

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies

A Research on:

The Key Actors in the Sudan Peace Process 1994 - 2005.

This Research Report is submitted to IDIS in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirement for the Award of a Postgraduate Diploma in Strategic Studies.

Presented by

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DECLARATION

This research paper is my original work and has not been presented for assessment in any other university.

Signed:  Date: 19th October 2005

REUBEN KIPKORIR MITEI

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This Research Paper has been submitted for examination with my approval as appointed supervisor.

Signed:  Date: 19th October 2005

MS ANITA KIAMBA

DEDICATION

To my wife Nelly and children for understanding and support during my long absence of the study and all the peoples of Sudan to whom this peace belongs and also my Supervisor for the scholarly direction and guidance.



ABSTRACT

The Government of Sudan has had a long history of conflict dating back before its independence in 1956. The people of Sudan and the international community initiated peace processes in an attempt to end the conflicts. But it has not been established which of the many actors were key in bringing about the successful peace process that government of Sudan and the international community have echoed. The purpose of this study will be to critically analyse the actors in Sudan Peace Process with specific objective to establish the key actors in Sudan peace process and the extent to which the peace agreement is likely to be implemented.

The research methodology is descriptive survey that will involve qualitative analysis techniques. Primary data will be collected through self-administered interview schedule to a specifically identified respondent by virtue of his participation in the peace process.

The study areas focus on the Key Actors in Sudan peace Process from 1994 to 2005.

TABLE OF CONTENT

DECLARATION.....	ii
DEDICATION	iii
ABSTRACT	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS	1
LIST OF ACRONYMS	2
CHAPTER ONE.....	3
1.0 BACKGROUND TO THE SUDAN PEACE PROCESS.....	3
1.1 Background to the Study	3
1.2 Statement of the Problem.....	7
1.3 Objective of the Study.....	8
1.4 Hypotheses of the Study.....	8
1.5 Justification of the study.....	8
1.6 Scope and Limitations.....	9
1.7 Conceptual Framework.....	9
1.8 Literature Review	10
1.8.1 The Sudan Conflict.....	10
1.8.2 Peace Initiatives in Sudan Conflict since 1994.....	16
1.8.2.1 The Sudanese Political Charter of April 1996	17
1.8.2.2 The Government of Sudan and Rebel Factions	18
1.8.2.3 South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM/A) and the Sudan People Liberation Movement (Bahrel Ghazal Group SPLM (B. G. G.)	19
1.8.2.4 Khartoum Agreement of 21 st April 1997.....	20
1.8.2.5 The Nuba Mountains Agreement 21 st April 1997.....	21
1.8.2.6 Fashoda Talks of 18 th -20 September 1997	22
1.8.2.7 Blue Nile Agreement of 22 nd December 1999.....	23
1.8.2.8 The People Process (Dinka-Nuer and Nur-Nuer).....	24
1.8.2.9 The Dinka-Nuer Washington Declaration.....	25
1.8.2.9 The Libya- Egypt Initiative.....	26
1.8.3 Analysis of Selected Actors in Sudan Conflict.....	26
1.9 Research Methodology	28
CHAPTER TWO.....	29
2.0 Examination of Historical Events that led to the Sudan Conflict	29
CHAPTER THREE.....	50
3.0 CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE KEY ACTORS TO THE SUDAN PEACE PROCESS	50
3.1 Dr. John Garang de Mabior.....	50
3.2 The IGAD	51
3.3 The Government of Sudan.....	52
3.4 The USA Government.....	53
3.5 Libya and Egypt.....	59
3.6 Foreign Investors.....	60
3.7 African Union.....	61
3.8 UN.....	61
CHAPTER FOUR.....	63
4.0 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	63
4.1. Introduction	63
4.2. Summary of Findings	64
4.3. Conclusions	69
4.4. Overall Conclusion	70
4.5. Recommendations	70
Bibliography	71

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AU African Union

CFC Cease Fire Commission

DOP Declaration of Principles

DUP Democratic Unionist Party

JEM Justice and Equality Movement

IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development

NDA National Democratic Alliance

NIF National Islamic Front

OLS Operation Lifeline Sudan

PNC Popular National Congress

RCC Revolution Command Council

SLA Sudanese Liberation Army

SPLA Sudan People's Liberation Army

SPLM Sudan People's Liberation Movement

WHO World Health Organization

CHAPTER ONE

1.0 BACKGROUND TO THE SUDAN PEACE PROCESS

1.1 Background to the Study

The number of internal wars in Africa has challenged the international conflict management for being too many and ever increasing yet the international system is either unwilling or unable to address the root causes of these conflicts. Neither is it able to provide acceptable and adequate framework for their management. With some regularity, decision makers around the globe are contemplating an intervention into a civil conflict.¹ Their motives for intervening are varied, as are most historical interpretations of outcomes of the interventions.

The Government of Sudan has had a long history of conflict dating back before its independence in 1956. Most of these conflicts revolve around the religio-political structures and emergence of sectarian politics in Anglo- Egyptian setting. The upsurge of nationalism in Egypt, culminating in the national revolt of 1919, had its repercussions in the Sudan. The Sudan at that time was ruled by Great Britain and Egypt which had conquered the country in 1898 and, having destroyed the independent Mahdist State, had established the so called Anglo- Egyptian Condominium.² The key actors in the Sudan peace process will not be concluded without the following chronology of events relevant to the conflict.

In 1955 conflict broke out in south Sudan on the eve of independence just before it became independent in 1956. In 1958, General Ibrahim Abbud led a military coup against the civilian government elected earlier in the year. In 1962, the Anya Nya movement

¹ Patrick M Regan (2005) Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intra State Conflict. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, P 1

² Gabriel Warburg.(1978) Islam, Nationalism and Communism in a Traditional Society: The Case of Sudan. Frank Cass, London

assumed control of southern revolt. In 1964, the "October Revolution" overthrew Abbud and a national government was established. Again in 1969, Ja'far Nimeiri led the "May Revolution" military coup. But in 1972, the Addis Ababa peace agreement between the government and the Anya Nya was signed where the south became a self-governing region. 1978, Oil was discovered in Bentiu in southern Sudan leading to the division by Nimeiri of the south into three regions in 1983. Civil war broke out again in the south involving government forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), lead by John Garang. In 1985, Nimeiri was deposed in a bloodless military coup by a group of military officers and a Transitional Military Council was set up to rule the country. In 1986, a Coalition government was formed after general elections, with Sadiq al-Mahdi as Prime Minister. In 1988, a coalition partner; the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) reached ceasefire agreement with the SPLM/A, but it was not implemented. In 1989, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) was established where Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi accepted the DUP-SPLM/A agreement but he was deposed in a bloodless military coup led by Brigadier, (later Lt-Gen) Umar Hasan al-Bashir. In 1992, the Nigerian Peace Conferences (Abuja I and II) were held, but little progress was made. In 1993, the Revolution Command Council was dissolved after Umar Hasan al-Bashir was appointed president.

In 1994, the IGAD-brokered peace process in which Declaration of Principles (DOP) was established. In 1995, the Egyptian President Husni Mubarak accused Sudan of being involved in an attempt to assassinate him in Addis Ababa. During the same year, the Asmara Declaration of National Democratic Alliance (NDA) acknowledging right of south Sudan to self-determination and calling for separation of state and religion and armed struggle to overthrow the ruling National Islamic Front (NIF) regime was signed.

In 1997, the Sudanese government accepted IGAD DOP and also to discuss self-determination for south Sudan. Khartoum Peace Agreement was signed between the

government and the South Sudan Independence Movement of Riek Machar. In 1998, Ethio-Eritrea War broke out reducing conflict with Sudan. During the same time, USA launched cruise missile attack on a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, alleging that it was making materials for chemical weapons.³ In 1999, President Bashir dissolves the National Assembly and declared a state of emergency following a power struggle with parliamentary speaker, Hasan al-Turabi. Sudan begun to export oil in the same year.

In 2000 October, the Lake Bogoria Peace Talks commenced, but in February 2001, Islamist leader Hasan al-Turabi was arrested a day after his party, the Popular National Congress, signed a memorandum of understanding with the southern rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/A). In July 2001, a Joint Libyan-Egyptian Initiative established a Declaration of Principles calling for an all-party transitional government, but did not deal with the issue of self-determination for the south. The Sudanese government accepted DOP without reservation and SPLM/A also accepted with conditions. In September 2001, UN Security Council lifted largely symbolic sanctions against Sudan which involved a ban on diplomatic travel which were imposed in 1996 over accusations that Sudan harboured suspects in an attempt on the life of Egyptian President Husni Mubarak, but US continued its sanctions. In October 2001, the US President George W. Bush named Senator John Danforth as special envoy to try help end the Sudan conflict. Again in November, US extended unilateral sanctions against Sudan for another year, citing its record on terrorism and rights violations. In January 2002, the government and the SPLM/A signed a landmark ceasefire agreement providing for a six-month renewable ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains region of south-central Sudan. Also in July, after weeks of talks in Kenya, the government and the SPLM/A signed a protocol covering self-determination and state and religion and on ending the 19-year civil war. Under the agreement southern Sudan will be able to hold

³ op cit

an independence referendum after a six-year power-sharing transition period. For the first time President, Umar Hasan al-Bashir and SPLM/A leader John Garang met face to face, through mediation efforts of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni. In September 2002, the Government of Sudan broke off talks, saying the SPLM/A seizure of the southern town of Torit had spoiled the atmosphere of talks, and that the SPLM/A had reopened the issue of the separation of state and religion by demanding that the capital of Sudan be *shari'a* free. In October 2002, the government and the SPLM/A signed a memorandum of understanding, agreeing to resume talks and to implement a cessation of hostilities for the duration of talks and the talks resumed.⁴

In November 2002, the cessation of hostilities agreement was extended until the end of March 2003. Memorandum of Understanding was signed on 'Aspects of Structures of Government' and the talks were adjourned until January 2003 where they resumed in Nairobi suburb of Karen.

Plans were also made for a separate symposium to deal with the issue of the disputed border territories of southern Blue Nile, Abyei, and the Nuba Mountains. During this period, the UN negotiated a separate bilateral agreement with the SPLM/A and the Sudanese government to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid into the disputed region of Southern Blue Nile for the first time.

In March 2003 Cessation of hostilities agreement was extended until end of June 2003. Also the Semi-autonomous talks took place on the three disputed border regions of Abyei, Nuba Mountains, and Southern Blue Nile. In April, SPLA/M and government agreed to the opening of corridor along the Nile River to facilitate humanitarian access. In May, talks resumed with the signing of partnership agreement in administrative arrangements for the transition period, which outlined specific measures necessary for

⁴ Africa Crisis Foundation : <http://www.africacrisis.org>

building up the humanitarian, security and development needs of southern Sudan during the first six months of the transitional period.

1.2 Statement of the Problem:

Intra and interstate interactions have a way of moving their interactions structures and patterns, domestic political factors, and global institutional context to a position where all these structures push the actors towards selecting out war or peace as the most appropriate response. Individual actors in conflict situations look at war as a rational or inevitable response to an unbearable situation. To come out of war, actors need to step out of this realist perspective and examine actual consequences of each action taken. Misperception, miscalculation, self fulfilling prophesies and error in most conflicts have been responsible for disasters that might have been avoided if actors had behaved differently.⁵

Since political actors who are in most cases the leaders of governments or faction groups are not fully conscious of the process that gets them involved in war, it is also true that they are not fully conscious of that which gets them out of it. It is of significance therefore that the consequences of the individual actors' behaviour that precede either side be examined. This is because factors within the structures on both sides often emerge as un anticipated consequences of the previous actions. The un anticipated positive consequences in the Sudan peace process is the result of so many actors coming into play. It has not been established which of the many actors were key in bringing about the successful peace process that government of Sudan and the international community have echoed. This study thus intends to fill this gap.

⁵ John A Vasquez (1993): The War Puzzle, Cambridge University Press, Great Britain.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The primary purpose of the study is to critically analyse the actors in the Sudan Peace Process. The specific objectives are to:

1. Critically analyse individual actors' role in the peace process to establish who the key actors are.
2. Determine their motivation to succeed.

1.4 Hypotheses of the Study

- a. The key actors in Sudan peace process are individual governments only concerned with Sudan achieving peace for the Sudanese
- b. There is no relationship between the Key actors' motivation to succeed in the peace process and their desired resultant benefits of peace.
- c. The uniting factor of all the actors in the Sudan Peace Process was peace for the common good of the Sudanese.

1.5 Justification of the Study

1.5.1 Academic Justification

The findings would provide information that would be used by the academicians to inform the analysis of peace making and peace building in Sudan. This study is of significance also in that it is aimed at generating new knowledge from the point of view of the actors as opposed to the traditional practice of analysing the outcomes of such processes only.

1.5.2 Policy Justification

The findings would be used by policy makers in Sudan Government, IGAD member countries, AU, UN among others to provide guidance on which actor may be trusted to oversee the implementation of peace agreements.

1.6 Scope and Limitation of the Study

1. Only the key actors who contributed positively will be considered. This is because there are numerous other minor actors who may not have contributed positively to peace process
2. Obtaining data from the key participants would be difficult because of time constraint. Instead secondary data from books, journals, internet and other relevant materials shall be used.
3. The study would focus only on the peace process. It will not consider issues like the peace keeping or the various peace agreements signed.

1.7 Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework of this study is based on the realist theory of international relations; that conflicts are caused by individuals, nature of state and the nature of international system.

The principle actors in realism theory are states, personified unitary rational actors whose behaviour is determined by the structure of international anarchy.⁶ It propounds that world politics is a self-help system which involves a struggle for power between states in the pursuit of their national interests. Diplomacy is one instrument for gaining a state's objectives, but ultimately the key instrument is military force. There are traditional realist theories⁷ neo-realist theories,⁸ and soft (institutionalist) realist theories.⁹ Realism thus will inform this study from the light of the causes of conflict as a function of the nature of individual leaders, states and the international system. But this study looks at realism from the view point that just as individual, state and the international system behaviour can cause

⁶ www.ausi.com.au/pulsim/Respources/theories.html

⁷ Morgenthau, H.J and Thomson, K.W., (1992): Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. McGraw-Hill, inc New York.

⁸ Waltz, K.N., (1979): Theory of International Politics. McGraw-Hill, inc New York.

⁹ Bull, H., (1979): The Anarchical Society. Macmillan, London.

war; they can as well cause peace. Considering individual leaders involved in the Sudan peace process, it can be argued that they shared common nature towards peace. But the international system on the other hand puts its anarchical nature in between them. As a result, other factors also come into play like participants in conflict getting weary of war thus creating a ripe moment for peace making.

1.8 Literature Review

This section is divided into three subsections. The first section discusses the Sudan Conflict. The second is a review of literature on the various peace initiatives in Sudan Conflict from 1994 to 2005. The third section attempts to identify the various actors in the Sudan peace processes and identifies the gap in the literature.

1.8.1 The Sudan Conflict

Sudan's various civil wars from before its independence to the current ongoing conflicts are as a result of the complex religious and ethnic subdivisions that exist within the Sudanese society.¹⁰ The background to the underlying structures of Sudan conflict started long before Sudan got its independence. By the twentieth century, the Sudanese were divided among nineteen major ethnic groups, spoke dozens of different languages, and followed three different religious traditions. Although Christianity had been introduced into Sudan in the third or fourth centuries, Islamisation of Sudan which started around AD 640 when Arabs from Arabia and North Africa started immigrating, together with the division between the North and South that was a creation of the policies of the British, formally separating the South from the North in 1922 explains the source of the conflict. Britain ruled Sudan as two essentially separate colonies, the south and the north, until 1956.

¹⁰ James Clement and Keneth Hill ed. (1999): Encyclopaedia of Conflict Since World War II, Fitzroy Dearborn, London. P1202.

The central division within Sudan was between the Muslim Arab North and the Christian and animist African South.

The relationship between the South and the North Sudan has been traditionally hostile. The Arabs of the north sent soldiers, slavers and bureaucrats to oppress the peoples of the south. The Africans thought that the Arabs elites in Khartoum were contemptuous towards the cultures of the south. They felt that they were second class citizens.¹¹ This left behind a legacy of suspicion and mistrust. In his address on the occasion of signing the Nairobi Declaration on the launching of the final phase of peace in Sudan, Dr John Garang de Mabior said;

“Sudan’s fratricidal wars, you all know, have been going on for 38 years of our forty eight years of independence since 01/01/1956. At certain points of time it appeared as if the whole country - not only North and South, but also East and West – was about to be engulfed in a bottomless pit of conflictual hatred. I must at this point tell you, that nobody abhors war more than those who lived through its horrors, ordeals, pains and tribulations. The civil war in Sudan not only ravaged the resources of the country and sapped national strength; they if continued wantonly, would have ended up impoverishing the nation’s soul and causing a total national moral collapse and final disintegration of the country. All these wars will now be behind us as a new era of peace is about to dawn in a New Sudanese political dispensation.

Indeed, what makes this peace welcome is that it came as a result of a hurting stalemate which made both sides realize that a win-win peace is attainable and that the cost of the alternative of peace is far less than that of

¹¹ Ibid p1203

continuation of the war. Peace became possible because both parties realized that the country was dissipating, that the state seemed to be withering away without undergoing the famous Marxian transformation and that the “Old Sudan” we have known was heading blindly into an abyss of irreversible fragmentation.”¹²

The First Sudanese Civil War, between the Muslim government and the mostly non-Muslim population of the southern Sudan, started in 1955 and ended with the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Accords. In 1955, after independence the Arab-led Khartoum government reneged on promises to southerners to create a federal system. This led to the southern Sudanese soldiers at the Tori garrison to mutiny and defected, an incident that began the process of political conflict that eventually developed into a fullscale war between the north and the south.¹³

In 1983, the Second Sudanese Civil War between the largely Muslim North and the Christian South.¹⁴ broke out when the president declared Shari’a law in the South. The causes of these conflicts were, dissatisfaction with partial autonomy and resentment of continued northern domination. These two led to a civil war with the establishment of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and its political wing, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM)¹⁵.

After the April 6, 1985 military coup, regional assemblies were suspended. The RCC was abolished in 1996, and the ruling National Islamic Front changed its name to the National Congress Party.

¹² Katsuyoshi Fukui & John Markakis; eds.(1994): Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa. Ohio University Press, Athens. p 95.

¹³ Ibid

¹⁴ Save the Children Sweden (2003): A Path to Change; South Sudan Programme Annual Report 2002. Save the Children Sweden, Nairobi. p 2

¹⁵ Ibid

In December 1999, a power struggle climaxed between President al-Bashir and then-speaker of parliament Hassan al-Turabi, who was the NIF founder and an Islamist ideologue. Al-Turabi was stripped of his posts in the ruling party and the government, parliament was disbanded, the constitution was suspended, and a state of national emergency was declared by presidential decree. Al-Turabi was arrested in February 2001, and charged with being a threat to national security and the constitutional order for signing a memorandum of understanding with the SPLA. He was placed in a maximum-security prison and remains in custody.

A ceasefire was declared in 2002. The agreement did not, however, satisfy Darfur campaigners' demands for a fairer deal for the region's population. Two local rebel groups, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA), accused the government of oppressing non-Arabs in favour of Arabs. Peace talks in 2003 produced an agreement under which state revenues particularly the oil money would be shared between the government and the southern rebel groups.

On the other hand, much of the North-South ethnic conflict is born of the North (Arab Muslims) versus South (African Christians and animists). The Criminal Act of 1991 instituted harsh punishments nationwide, including amputations and stoning. Most of the 22 million Sudanese who live in this northern states are Arabic-speaking Muslims, though the majority also use a traditional non-Arabic mother tongue.

The southern region has a population of around 6 million people. More than 2 million people have died in the conflict, and more than 4 million are internally displaced or have become refugees as a result of the civil war and war-related impacts.

Sudan also has two distinct major cultures, Arab and black African, with hundreds of ethnic and tribal divisions and language groups, which makes effective collaboration among them a major problem.

The conflict has a strong economic association in that economic development while under British colonial rule was focused in the North. The lack of investment in the south resulted in what international humanitarian organizations call a "lost generation" who lack educational opportunities, access to basic health care services, and little prospects for productive employment in the small and weak economies of the south or the north.

The conflict in early 2003 began when JEM and SLA rebels attacked government forces and installations. The government, caught by surprise, had very few troops in the region, and since a large proportion of the Sudanese soldiers were of Darfur origin, its response was to mount a campaign of aerial bombardment supporting ground attacks by an Arab militia, the Janjaweed, recruited from local tribes and armed by the government.

Both sides have been accused of committing serious human rights violations, including mass killing, looting, and rapes of the civilian population. However, the better-armed Janjaweed quickly gained the upper hand.

The scale of the crisis has led to warnings of an imminent disaster, with United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan warning that the risk of genocide is "frighteningly real" in Darfur. The magnitude of the Janjaweed campaign led to comparisons with the Rwandan Genocide, a parallel hotly denied by the Sudanese government. Independent observers have noted that the tactics are more akin to the ethnic cleansing used in the Yugoslav Wars but have warned that the region's remoteness means that hundreds of thousands are effectively cut off from aid. The Brussels-based International Crisis Group

has reported that over 350,000 people could potentially die as a result of starvation and disease.¹⁶

On September 9, 2004, US Secretary of State Colin Powell declared to the US Senate that genocide was occurring in Darfur, for which he blamed the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed.

Among the proximate causes of these conflicts are Drought and famine. Hunger causes conflict when people feel they have nothing more to lose by engaging in activities that may bring in some food. The non-Arab black people of Sudan and the Arab tribes have differing economic needs which have led to clashes. Conflict over access to land and water resources is the consequence of the communities' cultural and economic diversity. The Fur and Masalit are primarily sedentary farmers, while the Arabs and Zaghawa are nomadic herdsmen.

While the Darfur conflict has a political basis, it has also acquired an ethnic dimension in which civilians were deliberately targeted on the basis of their ethnicity, and an economic dimension related to the competition between pastoralists (generally Arab) and farmers (generally non-Arab) for land and water.

Competition for Scarce resources particularly oil in the Southern Sudan has been a major factor in the Sudan conflicts. Oil is a resource that has given Sudan conflict an international dimension. This has turned Sudan into an epicentre of the Horn of Africa conflicts giving it an international conflict over resources. This is compounded by the fact that the southerners recognized the value of their land together with its natural resource endowment.

¹⁶ <http://splmtoday.com/modules.phs?>

1.8.2 Peace Initiatives in Sudan Conflict since 1994

Several meetings between the SPLA/M and the Revolution for National Salvation, that is, the Government of Sudan, were held before 1994. Talks at the Koka Dam in March 1986 resulted in the Koka Dam Declaration of March 1986¹⁷ which all political forces and the government of Sudan declared their commitment to discuss the Basic Problems of Sudan and not the so-called problem of southern Sudan and in accordance with the agenda agreed upon in this Declaration, the lifting of the State of Emergency, Repeal of the "September 1983 Laws" and all other laws that are restrictive of freedoms, Adoption of the 1956 Constitution as amended in 1964, the abrogation of the military pacts concluded between Sudan and other countries and which impinge on Sudan's National Sovereignty and a continuous endeavour by the two sides to take the necessary steps and measures to effect a cease-fire. Consequently the two sides agreed to defer for further discussions the matter of New Interim government of national unity representing all the political forces including the SPLA/SPLM and the Armed Forces.

Various talks between Sadiq Al-Mahdi and John Garang which include the July 31st 1986 meeting, the Harare Meeting of 20th to 22nd March 1988 and that the meeting facilitated by the Global Inter-Action Council of Former Heads of State and Government in Addis Abeba, Ethiopia, between DUP and SPLM in November 1988 resulted in an agreement of November 16th 1988 between DUP's Mirghani and SPLM's Garang. Other meetings between the SPLA/M and the Government of Sudan were held in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) from August 19th – 20th, 1989 where there was no external mediator. The meeting was the first of its kind where Dinka, Missiriya and Rezeigat chiefs came together to discuss peace and cement mechanisms to bring about peace. This was a follow-up

¹⁷ <http://www.caabu.org/press/documents/koka-dam.html>: Koka Dam Declaration 1986 - Sudan

meeting between the parties to the meeting that took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in early August 1998. The talks collapsed due to differences on the role of religion in politics. The parties also disagreed again on the territorial definition of southern Sudan for the purpose of referendum.

The Nairobi (Kenya) talks of December 1st – 5th, 1989 were initially direct talks but later were facilitated by former US president Jimmy Carter in 1992. Abuja (Nigeria). May-June 1992 and April-May 1993 were mediated by former Nigerian President Ibrahim Babangida, the then chairman of the OAU.¹⁸

1.8.2.1 The Sudanese Political Charter of April 1996

The Talks between the GoS and SPLA-Bahr El-Ghazal Group in Nairobi in May 1993 resulted in a The Sudanese Political Charter of April 1996¹⁹ between the Government of Sudan and the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM/A) and Sudan People Liberation Movement (Bahrel Ghazal Group SPLM (B. G. G.)). where the parties, in recognition of the previous talks, pledged to put an end to the ongoing civil war in the Sudan and made provisions to resolve the conflict in the Sudan through peaceful and political means. The people of the southern Sudan will then conduct a referendum to determine their political aspirations after full establishment of peace, stability and a reasonable level of social development in the south, and at the end of the interim period.

The agreement also provided among other provisions that cultural diversity in the Sudan is recognized, Freedom of religion and belief shall be observed and a suitable

¹⁸ Deng, Francis Mading, "Negotiating a Hidden Agenda: Sudan's Conflict of Identities" in Elusive Peace - Negotiating an End to Civil Wars. , William I. Zartman, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1995, p. 95-96.

¹⁹ <http://www.caabu.org/press/documents/sudan-political-charter.html>: The Sudanese Political Charter - 1996

atmosphere shall be maintained for practising worship, dawa, proselytization and preaching. No citizen shall be coerced to embrace any faith or religion. The states shall also cater for provision of knowledge and satisfaction and that Power and national wealth shall equitably be shared for the benefit of the citizens in the country.

1.8.2.2 Government of Sudan and Rebel factions

In 1997, the government signed a series of agreements with rebel factions. led by former Garang's Lieutenant Riek Machar, under the banner of "Peace from Within." These included the Khartoum, Nuba Mountains, and Fashoda agreements that ended military conflict between the government and significant rebel factions. Many of those leaders then moved to Khartoum where they assumed marginal roles in the central government, or collaborated with the government in military engagements against the SPLA. In early January 2002, the leader of the Sudan People's Democratic Front (SPDF), Riek Machar, and the leader of the SPLM, John Garang, signed a declaration of unity in Nairobi, Kenya. Riek Machar had split in 1991 from the SPLA and formed his own faction, and in 1997 he joined the Government of Sudan as Assistant Vice President, after signing peace agreement with President Omar Bashir. In late 2000, Machar left the government and began to negotiate with the SPLA. The peace talks between the Sudan government and the SPLA/M brought hope to the people of Sudan. Many observers consider the agreement key to reconciliation efforts between the two main ethnic groups in southern Sudan, the Nuer and Dinka.

1.8.2.3 South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM/A) and the Sudan People Liberation Movement (Bahrel Ghazal Group SPLM (B. G. G.))

the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM/A) and the Sudan People Liberation Movement (Bahrel Ghazal Group SPLM (B. G. G.) in recognition of the series of previous peace talks, the Parties pledged to put an end to the civil war in the Sudan. They agreed on the provisions to resolve the conflict in the Sudan through peaceful and political means, preserve unity of the Sudan with its known boundaries, secure its entity against all internal and external dangers and endeavour to keep peace, justice and supremacy of values of right, goodness and virtue.

They also agreed that a referendum shall be conducted by the people of the southern Sudan to determine their political aspirations after the full establishment of peace, stability and a reasonable level of social development in the south, and at the end of the interim period. They in recognizing the constitutional development, implementation of federal system and political practice based on the values of participatory democracy, endeavoured to boost the progress in those fields in the light of changing situations, where the citizenship shall be the basis of rights and duties in furtherance of the values of justice, equity, freedom and human rights.

The initiative agreed that *Shari'a* and custom shall be the sources of legislation. However, states may enact legislation complementary to the federal law in matters peculiar to those states and that cultural diversity in the Sudan is recognized; Sudanese people were encouraged to freely express its values. Freedom of religion and belief would be observed and a suitable atmosphere maintained for practicing worship, dawa, proselytization and preaching. No citizen will be coerced to embrace any faith or religion.

On Social development, the government shall plan for confidence building and expediting the process of alleviation of poverty, ignorance and illiteracy. The states would also cater for provision of knowledge and satisfaction. Power and national wealth would equitably be shared for the benefit of the citizens in the country. A coordinating council between the Southern States was formed for better implementation of the agreement and parties pledged to work together for the stability and improvement of living conditions in the war affected areas according to the provisions of the subsequent Peace Agreement. They will carry the duty of implementing the security arrangement, resettlement reconstruction, development and preservation of rights and duties. The Sudanese shall interact with African and Arab Nations and world community on the basis of the effective Sudanese identity for the benefit of the country.²⁰

1.8.2.5 Khartoum-agreement of 21st of April 1997

“The Khartoum Process” of 1997 between GoS and several rebel groups but excluding SPLA/M resulted in the Khartoum-agreement of 21st of April 1997.²¹ The parties to the agreement included the South Sudan United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF) comprising: The South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM), The Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP), The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), The Equatoria Defence Force (EDF) and The South Sudan Independents Group (SSIG). The parties to the conflict in the Sudan agreed to make and abide by the general principles contained in the political charter signed in Khartoum on 10th April 1996 shall be part of this agreement and shall guide and explain its provisions. The parties also agreed that Sudan is a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious society where Islam

²⁰ <http://www.caabu.org/press/documents/sudan-political-charter.html>

²¹ <http://www.caabu.org/press/documents/sudan-peace-agreement-1997.html>: Khartoum-agreement

is the religion of the majority of the population and Christianity and the African creeds are followed by a considerable number of citizens. Thus the basis of rights and duties in the Sudan shall be citizenship, and all Sudanese shall equally share in all aspects of life and political responsibilities on the basis of citizenship not religion but freedom of religion, belief and worship shall be guaranteed.

The agreement also touched on the constitutional guarantees, fundamental rights and freedoms, the judiciary, democracy, power sharing which comprised federal powers, state powers, residual powers, wealth sharing and participation of the southern citizens in the federal institutions. The parties also agreed that the length of the interim period shall be four years and that there shall be established a coordinating council in southern states during the interim period which will be responsible for coordination, supervision, socio-economic planning, confidence-building, peace-nurturing, policy-making as well as political mobilisation.

1.8.2.6 The Nuba Mountains Agreement of 21st of April 1997

Talks between the GoS, South Sudan United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF), comprising of the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) and the Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement resulted in the Nuba Mountains-agreement 21st of April 1997.²² The Nuba Mountains-agreement 21st of April 1997 was basically similar to the Khartoum-agreement except that SPLA/M was included as opposed to the Khartoum-agreement. The parties to the agreement were The Government of Sudan, The South Sudan United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF) comprising: The South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM), The Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP), The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), The Equatoria

²² <http://www.caabu.org/press/documents/sudan-peace-agreement-1997.html>: Nuba Mountains-agreement

Defence Force (EDF) and The South Sudan Independents Group (SSIG). The only additions to the Khartoum-agreement were that no citizen shall be coerced to embrace any faith or religion and that the Federal Government shall lay down a comprehensive economic and social plan to develop the country in general and to bridge the gap between the various States in particular, so that within a definite period, a parity in provision of basic needs such as security, employment, water, food, education, health and housing could be reached. they also added that The length of the interim period may be shortened or extended if need arises by recommendation from the Coordinating Council to the President of the Republic.

1.8.2.7 Fashoda Talks of 18th - 20th September 1997

The delegations of the Sudan Government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM-United) met in Fashoda on 18th - 20th September 1997 under the mediation and chairmanship of His Majesty Reth Kwongo Dak Padiet, the Reth of the Shilluk. The opening session was addressed by His Majesty the Reth of the Shilluk, Dr. Riek Machar Teny, President of the Co-ordinating Council on behalf of the Government of the Sudan and Dr. Lam Akol Ajawin, Chairman of the SPLM – United on behalf of the Movement. The two parties discussed the Sudan Peace Agreement of April 21, 1997. After serious and frank discussions the two parties agreed on the amendments and additions to the said Sudan Peace Agreement. This resulted in the Fashoda Peace Agreement of 20th September 1997 between GoS and the SPLM-United led by Lam Akol.²³

²³ http://www.sudansupport.no/sudan_konflikt/peacepros/fashoda_agreement.html: The Fashoda Peace Agreement

1.8.2.8 Blue Nile agreement of 22nd December 1999

Talks between GoS and Blue Nile Citizens Front resulted in the Blue Nile agreement of 22 December 1999.²⁴ In the talks the Government of Sudan demonstrated steadfast commitment to realise lasting and comprehensive peace and stability in Sudan based on the durable responsibility of the concerned parties. This was based on it faithfully negotiating and successfully concluding another peace agreement with a former rebel faction namely "Blue Nile Citizens Front". The respective agreement "The Blue Nile Agreement" was signed in an august ceremony which took place in the Republican Palace in Khartoum on 22.12.1999 where the First-Vice President Sayed Ali Osman Mohamed Taha attended. The agreement was signed by Dr. Nafie Ali Nafie, the Presidential Adviser for Peace Affairs on behalf of the Government of Sudan, and by the tribal Chief Obaid Mohamed Abou-Shutal on behalf of Blue Nile Citizens Front. Sayed Abou-Shutal was the former Rebel Movement Deputy Governor of Blue Nile Region.

The Agreement provided that the two sides are committed to work together for implementation of its various provisions. It underlined the two parties' commitment to the Federal system of government, a system that allowed the citizens of every state to govern their own region on both the executive and the legislative levels, saying there should be a continued effort to develop it.

The Agreement said the two sides would work seriously to resolve all tribal conflicts in the region and to boost the coexistence between the ethnic groups with the view to realize stability and to serve the national interests away from fissures and splits. It said the two sides would deploy all the suitable means for reaching such an objective including the

²⁴ http://www.sudansupport.no/sudan_konflikt/peacepros/blue_nile_peace_agreement.htm: Blue Nile agreement

organization of seminars, workshops and training sessions for the local leaderships. The agreement called for giving a special consideration to the citizens of the Blue Nile state in representation into the various federal posts so that they would work for serving the homeland. The Blue Nile state agreement provided that special attention be given for developing the region in the animal, agriculture, forest, fisheries and energy resources and called for diversifying the good use of the agricultural lands in the region and that priority be given for allocating land plots to the citizens of the region. It urged the improvement of basic services in the region with particular emphasis given to the health and education services and that they should be expanded and improved in the rural areas.²⁵

1.8.2.9 The People-to-People Process (Dinka-Nuer and Nuer-Nuer)

The People-to-people process (Dinka-Nuer²⁶ and Nuer-Nuer) have held several conferences under the auspices of New Sudan Council of Churches and other organizations between different warring southern groups. South Sudanese Friends International (SSFI)²⁷ has been committed to grassroots solutions in southern Sudan. Founded in 1994 by Wal and Julia Duany, and based in Bloomington, Indiana, SSFI has spent years working behind the scenes, bringing people together for talks, and helping them find common ground for reconciliation. In January, 2000 Wal resigned from SSFI's board of directors when he assumed a new role as chairman of the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM).²⁸

²⁵http://www.sudansupport.no/sudan_konflikt/peacepros/blue_nile_peace_agreement.htm: **The Blue Nile Peace Agreement**

²⁶ <http://sudaninonet.tripod.com/Dinka-Nuer>

²⁷ http://southsudanfriends.org/Grassroot_Peace_Making_and_Self-Reliant_living_for_South_Sudan

²⁸ [http://southsudanfriends.org/The_People-to-people_process_\(Dinka-Nuer_and_Nuer-Nuer\)](http://southsudanfriends.org/The_People-to-people_process_(Dinka-Nuer_and_Nuer-Nuer))

1.8.2.10 Dinka-Nuer Washington Declaration of 13 January, 2002 was a conference

Dinka-Nuer Washington Declaration of 13 January, 2002²⁹ was a conference between the different Dinka-Nuer groups currently living in the US. Representatives of the Dinka and Nuer communities within the Sudanese Diaspora living in the United States of America, met from 11-13 January 2002 in Washington, D.C. within the spirit of the People-to-People peace process, which was facilitated by the New Sudan Council of Churches in southern Sudan. They unanimously joined their hearts, minds and lives to this process of reconciliation among the Sudanese people.

They committed themselves to further this peace process through this declaration and their dedication to pursue the resolutions. They reviewed the history of conflict in Sudan and particularly the conflict between Dinka and Nuer went back more than ten years and acknowledge the Declaration of Unity between the SPLM/A and SPDF issued by Dr. John Garang de Mabior and Dr. Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgeon on 6 January 2002. This brought to a close a more than ten-year period of division, conflict and suffering centred around the two leaders and expressed so often in violent conflict between their two communities, the Dinka and the Nuer. They also recognized that the bitterness of this period had left numerous factions and many deep wounds that were yet to be healed among southern Sudanese. Serious mistakes made by leaders during these years had resulted in deadly consequences for the Sudanese. In their public declaration, they appreciated and recognized the resolutions of previous People-to-People peace conferences as their resolutions. This includes the conferences at Loki (1998), Wunlit (1999), Waat (1999), Liliir (2000), and Kisumu (2001) in addition to other councils and meetings facilitated by

²⁹ [http://www.southsudanfriends.org/ Dinka-Nuer Washington Declaration 13 January, 2002](http://www.southsudanfriends.org/Dinka-Nuer%20Washington%20Declaration%2013%20January,%202002)

the NSCC. In addition there have been conferences in Eastern Equatoria, for example in Chukudum between SPLA and people of the Didinga-tribe.

1.8.2.11 The Libya-Egypt Initiative

The Libya-Egypt Initiative” (LEI) Between GoS and the Northern opposition parties in January 2000 resulted in a Memorandum of understanding of 2001³⁰ on Sudanese reconciliation which stated in part;

“Believing in the strategic interdependence between Egypt Arab Republic, Libyan Jamahiriya and Sudan Republic, Motivated by the historic responsibility to save the unity, security and stability of Sudan, Desiring to activate and speed up the process of dialogue and successful negotiations, Reflecting the good intentions of all concerned Sudanese parties, The parties hereby declare their commitment to work for realisation of peace and comprehensive national reconciliation in the Sudan based on the following principles:.....³¹

All parties committed themselves to immediate and comprehensive cessation of war and all forms of hostilities once they agreed to aforementioned eight principles. The talks between Riek Machar (SPDF) and John Garang (SPLM/A) in Nairobi resulted in the Nairobi Declaration, signed in January 2002, uniting the two rebel-groups that have fought each-other since the split in 1991.³²

1.8.3 Analysis of Selected Actors in Sudan Conflict

There have been various peace initiatives in the Sudan peace process. Similarly, there are various actors to the process, some of whom were mentioned by

³⁰ http://www.sudansupport.no/sudan_konflikt/peacepros/lei/lei_memor.html

³¹ [http://users.usinternet.com/ Nairobi Declaration on Unity between the SPLM/A and SPDF](http://users.usinternet.com/Nairobi%20Declaration%20on%20Unity%20between%20the%20SPLM/A%20and%20SPDF)

³² Ibid

Dr. John Garang De Mabior, Chairman and Commander in Chief of the SPLM/A, on the occasion of signing of the Nairobi Declaration on launching the final phase of peace in Sudan. In his speech he mentioned the following: Ustaz Ali Osman Taha, SPLM and GOS, General Sumbeiywo, IGAD envoys and countries and their Heads of State, Ministers, Peace Envoys, brotherly countries in Africa, the Arab world and the wider international community, the Nigerian efforts (Abuja I & II), the Joint Egyptian-Libyan Initiative (JELI), the African Union and the Arab League. He mention also a few of the very many names to thank for their contribution to the Sudan peace process; among them are imminent people like Obasanjo and Babangida of Nigeria, Kaunda, Magabe, Masire, Njoma, Chisano and Mandela of Southern Africa; Mubarak, Gadafi and Boutafilika of Northern Africa; Jimmy Carter, the late James Grant and OLS that has saved millions of lives since 1989, President Bush, his Secretary of State Collin Powel and his Special envoy Senator Danforth; both Houses of the United States Congress; Prime Minister Tony Blair and his Special Envoy Ambassador Alan Goulti; The United Nations Secretary General and his Special Envoy Ambassador Sahnoun; and a special friend of the Sudan peace process, the Norwegian Minister Hilde Johnson, who represented the Troika or Quadroika, the leaders of this East African Region led by Daniel Arap Moi, Museveni, Zenawi and Aferwoki. He referred to all of them as peace-makers.

“Finally, a word of tribute to my fellow neighbouring countries of Eastern Africa, to their leaders and people, you have done a lot to accommodate our people ... We envisage continued cooperation in many fields ... My special thanks to President Mwai Kibaki who is hosting this occasion and to all the

IGAD leaders for leading this victory of peace and sanity in a turbulent.

Finally, the Sudanese people to whom this peace belongs.”³³

1.9 Research Methodology

The research design is a descriptive survey that will involve qualitative analysis techniques. Primary data will be collected through self-administered interview schedule to a specifically identified respondent by virtue of his participation in the peace process. The researcher will personally visit the interviewee to personally administer the instrument so as to instantly respond to any difficulty faced by the respondent. Interview schedule will be administered on agreed date and time, which the researcher will arrange before the interview. Interview shall consist of oral questions by the interviewer and oral responses from respondent. The responses shall be recorded by the researcher verbatim. The instruments will be developed in relation to the study objectives and the data collected will be analysed using the qualitative analysis techniques. The study areas will focus on the Key Actors in Sudan peace Process from 1994 to 2004.

³³ op cit

CHAPTER TWO


2.0 EXAMINATION OF HISTORICAL EVENTS THAT LED TO THE SUDAN CONFLICT

The Republic of Sudan is situated in North Eastern Africa, bordering the Red Sea, between Egypt and Eritrea. It is the largest country in the continent of Africa, with a total area of 2,505,810 km² and a population of 38,114,160. It borders Egypt to the north, the Red Sea to the northeast, Eritrea and Ethiopia to the east, Kenya and Uganda to the southeast, Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic to the southwest, Chad to the west, and Libya to the northwest. The terrain is generally flat plains, though there are mountains in the east and west. The climate is tropical in the south; arid desert conditions in the north, with a rainy season from April to October. Soil erosion and desertification are the main environmental hazards

It attained independence from Egypt and United Kingdom in January 1956.³⁴ The country's capital city is Khartoum. The country's national language is Arabic. The republic of Sudan's National motto is "Victory is Ours" (Arabic: Al-Nasr Lana) and the National Anthem is "Nahnu Jund Allah Jund Al-watan" (We Are the Army of God and of Our Land).

³⁴ Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia.

Political map of Sudan



Source:[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/image: Dafur map.png](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/image:Dafur_map.png)

Although Christianity had been introduced into Sudan in the third or fourth centuries, Islamization of Sudan started around AD 640 when Arabs from Arabia and North Africa started immigrating. A merchant class of Arabs established themselves as economically dominant in feudal Sudan.

The division between the North and South was a creation of the policies of the British who formally separated the South from the North in 1922. Britain thus ran Sudan as two essentially separate colonies, the south and the north, until 1956. This gives a background explanation to the underlying structure of Sudan conflict that they started long

before Sudan got its independence. After independence the Arab-led Khartoum government reneged on promises to southerners to create a federal system, which led to a mutiny by southern army officers that sparked 17 years of civil war from 1955 to 1972. The most recent war began in 1983 and is ongoing. This is a war between the largely Muslim North and the Christian South.³⁵

The government of Sudan has had a strongly Arab character since the country's independence in 1956. Sudan has an authoritarian government in which all effective political power is in the hands of the President.

From 1983 to 1997, the Sudan was divided into five regions in the north and three in the south, each headed by a military governor. After the April 6, 1985 military coup, regional assemblies were suspended. The RCC was abolished in 1996, and the ruling National Islamic Front changed its name to the National Congress Party. After 1997, the structure of regional administration was replaced by the creation of 26 states. The executives, cabinets, and senior-level state officials are appointed by the president, and their limited budgets are determined by and dispensed from Khartoum. The states, as a result, remain economically dependent upon the central government. Khartoum state, comprising the capital and outlying districts, is administered by a governor.

In December 1999, a power struggle climaxed between President al-Bashir and then-speaker of parliament Hassan al-Turabi, who was the NIF founder and an Islamist ideologue. Al-Turabi was stripped of his posts in the ruling party and the government, parliament was disbanded, the constitution was suspended, and a state of national emergency was declared by presidential decree. Parliament resumed in February 2001 after


³⁵ Save the Children Sweden (2003): A Path to Change: south Sudan Programme Annual Report 2002. Save the Children Sweden, Nairobi. p 2

the December 2000 presidential and parliamentary elections, but the national emergency laws remain in effect. Al-Turabi was arrested in February 2001, and charged with being a threat to national security and the constitutional order for signing a memorandum of understanding with the SPLA. He was placed in a maximum-security prison and remains in custody.

Sudan has had troubled foreign relations with many of its neighbours and much of the international community due to what is viewed as its aggressive Islamic stance. For much of the 1990s, Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia formed an ad-hoc alliance called the "Front Line States" with support from the United States to check the influence of the National Islamic Front government. During this period, Sudan supported anti-Uganda rebel groups such as the Lord's Resistance Army in retaliation for Ugandan support of the Sudan People's Liberation Army. Beginning from the mid-1990s Sudan gradually began to moderate its positions as a result of increased US pressure following the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings and the new development of oil fields previously in rebel hands. Also, Sudan has a territorial dispute with Egypt over the Hala'ib Triangle.

The Hala'ib Triangle is an area of land measuring 20,580 km² located on the Red Sea's African coast, between the borders of Egypt and Sudan. Sovereignty over the area has never been satisfactorily determined. Both Egypt and Sudan claim ownership over the land. In 1899, at which time the United Kingdom held great influence in the area, the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Agreement for Sudan set the border at the 22nd parallel. However, in 1902, for its own convenience, the United Kingdom drew a separate "administrative boundary," under which a triangle of land north of the parallel was placed under Sudanese administration because it was more accessible from Sudan.

A Map of Egypt Showing Halaib Triangle



Hala'ib Triangle

Source: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/image: Hala'ib map.png](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/image:Hala'ib_map.png)

Map of Sudan showing the Hala'ib Triangle



Hala'ib Triangle

Source: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/image: Hala'ib map.png](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/image:Hala'ib_map.png)

Although both countries laid claim to the land, the area remained under Sudanese control until the dispute resurfaced in 1992, when Egypt objected to Sudan's granting of exploration rights in the waters off the Halaib Triangle to a Canadian oil company. In January 2000, Sudan withdrew its own forces from the area, effectively ceding control of the border zone to Egypt, whose forces have occupied the area ever since.

However, Sudanese president Omar Al-Bashir according to Associated Press, claimed in 2004 that despite his nation's withdrawal, and Egypt's control of the Hala'ib triangle, that the triangle still rightfully belonged to Sudan. He insisted that Sudan had "never relinquished" the town of Hala'ib and its surrounding environs. "We did not make any concessions... The proof is that we have recently renewed the complaint to the Security Council."³⁶ The newly discovered oil reserves in the territory may have prompted Al-Bashir's decision to resurrect Sudan's claim, and this has only increased the conflict.

Since 2003, the foreign relations of Sudan have centered on the support for ending the Second Sudanese Civil War and condemnation of government support for militias in the Darfur conflict.

The Economy of Sudan has been turned around from a struggling economy through sound economic policies and infrastructure investments, but it still faces formidable economic problems, starting from its low level of per capita output. From 1997 to date, Sudan has been implementing IMF macroeconomic reforms. In 1999, Sudan began exporting crude oil and in the last quarter of 1999 recorded its first trade surplus, which, along with monetary policy, has stabilized the exchange rate. Increased oil production, revived light industry, and expanded export processing zones has helped sustain GDP growth at 6.1% in 2003.

³⁶ op cit

Agriculture production remains Sudan's most important sector, employing 80% of the work force and contributing 39% of GDP, but most farms remain rain-fed and susceptible to drought. Chronic instability - including the long-standing civil war between the Muslim north and the Christian and animist south, adverse weather, and weak world agricultural prices - ensure that much of the population will remain at or below the poverty line for years.

In regard to Sudan Conflict, Sudan is a country which has enjoyed only a brief period of peace since independence in 1956. The First Sudanese Civil War, between the Muslim government and the mostly non-Muslim population of the southern Sudan, started in 1955 and ended with the 1972 Addis Ababa Accords. In 1955, southern Sudanese soldiers at the Tori garrison mutinied and defected, an incident that began the process of political conflict that eventually developed into a fullscale war between the north and the south.³⁷ In 1983, the Second Sudanese Civil War broke out when the president declared Shari'a law in the south. A ceasefire was declared in 2002. The agreement did not, however, satisfy Darfur campaigners' demands for a fairer deal for the region's population. Two local rebel groups, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA), accused the government of oppressing non-Arabs in favour of Arabs. The SLA is generally associated with the Fur and Masalit, while the JEM is associated with the Zaghawa of the northern half of Darfur. Peace talks in 2003 produced an agreement under which state revenues, oil money in particular, would be shared between the government and the southern rebel groups.

The causes of these conflicts were dissatisfaction by the southerners with partial autonomy and resentment of continued northern domination. These two led to a civil war in

³⁷ Katsuyoshi Fukui & John Markakis, eds (1994): *Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa*. Ohio University Press, Athens. p95.

1983 with the establishment of the Sudan People's Liberation Army(SPLA) and its political wing, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)³⁸. Fukui and Markakis holds that the over two decades conflict have deeply affected the whole Sudanese people. and those who live in eastern Equatoria Province of southern Sudan.

The North-South ethnic conflict is born of the North (Arab Muslims) versus South (African Christians and animists). In September 1983 President Nimeiri announced his decision to extend Islamic Shari'a punishments into the penal code, re-igniting the civil war. In 1984-5 another military coup led by Gen. Suwar al-Dahab restored a civilian government. However the civil war intensified in lethality and the economy continued to deteriorate. In 1989 General Umar al-Bashir became president and chief of state, prime minister and chief of the armed forces. The Criminal Act of 1991 instituted harsh punishments nationwide, including amputations and stoning.

Most of the 22 million Sudanese who live in this northern states are Arabic-speaking Muslims, though the majority also use a traditional non-Arabic mother tongue like Nubian, Beja, Fur, Nuban, Ingessana, among others. Among these are several distinct tribal groups: the Kababish of northern Kordofan, a camel-raising people; the Ja'alin and Shaigiyya groups of settled tribes along the rivers; the seminomadic Baggara of Kordofan and Darfur; the Hamitic Beja in the Red Sea area and Nubians of the northern Nilc areas, some of whom have been resettled on the Atbara River; and the Negroid Nuba of southern Kordofan and Fur in the western reaches of the country.

The southern region has a population of approximately 6 million and a predominantly rural, subsistence economy. This region has been negatively affected by war for all but 10 years since independence in 1956, resulting in serious neglect, lack of

³⁸ Ibid

infrastructure development, and major destruction and displacement. More than 2 million people have died, and more than 4 million are internally displaced or have become refugees as a result of the civil war and war-related impacts. Here the Sudanese practice mainly indigenous traditional beliefs, although Christian missionaries have converted some. The south also contains many tribal groups and many more languages are used than in the north. The Dinka, whose population is estimated at more than 1 million, is the largest of the many black African tribes of the Sudan. Along with the Shilluk and the Nuer, they are among the Nilotic tribes. The Azande, Bor, and Jo Luo are “Sudanic” tribes in the west, and the Acholi and Lotuhu live in the extreme south, extending into Uganda.

The South Sudanese perception of presence of structural conflict can be traced to the use of connotative words in ordinary communication like “Gaala”, a Pari word which connotes all foreigners of lighter skin, both Arabs and Europeans, the government, as well as residents of town ³⁹ which implies that for the Pari, successive rulers of the Sudan are just foreigners and their governments are also alien and perceived as enemies to a certain degree. Fukui suggest that it seems true that the military conflict between Pari versus Lotuho, Pari versus Toposa, Dinka versus Mandari and so on since 1984 has exacerbated existing ‘tribal’ or ‘ethnic’ hostility. In a situation where both SPLA and the Sudanese government seek to manipulate ‘traditional’ ethnic antagonism for their respective advantage, it is impossible to assess the extent to which an ongoing conflict is motivated by ethnic and group concerns on the one hand and by regional and national concerns on the other. Fukui and Turton⁴⁰ point out that certain elements of social organization mediate to heighten or moderate the intensity of conflict. South Sudan therefore has witnessed two levels of conflicts; one determined by socially accredited values and believes, while the

³⁹ Ibid

⁴⁰ Fukui and Turton (1979). p7

other is an individual or small act with limited, or without societal approval. The fact that civil servants cannot exercise independent judgment is a major source of instability and conflict. Even constructive criticisms are considered disloyal.

Sudan also has two distinct major cultures, Arab and black African, with hundreds of ethnic and tribal divisions and language groups, which makes effective unity among them a major problem due to conflicting cultures.

The Sudan conflict has a strong economic association in that economic development while under British colonial rule was focused in the North, while the south, though the source of the country's economic wealth, was neglected. The lack of investment in the south resulted in what international humanitarian organizations call a "lost generation" who lack educational opportunities, access to basic health care services, and little prospects for productive employment in the small and weak economies of the south or the north. The ongoing civil war has displaced more than 4 million southerners. Some fled into southern cities, such as Juba; others trekked as far north as Khartoum and even into Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Egypt, and other neighboring countries. These people were unable to grow food or earn money to feed themselves, and malnutrition and starvation became widespread.

Dissatisfaction culminated in a second military coup on 25th May 1969. The coup leader, Col. Gaafar Muhammad Nimeiri, became prime minister, and the new regime abolished parliament and outlawed all political parties. In 1972, the Addis Ababa Agreement led to a cessation of the north-south civil war and a degree of self-rule. This led to a ten-year hiatus in the civil war.

The Darfur conflict is an ongoing conflict in the Darfur region of western Sudan, mainly between the Janjaweed, a government-supported militia recruited from local Arab tribes, and the non-Arab peoples of the region. Darfur is inhabited by a variety of people, generally constituting two distinct groups: non-Arab black peoples such as the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa, and Arab tribes collectively termed Baggara, who settled the region from about the 13th century onwards. Both groups are Muslims. However, relations between the two groups have long been tense; the pre-colonial Fur kingdom regularly clashed with the Baggara, particularly the Rizeigat. Moreover, the conflict has been widely described as "ethnic cleansing", and frequently as "genocide".

“The Government of Sudan (GOS) has used aerial bombardments and helicopter gunships to attack the southern Sudanese civilian population for years. In 1999, there were 65 confirmed aerial bombings of civilians in southern Sudan, however, the number of such attacks more than doubled in 2000 to 132 and tripled in 2001 to 195 confirmed bombings. Most of these attacks occurred in the Bahr el Ghazal, Eastern Equatoria, Southern Blue Nile, and Upper Nile regions.

In addition to the direct threat to non-combatants from these aerial bombings, there are additional humanitarian issues associated with the Government's tactic of bombarding civilian and humanitarian targets. There is a direct relationship between GOS aerial bombardment and GOS flight denials of U.N. Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) humanitarian operations and evacuating staff. Furthermore, GOS aerial bombardments raise significant security concerns with OLS officials that often lead to the UN suspending operations to an insecure area. In addition, the abduction of humanitarian staff and killing of relief workers has a direct relationship to the GOS bombardment of civilian and humanitarian targets because

GOS bombardment appears to be part of an overall Government policy on restricting humanitarian access.”⁴¹

In September 2004, the World Health Organization (WHO) estimated 50,000 deaths in Darfur since the conflict's beginning, mostly by starvation; in October, its head gave an estimate of 71,000 deaths by starvation and disease alone between March and October 2004. While a recent British Parliamentary Report estimates that over 300,000 people have already died,⁴² the United Nations estimates that 180,000 have died in the 18 months of the conflict.⁴³ More than 1.8 million people had been displaced from their homes. 200,000 have fled to neighboring Chad. The refugees include non-Arab victims of non-Arabs, Arab victims of non-Arabs, and Arab victims of Arabs; however, the large majority are non-Arab black Africans fleeing Janjaweed attacks.⁴⁴ The UN, prior to the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake, called the Darfur conflict the world's worst current humanitarian crisis.

The conflict in early 2003 began when JEM and SLA rebels attacked government forces and installations. The government, caught by surprise, had very few troops in the region, and since a large proportion of the Sudanese soldiers were of Darfur origin, distrusted many of its own units; its response was to mount a campaign of aerial bombardment supporting ground attacks by an Arab militia, the Janjaweed, recruited from local tribes and armed by the government.

⁴¹ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/sudan-peace-process.htm>

⁴² <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4268733>

⁴³ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/africa/4349063.stm>

⁴⁴ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3737566.stm>

A United Nations observer team reported that non-Arab villages were singled out while Arab villages were left untouched. The Janjaweed are also said to have "torched dozens of mosques and torn up and defecated on copies of the Qur'an."⁴⁵

Both sides have been accused of committing serious human rights violations, including mass killing, looting, and rapes of the civilian population. However, the better-armed Janjaweed quickly gained the upper hand. By the spring of 2004, several thousand people — mostly from the non-Arab population — had been killed and as many as a million more had been driven from their homes, causing a major humanitarian crisis in the region. The crisis took on an international dimension when over 100,000 refugees poured into neighbouring Chad, pursued by Janjaweed militiamen, who clashed with Chadian government forces along the border. More than 70 militiamen and 10 Chadian soldiers were killed in one gun battle in April.

The scale of the crisis has led to warnings of an imminent disaster, with United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan warning that the risk of genocide is "frighteningly real" in Darfur.⁴⁶ The scale of the Janjaweed campaign has led to comparisons with the Rwandan Genocide, a parallel hotly denied by the Sudanese government. Independent observers have noted that the tactics are more akin to the ethnic cleansing used in the Yugoslav Wars but have warned that the region's remoteness means that hundreds of thousands are effectively cut off from aid. The Brussels-based International Crisis Group has reported that over 350,000 people could potentially die as a result of starvation and disease.

⁴⁵ The economist, May 15, 2004: Mild rebuke for Darfur' Killers

⁴⁶ op cit

In early July 2004, Annan and United States Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Sudan and the Darfur region, and urged the Sudanese government to stop supporting the Janjaweed militias. Annan described the trips as "constructive". The African Union and European Union have sent monitors to monitor the cease-fire signed on 8 April 2004; however, the Janjaweed's attacks have not stopped, as noted by the United States and more recently Human Rights Watch.

The Arab League asked for a longer term and warned that Sudan must not become another Iraq. This gives the international nature in which the Sudan conflict had become. UN Resolution 1556 also imposed an arms embargo on the Janjaweed and other militia. From the Sudanese government's point of view, the conflict is simply a skirmish. The Sudanese president, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, said, "The international concern over Darfur is actually a targeting of the Islamic state in Sudan." Sudan has warned Britain and the United States not to interfere in the internal affairs of the East African country saying it will reject any military aid, while asking for logistic support

In August 2004, the African Union sent 150 Rwandan troops in to protect the ceasefire monitors; however, "their mandate did not include the protection of civilians."⁴⁷ Rwandan President Paul Kagame declared that "if it was established that the civilians are in danger then our forces will certainly intervene and use force to protect civilians"; however, such an effort would certainly take more than 150 troops. They were joined by 150 Nigerian troops later that month.

Peace talks, which had previously broken down in Addis Ababa on July 17, 2004, were resumed on August 23, 2004 in Abuja. The talks reopened amid acrimony, with the

⁴⁷ http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf

SLA accusing the government of breaking promises that it made for the little-respected April ceasefire.

On September 9, 2004, US Secretary of State Colin Powell declared to the US Senate that genocide was occurring in Darfur, for which he blamed the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed. This position was strongly rejected by the Sudanese foreign affairs minister, Najib Abdul Wahab. The United Nations, like the African Union and European Union, have not declared the Darfur conflict to be an act of genocide. If it does constitute an act of genocide, international law is considered to allow other countries to intervene.

In recent months, the rate of killing has slowed. This suggests that the government of Sudan is heeding warnings from America, which has accused it of genocide, and from international criminal court, which has compiled a list of people wanted for war crimes in Dafur.⁴⁸

The Underlying Causes of the Sudan conflicts can be classified into first, the Fundamental causes which include; widespread poverty, the crisis of governance, the lack of respect for human rights and Marginalization and secondly, the Structural Causes, for instance differing Arabic and indigenous African Culture, ethnicity factor - "Arabs versus African". Before the 20th century Darfur was a centre of the slave trade, and Fur slavers competed with Arab ones to raid the nearby Bahr el Ghazal to obtain slaves for the coastal regions. This point to the fact that the background to the Sudan conflict started long before 1955. Despite peace agreements, insufficient attention has been given to the underlying causes of Sudan's conflict, contributing to the continued fighting in Sudan. Peace settlement that does not seriously address the causes of conflict in Darfur and other areas

⁴⁸ op cit p 12

cannot be comprehensive, nor can it be sustained without community involvement. Community marginalisation is major cause of dissentment among communities.

The conflict between the northern and southern Sudan has usually been misunderstood, because the historical roots of the conflict have been misrepresented. There are two opposite views of the conflict which are frequently given for the continuing rift: the first of which is that the division between the north and south is based on centuries of exploitation and slave raiding by the “Arabs” North against the African south. This view supports the argument given earlier that Sudan conflict started much earlier before that 1995 conflict. The second view holds that the Sudan was officially split by the imperialists meddling, since Sudanese Islam, being both “African’ and “Arab” imposes no natural or historical division between the two regions. But it is also true that Sudan has been going through a process of Arabization and Islamization since the invasion of the Sudan by Arabs tribes from Upper Egypt and also across the red sea during the middle ages.

The Arabization of Sudan has been accepted as historical fact both by those who think that it is a natural and inevitable process, and also by those who see it as an external threat which must be stopped by rallying of all indigenous African opposition.

Among the proximate causes of these conflicts are Drought and famine. Hunger causes conflict when people feel they have nothing more to lose by engaging in activities that may bring in some food. The two groups, that is the non-Arab black people of Sudan and the Arab tribes have differing economic needs, which has led to clashes; the Fur and Masalit are primarily sedentary farmers, while the Arabs and Zaghawa are nomadic herdsmen, which has brought them into conflict over access to land and water resources.

While the Darfur conflict has a political basis, it has also acquired an ethnic dimension in which civilians were deliberately targeted on the basis of their ethnicity, and

an economic dimension related to the competition between pastoralists (generally Arab) and farmers (generally non-Arab) for land and water.

Competition for Scarce resources particularly oil in the Southern Sudan has been a major factor in the Sudan conflicts. Oil is a resource that has given the conflict an international dimension. It has turned Sudan into an epicentre of the Horn of Africa conflicts. This is compounded by the fact that the southerners recognized the value of their land together with its natural resource endowment.

The triggers to these conflicts have been varied but the most prominent ones include the introduction of Shari'a laws. In September 1983 President Nimeiri announced his decision to extend Islamic Shari'a punishments into the penal code, re-igniting the civil war. In 1989 General Umar al-Bashir became president and chief of state, prime minister and chief of the armed forces. His government introduced the Criminal Act of 1991 which instituted harsh punishments nationwide, including amputations and stoning. The conflict therefore began because the southerners objected shari'a laws

Dismantling of political establishments is another factor that brought Sudan in line of conflict. After the April 6, 1985 military coup, regional assemblies were suspended. The RCC was abolished in 1996, and the ruling National Islamic Front changed its name to the National Congress Party. After 1997, the structure of regional administration was replaced by the creation of 26 states. The executives, cabinets, and senior-level state officials are appointed by the president, and their limited budgets are determined by and dispensed from Khartoum. The states, as a result, remain economically dependent upon the central government. In December 1999, a power struggle climaxed between President al-Bashir and then-speaker of parliament Hassan al-Turabi, who was the NIF founder and an Islamist ideologue. Al-Turabi was stripped of his posts in the ruling party and the government.

parliament was disbanded, the constitution was suspended, and a state of national emergency was declared by presidential decree.

External influence by states interested in the Sudan's strategic position is evident. For much of the 1990s, Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia formed an ad-hoc alliance called the "Front Line States" with support from the United States to check the influence of the National Islamic Front government. During this period, Sudan supported anti-Uganda rebel groups such as the Lord's Resistance Army in retaliation for Ugandan support of the Sudan People's Liberation Army. Beginning from the mid-1990s Sudan gradually began to moderate its positions as a result of increased US pressure following the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings and the new development of oil fields previously in rebel hands

Looking at the management methodology, Peace Talks was the first method applied in attempt to manage the Sudan conflict. The first Peace agreement was signed in Addis Ababa in 1972. Peace talks between the southern rebels and the government made substantial progress in 2003 and early 2004, although skirmishes in parts of the south were reportedly continuing. The peace was consolidated with the official signing by both sides of the Naivasha treaty on January 9, 2005, pursuant to which the south will be granted autonomy for six years, to be followed by a referendum on independence. It is hoped that the treaty will finally mark the end of a decades-long war that has claimed millions of lives.

Peace negotiations as an alternative management method were held in Kenya since 1994 through IGAD initiative. In 2004, Chad brokered negotiations in N'Djamena, leading to the April 8 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement between the Sudanese government and JEM and SLA. Also, Sub-Regional Integration in Conflict Prevention and Management through The African Union (AU) formed a Ceasefire Commission (CFC) to monitor observance of the April 8th ceasefire. The African Union had expected to have 3,000

additional troops in place in the region in November 2004, but cited lack of funds and logistical difficulties delayed this deployment, waiting on the AU's Peace and Security Council to meet on 20th October 2004 and decide on the expanded duties and numbers of the force. It was decided that these AU troops, from both Nigeria and Rwanda, be deployed by October 30, 2004.

Others have pursued economic development by regional integration schemes. This approach holds that many African conflicts have their roots in domestic politics. However, all the conflicts have a regional context, which makes regional approach to the resolution of African conflicts an imperative.

The United Nation intervention with a strong peace keeping mission is being deployed quickly by the United Nations. On 30 July, the United Nations gave the Sudanese government 30 days to disarm and bring to justice the Janjaweed, in UN Security Council Resolution 1556. If this deadline is not met in 30 days, it "expresses its intention to consider" sanctions.⁴⁹ The UN's 30 day deadline expired on August 29 2004, after which the Secretary General reported on the state of the conflict. According to him, the situation "has resulted in some improvements on the ground but remains limited overall" and advises "a substantially increased international presence in Darfur" in order to "monitor" the conflict. The United Nations also pledged \$100 million dollars to support the force, about half of the \$221 million cost to keep them deployed for a year. The European Union mobilized the remainder, an additional EUR 80 million on October 26 from their African Peace Facility to support the deployment and operations of the 3144-strong AU observer mission which monitor the implementation of the cease-fire agreement.⁵⁰ Also The

⁴⁹ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3940527.stm>

⁵⁰ <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction>

Genocide Intervention Fund has been raising private donations to fund peacekeepers from the African Union in Darfur.

International Community Appeals for donors to see the need to commit funds for essential development has been another method to manage the conflict. The rationale here is that with meaningful essential development activities, people's attention would focus on them rather than war.

The other way that has been applied is the International pressure. In his testimony, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Charles Snyder said that the Bush Administration is "pressing" the Sudanese government "at the highest levels" to negotiate a "humanitarian ceasefire" with Darfur's rebels. The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur handed their report to the Secretary General on January 25.⁵¹ The Commission found that the Government of the Sudan and the Janjaweed were responsible for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting to crimes under international law. The Commission identified 51 individuals responsible for the violation of human rights and recommended immediate trial at the International Criminal Court.

On 23 July 2004, the United States Senate and House of Representatives passed a joint resolution declaring the armed conflict in the Sudanese region of Darfur to be genocide and calling on the Bush administration to lead an international effort to put a stop to it.

On September 9, 2004, the US put forward a UN draft resolution threatening Sudan with sanctions on its oil industry which was adopted, in modified form, on September 18, 2004 as Resolution 1564,⁵² pressuring the Sudanese government to act urgently to improve the situation by threatening the possibility of oil sanctions in the event of continued

⁵¹ http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf

⁵² <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8191.doc.htm>

noncompliance with Resolution 1556 or refusal to accept the expansion of African Union peacekeepers. Resolution 1564 also established an International Commission of Inquiry to look into human rights violations, and to determine whether genocide was occurring.

In conclusion the major challenge facing the peace in Sudan is the post conflict management issue. It is an historical fact that peace accords have been signed in various parts of the world but they never work. The Sudan peace process can only be explained by the theory of the ripe moment that Sudan conflicts have come to maturity and should come to an end.

CHAPTER THREE

3.0 CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE KEY ACTORS TO THE SUDAN PEACE PROCESS

The following is an analysis of the key actors in the Sudan Peace Process. The process had involved many actors which included individuals as well as institutions as well as the media. The world media often portrayed the Sudanese conflict as one of a Christian David in the south fighting off the oppressive Goliath of the north.

3.1 Dr. John Garang de Mabior

Dr John Garang is an individual who led a rebellion in South Sudan for 22 years in search for peace and was killed in a helicopter crash just as the people of South Sudan seemed set to enjoy the fruits of victory from his struggle. According to George Bush, he was a “visionary leader and a peace maker.”⁵³ He was also a skilled diplomat, charming support from America and most of Sudan’s neighbours- including, Ethiopia and Eritrea, even as they fought each other. Garang won almost total autonomy for south Sudan in a comprehensive peace agreement, known as CPA, with the central government in Khartoum early in 2005. The CPA was one of the few recent bright spots in a continent still plagued by civil wars, famine and corruption. Many fear that without Garang’s forceful leadership, the whole peace agreement may unravel, for he died at a pivotal moment in the creation of a fledgling south Sudanese state. In his address to a donors’ conference in Oslo in May 2005, Dr. John Garang de`Mabior gave his vision;

“I want to emphasize and reflect to the international community in this conference the importance and uniqueness of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The conceptual framework of CPA and post-conflict Sudan is ‘one country, two systems’ in all structures of government, as well as extensive devolution of power

⁵³ the economist August 6th 2005 p 11 ; Death and Division

at all levels of administration. The CPA does not only put an end to Sudan's 21 years of debilitating war, it also aims to remove all root causes of war: political, social, economic and cultural.”⁵⁴

It was unfortunate that this peace maker died where peacemakers are in short supply. He believed that Peace became possible because both parties realized that the country was dissipating, that the state seemed to be withering away without undergoing the famous Marxian transformation and that the “Old Sudan” we have known was heading blindly into an abyss of irreversible fragmentation.”⁵⁵

John Garang was one of the few African freedom fighters to win much international praise.

3.2 The IGAD

Since 1993, the leaders of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya have pursued peace initiative for the Sudan under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), but results have been mixed. Peace negotiations as an alternative management method were held in Kenya since 1994 through IGAD initiative. Despite the mixed results recorded, the heads of state from four countries formed a mediation committee in March 1994 under the aegis of IGAD and held the first formal negotiations in March 1994. The basis of these talks was a declaration of principles (DOP), which includes the right of self-determination, separation of religion and the state (secularism), and a scheduled referendum to be held in south Sudan with session as an option. the IGAD initiative promulgated the 1994 Declaration of Principles (DOP) that aimed to identify the essential elements necessary to a just and comprehensive peace settlement; that is, the

⁵⁴ Ibid

⁵⁵ Katsuyoshi Fukui & John Markakis; eds.(1994): Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa. Ohio University Press, Athens. p 95.

relationship between religion and the state, power-sharing, wealth-sharing, and the right of self-determination for the south.⁵⁶ The Sudanese Government did not sign the DOP although it reluctantly accepted it. The government in Khartoum walked out of the talks in September 1994 and returned only in 1997 after major battle field losses to the SPLA. In 2004, Chad brokered negotiations in N'Djamena, lead to the April 8 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement between the Sudanese government and JEM and SLA.

3.3 The Government of Sudan

The government of Sudan made moves to make peace with the SPLA in an effort to deflect criticism of its behaviour in Darfur. But could not be regarded as a serious peacemaker because it could reignite war not only in the west but in the south too. The government in Khartoum walked out of the talks in September 1994 and returned only in 1997 after major battle field losses to the SPLA where it signed a series of agreements with rebel factions, led by former Garang's Lieutenant Riek Machar, under the banner of "Peace from Within." These included the Khartoum, Nuba Mountains, and Fashoda agreements that ended military conflict between the government and significant rebel factions. Many of those leaders then moved to Khartoum where they assumed marginal roles in the central government, or collaborated with the government in military engagements against the SPLA. These three agreements paralleled the terms and conditions of the IGAD agreement, calling for a degree of autonomy for the south and the right of self-determination.

Peace talks between the southern rebels and the government made substantial progress in 2003 and early 2004, although skirmishes in parts of the south were reportedly continuing. The peace was consolidated with the official signing by both sides of the

⁵⁶ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/sudan-peace-process.htm>: Global Security: Sudan Peace Process.

Naivasha treaty on 9 January 2005, pursuant to which the south will be granted autonomy for six years, to be followed by a referendum on independence. It is hoped that the treaty will finally mark the end of a decades-long war that has claimed millions of lives. Now there is peace between the north and the south but intertribal war still exists in the western region of Darfur.

The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur in their report to the Secretary General on January 25 ⁵⁷ found that the Government of the Sudan and the Janjaweed were responsible for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting to crimes under international law. The Commission identified 51 individuals responsible for the violation of human rights and recommended immediate trial at the International Criminal Court.

On 23 July 2004, the United States Senate and House of Representatives passed a joint resolution declaring the armed conflict in the Sudanese region of Darfur to be genocide and calling on the Bush administration to lead an international effort to put a stop to it.

These are indicators that the Government of Sudan acted in most of the peace process because International pressure was applied on it as exemplified by the aforementioned Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Charles Snyder's testimony, that the Bush Administration is "pressing" the Sudanese government "at the highest levels" to negotiate a "humanitarian ceasefire" with Darfur's rebels.

3.4 The U.S. Government

The U.S. engagement in the Sudan peace process strengthened from March 2001 to December 2004. In March 2001, President Bush directed a review of US - Sudan policy. The review resulted in three policy objectives: first, counterterrorism cooperation, second,

⁵⁷ http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf

was aimed to end regional destabilization, and the third was on achievement of a just peace.⁵⁸

In May 2001, Secretary of state Colin Powell directed the Assistant Secretary Walter Kansteiner to quietly approach the Sudanese to discuss all three policy objectives, particularly the prospects for achieving a just peace in Sudan. President Bush appointed Andrew Natsios as U.S. Special Humanitarian coordinator for Sudan. In June 2001, the U.S. formed an informal Troika with the United Kingdom and Norway to support the peace process. Natsios, the US Special Humanitarian Coordinator traveled to Sudan in July 2001 to lay out a framework of humanitarian access, reinstatement of humanitarian neutrality, and preparing southern Sudan for peace. In September 2001, President Bush appointed former Senator John Danforth as the Special Envoy for Peace in Sudan. His role was to explore the prospects that the U.S. could play a useful catalytic role in the search for a just end to the civil war, and enhance humanitarian services delivery that can help reduce the suffering of the Sudanese people stemming from war related effects.

Danforth traveled to the region in November 2001 and set out "four tests" for peace, namely: a slavery commission, ending attacks on civilians, days of tranquility (vaccination program), and a Nuba Mountains ceasefire.

In January 2002, Secretary Powell directed a U.S. team to assist parties with the Nuba Mountains ceasefire discussions. The parties agreed to Ceasefire Agreement in the Nuba Mountains, Burgenstock, Switzerland. In April 2002, the Assistant Secretary Kansteiner formed the Sudan Programs Group within the Department's Bureau of African

⁵⁸ <http://usinfo.state.gov>: Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State.

Affairs to support Special Envoy Danforth and the peace talks. The U.S. and the Troika stood up to a Joint Monitoring Commission to monitor the Nuba Mountains ceasefire. Secretary Powell authorized the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum to resume normal operations after a four-year hiatus. In May 2002, the U.S - funded report of the International Eminent Persons Group on slavery in Sudan was issued and the U.S. participated directly in the Sudan peace talks for the first time.

In July 2002, the parties sign the Machakos Protocol and agreed in October to a cessation of hostilities. The U.S - led Civilian Protection Monitoring Team begun operations to monitor attacks on civilians. At the same time President Bush signed the Sudan Peace Act. Again in January 2003, Danforth, the Special Envoy traveled to the region to monitor progress on the "four tests."

In May 2003, the Secretary Powell met with Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) Chairman John Garang in Washington. In September 2003, the parties signed an agreement on security arrangements. Secretary Powell met with the Sudanese Foreign Minister Ismail in Washington after which Powell traveled to the site of the peace talks in Naivasha, Kenya. In November 2003 US Secretary Powell once again met with SPLM Chairman Garang in Washington after which the U.S - sponsored UN Security Council President Statement was issued, authorizing pre-planning for a UN Peacekeeping mission.

In December 2003, President Bush talked to President Al Bashir and SPLM Chairman John Garang on wealth-sharing. It resulted in a breakthrough agreement where the Parties signed the agreement on wealth-sharing in January 2004. In March 2004, the U.S. tabled a compromised proposal to resolve the Abyei issue, which was accepted by the parties. President Bush talked to President Bashir and SPLM Chairman Garang after which the U.S. pressed for the first UN Security Council press statement on Darfur in April.

In May 2004, the parties signed agreements on power-sharing and the three conflict areas (Nuba Mountains/Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Abyei). The UN Security Council then adopted a Presidential Statement condemning the violence in Darfur and demanding humanitarian access. In June 2004, the Secretary Powell traveled to Khartoum and Darfur regions of Sudan. President Bush then nominated the Special Envoy Danforth as the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. The U.S. and U.K. introduced UN Security Council Resolution 1547, establishing a UN Special Representative of the Secretary General and creating a UN political office in Sudan.

July 2004, The U.S. sponsors UN Security Council Resolution 1556 on Darfur and in September 2004, the Secretary Powell met with SPLM Chairman Garang in Washington. The U.S. yet again sponsored UN Security Council Resolution 1564 on Darfur.

In November 2004, the Secretary Powell dispatched a U.S. team to discuss security arrangements with the Sudan People's Liberation Army Front Commanders. Under the U.S. Presidency, the United Nations Security Council held an extraordinary session in Nairobi, Kenya, to discuss Sudan. The parties signed a Declaration, witnessed by the Security Council, to finish the final comprehensive agreement by the end of 2004. The Security Council adopted Resolution 1574. Secretary Powell met with National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Chairman Mirghani. President Bush then talked to President Bashir and SPLM Chairman Garang. In December 2004, the parties completed the permanent ceasefire and implementation modalities and President Bush signed the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act.

Bathsheba N. Crocker and Chester A. Crocker, in the *International Herald Tribune* of Friday 11 June 2004 ⁵⁹ argues that the US role in the southern Sudan is that of a primary midwife of an African and European-backed peace effort, which could achieve a bold vision for peace, opening a new chapter in a devastated land that has known little but war since gaining independence from Britain in 1956. For a U.S. administration in need of a foreign policy victory, this would be a big prize.

“The stakes are huge: millions of lives have been lost in Sudan’s intractable conflict. Sudan, which remains on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism, is strategically important in the U.S. effort to combat failed states and terrorism throughout the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region. A successful re-engagement with this multi-religious, Muslim majority society could give substance to the rhetoric about America’s desire for constructive relations with the Islamic world, while assuring that Sudan’s millions of non-Muslim citizens regain their rights.....”⁶⁰

Peace will only have a chance in Sudan if there is active U.S. leadership. The United States has the needed leverage, including through the potential to lift sanctions and normalize diplomatic relations. It can also provide serious resources and play a key role on the UN Security Council. For instance, On September 9, 2004, the US put forward a UN draft resolution threatening Sudan with sanctions on its oil industry which was adopted, in modified form, on September 18, 2004 as Resolution 1564,⁶¹ pressuring the Sudanese

⁵⁹ *Bathsheba Crocker is co-director of the post conflict reconstruction project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington. Chester Crocker, a former assistant secretary of state for African affairs, is a professor of strategic studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid*

⁶¹ <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8191.doc.htm>

government to act urgently to improve the situation by threatening the possibility of oil sanctions in the event of continued noncompliance with Resolution 1556 or refusal to accept the expansion of African Union peacekeepers. Resolution 1564 also established an International Commission of Inquiry to look into human rights violations, and to determine whether genocide was occurring.

The challenges in implementing Sudan's peace accord cannot be overstated. Hatred and mistrust run deep among the Sudanese. Potential spoilers abound, from armed militias and hardliners in both parties to meddling neighbors. Only the United States has the mobilizing and coordinating capacity to make Sudan's complex, post-conflict reconstruction work. Four central tasks require U.S. leadership. First, the immediate crisis in Darfur, while aggressively nailing down the broader north-south peace agreement. The Bush administration has achieved much in Sudan since it began its peace initiative in 2001. It must not be blown off course either by the maneuvers of the north-south parties or by those demanding a sudden shift toward an anti-Khartoum campaign over Darfur. Darfur is another unforgivable scar on Khartoum's record, but such crises will end only when there is a durable structure for peace. The answer is sustained action - currently being organized under U.S., African Union and EU leadership - to set up a "cease-fire commission. proposition vitally needed resources and deploy monitoring teams with observers to bring Darfur's humanitarian situation under control."⁶²

The second challenge was to convert the already negotiated protocols into a comprehensive peace agreement (including a nationwide cease-fire) and then start implementing it. This will require tough-minded diplomatic leadership. A UN

⁶² Ibid

peacekeeping force must be properly mandated and equipped so it can respond with force against threats to the hard earned peace.

Third, the United States and other donors will have to commit serious money for reconstruction needs. The Sudanese people, especially in the underdeveloped south, need to see real benefits flowing from peace. Finally, ending the civil war means taking the gun out of politics and giving substance to the agreements' promise of an inclusive political system. Negotiating peace in Sudan has required years of intense work. Making it stick will be even more demanding. It is a challenge worthy of American leadership.

It can be concluded here that the U.S has the most influence in realizing the goals for peace in Sudan. Its ability to combine negotiations, pressure, threats and the needed resources puts it on top of the rest of the key actors.

3.5 Libya and Egypt

In July 2000, the Libyan/Egyptian Joint Initiative on the Sudan was mooted, calling for the establishment of an interim government, power-sharing, constitutional reform, and new elections. Southern critics objected to the joint initiative because it neglected to address issues of the relationship between religion and the state and failed to mention the right of self-determination. It is unclear to what extent this initiative had a significant impact on the search for peace, as some critics view it as more aimed at a resolution among northern political parties and protecting the perceived security interests of Egypt in favor of the unity of the Sudan.

3.6 Foreign Investors

Sudan peace process is crucial to White Nile oil deals. Analysts said that Sudan's fragile peace process will determine the fate of a major oil exploration deal following the death of the country's first vice president John Garang. UK firm White Nile plans to drill for oil in the south Sudan.⁶³ Africa analyst David Mozersky of the International Crisis Group (ICG) says that there are challenges and obstacles that need to be overcome through the implementation of the peace process.

In January 2005, southern rebel leader John Garang signed a peace pact with the government of Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir to end two decades of civil war. A month later, the former Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) led by Garang, secured a promising oil deal with White Nile. It has sparked controversy ever since, with Khartoum disputing the SPLM's right to award oil deals and French company Total claiming it has drilling rights to the block. Under the pact, White Nile plans to acquire a stake in the 67,500 square km Block Ba in southern Sudan from Nile Petroleum, owned by the SPLM, in exchange for a 50 percent stake in the firm.

The May 2005 Oslo donors' conference saw countries pledged to support the rebuilding of Sudan. The countries were Kenya, under south-south cooperation scheme with its support on gathering information and statistics to inform decision making, training of UN observers for Sudan through Peace Support Training Center, Training and Curriculum development. Norway pledged to fund the humanitarian needs in the reconstruction of the country; US also pledged to fund the humanitarian needs and the European Union gave other pledges⁶⁴

⁶³ http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php?id_article=10937

⁶⁴ Garang's Vision for a new South Sudan: The standard newspaper 4th august 2005 P 5

3.7 African Union

The Sub-Regional Integration in Conflict Prevention and Management through The African Union (AU) formed a Ceasefire Commission (CFC) to monitor observance of the April 8th ceasefire agreement. The African Union had expected to have 3,000 additional troops in place in the region in November 2004, but cited lack of funds and logistical difficulties delayed this deployment, waiting on the AU's Peace and Security Council to meet on 20th October 2004 and decide on the expanded duties and numbers of the force. It was decided that these AU troops, from both Nigeria and Rwanda, be deployed by October 30, 2004.

3.8 UN

The United Nations intervention with a strong peace keeping mission was deployed quickly in the conflict regions of Sudan by 2004. On 30th July 2004, the United Nations gave the Sudanese government 30 days to disarm and bring to justice the Janjaweed, in UN Security Council Resolution 1556. If this deadline is not met in 30 days, it "expresses its intention to consider" sanctions.⁶⁵ The UN's 30 day deadline expired on August 29 2004, after which the Secretary General reported on the state of the conflict. According to him, the situation "has resulted in some improvements on the ground but remains limited overall" and advises "a substantially increased international presence in Darfur" in order to "monitor" the conflict. The United Nations also pledged \$100 million dollars to support the force, about half of the \$221 million cost to keep them deployed for a year. The European Union mobilized the remainder, an additional EUR 80 million on October 26 from their African Peace Facility to support the deployment and operations of the 3144-strong AU

⁶⁵ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3940527.stm>

observer mission which monitor the implementation of the cease-fire agreement.⁶⁶ Also
The Genocide Intervention Fund has been raising private donations to fund peacekeepers
from the African Union in Darfur.

⁶⁶ <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction>

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1. Introduction

The Government of Sudan has had a long history of conflict dating back before its independence in 1956. Various peace initiatives were established in efforts to resolve the conflicts. In 1972 there was the Adis Ababa peace initiative; in 1989 Operation Lifeline Sudan was established. In 1994, the IGAD-brokered peace process in which Declaration of Principles (DOP) was established. In October 2000, the Lake Bogoria Peace Talks commenced. In July 2001, a joint Libyan-Egyptian initiative established a Declaration of Principles calling for all party transitional government. In January 2002, the Government of Sudan and SPLM/A signed a landmark ceasefire agreement providing for a six-month renewable ceasefire in Nuba mountains region of South Sudan. They also signed a protocol covering self-determination and state and religion and on ending the 19 year civil war. In November 2002, the cessation of hostilities agreement was extended to end of March 2003, and again extended to June 2003. In January 2005 a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed between the Government and the people of south Sudan.

Various individuals, groups, institutions and governments had roles in all these peace initiatives. One was therefore faced with the question of who played the key role in the peace process. There was therefore a need to establish which of the many actors were key in bringing about the successful peace process that government of Sudan and the international community have echoed.

The primary purpose of the study was to critically analyse the actors in the Sudan Peace Process. The specific objectives were to critically analyse individual actors' role in the

peace process to establish who the key actors are and to determine their motivation to succeed.

The significance of this study is two-fold: The findings shall provide information that can be used by the academicians to inform the analysis of peace making and peace building in Sudan as well as aimed at generating new knowledge from the point of view of the actors as opposed to the traditional practice of listing the outcomes of such processes only. The other significant contribution is that the findings will be useful to policy makers in Sudan Government, IGAD member countries, AU, UN among others in providing guidance on which actor may be trusted to oversee the implementation of peace agreements.

4.2. Summary of Findings

There were various actors in the Sudan Peace Process. The key of which were the people of South Sudan, individuals John Garang and President Al-Bahir, the Government of Sudan, the U.S Government, IGAD and the African Union.

The people of South Sudan can largely be explained by the theory of the ripe moment that it was the right time for the conflicting parties to negotiate for peace because they were all tired of war.

The individual key players were John Garang and president Al –Bashir. John Garang led a rebellion in South Sudan for 22 years in search for peace. He was killed in a helicopter crash soon after he was made the first vice president of Sudan and just as the people of South Sudan seemed set to enjoy the fruits of victory from his struggle. He was a complete contrast of al Bashir in that he was positive about the peace process whereas Al Bashir was not. According to George Bush, he was a “visionary leader and a peace

maker.⁶⁷ He was also a skilled diplomat who charmed support from America and most of Sudan's neighbours- including, Ethiopia and Eritrea, even as they fought each other. Garang won almost total autonomy for south Sudan in a comprehensive peace agreement, known as CPA, with the central government in Khartoum early in 2005. He died at a pivotal moment in the creation of a fledgling south Sudanese state. His vision of the post-conflict Sudan was 'one country, two systems' in all structures of government, as well as extensive devolution of power at all levels of administration and removal of all root causes of war: political, social, economic and cultural.⁶⁸

It was unfortunate that this peace maker died where peacemakers are in short supply.

President Al -Bashir on the other hand did not show willingness and commitment to the peace process. He was openly partisan and only acted positively after being coerced by the U.S and he was ready to revert to earlier stand whenever opportunity arose. His government accepted the Declaration of Principles initiated jointly by Libya and Egypt without condition. It can be concluded from this analysis that he is not a serious peace maker. Instead he was a key deterrent to the process.

The two individuals' behaviour can be explained by the realist theoretical framework applied in this study that the nature of state or interstate relations are determined by the nature and character of the individual leaders in the sense that if it was not for the personality of John Garang and his peaceful nature and desire for peace, the peace agreement would not have been reached. On the other hand, if President Al Bashir was not the president, Sudan would not have experienced protracted conflict. His unwillingness to be part of peace process was further emphasised by his delegating the responsibility of

⁶⁷ the economist August 6th 2005 p 11 ; Death and Division

⁶⁸ Ibid

representing the Government of Sudan in the peace talks and signing of CPA to his first vice president Ali Taha.

The U.S Government, though a late comer to the process, joined the Sudan Peace process with its own three policy objectives: first, counterterrorism cooperation, second, was aimed to end regional destabilization, and the third was on achievement of a just peace by the Sudanese.⁶⁹

It joined the peace process with the mind that it could play a useful catalytic role in the search for a just end to the civil war, and enhance humanitarian services delivery that can help reduce the suffering of the Sudanese people stemming from war related effects. This role was confirmed when Secretary Powell directed a U.S. team to assist parties with the Nuba Mountains ceasefire discussions which resulted to the parties agreeing to Ceasefire Agreement in the Nuba Mountains, Burgenstock, Switzerland. Also in May 2002, the U.S. participated directly in the Sudan peace talks for the first time and saw the parties sign the Machakos Protocol and agreed in October to a cessation of hostilities. At the same time President Bush signed the Sudan Peace Act.

It is also through U.S involvement that parties signed an agreement on security arrangements and authorizing pre-planning for a UN Peacekeeping mission. In December 2003, talks between President Bush and President Al Bashir together with SPLM Chairman John Garang resulted in a breakthrough agreement where the Parties signed the agreement on wealth-sharing in January 2004. In March 2004, the U.S. tabled a compromised proposal to resolve the Abyei issue, which was accepted by the parties. Under the U.S.

⁶⁹ <http://usinfo.state.gov>: Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State.

Presidency, the United Nations Security Council held an extraordinary session in Nairobi, Kenya, to discuss Sudan. The parties signed a Declaration, witnessed by the Security Council, to finish the final comprehensive agreement by the end of 2004. The Security Council adopted Resolution 1574. In December 2004, the parties completed the permanent ceasefire and implementation modalities and President Bush signed the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act.

It can therefore be concluded that the U.S had a primary role in the peace process even though its commitment emanated from its own administration's need of a foreign policy victory especially because Sudan was on the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism. This made it strategically important in the U.S. effort to combat failed states and terrorism throughout the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region. "A successful re-engagement with this multi-religious, Muslim majority society could give substance to the rhetoric about America's desire for constructive relations with the Islamic world, while assuring that Sudan's millions of non-Muslim citizens regain their rights....."⁷⁰

Peace had a chance in Sudan because there was active U.S. leadership. The United States gave the needed leverage, including use of threats. It also provided resources and played a key role on the UN Security Council. For instance, the US put forward a UN draft resolution threatening Sudan with sanctions on its oil industry which was adopted, in modified form, on September 18, 2004 as Resolution 1564,⁷¹ pressuring the Sudanese government to act urgently to improve the situation by threatening the possibility of oil sanctions in the event of continued noncompliance with Resolution 1556 or refusal to accept the expansion of African Union peacekeepers.

⁷⁰ Ibid

⁷¹ <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8191.doc.htm>

Only the United States has the mobilizing and coordinating capacity to meet challenges in implementing Sudan's peace accord and make Sudan's complex, post-conflict reconstruction work. The answer is sustained action - currently being organized under U.S., African Union and EU leadership.⁷²

Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) through the leaders of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya have since 1993 pursued peace initiative for the Sudan but results have been mixed. Peace negotiations as an alternative management method were held in Kenya since 1994 through IGAD initiative where the heads of state from the four countries formed a mediation committee and held the first formal negotiations in March 1994. The basis of these talks was a declaration of principles (DOP), which includes the right of self-determination, separation of religion and the state (secularism), and a scheduled referendum to be held in south Sudan with session as an option. the IGAD initiative promulgated the 1994 Declaration of Principles (DOP) that aimed to identify the essential elements necessary to a just and comprehensive peace settlement; that is, the relationship between religion and the state, power-sharing, wealth-sharing, and the right of self-determination for the south.⁷³ The Sudanese Government did not sign the DOP although it reluctantly accepted it. The implication here was that the Government of Sudan was not willing to pursue peace. It walked out of the talks in September 1994 and returned only in 1997 after major battle field losses to the SPLA. In 2004, Chad brokered negotiations in N'Djamena, lead to the April 8 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement between the Sudanese government and JEM and SLA. IGAD thus

⁷² Ibid

⁷³ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/sudan-peace-process.htm>: Global Security: Sudan Peace Process.

had a pivotal role as the peace maker in the region but needed a stronger external reinforcement which came from interested actors like the U.S.

The African Union carrying out its role on the Sub-Regional Integration in Conflict Prevention and Management formed a Ceasefire Commission (CFC) to monitor observance of the April 8th ceasefire agreement but lack of funds and logistical difficulties delayed the deployment of peacekeepers. It decided that AU troops from both Nigeria and Rwanda be deployed in the Sudan. It can therefore be concluded that AU though with important role in the peace process lacks then logistical infrastructure to implement its resolutions. It thus requires support from the United Nations intervention with a strong peace keeping force.

The United Nations did not come to fore as an actor in the Sudan Peace process but provided necessary support. For instance, it gave the Sudanese government 30 days to disarm and bring to justice the Janjaweed, in UN Security Council Resolution 1556. but most of its role was necessitated by the U.S. Government's direct involvement in the Sudan peace process.

4.3. Conclusions

The Key actors to the Sudan peace process are first the people of South Sudan under the leadership of John Garang de Mabior, the U.S Government, IGAD and to a lesser extent AU and the UN. The Government of Sudan is a partisan key actor and from a negative stand point in that it caused and sustained the Sudan Conflicts. The role of the people of south Sudan was relevant in the sense that it provided the momentum for negotiation and was the only actor that negotiated peace for the sake of peace to their people. They were tired of conflicts. IGAD's role was based on the member countries' perception of the conflicts as a threat to peace and security in the region. On the other hand the U.S. had its interests combating terrorism throughout the Horn of Africa and

Red Sea region as well as economic importance of the Sudanese oil reserves. The US thus took advantage of its capabilities in meeting the logistical resource needs to the peace process.

4.4. Overall Conclusion

The Sudan peace process had many actors whose participation was motivated by those actors' interests. The key actors were the people of south Sudan led by John Garang De Mabior whose interest was peace for the people of Sudan. Others are the U.S Government, IGAD Countries and the African Union. Their commitment to Sudan achieving peace was pegged to their own countries' and states' interests. There was therefore a strong relationship between the key actors' motivation to succeed in the peace process and their desired resultant benefits of the peace in Sudan.

The overall conclusion is that the Key Actors in the Sudan Peace Process were the people of South Sudan whose time for peace was ripe. Others were the US, IGAD and Government of Sudan whose motivation was self interest and that it is only the Sudanese who can be relied upon to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to their own advantage.

4.5. Recommendations

The following recommendations were made from the findings of this study:

1. For the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to be implemented it requires the participation of the key actors combined so that they complement one another and in consideration of the needs of the Sudanese. For this reason the people of Sudan can only be trusted to bring meaningful implantation of the peace agreement.
2. There is need for proper machinery to be laid down to solve once and for all the problem of unpredictability of the Government of Sudan. This can only be done

through superpower actors like the US and the international community's action to ensure implementation of the peace agreement.

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