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**THE IMPACT OF EXISTING STRATEGIES FOR COUNTERING
RADICALISATION AND TERRORISM IN KENYA, UGANDA AND
TANZANIA (1998-2012)**

**UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
EAST AFRICANA COLLECTION**

**A Research Project Submitted in Partial Fulfilment for the Award of
Master of Arts in International Studies**

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DECLARATION

I certify that this study project is my original work and includes no material which has been permitted for the award of any other degree or diploma, in any institution or other tertiary college and, to the best of my talents and notion, comprises no material beforehand released or written by means of yet another individual, except where due reference has been made within the textual content.

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Maria W. Nzomo, 23.11.2016

DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this project to my Mother Lydia Akaranga who has stood by me and made sure I excel in every aspect of my life. I would also like to dedicate this to my son Rio Arthur Tunga, I am settling the stage for you to rise up and go further than I have.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

VEOs Violent Extremist Organisations

KDF Kenya Defense Forces

ECEGVR European Commission’s Expert Group on Violent radicalization

HOA Horn of Africa

GTDGlobal Terrorism Database

GDP Gross Domestic Product

ATAAnti-Terrorism Assistance

ATPUAnti- Terror Police Unit

MRCMombasa Republican Council

NFDNorthern Frontier District

CUFCivic United Front

AIAIAl-Itihaad al-Islamiya

AHFAl-Haramain Foundation

NISNational Intelligence Service

AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia

ABSTRACT

East Africa is frequently alluded to as a hot bed of radicalization as a result of the nearness of delicate states like Somalia and Sudan. From the season of the twin assaults against the embassy of America in Dar es Salaam & Nairobi by al-Qaeda in 1998 the 3 nations have kept on confronting significant fear monger assaults and dangers. In July 2010 Uganda confronted twin suicide assaults with Al-Qaeda connected Al-Shabaab asserting duty. One normal contributing component is that both Tanzania and Kenya are effortlessly available by means of ocean. Each of the three nations likewise have a radicalized Islamic component, abnormal state of debasement in movement and exceptionally permeable outskirts that have helped the psychological oppressor bunches pick up section. The motivation behind this study was to inspect and dissect the effect of existing counter techniques utilized by Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania in moderating radicalization and fear based oppression (1998 to 2012). The study received an exploratory outline. The concentration of exploratory plan is to increase comprehension and recognition of the issue for future investigation. . The study concentrated on occasions of radicalization and psychological oppression that have happened inside Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania from 1998 to 2010. The study used subjective information from optional sources. This was gotten from government reports, diaries, course books, News, recommendations, Newsletters, Magazines and the web. This was an imperative technique for information accumulation on the grounds that the study explored the different written works about the effect of existing systems for countering radicalisation and psychological oppression in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. The study built up that Population development in the course of recent years concluded that the eastern region of Africa has become the youngest and developing region in the universe. In the meantime, Violent Extremists Organization (VEOs) stays dynamic in the district and have developed their impact in various zones. Albeit savage fanatics in East Africa stick to differing belief systems, the techniques that they utilize to enroll youth into their positions are regularly comparative. Radical associations comprehend and go after a blend of political substances, financial variables, and individual qualities that render youth in East Africa defenseless against VEO enlistment. The study showed the degree to which radicalization in East Africa is a multifaceted and complex test and proposed

various suggestions went for supporting the limit of governments and common society associations to counter radicalization among the locale's childhood. As East Africa's childhood populace develops in size and political significance, as of now speaking to most of the populace in the area, discoveries highlighted the need to make key interests in youth-situated administrations, premier among them instruction. Another strategy for deliberately putting resources into youngsters is to energize their business exercises. Discoveries suggested that legislatures augment yearly rivalries that honor new company funding to youthful business people. National governments additionally need to guarantee square with dispersion of assets for minimized groups.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

East Africa continues to be one of the most violent and unstable regions of the world. In the last few years alone this region has greatly emerged as a distinct theatre of the "war on terror". East Africa is often referred to as a hot bed of radicalization because of the presence of fragile states like ¹Somalia and Sudan.

From the time of the simultaneous attacks of the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam by al –Qaeda the 3 countries have continued to face major terrorist attacks and threats. In July 2010 Uganda faced twin suicide attacks with Al-Qaeda linked Al-Shabaab claiming responsibility. One common contributing factor is that both Tanzania and Kenya are easily accessible via sea. All three countries also have a radicalized Islamic element, high level of corruption in immigration and very porous borders that have assisted the terrorist groups gain entry (The Journal of Conflict Studies, 2013). The frequency of attacks and reports of missing youth especially in areas along the border and the coast spell a fear that citizens mostly the youth from Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania are being recruited and radicalized into terrorists.

Radicalization is characterized as the means of acquainting individual with a way of conviction and basic presentation of ideas that supports movements from

¹Fragile states Index 2014. <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/>

moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extreme views.²It therefore is one of the major avenues for the transformation of individuals into terrorists. Additionally, terrorism is a purposeful demonstration that is planned to totally destroy the object of hostility, for example, a nation or an international organization or facility. It is submitted with the point of scaring a populace, unduly convincing an administration or a global group to decline playing/ perform out any demonstration or to communicate something specific.

Issues come up when radicalization prompts to demonstrations of savagery, for example, terrorism. Violent radicalization is hence seen as socialisation to extremism which manifests itself in terrorism.³Recent research describes terrorism as a byproduct of radicalization. Therefore an understanding of radicalization is critical in combatting terrorism. Once a radical is socialized into extremism the chances of becoming a terrorist increase. (Rayad, Stephen and Mohamad, 2013).

Primarily the radicals flourish in an empowering domain basically portrayed by a broadly shared feeling of unfairness among concerned fragments of the populace. Besides sentiments of foul play, mortification and minimization have dependably been intense powers in legislative issues and prime movers for change. (European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalization, 2008; Schmid, 2013). These continue to be constant features to the cause of radicalization resulting to terrorism. In the East African

² Royal Canadian mounted police

³Journal of Psychology and Behavioral Science, Vol. 1 No. 1; December 2013

Region radicalization has been evident in the semi-arid and arid areas whose populations have for centuries felt sidelined by their governments. This sentiment being minimized thus makes an influx of radicalization at last prompting to psychological oppression. It has been contended that the quality of political Islam in East Africa lies in its capacity to address the requirements of specific gatherings that have been underestimated by both political procedures and resource clashes.

Similarly mass-level components, such as perceived injustices against Islam, have therefore assumed a part in radicalization. Coming up in the most part as religious (Islamic) fanaticisms, radicalization is generally ascribed to:⁴The socio-economic and political instability of the states or its total nonappearance, the chapter 11 of current philosophies, the absence of solid establishments and social administration conveyance, and in particular International connectedness these are crucial establishments for radicalization in East Africa. Across the region, the "war on terror" has taken on multiple forms and meanings. Radical Islam was already causing strains among societies and secular regimes in the sub-region even before the explosion of the American embassies in Tanzania & Kenya, building on the economic decline and lack of strong and legitimate states⁵. Thus radicalization leading to terrorism is a situation that demands thorough

⁴Medhane, T. (2011), *The Political Economy of Radicalization and Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*. Dakar, Senegal

⁵Medhane, T. (2011), *The Political Economy of Radicalization and Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*. Dakar, Senegal

analysis. This study attempts to examine the impact of existing strategies employed to counter radicalisation and terrorism in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania and give recommendations to help curb or end the ever growing threat to the region.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

In recent years, Africa has attracted significant attention because of violent activities that have threatened international peace and security.⁶ Researchers have found that East Africa is a particularly a risky region because of al-Qaeda activities and increasing levels of the Transnational Salafist Revolutionary Movements. Some studies indicate that there has been a ground for activities by the Muslims as from the 90s & that it maintains to be a key area of focus if the fight against terrorism is to be won⁷. The region has been said to be offering a favorable environment to these movements⁸. These studies specify that the region is a priority area in al-Qaeda's and Al-Shabaab's global strategy because frequent terrorist activities have been reported in the horn of Africa. Consequently, Militant Islamist groups or activities have been widely reported in the Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.

⁶Rabasa A. (2009a). Al-Qaeda Terrorism and Islamist Extremism in East Africa. Retrieved January 31st 2016, from Real Instituto Elcano: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/international+terrorism/ari96-2009

⁷Ali AM. (2008). Radicalization Process in the Horn of Africa-Phases and Relevant Factors. Paper presented at the Regional Cooperation to Counter Terrorism COMSEC/UNODC/ICPAT.

⁸Rabasa A. (2009). Radical Islam in East Africa. Prepared for the United States Air Force.

There remains to be seen about the effectiveness of the strategies being employed to mitigate radicalization within East Africa. ⁹According to a report by ISS-Institute of Security Studies in Africa the collective punishment approach based on perceptions employed by Kenyan Security forces to curb radicalization has yielded no fruits. The perceptions mostly wrong, targeted Somali and Muslims resulting into a feeling of xenophobia and persecution from these communities. The Kenyan government regime from 2007 to 2012 had no programs suited to address Radicalization only until recently have anti-terror laws been established. In Kenya¹⁰ particularly, the consequences of the regions' inability to address developing radicalisation has not just empowered Al-Shabaab to enroll outside warriors however has likewise encouraged the spread of Al-Shabaab in the nation and the more extensive locale. It is against this foundation in this way that the study tries to fill that gap by examining the impact of existing strategies that Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania countries have employed to counter radicalization and terrorism in the region.

1.3 Research Questions

Through this gain knowledge of, answering these questions will be my major aim will;

- i. What does existing knowledge say are the drivers of radicalization and terrorism in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania?

⁹ Institute of Security Studies in Africa, WWW.IRINNEWS.COM

¹⁰Botha, A. (2014).

- ii. What existing counter strategies have been employed to mitigate radicalization and terrorism in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania?
- iii. What combination of drivers and measures are likely to be effective in mitigating radicalization and terrorism in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

1.4.1 General Objective

To examine and analyse the impact of existing counter strategies employed by Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania in mitigating radicalization and terrorism (1998 to 2012).

1.4.2 Specific Objectives

The gain knowledge of will be guided by these particular goals:

- i. To establish what existing knowledge say are the drivers of radicalization and terrorism in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.
- ii. To examine the existing counter strategies that have been employed to mitigate radicalization and terrorism in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.
- iii. To determine what combination of drivers and measures are likely to be effective in mitigating radicalization and terrorism in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.

1.5 Literature Review

1.5.1 Introduction

This chapter represents an evaluation of the works the researcher referred to in order to lay an understanding of the research problem; that is the relationship among the different

works and the current study. It also gives a critical review of these works while identifying the gaps that have necessitated this study.

1.5.2 Terrorism in East Africa

Over the last decade Africa was not known to have radical and terrorist groups. However since 1998 there was a sharp increase in terrorism in Kenya, Tanzania, Somalia, Sudan, Kenya and Uganda. In 1998 in both Kenya and Tanzania the American Embassies were bombed simultaneously leading to amass destruction of lives and property. In Uganda ¹¹the Lord's Resistance Army under Joseph Kony leadership has caused a lot of harm in the community. Although they are classified as a militia group they operate very similarly to terrorist groups. For a long time they carried out massacres, abductions and maiming of civilians. In July 2010 ¹²Kampala witnessed the twin explosions that targeted citizens keeping abreast with the FIFA world cup in 2010. The Al-Qaeda linked Al-Shabaab Islamic militia based in Somalia claimed responsibility for the attacks. A Ugandan national Issa Luyima was one of the key suspects. In Kenya more attacks have continued to hit the country since the 1998 bombing. Kenya has been on the receiving end of terrorist attacks mostly because the KDF (Kenya Defense Forces) invaded Kismayu which is a major revenue source of the Al-Shabaab. The Al-Shabaab also continues to

¹¹Ghana Growth and Development Platform Current Issue Note 11, August 25, 2015

¹² <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/26/ringleader-of-2010-uganda-bombing-found-guilty-of-terrorism>

issues threats to other countries that contribute to the AMISOM troops. Terrorists have attacked and killed citizens in churches, public transport, shopping malls and even police posts.

The level of attacks executed pointed out that they were carried out from within and not without and this a key point to take note of. The frequency of attacks and reports of youth reported missing especially in areas along the border and the coast spell a fear that citizens mostly the youth from Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania are being recruited and radicalized into terrorists.

1.5.3 The psychology of the terrorist

According to ¹³psychological researchers Crenshaw 1986; Lacqueur, 2003; terrorism is a deliberate, strategic and instrumental act connected to and supported by ideological objectives. More often than not these acts involve a group. Schimid and Jongman 1988 say that earlier efforts in research tended to insinuate that terrorist activities were as a result of personality or mental abnormality. However following research Horgan 2003 explains that research has failed to explain that there is a terrorist personality or terrorist profile. It is very unlikely to find the cause of radicalization by looking at only personality traits. However Social researchers have perceived that apparent treacheries and mortification are integral to comprehending terrorism. Hacker (1976) explained that an individual's search for identity may attract the individual to extremist groups. Hefurther

¹³Crenshaw, M. (1986)

explained that the 'black and white' ideologies of these groups become attractive to those trying to escape from the world and its complexities.

Instead of trying to get their own identity, operating under group identity is suffice. Crenshaw goes further to explain that in these extremist groups individual finds a sense of belonging and meaning. For individuals who become terrorists the major attracting factor is on the community of other believers rather than on the group's ideology or to violence.

Radicalization is described as a process based on four steps, which are pre-radicalization, identification, indoctrination and action by the FBI. The FBI report suggests that all radicalized individual goes through these processes before becoming a radical and finally a terrorist. According to Solber and Bhatt 2007, nationals of a country that embrace a jihadi-salafi belief system do as such via a 4 step process. That is identification of self, pre-radicalization and indoctrination to more intense commitments & belief to terrorist theories and finally jihadization where the individual have faith that it is their duty to participate in terrorist activities.

In 2009 after extensive research Saucier et al. established certain themed behaviours on militant extremists found in every 3 or 4 groups. He explains that these behaviours are the use of tactics to excuse oneself of the negative consequences of their violent activities and the prominent use of military terminology in areas rarely used. The group also develops the view that they need to reach the group's rightful position but that objective is being tragically hampered by external forces. According to Saucier some of the most prominent

traits is that the individuals tends to constantly glorify the past in reference to one's group,they repeatedly reference to a future paradise, have a perception that great calamities are yet to occur,they anticipate supernatural intervention, glorifydying for a cause, havean obligation and responsibility of killing and creating war,and the heightenedelevation of intolerance,vengeance andwar like behaviour.

Crenshaw quotes Munger ¹⁴2006 who says that something must be done to provide incentives and also remove disincentives that encourage radicalisation and finally terrorist activities. Some major steps to manage this diffusion of responsibility areinstilling of social identity and obedience. Duties delegation is a psychological and socialfactor where members feel partially responsible of their violent extremist behaviour either individually or as a group. De-individualization is where focus on judgement is on the group rather than the member,this lowers awareness of self making the members not to restrain themselves. The obedience to authority diminishes because the individual transfers any moral fiber from himself to the group. Tajfel and Turner, 1986 explain that how an individual views himself in accordance to social groups weakens social responsibility. Once an individual has learnt to control their behaviour and regulate their actions their moral code will guide their actions away from radical or terrorist activities.In support of this theory, a study conducted by the ICSR ¹⁵former Al-Shabaab

¹⁴ Ibid

¹⁵Meleagrou-Hitchens/19/11/2012.

members confessed that they left once they realized that actions of the Al-Shabaab were against their religious beliefs.

Cronin 2006 and Jackson 2009¹⁶ say that terrorists just as other groups have vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities need to be managed to kill radicalisation and finally terrorism. In their analysis they observed that internal mistrust can be a destabilizing factor in a group causing the members to focus on inwardly rather than externally towards operations or goals. Therefore ways have to be developed to manage these vulnerabilities to kill radicalisation and finally terrorism.

1.5.4 Unemployment as it relates to Radicalisation and Terrorism

Unemployment in East Africa and in the whole African region continues to be a major concern. Many developing nations have a huge number of unemployed youth most of whom are university graduates. Unemployment of the youth is problematic as it leaves them idle and without means to survive. Terrorists have taken this opportunity to radicalize the youth and finally becoming terrorists by enticing them with promise of riches to them or their families. In a report by¹⁷ the ICSR based on field work study on former Al-Shabaab members, half of those interviewed said they were motivated into terrorism by financial rewards. According to the interviewees, Al-Shabaab recruiters

¹⁶ Crenshaw, 1986

¹⁷Ibid

promise a monthly income of 500USD which is more than 4 times the national average. They therefore see it as an opportunity to make quick money.

In an article by ¹⁸Aljazeera in 2013, the level unemployment in Kenya is described as a ticking time bomb. It explains that joblessness in Kenya is growing issue however its already an epidemic for the youth it. Kenya's youth comprise 80% of the population with most being under 35 years. It is among the vast population of youth in Africa with roughly 70 percent of its working age being youth. However approximately 10 million people remain unemployed. When a country has a huge number of idle and unemployed youth this creates a lot of political instability. An article by the ICSR stated unemployment of youth in Kenya ¹⁹was at 75% by 2012 with a majority being Muslims from the northern region. Terrorists have tapped into this gap by luring them with promises of wealth in order to become radicals. The ²⁰Unemployment Rate in Uganda as reported by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics in 2012 stood at 4.20 percent in 2010 this was a sharp decline from 2007 where it stood at 1.90 percent. The story is similar as that of Kenya and Tanzania with the majority of the unemployed being youth.

Insider- A Ugandan online news site explains that Uganda's unemployment is based at 80% or more of the university graduates. Unemployment contributes to crimes,

¹⁸Kenya's Ticking Time Bomb. <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2013/11/kenya-ticking-time-bomb-20131120115023966577.html>

¹⁹Meleagrou-Hitchens 2012.

²⁰<http://www.tradingeconomics.com/uganda/unemployment-rate>

lawlessness and exposes the youth to recruitment by terrorist groups with the promise of a better future. The ILFS 2006 reported that a vast majority of the unemployed youths in Dar es Salaam were made up of first time job seekers with the general unemployment rate standing at 31.5 percent in ²¹Dar es Salaam and 16.5 percent in other urban areas. In separate studies carried out by the Tanzanian military and a non-governmental organisation connected the radicalism of youth to unemployment. In the report Maj-Gen Mabeyo states that the youth were joining the radical groups after being enticed with promises of better wages.

According to ²²Emmanuel Uduaghan the Delta State governor, youth unemployment is a great contributing factor to terrorism. He explained that terrorism, violence and numerous occurrences of kidnapping are linked to high rates of youth unemployment. When there is a growing pool of young people it creates a breeding ground for terrorism recruitment.

1.5.5 Racial Profiling

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) describes racial profiling by law enforcement as a process that targets citizens for suspicion of crime based on their ethnicity, race, religion or natural origin.

²¹JastonBidala. Unemployment makes terrorist groups appealing to Dar youth. The East African.

²²Baffour, 2016

Following series of terrorist attacks in the region the Kenyan government launched an operation to capture suspected terrorists.²³ However this exercise seemed to target the Somalis and some minority Muslims. At the coast, the police targeted mosques suspected to be of Islamic extremists. However not all mosques house Islamic extremists. It is also wrong to believe that most terrorists and radicals come from the coastal from both Kenya and Tanzania.

The Rwandan genocide resulted in loss of lives of over 800,000 and resulted to about 2 million refugees from Rwanda. There was genocidal slaughter of Tutsi by the members of the Hutu majority government. This was the result of a growing hate over a period of time between the Hutus and Tutsis. These communities were wrongly classified and profiled, eventually resulting into a massacre never to be forgotten. Profiling based on religion, ethnicity or class is dangerous for any community as the result is always negative.

After ²⁴the twin world cup bombings in July 2010 profiling of Ugandan Muslim community became a growing concern. According to Uganda Muslim Youth (UMYDF) it became difficult to counter the view among locals that their faith is lined to terrorism. This was made even harder by the numerous arrests by the Ugandan Police of Muslims. On their part UMYDF has been trying to counter extremist messages and cult mentality that tends to grow in young Muslims.

²³Gathaara, 2016.

²⁴Combating Extremism. UMYDF. <http://umydf.org/programs.php>. 28th Sep 2016

Thus the profiling of Muslims as terrorists is a bad move which eventually brings feelings of hatred and marginalization. By profiling we forget the real causes of radicalisation and terrorism which include corruption,unemployment,inadequate policies and inadequate intelligence gathering.

1.5.6 Military response

In October 2011²⁵Kenya initiated Operation Linda Nchi (Operation Protect the Nation) this came up as a result kidnappings of foreign nationals by the Al-Shabaab. Analysts say that attacks on Kenya Soil are as a result of their troops continued presence in Somalia. These attacks have continued to affect Kenya's tourism sector as well as overall security of the country. At the same time this was complimented by intense security measures within the country especially an operation that set out to weed out illegal immigrants from the Eastleigh Community.

In a ²⁶report published by the International Crisis Group(2012) Kenya's decision to intervene militarily in Somalia was seen as a rush and not well thought out. The Al-Shabaab vowed to ensure instability in Kenya as long Kenyan troops are still in Somalia. Kenya is unlikely to move out of Northern Somalia as it has invested a lot. However the citizens of Kenya and Somalia are unsettled by the overextended process. It breeds

²⁵<http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/operation-linda-nchi.23September2016>.

²⁶ International Crisis Group. The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia.No.184.2012

mistrust from both Somalia and Kenyan citizens over the prolonged stay of Kenyan troops in Northern Somalia.

2.1 Corruption and Refugees

Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania have in the past taken in refugees from various neighboring countries from Somalia, Burundi, Rwanda, Ethiopia and South Sudan.

It has come to be seen by some governments that an influx of refugees brings with it complications. According to the UNHCR, Kenya held at least 500,000 refugees from Somalia in 2012.²⁷ This number has kept on escalating throughout the years. Kenya has the fourth largest refugee camps after Pakistan, Iran and Germany. In East Africa, The Dadaab Refugee camp is one of the biggest refugees' camps.

In Tanzania the Nyaragusu camp was the fifth biggest camp in 2012 with 68,100 displaced people primarily from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In that year there was an increment of evacuees from DRC filling Uganda.

It is however worrying that a convergence of refugees has permitted unapproved people to get into the nation. Corruption along the borders is a developing issue in these nations where authorities give national recognizable proof to refugees without exhaustive

²⁷Ligami, 2016

examination. The outcome is an inundation of unregistered outcasts who enter the nation to select and prepare natives to become terrorists.

2.2 Poverty ,Refugees and Marginalization

The increased level of destitution, unemployment, and underdevelopment in the Kenya-Somalia border range is one the most elevated in the nation and is a noteworthy giver to High rate of crime.²⁸ There is an issue regarding competition of resources within the Somali community due to environmental degradation. Conflicts arise out of water and land mostly for their livestock. There has also been ongoing conflict between the Kenyan Somalis and those from neighboring Somalia or refugee camps. The main issue being they are in competition of resources mainly of water and land. As the number of refugees continued to increase from Somalia conflict kept increasing bringing with it gun-smuggling, clan tensions and warfare.

However the influx ²⁹of refugees is not the only cause of conflict. In the East African Region radicalization has been evident in the semi-arid and arid areas whose populations have for centuries felt sidelined by their governments. This feeling of being marginalized in turn creates a wave of radicalization finally leading to terrorism. According to the

²⁸ Dr. Ken Menkhaus. USAID For the American People. Kenya-Somalia Border Conflict Analysis. 2005. 78p

²⁹ Dr. Ken Menkhaus. USAID For the American People. Kenya-Somalia Border Conflict Analysis. 2005. 78p

TJRC ³⁰report released in August 2013 it was found that there existed perceptions of marginalisation in all provinces but most notably the North Eastern Province, Nyanza Province, North Rift, Coast and Western Provinces. The report described marginalisation as the procedure that denies openings and results to those "living on the edge," while improving the open doors and results for the individuals who are "at the middle. The indicators of marginalisation measured included physical infrastructure, housing, security, food, education, access to land, employment, health, water and sanitation. On the Northern part of the country there was a growing concern among the citizens that they lacked government support. Lack Government support translates wholly to development. TJRC explains that economically marginalised groups tend to be socially marginalised or socially exclusion. The report explained the Kenyan states response to this problem has been to work against those who claimed marginalisation or by enticing them with tokens which did not benefit an entire community but few individuals. Another area that creates discontent and causes social exclusion is the issue of land. According to the TJRC report this has affected the whole country with communities at the coast suffering the most. These are one of the reasons for high level of unemployment and under development causing the emergence of the MRC (Mombasa Republic Council).

The increasing numbers of youth that have crossed into Somalia have been those at the borders of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. It has been contended that the quality of political

³⁰Kenya TJRC Summary Report. August 2013.

Islam in East Africa lies in its capacity to address the necessities of specific gatherings that have been underestimated by both political procedures and asset clashes. (European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalization, 2008; Schmid, 2013).

1.5.7 Criminal justice response to terrorism measures taken by governments of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco

Joylon Ford in his ³¹research on criminal justice response to terrorism in Maghreb argues that terrorism possess a threat to peace and security in Africa .It serves to distract states from important developmental issues.

In his study he reiterates that different methods have to be employed to counter terrorism in Africa. These include formulation of policies to regulate movement of funds, people, arms and explosives, creating adequate offences in national laws and building institutional capacity to increase information sharing between security agencies. Working together, the government authorities need to implement initiatives to improve tolerance and equality in society. More importance should be put in reducing the social factors that play a big role in contributing to radicalisation and terrorism. He further adds that terrorism is in itself a crime; however responsibility does not lie with the international community but that the individual countries have to make the effort to tackle it. A country's criminal justice system must be equipped to identify, investigate, prosecute and prevent these terrorist attacks. This should be done while following rule of law and

³¹Ford J. (2009).Beyond the war on terror.A study of criminal justice responses to terrorism in the Maghreb, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa.

respecting all human rights. That is by ensuring once they are arrested these terrorists need to be prosecuted or extradited to their respective countries for punishment. He further adds that terrorism and any other related behavioral conducts need to be punishable by law. Measures need to be taken to ensure that policies are in place to facilitate punishment for acts of terrorism.

Ford states ³²that since the intention is to prevent terrorism therefore punishment should not only be on already committed, there should be measures put in place to also penalize those found with the intent to commit the act of terrorism. The terrorist preparatory conducts include recruitment, incitement to terrorism and financing terrorism. Another way to prevent terrorism is regulation of formal and informal financial institutions through legitimate laws. Criminal justice systems should not only focus on the short term advantages of the number of terrorists captured or killed. The systems put in place should be able to prosecute these criminals according to laws and procedures while also complying with the constitution and international standards of behaviour.

Ford adds that there may be temptations to use unlawful means to capture unlawful terrorists. However there are more positive effects to adhering the rule of law which may include; having disciplined law enforcement and most important having overall community support. This further act as a moral compass in the society.

³² Ford (2009)

Ford says that the idea of having a strengthened justice system is more a problem than a solution because it operates in a fashion that will not result in long term counter-terrorism effects. He says that the system needs to be loosened and made more flexible. A system that is considered 'too strong' has minimal safeguards, very broad definition of crimes and does not have the mechanism to review the conduct of the officials. This only weakens the rule of law and brings about a negative attitude from the society as they will not respect the law. This discontent by society can open a door for the terrorists to recruit and radicalize more people. He further adds that a strong justice system is not only determined by the quantity of arrests but also by the quality of the laws and procedures in place. This will indicate the level of transparency, the ability to respond to crimes and compliance with internal standards and human rights.

Ford advises ³³in his book that African countries need to come up with counter-terrorism strategies that improve the overall criminal justice system of a country so as to serve the community better in terms of crime prevention. A major problem in Africa is using the military as an answer to radicalisation and terrorism prevention. Many African countries have moved away from having a balanced criminal justice system similar to the UN Security Council regimes; instead they follow policies based on hard line military terms. A good example is the US, since 2009 Obama's administration has embraced a more holistic approach to terrorism one that integrates due process, the rule of law and human rights. This is in agreement with the Global counter-terrorism strategy adopted by the UN

³³ Supra note 31

general assembly in 2009 .He says that Africa needs to move to intelligence–evidence and policing-justice models so that those who use terrorism as a medium can be dealt with squarely as criminals. He argues that a better justice system based on counter terrorism will enable a population and government focus on more development issues.

1.6 Justification of the Study

1.6.1 Policy Justification

This study is expected to be of value to the policy makers as it will guide and help the policy makers and planners in coming up with sound policies and measures to address radicalization and terrorism in the region. Thus this study is to be of great value to the security agencies in the country and region at large, the legislature and also the executive.

The study will also inform and enlighten the general public on radicalization and how it impacts on terrorism. Through understanding and enlightenment on the causes of radicalization, and its impact on the county, the general community; local leaders and

religious institutions such as churches and mosques can come up with initiatives and programmes to address the vice.

1.6.2 Academic Justification

The study will be of great importance to the future scholars, academicians and researchers as it adds value to the body of knowledge by expanding the existing literature in the field of radicalization and terrorism in the horn of Africa. Additionally, the study will act as a basis for future research.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

The study will be guided by Social Identity Theory and Rational decision hypothesis. Social Identity Theory sees conduct from the social-mental viewpoint of intergroup relations and gives a connection amongst circumstances and conduct³⁴. The defenders of the theory including Henri Tajfel depict Social identity theory³⁵ as group conduct that arises from a shared sense of social category membership. Tajfel (1979) suggested that

³⁴ Tajfel, H., & Turner, 1986

³⁵ Hogg, Michael A. (Ed) (1990). viii 297 pp

the gatherings to which individuals had a place with were an essential wellspring of pride and regard. He assist clarifies that gatherings give an individual a feeling of social personality and having a place with the social world. Along these lines to expand our own picture we advance the status of the specific gathering we have a place with. Our self-image is made more prominent by having prejudiced views towards groups other than ours, perceiving the world from the perspective of 'them vs us'. The central argument of this theory is that members of a group aspire to find fault in other groups considered an 'out' group thereby reinforcing their self-image.

An exhaustive comprehension of the social identity theory inside the structure of radicalization and terrorism gives an unmistakable comprehension of the socio-mental elements of people and groups as they radicalize. As an individual turns into a radical, turning into a terrorist is viewed as the 'in gathering' with whatever is left of society as the 'out gathering'.

Then again, Rational choice theory approaches terrorism as political conduct in light of measured decisions by terrorists as rational actors, and considers the mental factors that may either empower or repress support in psychological militant exercises. Defenders of this hypothesis including James S. Coleman clarify that this theory sees psychological militant associations as thinking substances that measure means and closures, expenses and advantages, and settle on a balanced decision. This theory is useful for researching radicalization through the perspective of motivational binding. The sparks inside judicious decision theory are preconditions, figures that set the phase for fear based

oppression as time goes on, and precipitants, specific events that quickly go before the occasion of terrorism. As preconditions and precipitants are modified, so is the direction of radicalization toward terrorism. An essential issue to rational choice theory is that adjustments in the guidelines of the game (preconditions and precipitants) can modify the conduct of the players.

1.8 Hypothesis of the study

The study will be based on the following hypothesis:

1.8.1 Radicalization is caused by a myriad of factors relating to the search for a better life by the youth in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.

1.8.2 The governments of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania are focusing youth empowerment programs as counter terrorism strategies.

1.8.3 Economic empowerment is the empowerment programs are the best counter terrorism strategies that can be adopted by governments of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.

1.9 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

1.9.1 Introduction

This chapter explains the research methodology used in this study. It seeks to explain the research methods to be used in data collection. Research is an additional contribution to the existing stock of knowledge. The Industrial Research Institute³⁶ describes research

³⁶Industrial Research Institute (2010) Research management. Michigan: Industrial Research Institute

methodology as a way of searching or solving the research problem. Research³⁷ is seen as a systematic way to gain knowledge; the researchers always work to solve the problem in a systematic way in order to find a conclusion. Consequently this part will give points of interest of the research design, the focused population, and the sampling procedure, description of research instruments, legitimacy and unwavering quality of instruments, information gathering systems and information investigation methods trying to determine the research problem.

1.9.2 Research Design

The main function of a research design is to ensure that the evidence gathered assists the researcher to effectively address the research problem logically while also avoiding being vague.

The study adopted an exploratory ³⁸design. The focus of exploratory design is to gain understanding and familiarity of the problem for future exploration. Most of the time exploratory design is carried out when research problems are in the very first stages of investigation. This design type is best used to establish an understanding of what methodology would effectively apply to the study. It focuses of gaining familiarity with basic details, settings, and concerns. A positive aspect of exploratory research design is

³⁷Redman, 2009

³⁸Organizing Your Social Sciences Research Paper.USC Libraries.<http://libguides.usc.edu/writingguide/researchdesigns,2016>

that it offers a well-grounded picture of the situation being developed, the generation of new ideas and determines whether the study will be achievable in future.

1.9.3 Research Scope

A research scope determines what is to be explored in the study. The parameters of the study are defined when determining the scope of the study. The study focused on events of radicalisation and terrorism that have occurred within Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania from 1998 to 2010.

1.9.4 Target Population

This determines the population from which the sample of the study will be drawn. The study targeted the 3 three countries in East Africa, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.

1.9.5 Data Collection Instruments

The study utilized qualitative data from secondary sources. This was obtained from government reports, journals, textbooks, News, proposals, Newsletters, Magazines and the internet. This was an important method of data collection because the study reviewed the various literatures about the impact of existing strategies for countering radicalisation and terrorism in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. This also formed the background of the available information where the study established new findings that foster new knowledge to the area of study.

1.9.6 Data analysis and interpretation

The data³⁹ collected from the field is received in its raw form and must be decoded and analyzed. After analysis the researcher is able to make sense of the data that has been collected. The methods used for data collection have an impact on the process of analysis and data interpretation. The study will use qualitative analysis by analysing the data in a systematic way to come up with useful information since the nature of data collected was qualitative. It captures a qualitative picture of interviewees, concerns, ideas, attitudes and feelings. In addition, it provided valuable historical and cultural insights through analysis of texts.

1.9.7 Ethical and Logistical Considerations

Logistical Considerations

A good quality research needs to have proper logistics. Conducting a research needs proper planning. When the researcher is aware of logistical issues it assists in being prepared.

To conduct a good ⁴⁰research a research permit needs to be obtained to have authority to carry out the research. In addition to the research permit the research instrument needs to be pretested to ensure that the items are stated clearly. This process enables the researcher to assess if the instrument is clear and that the respondents are able to use it. At this stage

³⁹Mugenda & Mugenda, 1999

⁴⁰Olive M. Mugenda & Abel G. Mugenda, Research Methods, 1999, Kenya. Acts Press, 268p

any items that are confusing or annoying will be removed at this stage. The researcher obtained a research permit from the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies.

Language can also be a constraint if the respondents are not literate. Once the sample is selected the researcher will confirm literacy levels of the population sample. If translation is necessary it should be done before the actual fieldwork. Hostility of the respondents should also be considered, some respondents may be hostile others may be suspicious to strangers talking to them.

Ethical Considerations

A researcher needs to observe that they act with integrity while conducting the research. The researcher has to ensure that respondents are protected by keeping the information collected confidential. ⁴¹There should be strict anonymity by protecting the anonymity of the respondents. All respondents must be involved voluntarily on the study. The researcher has the duty of clearly informing the client the real reason for the study.

Plagiarism is also an ethical consideration that has to be carefully thought of. The researcher will ensure that they do not plagiarize other researcher's work. All work needs to original.

⁴¹Olive M. Mugenda & Abel G. Mugenda, Research Methods, 1999, Kenya. Acts Press, 268p

1.10 Chapter Outline

The first chapter introduces the area of study giving an overall background and justification for the study. The area of study will cover three East African countries that are Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.

A clear background of the study helps to lay a foundation for the following sections of the proposal. This chapter will also cover the statement of the problem this explores the problem statement giving justification to the need for the study to be carried out. It also encompasses the research objectives and questions that the study intends to answer. It finally includes the theoretical framework that backs up the study with social theories, justification of the study and the hypothesis of the study.

Chapter two explores what existing knowledge say are the drivers of radicalization and terrorism in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. Chapter three examines the existing counter strategies that have been employed to mitigate radicalization and terrorism in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. Chapter four offers a combination of drivers and measures are likely to be effective in mitigating radicalization and terrorism in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. Finally chapter five will present the conclusion and recommendation of the study.

CHAPTER TWO

EXISTING KNOWLEDGE ON THE DRIVERS OF RADICALIZATION AND TERRORISM IN KENYA, UGANDA AND TANZANIA

2.1 Radicalization

Radicalization has postured huge difficulties to lawmakers, policymakers, sociology analysts and terror specialists. Inquiries of why radicalization happens, what triggers a man to take an interest in it and why a couple people get radicalized while some others surrender it almost through, develop in insightful and political reasonable talks. There are very nearly sixteen known observational and non-trial theories of radicalization, more than six to seven applied stage models created based on some of those theories⁴² furthermore, more than twelve instruments of radicalization, of which none have been unequivocally denied by the African governments considered for the present study. However, a few academicians have purposely or accidentally affected policymakers.

A generally huge extent of radicalization research examines whether the presence of basic causes can light up why people have a tendency to be radicalized. This approach has increased much footing in the course of the most recent decade. The theory focuses on that the individuals who are defenseless to radicalization, are all the while, or have

⁴²Wilnera,&Claire-Jehanne. (2010). Home-grown terrorism and transformative learning: an interdisciplinary approach to understanding radicalization,' Global Change, Peace, and Security

been able to be radicalized, trust they are socially, politically or fiscally precluded from claiming something they are qualified for, when appeared differently in relation to individuals around them . This disservice (saw or something else) is transformed into dissatisfaction advancement of the 'disappointment animosity' hypothesis and this consequent outrage can conceivably be diverted into terrorism.

The human main drivers referred to inside different records of radicalization are various also, far reaching and concern the financial, social, and verifiable circles, while precipitant variables by and large suggest full scale level political grievances. One regularly referred to lenient element recommends that financial disservice and an absence of social versatility affect radicalization. Then again, elective research has appeared there to be no clear connection between financial hardships and radicalization⁴³; Therefore, those such as Krueger⁴⁴ contend that it shouldn't be treated as a causal relationship. Thus, socioeconomic, and structural challenges are not static and are bound to change, whereas terrorism events don't take long.

Lack of integration is another consideration often mentioned perceived and actual of immigrant settlers into their host country⁴⁵. However, once again, not all

⁴³Krueger, & Malečková, (2003). Education, poverty, and terrorism: Is there a causal connection.

⁴⁴Barnes, (2006) "Born in the UK: Young Muslims in Britain". London: The Foreign Policy Centre.

⁴⁵ Rock, (2005)

subscribe to this theory. Indeed, some allude to the different studies that demonstrate most by far of Muslims to by and by feel very much coordinated into the UK and glad to be British⁴⁶. This then may not be about mix essentially, but rather more about character. Numerous contend that Muslim youth in the West are as often as possible torn between the frequently clashing personalities of their folks' countries and the common West. Subsequently, they can't join a personality to it is possible that one, or may oppose both⁴⁷. They may likewise need to adjust the character of religion, which is regularly an intricate assignment.

Characters are not particular or altered, and can be liable to continually expanding change. Notwithstanding, some even contend that the personalities youthful Muslims are attempting to adjust are beginning to end up out of date. Further, after occasions like the Bradford and Oldham revolts in 2001, a few studies have proposed that Muslim men are viewed as the new society villains and foe inside⁴⁸. ⁴⁹argues, under these strains and in a

⁴⁶Freedman, L. & Alexander, Y. (1983).*Perspectives on terrorism*, (Ed.). Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc

⁴⁷Roy, (2004)

⁴⁸ Post, J. M. (2007) "Rewarding with Fire: Effects of Retaliation on Terrorist Group Dynamics". *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 10: 1: 23-35

⁴⁹ Meijer, R. (2005)

time of flux, individuals will probably withdraw to conventional thoughts and ways of life as a method for adapting to this change. This difficulties their own impression of personality, where having a place in their own groups develops as antagonistic vibe (saw or something else) from more extensive society increments.

Proceeding onward to precipitant elements, in spite of the fact that there are numerous plot in different records of radicalization, one is most regularly specified in a Western setting. This worries the social, financial, and political prosperity of Muslims all around; typically in Muslim states.

This is as a result of passing of Muslim regular folks through the immediate and roundabout outcomes of Western remote strategy. This is not select to clashes including the West, as it likewise identifies with issues concerning states and locales, for example, Kashmir, Bosnia and Palestine. There are those that rebate the significance of outside arrangement inside radicalization. One of their contentions identifies with the presence of AQI radicalism in the UK prior to 9/11 (and ensuing attack of Afghanistan), though in impressively littler size. However, it might be conceivable to contend that considering remote approach in an immediate setting, i.e. as far as the UK's military operations, is dreadfully oversimplified.

There are some impression of Britain's foreign policy choices (or absence of) pre-9/11, similar to Bosnian Muslim genocide in the 1990s. The genocide was pre-cautioned by noticeable personalities like previous British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher who

anticipated the ascent of 'Islamic radicalism' if the West did not mediate in the emergency. The Bosnian crisis is not unique, it has been argued that contentions in Algeria, Chechnya, Albania, and Kosovo, for instance, prompted to the enlivening of Muslims who felt this was not in actuality a 'happenstance', but rather because of the West seeing Islam to be a danger after the death of Soviet socialism. It is just when outside approach is talked about in connection to an envisioned group that it has any significance to Muslims in the West who typically have no immediate association, aside from religion, to the general population being referred to.

This suffering is not personally felt by radicalizes in the West but in the context of the 'Ummah'; a concept which relates to the global kinship of Muslims⁵⁰. As an outcome, seeing the embarrassment of other people who are seen to be firmly associated to them can summon solid outrage. In any case, the idea of the Ummah is received by an incomprehensible number of Muslims which shows the presence of extra variables for radicalization to happen. Taking a wide point of view on the causing analysis, similitude can be inferred between the approach and more extensive studies in human science and criminology. In spite of the fact that an expansive number of records of radicalization and terrorism may not say the term, they are basically anomie based records where parallels

⁵⁰Gleditsch, N., Wallensteen, P., Eriksson, M., & Sollenberg, M. (2002). Armed conflict 1946-2001: A new dataset. *Journal of Peace Research*, 39(5), 615-637

can be seen with studies in crime and deviance⁵¹. ⁵²Erikson K observed that applying some sort of large scale level weight or stress onto a group implied that the strain separated down to the individual conceivably makes them take part in deviancy.

There is additionally some connection between roots because based records of radicalization and ideas for example, social complication hypothesis. Exuding from research led by of the Chicago School, the hypothesis is for the most part connected to comprehension deviancy and wrongdoing. Faris advanced this hypothesis trying to make associations between social pathologies and social issues. In this way, under states of social disorder there is the likelihood of an expansion of social issues, for example, wrongdoing, rates of liquor abuse, emotional well-being, and suicide. In any case, there is no proof to recommend that these expansive scale basic strengths are causal variables inside radicalization, particularly while considering that there are numerous, who encounter comparable, if not the same, strains and are not radicalized.

Accordingly, in spite of the fact that this approach has been grasped by specific scholastics like and associations like the United Nations , accepting that underlying

⁵¹Shultz, R. (1979). Coercive force and military strategy: Deterrence logic and the cost-benefit model of counterinsurgency warfare. *The Western Political Quarterly*, 32(4), 444-466

⁵² Erikson, K. (2006) *Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance*. John Wiley & Sons

drivers alone straightforwardly prompts to fear based oppression is passionately marked down by numerous creators.

2.2 Process of Radicalization

Sparlek and Lambert broke down imperative auxiliary information wellsprings of sixteen terrorism plots against the West. And additionally verifying that all plots began off in the West, i.e. where introductory radicalization happened, he contended there to be three unique sorts of circumstance. The initially is marked as order and control where enrollment, destinations, assets and learning are altogether sifted best down from AQ. Second are the recommended plots, where radicalizes go to certain Muslim zones of the world, for example, the Af-Pak area, for case, to give supplies to or join and battle with the Mujahedeen. When they arrive, they may possibly be educated that there are sufficient supplies or warriors and the most ideal approach to help the cause is to return back to their nation of origin in the West and do some kind of assault. He affirms that the points of interest of this plot are, more regularly than not, left to the culprit.

Third, identifies with those plots that are AQI which don't accept that there is any sort of contact, not to mention bearing, from AQ chain of command. These people and gatherings will lead demonstrations of fear based oppression, for example, the barbarities on Madrid's underground framework in 2004, as they essentially concur with the center standards of AQ and informally join its name to the assault. Silber vitally calls attention to that a large portion of the plots he broke down were 'base up' activities . What is normal over Silber's investigation is the communication that individuals have with each

other. By and large of radicalization it can be contended that there is the requirement for contact with an outrageous ideologue and additionally aggregate. There are numerous who affirm this for the most part happens through the presence of informal communities. This can be seen in far reaching settings like, for instance, factions, add up to establishments, and terrorism.

The requirement for contact with an outrageous ideologue or gathering is crucial for the radicalized to disguise outrageous belief systems. Indeed, even those thought to be solitary wolves have a few kind of association regardless of the possibility that this is one directional and carefully, with a radicalizer. Contends that specific hypothesis, particularly 'underlying driver, shed critical lights on the inspirations of insubordinate conduct', however 'none of them endeavor at demonstrating the brain; they don't make any central presumption about what spurs a human being. He contends the requirement for political business visionaries to have the capacity to 'casing the issue. Despite the fact that Gupta's reference to political has some importance; the circumstance is more unpredictable than this.

The imperative indicate consider from Gupta's investigation is the human component expected to drive radicalization; something reflected in more extensive studies. For instance, the European Commission's Expert Group on Violent radicalization (ECEGVR) contend that 'Solid individual encounters, family relationship and fellowship, aggregate regression are expected to trigger the real procedure. The investigation of social impact attempts to recognize how this happens, and plans to better see how components, for

example, societal standards, assemble impact, and social practices gotten to be necessary in encouraging this move in conduct. Inside both orders of human science and social brain research there exists a lot of writing that addresses this. Despite the fact that these speculations don't highlight routinely in records of radicalization, certain studies have distinguished the significance of some of these ideas.

This has driven a few scholastics jump at the chance to contend that radicalization appears 'to include a few stages that are based upon genuinely surely knew systems of impact. Social impact impacts radicalization in two ways. To start with is from the impact applied at the individual level, i.e. on a coordinated premise. This happens, as a general rule, between the radicalized and the radicalizer. In writing, a great part of the discussion concentrates on the identity of the radicalizer. This is basic when utilizing procedures of influence to impact others to take part in acts they regularly would not, or with starting to begin tolerating belief systems they beforehand possibly had practically no enthusiasm for.

The second approach identifies with the weight applied inside gathering circumstances. Here, the significance of ideas like companion weight, similarity, cohesiveness, and unanimity are pushed to the fore . For instance, if the larger part of an extraordinary gathering (particularly persuasive individuals inside it), or a gathering of companions so far as that is concerned, have radical plans then whatever remains of the gathering, or remote people, could feel under weight to adjust to this position. Crenshaw found that union and consistency are probably going to be increased considering the present

situation of underground life. As far as radicalization, underground life does not need to fundamentally identify with conferring or supporting a fear monger act in essence, or even association to an outrageous gathering. It might basically concern the affirmation of what is thought to be against social standards and constituted as being freak conduct. It can likewise be contended that being associated to a gathering whose conclusions begin to focalize implies that the move in assessment can likewise turn out to be more outrageous.

2.3 Terrorism in Africa

Countries in the horn of Africa HOA have been found to have good conditions helping the development of progressive developments. These incorporate the institutional shortcomings of the states in the locale and the debasement and infighting among pioneers of these nations, elements which empower Jihadists to move, select, arrangement and compose their exercises without being noticed. According to Victoroff⁵³ various reasons have been advanced for the growth of these movements in Somalia including the absence of a functioning government since the overthrow of the president Mohamed Siyad Barre in 1991. Even though revolutionary movements and terrorist activities have been reported in Kenya, Salafi Jihadists in the country are believed to be few. There are some factors in the country however which enable those engaging in revolutionary activities to use the country as a base. The country's advanced

⁵³Victoroff, J. (2005). The mind of the terrorist: A review and critique of psychological approaches. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49(1), 3-42

economy, a functioning sovereign government which limits freedom of Western intelligence and counter-terrorism units are some of the reasons advanced for the presence of revolutionary activities.

Also since 9/11, terrorism has taken up a lot of the United States assets. It has likewise turned into a key outside approach issue, with the capability of a little gathering of people delivering real harm as setbacks and fortune. These quick developing patterns constitute an undeniable risk to the security of human progress .Various techniques and approaches have been advanced to counteract and prevent fear based oppression after President George W. Bramble announced War on Terror. A few unique types of strategies have been actualized to counteract psychological oppression, including military activity, monetary authorizations, and discretionary endeavors. America's long war against terrorism has been going ahead without much genuine open civil argument about the genuine inspiration of psychological oppressors. Feelings, for example, dread and outrage made by terrorism are hindering the persistence expected to frame genuine strategies coordinated at the underlying driver of psychological oppression . The squeezing danger is not fear mongering, but rather how we comprehend the reason for psychological warfare. The absence of comprehension can and has made insufficient counterterrorism approaches.

Counterterrorism arrangements include either making an immediate move approach or a guarded approach. An immediate activity approach incorporates crushing psychological

oppressor preparing camps, retaliating against a state support, gathering knowledge, or solidifying the fear monger's benefits. A more cautious approach includes precaution measures like innovative hindrances (e.g., metal indicators and bomb locators) and the securing of outskirts. A great part of the strategy going into counterterrorism depends on an immediate activity approach. It is essential that the moves made are focused on adequately at the main driver of psychological oppression keeping in mind the end goal to anticipate fear monger activities before they happen. The quantity of choices taken relies on upon the human, money related, and political assets the United States are set up to contribute. The absence of boundless assets implies that arrangement should be versatile to the particular elements that cause psychological oppression.

Meanings of psychological oppression are disputable because of issues of marking activities as fear based oppression advances the judgment of the performers, which may reflect ideological or political inclination. For this study, we will utilize an expansive meaning of fear based oppression as characterized by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). This will help us investigate psychological oppression and won't bar cases in light of inclinations. Psychological oppression is the debilitated or real utilization of unlawful constrain and brutality by a non-state on-screen character to accomplish a political, financial, religious, or social objective through dread, pressure, or terrorizing. The casualties or objects of fear monger assault have minimal inborn esteem to the psychological militant gathering however speak to a bigger human group of onlookers

whose response the psychological militants look for. Understand that fear based oppressors are sound on-screen characters. They have a particular reason for their utilization of brutality and foresee that it will make a response from the gathering of people that they are focusing on.

Terrorism has been for the most part drawn nearer from a verifiable point of view. This has prompted to an absence of hypothetical examination on the reasons for fear based oppression. Li and Schaub's study centered around two distinct hypotheses to clarify what drives certain people to utilize brutality so as to finish their objectives while others fulfill their objectives with the utilization of viciousness. The principal hypothesis concentrates on why individuals come to utilize savagery. This can be clarified by the Davies Jcurve hypothesis. As indicated by Davies, upsets, or in this occasion psychological warfare, are well on the way to happen when a drawn out time of target monetary and social advancement are trailed by a brief time of sharp inversion. Amid the last time frame, a mental condition of nervousness and dissatisfaction shows when desires split far from expected reality. The steadiness is reliant on a perspective in a general public. At the point when a sentiment deficiency, whether it is political or monetary, turns into the perspective and an inadmissible hole is delivered.

⁹³Found that, with the end goal for fear based oppression to happen, you require the nearness of three things. Initially, there should be a solid grievance. Second, there must be an absence of chance for political association. Third, an occasion must occur that

incites the flare-up of a fear based oppressor assault. It is imperative to comprehend what occasion is bringing on a psychological oppressor to wind up baffled and depend on viciousness. Conclusion surveys of Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip demonstrated that support for psychological oppressor assaults did not diminish with salary or instructive level. For a cross-area test of nations, found that low salary was not connected with more terrorism when common and political freedoms were controlled. These creators reasoned that it is the absence of these freedoms, not destitution, which brought on psychological warfare.

In a provocative study, contended for a nonlinear relationship amongst wage and psychological oppression in which center pay is more helpful for fear based oppression. In poor nations, the populace is more centered on everyday survival, while in rich nations there are less grievances to fuel psychological warfare. An incomprehensible number of experimental studies on psychological oppression have taken a gander at monetary and political reasons, and there is still much civil argument over the effect of these two elements.

2.3.1 Economic Analysis of Terrorism

Past observational studies taking a gander at the effect of financial advancement are blended. Li and Schaub have demonstrated that the monetary advancement of a nation assumes an essential part in decreasing the quantity of transnational fear based oppression episodes inside a nation. On the inverse side, saw minimal direct association between neediness or instruction and interest in psychological warfare. It is hard to comprehend

the financial thinking behind the utilization of psychological warfare. The possibility of individual monetary pick up by a psychological militant is not really supported, as they would turn into an objective of the crowd they assaulted. They may see the guarantee of bigger installments to their families, as adequate inspiration to take an interest in fear mongering. In any case, there is extremely constrained possibility for monetary pick up of an individual utilizing psychological warfare which gives little motivation to a person to fall back on utilizing terrorism for individual financial pick up.

There has been a broad presumption that destitution makes fear based oppression. This view is definitely not stunning considering that a significant part of the outcomes from past writing on the monetary states of contention propose that neediness in Africa builds the likelihood of viciousness. Abadie found a noteworthy relationship amongst terrorism and monetary factors, for example, pay in the African mainland. Abadie discovered confirmation that psychological oppression is connected with destitution. Neediness is firmly identified with the instruction level. By and large, taught individuals will probably be included in the political procedure. Taught individuals will be probably going to take an interest in governmental issues partially on the grounds that political contribution requires some base level of intrigue, mastery, and duty to issues and exertion, all of which are more probable if individuals have enough instruction and pay to fret about more than least monetary subsistence. The suggestion for governmental issues is that long haul approaches in view of human improvement are the best barrier against fear mongering. This is because of the way that individuals would be additionally ready to

utilize political techniques rather than rough strategies to realize change when they are baffled about a circumstance.

Financial outcomes of terrorism can be at the macroeconomic level as far as diminished GDP or lost GDP. Macroeconomic encapsulates utilization, speculation, and government expenditure and may equally be influenced by psychological factors. A nation that experiences psychological warfare may lose the fight against a potentially greater power with respect to financial ability. In addition, such financial power is a sure comparative advantage that when exploited may eliminate the risk of fear based oppression. The requirement for more government-bolstered counterterrorism appropriations may swarm open and private speculations inferable from higher assessments. There may likewise be microeconomic level effects from psychological oppression as a few parts or areas are at more noteworthy danger from fear monger assaults. In a period arrangement investigation, demonstrated that fear based oppressor assaults coordinated at the Greek visitor industry cost Greece 23.4% of its yearly tourism income for 1988. Another influx of fear monger assaults in Austria amid 1985–87 cost Austria 40.7% of its yearly visitor incomes for 1988.

Propelled economies can balance the impacts of fear based oppression with very much coordinated financial and money related arrangements, as the USA did taking after 9/11 . Second, little psychological oppression tormented economies e.g. Israel, Colombia, and the Basque Country in Spain will encounter huge misfortunes of GDP adding up to

upwards of 10% of GDP amid supported psychological militant battles (e.g. Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003). Third, little creating nations, for example, Kenya, Uganda, and Somalia are well-suited to indicate impeding financial impacts from fear based oppression (Enders and Sandler, 2012; Gaibullov and Sandler, 2011). This is likely valid for fizzled states that host psychological oppressor bunches, in light of the fact that such gatherings will drive off outside direct venture (FDI), which is an imperative wellspring of investment funds and, henceforth, development. Assuming, be that as it may, a creating nation has just a humble measure of psychological oppression, then the nation ought to climate these assaults with minimal financial anxiety.

Fourth, most cross-sectional and board investigations of provincial totals found that psychological oppression brought on a little, however critical, negative effect on per capita GDP development. In, the fall in this development rate was around 0.05% every year for a normal nation in their overall example.

2.3.2 Political Analysis of Terrorism

Two contentions have been advanced concerning the relationship amongst majority rule government and fear mongering. The main contends that vote based system diminishes fear mongering, in light of the fact that it offers access for subjects to look for a contrasting option to their grievances in a peaceful approach, when irreconcilable circumstances emerge. The second contention fights that majority rule government supports fear based oppression. Majority rule nations give more opportunities like discourse and affiliation, which diminishes the cost of leading psychological militant

exercises, hence encouraging more fear based oppression. A number of the past studies have found that the level of majority rules system tends to assume a positive part while counteracting fear based oppressor assaults. This is likely due into the way that there are more open doors for an individual or gathering to express their political objectives through the procedure of government. Likewise, government mistreatment improves the probability of being disappointed with the absence of chance to take an interest.

A dictatorial sort of government will abuse certain social liberties that will keep the investment in the political procedure; in this manner improving the probability that somebody will pick an option strategy, similar to fear mongering, to influence the political result. The capacity to select individuals is critical and can be made troublesome by doing such things as lessening grievances and keeping the outrage and contempt of their natives, not mistreating common rights⁵⁴. Law based interest helps in a wide range of approaches to decrease fear based oppression. Support increment fulfillment and the political adequacy of nationals. This additionally lessens their grievances, their capacity to enroll new individuals, and it raises open resistance of counterterrorism approaches. Besides, discovered proof supporting the view that terrorism is a difficulty with the absence of social liberties, and backings the view that psychological warfare is a political and not monetary issue.

⁵⁴Heymann, P. (2002). Dealing with terrorism: An overview. *International Security*, 26(3), 24- 38

⁵⁵, Conversely, discovered confirmation proposing that majority rules system increments fear based oppressor assaults. Likewise found that investigation of the advancement of majority rule government and free market financial aspects is not an answer for psychological oppression. This does not bolster the theory that cultivating vote based system in the eastern African nations will give insurance against psychological warfare. Or maybe, the outcomes are inverse and demonstrate that a more liberal African political framework is more helpless to the risk of fear based oppression than a tyrannical administration. Moreover, found that the conceivable hood of fear based oppressor bunches happening in majority rules systems is three and one-half times more prominent than happening in non-vote based systems. The present position of the African countries has been in support for more vote based countries, which runs parallel to the finding above. This approach, as appeared in the exact studies from above, demonstrates that the arrangements are not anticipating psychological warfare, but rather really helping it.

⁵⁶Schimid totals up the trademark shortcomings that majority rule government have in battling terrorism and why terrorism will probably happen in majority democratic governments. To start with, in democracies, there is flexibility of development. Individuals are allowed to travel everywhere freely without the sort of reconnaissance that happens in closed social societies. Additionally, there is the opportunity of

⁵⁵Piazza, J. (2008). Do democracy and free markets protect us from terrorism? *International Politics*, 45, 72-91.

⁵⁶Schmid, A. (2002). Terrorism and democracy. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 4(4), 14-25

affiliation. The state does not keep similarly invested people from shaping gatherings. Thirdly, open social orders give would-be terrorists a wealth of targets. Ultimately, there it is moderately simple for terrorists to get weapons and exchange reserves from namelessly held financial balances. It is this sort of environment that builds the imaginable of terrorist happening in majority democratic governments as opposed to authoritarian governments, which can control these variables without lifting a finger.

2.4 Effectiveness of counterterrorism Strategies

Transference is a key thought for assessing most counterterrorism activities. For instance, upgrading international embassy security initiated terrorists to kill authorities outside the compound⁵⁷. Activities to secure, say, Americans on US soil through country security brought about more assaults against Americans on remote soil⁵⁸. Before and after 9/11, and the 1998 US embassy bombing in Kenya about 40% of transnational terrorist attacks were directed against US interests even though very few of these attacks occurred on US soil after 9/11⁵⁹. Obviously, terrorists weighed evolving dangers, as discerning activity predicts, when they picked where and how to assault. Another

⁵⁷Enders W., Sandler T., and Parise Gerald F (1992) An econometric analysis of the impact of terrorism on tourism. *Kyklos* 45(4): 531–554

⁵⁸Enders W. and Sandler T. (2006) Distribution of transnational terrorism among countries by income classes and geography after 9/11. *International Studies Quarterly* 50(2): 367–393

⁵⁹ Ibid

counterterrorism disillusionment is the clear absence of viability of UN resolutions and traditions. A few specialists saw awesome guarantee in these treaties⁶⁰. Intervention vector auto regression studies showed that past UN resolutions and conventions had no measurable effect on particular outlawed modes of attack (e.g. bombings or blowing up planes).

That is, the pre-intercession mean of the specific banned assault mode did not contrast from the post-mediation mean after the bargain was sanctioned. This is not astounding on the grounds that these bargains have no requirement component and just a couple of resistant states can fix the additions from agreeable states. Time-arrangement concentrates likewise researched the counterterrorism viability of retaliatory attacks, for example, the US government office besieging of 1998 in Kenya. Sandler, Tschirhart and Cauley found an intertemporal substitution, where psychological militants moved assaults got ready for the future to the present to challenge the strike. As a result, fear based oppressor assaults went up taking after the strike and declined months after the fact as psychological militants needed to recharge spent assets. The general level of fear monger assaults did not change in the close term. Baermann and Conybeare found a similar example for Israeli retaliatory assaults on the Palestinian psychological oppressors.

⁶⁰Wilkinson P. (2006) *Terrorism and the Liberal State*, revised edn. London: Frank Cass

Utilizing Palestinian–Israeli information, gave an examination between the utilization of harsh discouragement and propitiatory activities against fear based oppressors. The last activities reward would-be fear based oppressors for abstaining from savagery. Parametric and nonparametric exact examinations demonstrated that unpredictable harsh activities brought about more psychological militant assaults, though aimless propitiatory activities brought about less fear monger assaults. These outcomes are in concurrence with past learns about constraint initiated kickback assaults. Hypothetical work demonstrated that legislatures have more achievement tending to household than transnational fear mongering, in light of the fact that a national government can disguise all externalities for potential local targets. Also, different countries can't free ride on its proactive endeavors to destroy a household psychological oppressor assemble.

At the point when the French annihilated Action Directe, no different nations inferred benefits on the grounds that the gathering did not assault the interests of different nations. For a typical transnational terrorist risk, sovereign governments generally overspend on protective measures to move assaults abroad, while these legislatures under spend on proactive (offensive) measures so as to free ride on the endeavors of other governments^{61,62}. Subsequently, guarded measures result in negative transnational

⁶¹Arce Daniel G, and Sandler Todd (2005) Counterterrorism: A game-theoretical analysis. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(2): 183–200

⁶² Sandler T. and Enders W. (2004) An economic perspective on transnational terrorism. *European Journal of Political Economy* 20(2): 301–316

externalities, while proactive measures prompt to positive transnational externalities. This overspending defense might be balanced for nations having noteworthy assets abroad. On the off chance that US country security shifts terrorist assaults to the Middle East or Africa where US natives are slaughtered, the motivator to move assaults abroad is reduced. Rather, the USA might be prompted to take activities to take out the specific terrorists' attackers in general. Proactive reactions against a terrorists attack may unleash kickback if terrorists' supporters view such activities as extreme, along these lines bringing about newcomers. At the point when this happens, the positive advantages passed on to different nations from the activities are diminished by the kickback costs, so that under spending is shortened.

CHAPTER THREE

THE EXISTING COUNTER STRATEGIES THAT HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED TO MITIGATE RADICALIZATION AND TERRORISM IN KENYA, UGANDA AND TANZANIA

3.0 Introduction

De-radicalization means the way toward surrendering radicalism, especially the utilization of viciousness as an instrument for accomplishing political objectives. This may happen at an individual or gathering level. Regularly, de-radicalization at an individual level involves three viewpoints: behavioral - the deserting of savagery, ideological - the de-legitimization of the utilization of viciousness, and authoritative - basic changes inside an association's initiative. While it is alluring that de-radicalization uses the three points of view, this does not generally take after and there is along these lines requirement for prioritization in de-radicalization programs. Ordinarily, the most crucial consideration is the threat posed by the use of violence. Consequently, disengagement from violence or recognition that violence is illegitimate or ineffective is a critical element for de-radicalization. This chapter looks at the existing counter strategies that have been employed to mitigate radicalization and terrorism in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.

3.1 Addressing Radicalism in Counter-Terrorism

Endeavors Terrorism as is contended is the outrageous stance of radicalism, it has various establishments and to comprehend these basic powers, security contemplates need to embraced more interdisciplinary points of view to the causes, operations and additionally counter terrorism systems. A perfect rearing ground for enlistment develops when different social, social, financial, political, and mental elements meet up. However, notwithstanding when such negative progression meets, diverse terrorist still have distinctive political targets. Notwithstanding such confusions and variety of reasons, all psychological militant gatherings share one regular goal; the eagerness to execute or hurt regular people for their cause. This is the reason terrorism is at last a noteworthy security concern. In this way, there is no motivation to denying that counter-fear based oppression is basically about securing the state and shielding regular folks from the threat and impacts of a psychological militant assault in the event that the arrangement is not prohibited. This requires most prominent cautiousness in security measures, insight gathering, law implementation, interagency coordination, and, when important, the utilization of drive. Fear monger organizes in a manner of speaking would not be dissuaded by anything not as much as complete efforts to establish safety.

The verbal confrontation about the main drivers of fear based oppression, be that as it may, is not about counterterrorism. Promoters of the main driver approach are occupied with battling the conditions that make fear mongering, not the terrorists themselves. This

is the reason the case for social and financial advancement in the Islamic world ought not to be made with regards to counterterrorism. The advancement plan is not about terrorists themselves, but instead those most defenseless to the objectives and messages of terrorism. It is definitely inside this more extensive setting that an approach that goes past the restricted bounds of fear based oppression and counter-terrorism is essential. Battling radicalism as opposed to 'terrorism gives a superior worldview and system for various reasons. To begin with, radicalism all the more precisely mirrors the political and ideological measurement of the danger. Regardless of how differing the causes, inspirations, and philosophies behind fear based oppression, all endeavors at planned savagery against regular people share the qualities of vicious radicalism. Also, while terrorism is a savage security challenge, radicalism is essentially a political danger against which non-coercive measures ought to be given a shot. There is nothing predetermined in the conceivable move from radicalism to fear based oppression.

All psychological militants, by definition, are radicals. However all radicals don't wind up as psychological militants. Truth be told, just a couple of radicals wander into fear based oppression. In the meantime, obviously most fear mongers begin their individual adventure towards fanatic brutality first by getting to be radicalized. Since radicalism is regularly an antecedent to terrorism, concentrating on radicalism adds up to averting terrorism at a prior stage, before it is past the point of no return for non-coercive measures. At last, radicalism, dissimilar to psychological oppression, has social

measurements. There are radicalized social orders where demonstrations of terrorism discover some sensitivity and level of support. It is difficult to discuss fear based oppression as a social wonder, notwithstanding. There are no social orders that are inclined to fear monger exercises as being proposed though erroneously. The relative fame of certain psychological militant systems in the Islamic world must be clarified inside the structure of such radicalized social orders where fanatic brutality finds a domain of authenticity and understood support. Such radicalized social orders are saturated by a profound feeling of aggregate disappointment, mortification, and hardship in respect to desires. This radicalized social district is effectively controlled and misused by psychological oppressors. This is the reason concentrating on the aggregate grievances behind radicalism is presumably the best method for tending to the underlying drivers of fear mongering.

This exertion at aversion can be thought about as a first line of barrier against fear based oppression. The objective is to decrease the social, financial, and political offer of terrorism by confining fear mongers and winning over potential enlisted people. Once the test is characterized thusly, the following and more troublesome stride is to recognize a powerful technique to battle radicalism. The financial and political setting where radicalism flourishes, especially among Muslims, shows a critical circumstance for counter-psychological warfare campaigners. This empowering environment can be changed most successfully by concentrating on relative hardship and human

advancement. Rearing justification for radicalism and psychological militant enlistment develop not really under states of wretched neediness and hardship, yet rather when negative social, financial, and political patterns unite. Truth be told, when broke down in a more extensive system of financial and political hardship, the societal support for terrorism and radicalism increases more noteworthy pertinence.

Rejecting the social and monetary reasons for radicalism because a few fear mongers have white collar class foundations as happens now and again is somewhat one-dimensional and misleading. Regardless, nearer examination has a tendency to affirm that feeble, fizzling, and fizzled states; ungoverned spaces; and common wars that make places of refuge for psychological warfare are all in immature parts of the world, not in the industrialized nations. Terrorism is not really brought on by financial issues, but rather there is positively a connection amongst hardship and radicalism. The all the more difficult question, especially in the Arab world, is relative hardship and the nonattendance of chances in respect to desires. The size of youth disappointment is aggravated by a demographic blast, developing desires, frail state limit, and decreasing open doors for upward versatility in many parts of the Muslim world. Globalization assist intensifies this circumstance in light of the fact that unsettled Muslim masses of both sexes are gotten in the growing pressure between religious convention and western innovation that is rising as a worldwide culture.

3.2 Kenya's Vulnerability because of its Domestic Issues

Kenya is the epicenter for East African monetary, political, and helpful exchange. It is a noteworthy player provincially and universally in light of the fact that, up to this point, it has been a standout amongst the most prosperous and politically stable nations in East Africa. To comprehend the present choice by the administration to choose national security over philanthropy, value that Kenya's real household issues, which make it seep through fear based oppressors' exercises and assaults henceforth more careful as an aftereffect of elevated defenselessness to outside assault. These issues run from feeble legitimate administration, prohibition, political narrow mindedness, underestimation, destitution, anxiety and youth swell combined with joblessness. These components give prepared and as of now miserable pool from which fear systems select adherents. The risk from Al-Shabaab to Kenya's political and regional honesty is in this manner not a danger that Kenya can disregard. The nearness of immense Somali outcast populace has likewise empowered the Al-Shabaab to utilize the displaced person camps as havens and offer a prepared save of would be psychological militants.

All these have contributed and demonstrated the potential danger to Kenya's security as a country state. The ungoverned space in Somalia has on its part empowered the enlistment and preparing of the fear mongers who discover their route unhindered into Kenya because of the porosity of the fringe. Kenya along these lines may have been compelled

to wage a plain attack into Somalia to handle the Al-Shabaab danger, in the wake of having measured the results including being reproved by the worldwide group and the colossal cost required as another hazard. The last may have driven Kenya to renegotiate its position and tolerating consideration in the AMISOM game plan. For the Kenyan government, it might have all the earmarks of being a win-win circumstance as it considers pressurizing for the sending back exiles to Somalia and giving them the way to take matters into their own particular hands, and in the meantime counter the dangers from Al-Shabaab.

3.3 Insufficient Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism Policies

The part of counter-fear based oppression expanded altogether in Kenya since 9/11. The mission of battling fear mongers was not another idea given that even before September 11, 2001, there were counter-psychological warfare units that existed in both the law authorization and knowledge fields. The principle issues, in any case, depended on absence of subsidizing and support from Western partners. Kenya was added to the U.S. Anti Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program promptly after the 9/11 occurrence to accomplice in the war against dread.

The addition to ATA however did not mean prompt noteworthy subsidizing which just began to be dispensed quite a while later. This was, by and by, an announcement made by

both America and Kenya to emphasize their joint battle against terrorism. Since 2002, The ATA Program has "prepared a few Kenyan Security authorities in the United States and numerous more in U.S. assigned preparing offices all through East Africa. The Kenyan Government has likewise made an Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU) and a Joint Terrorism Task Force, 142 the National Counter-Terrorism Center, and the National Security Advisory Committee as an organizing office. The immediate subsidizing for counter-psychological warfare, which ostensibly existed preceding 9/11, expanded around 15 times its past esteem in the prompt year taking after the assault. The issue still stays with expand dread systems and framework. Conveying the dread suspects to equity has been the greatest test to the foundation.

The insufficient psychological warfare laws in Kenya have brought about grave issues and even with enhanced enactment in the course of the most recent couple of years, achievement has been negligible. For instance, the meaning of fear based oppression is unclear and hence, capable, ready to be challenged by numerous adversaries. The Kenyan government characterizes terrorism as "hostile to state savage exercises attempted by non-state elements which are propelled by religious objectives". This definition disregards terrorism in light of political, ideological, and criminal methods of reasoning and accordingly, places an unreasonable focus on the minority religion in Kenya - Islam. Also, real enactment has been exceptionally hard to pass and put into practice, in this way the administration has been working without a thorough and enveloping hostile to

terrorism laws and gauges. The 2003 Suppression of Terrorism Bill did not make it into law after an open objection over unlawfulness, worldwide human rights infringement, and saw oppression Muslims. After two years, the Anti-Terrorism Bill of 2006 was again brought before Parliament. This bill contained large portions of indistinguishable issues from its ancestor and was, hence, not go into law. Certain violations conferred by psychological oppressors, (for example, murder) can be indicted in Kenyan courts; be that as it may, there has yet to exist an exhaustive hostile to terrorism law seeing that one exists in other Western majority rules systems.

The absence of this extensive enactment puts Kenyan law authorization authorities in positions where they perform beneath desires and with cases of human rights infringement against the Muslim people group. Giving over dread suspects to neighboring nations raised a great deal of inquiries. In one example after the 2010 bombings in Kampala, Uganda, the Government of Kenya exchanged thirteen Kenyan natives associated with participating in the assaults to Uganda. There are likewise a few Kenyan nationals presently kept at Camp Delta, Guantanamo Bay. Mohamed Abdulmalik One such subject, was casually associated with partaking in the 2002 Mombasa assaults. In the outcome of the Westgate assault in Nairobi, it is clear to security and strategy specialists that Kenya is still vigorously defenseless and depends on Western security assets in the battle against fear based oppression. This is not amazing for a creating majority rules system as yet managing basic levels of destitution and other social issues.

Still, the counter-terrorism units that were extended and supported for the sole reason for reacting to demonstrations of fear based oppression are evidently overpowered by failure to cooperate. To the degree that post-9/11 counterterrorism laws around the globe take into account shifting degrees of detainment with little oversight, one can everything except anticipate that Kenyan powers will utilize its energy aimlessly, but legitimately, to hunt down culprits, regularly to the detriment of honest regular citizens.

3.4 Human Development as a Way to Counter Radicalization

A few open deliberations that have rejected the social and financial reasons for radicalism in light of the fact that a few terrorists have relatively good foundations and are oversimplified and deluding. Be that as it may, the truth of the matter is that for sure a few, not most nor the majority of the fear mongers that are of the white collar class monetary level. To be sure as talked about before, terrorists do have financial hardship or something to that affect that makes them more helpless against enlistment. The monetary and social setting inside which radicalism flourishes is significantly critical. Societal support, exhibits the earth where most psychological militant and radical developments gets grounded. This is the reason prosperous and law based nations have obviously genuinely simple time managing psychological warfare contrasted with devastated and

politically shaky nations, where terrorism has a tendency to wind up a systemic issue. A similar contention can be made about common war. What is thought about the reasons for common wars can be exceptionally educational for our investigation of human improvement and radicalism.

In a brilliant World Bank think about on the main drivers of common wars, it is contended that "Nations with low, stagnant, and unequally disseminated per capita pay that have stayed reliant on essential items for their fares confront hazardously high dangers of delayed clash. Without financial improvement neither great political establishments, nor ethnic and religious homogeneity, nor high military spending give noteworthy barriers against expansive scale brutality." These variables ought to assistance to understand that unfavorable financial flow can deteriorate into political viciousness and sustain an endless loop of radicalism, fear mongering, and common war.

At any rate, such issues make a domain where radicalism and political savagery discover social acknowledgment. While radicalism and terrorism result from numerous interrelated causes, it has as of late ended up well known to contend that the underlying drivers of radicalism are irrelevant to financial hardship and an absence of training. The contention that destitution and an absence of training are inconsequential to political savagery and radicalism depends on a false notion that can be outlined in the accompanying way; Terrorists don't tend to originate from the poorest components of the

populace; rather, they are frequently generally knowledgeable or more normal regarding wage. Along these lines, singular neediness is not without anyone else's input the essential variable that arranges individuals to psychological warfare, and in this manner, lessening destitution or enhancing training won't truly diminish fear mongering. The most widely recognized protest comes as the well-known contention about the September 11 fear monger assaults; out of the 19 criminals, 15 of them originated from Saudi Arabia, saw as one of the wealthiest nations of the Middle East. On the off chance that destitution and an absence of training were to create psychological warfare, it is frequently contended; most fear mongers would originate from the poorest nations in the Arab world or from sub-Saharan Africa.

The contention that financial hardship is random to radicalism and fear based oppression is mistaken for various reasons. To begin with, the contention depends on an exceptionally thin and select concentrate on "first class" psychological militant pioneers. As psychological warfare master Judy Barsalou calls attention to; powerful fear based oppressor bunches depend on a division of work amongst youthful and uneducated 'troopers' and ideologically prepared and all around supported first class agents. In Pakistan, the previous are frequently culled from madrassas." It is subsequently essential to recognize that while psychological oppressor pioneers tend to originate from expert classes, the troopers are regularly poor and uneducated. One ought to likewise not be befuddled by the way that at the most elevated amount, the execution of fear based

oppressor movement requires capable authoritative aptitudes and advancement. The poorest and minimum instructed masses can be enlisted and radicalized by fear monger engineers yet; they would make incapable psychological militants in a mind boggling operation. Undoubtedly, the more intricate an operation is, the more noteworthy security dangers it involves, and the more probable the discoveries are to be tip top, the consequence of a cautious screening process.

Every one of these variables just fortify the significance of tending to the subject of relative hardship, disappointed achievers, and radicalism as a social milieu. The second indicate with respect the connection between financial hardship and radicalism is the way that fear monger associations as a rule look for falling flat or fizzled states, which are regularly poor from where to set up shop. This is the reason fizzled states in Asia and Africa -, for example, Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, and Sierra Leone effectively transform into fear monger sanctuaries and are regularly overwhelmed in an endless loop of common war, political savagery, and radicalism. As Susan Rice calls attention to, "these states give helpful operational bases and places of refuge for global fear based oppressors. Psychological oppressor associations exploit coming up short states' permeable fringes, of their feeble and non-existent law implementation and security administrations, and of their inadequate legal foundations to move men, weapons, and cash the world over."

Rosenau contends that fear based oppressor enrollment requires no less than three components, initial, an absence of state limit, especially in the regions of police, insight, and law implementation; second, a 'preparing conviction, for example, Salafist/jihadist radicalism; and third proper fomenter who can proliferate these thoughts and make a powerful psychological militant drive. Home developed dread systems are simply beginning to rise with expanding number of youth looking for preparing with Al-Shabaab. Kenya must keep on utilizing the law implementation and insight substances that are now set up, upheld by all around arranged coordination. These specific units and offices, while not working to their maximum capacity, are in any event halfway moderating fear monger dangers. They go about as both a hindrance and responsive constrain to fear based oppressors, preventing the arranging of assaults on Kenyan soil and responding to insight assembled over the span of examinations.

Notwithstanding the present limit of these substances, there must be precise upgrades made at the individual and departmental levels. Furthermore, Kenyan authorities need to investigate the genuine culprits of fear monger acts. While there is a mind-boggling conviction on both a legislative and societal level that Kenyan Muslims are activating assaults in substantial numbers against their own nation, history essentially does not bolster the declaration. It is basic to make it a need to incorporate Muslims in governmental issues, the economy, and regular daily existence. This incorporates, as has

been a critical methodology of the Global War on Terror, "winning the hearts and psyches of target populaces.

Kenya started "Operation Linda Nchi" (its first-historically speaking provincial military mission) with the objective of securing its northern fringe with Somalia, which was a response to long held conviction that a number of its issues of uncertainty are identified with the permeable outskirts with Somalia. In the event that this mission is fruitful, the legislature will have the capacity to enhance the organization of movement assets to the outskirts and essentially decrease the quantity of individuals traveling unnoticed amongst Kenya and Somalia. This lessening will make not just genuine interior security in any case, additionally a picture of Kenya as a politically stable nation with solid state limit. These suggestions have the impact to incredibly bring down the danger of future demonstrations of fear based oppression in Kenya and put the nation on a way toward political security and monetary success, tremendously craved by the general population of Kenya and the entire of the global group.

3.5 Definition, Dimensions and Dynamics of Counter Terrorism in Uganda

With a specific end goal to satisfy their commitments under human rights law to ensure the life and security of people under their purview, States have a privilege and an obligation to take powerful counter-fear based oppression measures, to counteract and dissuade future psychological militant assaults and to arraign those that are in charge of doing such acts. In the meantime, the countering of terrorism postures grave difficulties to the assurance and advancement of human rights.

Like most anti-terrorism legislations in Africa, Uganda's 2002 Anti-Terrorism Act (Ugandan Act) is largely a by-product of the post 9/11 global response to the threat of terrorism. The Ugandan Act consists of 33 sections, nine parts and three schedules. The provisions of the Ugandan Act can broadly be broken down into the following: Institutional and judicial jurisdiction over terrorism (Part II); definition and punishment of terrorism and terrorist acts (Part III); designation of terrorist organisations and proscription of financial assistance for terrorism (Part IV and V); terrorism investigations and interception of communication and surveillance (Part VI, VII and VIII); finally, miscellaneous provisions (Part IX). This chapter analyses the provisions of the Ugandan Act comparing it where appropriate with other anti-terrorism legislations in Africa particularly Tanzania's Prevention of Terrorism Act (Tanzanian Act) and Ghana's Anti-Terrorism Act (Ghanaian Act).⁶³ It also considers its conformity with international and

⁶³ The Ugandan Act came into force on 7 June 2002, the Tanzania Act on 15 June 2003 and the Ghana Act on 10 October 2008.

regional frameworks for countering terrorism and examines how its application impacts on human rights.

The Ugandan Act contains a rather long list of broad activities which would constitute terrorism when carried out for the purpose of 'influencing the Government or intimidating the public or a section of the public and for a political, religious, social or economic aim' and is done 'indiscriminately without due regard to the safety of others property.'⁶⁴ The listed activities, which cover both treaty offences and common law crimes include: manufacturing, handling or detonating a lethal device in a public place, involvement in murder, kidnapping, abduction or maiming of any person, provision or collection of funds for terrorist activities, hijacking and hostage taking, unlawful seizure of an aircraft or vessel, unlawful importation or distribution of firearms, serious interference with or disruption of an electronic system, production and development of a biological weapon, and unlawful possession of explosives with intent to effect a terrorist act.⁶⁵

The Ugandan Act also makes it a crime to run a 'terrorist organisation' or an organisation that promotes, publishes and disseminates news or materials that promote terrorism. It likewise accommodates a 'wide associate, endeavor, trick and extra obligation.' The Act additionally particularly records four associations as fear based oppressor associations in

⁶⁴ 3 Sec 7 of the Ugandan Ac

⁶⁵ Ibid, p84

the Third calendar to the Act. These associations are the Lord's Resistance Army, The Lord's Resistance Movement, Allied Democratic Forces and Al-Qaeda. The Ugandan Act facilitate criminalizes participation, support or help to a fear based oppressor association furthermore makes it an offense to contribute property, stores or some other asset to a psychological militant association.

The meaning of terrorism as gave in the Ugandan Act and the activities it criminalizes have been criticized as too broad, vague and far reaching. It obviously undermines a plethora of human rights provided under both the Constitution of Ugandan and other international instruments. The provisions on the Ugandan Act clamps down on freedom of expression and could be interpreted to translate an ordinary civil demonstration or protest (which obstructs traffic or closes a public service as they are prone to) into a terrorist act. For instance, in September 2009, terrorism charges were brought against over 29 persons who allegedly burnt down a police station during a riot in the city of Kampala. This riot was a public demonstration against the government's refusal to allow the traditional ruler of the area (the Kabaka) to visit a neighbouring town.⁶⁶

The punishments prescribed for terrorist offences under the Ugandan Act also cause grave concern for their human rights implications. Section 7 (1) of the Ugandan Act

⁶⁶ 'Riot suspects face terrorism charges' The New Vision, 22 September 2009 1

makes the death penalty mandatory for acts of terrorism which result in death and makes it an option for lesser forms of terrorism. Under the Ghanaian Act, harboring terrorists, providing lethal devices to terrorist groups, supporting terrorist activities, dealing with terrorist property, recruitment of members for terrorist groups are some of the offenses that attract not less than seven years and not more than 25 years imprisonment terms.⁶⁷

3.5.1 Terrorists on Trial

The Ugandan Act gives the executive a wide margin of discretion in deciding ‘who is suspected of terrorism and how to act on that suspicion.’⁶⁸ The Ugandan Act empowers the Minister of Internal Affairs (Minister) to amend, by instrument of the state and when the cabinet approves, the list of terrorist organizations specified in the second schedule of the Act.⁶⁹ The Minister shall within two weeks present the instrument to parliament which can annul the instrument within three weeks after receiving it but the annulment does not ‘affect the previous operation of the instrument.’⁷⁰ This provision creates ample space for abuse by the executive, which has a five-weeks window of unfettered powers to take any measures it deems fit against any organisation it disapproves of. Thus, after an

⁶⁷Sec 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the Ghanaian Act.

⁶⁸ Powell, CH ‘Terrorism and governance in South and Eastern Africa’ in VV Ramraj et all (eds) (2005) *Global Anti-Terrorism: Law and Policy*

⁶⁹Sec 10(2) of the Ugandan Act.

⁷⁰Sec 10(3) of the Ugandan Act.

organisation has been declared to be a terrorist organisation, Section 10(5) of the Ugandan Act empowers the Minister to dissolve, wind up and provide for the forfeiture of the organisation to the state.

In Tanzania, the Tanzanian Act additionally permits the Minister of Home Affairs to pronounce people or gatherings to be terrorists or fear based oppressor associations where there is 'sensible doubt' and from there on, to solidify their assets. Be that as it may, the prerequisite of 'sensible doubt' maybe, makes space for legal oversight yet this arrangement or some other criteria for figuring out who is pronounced a psychological oppressor is prominently lost from the Ugandan Act. The Ugandan Act grants police or open officers to utilize sensible constrain in releasing their capacities under the Act furthermore concurs them resistance from common procedures for anything benefited 'in confidence' in the practice of that capacity.

It however holds approved officers criminally subject for requesting or tolerating a fix, carelessly discharging data biased to examinations and taking part in torment, brutal and corrupting treatment, illicit detainment or purposefully harming property. Segments 29 and 33 of the Tanzanian Act allow common and criminal resistance to all cops who seize or harm property and cause damage or demise while releasing their capacities under the Act. The Ugandan Act likewise impacts the rights to property and security. Article 27(2) of the 1995 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Uganda (Ugandan Constitution) gives that "no individual might be subjected to obstruction with the protection of that

individual's home, correspondence, correspondence or other property." This arrangement is enormously disintegrated by the counter terrorism arrangements in the Ugandan Act.

The Minister is permitted by the Ugandan Act to assign a security officer as an 'approved officer' with the privilege to catch the interchanges and direct a reconnaissance of a man under the Act. The extent of this block attempt and observation reaches out to letters, postal bundles, phone calls, faxes, messages, meeting, developments, and access to individual financial balances. The Ugandan Act promote makes it a wrongdoing, culpable with two years detainment or an alternative of fine, for anybody to discourage an approved officer doing this capture attempt or observation operation. Moreover, the Third Schedule to the Ugandan Act gives that the court can arrange for an inquiry and seizure of property and materials sensibly accepted to be of significant esteem to any examination. Nonetheless, these requests can be differed on an application by the exploring officer or denied *suo moto* by the court or on the utilization of the individual abused by the request.

In any case, the Ugandan Act likewise enables a researching officer to issue a 'pursuit and seize' warrant without anyone else's input where he 'has sensible reason for trusting that the case is one of awesome crisis and that in light of a legitimate concern for the state, prompt activity is fundamental.' On the other hand, the police and the Minister must apply to the courts in Ghana for a request for seizure, detainment, administration,

relinquishment and devastation of fear based oppression property. All the more along these lines, under the Ghanaian Act, just senior cops can apply to the court for a request to lead a capture attempt operation. This strategy ensures more noteworthy regard for human rights dissimilar to the Uganda system, where the official can meddle with and undermine the rights to security for the sake of 'extraordinary crisis' and 'state intrigue'.

Another part of the Ugandan Act that raises concern is the unwinding of the tenets of proof for the state. For instance, Section 14(2) gives that in procedures against individual for helping with the maintenance or control of fear based oppression supports, the onus is on the individual to demonstrate that they didn't know or have sensible cause to speculate that their exercises identified with psychological warfare. Moreover, Section 22 of the Ugandan Act makes materials got from block attempt or observation acceptable in proof against the individual. The Tanzanian Act and the Ghanaian Act likewise have comparable arrangements. Segment 34(4) of the Ghanaian Act makes confirm got in comparable conditions allowable notwithstanding when it contains gossip, however requires the proof to be certified.

3.6 Conclusion

From the foregoing, it's can be said that though some steps have been taken nationally to criminalize, suppress, prevent and prosecute terrorist activities, these steps are not enough

in themselves to deal with the threat of terrorism. The practical implementation of most national anti-terrorism acts, like the respective governments Act, will only serve to foster underlying conditions and social imbalances that create a gulf between the state and the people, thereby causing them to resort to terror tactics. At worst, these national antiterrorism legislations will provide state governments a dark cloak behind which they can undermine and violate human rights with impunity.

CHAPTER FOUR

COMBINATION OF DRIVERS AND MEASURES ARE LIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVE IN MITIGATING RADICALIZATION AND TERRORISM IN KENYA, UGANDA AND TANZANIA

4.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the factors that have facilitated the growth of radicalization and terrorism in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania from 1998 to 2014. It also looks at the previous strategies employed by these governments to mitigate radicalization and terrorism in the region. Since the end of World War II, terrorism has quickened its development into a noteworthy part of contemporary conflict. Various variables assume a part in the radicalization procedure. In any case, most contribution in terrorism comes about because of slow presentation and socialization towards outrageous conduct. In this way the procedure is continuous and incorporates numerous events, encounters, world views and role players.

4.2 Factors That Have Facilitated the Growth of Radicalization and Terrorism

4.2.1 Political Factors

The history of East African nations has also contributed to the radicalization that today leads numerous Muslim adolescents to join fundamentalist gatherings. For example, in spite of the fact that Kenya being a secular state, it is basically a Christian nation as a result of the overwhelming Christian populace and the way that, as a previous British

colony, the structures of government depend on Christian standards. Subsequently, there is the recognition that Islam is 'outsider', in spite of the way that it came to Kenya before Christianity. The emergence of the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) demonstrates that various Muslims in Kenya, particularly in the waterfront locale, feel politically minimized to such an degree that they are requesting autonomy from Kenya⁷¹.

After independence, the Kenyan government employed the British model, while the seat of political power was situated in Nairobi, a transcendently Christian zone. Thus, while promote fortified by a geographical divide, Muslims in post-independence Kenya have been continued the fringes of the national plan. This brought on the Muslim people group to feel that it was not some portion of Kenya. Similarly, it brought on the government and non-Muslims to scrutinize the patriotism of Muslims, a recognition that was reinforced by the way that after independence the Kenyan-Somalis began upsetting for a different homeland with the alternative of joining their brethren in Somalia.

This sentiment not belonging to Kenya began when Kenya's independence was being arranged. Amid discussions, for example, the Lancaster House conferences, numerous ethnicities were enough spoken to, with the exception of the Kenyan-Somalis. Subsequently, when Kenya accomplished independence in 1963, the Somali people group

⁷¹Aronson, S.L. (2012). United States aid to Kenya: A study on regional security and counterterrorism assistance before and after 9/11. *African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies*. 5(1), 119-126

in Kenya felt that it had been forgotten and was not part of the new government⁷². This eventually prompted to the Shifta separatist war (1963–67). This war, started by the Somali ethnic group, was endeavors to have the Northern Frontier District (NFD) withdraw from Kenya to join a Greater Somalia. The Kenyan government named the contention after the Somali word for 'bandit', which is *shifta*.

Calls for a Greater Somalia joining all the Somali talking individuals in the Horn of Africa can be followed back to 26 June 1960, days after the British government allowed freedom to the previous British Somaliland as Somalia. This Greater Somalia included ranges in Djibouti (the previous French Somaliland), Ethiopia and Kenya. Therefore, notwithstanding contrarily affecting on soundness in Kenya, the wellspring of the Ogaden separatist development in Ethiopia can likewise be followed back to this period⁷³. While trying to discover an answer for the Shifta uprising, the Somali people group was permitted to vote in the main choice since independence on whether to remain some portion of Kenya or join Somalia. The result of the choice was clear the Somalis joined Somalia however the powers told the individuals who voted in favor of independence that they were welcome to leave Kenya for Somalia, as Kenya was not set up to surrender its

⁷²Daniela K. (2009) "Somalia: Militant Islamists Try to Draw Kenya into a Trap," InternationalCrisis Group, June

⁷³Prestholdt, J. (2011). Kenya, the United States, and counterterrorism. *Africa Today*, 57(4), 3-27

territory⁷⁴. This marked the start of the Shifta separatist war, amid which Somalis guaranteed part of the Kenyan drift from Kilifi to Lamu as a major aspect of Somalia and began a guerrilla war to recover it.

As a result of the Shifta War and the way that the Somali Kenyans from numerous points of view speak to the substance of Islam in Kenya, the whole Muslim community has been minimized. As a consequence of this, numerous Muslims in Kenya have grown up with some kind of fierceness against progressive Christian-ruled governments, in this way making it simple for youthful Muslims to join radical gatherings for the sake of protecting their confidence . So also in Tanzania, various Islamic associations, including the National Association of Koran Readers in Tanzania (Balukta) and the Civic United Front (CUF), developed in 1980 contrary to the administration. From that point forward, fundamentalist Muslims have attempted to uphold an Islamic way of life that brought about mobs in 1993–94 when proprietors of butcher shops offering pork were assaulted.

East African governments have sought after lawful activity against different Muslim pioneers as of late trying to disconnect speculated radicals. Shockingly, a number of these legal endeavors have bombed, promote fortifying a feeling that the government is unreasonably abusing Muslims. For example, when Sheik Ponda was striven for actuating riots in Tanzania in October 2012, inadequately confined charges and a frail examination drove just to a short, suspended sentence. Ponda was later accused again of actuating Muslims in Zanzibar and Morogoro to strike and uproar. However, following 2

⁷⁴ Ibid

years of prosecution he was absolved for absence of proof. That being said, prosecutors declared their plan to raise the twice-lost case to Tanzania's High Court. In Kenya, Sheik Mohammed Dor was accused of impelling after affirmations that he expected to finance a beach front separatist gathering. Prosecutors soon adjusted the charges, a judge then put off the trial, and in the long run the state dropped its case completely⁷⁵.

Conspicuous Muslim pioneers in Kenya and Tanzania have additionally been kept by security specialists without charge. Some have been bafflingly killed. Charges of police-supported demise squads that objective radical Muslim pioneers have been circling broadly for a considerable length of time. One occurrence credited to such a squad is the demise of Aboud Mohammed Rogo, who was slaughtered in a drive-by shooting in Mombasa in August 2011⁷⁶. In his vehicle were his dad and girl and in addition his significant other, who was harmed. Barely a year later and weeks after the Westgate shopping center assault in Nairobi, Rogo's successor Sheik Ibrahim Ismail and three others were executed in another drive-by shooting. Ismail's successor, Sheik AbubakarShariff, known as Makaburi, was killed in April 2014; only 2 days after the police's hostile to dread unit connected him to al Hijra assaults in Mombasa the earlier month.

⁷⁵Ibid

⁷⁶Afrobarometer (2015), Is Kenya's anti-terrorist crackdown exacerbating drivers of violent extremism? Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 37 2 July 2015 Stephen Buchanan-Clarke and RorisangLekalake

Muslims for Human Rights, a Kenyan advocacy group, has claimed that police and prosecutors may be turning to extrajudicial measures due to their inability to conduct proper investigations or prosecutions of suspected Islamic extremists⁷⁷. That narrative only strengthened over time. Human Rights Watch reported that, from 2010 to 2016, Kenyan security forces “forcibly disappeared” at least 34 people during counterterrorism operations in Nairobi and the northeast, and in at least 11 cases dead bodies were found of people who had recently been arrested by government authorities. One of Kenya’s top investigative journalists has claimed that the numbers were even higher, saying that he has uncovered 1,500 extrajudicial killings of citizens by the police since 2009⁷⁸.

Similar charges have unfolded in Tanzania. In October 2012, Sheikh FaridHadi Ahmed, the head of the Uamsho Islamic group, which advocates for an autonomous Zanzibar under Islamic law, went missing. Uamsho leaders called for the police to investigate. Supporters launched demonstrations, some deadly. Ahmed reappeared after 4 days and claimed that he had been abducted by police officers⁷⁹. He was promptly arrested by police and held without bail for months under a provision of the National Security Act. A judge ultimately dismissed several district-level charges against Ahmed since prosecutors

⁷⁷Amnesty International. (2014). Kenya: Somalis scapegoated in counter-terror crackdown. 27 May 2014. Available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2014/05/kenyasomalisscapegoated-counter-terror-crackdown/>

⁷⁸ Ibid

⁷⁹Devji, F. (2005). *Landscapes of Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity*. Ithaca: CornellUniversity

failed to furnish any evidence against him. However, charges of incitement and conspiratorial involvement in his own kidnapping remained in place.

Beyond the specifics of this or other cases, the lack of transparency and pattern of haphazard arrests, bail policies, and prosecutions have made many Muslims suspicious of political leaders and state institutions⁸⁰. Combined with a sense that they have been economically marginalized, many are increasingly disinclined to work through existing governance structures in order to right perceived wrongs. As a result, extremist and exclusivist Islamic narratives can seem more compelling

4.2.2 Socioeconomic Factors

Financial drivers of radicalization in East African nations incorporate genuine and saw minimization and prohibition from national assets, disappointed desires, and relative hardship. In spite of the prompt connections that are frequently made amongst neediness and radicalization, the issue of monetary conditions expands well past just destitution. At the end of the day, different markers encourage or give good conditions to radicalization and inevitable enlistment. Along these lines, financial troubles that incorporate, unequal access to assets and ability have added to East African country's defenselessness to fear based oppression. While the fanatic Islamist belief system grabbing hold in East Africa is

⁸⁰Ibrahim, M (2010). "The Al-Shabab Myth: Notoriety not Popularity." NCEIS Research Papers, 3(5), p. 9.

foreign made from somewhere else, worsening elements assume a part in how definitively such philosophy reverberates upon presentation⁸¹.

For instance, despite terrorists exhibiting varying levels of wealth, education, zealotry, and experience, socioeconomic marginalization fuels the credibility and dispersal of extremist narratives. In East Africa, perceptions of unequal socioeconomic status and some ill-advised state actions have nudged Muslims toward more conservative tendencies and enabled us versus them narratives to resonate. East African Muslims do have legitimate grievances⁸². Youth unemployment in Kenya's Muslim-dominated Coast and North Eastern provinces are 40–50 percent higher than the national average. Rates of primary and secondary school completion and attendance tend to be lower in Muslim counties, probably because there are fewer schools and teachers per student in the two coastal provinces than in other parts of Kenya.

Similar patterns can be seen in Tanzania and Uganda. The youth unemployment rate in the overwhelmingly Muslim island of Zanzibar has been about 17 percent in recent years, almost twice the national average of 9 percent. Also, the primarily Muslim coastal areas often have poorly defined property rights, hindering economic opportunities and paving the way for occasional land seizures by the government or large, non-local

⁸¹Ryan C,(2014) "Al-Shabaab and the Exploitation of East Africa's Religious Divide," IPI Global Observatory,

⁸² Ibid

businesses. Public opinion surveys depict a less divisive portrait at national levels. One survey of Kenyans showed that about half of Muslim respondents perceived their living conditions as the same or better than others⁸³. In comparison, about two-thirds of Christian respondents felt the same way. Still, this reflects Muslim sentiment that roughly matches the rest of Kenyan society a perspective that has persisted for a number of years according to earlier survey rounds in 2008 and 2011.

In Tanzania, 53 percent of Muslims surveyed perceived their living conditions as the same or better than other Tanzanians. Christians answered identically. Such results likely reflect the long history of harmonious interfaith relations in the region and the continuing resilience of such bonds when viewed at a nationwide level⁸⁴. Claims that Muslims are deliberately denied economic, educational and other opportunities relative to their non-Muslim compatriots have become common within the region's Muslim communities, moderate and extremist alike⁸⁵. For many Muslims, particularly youth, such inequality

⁸³Anneli B.(2014), "Radicalisation in Kenya: Recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council," ISS Paper 265, September 2014

⁸⁴Mwangi, O.G. (2012). "State Collapse, Al-Shabab, Islamism, and Legitimacy in East Africa.", op cit., pp.519

⁸⁵Liat S, Matthew S, and Danielle C, (2013) Mapping Perceptions of Violent Extremism: Pilot Study of Community Attitudes in Kenya and Somaliland (New York: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2013).

validates the divisive messages of fundamentalist Islamic centers, madrassas, and mosques.

4.2.3 Religious Factors

In the same way as other different Muslims in different parts of the world, youthful Kenyan, Tanzanian and Ugandan Muslims have been indoctrinated into the conviction that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the Palestinian-Israeli emergency are a piece of a more extensive worldwide battle against Islam. By advancing universal Muslim fellowship, the Hanbalischool began to contradict the Shafi'i school in Kenya, bringing about neighborhood Muslim young people beginning to respect the circumstances in Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine as issues influencing all Muslims over the world and, thusly, deserving of their inclusion⁸⁶. This belief system, which lectures universal Muslim fraternity, prompted to youngsters from different parts of East Africa being enlisted as mujahedeen to battle in Afghanistan against the Soviet occupation. These elements consolidate to give rich ground to Muslim young people in Kenya to wind up radicalized and join fanatic gatherings.

For as far back as two decades, East Africa has likewise seen the fast development and spread of the Wahhabi strain of Islam after the arrival of Muslim understudies who went for religious concentrates on in Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism was produced by the eighteenth century Muslim scholar Muhammad ibn Abdi al-Wahhabi (1703–92) from

⁸⁶Annie B and Mahdi A, (2006), Radicalization and Al-Shabaab Recruitment in Africa, Institute for Security Studies

Najd, Saudi Arabia. Al-Wahhab pushed cleansing Islam of what he thought to be polluting influences and advancements. Wahhabism cases to hold fast to the right comprehension of the general Islamic precept of Tawhid the Uniqueness and Unity of God shared by the greater part of Islamic organizations, yet exceptionally translated by al-Wahhabi. Al-Wahhabi was affected by the works of Ibn Taymiyya and addressed traditional translations of Islam, guaranteeing to depend on the Koran and the Hadith as his powers⁸⁷.

From that point forward, Salafi/Wahhabi evangelists have entered Muslim people group in East Africa, especially in urban towns and underestimated provincial regions. Neediness, sadness and absence of chances have given rich ground to the Salafi development to enter the lives of down and out Muslim adolescents by setting up deliberately focused on social and financial strengthening programs. These projects incorporate the arrangement of bursaries for penniless understudies to seek after their (Islamic) instruction and surrendering begin money to private companies⁸⁸. In doing as such, Salafists have progressively offered neighborhood administration

⁸⁷Annie B, (2014), Radicalization in Kenya, the Recruitment to Al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council, Institute for Security Studies

⁸⁸ Ibid

structures in ungoverned spaces, hence making critical presentation to and bolster for radical elucidations of Islamic lessons and irritating the recent tranquil Muslim people group that for quite a long time took after the non-radical Shafi'i school of thought. Thusly, through religious and other instructive foundations affected by radical beliefs, the East African Muslim people group is under risk from inside.

Besides, the Salafist development is to a great extent decentralized, yet brought together by a typical procedure that incorporates invading existing insurrections all through the Islamic world, seizing parochial objectives and radicalizing nearby populaces. This procedure has been embraced in Kenya by Saudi-prepared Wahhabi researchers to assume control mosques, madrassas and welfare social orders. It has prevailing with regards to rendering the Shafi', who for a considerable length of time overwhelmed Islamic undertakings in Kenya and the east shoreline of Africa, progressively inept and superfluous in the administration of the welfare of Muslim people group. So also grating amongst Muslims and Christians has expanded and separatist voices have become louder.

In Tanzania for example some required the change of Tanzania completely into a Muslim state. Others required the withdrawal of Zanzibar and its transformation into an Islamic state. New Muslim associations have been framed and political pressure progressively heightened, particularly straightforwardly before and amid races. For instance, in January and February 1998, there were savage conflicts in Dar es Salaam between

the radical Khidmat Al-Dawa Al-Islamiya and the decision Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party. The Uamsho (Awakening) association, already known as the Association

for Islamic Mobilization and Propagation, has required a submission on Zanzibar's exit from its union with terrain Tanzania. Uamsho has been picking up notoriety taking after the disappointment of supporters of Zanzibar's principle resistance party, CUF, with its choice to shape a legislature of national solidarity with the CCM⁸⁹. In turn, this influenced Kenya and Uganda. In both Kenya and Tanzania religion has in this manner converged with governmental issues to make an unpredictable circumstance subsequently a rearing ground for radicalization and fundamentalism.

The challenge of Islamic extremism has been a more local phenomenon. Perceptions of religious discrimination are higher in particular areas where divisive and exclusionary Islamic narratives have been present and circulating longer, such as Mombasa, Zanzibar, Tanga, and sections of Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. Accordingly, East African Muslims who subscribe to extremist interpretations of Islam remain a small (though vocal) minority. Yet the growth of this minority reflects and perpetuates a steady erosion of East African resilience in the face of the extremist Islamist ideology that has been coursing the region.

4.2.4 External Influences

A major contributing factor to East Africa's shift toward more militant interpretations of Islam is the influence of well-funded foreign Islamist groups. This includes so-called Wahhabi organizations whose sponsorship of educational and religious activities has

⁸⁹Issa Yussuf (2004), "Zanzibar Pushes to Curb Unemployment," *Tanzania Daily News*, November 24, 2014.

been fueled by the wealth of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other oil-rich Gulf states. Unlike East Africa's historical tradition of infusing religious customs with local traditions, Wahhabism is an extremely conservative interpretation of the Koran. It forbids most aspects of modern education, requires strict dress codes, abides by ancient traditions of social relations, and disregards many basic human rights, particularly for women⁹⁰. While Wahhabism does not on principle denounce other faiths, many Wahhabi preachers do not tolerate other viewpoints. Even other interpretations of Islam, such as Sufism, are considered heretical and offensive to Wahhabis⁹¹. In effect, the version of Islam that is being imported to East Africa is rooted within a particular Arab cultural identity. This is very different from the Islamic traditions that have evolved in other Muslim countries like Malaysia or Indonesia.

Foreign-sponsored East African Muslim groups have had a presence in East Africa since the mid-20th century, but have expanded significantly since the 1970s. One estimate pegged funding from Saudi Arabia at \$1 million per year on Islamic institutions in Zanzibar alone. The aims of the foreign funding are diffuse, going to social centers, madrassas, primary, secondary, and tertiary educational institutions, and to humanitarian and social programs. Many investments are large and multiyear. The Kuwait-based

⁹⁰Ibid

⁹¹Ben H (2016), "A Saudi Morals Enforcer Called for a More Liberal Islam. Then the Death Threats Began," *The New York Times*, July 10, 2016

Africa Muslims Agency is a prime example⁹². It has operations across the continent, including in Kenya, Malawi, Madagascar, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. One such operation involves a 33-year agreement signed in 1998 with the Zanzibar government to operate a university that has so far produced over 1,200 graduates⁹³.

Not all beneficiaries of these funds are strictly Wahhabi or conservative to begin with. Some schools, social centers, and humanitarian outreach programs mix Wahhabi materials and programs with secular activities to reach a broader audience. In Kenya, the Saudi government has for decades provided financial support and scholarships to the Kisauni College of Islamic Studies in Mombasa, where AbouRogo Mohammed studied⁹⁴. Likely dozens and potentially hundreds of madrassas and primary and secondary schools in Kenya have been built and underwritten in a similar manner. Some activities supported by these foreign Islamic groups are laudable. They have sponsored medical care and provided aid during disasters, similar to other faith-based and secular organizations. However, these humanitarian activities are not entirely benign, since many of these Islamic groups will integrate proselytization into all their activities or will require that findings abide by strict, conservative customs to access funds or benefits.

⁹²Africa Muslim Agency Sets Up College in Zanzibar,"Panafican News Agency, July 26, 1998

⁹³ Ibid

⁹⁴*Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation*, Africa Briefing No. 85 (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, January 2012), 5, 11.

Some groups do have links to militant Islamist organizations. The Saudi-funded Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, for example, which had a large presence in refugee camps and supported many madrassas in East Africa, including some linked to Ansaar Muslim Youth Center, was closed and expelled from Kenya and Tanzania for such links⁹⁵. The Revival of Islamic Heritage Society, a Kuwaiti nongovernmental organization, was likewise found to have been providing financial and material support to al Qaeda-linked organizations, including al Shabaab's predecessor, Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI). Notably, AIAI's Somali leaders were largely educated in the Middle East⁹⁶.

The 1998 bombings of the US government offices in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam was somewhat financed by cash diverted through philanthropies, for example, the Al-Haramain Foundation (AHF). The 11 September 2001 assaults in the US brought about Western nations to set out on colossal efforts to establish safety that included finding associated sources with financing of fear based oppressor exercises and the boycotting and closing down of universal Muslim altruistic associations' idea to be required in this procedure. These activities created additional socioeconomic urgency among Muslim

⁹⁵Patrick Mayoyo (2004), "Kenya Muslims Say No to US School Funds," *The East African*, February 23, 2004. "Treasury Announces Joint Action with Saudi Arabia Against Four Branches of Al-Haramain In The Fight Against Terrorist Financing," U.S. Department of the Treasury press release, January 22, 2004

⁹⁶Kuwaiti Charity Designated for Bankrolling al Qaida Network," U.S. Department of the Treasury press release, June 13, 2008

communities that depended on these associations. The 11 September 2001 assaults in the US brought about Western nations to set out on colossal efforts to establish safety that included finding associated sources with financing of psychological oppressor exercises and the boycotting and closing down of universal Muslim magnanimous association's idea to be required in this procedure⁹⁷. These activities brought on additional socioeconomic urgency among Muslim communities that depended on these associations.

The associations filled a vacuum made by the failure of the Kenyan state to give essential administrations, and by disarranged Shafi'i pioneers and direct Muslim researchers whom the Salafists blamed for blundering Muslim people group based activities and being "traded off" by their relationship with the Kenyan state. Through the dispersion of monetary help from Middle Eastern-backed philanthropy associations driven by people with a fanatic plan, conventional individuals get to be vital focuses of the drive to spread radicalism. By satisfying the essential needs of conventional individuals, these establishments and people in actuality purchase support and steadfastness.

Whether universities or bare-bones madrassas, educational institutions have obvious strategic value in shaping the beliefs of youth. Some of these schools do provide valuable instruction in math, sciences, and more. However, they also inculcate a rigid interpretation of Islam that is exclusionary and emphasizes dawa, or the further proselytization of this brand of Islam. The curriculum also sometimes follows a principle called Islamization of knowledge developed in an effort to reconcile fundamentalist

⁹⁷Babo A., (2004), Small village with a reputation for terrorism, *All Africa*, 8 March 2004

Islamic ethics into the disciplines of law, banking, and finance, among others. Over time, students absorb very definitive ideas of what is and what is not Islamic and who is and who is not a Muslim and are encouraged to actively advance these same views⁹⁸. This is a recipe for confrontation, even if the programs that initially promoted such views did not advocate violence.

This growing influence of extremist Islam in East Africa has mostly been limited to particular neighborhoods, cities, or regions. But those effects have been cumulative and compounding, leading an increasing number of groups in the region to adopt progressively more aggressive and confrontational missions. The growth of networks that may be sympathetic to violent extremism lays the groundwork for the local collaboration that has been seen or suspected in deadly al Shabaab attacks in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.

4.3 Strategies employed by these governments to mitigate radicalization and terrorism in the region

The role of counterterrorism efforts meaningfully increased in East Africa since 9/11. However, prior to September 11, 2001, there were undoubtedly counterterrorism units that existed in both the law enforcement and intelligence arenas. The National Security Intelligence Service was established previously known as the national Security Intelligence Service NSIS (which originated as a special Branch of the department of the

⁹⁸Joseph Kand Megan L (2007), "Islamic Universities Spread through Africa," *Chronicle of Higher Education* 52, no. 44, 33–37

national police in 1952 during the colonial rule) has been firmly endorsed with the mandate to conduct counter-intelligence (among other services) as part of counter-terrorism measures⁹⁹.

With respect to worldwide war on fear, East Africa was added to the U.S. Against Terrorism Help (ATA) Program. The expansion to ATA was generally a convention and no noteworthy financing was scattered until quite a long while later. The immediate financing for counterterrorism, which ostensibly existed before 9/11, expanded about 15 times its past esteem in the quick year taking after the assaults¹⁰⁰. In addition, the authorization of a \$100 million aid package titled the East African Counterterrorism Initiative by President Bush in 2003.

4.3.1 Counter-Intelligence

Recent in East Africa signals presence of a various insight drove counter-terrorism methodology (including counter-radicalization). Conclusion of radicalization and influence into dread cells and gatherings in East Africa by the National Intelligence Service (NIS) is characteristic of an effective multifaceted methodology. The Intelligence Service has likewise profiled many dread enrollment specialists working on the internet and a few have been captured. Human insight (HUMINT) operations focusing on dread

⁹⁹Prestholdt, J. (2011). Kenya, the United States, and counterterrorism. *Africa Today*, 57(4), 3-27

¹⁰⁰Mogire, E., & Agade, K. M. (2011). Counter-terrorism in Kenya. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 29(4), 473-491

cells worked by the Somali Islamist amass Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujahideen were scaled up since 2014 all through 2015.

4.3.2 Domestic Legislation

Failure to obtain enough prosecutorial evidence occasioned by the weak East Africa's judicial system has forced many (ATPU) Anti-terror police unit to resort to assassinations. Local legislation is by all account not the only determinant of states ability to capture and indict fear based oppressors, nor is it fundamentally intelligent of a state's capacity to avoid psychological oppressor exercises. Different variables, including the powerful execution of these laws, the state and quality of the judicial system, and regardless of whether states approach counterterrorism in a way that addresses its main drivers, are similarly essential¹⁰¹. Nonetheless, increasing interest among African governments to put laws in place to combat terrorism suggests that counterterrorism will be an area of increased activity in the years to come.

NIS is allowed to approve operations to carry out any of its functions, which can include getting anything or information, and install anything. This was among many other provision containing broad definitions¹⁰². The court allows up to 14 years in prison for being a terrorist or persuading anyone by any means to join terrorism. Another section

¹⁰¹ Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice (KPTI) Press 20-06-2014. 'Press Statement on the Mpeketoni and the Deteriorating state of Security in Kenya

¹⁰² Ibid

allows any NIS officer to detain any person whom the officer suspects of engaging in any act or thing or being in possession of anything which poses a threat to national security.

4.3.3 Muslim Religious Leadership

East African Muslims leaders have been on the fore front in counter terrorism measures within the Muslim community. For instance in Kenya, SUPKEM has conducted a survey in the coastal region to first get a better understanding of the motivational factors behind the radicalization, and together with the National Cohesion and Integration Commission are also advocating an amnesty regulation to deal with the return of the youth who joined the Al-Shabaab organization .The Council of Imams and council of elders from both Uganda and Tanzania that largely profess the Islamic faith have also been noted to swear to combine forces with the Kenyan government to root out any false ideologies by Muslim radicals that has led to loss of many innocent lives.

4.3.4 NGO's And the Civil Society

A strong civil society is vital to democracy, security, and prosperity. The UN Strategy particularly supports non-administrative associations and common society to connect with, as fitting, on the best way to upgrade endeavors to actualize the Strategy. A September 2008 General Assembly determination on the event of the main formal survey of system usage endeavors is relied upon to go marginally further and particularly empower them to draw in, as suitable, on the best way to improve endeavors to execute

the Strategy, incorporating through cooperation with part states and the UN System¹⁰³. The incorporation of the proviso as fitting, in any case, abandons it to states to decide the part (assuming any) to be given to common society associations, in this manner mirroring the scope of perspectives on common society associations (CSOs) among the UN enrollment.

These differing qualities was reflected amid the September 2008 transactions, where various nations protested the incorporation of the proposed dialect empowering more CSO engagement. CSOs can assume imperative parts in advancing execution of some of its discrete components¹⁰⁴. CSOs, these differing qualities was reflected amid the September 2008 transactions, where various nations protested the incorporation of the proposed dialect empowering more CSO engagement. CSOs can assume imperative parts in advancing execution of some of its discrete components¹⁰⁵. For any complete counterterrorism procedure to be powerful, respectful society should be a piece of its improvement and usage, as expansive based engagement between the state and CSOs can

¹⁰³Piombo, J. R. (2007). *Terrorism and US counter-terrorism programs in Africa: An overview*. Naval postgraduate school monterey ca center for contemporary conflict.

¹⁰⁴Rosenau, W. (2005). Al Qaida recruitment trends in Kenya and Tanzania. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 28(1), 1-10.

¹⁰⁵Ploch, L. (2010). *Countering terrorism in East Africa: the US response*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.

serve as a medium for tending to worries between the state and people in general with regards to particular counterterrorism activities.

Over the years a consensus has evolved where East African governments acknowledge that their efforts to CVE must be inclusive and that productive relationships must be built with all stakeholders and the communities, as evidenced by the White House Summit. It is only by collective effort that this battle can be won¹⁰⁶. East Africa has, however, chosen a path of alienating communities where radicalization occurs as well as estranging organizations' and individuals that are critical of counterproductive approaches employed in countering terrorism and violent extremism.

4.3.5 Improving Political Inclusion of Muslim Communities

Political leaders acknowledge that Muslims have some legitimate claims of marginalization, whether by design or neglect. This alone will send a powerful message to Muslim constituencies and may spark a sense of trust in collaboration and reform. East African leaders are also expanding engagement with Muslim communities, including those that may have experienced some radicalization but have not advocated violence¹⁰⁷. For instance when security improved in Kenya's northeast in the latter half of 2015 it was

¹⁰⁶Shinn, D. (2004). Fighting terrorism in East Africa and the Horn. *Foreign Service Journal*, 81(9), 40.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid

credited to the regional coordinator Mohamud Ali Saleh, a former ambassador to Saudi Arabia who had been named to the post after the Garissa University attack.

The subsequent reduction in terrorism observed in this region stemmed not from more robust enforcement, but rather as a result of Saleh's skills as an interlocutor between the government and local communities, which resulted in improved community policing and intelligence tip-offs¹⁰⁸.

¹⁰⁸Ryan C(2015), "Al-Shabaab and the Exploitation of Kenya's Religious Divide," IPI Global Observatory, December 2015

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE STUDY

5.0 Introduction

East Africa's growing youth populace is gradually depicting the area's security environment. Increase in population in the recent past has made East Africa one of the most youthful region. Extremist groups in the region have augmented their impact in various areas. Albeit brutal extremists in East Africa certain to differing belief systems, the procedures that they utilize to enroll youth into their groups are regularly comparable. Radical associations comprehend and go after a blend of political substances, financial elements, and individual attributes that render youth in East Africa helpless against extremist establishment.

A primary objective of the study is to advance comprehension of the drivers of youth radicalization, distinguish East African youth's versatilities and methods for dealing with stress to these drivers, and to produce approach recommendations went for relieving the drivers. Tending to radicalization challenges at both full scale and miniaturized scale levels requires that these areas, frequently new to each other, comprehend alternate's qualities and confinements. Upgrading cross-sectoral trust is particularly critical while drawing in youth at the edges of society. Provincial to-urban movement, the breaking down of customary family and group structures, and an absence of formal work have pushed substantial quantities of East African youth into the casual area, where they associate rarely or experiencing some miscommunication with state foundations. Youth

living in the casual area are attempting to meet their fundamental needs and discover their place in the public eye. These adolescent are helpless against VEO enrollment specialists, who offer them a solid feeling of reason, group, and even money related remuneration.

5.1 Conclusions of the Study

Despite the fact that numerous East African youth inhabit the edges of society, they are in any case immersed with data made accessible by new innovations. Mobile phones and, to a lesser degree, Internet get to, even in provincial territories, have upset the routes in which East African youth impart and remain educated. Data and correspondence innovation is molding youth culture and the strategies utilized by youngsters to expend music, film, and workmanship.

An important proviso when drawing nearer issues identified with youth radicalization is the treatment of religion. Albeit brutal fanatics may express and legitimize their motivation utilizing religious dialect, the study started with the suspicion that religion is not a characteristic wellspring of savagery, yet rather, a positive channel through which youth radicalization is frequently most adequately countered. This point was fortified by the consideration of religious viewpoints all through whole sessions and talk bunches, with numerous solid cases of common society and religious associations' endeavors to address dynamic youth enrollment into VEOs in East Africa.

Youth and Economic Growth

The pervasiveness of a substantial and element youth populace is forming East Africa's security scene. The locale's populace is as of now one of the most youthful on the planet and is anticipated to become more youthful over the coming decades. 70% of East Africa's populace and seventy-seven percent of Uganda's populace are less than thirty years old, and Africa's general populace is relied upon to twofold by 2030. Initial responses to East Africa's "childhood lump" are much of the time negative. East Africans consider how they will bolster, house, instruct, and get ready for future eras of youngsters. Look into on struggle and political brutality shows that youthful populaces are more inclined to strife than more seasoned ones, and that adolescent will probably join radical associations than grown-ups. The study perceived the security challenges that a youthful populace presents, while likewise highlighting the open doors that it might bring.

The potential for East Africa's childhood to serve as drivers of financial development are evident when contrasting its demographic patterns with other world locales, for example, East Asia. In South Korea, for instance, the nation's childhood lump was changed over into a national resource through a mix of instructive projects and youth-arranged administrations that readied youngsters for occupations in a current and all-inclusive associated economy. Nonetheless, most East African nations have not led adequate government arranging, pulled in sufficient measures of private part speculation, or encouraged the social mindfulness important to change over these demographic patterns

into national points of interest, or even to appropriately oblige their present and future youthful subjects.

Characteristics of Contemporary East African Youth

East Africa's future youth , or "cheetah era," as it is progressively distinguished, is set apart by various one of a kind qualities. Discoveries noticed that East African youth are progressively associated with each other and the worldwide commercial center of thoughts by means of data and correspondence innovation. Indeed, even extremely poor youth in East Africa will give up expansive bits of their pay to buy mobile phones. Likewise, enhancements in Internet infiltration have expanded the quantity of East African youth getting to data on the web, though at moderately low levels when contrasted with different parts of the world. East African youth are utilizing online networking stages, for example, Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, and others to share thoughts regarding a scope of themes with each other and their associates in the diaspora. Albeit web-based social networking use is on the ascent, messaging and FM radio communicates remain the prevalent methods of youth correspondence in East Africa.

The study likewise noticed that East African youth are more urban than past eras. Youth in the area are relocating to urban communities looking for instructive open doors, work, and the present day courtesies that go with urban life. Albeit East Africa's quickly developing urban areas give openings, they are likewise puts where youth encounter hardships associated with occupation deficiencies, high expenses of living, and an absence of conventional family and social structures. The challenges of urban life are a

wellspring of youth disappointment and may render certain youngsters helpless against radical impacts.

The study discoveries proposed that counter-radicalization programs endeavor uncommon endeavors to contact youngsters attempting to make due in vast urban communities. By the by it underscored the significance of separating between youth in the area. Some East African youth live in rustic zones, hold fast to more customary ways of life, and are far expelled from the exercises of the state. The district's childhood lump is both a urban and provincial phenomenon.

East African youth likewise change as per religious inclinations, honing Christianity, Islam, other world religions, or no religion by any stretch of the imagination. The discoveries concurred that religious encounters are an essential element while tending to youth radicalization, both as potential drivers of and remedies to savage fanaticism. In that capacity, the study prescribed that the administration incorporate religious pioneers and tutors in their counter-radicalization arranging and program usage.

The nation settings in which East African youth are framed additionally affect their defenselessness to radicalization, particularly the commonness of contention. Certain East African youth have encountered between state war, common war, ethnic clash, or post-race viciousness, while others have delighted in relative peace. Likewise, the locale's childhood live under various sorts of governments and have divergent encounters with their nations' open foundations. The assorted connections that states keep up with their childhood populaces shape how youngsters see political contribution and their trust in or

disillusionment with political pioneers. Discoveries noticed that trust in political foundations disheartens youth radicalization, while distrust prompts to sentiments of dissatisfaction and expanded VEO weakness.

5.1.1 Drivers of Youth Radicalization in East Africa

VEOs can't manage themselves without youthful enlisted people. Radical gatherings are insightful sees of the difficulties confronting youngsters in East Africa, and they tailor their enrollment systems to endeavor youth vulnerabilities. Discoveries traded data about the trusts, longings, and necessities of youth in their nations with the objective of better seeing how to counter the interest of VEOs. The study recognized that individual components, financial conditions, and political substances go into a youngster's analytics when choosing to join or deny enrollment to radical associations.

Individual Factors that Drive Youth Radicalization

Discoveries' encounters had a tendency to affirm the finding of exact studies that show that radicalization is on a very basic level an individual procedure, and countering it requires embracing systems with an individual touch. In view of this, the study concurred that common society associations that connect with guardians, educators, mentors, guides, and religious pioneers, and also singular youngsters, are basic to counter-radicalization endeavors.

Common society associations that work at the grassroots level are fit for recognizing radicalization in its beginning stages and interceding before it metastasizes into fierce fanatic acts. Discoveries additionally perceived that East African youth, similar to youngsters in other world districts, look for a feeling of reason and significance in their lives. Young fellows much of the time pass on an aching for enterprise, magnificence, and brave or notorious status, and hunt down outlets that empower them to break from tradition. VEOs know about youngsters' journey for significance and build perspectives that fulfill youth wishes for self-completion and satisfaction. With a specific end goal to balance radical perspectives, discoveries noticed that adolescent must be presented to a plenty of counter-stories and positive life dreams. The absolute most imperative interlocutors for imparting counter-stories are religious pioneers, guides, mentors, instructors, and other common society pioneers.

Measuring the counter-radicalization effect of a solitary common society delegate is in fact testing. In any case, discoveries concurred that when taken as a total, common society associations shape a first line of protection against VEOs. The test for governments is to make space for and, when conceivable, to empower the bunch associations that happen between common society gatherings and East African youth. The true objective is not to make a solitary counter-radicalization program as such, but instead, a common society arrange that draws in youngsters in the innumerable routes important to turn away savage fanatic thoughts from flourishing.

In view of this perception, discoveries prescribed that East African governments receive administrative structures to enable common society associations to complete youth situated exercises and to advocate for the benefit of youth causes. At present, lawful confinements put on nongovernmental associations (NGOs) and common society aggregates in a few nations might be repressing them from understanding their maximum capacity as counter radicalization mediators.

Socioeconomic Drivers of Youth Radicalization

Notwithstanding exploiting youngsters' requirement for reason and significance, VEOs exploit financial components that render East African youth defenseless against radicalization. Youth in East Africa battle to get to business, training, lodging, wellbeing administrations, and different necessities. In spite of the fact that various East African nations have encountered great financial development over the previous decade—a modest bunch of nations spoke to at the study posted GDP development rates of seven percent and higher this previous year youngsters are as yet thinking that its hard to pick up work and progress as indicated by different development pointers.

Specifically, discoveries noticed that accomplishing socially perceived adulthood in East Africa is troublesome for poor and non-tip top youth, particularly the young fellows among them. The pervasiveness of contention, high rates of unemployment, absence of training, and particularly the powerlessness to build up a home and wed have all added to East Africans remaining adolescents any longer than their partners somewhere else on the planet. For example, while the United Nations and most worldwide for a characterize an

adolescent as a man between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four, the East African Community characterizes a young as a man between the ages of fifteen and thirty-five. Amid these many years of being ordered as an adolescent, youngsters encounter long "in the middle of" periods, in which they sporadically seek after studies, work low maintenance, inhabit home with guardians, or move to urban focuses looking for financial open door.

Youngsters got in this "in between" stage may get to be baffled with their powerlessness to accomplish socially perceived adulthood and look for approval by joining rough radical gatherings, which give them a grown-up like status through obligation, reason, and regularly monetary remuneration. Discoveries stressed the need to reshape social understandings of adulthood in ways that reflect provincial substances in regards to marriage, lodging, employment among others.

Aggravating the issue of deferred adulthood is the regular observation among more seasoned eras that youngsters ought to "sit tight" for employments and impact. Discoveries perceived, for instance, that most government employments are held by more seasoned specialists, who are probably not going to leave their posts at any point in the near future. The study prescribed that open foundations change annuity frameworks and offer motivating forces for more seasoned functionaries to resign with the objective of making space for youthful government workers to enter open administration. Expanding the quantity of youthful government employees would convey new viewpoints to the positions of governments, which are urgently required as East Africa's childhood

populace now speaks to most of the citizenry in these nations. Discoveries likewise suggested that private part organizations embrace measures to contract youthful workers and incorporate them into their corporate administration structures, which would not just convey new aptitudes and points of view to African organizations, additionally develop the up and coming era of African business pioneers.

Political Drivers of Youth Radicalization

Political substances in various East African nations were additionally referred to as youth radicalization influencers. Findings established that youth are pushed by a longing to battle unfairness, exclusion, and humiliation. At the point when youth watch any of these antagonistic practices in broad daylight authorities, particularly defilement among security division faculty, they get to be baffled with open foundations and search for answers for issues outside of their nations' political procedures.

Unequal treatment was likewise highlighted as a factor of youth radicalisation. Exemption among politically associated elites causes youngsters to lose trust in their lawful organizations, particularly when youth get brutal disciplines for apparently little offenses, for example, working an unregistered business or living in stopgap homes without formal titles.

Discoveries likewise noticed the issue of government officials activating youth before races keeping in mind the end goal to communicate their political stages and pick up the adolescent vote, much of the time speaking with youngsters utilizing PDA innovation and online stages. Legislators usually feed youth disappointments and guarantee clearing

changes went for enhancing their lives. In the wake of winning their decisions, they may disregard or relinquish youth supporters, leaving a semi-composed and politically charged youth accomplice sit. Government officials who lose their races may comparatively abuse their childhood supporters by affecting them to brutal challenges or outfitted resistance. In both cases, political control drives youngsters to feel baffled with lawmakers and appointive legislative issues. This inclination may add to the conclusion that answers for youth issues must be accomplished outside of standard legislative issues, maybe through brutal fanaticism.

A crisis of national character was likewise referred to as a potential reason for radicalization in East Africa. At the point when youngsters are not immovably established it could be said of country, they will probably be influenced by remote fanatics who summon transnational and radical standards. Likewise, homegrown radicalization will probably surface along ethnic, group, or collective lines when a solid feeling of country is truant from the national cognizance.

The findings revealed that administrations cultivate sound patriotism through municipal training, national games groups, social occasions, and different exercises that fortify national solidarity. In spite of the fact that sanctioning government changes is testing, tending to the politically established drivers of radicalization may really be more clear than handling radicalization's exclusively based and financial causes. Discoveries recommended that improving the part of youth in political basic leadership is an imperative stride in tending to the political drivers of radicalization. They prescribed that

administrations select youngsters to serve in authority positions and arrange gatherings that furnish youth with chances to express their worries to government authorities.

Study findings recognized that East Africa encounters some social idleness when endeavoring to incorporate youngsters in government, yet that testing conventional perspectives about youth serving in places of power is important to address squeezing challenges confronting the locale. Findings likewise suggested that more government assets be given to youth-related projects. This incorporates properly subsidizing youth services and guaranteeing that they have clear orders and adequate impact versus other government departments

5.1.2 Combination of Drivers and Measures Likely to Mitigate Radicalization and Terrorism in East Africa, Uganda And Tanzania

Engaging East Africa's Informal Sector

A huge bit of East Africa's youth lives and directs business in the casual division. These young are described by their occasional connections with state organizations, unregulated business exercises, absence of enlisted property, and cooperation in informal security systems. Despite the fact that they are a vast and various gathering, the normal hardships that they confront add another layer of weakness to radicalization and VEO enrollment.

Findings depicted youth in the casual segment as being "on the edge," "at the edges," "dropped-out," or "far from the standard." East Africa's casual youth might be physically inaccessible from state organizations, for example, youth living in remote regions where

the state has little limit. Then again, youth in the casual division might be routinely presented to state organizations, for example, urban youth who live in closeness to cops, gendarmes, metropolitan powers, and so on., however associate with them in shallow courses or experiencing some miscommunication.

Youth in the Informal Economy

Youth living in the casual part participate in bunch monetary exercises (offering merchandise and enterprises in casual commercial centers, acting as day workers, cleaning homes, cooking suppers, serving as doormen, directing farming, making fabrics, offering hand crafted CDs and DVDs, and taking part in innumerable other wage creating exercises), however they don't enroll their organizations and pay few if any assessments.

Discoveries communicated blended suppositions about youth working in the casual economy. From one perspective, casual economies are liable to culpability, yield almost no assessment income, and neglect to consume on the economies of scale accomplished by formal organizations and companies. Different East African nations have found a way to relieve the negative repercussions of the casual economy by illegalizing casual business exercises or moving them far from focal business areas. In a few occasions, these measures have prompted to vicious conflicts between police powers and casual dealers, or "hawkers," and diminished trust amongst governments and youth.

Then again, findings perceived that the casual economy is a wellspring of youth business enterprise and creativity. Youngsters working in the casual economy are developing new items and finding imaginative approaches to create benefits in intense business situations. Findings noticed their social orders' changing impression of Jua Kali laborers, the Kiswahili expression for the individuals who work casual organizations under the hot sun, and the positive effect of their administrations. Without their casual monetary exercises, youngsters would likely experience higher rates of unemployment, inaction, and sentiments of franticness, all of which increment youth weakness to radicalization.

Findings prescribed that legislatures strike a harmony between checking the negative externalities of the casual economy and joining its advantages. They proposed that legislatures, particularly youth services, make projects to advance youth enterprise and business improvement. A modest bunch of East African governments and NGOs have as of now made these sorts of projects, for example, yearly rivalries that honor new company cash-flow to youthful business visionaries. Likewise, findings prescribed that financial foundations investigate more choices for stretching out credit to youthful business people in the casual segment. They recommended that their nation's national banks finance or guarantee credits that business banks and microfinance organizations reach out to youthful businessmen.

Findings additionally underscored the significance of instruction to finding reasonable occupations, and prescribed that legislatures put all the more intensely in both college and

professional preparing programs that relate to market needs. They to a great extent concurred that professional preparing ought to be offered similarly to men and ladies, regardless of the possibility that this repudiates social standards about ladies participating in specific occupations.

Findings likewise proposed that administrations and common society associations work to destigmatize callings that youngsters consider undesirable, including conventional work. They noticed that young in some East African nations at times falter to work in development, sanitation, cultivating, angling, or different enterprises that depend on difficult work, and that laborers from India and China are utilized in these segments. East African youth need these occupations, they as well as ought to request that their administrations require organizations from China, India, and somewhere else to source work locally. This would make employments for specialists in East Africa and help them to fabricate their expert aptitudes.

Eventually, a more hearty economy furnishes youth with expanded open doors and disintegrates VEOs' capacity pull in them with financial motivating forces. Maybe more imperatively, holding work that gives a reasonable employment ingrains a feeling of reason and importance in the lives of youngsters, strengthening their imperviousness to radicalization.

Interpreting Youth Culture

Listening to and watching youth culture gives helpful insights about how youngsters are reacting to contemporary social and political occasions, including the exercises of radical gatherings. Youth in the casual part are making music, film, verse, theater, and radio projects, some of the time alluded to as "ghetto radio." A lot of their social yield is imparted in Kiswahili, English, or French, making it available to the larger part of youngsters in the locale. The transnational way of East African youth culture empowers youngsters to impart quickly and intensely with each other.

Findings communicated a few reservations about the shape and substance of youth culture. East African hip-bounce, rap, and other advanced types of youth expression once in a while appear to be irregular and wrong to more seasoned eras. A few findings were worried that adolescent culture is excessively engrossed with cash, power, and vanity. Contemplate findings urged their partners to keep a receptive outlook and perceive that adolescent culture is a true articulation of youngsters' emotions. Regardless of the possibility that young culture appears to be scary or ugly, it by and by transfers critical data that more established eras can use to comprehend youth, particularly when endeavoring to disentangle radicalization patterns.

Data and interchanges innovation is supporting the dispersal of East African youth culture. Phones, instant messages, and the Internet are furnishing youngsters with access to music, recordings, and data about prevalent East African youth craftsmen. The district's childhood are additionally perusing web journals, Facebook passages, and Twitter messages composed by their companions about current occasions and legislative issues.

Findings communicated a few reservations about online substance and youngsters' utilization of web-based social networking. They watched that data presented on online discussions is once in a while mistaken, negative, and proclaimed by radical gatherings. One system that could be utilized to counter negative or false data is for governments to disperse positive and truly precise messages. Government advertising officers can advance these sorts of messages by partaking in web-based social networking and presenting data on online discussions. These endeavors show an administration's dedication to straightforwardness and readiness to connect with youngsters utilizing their favored strategies for correspondence. In any case, findings communicated blended perspectives about the part of government in checking and possibly restricting youngsters' entrance to online data.

More youthful findings tended to feel firmly that the Internet ought to remain an open space where thoughts are traded unreservedly. Different findings, especially those

speaking to security division organizations, communicated incredulity about the positive capability of the Internet in light of the locale's memorable and contemporary weakness to fierce radicalism, and stayed open to the likelihood of controlling on the web content. In spite of the fact that findings' perspectives about the Internet and online networking shifted, they concurred that the issue would increment in significance as youth Internet utilize increments over the district.

Fostering Multi-Sectoral Responses To Youth Radicalization

The political, financial, and singular variables that drive rough fanaticism in East

Africa are differed, making it troublesome for counter-radicalization experts to touch base at a solitary, all around appropriate way to deal with avoiding youth radicalization. Security division organizations are critical performing artists in counter-radicalization endeavors, yet can't without any help address the horde upstream variables that cause youngsters to grasp savage fanaticism. Rather, an "all-hands-on-deck" approach is required that consolidates on-screen characters from crosswise over divisions, including security foundations, non military personnel government services, and common society associations. Building trust crosswise over segments is testing yet basic to making a counter-radicalization organize that is far reaching and viable.

Findings initially recognized the requirement for governments to advance interagency collaboration when drawing nearer youth radicalization issues. Youth services ought to arrange their exercises with security-related government foundations, for example, the police, gendarmerie, armed force, and insight organizations. Security organizations should in like manner stay in contact with non-protection related offices, for example, training, wellbeing, and work services. Cultivating interagency participation requires political pioneers to assemble political will inside their legislatures to address youth radicalization issues. Findings perceived this is trying in light of contending needs and restricted budgetary assets, and proposed that outside help may demonstrate accommodating to meeting their financial requirements for youth programs. Open foundations should likewise contact and work with common society banches.

Findings proposed that legislatures venture out advancing cross-sectoral cooperation by gathering exchanges between open foundations and NGOs, religious gatherings, organizations, group affiliations, recreational clubs, sports groups, and other common society banches. Government authorities conceded that they are every so often suspicious of the intentions and objectives of common society associations. So also, thoughtful society associations communicated wavering about collaborating with government authorities, expecting that their lack of bias and autonomy may be traded off ought to neighborhood groups see their associations as augmentations of the state. As they exchanged words about youth radicalization, findings concurred that legislatures and common society associations ought to pick up gratefulness for alternate's needs, limitations, and qualities.

Findings additionally noticed that since youth radicalization is a transnational test, cross-sectoral cooperation needs to incorporate on-screen characters from different nations and territorial associations. Enlisting one of East Africa's Regional Economic Communities (RECs) or the African Union (AU) to dispatch a repeating local youth gathering was proposed. Such a discussion would expand on past youth summits sorted out by East Africa's RECs and the AU, and would gather youthful researchers, rising political gathering pioneers, VIPs, competitors, DJs, business visionaries, and other youth delegates to impart the troubles confronted by youngsters and propose answers for their difficulties.

Eventually, contemplate findings from crosswise over areas, including security foundations, government services, and common society bunches, perceived that the drivers of youth radicalization are to a great degree assorted and essentially difficult to address by any single division alone. Notwithstanding their contrasting hierarchical societies, they concurred that cross sectoral collaboration is vital so as to effectively counter youth radicalization and profit by the gainful capability of East Africa's youngsters.

Somalia and Youth Radicalization

Throughout the study, radicalization challenges exuding from Somalia were of exceptional worry to findings and were raised every now and again. Somalia's extended clash and its effect on neighboring nations have made vulnerabilities that the AL Qaeda connected gathering, al-Shabaab, is misusing among the area's childhood.

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and neighboring nations' military crusades in Somalia are pressing al-Shabaab and cutting it off from its inside assets. Al-Shabaab's combat zone misfortunes may have the impact of expanding its endeavors to recharge its positions with enlisted people and assets drawn from neighboring nations.

Findings noticed that al-Shabaab's future relies on upon its capacity to discover new individuals, and that the gathering is looking for youthful enlists in numerous spots, including among East Africa's Somali diaspora groups and non-Somali youth. It has put scouts along East Africa's drift and in urban focuses, where youngsters experience the political, financial, and singular components that findings recognized as drivers of radicalization. Al-Shabaab's religious and political philosophy pulls in youngsters in these territories by furnishing them with a solid feeling of character, reason, and group.

What's more, the gathering offers financial motivators that meet youngsters' prompt needs, while promising extra financial prizes for later administration.

As al-Shabaab searches for newcomers in neighboring nations, findings highlighted the potential for Somali diaspora groups to help with countering the gathering's allure.

East African Somali populaces, particularly those in neighborhoods of substantial urban communities like Addis Ababa, Dar es Salaam, Kampala, Mombasa, and Nairobi, have

encountered the negative results of al-Shabaab's exercises and frequently unequivocally restrict its destinations.

Specifically, Somali youth in the diaspora are creating music, workmanship, and verse that urge their companions to reject al-Shabaab's belief system and to seek after tranquil answers for their nation's issues. These social expressions serve as effective counter-accounts that common society associations and governments ought to support when conceivable.

Findings by and by underscored the battles that diaspora Somalis confront when attempting to incorporate into their host social orders. Findings recognized that dread of fear monger assaults, news of theft, and the weight of expansive outcast camps have diminished sensitivity for Somalis and brought about separation. Al-Shabaab selection representatives go after the sentiments of otherness and minimization made by these conditions to enroll Somali diaspora youth to their cause. Findings highlighted the requirement for common society associations to connect with Somali diaspora youth and for their legislatures to embrace comprehensive strategies that lessening the probability of diaspora radicalization.

Notwithstanding helping with counter-radicalization endeavors in their host nations, Somalis in the diaspora may likewise assume positive parts in political improvements

inside Somalia. Diaspora Somalis take after current occasions in Somalia nearly and stay in contact with family and companions there by means of versatile innovation and settlements. Findings prescribed that East African governments and common society associations, alongside their worldwide accomplices, bolster exercises that enable Somali diaspora groups to usefully connect with their companions in Somalia.

Findings recognized that the security challenges originating from Somalia require both short-and long haul systems to advance dependability and assemble state limit. They communicated their solidarity with their Somali partners and made plans to cooperate to battle al-Shabaab's misuse of the area's youth.

5.2 Recommendations and the Way Forward

The study exhibited the degree to which radicalization in East Africa is a multifaceted and complex test and proposed various suggestions went for reinforcing the limit of governments and common society associations to counter radicalization among the locale's childhood.

As East Africa's childhood populace develops in size and political significance, as of now speaking to most of the populace in the district, findings highlighted the need to make vital interests in youth-arranged administrations, chief among them training. Instruction benefits that furnish youngsters with the abilities expected to enter an inexorably current

and comprehensively associated commercial center are imperative. In a comparable vein, professional preparing is imperative to furnishing the area's childhood with employable aptitudes, and it ought to be stretched out similarly to young fellows and ladies. Instruction presents youngsters with an assortment of life choices and is a basic first line of safeguard against a significant number of the financial components that may prompt to youth radicalization.

Another strategy for deliberately putting resources into youngsters is to support their business exercises. Findings suggested that administrations augment yearly rivalries that honor new company funding to youthful business visionaries. The concentrate likewise proposed that administrations work with financial foundations to build the stream of money to youthful agents, maybe by sponsoring or endorsing advances to youthful business visionaries.

Findings recognized that stretching out financial administrations to East African youth is testing in light of the fact that a significant number of them live and do organizations in the casual division. Despite the fact that organizations in the casual part don't produce charge income and here and there draw in culpability, they are colossal wellsprings of youth inventiveness and business enterprise.

At the point when legitimately tackled, casual youth specialists may serve as more grounded drivers of work and monetary development. States ought to discover innovative approaches to advance these sorts of organizations and continuously join them into the formal economy.

Findings likewise suggested that East African governments appropriately put resources into youth arranged offices, particularly youth services. They highlighted the need to incorporate youth points of view into government by contracting youthful government workers and making repeating youth discussions to listen to youngsters' worries.

They likewise recognized that while governments have critical parts to play in offering the right mix of open administrations to dishearten youngsters from joining radical gatherings, common society associations are similarly if not more essential. Common society gatherings, for example, religious associations, group affiliations, recreational clubs, sports groups, and others, serve as an essential line of resistance against radical belief systems. They are equipped for cooperating with individual youngsters in ways that open foundations can't. Thus, findings proposed that legislatures and outer givers bolster coaching programs completed by common society bunches. They additionally pushed for empowering administrative situations that permit common society associations to work and connect with youngsters.

The study included various discourses about East Africa's social standards and the likelihood of moving them to reflect new financial substances too. Findings noticed that accomplishing socially perceived adulthood is testing since it requires youngsters to have a relentless wage, to set up a home, and to wed. In the event that the idea of adulthood stays static, radical gatherings may misuse it by offering youngsters grown-up like status through places of duty, reason, and financial remuneration.

Findings additionally urged each other to watch and draw in East African youth culture, which reflects youngsters' desires and dissatisfactions. Youth culture can serve as a valuable marker of youngsters' weakness to radicalization, and it offers open doors for associate good examples to disperse counter-accounts. Findings suggested that legislatures and common society associations approve youthful craftsmen by supporting the business design expected to mass create and appropriate their music, film, verse, and other masterful expressions.

Findings recognized that adolescent culture is by and large progressively scattered by means of mobile phones, instant messages, online networking, and the Internet. In East Africa, the pervasiveness of messaging and youth-run FM radio stations introduce key

channels for counter-radicalization experts to connect with youth and to venture positive other options to rough fanaticism.

A cross-cutting subject all through the workshop was the position of Somalia in East Africa's security scene. Somalia's constant flimsiness and the exercises of al-Shabaab represent an extraordinary and squeezing test to the area. East African youth are defenseless against al-Shabaab's enrollment technique and must be helpfully drawn in by common society associations and governments keeping in mind the end goal to oppose the development's radical philosophy.

Findings communicated set out to work with their Somali partners, both in Somalia and in the diaspora, to counter the vicious radical dangers radiating from the nation and to discover sturdy answers for its longstanding political difficulties.

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