

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

**PEACE AND SECURITY IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA: A CASE
STUDY OF COMESA**

JOSEPHINE KOKUNULA KARIUKI

R50/68329/2011



**A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT**

2013

DECLARATION

This research project is my original work and has not been presented in any other university for any purpose of examination




Signature

7th November 2013

Date

JOSEPHINE KOKUNULA KARIUKI

This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the appointed university supervisor



Signature

7.11.13

Date

DR. OCHIENG

DEDICATION

This project is dedicated to all my children and to the loving memory of my late father, Kahwa Kemanzi, for his passion for knowledge.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The completion of this thesis would not be possible without the material and moral support from various people. First of all I thank the Almighty God for giving me good health, and guiding me through the entire course. Secondly I am greatly indebted to Dr. Ochieng Kamudhayi who was my supervisor, for his effective supervision, dedication, availability and professional advice. I extend my gratitude to my lecturers who taught me, therefore enriching my research with the learnt knowledge. My final appreciation goes to my classmates, from whom I was richly developed and appreciate their encouragement and positive criticism.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CSSDCA	Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa
DPs	Developing Partners
EAC	East African Community
EASF	Eastern Africa Standby Force
EU:	European Union
FTA:	Free Trade Area
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IGAD:	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
IOC	Indian Ocean Commission
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
OAU	Organization of African Unity's
PTA	Preferential Trade Area
RECs:	Regional Economic Countries
SADC:	Southern African Development Community
SPSS:	Statistical Package for Social Sciences

UN: United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION	ii
DEDICATION	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	iv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	v
ABSTRACT	xi

CHAPTER ONE

PEACE AND SECURITY IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF COMESA

1.1 Background to the Study	1
1.2 Statement of the Problem	2
1.3 General Objective.....	4
1.3.1 Specific Objectives	4
1.4 Literature Review.....	4
1.4.1 Regional Integration.....	4
1.4.2 Peace and Security	9
1.4.3 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).....	13
1.4.4 Research Gap	17
1.4.5 Justification of the Study	17
1.5 Theoretical Framework	18
1.5.1 Regionalism and Functionalism.....	18
1.6 Hypotheses	20
1.7 Research Methodology.....	20

1.8 Chapter Summary	23
---------------------------	----

CHAPTER TWO

AN OVERVIEW OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND PEACE AND SECURITY

2.0 Introduction	24
2.1 Global Overview of Regional Integration Peace and Security	24
2.1.1 Regional Integration in ASEAN	25
2.1.2 Regional Integration in EU	26
2.1.3 OAU/AU Integration	27
2.2 Regional Integration in Africa and Peace and Security	31
2.4 COMESA and Peace and Security	41
2.4.1 The Eastern Africa Standby Force	42
2.4.2 Regional Security Dynamics	44
2.4.3 Regional integration challenges in COMESA	46
2.5 Conclusion	46

CHAPTER THREE

THE NATURE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN COMESA

3.1 Introduction	48
3.2 COMESA	48
3.3 Trade in COMESA and peace and security	49
3.3.1 Democratic Republic of Congo peace and security	50
3.4 Climate change and peace and security in COMESA	53
3.4.1 Climate change and human security	54

3.5 Agricultural and peace and security in COMESA	57
3.5.1 Food security and peace and security	58
3.6 Natural resources and peace and security in COMESA.....	59
3.7 Infrastructure and peace and security in COMESA.....	62
3.8 The Nature and Dynamics of peace and security in COMESA.....	66
3.8.1 Great Lakes region.....	67
3.8.2 Ethnicity and Political Governance	68
3.8.3 The Scramble for Resources in DR-Congo	68
3.8.4 The Horn of Africa.....	69
3.8.5 Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons	71
3.8.6 Forced Displacement in the Horn of Africa.....	72
3.9 conclusion.....	73

CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATIONS OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF COMESA

4.0 Introduction	75
4.1 Strategic objectives of COMESA in relation to peace and security	75
4.2 Opportunities for regional integration.....	78
4.2.1 Programmes of regional integration, peace and security	81
4.3 Challenges of regional integration, peace and security in COMESA.....	84
4.4 COMESA contribution to peace and security and member states cooperation	84
4.5 Threats to peace and security within the COMESA	86
4.5.1 Internal and external migrations	86

4.5.2 Piracy and Terrorism.....	88
4.5.3 Unbalanced distribution of resources.....	89
4.5.4 Water scarcity	90
4.6 Easing threats to peace and security in COMESA region.....	91
4.7 Failures of COMESA programs on peace and security	92
4.8 COMESA, SADC, EAC and IGAD to peace and security	93
4.9 Relationship between regional integration and peace and security.....	93

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1 Introduction	96
5.2 Summary of Findings	96
5.3 Discussion of the findings.....	97
5.3.1 Relationship between peace and security and regional integration	97
5.3.2 The nature of peace and security in COMESA.....	98
5.3.3 Opportunities and challenges of regional integration in COMESA	99
5.4 Conclusion.....	100
5.4.1 Regional integration and peace and security	101
5.4.2 Specific programmes of COMESA and peace and security	101
5.5 Recommendations	102
5.5.1 Recommendation for Further Studies	102
5.5.2 Policy recommendations	103
Bibliography.....	107
Appendices	119

ABSTRACT

States are increasing their cooperation and collaboration with neighbours in order to better respond to the pressures and opportunities presented by globalization. Therefore, the most important reasons for joining regional groupings have been the hope to address common challenges that face the concerned member states. COMESA and Africa in general have witnessed armed conflicts the majority being civil and ethnic which poses a threat to regional integration. In spite of the existence of an elaborate administrative structure and the various programmes such as trade, climate change, agricultural, natural resources, infrastructure enshrined in the treaty establishing COMESA, peace and security which remains key and fundamental to the integration agenda has been persistently absent and obscure. The question which the study sought to answer was: Has the various COMESA integration programmes facilitated in bringing peace and security in the region? The overall objective of the study was to analyze the relationship between peace and security and regional integration in COMESA. The following were the specific objectives that guided the study: To assess whether regional integration enhances peace and security; to examine the nature of peace and security in COMESA; to analyze challenges and opportunities of regional integration in COMESA. The study therefore, sought to explore whether regional partnerships through the various programmes such trade, climate change, agricultural, natural resources, infrastructure in the common market have helped facilitate this goal and whether the current principles of cooperation between the member states and the regional organization are sufficient for the task at hand as it has been persistently absent and largely ignored. The study was guided by the following hypotheses: There is no relationship between regional integration and peace and security; regional integration has led to peace and security; regional integration has not led to peace and security. The study was based on theory of regionalism and functionalism that views society as a social system of interconnected parts in the same way a body depends on the heart, lungs and brain to work together for the body to survive and explains that societies function properly if they share common goals. The study found that regional integration in COMESA ought to add to peace and security and that peace and security is a key ingredient for successful regional economic integration. The study recognizes that peace and security is the foundation in building a socially and economically strong regional grouping and that peace is a pre-requisite to sustained economic development. The study also found that in a number of integration initiatives like EU and ASEAN, regional security appears as a policy objective of regional economic integration, not just an “outcome”. The study recommended that the various programs in COMESA should be reformulated to include peace and security aspect as a key objective. The study further recommended that future studies be conducted to establish why the various programmes have not achieved their original laid objectives as per the COMESA treaty. The study finally recommended that individual member states should adapt a peace curriculum aimed at building a culture of peace in the region through learning.

CHAPTER ONE

PEACE AND SECURITY IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF COMESA

1.1 Introduction and background to the Study

This chapter presents the proposal which includes the background of the study, statement of the problem, the objectives, literature review, theoretical framework, the hypothesis, the research methodology and finally the chapter summary on peace and security in regional integration in Africa: A case study of COMESA.

Regional integration emerged as one of the key developments in international relations at the beginning of the twenty-first century. As a result, states are increasing their cooperation and collaboration with neighbours in order to better respond to the pressures and opportunities presented by globalization¹. This tendency to set up regional frameworks has reached such a scale that it is now possible to say that a new level of governance has been created that oscillates between the national and international ones.

The most important reasons for joining regional groupings have been the hope to address common challenges that face the concerned member states. These reasons include improving economic policies of the members, reducing poverty, managing the process of liberalization in a collective and coordinated manner, formulating a common approach to external negotiations and addressing cross border issues such as shared resources or effects of drought and insurgency among others.

¹ Farrell, Mary; Bjorn Hettne and Luk Van Langenhove (2005). *Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice*, London: Pluto Press.

COMESA and Africa in general have witnessed armed conflicts the majority being civil and ethnic which poses a threat to regional integration. The volatile situation in Great Lakes region, Horn of Africa and other parts of Africa has over the years presented a spectacle of unimagined atrocities. These conflicts have affected the development of countries and have led to the loss of human life and adversely weakening the potential benefits of regional cooperation. As recognized by Boin and Rhinard, that if threats to safety and security unfold along boundary-crossing trajectories, response capacities of individual states will have to become linked if not integrated².

With this in mind, COMESA member states needs to take a common and stronger position in promoting peace and security in the region. This will allow regional members to benefit in sharing and popularizing the active peace and security programme within COMESA with the main objective of working with Member States to develop effective regional mechanisms for conflict prevention; to anticipate and prevent the emergence of conflicts; to resolve ongoing conflicts and for post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Although, peace and security are essential ingredients in regional integration; they nevertheless continue to pose a major challenge in Africa and other parts of the world. With regards to COMESA, the region has witnessed violent conflicts triggered by a variety of reasons including resource scarcity/abundance, poor governance, ethnicity and

² Boin, Arjen and Mark Rhinard (2008), "Managing Transboundary Crises: What Role for the European Union", *International Studies Review*, Vol. 10 (1), pp. 1-26

insurgence among others which poses a threat to peace and security³. The volatile situations in the Great Lakes region, the Horn of Africa, West Africa, the Arab Spring in North Africa have over the years presented a spectacle of a variety of atrocities. These conflicts have affected the development of these countries and have led to the loss of human life adversely weakening the potential benefits of regional integration.

In spite of the existence of an elaborate administrative structure and the various programmes such as trade, climate change, agricultural, natural resources, infrastructure enshrined in the treaty establishing COMESA⁴, peace and security which remains key and fundamental to the integration agenda has been persistently absent and obscure. Countries in COMESA not engaged in civil wars are faced with civil and political unrests, refugee influxes, terrorism threats and attacks, the HIV-AIDS epidemic and other contagious diseases, high crime rates, and natural disasters to name a few that affects human security.

Since, regional organizations are said to be capable of fundamentally shifting the dynamics of a region towards peace and security; build bridges of understanding; transform relations from enmity to amity; and bring stability and prosperity where conflict and discord previously reigned and that peace and security is the foundation in building a socially and economically strong regional grouping, therefore, making peace and security a pre-requisite to sustained economic development⁵. The question which this study seeks to answer is: Has the various COMESA integration programmes facilitated in bringing peace and security in the region?

³ L. Jeremy and S. Kathryn, (2002). Scarcity and Surfeit, *The ecology of Africa's conflicts*, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa.

⁴ COMESA Treaty, Article 15

⁵ Yeates, Nicola and Bob Deacon (2006). "Globalism, Regionalism and Social Policy: Framing the Debate", *UNU CRIS Occasional Paper* 0-2006/6.

1.3 General Objective

The overall objective of the study was to analyze the relationship between peace and security and regional integration in COMESA.

1.3.1 Specific Objectives

The following were the specific objectives that guided the study:

- i. To assess whether regional integration enhances peace and security;
- ii. To examine the nature of peace and security in COMESA;
- iii. To analyze challenges and opportunities of regional integration in COMESA.

1.4 Literature Review

The literature review is organized in three parts: The first part examines the various aspect of regional integration and the expected benefits. The second part explores the concept of peace and security in the region. The third section examines the COMESA integration and the peace and security agenda.

1.4.1 Regional Integration

Regional integration is a term that has been used over the years, yet to date no single precise definition has been formulated. The term has been used interchangeably with economic co-operation, regionalism and regionalization which, according to Onditi,⁶ are inherently imprecise and fuzzy notions yet impossible to ignore and have become ever more essential to the analysis of contemporary regionalism.⁷ According to Rosamond, regionalism often refers to “the tendency of geographically proximate territories or states engaging in economic integration and forming free trade area and

⁶ Onditi O Francis (2010). ‘Development or Security? *The Dilemma of Policy Prioritisation, Institutional Coordination, and Sequencing of Integration in East African Community*

⁷ Emanuel, A. (1994). Imagined (security) communities; Paper presented at 1994. Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, pp.1-4.

possibly a common market” this perspective does not consider political integration hence lacks the element of peace and security which are essential in any regional integration ⁸.

In his contribution, Bach adds that regionalism goes beyond economics and markets to involve transformation of a geographical area into a clearly identified social space.⁹ It is often the political choice of any given country whether based on political, economic, social or geographical considerations to be part of a regional bloc. Furthermore, each country, depending on the benefits of integration determines the degree of sovereignty it is willing to surrender.

The concept of regionalism is further elaborated by Manboah-Rockson who asserts that regionalism is characterized by multi-dimensionality of events such as business transactions, increased homogeneity and political re-alignment.¹⁰ Barry Buzan’s concept of regional security complex,¹¹ introduces a useful international relations prescription that brings in the fabric of a supranational economic and political cooperation. To Lee¹² regional integration is a process by which a group of nation-states voluntarily and in various degrees access one another’s markets. Recent studies on regional integration by Hettne also reveal the new wave of regionalism as characterized by its multidimensionality, complexity and fluidity.¹³

⁸ Rosamond, B. (2000). *Theories of European integration*, St. Martins. Press, New York.

⁹ Bach, D (2003). New regionalism as an alias; regionalization through trans-state networks; In Grant, A and F, Soderbaum (eds). *The new regionalism in Africa*. Burlington: Ashgate, p. 21-30.

¹⁰ Manboah-Rockson, J.K. (2003). *Regional and Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Review of Experiences, Issues and Realities at the Close of the Twentieth Century*. University of Cape Town, SA

¹¹ Buzan, B. (2003). *Regional Security Complex Theory in the Post-Cold War World*. In Soldierbaum, F. and Shaw, T.M., (eds). *Theories of new regionalism*. Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke.

¹² Lee, M. (2001). *SADC and the free trade area in South Africa*. In Maloka, E. and Eddy E.L (Eds) *Africa in the New Millennium; Challenges and Prospects*, African Institute of South Africa, Pretoria.

¹³ Hettne, B. (2005). *Beyond the new regionalism*. *New Political Economy*, 10(4), pp. 543-571.

Therefore, this study concludes that regional integration is a process in which states enter into a regional agreement in order to enhance regional cooperation through regional institutions/programmes with objectives ranging from economical to political and the broader socio-political and security.

According to Fawcett and Harrell, regional political and economic arrangements are informed by new thinking that they could help mitigate trans-boundary and communal conflict by severing the historic ties and identities.¹⁴ This understanding has been vividly exemplified by some Regional Economic Countries (RECs) in Africa. For instance, both the Common Market for Eastern and Southern African (COMESA) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) at different stages and circumstances has influenced peace stability in their respective regions. Remarkably, COMESA's recognition of the relationship between security, peace and economic development during its 1999 Summit and the subsequent establishment of a Peace and Security Committee in 2000 attest to this assertion.¹⁵

Regional integration has contributed to economic development, political amalgamation and to some extent, harmonization of security and peace regimes.¹⁶ Falk argues that as opposed to hegemonic regionalism, the new regionalism involves more spontaneous processes that often emerge from below and within the region itself, and more in accordance with its peculiarities and problems.¹⁷ In this sense broadening integration mirrors the wider interdependence between development interventions and

¹⁴ Fawcett, H. (1995). *Regionalism in World Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

¹⁵ Karangizi, S, (2001) *Sub-regional Agenda for Peace and Security: The Case of COMESA*; 'in' Cilliers, J. (eds.) *Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention in Africa* (proceedings of the UNESCO-ISS Expert Meeting, Pretoria South Africa, Pp. 23-24.

¹⁶ World Bank (1994). *Accelerated Development and UN Committee for Program and Co-ordination, proposed Revision to the System –Wide Plan of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development, Thirty-Fourth Session. E/AC. 51/7, 7.*

¹⁷ Richard F. (1997) *State of Siege; Will Globalization Win out?* *International Affairs*, pp. 316-24.

security issues. The process of regionalism has led to internal issues becoming externalized.

Felicio states that even with the rise in regional integration, still there has been a slow process in the importance of peace among the regional members¹⁸. Particularly in Africa, the debate on regional integration has dominated the agenda of African leaders in the past years. The Africanisation process and nationalism saw the culmination of calls for African unity which hatched the scheme for regional integration. Although, the contention has been, on whether the integration, should be political or economical.

According to neo-functional theory, regional integration is an intrinsically sporadic and conflictual process, but one in which under conditions of democracy and pluralistic representation, national governments find themselves increasingly entangled in regional pressures and end up resolving their conflicts by conceding a wider scope and devolving more authority to the regional organization they created¹⁹. Eventually, even the citizens of the member states begin to shift their expectations to the regional organization. COMESA as a regional body is to some extent pegged on the neo-functional theory since the cooperation places emphasis on the role of the secretariat which is meant to reduce the influence of individual heads of states decision making.

Apart from the African Union, there are other sub-regional groupings in Africa which include the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA, 19 members); the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) which superseded COMESA; the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (12 members, including Tanzania); the

¹⁸ Felicio, T. (2005). 'Managing security as a regional public good a regional-global mechanism for security', in *unu-cris occasional papers*, No. 48.

¹⁹ Haas, Ernst B (1958): *The uniting for Europe, social and economic forces, 1950-1957*, Stanford University Press.

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (6 members, including Kenya and Uganda) and the East African Community²⁰. As cooperation between the member states becomes more and more visible, the regional members need to address the issues of peace among the members.

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) as an ²¹ integration, set out in the Preferential Trade Agreement Treaty of 1993, is focused on the integration of markets through the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and investment to achieve full economic co-operation through a gradual process of the creation of a free trading zone, the establishment of a common market and ultimately an economic community. The complete roadmap of the COMESA integration agenda is given by the COMESA Treaty, which however, does not provide clear deadlines for the implementation of the agenda. The Free Trade Area (FTA)²² was established in 2000 and the customs union was launched in 2008. A number of protocols are attached to implement the Treaty, namely the COMESA Protocol on the Gradual Relaxation and Eventual Elimination of Visa Requirements and, the COMESA Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Labour, Services, the Right of Establishment and Residence. Harbom argues that conflict in itself is often economically motivated, being associated with looting, forced labour or the expulsion of local communities to secure exclusive

²⁰ Jenkins, K., (2000). *Regionalism in world politics*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

²¹ Comprises of 19 members: Burundi, Comoros, Congo, DR, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe

²² FTA comprises of 11 countries: Burundi, Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe

control over resources thereby enabling migrant labour or international corporations to exploit resources²³.

Jenkins argues that preventing conflicts and sustaining peace and stability is in line with the vision to have a secure and politically united region. Jenkins emphasizes that peaceful co-existence, settlement of disputes, good neighbourliness, democracy and good governance as well as underscoring the importance to social and economic development within the region²⁴. Instability in the region can easily translate into threats to the social, economic, cultural and political wellbeing of the people of the COMESA region.

1.4.2 Peace and Security

More than half of Africa's countries are at risk of facing peace and security crises in the form of state collapse, weak states, civil wars, ethnic massacres, and social and political deprivations of its citizenry²⁵. Regrettably, African nations still remain the weakest and most fragile of all states, miserably occupying the bottom half of the failed states index year in and year out²⁶. According to the report, despite the continent's current relative stability, which includes reduced armed inter-state conflict, new security challenges could influence the political and security landscape negatively. The drivers of conflicts and violence are still potent.

Peace and security is essential in regional integration. In pre-Westphalia era, the contact between the different polities (countries) was minimal and, therefore, security

²³ Harbom, L., & Wallensteen, P., (2005). 'Armed conflict and its international dimensions, 1946-2004', in *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 42(5), pp. 623-635.

²⁴ Jenkins, K., (2000). *Regionalism in world politics*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

²⁵ ISS-UNESCO, (2001). *Peace, human security and conflict prevention in Africa*. Pretoria: International Institute of Security Studies, 23-23 July 2001.

²⁶ United Nations, (2008). *Report of the Secretary-General on the relationship between the United Nations and regional organisations, in particular the African Union, in the maintenance of international peace and security*, S/2008/186, 7 April.

was above all national issues and in most cases, had exclusive domestic implications. In an era when communication and mobility were sluggish (or inexistent), the increase of security in a country (or feud) had no positive or negative direct impact on the neighboring countries. In the post-Westphalia world, this configuration has been profoundly altered. The formation and consolidation of states led to their securitization and, consequently, national security became, hence, a relational concept. States played out their security strategies versus other states. The UN Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change observes in accordance, that today, more than ever before, threats are interrelated and a threat to one is a threat to all. The mutual vulnerability of weak and strong has never been clearer²⁷.

To be secure is by definition, to be secure from threats. As early as in the Roman period security was regarded as the absence of distress upon which happy life depends²⁸. And threats have different providers and receivers, which may result in ten different types of conflicts. The types of conflicts where the regional level plays the dominant role, either as the provider or/and the receiver of the threat are shadowed. Most conflicts are, however, civil wars or are associated to terrorism, which sometimes does not have any direct connection to the regional level. In the present globalized world, a threat (or an attack) to the national security of one state (be it perpetrated by a domestic opposition force or by a global terrorist organization) has an inevitable seismic reaction in neighboring states. Harbom and Wallensteen (2005) say that in 2004, there were 30 armed conflicts, 27 of which were intrastate, and 3 were internationalized interstate and

²⁷ United Nations, (2004). *Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, New York, United Nations.

²⁸ Waever, Ole, (2004). 'Peace and Security: Two Concepts and their Relationship' in Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung (eds.) *Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research*, London and New York, Routledge, , pp. 6.

the incidence of internal conflicts continue to increase while affecting the neighboring countries²⁹.

The challenge for the COMESA, its member states and international development partners is how to facilitate and strengthen a self-nourishing relationship between human, regime and state security at the national level. Importantly, this demands reflection on how to support the process of reconstituting regional politics of member states from being a zero-sum calculation and state-centric notion of security to a more positive process characterized by reciprocal behaviour and legitimate relations between the rulers and the ruled. In essence, the promotion of human security goes a long way towards bolstering regime security and stability. The emergence of unemployment, hunger, poor service deliveries, organized crime, terrorism, drug and human trafficking, unconstitutional changes of governments and electoral violence has demonstrated that, in order to ensure human security, peace and stability, not only are pro-growth policies needed, but also redistributive policies anchored on positive relationships between human and regime security, or a positive alignment between political incentives and good economics.

Lawrukwa, Mjema and Rutasitara explain that one of important measures in ensuring peace and security is conflict resolution. Conflict resolution presupposes that the state of conflicts is already in place and it has, therefore, to be resolved. In other words the conflict has to be brought to an end and peace has to be restored in the society. Conflict

²⁹ EAC Secretariat, (2009). *'EAC Partner States Urged to Take Full Responsibility for Peace and Security matters as Conference Ends in Kampala'*, <http://www.eac.int/about-eac/eacnews/459i.html>, accessed on 16-6-2013.

resolution measures usually constitute peace negotiations, the signing of peace agreements and implementation of such agreements³⁰.

Post-conflict peace building encompasses the daunting challenges of conflict resolution, reconstruction, and societal transformation³¹. To the greatest extent possible, this requires a restoration of confidence and trust (social capital), and national empowerment (political capital), so that nationals take responsibility for building the kind of society they want to live in. For this to succeed, it is of paramount importance that processes be shaped, driven and owned by internal actors³². El-Affendi argues that this does not necessarily assume that internal actors will develop better policies than external actors, but experience shows that external domination generates resentment, inertia and resistance; consequently externally driven peace building is usually unsustainable³³. Nor does this mean that external actors should idealize internal actors rather, they need to understand the diversity of interests at play, and the different perspectives and agendas present in the society. Hence, ensuring effective peace and stability needs an approach that is facilitating and supportive of national processes, but not directive and pressured³⁴.

Hattne³⁵ explains that regional integration has been taken as one of important measures in the fight against conflicts and efforts in building peace. It has been observed that regional integration creates conditions of regionalism which are likely to lower the

³⁰ Lawrukwa, W., Mjema, G. & Rutasitara, R., (2002). *Regional Integration Study of East African Community*, EAC Secretariat, pp. 32.

³¹ Ramesh, C., & Van Langenhove, L. (2005). 'Inter-Regionalism and the Future of Multilateralism', in a paper presented at the 5th Pan-European IR Conference of the Standard Group of International Relations.

³² Dinka, T., & Walter, K., (2007). 'Africa's Regional Integration Arrangements: History and Challenges', in *Discussion Paper No. 74*, European Centre for Development Policy Management.

³³ El-Affendi, A., (2001). 'The Impasse in the IGAD Peace Process for Sudan: The limits of regional peace making?' in *African Affairs*, vol. 100, pp.581-99.

³⁴ Ramesh, C., & Van Langenhove, L., (2005). 'Inter-Regionalism and the Future of Multilateralism', in a paper presented at the 5th Pan-European IR Conference of the Standard Group of International Relations.

³⁵ Hettne, B. (2005). Beyond the new regionalism. *New Political Economy*, 10(4), pp. 543-571. Imobighe,

degree of conflicts. This is because such integration can change conditions of economic stagnation and poverty which are a source of political turbulence, wars and unrest. Furthermore, through regional integration ethnic tensions between groups are likely to disappear. Integrations can also create conditions which are not favorable for the survival and operations of warlords and tyrants³⁶.

There are various challenges facing regional peace and security in the world and COMESA is no exception. These challenges include: Bureaucratic Inertia, Political Landscape, Economic, Globalization, Social, Financial Resources Challenges, Overlapping Memberships and Duplication of Mandates, Natural Resources and the Environment, Nature Conservation, Consistency between National Policies, Modalities for Implementation, Lack of Continuity and Sustainability in the Programmes, Definition of Regional Programmes, Divergence in approach towards regional integration between Developing Partners (DPs) and Regional Economic Countries (RECs), National and Regional Coherence, Economic and Institutional Obstacles to Integration, Political Obstacles to Integration, Regional versus Continental Challenges, Economic Cost of Implementing Regional Commitments and Sector Policy harmonization is Critical to the Success of Regional Integration.

1.4.3 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) is a regional integration grouping of twenty African sovereign states³⁷. These states agreed to promote

³⁶ Gakwandi, A. S., (1996). 'Towards a New Political Map of Africa', in AbdulRaheem, T. (ed), *Pan-Africanism: Politics, Economy and Social Change in the Twenty-First Century*, London, Pluto Press, pp. 12.

³⁷ Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Southern Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe

regional integration through trade development, and to develop their natural and human resources for the mutual benefit of all their peoples.

COMESA was established in 1993 and 1994 to replace the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA), which had been in existence since 1981 within the framework of the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos³⁸. The specific aim of PTA was to "promote co-operation and development in all fields of economic activity particularly in the field of trade, customs, industry, transport, communication, agriculture, natural resources and monetary affairs with the aim of raising the standard of living of its people, of fostering closer relations among its member states and to contribute to the progress and development of the African Continent".³⁹ The founding members of PTA envisaged and planned for the eventual creation of COMESA within the context of the Lagos plan of Action's goal of establishing an African common market by the year 2000.⁴⁰ Following on this timetable therefore the treaty establishing COMESA was signed in Kampala Uganda in 1993 and ratified in Lilongwe Malawi on 8th December, 1994 thereby effectively replacing PTA.⁴¹

According to the COMESA Treaty, the specific aims and objectives of COMESA are among other things: to attain sustainable growth of the member states by promoting a more balanced and harmonious development of its production and marketing structures;

³⁸ Johnson G.E. Omotunde, (1991). Economic Integration in Africa: Enhancing prospects for success, the Journal of modern African studies, vol. 29, No. 1

³⁹ Treaty for the Establishment of the Preferential trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States, Preamble and Articles 3(1), p 4

⁴⁰ The Preferential Trade Area (PTA) for Eastern and Southern Africa (1989): Achievements, problems and prospects, African spectrum, vol. 24, No. 2, 160-161. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40174356> Accessed: on 28th May, 2013

⁴¹ A Mauritius, Profile: Common Market For Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) www.africa-union.org/Recs/COMESAProfile.pdf Accessed on 19/04/2013

to promote joint development in all fields of economic activity and the joint adoption of macro-economic policies and programmes to raise the standard of living of its peoples and to foster closer relations among its members states; to cooperate in the creation of an enabling environment for foreign, cross-border and domestic investment and in the joint promotion of research and adaptation of science and technology for development; to cooperate in the promotion of peace, security, and stability among the member states in order to enhance the economic development in the region; to cooperate in strengthening the relations between the common market and the rest of the world and in the adoption of common positions in international fora; and to contribute towards the establishment, progress, and the realization of the objectives of the African Economic Community⁴².

The COMESA Treaty has two important elements. The first one is the concept of multiple speed or variable geometry that provides for a group of countries to move faster in the regional economic integration process than some of the other countries. The second concept says that sanctions can be imposed on countries that default in implementing agreed COMESA programmes and settlement of disputes arising from interpretation or implementation of the Treaty.

There are a number of other sub-regional organizations operating within the region covered by COMESA, such as the East African Community (EAC), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). COMESA established working relations, both formally and informally, with all these sub-regional

⁴² COMESA's Treaty: Aims and Objectives. Available at: www.comesa.int/about/treaty/TR003.htm

organizations. Memoranda of Understanding have been signed with EAC, IGAD and IOC⁴³.

COMESA started its engagement on peace and security during a meeting in Lusaka in March 2000. It recognized that peace; security and stability are basic factors in providing investment, development, trade and regional economic integration. Experience has shown that civil strife, political instabilities and cross-border disputes in the region have seriously affected the ability of the countries to develop their individual economies as well as their capacity to participate and take full advantage of the regional integration arrangement under COMESA⁴⁴. It has been fully accepted that without peace, security and stability there cannot be a satisfactory level of investment even by local entrepreneurs.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa was created in 1996 to supersede the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD)⁴⁵, which was founded in 1986. The main objective of IGAD organization is to foster economic and diplomatic cooperation between member states with the aim of increasing food security, environmental protection, economic integration, Peace and Security in the region. The IGAD Strategic plan was elaborated in 2003 and adopted at the 10th Summit of Heads of States and Government in Kampala, Uganda. The plan provides a coherent framework guiding IGAD with the implementation of its priority development programmes towards reducing poverty and achieving higher (and sustainable) economic growth in the region. Ramesh and Van Langenhove suggests that

⁴³ Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa in brief, a production of the COMESA Secretariat printed by modern press & stationers Ltd, Lusaka Zambia, p.1

⁴⁴ COMESA's Treaty: Aims and Objectives. Available at: www.comesa.int/about/treaty/TR003.htm

⁴⁵ IGAD comprises of 6 member states: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda.

regional integration help to create webs of functional links, which then improve relations between the member states⁴⁶. Therefore, trade and development, investments, labour and capital markets in the region all need to be protected by creating a peaceful environment through regionalism.

1.4.4 Research Gap

Achieving peace, security and stability in COMESA continues to be a monumental task. However, most literature on COMESA addresses industrialization and economic reforms with limited literature on peace and security. This study therefore, seeks to explore whether regional partnerships through the various programmes such trade, climate change, agricultural, natural resources, infrastructure in the common market have helped facilitate this goal and whether the current principles of cooperation between the member states and the regional organization are sufficient for the task at hand as it has been persistently absent and largely ignored.

1.4.5 Justification of the Study

The study is intended to generate both academic and policy-relevant debate that will potentially lead to restructuring of the various programmes such trade, climate change, agricultural, natural resources, infrastructure in the common market with the view to making peace and security a major objective and an integral component of economic integration and co-operation in COMESA and in Africa. The study will also help to stimulate academic and policy-debate on the link between peace, security, and regionalism in contemporary Africa. The study also aims to share and popularize the

⁴⁶ Ramesh, C., & Van Langenhove, L., (2005). 'Inter-Regionalism and the Future of Multilateralism', in a paper presented at the 5th Pan-European IR Conference of the Standard Group of International Relations.

importance of peace and security and to identify potential security challenges that threaten human security in the COMESA region.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

The study was based on the following theory:-

1.5.1 Regionalism and Functionalism

Integration is defined by the principles of membership, interdependence, political solidarity, subsidiary, and common regional citizenship⁴⁷. Empirically, it has demonstrated significant peace-building effects, for example, the European Union developed a network of institutions for managing regional interdependence and this ensured the irreversibility of the post-World War II settlement in Europe. However, if the European experience is to be regarded as an instance of its systematic effects as a strategy of reconciliation and termination of conflict, the COMESA integrations needs to be explored through the analytical lens and causal logic of conflict resolution and peace building in the region.

On the other hand, Block explains that functionalism views society as a social system of interconnected parts in the same way a body depends on the heart, lungs and brain to work together for the body to survive. Instead of a heart and lungs, society has social institutions so that the social body can survive. A society can function properly if it shares common goals. These beliefs helps create social order through a commitment to a shared value consensus sometimes known as a “collective conscience”. Goal attainment refers to the shared activities all members of society are directed to engage in by directing

⁴⁷ Gagnon, V. P., (1994) ‘Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia’, in *International Security*, 19, no. 3, pp. 130-166

individual goals, a society's value consensus is reinforced. In our society making a profit to help the society flourish is a goal. Therefore, the need of political institutions helps establish these goals. In this case, regional economic integration such as the COMESA aims to make the society cohesive through programs of economic integration which have a relationship to peace and security. Hence, in a cohesive society there is high likelihood of having peace and security as opposed to a society that is deviant⁴⁸.

This study uses regionalism and functionalism in international relations as a theoretical tool to analyze the phenomenon of regional integration in COMESA. The present era is one in which the world is witnessing a renewed interest in regionalism. Regionalization as the process through which governmental policies, civic society and the corporate sector share interests and combine resources to agreed common ends at the regional, as distinct from the national or global, level. The distinction is important, but largely overlooked, between processes of this kind that are truly regional and those that are cross-regional or trans-national. For instance, the coining of the two words "regional" and "functionalism" in the COMESA region have given rise to sub-regional groupings: the East African Community (EAC, 5 members); the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) which superseded COMESA; the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (12 members, including Tanzania); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (6 members, including Kenya and Uganda). Except for IGAD, whose mandate concerns political stability and reducing insecurity in the region, the other groups focus on economic trade. The IGAD mandate is similar to the theme of this study which also

⁴⁸ Block, N., (1996). 'What is functionalism? A revised version of the entry on functionalism,' in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement*, Macmillan, pp. 400-402.

explores the impact of COMESA regional integration on peace and security in Africa to fill in the gap in which most studies have ignored.

Regionalism in COMESA has entailed the search for collective approaches to the problems of weak economies and polities in the face of equally formidable external vulnerabilities. There is a growing need to promote security and peace in the region to meet emerging threats. Hence, there is a growing need to promote full implementation of the various programs of economic integration in order to meet the emerging peace and security threats in COMESA.

On the other hand, functional working relationships between the member states play a decisive role in implementing the various programs. Conflicts in the region may be minimized as part of establishing functional and complementary relations between the member states that are born out of recognition of distinctive strength and weakness thereby enhancing human security. But functionalism still has a long way to go in constructing solid security institutions for solving problems in the COMESA region.

1.6 Hypotheses

- i. There is no relationship between peace and security and regional integration
- ii. Regional integration has led to peace and security
- iii. Regional integration has not led to peace and security

1.7 Research Methodology

The type of research design employed in this study was exploratory in nature. Exploratory research is a type of research design conducted when researchers lacks a clear idea of the problems. It draws definitive conclusions only with extreme caution. It also, helps determine the best research design, data collection method and selection of

subjects⁴⁹. The aim of exploratory research is to discover ideas, concepts, insights, generate possible explanations and hypotheses. This study was based on both quantitative and qualitative research methods since; this strengthens the research by offsetting the weakness of both quantitative and qualitative research methods.

This research was based on primary and secondary data. The primary data was collected by the use of questionnaires and an interview guide. Maholtra explains that questionnaires are an important data collection tool. The questionnaires administered included both open and closed ended questions. This is because open ended questions provide an insight of new ideas and closed ended questions ensure that the respondents are restricted to certain categories in their responses. Interview guide was used since it generally yields highest cooperation and lowest refusal rates, offers high response quality, takes advantage of interviewer presence and it's multi-method data collection. Secondary data was gathered by means of reviewing published books, journal articles and public documents on the subject for the relevant concepts and current opinions.

Quantitative data collected was analyzed by the use of descriptive statistics using SPSS and presented through means, standard deviations and frequencies. This was done by tallying up responses, computing percentages of variations in response as well as describing and interpreting the data in line with the study objectives and assumptions through use of statistical package for social sciences (SPSS). Mugenda and Mugenda, explains that SPSS is a comprehensive, integrated collection of computer programme for managing, analyzing and displaying data. The qualitative data was coded thematically and then analyzed statistically. The data collected using interview guides which is

⁴⁹ Cooper, D.R. & Schindler, P.S. (2000). *Business Research Methods*: New York, McGraw Hill.

qualitative in nature, was analyzed using conceptual content analysis which is the best suited method of analysis. According to Mugenda and Mugenda ⁵⁰the main purpose of content analysis is to study the existing information in order to determine factors that explain a specific phenomenon.

⁵⁰ Mugenda, O. M. and Mugenda, A. G. (2003). *Research Methods: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches*. Nairobi: Acts.

1.8 Chapter Summary

This project is organized into five chapters with an introduction and conclusion of the themes discussed in every chapter.

Chapter one gives a general introduction to the study. It provides the background of the study, the problem statement, objectives, hypothesis, theoretical framework, literature review and methodology in relation to peace and security in COMESA region.

Chapter two presents an overview of regional integration and peace and security. It is organized in the following sub-topics: Global overview of regional integration peace and security, regional integration in Africa and peace and security, COMESA peace and security and finally the conclusion.

Chapter three analyzes the nature of peace and security in COMESA. The chapter analyzes into details the specific programs of economic integration and the relationship to peace and security in COMESA. It will also discuss COMESA as an institution, the operations of the institutions in relation to peace and security in the region..

Chapter four analyzes the research findings on peace and security in regional integration in Africa: A case study of COMESA.

Chapter five presents the discussion, conclude and recommend on the findings.

CHAPTER TWO

AN OVERVIEW OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND PEACE AND SECURITY

2.0 Introduction

This chapter analyzes the historical background of regional integration and peace and security. It is organized in the following sub-topics: Global overview of regional integration peace and security, regional integration in Africa and peace and security, COMESA peace and security and finally the conclusion.

2.1 Global Overview of Regional Integration Peace and Security

The early regionalization of the 1950s and 1960s focused mainly on technical and economic factors, with a view that economic growth would ensure peace and the welfare of societies. But from the 1970s, empirical evidence increasingly pointed out that economic factors alone were not sufficient to ensuring growth as “economic stagnation fed political strife while political conflict exacerbated economic uncertainty”⁵¹. Hence the 1970s and 1980s saw the resurgence of political economy and the birth of the New Regionalism which differs from the old one by its multidimensionality and comprehensiveness in the combination of both economic and political factors. With its focus on economics and politics at regional level, regional integration stands as a subfield within international political economy, which itself, is a social science concerned with “the interplay of economics and politics in the world arena”⁵². Within this context,

⁵¹ Frieden, Jeffrey A. & Lake, David A. (2000). *International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Wealth and Power*. New York: Bedford and St. Martin's, p. 4.

⁵² Harrison (1974:14) in Rosamond, Ben (2000). *Theories of European Integration*. Houndmills: Palgrave, p. 12.

“regional integration as an instance of regionalism in the global political economy, aims at offering reflections upon and possibly generalizations about the tendency of groups of territorially adjacent states to cluster together into blocs”⁵³. The European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), MERCOSUR in South America, etc., are examples of such blocs. Whereas conceptualization and practice evolved with time, the general objective of regional integration has remained the same: ensuring peace and the welfare of societies. Regional integration’s concern for the welfare of societies also makes it extendable into development studies and usable as a development strategy.

The 1990s witnessed not only a deepening of regional integration agreements, but also their global expansion. The typical case of regional integration, the European Union, not only did it achieve a single, integrated common market, but it also laid the foundations for peace and security. A similar process of regional integration occurred in the Americas with the creation of the NAFTA and MERCOSUR agreements as well as in the Asia-Pacific region with the increased integration of the ASEAN regional system and the emergence of the APEC organization. While the initial scholarly focus was on the question of whether all these regional agreements would prove to be a memorable phrase, “building blocs or stumbling blocs” in the movement towards increased peace and security in their respective regions, recent empirical evidence suggests otherwise.

2.1.1 Regional Integration in ASEAN

ASEAN was created in 1967. Its founding members were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. ASEAN was created with three interrelated

⁵³ Rosamond, Ben (2000). *Theories of European Integration*. Houndmills: Palgrave, p. 15.

objectives: to alleviate intra-ASEAN tensions, to reduce the regional influence of external actors, and to promote the socioeconomic development of its member states as a further hedge against Communist insurgency.⁵⁴

Indeed, in 1975, the reunification of Vietnam under Communist rule accelerated ASEAN's members' commitment in the strengthening of the regional organization. The Bali Conference of 1976 was the first meeting of the ASEAN heads of government. At that meeting, the ASEAN states signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, a document that articulated ASEAN's understanding of the principles governing state conduct and relations in the region. Essentially, the TAC obliged its signatories to settle disputes peacefully and respect the sovereignty and independence of their neighbors.⁵⁵ For many scholars, this commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes in a region that had been characterized by acute border disputes in the 1950s and early 1960s has been the most important aspect of ASEAN's similarity to a security community.⁵⁶

2.1.2 Regional Integration in EU

It is widely believed that deeper economic engagement brings down political tension between member states. Today's European Union is a glaring example, which is claimed to be the most successful regional integration arrangements in the world. The challenge, however, is to replicate this so-called successful initiative in other areas of the world, particularly where intrastate conflict is the main hindrance to trade and development. Intuitively it may be apparent that deeper economic integrations discourage war. Greater economic engagement, mainly through intra-regional trade, makes war too

⁵⁴ Ahmad, Zakaria Haji and Baladas Ghoshal. (1999). "The Political Future of ASEAN after the Asian Crisis," *International Affairs*, Vol. 75, No.4, pp. 759-778.

⁵⁵ Acharya, Amitav. (2001). *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (London: Routledge).

⁵⁶ Exemplary of this interpretation are the works by Acharya (2001) and San (2000).

expensive, which encourages politicians to solve problems through peaceful means. Since the beginning of the EU process, there has been no war in the EU region, especially between France and Germany.

2.1.3 OAU/AU Integration

The UN promoted the regionalization of peace and security, heralding it as a necessary shift and an effective way to manage certain types of conflict. The organization envisions a two-tiered conflict management system with regional organizations playing the on-the-ground role and the UN serving a coordinating role from above⁵⁷ as outlined in the then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 Agenda for Peace. The 'peace pyramid' in the sub-regional organizations and the OAU/AU acting as the initial respondents to the armed conflict, while the UN contributes more to peace building and post-conflict reconstruction at the top of the pyramid⁵⁸. Since the debacle in Somalia in 1994, Western countries have become more unwilling to directly intervene to end conflicts in Africa; there is therefore, a real and undeniable need for African states to find their own solutions to the continent's conflicts⁵⁹. In a 1995 UN report "*Improving preparedness for conflict prevention and peace-keeping in Africa*" sub-regional organizations sometimes have a comparative advantage in taking the lead role in the prevention and settlement of conflicts and to assist the UN in containing them.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was the first regional organization in Africa to deal with peace and security issues. However, the OAU shied from involvement

⁵⁷ Jackson, Richard (2000). The dangers of regionalizing international conflict management: The African experience. *Political Science*, 52 (1), pp. 41–60.

⁵⁸ Malan, Mark (1999). The OAU and African subregional organizations: A closer look at the 'peace pyramid'. Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper 36, Jan.

⁵⁹ Adebajo, Adekeye and Chris Landsberg (2003). South Africa and Nigeria as regional hegemon. In: Baregu and Landsberg 2003, pp. 171–204.

in disputes within Member States, establishing that the organization's most fundamental stance was one of non-intervention and the prioritization of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs⁶⁰. However, in 1993, at a conference in Cairo, the OAU established a Mechanism for conflict prevention, management, and resolution which served as a signal of the continent's renewed interest in peacemaking. In regard to the RECs, the declaration tentatively explained that the OAU was to coordinate its activities with the African regional and sub-regional organizations⁶¹. Since the OAU established its sub-regional structures in 1972⁶², there has been an implied OAU position that the organization may intervene in regional matters under certain conditions: when regional efforts were exhausted or the sub-regional organization's credibility was lacking, or where conflict spilled into other regions⁶³. Yet a 1999 study, commissioned by the OAU on the functioning of cooperation between the OAU and sub-regional organizations in the realm of conflict resolution, found that the unclear division of labour and responsibilities and the lack of an institutionalized arrangement for conflict management between the organizations were limiting their effectiveness⁶⁴.

Moreover, responses by sub-regional organizations in Africa have usually been *ad hoc* because there was a lack of institutionalized structures at the sub-regional level to

⁶⁰ Okoth, P. Godfrey (2008). Conflict resolution in Africa: The role of the OAU & AU. In: Nhema, A. and P.T. Zeleza eds. *The resolution of African conflicts: The management of conflict resolution & post-conflict reconstruction*. Oxford, James Currey. pp. 22–37.

Van Nieuwkerk, Anthoni (2004). The role of the AU and NEPAD in Africa's new security regime. In: Field, S. ed. *Peace in Africa: Towards a collaborative security regime*. Johannesburg, Institute for Global Dialogue. pp. 41–62.

⁶¹ Organisation of African Unity (1993). Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the establishment within the OAU of a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution. AHG/DECL.3 (XXIX). Cairo, 28–30 June.

⁶² Organisation of African Unity (1972). Assembly of African Heads of State and Government. Ninth ordinary session. Rabat, 12–15 June.

⁶³ Mwanasali, Musifiky (2003). From the Organization of the African Unity to the African Union. In: Baregu and Landsberg, pp. 205–224.

⁶⁴ *ibid*

deal with conflict management and resolution activities, especially non-military activities⁶⁵. The OAU took a case-by case approach in its early peacemaking efforts which became the norm for the continent, relying on political leaders and individual countries to make security decisions instead of a collective supranational body⁶⁶. Furthermore, when the RECs started to engage more directly with peace and security matters in the 1990s, there was no effective continental framework or mechanism to harmonize these efforts or coordinate relations with them and the OAU and the UN. The OAU's failure to reach out to the growing group of sub-regional actors who were becoming active in peace operations allowed the OAU to eventually become irrelevant as an organization⁶⁷.

The principle of 'subsidiarity' was supposed to govern this relationship. It implies that regional arrangements or regional institutions should make 'every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes' before referring them to the Security Council, as originally enshrined in Chapter VII of the UN Charter (1945). The norm also preceded the Charter in other emerging international organizations⁶⁸. Dinka⁶⁹, however, holds that there is no consensus on how subsidiarity is to be applied to the task of peacemaking, and no consensus generally on its application within the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Neither the AU nor the RECs have specifically defined or clarified how subsidiarity would be implemented in non-military peacemaking efforts. This lack of

⁶⁵ Malan, Mark (1999). The OAU and African subregional organizations: A closer look at the 'peace pyramid'. Institute for Security Studies, *Occasional Paper* 36, Jan.

⁶⁶ Imobighe, T.A. (2003). The OAU (AU) and OAS in regional conflict management: A comparative assessment. Ibadan, Spectrum Books.

⁶⁷ Abass, Ademola (2010). African peace and security architecture and protection of human security. In: Abass, A. ed. *Protecting human security in Africa*. New York, Oxford University Press. pp. 247–283.

⁶⁸ Møller, Bjørn (2005). The pros and cons of subsidiarity: The role of African regional and sub-regional organizations in ensuring peace and security in Africa. In: Hammerstad, A. ed. 2005, pp. 23–82.

⁶⁹ Dinka T.K (2007), 'Africa's Regional Integration Arrangements: History and Challenges', in *Discussion Paper*, No. 74, European Center for Development Policy Management

a definition from the organizations is a significant omission on their part, illustrating that despite support for regionalization, the governing principles of this relationship remain unclear and insufficiently considered.

Regional organizations can help bring the resources and leverage required to sustain a successful peace process, but must also determine a way to manage the interests and demands that emerge from local and international actors.⁷⁰ Supporters of a regional approach contend that regional actors' familiarity with the region, including the cultural, social and historical factors, can make them more effective on the ground. Geographical proximity should facilitate quicker and less expensive responses. Additionally, sub-regional organizations should also be more committed to seeing out enduring conflict resolution in their region having such a strong stake in creating peace in their neighbourhood and avoiding the negative effects of conflicts, such as cross-border refugee flows. The comparative advantages of the international (UN) and regional level can be combined for the most efficient response to conflicts⁷¹. However it must be cautioned that peacemaking efforts led by a regional organisation, rather than a simple unilateral or bilateral team, require greater levels of coordination and cooperation to harness these potential advantages.

The regionalization of peacemaking in Africa will obviously be closely related to the continued evolution and development of the AU, where the RECs have been considered 'building blocks' of the APSA. The success of the AU will 'depend, to a large

⁷⁰ Powell, K. (2005). *The African Union's Emerging Peace and Security Regime*. ISS Monograph Series 119 of May 2005.

⁷¹ Samkange, S. (2002). African Perspective on Intervention and State Sovereignty. *African Security Review*, Vol 11(1).

extent, on the ways in which [RECs] and regional security arrangements will merge into the AU'. It was planned that these necessary relationships and cooperative structures would be defined in the protocol relating to the establishment of the AU's peace and security body and later legal frameworks.

2.2 Regional Integration in Africa and Peace and Security

Africa's regional economic communities (RECs) are playing an increasingly important role in peace and security. The RECs were originally established with mainly economic goals in mind, including enhancing economic integration, trade, and development; more recently, peace and security agendas have become increasingly pressing and unavoidable. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for example, made this clear link when it concluded that the community could not pursue its economic and social objectives without first consolidating peace and security, hence requiring the Community's to focus on this issue in its first security related protocol in 1978 (ECOWAS 1978). The process of RECs building security instruments is still taking place today. Indeed, these institutions, their governing rules and their relationships are still taking shape⁷². It has become clear, however, that there are tensions and inconsistencies in the strategies and working relationships between the UN, the African Union (AU) and regional communities, which are, in certain circumstances, undermining the likelihood of successfully managing conflict resolution efforts and establishing peace.

⁷² Adetula Victor (2008). The role of sub-regional integration schemes in conflict prevention & management in Africa: A framework for a working peace system. In: Nhema, A. and P.T. Zeleza eds. The resolution of African conflicts: The management of conflict resolution & post-conflict reconstruction. Oxford, James Currey. pp. 9-21.

African regional integration has had a remarkable new beginning since the formal beginning of the African Union in 2002. Bach argues that following the Treaty of Abuja, and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) the African Union has become the frame for a new African regionalism. The new beginning in African integration is impressive, promising and creative. Bach concludes that it is not only a rhetoric operation but a substantial recognition of the need to redefine the parameters of political, socio-economic and security developments on the African continent⁷³.

Although regional integration, by and large, is a constructivist activity, integration is more than a technical operation. Gottschalk explains that the technicalities of regional integration – including the question of how to measure regional integration progress – are relevant. Gottschalk further explains that in order to achieve integration objectives and to strengthen the legitimacy of region-building, clarity about normative preconditions, political objectives and genuine goals of value added ought to be defined and regularly re-calibrated. According to Gottschalk the purpose of regional integration in the African context seems to be evident yet this question does not necessarily find coherent answers⁷⁴. Gottschalk explains that in the light of the many failures of African development of the past three to four decades, it sometimes seems as if regional integration may be understood as the panacea to run away from this failed past. Gottschalk concludes that the overriding experience of regional integration is the fact that weak states only produce weak integration. Strong regional integration requires solid, functioning and accountable national structures. Regional integration is no substitute for

⁷³ David Bach, (2005) "*The Global Politics of Regionalism: Africa*", in: Mary Farrell, et.al.(eds.), *Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice*, London: Pluto Press: 171-186.

⁷⁴ Keith Gottschalk. (2004). "The African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development: Strong Institutions for Weak States?", in: *International Politics and Society* 4: 138-158

reforming the nation-state across Africa. Successful regional integration requires a solid preparation of each member state of a regional grouping⁷⁵.

The most comprehensive argument for region-building in Africa is twofold: Waller explains that region-building is the reaction to the limits of autonomous state activities in generating and distributing public goods. At the same time, region-building provides the means and the potential to enhance the liveliness of Africa as a whole and of all of its societies and states in the age of globalization. Regional integration is therefore, about the pooling of limited resources and the advancement of distributing public goods under the global conditions of the twenty-first century. Waller highlights peace and security, rule of law and political stability, economic development and social inclusion as African challenges that goes beyond the capacity of individual states. Waller explains that in order to increase the sense of ownership and the degree of inclusivity of citizens in the life of Africa, regional integration provides an additional level of governance and the management of public affairs. Region-building is therefore, about building up tools to better generate public goods and objectives for a more sustainable distribution of public goods. But region-building only works if it is law-based and driven by a common legislation⁷⁶.

Almost all regional formations have cooperation and peace and security as important components of their stated objectives. The fulfillments of these objectives are limited in many of these blocs.⁷⁷ Waever argues that peace is critical to a people's agenda

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Peter P. Waller (1999). *Demokratische Renaissance in Afrika?*, in: *Internationale Politik*, 8: 49–54

⁷⁷ Waever, Ole, (2004). 'Peace and Security: Two Concepts and their Relationship' in Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung (eds.) *Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research*, London and New York, Routledge, pp. 6.

for regional alternatives. Since most current regional formations are political in nature, not just economic, there is a geo-political, social and also security component in most of their charters. Another important factor sited is that conflict and security issues are often the most significant obstacles in the process of regional integration or regional cooperation.⁷⁸

In many current regional formations, the chief security concern is the global war on terror, although many fail to see this in the midst of a justified indignation regarding violent terror attacks in the region.⁷⁹ However, security from a people's perspective is part of a broader concept, more comprehensive than physical security.

Human security can best be guaranteed and accessed at the national level where states are more amenable to popular pressure. However in a globalized world, most of these issues have a global and even regional scope and are enmeshed in conflicts and controls which require a broader engagement. Where solutions lie in fighting the global elite, and keeping out the aid and interference from imperialist powers, regional cooperation helps because individual countries are far more vulnerable to such intervention especially in the case of smaller and weaker states. This according to Hansohm involves cooperation and resolution of differences through various channels between countries in the region on the one hand and on the other, the preparedness to stand up against imperial hegemony. This is, without doubt, truly effective only when the governments in the region are pro-people and progressive. But it is also possible, as we

⁷⁸ Ibid

⁷⁹ Molukanele, T., Ridd, G. & Abdellaiou, J. (2004). United Nations Peacekeeping Missions. *Conflict Trends*, Vol 2.

have seen in the case of anti-WTO campaign, for people to pressurize their governments to take a stand by banding together in blocs of nations. When countries work together or are forced by popular pressure to work together on resolving conflict issues and issues of human security they often manage to take anti-imperial positions. It is also easier for people of the various countries in the region to pressurize them at the regional level.⁸⁰

Bull argued that while regional formations would normally be geographically contiguous, having shared economic and political interest, a common history and culture, this need not be part of its definition. Bull also noted that countries can come together on common economic political, cultural interest outside their own regions too. What is most critical is that regional alternatives would necessarily have a comprehensive approach to human security at its core⁸¹. According to Bull regional conflicts can arise from many factors: conflicts over natural resources, markets, sovereignty, democracy, inequality, historical enmity, etc. Bull explains that although wars break out over these or other issues, people have real stake in peace with neighbours: communities and social movements, even local business. Bull further argues that people's interests are more important than, and need to be privileged over, national borders and elite interests. Dinka and Walter proposes that conflicts have to be replaced by cooperation- this means much pressure has to be exerted by those who have the biggest stake in peace and human security; the people of the countries in the region. Dinka and Walter argues that when there are mechanisms for solving local regional differences through institutional as well as people- to- people channels it is less likely that conflicts flare up into war or are

⁸⁰ Hansohm, D. et al., (2000). *Monitoring Regional Integration*. Yearbook Vol. 2, Windhoek: Gamsberg.

⁸¹ Bull, H. (2002). *The Anarchical Society: a study of order in world politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.

deliberately fanned by various vested interests⁸². According to Dinka and Walter this kind of regional intervention for peace would have to be based on democratic and collective decision-making in the region, between various governments in the region and also in consultation with the people, to make sure it is no excuse for hegemonic intervention. Regional peacekeeping however is a possible antiwar that we must consider in a better world. If we are to banish war, regional force is an option that must be considered, democratically controlled.

Regional integration that is beneficial needs to be democratic at all levels, providing more democracy as a result of integration, not less⁸³. This means that there has to be democracy within the country, for local communities, between the countries, and with the rest of the world.⁸⁴ Hegemony both outside and inside the formation would have to be resisted. Here the role of peoples movements becomes particularly important, again especially in bigger stronger countries. Also struggles for democracy have to be supported by the regional formation.

The African Council's decision to disallow members whose governments have been established through military coup and not electoral means has had considerable impact in terms of discouraging that trend in the continent. In the Honduras, the support of the local states to deposed Zelaya is a big detriment to those espousing the coup. For the situation in the Honduras to change, the governments in the region would play a

⁸² Dinka T & Walter K (2007). 'Africa's Regional Integration Arrangements: History and Challenges', in *Discussion Paper*, No. 74, European Center for Development Policy Management

⁸³ Ajulu, C., Othieno, T. & Samasuwo, N. (2006). Sudan: The state of transition, prospects and challenges. *Global Insight*, Vol 56.

⁸⁴ *ibid.*

major role, in supporting the forces of democracy, and opposing imperialist interference.⁸⁵

Another important guarantee for democracy within regional formations according to Block will be for regional integration to be at more than one level: there can be integration inside regional formations as well for e.g. it is possible that smaller countries inside a larger unity might come together to protect their interests against the bigger regional hegemony, for instance India, Brazil and South Africa in their respective regions.

Regional responses have to be a bottom up rather than top down process⁸⁶. Communities, social movements, trade unions, political parties, human rights defenders, small businesses, progressive bureaucrats, have to be involved in building an active stake in the processes. Elite led governments, which are always under the pressure of powerful economic and political vested interests, will have to be forced by the counter pressure of the common people towards human security and peace.

While security scholars have been focusing on the role of regional organizations in military peacekeeping, these organizations can and do play a role in non-military peacemaking and peace building efforts, which remains the subject of fewer academic inquiries and intergovernmental strategies. The non-military functions of peace and security, includes preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, and mediation, considering the

⁸⁵ Block, N., (1996). 'What is functionalism? A revised version of the entry on functionalism,' in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement*, Macmillan, pp. 400-402.

⁸⁶ Block, N., (1996). 'What is functionalism? A revised version of the entry on functionalism,' in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement*, Macmillan, pp. 400-402.

role of the UN and AU in cooperating with such efforts at the regional level. While all of the sub-regions of Africa face similar quandaries, each sub-region also has its own peculiar challenges and differences in the level of development and cooperation on peace and security issues. The focus here is on COMESA with potentially relevant conclusions being drawn for other regions.

The tension and resultant competition between the UN, AU and regional organisations, and among regional organisations themselves, have limited the potential success of conflict resolution efforts and of establishing lasting peace. This problem is acute in Southern Africa, where the highly political Southern African Development Community (SADC) comes into conflict with the UN and/or the AU. In Zimbabwe, Madagascar and the DRC, this tension and lack of cooperation have been problematic and visible in conflict resolution efforts. Lessons from these cases make this point. In order to better manage peacemaking efforts and help facilitate more lasting peace, international and regional organisations need to clarify and improve upon their working principles and stop disagreements and the lack of coordination from hindering peacemaking.

With ever increasing urgency, the United Nations (UN) has worked to develop the budding security relationship between itself and regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa, especially the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and COMESA⁸⁷. In conflict resolution efforts in COMESA, this relationship has sometimes featured competition and tension, with more than one organisation vying for the lead, or

⁸⁷ Williamson, C.A. (2006). Justice empowered or justice hampered: The International Criminal Court in Darfur. *African Security Review*, Vol 15(1).

in other cases, trying to pass the blame for failures. Since the UN's early peace mission in the Somalia, achieving peace and stability in Africa has been a monumental task.

There is much support from African governments for regional integration. Indeed, since independence they have embraced regional integration as an important component of their development strategies and concluded a very large number of regional integration arrangements (RIAs), several of which have significant membership overlap. There are however few success stories. African RIAs are generally ambitious schemes with unrealistic time frames towards deeper integration and in some cases even political union. African RIAs are usually neighborhood arrangements.⁸⁸

According to Motsi African countries needs pool their resources together for the common defence and security of the region. Motsi argues that such a policy is likely to reduce suspicion and rivalry among states a factor that has engendered conflicts in the continent and has traditionally hindered interstate cooperation and integration in Africa⁸⁹. Motsi also explains that, cooperation will increase transparency in national defense and security policies. Motsi further argues that, a common policy will provide best practices to strengthen the defense and security sectors as well as to safeguard individual national, sub-regional and continental values. A common defense and security policy as highlighted by Motsi will be cost effective to member states, as it will eliminate unnecessary national expenditure on defense and security and will allow for the reallocation of resources to address more threatening challenges such as poverty and globalization tackling human security.

⁸⁸ IBID

⁸⁹ Motsi, I. (2005). *Saving face above saving lives: the African Union's betrayal of the civilian population in Sudan*. University of Pretoria, CIPS, Paper 32/2006.

According to Motsi the need for a common African defense and security policy was stressed during the Inaugural Summit of the AU held in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002, when the Assembly of Heads of State and Government deliberated the proposal of Libyan leader that Africa establishes a single continental army⁹⁰. The African leaders were also motivated to respond to the multifaceted challenges to stability, security and cooperation on the continent. Motsi explains that conflicts in Africa bear certain unique characteristics predominantly embedded in their root causes, intensity, duration (often too long), escalation and their propensity to spill over to neighboring states.

Inter-African Relations, the Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government of July 2000, as well as the solemn declaration of the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), also of July 2000. Through its four calabashes, the CSSDCA commits member states to the process of developing a common position on the basis that the security, stability and development of each African country is inseparably linked to that of other African countries. The four principles were first articulated in the Kampala Leadership Forum Document of 1991, in recognition of the fact that the problems of security and stability in many African countries had impaired their capacity to achieve the necessary level of intra- and inter-African cooperation that is required to attain socio-economic development and transformation.⁹¹

⁹⁰ Motsi, I. (2005). *Saving face above saving lives: the African Union's betrayal of the civilian population in Sudan*. University of Pretoria, CIPS, Paper 32/2006.

⁹¹ Motsi, I. (2005). *Saving face above saving lives: the African Union's betrayal of the civilian population in Sudan*. University of Pretoria, CIPS, Paper 32/2006.

Underlying the fact that violence is endemic and persistent in Africa is the reality that the continent is constantly exhibiting changing and challenging dynamics characterized by shifting patterns of international and regional engagements, in its quest for solutions.

The majority of sub-Saharan African countries are members of one or more regional or sub-regional arrangements that seek to promote economic coordination, cooperation or integration among the member countries concerned. The various African regional economic blocs, and indeed the individual countries that comprise their membership, are at varying stages of development and implementation of their regional arrangements. The blocs' scope covers various socio-economic, developmental and political considerations, including the promotion of intra-regional trade, socio-economic policy coordination, and management or development of shared physical infrastructure and the environment. Some of the African regional arrangements also cover issues of common interest in the areas of public governance, defense and security, among other socio-economic and political dimensions

2.4 COMESA and Peace and Security

The Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) is an organization with a primarily economic agenda. COMESA current member states are Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Seychelles, Swaziland, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe (COMESA, 2012).

As most other RECs, COMESA is involved in the AU's peace and security architecture. Since 2000, COMESA has had a Committee on Peace and Security, which meets at least annually to consider peace and security issues. All Member States are

represented on the Committee at ministerial level. The Committee is supposed to be the regional equivalent of the PSC but it is not a decision-making structure. It can only make recommendations to the Council of Ministers which will be subsequently forwarded to the Authority-Heads of States and Governments- for a final decision⁹².

The COMESA has also established a Committee of Elders too as part of its preventive diplomacy strategy. The Committee has nine standing members and is supported by a unit in the Secretariat. The Committee's functions include mediation, dispatching of peace envoys, and providing leadership for COMESA election observation mission. There are plans to put in place a mediation support unit within COMESA's Secretariat to support the Committee of Elders in their mediation efforts⁹³. The COMESA hasn't however been so far involved, as an organization, in any significant peace and/or security operation or mission.

2.4.1 The Eastern Africa Standby Force

The Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) was not formally created by the three organizations but it is made of military forces of countries members at least of one of those organizations. Those countries are: Burundi, Comoros, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda. As the list shows, some member states of the EAC or COMESA are not on board.

The Force was created in Uganda February 2004 during a meeting of Eastern Africa Chief of Defense Staff. At that time, it was named the Eastern Africa Brigade (EASBRIG). The name was changed to Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF), during the

⁹² Matshenyego, F., Bah, S., Mniema, A., Nguema, H., Tamba, M., Frederiksen, J., Abelaziz, A., Reeve, R. (2010). African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). *2010 Assessment Study Report*. Addis Ababa: African Union's Peace and Security Department.

⁹³ Frederiksen, J., Abelaziz, A., Reeve, R. (2010). African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). *2010 Assessment Study Report*. Addis Ababa: African Union's Peace and Security Department.

6th Extraordinary Council Ministers meeting held in Nairobi Kenya, on June 2010. The idea was to show existence of multi dimensionality. The force operates under a memorandum of understanding agreed upon by states members on April 2005.

The absence of one Regional Economic Community (REC) covering these ten countries led the Heads of State and Government of the Region during their meeting on 28th January 2007, to authorize the creation of an Independent Coordination Mechanism to serve as the Secretariat for the EASF⁹⁴.

The Standby Force Headquarters, located in Nairobi, Kenya, is responsible for generating and preparing the Standby Brigade in liaison with the Planning Element. It is composed of military and civilian staff on secondment from Members States. The Planning Element located also in Nairobi, serves as a multi-national and multi-dimensional full time planning headquarters of EASF. The logistic base is located in Addis-Ababa. It is a central regional Base for sub-depots and maintaining, storage and management of the logistical infrastructure. All 10 EASF Members States are represented within the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Council of Ministers of Defence and Security Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff EASFCOM.

The Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) still faces some challenges, some of a legal order, others logistical and organizational. First, EASF is operating with a weak legal framework. Currently, there is only a Memorandum of understanding and a policy framework which are not binding. Second, there is no binding arrangement between Members States for force deployment although every year the Members States renew their troops pledged. Third, there is a big lack of communication between the African

⁹⁴ Nguema, H., Tamba, M., Frederiksen, J., Abelaziz, A., Reeve, R. (2010). African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Assessment Study Report. Addis Ababa

Union and the Eastern African Standby Force. Fourth, the communications with the RECs in the region (IGAD, EAC and COMESA) is also very poor. Fifth, efforts to operationalize the EASF are dogged by inter and intra States tensions. Finally, the Brigade Headquarters with only three persons is understaffed.

There is limited trust between several of the regional states, which have been at war with each other, and are still involved in unresolved conflicts. The result is that COMESA is one of the most impoverished and conflict ridden regions of the world⁹⁵. Attempts to establish effective regional institutions have so far been unsuccessful. No state has been able to lead the process of finding a way to include all the states in the region in an effective regional security structure, or political and economic institution for that matter. The largest regional institution, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), is a case in point, and the attempt to set up the regional African Standby Force (ASF) is another example of the lack of trust and leadership which can be found in the region. It is questionable if the AU's COMESA region can be understood analytically as a single large security complex. However, the historical enmities and amities exist both locally and in the larger system.

2.4.2 Regional Security Dynamics

Security is a relational phenomenon, and we cannot understand the security of an individual state without understanding the international pattern of security interdependence in which it is embedded⁹⁶. One example of this is the relationship between Kenya and Somalia, the two states being tied together by geography into what is called a security complex. Kenya cannot afford not to become involved in the crisis in

⁹⁵ Sharamo, R., & Mesfin, B. E. (2011). *Regional Security in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa*. Pretoria.

⁹⁶ Buzan, B. (1991). *People, States and Fear*. Herfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf. P.112

Somalia because it has a direct bearing on Kenya itself in terms of refugee flows, crime, etc. The regional dynamics According to Buzan have a significant influence on how states conduct their policies at the international level.

The region lacks a regional institution that encompasses all states in the region. While the three main organizations, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC) have membership from the region, none of them include all states and the region has so far been unable to agree to join forces in one regional arrangement. This is amongst several reasons why the EASF today is based on a regional mechanism, which is not built upon and into an existing regional structure. IGAD is the organization with the highest number of members from the region, but is split between north-south divisions of interest. Ethiopia is dominating this organization, which has made it difficult for the organization to accommodate all the different actors in the region, with states like Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania not seeking membership. However, IGAD has played a significant role in setting up the so-called Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), which is a donor supported attempt to cooperate on issues such as small arms proliferation, pastoral caused conflicts, cattle rustling and smuggling. It seems that IGAD has been relatively successful in finding a role in this specific area, and the cooperation on these cross-border issues has an important confidence building element which should not be underestimated.

2.4.3 Regional integration challenges in COMESA

The region is one of the most conflicts ridden and poverty stricken in the world⁹⁷. This has been combined with a high fertility rate, low life expectancy and lack of government capacity and service delivery. The political elites in power, most of them stemming from former liberation movements, refused to implement effective political reforms which could create space for a real political opposition. The consequences of these factors have been that the COMESA region faces a significant and sends a significant warning to semi-authoritarian leaders in that they need to remedy the challenges facing them. However, a number of the issues facing the region are of a regional, as opposed to a national, nature. The challenges from issues such as climate change, drought, and the related humanitarian disaster affecting millions of people in region, needs effective government and international responses and capacity. The region seems currently unable to produce both national and combined regional responses to these challenges⁹⁸. The role of international donors becomes crucial, both in terms of actual bankrolling initiatives, and also as policy drivers. One of these multilateral issues is the continental and sub-regional security architecture, which was initiated in 2002 as an attempt to create an African military capability enabling the continent to respond to conflict.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the literature on regional integration peace and security under global, Africa and COMESA perspective. Most current regional formations are

⁹⁷ UNDP. (2012). *Human Development Report 2011: Sustainability and Equity: A Better Future for All*. New York: UNDP.

⁹⁸ IBID.

political in nature, not just economic; there is a geo-political, social and also security component in most of their charters. Another important factor is that conflict and security issues are often the most significant obstacles in the process of regional integration or regional cooperation. It is widely believed that deeper economic engagement brings down political tension between member states. Today's European Union is a glaring example, which is claimed to be the most successful regional integration arrangements in the world. The challenge, however, is to replicate this so-called successful initiative in other areas of the world, particularly where intrastate conflict is the main hindrance to trade and development. The unclear division of labour and responsibilities and the lack of an institutionalized arrangement for conflict management between the organizations are limiting their effectiveness. Sub-regional organizations in Africa have usually been *ad hoc* because there is a lack of institutionalized structures at the sub-regional level to deal with conflict management and resolution activities, especially non-military activities. Regional organizations can therefore, help bring the resources and leverage required to sustain a successful peace process, but must also determine a way to manage the interests and demands that emerge from local and international actors. Additionally, sub-regional organizations should also be more committed to seeing out enduring conflict resolution in their region having such a strong stake in creating peace in their neighbourhood and avoiding the negative effects of conflicts, such as cross-border refugee flows.

CHAPTER THREE

THE NATURE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN COMESA

3.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the nature of peace and security in COMESA. It discusses COMESA as an institution, the operations of the through the various programmes such as trade, climate change, agricultural, natural resources, infrastructure in the common market in relation to peace and security in the region.

3.2 COMESA

The organs within COMESA include the Authority, the Council of Ministers, Intergovernmental Committee, Technical committees (12 Committees) among others⁹⁹. The Authority in COMESA consists of heads of state and government and is the supreme policy organ. The decisions and directions of the Authority are by consensus and are based on recommendations of the Council of Ministers.

COMESA recognizes that peace, security and stability are basic factors in providing investment, development, trade and regional economic integration. Experience has shown that civil strife, political instabilities and cross-border disputes in the region have seriously affected the ability of the countries to develop their individual economies as well as their capacity to participate and take full advantage of the regional integration arrangement under COMESA. It has now been fully accepted that without peace, security and stability there cannot be a satisfactory level of investment even by local entrepreneurs.

⁹⁹ COMESA's Treaty. Chapter Four, Article 8

3.3 Trade in COMESA and peace and security

According to the key informants interviewed¹⁰⁰ it has become a general trend in the world that countries with similar political, regional, cultural, social, economic aspects and needs are merging into economic blocks. They notes that the reasons for this phenomenon are varied consisting of gaining bigger markets to achieving some political ends. They further notes that a number of countries in Africa, including COMESA states have followed this pattern and formed regional agreements of one form or another. These blocks according to key informants provide a wider and bigger market that offers possibilities of diversification in production, processing, and marketing for members.

According to Nyandemo and Maluki there is growing evidence that preferential trade agreements (PTAs) provide strong institutional incentives to prevent regional conflict among member states, often creating the conditions of trust that can help prevent militarized aggression¹⁰¹. Nyandemo notes that PTAs do more than create expectations of economic gains and reduce opportunism; they also create hierarchical relations between states, which can encourage conflict under different conditions due to distrust.

Nyandemo argued that the formation of regional trade ties and institutions creates incentives to settle disputes before they erupt to violence. Nyandemo noted that trade with regional nations fosters economic interdependence among governments, generates expectations about wealth gains, now and into the future, and may even create a sense of community among nations. International institutions like preferential trade arrangements

¹⁰⁰ Colonel Obonyo, a regional security expert, Maluki Patrick., university of Nairobi interviewed on 27th June 2013, Samuel Nyandemo, university of Nairobi, Philip Nyinguro university of Nairobi,. Gerald Mbuthia, integration consultant, Nairobi, Miss Joyce Umetesi, policy expert world bank, Nairobi, Mr. Peter Njeru, ministry of regional cooperation, Celia Wanda and Alex Muturi, regional health expert, Gidraf Mbuthia, regional businessman.

¹⁰¹ Nyandemo S. and Maluki P. University of Nairobi interviewed on 28th June 2013.

(PTAs) or the World Trade Organization (WTO) that organize trade ties reinforce these peace-making processes by providing formal institutional mechanism through which states lengthen the shadow of future trade.

3.3.1 Democratic Republic of Congo peace and security

The Democratic Republic of Congo is intensely rich in natural resources. According to Maluki bad political and poor economic governance have led to conflict in the country for many years and has left its people with little benefit from its wealth¹⁰². Maluki notes that there is no intrinsic reason why the situation should not be reversed to make the DRC a vibrant economy with a government that serves the interests of its people. According to the respondent the return of peace and security in DRC would potentially offer a huge market for imports as well as make DRC a major exporter of minerals to the world and within COMESA. With peace and security, the DRC economy would become the engine for a rapid growth and this would lead to poverty reduction and the improvement in the quality of life of its people and those of the COMESA region.

Trade is important to DRC. With urbanization rates of 35–40% and a concentration of urban centres near border areas; the DRC represents a significant market for basic food and consumer goods. The deterioration of domestic infrastructure (including rural access roads) and security problems during the conflict period has highlighted the importance to the DRC of international transport corridors, maintained essentially by its neighbours¹⁰³. The trade situation is however economically imbalanced with DRC exporting mainly unprocessed natural resources to international markets while importing substantial amounts of food and manufactured products from the region and

¹⁰² Interview with Maluki Patrick, university of Nairobi on 27th June 2013.

¹⁰³ Research Report: Trading for Peace, Achieving security and poverty reduction through trade in natural resources in the Great Lakes area

beyond since, no investment can be done in a country locked with conflict¹⁰⁴. Trade institutions necessarily or regularly promote peace among members. Mbutia argued that trade institutions are likely to keep the peace among member states. He noted that states form social networks through membership in these institutions¹⁰⁵. Mutual memberships according to Mbutia create ties between states and, although the strength of these ties increases with additional joint memberships, they do not necessarily create positive or negative bonds between states.

Scholars have been skeptical of the claim that interdependence promotes peace among states. Mbutia explains that it is well understood that international institutions can have adverse effects on conflicts among member states, which can result to mismanaging crisis situations and worsening conflict intensity, or producing rivalry among states due to their relative social positions¹⁰⁶.

In October 2006 Mbutia notes that, COMESA, DFID, and USAID embarked on a research project “Trading for Peace” which sought to deepen understanding of the links between trade in natural resources, governance and stability in the Great Lakes Region. The project was initiated at a time when there were clear indications that the situation in the Great Lakes Region was changing on two important fronts. Peace processes had fostered transitions leading to elections in both Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Many observers felt a new culture of dialogue was evolving, setting the stage for a broader stabilization in the region. We saw the changing political dispensation as a window of opportunity to initiate activities and dialogue toward policy development

¹⁰⁴ Interview with Gerald Mbutia, integration consultant on 1st July 2013.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. See P. 45

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. See P. 45

aimed ultimately at promoting sustainable development and regional economic integration. The first Trading for Peace report summarizing the results of this research phase was published in October 2007.

The evidence of the research showed that fair and equitable trade can provide tools for poverty eradication and help to consolidate peace in countries that are emerging from conflict. Trading for Peace has demonstrated a fundamental point – that fairer trade does not have to wait for peace but it can contribute towards building peace. Through a series of cross-border meetings which have brought together traders, officials, civil society and the private sector to better understand each other and learn how a Simplified Trade Regime for small scale traders can really help their livelihoods. Trading for peace begun to build collaboration at the community level and among different groups across borders. As communities find that they can trade with each other easily and in a mutually profitable manner, they begin to value the relationships they have developed and work towards maintaining them– and they are not likely to want the trade disrupted by conflicts and nor will they want their trade relationships and networks formed to be destroyed.

More orderly trade across the DRC's borders would help to bring peace by increasing peaceful contact between hostile and fragmented communities¹⁰⁷. Many of the obstacles to trade and peace in the Great Lakes Region are identical. Perceived unfairness in trade relationships not only reduces the perceived benefits of trade for at least one side, but also drives both sides to seek protection and redress in ways which in the Great Lakes Region, with its history of extreme violence, tend to be violent themselves. People who mistrust each other, who do not recognize each other's rights and who do not perceive a net positive value in a peaceful relationship will exchange gunfire rather than goods. In

¹⁰⁷ Interview with Samuel Nyandemo, university of Nairobi, on 27th June 2013

this context, everything that helps to build confidence across borders, between contesting communities, and between traders and officials – what might be described as a project against ignorance – serves the cause of peace as well as improving trade.

Upsurges of fighting between government forces, rebels and militia groups indeed caused major and growing human misery in Eastern Congo at the ends of 2006, 2007 and 2008. But there are fewer and smaller areas of conflict overall, and the “zones of tranquility”, in which fighting has ceased and reconstruction can begin, are without doubt increasing in size and spreading.

Trade is a necessary catalyst for building peace in the Great Lakes Region, whose populations are extremely interdependent¹⁰⁸. Nyandemo notes that investing in the creation of an economic and political environment that enables legitimate cross-border trade to flourish for the wider benefit pays dividends not just for the traders, but for governments and communities throughout the region. The immediate dividend is economic, but the long-term reward is peaceful co-existence.

3.4 Climate change and peace and security in COMESA

According to Mbuthia the relationships between climate change, environmental degradation and conflict are complex and as yet poorly understood¹⁰⁹. Mbuthia explains that environmental factors are rarely the sole source of conflict, but changes in, and depletion of natural resources (e.g. water, grazing lands fuel wood) linked to climate change have been implicated as causal factors in the current crisis in Darfur. The trans-boundary nature of major water resources and water scarcity in many regions of Africa are potential seeds of future conflict. Shared water resources always constitute risks of

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Gerald Mbuthia, integration consultant on 1st July 2013.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

conflict between riparian countries, particularly if poverty is widespread, property rights are insecure and/or unclear, if the resource is scarce, and the potential stakes are high (e.g. large forgone profits if the resources are untapped or captured by neighboring countries). Regarding rivers and river systems there is always a critical upstream-downstream relationship among countries, which can only be settled in international agreements and management schemes involving two or more countries. As climate change and socio-economic factors shift the balance between water supply and demand, strong regional coordination in the management of river basins and water resources will be needed to negotiate the equitable allocation of the available water and minimize disagreement between upstream and downstream countries that could potentially lead to conflict.

Cross-border networking – bringing people together across the borders of eastern DRC, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda in order to find common solutions to common problems, by combining different interests and perspectives into joint cross-border approaches and providing space for confidence-building and the discussion of opposed or shared interests and perspectives; Institutional capacity building – strengthening regional organizations such as COMESA so that they can effectively ensure the implementation of trade reforms and other cross-border political commitments at the governmental level; Better investment climate in border areas and for cross border enterprises – helping to bridge the gaps in local roads, energy supplies and agricultural infrastructure.

3.4.1 Climate change and human security

Maluki and Nyandemo explains that climate change increasingly undermines human security in the present day, and will increasingly do so in the future, by reducing

access to, and the quality of, natural resources that are important to sustain livelihoods¹¹⁰. Climate change according to Maluki is also likely to undermine the capacity of states to provide the opportunities and services that help people to sustain their livelihoods. Maluki argues that in certain circumstances these direct and indirect impacts of climate change on human security may in turn increase the risk of violent conflict.

Key environmental challenges according to Mbutia includes climate change and climate variability, widespread pollution, loss or degradation of ecosystem services, and large-scale natural resource depletion of land, water, forests, minerals and energy resources. In addition, Africa including COMESA experiences significant change and loss of biodiversity resources, which constitutes a key development challenge to the region¹¹¹. Climate change adds to existing environmental, social and economic challenges. COMESA's environmental problems are not isolated phenomena but are linked in multiple ways with other development themes across the region. Attaining development objectives such as sustained and pro-poor growth, public health, broad-based employment, devolution and strengthening of people's rights in the region as well as sub-regionally presupposes sustainable use of the region's natural capital, reduced levels of pollution and equitable management of shared natural resources including trans-boundary water resources, drainage areas and forest ecosystems¹¹².

According to Njeru regional environmental issues have broader geographical implications: failing to sustainably manage natural resources in one country raises the risk of negative repercussions in neighbouring countries in the region and occasionally in large parts of the continent. This applies to the quest for water, grazing areas, agricultural

¹¹⁰ Interview with Samuel Nyandemo and Patrick Maluki, university of Nairobi, on 27th June 2013.

¹¹¹ Interview with Joyce Umetesi, policy expert world bank, Nairobi, on 3rd July 2013.

¹¹² Interview with Celia Wanda and Alex Muturi, regional health expert Nairobi, on 5th July 2013.

lands, precious metals (e.g. gold, diamonds) and may lead to conflicts. Moreover, Njeru noted that implementing policies to reduce pollution or natural resource depletion in one country may lead extractive or polluting companies or other actors to move their businesses/activities to neighbouring countries¹¹³. According to Njeru this becomes particularly visible in sub-regional settings where countries share a common resource, such as in the case of Lake Victoria and the Nile River. Nyinguro noted that political instability, corruption, poor policies, or weak policy implementation at the national level may harm neighbouring countries and as a result it eventually leads to conflict¹¹⁴. Hence, several national environmental problems have (sub) regional implications and can only or best be addressed in international collaboration.

Some of the key development challenges that the COMESA region faces and is likely to face are due to climate change and increasing climate variability in the near future, are expected to come in the areas of water and agriculture¹¹⁵. According to Mbuthia a report by Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) plausible estimates that an additional 75-200 million people in Africa could be exposed to additional water stress by 2020, and that yields from rain-fed agriculture could decline by 50% in some countries. According to Mbuthia such reductions are likely to increase food insecurity, and have major impacts on human health and poverty reduction efforts and as a result posing a threat to human security. Mbuthia also noted that many areas of Africa will face increased numbers of natural disasters such as floods and droughts. Mbuthia also recognized that all of the impacts above, as well as an increase in the range of vector-borne diseases, could have significant negative impacts on human health. Sea-

¹¹³ Interview with Peter Njeru, ministry of regional cooperation Nairobi, on 2nd July 2013.

¹¹⁴ Interview with Philip Nyinguro university of Nairobi, on 3rd July 2013

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

level rise and coastal flooding is likely to become a large issue towards the end of the century, and needs to be included in long-term planning, but is not an immediate priority.

According to Maluki across Africa the vulnerability of certain groups of people to climate related stresses is already very high, and projected climate changes indicate that this vulnerability can increase dramatically, and new vulnerabilities will emerge, unless appropriate adaptation measures are taken. As an example, the need for firewood for domestic consumption around Lake Victoria has resulted in widespread deforestation, which leads to soil erosion, increased vulnerability to flooding and ultimately pollution of the shared waters of Lake Victoria¹¹⁶.

3.5 Agricultural and peace and security in COMESA

The COMESA Treaty (Article 129) stipulates that the overall objectives of co-operation in the agricultural sector are the achievement of regional food security and rational agricultural production within the Common Market¹¹⁷. To this end, Member States have undertaken to: Harmonize agricultural policies; work towards regional food sufficiency; increase agricultural productivity to meet domestic and export markets, and replacement of imports on a regional basis. According to a report by FANRPAN agriculture is an important engine for economic growth and development in the COMESA region¹¹⁸. FANRPAN noted that agriculture contribute towards creating employment, increasing incomes, improving standards of living, and reducing poverty and hunger. This makes agriculture a high priority on the integration agenda and on the achievement of other regional aspirations including peace and security. Compared to

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ COMESA Treaty (Article 129)

¹¹⁸ Food Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network (FANRPAN) (2010). 13 August. Final Report

other regions on the continent where oil, minerals and other resources are abundant, the COMESA region relies heavily on agriculture as the engine for economic development.

According to Umetesi agriculture is, therefore, a critical pathway in attaining economic growth in the region, by creating employment, and reducing poverty and hunger. The sector accounts for more than 32% of COMESA's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), provides a livelihood to about 80% of the region's population, accounts for approximately 65% of foreign exchange earnings and contributes more than 50% of raw materials to the industrial sector. Umetesi further noted that most of the developing countries within COMESA are agricultural commodity-dependent for their livelihoods. The external trade of COMESA member states relies mainly on exports of primary products to industrialized nations. Agricultural commodities are major drivers for growth in intra-COMESA trade. COMESA trade statistics indicate that total intra-COMESA trade during 2008 amounted to some US\$6.3 billion.

3.5.1 Food security and peace and security

Even though agriculture forms the backbone of COMESA economy, FANRPAN noted that it ranks among the least funded sectors¹¹⁹. Only a few countries in Africa had managed to meet the requirement of the 2003 Maputo Declaration. In Maputo in 2003, African heads of state set targets of allocating 10% of national budgets to agriculture by 2008 and of reaching national agricultural growth rates of 6%. As well as allocating more of their budgets to agriculture, most countries will have to boost agricultural sector growth rates in order to achieve MDG1. According to the World Bank in 2008, only two

¹¹⁹ Food Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network (FANRPAN) (2011). 30 August. Final Report

countries in the COMESA Region, Malawi and Ethiopia, increased their national budget allocation to a minimum of 10%, albeit with varying results. Majority of COMESA Member States are still devoting less than 5% of their budgets to agriculture. Private sector investment in agriculture is also low due to a number of risks in the sector and relatively low levels of profitability.

Conflict prone regions and countries like the Eastern DRC used to be one of the most important food-producing areas of the Congo, but decades of insecurity have to a large extent destroyed the region's agricultural economy. However, agricultural products still contribute up to 50% of recorded exports of North Kivu, and the majority of the population is engaged in farming. The restoration of peace and security in formerly conflict prone regions and countries, such as Burundi, DRC Congo and Sudan, will however facilitate intra-regional trade, especially in agricultural products where Member States have varying comparative advantages.

3.6 Natural resources and peace and security in COMESA

According to Maluki, water scarcity is single biggest threat to global food security¹²⁰. Maluki argues that whether a region starts with water or adds water at a later stage in its continuum to evolve a process of cooperation, it is important to note that water is an integrated part of regional economic dynamics, and not a resource to be utilized in isolation. The respondent explained that Egypt has depended upon the waters of the Nile from times of antiquity. It is in acknowledgement of this fact that Herodotus described Egypt as the gift of the Nile¹²¹. Because of its dependence on the Nile, Egypt's

¹²⁰ Ibid

¹²¹ Interview with Colonel Obonyo, a regional security expert, Maluki, university of Nairobi on 27th June 2013, Dr. Samuel Nyandemo, university of Nairobi, Professor Philip Nyinguro university of Nairobi, Mr. Gerald Mbuthia, integration consultant, Nairobi, Joyce Umetesi, policy expert world bank, Nairobi, Mr.

leaders, using Herodotus' description as their hegemonic narrative, have always been industrious in ensuring a monopoly over the waters of the Nile. However in spite of Egypt's hegemony over the Nile waters, upstream states are increasingly challenging Egypt's monopoly. Swain noted that beginning the end of colonialism in Africa, Nile basin states have been slowly but surely mounting a challenge to Egyptian domination over the Nile. Swain notes that it seems as if the upper riparian states, from whose mountains the Nile gushes downstream, are asking Herodotus in retrospect: whose gift is the Nile anyway?

According to the respondent the Nile watercourse, considered to be the longest in the world, crosses ten states whose combined populations constitute 40% of the entire population of Africa¹²². The main tributaries of the Nile River are the Blue Nile and the White Nile. The source of the Blue Nile, which constitutes 86% of the volume of the Nile, is in Ethiopia and to some degree Eritrea, while the contribution of the White Nile is shared amongst Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The Nile member countries are already members of two regional economic bodies. Countries such as D.R. Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan are members of COMESA while Tanzania is a member of the East African Community (EAC). Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya and Uganda are members of both the organizations with South Sudan expected to join soon. Thus, the Nile member countries have been positively disposed towards institutionalized economic cooperation in Africa. They can draw from

Peter Njeru, ministry of regional cooperation, Dr. Celia Wanda and Alex Muturi, regional health expert, Gidraf Mbuthia, regional businessman..

¹²² Ibid

their experience of the two organizations, or indeed their analysis of regional cooperation agreements in other parts of the world, to envisage, shape and structure regional economic cooperation agreement in the Nile Basin.

The Nile basin is characterized by high population growth, poverty, food insecurity, environmental degradation, water scarcity and on top of it all, the potential for conflict over water¹²³. The demand for fresh water in Nile basin riparian states is on the increase and is likely to lead to water scarcity especially in Egypt. And as the population of the Nile basin continues to expand, water scarcity will be at the forefront of the region's problems¹²⁴. Smith explains that this will lead to massive poverty and food insecurity in the Nile basin culminating to a threat to human security. The region's developmental potential will further be reduced by the fact that it will not be able to generate electricity. Swain argues that by 2025, it is expected that almost all countries in the Nile basin will experience water stress or scarcity¹²⁵.

According to Abdel the main difference between the proposed Nile REC and COMESA and EAC is that the latter two, like SADC, are driven by trade and industry agenda, whereas the Nile REC could be driven by water cooperation agenda¹²⁶. Abdel notes that cooperation in water requires significant trade-offs. Abdel argues that shares of water can be negotiated in exchange for transit, hydro-electricity, agriculture and economic development opportunities. Cropping patterns can be developed on the basis of comparative advantage of natural resource endowment, supported by regional free trade

¹²³ Niveen Tadros, (1996–1997). *Shrinking Water Resources: The National Security Issue of this Century*, 17 NW. J. INTL L. & BUS. 1091, 1092.

¹²⁴ Russell Smith, (1999). *Africa's Potential Water Wars*, BBC NEWS, Nov. 15,

¹²⁵ Ashok Swain, (2004). *Managing water conflict, Asia, Africa and Middle East* 93; Kevin Watkins, (2006). *Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis*, Human Development Report 135–36.

¹²⁶ Mohamed Abdel Aty Sayed, (2008). *Eastern Nile Planning Model, Integration with IDEN Projects To Deal with Climate Change Uncertainty and Flooding Risk*, 1 Nile Basin Water. 86, 86.

in food and agricultural commodities. The Nile Basin countries should consider establishing a Regional Food Trade Network to formalize informal trade, reduce artificial food scarcity, create regional food buffer stocks, and facilitate judicious balance between food crops and cash crops, as well as drought-resistant crops and water-intensive crops on a regional basis. The NBI has already made small beginnings for regional power trade. The countries are negotiating power trade even outside the formal projects of NBI. Their willingness to explore this avenue demonstrates huge potential for cooperation, trade and joint investments in power sector. The countries can jointly develop eco-tourism opportunities. Once regional cooperation in water, hydro-electricity, tourism and agriculture grows, trans-boundary cooperation in banking and communication will automatically expand.

Such regional cooperation is only possible if the River Nile and its tributaries are treated as a regional common by all governments and people in the region. This will mean ensuring sustenance, quality and flow of the river in the best interest of all people and environment of the entire basin and in the end peace and security will prevail in the region and Africa at large.

3.7 Infrastructure and peace and security in COMESA

According to Nyandemo infrastructure is a necessary condition for trade and regional overall economic and social development¹²⁷. According to the respondents infrastructure provides the physical links between the various countries and forms a major component of the costs of trade, the global competitiveness of every country and thus its development prospects. The respondents noted that COMESA comprises an enormous land mass with diverse economies. According to the respondents some have

¹²⁷ Interview with Samuel Nyandemo. University of Nairobi, on 27th June 2013.

small economies, land size and populations, and some are landlocked, an economic geography that presents significant challenges. Regional integration as noted by the respondents is admittedly the best strategy to provide larger and more competitive markets, and thus enhances regional infrastructure development. The respondents concluded that integrating physical infrastructure is a necessary though insufficient condition for achieving deeper regional integration and increased trade among countries.

According to African Development Bank (AFDB) inadequacy of infrastructure in COMESA is widely recognized¹²⁸. Several studies by AFDB have concluded that the biggest impediment to regional and intra-Africa trade is poor infrastructure, both in terms of missing links in existing regional networks and inadequate maintenance of existing infrastructure. According Eustace and Fay, there exist a strong relationship between infrastructure and economic growth, although the direction of causality may still be debatable: good infrastructure spurs economic growth; and conversely, increased growth results in greater demand for infrastructure¹²⁹.

Economic and social services such as banking, retail, health, and education cannot function effectively without a modern and efficient infrastructure system. The respondents noted that critical requirements such as defense and security must be supported by a sound and robust infrastructure. The respondents further noted that information sharing, social mobility, individual choice and consequently, the quality of life of individuals depends on a responsive and efficient infrastructure system. Efficient transport, communications, energy infrastructure and related services are important for

¹²⁸ African Development Bank (AFDB) and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) (2006) – Infrastructure Development and Regional Integration: Problems, Opportunities and Challenges, High-Level Seminar, Annual Meetings, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.

¹²⁹ Eustace, A., and M. Fay. (2007). Current debates on infrastructure policy. *World Bank Policy Research Working paper* 4410, November.

trade and the pursuit of the regional development goals. On the other hand, inadequate infrastructure and services result in increased production and transaction costs, which reduce competitiveness and make it more difficult to achieve overall development goals. The COMESA 2009 “proposal for the creation of a COMESA infrastructure fund” attempts to increase trade among countries through trade liberalization¹³⁰. However, in many cases, formal trade liberalization has not been successful partly because some fundamental aspects of trade logistics, such as infrastructure, have been limited.

According to the respondents in making an investment location decision, a potential investor will look at the availability, cost and reliability of infrastructure – power, water, transport and telecommunications. If these are not favorable, the investor is unlikely to locate. This the respondents noted translate not just in loss of investment for a location or country, but is a high opportunity cost in terms of lost employment incomes. According to the respondents increased investment, jobs and incomes lead to an improved standard of living, and this translates into higher literacy rates (because parents can now afford to pay for their children’s education) and better health uplifting the population from a dependent to an independent and productive one. This also means that the population may be able to afford and be willing to pay for infrastructure services such as water, electricity, telephones and public transport. In contrast, some of the respondents noted that if investment is not attracted because of poor infrastructure, all the adverse effects caused by unemployment and lack of income follow and neither can infrastructure itself be expanded because there will be no incomes and, therefore, no impetus to spur the further development and expansion of infrastructure will lead to poor living standards which directly impacts negatively on human security.

¹³⁰ COMESA Treaty

The efficient functioning of road transport is linked to the efficiency of cross-border facilitation. COMESA for example introduced a number of measures intended to improve road transport operations. These include, Harmonized Road Transit Charges, COMESA Carriers License and the COMESA Yellow Card¹³¹. The COMESA Yellow Card or the Third Party Regional Motor Vehicle Insurance Scheme allows pre-purchase of insurance in local currency at origin and the insurance is honored by all participating countries. This means for example, that a motorist or trucker travelling from Zimbabwe to Uganda who has to traverse, Zambia, Tanzania and Kenya need not stop at each border post to purchase insurance, but uses the Yellow Card to gain access and cover. In the event of an accident in a third country, the motorist is covered for third party liability, property damage and basic medical cover. The convenience and facilitative role of such a system are evident. According to COMESA, the Yellow Card has since its inception, generated revenue worth \$2 million with only \$200,000 worth of claims processed¹³².

The respondents noted that armed conflicts and general instability in many parts of COMESA, notably the Great Lakes and Mano River regions, not only destroy existing infrastructure but also prevent their development, thus adding to the constraints on the affected countries. The net impact on trade is that the prices of infrastructure services in COMESA are high by global standards. The missing links in the transport networks have been destroyed or could not be developed because of armed conflicts and political instability, especially in and around the Great Lakes and Manu River regions. COMESA is seeking to establish a COMESA Infrastructure Fund for trade-related infrastructure projects. These regional funds would complement funding from the continental

¹³¹ COMESA Treaty

¹³² Eastern Africa Regional Integration Strategy Paper 2011 - 2015

infrastructure funds that have already been established and from the regional development banks and international financial institutions such as the African Development Bank and the World Bank.

3.8 The Nature and Dynamics of peace and security in COMESA

The end of the Cold War ushered in a new international spirit of cooperation that raised hopes for peace and security in Africa. Countries previously embroiled in conflict, such as Namibia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Africa adopted more democratic systems of government. However, any illusions of a post-Cold War peace dividend were shattered as conflicts erupted in virtually all of Africa's sub regions: Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia in the Horn of Africa¹³³; the Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, and Burundi in Central Africa and the Great Lakes region. While Africa's democratization struggles in the early 1990s sought to restore values of democracy and human rights, in countries like Congo-Brazzaville, resistance to the process by ruling political and military elites led to "communal" violence in countries like Kenya. Political exclusion and inequalities in access to economic and social opportunities combined with issues of identity and citizenship to result in genocide in Rwanda, mass murder in Burundi, and civil wars in Somalia, and Central African Republic.

The crises and conflicts in Africa are accentuated by deep-rooted environmental problems related to access to, and use of land resources, and competition for natural resources such as minerals and timber. As unemployed, disaffected "lumpen" youths in

¹³³ Katsuyoshi Fukui and John Markakis (1994). *Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa* (London: James Currey).

many of Africa's rural areas have been recruited into rebel movements, law and order has broken down, resulting in the proliferation of private armies, militias, and the illicit trade in arms and drugs in states like, (Northern) Uganda, Sudan, and Somalia.

In addition to these intrastate conflicts, Eritrea and Ethiopia waged a more old-fashioned interstate conflict between 1998 and 2000. While some states like Kenya have taken a leading role in regional peacemaking efforts, such initiatives have often been frustrated by the scale and complexity of conflicts, lack of resources, the parochial agendas of local actors, and weak sub regional mechanisms for managing conflicts. Apart from these general characteristics, each sub region exposes particular trends that have shaped the dynamics of peace and security in its own locality. Understanding these dynamics is critical to any effective intervention strategy.

3.8.1 Great Lakes region

The dynamics of peace and security in the Great Lakes region— Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Eastern Congo—have, over the last seven years, been painstakingly documented in a number of studies¹³⁴. According to Mwagiru these conflicts are complex and involve a multiplicity of interlocking regional and international forces that mitigate or fuel conflicts, thus complicating peacemaking efforts¹³⁵. The war that was in Burundi and tensions that locked Rwanda continued inspite of several peacemaking efforts and the temporary truce under UN supervision in the DRC. According to Melvern in this sub region, the epicenter of conflict is constantly shifting from one country to another¹³⁶. In 1993 it was Burundi, where more than 200,000 people died; in 1994 it moved to Rwanda,

¹³⁴ Colette Braeckman, (1994). *Rwanda: Histoire d'un Génocide* (Paris: Fayard,)

¹³⁵ Makumi Mwagiru, (2000). *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management* (Nairobi: Watermark Press).

¹³⁶ Linda Melvern, (2000). *A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide* (London: Zed Books), pp. 222–223.

where genocide left an estimated one million dead; in 1996, it moved to Burundi and the DRC, where an estimated 2.5 million people reportedly died since August 1998. Melvern notes that the war in the DRC has spawned more than 600,000 refugees and two million internally displaced persons.

3.8.2 Ethnicity and Political Governance

According to Nyinguro bad governance and ethnic politics have accentuated conflicts in Central Africa. In Rwanda and Burundi, conflict revolves around the ethnic differences between the Tutsi and Hutu, which translates into the politics of inclusion and exclusion¹³⁷. Nyinguro explained that apart from promoting unequal access to opportunities, ethnicity in the two countries has enabled ethnic minorities to control the state and its resources. Nyinguro noted that in Rwanda, the failure of the Hutu government to accommodate members of the Tutsi ethnic group resulted in the genocide of 1994. In Burundi, the fear of Hutu dominance has often stalled the implementation of peace accords. To remain in power, Nyinguro noted that regimes rely on violence to regulate internal political and other differences and to erect structures that exclude and marginalize sections of society.

3.8.3 The Scramble for Resources in DR-Congo

A second feature defining conflicts in Central Africa according to Nyinguro¹³⁸ is the myriad interests tied to the DRC's huge natural resource that has earned it the French characterization of *scandale géologique*. These include minerals like diamonds, gold, silver, iron, zinc, copper, cobalt, columbite-tantalite, cadmium, manganese, bauxite, uranium, radium and timber. These vast resources have become even more valuable in

¹³⁷ Ibid

¹³⁸ Interview with Philip Nyinguro, university of Nairobi, on 3rd July 2013

the context of the current world financial crisis. Eastern Congo is home to some of the richest columbite-tantalite (coltan) deposits in the world, a mineral whose price skyrocketed to U.S.\$200 a pound at the end of 2000.

As in West Africa, natural resources in Central Africa are instrumental to the war economy. Since the colonial era, both state and private actors have competed for access to the Congo's mineral wealth. Internally, both the government and rebel movements use income from the sale of gold, diamonds, timber and coffee to acquire weapons, recruit troops, gain military support and finance their war efforts. Regional states involved in the Congo war are extracting resources found in areas under their control. For example, in the first quarter of 2000, Uganda and Rwanda became leading exporters of diamond and copper, despite not producing these resources domestically. A Swiss government secret report revealed a small portion of which was retained by the Rwandese military and other foreign intermediaries. In seeking to restore peace to Central Africa and particularly to the DRC, the issue of access to and exploitation of mineral resources to fund and promote conflicts have to be addressed.

3.8.4 The Horn of Africa

In defining the security dynamics of the Horn of Africa, a sub region comprising Djibouti, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Somalia, Mbuthia observed that the region is in the process of redefining the fundamentals that relate to the social contract and who should govern¹³⁹. According to Mbuthia the region reveals an overlap of differing, sometimes conflicting governance systems, reinforcing the interdependence of the security system as well as posing critical challenges to regional peace and security. Mbuthia noted that apart from being embroiled in intra- and interstate conflicts, the

¹³⁹ Ibid

majority of countries on the Horn of Africa lack substantive capacity to deal with many of the longstanding conflicts in the sub region.

When the Horn of Africa is compared to Central or West Africa, Mbutia noted that the Horn of Africa has meager natural resources, though Sudan is increasingly becoming a major oil producer in Africa. Lying on the southern part of the Sahara and dependent largely on rain-fed agriculture, the sub region is under constant threat of famine and drought. Thus, conflict over access to limited natural resources—water, land and pasture—has been part of the history of the Horn of Africa.

According to the respondents the context of conflict changed dramatically under colonialism. According to the respondents ethnic communities were either arbitrarily split or lumped together with other disparate groups in new states with little regard to their wishes, often resulting in states with little sense of national identity or unity. To consolidate national unity, the respondents noted that governments resorted to strategies of centralizing political and economic power and suppressing pluralism. In the Horn of Africa, as elsewhere in Africa, the centralized state disrupted and marginalized outlying areas. In the marginal parts of Uganda, Kenya, Somalia, or Ethiopia, people either view the state as an alien entity or refer to it in the past tense. Nonetheless, the nature and dynamics of conflicts in this sub region have changed significantly since the end of the Cold War. This change revolves around three main factors: the legacy of the superpower rivalry; the proliferation of small arms and light weapons; and the forced migration of populations.

3.8.5 Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons

According to the respondent the main feature in the process of state collapse and the withdrawal of the superpowers from Africa has been the militarization of populations, accompanied by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons¹⁴⁰. Colonel Obonyo explains that from Northern Uganda and Southern Sudan to Ethiopia, militias and rebel movements fighting central governments and is often as well equipped as the state. Colonel Obonyo notes that even Kenya, which is widely perceived to be a strong state, has been affected by this phenomenon. In response, governments in the Horn of Africa have been acquiring more arms, ostensibly to deal with security threats. Rather than ensuring security and generating peace, this arms buildup has instead accelerated the proliferation of arms and increased tensions and conflicts. According to Colonel Obonyo the ability of states to subdue or hold militias accountable for arms proliferation has greatly diminished. The flow of arms and proliferation of militias have important implications for interstate relations on the Horn of Africa. As Somalia continues to be a conduit for arms, the historically close military ties between Kenya and Ethiopia are under increasing threat. The presence of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia has also adversely affected peace and security in the region. Colonel Obonyo argues that while militias continue to accumulate arms, the ability of sub regional states to expand their arsenals is sometimes curtailed by international pressure to reduce military expenditures. In contrast, Colonel Obonyo notes that insurgents are able to replenish their arms with resources from looted food aid and external remittances from ethnic Diasporas. According to Colonel Obonyo the prolonged insurgency on the Horn of

¹⁴⁰ Interview with Colonel Obonyo, a regional security expert, on 29th June 2013

Africa has inevitably multiplied the number of people skilled in the use of firearms, destabilized societies, led to the breakdown of the rule of law, disrupted lives and escalated violence and insecurity in urban and rural areas. As a result of this Colonel Obonyo notes that rural violence takes the form of banditry and cattle rustling in the Rift Valley province of Kenya and the Karamojong region in Uganda causing internal instability. In sedentary communities, Colonel Obonyo notes that insurgent activities affect agriculture, the mainstay of most economies in the region. In Northern Uganda for example, insurgency has rendered production difficult. These developments have resulted in the steady fragmentation of the institutional basis of state power in many parts of the Horn of Africa and threatening human security.

3.8.6 Forced Displacement in the Horn of Africa

Evidence from respondents indicates that the Horn of Africa has generated more than a quarter of Africa's six million registered refugees¹⁴¹. In addition to refugees the respondents noted that all countries in the Horn of Africa have a large number of internally displaced persons. Sudan alone has generated four million internally displaced persons, the largest in the world. Indeed the fast-growing proliferation of small arms and light weapons is linked directly to this movement within and across borders.

A large proportion of the populations of COMESA member states are nomadic pastoralists who constantly migrate across national borders. Environmental pressure has intensified competition for access to limited natural resources such as common pasture and watering points among these communities. Over time, conflicts over these resources have generated cycles of violence as communities that suffer attack, regroup, and carry out retaliation against their aggressors. To minimize casualties in what has become part

¹⁴¹ Interview with Maluki, university of Nairobi, on 27th June 2013

of their coping strategies, communities engage in large-scale migration and evacuation operations when tensions between various groups begin to escalate. Such migration often involves crossing international borders, and has sometimes sparked off interstate tensions.

3.9 conclusion

This chapter analyzed the relationship between peace and security and regional integration in COMESA. The chapter explored on the various programmes such trade, climate change, agricultural, natural resources, infrastructure in the common market.

In the world countries with similar political, regional, cultural, social, economic aspects and needs are merging into economic blocks. Regional blocks provide a wider and bigger market that offers possibilities of diversification in production, processing, and marketing for members. Trade agreements provide strong institutional incentives to prevent regional conflict among member states, by creating conditions of trust that help prevent militarized aggression.

On climate change the chapter concludes that environmental factors are rarely the sole source of conflict, but changes in, and depletion of natural resources (e.g. water, grazing lands fuel wood) linked to climate change. The trans-boundary nature of major water resources and water scarcity in many regions of Africa are potential seeds of future conflict. Shared water resources always constitute risks of conflict between riparian countries, particularly if poverty is widespread, property rights are insecure and/or unclear, if the resource is scarce, and the potential stakes are high (e.g. large forgone profits if the resources are untapped or captured by neighboring countries). Climate

change is likely to undermine the capacity of states to provide the opportunities and services that help people to sustain their livelihoods.

Agriculture is an important engine for economic growth and development in the COMESA region since it contribute towards creating employment, increasing incomes, improving standards of living, and reducing poverty and hunger. This makes agriculture a high priority on the integration agenda and on the achievement of other regional aspirations including peace and security. Agriculture is, therefore, a critical pathway in attaining economic growth in the region, by creating employment, and reducing poverty and hunger.

Infrastructure is a necessary condition for trade and regional overall economic and social development since it provides the physical links between the various countries and forms a major component of the costs of trade, the global competitiveness of every country and thus its development prospects. As economic and social services such as banking, retail, health, and education cannot function effectively without a modern and efficient infrastructure system.

CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATIONS OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF COMESA

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents analysis and findings of the study as set out in the research methodology. The study findings are presented on the role played by regional integration in peace and security in Africa: with specific reference to COMESA region. The data was gathered using questionnaires and interviews. The instruments were guided and designed in line with the objectives of the study.

4.1 Strategic objectives of COMESA in relation to peace and security

The study aimed to establish the strategic objectives of COMESA in relation to peace and security. To this end, the respondents indicated that the strategic objectives of COMESA are to co-operate in the promotion of peace, security and stability among the Member States in order to enhance economic development in the region; the respondents also indicated that COMESA aims at maintaining regional peace and stability through the promotion and strengthening of good neighbourliness; and through peaceful settlement of disputes among the Member States in case of conflict, the respondents also noted that COMESA promotes a peaceful environment as a prerequisite for economic development. The respondents further noted that COMESA aims at recognizing and observing the rule of law.

Table 4.1 Respondents' level of agreement on factors that influence peace and security in COMESA

	Mean	Std. Deviation
Political instability	4.6875	.53506
Agriculture	4.6875	.53506
Trade	4.7187	.45680
Natural resources	4.5000	.71842
Globalization	4.1513	5.32332
Infrastructure development	4.1800	.71842
Regional Financial Institutions	3.2812	1.25040
Climate change	4.4063	.83702
Other sub-regional bodies e.g. EAC, IGAD,SADC	4.0938	.53033

The study used a Likert-type scale in collecting and analyzing the data on a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 point being assigned to very low extent, indicating no influence while 5 was assigned to very great extent, to indicate high level of influence by the factor on peace and security in COMESA. The scales ranged from 1 to 5 making an interval of 4 between the two extremes; the following allocationary keys can be developed: very low extent (never influences) was given the range 1 – 1.8, low extent (very rarely influences) was given the range 1.81 – 2.6, moderate extent (rarely influences) was given the range 2.61 – 3.4, great extent (influences) was given the range 3.41 – 4.2 while very great extent (always influences) was assigned the range 4.21 – 5. This allocationary key was used in all the subsequent likert-type scale analysis.

According to the table above, factors that influences peace and security in COMESA to a very great extent are trade as shown by a mean score of 4.7187, these study results concurs with Powers that there is a growing evidence that preferential trade agreements (PTAs) provide strong institutional incentives to prevent regional conflict among member states, often creating the conditions of trust that can help prevent militarized aggression¹⁴². The results are also in line with Gartzke and Boehmer who noted that no investment can be done in a country locked with conflict¹⁴³. Agriculture is the other factor as indicated by a mean score of 4.6875, these results concurs with the world bank report that agriculture is a high priority on the integration agenda and on the achievement of other regional aspirations including peace and security¹⁴⁴, Political instability also influences peace and security in COMESA to a very great extent as indicated by mean score of 4.6875, natural resources with mean score of 4.5000 also influences peace and security in the region to a very great extent, climate change as well with a mean score of 4.4063 influences peace and security in the region to a very great extent. The study results on climate change are in line with Collier and Paul¹⁴⁵ that environmental factors are rarely the sole source of conflict, but changes in, and depletion of natural resources (e.g. water, grazing lands fuel wood) linked to climate change have been implicated as causal factors of conflict. The results also concurs with Barnett that climate change increasingly undermines human security in the present day, and will

←

¹⁴² Powers, K. L. (2004). Regional trade agreements as military alliances. *International Interactions* 30(4): 373–395.

¹⁴³ Gartzke, E., Q. Li and C. Boehmer. (2001). investing in the peace: Economic interdependence and international conflict. *International Organization* 55(2): 391–438.

¹⁴⁴ World Bank, (2009). 'Framework Document for a Global Agriculture and Food Security Program'.

¹⁴⁵ Collier, Paul, (2003). *Natural Resources, Development And Conflict: Channels Of Causation And Policy Interventions*, World Bank, Washington DC.

increasingly do so in the future, by reducing access to, and the quality of, natural resources that are important to sustain livelihoods¹⁴⁶.

Further, according to the table above, the factors that influences peace and security in the COMESA region to a great extent are infrastructure development with a mean score of 4.1800, globalization as indicated by a mean score of 4.1513 and finally other sub-regional bodies e.g. EAC, IGAD, SADC as shown by a mean score of 4.0938. The study further established that regional financial institutions rarely influence peace and security in COMESA region as indicated by the mean score of 3.2812.

4.2 Opportunities for regional integration

The study sought to know the main opportunities for regional integration. The study established that regional integration offers the opportunity to broaden national markets and production scales and to promote trade in services and intraregional investments¹⁴⁷. They also established that regional integration also encourages the formation of regional value chains and constitutes a learning platform which can lead to improved competitiveness at the worldwide level.

The respondents also indicated that regional integration also provides an opportunity in developing an integrated energy system by fully exploiting the diversity of energy resources within the region, capitalize on the emergence of new energy technologies, and help supply the financial and technical requirements of an efficient energy sector that would help meet the rapidly growing electricity demand in the region.

¹⁴⁶ Barnett, J. (2003). Security and climate change. *Global Environmental Change*, 13, 7e17.

¹⁴⁷ See Chapter Three P 45

According to the respondents regional integration enables countries to better protect and exploit their shared wealth in natural resources. The respondents' particularly noted that regional integration is the way forward in protecting water resources, which are becoming increasingly scarce and which are particularly vulnerable to climate change¹⁴⁸.

The study also established that regional integration provides unique opportunities in integration of the regional financial sector that could contribute to enhancing competitiveness across countries by strengthening financial infrastructure, harmonizing regulatory policies, and removing market impediments to cross-border activities, particularly lifting the exchange controls between COMESA countries.

The study also established that regional integration provides opportunities in meeting the daunting challenges of addressing youth unemployment and creating efficient social safety nets.

Table 4.2 Respondents' level of agreement with the following statement on the challenges of regional integration, peace and security

	Mean	Std. Deviation
Infrastructure is a necessary condition for trade and regional overall economic and social development	4.5000	.50800
Water resources and water scarcity in COMESA regions is a potential seed of future conflict.	4.5000	.56796
Regional integration provides a wider and bigger market that offers possibilities of diversification in production, processing, and marketing for members.	4.8125	.39656

¹⁴⁸ See Chapter Three P 54

Weak institutions and human capacity limit COMESA effectiveness	4.4063	.71208
Insecurity and political instability are major obstacles to deeper integration	4.7500	.50800
Peace, security and stability are basic factors in providing investment, development, trade and regional economic integration.	4.5000	.56796
Uneven policy, regulatory and institutional readiness hinders intra-regional investment prospects	3.7500	.80322
Climate change increasingly undermines human security	4.5000	.56796
Failing to sustainably manage natural resources in one country raises the risk of conflict in neighbouring countries	4.5000	.50800
Agriculture contributes towards creating employment, increasing incomes, improving standards of living, and reducing poverty and hunger	4.7187	.52267
Agriculture is among the least funded sectors in COMESA member states	4.7500	.43994
Peace and security must be supported by a sound and robust infrastructure	4.2812	.63421

The study also used a Likert-type of scale of 1 to 5 with 1 point being assigned to strongly disagree, while 5 was assigned to strongly agree, indicating the truthfulness of the statements. The data was then analyzed using SPSS to get the above values of mean and standard deviation the scales ranged from 1 to 5 making an interval of 4 between the two extremes. The following allocationary keys were developed: strongly disagreeing was given the range 1 – 1.8, disagreeing was given the range 1.81 – 2.6, moderate was given the range 2.61 – 3.4, agree was given the range 3.41 – 4.2 while strongly agree was

assigned the range 4.21 – 5. This allocationary key was used in all the subsequent likert type scale analysis.

4.2.1 Programmes of regional integration, peace and security

According to the table above, majority of the respondents' strongly agreed that regional integration provides a wider and bigger market that offers possibilities of diversification in production, processing, and marketing for members as indicated by a mean score of 4.8125. This is in line with Barbieri who noted that regional blocks provide a wider and bigger market that offers possibilities of diversification in production, processing, and marketing for members¹⁴⁹. Barbieri also noted that economies of scale accrue to national firms or businesses that have the capacity to strategize beyond their national borders.

The study also established that majority of the respondents' strongly agreed that insecurity and political instability are major obstacles to deeper integration as shown by a mean score of 4.7500. The study further, established that majority of the respondents' strongly agreed that agriculture is among the least funded sectors in COMESA member states¹⁵⁰ as indicated by a mean score of 4.7500.

The respondents' also strongly agreed that agriculture contributes towards creating employment, increasing incomes, improving standards of living, and reducing poverty and hunger as indicated by a mean score of 4.7187. This concurs with the World Bank that agriculture is considered to be the engine for economic development in the

¹⁴⁹Barbieri, K. (1996). Economic interdependence: A path to peace or a source of interstate conflict? *Journal of Peace Research* 33(1): 29–49

¹⁵⁰ See Chapter Three P 53

COMESA region¹⁵¹. According to the World Bank the sector accounts for more than 32 per cent of COMESA's gross domestic product (GDP), provides a livelihood to about 80 per cent of the region's labour force, accounts for about 65 per cent of foreign exchange earnings and contributes more than 50 per cent of raw materials to the industrial sector.

On infrastructure the respondents' strongly agreed that it is a necessary condition for trade and regional overall economic and social development as indicated by a mean score of 4.5000. The study results are in line with Nyandemo that infrastructure provides the physical links between the various countries and forms a major component of the costs of trade, the global competitiveness of every country and thus its development prospects¹⁵².

The respondents' as well strongly agreed that water resources and water scarcity in the COMESA regions is a potential seed of future conflict as shown by a mean score of 4.5000. The finding concurs with Alao who noted that water scarcity is single biggest threat to global food security¹⁵³. Alao argues that as water quality degrades or the quantity available not able to meet the rising demands over time, competition among water users will intensify leading to conflict over the resource.

Majority of the respondents' also strongly agreed that peace, security and stability are basic factors in providing investment, development, trade and regional economic integration as shown by a mean score of 4.5000. The study results concurs with Adetula and Victor who argued that the RECs were originally established with mainly economic goals in mind, including enhancing economic integration, trade, and development but

¹⁵¹ World Bank,(2009). 'Framework Document for a Global Agriculture and Food Security Program'. World Bank

¹⁵² See Chapter Three P 57

¹⁵³ Abiodun Alao,(2007). *Natural resources and conflict in Africa: the tragedy of endowment* .p 55.

more recently, Adetula and Victor notes that they have added peace and security agendas as such matters have become increasingly pressing and unavoidable¹⁵⁴.

On climate change majority of the respondents' also strongly agreed that it increasingly undermines human security as indicated by a mean score of 4.5000. The study finding are in line with Nyandemo and Maluki who argues that climate change is also likely to undermine the capacity of states to provide the opportunities and services that help people to sustain their livelihoods¹⁵⁵. They argue that in certain circumstances these direct and indirect impacts of climate change on human security may in turn increase the risk of violent conflict.

The respondents' also strongly agreed that failing to sustainably manage natural resources in one country raises the risk of conflict in neighbouring countries as indicated on the table by a mean score of 4.5000. The study noted that rising population exacerbates perennial water shortage. Lake Victoria and the Nile basins are good examples of how riparian countries can cooperate in the use of shared water resources.

The respondents' too strongly agreed that weak institutions and human capacity limit COMESA effectiveness as indicated by a mean score of 4.4063. The respondents' too strongly agreed that peace and security must be supported by a sound and robust infrastructure as indicated by a mean score of 4.2812. Finally the respondents' agreed that uneven policy, regulatory and institutional readiness hinders intra-regional investment prospects as indicated by a mean score of 3.7500.

¹⁵⁴ See Chapter Two p29

¹⁵⁵ See Chapter Three P 50

4.3 Challenges of regional integration, peace and security in COMESA

The study sought to establish the main challenges affecting regional integration, peace and security in COMESA. To this end, the respondents indicated that the biggest threat includes banditry and cattle rustling among the nomadic communities living along the borders between member states¹⁵⁶. The study also established that proliferation of small arms and light weapons is a major challenge that leads to prolonged insurgency thereby destabilized societies leading to the breakdown of the rule of law, disrupted lives and escalates violence and insecurity in urban and rural areas. Bad governance and ethnic politics were also cited as major challenges of regional peace and security. Continued terrorist attacks in Kenya, Somalia, Uganda among other COMESA states was also cited as a major challenge to peace and security in the region. Acts of piracy in the treacherous waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden was cited as major challenges to regional peace and security.

The study also established that lack of capacity of member states to engage in regional peace and security initiatives was also a challenge facing COMESA. The study also established that political instability is major obstacles to deeper integration. The study noted that political strife is a regional curse that frightens investors, inhibits development and stifles economic growth. These conflicts consume resources that could otherwise be channeled into productive activities.

4.4 COMESA contribution to peace and security and member states cooperation

The study sought to establish whether COMESA contributes to peace and security in Member States. To this end, the respondents hailed COMESA for the crucial role the

¹⁵⁶ See Chapter Three P 65

region body was playing in enhancing peace and security amongst the 20 Member States. The respondents paid special tribute to the COMESA Peace and Security which has deliberately brought on board the civil society and private sector organizations on the programmes as they represent an influential voice in the development and implementation of peace and security policies. The respondents added that COMESA has aided in the attainment and preservation of peace and security in the entire region through the reversal of economic decline in the region through cross border trade through which poverty, which is a mitigating factor of conflict is alleviated¹⁵⁷.

According to the respondents COMESA usually holds various consultative forums on conflict in the region that involves various stakeholders to ensure that comprehensive solutions are reached and also ensure that issues affecting peace and security are addressed at grassroots level.

The study also sought to know the various ways COMESA member states cooperate during regional conflicts. The respondents indicated that in case of eruption of conflict member states are engaged in cross-border peace building efforts supported by donors and the international communities¹⁵⁸. The respondents also indicated that there is involvement of individual states in different sub-regional agreements that helps to 'construct bridges' between these sub-regional groupings and form an extensive network of intra-regional agreements and cooperative ties, in a broader sense. Some of the sub-regional organizations take part in conflict prevention and conflict settlement activities in

¹⁵⁷ Maluki, university of Nairobi on 27th June 2013

¹⁵⁸ Colonel Obonyo, a regional security expert, Maluki, university of Nairobi, Dr. Samuel Nyandemo, university of Nairobi, Professor Philip Nyinguro university of Nairobi, Mr. Gerald Mbuthia, integration consultant, Nairobi, Joyce Umetesi, policy expert world bank, Nairobi, Mr. Peter Njeru, ministry of regional cooperation

their regions for example in the COMESA region the respondents noted that IGAD, a sub-regional organization, is tasked and specializes on conflict resolution.

4.5 Threats to peace and security within the COMESA

The following are the threats to peace and security within the COMESA

4.5.1 Internal and external migrations

The study sought to find out the major threats to peace and security within the COMESA region and how the threats affect regional integration. According to key informants interviewed the major threats includes internal and external migrations, these includes refugees and internally displaced persons¹⁵⁹. The study established that the major effect that refugees have on the host country is political impact. The study findings are in line with Loescher who notes that the political and security impacts of refugees tend to be negative on the host states¹⁶⁰. According to Loescher refugees can pose considerable political and security risks for the host governments. They are a political force for their country of residence and the way they react to the politics of host country. Furthermore, their political relationship with their indigenous country, have become important factors in influencing relations between the sending and receiving countries which poses as a serious threat to regional integration. The study further established that the presence of refugees accelerates existing internal conflicts in the host countries. The study as well established that refugee camps are located close to the boundary of the country of origin and as such provides sanctuary to rebel organizations, and a base from which to carry out their operations. The study also found that refugees can serve as

¹⁵⁹ See Chapter Three P 66

¹⁶⁰ Gil Loescher,(1999). A professor at the Refugee Studies Centre at the University of Oxford, stresses:

domestic opposition groups in the host country with material resources and motivation to wage their own armed battles.

Refugees also impact negatively on environment of the host countries. Studies show that the presence of large numbers of refugees has been associated with environmental impacts on land, water, natural resources, and slum growth. For example, in Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya the initial arrival of refugee was accompanied by severe environmental impacts when displaced people moved into and through the boundaries to secure their immediate needs. The study indicated that many cases have shown that refugees can be seen as an environmental threat, and as a consequence, hostility towards them can be generated when they consume significant amounts of natural resources such as water and produce waste. In Dadaab refugee camp for instance, clashes between the refugees and the locals is rampant and as the study established that, these clashes are instigated by competition of local resources such as firewood.

The study further established that refugee camps located in or near conflicts are often vulnerable to armed insecurity threatening, on the one hand, displaced people and host communities and, on the other, humanitarian workers, a good example being Dadaab camp in Wajir County which hosts refugees mainly from Somalia¹⁶¹. The study established such a refugee camp can be targeted by domestic and foreign security forces - and used as 'training grounds' and recruiting bases for non-state actors. The study further established that the state of insecurity in Somalia plays as a catalyst to this and it may be difficult for the Kenyan Authorities to differentiate between genuine refugees and insurgents. The presence of small arms in refugee camps acts as a threat to national security hence a threat to regional security.

¹⁶¹ Maluki P. University of Nairobi interviewed on 28th June 2013.

4.5.2 Piracy and Terrorism

According to key informants interviewed piracy off the coast of the Horn of Africa poses as a major threat to peace and security within the COMESA region and has affected regional integration. The study established that piracy is having an impact beyond the borders of Somalia. Since the beginning of the civil war, the study established that many Somalis have fled to Kenya in order to escape war, hunger and disease¹⁶². The study noted that the border between both countries can be crossed very easily and significant Somali communities live in Kenya's capital and largest harbor, Nairobi and Mombasa, respectively. The study notes that Somali piracy has impacted on local and regional security too. Within Somalia, it has exacerbated the already poor security situation by fuelling internal insurgency within the country.

Further, the study established that piracy has become a threat to the neighbouring countries of Kenya and Ethiopia where the militias have threatened to attack Kenya for their participation in the pirate trials and 'interference in Somali affairs' respectively. They have also threatened the security, fishing industry and tourism of the once peaceful tropical paradises of Mauritius and the Seychelles, and other Indian Ocean islands. In addition, the study notes the recent bomb attacks in Uganda, allegedly for that country's participation in AMISOM have highlighted the regional threats caused by the piracy and terrorism on those bases. The study also established that the Al Shabab, the Somali insurgents, is linked to Al Qaeda which if left unchecked might threaten the whole region thereby further endangering lives. The study further established that piracy has

¹⁶² Colonel Obonyo, a regional security expert.

additionally had a detrimental effect on the delivery of world food aid to the IDPs and other starving Somalis posing a serious threat to human security.

4.5.3 Unbalanced distribution of resources

The study also established that unbalanced distribution of resources such as oil and diamonds which are important commodities on the international market poses a serious security challenge. The study notes that in Africa these resources have been a blessing for some and a curse for others – the latter specifically for the population and the region where these resources are extracted from. These resources are a curse for these regions because they remain in abject poverty, experience poor economic growth and a generally lower standard of living in comparison to other parts of the country that enjoy the bulk of this wealth. This problem can be attributed to poor resource management. The study notes that at the root of most of the violent conflicts in history has been the competition for territory and resources, and specifically seen in Africa this competition is based on the lack of resources to benefit all of the population. Examples of these conflicts can be seen in the resource-rich countries of Congo, Angola, and Sudan all of whom have been affected by civil wars. These countries are rich in natural resources but are often poor, because of government's constant unbalanced exploitation of these resources and this has created "corrupt and repressive government and armed conflict and for many countries these resources keep the economy going and satisfy many human needs.

The study notes that poor resource management has huge implications for peace and security in the region and that the notion of natural resource curse is closely linked to poor resource management as it creates stagnation and conflict, rather than economic

growth and development¹⁶³. The study noted that conflicts will continue to increase as long as there is a huge reliance on resources; the resources remain scarce; the demand for it increases and the challenge that some do not profit from the wealth. Conflicts are evident through clashes between the government, militia groups and other significant actors vying for ownership and control of the resources. Even though groups use conflict as a medium to promote their demands, it has led to more political instability and the increasing loss of lives.

4.5.4 Water scarcity

The study as well established that environmental factors such as pollution, population pressure, land carrying capacity, depletion of fish stocks, and water scarcity among others pose a serious security threat to regional integration in COMESA¹⁶⁴. The study notes that water scarcity, accelerated by climate change, affects water availability and may threaten peace and security. This role of water, as a contributing factor for triggering wars, sheds light on the significance of the protection of water during armed conflict. Keeping water out of war not only contributes to preserving an indispensable natural. The study notes that the causes that may bring on conflict over water include natural and human factors. Among the human causes are the degradation of freshwater resources and the impacts of climate change resource for life but also serves as a tool for the hostile parties to start negotiations, building trust and peace. The study notes that a significant example of this is the impact of climate change on water availability in Sudan. This is in line with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), that climate

¹⁶³ See Chapter Three P 58

¹⁶⁴ See Chapter Three P 54

change has reduced agricultural production owing to a decline in rainfall and this is a contributing factor for the conflict in Darfur¹⁶⁵. Climate change is therefore an issue that fuels the debate over conflicts triggered by water, by accelerating droughts and scarcity of water resources.

4.6 Easing threats to peace and security in COMESA region

The study aimed at establishing measures that can be taken to ease threats to peace and security in COMESA region. The study established that governance in terms of strengthening the political structure, having policies that incorporate economic growth and that are people oriented, adopting a sound political and human right approach and incorporating human security in the national agenda of respective governments in the region will ease threats to peace and security in COMESA region.

The study established that consolidating peace and security and strengthening the democratic process is a key to peace and security challenge in the regional Member States¹⁶⁶. The importance of democracy and good governance should be also noted as the basis of stable and safe societies and for socio-economic development. The study noted that regional home-grown initiatives and efforts to consolidate peace and stability should be supported and strengthened. The study established that over a decade, Eastern Africa, especially the Horn of Africa, has been plagued by civil wars, cross-border conflicts, social strife, and arms trafficking. Lately, piracy in Somalia has added a new dimension to the insecurity problem in the region, posing threats to ships navigating the Indian

¹⁶⁵ See Chapter Three P 56

¹⁶⁶ See Chapter Three P 63

Ocean. The study found out that democracy is the only way to restore normalcy in unstable governments’.

4.7 Failures of COMESA programs on peace and security

The study aimed to know why the various programs e.g. trade, infrastructure development, agriculture, environment & natural resources have not delivered on peace and security in the region. The study established that nature and structure of the various programmes for example agriculture is prone to natural disasters and economic risks which have been prevalent in recent years due to impacts of climate change and global economic context, desertification, droughts and floods¹⁶⁷. Given these situations, agriculture has not fulfilled its core objectives of ensuring food and nutrition security which forms the basic foundation of human security.

The study established that insufficient infrastructure is a major constraint to business activities as it reduces the competitiveness of enterprises through high production and transaction costs¹⁶⁸. While infrastructure is essential for improving the economic activities of the poor, region-wide infrastructure is also needed given the importance of economic integration in COMESA. Transport corridors linking countries and major cities facilitates trade, especially for land-locked countries and as a result contribute towards building peace. The study therefore, established that the various programmes are not people oriented and that in their formation the various programs were not formulated to meet peace and security objectives in the region.

¹⁶⁷ See Chapter Three P 53

¹⁶⁸ See Chapter Three P 58.

4.8 COMESA, SADC, EAC and IGAD to peace and security

The study sought to find out the possible impact of increased co-operation between COMESA and other regional and sub-regional organizations like SADC, EAC and IGAD to peace and security in the region. The study established that increased co-operation between other regional and sub-regional organizations will result to duplicity and overlapping of mandates that will resort to fatigue among member states in terms of contributions¹⁶⁹ to their various membership, intensify the scramble for available resources and the region is already facing an unprecedented crisis of resource depletion, a crisis that encompasses shortages of oil and coal, copper and cobalt, water and arable land.

4.9 Relationship between regional integration and peace and security

The study aimed to establish the relationship between regional integration and peace and security. The study established that regional integration in COMESA ought to add to peace and security. The study established that peace and security is a condition for regional economic integration. This is in line with Yeates, Nicola and Deacon who noted that regional organizations have the capability of fundamentally shifting the dynamics of a region towards peace and security; build bridges of understanding; transform relations from enmity to amity; and bring stability and prosperity where conflict and discord previously reigned¹⁷⁰.

¹⁶⁹ Colonel Obonyo, a regional security expert, Maluki Patrick., university of Nairobi, Samuel Nyandemo, university of Nairobi, Philip Nyinguro university of Nairobi,. Gerald Mbutia, integration consultant, Nairobi, Joyce Umetesi, policy expert world bank, Nairobi, Mr. Peter Njeru, ministry of regional cooperation

¹⁷⁰ Yeates, Nicola and Bob Deacon (2006). "Globalism, Regionalism and Social Policy: Framing the Debate", UNU CRIS *Occasional Paper*

The European Union is a perfect model for regional integration as it has long been the most developed model of regional integration in terms of peace, security and stability. Compared to most other regions of the world, the EU is a haven of peace, prosperity, and security¹⁷¹. The nature of the interstate relations in EU, tend to overlook the need for cooperation in bringing regional peace and security which ultimately also serve the national interests of the individual countries.

The underlying idea of the establishment of ASEAN was basically the notion of power politics and their conception of security. As the Bangkok Declaration 1967 clearly shows, security concerns driving the five founding countries to establish ASEAN emerged from their perceived threats coming from both security environments, i.e. from within and outside the region. Most of them were newly independent countries. They were very concerned with their sovereignty and political independence, which they saw as being threatened by super powers' competition coming from every corner of the world, including Southeast Asia, as their competition field and by hostile relations with their own neighbouring countries. Those two security environments led those countries to see other countries as the source of threats to their security or, more precisely, their existence as independent states. ASEAN is a strategic and collective response of those countries, united by shared non-communist ideological orientation.

The adoption of Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in the 1970s was a further indication of the dominance of the traditional conception of security among ASEAN member countries¹⁷². Both

¹⁷¹ See Chapter Two P 24

¹⁷² See Chapter Two P 23

ZOPFAN and TAC were intended to eliminate such external potential threats by fencing ASEAN from external interference. ZOPFAN was basically a demand especially directed to the powerful extra-regional powers (US, China and Soviet Union) to leave Southeast Asian countries alone, while TAC was designed more broadly in the sense that ASEAN countries demand that all states, both intra- and extra-regional, hold the principles of non-interference and respect for state sovereignty in their relations with them. In both cases, the state was clearly the main reference of security.

According to Buzan¹⁷³ ASEAN made some changes or, more appropriately, modifications in its strategy for peace and security in the region following the end of Cold War which, for many, was seen as signifying the dramatic change in the discourse of security¹⁷⁴. In line with Liberal's prescription, ASEAN adopted more cooperative rather than confrontational approach to security. Buzan notes that as ASEAN begun changing its conception of peace and security from negative to more positive. Instead of framing security in terms of 'secure from', it began to define security in terms of 'secure with'.

¹⁷³ Buzan, Barry, (1991). *People, States and Fear*. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd ed., Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner.

¹⁷⁴ IBID.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents summary of the findings, conclusions based on the findings and recommendations there-to on peace and security in regional integration in Africa: a case study of COMESA. The chapter also presents recommendations for further studies.

5.2 Summary of Findings

The study aimed to assess peace and security in regional integration in Africa: a case study of COMESA. The study established that nature and structure of the various programmes for example agriculture is prone to natural disasters and economic risks which have been prevalent in recent years due to impacts of climate change and global economic context, desertification, droughts and floods. The study established that regional integration in COMESA ought to add to peace and security. The study found that peace and security is a condition for regional economic integration. The study also established that increased co-operation between other regional and sub-regional organizations will result to duplicity and overlapping of mandates that will resort to fatigue among member states in terms of contributions to their various membership, intensify the scramble for available resources and the region is already facing an unprecedented crisis of resource depletion, a crisis that encompasses shortages of oil and coal, copper and cobalt, water and arable land.

5.3 Discussion of the findings

5.3.1 Relationship between peace and security and regional integration

The ultimate goal of regional integration is to merge some or all aspects of the economies concerned. This usually evolves from simple cooperation and coordination of mutually agreed aspects amongst a given number of countries to full integration or merger of the economies in question.¹⁷⁵

The history of regional integration in Africa shows that the reasons or objectives for integrating have been evolving over time. These have shifted from the initial focus on the political decolonization of Africa to the current emphasis on socio-economic integration in the post-independence era for stronger bargaining base in global forum and for mutual benefit in the form of accelerated growth and development.¹⁷⁶ The study found that the European post-war history and the initial phases of European integration are thereby explicitly or implicitly presented as a demonstration of the validity of the assumption. The contribution of cooperation in functional areas to regional peace was even elevated to the status by functionalist theory. It is often assumed that this experience is replicable in other parts of the world. This simply presents a few considerations on these linkages with the only purpose to help to clarify these linkages, both conceptually and empirically.

The study conceptually found that the distinction between 'traditional' security and human security, including food security, economic security, political security, cultural security among others should obviously be made. The study found that the

¹⁷⁵ Kamidza, R., Mbugua, K. & Pillay, V. (2005). African Peacekeeping Missions. *Conflict Trends*, Vol 4.

¹⁷⁶ Katzenellenbogen, J. (2005). Guardians of peace: Pretoria's burden. *Focus*, Issue 38.

distinction between the former and the latter is difficult to understand for the common man due to lack of knowledge.

The study further found out that when the regional integration “deepens” and becomes multidimensional (covering different policy areas: economic, political, infrastructure, etc.), this permits bargaining between the different countries involved, which might also reduce the probability of conflict.

The study too found that in a number of integration initiatives, regional security appears as a policy objective of regional economic integration, not just an “outcome”. Examples include: European Coal and Steel Community 1951 (ECSC), European Economic Community 1957 (EEC), ASEAN (1967), MERCOSUR (1991). This raises questions about interconnection between peace and security and regional integration: is it regional integration that adds to peace and security or the vice versa?

5.3.2 The nature of peace and security in COMESA

The study found that regional integration in COMESA ought to add to peace and security and that peace and security is a key ingredient for successful regional economic integration. The study further found that the existence of linkages between regional economic integration and peace and security is accepted by many scholars and is an assumption behind many contemporary discourses in favour of deeper cooperation and integration at the regional level in order to avoid or end bilateral, regional and even domestic conflicts.

5.3.3 Opportunities and challenges of regional integration in COMESA

On the main opportunities for regional integration, the study found that regional integration offers the opportunity to broaden national markets, production scales and to promote trade in services and intraregional investments. The study also found that regional integration provides an opportunity in developing an integrated energy system by fully exploiting the diversity of energy resources within the region. Further, the study found that regional integration enables countries to better protect and exploit their shared wealth in natural resources. The study as well found that insecurity and political instability are major obstacles to deeper integration. The study too found out that agriculture contributes towards creating employment, increasing incomes, improving standards of living, and reducing poverty and hunger which impacts on human security.

On infrastructure the study found out that it is a necessary condition for trade and regional overall economic and social development thereby a necessary condition for peace and security. On water resources and water scarcity in the COMESA region the study found out that it is a potential seed of future conflict as is the single biggest threat to global food security. Further the study found that climate change increasingly undermines human security. The study too found out that that failing to sustainably manage natural resources in one country raises the risk of conflict in neighbouring countries. Finally the study found that uneven policy regulatory and institutional readiness hinders intra-regional investment prospects.

The study recognizes that peace and security is the foundation in building a socially and economically strong regional grouping and that peace is a pre-requisite to sustained economic development. The study established that the objective of COMESA

peace and security programme is to work with Member States to develop effective regional mechanisms for conflict prevention; to anticipate and prevent the emergence of conflicts; to resolve ongoing conflicts and post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization.

The study also established that COMESA is also addressing relatively new conflict-related to global challenges such as terrorism, piracy and the effects of climate change by developing strategies for the sub-region and forging strategic partnerships.

The study further found out that in addressing issues of peace and security, COMESA has put in place a structure that includes COMESA Ministers of Foreign Affairs as an exclusive policy organ, COMESA Parliamentarians, a Committee of Elders, civil society organizations and private sector and has constituted programmes in the areas of conflict prevention, conflict resolution, as well as post conflict reconstruction.

According to the study, trade reduces the probability of conflict between countries but the interconnection is limited. In addition, democracy (probably related to economic freedom) has an independent positive effect on trade and the probability of conflict. Nevertheless, it is also true that trade issues can lead to conflict and that trade instruments can be used for political purposes.

5.4 Conclusion

The study notes that much has been done already to raise awareness on the indispensability and viability of African sub regional and regional integration in the face of these risks of marginalization and the loss of opportunities offered by globalization. The study also notes that the globalization process is increasingly being realized from a regionalized African platform to enhance the bargaining power of countries or their regional groupings.

The study concludes that the benefits of regional integration are economic growth, peace and security among others all through collaboration and interdependence and enhancing stronger bargaining bloc in international arena. The study also concludes that “regionalization” is a viable alternative strategy or instrument in facilitating and promoting and in the long run attaining sustainable global peace and security via the collective existence and emergence of regional peace and security in different parts and sub-regions of the world not necessarily in absolute terms but in relative terms.

5.4.1 Regional integration and peace and security

On whether regional integration processes adds to peace and security around the world, the study concludes that the experience of the European Union (EU) is a recurrent point of reference because of its long history, broad scope, further deepening and successive enlargements. The study concludes that the European Union is often viewed as the epitome of regional integration as it has experienced peace and security for over 50 years now. EU in itself is a peace project and a supremely successful. It has underpinned the reconciliation and peaceful development of Western Europe over the last half century, helping to consolidate democracy and to assure prosperity. Indeed, the European regional integration experience primarily developed under the auspices of creating a European space characterized by sustainable peace and security which is somewhat a unique experience in the world.

5.4.2 Specific programmes of COMESA and peace and security

The study further concludes that the specific programmes of COMESA should reflect peace and security concerns in there formulation since these issues remain key and fundamental to the integration agenda. Many observers have noted that developing

countries have had a tendency to engage in deeper regional integration which does not address interests in terms of peace and security for the common man. The 'fallacy of transposition' of the European experience, which does not fit developing countries, has dominated the institutional and policy development programmes of many regions including COMESA.

In conclusion the study notes that in spite of the existence of organs of the common market, that has the Authority; the Council; the Court of Justice; the Committee of Governors of Central Banks; the Intergovernmental Committee; the Technical Committees; the Secretariat; and the Consultative Committee., COMESA integration efforts have had limited impact so far, more so in area of peace, conflict resolution and security. The study notes that the reality on the ground does not match with the ideals of aims and objectives the degree of integration remains highly superficial. Thus results have been below expectations.

5.5 Recommendations

The study makes the following recommendations:-

5.5.1 Recommendation for Further Studies

The study established that the various programmes within the regional organization influences peace and security to a great extent. To augment this study, it is recommends that another study be conducted to establish why the various programmes have not achieved their original laid objectives as per the COMESA treaty.

5.5.2 Policy recommendations

The study recommends that individual member states should adapt a peace curriculum aimed at building a culture of peace in the region through learning. This Peace Education may take place in formal, non-formal and informal settings. Formal peace education should cover the knowledge, skills and training obtained in primary, secondary and tertiary institutions such as schools, colleges and universities. While non-formal education is of a short-term duration; it is geared towards the upgrading of skills and introducing new knowledge, informal peace education will be learning or training, for anyone in a structured or unstructured setting. The study recommends the following learning approaches as proposed by Bodine and Crawford¹⁷⁷.

- i. The first approach is the process curriculum approach. This involves designing of a distinct curriculum on the principles and skills of non-violence, and teaching the contents as a separate course to be taken by students, in addition to their existing courses. In this context, learning takes place by way of structured activities such as simulations, role plays, group discussions and cooperative learning activities.
- ii. The second approach is the mediation programme approach. In this case, a number of students are trained within a school setting to provide neutral third-party facilitation services to their peers. Some people refer to this as a peer mediation system. The disadvantage of this second approach compared to the first is that it involves just a few people in the school. The advantage, however, is that the

¹⁷⁷ Bodine, Richard J. and Crawford, Donna K. (1998). *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution Education: A Guide to Building Quality Programs in Schools*, San Francisco: National Institute for Dispute Resolution, p. 61.

knowledge imparted on the selected few is so deep that the beneficiaries can continue to serve as mediators in any society.

- iii. The third approach is known as the peaceable classroom approach. In this approach, conflict resolution principles and skills are infused into multiple subject areas, such as social studies, language arts, history, mathematics and science – usually the higher classes in primary and secondary schools.
- iv. The fourth approach is the peaceable school approach. This builds on the peaceable classroom approach by allowing the entire school to benefit from the teaching of peace principles and skills.

However, there lack application of the knowledge and skills that is imparted from the institutions of higher learning on peace, security, regional integration and human security. Therefore, this study recommends creation of environments where policy experts and peace scholars can freely engage in peace processes applying their knowledge, skills and expertise to ensure a more secure region.

The current policies in COMESA have prioritized territorial security at the expense of human security. Therefore, the study recommends a reform of the policies to give preference to human security in a bid to improve the human safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression and or, the protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life. Therefore, COMESA policies should be aimed at ensuring economic security; food security; health security; environmental security; personal security; community security; and political security in the region and in individual Member States.

The study further recommends formation of a regional watchdog body in charge of both 'traditional' security and human security. The body should be composed of policy experts who will be charged with responsibility of formulation, implementation and evaluation of policies that are directly applicable in the regional context. This move will eradicate the 'fallacy of transposition' of the European experience which lack general applicability. This body should be strengthened and empowered in order to implement and monitor regional integration programmes at the regional and country levels. Further, this body should be independent of all national authorities' influences. It should have a mandate that is well anchored on the agreed key objectives especially on peace, security and stability, with sufficient authority to enforce (and possibly supervise) compliance by all members for the attainment of the shared objectives.

The study also recommends that the various programs in COMESA should be reformulated to include peace and security aspect as a main objective. These programs should therefore include aspects of skills, knowledge, technological and expertise transfer among the member states. For instance, there should be trading for peace programs, agricultural fairs among others. Such programs should include prior informed analysis and internal consultations, including bringing civil society and the private sector on board much earlier, to precede integration programmes of trade, agriculture, infrastructure to enhance ownership that motivates full implementation reducing risks of both human and territorial security in order to identify challenges and needs in the region and thereby formulation of appropriate policies for redress.

Finally, the study recommends the strengthening of governance institutions of individual member states to create political consensus to facilitate achievement of the

regional peace and security goals. The governance institutions in the COMESA member states should focus on conflict prevention and conflict resolution. There should be further security sector reforms to ensure stronger borders, holding security personnel accountable for any incidence while motivating them as a means to eradicating corruption in all border points. Reforms must try to reduce illegal arms importation by addressing the sources of supply and demand points.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

- Abass, Ademola (2010). *African peace and security architecture and protection of human security*. In: Abass, A. ed. *Protecting human security in Africa*. New York, Oxford University Press. pp. 247–283.
- Abiodun Alao, (2007). *Natural resources and conflict in Africa: the tragedy of endowment*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Acharya, Amitav. (2001). *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (London: Routledge).
- Adetula, Victor (2008). *The role of sub-regional integration schemes in conflict prevention & management in Africa: A framework for a working peace system*. In: Nhema, A. and P.T. Zeleza eds. *The resolution of African conflicts: The management of conflict resolution & post-conflict reconstruction*. Oxford, James Currey. pp. 9–21.
- Ahmad, Zakaria Haji and Baladas Ghoshal. (1999). “*The Political Future of ASEAN after the Asian Crisis*,” *International Affairs*, Vol. 75, No.4, pp. 759-778.
- Block, N., (1996) ‘*What is functionalism?* A revised version of the entry on functionalism,’ in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement*, Macmillan, pp. 400-402.
- Bodine, Richard J. and Crawford, Donna K. (1998). *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution Education: A Guide to Building Quality Programs in Schools*, San Francisco: National Institute for Dispute Resolution, p. 61.

- Bull, H. (2002). *The Anarchical Society: a study of order in world politics*. New York: Columbia Univeristy Press.
- Buzan, B. (2003). *Regional Security Complex Theory in the Post-Cold War World*. In Soldierbaum, F. and Shaw, T.M., (eds). *Theories of new regionalism*. Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke.
- Buzan, Barry, (1991). *People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd ed., Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner.
- CHS (Commission on Human Security) (2003): *Human Security Now: Protecting and Empowering People*, New York; online: <http://www.humansecuritychs.org>.
- Colette Braeckman, (1994). *Rwanda: Histoire d'un Génocide* (Paris: Fayard)
- Collier, Paul, (2003). *Natural Resources, Development And Conflict: Channels Of Causation And Policy Interventions*, World Bank, Washington DC.
- Cooper, D.R. & Schindler, P.S. (2000). *Business Research Methods*: New York, McGraw Hill.
- David Bach, (2005). *The Global Politics of Regionalism: Africa*, in: Mary Farrell, et.al.(eds.), *Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice*, London: Pluto Press: 171-186.
- Farrell, Mary; Bjorn Hettne and Luk Van Langenhove (Eds.) (2005) *Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice*, London: Pluto Press.
- Fawcett, H. (1995) *Regionalism in World Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Frieden, Jeffrey A. & Lake, David A. (2000), *International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Wealth*

- Haas, Ernst B. (1958): *The Uniting for Europe, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957*, Stanford University Press.
- Hansohm, D. et al., (2000). *Monitoring Regional Integration*. Yearbook Vol. 2, Windhoek: Gamsberg.
- Harrison (1974:14) in Rosamond, Ben (2000), *Theories of European Integration*. Houndmills: Palgrave, p. 12.
- Hettne, B. (2005) *Beyond the new regionalism*. *New Political Economy*, 10(4), pp. 543-571. Imobighe,
- Imobighe, T.A. (2003). *The OAU (AU) and OAS in regional conflict management: A comparative assessment*. Ibadan, Spectrum Books.
- ISS-UNESCO (2001). *Peace, human security and conflict prevention in Africa*. Pretoria: International Institute of Security Studies, 23-23.
- Jenkins, K., (2000). *Regionalism in world politics*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Karamgizi, S, (2001) *Sub-regional Agenda for Peace and Security: The Case of COMESA*; 'in' Cilliers, J. (eds.) *Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention in Africa* (proceedings of the UNESCO-ISS Expert Meeting, Pretoria South Africa, Pp. 23-24
- Katsuyoshi Fukui and John Markakis (1994). *Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa* (London: James Currey).

- Keith Gottschalk (2004). "The African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development: Strong Institutions for Weak States? in: *International Politics and Society* 4: 138-158
- L. Jeremy and S. Kathryn, Scarcity and Surfeit, (2002). *The ecology of Africa's conflicts*, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa,
- Lake, D. and P, Morgan. (1997) *Introduction. In, D. Lake and P. Morgan eds. Regional orders; Building Security in a new world*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 3-19.
- Lawrukwa, W., Mjema, G. & Rutasitara, R., *Regional Integration Study of East African Community*, EAC Secretariat, 2002, pp. 32.
- Lee, M. (2001). *SADC and the free trade area in South Africa*. In Maloka, E. and Eddy E.L (Eds) *Africa in the New Millennium; Challenges and Prospects*, African Institute of South Africa, Pretoria.
- Linda Melvern, (2000). *A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide* (London: Zed Books, pp. 222–223.
- Makumi Mwangi, *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management* (Nairobi: Watermark Press, 2000).
- Manboah-Rockson, J.K. (2003) *Regional and Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Review of Experiences, Issues and Realities at the Close of the Twentieth Century*. University of Cape Town, SA
- Manboah-Rockson, J.K. (2003) *Regional and Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Review of Experiences, Issues and Realities at the Close of the Twentieth Century*. University of Cape Town, SA

- Marshall, M. G. / T. R. Gurr (2005): *Peace and Conflict 2005: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy*. University of Maryland, Baltimore: Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM)
- Matshenyego, F., Bah, S., Mniema, A., Nguema, H., Tamba, M., Frederiksen, J., Abelaziz, A., Reeve, R. (2010). *African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)*. 2010 Assessment Study Report. Addis Ababa: African Union's Peace and Security Department.
- Motsi, I. 2005. *Saving face above saving lives: the African Union's betrayal of the civilian population in Sudan*. University of Pretoria, CIPS, Paper 32/2006.
- Mugenda, O. M. and Mugenda, A. G. (2003). *Research Methods: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches*. Nairobi: Acts.
- Nana, K.P. (2007) Globalization, Development, Security; In Collins; *Contemporary Security Studies*. Oxford, Pp.257-271.
- Nguema, H., Tamba, M., Frederiksen, J., Abelaziz, A., Reeve, R. (2010). *African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)*. 2010 Assessment Study Report. Addis Ababa
- Okoth, P. Godfrey (2008). *Conflict resolution in Africa: The role of the OAU & AU*. In: Nhema, A. and P.T. Zeleza eds. *The resolution of African conflicts: The management of conflict resolution & post-conflict reconstruction*. Oxford, James Currey. pp. 22–37.
- Peter P. Waller, (1999). *Demokratische Renaissance in Afrika?*, in: *Internationale Politik*, 8: 49–54

Powell, K. (2005). *The African Union's Emerging Peace and Security Regime*. ISS Monograph Series 119 of May 2005.

Rosamond, B. (2000). *Theories of European integration*, St. Martins. Press, New York.

Sharamo, R., & Mesfin, B. E. (2011). *Regional Security in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa*. Pretoria: ISS.

Van Nieuwkerk, Anthoni (2004). *The role of the AU and NEPAD in Africa's new security regime*. In: Field, S. ed. *Peace in Africa: Towards a collaborative security regime*. Johannesburg, Institute for Global Dialogue. pp. 41–62.

Wachira, G. (2003) *Linking Peace, Security and Regional Integration in Africa*. Report on the UNU-CRIS – Africa Centre, University of Bradford international conference at the University of Bradford, U.K. 2 June 2003. University of Bradford Press.

Waever, Ole, (2004). 'Peace and Security: Two Concepts and their Relationship' in Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung (eds.) *Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research*, London and New York, Routledge, , pp. 6.

World Bank (2005b): *Voices of the Poor*, Washington, DC; online:

<http://www.worldbank.org>

JOURNALS

Adebajo, Adekeye and Chris Landsberg (2003). South Africa and Nigeria as regional hegemons. In: Baregu and Landsberg 2003, pp. 171–204.

African Development Bank (2006) and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) – *Infrastructure Development and Regional Integration: Problems,*

- Opportunities and Challenges, High-Level Seminar, Annual Meetings, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, 2006.*
- Ajulu, C., Othieno, T. & Samasuwo, N. (2006). Sudan: The state of transition, prospects and challenges. *Global Insight*, Vol 56,
- Barbieri, K. (1996). Economic interdependence: A path to peace or a source of interstate conflict? *Journal of Peace Research* 33(1): 29–49
- Frederiksen, J., Abelaziz, A., Reeve, R. (2010). African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). *2010 Assessment Study Report*. Addis Ababa: African Union’s Peace and Security Department.
- Gagnon, V. P., (1994). ‘Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia’, in *International Security*, 19, no. 3, pp. 130-166
- Gakwandi, A. S., ‘Towards a New Political Map of Africa’, in Abdul Raheem, T. (ed), *Pan-Africanism: Politics, Economy and Social Change in the Twenty-First Century*, London, Pluto Press, 1996, pp. 12.
- Harbom, L., & Wallensteen, P., ‘Armed Conflict and Its International Dimensions, 1946-2004’, in *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 42(5), 2005, pp. 623-635.
- Johnson G.E. Omotunde, (1991). Economic Integration in Africa: Enhancing prospects for success, *the Journal of modern African studies*, vol. 29, No. 1, 1
- Molukanele, T., Ridd, G. & Abdellaiou, J. (2004). United Nations Peacekeeping Missions. *Conflict Trends*, Vol 2.
- Onditi O Francis (2010), ‘Development or Security? *The Dilemma of Policy Prioritisation, Institutional Coordination, and Sequencing of Integration in East African Community*

Samkange, S. 2002. African Perspective on Intervention and State Sovereignty. *African Security Review*, Vol 11(1).

OTHER SOURCES

Ashok Swain (2004). Managing water conflict, Asia, Africa and Middle East p.93;

Bach, D (2003) New regionalism as an alias; regionalization through trans-state networks; In Grant, A and F, Soderbaum (eds). *The new regionalism in Africa*. Burlington: Ashgate, p. 21-30

Barnett, J. (2003). *Security and climate change*. *Global Environmental Change*, 13, 7e17.

Boin, Arjen and Mark Rhinard (2008), "Managing Transboundary Crisis: What Role for the European Union", *International Studies Review*, Vol. 10 (1), pp. 1-26

Dinka, T., & Walter, K., 'Africa's Regional Integration Arrangements: History and Challenges', in *Discussion Paper No. 74*, European Centre for Development Policy Management, 2007.

EAC Secretariat, (2012). '*EAC Partner States Urged to Take Full Responsibility for Peace and Security matters as Conference Ends in Kampala*'.

Eastern Africa Regional Integration Strategy Paper 2011 – 2015

El-Affendi, A., 'The Impasse in the IGAD Peace Process for Sudan: *The limits of regional peace making*' in *African Affairs*, vol. 100, 2001, pp.581-99.

Emanuel, A. (1994), Imagined (security) communities; *Paper presented at 1994*. Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, pp.1-4.

Eustace, A., and M. Fay. (2007). "Current debates on infrastructure policy. "*World Bank Policy Research Working paper 4410*, November

- FANRPAN (2011). Food Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network 13 August. Final Report
- Felicio, T., (2005) 'Managing Security as a Regional Public Good A Regional-Global Mechanism for Security', in *UNU-CRIS Occasional Papers*, No. 48.
- Gartzke, E., Q. Li and C. Boehmer, (2001). *Investing in the peace: Economic interdependence and international conflict. International Organization* 55(2): 391–438.
- Gil Loescher, (2001) A professor at the Refugee Studies Centre at the University of Oxford, stresses:
- Jackson, Richard (2000). The dangers of regionalizing international conflict management: The African experience. *Political Science*, 52 (1), pp. 41–60.
- Kevin Watkins (2006). Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis, *Human Development Report* 135–36
- Malan, Mark (1999). The OAU and African subregional organizations: A closer look at the 'peace pyramid'. *Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper* 36, Jan
- Mohamed Abdel Aty Sayed (2008). Eastern Nile Planning Model, Integration with IDEN Projects To Deal with Climate Change Uncertainty and Flooding Risk, 1 NILE BASIN WATER ENG'G SCI. MAG. 86, 86
- Møller, Bjørn (2005). The pros and cons of subsidiarity: The role of African regional and sub-regional organizations in ensuring peace and security in Africa. In: Hammerstad, A. ed. 2005, pp. 23–82.
- Mwanasali, Musifiky (2003). From the Organization of the African Unity to the African Union. In: Baregu and Landsberg 2003, pp. 205–224.

Niveen Tadros, (1996–1997). Shrinking Water Resources: The National Security Issue of this Century, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 1091, 1092

Organisation of African Unity (1972). Assembly of African Heads of State and Government. Ninth ordinary session. Rabat, 12–15 June.

Organisation of African Unity (1993). Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the establishment within the OAU of a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution. AHG/DECL.3 (XXIX). Cairo, 28–30 June.

Ramesh, C., & Van Langenhove, L (2005), 'Inter-Regionalism and the Future of Multilateralism', in a paper presented at the 5th Pan-European IR Conference of the Standard Group of International Relations.

Richard F. (1997). *State of Siege: Will Globalization Win out?* International Affairs, pp. 316-24.

Russell Smith, (1999). Africa's Potential Water Wars, BBC NEWS, Nov. 15, , <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/454926.stm>.

T.A. (2003). The OAU (AU) and OAS in regional conflict management: A comparative assessment. Ibadan, Spectrum Books.

The Preferential Trade Area (PTA) for Eastern and Southern Africa: Achievements, problems and prospects, African spectrum, vol. 24, No. 2(1989), 160-161.

Thomas, C. (2001): Global Governance, Development and Human Security: Exploring the Links, in: *Third World Quarterly* 22 (2), 159–79

- Tschirgi, N. (2003): Peace building as the Link between Security and Development: Is the Window of Opportunity Closing?, New York: International Peace Academy (IPA Policy Paper).*
- UN (United Nations) (1992): An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, UN Doc A/47/277-S/2411, New York; online: [http:// www. un.org](http://www.un.org)*
- UN (United Nations) (1994): An Agenda for Development: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/48/935, New York; online: <http://www.un.org>*
- UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (1994): Human Development Report 1994: New dimensions of human security, New York: Oxford University Press; online: <http://hdr.undp.org>*
- UNDP. (2012). Human Development Report 2011: Sustainability and Equity: A Better Future for All. New*
- United Nations, (2004). Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, New York, United Nations,*
- United Nations. (2008). Report of the Secretary-General on the relationship between the United Nations and regional organisations, in particular the African Union, in the maintenance of international peace and security, S/2008/186, 7 April.*
- Williamson, C.A. (2006). Justice empowered or justice hampered: The International Criminal Court in Darfur. African Security Review, Vol 15(1).*

World Bank, (1994). Accelerated Development and UN Committee for Program and Co-ordination, proposed Revision to the System –*Wide Plan of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development, Thirty-Fourth Session. E/AC. 51/7, 7.*

World Bank, (2009). ‘Framework Document for a Global Agriculture and Food Security Program’. World Bank

Yeates, Nicola and Bob Deacon (2006) “Globalism, Regionalism and Social Policy: Framing the Debate”, UNU CRIS Occasional Paper 0-2006/6.

INTERVIEWS

Colonel Obonyo, a regional security expert, Nairobi

Dr. Alex Muturi, regional health expert, Nairobi

Dr. Celia Wanda, regional health expert, Nairobi

Dr. Samuel Nyandemo, university of Nairobi, Kenya

Gerald Mbuthia, integration consultant, Nairobi

Gidraf Mbuthia, regional businessman, Nairobi

Joyce Umetesi, policy expert world bank, Nairobi

Maluki Patrick, university of Nairobi, Kenya

Peter Njeru, ministry of regional cooperation, Kenya

Professor Philip Nyinguro university of Nairobi, Kenya

APPENDICES

Introduction Letter

Josephine Kokunula Kariuki

R50/68329/2011

Nairobi University,

P.O Box 30195,

Nairobi.

Date 25/07/2013

Dear Sir/Madam/,

RE: PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH

I am a student pursuing a degree of **Master of Arts in international conflict management** and conducting a research on **“PEACE AND SECURITY IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF COMESA”**. Kindly spare some of your time to complete the questionnaire attached herein. The data collected will be used for academic research only. The information you give will be handled with utmost confidentiality. Your participation is important for the success of this project and I greatly appreciate your contribution.

Yours faithfully,

Josephine Kokunula.

	1	2	3	4	5
Political instability					
Agriculture					
Trade					
Natural resources					
Globalization					
Infrastructure development					
Regional Financial Institutions					
Climate change					
Other sub-regional bodies e.g. EAC, IGAD,SADC					

Section C

8. What are the main opportunities for regional integration?

.....

9. On a scale of 1-5; where 5= strongly agree, 4= agree, 3 =moderate, 2= disagree, 1= strongly disagree what is your level of agreement with the following statements (please tick appropriately)

	1	2	3	4	5
Infrastructure is a necessary condition for trade and regional overall economic and social development					
Water resources and water scarcity in COMESA regions is a potential seed of future conflict.					
Regional integration provides a wider and bigger market that offers possibilities of diversification					

in production, processing, and marketing for members.					
Weak institutions and human capacity limit COMESA effectiveness					
Insecurity and political instability are major obstacles to deeper integration					
Peace, security and stability are basic factors in providing investment, development, trade and regional economic integration.					
Uneven policy, regulatory and institutional readiness hinders intra-regional investment prospects					
Climate change increasingly undermines human security					
Failing to sustainably manage natural resources in one country raises the risk of conflict in neighbouring countries					
Agriculture contributes towards creating employment, increasing incomes, improving standards of living, and reducing poverty and hunger					
Agriculture is among the least funded sectors in COMESA member states					
Peace and security must be supported by a sound and robust infrastructure					

10. What are the main Challenges Affecting Regional Integration, Peace and Security in COMESA?

.....
.....
.....

11. In what ways do COMESA member states cooperate during regional conflicts?

.....
.....
.....
.....

12. Has COMESA contributed to peace and security in your country? Please explain

Thank you for your time and participation

Interview Guide

1. What are the major threats to peace and security within the COMESA region and how have these threats affected regional integration? Explain.
2. What measures can be taken to ease threats to peace and security in COMESA region. Explain.
3. Why have the various programs e.g. trade, infrastructure development, Agriculture, Environment & Natural Resources not delivered on peace and security in the region? Explain.
4. What is the possible impact of increased co-operation between COMESA and other regional and sub-regional organizations like SADC, EAC and IGAD to peace and security in the region?
5. Does regional integration add to peace and security?