

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS)

**“The Impact of Corruption on Structural Violence in Africa: A Case
Study of Kenya 1993-2008”**


Ochieng’ Felgona Atieno

R50/ 70161/2007

Supervisor

Prof. Amb. Maria Nzomo

**A Research Project submitted in partial fulfilment of the Degree of
Masters of Arts in International Studies**



September, 2010

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DECLARATION

I, the undersigned hereby declare that this research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in this or any other University for examination.

Signed:  · 19/09/2010

OCHIENG' FELGONA ATIENO

Date: SEPTEMBER 2010

REG. NO: R50/ 70161/2007

This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the appointed supervisor.

Signed:



PROF. AMB. MARIA NZOMO

(Supervisor)

24 NOV 2010

Date: September 2010

ABBREVIATIONS

AU	African Union
AfriCOG	Africa Centre for Open Governance
APNAC	African Parliamentarians Network Against Corruption
CBK	Central Bank of Kenya
CDU	Central Depository Unit
CLARION	Centre for Law and Research International
CKRC	Constitution of Kenya Review Commission
CPI	Corrupt Perceptions Index
EAC	East African Community
ECK	Electoral Commission of Kenya
FPE	Free Primary Education
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IPPG	Inter-Party Parliamentary Group
IACC	International Anti-Corruption Conference
KACA	Kenya Anti- Corruption Authority
KACC	Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission
KBI	Kenya Bribery Index
KANU	Kenya Africa National Union
KTN	Kenya Television Network
KUBI	Kenya Urban Bribery Index
NACCSC	National Anti-Corruption Campaign Steering Committee
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition

NTV	Nation Television
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Convention
PNU	Party of National Unity
TI	Transparency International
UNCA	United Nation Convention of Anti-Corruption

DEDICATION

This project is dedicated to all anti-corruption champions and whistleblowers like David Sadera Munyakei. And to all the citizens of Kenya who shun corruption and its implications that lead to conflict in our society.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to record my sincere indebtedness to individuals and institutions without whose assistance and cooperation this project would not have been conceptualized and completed. The shortcomings of this study are my responsibility. Such strengths as it has are due in large part to the support received from various quarters.

First, is the work and academic guidance accorded to me by my supervisor Prof Maria Nzomo whose input and critique was fundamental in coming up with this study. Second, I would also wish to thank Transparency International-Kenya for inspiring me to pursue this study and allowing me to use their facilities. I also take this opportunity to thank the Kenya Anti Corruption Commission (KACC) for its openness, promptness and tolerance during this research. I would also wish to thank all other institutions and individuals who created time to respond to my questionnaire.

Lastly, I am hugely indebted to my good friend, Duncan Okello for helping me shape up the idea, for his wise counsel and constant encouragement to press on with intellectual challenges ahead.

ABSTRACT

The specific objectives of this study are to examine the link between corruption and violence and to investigate the impact of corruption on structural violence in Kenya.

The study is divided into five key sections. The first chapter introduces the research and the overall aims of the study. The second part examines corruption and violence trends in Kenya. The third section looks into the impact of corruption on structural violence in Africa, specifically Kenya. The fourth part is questionnaire administration and analysis and the final part highlights conclusions and recommendations.

The study found that: (i) though many appreciated corruption, many did not believe there is a common definition for it(ii) most Kenyans believes that there is a either a very strong or strongly link between corruption and violence (iii) lack of political will is the major impediment in the fight against corruption (iv) the governance framework in Kenya contributes to corruption and conflict (v) 100% of the respondents said that countries with high levels of corruption are more likely to have conflict (vi) respondents did not think that lack of common understanding on corruption is likely to lead to unsuccessful anti-corruption initiatives.

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CHAPTER ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Background to the Research Problem

The issue of corruption has been at the heart of the agenda amongst leaders in Kenya, and its development partners both regionally and internationally. This is premised on the fact that corruption has negatively impacted on the socio-economic and political development of the country. As a result, various subjects that have been qualified to mean corruption include embezzlement of funds, nepotism, and unequal distribution of resources, inequality gap, election rigging, and bribery for accessing basic services, trade permits and licence amongst others.

The evolution of corruption has resulted into various definitions. The government of Kenya defines corruption as “bribing agents, secret inducement for advice, deceiving principal, conflict of interest, improper benefits to trustee for appointments, bid rigging, and dealing with suspect property.”¹ This definition alludes to instances where part of the citizenry has an advantage due to their influence or economic power over others. Hence they are able to manoeuvre decisions to their advantage as described above. The government of Kenya definition can be deduced to mean an act of influencing official decision in ones favour.

Transparency International (TI) is amongst the international institutions that have been vocal about corruption. According to TI, corruption is defined as “the misuse of

¹ Republic of Kenya, The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003; Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 41(Acts No. 4) Government Printer, Nairobi pg 54 and 81-87

entrusted power for private benefit.”² This definition looks wholesomely at the ability of officials to execute their duty regardless of the discretion bestowed to them. Though more elaborate, it is confined to the attitude of an official towards the service seeker. It assumes that corruption occurs in a vacuum and only looks at the private sector as the supply-side of corruption, and the accountability of individuals mandated to provide services. The Transparency International definition overlooks the governance framework in place, which is, often exploited due to weak checks and balances in the system.

According to Andrei and Robert, corruption is defined as “the sale by government officials of government property for personal gain. Insofar as government officials have discretion over the provision of these goods, they can collect bribes from private agents.”³ Like the preceding definition, it limits corruption more on the actions of public officials, and it does not encompass accountability of private individuals who often induce government officials to provide them with government documents that propel their economic power such as trade permits, licenses and legal documents amongst others. Like the other definitions, it overlooks the systems in place.

As shown above, various literature definitions do not take note of the tripartite relationship of corruption that includes governance framework, the power relations between the public servant, the citizens and service delivery. In my view, the initiator of corruption, the person demanding a bribe, and the system in place are crucial in

² Transparency International and Pope Jeremy, *Confronting Corruption : The Elements of a National Integrity System*, TI Source Book 2000(Malaysia, 2000), pg 2

³ Shleifer Andrei; Vishny W Robert, *Corruption*, JSTOR: The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, No. 3. (Aug., 1993), pp. 599

determining what constitutes corruption. For the purpose of this study, corruption is defined as a governance system that is permeated by power relations that determines access to service delivery. This definition presupposes that for corruption to occur there must be a weak governance system that does not provide effective checks and balance. As a result, those entrusted with the responsibility to provide such services are able to control who gets what, when, how and at what or whose expense. Weak governance framework, thus fails to make corruption a high risk for people to shy away from engaging in it.

This study is based on two assumptions; first corruption is as a result of weak governance framework in the country. The causes of corruption is as a result of having needs that necessitates fulfilment, and ineffectiveness thereof, of an office created to provide those service utilities or provision of goods to the citizenry in timely manner. The ineffectiveness is thus a manifestation of the structural ineptitude that becomes overt, when the clients to that office raise a red flag or protest at the negative impact of that office into the fulfilment of their needs. Essentially, this study presupposes that corruption can be contained through tightening of governance systems in a country.

The gravity of corruption has been underscored by the drafting of regional and international Conventions on corruption such as the African Union Convention on Corruption, the United Nation Convention of Anti-Corruption (UNCAC), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Convention on Corruption, and the popularity of Transparency International's corruption indices

amongst others. The increasing interest on Conventions on corruption points to the universal concern of the vice. According to Peter Anassi, “corruption as we know it, knows no boundary, social, racial or political barriers. It runs across country and globalization of issues is therefore inevitable. International organizations have therefore; become the most effective instruments in fighting global corruption.”⁴ For example the OECD Convention looks at the supply side of corruption by calling on its members not to bribe abroad to access business. This makes the signatories to comply locally and abroad with anti-bribery calls. The fact that states would not be comfortable to be seen to operate outside such Conventions makes it easier not only to contain corruption across borders, but also to offer an opportunity to peer-review and pressure governments to act on corruption concerns within their countries.

Being a strategic country in the region, Kenya has thus continued to receive criticism from the international community for perceived increase in corruption. Consequently, all problems pertaining to governance in Kenya have been attributed to the penetration of the vice in all aspects of life socially, economically and politically. In 2003 the then Minister for Justice Hon. Kiraitu Murungi delivered a speech at the Transparency International’s 11th International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC) saying that “Where I come from corruption in part of our lives. Before our own eyes we have seen it fill our roads with potholes; deny medicines to our hospitals; literally remove desks from our classrooms. Corruption has undermined our agricultural sector and thereby our attempts to feed

⁴ Anassi Peter, *Corruption in Africa: The Kenyan Experience; A Handbook for Civic Education on Corruption*, Trafford Publishing, 6E-2333 Government St, Victoria BC V8T 4P4 Canada and Dialnet Communications Limited, Kenya, 2004 p 229

ourselves as a nation; corruption has denied fresh water to parched sections of the nation; corruption has systematically eaten away at the very fabric of our society.⁵ After the 2002 general elections Kenya gained recognition internationally as an anti-corruption led government. Its citizens were actively involved in reporting corruption cases leading to Gallup International ranking Kenyans as the most optimistic people in the world in 2003. But in 2004 the citizens were disillusioned at the slow pace of reform. Public involvement in anti-corruption campaigns waned and the status quo resumed. From the presiding, the question of interest then becomes; what ails the anti-corruption initiatives in Kenya? Is it the lack of will to fight corruption, or the determination to reform the structures? Michella Wrong alludes to the problems facing Kenya by stating that “given that Kenya had never experienced a civil war, never been invaded, and had started out with so much in its favor, the fault must lie elsewhere. And everyone agreed where: in a system of corruption and patronage so ingrained, so greedy it was gradually throttling the life from the country.”⁶ The presiding assertion implies that the question many people ask is; despite seeming political will after the Narc administration took over, Kenya is still compounded with cases of corruption, poor development, dwindling economy, and high poverty. In as far as Michella Wrong argues, the problem is with the system, and unless it is dealt with nothing much would change.

The second assumption on this study is that one of the key contributing factors to violence in Kenya is corruption. The impact of corruption on structural violence in Kenya

⁵ Speech by Hon. Kiraitu Murungi, MP, Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs during the opening of the 11th International Anti-Corruption Conference Sunday 25th May, 2003 ,Seoul Korea

⁶ Wrong Michella, *Our Turn to Eat : Story of a Kenyan Whistleblower*; The Fourth Estate, HarperCollins Publishers, Great Britain, 2009 p 11

can be attributed to situations where citizens are denied access to certain resources due to their economic, political or social status in relation to service delivery. Corruption leads to poverty, unemployment, inequality, nepotism, information asymmetry amongst others that have attributes to the definition of structural conflict as they impose conditions that place people at a high risk of negative consequences. The dissatisfaction leads to lethargy amongst citizens resulting to social tension hence violence is triggered during general elections or referendum as experienced in 2005.

Some scholars trace structural violence back to Gandhian work on non-violence while others project it through Galtung who argues that structural violence is latent and inherent in the human society through their relationships whether formal or informal, thus only the degree vary. According to the Glossary of Terms and Concepts in Peace Studies “structural violence is embedded in social and political hierarchies—enacted most often by societies and their institutions—that impose conditions which place people at high risk for negative consequences, such as unemployment, malnutrition...and ill health.”⁷ This definition highlights the social tensions that are as a result to corruption hence providing the link between corruption and structural violence in this study. It further points to the fact that structural violence results from frameworks that societies and its institutions embrace.

The term conflict is traced back to Latin word ‘confligere’ that means to strike together. The Glossary of Terms and Concepts in Peace Studies defines conflict to mean “‘to clash

⁷Miller Christopher, *A Glossary Terms and Concepts in Peace and Conflict Studies*: University of Peace 2005, African Programme, pg 73 2nd Edition

or engage in a fight', a confrontation between one or more parties aspiring towards incompatible or competitive means or ends."⁸ The aspect of incompatibility of goals suggests that when there are limited resources there is a possibility of high competition that result into tension as the infinite human needs lead to scramble for the limited resources and only a few who can pay for them survive. For the purposes of this study the term conflict and violence will be used interchangeably.

According to Mwangi Makumi "Structural violence is where the underlying structure of relationships is unjust and inequitable; it breeds conditions of structural violence, where the weaker party suffers, even though not always visibly."⁹ This scholar presupposes that for structural violence to occur there must be an existing relationship between the party that is presumed to suffer and the party seen to be responsible for their suffering. Thus the violence is visible where power relations take centre stage and the party wielding more power gain at the expense of the less powerful. Violence is thus embedded in social relations and networks of patrons and clients that bring about the aspect of bureaucracy in service delivery. According to Andrew Mullei "these relations invade government bureaucracies, political parties and other formal organisations whose functioning consequently depends more on the hidden or non-formal patronage system than on formal rules and regulations."¹⁰ From the presiding, the patron-client relations thrive more in instances where bureaucracies does not work.

⁸ Miller Christopher, *A Glossary Terms and Concepts in Peace and Conflict Studies*: University of Peace 2005, African Programme, 2nd Edition pg 22

⁹ Mwangi Makumi, *Conflict in Africa: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, Centre for Conflict Research, Nairobi, 2006 p 15

¹⁰ Mullei Andrew, Ed, *The Link Between Poverty and Corruption: Lessons from Kenya case studies*; African Centre for Economic Growth, 2001, Nairobi, Kenya p 45

1.1 Problem statement

The issues of corruption and structural violence have been a major problem and concern in Kenya for long time. Despite its negative impact on development, scholars have continued analyse these two issues separately, rather than interlinking them. In order to resolve both structural violence and corruption phenomena, there is therefore need to study the link as a way of working out proper strategies for the two.

The impact of corruption on structural violence is of great significance to this study as it will help in examining the extent to which governance framework in Kenya has given rise to conflict. This study will seek to establish that corruption results into violence through analysing the linkages of the two. The findings of this study will therefore help policy makers, anti-corruption advocates and agencies to improve on their strategies by incorporating conflict in their study of corruption given that high levels of corruption are experienced in conflict ridden countries. The annual Corrupt Perceptions Index (CPI) by Transparency International shows a strong link between corruption and conflict. Huegette Labelle, the Chair of Transparency International says that deeply troubled states such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Myanmar, Somalia, and Sudan remain at the very bottom of the index. "Countries torn apart by conflict pay a huge toll in their capacity to govern. With public institutions crippled or non-existent, mercenary individuals help themselves

to public resources and corruption thrives.¹¹” The preceding indicates that weak governance framework is a recipe for fuelling conflict as corruption thrives.

This study will also contribute in filling the academic gap in studying violence and corruption as it will seek to answer the following questions: Does corruption create opportunity for structural violence? Does the existing governance framework of a country contribute to corruption and conflict?

1.2 Objectives

The aim of this study is to seek to determine if corruption within structures and processes of a country contributes to violence and overall weakness in the governance system. The research also aims at establishing the trends over the period 1993 and 2008.

Specific objective:

1. Assess whether corruption creates opportunity for violence,
2. Determine whether the existing governance framework in Kenya contribute to corruption and conflict,
3. Examine the trends, nature of corruption and conflict.

1.3 Literature review

1.3.1 State of corruption in Kenya 1993-2008

According to John Mbaku “the structural causes of corruption includes missing political prerequisites, patterns of dominant loyalties and obligation in the society and the degree

¹¹ Labelle Huguette, Chair of Transparency International; Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 2007 Press Release

to which government is constrained from within or from without from other centres of power.”¹² By analysing the authors’ argument we can deduce that structural causes of corruption are as a result of poor political structures, politics of nepotism, tribalism and state capture. Characteristic of structural problem in a country can then be arrived by looking at the political organisation in the country. Despite this, the anti-corruption campaign in Kenya and around the world continues to be modelled around attitude change of officials while neglecting the governance framework that the service delivery is anchored on. This underpins the argument of structural violence as that which is as a result of the ‘potential and actual.’ The potential here refers to the optimal utilisation of institutions when systems are strengthened to maximize on fulfilling the needs of the citizens, and the actual refers to the real situation on the ground when service delivery is sought.

Current literatures on corruption in Kenya are mainly focused on the nature, causes, cost of corruption, institutions perceived to be corrupt, legal gaps, and its link to poverty, but limited research looks at the linkages of corruption and conflict in Kenya. Johan Galtung argues that “violence is built up into the structure and shows up as unequal life chance.”¹³ This argument presupposes that corruption results to unequal access to resources which lead to conditions such as poverty and consequently social tension as the gap between the have and have-nots widens. Despite this, little or no research has been done to look at the two phenomena. Galtung’s argument also alludes to characteristics of

¹² Mbaku John Mukum, *Corruption in Africa: Causes, Consequences and Cleanups*, Ogden, Utah, USA Lexington Books, 2007 p 68

¹³ Galtung Johan, *Violence , Peace and Peace Research ; International Peace Research Institute, Oslo*, Pg 171

structural violence trait that states that no actual actor can be identified as the cause of conflict hence the entire governance system of the country. That the increase in corruption leads to high levels of corruption, unemployment that are evident over time implies that structural violence is taking place as no single actor can be identified as the cause, though the situation arises due to the systems in place.

1.3.2 Structural causes of violence

Structural violence proponents argue that violence is embedded in the system before it is triggered. This can be said to imply that continued cases of mega corruption, bribery, fraud, embezzlement, nepotism, are instances that trigger violence especially during, pre and post elections in Kenya. It has been argued that factors that trigger of violence in Kenya can be contained through a review of constitutional process and overhaul in government system, to provide equal access to resources and services to the citizenry.

A survey¹⁴ conducted by the government anti-corruption agency indicates that a majority of Kenyans feel that there are “certain structures and processes that are designed to abet corruption. About 43% say that such structures and processes exist and provide fertile avenues for corruption.”¹⁵ This research points out to the fact that citizens have also become aware of the governance system as pivotal in containing corruption. Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) is the body mandated to deal with corruption and economic crimes on behalf of the government. According to the law, the KACC’s

¹⁴ The National Anti-Corruption Campaign Steering Committee, **The State of Corruption in Kenya; Nairobi**

¹⁵ The National Anti-Corruption Campaign Steering Committee, **The State of Corruption in Kenya; Nairobi Pg ix**

functions are amongst others- “(e) to examine the practices and procedures of public bodies in order to facilitate the discovery of corrupt practices and to secure the revision of methods of work or procedure that, in the opinion on the Commission, may be conducive to corrupt practices;”¹⁶ This function presupposes corruption thrives in the systems and structures put in place. And in linking it to structural violence, it can be said that there is latent violence to the extent that the practices and procedures of public bodies results into creation of a gap in access to services. This stipulated function recognises that corruption can be as a result of planned structures of governance. The National Anti-Corruption Campaign Steering Committee (NACCSC) state that “corruption-whether incidental, systematic or systemic, and whether endemic or planned- has profound damaging political, social and economic effects and consequences at different levels.”¹⁷

1.3.2 Access to resources

Access to resources is amongst the major associated with corruption. This is due the fact that corruption is globally agreed to be a phenomenon that deliberately put certain part of the population at a disadvantage due to arbitrary allocation of resources to one set of people at the expense of others who often have no impetus to induce or influence official decisions. According to Andrew Mullei corruption is a major factor for poverty as it “promotes unfair distribution of income and inefficient use of resources¹⁸.” Given that corruption makes it possible for those who can pay for resources and services get

¹⁶ Republic of Kenya, **The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003**: Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 41(Acts No. 4) Government Printer, Nairobi pg 61

¹⁷The National Anti-Corruption Campaign Steering Committee, **The State of Corrunption in Kenya**: Nairobi Pg ix

¹⁸ Mullei Andrew, Ed, **The Link Between Poverty and Corruption: Lessons from Kenya case studies**,; African Centre for Economic Growth, 2001, Nairobi, Kenya p 37

preference over those who don't, they have continued to amass resources at the expense of the have-nots resulting in widening of the inequality gap.

Besides the inequality gap, it also is as a result of lack of equal access to services such as basic education enrolment, health, drugs and often employment. Access to these services play a significant role in determining the living standards of individuals due to the fact that good education provides necessary training for employment, while good health boosts life expectancy period of a society as well as reduce mortality rate.

1.3.3 Institutional gaps

Opportunities for corruption arise due to weak institutional framework. The ability of institutions to contain corruption is dependant on the legal standing of the institutions and their functions. In the case of Kenya, it has been cited that an impediment of the fight against corruption lies with the functions of the institutions and the legal framework establishing it. For example, it has been argued by analysts and the Kenya Anti Corruption Commission (KACC) that the flaw in the ability of KACC to discharge its duties lies with the fact that the institution has no prosecutors' powers to follow up on cases. This has led to calls by governance specialists to reforms involving state reconstruction, through democratic constitution making to create laws and institutions that cannot in anyway create opportunities that constrain the states and its agents. One of the functions of the Kenya Anti Corruption Commission (KACC) is explained as (f) to advise head of public bodies of changes in practice or procedures compatible with the effective discharge of the duties of such bodies that the Commission thinks necessary to reduce the likelihood of the

occurrences of corrupt practices;.¹⁹ This function implies that there are underlying institutional weakness that should be tightened to provide effective checks into the system.

The preceding thus presupposes that for corruption to occur there must be weak governance structure and either a visible or invisible actor who has been given or has taken the responsibility to carry out certain services to the public. This actor however, works under certain governance infrastructures created by a government or state. It is these infrastructures that form the structures of operation and are either categorised as latent or overt violence in the system.

Most anti-corruption reform initiatives presuppose that “a major cause of corruption in Kenya is the absence of watchdog institutions, or at any rate the inadequacy or weakness of existing watchdog institutions.”²⁰ The preceding argument implies that there are gaps in the role of watchdog institutions. The gaps include prosecutors’ powers, lack of independence to discharge duties and functions amongst others. According to Boulding Kenneth “the strength of a system involves habits, cultures, taboos and sanctions, all these things which enable a system to stand increasing strain without breaking down into violence.”²¹ The causes of corruption are thus not necessarily structural, nor are its cure in creating institutions, but it can be caused through acquired practices that are socialised into the system. Anti-corruption institutions are therefore expected to not only educate

¹⁹ Republic of Kenya, The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act. 2003: Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 41 (Acts No. 4) Government Printer, Nairobi

²⁰ Chweya Ludeki, Kithome John, Akivaga Kichamu, *Control of Corruption in Kenya: Legal-Political Dimensions 2001-2004*, CLARIPRESS Nairobi, 200, p 30

²¹ Boulding Kenneth, *Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung*, *Journal of Peace Research* No. 1. Vol. XIV/1977, University of Colorado, p84

the public about the impact of corruption, but to engage in extensive attitudinal change of the officials and the public.

1.4 Justification

After reviewing the available literature on corruption and conflict, it is evident that there is limited study on the two issues. The research will therefore, focus on the linkages between corruption and conflict, and seek to address the impact of corruption on conflict in Kenya.

This study will not only address important issues on corruption and conflict, but it will seek to fill an important research gap that is currently missing. The findings of this research can therefore, be used to compliment the existing anti-corruption policy in Kenya where, like other African countries violence cycle is witnessed regularly when governance institutions are exposed to contested general elections and political transitions. It will also fill in the missing academic gap as well as seek to establish if there is a link between corruption and the rising vigilante groups in Kenya.

The justifications above will help in studying the structural link between levels of corruption and effectiveness of governance institutions in containing conflict in Kenya. A research of this nature will thus help policymakers in international institutions understand why the rise in reports of corruption go hand in hand with increasing reports of violence and conflict in Kenya. It will seek to answer the following questions; does corruption

eliminates or creates opportunity for conflict? Does the existing governance framework in a Kenya contribute to conflict?

The period of the study 1993-2008 is important to the study as it marks the era when the language of transparency and accountability took hold in governance. At the same time, corruption scandals such as Goldenberg were hatched and exposed , and vigilante groups such as mungiki allegedly formed at the beginning of this time to protest against the allegedly government seclusion of the youth in development programmes.

1.5 Theoretical Frameworks

The phenomenon of corruption and conflict have been analysed using various frameworks. It is however, worth noting that the causal relationship between the two has not been studied. This study will highlight a few frameworks that have been applied and apply the most appropriate in the view of this study.

1.5.1 Economic theories of corruption

The economic theorist approach corruption from the perspective of ‘rent-seeking.’ According to Brian Cooksey “rents are the return to natural or artificially created scarcity.”²² This implies that there is always an economic gain for engaging in corruption by controlling basic essential services to the public. He further argues that “corruption as seen from economics perspective takes place where opportunities and discretion are

²²Cooksey Brian, Mulei Andrew, Mwabu Germano, in *The Link Between Corruption and Poverty: Lessons from Kenya Case Studies*, Edited by Mulei Andrew; The African Centre for Economic Growth, Nairobi, Kenya 2001 Mulei p 44

prevalent, for example where there is availability of rent and where government controls provide the scope for earning profits from rent seeking.”²³ This underscores the fact that most Kenyans pay bribes for basic service; such as school, water, electricity, employment amongst others. According to the Kenya Bribery Index²⁴ 45% of respondents paid bribes in 2008 to speed up access to services, compared to 29% in 2007. This occurred in places where the demand is high and private individuals have been granted discretion to provide similar services which are often guaranteed than in the government agencies where the services are presumed to be free. This theory though linking corruption and inequality, it does not provide adequate framework for analysing violence as it looks at the economic aspect alone.

1.5.2 Social environment of disequilibrium

This theory looks at corruption from a social relation context. According to Kivutha Kibwana, “social environment of disequilibrium²⁵ is a theoretical premise that has been used to analyse corruption in Kenya. “A social environment of disequilibrium comes into existence the moment access to resources, power and authority becomes contestable and when such a situation becomes institutionalized by social hierarchies whose function is to sustain such inequality by providing the necessary institutional, cultural, political, economic and legal frameworks.”²⁶ The theory argues that corruption results from eruption of individual self attribute. Corruption thus is attributed to norms of a society and governance framework.

²³ Ibid p 45

²⁴ Transparency International-Kenya; Kenya Bribery Index 2008, Nairobi, pg 12

²⁵ Kibwana Kivutha et al, (ed), *The Anatomy of Corruption in Kenya: Legal; Political and Socio-Economic Perspectives*, Centre for Law and Research International (CLARION), Nairobi, 1996, p 138

²⁶ Ibid p 138

According to British Journal of Sociology, “corruption is embedded in social relations and networks of patrons and clients. These relationships invade government bureaucracies, political parties, and other formal organisations whose functioning consequently depends more on the hidden or non-formal patronage system than formal rules and regulation.”²⁷ It is evident from the above that sociologists provide a clear framework for studying the power struggles that led to red tape and corruption. A survey carried out concluded that most Kenyans believed that most corruption results from the designed process in accessing services. Asked which structures and processes are designed to abet corruption the most mentioned is the process...²⁸ It can thus be argued that many Kenyans engage in acts of corruption and bribery to circumvent bureaucracy and save time by expediting the process through ‘facilitation fees.’ What efficiency argument proponents overlook is the fact that more often than not, the inefficiencies and irritating red tape exist by design, not by accident, and that its removal is not simply a paper exercise.²⁹

This theory can thus be used to look into conflict in as far as it is about power relations in a society, limiting its capability to study instances of conflict in contested elections, conflict as a result of social tensions that lead to formation of vigilante groups amongst others. This theory does not therefore, provide a strong framework to analyse the underlying power relations that result to conflict.

²⁷ Ibid p 45

²⁸ The National Anti-Corruption Campaign Steering Committee, *The State of Corruption in Kenya*; Nairobi pg 53

²⁹ Githongo John in , *The Link Between Corruption and Poverty: Lessons from Kenya Case Studies*, Edited by Mulei Andrew; The African Centre for Economic Growth, Nairobi, Kenya 2001 Mulei pg 3

1.5.3 National Integrity System

According to this concept corruption is hinged on asymmetrical system of checks and balance in the structures of service delivery mostly in public and also in private sector. According to the concept, a national integrity system encompasses the agents of the state, the private sector, civil society and the citizens. The concept of national integrity system is developed by Transparency International to examine the link between corruption and governance framework in a country.

The concept does not however look at the underlying structural relationships outside the system, but the roles that each pillar plays. It is therefore inadequate in examining the impact of corruption on violence. The national integrity system is a concept that is currently being applied in the fight against corruption in Kenya today by the Kenyan Chapter of Transparency International and the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission. This concept is inadequate in studying violence as it is limited to the roles of various governance institutions.

1.5.4. Structural violence theory

Having studied the above frameworks that have been used to analyse corruption and conflict, this study will approach its research using the structural violence theory. The theory of structural violence is traced back to Gandhian work on non-violence and projected by Galtung who argues that structural violence is latent and inherent in the human society through their relationships whether formal or informal, thus only the degree vary. The theory not only looks at violence as a cycle that evolves in different

stages from latent, to overt, but it provides a framework for studying corruption as it defines violence through manifestations of corruption such as unemployment, poverty, ill health amongst others

This theory further categorises violence to be either of latent or personal violence which according to Galtung supposes that “there is situation of unstable equilibrium where the level of actual realization is not sufficiently protected against deterioration by upholding mechanism.”³⁰ The upholding mechanism in this case can be deduced to mean the governance framework or system of a country. Corruption like conflict is as a result of symmetry or asymmetry in power, influence, or awareness. This means that the parties involved can either be of similar strength such as corruption trade between politicians and private sector, or of varying strength such as corruption between a public official and a citizen. Galtung further argues that “structural violence is...used to threaten people into subordination: if you do not behave, we shall have to reintroduce all disagreeable structures we had before.”³¹ This implies that due to the power relations at play, those who are not willing find it difficult to access certain services and resources, and while they attempt to blow the whistle they might find themselves worse off. For example in 1993 the Goldenberg whistleblower Mr. David Muniyakei was sacked from his job at the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) after it was discovered that he is the one who blew the whistle. Muniyakei’s life got threatened several times forcing him to change his identity

³⁰ Galtung Johan, Violence, Peace, and Peace Research in Journal of Peace Research,(International Peace Research Institute ,Oslo, 1969-)pg 172

³¹ Galtung Johan, Violence, Peace, and Peace Research in Journal of Peace Research,(International Peace Research Institute ,Oslo, 1969-)pg 172

and resettle in a new town. In essence Munyakei rocked the boat and the system sought to reprimand him.

According to Galtung, Violence is that which increases the distance between the potential and the actual, and that which impedes the decrease of this distance.³² Proponents of anti-corruption have unanimously agreed that corruption results into economic, social and political disadvantages of governance institutional structures. This leads to unequal access to service delivery, justice, employment opportunities amongst others.

The causes of corruption in Kenya have been attributed to poverty, unemployment, inequality, nepotism, information asymmetry amongst others that have attributes to the definition of structural conflict as they impose conditions that place people at a high risk of negative consequences. As a result, President Kibaki's administration passed many anti-corruption laws, and signed other international and regional legislation. To this effect Kenya has about seven³³ institutions mandated to fight corruption, and over three³⁴ laws that have been passed by parliament to contain corruption. Contrary, cases of corruption scandals and reports have continued to rise unlike in the Moi regime where there was no active law on corruption and equal violence was experienced. The question then is, does the governance framework of Kenya create opportunity for corruption and violence?

³² Galtung Johan, Violence, Peace ,and Peace Research in Journal of Peace Research,(International Peace Research Institute ,Oslo, 1969-)pp167- 191

³³ Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission(KACC), National Anti-Corruption Campaign Steering Committee (NACCSC), Attorney General's Office, Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs, Anti-Corruption offices in all ministries, Public Complaints Office, Public Prosecutor's Office

³⁴ Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, Public Officer Ethics Act, Public Audit Act, and Public Procurement and Disposal Act

Following Johan Galtung's argument on structural violence it is evident that this theory will help in analysing both corruption and violence phenomena in Kenya. Galtung provides a link between the two when he defines structural violence as that violence is built up a one structure when there is unequal life chance. Violence can be exercised even if there is no concrete actor one can point to directly

1.6 Hypothesis

1. Corruption in a governance framework creates opportunity for violence
2. Countries with high levels of corruption are more likely to have conflict
3. Lack of common understanding on corruption is likely to lead to unsuccessful anti-corruption initiatives

1.7 Methodology of the research

1.7.1 Design of the Study

The research study to be undertaken will examine the impact of corruption on conflict and will thus adopt descriptive and analytical research. Analysis on the study will be obtained face-to-face interviews, discussions and talks with anti-corruption and conflict studies specialists. The secondary data available will be used to reinforce descriptive nature of the phenomenon. This will be done through library research, internet search and literature on anti-corruption and conflict. It is hoped that this will help in establishing the nexus between corruption, governance framework and conflict in Kenya.

1.7.2 Population sample

Since it is not possible to study the entire governance structure of Kenya due to time and financial constraints, 56 state and none state institutions were selected and used to establish the parameters that were then used to generalize the governance structure of Kenya. The population of interest in this study includes both state and non-state anticorruption institutions, and individual advocates interested in anti-corruption and conflict work in Kenya. Which include state institutions (47),³⁵ international organisation (3),³⁶ regional organisations (3)³⁷ local organisation (2) and whistleblowers? These works includes publishing of perception indices, bribery experience indices, cost of corruption, attitudes on corruption, and conflict studies amongst others.

1.7.3 Data collection procedures

From the target population of 55 institutions, the research will draw sample using stratified random sampling. Different ratios will be taken as shown below.

Table 1.7.3

Category of anti-corruption and conflict studies institution	Target population	Sample	Ratio
State institutions	45 institutions	21	70%
International institutions	3	2	7%
Regional institutions	3	2	7%
Local organisations	2	5	16%
TOTAL	53	30	100%

³⁵ Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC), Ministry of Justice, Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs, Attorney General's Office, Anti-Corruption offices in 43 ministries, Public Complaints Office, and Public Prosecutor's Office.

³⁶ Transparency International, World Bank, United Nations

³⁷ African Union, Africa Centre for Open Governance (AfriCOG), African Parliamentarians Network Against Corruption (APNAC)

The categorisation of institutions advocating for anti-corruption as state, non-state, international, regional and local will ensure that all views are collected and balanced in the study.

Data collection will be done through the use of semi-structured questionnaires that have open –ended and closed questions. In cases where the responded will not adequately give clear answers, face-to face interviews will be arranged. In his instances the same questionnaire will be used as a guide.

Data collection will be preceded by making of personal contacts with all relevant respondents through email, and phone and provision of introduction letter from the University to clarify the use of information from the respondents.

1.7.4 Data analysis procedures

The data collected will be interpreted and analysed through various mediums. Descriptive statistics such as tables, graphs, and charts will be used.

1.8 Scope and limitation of the research

The study faces some constraints due to the following factors:

1.8.1 Conceptual

Literature review indicates that there are varied definitions of corruption hence inadequate theory to explain it. This will be a challenge in arguing out the research. On

the other hand, conflict has not been adequately incorporated in anti-corruption literatures and studies.

1.8.2 Suspicion

Anti-corruption work is political and clouded with suspicion hence it will be difficult to convince all actors to respond to the interviews.

1.8.3 Finance

This will limit the travel to parts outside Nairobi and Kenya, hence international actors not represented in Nairobi will be left out.

CHAPTERS OUTLINE

Chapter one: Introduction

This chapter laid ground for study by looking and the concepts of corruption and structural violence. It also captures literature review segment into the study.

Chapter 2: Contextualising corruption and violence in Kenya

This chapter will look at events leading to the introduction of the term transparency accountability and good governance in relations of states. It will study the trends of corruption and violence in Kenya following the period and the civil society reform agenda and general elections of since the year1992.

Chapter 3: Impact of corruption on structural violence in Kenya

The chapter will look at the effects of corruption that result to violence and highlight examples in Kenya and African.

Chapter 4: Data analysis and interpretation

This chapter will involve preparations of research questionnaires in line with the subject of study. It will also involve administration and analysis of the questionnaires and interviews.

Chapter 5 Summary of findings Conclusions and recommendations

This chapter will present the research findings from the sample population and present analysis. It will look at whether this research approves or disapproves the hypothesis.

CHAPTER TWO

CONTEXTUALISING CORRUPTION AND VIOLENCE IN KENYA

2.0 Introduction

The period of this study marks a significant turn-around in the history of Kenya. This is because in 1993 the country was coming out of the first multiparty elections and experience of increased democracy in governance. This is the period when the *de jure* one party state KANU gave-in into the constitutional amendment to allow for democracy, and free and fair elections. “At the time Kenya was experiencing multiparty elections, the constitution had been amended 30 times since the Republic was formed in December 1964.”³⁸ The piecemeal constitutional amendments were done to provide a system of check and balance to overarching Executive influence in management of public resources, and cases of political corruption. It is also in 1993 that the multi-billion Goldenberg corruption scandal was unearthed. According to Transparency International-Kenya’s Fools Gold “the clincher that Goldenberg was exporting nothing and was therefore being given free public money was found in the 1993 Kenya Economic Survey.”³⁹ The Minister claimed that Goldenberg had already earned KSh9.4 billion, invaluable foreign exchange and the money received by the Central Bank. He maintained that there was no evidence of fraud in Goldenberg deals.”⁴⁰

Goldenberg has been termed as the biggest economic scandal in the history of Kenya. The scandal not only robbed the tax payer, but also led to loss of employment to the

³⁸ Country Watch; Kenya 2004 Country Review; <http://www.countrywatch.com> pg 9

³⁹ Transparency International-Kenya; Fool’s Gold: Abuse of Export Compensation Schemes in Kenya and Argentina; Feb 24, 2003, Nairobi <http://www.tikenya.org/documents/FoolsGold.pdf>-accessed 2nd Feb, 2010)

⁴⁰ Ibid pg 18

whistleblower Mr. David Munyakei, who worked as a clerk at the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK). The turn of events that followed the unearthing of the scandal draws parallel to the impact of corruption and structural violence in as far as Mr. Munyakei's life changed for the worse. Mr. Munyakei was dismissed from work and his life threatened following the scandal. He had to run for his life and change his identity. Poverty and poor man's diseases became part of lifestyle. By the time Transparency International awarded him the 2004 Integrity Award, he was desolate, suspicious and full of regrets for blowing the whistle on a scandal that he said left people treating him with apprehension, while the corrupt system remained intact.

The 1990s also marks the entry of the terms corruption, transparency, accountability and good governance in international relations. According to Ann Eliot Kimberly "this decade is the first to witness the emergence of corruption as a truly global political issue eliciting a global political response. Since 1992 half-dozen or more international organizations-governmental and non-governmental- have energetically taken up the question."⁴¹ Herald Suzette asserts that "the new ideas of 'good governance' were put in effect; most particularly, the demand that economic aid be tied to the process of democratization, liberalization of the economy, and effective control over corruption."⁴² It is during this period that we also witness the mushrooming non-state anti-corruption initiatives in Kenya⁴³ to tackle what had been

⁴¹ Ann Elliott Kimberly (eds) ; Corruption and The Global Economy; Institute for International Economics Washington, DC, June 1997,pg 8

⁴² Herald Suzette; State, Law, and Vigilantism in Northern Tanzania, African Affairs, 105/ 419, Oxford University Press, 2005 pg 278

⁴³ Transparency International was founded in Kenya in 1993 by former World Bank Country Director Peter Eigen and Dr. J.B Wanjui, Joe Githongo amongst others.

entrenched to governance principles by powerful regional and inter-state monetary institutions as the donor conditions on anti-corruption reform took shape. “For developing countries, anti-corruption thus became a key measure for access to aid and North-South bilateral engagements. Corruption is no longer a local matter but a translational phenomenon that affects all societies and economies, making International Corporation to prevent and control it essential.”⁴⁴

Conflict is another common feature in governing of African states. Given that conflict and corruption are seemingly permanent features in Africa International Relations, the two terms have informally been entrenched in the measure of good governance. Various corruption indices have shown a correlation between levels of corruption and conflict in Africa. For example Africa countries like Somalia and Sudan that have been ranked poorly in the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index also exude obvious violence in the country. “With countries such as Somalia and Iraq among those showing the highest levels of perceived corruption, Transparency International’s (TI) 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), ... highlights the fatal link between poverty, failed institutions and graft⁴⁵ .

This thus reinforces the argument that corruption impacts on structural violence in a governance system. This happens as a result of weak governance framework that makes it possible to challenge institutional independence leading to permeation of state’s

⁴⁴ Bukovansky Mlada; The Hollowness of Anti-Corruption Discourse; Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (May, 2006), pg 188 , Taylor & Francis, Ltd. : <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25124069> accessed: 17/02/2010 06:35

⁴⁵ Transparency International; Press Release: Corruption Perceptions Index ,2008, 23 rd September, 2008, Berlin

monopoly of violence. As a result small-arms infiltrate a country and law and order becomes a reserve of those who can bribe their way through. Consequently, structural violence is experienced and is often triggered during an election or when political leaders openly disagree on national issues.

This chapter will therefore look at the events that led to repealing of Section 2A of the constitution, the general elections, governance and the rise of vigilante groups vis-à-vis corruption.

2.1 Constitution

Several scholars have argued that the “rationale for curbing corruption is now almost always buttressed by an institutional rationale, which rests on the need to secure separation of powers, accountability and transparency in government (Klitgarrd, 1998; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Theobald, 1990).⁴⁶ Keeping in mind the supremacy of entrenching governance in the law of the land, the civil society in Kenya started in earnest to engage in constitutional review discussions to pressurise the government to allow multiparty. These events are amongst those that led to the piecemeal amendment and repeal of the Kenyan Constitution. The events leading to repealing of Sec 2A and consequent calls for a constitutional review best describes Kenya as a poorly structured governance framework. Cry for constitutional reform to right the wrongs that have been

⁴⁶ Bukovansky Mlada; *The Hollowness of Anti-Corruption Discourse; Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (May, 2006), pg 195 , Taylor & Francis, Ltd. : <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25124069> accessed: 17/02/2010 06:35

inflicted on Kenyans due to poor law that creates structures and systems for inequity, inequality and repression point to structural deficiency in the governance framework.

The year 1993 is one of the significant post elections period in Kenya. This is the period preceding the first multiparty elections in Kenya after the repeal of Section 2 of the Constitution that had Kenya as a *de jure* one –party state. This was the first multi-party elections in Kenya and it signified liberal aspect of electioneering that provided an aspect of freewill. According to Patrick Mutahi ‘the constitutional review process was ...hinged on the need to establish a governance system that would derive from, and respond directly to the wishes, needs and aspirations of the people of Kenya. A governance system that would sustain not only the welfare and wellbeing of the people but also guarantee national unity, peace and stability’’ (2004: 12)⁴⁷

The preceding point to the fact that the corruption, violence and the spill-over effects can be contained when the law is enacted to define, prohibited, and penalised corruption, and its impact on structural violence. It also point to the argument that it is fundamental for a country to enact laws that not only provide an environment for peaceful co-existence, but also ensures that corruption is contained. The constitution is thus the precursor for containing corruption and violence not only in Kenya, but in any country. This is due to the fact that it provides the operational framework for governing a country.

⁴⁷ See Mutahi Patrick ; Manipulating the Constitution in Katumanga Musambayi and Mitullah Winnie (eds); The Moi Succession Elections 2002, East African Monographs No 2, An IFRA Series, Transafrika Press, Nairobi pg 28

But the Constitutional review process has not been easy. In 2005, the Constitutional Referendum was defeated by 57% votes against 43%.⁴⁸ Violent confrontations were also experienced between the Yes (Banana) supporters and No (Orange) supporters, and about “9 people were killed”.⁴⁹ Currently, a second attempt by the Committee of Experts (COE) to give Kenyans another constitution is already threatened with emerging political differences that have been claimed are meant to ‘derail’ the process. Pundits already predict similar or worse confrontations as in the 2005 Constitutional Referendum and 2007 post elections violence.

2.2 General Elections

2.2.1 Multiparty elections

The impact of corruption on violence in Kenya and globally is often depicted by the experience leading to the run-up to a general elections. General elections in a country have been instrumental in testing a country’s institutional check and balances as well as the extent to which officials in those institutions can be compromised. In analyzing British and United States of America election, Seymour and Frary (1918) concludes that "by... 1715 violence and intimidation were regarded as the most effective means of winning votes... . By 1776 the use of violence seems to have become a recognized political maneuver and elections in the larger constituencies were characterized by hosts of hired ruffians and bludgeon men." According to Ashish Chaturvedi, in the United States, “the Hayes-Tilden election of 1876 almost led to a national crisis. The election

⁴⁸ Kenya Referendum; www.kenya-advisor.com/kenya-referendum.html-

⁴⁹ Ibid

results were dubious in four states and violence was a factor in three.”⁵⁰ Back to Kenya for example, the claims of rigging in the disputed 2007 general elections between Party of National Unity (PNU) candidate Mwai Kibaki and Orange Democratic Movement’s (ODM) Raila Odinga were all attributed to collapsed governance framework. For example, the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) is allegedly claimed to have been compromised through the Executive appointments of Commissioners, thus its Chairman Mr. Samuel Kivuitu succumbed to pressure and announced a winner in highly disputed elections. The judiciary also came under scrutiny after the ODM candidate Hon. Raila Odinga snubbed judicial intervention arguing it was compromised and Kenyans had already lost their faith in it. The contestation of state power is therefore marred with incidents of violence that lead to loss of life and displacements of communities.

In Kenya, as elsewhere where political contestations determine who wields power, violence is been predominant in pre-elections campaign, voting process and post general elections. This has been due to; unbalanced access to resources between the incumbent and opposition, manipulations of voter registration exercise by politicians, control of media coverage and tallying process during the elections.

In seeking to deal with this, Kenya enacted a Political Parties Finance Act, 2007. This law will compel the state to finance opposition parties’ depending on number of seats garnered during an election.

⁵⁰ Chaturvedi Ashish; Rigging Elections with Violence, Public Choice, Vol. 125, No. 1/2 (Oct., 2005), pp. 189, Springer : <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30026660> Accessed: 17/02/2010 06:42

2.2.2 Electoral violence

Electoral violence in Kenya has been a permanent feature since the attainment of independence. The 1992 elections saw the open use of violence in killing, intimidation and displacing of communities perceived as opposition supporters. According to Patrick Mutahi “the violence, which began in late 1991, came after KANU, the ruling party, reluctantly agreed to repeal section 2A of the Constitution, which prohibited the establishment of other political parties except KANU, hence allowing the formation of many parties in the country.”⁵¹ The advent of multiparty elections was thus seen as a fundamental ingredient in increasing democracy and dealing with underlying impediment to free and fair electoral processes. Multiparty elections did not, however, quell the violence associated with general election in Kenya. Instead, it exacerbates the violence where citizens in certain regions were intimidated and maimed in order to vote for the incumbent. Patrick Mutahi says that “between 1991 and 1993, there were about 250,000 displacements, associated with some 1,000 murders arising from ethnic tension.”⁵²

The 1997 general elections saw renewed calls for comprehensive constitutional reforms in Kenya. The government, however, promised to facilitate this after the elections. As a result, the Inter-Party Parliamentary Group (IPPG) was established and the Constitution of Kenya Review Amendment Act, 1998 was enacted to initiate constitutional reforms. This process paved way to the establishment of the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC) that later collated Kenyans view of the constitutional process.

⁵¹ See Mutahi Patrick ; Political Violence in the Election in Maupeu Herve', Katumanga Musambayi and Mitullah Winnie (eds); The Moi Succession Elections 2002, East African Monographs No 2, An IFRA Series, Transafrica Press, Nairobi pg 69

⁵² Ibid pg 16

Amongst all the electoral violence experienced in Kenya, the 2007 post election violence seemed to have shaken the country as almost all communities were up in arms against each other, and ancient regional boundaries were drawn as hubs for specific communities. Immigrant communities were forced out of certain regions following the disputed elections. According to Wikipedi “in 2007 about 800-15000 people were killed and 180,000-250,000⁵³ presumably displaced as a result of the post elections violence. The violence was equated to genocide as it was argued there was deliberate attempt to eliminate certain communities from certain regions. To-date the lull is still a delicate trigger that has been highlighted whenever a political impasse is sensed.

The above arguments thus point to the link between democracy and constitutional structures. By deduction it can be argued that multiparty elections in Kenya cannot be free and fair unless the Constitution is amended and necessary structures put in place. These structures will be important as they will be anchored in the supreme law of the land – the Constitution.

2.3 Corruption trends in Kenya

Despite making milestones in the Constitutional review process by repealing Section 2A, the issues of corruption continued to plague the Moi regime leading to a freezing of aid which only resumed after the first multiparty elections in 1993.

⁵³Wikipedi, the Free Encyclopaedia; 2007-2008: Kenyan Crisis http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007-2008_Kenyan_crisis. Accessed Feb, 22 2010 accessed at 2.35pm

2.3. Anti-corruption policies

2.3.1 Institutions created to fight corruption

The enactment of anti-corruption laws in Kenya dates back to 1956⁵⁴ when the Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap. 65) came into effect. This was followed by eight amendments to the Act between 1956 and 1991 to allow for criminal sanctions against graft. In 1993 an Anti-Corruption Squad was formed, but later disbanded in 1995 under dubious circumstances. The Kenya Anti- Corruption Authority (KACA) was thereafter formed in 1997 following the amendment of cap 65. This was, however, short-lived as the Kenya Anti- Corruption Authority was later declared unconstitutional and disbanded in the year 2000. It is worth noting that KACA was disbanded two years before the general election, an indication of no political will to fight corruption to the extent that there was no body that could legally capture cases political corruption in the run- up to the general elections.

The 2002 general elections were campaigned on the platform of reform and anti-corruption by the opposition. Given the increased allegations of corruption in President Moi's administration, uneven regional development, cases of nepotism, tribalism, ethnicity and the ghost of Goldenberg Scandal, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) crafted its 2002 elections campaign on the agenda of reform and anti-corruption. "The National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) headed by President Mwai Kibaki defeated the then incumbent party, the Kenya National Union (KANU) in the national general elections held in December 2002 largely because KANU had

⁵⁴ Kantai Parselelo, Mati Mwalimu; After KACA What Next?; Transparency International-Kenya, 2001 http://www.tikenya.org/documents/KACA_report_final.pdf Pg 6

become a byword for chronic high-level corruption. NARC, sensing the anti-corruption mood prevailing in the country, promised the electorate that, if elected, it would mount an uncompromising clean-up crusade - a policy which proved highly popular with the electorate. The abuse of public office for private gain would, emphasise NARC, be met by zero-tolerance.’⁵⁵

The outcomes of the elections were not disappointing as the NARC party had won the elections and the ‘corrupt’ Moi regime shown the door. With the landslide win against KANU, NARC embarked on laying ground for reform and anti-corruption agenda in 2003. The anti-corruption momentum was steered by the recruitment of Mr. John Githongo⁵⁶, the founding Executive Director of Transparency International-Kenya, as the Permanent Secretary (PS) for Governance. The PS acted as the governance advisor to President Kibaki. Several institutions were created and other revived to tackle the monster called corruption.

2.3.2 The cost of bribe in Kenya

The signal by the NARC administration to deal with corruption persuaded Kenyans to take civic responsibility and arrest traffic policemen and public officials who

⁵⁵ Timamy. Khalil M.H ; African Leaders and Corruption; Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 32, No. 104/105, Oiling the Wheels of Imperialism (Jun. - Sep., 2005), pg. 389, Taylor & Francis, Ltd. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4007080>, Accessed: 17/02/2010 06:46

⁵⁶ Mr. Githongo is the founding Executive Director of Transparency International-Kenya. He served as the Governance Advisor to President Kibaki until 2007 when he resigned. Mr. Githongo did not return to Kenya following an official visit with the then Director of KACC Justice Aaron Ringera, when he made a stop-over in UK and rendered his resignation while there. Mr. Githongo later released a damning tape on BBC International implicating the then Justice and Constitutional Affairs Minister Hon. Kiraitu Murungi and the Finance Minister Hon. David Mwiraria urging him go slow on the fight against corruption, and have his fathers loan cancelled by he government. Mr. Githongo later worked with UK Journalist Mitchell Wrong in writing the book ‘our Turn to eat’


demanded for bribes. It is during this time that “Gallup International⁵⁷ rated Kenyans as the most optimistic people on earth where 77% feel 2003 will be a better year than 2002”. By this time the government had pronounced zero-tolerance anti-corruption policy. “But within a year and four months of assuming power, the NARC government became dogged by embarrassing disclosures that a number of highly placed government officials and ministers were party to grave corruption scandals involving hundreds of millions of dollars. The most infamous was the Anglo Leasing corruption scam.”⁵⁸ Anglo Leasing has been the buttress hanging on the NARC administration since the damning revelations by John Githongo on how government Ministers tried to persuade him to ‘go slow’ on corruption cases.

In general, when the government took no action on implicated officers, the public confidence waned and corruption became a way of life as demands for bribes shot up as depicted in the table below.

⁵⁷ Gallup International End of Year Poll January, 2003-Kosovo not the most Optimistic country in the World anymore, www.indexkosovo.com/Publications/Pub_jan03.html

⁵⁸ Timamy. Khalil M.H ; African Leaders and Corruption; Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 32, No. 104/105, Oiling the Wheels of Imperialism (Jun. - Sep., 2005), pg. 390, Taylor & Francis, Ltd. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4007080>, Accessed: 17/02/2010 06:46

Table 1.0⁵⁹ showing the size of bribe in Kenya 2001-2005



Source Author, (2009)

The table above shows the bribery trend in Kenya as captured by the Transparency International-Kenya's bribery index. The period of interest is the year 2003 where the current Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) took office and anti-corruption was elevated as a government policy. The period is captured as in the Kenya Bribery Index of 2004 were Kenyans experiences with bribery dropped significantly to ksh 4,000 from ksh 4,500, and ksh 8,000 in 2002 and 2001 respectively.

⁵⁹ The table shows the Kenya Bribery Index (KBI) scores for cost of bribe demanded from Kenyans between 2002- 2006. The index captures experiences of Kenyans with corruption and is captured one year in retrospect. Thus 2004 reflect the period in 2003. The Kenya Urban Bribery Index (KUBI), as it was formally known first done to study magnitude of bribery in Kenya's urban set-up with objective, captured actual incidences of bribery as experienced by Kenya It was also meant to monitor the estimate, magnitude, incidence and direct financial cost of bribery in Kenya . In 2004 the index was later expanded to include both urban and rural set-up and was called Kenya Bribery Index (KBI). In 2008 Transparency International-Kenya partnered with other East African states and they currently publish the index as East Africa Bribery Index.

In 2006 index (capturing 2005) Kenyans were paying half the bribe they paid in previous years. However, in 2004 as captured in the year 2005 index, the cost of bribery went up to ksh 5,000 due to loss of confidence in the NARC administration to deal with corruption.

In mid- January 2003, the Kenyan National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) government announced plans for a new anti-corruption commission.⁶⁰ The Public Officer Ethics Acts, 2003 was also enacted to elaborate mechanisms under which civil servants, hitherto perceived to be corrupt would not only declare their wealth, but account for it. To-date, the wealth declaration forms have never been made public, an oxymoron to the logic behind the process. Despite this, junior government officials continue to fill in wealth declarations forms, failure to which salaries are discontinued⁶¹.

2.3.3 Corruption perceptions in Kenya


As the levels of bribe swayed down and shot up again, so did the perceived levels of corruption in the country. The zero-tolerance policy saw the perception on corruption go down by 0.2 points in 2004, a reflection of 2003 as the index is captured two years in retrospect.

⁶⁰ Ibid pg 21

⁶¹ Interview with a public servant to sought anonymity

However, when the governance institutions failed to tackle corruption the incidence of manifestations of corruption in Kenya continued to deteriorate in the period of study, as shown in the graph below, while it is seemingly improved in Uganda and Tanzania.

Table 1.2⁶²



Source Author, (2009)

According to the 2008 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) Kenya's score remains constant at 2.1 since the year 2006. This is the highest score attained since post Moi era of zero tolerance policy to corruption. In 2002 and 2003, Kenya's score was 1.9. It improved by 0.2 in 2004 to attain a 2.1 score, which later slide to 2.0 in 2005. This shows a consistent trend not any different from that experienced during the Moi era. The trend can imply that given the establishment of specialized anti-corruption institutions and

⁶² The table shows the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores for Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania 1995-2008

Kenya's corruption perceptions abroad, it can be deduced that corruption in Kenya is more structural and systemic hence lack of decrease in post Moi NARC's anti-corruption administration and the current Coalition government.

In 1998 Kenya scored 2.5, the highest score attained so far. This can be alluded to the signal sent by President Moi that corruption was a high risk when he fired his then Vice President (VP) Prof. George Saitoti and was left without a VP for over one year period. According to Shleifer and Vishny "penalizing for corruption changes the level of the bribe..., but does not change the essence of the problem."⁶³ Between 1999 and 2001 Kenya score was 2, 2.1 and 2 out of 10 respectively. The preceding indicate that anti-corruption laws or not, the perceptions of business investors and international non-state actors has remained almost the same on Kenya. The results suggest that "the first step to reduce corruption should be to create an accounting system that prevents theft from government."⁶⁴ Consequently, investor confidence waned as corruption increased the cost of doing business in the country and foreign companies relocated to Uganda and Tanzania.

2.4 Vigilante groups

The trend in corruption and more open political ground also saw a trend in emergence of vigilante groups to counter the increased ethnic violence and insecurity in Kenya. The vigilantes were formed to consolidate socio-economic, political and ethnic power to

⁶³ Shleifer Andrei; Vishny W Robert, Corruption, JSTOR: The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, No. 3. (Aug., 1993), pg 604

⁶⁴ Ibid pg 604

address the challenges facing local communities. The mushrooming of vigilantes in Kenya is traced back to the 1990s when Kenya's economy was dwindling and employment and access to service delivery was pegged into the political support the region had given the incumbent. The largest and oldest vigilante group in Kenya is said to be the mungiki group. In studying vigilantes in Guatemala, Angeline Godey argues that the level of crime in a country is commensurate to the character and quality of life of a society. Similar studies in South Africa also indicated that the fact that the youth are actively involved in such groups tells a lot about the demography of a society. According to Ruteere, "from 1991 to 1994 when state sponsored ethnic violence swept through the Rift-Valley targeting Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, Kisii and other opposition-leaning communities, the mungiki found itself with a large pool of displaced people from which it recruited"⁶⁵its members. In addition to the above, vigilantes groups cropped up in Kenya as a mechanism to shield communities from politically instigated violence of the 1990's.

The rise of vigilante groups has been significant in the run up to general elections in Kenya. According to Ruteere Mutuma, "the mungiki movement crept into public attention in Kenya in 1992 through press reports of arrest and prosecution of youth for illegal oath taking against the government of President Daniel arap Moi"⁶⁶ In the run up to the 2002 elections mungiki was also instrumental in as far as it publicly declared its support for the KANU candidate Hon. Uhuru Kenyatta. Besides mungiki, other political

⁶⁵ Ruteere Mutuma; Dilemmas of rimes, Human Rights, and the Politics of Mungiki Violence in Kenya , Kenya Human Rights Institute 2008, Nairobi , pg 8

⁶⁶Ibid pg 6

parties were also identified with certain vigilante groups such as Chinkororo in Kisii regions, Baghdad boys in Huruma and kibera slums in Nairobi well as Luo Nyanza amongst others. “In March 2002, the Police Commissioner outlawed vigilante groups and private armies known to exist in the country. The groups were: Mungiki; Taliban ; Jeshi la Embakassi; Baghdad Boys; Sungu Sungu, Amachuma; Chinkororo; Dallas Muslim Youth; Runyenjes Football Club; Jeshi la King’ole; Kaya Bombo Youth; Sakina Youth; Kuzacha Boys; Kamjesh; Charo Shutu; Sri Lanka; and Bayamulenge. Most of the banned groups were linked to politicians from both KANU and opposition who used them to settle political scores. The groupings, however, continued to exist informally and were to feature prominently in the electioneering period.”⁶⁷

Vigilante groups in Kenya are allegedly funded by powerful politicians who are claimed to have taken oaths. In 2003, officials of the new government were quoted in the Kenyan press as having worked out “an agreement with mungiki to keep peace in return for government non-interference in their peaceful activities”⁶⁸

The run up to the 2007 general elections saw adverse mentions of mungiki in the violence and killings witnessed in slum areas in Kenya. “In the second half of 2007, media accounts continued to point to the growing influence of the movement in the control of basic services such as water and security in the slum settlement in Nairobi.”⁶⁹ The 2007 post election violence is allegedly said to have been catalysed by the involvement of the

⁶⁷ Ibid pg 74

⁶⁸ Ruteere Mutuma; Dilemmas of rimes, Human Rights, and the Politics of Mungiki Violence in Kenya , Kenya Human Rights Institute 2008, Nairobi , pg 19

⁶⁹ Ibid pg 7

mungiki sponsored violence in the country. According to Ruteere, “the outbreak of violence following the disputed December,2007 General Elections in Kenya, thrust the mungiki movement into the centre- stage of the discourses on violence.⁷⁰ But this did not only put the spotlight only on mungiki, but other vigilante groups and their role in corruption and violence.

Conclusion

Corruption trend in Kenya has generally remained same in both the early 1990s and into the new administration in year 2002. According to the TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index through out the 1990’s corruption and conflict in Kenya were hand in hand with instances of violence in the country at that time. These include the like of the Wagala massacre, the Nyayo chambers, ethnic cleansing amongst others. It is also during this time that one of the dreaded vigilante youth Mungiki was born to deal with issues of limited resources, lack of economic empowerment attributed to corruption and ethnicity. By deduction it can be argues that this is the time when the implications of corruption conspicuously started to come up in violent acts.

⁷⁰ Ibid pg 7

CHAPTER THREE

IMPACT OF CORRUPTION ON STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE IN KENYA

3.0 Introduction

Mutuma Ruteere argues that “Africa, being a continent that is never in shortage of problems, has also the problem of corruption, particularly bribery and misuse of office to serve personal interest. Corruption is, indeed, a problem that ranks with the problem of structural distortion that we have been talking about.”⁷¹ The preceding argument alludes to the presupposition that corruption goes hand in hand with the aspects that constitute an operational system in a country. In as far as this goes; it can be argued that a governance framework of a country is crucial in determining the extent of penetration of corruption.

According to Shleifer and Vishny “the structures of government institutions and the political process are very important determinants of level of corruption. In particular, weak governments that do not control their agencies experience very high corruption levels.”⁷² This underscores the fact that the process of contestation of power is fundamental in determining the structure of government and therefore, legitimacy of its political process. In studying the impact of corruption on violence it is thus important to look at the aspects of state construction and legitimisation of the government. This is derived from the fact that the modern state incorporates aspects of state legitimacy that include democracy through elections and states’ monopoly of violence that must ensure peaceful co-existence as provided for in the United Nations Charter. Paul Coulier says

⁷¹ Ibid 135

⁷² Shleifer Andrei; Vishny W Robert, Corruption, JSTOR: The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, No. 3. (Aug., 1993), pg 599

that “ elections are commonly practiced to date, which is to say far from free and fair, have increased the risk of violence , not reduced it.”⁷³ Essentially, elections do not necessarily legitimise a government, but the environment and internal systems in which is it conducted.

3.1 Poor leadership and distortion of official decision

In Africa, the impact of corruption on structural violence is conspicuous in the continued challenge of the African state’s monopoly over violence and in self-aggrandisement of the Executive and leadership. To consolidate popularity and wealth, African leaders have employed carrot and stick measures to consolidate, capture, and hold on to power at the expense of good governance and democracy. Poor leadership results into conflict as decisions are made without due process and without objectivity. Bayley argues that “corruption has lead to poor leadership and distortion of official decisions”⁷⁴ in Africa which in return has led to violence due to omissions and commissions. And Kenya is no exception.

Corruption stirs violence, especially, in Africa and Kenya in particular where leaders who steal are seen to act on behalf of the community. According to Mutahi, “the culture of corruption also took hold in the civil service and within parastatals of many post-independent countries, where nepotism was rife in appointments, with those in authority employing their kith and kin as well as people hailing from their villages. So wide-spread

⁷³ Collier Paul, War, Guns and Votes: Democracy in dangerous places, pg 225

⁷⁴ Bayley David H; The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation, The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Dec., 1966), pg722, University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science Association <http://www.jstor.org/stable/445147> accessed: 17/02/2010 06:52

was the culture of patronage and clientele-ism that the values of transparency and accountability had no place in the evolving political situation.’’⁷⁵ For example, the post 2007 Kenyan Minister of Education Prof. Sam Ongeru’s confessions in his native Kisii language⁷⁶ that he discovered that Free Primary Education (FPE) funds allocated to the Kisii region was little and being a Professor he decided to right the wrong and secretly shifted money. He said this to ululations from his tribesmen. FPE scandal as it came to be known threatens the education for all policy adopted in Kenya in 2004. At the same time, the Minister of Agriculture Hon. William Ruto was also embroiled in a brewing maize scandal that led to the loss of billions of shillings.

Bayley further asserts that ‘‘it is easy to say that a civil servant should consider only the merits of a case. A politician, by the nature of his job, is a channel for the pressure of special groups within the country. It is an accepted part of his function that he garners public expenditures for his constituents or groups represented within his constituency; that he helps them to gain access to government employment; that he influences administrators to locate a road through a town in his area rather than in an adjacent constituency. A politician is the instrument that makes government responsive to individuals. A civil servant who responded to his tribal or caste affiliation to secure jobs for young men would be accused of being nepotistic; a politician who secured government employ for the same group would be admired as an effective politician...is not entirely curious then that one may speak of an act being corrupt and not find massive

⁷⁵ See Mutahi Patrick ; Political Violence in the Election in Maupeu Herve`, Katumanga Musambayi and Mitullah Winnie (eds); The Moi Succession Elections 2002, East African Monographs No 2, An IFRA Series, Transafrica Press, Nairobi pg 386

⁷⁶ Kenya Television Network(KTN), Free Primary Education Funds; KTN Prime News, 13 th February, 2010

social censure.”⁷⁷ The Minister for Education confession was followed by the Prime Minister’s suspension of the minister for three months, which has stirred arguments in the coalition government and some members of the Kisii community condemn the suspension which has since been nullified by President Mwai Kibaki. In as far as some members of the Kisii community were concerned ‘one of their own’ was being treated unfairly. Hence section of the community took the streets to condemn the suspension by the Prime Minister, and targeting communities associated with the Premier. While this was unfolding the communities in the Rift Valley associated with the Minister of Agriculture were also threatening to stage demonstrations. This is not new in Kenya, and has been the trend.

It can therefore be deduced that Prof. Ongeri was seen by sections of his community as an effective leader prompting them to demonstrate against outright corruption in the Ministry of Education.

3.2 Inequality gap and poverty

3.2.1 Inequality

The impact of corruption on poverty is characterised by wide inequality gap, asymmetric structure of power and accumulation of limited public resources. According to Hasty “forms of desire that fuel corruption are not merely selfish and private but profoundly social, shaped by larger sociocultural notions of power, privilege, and responsibility

⁷⁷ Bayley David H; *The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation*; *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Dec., 1966), University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science Association pg. 722

(Olivier de Sardan 1999; Rosen 2002).”⁷⁸ By deduction it can be argued that the driving factors that lead to corruption is the greed to amass wealth and desire to capture and control public budget once in a decision making office. And once such officials ascend to power the continued embezzle of public coffers led to lethargy amongst the public and consequent violence between the have-nots and the haves. As the inequality ensures violence erupts. According to Collier “in the absence of democracy, as a society starts to get rich it become more prone to political violence. It becomes prone to violence given the uncouth tactics employed to keep peace.”⁷⁹ For example, in Kenya like many African countries, people with questionable characters get elected to parliamentary offices, and once there their first assignment is engaging in embezzlement of public resources and creation of empires. Many parliamentary and local authority members have accumulated wealth after election in public office. This has resulted into crafting of laws that favour the office holders, especially the land question where communities have engaged in violent actives, whilst the leaders stay put opposing any law that would rationalise the land issue in Kenya. Paul Collier supports this argument by stating that “democratic politics in the countries of the *bottom billion* tends to attract candidates with criminal records...elected office provides immunity from prosecution.”⁸⁰

In some contexts the extent of resultant social inequality is vast and growing-for example Kenya has been identified as one of the ten most unequal societies in the world. Corruption impacts on violence by widening the inequality gap of a society or a country.

⁷⁸ Hasty Jenniter ,Pacific Lutheran University, *The Pleasures of Corruption: Desire and Discipline in Ghanaian Political Culture*; *cultural anthropology*, Vol. 20, Issue 2, pp. 271, ISSN 0886-7356, electronic ISSN 1548-1360, www.uh-norcross.edu/journals/rights.htm. accessed : 17/02/2010 06:42

⁷⁹ Collier Paul, *War, Guns and Votes: Democracy in dangerous places*, pg 21

⁸⁰ Collier Paul, *War, Guns and Votes: Democracy in dangerous places*, pg 27

Corruption, therefore, lowers the general welfare of the people by raising prices, damaging the structure of production, and reducing consumption.⁸¹ This is evidenced by the number of people living below the poverty line and life expectancy of a country where, often, violence is rampant as communities fight over scarce resources. According to Hoivik Tord “the distribution of a society’s resources affects not only the standard of living, but the chances of survival itself. A more equal distribution will normally increase the average length of life in society as a whole. The loss of life from an unequal distribution is an aspect of structural violence: violence inherent in the social order.”⁸² Corruption therefore leads to violence as it denies the citizens their basic rights hence the scramble for survival makes violence lucrative as an option of protection and preservation of the community. Hence it can be argued that slums and poor urban neighbourhood are more prone to violence due to the injustices experienced as results of corruption. According to Jones Gruffydd “the distinct form of impoverishment and deprivation produced by structural adjustment results in social exclusion and conditions of structural violence. These conditions have in some cases given rise to community-based organised resistance, but such conditions are likely to lead to crime, drug-use and alcoholism as to collective resistance and struggle for alternatives.”⁸³

According to Galtung and Holivik, “the measurement of the magnitude of violence can proceed along two principal lines. We can measure either the violent input or the violent

⁸¹ Timamy. Khalil M.H ; African Leaders and Corruption; Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 32, No. 104/105, Oiling the Wheels of Imperialism (Jun. - Sep., 2005), pp. 383, Taylor & Francis, Ltd. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4007080>, Accessed: 17/02/2010 06:46 136

⁸² Hoivik Tord; The Demography of Structural Violence, Journal of Peace Research No. 1, Vol. XIV/1977 ; Department of Sociology, University of Oslo, and International Peace Research Institute, Oslo pg 1

⁸³ Jones Gruffydd Branwen, Neo Colonialism, structural violence and resistance in Africa: University of Aberdeen Scotland, UK; Paper presented on the panel of African Development: The Continuation of a North-South Divide in Global Politics at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San DiegomCarlifonia,22-25 March ,2006 http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citaion_pg_1

output...Galtung and Holivik (1971) proposed a method for measuring structural violence with the use of life expectancy data.⁸⁴ According to the two scholars structural violence of a country can be calculated by looking at the life expectancy of a country and its populations against the Swedish Model (or the highest life expectancy at the time of study), then look at the Egalitarian Model where it is assumed all resources are equally divided in the world, then getting the difference to establish the deaths as a result of structural violence. The two mentioned models conclude that “under conditions of complete global equality, the rich countries would lose only minor amounts of life expectancy, whereas the poor would gain tremendously.”⁸⁵ The preceding indicate that if the levels of poverty were lower in Kenya and a narrower inequality gap, then the levels of violence would be minimised.

3.2.2 Poverty

Corruption exacerbates poverty which later affects the standards of living and life expectancy of a country. “The link between poverty and corruption therefore lies in the unequal access to good and services”⁸⁶ due to unequal power relations between the giver of the services and the user. According to Tord, “in structural violence, the loss of life is caused by social conditions. The victims of structural violence are social groups rather than individual persons.”⁸⁷ Fanon Frantz argues that “dehumanization leads men to lethargy and they are conditioned to believe that violence is a way of life. Whether he’s

⁸⁴ Kohler Gernot and Alcock Norman ; An Empirical Table of Structural Violence, Journal of Peace Research No. 4, Vol. XIII/1976 , pg 343 Canadian Peace Research Institute Oakville, Toronto

⁸⁵ Ibid pg 355

⁸⁶ Mulei Andrew, **The Link Between Corruption and Poverty: Lessons from Kenya Case Studies**, Edited by; **The African Centre for Economic Growth, Nairobi, Kenya 2001** pg

⁸⁷ Hoivik Tord; **The Demography of Structural Violence**, Journal of Peace Research No. 1, Vol. XIV/1977 ; Department of Sociology, University of Oslo, and International Peace Research Institute, Oslo pg 60

black or yellow or white, always the same trait of character...and who understands only violence.”⁸⁸

Corruption also quite often involves the transfer or diversion of resources or services from public to private use.⁸⁹ This essentially means that corruption leads to scramble of limited resources such as water, health facilities, education hence tension develops between communities and hence a trigger leads to violence and conflict later.

3.3. Political capital

Politicians engage in corruption to expand their political capital and for political self preservation. An example of the impact of corruption on violence is seen when public officials or governments capture budgetary allocations. According to Timamy “budgetary capture is when corrupt civil servants deliberately confine a ministry’s or parastatals budgetary allocations through corrupt procurement procedures that ensure that their private firms tender this services. The services include stationery, fuels cleaning services, security amongst others. Hence they control the budget. Leaders do everything in their power to keep the public sector wage component of recurrent expenditure at a minimum in order to capture as much as possible for companies fronted by the political elite.”⁹⁰ This is done to consolidate political capital in future elections. Timamy adds, “For example, in Kenya, the Anglo-Leasing scandal illustrates non-transparency in project

⁸⁸ Fanon Frantz: *The Wretched of the Earth*; Penguin Books Ltd, 80 Strand, London WC2R 0RL, England 2001, pg 14

⁸⁹ *Ibid* pg 136

⁹⁰ Timamy. Khalil M.H ; *African Leaders and Corruption; Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 32, No. 104/105, *Oiling the Wheels of Imperialism* (Jun. - Sep., 2005), pp. 387, Taylor & Francis, Ltd. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4007080>, Accessed: 17/02/2010 06:46

procurement, and the initial unwillingness of the government to reveal the identity of financial recipients suggests a promise of immunity to future potential parties to embezzlement.⁹¹ Anglo-leasing is said to have been invented to expanding the political party of PNU in preparations for the just concluded 2007 general elections in Kenya

Timamy Khalil argues that “a closer inspection of the behaviour of rulers in extremely corrupt regimes (and this does not apply solely to Africa) shows that the motivation for graft is the maintenance of political office in the first instance, rather than personal consumption. Given the excesses associated with political leaders they become driven by the instinct of self-preservation to widen disparities in financial power between themselves and the opposition. As a consequence, in extremely corrupt regimes national budgets are reduced to a degree which prompts a wide-ranging and destructive collapse of wealth-creating institutions.”⁹² In Kenya, this is well illustrated by the former anti-graft advisor John Githongo’s tape recordings of Ministers blackmailing him to go slow on his anti-corruption work so that his father can be given immunity over government owed loans and so that the then administration secure a second term in office.

3.4 Violence

3.4.1 Electoral violence

According to the Central Depository Unit (CDU), “electoral violence refers to any act or series of acts that cause harm or threat of harm to an individual or group of people, or

⁹¹ Ibid pg387

⁹² Timamy. Khalil M.H : African Leaders and Corruption; Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 32, No. 104/105, Oiling the Wheels of Imperialism (Jun. - Sep., 2005), pp. 383, Taylor & Francis, Ltd. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4007080>, Accessed: 17/02/2010 06:46

damage to property, if the act or series of acts is intended or results in influencing electoral choices or outcomes. Harm can be physical or psychological.⁹³ The definition by CDU is in line with Galtung's definition of structural violence as latent. It thus does not need to be pronounced or physical to be experienced. The very act that imposes negative consequences is by violence.

Electoral violence is mainly as a result of rigged or disputed elections. Often, the incumbent uses unorthodox means to sway the result in their favour as has been witnessed globally. According to Chaturvedi "the Government in power was almost invariably first to prove itself a connoisseur in the arts of conducting a corrupt election The instructions sent to prefects by the government at the time of election, invariably urged the officials to make use of an "intelligent activity", naturally in favour of the government candidate."⁹⁴

Violence is also predominant during party elections where competitors engage in electoral malpractices to outdo each other. This include, exporting of voters from neighboring constituencies to vote-in a party candidate. According to Mutahi "a trend has been set during the nominations that violence can pay and it proved to be a success since several candidates won their nomination through engaging in inter-party or intra-party violence."⁹⁵ For example in Kenya the link between corruption and violence was

⁹³ Central Depository Unit(CDU) ; *Ghasia Watch Report: January-December 2002*

⁹⁴ Chaturvedi Ashish; *Rigging Elections with Violence*, Public Choice, Vol. 125, No. 1/2 (Oct., 2005), pg. 196, Springer : <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30026660> Accessed: 17/02/2010 06:42

⁹⁵ See Mutahi Patrick ; *Political Violence in the Election in Maupeu Herve*, Katumanga Musambayi and Mitullah Winnie (eds); *The Moi Succession Elections 2002*, East African Monographs No 2, An IFRA Series, Transafrica Press, Nairobi pg 81

demonstrated by the inclusion of disciplinary and peace committees. According to Mutahi “the work of the disciplinary committee was complimented by the peace committee which the ECK has established in various constituencies to assist in conflict resolution and management.”⁹⁶

3.4.2 Ethnic violence

According to Timamy “a fundamental component driving the dynamics of political control and economic domination has been the pull of tribal loyalties in the calculus of both the rulers and the ruled. And in this interplay, the state became the central medium used by rulers in the pursuit of unspoken agendas, in seeking narrow developmental goals, and in striving for political continuity.”⁹⁷ This reinforces the argument that extent of violence is intrinsically intertwined with the level of tribal loyalties. When violence erupts, tribal differences are blamed. This presupposes that homogeneous societies would be more peaceful as they are all nation-states. This is contestable to the extent that homogeneous countries like Somali have been embroiled in civil war since Said Bare’s rule.

According to Mutahi “it is not the existence of multi-ethnic groups in Kenya that is problematic; rather the systemic manipulation of ethnicity by the ruling elite is at fault.”⁹⁸

Kenya has multiple tribes about 42 and the diversity has led to violence especially, when

⁹⁶ See Mutahi Patrick ; Political Violence in the Election in Maupeu Herve’, Katumanga Musambayi and Mitullah Winnie (eds); The Moi Succession Elections 2002, East African Monographs No 2, An IFRA Series, Transafrica Press, Nairobi pg 90

⁹⁷ Timamy. Khalil M.H ; African Leaders and Corruption; Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 32, No. 104/105, Oiling the Wheels of Imperialism (Jun. - Sep., 2005), pp. 384, Taylor & Francis, Ltd. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4007080>, Accessed: 17/02/2010 06:46

⁹⁸ See Mutahi Patrick ; Political Violence in the Election in Maupeu Herve’, Katumanga Musambayi and Mitullah Winnie (eds); The Moi Succession Elections 2002, East African Monographs No 2, An IFRA Series, Transafrica Press, Nairobi pg 84

one tribe thinks that the other is taking advantage of them. During the 2010 referendum the Mtito MP Hon. Kiema was quoted on NTV⁹⁹ stating that the citizens should vote “NO” for the referendum as the land question means that soon as it is passed his tribesmen from *Ukambani* should prepare themselves to be kicked off areas dominated by other tribes such as Coast Province and Central and everyone would be required to go back to their ancestral land. Such corrupted utterances may lead to violence as it pits one tribe against the rest.

Fanon Frantz argues that “the different tribes fight amongst themselves since they cannot face the real enemy...the man who raises his knife against his brother thinks that he has destroyed once and for all the detested image of their common degradation, even though these expiatory victims don’t quench their thirst for blood.”¹⁰⁰ As in the case of Kenya, politicians continue to manipulate tribes through corruption of official decisions. This creates the “we” versus “them” notion in access to public service and hence interference with peaceful co-existence with other tribes as in the case of the 2007 post elections violence in Kenya. In the run up to the general elections various politicians rounded up their tribes against the opposition. This explains how the hot spots for the elections violence was areas dominated with immigrant tribes.

3.4.3. Vigilantes

Corruption impacts on violence through mushrooming of vigilante groups that are formed to challenge the state’s monopoly of violence, often as a result of collapsed security

⁹⁹ Hon. Kiema Kilonzo, NTV News at 9pm; 15 th May, 2010

¹⁰⁰ Fanon Frantz: *The Wretched of the Earth*; Penguin Books Ltd, 80 Strand, London WC2R 0RL, England 2001, pg16

apparatus compromised through corruption acts. These groups recruit the youth who are vulnerable due to unemployment and poverty. It has been argued that the characteristics of vigilante groups, often associated with the youth, depict the topology of political landscape and social fragmentations of a society. In Kenya for example, Mutahi argues that “the youth have thus been used to settle political and social scores mostly through inflicting of pain to the ‘uncooperative’ electorates. The vigilantes were largely used to intimidate upcountry people so that people in those areas would not start demanding constitutional reforms.”¹⁰¹

The impact of Corruption on violence is often characterised by emergence of a group of disgruntled irritable youth who play ‘supporting role’ in political socioeconomic unrest in Africa. Youth are an increasingly compelling subject for study in Africa, entering into political space in highly complex ways. To pay attention to youth is to pay close attention to the topology of the social landscape-to power and agency; public, national, and domestic spaces and identities, and their articulation and disjuncture; memory, history, and sense of change; globalization and governance; gender and class¹⁰².

3.5 Refugees/ Internally Displaced People

Corruption impacts on violence by creating an inflow on refugees and Internally Displaced People (IDPs). For example bad governance in Somali and Sudan has resulted

¹⁰¹See Mutahi Patrick ; Political Violence in the Election in Maupou Herve’, Katumanga Musambayi and Mitullah Winnie (eds); The Moi Succession Elections 2002, East African Monographs No 2, An IFRA Series, Transafrica Press, Nairobi pg 71

¹⁰² Durham Deborah; Youth and the Social Imagination in Africa: Introduction to Parts 1 and 2; Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 73, No. 3, Youth and the Social Imagination in Africa, Part 1 (Jul., 2000) pg 113, The George Washington University Institute for Ethnographic Research

to an influx of refugees in Kenya and neighbouring states. At the same time, the 'stolen' Kenyan election of 2007 resulted into tribal wars and displacements of about 10,000 families

Often, refugees are as result of politically instigated violence which is followed by governments setting up commissions of enquiries, whose findings are released after battling with civil society or the public. As such, the victims do not trust these commissions and do not even give their testimonies. The oppressor's government can set up commissions of inquiry and of information daily if it wants to; in the eyes of the native, these commissions do not exist¹⁰³.

In Kenya today, the 2007 elections IDPS are yet to be compensated. The IDPs have thus been engaged in embroiled battles with the government where they were stopped from protesting to Nairobi's State House. Fantz argues that "the same violence is thrown back upon us when our reflection comes forward to meet us when we go towards a mirror."¹⁰⁴

3.6 International and regional trade

Corruption hurts investment and economic growth of a country. According to Bukovansky "corruption hurts economic development either by siphoning of resources and discouraging foreign investment, or because corrupt elites select public projects in order to maximize their opportunities for monopoly rents rather than encourage suitable

¹⁰³ Fanon Frantz: *The Wretched of the Earth*; Penguin Books Ltd, 80 Strand, London WC2R 0RL, England 2001, pg 73

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid* pg 15

growth.”¹⁰⁵The 1996 UN Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions (UN General Assembly 1996a) states that “a stable and transparent environment for international commercial transactions...is essential for the mobilization of ...resources across national borders in order...to promote economic and social development and environmental protection.”(Annex a para 1-3). The recognition that corruption impacts on international and regional trade cannot be overstated as the regional bodies and inter-state agencies have crafting standards of doing ‘clean’ business to protect the global and regional economy such as the OECD, and the East African Community (EAC).

In the past decade, a charge that a country development suffers because of corruption has become a widespread and routine in addressing the ‘development gap’ between the North and South.¹⁰⁶ This can be looked at parallel to the Zimbabwe sanction due to disputed elections, and rampant corruption by President Robert Mugabe’s administration. Where the Zimbabwean dollar suffered a massive -18% inflation and people carried loads of notes to buy a piece of bread as food stores were empty and hospitals went without drugs. According to Kimberly, “there is growing awareness that security and stability depend not simply on air forces, armies, and national arsenals but also on a host of interacting economic and political factors. The security of one nation can be radically affected by

¹⁰⁵ Bukovansky Mlada; *The Hollowness of Anti-Corruption Discourse; Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (May, 2006), pg 194 , Taylor & Francis, Ltd. : <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25124069> accessed: 17/02/2010 06:35

¹⁰⁶ Bukovansky Mlada; *The Hollowness of Anti-Corruption Discourse; Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (May, 2006), pg 182 , Taylor & Francis, Ltd. : <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25124069> accessed: 17/02/2010 06:35

purely domestic development in a seemingly distant state.”¹⁰⁷ For example in East Africa, the 2007 disputed elections in Kenya led to economic instability in Uganda and Tanzania, due to the fact that Kenya hubs the port for the two countries. Uganda being a landlocked country suffered fuels shortage as fuel could not be piped though the volatile Kibera railway. The ensuing violence in Kibera was as a result of corruption in the management of the electoral processing Kenya and consequent economic disability in East Africa.

Conclusion

From the preceding, it can be established that there is a correlation between corruption and the extent to which a country is penetrated by violence. The impact of corruption on structural violence can thus be gauged by looking at the circumstances that have lead to breakdown of peaceful consistence that lead to violence. This ranges from poor leadership, inequality and poverty, political capital, violence, unstable international trade, refugees influx amongst others that are an implication of corruption into a governance system.

¹⁰⁷ Ann Elliott Kimberly (eds) ; Corruption and The Global Economy; Institute for International Economics Washington, DC, June 1997,pg 11

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION

4.0. Introduction

This chapter presents findings of the study which have been discussed under the preceding chapters and sub-sections in line with the study objectives. The thematic areas include: study of population sample demographics, study of corruption and violence, and its impact on Kenya.

4.1 Questionnaire response rate

Questionnaires with both open and close-ended questions were administered to the sample population, also the respondents. Of the 56 sample population, only 30 of the respondents participated in e research representing 54% (53.5% response rate. This is attributed to the sensitive nature that guards the anti-corruption initiatives compounded with suspicion, especially from government institutions. Out of these sample respondents from state institutions comprised of eight institutions making 26% (26.6%) while non-state actors including individuals where 22 making 73% of the respondents. The proposed individual identified as a whistleblower did not respond to the questionnaires administered using emails, and telephone interviews.

4.2 Characteristics of respondents

The sample population included state, non-state and individual respondents thus an attempt was made to present data first in terms of demographics of respondents, highlighting the difference groupings where possible. This was followed by description

of themes for the study that basically looked into the main study objectives to guide analysis and discussions.

4.3 Distribution of respondents by gender and age

The formatting of the questionnaires required respondents to indicate their gender. The resulting distribution showed that out of the 30 respondents interviewed 50% were male, 33% were female while government institutions declined to indicate the gender of the Officer answering the questionnaire citing the responses as institutional. This showed that the distribution of gender is greatly skewed towards male who are on decision making positions and hence can be deduced to mean that response was from those in powerful positions. It therefore follows that out of respondents interviewed, 16% were government institutions.

The respondents were also asked to indicate their age brackets. The findings presented show that of the 30 respondents, about 40% were within the age bracket of 18-30 years, while 26% were within age bracket of 31-40 years, and about 16% did not indicate their age brackets. The finding from the respondent imply that majority of people active in the governance area are in their prime 30's and early 40's.

4.4.1 Assess whether corruption creates opportunity for violence

According to the respondents 100% indicated that corruption creates opportunity for corruption. When asked to indicate the strength of corruption creating violence from very strongly to none at all 67% felt that there was a very strong link between corruption and violence, while 33% felt that there was a strong link.

All the respondents indicated that the governance framework in Kenya contributes to corruption and conflict. These responses confirm the research hypothesis 1 and 2 of this study.

4.5 Examine the trends, nature of corruption and conflict

In analysis the understanding of corruption about 17% of the respondents answered the question "in your opinion, do you think that there is a common understanding on what corruption is? YES NO" as neither, while another 17% said that there is no common understanding on what constitutes corruption. However, 66% of the respondents said that there is a common understanding of the definition of corruption. According to the KACC response 70% of respondents in their previous survey understand corruption and have given examples from their experiences of corruption to KACC. However, Transparency International-Kenya indicated in the questionnaire that people have different definitions of corruption, but interrelated examples of it. This underscores the research argument that various literature definitions do not take note of the tripartite relationship of corruption that includes governance framework, the power relations between the public servant, the citizens and service delivery

Given that 67% of the respondents felt that there is a common understanding to what corruption is, the research hypothesis 3 that states that “lack of common understanding on corruption is likely to lead to unsuccessful anti-corruption initiatives” is not verified.

In verifying the trend of corruption Vis `a vis conflict, 100% of the respondents answered the questions on whether countries with high levels of corruption are more likely to have conflict to the affirmative. This verifies the link between corruption and conflict.

4.6 Categories of violence and challenges facing the ant-corruption initiatives

Respondents cited varying categories of violence to include disenfranchisement, inequality in delivery of services and basic necessities, political instigate ethnic violence, electoral violence, domestic violence and violence due to scarcity of resources. When asked to state the responsible parties to these categories of violence the response was as follows; poor political leadership and citizen apathy, poor planning and lack of alternatives, political corruption, and poor governance framework.

4.6.1 Challenges

Respondents were also asked to give other conditions that they thought was as a result of the impact of corruption on violence. The following responses were cited; lack of information and protective framework for activist, powerful executive, poor social capital that lowers investments promoting poverty and unemployment, personalization of institutions leading to poor service delivery and bribers, institutional failure / collapse,

post election violence , low political competition, a weak civil society, absence of institutional mechanism to deal with corruption and negative ethnicity and culture of impunity amongst others.

A major challenge during the research study was hostility from snit-corruption agency and suspicion on the use of data collected. Many agencies confined their literature on the cause of corruption and examples of corruption making it difficult to get the intended link to violence.

4.7 Hypothesis test

In conclusion, the research hypothesis one and two have been verified and three not verified. This therefore implies that majority of Kenyans believe that corruption in a governance framework creates opportunity for violence and that given that Kenya is cited amongst the most corrupt countries in corruption indices, it therefore is has conflict emanating from implications of corruption

Respondents however did not verify if lack of common understanding on corruption is likely to lead to unsuccessful anti-corruption initiatives. Most respondents felt that there is common experience of corruption, but no common appreciation of its impact.

CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the summary of findings, conclusions, recommendations, suggestions for further research and contribution to the body of knowledge.

5.2 Summary of findings

The first objective on assessing whether corruption creates opportunity for violence found out that although 67% of the respondents felt that there was a very strong link between corruption and violence, 33% felt that there was just a strong link. This objective was thus partially met since 100% of the respondents answered in affirmative in varying degrees.

The second objective of determining whether the existing governance framework in Kenya contributes to corruption and conflict, found that 100% of respondents felt the governance framework was faulty. Examples of explanation included citing of the system of political patronage inherited from colonialism that ensure overbearing executive and legislative framework that has failed to protect whistleblowers, ineffective judicial system, poor leadership, inequality amongst others.

The third objective on examining the trends, nature of corruption and conflict was not met as it was difficult to ascertain the trend from the responses. This was due to the fact that most respondents cited poor leadership, lack of political will, lack of coordinated efforts to fight corruption, lack of citizen ownership in the process and ineffective judicial system as the major impediment in the fight against corruption. Many felt that if the governance framework was more effective, then corruption would be contained and hence conflict. Thus the trend was not easily captured. One of the respondents said “the biggest impediment is that those expected to fight corruption i.e. the judiciary, cabinet, police are themselves corrupt. It is like asking the corrupt to fight themselves”

5.3 Conclusions

The study substantially met two of the three set objectives and it can be concluded that it was a success. Further, it can also be deduced that a lot is still needed to make the impact of corruption in Kenya appreciated by all, both for the realization of its link to violence and for future anti-corruption initiatives. Key issues required to maintain such a process include quality and interactive stakeholder participation within the entire process of anti-corruption campaign as much as possible, need to have a common understanding of what corruption is, and need to further research on the link between corruption and violence. Challenges facing the current anti-corruption work need to be addressed as a matter of urgency so that the current constitutional reforms are not jeopardized. It will also help ensure that electoral violence linked to stolen elections is contained.

5.4 Recommendations

This study recommends both long term and short term policies. First and foremost, it recommends the inclusion on structural violence into the anti-corruption initiatives. This may enable anti-corruption strategies come up with something akin to early warning system into violence due to levels of corruption. While analysing the levels of corruption in Kenya, analyst would be able to gauge changing trend hence extent of violence given that respondents cited that countries with high level of corruption are likely to have conflict and that Kenya fall in that category. This follows from TI conclusion in the 2008 CPI that countries with high levels of corruption are more likely to have conflict.

Second recommendation is to have scholars study the link between sprouting vigilante groups to corruption. This would give a root cause of violence and corruption given that these vigilante groups are mostly associated with violence.

Lastly, it was evident during the study that thought anti-corruption strategies could easily link corruption and violence, no thought has been given into studying these two phenomenons. More academic research should be done to give clearer linkages between the two and seek to find the correlation between corruption and violence and to what extent violence has emanated from levels of corruption.

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APPENDIX 1

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RESPONDENTS

INTRODUCTION

Below is a questionnaire for a research project entitled "The Impact of Corruption on Structural Violence in Africa: A case study of Kenya 1993-2008" leading to the award of a Masters degree in International Studies, University of Nairobi. Your response is needed for academic purposes and will be treated in strict confidence. Please answer the questions as truthfully as you can. You may wish to remain anonymous and your anonymity will be guaranteed. Due to the sensitivity of this research, interviewee's details shall be kept confidential at all times. I can send you a copy of this research on request. (Felgona A. O – Researcher)

INSTRUCTIONS

- i. Answer all questions
- ii. You may or may not indicate your name
- iii. Put a tick (✓) or provide the required information for the various questions

SECTION I: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. Name _____
2. Institution / organisation/agency _____
- 2a. Position in the institution _____
3. Indicate your gender: Male Female
4. Indicate your age bracket
 - (1) 18 – 30
 - (2) 31 – 40
 - (3) 41 – 50
 - (4) 51 – 55
 - (5) 56 and above

SECTION II: CORRUPTION AND VIOLENCE

5. In your opinion, do you think that there is a common understanding on what corruption is? YES NO

5b. Please explain?

6. In your opinion, what are the major categories of violence you observe in Kenya?

6b. Who is primarily responsible for causing violence each of the categories above?

7. Do you think that corruption creates opportunity for violence?

YES NO

7b. How strongly, if at all, does corruption create an opportunity for violence?

- 1. Very strongly
- 2. Strongly
- 3. Very weak
- 4. Weak
- 5. None

7c. If your answer to 7 above is yes, please explain your answer.

8. Do you think that the governance framework in Kenya has contributed to

corruption and violence? YES NO

8b. Please explain your answer.

9. In your opinion, do you think that countries with high levels of corruption are more likely to have conflict? YES NO

9b. If your answer to 9 above is YES, do you think Kenya falls in this category?
YES NO

SECTION III IMPACT OF CORRUPTION ON VIOLENCE

10. Do you agree with these statements?

The following attributes are as a result of corruption in Kenya;

	YES	NO
i General violence	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ii Electoral violence	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
iii Ethnic violence	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

10b. Do you agree with the following statement?

The following attributes are a trigger to violence in Kenya;

	YES	NO
i. Nepotism in Public Service	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ii. Ethnic vigilante groups	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
iii. Widening inequality gap	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
iv. Poverty	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
v. Poor leadership	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
vi. Distortion of official decision	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

11. Give other conditions that you think are as a result of the impact of corruption on violence _____

12. Please indicate if you agree with the following statements.

Do you think corruption?

	YES	NO
i Creates violence	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ii Sustains violence	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ii Stops violence	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

12b. Please explain your answer

13. In your view, what is the greatest impediment to the anti-corruption initiatives?

13. Any other comment?
