



UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

**INTERNATIONALIZATION OF AFRICAN CONFLICTS: CASE STUDY OF
CHINA IN SOUTH SUDAN**

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EAST AFRICANA COLLECTION**

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
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DECLARATION

This project is my original work and it has not been presented for the award of degree at any Institution.

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Recommendation

This study has been forwarded for examination with my approval as the University Supervisor

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this project to the entire Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies of the University of Nairobi. While it is a basic administrative duty to impart students with knowledge of international events, principles and discourses, the design and resilience in the articulation of this duty has awed me. The rich scholarly experience of its human resource will go a long way in redefining the realms of international system, keep up IDIS!


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Finally this project would not be without the moral support of my best friends Victor, JB and Erick, my sincere gratitude to you, keep this spirit on.

MAP OF SOUTH SUDAN



Source: World Atlas

ABSTRACT

Internationalization of African conflicts is a phenomenon that has dominated political systems for sometimes now. With the rise in need for trade and energy resources world over, states are jostling for every opportunity including raking into loopholes in the name of helping restore democracy, peace and world order. The study investigated the dynamics of the Chinese involvement in the south Sudan conflicts, giving breakdowns of the series of their actions in various stages of conflicts and development initiatives. The study identified policy guidelines of the Chinese relations with African states in terms of trade and armed conflict resolutions as well as a shift in part of the policy that laid a foundation in the demonstration of their interests in south Sudan. Interests and third party involvement in African conflicts have had a ripple effect of prolonged conflicts and devastating effects such as deaths, human rights violation and economic degradation. This third party intervention targeting most resourced nations in Africa greatly internationalized not only the conflict situation but the whole system of interaction and partnerships between these African countries and China. The study justified the relevance of this research to individuals, Academia and policy players such as the NGOs, Civil society and political institutions in analyzing politics of interventions. The literature reviewed in retrospect had mixed views on the effects vis-à-vis the interest based intervention. The study was purely hinged on the theoretical framework of Realism that highlights the dichotomy of interest and intervention. This study was largely built on the premise of qualitative design with a defined population of non randomized sample consisting of scholars, south Sudanese immigrants as well as Chinese officials. The study recommended that there is need for genuine sustained efforts to restore peace in the newest nation for the benefit of the common people and not only interests of the actors. That for a long lasting peace, the international community needs to consolidate its influence and mainstream the process of achieving it through dialogue and also other mechanisms should that fail. These include imposition of trade embargoes and economic sanctions that would not be injurious to the common people but the leadership as well as strengthening of the international judicial system that would bring to book perpetrators of conflict in the newest great lakes region. The regional bodies such as IGAD and the entire great lakes region need to do more and seek regional solution workable for the nation including local mechanism such as power sharing.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS

- AU** – African union
- CNPC** – China National Petroleum Company
- CPA** – Comprehensive Peace Agreement
- CCP** – Communist Party of China
- DRC** – Democratic Republic of Congo
- EU** – European Union
- FOCAC** - Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
- GPOC** - Greater Pioneer Operating Company
- GNPOC** - Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company
- GDP** – Gross Domestic Performance
- IGAD** – Intergovernmental Authority on Development
- MPLA** - Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
- NCP** – National Congress Party
- NGO** – Non Governmental Organization
- NORCO** - North Industries Group
- ODA** – Official Development Assistance
- OFDI** – Outward Foreign Direct Investment
- SADC** – Southern African Development Community
- SIPRI** - Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
- SPLM** – Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
- SSP** – South Sudan Pounds
- SPLM/A** - Sudan People's Liberation Movement / Army
- UNITA** - National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
- UK** – United Kingdom
- UNMISS** – United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
- UN** – United Nations

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

1.0 Introduction.

Intervention in conflicts situations in Africa and the subsequent cooperation between the various actors and the countries involved in conflicts is on the rise. China's increasing presence in Africa and indeed most resource rich nations seems to be an interesting phenomenon. This chapter will focus on this internationalization aspect by China in south Sudan, analyzing the background of the study, the statement of the problem, the objectives, the justification of the study, literature review, theoretical framework and the research methodologies that will be used in the study.

1.1 Background of the study.

The concept of international involvement in the trigger of unrests and drawn out wars is not strange to Africa. The availability of arms manufactured in Europe, America and Asia has found ready markets in Africa over time. This combined with the intertwined interests all captured in trade, have crafted a network that has for a long time bred a never ending conflicts in the African region, and to this end internationalization has become a necessity.¹ Most notable long lasting conflict that for decades has remained a reference point in interest based interventions and internationalization is the DRC stalemate. There have been close to seven states involved in the intervention and mediation process in the Democratic Republic of Congo, for the past decade now.² Resources have been at the center with rich minerals, water as well as other political agenda's underpinning the incessant conflicts.³ The multinational corporations have also joined in the fray of the complex conflict that has seen over 5.4 million deaths. The involvement of the United States from early 1960 was guised as a war against communism but with sole intention of benefitting from the rich Congo resources as has been widely interpreted.

¹Schmidt Elizabeth (2010) *Foreign intervention in Africa: From the cold war to the war on terror*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Pg. 35-57.

²MwagiruMakumi(2000) *Conflict: Theory, processes and institutions of management*, Watermark Publishers, Nairobi, Pg 69-91.

³Subramoney Stanley (2011) *Africa has the advantage – it now needs to win the game*, A NEPAD Report 02, June 2012.

Angola was on a similar path, experiencing a war that began in 1975 to 2002 and broken down in about four phases. It's said that the Angolan conflicts was overly a complex war owing to the combination of Angolan violent internal dynamics and massive foreign interventions largely internationalized with vested interests.⁴ The Soviet Union and the American led capitalists' interests conflicting with the communists east led soviet invested lots of support during the cold war that would later be replicated during the MPLAVsUNITA conflicts. The Americans largely supported the UNITA's Savimbi led coalition which had the support of South Africa as a traditional ally too. It later emerged that those supports were not advanced solely for ideological courses but resource based interests.

The Libyan fiasco has been branded to have had an international hand, notably American, though there are other western involvements, as well as the Arab spring that swept through the Northern frontier, inducing military interventions out of a resolution of the Security Council of 1973 to avert major civil strife. Other interests interventions that form the background of this study include the Operation Harmattan backed by the UK, Canada and the rest that was to pass as an ordinary global operation to establish stability just for a more recent American strong involvement to create a dramatic end of the Gadaffi administration through support of the off wing militia.⁵ This project will however focus on this interest based internationalization of the South Sudan conflict that has a unique bearing in the face international interventions. The Chinese administration, interventions, their Africa relations policy as well as the underlying influence are the central focal items under scrutiny in this respect.

1.1.1 Brief background of the South Sudan

⁴AlaoAbiodun(1994) *Brothers at war: Dissidence and rebellion in southern Sudan*, British Academic Press, London, Pg. 1-4.

⁵Mitchell John (1988) *Companies in a World of Conflict*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, UK, Pg. 112.

Geographically, South Sudan is not part of the Sudan region at all (the Sahel), forming as it does part of Sub-Saharan Africa. In modern reference, it does, however, include parts of the East Sudanian Savanna. Its inclusion in "Sudan" is due to the historical southward expansion of the Ottoman Khedivate of Egypt during the 19th century, and its consequent inclusion in Mahdist Sudan, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and the Republic of Sudan during 1885 to 2011. South Sudan is mostly inhabited by Nilo-Saharan speaking peoples, with Niger-Congo speaking minorities. Historically, what is now South Sudan was dominated by Central Sudanic speaking peoples, but the presence of Nilotic peoples can be assumed from prehistoric times as well. Since about the 14th century, following the collapse of the Christian Nubian kingdoms of Makuria and Alodia, the Nilotic peoples gradually came to dominate the region. It is multi linguistic with ethnic composition of approximately 75 tribes and sub tribes with the Dinka and the Nuer being the largest.

Its independence was born out of 20 years of civil war between north and south which caused the death of nearly 2 million people and displaced about 4 million. Both parties agreed, in 2005, on the conclusion of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that provided for 6-years autonomy for South Sudan and the organization of a self-determination referendum in January 2011 where a large majority of South Sudanese overwhelmingly voted for the accession with over 98% of votes in favor.

1.2 Statement of the research problem.

Over time interventions in conflicts within African countries have been viewed with varied lenses. There are those who have alluded to interest based interventions where as there are those who have advanced a standpoint with liberal leanings, that the interventions have been inspired by humanitarian need. The Chinese involvement has been a key concern as to whether it is a sole humanitarian affair or an under-cover assignment and this change of position is of the Chinese administration is the key subject under investigation in this

research. China was and has been known to pursue a non-political interference in its foreign policies over the years but a slight drift is being experienced especially in period under review, of 1988 - 2014 onwards. Over time there have been gaps in exactly why there is influx of foreign institutions and states in most conflicts situations in Africa. And even more peculiar is their sense of drive in selected counties and not every single state involved in strife. These gaps have established the basis of going beyond the documented literature to find answers to this problem.

1.3 Study objectives.

This study will espouse to:

- 1) Establish the dynamics of the south Sudan conflicts.
- 2) Establish the interests of China in the South Sudan conflicts.
- 3) Establish how China has internationalized the south Sudan conflicts and the resultant effects.

1.4 Research questions.

- 1) How have the south Sudan conflicts dynamics played out under the Chinese involvement?
- 2) Is the Chinese involvement in the south Sudan conflicts oriented on self-interest?
- 3) How has China internationalized the south Sudan conflicts and what are the resulting consequences?

1.5 Study Hypothesis.

The world political systems theory advances a standpoint of self-help unit with individual state' interests overriding any other interaction need. Suffice to say therefore that

- 1) China's involvement in the south Sudan conflicts has inspired and changed its dynamics
- 2) Chinese are pursuing their national interests in the south Sudan
- 3) China's involvement in the south Sudan conflicts has internationalized it.

1.6 Justification.

This research paper will be relevant for individuals, corporate players both in private and public sectors, in establishing a benchmark in understanding the greater external intervention and cooperation in the international political system.

1.6.1 Academic Justification.

This research will be useful to academic players who seek to broaden their understanding on the role and interests of various international actors in the international political system with special bias in the Chinese African relations benchmarked on the South Sudan Chinese conflict support and mediation processes. This research will further and fill in the academic gaps left in the previous studies on the similar course. It will also give an opportunity to budding scholars to build on areas that will not be conclusive hinged on the cumulative nature of a research process.

1.6.2 Policy justification.

This research will offer reference materials to governments, civil and political institutions with interests in understanding and analyzing the politics of interventions. This research will be ideal for country experts seeking a richer understanding of domestic conflicts within the areas of their expertise and the externalities' influence.

1.6.3 Benefit to the general public.

This study will be essential to the general public who are constantly affected by the conflicts and the participation by foreign actors who intervene and further their operations in the affected countries. It will majorly be beneficial to the south Sudanese who are caught in the mix of the Chinese participation in their country and are yet to understand the dynamics of the conflicts as well as the underlying factors behind the Chinese participation. This study will give an insight into the conflict situation, the genesis and the resulting effects to their daily lives and further inform their decision in future relations with the political system as well as the need for sober political and civil participations for a peaceful coexistence.

1.7 Literature Review.

The internationalization of the south Sudan conflicts by the Chinese administration was experienced largely in the period just prior to the 2005 Comprehensive agreement that eventually ended the civil war between the north and the south⁶. However there were sporadic conflicts between the two countries over resources, marginalization and forced cultural orientations as well as religion.⁷This research will cover period 1989 to 2015 when the Chinese interests were significant, though there will be brief mentions of the first civil war stretching back to 1959 just to have a connect with the past conflicts, owing to the discovery of oil in various areas. And prominently the period of the run down to the referendum when the Chinese embrace for the south blossomed and the much touted foreign policy brought into sharp focus.

Internationalization according to the Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary is to make international, the act or process of bringing something under the control or protection of many nations; the act or process of making something international, exposing a scope to

⁶Large Daniel, *Between the CPA and the Southern Independence: China's post conflict engagement in Sudan*

⁷Johnsons H. Douglas, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars, Peace or Truce: Fountain Publishers, 2013,Pg.59*

international stature.⁸ It involves how a conflict crosses to international borders and becomes a concern of international actors. The Chinese involvement in the South Sudan conflict has created a beyond boarder stature to its domestic state of affairs and in this respect qualifies to be researched in that aspect. The Chinese engagement with the south Sudan and indeed Africa is guided by its policy of none interference and economic growth. In the past though, during in the 1950's during the Mao leadership, china's engagement with Africa was more of ideologically and politically motivated and trade and economic axis was not a very strong component.⁹ This though changed after the cold war and later in 1990's during the Deng Xiaoping's presidency, and with economic empowerment, the motive became stability and economic growth. Yuan argues that the model of Chinese cooperation is a mutual partnership with deeply renewed economic engagement that would see a revamped growth and rapid development for Africa.¹⁰ Realists realm to the Chinese involvement in south Sudan is captured by the Crisis Group that tags a new reference to Chinese' model of interaction with resourced African states.

Brautigam argues in her interview that Chinadevelopedand continues to develop series of investments and aid instruments that provided and continue to provide economic foundation for its bilateral partnerships in Africa. They targeted (and continue to) a partner's development priorities but were also designed to support Chinese businesses on the continent and manufacturers at home. In resource-rich states eager to develop such as South Sudan, resource-guaranteed infrastructure loans are often a primary vehicle for engagement. Generous lines of credits have become a catalyst for infrastructure development and in turn have helped secure China's energy and natural resource needs. Despite some misperceptions in Juba, such "loans" have not involved a transfer of cash, but rather designation of a resource

⁸ Oxford English Advanced Learners Dictionary.

⁹ Anshan Li(2007), *China and Africa, Policy and Challenges*: Washington Publishers, Washington, Pg. 69-93

¹⁰ Wu Li Yuan(2006) *China's Economic Policy, Planning or Free enterprise?*: Sino-International Economic Research Centre, Beijing, China, Pg. 1-60.

envelope with specific terms pursuant to which the recipient draws down by contracting Chinese companies. Those awarded contracts often use Chinese equipment and raw materials and employ skilled Chinese labor under the concessions' terms and conditions.¹¹ Brautigam refers to this model as “one win for Africa, and two for China” where African countries are presented with rosy pictures of enhanced development and economic growth which turn out aptly to be a deeper exploitative engagement that would see the dispirited continent out of the deep economic meltdown.

Burs and Collins argue that Chinese engagement with the south in 1989 during the second civil war to 2005 during the signing of the CPA, notably the time around which minerals were discovered in numerous locations, to greatest extent has changed the dynamics of the whole cooperation, arousing an interest component.¹² Large further agrees to this saying that during the civil wars, China's involvement with the government of Sudan was more of modernization that gave more priority to outcomes, even at the expense of social impacts. He further says that during the time, China's role was to be an alternative practical economic and development partner by providing infrastructure, energy projects and roads, a concept that laid a precondition for oil exploration and eventual export.

Bauer argues that a clear view of the Chinese act of unity with the southern Sudan, after a continuation of conflict between the north and south, as well as other genocidal forms of conflicts in the Nuban Mountains, southern Kordofan and Abiyei regions, was a consequence of endangered Beijing's oil interests. That the refusal of the south to permit oil flows as a way of asserting sovereignty led China to join others to find a solution that would give the Chinese oil and non Islamist ethnicities such as the Nuba, the Ngok-Dinka and others some

¹¹ Brautigam Deborah (2009) *The Dragon Gift: The real story of China in Africa*, Oxford University Press, UK, Pg. 1-30

¹² Burr J.M & Collins R.O (2010) *Sudan in Turmoil, Hassan al-Turabi and the Islamist state*, Wiener Publishers, Pg. 250

sense of life.¹³ Collins in his book, *Sudan in Turmoil*, takes a commercial view of the Chinese engagement with Sudan administration, arguing that it is not just a conventional truth that trade engagements where arms and ammunitions are involved would be devoid of heightened interest in the situation that is obviously a geminating ground for flourishing trade, but a reality of the very interest. He asserts that China being a loyal arms and military equipment supplier to the Sudan government was obviously a partisan ally with vested interest in the South civil wars and the subsequent GoSS intra ethnic wars reflected in its strategic move to embrace the Juba administration upon realization of the unstoppable independence and the resources that the south was bound to command.¹⁴

Gransow, however slits down in the middle, relations of China and Africa, not intending to impose negatively on China's participations in Sudan. He says that it might not be out rightly false that China has interests in Sudan for oil resources on the strengths of its economic policy, but it must also be stated boldly that it strongly emerged as one single most supporter of "Right to Protect" mantra of the United Nations and this was reflected in their abstention during the Security Council vote on Libya in the summer of 2011. He argues that China for the last 15 years has undergone a remarkable transition in its policies from the year 2000 where it stated that protection of human life has more legal and moral value than respect for national sovereignty.¹⁵

Attree argues that China's series of interest in the conflict of the south within the framework of internationalization is seen in its change of tact and play to the gallery by extending an olive branch where it is eventually seen to appreciate the CPA, a gesture viewed to contrast its position in the formative stages of the quest for solution to the whole conflicts dynamics in

¹³ Bauer Yehuda(2008) *The Jews, a contrary people*, The National Bibliothek, UK. 2014, Pg.188

¹⁴ Burr, J. M., & Collins, R. O. (2010).*Sudan in turmoil, Hasan al-Turabi and the Islamist state, 1989-2003*. Princeton, N.J.:Markus Wiener Publishers, Pg.251

¹⁵ Gransow Bettina : *China's South-South Relations*, National Bibliothek Publishers, 2013, Pg. 7-9

the region.¹⁶ He further argues that China publicly supported the CPA, but this was to enhance further future exploitation and development of oil resources in South Sudan. The burgeoning economy and the rise in its industrial power was a drawing instrument in its calculus for an increased economic partnership entrenched in its policy on relations.¹⁷

Sanusi, Nigeria's Central Bank Governor in his submission to the Financial Times opines that China's engagement with Africa in whatever capacity is egoistic and utterly selfish in the context that he describes China to be exploiting primary resources and selling manufactured products to the same Africa. He claims that Chinese gesture is a hallmark of colonialism.¹⁸ Yun Sun on the other hand views Sanusi's perspective as lacking in the impartiality. He says China's role in Africa is an interesting phenomenon. He adds that the polarization stems from the focus on different aspects of China's activities on the continent. For example Yun alludes to dragon-slayers emphasis of China's selfish quest for African natural resources and how it sabotages international efforts to keep unpalatable African regimes in check on one hand

He on the other hand, views panda-huggers' applause for China's contribution to Africa's economic development through infrastructure projects and revenue creation as a balanced phenomenon in the Chinese undertaking. Yun summarizes by saying that China's involvement in Africa is not altruistic in a sense as they may reflect but a win-win situation reflected in trade.¹⁹ Ramo appears to lend credence to the Chinese so referred to resourceful interaction and conflict resolution saying the goal for the Chinese is not conflict, but the avoidance of conflict. That this is a doctrine that sometimes confuses U.S. thinkers, who are

¹⁶ Attree .L. (2012) *Sudan and south Sudan*. In Saferworld (Ed) *China and conflicts affected states, between principle and pragmatism*, Pg. 17

¹⁷ Large .D. (2008) *Sudan's foreign relations with Asia: China and the politics of looking East*, Institute of security studies http://www.darfurconsortium.org/member_publications/2008/Feb/BP.IS.0208.pdf. Pg. 33

¹⁸ Sanusi Limido, *Africa Must Get Real About Chinese Ties*, A Financial Times Publication, March 11, 2013

¹⁹ Yun Sun, *China's Increasing Interest in Africa: Benign but Hardly Altruistic*, A Brookings Journal/Publication, April, 5, 2013

looking for signs of a China 'threat, but it reflects a deeply held Chinese belief that armed conflict is an indication of failure.²⁰ He continues that the Chinese have for a long time been viewed as a vulture synonym in their efforts to mediate conflicts or general relations with states in Africa. Yet this is a concern and a responsibility of any serious international actor worth his salt and who wishes to develop their bilateral base.

Hanaver and Lyle argue that China's mediation in the south Sudan conflict offers a window into Beijing's more proactive diplomatic approach to conflicts in Africa that has a tinge of interest in the resources going south. They take a look at the statistics of oil resources that the south Sudan is endowed with and the subsequent benefits in terms of the imports they make annually and dare to seal their case of absolute interests.²¹ Alex argues that with the approximated 5% of oil imports, assuming the country's oil production is at full capacity, Chinese keen interest in South Sudan is expected within the level of foreign investment operations at the resource exploitation and trade front adding that what else would matter if not interests.²²

Tunsjo adds to the perspective of Chinese interests in the conflict intervention configuration by arguing that whether or not the Chinese pressure on the Khartoum to mend fences with the south was a gesture of a responsible world power, one thing is clear that the communist administration had a keen resolve to protect its energy interests by establishing a solid relationship with the southern nation which had just seceded and attained autonomy. That even down the historical lane, Chinese tendency had changed and the high flying policy of none interference had already lost its grip midstream. Tunsjo clarifies that China needs both

²⁰Ramo J.C. 2004, *The Beijing consensus*, The Foreign policy Center, <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/244.pdf>, Pg.39

²¹Hanaver Larry, Lyle J Morris. *Chinese Engagement In Africa:Drivers,Reaction and Implication for US Policy*, Santa Monica, CA : Rand Corporation, [2014], Pg.84-86

²²Fielding Alex.*China: Africa's new powerbroker*, The National Interest Publication, June 22, 2015, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-africas-new-power-broker-13157>

the south and the north and this was reflected in its unique ability to hold close the two nations during the conflicts, a process that is still on to date.²³

Hang pitches tent on the participation of China within the auspices of UNMISS where it sent an infantry battalion of 700 peace keepers to help in the protection of oil installations and the oil workers therein. This, Hang says falls squarely on the paradigms of interests of the protection of the harvesters as well as the exploits. He alludes to the United Nations Resolution 2155 that validated the move on oil installation and citizens' protection.²⁴ Hang argues that the "What would be in it for China" mantra, was actively shown in the Chinese participation and the softening of stance and the backpedalling in its earlier to participate actively in the southern conflict is analyzed in the light of the United Nations Security Council negotiations on the mandate of the (UNMISS) on the protection of the civilians which was resisted by a couple of diplomat.

Zhongying profiles China within this context saying, "in various ways, China has had international leadership pushed upon it, and as its economy rises, and trade profile increases across the globe, it has discovered, and again considering its domestic security agenda, that peacekeeping missions can help achieve peaceful international environment which works in its interests as it begins to build sound external partnerships."²⁵ Peria, extrapolating Chinese foreign policy described China's foreign policy in Africa as oscillating between four pillars – political, economic, ideological and strategic – since the 1950s. Politically, China seeks increased influence in multinational organizations and a firm commitment to the "One China" policy. Economically, China wants to secure natural resources and expand markets for exports. Ideologically, China wants to legitimize and popularize its own development model

²³Tunsjo Oystein.(2013) *Security and profit in China's energy policy: Hedging against risk*, Colombia University Press, Colombia, Pg. 97-100.

²⁴Hang Zhou. *China and south Sudan: Economic engagement continues amid conflicts*. September 15, 2014

²⁵Zhongying .Z. (2014) *China's changing attitude*, Oxford University press. London. Pg. 87

by promoting growth abroad. Strategically, Beijing seeks to develop the capacity to project force abroad in order to protect its citizen and capital throughout the continent.²⁶ He however cast his eyes on the intricate balancing act that China has to play though in the overall conflict intervention. He sees China's evolving policy for engaging with South Sudan as an interesting case study for whether Beijing would be able to reconcile its disparate interests into one cohesive foreign policy or not.

Bellamy disagrees and offers a completely different narrative. He says that there is the angle of the right to protect, abbreviated as R2P, as postulated in the UN charter and deliberated in the Security Council in 2006 and 2009 where China and Russia alongside the other membership, reaffirmed own commitment to. He sees International hegemony as lurking in the shadows, it bears pointing that by virtue of their permanent membership in the Security Council, China and Russia have cast more votes in favor of the proposition of intervention of whatever means, in regard to protecting the general citizenry, a principle that has the backing of a majority of western democracies. Suffice to say therefore, intervention principle is not a preserve of a particular political axis but a needful gesture that should not only be construed to imply interest strategy but a moral obligation of an entire political organization and the Chinese South Sudan intervention is one such.²⁷

Shanon argues that China's insistence on IGAD's leadership role in the South Sudan peace process and its calls for "political power cover" where China is sandwiched in the decision making process for the interests protection is one that oozes calculated strategic move of self-interest.²⁸ He portends that China brokered "Special Consultation in Support of the IGAD on the South Sudan Peace Process" is one laced with undercover interests. He concludes his case by alluding to the Chinese foreign affairs minister Wang Yi's submission, on an Africa tour

²⁶ Peria Charles. *Seeing China in Africa through the lens of south Sudan*, an Aid Data Beta journal, September 24, 2012, <http://aiddata.org/blog/seeing-china-in-africa-through-the-lens-of-south-sudan>

²⁷ Bellamy Alex. (2005) *Responsibility to Protect, Defense*, Oxford University Press, UK, 2015, Pg. 2.

²⁸ TiaziShanon. *China in South Sudan, Practical Responsibility* A Diplomat Publication, January 13 2015.

at the beginning of 2015, where he met the Khartoum administration officials as well as the representatives of the warring sides of South Sudan, “We have huge interests in South Sudan, so we have to make greater efforts to persuade the two sides to stop fighting and agree on a cease fire”²⁹ According to the International Crisis Group, Chinese influence and interest is appreciated to the extent that an article makes a solemn appeal to the Chinese administration to use the influence to whip the polarized locale (South Sudan) to peace settlement “China has considerable influence in Sudan and through its investments including oil sector, it should move and do the expected for the safeguards of its investment first, and as a responsible world power.³⁰ But even in this interest analysis however, Porter Philip plays a devil’s advocate. He says China’s interest in the South and wider Sudan and indeed Africa isn’t limited to importing Sudanese oil only. He argues that China’s interests in Sudan are only one case in a larger narrative of involvement in Africa. That while China needs resource inflow in order to maintain the pace of its economic expansion, it must also identify new markets to which it can export finished good that in all practical sense not only advances a principle of interest but a symbiotic aspect of a relation.³¹

Another voice in the debate is Brautigam. She argues that China is not a unique actor in its motives or actions. Brautigam states: “Like the US, China gives aid for three reasons: strategic diplomacy, commercial benefit, and as a reflection of society’s ideologies and values”.³² Her argument is somewhere in the middle between China’s own public statements and those more critical of China. Brautigam’s study concludes that China is not engaging in Africa only for the resources, and is not an unreliable partner as claimed. She claims further that China has a different view of how to reach stability and development, and the main aspect to reach these goals is an increase in the economy. She adds “Like the Japanese, the

²⁹ Tiazi Shanon. *China in South Sudan, Practical Responsibility*, A Diplomat Publication, January 13, 2015.

³⁰ International Crisis Group Working to Prevent Conflict Worldwide, *Sudan and South Sudan’s Merging Conflicts* African Report, Issue No. 223, 29 January 2015.

³¹ Porter Philip: *Introduction to Chinese Policy*, April 24 2012, Pg 10.

³² Deborah Brautigam (2009) *The dragon’s gift*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, Pg. 15

Chinese believe that the best antidote to conflict and instability is sustained economic development that will herald growth and prosperity as the requisite benchmarks for any state with peace and development as part of their future undertakings.³³

International Crisis Group, views Chinese foreign to be complimented by a policy framework that encourages Chinese companies to go out, offering subsidies and other incentives for outward investments and the export of Chinese goods, technology and equipment. This philosophy has the component of interest in peaceful coexistence that China advocates for in the Southern Sudanese region. According to Lych in His piece where he refers elaborately to the deal secured by China to make a reality the objective, "It's not lost on any analytical pundit that trade or oil imports could be insignificantly felt in ordinary terms, standing at 5%, but China is the largest single consumer of the larger Sudanese oil. This presents China with enormous influence to champion its interest in the South that lives solely of 98% of its oil production.

Lich says the Chinese government do not take lightly the safety of its citizens working in the oil installation just as reviewed in the initial section of this work, under the framework of the UNMISS and would go an extra mile in achieving it.³⁴ In essence Lich dissects the deeper aspect of vitality of human resource as the frontline base of investment within the Chinese policy frameworks. This protection component is viewed by Lich to admit to the interest question and asserts with authority the inspiration behind such maneuvers. It goes without say then that ordinary South Sudanese interest might not or out rightly is not the driving force even in the Chinese contribution of the first ever battalion to the UNMISS. The wider peace in the South Sudan area will even be of greater commercial value to Chinese government

³³ Deborah Brautugram (2009) *The dragon's gift*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, Pg.21

³⁴ Colum Lych:, *UN peace keepers to protect China's oil installations*, A Cable Publication, June 16 2014

Large frames that the Chinese growing link and support for South Sudan witnessed in 2007 during the Kiir's visit to Beijing where china's CCP party had invited SPLM to establish relations in order to ensure efficient development and management of oil resources for the benefit of South Sudan is testament to the recast of a growing strategic repositioning of its interest element. That the gradual embracing of Juba and the establishment of a first diplomatic axis and consulate in the capital Juba is seen as a turn of events in the realization of looming political independence and subsequent break-away that would obviously mean theresourced and mineral rich South would be the one to pay the piper, figuratively soexpressed.³⁵ China's link with South Sudan is a stark contrast with how relations had developed with the northern Sudan which had resource imperatives and investment opportunities as paramount and which again was a commercially driven entry into a new theatre with the South Sudan, asserts Large.

Okiech however disagrees to this narrative of Chinese sole interest driven approach and offers a rich content of even greater need of the Chinese presence by the South Sudanese administration. As the SPLM secretary general in the 2008 when he presented the Organizational Report to the Second National Convention of Sudan People's Liberation Movement sitting in Juba, he elaborated on a mutual establishment that is the China Southern cooperation that should not be viewed parochially in favor of the south Sudan administration "It's a more symbiotic and mutual arrangement that has also seen South Sudanese technocrats and leadership advance an olive branch for cooperation. He singles the gesture of the governor of upper Nile State Gatluak Dong Garang making an official visit to China, where

³⁵Large Daniel. *China's Sudan Engagement: Changing Northern and Southern Political Trajectories In Peace and War*, A China Quarterly Journal No. 199, September 2009, Pg. 610-626

he met government representatives, visited China's National Petroleum Company offices and sought to negotiate expanded Chinese investment in Malakal, the state capital.³⁶ Cambridge argues that China's interest in the South Sudan conflict hinged on the theoretical framework of realism is felt in the overall Chinese investments in Africa. He claims that China is the single biggest investor in Africa after United States according to the latest statistics, quoting the IMF report on Chinese establishments and occupational investments in Africa.³⁷ He projects a table extracted from the 2004 Chinese African interest distribution, by the International Monetary Fund that rates Sudan at third place behind South Africa and Angola, depicting early African inclination by this Communist's administration and the trend that has continued to replicate even more in the succeeding years.

CHINA'S MOST IMPORTANT TRADING PARTNERS IN AFRICA

China's Imports from Africa	US \$ M	%
Angola	3422.63	27.4
South Africa	2567.96	20.6
Sudan	1678.60	13.4
DRC	1224.74	9.8
Equatorial Guinea	787.96	6.3
Gabon	415.39	3.3
Nigeria	372.91	3.0
Algeria	216.11	1.7
Morocco	208.69	1.7
Chad	148.73	1.2

³⁶57 Organizational Report presented to the Second National Convention of Sudan People's Liberation Movement by SPLM Secretary General Pegan Amum Okiech, 18 May 2008

³⁷International Monetary Fund Report. *Trajectory of Economic Coexistence*, 2004, Pg.56

Total	11043.72	88.4
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Source: *International Monetary Fund 2004.*

Carmody in his book, the New Scramble for Africa claims a precarious rush and interests where EU powers and Japan have been playing defensive maintenance and “catch up” games with China in Africa. He alludes to the aid related humanitarian scramble as infused with geopolitical and economic motives, including the People’s Republic of China.³⁸ Shangwan of China daily on the contrary has a different stand point. Here the “Heart and Spirit to help” line features very prominently. He argues that the Chinese involvement in Africa has faced critics, some even accusing them of neo colonialism. But the Chinese have strived to prove to the world that their involvement is for the need for peaceful coexistence. The Shangwan alludes to the comments of the Vice director of peace keeping affairs office, Ministry of Defense, Dai Shao, “Wherever we go and whatever we do, we bear in mind that we are messengers of peace always out to win the hearts and minds of the people for the interest of a generation and that’s what China is devoted to doing”³⁹ David in his book China and Africa, A century of engagement, takes down the Beijing administration for a calculated engagement with the two Sudan. He, together with his co-author Eisenman, interrogates the Chinese interaction with the south just at a party to party level not to offend Khartoum. They argue that this relationship began to form shape in the full realization of the CPA coming to its wake.⁴⁰

Taylor walks the same path of realistic intervention of the Chinese in the southern nation claiming it is not purely a sober intervention but a tactical push, largely influenced by geopolitical and economic mantra that has for over a decade now rendered the continent a

³⁸ Carmody Padraig (2011) *The new scramble for Africa*, Polity Press, Cambridge, Pg. 1930- 1980

³⁹ Shangwan. *China acting as responsible power*, A China Daily Publication, 24 July 2007

⁴⁰ Hamilton David, Eisenman Joshua. (2012) *China and Africa: A century of engagement*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012, Philadelphia, Pg. 255-269

gold rush unit in the international political system.⁴¹ But Steel however in his argument, advances a Darfur component reflecting closely to the south Sudan intervention that is the tradition of the Chinese passion hidden in its policy framework of non-interference.⁴² Steel argues that Chinese involvement with the North-south and the Darfur conflicts reveal a parochial and more direct resource interests carried in their interaction with the south as well. He proceeds that it was not in the Chinese interest to find a lasting peace in the wider oil rich Darfur as that would have meant a return to the American companies that had quit the volatile region, as such; the zero sum status would arguably leave just its Chinese National Petroleum Company that had dominated the region.

Beuret and Woods add that the poverty nexus and the marauding conflicts only served the great powers' interests. They claim that a similar situation was also reflected in Ethiopia when some western actors reduced aid but China actually increased its presence since the disputed 2005 elections that saw blatant shootings and mass detention by the incumbent administration and to this the die again was cast, we move in our interest, so as we guarantee the recipient countries, we lay wait for net return.⁴³ Zhongyong however disagrees, opining that the responsibility to mediate and seek peace in the fragile South Sudan is a demonstration of a Chinese commitment to the UN and its security functions as mandated by the UN Charter and not only to serve its individual moral interest but a requirement of a rising superpower and also an arena for China to interact with other cultures for a more integrated global world.⁴⁴

However Hang Zhou of the Jamestown Foundation also looks at the Chinese involvement through more responsible lenses as he opines that China's diplomatic efforts to address the

⁴¹Taylor Ian *Flexigemony and force in China's Resource Diplomacy in Africa*, 2010, Pg. 780.

⁴²Steele Philip: *Sudan Darfur and the Nomadic Conflicts*, 2013, New York, USA.

⁴³Beuret Michael and woods Paolo, *China and India in Developing Countries*, AASBEA Publishers, 2009, Pg.200-300.

⁴⁴Zongying, *China's changing Attitude*, New York Publishers, 2013, New York, Pg. 87

on-going conflict should be first understood against a larger backdrop of growing awareness within the Chinese government of its potential role in African peace and security.⁴⁵ Nwankwo in his book *Companion to Business in Africa* also joins in the fray for business stand point. He says that Chinese investments in resources remain strategic in its overseas direct investment if one considers the increasing energy consumption needed for its manufacturing industries and population. That the Chinese government continue to support the purchase of international energy assets by providing both finance and tie in development projects that appeal to leaders in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. Therefore there is close link between the NGO's interests and the Chinese government contribution to OFDI in African regions and its participation in their peace processes.⁴⁶ Hanauer minces no words in economic, intervention and the constrictions in the implementation of the non-intervention policy of the Chinese. He says that the south Sudan conflict may show China's willingness to play a responsible world power, and even their participation may have eased conflicts but their diplomatic intervention may be productive but the whole matrix highlighted China's changing calculus of national interests versus non-interventionism.⁴⁷

1.8 Summary of gaps in the Literature Review

From the literature reviewed, there is, and indeed there was a hand of support extended by the two Sudan administrations just in the wake of the split of the two countries. It is also clear that the Chinese involvement with the South began to gain greater momentum just under 2011, just after the independence when it was quickly recognized by Beijing who did not waste time in establishing energy and economic partnerships with the new administration. Support aspect actually came out when the relations between Khartoum and South Sudan began to

⁴⁵The Jamestown Foundation. Global Research and Analysis: *Testing the limits: China's Expanding Role in the South Sudan Civil War*, China Brief Volume: 14 Issue: 19, October 10, 2014

⁴⁶Nwankwo Sonny, Ibeh Kevin(2014)*The Routledge Companion to Business in Africa*, Routledge Publishers, London, Pg. 303-306

⁴⁷Hanaver Larry(2014) *Chinese engagement in Africa: Drivers, reactions and implications for US policy*, RAND Corporation, 2004, Santa Monica, Pg 84-86

deteriorate over border and energy disputes and China finding itself in the awkward position when it was approached by the two administrations for support.⁴⁸ The review also established gaps that the study will major on in the subsequent chapters. The literature has failed to:

- Effectively establish dynamics of the south Sudan conflicts
- Satisfactorily identify the interests of the Chinese in the south Sudan conflicts
- Establish how China internationalized the south Sudan conflicts and the resultant effects.

1.9 Theoretical framework

This research was hinged on the most definite theory of Realism as postulated in the works of scholars such as Hans Morgenthau, Thomas Hobbes and Machiavelli. Realism is a tradition of international theory centered upon propositions that the international system is anarchic in nature and a common belief that there is no actor above states capable of regulating their interactions and that states must arrive at relations on their own and as opposed to a dictated resolution by a higher authority. The main guiding principle assumption being states' desire (China's) to pursue self-interest and strive to attain as many resources as possible where the primary concern is state survival.

The components of the Chinese interests are soundness and the wellbeing of its people. This is achieved within the frameworks of energy security, market for finished products under trade auspices and cultural enhancement that is a guiding principle in the Chinese quest for cohesion and strong global social fabrics. The research espoused to highlight the state, in this case China and South Sudan as the dominant critical actors in the conflict resolutions and

⁴⁸ Lanteigne Marc(2013) *Moving Beyond Asia: China's cross – regionalists foreign policies*, Routledge, Publishers, ,USA, 2013, Pg. 153

relations.⁴⁹ It exposed the reality within this benchmark on the Chinese interests in the South Sudan conflicts and the various roles the Chinese administration played to maintain their interests in the South Sudanese conflicts. This theory enabled this study to establish the objectives of Chinese internationalization of the south Sudan conflicts by exposing the interests involved favored by their policy of foreign relations.

1.10 Methodology

This research strove to collect data relating to the topic under study by digging into the relevant available secondary data, desktop soft materials including online books, journals, newspapers, publications, short articles. A primary data collection approach through interviews was also a major consideration in this research process. There was a one on one interaction with the South Sudanese officials as well as various immigrants who had various views on the Chinese involvement in the conflicts back home. Chinese officials were also involved in this undertaking to establish the reality in their venture in the South Sudan conflicts. This design of research data collection enhanced a freer environment where no manipulation or intimidation would be involved. Telephone interviews offered a freer environment for maximum extraction of information and data since the distance and space guaranteed confidence in the response to the questions.⁵⁰ Sampling was the guiding principle in the choice of the participants. The frame was composed of the technocrats in the field of study as well as the individuals who bore the experiences of the conflicts in the south Sudan. These approaches were the most preferred in this study due to their qualitative nature in the data collection. This aspect involved immersing oneself into the scene to make sense of it in determining how to construct oneself. Qualitative research was designed in this study to

⁴⁹Donnelly Jack, *The Ethics of Realism*, in Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Oxford University Press, 2008, Pg. 150

⁵⁰Weathington Bart. (2010) *Research methods for the behavioral and social sciences*, John Wiley & Sons, UK. Pg.232

reveal a target audience's range of behavior and the perceptions that drive it with reference to this specific topics and objectives. It uses in-depth studies of small groups of people to guide and support the construction of hypotheses. This study adopted qualitative design due to its strength to:⁵¹

- Create synergy among respondents, as they built on each other's comments and ideas.
- The dynamic nature of the interview and discussion processes, which engaged respondents more actively than was possible in more structured survey.
- The opportunity to probe ("Help me understand why they felt the way they did") enabling this researcher to reach beyond initial responses and rationales.
- The opportunity to observe, record and interpret non-verbal communication (i.e., body language, voice intonation) that was part of the respondent's feedback, which was valuable during interviews, discussions and analysis.

The study adopted a non-randomized sampling technique where a population of south Sudanese immigrants, Chinese officials and International relations technocrats were identified for interviews. This method was appropriate since it provided a more focused approach where relevant information was obtained firsthand.

The specific tool used was an interview guide structured to apply to the different population samples.

1.11 Chapter summary

- Chapter one introduced the study, its aim, the approaches and the scope, clearly explaining the objective of study and how the study was carried out.
- Chapter two established the dynamics of the south Sudan conflicts

⁵¹Tracy Sarah (2013) *Qualitative research methods: collecting evidence, crafting analysis, communicating impact*, Wiley-Blackwell, UK. 2013. Pg. 1-30

- Chapter three established the interests of China in the south Sudan conflicts and their overall participations there in.
- Chapter four established how China has internationalized the south Sudan conflicts and the resultant effects of the whole intervention mechanisms.
- Chapter five analyzed, concluded and recommended the way forwarded in the entire matrix of the internationalization of the south Sudan conflicts.

CHAPTER TWO

DYNAMICS OF THE SOUTH SUDAN CONFLICTS AND THE CHINESE ACTIONS

2.0 INTRODUCTION

This section will espouse to establish the conflict situation in the south Sudan with the view to tracing the series of the Chinese participations and highlighting the various interest laden involvement of the Beijing administration. It will form the foundation for the establishment of the Chinese involvement and the causal effects that is the hallmark of this academic research. It will highlight at the introductory level a brief historical breakdown of the south Sudan conflicts as a show case of the journey toward the conflict reality and change of policy application that has been the Chinese brand of none interference.

2.1 The South Sudan Conflicts

The study established that south Sudan conflict is a long meandering narrative of resources and greater autonomy through a look at the short history. The first ever notable civil war of the south Sudan was witnessed between, 1955 and 1972 and it was between the Sudanese government and the southern rebels who demanded greater autonomy for southern Sudan. The war came to an end with the signing of Addis Ababa peace accord in 1972 which granted significant regional autonomy to southern Sudan on internal issues.⁵² The second civil war erupted in 1983, a result of long-standing issues fuelled and heightened by then President Nimeiri's decision to introduce and impose Sharia law.⁵³ This culminated in a negotiations between the government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army, or SPLM/A of southern Sudan in 1988 and 1989, but were later to be abandoned when General Omar al-Bashir ascended to power in the 1989 military coup and subsequently establishing a military rule. Fighting over resources, southern self-determination, and the role of religion in the state raged between the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A for over two decades. The war left two and a half million people dead and four million people displaced. These conflicts were however to be the impressions of independence developments in the south Sudan history. In January 2005 the National Congress Party, abbreviated as NCP, and Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army, or SPLM/A, put to paper and sign the dotted lines of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). With this truce came an established six-year Interim Period, when a number of provisions were to be implemented to test the strength of a unified Sudan and to ensure sustained peaceful coexistence between the north and the south.⁵⁴

During this Interim Period, southern Sudan basked in the glory a high degree of autonomy within a united Sudan and at the conclusion of this Period, the people of southern Sudan voted in a referendum determining their destiny, whether to continue being part of the larger

⁵² <http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Sudan.html#Southern>

⁵³ De-RoubenKarl and HeoUk. *Civil wars of the world: major conflicts since World War II*. ABC-CLIO. Pg. 743.

⁵⁴ *Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead*, International Crisis Group, 31 March 2006

Sudan or secede for eternity from it and attain full independence southern.⁵⁵In April 2010, Sudan held elections meant to pave the way for a democratic transformation. However, the rose began to lose stout and instead of a strengthened power sharing goodwill between the NCP and the SPLM/A, the elections became a wedge, further dividing them⁵⁶.As with the reflection of the provisions of the CPA, the people of southern Sudan voted for their independence in the Southern Sudan Referendum on January 9, 2011. Six months later, on July 9, 2011, the six-year Interim Period came to an end and South Sudan went into the referendum, overwhelmingly casting their ballots, 98% affirming this reality and south Sudan becoming the world's newest country.⁵⁷Just as an extension, it's necessary that this study also indicates, because there are sections that mention these areas, that the CPA also provided the residents of the Abyei Area with the right to vote in their own referendum to determine whether the contested border region would remain in Sudan or become part of South Sudan. The people of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, many of whom fought with the SPLM against the Sudanese government during Sudan's successive civil wars, were also to participate in a popular consultation process, which was supposed to determine how the states could be autonomous within Sudan.⁵⁸However, the 2011 south Sudan independence endowed it with massive resources, over 75% of it.⁵⁹And with this came the source of another conflict, the south-north oil impasse which saw the Juba government shut the production wells accusing the north of extortion and theft of its crude. In this conflict lay the Chinese participation and internationalization in its efforts to mediate for the peace and end to the impoverishing situation for purported populace interests.

⁵⁵*The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan's Uncertain Peace*, International Crisis Group, 25 July 2005

⁵⁶*Updated Timeline of the Implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan*, Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF), April 2009

⁵⁷Fick, Maggie (30 January 2011). *Over 99 pct. in Southern Sudan vote for secession. USA Today*. Retrieved 30 January 2011.

⁵⁸*Protocol on the resolution of Abyei conflict*, Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army, 26 May 2004 (hosted by reliefweb.int)

⁵⁹*South Sudan profile*.BBC News. 8 January 2014. Retrieved 14 February 2014.

Considering the country's policy for African relations, discussed later in this study, which delves not extensively on the pure support for Africa, it was a test for the Chinese model and approach in this scenario.⁶⁰ The Chinese engagement with Sudan was strong in 1989 during the second civil war which began around that year to 2005 during the signing of the CPA. It's also around this time that minerals were discovered in numerous locations. This period saw lots of realignment and struggle for visibility largely reflected in the Chinese relationship with the south. The discovery of oil in Heglig, Unity and Kaikang and the buying of shares, 40% in Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company by the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) as well as the construction of Oil Company to Port Sudan was a testament to the Chinese government support and interest in the largest African country.⁶¹ During the civil wars, China's involvement with the government of Sudan was more of modernization that gives more priority to outcome even at the expense of social impacts. China has had rebuts on its policy for Africa and the wanting environmental repercussions as well as the human rights violations as would be discussed in the succeeding chapter on Chinese internationalization and the resulting effects. During this time, China's role was to be an alternative practical economic and development partner by providing infrastructure, energy projects and roads, a concept that laid a precondition for oil exploration and eventual export for the burgeoning economic power and world influence.⁶² During the study it was established that through this, China became a loyal arms and military equipment supplier to the Sudan government, which, even though, through its numerous defense under "mutual

⁶⁰ Colombat Nico. *Sudan and south Sudan: Growing Sudan – south Sudan oil impasse has high stakes*, Voice of America, February, 4, 2012

⁶¹ Burr J. M. & R.O Collins. (2010) *Sudan in Turmoil: Hassan al-Turabi and the Islamist State*, Weiner Publishers, Pg 250.

⁶² Large Daniel (2011) *The end of abstraction: China's developing relations with Sudan*. In C.M Dent (Ed) *China and Africa development relations*, Roulledge Publishers, London, Pg. 89

trade” narrative, aggravated their relationship with the south as that support was considered to energize the north who used the arms to unleash torrents of missiles on the south.⁶³

China’s relations with the south however became a reality from 2005 during the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, CPA a blue print document that lay the roadmap to south Sudan independence, when it was rather obvious that the cessation would soon become a reality. The Chinese approach to the SPLA and a meeting with SPLM delegation in Beijing was a way of wooing the south with a clear mind of the massive oil endowment that was going to be in the jurisdiction of the south. This happened at the invitation of the Chinese administration just in the wake of the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Khartoum and Juba.⁶⁴ The latest conflict however was between President Kiir and his former deputy, Machar over leadership controls and articulation since secession in 2011. It all started in 15 December 2013 during a meeting of the top government brass where the president ordered for disarming of the elements in the barracks, a move that was questioned by the vice President Machar, prompting an ethnic war between soldiers.⁶⁵ Kiir accused his deputy Machar of attempted coup and was sacked from his position alongside his entire cabinet in what seemed to be a brewing ethnic war between the dormant Dinka tribe of the president and the minority Nuer led by Machar.⁶⁶ But the rivalry between these ethnic godfathers cut deep than is glossed superficially. Resources control stream fast as the underlying reason that has proved sensitive and tricky over time now. Numerous negotiations under IGAD have all not born fruits.⁶⁷ And a recent visit by the American president Barack

⁶³ Burr and Collins 2010. *The realities of Chinese African Relations*. Cambridge Publishers 2011, Pg.120-179.

⁶⁴ Attree .L. (2012) Sudan and the south Sudan. In Saferworld (Ed), *China and conflicts affected states. Between principle and pragmatism*, Saferworld Publication, London, Pg. 17.

⁶⁵ Howden Daniel in Juba. *South Sudan: the state that fell apart in a week*. The Guardian. Retrieved 24 December 2013.

⁶⁶ The Guardian. *South Sudan sacks cabinet in power struggle*. Wednesday 24 July 2013

⁶⁷ Enough . *Conflicts in south Sudan: The world’s newest country*. October 1, 2014

Obama where he hinted at a possible sanction on the Juba government as well as the heads of the rebel elements should they fail to beat a stipulated deadline to end the war.⁶⁸

This internationalization aspect by Washington in spite of its company, Chevron withdrawing out of Sudan more than three decades ago, was indicative of the greatest concern of the super power as a moral responsibility. However within the realms of interests, the Chinese involvement and their more rapid on hand role as well as the behind the scenes participations seemed to have been viewed in the lights of their stakes captured widely in their reasons for involving in Africa.⁶⁹The shift of China's Africa policy in the recent years occurred for a number of reasons: first, China realized the importance of having African support in multilateral forums by its numerical advantages as the largest single regional grouping of states and its tendency towards "bloc voting". Second, China's dynamic economic growth fuelled its insatiable appetite for energy and natural resources, all abundant in relatively untapped markets in Africa. Third, the West's waning interest and influence in Africa after the Cold War created an ideal entry opportunity for China. Forth, China could utilize its political and diplomatic clout to further isolate Taiwan in Africa, a cornerstone of China's foreign policy.⁷⁰China was perceived to have been embroiled in this domestic conflict owing to its foreign investments that are at stake in the face of the conflict. The independence of South Sudan technically and in reality endowed it with roughly 75% of unified Sudan's total oil output, a black gold in the face of the communist nation with the rising economic base.⁷¹The south Sudan oil transit impasse alluded to in the preceding section of this study was the first major test of the delicate balance as far as allegiance of the Chinese is concerned.

⁶⁸ Laing Aislinn..*Barrack Obama threatens economic sanctions if south Sudan civil war deal not reached*. The Telegraph, 27 July, 2015

⁶⁹ Ayriyan Serine. *South Sudan and its dimensions of interests*. The Positive, September 5, 2015

⁷⁰ Alden Chris, *China in Africa*, Zed books Ltd, 2007, Pg. 22

⁷¹ BBC online. *South Sudan profile- overview*, 27 August 2015

Wakening from close ties with the central Khartoum administration that was considered a champion of human rights atrocities and her close ally China, to the wealthy south, it proved a tight rope that the Beijing administration was to walk.⁷² But even in this light, the Chinese close ties with the south began to form shape well in 2005 during the Kiir visit to Beijing. Critically analyzed, the historic visit that marked a turning point in the bilateral engagements⁷³ with the south appeared more of an olive branch to an already too willing actor, and this is where the Chinese interests come strongly. Kiir's visit, flanked by northern and southern officials revealed an interesting picture. That he presented two documents in the round table meeting. One document was the copy of the Machakos CPA accord and the other being an oil map and that the Chinese were left to figure out their next move even as they struggled to balance their relations with the grumbling north.⁷⁴

It was an opportunity for the communists to decide on where their bread was buttered. The approach applied by the Chinese⁷⁵ in this circumstance was the "Hedging strategy" geared towards the southern cessation cleverly preparing for this inevitability. Though the Chinese had reservations about separation, it in reality remained so an inevitable process. The referendum had broad international backing and the likely out-come was clear. Pragmatism demanded both evolution of its public messaging⁷⁶ on self-determination and amplification of political, economic, and party interaction with Juba and the ruling SPLM. The 2007 visit by the Kiir entourage laid bare the centrality of oil in the shifting dynamics between China and the two Sudanstates. The potential division of the oil sector and the associated political and economic complications was now a time-bound fixture on the horizon. In the absence of sufficient contingency planning in the run-up to separation, the die of China's entanglement

⁷² Tiezi Shanon. *The Diplomat, China's south Sudan Dilemma*, December 25, 2013

⁷³ International Crisis Group, *China's new courtship in south Sudan*, Africa report no. 186, 4 April 2012

⁷⁴ Bay Austin. *on China's Sudan dilemmas*, A Washington Examiners journal 2 February 2012

⁷⁵ Large Daniel. *South Sudan and China: turning enemies into friends* in Daniel Large and Patey. A. Luke (Eds), *Sudan looks East: China, India and the politics of Asian alternatives*, Oxford publishers 2011, Pg. 273-288

⁷⁶ *South Sudan tables demand for Chinese oil firms*, A gurtong Publication, August, 11, 2011

was going to be cast. To gain foothold and be safely gripped to the expectations, the Chinese had a strategy. Given that secession appeared inevitable, Chinese officials lobbied Khartoum to maintain stability by facilitating and accepting a peaceful referendum, including during the Sudanese foreign minister's September 2010 visit to Beijing.

The dynamics of the south Sudan conflicts, the peace process to the attainment of independence is one path that has not left the Chinese administration behind a bit. When south Sudan attained independence on July 9 2011, President Hu Jintao's representative to Independence Day ceremonies, Jiang Weixin, signed a joint communiqué with Southern officials recognizing the new state.⁷⁷ This saw establishment of diplomatic relations and upgrading China's consulate that was initially just a skeleton established of a human resource of only three officials just at the formative stages of the bilateral to a full fledged embassy with table structures and recognition in foreign relations.⁷⁸ Bilateral were soon to increase in their frequency. This was when the foreign minister Yang Jiechi visited Juba. Though China's historical support to Khartoum had sour memories even as they pursued the new friendship, the prevailing sentiments among government elites that "there are no permanent enemies" cast the die that this communist nation was keen on establishing a solid relations at all costs.⁷⁹ And their parting shot told of the buttressed presence in the country as well as the future motivation even to participate in the resolution process therein, "Jubaistakingpragmatic view, looking not to the past but to the huge role China could play in trade and development "Besides the oil impasse support, China was a crucial supporter in political and material terms for UN peacekeeping in Sudan since the early 2000 It backed the revamped mandate of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) in 2011 and continued to buttress its presence in the new country through continued troop contributions.

⁷⁷ *China recognizes independence of south Sudan*, A Xinhua Publication, July, 9, 2011

⁷⁸ International Crisis Group. *China's new courtship in south Sudan*, African report no 186, April 4, 2014, Pg.4-5

⁷⁹ International Crisis Group. *China's new courtship in south Sudan*, African report no 186, April 4, 2014, Pg.5

Headquartered in Wau, Western Bahr al Ghazal state, Chinese 350 peacekeepers were primarily an engineering contingent, and were later accompanied by combat troops per new integrated force protection arrangements that was charging the protection role of the civilians who were prone to human rights abuses.⁸⁰In addition to engineering, construction, and maintenance of national infrastructure and UN assets, its personnel also operated a Level II UN hospital and staff force head-quarters and mission support units. Commitment levels were expected to be maintained. History has seen it all, and China has invested diplomatically wherever it has stationed peace-keepers, and their presence on the ground in South Sudan is no exception.

But perhaps the greatest blow to the Chinese government, as found out in the study, was the south-north oil impasse. This incident revealed aspects of the Beijing change of tact to the application of their policy of none interference.⁸¹Perceived within the frameworks of foreign policy, the Chinese were out with their model of mutual cooperation and partnership. This standoff where the south accused the north of extortion by charging exorbitant amount on oil streaming through their pipeline, way above the market rate and subsequent theft of its crude, halted oil production following a decision by Juba to shut all production wells within its jurisdiction if there was not going to be a favorable solution.⁸²This circumstance saw China begin to intervene by sending its envoy for African affairs, Lui Guijin, first representing Chinese interests and later accepting a lead role in the Security Council to initiate ways of finding lasting peace to the conflict. Here the Chinese policy for Africa, highlighted in chapter three was at its test.⁸³China's involvement in this conflict was well lauded by the

⁸⁰ International Crisis Group No 186,China's new courtship in south Sudan,4 April 2012,Pg. 6

⁸¹African Monitor. *On-Interference but engagement: China's changing responses to Africa's regional conflicts*. Frontier services group journal, October 2014

⁸²*Oil row grows as south Sudan halt production*.www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/.../20121309321274188.html

⁸³ Chinese envoy urges north-south to adhere to peace options, Xinhua, June, 13, 2011, <http://en.people.cn/90001/90777/90855/7407607.html>

international community as a step toward the ⁸⁴ right direction in managing the South Sudanese situation. But the Chinese-South Sudan arms contract that would see a consignment worth of 38 million dollars supplied by the North Industries Group (NORCO) to Juba raised eye brows and brought into sharp focus the neutrality of this nation with strict international foreign policy of non-interference.⁸⁵

Even more revealing was the Chinese action of halting the supply of the second batch of the arms consignment by the (NORINCO), buoyed by the Chinese foreign affairs declaration that the People's Republic of China would deploy a full military battalion to the United Nations mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), hinting at an energized process of active involvement in the South Sudan conflicts just as they were in the united Sudan.⁸⁶ The dynamics of this conflict was also viewed within the context of the growing bilateral and partnerships even in the midst of the conflicts. A closer look at the Chinese stake in the South Sudan by this study revealed an exponential surge in the overall trade partnership. Bilateral trade volume had significantly grown from 2013 almost four fold, to 2.54 million dollars, about 18% of South Sudan's GDP.⁸⁷ Oil as a natural resource was viewed to obviously be at the center of the Chinese-South Sudan close ties and perhaps the catapulting agent of active intervention and mediation of the Chinese administration in the war torn country.⁸⁸ Approximately oil imports from South Sudan stood at 5%, with the country's oil production at full capacity and with that, Chinese keen interest in South Sudan was exposed within the level of foreign investment operations at the resource exploitation and trade front.⁸⁹ The Chinese participation in the south could not come as a surprise venture. They had crossed the Rubicon way before the actual

⁸⁴International Crisis Group Asian Report No 166 *China's Growing Role in UN peace keeping*, 17 April 2009

⁸⁵ Sudan Tribute, *China and the south Sudan*, A journal of the Jamestown foundation, July 17, 2010

⁸⁶ Zhou Hang. *Testing the limits: China's expanding role in the south Sudan civil war*, A China Brief publication, October, 10, 2014.

⁸⁷ China's Ministry of foreign affairs, A government report of March 2012

⁸⁸ *Sudan and south Sudan merging conflicts*, International crisis group African report No. 223, January, 29, 2015, Pg. 10-18

⁸⁹ Rosen Amin. *Oil may explain why China is sending infantry to a UN peace keeping mission for the first time*, A Business Insider Journal. June 16, 2015, www.businessinsider.com/china-sending-troops-to-south

venture. With the rise in the number of operating companies within the borders of the south, the die was cast that interest protection and the security of investment was a mighty consideration and a matter too close to the hearts of the Beijing players.⁹⁰

Unity state, a vibrant oil producing locality at the South Sudan was dominated by the Greater Pioneer Operating Company (GPOC), a consortium that China controlled 40% stake, technically making it a key player in the economic mobilization and growth in the region. The company holding this stake was the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC).⁹¹ It's was also estimated that about 104 Chinese companies were registered in South Sudan with more inclinations in the oil production, infrastructure constructions and telecommunication, key Components in the Chinese economic pillars.⁹² Key to this end therefore meant that incessant conflict is likely to compromise the burgeoning business expansion in the South Sudanese region.⁹³ An even more human angle in the Chinese active participation could be seen within the prism of their citizens' presence in the war torn region. By 2013 it was estimated that over 2,300 Chinese citizens resided in South Sudan way before the onset of the conflicts⁹⁴ and twined to this was a move by the Chinese administration to boost the UNMISS to protect their civilians at oil installations. The Chinese negotiations and behind the scene lobbying for support to secure a Security Council resolution 2155 for the deployment of the combat troop in the south Sudan to protect oil installations was an obvious move of interest protection and that remains to be revealed in more active participations including playing the lead role in the negotiations.

⁹⁰ Mukhtar Alwiya. Al-Araby, China plays peacemaker to protect investment in south Sudan, 16 January, 2015, www.alaraby.co.uk/english/.../9c6f46da-b375-4a9e-8de1-15db2e53274...

⁹¹ Oil production in south Sudan: making it a benefit for all, a Cordaid summary report on assessment of the impact of oil production on communities in upper Nile and Unity states, May 2014, https://www.cordaid.org/.../Oil_Production_in_South_Sudan_Su...

⁹² Partnership for peace and development: south Sudan and China, A Saferworld seminar and workshop report, May 2013, P.3. mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/.../Partnerships-for-Peace-and-Development...

⁹³ Zhou Hang. China and south Sudan: Economic engagement continues amid conflicts, An African Arguments Publication, September 12, 2014

⁹⁴ Zhou Hang, Testing the limits: China's expanding role in the south Sudan civil war, A Jamestown journal, China Brief Volume: 14 Issue: 19 October 10, 2014

The Chinese have shown solid support for the IGAD initiatives and were recently quoted to have lauded the signing of a peace agreement in Addis Ababa⁹⁵To this end China contributed a battalion of 700 soldiers to UNMISS, the first ever Chinese battalion to a peace keeping operation and also maintained two training facilities for peace personnel, one in Nanjing in Jiangsu province and the other in Langfang in Hebei a gesture conceptualizing the “what is in it for me” mantra.⁹⁶China had to make a shift in its foreign policy on relations with other international actors. It had been circumspect in intervening in other countries even when sanctioned by the United Nations. But with the rise in the economic power, a total change was experienced in such relations. One such shift was from an absolute refusal to support any peace process in whatever circumstance, to a permanent commitment to the UN.⁹⁷ In various ways, China had international leadership pushed upon it, and as its economy rose, and trade profile increased across the globe, it discovered, and again considering its domestic security agenda, that peacekeeping missions was an essential instrument in achieving peaceful international environment which worked in its interests as it began to build a sound external environment for its long term economic growth and development.⁹⁸China insistence on IGAD’s leadership role in the South Sudan peace process and its calls for “political power cover” where China is sandwiched in the decision making process for the interests protection was viewed through suspicious lenses of calculated strategic move of self-interest.⁹⁹In the beginning of January 2015, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was on a tour of Africa. This was a normal customary undertaking by Chinese foreign ministers for mutual cooperation. Wang visited Sudan, and held discussion with both sides of the South Sudan conflict on how to speed up political reconciliation in that newly-formed country.

⁹⁵MaashoAoron. *South Sudan peace deal in balance as leaders gather ahead of deadline*, A Reuter online publication, August, 15, 2015

⁹⁶FengBree , *China to send its first infantry troops to UN. Mission in south Sudan*, Sinosphere, December 23, 2014 sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/.../china-to-send-its-first-infantry-troops-t...

⁹⁷Rotberg I Robert.. *Chinese peace keepers in Africa*, China-US Focus Digest, June 19,2014, www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/chinese-peacekeepers-in-africa/

⁹⁸Zhongying. *China’s changing attitude*, Chinese Tribute Publication, Pg. 87

⁹⁹TiaziShanon. *China In South Sudan, Practical Responsibility*, Diplomat, January 13 2015.

Also under discussion was the lingering conflict between Sudan and South Sudan, which dated back to the years before South Sudanese independence.¹⁰⁰ In Khartoum, Wang met with representatives from both sides of the South Sudan conflict as well as officials from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a trade bloc consisting of eight African nations that is helping mediate the South Sudan peace process. China's Foreign Ministry branded the meeting a "China-brokered Special Consultation in Support of the IGAD led South Sudan Peace Process," which strived to both put China front and center and yet insist on IGAD leadership. This Consultation was held to continue with the support for the mediation efforts by IGAD on the South Sudan issue, and to encourage conflicting parties of South Sudan to proceed with dialogue and negotiation, as was captured by Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei. These sentiments were equally shared by the Chinese ambassador to South Sudan, Ma Queng Wang in the same report where he made a special point upon the warring sides, affirming that wars and conflicts hurt the oil industry which is where Beijing's interests are concentrated. However his warning to the locals that, China, Sudan and South Sudan had enjoyed sound cooperation over oil production and that any damage to the oil industry would first hard hit the South Sudanese and Sudanese people sounded more realistic and abstract at the face of it. It was a more humanitarian line though, but the first was its involved interest as Large Daniel captures in his analysis of the Chinese armed conflict resolution in Africa.¹⁰¹

Wang may have tried too hard to prove also that China's moves were an act of "Responsible world power" but no matter how a responsible a nation is, a government must still pick and choose where to invest its time and resources, a calculation that is naturally heavily

¹⁰⁰ Xinhua. *China's mediation in south Sudan not for own interests*, January 12, 2015, news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-01/12/c_133913969.htm

¹⁰¹ Large Daniel. *China's role in the mediation and resolution of conflicts in Africa*, The Oslo forum Network of Mediators 2008, Pg.35-37

influenced by where national interests are at stake.¹⁰² China had and indeed has undeniable interest involved in both Sudan and the South Sudan, and would greatly benefit if a conclusive peace would be found for this region, in this regard, China is acting not only as a “Responsible World Power” but like a practical great power. A deeper look at this Chinese intervention and roles in conflict situations in Africa, a more economic shadow follows without detachment. China re-emerged as a great power in a world not of its own making. The distribution of power in major organizations and the dominant norms of international interactions were deemed and continue to be deemed, to favor unfairly the existing Western powers, and at times obstruct China's ability to meet national development goals.

Nevertheless, engaging the global economy has been a key source of economic growth (thus helping to maintain regime stability), and establishing China's credentials as a responsible global actor is seen as a means of ensuring continued access to what China needs. As an emerging great power which is also still in many respects a developing country, China's challenge is to change the global order in ways that do not cause global instability or generate crises that would damage China's own ability to generate economic growth and ensure political stability.¹⁰³ Chinese influence and interest is appreciated to the extent that an article makes a solemn appeal to the Chinese administration to use the influence to win over the polarized locale (South Sudan) to peace settlement “China has considerable influence in Sudan and through its investments including oil sector, it should move and do the expected for the safeguards of its investment first, and as a responsible world power.¹⁰⁴ China's interest in the South and wider Sudan and indeed Africa wasn't limited to importing Sudanese oil only, China's interests in Sudan was only one case in a larger narrative of involvement in

¹⁰² International crisis group. *China's new courtship in south Sudan, Africa report No. 186* 4 April 2012, www.crisisgroup.org › ... › South Sudan

¹⁰³ Breslin Shaun. *China's emerging global role: dissatisfied responsible great power*, November 3, 2010

¹⁰⁴ International Crisis Group Working to Prevent Conflict Worldwide, *Sudan and South Sudan's Merging Conflicts*, an African Report, No. 223, 29 January 2015.

Africa. While China needed resource inflow in order to maintain the pace of its economic expansion, it had also to identify new markets to which it could export finished good.¹⁰⁵

According to the International Crisis Group, Chinese foreign aid is complimented by a policy framework that encourages Chinese companies to go out, offering subsidies and other incentives for outward investments and the export of Chinese goods, technology and equipment. This philosophy had the component of interest in peaceful coexistence that China advocated for in the Southern Sudanese region. It's not lost on any analytical pundit that trade or oil imports could be insignificantly felt in ordinary terms, standing at 5%, but China is the largest single consumer of the larger Sudanese oil.¹⁰⁶ The history of Chinese involvement in Sudan dated back to 1956 with the construction of the entire oil infrastructure by the Chinese government. This presented (and continues to) China with enormous influence to champion its interest in the South that lives solely of 98% of its oil production.

A greater testament to the Chinese interest in the south region was at its peak in 2007 when Kiir made a tour of delegates on a China's People's Party(CCP) party invitation. Kiir led the SPLM officials where relations were established for the management of oil resources for the benefit of the south Sudan as they crafted it, but in closer scrutiny, an element of win for one and two for China was revealed.¹⁰⁷ The gradual embracing of Juba and the establishment of a first diplomatic axis and consulate in the capital Juba was seen as a turn of events in the realization of looming political independence and subsequent break-away that would obviously mean the resourced and mineral rich South would be the one to pay the piper, figuratively so expressed.¹⁰⁸ The African and indeed South Sudan Chinese conflicts

¹⁰⁵ Porter Philip: *Introduction to Chinese Policy*, April 24 2012, Pg. 10.

¹⁰⁶ International Crisis Group Working to Prevent Conflict Worldwide, *Sudan and South Sudan's Merging Conflicts*, an African Report, No. 223, 29 January 2015.

¹⁰⁷ Large Daniel, Patey Luke .*Sudan looks East: China, India and the politics of Asian alternatives*, New York: James Carrey Ltd, 2011, Pg. 168

¹⁰⁸ Shinn David(2012) *China and Africa: A century of engagement*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012, Philadelphia, Pg. 225- 240

intervention is not purely a sober intervention but a tactical push through, largely influenced by the geopolitical and economic mantra that for a decade now has rendered the continent a gold rush unit in the international political arena.

It is an underscore of the dominant economic appetite for the spiraling resources and opportunities practiced by major world powers in pursuit of stronger military, economic and cultural superiority in the multi-polar system.¹⁰⁹ The intervention of China into the murky conflicts of south Sudan where torrents of accusations have been part of the hymn songs have made the People's Republic embark on a campaign to make their point heard. Chinese strived to prove to the world that their involvement is for peace and the need for peaceful coexistence as was alluded by its Vice director of peace keeping affairs office, Ministry of Defense, Dai Shao, that "Wherever we go and whatever we do, we bear in mind that we are messengers of peace always out to win the hearts and minds of the people for the interest of a generation and that's what China is devoted to doing."¹¹⁰ China was quoted as the first in a fifteen nations to recommend deployment of peacekeepers to Somalia during a UNSC mission to Addis Ababa; the first time China had taken a lead in promoting foreign intervention to resolve a conflict thousands of miles away from its borders. The one security area where China received positive marks from nearly everyone was its contribution to UN and African Union peacekeeping efforts. A study prepared by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) said that by sending engineers, transport battalions, and medical units, China provided critically needed material assets at a time when multilateral peacekeeping was severely overstretched.¹¹¹ Then came the angle of the responsibility to protect abbreviated R2P, postulated in the UN charter and deliberated in the Security Council in 2006 and 1009

¹⁰⁹ Read Dan. *The new Imperial scramble for Africa: How China and the US compete over Africa's resources and labor*, A toward freedom journal, May 20, 2005

¹¹⁰ Su Qiang. *Peacekeeping, a rising role for PLA*, China Daily, July, 24, 2007

¹¹¹ Bates .F. *China and the issue of peace keeping*, Green press, Hong Kong, China, 2009, Pg. 30

where China and Russia alongside the other membership, from the Security Council and beyond, reaffirmed own commitment to.

Those who saw or continue to see International hegemony as lurking in the shadows, it bears pointing that by virtue of their permanent membership in the Security Council, China and Russia have cast more votes in favors of the preposition of intervention of whatever means, in regard to protecting the general citizenry, a principle that has the backing of a majority of western democracies.¹¹² The Chinese involvement in the south Sudan conflicts in all openness revealed a constructive sense of agility where there were stakes. The responsibility to protect mantra was only engaged and boldly scribed by China when it favored them as was argued by Bellamy. The Chinese abstained during a crucial resolution 1706 on the deployment of soldiers in the Darfur region in the wake of the mass atrocities by the Khartoum backed Janjaweed militia.

2.2 Chapter summary

This chapter has established that there is a complex dynamics in the south Sudan conflicts almost un-detachable from the interest of the Chinese. Though this chapter might reflect some aspects of similarities in their constructions with the next chapter, it has shown the breakdown of various actions of the Chinese in the process of their interventions and operations in the south. These various actions as demonstrated will form the basis of the pure interests and motivations of the Chinese involvement in the south Sudan investigated in Chapter three.

¹¹²Ballamy J. Alex *J Responsibility to Protect, Defense*, Oxford University Press, UK, 2015, Pg. 7-8.

CHAPTER THREE

CHINA'S INTERESTS AND MOTIVATION IN SOUTH SUDAN

3.0 Introduction

This chapter intends to interrogate the pure interests of the Chinese and the motivating factors reflected in their actions in the south Sudan. It will also trace part of the history of their involvement so as to show the chronology and sequence of their actions. To help bring this out, their actions in Africa and policy of engagements will be analyzed in part.

3.1 China's conflicts and economic engagements in Africa.

Peaceful coexistence has been a prominent principle feature in China's official presentation of its objectives in international affairs and Africa. Beijing has always portrayed its commitment to supporting the existing security-related architecture in Africa. It places particular importance on the African Union (AU) and African regional organizations such as the IGAD, as well as the UN Security Council.¹¹³ The importance of peace and resolving conflict is regularly invoked by Beijing, but this is not a significant or direct aspect of Chinese engagement with notable nations or continents. China's Africa Policy (2006), for example, devotes just a paragraph to this area and dominates a huge chunk of the policy paper with areas of investment and economics such as trade and mutual cooperation.¹¹⁴ Likewise, the humanitarian assistance China has provided, mostly in kind, is minor in comparison to its other investments.

Beijing has, however, taken on a more active role in African operations of UN peacekeeping, mainly in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Sudan. The instances in which China has actively and substantively responded to conflict through mediation or conflict-resolution efforts are few, attributing this reason to its capability as a developing nation and policy of non-interference.¹¹⁵ The Chinese government operates a secondary support role premised on the principle of assistance within its own capability as developing country acting within its current means but one that will play an increasingly important role as it develops further in its mainstreaming and leveraging on the energy resources to keep its dynamic economy. Efforts are channeled through involved governments and/or through support to the African Union (AU). Examples include a Chinese government donation of \$300,000 to the

¹¹³ *China's independent foreign policy of peace*, A report by the Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN, July 11, 2003

¹¹⁴ *China's African Policy*, A people Daily full text version of the Chinese – Africa relations policy paper presented in January, 12, 2006, http://en.people.cn/200601/12/eng20060112_234894.html

¹¹⁵ Nathan .J. Andrew (2009) *Principle of China's Foreign Policy*, An Asia for Educators Journal, Columbia University Press, USA. <http://afe.easia.columbia.edu>

Kenyan Red Cross in January 2008 for support to post-election programs, or its donation of \$300,000 to the AU to assist with peacekeeping in Somalia in August 2007.¹¹⁶

The study established that the Chinese government has not proactively sought to involve itself in peace processes; rather, it has affirmed the primary responsibility of the international community and engaged as and when its interests have been threatened.¹¹⁷ The geography of Chinese engagement in Africa, and concentration of investment in resource-rich states, many prone to or characterized by armed conflict has meant that its resource-extraction operations have become intertwined in existing conflict theatres and the thrill of protecting it remains pronounced. Chinese companies in places are reinforcing pre-existing, resource-related conflict dynamics. As such, they broadly follow in the footsteps of other external actors and in turn are subject to the same operating constraints and challenges. For example, China's entry into the Nigerian oil sector involved Chinese companies becoming caught up¹¹⁸ in conflict between the Nigerian state and militias.

Close association with African ruling elites poses challenges for China at times of regime transition. Beijing for instance distanced itself from Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe due to the negative impact it had on the Chinese its investments¹¹⁹, the destabilizing effect on the wider Southern African Development Community (SADC) region and outcry over arms sales. However, current Chinese engagement related to conflict is arguably most consequential in post-conflict settings, where China has brought investment and effective infrastructural delivery and thus increased visible peace dividends in places such as Sierra Leone, Liberia

¹¹⁶ United Nations Office for Partnerships, A report on selection of partnership initiatives, September 1, 2010, Pg. 12

¹¹⁷ Large Dan (2008) *China's Role in mediation and conflict resolution In Africa*, Oslo Publishers, Norway, Pg. 36-37

¹¹⁸ Obi Cyrill (2008) *Oil Extraction, Dispossession, Resistance and Conflict in Nigeria's Oil Rich Niger Delta*, Nordic Africa Institute, Lagos, Nigeria

¹¹⁹ *China in Africa: Is China gaining control of Africa's resources?* A quarterly Journal by CQ Press, a division of congressional Quarterly Inc. January 1, 2008, Pg. 18-21

and Angola. China entered Sudan in the 1990s for oil purposes resulting from the need of the resource to power the industrialization process and the burgeoning economy back home.

The Chinese motive for Africa is closely hinged on the insatiable appetite for the oil development and the asymmetrical balance of the net benefits.¹²⁰ But the more economic angle that has for a long time been the drive in the Chinese involvement with Africa is the eight objectives of the Chinese motive for Africa. These have been believed to be the spelt out guiding agenda whenever the Chinese call for interactions. These are attached in their policy that is always considered sensitive to the relating state. First was to assure the supply of raw materials for China, including agricultural products, Create markets for Chinese products and services, Obtain land for agricultural purposes, Channel migration of Chinese people to Africa and Gain diplomatic support from African countries, Present an alternative to the Western development model, Provide an alternative to Western development cooperation and to emphasize China's status as a super-power.¹²¹ However, as China's involvement in Africa gets deeper and its embedded interests are inevitably subject to domestic influences and challenges by Africans from all sectors, the ability and desirability of holding to its stance of "non-intervention" in Africa is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. For example, in the case of Zambia, China threatened to withdraw its investment should the opposition president candidate, Michael Sata, be elected, due to his anti-China and pro-Taiwan campaign.¹²² Moreover, China began to realize that the cost of such a policy may eventually out-weigh its benefit. In the case of Sudan, China's support for the Sudanese government over the Darfur issue caused not only heavy damage to China's international reputation, but also the financial penalties when Chinese oil companies tried to raise money

¹²⁰ Burr, JM. and Collins, R.O,(2010) *Sudan in Turmoil: Hassan Al-Turabi and the Islamic state*, 1989-2003, Princeton, N.J. :Markus Weiner Publishers, Pg. 248-249

¹²¹ Dijk M. P.V (2009) Introduction: *Objectives and of China's new presence in Africa*. In M.P.V. Dijk(ED), *The new presence of China in Africa*, Amsterdam University press, Pg.11-12

¹²² Chris Alden(2007) *China in Africa*, Zed books Ltd, 2007, Pg.71

in international capital markets. In addition, Chinese government officials have increasingly realized that promoting good governance and transparency will be in China's long term interest, because operating in the African environment, Chinese enterprises are not immune to the risks of rampant corruption as well.

3.2 China - Sudan-south Sudan relations.

In understanding the Chinese relations and interventions in the south Sudan conflicts, it's important that this study digs through the past linkages of economics as well as other aspects of interactions therein. The interactions were largely with the united Sudan but the reactions of the south were equally strong owing to the impacts of the same Chinese relations with the north.¹²³ It's evidently clear that the main catalysts of the civil wars since the Al-Bashir coup between the South and North was more of an anti-religious expansionism, establishment of the Islamic caliphate alongside other factors alluded in the preceding historical background of the cause of wars, the discovery of oil changed the face and logic of the conflicts.¹²⁴ China had some element of engagement with the Sudan and provided some aid and investments way before 1989. One of the most famous projects, the Friendship Hall in Khartoum, was built in 1972 just after the Addis Ababa peace agreement. This hall symbolized the flourishing relationship between the states in the better parts of 1970s.¹²⁵ Another notable Chinese contribution was the 260 million Yuan, that's over US\$ 40 million worth of aid, which included the Friendship Hall, but as well the Medani Gandarif road, a fishery in Wadi Halfa, Rice development in Awei and a textile and weaving factory in Hassa Heissa.

¹²³ Crisis Group Africa Report, No. 186, *China's new courtship in Sudan*, April, 2012, Pg. 8

¹²⁴ Natsios A.S. *Sudan, south Sudan and Darfur*, Oxford. Oxford University press, 2012, p. 112

¹²⁵ Large D. *Sudan's foreign relations with Asia. China and the politics of looking east*. Institute for security studies, http://www.darfurconsortium.org/member_publications_2008/Feb/BP.ISS.0208_PDF_2007, Pg. 2

Other contributions that went along way to solidify the relationship between the Chinese covered in the area of medical missions to Sudan, a couple of hospitals were initiated and the China Foundation of Poverty Alleviation works improved health care, while several other companies also¹²⁶built schools, hospitals and roads. However, active Chinese involvement in the Sudan conflicts was hugely experienced in the Darfur conflicts much later in the early 2000 to the current independent South in the fallout of president Kiir and the deputy, Machar. The subsequent sub section of this chapter however delves into the Chinese hand of interests and the underlying support therein. There will be passing mentions of other related Chinese involvement in other areas such as Darfur. This is inspired by the fact that the roadmap to the South Sudanese independence had a huge chunk of the Darfur involvement as there existed a wing of the SPLM military, the Sudan Liberation Army SLA, an outfit that fought for recognition and equality just as the Southern militant group.

3.3 China's 1990's engagements

There are several trends in the Sino-Sudanese relationship from late 1980's perhaps to date, even still pursued with the autonomous south. The civil wars of the south and the north kind of had an effect of linkage crafted circumstantially, because the south had a built vitriol over the North's treatment and the underlying underdevelopment.¹²⁷ Turab, the then lieutenants in the Sudan administration supported Iraq during the gulf war in early 1991 and subsequently suffered alienation when it was declared persona non grata in the international political participation, at least largely, for supporting terror outfits especially after the assassination of Hosni Mubarak in 1995. This state of affairs alienated and isolated Sudan from major West and Middle East powers and also considering that the country was under sanction from the

¹²⁶ Attree .L. *Sudan and south Sudan*. In Saferworld(ED) *China and conflict affected states –between principle and pragmatism*. London, Saferworld, 2012, Pg. 24

¹²⁷ Kock de Petrus. *The politics of resources, resistance and peripheries in Sudan*, South African Institute of International affairs, Occasional paper No.86, June 2011, Pg. 6-7

UN in 1996 and again from the US in 1997, a country could only be prompted to adopt a new strategy of seeking help from another country, and this was China.¹²⁸

Sudan's major inflation and low negative economic growth was also another factor that codified the Sino-Sudan relationship.¹²⁹ This paved way for the Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation, and an Agreement on Economic, Trade and Technical Cooperation signed respectively in 1990 and 1992. These agreements bore the first few observable trade provisions and support by China to Sudan, it was to provide some interest free loans for university laboratory equipment, irrigation equipment among other elements to facilitate some level of observable growth and development.¹³⁰ Trade thrived since the beginning of the 1990s and during this period China had imported grain from Sudan. In 1993, Sudanese exports were US\$30 million, but they were almost three times higher in 1994. But China's entry came more entrenched with the oil discovery especially when the Chevron Company withdrew after the death of its four employees in 1994.¹³¹ In early years of 2000, China increased its participation in the Sudan with the writing off of 63% of Sudan's debt of US\$67.5 million and during the years 2002-2006, China providing Sudan with loans and grants worth US\$ 1.1 billion, which was 37% of the total amount of loans and grants contracted by Sudan in the period.¹³² It was these support that the Chinese offered the Khartoum administration that was considered an act of conspiracy with the oppressive north and the source of vitriol of the south to the Beijing administration. The civil wars before the south Sudan independence were considered by the south to be buoyed by the Chinese financial and military support of the

¹²⁸ Daniel Large, Pateyluke. *Caught in the middle: China and India in Sudan's transition*, A DIIS Working paper 2010, Pg. 6

¹²⁹ Natsios. *Sudan, south Sudan and Darfur*, Oxford, Oxford University press, 2012, Pg. 108

¹³⁰ Central Bank of Sudan 2002 Policy report

¹³¹ Burr J. M. & Collins (2010) *Sudan in turmoil: Hassan al- Turabi and the Islamist state*, Markus Wiener Publishers, Princeton, Pg. 247-249

¹³² Askouru Ali. *China's investment in Sudan: Destroying communities*, a Pambazuka Journal, December, 14, 2006, Issue 282

north and subsequent relations with them began suspiciously but later gained momentum with their support of the CPA.¹³³

3.4 China South Sudan relations

The independence of the South Sudan was in 2011 when the final part of the CPA was implemented. That was a culmination of a referendum process on the 7th February.¹³⁴ With this development, came a new stake, a stake that was not a distant mirage but a reality that the dawn had since made a turn around and indeed must be lived with, the endowment of South Sudan with more than 75% of the natural oil resource.¹³⁵ This phenomenon became a stimulating and another compelling situation confronting the Chinese government, juggling between interests and foreign policy as it waded through the reality of largely interest protection. China's economic engagement with South Sudan, the world's youngest country, grew rapidly since the latter's independence in 2011.

Around 100 to 140 Chinese enterprises operated in South Sudan by 2013.¹³⁶ Since 2008, they had concluded agreements worth about 10 billion USD with the South Sudanese government, and the latter through official channels, had expressed willingness to have Beijing's support for projects worth 8 billion USD¹³⁷ and the outbreak of violent conflicts in December 2013 posed challenges to China's burgeoning economic engagement with South Sudan and the normal operations of Chinese companies there. Prior to the on-going conflict, oil evidently featured as the most significant component of the bilateral economic relations. With China

¹³³ International Crisis Group. *China's new courtship with Sudan*, Africa report No. 186, April 4, 2014, Pg. 3 -4

¹³⁴ John Brosche, *CPA: New Sudan, Old Sudan of Two Sudan's*, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Journal of African Policy Studies, Volume 13, No 1, 2007.

¹³⁵ Fortin J. *China in the middle: south Sudan's biggest oil importer learns to wield its clout*, An Economists Publication, April 9, 2014

¹³⁶ China's official South Sudan Economic Partnership statistics 2013/South Sudan foreign Investment Statistics 2013,

¹³⁷ Global Risks Insights. *Violence in south Sudan threatens Chinese oil investment*, December 18, 2014

National Petroleum Corporation's (CNPC) large investment stake in the oil industry, South Sudan, at its full capacity, accounted for approximately 5 % of China's imported oil.¹³⁸

South Sudan relapsed into war on December 15, 2013, primarily due to the power struggle between President Kiir and former deputy Machar. China once again found one of its sizable foreign investments particularly in the oil sector embroiled in local political turbulence. This served as a painful reminder to Beijing that independence not only endowed South Sudan with the over seventy per cent of unified Sudan's total oil output, but also daunting political and security risks on the operating companies and the entire investments amounting in tens of dollars.¹³⁹ But Beijing's investments were celebrated too soon before the Chinese government shot itself in the leg with the business interest. This was the delivery of the first consignment of a \$38 million order of arms from China North Industries Group (NORINCO) an operative consortium from China, to Juba, South Sudan's capital, in June, which called into question China's neutrality in the peace process.¹⁴⁰

Just immediately after the outcry as to how neutral the Chinese administration was with the twitchy arms contract, which, according to this research was the same architecture in the Darfur and the Central unified government of Sudan versus south wars, it appeared therefore that China was still keen on pursuing the trade freedom, linked closely to the Darfur conflict which was a blatant violation of the United Nations arms embargo?¹⁴¹ China's ambitions in the South Sudan was not a distant opposite of the choreography of interest based engagements in the Darfur, Abiyei province and the Kordofanian geographies, connecting the

¹³⁸ Global Risks insights. *Violence in south Sudan threatens Chinese oil investment*, December 18, 2014

¹³⁹ The Jamestown Foundation, Global Research and Analysis: *Testing the limits: China's Expanding Role in the South Sudan Civil War* China Brief Volume: 14 Issue: 19, October 10, 2014

¹⁴⁰ Gridlefflyya. *China halts arms sales to south Sudan after Norinco shipment*, a Bloomberg Business journal, September 30, 2014

¹⁴¹ Gridnefflyya. *China halts arms sales to south Sudan after Norinco shipment*, a Bloomberg business Journal, September 30, 2014

narrative to the conspiracy of the Beijing involvements in the earlier similar dealings. China soon after would react to the outcry and suspicion in their trade relations with Juba by announcing a halt in the supply of the second batch of the arms consignment in September 20 2013, in addition to the Chinese Foreign Ministry's announcement of the deployment of a full infantry battalion to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) China was seen as very actively and directly involved in the South peace process, something not usual.

Aljazeera Presenter Clark and guests Ochieno - writer for the *New African* magazine and commentator on African affairs and Naidu- Specialist in African international relations and the rise of emerging powers in Africa assert that China may have been Africa's biggest trading partner but the arm's length approach it took on the conflicts and domestic difficulties in the African continent is not far from the obvious trend of interest.¹⁴² This was demonstrated in the Khartoum and Darfur conflicts that were out rightly a pursuit of self-agenda which goes ahead to questions China's deployment of 700 peace battalion to the UNMISS peace keeping mission.¹⁴³ The Chinese administration was faced with a great challenge just as they did in the previous standoffs between the Khartoum government and the de- facto South as well as the Darfur genocide, way before independence of the South. And the Chinese just like the tradition of the international political system of the self-help construction, demonstrated their ambition to maximize from strategic resources that abound from various parts of the continent.¹⁴⁴ Suffice to say therefore that the involvement of the Chinese in the autonomous South was not by default but a rich economic inspiration as alluded by Tiezi, that Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, on an Africa tour, represented pure Chinese interests. Wang was

¹⁴² Aljazeera online, *Inside Africa*, November 20, 2013, 1830GMT

¹⁴³ The Aljazeera's inside story *China's motive in South Sudan? The duty of a responsible world power or protecting own self-interests?* 13 January 2015 1927GMT, <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2015/01/china-motive-south-sudan-201511319545>

¹⁴⁴ Sutter R.G. *Chinese foreign relations: power and policy since the cold war*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008, Pg. 5

in Sudan, where he participated in a discussion with both sides of the South Sudan conflict on how to speed up political reconciliation in that newly-formed country.¹⁴⁵

In Khartoum, Wang met with representatives from both sides of the South Sudan conflict as well as officials from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a trade bloc consisting of eight African nations that is helping mediate the South Sudan peace process. China's Foreign Ministry dubbed the meeting a "China-brokered Special Consultation in Support of the IGAD -led South Sudan Peace Process." This consortium intended to put China front and center and yet insist on IGAD leadership. This Consultation was held to continue with the support for the mediation efforts by IGAD on the South Sudan issue, and to encourage conflicting parties of South Sudan to proceed with dialogue and negotiation as was explained by Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei during the visit. But what coined and created the suspicion was the insistence on the IGAD leadership role. China could have as well opted for a direct mediation initiative and play the world responsible power as they had claimed on the sides, but adopting a silent operated perhaps worked well than the former.¹⁴⁶ And so went the begging question on why there was an insistence on IGAD's leadership role? *Political cover* was the answer. China was generally known to steer clear of internal conflicts like the ongoing war between South Sudan's Kiir and opposition fighters led by former Vice President Machar and was fully aware that the conflict was more ethnic based on the political roles and resource controls. However, China's own interests in South Sudan and, perhaps just as importantly, lack of any other major powers with an incentive to step up, forced Beijing to play a more active role and the role was basically interest based. In the June 2004 Reuters report, China's ambassador to South Sudan was quoted admitting that

¹⁴⁵ Tiezi Shanon. China in south Sudan: practical responsibility, a Diplomat journal, January 13, 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/china-in-south-sudan-practical-responsibility/>

¹⁴⁶ *China's motive in south Sudan; The duty of a responsible world power or protecting own interest?* Aljazeera, January, 13, 2015

China had great interests in the South Sudan and had to make even greater efforts for the two sides to stop the infighting. This does not pass for an isolated statement.¹⁴⁷

In this context, the reality of states' priority was highlighted against the backdrop of a sole responsible actor's expected intervention and the need to respond to the need of the affected first, in this case being the South Sudanese. Chinese stakes in the South Sudan is reflected in the, what is in it for me and what do i stand to lose mantra, reflected in the culmination of the growing economic partnership with the South administration. Just as elaborately discussed in the background of this study, China was keen to initiate a rapport wrapped in the bilateral intentions with the south for individual benefit purposes highlighted in the eight objectives of China for Africa.¹⁴⁸ Since South Sudan gained independence in 2011, bilateral economic engagement had grown rapidly. The bilateral trade volume, although largely insignificant to China, almost quadrupled in 2013 to \$2.54 billion, representing roughly 18 percent of South Sudan's GDP according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 2013 with oil continuing to feature prominently as a component of the bilateral economic relationship.¹⁴⁹ About 140 Chinese companies were registered in South Sudan and the traces of their involvement in non-oil sectors were increasingly perceptible, particularly in infrastructure construction and telecommunication.¹⁵⁰ However, the unresolved conflict overshadowed this burgeoning expansion of economic cooperation and the potential developmental benefits that would result from it were unlikely to be realized any time. Even in the hailed peace mission contribution in which the Chinese administration offered its maiden 700 troops to the now popular UNMISS; there goes nothing solely of the humanitarian instincts about, appendage

¹⁴⁷ Reuters Report, *China urges renewed peace effort in south Sudan April 24, 2004* <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/23/us-china-southsudan-idUSBREA3MOME20140423>

¹⁴⁸ Dijk. *Introduction: Objectives of and instruments for China's new presence in Africa*. In M.P.v. Dijk (ED) *New presence of China in Africa*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press

¹⁴⁹ Zou Hang, *Testing the limits, China's expanding role in south Sudanese civil war*, a Jamestown journal, China brief volume 15, issue 19, October 10, 2014 October 8 2003.

¹⁵⁰ Atree Larry. *China and conflict affected states,: between principle and pragmatism*, an excerpt from the saferworld report, January 2012, Pg. 29 - 30

of interest and individual agenda setting abound in the whole context of Chinese interventions. China's significant stake in South Sudan motivates its participation in the peacekeeping mission there to an unprecedented level. China never failed to demonstrate to the world their known design of intentions and interest protection. After the visit by the foreign minister Yun, the conflict in the south did not prove an ordinary conflict whose end was going to be walk in the park, they could not stomach anymore threats of abductions and killings of their workers at the oil installations.

Unlike the Darfur war that was a germinating ground for their exploitation of oil since no other company could operate in the volatile environment except the China National Petroleum Corporation¹⁵¹, south Sudan proved a little tricky in the sense that the continuation of the war caused more harm than good and its end would be God sent outcome and efforts had to be mounted for the realization of the desired results.¹⁵² And this was reflected in the Chinese support at the Security Council on Resolution 2155, which reprioritized the mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) toward the protection of civilians. China succeeded in garnering support to charge the beefed-up peacekeeping mission with responsibility to protect the civilian populations at oil installations, note the emphasis, Oil installations, and a key component in their interests.¹⁵³ China's efforts to secure the arrangement in Resolution 2155 confirmed the link between its overseas interests and its participation in UN peacekeeping missions. Furthermore, China's dispatching of combat troops as peacekeepers indicated Beijing's willingness to fully explore all available means under the UN umbrella to protect its overseas

¹⁵¹ Casertano Stephano. *Our Land, our Oil: Natural Resources, Local nationalism, and violent secession* Wiesbaden Publishers, UK 2013. Pg.135-36

¹⁵² Martina Michael. *China's role in south Sudan marks change in policy*, Business Daily Journal, February 2014

¹⁵³ LychColumn. *UN peacekeepers to protect China's oil interests in south Sudan*, The Cable, June 16, 2014, foreignpolicy.com/.../u-n-peacekeepers-to-protect-china's-oil-interests-in-...

interests even at the face of changing or modifying its coveted policy of non-political involvement and support.

The first ever battalion was a deviation from the standard Chinese model of operations, where it has never dispatched any such units. In fact, this also dovetails with China's domestic mainstream view that its participation in peacekeeping missions constitutes an effective way to protecting its overseas interests, especially when Beijing still lacked long-range projection capabilities and did not intend to move dramatically away from its longstanding policy of non-interference as was reported in the Chinese National Radio in May.¹⁵⁴ In fact in an interview with Some South Sudanese officials, there was a suggestion that Chinese troops would be deployed to protect vital installations in the oil-rich Unity and Upper Nile states, which reinforces the mercantilist interpretation of China's proactive engagement with UNMISS and the wider operatives in the southern state.¹⁵⁵ The Chinese involvement with South Sudan conflicts do not hang loose as an initiative out of a strong need for intervention on human suffering as been argued on the side lines.

Looked through keenly, there were elements of strong interests. This is not history that this research has established but a clear show change of policy to suit some interest of sort. During an interview with Independent Newspaper, China's former ambassador to South Africa, Zhong, happily acknowledged the deficiencies in China's understanding of the South Sudan conflict, which was the focus of his attention. Zhong appreciated that the Chinese did not respond effectively to the realities on the points of their interests, more so Africa. Now, given the engagement of China and Africa for close to decade now, something about this realization was coming out and direct engagement with the warring south. And the more

¹⁵⁴ Oystein Tunsj(2013) *Security and Profit in China's Energy Policy: Hedging Against Risk*, Columbia University Press, 2013, Columbia, Pg. 97-100

¹⁵⁵ Zhou Hang. Testing the limits: *China's expanding role in the south Sudanese civil war*, a Jamestown Foundation production, China Brief, volume 14, October 10, 2014, Pg. 3-6

striking thing about Zhong's interview was his description of his 'pretty dramatic' first meeting with the South Sudanese opposition – the Machar rebels within the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), who had fallen out with President Kiir – after the civil war that erupted in Juba in December 2013.¹⁵⁶ To most diplomats and this study, meeting both sides was a standard practice, but not for China in this regard. Zhong admitted that for the longest time China's policy of non-interference in the domestic politics of nations had been rigid and that direct involvement was also prudent for development and prosperity. But the question was why Africa? Not even the answer given by Zhong that Beijing's had simply realized that tackling conflicts had become necessary for advancing Beijing's historical policy of promoting African development, could satisfactorily answer the question especially in the wake of a second scramble for Africa.¹⁵⁷ This rather tortured explanation recalled China's more familiar euphemistic justification of its aggressively pro-market economic policies of the last 30 years as 'socialism with Chinese characteristics.' Such linguistic contortion was the price of attempting to maintain ideological consistency while adapting to changing realities. A small price to pay, it seemed.

Around this time Zhong informed that he had given a firm lecture to the united SPLM before the fallout later in the year 2013, about the need to resume oil production, which it had stopped over a dispute with Khartoum regarding its tariff for pumping the oil to its harbor for export. He also told them to put the interest of the people first in tackling the leadership wrangles. And he gave a similar lecture to the Machar rebels after the split in December 2013, urging them not to attack the oilfields, as the revenue they produced would be vital to the recovery of the country after the conflict, no matter who was in charge. The rebels had already completely destroyed one of the oil fields. In both cases they seemed to listen to him,

¹⁵⁶ " China – South Sudan – *Beijing's role in conflict resolution and the contortions of language* , Africa – News and Analysis, November 6, 2014

¹⁵⁷ *China's role in international conflict management: Sudan and south Sudan global review*, A Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS) Journal in collaboration with the Saferworld, December 2012.

and he believed the advice he gave was the more persuasive coming from China than it would have been from Western governments. Of course it just happened that China had substantial investment in the oilfields, and about 300 of its workers in South Sudan were still running them. And so the protection role was at its very best.¹⁵⁸ It is a long narrative the innocuous involvement of the Asian nation in the conflict riddled south Sudan and indeed Africa. Africa for the longest time dating decades had been a continent viewed by the west as a neglected pole with nothing much to offer especially in the period post-colonial era. But a closer look reveals a latest quest characterized by economic jostles as African states took positions on which side to align. China was playing the long game in South Sudan and Africa as a whole. While the West ignored the economic potential of the continent for decades, China had filled the void, exchanging its capital investment and know-how for long-term control over African oil, land and natural resources.¹⁵⁹ It had a ways to go in becoming Africa's uncontested power broker and South Sudan's protracted conflict reflected the limits of its stabilizing influence.

Nevertheless, given that the 21st century was predicted to be "Africa's century" of economic growth strategically positioned itself to reap the rewards of calculated moves. And truly the interventions in the Independent South Sudan by China following the fallout between Kiir and Machar were a true reflection of one such move. "I expect anyone with deeper understanding of International Relations not to view China as just a concerned responsible partner in the South Sudan interventions, the mantra remains clear, "What is in it for me"¹⁶⁰ With extensive oil and infrastructure investments in South Sudan, China had a history of arms shipments to Kiir's forces, as well as increasing political and economic influence on Sudan. South Sudan accounted for 5 percent of China's crude imports and the state-owned

¹⁵⁸ Brown James. *China-south Sudan –Beijing's role in conflict resolution and the contortions of language*, Africa News and Analysis, November, 6, 2014

¹⁵⁹ Ponder Ian. *China: Africa's new power broker*, a National Interest Journal, June 22 2015

¹⁶⁰ Phone Interview, Professor Oginga Nying'uro, Senior lecturer, Political Science department, University of Nairobi, July 15, 2015

China National Petroleum Corporation held a 40 percent stake in three of South Sudan's largest oil fields. Moreover, China had been quietly ramping up its humanitarian aid, pledging over \$21 million of emergency relief in October 2014.

The grueling efforts are also witnessed in the Chinese government meeting the two warring sides in Khartoum during a visit of its secretary of African affairs late in 2013. A report by the Saferworld indicated that despite its stated neutrality, China was gradually using diplomatic means to push for the resolution of certain conflicts.¹⁶¹ It also said the Asian power was becoming a major supplier of conventional arms to African states and had increased its contributions to UN peacekeeping missions twentyfold since 2000, with the majority based in Africa.¹⁶² China took a very simple position with regard to the conflict pitting the two countries in the Oil transit fee impasse, which was that it wanted to see oil production and export resumed by a fair agreement as soon as possible, and it pressed both parties to negotiate seriously under the facilitation of the African Union.

It showed no interest in any other solution than utilising the existing infrastructure, which was built by the Chinese for this purpose.¹⁶³ But low key or otherwise, China's vested interest in the oil transit fee conflict, as revealed by the study, resulted in a shift in their non-interference policy. It was evidently clear that China played its first shuttle diplomacy in 2012 by sending a special envoy to broker the tensions. China's economic need forced it to intervene in the domestic politics of another country. In 2008, using its ties with Sudan, China quietly pressed Darfur to accept UN peacekeeping forces. Although this step may have been outside China's diplomatic normalcy by some observers that it was executed under the situation where a barrage of criticisms were leveled against the country for its close ties with

¹⁶¹Michael Truebag. Regional coordinator, conflict management, Saferworld, phone interview, September 3, 2015.

¹⁶²Saferworld Report 2011 Pg. 6

¹⁶³Adams Oloo, Head of Department, Political Science, University of Nairobi, Oral interview, June 20 2015

Sudan just when the Beijing Olympics was about to occur, saving image as the host was the grandest they could pull at the time.¹⁶⁴

3.5 Chapter summary

The study has established that the entire choreography around the Chinese intervention in the South Sudan either in a conflict within its own administration units or inter-boundary with the Sudan centered around the Darfur and the wider Nuban mountains, has projected a unique approach of the way China has internationalized the stand offs,. From the respondents and the secondary data referred to, the traditional China with strict foreign policy of none interference in domestic affairs of other states appeared to soften its policy of non-involvement, later employing undercover operatives and finally direct participation to intercede and exploit the opportunity to foster cooperation.

It's clear that China of the 80's was not the China of 90's when the realization of the burgeoning economic power became a reality and powering the economy with the requisite energy became a necessity. China surpassed America as Africa's largest trading partner in 2009 thanks to the heavy investment and non-political policy that the African countries found fit for their governance choreography.¹⁶⁵ China's attitude to conflict resolution in Africa reflects contrasting policy priorities and economic Interests. China remains a developing power more willing and able to talk peace than to participate substantively in such processes in Africa. In part this reflects a dearth of experience in applied conflict resolution in Africa. More importantly, it demonstrates China's primary interest in engaging on its own terms for its own ends. This interest is complicated by Africa's wider foreign relations, which feature continuing efforts to promote a fuller incorporation of China into multilateral forums and governing norms and values.

¹⁶⁴Hui Ting Ying. *China's delicate diplomatic tango between Sudan and South Sudan*, January 7, 2013

¹⁶⁵Shinn .H. *China and Africa: A century of engagement*, University of Pennsylvania press, USA, 2007, Pg.17

CHAPTER FOUR

INTERNATIONALISATION OF THE SOUTH SUDAN BY CHINA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IMPACTS.

4.0 Introduction

After establishing the role of the Chinese administration in the South Sudan conflicts and the dynamics of the same in chapter two and three, chapter four espoused to expose the net effect of their participation in the decade long conflict scaling its way to the independent South Sudan standoffs. This chapter delved into effects modeled around the peace process in the south Sudan mainstreaming the civil wars therein.

4.1 China- South Sudan war involvement impact

The Chinese involvement in the first civil wars of the south Sudan might really not be enumerable. The first, also called the *Anyanya*1 lasted close to two decades from 1955-1972. The immediate causes of the mutiny were a trial of a southern member of the national

assembly and an allegedly false telegram urging northern administrators in the South to oppress Southerners.¹⁶⁶The mutinies were suppressed, though survivors fled the towns and began an uncoordinated insurgency in rural areas. Poorly armed and ill-organized, they were though little threat to the outgoing colonial power of the newly formed Sudanese government and operated largely as a guerrilla outfit for the period 1955-1963. However, the insurgents gradually developed into a secessionist movement composed of the 1955 mutineers and southern students. These groups formed the *Anyanya* guerrilla army.

Starting from Equatorial, between 1963 and 1969 *Anyanya* spread throughout the other two southern provinces: Upper Nile and Bahr al Ghazal. However, the separatist movement was crippled by internal ethnic divisions. The war came to an end in 1972 with the Addis Ababa agreement which guaranteed greater cultural and religious autonomy to the southerners.¹⁶⁷

The second, a result of the unimplemented Addis Ababa agreement that had spelt out much freedom and independence broke out in 1983 and lasted till 2005. The war was spiked off when President Nimeiri attempted to take control of oil fields straddling the north-south border. Oil had been discovered in Bentiu in 1978, in southern Kordofan and Upper Blue Nile in 1979, the Unity oilfields in 1980 and Adar oilfields in 1981, and in Heglig in 1982.¹⁶⁸ Chinese support for the Khartoum administration during the civil war was reflected in form of arms supply in 70's but real presence in terms of oil involvement is seen in the collusion between the oil companies and the rebels that fought the southerners in their quest for freedom and economic emancipation. In fact at independence, China's communist party administration was accused of a meddling process of during the period of the war.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁶O'Ballance, Edgar. (1977). *the Secret War in the Sudan: 1955–1972*. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books. (Faber and Faber edition) Pg. 42

¹⁶⁷O'Ballance Edgar. 1977. *The Secret War in the Sudan: 1955–1972*. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books. (Faber and Faber edition) London, UK, P.57

¹⁶⁸Raftopoulos Brian and Karin Alexander (2006). *Peace in the balance: the crisis in the Sudan*. African Minds. Pg. 12–13.

¹⁶⁹Copnall James. (2014) *A Poisonous Thorn in Our Hearts*. London Publishers, London, UK, Pg.205

4.1.1 Deaths, human rights violations and underdevelopment

Just like in the Darfur region, the ripple effect of the second civil war had the same choreographic identity. The war caused a numbers of social, cultural and economic problems for Sudan. Many social changes took place, not only in the southern Sudan, where the war was largely fought since inception, but also to the Sudanese Nation as a whole.¹⁷⁰

The war in Sudan has not only cost the Sudan 2.9 million lives, but the country was economically destroyed. The Sudan government invested massively in the war that cost it approximately two million US Dollars per day. This multiplied with the total number of days the war took, the figure might equal more than two African states total domestic fiscal budgets.¹⁷¹ Between 1983 and 1984 alone, it was estimated that 500,000 south Sudanese died in the war between the Khartoum Government and the rebels of the Sudan People's Liberation Army, the SPLA. In 1994 the war was mainly fought in the South and the death toll was assumed to be greater than in the North. Millions of Sudanese citizens were also displaced. By 1994 there were about 20,000 displaced children between the ages of 7 and 17.¹⁷²

These astronomical catastrophes of displacements and deaths were more generalized attributes of the war, largely viewed to have been incredibly supported in various natures. Maluki, International Studies expert, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi, says that it is apparent that had the Chinese administration not been part of the support for the Khartoum government perhaps, in fact most probably the war

¹⁷⁰Lobe, J. 1998: *Self- Determination Conflict Profile*, in: Foreign Policy in Focus, London Publishers, UK, Pg. 35-57

¹⁷¹Teresa Welsh. *South Sudanese fighting carries heavy price tag*, a U'S News, Opinion and Analysis journal, January 14, 2015

¹⁷²ScaruffPiero. *Wars and casualties of the 20th and 21st centuries*, London Publishers 2000, London, UK, Pg. 76-87

might not have reached the devastating levels it actually reached.¹⁷³ The war had a toll on the most vulnerable society members including the children. By 1994 there were about 20,000 displaced children between the ages of 7 and 17.¹⁷⁴ Most of these children had lost their parents in the war and UNICEF called them lost children of the Sudan. Due to the war, these Sudanese children were forced to walk long distances looking for security, food, water and education. It is estimated for instance, about, that about 30,000 Children had to walk from Sudan to Ethiopia in 1991 in escape of the heated civil unrest, the worst ever penalty to pay for broken societal appropriateness. This process was replicated immediately Ethiopia got independence when they had to traverse the harsh terrains enroot back to their country Sudan and the harrowing experience of some dying on the way due to hunger, thirst and diseases is untold.¹⁷⁵ Most children were equally displaced and stationed in camps in various countries such as Kenya and the outskirts of the Sudan. In 1992 UNICEF managed to unify about 1,200 children with their families. However, 17,000 children were still reported to be in the refugee camps in Kenya.¹⁷⁶ The number of displaced children displaced had increased since that time, approximately 1.2 million.

On the educational front, the level of devastation cannot be overemphasized. The educational policy of both Sudanese Governments in the war torn Southern Sudan had been characterized and dominated by the arguments that there was war and instability in the South and that it would have been a waste of money and energy to invest in that part of the country, where 80% of the territory remained under the SPLA/SPLM.¹⁷⁷ In fact, the government was not in control of many towns except Juba, the capital of Southern Sudan, Malakal and Wau where

¹⁷³ Oral Interview with Maluki, Institute of International Studies, University of Nairobi, August 20, 2015, Nairobi.

¹⁷⁴ Unicef report on the cost of south Sudan civil wars, 1996, Pg.25.

¹⁷⁵ Corbett, S. 2001: *The Lost Boys of the Sudan land in America*,: The New York Times Magazine, April 2001, Pg. 50-54)

¹⁷⁶ Unicef report analysis on devastating effects of the south Sudan civil wars, 1996

¹⁷⁷ Deng, F. M. 1995. *War of visions, conflict of Identities in the south Sudan*. Washington: Brookings Institution, Pg.88-99

the control was however more in terms of saving face by the central government and so Khartoum saw no reason to open schools or higher education institutions in the South. Besides that, many people in the South were considered supporters of the SPLA/SPLM by the Khartoum government and, therefore, there was not need to be offered government services.¹⁷⁸ The only Southern university, the University of Juba, only retained the regional tag of Juba but in reality operated from the North in Khartoum after being transferred there in 1987 due to security reasons.¹⁷⁹ Universities were ill equipped with the necessary instruments a standard university should possess. In short, they were paper Universities that matched no international standards. Most of the graduates at the new universities were classified as none qualified for the various job they were meant for.¹⁸⁰ On health, before 1983, there existed an established functioning health system in Sudan and in the North in particular. And as the war continued in the South, the health system deteriorated in the North. Medicine was either not available or not within reach to many locals due to exorbitant costs in the many hospitals in the North. Many people could not afford to visit a doctor. The situation in the South was equally damning all the way from 1994 with the few hospitals that were established soon after the Addis agreement in 1972 being shuttered in the war. There was not any single hospital in the South that was functioning at the time. 1994 there were some notable outbreak of deadly diseases in Southern Sudan, notably, the Kalazaar. About five thousand Southern Sudanese from Western Upper Nile died of Kalazaar. In general, the humanitarian situation in Sudan was not impressive a bit, especially in the Upper Nile region.¹⁸¹

4.1.2 Development effects

¹⁷⁸Breidlid, *A concise history of south Sudan*, Fountain Publishers, Kampala, Uganda, 2014, Pg. 312

¹⁷⁹Oral interview with Emmanuel Jaal, former child soldier and peace ambassador to the United Nations, 20th June 2015, Nairobi, 20 00 hours.

¹⁸⁰Yei/Himman, *Educational Policy of the New Sudan and Implementation guidelines*, Oxford Publishers, UK, 2002, Pg. 1-33

¹⁸¹Ayoti, M. (2000) *Unfinished Business in Upper Nile*. A research report, commissioned by international Ecumenical Church Agencies, pp. 1-31.

It was argued that one of the greatest precursors to war was the blatant discrimination and marginalization of the southern population by the autocratic regime of the Khartoum power. But this was in light of the Chinese support and the external influence already investigated and established by the study. Chinese actions directly and indirectly supported the north, reinforcing the center-periphery effect and the horizontal inequalities in the larger populace. China was relevant in the Khartoum power matrix and their direct or indirect support undermined the efforts of the southerners' oppositions, thereby perpetuating the central government rule.¹⁸² The development model to the south Sudan was more dependent on the extension of the support by the central government of Sudan. And so, much as this might not have had a direct positive contribution to the South, considering that most of the control was only in Juba and a few areas under the government's grasps, and again remaining alive to a fact that even most educational institutions worth serious support of the government were already operating from the north such as the University of Juba. It nonetheless played a role in the Sudan development which by and large involved the state of the southerners before the secession. During the period of the second civil war, all the way to late 90's, most support of the Chinese to the North involved arms trade, the initiation and development of the oil infrastructure.¹⁸³

The Greater Nile Petroleum (GNPOC) Operating Company, a government-Chinese consortium with 40% stake of China National Petroleum Company, initially constructed a pipeline beginning at the Heglig oil field in South Kordofan state.¹⁸⁴ But by 1999, the pipeline had only been extended and began in the Unity oil field. The pipeline extended to the Port Sudan crude oil refinery on the Red Sea, via the Nuba Mountains and Khartoum in the

¹⁸²AchiecqueMawut.(2011) *Integration and fragmentation of Sudan: An African renaissance*, Bloomington Publishers, London UK, Pg. 483-487

¹⁸³*The EU and Sudan: On the brink of change*, a Great Britain Parliament 18th session report 2010-2012, London stationery office, UK, 2011, Pg. 32

¹⁸⁴AP 1999, *Sudan inaugurates oil pipeline*, Alexander's Gas & Oil Connections' Journal, May 31, 1999 Retrieved March 5 2008.

subsequent years to cover more miles.¹⁸⁵This infrastructure served and continue to be the back bone of the Sudanese administration as the revenue that accrued out of the exports served to support any development initiative that there would be in the de jure south Sudan in the early years. The transit fees also accruing out of the transfer of the oil minerals from the now independent South to the North is now an additional income generator of the North. China's contribution to the south Sudan's conflicts in terms of their monetary support appeared constricted and shrouded in mystery. China had no definition of aid and did not separate investments and aid, which made comparison much more difficult. In addition, China had no statistics of the amount of aid they gave or a systematic evaluation of aid so determining the amount of China's aid to other nations and its effectiveness was extremely difficult.¹⁸⁶The Chinese support for the government had undoubtedly undermined all the efforts of the opposition to effect change in the government, thereby extending its rule despite the clear political indications that the junta had been rendered¹⁸⁷ unable to rule the country without heavy Chinese economic and military support.

The monetary assistance as well as the weaponry supplies rendered the north south conflict a monster that never appeared to go away. And in the respect of Sudan it's just as such, aid not quantified but highlighted as Official Development (ODA) Assistance with an appendage of commerce and trade element. And with this constriction, China thrived in its trade support with the Sudan in the context of being vague but existing in its rallied trade partnership with the Khartoum administration.¹⁸⁸In early 2000, China's support and relations with Sudan's growing notable vigor. The Chinese intensified their relationship, and in 2001, China wrote

¹⁸⁵ USAID 2001, *Sudan: Oil and gas concession holders*, University of Texas Library, Retrieved March 5 2008.

¹⁸⁶ Brautigam, D. (2011). Aid 'with Chinese characteristics': Chinese foreign aid and development. Finance meets the OECD-DAC aid regime. *Journal of International Development*, 23(5), 752-754. doi: 10.1002/jid.1798

¹⁸⁷ Askouri, A. (2007). *China's investment in Sudan: Displacing villages and destroying communities*. In F. Manji & S. Marks (Eds.), *African perspectives on China in Africa*. Oxford/Cape Town/ Nairobi: Fahamu

¹⁸⁸ Chapnniere, J.R (2009) *Chinese aid to Africa, origins, forms and issues*, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, Pg. 20

63% of Sudan's debt of US\$67.5 million.¹⁸⁹ During the years 2002 and 2006, China provided Sudan with loans and grants worth US\$ 1.1 billion, which is 37% of the total amount of loans and grants contracted by Sudan. A lot of the money went to the development of electricity, water projects, irrigation, drilling of wells, and solar energy, mostly in the northern area. I like pointing that this sort of development out of the Sino support, played role in the development of the North and very little though in the south due to the marginalization and the resistance from the south in the second civil war.¹⁹⁰ But again notable to say, it was the united Sudan with no independent south, so whatever benefit that accrued out of the Sino-Sudanese relations was meant for the South and the entire country but the friction and high level of marginalization deprived the south of equal distribution of the gained resources and net effect of abject poverty and skewed development. China's trade aid and investment was assumed to have contributed to numerous projects including schools, roads, hospitals etc., their participation was viewed in terms of the support of the conflicts and the amounting effects in the catastrophes. More efforts were employed in the aid system and the so called win-win model of partnership of the Chinese administration, but little concern was employed in monitoring the extent of the aid use.¹⁹¹

Though socio economic development of Sudan was cited as the greatest conflict curtailer, the Chinese participation on the flipside, was viewed in the light of catalyst and intensifying factor rather than a preventing one in the sense that any activity that increases a government potential for political legitimacy and warfare renders it culpable in the whole effects and support for the war.¹⁹² Victor of Peace Studies, United States International University, further alluded to this narrative saying, "culpability is a denting responsibility aroused by a direct or

¹⁸⁹ Askouru .A. (2007) *China's investment in Sudan: Displacing villages and destroying communities*. In F. Manji and S. Marks (Eds.) *African perspective on China in Africa*. Oxford/Cape Town/Nairobi: Fahamu. Pg .71

¹⁹⁰ Europa publications, *Africa south of the Sahara 2004*, Psychology Press, 2003, UK, Pg. 1080-1088

¹⁹¹ StocchettiMatteo. *Images in use: Towards the critical analysis of visual communication*, Amsterdam Publishers, Amsterdam, 2011, Pg.212-215

¹⁹² Attree.L. *Sudan and south Sudan*. In saferworld (Ed), *China and conflict affected states. Between principle and pragmatism*. London, saferworld. 2012, Pg.24

indirect hand in a conflict situation in the world political system and any element around it must be avoided at all costs".¹⁹³In fact the Chinese involvement in the civil war was the result of the skewed development structures responsible for the marginalization of the South Sudan considering that most of the developments during and after the conflicts were much more centered in the north, only acted as an intensifying factor to the conflict than anything preventive.¹⁹⁴Just like in all conflict scenarios in Africa and world over, politics of external involvement never escaped scholarly debates and this is what created complex dynamics. One prism that distorted and created a different overview to the Chinese involvement in the south Sudan or rather the Sudan civil wars, was the politicization frame attached to it.¹⁹⁵Interests and political game plays were always almost intertwined in the jostles viewed to be theoretically realistic as such in most instances is the world's power inspiration. Internationalization of conflicts escaped no political interpretation, which in most cases delayed conflict resolutions or even abetted it.

The DRC conflict was a living testimony, since the involvement of third parties played spoiler behavior. Even external aids from international bodies at times were faced with political condemnations. Aid from the UN, AU, etc. for instance, were viewed all to have been used on rebellions or tribes to increase their own people's fortunes and gain an advantage. The SPLA were directly and harshly affected by the government's use of NGOs, and aid workers were targeted and killed.¹⁹⁶This must be defined as inclusive of and not limited to the Chinese aid to the government of Sudan and the resultant effect to the southerners and the wider ripple effects it had to the south Sudanese socio-economic

¹⁹³Phone interview with Oluoch Victor, conflict and peace studies, University of Nairobi, August 10, 20015

¹⁹⁴Leriche Mathew, Arnold Mathew.(2013)*From revolution to independence*, Oxford University press, New York, Pg. 112-114

¹⁹⁵Johnsons D.H. (2003). *The root causes of the south Sudan civil wars*, The International African institute, Oxford, Pg. 144.

¹⁹⁶Johnsons D.H. (2003). *The root causes of the south Sudan civil wars*, The International African institute, Oxford, Pg. 144.

existence development. Up to 2011 there were approximately 5 Chinese official development finance projects identified in South Sudan by various media reports. These projects ranged from assisting in constructing a hospital in Bentiu in 2011, to a grant of 200 million for agriculture, education, and health and water supply projects in South Sudan.¹⁹⁷

4.2 Chinese in the Independent Government of South Sudan and the resultant effects

The South Sudan independence in 2011 saw China move swiftly to sign various deals running into billions including a mega Juba airport deal, pipeline construction among others. However these deals had to be suspended when the new state went to war with itself just barely into freedom.¹⁹⁸ But just after the independence, the two countries had broken into violence that almost saw a complete breakdown into interstate war with¹⁹⁹ the sources of hostility being border demarcation, ownership of the oil-rich Abyei region, transit fees from Sudanese pipelines, and Khartoum's allegations that Juba sponsored militias in southern Sudan operating against the Sudanese regime. The north used the oil pipeline to condition the south to halt any support for the rebels. South Sudan being landlocked and lacks in established oil infrastructure to see its crude to market relied and continues to, on the north. Because there was no proper clear cut agreement on transit rates, there was conflict on the demands by the north and that of the south.²⁰⁰

The north demanded \$32 per barrel transported through the pipeline while the south are frowning the figures claiming they are exaggerated beyond the international standard of \$ per

¹⁹⁷Strange, Parks, Tierney, Fuchs, Dreher, and Ramachandran, *China's Development Finance to Africa: A Media-Based Approach to Data Collection*. <http://aiddatachina.org/projects/24574>

¹⁹⁸Wasara Samson (2014) *Post referendum Sudan: national and regional questions*, a Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa(CODESRIA) Publication, Pg. 185-188

¹⁹⁹Mcneish Hannah, *South Sudan oil resumption raises sticky questions*, an Africa Review Journal, September 22, 2015

²⁰⁰International Business Times, *China in the Middle East: South Sudan's Biggest Oil Importer learns To Wield Its Clout*, April 09, 2014.

barrel. Sudan confiscated large amount of the southern oil in arrears for the unpaid fees. This led to the south shutting of the fields for nearly fifteen months from early 2012 in retaliation, causing a drop in the export business.²⁰¹ Since the early 1990s, China had invested heavily in Sudan's oil industry. After the 2011 partition, 75% of Sudanese oil fell under the control of South Sudan, and the Chinese were forced to accept that the majority of Beijing's investments in Sudan were no longer under Khartoum's control. Since Juba's independence,²⁰² China had sought to maintain its alliance with Sudan while establishing a close partnership with South Sudan, ultimately to ensure a continued flow of oil to China. This objective grew increasingly challenging when tensions between the two Sudan prompted Juba to shutdown oil production from January 2012 to March 2013. Initially the re-orientation of engagement and mediation process was being undertaken by the African Union but there were no results to show. So the Chinese appointed a special envoy Yi Wang to help solve the stalemate. These narratives do not in a way reveal just the chronology of events but the sequence and the underlying resultant effects of the Chinese mediation process. Wang Yi met the leaders of the two countries separately in Khartoum and Juba and appealed to them to halt the violence in respect of the suffering of the citizens and how derailing the net effect of the conflict had on the economy. Now a deeper understanding of the Chinese effects revealed a reduced energy and reopening of the resumption of the oil flow.²⁰³

China being a trusted ally of Khartoum and with the courting of friendship with Juba, stood a better chance of mediating the two sides and their involvement largely contributed to the stop of the fight through a negotiated comprehensive deal which proposed a deployment a joint policing force along the disputed Abiyei border and the southern kordofan region that had not been demarcated properly. But on the flip side, the continuing conflict between the north and

²⁰¹ Markey Peg. *Sudan lowers oil transit fee demands*, a Reuter's report, March 13, 2012

²⁰² Wagna Daniel. *The dangers of the south Sudan civil war*, The Maanzella Report, January 7, 2014

²⁰³ Smith David. *China urges immediate end to conflict in south Sudan*, a Guardian Publication journal, January 7, 2014

south was a culmination of the longstanding struggle dating back to the civil wars which had a Chinese hand reflected in arms' trade and protection of Sudan by china in the Security Council. The distrust arising out of the Chinese support for the Khartoum administration, by extension continued to develop a ripple effect on the oil impasses.²⁰⁴

The second violence which began in the South Sudan after President Kiir announced that his government had prevented a coup attempt by Vice President Machar where Machar denied the accusation and accused Kiir of fabricating an excuse to crack down on opposition, was the clear genesis of the crisis. Violence in the capital of Juba was believed to have killed hundreds of people, and the uprisings really spread. Unrest continued along ethnic lines: Kiir is part of the majority Dinka ethnic group, while Machar is of the Nuer ethnic group.²⁰⁵ The South Sudan conflict, regarded widely as the latest civil war of the new independence appeared not to have a direct Chinese hand, at least within the paradigms of conflict developments in the nation; it was perceived to be purely an ethnic uprising. However in terms of the effects of the²⁰⁶

Chinese involvements, there is interplay of close protection of interests accruing out of the established investments in the energy sector and the energized resolve to continue with the future economic engagements. The established economic relations between China and the government of south Sudan, just after the referendum that created full independence as already alluded in the preceding paragraph, was a direct precursor to the element of close engagement between the two nations. It follows then that this close partnership and almost a review of the foreign policy of the Chinese administration to directly participate in the

²⁰⁴ Johnson, Hilde. (2011) *Waging Peace in Sudan: The Inside Story of the Negotiations that Ended Africa's Longest Civil War*. Sussex Academic Press. UK, Pg.77-88

²⁰⁵ TieziShanon, *China's south Sudan Dilemma*, a Diplomat Journal, December 25, 2013

²⁰⁶ Fielding Alex. *Could south Sudan push provide blueprint for China's African policy?* an IPI Global Observatory Journal, June 24, 2015

mediation process was established by this research to have been a soft way that peace was generated, at least in the short term, reflected in the more recent cease fire.²⁰⁷

The study established that the south Sudanese conflicts have had devastating effects on the populace and the development of the nation. According to the United Nations, there were violations of human rights during raids in churches, hospitals and mosques including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, rape and other acts of sexual offences, arbitrary arrests and detention.²⁰⁸ Almost two million people have been displaced by the violence; about quarter of these people have fled to neighboring Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda. About 100,000 people sought refuge inside UN bases with fearing to return home. Though there are no official death tolls, the international crisis group estimates them at 50,000 and 100,000 people.²⁰⁹ The combination of South Sudan's low level of agricultural productivity, human displacement through conflict, and poor transport infrastructure had increased the likelihood of a humanitarian crisis. As many as 4 million people, or close to a third of the population, face serious food shortages and the risk of famine.

In economic terms, the conflict had a pronounced effect on South Sudan. Projections by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) suggested that real GDP was bound to decline by around 15% in 2014. Because much of South Sudan's economic activity is informal, and therefore not (or imperfectly) captured in formal national accounts, the true costs incurred to 2016 was likely to be considerably greater in respect of the analysis.²¹⁰ On the south Sudan economic effects of the internationalized war, this study adopted the frontier economic model of analysis which narrowed down on the destruction, disruption, diversion and de-saving matrix

²⁰⁷Smith David. *China urges immediate end to conflict in south Sudan*, A Guardian Journal January, 7, 2014

²⁰⁸UNMIS (2014) *Conflicts in south Sudan*, a human rights report, May 2014

²⁰⁹50,000 and not counting, an AFP Report, November 15, 2014

²¹⁰IMF(2014) *World Economic Outlook*
Database, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/index.aspx>

to glimpse highlight the net economic costs of the conflicts leveraging on the Chinese military and economic involvement in overall, in the previous conflicts there in.²¹¹

On the side-lines the Chinese administration could not claim the moral ground on the strength of its credible mediation efforts. The big brother role and the interplay of trade partnership somewhat created a complex scenario where Beijing wore double hats, one where it had to intervene and the other where it had to supply arms artillery in the network of trade relations. So China in its trade of military arms cache,²¹² where \$20 million arms and ammunitions were supplied to the south in 2014, and a military energy was employed and the rejuvenated south engaged in endless war. The resultant war effects or what was referred as the net effects of the military operations, was a consequence of the very Chinese buoyed weaponry supplies in whichever view it was subjected through. In June 7, a Hong Kong-based cargo ship called the Feng Huang Song docked in the port of Mombasa, Kenya. On board were \$38 million worth of arms produced by China's state-owned weapons manufacturer, NORINCO, thousands of assault rifles, grenade launchers, anti-tank RPG rounds, and many millions of bullets. On June 10, Mombasa dockworkers began unloading the cargo and preparing it for overland travel to its final destination: South Sudan.²¹³ The irony of the Chinese weapon supply and oil trade as well as conflict resolution was one pyramid that portrayed a mixed obsession of the communists' nation with their eventual involvement with the south²¹⁴ where it extinguished the fire midstream and avoided the base while at it with inflammables supplies literally.

²¹¹ Callier.P. & Hoefler.A. (2004) *Conflict*, In B .Lomborg (Ed), *Global Crises, Global Solutions*, Cambridge University Press

²¹² Tiezi Shanon, *China sold \$20million in arms and ammunition too south Sudan*, The Diplomat publication, August 27, 2015.

²¹³ Oakford .S. *Weapons are streaming into south Sudan*, A Vice News Publication, August 26, 2014

²¹⁴ *China sells south Sudan arms as government talks peace*, A Bloomberg Business Publication, July 9, 2014

The deaths and fatalities were to an extent heaped on the Chinese administration. Because of the dominant role played by oil in South Sudan's economy (around 60% of GDP)²¹⁵ GDP growth in any year is heavily influenced by oil production. The shut-down of oil production in 2012 was estimated to have reduced GDP by 45% in that year. Disruption in 2014 was reported to have reduced oil production by around a third from 90 million barrels for the year to 60 million. As already reported, GDP for 2014 was expected to decline by 15% in 2014. Clearly, the sensitivity of GDP to oil shocks suggested that a crucial issue was use of appropriate assumptions about the extent to which conflict would disrupt oil production in the entire deemed impoverished nation of the south Sudan.²¹⁶ The disruption effects described above were flow effects; oil production was disrupted during the conflict period, but was then expected to return to higher levels later when a bit of normalcy was to be achieved. In effect, the rate of oil extraction from the wells slowed during conflict, but then returned more or less smoothly to higher levels once the incidence of conflict abated. A more serious form of disruption lied in the destruction of oil assets, including the burning of oil fields. Under such scenarios, the resumption of production following conflict was much more difficult, and consequently, the cost of conflict was felt for long. For deviation, this was reflected in the south Sudan's investment in the civil war through purchases of military artillery as well as more reinforced military personnel as opposed to the other priorities.²¹⁷ In projecting the incremental military spending associated with the conflict, this study took into account that prior to conflict, military expenditure accounted for a significant proportion of total spending as high as 28% in the 2012/2013 fiscal year. This reflected concerns relating to security in the post-independence environment of the newest state.

²¹⁵African Development Bank (2012) Interim Country Strategy Paper (2012-2014) P. 3, World Bank (2013) *Interim Strategy Note for the Republic of south Sudan*, Pg. 6.

²¹⁶Government of the Republic of Sudan (2014) Budget book, Pg. 7.

²¹⁷*The Military dynamics in south Sudan*, An Enough Forum Research Journal, July 2014

In order to ascertain the impact of the current conflict, the study observed that the outturn for military spending in the 2013/2014 budget was around 3.6 billion south Sudan Pounds, this being relative to an initial budget of 3.1 billion (SSP), and the budgeted amount for 2014/2015 was just under 4.0 billion SSP. These figures amounted to around 8% of nominal GDP in 2013 and 11% in 2014 (the latter reflecting both the increase in military spending and the drop in GDP). These were high shares compared to averages reported for other conflict countries: around 5.2% in countries during civil wars, 4.7%²¹⁸ post-conflict, and 3.3% in times of peace. One simple way of estimating the incremental impact of the conflict on military spending is to treat this as equivalent to the differential between the figure of 3.1 billion budgeted for the financial year 2013/2014 (i.e. prior to the eruption of conflict) and the figure of 4 billion SSP for 2014/2015 (i.e. during the current conflict) – around 900 million SSPA. UN panel said such arms sales, while legal, prolonged and still continues to prolong even the current ethnic tension and the conflicts, facilitated human rights violations and other forms of atrocities. It was established that any such support do not only reflect a mutual trade but a negative aid to war. The Juba administration was obviously engaging the north with their increased military strength and might, a direct attribute to the Chinese supplies and aid.²¹⁹ It again followed that their very involvement bore some fruits in attempting to bring the two warring factions to the table.

Much as the process had been operating behind the IGAD led peace process, it had the full support of the Chinese special envoy Yi Wang who worked very closely in an attempt to deliver a peaceful solution to the incessant resource based conflicts.²²⁰ Given that the southerners needed china for the extraction and exploitation of the minerals they entirely depended on, it was a more rattling feeling to heed to the calls. China's whole intervention

²¹⁸ Collier P. and Hoeffler .A. *Military expenditure in post-conflict scenarios*, CSAE Working Paper, WPS, 2004-13, Pg. 2.

²¹⁹ *Interim report of the panel of experts on south Sudan established pursuant to a Security Council resolution 2206(2015)*, August 21, 2015P3-55

²²⁰ *China supports IGAD's mediation efforts on south Sudan*, A Zinhua Publication, January 12, 2015

process in the south Sudan must have been viewed within the structures of attained peace, at least at the face of it.²²¹ A recent visit by president Obama²²² to Ethiopia in July 27, 2015 that saw him hint at a possibility of sanctions to the new state should they not halt the wars that have cost the economy and suffering of millions of innocent people, also went down as a means to an end of the incessant conflicts and a boost to the Chinese Diplomatic attempt of establishing peace.

4.3 Chapter summary

This chapter has established that indeed effects of the south Sudanese conflicts have remained adverse at very least. The deaths, human rights violations and the abject poverty that the newest state continues to experience is one that rattles imagination. The Chinese involvement in the south Sudan for the interest protection could be lauded to apply pressure on the two warring sides to have reason and cease the war. Their involvement for the protection of interests as has remained as reflected in this study chapter is one that cuts from both ends. The supply of the arms in trade partnership has enriched the war and renewed suffering. Truly the oil component is the catalyst and the Chinese with their power pumps have been drawn in the middle.

²²¹GhoshPalash. *Sudan: Future Oil Exporting Powerhouse?* an International Business Times Publication, March 16, 2012

²²²*Obama and African leaders to consider sanction in south Sudan civil war*, a Guardian publication, July 26, 2015

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter outlines the summary, conclusion and recommendations based on the three objectives as guided by this study.

5.1 Summary

This study has established that indeed the Chinese involvement in the south Sudan conflicts created a complex dynamics that strongly tied to core interests in the resources that the south commanded. Traced from their operations way before the south Sudanese cessation from the north, their operations was choreography of steps toward a fulfillment of the very objective of this study which is interest. The Chinese with their operatives completely changed the dynamics of the south-north relations reflected in their handling of the civil wars where they completely neglected the voices of the southerners and instead operated with the Khartoum administration. Their change of tact and gradual embracing of Juba was soon after the realization that the cessation was inevitable and that technically was going to endow the south

with enormous resources under its jurisdiction and therefore there was need for change in the way they related with the southern political arm.

It is clear from this study that since Sudan's partition, Beijing has accelerated a fast hand approach in its engagement with the emerged duo states, most significantly is their reorientation with the new Juba administration well too, as they stride into new partnership with the newest country. The number of Chinese nationals and commercial actors in Juba has had a dramatic surge in the last ten years since independence. Beyond oil, Chinese companies are most interested in infrastructure, and South Sudan needs everything: roads, bridges and other infrastructures necessary for development. Beijing affirmed in January 2012 its intent to offer an economic package, including development grants and a possible billion-dollar infrastructure loan, and details are being negotiated. This component of direct negotiations by the Beijing administration to try foster peace between the warring political leadership has greatly internationalized the ongoing conflict situation in the south. The Chinese have completely changed from their strict non-direct participation in political processes to a more direct meeting style between its leadership and the warring factions. Internationalization aspect has also been reflected in the participation of other non Chinese state actors like the United States during the AU summit visit where president Obama gave a strong combative statement of either the southerners embrace a lasting peace settlement or brace for sanctions. There seems also to be no thought of history where the southerner disliked the Chinese for their support of the north during the civil wars to a more cordial relation where the southerners too are willing to embrace a partner who is all ready to develop their oil resources for maximum benefits. So there is a maxim of interest on both two nations going forward and as such actualization of the interest mantra is even more pronounced in the study.

5.2 Conclusion

This study concludes that there is a complex dynamics at play in the Chinese participation in the south Sudan conflicts. The end bite reveals a network that is a cobweb of interest and political framework that involves the Chinese operations interchangeably working to support itself. What this means is that the Chinese operations that were to be seen as an act of a responsible world power changed face and became a mutual trade and development endeavor, a mantra synonymous and reflective of individual interest actions.

This study also concludes that there is a systematic order of operations involving political powers acting to help establish peace in some countries with hidden agenda. That it is a realistic word where self-help is the order of the day. The Chinese have actualized this by delicately balancing their ties and involvement in the conflicts of the duo states of Sudan and the south Sudan depending on which side of their bread is buttered. There is strong component of benefits in the whole choreography of interventions and subsequent internationalization. China has deepened its relations and quest for long term peaceful settlement in the south coming out to tell the world openly of their interests to protect in the oil rich south. In short, interests dictate how countries offer support to others and the envisioned cooperation in the long run.

The research finally wraps that the Chinese participation in the south Sudan has greatly internationalized the whole sovereign war that was never a cross border conflict but an uprising of a de-facto wing of an independent state. That the involvement raised the conflict to an international level that had foreign hand and raised international attention only made worst by the foreign media coverage of the interplay between the overseas operatives and the and the local governments.

5.3 Recommendations

The government of the south Sudan needs to manage relations with China and the warring political leadership as well as other ethnic entities so as to pursue legitimate near-term demands in the running of the government without endangering the broader political and economic relationship. The Juba administration needs to formalize a task force to interrogate the country's investment, local/international peace strategies and partnerships and their effect on national development and foreign policy. They need to harness new foreign investment, including by: ensuring transparency and cost efficiency through competitive bidding, setting clear social, environmental, and quality standards; and negotiating training and employment targets for both skilled and non-skilled positions so as to maximize employment of South Sudanese nationals.

The government of China should strive to ameliorate the stalemate by assuming political responsibilities commensurate with economic status, by building on recent diplomatic efforts through more active and regular involvement in the Kiir-Machar negotiations, including by directly engaging, (like they have been doing though) only that this time it should communicate strongly that the south risks losing the goodwill for development support and oil export. Only 5% of it constitute the Chinese consumption, not very insignificant yes but could be forfeited none the less, and the greatest loser is the Juba government.²²³ This should be done with great emphasis on areas that have hurt China's reputation in the past, notably transparency, social and environmental considerations, local employment targets and quality delivery; and improve China's standing by ensuring the benefits of commercial engagement and partnerships extend beyond government elites currently in the constituted government. The Chinese must not also play a delicate balancing act of interests between which faction to support and which to leave as they did in the south-north oil impasse.²²⁴ The international

²²³Dispatch Tom. *China, America and a new cold war in Africa*. An Oil Price publication, July, 21, 2014

²²⁴Letouze Emmanuel. *Fragile states: Resource flows and trends*, OECD, Paris, 2013. Pg. 58-59.

community needs to exercise full responsibility in the south Sudan conflicts without letting one country like China to actively involve in the peace recovery process. The IGAD and other regional bodies, as well as the great lakes region countries need to come together and develop a working mechanism of restoring peace in the newest state.

The international law, should not be as fluid as it currently exists, more efforts need to be applied to its structure modeling so as to guarantee stiffer penalties to violators of its statutes.²²⁵ Currently state actors neglect obligations and basic duties such as establishment of peace and stability as a prerequisite for the overall stability of the international order. This should be applied to the southern state, so as to realize the much needed peace and stability for the south Sudan people. The warring leaders of the new government need to be informed that independence came out of their struggle and the current political situation should be commensurate with the same principle of struggle. The regional bodies as well as the interested state actors such as Uganda, Sudan and the rest should not politicize the peace process in line with their interests and instead desist from gestures and activities e.g. the deployment of the Ugandan troops²²⁶ in Juba to support the Kiir government that portrays skewed and partial peace participation. The media need to continuously direct their lenses in the atrocities in the south resulting from the war. This will go a long way in creating awareness and apply more pressure on the government and the rebel leadership in the opposition for a faster peaceful settlement.

²²⁵C.Basak. *International law for international relations*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, Pg.384.

²²⁶*SPLM-IO/SPLA calls on the government to respect cooperation agreement*, Nyamilepedia, April 11, 2015, www.nyamile.com/.../splmspla-calls-on-t...

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ANNEX (1)

Interview guide

Dear Sir/madam

I wish to kindly request you to help with information on the listed questions. This is in line with my study on Internationalization of African conflicts, a case study of China in south Sudan which is part of the requirement for the ward of degree of Master of Arts in International studies. Your continued support will be highly appreciated.

- 1) What is your general view on the whole internationalization of the Africa conflicts?
- 2) What are the most notable countries that have witnessed the most number of interest based interventions?
- 3) How would you rate the interventions in terms of the whole purpose of third party intervention?

- 4) How do you analyze the Chinese involvement in the south Sudan conflicts?**

- 5) How do you relate the same involvement with that of Khartoum during the 1st and 2nd civil wars?**

- 6) Does south Sudan benefit from the Chinese involvement?**

- 7) How do you rate the Chinese international policy on armed conflict intervention?**

- 8) Do you think it has been upheld?**

- 9) How does this policy relate with that of non-interference in domestic sovereign affairs?**

- 10) Has the Chinese back pedaled on their traditional non-interference policy in their relations with the south Sudan?**

- 11) Is China colonizing Africa?**

- 12) Is China's intervention in south Sudan conflicts fuelling or easing it?**

- 13) Can Chinese influence manage the south Sudanese conflicts?**

- 14) How would China balance between trade with south Sudan and the respect of the United Nations on arms embargo?**

- 15) How has China internationalized the south Sudan conflicts?**

- 16) Has IGAD done enough to meliorate the conflict in south Sudan?**

- 17) What are the ripple effects of the Chinese involvement in the south Sudan conflicts?**

- 18) What are the instruments China is using in the intervention mechanisms in south Sudan?**

- 19) Is Africa rising?**

- 20) Why is Africa prone to conflicts?**