

**"CORE STATES IN REGIONAL CONFLICT
RESOLUTION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
KENYA'S ROLE IN THE SOUTHERN SUDAN
PEACE PROCESS"**

BY

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

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DECLARATION

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DR. PHILIP O. NYINGURO

DEDICATION

It is with great delight and respect that I dedicate this work to my late Grand Mother, Mamaduong', who kept reminding me that she would wait even in her demise to enjoy the fruits of my academic labour. It is quite horrible that you left us without laying your blessed hands on a work you so eagerly awaited. In disappointment, you passed on and never got to see you in your demise just as you predicted. My dear granny, you spoke English without going to school and remained my inspiration throughout my academic life. Although I did not get to say a final farewell to you, you remain my inspiration. May God lend me a hand not to let you down.

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Finally, I would like to emphasize that, if this work makes a contribution to the peace processes in Southern Sudan, a sizable share of the credit goes to those who I have not mentioned, especially the silent Key Informants who accorded me assiduous cooperation during the interviews conducted for the purpose of this study.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Abbreviations	iv
List of Tables	vi
Abstract	vii

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.0	Background.....	1
1.1	Objective of the Study	3
	1.1.1 Specific Objectives.....	3
1.2	Statement of Research Problem.....	4
1.3	Justification of the Study	9
1.4	Theoretical Framework.....	11
1.5	Research Hypotheses	16
1.6.0	Methodology	16
	1.6.1 Data Collection.....	17
1.7.0	Definition of Operational Terms	18
	1.7.1 Conflict	18
	1.7.2 Conflict Resolution	19
	1.7.3 Conflict Management.....	20
	1.7.4 Mediation	21
	1.7.5 Negotiation	21
	1.7.6 Core State	22
	1.7.7 Hegemony	22
	1.7.8 Greater Eastern Africa.....	23
1.8	Scope and Limitations of the Study.....	24
1.9	Organization of the Study.....	26

CHAPTER TWO

CORE STATES IN REGIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND MANAGEMENT: A GENERAL OVERVIEW

2.0	Introduction	27
2.1	Core States and Conflict Management in the Americas.....	28

2.2	Core States and Conflict Management in South Asian	34
2.3	Core States and Conflict Management in African	39
2.4	Kenya as a Core State: A Review of Conflict Management Initiatives.....	44
2.5	Regional Powers as Interveners in Regional Conflicts	55

CHAPTER THREE

KENYA'S REGIONAL POLICY: KENYA – SUDAN RELATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE

3.0	Introduction.....	62
3.1	Security Considerations.....	63
3.2	Personality and Idiosyncratic Factors.....	66
3.3	Economic Factors.....	69
3.4	Geo-Strategic Factors	71
3.5	Kenya – Sudan Relations: A Conflict Perspective	75
3.6	Conclusion	77

CHAPTER FOUR

MOTIVATIONS FOR KENYA IN RESOLVING THE SUDAN CONFLICT

4.0	Introduction.....	.81
4.1	Security as a Motivator for Kenya in Resolving and Manage the Sudan Conflict	
4.1.1	Background82
4.1.2	Small Arms Proliferation as a Source of Insecurity in the Region	85
4.1.3	Terrorism as a Source of Insecurity in the Region.....	93
4.2.0	Kenya's Economic Interests in the Management of the Sudan Conflict.....	96
4.2.1	Economic Interests: Trade Between Kenya and Sudan in the Conflict Period	98
4.2.2	Economic Interests: Effects of Terrorism on Kenya's Tourism Industry	103
4.3	Opportunities in a Peaceful Southern Sudan.....	106
4.4	Challenges for Kenya and the Peace Process.....	109
4.5	Conclusion	110

CHAPTER FIVE

HEGEMONIC INTENTIONS AS MOTIVATOR FOR KENYA IN THE SOUTHERN SUDAN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

5.0	Introduction	114
5.1	Kenya's Hegemonic Status in the Region and the Sudan Peace Process.....	116
5.2	Economic Factors as Determinants of Hegemonic Proclivity.....	120
5.3	Relationship Between Economic and Military Capability in Hegemonic Propensity	127
5.4	Political Hegemony and Globalization	130
5.5	Conclusion.....	133

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.0	Summary.....	136
6.1	Conclusions	
6.1.1	Security and Economic Considerations.....	143
6.1.2	Hegemonic Considerations	148
6.2	Recommendations	
6.2.1	Policy Recommendations.....	153
6.2.2	Challenges to Peace Building.....	158
6.2.3	Recommendations for Further Research.....	161
	Bibliography	162
	Appendix I: Interview Schedule and Key Informant Guideline Questions	
	Appendix II: Research Authorization (Ministry of Education Science and Technology)	

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AACC	All African Conference of Churches
ANC	African National Congress
AU	African Union
BJP	Bharatiya Janta Party (of India)
CNN	Cable News Network
COMESA	Common Market for East and Southern Africa
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Accord (on Southern Sudan Conflict)
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICG	International Crisis Group
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KTN	Kenya Television Network
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
NCCK	National Council of Churches of Kenya
NFD	Northern Frontier District
NGOs	Non – Governmental Organizations
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NRA	National Resistance Army
'OAG'	Other Armed Groups
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community

SAP	Structural Adjustment Programs
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SRIC	Security Research Information Centre
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNLA	Uganda National Liberation Army
USA	United States of America
WCC	World Council of Churches
WTO	World Trade Organization

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.0 (a): Interventions by type of intervener	Pp58
Table 2.0 (b): Type of intervener by region	Pp59
Table. 3.0: Kenya Trade With Sudan Exports Imports and Balance of Trade 1978-1987 (K₡'000)	Pp70
Table 4.0: Kenya Trade With Sudan, Exports and Imports 1993-2003 (K₡'000)	Pp99
Table 4.1 (a): Hotel Bed-Nights Occupancy Rate 1999-2003	Pp105
Table 4.1 (b): Kenya Tourism Earnings in Ksh. Millions	Pp105
Table 5.0 (a): Kenya Trade With Uganda, Exports Imports and Balance 1993-1996 (K₡ Million)	Pp122
Table 5.0 (b): Kenya Trade With Uganda, Exports Imports and Balance 1997-2003 (Ksh.'000)	Pp122
Table 5.1 (a): Kenya Trade With Tanzania, Exports Imports and Balance 1993-1996 (K₡ Million)	Pp126
Table 5.1 (b): Kenya Trade With Tanzania, Exports Imports and Balance, 1997-2003 (Ksh. Million)	Pp126

ABSTRACT

This study examines the motivation for Kenya's involvement in the region's conflicts over the years and the role it plays in the management of these conflicts. The study answers key questions that have eluded direct answers and that are pertinent in the study of Kenya's diplomacy of conflict management. That is, the factors conditioning Kenya to manage and resolve the conflict in Southern Sudan and the role and motivation for Kenya's consistent insistence on resolving the conflict

The study puts in context three key variables as motivators for Kenya's involvement in resolving and managing the Sudan conflict upon which, thematic hypotheses are based, that is, *economic, security, hegemonic and power* variables as intrinsic national interests. The study shows that, economic considerations are an important motivator for Kenya to continually involve itself in managing the conflict in Southern Sudan. The study also demonstrates that security is a major factor for Kenya's involvement in managing/resolving the conflict. With a direct effect on internal (in) security exacerbated by porous borders and proliferation of small arms used in committing crimes within the country. The study aptly draws the connection between terrorism, insecurity and its effects on Kenya's tourism industry as a direct security and economic problem.

Lastly, the study contextualizes the interrelationship between hegemony and conflict management as a responsibility of states in the region, but more so, that of the core state – Kenya in this case. Hegemony is argued against the backdrop of challenges from Uganda and Tanzania. The study also underscores the importance and need of/for peace building in the conflict management process as a safety net for preventing resurgence of conflict.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.0 BACKGROUND

Kenya has over the years been perceived, as a regional hegemon – at least in the economic aspects. The political and economic head start that Kenya enjoyed dating back to colonial period was further perpetuated by relative stability and its continued alignment with the west during the cold war period. Kenya took advantage of the continued instability in its neighboring countries of Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Uganda. Coupled with Tanzania's alignment to the East in the Cold War rivalry that further alienated Tanzania under Nyerere with his policy of 'Ujamaa'-African Socialism, which ensured limited economic growth. To this extent, the lion's share of infrastructure and economic investment tended to be centered in Kenya.

Korwa and Ngunyi, point out that,

“As a deliberate colonial policy, Kenya became the industrial power in East Africa. For instance, by 1950, of the 474 companies registered in East Africa, only seventy (70) operated in both Tanzania and Uganda, the remaining four hundred and four (404) were in Kenya. This was equally similar to service sector and trade. This asymmetry in the development continued in the independence period”¹.

This lop-sidedness led to what Bele Belassa called “backwash effects” with reference to East African Community, where gains from cooperation are concentrated in only one member state instead of “spread effects”²

¹ Korwa, Adar and Mutahi Ngunyi “Politics of Integration in East Africa Since Independence” in Walter Oyugi (ed). 1994, *Politics and Administration in East Africa* E. A. E. P., Nairobi, p.412

² Bela, Belassa, 1961, *The Theory of Economic Integration*, George Allan and Orion, London p. 47

Given that it is in the nature of states to want to accumulate power, those in insignificant positions will want the position of preponderance either explicitly or implicitly, and those in preponderant positions will want to maintain them.³ Kenya over the years, has struggled to maintain this preponderant position as others in the region also seek to attain this position especially with the decline and end of cold war and attainment of relative peace in Uganda within the context of diplomacy of conflict management. To Mwagiru⁴ diplomacy of conflict management is more of form than substance. He contends that, Kenya's policy on conflict management was born in 1980's; it flourished for sometime then went to slumber. President Moi's involvement in conflict as exemplified in the Tito Okello – Museveni conflict mediation in 1985, Kenya's mediation efforts in Sudan conflict within the framework of IGAD, its involvement in Somali, and its offer to mediate in (DRC) Zaire conflict between Mobutu and Kabila can be put within the context of the need to play the part of regional hegemon.

Mwagiru argues that, Kenya has been seeking to play the role of a regional hegemon since 1960. It had developed this image as a modest capitalist state with a growing and prosperous economy, hence a vital force in various international forums⁵. Kenya aspires to create peace regionally because of its perceived relative stability hence seeking a leadership role in the region. Therefore, given Nyerere's involvement in the Uganda conflict, by president Moi mediating the conflict he was seen to re-assert Kenya's role in the region, and also as a move to contain Nyerere's influence in the region. Museveni's 'good boy'⁶ status in the region is possibly a more recent challenge to Kenya's quest for supremacy in the region

³ Korwa Adar and Ngunyi, M., in Oyugi 1994 Op Cit pp. 402-403

⁴ Mwagiru "Foreign Policy and the Diplomacy of Conflict Management in Kenya: A Review Assessment," *African Review of Foreign Policy*, Vol.1, No 1. March 1999 pp. 67 – 78

⁵ Mwagiru, Makumi, 1994, "The International Management of Internal Conflicts in Africa: The Uganda Mediation 1985," PhD Thesis Rutherford College, University of Kent at Canterbury

⁶ By 'good boy' we have in mind Museveni's increasing favor from the World's super power, USA that he has curved out in the region as a staunch ally giving the impression that Uganda is the region's lead state to the US.

and therefore Kenya has to ensure monopoly in the region's conflicts management to restore the lost confidence that the west had in it.

Kenya's diplomacy of conflict management should also be put within the context of definition of regional security, in the facets identifiable as security of the individual citizens, security of the nation, of the regime and of the state. Whereas security of the regime has tended to override all the others, the nascent problems of refugees, proliferation of firearms through the porous borders could also be a motivator for Kenya's involvement in the regions conflict. We are therefore situating Kenya in the Greater Eastern African conflicts under the rubric of both national interest as the driving force and the need to claim back its rightful position in the region. The conflicts can hence be seen as providing opportunities for Kenya to attain this goal.

1.1 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The study's focal point is on the motivations and the process of conflict resolution in the Southern Sudan. Kenya as the lead state in the process and the core state in the region must discern its interest as it negotiates peace in Southern Sudan. The general objective of the study is therefore to assess the role and motivation for Kenya in managing and/or resolving the conflict in Southern Sudan.

1.1.1 SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

In specific terms, the study attempts to:

- a. Assess the motivation for Kenya in resolving the Sudan conflict,
- b. Assess the extent to which Kenya's latent intentions in managing and resolving this conflict have been achieved
- c. Draw a link between the latent and the manifest purpose for Kenya in resolving the conflict

1.2 STATEMENT OF RESEARCH PROBLEM

Kenya's resilience insistence to hold on to the peace process at all costs generates a study problem. The Libya/Egypt axis dispute, the Sudan South Africa encounter at the AU summit in Mozambique in 2004 and the skepticism with US late direct involvement in the peace process – read the opposition to transfer of venue for signing of Comprehensive Peace Agreement from Nairobi to Washington. These facts inevitably need explanation and that what this study does. In answering the following questions, the study has contextualized Kenya's motivation for resolving the conflict in the Sudan and attempted to bridge the gap left by the descriptive approach⁷ that scholars have employed over the years. The Key research questions addressed are:

- a) What are the factors conditioning Kenya to manage and resolve the conflict in Southern Sudan?
- b) What is the motivation for Kenya's consistent and insistence on resolving the conflict?

Scholars have by and large succeeded in stating Kenya's position in the region's conflict management, however its motivation and role have not received the adequate concern that would delimit its continued involvement in resolving the conflict. This is the focus of this study: to attempt the filling of these gaps that have either been intentionally or otherwise ignored.

Literature on Kenya's diplomacy of conflict management has largely made the assumptions that historical givens have put Kenya at the forefront of conflict management. A few have however considered alternative motivation in Kenya's involvement in the

⁷ This is not to say that the descriptive approach is out of touch, indeed description is one of the major aims of any scientific study, however the study has brought in a slightly different approach that gives more credence to some of the available works in addition to highlighting new and up coming issues that remained blurred in the past works.

region's conflicts. Scholars such as Makumi Mwangi, P.G, Okoth and Samuel Makinda,⁸ have attempted alternative motivation and challenges to Kenya as a regional hegemon. Personality of Kenyan leaders has also featured as the cause for change in tact in the diplomacy of conflict management especially with the transition from Kenyatta to Moi.

Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr⁹ in their article "Opportunity and Willingness" argue that, certain leaders' traits and qualities cannot be actualized or seen until opportunity presents itself for such activities as mediation. And even when the opportunities avail themselves, the leaders themselves must have the willingness to engage in mediation of conflicts. Consequently, whereas this consideration may have hindered Kenya's diplomacy of conflict management during the Kenyatta regime, it, to a large extent shaped it during the Moi regime. The availability of opportunities for conflict management and the willingness of the head of state at that time to engage in them demonstrated Kenya's relative importance in the region, not only with regard to our case study – Sudan but also, Uganda, Somali, and DRC (Zaire) conflicts of 1980s and 90s.

The Sudan case presents Kenya with the most forthright option of achieving its goal as a regional hegemon at least economically. In a 'Traffic Jam of Initiatives' as International Crisis Group (ICG) put it, Kenya wants to ensure that it can continue to skim off profit from humanitarian assistance that flows through "Operation Lifeline Sudan" and maintain its appearance as the peace broker for the Sudan,¹⁰ especially against the backdrop of Egypt's initiative. It is also useful to note that for a long time, Kenya chaired and hosted the longest running initiative, that is, the IGAD peace process, which also involves Uganda, Ethiopia,

⁸ See, Mwangi, 1990, 1994, 1999, Okoth, P.G., 1994, 1999, and Makinda Samwel, 1988

⁹ Most Benjamin and Harvey Starr, 1993, *Inquiry Logic and International Politics*, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia

¹⁰ International Crisis Group, 2002, *God Oil and Country: Changing Logic of War in Sudan*, ICG Brussels p. 155

and Eritrea. By virtue of chairing the initiative all through and at the same time hosting the talks Kenya is put at a higher pedestal than other regional contenders.

International Crisis Group has to some extent rightly pointed out Kenya's purpose, however the missing link here is the actual connection between management of the conflict and other economic benefits. Whereas Kenya may be interested in skimming profits from the Operation Lifeline Sudan, this by and large is a short-term benefit and naturally a proper motivator would be longer-term economic benefits such as, sustainable trade flows between Kenya and Sudan including potential cheap oil imports from the Sudan.

Egypt and Libya's initiatives were largely seen by Kenya as undermining IGAD. In a protest letter for instance, former president of Kenya Daniel arap Moi wrote to presidents Mubarak and Qadhafi that they should have consulted him on their joint initiative given the central role of the IGAD process. Kenya consequently began exploring possibilities of holding a wider summit with a number of regional heads of states including Egypt as a means to garner a regional mandate for IGAD as the lead process.¹¹ Noteworthy is the fact that bilateral trade disputes further aggravated efforts by the two countries to co-ordinate or harmonize their initiative. (Egypt and Kenya)¹²

The resilience and tenacity of Kenya as a lead state in the Sudan peace process was further manifested, when Kenya's mediation role in the Sudan conflict took a center stage at the African Union executive council meeting in Mozambique in 2004 with the Khartoum government asking the member states to consider shifting the role to South Africa, a proposal Kenya out rightly rejected arguing that, involving another party would derail the process. In rejecting the proposal Kalonzo Musyoka (the then Kenya's Foreign Affairs Minister) asserted that,

¹¹ International Crisis Group, 2002, *God Oil and Country: Changing Logic of War in Sudan*, ICG Brussels p. 159

¹² In mind here is dispute over Egyptian Rice and Sugar Exports to Kenya and Kenya's Tea exports to Egypt.

Kenya would only allow South Africa to take part in the talks on condition that it watches from far...I wonder what my colleague Mustafa (Sudanese Foreign Affairs Minister) meant by asking for South Africa's involvement in the Sudan conflict. This is too late a plea that may send bad signals on the mediation process. South Africa may only come in an organized manner and watch from far.¹³

Whereas this can be treated as logical sincerity, the undercurrents reveal the defensive nature of Kenya as the unchallenged hegemon in the region and therefore any other African third parties must play to its tune.

With the transition situation in 2002, Kenya's special envoy to IGAD peace process, Lazarus Sumbeiywo, a veteran of the negotiations was seen as handicapped by the fact that his position was part time. However, the permanent appointment of Sumbeiywo to the position by president Kibaki, the new regime further vindicated Kenya's commitment to maintain its lead role in the peace talks/process. It can also be seen as a re-assertion of the fact that Kenya needs to further entrench itself in the region's conflict management. Kenya's supremacy can also be seen as vindicated by the support from both the European Union and the United States as observers and friends of IGAD working closely with Kenya's special envoy Lieutenant General Lazarus Sumbeiywo. Kenya's position can therefore only be adequately considered within the context of several other competing initiatives.

The Uganda conflict in mid 1980s provided Kenya with an opportunity to re-invent itself in the region's diplomacy of conflict management. This came at a time when Nyerere had indicated his intentions to retire as president and in politics. Kenya would not have got a better opportunity. The immediate cause of the conflict that president Moi tried to mediate

¹³ The People Daily July 11 2003

was the collapse of Obote government through a military coup in 1985 led by Major General Tito Okello, Constituted as Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA). Okello's immediate priority was to negotiate with assorted guerrilla factions, which had sprung under Obote's rule. However Museveni's demand to negotiate with Okello as head of UNLA and not head of state meant higher stakes and need for a third party's involvement¹⁴

In search of a mediator, both sides looked to Tanzania as the potential candidate because of President Nyerere's dominant role in Amin's down fall and subsequent contribution to Uganda's reconstruction. In addition Nyerere knew and had worked with the two leaders (Okello and Museveni both lived in Tanzania as exiles during Amin's reign). However Nyerere's halfhearted effort meant Tanzania preferred a low-key approach toward Uganda after years of involvement in the post Amin political process. Further, as Mwangiri points out, Nyerere did not want his departure to be overshadowed by entanglement in Uganda politics.¹⁵

As Nyerere's interest waned, Kenya became the next obvious option. Although Kenya had largely remained ambivalent, Moi took an active role as a mediator. He saw the intervention in Uganda as a means to reclaim Kenya's regional position and clout, and a chance to enhance his peace credentials.¹⁶ Following fruitless peacekeeping mission in Chad that tarnished his image, this was a chance to restore Moi's stature. (As we shall see in the literature review there was a tacit confluence of personal and national interest.)

The available literature as we shall see in chapter two, have largely stated Kenya's policy in the region's conflicts management. They have (and rightly so) pointed out the reality of the situation, described Kenya's involvement, commitment and challenges. This

¹⁴ Mwangiri, Makumi, 1994, "The International Management of Internal Conflicts in Africa: The Uganda Mediation 1985," PhD Thesis Rutherford College, University of Kent at Canterbury

¹⁵ Ibid

¹⁶ Ibid

research seeks to provide a critical analysis of Kenya's interest in resolving the Sudan conflict taking into account the new and emerging security problems with the aim of determining why Kenya behaves the way it does and the part it plays in the process.

1.3 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

In globalized international system states have largely found it more difficult to go it alone in international affairs. States, in spite of their interests are conditioned to seek the cooperation of other states so as to obtain relative gain as opposed to absolute gain in a pure power relation's scenario. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye¹⁷ contend that states opt for cooperation when the cost of going it alone far outweighs that of cooperation.

However, regions have by virtue of natural or acquired advantages had core states, which act as the traditional centers upon which regional cooperation to a given extent depend. States in their individual capacity driven by the need to acquire, maintain and demonstrate power have perpetuated their national interest carefully coated to reflect regional interest. Whereas, as realists argue, there cannot be harmony of interest in international matters and therefore there cannot be a regional interest in practical sense, the dominance of certain states in given regions have largely made the idea of regional interest relatively more acceptable.

The research has both policy and academic relevance. At the policy front, the re-direction of policy agenda in the region serves to facilitate and improve its trade and economic benefits as well as redefine its international, but more importantly regional status. The highlighting of this latent interest may not be adequately achieved in this research but should be able to provide a new direction for further research. Policy makers and scholars

¹⁷ Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye, 1989, *Power and Interdependence*, Fires man and Co., Boston

alike will therefore be provided with a new view of Kenya in the region. The positions states occupy in international power distribution scale both by status and economic capability determines how much clout they command in the game of 'who gets what, when and how' of international politics. Kenya must therefore stake its regional status and economic capability by making use of all available opportunities. This includes ensuring peace in neighbouring states and taking advantage of emergent economic opportunities.

Conflict management consumes enormous state resources, which could have otherwise been redirected into investments with more direct benefit to the taxpayers. The question we attempt to answer here is why Kenya has ignored the domestic option and instead put its scarce resources both material and human into conflict management. The obvious rationale or assumption is that, the option it has taken has more long-term benefits than the option foregone. By answering this question the study adds to policy choices for policy makers.

At the **academic** front, the research has to a large extent filled the gap of knowledge that the available literature has intentionally or otherwise left out. Indeed the consideration of Kenya, as a core state separate from the past reference to it as sub-imperial and economically domineering state will obviously bring in a new dimension in the study of Kenya's preponderance in the region in economic, political, and strategic aspects. Two, several assumptions (see chapter three) have been made about Kenya with reference to its involvement in conflict management, this study seeks to justify some of these assumptions within the context of the changing realities of the international system. By doing this it seeks to incrementally add on to the existing literature from a new perspective that would guide further academic pursuit in the field of diplomacy of conflict management and foreign

policy. Scholars and students of International relations alike will also develop more insight in the area arising from issues for further research.

1.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Concisely defined, a theory is a logical deductive system consisting of a set of interactive concepts from which testable propositions can be deductively derived.¹⁸ A theory denotes a set of systematically organized ideas that explain a given phenomenon. It is a tool employed in understanding. It concerns the hows and whys of empirical phenomena. If theories are by any means useful as they undoubtedly are, then this rest with their descriptive, explanatory and prediction attributes. These attributes make theoretical framework an indispensable part of research. A theory will delimit the extent of a research and define a boundary in an attempt to provide a projection of the outcome of the research. Without theory, scientific research is un-attainable. Theories also provide the range of concepts that the researcher uses in the process of analytically describing and presenting his findings.

In attempting to put the study within a given range of concepts, the state will be central in understanding conflict management. The state here shall be looked at in a regional context. Power politics will therefore take a center stage. The argument in power politics is that conflict management is greatly, if not entirely facilitated by preponderance of power in favor of one of the parties to the conflict, this can include a third party which transforms a dyadic into a triadic relationship and it can alter the outcome of resolution by the use of its power.¹⁹ The ability of the third party extracting success in mediation is largely dependent on the amount of leverage it commands or has at its disposal. This for instance, initially greatly

¹⁸ Nachmias, F. Chava, and Nachmias, D., 1996, *Research Methods in Social Sciences*, Martins Press, London p. 143

¹⁹ See Bercovitch, J. 1989, and Mwangi, M 1994

affected the Sudan peace process due to the lack of a mediator with adequate leverage. From the early 1990s there was no significant progress made in the process until the late 1990s when Kenya, within the framework of IGAD, took up the negotiations process in earnest.

In realists' view of the world, conflict is an integral part of relationship in society and can only be tempered both by balance of power (or terror), where only the strong dominate. The realists perceived of balance of power as maintained by the manipulation of threats, which is the conflict component of realism.²⁰ Given the anarchical nature of the international system, conflict can at best only be regulated temporarily through forced adjustments based on the current power status of the parties involved. Conflict is thus a zero sum game and in this perspective, can only be settled on the basis of power and coercion.

Neo-liberal institutionalism, however assumes that states focus primarily on their individual absolute gains and are indifferent to gains of others. This focus on absolute gain is usually taken, to mean that a state's utility is solely a function of its absolute gain.²¹ However, as Waltz points out, "in the anarchy of international politics, relative gain is more important than absolute gain."²² A state's utility in structural realism is at least a function of some relative measures like power. These differences in assumptions about states preferences, leads to different expectations about the prospect of international conflicts and cooperation. In studying Kenya's role in regional conflict management we must take into consideration the motives that drive it into involvement in conflict management as a function of either absolute or relative gain. The prospects for peace are obviously of benefit to Kenya. The nature and course the conflict takes determines the amount of gain accrued.

²⁰ See also Mwangi, 1994 Op Cit. p. 36

²¹ Powell, Robert "Absolute and Relative Gain in International Relations Theory" in *African Political Review* Vol. 85 No.4 1991 pp. 103

²² Waltz, Kenneth, 1959, *Man the State and War*, Columbia University Press, New York p. 198

Classical realism as earlier pointed out presents a rather pessimistic view of human nature that describes politics as a continuing struggle for power. Thomas Hobbes viewed man as driven by 'perpetual and restless desire for power, after power that ceases only in death.'²³ Morgenthau echoes this when he says that, "man is born to seek power."²⁴ Aaron, writing with reference to the role played by pride in relations among states, observes that, "the difficulty of peace has more to do with man's humanity than his animality."²⁵ The nexus of political action is the domination of one person by another. Politics is a struggle for power over men and whatever its ultimate aim may be, power is the immediate goal and mode of acquiring, maintaining and demonstrating it determine the technique of political action.²⁶

The hypothesis that this argument generates with reference to Kenya is that, Kenya is involved in regional conflict management for the sole purpose of re-asserting its position as the regional power, maintaining it and if need be, demonstrating it. "In a world where power counts" writes Morgenthau, "no nation pursuing a rational policy has a choice between renouncing and wanting power."²⁷ Kenya cannot afford to keep aloof; it has to want power as a consequence of the nature of the international and state system. It is useful to recognize that classical realism begins at the individual level with pessimistic view of human nature that describes politics as a continuing struggle for power. The individual drive for power is redirected by the state, which acts without any higher constraints in anarchic international system.

²³ Hobbes, T., Op Cit, 1958, p. 80

²⁴ Morgenthau, Hans J, 1991, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Kalyani, New Delhi, p. 168

²⁵ Aaron, Richard I., 1966, *The Theory of Universals*, Claredon Press, New York p. 366

²⁶ Morgenthau, H., 1991 Op Cit, p. 195

²⁷ Ibid p. 200

Structural realism however, moves away from this classical realist pessimism. Central to structural realism is the argument that “wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them,”²⁸ at least nothing other than the balancing power of other states. Viewed from this perspective, the central problem of international relations is that of achieving cooperation in an anarchic but increasingly interdependent world.²⁹ Russell J Leng argues that, prudence in the weighing of the consequence of a state’s action becomes the supreme virtue in international politics.

At best the relations among the competing states are based on reciprocal exchange through careful diplomacy. Therefore prudence entails knowing the limits of ones power and, rationally calculating the cost and risk of action in terms of interest at stake.³⁰ A prudent policy is rational policy in so far as rationality can be defined as acting in accordance with the best interest of the state. We must therefore put Kenya’s action in the region in these contexts of prudence of its regional policy of conflict management guided by national interests defined in terms of power and national security. Whatever the ultimate objectives may be the immediate objective of this policy must be to maintain, demonstrate or extend the power of the state, since power is largely seen as the means to any other objective in the international arena.

Mitchell, C.³¹ postulates the Conflict Research Paradigm derived from world society. The approach contends that, conflictual behavior in society result from the actor’s perception of the environment in which they live. Conflictual behavior is therefore a learned behavior, conditioned and directed by environmental circumstances. To Burton³² conflicts

²⁸ Waltz, K., 1959 Op Cit, pp. 232

²⁹See Keohane, R., 1989 Op Cit.

³⁰Russell, J., Op Cit, 1993 p. 5

³¹ Mitchell, C., Op Cit, 1989

³² Burton, J. W., 1989 Op Cit, p. 51

are endemic because of the existence of many diverse decision making centers in the society. And because each decision making center is different, it is normal that different points of view will emerge. The approach argues for conflict management mechanisms that do not rely on power until there is a breakdown in the management process.

By virtue of the state being my unit of analysis and by virtue of the central role of power, national interest and security in the research hypotheses realism and neo-realism have been used as the guiding theoretical framework. The state centric structure of regionalism makes these theories more relevant to the study. Kenya is bound to protect its national interests in its regional pursuit of power in an environment of competition and need for security. However, the increasing complexity of interdependence and globalization cannot be ignored hence the relevance of structural realism/neo-realism. The increasing economic interdependence and globalization that have seriously challenged state borders and individual sovereignty bring to the fore neo-liberalism as an alternative theoretical framework especially with reference to economic benefits as the motive for Kenya's involvement in the region's conflict management.

It is however important to note that theories build on one another, and therefore all the three approaches will benefit from one another. The distinction for instance between realism and neo-realism will and must not be stressed to the extent of treating them as independent approaches. Indeed by virtue of the prefix 'neo' the connotation is that a 'neo-theory' is derived from the original theory. It is a build up of the original theory but taking into consideration new emerging facts that tangentially challenge the original theory. For instance, while realism remains core to the study by recognizing that classical realism does not take into account inter-dependence, complex inter-dependence and globalization, the

research brings in neo-realism as a complimentary theoretical framework to fill in the gap the classical realism un-intentionally ignores.

The dichotomy is therefore simply put for purposes of clarity. I have used realism and neo-realism distinctly in the first two hypotheses. In the third hypothesis on economic factors, the study uses neo-liberalism as an alternative theoretical framework to provide a structure of explanation for facts that touch on matters of investment, economic expansion, globalization, free market economy liberalization and the eclipsed state structure in the current international system.

1.5 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

The research in a bid to achieve its objectives tested three hypotheses based on the assumptions that:

1. Insecurity in the country motivates Kenya to resolve the conflict in Sudan.
2. Hegemonic pursuit conditions Kenya to resolve the Sudan conflict
3. Kenya's resolution of the conflict in Sudan is a function of its national economic interests.

The central assumption is that, if the driving force for Kenya in resolving the Sudan conflict is either economic interests or (in) security. On the other hand, regional hegemony is also a possible motivator in this endeavour. It is also possible that all the three combined are determinants.

1.6.0 METHODOLOGY

The study relied both on secondary and primary data in sourcing information. In addition to published works, the information available in local and international dailies periodicals and journals formed a considerable part of the investigation. Central to the verification of the hypotheses was interviews with government officials both directly involved in policy formulation dissemination and implementation process. This was at different levels, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Office of the President, Special Envoys, extra governmental good will ambassadors, international and regional officials directly or indirectly involved in the conflict management.

I also interviewed retired former officials who were involved in the conflict management endeavors in addition to the parties to the mediation process attending various peace talks in Kenya. In addition, I interviewed selected Sudanese refugees living in Nairobi in a bid to put together their perception of Kenya both as their host and negotiator for peace in their country.

The respondents were categorized into three:

- a. Mediators, including officers of the ministry of Foreign Affairs, Office of the President and Non Governmental Organizations.
- b. Parties to the conflict, including officers from the embassies of the countries experiencing or who experienced conflict and Non Governmental Organizations from these countries.
- c. Selected Sudanese refugees living in Nairobi

1.6.1 DATA COLLECTION

Primary data was collected by means of a guideline of questions and informal interviews with Key Informants from the identified groups of informants. Reference has also

been made to minutes of negotiations process on the Sudan conflict in Kenya and utterances made by parties to the conflicts in addition to commentaries by international and local analysts of the conflicts. Secondary data was collected through library research that included books, periodicals articles, dissertations and theses dealing with conflict and related fields. The field data was analyzed qualitatively and descriptively. This has been combined with the secondary sources and collated to enable the drawing of informed conclusions with reference to the research hypotheses.

1.7.0 DEFINITION OF TERMS

Several terms need definition however, not all of them can be defined here. Terms that have restricted use to given sub-sections but that are central in the study have been defined within the given sub-sections. Nonetheless we have identified key terms and concepts that require express definitions as operational terms that are over achingly used through out the study and that provide conceptual basis for the whole study. Some of these have been consciously defined in detail in the previous sub-section, however we still need to make them clearer. These include:

1.7.1 CONFLICT

Conflict generally refers to disagreement between two or more parties, which may escalate to the level of violent confrontation resulting from divergence of interests, values and beliefs. It is more often than not, a consequence of competition and disagreements over resource allocation or distribution. In some cases, conflict has been as a result of xenophobia, religious, ethic differences and territorial contestations.³³

³³ See Mwangi, 1990, 1994 and 1999, Ikle F.C., 1964, Zartman I. W., 1989, and Mitchel, C., 1989.

There are two major categories of conflict, that is, *internal* and *international* conflict. The argument for occurrence of internal conflicts draws from the fact that the conflict has domestic sources. However, by the consideration of interdependence of international society and that all conflict entail a derogation of human rights whose standards are largely international, it has become more difficult to draw a distinction between internal and international conflicts. International conflict in this case, taking cue from realist's doctrine that dichotomizes internal and international conflict, is in these terms defined as interstate conflicts. This dichotomy is however complicated further by the fact that there are also various external causes of internal conflicts such as regional rivalries and global political and economic trends.³⁴

Internationalization of conflict has in many occasions been as a result of provision of humanitarian aid to both parties to the conflict. "This tends to legitimize the rebel faction through promise of aid to both sides of the conflict."³⁵ The conflict manager should therefore appreciate the dynamics of relationships between the internal and the international aspects of a conflict situation. In other words it is useful to take note of the fact that, although the issues that inform a conflict might be internal, they are internationalized by the introduction of external managers of the conflicts. To Mwangi, "on a practical conflict management level, the internationalization of conflict enables the conflict manager to draw from a wider range of strategies repertoires for management. On the analytical level, internationalization enables the analyst to have a broader view of the conflict and the processes of its management."³⁶

³⁴ Mwangi, M., 1994, Op Cit p. 28

³⁵ Deng, F M and Zartman I. W., (eds), 1991, *Conflict Resolution in Africa*, The Brookings Institute, Washington p. 8

³⁶ Mwangi, M., 1994, Op Cit p. 31

1.7.2 CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Conflict resolution refers to dealing with the actual causes of conflict and consequently eliminate misunderstanding and inherent suspicions between parties in conflict. This prepares the ground for positive post-conflict environment so as to preempt resurgence of hostilities and conflict. It is perceived as win-win situation by comprehensively addressing the reasons that lead to the conflict in the first place and fostering co-operation, trust and good will between the conflicting parties. Indeed, in the Sudan conflict the main areas of disagreement and discontent that led to the conflict have been at the center of the negotiations. These include, sharing of resources especially oil, self-determination, separation of state and religion and power sharing. These were the main issues around which separate agreements were signed by the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A, leading to a comprehensive peace agreement.

1.7.3 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Conflict management in this context entails seeking either to prevent conflict from erupting into a crisis or cooling down a crisis upon eruption. Management here, include denying each side the means of combat, empowerment and facilitating discussion rather than fighting.³⁷ It includes diverse efforts to bring parties in conflict together so as to reduce, end or to bring under control conflict situation that is, avoid and prevent further escalation and bring sustainable peace.

A conflict manager cannot successfully do so if he is at the same level as the warring factions. There is need to have the ability to enforce the agreements either through sanctions, threats of force or incentives. This is where the core state comes in to provide this

³⁷ Zartman, I. W., 1989, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention Africa*, Oxford University Press, New York. p. 11

impetus and to legitimize the process and to ensure success in the management of the conflict.

1.7.4 MEDIATION

William J. Dixon defines mediation as “any third party involvement that goes beyond facilitation of communication and contacts and includes drafting and promotion of plans for conflict resolution.”³⁸ Mediation efforts hinge on willingness of both disputant parties to entrust in third parties at least some measures of responsibility for shaping valued outcomes. It is technically a third party intervention objectively to break a stale mate and or provide an acceptable solution to the belligerent parties. It involves passive role of encouraging negotiations and the provision of channels of communications. It also involves active engagement by means of providing proposals and seeking compromises.

1.7.5 NEGOTIATION

For purposes of conceptual clarity it is important to draw a distinction between negotiation and mediation. As Mwagiru points out negotiations takes place when two parties attempt to manage their conflict bilaterally in a dyadic structure. However when a third party becomes involved it transforms the overall structure into a triad, hence the mediated negotiation.³⁹ The rules of power theory invariably postulate that such a third party has its own interests in the conflict and its outcome. This leads into transformation into what Mwagiru calls triadic negotiations.⁴⁰

³⁸ Dixon, Williams J., “Democracy and Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict” in *African Political Science Review* Vol. 88 No.1 March 1994 p. 19

³⁹ Mwagiru, M., 1994, Op Cit, p. 38

⁴⁰ Mwagiru M., 1994, Op Cit, p. 38

The conceptual import of these definitions is simply that, mediation encompasses the engagement of third parties in a conflict negotiation situation while negotiation is a bi-party activity of the belligerent factions.

1.7.6 CORE STATE

A core state is an economically, politically, and to some extent militarily preponderant state in a given region. The perception here is the fact that states are at different levels of development (political and economic). The international hierarchy of power and the dichotomy of states regionally and internationally automatically put some states above others.

The maintenance of status quo in the social equilibrium sustains certain states as superior and others as subordinates. Regionally, certain states have conventionally been accepted as core states upon which other states in one way or another conditionally depend by virtue of political, economic and even military supremacy. They play the role of hub and center for the regions development. They are the region's powers so that one can argue for instance in Africa that Nigeria is a regional power in west Africa, South Africa in the south and probably Egypt in north Africa. It is this perception that defines a core state. The treatment of Kenya as a core state therefore means that Kenya inevitably struggles to maintain this position in the region. Its involvement in regional conflict management is viewed as part of its attempts to achieve this goal.

1.7.7 HEGEMONY

The terms hegemony and core state are by no means conceptually the same. However, there is always the temptation to use the two terms interchangeably. Hegemony connotes a single state eager to universalize its preferred interests. The underlying fact is that

of power relations among interacting states that dichotomize the international system and that puts some states above others in the hierarchy of power capability (economics, political, military or geo-strategic).

Several scholars have defined hegemony. The most lucid is that of Robert Keohane who broaches the question of hegemony by examining the theory of hegemonic stability, which holds that “order in the realist lexicon depends on the preponderance of a single state.”⁴¹ In other words, in the context of world political economy it is a preponderance of material resources. Hegemonic powers must therefore “have control over raw materials, sources of capital, markets and competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods.”⁴² Kenya’s obvious preponderance in the region can therefore be put within these contexts. To the extent that, the recent signing of East African Community Custom’s union protocol that allowed partner states to levy tariffs on Kenya’s industrial exports, while theirs are zero rated, indicates Kenya’s preponderance and the fears that partner states have.

Whereas the two terms ‘hegemony’ and ‘core state’ may be used interchangeably, the need to draw an analytical and academic distinction that arise from their usage cannot be ignored. Hegemony connotes some level of compulsion and domination regionally or internationally. Such compulsion is achieved through a combination of sanctions and incentives in pursuit of national interest. Core states need not necessarily be compulsive in the nature of their relation with other states; it could achieve similar ends as well through mutual agreements in a give and take scenario.

⁴¹ Keohane, Robert, 1984, *After Hegemony: Co-operation and discord in political Economy*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey p. 12

⁴² Ibid p. 32

1.8 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

There are several parties involved in the region's conflict management including members of IGAD (Uganda, Kenya, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia) the United States, European Union, Nigeria, Egypt, Libya, Tanzania and South Africa. All play a role at one level or another. This study however considers the arguments for Kenya; one, as a regional economic hegemon and as an affected neighbor of the war ravaged nations. Two, as a state with a universal goal of seeking to acquire, maintain, and demonstrate power within the framework of anarchical international/regional system. It concerns itself with consideration of national interests that shape its regional policy on conflict management.

The world is a network of complex interdependence and several domestic policies are conditioned by factors external to the state. Where such factors adequately and reasonably affect/influence Kenya's role in regional conflict management they have been considered as pertinent to the study. As the central guidelines, international /regional status, insecurity and economic considerations forms part of the study's research problem. The study focuses on the Southern Sudan conflict resolution process undertaken within the framework of IGAD as the case study. The period taken into consideration has been defined as the last two decades that is, from 1983-2005. The justification for this is the consideration of the facts that:

- a) The conflicts in Southern Sudan in which Kenya has been actively involved fall within this period
- b) The hypothesis of Kenya re-asserting its supremacy in the region is better factually studied within this period. In the first two decades of independence, Kenya's supremacy at least economically was unchallenged.

The time period therefore provides an adequate and appropriate opportunity to examine the given hypotheses.

The research encountered several limitations key to these included the fact that the peace processes were on going and some of the respondents were not very forthright for fear that their comments would jeopardize the processes. This came with the difficulty of accessing certain information that they viewed as classified. Two, the concept of hegemony was problematic as most of the key informants did not take it as a topic for open discussion and responses were often accompanied by the warning of it being off the record. The fear it seemed to generate was that, it would be seen as part of Kenya's hidden agenda in the peace processes and if put on public domain would put in danger its position as an impartial arbiter and peacemaker.

There was also the limitation of resources and time. Even though this did not significantly impact on the research, it remained a big challenge to the research especially in terms of access and mobility. Another key problem that was surmounted with some difficulty was the security provisions associated with some of the key informants such as government officials and key parties to the conflict who were not easily accessible. It took a lot of time to gain access to them and when it came, the duration given was pretty short and took the researcher a lot of wit to get a comprehensive interview. However, the sensitivity of the research area worked in favor of the researcher as the interviews progressed.

1.9 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

The study is divided into six chapters. Chapter one is the introductory chapter and includes, the research problem, justification hypothesis and method (s) of research. Chapter two covers the general review of literature both in African cases and example from other

regions. The chapter puts the study in a global context. Chapter three provides a general foreign policy perspective of the study with reference to the variables the conditions Kenya's regional foreign policy conduct with regard to conflict management. Chapters four and five are the main chapters of the study in which the variables that form the hypothesis are put to test and analysis of data both secondary and primary done. It is these chapters that provide the studies findings. Chapter three tackles economic and security considerations, while chapter five discusses hegemonic considerations in management of the Southern Sudan Conflict. Chapter six provides recommendations and a general conclusion based on the findings, and proposes issues further for research.

CHAPTER TWO

CORE STATES IN REGIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND MANAGEMENT: A GENERAL OVERVIEW

2.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter reviews selected literature on the role that various core states in the world play and have played in regional conflict management. It puts the study in a global perspective that gives the benefit of understanding Kenya not in isolation but within the purview of other experiences elsewhere. Like the other core states, Kenya has over the years commanded a significant regional clout that put relative superiority upon its economic and political system. The immediate post independence decade was probably the height of this power position. In analyzing Kenya's dominant role in the region, we cannot avoid the general background of the structure of the international system.

Realists and neo-realists alike maintain that inequality imposes a hierarchical structure upon the international system. The central consideration for the realist is military and strategic capabilities. Other analysts have widened this scope to include economic inequality as the most important element adding to the strategic inequality. The stability of this hierarchical structure is therefore a function of preponderant political economic, material, technical, strategic, and even cultural resources as to attain dominant role over the system. This is the argument postulated by Gilpin's⁴³ hegemonic power model Modelski's⁴⁴

⁴³ Gilpin, Robert, 1987, *War and change in world politics*, Cambridge University press, Cambridge.

⁴⁴ Modelski, George (ed), 1987 *Exploring Long Cycle*, Lynne Publishers, Boulders, pp. 112-128

leadership model, Chase Dunn's⁴⁵ Wallersteinian model, Cox's⁴⁶ Gramscian model, and Keohane's⁴⁷ regime analysis.

States are composed of individual and collective actors motivated by territorial and political needs as well as by economic and material needs and goals (welfare, production and prosperity).⁴⁸ Kenya's regional endeavors put in this context gives the obvious impression that national interest consideration would override any other factors. Richard Rosencrance⁴⁹ explains these facts by underlining the *Rise of Trading State*. In international relations, forces and wealth are equally necessary to manage political-territorial and economic financial issues and to organize international systems/regional systems.

2.1 CORE STATES AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

The American region as defined by the boundaries of the Organization of the American States (OAS) has been prone to numerous conflicts. Some of these conflicts have been attributed to the existence of United States of America as a super power and this what makes it a little different from other regions. Whereas its hegemony in the Americas may be undisputed, confining the US's hegemony to the Americas only is extremely limiting and superfluous. The US is currently the world's single super power in all its aspects – political, economic, military and cultural – and has the tendency to demonstrate its hegemony through

⁴⁵ Chase, D., 1989

⁴⁶ Cox, Robert W. 1987, *Production Power and World Order: Social Forces in Making of History*, Colombia Press, New York

⁴⁷ Keohane, Robert Joseph Nye, 1989, *Power and Interdependence*, Fires man and Co., Boston

⁴⁸ Attina, Fulvio, 1990, "Organization, Competition and Change of International System" in *International Interactions*, Vol. 16 No. 4 p. 320

⁴⁹ Rosencrance, Richard, 1986, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World*, Basic Books. New York

out the world. However this does not prevent us from cutting the US out as a regional core state⁵⁰ especially in the context of the Organization of American States (OAS).

The Monroe Doctrine⁵¹ marked the beginning of the US dominance over the Americas as a core state. The Monroe Doctrine was delivered by President Monroe on December second of 1823 and would define the attitude of the United States concerning the other nations on the continent for decades to come. The salient points of the Monroe Doctrine read:

“We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers (European), to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintain it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.”⁵²

Thus, with this declaration, the United States formally affirmed that the international powers of Europe no longer had any right to meddle in the affairs of Latin America. The government of the United States implicitly claimed exclusive rights to shape and control the

⁵⁰ The terms hegemony and core states are here used interchangeably because of the difficulty of separating using actions in the regions conflicts as either hegemonic or otherwise due to its unilateralism.

⁵¹ Sicker, Martin 2002, *The Geopolitics of Security in the Americas*, Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers pp. 21

⁵² Mecham, J. Lloyd, 1965, *A Survey of United States – Latin American Relations*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, pp. 48; Sicker, Martin, 2002, *Op Cit*, p. 22

formation and administration of the newly established nations of Latin America. Although the United States was not entirely powerful enough to back up the Monroe Doctrine with military strength to ensure that the countries of Europe abided by it, this was an essential and pivotal paradigm in the attitudes and policies of the United States towards Latin America and began the growth of the sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere. While the Monroe Doctrine was stated in terms of ensuring the security of the continent, after its declaration “the United States showed that it was not so much interested in protecting Latin America as in spreading its influence and control over the region”⁵³.

However, it has always been very difficult to define a Latin American security complex in a way that excludes the United States. Historically, the United States has reacted in many different ways to insecurity in the region. It has never consistently opposed the use of force in the region. It has sometimes chosen to remain disengaged from international tensions (as with the conflicts between Peru and Ecuador in 1939-41 and between Chile and Argentina in the 1970s).⁵⁴ On other occasions Washington itself has been willing to use military force, or to support or actively promote the use of force by others (as in Central America in the 1980s). Equally, although it has sometimes promoted multilateral security arrangements, it has steadfastly resisted any institutional constraints that would curb its traditional unilateralism and hegemonic presumptions. Irrespective of the policy actually chosen, its very presence and the possibility of US action have always been factors in the minds of Latin American governments. It is in the nature of hegemony that actions and reactions will be influenced by expectations of what the United States may or may not do.⁵⁵

⁵³ Kryzaneck, Michael J., 1996, *U.S. – Latin American Relations*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, pp. 31

⁵⁴ Hurrell, Andrew, “Security in Latin America”, in *International Affairs*, July 1998, Vol. 74, Issue 3

⁵⁵ Ibid

The US role in the security of the hemisphere provides the perfect illustration of the old adage that intervention and non-intervention are two sides of the same coin.

Indeed this US dominance in the region largely relegated the Organization of American States (OAS) the regional organization to more or less an instrument of legitimizing its unilateral actions in the region, as the region increasingly became an arena for cold war and capitalist economic expansion. From 1980 to 1989, when Central American countries were facing a period of political and military tensions, civil war and foreign intervention, the OAS played an almost insignificant role in the isthmus, indeed, contentions by Nicaraguan Sandinistas that the OAS was controlled and manipulated by Washington were enough to thwart any OAS involvement in the region. The Reagan administration's interventionist policies in Nicaragua and questionable OAS sponsorship of US intervention in Guatemala in 1954 and the Dominican Republic in 1965 were sufficient evidence for Nicaraguans that the OAS was not an impartial actor.⁵⁶

The US intervention in Panama in 1989 exemplifies the impunity with which it demonstrated its power in the region's affairs. While the nations of Latin America were outraged at the unilateral use of force to displace the government of Panama under Manuel Noriega, "essentially ... these were rhetorical gestures" as Smith notes, "the U.S. intervention was a *fait accompli*, and no one was about to take action against it"⁵⁷. It is clear in the light of this situation that the United States sphere of influence in Latin America was so solid and so powerful that it could exert its dominance with almost absolute impunity. Using force in Latin America, be it direct or clandestine, was effortless and acceptable for the United States.

⁵⁶ Tacsan, Joaquin, Searching For OAS/UN "Task-Sharing Opportunities in Central America and Haiti", in *Third World Quarterly*, September 1997, Vol. 18, Issue 3 pp. 231 – 256

⁵⁷ Smith, Peter H. 2000, *Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S. – Latin American Relations*. New York: Oxford University Press p. 297

Though the influence of the United States over the region's conflicts has grown and solidified over the past centuries to the point where unilateral intervention to fulfill policy goals had become routine and acceptable, in recent years there have been signs of a reversion of this power. Growing social, economic, and political independence in Latin America has challenged the ability of the United States to effortlessly and expeditiously incite policy change to fulfill its specific needs.

From the perspective of the late 1990s there are sub-regions where dramatic and positive developments have such as the move from geopolitical rivalry to cooperation between Brazil and Argentina that took place through the 1980s, leading to the emergence of institutionalized economic and political cooperation in the form of Mercosur.⁵⁸ Indeed by the early 1990s a reasonably stable security community had emerged based around the Brazil – Argentina rapprochement – a group of states within which “there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way”⁵⁹ where there are dependable expectations of peaceful change; and where military force gradually disappears as a conceivable instrument of statecraft.⁶⁰

In the security field, this rapprochement involved confidence-building measures, arms control agreements with cooperative verification schemes (especially in the nuclear field), shifts in military posture and declining levels of military spending, as well as a security discourse that avoids the rhetoric of the balance of power and that contrasts sharply with the extreme geopolitical doctrines of the 1960s and 1970s.

The successes in the field of cooperative security have mostly been of a negative (but still important) kind: relaxing tension; reducing threat perceptions via confidence-building

⁵⁸ Hurrell, A., 1998, Op Cit

⁵⁹ Morris, Michael and Victor Millan, (eds), 1983, *Controlling Latin American Conflicts* (Boulder, CO: Westview

⁶⁰ See Little, Walter, “International Conflicts in Latin America”, in *International Affairs* October 1987, Vol. 63, No. 4, pp. 451 - 463

measures and arms control regimes; preventing backsliding and the reappearance of balance of power discourses. There have been only rather modest steps towards the more active components of cooperative security, such as agreeing plans for joint action or for the construction of anything resembling a collective security system.

These developments are further vindicated by the fact that the US had become a benign superpower. It had shown – as it would all the way through the 1990s – a disposition, perhaps a determination, not to act unilaterally in Inter-American affairs.⁶¹ Particularly, the US would not carry out unilateral interventions such as those of Grenada and Panama in the 1980s. Further, the US government had expressed its will to support democracy in the region and to establish a more respectful and fraternal interlocution with its, mostly young, democratic counterparts. Actually, the US had been supportive of fundamental initiatives to strengthen democracy and to establish institutional and political mechanisms for the collective defense of democratic stability. It had acted democratically and receptively of Latin American countries; initiatives; and sensitivities; in the OAS process leading to UN General Assembly Resolution 1080 of 1991, also known as the Santiago Commitment.

In *Preserving the Unipolar Momentum*, Michael Mastanduno⁶² analyzes the combination of unipolarity in security terms, softened by a benevolent use by the US of its military supremacy, and its strategy of democratic enlargement and engagement, together with a rather aggressive approach to international economic issues.

⁶¹Andres Fontana, "Inter-American Security Relations, before and After" March 26, 2003 Submitted for publication to the Cambridge Review of International Affairs, A preliminary Version of this paper was presented at the workshop Latin America 2003, organized by the Centre for International Studies and the Centre for Latin American Studies of the University of Cambridge, on February 14 and 15, 2003.

⁶²Michael Mastanduno. "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War." In *International Security* Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997): 49-88.

2.2 CORE STATES AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN SOUTH ASIAN

The South Asian region is substantially unique in its own right. For comparative purposes it is important for this study because, the two contenders to the region's leadership, India and Pakistan are themselves in conflict with one another over Kashmir. They are therefore subject of conflict management. This tilts the perspective of comparative argument for their role in regional conflict management. Though there is considerable force to the argument that South Asian security is crucially contingent on the India-China-Pakistan triangle,⁶³ India remains the biggest power in South Asia, and her significance, in terms of how India sees herself and how others see her, is a key consideration for regional politics.

India established good neighbourly relations with her smaller neighbours on the basis of treaties with Bhutan in 1949, Sikkim in 1950, Nepal in 1950, Burma in 1951 and Ceylon in 1954/1964. Military force during this phase was largely used for domestic purposes; the invasion of Goa in 1961 was the exception.⁶⁴ The period during the Indo-China war of 1962 and the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 caused a major re-thinking, for India had to conceptualize the possibility of a war on two fronts. The increase in defense allocation during this period, and increased military co-operation with the West saw the beginning of a greater security consciousness. After Indira Gandhi came to power in 1966 she displayed a greater willingness to link politics and military affairs. She also turned India firmly in the

⁶³ See Subrata K. Mitra, "War and Peace in South Asia: A revisionist view of India – Pakistan relations" in *Contemporary South Asia*, 2001, Vol. 10 No. 3, Racine (2001) pp. 272 – 289

⁶⁴ Subrata K. Mitra, 2002, "Emerging Major Powers and the International System: Significance of the Indian View" Department of Political Science, South Asia Institute The University of Heidelberg, (Germany), <http://www.raaf.gov.au/airpower/publications/conferences>

direction of the Soviet Union with the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace,⁶⁵ Friendship and Co-operation, signed on 9th August 1971.

After 1971, the balance of power in South Asia was altered significantly, with the defeat of Pakistan in 1971, the emergence of Bangladesh and the peaceful nuclear explosion of 1974 which gave yet another indication of an 'Indira Doctrine', which visualized India as the hegemonic power of South Asia.⁶⁶ The defeat of Indira Gandhi in the Parliamentary elections of 1977 and the ushering in of the first Janata government in Delhi under the leadership of Morarji Desai, seen at that time as pro-American, tilted the balance away from the Soviet Union, but at the same time, introduced another dose of uncertainty to India's strategic vision. This changed again in 1980 with the return of Indira, but the period of 1980 to 1984 saw India isolated, and funds for defense spending becoming scarce.

Increased US support to Pakistan after the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan saw India's return to reliance on the Soviet Union and greater Soviet arms imports in India. In retrospect, the period that intervened between the two assassinations, of Indira Gandhi in 1984 by her Sikh body guards and Rajiv Gandhi by Tamil terrorists in 1989, was one of continued Indira 'doctrine' which saw attempts to expand India's influence in South Asia and hostility towards China, Pakistan and the US grow stronger. Missile programmes were initiated after 1983 and defense spending doubled from 1980 to 1989. Operations Siachen (1984) and Brasstacks (1986-87) occurred. Support was lent to the Tamil Tigers (1987-90) and an Indian intervention in Male took place in 1988. Though the onset of liberalization of the Indian economy in 1991 prepared the ground for a rapprochement with the United States, the contradictory pulls within India's strategic thinking continued from 1990 to 1999.

⁶⁵ Cohen Stephen, 2001, *India: Emerging Power*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 25 – 31 and p. 47

⁶⁶ Surjit, Mansingh 1999, *India's Search for Power: Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy 1966 – 1982*, Delhi, Sage, pp. 13-25

The collapse of the Soviet Union necessitated a radical change in policy, while economic reforms in India necessitated budget cuts affecting the military adversely. This might have opened a window of opportunity for Pakistan, which, taking advantage of the onset of militancy in Kashmir started supporting cross border insurgency in Kashmir and covert military operations. While on the political front the unilateralist Gujaral doctrine and subsequently the BJP initiatives for a diplomatic deal with Pakistan (by the way of the first Lahore bus trip and subsequently the Agra summit) continued, the Pakistani military operated on more conservative lines and sought to take advantage of perceived weakness of the Indian military establishment. One consequence was the war in Kargil in 1999, but the forceful reaction of India's army once again underscored the need for a coherent Indian strategic doctrine.

Indeed as Subrata K. Mitra⁶⁷ argues, India's preponderant size relative to its neighbours, which does not necessarily translate into overwhelming power over them, is one of the main causes of stalemate in South Asia. India is keen to retain the *status quo*, which its leaders understand in terms of its relative power, and territorial boundaries that it was privy to prior to the end of colonial rule. A *status quo* contested by its neighbors including China and its archrival Pakistan.

Though South Asian security is largely subject to the India – China – Pakistan triangle India treats Pakistan with skepticism and a perpetual threat. For instance, in an important speech that the Indian Prime Minister delivered in Berlin on 28th May 2003, close on the heels of peace initiatives in mid-April, he declared categorically that, “search for peace with Pakistan would continue though there would be no lowering of the guard by Delhi for

⁶⁷ Subrata K. Mitra, “The Reluctant Hegemon: India's Self – Perception and the South Asian Strategic environment” in *Contemporary South Asia*, 2003, Vol.12 No. 3 pp. 178 – 196

the sake of peace.⁶⁸ However this is not accentuated by any bold gambit, gesture or a token of sacrifice to show that India was indeed turning the corner. As the Prime Minister further noted, “it is possible for two enemies to resolve problems through dialogue. The kind of destruction that humans are capable of inflicting shows that humanity has power but not reason.”⁶⁹ This rhetoric is easily justifiable by India’s possession of nuclear weapons while at the same time recognizing similar power from Pakistan with whom it is in conflict over Kashmir, a conviction firmly anchored on the maintenance of political and military *status quo*.

It is also important to note that regional security in South Asia has not been limited to inter-state conflicts. The region is plagued by internal terrorist activities that effectively redirect focus. For instance in India, “Reforming the national security system,” report non-state actors, particularly terrorists are identified as one of the main targets of future activity in enhancing national security profile of India. While China and Pakistan are mentioned as the main concerns in the report, on the other hand, the consistent ability of Pakistan to draw the United States of America and China to its side is another worry for India in its quest for regional leadership.⁷⁰ Also identified in the report are factors such as, rapid economic growth of china coupled with ambitious military modernization programme in addition to Pakistan’s traditional hostility.⁷¹

The purpose of this expose is to demonstrate the intricate combination of a core state in conflict with a competitor and the need to resolve the same conflict. What we see is a stand off and insistence on *status quo*, as conflict management is pursued through negotiations with little external intervention. The result is competition deluge on economic, military, political and regional leadership fronts for the three states. As Surjit argues, “Under

⁶⁸ *The Statesman Weekly*, 31st May 2003, Vol. 95 No. 22

⁶⁹ *Ibid*

⁷⁰ See generally, Subrata K. Mitra, *Op Cit*.

⁷¹ *Ibid*

the impact of the new contextual and indigenous developments, is re-examining its approach to international and regional organizations.”⁷² Nehru for instance, was a great supporter of international peacekeeping and mediation initiatives and a staunch advocate of Asian regional cooperation as early as before independence of India.

The key security problem for India now is the Kashmir dispute, which it insists is an internal problem. Although the remote sources of India’s insecurity often lie within the territories of its neighbours, India has so far refused to have the issue as a common problem of the South Asia, preferring instead, to up at a bi-lateral level, in fact even attempts to have the issue taken to United Nations Security Council has met similar resistance.

By and large India’s role in regional and international politics, there are three strands of policy preferences. As Manoi⁷³ points out, the most visible being that of a ‘Firm India’, a powerful state able to use force freely, rather like the United States and Israel, a strand introduced by Indira Gandhi and advocates of the bomb as a symbol of national power.⁷⁴ This strand, for instance, would view the 1988 – 90 peacekeeping operations in Sri-Lanka, which turned into a military catastrophe, as a success, because it demonstrated that India has evolved a ‘will to act’ to preserve its vital national interest.

The second strand is what Cohen⁷⁵ calls ‘peace mongering Conciliatory India’. Proponents of this strand who are mainly professionals and specialists would prefer for instance to deal with Pakistan and China by territorial compromise and negotiations, displaying military power only to supplement diplomacy. They are largely opposed to military

⁷² Surjit, Mansingh 1999, Op Cit

⁷³ Manoi Joshi, “Commitment in Sri-Lanka” in *The Hindu* (International Edition) 19th May 1990

⁷⁴ See Ibid

⁷⁵ Cohen Stephen, 2001, Op Cit

led economic development and regional expansion. The third strand is the 'Didactic India', a civilization India that should deploy its culture as a resource or valuable diplomatic asset.⁷⁶

Note worthy is the fact that three key aspects run through these arguments, that is, need for economic development, hence India's embrace of liberal policies and rapid economic growth: National security and territorial protection and Regional power leadership. This what Vajpayee demonstrated in his numerous speeches recent speeches.⁷⁷

2.3 CORE STATES AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN AFRICAN

Regional leadership in Africa is not a new phenomenon. In the Southern Africa for instance, a security structure is gradually emerging under Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). South Africa is largely expected to play a hegemonic role. However, Paul Omach notes that, "South Africa is cautious if not reluctant...although it is the most economically advanced country with most sophisticated military force in Africa."⁷⁸ This he attributes to the fact that "it is a country undergoing political economic and social transformation after many years of apartheid...it is also trying to redefine its role and image as a regional power taking caution not to be perceived as an overbearing power in the sub-region."⁷⁹

In spite of its head start South Africa has preferred a multilateral approach within the framework of SADC (read its involvement in the political crisis in Lesotho) rather than a unilateral option. South Africa has preferred to pursue diplomatic approach, engaging in

⁷⁶ Ibid

⁷⁷ See generally, Surjit Mansingh 1999, Op Cit

⁷⁸ Omach, Paul, "The African Crisis Response Initiative- Domestic Politics and Convergence of National Interests" in *African Affairs Journal*, 2000, Vol. 99 No.394 p. 80

⁷⁹ Omach, Paul, "The African Crisis Response Initiative- Domestic Politics and Convergence of National Interests" in *African Affairs Journal*, 2000, Vol. 99 No.394 p. 80

dialogue with parties to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo for instance. South Africa's cautiousness was also illustrated in its reluctance to directly intervene in the Zimbabwe crisis with president Mbeki opting to dialogue with both President Mugabe and the leader of the MDC Morgan Tsvangarai in spite of massive external pressure to take sides.

Stephen Burgess argues that "South Africa is a military super power in the region, and that it possesses the capacity to reach far into the continent to lead in maintaining peace and security in the 21st century..." He points out that "the transformation of South Africa into a non-racial democratic state in 1994 created a basis for a uni-polar and hierarchical structure and prospects for South Africa providing leadership for the member states of SADC."⁸⁰ Burgess identifies the significance of South Africa's involvement through SADC "in the halting of attempted coup in Lesotho through mediation, backed by the threat of the use of force."⁸¹

However in an apparent disagreement with Omach,⁸² Burgess sees a willingness of the South African government to play an active leadership role in Africa.⁸¹ Nonetheless, he notes that this was unrealized until 1997 as ANC engaged in internal power consolidation. "The situation changed suddenly in May 1997 as president Mandela used South African power and prestige to lead the way in convincing president Mobutu to leave power in Zaire and paving the way for installation of Kabila's regime. By September 1997 DRC joined SADC and the southern Africa structure, altering the balance of power in Central-Africa...with the Congo Kinshasa success, South Africa had demonstrated its regional

⁸⁰ Burgess, Stephen F, "African Security in the 21st century: the challenges of Indigenization and multilateralism" in *African Studies Review* 1998 Vol. 41 No 2. p. 42

⁸¹ Ibid pp. 44

⁸² Omach, Paul, 2000, Op Cit.

⁸³ Ibid p. 44

leadership ability.”⁸⁴ The DRC arguably put Kenya and South Africa on a competition course as both parties struggled to outdo the other in resolving the conflict. President Moi’s apparent partiality and indecisiveness especially considering his latent support for Mobutu, made Kenya loose out in the battle for supremacy in the region.

Zimbabwe on its part did not take kindly South Africa’s apparent regional leadership prospects. As Burgess puts it,

In reaction to the prospect of South Africa’s hegemony, president Mugabe re-asserted Zimbabwe’s long standing leadership role in SADC, particularly in its effort to develop a SADC security functions, (similar to the multiple defense pact of ECOWAS when Zimbabwe led Angola and Namibia in intervening in the name of SADC in August 1998 to save the Kabila government from being overthrown.⁸⁵

Note that South Africa initially barked and attempted to mediate between warring partners then accepted the intervention. Key here is the need for a regional organization within whose framework national interests can be multilateralized. IGAD, has provided such a forum for Kenya. Even though no military action has been taken, the continued diplomatic approach by Kenya via IGAD can be seen as providing a similar parallel to the Southern Africa situation.

The West African situation is a little more structurally defined; the threat that ethnic conflict in Liberia post to other states in the region forced most ECOWAS governments including pro-French ones, to accept Nigeria’s leadership in what became a peace enforcement action through a mutual defense pact of ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1990s.

⁸⁴ Ibid p. 44

⁸⁵ Ibid p. 44

In his critical observation of the Liberian conflict in 1989, pitting Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia against Samuel Doe's military dictatorship, Max Ahmadu points out the role of Nigeria as a core state within the framework of ECOWAS and ECOMOG. He argues that, "The predominant role played by Nigeria whose contribution was estimated at 70% of ECOMOG's military and financial resources was particularly resented by Taylor who accused it of occupying Liberia and violating its sovereignty."⁸⁶ Nigeria was largely seen as staking its position as the region's core state and the opportunity to demonstrate the same could not go unattended. Any challenges to their position could not be welcome. Indeed as Max Ahmadu argues, After Ghana's intervention in the same conflict and possible success of the Akosombo Accord in 1995, the Nigerians who had been running the show in Liberia since 1990 were obviously less than pleased about the credit that Jerry Rawlings naturally hoped to gain from successful diplomacy that would add to his stature as an international statesman.⁸⁷

The Ghanaian president however was well aware of the crucial importance of Nigeria's support if any peace deal was to be successful. Nigeria's resilience in maintaining control over Liberia's conflict was clearly manifested in its refusal to seek United Nation's approval, opting to simply inform it. It further resisted calls for U.N intervention in Liberia, "in May 1990 Nigeria, Ethiopia and Zaire barred an attempt by the U.N secretary general, Perez de Cuellar from bringing the Liberia civil war to the U.N Security Council and on July 31st 1990, an attempt by France and other European community members to call a security

⁸⁶ Ahmadu, Max Sessay, "Politics and Society in Post War Liberia" in *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 1996 Vol. 34, No 3 p. 396

⁸⁷ Ibid, pp. 399-400

session on Liberia was blocked.”⁸⁸ The goal here was for Nigeria and its ECOWAS allies to manage the Liberian conflict and did not want to forfeit control of the situation to the U.N.

Arie Kacowicz attests to Nigeria’s supremacy, in his argument,

Nigeria has been the obvious candidate for sub-paramouncy in West Africa, on any objective measure such as size of population, military strength and economic power.... it can be argued that the country has played a positive and preponderant role in the keeping of peace in the region evidenced in the launching of ECOWAS in 1975 and the deployment of ECOMOG in Liberia in 1990.⁸⁹

However, its hegemonic pretensions have been traditionally disputed by other states that regard themselves as alternative candidates for regional leadership, notably Senegal, Ghana and Ivory Coast⁹⁰, which may become preponderant in the economic realm. Kacowicz further argues that,

Nigeria’s eagerness to re-assert itself as the major peacekeeper and political influencer in West Africa became evident with ECOMOG initiative in 1990. Its military and civilian leaders have always been pre-occupied with finding ways of co-operating with their neighbors, including Francophone rivals, and have constantly attempted to exercise their nations’ leverage and hence its prestige acknowledged through out West Africa⁹¹

As part of this research hypotheses and as Burgess points out “Power distribution has become a key factor in African security. In Western and Southern Africa, power has become more concentrated and hierarchical especially with growing assertiveness of three

⁸⁸ Burgess, S., 1998 Op Cit

⁸⁹ Kacowicz, Arie M, “Negative International Peace and Domestic Conflicts in West Africa 1957- 1996” in *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 1997 Vol. 35, No.3, p. 371

⁹⁰ Note that the latest instability in Ivory Coast and civil war has definitely robbed it of this bid, as it has become a subject of regional intervention to restore stability. In these conditions it cannot stake its claim as a regional core state.

⁹¹ Ibid p. 372

regional powers, Nigeria, South Africa and Zimbabwe⁹² and organizations (ECOWAS and SADC) which have the authorization, salience and capability to mount and lead security operations”⁹³

2.4 KENYA AS A CORE STATE: A REVIEW OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES

Eastern Africa region is a little different. The power structure is perhaps in the formative stage, with the revival of East African Community and the developing IGAD initiatives. It is the argument of this research that Kenya is poised to take or re-take the role of regional power as anarchy is gradually reduced against Burgess’ argument that in East and Central Africa, anarchy remains prevalent as his explanation for the ‘failure’ to enforce peace in Rwanda and Somalia. According to Burgess, “in both regions no organization possesses the capability to intervene”⁹⁴. This assertion has been vindicated by the provision peacekeeping forces by African Union to the Darfur conflict as opposed to a regional force. Indeed the participation of Kenya and Rwanda in the AU mission though demonstrates the willingness to create such a force, also indicates the lack of framework for its creation.

High levels of salience have largely accompanied indigenization of peace enforcement in Western and Southern Africa as regional forces struggle to prevent spill over of conflicts into their home countries. National interests have also permeated and motivated interventions. For instance, “even though ECOWAS lacked the military might and the mandate from ECOWAS to prevail over the NPFL, Nigeria and its allies had the salience to

⁹² Recent internal political and economic developments in Zimbabwe (land problems and international isolation- economic sanctions against Zimbabwe) has made it greatly diminish in its power status leaving South Africa as the sole regional core state in the South African region]

⁹³ Burgess, S., 1998 Op Cit p.56

⁹⁴ Burgess, S., 1998 Op Cit p.56

absorb the cost in lives and resources in taking sides in order to enforce the peace and to sustain the operation for seven years... and while most ECOMOG states were motivated by fears of spill over, Nigeria wanted to demonstrate that it had become the leading state in Western Africa.”⁹⁵

Kenya has therefore the task of matching up, even though there are few signs of possible spill over. Other motivations such as the need to demonstrate its regional power status still remain central. The developing hypothesis here is the need for Kenya to restore and maintain its advantaged position as the region’s hegemon. Indeed Nigeria has been able to uphold this position in the Liberia conflict. The exiling of deposed leader Charles Taylor in Nigeria, the preceding negotiations and the continued central role of Nigeria in the ensuring peace process attests to this.

Various scholars and authors have looked at Kenya especially with reference to its position in the region and more specifically on it’s diplomacy of conflict management. Samuel Makinda writing on Kenya’s economic policies argues that: Kenya’s external economic policies of attracting foreign investment and dominance of East African market in Kenya’s export of manufactured goods are the independent variables that...combine to facilitate and maintain Kenya’s regional dominance.⁹⁶

This is the argument that Timothy Shaw expresses when he views Kenya as a sub-imperial state drawing from Kenya’s colonial relations.⁹⁷ Sub-imperial states as he asserts, are at the center of the periphery, a client state that, is able to exert dominance in a region of the third world. According to Shaw, Kenya has been such a power in East Africa. This has

⁹⁵ Burgess, S., 1998 Op Cit p.57

⁹⁶ Makinda, M., Samuel “From Quiet Diplomacy to Cold War Politics” in *Third World Quarterly* Vol. 5 No.2 1988 p. 145

⁹⁷ Shaw, Timothy, “ International Stratification in Africa: Sub- Imperialism in Southern and Eastern Africa” *Journal of Southern Africa Affairs* Vol. 2 No. 2 April 1977 p. 145

enabled Kenya to act, to advance its foreign policy and national interest, a role that produced dependence and regional inequality.⁹⁸ Agreeably Kenya was at a higher pedestal in the region in the first two decades of independence and acceptably acquired the position of the regional hegemon. However, the last two decades have not been very favorable to Kenya in many respects including economically and politically. The question that begs for answers here is whether this regional dominance still stands with the onset of globalization and highly inter-meshed web of interdependence that grants no single state absolute advantage over its neighbours.

Immanuel Wallerstein⁹⁹ advances a similar argument in his dichotomy of international division of labor that divides the world into periphery and the core, where the core specializes in industrial production and has monopoly of technology while the periphery specializes in the provision of labor and production of raw materials. The periphery is further dichotomized into the core of periphery and the periphery of the periphery. Shaw and Makinda's dependency analysis therefore puts Kenya at the core of periphery and an agent of imperialist forces.

Robert Gilpin¹⁰⁰ alludes to the same argument by giving an additional dichotomy of semi-periphery to refer to countries that are neither in the periphery nor close to the core. Kenya's grant of Ksh. 20 million to the Lule regime in 1979 and waiver of all port demurrage charges on Ugandan goods stranded at the port of Mombasa during the Uganda civil war,¹⁰¹ can be seen as a manifestation of its sub-imperial status. By acting as a regional donor

⁹⁸ Ibid pp. 151-152

⁹⁹ Wallerstein, I., 1974, *The Modern World Systems: Capitalist Agriculture and The Origins of European World-Economy in the 16th Century*, Academic Press, New York

¹⁰⁰ Gilpin, Robert, 1987, Op Cit.

¹⁰¹ Okoth, P. G., "Foreign Policy of Uganda towards Kenya and Tanzania" in Walter Oyugi, (1994), *Politics and Administration in East Africa* E.A.E. Publishers, Nairobi p. 373

to the war ravaged Uganda economy, Kenya could be seen as re-asserting its regional economic hegemony.

Okoth¹⁰² further asserts Kenya's manipulative capacity over Uganda after the fall of the Lule regime and deterioration of relations with the Binaisa's government. The opening of road link between Sudan and Kenya between Lodwar to Kapoeta in August 1979 and plans of another one to Juba in Southern Sudan demonstrates Kenya's ability to influence routes for Sudanese goods. Through this, Sudan completely bypassed and isolated Uganda to use Kenya's ports directly. The restoration of relations with Uganda in 1980 could only have been a priority to Uganda.

As Okoth argues, the motivation was the unstoppable Kenyan export dominance in Ugandan markets.¹⁰³ Kenya being the entry point for the region's goods, cooperation and peace in the region has a major bearing on its economic interests. Kenya greatly took advantage of her proximity to the Indian Ocean, on several occasions to hold Uganda at ransom with border closures preventing Uganda wagons from going through Kenyan railways.

The overthrow of Obote II regime by Tito Okello could not have been more regrettable to Kenya. The imminent threat to Tito Okello by Museveni, to Kenya meant a viscous circle of coups and instability in Uganda, which was in no way in Kenya's interest and therefore the need for Moi to mediate in the conflict. This is what Okoth, P.G asserts when he points out that this measure temporarily saved the situation in Uganda when president Moi indicated his interest in playing a direct role in the political development there,

¹⁰² Ibid

¹⁰³ Ibid p. 374

playing host to talks between the military regime and the NRA fighters.¹⁰⁴ Kenya's policy at this time was to demonstrate friendly neighborliness.

However, Kyaga Nsubuga argues that Kenya's reason for participation in the "peace talks" was apparently for self-interest and rather as a wish to get government of its choice in Uganda. Kenya's attitude was that the only way to achieve peace in Uganda was to try and recognize factions. This was further demonstrated by president Moi's impatience after only two months of negotiations and threatened both parties with expulsion if they did not reach an agreement soon.¹⁰⁵ For this study therefore what remains to be answered here is the actual role of idiosyncratic variables in Kenya's diplomacy of conflict management.

Mwagiru in his observation of the Uganda conflict mediation argues that, Moi's interest in Uganda under the rubric of Nairobi Peace talks in 1985 was one of the first African cases of mediation in civil wars marking the start of gradual shift in African norms about intervention in internal conflict. The Nairobi talks thus provided an interesting pointer to the conceptual issue of entry, motivation, leverage and their significance in African mediation.¹⁰⁶ In his conviction, civil wars are testing the tenacity and will of African mediators, their preparedness, patience and more critically their organizational ability to mobilize incentives, frame procedural questions and structure the bargaining on substantive issues.¹⁰⁷ As one Kenyan diplomat in Uganda pointed out "Moi's mediation of the Ugandan conflict was a big success for him and will contribute to his status all over the world. His

¹⁰⁴ Ibid p. 379

¹⁰⁵ Kiyaga, Nsubuga "Uganda, Kenya Relations 1970-85: The Inter Play of History, Economics and Geopolitics" Seminar paper on Issues in Contemporary Africa International Relations, Department of Political Science and Public Administration Makerere University Kampala 1987 p. 19

¹⁰⁶ Mwagiru "Foreign Policy and the Diplomacy of Conflict Management in Kenya: A Review Assessment," *African Review of Foreign Policy*, Vol.1, No 1. March 1999 pp .44-64

¹⁰⁷ Ibid

handling of the delicate and explosive negotiations is a demonstration of Kenya's political maturity, marking a milestone in Kenya's diplomacy.¹⁰⁸

Analytically, we need to underscore the confluence between individual and national interest in this case. As Mwagiru observes, national interest coincided with Moi's image making. Central to these interests was the perpetual fear of spill over effects from Uganda's civil war into Kenya. Instability in Uganda, government officials reiterated was the source of refugees who consumed economic resources, strained social services, and caused domestic disturbance through the spread of firearms. These concerns were also tied to broader analysis of the centrality of Uganda as Kenya's main trading partner and vital transport corridor of Kenyan goods destined to markets in Rwanda, Burundi and beyond.¹⁰⁹

Mwagiru has also addresses the changing realities of Kenya's position in regional diplomacy. He argues that, although Kenya's Foreign Policy in the decade after independence was based on continuity and constancy and developed a sound conceptual footing in the 1980's, this has changed in recent times into incoherence and there is need to return to the drawing board to determine how the quest of the 1980s can be reclaimed.¹¹⁰ Any adherent of Mwagiru's argument would thus see Kenya's concerted effort to engage in the region's conflict management as a move towards reclaiming this lost glory. What Mwagiru ignores is the fact that these challenges are possibly only perceived and has very little effect on Kenya's key areas of preponderance, economic advantages geo-strategy and relative internal peace.

Paul Kurgat moves towards this direction when he notes that, Kenya is becoming more experienced in Africa's management of conflict since on many occasions Kenya has

¹⁰⁸ Weekly Review December 20th 1986

¹⁰⁹ Mwagiru, M., 1999 Op Cit

¹¹⁰ Mwagiru M., 1994, Op Cit p. 1

been able to broker deals despite its limited resources. He observes that Kenya has earned prestige and importance in Africa's diplomatic circles.¹¹¹ The problem with Kurgat's optimism is that he does not seem to take interest in whether these many-brokered deals have been able to stand the test of time. For instance Kenya brokered a deal between Museveni and Tito Okello, the deal however did not hold for long for Museveni returned to war and overthrew Okello in 1986 barely six months after signing 'the peace agreement'.

Okoth, P G writing in 1997 attests to Mwangi's thesis of 'returning to the drawing board'.

He observes that,

If Nairobi is to continue to matter especially in the diplomacy of the Great Lakes region, it must contain Yoweri Museveni's frighteningly abrasive approach to regional diplomacy. This is because the Ugandan president is currently seen as an important factor in the political power interplay in the Great Lakes region and therefore anybody interested in managing the Great Lakes crisis cannot afford to ignore him.¹¹²

According to Okoth, Uganda is first replacing Kenya, as a dominant state in the region and Kenya's ability to influence regional affairs appear to be on the wane rather than on the increase. The political events of the past one-year may have negated this argument, however it largely remains valid and Kenya has to put more effort to achieve its goal of remaining the region's dominant state. By making this assertion, Okoth seems to get into the same trap that Mwangi created by failing to separate perceived threats from and actual occurrences in the region.

¹¹¹ Kurgat, Paul, "Kenya's Foreign Policy and Africa's Conflict Management" Paper Presented at Historical Association of Kenya Conference October 31st – November 2nd 1997 p. 14

¹¹² Okoth, P.G., "Crisis and Diplomacy in Great Lakes Region of East and Central Africa: The Role of Regional Actors, the United States and United Nations", Paper Presented at the 6th Regional Conference on American Studies in East Africa: The Future of US, African Relations July 8-12 1997 Egerton University pp. 32-33

Lenderach¹¹³ brings in the issue of public opinion. To him the opinion and interests shaped by the media coverage of peace making, centers largely on personalities of the peace maker rather than what is needed to sustain a constructive process. This, he argues, is especially true of high level mediation efforts in which prominent figures emerge and are followed closely as they engage the parties in efforts to bring about negotiations and an end to the fighting.¹¹⁴ In the period preceding the transition from Moi to Kibaki, doubts had already been raised as to the future of the peace processes, on Southern Sudan with the departure of Moi. This is the fear International Crisis Group (ICG) expressed when they indicated that,

The December 2002 general elections have already affected the peace process on Sudan. The biggest impact, should President Moi's ruling KANU party loose could be the departure of Kenya's special envoy and lead negotiator General Lazarus Sumbeiywo. His importance to the process cannot be overstated and replacing him at this stage could prove fatal for the outcome.¹¹⁵

In contrast to this focus on personalities, a number of researchers have argued that peace building and more specifically intermediary work should be understood as a process made up of roles and functions rather than as an activity in the person of the mediator. James Laue and Gerald Cormick delineate conflict intervention roles including activities and advocates as well as mediators and enforcers.¹¹⁶ Loreleigh Keashley and Ronald Fisher¹¹⁷ submit that, intermediary work can be conceived as strategies that are matched to different

¹¹³ Lenderach, John Paul, 1997, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, United state Institute for Peace, Washington

¹¹⁴ Lenderach, John Paul, 1997, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, United state Institute for Peace, Washington p. 66

¹¹⁵ International Crisis Group, 2002, "Power and Wealth Sharing: Make or Break Time in Sudan Peace Process" Report 18th December 2002 p. 13

¹¹⁶ Laue, James and Gerald Cormmick, "The of Intervention in Community Disputes" in Bermant G. *et al.* (1978) *The Ethics of Social Intervention* p. 202

¹¹⁷ Loreleigh, Keashley and Ronald Fisher, "Toward A Contingency Approach to Third Party Intervention in Regional Conflict: A Cyprus Illustration" *International Journal*, Vol. 45, Spring 1990 pp 424- 453

stages of escalation and de-escalation of conflicts, therefore different strategies are needed at different stages of conflict development.¹¹⁸ The single thread running through these arguments is that conflict is a dynamic process and peace building is a multiplicity of interdependent elements and actions that contribute to the constructive transformation of the conflict. It therefore cannot rely on a single entity.

Kenya, given this situation, in spite of its intrinsic interests must be able to couch its goals and interest so as to reflect this multiplicity. Its engagement within the framework of IGAD is one such example, continuous welcoming of observers and widening of participants including competitors, further ensures international legitimacy. Whereas there is no harmony of interests in international system as realist postulate, the temptation to cloth national interest to acceptably become a regional interest at one point ceases to be a mere temptation but a key objective of a state and Kenya is no exception.

Ikle's perception of negotiations as a "process in which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purposes of reaching agreement on the exchange or on realization of common interest when conflicting interest are present"¹¹⁹ is particularly important. It implies several basic assumptions, one, negotiations are possible only when two or more states are interacting under conditions which combine element of both conflict and cooperation. Two, it assumes that, some degree of communication is possible between the parties in order for there to be an exchange or common realization of interest between them. In general then, negotiation process may be conceived as one in which two or more nations conduct communications about some objectives which combine conflicting and cooperative goals. This may give the impression that negotiation and meditation are not different. Ikle by

¹¹⁸ Ibid p. 429

¹¹⁹ Ikle, F. C., 1964, *How Nations Negotiate*, Harper and Row, New York pp. 3-4

involving a third party in defining negotiation has not taken cognizance of the pertinent difference between negotiations and mediation.¹²⁰

To Ikle, an actor has three alternative strategies among which to choose according to the extents to which they enable him maximize his goals. That is, accepting the available terms set forth in the present status of the bargaining process and settle at that point; choose no agreement and bring the negotiations to a close, or engage in further bargaining to try to achieve an acceptable final solution.¹²¹ However the guiding consideration is the weighing of utility of the present alternatives available to the actor against the utility of no agreement. To this end the aim of negotiation is to try and find the range of common interest between two or more actors, where their common interest outweigh the alternative advantage of not agreeing.

Bruce Russet¹²² points out that events outside negotiation may serve as international threats or warnings, which are designed by one or more actors to have some impact on the negotiating behavior of other actors. These threats may be designed to emphasize the cost of no agreement to the actors or to encourage them to accept terms favorable to the threatening nation. Looking at Kenya as a mediator, then we critically consider for instance, President Moi's threat to Tito Okello and Museveni when they delayed on several occasions to sign the Nairobi Peace Accord. Superficially, by Moi getting impatient with the belligerent parties, he was seeking to point out indirectly that the option available against peace was far more expensive than peace itself. On the other hand, one cannot escape to see the underlying motivation of Moi's impatience, the urgent need to redeem Kenya's and his own image in the region could not be delayed especially when signs of success were in sight.

¹²⁰ See Mwagiru M., 1994, Op Cit, for a detailed discussion of dyadic and triadic differentiation

¹²¹ Ibid pp. 60-61

¹²² Russet, Bruce, 1972 *Peace, War and Numbers*, Sage Publishers, London p. 216

Museveni's defiant response to the effect that Moi was not forced into mediating the conflict and that if they failed on the table, there were other ways of solving the problem could not have come at a worse time for Kenya and Moi. In essence Museveni vividly viewed Kenya as dispensable, challenging its status in the region.

Michael Wallace on his part points out the role of status inconsistency in conflict. He argues that status inconsistency creates dissatisfaction within a nation, because from its point of view it violates the crucial system norm that nations receive rewards in proportion to their position on the pecking order.¹²³ This is what Galtung' expands when he postulates that "the frustration thus endangered, coupled with the leverage possessed by such a nation in having at least one high status creates both the motive and the opportunity for increasing aggressive international behavior."¹²⁴ Galtung and Wallace's arguments here is that, status inconsistency may precipitate conflict, this is not necessarily armed conflict alone but also conflict of interest. This is the perspective; I wish to put Kenya in. The imminent competition for status in the region in the dynamic international system has put Kenya at the forefront of conflict management. Its struggle to retain the position of a core state must hence be within the general rubric of challenges from Uganda and Tanzania. The need to have a higher status may therefore serve as a motivation for Kenya's aggressive conflict management in the region.

To Claude, I.,

States struggle for what they regard as appropriate places in the distribution of power... by the artificial methods of linking themselves to the strength of

¹²³ Wallace, Michael D., "Status Formal Organizations and Arms Levels as Factors Leading to the Onset of War", in Russet B., 1972 *Peace, War and Numbers*, Sage Publishers, London p. 53

¹²⁴ Galtung, Johan B., 1964, "A structural Theory of Aggression", in *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 2 April 1977 p. 107

other states. Indeed this is the only method available to the bulk of states in the actual circumstances of modern history.¹²⁵

Kenya's consideration of the option of widening the Sudan peace process so as to give IGAD a wider international support, as it were, could reasonably be considered against Claude's argument. The motivation to cooperation and coalition as a means to its regional standing aimed at altering the status. Russett¹²⁶ suggests that as a working hypothesis, it is not unreasonable to assume that the distribution of payoffs within an alliance will be some function of the capabilities of parties; therefore alliance would result in an upgrading of ascribed status in the system as a whole. In mind here, is the acceptance of Kenya to engage South Africa as a friend of IGAD – Sudan peace process, the collaboration with the US, and EU in the same process, tacitly aimed at giving Kenya the required impetus to reassert its regional hegemonic interest.

2.5 REGIONAL POWERS AS INTERVENERS IN REGIONAL CONFLICTS

Regional powers have over the years operated under the umbrella of the super power(s). This is as earlier noted, because of the natural affinity and need by and for the two, regional power and super power(s), to work either in a symbiotic relation or in a dependency relationship subject to the strategic value of the regional power(s). Interventions in regional conflicts have been a key area of concern for scholars of international relations and conflict studies. It has been the tradition that the major world powers intervene in various conflicts across the globe. But the national interest consideration and relative gain calculations may dissuade super powers from intervening in regional conflicts far withdrawn from their

¹²⁵ Claude, I., 1962, *Power and International Relations*, Random House, New York p. 89

¹²⁶ Russett, B., 1972, *Peace, War and Numbers*, Sage Publishers, London

immediate interests. This gives room for regional powers to take charge of situations. This has been the case in most conflicts in West Africa with Nigeria as a key candidate for the regions leadership, South Africa in the southern Africa region, India and Pakistan in the Indian sub-continent etcetera.

How likely major powers are to intervene in the affairs of other states has generated much theoretical and empirical attention. Traditional realists expect that major powers will be the most frequent interveners, as they possess both the resources and the global interests to undertake such actions. Liberals contend that the end of the Cold War, coupled with the emergence of global problems ranging from the environment to the profusion of ethnic conflicts, requires greater major power involvement to ensure stability in the Third World. Neo-realists, on the other hand, take a different lesson from the end of US-Soviet rivalry. They assert that there are few areas in the Third World considered strategic enough to warrant major power interventions.¹²⁷ Whether and how a third party intervention can influence the trajectory of an ethnic conflict depends upon numerous factors. These include: what type of actor the intervener is, its motivation(s), the strategy it employs, who the recipient of the aid is, and the characteristics of the dispute and its participants. In this study, we adopt an inclusive notion of intervention that covers actions including diplomatic support¹²⁸ but not economic aid and military assistance.

Preponderant states, which are 'neighbours' of ethnic conflicts, are defined by their major characterization, that is, as regional powers. Less systematic attention has been paid to

¹²⁷ Major exceptions include disputes between countries that are either overtly or covertly known to possess weapons of mass destruction, e.g. the Arab-Israeli conflict, India-Pakistan and the North-South Korea contention.

¹²⁸ There are differing views as to whether diplomatic support constitutes an interventionary action. Regan, for instance, argues that political statements are a regular aspect of diplomacy and should therefore be excluded. Yoon, on the other hand, asserts that more subtle forms of intervention, such as diplomatic support, must also be systematically examined. See Regan, "Conditions of successful third-party intervention in intrastate conflicts"; and Yoon, "Explaining US intervention in third world internal wars, 1945-1989", in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1997, Vol. 41(4), p. 20

the interventionary strategies of states located in territorial proximity to these domestic conflicts. Michael Brown contends that neighbouring states find it almost impossible to avoid becoming embroiled in an internal dispute and that; they often contribute to its escalation and to regional instability.¹²⁹ Alexis Heraclides' study of seven secessionist conflicts supports this argument; "only four of the 19 states that bordered these countries were able to remain neutral or unfavourable toward secessionists."¹³⁰ These arguments tend more towards military intervention, which Kenya has largely not engaged in, however, Kenya's diplomatic approach falls within this general rubric of intervention. Kenya has in many occasions been accused of not being able to be non-partisan given its historical experiences with Sudan on border dispute and allegations of support to some of the parties to the conflict. To this extent, Brown and Heraclides' argument is very germane to our study.

Neo-realists, among other scholars, emphasise the interventionist role of regional powers, asserting that they will become more active in regional affairs, especially as the major powers reduce their involvement in the Third World. During the bipolar rivalry, the actions of these states were often circumscribed by the superpowers, which were usually their allies or provided them with substantial political, economic and military support because of the ideological nature of the challenges they faced.¹³¹ This partly explains the few number of occasions Kenya involved in conflict managements in the 1970s and 1980s.¹³²

¹²⁹ Brown, M.E., "The causes and internal dimensions of Regional conflict" in Brown M.E., (ed) 1996, *The International Dimension of Internal Conflict*, Cambridge MA MIT Press pp 1-31

¹³⁰ Heraclides "Secessionist Minorities and External Involvement" in *International Organizations Journal*, 1990, Vol. 44 No. 3 pp. 374-375

¹³¹ Buzan B., "A framework for Regional Security Analysis" and Klares "Wars in the 1990s" in Buzan B., and Rizvi G., (eds) 1986, *South Asian Insecurity and Great Powers*, Macmillan, Basingtoke

¹³² A part from the Museveni - Tito Okello conflict in Uganda Kenya only superficially involved in other conflicts such as in Chad, Uganda Tanzania dispute during Amin regime, Western Sahara etcetera. Intricate concern with managing conflicts for Kenya began with the Sudan and Somalia conflicts under the umbrella of IGAD.

The motivations of these regional powers can range from asserting their dominance and exploiting a rival's problems to halting refugee flows and protecting ethnic brethren. India and Pakistan in South Asia are a classic example. Rivals since the partition of the subcontinent in 1947, both countries continue to exploit each other's insurgencies. During the 1990s India has supported five minority groups in Pakistan: the Ahmadis, Hindus, Mohajirs, Pashtuns and Sindhis. Pakistan has extended a helping hand to the Kashmiris, Sikhs, Nagas and Muslims who reside in India.¹³³ Kenya in this context obviously seeks to halt refugee flows and in addition, enhance security and economic benefits as we saw in the previous chapters. As to asserting its dominance, a subject of this chapter, remains a latent motivation.

Table 2.0 (a) below, details the number of interventions by type of intervener.

Table 2.0 (a): Interventions by type of intervener

A	B	C
Major powers	240	25
Regional powers	224	23
Neighbours	268	28
Regional states	48	5
Others	195	20
Totals	975	101

Legend for Table:

A - Type of intervener B - No of interventions C - % of all interventions

Source: Khosla Deepa, "Third World States as interveners in Ethnic Conflicts: Implications for Regional and International Security" in *Third World Quarterly*, 1999, Vol. 20 No. 6 pp. 1143 1157

While countries, which are territorially contiguous to states embroiled in an ethnic dispute are the most likely to become involved, they are only slightly more active than regional or major powers. Overall, neighbours were responsible for 28% of the total of 975

¹³³ Khosla Deepa, "Third World States as interveners in Ethnic Conflicts: Implications for Regional and International Security" in *Third World Quarterly*, 1999, Vol. 20 No. 6 pp. 1143 – 1157

interventions.¹³⁴ We can classify Kenya both as a neighbour in our case study, Southern Sudan as well as a regional power the perceived challenges notwithstanding. As Khosla points out, “it is interesting to note that only in sub-Saharan Africa do neighbours become involved in over half the region’s interventions.”¹³⁵ See table 2.0 (b) below:

Table 2.0 (b): Type of intervener by region

A	B	C	D	E	F
Asia and the Pacific Islands (482)	89	119	105	43	126
North Africa and the Middle East (138)	29	92	11	3	3
Sub-Saharan Africa (251)	72	13	141	1	24
Latin America and the Caribbean (104)	50	0	11	1	42
Totals (975)	240	224	268	48	195

Legend for the Table:

A – Region [a] C – Regional powers
B – Major powers D – Neighbours
E – Regional states F – Other

Note: (a) Numbers in brackets are the total number of interventions in each region

Source: Khosla Deepa, “Third World States as interveners in Ethnic Conflicts: Implications for Regional and International Security” in *Third World Quarterly*, 1999, Vol. 20 No. 6 pp. 1143 – 1157

One cogent explanation is that, while territorial boundaries were often arbitrarily drawn in most Third World regions in the colonial era, it is in Africa that they are the most haphazard. Numerous ethnic groups such as the Tutsis and the Somalis are spread across three or more, often-neighbouring states and the Maasais in two states. This situation was a major concern for Kenya’s territorial integrity in the immediate post independence period and remains a soft spot. These divisions might make some African governments including Kenya, more willing to intervene in neighbouring countries in support of their territorial integrity which neighbours have laid claim to, and ethnic kin.

The next most active types of interveners are major and regional powers. While not being responsible for the majority of interventions, major powers remain engaged in Third

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid

World regions in the post-cold war period. We are belaboring this point because of Kenya's dual position as a neighbour to conflict prone countries with interests and a regional power (at least to an extent). Its interventionary tendency in these conflicts is therefore better understood within the contexts of regional power structure that puts it above its neighbours who would have equally been interested in managing these conflicts. It must be unique that Kenya is hosting two peace talks concurrently within the IGAD framework in spite of the existence of other IGAD member states and other "peace loving" states in the region that qualify to undertake and spearhead the peace talks. This is the thrust of the hypothesis of Kenya re-asserting its hegemonic tendencies in the region through involvement in the management of these conflicts.

The United Nations on its part has been a major avenue for peacemaking and conflict management. However it does not vividly recognise the important role of regional powers in regional conflict management. Article 53 of Chapter III of the UN Charter states that, the Charter does not preclude "the existence of regional arrangement or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations".¹³⁶ In this, the charter only recognizes regional organizations in managing and resolving conflicts however individual nation states are not given similar acknowledgment which may prove to be a big flaw in the diplomacy of conflict management.

As Knight, W. Andy,¹³⁷ notes, if the tasks of global governance, particularly in the fields of peacemaking and preventive diplomacy, are to be shared among all the potential

¹³⁶ United Nations Charter

¹³⁷ Knight, W. Andy, "Towards a subsidiarity model for peacemaking and preventive diplomacy: making Chapter VIII of the UN Charter operational." In, *Third World Quarterly*, March, 1996, Vol. 17 No.1, p. 31

entities that have specific competencies in the field of security, then we may need to reinterpret Chapter VIII to include not only regional 'intergovernmental' arrangements, but any arrangement that can conceivably aid in the process of preventing conflict and maintaining the peace. Today, this could involve both state and non-state actors operating at sub-state, national, transnational, regional, trans-regional and international levels.

During his visit to Kenya in 2004, the Secretary General of the United Nations acknowledged the important role that Kenya has played and continues to play in regional conflict management especially in the on going peace processes on Southern Sudan conflict. Whereas this conflict is mediated within the framework of IGAD it was apparent that Kenya as a state not as a member of IGAD took the credit for the forward leaps that have been made towards achieving peace in the country. Opponents of Kenya's domination of the regions conflict management arena have argued that Kenya is simply a host and facilitator to the peace talks and not the mediator. While this is somewhat true, Kenya's actual role goes beyond being simply a host. Its immense contribution in terms of resources, human and financial is un-doubtedly recognizable. Its commitment resilience and zeal goes beyond those of a mere host and this must be conceptualized as being both a function of its vested interests and several national considerations at stake.

CHAPTER THREE
KENYA'S REGIONAL POLICY: KENYA – SUDAN RELATIONS IN
PERSPECTIVE

3.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter situates the study within a foreign policy context and the various historical aspects of Kenya's foreign policy that have shaped Kenya's diplomacy of conflict management in the region and Sudan in specific. In essence it is a precursor to the consideration of some of these variables in the identified scope of the study. It provides a historical foreign policy perspective to the issues under study in a wider context of regional conflict management. We shall use a thematic rather than chronological approach in this examination. The sub – themes shall revolve around sources of foreign policy for Kenya.

Putting foreign policy in a conceptual perspective, whereas foreign policy focuses on the external environment, its origin in terms of formulation remains domestic. It can therefore be perceived as an externalized domestic policy, the guiding principle being national interest, power and security. James Rosenau¹³⁸ argues that, foreign policy consists of the external behaviour of the states; it is what individuals representing the state do or do not do in their interactions with other individuals, groups, and officials else where in the world. To him differences must be drawn in the analysis of foreign policy as orientations, plans and behaviour. That these aspects should be understood as independent, intervening, and dependent variables of foreign policy analysis or as inputs, decision-making, and output phases through which governments sustain their ties with the external world. Conflict

¹³⁸ Rosenau, J., 1976, "The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy" in Rosenau *et al World Politics*, Free Press, New York, pp. 16-17

management as an externalised domestic policy must be situated within the cardinal state principles of national interest embodied in power and security.

Kenya has over the years been involved in the conflicts in the region both as a mediator and manager. The 1970s and early 1980s saw Kenya involve in the Congo, Morocco – Western Sahara and Chad conflicts within the framework of OAU earning it both respect and clout in the continent with a little disappointment especially in the case of Chad. However the last two decades was the most active of all for Kenya in conflict management. This, it has done both independently and within regional organizational frameworks (read IGAD). Key to this period has been the Sudan conflict. Several variables have been at play in this process. Whereas systemic variables affected the country's posture on continental Africa and other international issues, national variables have been seen to affect Kenya's foreign policy in East Africa. As John Howell argues, "Kenya's foreign policy rotated between theory of realism" (which he calls conservative) and the theory of idealism (radical)" The policy of realism operated with respect to Kenya's activities in East Africa while continentally and internationally Kenya was guided by idealism."¹³⁹

3.1 SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

The desire to protect Kenya's territorial integrity shaped Kenya's policy of living in harmony (good neighborliness) with all its neighbors. From the onset Kenya had the experience of threats both to its territorial integrity and security from the secessionist movements in the former Northern Frontier District (NFD). Somalia for instance cited historical, cultural and racial reasons in laying claim to parts of Kenyan territory in North Eastern province. The fear was that the ineffective handling of the Somali situation could

¹³⁹ See, Orwa K, 1994 "Continuity and Change: Kenya's Foreign Policy From Kenyatta to Moi" in Oyugi W., *Politics and Administration in East Africa*, EAEP, Nairobi p. 300

have had dire consequences. Moderation would prevail over radicalism in guiding the new states foreign policy. These were both reflected in the KANU manifesto of 1961 and 1960 KANU constitution. By 1963 upholding of pre-independence status quo in East Africa had become a necessity.

The cogent issue was that, if Kenya gave an inch of its land, a domino effect could ensue from Uganda, Sudan and Tanzania: Uganda in the west of Rift Valley, Tanzania over the Maasai in Kenya, and Sudan over areas running north-wards from Lokichogio triangle. In addition, as Odhiambo points out, “the existence of nomadic peoples across Kenya’s common border with Ethiopia also raised the issue of legitimate borders.”¹⁴⁰ Indeed it was over the same period that a dispute arose between Kenya and Sudan over the Lokichogio triangle. The desire to protect Kenya’s territorial integrity largely shaped Kenya’s policy of living in harmony with its neighbors. The argument as Orwa Katete puts it, is that, “national or domestic aspirations cannot be achieved in an environment of internal and regional insecurity and instability.”¹⁴¹ It is important to note that over the years through present, insecurity in the country’s North Eastern North rift regions and proliferation of firearms has been blamed on the instability in the neighboring states particularly Sudan. This is argued, in this case, against the backdrop of several claims to Kenya’s territory, including the Kenya Sudan dispute over the Lokichogio triangle.

The internal insecurity in North Eastern province and shifta activities further aggravated the problems. The former Northern Frontier District conflict had two sides, first there was the external, which involved territorial claim and two, there was the domestic one involving ethnic irredentism including armed struggle in the form of shiftas. The arising

¹⁴⁰ Odhiambo, N., “Summitry System as a Mechanism for Conflict Resolution in East Africa” MA Thesis, Department of Government, University of Nairobi, 1990

¹⁴¹ Orwa K, 1994 Op Cit., p. 306

national security policy was hence the commitment to guard Kenya's borders. The desire to protect Kenya's territorial integrity shaped Kenya's policy of living in harmony with its neighbours. Orwa argues that, "Kenyatta also sought to achieve the policy of regional harmony and status quo by military balance through defense agreements with Britain and Ethiopia and by increasing national military capability and to achieve internal security and rapid economic development."¹⁴² A balance of power policy is here argued with reference to Kenya's relation with Uganda under Amin, allying with Ethiopia to check Somalia and increasing military spending on equipment and expansion of the personnel in addition to persuading the US not to support Somalia in its war with Ethiopia.

The OAU's appointment of Kenyatta as the chairman of the important ad hoc OAU Congo Commission to meditate on the crisis in Congo was a further vindication of Kenya's regional policy of harmony and good neighborliness. In other words, as a peace loving state it stood a greater chance of bringing peace elsewhere. The threat in 1965 by Johnston administration in the US to withdraw aid to Kenya as a result of its stance on the Congo crisis and criticism of the U.S exemplifies the challenges that come with the opportunities within the context of Bruce Moon's¹⁴³ "Foreign policy of dependent states."

The diplomacy of conflict management is not necessarily regional, hence can be from within or without. Terrorism has presented a security threat to Kenya. Kenya has thrice been a victim of terrorists' activities in 1981 (Norfolk Hotel bombing), 1998 (American Embassy bombing) and 2002 (Kikambala bombing) due to its closeness with Western interests. The northern neighbours especially Sudan, have consequently been accused of being either sympathetic to terrorists or due to the lack of government control are providing

¹⁴² Ibid, pp. 305-306

¹⁴³ Moon, B., "Foreign Policy of The Dependent State" in *International Studies Quarterly*, 1983 Vol. 27 p. 431

a conducive environment for terrorists activities. The mediation of conflict in Sudan is therefore seen as a means to reducing security risks resulting from terrorist activities.

3.2 PERSONALITY AND IDIOSYNCRATIC FACTORS

The formulation and conduct of foreign policy, and conflict management for that matter, is in every aspect dependent on the personnel charged with the responsibility, whether at the bureaucratic/ institutional or personalized levels. In looking at the policy variance in Kenyan history, the past regimes come handy in considering similarities and differences in terms of personality and idiosyncratic variables. To Orwa,¹⁴⁴ whereas there was no major departure from Kenyatta regime to the Moi regime: the difference was in Moi's personal involvement in foreign policy matters as opposed to Kenyatta's low profile, which gave room to his lieutenants in the foreign policy making and execution apparatus.

Explained probably by his old age, the foreign policy posture may not be attributed wholly to his personal orders but to the officers that were charged with the responsibility of foreign affairs. This does not exempt Kenya at that time from the general characteristics of foreign policies of countries with personalized rule. It does not likewise mean the decision making process was by any means organizational, bureaucratic or rational. They still remained personalized.

The demise of president Kenyatta put Moi at the helm of both the country's leadership and an opportunity to curve out his status as an African statesman. Moi's personal character and conviction shaped Kenya's foreign policy in the post Kenyatta regime. His realization that he did not enjoy the regional and international respect that Kenyatta commanded propelled his anxiety to initiate foreign policy shifts to allow him play

¹⁴⁴ Orwa, K., 1994, Op Cit., p. 307

Kenyatta's role. Moi had the first task of consolidating his image as a regional peacemaker. During his tenure as OAU's chairman he had had a high profile in the OAU's efforts to manage some of Africa's intractable conflicts¹⁴⁵ such as the Chad and Western Sahara conflicts. As Mwangi¹⁴⁶ notes, the Nairobi session of the implementation Committee set up by the OAU Assembly in June 1981 by resolution AH/ Res. 103 (XVIII), which president Moi chaired, was acclaimed as a tremendous achievement of the OAU by Tanzanian Foreign Minister Salim Salim.¹⁴⁷ His departure from the OAU obviously created a void for Moi and there was need to quickly fill it. The Sudan conflict for instance presented him with an opportunity to pursue this goal.¹⁴⁸

In addition the pre- 1985 rivalry between Kenya and Tanzania for pre-eminence in the region in the diplomacy of conflict management had put Tanzania at a higher pedestal especially considering Tanzania's involvement in conflicts in Southern Africa in Namibia, Mozambique, Angola and Uganda in East Africa. Further still Kenya's covert and inconsistent handling of the South African situation with regard to the OAU,¹⁴⁹ led to it being viewed as reactionary. The pre-eminent dent on Kenya's international image warranted a corrective measure, and playing the role of a regional peacemaker came handy. The Conflict in Sudan could not have come at a better time. President Moi therefore went into the management of this conflict frontally and personally.

The philosophical rationale for this policy was the argument that there was need to make the statement internationally that Africans were capable of managing their own

¹⁴⁵ Chazan, Naomi *et al*, 1992, *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa*, Boulder Co., 2nd Ed Riemer p. 356

¹⁴⁶ Mwangi, M., 1994, "The International Management of Internal Conflicts in Africa: The Uganda Mediation 1985," PhD Thesis Rutherford College, University of Kent at Canterbury p. 280

¹⁴⁷ Weekly Review, August 28th 1981, p. 13

¹⁴⁸ Mwangi, M., 1994, *Op Cit*. pp. 280-281

¹⁴⁹ Musambai, K., 1995, "The Politics of Foreign Policy Execution: Consistency and Inconsistency in Kenya's Foreign Policy towards South Africa 1978-1992" MA Thesis Department of Government University of Nairobi.

conflicts: that not only had Africa come of age but also that Africans understood the conflict in the continent better and were thus best placed to manage them.¹⁵⁰ In restating OAU's policy against foreign intervention and African management of African problems, Kenya had an eye on its detractors in the OAU who were becoming increasingly vocal. The involvements in various conflicts in the region arguably qualify as damage control mechanism on the part of Kenya.

His personal conviction that governments in power of whatever form should never be overthrown by force made him opt for mediation in Okello – Museveni conflict as a way of prolonging Tito Okello's tenure or at least consolidating it in Uganda. This he did in an environment of skepticism with Museveni's National Resistance Movement ability to overthrow the government in Kampala. This conviction was also seen in his trying to mediate the Zairian conflict in 1997 when he became openly pro – Mobutu. The failure in the mediation of the Uganda conflict can be attributed to Moi's personality, that while he brought the parties together there was no game plan to resolve the conflict.

This is the same argument that Stephen Walker¹⁵¹ makes in his examination of Kissinger's operational code and the Vietnam War. President Moi's limited education could also be seen to explain his conviction and approach to conflict management in the region. In addition, the pressure from the wave of change in the region characterized by the gaining of power by the so called "Dar-es-Salaam crowd"¹⁵² younger than Moi and with obviously divergent 'operational code' as it were, exacerbated Moi's need to re-assert himself to fill the gap of isolation.

¹⁵⁰ Mwagiru, M., 1994, Op Cit. p. 278

¹⁵¹ Walker, Stephen "Interface Between Beliefs and Behaviour: Henry Kissinger's Operational Code and Vietnam War" in *Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol. 21 March 1977 p.135

¹⁵² This refers to the acronym for Museveni, Males Zenawi, Afeworki, the late Kabila and Mkapa all in Dar es Salaam University at the same time

The lessons learnt in these conflicts factually guided Moi's re-orientation of his approach to conflict management in Sudan. In mind here is the organizational framework within which he could cushion any inherent weaknesses in his personality. In mind here is the IGAD framework, at the on set of the Sudan conflict management, Moi presided over the negotiations both as the chairman of IGAD and host of the talks. Whereas in various occasions he delegated the negotiations to his lieutenants, he maintained a personal grip on the process ensuring that distractions were carefully waded.

This Indeed Moi's personal commitment to management of the Sudan conflict has been seen as one of the key reasons for success of the process. His unwavering dedication to the process has largely made it difficult to dissociate him with the peace process even after his departure from presidency. Through his Moi African Institute (MAI), he has continued to retain a link with substantial influence of the parties to the conflict especially, the SPLM/A leadership. In fact Moi has demonstrated that he is not about to retire from involvement in regional conflict management especially in Sudan.

3.3 ECONOMIC FACTORS

Historically since independence, trade between Kenya and its neighbours have been in Kenya's favour and therefore anything that would tilt that balance would not be welcome. In realist perspective, Kenya must prefer regimes and political climate where this position is not only perpetuated but also enhanced. This is for instance, the argument Mwangiru¹⁵³ presents in his examination of Kenya's involvement in the Uganda conflict. Because Kenya's

¹⁵³ Mwangiru, M., 1994, Op Cit

economic and commercial activities are central to relations with the other East African States and since this regional commerce is a major variable in Kenya's economic development.¹⁵⁴

Kenya has pursued a conservative and legitimist Foreign Policy with regard to her relations with other East African States.¹⁵⁵ The furtherance of Kenya's economic interests therefore relies significantly on stability in the region. For instance, during the reconstruction of Southern Sudan after the end of war in Sudan in the seventies, Kenya had done well in terms of exports (See table 3.0 below) and employment opportunities for Kenyans. But the resumption of hostilities in Sudan in 1983 adversely affected Kenya's economy since it could no longer reap the economic benefits it had hitherto enjoyed.¹⁵⁶

Table. 3.0: Kenya Trade With Sudan Exports Imports and Balance of Trade 1978-1987 (K£'000)

Year	Exports	Imports	Balance
1978	7027	23	7004
1979	7665	210	7455
1980	9949	8	9941
1981	12426	22	12404
1982	18882	18	18864
1983	24602	17	24585
1984	20999	2397	18602
1985	30047	12	30035
1986	21450	77	21377
1987	22229	332	21897

Source: Adapted from Kenya Economic Survey 1979, 1982, 1986 and 1988

From table 3.0 above, it is notable that the period of 1978 to 1985 witnessed a steady increase of trade in terms of exports from Kenya to Sudan reaching its peak in 1985. 1986 however saw a drastic drop in trade of about 27% from the 1985 peak. This is likely because

¹⁵⁴ Orwa, K., "Diplomacy and International Relations" in Ochieng, W R., ED *Themes in Kenyan History*, Nairobi Heinemann, 1990 p.225

¹⁵⁵ Howell, 1968, "An Analysis of Kenya's Foreign Policy" in *Journal of Modern African Studies* 1968 Vol. 3. pp. 29-48

¹⁵⁶ Mwagiru, M., 1994 Op Cit p. 279

of the shock that the resurgence of conflict in Southern Sudan in 1983 caused to the business environment.

It is this that Mwagiru points out. The boom, he identifies as resultant from the reconstruction activities in Southern Sudan after the end of the first wave of violent conflict. The decline that followed in 1986 is a manifestation of the adverse effects of the last wave of violence that was subject of January 2005 peace deal spearheaded by Kenya. The big margin in the balance of trade between Kenya and Sudan proves the fact of preponderance and dominance of Kenyan economy in terms of exports to Sudan over the years. This reality is reason enough to cause upsets for the Kenyan economy in case of a tilt in the balance as a result of whatever factors, in this case security and internal strife in Sudan.

The urgent need to ameliorate these economic effects has we shall see in the next chapter motivated Kenya to actively engage in managing conflict in the Southern Sudan. This consideration must also be put within a wider context of Western economic interests in the country. Some of the western investments have subsidiaries or regional headquarters in Kenya. They therefore in advertently support Kenya's efforts at achieving peace in the Southern Sudan as a means to ensuring their interests are cushioned.

3.4 GEO-STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

Geographical positions define and condition advantages accrued and disadvantages suffered by the various states in the international system. Kenya had and has its share of these givens in the East African region. To a large extent Kenya has taken advantage of and utilized its special geographical position both economically and politically especially during

the cold war period. As Nying'uro¹⁵⁷ argues, the East – West rivalry that characterized the cold world war period strengthened Kenya's special position. "Proximity to the horn of Africa, the middle East and the Indian ocean, all vital theaters of the cold war, gave Kenya its high geo – strategic value. Seen as a possible launching site for a deployment force in the event of an incursion into the Persian gulf by the Soviet or others...in fact, because of the interest the west had in Kenya and Kenya's role as a bulwark against communism, Kenya was viewed as a 'sub imperial' state promoting the interest of the imperial powers."¹⁵⁸

Kenya was therefore important (especially to the west) for ideological and geo – strategic reasons motivated by the desire to keep Kenya and the region within the western bloc and preempt communist influence.¹⁵⁹ In other words the cold war provided Kenya with opportunities and leverage for its foreign policy options. The prevailing international system at that time came with option for different countries, in the case of Kenya derived from its geo-strategic position.

Kenya's deep-water harbor at Mombasa was a potential site for re-supply and refueling in the event of any general war. The US signing of general access with Kenya in the 1980's giving the US military port-of-call rights in Mombasa and the permission to use Mombasa as a base for US military maneuvers in the region exemplified the facts. In addition Kenya could be useful in cushioning the East and Central Africa region against the spread of communism.¹⁶⁰

This historical advantage has been seen as a remarkable source of Kenya's hegemonic development in the region catapulted by the massive support that it got from the

¹⁵⁷ Nying'uro. P O., "External Sources OF Kenya's Democratization Process" in *Journal of Political Science* 1997, Vol. 25 pp. 181 – 182

¹⁵⁸ Ibid pp. 11

¹⁵⁹ Nyinguro, P. O, 1999, "United States Policy and Transition to Democracy in Kenya" PhD Thesis Department of Government and International Studies, University of South Carolina p. 169

¹⁶⁰ Ibid, p. 173

west during that period. Kenya also sought to demonstrate its regional geo-strategic advantage by blocking shipment of military equipment through Mombasa port when Amin laid claim to Kenyan territory in 1976.

The entrenchment of pro-communist regime in the horn of Africa (Ethiopia and Somalia) in the 1970s provided Kenya with further opportunities. This in addition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 raised Kenya's strategic value even higher due to its adjacent position in the Indian Ocean and the need by the US to contain communism in the horn of Africa after losing its ally, Ethiopia. This saw an enhanced U.S – Kenya relation through massive military aid to Kenya. Kenya's military might (perceived or real) has its origin in this rivalry that found its theatre in the region. Kenya by aligning with the west in spite of claiming to be a signatory to the non-aligned movement¹⁶¹ expediently sought to pursue its policy of regional preponderance by taking advantage of the support that the west provided. However, this must be perceived within the context of patron client relations.

Somalia's claim over the northern frontier district and the USSR signing of friendship treaty with Somalia further compelled Kenya to get into military assistance agreement with the U S; a deal it had earlier turned down in 1975. This can be seen as an intersection of interests and concern. The U S concern with containing communism, and Kenya's concern with its territorial integrity, resulting in the need for some form of military and strategic partnership.¹⁶² This can be put in context with Bruce Moon's argument that "... Long term structural relationship that come with opportunity for a weak state and

¹⁶¹ See Orwa's, (1994) argument that, "although non-alignment was a movement triggered by external developments (cold war), in the Kenyan situation it was a policy consistent with the demand of national survival of the a new state as a realistic response to the uncertainty about the reliability of the existing bi-polar international system and the threat to independence by resurgence of neo-colonialism. However non-alignment as conceived and applied in the Kenyatta regime was a conservative and status quo based, as was the policy of good neighborliness. In practice Kenya opted to retain and improve on existing pre-independence links with the west and hardly made any efforts to be really non-aligned.

¹⁶² See Nying'uro P. O, 1999, Op Cit., pp. 184 -185

necessity for the powerful state accompanied by a wide range of penetrative and dependency-producing transactions, undermining the very autonomy of the decision making unit.”¹⁶³

Communism is long gone but with its demise came the new threat to international peace, that is, terrorism. By any standards Kenya’s geo-strategic importance has by no means declined. Indeed the inclusion of Sudan in Presidents Bush’s and US in the class of states supporting terrorism further entrenched Kenya’s geo-strategic importance. The two attacks by terrorists in Kenya in 1998 at the US embassy that led to the loss of more than two hundred lives and the November 2002 Kikambala bombing were largely due to the perception by the terrorists that Kenya is a US ally. The nexus that this proposition creates with reference to conflict management is that, the two states Sudan and Somalia have largely been viewed as harboring terrorists.

The Sudan conflict has been perceived as creating a conducive environment for the operations of the terrorists. Kenya’s coastal (Lamu) and Northern region have therefore remained as training grounds for the US and British military personnel and as stations for monitoring the terrorist friendly Northern neighbours of Kenya. These operations have provided a symbiotic relationship between Kenya, the US and Britain in terms of training for Kenya’s own anti-terrorism squared for its own internal security as well as combined effort at fighting and guarding against the spread terrorists activities both in the region and elsewhere.

Kenya’s proximity to the horn of Africa, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, initially seen as vital theaters of the cold war, are now vital theaters for the war on terrorism, and arguably continue to bestow Kenya with high geo-strategic value. The concern then was

¹⁶³ Moon, B., 1983 Op Cit., p. 321

communism; the concern now is terrorism and the horn of Africa remains in contention with regard to this new threat. Kenya's proximity to this region has likewise remained an important consideration both for the international community's war against terrorism and Kenya's concern with security.

3.5 KENYA – SUDAN RELATIONS: A CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE

Kenya Sudan relations have historically been no less cordial. The disputes over the Lokichogio triangle though short lived were adequate enough to generate animosity between the two states. The mid 1980s came with renewed tensions especially after the resurgence of internal conflict in Southern Sudan orchestrated by the liberation struggles of the Sudan People liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).

The influx of refugees into Northern Kenya and the consequent problems generated a level of nervousness of the Sudanese Government that felt that the refugees had sympathy for the SPLM/A. In 1988 Sudan publicly accused Kenya of allowing SPLM/A to open offices in Nairobi implying that Kenya was supporting the movement. In spite of Nairobi's vehement denial of the charge Sudan went a head to threaten to retaliate by giving support to "Mwakenya", a clandestine group allegedly operating in Kenya with an aim of destabilizing the Kenyan government.¹⁶⁴ In addition the opening of a humanitarian office for the Sudanese refugees in Nairobi was hotly contested by Sudan who argued that there was no need to open a parallel office when there was a Sudanese embassy in Nairobi that the crisis could be handled through.¹⁶⁵

In addition, the opening of Kakuma refugee camp in Turkana, Northern Kenya, in 1991 worsened the animosity. Sudan disputed the site as too close to Sudan and should have

¹⁶⁴ Weekly Review June 10th 1986 p. 52

¹⁶⁵ See Mwachofi Singo, 1996, Op Cit. for more details on the refugee problem and the consequent tension

been opened much deeper into Kenyan territory.¹⁶⁶ It is important to note that in spite of Kenya's mediation of the conflict in Sudan, it started at a time when mutual mistrust and suspicion was evident between the two states. However, over the years the situation has improved and the process significantly – conclusively – progressed.

The essence of the background of inter-state conflicts and animosities is to highlight the important environment within which the mediation process in Southern Sudan was started and operated. We therefore must not be oblivious of the effect of the background of conflict and mistrust would obviously had on the peace processes conducted in Kenya. Kenya had to first demonstrate that the disagreements they have had in the past between them did not influence the direction and preferences it put on the table. The underlying consideration here takes us back to the national interest argument that generates suspicion between parties to conflicts for fear of undercurrents and undisclosed goals that states seek to derive from inter-state interactions.

It is important to note also that, the nature of relations between contiguous states is often determined by endogenous factors accrued from their body politic based on the assumption that, needs of states emanate from their internal situation. The crystallization of specific national interests accruing from the states, affect and are in turn affected by the countries foreign relations with its neighbours. This argument for instance finds a lot of ground in structural realism.¹⁶⁷ In this respect nation states do not only endeavor to

¹⁶⁶ Note that the Kakuma refugee camp lies within 100 miles from the Kenya – Sudan border. This Sudan saw as an advantage to the SPLM/A who they saw as having sympathizers from the refugees in Kenya and therefore camp could easily be used to the advantage of the SPLM/A.

¹⁶⁷ Structural Realism unlike classical realism, takes cognizance of economic and structural realities present in the nation state and factors that additionally influence the way foreign policy behaviour proceed.

concretize their felt interests through statesmen but also project foreign policies reflective of their international situation.¹⁶⁸

3.6 CONCLUSION

Actors' power attributes are *inter alia* the economic or political capabilities at their disposal, which makes it possible for them to push for actualization of their basic goals in interaction. Given that some states have limited power attributes they normally sacrifice certain interests for the attainment of others. The manner in which states apply their power capabilities is thus determined by their external goals and objectives. These objectives are also determined by their internal political systems, such as political stability, instability, economic prowess, which dictate the mode of application of its power capabilities.¹⁶⁹

The diversity and complexity of nation-states' needs and the shifting nature of their power attributes dependent on different interactive conditions objectively condition actions that are in effect seen not to fatally destabilize the status quo. The drive to retain and maintain a state's position in the international system is a function of several state interest-laden policy actions aimed at ensuring a balance in regional equilibrium. In studying Kenya's policy intentions and actions in the region, one must take cognizance of the manifest and material conditions that justify its actions. But more importantly is the unraveling of the latent motives aimed at projecting the national interest embodied in economic and political considerations.

Modern states are innately politically and economically interdependent; they rely upon each other for resources and commodities, which enable them to develop sustainable

¹⁶⁸ Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye, "Power and Interdependence Revisited" *International Organizations Journal* 1987, Vol. 41 No. 4, p. 731

¹⁶⁹ Tirimba Mokaya, H., 1991, "Conflict and Cooperation: The antecedents of Kenya Uganda Relations 1964-1990" MA Thesis Department of Government University of Nairobi, p. 2

and viable economies.¹⁷⁰ The emergent argument here is interdependence and national interest. The regional economic reality is that of interdependence just as it is true of any other region. In fact, the interdependence arising out of proximity and contiguity is such that, it is extremely unrealistic to talk of either Sudan and indeed any other country in the region being self reliant or capable of dispensing of its neighbour (s).

The border closers for instance between Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda in the region were really neither in the interest of the aggrieved parties nor perceived adversaries. The net losses on either side were overwhelming. Even Amin's arrogant disregard for his neighbours were economically unsustainable, he often realized this reality and sort normalization of relations as soon as this reality dawned on him. It is this inter-dependence that conditions Kenya to bring peace in Sudan in anticipation of increased economic benefits from a peaceful southern Sudan. On the other hand Sudan expects reciprocal economic benefits from Kenya. The process of conflict management on either side is therefore inseparably interest laden.

On grounds of cost benefit analysis and relative gain calculations, no one can walk out on the other. This is what Morgenthau has in mind when argues that, this being a world of opposing interests and conflicts among them, moral principles cannot be realized but must be approximated through the ever temporary balancing of interests and the ever precarious settlement of conflicts. Pluralist society through a system of checks and balances should aim at realization of lesser evil rather than absolute good.¹⁷¹

National interest conceptually defines a country's perception of its good *vis-à-vis* the rest. In the relative gain theory, certain national interests have to be sadly sacrificed at the

¹⁷⁰ Holsti, Juaka Kalevi, 1972, *International Politics: A framework for Analysis*, 2nd Ed. New Jersey, Prentice Hall Englewood Cliff, p. 447

¹⁷¹ Morgenthau, Hans J, 1991, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Kalyani, New Delhi p.4

alter of economic gains. However, preponderance that defines hegemony generates the temptation by a state to identify its own interest as regional interest. This is in line with Carr's¹⁷² argument that all nations are tempted and few have been able to resist the temptation for long, to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in the moral purposes of the universe. Men come easily to believe that arrangements agreeable to themselves are beneficial to others and theories of public good which turn out on inspection to be an elegant disguise for some particular national interests are as common in international as in national affairs.

To the realists, the doctrine of the harmony of interests thus serves as an ingenious moral device invoked in perfect sincerity by private privileged groups in order to justify and maintain their dominant position. In realists' perspective, there can be no harmony of interest when power and national security defines national interest.¹⁷³ This reality of international relations explains the unending suspicion with which international affairs is conducted. The fear of one state slyly imposing its own interest upon the other in the process of their interaction cannot be avoided. As we shall see in the subsequent chapters, the negotiations process in the conflict in Sudan had its own share of misgivings and mistrust by various parties including accusation and counter accusation.

In retrospect, the chapter has attempted to highlight key issues that have characterized Kenya Sudan relations over the years. In additions it has discussed the net effects of the nature of conflictual relations that has over the years defined the interaction between these states as neighbours with common interests including, ethnic, cultural, economic, political and strategic considerations as determinants of foreign policy. In this

¹⁷² Carr Hallett E., 1946, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939*, London, Macmillan and Co. p. 75

¹⁷³See Morgenthau, H. J., 1991, *Op Cit.* and Edward Hallett Carr, 1946, *Op Cit.* For a detailed discussion on the relationship between power, national interest and harmony of interest

vein, the chapter has also situated the relation between the countries in a foreign policy perspective by identifying, defining and discussing the central determinants of foreign policy for Kenya that either give it head starts or drawbacks that it has to grapple with. Key here has been economic preponderance, security—including terrorism—, geo-strategy, and idiosyncratic variables.

The import of this background is that, in studying Kenya as a core state we have to identify factors that naturally or derivatively give it an advantage over the others in the region. Further the study of Kenya's purpose for involvement in regional conflict management is as much a foreign policy issue. Indeed the potency and relevance of the concept 'diplomacy of conflict management' that has been widely used in respect of this area of research is drawn from its inherence in foreign policy. This justifies the need for situating the study within a foreign policy perspective.

CHAPTER FOUR

MOTIVATIONS FOR KENYA IN RESOLVING THE SUDAN CONFLICT

4.0 INTRODUCTION

In chapter three we suggestively identified foreign policy considerations that would make Kenya prioritize peace in the region and Sudan in particular and that have historically been central in Kenya's foreign policy posture in the region. We were also able to give a historical background on the inter-state activities that characterized the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s especially with reference to cases of hostilities between Kenya and Sudan at different periods. In this chapter we shall present the issues that have guided and motivated Kenya to persistently pursue peace in Sudan. Further as an attempt to prove or disprove the hypotheses, this chapter will concentrate on hypotheses two and three on economic and security considerations. It is in this chapter that the primary data relating to these issues will also be incorporated within the scope of the study. It will put in context the prospects and outcomes of the peace processes on Sudan.

International politics, like all politics is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim. Statesmen and people may ultimately seek freedom, security, economic prosperity or power itself. They may define their goals in terms of religious, philosophic, economic or social ideals... whenever they try to realize their goals by means of international politics; they do so by striving for power.¹⁷⁴ All politics, domestic or and international, reveals three basic patterns, that is all political phenomena can be reduced to one of three basic types. A political policy seeks either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁴ Morgenthau, H. J., 1991, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Kalyani, New Delhi p. 31

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid* p. 52

These different patterns of international policies do not necessarily correspond to conscious motivations in the minds of statesmen or supporters of the respective foreign policies. They may even be oblivious of the actual character of policies they pursue and support. The essence of this argument is that, certain policies pursued and benefits accrued there from accrued may actually not be the intended ones. The combination of the three patterns of international policies may be achieved at different times either intentionally or without presuppositions. Kenya in engaging in conflict management perceptibly has manifest intentions, however there are obviously certain intentions that are latent and as well unintended. All these will be considered in studying the motivations for Kenya's involvement in conflict management.

4.1 SECURITY AS A MOTIVATOR FOR KENYA TO RESOLVE AND MANAGE THE SUDAN CONFLICT

4.1.1 BACKGROUND

Territorial integrity is the fulcrum around which Kenya's relations with Sudan revolved in the 1960s and 1970s. Territorial integrity here is based on the assumption that each state has fixed and safe boundaries, which are not subject to external violations. Thus, the right to defend territory in the possession of a state clearly belongs to the state.¹⁷⁶ For the African states, the principle of territorial integrity has been widely invoked in their relations. The artificial boundaries of African states were drawn by Europeans to serve the European purpose, on bases of European power politics. Very little concern for African interests or needs was included in the process.¹⁷⁷ Michael M. Gunter argues that, "since many

¹⁷⁶ Bowett, D. W., 1958, *Self Defense in International Law*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, p. 38

¹⁷⁷ Mark W. DeLancy, (ed), 1979, *Aspects of International Relations in Africa*, African Studies Programme Indiana University, Bloomington, p. 7

international borders are artificial creations in the sense that they do not reflect geographic, ethnic, or historical facts, we may only be seeing the tip of the ice berg. Beneath it may lay almost limitless insecurity, chaos and war.¹⁷⁸

For purposes of peace and security African states via the OAU reaffirmed their commitment to adhering to the principle of territorial integrity based on the colonial boundaries inherited at independence. The motivation to respect this principle as K. Adar points out is largely based on the domino effect. It is assumed that allowing changes of boundaries of a state or states through conflicts or otherwise, no matter how legitimate such claims might be, would lead to similar demands among other contested boundaries elsewhere.¹⁷⁹

We are belaboring the point on territorial integrity not because we are oblivious of the risk of drifting away from internal conflict management and resolution in Sudan to inter – state conflict between Kenya and Sudan, which is not the subject of discussion, but because the issue has not lost currency.

Sudan over the years has had its share of disputes over territory with Kenya; the dispute over the Lokichogio triangle stands, in its own right, as an inter-state issue worth raising. However the more protracted dispute between Kenya and Sudan stems from the resurgence of insurgency in the South in 1983. The resultant diplomatic row over the presence of the SPLM/A leadership in Kenya and the consequent disputes over Sudanese refugees' presence in Kenya merit noting as having a bearing on Kenya's position as a mediator of the conflict in Sudan. This may now be water under the bridge but it certainly

¹⁷⁸ Gunter, M. Michael, 1979, "Self Determination or Territorial Integrity: The United Nations in Confusion" in *World Affairs* Vol. 141 Winter, p. 212

¹⁷⁹ Korwa, Adar G., 1994 *Kenya Foreign Policy Behaviour Towards Somalia, 1963-1983*, University Press of America, New York, p. 3

explains in part the mistrust that characterized the initial stages of the negotiations from 1993 to 2001 when no remarkable achievements were made.

The security considerations for Kenya – Sudan relations including presently, must therefore not ignore territorial integrity and sovereignty. In this reference territorial integrity is used to mean the power of a sovereign state to exercise supreme authority over all persons and things within its territory. While sovereignty is an attribute of the will of the people of the nation, and which consists in its supreme juridical authority, based on natural law and exercised in the framework of rules necessary for the peaceful and harmonious co-existence of nations.¹⁸⁰ It is worth noting that, in spite of the dying out of inter – state conflict between Kenya and Sudan, the consequent break out of internal conflict in the country brought in a new dimension to the security issues in the North Eastern Province and Kenya continues to pursue the same goal of ensuring security in the province more than three decades down the road. As president Kenyatta wished 37 years ago, “all that Kenya wants is an end to bloodshed, misery, and waste, so that our people in North Eastern areas may play a full part in our government’s plans for development, and so that they may enjoy peace in the area and share in full benefits of our national prosperity.”¹⁸¹

Our focus will be on the internal conflict in the country. However, we need the inter-state conflict background to enable us delineate certain hurdles that may stand in the way of the peace processes as a result of such historical backgrounds that naturally generate vested interests.

¹⁸⁰ The Athens World Conference, 1964, *World Peace Through Law*, West Publishing Co., St. Paul Minn, p. 105

¹⁸¹ Government of Kenya “Main address by his Excellency the President Mzee Jommo Kenyatta at State opening of Parliament, 15th February 1967, Government Printers, Nairobi p. 6

4.1.2 SMALL ARMS PROLIFERATION AS A SOURCE OF INSECURITY IN THE REGION

Kenya's borders in the north with Sudan, and the north rift borders with Uganda have been highly porous. The conflicts in these countries have ensured steady flow of illegal firearms that are used for criminal activities in Kenya. This has been a great concern for Kenyan authorities in their bid to ensure security both in the country and along its borders. The short-term remedy has been the beefing up of security along its borders and strict border controls. Indeed there is currently an on going security operation to mop up illegal firearms in the region. However this has not worked effectively given the big expanse of the border and inadequate personnel to man these borders. The long-term solution that Kenya has taken is to mediate and resolve the conflict in Sudan so as to in part rid the horn of Africa of firearms in the wrong hands that eventually find their way into Kenya.¹⁸² At a wider level, small arms and light weapons have been identified as playing a key role in facilitating and fueling other cross – border activities such as cattle rustling, drug trafficking and trade in endangered species of wildlife. For instance, in the pastoral communities bordering Kenya and Sudan, there are often deadly skirmishes between communities from either sides of the border.

Conflicts and incidents of cattle rustling date back to about a century but were not characterized by today's high mortality rates. The availability of small arms among pastoralists' countries has turned these conflicts into brutal low intensity wars as Thokozani¹⁸³ calls them.

¹⁸² Interview with Under – Secretary Office of the President – Internal Security

¹⁸³ Thokozani, Thusi “ Assessing Small Arms Control Initiatives in East Africa: The Nairobi Declaration” in *African Security Review*, 2003, Vol. 12 No. 2 p. 19

'Small arms'¹⁸⁴ is used here to refer to; those weapons designed for personal use by several persons serving as crew; including revolvers and self loading pistols and carbines, sub-machine guns, hand held under barrel and mounted grenades launchers, portable anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers for anti-aircraft and anti-tank rockets and missile systems, and mortars of calibers of less than 100mm. Ammunitions and explosives form an integral part of small and light weapons used in conflicts and includes cartridges for small arms, shells and missiles for light weapons, anti-personnel and anti-tank grenades, land mines, explosives and mobile containers with missiles or shells for single action anti aircraft and anti-tank systems.

Small arms are pervasive through out the North-Eastern area of Kenya flowing from conflicts in Sudan, Uganda, and Somalia. Their presence have intensified security concerns, making attempts to control animal diseases¹⁸⁵ establish and maintain development initiatives nearly impossible. Insecurity and conflict have made it more difficult for pastoralists to take animals to markets, impacting on markets' ability to function; economic stability in the region has continued to erode.¹⁸⁶ The implicit fact here is the nexus between insecurity in the region and economic development. Most of the communities living in the North Eastern parts of Eastern and Rift Valley provinces depend on animals for their livelihood. Any deterrence from effective management of their stock and exchange practically impoverishes them and this is the concern of the Kenyan authorities and other NGOs operating in the region. This point combines effectively with our next subsection on economic variables as a source of influence for managing conflicts in the region.

¹⁸⁴ United Nations General Assembly A/54/258 definition of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)

¹⁸⁵ Note that animal husbandry is the main economic activity in the region and anything that deters the effective management of this sub – sector hits hard at the nerve of the regions economic sustainability and food security.

¹⁸⁶ Frank, Emily “ Participatory approach for local peace Initiatives: The Lodwar Border Harmonization Meeting” in *Africa Today* EBSCO Publishing 2003

It is estimated that there are five million small arms circulating among 189 million inhabitants of the pastoral areas of Eastern and the horn of Africa.¹⁸⁷ These arms have also increased cross – border raids between the Karamojong and Pokot, the Samburu, Marakwet, Sapiny or Sabawoots and Bukusu. These conflicts occur in the border areas of the North Eastern Uganda and Western parts of Kenyan border.¹⁸⁸ Similar conflicts are also witnessed in the Turkana and Kenyan Somali areas of North Eastern Province between Borana and Rendille in Moyale-Marsabit and between Aquran and Garre in Isiolo district. Isiolo is particularly important because of its strategic location on the Great North Road from Nairobi to Addis Ababa. It is therefore a gateway between North and South, serving as an ideal conduit for small arms from neighbouring districts and from Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia. The small arms trade along this route is lucrative, as merchants can buy an AK-47 for the equivalent of Ksh. 5, 000 in Somalia... and sell it for Ksh. 50, 000 in Kenya.¹⁸⁹

As a result of the above situation most analysts are of the view that the Karamojong and North Eastern/ Eastern region is awash with guns that originate from the war in Sudan, and Northern Uganda.¹⁹⁰ This has been the more reason why Kenya is interested in resolving the conflict in Southern Sudan. Indeed as Kenya's former Minister for Foreign Affairs and central player in the Sudan conflict noted:

We wear two hearts, Kenya as a peace loving state wants the best for our northern neighbours, Sudan and including Somalia. On the other hand the rampant insecurity in North Eastern Rift Valley and indeed Nairobi and other major urban centres is

¹⁸⁷ Kingston, B., "The state as Raider among the Karamojong: Where there are no guns, they use the Threat of guns" Paper presented at the Seminar on Historical and the Collapse of the Karamojong Culture: Premature Reports of trends, African Studies Seminar, St. Anthony's College, University of Oxford 13th June 2002 pp. 1

¹⁸⁸ Thokozani Thusi Op Cit

¹⁸⁹ Khadiagala, M. Gilbert 2004, "Protection and Poverty: Community Weapons Collection Experiences in Northern Kenya", A report Commissioned by Oxfam GB, Nairobi, p. 30

¹⁹⁰ Ibid p. 2

largely as a result of the apparent free flow of firearms from our neighbours in conflict. Peace in these countries is therefore in their interest as much as in ours.¹⁹¹

A survey of crime in Kenya indicate that, most banditry and cattle rustling activities attributed to the availability of small arms and light weapons took place in Rift Valley Province with 41.3% followed by Eastern, 18.9% and Coast, 14.7% North Eastern, 11.7% in 2001. Most affected were Marakwet, West Pokot, Turkana, and Samburu in Rift Valley. In Eastern province, the most affected were, Isiolo and Meru North. While in North Eastern, both Garissa and Wajir experienced banditry incidents.¹⁹² Cattle rustling is equally prevalent in these provinces. Rift Valley leads with 67.9% in 2001, North Eastern 14.3%, and Eastern 10.7%.¹⁹³ Noted also, is the type of weapons used, which were mostly, in fact, 60% were AK-47s and G3s Rifles.¹⁹⁴ These weapons may have been preferred due to their effectiveness over long distance and easy availability of the weapons from neighbouring countries experiencing violent conflict such as Sudan, Somalia and Uganda.

In the case of coast province and Eastern, and North Eastern the geographical proximity of the Garissa district, which borders Somalia, may have influenced the banditry in the regions in view of the instability experienced in Somalia in the past decade and the easy availability of firearms from the conflict.¹⁹⁵ The pertinent issue here is that, the provinces mentioned share international borders with countries such as Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, and Ethiopia, which have been experiencing, armed conflict. This promotes proliferation of firearms especially because of porous borders.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹¹ Interview with Kenya's former Minister for Foreign Affairs July 2004

¹⁹² Security Research Information Centre, 2002, Kenya Crime Survey 2001, SRIC, Nairobi p. 51

¹⁹³ Ibid p.62

¹⁹⁴ Ibid p. 47

¹⁹⁵ Ibid p. 51

¹⁹⁶ Ibid p.52

It is estimated that there are over 130,000 illegal arms in circulation in Kenya.¹⁹⁷ The weapons influx is seen largely to be exacerbated by the refugee flow into the country. “This situation undermines the rule of law and fan a culture of violence and impunity”.¹⁹⁸ Nairobi experiences the highest number of robbery, hijacking, murder and general insecurity. This has largely been attributed to infiltration of illegal firearms from the conflict prone countries in Northern Kenya and the increasing number of refugees in the city.

The main concern however is the conflict in Southern Sudan¹⁹⁹ from which these refugees escape and find easy access to firearms that eventually find their way into Nairobi. Indeed as noted by an Oxfam GB study, small arms trade in Northern Kenya, in Garissa for instance, “the source of the weapons is Somalia and Sudan especially in the upper Shabelle and lower Juba. The traffickers get in through Diff, Liboi, and Daadab and carry their deadly cargo by lorry, bus or disguised as livestock traders. Most of these arms find their way into Ijara, Tana River, Ukambani and Nairobi.”²⁰⁰ Most of the weapons are normally destined for markets in Eastleigh and Kariobangi North estates of Nairobi.²⁰¹

It is against this backdrop that the Nairobi Declaration (now with a permanent monitoring secretariat in Nairobi set up in 2005) on small arms proliferation was signed in March 2000. Signatories significantly include; Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and other Great Lakes region states such as Burundi, Rwanda, and Democratic Republic of Congo. The interesting combination of these countries reveals the nature of historical, economic, political, and socio-cultural linkages that define their relations in times of both

¹⁹⁷ East African Standard July 20th 2004 p. 4

¹⁹⁸ Interview with a senior Provincial Administration Official July 2004

¹⁹⁹ Read Somalia also

²⁰⁰ Khadiagala, M. Gilbert 2004, “Protection and Poverty: Community Weapons Collection Experiences in Northern Kenya”, A report Commissioned by Oxfam GB, Nairobi. See also Daily Nation Special Report, July 29th 2004, pp. 11- 12

²⁰¹ Ibid

peace and war.²⁰² The Nairobi declaration emphasizes and reflects the cross – border dynamics of conflict, instability and small arms proliferation as it affects countries of the two sub-regions of the horn of Africa and Great Lakes. From the outset,

The framers of the Nairobi Declaration underlined the direct relationship between internal instability and the availability of small arms, and emphasized the urgency of resolving civil conflicts. Insecurity and conflicts in a number of states, they asserted, had created extensive cross-border markets for small arms, and thus it is necessary to seek negotiated solutions and to nurture the environments for addressing the root causes of these conflicts.²⁰³

In the implementation of the Nairobi Declaration, attention is devoted to enhancing regional regulatory frameworks to curb small arms flow as well as addressing the numerous grievances that encourage recourse to arms in individual countries. Pastoral communities in Northern Kenya have long felt the impact of small arms notably “weapons such as the AK 47, G-3, M-16, Uzi and other semi automatic rifles. Most of these are readily available from sources in war-torn Somalia, the now seemingly peaceful Southern Sudan, Uganda, and Ethiopia.”²⁰⁴

One needs to note that, the Nairobi Declaration stresses on national initiatives within a regional context to control small arms proliferation. This poses a major challenge that has a bearing on this study. Most of these countries are in conflict, including Sudan, which is our area of focus. Though the existence of this conflict does not necessarily mean small arms control measures must be put on hold, they do impact on the authorities’ ability

²⁰² Thokozani, Thusi Op Cit. p. 20

²⁰³ Khadiagala, M. Gilbert 2004, Op Cit, p. 11

²⁰⁴ Khadiagala, M. Gilbert 2004, Op Cit, p. 10

to regulate small arms (and where necessary disarm people) and the will to do so in conditions of severe insecurity.²⁰⁵

The success of the Nairobi declaration is therefore subject to the conclusive management and end of these conflicts in the region. Somebody must take the lead. Kenya as a secondary party and victim of the conflicts must by any means abrogate itself the duty of facilitating negotiations and mediating peace in its Northern neighbours if the proliferation of small arms is to be effectively controlled. This is to directly and by extension mitigate the rising cases of insecurity in the country courtesy of easy access to weapons of crime. Further, as the war on terror expands to Eastern Africa, small arms proliferation and trafficking will receive more attention. This has put Kenya at the center of managing these conflicts and vindicates its important role in regional conflict management.

Kenya's pivotal role for instance in the Sudan peace process came to a climax in the exercise, which saw the Sudanese protagonists put pen to paper on a landmark pact in January 2005. With the attainment of peace in Sudan, at least in theory, Kenya and the wider Eastern Africa can look forward to improved security that has over the years been compromised by the conflict in Sudan. Once the SPLA fighters are absorbed into a conventional army, as stipulated in the agreement, the use of the huge stocks of firearms in their control should be more effectively monitored.²⁰⁶ Indeed the swearing in of John Garang as the first Vice President on 9th July 2005 in Khartoum further raised the hope of actual peace in sight and consequently more control of firearms, as Southern Sudan becomes a semi-autonomous province of the bigger Sudan.

As noted earlier these dangerous weapons have found their way into the wrong hands adversely compromising the security of the region. For instance, at the border region

²⁰⁵ Thokozani Thusi Op Cit. p. 20

²⁰⁶ Daily Nation, June 2nd 2004 p. 11

inhabited by Kenya's Turkana and their Sudanese Toposa cousins, cattle rustling, law and order and respect for national borders have made little meaning to members of these communities motivated by the easy access to firearms used in cross-border cattle rustling. This is exacerbated by similar activities along the Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Somali borders.

General insecurity is therefore a big concern; state officials constantly blame the upsurge in violent crime seen as far away as Nairobi, on the influx of illegal guns from neighbouring countries. Whereas the central domestic policy focus on dealing with the vast numbers of small arms in Northern Kenya has alternated between presidential amnesties to encourage voluntary surrender and draconian security operations mounted to seize illicit arms²¹⁷ all these have not been effective. In fact, the Oxfam GB report points out that:

The uncontrolled circulation of small arms in northern Kenya presents the Kenyan government with a stark dilemma. Despite being the most militarized in the country, the region is the least secure, and there are widespread local demands for the state to improve security, curb the proliferation of firearms, and eradicate livestock rustling. However the deployment of military and police forces has only widened the gulf between the population and the state, without making any appreciable difference to security or the spread of small arms.²¹⁸

The viable long-term solution in sight rests with the policy of the diplomacy of conflict management. This means tackling the problem from the source and not at the destination point. This is one of the reasons for Kenya's resilience in seeking to restore peace in Sudan. As a member of the IGAD peace initiative, it has a duty to fulfill its obligations. But as a directly affected neighbour, it is its responsibility to ensure security for

²¹⁷ Khadiagala, M. Gilbert, 2004, Op Cit, p. 16

²¹⁸ Ibid

its citizens. With the ineffectiveness of its domestic policies of handling the problem, the option of a regional foreign policy must be aggressively pursued and that is, the diplomacy of conflict management.

4.1.3 TERRORISM AS A SOURCE OF INSECURITY IN THE REGION

In the horn of Africa, Sudan for along time in the 1990s was viewed as operational headquarters for global terrorist activities. Having served as a safe haven for Osama bin Laden until 1996 while also providing a base of operation for other terrorist groups, Sudan has naturally become a focus of international war on terrorism.²⁰⁹ Sudan's connection to terrorist activities have been varied including accusation of harboring those involved in the assassination attempt against President Mubarak of Egypt in 1995 in Ethiopia:²¹⁰ A diplomat at the Sudanese UN Mission was also accused of having ties to conspirators who planned to destroy the UN building and other targets in New York in 1993 leading to his expulsion in April of 1993.²¹¹

By 1996, Sudan had become internationally isolated for harboring bin Laden. Sudan was equally not spared in the US led anti terrorism campaign; it centrally became a target after the August 7th 1998 twin bombing of US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in which more than 200 lives were lost. The US in retaliation fired cruise missiles into Khartoum, which destroyed the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant alleged to have been producing VX nerve gas for biological weapons and that its owner had links to Osama bin

²⁰⁹ International Crisis Group, 2002, *God, Oil and Country: The Changing Logic of War in Sudan*, ICG Group Press, Brussels pp. 71 and 76

²¹⁰ UN Press Release, 31 January 1996

²¹¹ US State Department, *Patterus of Global Terrorism*, 1996

Laden.²¹² Evidence was not presented publicly, however, because the US said it wished to protect intelligence sources and methods, but Sudan scored a diplomatic victory by claiming the plant was making medicine.²¹³

In a bid to salvage its dented international image Sudan embarked on a fence mending exercise in the year 2000 by denouncing terrorism and managed to restore some confidence especially with the US. Indeed after the September 11th attack in New York and Washington, a government spokesman publicly condemned the attacks and declared solidarity with the international community in the global fight against terrorism.²¹⁴ In spite of the measures taken by Sudan aimed at distancing it self from terrorism beginning with the expulsion of Osama bin Laden in may 1996, Sudan is still viewed warily especially by the U.S. given its past connections to terrorists. Indeed, it is for this wariness that even as the US deputy Secretary of State, Mr. Robert Zoelick commenting on the swearing in of John Garang as the first vice-president of Sudan in July 2005, indicated that in spite of the US appreciating the achievement of peace with Southern Sudanese rebels, it still upholds trade restrictions/embargo on Sudan. Whereas this is manifestly tied to peace in the Darfur region, it is latently related to terrorism and the US war on terror.

It is instructive to note that the terrorists who attempted to shoot dawn an Israeli plane, as it took off from Mombasa – Kenya in 2002, used man – portable (shoulder launched) surface to air missile also categorized as light weapons.²¹⁵ The weapons used in these attacks including those used in the bombing of Paradise Hotel in Kikambala are largely

²¹² Even though it turned out to be an innocent victim of the US's multiple onslaught against suspected terrorist positions beginning with Afghanistan, it took a pains taking fence mending exercise for Sudan to return to the good books of the US. Note also that this suspicion began with the confirmation earlier that Osama Bin Laden, US's most wanted fugitive had been given refuge in Sudan in the 1990s.

²¹³ International Crisis Group, 2002, *God, Oil and Country: The Changing Logic of War in Sudan*, ICG Group Press, Brussels p. 79

²¹⁴ ICG, 2002, Op Cit. p. 82

²¹⁵ Thokozani, Thusi Op Cit

suspected to have originated or come from or through the northern war torn neighbors of Kenya. The organizers and executors of the bombing missions have also been associated with Sudan supported terrorist groups such as, Al-Gama'a-Islamia, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Lebanon's Hezbollah and Hamas, whose members are noted to continue to train and operate from Sudan. Sudan for instance permits Hezbollah and Hamas to continue their activities because it considers them as conducting "legitimate resistance to Israeli occupation."²¹⁶

Note that the Paradise Hotel is Israeli owned and was easily an offshore Palestinian terrorists' target against Israelis. Continued conflict in Southern Sudan is therefore viewed as enhancing the operations of such terrorist groups targeting Kenya's development partners and foreign investors. It is imperative that Kenya would do everything within its power to reduce such risks that come with terrorist activities. By extension, as a result of Kenya managing and mediating this conflict with the aim of ensuring peace in Sudan it is latently fighting terrorism.²¹⁷

With the attacks in Kenya and Tanzania, the perception that Africa has once again, following the end of cold war, become a victim and the theatre of a conflict between external parties, namely Al-Qaeda terrorist network and the alliance against international terrorism. The importance of Africa in terms of international terrorism focuses on ... the ineffective state security apparatuses, which create an environment for carrying out attacks.²¹⁸

Kenya is an example in this aspect of vulnerability.

Internally, for years, the North Eastern upper Rift Valley part of the country, has been essentially cut off from the rest of the state. Safe travel in this part of the country is

²¹⁶ U.S. State Department, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, 2000

²¹⁷ Interview with former Minister for foreign affairs July 2004. Note that undersecretary Office of the president -internal security expressed the same sentiments during similar interview.

²¹⁸ Mair, Stephen "Terrorism and Africa" in *Africa Security Review*, Vol. 12 No. 1 2003 pp. 109-110

only possible in military protected convoys. Well supplied with weapons from Sudan and Uganda, armed criminals carry out gang robberies and the government is currently invariably incapable of controlling the trading of goods (especially firearms) and the movement of people across the Kenya border in the region.²¹⁹ These loopholes provide the transit zone for terrorists and their weapons for activities targeting western establishments that dot the East African region but especially in Kenya. Terrorism therefore remains a key concern for the region, and Kenya in specific drawing from its experiences since the most recent attacks on Israeli target in the coast. All logical efforts would be to close this Northern terrorists' corridor, and one of the most reliable means is via bringing peace in Sudan.

4.2.0 KENYA'S ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN RESOLVING AND MANAGEMENT OF THE SUDAN CONFLICT

As we saw in the preceding chapters, Kenya has always put economic development at the fore when it comes to its regional policy. Over the years economic preponderance has defined Kenya's foreign policy. Scholars have variously defined this with terms such as, policy of realism, idealism, pragmatism; regional harmony, covert and overt etcetera in an attempt to describe Kenya's foreign policy regionally and internationally. Classical Marxian economics that widely defines the international systemic hierarchy of power delineate economics as the superstructure and politics as the sub-structure.²²⁰

Economics is a key determinant of political behaviour of any given state. The position a state occupies in the international economic structure defined in terms of core,

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Tucker, Robert C., 1978, *The Marx- Engels Reader* Norton and Co., New York

periphery or semi-periphery²²¹ is by and large a function of its economic capability among other factors. It is therefore imperative upon any state that international relations must have as a key consideration economic benefits tailored around costs benefit analysis. Powell's²²² relative gain theory highlighted in chapter one then becomes central in discussing economic considerations as a motivator of a given state action.

In this sub-section of the chapter we shall attempt to dissect the various economic variables that have inspired Kenya to mediate and or manage the two conflicts. Conflict management or mediation comes with economic and social costs that adversely impact on the economy. It suffices to argue that, Kenya has latent and long-term benefits that it foresees and that cannot be exploited in the present status of disharmony and insecurity in the region. The reversal of the situation would definitely lead to accrual of such benefits.

ICG's assertion for instance that, "Kenya wants to ensure that it can continue to skim off profits from the humanitarian assistance that flows through operation lifeline Sudan and maintain its appearance as the peace broker for Sudan."²²³ This assertion has two sides to it, in terms of maintaining its appearance, as the peace broker for Sudan Kenya is indeed not mistaken. This is the argument advanced by the chapter on hegemony; it actually needs to prove a point as a successful mediator. However in terms of skimming profits from the short lived operation life line Sudan project, ICG misses the point on the motivators that drive states into pursuing power and preponderance. Kenya has had a large balance of trade

²²¹ For a detailed discussion on the international division of labour that defines core, semi-periphery and periphery see Immanuel Wallerstein, 1974, *The Modern World Systems: Capitalist Agriculture and The Origins of European World-Economy in the 16th Century* and Robert Gilpin, 1987, *Political Economy of International Relations*.

²²² Powel, Robert "Absolute and Relative Gain in International Relations Theory" in *African Political Review* 1991, Vol. 85 No.4 pp. 76 – 77

²²³ ICG, 2002, Op Cit p.155

in its favour with Sudan over the years²²⁴ and obviously wants to maintain that advantaged position.

From table 3.0 in chapter three, over the ten years period the balance of trade in favour of Kenya averaged K₣15,518.4. The economic benefits accrued over that period substantially contributed to economic development; it is therefore imperative that Kenya would want to better that position. In chapter two we noted that the resurgence of conflict led to a remarkable decline of up to 27% in returns from trade with Sudan and quantity of exports destined for Sudan. This decline undoubtedly had effects on the Kenyan Economy. The mediation of the Sudan conflict has as much economic precursors as the sheer need to maintain a dominant position in the region. As we shall see in the consequent sub-sections the situation in terms of balance of trade has not changed much and Kenya seeks to enhance its advantaged position vis-à-vis trade with Sudan.

4.2.1 ECONOMIC INTERESTS: TRADE BETWEEN KENYA AND SUDAN IN THE CONFLICT PERIOD

We have noted that economic activities between Kenya and Sudan are of great importance to Kenya. The consideration is two fold; at the superficial level is the issue of immediate benefits that Kenya accrues as a result of the conflict; at a more permanent level is the Kenyan exports destined for Sudan. Kenya has maintained a high exports imports ratio against Sudan. Table 4.0 below exemplifies the magnitude of the exports to Sudan between the years 1993 – 2003 that Kenya would not hesitate to maintain and or increase. This is the essence of power politics, economic and otherwise. As it stands now Kenya dominates in the economic power play between it and Sudan.

²²⁴ See figure 2.0 in Chapter two for instance

Table 4.0: Kenya Trade With Sudan, Exports and Imports 1993-2003 (K₡'000)

Year	Exports	Imports	Balance
1993	82320	3	82317
1994	72624	115	72509
1995	61760	124	61636
1996	70986	71	70915
		(Ksh. '000)	
1997	1866306	338926	1527383
1998	2989538	103066	2886472
1999	2705420	13890	2691530
2000	2191440	24596	2166844
2001	2447373	1029914	1417459
2002	2818408	253962	2564446
2003	4378583	566306	3812277

Source: Adapted from, Kenya Economic Survey 1995,1996, 1998, 2003 and 2004

From the trade figures, we clearly see a skewed trade balance in favour of Kenya averaging K₡ 71844250 in the period 1993 – 1996 and Ksh. 2438058700 in the years 1997 – 2003. Indeed there was a general improvement in exports from 1993 to 2003 reaching a peak of Ksh. 4378583000 in 2003. This marked improvement can be attributed to the increasing optimism for peace in Sudan hence increased trade activities between the two countries. The level of optimism reached its penultimate stage in the year 2003 after the Machakos round of talks in 2002 and increased hopes both in the Nakuru and Nanyuki and Naivasha rounds of negotiations and mediation between the SPLM/A and the Khartoum government. Uncertainties of the progress of the peace process in the years 1999 – 2001 were clearly reflected in the reduction of exports from Ksh. 2989538000 in 1998 to a low of Ksh. 2191440000 a drop of 26.7% in the year 2000, before it marginally rose again by 11.7 % in 2001 to Ksh. 2447373000.

The imperative conclusion here is the sensitivity of trade activities to fluctuations in levels of political stability. This is what Kenya has in mind as it presses on with the mediation of the peace process in Sudan so that its economic interests may not be adversely

affected as it studies the trade pattern between them. Imports from Sudan have been marginal which explains the huge gap in balance of trade in favour of Kenya. There was however a remarkable improvement in 2001 when imports from Sudan reached an all time high of Ksh. 1029914000. But this was short-lived for it dropped drastically by 75.3% to Ksh. 253962000 in 2002. (We shall explain this in the subsequently paragraphs).

These benefits (anticipated or actual) do not come free, this justifies why the Kenyan former president – Moi – largely took a personal interest in the government's Sudan policy. As a Kenyan diplomat noted, "Kenya has considerably borne the brunt of the response to the war and that is why president (former) Moi took the lead on the issue."²²⁵ These sentiments are exemplified in the number of refugees that Kenya hosts, the consequent insecurity that has been largely blamed on the Wars in Southern Sudan and Somalia and some of the costs of hosting the negotiations meetings. Conversely Kenya has also continued to receive what ICG calls " a perverse subsidy as a result of Sudan's long agony".²²⁶ As a primary channel for the massive international relief effort for Sudan, it obtains a port fees, road taxes and the financial benefits that accrue from the presence of NGO workers as well as construction and maintenance of the Lokichogio airfield and other infrastructure improvements. The United Nations Operation Lifeline Sudan and associated humanitarian organizations are largely staged from Kenyan territory. Kenya also permits non- United Nations affiliated NGOs to operate, although Khartoum argues that these access Sudanese territory illegally.²²⁷

In 2001 Kenya was involved in an international trade dispute over whether to purchase Sudanese oil. In what appeared to be the Sudan government's latest oil diplomacy

²²⁵ ICG Interview in Nairobi, July 2001.

²²⁶ For a Critique of this line of argument, see the beginning subsection of this chapter

²²⁷ ICG, 2002, Op Cit. p. 61, See also, Daily Nation June 2nd 2004.

success, it concluded a deal with the then Kenyan Energy Minister Raila Odinga to export tariff-free oil to Nairobi under terms of Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA).²²⁸ This agreement explains the 97.6% increase in imports from Sudan to Kenya in 2001 from a low of Ksh. 24596000 in the year 2000 to Ksh. 1029914000 in 2001. (Refer to table 4.0) The biggest import commodity being oil from Sudan to Kenya in that year. In this agreement Kenya saw an opportunity to reduce the costs of its oil imports from the Middle East by opting for the Sudanese oil that would be much cheaper in the long run in spite of the COMESA zero tariff agreement. However a domestic controversy led to re-evaluation of the contract, which caused Sudanese Foreign Minister to threaten ending imports of Kenyan coffee and tea. Facing a trade war, Kenya finally allowed the duty free imports.

This led to further controversy within the Kenyan Energy industry, which argued that importing refined oil products from Sudan, would break the “white oil rule” which puts all oil imports through the Mombasa-based refinery.²²⁹ The other consideration that the domestic oil industry toyed with against this move was the argument that Sudanese crude oil does not meet the Kenyan specifications.²³⁰

The Kenyan public opinion was also swayed by the argument that, importing the Sudanese oil was like importing blood oil and therefore by extension the Kenyan government was remotely financing the war by the Islamist Sudanese government against the Southern based Christian SPLM/A. Kenya did not want to loose sight of its position as the peace maker in the Sudan conflict. By entangling itself in the internal affairs of Sudan through such accusations as buying blood oil from Sudan, it stood the risk of loosing its

²²⁸ Ibid p. 61

²²⁹ ICG Op Cit. p. 61

²³⁰ Daily Nation 14th August 2001, “Kenya opens the Door to Sudan Oil Imports”

clout and stature that it had acquired over the years as a peacemaker. It had to finally make a tactical retreat by canceling the contract while wading off the threat by Sudan to stop its Coffee and tea exports.

The final withdrawal of the agreement was reflected in the 75% reduction in imports from Sudan in 2002. Note that the exports to Sudan in that year were not negatively affected as threatened by Sudanese authorities; in fact there was an increment of 15.2% from Ksh. 2447373000 in 2001 to Ksh. 2818408000 in 2002. In other words, either Kenya's tactical retreat worked or Sudan did not intentionally implement its threat as a result of a cost benefit calculation of the implications of the intended threat.

In essence Kenya knew that the ultimate and legitimate access to Sudanese oil lay with the ending of the conflict in Southern Sudan. That is where it put its boots by aggressively pursuing the peace process. In any case Kenya has not lost sight of the opportunities that the Sudanese oil would bring hence remains committed to this goal but via the ending of the war in Southern Sudan. We may also point out the increasing influence of public opinion on foreign policy of third world countries. It may still be marginal but the increased access to information inevitably draws the interest of the public on foreign policy matters that would have a bearing on their livelihood.²³¹

Peace in Sudan must also be seen in terms of enlargement of trading activities and general economic growth as the Sudan – Kenya trading circuit would lead to other opportunities of developing the northern Kenya region that has been starved of development since independence. Related infrastructure developments such as, possible

²³¹ See Holsti's, Ole's Article on "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond Lippmann Consensus" in *International Studies Quarterly* 1992, Vol. 3, No1 pp. 440 – 467. For a detailed discussion on the role of public opinion in foreign policy making and conduct, see also Gorm Rye Olsen's Article on "European Public Opinion and Aid to Africa: is there a link?" in *Journal of Modern African Studies* 2001, Vol. 39 No. 4 pp. 521 – 556

construction of pipeline(s) and pump stations, improvement of road and rail networks between Kenya and Southern Sudan and the creation of intervening economic and social opportunities along the circuit would be a welcome and great chance for Kenya's expansionist inclinations *vis-à-vis* Sudan. The symbiotic trade relations that the oil trade would create would inevitably lead to an expanded regional market for Kenyan industrial and commercial sector as well as drastically reduce the cost on non-renewable energy for Kenya.

Kenya's investment in the peace process in Southern Sudan should certainly be seen also as a long term economic investment. Indeed as one observer noted, "... it is not surprising that Nairobi is angling to take full advantage of business opportunities in the new Sudan."²³² The discovery of oil in Southern Sudan at Bentiu, a mere 100km from Lokichogio presents Kenya with vast opportunities. Apart from Kenya getting access to the oil for its domestic use, there is the high possibility of some of the oil being exported through Mombasa port at a mere 1000 km distance to connect to the Eldoret pipeline compared to the 16000km to Port Sudan on the red sea. Further, Nairobi is also hoping that the penetration of its products and services into the Sudan market will create a spill over market in Chad,²³³ which has also recently become an oil producing country.

4.2.2 ECONOMIC INTERESTS: EFFECTS OF TERRORISM ON KENYA'S TOURISM INDUSTRY

Tourism is one of the largest sources of revenue/income and foreign exchange for Kenya. Over the years Kenya has been dependent on the traditional sources of tourists from the west (especially Europe and America) for its wide range of tourist attractions. This dependency became evident after the August 7th bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi

²³² The East African, July 2005, p. 10

²³³ Ibid

and the 2002 bombing of paradise hotel in Kikambala (including attempted shooting down of an Israeli Jet Liner from Mombasa's Moi International Airport). The consequent travel advisories from the countries that form its traditional sources of tourists, led to cancellation of flights of, for instance British Airways and several other charter flights and hence a massive drop in tourist inflows into the country for fear of being terrorist targets. The effect threatened the complete collapse of the industry.

Although this led to the diversification efforts targeting domestic market and the capture of new markets in Asia and the Far East, it demonstrates how much security remains a key concern in ensuring a stable economic development. Kenya remains vulnerable both as a target and a transit zone for terrorists due to its proximity to the conflict prone horn of Africa. As the impression of general insecurity grows, which is now strengthened even further due to the increased danger of terrorist attacks; tourists and investors are increasingly turning their backs on the region. This intensifies the existing economic misery in the region.²³⁴ In an attempt to reduce the adverse impact on its tourism industry due to terrorism, Kenya in addition to beefing up security in key installations also pursues the resolution of the conflicts in the region that create a conducive environment for terrorist activities.

The impact of terrorism and terrorists' attacks on the country over the period of 1998 and 2002 are demonstrated in the various economic surveys in that period. This was as a result of fears by tourists and negative travel advisories by various western governments against traveling to Kenya. During these periods of negative travel advisories, visitors arrivals for instance declined by 10.6% in 1998 against tourism earnings of K₡ 875 million in the

²³⁴ Ibid, p.110

same year. It however went up in 1999 by about 8.4 % to stand at 969.3 thousands. Bed occupancy rate dropped from 35.3% in 1998 to 33.9% in 1999.²³⁵

In 2003, hotel bed occupancy dropped by 24.2% from 3,436,800 in 2002 to 2,605,900 in 2003. The night occupancy dropped significantly from 42% in 2002 to 33.6% in 2003.²³⁶ This drop is directly attributable to the effect of terrorism on the fragile tourism industry that is highly sensitive to security concerns and scares. Table 4.1 (a) below demonstrates these tourism market sentiments.

Table 4.1 (a): Hotel Bed-Nights Occupancy Rate 1999-2003

Year	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Occ. rate '000	2951	3687.8	3354.9	3436.8	2605.9
Percentage	33.9	39.3	40.3	42	33.6

Source: Adapted from Kenya Economic Surveys 2000,2003 and 2004

The drop in 1999 to 33.9% bed occupancy is explained by the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, as the effects fizzled out we begin to see another steady rise in hotel bed occupancy from 39.3% in 2000 to a peak of 42% in 2002. 2003 saw another drastic drop to 33.6% due to the Mombasa terrorist incidences in 2002. However, overall tourism earnings ironically increased by 18.6% from Ksh. 21734 million in 2002 to Ksh. 25768 million in 2003.²³⁷ (See Table 4.1 (b) below)

Table 4.1 (b): Kenya Tourism Earnings in Ksh. Millions

Year	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Amount	21368	16868.5	20660	21734	25768

Source: Adapted from Kenya Economic Surveys 2000,2003 and 2004

The increased earnings can be attributed to the aggressive marketing after the advisories targeting domestic markets, the Far East and the traditional markets. This resulted in a remarkable increase for instance, on domestic tourism. In addition the relatively

²³⁵ Kenya Economic Survey, 2000, p. 9

²³⁶ Kenya Economic Survey, 2004, pp. 6 and 175

²³⁷ Ibid

improved security in the country's tourist circuits that included collaboration with the U.S. and Britain in security operations in the country could have re-assured individual tourists to travel to Kenya in spite of their governments' advisories.

4.3 OPPORTUNITIES IN A PEACEFUL SOUTHERN SUDAN

With the success of the Southern Sudan peace process, it is important to consider the key benefits or otherwise that such a success portends for Kenya and which Kenya is invariably aware of. Infrastructure is the engine that drives economic development. A peaceful Sudan would lead to an improvement of the road link between the countries and facilitate trade in the triangle. At the moment this vital road link can only be used during dry seasons not forgetting the ever-lurking danger from holders of loose guns.

Already in the pipeline is the planned extension of Kenya's railway line to Sudan estimated to cost nearly Ksh.300 billion almost a third of the country's GDP.²³⁸ The construction of the railway line, which is to run through the plains of northern Kenya through the swamps of southern Sudan, is expected to commence by the yearend and will be funded by donors and oil revenues from Southern Sudan. A direct railway line is expected to spur economic growth in the country's semi-arid north. The 2500-kilometer line is expected to stretch from Juba in Sudan via Lokichogio to Nakuru. In addition two more lines will be built to connect Southern Sudan with Uganda.²³⁹

A return to normalcy in Sudan should also mean good number of Sudanese refugees living in Kenya return to their homeland. The pressure that the refugees continue to put on the fragile ecosystem at the marginal Kakuma area cannot be overemphasized. Note that Sudanese refugees form a staggering 37.5% of the refugee population in Kenya. The

²³⁸ The East African Standard, The Financial Standard, 13th July, 2004 pp. 4 – 5

²³⁹ The Commissioner for International Cooperation of SPLM/A

competition for scarce resources in the area (and other areas as far as Nairobi) among the immigrants and between the aliens and indigenous communities, which has in many occasions resulted in violent clashes, will be reduced.

Kenya is leading regionally in the export of manpower. With the increasing pressure on the Kenyan job market and unemployment forming a central concern for Kenyan government, peace in Sudan would mean many Kenyan professionals should be able to find jobs there. Due to the long conflict in southern Sudan, generations have gone without education, creating a huge skilled labour deficit, which is a *sin qua non* for the regions meaningful reconstruction. Kenyans would be best placed to fill the gap in southern Sudan's manpower requirements, considering both their industry and enterprise.²⁴⁰ In the short term peace may mean job losses for Kenyan based thousands of NGO workers when the NGOs close shop however this must be argued along side the opportunities that the peace will come with. Indeed as the reconstruction begins in earnest; several investors and NGOs are already recruiting Kenyans to work in various sectors in the fledging new Southern Sudan economy. Kenyan companies such as Kenya Commercial Bank are already planning to open branches in Southern Sudan (Rumbek). East African Portland Cement has also secured lucrative tenders for supply of cement for reconstruction in Southern Sudan targeting the heavy investment in infrastructure and other areas of construction.²⁴¹ With no single inch of tarmac road in Southern Sudan, twelve key roads would have to be tarmacked as a priority to link the region with Northern Sudan and the greater horn of Africa and the great lakes so as to create a major market of some 300 million people.

Other initiatives include, CMC Motors, which plans a long haul track dealership at Rumbek to meet the region's increasing trading needs. In addition, public and private

²⁴⁰ Interview with Managing Director, Investment Promotion Centre, Nairobi.

²⁴¹ See Daily Nation, 10th May 2005, June, July 2005

institutions in Kenya are urging the business community to turn north, with Kenya Bureau of Standards having signed a protocol with its Sudanese counterpart to harmonise the quality of products meant for trade between the two countries. Further, Kenya Association of Manufacturers is urging business leaders in the Sudan to source their requirements from Kenya.

A peaceful Southern Sudan has been largely viewed as capable of translating into a huge market for Kenyan products. As Kenya's Foreign Affairs Minister noted, Southern Sudan is comparable to Uganda and Kenya combined at least in terms of geographical expanse. This if properly harnessed can translate into a considerably big market that has not been exploited and Kenya is obviously poised to take the biggest chunk of that market for its products.²⁴² The area will inevitably take some time to attain a semblance of self-sufficiency in essential goods. Kenya's industrial edge over her neighbours and the already established commercial links between the two countries make it the trading partner of choice.

Kenya has made certain major decisions as it prepares to take advantage of the opportunities. One such decision is training and attachment for Sudanese personnel. For instance about 19 SPLM officials are training at the Kenya Institute of Administration and are attached to government offices including Central Bank of Kenya and the Attorney General's Chambers. At the Oslo donors' conference Kenya pledged \$3.5 million for Southern Sudan. Moreover, during the transition period, Kenya will be sending administrators to assist in the setting up of administrative institutions. Kenya is also offering to get the directorate of personnel management and the Public Service Commission to train staff of the government of the South and to equip them with the skills they need to participate effectively in the government of national unity in Khartoum. Nairobi has also

²⁴² Interview with former Minister for Foreign Affairs.

offered to second judiciary staff to the government of Southern Sudan to help staff in the area up grade their skills.

Kenyan investors have also been visiting Southern Sudan in a bid to identify prospects for investments in towns such as Yei, Rumbek, Yambio, Maridi and Kapoeta so as to learn business registration procedures, licensing and acquisition of business permits from the SPLM officials. The SPLM has also opened an office in Nairobi to register Kenya traders and investors.²⁴³

4.4 CHALLENGES FOR KENYA AND THE PEACE PROCESS

With the opportunities come challenges that Kenya must trade on carefully if its behaviour and zeal is not to fuel another of hostilities especially between the other armed groups (AOGs) in Southern Sudan, the Khartoum government and the semi-autonomous Southern Sudan. The comprehensive peace agreement that has brought the parties together is not only complex but is also based on an arrangement that has never been tried elsewhere. Clearly, the greatest challenge will be whether the government in Khartoum and the government of the semi-autonomous government in the south will respect and stick to the structure of power and responsibilities as spelt out in the agreement. The tactics and behaviour of foreign governments – especially Sudan's neighbors – will be critical in this regard because so far foreign governments have appeared keen to deal directly with the southerners, ignoring the fact that under the agreement, the government in the south is not in a position to negotiate bilateral agreements at par with Khartoum. It is a pertinent issue because subsequent to the signing of the peace treaty in Kenya in January, governments in

²⁴³The East African Standard, July 13th 2005 p. 10

the region itching to do business in southern Sudan have been sending delegations to Rumbek, the designated seat of the semi autonomous government.

For example, there were murmurs in diplomatic circles when Kenya sent a high-powered delegation comprising 41 people to Rumbek to discuss business opportunities with the SPLM leadership. Cautious voices in diplomatic circles warned that actions that suggest that key neighbours of Sudan such as Kenya were keen to deal with the south to the exclusion of Khartoum would only fuel tensions in the post-conflict Sudan.²⁴⁴ The question raised was whether that visit was in line with the terms of the comprehensive peace agreement. In addition, Kampala and Nairobi have been hosting delegation of European businessmen coming to meet top SPLM officials to discuss business opportunities.

Kenya's suggestively undiplomatic move contrasts for instance with South Africa's better understanding of the delicate situation in Sudan, when, on his first visit to the country, President Thabo Mbeki's delegation of government officials and investors headed straight to Khartoum for consultations with the government, before visiting Rumbek. In effect, tensions over just how much leeway the government of the South has to enter into agreements will crop up in government of national unity. This must be handled carefully enough to avert Khartoum feeling that deals are being cut with foreign investors and governments to the exclusion of the unity government

4.5 CONCLUSION

With the end of the cold war over a decade ago, the elimination of Soviet involvement in Africa and the decline in U.S. interest in the region, opportunities have increased for intervention by other governments in African conflicts. African diplomatic

²⁴⁴ The East African July 11 – 17 2005 p. 8

norms have emphasized non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, even where conflicts were severe. “As the concept of national sovereignty is increasingly eroded and intractable internal conflicts more common, new internationally agreed norms should be established regarding when and how... other nations should act to: 1) mediate internal conflicts; 2) separate warring factions; 3) provide humanitarian relief in times of conflict and; 4) restore political *and economic* (italics mine) order.”²⁴⁵

The phrase African solution for African problems is slowly taking shape with an increasing number of African conflicts under the direct management of African states and statesmen. This is the approach Kenya pursues with reference to conflicts in the region. Aside from the direct impacts that it bears from these conflicts as a result of its proximity to the war torn countries, Kenya has taken the initiative to ensure peace in its regional neighborhood.

States however never ignore the supremacy of national interest and power over morality. In a realist perspective, a state’s action may be motivated by a perceived moral responsibility, however the ultimate determinant of state behaviour is national interest and power politics. Kenya may hence take it as a moral responsibility to bring peace in Sudan, non-the-less it ultimately situates its national interest within this responsibility.

In Chapter three we identified key areas that define national interest and that guide the formulation and conduct of foreign policy. In this chapter we have discussed two of these areas of national concern, security and economic considerations. We have argued that these are key motivators for Kenya’s continued involvement in the management of the Sudan conflict. Primary to economic interest have been Kenya’s concern with the regional market and a need to expand that market in an attempt to enhance its economic

²⁴⁵ Carol J. Lancaster, 1993, “United States and Africa: Into the Twenty First Century” Policy Essay No. 7 p. 48

development. We have pointed out and showed that conflicts in these countries have a direct negative impact on Kenya's economy and that the long-term means of avoiding this negative impact is the management and resolution of these conflicts. The chapter argues that Kenya's economic interest is at the core of its engagement in Sudan. Economic interests identified generally as; enhanced access to the existing market and the expansion of potential market. Where markets here refer to market for industrial and commercial sector products, service sector, labour / manpower market and investment opportunities for Kenyan foreign investors. Such latent economic policies also include, the development of infrastructure linking the countries and the access to cheap Sudanese oil. It has also looked at the resultant pressures both to given micro-economies and the ecosystem by refugees from the war torn countries.

In terms of security, the chapter has argued from the basic premise that no economic progress can take place in an environment of insecurity. It has highlighted the key security or insecurity concerns from Sudan, specifically proliferation of small arms, terrorism and general insecurity associated with the influx of refugees into the country. Whereas the immediate response by any state would be to beef up security along Kenya's borders with Sudan for instance, it is the argument of this chapter that the long-term solution that Kenya has opted for, is to mediate and manage the conflict in Sudan. The aim of this approach is to cut one of the nerves of insecurity in the country, which is the conflict in Sudan.

The chapter has also drawn a link between the tourism sub-sector of the economy and insecurity especially terrorism by pointing out the adverse effects of terrorism on Kenya's tourism sub-sector. The connection is the favorable environment for terrorist activities created by the conflict in Sudan. One needs to note that the dichotomy of security, terrorism and economic factors as motivators for Kenya's involvement in the management

of the conflict in Sudan is purely for organizational purposes. The factors are closely interlinked to the extent that security as well as terrorism (which is in any case a security issue) has a direct effect on the economic factors and therefore the distinction must not be stretched too far. The best approach to understanding the chapter as is noticeable, is by recognizing and connecting the linkages backwards and forwards.

CHAPTER FIVE

HEGEMONIC INTENTIONS AS MOTIVATOR FOR KENYA IN THE SOUTHERN SUDAN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

5.0 INTRODUCTION

In chapter one we gave a comprehensive definition of hegemony and its relationship with the term 'core state.' We will therefore not delve deep into the definition of hegemony and core states. However we need to highlight that, the purpose of the dichotomy was to enable us avoid the trap of using the two terms interchangeably without highlighting the inherent differences that they connote. Whereas it suffices to argue that hegemony creates core states it does not logically suggest that for a state to be core it must first be hegemonic.

'Hegemony' and 'core state' are in all respects realists' operational terms, the international hierarchy of power that defines the positions states occupy and how much clout they command invariably creates hegemonic regional powers. The derivation may be historical and geographical advantages bestowed upon the state purely by chance and coupled with the state's ability to harness the wealth that nature has bestowed upon it. In these terms then, hegemony is a function of key considerations that include among other things, resource availability and ability to exploit the resources for national gain in comparison with other contiguous states – this implies economic preponderance. It is also a function of geo-strategic advantages that a state commands in addition to military capabilities to protect, maintain and expand this predominance vis-à-vis other states.

As Conway, W. Henderson, points out, "the hegemony of a dominating state remains stable until a lower ranked state, growing in power and dissatisfied with the order

provided by the hegemon and inevitably oppose the hegemon.”²⁴⁶ Layne, C. in agreement points out that, “potential challenges rise by experiencing economic growth rates greater than that of the hegemon and inevitably oppose the hegemon.”²⁴⁷ Whereas Kenya may not be dominating in the strict sense of the word, the eminent emergence of Uganda and Tanzania as alternative centers of preponderance in the region with their increasing growth rates as opposed to Kenya’s declining growth rates are better seen as potential challenges to Kenya’s hegemonic status. The foregoing hypothesis is that, Kenya’s engagement in the management of the Sudan conflict is motivated by the need to circumvent this challenge. ²⁴⁸

In this chapter the study situates Kenya in the region first, as a state with certain advantages that have over the years put it in a preponderant position over and above its neighbours. Second, it identifies the purpose for pursuing, for instance, economic dominance, whether they are purely for economic reasons or for political and strategic reasons as well. In doing the study delineates the existence of hegemonic interests or otherwise. Ultimately it points out the relationship between Kenya’s conflict management endeavors and its regional position.

Order in the realist lexicon depends on the preponderance of a single state.²⁴⁹ In other words, in the context of world political economy it is a preponderance of material resources. Hegemonic powers must therefore “have control over raw materials, sources of

²⁴⁶ Conway, Henderson, W; 1998, *International Relations: Conflict and Co-operation at the turn of the 21st century*, McGraw-Hill, Boston, p. 116

²⁴⁷ Layne, Christopher, “The Uni-polar illusion: Why new Great powers will Rise” in the *Cold War and after: Prospects for Peace*, p. 271

²⁴⁸ To add on to this, the dispatch of peace keeping troops to Eritrea-Ethiopia border in March 2004 and several other peace keeping engagements under the United Nation’s in Sierra Leone, and Democratic Republic of Congo can be seen as widening the net of diplomatic approach to include military intervention through peace keeping.

²⁴⁹ Keohane, Robert, 1984, *After Hegemony: Co-operation and discord in political Economy*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey p. 12

capital, markets and competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods.²⁵⁰ In this respect we will consider Kenya's level of economic development vis-à-vis other states in the region that are perceived to be in competition with it, in mind here is Tanzania and Uganda. We will from there situate this competition within the context of diplomacy of conflict management.

5.1 KENYA'S HEGEMONIC STATUS IN THE REGION AND THE SUDAN PEACE PROCESS

The importance of geo-strategic considerations in foreign policy making and conduct has never been in doubt over the years. Certainly it has had a lot of currency especially with reference to relations with super power(s). It is again important to note that it equally has considerable influence in regional power structures especially where such power is not distinctly identified or just emerging. This is undoubtedly where Eastern Africa is classified with Kenya as an emerging hegemon. In other words, association or alliance with a super power or a major western power often accompanies the emergence as a regional power. If the region is particularly sensitive and has great strategic importance, the link between super power and regional power is likely to be symbiotic – neither party being able to do without the other, not withstanding exceptional, unexpected desires of the other.²⁵¹ This argument can explain Kenya – U.S relations in the cold war period and even in the post cold war period as the war on terror replaces the cold war and communism as a major U.S's international concern.

Whereas it may not be a pure symbiotic relation, the nascent mutuality in the relations can be easily seen in the joint U.S. – Kenya anti-terror operations in the country.

²⁵⁰ Ibid p. 32

²⁵¹ Chan, Stephen, 1990, *Issues in International Relations: A View from Africa*, Macmillan London

Kenya's strategic location in the Indian Ocean coastline and proximity to the conflict prone northern neighbours (that are seen to provide dens and transit zones for terrorists and terrorists activities as we saw in chapter three) has made Kenya both susceptible to terrorist activities and strategic for U. S. anti- terror onslaught. Its association with the super power – the U.S - has equally increased its vulnerability and made it a prime target for terrorists. Kenya is in this respect concerned with its internal security as much as the U.S. is concerned with its homeland security and that of its citizens abroad. We can therefore argue that Kenya's geo-strategic location in the region has given it the opportunity of furthering its regional preponderance agenda through its association with the U.S. This however comes with costs including the cost of loss of human life and property as witnessed in 1998 and 2002 terrorist attacks in Kenya. Comparatively, Uganda's abrasive move to court the U.S. over the last decade or so easily fits into this mind set.

However, “ a state with potential to exercise power in specific circumstances, to act as a regional power needs to be predictable to the super power. The super power needs to assess the contribution or damage to their interests that an active regional power can bring about.”²⁵² The U.S's oscillation between Kenya and Uganda as allies can therefore be explained by the lack of an outright and predictable ally in the region. In such a case, it is more expedient to maintain the two as its partners in the region without distinctly identifying one as the kin pin reference point. This throws into doubt Kenya's regional preponderance as a core state or its hegemonic status. Kenya's shaky democracy and intermittent

²⁵² Ibid

implementation of liberal democratic principles including in economic sphere are worth raising as areas of significant doubt.²⁵³

The war in Iraq similarly cast more doubt on Kenya's predictability. Whereas Kenya sought to re-assert its sovereignty by making an independent decision over the Iraq and standing by the UN decision and not supporting the US, Uganda chose expediency and gave an express verbal support to the US in the war. In this, Uganda saw an opportunity of improving its regional rating by the world's sole super power. If we are to stand by Chan's postulates on the relationship between super powers and regional powers, then Uganda is on the right track in its bid for regional paramouncy. However this is not the only consideration in the regional power game, economic factors play a key role and this is where Kenya may not have been significantly challenged as we shall see in the next sub-section.

The wariness that has characterized Kenya's last leg of the Sudanese negotiations demonstrates the fear that comes with super power involvement in matters that a regional power claims a monopoly. Indeed as many have observed, the Kenyan government is beginning to seriously worry about American pressure to take advantage of future peace in Sudan. While a political and diplomatic solution to the civil war in Southern Sudan seems to have been achieved, the Nairobi government, which has been involved in the inter-Sudanese negotiations for more than a decade, for along time viewed with skepticism the enthusiasm with which the Bush Administration supports the Sudanese negotiations. As the special envoy to the Sudanese peace negotiations noted, "the United States' coming to the negotiations at the last minute would mean an attempt to run off with the prize after we

²⁵³ Note that, the U.S is a key advocate of liberalism and free market economy beginning with the Reagan administration in the early 1980s and it has maintained this as a guiding policy of engagement with the third world countries.

have succeeded in carrying out peace negotiations in Sudan.²⁵⁴ In this, material gains are also seen to spur the U.S's interest in peace in the Sudan, the expansion of the country's oil production is not new to the U.S aspirations in Sudan. These sentiments were confirmed by the coming of the US secretary of state Collin Powell to Naivasha to attend one of the sessions of peace talks. Later, reports that the signing of the peace agreement would be done in Washington were dispelled certainly due to the pressure against such a move by Kenya.

The initial agreement between the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A was finally signed in Kenya in 2004 and the final Comprehensive Peace Accord signed in January 9th 2005 in Nairobi Kenya witnessed by several African and world leaders including the US Secretary of State Collin Powell, indicating the unfettered interest that the US has in the Sudan peace process and the benefits of post war economic reconstruction. This decision has two sides to it, one, it could easily be interpreted to demonstrate the level of symbiosis between the two states, a regional power and a super power. The US's giving in to pressure of not insisting on the signing of the agreement in Washington demonstrates the relative strategic importance of Kenya that grants it relative clout in the international and regional hierarchy of power. Two, for a long time the luke-warm interest by the US in the Sudanese peace process was seen as a stumbling block and therefore the coming of Collin Powell to Kenya on the different occasions was a much needed boost for the process. This does not however, mean that Kenya could not, independent of the US, see through the talks, but the interdependence between regional and super power argument comes in handy. Indeed the centerpiece of the address of the IGAD chairman and president of Uganda – Yoweri Museveni – during the signing ceremony of the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) was Africa's ability to solve its own conflicts (African Solution for African problems). The actual

²⁵⁴ Indian Ocean Newsletter, No 1062, 1st November 2003

recognition of Kenya's importance finally came when the US deputy secretary of state admitted that, "the world will forever be grateful for what Kenya has achieved in the search for regional peace..."²⁵⁵ Whereas this may not demonstrate hegemony, the mere recognition by the US that Kenya plays an important role in regional conflict management and especially in the Sudan conflict, can be seen to put it at a little higher position in the region.

5.2 ECONOMIC FACTORS AS DETERMINANTS OF HEGEMONIC PROCLIVITY

Morgenthau argues that, "whenever economic, financial, territorial, or military policies are under discussion in international affairs, it is necessary to distinguish between, say, economic policies that are undertaken for their own sake and those that are the instrument of a political policy – a policy, that is, whose economic purpose is but the means to the end of controlling the policies of another nation."²⁵⁶ When, however, the objectives of economic policies serve to increase the power of the nation pursuing them with regard to other nations, these policies and their objectives must be judged primarily from the point of view of their contribution to national power.

An economic policy that cannot be justified in purely economic terms might nevertheless be undertaken in view of the political policy pursued. This is the difficulty that one finds with the Kenyan situation, the delineation of economic policies that are purely for economic purposes and those that are for political reasons. However, this is not unique to Kenya alone; the difficulty is generally observable in all third world countries. The reason being that, aside from the motivation to pursue power, the priority of coming out of their status of underdevelopment seems to override everything else. Kenya is no exception.

²⁵⁵ Daily Nation 11th July, 2005, p. 10

²⁵⁶ Morgenthau, Hans J, 1991, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Kalyani, New Delhi p. 36

The need to eliminate poverty and general economic backwardness makes it very difficult for Kenya for instance, to pursue economic policies for the sole purpose of hegemonic tendencies. However it has also been latently noticed especially by other competing states that Kenya's expansionist and preponderant tendencies are geared towards regional dominance over its neighbours. As one high-ranking Uganda high commission official noted, "we acknowledge Kenya's superiority and regional dominance especially in economic (commercial and industrial) realm and therefore we are not just competing with Kenya as an equal neighbour, but one that has over the years considered itself a regional leader in various aspects."²⁵⁷ The tendency to dominate, in particular is an element of all human associations, from the family through fraternal and professional associations and local political organizations, to the state.

The whole political life of a nation, particularly of a democratic nation, from the local to the national level, is a continuous struggle for power. In view of this ubiquity of the struggle for power in all social relations and at all levels social organization, it is not surprising that international politics is of necessity power politics.²⁵⁸ One can get away with the argument that Kenya's economic predominance and the continued need to widen the gap in the level of economic development is an engagement in power politics. However, one needs to take note of the actual motive behind its economic policies. As we saw previously, Kenya has had a bigger economic advantage over its neighbours, Tanzania and Uganda and the trend has only marginally changed over time. Table 5.0 (a) and (b) below exemplifies this assertion.

²⁵⁷ Interview with Ugandan Economic Attaché July 2004 Nairobi

²⁵⁸ Morgenthau, Hans J, 1991, Op Cit., p. 40

Table 5.0 (a): Kenya Trade With Uganda, Exports Imports and Balance 1993-1996 (K.£ Million)

Year	Exports	Imports	Balance
1993	325.98	15.98	310
1994	544.27	9.29	534.98
1995	766.7	8.03	758.67
1996	953.18	1.48	951.7

Source: Kenya Economic Survey 1994 and 1997

Table 5.0 (b): Kenya Trade With Uganda, Exports Imports and Balance 1997-2003 (Ksh.'000)

Year	Exports	Imports	Balance
1997	16571110	467212	16103898
1998	19466334	59738	19406596
1999	21189072	307012	20882060
2000	24186092	515402	23670690
2001	30039898	683429	29356469
2002	31280038	664421	30615617

(Ksh. Million)

2003	30668	1038	29630
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Source: Kenya Economic Survey 1999,2003 and 2004

It is evident from table 5.0 (a) above that Kenya had the lion's share of trade revenue vis-à-vis Uganda. The trend did not significantly change due to Kenya's overwhelming industrial primacy. Indeed the period of 1993 and 1996 witnessed a steady increase of Kenyan exports to Uganda of 65.4% over the four years from a low of K.£ 325.98 million to a high of K.£ 953.18 million. Conversely imports from Uganda declined by 90.7% from a high of K.£ 15.98 million to a record low of K.£ 1.48 million. The balance of trade as shown reflects these sentiments with a huge margin of increase over that same period from K.£ 310 million to K.£ 951.7 million. The nexus of this expose is to demonstrate Kenya's preeminent economic advantages over Uganda reflected in the trade between the two countries. As to whether these economic advantages have anything to do with its hegemonic tendencies is neither here nor there. They are, in retrospect, a reflection of purely economic policies

pursued for the sole purpose of economic returns and it is not easy to clearly demonstrate the existence of undercurrents of power politics between the two countries.

The danger of the over-latency is that, it gives a lot of room for feral conclusions including that, Kenya is economically predominant in its trade with Uganda because of its thirst for regional hegemony. We must however primarily be live to the fact that a key determinant of hegemony is economic preponderance. This includes control of raw materials, which is not provable in this analogy and control over production of high value commodities, which passes as processed products. In this context then, an argument on Kenya's hegemony can be sustained, as these considerations must be looked at in tandem.

The period 1997 to 2003 saw a turn of events that is worth noting. There was a remarkable decrease in the balance comparatively in the period 1997 to 2003 with an increment of 45.9% in exports to Uganda from Ksh. 16571110 thousands in 1997 to Ksh. 30668 millions in 2003 against increase of 54.98% in imports from Uganda from Ksh. 467212 thousands in 1997 to Ksh. 1038 millions in this period. This change of fortune for Kenya in the last six years that has seen a steady reduction in balance of trade between Kenya and Uganda is a covert demonstration of Uganda's abrasiveness in its drive to clip Kenya's wings in the regions economic dominance. It is during this period that Kenya reportedly lost a lot of its investors to both Uganda and Tanzania. The reasons for which were largely internal including, deteriorating infrastructure, comparatively high cost of electricity, relative political instability, rampant corruption, relatively high tax regimes, complicated and unnecessarily long licensing procedures for investors among a host of other factors.

Again, as earlier pointed out, it remains tricky to conclude that these economic gains by Uganda were in pursuit of political ends or they were purely for the sake of economic

values. Largely they are easily seen as purely economic without any political overtones. Non-the-less, even pure economic policies are translatable to political ends if they so coincidentally serve those interests and Uganda would not hesitate to credit itself for that. This abrasiveness is adequately enough fright for Kenya's regional economic preponderance as it begins to feel that it is loosing its ground in the region.

Given that hegemony hinges on economic advantages, it is crucial that Kenya would want to do every thing at its disposal to reverse the trend. It is on these grounds that we argue out Kenya's diplomacy of conflict management in the region. By Kenya negotiating peace in Southern Sudan then it expects to derive two benefits. One, as a regional power it demonstrates to its challengers that the discipline of peacemaking remains its preserve. Two, peace in Southern Sudan means an increased market for its products and investors (see chapter four). With the apparent head start, the availability of equal opportunity for all in the region to access the new markets will be cancelled out by its comparative economic advantage over them.

This argument becomes more accurate when one looks at the logic of Kenya retaining the peace process both as a mediator and host in spite of the chairmanship of IGAD – the organization under whose auspices the peace process takes place – having been taken by the Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni. As much as the argument for continuity may suffice, one would have expected that, with the change of leadership in IGAD, Uganda would have taken a more central role in the peace process. This was not the case and Kenya continued to dominate the peace process, handling it more as a national affair than a regional organization affair and incurring high costs both of human resource and financial nature. Whereas one would argue that this was so for purposes of stability and consistency, power politics, which is rife in the region, does not subscribe to this argument.

As we saw in chapter four, Kenya has demonstrated the zeal to dominate the Southern Sudan market and given its comparative advantage, it may just be a matter of time before Southern Sudan becomes an economic appendage of Kenyan investors. Indeed by pledging \$3.5 million at the Oslo donors' conference, one can argue that, Kenya is not just being a friendly and philanthropic neighbour but also acting as a regional donor to further its hegemonic tendencies in the face of Uganda and other countries in the region. Uganda is however, not taking this lying down. Uganda has for instance, opened a consulate at the Sudanese city of Juba to assist Ugandan firms participate in trade and investment in Southern Sudan. Uganda is also keen to establish a rail link from Gulu to Sudan's Nimule and Juba and from Pakwach to Sudan's Wau and Yei towns.²⁵⁹ Ugandan Authorities are worried that if they do not move quickly, they could loose out to Kenya is already opening commercial Bank and other investments and is likely to erect infrastructure at Sudan's Rumbek Airstrip. This perspective demonstrates the challenge that Kenya is already getting Uganda and the fear that the 'weaker' competitor has over Kenya's prowess (economic).

With the introduction of direct flights by Air Sudan from Entebbe to Khartoum Uganda anticipate an improved trade and tourism flows between the two countries. Similarly, Air Sudan also launched its inaugural flight (after over twenty years of absence) to Nairobi – Kenya in June 2005. Indeed, the competition between investors in the two countries was demonstrated during a Southern Sudan investors' conference in Kampala, which registered a significant attendance, by Kenyan investors keen to take up the opportunities.

Kenya's trade with Tanzania has somewhat been intermittently irregular in terms of trends of increase or decrease in imports and exports. Except for the period of 1993 to 1996

²⁵⁹ The East African, July 11 – 17, 2005, p. 9

when Kenya registered a steady rise in exports reminiscent of its traditional dominance, the consequent period was largely unsettled. Tanzania had its gains and losses as much as Kenya did. Kenya however maintained a relative overhead in the balance of trade in the same period. The tables 5.1 (a) and (b) below demonstrates this inconsistency of swings of increase and decrease over the period of 1997 to 2003.

Table 5.1 (a): Kenya Trade With Tanzania, Exports Imports and Balance 1993-1996 (K₡ Million)

Year	Exports	Imports	Balance
1993	270.48	24.44	246.04
1994	454.78	54.54	400.24
1995	631.02	31.1	599.92
1996	758.25	46.4	711.85

Source: Kenya Economic Survey 1995 and 1997

Table 5.1 (b): Kenya Trade With Tanzania, Exports Imports and Balance, 1997-2003 (Ksh. Million)

1997	15790	865	14925
1998	16116.4	610	15506.4
1999	13767	480	13287
2000	11092.1	928	10164.1
2001	13511	585	12926
2002	14181.1	803	13378.1
2003	14588	1368	13220

Source: Kenya Economic Survey 1998, 2000, 2003 and 2004

Table 5.1 (a) shows an increase in export earnings of 64.3% for Kenya over the period 1993 to 1996 from K₡ 270.48 million in 1993 to K₡ 758.25 million in 1996. The balance of trade increased by a similar margin of 65.4% from K₡ 246.04 million in 1993 to K₡ 711.85 million in 1996. It is important to note that in this period the reversal of economic fortunes for Kenya were at their initial stages and therefore could not be manifested in surveys in this period.

The consequent period shown in table 5.1 (b) is marked by mixed fortunes of intermittent increase and decrease on both sides. In spite of Kenya maintaining its characteristic high levels of balance of trade, Tanzania made remarkable inroads into the

Kenyan Economy with increased exports to Kenya. This can be attributed to two factors. One, and this likewise applies to Ugandan case earlier discussed; this is the period that efforts at revamping the East African Community were at their peak with the introduction of East African passport and other overtures that made travel and trade between the states much easier; this meant more convenience in trading activities. Two, it is also in this period that Tanzania became an increasingly better investment destination as opposed to Kenya due to the factors earlier highlighted. Kenya, in this period registered an increase in re-locations by foreign investors from the country to Tanzania hence generally reducing its investor base and consequently exports capacity to Tanzania.

We have noted that most of these investment losses were largely because of internal factors. Whereas this trend may have a bearing on Kenya's regional economic preponderance it may absolutely have no relations to Kenya's economic policies that are primarily power related if the same can be delineated. The challenge therefore exists from both Tanzania and Uganda, but these are manifestly pure economic policies with no direct link to regional power competition. Latently however, it remains to be proved that any of the economic advantages accrued by the two states Tanzania and Uganda are power related and therefore a challenge to Kenya's perceived regional hegemony.

5.3 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY CAPABILITY IN HEGEMONIC PROPENSITY

Note worthy is the fact that hegemony goes beyond economic preponderance. A hegemonic state must possess enough military power to be able to protect the international

(regional) political economy that it dominates from incursions by hostile adversaries.²⁶⁰ This is important because economic issues, if they are crucial enough to basic national values may become military-security issues as well. The military conditions for economic hegemony are met if the economically preponderant country has sufficient military capabilities to prevent incursions by others that would deny it access to major areas of its economic activity.²⁶¹ To this extent, Kenya may not be expressly referred to as hegemonic in the region. Even though Kenya has successfully prevented and rebuffed claims to its territory non can be explicitly accredited to its military might.

Kenya increased its military expenditure considerably during the period that its territorial integrity was most threatened, reinforced its military manpower and hardware and even entered into military pacts with states perceived as friendly to it and foe to its 'enemies' (read Ethiopia). However, not any of these can qualify as demonstrable military-might needed for the maintenance and enforcement of economic hegemony. In any case these were direct responses to threats to its security and territorial integrity. On the other hand, even if Kenya had such a capability, in contemporary world of interdependence, it is difficult for a hegemon to use military power directly to attain its economic policy objectives with its partners and allies. Cases of use of raw power as witnessed in the American invasion of Iraq are presently few and far between and may require the tenacity of a world super power exerting its authority over a vulnerable small state perceivable as modern day imperialism.

In other words, even if we could prove that Kenya has the adequate military power to protect its regional economic interests, it is inconceivable that Kenya would invade Tanzania, or Uganda simply because these countries have for instance erected prohibitive

²⁶⁰Keohane, Robert, 1984, *After Hegemony: Co-operation and discord in political Economy*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey p. 39

²⁶¹ Ibid p. 40

tariffs against Kenya's industrial and commercial exports to their markets. The guiding principle here is interdependence and complex interdependence that considerably reduces the relevance of military capability in economic interactions between states. Indeed the existence of for instance, regional organizations renders the use of military power as an instrument of facilitating economic dominance inappropriate. This non-the-less does not mean that military force has become worthless. In fact its importance has only been transferred to other areas of immediate concern.

The continued and sustained supply of military personnel to the United Nation's peacekeeping missions in Africa and beyond is one such touted example of areas of immediate interest. The identification of Kenya to host the secretariat of the region's African Union (AU) stand-by military force for emergency and regular peacekeeping missions is another. This was endorsed in July 2005 with formal establishment of the Eastern Brigade, which is part of the Union's stand-by force for peacekeeping missions in and out of the continent. The heads of state of Eastern Africa endorsed Easbrig during a summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 2005. The member countries of Easbrig include Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Madagascar, Sudan, Comoros, Somalia and the Seychelles²⁶². Notably, the secretariat of Easbrig will be the Defence Staff College in Nairobi, even though the headquarters will be in Addis Ababa. Suffice to note also that Chief of Staff of the secretariat that will also host the planning elements (Planelm) is Colonel Robert Kibochi of Kenya. The main functions will be planning and training.²⁶³ The pre-eminent role given to Kenya demonstrates trust and ability to command respect in recognition of its role

²⁶² Tanzania, though geographically in East Africa opted to join the Southern Brigade

²⁶³ See The Standard Thursday 14th July 2005

in Africa as a peacemaker, its relative stability, salience and will to ensure universal peace in Africa.

With this advantage and as Southern Sudan gets into a new level of peace building, the need for AU forces to intervene and ensure a sustainable peace in Southern Sudan is not in doubt. Kenya will again obviously be handy in either providing forces for the AU deployment or logistical support. As a regional power it assumes the lead role of ensuring the smooth running of the peace building process in Southern Sudan. This will further enhance its contention for regional hegemony and the Southern Sudan peace process provides it with the opportunity to achieve this goal.

5.4 POLITICAL HEGEMONY AND GLOBALIZATION

The 1980s saw the resurgence of liberal and neo-liberal ideology with the pronouncement and preaching of free market ideology by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher administrations in United States and Britain respectively. Neo-liberal tradition prescribes the withdrawal of the state in mainstream management of national economic affairs and leaving it to the market forces seen as a more efficient allocator of resources. Neo-liberalism is subsumed under globalization as its driving force, as the ideology and policy formulation associated with free market capitalism. Such developments however, rarely entail actual dismantling of state power but rather a shift of the role of the state in favor of large-scale capitalist enterprises and especially finance and capital.²⁶⁴

The 'liberal creed' of the Washington consensus is largely disseminated through the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The specifics of the current wave of neo-liberalism is exemplified under the general

²⁶⁴ Baker, Dean *et al* (eds) 1998, *Globalization and Progressive Economic Policy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 20

rubric of liberalization, fiscal austerity, privatization, deregulation, elimination/reduction of state subsidies and lately good governance. States are now rated on these bases and the level of democracy and good governance, human rights and political freedom.

Regional powers are inevitably charged with the responsibility of setting the example in these indices. President Bush and America's campaign for the liberation of the world into a free world is the catchword. Kenya until 2002 was heavily criticized for its authoritarian, corrupt and un-democratic political system and for some time it was losing out to Uganda and Tanzania that were viewed as increasingly becoming the model open societies reminiscent of good governance of the free world. However, the 2002 general elections seemed to have put Kenya back on the right track and it won favour of the Brettonwood's institutions the Key institutions that oversee the implementation of the liberal creed. Kenya had failed the key test of the neo-liberal policies, liberalization and privatization, compared to Uganda and Tanzania that were seen to be on the right track and winning favours from the IMF, World Bank and the U.S. As it is emerging now even the much-praised Kenyan democracy touted, as Africa's example may not be. The leap made against its regional challengers may be but lost.

These neo-liberal policies are the harbinger of globalization; the argument advanced in globalization is that interdependence has dramatically increased. The view is that the whole of the set of interrelationships has become more than the mere sum of the individual parts. While the texture of interlinked relations are neatly mapped out, we are nonetheless presented with a self-justifying and self-sustaining analytical construct. To prove the case that contemporary capitalism is marked by a unique holism, the significance of any empirical interaction, agglomeration, business mergers or interdependence is established and modeled

as evidence of the theoretical construct (i.e. globalisation) itself.²⁶⁵ What is revealed is a failure to address first-order questions about the state of the world system, i.e. the status of centre-periphery relations, interstate competition and hegemonic rivalry. Not surprisingly, the omission of such questions leads the results towards affirmation of the positive benefits of international trade, liberalization and open regionalism.

Conflicts whether internal or international is a big deterrence to globalization efforts. Any state that seeks to benefit from this new phenomenon must have a drive to ensure security and states that have a bigger stake in an expanded free market are more concerned with ensuring peace. Kenya definitely falls in this category. As a state at the centre of the periphery, to cushion the losses accrued as a result of trading with more advanced economies in a globalised world it must endeavor to create its region within which it can exert its dominance. This is the inherent thesis in its expansionist tendencies in the region.

However, unfettered globalization reduces the influence of regional hegemonic tendencies of core states as the world becomes more and more homogenized and increasingly interconnected. It anticipates that the states that will benefit are those not left behind by this new wave.²⁶⁶ In these contexts inter state competition at a regional level is reduced if not eliminated as national and regional boundaries are rendered unimportant. We must however not overlook the resilience of the state as an international actor, whatever the impact of global corporate trade; they still have to be done within state territories with inalienable sovereign equality.

²⁶⁵ Marshall, Don D., "National development and the globalisation discourse: confronting 'imperative' and 'convergence' notions" in *Third World Quarterly*, 1996, Vol. 17 No. 5 pp. pp. 143 - 173

²⁶⁶ For further discussion on globalisation see Joseph Stiglitz, 2002, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, Penguin Books

5.5 CONCLUSION

Charles P. Kindleberger says, “For the world economy to be stabilized, there must be a stabilizer, one stabilizer.”²⁶⁷ This, as Keohane notes, implies that cooperation – the mutual adjustment of state policies to one another, depends on the perpetuation of hegemony.²⁶⁸ Immanuel Wallerstein has defined hegemony in economic terms as “ a situation wherein the products of a given core state are produced so sufficiently that they are by and large competitive even in other core states, and therefore the given core state will be the primary beneficiary of a maximally free world market.”²⁶⁹ Even though this definition may be insufficient in the current world characterized by high levels of interdependence and specialization in various areas of preponderance, it captures the position that we have attempted to put Kenya in this chapter.

Key to our highlights in the chapter is the continued preponderance of Kenya’s industrial exports in the region and a relatively superior industrial manufacturing and processing sector vis-à-vis its neighbours who are the main consumers of its industrial product. One can therefore successfully argue that Kenya thus acts as the stabilizer for the stability of the region’s economy.

In this chapter we have approached the discussion on Kenya’s regional power status from economic, political and military perspective. Core to the discussion was the blurred nature of economic policies pursued purely for economic purposes and those pursued for political or hegemonic reasons. This, by and large confined the clear-cut depiction of Kenya’s predominant economic position as a function of its hegemonic tendencies.

²⁶⁷ Kindleberger, P., Charles, 1973, *The World in Depression, 1929-1939*, University of California Press, Berkeley p. 305

²⁶⁸ Keohane, Robert, 1984, *After Hegemony: Co-operation and discord in political Economy*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey p. 31

²⁶⁹ Wallerstein, Immanuel, 1980, *Modern World Systems II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World Economy, 1600-150*, Academy Press, New York p.38

It is apparent that Kenya has sustained a dominant economic position in the region in spite of challenges and inroads made by Tanzania and Uganda in the recent past. This position has perpetuated its economic hegemony and justified its position as the region's core state. It has maintained the position of the region's economic and industrial hub and transit route for goods destined for Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, DRC, and Southern Sudan. Kenya has played this important part in regional economic development based on its strategic location along the Indian Ocean harbors, the goodwill of the political leadership, better infrastructure and relative internal peace and stability.

In the recent past however Tanzania has given stiff competition especially on the use of its seaports as alternative entry point for imports destined for the region's hinterland. This is part of what we have argued in this study as possible pointer to alternative regional leadership. However, we also pointed out that before conclusions are drawn on economic policy as hegemonic, we must determine whether they are pursued for political reasons or just for economic purposes *per se*. In this perspective, it has not been easy to draw this distinction; indeed the economic policies have tended to be simply economic. The chapter has argued out the intricate need for military capability to ensure the maintenance of economic hegemonic policies, which is not very distinct in the Kenya case except for latent military deployments in Africa and elsewhere for peacekeeping purposes. These deployments are largely a manifestation of the general confidence that Kenya commands and that qualify to accord it a regional leadership status.

Another key issue that has been raised in the chapter is regional political leadership. Kenya has principally, in the period defined by the scope of the study, failed in this benchmark of regional hegemony. The need for a regional political leader within the framework of neo-liberal policy of the 'free world', free market and good governance has

eluded Kenya and the credit given to its neighbours, Uganda and Tanzania. Although Uganda has had its down turn as the clamour for a multi- party democracy picks momentum against Museveni's no party "movementocracy," it has worn favour of the world custodians of these liberal policies, the IMF, World Bank and the U.S. Kenya though had its chance after the 2002 general elections and it remains to be seen what it reaps out of the opportunity as the region's political leadership hangs in the balance.

In retrospect, hegemony in the general conception as a motivator for Kenya's involvement in regional conflict management is neither here nor there. Every state desires leadership and preponderance both at the regional and international level and Kenya is no exception. However it is extremely complex to draw a direct link between hegemony *per se* and Kenya's involvement in managing conflicts in the region. As a state in pursuit of power, it is imperative that Kenya must have in mind latently or manifestly the need to increase its regional clout in every foreign policy engagement. These conflicts are indeed part of its foreign policy agenda in the region.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.0 SUMMARY

In his report on “The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa”, the U.N secretary general Koffi Anan noted that:

In many cases both in Africa and elsewhere, the failure of major external actors to maintain a common political approach to an erupting or on going crisis is one of the principle impediments to progress towards a solution. The adoption of a common stance by neighbouring states is especially critical. In early stages neighbouring states are likely to be the first ones approached as protagonists search for allies and support. If the conflict is allowed to escalate it will inevitably begin to take on a life of its own, but neighbouring states and other actors are likely still to wield considerable influence with the protagonists. Even when the conflict has further intensified, broader international efforts ... can succeed only if there is genuine cooperation and support of such measures by the sub-region.²⁷⁰

This observation particularly identifies the key role that regional core states play in conflict management. As is indicative of the immense responsibility, Kenya has taken up this, both as a host of peace talks, refugees, and mediator of conflict Southern Sudan. Its diplomatic intervention approach is now being seen to bear some fruit as the conflicts in the Southern Sudan comes close to a settlement.

In chapter three, we considered the levels of external interventions in regional conflicts by neighbouring states and regional powers among other international actors. In

²⁷⁰ Koffi Anan, 1998, “The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa”, United Nations, www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/sgreport/index.intl

this respect, we classified Kenya in the region both as a core state or regional power and a neighbour to the countries in conflict of Sudan, which it has been managing. In both cases Kenya has in one way or another been accused of being impartial.

In the Sudan conflict there have been complains of a 'traffic jam of peace initiatives.'²⁷¹ These two considerations combine to rationalize the need or otherwise for Kenya's continued presence in the conflicts. In recognizing the importance of regional actors in conflict management the U.N secretary general points out the considerable influence that neighbouring states wield in the conflicts. This is the position Kenya holds in the region in spite of the accusations of non-partisanship and vested interests that it has weathered. Indeed, as Zartman and Saadia Touval argue, "mediators must be perceived as having an interest in achieving an outcome acceptable to both sides and as being not so partial as to preclude such an achievement."²⁷²

Third parties mediate on the basis of their desire to make peace, and their own self-interest. Self-interest is the primary motivator for states. States are motivated by both defensive and offensive interests. Defensive interests include, promoting international stability, internal security and protecting the mediating nation's foreign interests.²⁷³ Often nations will attempt to manage a conflict in order to prevent rival powers from intervening and expanding their influence. It is in this perspective that we have argued out Kenya's interests in chapter four and five as economic, security and hegemony. Note worthy is the

²⁷¹ See International Crisis Group, 2002, "Power and Wealth Sharing: Make or Break Time in Sudan Peace Process" Report 18th December 2002

²⁷²Zartman, William, Saadia Touval, 1996, " International Mediation in Post Cold War Era" in Chester Crocker et al eds, *Managing Global Chaos*, Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC

²⁷³ Ibid.

fact that, when motivated by defensive interests, mediators often have some stake in achieving particular outcomes.²⁷⁴

In addition Anan warns of competing initiatives to resolving conflicts and advises for complementarity and cooperation among interested parties. As he puts it,

It is critically important that international actors avoid the temptation to undertake rival or competing efforts, once a framework for mediation has been established. This is in no way intended to discourage the designation by the governments and organizations officials with a special mandate to pay close attention to particular crisis situation. On the contrary, the appointment of special envoys and special representatives can greatly facilitate consultations, information sharing and decision making within the international community.²⁷⁵

This should be read against the backdrop of our earlier emphasis on 'a traffic jam' of peace initiatives. In chapter two we highlighted the complaints that Kenya raised over the intended intervention of Egypt and the call on South Africa to replace Kenya as the negotiator in the Sudan conflict. In addition to this, there have also been other states that showed interest in the Sudan conflict including Libya and Nigeria²⁷⁶. It is this multiplicity of initiatives that Anan warns against especially if the same is aimed at competing with and not complementing an already existing initiative. Kenya in a bid to guarantee its continued dominance in the Sudan conflict management ensured the exclusion of these states at least

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ Koffi Anan, 1998, Op Cit

²⁷⁶ Note that Nigeria is now taking a leading role in the new Western Darfur crisis (which is not part of our study) both due to its long standing interest in the Sudan conflicts and also because president Obasanjo is the sitting chairman of African Union which is spearheading the intervention. (Note; Rwanda has also offered to send troops)

to the extent of running parallel processes to the IGAD initiative²⁷⁷ in which it has remained the key negotiator and host.

In trying to understand why Kenya continues to dominate in the management of the Sudan conflict, we identified three hypothetical variables that are seen as key to Kenya's commitment to multiple conflict management. These were, economic interests, security considerations and the pursuit of hegemony in the region. It is these key variables that guided the research as suggested motivators of Kenya's involvement in conflict management in the region. The thesis was divided into six chapters, introductory chapter, a literature overview chapter, a discussion of economic and security considerations as motivators in chapter four and hegemony in the penultimate chapter.

6.1 CONCLUSIONS

6.1.1 SECURITY AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

International relations between sovereign states are guided by key concerns of national interest perceived as security, power, economic predominance etcetera that guide their foreign policies. In chapter four we concentrated on the two factors: economic and security as motivators of its involvement in the Sudan and Somali conflicts. We noted that Kenya has had relative economic advantage over its neighbours. This position has generally put it above the rest of the countries in the region. Its preponderant position is both historical and as a result of a concerted effort to improve its level of economic development. As a colonial policy, Kenya was nurtured as the region's hub of economic activities and development by the colonial settlers. It became the *de facto* colonial regional headquarters and the transit zone for economic activities in the hinterland.

²⁷⁷ Refer to chapter one for details

By the time Kenya gained independence it had become what came to be known by different scholars by different terminologies including, sub-imperial state, centre of the periphery in the region, neo-colonial state etcetera. The justification for all these was the level of economic development and its linkages to the western colonial economies. Indeed by the 1970s, Kenya alongside other African states such as Ivory Coast and Ghana were the examples of African success stories in economic development and stability. Traditionally Kenya had put economic development at the core of priorities of both its domestic and foreign policies. Domestic policies were widely defined by the post independence African creed of eradication of poverty, illiteracy and disease.

A lot of studies of Kenya's foreign policy carried out in that period and the consequent periods emphasized and concentrated on Kenya as a preponderant regional economic powerhouse. Its foreign policy posture both regionally and internationally was generally guided by the need to maintain and increase its economic dominance in the region. We also noted that part of its economic advantages were also as a result of its geographical position. With its deep water harbors at the Indian Ocean coasts, coupled with its relatively good physical (transport and communication) infrastructure, Kenya became the best option as a transit corridor for goods destined for Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, DRC, and Southern Sudan. This further increased its economic dominance, as many states found it rather difficult not to do business with Kenya.

Kenya's industrial dominance is another key factor that has conditioned its regional policy. In need and search of new markets, Kenya has not stopped at anything to further its expansionist motives in the region. With these considerations in mind, we drew a connection between economic interests and Kenya's diplomacy of conflict management. Central to the arguments were certain key factors identified as; need to ensure an adequate and expanded

market for its industrial and commercial export products; need for new markets for investments for Kenya's enterprising industrialists and investors, need for cheap oil imports from Southern Sudan. These cannot be achieved in a region plagued by conflict and insecurity.

The economic potential in Southern Sudan was identified as great, and the impediment has been the conflict and insecurity that cannot allow for trade between the countries. In pursuit of these interests and potential, we argued that Kenya saw it fit to guarantee its fledgling economy, commercial and industrial sector a secure current and future expanded market by mediating the conflict, ensuring the establishment of a stable government with whom it can do business and building peace for a stable region. The best option for Kenya to achieve these objectives lay in a diplomatic option to resolving the conflicts in the region hence mediation and negotiation.

The IGAD initiative therefore played into Kenya's game plan and it has not let the opportunities go as it pursues its national economic interest. The oil in Sudan was also identified as a key motivator as it stands to reduce the high costs of oil imports from the Middle East. The opening up of the oil rich Southern Sudan would be a great opportunity for Kenya as it seeks to develop its North Eastern Province, which has largely remained underdeveloped. A trickle down effect would inevitable result to overall improvement of the national economy as the Northern corridor is opened up for trade with Sudan. The solution to these is peace in the war-torn Northern neighbours. In sum therefore, economic interest and considerations was shown as a key motivator for Kenya's continued involvement in the management of conflicts in the region, but especially in Southern Sudan.

The other factor considered was security. In chapter three, we identified security in three aspects, security of the state, regime and the citizens and argued that security of the

regime has pre-occupied a lot of African leaders in the conduct of foreign policy. In this study, we similarly considered all the aspects of security as a motivator for Kenya's involvement in regional conflict management. Indeed in this context, it is not very easy to separate them. This was the purpose for our lucid reference to interstate conflicts for instance, between Kenya and Sudan, and between it and other neighbours. It, by and large, defines state security and the security of the regime(s) in terms of territorial integrity and respect of colonial borders (read OAU agreement). Security of the citizen was subsumed under internal security. This was discussed under two key issues, that is, small arms proliferation and its relationship to general insecurity in the country and terrorism and its effect on the Kenyan economy especially the tourism sector.

We noted that Kenya is experiencing an alarming increase of illegal small arms that are used in criminal activities all over the country. The most common areas of misuse identified included; cattle rustling (especially in Rift Valley and North Eastern Provinces), banditry, armed robberies, murders etcetera. It was shown that access to firearms has been made extremely easy due to the conflicts in Sudan, Somalia, Northern Uganda, Ethiopia and the Great lakes region. This is the more reason why Kenya has consistently engaged in regional conflict management. By doing so it aims at solving the root causes of insecurity and crime in the country along side regular policing. Managing these conflicts is seen as long-term solution to the problem of insecurity given its porous borders and the consequent difficulty of policing the vast borders with the conflict prone neighbours and increasing sophistication of arms traffickers.

The study made reference to the Nairobi Declaration on the control of small arms proliferation. It identified the inherent difficulty of implementing the consequent agreement since most of the signatories are countries in conflict and do not have the monopoly to

universally implement the agreement in all areas of their territory some of which is controlled by insurgents and rebels.

Terrorism was identified as a two pronged problem. One aspect is insecurity of the citizens while the other is the danger of international economic isolation that it causes due to fear of targeted foreigners being attacked. It therefore has a direct effect on the economy. In the complex web of interdependence that the neo-liberal free market economy and globalization symbolism, terrorism can tear down an economy.

It is the responsibility of every state to ensure that it is neither a target nor vulnerable to terrorist activities. Kenya has fallen in both traps and suffered the wrath of terrorists twice most recently. This we attributed to two factors; the massive presence of western interests in the country and its proximity to the war torn countries of Sudan and Somalia. Both of which have been accused of either being supportive to terrorists or as a result of the conflicts in their territories, provided hideouts and safe havens for terrorist activities in the region. Somalia for instance without a central government²⁷⁸ has been a conducive transit zone and base for terrorists targeting western interests in the region. As part of its activities aimed at reducing this risk and preventing further and future terrorist attacks Kenya aims to restore peace and stability in Sudan so as to dismantle the terrorist hideouts resulting from weak state security systems due to the conflict. This is again a long-term approach and which is a more certain way of reducing or even eliminating the threat of terrorism.

The two aspects of security are argued in tandem with their economic implications that make them central concerns and motivators for Kenya's involvement in conflict management in the region. The study was therefore showed that, security in both aspects

²⁷⁸ It is not until recently that an interim government was inaugurated in Nairobi Kenya in late 2004 and early 2005 period. But even still, this is a government in exile as it were and the challenges of relocating to Mogadishu have not been surmounted.

combine to condition Kenya's diplomacy of conflict management regionally. In Chapter four, we set out to prove or disprove the validity of the hypotheses that economic and security considerations are motivators of Kenya's involvement in regional conflict management. Certainly from the primary and secondary data analyzed, key informant interviews and available secondary material indicated that these factors are central in conditioning Kenya's regional behaviour in respect of conflict management. The case study considered (Southern Sudan) was adequately analyzed to delineate beyond doubt that, security and economic interests are the key variables pursued by Kenya as its national interest in the Sudan peace process, that it is both hosting and spearheading. The protective posture that Kenya has taken vis-à-vis other initiatives by other states is partly explained by these two latent interests that it has in the two conflicts.

6.1.2 HEGEMONIC CONSIDERATIONS

This was the centerpiece of chapter five. By taking Kenya as the region's core state, one assumes that Kenya commands a given level of hegemony in all or at least in some of its respect. Hegemony is multi-dimensional; it has economic, political and military dimensions. Kenya's economic preponderance has historically been assured. However one key issue that came up in the chapter is the challenges that are perceived to be coming from Uganda and Tanzania. Whereas Kenya might have lost some ground in regional economic predominance, largely due to internal factors, it may not be significant enough to perceptually dethrone it of the leadership bestowed upon it from pre-colonial times.

In studying the relationship between economic policies and hegemonic motives, the study argued that one must draw a clear distinction between economic policies pursued solely for the sake of economic benefits and those pursued with political motives. It is the

latter that justifies hegemony as a motive in economic policies pursued with reference to other states. In addition, generally, the third world – Kenya included – is weighed down by the urgent need to eliminate biting poverty, industrialize and generally attain high levels of economic development equal to or close to that of the developed world.

This primary pre-occupation with economic development *per se* makes it difficult for third world states to pursue economic policies for political reason lest they lose sight of their main and immediate goal. Kenya is no exception in this dilemma and it is difficult to characterize its regional economic policies as hegemonic in nature. Therefore, to the extent that the policies are expansionist, the visible motives are solely for economic development. However this does not preclude hegemonic tendencies, indeed such tendencies may be latently present but only as a secondary objective. One can on the other hand assume that by simply having a predominating economy, Kenya is hegemonic.

The study consequently drew a nexus between its expansionist trend to regional economic opportunities and its diplomacy of conflict management. Key in this argument was the fact that by taking the lead role in the management of the conflict Kenya hopes to assure itself of opportunities above all the rest in the new economies emergent from the end of conflicts in Southern Sudan by abrogating itself the responsibility of the region's peacemaker. Added to its relative superiority in industrial, and commercial sectors, more advanced bigger human resource capacity and higher entrepreneurial spirit of its citizens, it hopes to reap more advantages from these economies *vis-à-vis* other neighbours.

The study further discussed the other aspects of hegemony especially military. In effect there is no direct proof that Kenya holds the regional military predominance whether in terms of hardware, personnel, expertise or intelligence. However certain related military activities in Africa and the world were identified as key points worth noting as regionally

significant. These included its consistent provision of troops for various peacekeeping missions in Africa and elsewhere in the world. In addition Kenya has been identified as the possible base for African Union's proposed standing military force for peacekeeping and military interventions in Africa's numerous conflicts.

Whereas these serve as recognition of its regional significance, they do not go far enough to prove its regional military preponderance in any case the Kenyan national military has been one of the most idle standing national defense forces in Africa and beyond the determination of their ability is therefore extremely hazy. In any case, given that Kenya has subscribed to diplomatic means to resolving the conflicts with no option of military pressure to back it, military preponderance is relatively inapplicable in this study. There is hence very little opportunity of drawing a connection between military preponderance and Kenya's regional policy on diplomacy of conflict management. On the other hand we noted that, in the highly interdependent international system that we are in, military power as a means of enforcing economic policies is becoming increasingly out of date. Though this is not to suggest that it has been rendered un-important altogether.

Another central aspect of hegemony is political hegemony. In the preceding chapter, we pointed out the importance of neo-liberal ideology subsumed under free market economy, liberalization, globalization and good governance. It is in this score that Kenya faced the greatest challenge from countries such as Uganda and Tanzania, which were seen to be more on the right course than Kenya. Noted here was the important role that a core state plays in setting the example in political leadership. The study related these facts to the link between regional powers and super powers. In this aspect of regional leadership preponderance has oscillated between Uganda and Kenya as allies of the U.S – the world's super power.

Ideally however, the existence of a regional core state has been accepted and vested upon Kenya given the natural and acquired political and economic head start in the region. The maintenance of this power position as we noted has not gone unchallenged. The ideological supremacy of Tanzania under Nyerere adequately served this purpose, as Kenya remained a 'good boy' of the west. The deterioration of the political democracy in Kenya, increase in human right abuse and malignant corruption in the wake of a unipolar international system almost pushed Kenya to the periphery as it lost touch/favor with west. This we pointed out was further aggravated by warming up of Uganda to the west under Museveni with the implementation of neo liberal policies of the west that put Museveni's Uganda as one of the few success stories of liberalization in Africa together with Ghana and Botswana among others. Kenya's sluggish acceptance of these policies that came under the rubric of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) advanced by the Bretton Woods Institutions (IMF and World Bank). For some time, Kenya's political preponderance in the region was seriously in the wane and required serious reconsideration, and reinvention. Whereas there was limited tilt in for instance, trade balance between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, its international standing was seriously wounded. Therefore any chance to restore this status could not be left without attention.

It has been the argument of this study that, the numerous conflict management engagements but especially Southern Sudan were some of the opportunities and Kenya has selfishly guarded against any competition. Considering that Kenya over the years has been relatively peaceful, it has only been logical that it becomes the centerpiece of conflict management. At the peripheral level, it has provided a relatively secure location for various international organizations that monitor and facilitate conflict resolutions. These

organizations have provided Kenya with an opportunity to advance its national interest via the diplomacy of conflict management.

The study further noted that, at the intricate level, Kenya has directly involved itself in the conflict by being the mediating state as well as providing mediation venues for belligerent parties. Its direct involvement has been variously explained by different considerations including its proximity to the war torn state (Sudan) and therefore insecurity at its borders, proliferation of firearms, and refugee problems. However, other latent under currents are centrally very important, such include, consideration of the need to reclaim and re-assert its position as a regional power and accumulate the benefits derived both from trade potential and trade possibilities. Therefore, Kenya had a chance to further its national economic interest and regional economic dominance.

Kenya's diplomacy of conflict management in this case though seems to have a shadowy relationship with this perceived power competition in the region, as it remains basically a latent intention. Evident however was Kenya's assertion of its position as the region's peacemaker exemplified in its dominance of the management of the conflicts in the region including recent offers by president Kibaki in August 2004 to mediate peace in DRC by overseeing reconciliation talks between, Uganda, Rwanda, and the DRC to solve the conflict in Eastern DRC.

In retrospect, hegemony as a motivator for Kenya's diplomacy of conflict management is cloudy. It is a factor worth considering in studying Kenya's foreign policy on conflict management in the region, non-the-less it remains an extremely latent motivator. The difficulty for instance, of drawing a distinction between Kenya's economic policies aimed at achieving political ends and those purely for economic reasons blurs the explicit accentuation of hegemony as a motivator in this study and most certainly any other.

6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

6.3.1 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

It is generally acknowledged that the current theatre of conflicts in the horn and central Africa conflict systems has important repercussions for stability in the region. A proper management of these conflicts requires a clear conceptual understanding of the inter-linkages between several factors. This includes the nature of conflicts within the system, the broader regional and sub-regional milieu of conflict management²⁷⁹ and the region's power arrangement. In addition, as Kenya focuses on peace making, the other indispensable aspect of conflict is peace building. Kenya, the study established, has vested interest subsumed under economic, security and to some extent hegemony in making peace in Southern Sudan.

However, these efforts are fruitless and the interests may not be achieved at the end of the day if there is no clear strategy for peace building. Peace building involves initiatives that are designed to rebuild war-torn societies and institutions after hostilities have ended, as well as measures that are intended to prevent conflict before it erupts. Such practices may be seen as features of the new, 'human security' agenda, which has emerged in the post-cold war period as an alternative to traditional security studies and policies, which were preoccupied almost entirely with state and military interests.²⁸⁰

Peace building gained international attention when it was endorsed by former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali in "An Agenda for Peace". Conceived as a component of 'second generation' UN peace operations,²⁸¹ peace-building initiatives often follow early-stage peacekeeping interventions. However, ideally, the objective is to prevent

²⁷⁹ Mwagiru, M., 1998, Op Cit

²⁸⁰ There are several works on the subject. For a good summary and overview, see K Krause, "Theorizing security, state formation and the "Third World" in the post-cold war world", *Review of International Studies*, 24, 1997, pp. 125-136.

²⁸¹ Mackinley, J & J Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations", *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 15 No. 3, 1992, pp. 113-131

conflict and therefore, if implemented early and effectively, peace building might actually preclude the need for peacekeeping. With the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement in the Southern Sudan Conflict in January 2005 in Kenya, stakeholders are now talking of the enforcement mechanism for peace agreement to avoid a repeat of the 1972 peace agreement that never lasted. In reality the most critical part of the peace process is not even the putting of pen to paper for peace, but the sustainability of the peace pact: this is where the idea of peace building becomes indispensable as a final lap in peacemaking.

The other facet of peace building is the all-important preemption of conflict. Africa has the dubious record of belligerent forces wittingly dishonoring peace agreements including as soon as they are signed. As a preventative mechanism, peace building involves long-term processes to address the root causes of conflict: 'economic despair, social injustice, and political oppression'.²⁸² Both conceptually and normatively, it is this aspect of the peace building discourse that is the more innovative.

Perceived as a follow-up to peacemaking and or peacekeeping, the humanitarian efforts of peace building tend to be viewed in old security terms, as a sub-set of military or quasi-military operations following the restoration of order, whereas, when seen as a preventative approach, peace building links 'new' and 'old' security agendas by helping to bridge the analytical and practical gaps which have existed between security and development. This is the essence of the interrelationship between security and economic development, reconstruction and rebuilding of the 'new' economies. In addition, the study put to bear the stumbling bloc that insecurity is to regional development and the pertinent question of adequate security as a prerequisite for development.

²⁸² Boutros-Boutros Ghali, 1993, "An Agenda for Peace", United Nations New York

As we noted, globalization and regional trading blocs presuppose economic activities carried out in an environment of sustainable peace and security. This is the challenge Kenya is trying to address, but for it to do that successfully, it must put peace building as part and parcel of its conflict management agenda. Agreeably this aspect has not received the necessary attention it deserves and until this is taken care of, the peace efforts might just go into the doldrums as the region prepares for another round of resurgence of conflict or a new insurgency. The example of Western Darfur may be far fetched but it goes far enough to justify what observers have recently called “the African Shuffle (-ling).”²⁸³ That is, as soon as one conflict is mediated and peace agreement signed another crops up, hence a vicious cycle of conflicts and conflict management efforts in the continent. Even though the African Union chairman, President Obasanjo of Nigeria, disagreed with the concept of “African shuffling” the reality is that a more comprehensive approach to resolving conflicts need to be adopted and peace building must be part and parcel of it.

Thus conceptualized, the idea of peace building also resonates closely with much of the new regionalism literature and, in particular, with the emphasis on the role of civil societies in the peace/security/development nexus. Defined by Bjorn Hettne as “political co-operation on the regional level to promote the region as a viable economic, cultural, and ecological unit”,²⁸⁴ the new regionalism is pluralist and multifaceted. While taking account of old, formal, top-down regionalisms that are concerned with uni-dimensional and/or nation centric processes (trade or market integration, functional or neo-functional cooperation).

²⁸³ CNN's "Inside Africa" Interview with the African Union (AU) sitting Chairman, the Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo August 8th 2004

²⁸⁴ Hettne, B, 1990, *Development Theory and the Three Worlds*, Longman, Harlow, p. 25

The new regionalism approach also acknowledges the importance of movements in civil societies for emancipation, democratization, material opportunity and/or survival.²⁸⁵

According to Mittelman, the new regionalism approach is cognizant of “the cross-border flows that are truly bottom-up (ethnic group transactions that transcend international borders, migratory movements, trading on the parallel market, etcetera.)”.²⁸⁶ The commonality of such issues in both the new regionalism and new security discourses underscores the need to treat peace building and regionalism as related phenomena.²⁸⁷ Moreover, in recent complex emergencies in Africa, the importance of regional issues and actors has been obvious in the events leading to conflict, in subsequent crisis-interventions and in most, if not all, post-crisis reconstructions. Overall, these crises have emphasized the importance of identifying both the links between (in) security and (under) development, and the new regional dynamics that are unfolding in the post cold-war world.²⁸⁸

The new security agenda within which the idea of peace building has emerged generate new approaches that problematise the ontological and epistemological assumptions of traditional security studies by extending analysis beyond the traditional emphasis on a ‘black-box’ nation-state to include other actors (non-state and/or informal), multiple jurisdictions (local, regional and global as well as national), and issues of social relations (gender, ethnicity, culture and community).²⁸⁹ This broader concept of security is particularly relevant in areas of the Third World such as Africa, where civil wars as well as threats to the

²⁸⁵ MaClean, Sandra J, “Peace building and the New Regionalism in southern Africa” in *Third World Quarterly*, 1999 Special Issue, Vol. 20 No. 5 pp. 98 – 118

²⁸⁶ J Mittelman, 1996, “Rethinking the ‘new regionalism’ in the context of globalization”, *Global Governance*, 2, p. 197.

²⁸⁷ MaClean, Sandra J, *Op Cit*

²⁸⁸ Timothy Shaw, “Beyond post-conflict peace building: what links to sustainable development and human security?” in *International Peacekeeping*, 1996, Vol. 32 No. 2, pp. 36-48.

²⁸⁹ MaClean, Sandra J, *Op Cit*

economy or ecology are often more pressing than are inter-state rivalries, and where security is clearly centered within the broad problematique of development.

The involvement of such organizations as the World Council of Churches (WCC) and All African Conference of Churches (AACC) in the initial 1972 agreement and lately in early 1990s of National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) in the Sudan conflicts is some of the examples of multiple participation of peacemakers beyond the realists' nation-state black box. It may not be a clear-cut opening of the 'black box' since they participate mainly as facilitators and not negotiators and the state remains the key player in the management process, but it is a recognition of the complexity of conflicts and need for a widened scope of conflict management triangle.

The management of conflicts in the region are currently under the auspices of IGAD, again, this brings in the other key factor MacClean postulates, the regional organizations. However even within the regional organization framework the state remains the centripetal force that put together the whole process.

MacLean's identification of other issues such as gender considerations is central. In every conflict in Africa and elsewhere women and children are the most vulnerable groups and the majority victims of the conflicts. It is therefore only fair to give the women equal opportunity as men to part-take in the process, which has not been the case.

As Kenya continues in its central position both as the host, facilitator and mediator, it must adequately assign prominence to peace building and more concern with human and community development approach that brings together the civil society, regional organizations, local and global considerations.

The peace building process entails both short- and long-term objectives, for example short-term humanitarian operations and longer-term developmental, political, economic and

social objectives.²⁹⁰ However, peace-building initiatives, which overlook or underestimate the importance of regional political economy and culture or civil society, are unlikely to produce sustainable peace. Economic integration cannot be pursued independent of social cultural aspects of the concept. Indeed hegemonic tendencies have a lot of stake in social and cultural domination.

As the world talks about globalization, critics have come up with coinages that reflects America's and the west's cultural domination tendencies. Concepts such as "cocacolanization" draw their origin in the domination of the American corporate organizations and culture that is sweeping the world. Kenya's regional interests must also take cognizance of the need for regional cultural integration as a means to both, peace building and accomplishing its interests in the war torn neighbours.

6.2.1.1 Challenges to Peace Building²⁹¹

Key to the peace building process are issues of sustainability of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. This process however, has to anticipate challenges from several quarters. For instance, defence and how to deal with the "other armed groups" better known by the acronym "OAG" will be a potential source of strife. Under the agreement, there will be three different armies. The first will be a joint army, which will be based in Khartoum, the second, the SPLA and, finally, an army for the North. The OAG have been allowed to either join the army in Khartoum or the SPLA. The problem, however, is that, throughout the war, SPLA's position has been that these groups were being financed by the military intelligence of the Sudanese army. At a meeting with the OAG hosted by Kenya's retired president Daniel arap

²⁹⁰ Bush, K "Beyond Bungee cord Humanitarianism: Towards a Democratic Agenda for Peace Building", *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*, Special Issue, "Governance, Democracy & Human Rights", 1996.

²⁹¹ This sections benefits immensely from Interviews conducted by *The East African Weekly* and published in their July 11th – 17th Issue

Moi in June 2005, Dr. Garang appealed to the armed groups to join the SPLA, pledging that those who would chose to be integrated into the SPLA would be treated equally with others. Signs of trouble ahead however clearly played out. In a stinging criticism of Garang, the chief of staff of one of the major armed groups – the Southern Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) – Major General Paulino Matip, demanded not only a new memorandum of understanding between SPLA and SSDF but also a comprehensive ceasefire. In addition, that the SSDF be represented in all UN associated committees and commissions such as monitoring teams, ceasefire commissions and de-mining teams and to be equitably considered for the high command of the combined forces of the southern Sudan.

Clearly, diffusion of tensions between the groups in the south is going to be critical to the sustainability of the agreement as the government of southern Sudan consolidates its gains that include the right to self-determination, north/south border demarcation and an independent army during the interim period among others. The government of Southern Sudan will have four sources of revenue, namely, 50 per cent of oil revenues, 50 per cent of non-oil central government revenues generated in the south, revenues generated by the Southern Sudan government by virtue of its taxing powers, and international assistance, which will come directly to the south.

Diplomats privy to the peace process from its beginning cite the most problematic is the fact that the negotiations were confined largely to two parties: the National Congress government of President Omar Hassan-el Bashir and Garang's SPLM. This means that other crucial parties like the disaffected rebels in Darfur and others in Kassala and the rim of the Red Sea who have been at loggerheads with Khartoum and who were not included in the negotiations have yet to be given reason to feel part and parcel of the government of national unity.

In doubt also is how firm Garang's hold on the South is, despite the diplomatic and military pre-eminence he commands on behalf of the region. Though the SPLM movement is an amalgam of various southern ethnic groups, the dominant component is the Dinka, to which Garang belongs. The other big group in the southern ethnic assemblage, the Nuer, has given Garang problems in the past. Riek Machar, a persistent rival of Garang's who has fallen out with him before but is now back in the SPLM fold, is a Nuer. Garang thus has to secure an important enough position for him in the incoming government of national unity to retain his loyalty. The other important person is Salva Kiir, who was previously the chief of staff of the SPLA, the military wing of the SPLM. Though he was popular with the commanders, Garang removed him from his military position and installed him as a vice-chairman of the SPLM. He likewise has to be adequately rewarded to forestall any rebellion.

Furthermore, there are deep divisions between the southerners, and also in the north that raises the question of trust, the Darfur crisis, which has since imploded and become the concern for the international community's, remains the main challenge to the new government of national unity. At the Nairobi meeting in 2004, the UN Security Council members seemed to be of the view that the resolution of the 22-year-old Southern Sudanese problem would be the key to sorting out the Darfur issue, those sentiments were shared by Vice-President Ali Osman Taha, President Bashir's confidant and the chief government negotiator of the Khartoum-SPLM accord.

6.2.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The study has discussed three variables that are considered key to Kenya's involvement in conflict management in the region, that is, hegemony, economic and (in) security considerations. There are however, several factors that influence, condition and

determine external state behavior with regard to conflict management that have arisen in the course of the study but have not been considered within the scope of the study. For instance, personality variables are important aspect that needs further research to enrich this area of research. In this case, it would be interesting to study Moi's role in regional conflict management both as a national and regional statesman. Leaders' operational code have variously been studied, it would be a very useful source of additional information to study regional leaders operational code with regard to regional conflict management. In this context, one would be interested in studying conflict management during internal political transitions. That is, a consideration of whether leadership styles over the years have in any way influenced Kenya's Diplomacy of conflict management. Research in these directions would help to comprehensively understand Kenya's and other regional core states' roles and motivations (both latent and manifest) in managing conflicts in their regions.

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KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Week One

Respondents:

(a) Government Officials

Location: Nairobi

1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2. Office of the President – Internal Security
Provincial Administration
3. Special Envoys and Ambassadors

(b) Inter Governmental Organizations

Location: Nairobi

4. IGAD – Nairobi

Week Two and Three

Respondents:

(a) Parties to the Peace Process

Location: Nairobi

5. Sudanese Embassy – Nairobi
6. SPLM/A Spokesperson - Nairobi
7. Uganda Embassy – Nairobi
8. Tanzanian Embassy – Nairobi

(b) Non-Governmental Organizations

9. Sudan Mirror – Nairobi
10. International Crisis Group – Nairobi
11. Oxfam GB – Nairobi
12. World Vision International – Nairobi
13. Moi African Institute (MAI) – Nairobi

Week Four

Respondents: Sudanese Refugees in Kenya

Location: Nairobi

14. Koinonia Community – Koinonia House (Nairobi)
15. Kenyatta Avenue – Nairobi
16. United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) – Nairobi
17. Sudan Catholic Bishops Conference – Nairobi

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

KEY INFORMANT GUIDELINE QUESTIONS (Government Officials)

Introduction

I am carrying out a master of Arts in Political Science research on *Role of core states in regional conflict management: the case of Kenya in the Southern Sudan Peace process*. The research by focusing on the Southern Sudan conflict, seeks to establish the motivation and purpose for Kenya's involvement in the resolution and/or management of the conflict. As a key stakeholder and a participant in one way or another in the process, you have been identified as a **key informant** in the research. Your valued opinion, which I hereby seek, will be of great benefit to this research and the general policy environment for the parties to the conflict. Your opinion on the following research questions will be greatly appreciated.

I wish to reassure you that the information provided will be treated with utmost confidence and shall only be used for purposes of the research.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. In your opinion is Kenya an impartial party to the management of the conflict?
2. Therefore, is there need for Kenya to involve in managing these conflicts?
3. In your view, is Kenya an important player in the Southern Sudan Peace process?
4. What is your judgment of Kenya's overall position in the region (including Uganda, Tanzania, Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, and Burundi)?
 - a) Economic Position
 - b) Political Position
 - c) Strategic Position
5. Do you think Kenya is facing any challenges in the positions you put it?
 - a) Economic Position
 - b) Political Position
 - c) Strategic Position
6. How is Kenya responding to these challenges? Is it through?
 - a) Aggressive Diplomacy
 - b) Hospitality
 - c) Conflict Management
 - d) No Response
 - e) Others (Specify)
7. If more than one how do you rank them?
8. Is Kenya succeeding in its Conflict Management endeavors?
9. In your opinion does Kenya have any other interests apart from seeking peace for the countries in conflict?
10. Is there any security problem resulting from the conflict Kenya is currently resolving?
11. If yes what is the government doing to control the security problem?

12. Is the Kenya government's involvement in management of these conflicts part of the government plan to solve the security problem?
13. Are there any economic benefits Kenya is currently getting or seeks to get by involving in the management of these conflicts?
14. The Operation Lifeline Sudan has been alleged is a source of economic benefits is this true?
15. Kenya has been alleged to have interest in the oil in Southern Sudan as cheap source of oil imports. Is this one of the reasons why the government is interested in peace Southern Sudan?
16. What is Kenya's economic and market expansion targets in the region?
17. Kenya is the dominant economy in the region in terms of its export share of the regional market. Is resolving of these conflicts a means to further expanding this market?
18. There is obviously an emerging market in Southern Sudan, which is the same size as Kenya, Uganda, put together. Is this potential market a reason for Kenya's mediation of the conflict?
19. Any other remarks

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

KEY INFORMANT GUIDELINE QUESTIONS

(Sudanese Refugees and immigrants)

Introduction

I am carrying out a master of Arts in Political Science research on *Role of core states in regional conflict management: the case of Kenya in the Southern Sudan Peace process*. The research by focusing on the Southern Sudan conflict, seeks to establish the motivation and purpose for Kenya's involvement in the resolution and/or management of the conflict. As a key stakeholder and a participant in one way or another in the process, you have been identified as a **key informant** in the research. Your valued opinion, which I hereby seek, will be of great benefit to this research and the general policy environment for the parties to the conflict. Your opinion on the following research questions will be greatly appreciated.

I wish to reassure you that the information provided will be treated with utmost confidence and shall only be used for purposes of the research.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. For how long have you been in Kenya as a refugee?
2. In your opinion is Kenya an impartial party to the management of the conflict?
3. Is there need for Kenya to involve in resolving/managing these conflicts?
4. In your view is Kenya an important player in the Southern Sudan Peace process?
5. Your country is about to have peace for the first time in 21 years, who would thank for the peace achieved?
6. Where would you prefer to stay after the conflict is over (Kenya or Sudan)?
7. Do you think Kenyan investors will go to Sudan after the conflict?
8. Would be happy if that happened?
9. Who would prefer as an investor in your country, Kenyans, Ugandans, Tanzanians, Others (specify)?
10. The Kenya government says that the insecurity in Kenya is as a result of conflict in your country, do you agree? Explain
11. Where do you think the firearms used by criminals in Kenya come from?
12. Any other comments

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

KEY INFORMANT GUIDELINE QUESTIONS

(IGAD Member States)

Introduction

I am carrying out a master of Arts in Political Science research on *Role of core states in regional conflict management: the case of Kenya in the Southern Sudan Peace process*. The research by focusing on the Southern Sudan conflict, seeks to establish the motivation and purpose for Kenya's involvement in the resolution and/or management of the conflict. As a key stakeholder and a participant in one way or another in the process, you have been identified as a **key informant** in the research. Your valued opinion, which I hereby seek, will be of great benefit to this research and the general policy environment for the parties to the conflict. Your opinion on the following research questions will be greatly appreciated.

I wish to reassure you that the information provided will be treated with utmost confidence and shall only be used for purposes of the research.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. In your opinion who is leading the Southern Sudan Peace process?
2. What in your opinion, is Kenya's role in the peace process?
3. In your opinion is Kenya an impartial party to the management of the conflict?
4. Is there need for Kenya to involve in resolving/managing these conflicts?
5. What is your (country) in the peace process?
6. In your view is Kenya an important player in the Southern Sudan Peace process?
7. As a member of IGAD and East Africa region, what is your judgment of Kenya's overall position in the region (including Uganda, Tanzania, Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, and Burundi) in terms of Economic, Political and Strategic Position?
8. Is this in any way related to its leading role in the peace process, how?
9. Do you think Kenya is facing any challenges in the positions you put it? If yes, from who or where?
10. How is Kenya responding to these challenges?
11. If more than one how do you rank them?
12. From your experience, how would you explain the insecurity and illegal firearms in Kenya?
13. In your opinion, do you think Kenya has any other interests apart from seeking peace for Sudan? Economic, Political etc Explain
14. Apart from peace for Sudan what other interests (economic, political etc) does ... (mention country) in post war Southern Sudan?
15. Do you think they are in conflict with Kenya's interests you identified?
16. Any other Comments

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Telegrams: "EDUCATION", Nairobi

Telephone: Nairobi 334411

When replying please quote

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JOGOO HOUSE "B"

HARAMBEE AVENUE

P.O. Box 30040-0010

NAIROBI

1st November, 2004 20...

Otieno Michael Oloo
University of Nairobi
P.O. BOX 30197
NAIROBI

Dear Sir

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORISATION

Reference is made to your application for authority to conduct research on "Role of Co-States in Regional conflict management: A critical Analysis of Kenya's involvement in conflicts in the Greater Eastern Africa". I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorised to conduct research in the Government Ministries/Departments in Nairobi for a period ending 28th February, 2005.

You are advised to report to the Heads of the Government Ministries/Departments you will visit before embarking on your research project. Upon completion of your research project, you are expected to submit two copies of your research report to this Office.

Yours faithfully

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'B. O. Adewa', written over a circular stamp or seal.

B. O. ADEWA

FOR: PERMANENT SECRETARY

CC

The Provincial Commissioner
Nairobi

The Heads of Departments
Government Ministries/Institutions