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POLICY POSTURE IN EASTERN AFRICA 9

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THE POLITICS OF STABILISATION: KENYA'S POLICY POSTURE
IN EASTERN AFRICA

Introduction:

Kenya is one of the six countries which make up the Eastern African region. The other states are Ethiopia, Somalia, the Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. Because of their common border with Tanzania and Uganda, Burundi, Ruanda and Zaire may partially be regarded as part of the Eastern African perimeter, but the latter do not concern us here.

I hope to show that the collapse of the East African Community in 1977; the 1977/78 Ethiopia-Somali war; the 1978/79 Tanzania-Uganda war were the by products of a shift in regional power equilibrium. The process toward a state of disequilibrium began in the mid-1960s, and reached its climax during the second half of the 1970s, shattering Kenya's foreign policy that had sought to maintain equilibrium. However, since 1982, there is occurring regional adjustment and re-establishment of regional equilibrium. Again Kenya is one of the countries making this adjustment.

Kenya gained its independence from Great Britain on December 12, 1963, three years after Tanzania and Somalia and a year after Uganda. Ethiopia had long been an independent monarchy, save for the short period when it came under Italian rule, which the Sudan's formal independence dated to 1956.

Under British rule Kenya did not enjoy national sovereignty. Sovereignty is a legal concept which refers to the legal jurisdiction a state has within its territorial boundaries. It is a legal principle

that no other state has a right to challenge the exercise of this legal jurisdiction as long as its exercise is confined to within the state. Sovereignty also confers on a state the right of equal participation in the international system. But, in practice, this equality is a function of power equation. States with greater power are more likely to influence international affairs than those with less power.

For a state to be an effective actor in the international system, it must have sufficient power, namely the ability to influence other countries to do what they would otherwise not want to do. In this respect, power may be related to actual armed forces together with weapon system, territorial expanse, economic strength, the size and quality of the population as well as the capacity of a state's diplomats (Hartmann, 1967:4). Power is even more important because its distribution among states helps give the international system some semblance of order.

The Eastern African subsystem of the African subordinate state system displays some of the basic characteristics of the international system. It has cross-national boundary interactions of its own, and inter-state relations within it are also characterized by competition, conflict and co-operation. Power forms a basic element within the subsystem. Unfortunately, recent studies which have focused on Kenya's foreign policy have tended either to ignore or to under-state the role of power in regional politics.

Kenya's foreign policy has been subjected to various interpretations. One view portrays Kenya as a country which pursues two types of foreign policy. One is perceived as radical and applied to international

issues, the other is conservative, aimed at creating stable conditions in East Africa where Kenya has vested interests (Howell, 1968:30; Makinda, 1983:300-301; African Contemporary Record, 1972/73:b161).

A more recent view, and perhaps the most well articulated to date, denies that Kenya has a foreign policy independent of those of the metropolitan powers. Thus Kenya is described as a neocolonial state (Leys, 1975) which has a "cooperative link with the world economy and multinational corporations" (Ake, 1976:341), a country joined in alliance with "imperialism" to form "a substantial opposition to progressive regimes" in Eastern Africa (Lamb: 1975:84-85).

This conception has been expressed best by Timothy M Shaw who sees Kenya as a "sub-imperial power", a "middle power". Kenya and the white-ruled South Africa, another sub-imperial power, are presented by Shaw as being "of special importance in Africa where they are increasingly able to determine continental affairs in the interests both of themselves and their external associates" (Shaw, 1977:145). He adds that "A sub-imperial state is at the center of the 'periphery', a 'client' which is able to exert dominance in a region of the Third World". (ibid:146).

In Eastern Africa, Kenya is such a power. It is the leading diplomatic and economic centre where most corporate branches are located. This enables Kenya to act to advance foreign and national elite interests, role which produces "dependence and regional inequality" (ibid:151-152). The conclusion reached is that Kenya is a dependent, neocolonial state whose foreign policy is basically an extension of the policies of the imperialist capitalist states and their multinational corporations.

Samuel M Makinda has been even more forthright. Denying John Okumu's thesis that secessionist threats to the newly independent state of Kenya shaped the country's foreign policy, he asserts that "indeed, from the beginning, Kenya's foreign policy was shaped by the need to attract more foreign capital, maintain commercial links with neighbouring states, ensure the security of its borders and consolidate the domestic power base" (Makinda, 1983:302). Makinda goes further to say that this policy only entrenched dependence on "foreign investment" which, in turn, called for the perpetuation of Kenya's dependence on the "East African market". Dependence on the East African market and foreign investment was to facilitate and maintain Kenya's regional dominance. Probably, Makinda does not clarify the point, this regional dominance also depended on a military arrangement with the British and an alliance with Ethiopia (ibid:302).

It is difficult to deny that Kenya is a dependent state whose development, especially economic, reflects development in Western European and North American economies. It is also true that Kenya's economy is dominated by European and American multinational corporations, itself a consequence of colonial history (Orwa, 1986a: 6-7). These may at times influence both domestic and foreign policies. Professor D.W. Nabudere has noted the impact of the multinational corporations on East African regional organization starting with the 1964 Kampala-Mbale agreement up through the collapse of the East African Community in 1977. Some members of the former East African General Assembly have also confided that they were witnesses to the contribution of European and American aircraft manufacturers to the breakup of the East African Airways. William Attwood, United States Ambassador to Kenya during the 1960s,

has given us an inside information into the role of great powers in influencing policy of a dependent state (Attwood, 1967: Nabudere, 1979).

But it is unrealistic to assume that Kenya is led by naive leaders who have no perception of national interests except those of the multinational corporations and of a national elite. In fact, both Shaw's and Makinda's analyses are pregnant with contradictions. Kenya is supposed to be a neocolonial state; it is at the same time said to be witnessing "a revival of realpolitik" as a result of "the elusiveness of development and growth..." (Shaw, 1977:147). Realpolitik is strictly a balance of power politics and operates mainly to serve, promote and protect vital national interests. Furthermore, most of the variables Makinda cites in support of his thesis basically confirm realists' proposition of power politics. Therefore his interpretation of Kenya's dependency boils down to a balance of power explanation. As he puts it, Kenya entered into military arrangement with Great Britain and alliance with Ethiopia to "ensure the security of its borders".

States are run by people, It is their character which makes up the character of the state. Foreign policy of a country and its vital interests are what those who manage national affairs perceive them to be.

Kenya, like all sovereign states, has its vital national interests which it pursues both within the international and regional systems. Some of these cannot be realized by strict extension of the foreign policy of a globally dominant power or by the sole promotion of a combination of external and internal group interests. An examination of the original documents on Kenya's foreign policy might shade some light on this point.

Kenya's Foreign Policy in Perspectives:

The basis of post-independence Kenya's foreign policy is found in two documents, the 1960 Kenya African National Union (KANU) constitution and the 1961 and 1963 KANU Manifestos. In the constitution, four of the stated aims relate to foreign policy. There is a commitment by the leaders to "vigilantly safeguard national interest" and work "with the other nationalist democratic movements in Africa and other continents to eradicate imperialism, colonialism, racialism and all other forms of national or racial or foreign oppression".

In addition, Kenya would also join with other United Nations Organization (UNO) members to promote and consolidate "international peace and the peaceful settlement of international disputes". Finally, the country would work with other African leaders to foster "closer association of African territories and states by promoting unity of action among the people of Africa" (KANU Constitution, 1960: 1-2). This document reveals an obvious realism. The aims are couched in moderate tone. Collective action through multilateral organizations in handling international disputes was preferred to unilateral or violent approach. Even on the issue of African unity, the document does not refer to African federation but to "unity of action". The founders already recognized that continental political unity could not be attained and shelved the idea. Are these the same people who are said to have pursued radical African policies?

The 1961 and the 1963 KANU Manifestos, the latter signed by Mzee Kenyatta, followed the tone of the constitution, thus suggesting a degree of consistency in the thinking of leaders. A KANU government would "take the necessary measures to protect the security of the people and to preserve the national integrity of Kenya within the present borders". To achieve this, the armed forces were "to be maintained at a level" that would facilitate their carrying out this role. Furthermore, party

leaders resolved not to pursue "aggressive" policies or harbour imperialistic intentions against Kenya's neighbours. At the same time, the country upon the attainment of statehood, would seek a defence arrangement with other African countries, with special attention to "an Eastern African defence policy" so that neighbouring countries could work together to maintain regional stability (KANU Manifesto, 1961: 3 1963: 17).

By 1963, Kenya leaders had already accepted the necessity of upholding the pre-independence status quo in Eastern Africa. That year's KANU election Manifesto declared that Kenya would "build on the foundation of the East African Common Services Organization and of the East African Common Market to bring the people of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar into closer political co-operation". The colonial economic policy which had encouraged foreign private investment in Kenya would remain unchanged, while local private investment and state participation in the economy would receive governmental support (KANU Manifesto, 1963: 17, 23, 24; 1961: 14-15). Thus, in East Africa no radical changes were expected. Things were to remain the way they had been, although evolutionary changes would be acceptable. No critic has shown that the two KANU documents were drafted with the aid of the imperialists or at the request of multinational corporations.

As far as Africa was concerned, KANU adopted anti-colonialist policy, committing the country to the support of liberation movements. Leaders agreed to work together with other African states toward the gradual realization of "continental unity". (KANU Manifesto, 1961: 23-29 1963:26). Finally, non-alignment would constitute the basis of Kenya's global policy, with Kenya offering friendship to every country that would "return it". But the policy of non-alignment would not mean neutrality in world affairs. Far from it, Kenya planned to participate fully in

international developments supporting what the "country believed is right" and judging each case "on its merit". To this end, Kenya would not permit "the existence of foreign military bases on our soil", and the soon to be government committed itself to supporting world efforts for universal disarmament (KANU Manifesto, 1961: 28-30; 1963:27-28).

The Foreign Policy of the New State:

When Kenya gained her independence she chose to be guided by a number of a number of principles in the conduct of her foreign relations. The division of the world into two antagonistic blocs gave birth to a principle that such division constituted a hinderance "to the development of world peace and welfare" (Orwa, 1986b:41). Consequently the new state rejected this world system. This logically led to the adoption of the principle of non-alignment in international affairs. It was a principle by which the new state asserted her right to independence and sovereignty. As a corrolary the new state postulated the principle of "Postive Independence" which expressed the country's determination to be an effective actor in world affairs and her opposition to "imperialism, neocolonialism, racialism and all other forms of foreign or national oppression" (KANU Constitution, 1960:1-2; Manifesto, 1961: 28-29; Manifesto, 1963:26; Orwa, 1986:42). Internal and regional conditions produced the principle of regional status quo from which emerged the policy of "Good Neighbourliness". To this was tied an economic ideology known as African Socialism which rejected "Western Capitalism and Eastern Communism" (Sessional. Paper No. 10 of 1965: 1; Orwa, 1986b:42)see also KANU Manifesto, 1969:22).

From these principles four levels of policy become descernable. At the first level concern centers on global issues which come under the general policy of non-alignment. At the second level focus is on

continental affairs while at the third and final level of policy concentration is on the attainment and maintenance of regional stability. Collectively, activities at all these levels seek specific foreign policy goals. At the top of objectives list are what K.J. Holsti calls "Core" interests which comprise territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty and national security. Connected to these are the "middle-range" objectives - - economic cultural and commercial relations, diplomatic representation and political influence (Holsti, 1967: 132).

Although the ruling party KANU evolved Kenya's foreign policy principles and identified international goals before independence, implementation had to wait until after independence. How well foreign policy was conducted would depend in turn on the new country's diplomats. Yet in 1963 Kenya did not have professional diplomats and was bound to rely on inexperienced diplomats. This situation no doubt influenced the evolution and the style of foreign policy management.

The period between, 1963 and 1966 was, therefore characterized by a search for a workable system of foreign policy management. It was in addition marked by a fairly vocal parliament which sought to put its imprints not only on foreign policy formulation but also on implementation (Rothchild, 1968: 126-154, Gartezel, 1970 51-52) contrary to conclusions reached by Ngunjiri, 1973 and Okumu, 1973 265, a foreign affairs department determined to manage the conduct of the new state's international relations, especially under Joseph Murumbi as minister of state in the office of the President in charge of foreign affairs. a president who was inactive in foreign affairs contrary to what Howell thought (Howell, 1968: 30); and a clique around President Kenyatta led by Njoroge Mungai who determined that most foreign policy issues had to be vetoed by it so as to avoid the pursuit of irresponsible foreign policy. It was because of this fear that Njoroge Mungai enunciated the policy of "Wait and see" that came to dominate Kenya's approach to international politics through-

out the Kenyatta regime. All these factors led to the evolution of a pragmatic rather than idealistic approach to foreign policy, particular after the resignation of Murumbi from the government and the departure of the radical left from the government and the ruling party in 1966.

. Pragmatism, therefore, meant that Kenya would pursue a conservative course in her foreign policy. The position that the country took following the November 24, 1964 American-Belgian paratroopers intervention in Stanleyville, Congo, that has been used to justify a policy of radicalism on global and intra-African affairs, seem to have been Murumbi's personal assertion. He was disowned by the government in the same way as when he said that Kenya and Tanzania were ready to form a federation without Uganda.

. At the continental level much of Kenya's policy posture expressed principle rather than a radical commitment. Support for decolonisation efforts and struggle against "racialism" in Southern Africa evolved from domestic conditions and also in conformity with the general commitment of independent African states and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Charter. At home Kenya had been a victim of white racism. After independence the country adopted the policy of racial accommodation. It was and is fair that Kenya should oppose racialism and call for a multi-racial society in Southern Africa. In a similar vein support for liberation movements has consisted of collective diplomatic action and financial contribution to the OAU's Liberation Fund. All factors considered, this posture was consistent with the policy of wait and see. It was a pragmatic policy because it did not alienate our trading partners who also have entrenched economic interests in Southern Africa; it kept Kenya within the mainstream of intra-African politics and protected our economic interest in Africa as Kenya's trade with Eastern and Southern Africa countries before 1977 made up over 40% of the country's external trade (see Kenya Economic Survey 1977: 75, Okumu, 1973 265). Not until the 1980s did the country

begin to implement in letter and spirit UN sanctions against racist regimes, although she had earlier implemented fully the OAU's ban on diplomatic contact with white ruled South Africa and Portuguese Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Biseau, among others. Indeed, until the 1981 Summit meeting in Nairobi, Kenya direct role in inter African politic , had been low keyed. Our effort to reconcile the liberation groups in Angola in 1975 arose from the position of Kenyatta as an elder African statesman.

Non-alignment Policy

If intra-African policy has been devoid of the supposed radicalism, global policy has never been any different. Kenya's adoption of non-alignment as the basis of her international policy simply expressed a sense of conservatism and uncertainty in a bi-polar international system. The perceived threat of neocolonialism, which in the 1960s was thought to constitute a potential danger to formal political independence, called for a posture that could protect the formal political independence, especially when there was no doubt about the inability of the new states to defend their independence and sovereignty with military force (see Orwa, 1984 205). Thus, to Kenya as other Third World states, non-alignment "came to denote a policy as well as a strategy designed to avoid entanglement in the cold war which characterized this bi-polar structure" of the new international system (Jinadu, 1986:3).

Non-alignment sought to enable the new state to be an actor in international politics without losing her identity. As a part of a collectivity Kenya hoped to effectively pursue her international interests. The collective strength was to derive from a moral force rather than military power. The moral force was conceptualized as pervasive and salient encompassing security, defensive strategy and economic realms. Rapid economic development required diversification of both sources of trade

and aid. But such diversification also meant increased politico-economic independence and security as it would enable the state to skirt the Superpowers' "camps in which" they provided "the philosophy, way of life and the wherewithall of life in their (respective) camps or spheres" (KANU Manifesto, 1961: 28-30; Orwa, 1986b: 41).

That Kenya saw non-alignment as a strategy to protect the nation's independence and sovereignty from extra-African threat is clear. Speaking at Makerere University on August 17, 1964, the late Tom Mboya objected to the policy of isolation or neutrality in international politics. Since Kenya "belonged to the growing 'Third World' which believed in the policy of positive non-alignment", her policy was one "of positive non-alignment." Following from this fact Kenya could not "be used as tools of any of the rich countries" nor could she be expected ally... herself "permanently and automatically with either the Western bloc or the Eastern bloc" (Mboya, 1970:234; Orwa, 1986b:43).

Characteristic of this thinking was the 1965 Sessional Paper No. 10. In this major policy document "foreign ideology" was rejected and an apparent indigenous ideology of African socialism adopted. Other elements of neocolonialism and imperialism as foreign military bases would not be permitted to be established in Kenya nor would the country "belong to any permanent military alliance." A subordinate relationship with one or more countries would be avoided as that could not be consistent with the policy of positive independence (Sessional Paper No. 10, 1965: 2-3, 8-9; Orwa, 1986b:43). Consequently, the closure of the British military bases at Kahawa, Nairobi, now the seat of Kenyatta University, after independence was intended to underscore this policy (Mboya, 1970: 237).

This line of thinking carried on to the economic field. The ideology of African Socialism as it was conceived by the ruling elite rejected both

capitalism and communism as systems of economic organisation (Sessional Paper, No. 10, 1965:1). Here an indigenous "African ... economic system that is positively African" was preferred. In pursuit of this "African... economic system" Kenya would "borrow from any country technology and 'economic methods ... without commitment; to seek and accept financial assistance from any source - without strings; to participate fully in world trade - without political domination" (Orwa, 1986b:43; Sessional Paper, No. 10, 1965: 8-9). This policy was expected to achieve two basic international economic objectives. First, avoid economic imperialism, and second, facilitate the diversification of "both the markets for our exports and sources of imports whether of goods, capital or manpower" (KANU Manifesto, 1969:22; Sessional Paper No. 10, 1965:8-9).

When viewed from the perspective of the movement for New International Economic Order, the policy seeks the achievement of "the establishment of a new global economic order" and promotion of "causes of [international] stability as well as justice". (KANU Manifesto, 1979:9; Manifesto, 1983:25).

Positive Independence or Positive Non-alignment (the two terms have been used by Government officials interchangeably) required that Kenya's relations with the major powers be carefully balanced so that the country's ability to act in international affairs was not hampered. It was on this account that the British were forced to close their bases at Kahawa and Kenya pledged that her territory could not be used by either NATO or Warsaw Pact powers in any "localized conflicts" in which "any part of Africa or Asia or the Middle East" was involved (KANU Manifesto, 1961: 30, Mboya, 1970:237, Orwa, 1986b:42). Ideological rigidity was equally rejected (KANU Manifesto, 1979:8). These assumptions led to the assertion that:

We shall continue to join and co-operate with other developing nations in the fight for a new international economic order in which there will be greater justice, trade and control of international institutions that determine world economic priorities (KANU Manifesto , 1983:25).

In more concrete terms, non-alignment was formulated to mean a policy of "equidistance" between the East and the West. "Equidistance" thus underscored the existence of "a coincidence of interests" between Kenya and the capitalist countries of Western Europe and North America (Orwa, 1986:45). This conception of non-alignment clearly described Kenya's relations in the world economy. Kenya's apparent advanced economy rested on a continued reliance and dependence on western capitalist world system. For this reason nationalization of private capital (mainly Western European and North America) was rejected on the grounds that it could "not serve to advance the cause of African socialism" (East African Standard, September 30, 1964); that it "would discourage additional private investment" which would reduce "further the rate of growth of the economy"; that it would interfere with the effective utilization of "foreign aid funds leading to an even greater reduction in development expenditure". Therefore, nationalization would be limited to where private capital threatened national security; or "when productive resources are being wasted; or when operation of an industry by private concerns has a serious detrimental effect on the public interest" (Session Paper NO.10 of 1965:26-27).

The objectives of the policy were to guarantee foreign private capital, create conditions for additional foreign capital investment, to attract foreign aid funds from international and western banking and financial institutions as well as official assistance. Towards the

realization of these goals Kenya passed in 1964 Foreign Investment Protection Act which guaranteed these investments against nationalization and made it incumbent upon the government to compensate immediately any capital nationalized. The Act further allowed transfer of profits, management, patent and brand name fees as well as dividends. In addition, the Act created tax incentives and allowed for the creation of outright monopolies as exemplified by agreements with Delmonte, Firestone and Magadi Soda.

During the debate on the 1964 Foreign Investment Protection Bill, many backbenchers had sensed the contradiction between the policy of non-alignment and the obvious pro-west policy emerging from the cabinet. There were charges that Kenya's economic structure and arrangements could not allow the country to act independently in international affairs. This could only inhibit the realization of the country's non-alignment objectives, a situation that ought to be corrected by a slight tilt to the East. But the government, through Tom Mboya, maintained that Kenya was already non-aligned and "prepared to establish such economic and political relations with other states as the country's interests demanded" (Gartzel, 1970:51-52; House of Rep. Official Report, Vol. III, Part III, First Sess. 7th Oct.1964; Vol.IV, 3rd March, 1965). The country's interests demanded that economic and political relations be intensified with the western European states with which Kenya had a coincidence of interests.

Between 1964 and 1977 foreign private investment increased rapidly. By 1977 the United States of America ranked second to the United Kingdom with more than \$320 million in capital investment. West Germany, Japan, Italy and France had also made significant inroad (Gershenberg, 1983, Orwa, 1985). The contribution of foreign aid and investment to GNP also

assumed an increasing importance while a substantial part of saving and investment "has been financed increasingly by foreign aid and investment" (Rep. of Kenya, Sessional Paper NO.1 of 1986:15). Table 1 below underscores the point.

Table 1: The Contribution of Foreign Aid and Investment to GNP

	1965-69	1970-74	1975-79	1980-84
++ Gross Investment	19.7	25.4	23.9	25.6
Foreign Saving	3.2	7.5	7.8	9.5
+ Gross National Saving	16.5	17.9	16.1	16.1
Government Saving	(0.2)	2.0	2.4	(0.8)
Private Saving	16.7	15.9	13.7	16.9

Source: Republic of Kenya Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986: 15

Almost any other economic indicator confirms the reality of the policy of coincidence of interests with the West. Kenya is most indebted to the capitalist world both in terms of funded and unfunded external debt. Table 2 and 3 show what the situation looked like in the 1970s that Makinda (1983), Hveem and Willett (1974) have characterized as periods in which Kenya was non-aligned and played effective role in intra-African affairs.

++ Measured as the deficit on current account and exclude transfers

+ Minus debt service and profit remittance

Table 2: Total Public Debt: Funded and Unfunded

K\$million					
6					
1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
94.88	105.76	126.50	136.34	167.51	209.89

Source: Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey, 1977:59.

Table 3: Sources of Unfunded External Debt

K£'000						
	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
U.K.	46,314	47,209	48,014	47,098	43,826	40,786
U.S.A.	5,733	7,272	13,611	13,476	15,902	18,380
W. Germany	4,583	4,889	4,869	6,319	14,223	16,122
U.S.S.R.	130	113	97	89	69	57
Japan	598	599	690	1,058	2,788	6,710
Israel	566	471	374	275	173	87

Source: Republic of Kenya Economic Survey, 1977:60.

Although Kenya's foreign policy sought to diversify sources of trade so as to reduce her dependence on one state or group of countries, in practice diversification has been mainly within the capitalist market system while maintaining limited participation in the planned economies. This demonstrates the distinction between idealism and realism in international politics. As already indicated above, Kenya's real economic world lies

in the capitalist world system and nothing short of a revolution could change that fact. Tables 4 and 5 indicate the direction of Kenya's external trade -- trade outside Africa.

Table 4: Kenya's External Trade: Exports

K£ million

<u>Receiving country(E.E.C.)</u>	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
United Kingdom	58.85	59.81	72.25	96.25	142.27
W. Germany	56.02	58.42	60.83	82.01	98.05
Italy	23.73	20.12	15.20	14.76	21.28
France	6.35	5.88	5.99	11.35	11.18
Netherlands	17.69	21.05	27.76	32.57	52.58
Others	12.47	12.63	15.14	17.90	22.94
Other Western Europe	23.55	18.92	21.53	24.94	33.69
Total	198.66	196.83	218.70	279.88	381.99
Eastern Europe	4.94	6.95	8.11	5.48	6.78
U.S.A.	16.93	19.52	35.18	39.10	38.82
Japan	3.83	3.74	3.46	4.63	6.13
China(Peoples Republic)	1.96	0.63	0.31	1.88	3.29

Source: Republic of Kenya Economic Survey, 1985:96; Republic of Kenya Economic Survey, 1977:76.

Table 5: Kenya's Import Trade (Non-African)

	K£'000						
(E.E.C.)	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
U.K.	95,218	145,933	141,311	162,369	156,850	135,756	121,535
W.Germany	57,851	87,755	68,809	77,659	75,115	75,627	70,319
Italy	22,007	33,490	23,745	37,682	25,229	22,959	15,690
France	26,316	30,831	17,627	32,690	31,149	28,111	38,632
Nether-lands	10,901	15,961	14,111	20,879	21,103	23,114	27,718
Other	27,528	40,417	35,916	38,995	37,359	36,159	47,433
Other W. Europe	17,470	13,714	18,131	19,722	27,668	16,929	24,947
E. Europe Total	4,247	5,340	4,737	6,606	6,210	5,405	4,054
U.S.A.	30,482	41,096	34,925	60,964	63,651	53,377	56,541
Japan	65,603	67,912	49,927	88,409	73,456	70,137	85,523
China (People's Rep.)	5,814	5,103	4,804	7,192	8,184	6,608	3,076

Source: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstract 1984:73

Both tables 4 and 5 show conclusively that Kenya has taken measures to diversify her trade sources, but that the process has been largely concentrated in the capitalist economies. Together socialist countries account for less than three percent of both exports and imports.

The same pattern exists with respect to diplomatic and security relations. Kenya has direct diplomatic representation at ambassadorial level with only the People's Republic of China and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Yugoslavia has a trade mission. Kenya has yet to recognize North Korea although it recognizes South Korea and has allowed the latter to be represented in Kenya. Another point worth noting is that Kenya

does not post military attache to her embassies in Moscow and Peking while such are found in London, Bonn, Paris and Washington since 1975.

Most Kenya's ambassadors are concentrated in Western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia and India. With the exception of North Korea, Cuba and Romenia, all the major socialist countries of Eastern Europe and the People's Republic of China are represented at ambassadorial level in Kenya. If trade, foreign aid and man-power training are used as indicators of diplomatic relations the value is negative with respect to nearly all socialist countries. They have a combined values of less than K£3 million in both export and import trade except that Yugoslavia is the only socialist state that has entered into joint investment venture with the Kenya government while China has since 1980 been involved in the construction of a multimillion shilling sports complex in Nairobi. Direct ambassadorial representation in Moscow and Peking must therefore be attributed to the importance of these countries in the international power structure.

Although diplomatic and economic relations do suggest that Kenya, while retaining her predominantly pro-West bias, deals also with the socialist countries, military relations do not conform to the other two levels of relations. For purposes of military training, Kenya military officers have since independence been sent to the United Kingdom, Israel and the United States, the latter having acquired greater importance than Israel after 1976, for advanced training. This training has influenced equally the sources of arms, with NATO countries supply 80% and the United States 14% of all arms imported by Kenya. Of the NATO countries the top supplies are the United Kingdom, Italy, France, West Germany and Canada. Outside of NATO and the United States, Israel remains a leading supplier (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1967-1976 and 1971-80; Military

Balance, 1980; Luckham and Bekele, 1984:10). In addition, Kenya has since 1964 maintained direct military links with the West. After closing the British military bases at Kahawa she signed a military pact with Britain the object of which was and still remains the guaranteeing of Kenya's security from both internal and external threat. The 1980 military agreement with the United States not only contradicted the principle of not allowing Kenya to be used as stage-off base in conflicts involving Africa, Asia or the Middle East, but also underscored the contradictions that exist between Kenya's acceptance of non-alignment as a principle and the pursuit of national interests (Orwa, 1986b:45).

~~Throughout~~ ^{Throughout} the 23 years of her independence Kenya has only rejected military and economic aid from the Soviet Union and at one time ordered closed of the embassies of the Peoples' Republic of China and Czechoslovakia (Okumu, 1973). No official visitation has been exchanged at the highest level of governments between Kenya and the Soviet Union. Thus relations with the Soviet Union has "continued on a polite formal basis...." (Africa Contemporary Record, 1978/79, B280; 1980/81:225). This is what makes President Daniel Arap Moi's visit to China in 1980 of special significance. This visit took place only after Peking normalized relations with the United States and declared the open door policy that set stage for military cooperation with the United States and economic relations with the capitalist countries of the West including Japan and the United States.

One is therefore inclined to observe that Kenya has always had special relations with Western Europe and that this relationship is explained by a feeling that Kenya's economic and social development

can best be achieved through a capitalist system of production at home but which must receive steady inflow of external capital. Diplomatic and security relations are therefore essential if the economic goals based on capitalist mode of production are to be achieved. But this development strategy also require that special relationships and conditions prevail in Eastern Africa where Kenya inherited economies of advantage.

Kenya's Objectives in Eastern Africa

Kenya's global objectives are basically extensions of her domestic and Eastern African policies. The main concerns at home are national unity, economic and social development and the creation of political atmosphere that permits the growth of free enterprise. These objectives are linked to regional conditions, because a hostile regional environment would disrupt the achievement of domestic goals just as an unfriendly Western European attitudes would slow the development of a capitalist economy at home. Therefore, Kenya's major interests in Eastern Africa involved legitimation of the pre-independence boundaries, respect for territorial integrity of each state in the region and continuation of pre-independence regional economic relations. No where are these goals more emphasized than in the National Anthem. The new state wished to "dwell in unity, peace and liberty" and to receive economic and political good-will so that "plenty be found within our borders". These verses are expressions of "self interests" with a recognition that these interests are linked to regional peace and security.

Throughout the colonial period regional commerce and trade had been central to colonial economic development. Since little change

was anticipated in the structure of this economy (see Sessional Paper NO.10 of 1965) after independence the preservation of regional economic structures seemed an appropriate policy. Towards this end Kenya enunciated the policy of good neighbourliness. "Good neighbourliness simply meant the maintenance of pre-independence status quo" (Orwa, 1984:12). It further meant that Kenya was prepared to accommodate regional diversities as long as none appeared to threaten regional status quo.

The Struggle for the Maintenance of Status Quo

This posture is important today as it was in the 1960s. From economic view point Kenya's special economic position in East Africa "risked being challenged by Tanzania and Uganda" following independence (Orwa, 1984:12). There existed a dependency relationship. Kenya had developed into an East African metropol and Tanzania and Uganda constituted her periphery while Kenya formed the periphery that linked Tanzania and Uganda with metropolitan Europe and North America. Through such institutions the East African Common Services Organization, the East African Currency Board and the East African Common Market, with a more or less uniform external tariff and a virtually free trade system in the region completed the linkage. Common Services -- East African Post and Telecommunication, East African External Telecommunication, East African Railways and Harbours and East African Airways -- were established for the region with Headquarters in Nairobi. Thus Nairobi became the centre of economic and communication activities in post-World War Two British East Africa. Foreign investors responded well to this development by putting their capital in Nairobi and industries producing strictly for

East Africa grew, while insurance and marketing firms were also established (compare Elkan, 1969:14-15).

The consequences of this development were as follows. First, Nairobi became the centre for international capitalist penetration of East Africa. Second, the inflow of external capital enabled Kenya to develop a head of its neighbours. Third, Tanzania and Uganda formed the peripheries supplying the raw material for the production of Kenya-based industries, as well as markets for Kenya's manufactured goods. Fourth, foreign firms operating from Kenya acted as middle men for such direct raw material exports as Uganda's coffee and Tanzania's sisal. As Tanzania and Uganda developed into dependencies of Kenya, the latter also became inextricably tied to external capital. The survival of its economy in the post-independence era depended on the maintenance of this link; it could not be broken without very serious repercussions to the social and political stability of the new state. In short, domestic status quo.

Yet observers expected that Tanzania and Uganda would seek to redress the imbalance and that economic rearrangement in the region would be critical to Kenya's relations with these two countries, especially when political federation was not deemed urgent initially by Uganda and after 1964 by Kenya as well (Rothchild, 1968). Kenya's policy of good neighbourliness arose out of the recognition of this fact. A reckless foreign policy could endanger the economy which, by any measure, depended on the East African market, regional and internal stability and the continued inflow of western foreign private capital. Hence status quo must not be disturbed, even though incremental changes in the regional system could be agreed upon. Kenya refused to ratify the 1964 Kampala-Mbale economic agreement because it radically changed the regional economic

status quo by calling upon Kenya to slow its development to permit Tanzania and Uganda to reach parity. Her leaders had also rejected the East African federation proposal because it threatened national independence and sovereignty (Rothchild, 1968:162-163). Even the 1967 Treaty of East African Co-operation which created the defunct East African Community was signed only after significant concessions had been made by all parties involved even though Kenya knew the Treaty would bring problems (Mboya, 1967). Therefore, the provisions, when they appeared to conflict with Kenya's development objectives, were violated altogether (see Nabudere, 1979; Chemonges, 1984).

Ideological differences that emerged among the East African states at the beginning of the second half of the 1960s can partly be explained by the failure to redress the economic imbalance, which extended from location of industrial plants into the area of trade. Table 6 below demonstrate the nature of inter-state trade disparity in East Africa. The table shows clearly that Kenya had a massive favourable balance of trade against both Tanzania and Uganda; remained exporter of finished products and consumer of raw material from Tanzania and Uganda and that between 1959 and 1966 Tanzania was the worst off of the three East African countries.

The publication in 1965 of Kenya's Sessional Paper NO.10, which purported to be a blue print on African Socialism, marked a restatement of Kenya leaders' commitment to capitalism (see Mboya, 1970: 73-105). Two years later, Tanzania adopted socialist economy based on self-reliance as a way out of dependency on Kenya and Western capitalism and Uganda appeared ready to adopt the Tanzania approach with the unvailing of the Common Man's Charter. Kenya cautiously felt that these developments represented a threat to her vital interests, a political conspiracy against

Table 6: Inter-territorial Trade in East Africa, 1959 and 1966

	Kenya		Uganda		Tanzania	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
1959	Value £'000					
Total	12,232	5,484	5,224	6,494	2,571	8,049
1966	28,792	11,108	10,430	16,404	4,637	16,347
1959	<u>Percentage of Total Inter-territorial Trade by Commodities</u>					
1. Food Stuffs, beverages and Tobacco	60.1	25.6	26.8	33.9	13.0	40.4
2. Raw materials and mineral fuels	14.9	71.3	51.4	13.1	33.7	15.6
3. Manufactured goods and chemicals	81.2	12.7	14.7	37.6	4.1	49.7
Total	61.1	27.4	26.1	32.4	12.8	40.2
1966						
* 1	63.6	29.7	24.0	36.0	12.5	34.3
* 2	68.7	27.7	18.9	39.0	12.4	33.2
* 3	65.7	22.5	25.2	37.6	9.1	39.9
Total	65.6	25.3	23.8	37.4	10.6	37.3

Source: Okumu, 1973:278

*1-3 are used for commodities traded as they are listed for 1959.

the country's capitalist development which must be carefully watched. However, as long as the East African Community functioned the threat was minimized.

Another factor that mitigated against over-reaction on the part of Kenya was the fact that relations with Ethiopia, Tanzania and Uganda remained relatively warm throughout the first decade of independence. This does not mean that there were no disagreements. Tanzania had misgivings about Kenya's coolness on the issue of East African Federation. But the policy of good neighbourliness, to which Tanzania also subscribed (Shaw, 1969:29), continued to prevail. Thus Kenya continued to emphasize peaceful coexistence and peaceful settlement of disputes (Africa Contemporary Record, 1972/73:B161) among the region's states.

From the perspective of national security, Kenya seemed most vulnerable on the eve of independence. Concern arose out of real threat and potential ones. The Republic of Somalia had been demanding North Eastern Kenya from the British as early as 1960. As Kenya approached independence, it intensified its claim to the territory. Somalia invoked historical, religious and ethnic reasons for its action. Kenya's response was clear-cut. It offered a hand of good neighbourliness while warning that Kenya would never give up even an inch of its territory. The North Eastern Province issue was very critical to the survival of the new state. Much of Western Kenya had once formed part of Uganda and the Kampala government had raised questions about its eastern border with Kenya. The frontier with Ethiopia also called for adjustment. In as much as there were Somalis in both Kenya and Somalia, the Masai also moved back and forth between Kenya and Tanzania. Could the Somali irredentism trigger similar interest on the part of Tanzania?

This situation helped shape Kenya's Eastern African policy, and did, indeed, influence the evolution of the policy of good neighbour-

liness (Okumu, 1973:272). What Kenya wanted was respect of the pre-independence equilibrium in the region (Okumu, 1977:143). Emperor Haile Selassie, who also faced similar territorial claim by Somalia, underscored the point when he declared in 1964 that "The territorial integrity must necessarily be respected, because disregard for their fundamental principles is contrary to the interest of mankind" (Africa Contemporary Record, 1978/69:145).

Territorial integrity was considered a very vital national interest by the new Kenya government. It spent "\$70,000,000 in unplanned-for military expenditure" between 1964 and 1967 in a war of attrition with Somalia over the North Eastern Province (Okumu, 1973:271). The army grew from about 6,500 at independence to 16,000 in 1967. She did this while seeking a peaceful settlement. President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, acting on behalf of the OAU, mediated the conflict. Thus in October, 1967, President Kenyatta and Prime Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Egal of Somalia signed an agreement in Arusha, Tanzania, committing the two countries to a negotiated settlement of their disputes. Kenya's position regarding territorial issues underscored the importance her leaders put on this matter. Kenya entered a reservation that she would never consider any proposals touching on her territorial integrity (Africa Contemporary Record 1968/69:159; Okumu, 1973:271). This was a re-statement of the stand Kenya had taken in 1965 when she acceded^{to} the UN Charter. At that time Kenya recognized the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice but reserved to the state jurisdiction over

Disputes concerning any question relating to or arising out of belligerent or military occupation or the discharge of any functions pursuant to any recommendation or decision of any organ of the United Nations, in accordance with which the Government of the Republic of Kenya has accepted obligation (Gartzel, 1969:598).

It is important to note that Kenya's first diplomatic moves in Eastern Africa sought to protect the territorial integrity of the new state. This concern is what explains Kenya's decision to enter into military alliance with Ethiopia in 1964, and partly account for the 1964 Anglo-Kenyan military agreement. Following these military arrangements Kenya proceeded and signed two addition treaties with Ethiopia and Uganda settling their respective border differences. In each of these treaties Kenya did not concede territory. Kenya's objective in these moves was the maintenance of regional balance and stability. Regional balance or status quo has always been crucial to the continued economic growth in Kenya. Eastern Africa provides indispensable market for manufactured goods and raw material and make a significant contribution to Kenya's balance of trade position. Tables 7 and 8 below make the point amply clear.

Table 7: Kenya's External and East African Trade.

K£'000

Type of Trade	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
Imports							
External	352,195	393,773	529,243	658,795	619,251	957,515	931,123
East Africa	10,652	13,224	2,203	2,330	905	1,515	1,283
Total	362,847	406,997	531,446	661,125	620,156	959,030	932,406
*Exports							
External	176,532	278,458	440,004	354,513	370,965	444,109	478,310
East Africa	61,450	66,604	61,814	41,822	41,820	71,595	58,918
Total	237,982	345,062	501,819	395,712	412,787	515,704	537,228
Visible Balance							
External	-175,663	-115,315	- 89,239	-304,282	-248-286-513-406-452-813		
East Africa	+ 50,798	+ 53,380	+ 59,611	+ 38,689	+ 40,917+	70,080+	57,635
Total	-124,865	- 61,935	- 29,627	-265,413	-207,369-	443,326-	395,178

Source: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstract, 1984:52.

The Shifting of Regional Equilibrium

Generally speaking, the Eastern African region had been a fairly stable sub-system between 1961 and 1970. In spite of inter-state hostility, the region did not experience any explosive wars save for skirmishes along the north eastern front. Political good will tended to prevail while economic relations continued normally despite imbalances and misgivings about these among some countries of the region. Furthermore, military balance had been maintained through restrained military armament, military alliance between Tanzania and Uganda (1963) and Kenya and Ethiopia (Orwa, 1981). The East African Community and the East African Authority performed important political functions by providing forum for direct contacts among the East African presidents and in this sense served as a moderating factor. This condition contrasted a great deal with the 1970s. While in preceding period ideological, economic and even security differences had been confined to diplomatic manoeuvre and verbal confrontation, the 1970s deteriorated into violent conflicts.

The shift began with the overthrow of Prime Minister Egal in 1969. The coup brought to power a military leadership whose Greater Somalia strategy centered on a military solution and who had no legal obligation to honour the terms of the 1966 Ethio-Somali and 1967 Kenyan-Somali agreements. Somalia proceeded to forge an alliance with the Soviet Union from whom the former expected to receive arms already denied her by the United States and other Western arms suppliers. The Soviet in turn show an opportunity to counter U.S. presence in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa (Ojo, 1985:98,137-138). To the Northwest of Kenya another pro-Russian regime appeared momentarily in the Sudan in 1969. Uganda, under Obote, had provided the scale on which the political pendulum in the former British East Africa balanced. The coming to power of General Idi Amin in 1971, began a process which eventually disturbed the delicate equilibrium (Chemonges, 1984). Finally, the overthrow of Haile Selassie in 1974, left a vacuum in the power equation. The new military government declared Ethiopia a socialist state creating a prospect for Soviet dominance in the Horn of Africa.

Events moved rapidly towards the total collapse of the system. First, by 1974, Kenya risked being surrounded by socialist countries.

Uganda; though not one, relied on the Soviet Union and Libya for military support. The Sudan had renounced socialism in 1971 and denounced the Soviets, but its ties with Kenya were just beginning to take hold. Through Somalia and Uganda, the Soviets established a significant presence in the Horn and East Africa. Second, the policy of coexistence that had characterized inter-state relations in East Africa collapsed when Tanzania failed to recognize Idi Amin's regime and Nyerere refused to sit at the same table with Amin to constitute the East African Authority. Tanzania had also expected Kenya to denounce the military regime in Uganda. When Kenya failed and continued to have normal diplomatic intercourse with Amin, relations with Tanzania deteriorated setting in motion an unending ideological war that heightened suspicion on the part of both parties.

Kenya's behaviour may have been influenced by a number of factors. First, economic self-interest. Under Amin Uganda's economy increasingly became a hostage of Kenya. Second, realism cautioned against interference in the internal affairs of other countries as long as the equilibrium remained undisturbed. Thus, to Kenya, the military coup and all the accompanying internal atrocities was an internal matter better left to the Ugandans themselves. Finally, ideological consideration may have also played part. Obote had been more pro-Nyerere and he had leaned toward socialism. Amin ended this trend and acted as a check against the spread of Tanzania-type socialism in the region.

Economic conditions that prevailed in the 1970s also tended to disturb the balance. The military policies led to the collapse of the Ugandan economy and Kenya's exploitation of Uganda was heightened. During the coffee boom of 1976, it was Kenya and not Uganda that benefitted from

Uganda's coffee export. Thus Uganda became increasingly more important for commercial purposes than the East African Community arrangement. Or so it seemed to the inner circle in the government. A feeling grew that Community's Common Services in Tanzania lost money and were being subsidised by Kenya (Chemonges, 1984). The Daily Nation captured the mood in an editorial on August 8, 1976.

Our posture must be to diversify our exports and imports to other areas and to find alternative routes so that economic blackmail should not succeed especially given irreconcilable ideological difference between us and our neighbours....

Finally, in January 1977, Kenya took a bold step by breaking up the East African Airways. Tanzania had earlier pleaded with members of the East African General Assembly to save the airline, and Tanzania retaliated by closing all its borders with Kenya, an act which ended the Community system. Tanzania explained its action: "If Kenya did not want air, railway and sea links with her neighbours, there should be no reason why she should want road link with the same neighbours". Kenya was thus mistaken in thinking that Tanzania could not block Kenya's access to central African market (Africa Confidential, April 1, 1977:5).

The collapse of the Community left a regional vacuum. It had provided a framework for consultation among the East African leaders. After Amin took over power in Uganda the forum never functioned properly again, but it had continued to provide psychological security. In its aftermath, both Kenya and Tanzania sought alternatives. Kenya looked northwards trying to build political/links with the Sudan (see Africa and economic

Contemporary Record, 1973/74: B184; Hall, 1984:6). As for Tanzania, it sought to create new economic groupings such as Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and the Kagera Basin Development Council in the East-West. But attempts at creating new power centres did not yield immediate dividends and they failed to provide mechanisms for balancing regional power. Yet the situation coincided with an apparent arms race in the region which threatened to erupt into violent confrontations.

Between 1963 and 1969, Kenya's most aggressive enemy, Somalia, had an army of about 4,000 men which compared well with Kenya's estimated force of 5,000, and Ethiopia's 35 thousand-man army. Kenya had managed to keep its army very small throughout the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, probably because the size of the Somali army did not represent a preponderant force. Military arrangements with Ethiopia and Great Britain also acted as a balance to Somalia. Finally, Kenya's other neighbours did not represent an immediate security threat (see Weekly Review, July 12, 1976:3-5, Africa Diary, December, 7-13, 1963: 1487; Kessing's Archives, March 21-28, 1964). Even Tanzania and Uganda under Obote had maintained their forces at 7,000 and 10,000 men respectively and they were members with Kenya in the East African Community.

The arrival of the Soviets in Mogadishu following the 1969 coup, the existence of military governments in Ethiopia and Uganda and the internal instability that developed in the latter two countries eventually destabilized the region. The Somali army increased from 4,000 men in 1968 to 53,000 in 1977. Somalia also introduced in the region the largest and most advanced military arsenal. Its equipment included 250 t-34, t-54 and T-55 Soviet battle tanks; more than 300 BTR-40 and BTR-152 armored cars

66 combat aircraft consisting of Soviet Mig-15s, 17s, and 21s. (Strategic Survey, 1977:19).

In Ethiopia the coup removed from power Kenya's most trusted ally in the Horn of Africa as well as in East Africa. (Africa Contemporary Report 1974/75: B193-4). The revolution momentarily dismembered Ethiopia's 35,000-man army. Moreover, American-supplied military equipment was thought to be of no match to Soviet-armed Somalia. Ethiopia's airforce had a few U.S. F 5A and F 5 E fighter aircraft and some battle tanks but its military weakness was made worse by civil war and secessionist movements which intensified with the revolution.

In East Africa proper, Amin duplicated Somalia. He began to claim much of western Kenya and part of Tanzania's Kagera enclave. His regime also brutalized citizens of Uganda's neighbours, particularly Kenya and Tanzania (Weekly Review, February 13, 1976:5). Uganda's army increased from 10,000 in 1970 to about 21,000 men in 1976. Amin built one of the largest air forces in East Africa. He acquired 12 Soviet Mig-21s. Other equipments included unknown number of battle tanks and Sam. II Ground-to-Air Missiles, all of Soviet origin. Even if the army was incapable of effectively using the equipment, neighbours felt threatened.

As far as Tanzania was concerned, it quietly increased its forces. In 1974, these were thought to number about 10,000 men in the army, 1,000 in the air force and a similar number in the navy. When it mobilized against Uganda in 1978, the army was over 50,000 men. Equipment included Chinese T-59 and T-62 battle tanks, one to two squadrons of Mig-17s and 19s. The navy had ex-Chinese P-6 Swaton Class patrol boats (Africa Contemporary Record, 1973/74: B 309, B269-270).

In this power game Kenya's position appeared weak. Its forces stood at about 6,950 men, ground, air and navy together. The army had no battle tanks, while the air force flew 6 BAC-167 aircraft, 5 Bulldog armed trainers, 10 Beaver light transport planes and two Bell Helicopters (Africa Contemporary Record, 1973/74: B 176, Weekly Review, July 12, 1976:3-5). Because of the changed circumstances, Kenya entered the arms race in East Africa. The three branches of the military increased steadily from 1976 onwards. Military expenditure rose from less than one per cent of the Gross National Product in 1973 to 4.6 per cent in 1978, while spending as a percentage of total governmental expenditure increased from 6.3 per cent in 1967 to over 10 per cent in 1970. Defence allocation in the 1980/81 fiscal year accounted for 25% of the budget. The country also acquired 12 U.S. F5E and F5F fighter aircrafts, a number of anti-insurgency attack helicopters, an assortment of battle tanks from Britain, in addition to transport planes, armed cars and many other weapons from Israel, France and the Federal Republic of Germany. This growing concern with security dictated that military alliance with socialist Ethiopia be maintained and; when Somalia went to war with Ethiopia, Kenya interceded with the United States not to supply Somalia with military material.

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A few observations can be made from the foregoing. First, Kenya had in the years preceding the 1970s mainly sought to maintain status quo in Eastern Africa. Such a policy served both economic and security interests of the country as perceived by leaders. That economic self-interest contributed to the collapse of the East African Community. Leaders had failed to foresee that the balance they sought to maintain rested as much on the East African Community as on military power equation. Second, the arms race which began in the region at the end of the 1960s, led to the

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collapse of the regional equilibrium by the second half of the 1970s. The Soviet Union had entered the region arming Somalia and Uganda, the two countries that threatened regional security. Worse still, the Overthrow of the ancient monarchy in Ethiopia and the subsequent internal power struggle and instability played in the hands of the Somali. They sensed a military weakness and invaded Ethiopia in 1977. Had Cuba and the Soviet Union not come to Ethiopia's aid, Somalia would have defeated it allowing Somalia enough time to turn against Kenya. With Ethiopia defeated, Kenya, too, would have fallen to Somalia.

While the war between Ethiopia was still raging, Amin also found it hard to control internal conditions. His regime came under increased opposition both at home and outside Uganda. In an attempt to divert attention from domestic problems, he invaded a portion of Tanzania sure that he would win a military confrontation with Tanzania. The Tanzania army had until then been grossly under-estimated. Thus, as the 1977/78 Ethio-Somali war came to an end, Tanzania and Uganda were locked in another direct military confrontation, a battle which ended only after Tanzanian forces had overthrown Amin and paved the way for the return of Milton Obote to power in Kampala. In a word, by the second half of the 1970s the Eastern African equilibrium broke down, thus setting in motion a state of near anarchy.

Politics of Stabilization and the Return To Equilibrium

When a balance of power is disturbed the tendency is for the situation to return to equilibrium. The balance of power that had contributed to regional stability in the 1960s was grossly disturbed in the 1970s mainly because of developments in Somalia and Ethiopia; partly because of suspicion and ideological differences between Kenya and Tanzania; and

irresponsible leadership in Uganda all of which culminated in the break-up of the East African Community, closure of borders between Kenya and Tanzania and war between Tanzania and Uganda. Kenya and Tanzania made attempts to redress the systemic imbalance, Kenya by seeking to foster new relations with Sudan and Ethiopia while Tanzania looked South where she helped form Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).

Kenya's northern oriented strategy led to the establishment of permanent ministerial and border consultative committees with Sudan; the invitation of Colonel Mengestu Haile Marriam to pay a state visit to Kenya in 1980. While in Nairobi Col. Mangestu and President Moi reaffirmed their countries' continued commitment to the 1964 military treaty. Earlier, President Moi had paid official visit to Mogadishu aimed at improving relations in the Horn of Africa. In 1981 President Moi brought together Col. Mangestu and General Numeiry in a diplomatic effort to have Ethiopia and Sudan settle their difference over support for liberation movements based in their respective countries. These efforts by Kenya and Tanzania were part of attempt to re-establish the collapsed East African equilibrium. As these activities were taking place Ethiopia, with the assistance of the Soviet Union and Cuba, re-emerged as a major factor in the power equation in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia's new massive military power together with an enlarged and modernized Kenyan security forces had by 1981 re-established the military balance in the Horn of Africa that had been lost in the 1970s (Military Balance, 1983).

The return of Milton Obote to power in Uganda in 1980, instead of undermining the re-establishment of the lost equilibrium, contributed towards the re-establishment of regional stability. Obote's presence on

the East African scene created conditions for improved relations among the three traditional East African states. He successfully brought the East African leaders together in Kampala setting stage for future summit meetings that eventually led to normalization of relations as will be shown shortly.

Growing political instability in most of the Eastern Africa states following the conflicts of the late 1970s also contributed to the re-establishment of regional equilibrium. Obote had faced a Museveni-led rebellion along with other minor opposition groups. These groups sought to use neighbouring countries as their operational bases against the Obote regime. On August 1, 1982, the now defunct Kenya Air Force mutinied and the ring-leaders fled to Tanzania where they were given political assylum. Two months later a coup plot against Nyerere was discovered in Dar-es-Salaam and the leaders of the plot fled to Kenya where they received protection. These developments underscored the problem of regional security -- that is insecurity in one country seemed to influence events in another.

It was with this background that the Heads of State of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda held a summit meeting in Tanzania in October, 1983 to deal with security issues. The three leaders, Moi, Obote and Nyerere signed a secret security agreement the effect of which was the repatriation of dissidents from Kenya to Tanzania and Uganda and from Tanzania to Kenya to stand trial in each of these countries for treasonable offences. The October meeting was followed by the November, 1983 Arusha summit where the three leaders agreed to settle differences arising out of the collapse of the East African Community (see Weekly Review, December 16, 1983:13).

✓ The Arusha agreement marked the end of hostility between Kenya and Tanzania and from thence normalization of relations proceeded apace. It also opened the door for solving the perennial problem of how to divide the E.A.C. assets and liabilities totaling KSh. 12 million. The Joint Ministerial Committee set up by the Heads of State to settle them was directed to reach agreement by January, 1984 demonstrating the determination of the three presidents to have the experiences of the 1970s behind them. On January 25, 1984 the countries reached agreement by which the E.A.C. liabilities were divided proportionately -- Kenya 42%, Tanzania 32% and Uganda 26%. Assets were also divided proportionately with Kenya and Tanzania receiving the lion's share but only Uganda had to be compensated by transfer of hard currency. It appears that the demands for regional stability was more important because none of the parties achieved what it had originally demanded (Weekly Review, January 27, 1984:29)

President Moi captured the new spirit of co-operation emerging in East Africa during Kenya's Jubilee independence celebrations on December 12, 1983. "Our foreign policy continues to be guided by the principles of good neighbourliness, non-alignment and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries". Kenya subscribes to these principles because the interests of all the countries in the region require adherence to them. The President added that the East African leaders had agreed on renewed co-operation because they wanted to restore "peace and tranquility in East Africa" (Weekly Review, December 12, 1983:7).

But for Kenya experience appeared to have taught that regional "peace and tranquility" required a broader regional co-operation that went beyond the traditional East African countries. Even before the normalization of relations with Tanzania Kenya had signed an agreement with Sudan that outlawed the use of their respective countries by subversive groups intent on

distabilizing their respective governments. The nature of Kenya's trade patterns that developed during the 1970s made almost all the Eastern African states critical in national economic and commercial strategy. While Uganda remains the most important trading partner, Rwanda, Burundi and Sudan have emerged in importance since 1977. Uganda is the gateway to Rwanda, Zaire and Burundi while the Sudanese market is in Southern Sudan (see tables 7 and 8 below). The continuation of this Western, north west commerce hinges on stability in all these countries (see Weekly Review, August 23, 1985: 13-14).

Table 8: Kenya's Domestic Exports* (Eastern Africa)

Value by Country of Destination K£'000

country	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Uganda	25,703	26,871	43,585	31,498	30,588	55,531	46,795	55,161	62,781
Tanzania	20,365	22,995	7,677	1,837	3,074	3,477	4,535	5,547	4,781
Zaire	1,797	1,975	3,187	2,086	2,306	3,643	5,315	5,095	6,770
Rwanda	4,103	4,857	5,621	7,376	8,087	12,313	20,830	20,963	23,066
Burundi	678	1,107	1,735	3,160	4,267	7,077	12,751	13,035	13,402
Somalia	2,244	2,030	1,756	2,914	2,189	4,298	1,783	3,915	2,581
Sudan	712	1,807	3,504	5,071	6,228	8,103	10,910	13,601	20,204
Zambia	6,712	7,400	6,126	5,165	5,191	4,644	1,884	1,816	1,552

Source: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstract, 1984: 59

* Exclude transfers and re-exports

Table 9: Kenya's Imports (Eastern Africa)

Value by Country of Origin K £'000

Country	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Uganda	1,466	818	581	1,975	803	1,206	1,010	1,390	855
Tanzania	9,166	12,406	1,622	353	102	309	273	860	1,015
Zaire	461	410	606	2,466	533	157	720	987	1,214
Rwanda	-	765	1,259	2,333	3,289	2,623	3,690	2,311	3,391
Burundi	32	5	-	-	1,158	115	274	189	331
Somalia	126	103	105	20	71	44	30	33	40
Sudan	-	136	1,161	23	210	8	22	18	17
Zambia	549	824	1,030	1,575	1,243	1,518	1,592	1,372	1,040

Source: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstract, 1984: 73

A number of observations regarding Kenya's posture-on inter-state relations in Eastern Africa can be made from tables 8 and 9. First, she enjoys an overwhelming preponderance of advantage in regional trade. Second, Uganda, Burundi, and Sudan have become extremely important in economic calculus. Third, the 1977 border closure affected Kenya and Tanzania economically. As can be seen on table 8 Kenya exported goods worth Kf20.4 million to Tanzania in 1975 and Kf 23 million in 1976. She imported Kf9 million and Kf12.4 million from Tanzania during the respective years (table 8). After 1977 there occurred a sharp fall in trade between the two countries. The border problem affected Kenya's trade beyond Tanzania. In 1975 Kenya's African trade accounted for about 40% of total exports and by 1984 this figure had dropped to 26% in spite of significant increase in exports to Rwanda, Burundi and Sudan after 1977 (see Republic of Kenya Economic Survey, 1977: 75, 78; Economic Survey, 1985: 94). Finally, Kenya enjoys massive favourable balance of trade with all the Eastern African countries which as shown on table 6 helps reduce the volume of her international trade deficit. Therefore Kenya must put greater value on regional stability in order to promote her economic interests.

Kenya's efforts to assume Eastern African leadership following the retirement of President Nyerere must not be seen as idealistic and adventuristic. It is a pragmatic approach to the politics of a region which has become of immense importance to Kenya. By sponsoring the Uganda peace talks in Nairobi, Kenya was largely promoting her interests. The failure of the Nairobi peace agreement was thus accepted philosophically with Presidents Moi and Hasan Mwinyi of Tanzania declaring simply that whatever was happening in Uganda, the Nairobi agreement offered the best hope for a lasting peace (Weekly Review, January, 1986: 7). Realism dictated that, although Museveni had slapped Kenya on the face by floating the Nairobi agreement, his government should be accepted if the broader

objective of creating regional stability conducive to inter-state co-operation was to be realized. Thus, immediately after Museveni took Kampala, President Moi joined Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda at Eastern Zairian town of Goma and declared support for the Museveni government. The Goma meeting marked the beginning of a regional-wide summitry system, the Goma meeting being followed by another at Entebbe, Uganda in March, 1986 attended by presidents of Tanzania and Burundi in addition to the original four heads of State. The July, 1986 Nairobi Summit brought also Sadeq Ahmadi of Sudan while on November 27, 1986, Burundi hosted "the fourth regional summit of Heads of States and Government of East and Central Africa" (Daily Nation, November 28, 1986: 1,36). It is important to note that at all these summits the dominant issues have been security and economic co-operation, with the members of states repeatedly undertaking not to allow their respective territories to be used by dissidents or refugees for purposes of destabilizing their home governments (see Weekly Review, July 18, 1986: 10-11; July 25, 1986: 11; Daily Nation, July 10, 1986: 28; November 28, 1986: 1, 36).

Conclusion:

A number of conclusions may be drawn with respect to Kenya's foreign policy. First, Makinda is wrong in suggesting that Kenya's non-alignment and active involvement in inter-African affairs ended when the country granted the United States of America the right to use Kenya's military facilities in the support of the Rapid Deployment Force. Kenya's non-alignment has always been ambivalent except at the level of principle and public articulation. This also goes for Howell's conclusion that there may have been a time when Kenya pursued radical foreign policy on global issues. Second, Kenya's pro-West policy has never changed since 1963. This posture is explained by the acceptance of capitalist mode of production

as the best strategy for national development. Tied to this is the continued dependence on external sources for financing budgetary deficit and development budget. In this sense then one has to accept the existence of coincidence of interests between Kenya and the metropolitan powers. Any policy designed to promote and protect Kenya's economy must out of necessity promote and protect external capital. It is, therefore, at this level that Kenya can be seen to promote international capitalism in Eastern Africa. But does the ruling elite do this consciously aware that it is not promoting Kenya's interests? Inter-state trade is an important national interest that has a lot of bearing on national wealth. It is clear that Eastern Africa is important to the country's international commerce and even a non-pro-west ruling class would hardly wish to see the situation reversed. Finally, Kenya's reliance on the West and North America for security assistance by and large arises from the need to defend national territorial integrity. The defence of territorial integrity is a duty for both radical and conservative leaders alike. A policy designed to ensure national security cannot be said to promote the interests of external powers. If this were so then Kenya would have had to withdraw from her military alliance with Ethiopia after the latter adopted socialism. Does it not look strange that a "sub-imperial state" intervened on behalf of Ethiopia during the 1977/78 Ethio-Somali war? While it is true that foreign policy of a country reflects interests of the class that control economic and political power (Levin, 1966:213), it does not mean that such policy deliberately promote interests of metropolitan powers. As for Kenya her foreign policy seeks "to promote economic and social modernization ..." which had formed a major ideology of the pre-independence nationalists. Once they assumed political power they applied foreign policy with a view to achieving these objectives. It is for this reason that "relations with" other states, African or non-African, "have been handled with a great deal of caution..." avoiding radicalism on even such controversial issues as colonialism, racialism, neocolonialism and non-alignment (Okumu, 1973: 263) lest a radical posture

drive out and inhibit the continued inflow of external private investment capital as well as official development aid. Therefore, the 1980 military agreement with the United States of America, although a controvention of the principle of non-alignment, was not a deviation from Kenya's pro-West policy.

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