



**UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**

**INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL  
STUDIES**

**AFRICANIZING THE WAR AGAINST TERROR:  
*THE EXPERIENCE OF SADC***

**PATRICK LUMUMBA MIJONI**

**R50/81333/2012**

**A Research Project Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirement for the  
Award of Masters of Arts in International Studies, University of Nairobi-Kenya**

**2013**

University of NAIROBI Library



0377096 3

Bd 361955

f-11  
4/1  
b-22  
'MS'

## DECLARATION

This dissertation is my original work and has not been presented for an award at any other institute of high learning.

PATRICK LUMUMBA MIJONI



.....

**Signature**

05 NOV 2013


.....

**Date**

## APPROVAL

This work has been submitted for examination with my approval as Supervisor.

PROFESSOR V. G. SIMIYU



.....

**Signature**

5<sup>th</sup> NOV 2013

.....

**Date**

## **DEDICATION**

**This dissertation is dedicated to the innocent victims of terrorism in Africa.**

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

I sincerely thank the Kenyan Government for offering me the opportunity to attend the distinguished course at the National Defence College.

It gives me great pleasure and honour to acknowledge all those who supported me at the National Defence College while pursuing the challenging course. The immense knowledge that I amassed within one year will always be cherished. Special thanks to Brigadier D P Okwaro who professionally and meticulously guided me. As for Warrant Officer I Omwamba at the library and all others in the respective administrative duties, you were so wonderful in your assistance.

I am highly grateful for the encouragement, guidance and advice I received from Professor V G Simiyu, throughout the time of Master of Arts Degree in International Studies and the writing of this paper. I really appreciate your great enthusiasm and support.

I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to the officials who answered my questionnaires and those that I interviewed as well as those who provided me with information, assistance, and guidance in the production of this dissertation. I thank you all from deep down my heart.

The unwavering support, understanding and love by my family members also deserve to be acknowledged. Ellen, Irene, Patrick and Gordon, you were marvelous.

Finally, I would like to thank the Malawi Defence Force for having given me the opportunity to pursue my studies in Kenya.

## **ABSTRACT**

Terrorism can rightfully be considered as one of the most significant trans-national security threats of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Whilst national security has taken a broad spectrum, terrorism remains a vague concept and has a very complex and ambiguous definition. In the strife to secure its interests as well as peace and stability, the SADC region must therefore examine the gaps that would make it susceptible to modern terrorism.

It is in this vein that this study grapples to investigate and establish the extent of the threat of terrorism in the region as well as the capacity and strategy required in the africanisation of its war. In a world order which is characterised by conflicts, suspicion and competition, SADC needs to guard its policies so that they reflect signs of the present.

It would seem that due to lack of coordinated policies on anti – terrorism, the africanisation of the war against terror in SADC has many challenges. Various study tools were duly engaged in order to achieve a balanced view of the study.

The study concludes that whilst the extent of the threat of terrorism is relatively low in SADC, there is potential for it to escalate. Due to the dynamic nature of terrorism and ever increasing occurrences of terror attacks in African regions and elsewhere, SADC needs to cooperate with the international community, address the underlying causes accordingly and devise clear and consistent policies on anti-terrorism. The creation of a powerful institution in the region to deal with terrorism is highly recommended.

## **LIST OF ACRONYMS**

<b>AFRICOM</b>	- Africa Command
<b>AIAI</b>	- Al Ittihad Al Islami
<b>ADF</b>	- Allied Democratic Forces
<b>AQIM</b>	- Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
<b>AU</b>	- African Union
<b>CIA</b>	- Central Intelligence Agency
<b>CJTF-HOA</b>	- Combined Joint Task Force- Horn of Africa
<b>CNN</b>	- Cable News Network
<b>DDRRR</b>	- Disarmament Demobilisation, Reintegration, Resettlement and Reconstruction
<b>DRC</b>	- Democratic Republic of Congo
<b>ESAAMLG</b>	- Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group
<b>ECOWAS</b>	- Economic Community of West African States
<b>EWS</b>	- Early Warning Systems
<b>FDLR</b>	- Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda
<b>GSPC</b>	- Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication ET le Combat
<b>HIV/AIDS</b>	- Human Immune Viral/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
<b>IGAD</b>	- Intergovernmental Authority on Development
<b>JPCC</b>	- Joint Permanent Commission Committee
<b>KDF</b>	- Kenya Defence Force
<b>LRA</b>	- Lord's Resistance Army
<b>MDF</b>	- Malawi Defence Force
<b>NATO</b>	- North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

<b>NGOs</b>	- <b>Non-Governmental Organizations</b>
<b>OAU</b>	- <b>Organization of African Union</b>
<b>PAGAD</b>	- <b>People against Gangsterism and Drugs</b>
<b>RDCTC</b>	- <b>Regional Defence Counter Terrorism Center</b>
<b>RUF</b>	- <b>Revolutionary United Front</b>
<b>SADC</b>	- <b>Southern Africa Development Community</b>
<b>SADCC</b>	- <b>Southern African Development Coordination Conference</b>
<b>SARPPCO</b>	- <b>Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation</b>
<b>SIPO</b>	- <b>Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ</b>
<b>UK</b>	- <b>United Kingdom</b>
<b>UN</b>	- <b>United Nations</b>
<b>US (A)</b>	- <b>United States of America</b>



## **Table of Contents**

DECLARATION .....	i
DEDICATION .....	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	iii
ABSTRACT .....	iv
LIST OF ACRONYMS .....	v
Table of Contents .....	vii
CHAPTER ONE .....	1
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY .....	1
1.0 INTRODUCTION .....	1
1.1 BACKGROUND .....	1
1.1.1 Changing Global Trends in Threats to National Security.....	2
1.1.2 Africanisation of the War on Terror in the SADC.....	5
Figure 1.1: Map of Africa Illustrating the Position of the SADC Region. ....	8
1.1 STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM .....	9
1.4 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY .....	10
1.5 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY .....	11
1.6.1 Global War on Terrorism.....	12
1.6.2 SADC and Collective Security .....	15
1.6.3 The Nature of SADC's War against Terror .....	18
1.6.4 SADC Policies on War against Terror.....	19
1.7 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	21
1.8 HYPOTHESIS .....	23
1.9 STUDY METHODOLOGY .....	23
1.9.1 Opportunities.....	24
1.9.2 Limitations .....	25
1.9.3 Approach.....	25
1.9.4 Subject Population .....	26
1.9.5 Data Collection Methods and Study Tools .....	26
Figure 1.2 Methodological Triangulation .....	27
1.9.6 Data Gathering Procedures .....	28
1.9.7 Data Analysis and Interpretation .....	29
1.9.8 Emerging Problems.....	30
1.10 CONCLUSION.....	31

CHAPTER TWO .....	32
2.0 INTRODUCTION .....	32
2.1 ORTHODOX TERRORISM THEORY .....	32
Figure 2.1 The ‘New War’ / ‘New Terrorism’ nexus. ....	37
2.2. TERRORISM AS A SERIOUS THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY.....	37
2.3 THE DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES OF TERRORISM.....	44
2.4 THE THREAT OF TERRORISM AND ITS IMPACT ON SADC.....	50
2.5 CONCLUSION.....	58
CHAPTER THREE .....	60
3.0 INTRODUCTION .....	60
3.1 THE NATURE OF WAR ON TERROR IN THE SADC.....	60
3.3 SECURITY THREATS IN SADC .....	63
3.4 SADC AND THE WESTERN PERSPECTIVE ON GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR.....	67
3.5 SADC STRATEGIES AND POLICIES ON WAR AGAINST TERROR .....	68
Figure 3.1 Levels of Cooperation in Counter Terrorism .....	73
3.6 CONCLUSION.....	74
CHAPTER FOUR.....	76
4.0 INTRODUCTION .....	76
4.2 STUDY RESULTS AND DATA PRESENTATION .....	76
4.2.1 Results from Questionnaires.....	77
Figure 4.2 Distribution by country of origin of the respondents. ....	77
Figure 4.3 Occupations of the Respondents .....	78
Figure 4.4 Perception of the threat of terrorism in SADC.....	79
Figure 4.5 Challenges to anti-terrorism measures in SADC.....	80
Figure 4.6 Mitigation measures to the threat of terrorism in SADC. ....	81
Figure 4.7: Recommended strategies for SADC in the war against terror. ....	82
Figure 4.8: The applicability of an institution like RDCTC to SADC. ....	83
4.2.2 Results from Interviews .....	83
4.2.3 Observation Results .....	85
4.3 DISCUSSION ON AFRICANISING THE WAR AGAINST TERROR IN SADC.....	85
4.3.1 The Extent of the Threat of Terrorism in SADC .....	86
4.3.3 Challenges to Anti-Terrorism Measures in SADC. ....	86
4.3.4 Mitigation Measures of Terrorism in SADC. ....	87
4.3.5 Recommended Strategies for SADC in the War Against Terror. ....	88

4.3.6	The Applicability of a Regional Counter Terrorism Center in SADC .....	88
4.4	CONCLUSION.....	89
	CHAPTER FIVE .....	91
5.0	INTRODUCTION .....	91
5.1	CONCLUSIONS.....	91
5.2	RECOMMENDATIONS.....	93
5.3	AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH.....	95
	SOURCES.....	97
A.	ORAL INTERVIEWS .....	97
B.	BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	97
1.	Books .....	97
2.	Journal Articles .....	100
3.	Official Documents and Reports.....	101
4.	Internet Articles.....	101

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY**

*First, there can be no acceptable justification for terrorism - the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming, and menacing of the innocent. In any legitimate polity, if a people become permissive to terrorism, they are abandoning moral logic and humanity and are surrendering the field of discourse meant for sane debate and healthy disagreement in politics.<sup>1</sup>*

**Christopher Harmon, 2008.**

#### **1.0 INTRODUCTION**

This introductory chapter starts with some background information of the *War against Terror* in general aspects and thereafter focuses on terrorism in The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) region. It also provides some information on terrorism in developing countries in general with modern activities of terrorism illustrating the nature of the threat. Chapter one outlines the statement of the problem, aim of the study, objectives, literature review, theoretical framework and hypothesis, rationale for choosing the study subject, the methodology and the structure of the study.

#### **1.1 BACKGROUND**

The nature of war in general is examined with a focus on the nature of contemporary global threats to national security. It also identifies factors that make it mandatory for Africa and regional communities like SADC to address terrorism.

### **1.1.1 Changing Global Trends in Threats to National Security**

As Max Boot puts it, indeed, “the past is an uncertain guide to the future, but it is the only one we have.”<sup>1</sup> Colin S. Gray, in his book, *Another Bloody Century*, also argues that despite the constant changing of most of war’s contexts, although not at constant rates, the essential facts and principles about war and warfare do not change at all. Gray says that the future of warfare will be very much like its past. He takes the dramatic bangs of 11 September 2001 to be the appearance of the century’s first war and says it was possibly the eruption of the Third World War and that the event should prove to be an accurate sign of times to come.<sup>2</sup>

Gray starts by propagating his ideas of future conflict with the proposition that humankind is still in the process of curing itself of the habit of war and since such a transformation has not occurred in the past three centuries of our history, he poses the big question of why it should happen only now. Considering this historical precedent, he is of the opinion that warfare will long continue to be a much-favoured human activity. Much as there would be some modifications in its conduct, owing to the changes in technology, this would be balanced by important and timeless features like training and professionalism. As for common technology in warfare, he finds this as a very likely factor, which will promote uncommon tactics because of differences in culture.<sup>3</sup>

Gray argues that in warfare, the political context is the most important factor. However, he adds that since warfare is social, cultural, political and strategic behaviour, it must therefore reflect the characteristics of the communities that wage it. He also argues that surprise is not

---

<sup>1</sup> Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century*, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 2005), p. 17.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 13-19.

<sup>3</sup> . *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21.

merely possible but certain since war and warfare do not always change in an evolutionary linear fashion. Finally, Gray argues that much as efforts to control, limit and regulate war and warfare by international political, legal and ethical measures as well as attitudes are worth pursuing, such endeavours will always be rendered fragile and vulnerable by the commands of perceived belligerent necessity.<sup>4</sup>

As for Rupert Smith, in *The Utility of Force*, his views are relatively in the same lines with those of Colin Gray. Smith believes that our understanding of the future with regard to warfare depends on the contexts of the major conflicts and developments of the past 200 years. He sees armed conflict as a human condition and that we will continue to reinvent it and pass it on from generation to generation. He talks of the war amongst the people. Warfare has undergone a revolution, “‘a new paradigm shift’ that calls for both new assumptions and reconstruction of prior assumptions.”<sup>5</sup> Smith, who describes conflict as a human condition, is also of the opinion that it is highly unlikely we will ever totally remove it. He says that in order to defend and secure ourselves better in future conflicts, it will be mandatory to improve the utility of force.<sup>6</sup> As for Krulak, he sees the growing global instability to escalate by 2020 and that the future battlefields will be more complex and more lethal.<sup>7</sup>

Over the recent years, some people have been claiming that nuclear weapons have made all wars irrational and impossible. Apparently, the reality is that all sorts of wars, from terrorism, guerilla up to full scale campaigns have continued to exist and have actually become more dangerous. Whilst many commendable means of preventing wars are being exploited so well

---

<sup>4</sup> Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century*, Op cit., pp. 24-25.

<sup>5</sup> Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, (Penguin Books Ltd., London, 2005), p.2.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 26.

<sup>7</sup> Charles C. Krulak, *The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War*, (Marines Magazine, January 1999), p. 4.

through globalization, international relations, regional integration, humanitarian intervention and diplomacy, others are not. It is because “the war economy provides comfortable riches for tens of thousands of bureaucrats in and out of military uniform who go to the office to build nuclear weapons or to plan nuclear war and contractors unwilling to give up easy profits; warrior intellectuals who sell threats and bless wars.”<sup>8</sup>

Indeed, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States of America (US) is the sole super power whose dominance has certainly become overwhelming. Apparently this trend has also come out significantly with the escalation of challenges to the Americans. Nevertheless, the Americans, due to their hegemonic status seem to be so desperate to achieve their interests at any cost and in the process sometimes they even undermine international law.

Collective security is bound to take some time before it is significantly effective. This conviction, globally, should also justify why training for war, buying and replacing of military equipment -jet fighters for example- and the study of war itself have not been retrogressive but rather, to the contrary. As both Gray and Smith predict very little success in terms of global peace in the 21st century, those who are of the opinion that international politics will continue to be characterized by security competition and frequent wars would therefore seem to be correct to quiet a great extent.

It is for the above stated basis that SADC should not take the fact that terrorism is more apparent in other areas of the globe then that it should not be bothered or perceive that the threat will not spill over in one way or the other. There are now new threats and SADC must keep up with their ever-changing nature in the globalised world of today. The present epoch demands appropriate strategies and pragmatic policies to live through.

---

<sup>8</sup> Peter Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001), p. 864.

### **1.1.2 Africanisation of the War on Terror in the SADC**

The concept of *Africanisation* is part of the ideological materials at the basis of the new pan-African institutions which have been embraced in the discourse of all international actors, be they Africans or non-Africans. Despite its omnipresence in the literature, the concept has failed to be clearly defined. *Africanisation* refers to the process of increasing the extent of African participation in the field of peace and security, in particular through the growing implication of African organisations in conflict management and the deployment of peace operations. However, worth noting is that Africanisation is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the fulfillment of African ownership that can bring real African empowerment.<sup>9</sup>

Romain Esmenjaud ably argues that the policy of external actors aims at helping Africans take a growing share of the global peacekeeping burden, but while keeping control over the whole process - africanisation without African ownership. For instance, the creation of the AU, which has become a rising political actor recently, has certainly increased the leverage of Africans that cannot be completely marginalized anymore. However, as long as the financial and material dependency of Africa remains, achievement of an effective African ownership will be difficult. Moreover, Africa's natural wealth is again appearing to be a curse for the continent due to a new scramble which that may potentially increase the impact of African crises on great powers' economic interests. This growing competition for access to Africa's natural resources will thus pose challenges to the reinforcement of African capabilities and hence unlikely that African solutions will be favoured.<sup>10</sup> This pessimistic view has overlooked the fact that this world is ever-changing and often times unpredictable. The signs are even becoming manifested through

---

<sup>9</sup> Romain Esmenjaud, *Peace and security, external actors and the African Union: Africanisation without African Ownership*, ECAS 2009, Leipzig Panel 137, p.1.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.



the AU policies and activities as well as the economic growth of many African economies. The author of this study is optimistic that Africanisation is a reachable objective in the long run.

Shillinger is accurate when he says that “Terrorism is not just a western concern. It is an international issue requiring a coherent international response. Africa has a vital role to play in ensuring security within and beyond its shores. Building counterterrorism capacity requires moving beyond broad pledges to a systematic, incremental approach that recognises both the threat and resources.”<sup>11</sup> It would seem that many African states and regional organisations do not regard terrorism as a major cause for concern. Apparently, the threat of contemporary terrorism is global. Consequently, for our policy makers, it would thus be imprudent and unjustifiable to regard terrorism as a ‘thing of the west.’ In fact, the Muslim states are also experiencing similar tragic consequences of contemporary terrorism just as the western states are doing. More so, acknowledging existence of the threat would be beneficial for our policymakers in their strife of devising effective strategies in fighting the problem. Indeed, far-sighted action now to address and prevent terrorism would be appropriate before it emanates into a serious threat in Africa.

As for the Southern Africa Development Community, the bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998 accentuate that Africa is not immune to terrorism. Before finally being detected and arrested in October 1999, Kagan Mohammed, who helped to prepare the attack in Tanzania, had lived and worked in Cape Town, South Africa. The sub-region has experienced local terrorism with links to international terror. For instance, South Africans have allegedly been linked both to al Qaeda and international nuclear smuggling. Zambia also experienced a

---

<sup>11</sup> Kurt Shillinger, *Global Terror: Africa Not Immune to Terror*, Business Day, 7 Oct. 2005. P. 6.

series of bomb attacks – one of which killed a police officer during the bizarre ‘Black Mamba’ episode of 1996. In Malawi, in 2003, five foreigners were arrested and handed over to CIA agents under the accusation that they were fund-raising for al Qaeda. Recent reports have indicated that the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been exploited by the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah, for its own financing. Mauritius is also reported to have an offshore banking sector that is potentially vulnerable to exploitation by terrorist financiers. 12

In general, there are indications that most governments are failing to meet even the most basic obligations stipulated by the African Union (AU) counter-terrorism accords. Consequently, the regional economic communities and the states are ill-prepared to assess the threat and curtail the exploitation of their vulnerabilities which would eventually assist to safeguard their citizens as well as contribute to global security.<sup>13</sup> Most SADC states are certainly wanting in their capacity and political will to remain in tandem with everyone else.

---

12 *Michael Rifer, SADC and Terrorism, African Security Review, Vol. 14, No 1, 2005, p. 2.*

13 *Ibid.*, p. 7.

**Figure 1.1: Map of Africa Illustrating the Position of the SADC Region.**



*Source: sadcreview.com.*

## 1.1 STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

The events of September 11, 2001 brought about the new paradigm of global war on terror and regional organizations have been subjected to the challenges of this new security threat. The United States of America, as the world hegemony, as well as other western powers like Britain have taken the lead in countering this modern terrorism and it would seem that for African countries, as well as its regional organizations, there is no option but to follow suit since they are also affected in various ways. After all, one of the objectives which governments pursue is to protect their citizens and their interests. Consequently, in view of the fact that the issue of national security these days has taken a broad spectrum, protecting its citizens and their interests should be one of the priorities of any government.

Barry Buzan illustrates this broad concept of security in a classical way by outlining five sectors of security. These comprise military, political, societal, economic and environmental security.<sup>14</sup> The comprehensive approach of national security policy therefore should comprise “all aspects of a nation’s security and well being that includes its political independence, its sovereignty and territorial integrity, the protection of its natural resources, revenue generating capacity, social justice and the defence of its democracy.”<sup>15</sup>

How far SADC has gone with this africanisation of the war on terror needs to be examined and established. The continued and ever increasing risk of terrorism deserves some concern and action. Analysis of the existing foreign policies and practices as well as the quality and quantity of input by various states within SADC in dealing with this threat would be a basis

---

<sup>14</sup> Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, (Pearson Education Limited, Essex, 1991), pp. 116-134.

<sup>15</sup> Anicia Lala and Ann M. Fitz-Gerald (Eds), *Providing Security for People: Security Sector Reform in Africa*, (Shrivenham, Oxford, 2003), p. 17.

upon which to establish the possible means and strategies to mitigate it. There is need to examine the gaps in the way SADC has approached to secure its interests in such an environment.

The SADC region represents one of the most coherent sub regions in Africa and it is thus hoped that this case study can highlight some grey areas that need to be addressed or emphasized in the mitigation of the threat of terrorism in Africa. The analysis of the threat posed by terrorism in this sub-region have unveiled the fact that states require to affect grand strategy and collaborate at various levels including sub-regional, in order to secure their interests as well peace and stability. This reality would be part of the process to maximise people's freedom from fear and freedom from want. 16

### **1.3 AIM OF THE STUDY**

The aim of this research is to critically examine the africanisation of the war on terror in the Southern Africa Development Community and to propose any improvements.

### **1.4 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY**

The specific objectives of the study are as follows:

- To analyse SADC's capacity and strategy towards the threat posed by terrorism.
- To examine the africanisation of the war on terror in the SADC Region.
- To propose measures that could help in the africanisation of the war on terror in the SADC Region.

The research covers from the post- September 11, 2001 period to the present.

---

16 Anicia Lala and Ann M. Fitz-Gerald (Eds), *Providing Security for People: Security Sector Reform in Africa*, Opcit., p. 4.

## **1.5 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY**

Buzan's broad concept of security makes it clear that insecurity reflects a combination of threats and vulnerabilities.<sup>17</sup> In SADC, relatively peaceful as it may seem, terrorism poses a significant potential threat to human security and when its devastating effects transpire, the vulnerability of the innocent souls is usually irreversible for some time. This man-made source of threat, apparently escalating, ought not be taken as a secondary factor and deserves to be appropriately addressed.

It is in the context discussed above that this study has attempted to assess the extent of the threat of terrorism in the SADC states. The West, led by the US has declared war on terrorism; it may be time too for Africa to do it in its own way befitting its resources, capabilities and mechanisms. deserves some concern and action. Analysis of the existing mitigation policies and practice as well as the input by various states in SADC would be a basis upon which to establish the possible means and strategies to mitigate this menace.

## **1.6 LITERATURE REVIEW**

The various information sources used include published books and published articles, research papers, magazines, newspapers, documents and websites. The literature relevant to the study questions and assumptions reviewed start from the global perspective, African and then to that of the SADC Region. The scope, limitations and dilemmas faced by SADC states in countering terrorism have also been discussed in consistency with the research objectives.

---

<sup>17</sup> Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, (Pearson Education Limited, Essex, 1991), pp. 116-134.

### **1.6.1 Global War on Terrorism**

This terminology came up with none other than George Bush after the bombings of the twin towers on 9/11 – only to add controversy to the definition of terrorism and what constitutes it. The definition of terrorism has caused so much problems and controversies to the point that some academics have suggested that the word, having been so value-laden, has thus been rendered useless so much that it should be avoided in clear discourse. One of those who believe the word has been overloaded is Christopher Harmon. He alleges that no militant deserves to be labeled “terrorist” and that also no militant would call himself a “terrorist.”<sup>18</sup>

Christopher Harmon eventually offers a virtuous definition as well as some concepts that are very helpful in the understanding of the meaning of terrorism. In his simple terms, “Terrorism is the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming, and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends.”<sup>19</sup> This definition, claims Harmon, has never been surpassed for clarity and concision. Little wonder then that it was preferred by most analysts in 1979.<sup>20</sup> It would indeed seem very correct that basically, terrorism is about power and political influence. Though at times religion and other motives such as ecological may be at the fore, it is ‘saturated’ with politics.<sup>21</sup> Similarly, other scholars admit that the word is difficult to define because the term keeps on changing with time.

For instance, Russel Howard and Reid Sawyer claim that even the definitions offered by the dictionaries are of little help as they are outdated. To illustrate this they give an example from the much-adored Oxford Dictionary in which terrorism is defined as, “A system of terror. 1.

---

<sup>18</sup> Christopher C. Harmon, *Terrorism Today*, (Routledge, New York, 2008), p. 2.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p.5.

Government by intimidation as directed and carried out by the party in power in France during the revolution of 1789-94; the system of 'Terror'. 2. Gen. A policy intended to strike with terror those against whom it is adopted; the employment of methods of intimidation; the fact of terrorizing or condition of being terrorized.”<sup>22</sup> Indeed, it is apparent that the meaning of the term has changed since the past two hundred years.

When they further claim that efforts to define terrorism have consumed so much ink, they are not exaggerating and indeed there is need to sift the word from other similarities. To begin with, there is need to differentiate terrorists from other types of criminals and terrorism from other forms of crimes as well as considering what terrorism specifically does before reaching the ultimate decision to define the term. In the strife for more specific and yet comprehensive definition of the phenomenon, Russel Howard and Reid Sawyer identified five factors as being the basic elements that can constitute the definition of terrorism. Listed hereunder is what they considered to be fundamental to terrorism: <sup>23</sup>

- a. Ineluctably political in aims and motives
- b. Violent, or equally important, threatens violence
- c. Designed to have far reaching psychological repercussions beyond the
- d. immediate victim or target
- e. Conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or
- f. conspiratorial cell structure(where members wear no uniform or insignia): and
- g. Perpetrated by a sub-national group or non-state entity.

---

<sup>22</sup> Russel D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, *Terrorism and Counter Terrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*, (The McGraw-Hill Companies, Guilford 2004), p. 3.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 23.



It is only after considering the above that the authors defined terrorism as, “..The deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.”<sup>24</sup> It is evident by this definition that terrorism is specifically designed to have far reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victims or object of the terrorist attack.

James Lutz and Brenda Lutz come up with yet another controversy when they argue that just like beauty; terrorism is in the eye of the beholder! To this regard, ‘ones person’s freedom fighter is another person’s terrorist.’<sup>25</sup> However, the authors go further to claim that the basic line for the term terrorism is that it bears a negative connotation. The word in its typical usage has a connotation of evil, indiscriminate violence and of course, brutality. That’s why there would be cause for concern and sympathy when one claims to have been terrorised. Consequently, the group or action that is labeled terrorist implies that the actors or the violence is immoral, wrong, or contrary to obvious basic ethical principles that any reasonable human being might hold. Thus whilst the use of words like ‘freedom fighter’, ‘revolutionaries rebels’, ‘liberation soldiers’ and many more would imply that the group undertaking the violence is motivated by some greater good and has moral principles, terrorists on the other hand, attack legitimate governments that are accepted and undermine a political system and even a way of life that is desirable or good.<sup>26</sup>

Just as the subject of terrorism itself is wide and complex there are so many definitions that vary so much depending on the contexts, personalities using the term, beliefs, timeframe, political alienations and many more factors. However, in the final scrutiny it is evident that

---

<sup>24</sup> Russel D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, *Terrorism and Counter Terrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*, Op cit., p. 3.

<sup>25</sup> James M. Lutz and Brenda J. Lutz, *Global Terrorism*, (Routledge, New York, 2008), p. 7.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

terrorism is a practice that can be available to a dissatisfied group; it is a way and not an end. It is another means of achieving political ends.

On 9<sup>th</sup> September, 2011, the United States commemorated the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the 9/11 Al-Qaeda attacks with a solemn ceremony in the General Assembly Hall at the United Nations (UN) headquarters in New York. The US vowed to intensify the war against terror wherever it is perpetrated in the world.<sup>27</sup> Actually, the ceremony bore further testimony of the propagation of “global war on terrorism” - as President Bush had declared, ten years earlier. Indeed, the strong component of the terrorism phenomenon today is none other than trans-national terrorism that is sponsored by state governments.<sup>28</sup> That the contemporary religious groups like Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab are at the forefront of this new phenomenon is also ostensible. The efforts and strategies in this *global war on terror* are being manifested by the West and they also incorporate ‘others’ in their war.

### **1.6.2 SADC and Collective Security**

The Southern African Development Community has been in existence since 1980, when it was formed as a loose alliance of nine Black majority-ruled States in Southern Africa known as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). Following the adoption of the Lusaka Declaration on April 1, 1980, the main aim of this organisation was to coordinate development projects in order to lessen economic dependence on the then apartheid South Africa. The founding Member States are: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The transformation of the organization from a Coordinating Conference into a Development

---

<sup>27</sup> United Nations Commemorates The 10<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of 9/11, [On line] <http://www.un.org/terrorism> (Accessed August 25, 2012).

<sup>28</sup> Christopher C. Harmon *Terrorism Today* Op cit, p. 35.

Community (SADC) took place on August 17, 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia, when the Declaration and Treaty was signed at the Summit of Heads of State and Government thus giving the organization a legal character. SADC headquarters are located in Gaborone, Botswana and Member States are Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.<sup>29</sup>

SADC is still a young organisation. In fact, it has evolved in the background of a rapidly changing and therefore unstable regional political environment, dominated by South Africa's transition from apartheid, as well as encompassing civil wars in Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, rapid and unpredictable transitions to democracy and economic and political crises in various member states. SADC states are also very unequal despite being bound by a common history of independence struggles against colonialism and racial domination. The 14 SADC members include small island states, large underdeveloped countries with poor communications, relatively wealthy countries like South Africa as well as some of the poorest ones in the world, states with one-party histories, former autocracies, those that attempted Marxist Leninism, long-standing democracies, and nations that have only recently emerged from liberation against apartheid and racial domination. Colonial histories also differ as they were British, French, Portuguese and settler colonies. Little wonder, that SADC is in many ways still struggling in terms of security co-operation. Levels of institutionalization remain quite low and although treaties and protocols have been signed, there is inadequate history of common action and collective policy formulation. Moreover, the treaties and protocols have yet to be given

---

<sup>29</sup>The Southern African Development Community (SADC). [On line] - <http://www.sadc.int> (Accessed April 30, 2013).

much content as public statements issued after meetings are often bland, and do not address the essential issues.<sup>30</sup>

Consequentially, coming up with an answer to questions about what 'SADC's standpoint is in terms of global war on terror is hence quite difficult. It is therefore agreeable when Cawthraw and Van Nieuwkerk ably argue that it is thus justifiable to a large extent, for the issues addressed in the analysis of SADC to be dealt with at a moderately high level of abstraction and generalization. In this regard it would also seem appropriate in some cases that only the views of individual states can be taken into deliberation.<sup>31</sup>

Of the various African sub-regional organisations, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and SADC stand out as having achieved some measure of security cooperation. Both are dominated by a powerful member – Nigeria and South Africa respectively. Both were created to promote sub-regional economic integration. In the case of ECOWAS, during its first 5 years its laudable economic objectives were often hampered by military seizures of power, in a milieu in which regime security was misconstrued as state or national security. West Africa's security landscape has since been characterized by a new paradigm of fratricidal wars and internecine conflicts, particularly in the Mano River Union area – Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and nearby Guinea-Bissau. SADC has not had extensive experience of military coups-d'état, but is familiar with threats to regime security.<sup>32</sup>

---

30 Gavin Cawthraw and Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk, *Security in a Globalized World, SADC and Security* FES Briefing Paper June, 2004. p. 2.

31 Ibid., p. 2.

32 Gavin Cawthra and Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk, *Security in a Globalized World, SADC and Security* FES Briefing Paper June, 2004. p. 4.

### **1.6.3 The Nature of SADC's War against Terror**

International terrorism has indeed been a fundamental part of international politics for some time despite the fact that its perpetrators are illegal actors and their acts also are being bluntly condemned by most states in the world. Furthermore, terrorists' actions are frequently international since they relate to events or conflicts that take place in another country or region. In fact, the occurrence of terrorism is influenced by the very nature of the international system itself and the foreign policies of states. For instance, this can be done by generating more conducive or more prohibitive circumstances for the terrorist organizations. Some scholars have projected that during the next two decades, the world system will remain principally unipolar with the US still as the global hegemony; despite the possibility that regional power centers will grow stronger and contribute to a relative decline of the US. Consequently, state sponsored terrorism is unlikely to increase but will remain dynamic in regional conflicts whilst anti-hegemonic transnational terrorism will continue, and possibly increase.<sup>33</sup>

According to the UN Resolution 1373, the UN rules that all states should participate in the combating of terrorism. More so, the resolution coming under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, from the Security Council, the failure of any state to adhere to a minimum standard of vigilance and enforcement constitutes a threat to international peace and security. Thus SADC does have a legal obligation to follow through with the implementation of Resolution 137 and failure to do so puts both the international community into jeopardy. The UN is affirming that counter terrorism is a regional issue by encouraging states to intensify and accelerate the exchange of information as well as to cooperate on issues of administration and judicial with regard to terrorists acts.<sup>34</sup> Moreover, SADC's states would not be ready to be perceived as security liabilities and providing a security breach by having an insecure region.

---

<sup>33</sup> Brynjar Lia, *Globalisation and the Future of Terrorism*, (Routledge, New York 2005), p. 39.

<sup>34</sup> United Nations Counter Terrorism, [On Line] [www.un.org/en/sc/ctc](http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc) (Accessed 2 August 2012).

#### **1.6.4 SADC Policies on War against Terror**

As per the above discourse, therefore, one could be justified to say that how to oppose this evil practice or technique to achieve political goals by dissatisfied groups is what can be defined as counter terrorism. According to the US foreign policy, counter terrorism is ...”the practices, tactics, techniques, and strategies that governments, militaries, police departments and corporations adopt in response to terrorist threats and or both real and imputed.”<sup>35</sup>

The US countering terrorism policy has two aspects. First, there is that approach of being defensive in the way that actions taken are such to make citizen safer from terrorist’s threats through screening of airline passengers, placing video cameras and metal detectors in public places random patrols of bomb-sniffing dogs, and many other means. Secondly, by actively going after the terrorists themselves - to arrest them, prosecute, raid and undertake military action as appropriate.<sup>36</sup>

As for the threats of transnational terrorism in Africa has been well categorised into four by Michael Rifer. First, Somalia and the Horn of Africa where elements of al-Qaeda and are retaining an enduring presence within proximity of important western targets across the region. Second, Algerian Islamists with links to al-Qaeda who have been pushed southwards by successful counterterrorism measures in the north, resulting in growing signs of Islamist violence across the Sahelian states. Third, Nigerian Islamists calling themselves the Taliban (Boko Haram) after the deposed Islamist regime in Afghanistan have rendered the north vulnerable to infiltration by outside groups. This, coupled with the designation by al-Qaeda of Nigeria as a

---

<sup>35</sup> United States Foreign Policy. [On Line] <http://usforeignpolicy> (Accessed 29 AUGUST 2012).

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

target for an operational base poses concerns. And fourth, South Africa, functions as an important logistical and terror finance transit point.<sup>37</sup>

The US precondition that “you are either with us or them”, coupled with the AU accord on international terrorism, makes every individual state in SADC sub-region mindful and wary of its policies and actions with regard to global war on terror. Consequently, SADC though not as important as European allies or other countries such as Pakistan in the global war on terror, it also has an important part in assisting the US. Cooperation between the US and SADC should indeed exist especially in extraditing and apprehending transnational terrorists. South Africa evidently played an exemplary role by forwarding a list of names with possible links to suspects in the 9/11 attacks and even signed an extradition treaty a month after the incident. In fact, South Africa had earlier on arrested the Tanzanian convicted in the bombing of the US embassy in Dar es Salaam, Khalfan Khamis Mohammed (who had sought refuge among Cape Town Muslims) and handed him over to the American authorities accordingly.<sup>38</sup>

It becomes apparent that SADC as a sub-region would require collective action in the war against terror. Actually, in the aftermath of 11 September, regional organizations across the globe have reconstituted themselves to confront this new security threat. SADC could equally learn from these contemporaries and come up with its own ways by molding the models and experiences that are already being engaged by other regions.<sup>39</sup>

When examining globalisation and armed conflicts, Brynjar Lia argues that the former , in the sense of increased interconnectedness, interdependency and deterritorialisation will continue and thus implying that such effects will generate more anti-Western and anti-USA

---

<sup>37</sup> Michael Rifer, *SADC and Terrorism*. African Security Review, Vol. 14. No. 1, 2005. p. 16.

<sup>38</sup> CRS Report for Congress, *Africa and the War on Terrorism*,. 17 January, 2002. P.8.

<sup>39</sup> Michael Rifer, *SADC and Terrorism*, African Security Review, Vol. 14, No 1, 2005, p. 6.

terrorism in the developing world.<sup>40</sup> Since 11 September 2001, there has been a forced shift in global security paradigms. The security measures therefore worldwide have also had to adjust for a range of reasons and in various ways. This threat has equally applied to southern African states in some very factual ways. Paradoxically, Africa still depends on hegemonic influence of the west even in developing its own security strategies.<sup>41</sup>

## **1.7 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

As Scott Burchill argues, indeed, events and issues which comprise international relations can only be interpreted and understood by reference to conceptual framework. He justifies this when he says that, “Theories provide intellectual order to the subject matter of international relations. They enable us to conceptualise and contextualise both past and contemporary events. They also provide us with a range of ways of interpreting complex issues. Theories help us to orientate and discipline our minds in response to the bewildering phenomena around us. They help us to think critically, logically and coherently. A solid grounding in explanatory theories of International Relations will make empirical studies of world politics that much more intelligible.”<sup>42</sup>

The theories of realism and that of liberalism will inform this study. Social Constructivism, a liberal approach that emphasizes the role of ideologies, identities, persuasion, and transnational networks is highly relevant to understanding the post-9/11 world.<sup>43</sup>

First, it would be doing justice to this framework for analysis by defining what a theory is and what it implies. Despite the varied notion of the term theory for scholars in international relations, in simple terms, the normative theory offers some workable definition: “A

---

<sup>40</sup> Brynjar Lia, *Globalisation and the Future of Terrorism*, Opcit., p.17.

<sup>41</sup> Michael Rifer, *SADC and Terrorism*. Opcit. p.18.

<sup>42</sup> Scott Burchill et al, *Theories of International Relations*, (Palgrave, New York, 2001), p. 13.

<sup>43</sup> Jack Snyder, *One World. Rival Theory*, Foreign Policy, No. 145, Nov. – Dec., 2004, pp. 52-62.



representation of the way the world ought to be.” Equally, applicable is that of empirical theory: ‘using observation to test hypotheses about the world.’<sup>44</sup>

Realists are pessimists about human nature as they paint a grim picture of the world and believe that political struggle among humans is probably inevitable because people have an inherent dark side. They mainly focus on an anarchic nature of the world system based on competition among sovereign states, also believe that politics is the struggle for power and that foreign policy is based on survival of the fittest and hence a country must secure its own interests on assumption that other countries will not help you unless it is in their own interest.<sup>45</sup>

Indeed, realism is pessimistic but at the same time also pragmatic about the world order. It rightfully states that fundamental changes to the structure of the international system are unlikely, even if they are needed. To this regard, the international realm is therefore characterized by conflict, suspicion and competition between nation states.<sup>46</sup> It is in this context of the nature of our world that this study will base some of its analysis and interpretations with regard to terrorism in the SADC region.

Another theory that will inform this study is that of dependency. This theory responded to modernization theory. It surfaced in the 1960s, mostly among Latin American scholars in the strife of explaining why modernization or development had not happened everywhere. Rejecting the notion of the world as a group of sovereign nations, these academics suggested that the world comprised a single capital economic system under which different countries perform different roles or functions.<sup>47</sup>

---

<sup>44</sup>Scott Burchill et al, *Theories of International Relations*, Opcit., p. 8.

<sup>45</sup> John T. Rourke and Mark A. Boyer. *World Politics*, (Mc Graw- Hill Ney York 9198), pp. 11-18.

<sup>46</sup>Scott Burchill et al Opcit., p. 70.

<sup>47</sup> Thomas Clayton, *Competing Conceptions of Globalisation Revisited: Relocating the Tension between World –Systems Analysis and Globalisation Analysis*, Comparative Education Review, Vol. 48. No. 3. August 2004.

Therefore, Dependency theory focuses on the predicament of third world countries called “Dependent Countries.” Indeed, in as far as this dependency is the situation where the growth and expansion of the economy is determined and conditioned by growth and expansion of another economy, there is little manouvre, if any at all, on decision making or devising plans. This condition also implies that the dependent economies cannot initiate anything and the foreign policy of the dependent countries will also reflect dependency. Much as it is in the interest of SADC to combat global terrorism, economical dependence as well as other factors would certainly influence its policies at regional as well as individual levels.

However, as Morgenthau warned, we certainly ought to keep in mind that theoretical endeavours should not reduce international relocations “to a system of abstract propositions with a predictive function,” and also that we ought to be mindful that “world affairs have surprises in store for whoever tries to read the future from his knowledge of the past and from the signs of the present.”<sup>48</sup>

## **1.8 HYPOTHESIS**

That due to lack of coordinated policies on terrorism, the africanisation of war on terror in the SADC Region has many challenges.

## **1.9 STUDY METHODOLOGY**

The study methodology and design id discussed by evaluating the roles of various organisations in the SADC with regard to its policies on counter terrorism. It starts with the

---

<sup>48</sup> Ghazi A.R. Alghosaibi, *The Theory of International Relations: Hans J. Morgenthau and His Critics*. Background, Volume 8. No. 4 Feb., 1965. p. 6.

opportunities and limitations of the study. The rationale for the employed methodology and description of the way the research has been undertaken is also conversed. Consequently, collection methods and data gathering procedures have been described.

### **1.9.1 Opportunities**

The one year spent in Kenya by the author whilst pursuing studies at the National Defence College (Nairobi) was the best opportunity for this study. The war on terror that was being undertaken in that country, both internally and in Somalia, served as a good model of what one can consider as typical africanisation of global war on terror. During the stay in Kenya, direct observation was possible and there were also prospects to hear useful comments that could never be found in books - and yet so relevant and helpful to the study. Just three weeks after leaving Nairobi, the author had the privilege to be posted on a tour of duty in Zimbabwe for about a month as a SADC Elections Observer. This was another great chance to explore the subject in that country.

From the 5<sup>th</sup> to 11<sup>th</sup> October, 2013, there was a Joint Permanent Commission Committee (JPCC) on Security that was held in Malawi between the host country and Zambia. The author was part of the delegation for Malawi and took advantage of this meeting to get ten questionnaires answered by some of the senior officials from Zambia. More so, the author explored another SADC nation, Malawi, his homeland, to gather adequate information on various aspects of global terror and experienced that personal touch - rather than relying on help or getting data through telephones calls or emails.

### **1.9.2 Limitations**

Despite the opportunities discussed above, the study also suffered some limitations of which the time factor and economic constraints can be mentioned. In addition, some policy issues could not be adequately addressed during interviews due to some compressed working schedules of the senior officials. It was also difficult to get a very well balanced sample from all SADC nations and hence the author limited the study to four countries only.

### **1.9.3 Approach**

Since the focus of this study is on the experience of SADC, the case study approach was adopted in order to “illuminate the general by looking at the particular.”<sup>49</sup> The case study also presents the prospects of getting some valuable and unique insights much as it offers greater opportunities for the discovery of specific details. The other opportunities it offers are those of explaining why some outcomes might happen. It also provides the natural setting and allows the use of a variety of sources, types of data and research methods in the investigation of the relationships and processes that are of interest.<sup>50</sup>

This research strategy is suitable for the study because the threat of global terrorism is typical of a security situation that is of great concern to the whole of Africa. The findings from this study can certainly be applied in other regions that are more or less equally affected by global terrorism. Also by considering the limits of time and resources, the selection of a case study was an appropriate strategy.

---

49 Martyn Denscombe, *The good Research Guide*, (Open University Press, Buckingham, 1998), p. 30.

50 Martyn Denscombe, *The good Research Guide*, Opcit., pp. 30-31.

#### **1.9.4 Subject Population**

The questionnaires comprising 10 and 8 questions were distributed to senior officials from government ministries and security organs. The ministries that were targeted included the Ministry of Defence, Home Affairs, and Foreign Affairs whilst the security organs were the military, the police and intelligence agency. The questionnaires were answered by 5 respondents each from various government organisations and the total came to 30 for Malawi, 10 from Zambia and 5 each from Zimbabwe and Republic of South Africa. Other respondents to questionnaires also included 5 officials from the SADC Secretariat as well as another 5 from the Regional Defence Counter Terrorism Center (RDCTC). 10 key informants in Malawi accepted to be interviewed. Questionnaires are attached as appendices.

#### **1.9.5 Data Collection Methods and Study Tools**

Indeed, both qualitative and quantitative research methods have advantages and disadvantages. Since the two methods “do not exclude each other and are often best used together”,<sup>51</sup> this study utilised both methods in order to supplement one by the other. Additionally, in order to ensure the validity and reliability of the collected data, this study employed both methods. Qualitative methods were used for the purpose of finding out diversity of opinions and understanding the effectiveness of various aspects of the global war on terror. Quantitative methods were used for achieving correlation of various factors in relation to the threat of terrorism.

Various study tools were utilised in the study process. In order to achieve a balanced view, the research tools comprised four tools of investigating the topic. Observations were made,


---

3 L. Gosling and M. Edwards, *Toolkits: A Practical Guide to Assessment, Monitoring, Review and Evaluation*, (Save the Children, London, 1995), p. 44.

semi-structured interviews were conducted, and a questionnaire was undertaken. The final method employed for the investigation of the relationships and processes of interest was the review of documentation.

Following the analogy of triangulation, the four tools mentioned above were used to provide an angle on the topic as indicated in (Figure 4.1) below.

**Figure 1.2 Methodological Triangulation**



*Adopted from The Good Research Guide (1998), Martyn Denscombe*

More so, the findings were also triangulated by asking whether the respondents to the interviews agreed with what was found through the feedback assessment technique. In this

approach, some of the respondents' results were individually analysed and then asked whether they agreed and if this was concurrent with what they had meant.

### **1.9.6 Data Gathering Procedures**

Considering the fact that despite other strictures, “a good questionnaire can be invaluable for producing large amount of valid, handleable data with a high degree of objectivity”, 52 questionnaires were undertaken in the research of this study. Sufficient background information about the research and the questionnaire was appropriately given to respondents. The questionnaires were aimed at investigating opinions and attitudes from those officials who are involved in one way or another in policy making or execution of the same in the global war against terror. Almost all questions were closed ones. However, at the end, each one was asked to narrate his /her experience on *Africanizing the War against Terror in SADC*. Whilst the number of the respondents may not fully represent the actual opinions and attitudes on the subject in the whole of SADC, it would be also worth noting Silverman’s statement that, “a case study derives its validity not from the representativeness of its samples, but from the thoroughness of its analysis”.<sup>53</sup>

“Interviewing is a method of collecting data that can stand on its own or be a follow-up process to another method”.<sup>54</sup> This study used semi-structured interviews. The semi-structured interviews were used with specialists in the field of security as well as foreign policy. This qualitative research targeted operational officers and decision makers as part of the study’s objectives. The questions were duly formulated as per the roles and responsibilities of the

---

52 Derek Swetnam, *Writing Your Dissertation*, (How to Books Ltd., Oxford, 2004), p. 64.

53 David Silverman, *Interpreting Qualitative Data*, (SAGE Publications Ltd., London, 1994), p. 234.

54 Derek Swetnam, *Op cit.*, p.64.

interviewees. This factor determined the reason for having different numbers of questions for the interviewees.

Observation “means observing objects, events, processes, relationships, or people’s behaviour systematically and recording these observations”.<sup>55</sup> Direct observation is indeed an ancient study tool and is very effective for crosschecking people’s answers to questions as well as noting the unexpected and anything else that might be relevant to the programme.<sup>56</sup> As mentioned in Section 4.1, the one year stay in Nairobi as well as the visit to Zimbabwe and the returning to Malawi upon the end of course at the National Defence College provided a good chance to counter check many factors pertaining to the study and witness so some peculiar incidents.

One of the other useful sources of data, which was employed in this study, was the review of documents. Documents from various institutions like the Malawi Defence Force, The Malawi Police Service, and SADC Secretariat were obtained for relevant references to the study. Published journal articles by various agencies, statistical data, reports, letters and newspapers with some relevant information to the study were sourced and reviewed accordingly.

### **1.9.7 Data Analysis and Interpretation**

As stated by Patton, “Analysis is the process of bringing data, organising what is there into patterns, categories, and basic descriptive units. Interpretation involves attaching meaning and significance to the analysis, explaining descriptive patterns, and looking for relationships and linkages among the descriptive dimensions”.<sup>57</sup> It is already noted that the study used both

---

<sup>55</sup> Derek Swetnam, Op cit., p.64.

<sup>56</sup> L. Gosling and M. Edwards, Op. cit., p. 148.

<sup>57</sup> M. Q. Patton, *How to use Qualitative Methods in Evaluation*, (SAGE Publications Ltd., London, 1997), p. 144.



quantitative and qualitative research methods. Most interviews were recorded using a tape recorder and others were recorded on the spot by writing in short forms or using outlines. The results of the interviews were rewritten later. Data was then coded to identify themes and topics for analysis. Almost all interviewees had a chance to review or listen to their recorded sessions. Excel 2007 was used to present the questionnaires' data graphically.

The findings of observation, interviews, and document review are presented in a descriptive form hereunder with the results from questionnaires. Every attempt was made to prevent imposing personal views on the answers as this could have reduced the degree of partiality.

### **1.9.8 Emerging Problems**

Regarding interviewees, some officials from organisations who were considered as the key players in the issues pertaining to global war on terror, they were either not available or too busy with meetings and other important official engagements. One of the institutions that has major roles and is directly involved with war on global terror is that of intelligence agencies. For some reasons it was difficult to obtain answers from the officials under the pretext of being too busy and seeing the subject as being irrelevant to them. In the actual sense, it was because of fear for their jobs due to suspicion as confidentiality is very essential and exaggerated to a great extent in these organisations.

For the respondents of interviews and those who undertook the questionnaires, reliability of the data provided had some variation because of providing answers that were being expected by the researcher. Others seemed to provide incorrect answers possibly due to failure to understand the questions. There is also a possibility that the respondents did not really mean what they said.

In order to fulfill the above stated objectives, this dissertation makes use of both primary and secondary sources. Primary data for the research will be gathered through questionnaires to key informants from various Government ministries, security institutions, senior officials from SADC Secretariat as well as from the Regional Defence Counter Terrorism Center (RDCTC). Secondary data will be presented in the form of literature review from published information from various governments, some academic journals, theses, electronic documents, articles and relevant reference books. The information from the abovementioned sources will be analyzed and evaluated in order to come up with recommendations and proposing any improvements in the africanisation of war on terror in the SADC region.

As a method of analysis, the researcher will use tables and charts to analyse the collected data from questionnaires and direct interviews. The theories of realism and liberalism will be used in discussing the research findings.

## **1.10 CONCLUSION**

This chapter has introduced the study. It sets the study background and outlines the research problem, its aim, objectives, literature review, theoretical framework hypothesis, and the research methodology. The relevance of the study and the framework of the study have also been duly presented

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **TERRORISM IN CONCEPT AND REALITY**

#### **2.0 INTRODUCTION**

This chapter reviews the relevant literature pertaining to the concepts of global war on terror. The various information sources used included published books and published articles, research papers, magazines, newspapers, documents and websites. The chapter presents the concepts of global war on terror, its current nature and the impact on SADC. This is to evaluate how crucial the africanisation of global war on terror is and how it can effectively be applied.

Since the paradigm shift of national security at the global level, there has equally been an evolution of new perspectives to terrorism and its profundity has also changed. There are different views as to the nature of what constitutes the war on terror and some factors that determine its contemporary features as well as why the war will escalate or diminish. Different scholars have expressed their diverse viewpoints and it would seem that there is indeed contention on this new phenomenon much as there is also consensus in many spheres. How these views impact on SADC as a region would certainly be worth noting since the region is just part of the global system.

#### **2.1 ORTHODOX TERRORISM THEORY**

Orthodox terrorism theory is the principal paradigm or discourse that is used to understand, explain, and deal with terrorism. It is for this reason that terrorism is widely regarded as “a doctrine about the efficacy of unexpected and life-threatening violence for political change

and a strategy of political action which embodies that doctrine.”<sup>58</sup> Orthodox terrorism theory is a discourse built upon the act of terrorism in order to understand its Logic. The theory concentrates mainly on acts of terrorism as violence against the established authority or state, not necessarily by it. Whilst it does expound state terrorism, orthodox terrorism theory is essentially a western model of understanding rooted in western freedoms, the rule of law and the liberal democratic state. This is due to the necessity for a requirement to deal with acts of terrorism, which according to orthodox terrorism theory, are seen as threats to the state.<sup>59</sup>

Orthodox terrorism theory is based on a number of common themes that reoccur throughout terrorism literature. These can be grouped into three areas, *functional, symbolic, and tactical*. By using each of these types as a guide it is possible to expound the orthodox theory of terrorism. *Functional* relates to the orthodox belief that terrorism is intended to “provoke a response to further the cause by strategic manipulation.”<sup>60</sup> This is a central concept and suggests that the aim of the act of terrorism is to force a reaction, hopefully an over-reaction by the established power centre, governing authority or state against the instigators, their supporters and even the population in general. Rubenstein calls this “heroic terrorism” and suggests that the aim is to “provoke intense indiscriminate state repression in order to deprive the government of legitimacy and radicalise the masses.”<sup>61</sup> Laqueur calls this “the terrorist theory of provocation.”<sup>62</sup> Thus Orthodox terrorism theory suggests that the terrorists endeavour to extract legitimacy from the state and bestow it upon their own cause.

---

<sup>58</sup> Stohl M, *Current Perspectives on International Terrorism*, (Macmillan Press, London, 1988), p.116.

<sup>59</sup> George A, *Western State Terrorism*, (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991), p .44.

<sup>60</sup> Bowyer Bell J, *A Time of Terror*, (Basic Books, New York, 1978), p.50.

<sup>61</sup> Laquer W, *The New Terrorism*, (Oxford: Phoenix Press, 3<sup>rd</sup> Ed. 2001), p. 26.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p.27.

Orthodox terrorism theory uses the concept of symbolism to explain an act of terrorist violence as being highly symbolic and an attempt to terrorise, intimidate and strike fear into the those against whom the violence is directed; even if they are not the actual physical recipients of the violence. This is what Carlo Piscane calls “theory of propaganda by deed.”<sup>63</sup> Evidently, the actual targets of the act and the wider audience who witness it are directly affected by it. Orthodox terrorism theory suggests the aim of terrorist violence is to “kill one and frighten ten thousand.”<sup>64</sup> *Tactical*, the third component of Orthodox terrorism theory can be understood in two ways. Firstly, as a limited means to achieve short-term gain, such as the exchange of hijack hostages for prisoners or a bank robbery to fund arms procurement. This was a common understanding employed during the hijacks in the 1970s by Palestinian groups. The second way is as a tactical part of a long term strategic initiative with its roots in the theories of revolution and guerrilla warfare by proponents such as Mao Tse-Tung and Carlos Marighela. They suggested that acts of terrorism should be part of the wider struggle for revolution or an initial stage.<sup>65</sup>

As a result of the apparent confusion surrounding the understanding and definition of terrorism, the study of terrorism has become preoccupied with the constant debate that revolves around explaining *what* actually constitutes terrorism and *how* to counter it. Instead of perhaps concentrating on *why* it actually occurs. Jason Franks argues that there is need to engage the problem of explaining terrorism and that just as a rethinking has been successfully applied to conflict, the same must be done now to terrorism in order to provide alternative approaches that

---

<sup>63</sup> Hoffman B, *Inside Terrorism*, (Indigo, London, 1999), p.17.

<sup>64</sup> Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963. p.67.

<sup>65</sup> Chaliand G. *Terrorism from Popular Struggle to Media Spectacle*. (Saqi Books, London, 1987), p.12.

can deal with the root causes. This would assist to resolve and end the endemic forms of atrocious violence currently being experienced globally.<sup>66</sup>

The problem is that whilst the study of conflict has moved on and betrothed with alternative methods of understanding war and conflict, the orthodox terrorism perceptive is still constrained by the relative moral legitimacy debate, out of which it is presently unable to break. This definitional situation hence significantly deters any engagement in a 'roots of terrorism' contention in using alternative multidimensional analytical tools.<sup>67</sup>

These so called new war and new terrorism debates have indeed challenged the traditional understanding of conflict as interstate war or symmetric conflict. The contemporary conflict is no longer 'organised' inter-state war but instead intra-state conflict. These 'new wars' take the form of asymmetric warfare between groups, movements and organisations often against the state but predominantly within it. They have being described as ethnic identity conflicts, characterised by irredentist and secessionist movements and multi-party civil war. Often they are underwritten by religious or ethno-nationalist ideas and characterized by hatred, fear and genocide, no declarations of war, few battles and are typified by attrition, terror and violence against civilians. The new war debates suggest that recognition of these new forms of conflict have occurred in the disorder and uncertainty caused by the end of the cold war and the realignment of the international system following the collapse of the Soviet Union. These new conflicts could also be due to the failure of the state as an institution and the unsuitability of the Westphalia system as an international order.<sup>68</sup>

---

<sup>66</sup> Jason Franks, *Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism: Orthodox Terrorism Theory and Beyond*, (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2006), p. 1.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid. p. 3.

<sup>68</sup> Laquer W, *The New Terrorism*, (Phoenix Press, Oxford, 2001), p. 8.


Jason ably argues that much as Orthodox terrorism theory is the predominant discourse that is used to explain, understand and deal with terrorism, it is created and employed to deal with terrorism from the perspective of state security, without any form of roots debate, in order to legitimize governmental anti-terrorism and counter terrorism policies and actions. He further argues that it is apparent therefore that by combining the best approaches provided by terrorism and conflict studies into a hybrid framework, it is possible to compile a more comprehensive survey of the methods for explaining and understanding the roots of terrorism. This 'alternative theoretical approach' is what he recommends to be a holistic framework that incorporates a wide-ranging, multi-level and multidimensional approach to explaining and understanding the root causes of terrorism by rethinking and suggesting a number of alternative theoretical root causes. More so, he argues that this theoretical synthesis is to suggest that a hybrid of the approaches of conflict and terrorism can create a more sophisticated understanding of terrorism than the orthodox approach and hence more capable of opening alternative pathways for resolving the violence.<sup>69</sup>

Below is the figure that summarises the theoretical synthesis of root causes:

---

<sup>69</sup> Jason Franks, *Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism: Orthodox Terrorism Theory and Beyond*, (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2006), p. 20.

Figure 2.1 The 'New War' / 'New Terrorism' nexus.



Adapted from Jason Franks: *Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism*.

## 2.2. TERRORISM AS A SERIOUS THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY

The September 11 2001 attacks affected the American security policy and its central role in the evolving international system. In the immediate wake of the traumatic events, the US proclaimed the international terrorism as a new war and dubbed it *war on terror*. The US level of concern with national security has since been heightened together with geopolitics in response to the event. Consequently, there has been a “tectonic shift” in the structure of international relations.<sup>70</sup>

---

<sup>70</sup> Donald M. Snow, *National Security for a New Era: Globalization and Geopolitics*, (Pearson Longman, New York, 2004), p. 16.



In fact, the French President Jacques Chirac, within a week after the attacks, had suggested to President George Bush that owing to the nature of the terror attacks, the term campaign was more appropriate since it implied a broader more comprehensive approach to the problem requiring diplomatic, political, and economic aspects. President Bush agreed to this amendment. However, the war analogy that was being further perpetuated by CNN could not be easily relinquished as it had already grabbed the public attention.<sup>71</sup>

A scholar in Madrid, during the Seventh Commemoration of the 2004 Madrid terrorist bombings, summed up very well what constitutes the threat of terrorism today and how widespread it is in our contemporary world. He wrote that: "Terrorism could be considered one of the most significant trans-national security threats of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It is a vague concept that has a very complex and ambiguous definition. Globalization and the advancement in technology have made terrorism a more complex issue. It is much easier for terrorists to achieve their goals because their ability to cross borders easily with transportation and to communicate with their allies in all parts of the world. This has made it very difficult for experts to monitor terrorism and prevent attacks from occurring."<sup>72</sup>

Whilst there is nothing new in the asymmetrical enemy, the instruments have changed in the contemporary context because now the US has placed a relative emphasis on combating the unconventional opponents. The terrorist attacks riveted the US attention to a sub-category of non-state actors who are difficult to combat in conventional terms - as the US military has learned. More importantly a further characteristic of the changed environment is how the American role in the world is viewed. In particular, there is the issue of how dealing with

---

<sup>71</sup>Donald M. Snow, *National Security for a New Era: Globalization and Geopolitics*, Op cit., p. 245.

<sup>72</sup>Seven Years Ago Today: 11 -M Terrorist Attacks in Madrid. [Online]  
<http://www.alcalingua.com/index.php/es/blog/761-blog-11-m> (Accessed 11March 2011)

terrorism has prompted the US to act in concert with its allies and the international community or unilaterally, for its individual interests. In the immediate repercussion of the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration responded by calling actions that would be broadly international and the internationalist character seemed to prevail. However this eroded and ultimately the US unilateralism triumphed. This occurred due to the international concerns of the detainees at Guantanamo, the US announcement of the “axis of evil”, and the threats of likelihood of military action to deal with their alleged transgression without consulting.<sup>73</sup>

David Snow ably argues that the shocks of the September 11 attacks bring out the notion of military and non-military elements of security. He describes anti- terrorism as being a classic semi-military security problem. By analyzing national interests, he argues that interests have largely remained the same but that there is need to pursue them in different forms. For the discourse on power, the scholar analyses the nature of effectiveness of the various instruments of power in the changed environment and argues why the US should rightfully be perceived as arrogant and overbearing in its strife to remain the hegemony and thus maximize its influence over issues that augment its national security.<sup>74</sup>

According to George J. Tenet, the 18<sup>th</sup> Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) who worked in that capacity from 1997 to 2004, terrorism is one of the most serious threats to national security. Helen Cothran agrees with him when he further warns that the phenomenon is a serious threat to national security so much that the US needs to not to relax its guard against terrorists despite many successes in the fight against terrorism following the September 11

---

<sup>73</sup>Donald M. Snow, *National Security for a New Era: Globalization and Geopolitics*, Op cit., pp. 17-31.

<sup>74</sup>Donald M. Snow, *National Security for a New Era: Globalization and Geopolitics*, Op cit., p.174.

attacks.<sup>75</sup> Especially where nuclear terrorism still remains a serious threat to world stability, it is apparent that terrorism will persist as a serious threat to nations of the world.

The former CIA chief argues that this terrorist threat will also increase because of the growing domestic unrest and conflict in weak nations which will offer a conducive environment for terrorism to thrive. As such the United States has to focus its attention not only to Muslim nations in the Middle East but also to watch other countries from which terrorists are planning attacks against it. He Gives examples of Somalia, Indonesia and Columbia. In Somalia, the absence of a legitimate government has created an environment in which groups sympathetic to Al Qaeda have offered terrorists an operational base. In Indonesia, political instability separatists' movement, ethnic tensions and protracted violence have fueled Islamic extremism. As for Columbia, there are leftists insurgents making money from drug trafficking and thus hampering economic recovery and fueling a series of violence. <sup>76</sup>

Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer also share the opinion that terrorism is indeed a serious threat to national security. They say that the United States was confronted with the stark reality of modern terrorism on September 11; as the terrorism witnessed on this day was indeed a giant escalation of an evolving threat. They argue that the question for us is not if further attacks will occur in the United States, but when and to what magnitude. They further argue that terrorists will continue to try to adapt to the changing counter-terror security environment.<sup>77</sup>

Another scholar who shares the above opinion is Kurt Shillinger. He argues by saying that firstly, the threat of Islamist violence is global. To this regard then it would be unwise and

---

<sup>75</sup> Helen Cathran, *National Security: Opposing Viewpoints*, (Greenhaven Press, San Diego, 2004), pp.18-19.

<sup>76</sup> Helen Cathran, *National Security: Opposing Viewpoints*, Opcit., p. 16.

<sup>77</sup> Russell D. Howard, and Reid L. Sawyer, *Terrorism and Counter Terrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*, (The McGraw-Hill Companies, Guilford 2004), p.1.

from a policy perspective unjustifiable to regard terrorism as “the west’s issue”, since more Muslim states have experienced the tragic effects of the same problem than have western states. He further argues that recognising the threat as such is a prerequisite to building effective counterterrorism strategies.<sup>78</sup>

It is such new security needs that have led to the development of new ‘norms’ of humanitarian intervention and the international protection of human rights. Apparently, they have not only caused controversy but have further challenged the UN Charter framework of sovereignty and international law. There are controversies as to whether if there is a right of intervention, how and when it should be exercised and under whose authority. The concept of “responsibility to protect” similarly, has been noted to be cause for controversies with regard to consistency, credibility and enforceable standards to guide states and intergovernmental practice.<sup>79</sup>

However, Michael L. Rothschild has a different view altogether as he believes that the terrorist threat has been exaggerated. According to him, people have overestimated the risk that terrorists pose to people’s security due to intensity media coverage of the September 11 2001 attacks. He thus argues that we need to return to a more normal life by acting with respect to one’s real risk and the probability that as a person one can be affected. Therefore, if one reacts as if each terrorist act will be directed specifically at him, then he will hide, and collectively we will all hide. <sup>80</sup> This concept is in line with one of the liberal approaches, social constructivism, whereby the threat is normally what an individual or groups of people have to construct as a

---

<sup>78</sup> Kurt Shillinger, *Global Terror: Africa Not Immune to Terror*, Business Day, 7 Oct. 2005.

<sup>79</sup> Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 2001), pp. 1-11.

<sup>80</sup> Helen Cathran, *National Security: Opposing Viewpoints*, Op cit., pp. 23-26.

threat to their security. To this regard, the media indeed attributed a lot in sensitizing the Americans so much so that they have accepted the fact that terrorism is the new threat to human security.

Indeed, the media nowadays has increasingly become a source of influence in the international as well as the national arena. The view espoused by Henry Kissinger that terrorists do what they do, at least in part, because of the publicity the media provides was reiterated in Margaret Thatcher's description of the strong relationship that exists between the media and terrorists. In referring to the Irish Republican Army, she appropriately said that "Publicity is the oxygen of terrorism." This view certainly creates a fundamental dilemma between preventing the media from the manipulation of promoting the cause of terrorism or its methods on the one hand, and that of eroding the freedom of the press on the other. 81

P. Norris also ably argues that a key requirement of a democracy is the freedom of the press to report events openly but in a manner which is critical of as well as and detached from terrorist agendas. However, the information revolution that has been steered in by the development of the internet has had profound impact on the use of the media to further terrorist agendas as well as its manipulation to further government imperatives. In fact, from the terrorist perspective, media coverage is such an important measure of the success of a terrorist act or operation as any publicity surrounding a terrorist act alerts the world that a problem that cannot be disregarded and must be addressed subsists. Apparently, it would seem that governments do

---

81 Perl, R.F. *Terrorism, the Media, and the Government: Perspectives, Trends, and Options for Policymakers*, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief, October 22, 1997.

not have a strong hold on communication anymore and thus creating challenges for filtering information and the consequential insecurity posed by terrorists.<sup>82</sup>

For instance, the internet which has become a key tool for the terrorists' dangerous images may not be available through traditional media sources like the television and newspapers due to the nature and content of the material. The images are made easily accessible on the internet and thus increasing its intended shock. Bodies of the United States elite soldiers, the Rangers being dragged in Mogadishu and the recent similar images of the bodies of Kenyan soldiers in Kismayu are testimony to this phenomenon.

On a different note, as for the effects of the threat of terrorism, the fact is that terrorism has been so exaggerated so much so that it has also become a means of segregation and marginalization among different nations, religions, races, ethnic groups, tribes, and other forms of groups of people. As a result, many people have suffered and are still suffering because of being labeled or associated with 'terrorists' just because of where they come from, their race, religion and beliefs, This generalization, apparently is not only being practiced informally in communities but even formally as well in conducting business. For instance, at airports, or when applying for visas, those of Muslim origin or black race tend to be scrutinized unnecessarily too much just because someone perceives the other as belonging to the 'terrorists' groups. The Somali ethnic group of Kenya is a typical example whereby it is so due to the Somalis of Somalia of whom many have been linked to Al Shabaab group of terrorists.

Even certain behavior is also being associated with one being a terrorist. For instance, carrying a travel bag as you go to board the underground trains in the United Kingdom (UK) is always scaring to others and one receives a lot of attention from security personnel! Many

---

<sup>82</sup>Norris, P. et al, *Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the Government and the Public*, (Routledge, New York, 2003). p. 43.

individuals in various capacities continue to be victimized in the name of terrorism when actually there is no threat of such and do not actually appear or possess the quality of a terrorist.

The above literature review serves to illustrate how the threat of terrorism has become complicated and stern both globally and in Africa, including neighbouring countries of the SADC sub-region like Kenya. The situation could be appreciated as a warning to SADC countries that may eventually become vulnerable to terrorism too in the near future. If SADC does not tread carefully on its policies against the threat, devastating effects may be the end result especially when the environment is perceived to be conducive to the terrorists. It is thus a prerequisite for SADC to foster effective counterterrorism strategies before the situation worsens.

### **2.3 THE DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES OF TERRORISM**

One of the contemporary perceptions of terrorism worth noting is that Islam has great links with modern terrorism and hence has become a threat to national security. There is now a prevalent conception that modern terrorism is a result of the clash of civilizations. Antony Flew argues that nowadays Islam threatens to destroy Western civilizations as there is intention to create a global Islamic state instead. According to him, Moslems literally interpret and unquestionably accept the prescriptions in the Islamic holy book, the Quran, which charges over Moslems to take over the world. He says that Islam is contemptible of western ideals such as democracy, freedom of religion and toleration and hence demands its believers to do whatever necessary, including armed forces, to depose them. He further argues that there is no need for anyone to pretend that the September 11 were no profound religious acts when Osama Bin Laden himself insisted that they were. To this regard, he even questions as to why Moslems who find

life in a secular state intolerable do not return to their original states; rather than demanding the host countries to make radical constitutional changes to accommodate them.<sup>83</sup>

In support of the same argument, Antony Flew, goes ahead to quote Sir William Muir in his book, *The Life of Mahomet*, when he says that “The Sword of Mahomet and the Koran are the most enemies of Civilization, Liberty and Truth which the world has yet known.”<sup>84</sup> Indeed, the work of this author can arguably be said to be radical and anti-Islam considering his perpetuation of his earlier arguments by quoting Sir William Muir, who as a staunch Christian himself, has been well-known for having combined his arguments for scholarly as well as evangelical purposes.<sup>85</sup> Despite all this, these are some of the convictions that are predominant and are the view which is being held by a significant number of groups of people or individuals in Western societies as well as other circles with regard to modern terrorism.

There are also other scholars, like Christopher Harmon for instance, who blame Islamic teachings which permits terrorism. He cites an example whereby the Al Qaeda leadership justifies terrorism by the declaration that was made by Bin Laden in 1998 which states that. “it is the duty of the Muslims to prepare as much force as possible to terrorize the enemies of God.”<sup>86</sup> He also cites another example of the Al Qaeda training manuals of 1990 which recommended that Jewish communities, institutions, clubs and hospitals ought to be carefully chosen and include the largest gatherings so that any strike should cause thousands of deaths. He gives further evidence of ideals of assassination, bombing and destruction by quoting the al-Qaeda manual that was found in Manchester which included the following Koranic passage: “Strike

---

<sup>83</sup>Helen Cathran, *National Security: Opposing Viewpoints*, Opcit., pp. 27-33.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid., p.36.

<sup>85</sup>William Muir, *The Life of Mahomet*, [On Line] <http://www.answering islam.org/Books/Muir/index.htm> (Accessed 16 February 2013).

<sup>86</sup> Christopher C. Harmon, *Terrorism Today*, (Routledge, 2008, New York), p. 2.



terror into the enemies of Allah and your enemies, and others whom ye may not know, but whom Allah doth know.”<sup>87</sup>

Of course, some extremist Moslems have certainly abused the Quran’s teachings and justified their own political agenda using terrorist acts. Apparently, such sentiments and many more by this author and others to justify the link between Islam and terrorism have indeed created some marginalization of the Moslem communities in various ways due to generalization that comes forth ultimately. In fact, the emphasis should be on some radical or fundamentalist Moslems groups and not just every individual Moslem. Moreover, should this notion of ‘them and us’ war be further escalated, the challenge now would be that an emergent proportion of the world’s Moslem youth may grow up clasping extremist views that could eventually spearhead increased terrorism in the world. On the other hand, the continued wide range of well-funded charitable and publicity activities of radical Islamist groups will yield no other results but increased extremist views in the target populations. In fact it would seem that the extremist Moslems are vigorously opposing the capitalist ideology due to its exploitative framework.

To the contrary of the above view, Antony T Sullivan argues that Islam is not a threat to National security. He ably argues that despite some claims by prominent scholars, Islam does not pose threat to the security of the Western states. He thus goes on to condemn the US for setting up Islam as an enemy of the West since this could result in a war of civilization that the US will not win. He further states that anger towards the US in the Muslim world is a result of rage at specific American policies. He cites some of the causes of such rage being as a result of the US partiality to Israel at the expense of the Palestinians, maintenance of sanctions in Iraq while the innocent children die and consistent failure to support individual liberty and limited government

---

<sup>87</sup>Christopher C. Harmon, *Terrorism Today*, Opcit., p. 3.

in Moslem states. He says that these grievances are even shared by the seven million American Moslems.<sup>88</sup>

'Humanitarian intervention,' for instance, has been controversial in two occasions; when it has failed to happen and also when it does happen. When it happened in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo there were controversies, and when it failed to happen in Rwanda, controversies were also the outcome. In Rwanda, in 1994, the UN Secretariat and some members of the Security Council knew that the Hutu led government was planning genocide. Moreover, despite having a reasonable size of the UN forces as well as credible strategies that could have been utilized to mitigate the slaughter, the Security Council refused to take the necessary action. The genocide that ensued was a human catastrophe did not only destabilize Rwanda but the whole Great Lakes Region.<sup>89</sup>

As for the Kosovo scenario where intervention did take place in 1999, the operation raised major questions with regard to the legitimacy of military intervention in a sovereign state. The intervention provoked other questions such as whether the cause was just and all peaceful means of resolving the conflict had fully been explored. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) "coalition of the willing" acted without the Security Council's approval and yet a similar situation four years earlier on in Bosnia was not prevented by the UN. <sup>90</sup>

Undeniably, the issues and pre-occupations of the 21<sup>st</sup> century pose new and fundamentally different types of security challenges from those that faced the world in the last century, when the UN was founded. With the terrorists attacks of September 11 on the World Trade Centre bringing in an enemy with no contested frontiers and largely invisible, the war

---

<sup>88</sup>Helen Cathran, *National Security: Opposing Viewpoints*, Op cit., p. 41.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid., p. 1.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid., p. 1.

against terrorism the world must fight now is evident enough that new realities and challenges have emerged. Equally so, new expectations for action as well as new standards of conduct in international affairs have appeared forthwith.

It has also been argued that democratic countries are more vulnerable to terrorist attacks due to their commitment to civil liberties and basic rights hence they find it more difficult to find intelligence on citizens, to arrest, to interrogate and extract information. Further, the effectiveness of the courts can also be undermined by the intimidation of witnesses or other illegal actions like convictions being a problem due to lack of evidence. So it is perceived that the legal system in democratic countries give suspected terrorists more rights than other systems. Contrary to this, in non-democratic countries, dissident organisations are more constrained. A totalitarian system has comprehensive security agencies everywhere and opposition is much more difficult to organize. Persons can also be arrested merely on suspicion and questioned indefinitely.<sup>91</sup>

Another perspective is that the United States as the only superpower is more vulnerable as it becomes a more appealing target for some terrorists. This is so owing to the fact that as a superpower it is involved in political situations throughout the world. Thus terrorists will target the United States because of its foreign policy decisions and sometimes the antagonism towards it because it is perceived as the symbol of the Western powers so much so that any of it's activity is seen as having some malignant purpose. In fact, what the United States does or does not can make it a target.<sup>92</sup>

---

<sup>91</sup>Russel D. Howard, and Reid L. Sawyer, *Terrorism and Counter Terrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*, Op cit., pp. 39-40.

<sup>92</sup>Ibid., p. 47.

In fact, allies of the United States can equally be affected as it is normal in life to be victimized if you are a friend of someone's enemy. Spain for instance, had to withdraw from Iraq in 2004 after it was attacked in Madrid by terrorists who claimed to have done so because of its involvement in the war in Iraq along with the United States. This view certainly has had an impact on the foreign relations of the United States especially with regard to other countries as well those that have tendencies of non-alignment. It is evident that international security in the twenty-first century has enlarged its agenda and demands that actors work together. Since international security is produced by a plurality of actors, the nature of the threat of terrorism indeed makes it apparent for the need that states address it multilaterally. Any state cannot achieve much success unilaterally.

Despite this necessity, those who side together risk the consequences together as terrorists use the game of the mind in their strife to propagate their agendas. To borrow from Liddell Hart, just like psychological operations, terrorism is basically 'the battle of wits.' That is why when Spain pulled out of Iraq in 2004 due to the Madrid attacks many people regarded the event to have symbolised a great loss to the West and a significant reward to the terrorists.

When an Islamic Jihadists satellite group of al-Qaeda carried out a tragic terrorist attack in Madrid, killing 191 people and injuring 1,841, it is clear that the bombings contributed greatly to the Socialist Party's surprise victory at the polls three days later and the election of a new Prime Minister, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero. Already, Zapatero had promised to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq. James Phillip argues that this Spanish retreat was perceived as a huge political triumph for Al Qaeda and other like-minded Islamic radicals. He further argues that the unfortunate Spanish reaction to the Madrid bombings would particularly heighten the threat of copycat attacks on other countries as well as paving the way for much more terrorist bloodshed

throughout the Western world. He analogically explains that Spain's government like an appeaser who feeds a crocodile hoping it will eat him last, had fed a voracious crocodile a substantial meal that would only enlarge its future appetite.<sup>93</sup>

Bruce Bongar argues that during the past decade, there has been a dramatic transformation in the nature and uses of terrorism. Whilst in the 1970s, it was often observed that terrorists wanted a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead, nowadays it is different since terrorists want a lot of people dead and even more people crippled by fear and grief. Modern terrorists' major strategic intent is to use larger scale physical attacks in order to cause stress in the general population. Consequently, these changes in terrorist strategy have made it clear that we need better psychological and social responses to terrorism. He further argues that the psychological science needed to provide proper and effective treatment for victims of horrendous events, such as September 11th, and future potential terrorist acts, simply does not exist, so military, medical, and psychological experts must work together to improve their understanding of mass-casualty terrorism.<sup>94</sup>

## **2.4 THE THREAT OF TERRORISM AND ITS IMPACT ON SADC**

In the contemporary world, security has a broad agenda. Consequently, terrorism should equally be. The broad concept of security is indeed a result of the notion of security which is no longer limited to the military domain but also to the economic, societal, environment, and the political spheres. Nowadays security can no longer be conceptualized solely in terms of the state

---

<sup>93</sup>James Phillips, *Spain's Retreat After The Madrid Bombings Rewards Terrorism* (Accessed 16 March 2004) Available at: <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/03/>

<sup>94</sup>Bruce Bongar et al (eds.) *Psychology of Terrorism*, (Oxford University Press, New York, 2006), pp. 116-136.

but it also has to embrace the individual below it and the international system above it.<sup>95</sup>It is therefore appropriate that SADC as a region needs to look at itself as an organization that was formed to cater for the interests of its member states and yet at the same time consider its existence and survival in the global arena in tandem with international security norms which have become transnational, global and interdependent.

The preceding sub-topic has clearly illustrated the existing concepts of terrorism whereby global security has been endangered by the so-called modern terrorism. This necessitates the assessment of the threat in this region as well as its impact in the strife to find out what needs to be done and what mechanisms would be appropriate for effective solutions to the problem. Since the dynamics of globalization fit into the pattern of geopolitics of the contemporary environment as well as the solutions of the contemporary problems that emanate henceforth, it has been ably argued that the elimination of terrorism can be significantly accomplished through international efforts and collaboration. It has been well contended that some security issues like regional conflicts, terrorism and illicit drugs do not merit treating them appropriately by traditional concerns with the direct military security but rather, through non-military elements. The international environment has indeed changed. The September 11 attacks changed the US general view of the world and thus has had to rearrange its national priorities accordingly. There have been some debates between the internationalists and the isolationists and neo-conservative unilateralists, and this has had at least consensus that the September 11 attacks do not fit within standard categories and consequently deserve “out of the box” responses.<sup>96</sup>

The US views the ‘threat paradigm’ across Africa as a result of “Physical Safe Havens” and “Legal Safe Havens.” Whilst the former is also referred to as “Ungoverned Spaces”, the

---

<sup>95</sup>Michael Sheehan, *International Security: An Analytical Survey*, (2005), p. 45.

<sup>96</sup>Donald M. Snow, *National Security for a New Era: Globalization and Geopolitics*, OpCit. pp.182-211.

latter refers to the lack of a suitable legal framework to outlaw terrorism, the provision of material and financial support to terrorists and incitement to commit terrorist acts.<sup>97</sup> Moreover, some roots of terrorism are due to high rates of poverty, unemployment, and other factors leading to marginalization of entire social groups which may create a condition for potential terrorist recruits. Hence this view is justified to great extent as many of these aspects are befitting to the African situation and indeed to the SADC sub-region too.

Undeniably, nearly all African countries can be viewed as highly vulnerable to terrorist groups owing to physical, economic, institutional and political weaknesses, as well as African states inability to prevent terrorists from entering and operating in their territories. In fact the determination of the threat posed to each country is based on the presence, intentions and capacities of the terrorist groups.<sup>98</sup>

According to Andre le Sage, terrorist groups in Africa and their history of attacks over the past fifteen years can be categorized into four:<sup>99</sup>

- a. **Transnational Terrorism:** Attacks by al Qaeda and al Qaeda associated movements including GSPC/AQIM, AIAI (Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat/ Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Al Ittihad Al Islami) and other North African groups, on governments and Western targets.

---

<sup>97</sup> Andrew Le Sage, (ed.), *African Counterterrorism Cooperation*, (Potomac Books, Inc., Washington D.C., 2007), p. 12.

<sup>98</sup> Andrew Le Sage, (ed.), *African Counterterrorism Cooperation*, (Potomac Books, Inc., Washington D.C., 2007), p. 9-13.

<sup>99</sup> Andrew Le Sage, (ed.), *African Counterterrorism Cooperation*, (Potomac Books, Inc., Washington D.C., 2007), pp. 13-31.

- b. **Domestic Terrorism:** Attacks by domestic terrorist groups such as People against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) in South Africa, and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in Sierra Leone, on African governments and Western targets.
- c. **Rebels using Terrorist Tactics:** Attacks on African governments, African civilians, Western aid efforts, and tourists by African rebel movements and insurgents such as LRA, FDLR, and RUF (Lord's Resistance Army, Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda, and Revolutionary United Front) as part of a wider ethno-regional guerrilla struggle.
- d. **Terrorist Financing and Facilitation:** Funding and political support provide to Hezbollah and to a far lesser extent, HAMAS by businessmen and other supporters.

Much as it is premature to contemplate whether the African Union will address continental conflicts successfully, there are positive signs in that upon its inception in September 2001, one of its main objectives was to harmonise the economic and political policies of African states in order to improve Pan-African Welfare and provide Africans with a solid voice in international affairs. Many of those who hail the AU also believe that it has a stronger charter than the OAU and should its funding be equally better, it will be empowered to create a common bank, a common currency and a continental court of justice. It is more gratifying to note that the AU's prominent objective is to establish the Peace and Security Council of the AU whose role will mainly be to promote peace, security and stability in Africa in order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property, well being of the people, as well as a conducive environment for sustainable development.<sup>100</sup>

---

<sup>100</sup>Makumi Mwangiru, ed., *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization*, (Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, 2004). P. 15.



Terrorism is not just a western concern and as such it is an international issue requiring a coherent international response. Africa has a vital role to play in ensuring security within and beyond its shores. To acquire counterterrorism capacity would thus require moving beyond broad undertakings to a systematic and incremental approach that recognises both the threat and resources. The immediate strategy therefore, should be to build Africa's capacity on the basis of a blunt and practical division of labour among states and regional organisations according to their strengths. This leaves two roles for regional organisations such as the Southern African Development Community. These would include to focus primarily on border issues in order to co-ordinate interstate responses to trafficking of illicit goods, bogus travel documents, cash and people whilst another role would be that of facilitating the joint analysis of cross-border flows, including smuggling, that could be terror related.<sup>101</sup>

In adopting a systemic perspective, the beginning point is that indeed there are very few issues that are purely internal and that can be purely be seen to be so. The fundamental nature of this reasoning is that since the system is closely interwoven, what pose as threats for one state in the system are equally threats to other members of the system. This notion has been exhibited in the Great Lakes Region where specific threats to the Democratic Republic of Congo also ended up being seen as threats to other member states of the system and hence the hurried internationalisation of the conflict.<sup>102</sup> From the perception of conflicts, this concept does need more emphasis since it can similarly be adopted to examine threats to security in the SADC region.

---

<sup>101</sup>Kurt Shillinger, *Global Terror: Africa Not Immune to Terror*, Business Day, 7 Oct. 2005.

<sup>102</sup>Makumi Mwangiru, ed., *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization*, (Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, 2004). P. 144.

According to Andre Le Sage, the categorization of terrorism threat in SADC states indicates that it is either low or moderate and not significant in any of them.<sup>103</sup>

**Figure 2.2 Terrorism Threats and Vulnerabilities in SADC**

Country	Level of Threat	Terrorist Presence
Angola	Low	None
Botswana	Low	None
DRC	Low	Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda(FDLR) and Lord's Resistance Army
Lesotho	Low	None
Madagascar	Low	None
Malawi	Low	None
Mauritius	Low	None
Mozambique	Moderate	Transit by al Qaeda and possibly al Ittihad al Islami (AIAI)
Namibia	Low	None
Seychelles	Low	None
South Africa	Moderate	Al Qaeda and People against Gangsterism and drugs
Swaziland	Low	None
Tanzania	Moderate	Possibly al Qaeda and al Ittihad al Islami
Zambia	Low	Past al Qaeda transit
Zimbabwe	Low	None

Source: Andre Le Sage, *African Counterterrorism Cooperation*.

<sup>103</sup> Andrew Le Sage, (ed.), *African Counterterrorism Cooperation*, (Potomac Books, Inc., Washington D.C., 2007), p. 26.

Much as the above figure illustrates that there is no indication that terrorist groups are present in the SADC sub-region in any significant number, there is potential of its escalation. In fact, despite not having known terrorist leaders in the sub-region, unknown number of pockets of terrorists who are primarily focused on facilitating funding, transit and hiding for terrorist groups, particularly of al Qaeda, have been active. Numerous al Qaeda operatives have been arrested in the Sub-region or captured after transiting it. Moreover, the sub-region's relatively high levels of political stability have made it an attractive venue for terrorists operational planning and safe haven for a variety of reasons such as the following:<sup>104</sup>

- a. Porous borders, corruption, easy access to travel documents combined with excellent ports, roads and airport infrastructure make possible.
- b. High crime rates and regional weapons smuggling make access to small arms and explosives possible.
- c. Modern banking systems criminal syndicates make money laundering and resource mobilization possible.
- d. The operating environment is secure as long as terrorist supporters and transient operatives do not break the local laws or otherwise attract the attention of the local police.
- e. Muslim communities are peaceful but are increasingly targeted for extremist indoctrination by foreign charities and preachers.

SADC nations would therefore need to deliberate where terrorism stands in their collective list of priorities. Considering that disease, malnutrition, and crime kill far more individuals than do terrorist bombs in the region, it would thus be quite a challenge before

---

<sup>104</sup> Andrew Le Sage, (ed.), *African Counterterrorism Cooperation*, (Potomac Books, Inc., Washington D.C., 2007), pp. 26-27.

making terrorism a concern above all others. Moreover, terrorism is the cause of day for the West. Apparently, terrorism will at the end of the day become an issue upon which whether or not it is right, explicitly or implicitly, conditionality's are bound to be imposed.<sup>105</sup>

As SADC intensifies its internal ties socially, culturally, politically and economically, the reputation of the whole region will inevitably become increasingly held ransom to that of each member. If any of its member state of the SADC region were to suffer a significant terrorist attack, or even to have the United States and/or United Kingdom caution its citizens about travelling there, the whole region would be affected. Thus both unilateral as well as multilateral approaches would have to be adopted by SADC as a region. Every SADC state and the region as a whole are mandated to ensure that the proper precautions be in place to prevent that kind of development and also to demonstrate to the world its seriousness about the threat. The acme of all requirements would be to explore the creation of a regional anti-terrorism strategy.<sup>106</sup>

It is indeed no doubt that a regional security strategy ought to meet the needs and aspirations of the peoples of the region. The ongoing process of globalization has opened up states and their security in ways that were not possible to think about before. Moreover, given the diversity of the problems and issues in any region, the challenge of defining what the regional security interests are become paramount. It has been well argued that without defining the security interests and reaching some consensus about them, forming a regional security strategy that is functional cannot be possible. Furthermore, without such a security strategy there are

---

<sup>105</sup>Michael Rifer, *SADC and Terrorism*, African Security Review Vol. 14.No. 1, 2005.p. 8.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid pg 8.

doubts as to whether the region can effectively respond to the challenges of globalization in all its dimensions.<sup>107</sup>

## **2.5 CONCLUSION**

Much as one would settle for a particular conception as the greatest possibility in the understanding of the practical problems of terrorism it is also appropriate to acknowledge the limits of 'true knowledge.' That terrorism will continue being an intellectual and political sphere of contention for some time is equally outstanding in the discourse of the above subtopics. Even with globalization and modernization, religion would still seem to be in the highlight and indeed surpassing other factors in the social life of our contemporary world. Owing to such various social and psychological aspects of modern terrorism, it becomes apparent that there is justification to incorporate the liberal approach of social constructivism in the understanding and explaining of this phenomenon.

Since terrorism is a weapon of the weak it becomes apparent that as long as resource inequalities continue to dominate, it will continue to be a critical threat to the security of modern states. It is notable also that the current trend of terrorism has affected the nature of modern warfare thus demanding for some significant changes as well in terms of the use of force, the doctrines and forces development for appropriate capabilities in countering the new threats. States would hence have to adopt unorthodox measures to combat known terrorist organizations and their leadership. The dilemma of publicity with regard to terrorism brings in the realization that the use of the media is the continuation of terrorism by other means. Despite the

---

<sup>107</sup>Makumi Mwangiru, ed., *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization*, (Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, 2004). Pp. 134-135.

contradictory trend of globalization and fragmentation, the world is also realizing the necessity of collective security in the strife to confront modern threats of terrorism.

Every SADC state and the region as a whole are thus supposed to ensure that the proper precautions be in place to demonstrate to the world its seriousness about the threat. One of requirements would be to explore the creation of a regional anti-terrorism strategy. Furthermore, without such a strategy there are doubts as to whether the region can effectively respond to the challenges of the terrorism threat.

The fundamental nature of collective security is that since the system is closely interwoven, what poses as threats for one state in the system are equally threats to other members of the system. Much as unilateral action would be the method of countering terrorism, multilateralism would also apply and possibly be more effective. This would hence necessitate collaboration in all activities through sub-regional organisations to ensure collective actions and uniformity in the modus operandi.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **THE NATURE OF TERRORISM IN THE SADC**

#### **3.0 INTRODUCTION**

Chapter 3 focuses on the case study. It examines the africanisation of the war on terror in the SADC and also analyses SADC's capacity and strategy towards the threat posed by terrorism. The chapter examines analyses the nature of war on terror in the SADC and also examines specific countries' strategies, institutional arrangements and international cooperation measures.

#### **3.1 THE NATURE OF WAR ON TERROR IN THE SADC**

Princeton N. Lyman has ably argued that the war on terror in Africa did not begin on September 11, 2001 but in the 1990s in Sudan. This is where Osama bin Laden operated from and even the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's assassination attempt on 27 June 1995, was also planned by him from Sudan. In fact, the terrorists activities were becoming more evident only this time though and it would seem that the successful assassination of Sadat in 1981 was taken up frivolously. In fact, three years later, in 1998, that is when Al-Qaeda cells went on to blow up the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The United States in retaliation for these attacks as well as an attack in Afghanistan, bombed a chemical plant in Sudan, alleging that it was producing elements for chemical weapons for al-Qaeda. From the time of these attacks, the U.S. policy in Somalia became preoccupied with searching out, capturing, and killing the culprits of those attacks believed to have taken refuge there. All this culminated to the

resentful relationship with the terrorists in Somalia. Thus it is Somalia that has brought the AU directly into the global war on terror.<sup>108</sup>

The events of 9/11 made the U.S. focus on terrorism in Africa became much more pronounced. For the first time, the United States deployed a sizeable contingent of American troops in Africa by establishing of the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti in 2002. Later, President Bush announced a \$100 million counterterrorism initiative for East Africa and the Horn of Africa. Counterterrorism endeavours became even more pronounced in U.S. Africa policy after the Islamic Court Movement took power in Somalia. This led to the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, with inferred U.S. support and the current fighting that now consumes that devastated country. Another sign of increasing U.S. focus on security in Africa was the announcement by the Pentagon that it would establish a new unified Africa Command (AFRICOM) to bring together its varied programs on the continent. Indeed, the U.S. concern is understandable as Africa is no more immune to the threats from terrorism than any other continent. The combination of relatively weak states, ethnic and religious diversity that promotes discrimination, poverty, and its “ungoverned space” all bestow Africa a significant susceptibility to the growth of radical and sometimes internationally connected movements that employ terrorism.<sup>109</sup>

It is certainly worth noting that while the “war on terrorism” usually relates to internationally linked terrorists, Africans face other security threats of equal or greater significance, posing a question of focus for American as well as African counterterrorism efforts. There are several organized rebellions or insurgencies in Africa, which inflict serious havoc on African people and threaten national stability despite not always classified as terrorists. These

---

<sup>108</sup> Princeton N. Lyman, *The War on Terrorism in Africa*, Africa World Politics, Westview Press, 2008, pp. 276-302.

<sup>109</sup> Princeton N. Lyman, *The War on Terrorism in Africa*, *Opcit.*, pp.272-306.



include various militias in eastern Congo, who have been the target of the International Criminal Court for their crimes against humanity, the insurgents in the Niger delta of Nigeria, and the Janjaweed militia in the Darfur region of Sudan. It is notable that the U.S. African Command lists the Lord's Resistance Army, the Army for Liberation of Rwanda, and the obscure Afrikaner Boeremag in South Africa along with a host of Islamic groups as among the "Terror Groups in Africa." Clearly, noting this broad scope, Africa cannot ignore the threat of terrorism any more than can any other part of the world. Whilst most African states share the concern over terrorism and are prepared to cooperate in fighting it, for their own safety and security, they are also overwhelmed with other priorities and limitations.<sup>110</sup>

It is however, worth noting also, that the vast majority of conflict and "terrorist" activity in Africa is not linked to international sponsorship or any vast conspiracy against the West. For instance, the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, the various militias in eastern Congo, the militants in the Niger Delta, the extremist sects in Kenya, Nigeria, and elsewhere are the principal security threats to the African population. That is why any programs that seek to bolster African capacity against internationally sponsored terrorism, also need to build capacity against these threats whose roots go much deeper and are more complex than the global war against terror. The conditions that breed these homegrown forms of violent activity are the same as those that allow access for internationally sponsored terrorism. Thus they demand stronger significant progress on economic development, regional peace agreements, as well as improved intelligence and military capacity.<sup>111</sup>

---

<sup>110</sup>Jeffrey Marshall, *EUCOM Engagement in Africa*, Briefing presented to the Conference on AFRICOM at Airlie House, Virginia, September 23, 2007, p. 16.

<sup>111</sup>Jeffrey Marshall, *EUCOM Engagement in Africa*, *Opcit.*, p. 16.

That is why the challenge in combating terrorism in Africa lies in the balance of a legitimate program of security improvements with a continuing and sustained attack on poor governance, poverty, and deprivation of human rights since any crackdown on terrorist activity has to be carried out with great sensitivity to the historic grievances of marginalized groups, the incipient struggle for human rights, and the relatively weak civilian oversight of the military and security institutions. The African Union was met with tremendous expectations when it was created in 2000, especially in the area of conflict resolution. Departing from the more traditional and narrow defense of sovereignty of its predecessor organization, the AU has stated that conflict within any African state could affect the region. It has therefore duly established a Peace and Security Council and promised African leadership and responsibility in bringing such conflicts to a completion. This declaration has been backed by sending African peacekeepers to Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Darfur, ahead of the United Nations and the AU and regional organizations, such as ECOWAS, IGAD, and SADC, have taken the lead in negotiating peace agreements in Burundi, Liberia, the DRC, and elsewhere.<sup>112</sup>

### **3.3 SECURITY THREATS IN SADC**

In ways similar to its counterparts elsewhere in the global South, SADC focuses on domestic sources of threat and insecurity. Whilst political threats to regime stability are seen as the key priorities, most member states in the SADC are also faced with poverty, underdevelopment and the HIV/Aids pandemic. Further than this, the security agenda includes cross-border security issues principally in the criminal domain. Only few SADC member states

---

<sup>112</sup>Princeton N. Lyman, *The War on Terrorism in Africa, Opcit.*, pp.272-306.

perceive international terrorism as a key security threat and it would seem that none believe they face an immediate external military threat.<sup>113</sup>

In 2001, SADC mandated a Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) which was to provide guidelines for the implementation of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation for the next five years. As for security problems regarded as particularly pressing in SADC, many members are significantly affected by regional instability, resulting in cross-border problems. A few members of the SADC region seem to prioritise external threats, and all have no external military threat. International terrorism is seen as a threat by Tanzania and Mauritius and illegal fishing by Namibia, Mozambique and the island states.<sup>114</sup>

According to SIPO results, the region's security challenges were identified to be:<sup>115</sup>

**a. Political**

Underdevelopment and poverty, HIV/Aids, inter- and intra-state conflict, consolidation of democracy, refugees and irregular movers, wealth imbalances, disarmament demobilisation, reintegration, resettlement and reconstruction (DDRRR) and disaster management.

**b. Defence**

Armed conflict within states, HIV/Aids, need for trained units ready to be deployed by AU or UN, capacity development for defence technology, clearance of landmines, responding to external aggression, DDRRR, inter-operability doctrine, and small arms proliferation.

---

<sup>113</sup> Ibid., pp.2-5.

<sup>114</sup> Gavin Cawthraw and Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk, *Security in a Globalized World*, Op cit., p. 5.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

**c. State Security (intelligence)**

Capacity to prevent state subversion, negative effects of globalisation, terrorism, enhancement of bilateral relations, implementation of an Early Warning System (EWS), HIV/Aids, food security, and maritime resources.

**d. Public Security (policing)**

Crime, drugs, small arms, money laundering, human trafficking, violence against the vulnerable, conflict over diamonds.

The table below summarises the perceived threats in the region as per each member state.

The table below summarises the perceived threats in the region as per each member state.

**Table 3.1 SADC Countries' Perceived Security Problems.**

Country	Nature of Perceived Security Problem (Threat)		
	Internal (domestic)	Cross-border (regional)	External (international)
Angola	Instability flowing from civil war, Separatist tendencies (Cabinda). Armed & violent crime, Corruption, HIV/Aids Uneven resource distribution, Ethnicity	War in DRC (until recently) Support for Unita (until recently) Porous borders, Instability in Caprivi	Absent
Botswana	Economic grievances, Rising crime, HIV/Aids, Small arms	Refugees (Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola until recently, DRC), Illegal immigrants, Cross-border crime	Absent
DRC	Generally: impact of misrule and war, Internally displaced persons, Poverty, Corruption, Violent conflict, Small & light arms	Refugees (Rwanda, Burundi) Regional instability (Great Lakes) Illegal resource extraction	Illegal resource extraction
Lesotho	Weak state, Underdevelopment and poverty, Crime, HIV/Aids	Labour migration, Dependence on South Africa, Environmental degradation, Cattle rustling	Absent
Malawi	Weak state, Poverty, Crime, HIV/Aids	Dependence on rail links through Mozambique to the sea, Environmental degradation (Lake	Absent

		Malawi)	
<b>Mauritius</b>	Social exclusion, Religious tensions, Crime, Corruption	Drug cartels, Money launderers	International terrorism
<b>Mozambique</b>	Lack of economic development, infrastructure, training, Increasing crime and violence, Unconsolidated democracy	Regional instability (Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe)	Illegal fishing
<b>Namibia</b>	Violent crime (from a low base) Secessionist tendency (Caprivi uprising) HIV/Aids Poverty (income inequality) Ethnic tensions, social exclusion	Transit of criminals, Mgmt of refugee camps (Rwanda, DRC, Sierra Leone) Diamond theft & smuggling	Illegal fishing and Laundering, diamond theft
<b>Seychelles</b>	Social costs associated with the structural adjustment programme Drug abuse, HIV/Aids	Environmental disasters, Illegal immigrants	Poaching/illegal fishing in the EEZ, External shocks (wars, oil prices) Trafficking in illegal arms, Money laundering
<b>South Africa</b>	Apartheid legacy, socio-economic Inequality, Violent crime, Terrorism (white right, Qibla)	Regional instability, Illegal immigrants, Environmental degradation, The spread of communicable diseases Trans-border crime (vehicles, drugs, weapons, sex workers)	International crime Syndicates, Illicit small and light arms trade, Money laundering Schemes, Narcotics trafficking
<b>Swaziland</b>	Stalled transition to democracy generating political tensions, Socio-economic inequalities, HIV/Aids	Environmental degradation, Dependence on South Africa, Labour migration, Cattle rustling	Absent
<b>Tanzania</b>	Emergence of political, racial, religious divisions Secessionist tendencies (Zanzibar) Destabilisation caused by refugees Crime, debt, drug trafficking	Regional instability (Rwanda, Burundi, DRC) Refugees	International terrorism
<b>Zambia</b> Absent	Political instability Socio-economic inequalities HIV/Aids	Regional instability (DRC, Angola) Trans-border crime	Absent
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	Economic crisis, Political crisis Social crisis	Absent	Breakdown in relations with donors, IFIs, Dependence on transport routes via SA, Moz

Source: FES Briefing Paper, June 2004.

### **3.4 SADC AND THE WESTERN PERSPECTIVE ON GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR**

Thus, much as SADC shares some security concerns with Western countries, it differs quite extensively from the latter's emphasis on traditional and current security threats such as weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. Having managed to develop a security function over and above its development priorities, SADC stands to benefit from this specific form of functional cooperation. However, there is need for the region to put its recently agreed defence and security policies into practice. Having gone through both negative and positive experiences with outside intervention, SADC stands to benefit from continued close cooperation with selected global actors such as the UN and European countries in pursuing its common security agenda.<sup>116</sup>

SADC seems to differ from other regional organisations in some respects. First of all, it has a unique history, including civil war and liberation from colonial and apartheid domination. It does not have external security guarantees in the form of the US or any other major western power. Its security cooperation activities exclude civil society participation. However it shares a number of features with various sub-regional organisations. It appears the principal driver of regional security co-operation is shared regime threat perception and a common interest between regimes – be they democratic or not – in supporting each other against sources of internal and external insecurity. Also, sub-regional organisations in the developing world are increasing in scope and extent as a direct response to globalisation. They can be seen both as a response to and further impetus for globalisation. Whether they serve to mitigate the exclusionary effects of

---

<sup>116</sup>Gavin Cawthraw and Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk, *Security in a Globalized World*, Opcit., p. 2.

uneven global development, however, is unclear. It could be argued that they serve to accelerate inequalities by servicing neo-liberal economics through their outward orientations.<sup>117</sup>

Based on this short overview, one can say that the countries of SADC do not share a threat perception with Western countries. There seems to be limited overlap and significant divergence. The obvious area of overlap is international terrorism. Kenya, Tanzania and to a limited extent, South Africa have experienced incidents of international terrorism. Even so, few SADC countries have put it high on their list of threats; rather, they acknowledge that they have little option but to cooperate in the 'war on terror'. For SADC countries, globalisation, structural adjustment programmes, and demands for democratisation or regime change – all Western agendas – often threaten the security of people and states in Africa. Its concern is therefore largely with domestic instability. SADC countries have taken a somewhat different approach to that of the Western states.<sup>118</sup>

### **3.5 SADC STRATEGIES AND POLICIES ON WAR AGAINST TERROR**

Following acts of terrorism in the SADC region, the African continent, and the wider world, SADC remains concerned about threats to the social and economic development and security of its Member States. This was fostered when it passed its Declaration on Terrorism on 14th January 2002 as a formal statement of intent to eliminate terrorism and to foster security within the region and the world at large. The Declaration, which was signed by all Member States in Blantyre, Malawi, officially condemns all acts of terrorism and urges SADC Member States to take steps to combat terrorism wherever possible. It further suggests that all Member States ratify legal instruments for ending terrorism and cooperate at all levels to prevent acts that

---

<sup>117</sup>Gavin Cawthra and Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk, *Security in a Globalized World*, Opcit., p. 7.

<sup>118</sup>Gavin Cawthra and Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk, *Security in a Globalized World*, Opcit., p. 6.

endanger lives and disrupt security in the region, in accordance with international agreements.<sup>119</sup>

It is indeed worth noting that SADC as a sub-region has to some extent taken up some counter-terrorist initiatives. Even though it does not currently have a specific protocol dealing with terrorism, a few protocols, although not yet in force, are nevertheless relevant. These protocols will come into force once two-thirds of the member states submit their instruments of ratification. Despite the fact that SADC does not have a specific instrument dealing with terrorism, its role as a regional actor needs attention principally because SADC has increasingly indicated its commitment to address terrorism, as part of other security challenges in the region.<sup>120</sup>

The SADC region has the majority of members (eleven out of the fifteen) in the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) whose purpose is to combat money laundering. Countries from SADC which are ESAAMLG Members include Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Seychelles, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. This effort includes co-coordinating with other international organisations concerned with combating money laundering, studying emerging regional typologies, developing institutional and human resource capacities to deal with these issues, and co-coordinating technical assistance where necessary. ESAAMLG enables regional factors to be taken into account in the implementation of anti-money laundering measures. Following the

---

<sup>119</sup>Southern Africa Development Community, *Declaration on Terrorism*, 14th January 2002.

<sup>120</sup>Anneli Botha, *Initiatives to Prevent and Combat Terrorism in Southern Africa*, (Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2008). p. 75.



events of 11 September 2001, ESAAMLG expanded its scope to include the countering of terrorist financing.<sup>121</sup>

In the effort to promote peace and security in the region, SADC introduced the Protocol on politics, defence and security co-operation, in 2001. Upon implementation, this protocol specifically calls for the development of an Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, which will have the responsibility, among others, to protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, intra and inter-state conflict and aggression. It also meant to develop common foreign policy approaches on issues of mutual concern, promote regional co-ordination and co-operation on matters related to security and defence and establish appropriate mechanisms to this end. It is also destined to prevent, contain and resolve inter and intra-state conflict by peaceful means. Finally but not least, it is intended to develop close co-operation between the police and state security services of state parties in order to address cross-border crime and promote a community-based approach to domestic security. The Protocol against corruption, although not directly introduced as a measure to address terrorism, the curbing of corruption will strengthen a particular state's resolve against bribery since highly corrupt societies often limit social mobility and therefore prevent economic growth and investment. Moreover, recruitment to organisations and structures that resort to terrorism as a tactic has flourished in environments where the youth have limited opportunities for advancement.<sup>122</sup>

---

<sup>121</sup> Charles Wanguhu, *Regulatory Deficiencies Impacting on Anti Money Laundering Measures*, Commercial Law International, April 11th, 2012.

<sup>122</sup> Anneli Botha, *Initiatives to Prevent and Combat Terrorism in Southern Africa*, (Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2008). pp.73-76.

As for the Protocol on combating illicit drugs which has been in force since 20 March 1999, it was prompted by the realisation that illicit drugs from the sub-region were destined for international markets and that the large financial resources generated enabled transnational organisations and individuals to undermine governments. Internationally, the illegal drugs trade tends to generate financial resources for terror campaigns. The Protocol on the control of firearms, ammunition and other related material when adopted, the protocol will go a long way in eradicating the threat of firearms in the region. SADC also has other protocols such as Protocol on legal affairs Protocol on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, Protocol on extradition. These protocols could provide the foundation for co-operation between SADC member states in all manifestations of transnational crime, including terrorism. However, as Anneli Botha agreeably argues, the real test of state commitment to counter-terrorism instruments lies in their implementation and the measurement of their impact and success.<sup>123</sup>

The Soldiers of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) known as Stand-by Brigade conducted an exercise in Lohatla, South Africa's Northern Cape training facility, for a month in August 2009. The Stand-by Brigade was officially created on August 17, 2007, during the 27th session of the SADC heads of State and Government, held in Lusaka, Zambia. SADC member countries attended the Dolphin Phase III Military Exercises with contingent of the Armed Forces, of the National Police and civilians. Exercise Golfinho ("dolphin" in Portuguese) used 7,000 troops from the 12 nations at Lohatla. Various capabilities were tested, with the accent on interoperability of the forces and the use of various languages. The exercise was mainly about humanitarian crises and to act as both peacekeepers and peacemakers. Much as it was stressed that the standby brigade, one of five in Africa, is totally

---

<sup>123</sup>Anneli Botha, *Initiatives to Prevent and Combat Terrorism in Southern Africa* Opcit., pp. 73-76.

independent of outside help and Africa plans to rely only on its own forces should the need arise, apparently it did not address issues of terrorism.<sup>124</sup>

The Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) came up with a multi-lateral Agreement on Co-operation and Mutual Assistance in the Field of Crime. This agreement was designed to facilitate the entry of police officers from one country into another for the purposes of investigation, retrieval of evidence or exhibits and tracing and locating of fugitive offenders. Article 5 of the agreement sets out areas of co-operation such as exchange of crime-related information on a regular basis planning, co-ordination and execution of joint operations, (including undercover operations) co-operation in border control and crime prevention in border areas, as well as follow-up operations. However, no constitutive document specifically refers to terrorism as an area for co-operation under the backing of SARPCCO. Nonetheless, they implicitly authorise co-operation in that area.<sup>125</sup>

It would seem that like the protocol on firearms, SARPCCO demonstrates that there is both the capacity and the will in the SADC region to coordinate law enforcement and to combat cross-border crime. Nevertheless, SARPCCO cannot fully be a stand-in for a regional anti-terrorism programme. For instance, the DRC is not a member of SARPCCO, though it is an important member of SADC. Actually, combating terrorism in the SADC region goes beyond merely law enforcement and it is apparent that financial instruments, national defence and national security agencies, as well as national legislatures are all required to play their important roles.<sup>126</sup>

---

<sup>124</sup>Christopher Szabo, *12 Southern African Nations Exercise New Standby Force*, Digital Journal, Oct 4, 2009 [On line] <http://digitaljournal.com/article/280033#ixzz2T74PxHyY> (Accessed 05 May, 2013).


<sup>125</sup> Ibid., p.86.

<sup>126</sup>Michael Rifer, *SADC and Terrorism - African Security Review Vol 14 No 1, 2005*.

Nonetheless, as Michael Rifer argues, SADC already has important instruments in place that can be built upon in the creation of a regional anti-terrorism strategy. The mandates of SADC, the expertise and relationships of SARPCCO, and even the recommendations of ESAAMLG does justify why the region should not try to create something brand new. Preferably, they should all be integrated into a comprehensive and coordinated regional anti-terrorism body.<sup>127</sup>

Indeed closer cooperation and association among Member States as well as the international world is mandatory in combating terrorism. An ideal concept of cooperation and implementation process which could be useful in the war against terror in the SADC region can thus be depicted as in the diagram below:

**Figure 3.1 Levels of Cooperation in Counter Terrorism**



Adapted from: Anneli Botha et al, *Understanding Terrorism in Africa*.

---

<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

It would seem that whilst there are various challenges such as lack of adequate human and financial resources which prove to be a primary stumbling block at both national and regional levels, the problem of implementing decisions and instruments is more challenging; despite adopting a common framework for combating terrorism. Notwithstanding the fact that SADC does not have a specific instrument dealing with terrorism, its role as regional actor needs attention especially since SADC has increasingly indicated its commitment to address terrorism, as part of other security challenges in the region. SADC could play a leading role in developing a sub regional strategy against terrorism. Meanwhile, politicians and citizens continue to question the importance of focusing on terrorism when they are confronted with more direct threats to their immediate security.<sup>128</sup>

### **3.6 CONCLUSION**

The war on terror in Africa did not begin on September 11, 2001 but in the 1990s in Sudan, where Osama bin Laden planned an attack against Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak and later his Al-Qaeda cells went on to blow up the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. However, it is the terrorists in Somalia that has brought the AU directly into the global war on terror. Now, Africa cannot dispense with the threat of terrorism any more. In fact, the challenge in combating terrorism in Africa remains in the balance of a legitimate program of security enhancement with abiding to good governance and compassion to the historic grievances of marginalized groups.

SADC came into existence in 1980 to lessen economic dependence on the then apartheid South Africa. It is a young organisation that has evolved in the background of a rapidly changing

---

<sup>128</sup> Anneli Botha, *Initiatives to Prevent and Combat Terrorism in Southern Africa*, (Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2008). p. 88.

and unstable regional political environment despite being destined by a common history of independence struggles against colonialism and racial domination. There are challenges in terms of security co-operation and levels of institutionalization remain relatively low

SADC's counter-terrorist initiatives includes a few protocols and other existing mechanisms such as the Stand-by Brigade that can be integrated into an inclusive and coordinated regional anti-terrorism body. In SADC, the problem is that politicians set precedence on direct threats to the immediate security concerns than on terrorism.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **STUDY FINDINGS, ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION**

#### **4.0 INTRODUCTION**

The preceding chapters of the study have provided the theoretical and background approach on which the study is based. This chapter discusses the study methodology, the findings, and the results of the africanisation of the war against terror in the SADC. It critically analyses the roles of various organizations and integration of the SADC Region with regard to its strategies and policies on counter terrorism by summarizing the evidence, the analysis and the discussions.

#### **4.2 STUDY RESULTS AND DATA PRESENTATION**

This section presents the findings and results of the study. The findings from the different sources pertaining to the various aspects of global terror in the SADC are presented. Questionnaires, interviews, observations and documentary review results are presented either in figures or descriptive form or by using both means. The aim of the presentation of research findings is to organise the data in such a way that it can be easily utilised in the analysis and discussion phase of the study.


Effort has been made to separate the presentation of data from the analysis. The reason for this being that the future researchers may be able to use the data collected in various ways from those adopted by the researcher. Consequently, in this section, the data has been presented without comment. Data has been analysed with various comments made on its value or

implications in the subsequent section. Nonetheless, in certain cases it has been difficult to fulfill this obligation of separating data from analysis. In parts of this section, a brief analysis has been included.

#### **4.2.1 Results from Questionnaires**

The questionnaires that were administered to the senior government officials in the four countries were undertaken by 50 respondents. The questionnaires were all open-ended questions. The results to the questionnaires are presented in graphs as well as in descriptive form.

**Result 1:** The respondents comprised senior government officials in the SADC who are involved with policy and strategy (See Figure 4.2).




**Figure 4.2** Distribution by country of origin of the respondents.

**Result 2:** The results of the respondents indicated that there was an equal representation in the number of civilians and security personnel categories. Other than Malawi which had a higher figure for civilian personnel, the security personnel category was higher elsewhere apart from Zambia which had equal numbers. who answered the questionnaires fifty (75%) were either




farmers or fishermen. It means that 30 of the respondents belonged to each category; making it 50% for both groups respectively (Figure 4.3).




**Figure 4.3 Occupations of the Respondents**

**Result 3:** The extent of the threat of terrorism in SADC as perceived by the senior government officials is generally low as shown in Figure 4.4. Out of the 50 respondents, 40 (80%) perceived the threat to be low or insignificant whilst 7 said it is moderate and only 3 answered that it is high but then attributed the fact of its potential to become so.




**Figure 4.4 Perception of the threat of terrorism in SADC.**

**Result 4:** On the challenges being faced by SADC countries with regard to anti-terrorism measures, top of the list was financial constraints, lack of trained personnel, influx of refugees, illegal migration, and others (Figure 4.5).




**Figure 4.5 Challenges to anti-terrorism measures in SADC.**

**Result 5:** On the question of mechanisms that states have taken to mitigate the threat of terrorism in SADC, many respondents came up with various measures but those that came up most included information/intelligence sharing both at national and international levels, training in how to combat terrorism, computerization of border management systems, good governance and inclusiveness, and sensitization of the problem to the general public through various fora (Figure 4.6).




**Figure 4.6 Mitigation measures to the threat of terrorism in SADC.**

**Result 6:** As for recommended strategies for SADC in the war against terror, the respondents suggestions included the need to have common strategies and their continuous review, regional joint training in terrorism aspects, collaboration on judicial enforcement regarding terrorists, signing and ratifying protocols, establishing a research centre for the region on terrorism to counter the ever changing tactics of terrorism, cooperation in the execution of policies regarding anti- terrorism, and many others (Figure 4.7).



**Figure 4.7: Recommended strategies for SADC in the war against terror.**

**Result 7:** When asked whether an institution for the East African Community, Regional Defence Counter Terrorism Center (RDCTC) would be beneficial to SADC, the answer was yes for all respondents (100%) and with many justifications. This included respondents from the SADC Secretariat as well as those from the RDCTC. (Figure 4.8).



**Figure 4.8: The applicability of an institution like RDCTC to SADC.**

#### **4.2.2 Results from Interviews**

The interview results with all the interviewees indicate that the threat of terrorism in the SADC is low. However many respondents also mentioned the fact that the potential of terrorism being on the rise globally, as well as due to the proximity of prone countries like Kenya, it is hence likely to escalate.

As for policies of various SADC states in dealing with terrorism, all the four countries investigated have aligned themselves to international conventions and treaties to eliminate terrorism and pledged to take measures to address its underlying causes. Most SADC states have enacted laws to curb financing of terrorist activities. The Malawi government for instance, has as one of its measures which could be applied to forfeit terrorist property through the Exchange Control Regulations and Chapter 45:01 of the Exchange Control Act.

The interview results indicated that the SADC states need to address the underlying causes by improving human security in terms of food, health, education, employment, good governance, and inclusiveness in order to reduce the threat of terrorism in their respective countries. Other measures interviewees mentioned included the building of capacity of the law enforcers, computerization of border management systems for easy tracking and the strengthening of intelligence sharing.

On the challenges, some of those interviewed expressed grief over lack of commitment by politicians which they attributed to the possibility of their lack of understanding of the concept. Eventually this leads to low funding and consequently to lack of training, resources and institutions to address global terror. The porous borders are also reported to be conducive to trans-border crossing of various groups including asylum seekers.

On their comments on the Africanizing the war against terror in SADC, some respondents expressed the need to realize that the war against terrorism lies in the hands of all African states as an attack on one African country translates into attacks in all the countries since the effects of terrorism go beyond territorial boundaries. Some interviewees proposed about the need for SADC to have a central advisory board on terrorism that would spearhead combating terrorism in various ways such as obtaining necessary technical financial and other support from the international community, making periodical assessment of the threat of terrorism in the region and monitoring member states' compliance with international, continental and regional obligations.

### **4.2.3 Observation Results**

The stay in Kenya for a year during the studies that the author pursued at the National Defence College provided the opportunity for direct observation with regard to the extent of the threat of terrorism in that country and also to compare the same in SADC states. At first instance of realizing that there are security personnel to scan people for possible bombs or other dangerous weapons at the entrances of shopping malls, libraries, various government and non-governmental buildings, and even at church entrances, it certainly dawns upon someone coming from a SADC state that there is indeed a high level of security alertness. It did not take long for the author to find out why - for the many bomb and grenade attacks in churches and townships of Nairobi and Mombasa and elsewhere in Kenya carried out by Al Shabaab terrorists justified the high security alertness.

Such actions by security personnel certainly do not occur in the SADC states. Normally, such scanning and searching of people entering public places only occurs when there are international meetings taking place and /or when a head of state is in attendance. Even then, it is not terrorists that are targeted but some potential assassins or trouble makers. The effects of the threat of terrorism have not gone that far yet in the SADC.

### **4.3 DISCUSSION ON AFRICANISING THE WAR AGAINST TERROR IN SADC**

This section interprets and discusses the study findings on africanising the war against terror in SADC. Based on the findings presented in the preceding section, the discussion focuses on the extent of the threat, challenges, some aspects of SADC's capacity and the strategy towards the threat posed by terrorism, and the effective measures that could help in the africanisation of the war on terror in the region.



### **4.3.1 The Extent of the Threat of Terrorism in SADC**

The threat of terrorism in SADC is perceived as low as the finding presented in Section 4.2.1 (Result 8) reveals. Nevertheless, the potential for it to intensify is there as per the finding in Section 4.2.2.

The extent of the threat of terrorism in SADC is generally low since terrorists' activities have not yet put the people in this region at a high risk by threatening their social, economic, cultural, and psychological values. Despite this current situation, the threat is a reality as there have been terrorists' incidents before in some SADC states and the insecurity being caused by the recurrent terrorists' attacks in East Africa and other regions on the African continent should be of great concern to the policymakers in SADC. In fact terrorism has become a global threat and terrorists do not have boundaries hence an integrated approach to solving the threat would be mandatory.

### **4.3.3 Challenges to Anti-Terrorism Measures in SADC.**

The conspicuous challenges being faced by SADC countries with regard to anti-terrorism measures include financial constraints, lack of trained personnel, influx of refugees, illegal migration, and others such as lack of coordination and information management. These challenges as revealed by the finding in Section 4.2.1 (Result 4) reduce SADC's capacity in dealing with the threat of global terror. Another challenge is that of dealing with the underlying causes of terrorism that are usually overlooked in anti-terrorism as revealed in Section 4.2.2 (para. 3).

Due to economic constraints, there is non-availability of required materials and equipment hence it becomes problematic to man the porous borders to control the influx of

illegal migration and criminals. As a result of lack of adequate well-trained manpower, there are poor border management systems and capacity for information management is wanting. Low funding thus affects both human resource as well as material resources. After all, the implementation of policies can be effective not only by good proposals or well phrased procedures, but having resources, to back them up appropriately, is also necessary.

With globalisation effects such as interconnectivity and easy access to information and travel, anti-terrorism measures are certainly facing many challenges worth being concentrated on.

#### **4.3.4 Mitigation Measures of Terrorism in SADC.**

In the mitigation of the threat of terrorism in SADC, some measures proposed include information/intelligence sharing, increasing capacity through training in how to combat terrorism, computerization of border management systems, good governance and inclusiveness, and sensitization of the problem to the general public through various forums among others. Section 4.2.1 reveals (Result 5).

Indeed information sharing facilitates knowledge access, its analysis and dissemination for informed actions. More so it is after personnel are well trained in various aspects that they will be able to manage information, border management systems and disseminate appropriately to the public knowledge that is befitting them. It would appear therefore that by building the capacity of personnel the other measures become automatically obligatory. Even when there are well trained security agents to fight terrorists when need arise; this capacity alone is a deterrent factor since terrorist would normally not want to face stringent opposition when they choose to execute their attacks. Thus training of police and military officers as well as intelligence officers in anti-terrorism aspects is justly recommendable.

#### **4.3.5 Recommended Strategies for SADC in the War Against Terror.**

Section 4.2.1 (Result 6) reveals some of the recommended strategies for SADC in the war against terror. The suggestions included the need to have common strategies and their continuous review, regional joint training in terrorism aspects, collaboration on judicial enforcement regarding terrorists, signing and ratifying protocols, establishing a research centre for the region on terrorism to counter the ever changing tactics of terrorism, cooperation in the execution of policies regarding anti- terrorism, and many others.

The above strategies reflect a holistic approach and coordinated efforts to the threat of terrorism in the region. Indeed, fighting global terror needs no further emphasis that it requires collective struggle since it is a transnational predicament. Thus there is need for regional integration in terms of policy, modalities in the execution of measures adopted, monitoring of progress and challenges with regard to anti-terrorism endeavors. There would also be a requirement to focus on the socio- economic and psychological environment that surrounds it, as well as some other aspects like political factors since unsafe conditions that may be created by terrorism are likely to impede not only peace but economic development too. Constructive measures and efforts of all states would become strengthened by integrated advocacy.

#### **4.3.6 The Applicability of a Regional Counter Terrorism Center in SADC**

The answer for whether an institution for the East African Community, Regional Defence Counter Terrorism Center (RDCTC) would be beneficial to SADC was 100% positive and with many justifications as Section 4.2.1 (Result 7) reveals. The proposals are valid and very applicable to counter-terrorism efforts in SADC.

Indeed, as justly propagated by the findings in Section 4.2.2 (para. 5) for SADC to have such an institution, this would be an ideal symbol of regional integration. It is indeed such a

body that would have central advisory board on terrorism and hence have the capacity and mandate to spearhead combating terrorism in various ways such as obtaining necessary technical financial and other support from the international community, making periodical assessment of the threat of terrorism in the region and monitoring member states' compliance with international, continental and regional obligations.

A Regional Counter Terrorism Center in SADC would be useful also in devising common strategies, making reviews, integrating intelligence, research and coordinating regional efforts in various spheres such as regional joint training/workshops and operations on the same. Such an institution would also help to ensure consistency in implementation of policies.

#### **4.4 CONCLUSION**

Chapter four attempted to discuss the research methodology as well as the design of the study. The advantages of choosing a case study approach have been elaborated. It has been explained that in order to ensure the collection and presentation of valid and reliable data, the study used both qualitative and quantitative research methods. The research tools, adopted the methodological triangulation, comprised of questionnaires, interviews, observation, and review of documentation. The study had some setbacks due to limited time, sensitivity of the subject, and failure to meet some key informants.

The findings have been presented in graphs to illustrate quantitative results. Qualitative results were also presented in descriptive form. Some key issues on policy, strategies and challenges have been highlighted accordingly. Direct observation also shed more light on the issues of terrorism in SADC. As mentioned before, every effort has been made to separate presentation of data and the interpretation, though in some aspects this was impossible. The extent of the threat of terrorism in SADC and some proposals about africanising the war on terror has also been

covered. Additionally, aspects of coordination and implications of lack of funds and resources have been discussed. The next chapter is the conclusions and recommendation of the study.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **5.0 INTRODUCTION**

Throughout chapter four and earlier chapters of this dissertation, comments were made and discussed in detail, though due to the space limitation, only those limited to the aim and objectives of the study are emphasised in this chapter. Based on the findings of the study the researcher also makes some recommendations and outlines some areas for further research.

This study concludes that the Global war on terror is being addressed in SADC but that strategies and policies in dealing with it need more reshaping and solidifying in order to be efficient and in tandem with the nature of the threat. In general, the extent of the threat of terrorism in SADC states is low. However, considering that elsewhere in African regions both the intensity and the frequency of terrorist activities seem to be on the increase, there is indeed need to be well equipped with institutions and capacity of various types to empower the counter-terrorism measures already in place in SADC.

#### **5.1 CONCLUSIONS**

While it may be as much a preventative measure as it is a response to an immediate threat, the need for SADC to embrace a regional anti-terrorism body should be clear. Perhaps less clear is how to create such a body, and what form it will take. The region will have to find unique ways to amalgamate existing arrangements with international structures and best practices. It is proved that good policies do not always and necessarily guarantee good results and they can even turn out to be empty promises.

Perhaps the first place to start is to demonstrate the will and commitment of all member governments with the adoption of a SADC protocol on terrorism. That SADC would have protocols for issues like wildlife law enforcement but not one for terrorism belies the global security realities of today. While terrorism as an issue may have been placed at the -international forefront by the United States (US) and -others, it is not without implications for southern Africa. Taking that measure would be an important first step in bringing southern Africa into compliance with UN Security Resolution 1373 and in line with the efforts of regions and sub-regions around the world.

The protocol component is important. For one, it gets all signatory governments on board but it would be difficult to combat an issue like terrorism, which demands things like revised legislation and national militaries, without the full commitment of all member states. While the bulwark of a region's anti-terrorism efforts will occur below the state, the state needs to still be involved because it still has an important role to play. Regional anti-terrorism efforts in southern Africa, as elsewhere in the world, demand both a top-down and bottom-up approach to implementation. Beyond that, signing a protocol or resolution would give SADC the legal authority to create a regional anti-terrorism body.

Article 15 is perhaps the most important component of the model offered by the firearms protocol, because it would seemingly give SADC that authority: to create a body specifically tasked with combating terrorism and also in terms of the relative capabilities of its members – having a central anti-terrorism authority could be an important boon to the collective efforts of SADC on this issue.

As SADC deepen its internal ties socially, culturally, politically and economically, the reputation of the whole region will inevitably become increasingly staked to that of each member. If a single SADC state were to suffer a significant terrorist attack, or even to have the US or United Kingdom (UK) caution its citizens about travelling there, the region at large would be affected. It is in the interest of every SADC state and the region as a whole to ensure that the proper precautions be in place to militate against that kind of development, to demonstrate to the world that it is serious about the issue, and to explore the creation of a regional anti-terrorism strategy.

## **5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS**

In the strife to reduce terrorism risk, the management of security threats should become everyone's concern in the SADC region. There are appropriate measures that need to be taken by the policy makers, the leaders at various levels, the well wishers, the locals and all member states of the region. The political, social, economic and psychological aspects of terrorism need to be addressed accordingly if progress has to be achieved.

With regard to the dynamic nature of terrorism and ever increasing occurrences of terror attacks in African regions and elsewhere, the existing policy implementation problems as well as the demands for coordination and collaboration, the following recommendations are proposed:

- The SADC member states need to cooperate with the international community in war against terrorism by adhering and ratifying the International Treaties aimed at combating terrorism. Thus Enactment and enforcement of the Counter-terrorism Bills should be mandated.



- Clear objectives of policies on anti-terrorism should be formulated and be consistent in the SADC region order to avoid mistrust. The vision should be clearly presented and plans be appreciated to be workable ones by all states and ensuring that means on how progress will be measured are in place.
- Since policy is never static and predictions about policy impacts are usually difficult to formulate, the policy makers must be flexible enough to accommodate changes and to have them reflected in the implementation plans. This could be achieved through assessments of the impacts of previously devised programmes that are in effect.
- Creation of a powerful institution to deal with terrorism. A regional counter terrorism center would coordinate efforts of member states much as it would also be involved with research and follow up on policy issues pertaining to the threat of global terror.
- The necessary procedures, resources and funds must be provided to the regional counter terrorism center so that it can easily facilitate coordination activities at regional and country levels. These requirements would also give the institution the capacity to even make follow-ups on the continuity of SADC policies.
- The regional counter terrorism center should ensure that there is appropriate information and effective consultation with the member states and other stakeholders since this would assist in making decisions that have analysis about future effects and outcomes.

- The underlying causes of terrorism should be addressed accordingly by every member state. The SADC countries need to build good economic environments which would prevent young people from becoming prey to criminal gangs, including terrorist groups. Unemployment to youths is one of the key drivers of terrorism.
- The SADC countries need to enhance the community awareness on the security threat posed by terrorists. Doing so will enable citizens to participate fully in the war against terror. The awareness programmes and initiatives on terrorism should include schools for educating the messengers of the next generations.
- Some follow ups on the mitigation programmes on terrorism and other crimes that are currently being implemented should be made in order to assess their progress and effectiveness.

### **5.3 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH**

The thesis has endeavored to make a useful contribution to counter terrorism in the SADC region. The study raised a number of questions that future research should explore.

- Further research is to be carried out to ascertain the extent of the threat of terrorism in SADC and/or the probability of its change. This would be essential in identifying appropriate mitigation measures and to confirm the relevance of those currently being in use.

- Another study could examine the psycho-social impact of terrorism on the people living in terrorist attacks prone areas. This could reveal some areas of concern pertaining to security issues, apart from the normal welfare factors of the populace.
- In addition, further research is needed to validate the findings from this study through international comparisons and various case studies.

The researcher is optimistic that the people living under the threat of terrorism on the continent of Africa and beyond will eventually benefit from the war that is being campaigned against it.

## SOURCES

### A. ORAL INTERVIEWS

1. 30 respondents to questionnaires from various government ministries and security organisations from Malawi.
2. 20 respondents to questionnaires from various government ministries and security organisations from Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Republic of South Africa.
3. 5 respondents to questionnaires from officials from the SADC Secretariat.
4. 5 questionnaires from the Regional Defence Counter Terrorism Center (RDCTC).
5. 10 interviewees from Malawi.

### B. BIBLIOGRAPHY

#### 1. Books

- Algozaibi Ghazi A.R., *The Theory of International Relations: Hans J. Morgenthau and His Critics*. Background, Volume 8. No. 4 Feb., 1965.
- Andre Le Sage, *African Counter terrorism Cooperation*, (Potomac Books Inc., Washington D.C., 2007).
- Bongar Bruce et al (eds.), *Psychology of Terrorism*, (Oxford University Press, New York, 2006).
- Botha Anneli, *Initiatives to Prevent and Combat Terrorism in Southern Africa*, (Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2008).
- Burchill Scott et al, *Theories of International Relations*, (Palgrave, New York, 2001).
- Buzan Barry, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, (Pearson Education Limited, Essex, 1991).
- Carter Jimmy, *Talking Peace: A vision for the Next Generation*, (Dutton Children's Books, Michigan, 2008).
- George A, *Western State Terrorism*, (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991), p .44.

- Bowyer Bell J, *A Time of Terror*, (Basic Books, New York, 1978).
- Cathran Helen, *National Security: Opposing Viewpoints*, (Greenhaven Press, San Diego, 2004).
- Chaliand G. *Terrorism from Popular Struggle to Media Spectacle*. (Saqi Books, London, 1987).
- David Silverman, *Interpreting Qualitative Data*, (SAGE Publications Ltd., London, 1994).
- Derek Swetnam, *Writing Your Dissertation*, (How to Books Ltd., Oxford, 2004).
- Donald M Snow, *When America Fights: The Uses of US Military Force*, (CQ Press, Washington, DC, 2000).
- Evans Gareth and Sahnoun Mohamed, *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 2001).
- Fakuyama Francis, *The End of History and the Last Man*, (Free Press, New Yoek, 1992).
- Gavin Cawthra, *The Role of SADC in Managing Political Crisis and Conflict*, (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Maputo, 2010).
- Greg Mills and John Stremiau, (Eds.) *The Reality Behind the Rhetoric: The US, South Africa and Africa*, (South African Institute of International Affairs, Witwatersrand, 2000).
- Gregory Alonso Pirio, *The African Jihad: Bin Laden's Quest for the Horn of Africa*, (Red Sea Press, Michigan 2007).
- Gus Martin, *Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues*, (SAGE Publications, London, 2006).
- Harmon Christopher C. *Terrorism Today*, (Routledge, New York, 2008).
- Hoffman B, *Inside Terrorism*. (Indigo, London, 1999).
- Howard Russel D. and Reid L. Sawyer, *Terrorism and Counter Terrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*, (The McGraw-Hill Companies, Guilford 2004).
- Jason Franks, *Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism: Orthodox Terrorism Theory and Beyond*, (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2006).
- Krulak Charles C., *The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War*, (Marines Magazine, January 1999).
- Lala Anicia and Ann M. Fitz-Gerald (Eds), *Providing Security for People: Security Sector Reform in Africa*, (Global Facilitation Network for security Sector Reform, 2003).

- Laquer W, *The New Terrorism*, (Oxford: Phoenix Press, 3<sup>rd</sup> Ed. 2001).
- Lia Brynjar, *Globalisation and the Future of Terrorism*, (Routledge, New York, 2005).
- L. Gosling and M. Edwards, *Toolkits: A Practical Guide to Assessment, Monitoring, Review and Evaluation*, (Save the Children, London, 1995).
- Lutz James M. and Brenda J. Lutz, *Global Terrorism*, (Routledge, New York, 2008).
- Martyn Denscombe, *The good Research Guide*, (Open University Press, Buckingham, 1998).
- Muriel Horrell, *Terrorism in Southern Africa*, (South African Institute of Race Relations, California, 2010).
- M. Q. Patton, *How to use Qualitative Methods in Evaluation*, (SAGE Publications Ltd., London, 1997).
- Mwangiru Makumi, ed., *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization*, (Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, 2004).
- Norris, P. et al, *Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the Government and the Public*, (Routledge, New York, 2003).
- Paret Peter, *Makers of Modern Strategy*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001).
- Phillips James , *Spain's Retreat after the Madrid Bombings Rewards Terrorism* (Accessed 16 March 2004) Available at: <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/03/>
- Princeton N. Lyman, *The War on Terrorism in Africa*, (Africa World Politics, Westview Press, 2008).
- Rourke John T. and Mark A. Boyer. *World Politics*, (Mc Graw- Hill Ney York 9198).
- Saul Ben, *Terrorism*, (Hart Publishing, London, 2012).
- Sheehan Michael, *International Security: An Analytical Survey*, (2005).
- Smith Rupert, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, (Penguin Books Ltd., London, 2005).
- Strategic Review for Southern Africa, *SADC at 25: An Overview of Selected Issues*, (The Gale Group Inc., Pretoria, 2005).
- Snow Donald M., *National Security for a New Era: Globalization and Geopolitics*, (Pearson Longman, New York, 2004).

Spero J Edelman, *The Politics of international Economics Relations*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (St Martin's Press, New York, 1990).

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963).

Thomas A. Imobighe and A. N. T. Eguavoen, *Terrorism and Counter-terrorism: An African Perspective*, (Heinemann Educational Books, Michigan, 2006).

Thomas L Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*, (Straus and Giroux, New York, 1999).

Van Creveld Martin, *The Transformation of War*, (Free Press, New York, 1991).

Yonah Alexander, and Edgar H. Brenner, (eds.) *Terrorism and the Law*, (Transnational Publishers, Inc., Washington D.C., 2001).

## **2. Journal Articles**

Clayton Thomas, *Competing Conceptions of Globalisation Revisited: Relocating the Tension between World –Systems Analysis and Globalisation Analysis*, *Comparative Education Review*, Vol. 48. No. 3. August 2004.

Kwesi Aning, *African Counterterrorism Cooperation: Assessing Regional and Sub-regional Initiatives*, *African Studies Review*, Volume 52, Number 1, April 2009.

Jack Snyder, *One World. Rival Theory*, *Foreign Policy*, No. 145, Nov. – Dec., 2004,

Rifer Michael, *SADC and Terrorism*, *African Security Review* Vol. 14.No. 1, 2005.

Shillinger Kurt, *Global Terror: Africa Not Immune to Terror*, *Business Day*, 7 Oct. 2005.

Thomas Clayton, *Competing Conceptions of Globalisation Revisited: Relocating the Tension between World –Systems Analysis and Globalisation Analysis*, *Comparative Education Review*, Vol. 48. No. 3. August 2004.

### 3. Official Documents and Reports

Cawthraw Gavin and Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk, *Security in a Globalized World*, SADC and Security FES Briefing Paper June, 2004.

CRS Report for Congress, *Africa and the War on Terrorism*, 17 January, 2002.

Perl, R.F. *Terrorism, the Media, and the Government: Perspectives, Trends, and Options for Policymakers*, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief, October 22, 1997.

Southern Africa Development Community, *Declaration on Terrorism*, 14th January 2002.

Marshall Jeffrey, *EUCOM Engagement in Africa*, Briefing presented to the Conference on AFRICOM at Airlie House, Virginia, September 23, 2007.

### 4. Internet Articles

James Phillips, *Spain's Retreat After The Madrid Bombings Rewards Terrorism* (Accessed 16 March 2004) Available at: <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/03/>

Muir William, *The Life of Mahomet*, [On Line] <http://www.answerislam.org/Books/Muir/index.htm> (Accessed 16 February 2013)

The Southern African Development Community (SADC). [On line] <http://www.sadc.int> (Accessed April 30, 2013).

United Nations Commemorates The 10<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of 9/11, [On line] <http://www.un.org.terrorism> (Accessed August 25, 2012).

United Nations Counter Terrorism [www.un.org/en/sc/ctc](http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc) (Accessed 2 August 2012).

United States Foreign Policy. <http://usforeignpolicy> (Accessed 29 AUGUST 2012).

William Muir, *The Life of Mahomet*, [On Line] <http://www.answerislam.org/Books/Muir/index.htm> (Accessed 16 February 2013).



Questionnaire given to Interviewees (senior officials) from Malawi

**QUESTIONNAIRE ON *AFRICANISING THE WAR AGAINST TERROR:  
THE EXPERIENCE OF SADC***

**NOTE: All answers will be treated as confidential and will be used for academic purposes only. The research findings will be shared with any participant if requested. Your full cooperation in giving correct and sincere answers is highly appreciated. God bless.**

1. What would you say is the extent of the threat of global terrorism in Malawi?

**A= high**

**B=moderate**

**C=low**

2. What has been Malawi Government's policy in dealing with global terrorism?

3. What measures have been taken so far by the Government of Malawi to reduce the threat of terrorism in the country?

4. What are the plans of your ministry for implementing those mechanisms intended to address global terrorism

5. What are the challenges being faced by your ministry with regard to global war on terror?

7. Which institutions, in Malawi, have been taking the leading roles in the war against terror?

8. What roles do you expect the military to undertake in the war against terror?

9. What roles do you expect the police to undertake in the war against terror?

10. What strategies would you recommend for the SADC Region in the war against terror?

## APPENDIX B

**Questionnaire to senior officials of the four countries in SADC (Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi and RSA).**

**NOTE: All answers will be treated as confidential and will be used for academic purposes only. The research findings will be shared with any participant if requested. Your full cooperation in giving correct and sincere answers is highly appreciated. God bless.**

- 1, What would you say is the extent of the threat of global terrorism in the SADC Region?  
A= High  
B= Moderate  
C= Low
2. What has been SADC's policy in dealing with global terrorism?
3. What measures have been taken so far by your country to reduce the threat of terrorism in the region?
4. What are the plans that have been implemented by SADC for those mechanisms intended to address global terrorism?
5. What roles do you expect the SADC Stand –by Force to undertake in the war against terror?
6. What are the challenges being faced by SADC with regard to global war on terror?
7. What strategies would you recommend for the SADC Region in the war against terror?
8. The East African Community has the *Regional Defence Counter Terrorism Center (RDCTC)*. Do you think having such an institution would be applicable to the SADC states in its anti-terrorism measures? Please explain the reason(s) for your answer.
9. What other comments would you make on **Africanizing the War against Terror** in SADC?

**Questionnaire to senior officials of the Regional Defence Counter Terrorism Center (RDCTC).**

**NOTE: All answers will be treated as confidential and will be used for academic purposes only. The research findings will be shared with any participant if requested. Your full cooperation in giving correct and sincere answers is highly appreciated. God bless.**

- 1, What would you say is the extent of the threat of global terrorism in the East African Community ?  
**A= High**  
**B= Moderate**  
**C= Low**
2. What has been The East African Community SADC's policy in dealing with global terrorism?
3. What measures have been taken so far by The East African Community SADC to reduce the threat of terrorism in the region?
4. What are the plans that have been implemented by the East African Community SADC for those mechanisms intended to address global terrorism?
5. What roles do you expect the The East African Community SADC Stand –by Force to undertake in the war against terror?
6. What are the challenges being faced by The East African Community SADC with regard to global war on terror?
7. What strategies would you recommend for the SADC Region in the war against terror?
8. The East African Community has the *Regional Defence Counter Terrorism Center (RDCTC)*. Do you think having such an institution would be applicable to the SADC states in its anti-terrorism measures? Please explain the reason(s) for your answer.
9. What other comments would you make on **Africanizing the War against Terror** in SADC?