MANAGING CONFLICT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE AFRICAN UNION IN SOMALIA AND SUDAN (DARFUR)

BY

FRANCESCAH KIPSOI

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DECLARATION

This project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university or institution.

Signature _____ Date _____

Francescah Kipsoi
R51/63950/2010

This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor.

Signature _____ Date _____

Dr. Ochieng. Kamudhayi
Supervisor

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LIST OF ABBREVIATION AND ACRONYMS

ACRF	African Crisis Response Force
AMIS	African Mission in the Sudan
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ARPCT	Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism
ARS	Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia
AU	African Union
CARBG	Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group's
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
OAU	Organization of African Unity
SLA	Sudan Liberation Army
SLA	Sudan Liberation Army
SNM	National Movement
SNRC	Somalia National Reconciliation Conference
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Scientists
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations Africa Mission in Darfur
UNO	United Nations Operation

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ABSTRACT

The effectiveness of conflict resolution as a technique in managing civil wars has gained increasing attention in today's international arena. Nonetheless, the outcome of the strategy whether successful or failed- is dependent on a number of present or created conditions. Using the AU led Somalia and Darfur conflict management, this study compares the conflict resolution approaches identifying the determinants of successful and failed resolution outcome. This study targeted 30 individuals, from both Somalia and Darfur, involved in conflict resolution. The empirical result of the study confirmed a positive correlation between successful conflict management outcome and a "ripe" moment for initiating mediation, mediator leverage and a suitable resolution strategy in each conflicting area. As part of recommendations, the conflicting parties should be ready and willing to come together and end their differences. This will make the work of the uniting parties simple. At the same time, the neighboring countries who are lucky enough to be living in peace should take the initiative to intervene in the conflicting countries where need be. The top officials in any government should lead by example. They should speak and live peace for the rest of the people to hear and see. This will decrease instances of conflicts in the various countries. This study also emphasized the need for further research on determinants of successful implementation of peace agreements.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

With the end of the Cold War era, the world has witnessed the decline in conflict between states and a worrying prevalence of conflicts within state boundaries or civil wars. Civil wars are more difficult to manage than inter-state conflict given the intractability, entrenched positions and psychological polarization that characterize such conflict. In terms of history and culture, the countries of the Horn of Africa – Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia – are distinct from other African countries as local languages dominate the administration in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia.

Conflict management, one of many options available for managing civil wars, has become a distinguished and preferred form of conflict management because it offers a non-coercive means of engaging with a third or external party who is trusted by all disputants involved in the conflict. There have been at least fourteen attempts by external parties to mediate the drawn-out Somali civil war. Nonetheless, experts on Somalia have observed that the international community's conflict management efforts have failed to end the Somali crisis, identifying lack of political will, misdiagnosis of the crisis, confusion between state-building and reconciliation and poor conflict management skills as some of the key underlying factors.

Conflict management, therefore, is not always an effective technique of conflict management in the context of a civil war and its outcome-whether successful or failed- is

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dependent on a number of present or created conditions. Mainly focusing on the Somali civil war and the African Union-led conflict management process from 2002-2004 in particular, this study aims to uncover some of the factors that contribute to successful or failed conflict management in the context of a civil war.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The conflict in Somalia and Darfur has resulted in the stagnation of the economic, social, and cultural development of the nations. Thousands of lives have been lost in the last decade, calling for a need to manage the conflict. Humanitarian help has been sent in these countries several times but there is an absence of tangible, long-term solutions. After decades of intense civil war following the collapse of the Somali central government in 1991 and the intangible achievements of subsequent peace initiatives, it has been argued that the SNRC-the fourteenth attempt at resolving the Somali conflict-encompassed the right ingredients for a successful conflict management. Nonetheless, while the IGAD-led peace process managed to produce a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs),

There are various perceptions from Somalis and the international community on the nature of the conflict management of the SNRC. The perceptions have ranged from deeming the conflict management an outright failure to partially successful. Conversely, it is against this paradox that the study aims to revisit the SNRC through a critical lens with the aim of analyzing the conflict management process employed and to link the process to the current outcome. The critical questions that need to be asked, therefore,

are: To what extent has managing Conflict in the Horn of Africa succeeded: A comparative analysis of African Union in Somalia and Sudan (Darfur)?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The overall objective of this study is to assess the utility of managing conflict in the Horn of Africa.

The specific objectives of the study are:

- To test the validity and scope of existing theories on determinants of successful or failed conflict management in international conflict management in the context of civil wars.

- To analyze and determine the African union decision making and organizational capabilities in managing conflicts.

- To contribute towards generating new hypotheses on determinants of successful or failed conflict managements in the context of civil wars.

1.4 Justification of the Study

This study is justified on two grounds; academically and policy wise. Academically, a considerable number of quantitative studies have thus far been conducted with the aim of identifying variables that have an impact on conflict management. Nonetheless, only a few in their studies differentiate between interstate and intrastate conflicts. Moreover, very few studies of conflict management have attempted to hypothesize about the relationship between contextual and procedural factors and conflict managements in the

Somali conflict. This study aims to contribute in bridging this gap by indentifying important determinants of conflict management in the context of a civil war.

Additionally, little has been done to systematically analyze and document the lessons learned from the conflict management efforts of the IGAD-led and the 14th most recent conflict management effort in Somalia and Darfur.[1] This study aims to bridge this gap by adding to the existing body of knowledge on the conflict management efforts in the Somali conflict while also informing and maximizing future conflict management initiatives. This is based on the conviction that if lessons learned are not seriously considered future conflict management attempts will continue to be undermined.

1.5 Literature Review

Since the creation of the UN in 1945, peacekeeping has become a dominant feature of conflict resolution. UN peacekeeping history shows a total of 59 missions from the first mission in 1948 to 2004. Currently, in Africa alone, there are missions in Darfur, Eritrea and Ethiopia, Somalia, Chad and the DRC[2]. There have also been attempts to regionalize peacekeeping efforts, as exemplified by the Economic Community of West Africa Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) initiative. The emergence of regional peacekeeping was predicated on the US application of the doctrine of burden-sharing and collaboration.

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[1] In conducting a thorough literature review, the researcher identified only a few comprehensive and systematic studies that have been dedicated to analyzing the lessons learned in the conflict management attempts of the Somali conflict, namely: a study conducted by Accord entitled "Whose peace is it anyway? Connecting Somali and International peacemaking", published by Conciliation Resources in collaboration with Interpeace, issue 21, 2010 and a series of studies on Somali-led peace processes conducted by Center for Research and Dialogue in collaboration with Interpeace located at http://www.interpeace.org/index.php/Publications/Publications.html

[2] Mkandawire, Thandika and Olukoshi, Adebayo (eds.) (1995) *Between Liberalization and Oppression: The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Africa*, Dakar: CODESRIA

Initially, this took place through the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) – an initiative that followed the US experience in Somalia, and the lack of international action during the genocide in Rwanda and events in Burundi. The ACRF sought to build an African force that would intervene in African conflicts, thus reducing the demand for outside interventions by the members of the UN Security Council[3]. This approach has also been adopted by a number of other donor countries – notably France and Britain – in recent years. Associated with this is the colonial alignment of effort to resolve conflicts in their former colonies. In spite of these efforts, peacekeeping in Africa has been challenged, due to the continent's lack of economic and political resources to drive the process to its logical conclusion[4]. Conflict management is of immediate importance to regional and international actors because the destabilization is a threat to regional and international peace.[5]

A major theme that emerges in the literature on the causes of civil wars in Africa is the dichotomy between internal and external causes of conflict. For instance, scholars have argued that external factors such as colonialism and cold war proxy policies helped define and shape the societies that have experienced civil wars.[6] However, they prudently argue that the influence of external factors can often be exaggerated and in fact evidence

[3] Laakso, Liisa and Olukoshi, Adebayo O. (1996) 'The Crisis of the Post-Colonial Nation-State Project in Africa' in Olukoshi, Adebayo O. and Laakso, Liisa (eds.) Challenges to the Nation-State in Africa, Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet

[4] Obstacles' in The New York Times, 24 March, Available at: http://www.nytimes.com /2008/03/24/world/africa/ 24darfur. html> Accessed on 20 July 2008.

[5] Lionel Cliffe(1999), Regional Dimension of Conflict in the Horn of Africa. In: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 20,No.1, pp. 89-111

[6] Taisier M. A. & Robert, M. O. Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and resolution, (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999), pp. 289

suggests "a complex mix of internal and external factors operating at various stages of conflict and conflict resolution". The roots of civil wars in Africa can be largely explained by the policies and practices of the ruling elites that have included manipulating ethnic loyalties, and suppressing the economic, cultural, and political rights of marginalized communities.

Bad government policies to be one of the root causes of Africa's conflicts, arguing that "hegemonic regimens tend to repress the opposition, inhibit free expression, limit the arena for decision-making, restrict public accountability, and allow only narrow and restricted opportunities for mass participation".[7] Most African leaders have employed distractive policies (including personalization of the state) as a survival tactic and with the aim holding on to power. This has contributed to internal civil strife.[8]

1.5.1 The African Union

Limited external commitment in Africa especially after the cold war has led to the development of regional organizations who among other things contribute to conflict resolution.[9] Regional and sub-regional organizations are an integral part of the design and implementation of conflict management norms and strategies on the continent, and are becoming increasingly more proactive in this regard.[10]

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[7] Rothchild, Donald, *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Co-operation*, (The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1997), pp. 39

[8] Clapham, Chistopher, *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival*, (Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 4-5

[9] Soderbaum F. (1996) *Handbook of Regional Organistaions in Africa*, Nordiska Afrikainstuttet,uppsala p. 30-31

[10] Olonisaki. F(2007) *Africa after the African commission*, Institute of Development studies p. 1

The AU's overarching objective is the emergence of "an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena." [11] The union's more specific vision for conflict management reflects awareness that the precondition for achieving this overarching goal is security and stability on the continent. The AU's vision set out in various legal documents and interpreted and implemented by a set of interrelated institutions that constitute the African peace and security architecture is nothing if not ambitious- particularly when compared to its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity.

The African union establishes a long list of tasks related to the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict across Africa. The mission statement is not very specific in regard to which type of operations the union can undertake.[12] Africa is a continent rife with conflicts. The number of conflicts in Africa indicates the need for focus on conflict resolution before general development can take place. The African Union has made a significant effort to become an active partner in resolution of African conflicts.[13] The AU's member states, bureaucrats, and external donor states are building a set of institutions and instruments—commonly referred to as the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)—that enables the AU to play a much greater role in conflict management.[14]

[11] AU Commission,(2009) Strategic Plan 2009-2012, AU document EX.CL/501 (XV) Rev.2, p. 11.

[12] Jakkie Cilliers,(2002) Peace, security and democracy in Africa, Institute for Security Studies, ISS paper 60, p. 8.

[13]African Union Constitutive Act was signed in Togo. Availablefrom http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/au_act.htm on the Internet.

[14] Paul D. Williams (2011) The African Union's Conflict Management Capabilities. working paper Robina Foundation p.2

The AU still lacks considerable capacity – both logistical and human resource – to replicate whatever limited success it has achieved in the area of peacekeeping. In part, the absence of a strong civilian component to African peace missions remains a serious gap in a region where this aspect of conflict management has traditionally been the preserve of the military. This limited capacity is also reflected in the process of operationalising other aspects of the AU peace and security architecture, which correctly envisages multiple tasks and roles for civilians at various levels.[15]

From an idealistic approach, the Security Council has strong authority and is capable to make decision without veto right. From a realistic view, on the other hand, the legitimacy of the African Security Council influence is falling short due to the lack of the major powers in Africa. The Security Council composition may push major powers in the direction of regional organizations, where the major powers may have an easier access to influence.[16]

1.5.2 The African Union in Darfur and Somalia

A joint AU/UN peacekeeping force was deployed to Darfur in the beginning of 2008. The African Union has had a peacekeeping role in Darfur since 2003, when it helped broker a cease-fire between the government of Sudan and rebel groups. Prior to the deployment of the joint peacekeeping force, experts had serious reservations about the ability of the AU peacekeepers to work effectively. "Everyone knows this has been a very undermanned, understaffed, under-trained, and under-resourced force," Cohen said in

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[15] Olonisaki. F(2007) *Africa after the African commission*, Institute of Development studies p. 2

[16] Holt, V & M, Shanahan, (2005) *African Capacity Building for Peace Operations*, p. 15

2006. The case of Darfur, and the politics that have dogged the peacekeeping operation since inception, is indicative of the crisis within. Darfur is entirely reliant on the goodwill of the international community for survival[17].

The recent indictment and call to issue a warrant for the arrest of General Omar el-Bashir has added another drawback to the resolution of the Darfur crisis. The development has polarized the international community – in particular, the League of Arab States and the AU. These seeming differences in position play into the intransigence of the regime in Khartoum over the resolution of the Darfur crisis[18].

The Darfur initiative is representative of the continent in the post-Cold War and post-11 September 2001 world. In the first place, the AU is merely responding to initiatives emanating from outside its borders and, as such, has little or no say in the way they are managed. Peacekeeping initiatives to date have been at the mandate of the UN or erstwhile colonial powers, as the AU's limitations are manifested in restricted human and material resources and, above all, in the debilitating lack of political will. The manner in which the defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU) was transformed into the AU did not overcome the weaknesses inherent in the old organization, and has not provided the kind of leadership envisaged. Somalia, Chad and Sudan are constant reminders of the organization's challenges in managing its own affairs[19].

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[17] F. H. Khalif, *The Impact of the External Actors and their Interests in the Somali Peace Processes (2000-2004)*, Unpublished Thesis Masters Dissertation, University of Nairobi, 2004, p. 89-90

[18] Darfur Attack Kills Peacekeepers', Available at: <http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7020596.stm> Accessed on 20 July 2008.

[19] or failed states, see Zartman, I. William (1995) *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of egitimate Authority*, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner.

When it comes to understanding the Somali conflict, scholars tend to fall into two main debates.[20] On one hand, a view that is common among scholars and students of Somali studies is that the Somali people originated from Southern Arabia and share the same language, culture, religion and ancestry and hence, unlike the rest of Africa, Somalia is considered a nation[21]. Why and how could this society, one of the few nations in the continent with one ethnic group, one culture, one language, and one religion, find itself in such parlous circumstances-verging on self-destruction?[22]

On the other hand, they oppose the simplistic notion that all Somali people belong to one ethnic group, speak the same language, follow the same religion and share the same culture and tradition.[23] A closer examination of this assertion shows that it is inaccurate and misleading.[24] The Somali society has always been divided into nomadic pastoralist in the north and the southern Agro-pastoralist and throughout the colonial period there grew distinct territorial, linguistic and administrative traditions in the original territories.

Understanding state collapse in Somalia requires looking beyond clannism and ongoing factional intrigue, which is a symptom of state collapse rather than its cause".[25] They point at the incompatibility of the Somali civil society with the colonial (centralist) state

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[20] ICG, Somalia: *Continuation of War by Other Means?* Report No. 88, December 2004, p. 5

[21] F. H. Khalif, *The Impact of the External Actors and their Interests in the Somali Peace Processes (2000-2004)*, Unpublished Thesis Masters Dissertation, University of Nairobi, 2004, p. 89-90

[22] Osman, Abdullahi, A. "Cultural Diversity and the Somali Conflict: Myth or Reality?", *African Journal in Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 07, No. 2 (2007), pp. 96

[23] Ahmed, Ismail I. and Green, Reginald H. *"The heritage of war and state collapse in Somali and Somaliland: local-level effects, external intervention and re-construction" Third World Quarterly* Vol. 20. No. 1 (February 1999), pp.115

[24] Ibid, pp. 114

[25] Ibid, pp. 115

as a major factor in causing the conflict. Institutional structures that incorporated concepts entirely alien to the existing Somali institutions were imposed under colonial rule. As a result, a discrepancy emerged between the highly decentralized pastoral structures and the highly central nature of the postcolonial state.

The myth of Somali homogeneity has played a major role in the rise of nomadic clans to political predominance, and the appropriation of resources from the less warlike and intensely religious agro-pastoral groups in and around the inter-riverine region.[26] "A major factor in the Somali conflict is the struggle among clans for control of limited and increasingly scarce resources, especially land and water. More specifically, it is a violent competition between the Darood and Hawiye clan families for political and economic dominance of the inter-riverine region".[27]

1.6 Theoretical Framework

This study will build its analysis on the contingency approach developed by Kleiboer and Bercovitch. As demonstrated in the literature review, the contingency approach provides a framework for the existing literature that provides more clarity on the relationship between international conflict management and successful conflict outcomes by treating conflict managements as dependent on a number of independent contextual and process variables. Contextual variables include issues such as: The nature and characteristics of the conflict; the relationship between the disputants; the characteristics and skills of the

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[26] Mohamed Haji Mukhtar, "The Plight of the Agro-pastoral Society of Somalia", Review of African Political Economy, Vol.23 No.70 (December 1996), pp 545

[27] Mukhtar, Mohamed Haji. "The Plight of the Agro-pastoral Society of Somalia", Review of African Political Economy, Vol.23 No.70 (December 1996), pp 548-550

mediator, and the international context. Process variables include the strategies mediators may employ.[28]

The contingency approach offers a dynamic framework of interactive and reciprocal behaviours, and provides the researcher with a reproducible model conflict management that permits operationalization and analysis of individual clusters, their interactions and their relative importance.[29] Theoretical debate in political science literature regarding what kind of conditions are conducive to an escalation of humanitarian to military intervention is limited to a degree. Instead, a number of different perspectives on intervention have looked at specific factors that might encourage or deter intervention.

A few authors have looked at a cross-section of factors for intervention. Among these authors, Patrick Regan notably argues that a mix of domestic and international "audience constraints" motivate states to become involved in external intrastate conflicts[30]. While broad comparative analyses of different influences behind intervention are few in number, perspectives on intervention have been viewed as falling within two broad schools of how to view the international system, realism and liberalism.[31] Liberal perspectives of intervention commonly see it as motivated by altruistic humanitarian intentions while realist perspectives tend to view interventions, even those of a humanitarian nature, through the prism of self-interest. This study, while answering the

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[28] Kleiboer, M.(1996), "Understanding Success and Failure of International Conflict management", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 361

[29] Bercovitch, J. and Derouen, K (2009). *"Managing Ethic Civil Wars: Assessing the Determinants of Successful Conflict management"*, Civil Wars, Vol. 7, No 1 , pp. 102-103

[30] Regan, Patrick M (1998). *"Choosing to Intervene: Outside Interventions into Internal Conflicts as a Policy Choice."* Journal of Politics, vol. 60, no. 3: pp. 754-779.

[31] Finnemore, Martha(2003). *The Purpose of Intervention.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

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fundamental question of what prompts multilateral military intervention, also serves to agglomerate and contrast the array of viewpoints on the subject.

On a broad level, the perspectives regarding why military intervention occurs can be grouped into three categories or condition sets: those that see intervention as motivated by severity of conditions on the ground, those that see it as the product of domestic political influences, and those that see it as a product of geopolitical considerations. In evaluating these different assessments of intervention, this study argues that an escalation in the level of intervention is likely due to geopolitical considerations and certain domestic political influences. This is not to deny that the severity of a conflict is not pertinent in the choice to intervene. In accordance with principles found in the UN Charter, it seems unlikely that a multilateral coalition would violate the sovereignty of another state by interfering in its domestic affairs without a serious humanitarian impetus.

This paper would argue that a high level of violence and instability in a nation is necessary for prompting a violation of a state's sovereignty. However, a conflict's severity does not account for the discrepancy of why escalation occurs in some cases but not in others. Instead, this study claims that a mixture of domestic political influences and geopolitical influences are likely the primary conditions behind the escalation of humanitarian intervention to military intervention. In particular, this piece proposes that self-interest on the part of interveners combined with a favorable international system set the conditions for multilateral forces to intervene militarily.

1.7 Hypothesis

The study tests the following hypothesis:

- Positive hypothesis: The potential for successful conflict management in a civil war depends on the initiation of conflict management at a "ripe moment", mediator leverage over the conflicting parties and conflict management strategy that is suitable to the conflict context.

- Null hypothesis: The potential for successful conflict management in a civil war does not depend on the initiation of conflict management at a "ripe moment", mediator leverage over the conflicting parties and conflict management strategy that is suitable to the conflict context.

1.8 Research Methodology

This study was guided by the case study approach, a sub-set of qualitative research methodology. Case study approach has been greatly advanced by scholars and it is defined as "a detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events".[32] This highlights one of the strong attributes of case study methodology as its potential for both testing hypotheses and particularly useful for theory development;[33] hence, very suitable for the research objective of this study.

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[32] Ibid, p. 5

[33] George, Alexander L. and Bennett, Andrew(2005). *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, Cambridge, Mass., The MIT press, pp.16

1.8.1 Data Sources

The study made use of both primary and secondary sources. Primary data will be obtained using both in-depth interviews and questionnaires to allow for consistent and reliable findings/generalizations. Secondary data will be derived from credible reports on Somalia and Darfur, academic journals and books, official IGAD/AU/UN communiqués and the internet. Secondary data will be useful in complementing the primary data as it is not only cost effective but also necessary in filling the gaps in the event that the target population is inaccessible.

1.8.2 Data Collection Procedures

Data will be collected using closed and open ended questionnaires.[34] Questionnaires are easy to analyze, easier to administer and economical in terms of money and time. To ensure the effectiveness and validity of the questionnaires, appropriate questions linked to the objective and hypotheses of the study was included and the wording will be clear. Keeping in mind the variations in the population sample (i.e. level of literacy), structured interviewer-based questionnaires was also be employed.

Once the target group will be identified and the research instruments developed to lead researcher and trained research assistants will disseminate the questionnaires.[35] A period of two weeks will be deemed sufficient for response.[36] Sufficient follow-up will be

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[34] Questionnaire is attached in Annex 1

[35] It is important to point out that the researcher conducted the interviews by herself, as per the request of majority of the respondents who expressed an unwillingness to provide information in the presence of a third party.

[36] During the actual data collection phase, the researcher had to revise her approach. In addition to forwarding the questionnaires to some respondents for their completion, the researcher also meet with most

conducted to avoid low response rate. For In-depth interviews, detailed minutes/notes will be taken from all stakeholder consultations and these notes were carefully transcribed soon afterwards.

1.8.3 Sampling Procedures

Purposive sampling technique will be used in targeting key informants who will consist of key decision makers in the SNRC (i.e. mediators) or a group of people believed to be reliable for the study and have the required characteristics (i.e. SNRC delegates and diplomats, Somali/international experts on Somalia and Sudan).[37]

At least 10% of the accessible population is required in ensuring the target population is representative and for accurate generalizations.[38] Noting that the total number of delegates involved in the SNRC was 300, the study targeted at least 10% of this figure or 30 respondents. The study was carried out in Nairobi, Kenya for two main reasons. First, a number of the Somali delegates are still based in Nairobi. Secondly, some members of the international community involved in the SNRC as well as experts on Somalia are also based in Nairobi; in some cases phone interviews or questionnaires submitted through e-mail was conducted in targeting respondents outside Nairobi.

1.8.4 Research Ethics

Ethical issues will be seriously considered during data collection. The purpose of the research was explained before questionnaires were distributed, confidentiality was upheld

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of the participants to administer interviews based on the questionnaires. The researcher recorded responses from interviews on the questionnaires.

[37] Mugenda and Mugenda, p. 50

[38] Ibid, p. 42

to secure the respondents, consent was obtained from the respondents in using information obtained in the study, and voluntary participation by the respondents was upheld. The research will also strive to avoid research bias or skewed results by ensuring a representative population will be targeted and that all questions were interpreted in the same manner by the respondents by including contingency or follow-up questions when required.

1.8.5 Data Analysis and Presentation

To analyze the data, this study will employ the statistical package for social sciences (SPSS) which uses descriptive and inferential statistics. This system is suitable as it supports data summarization and basic inferential statistics and offers advanced data manipulation.[39] Descriptive statistics enables meaningful description of a distribution of scores or measurements using a few indices or statistics. Measures of central tendency (the mean values) provides the expected score or measure from a group of scores in a study.[40] Measures of variability, such as standard deviation informed the analyst about the distribution of scores around the mean of the distribution. Assisted by the SPSS and a research assistant, content analysis will be employed in interpreting the data whereby the frequency with which an idea appeared was interpreted as a measure of importance, attention or emphasis.[41] Qualitative data, derived through the open-ended questions administered to the respondents, was also coded for analysis. Graphs and pie charts will be employed to present the findings.

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[39] Ibid, p.116

[40] Mugenda, O.,and Mugenda, A., *Research Methods: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches*, pp. 120

[41] Ibid

1.9 Chapter summary

Chapter one will have the introduction of the study; it also includes the statement of the problem, objectives, hypothesis, justification and the review of other literatures which are related to the subject being studied.

Chapter two will focus on African unions' historical evolution since its inception, its mandate and the trends on conflict management in Africa. In this chapter, Somalia and Darfur will be analyzed on how the organization has tried to solve its conflicts.

Chapter three will examine African unions' management capabilities in the horn of Africa as the regions' main organization that deals with African problems. In this chapter therefore, African unions' participation in managing conflict in the horn of Africa, its peace initiatives, conflict resolution strategies and the unions interests in the region will be analyzed.

Chapter four will analyze the findings of the African unions' participation in conflicts in Somalia and Darfur, it will also be seen whether the countries conflicts have been resolved. This chapter will also give the prospects whether the two regions have stabilized or conflicts have continued to abound even with the intervention of the African union.

Chapter five will give recommendations and conclusions on how the African union can amicably resolve conflicts in Somalia and Darfur and the region at large. This will depend of findings in chapter in preceding chapters.

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORY OF CONFLICT IN SOMALIA AND DARFUR

2.0 Introduction

This chapter deals with changes that have taken place in the horn of Africa over time particularly comparing the state of Darfur and Somalia with regard to peace and conflicts. In addition, it also looks into various interventions in Darfur and in Somalia while trying to compare and contrast how these interventions are implemented in the two countries.

The chapter has been divided into five sections including; trends in the horn of Africa, Comparison between conflict in Darfur and conflict in Somalia, the African Union, State Collapse and United Nations Operation (UNOSOM), 1993–94 in Darfur and in Somalia.

2.1 Trends in the horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa[42] is located in the North-eastern part of the African continent with an area of over 1.9million square Kilometers, a coastline of more than 4000 Kilometers, which is the longest in Africa, and an estimated population of about 93million.[43] The four important countries that are located in the horn of Africa include Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti, and Eritrea. One of the major challenges that hinder the development of the region is perennial conflict between and within the countries of the horn of Africa. The impacts of these in the development of the region are very costly in both the economy and human aspects of the countries. Even though the horn of Africa has natural resources that could contribute to its economic growth, it is still one of the poorest in the entire

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[42] Woodward, Peter(2006). *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa*. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, p. 36

[43] Makuwira, Jonathan(2011), *The African Union, and the Unfolding Disaster in the Horn of Africa*, e-International Relations, p.2.

world. Peace in the horn of Africa among the countries, as well as its neighbors, will enable the region to exploit the natural resources to benefit its citizens.[44]

There have been several attempts by non-African states, as well as regional organizations, to manage the conflicts. In the year 2001, African states made the step of establishing the African Union, which succeeded the Organization of African Unity (OAU).[45] Since its introduction, the AU has made considerable effort to play an active role in conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa during conflicts. The members of the AU have the responsibility of conducting peacemaking, peace building, and peacekeeping.[46]

The peace and security outlook for the Horn of Africa remains bleak[47]. The conflict audit includes protracted state collapse in Somalia, deep hostility between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a fragile peace agreement between North and South Sudan, continuing instability in Darfur, periodic bouts of unrest in the Ogaden and northern Uganda, and two international peacekeeping operations—in Mogadishu and Darfur struggling to contain violence.[48] Political weaknesses also become apparent when examining the nations of the Horn of Africa. Perhaps one of the characteristic features of these nations is their immense capacity and their readiness to exploit already existing conflicts in neighboring states. Although negotiations to resolve outstanding problems are conducted, they are

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[44] Elbadawi,et al(2003),"*Why Are There So Many Civil Wars in Africa? Understanding and Preventing Violent Conflict*" Journal of African Economies, vol. 9. Issue :3, p.251

[45] Ibid 2.

[46] The majority of the delegates which make Mbagathi plenary are members and supporters of SRRC; TNG and NSC have pulled out from Mbagathi talks in May 2003.

[47] Bush, George H.W (1999). *Address on Somalia.* White House, Washington D.C. Address

[48] Joint Communique Issued by the 6th Ministerial Facilitation Committee Meeting , 22nd May, 2004, Nairobi, Kenya

likely to fail because successful negotiations between two or more parties in conflict necessarily entail exchange of resources.[49]

However, nations of the Horn of Africa, lack the resources necessary for mutually beneficial exchange relationships. This deficiency limits their range of responses and hampers their ability to engage constructively in negotiations. In the absence of a sufficient resource base to enter into mutually beneficial exchange relationships, subversion of the other is perceived as the only option open to such countries in their attempts to find solutions to their domestic political conflicts[50].

Therefore, successful management of conflicts requires either a powerful state capable of imposing its will through rewards and/or sanctions, or the convergence of actor interests. However, close examination of the power capability of nations of the developing world, especially those in the Horn of Africa which are among the poorest, excludes the former.[51] Often opposing interests - there are, the less likely it is that individual actors will reach a negotiated settlement, especially if their resource bases are weak. Their weakness, coupled with the strategic location of the Horn of Africa, has attracted foreign powers, which have intervened on more than one occasion for humanitarian and/or political reasons.[52]

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[49] Kaufman, R. (1973). 'The patron-client concept and macro-politics: prospects and problems', Comparative Studies in Society and History I 5, I: 284-308.

[50] The majority of the delegates which make Mbagathi plenary are members and supporters of SRRC; TNG and NSC (2003) have pulled out from Mbagathi talks.

[51] Taisier M. A. & Robert, M. O (1999). Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and resolution, (McGill-Queen's University Press, pp. 289

[52] Assefaw, B.(1999) States, international organizations and the refugee: reflections on the complexity of managing the refugee crisis in the Horn of Africa The Journal of Modern African Studies, Cambridge University Press pp. 597-619.

The United Nation's 1992 Agenda for Peace articulated a new collaborative relationship between the UN and regional bodies for the management of regional crises.[53] Increasingly, regional and sub-regional groupings are seen as the first resort for problems transcending national borders, leaving the wider international community to deal with problems that cannot be solved at lower levels. Accordingly there has been considerable external encouragement for the development of African regional organizations capable of addressing peace and security problems.

2.2 Comparison between conflict in Darfur and conflict in Somalia

To begin with, Somalia occupies a strategic position in the Horn of Africa. In addition to ties with other African countries, it has close religious and historical links with the Arab and Islamic world .At the time of the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group's (CARBG) arrival, Somalia had a population of approximately six million, including refugees[54] On the other hand, the Republic of Sudan, the largest country in Africa, lies on the western shore of the Red Sea. It is bordered by Eritrea and Ethiopia to the east, Kenya, Uganda and Democratic Republic of Congo to the south, the Central African Republic, Chad and Libya to the west, and Egypt to the north. The population of around 28 million comprises a diverse range of ethnic groupings which speak over 400 languages. Somalia consists of dry savannah plains with streams flowing only after rain. Much of the country has sandy soil with little agricultural value; the scant 33 per cent of

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[53] UN A/47/277-S/24111 17 June 1992

[54] James Wyllie(1993), "*Somalia, State Disintegration and Regional Stability*", Jane's Intelligence Review p. 71

land is that is arable in the Haud Plateau.[55] The Somali economy derives from its semi-arid climate and an environment featuring frequent drought and highly localized rainfall. Cattle, goats, and sheep are herded, but camel ownership is considered the "noblest Somali calling".[56]Although competition for scarce resources often creates conflict over wells and pasture lands; the Somalis are united by the traditions of a herding lifestyle.

After the country's independence in 1960, economic growth failed to keep pace with the rise in population caused by the influx of refugees[57] This was a result of the country's heavy dependence upon agriculture and herding which are affected by drought. Somalia's largest industry is processing agricultural food products.[58] During the 1980s, devastating droughts, the Ogaden War with Ethiopia, and the civil war that followed threw a failing economy into ruins. By the 1990s, Somalia was classified a "least developed country" by the UN[59] Somalis are split up into many clans and sub-clans. The clan is the most important social unit in Somalia and, thus, clan membership continues to play an important part in Somali culture and politics. Clans are patrilineal and are often divided into sub-clans, sometimes with many sub-divisions. The number and size of sub-clans within a clan varied; the average sub-clan in the twentieth century numbered about 100,000 people. Certain clans are traditionally classed as "noble clans", referring to the

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[55] DND, NDHQ, Analysis of Area of Operations Report, p. 19.

[56] David D. Laitin, *Politics, Language and Thought: The Somali Experience* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), p. 21.

[57] *Africa South of the Sahara*, 1993, p. 755).

[58] DND, Land Force Central Area Headquarters, CFB Toronto, *The Somalia Handbook*, p. 9.

[59] Samuel M. Makinda (1992), *Security in the Horn of Africa*, Adelphi Papers No. 269 (London: Brassey's, p. 34.

belief that they share a common Somali ancestry, whereas the minority clans are believed to have mixed parentage. The noble clans are believed to be descended from Samaale, and are sometimes referred to collectively by this name. The four noble clans are Darod, Dir, Hawiye, and Isaaq. Sab is the term used to refer to minority clans in contrast to Samaale.

On one level, the civil war in Sudan has afflicted the country almost continuously since independence in 1956 can be seen as a conflict between the Arab Muslim north and the black African, and predominantly Christian or animist, south. At a more detailed level, other features of the conflict emerge[60]. Darfur's people are a complex mosaic of between 40 and 90 ethnic groups, some of 'African' origin (mostly settled farmers), some Arabs all Muslim. Peaceful coexistence has been the norm, with inevitable disputes over resources between fixed and migratory communities resolved through the mediation of local leaders. [61]

Clan elders play a critical role in mediating and adjudicating disputes in Somalia using Somali customary law (xeer).-They are acknowledged experts in the process of conflict-resolution negotiations. Military units would treat a conflict as a discreet event, they'd bring in the clan elders, they would sit down and make a peace, there would be a document to prove it, and then there would be peace and we could all go away, when in fact that wasn't the case. In Somali political culture, conflict management never ends, they are always in dialogue, they're always meeting and it took us quite a long time to

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[60] *Sudan: Conflict and minorities*, Minority Rights Group International Report 95/3

[61] Rothchild, Donald(1997), *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Co-operation*, (The Brookings Institution, Washington pp. 39

understand that to be effective in helping them manage their conflicts. Accords and arrangements struck without ratification by the clan are not viewed as legitimate and are rarely upheld. Thus, peace conferences held at a distance (in Nairobi, Addis Ababa, or Mogadishu) that were not vetted by the local populations were not considered binding.[62]

Significant armed conflict was absent during Somalia's first 17 years of independence (1960–77). The first 10 years of independence were marked by vibrant but corrupt and eventually dysfunctional multiparty democracy. When the military came to power in a coup in 1969, it was initially greeted with broad popular support because of public disenchantment with the clannishness and gridlock that had plagued politics under civilian rule. In the context of the cold war, the regime, led by Siyad Barre, recast the coup as a socialist revolution and with funds from international partners built up one of the largest standing armies in sub-Saharan Africa.

In January 1917 Darfur was absorbed into the British Empire and became part of Sudan, making this the largest country in Africa. The British reluctantly but peacefully granted Sudan independence in 1956. They handed over political power directly to a minority of northern Arab élites who, in various groupings, have been in power ever since. This caused the South to mutiny in 1955, starting the first North-South war. It lasted until 1972 when peace was signed under President Nimeiry. But the Government continually flouted the peace agreement. This combined with its shift towards imposing radical

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[62] Testimony of Dr. K. Menkhaus, Transcripts vol. 7, p. 1277.

political Islam on an unwilling people, and the discovery of oil, reignited conflict in the South in 1983.[63]

Between 1977 and 1991, the country endured three major armed conflicts. The first was the Ogaden War with Ethiopia in 1977–78, in which Somali forces intervened in support of Somali rebel fighters in a bid to liberate the Somali-inhabited region of the Ogaden. Somalia lost the war and suffered around 25,000 casualties.[64]Those losses sowed the seeds of future internal conflict, prompting the rise of several Somali liberation movements' intent on overthrowing the military regime of Siyad Barre, whom they held accountable for the debacle. The first of these movements was the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), established in 1978 by Abdullahi Yusuf. This mainly Majerten clan movement engaged the regime in periodic skirmishes in the northeast of the country and was met with harsh repression.

National Movement (SNM) for control over northwest Somalia. The SNM was formed in1981 by some members of the Isaaq clan following the Ogaden War. Isaaq grievances deepened over the course of the 1980s, when the Barre regime placed the northwest under military control and used the military administration to crack down on the Isaaq and dispossess them of their businesses. The civil war mounted by the SNM began in May 1988 and produced catastrophe. Government forces committed atrocities against civilians (an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 Somalis died, mostly members of the Isaaq clan, which was the core support for the SNM) aerial bombardments leveled the city of

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[63] Elbadawi, Ibrahim and Sambanis, Nicholas(2000), "Why Are There So Many Civil Wars in Africa? Understanding and Preventing Violent Conflict", *Journal of African Economies*, Vol. 9. Issue: 3 pp: 251

[64] Ahmed Samatar, (1998) *Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality*, London, Zed press p. 137

Hargeysa; and 400.000 Somalis were forced to flee across the Ethiopian border as refugees, while another 400,000 were internally displaced. [65] These atrocities fueled Isaaq demands for secession in what became the self-declared state of Somaliland in 1991.[66]

The third armed conflict before 1991 pitted embattled government forces against a growing number of clan-based liberation movements in 1989 and 1990. The strongest of these movements included the United Somali Congress, USC (Hawiye clan), the Somali Patriotic Movement (Ogadeni clan), and the Somali Salvation Democratic Movement (Majerten clan). This multi front war presaged the predatory looting and banditry that characterized the warfare in 1991–92.

In addition to these wars, many other legacies of the Barre period fuel conflict in contemporary Somalia. First, the state was oppressive and exploitative, and was used by some political leaders to dominate others, monopolize state resources, and appropriate valuable land and other assets. As a result, reconciliation and power-sharing discussions in Somalia are complicated by high levels of distrust and a "zero-sum game" mentality toward political power and the state.[67]Second, the leadership skillfully manipulated and politicized clan identity over two decades of divide-and-rule politics, leaving a legacy of deep clan divisions and grievances. Third, this period coincided with the height of Cold War competition in the Horn of Africa. That allowed the Barre regime to attract large

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[65] *Somalia: A Government at War with its Own People*, New York: Africa Watch, 1990.

[66] Somaliland's claim of sovereign independence has not received external recognition from the United Nations or any state.

[67] Somali calculations of the costs and benefits of reviving an effective central government are discussed in Ken Menkhaus, *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism*, chpt. 2. Adelphi Paper 364. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004a.

quantities of military and economic aid. When the war ended, the level of expenditure, especially to maintain the bloated bureaucracy, was not sustainable and precipitated the fall of the regime.

Darfur, meanwhile, became embroiled in the various conflicts raging around it: not just internal wars by the centre over its marginalized populations – many of the soldiers who fought for the Government against the South were Darfurian recruits – but also regional struggles.[68] Janjaweed fighters, with their philosophy of violent Arab supremacism, were first active in Darfur in the Arab-Fur war in the late 1980s. Recruited mainly from Arab nomadic tribes, demobilized soldiers and criminal elements, The use of Darfur by Libya's Colonel Qadafhi as a military base for his Islamist wars in Chad promoted Arab supremacism, inflamed ethnic tensions, flooded the region with weaponry and sparked the Arab-Fur war (1987-89) with their philosophy of violent Arab supremacism, were first active in Darfur in the Arab-Fur war in the late 1980s.

The ruthlessly opportunistic Sudanese Government first armed, trained and deployed them against the Massalit people of Darfur in 1996-98. This was an established strategy by which the Government used ethnic militias to fight as proxy forces for them. It allowed the Government to fight local wars cheaply, and also to deny it was behind the conflict, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. After years of painstaking negotiations, in January 2005 a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between the Government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army

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[68] Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, (2005) *Darfur: a Short History of a Long War*, Zed Books p. 13

(SPLM/A), ending 21 years of bloody war which killed two million people, displaced another four million and razed southern Sudan to the ground.[69]

In early 2003, the struggle for land and power in the western Sudanese region of Darfur erupted into violence between Sudanese government forces and rebel groups protesting the marginalization of the region's black African ethnic groups by the Muslim central government. Arab militias (Janjaweed) supported by the government soon began enacting policies of ethnic cleansing--including forced displacement and starvation, murder, torture and rape--against Darfur's civilian population, leaving hundreds of thousands of people dead and more than 2 million expelled from their homes.

After decades in the political wilderness, being left out of the peace negotiations was the final straw. Inspired by the SPLA's success, rebel attacks against Government targets became increasingly frequent as two main rebel groups emerged – the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).

By early 2003 they had formed an alliance. Facing the prospect of its control over the entire country unraveling, in 2003 the Government decided to counter attack. Manipulating ethnic tensions that had flared up in Darfur around access to increasingly scarce land and water resources, they unleashed the Janjaweed to attack communities they claimed had links to the rebels.[70]

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[69] Douglas H. Johnson, (2006)*The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, Indiana University Press, p. 52

[70] Gerard Prunier,(2007) *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*, Cornell University Press, www.wikipedia.org

2.3 Devastating drought and famine in Darfur and in Somalia

In 2011, east Africa had two consecutive below-average rainfalls, resulting in one of the worst droughts in 60 years. This led to a declaration of famine in six regions of Somalia, which affected around 4.8 million people. At the height of the emergency, around 750,000 people were thought to be at imminent risk of starvation in Somalia with more than 380,000 vulnerable people in Somalia. Last year, Mary Robinson, former president of Irelandand UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, travelled to east Africa and saw the devastating effects of the drought in Somalia firsthand. [71]

All Somalis are acutely aware that their social, economic, and political institutions are shredded. Their coasts and land has become the hub where other nations dump their hazardous nuclear waste, which is not only killing our fish, poisoning our grazing and farming land, but will endanger the health of future Somali generations. In a highly globalized world, Somalia's "free duty" unpoliced border became a magnet for other nations to export to Somalia their expired or fake prescription drugs and foods-knowing perfectly that Somalia lacks customs inspectors. Illegal arms traders dump deadly mines and weapons into Somalia so the last remaining Somali on the planet would not run out of ammunition to kill himself. The Somali youths instead of carrying books in their hands, carry AK-47 to terrorize the civilian Somali population and to rob the little remaining Somali resources.

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[71] *Somalia: A Government at War with its Own People*, New York: Africa Watch, 1990.

The situation is no better in Darfur. Amidst the turmoil in, add the possibility of drought. The Sahel, the semi-arid region between the Sahara Desert and southern grasslands, has received above-average rainfall in recent years. But precipitation trends suggest that a period of drought is in the near future, which aid workers warn could spell trouble for ongoing peace efforts in Darfur.[72] "This is three years they've been above the statistical average [for rainfall]," said Andrew Morton, manager of the United Nations Environment Programmes conflicts and disasters program. "If you believe in statistics, there is no evidence it will continue."

The expected drier seasons loom over attempts by the international community to revive peace negotiations between the Sudanese government and Darfur's rebel factions. Water and land disputes are at the core of negotiations, and improved resource management is necessary to avoid further violence, Morton said. "There is a better chance for below average rainfall than above average rainfall," said Wassilla Thiaw, manager of the center's international bureau, which provided the forecast for its African Desk. A drought would likely be disastrous in Darfur, where the United Nations is struggling to provide basic human services such as water, food, and health care for an estimated one million people in need. The aid organizations that had provided many of these services were ousted by President Omar Al-Bashir on March 4 in response to an International Criminal Court order for his arrest. The United Nations is already warning that its resources are limited, announcing last week that it is unlikely to have sufficient funding to fuel its water pumps for more than a month. In Darfur, previous droughts have led farmers to fence off their land, forcing nomadic herdsmen to look elsewhere to feed their livestock. The drier

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[72] *Sudan: Conflict and minorities*, Minority Rights Group International Report 95/3

conditions, coupled with overgrazing and deforestation, expanded desertification and contributed to fierce land competition between ethnic groups.

In the 1980s, desertification and poor land management were blamed for the poor water conditions. Today, climate change is recognized as a contributor to the conflict.

In Northern Darfur, 16 of the 20 driest years on record have occurred since 1972, according to UNEP. The loss of heavy rains throughout Sudan is due in part to natural temperature fluctuations, but climate models have recently found a correlation between the warming of the Indian Ocean and a drying of sub-Saharan Africa.

"Amid the diverse social and political causes, the Darfur conflict began as an ecological crisis, arising at least in part from climate change," wrote U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in 2007. This, however, said that the Sahel recently received more rainfall than would be expected if climate change were affecting precipitation levels. "Most models point to suppressed rainfall over the Sahel with climate change, but that's not what we've been seeing over the past 10 years," he said. "But 10 years is still a very short period of time when you're talking about climate change. Climate change is something that happens over 20-50 years."[73]

2.4 The African Union in Darfur and in Somalia

The UN raised the alarm on the crisis in Darfur in 2003, and finding a lasting resolution has been a top priority for the Security Council. Under the auspices of the African Union (AU) and with support of the UN and other partners, the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA)

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[73] de Waal, Alex (2008) "Darfur Activism: The Debate Continues (Part 2)" posted on the SSRC blog *Making Sense of Darfur* on 2008-01-08 http://www.ssrc.org/blog/2008/01/08/ darfur-activism-the-debate-continues-part-2/

was signed on 5 May 2006. As few parties signed on, a renewed peace process under a joint AU-UN mediator took place in Doha, Qatar, over 2010 through June 2011, producing a framework document. Intensive diplomatic and political efforts to bring the non-signatories into agreement with the Doha for Peace in Darfur continue.

The AU began to deploy a small number of monitors to Darfur following a ceasefire signed in April 2004 in N'Djamena, Chad. A commitment in late summer 2004 to increase the monitoring force to approximately 3,500 went unfulfilled for over half a year, and during this time the AU was unable to secure from Khartoum a mandate for civilian protection-only a mandate to monitor the largely nonexistent ceasefire. [74]

Following the 16 November 2006 High-Level consultations in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) augmented the existing African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and prepared to deploy an unprecedented joint AU/UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur The African Union/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur was formally established by the Security Council on 31 July 2007 through the adoption of resolution 1769 referred to by its acronym UNAMID, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. UNAMID formally took over from AMIS on31 December 2007. Its mandate is Protection of civilians, contributing to security for humanitarian assistance, monitoring and verifying implementation of agreements, assisting an inclusive political process and contributing to the promotion of human rights and the rule of law. The mandate is

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[74] OCHA (2007) *"Darfur Humanitarian Overview"* received at the OCHA-office in Khartoum 15 November 2007, Khartoum

renewed yearly, and the adoption of Security Council resolution 2003 on 29 July 2011 extended it for further 12 months, until 31 July 2012.[75]

Following the violence in the Western Darfur region of Sudan, which begun with the armed resistance groups the Sudan Liberation[76] Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) attacking government outposts in response to a history of socio-economic and political marginalization, the AU has deployed a protection force to Darfur in June 2004, also known as the African Mission in the Sudan (AMIS).[77] However, the ability of the AU to achieve and fulfill its mission in this situation would always depend on its capacity to mobilize the political will of its Member States. Therefore a political process was also vital in ensuring that there was a bona fide peace to keep. AU-led mediation talks were convened in 2004 which led to a Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement in Ndjamena, Chad, which was signed on 8 April 2004.[78] Subsequently, the Protocol on the Security Situation in Darfur; the Protocol on the Improvement of the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur; and the Declaration of Principles for the Resolution of the Sudanese Conflict in Darfur were all signed on November 2004.[79]

On the other hand, the manner in which the defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU) was transformed into the AU did not overcome the weaknesses inherent in the old

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[75] UNAMID Report 2012

[76] Flint, Julie (2007) *"Darfur's armed Movements"* in de Waal (ed) *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* p. 161

[77] de Waal, Alex (2008) "Darfur Activism: The Debate Continues (Part 2)" posted on the SSRC blog *Making Sense of Darfur* on 2008-01-08 http://www.ssrc.org/blog/2008/01/08/ darfur-activism-the-debate-continues-part-2/

[78] Human Rights Watch (2008) *"Sudan: Notorious Janjaweed Leader Promoted Appointment of Musa Hilal an Affront to Darfur Victims"*

[79] OCHA (2007) *"Darfur Humanitarian Overview"* received at the OCHA-office in Khartoum 15 November 2007, Khartoum

organization, and has not provided the kind of leadership envisaged. Somalia is a

constant reminder of the organization's challenges in managing its own affairs[80].

Decentralization – a form of governance required by many donor organizations – is

intended to disperse power and resources from the central government to each of Sudan's

2.5 State Collapse in Somalia and in Darfur

Armed conflict raged across southern Somalia through 1991 and 1992, pitting clan-based

militias against one another for control of valuable towns, seaports, and neighborhoods.

The wars, which began as struggle for control of the government, quickly degenerated

into predatory looting, banditry, and occupation of valuable real estate by conquering

clan militias. Young gunmen fought principally to secure war booty, and were under only

the loosest control of militia commanders. Powerful merchants and warlords were

implicated in this war economy too. The principal victims of this violence were weak

agricultural communities and coastal minority groups caught in the middle of the

fighting. Looted of all their belongings, they faced a massive famine in late .1991 and

early 1992, prompting large international relief operations. . [81]

The food aid quickly became part of the war economy, a commodity over which militias

fought and that warlords diverted to fund the wars. An estimated 250,000 Somalis died in

this war and famine. The war of 1991–92 also produced a powerful array of interests in

perpetuating lawlessness and violence and blocking reconciliation. Warlords' power base

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[80] or failed states, see Zartman, I. William (1995) *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of egitimate Authority,* Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner.

[81] Africa Watch, (1990) *Somalia: A Government at War with its Own People,* New York

depended on a chronic state of insecurity, so that their clan constituencies needed them for protection. Illiterate gunmen saw war, plunder, and extortion as their only livelihood. Some businessmen were enriched by war-related criminal activities such as weapons sales, diversion of food aid, drug production, and exportation of scrap metal. And whole clans found themselves in possession of valuable urban and riverine real estate won by conquest, which they stood to lose in a peace settlement.

By contrast, in the northwest and northeast of Somalia, the collapse of the central government did not precipitate the kind of warfare and plunder that devastated the south. In Somaliland, inter clan clashes did occur, including two serious wars in 1994 and 1996. But for a variety of reasons—more robust authority of traditional clan elders, greater political cohesion among the clans, more support from businessmen to support peace and subsidize demobilization, and more effective political leadership, to name a few—the fighting never devolved into anarchy and generalized violence. Instead, the self-declared state of Somaliland gradually began to build a modest capacity to govern, and a national assembly of traditional clan elders helped to manage the peace and keep young gunmen under control. In the northeast, chronic inter clan tensions were contained by traditional elders as well. In both regions, a modest economic recovery fueled by import-export activities through their seaports helped to divert energies toward commerce and away from warfare. On the contrary however, despite the conflicts, Darfur managed to withstand the pressures and its state; though shaken, did not collapse altogether. [82]

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[82] OCHA (2007) "Darfur Humanitarian Overview" received at the OCHA-office in Khartoum 15 November 2007, Khartoum

2.6 Civil wars in Darfur and in Somalia

Although a tentative peace was reached in the country's long-standing civil war, the Darfur region is witnessing increasing carnage with over 1 million people displaced, most of them fleeing to neighboring Chad. Participants in the roundtable offered suggestions from many viewpoints on how to end the fighting and start the process of reconciliation and rebuilding. .[83]

"Cautious optimism" is a term frequently used to describe prospects for sustained peace in war-weary Sudan. The complex, frequently shifting conflict is difficult if not impossible for outsiders or the English lexicon to accurately describe. As pointed out in the discussion, Sudan's woes cannot be reduced to a simple, reductionist model. Not simply a North-South, Arab-African, Muslim-Christian, or Government-SPLA conflict, the region's troubles are myriad and not easily reducible to simple dichotomies. Unfortunately, the norm in the Western media has been to eschew in-depth, penetrating analysis on Sudan and to substitute it with a more convenient reversion to hackneyed terms and journalistic rhetoric.

Delegates to the roundtable explained that although there has been an intermittent North-South conflict in the country for over half a century, many other intricate factors have contributed to the nation's decades of suffering. Ethnic, racial, religious, political, and socioeconomic dynamics and their various confluences have all, at one time or another, underlain the bloodshed. Still, there is wide agreement that something needs to be done now to stop the killing in Sudan, where the UN has reported possible genocide and ethnic

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[83]Sudan Vision daily(2012) *No Longer Bound by Recent Fragile Agreements,* Byader Media Distributions Co. Ltd

cleansing. Along with military intervention, ethical intervention is seen as imperative.

On the other hand, heavy fighting broke out early 2006 between Union of Islamic Courts' (UIC) militia and members of U.S.-backed Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT). UIC seized control of Mogadishu 8 June, driving out rivals and later consolidating control over most of south. Talks in Khartoum between UIC and TFG led to mutual recognition and de facto ceasefire 22 June. [84]

Situation deteriorated markedly in July. Ethiopian troops entered to support TFG – only to remain indefinitely. Prospects for power-sharing between UIC and TFG decreased as UIC refused to participate with Ethiopian troops in country. Full-scale conflict erupted December 2006 after Islamists gave Ethiopia seven-day ultimatum to withdraw. TFG-Ethiopian troops took upper hand end-December, routing UIC troops but leaving power vacuum. Defeat of Islamists signaled return to clan-based politics in country.

UN Security Council authorized 6-month AU peacekeeping mission (AMISOM) February 2007. Uganda, Nigeria and Burundi pledged deployment of troops and EU, U.S. and UK financial support. Ugandan troops deployed to Mogadishu in March as part of AMISOM mission amid continuing violence. Former UIC leader Sheikh Aweys said considered AU peacekeepers enemies, launched attacks on Ugandan bases.

Long-postponed National Reconciliation Congress held July 2007 in Mogadishu – conference itself attacked by mortars. Chairman of Reconciliation Committee invited opposition, but UIC chairman Sheikh Sharif Ahmed rejected clan-based process. AMISOM mandate extended August 2007, again February 2008.

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[84]Africa Watch, (1990) *Somalia: A Government at War with its Own People*, New York:

New faction Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) formed September 2007 with UIC leader Sharif elected chair. PM Geedi resigned 29 October after continued rift with President Yusuf and speculation of imminent no-confidence vote. New PM Nur Hassan Hussein (Nur Adde), sworn in 24 November, appointing new 18-strong streamlined cabinet 10 January 2008 after December dissolution over power-sharing row. Hundreds protested Ethiopian presence 7 November after arrival of reinforcements reported. Troops fired on protesters and radio stations later closed in crackdown on media.

UN talks between TFG and Asmara-based ARS began May 2008. Djibouti agreement signed 9 June by TFG, some of ARS, opened door to cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of Ethiopian troops. Formally signed August 18th, giving 30 days for ceasefire and 120 days for withdrawal if peacekeeping force deployed as replacement. Split in ARS deepened: agreement signatories led by Sharif, Asmara faction led by Aweys. Aweys, formally ARS-Asmara leader from July, likely more influence on ground than internationally-backed Sharif. TFG power struggle emerged between President Yusuf and PM Nur Adde after latter sacked Mogadishu mayor, 11 ministers resigned in protest, Yusuf revoked sacking order. .[85]

Security worsened early 2008. Islamist insurgency led by al-Shabaab militant group spread to Lower Shabelle, Puntland, Hiran, Bay, Bakool and Juba regions, amid reports of retaliatory attacks by Ethiopian forces and renewed U.S. airstrikes on Islamist bases. Key districts fell to insurgents late April as Mogadishu witnessed some of heaviest fighting in decade. Aid agencies continue to warn of acute humanitarian crisis: some 1.1

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[85] *Somalia: A Government at War with its Own People*, New York: Africa Watch, 1990.

million estimated displaced since fighting resumed January 2006; WFP country director warned of "Ethiopia-like" famine, predicting some 3.5 million – nearly half population – will need food aid by end 2008. [86]

2.7 Decentralization of the role of conflict resolution

In Sudan, decentralization is a process that has occurred over time and is still evolving. In 1991, a Local Government Act divided Sudan into nine states with 69 provinces and 219 local councils, or localities. In 1993, Sudan was divided into 26 states, 188 provinces, and 531 localities. Various reorganizations continued, and in 2003 Sudan consisted of 26 states, 127 provinces (renamed localities) and 134 administrative units. The responsibility for delivering basic services, such as education, health, and water was decentralized to local levels, but as Elkarib's research indicates, budget management remains centralized. Most states lack the necessary resources or revenues to provide effective services, she says. [87]

Power and budgets are still tightly controlled from the capital, Khartoum. Unfortunately, health and education services for women have worsened under the decentralization model that Sudan's constitution and a 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement dictate, says Elkarib.The Gender Centre's two-year project, funded by Canada's International Development Research Centre, is the first research conducted in Sudan about the impact of governance on women, she says. In early June, the top USAID official warned that more than 300,000 people from Darfur are likely to die over the summer from starvation

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[86] Rothchild, Donald, *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Co-operation,* (The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1997), pp. 39

[87] Human Rights Watch (2008) *"Sudan: Notorious Janjaweed Leader Promoted Appointment of Musa Hilal an Affront to Darfur Victims"*

and disease-even if aid is increased. If relief is delayed, the death toll could be as high as 1 million. The number of children suffering from malnutrition in Darfur is estimated to be as high as 25 percent.

On the other hand, between May 31 and June 9, 2008, representatives of Somalia's federal government and the moderate Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) group of Islamist rebels participated in peace talks in Djibouti brokered by the former United Nations Special Envoy to Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah. The conference ended with a signed agreement calling for the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in exchange for the cessation of armed confrontation. Parliament was subsequently expanded to 550 seats to accommodate ARS members, which then elected Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the former ARS chairman, to office. President Sharif shortly afterwards appointed Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, the son of slain former President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, as the nation's new Prime Minister.

With the help of a small team of African Union troops, the coalition government also began a counteroffensive in February 2009 to assume full control of the southern half of the country. To solidify its rule, the TFG formed an alliance with the Islamic Courts Union, other members of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia, and Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a, a moderate Sufi militia. Furthermore, Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, the two main Islamist groups in opposition, began to fight amongst themselves in mid-2009. As a truce, in March 2009, Somalia's coalition government announced that it would re-implement shari'a as the nation's official judicial system. However, conflict continued in the southern and central parts of the country. Within months, the coalition government had gone from holding about 70% of south-central Somalia's conflict zones, territory

which it had inherited from the previous Yusuf administration, to losing control of over 80% of the disputed territory to the Islamist insurgents. [88]

Following the outbreak of the civil war and the ensuing collapse of the central government, Somalia's residents reverted to local forms of conflict resolution; either secular, traditional or Islamic law, with a provision for appeal of all sentences. The legal structure in Somalia is thus divided along three lines: civil law, religious law and customary law. While Somalia's formal judicial system was largely destroyed after the fall of the Siad Barre regime, it was later gradually rebuilt and administered under different regional governments, such as the autonomous Puntland and Somaliland macro-regions. In the case of the later Transitional Federal Government, a new interim judicial structure was formed through various international conferences.

Despite some significant political differences between them, all of these administrations share similar legal structures, much of which are predicated on the judicial systems of previous Somali administrations. These similarities in civil law include: a) a charter hich affirms the primacy of Muslim shari'a or religious law, although in practice shari'a is applied mainly to matters such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, and civil issues. The charter guarantees respect for universal standards of human rights to all subjects of the law. It also assures the independence of the judiciary, which in turn is protected by a judicial committee; b) a three-tier judicial system including a supreme court, a court of appeals, and courts of first instance (either divided between district and regional courts, or a single court per region); and c) the laws of the civilian government which were in effect prior to the military coup d'état that saw the Barre regime into power remain in

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[88] Africa Watch, 1990.

force until the laws are amended. [89]

2.8 United Nations Operation (UNOSOM), 1993–94 in Darfur and in Somalia

U.N. intervention in Somalia was initially prompted by a desire on the part of the international community to protect food relief and end the famine ravaging southern Somalia. It was initially a U.S.-led, U.N.-sanctioned multilateral intervention involving nearly 30,000 troops. In May 1993, the operation was formally handed over to the United Nations. The U.N. mandate was much more expansive – to assist Somalis in promoting national reconciliation, rebuilding the central government, and reviving the economy. The intervention initially succeeded in freezing armed conflicts in the country.

In June 1993, only one month after the United Nations assumed control of the operation, the militia of General Aideed (representing the Haber Gedir/Hawiye clan) attacked U.N. forces, killing 24 peacekeepers and precipitating a four month battle between the United Nations and Aideed's militia. The subsequent failure of U.S. and U.N. forces to capture Aideed, the paralysis that the fighting imposed on U.N. nation-building efforts, and the disastrous losses sustained in the October 3 "Black Hawk Down" incident sealed the fate of the U.N. operation, which departed in March 1995, leaving Somalia still in a state of violence and anarchy. The United Nations operation did not however intervene in the Darfur conflict in the year 1993-1994.

The post-UNOSOM period is marked by several key developments with more than a dozen conferences have been convened, of which only one—the 2000 Arta Peace

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[89] DND, Land Force Central Area Headquarters, CFB Toronto, *The Somalia Handbook*, p. 9.

Conference came close to bearing fruit. The conferences have tended to provoke conflict inside the country, divert energies of the political elite from governing areas they claim to control to jockeying for positions in a proposed state, and elevate the status of factional and militia leaders, whom some argue are part of the problem, not the solution. Second, UNOSOM's civil and political work helped to empower a small but growing civil society in Somalia, which has since been an important force for peace-building in the country. Third, UNOSOM's enormous presence transformed the Somali economy in ways that helped to undermine the war economy and reshape interests in greater levels of security and rule of law. Merchants who in 1991–92 had profiteered from diverted food aid and looting nowmade small fortunes in quasi-legitimate business ventures, from procurement and construction to remittances and import-export commerce. Their shifting interests helped to contain armed conflict and lawlessness in the post intervention period. [90]

2.8.1 The rise of Alshabaab

In 2003, a new, ruthless independent Somali Jihadi network emerged. It was called al-Shabab. It was based in Mogadishu and its core membership numbered in the tens. In Mogadishu, these new Jihadis appeared to be an alarming new player on the Somali stage. The notoriety and effectiveness of these militants has contributed to perceptions of Somalia as a breeding ground for Islamist extremism and a hub of terrorist activity. In reality, Jihadism is an unpopular, minority trend among Somali Islamists. AIAI's military wing had been largely dismantled; the new Jihadi network's effective membership

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[90] Somali calculations of the costs and benefits of reviving an effective central government are discussed in Ken Menkhaus, *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism*, chpt. 2. Adelphi Paper 364. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004a.

probably was in the tens rather than the hundreds, and ranking al-Qa'ida operatives in Somalia probably numbered less than half a dozen.

In the same year of 2003 the Darfur region on the border of eastern Chad and western Sudan was afflicted by violent conflict initially between the Sudanese government and a pro-government militia known as the Janjaweed; and two rebel movements, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).22 The conflict resulted in widespread atrocities committed against civilians and uprooted people from their homes generating displaced populations. To date there are close to 2.7 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and another 4.7 million people affected by the conflict and in need of humanitarian assistance. As of early January 2009 only 65 per cent of the affected population was accessible by humanitarian agencies.[91]

In December 2006, Ethiopian forces with implicit backing from the western governments forced out the ICU from control and installed the TFG in Mogadishu. The ICU leadership took refuge in Eritrea where they established the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) that mobilized support against the Ethiopian occupation. UN-mediated talks between the ARS and the TFG in Djibouti agreed on a timetable for withdrawal of Ethiopian forces in 2008 which lead to the establishment of a new 'unitary' TFG, a moderate Islamist government in Somalia that had considerable backing from Somalis and the international community. Meanwhile, the rise of Islamic Jihadist group Al Shabab was given a dramatic boost by the Ethiopian occupation of 2007-08.[92] The TFG

[91] International Herald Tribune (2008-01-23) *"Once again, Sudan shows its scorn for the world"* http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/01/23/opinion/edsudan.php

[92] Healy, Sally,(2008) *"Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel"*, Report by Horn of Africa Group, (Catham House), pp. 25-26

has to date proved itself incapable of building a coalition to combat Al Shabaab and Hizbul Islamiya forces that control much of south central Somalia. Somalia has now become an arena for a global contest pitting Al Qa'ida against the West, raising the country's vulnerability to armed conflict even more.

Thus, as of early February 2007, the situation in Somalia was still precarious. The TFG coalition remained narrow, and was deeply resented by most Mogadishu groups. Top TFG leaders appeared committed to imposing an elusive victor's peace on Mogadishu. Armed attacks against TFG personnel and buildings were on the rise. Efforts to deploy an AMISOM peacekeeping force to Somalia remained the subject of intensive diplomatic energies, while Somali insurgents had issued threats to kill foreign peacekeepers should they be deployed. The TFG had made almost no progress in providing improved public security or other government services in the capital. This record stood in stark contrast to the performance of the ICU administration, the standard against which the TFG was being judged by impatient Mogadishu residents. [93]

Between February and the end of April, Mogadishu has been the scene of persistent violence, in which hundreds of people were killed, thousands were wounded, and more than 200,000 people fled the city. At first, the violence included mortar and rocket attacks on TFG and Ethiopian installations, and the city's airport and seaport; machine gun attacks on police stations and checkpoints; targeted assassinations of public officials, military and security personnel, nongovernmental activists, and their relatives;

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[93] Cilliers, Jakkie 'Regional African Peacekeeping Capacity (2008): Mythical Construct or Essential Tool?Ip Institute for Security Studies, Available at: <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/8No4/ Cilliers.html> Accessed.

unexplained homicides; intra-clan gun fights; car hijackings; and the erection of road blocks by local militias to extol tolls from motorists.

The fighting in Mogadishu was further escalated since the end of March, when the insurgents introduced new Iraqi-style warfare tactics, such as: planes' downing; burning TFG's and Ethiopians soldiers and mutilating their bodies; open artillery duels instead of hit-and-run mobile mortar assaults; and the use of roadside bombs and other improvised explosive devices. And in April, it seemed like the fighting escalated yet again with the introduction of suicide bombing operations. The escalation in the fighting began following a failed March 21 and 22 disarmament operation conducted by the TFG, which resulted in the capture of TFG troops, and — in scenes evocative of the deaths of US soldiers in 1993 — the mutilation of their bodies in Mogadishu's streets. [94]

Armed conflict involving Islamist movements has introduced new dimensions to warfare in Somalia. First, they inject a level of ideology and a "war of ideas" into the Somali civil war that had largely been absent since 1988. Second, they have been able to attract a cadre of fighters transcending clan lines who are much more committed, disciplined, and willing to die than fighters in Somali clan militias and government forces. Third, the Islamists have demonstrated a superior ability to build networks of Somali financial backers across clan lines and in the diaspora. Finally, the Al Shabab has introduced new tactics of war — improvised explosive devices, suicide bombing and extensive use of political assassination. The TFG has to date proved itself incapable of building a coalition

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[94] Somali calculations of the costs and benefits of reviving an effective central government are discussed in Ken Menkhaus, *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism*, chpt. 2. Adelphi Paper 364. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004a.

to combat Al. Shabaab and Hizbul Islamiya forces that control much of south central Somalia. Somalia has now become an arena for a global contest pitting Al Qa'ida against the West, raising the country's vulnerability to armed conflict even more.[95]

On the other hand, A surprisingly favourable deal for the South, the CPA included a power-sharing agreement leading up to a referendum on independence for the South in 2011, a 50-50 share of the profits from its lucrative oilfields, national elections in 2009, and 10,000 UN peacekeepers to oversee the agreement's implementation. But the 'comprehensive' deal completely ignored Darfur, catalyzing the conflict that is currently engulfing the region. In May 2011, the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur was formalized after two years of negotiations. On the broader scene, tensions and military disputes continue along the border between Sudan and South Sudan. Perhaps most telling, as pondered by ICG, was the recent commentary on the attack on the oil-rich Heglig area of South Kordofan.[96]

2.9 Conclusion

From this chapter, it is worth noting that in both Darfur and Somalia, causes of conflicts can be attribute to either political, social or economic factors. For example the first 10 years of independence in Somalia were marked by vibrant but corrupt and eventually dysfunctional multiparty democracy. In addition, the governments of both Darfur and Somalia contributed to conflicts experienced in each one of them.

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[95] Mark Bradbury (2009), *Somalia: the Aftermath of September 11th and the War on Terrorism*, Oxfam Report Series, p. 18

[96] Sudan Vision daily(2012) *No Longer Bound by Recent Fragile Agreements*, Byader Media Distributions Co. Ltd

For instance, the ruthlessly opportunistic Sudanese Government first armed, trained and deployed them against the Massalit people of Darfur in 1996-98. This was an established strategy by which the Government used ethnic militias to fight as proxy forces for them. It allowed the Government to fight local wars cheaply, and also to deny it was behind the conflict, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Similarly in Somalia, Government forces committed atrocities against civilians (an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 Somalis died, mostly members of the Isaaq clan, which was the core support for the SNM); aerial bombardments leveled the city of Hargeysa; and 400,000 Somalis were forced to flee across the Ethiopian border as refugees, while another 400,000 were internally displaced.

It is also worth noting that the African Union and the United Nations Organizations played a major role in the intervention processes in the Darfur conflicts and Somalia conflicts.

CHAPTER THREE:

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES IN DARFUR AND SOMALIA

3.0 Introduction

This section deals with various issues in Darfur and in Somalia. The section has been divided into ten subsections including; the issue of security, freedom of movement issues, the issue of poverty, the issue of refugees in Darfur and in Somalia, issue of Somalia's society and Darfur's society, issue of politicization of the clan, issue of failing governance, Competition for power and resources, Regionalization of conflict and Internationalization of Conflict.

3.1 Issues in Darfur and in Somalia

3.1.1 The issue of security

The over-riding determinant of risks to both the livelihoods and protection of Darfur residents in GOS controlled areas is whether there was an 'agreement' between Arabs and Darfur residents, and the nature of that agreement. In some cases (e.g. Abata), the Darfur residents told the review team that Arabs acted as 'protectors' by day, but would loot them at night. Specific examples of protection payments are given in Box 2. Protection payments stopped in some places for a number of reasons. Some mentioned the presence of NGOs, others the establishment of a police station. Elsewhere, Darfur residents threatened to move to camps if they had to continue to pay, or refused to do so

(as in Waro and Urdi). However,.in Urdi, while protection payments have decreased in the Darfur, attacks and robberies on the road have increased.[97]

Neither the GOS police, the military nor UNAMID is able to provide security for Darfur residents. In Abata in particular, Darfur residents (including Sheikhs) mentioned that they had asked the police or the military to make the place safe, or respond to incidents like crop destruction, but little had been done. When police came to Abata, however, they started looting and raping. In Urdi and Nyertete, people said that, when they reported an incident to UNAMID or the police, nothing happened. Although people expect UNAMID to help provide security, there is little confidence that it can. Several people mentioned that the presence of large numbers of others made them feel safer. For example, IDPs come to Trej because there are still a large number of people living there. In Orokum, some Fur residents said they encouraged people not originally from there to settle.[98]

Many Darfur residents, including in Abata, Waro and Nyertete, reported continued looting and attacks both within towns and Villages, and when travelling on nearby roads. In many places, farming and firewood collection is still associated with a high risk of rape or attack, for example in and around Nyertete, Zalingei and Abata. But in others, for example Trej and Orokum, security has improved since the start of the conflict, and farming in areas close by and firewood collection is now considered relatively safe. Farming and firewood collection far from the Darfur remains unsafe in all areas visited.

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[97] AU Country Team Sudan (2008) *Statement on the Humanitarian Situation* in Darfur,.

[98] O'Callaghan S. and S. Pantuliano (2007) *Protective Action: Incorporating Civilian Protection into Humanitarian Action*, HPG Report, London: ODI.

Crop destruction by nomads or Arabs from the damras is still reported to be a common problem everywhere.

3.1.2 The issue of poor education system

Somalia has very low literacy level; an issue which should be dealt with since it is affecting economic, social and political development in Somalia. Somalia has a literacy rate of 37.8% for the total population and 25.8% for the female population. In other words, just about 37.8% of the total population of Somalia above age 15 can read and write and just about 25.8% of Somali females above age 15 can read and write which is very bad compared to other African countries. The illiteracy level remains all-time high in Somalia today. Children of school-going age pick up guns instead of books which explain the extreme poverty, hunger, war, instability, etc. in Somalia today. The poor especially women and children are almost always on the run in Somalia due to the numerous conflicts across the country. Quality education including peace and tolerance is the key to solving most of the problems facing Somalia today.[99]

Similarly, the education system in Darfur is not satisfactory. Children in Darfur face many challenges in receiving an education: too few teachers, overcrowded classrooms and limited or no supplies, among others. Youth face even more difficult barriers: secondary schools do not exist in the internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, leaving young people in the camps with nothing to do and little hope for the future. The ever-worsening security situation in Darfur only makes matters worse. In addition, the crisis,

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[99] Somali calculations of the costs and benefits of reviving an effective central government are discussed in Ken Menkhaus, *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism*, chpt. 2. Adelphi Paper 364. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004a.

which is nearly four years old, is still viewed by the international community as an "emergency," which means that funding for education is not seen as a priority.

This report outlines findings on education from missions taken by the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children in November 2005 and June 2006, and recommends actions the international community can take to ensure that the children and young people of Darfur have a chance to learn while displaced from their homes and communities. For far too long, education has not been considered a priority issue in humanitarian emergencies. Children and youth traumatized by conflict and displacement have missed the opportunity for the structure, stability and sense of normalcy that schooling provides. Schools can be places where life-saving information-such as landmine awareness and HIV/AIDS prevention-is taught, and investing in education enhances peace, eases the return home and furthers the reconciliation process. Because so many "emergencies" are now multi-year, protracted crises, it is even more critical to ensure that education is fully integrated into the humanitarian response and coordinated with a longer-term development process.

Darfur is particularly illustrative of this need. The conflict there is now nearly four years old, yet the Women's Commission found on missions to Darfur in November 2005 and June 2006 that support for quality and appropriate education for displaced children and youth in Darfur is significantly lacking. The observations and recommendations detailed below are based on meetings with representatives from the Government of Sudan, UN agencies, international and local nongovernmental organizations and teachers, headmasters, students and community leaders

3.1.3 Freedom of movement issues

In all Villages visited, some Darfur residents stayed whilst others fled to bigger Villages or camps in Zalingei, Dileig, or Nyertete. Those with money could go as far as Nyala or Khartoum. Some families split, with some remaining in the Darfur to farm and others leaving for the camps. In Abata, Waro and Urdi, people were forcibly prevented from leaving, particularly in the first years of the conflict. The Janjaweed established checkpoints, and when people tried to flee, they would be brought back. It was only in 2006 that significant numbers were able to leave Abata for Zalingei. In Waro and Urdi, only male youth left as the Arabs did not want them in the Darfur. In many places, it was the richer people who left, either because they were targets for the Janjaweed, or because they were able to pay the transport costs and associated taxation at checkpoints.[100]

Limited freedom of movement, particularly for the Fur, remains one of the main constraints on livelihoods. There is evidence that both the GOS and SLA/AW have been placing travel restrictions on populations under their control in the Jebel Marra. Early in 2008, after the road to Golo from Nyertete was reopened, the SLA/AW limited movement from its territory in Jebel Marra into Golo. This was reportedly with the aim of maintaining the size of the Sorong market in the Jebel Marra. The policy was reversed after the GOS stopped commercial traffic into the Jebel Marra. More general restrictions on movement related to insecurity are also affecting access to markets. Travel between Nyertete and Golo was reported to be particularly unsafe, with several robberies every market day. The only option in many cases is to go on foot, or not to go at all. As a result

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[100] Pantuliano, S. and S. O'Callaghan (2006) *The, 'protection crisis':* A review of field based strategies for humanitarian protection in Darfur. HPG Discussion paper.

of insecurity, prices in the market have gone up, for example of sugar and soap, which has to be imported from elsewhere. Access to markets has also decreased because of a decrease in the number of markets. [101]

The Somali Peace Rally (SPR) remains extremely concerned about the recent restriction of Somali people's movement inside the regions of north-west (Somaliland) and north-east (Puntland)of Somalia, who were traveling to participate in the current Somali peace process in Djibouti.

The SPR condemns any attempt from security authorities of those Somali regions to restrict the freedom of their Somali people's movement for travelling, the freedom of the press and the free exchange of information on the Somali affairs, which are the cornerstones of democratic good governance.

The movement of the people in Somalia faces some restrictions also and that is why the SPR strongly urges the authority of Somali north-east region (Puntland) and that of Somali north-west region (Somaliland) to desist from restricting their Somali people's movement for traveling and to respect the fundamental rights of freedom of movement and expression. We believe that all Somalis in those regions should enjoy those rights as the democratic process develops in those parts of Somalia (north-west and north-east regions). The SPR also calls on the regional authorities of north-west and north-east of Somalia Somaliland and Puntland regions) to promptly investigate the circumstances of a group of 19 deported-people by the north-west authority of Somalia, who were traveling from Puntland to Djibouti to take part in the Somali reconciliation talks and to bring

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[101] Aklilu, Y. (2006) *Livestock, migration and trade.* War affected communities. DJAM track 1. Darfur Early Recovery.

those responsible for the restriction of their movement inside Somalia to justice.

The regional constitutions of north-west authority (Somaliland) and north-east authority (Puntland) of Somalia clearly underline the safeguard of civil laws, including freedom of movement and expression.

3.1.4 The issue of poverty

People in the Villages do not have access to all of their previous livelihood strategies. Much livestock was looted early on in the conflict and labor migration is no longer possible due to insecurity.[102] Most farmers reported having at most only one donkey, whereas in Abatta, for example, Darfur residents said that an ordinary family before the conflict would have had around 20 cows and 30 goats. Meanwhile, wage labor in Abata is limited as people do not have the money to hire.[103] For all Darfur residents, the land safely accessible for cultivation is limited.[104] In Abata many families share farmland, thus reducing the area planted per family. For the Fur population, access is limited to a 1km radius around the town. In Waro and Urdi, many farmers reported that some of their land was occupied by Arab groups, who were collecting the mangoes from their orchards.[105] Safely accessible land had decreased by two-thirds, production was much lower and farming was largely on a subsistence basis. In Urdi, farmers who used to produce five or

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[102] Buchanan-Smith, M. and A. Abdullah Fadul (2008) *Adaptation and devastation*: the impact of the conflict on trade and markets in Darfur.

[103] World Food Programme (2008) '*Food Security and Nutrition Assessment of the conflict-affected population in Darfur, Sudan 2007*' Final Report. Khartoum: WFP

[104] Al Massar (2003). *Pastoralist baseline survey,* Greater Darfur, Final report.

[105] Aklilu, Y. (2006) *Livestock, migration and trade. War affected communities.* DJAM track 1. Darfur Early Recovery.

six sacks of grain were now producing just one.[106] All the grain is consumed, while groundnuts are all sold, whereas previously some was kept back to make oil. Sweet potatoes are also a source of income. Despite the restricted access to farmland, farming is still the main livelihood strategy for most rural populations, although this is now mostly limited to subsistence. As with IDPs in camps, new or expanded livelihood strategies include firewood collection, charcoal preparation and brick making, though the market for bricks in rural areas is limited and firewood collection is not possible in Abata as it is largely controlled by the Arabs surrounding the town.[107] Similarly in Somalia during the 1980s, devastating droughts, the Ogaden War with Ethiopia, and the civil war that followed threw a failing economy into ruins. By the 1990s, Somalia was classified a "least developed country" by the UN.

3.1.5 The issue of refugees in Darfur and in Somalia

The response by the international community to the humanitarian disaster in Darfur has been commendable and in extremely dire conditions they have had some admirable successes.[108] The focus of the humanitarian operation has been bringing acute assistance to IDPs in the camps. Even though it continuous to be a central task, there is also a huge need for enlarging the humanitarian operation to include people outside the camps, there is a clear risk of an emerging famine in Darfur that would affect people inside and outside the camps. The local population sometimes feels neglected in comparison to the refuges

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[106] Young, H., A. Osman et al. (2007) *Sharpening the strategic focus of livelihoods programming in the Darfur region.* A report of four livelihoods workshops.

[107] Adam E. F. O (2007) *Inter-Agency Livelihoods Assessment in Abu Shouk, Al Salam and ZamZam IDP Camps, North Darfur, El Fasher. Sudan*: North Darfur Assessment Task Force.

[108] UNHCR (2011) *"Chad/Darfur/Central African Republic" and UNHCR "Darfur: Refugees reach Central African Republic after 200-km trek"*

or IDPs living in the camps. A comparison could be made with western Zambia where this relation has existed for decades with Angolan refugees living in refugee camps (even though most of them now have been repatriated since the end of the Angolan civil war). The government of Zambia had a programme called the *Zambian Initiative* that dealt with these problems in an appropriate way. There are lessons from this project that could be transferred to the conditions in Darfur.[109]

Underdevelopment is one of the main root-causes for the Darfurian conflict; therefore it is also important to start with different development projects where it is feasible. These projects should take place in areas belonging to different ethnic groups. One benefit with such a project is that it will demonstrate improvements in an area that could seem hopeless. For example rebuilding burnt villages could mean jobs and send hopes to desperate IDPs and thus decrease frustration in the camps. These development projects have to work in close cooperation with UNAMID so that the peacekeeping force could protect the projects. The challenging situation in Darfur means that such development project most be co-ordinated between different UN-organs, NGO's and the, Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund, stipulated in the DPA.[110]

On the other hand, though competition for scarce resources often creates conflict over wells and pasture lands, the Somalis are united by the traditions of a herding lifestyle. Somalis forced to flee war and the worst drought for 10 years are now living in overcrowded and unsanitary camps in Somalia and her neighboring countries: Kenya,

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[109] Human Rights Watch (2010) *"Central African Republic, State of Anarchy, Rebellion and abuses against civilians"* p. 4

[110] Human Rights Watch (2010) *"Central African Republic, State of Anarchy, Rebellion and abuses against civilians"* p. 4

Ethiopia, Djibouti and Yemen. One such camp, the Dadaab camp in northern Kenya, has facilities for 90,000 people, and yet houses over 280,000 refugees who have no access to basic necessities, including clean water. Some refugees were moved to a camp in north-west Kenya in late 2009 but thousands continue to arrive monthly. In Ethiopia, the Shedder camp is home to about 8,000 people, with thousands more arriving there every month. Again here the facilities are not adequate to handle the huge numbers of arriving refugees, leaving them ravaged by the harsh environment and disease. In Somalia itself, insecurity has hindered international aid agencies from reaching the 485,000 people who have fled from the capital, Mogadishu, to makeshift settlements for the displaced in the Afgòoye corridor. [111]

Somalia is one of the poorest countries in the world, devastated by poverty, high food prices and recurrent droughts. Concern has been working in Somalia since 1986, responding to emergencies caused by drought, flooding and food shortages. We also carry out longer-term development work which focuses on improving water facilities, nutrition, primary education and agriculture. After the country's independence in 1960, economic growth failed to keep pace with the rise in population caused by the influx of refugees[112]

[111] Somali calculations of the costs and benefits of reviving an effective central government are discussed in Ken Menkhaus, *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism*, chpt. 2. Adelphi Paper 364. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004a.

[112] *Africa South of the Sahara*, 1993, p. 755).

3.1.6 The issue of poor governance

Because there is no central government to maintain law and order in Somalia today, lawlessness, robbery, piracy, etc. are very rampant and Somalia remains one of the poorest and most violent countries in the world today. Somalia has been without a functioning government since 1991, and since late 2006 the county has been engulfed in renewed armed conflict in which thousands of civilians have been killed and tens of thousands forced to flee their homes. It is one of the world's worst refugee crises with well over a million people repeatedly displaced within Somalia, and 500,000 fleeing to countries in the region. [113].

Similarly in Darfur, the Government does not seem to be concerned about ending the conflicts. For example there was an established strategy by which the Government used ethnic militias to fight as proxy forces for them. It allowed the Government to fight local wars cheaply, and also to deny it was behind the conflict, despite overwhelming evidence that it really was.

3.1.7 Health issues in Darfur and in Somalia

Although Somalia has a low HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate of 0.7%, about 34,000 people were living with HIV/AIDS in 2009 with about 1600 deaths recorded within the same year. Typhoid fever, dengue fever, malaria, Rift valley fever, Rabies, Schistosomiasis, protozoa and bacterial diarrhea, hepatitis A and E, etc. continue to threaten several lives in Somalia today. the challenges facing Somali children and women were daunting. "The infant mortality rate currently stands at 132 per 1,000 births, and the

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[113] Bush, George H.W (1999). *Address on Somalia*. White House, Washington D.C. Address

maternal mortality rate is 160 per 10,000," it said. "In some parts of the country, one in four children exhibit symptoms of malnutrition. Only 17 percent of children of eligible school age are receiving primary education, and of those in schools, less than a third are girls.

"Access to safe drinking water is also a major problem facing Somalis - less than 75 per cent of the population has access to hygienic water resources," the statement added. "Coupled with these are the challenges posed by HIV/AIDS which, though demonstrating relatively low prevalence at about one percent (1999 figs), still requires stringent initiatives in place to prevent a future rapid increase."

The World Health Organization says Somalia has one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the world. In southern Somalia, the situation is grave, and the recent famine has made the health crisis for mothers and infants even worse. In camps for internally displaced people in Mogadishu, women give birth in their tents. If there are complications, they are either taken to the clinic in the camp or, if the resources exist, transported to one of Mogadishu's three hospitals.

At the Medina Hospital, which focuses on trauma and emergency maternal medicine, nearly 200 women give birth every month. The director, Dr. Mohamed Yusuf, says the famine is straining the hospital's already limited capacity. "A lot of people who are IDPs today, you can imagine how they are malnourished while they are in pregnancy," Yusuf said. "And the premature delivery is frequent here, and not having an incubator is another problem."A lack of equipment in Somalia is endemic. There are no neonatal facilities in the south. And without respirators or incubators - caring for premature babies

is difficult. The closest incubator can be found 846 kilometers north in Hargeisa, the capital of the autonomous region of Somaliland.[114]

Similarly in Darfur, women's health and mental health remain largely unaddressed. While suicide-related figures were actually lower than in other conflict-affected populations, they are still alarmingly high compared to general rates globally, and indicate a serious shortage of access to mental-illness treatment in South Darfur. No mental-health services are available for displaced people in Darfur, apart from those offered by a few international NGOs. The prevalence of depression and suicide is a considerable mental-health burden worldwide and a challenge for humanitarian agencies in Sudan.[115] In addition, women's health issues had suffered from general neglect, with high pregnancy rates, minimal family planning and prenatal services and high rates of childbirth with no skilled attendants. Yet, women head between 65 and 84 percent of all households among those internally displaced by the conflict in Darfur. According to the World Health Organization, women have considerable mental-health needs in many under-served populations. The multiple roles they play in society place them at greater risk of experiencing mental-health problems than others in the community. Women more than men are likely to be adversely affected by specific mental disorders, such as anxiety-related disorders and depression, the effects of domestic and sexual violence, and escalating rates of substance abuse.

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[114] Healy, Sally(2009), *Peacemaking in the Midst of War: An Assessment of IGAD's Contribution to Regional Security*, Working Paper No. 59 ,Royal Institute of International Affairs, pp. 1

[115] Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, (2005) *Darfur: a Short History of a Long War*, Zed Books p. 13

Inadequate health services tailored to the needs of women and girls was mentioned repeatedly. Common grievances mentioned included the following: some clinics only took a limited number of patients a day and the rest had to return the next day; medicines or Prescriptions were inadequate and consisted mainly of pain killers, and some health facilities (hospitals for example) charged money for services and that referral health care was not affordable in terms of financial accessibility, both in transportation costs as well as user fees. The most common health care providers mentioned were the traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs). TBAs were viewed as delivering good quality care and they accepted in-kind payment (sugar, salt, and soap was mentioned most frequently). As opposed to about 40,000 ponds charged by the trained midwives. A closer look at health seeking behaviors of women and girls and accessing health services would be useful. 116

3.1.8 The issue of the border in Darfur and in Somalia

Sudan's army clashed with rebels from Darfur near the border with South Sudan on overshadowing talks aimed at allowing aid into rebel-held areas where aid groups have warned of impending famine. Sudan's border regions have been mired in violence since South Sudan seceded a year ago under a 2005 peace agreement that ended decades of civil war. The neighbors came close to a war in April when fighting escalated along the 1,800 kilometer-long (1,100 mile) joint border, much of which hosts oil-producing facilities and is disputed.Sudan's army said it had attacked fighters in Karkadi in the oil-producing state of South Kordofan, which borders South Sudan. The fighters were members of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), it said, referring to a rebel group

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[116] Rothchild, Donald(1997), *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Co-operation,* The Brookings Institution, Washington,, pp. 39

based in Darfur, scene of a near decade-long insurgency.JEM has joined up with rebels operating along the border with South Sudan who are trying to topple Sudan's President Omar Hassan al-Bashir. Sudan accuses South Sudan of supporting their activity, a claim Juba denies.

"They (JEM) came from South Sudan and were on their way to Darfur," army spokesman al-Sawarmi Khalid said. "The armed forces are expelling them from the area."However, JEM rejected that, saying it had seized an army base in Karkadi, which is in South Kordofan and close to Darfur. "We control the area. We've destroyed the base and also an ammunition depot," Jibril Adam Bilal, a JEM spokesman, said. [117]

The violence came as Sudan met with rebels for the first time in Addis Ababa to discuss allowing aid to be dispatched to areas held by the rebels in South Kordofan and nearby Blue Nile state.Sudan last month accepted a proposal by the African Union, the Arab League and the United Nations to allow aid to be sent to civilians living in areas outside government control where aid groups have warned of massive food shortages. Hundreds of thousands of people have fled fighting in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, but the Khartoum government has so far restricted the movement of aid groups and U.N. agencies in both areas.Fighting between the army and the northern wing of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM-North) broke out in South Kordofan in June before southern independence and spread to Blue Nile in September. Both states contain large populations who sided with the south during the civil war, but that ended up on the

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[117] Obstacles' in *The New York Times (2008)*, 24 March, Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com /2008/03/24/world/africa/24darfur. html>.

northern side of the border after Juba's secession. On the contrary, the issue of the border is less significant in Somalia because Somalia is not divided like Sudan is.

3.2 Regionalization of conflict

The Somali civil war is not "hermetically sealed"; neighbouring courtiers have contributed to the conflict in one way or another through provision of arms, training, funding or sanctuary to allied factions.[118]

Underlying much of the insecurity in Somalia and the wider region of the Horn is the Somalia-Ethiopia security dilemma. Ethiopia has legitimate security concerns along its long border with Somalia, made more acute by a past history of Somali irredentism directed at Somali-inhabited eastern Ethiopia. Ethiopia has taken steps to improve its own security which has made large sections of the Somali population feel less secure. For their part, some Somali political and military figures have sought to mobilize domestic support with anti-Ethiopian rhetoric and campaigns, and have been reluctant to take clear steps to reassure its neighbours it respects their borders and their need for security. Ethiopia has a powerful interest in ensuring that no Somali government emerges that is hostile to Ethiopia either as an irredentist or Jihadi Islamist threat, and more than any other external actor will take whatever steps are needed to assure that this core interest is met; including providing support to proxy factions (i.e. SRRC) to further its national interests.[119]

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[118] ICG (2002), Somalia: *Countering Terrorism in a Failed State*, Africa Report No.59.

[119] Mark Bradbury(2003), Somalia: *the Aftermath of September 11th and the War on Terrorism*, Oxfam Report Series, p. 18

The Somali crisis is also .deeply entangled in a wider regional conflict complex that includes the unresolved Ethiopia-Eritrea war; Somalia remains very susceptible to spill over from this conflict[120]. Eritrea has provided substantial support to Islamists in Somalia in 2006-08, first channelling training and financial support to the Islamic Courts Union and then to Islamist insurgents (mainly Hisbul Islamiyya) in 2007-08.[121] This was a proxy war policy designed to support Somali armed groups fighting occupying Ethiopian forces.

The crux of the political difference among the regional actors is whether state building in Somalia should start from the top or from the bottom. ICG points out, whereas the Arab states-led by Egypt- perceive a strong, unified Somali state as an essential counterweight to Ethiopia's influence in the Horn and its control of the Nile waters, Ethiopia prefers " bottom-up, peace dividend approach" widely known as " building block".[122]

It has been observed that regional rivalries have rendered IGAD an inadequate forum for tackling the challenges of conflict resolution in Somalia.[123] Sally Healy attributes the subsequent failure of IGAD to prevent or resolve much of the serious conflict in the Horn of Africa to an entrenched political culture that endorses the use of force and mutual intervention by states in conflict even when reconciliation talks are in progress and suggests that where positive results have been achieved these are more the product of

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[120] Healy, Sally(2008), *"Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel"*, Report by Horn of Africa Group, Catham House pp. 20-21,

[121] Ibid p.143

[122] ICG (2002), Somalia: *Countering Terrorism in a Failed State*, Africa Report No.59.

[123] ICG (2004), *Biting the Somali Bullet*, Africa Report No 79, p. 18

regional politics than of IGAD's institutional strength. Healy concludes that the scope for the IGAD Secretariat to develop an autonomous conflict-resolution capability will remain limited, but that member states will still seek to utilize IGAD's authority to legitimize their own regional policies.[124]

Similarly, Darfur became embroiled in the various conflicts raging around it: not just internal wars by the centre over its marginalized populations – many of the soldiers who fought for the Government against the South were Darfurian recruits – but also regional struggles.[125]

3.3 Internationalization of Conflict

In 2006, a coalition of Islamist courts or the Islamist Courts Union (ICU) in alliance with other clan militias ousted a coalition of warlords (the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism- backed by the U.S.). The ICU won public support as it seemed to offer an alternative political system that could deliver services and security to the population, in sharp contrast to the limited authority of the nascent TFG formed in Kenya in 2004.

In December 2006, Ethiopian forces with implicit backing from the western governments forced out the ICU from control and installed the TFG in Mogadishu. The ICU leadership took refuge in Eritrea where they established the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) that mobilised support against the Ethiopian occupation. UN-mediated

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[124] Healy, Sally(2009), *Peacemaking in the Midst of War: An Assessment of IGAD's Contribution to Regional Security*, Working Paper No. 59 ,Royal Institute of International Affairs, pp. 1

[125] Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, (2005) *Darfur: a Short History of a Long War*, Zed Books p. 13

talks between the ARS and the TFG in Djibouti agreed on a timetable for withdrawal of Ethiopian forces in 2008 which lead to the establishment of a new 'unitary' TFG, a moderate Islamist government in Somalia that had considerable backing from Somalis and the international community. Meanwhile, the rise of Islamic Jihadist group Al Shabab was given a dramatic boost by the Ethiopian occupation of 2007-08.[126]

Armed conflict involving Islamist movements has introduced new dimensions to warfare in Somalia. First, they inject a level of ideology and a "war of ideas" into the Somali civil war that had largely been absent since 1988. Second, they have been able to attract a cadre of fighters transcending clan lines who are much more committed, disciplined, and willing to die than fighters in Somali clan militias and government forces. Third, the Islamists have demonstrated a superior ability to build networks of Somali financial backers across clan lines and in the diaspora. Finally, the Al Shabab has introduced new tactics of war – improvised explosive devices, suicide bombing and extensive use of political assassination. The TFG has to date proved itself incapable of building a coalition to combat Al Shabaab and Hizbul Islamiya forces that control much of south central Somalia. Somalia has now become an arena for a global contest pitting Al Qa'ida against the West, raising the country's vulnerability to armed conflict even more.

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[126] Healy, Sally(2008), *"Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel"*, Report by Horn of Africa Group, Catham House, pp. 25-26

3.4 Conclusions

The Darfur conflict points to the reality of international politics, where each continent looks after its own. The submission by the Darfur Consortium – that the Darfur peacekeeping force is too small in number, inadequately funded, lacks basic equipment and that most Darfurians have lost faith in the peacekeepers – summed up the travails of peacekeeping and conflict resolution on the continent. Africa will continue to rely on the occasional goodwill of the developed world and a UN system that is, like Africa, dependent on the West. Neither South Africa nor Nigeria – the supposed resource-endowed states on the continent – are ready to assume a more significant role.[127]

Both states have their own internal problems: South Africa is smarting from the recent xenophobic attacks on Africans, which revealed the gap in unfulfilled promises to its citizens since the first democratic election in 1994. Nigeria is not only confronted with the common problem of a lack of economic opportunities but also poor governance, corruption and collapsed infrastructures. South Africa's role (or lack of it) in Zimbabwe did not please the West12, whose agenda for regime change differs from what the continental and regional organizations are advocating. These differences in perspectives, opinions and strategies for intervening will continue to be to Africa's disadvantage as long as it continues to rely overwhelmingly on outside intervention for the management of its affairs.[128]

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[127] Obstacles' in *The New York Times (2008)*, 24 March, Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com /2008/03/24/world/africa/24darfur. html>.

[128] Cilliers, Jakkie(2008) *'Regional African Peacekeeping Capacity: Mythical Construct or Essential Tool?*

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents data analysis, findings and presentation. The overall objective of this study is to assess the utility of managing conflict in the Horn of Africa. Specifically, the study sought to test the validity and scope of existing theories on determinants of successful or failed conflict management in international conflict management in the context of civil wars; analyze and determine the African union decision making and organizational capabilities in managing conflicts as well as contributing towards generating new hypotheses on determinants of successful or failed conflict managements in the context of civil wars. The study was based on a positive hypothesis that potential for successful conflict management in a civil war depends on the initiation of conflict management at a "ripe moment", mediator leverage over the conflicting parties and conflict management strategy that is suitable to the conflict context. The negative hypothesis, on the other hand stated that, for successful conflict management in a civil war does not depend on the initiation of conflict management at a "ripe moment", mediator leverage over the conflicting parties and conflict management strategy that is suitable to the conflict context.

This study based its analysis on the contingency approach developed by Kleiboer and Bercovitch and which provides a framework for the existing literature that provides more

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'Institute for Security Studies, Available at: <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/8No4/ Cilliers.html> Accessed.

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clarity on the relationship between international conflict management and successful conflict outcomes by treating conflict managements as dependent on a number of independent contextual and process variables. Data in this study has been analyzed using descriptive tools including percentage, frequency, tables, graphs and pie charts.

This section has been divided into twenty three subsections including; Comparison of the gender of respondents in Darfur and in Somalia, Comparison of the age of respondents in years in Darfur and in Somalia, Comparison of academic qualifications in Darfur and in Somalia, Comparison of the extent to which the timing of AU-UN peace intervention was appropriate in Darfur and in Somalia, Comparison of whether there was a perception of increased suffering by all conflicting parties in Somalia and in Darfur, Comparison of whether the conflicting parties were willing to negotiate in good faith in Darfur and in Somalia, Representation of the conflicting parties in the peace process in Somalia and in Darfur, Level of participation at the AU-led peace process, Participation in any AU-UN lead peace initiatives for between 2004 – 2009, Do you feel that the intervention process was successful?, Representation of the Arabs (Government) and the Zurg (Africans) in the peace process.

4.1 Comparison of the gender of respondents in Darfur and in Somalia

Table 1

	Frequency	Percent
Male	19	63.3
Female	11	36.7
Total	30	100.0

Table 2

	Frequency	Percent
Male	15	50.0
Female	15	50.0
Total	30	100.0

From tables 1 and 2, Findings on the gender of the respondents in Darfur showed that majority (63.3 percent) were male and 36.7 percent were female while in Somalia, the percentage of male respondents was equal to that of female respondents as illustrated by table 2. This can be attributed to the fact that when wars began, women and children went to seek refuge in the neighboring countries living men behind to engage in war. In Sudan however, most of the people who had gone to other countries as refugees have already returned home.

4.1.1 Comparison of the age of respondents in years in Darfur and in Somalia

Table 3

	Frequency	Percent
31 – 40	3	10.0%
41 – 50	6	20.0%
51 – 60	10	33.3%
61 – 70	7	23.3%
Above 70	2	6.7%
No response	2	6.7%
Total	30	100.0%

With regard to the age of the respondents, In Darfur; majority (33.3 percent) were between the age of 51 and 60 years while 23.3 percent were between 61 and 70 years. The researcher however noted that 20.0 percent were falling between the age of 41 and 50 years. The other 10 percent of the respondents were between 31 and 40 years while 6.7 percent were above 70 years. The remaining 6.7 percent gave no response. This implies that majority of the people currently in Darfur are between the age of 51 and 60 years. This can be attributed to the civil wars in Sudan, many people were displaced from their homes and many others went to seek refuge in the neighboring countries. Many of those displaced were the youth and young children. Similarly, majority of the people in Somalia were between the age of 51 And 60, while some were between the age of 31 and 40. Those falling between the age of 20 and 30 however formed the minority.

The conflict resulted in widespread atrocities committed against civilians and uprooted people from their homes generating displaced populations. To date there are close to 2.7 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and another 4.7 million people affected by

the conflict and in need of humanitarian assistance. As of early January 2009 only 65 per cent of the affected population was accessible by humanitarian agencies.129

4.1.2 Comparison of academic qualifications in Darfur and in Somalia

Table 4

	Frequency	Percent
Primary	12	40.0%
Secondary	8	26.7%
Tertiary	3	10.0%
University	6	20.0%
No response	1	3.3%
Total	30	100.0%

Findings on the academic qualifications of the respondents in Darfur indicated that 40 percent had gone up to the primary level. 26.7 percent and 20.0 percent had gone up to secondary and university levels respectively. The other 10.0 percent had attained tertiary level of education while the remaining 3.3 percent gave no response. This indicates that majority of the people in Darfur have gone up to the primary level. On the other hand however, majority of the people in Somalia have gone up to the secondary level of education whereas a few have gone up to the tertiary level. This shows that the level of education in Darfur is so low. With high level of illiteracy, communication becomes difficult and so conflict resolution is a challenge.

129 International Herald Tribune (2008-01-23) "Once again, Sudan shows its scorn for the world" http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/01/23/opinion/edsudan.php

4.2 Comparison of the extent to which the timing of AU-UN peace intervention was appropriate in Darfur and in Somalia

Table 5

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	11	36.7%
No	17	56.7%
I don't know	1	3.3%
No response	1	3.3%
Total	**30**	**100.0%**

Table 6

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	20	65.5
No	6	20.7
I don't know	3	10.3
No response	1	3.5
Total	30	100.0

From table 5, findings in Darfur on whether the AU-UN peace intervention timing was appropriate, majority (56.7 percent) of the respondents said that it was not appropriate while 36.6 percent said that it was appropriate. 3.3 percent however said that they had no opinion whether the timing was appropriate or not and the remaining 3.3 percent did not give any response. This implies that many of the people of Darfur were not satisfied by the amount of time taken by the AU-UN while carrying out their peace intervention process. The lead international actor on Darfur has been the African Union (A.U.). The A.U. has done as much as it could within the framework of its limited resources and mandate.

On the other hand, table 6 shows that Sixty five percent of the respondents in Somalia felt that the timing of the peace process was appropriate while only twenty percent thought that it was not appropriately timed. Most of the respondents who answered the question in the affirmative felt that the peace process was timely in order to prevent further deteriorating in the. humanitarian situation amongst the civilians. Respondents who deemed the timing of the peace process inappropriate argued that the motive of particularly one member of the frontline states, namely Ethiopia, for initiating the SNRC was to undermine and replace the TNG. The respondents argued that Ethiopia had formed the SRRC to counter the outcome of the Arta peace process and cripple the authority of the TNG allegedly pre-empting the emergence of strong Somali state. "In a sense, the SNRC was a hijacking of the TNG", summarized one respondent. This indicates that the timing of the peace initiative was pre-mature given that the Somali-ownership of the process was undermined from the onset.

4.2.1 Comparison of whether there was a perception of increased suffering by all conflicting parties in Somalia and in Darfur

Figure 1

Table 7

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	13	43.3%
No	11	36.7%
I don't know	4	13.3%
No response	2	6.7%
Total	30	100.0%

The results presented in the above graph shows that 58.6% (more than half of the respondents) in Somalia reported that there was no perception of increased suffering or

. "hurting stalemate" by the conflicting parties prior to the peace process. Although some respondents indicated the existence of a one-sided stalemate (i.e. the TNG's authority did not extend beyond Mogadishu and some faction groups like the SRRC were receiving external military and financial support from Ethiopia; nonetheless the warlords were still unable to defeat the TNG), they did not attribute a stalemate as a factor that finally led the conflicting parties to the negotiating table. In fact, some respondents pointed out that the constant violations of the cessation of hostilities agreement signed by the twenty-four faction leaders during the peace process was a clear indication that a stalemate did not exist and that neither the means nor the will to continue fighting had been exhausted. Only 37.9% believed that a "hurting stalemate" by the conflicting parties existed and that this acted as a catalyst for negotiations.

With regard to whether there was perception of increased suffering by all conflicting parties in Darfur however, 43,3 percent said that suffering by all conflicting parties had increased, 36.7 percent of the respondents said that suffering had not increased while 13.3 percent said that they did not know whether there was increased suffering· by all conflicting parties or not. The remaining 6.7 percent however gave no response on the same. This implies that to many of the people of Darfur, the peace initiative process brought along with it suffering to the conflicting parties.

4.2.2 Comparison of whether the conflicting parties were willing to negotiate in goo faith in Darfur and in Somalia

Table 8

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	5	16.7%
No	18	60.0%
I don't know	2	6.7%
No response	5	16.7%
Total	30	100.0%

Figure 2

The researcher also wanted to know the extent to which the conflicting parties were willing to negotiate in good faith in Darfur and in Somalia. Majority (60.0 percent) of the respondents from Darfur said that the conflicting parties were unwilling to negotiate in good faith while 16.7 percent said that the conflicting parties negotiated in good faith. The other 16.7 percent gave no information at all while the remaining 6.7 percent did not know whether the conflicting parties were willing or not. This indicates that measures put in place to try and bring together the conflicting parties in Darfur were unsuccessful due to unwillingness of the parties to cooperate.

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4.2.3 Representation of the conflicting parties in the peace process in Somalia and in Darfur

Table 9

	Frequency	Percent
Government was more represented	5	16.7%
SPLM/A was more represented	8	26.7%
Both parties were fully represented	17	56.7%
Total	30	100.0%

The researcher also sought to know the level of representation of the conflicting parties in the peace process in. Majority (56.7 percent) of the respondents in Darfur said that both parties were fully represented while 26.7 percent said that SPLM/A was more represented. The rest (16.7 percent) were of the opinion that the government was more represented. This shows that during the peace process in Darfur, both conflicting parties formed the majority of those who participated. Involving the conflicting parties in any conflict resolution process is of great importance because unless they themselves decide that they need to terminate they differences and to live together in harmony, no one, not even the government can make that decision on their behalf.

In February 2003 the Darfur region on the border of eastern Chad and western Sudan was afflicted by violent conflict initially between the Sudanese government and a pro-government militia known as the Janjaweed; and two rebel movements, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).22.

To further determine if mediation of the Somali conflict was pursued at a "ripe" moment and a perception of increased suffering by the conflicting parties existed, it was also important to assess to what degree potential "spoilers" of the peace process were

identified and included in the peace process. As highlighted in the literature review, mediation in intractable conflicts is more likely to be effective if there are no sections in each community committed to the continuation of violence or spoilers[130]. Spoilers in such a context have much to lose from a peaceful outcome and much to gain from the continuation of violence. Their presence and activities constitute a major obstacle to any mediation effort. In order to determine the potential for spoilers during the SNRC, it was important to reflect on how inclusive the peace process was in terms of including the key stakeholders.

In Somalia, 27.6% felt that civil society were totally represented, 27.6% thought they were not represented, and 24.1% thought that civil society were partially represented. An interesting observation made was that most of the respondents proposed the need to re-think the concept of "civil society" in the Somali context. It was proposed that the concept of civil society needs to be unpacked to include representation from the key professional segments of the Somali society (i.e. doctors, teachers, intellectuals etc). This was not done during the SNRC and there seemed to be confusion on what actually constituted "civil society". Most respondents who felt that Civil Society was partially or not represented alluded to this argument.

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[130] Menkahus, Ken, "Diplomacy in a Failed State", *Accord. Whose Peace is it Anyway? Connecting Somali and International Peacemaking* Issue No. 21 (2010), pp. 19

Figure 3

The results above shows that 27.6% of the respondents in Somalia felt that the private sector was highly represented, 48.3% thought they were partially represented, while 3.4% thought that the private sector was not represented. Respondents who expressed that the business community was partially represented or not represented at all argued that the mediators had engaged the business community in the peace process at a very late stage during the third and final phase of the reconciliation conference. It was noted that some businessmen had profited from the unregulated and untaxed war economy during the civil war and therefore were intrinsically inclined to oppose the revival of a central government that could threaten this prosperity. In this regard, their full inclusion in the process and buy-in was deemed important but overlooked by the mediators.

When the researcher asked the respondents why they felt that this constituency was partially or not represented a variety of explanations were provided. For instance, some informed that Ethiopia and some warlords had deliberately excluded religious representatives from the list of participation at the peace process. During an interview with a faction leader, he stated that he had deemed it neither appropriate nor necessary to include religious representation during the peace process. Still others felt that, unlike today, during the time of the SNRC there was no recognizable political Islamic group; rather, religious leaders had immersed themselves within the clans or under some faction leaders. This clearly indicates that the importance of religion had been underestimated during the SNRC. By the admission of Ambassador Kiplagat, "We did not realize the importance of the religious element. Somalis did not acknowledge religion as an important issue; rather, power-sharing was raised as the most important factor". The consequence of this, according to some respondents, was that the moderate religious leaders who had not been fully engaged in the SNRC (i.e. Al-Islah group) later formed part of the Islamic Court Union that had later opposed the TFG in 2006 following the conclusion of the SNRC.

Although not in the category of "spoilers", it is nonetheless important to highlight that a number of respondents reported that Somaliland was also among the key stakeholders inadequately engaged in the peace process; hence undermining the unity of Somalia.

4.3 Level of participation at the AU-led peace process

Table 10

	Frequency	Percent
Function leader	4	13.3%
Delegate	1	3.3%
Political leader	3	10.0%
Civil society	16	53.3%
Diaspora	5	16.7%
No response	1	3.3%
Total	30	100.0%

Findings on the respondents' opinion on the level of participation at the AU-led peace process, majority (53.3 percent) acted as civil society representatives while others 16.7 percent participated as representatives of those in diaspora. The researcher also noted that 13.3 percent acted as function leaders. It is also worth noting that 10.0 percent participated as political leaders while 3.3 percent acted as delegates at the AU-led peace process. The remaining 3.3 percent however gave no response on whether they participated and at what level. This indicates that majority of the people in Darfur participated in AU-led peace process as civil society representatives.

The AU began to deploy a small number of monitors to Darfur following a ceasefire signed in April 2004 in N'Djamena, Chad. A commitment in late summer 2004 to increase the monitoring force to approximately 3,500 went unfulfilled for over half a

year, and during this time the AU was unable to secure from Khartoum a mandate for civilian protection-only a mandate to monitor the largely nonexistent ceasefire.[131]

4.3.1 Participation in any AU-UN lead peace initiatives for between 2004 and 2009

Table 11

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	22	73.3%
No	3	10.0%
No response	5	16.7%
Total	30	100.0%

Concerning whether the respondents participated in any AU-UN lead peace initiatives in Darfur between 2004 and 2009, a vast majority (73.3 percent) participated while 10.0 percent had not participated. The remaining 16.7 percent did not give their response on whether or not they had participated. This shows that many of the people in Darfur played a role in AU-UN led peace initiatives between 2004 -2009. Nations that have experienced conflicts and lack of peace for long periods of time always have one dream in common: peace and tranquility. Whenever therefore an opportunity which seems to be leading them towards their desired dream presents itself, many people from such nations are always willing to do everything possible to see their dream come true. However, the AU-UN did not lead any peace initiative in Somalia between2004 and 2009.

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[131] Flint, Julie 2007-12-31 *"Darfur's Emerging Arab Leader under Government Assault"* posted on the SSRC blog *Making Sense of Darfur* on 2007-11-31 http://www.ssrc.org/blog/2007/12/31/darfurs-emerging-arab-leader-under-government-assault/

4.3.2 Do you feel that the intervention process was successful?

Table 12

	Frequency	Percent
Yes, very successful	5	16.7%
Partially successful	12	40.0%
Not successful	6	20.0%
No response	7	23.3%
Total	30	100.0%

On whether the intervention process was partially successful, 40.0 percent of the respondents agreed that the process was successful while 23.3 percent could not give their response on whether the process was successful or not. The other 20.0 percent said that the intervention process did not succeed while the remaining 16.6 percent agreed that the process was very successful. This implies that majority of the people in Darfur did not experience the impact of the intervention process as they had anticipated. There is

4.3.4 Representation of the Arabs (Government) and the Zurg (Africans) in the peace process

Table 13

	Frequency	Percent
Government was more represented	10	33.3%
Africans was more represented	7	23.3%
Both parties were fully represented	13	43.3%
Total	30	100.0%

Regarding whether the Arabs (Government) and the Zurg (Africans) were represented in the peace process, majority (43.3 percent) of the respondents said that both parties were fully represented while 33.3 percent opposed by saying that Africans were the ones more

represented. The remaining 23.3 percent were of a different opinion that the Government was more represented. This implies that both conflicting parties were fully represented in the peace process in Darfur. This however was not there in Somalia since Somalia was not divided into the Arabs (Government) and the Zurg (Africans like Sudan was.

4.4 Did the AUs have an appropriate intervention strategy to promote the overall security?

Table 14

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	4	13.3%
Partially appropriate	6	20.0%
No	16	53.3%
No response	4	13.3%
Total	30	100.0%

On whether the AUs had an appropriate intervention strategy to promote the overall security in Darfur, majority (53.3 percent) of the respondents said that there was no appropriate strategy to promote security while 20.0 percent said that the intervention strategy was partially appropriate. 13.3 percent were of the opinion that the intervention strategy to promote overall security in Darfur was appropriate whereas the remaining 13.3 percent gave no response on the same. This implies that majority of the inhabitants of Darfur felt insecure during the peace process attributed to failure by the AUs to put in place an appropriate intervention strategy to promote overall security. Whenever there is an important activity, event or process taking place in any state, region or environment, security is supposed to be given priority at all cost. This is because with every single step taken in any situation, there are some people who are opposed to the same for one reason

or another and they tend to use all means available to render the whole process unsuccessful.

Prior to the deployment of the joint peacekeeping force, experts had serious reservations about the ability of the AU peacekeepers to work effectively. "Everyone knows this has been a very undermanned, understaffed, under-trained, and under-resourced force," Cohen said in 2006.

4.4.1 Was the CPA a successful approach in promoting security?

Table 15

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	7	23.3%
Partially successful	13	43.3%
No	8	26.7%
No response	2	6.7%
Total	30	100.0%

Concerning whether the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) was a successful approach in promoting security in Darfur, majority (43.3 percent) of the respondents said that the process was partially successful while 26.7 percent said that it was not successful at all. Others (23.3 percent) agreed that the CPA approach was successful while the remaining 6.7 percent did not give their opinion on the same. This implies that majority of the people in Darfur felt that the CPA approach was not up to the standard and that is why it was partially successful and therefore given a chance, they would have gone for another approach in the peace process. It is worth noting that it is very hard to do something that everybody will be happy about. Every other person has his or her own opinion and so trying to satisfy all people is a dream that may never come true. It is of

significant importance however that whenever one goes out to do something as long as it is for the common good, they should go ahead and do it irrespective of some people's opinions that it should not be done.

A surprisingly favorable deal for the South, the CPA included a power-sharing agreement leading up to a referendum on independence for the South in 2011, a 50-50 share of the profits from its lucrative oilfields, national elections in 2009, and 10,000 UN peacekeepers to oversee the agreement's implementation.132 But the 'comprehensive' deal completely ignored Darfur, catalyzing the conflict that is currently engulfing the region. On the other hand, there was no comprehensive peace agreement in Somalia and so its success in promoting security does not apply to Somalia.

4.4.2 Was the Doha Agreement a success or failure in promoting peace and security?

Table 16

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	18	60.0%
Partially successful	9	30.0%
No	2	6.7%
No response	1	3.3%
Total	30	100.0%

With regard to whether the Doha agreement was a success or failure in promoting peace and security in Darfur, a vast majority (60.0 percent) said that it was successful while 30.0 percent said that it was partially successful. Others (6.7 percent) said that the Doha

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[132] Niam Tadjadine Bechir, Chief Negotiator JEM-CL, part of URF, and Dr. Abelhadi Hachin JEM-CL, part of URF, interviewed 26 November 2007, Juba

agreement was not successful whereas the remaining 3.3 percent did not say whether or not it was successful. This implies that the Doha agreement satisfied many of the people in Darfur as opposed to the CPA approach. There being no Doha agreement in Somalia however, whether or not it was successful in promoting peace and security is insignificant.

4.4.3 Representation of the civil society participation in the Doha Agreement

Table 17

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	14	46.7%
Partially represented	8	26.7%
No	7	23.3%
No response	1	3.3%
Total	30	100.0%

The researcher was also concerned about the participation of the civil society in the Doha Agreement. Majority, (46.7 percent) of the respondents said that the civil society was well represented in the Doha Agreement while 26.7 percent said that it was partially represented. Others, (23.3 percent) said that the civil society did not participate in the Doha Agreement while the remaining 3.3 percent did not give any response. This implies that many of the people in Darfur believe that the civil society was fully represented in the Doha Agreement. On the other hand, the Doha agreement was not there in Somalia and so the representation of the civil society in the same does not apply.

4.5 Do you think a referendum will end the conflict?

Table18

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	17	56.7%
Partially	9	30.0%
No	3	10.0%
No response	1	3.3%
Total	30	100.0%

Findings on whether a Darfur referendum would end the conflict showed that majority (56.7 percent) of the respondents had a feeling that if a referendum was held, then the conflicts would come to an end while 30.0 percent believed that a referendum would end the conflict partially. Others (10.0 percent) were of the opposing idea that a referendum would not bring an end to the ongoing conflicts while the remaining 3.3 percent did not give their opinion on what would happen if a Darfur referendum was held. This implies that many of the people in Darfur were very optimistic that given a chance to do a referendum, then their long endured period of conflict would come to an end and then the long awaited period of peace and harmony in the land would follow.

Show me a people who have been in conflict for ages and I will show you people who do everything they can to have peace in their midst. For any group of people living together, peace coupled with harmony is a basic necessity if they are to thrive in all aspects of life ranging from the economic, social, religious and political aspects. However, no one was anticipating for a referendum in Somalia and so whether or not the referendum would end the conflict did not apply.

4.5.1 Did the 2011 referendum play a major role in Darfur conflict and its future?

Table 19

|	Frequency	Percent
Yes	15	50.0%
Partially	8	26.7%
No	5	16.7%
No response	2	6.7%
Total	30	100.0%

Regarding whether the 2011 referendum played a major role in Darfur conflict and its future, majority of the respondents said that it did play a great role while 26.7 percent said that it played a partial role in the Darfur conflict and its future. Others (16.7 percent) said that the 2011 referendum played no role at all while the remaining 6.7 percent gave no response. This implies that just as they had foresaw, the people of Darfur saw the 2011 referendum to have played a major role in the Darfur conflict and its future. On the contrary, there was no 2011 referendum in Somalia.

4.6 Is the mediator influence/leverage on the conflicting parties important for successful mediation outcome?

Table 20

	Frequency	Percent
Very important	16	51.7
Partially important	5	17.2
Not important	1	3.4
No response	8	27.7
Total	30	100.0

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Figure 4

An overwhelming 51.7% responded in the affirmative. 17.2% deemed leverage to be partially important in achieving a successful mediation outcome while 3.4% claimed leverage is not an important factor at all. In Darfur however, there was no leverage in the process of mediation between the conflicting parties.

4.6.1 Did the IGAD Technical/Facilitation Committee and International Community use different forms of influence/leverage on the conflicting parties?

Incentives consist of material and non-material goods offered by a mediator to persuade actors to modify their preferences and, consequently, their behavior. Incentives are designed to influence adversaries' strategies along predetermined lines. The incentives used by a mediator may range along a continuum of intensity from non-coercive to coercive or be combined in a "carrot-and-stick" fashion. Finally, incentives may well involve a time element (i.e. deadlines).[133]

Given that some respondents did not immediately grasp the issue of mediation leverage, the researcher had to contextualize the question by providing actual scenarios during the

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[133] Rothchild, Donald, *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation*, (Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 1997), pp.97

SNRC proceedings.[134] The researcher asked: "During especially phase two of the SNRC when the transitional charter was under deliberation, we saw some serious and prolonged deadlocks in the process with faction leaders at times boycotting the negotiations. As well, it was noted in some occasions during the proceedings of the SNRC that some faction leaders left in the middle of the process and returned to Somalia to continue fighting despite having signed the cessation of hostilities agreement.[135] In moments such as these, did the mediators or the international community apply sanctions, diplomatic pressure, threats of military intervention or financial incentives to get the parties to change their behavior?"

Majority of the respondents pointed out that neither the mediators nor the international community applied coercive incentives (i.e. sanctions) to break deadlocks or influence change in the behavior of the conflicting parties when it was required. Some respondents, however, noted that non-coercive forms of leverage and especially diplomatic pressure from the IGAD Ministerial Committee, was effectively employed to keep the peace process on track. This is very much linked to the question the researcher also posed: Did the mediators and the international community have an effective strategy of identifying and managing the "spoilers" of the peace process? Interestingly, all the respondents responded that the mediators and the international community did not have an effective strategy of identifying and managing the "spoilers" of the peace process. Intrigued by

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[134] It proved to be very helpful in situations such as these that the researcher had herself participated as an observer during Phase 2 and 3 or the SNRC.

[135] For instance, Barre Hirale leaves the peace process to return to Kismayo in order to prevent General Morgan's advance into and take over from Kismayo.

this, the researcher asked why the respondents felt this to be the case? Two main responses emerged.

First, a number of respondents believed that the lack of neutrality and vested interests on the part of the mediators (especially by Ethiopia and to some extent Djibouti) and some members of the international community was the main obstacle in effectively managing the "spoilers" of the peace process. Due to lack of neutrality and vested interests, some respondents pointed out that only "lip service" was evident with regard to getting the "spoilers" to change their ways. In fact, it was pointed out that to a large extent some of the mediators and members of the international community sided with one faction against the other, while continuing to supply arms to their proxies. One respondent put it well in the form of a question: "How could the mediators and some members of the international community have managed the "spoilers" when they themselves were the "spoilers"?

However, the different forms of influence/leverage on the conflicting parties by the IGAD Technical/Facilitation Committee and International Community were not experienced in Darfur.

4.6.2 Extent of the impartiality /neutrality of the IGAD Technical/Facilitation committee.

Figure 5

The results above show that 65.5% felt that the mediators were moderately impartial, and 10.3% thought they were highly impartial. Secondly, and in line with the argument above, some respondents believed that the lack of mediator leverage was largely attributed to a lack of a co-ordinated approach and instead competing approaches by the mediators and international community vis-a-vis the resolution of the Somali conflict.

Thirdly, others like the Ambassador Kiplagat argued that IGAD's main deficiency had been the lack of sufficient political backing and international support. This became particularly obvious during the implementation phase of the peace agreement. In the contrary, the actions of IGAD were not there in Darfur.

4.6.3 Did the IGAD Technical/Facilitation committee have the skills to mediate the Conflict?

Figure 6

The above results show that 24.1% felt that the mediators had some skills to mediate the Somali conflict, while 17.2% thought they had no skills. Only 13.8% expressed that the committee had the needed skills. Generally, the respondents particularly felt that Amb. Kiplagat was more experienced in mediation compared to the other two Special Envoys from Ethiopia and Djibouti. When asked why they believed the IGAD mediators did not have the skills to mediate the Somali conflict, respondents informed it was because they did not properly understand the root causes of the Somali conflict and the changing nature of the conflict, which in turn led to flawed mediation strategy. However, whether or not the IGAD Technical/Facilitation committee had the skills to mediate the Conflict was insignificant in Darfur since IGAD committee were not in Darfur.

4.7 Comparison of whether the mediators had an appropriate mediation strategy in Darfur and in Somalia

Table 21

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	5	17.2
Partially appropriate	6	20.7
No	13	44.8
No response	5	17.3
Total	30	100.0

Figure 7

A whopping 44.8% of the respondents in Somalia thought that the mediators did not have an appropriate mediation strategy, 17.2% thought the mediators had the appropriate strategy while 20.7% thought that the mediation strategy was partially appropriate. Respondents who had answered in the negative had been requested to provide reasons.

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.Most responded that there was a lack of Somali ownership in setting the agenda of the peace process. For instance, one respondent reflected that "the SNRC was a fait a compli". Ethiopia had wanted to replace the TNG with factions such as the SRRC that it could manipulate and control".

As well, leaving out Somaliland from the peace process was deemed to be a vital mistake by some respondents. They acknowledged that while Somaliland had indeed expressed reservations in participating in the SNRC, nonetheless the international community and the mediators (i.e. Djibouti, Ethiopia) should have exercised a bit of leverage in convincing the Somali landers to engage. Somaliland's absence further played into the agenda of Ethiopia to prevent a unitary Somali state. For Darfur, 44.8% of the respondents thought that the mediators did not have an appropriate mediation strategy. This implies that, most mediators did not use the appropriate strategies in resolving the conflict in Darfur and in Somalia.

4.7.1 Comparison of whether the Bottom -up approach (building block approach) and the Warlord- centered approach were appropriate in resolving the conflict in Darfur and in Somalia

Figure 8

Figure 9

Respondents felt that the mediators gave too much power to the warlords in decision-making during the process which majority of the respondents felt was imprudent as it undermined the inclusivity and legitimacy of the process, as illustrated in figure 4.8.1

above. From figure 4.22.1 above, it is also noted that respondents advocated for a bottom-up approach instead of a warlord centric approach.

4.7.2 Was the 4.5 clan based formula used in the peace process representative and transparent?

Some respondents pointed out that the selection of delegates in the peace conference was skewed, as majority of those included were allies of one particular faction; namely SRRC. As well, 41.40% of the respondents believed that the 4.5 clan formula adopted by the mediators to decide on key issues such as participation and composition of parliament was not representative and not transparent. For instance, limiting the participation of the minority group vis-a-vis other clans was deemed to be discriminatory and as a social injustice.

Some respondents felt that while the 4.5 formula appeared sensible at the beginning as many believed reconciliation could be brought about by sharing the spoils of war and power amongst the clans. Nonetheless, rather than foster reconciliation the 4.5 formula caused more tension. This was however not applicable in Darfur since the Bottom -up approach (building block approach) and the Warlord- centered approach were not used in the peace process in Darfur.

4.8. Hypothesis testing

To test whether the different explanatory variables (i.e. the potential for successful conflict management in a civil war depends on the initiation of conflict management at a "ripe moment", mediator leverage over the conflicting parties and conflict management

strategy that is suitable to the conflict context), the researcher carried out a hypothesis test where the t-value as well as R squared guided the interpretation of the outcome.

For both Darfur and Somalia, the researcher tested the hypothesis at 5% significant level (95% confidence level). Variables that had t-value greater than 5% indicated a lower confidence level and thus leading to rejection of the null hypothesis. Table 4.8.2 illustrates the test of hypothesis at bi-variate level.

Significant level indicates the level at which null hypothesis is rejected or accepted. At 95% confidence level, an explanatory variable with t-value of less than 0.05 leads to the rejection of null hypothesis while t-value greater than. 0.05 leads to. acceptance of null hypothesis. The opposite is true for the positive hypothesis. At the same time, the test of hypothesis determines the extent to which an explanatory variable explains the changes in the dependent variable.

Table 22: Hypothesis testing at bi-variable level

Independent variables	Bi-variate test of hypothesis			
	Significance level		R-Squared value	
	Somalia	Darfur	Somalia	Darfur
The initiation of mediation at a "ripe moment"	0.009	0.007	0.55	0.59
Mediator leverage over the conflicting parties	0.011	0.009	0.67	0.60
Conflict management strategy	0.003	0.001	0.65	0.75

Findings indicate that the initiation of mediation at a "ripe moment", mediator leverage over the conflicting parties and the mediation strategy that is suitable had significant values of 0.009, 0.011 and 0.003 respectively for Somalia while for Darfur the values were 0.007, 0.009 and 0.001 respectively. Given the results, were accept the positive hypotheses for both Darfur and Somalia at 95% confidence level.

4.8.1 Determinants of a successful outcome or failed conflict management in international conflict management.

From the study, the researcher affirms that, for both Darfur and Somalia the validity and scope of existing theories on determinants of successful or failed conflict management in international conflict management in the context of civil wars potential for successful conflict management in a civil war depends on the initiation of conflict management at a "ripe moment", mediator leverage over the conflicting parties and conflict management strategy that is suitable to the conflict context. The contingency theory was useful because it affirmed that conflict management and successful conflict outcomes depends on a number of independent contextual and process variables. The African Union therefore has to a large extent contributed to the conflict resolution processes in the horn of Africa.

4.8.2 The African union decision making and organizational capabilities in managing conflicts.

The African union is capable of intervening and managing conflicts in Africa since the AU's overarching objective is the emergence of "an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Afiica, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena."

[136] The union's more specific vision for conflict management reflects awareness that the precondition for achieving this overarching goal is security and stability on the continent. Since its introduction, the AU has made considerable effort to play an active role in conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa during conflicts. The members of the AU have the responsibility of conducting peacemaking, peace building, and peacekeeping. With its efforts in dealing with the Somalia and Darfur conflicts and the time that AMISOM was launched, the AU had shown no evidence that it could muster, deploy, fund or manage an 8000-strong peacekeeping operation while also conducting a mission in Darfur.

Part of the reason why the AU could not find sufficient numbers of troops was that most African governments viewed the Somalia operation as too dangerous, too costly and unlikely to succeed. This was hardly surprising because it was an ill-conceived mission that essentially entailed sending a small number of under-resourced peacekeepers to a war-zone in order to prop up one of the belligerent factions. Not only did this put AU peacekeepers directly in harm's way; it also helped fuel a new phase of conflict in Mogadishu. The state of peace and security on the African continent remains a pre-occupying phenomenon, with successes and continuing challenges. Indeed, alongside the steady progress in the establishment of the African Union (AU) continental peace and security architecture and the promising achievements in addressing African conflicts.

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[136] AU Commission,(2009) Strategic Plan 2009-2012, AU document EX.CL/501 (XV) Rev.2, p. 11.

4.9 Conclusion

Whenever there is an issue which involves two or more people or parties, the issue can only be addressed if the parties involved are willing to participate and cooperate in the process failure to do so which makes the entire efforts bear no fruits.

Similarly in Somalia, the conflicting parties were not so willing to negotiate in good faith. When a "hurting stalemate" exists it is presumed that the willingness by the conflicting parties to pursue negotiations as an alternative to conflict enhances the chances for successful mediation outcome.[137] The results above show that more than half of the respondents 58.6% believed that the conflicting parties were not willing to negotiate in good faith[138] while 20.7% of the respondents expressed that they were just partially willing to negotiate in good faith and only 13.8% thought that they were willing to negotiate in good faith. When asked to elaborate on why they believed the conflicting parties were unwilling to negotiate in good faith, the main reason provided was that the faction leaders had participated in the SNRC with the sole objective of sustaining their self-interests (i.e. position in the transitional power, or as a means of escaping indictment by the international criminal court for crimes against humanity). One respondent bluntly asked the researcher, "How do you achieve peace with twenty-four faction leaders?"; a question that indicated the lack of credibility and trust the faction leaders inspired amongst the Somali public. From the respondents' comments, the researcher could

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[137] Zartman, I. W. , "*The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments*", In: Darby, John and Mac Ginty, Roger, (eds.) *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes*, (Palgrave Macmillan Ltd, 2003), pp. 15

[138] "In good faith" in this context refers to the genuine will by the conflicting parties to reconcile and reach a compromise on the dispute through negotiations.

deduce that the warlords may have rationalized that since victory by one side was not foreseeable at that moment, negotiations would buy time in exploring other strategies.

CHAPTER FIVE

FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS

5.0 Summary of findings

Findings on the gender of the respondents in Darfur showed that majority (63.3 percent) were male and 36.7 percent were female while in Somalia, the percentage of male respondents was equal to that of female respondents. With regard to the age of the respondents, In Darfur; majority (33.3 percent) were between the age of 51 and 60 years while 23.3 percent were between 61 and 70 years. The researcher however noted that 20.0 percent were falling between the age of 41 and 50 years. The other 10 percent of the respondents were between 31 and 40 years while 6.7 percent were above 70 years. The remaining 6.7 percent gave no response. This implies that majority of the people currently in Darfur are between the age of 51 and 60 years. This can be attributed to the civil wars in Sudan, many people were displaced from their homes and many others went to seek refuge in the neighboring countries. Many of those displaced were the youth and young children. Similarly, majority of the people in Somalia were between the age of 51 And 60, while some were between the age of 31 and 40. Those falling between the age of 20 and 30 however formed the minority.

According to the findings in Darfur on whether the AU-UN peace intervention timing was appropriate, majority (56.7 percent) of the respondents said that it was not appropriate while 36.6 percent said that it was appropriate. 3.3 percent however said that they had no opinion whether the timing was appropriate or not and the remaining 3.3 percent did not give any response. Sixty five percent of the respondents in Somalia

however felt that the timing of the peace process was appropriate while only twenty percent thought that it was not appropriately timed. Most of the respondents who answered the question in the affirmative felt that the peace process was timely in order to prevent further deteriorating in the humanitarian situation amongst the civilians. The researcher also wanted to know whether the conflicting parties were willing to negotiate in good faith. Majority (60.0 percent) of the respondents said that the conflicting parties were unwilling to negotiate in good faith while 16.7 percent said that the conflicting parties negotiated in good faith. The other 16.7 percent gave no information at all while the remaining 6.7 percent did not know whether the conflicting parties were willing or not.

A whopping 44.8% of the respondents thought that the mediators did not have an appropriate mediation strategy, 17.2% thought the mediators had the appropriate strategy while 20.7% thought that the mediation strategy was partially appropriate. Respondents who had answered in the negative had been requested to provide reasons. Most responded that there was a lack of Somali ownership in setting the agenda of the peace process.

5.1 Conclusion

Whenever there is an important activity, event or process taking place in any state, region or environment, security is supposed to be given priority at all cost. This is because with every single step taken in any situation, there are some people who are opposed to the same for one reason or another and they tend to use all means available to render the whole process unsuccessful.

The state of peace and security on the African continent remains a pre-occupying phenomenon, with successes and continuing challenges. Indeed, alongside the steady progress in the establishment of the African Union (AU) continental peace and security architecture and the promising achievements, the geopolitical map of Africa continues to bear the marks of several latent crises. There are also marks of multiple full-blown conflicts in the face of which peace efforts are often met with opposition or simply foiled by the existence of diverse challenges. The diverse challenges are often based on the logic of confrontation and on rivalries, to the detriment of concepts that are more receptive to the exigencies of peaceful solutions anchored on dialogue, compromise and win-win for mutual benefit.

For any group of people living together, peace coupled with harmony is a basic necessity if they are to thrive in all aspects of life ranging from the economic, social, religious and political aspects. Conflicts in Darfur, as well as in many other African countries, have often been presented as ethnic or tribal conflicts, as they were usually fought by contending ethnic groups or "tribes." The Rwandan genocide, for instance, was fought between the Hutus and Tutsis; the first and second civil wars in Sudan were fought between an Arab Muslim North and an African Christian/Animist South; the Darfur crisis presents itself as a fight between Arab militia, the *Janjaweed,* and African tribes; and Somalia has been depicted as a conflict between different clans.

It is worth noting that the ethnic and tribal identities are relevant in these conflicts, but they are only secondary factors. Ethnicity and tribalism are only the lines along which wars in Africa are fought. Using ethnic and tribal affiliation as the root causes of conflict is misleading, because it hides the real causes for war.

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It is also imperative to note that involving the conflicting parties in any conflict resolution process is of great importance because unless they themselves decide that they need to terminate they differences and to live together in harmony, no one, not even the government can make that decision on their behalf.

5.2 Recommendations

In the attempt to manage conflict in the Horn of Africa, the researcher recommends that; The conflicting parties should be ready and willing to come together and end their differences. This will make the work of the uniting parties simple. secondly, the neighboring countries who are lucky enough to be living in peace should take the initiative to intervene in the conflicting countries where need be. Thirdly, the top officials in any government should lead by example. They should speak and live peace for the rest of the people to hear and see. This will decrease instances of conflicts in the various countries. This will call for peaceful environment by establishing a transparent, representational and interactive political structure, to avoid the spectacle of people falling back to clannism and lawlessness. There are governments and other outside actors who supported various groups and persons in both Somalia and Darfur. These actors should call for a regional reconciliation and discard their personal interests for the sake of prosperity, peace and stability. Therefore, for a lasting peace to prevail in Somalia and Darfur as well as its Diaspora, a legitimate government that is accountable to its citizenry and sensitive to their needs must emerge. Its authority has to be built from the grassroots. Fourthly, the United Nations in collaboration with the African Union should hasten the deployment of peacekeeping forces in the region to ensure that peace and security prevail for smooth running of the new government in Somalia. The government has the

responsibility to manage the reconstruction process through national authorities, provincial and local channels as well as security forces. Therefore United Nations, African Union, Intergovernmental Authority on development and the rest of the donor world and the international community must exercise steadfastness in their support for the Horn of Africa.

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