

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

MASTERS OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

MANAGEMENT

SOCIO- ECONOMIC FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE EXTREME RADICALIZATION IN EAST AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF NAIROBI, KENYA

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
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DECLARATION

I declare that this research project is my own original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.


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Date 3rd November, 2015

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This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor.

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date 3rd November, 2015.

Dr. MARTIN OUMA

DEDICATION

This study is dedicated to my dear parents, my late father Mr. Paul Omongo, my mother Silpa Omongo, wife Winnie and daughter Renata for believing in the power of education and accorded me moral support.

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ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS

ATPU	-Anti- Terrorism Police Unit
CID	- Criminal Investigations Department
CSO's	- Civil Society Organizations
GDP	- Gross Domestic Product
GWOT	- Global War on Terror
HUMINT	-Human Intelligence
LRA	- Lord's Resistance Army
MDG's	- Millennium Development Goals
MRC	- Mombasa Republic Council
MYC	- Muslim Youth Center
NGO's	- Non- Governmental Organization
NIS	- National Intelligence Service
SUPKEM	- Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims
UK	- United Kingdom
UN	- United Nations
UNHCR	- United Nations High Commission for Refugees
US	- United States
VEO's	- Violent Extremist Organizations
WOT	- War On Terror

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ABSTRACT

Terrorism is a global phenomenon brought about by myriad factors which differ from continent to continent and country to country. Due to emerging networks of terrorists using advanced technology, they find their ways into the African Continent, thereafter spreading their wings to Kenya through Somalia. The study investigated the socio economic factors that influence extreme radicalization in Kenya, a case study of Nairobi. It found out that, the most susceptible groups to radicalization were youths aged between ten (10) and twenty five (25) years. It further established that economic deprivation such as lack of employment, marginalization and exclusion of natural resources was a major factor to radicalization. There is no overarching theory to theorize counter- radicalization, but this study used the relative deprivation theory to explain the nexus between the economic deprivation and the radicalization aspects. Through qualitative research and analysis of data from various academic scholars, journals, publications and other academic works, the study investigated the strategies and approaches used by the Kenyan government in countering radicalization and their implication to the youths. The study explored counter-radicalization and de-radicalization strategies in order to device ways of preventing violent and radical extremists from luring youths into radicalization. The analysis of the study found out that, the strategy was not being utilized to contain the vice especially in Kenya. The study further explored radicalization in Eastleigh Estate in Nairobi, Kenya bearing in mind that, Nairobi has high population of Kenyan Somalis who are harboured as refugees and registered by United National High commission for Refugees (UNHCR) as urban refugees. The study also examined, the roles played by other institution and stakeholders in counter- radicalization and de-radicalization. These institutions include Police, Judiciary, Intelligence agency and Religious leaders. Lastly, the study utilized relative deprivation as a theory used in arriving at the above findings. The study recommends that collective response needs to be enhanced to combat both domestic and international radicalization of susceptible youths into terrorism, as the government invest more on under-cover intelligence led means to detect and deter violent extremists to actualize their activities.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

1.0 Introduction

Radical organizations have been actively recruiting the youth in different parts of Africa and the world. These organizations understand and prey upon a combination of political realities, socio-economic factors and individual characteristics that render youth vulnerable to recruitment through push and pull factors.¹ Although violent extremists adhere to diverse ideologies, the strategies that they employ to enlist youth into their ranks are often similar. Despite the scientific attention to define radicalization, its causes and consequences, scholars have not yet developed a universally accepted definition of the concept. Nevertheless, faced with pressure to tackle radicalization, policy makers and security agencies in different countries have developed working definitions.²

In an attempt to define radicalization, Wilner and Dubouloz came up with a definition centred around violent radicalization with emphasis on the active pursuit or acceptance of the use of violence to attain the stated goal. They define radicalization as: A personal process in which individuals adopt extreme political, social and religious ideals and aspirations where the attainment of particular goals justifies the use of indiscriminate violence. It is both a mental and emotional process that prepares and motivates an individual to pursue violent behaviour.³ This chapter seeks to introduce the study through the main objective of socio-economic factors influencing the youth into extreme radicalization. It comprises of the background of the study, statement of the problem, objectives, research questions,

¹The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), "Preventing Youth Radicalization in East Africa" Work Shop in Kigali, Rwanda 22-27 Jan 2012, Program Report, 7-12:8

² Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman, *Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process* (Washington, DC: Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2009)

³ Wilner and Dubouloz (2010) *Homegrown Terrorism and Transformative Learning: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding radicalization* Alex S. Wilner and Claire-Jehanne Dubouloz aCentre for Security Studies, ETH-Zurich (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology)

justification of the study, literature review, summary of literature gap, theoretical model, operationalization of key concepts and terms as well as methodology of the study. Out of this structure, the study seeks to examine the social and economic factors that led the youth to enrol in extreme radical groups as the case of terrorism in Nairobi, Kenya.

1.1 Background of the Study

Globally, radicalization into extremist groups has been characterised by extreme violence based on various ideologies including nationalism, anarchism, separatism and extreme left-wing or right-wing political ideas. Even though the vast majority of the world population pursue peaceful co-existence and tolerance irrespective of their place of origin or persuasion, the world is faced with a threat of extreme violence that is preceded by radicalization processes. The history of radicalization into violence or radicalization leading to terrorism is quite long and a complex psychosocial process.⁴ In the 1890s, for instance, during a time of unprecedented prosperity but where the majority of the population was being excluded from participating both politically and economically, a large-scale workers movement ensued creating a broad wave of radical individual and collective action throughout Europe demanding recognition and a place as full partners in society.

Decades later, in the interwar period, great depression created widespread social and economic crisis that ruined even large parts of the middle classes and caused prolonged mass unemployment. This environment became conducive to polarization, conflict, xenophobia and also anti-Semitism.⁵ A rising tide of radicalization benefited especially fascist groups, whose following grew because they seemed to be able to offer a new order to many people experiencing great personal uncertainty and general disillusionment towards the existing

⁴ NCTb (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism) (2008). *Salafism in the Netherlands: A Passing Phenomenon or a Persistent Factor of Significance?* The Hague: NCTb.

⁵ Brock, S. Blomberg and Gregory Hess. "From (No) Butter to Guns? Understanding the Economic Role in Transnational Terrorism." *Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness*, ed. Philip Keefer and Norman Loayza, New York: Cambridge UP, 2008

social order. Such groups made use of terrorist tactics to disrupt democratic governments. After World War II, the successive anti-colonialist movements which challenged European overseas presence witnessed worldwide radicalization, which was facilitated by a sense of shared injustice and resistance against colonial rule and interference.

This momentum continued with the May 1968 student revolt and the New Left movement which radicalized further as a virulent anti-establishment and anti-Vietnam war force. Again, a sense of injustice encapsulated, among others, by the Palestinian issue and the Vietnam War became powerful ideological rallying points uniting diverse groups across borders and even continents. In many countries, rightwing terrorist groups emerged claiming they were defending the traditional values of family, nation and order that were contested by those who protested.⁶ At the global level, polarizing tendencies and radicalization processes can be witnessed within many religious, ethnic and cultural population aggregates. Within this, widespread feelings of inequity and injustice a very acute sense of marginalization and humiliation exists, in particular within several Muslim communities worldwide as well as, among immigrant communities with a Muslim background established in European countries.

These perceptions and feelings are often underestimated by Western observers, whereas the latter is boosted by the aforementioned feelings of inequity whether real or perceived. Both expressions of radicalization processes are thus the result of very different individual and collective dynamics.⁷ African states have also had their share of threats from terrorism than any other continent. Its combination of relatively weak states, ethnic and religious diversity and sometimes discrimination, its poverty, and in many places its

⁶ Krueger, Alan, *What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism*, Princeton: Princeton UP, 2007

⁷ Krueger, Alan and David Laitin, "Kto Kogo? A Cross-country Study of the Origins and Targets of Terrorism." *Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness*. Ed. Philip Keefer and Norman Loayza, New York: Cambridge UP, 2008

'ungoverned space' all lend Africa, a significant susceptibility to the growth of radical and sometimes internationally connected movements that employ terrorism.

Some of these are aimed specifically at African governments for example, the radical Islamic Maitatsine and Taliban in Nigeria and the pseudo-Christian Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda, others clearly have a more international agenda, for example, the al-Qaeda cells along the East Coast of Africa and presumably, the North Africans and Sudanese who have returned to their home countries from training and participating in the insurgency in the middle East.⁸ In East Africa, the burgeoning youth population has increasingly continued to define the region's security environment. Population growth over the past several decades has made East Africa one of the youngest regions in the world and is projected to continue. At the same time, violent extremist organizations (VEOs) remain active in the region and have extended their influence in a number of areas.

Preventing Youth Radicalization workshop set out to identify the common challenges facing East Africa's youth and to explore strategies aimed at enhancing their resistance to radical ideologies.⁹ Although violent extremists in East Africa adhere to diverse ideologies, the strategies that they employ to enlist youth into their ranks are often similar. Radical organizations understand and prey upon a combination of political realities, socioeconomic factors, and individual characteristics that render youth in East Africa vulnerable to VEO recruitment.¹⁰ The radicalization of the nationals of the states in East Africa has led to recurrent attacks and complicating counter radicalization efforts.

Similarly, radicalization process has been an ideology and a vehicle compounded with hidden agendas of groups exploiting whatever they feel works in order to gain power and

⁸Presthold. Jeremy, "Kenya, the United States and Terrorism", Africa Today, vol. 57, no. 4 (summer2011)

⁹ Robert Young Pelton, "Kenya modified Invasion to suit US concerns", Somalia Report, 11 November 2011. In, Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation" Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 85, 25 January 2012.

¹⁰The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), " Preventing Youth Radicalization in East Africa" Work Shop in Kigali, Rwanda 22-27 Jan 2012, Program Report, 7-12:8

domination. Ali has argued that, the process of violent radicalization has penetrated the major traditional, informal and formal institution, through the ballot box and political challenge.¹¹ These are the 'Jihadists' that targets the governance institutions of the countries by trying to win political dominance either by way of religious Jihad and armed struggle or by if necessary within the Civil Societies, the process of violent radicalization has also embedded itself through humanitarian civil societies.¹²

The process of radicalization also conveniently has taken the advantage of the existing social fabric of tribal loyalty, where a single extremist leader can mobilize his whole sub tribe and tribal alliance; others are religious Institutions, education institutions, the opposition, secessionists, and adversaries. Kenya has been a victim of transnational crimes such as terrorism, although the targets of the attacks were mainly foreigners; the consequences had multiple ramifications to Kenya. The Kenyan component for example; in regard to the planning and execution of 1998 and 2002 terrorist attacks in Nairobi and Mombasa respectively was evident. This justifies the claim that, terrorism in Kenya is an extension of the international terrorism that involves external elements and the local component.¹³

The growth of radicalization in Nairobi Kenya in recent years has manifested itself in the spread of extreme Islamist mainly perpetuated by the Wahhabi ideology. This has resulted to the emergence of extremists and terrorist groups influenced by these ideologies. The development has further been influenced by, a number of socio-economic factors that have contributed to the growth of domestic radical groups.¹⁴ 'Home-grown' extremist has emerged and the current wave of radicalisation into extreme violence in Nairobi Kenya may be

¹¹ Ali, A. M. (2008). *Radicalization Process in the Horn of Africa: Phases and Relevant Factors*, ISPSW Institut für Strategie-Politik-Sicherheits-und Wirtschaftsberatung, Berlin, Germany

¹² Johnnie Carson, "Kenya: The Struggle Against Terrorism," in Rotberg, ed., *Battling Terrorism*, pp. 173–192. See also Gilbert Khadiagala, "Kenya: Haven or Helpless Victim of Terrorism," in *Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report no. 113, January 2004.

¹³ M. Juergensmeyer (2003). *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. California, Berkeley: University of California Press.

¹⁴ Rabasa, A. (2009). *Radical Islam in East Africa*, RAND project Air Force, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA.

associated to individuals and groups that are inspired by religion and socio-economic factors. Among others, the most critical factor that facilitates radicalization is the rampant spread of immorality in Nairobi Kenya and the region.¹⁵

Islamist radicalism is not new in Kenya; A Kenyan citizen was for instance, involved in the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dares Salaam. These coordinated bombings which killed about two hundred and twenty (220) people and these were the first suicide bombings by an East Africa al-Qaeda cell. Similarly, in al-Qaeda's 2002 coordinated attacks on the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Kikambala and a plane at the Mombasa airport, at least one Kenyan was involved.¹⁶ More recently, in September 2013, Al-Shabaab fighters carried out a deadly attack at the Westgate upscale shopping mall in the Westland area of Nairobi. The terrorist attacks in both Westgate and Garissa University college employed advanced weaponry such as automatic weapons and this attacks has brought to the realization that counter-radicalization is key to the Kenyan government.

The attack at Westgate Mall left sixty seven (67) people dead.¹⁷ While that of Garissa University College left one hundred and forty two (148) students, three (3) police officers, and three (3) soldiers dead, while seventy eight (78) civilians were injured.¹⁸ Since then, the government has given ultimatum to UNHCR to relocate refugee camps to Somali, as they are recruitments environments for radicalization. Eastleigh was founded in 1921 by the colonial government and is almost entirely inhabited by Somalis, except for a few indigenous residents. The colonial government allotted Nairobi's residential estates by race, and Eastleigh was pointed for Asians and elite Africans who worked as clerks, builders or shoemakers.

¹⁵ Ali, A. M. (2008. Radicalization Process in the Horn of Africa: Phases and Relevant Factors, ISPSW Institut für Strategie-Politik-Sicherheits-und Wirtschaftsberatung, Berlin, Germany

¹⁶ Carpenter's Waal. Alex, „Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect“, International Affairs, Vol.83, No.6 (2007), pp.1039-1054

¹⁷ Byers, Alex J. Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? 2005 The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq, Ethics & International Affairs, Vol.19, No.2 (2005), pp.31-53

¹⁸ Africa Union, Incident Analysis: Terrorism Attack Garrissa University. Kenya, 2 April 2015, Algiers

The commercial sector in Eastleigh is largely dominated by Somalis, with most if not all businesses owned by the Somali community. They have invested heavily in the real estate and commercial buildings, contributing over \$1.5 billion to Nairobi's revenue alone.¹⁹ It has often been referred to as 'little Mogadishu' due to its Somali characteristic and running an economy within another economy. Since 2012, the neighbourhood has experienced a number of terrorist attacks linked to the Al-Shabaab militant group in Somalia, which the country launched in retaliation for the Kenyan military's deployment of troops in southern Somalia against the insurgents.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Terrorism has become not only domestic but also an international security predicament with direct implications on people and the economy. One of the most complex counter-terrorism measures is counter-radicalization. Though many states affected by terrorism have had effective measures to prevent and mitigate terrorism, preventing recruitments is often a difficult measure. This is because the main problem with terrorism is that those who carry out the activities and the ideologies of the recruiters would make terror groups void. More importantly, no organization, terrorist or otherwise, would be able to exist without followers. "The main resource of any terrorist organization is its militants since membership is usually recruited from the pool of supporters."²⁰

Consequently, members make up the body of the group, while the leadership constitutes the head. The ideology that drives the group is the heart. Thus, this paper seeks to put much in depth on "the body," because it is through the members that the leadership is able to execute its desired acts as the foot soldiers allow the organization to thrive. Terror

¹⁹ Mohammed, Guled (9 January 2013). *Kenya: The Cost of Harassing Somalis Over Terror*. The star, Nairobi

¹⁹ João Ricardo Faria and Daniel G. Arce M, "Terror Support and Recruitment," *Defence and Peace Economics* 16. no. 4 (August 2005), 1.

attacks have “grave economic, political, and social implications.”²¹ In the past attacks, Kenyans and foreigners in Kenya such as those in Westgate Mall in 2013 and Kikambala hotel died and many were injured.²² United States, Germany, and the U.K. for instance, issued travel advisories that paralyzed the tourism sector in 2003, recording a loss of \$14 million a week.

However, foreign tourists cancelled their visits to Kenya’s sunny beaches in Mombasa, Malindi, and Lamu and to renowned safari destinations in Masaai Mara, Tsavo, and Samburu. After the advisories, the numbers of tourists declined drastically, thereby affecting the Kenyan economy.²³ The urge to understand and tackle the threat of radicalization is not only rooted in the fear of possible new terrorist attacks, but also the recruited groups and individuals can have a serious disruptive impact upon the Kenyan society and socio-cultural relations and in most cases, it leads to terrorism. Against this background, it was realized that there is a need to identify groups that are vulnerable to radicalization, the causes and their motivating factors.

It is also important to think of de-radicalization programmes, which may prevent and minimize the risks of radicalization of Kenyans into extremist behaviours. Since most of the attacks originated from Somali natives who inhabit Eastleigh estate in Nairobi, it is imperative to analyze the modes of radicalization that happens at religious places especially in Madrassas. The boundaries between business, politics and religion are ill-defined and there are also instances of individuals or groups who use their financial success to support radical Islamist groups in Somalia, while still based in Eastleigh. The role of businessmen in facilitating terror-related activities in Eastleigh is influenced by a number of factors key

²¹ K. J. Kelley, Kenya Seeks 30 billion from U.S., *The Daily Nation Newspaper*, (Thursday, June 26, 2003) in Kefa Otiso, “Kenya in the Crosshairs of Global Terrorism: Fighting Terrorism at the Periphery,” *Kenya Studies Review*, Vol 1, no.1 (2009),117–119.

²² Westgate Terrorist Attack: A Compilation of Statements September 23, 2013. <http://kenyastockholm.com/2013/09/23/StateReport:Kenya.html>

²³ Marc Lacey, “Threat of Terrorism Hurts Kenya Tourism,” *New York Times*, January 4, 2004, accessed August 16, 2012, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/432633287?accountid=12702>.

among them being, they operate largely outside the formal economy of the country. Secondly, they rely heavily, but not exclusively, on clan or kinship networks of trust in their business dealings.

1.3 Objective of the Study

The broad objective of this study therefore is to analyse the socio-economic causal factors that motivate the increasing extremist radicalization in Kenya.

1.3.1 Specific objectives

More specifically, the study seeks

- i. To Establish the most susceptible group to radicalization in Nairobi's Eastleigh region in Kenya
- ii. To analyse the socio-economic factors that influence radicalization in Nairobi's Eastleigh region in Kenya
- iii. To explore the best counter-radicalization and de-radicalization strategies that can be used by the Kenyan Government

1.4 Research Questions

To achieve the above objectives, the following research questions have been developed:

- i. Who are the most susceptible group to radicalization in Nairobi's Eastleigh region in Kenya?
- ii. How do socio-economic factors influence radicalisation in Nairobi's Eastleigh region in Kenya?
- iii. What are the counter-radicalization and de-radicalization strategies used by the Kenyan Government?

1.5 Justification of the Study

The research study sought to benefit the policy making and formulation, relevant academia as well as the general public. From the findings, the study contributed to the counter radicalization measures that are very important in the War on Terror (WoT). In policy formulation, the study added relevant recommendation on the on-going police reforms that are needed to understand the legal, socio-economic and political challenges faced in counter radicalization and mostly on understanding the dynamics of radicalization. The research has provided pertinent policy-related answers and solutions as far as radicalization and eventually counter-terrorism management is concerned, as this was instrumental in the development of sound policies to manage the vice. The recommendations will assist policymakers and law enforcement officers by providing a thorough understanding of the threat posed by radicalization and the ultimate consequences.

The study sought to add to the existing body of academic sources in radicalization studies. Since the research study has not come across extensive literature or study on the subject of radicalization in Kenya, it will provide valid and relevant information on the process of radicalization to enable the security agencies combat the threat. The study also sought to enlighten the general public and demystify the conflict between policing and human rights, particularly on the radicalization and the importance of cooperating with the intelligence and police. This is because the community is very important in counter-radicalization. Furthermore, the study has highlighted all emerging issues that will be important for further studies.

1.6 Scope and Limitation

The research involved various groups that included those who had been radicalized, de-radicalised, parents of those who had been preachers, local administrators, and intelligence operatives. The research was carried out in Nairobi as the area had been selected due to high

number of reported cases of radicalization of youths who eventually headed up in Somalia to fight alongside Al-Shabaab.

The following limitations in this study were anticipated:

- i. The major limitation that this study had was in terms of literature which was though available was scattered in various publications and the task of consolidating them to make constructive reading was daunting.
- ii. It terms of interviews, the individuals to be interviewed were hardly available while others seemed suspicious to the responses for a wide range of reasons such as not wishing to fall foul of the law for being active members or for having participated in radicalization.
- iii. The process was time consuming and frustrating since continual evolution of beliefs and ideologies meant that more recent developments or shifts were not fully captured.

1.6.1 Assumptions of the Study

Although the area of this study was complex and sensitive, it was assumed that, the study samples were willing to respond to the interviews successful and provided correct information that led to genuine analysis of the problem. It was also assumed that, the government agencies involved in the study gave consent to their officers to participate in the study.

1.7. Literature Review

The literature review was organized into five cross-cutting thematic areas: the global situation of the threat to peace and security arising from radicalization process, the threat to peace and security that radicalization have at the regional level (East Africa) and the threat to peace and security that radicalization have in Kenya and the support that help it to thrive.

1.7.1 Radicalization on the Global Front

Violent confrontation between Islamic radicalism and the west has been one of the defining features of the first decade of 21st century. The tragic events of September 11, 2001, in the United States and subsequent attacks in Madrid and London combined with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, have shown how the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism has fostered among some Muslims who believe that, a religious war (jihad) is required to fight against infidels who are thought to be invading holy places or working against the Islamic faith as a result of Christian beliefs.²⁴ Jihad means 'to strive' or 'to struggle' in Arabic. Radicalization in the west is driven by jihad-salafi ideology which motivates young men and women born or living in the west, to carry out autonomous jihad via acts of terrorism against their host countries.

Ideology was the bed rock and catalyst for radicalization as it defines conflict, guides movements, identifies the issues, drives recruitment and is a basis for action. In many cases, it determines target selection and informs what will be done and how it will be carried out.²⁵ Radicalization has increasingly set the agenda for western understanding of Muslims minority groups events such as 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington in 2001, the Madrid bombing of 2004, the 7/7 terrorist bombing in London in 2005 as well as a series of arrest of juveniles suspected of planning terrorist attacks in Netherlands, Germany and Denmark have convinced European government and security services of the risk of Islamic terrorist attacks in Europe.²⁶ Attempts to understand why terrorism occurs and initiatives to prevent it are often based on reference to the concept of radicalization.

The basic beliefs in regard to Islamic terrorists are that they gradually evolve from ordinary peaceful Muslims into individuals who are capable of killing innocent people in the

²⁴ Bartlett, J., & Miller, C. (2011). The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non-Violent Radicalization. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 24(1), 1-21

²⁵ Hoffman, B. (2006). *Inside Terrorism*. Columbia: Columbia University Press.

²⁶ Ibid

name of Islam.²⁷ However, most definitions of radicalization do not confine to active participation in terrorist attack but include support for terrorism as an aspect of radicalization. Aarhus which is –Denmark’s second largest city has hosted groups of radical Muslims associated with international terrorism. Taarnby describes how the western district court in Aarhus in 1996 had three Egyptian on trial, Abdel- Hakeem Mohammed, Alia Soliman and Mohammed Shabaan among others.²⁸ Policy makers in Europe and elsewhere have in recent often felt obliged to formulate policies designed to combat and prevent radicalization thus, Denmark has been leading in these efforts.²⁹

There has been an increasing agreement among policy makers that they need not only a comprehensive reactive counterterrorism apparatus, but also policies that prevent radicalization processes from initiating and can reverse them if they do. In Denmark, the concern about radicalization and the feeling among policy makers that something needs to be done have been fuelled by the fact that, the seven Danish citizen have been convicted on terrorist charges since 2001. Furthermore, Denmark has convinced European government and security services of the risk of Islamist terrorist attacks as attempts to understand why terrorist occurs and initiatives to prevent it are often based on references to the concept of radicalization.

1.7.2 Radicalization in East Africa

East Africa’s burgeoning youth population is increasingly defining the region’s security environment. Population growth over the past several decades has made East Africa one of the youngest regions in the world and is projected to continue. At the same time, violent extremist organizations (VEOs) remain active in the region and have extended their influence in a number of areas. The Preventing Youth Radicalization workshop set out to

²⁷ Gunning, J and Jackson, R. (2011). “What’s so ‘Religious’ about ‘Religious Terrorism.’” *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 4(3): 369-388

²⁸ Michael Taarnby. An overview and analysis of the activities of Jihad is in Denmark 1990-2006. DIIS Working Paper 2006:35, November 2006, 83 p.

²⁹ Ibid

identify the common challenges facing East Africa's youth and to explore strategies aimed at enhancing their resistance to radical ideologies are of concerns.³⁰ Although violent extremists in East Africa adhere to diverse ideologies, the strategies that they employ to enlist youth into their ranks are often similar.

Radical organizations understand and prey upon a combination of political realities, socioeconomic factors and individual characteristics that render youth in East Africa vulnerable to recruitment. A primary goal of the Preventing Youth Radicalization workshop was to promote understanding of the drivers of youth radicalization, identify East African youth's resiliencies and coping mechanisms to these drivers and to generate policy recommendations aimed at mitigating the drivers.³¹ Violent extremist organizations (VEOs) take advantage of socio-economic factors that render East African youth vulnerable to radicalization. Youth in East Africa struggle to access employment, education, housing, health services and other necessities.

Although, a number of East African countries have experienced impressive economic growth over the past decade, a handful of countries represented at the workshop posted Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates of seven percent and higher the past years. However, young people are still finding it difficult to gain employment and advance according to various development indicators.³² In particular, participants noted that, achieving culturally recognized adulthood in East Africa is difficult for poor and non-elite youth especially the young men. The prevalence of conflict, high rates of unemployment, lack of education, and the inability to establish a home and marry have all contributed to East Africans youths much longer than their counterparts elsewhere in the world.

³⁰ Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), "Preventing Youth Radicalization in East Africa Work Shop in Kigali, Rwanda 22-27 Jan 2012, Program Report,

7-12

³¹ Crisis Group Understanding Islamism Middle East/North Africa Report No. 37, 2 March 2005.

³² *Ibid*

1.7.3 History of Radicalization in Terrorism

The term radicalization let alone definition, is contested by many.³³ Arguably one of the most complete definitions is that coined by Allen³⁴ as it encapsulates many elements used by most scholars. According to Allen, radicalization is “the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence as a method to effect societal change.”³⁵ Somalia’s growing Islamist radicalism is spilling over into Kenya and the militant Al-Shabaab movement has built a cross-border presence and a clandestine support network among Muslim populations in the North Eastern, Nairobi and on the coastal region. They are continuing to radicalize and recruit youth from these communities, often capitalizing on long standing grievances against the central state. This problem could grow more severe with the October 2011 decision by the Kenyan government to intervene directly in Somalia.

Radicalization is a grave threat to Kenya’s security and stability and therefore it is prudent and a priority for Kenyan government to formulate and execute sound counter-radicalization and de-radicalization policies before it is too late. The Islamic radicalization that was observable in many Muslim societies has its roots in revivalist movements that emerged in the 1950’s³⁶ and Kenyan Muslims are no exception. They have become more observant and a small portion has become radicalized. The Kenyan Muslim community of about 4.3 million of the country’s 38.6 million population according to the 2009 census has been exposed to various strains of radical Islamism in the last four decades, much of it based on an amalgam of Salafi theologies, the best supported of which has been Wahhabism. Salafi

³³Mark Sedgwick, “The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 22, no. 4 (2010): 479 – 494

³³Charles E. Allen, “Threat of Islamic Radicalization to the Homeland,” Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, March 14, 2007, p. 4.

³⁵ Charles E. Allen. “Threat of Islamic Radicalization to the Homeland,” Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, March 14, 2007, p. 4.

³⁵Crisis Group. *Understanding Islamism Middle East/North Africa Report No.37*, 2 March 2005.

radicalization was gradual and unfolded in three distinct phases, each complementing the other.

The first wave occurred in the late 1970s and coincided with Saudi Arabia's emergence as an oil power keen to export its brand of Islam. It was essentially theological and driven by an unstated proselytizing agenda. The aim was to subvert the traditional Shafi mazhab (sect) and related Sufi orders and convert their adherents to Wahhabism.³⁷ The second phase started in earnest in the early 1980s. It was overtly political, rested on the Salafi creed and unfolded against the backdrop of Iran's Islamic Revolution.³⁸ The political message of the new generation of Salafi radicalizers³⁹ was simple but compelling: "pure" and "authentic" life was impossible under a secular state, not least because it did not allow Muslims to live in conformity with Sharia (Islamic law). Muslim minorities had no business seeking accommodation with the state as they short of overthrowing the state, the only options were to emigrate as the Prophet Muhammad did or struggle for separatism.

The third stage unfolded in the 1990s entirely driven by a new generation of Salafi Jihadi militants and groups. This added a deeply militant layer on top of small but influential radicalized institutions based on a distinct puritanical theology and a potent political narrative. The jihadis neither invented a new language nor a new theology but simply built on the solid foundation established by their predecessors, the novelty of their world and World Assembly of Muslim Youth, all Saudi funded.⁴⁰ The first two were run by expatriate scholars and technocrats recruited from India and Pakistan. They built a vast network of charities, madrasas and health clinics in Muslim dominated areas.

Madrasa graduates obtained full scholarships to study in Saudi and Pakistani Islamic universities as Magazines and newsletters in English and Swahili were launched often

³⁶ Ibid

³⁷ Jeremy Presthold, "Kenya, the United States and Terrorism", *Africa Today*, vol. 57, no. 4 (summer 2011)

³⁸ Crisis Group Understanding Islamism Middle East/North Africa Report No. 37., 2 March 2005.

⁴⁰ Mark Sedgwick, "The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 22, no. 4 (2010): 479 – 494

targeting the educated and professional classes. Tabligh Jemaat is a conservative missionary movement that is often castigated by salafis for its practices. In most parts of the world, it is non-political and not involved in violence but because of similarities of appearance, it is frequently used as a cover by more extreme groups.⁴¹ Iran strove to export its Shia faith and brand of radicalism to Kenya, which has a tiny Asian Shia community that has traditionally stayed out of politics. A member of Asian Shia community called Naushad Merali is among the country's wealthiest businessman who showed no signs of radicalization despite close links with Iran.

Attempts to radicalize Shia were intense in the 1980s and early 1990s, but have petered off. The targets were communities in Nairobi and Mombasa. These activities triggered serious sectarian tensions with Wahhabi groups; Jamia Mosque which is the largest in Nairobi was the battleground.⁴² Al-Shabaab's swift rise to relative dominance in southern Somalia since early 2009 has added to concerns about radicalization in Kenya and beyond. Despite recent military setbacks, growing internal schisms and public backlash, it remains a major threat to Somalia's and the region's security and stability. In the last four years, it has built a formidable and secretive support infrastructure in Kenya.⁴³ A tiny, but highly radicalized close-knit and secretive Salafi Jihadi fringe looks up to Al-Shabaab as a source of emulation (*marjaiyah*), supports its jihad, funnels money and recruits is the primary agent of radicalization. Even without the physical threat posed by Al-Shabaab, Kenya would have to contend with this small but dangerous, home grown threat.⁴⁴

⁴⁰Ibid

⁴¹Crisis Group Africa, Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Mind? Crisis Group Africa Report No.95 11 July 2005, p. 6-9.

⁴²Ibid

⁴³Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1853 (2008), S/2010/91, 10 March 2010, pp. 30-37.

1.7.4 Radicalization in Kenya

The recruitment of Al-Shaabab and Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) has been a challenge in Nairobi Eastleigh estate and Mombasa respectively in Kenya despite a history of extremism and unconventional political development. Relatively little empirical research has been done to determine why and how individual join Al-Shabaab and Mombasa Republican Council (MRC). These organizations have very different profiles. Al-Shabaab pursues an Islamist terrorist agenda while the MRC pursues a secessionist agenda; the latter has not carried out terrorist attacks. Muslims youths have joined extremist groups as a counter reaction to what they see as government imposed “collective punishment” driven by the misguided perception that all Somali and Kenyan Somali nationals are potential terrorist.⁴⁵ Therefore as long as Kenyan citizen exclusively identify what is perceived to be under threat, radicalization will still be a menace.

The Islamist extremism did not appear in Kenya for the first time after the country’s military intervention in Somalia in 2011 or with Al-Shabaab subsequent attacks in Nairobi and Mombasa restaurants, public places and churches in Kenyan. The first significant manifestation of the growing threat of extremist in post independence East Africa can be traced back to the 7th August 1998 attack on the US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Tanzania which were attributed to Al Qaeda. Radical groups tend to be dominated and operated by men, yet women may also be drawn to radical ideologies and sometimes take on active roles in extremist or militant groups.⁴⁶ Historically, women have performed a range of functions from providing encouragement to participants in militant operations.

Although, a number of politicians in Kenya and Tanzania claimed that their respective countries, had merely been used as a battle ground to target the United States and its interests,

⁴⁵ Report of the *Monitoring Group* on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 1916 (2010), S/2011/ 433, 18 July 2011

⁴⁶ Presthold, Jeremy, “Kenya, the United States and Terrorism”, *Africa Today*, vol. 57, no. 4 (summer 2011)

individuals involved in the attacks included both foreigners and locals. In addition, to being victims of Al-Shabaab attacks, nationals from Kenya and Uganda were also directly involved in recruiting their fellow nationals to join the organization's ranks.⁴⁷ Initially, after being radicalized, these individuals left their countries to fight in Somalia. This trend also gradually changed in that locally marginalized, radicalized and recruited individuals started being used to execute attacks in their own countries. Turning against their fellow citizens in this way means that these radicalized individuals are identifying with something other than being Kenyan.

Silber and Bhatt have argued that, fifteen to thirty-five year-old male Muslims who live in male dominated societies are particularly vulnerable. This is because they are in the ages where they are often seeking to identify who they really are while trying to find the "meaning of life".⁴⁸ This age group is usually very action-oriented. Silber and Bhatt examined individual level of radicalisation and developed a model that consisted of a distinct series of steps. These are pre-radicalisation, self-radicalisation, indoctrination and Jihadization.⁴⁹ Each of the phases is unique and has specific signatures associated with it as it signifies violent extremist behavioural changes in major areas of a person's life including ideology, social relation and criminal activity.

⁴⁷ Ibid

⁴⁸ Silber, M. D. and Bhatt, A (2007). *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat*, New York City Police Department

⁴⁹ Ibid

Radicalization Process

In this study, radicalization process is defined as the process by which citizens and residents of a particular geographic area turn to violence, using Islam as an ideological or religious justification. The process is composed of four distinct phases:

Table 1.1 Radicalization Process

Pre-radicalisation	Self-identification	Indoctrination	Jihadization
Point of departure: From ordinary jobs, little, if any criminal history	Individuals begin to gradually gravitate away from their old identity and begin to associate themselves with like-minded individuals.	Individuals progressively intensifies beliefs and adopts Jihadist- ideology and concludes that militant action is required	Group members accept their individual duty to participate in jihad. They take part in planning and actual violence

Source: Researcher, 2015

1.7.5 Summary of gap in the Literature

The research study has identified that counter-radicalization which is a key measure in counter-terrorism, has inadequate literature particularly in the East Africa case. The most susceptible group to radicalization in Kenya had not been established and covered in order to recommend efficient strategies for counter radicalization and de-radicalization. The socio-economic factors that influence radicalization to enable early intervention had not been identified and understood adequately. Radicalization centres that induce recruitment and the relationship between religion, socio economic, family and education background had not been established in order to be addressed.

1.8. Theoretical model

A theory can be defined as logical deductive system consisting of a set of interactive concepts from which testable proportions can be derived. It denotes systematically organized ideas that explain a given phenomenon. It is employed in explaining, predicting, describing and understanding thus answering 'whys' and 'hows' of the world around us. Therefore, in understanding what motivates an individual into terrorism, the study was guided by the theory of relative deprivation as a theory of political violence. Gurr⁵⁰ explains that, instead of an absolute standard of deprivation, a gap between expected and achieved welfare created collective discontent. This theory also applied to individuals who found their own welfare to be inferior to that of others to whom they compared themselves.

Gurr explains political violence as the result of collective discontent caused by a sense of relative deprivation. He also said that, 'relative deprivation' as a term used to denote tension that develops from a discrepancy between the "ought" and the "is" of collective value satisfaction and that disposes men to violence." This gap between an individual's expected and achieved welfare results in collective discontent. In relation to this study, the frustrated venerable youths felt that they are left out by the government in the provision of employment and have been marginalized as a result of unequal distribution of resources hence resort to joining extremist groups for radicalization.

The concept of relative deprivation dates back to ancient Greece, Aristotle articulated the idea that revolution is driven by a relative sense or feeling of inequality, rather than an absolute measure. According to Gurr⁵¹, "For Aristotle the principal cause of revolution is the aspiration for economic or political equality on the part of the common people who lack it and the aspiration. Gurr states that perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities is what leads to discontent, not the millionaire's absolute economic

50 Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Center of International Studies, Princeton UP, 1970)

51 Ibid

standing. The study used this theory as stipulated by Gurr, describing the frustration caused by relative deprivation and the resulting aggression that is manifested as terrorism. Thus, the levels of terrorism may be explained in part as an expression of country's conduciveness to relative deprivation.⁵²


To examine this theory empirically in relation to this study, one examines whether high unemployment rates and dependent ratio on higher rates of enrolment in tertiary education are positively correlated with terrorism. When a large group of highly educated individuals enter the work force and levels of unemployment are high, the individuals may feel over-qualified and disappointed relative to what they expected to gain from their education. Presumably individuals pursue higher education with the expectation that additional studies or training will help them find better jobs. As a result, even well-educated individuals such as the Garissa University attack terror suspect who was a discontent law student), may feel greater discontent from unemployment than those who did not expect such grand employment opportunities.

This socioeconomic discontent in turn, may result in political violence.⁵³ While individual economic indicators alone do not appear to be strongly correlated with terrorism, the interaction effect of an economic variable (unemployment) and a social variable (education) may provide better insight into understanding terrorism. Because relative deprivation also can be used to describe a discrepancy in what an individual has in economic goods and what he believes he is justly entitled to have, a look into the effect of increased international interactions could serve as a more effective application of the theory. Meanwhile, the theoretical model has been illustrated below.

⁵² Ted Robert Gurr. *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Center of International Studies, Princeton UP, 1970)

⁵³ *Ibid*

Fig.1.1 Theoretical Model



Source: Researcher, 2015

1.8.1 Operationalization of Key Concepts and Terms

The definitions of terms and concepts as understood within the scope of this research are as follows:

Indoctrination:

In this study, indoctrination is the process of inculcating ideas, attitude, cognitive strategies and convictions in which an individual progressively intensifies hidden beliefs and adopt jihadi-salafi ideology. The key indicators could be withdrawals from the mosques and politicization of new beliefs.

Jihadization:

In this study, jihadization refers to the phase in which members of the cluster accepts their individual to participate in jihad and self designate themselves as holy warriors or Mujahedeen. Ultimately the group will begin operational planning for hijad or a terrorist attack. These acts include planning, preparation and execution.

Pre-radicalization:

The concept has been used to describe an individual's world in which his or her pedigree, lifestyle, religion, social status neighbourhood and education prior to the start of their journey down the path to radicalization.

Radicalization:

In this study, the concept refers to a personal process in which individual adopts extreme political, social, and/or religious ideals and aspirations where the attainment of particular goals justifies the use of indiscriminate violence. It is both a mental and emotional process that prepares and motivates an individual to pursue violent behaviour.

Region:

In this study, region refers to a geopolitical area covering the Horn of Africa and East African region which consist of Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya.

Salafi jihadist:

It is a concept in this study, which defines a school of thought of Salafi Muslims who supports violent jihad (an Arabic word meaning struggle)

Security:

It is a concept used in this study, not confined to traditional security but included economic, social and human security.

Self – identification:

This term as used in this study is largely influenced by both internal and external factors and marks the point where the individual begins to explore Salafi Islam while slowly migrating away from their former identity philosophy, ideology and values.

Sunni Islam

It is abroad term utilized in this study derived from Sunnah (an Arabic word meaning habit or usual practice) and the term refers to living habit of Muhammad Sunni Islam which is the largest branch of Islam up to 90% of the total Muslims population of the world.

Terrorism:

In this study, it refers to a premeditated use of violence to achieve certain objectives and essentially it is intimidation through violence.⁵⁴ Terrorism as used also denotes the consequence of radicalization.

⁵⁴ Matthewson, K and Michael Steiberg. The Faces of Terrorism: Social and Psychological Dimensions. Princeton University Press, 2003

1.9. Methodology of the study

Methodology is a system of explicit rules and procedure upon which research is based and against which claims for knowledge are evaluated. This is a qualitative study that relied on library research and supplemented by informant interviews as well as telephone interviews where the interviews were conducted according to the availability and knowledge of the interviewees. However, this section consist of the following sub-headings; research design, study sites, study population, sample size determination and sampling procedure, data gathering instruments, instruments validity and reliability, data collection methods and ethical considerations .

1.9.1 Research Design

The study utilized an exploratory design which involved using interviews to determine and gather qualitative descriptions of radicalization. The study generated initial and comparable data in a complex area while capturing the diversity of different contexts and levels of exposure to violent radicalisation. Each item in the interview addressed a specific objective and administered to the respondents from the sampled groups. By using qualitative techniques, the design enabled the researcher to obtain valuable insights into the attitudes or feelings. The design provided an opportunity captured by the diversity of contexts and levels of exposure to radicalization, thus a case study of Nairobi, Kenya.

1.9.2 Study Sites

The study was conducted in Nairobi's Eastleigh region and compared to those similar scenarios in Mombasa in Kenya. The sites were selected bearing in mind that the trend of radicalization was similar. The wide coverage was intended to provide broad perspective and a triangulation that illustrates various factors that motivate radicalization. The study also noted key extremist websites and chat forums in the internet such as those propagated by Al-Shabaab to provide insights. The main focus was on forums as they provided the most interactive and 'live'

content .The internet was increasingly seen as an important arena for the promotion and development of violent radical groups and also presents a highly potent open source.

1.9.3 Study Population

The study population consisted of people who had been radicalised and had either heeded to the government amnesty or had surrendered, those in prison and remand or in police custody, their parents (where possible), Islamic preachers, local administrators and intelligence and anti-terrorism operatives. Local administrators were approached to identify those who were living among the society while the prisons and police records were used to identify those who were in custody.

1.9.4 Sample Size determination

The study targeted interviewees into two broad categories; those individuals who had participated in radicalization or with firsthand experience of violent radicalization and those with no specific identifiable relationship to violent radicalization groups or ideologies. Due to the contentious and highly political nature of the area of study, a large sample was not envisaged. According to Mugenda and Mugenda, such research required a small number of respondents for a qualitative type of study.⁵⁵ This was supplemented by analysis from internet monitoring. The study was conducted by collecting data from the site mentioned above and the methodological triangulation increased credibility and validity of the results. This involved using more than one individual and institution from different areas and spreading the figure in all the sites to gather data. The study was conducted using interviews and internet visits across the identified sites.

⁵⁵ Mugenda, O. M. and Mugenda, A. G. (2003). Research methods: Quantitative & qualitative Approaches, ACTS Press, Nairobi.

1.9.5 Sampling procedure

For practical reasons, the study used purposive sampling and identified five local administrative institutions from where five individuals were conveniently selected for the interviews.⁵⁶

1.9.6 Data Collection Methods

The data was collected using interview guide which was administered to the victims of radicalization.

1.9.6.1 Instruments Validity

Validity refers to the degree to which the product of the analysed data represents the occurrence that is being studied. To ascertain whether the content and validity of the interviews is appropriate and relevant to the study objectives, consultations with the supervisors and any relevant expert in this field of study was made to help improve the quality.

1.9.6.2 Reliability

A pilot study was conducted in an adjacent Majengo and Pumwani areas to the study sites to help identify shortcomings that were likely to be experienced during the actual data collection in order to enhance reliability of the interview guide.

1.9.7 Ethical Considerations

While doing research, the researcher was aware of what was considered acceptable and what was not. Neumann states that, ethical research does not inflict harm of any sort, be it physical, psychological abuse or even legal jeopardy. Taking these principles into account benefits not only the participants and the researcher but also those who get to read the research work. It helps to establish credibility. The study objectives and methodology was explained to

⁵⁶ Mugenda, O. M. and Mugenda, A. G. (2003). Research methods: Quantitative & qualitative Approaches, Acts Press, Nairobi.

those who participated in the study. The principle of voluntary participation and the requirement of informed consent were emphasized to ensure confidentiality. The participants were made to sign a consent form that explained the nature of the study prior to participating in the research. Any information collected was handled confidentially and in order to protect interviewee's confidentiality, the timing and the location of the interview was not disclosed to anybody else.

1.9.8 Chapter Summary

This chapter has introduced the study and highlighted key concepts of radicalization of youth into extremist groups. Indeed, the chapter has pin pointed the need to understand deeply the dynamics of radicalization, the processes, recruitment, causes of joining and all the push and pull factors of radicalization. In the subsequent chapters, the study embarked on the susceptible group, the socio-economic factors of radicalization, counter-radicalization and de-radicalization strategies as suggested by the theory of relative deprivation.

1.9.9 Chapter Outline

The project is divided into five (5) chapters.

Chapter One

This chapter consist of introduction and background to research problem. It introduces the research topic and its justification, the theoretical model, limitation and scope of the research problem, review on the relevant literature, methodology used, objectives as well as research questions.

Chapter Two:

This Chapter focuses on the most susceptible group to radicalization in Kenya. It consists of factors on age among the youths and the contemporary society, as well as ethnic and religious factors that contribute to radicalization in Nairobi, Kenya.

Chapter Three:

Chapter three covers socio-economic factors that influence radicalization in Nairobi, Kenya where the research focuses on socio-economic challenges, economic deprivation as well as socio political factors that influence radicalization. It also tries to examine how unemployment and identity can lure youths into radicalization.

Chapter Four:

Chapter four focuses on Counter-radicalization and de-radicalization strategies employed by Kenya government to prevent and de-radicalize the youths into joining extremist groups. It tries to evaluate State actors and machinery such as police, intelligence, judiciary, prison and remand and Non State actors like religious groups, Civil Society Organizations and Non- Governmental Organizations.

Chapter Five:

This chapter constitutes of summary, conclusion and recommendations to the study findings.

CHAPTER TWO

THE MOST SUSCEPTIBLE GROUP TO RADICALIZATION IN KENYA

2.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses the most susceptible group to radicalization in Kenya where the study explored on various factors which makes an individual vulnerable to radicalization. The factors include susceptibility to radicalization, age groups, youths in the contemporary society, ethnic and religious factors and summarize the main issues discussed. It further provides the perspective for detailed analysis of what makes the group vulnerable to such violent extremists.

2.1 Susceptibility to radicalization

The study established that the most susceptible group to radicalization are youths due to frustration and lack of proper education. However, in order to undertake the challenge, it was first necessary to note that becoming a terrorist is a process with the first step being radicalization. It was then possible to consider the factors, experiences, and perceptions that made one vulnerable to radicalization. This raised the question as to whether it was due to poverty or perceptions regarding lack of upward mobility or prosperity due to limited educational opportunities or other aspects. Understanding the influence of these and other factors was essential if one was to consider the vulnerability of the Muslim population in Kenya to terrorist radicalization.⁵⁷

The understanding on the influence of the factors provided insights into the vulnerability to radicalization. Interestingly, it was observed that the percentage of youth found to be vulnerable to radicalization within the sample was significantly higher than women-centered

⁵⁷ International Crisis Group. "Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation." Africa Briefing, no. 85 (25 January 2012), <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/b085-kenyansomali-islamist-radicalisation.aspx>.

profiles that had been constructed by many terrorism analysts and scholars previously. This could be exemplified by the policies of the United States and its engagement in fighting terrorism and its involvement in the Middle East that served as a source of frustration among the Muslim population in the West.⁵⁸ Additionally, several interviewees reported that education and poverty were the main influence to radicalization.

The study further established that, there were three primary groups from which Islamists sought to recruit, troubled youths who were estranged from their families, disaffected college students, young professionals and inmates within the prison system. Troubled youths were the most vulnerable to radicalization, much like young delinquents recruited into street gangs; they were usually relegated to performing support functions for the group such as stealing materials, money and so on. These young Muslims have usually been in legal trouble, often users of alcohol and drugs, had significant difficulties with their parents and were estranged from their homes. In cases where these individuals became radicalized as compared to other secondary sources, it was reported that it occurred when a small group of friends brought them to a mosque for shelter,⁵⁹ and once inside the mosque, they became part of a prayer group of other disaffected youths who then became his surrogate family.

In that same conducive environment, the young Muslims were then ripe for recruitment by a radical Mosque member who was leading a prayer group or an Islamist Imam whose message is anti-western and promotes the Islamist agenda⁶⁰. Anzalone admits that the relationship was complicated, but states that the mosque and its leaders, “helped provide the religiously based ideological frame for the groups thus assuming a supplementary rather than a

⁵⁸Kagwanji, Peter. “Counter-terrorism in the Horn of Africa: New Security Frontiers, Old Strategies.” *African Security Review* 15, no. 3 (2006)

⁵⁹ *Ibid*

⁶⁰Anzalone, Christopher. “Kenya’s Muslim Youth Center and Al-Shabaab’s East African Recruitment.” *CTC Sentinel* 5, no. 10 (October 2012).

simply indoctrinating role. By virtue of this pattern, religious ideology and group affiliation served to supplement and reinforce one another to work towards the kind of commitment that would propel young men into lives of righteous battle, exposure to danger and sometimes suicide”⁶¹.

2.2 The age factor in Radicalization

In regard to the age factor to radicalization it was established that, youths aged between ten (10) and twenty five (25) years were the most vulnerable to radicalization. While the ages of the young person’s vary depending on the groups, there were examples of school-aged young persons (kindergarten through college, or approximately between the ages of five and twenty-two that were involved in a range of support and operational activities. There appeared to be variations both within the groups as well as between different groups. The young persons, who had been recruited or radicalized, spanned a range of ages and developmental stages which included both males and females and had varying skill sets, education levels and appeared to have grown up in a variety of environments.⁶²

Furthermore, it was observed that some of the groups utilized a vetting process to help identify new recruits and in some cases, the group were looking for more educated, skilled or committed young person to fill a particular role in the organization such as future leaders or operational planners while in other cases, the groups appeared to be interested in simply filling the ranks. Vetting had occurred through the use of “gateway organizations,” which included groups similar to the boy scouts or through other youth organizations such as those affiliated with universities or religious institutions. Moreover, it was noted that, these gateway organizations were sponsored by the terrorist groups to “grow” future members, while in other

⁶¹Ibid

⁶²NyambegaGisesa, A portrait of a jihadist born and bred in Nairobi, Africa News Online, 30 January 2012, <http://africanewsonline.blogspot.com/2012/01/portraitof-jihadist-born-and-bred-in.html> (accessed 26 March 2013).

circumstances the groups were being used by the organization(s) as a venue for talent spotting potential recruits.

However, it was reported that when support bases have lessened or the need for personnel had increased, it appears to have an effect on the types of persons that were recruited (i.e. the group decided to reach out to even younger persons or those who had less knowledge or dedication to the group's underlying ideology). In some instances, it was examined that youth became acquainted with the group or radicalized of their own volition.⁶³ The Internet had been used by some youths to familiarize them with radical ideology or to identify other likeminded persons (to include recruiters) that could provide additional information and access.

2.3 The youth in the contemporary society in Kenya

The youths in the contemporary society serves as the drivers of the economy, in this regard, the study established that most of the youths acted as a fodder to recruitment into radicalization. However, the prevalence of a large and dynamic youth population was shaping East Africa's security landscape. The region's population is one of the youngest in the world and is projected to grow younger over the coming decades. Seventy percent of Kenya's population are under the age of thirty and Africa's overall population is expected to double by 2030. Initial reactions to East Africa's "youth bulge" are frequently negative. Thus, Kenyans wondered how they will feed, house, educate, and prepare for future generations of young people. Research on conflict and political violence indicated that young populations were more prone to conflict than older ones, and that youth were more likely to join radical organizations than adults.

The potential for Kenya's and the entire East Africa's youth was observed to serve as drivers of economic growth comparing its demographic trends to other world regions. In other

regions such as South Korea, the country's youth bulge was converted into a national asset through a blend of educational programs and youth-oriented services that prepared young people for jobs in a modern and globally connected economy.⁶⁴ However, in Kenya for instance, the government has not conducted sufficient planning, attracted adequate amounts of private sector investment, or fostered the social awareness necessary to convert these demographic trends into national advantages, or even to properly accommodate their current and future young citizens.

In Kenya's up-coming youth generation, or "cheetah generation," as it was increasingly identified, was marked by a number of unique characteristics. It has been increasingly connected to each other and the global marketplace of ideas via information and communication technology. Even very poor youth in Kenya are willing to sacrifice large portions of their income to purchase cell phones. It was further noted that, improvements in Internet penetration have increased the number of Kenyan youth accessing information online, albeit at relatively low levels when compared to other parts of the world.⁶⁵ The modern Kenyan youth were using social media platforms such as Face book, Twitter, Whatsapp, Snap Chat and others to share ideas about a range of topics with each other and their peers in the Diaspora including terrorist sites.

The study examined that, youths in Kenya were migrating to cities such as Nairobi in search of educational opportunities, employment and the modern amenities that accompany urban life most of whom were Somali nationals who inhabited Nairobi's Eastleigh and adjacent Majengo and Pumwani areas. Although, East Africa's rapidly growing cities provide opportunities, they were also places where youth experience hardships connected to job shortages, high costs of living, and lack of traditional family and social structures. The difficulties of urban life were mentioned as a source of youth frustration and were rendering

⁶⁴Sabahi, Muslim Youth Centre vows violent response to killing of its leader Rogo, 27 August 2012, http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2012/08/27/feature-01 (accessed 26 March 2013).

⁶⁵Ibid

certain young people vulnerable to radical influences. Participants suggested that counter-radicalization programs would make special efforts to reach out for young people who were struggling to survive in large cities.

Participants nevertheless underscored the importance of differentiating between youth in the region.⁶⁶ Some Kenyan youth choose to live in rural areas, adhere to more traditional lifestyles, and were far removed from the activities of the state. The study further established that the Kenyan youth vary according to religious preferences, practicing Christianity, Islam, other world religions, or no religion at all. Religious experiences were important factors when addressing youth radicalization, both as potential drivers and antidotes to violent extremism. As such, they recommended that governments include religious leaders and mentors in their counter-radicalization planning and program implementation.⁶⁷

In addition, the Kenyan youth have divergent experiences with their country's public institutions. The diverse interactions that Kenya maintains with its youth populations shaped how young people view political involvement and their trust in or disillusionment with political leaders. Thus confidence in political institutions discourages youth radicalization while skepticism led to feelings of frustration, exclusion, disappointment, polarized mindset, tendency to misinterpret situations, victim mentality and increased violent extremist organizations (VEO) vulnerability. Put differently it was established that because the academic concern with Muslims minorities in Kenya today is driven largely by perception of Muslims as potential dangerous, this ignites the usual debate on marginalization and exclusion from economic resources by the government of Kenya.

⁶⁶ Anzalone, Christopher. "Kenya's Muslim Youth Center and Al-Shabaab's East African Recruitment." CTC Sentinel 5, no. 10 (October 2012).

⁶⁷ Combating Terrorism Center, "Al-Qaida's (Mis)adventures in the Horn of Africa," 2 July 2007, <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-qaidasmisadventures-in-the-horn-of-africa>.

2.4 Ethnic and religious factors

Ethnic and religion was a crucial factor to radicalization as was observed by majority of the respondents, since key development that emerged from the violent attacks on civilians was, local Kenyan nationals were involved and not Somali-Kenyans or Somali nationals whose relatives were residing in Nairobi's Eastleigh estate and its environs such as Majengo and Pumwani areas as was originally assumed. Understandably, concerns about violent extremists in the Horn of Africa had been aggravated by the political instability in Somalia which gave rise to Al-Shabaab in year 2007. However, as mentioned above, many Kenyan youths particularly those from Somali and Afro-Arab Swahili origin and those drawn from urban informal settlements such as Majengo (an old informal settlement in Nairobi's Eastland), have been linked to Al-Shabaab activities.⁶⁸ The majority of Majengo inhabitants are de-tribalized Muslims with low standards of living due to lack of economic opportunities.

Nairobi's Majengo area attracted the attention of security agencies after it was reported that a large number of Kenyan Muslim youths who had joined Al-Shabaab in Somalia came from Majengo. For example, in December 2011 the Kenyan police released the names of fifteen (15) men they believed had left Kismayu for Kenya.⁶⁹ The group included nine Kenyan nationals aged between 24 and 32 and known to have resided in Majengo and Mombasa before leaving for Somalia in 2010.⁷⁰ At the same time, the Muslim community especially Kenyan nationals of Somali origin are confronted with increasing perceptions of being responsible for the growing security risks in the country. The fact that they are visibly part of the Muslim community, even if not in any way part of Al-Shabaab, contributed to them being treated differently. Most notably,

⁶⁸ Christopher Anzalone, "Kenya's Muslim Youth Center and Al-Shabaab's East African Recruitment," CTC Sentinel 5, no. 10 (October 2012): 9-13

⁶⁹ Rinehart, Jason. "Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency." Perspectives on Terrorism 4, no. 5 (2010).

⁷⁰ Z addockAngira, Police name 15 key Shabaab fugitives, Daily Nation, 31 December 2011, <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/1297974/-/10c6s8kz/-/index.html> (accessed 26 March 2013).

members of the Somali-Kenyan and Somali communities claim to be victims of racial or ethnic profiling and to have been rounded up and arrested for little reason other than their race and ethnicity.

Another trend was that in addition to being locals, it was reported that those implicated had recently converted to Islam, which raised concern among the Muslim community as to the way young people were converted to Islam and the capacity of extremists to exploit new converts. This reminded the broader Kenyan community that ethnic or religious profiling is not an effective counter-measure in identifying possible Al-Shabaab members or supporters. Additionally, authorities were cautioned against perceiving the spread of any particular religion or conversion to such, as a threat to national security. This concern was confirmed by the UN Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritrea which reported that hundreds of impoverished Kenyan youths had been recruited into Al-Shabaab in recent years.

The study further established that, Al-Shabaab's presence in Kenya has been concentrated primarily within the ethnic Somali community, but since 2009 the group has rapidly expanded its influence and membership to non-Somali Kenyan nationals. An investigative report by daily nation in Kenya, pointed out that madrassa has become a hotbed for recruitment and radicalization in Nairobi's Eastleigh neighbourhood where radical Islamism are reported to be active in recruitment and radicalization. According to the parents of madrassa in Nairobi's Pumwani Estate, extremist teachers had been using the school to hide their real business by smuggling youths as young as 15 years to Somalia to train with Al-shabaab.⁷¹

⁷¹ Leftie, P. Al-Shabaab executes 'Kenyan spy', Daily Nation, 11 January 2012, <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Al-Shabaab+executes+Kenyan+spy+/-/1056/1303950/-/vx9k9u/-/index.html> (accessed 26 March 2013).

On 12 January 2012 Kenya Defence Forces spokesperson Maj. Emanuel Chirchir was quoted saying that, Al-Shabaab had executed a man within its ranks whom it accused of spying for the Kenyan military. Chirchir added that, the executed 'spy' was a Non-Somali Kenyan said to hail from Nairobi's Majengo area and who had earlier been recruited to fight for Al-Shabaab. During another interview with the same parents, it was found out that extremists employed a systematic process to transform their recruits into cold-blooded killers by use of mixture of deception, control and brain washing in an effective and often deadly way and that at the Madrassas, the young people are indoctrinated in extremist interpretation of the Koran; some are selected to become bombers and eventually they are taken away without a farewell to their families to embark on their suicide mission.⁷²

In another more recent example, Kenyan police officers arrested Titus Nyabiswa a 26 years old, in a village on the Kenyan coast close to Mombasa and confiscated several firearms and hand grenades. Nyabiswa apparently, converted to Islam in western Kenya before becoming involved with Omar Faraj who was allegedly involved in a bombing incident on 24th October 2012 which killed a police officer and two other suspected members of Al-Shabaab after police raided Faraj's home in Mombasa as he was under close surveillance before the operation.⁷³ When assessing the overall vulnerability of the youth in Kenya to both radicalization and recruitment by organisations such as Al-Shabaab, one needs to understand where and why people are susceptible to the message of radical ideologies.

⁷² Daily Nation, Military apologises over old 'spy' pictures, 12 January 2012, <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Military+apologises+over+old+spy+pictures+/-/1056/1304780/-/cb617k/-/index.html> (accessed 26 March 2013).

⁷³ Jim Kouri, Suspected Al Shabaab terrorists in Kenya linked to Obama family, Examiner, 29 October 2012, <http://www.examiner.com/article/suspected-al-shabaabterrorists-kenya-linked-to-obama-family> (accessed 26 March 2013).

The study also noted that, Education was viewed as key for several reasons since the limiting effects of lacking a high school education potentially served as an avenue for frustration and anger leading to criminality and radicalization. The radicalization influence on College Campuses, understanding how many College Students exhibited signs of radicalization was very informative. For example, in Nairobi's Eastleigh estate it was established that Schools and Mosques taught extremist views and this had reshaped the Somali community who are the majority. Moderate Imams complete with hard-line preachers pushing for a strict interpretation of Islam for instance radicalized Sheik Ahmed Ali who was a Student at Jomo Kenyatta University College of Agriculture and Technology, after his University Education in 1998, he worked for Oil Multinationals shell and Mobil company as an engineer, but it was his exemplary performance in mobilization of the community at Masjid Pumwani Riadhya Mosque that caught the eye of Al-Shabaab who appointed him the de-facto leader of its Kenyan cell in 2007.

Lastly, in light of recent terrorist attempts by college-educated individuals, it must be considered whether radicalization might occur after the education process and the individual is exposed to other influences like limited employment opportunities or wage discrimination that could contribute strongly to the radicalization. Moreover, it was noted those who have pursued education up to higher level were as well vulnerable to radicalization because of extremist ideologies and financial gain. In some cases it was found that individuals who had all the facilities to enjoy decided to join the extremes groups to identify with the group for fame since doing that would make him famous among the Muslim community and the entire world.

2.5 Chapter Summary

In this chapter, it has been established that the most susceptible group to radicalization are youths both gender males and females. Despite Kenya having larger population of the youths who could properly engage in economic development of the country, the younger ones aged between ten (10) and twenty five (25) still remain vulnerable to radicalization due to peer pressure, frustration and marginalization . It was further noted that ethnic and religious factors played a significant role in the process of involvement in radicalization. This chapter has confirmed and accomplished objective and research question number two of the study.

CHAPTER THREE

SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE RADICALIZATION

3.0 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the social and economic factors that influence individuals into radicalization, stressing on poor economic conditions which increase pressure for economic change and, as a result, triggering government reactions to such uprisings. Situations where increased economic disparities occur within or are limited to identifiable ethnic and religious groups definitely affect the political climate, raising questions of discrimination and marginalisation. It further explores socio-economic challenges, economic deprivation, socio-political factors, and unemployment and identity factors.

3.1 Socio-economic Challenges

Socio-economic development is called for not only in Kenya but also the entire continent. However, it was established that poverty alone was not driving people to radicalization but poor socio-economic circumstances undoubtedly made individuals more susceptible to it. It was noted that a key factor was unequal opportunity for upward social mobility as a result of religious, ethnic and political differences. Creating new jobs is not the responsibility of only government; it requires innovative thinking by ordinary people. However, government can create an environment that encourages innovation such as offering tax breaks and low-interest loans to start changing the mentality of future entrepreneurs at school, much can be done to encourage

and equip young people not only to become educated but also to contribute to the financial stability of the country and to their own well-being.⁷⁴

According to Botha, poor socio-economic conditions in terms of population growth are apparent in poor access to public services, uneven development, urbanization, lack of economic prosperity, unemployment and illiteracy which contribute to a country and community's vulnerability to social conflict and radicalization.⁷⁵ It was observed that, if economic development could be manifested equally in all regions, it was vital to cut socio-economic grievances which would leave the government with the primary responsibility of providing basic services to all people especially to the communities regarded as marginalised. It was also reported that State absence in providing health care, education, infrastructure among others created a void that other role-players are willing to fill, thus gave Non-Governmental Organisations, charities and foreign governments an opportunity to provide valuable assistance to communities in need and this should be allowed to continue with their activities under careful supervision.

3.2 Economic Deprivation

On economic deprivation, it was observed that Relative economic deprivation was the subject of local dissent, dissatisfaction and opposition to the national government.⁷⁶ The average incidence of poverty in the Nairobi county was sixty two (62%) percent in 2006.⁷⁷ The level of economic disparity is perceived as being particularly acute among the province's large

⁷⁴ Oliver Mathenge and Zadock Angira, Garissa erupts in violence after soldiers' killing, Daily Nation, 21 November 2012, <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Garissa-erupts-in-violence-after-soldiers-killing/-/1056/1625452/-/ex3xjcz/-/index.html>

⁷⁵ Botha, Anneli. Assessing the vulnerability of Kenyan youths to radicalisation and extremism. ISS Paper 245. April 2013

⁷⁶ M Khayat, Al-Shabab Al-Mujahideen and Kenyan Muslim Youth Center strengthen ties, Middle East Media Research Institute, Inquiry and Analysis Series Report no. 870, 12 August 2012, 1, http://www.memri.org/report/en/print6581.htm#_edn5

⁷⁷ Bosire Boniface, Muslim Youth Centre aims to create religious strife in Kenya, analysts say, Sabahi, 22 August 2012, http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2012/08/22/feature-01

concentration of Muslims who felt increasingly marginalized by broken promises of deeper government commitment to equitable development in the region.⁷⁸ Some Kenyans were keenly aware of the role of local socio-economic deprivation and anti-government sentiment on conditions conducive to violent extremism. Reflecting on these conditions, it was observed by one local civil society representative who expressed concerns over the inability of local institutions to address local needs in education, employment, and security which provided an opportunity for violent extremists to capitalize on widespread feelings of hopelessness and marginalization among local communities.⁷⁹

Organizations such as al-Shabaab “latch on to any grievance that anybody might have” and use the tailwinds of related frustrations to rally individuals particularly youth to their cause. As one local religious leader and community activist exclaimed, al-Shabaab “owes me nothing while government owes me everything. So it was up to them to behave in a manner that does not allow Al-Shabaab any room to get to my son. I think if Al-Shabaab were to recruit my son today, I would point my finger at the government. The government would have thrown the first stone.” These are sentiments noted by Maalim in the study of Al Shabaab mortars⁸⁰ It was noted that, there was a consensus among the respondents that unemployment and lack of economic opportunity was a major source of general insecurity and could potentially contribute to opening pathways to violent extremism among individuals in vulnerable local communities.

⁷⁸ Ibid

⁷⁹ Sabahi, Muslim Youth Centre vows violent response to killing of its leader Rogo, 27 August 2012, http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2012/08/27/feature-01

34. Tom Odula, Kenya attacks: ElgiveBwireOliacha, Al Shabaab member, pleads guilty, Huffington Post, 26 October 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/26/kenya-attacks-al-shabaab_n_1032508.html

⁸⁰ AbdilatifMaalim, Kenyan civilians injured by Al Shabaab mortars, Somalia Report, 16 March 2011, http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/301/Kenyan_Civilians_Injured_By_Al_Shabaab_Mortars

High levels of unemployment, reported at forty (40%) percent in December 2011 were commonly cited as a grievance around which violence may be incited.⁸¹ A youth community organizer from Mombasa noted that “the issue of unemployment is rampant in Nairobi and at the coast” and “citizens did not feel that the government was making an effort to improve job growth even though it was seen to be in the best position to alleviate this issue.”⁸² For example, during an interview with the Chairman of Kenya Muslims National Advisory Council in Eastleigh, he confided that a young convert of Al-shabaab narrated how he was recruited, given shelter in the mosque, food, clothes and even more pocket money by Al-shabaab in a mosque in Nairobi’s Majengo estate. He had already been taken by Al-Shabaab to the North Eastern town of Garissa and was on his way to Somalia, but Al-Shabaab got nervous and sent him back after Kenyan forces intervention in Somalia.

Majority shared the perception that local economic deprivation was as a result of government mismanagement of resources. They commonly cited discrepancies in the quality of infrastructure between central and Nairobi to illustrate this disparity.⁸³ Nairobi County generates a significant amount of income for the country but the community representatives felt they see little in return by way of government investment in local infrastructure and public services. Instead, the revenue is invested elsewhere in the country. A local human rights expert in Nairobi identified “general lack of infrastructure in many rural parts” of Coast, Nyanza, North Eastern and Eastern parts of the country as a very real grievance and economic deficiency. Another stated that the Coast Province “attracts tourism as the beaches was a major income generating

⁸¹ Richard Munguti, Two charged over police deaths, The Nation, 29 March 2011, <http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-252925408/two-charged-over-police.html>

⁸² Ibid

⁸³ Tom Odula, Kenya attacks: ElgiveBwireOliacha, Al Shabaab member, pleads guilty, Huffington Post, 26 October 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/26/kenya-attacks-al-shabaab_n_1032508.html

opportunities , but when you go further inward into where the people live, there is lack of infrastructure.’⁸⁴

A number of local interviewees identified land ownership as a primary grievance contributing to a broader sense of marginalization and inequity among communities in Coast Province. These land-related grievances date to the time of Kenya’s independence, when the lands of the British colonists were redistributed disproportionately in favour of particular ethnic groups from other parts of the country. “Most of the lands that belonged to the coastal people were taken by the ruling elite using their political positions,” stated a community organizer from Mombasa who was a businessman in Nairobi’s Eastleigh estate. Land owners and their heirs are viewed as “non-indigenous Kenyan farmers” who profit from the dispossession of native people from the coast. As a result of land redistribution, many indigenous of the coast are “squatters” on the land they believe to be rightfully theirs but that belongs to absentee landlords who can evict them at any time.⁸⁵

For the youth in Mombasa, frustration over this landlessness can easily lead to tension.⁸⁶ A religious leader and scholar in Nairobi noted that young men become resentful of “foreigners and aliens coming in to their territory, getting land and getting that land recognized legally through registration” while community elders who have lived and worked this land are left powerless.⁸⁷ The Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), a local political movement calling for

⁸⁴ Property Kenya, Suspects in grenade attacks denied bail, 4 November 2011, <http://www.propertykenya.com/news/1547594-suspects-in-grenade-attacks-denied-bail>

⁸⁵ Daily Nation, Military apologises over old ‘spy’ pictures, 12 January 2012, <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Military+apologises+over+old+spy+pictures+/-/1056/1304780/-/cb617k/-/index.html>

⁸⁶ Jim Kouri, Suspected Al Shabaab terrorists in Kenya linked to Obama family, Examiner, 29 October 2012, <http://www.examiner.com/article/suspected-al-shabaabterrorists-kenya-linked-to-obama-family>

⁸⁷ UNSC, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1916 (2010)

the secession of the coast from the rest of Kenya, was discussed in the context of local grievances over land and other aspects of marginalization on the coast.

3.3 Socio-Political factors

With youth unemployment comprising seventy (70%) percent of the country's total unemployment rate,⁸⁸ it was established that lack of opportunity among Kenya's rapidly growing youth population has been associated with growing sense of socio-economic and political marginalization. Interlocutors repeatedly expressed concerns related to marginalized and frustrated youth in their communities whom they categorized as easily influenced and idle with a greater propensity to engage in behaviours that created insecurity within the community. Some Nairobi's Eastleigh elders and traditional leaders mentioned unemployment and lack of education as the primary reasons for youth frustration. They noted the frequency with which they encounter aimless youth with nowhere to go.

Al-Shabaab has been targeting Kenyan youth for recruitment, especially in Pumwani, Majengo, Eastleigh and the coastal regions as observed by majority of the respondents. Most people who run organizations such as Al-Shabaab "were not well versed in Islam. They latch onto any grievance that anybody might have and removed from any intellectual content and use that as a reason to radicalize them and become rabble rousers. Indeed used exaggerations and lies to manipulate the youth into radicalization. In Nairobi and other parts of the country especially Mombasa and North Eastern parts, it was reported that including other secondary sources that al-Shabaab's youth-targeted recruitment poses a threat to Kenyan security as there have been instances of youth who run away, come back, and experiment on these areas."⁸⁹

⁸⁸ William Chittick, The theological roots of peace and war according to Islam, *The Islamic Quarterly* 34(3) (1990), 156.

⁸⁹ Roggio, Shabaab names new leader of Kenyan branch, *The Long War Journal*, 13 January 2012, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/01/shabaab_names_new_le.php

3.4 Unemployment factors

The study established that unemployment and general lack of economic opportunity was a major source of general insecurity and can potentially contribute to opening pathways to violent extremism among individuals in vulnerable local communities. High levels of unemployment are reported at forty (40%) percent in December 2011, as a grievance around which violence may be incited. During an interview with a civil society chairman and a father of 16 year old son, described how his son changed his religion and started visiting the mosque in Nairobi's Majengo estate where he was radicalized to join Al- Shabaab.⁹⁰ He further said that a group known as Muslim Youth Centre (MYC) operating in Pumwani Estate in Nairobi is a recruiting agency for Al-Shabaab.

Officially, the constitution of MYC defines the group as a 'Community Based organization' that aims to provide youth with religious counseling but in practice, members openly engage in recruiting youths for Al-Shabaab in Kenya and facilitates their travel to Somalia for training to fight for 'jihad'.⁹¹ A youth community organizer from Nairobi's Eastleigh estate noted that "the issue of unemployment is rampant in Nairobi County" and "citizens did not feel that the government was making an effort to improve job growth even though it was seen to be in the best position to alleviate the issue." According to various interviews, Al-Shabaab is a form of employment for many 'unemployed'. According to them, joining Al-Shabaab is paying well, from \$50-\$150 monthly, depending on the work, yet required little effort. "All one had to do was carry around a gun, grenade and patrol the streets," explained a respondent. "It was an easy job compared to other jobs such as construction work."

⁹⁰ Interview (Civil Society) July 2015

⁹¹ Ibid

Therefore, for some of these youth, a significant reason for joining Al-Shabaab was because it enabled them to provide for themselves and their families. Although personal poverty is not a reason for joining violent extremism, the cases of these youth showed that the effects of poverty such as idleness and low self-esteem, could not be ignored in this discussion. The fact that many Somali youth are unemployed and rely on relatives for sustenance either in Somalia or in the Diaspora, dampens their self-worth such that when an opportunity to fend for oneself arises, they are quick to take that advantage.⁹² This in turn results in the spread of radicalization into extremism.

3.5 Identity Factors

According to Schwartz, Al-Shabaab uses reputation to attract youth as a recruiter would first identify a group of youth who seemed to consistently socialize in or frequent a specific location. He would then approach one of the youth and offer to make him an “Amir” of his own “men” if he could get three or more of his friends to also join.⁹³ This was the most popular reason cited in interviews as well. In the words of one respondent, “Walking the city with a gun as a member of Al-Shabaab ensured everybody feared and respected you. Girls also liked you.” Those who joined Al-Shabaab especially in towns where the group had a large presence were seen as heroes for defending the country and the religion.⁹⁴

In the study it was found that most youth value reputation that one earns by joining Al-Shabaab as it was attractive for two main reasons. First, it delivered them from irrelevance to prominence. In a society that places great emphasis on age, the economically dependent youth command little respect and were seen as powerless. By becoming a member of Al-Shabaab,

⁹² Roland Marchal, “The Rise of a Jihadi Movement in a Country at War: Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen in Somalia,” Center for Scientific Research at Sciences-Po., Paris, 2011, p. 12.

⁹³ Seth J. Schwartz et al., “Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 32:6 (2009): pp. 552-553.

⁹⁴ Interviews: Eastleigh Nairobi, July 2015

youth were able to gain immediate respect and access to power, thereby strengthening their sense of self-worth. Second, it strengthened a particular identity: in this case, “defender of a country and religion.” This is important for two reasons. It highlighted the centrality of Islam in Somalis’ sense of identity.⁹⁵ The role of religion is especially magnified in the identity of youth for whose clan politics has brought nothing but chaos and destruction.

That was why when asked whether they were Somali or Muslim first, majority of the respondents answered they were Muslim first. This did not necessarily indicate religious zealotry, but rather the intertwined nature of religion and nationality in their sense of identity. More importantly, though, it echoes Seth Schwartz’s argument that terrorism represents a confluence of cultural, social, and personal identity.⁹⁶ It particularly underlines the role of a cultural identity strongly rooted in collectivism - prioritizing the group over oneself- in accepting terrorism. In this case, collectivism is evidenced by the youth’s willingness to sacrifice their ambitions, relationships and lives for the sake of religion or country.⁹⁷

3.6 Other Factors

Assessing the role of economic conditions should guard against the assumption that socio-economic or political conditions ‘compel’ individuals or groups to commit acts of terrorism. More importantly, a combination of the socio-economic factors do eventually manifest in acts of terrorism among other forms of violent extremism. The introduction of a political or religious ideology could allow poor socio-economic conditions to induce individuals who had

⁹⁵ International Crisis Group. “Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation.” Africa Briefing, no. 85 (25 January 2012), <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/b085-kenyansomali-islamist-radicalisation.aspx>.

⁹⁶ Seth J. Schwartz et al., “Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 32:6 (2009): pp. 552-553.

⁹⁷ Roland Marchal, “The Rise of a Jihadi Movement in a Country at War: Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen in Somalia,” Center for Scientific Research at Sciences-Po., Paris, 2011, p. 12.

nothing to lose and in other words, replaceable foot soldiers.⁹⁸ There are other actors associated with socio-economic factors influencing radicalization as discussed below. Fast population growth can have effect on security based on the competition for resources.

In matters of terrorism, radicalization, possibility of population and conflict are directly linked to the ability of the state, more directly the 'land', to fulfil people's basic needs. Although a larger man power can financially contribute to the sustainability of the state as the state can lack resources such as land to sustain the population. Associated with this was, the growing concern that population growth and climate change will further enhance the possibility of conflict over water and food on the African continent. Overpopulation, particularly in situations where the majority of the population was underage, could place additional strain on basic service delivery. High population growth, particularly in developing countries, could enhance the vulnerability of a country to instability and conflict in two ways: through straining on government to fulfil the basic needs of its citizens and competition among people for scarce resources made worse by overpopulation.

With a bulge in population, a state may be unable to provide education, employment and broader up-lift opportunities are at risk of growing marginalisation and frustration. When accompanied by urbanisation, slums could be a breeding ground for extremism: 'Slum belts around many cities especially Majengo slums in Nairobi are incubators for radicalization and Consequently, in the developing world was living with explosive population growth placing in the hands of revolutionary organizations dedicated to destroying governments, legions of young women and men with few good prospects the veritable working capital of violence.'⁹⁹ Additionally, overall access to basic needs and services as well as access to these facilities is

⁹⁸ R Ehrlich and L Jianguo, Socioeconomic and demographic roots of terrorism, in J J F Forest (ed), *The making of a terrorist: recruitment, training and root causes*, vol 3, Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006, 165.

⁹⁹ Hogan and M Taylor, *The making of a terrorist*, *Jane's Intelligence Review* 13(12) (2001), 16-18

often unequally distributed within a country may cause frustration. For example, people often expect that there should be less access to basic services in rural than in urban areas. It is also to be expected that richer communities will have better access to services than poorer communities.

According to the Failed State Index of the Fund for Peace, uneven development in Kenya in 2012 is scored at 8.2 (on a scale where fully uneven development at 10 and fully even development at 1).¹⁰⁰ However, when access to resources is based on ethnic, cultural or religious characteristics or there is a growing divide between the 'haves' and 'have nots' in countries and communities, economic conditions further contribute to instability. In other words, countries confronted by large differences between 'haves' and 'have nots' are additionally vulnerable to conflict, which may include resorting to acts of terrorism. Indeed, scholars such as Ngugi wa Thiong'o have suggested that in Kenya, the issue of ethnicity is overrated and that the focus should shift from terming ethnicity to 'haves and have nots'.¹⁰¹

The relationship between inequality and conflict extends beyond socio-economic or even political conditions. According to the World Bank's 2004 World Development Report high inequality can lead to latent social conflict, which manifests itself through political struggles for public resources. Inequality may mean that different social groups have different interests, and the outcome of the political process through which those interests are reconciled may lead to reduce aggregate outcomes. This may happen because political processes (electoral or otherwise) seek to effect redistributions but may do so in ways that have high economic costs.¹⁰² Underlying social grievances caused by factors such as inequality, ethnic and linguistic fragmentation, and

¹⁰⁰ Ibid

¹⁰¹ Wilfred Ayaga. "We are not savages, NgugiwaThiong'o tells politicians" Updated Friday, June 5th 2015. Available at: <http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000164632/we-are-not-savages-ngugi-wa-thiong-o-tells-politicians>

¹⁰² World Bank, World development report, 2004, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2003/10/07/000090341_20031007150121/Rendered/PDF/268950PAPER0WDR02004.pdf

social distrust in government institutions play a key role, directly impacting on the state's ability to deal with social conflict. In other words, the greater the latent social conflict, the less state institutions will be able to effectively manage that conflict.

Inhabitants of the coastal region in Kenya, where 30 per cent of the country's Muslim population lives, complain that this area is less developed than the rest of the country. What makes this uneven development more volatile is the perception that the religious divide in the country ultimately contributes to this situation. It is therefore not only a debate about development, but becomes a religious and eventually a political debate.¹⁰³ Subsequent calls for self-determination and independence from the rest of the country become intertwined with religious, political and economic circumstances that are increasingly difficult to separate. Kenya's scores in the annual Failed State Index indicate that the country experiences considerable demographic pressures, group grievances, uneven development, poverty and decline despite nominal improvements here and there.

In terms of coastal people's claims that the Kenyan authorities disregard their needs, the coastal region was traditionally far more developed as a trade route from the Middle East and India to the interior but this situation has changed dramatically since independence.¹⁰⁴ Arguably, the Coast has also taken a relative marginal position in respect to the distribution of investments and services as it appears the most deprived region. Apart from Mombasa, no intermediate urban centres have been designated. There has not been any concerted effort or planning for the development of this part of the country by successive governments. Since Independence the

¹⁰³ Ibid

¹⁰⁴ Ibid

centre has been dominated by up-country groups and there has been an under representation of ministerial positions given to coastal representatives.¹⁰⁵

3.7 Chapter Summary

On socio-economic factors to radicalization the study has established that the drivers of radicalization in Kenya included perceived marginalisation and exclusion from national resources, frustrated expectations, and relative deprivation. Despite the immediate links that are often made between poverty and radicalization, the issue of economic conditions extended well beyond just poverty. In other words, other indicators provided favourable circumstances for radicalization and eventual recruitment. Therefore, economic difficulties such as unequal access to resources and expertise contribute to a state's vulnerability to radicalization which in turn leads to terrorism. However, when studying the background of those behind terrorist attacks, it has been noted that not only poor people are drawn to terrorism but also the rich. The possibility of better-off people being drawn to extremism makes it necessary to determine the role poor economic conditions plays.

¹⁰⁵ Dick Foeken, Jan Hoorweg and R A Obudho, *The Kenya coast: a regional study*, Leiden: Leiden University, 2000, <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/4675/ASC-1241504-044.pdf?sequence=1>

CHAPTER FOUR

COUNTER- RADICALIZATION AND DE-RADICALIZATION STRATEGIES IN KENYA

4.0 Introduction

This chapter examines the strategies and measure put in place by the Kenyan government to counter- radicalization and to de-radicalize the already affected youths. The study will discuss on State actors and machinery such Kenya police, intelligence, judiciary, prison and remand. It will also focus on Non- state actors like religious groups, civil society organization and Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and then summary to the chapter.

4.1 Counter-radicalization and de-radicalization

Counter-radicalization as adopted by united nation working group on radicalization and extremism that leads to terrorism is “a package of social, political, legal, education and economic programmes specifically designed to deter disaffected and possibly those already radicalized individuals from becoming terrorist” thus counter- radicalization works upstream to prevent radicalization by reducing vulnerability and increasing resilience to these individuals who have become radical with an aim of re-integrating then in the society ¹⁰⁶. De-radicalization on the other hand, seeks to reverse the radicalization process for those already or partly radicalized or help them to disengage with radical or extreme groups, whether or not they change their ideas as a result. ¹⁰⁷ In this regard, this chapter addresses the State actors and machinery and Non state actors in counter radicalization and de- radicalization measures in an overall attempt to counter terrorism.

¹⁰⁶ Ryan and Neumann, 2009

¹⁰⁷ UN- first report of the working group on radicalization and extremism that leads to terrorism; inventory of state programmes, 2008

4.2 State Actors and Machinery

State actors are people, entities or authorities acting on behalf of a government body and therefore subject to regulations. However, as used in this study state actors and machinery are government authorities with a mandate to providing information and deter threat of any nature, provide counter measure, maintain peace and national security and enforce law to citizens in a country. These are: Kenya police, intelligence, judiciary, prison and remand.

4.2.1 The Kenya Police

The study established that majority of the respondents note with concerns that Kenyan police have, over the years, accumulated a tattered reputation because of their use of excessive force, allegations of corruption and extrajudicial killings and therefore could not be trusted with counter-radicalization. It was further observed during the study that, by sending its troops to Somalia, Kenya lost its distinctive regional profile as the only country whose military never went to war with any of its neighbours and this had two consequences; the first was that Al-Shabaab explicitly targeted Kenya for retribution. Since Kenya intervened in Somalia, there have been a total of thirty (30) attacks involving grenades or improvised explosive devices.¹⁰⁸

This succession of relatively minor incidents precluded the attack on the upscale Westgate shopping mall on 21st September, 2013. The second consequence was to reinforce Kenya's explicitly prominent role in the War on Terror in the region. Domestically, the face of the aggressive counter-terrorism posture was the enhanced role of the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) and the passage of an anti-terrorism bill in 2002. It was noted that policing terrorism as a transnational crime was posing significant multifaceted challenges. On general scale, there were significant challenges in terms of personnel capacity and operational infrastructure needed

¹⁰⁸ Nelson Odhiambo, "Experts Split on Calls to Withdraw Kenyan Troops from Somalia After Terror Attack." Daily Nation, April 12, 2015.

for the police to prevent such crime. The legal framework of these growing attacks has a couple of challenges mostly with regard to formulation and enforcement of regulatory laws. For instance, on 30th April 2003, the government introduced the suppression of terrorism bill (through Supplement No. 38 of Kenya Gazette).¹⁰⁹

The anti-terrorism bill was abandoned midway as anti-lobbyists of the bill perceived that if enacted, it could be perceived as calculated to stereotype and victimize the Muslim population. Critics of the bill argued that it was a reproduction of the US Patriots Act. Opponents of the bill, such as sections of the civil society organized rallies countrywide to educate Kenyans on the evils of the bill. Indeed, the US and Britain had issued travel advisories to their nationals against visiting Kenya until the anti-terror legislation was enacted. One of the claims made against the bill was that it allowed problematic police searches and extra-judicial actions against suspected terrorists who would have no recourse within the law.¹¹⁰

The secrecy concerning the training and equipping of the special units of the police for counter-terrorism operations have in the past highlighted the chances of repression and unaccountability by a police largely perceived to be incompetent, corrupt, repressive and alienating the public that it serves.¹¹¹ As one interviewed police officer puts it, the fight against terrorism was viewed as being discriminatory to the Muslim community in Kenya:¹¹² Curbing terrorism is, however, challenging because the Muslim population claim the efforts put in place are discriminatory to them while terrorism continues to pose significant challenges to the police.

¹⁰⁹ counterterrorism assistance before and after 9/11. *African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies*. 5(1), 119-126

¹¹⁰ Al Jazeera America (2013). Kenyan authorities hold eight suspects in Nairobi mall attack. (2013, September 28). Al Jazeera America. Retrieved from <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/28/>

¹¹¹ Jeanne Giraldo and Harold Trinkunas, "Transnational Crime," in *Contemporary Security Studies*, ed. Collins, A. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 346-367.

¹¹² Ibid

The interviewed police officers perceived radicalization as a process to terrorism threats emanating from the lawless state of Somalia that lacked a central governing authority since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991.

There are striking narratives of interviewed police officers to the effect that terrorist threats abound from the famous Somali-based terrorist group Al-Shabaab said to have clandestine recruitments and training centers in Kenya. It was found that terrorism is a transnational crime that goes beyond the purview of the state police. It has increasingly become a global problem that requires concerted action by the synergies of nations. Since Kenya has been a target of terror attacks in the past, it was established that Kenyans unique interests to other countries and its strategic location globally makes it vulnerable to attacks. Furthermore, it was found that Kenya has weak independent institutions that cannot be relied upon for the counter measures to radicalization.

On August 7th 1998, the US Embassy in Nairobi was attacked in which over 200 lives were lost. Apparently, the anti-terrorism debate in Kenya is dominated by the regional policy agenda of the US government in which the Kenyan government is considered an important ally given the country's geographical and historical proximity to the Middle East and the Arab world believed in Western security agendas to be the principal source of contemporary international [Islamist] terrorism. Hence, with regard to the Global War on Terror (GWOT) championed by the US government, there appears to be a convergence of interest between the Kenyan state security apparatus and the US foreign policy goals on security.¹¹³

From a purely Kenyan state-centric position, this relationship is arguably beneficial because international cooperation and support may assist the Kenyan state to overcome capacity deficits in terms of policing terrorism. Police officers interviewed, cognizant of the fact that they

cannot effectively prosecute the anti-terrorism campaign alone, advocated the need for partnership with international bodies, such as Interpol. A cross section of interviewed police officers of various ranks in Nairobi said that terrorist organizations operating from Somali have established a range of secret training bases of radicalization sites especially mosques in Kenya and that it was a challenge to their provision of internal security.¹¹⁴ Regarding law enforcement, some of the interviewed police officers cited lack of a comprehensive legislation as an impediment to curbing the growing threat of new crime waves such as those that operate through modern technologies like cyber crimes, identity impersonation and copyright infringements.

It was noted that, the Kenya Communications Amendment Act of 2008 in which cyber crimes are defined was not sufficiently comprehensive as there are a number of new crimes that are not covered by the Act. For instance, respondents observed that over the past two years there has been an increase in fraud involving mobile phone money transfer services that was not adequately addressed in the 2008 legislation. Interviewed police officers stress the need to constantly review legislations to make them more responsive to changing crime trends, especially cyber crimes.¹¹⁵

4.2.2. Intelligence

The study established that because Kenya has unique social, cultural, religious, political, psychological and economic aspects as drivers of radicalization, it needed an equally diverse counter-radicalization and de-radicalization strategy which detect and deter threats posed by terrorists based on typologies or generic profiles of terrorists that was based on intelligent led strategies. As such, each aspect of the strategy was to focus on a unique typology of terrorists and other transnational threats. Moreover, recent events in Kenya signaled existence of a diverse

¹¹⁴ Interview July 2015

¹¹⁵ Ibid

intelligence led counter-terrorism strategy to tackle radicalization and terror activities. Closure of radicalization and indoctrination terror cells and groups in East Africa by the National Intelligence Service (NIS) was indicative of a successful multifaceted strategy.

The Intelligence Service has also profiled dozens of terror recruitment agents operating on the cyber-space which led to arrests of several criminals. Human intelligence (HUMINT) operations targeting terror cells operated by the Somali Islamist group Harakat Al-Shabaab AL-Mujahedeen were scaled up since the year 2014 throughout 2015.¹¹⁶ Increased army operations against the Somali Islamist, besides border operations by special army units, and the Rapid Deployment Unit to ¹¹⁷confound proliferation of the border by the terror groups are paying off. “We have killed dozens of key Al-Shabaab terrorists, more than 50 have been arrested and are facing cases in court, and nearly a hundred are on the terror watch-list, while key terror cells in East Africa are being closely monitored by intelligence services.

On the other hand, nearly over a hundred members of the terror group Al-Shabaab have denounced terror and surrendered to the state.”¹¹⁸ The role of the intelligence service is to identify and provide effective counter intelligence on threats on national security; as such the intelligence service was limited in its counter-intelligence operations. It depends on the police service to effectively neutralize the threats. It was found that the Security Intelligence Services needed a robust homeland security policy, public awareness, effective law enforcement, and most important, inter-agency coordination to achieve effective counter-radicalization, de-radicalization and terrorism in order to contain national security.

¹¹⁶ Asim Qureshi, “Feeding grievances: The killing of Makaburi”, available at www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/04/feeding-grievances-killing-mak-2014411 (accessed on 9 June 2015)

¹¹⁷ Interview July 2015

¹¹⁸ Ibid

Kenya's strategy focuses on both preempting the threat posed by radicalization and the threat of terrorism, in fact the core objective of the strategy is to secure civilians and the property of the country from destruction by terrorists. The government was ensuring the identification and destruction of conditions that created and facilitated radicalization processes which eventually result to terrorism. Therefore devolution has been playing a key role in making conditions such as economic, political, and social negatives, become impossible to exploit for terrorists. However, this diverse strategy does not exclude the use of force to enforce law and safe guard human life and protect property of the Kenyan's.¹¹⁹

4.2.3 Judiciary

The Anti- terror police unit (ATPU) officers interviewed disclosed that Kenya's weak judicial system forced them to resort to assassinations, as police have failed to produce strong and enough evidence to prosecute terrorists. Domestic legislation was not the sole determinant of whether states have the capacity to arrest and prosecute terrorists, nor was it necessarily reflective of a state's ability to deter terrorist activities. Other factors, including the effective implementation of these laws, strength of the judicial system and whether or not state's approach counter-terrorism in a manner that addresses its root causes, are equally important.¹²⁰ Nevertheless, this surge of interest among African governments to enact and expand their counterterrorism laws suggests that this will be an area of increased activity in the years to come.

The recently passed sections of Kenyan Security Laws (Amendment) Act offers a cautionary example of how such laws may necessitate stronger political and structural counterbalances. Whereas Kenya was one of the countries that had previously strongly resisted

¹¹⁹ Aronson, S.L. (2012). United States aid to Kenya: A study on regional security and counterterrorism assistance before and after 9/11. *African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies*. 5(1), 119-126

¹²⁰ Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice (KPTI) Press 20-06-2014. 'Press Statement on the Mpeketoni and the Deteriorating state of Security in Kenya.'

pressure to enact counter-terrorism legislation in the post-9/11 period, in 2014 it was the Kenyan government, at least the executive branch and its allies within the legislature, that introduced and fought for the passage of the Security Laws. The main political opposition party and numerous civic groups strongly objected to the provisions of the bill, as well as the manner in which it was passed, which they alleged violated parliamentary rules and constitutional requirements.

These objections were partially upheld by the High Court in a ruling that found eight provisions of the Act unconstitutional. Even with some of the most controversial provisions struck out, the law expands the power of the president, the cabinet secretary and the director general of the National Intelligence Service, which human rights activists and political commentators claim takes Kenya back to the Moi era.¹²¹ The National Intelligence Service (NIS) is now allowed to authorize covert operations to “carry out any of its functions,” which can include entering any place, obtaining anything or any information, and search, take, return, and install anything. The court allowed up to 14 years in prison for saying anything “that is likely to be understood as directly or indirectly encouraging or inducing another person to commit or prepare to commit an act of terrorism,” whether or not that person actually does so.

Another section allows any NIS officer to “detain any suspects found engaging in any act or thing or being in possession of anything which poses a threat to national security,” thus allowing a wide berth for interpretation.¹²² Other provisions left in the bill reduce legislative oversight over the NIS, allow the organization to demand any information from any government entity, allow suspects to be detained for up to 90 days, and allow individuals to be arrested more than once for the same crime without any new evidence and without a warrant. In the Kenyan

¹²¹ Ibid

¹²² Samuel Kumba. CS Lenku: Let Us All Unite to Fight Crime. Kenya School of Government Weekly Bulletin. Vol.3 Issue 20

case, counter-terrorism laws that focus on expanding government prosecutorial powers can be more problematic than helpful.

Before this second wave of counterterrorism legislation gains momentum, a third wave of legislation focused on civil liberties and human rights protections from counterterrorism responses would achieve more progress towards peace and stability in the region, at least in countries that do not have these liberties enshrined in their constitutions.¹²³ In Kenya's case, as in many others with expansive constitutional protections in this area, the independence and strength of the judiciary headed by the Chief Justice combined with a determination by government leadership to balance citizen security with civil freedoms, is the real determinant of progress in this realm.

4.2.4 Prison and Remand

It was established that Prison and remand played a critical role in both reinforcing the radicalization process due to the isolated environment. The ability to create an atmosphere of a confined audience, the absence of distractions and the large population of disaffected people makes it an excellent breeding ground for radicalization and that the feeling of being collectively marginalized among inmates provided a strong binding factor for radicalization. It was noted that the prison warders are accessible to names, particulars and bio-data of those arrested with terror related offences thus could use the same to know the background of such inmates and offer rehabilitation and de-radicalization programmes. It was observed further that the correctional services were not doing intensively enough to involved inmates in programmes and constructive activities that would change their ideological mindset to radicalization.

¹²³ Afrobarometer, Is Kenya's anti-terrorist crackdown exacerbating drivers of violent extremism? Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 37 2 July 2015 Stephen Buchanan-Clarke and Rorisang Lekalake

It was examined that Prison conditions in Kenya are harsh and sometimes life-threatening, though the government attempted to improve conditions between 2005 and 2006, according to a U.S. State Department report. Most prisons were severely overcrowded, moreover, in 2006, 93 prisons were home to at least 50,000 inmates, more than three times their intended capacity. Meru Prison had three times more inmates than its intended capacity.¹²⁴ There was strong evidence that Kenya's Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) has carried out a series of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The ATPU was created within the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) in 2003 in response to the attacks on the US embassy in Nairobi in 1998 and on an Israeli-owned Mombasa hotel in 2002. Terrorist attacks have increased in Kenya in recent years, particularly after Kenya sent its military into neighbouring Somalia in October 2011. Human Rights Watch also found evidence of arbitrary arrests and mistreatment of terrorism suspects in detention.¹²⁵

4.3 Non-State actors engaged in counter-Terrorism

Non- State actors are entities or organizations with sufficient powers to influence positive or negative change towards a given interest even though they do not belong to any established institutions of a state. As used in this study, Non state actors are those transnational organizations funded by foreign countries to further their interest into the extremist groups hence some acts as recruiting agents towards radicalization of the youths into terrorism. These includes: religious groups, Civil Society Organizations and Non- Governmental Organizations

¹²⁴ Crisis Group observations; "Kenya: Security Forces Abusing Civilians near Somalia Border", Human Rights Watch, 12 January 2012.

¹²⁵ Kazungu Chai. UN to help Kenya Fight Terrorism, says Ban Ki-Moon. Daily Nation Saturday, June 28, 2014

4.3.1 Religious Groups

On religious groups, it was established that a significant element of religious leaders contributed to addressing conditions conducive for radicalization that led to the spread of terrorism through their work within and among different communities of faith. Religious leaders at all levels representing different faiths have an essential role to play in promoting inter- or intra-religious dialogue, tolerance, and understanding among religions all of which are identified in the Strategy as important.¹²⁶ For example, compared with other segments of civil society, the clergy was often in the unique position of both having access to those in high-level government positions and engaging with the masses on the ground.

The role Kenyan religious groups and leaders could not be underestimated in counterterrorism because, terrorism in Kenya has religious aspects and that terror groups have had a degree of intentions to divide the country into religious line to create conflicts. It was observed that the latest major attack at Garrissa University College saw the religious leaders coming together to condemn the attack, while demystifying the conflict between Muslims and Christians. The Anglican Archbishop Julius Kalu of Mombasa, a coastal city in Kenya, said that the terrorists wanted to divide the country along religious lines and called for resistance to this religious conflict. Indeed, the Muslim leaders condemned the attack and disowned terrorists, terming them as criminals using religion to commit crimes.¹²⁷

¹²⁶ Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice (KPTI) Press 20-06-2014. 'Press Statement on the Mpeketoni and the Deteriorating state of Security in Kenya.'

¹²⁷ Fredrick Nzwili, Kenya religious leaders urge unity after Garissa attack. Religion News Service: 12 p.m. EDT April 6, 2015. Available <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/04/03/religion-news-service-kenya-garissa-attack-religious-leaders/25254935/>

In Garissa following the university attack, the Muslim community in Garissa County strongly condemned barbaric acts committed against innocent University Students as stated by Abdullahi Salat, Chairman of the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims.¹²⁸ It was also noted that Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) has been on the fore front in counter terrorism measures within the Muslim community. SUPKEM has conducted a survey in Nairobi and the coastal region to get a better understanding of the motivational factors behind the radicalization, and together with the National Cohesion and Integration Commission are also advocating an amnesty regulation to deal with the return of the youth who joined the Al-Shabaab organization.

Moreover, SUPKEM was established in 1973 to consolidate efforts to promote Muslim interests under one umbrella organization and among its senior officials were Kenyan cabinet officials. In 1979, it was officially recognized as the only organization entitled to represent all Muslims within Kenya and to maintain links with Islamic organizations outside Kenya. The Council of Imams, SUPKEM and council of elders from both the Borana and Somali communities that largely profess the Islamic faith have also been noted to swear to combine forces with the Kenyan government to root out any false ideologies by Muslim radicals that have led to loss of many innocent lives.

¹²⁸ Fredrick Nzwili, Kenya religious leaders urge unity after Garissa attack. Religion News Service 6:12 p.m. EDT April 6, 2015. Available <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/04/03/religion-news-service-kenya-garissa-attack-religious-leaders/25254935/>

4.3.2 Civil Society Organizations

It was noted that a strong civil society was vital to democracy, security and prosperity thus UN Strategy specifically encourages “non-governmental organizations and civil society to engage as appropriate on how to enhance efforts to implement the Strategy.”¹²⁹ A September 2008 General Assembly resolution on the occasion of the first formal review of strategy implementation efforts is expected to go slightly further and specifically encourage them to “engage, as appropriate, on how to enhance efforts to implement the Strategy, including through interaction with member states and the UN System.”¹³⁰ The inclusion of the clause “as appropriate,” however, leaves it to states to determine the role (if any) to be given to civil society organizations, thus reflecting the range of views on Civil Society Organization (CSOs) among the UN membership. This diversity was reflected during the September 2008 negotiations, where a number of countries objected to the inclusion of the proposed language encouraging more CSO engagement.

Civil Society Organizations could play important roles in promoting implementation of a number of its discrete elements if given a chance as their Strategy had been hailed as a “living document” that would evolve over time. Civil Society Organizations, with their long-term presence in the field and often deep understanding of the local context in which the Strategy needed to be implemented, could play an important role in ensuring that implementation kept pace with the changing realities on the ground. For any comprehensive counterterrorism strategy to be effective, civil society needed to be part of its development and implementation, as broad-

¹²⁹ meeting of the 1540 Committee on the Role of NGOs, New York, 12 July 2007 [On file with Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation].

¹³⁰ U.S. Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. (2013). Country reports on human rights practices for 2013: Kenya. Available at:

<http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dliid=220124#wrapper>

based engagement between the state and Civil Society Organizations could as well help serve as a medium for addressing concerns between the state and the public in the context of specific counterterrorism actions.¹³¹

4.3.3 Non-Governmental Organization (NGOs)

Non- governmental organizations (NGOs) and other Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) around the world have been actively engaged in long-term efforts to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism well before the Strategy labelled those efforts as such. For example, CSOs have been working to support sustainable development, realize the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), provide humanitarian relief, empower marginalized communities, promote dialogue, protect human rights, improve governance, expand political participation, empower women, and prevent and resolve violent conflict. They were working to give voice to marginalized and vulnerable groups and provide a constructive outlet for the redress of grievances in many instances, NGOs have access to and have engaged with groups that states have little contact with or limited influence over.

More broadly, NGOs can serve as a stabilizing force in communities when governments are temporary, changing every few years, or even completely absent.¹³² This, as has been evidenced in the past, was not useful for the longer-term tackling of counter radicalization, says Njonjo Mue, Senior Advisor of Kenyans for Peace with Truth & Justice.¹³³ Over the years a consensus has evolved where governments acknowledge that their efforts to fight counter radicalization must be inclusive and that productive relationships must be built with all

¹³¹ meeting of the 1540 Committee on the Role of NGOs, New York, 12 July 2007 [On file with Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation].

¹³² Ibid

¹³³ Samuel Kumba. CS Lenku: Let Us All Unite to Fight Crime. Kenya School of Government Weekly Bulletin. Vol.3 Issue 20

stakeholders and the communities, as evidenced by the White House Summit. However, most Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) can also spot the signs of vulnerability and work upstream to protect individuals from radicalization through improved parenting, neighbourhood supports and community resilience. Other community organizations and members will play a facilitating role in providing practical help and emotional support to the individuals concerned and their families in the days of de-radicalization or disengagement process¹³⁴

4.5 Chapter Summary

The study established that the most prevalent strategy employed to fight terrorism is intelligence gathering and sharing. The method proved to be efficient since the acts of terrorism could be foiled and action taken before terror activities are committed. Although a combination of all other strategies is productive and effectively contains terror, intelligence and sharing proved to be more effective strategy utilized by governments in the East African region. The study established that that majority lacked confidence with Kenya police in fighting radicalization due to being easily compromised before a suspect is taken to the court for prosecution. They further observed that weak judicial system was working against prosecution of terrorists suspects and that even if the counter-measures are put in place while the police had not reformed then Kenyans will still be vulnerable to radicalization. However majority welcomed the integration of civil society, religious leaders and NGOs in the fight against radicalization.

¹³⁴ Journal of International relation and foreign policy volume 2 (2) 2004/ Nan 2005

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter constitutes the summary of all the chapters and findings in each particular chapter, the conclusion made by the researcher as well as policy recommendations advocated for an inclusive and holistic approach towards fight against terror.

5.1 Summary of the findings

The study established that, the most susceptible people joining the terror networks in Kenya was frustration and marginalization in the distribution of government resources while others thought it was fashionable to do so and that a combination of peer pressure and religion also accounted for the reason since most the vulnerable were aged between 10 and 25 years. Such youths also felt that they were abandoned by the government and their families hence offer Al-Shabaab a large pool of potential recruits outside their traditional base in South-Central Somalia. Indeed, there was evidence to suggest that the relatively established local infrastructure and security of Somalia's neighbours offered an environment more conducive to terrorist activity. It was further observed that as level of frustration increases there would be an increase in the individual's willingness to engage in terrorist activity.

The study established that, the socio-economic factors of radicalisation in Kenya included perceived marginalisation and exclusion from national resources, frustrated expectations, and relative deprivation. Despite the immediate links that are often made between poverty and radicalization, the issue of economic conditions extended beyond poverty. In other words, other indicators provided favourable circumstances for radicalisation and eventual recruitment into the

vice, therefore, economic difficulties such as unequal access to resources, unemployment and socio political factors provided fodder for vulnerability to radicalization which led to terrorism. However the possibility of better-off people being drawn to extremism makes it necessary to determine the role poor economic conditions plays.

Counter-radicalization and de-radicalization strategies was evaluated to be significant to Kenya in preventing the youths into joining the extremist group, it was established that weak institutions has led to increased extremist groups because most youth took advantage for lack of employment to indulge in the radicalization cells. It was further noted that the government security agencies were not well equipped with skills to detect, deter and prevent the extremist groups from recruiting the youths into terror. In this regard, the government should play an important role in setting the policy framework, providing funding and addressing structural issues to curb the vice. It was further noted that Non- governmental organizations and civil societies have a role to play in terms of narratives and messages since it has been noted that the counter- measures are often more effective when they come from such groups rather than government.

5.2 Conclusion

Based on the objective one, the study establishes that the most susceptible group to radicalization are aged between 10 and 25 years. The primary groups from which extremists seek to recruit are troubled youths who are strangled from their families, disaffected college students and young professionals. It was observed that troubled youths are the most vulnerable to radicalization, much like the young delinquency recruited into street gangs. The study also establishes religious groups as the most targeted especially when they from prayer groups of other disaffected youths in the mosques which provide incubators for radicalization. Education

has also been noted to be a key reason to vulnerability to radicalization as the limiting effects of lacking education can potentially serve as an avenue for frustration leading to criminality and radicalization.

The study established that marginalization and exclusion of natural resources led to unemployment to the youths which made them felt frustrated and opted that the only place to get help was to join the terror groups. It was further found out that ethnicity and religious groups played a major role in the radicalization process as most Somalis and other religious groups were influenced by Islamic ideologies. The study further concluded that identity was noted to be a factor where most youths relied on to involve in radical extremes believing that identifying with such a group made them fame and stronger as they were feared in the community while others also involved in the extremist group for economic gain.

The study established that, though Counter-radicalization and de-radicalization strategies were the best to be explored in preventing the spread of radicalization, it could not work efficiently because of poor facilitation to state actors and weak institutions like the judiciary. The law on terrorism was also not defined in the constitution to prosecute terrorism suspect the police reforms has stalled which has given fodder for the youths to take advantage and indulge in terrorist acts and as result, this has given an opportunity for Non-Governmental Organizations and Civil Societies Organizations to seek funds from donors to help the vulnerable youths. However, some of the Organizations became front offices and agents for recruitments.

5.3 Recommendations

Given the rising wave of radicalization in Kenya, this study recommends that collective response should be enhanced to combat the domestic as well as international radicalization of susceptible youths into terrorism. Although arrange of measures have been taken, (the tabling of anti terrorism bill, security precautions at vital installations) a lot more can still be done as Kenya should realise that national interests can be served well only through cooperation with other partners in the fight against terrorism. There is need for critical infrastructure to train security agencies and deployment with the necessary skills to deal with different scenarios. Training in suspicious behaviour is important for the early detection of potential susceptible groups to radicalization and pre- attack reconnaissance.

This study also recommends that Security deployment must be pro active and create deterrence as unprotected assets create vulnerability which attracts the adversary. Moreover, the government should invest more on undercover intelligence led programmes to detect and deter radicalization. It further recommends that long term studies on radicalization processes that enhance knowledge on how radical group turn violent was rather necessary as well as approach to programming based on local needs and community perceptions. More attention is needed in the distribution of state resources to marginalized areas and government needs to pay more attention towards the nexus between terrorism and counterterrorism as a potential drive for further and wider radicalization towards violence and terrorism.

The study recommends that the government should prioritize local perceptions in designing counter-terrorism and counter radicalization programming by supporting initiatives that address local conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. These initiatives need not be labelled as such to have an impact, which can be measured by ongoing perception surveys as part of donor due diligence in program implementation. Strengthen local ownership by integrating

community participation in the inception, design, implementation and evaluation of local programming. The government should develop[organizational structures and affirmative action oriented policies and programmes such as rehabilitations forums and educations that fosters, accommodates and encourages those radicalized to be accepted and integrated back into the society.

5.4 Proposed areas for further research

The study was however not exhaustive, further research could be done in the areas such as strategies of indoctrination, mobilization and training adopted by the terrorist and their leaders within terrorist organizations with spread focus on the role of internet. More substantive and theoretical informed further research is needed with respect to the institutions and organizations where radicalization leading to terrorism does occur particularly in schools, religious settings prisons and armies. Meanwhile, the major question one would want to ask in the further research is why Kenya has suffered terrorist attacks by exploring the links among Kenya, United States, Israel and the Arabs in perpetuating hatred towards Kenya by terrorist groups.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Interview guide

Kindly tick in the space provided (✓) the correct answers or supply the required information where, required, please specify and elaborate.

Respondents Information

1. Name..... (Optional)
2. Age of the respondent
Below 25 years () 26 to 35 years () 36 to 45 years ()
45 to 50 years above 51 years ()
3. Gender of the respondent?
Male () Female ()
4. What is your highest level of education?
Postgraduate () Degree () Diploma () Form four ()
Primary School () No school ()
5. How long have you worked in the organization?
Less than 1 year () 1-3 years () 4-6 years () above 6 years ()

Section A: The Most Susceptible Groups to Radicalization in Kenya

6. Highlight how persons are being radicalized into terrorism in Kenya

.....

.....

7. State whether there are extreme radical groups in your area

.....

8. Are there persons in your area who have joined any extreme radical groups

.....
 9. Name at least 2 extreme radical groups that you know or have heard of in Kenya.

.....

10. Which are the most vulnerable groups of individuals to radicalization

.....

11. How else are individuals recruited into terrorism in Kenya?

.....

Section B: Socio-Economic Factors influencing radicalization in Kenya

12. Indicate your level of agreement with the following statement relating to extreme radicalization in Kenya (Scale 1=strongly agree 2= agree 3= moderate 4= disagree 5=strongly disagree)

Statement	1	2	3	4	5
Extreme radicalization is influenced by marginalization					
Extreme radicalization is influenced by poverty					
Extreme radicalization is influenced by unemployment					
Radicalization is purely based on religious justification					
The reasons for joining terrorist groups is influenced by need political change					

13. Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Somali or Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified to defend either of the two, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified?

<u>Answer</u>	<u>Score</u>
Score often justified	3
Sometimes justified	2
Rarely but still justified	1
Never and others	0

14. What are the social factors influencing individuals into radical groups

.....

15. What are the economic factors that influence individuals into joining radical groups

.....

Section C: Counter – Radicalization Strategies

16. State whether there is enough effort by the government to fight terrorism

.....

17. State if the Kenyan government prevents and protects the youth from radical groups

.....

.....

 18. To what extent does the Kenyan government prevent the youth from joining terror group?

Very great extent []

Great extent []

Moderate extent []

Little extent []

No extent []

19. Indicate your level of agreement with the following statement relating to Kenyan Government's measures to fight and stop radicalization Scale (1=strongly agree 2= agree 3= moderate 4= disagree 5=strongly disagree.)

Statement	1	2	3	4	5
The government should apply curfews in 'hotspot' areas					
The Kenya-Somalia border security wall is an important counter-terrorism measure					
Kenya should close the Somali border					
Kenya should withdraw immediate effects its military intervention in Somalia					
The Kenyan Citizens should take responsibility in community policing					

20. How else should the Kenyan government fight and prevent youth radicalization that is not mentioned above?

.....
.....

21. State whether Kenya has enough policy and legal frameworks to prevent and deal with suspected members of radical groups

.....
.....

Thank you for your time