Implementation of Conflict Early Warning and Early Response: IGAD-CEWARN in Kenya //

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Declaration

This research project is my original work and has not been presented to any other institution or university.

Signed _____   Date ___14-11-2012___

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This research project has been submitted for examination with our approval as the university supervisors.

Sign _____   Date __17/11/12__

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Dedication

This research paper is lovingly dedicated to my parents who have been my constant source of inspiration. They have given me the drive and discipline to tackle any task with enthusiasm and determination. Without their love and support this project would not have been made possible.

Abstract

The study examine implementation of conflict early warning and early response, The debate conflict prevention research is at present concerned with how to effectively bridge the gap between early warning and response to prevent the occurrence and escalation of violent conflict. Previous studies of CEWARN have examined the overall causality of early warning and conflict prevention. Data was mainly be derived from secondary and primary sources. The data collection tools for the secondary data that was used was in-depth information gathering, and document analysis. For the primary data direct observation and open ended interviews were used. The study found that the analysis part of early warning involves the synthesis of background and current event information, the careful selection of indicator information, the examination of motivations and behaviours (to predict future directions), the assessment of capabilities (to carry out violence), the development of scenarios (to explore the possibilities for conflict escalation) and the determination of the most probable outcomes. One could turn to the "fires of conflict" analogy to help identify structural, proximate and triggering factors. IGAD, in contrast, although also a region compromised by conflicts, has chosen a different approach. Due to the political and security situation IGAD was not in a position to develop a functioning and effective region-wide EWR concept. Early warning systems' for the prevention of violent conflict are 'latecomers' compared with their application in other fields.

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List of Abbreviation

APSA: African Peace and Security Architecture

AU: African Union

CEWARN: Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism

CEWS: Continental Early Warning System

CMD: Conflict Management Division

CEN-SAD: Community of Sahel-Saharan States

COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States

ECOWARN: ECOWAS Warning and Response Network

ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States

FEWER: Forum on Early Warning and Early Response

IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development

MARAC: Central African Early Warning Mechanism

OAU: Organization of African Unity

OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

OMC: Observation and Monitoring Centre

OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

PSC: Peace and Security Council

REC: Regional Economic Community

SADC: Southern Africa Development Community

WANEP: West Africa Network for Peace Building (WANEP)

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction to the Study

Background of the study

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional economic community (REC) established under the auspices of the African Union (AU), is mandated to promote minimal regional economic integration (MEIP) and other political, security and socio-economic issues of importance to member states through the implementation of common policies and programmes (including the facilitation of the movement of persons). IGAD brings together Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Somalia and Sudan[1]. Presently IGAD is focusing on a limited number of interventions where it has comparative advantage and clout including; Trade, investment and financial integration, Cross border infrastructure and the supporting services and Regional public goods in all sectors including in health and migration.

To more effectively implement its expanded mandate, IGAD has established several institutions and specialized Centres of excellence, including the IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC) and Conflict Early Warning Mechanism (CEWARN). Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism, CEWARN, for short, launched in 2002, is a co-operative initiative of the seven IGAD (Inter-governmental authority on development) member countries, namely, Djibouti Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda, Sudan and Eritrea[2]. The ultimate goal of CEWARN is to establish itself as a self-sufficient, functional and long-standing conflict warning and response system in the IGAD region; promoting an environment of positive co-

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[1] Perry Bradley E., *"Fast and Frugal Conflict Early Warning In Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role Of Intelligence Analysis* , , Department Of Intelligence Studies Mercyhurst College Erie, Pennsylvania August 2008).p1

[2] Meier Patrick, "New Strategies for Early Response: Insights from Complexity Science," *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA , p19*

operation among the stakeholders. in response to possible and real violent conflict between these countries, and set the grounds for peacefully settling disputes in the area[3].

Conflict in Kenya is very dynamic necessary steps needs to be determined for appropriate means of mobilizing early responses to violent conflicts in the country. This requires knowledge of conflict issues and their causes, durations of conflict (short-lived, sporadic or protracted) and attentiveness to the identities, interests and concerns of actors among other factors.[4] CEWARN is an information-based strategy for conflict prevention that is highly bureaucratic in character; there is also a need for enhanced Micro-level analysis in pre-conflict situations which would be expedient for designing appropriate response options that benefit various sectors of the society. It also privileges indicators, methods of data collection and analysis that are very specific and highly technical thus limiting its consumption for early response.[5]

Statement of the Research Problem

Conflict early warning mechanisms in the region are fraught with organizational barriers that institutionalize the conflict early warning-early response gap alluded to above.[6] People-centered conflict early warning and response is seen to be significant for operational prevention, which calls for direct responses of preventive measures. Such an approach entails the assessment of mitigating effects to prevent escalation at the local level. An example in the case of CEWARN would be peace initiatives by community based actors such as civil society organizations and

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[3] Perry Bradley E., "*Fast and Frugal Conflict Early Warning In Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role Of Intelligence Analysis* , , Department Of Intelligence Studies Mercyhurst College Erie, Pennsylvania August 2008.p1

[4] Mwagiru, Makumi, "*Conflict Management in Africa*"; Nairobi: Centre for Conflict Research (CCR) and Friedrich Ebert Stifling (FES). 2001,

[5] Kagwanja P. M , Ntegeye G .R., Oketch S.J., *Regional Conflict Formation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: Structure, Dynamics and Challenges for Policy.*, Center on International Cooperation, New York University and The African Peace Forum, Nairobi, Kenya 11-13 November 2001, Safari Park Hotel p.2

[6] Alexander Austin, 'Early Warning and the Field: a Cargo Cult Science?', *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation.* (Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin: 2003).

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local government authorities. The debate conflict prevention research is at present concerned with how to effectively bridge the gap between early warning and response to prevent the occurrence and escalation of violent conflict. Previous studies of CEWARN have examined the overall causality of early warning and conflict prevention.[7] The correlation between mitigation of conflict and violence has been shown to be positive, while correcting for the effect of time lag the opposite effect has been proven, which means that there is a positive link between early warning and the prevention of conflict. However, there is no clarification within these studies of effectiveness of conflict early warning & response mechanism in kenya. It is thus of importance to further examine the mechanism of early warning and early response leading to conflict prevention in order to better understand the effectiveness of conflict prevention mechanisms in Kenya and other nation.

Objective of the study

i.   To identify the mandate of CEWARN in Kenya

ii.   To investigate the level involvement of actor's in early warning & response mechanism in conflict prevention in Kenya

iii. To determine the success of CEWERU Kenya

Literature Review

The literature is reviewed according to the following broad theme: Conflict in Kenya, Defining Conflict Early Warning, and CEWARN as an Early Warning System and finally on effectiveness of conflict early warning & response mechanism with specific emphasis on CEWERU in Kenya.

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[7] Brahm, Eric. "Early Warning." *Beyond Intractability.* Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: January 2005

CEWARN

The debate conflict prevention research is at present concerned with how to effectively

bridge the gap between early warning and response to prevent the occurrence and escalation of

violent conflict. Previous studies of CEWARN have examined the overall causality of early

warning and conflict prevention.[8] The correlation between mitigation of conflict and violence

has been shown to be positive, while correcting for the effect of time lag the opposite effect has

been proven, which means that there is a positive link between early warning and the prevention

of conflict. However, there is no clarification within these studies of how preventive responses

are effective under certain circumstances. It is thus of importance to further examine the causal

mechanism of early warning and early response leading to conflict prevention in order to better

understand the effectiveness of conflict prevention mechanisms. The linkage of early warning

and response is claimed to be most effectively done with a people-centered perspective, since it

involves people on the ground closest to the events.

In operational terms, 'the CEWARN Unit and the national Conflict Early Warning and

Response Units (CEWERUs) are expected to develop case scenarios and formulate options for

response based on the situation and incident reports provided by Field Monitors'. The Kenyan

CEWERU is comprised of various representatives from the central government, parliament,

civil society groups, representatives from the Provincial Administration, Police, Military,

academic institutions, research institutions among other representatives, designated by the

government. While IGAD member states may involve these groups in the EWER process, the

highly technical character of the information generated and the bureaucratic structures in place

sometimes limits the number and type of actors and the capacity in which they can engage in the

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[8] Ruddy Doom and Koen Vlassenroot, "Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Minerva's Wisdom?", *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* (1997).

process.[9] Perhaps it is out of the recognition of this weakness that has CEWARN began strengthening the role of District Peace Committees in early response.

People-centered conflict early warning and response is seen to be significant for operational prevention, which calls for direct responses of preventive measures. Such an approach entails the assessment of mitigating effects to prevent escalation at the local level. An example in the case of CEWARN would be peace initiatives by community based actors such as civil society organizations and local government authorities.[10] The inclusion of these actors in the decision making and implementation of responses is thus important for prevention of escalating conflict. Response possibilities are then improved as the linkage between the actors' warning and responding is strengthened. An integrative and inclusive mechanism of conflict early warning and response is called for to secure a positive impact on the ground where escalation of conflict takes place. The CEWARN Unit in Addis Ababa is intended to take on the role of facilitation between the local and regional stakeholders, which makes it the focal point of the minor field study. The different stakeholders working within CEWARN are then in focus as interviewees in order to assemble and assess how preventive responses are decided and carried out as well as their effectiveness of conflict prevention.

Defining Conflict Early Warning

There are several definitions of the generic term "conflict early warning" in the literature. Most of the existing definitions reflect attempts in various levels to respond to "the four important questions in early warning: who to warn, when, of what, and how." While some of the

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[9] Meier Patrick, "New Strategies for Early Response: Insights from Complexity Science," *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA , p19*

[10] Susanna Campbell and Patrick Meier, "Deciding to Prevent Violent Conflict: Early Warning and Decision making within the United Nations", Paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference 49th Annual Convention, Chicago, February 28th, 2007

definitions emphasize on the "what and who to warn" aspects of the question, others underscore methodological considerations of how to carry out early warning. For instance, OECD's definition addresses the questions of "what and who to warn" by defining conflict early warning as "a process that alerts decision makers to the potential outbreak, escalation and resurgence of violent conflicts; and promotes an understanding among decision makers of the nature and impacts of violent conflicts." Conflict early warning is the systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of crises for the purposes of anticipating the escalation of violent conflicts, development of strategic response to these crises, and the presentation of options to critical actors (national, regional and international) for the purposes of decision-making and preventive action[11].

Conflict early warning is not a self-contained or independent undertaking in and of itself.[12] Rather, it is considered as "complementary" to conflict prevention strategies of actors at various levels. In more particular sense, conflict early warning is considered as "a prerequisite for operational conflict prevention which seeks to contain or reverse the escalation of violent conflict by using the tools of preventive diplomacy, economic sanctions and/or incentives, and/or military force." As will be further explained later with the use of practical conflict scenarios in chapter three, conflict early warning is one of the various conflict prevention tools which can be applied at the initial or latent stages of a particular conflict[13].

[11] Kagwanja P. M , Ntegeye G .R., Oketch S.J., *Regional Conflict Formation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: Structure, Dynamics and Challenges for Policy.*, Center on International Cooperation, New York University and The African Peace Forum, Nairobi, Kenya 11-13 November 2001

[12] Korwa G. Adar and Isaac M. Munyae 2001. "Human Rights Abuse in Kenya under Daniel Arap Moi 1978-2001. *African Studies Quarterly 5(1): 1.* PP. 55

[13] Blénesi Éva, *Ethnic Early Warning Systems And Conflict Prevention*, Global Security Fellows Initiative Occasional Paper No. 11, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences Global Security Fellows Initiative, 1998 p. 6

The concept of conflict early warning is also closely related to that of early response, which is defined as "any initiative that occurs in the latent stages of a perceived potential armed conflict with the aim at reduction, resolution or transformation." Response can be undertaken by different actors such as international community, regional organizations, national governments, civil society organizations, etc. In fact, as indicated in OECD's 2009 early warning publication, existing "common wisdom" in the field dictates that conflict early warnings should have "a strong link to responders or response mechanisms."

CEWARN as an Early Warning System

CEWARN is part of IGAD's Peace and Security Division, which connects them to the Council of Ministers and the Summit of Heads of States and Governments, where high profile decisions are made concerning conflict prevention measures in the region[14]. CEWARN is the regional coordinating office taking the lead in implementing the IGAD mandate and then consulting with the various stakeholders, but in every member state there are focal points which coordinate the work[15]. The establishment of CEWARN shows that the regional leaders want to find ways to bring stability and knowledge on how to prevent conflicts from escalating. The decision making bodies of CEWARN are the Technical Committee on Early Warning and the Committee of Permanent Secretaries as the senior policy organs. The Technical Committee brings together the representatives of the member states, which are the CEWERU Heads as well as civil society representatives. They meet at least once a year to give recommendations to the

[14] Mwagiru, Makumi, *Conflict Management in Africa*; Nairobi: Centre for Conflict Research (CCR) and Friedrich Ebert Stifling (FES). 2001
[15] Kagwanja P. M , Ntegeye G .R., Oketch S.J., *Regional Conflict Formation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: Structure, Dynamics and Challenges for Policy.*, Center on International Cooperation, New York University and The African Peace Forum, Nairobi, Kenya 11-13 November 2001, Safari Park Hotel p.2

Committee of Permanent Secretaries, which are senior government officials from the relevant ministries handling CEWARN's work, such as the foreign ministry. They discus policy guidelines as well as lobby for and assist in implementation of CEWARN activities in the member states. Each CEWERU also has a National Steering Committee, which includes state and non-state actors like parliamentarians, police and military representatives as well as community leaders from civil society.

The Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) was established in 2002 as an early warning component of the IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) which "superseded in 1996 the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development(IGADD), which was founded in 1986 primarily to react to the recurring and severe droughts and other natural disasters in the Horn of Africa." ollowing a revitalization process which resulted in the above mentioned transformation, IGAD's mandate was broadened to include the promotion of "peace and stability in the sub region and creation of mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention, management and resolution of interstate and intrastate conflicts through dialogue." Consequently at the 8th Summit of IGAD Heads of States and Government, IGAD decided to establish the CEWARN as a conflict early warning and early response mechanism as part of its revitalized mandate on development, peace and security[16]. Conflict early warning and early response are connected as a mechanism of conflict prevention. The assumption is that by gathering information on early warning of escalating crises and analyzing the possibilities of early responses, the prevention of violent conflict is of greater likelihood. How such a mechanism is to be effective is not inherent and specified in theory,

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[16] Brahm, Eric. "Early Warning." *Beyond Intractability*. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: January 2005. PP. 48

hence the causality of warning and response depends upon the actors involved in the measures taken to prevent conflict from escalating. Research is very limited on how to implement effective responses to prevent crises from escalating; there is therefore a great need to increase knowledge on how the relevant stakeholders deal with mitigating factors, collaboration and inclusion locally.

CEWERU In Kenya

The CEWARN Unit in Kenya is intended to take on the role of facilitation between the local and regional stakeholders, which makes it the focal point of the minor field study. The different stakeholders working within CEWARN are then in focus as interviewees in order to assemble and assess how preventive responses are decided and carried out as well as their effectiveness of conflict prevention. The information that constitutes conflict Early Warning in any given conflict context should elicit appropriate responses. The current state of conflict in Kenya is evidence of a gap that makes it impossible or undesirable for various actors to respond effectively to conflict early warning information. Thus, one of the main recommendations emerging from our engagement with government officials, CSOs, academics, Community groups and individuals from different parts of the country, is that advocating for the rethinking or reconfiguring of the way conflict Early Warning is conceptualized and operationalized in Kenya should be an integral part of the Mobilizing Early Response Project.

Conflict early warning and conflict early response exists in part, due to the roles we assign to the actors in various conflict contexts and the way we choose to think about the historical, material and ideational conditions of the actors party to these conflicts. That is, the assessment engages the different ways in which Early warning and Early Response have been conceptualized and operationalized and illustrates how response is deferred or deterred by the

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institutionalization and overreliance [by states and CSOs] "on resource intensive methods, built on complicated algorithms that require vast amounts of data in a region where 'technologically advanced infrastructure and research dollars are not in abundance.'[17]

First, the assessment focuses on Kenyan civil society perspectives on early warning/early response while considering alternative ways of engaging governmental conflict prevention mechanisms. It recognizes the existence of numerous conflict Early Warning initiatives in the country but sees little utility in refining the accuracy of current models unless these early warning systems have a mechanism to prevent violent conflict or transform the factors that create the conditions of possibility for such conflicts.[18] As such, the EWER assessment and prevention plan that constitute this study both foreground conflict transformation mechanisms that link Early Warning information to multi-track mediation and activism among other processes aimed at promoting justice and peace in Kenya.[19]

Second, the assessment is edified by both the region specific and recurrent themes from the discussions and presentations made by respondents during field visits. Using these as point of departure, what comes to mind is a form of EWER mechanism that maintains attentiveness to the social, economic and cultural factors underlying different Kenyan political and conflict context(s) [20]. This has far reaching implications for how the terms Early Warning and Early

[17] Perry Bradley E., *Fast and Frugal Conflict Early Warning In Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role Of Intelligence Analysis*, Department Of Intelligence Studies Mercyhurst College Erie, Pennsylvania August 2008.p1

[18] Alexander Austin, 'Early Warning and the Field: a Cargo Cult Science?', Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation, (Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin: 2003).p.2

[19] Brahm, Eric. "Early Warning." *Beyond Intractability*. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: January 2005

[20] Kagwanja P. M , Ntegeye G .R., Oketch S.J., *Regional Conflict Formation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: Structure, Dynamics and Challenges for Policy.*, Center on International Cooperation. New

Response are used in this study. At a conceptual level, the assessment departs from conventional or generic conceptions of Early Warning Systems like that used in the *Berghof Handbook for Conflict resolution* or the IGAD-CEWARN and other governmental and CSO conceptions of EWER that reflect a similar rationality. According to the *Berghof* conception, Early Warning is: "any initiative that focuses on *systematic* data collection, analysis and/or formulation of recommendations, including risk assessment and information sharing. Early response will refer to any initiative that occurs in the latent stages of a perceived potential armed conflict with the aim of reduction, resolution or transformation."[21] Given that the Kenyan conflict context is our site of analysis, the above conception proves inadequate not because of what it includes but for what it leaves out. As intimated by some of the groups encountered during the research, most early warning and response mechanisms lack effective means of engaging with grass-root organizations, informal networks, indigenous early warning systems and commonplace signs of conflict that are not *systematic* but reflect the reality of conflict in these regions[22]. What becomes clear therefore, is that the *Berghof* conception of EWER is a valorization of *systematic* and positivist modes of analysis that proliferate scientific knowledge in the social sphere, thus instituting a certain social order and class or gender structure. They also exclude a large body of actors, cultural practices and tactics that could be mobilized to respond to the early signs of conflict. Like the Berghof conception of EWER, most of the state and CSO initiatives shift both the responsibility and agency to recognize and act on potential causes of conflict to actors who

York University and The African Peace Forum, Nairobi, Kenya 11-13 November 2001, Safari Park Hotel p.2

[21] Alexander Austin, 'Early Warning and the Field: a Cargo Cult Science?', *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*, (Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin: 2003).

[22] Alexander Austin, 'Early Warning and the Field: a Cargo Cult Science?', *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*, (Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin: 2003).

are perceived to have the 'capacity' to analyze and respond in a particular way thus concretizing the privileged position of states, certain international civil society organizations, Faith Based Organizations and national NGOs.

Theoretical framework

The study brings into perspective the human needs Theory of Schneider and Alderfer, human needs play an important role in the ensuring the well being of humans as enumerated in the Maslow theory.[23] These needs are categorized into five broad groups namely; physiological such as the classic drives of hunger, thirst and sex, safety needs (material and interpersonal), belongingness, esteem needs and self actualization. [24]Schneider and Alderfer identify that Maslow arranges these needs in a hierarchical order starting from the basic items of food, water and shelter then safety or security, belonging or love, self esteem and finally personal fulfillment. Burton states that no threat can deter human beings when their needs are at stake and denial by society of these needs would lead to alternative behaviors such as conflict to satisfy them. This means that people's unyielding drive to meet their unmet needs on the individual, group and societal level is one of the primary causes of protracted or intractable conflict. He perceives human needs as an emergent collection of human development essentials whereby needs are sought simultaneously in an intense and relentless manner. The human essentials include safety or security or the need for structure, predictability and freedom from fear and anxiety, belongingness or the need to be accepted by others and to have strong personal ties with family, friends and identity groups; self esteem or the need to be recognized by oneself and others as

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[23] B. Schneider and C.P. Alderfer, Three Studies of Measures of Need Satisfaction to Organizations' Vol.8, No. 4, 1973), p. 489.

[24] B. Schneider and C.P. Alderfer, Three Studies of Measures of Need Satisfaction to Organizations. Vol.8, No. 4, 1973),PP. 489.

strong, competent and capable; personal fulfillment or the need to reach one's potential in all areas of life.[25]

Wolf states that all Nile water treaties were signed on the basis of needs such as irrigable land, population or the requirements of a specific project and not right based position. He observes that shifts by countries from rights position to needs based criteria in negotiations occur because rights in contrast to needs are not quantifiable. Wolf notes that one principle incorporated into water conflict resolution theory is the allocation of water resources according to its economic value or efficiency and equity which entails the allocation of water to its highest value use and the distribution of gains from an allocation[26]. He argues that efficient distribution means different uses and users along a waterway may place differing values on the resource hence re-allocation of water according to these values.

Hypotheses of the Study

i. The parameters of the Kenyan CEWERU are specific and well structured

ii. The level of involvement of actor's in early warning & response mechanism in conflict prevention in Kenya is high.

iii. CEWERU Kenya has been a relative success

Methodology

Data was mainly be derived from secondary and primary sources. The data collection tools for the secondary data that will be used will be in-depth information gathering, and

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[25] W. Burton' Conflict Resolution: The Human Dimension' Vol. 3, Issue 1, 1998, PP. 13.
[26] A.T. Wolf, Criteria for equitable allocations, the heart of international water conflict.Vol. 1, Issue 1, PP.10.

document analysis. For the primary data direct observation and open ended interviews will be used. This technique will mainly involve literature research. Data collected in this procedure will include quotations, opinions and specific knowledge and background information relating to the history of the conflicts and negotiations that have taken place. The research design used in this study will be descriptive survey method. This method is preferred because it allows for prudent comparison of the research findings.[27] The qualitative design chosen for this research is theory grounded, or natural inquiry. Grounded theory research unfolds and emerges empirically from the data and is more responsive to contextual values rather than researcher values[28].

The study will use an interview guide to collect the required data. An interview guide is a set of questions that the interviewer asks when interviewing.[29] It makes it possible to obtain data required to meet specific objectives of the study. The interviewees will be top official at Ceweru In Kenya.

Data collected will be purely qualitative and it will be analyzed by means of content analysis. [30]Content analysis involves observation and detailed description of phenomena that comprise the object of study. This method is preferred because the information collected will be qualitative and therefore require analytical understanding. When human coders are used in content analysis, reliability translates to the amount of agreement or correspondence among two

[27] D. R. Cooper and P. S. Schindler, *Research Methods* (7th ed. New York: Irwin/McGraw-Hill, 2000) p 112

[28] A. D. Jankowicz, *Research Projects* (6th ed. London: Thomson Learning, 2002) p 87

[29] Mugenda, O. M., & Mugenda, A. G., *"Research methods: Quantitative and qualitative approaches"*, (Nairobi: Acts Press Siegel, N. 2003), Research methods for managers, A skill building approaches (2nd ed.).(New York: Wiley Publishers, 2003). Pp. 71

[30] Holsti, O.R., *"Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities"*, (MA: Addison-Wesley 1980) pp. 7

or more coders.[31] Reliability in content analysis will be ensured by analyzing the amount of agreement or correspondence among the key informants. The primary data will be supplemented by secondary data on cultural pluralism and politics. The secondary data will be collected from electronic journals, book, periodic reviews and articles.

The data will also be analyzed by making connections to existing, and integrating it with relevant concepts and theoretical framework. Data will be analyzed interpretatively. This will be done by synthesizing, categorizing and organizing the data into patterns that produce the description of the phenomena or a narrative of the synthesis. It will proceed from the belief that all meaning is situational in the particular context or perspective.[32] As a result, there could be different meanings to the same phenomena because the meaning will depend on the context. Since it is a qualitative research the hypothesis will be generated after the data is collected. This will entail evaluating and analyzing the data to determine the adequacy of its information and its credibility, usefulness consistency and validation of the hypothesis. This will be the final step and will entail giving a vivid descriptive account of the situation under study. It will give an analytical view citing the significance and implications of the findings.[33]

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[31] Neuendorf, K. A.' "*The Content Analysis Guidebook Thousand Oaks*", (CA: Sage Publications, 2002) pp. 56

[32] GoK, 2005, *Draft National Policy on Peace Building and Conflict Management*, National Steering Committee (NSC), Nairobi.

[33] E. Burrow, H Gichohi & M. Infield, 2001, *Rhetoric or Reality; a review of Community Conservation Policy and Practice in East Africa*, Nairobi.

Chapter outline

Chapter one is the introduction – A brief background of the research opportunity and the proposed objectives of the study are presented here. the methodology of the research is also introduced in this chapter.

Chapter two is on the concept of early warning & early response

Chapter three outlines conflict early warning in Africa

Chapter four is on data analysis and presentation of CEWERU Kenya

Chapter five wills summaries the findings Conclusions

CHAPTER TWO

The Concept of Early Warning & Early Response

Introduction

Early warning and early response (EW/R) is considered one of the pillars of operational conflict prevention. Some believe that early warning emerged from a military origin while others attribute its emergence to a humanitarian perspective. According to the first perspective, early warning developed during the Cold War in the field of national military intelligence to enhance capacities to predict potential (ballistic) attacks[34]. Early warning started focusing on humanitarian issues and also included famine and refugee migration in the late 1980s. This activity was led by relief organisations that are mostly non-governmental, making them the first actors to use early warning as a system of humanitarian assistance[35].

The origins of 'early warning systems' lie in two main sources - disaster preparedness, where the systematic collection of information was expected to shed light on the causes of natural calamities, and the gathering of military intelligence. In the 1950s a connection was made between the efforts to predict environmental disasters, such as drought and famine, and attempts to foresee crises arising out of political causes. The period from the 1960sto the 1970s was characterised by a firm belief in the value of information technology and faith in the wonders of statistical analysis. Granted large budgets by the governments, projects were constructed which used event data-coding and sought to build models for understanding political behaviour[36]. These started to fall out of favour in the mid-1980s. In 1992, early warning as a system of conflict

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[34] Kaldor, M., *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Cambridge: Polity, 1999.
[35] Gondwe, G., E. "Regional Integration and Globalisation: The Role of COMESA." *African Review of Foreign Policy* 1,2 (1999): 22-30.
[36] Azar's E., The Codebook of the Conflict and Peace Data Bank, (Center for International Development, University of Maryland at College Park: 1982).

prevention was established in the UN Secretariat after the Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali's report, 'An Agenda for Peace[37]', highlighted the link between humanitarian action and the peace process[38].'

The nature of conflict in Africa, has re-invented the focus onto the development of knowledge-based models that enhance the decision maker's ability to identify critical policy developments in a timely manner.

Conflict Early Warning

Early warning can be defined as the "systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of crises for the purpose of anticipating the escalation of violent conflict, the development of strategic responses to these crises, and the presentation of options to key decision makers"[39].

The history of conflict early warning systems was a recent phenomenon dating back to the 1950s and is rooted in intelligence and military reconnaissance. Throughout history, military leaders have sought to gain the high ground advantage, and by doing this, commanders were able to survey large areas of the battlefield, watch enemy troop movements and guard against surprise attacks. In recent years scholars have argued on the necessity and possibility of extending the concept's application to the area of violent human conflicts, both inter-state and domestic ones. During medieval times, feudal lords built their castles on high hills, not only to look out upon their subjects, but also to secure the best battle position and to watch for approaching enemy

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[37] Boutros Boutros-Ghali's report on *An Agenda for Peace*, 1992. para. 23
[38] Guit, Ted Robert and Barbara Harff. *Early Warning- of Communal Conflicts and Genocide: Linking Empirical Research to International Responses.* Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1996.
[39] Schmid, A.P. (1998): *Thesaurus and Glossary of Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Terms (Abridged Version)*, FEWER – Forum on Early Warning and Early Response

forces. Before reaching their current application in conflict prevention, conflict early warning

systems have gone through three different but overlapping phases[40].

During the first phase of their evolution in the last decades of the 1950s century, early

warning systems were mainly developed "to predict impending dangers emanating from natural

disasters such as earthquakes, floods, and stock market crashes in the economic sphere as well as

to predict the effects of these disasters on people." In the second phase of their development in

the 1980s, early warning systems were further expanded into humanitarian affairs to predict

famine and refugee migration with the purpose of alerting relief agencies about looming

humanitarian crises.[41]

Thus, early warning is defined as an instrument of conflict preventive strategies that

should help to ascertain whether and when violent conflicts can be expected to occur, with the

object to prevent this from happening by way of a so-called "early response". Such response

could consist of different forms of (military and non-military) intervention by third actors, such

as states, international (governmental and non-governmental) organizations or individual

mediators[42]. Subsequently in the third and final phase of their development, early warning

systems attained their application in the maintenance of global and regional peace and security in

the early 1990s which also witnessed a surge in their utilization as important intervention tools

for the anticipation and prevention of violent conflicts[43].

[40] Susanna Campbell and Patrick Meier, "Deciding to Prevent Violent Conflict: Early Warning and Decisionmaking within the United Nations", Paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference 49th Annual Convention, Chicago, February 28th, 2007

[41] Ruddy Doom and Koen Vlassenroot, "Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Minerva's Wisdom?", Journal of Humanitarian Assistance (1997).

[42] Rupesinghe, K.: 'Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy', in The Journal of Ethno-Development, 1994, no. 4, pp. 88-97.

[43] Gordenker, Leon "Early Warning: Conceptual amd Practical Issues." Early Warning and Conflict Resolution, eds. Kumar Rupesinghe and Michiko Kuroda. London: The MacMillan Press, Ltd, 1992

Early Warning and Conflict Prevention

Regardless of the possible indicators, early warning still remains a challenging and delicate exercise, which requires the overcoming of two fundamental problems. The concept of early warning has only recently made its way to the field of "high politics" and the settlement of conflict. There are different ways in which one can describe or define the concept of early warning. For example, Lund argues with regard to the related concept of preventive diplomacy that this involves efforts to either prevent or contain violent conflicts.[44]

Firstly, there is the problem of obtaining the necessary quality and quantity of information in a timely manner. Secondly, there exists the analytical problem of misperception or faulty analysis.[45] The core notion behind preventive diplomacy is the argument that addressing problems the moment they emerge is generally better than responding after they have grown to a less manageable scale. Thus, a key defining criterion for preventive diplomacy would be the intensity of a conflict. Often times NGOs are well situated to play a role in early warning and preventive action. They can alert the international community about possible breakdowns in a country's government or in relations amongst different groups. They are in an advantaged position to alert the outside world and local actors, promoting awareness about the sources, likelihood and possible consequences of a conflict and alternatives to it. Preventive diplomacy is concerned with efforts taken at the low levels and incipient stages of a conflict and should be distinguished from action taken with regard to conflicts at higher levels of violence.[46]

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[44] Lund M.,: *Preventive Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: A Guide for the Post-Cold War Era* (draft manuscript: Washington, 1994).
[45] Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997): *Preventing Deadly Conflict*, New York, Carnegie Corporation of New York, online version
[46] Nicolaïdis, K. (1996): *International Preventive Action: Developing a Strategic Framework* In: Rotberg, R.I. (ed. 1996): *Vigilance and Vengeance. NGOs Preventing Ethnic Conflict in Divided Societies*, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, pp. 23-69.

Early warning serves as capacity building for conflict prevention and can be used to strengthen the capacity of potential parties to violent conflict for resolving and progressively reducing the underlying problems that produce disputes. Early warning raises several questions when it comes to the use of the system in conflict prevention[47]. There are those who agree that early warning should not be used as part of the 'conflict prevention' strategy. They recommend that it should be an independent and separate data gathering system. While others highly emphasise that early warning should anticipate conflict before it erupts. They state that the purpose of early warning should not be for reporting the escalation of conflict but rather to predict the root causes of conflict. This is related to the initial use of early warning to detect potential environmental hazards.

Protecting people from harm and violence should not be an issue only before the emergence of conflict but also an ongoing process through different stages of conflict because early warning can play a major role in bringing the information necessary for action and helping to understand the issues. Early warning can facilitate intervention, policy formulation and other responses by conducting effective data collection and, analysis and by recommending a proper implementation framework.[48] Therefore early warning can occur at every step of conflict management, escalation and prevention. It is a system that brings the early warning signs of emerging, potential or ongoing conflict. Therefore, it is relevant and more practical to think of early warning as an important part in three different stages; pre-conflict, in-conflict and post-conflict.

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[47] Bradley E. Perry, "Fast and Frugal Early Warning in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role of Intelligence Analysis" (Master's Thesis, Faculty of Mercyhurst College, 2008), 6.

[48] Nyheim, David. *Preventing Violence, War and State Collapse: The Future of Conflict Early Warning and Response*. Paris: OECD/DAC Secretariat, 2009.

Classification of Early Warning Systems

There are a large number of systems in the field of conflict early warning often exhibiting differences in terms of specific models and tools in use; location of the early warning apparatus, and the nature of ownership of the early warning process.[49]

Hard and Soft Early Warning Systems: In designing an early warning and response mechanism, the tasks are two-fold: On the one hand, the design of an information collection, analysis and communication system; on the other hand, the design of a response or decision-making structure that acts on early warning analyses produced by the system.[50] A "hard" intelligence-oriented system (HEW) is associated with traditional systems of intelligence gathering commonly oriented toward strategic security concerns of states to protect their own national interest[51]. A "soft" humanitarian early warning system (SEW) requires an information and analytic base that stresses human rather than strategic security and the welfare of all stakeholders based on information and analyses developed in a transparent system rather than in a closed one, although the information distributed may be classified and restricted to different levels of users.

Co-operative security posits that actors do not compete for security, but due to its mutuality, they co-operate at the regional, state and lower levels to avoid confrontation and eventually interstate conflict. However, co-operative security still caters for both military and non-military components through discussion, negotiation, co-operation and compromise. Cohen

[49]Matveeva, Anna. "*Early Warning and Early Response: Conceptual and Empirical Dilemmas*." GPAC Issue Paper 1. The Hague: European Center for Conflict Prevention/International Secretariat of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, 2006.

[50] Schmeidl, Susanne. "Conflict Early Warning and Prevention: Toward a Coherent Terminology." In Cirú Mwaúra and Susanne Schmeidl (eds.), *Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa*. Asmara and Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press Inc., 2002. PP.39

[51] Ibid 2002.

conceives of co-operative security as a model that entrenches the central notion of individual security within mutually reinforcing and protective concentric shields of collective security, collective defence and stability promotion[52]. Inherently the model of Cohen, as well as the demarcation by Snyder, both affords conceptual space for hard, as well as emergent soft security dynamics. to promote individual, not state security[53].

As traditional intelligence systems rely on secrecy, situation rooms, and encrypted communications of highly classified information, a HEW modeled after it will be highly centralized and depend on in-house information collection and analysis with extremely limited levels of access[54]. This is very different from a SEW that is highly decentralized and depends on significant involvement of civil society for information input and analyses (research units in universities or think tanks), yet with specific standards for information collection and analysis[55]. As information for early warning must be timely, accurate, valid, reliable. and verifiable, a SEW based on an open system has the advantage of using its networks of interested organizations for these purposes. These practices permit users to judge the source's credibility and, to some degree, the authority of the analysis for themselves. This tends not to be the case in a HEW model where classification of information limits access, thus making verification by outsiders far more difficult.

[52] Cohen, R., 2001, Co-operative Security: From individual security to International Stability, in Co-operative security: New horizons for international order, *The Marshall Centre Papers*, No 3, George Marshall

[53] Snyder, C.A., 'Regional Security Structures', in Snyder, C.A. (ed), 1999, *Contemporary Security and Strategy*, Routledge, New York. PP. 15

[54] Schmeidl, Susanne. "Conflict Early Warning and Prevention: Toward a Coherent Terminology." In Ciru Mwaura and Susanne Schmeidl (eds.), *Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa*. Asmara and Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press Inc., 2002.

[55] Ibid 2002

Parallel to the distinction between "hard" and "soft" early warning, we can further differentiate an interventionist ("hard") and facilitative ("soft") model of conflict management. One approach to conflict early warning, prevention, and management can be based on coercive power, formal. Authority and material influence - an interventionist model. Thus, when countries refuse or are unwilling to cooperate, a regional organization can intervene militarily much as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) did in Kosovo. Short of that, a regional organization (such as the E) can use its formal authority, assigned by treaty, to require compliance with the regional body's dictates. But most of the time a regional organization with the Ell's legal power need not use its formal authority but can simply use economic inducements or penalties (sanctions) to insist that its members fall into line with the community's overall norms[56].

The aim of conflict early warning systems depends on the composition of factors such as the types of conflict (interstate, ethnic or pastoral), geographic coverage (regional, sub-regional, or national), institutional level (governmental or non-governmental) or, composition of stakeholders, there are different expectations on how early warning systems should perform and what they should achieve."[57]

Many different indicators and signals serve as a basis for monitoring potential conflicts and achieving early warnings. Predictors, precursor events or general signs of trouble can be used in forecasting events that could escalate into violent conflicts. Generally, important indicators of violence include widespread human rights abuses, increasingly brutal political oppression, and inflammatory use of the media, the accumulation of arms, and an increase in

[56] Ibid 2002
[57] Susanna Campbell and Patrick Meier, "Deciding to Prevent Violent Conflict: Early Warning and Decisionmaking within the United Nations", Paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference 49th Annual Convention, Chicago, February 28th, 2007.

organized killings.[58] However, noticing the first tensions, signaling and analyzing the situation usually aren't the biggest obstacles. A lack of political power and will amongst governments and trans-governmental organizations to act poses the biggest problem. The missing element is often political will and leadership necessary to translate early warning into effective action and intervention. Early warning has, in fact, been less of a problem as is often assumed. For example, a lot of information was available on the conflicts in Somalia and Rwanda. At the time of escalation of both cases, incoming signals had to compete with other international events as well as find the political will and leadership needed to change early warning into effective early action[59].

According to Alex Austin, the objective of conflict early warning is conceived as "obtaining knowledge to assist in the prevention and mitigation of conflict."[60] Importantly, without the provision of effective national security, neither citizens nor communities can be personally secure. Without secure and stable countries and a body of practice or law whereby countries regulate their interaction, individual, community, regional and international security remain elusive. On the other hand, even if the state is not at war and human rights abuses are present, the security of the state comes under threat[61]. Relatedly, conflict may originate from the individual, the state or the state system or a combination of both. At the same time, the intensity of war also affects neighbouring states increasing migration which in turn affects the economy

[58] Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997): *Preventing Deadly Conflict*, New York, Carnegie Corporation of New York. PP. 70

[59] Aall, P. (2005): *Nongovernmental Organizations* In: Aall, P., Miltenberger, D., Weiss, T.G. (2005): *Guide to IGOs, NGOs, and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations*, Washington D.C., Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace, pp. 85-180.

[60] Alexander Austin, ""Framework for Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System." In *Meeting the Challenges of Conflict Prevention in Africa: Towards the Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System*. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2008.

[61] Souaré, Issaka. "Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Mechanisms in Africa: A Critical Assessment of Progress.' *African Security Review* 16, no.3 (2007): PP. 96-109.

and social condition of the country. This shows the interrelated nature of insecurity. Therefore human security and national security can never be mutually exclusive. It is impossible to ignore the fact that both are interlinked since one cannot be achieved without the other. In this sense, in order for early warning to be effective, its purpose and scope should be broadened. Thus the broader perspective of human security is useful as it provides broader indicators for early warning.

There were two strands to the debates on the aim of early warning among operational agencies. On the one hand, some argued that early warning should serve as a tool to predict the outbreak, escalation, or resurgence of violent conflict. According to this school of thought, early warning analysis as an exercise should also be kept separately from advocacy efforts on response. Such a separation was seen as necessary to ensure that early warning analysis did not lose rigour because of a need to promote one response option or another[62]. Though conflicts can lead to change in some situations, they have also contributed to the deaths of individuals, the destruction of infrastructures, widespread sexual abuse and the looting of natural resources. So it is essential to distinguish between conflicts that are beneficial and conflicts that are disadvantageous[63]. A clear understanding of the kinds of conflicts that early warning should report is a critical question that must be addressed.

The other argument countered this saying that simply predicting or providing analysis on whether violence will erupt (and lives will be lost) in a given area was not in the interests of the populations living there. Rather, early warning should be linked to strong response mechanisms

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[62] Schmid, Alex P. *Thesaurus and Glossary of Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Terms.* London: FEWER, Erasmus University, Syntesis Foundation, 1998.

[63] Guit, Ted Robert and Will H., Moore. "Ethnopolitical Rebellion: A Cross-Sectional Analysis of the 1980s with Risk Assessments for the 1990s." *American Journal of Political Science, Vol.* 41,4 1997: PP. 1079-1103.

and advocacy efforts at national, regional, and international levels *to save lives*. warning in the African Union is rooted in the new concept of 'human security' and the principle of the responsibility to protect. Human security is about human beings and their broader security needs. Despite widespread support for the core principles of early warning, consensus seems to be lacking over precisely what threats individuals should be protected from.

The concept of conflict early warning is also closely related to that of early response, which is defined as "any initiative that occurs in the latent stages of a perceived potential armed conflict with the aim at reduction, resolution or transformation." Response can be undertaken by different actors such as international community, regional organizations, national governments, civil society organizations, etc. In fact, as indicated in OECD's 2009 early warning publication. existing "common wisdom" in the field dictates that conflict early warnings should have "a strong link to responders or response mechanisms."

On the other hand, advocates for the broader meaning of human security agree that individuals should not be protected only from violence or fear but also from other challenges such as hunger, disease and natural disasters because these kill far more people than war, genocide and terrorism combined. Accordingly, they argue that human security should include the protection of people from threat as well as from violence. While those that support the narrow perspective indicate that focusing on more specific issues would lead to greater success, the broader school of thought states that addressing issues narrowly cannot bring sustainable peace and security since other root causes will not be addressed and may escalate with time.

They even define human security as 'the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment and the freedom to take action on one's own behalf[64].

Africa has traditionally followed a broad and expansive approach to the concept of human security. The draft African Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact states that: Human security means the security of the individual with respect to the satisfaction of the basic needs of life; it also encompasses the creation of the social, political, economic, military, environmental and cultural conditions necessary for the survival, livelihood, and dignity of the individual, including the protection of fundamental freedoms, the respect for human rights, good governance, access to education, healthcare, and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his/her own potential[65].

The security of the individual is also considered to be broader in terms of his/her personal surroundings and the community the individual lives in. From the above definition, it is clear that the AU has adopted an expansive view of what constitutes human security. But there are those who caution against the broadening of the concept. According to them, broadening the definition of human security would make it less practical. However, with more than 800,000 people a year losing their lives to violence and about 2.8 billion suffering from poverty, ill health, illiteracy and other maladies, the inclusion of freedom from want cannot justifiably be ignored.

On the other hand, in light of the wide spectrum of security needs it seeks to achieve, the objective of early warning is also conceived in relation to human security. As shown by Tobias Debiel and Herbert Wulf, most conflict early warning systems currently in operation claim that

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[64] Matveeva, Anna. "Early Warning and Early Response: Conceptual and Empirical Dilemmas." GPAC Issue Paper 1. The Hague: European Center for Conflict Prevention/International Secretariat of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, 2006.
[65] Perry, Bradley E. "Fast and Frugal Early Warning in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role of Intelligence Analysis." Master's Thesis, Faculty of Mercyhurst College, 2008.

their objective is "tackling threats to human security such as wars, armed conflicts, state failure, genocide, and other gross human rights violations."[66]

Early Warning Systems Specialist

The Early Warning Systems Specialist (EWSS) analyses the situation and formulates the options for a community-based early warning system on climate change related hazards, to be piloted in the target communities, after having assessed and documented the recent early warning and emergency practice in the country and the target area, and the roles and functions of key actors in the field. His/her consulting services will provide the groundwork for establishing a suitable, practical, adapted and low-cost early warning system in anticipation of climatic variations, e.g. flood and drought. The initial workshop of experts on early warning reached a consensus that threats of violence and loss of life are potential entry points for the AU's early warning system. This was followed by the draft Roadmap which emphasizes that 'the objective of the CEWS should be the provision of timely advice on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security to enable the development of appropriate response strategies to prevent or limit the destructive effects of violent conflicts[67].'

If early warning is to anticipate violent conflict, this cannot be understood without reference to root causes such as poverty, inequality, political representation and the uneven distribution of resources. The link between violence with deep rooted poverty, inequality, development, governance and other related issues is discussed by many scholars. For example, the 2001 UN Report clearly mentions that every step taken towards reducing poverty and

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[66] Bradley E. Perry, "Fast and Frugal Early Warning in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role of Intelligence Analysis" (Master's Thesis, Faculty of Mercyhurst College, 2008), 6.

[67] Wong, Chee Yew and Sakun Boon-itt. "The Influence of Institutional Norms and Environmental Uncertainty on Supply Chain Integration in the Thai Automotive Industry." *International Journal of Production Economics* 115, no. 2(2008): 400-410.

achieving broad based economic growth is a step towards conflict prevention. Therefore, preventive strategies must work to promote human rights, to protect minority rights and to institute political arrangements in which all groups are represented. Hence, ignoring these underlying factors amounts to addressing the symptoms rather than the causes of deadly conflicts. [68].

Response Mechanisms

Early Response is often used in conjunction with 'Early Warning'. The term refers to either 'preventive action' or 'early response action'. According to Diller, early response is defined as a "process of consultation, policymaking, planning, and action to reduce or avoid armed conflict. These processes include: diplomatic/political; military/security, humanitarian; and development/economic activity." It means that there exist various kinds of ER actors: UN, regional governments, individual governments, NGOs, individuals and so on[69].

Ensuring human security has been presented as a means of reducing the human costs of violent conflict. Integrating early warning and early response with a conflict prevention through intervention strategies based on human security and a multiple engagement, multi-track approach to address sources of violence[70]. Traditional mechanisms of responding to conflicts, in addition to government ones, irrespective of whether the government has sanctioned them or not, or whether there is outside support for them or not. Typically, whether government influence is present or not, every community has ways of responding to conflicts, ranging from the individual

[68] Austin, Alexander. "Early Warning and the Field: A Cargo Cult Science?" In Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management (ed.), *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2004.
[69] Schmid, A. (2000) Thesaurus and Glossary of Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Terms. Forum on Early Warning & Early Response (FEWER).
[70] Endaragalle, D. (2005) 'A New Generation of Conflict Prevention: Early Warning, Early Action and Human Security' pp. 8 –unpublished working paper

and family level to the community level. Ordinarily, if the conflicting parties agree to 'talk', through self or communal initiatives, they do it with or without assistance from the rest of the community members. What happens largely depends on the generally accepted rules and guidelines of the involved communities. Other primary stakeholders playing key roles in response are the government and civil society organisations (CSOs).

Early Warning System the Foundation for Co-Existence (FCE) has been implementing a citizen based early response mechanism. This system has intervened in a recorded number of 156cases of conflict. Four independent evaluations by international experts in the science of conflict resolution have attested that this system has prevented or mitigated or contributed to resolve conflicts

The FCE's early response system is based on the application of multi-track diplomacy. Multitrack diplomacy is the implementation of conflict prevention interventions from different vantage points within a 'citizen based network'. It emphasizes making citizens a major stakeholder in the process of transforming the conflict. "Multi-track diplomacy is based on two principles. The first is that the greater the degree of concern and effort there is to prevent or resolve a conflict, the greater the chance of success. What is intended is that citizens share the burden of reconciliation, conflict resolution and networking to revive and transform relationships[71]. The second principle is that the limitations of each actor or sector can be overcome through cooperation and coordination with others. What is meant here is that strategic sectors of society such as business elites, trade unions, professional organizations, religious organizations, war victims, NGOs, and community leaders are involved in sharing the burden of conflict transformation". It is evident from the 'multi track diplomacy' approach that the success

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[71] Endaragalle, D. (Forthcoming) 'Theoretical Justifications For FCE's Early Warning And Early Response System.'

ate of an early response process depends on two- on many occasions social- variables. They are

he degree of effort invested in order to prevent and the amount of limitations to intervene in a

onflict.

The responses experienced in all MSs are triggered by warning signs and messages of

erious disagreements (e.g. feuding groups cease sharing resources, one group domineering, and

najority of the people become 'yes' persons). The warning information comes from the people

hemselves and/or local administrators e.g. chiefs, councillors and headmen. In Kenya for

nstance, the usual flow of information is: chief councillors peace committees district officer

DO) district commissioner (DC)[72]. In the case of the former Turkana District, Kenya, once a

:onflict (real or potential) is known, the district peace and development committee, Riam Riam,

:tarts to discuss and plan on what to do and how to respond, both in short (rapid) and long (listen

o grievances and then decide what to do could be compensations) terms. At the conflicting level,

:hiefs, churches/sheikhs councillors and elders come together to discus and dialogue on what to

lo.

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[72] Endaragalle, D. (2005) 'A New Generation of Conflict Prevention: Early Warning, Early Action and Human Security' pp. 8 –unpublished working paper

CHAPTER THREE

Conflict Early Warning Systems/Mechanism in Africa

Introduction

As indicated in Chapter Two, the African Union is in the process of implementing the various pillars of the African peace and security architecture (APSA) including the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) which is envisaged to be instrumental in the timely prevention of violent conflicts. An integral part of this process is that of harmonizing conflict early warning in the continent by integrating the early warning mechanisms of the different sub-regions within the overarching framework of the CEWS. Intent on situating this process of harmonization in the proper conceptual context, this chapter attempts to provide synthesized information on theoretical aspects of conflict early warning; explores its historical development; and finally concludes by providing an overview of classifications of early warning systems.

Conflict in Africa

The term conflict is often used to refer to armed conflict.[73] Mwagiru defines conflict in reference to the existence and pursuance of incompatible goals by two or more parties.[74] Burton makes a distinction between disputes that are over interests and conflicts from those that are over values.[75] He also observes that conflicts of interests can be negotiated, mediated or subjected to judicial determination while conflicts involving needs, values and identity can not be subject to compromise. Mwagiru concurs with Burton's definition about conflicts involving values, wants

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[73] W. Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and intervention in Africa*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985, page 8.
[74] Mwagiru, M. Conflict, Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management. Nairobi: Watermark Printer. 2000.
[75] J. W. Burton, "World Society and Human Needs" in I. Margot and A. J. R. Groom (eds.)

and interests.[76] 'Conflict' has been perceived differently by diverse scholars. There are those who view conflict to be subjective. To them for a conflict to exist, it has to be dysfunctional and its effects must be felt by the parties.[77] This group identifies itself with the conflict research paradigm.[78]

The other group of scholars argues that a conflict need not be felt by parties to the conflict; this group perceives conflict to be objective. The objective view is propounded by the peace research paradigm, which argues that there exists structural violence which is not felt or realized by the parties. Vayrynen observes that a conflict is not static and that each conflict has a life and autonomy of its own.[79] The life of a conflict is carried by the parties to the conflict because they experienced it and took part in the conflict. He further argues that because a conflict has a life it also has a memory. The memory of a conflict is carried by the parties to the conflict and passed on to other generations.

Brown defines ethnic conflict as a dispute about important political, economic, cultural or territorial issues between two or more ethnic communities.[80] He observes that ethnic conflict is differentiated from other conflicts because the battle line is defined on ethnic identity. Stavenhagen argues that ethnic conflicts start out as internal disputes and become internationalized when neighboring states and other international actors become involved.

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[76] M. Mwagiru, *The international Management of Internal Conflicts in Africa*, Uganda Mediation, 1985, PP. 26-28.

[77] K. Webb, "Structural Violence and Definition of Conflict", World Encyclopedia of Peace, Vol. 2, Oxford Pergamon Press, 1986, PP. 431-434.

[78] See Theoretical Framework.

[79] R. Vayrynen, "To Settle or to Transform? Perspective on the Resolution of National and International Conflicts" in R. Vayrynen, (ed.) *New Direction in Conflict Theory and Conflict Theory and Conflict Resolution*, London Sage Publishers, 1991, pp. 20-25.

[80] M.E. Brown, "Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflicts" in M. E. Brown (ed.) *Ethnic Conflict and International Security op. cit. pp. 4-26: 5.*

Horowitz explores important themes and frameworks in ethnic conflicts. He argues that symbolic politics and ethnic status are important in understanding the underlying causes of ethnic conflicts. He observes that symbolic politics and ethnic status are important in determining group status in post-colonial societies and cannot compete effectively with the state in the allocation of prestige. Secondly, under colonial rule attributes and economic benefits were based on ethnic status and became matters of state in Kenya. Moreover, Steve employs the internal colonialism model to explain the existence of ethnic conflicts.[81] He identifies political, social and economic domination of an ethnic group by another as the underlying causes of the dominated group to mobilize on an ethnic basis.[82] The internal colonialism thesis can be traced back to the debate between Europe and America on the question of the self-determination of colonial people. The thesis is also used to explain the extent to which ethnic sentiments are in part a product of tolerance or intolerance of the central state.

Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism

Conflict prevention requires careful monitoring of indicators of rising tensions and taking measures to ease them. [83]Early warning consists of data collection, risk analysis, and the transmission of information with recommendations to targeted recipients. Early response systems refer to timely and appropriate prevention initiatives, usually undertaken during latent stages of perceived potential violent conflict[84].

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[81] Steve, J. "Internal Colonialism", *Ethnicity and Racial Studies.* Vol. 2 No 2, 1979, pp 255-8. Internal Colonialism model has been used to explain relationship based on racism, ethnic and cultural categorization of the population within a state that contributes to accentuate differences that focus into makers of inequality.

[82] Ibid

[83] Cilliars J, 'Towards a Continental early Warning System for Africa', ISS paper 102, April (2005) 12.

[84] Alexander Austin, 'Early Warning and the Field: a Cargo Cult Science?', *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation,* (Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin: 2003).

Early warning and early response systems have been adopted by international organisations, bilateral agencies, research institutions and NGOs. Early warning specialists differ as to their selection of the types of conflicts that should be targeted for preventive action. By and large there is agreement that the nature of the response should be proportional to the intensity of the conflict and that such response is likely to be more effective in its early stages. Formulation of accurate predictions is challenging, the more difficult aspect has been persuading political leaders and the public to act upon warnings. Often civil society organisations end up playing the dual role of warning as well as implementing measures in response.[85]

Lund, however, refers to moments of ripeness, in the sense that there could be more possible turning or opportunity points, at which third parties might take effective action[86]. This is in line with the work done by Bloomfield and Leiss on the containment of localized conflicts[87]. They argue that conflict is, above all, a dynamic process consisting of a sequence of phases. Within each phase there are factors that generate pressures, which encourage or discourage violence. The balance between them determines whether a conflict will deteriorate[88]. Within each stage these factors push the conflict across thresholds toward or away from violence.

Operationalizing conflict early warning systems which was initiated at the continental level as indicated earlier was replicated at sub-regional levels with the various Regional Economic Communities (RECs) following suit in establishing their respective early warning mechanisms. Similar to the continental one, the main focus of the sub-regional early warning

[85] CEWARN, *CEWARN Strategy: 2007-2011*(Addis Ababa: The CEWARN Unit, 2006), 14.
[86] Lund M..: *Preventive Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: A Guide for the Post-Cold War Era* (draft manuscript: Washington, 1994).
[87]Bloomfield L.P. and A.C. Leiss, "*Controlling Small Wars: A Strategy for the 1970s*" (London, 1970).
[88] Rupiya, Martin R. and Nhema, Afred G. 2008. 'A Regional Security Perspective from and for the Horn of Africa', in H. G. Brauch et al. (eds), *Globalization and Environmental Challenges*. Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer PP. 21

initiatives is generally conceptualized as "alerting a recognized authority to the threat of a new (or renewed) armed conflict at a sufficiently early stage so that the authority can attempt to take preventive action[89]. Nevertheless, the various RECs are at different levels of progress in terms of implementing their early warning and conflict analysis mechanisms.[90] While some like the ECOWAS and IGAD are more advanced in terms of implementing major parts of their early warning data

IGAD-CEWARN

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa was created in 1996 with the promulgation of the Agreement Establishing the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). This replaced the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) which had been founded in 1986.

The IGAD Secretariat has developed a number of projects to help build the capacity of member states in the area of conflict prevention, management and resolution. As a first step IGAD, with funding from the European Union (EU), is building conflict prevention and mediation capacities in the region. The IGAD Heads of State and Government meeting at the 9th Summit in Khartoum in January 2002 signed a Protocol on the Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN). CEWARN was launched in the first week of September 2002 in Addis Ababa. The Unit's staff component of three researchers is currently undergoing training in early warning data analysis. It is envisaged that their Unit will work in

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[89] Albrecht Schnabel and David Carment (eds.), *Conflict Prevention from Rhetoric to Reality* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004), 317.
[90] AU [African Union] CMD [Conflict Management Division] (eds.), "Status of Implementation of Early Warning Systems in the Regional Economic Communities: Background Paper No. 4", In *Meeting the Challenges of Conflict Prevention in Africa: Towards the Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System* (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2008a).

cooperation with regional early warning units, or CEWARU's, based in each IGAD member state.

Early warning and response systems were first developed in Africa in the 1970s to deal with drought and to ensure food supplies to avoid humanitarian disasters. In the 1990s, accelerated by the Rwandan genocide, early warning efforts expanded beyond natural disasters to include food security and refugees. More recently, early warning efforts have been used to address the prevention, management and resolution of violent conflicts. Cilliars rightly notes that the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) represents the most sophisticated system available amongst the Regional Economic Communities in Peace and security[91].' External factors have played a role in the evolution of both internal and inter-state conflicts in the IGAD region. This is because the Horn of Africa is strategically located at the crossroads of different continents, cultures and influences. The Horn of Africa region is also exposed to the hazards of peripheral areas which act as breeding grounds for transboundary threats including smuggling, lawlessness, militias, and, increasingly, international terrorism. Each IGAD Member State is vulnerable to spillover effects of violent conflict in other states of the region. Such effects include illegal cross-border movements and large-scale cross-border crime[92]. Pursuant to this, IGAD established an early warning unit in 2000 under the Protocol on the Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) which has a central hub located in Addis Ababa. This unit is responsible for the exchange of information, encoding of information and support of the national units, known as Conflict Early Warning and Response

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[91] J Cilliars, 'Towards a Continental early Warning System for Africa', ISS paper 102, April (2005) 12.
[92] Susanna Campbell and Patrick Meier, "Deciding to Prevent Violent Conflict: Early Warning and Decisionmaking within the United Nations", Paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference 49th Annual Convention, Chicago, February 28th, 2007

Units[93].' From this list and various reports and writings on CEWARN, it is clear that its current focus is cross border pastoral conflict. This perhaps would explain CEWARN's inability to make substantive early warning reports on the postelectoral violence situation in Kenya in 2007 and the recent Ugandan riots in August 2009.

There are various levels of process that figure into institutionalizing regional conflict early warning mechanisms. In order to capture the diversity and linkages of the regional actors in conflict, CEWARN has to operate at three levels: subnational, national, and regional. While the latter level provides the necessary foundation for any regional conflict early warning mechanism, cooperation is essential with other mechanisms at lower levels for the entire system to function properly. It is against this background that IGAD has been active in the field of peace and security since its revitalization in 1996.[94] It continuously supports initiatives on conflict prevention, management and resolution (CPMR). As a regional body and political forum in the Horn of Africa

IGAD's mandate was broadened to include the promotion of peace and stability in the sub region and creation of mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention, management and resolution of interstate and intrastate conflicts through dialogue. There is much critique, however, that early warning has not translated into early or effective response. The national level involves essentially in-state mechanisms (CEWERUs), while sub-national 9nes range from the provincial or district level to the cavity. The challenge is to integrate these national and sub-

[93] C Mwaura and S Schmeidl (eds) *Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa*, 2002.
[94] J Cilliars, 'Towards a Continental early Warning System for Africa', ISS paper 102, April (2005) 12.

national mechanisms properly into the larger regional CEWARN framework, especially as each level involves both official actors (government representatives) and civil society[95].

IGAD, like several other regional institutions, should take the lead on conflict management, but it is severely hampered by wars and conflict among its members. Considering the fact that within IGAD we find Somalia as a collapsed state, Sudan with its wars and defying international conflict-moderating action, Ethiopia and Eritrea in a state of no-peace-no-war and Uganda with its northern conflict with the Lord's Resistance Army, the impossible conflict mediating task of the regional organisation becomes apparent[96]. Obviously, IGAD is compromised by conflicts and has not been in a position to develop a framework capable of coping with these conflicts[97].

The security architecture of IGAD is with the exception of the EWR system CEWARN not presently at an implementation stage. However, despite all these difficulties IGAD has The seven member states of IGAD created CEWARN for the Horn of Africa region. The mandate of CEWARN is to 'receive and share information concerning potentially violent conflicts as well as their outbreak and escalation in the IGAD region'. With the mandate to predict tensions and conflicts CEWARN combines elements of the predictive model and the risk assessment models because of a number of acute inter- and intra-state conflicts in the region CEWARN initially

[95] Healy, Sally. 2008. *Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa*. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House.
[96] Rupiya, Martin R. and Nhema, Afred G. 2008. 'A Regional Security Perspective from and for the Horn of Africa', in H. G. Brauch et al. (eds), *Globalization and Environmental Challenges*. Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer.
[97] Healy, Sally. 2008. *Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa*. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House.

adopted an incremental approach by focusing exclusively on two pastoralist conflicts[98]. Its ultimate aim is to report on all violent conflicts in a broadly defined human security area and not just on national or state security. Operationally, CEWARN established a network of field monitors, country coordinators, national research institutes and conflict-EWR units at the national level and began its work in two pilot areas on pastoral conflicts in the cross-border areas of Ethiopia, Kenya Uganda and Sudan as well as in the second cross-border areas of Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia CEWARN uses a set of 52 socio-political indicators for two types of reports: Violent Incident Reports with indicators on armed clashes, raids, protest demonstrations and other crimes; and indicators for reports on the presence and status of communal relations, civil society activities, economic activities, governance and media, natural disasters, safety and security and social services.

CEWARN also recognises that there are several continuing operational gaps of implementation, including an inadequate information base and the lack of an effective response component. The capabilities and funding of CEWARN as well as those of IGAD are limited. The clearing house at the headquarters employs a small number of staff. It is intended to report on pastoral conflicts in all member states within the present planning period (2007-2011).

African Union: adoption of interventionist policies

Protracted violent conflict and the development crisis in sub-Saharan Africa led to two important African economic and security initiatives: the New Partnership for Africa's Development and the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU). Both institutions were launched to facilitate 'African solutions to African

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[98] Von Keyserlingk, Niels and Kopfmüller, Simone. 2006. *Conflict Early Warning Systems. Lessons Learned from Establishing a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) in the Horn of Africa.*

problems'. The OAU had been the stronghold for upholding state sovereignty[99]. When it was launched by the African heads of state in 1999, the AU committed itself to promote peace, security and stability of the continent, to promote democracy and good governance, due process, the rule of law and human rights, as well to engage in effective intervention under grave circumstances. At the same time the vision of the AU upholds defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its members[100].

Before the 1993 reforms officials of the General Secretariat were engaged in the monitoring of conflicts. To this purpose they drafted reports to the Secretary-General and formulated recommendations to him whether or not to launch mediation initiatives. This work has always been of a subordinate nature in OAU conflict management, as Secretariat functionaries have only limited autonomous powers: their task is restricted to advice and persuasion. Moreover, the functioning of the OAU and its staff has always been considerably affected by the constraints inherent in the organization's parsimonious budget. The gathering and analysis of information has therefore been hampered by insufficient research facilities and limited funds for travel.

During the few years that the AU has been operational it was, or is, engaged in four military peacekeeping or peace-building missions. The AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)[101], initiated in 2002, is intended according to the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union – for 'early responses to contain crisis

[99] Ikome, Francis Nguendi. *'Good Coups and Bad Coups: The Limits of the African Union's Injunction on Unconstitutional Changes of Power in Africa'*. Occasional Paper 55. Johannesburg, Institute for Global Dialogue, 2007

[100] Murithi, Tim. 2008. 'The African Union's evolving role in peace operations: the African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia', *African Security Review* 17(1): PP. 70-82.

[101] Boshoff, Henri. 2003. 'Early Warning: Some Techniques and Other Thoughts', Speaker, Workshop on the Establishment of the AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), Addis Ababa, October 30-31.

situations so as to prevent them from developing into full-blown conflicts' (African Union 2002). It consists of two components: an observation and monitoring centre ('The Situation Room') at the AU headquarters which is responsible for data collection and analysis on the basis of appropriate early warning indicators; and parallel observation and monitoring units at the sub-regional level, which are supposed to link up to the Situation Room.

AU claims far-reaching competencies. Article 4 opened up the possibility of military intervention under two circumstances[102]: first, 'pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity'; and second, upon request of a member state 'in order to restore peace and security[103]. On the basis of this charter the AU has engaged in several peace operations and has adopted an interventionist policy. It seems that rudimentary African security architecture to address African security needs is emerging. At its top is the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), the political decision-making body, consisting of fifteen rotating members, as an organ 'for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts'. It is intended to be 'a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa' (African Union 2002)[104].

In addition, the AU's military capacities are still not very strong. The ASF is still in its early stages. The AU wants to have up to five regional brigades with a strength of at least 3,000 troops each, ready to operate as an African Rapid Reaction Force by June 2010 and capable of deployment anywhere on the continent. However, even if the non-interference norm is now interpreted in more restricted fashion, it is doubtful whether member states would at present be

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[102] African Union. 2002. *Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council*
[103] AU (2000). Constitutive Act of the African Union.African Union,Lome.
[104] Boshoff, Henri. 2003. 'Early Warning: Some Techniques and Other Thoughts', Workshop on the Establishment of the AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), Addis Ababa, October 30-31.

willing to accept further limits on their sovereignty. The extent to which the OSCE is allowed to go in Europe is probably wholly unacceptable. Moreover, in terms of the conflictual structures marking domestic socio-political configurations ideas on OSCE lines also seem unrealistic. In many cases the adherence to formal notions of sovereignty is a vital - and sometimes one of the few remaining - means with which state elites hope to preserve their position vis-à-vis the rest of the population.

The   of African Unity (OAU) established the Central Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution charged with the anticipation and prevention of situations of armed conflict as well as with undertaking peacemaking and peace-building efforts. The establishment of a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), however, accelerated after the transformation of the OAU to the African Union (AU) in 2002. The CEWS is intended to be one of the key pillars of the Peace and Security Council in addition to the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force and a Special Fund. The Roadmap for the Operationalization of the CEWS which was developed in 2005 to describe the practical steps necessary for its implementation was adopted by the Peace and Security Council in June 2006. CEWS is an adaptation of the EU early warning system[105]. The main instruments of the CEWS are reports, compiled on the basis of open source information that identifies potentially dangerous activity. These reports are the basis for the Peace and Security Council decisions, particularly for the possible deployment of the African Standby Forces. This setup of AU's early warning system places it into the type of risk assessment models with an early warning component.

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[105] African Union. 2002. *Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council*

The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) is supposed to anticipate and thus prevent conflict from turning violent. Only a few specialists have been employed so far. Thus, the early warning system is far from functioning. The African Peace Facility Fund, mutually financed by the EU and AU, provides special support with its pledge of €300 million between 2008 and 2010. A major influence on the AU has been the operations of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in West African conflict situations. ECOMOG was the first African regional initiative on peacekeeping and was deployed in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. ECOMOG is seen as a model since, according to a study by the European Parliament (2008: 16): Its shows that a committed and robust regional force can bring an end to complicated conflicts. Indeed, the experience of ECOWAS in the field of peace and security offers much that the rest of Africa can learn from.

The CEWS is planned to deliver standardised and timely early warning reports as well as effective policy options as of 2009. An evaluation of the CEWS in 2006, made clear how much is still to be done, particularly also to link up to the emerging regional EWR systems (African Union 2008). According to a study of the European Parliament the CEWS is understaffed and underfunded and thus seriously constrained in its activity[106].

COMESA

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA[107]) aims to fully integrate the countries of Eastern and Southern Africa into an economic union through trade and investment. COMESA's active engagement in addressing the conflicts in the region dates back to

[106] Boshoff, Henri. 2003. 'Early Warning: Some Techniques and Other Thoughts', Speaker, Workshop on the Establishment of the AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), Addis Ababa. October 30-31.
[107] The Member States are: Angola, Burundi; Comoros; Democratic Republic of Congo; Djibouti; Egypt; Eritrea; Ethiopia; Kenya; Madagascar; Malawi; Mauritius; Namibia; Rwanda; Seychelles; Sudan; Swaziland; Uganda; Zambia; Zimbabwe

1999 due to concerns on what appeared then as widespread and persistent armed conflicts in the region and after a lengthy debate on the devastating impact of wars and conflicts on the COMESA integration agenda as noted in preceding sections. The Fourth Summit of the COMESA Authority, which was held in Nairobi, Kenya in May 1999 then made a decision for formal structures and modalities for COMESA engagement on matters of peace and security under the article 3(d) of the COMESA treaty. The Authority mandated COMESA Ministers of Foreign Affairs to meet at least once in a year to discuss modalities for addressing peace and security and to also monitor and advice the Authority on promotion of peace, security and stability. The Authority also directed that the activities of the Programme would have to work within the framework of the African Union, hence build towards the Regional Peace and Security Architecture. The Authority also decided on a three tier system to enable faster intervention.

COMESA attained a Free Trade Area on 31 October 2000 after 17 years of a trade liberalisation programme starting under the Preferential Trade Areas for Eastern and Southern African States (PTA) which was established in 1982. The immediate objective of COMESA is to move to a Customs by the year 2004. Recognizing the complexity of the conflicts in the region the Authority further directed the COMESA Secretariat on the need for collaborative and consultative relationship between a wide range of stakeholders that include civil society, business community and parliamentarians. COMESA responded by setting up the structures for the engagement of other non-state actors including the formation of a network of civil society

and private sector organizations through a process of accreditation to the COMESA Programme on Peace and Security; and the establishment of a COMESA Inter-Parliamentary Forum[108].

During the First Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs that was held in Lusaka, Zambia in 2000, the Ministers recommended for the future development of an early warning system with the view of consolidating COMESA economic integration programme. Following this, the establishing an early warning and response system has always remained high on the priority and has been revisited by various Meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. An opportunity for COMESA to eventually set this came up through a capacity building program of the African Peace Facility (APF) for AU and the other recognized Regional Economic Communities (RECs), which has the objective of capacitating them to engage more effectively an on a sustainable basis in CPMR of armed conflicts in the continent. (The African Peace Facility was created to support emerging new African structures to work for peace and security in Africa). COMESA is thus in the process of developing its indicators to be used in the structural vulnerability assessments. The development of the indicators will be done in close collaboration with civil society actors.

COMESA works together with IGAD and EAC and funded through the European Union's 9th EDF have developed a CPMR strategy for the ESA region. COMESA was designated a lead role in the "Fight against War Economy". This is taking to account the role that the illicit exploitation of natural resources has played in propagating the conflicts and could also be a key source of conflict in the case of relapse of conflicts particularly in the Great Lakes region. COMESA in collaboration with EAC and IGAD are jointly developing a programme

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[108] Oyejide, T. A., "Rationalization of Regional Integration Institutions in West and Central Africa", Report prepared for the Global Coalition for Africa. 2001.

intended to enhance political integration, good governance and human security, which are seen as cross cutting issues to regional integration but which also closely support conflict prevention[109]. The programme which will be under the overall leadership of EAC will strive to achieve results of improving political governance, transparency, democratization processes, security, stability and sustainable development in the Region.

At the inception of the COMESA Programme on Peace and Security, COMESA Member States found that one of the root factors of conflicts in the COMESA region to be lack of democratic governance and the rule of law. The Member states encouraged each other to enhance democracy, good governance and the rule of law through implementing Article 6h of the COMESA Treaty which provides for an agreement on the promotion of democracy, good governance and the rule of law in all its member states.

As COMESA awaits the implementation of the political integration and human security support programme, it has continued to observe elections in member states to ensure that they are perceived as free and fair. While COMESA observes elections upon initiation to Member States. Elections that have the potential to instigate conflicts and elections in countries emerging from conflicts are of particular interest.

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) established its Conflict Early Warning System (COMWARN) in June 2009. COMWARN endeavours to respond to the COMESA mandate of conflict prevention through preventive diplomacy, by focusing on structural factors of conflicts. The entry points for COMWARN are structural vulnerability and enabling COMESA to respond at the earliest possible stage. COMWARN, which is currently being developed, will include a comprehensive early warning and analysis

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[109] Hess, R., "Rationalization of Regional Integration Institutions in Eastern and Southern Africa: An Overview of the current Situation", Report prepared for the Global Coalition for Africa, 2000.

system capable of identifying the conditions, processes and actors that cause the eruption, escalation and persistence of conflicts. COMESA is in the process of developing, in close collaboration with civil society actors, the indicators to be used in the structural vulnerability assessments.

ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN)

The ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN) is an observation and monitoring tool for conflict prevention and decision-making. As set out in Article 58 of the revised 1993 ECOWAS Treaty, its establishment and functioning are defined by the Protocol, Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security of December 1999. The implementation of this tool begun in 2003. ECOWARN is the conflict early warning mechanism of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which was founded in 1975 as regional grouping of fifteen member states[110], primarily tasked with the promotion of economic integration[111]. Following an organizational reform in 1993, the ECOWAS expanded its activities in the domain of peace and security management "against the backdrop of an altered international environment and regime change in numerous member states."

The rationale for the establishment of the ECOWARN as a sub-regional early warning mechanism is to be found in the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peace-keeping and Resolutions adopted in 1999, which stipulated for "the strengthening of the cooperation between Member States in the fields of preventive

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[110] Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo
[111] CEWARN, *CEWARN Strategy: 2007-2011*(Addis Ababa: The CEWARN Unit, 2006), 14.

diplomacy, early warning, prevention of cross-border crimes, peace-keeping, and equitable management of natural resources[112]."

This mechanism is unique in Africa in its current configuration, its evolution and implementation. Discussions are underway with other Regional Economic Communities (RECs) that would like to use it as a model[113]. ECOWARN is made up of two operational branches. One is the Observation and Monitoring Centre based in Abuja. It has a Situation Room and works with analysts, experts and ECOWAS personnel. It is currently managed by Colonel Yoro Koné. It is under the responsibility of Colonel Touré (Commissioner in charge of Political Affairs, Peace and Security) as well as Dr. Mohamed Ibn Chambas (President of the ECOWAS Commission).

The second operational branch is the four sub-regional zone offices. Zone I covers Cape Verde, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal. Zone II covers Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali and Niger. Zone III covers Ghana, Guinea Conakry, Liberia and Sierra Leone. I currently manage Zone IV covering Benin, Nigeria and Togo. ECOWARN has evolved a lot even though more can always be done. ECOWARN have a high-performance tool thats have improved over time. This very technical tool has been progressively adjusted to field realities, in particular thanks to the contribution by West African civil society. It also had to be translated into French as it was developed in English. This was not easy as the concepts are at times different.

ECOWAS created the peace exchange forum which is a specialised online dialogue platform through which relevant actors can exchange and improve synergies among their actions. It is accessible to members with a login and password. The zone offices are like observation and

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[112] ECOWAS, *The Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Management, Resolution, Peace Keeping and Security* (Lome, 1999), Chapter IV.
[113] CEWARN, *CEWARN Strategy: 2007-2011*(Addis Ababa: The CEWARN Unit, 2006), 14.

monitoring offices. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has proven to be a significant body for action regarding conflict and, despite significant material and political challenges, represents the vanguard of sub-regional security development in Africa. ECOWAS' Early Warning Mechanism (ECOWARN)[114] provides weekly monitoring and evaluation of developments in the 15 states of the sub-region that could potentially lead to violent conflict. The 30-40 monitors in the system comprise civil society members of the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) and government appointed observers - 2 from each ECOWAS member state. This collaboration serves as a unique example of cooperation between governmental and civil society organizations, and the training in Dakar brought these entities together to discuss challenges and successes in a confidential environment.

In order to respect state sovereignty, ECOWAS has relied on open information sources, which has nothing to do with what is called "intelligence or counter-intelligence" of information that remains the State's prerogative to manage their security[115]. This open information is transmitted by ECOWAS-trained civil liaison officers, members of civil society, in each zone capital. Each office works in liaison with a government representative and a representative of civil society. In most of the countries, civil society is represented by a network member of the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) and the government is represented by a member of the administration. Each week, national focal points have to fill in an ECOWARN risk indicator form[116].

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[114] John Mark Opoku West *African Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System: The Role of Civil Society Organizations* – KAIPTC Paper, No 19, September 2007.
[115] ECOWAS. *The Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Management, Resolution, Peace- Keeping and Security.* Lome, ECOWAS Secretariat, 1999.
[116] Debiel, Tobias and Herbert Wulf. "Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism: Tools for Enhancing the Effectiveness of Regional Organization? A Comparative Study of the AU, ECOWAS,

ECOWAS authorised in its Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance the establishment of a sub-regional peace and security observation system with the intention of early warning[117]. This mechanism also establishes an Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC) at the headquarters as well as four observation and monitoring zones with monitoring units within the sub-region. The West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) has been engaged by ECOWAS to assist in data collection for the purpose of early warning. WANEP is a sub-regional civil society organisation based in Ghana. The ECOWAS system is an innovative approach insofar as it combines data collection by civil society and government officials. On this basis it belongs to the type of EWR models described above as risk assessment and early warning as well as investigative research by civil society[118]. At the time of writing the WANEP-ECOWAS early warning reports are not publicly available. Nevertheless, a component of the AU CEWS is in an emergent state in the ECOWAS region. Since 2002, when a memorandum of understanding was signed, WANEP has been officially charged with facilitating the ECOWAS Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN). WANEP collects data on human security issues, most notably human rights and democracy, food shortages, unemployment, arms flows and civil military relations and droughts and flooding. WANEP processes and analyses the data and prepares reports for the OMC at the ECOWAS headquarters in Abuja

IGAD, ASEAN/ARF and PIF." Crisis States Research Center Working Paper Series No. 2. London: Crisis States Research Center, 2009.
[117] ECOWAS. *The Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Management, Resolution, Peace- Keeping and Security*. Lome, ECOWAS Secretariat, 1999.
[118] ECOWAS. *The Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Management, Resolution, Peace- Keeping and Security*. Lome, ECOWAS Secretariat, 1999.

CHAPTER FOUR

Implementation of Conflict Early Warning and Early Response

Introduction

Early warning is a systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of crises for the purpose of: anticipating the escalation of violent conflict; the development of strategic responses to these crises; and the presentation of options to critical actors for the purposes of decision-making. The Continental Early Warning System is established as one of the key pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture within Article 12 of the PSC Protocol. Article 12 specifies that the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) should consist of an observation and monitoring centre (to be known as the 'Situation Room'). The Chairperson of the Commission shall use the information gathered through the Early Warning System to advise the Peace and Security Council on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and recommend the best course of action[119].

It is research that tries to predict the occurrence of violent conflict and the implementation of initiatives to prevent the violent conflict[120]. Part of conflict prevention that attempts to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict; Conflict prevention that consists of two actions: predicting the occurrence of violent conflict (early warning) and the implementation of policy suggestions to prevent violent conflict, based on early warning assessments (early response)

CEWARN currently focuses exclusively on "cross-border pastoral conflicts and cattle raiding" only. CEWARN Director Dr. Martin Kimani Mbugua stated that the launch is key to

[119] ASEAN. 2003. *Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II)*.
http://www.aseansec.org/15159.htm (accessed March 13, 2009).
[120] Ronard wasilwa, personal interview. Country coordinator CEWARN, October 2012

CEWARN's transformation into a more robust regional mechanism that uses data-driven insight to address a broad spectrum of violent conflicts far beyond the mechanism's previous focus on cross-border pastoral and related conflicts[121]. ECOWARN has a much broader and perhaps an ambitious focus on a wide range of issues and seeks to monitor "all aspects that affect peace and security" in the West African sub-region. Reflecting this broader focus, the ECOWARN maintains that it seeks to "assess political (human rights, democracy), economic (food shortages), social (unemployment), security (arms flows, civil-military relations), and environment (drought, flooding) indicators on a daily basis." In terms of coverage, CEWARN can be considered to have a narrow geographical scope since its reporting areas do not cover all areas in the sub-region. CEWARN currently monitors pastoral and related conflicts in two selected reporting areas of the Karamoja and the Somali Clusters. Whereas the Karamoja Cluster comprises the border areas of Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda, the Somali Cluster comprises the cross-border areas of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia[122].

The development of a national mechanism for early warning

The Conflict Early Warning and Response (CEWARN) Mechanism sits within the broader Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)[123], a regional organisation which brings together Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. This was established in 2002 and is located in Addis Ababa. CEWARN's mandate is to receive and share information concerning potentially violent conflicts, as well as their escalation and outbreak in the IGAD region, undertake analysis of the information, develop case scenarios and formulate options for response. CEWARN links up to the Continental Early Warning System of the

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[121] Dr. Martin Kimani Mbugua, personal interview, CEWARN Director, Nairobi, October 2012
[122] Ronard wasilwa, personal interview. Country coordinator CEWARN, October 2012
[123] Florence musoke, IGAD Finance and Administration Director, personal interview, October 2012, Nairobi.

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African Union. The CEWARN system is based on a network of field monitors, country coordinators, National Research Institutes (NRI), and National Conflict Early Warning and Response Units (CEWERUs)[124]. In Kenya, the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC) within the Office of the President serves as Kenya's CEWERU.

The specificity of CEWARN's original mandate was to deal with pastoral types of conflicts which pose a critical threat to rural communities in northern and western Kenya.31 The need to create a framework to specifically address these types of conflicts stemmed out of the realisation that these conflicts had significant spillover effects in the region, and that therefore a regional approach with national structures was needed to operationalise the CEWARN mechanism. Its coverage is focused on trans-boundary regions called "clusters", which are traditional pastoral regions[125]. However, in Kenya, CEWARN activities have further evolved to cover non-pastoralist areas, especially those considered as conflict hotspots, for example in the Rift Valley, Nyanza and Coast provinces. This design has been shaped by NSC's efforts to "domesticate" the CEWARN mechanism, to make it relevant in the Kenyan context[126].

Integration of early warning mechanisms

The establishment of peace committees is a positive move in addressing the incessant conflicts that the communities of the Rift Valley experience. The committees have been instrumental in addressing inter-community conflicts. However, there has been limited attention paid to how community early warning information may be integrated into state agencies' conflict prevention initiatives.

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[124] Dr. Martin Kimani Mbugua, personal interview, CEWARN Director, Nairobi, October 2012
[125] Anna Tibaijuka, Executive Director, UN Habitat and Director-General, UNON), personal interview, Nairobi, October 18, 2012
[126] Michael Ouko , personal interview, October 2012, Nairobi.

The study proposes that the provincial administrators need to have formal ways of having access to the communities' early warning information. For instance it should be clear to the elders and peace committee members that they collect early warning information and report it to the assistant chief, who then records the same[127]. The administrator would then initiate the process of verification of the information immediately. Once the information has been verified, the elders from the likely conflicting communities are engaged in dialogue before a full blown conflict erupts. In addition, the provincial administrators need to facilitate the establishment of grazing committees who would be involved in negotiating for grazing space during droughts, as was the case in the tradition of the Samburu and Turkana. The grazing committees are composed of elders who own large herds of animals and negotiate with their neighbours who have grass before the herdsmen move with their animals. This will go a long way in averting potential drought-related conflicts.

Regional Organisations and Early Warning and Response

The African Union recognises the need for the *harmonization, co-ordination and cooperation* of Regional Mechanisms and the African Union in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa[128]. Accordingly eight regional organisations have signed the Memorandum of Understanding on the formation of the Early Warning System with the AU. However, the process of transforming the idea of an early warning system from a concept on paper into reality has been slow and challenging. Almost all regional organisations have established or are in a process of forming the early warning mechanism with the ECOWAS, the IGAD and the SADC taking relative leads in their respective regions.

[127] Michael Ouko , personal interview, October 2012, Nairobi.
[128] Anna Tibaijuka, Executive Director, UN Habitat and Director-General, UNON), personal interview, Nairobi, October 18, 2012

According to CEWARN Director, ECOWAS, the early warning system was established through the protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security in 1999. The ECOWAS early warning system (ECOWARN) focuses on human security and is different from the traditional intelligence-gathering in that all its information is from an open source and also, it makes all the information accessible for the general public[129].

This system consists of the Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC) at the centre of the ECOWAS Commission, Abuja and four Zonal Bureaus in Banjul (The Gambia), Cotonou (Bénin), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) and Monrovia (Liberia) that send a daily report to the OMC. Each zone has zonal bureau officers (ZBO) and zonal coordinators (ZC) to ensure and maintain collaboration between WANEP and ECOWAS at the zonal level. [130]The OMC and PMC are the peace and stability observatory centers responsible for collating and analyzing early warning reports from all the four zones for onward transmission, in digestible form, to the President of ECOWAS.

There are three levels of reporting mechanisms: countries, zones and headquarters.

At the country level, incident and situation reports are submitted by WANEP. At the zonal level, the reports posted on the ECOWARN website are reviewed and analyzed at each zone by ECOWAS zonal bureau officers (ZBOs) and WANEP zonal coordinators (ZCs). At the headquarters level, analysts at the Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC) of ECOWAS and Peace Monitoring Centre (PMC) of WANEP, which is the focal office for data collection by civil

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[129] Dr. Martin Kimani Mbugua, personal interview, CEWARN Director, Nairobi, October 2012
[130] Ronard Wasilwa, personal interview. IGAD liason Officer, October 2012

society actors, examine the country reports together with the zonal analyses and develop assessments, alerts and recommendations for actions and interventions as the situation demands.

In addition to this, ECOWAS has a relatively unique and strong approach towards the involvement of civil society organisations through its partnership with the West African Network for Peace Building (WANEP) engaging 12 national networks and over 450 member organizations. In addition to this, ECOWAS has gone one step further in incorporating the Network in a sustainable way through the creation of a liaison office within the ECOWAS secretariat in Abuja, Nigeria, which is responsible for providing civil society access to governments and decision makers through ECOWAS. In 2007, ECOWAS and WANEP embarked on a series of activities including assessments and the production of a region-specific training manual for the field officers that are responsible for collecting data. This system, however, is contested by other NGOs which are not members of WANEP by indicating that the indicators and thematic areas of this system are not user-friendly for civil society[131].

In addition, the operation of the ECOWARN mechanism is seen to be restricted to ECOWAS and WANEP focal persons and is not open to the wider civil society Generally, ECOWAS' recognition among states has contributed to the success of the diplomatic response for the ECOWARN; the case of Guinea and the intervention of ECOWAS is a recent example. However, the ECOWAS situation-reporting database that comprises close to 100 indicators is currently in its trial phase and the incident report format is also being designed. It has also been in its testing phase since June 2006. This does not allow us to assess the success and failure of the work so far. But ECOWAS also agrees that it has challenges with regard to human resources and calls for a more sophisticated online facility to have quality data and analysis.

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[131] Ronard Wasilwa, personal interview. IGAD liason Officer, October 2012

IGAD on the other hand has an early warning system which was established with the objective of receiving and sharing information concerning potentially violent conflicts as well as their outbreak and escalation in the IGAD region including livestock rustling, conflicts over grazing and water points, nomadic movements, smuggling and illegal trade, refugees, landmines and banditry[132]. However, CEWARN was mandated by the Member States to commence its monitoring and reporting on cross-border pastoral conflicts in 2003.

Technically, the CEWARN system is complex and authoritative and has not yet closed the gap between analysis, options and actions. This is made more pronounced by the location of the CEWARN in Addis Ababa while the main office for IGAD is in Djibouti[133]. This had widened the gap between the data collection and action due to distance and the system is left without mechanisms to harness and focus political will to action by IGAD Member States. The danger is that CEWARN may not be able to operationalise its conflict prevention ambitions at the regional level. This system is also relatively expensive; it requires about US600, 000 per annum to run in its current configuration which makes it dependent on external support, especially with IGAD's plan to expand its focus from pastoralist to other areas in the coming years, the political will and relationship among the states and the cost of the system are points of challenge. Last but not least, the lack of a strong link with CSOs can limit the data collection process, especially accessibility of in-depth and grass root information from the system. This is important because most CSOs have a better connection with the community, especially women and other vulnerable groups.

Why Response Does or Does not Occur

[132] Ronard Wasilwa, personal interview. IGAD liason Officer, October 2012
[133] Florence musoke, IGAD Finance and Administration Director, personal interview. October 2012.
Nairobi.

Despite a decade of debate, it is uncertain where and with whom the responsibility to prevent conflicts lies. The UN claims such a role, but its institutional capacity and political constraints are too severe for early action and its record so far has not been promising. Thus, there is a paradox: those who want to intervene (civil society or regional organisations), have no capacity to do so,while those with capacity are seldom interested in early intervention. NGOs themselves often do not perceive conflict intervention as their responsibility, or their capacity for prevention activities is dismal[134]. A realization that it is everybody's responsibility to protect themselves and others is important, but it only has a chance to work if it is locally owned and supported.

Often, although information is generally available, it is not presented in a 'digestible' form. Clarke observes that 'the challenge lies in organising and interpreting that information for action in an accelerated decision making process where only small windows of opportunity exist'. Strategically-placed early warning signals, reinforced by a strong lobbying capacity, can make a difference in stirring the international community into action. Organisations such as the ICG seek to stimulate western political institutions who otherwise may chose not to act. Their strategy is to capture attention by sending out clear and strong signals without diluting the message.

IGAD on the other hand has an early warning system which was established with the objective of receiving and sharing information concerning potentially violent conflicts as well as their outbreak and escalation in the IGAD region including livestock rustling, conflicts over grazing and water points, nomadic movements, smuggling and illegal trade, refugees, landmines

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[134] Florence musoke, IGAD Finance and Administration Director, personal interview, October 2012, Nairobi.

and banditry. However, CEWARN was mandated by the Member States to commence its monitoring and reporting on cross-border pastoral conflicts in 2003.[135]

Implementation of Conflict Early Warning and Early Response

It may be easy to predict the eruption of violence but adequate Early Action may not be taken. (Examples include the Toposa/Turkana Conflict on the eve of Christmas in 2001 where more than 50 people lost their lives – everybody thinks this would have been prevented). The drought early warning system during the 1999-2001drought gave early signals that things were worsening but early action in Turkana came nearly one year later[136].

There is a success story of conflict prevention by the *el fatah* elders under the Wajir Peace and Development Committee in Kenya. They have succeeded in preventing violent conflict because of the elaborate network of monitors comprising elders, women, youths, CSOs, government officials etc. It is simply difficult for latent conflict to go unnoticed and unreported. Immediately this is reported, early action is taken without further delay. Probably SPF could learn from this system[137].

The production of early warning reports on possible violent conflict is a difficult task. A lot of input and expertise is needed from different organizations in order to evaluate information about a conflict. This needs to happen in an on-going fashion and needs to be coordinated; The next step is to decide what can be done by whom, where, and when (identifying opportunities for peace). This presupposes a lot of knowledge of the local situation and of the organizations involved in peace work on the ground.

[135] Ronard Wasilwa, personal interview. IGAD liason Officer, October 2012
[136] Ronard Wasilwa, personal interview. IGAD liason Officer, October 2012
[137] Florence musoke, IGAD Finance and Administration Director, personal interview, October 2012, Nairobi.

Types of conflict early warning: Framework Analysis

Three main types of CEW can be readily identified: quantitative analysis of trend data similar to food security EWS analysis[138]; more qualitative approaches to understanding and providing background information as well as warning (which is similar to vulnerability analysis in classic food security analysis); and general studies of the causes of conflict which are more akin to general analyses of food insecurity than to early warning per see; The most comprehensive example of a CEW trends analysis has been developed by FAST, operated by the Swiss Peace Foundation. Other examples include the [139]IGADs CEWARN mechanism and the ALRMP's Drought/Conflict Early Warning Systems. The key to a successful CEW is in its ability to elicit timely and appropriate response to prevent or avert violent conflict[140].

Key Early Warning and response Factors

Socio-Economic Conditions which comprised almost exclusively of structural preconditions (or the underlying, long term root causes) that make violent conflict more likely. In addition to the question as to whether the country exhibits signs of structural risk there is a question as to whether there is a widespread perception of rapid deterioration.

States in the process of failure are more susceptible to violent conflict. Though research findings differ as to whether the political structure of the state matters, the key question is whether a state is moving towards failure and is therefore increasingly incapable (through formal and/or informal structures) of repressing, mediating or brokering between the varying interests that could result in viole nt conflict. General failure could in some cases be precipitated by the

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[138] Maina S K , personal interview. CEWERU head, October 2012
[139] Florence musoke, IGAD Finance and Administration Director, personal interview, October 2012, Nairobi.
[140] Ronard Wasilwa, personal interview. IGAD liason Officer, October 2012

decay of criminal/judicial processes and unequal access to the state's institutions and/or the perception of high level corruption[141].

Insurgent groups may have camps in neighbouring countries as a platform for operations, caching weapons and training personnel. Both the regional and international dimensions can be illustrated in the Great Lakes region of Africa, where unrest or violent conflict inevitably has consequences for neighbouring states and where former colonial powers have historically played a significant role. Diaspora communities have historically provided a ready source of funds to fuel conflict – for example, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have in the past tapped into a wide range of Tamil communities in both the developed and the developing world. Similarly, small arms have spilled across borders with enormous military and human costs, threatening security within and between states.

The overall level of security is a fourth critical factor, consisting of individual indicators that could include the systematic caching of weapons (for example in Rwanda),[142] or drastic reductions in the price of small arms (which could provide evidence of a cross border flow). Similarly, the type of small arms available could be a significant indicator: are they weapons of war or for personal protection? The complex inter-relationship between factors can be seen in the case of Liberia, where Charles Taylor's troops acquired small arms and ammunition through the exploitation of agricultural products and mineral resources. The small arms used in Taylor's

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[141] Florence musoke, IGAD Finance and Administration Director, personal interview, October 2012, Nairobi.
[142] Bruce D. Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda: the Dynamics of Failure.* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2001), p. 11).

engagement in Guinea and Sierra Leone originated in Eastern Europe, and were shipped through Burkina Faso[143].

In recent cases, public discourse has often reflected an attempt to mobilise popular will in favour of violent conflict – in this sense, it is a proximate indicator. It is also structural in that ideological factors may be long term and an important feature of the socio-political culture of the country. Critical issues therefore include whether the pre -conditions necessary to divide people and pit them against one another, exist.

Conflict Early Warning Indicators

Long-term structural indicators of conflict are often based on quantitative data produced on an annual basis. These indicators are often collected globally, permitting cross-country comparison. These kinds of structural indicators are seen as fairly unproblematic in the literature. Short-term indicators, on the other hand, typically rely on qualitative data such as expert surveys and questionnaires or locally-generated information. There is some consensus in the literature that key me " ..... ----'--ators and short-term triggers of conflict vary considerably according to context. As a result, most CEWSs that measure short-term indicators are locally or nationally based and rely on data sources that are context-specific.[144] A large number of these short-term indicators exist and their relation to conflict varies according to context.

FAST monitors a few specific categories of indicators. These include "triggers" and "accelerators". Triggers are unexpected events that can spark a conflict. Examples could be: the split in SPLM in 1991. Accelerators are catalysts that can escalate levels of violence and which

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[143] Edward J. Laurance, *Light Weapons and Intrastate Conflict: Early Warning Factors and Preventive Action, A Report to the Carnegie Commi ssion on Preventing Deadly Conflict.* (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1998).
[144] International Peace Institute. 'The Security-Development Nexus: Conflict, Peace and Development in the 21st Century'. New York, International Peace Institute, 2004.

increase the significance of underlying causal factors. An example would be an NGO that provides animal health services to a host community and excludes IDPs who also own livestock and require the same services[145].

While many short-term indicators are context-specific and are not based on globally replicable quantitative data sources, some short-term indicators appear to have broader relevance and can be generated from easily available global data sources, allowing cross-country comparison. These include movements of IDPs and refugees, and commodity price and currency related indicators. Other short-term indicators are produced globally on an annual basis – including those relating to governance, human rights, public opinion and security. Governance, human rights and security indicators are produced more regularly for some regions, countries or localities by various regional, national and local early warning systems[146].

The FEWER model includes context-specific situation assessment using indicators and analysis as well as quantitative model-based studies. The model is premised on participatory approaches and normally involves CSOs trying to understand local and national conflict risks. The indicators include; military indicators (threats of attacks, troop movements); Fragmentation and behavioral indicators (political and personal rivalries, loyalties to strong men rather to state); Ideological indicators (ethnic polarization, use of media); Social and economic indicators (population movement and displacement factors, rapid onset economic changes etc.)

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[145] Niels von Keyserlingk and Simone\ Kopfmüller, "Conflict Early Warning Systems: Lessons Learned from Establishing a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) in the Horn of Africa", GTZ Working Paper, 2006.

[146] Florence musoke, IGAD Finance and Administration Director, personal interview, October 2012, Nairobi.

The role of CEWARN

CEWARN'S began in 2003 as a pilot project in Karamoja and Somali cluster[147]. Its mandate is to receive and share information on conflicts, livestock theft, escalation of conflicts and cross borders issues. It also undertakes analysis, develops scenarios and formulates options for response. However in the new CEWARN strategy (2013-2019) it intends to expand its mandate nationwide to cover other conflicts in rural and urban areas.

The CEWERU which sits at the Ministry of Provincial Administration and International Security; National Steering Committee on Peace building and Conflict Management is a response unit and also house the National Conflict Early Warning and Early Response (NCEWERS)[148]. Its role as provided for by the CEWARN Protocol is to domestic the CEWARN mechanism. The purpose of establishing a national early warning and early response system is to enhance synergy between the two EWR systems. CEWARN seeks to enhance and build capacity through analysis, training and information sharing and tools[149]. At the same time it's mandated to coordinate all peace activities and actors in the country.

CEWERU

The CEWERU Head of Kenya started his presentation by informing of the transitions they had undergone, including acquiring bigger offices. The Unit has also been able to accommodate some interns on attachments[150]. In addition, the Kenya Government has granted a

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[147] John Davies, "Conflict Early Warning and Early Response for Sub-Saharan Africa: Crisis and Transition Tool Kit", Summary of Working Draft Submitted to Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), University of Maryland, Maryland, 2000;
[148] Maina S K , personal interview. CEWERU head, October 2012
[149] Maina S K , personal interview. CEWERU head, October 2012
[150] Summary Report of the Proceedings and Recommendations of the 5th Meeting of Technical Committee of Early Warning (TCEW) of CEWARN Khartoum, Sudan 29-30 October, 2007

budget line of 600,000 USD for running of the National Steering Committee. The following are a list of activities presented as being carried out during the period under review:-

Finalization of the Draft National Policy on Peace building and Conflict Management. Final consultations were made in January 2007 and the draft forwarded to the Permanent Secretary (PS), Office of the President for further direction[151]; Establishment of sub-committees on media, conflict analysis and training in addition to already existing Technical Committee/Policy Steering groups to assist in implementation of its strategy; Media activities, including the process of formulating a comprehensive media strategy to increase visibility of CEWERU as well as give prominence on peace issues. Infomercials have been made at the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation and Citizen Radio and peace messages translated into 16 indigenous languages[152]

Limitations of CEWERU in as far as carrying its mandate

Among the IGAD members' states, Kenya is the most advanced in its peace architecture following its vibrant Conflict Prevention and Resolution Mechanism (CPMR) programme which is being spearheaded by the CEWERU. Although the CEWERU has marked significant milestones in response, there is still need for enhanced collaboration to address the poor linkages between the CEWERU and other organizations to address the problem of uncoordinated response by different actors. It can only respond on national frontiers, but limited to cross border issues which require consultations, The CEWARN Rapid Response Fund (RRF) is a new concept and hence the CEWERU is challenged in the disbursement of funds hence delayed

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[151]Florence musoke, IGAD Finance and Administration Director, personal interview, October 2012, Nairobi.
[152] Ibid 2007

response since it does not directly administer funds. There are protocol issues that hinder carrying out response[153].

Other challenges are; The CEWERU is challenged in its analytical capacity hence response is not informed, It has shortages of funds hence it relies on the CEWARN fund, The AOR's remain poor in terms of vastness and communication thereby positioning security in some of these areas remains a challenge, Response on cross border issues are hampered by lack of harmonized policies when it comes to information sharing on signals and lack of coordinated policies on signals and lack of border governance. CEWERU Kenya has not championed cross border disarmament largely due to policy issues. CEWERU lacks adequate capacity to respond to emerging issues such the oil discovery in Turkana and Sustainability of peace process

Challenges in the Operationalization of the CEWS

CEWARN gathers information through National Research Institute (NRI) it receives data and carries out analysis of the same before sharing with stakeholders. It uses horizontal and vertical approach in carrying out EW/ER through Field Monitors, Local Peace Committees, media and authorities.

It is difficult to establish baselines or comparative data for conflict. Conflict is complicated and unpredictable. Interpreting current events or predicting their impact on the future is not easy. Involves many variables and interpretation is usually very site specific. Conflict information is politically sensitive[154]. There is a diversity of terminology and conceptual frameworks for conflict, multiple causal factors and levels as well as the lack of consensus on

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[153] Summary Report of the Proceedings and Recommendations of the 5th Meeting of Technical Committee of Early Warning (TCEW) of CEWARN Khartoum, Sudan 29-30 October, 2007
[153] Ibid 2007
[154] A Strategy for the African Union." *African Integration Review* 3, no. 1(2009): 3.

definitions and analytical frameworks. It is not easy to know what to do with the information. The response may be difficult to determine.

Uncertainty about the future leads early warners to fear being wrong in their predictions. If the warning of a threat is not borne out, then the warner can be accused of "crying wolf". Alternatively, there is also a fear of being right! Most people and organizations, the UN included, like to focus on success and positive outcomes, and pessimism is discouraged, even counterproductive. By sounding the alarm in advance, a warner risks being labeled an "alarmist." Furthermore, making an early warning suggests that the authorities are not in control and they may take offence. Thus, various Secretaries-General have sought to make their warnings discreet and private, out of the public eye. Otherwise, they fear that bringing a threat to public attention would amount to pointing a finger at one or more disputants, raising the pride and the backs of the protagonists, making mediation and conflict avoidance more difficult. Thus, early warning, if done in an improper manner, can actually be an impediment to quiet diplomacy and discreet preventive action. Also the planners of violence will certainly do their best to discredit the early warning, the warner, and any talk of preventive action[155].

Most EWR have similar challenges in terms of delayed information sharing and with CEWARN in particular this is a major problem due to difficult terrain, also poor communication network, vast AOR's (Areas of Reporting), low human resource in terms of FM's, elevated expectation by the community from the FM's, high level of EWR actors on the ground hence a lot of un-coordinated activities, confidentiality of sources of information for fear of stigmatization on grounds of betrayal (The question remains, how does EW succeed in closed communities) also weak NRI is another challenge, in the sense that there is lack of research

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[155] Florence musoke, IGAD Finance and Administration Director, personal interview, October 2012, Nairobi.

which is meant to inform response. At the same time there is poor institutionalization of linkages with other primary shareholders.

Significant progress has been achieved in the operationalization of CEWS since the adoption of the Framework for the Operationalization of CEWS in December 2006. Since then the system has been able to provide reliable and up-to-date information on potential, actual and post-conflict situations[156]. The CEWS have registered important outputs and achievements, which among others include: Successful development of the CEWS methodology through a consultative process with all involved stakeholders; Development of data collection and analysis tools and the elaboration of a software licensing agreement between CEWS and the early warning systems of the RECs. Strengthened coordination and collaboration between CEWS and the early warning systems of the RECs. Refurbishment of the Situation Room. Infrastructure upgrade and installment of the necessary equipment's, including the live monitoring software (LIVEMON in the office of the AUC Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson, Commissioner for Peace and Security and the Director for Peace and Security)[157]. Increased expertise and analytical skills of the CEWS and the early warning systems of most RECs. This includes putting in place some Early Warning Officers, Analysts and Situation Room staff. Information collection and monitoring tools are operational and data can be accessed through a specifically developed CEWS information portal.

Full operationalization of CEWS so that it effectively supports conflict prevention, mediation and preventive diplomacy is still to be realized. Moreover, uneven development and in

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[156] Rehema Batti , personal interview, October 2012, Nairobi.
[157] Anna Tibaijuka, Executive Director, UN Habitat and Director-General, UNON), personal interview, Nairobi, October 18, 2012

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some cases, slow development of early warning systems in RECs ultimately hinders higher level operation.

The 2010 APSA assessment found that automated data collection and reporting are relatively advanced at the level of CEWS. This is also the case at ECOWARN and CEWARN. In most other RECs, progress has been achieved in establishing policy frameworks, specific concepts and approaches to early warning. Data collection and reporting for early warning is yet to be effective in CEN-SAD, EAC and COMESA. Continuous news monitoring, summarised in the Africa News Brief and Daily News Highlights, are circulated by the AUC to a wider network of subscribers including all RECs by email. Collection of data from stakeholders is progressing but still needs substantial efforts to be completed.

Conflict analysis and development of response options are at an incipient level in some regions. Together with the need for sharing information with stakeholders, analysis and response options are the biggest challenges. Only IGAD is building up an integrated response mechanism at this stage. The CEWARN response includes elements of mediation at local level[158]. Processes and templates for Early Warning Reports that include policy options are in place at the AU, ECOWAS and IGAD Substantial efforts are needed to strengthen the way in which policy makers' access, use and decide upon theresponse options developed by analysts[159].

As part of efforts to enhance the data collection and information gathering capacity of the Situation Room and Monitoring Units, the AU and RECs are in the process of developing various software modules to facilitate the collection, sharing and distribution of information

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[158] According to the Peace and Security Council Protocol of the African Union Towards an Evolving Security Regime?", *African Security Reviews* (Forthcoming), 2009.
[159] Ronard wasilwa, personal interview. Acting country codinator CEWARN, October 2012

within the AU (including PSOs and field offices) and with the RECs. In order to put in place the overall IT requirements of the CEWS, the following items need to be put in place.

There is a multiplicity of early warning and response mechanisms which are not adequately coordinated. Despite the NSC mandate and framework, duplication of initiatives and failure by actors to effectively share information make coordination difficult. Different actors also use different monitoring and reporting tools and methods, making it difficult to share and process information. This in turn negatively affects analysis, communication, decision making and effective responses[160].

One key challenge in this architecture relates to the difficulty in providing preventive and rapid responses[161]. Firstly, the Rapid Response Fund procedures (under NSC) are time consuming, leading to delayed responses. Secondly, perceived competition between DPCs and security agencies hinder rapid response as security agencies feel that the prominence given to DPCs by NSC and other peace actors interferes with their mandate. It remains to be seen whether trust- and confidence-building measures will enhance complementarity and good working relationships between these structures.

Ethnic identity of the people involved in the warning-response chain sometimes prevails over the necessity to issue an alert on or respond to a specific situation. For example, a DPC may have verifiable early warning information but fail to share it, especially where their ethnic groups are involved, for fear of being reprimanded by their community members.

At the national level, inadequate analytical capacities at NRI has led to a lack of longer-term analysis of conflict trends. As a result, this type of knowledge is not captured and processed systematically, which, in turn, does not aid the formulation of proactive and preventive planning

[160] Yufnalis okubo, RISP II Coordinator, personal interview, October 2012, Nairobi.
[161] Jill Rutaremara, Rwanda Defence forces, personal interview, October 10, 2012.

or responses to conflict risks. Delayed action and lack of feedback from national to local level actors on information shared hampers the perception that early warnings are properly addressed at the central level.

Despite the potential to prevent conflict, the lack of top-level financial and institutional capacity development support by the government, as well as political interference both at national and local levels, affects the proactive approach which is needed to enhance their effectiveness.

The peace architecture in Kenya also lacks a performance measurement framework which would contribute to enhancing its effectiveness, not only in terms of impact, but also in streamlining and stimulating the respective analyses and activities of a range of actors. In that respect, coordination with other institutions (such as the police at the local and NCIC at the national level) is a critical issue to improve effectiveness in the face of future political violence[162].

Opportunities: enhancing the effectiveness of early warning and Response mechanism

Despite the challenges highlighted above, and as the UWIANO experience has shown, early warning mechanisms in Kenya have the potential to be more effective at preventing conflict if their capacities are strengthened and a number of challenges tackled. Arising from the inadequacies of the early warning mechanisms in 2008, it is important to address the following issues in order to improve early warning mechanisms:

Despite NSC's position under the Office of the President, the lack of a policy framework to guide its actions has hampered its ability to duly implement its mandate and coordinate

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[162] Jill Rutaremara, Rwanda Defence forces, personal interview, October 10, 2012.

various actors in particular. Nonetheless, the revised December 2011 national policy on peacebuilding and conflict management provides an opportunity to reinforce NSC's role in supporting and implementing more effective early warning and peacebuilding activities in Kenya. This, however, has yet to be adopted by the government.

This would include support for capacity building of organisations and individuals at all levels. Both field and peace monitors need to be able to properly cover their regions, including remote areas. DPCs need to have the appropriate capacity to function as a key framework to anticipate and solve conflicts. At the national level, an assessment of NRI capacity needs should be undertaken. The move towards the county system of governance presents an opportunity for rationalisation and the optimal deployment of peace/field monitors. Currently, NSC disburses small grants to DPCs sustaining this support will ensure that DPCs remain relevant and accepted in communities[163].

In order to harmonise early warning activities and enhance synergies among actors at all levels, key actions which need to be taken include developing a common set of indicators as well as a common tool for data collection and processing. The ongoing efforts to harmonise and integrate early warning and response systems present a good opportunity to advance this.

The CEWARN protocol provides an important regional framework to address trans-boundary pastoral conflicts. However, as exemplified by NSC's an attempt to implement the CEWARN mechanisms in nonpastoral contexts in Kenya, progressive adaptation of its tools and practices in different contexts will ensure its broader implementation in many other areas which NSC has not been able to cover[164].

[163] Yufnalis okubo. RISP II Coordinator, personal interview, October 2012, Nairobi.
[164] Ronard wasilwa, personal interview. Acting country codinator CEWARN, October 2012

Given the limitation of government budgetary allocation to conflict early warning initiatives, the Rapid Response Fund of CEWARN is an example of a well-intended mechanism which donors can support. However, its use should be more strategic, i.e. deployed for rapid and early responses, as opposed to shortterm projects at the local level[165].

IGAD on the other hand has an early warning system which was established with the objective of receiving and sharing information concerning potentially violent conflicts as well as their outbreak and escalation in the IGAD region including livestock rustling, conflicts over grazing and water points, nomadic movements, smuggling and illegal trade, refugees, landmines and banditry. However, CEWARN was mandated by the Member States to commence its monitoring and reporting on cross-border pastoral conflicts in 2003.

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[165] Yufnalis okubo, RISP II Coordinator, personal interview, October 2012, Nairobi.

CHAPTER FIVE

Conclusion

This study first takes stock of early warning research. It compares and categorises the most advanced early warning systems in their achievements and shortcomings and assesses what they have to offer to policy makers. In the following section, we will undertake a comparative case study of five regional/sub-regional organisations. Several regional and sub-regional organisations have established, or are building up, EWR mechanisms. In Africa, we will focus on the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), an intelligence-gathering and analysis centre of the African Union; the Conflict Early Warning Response Mechanism (CEWARN) of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa (IGAD); and the West Africa Early Warning Network (WARN) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). As contrasting examples, we will analyse and discuss why such EWR mechanisms have not been established in Asia and Oceania by the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its Regional Forum, and the Pacific Island Forum (PIF); and how far this had impacted on the organisations' ability to react to upcoming crises. The final section aims at finding answers to the question of whether an EWR mechanism can be considered a useful tool and spells out policy implications for how regional organisations could capitalise on this.

Based on the overall findings and observations thus far, as an exploratory study, this thesis concludes by proposing the following hypotheses which can be further tested by similar enquiries in the future. Firstly, even though no established official definition of "harmonization of conflict early warning systems" was found during the study, from the way it is currently practiced, its conception tilts more in the direction of the comprehensive conception of the term which asserts that harmonization does not create uniformity but results o n l y in

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the elimination of methodological incompatibilities. This is practically evidenced by the fact that harmonization in most of areas builds up on the activities of the existing early warning mechanisms and seeks to create compatible strategies based on principles such as division of labour and preservation of the regional nature of the respective systems. Consequently, emphasising the need for appropriate defintion of the process, this study echoes similar assertions made in other areas of harmonization by recommending that the African Union should "establish an agreed, concise conceptualization of what harmonization is so that the term conjures up similar connotations and implications to all stakeholders." Taking this fact into account, research grants in the field of EWR should set a priority on the consolidation of existing models and findings with a focus on transparency, availability and connectivity towards regional and local EWRS. At the same time, development assistance to regional organisations should refrain from investing in the establishment of completely new systems and instead encourage their partners in crisis regions to capitalise on existing information pools, networking and cooperative learning. Thus the monitoring and assessment of local events and the policy-oriented formulation of scenarios and plausible as well as feasible response strategies could become the core task of regional EWR mechanisms.

Secondly, while most of the measures which are being undertaken to achieve harmonization are largely technical and perhaps procedural in their essence, harmonization as a process is delinked from the political and complex issues surrounding the coordination and cooperation of the early warning systems. As shown in the study, the current approach to harmonization by the African Union (CEWS) builds upon the experience of existing mechanisms, some of which have a narrow and largely "apolitical" approach of monitoring conflicts. In most of the cases, member states of the systems have not yet fully agreed to share

early warning information obtained from their legislative domain. Additionally, they are also reluctant to sacrifice their sovereignty by allowing an inter-governmental body to collect information on the potential outbreak of violent conflicts within their jurisdiction especially in situations when governments themselves play a part in the conflicts. In this regard, in addition to its current drive in forming knowledge-based consensus around the CEWS as already shown in this study, the African Union can play a role in garnering the political will and commitment of its member states to the effective operation of the conflict early warning both at the sub-regional and continental levels.

Thirdly, whereas it is an essential element of prevention of conflicts, the issue of response has not been adequately featured in the ongoing process of harmonizing the different early warning systems. Consequently, in conjunction with the efforts to create a compatible early warning methodology for the entire continent, the AU should also ensure that adequate response strategies are also integrated along with the capacity to collect and analyze conflict related data and information in the various early warning mechanisms in the continent.

CEWARN and ECOWARN are analyzed in this section based on the type of early warning models in use and the location and organization of the systems. In terms of early warning models in use, CEWARN's model is characterized as a combination of both predictive and risk assessment models with early response component. Whereas CEWARN's mandate and use of a number of social, political and economic indicators to anticipate the escalation of a situation are the main expressions of the predictive nature of its model, the utilization of these indicators as well as data on events to respond in a timely manner rendered the CEWARN early warning model to be characterized also as Risk and Capacity Assessments with Early Response Component. In the case of ECOWARN, its early warning module is categorized

under risk assessment and early warning and investigative research by civil society due to its strong linkage with civil societies such as WANEP (West Africa Network for Peace Building.

The analysis part of early warning involves the synthesis of background and current event information, the careful selection of indicator information, the examination of motivations and behaviours (to predict future directions), the assessment of capabilities (to carry out violence), the development of scenarios (to explore the possibilities for conflict escalation) and the determination of the most probable outcomes. One could turn to the "fires of conflict" analogy to help identify structural, proximate and triggering factors.

Both the analysis and the warning should, ideally, also include suggestions for preventive action. One approach to devising preventive actions is to start by summarizing the accelerators and triggers. The removal of such factors would be one means of preventive action. In addition the international community could carry out other peace promotion fire retardant activities. The study of preventive actions is carried out later in the course.

IGAD, in contrast, although also a region compromised by conflicts, has chosen a different approach. Due to the political and security situation IGAD was not in a position to develop a functioning and effective region-wide EWR concept. As a compromise, IGAD presently restricts its fully developed indicator and report-based EWR to two pilot areas, both involving cross-border local level conflicts. This political compromise has both costs and benefits. Certainly, the declared intention of the EWR system of predicting violent conflict cannot be met. This would require a region-wide approach. Thus, numerous conflicts and tensions with a potential to turn into violent conflict remain unobserved and unreported by the official IGAD CEWARN system. However, the concentration on two local cross-border conflicts has the advantage of collecting the relevant information at the local level. Thus, the strong

criticism against many EWR models, of largely ignoring the strength of the local space in mediating conflict, is of less relevance in the case of IGAD's two pilot projects.

Instead, the focus could be on the consolidation of advanced models, the intensified sharing of data collections (despite academic competition and political barriers) and the public provision of relevant information. This would not only increase efficiency in the field, but would also broaden the scope of user groups of early warning systems and would enable advocates of early warning to inform in due course the people affected. Advanced predictive models, as currently developed by the PITF, should become accessible to the public or at least available to relevant organisations. Newly established or planned EWR systems could thus make use of existing systems instead of reinventing the wheel. This would enable the allocation of scarce resources to: the event-based and actor-oriented analysis of escalation processes and the development of scenarios and alternative response strategies that take into account possible cognitive biases; and monitoring the local space that has so far been mainly neglected by the larger research projects.

Early warning systems' for the prevention of violent conflict are 'latecomers' compared with their application in other fields. The origin of such systems dates back to the 1950s and lies in intelligence and military reconnaissance. In a second phase, early warning systems were established in the fields of natural disasters, humanitarian emergencies, gross human rights violations, the spread of diseases and economic crises. Since the 1980s, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has undertaken efforts to foresee political-humanitarian crises. Within the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, several early warning projects led to the establishment of a 'Humanitarian Early Warning System.' 'Early response mechanisms are much more recent efforts to close the

gap between early warning and early action and have so far been elaborated most convincingly with regard to humanitarian emergencies.

Alexander Austin defined an early warning system from an academic perspective as: 'any initiative that focuses on systematic data collection, analysis and/or formulation of recommendations, including risk assessment and information sharing, regardless of topic, whether they are quantitative, qualitative or a blend of both.' Within early warning, three components can be differentiated: 'estimating the magnitude and timing of relative risks of emerging threats, analyzing the nature of these threats and describing plausible scenarios, and communicating warning analyses to decision makers.' Early response, accordingly, means: 'any initiative that occurs in the latent stages of a perceived potential armed conflict with the aim at reduction, resolution or transformation. The term mechanism will refer to the individual units of an Early Warning System such as data collection, data formatting, data analysis with the understanding that there is a relationship and process between these unities for the system to operate.'

Early warning, since its inception in the late 1990s as a conflict prevention tool in Africa, has been widely adopted by different regional organisations in the continent. Africa has faced grave wars and severe droughts. It also has experienced the worst desertification in the world. The lack of good leadership, corruption, illiteracy, poverty etc. adds much more to the instability of the continent. The nature of conflicts has shown that they have a trans-border character and therefore the repercussions can be felt in neighbouring states. This verifies the assumption that security is indivisible. To make this worse, most conflicts as much as they have become drivers of change, have also resulted in the death of civilians, sexual abuse, and loss of developmental activities and destruction of public services. This reality calls for early warning: a well structured

and effective anticipation of conflicts that constitute threats to the individuals which in turn affects the state and the world in general.

Beyond a mere comparison, the discussion thus far in this chapter was an attempt to indicate the different approaches to conflict early warning in the continent. Additionally, it was also a way of exploring the main practical issues surrounding harmonization of the various mechanisms within the overarching framework of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) of the African Union.

As the comparative analysis of the CEWARN and ECOWARN has shown, there are both similarities and differences in the way early warning is being undertaken in the two mechanisms. Generally speaking, similarities were exhibited in terms of overarching early warning mandates; in the use of open sources for data collection; and in the methodology employed for conflict analysis. On the other hand, major differences were observed in terms of considerations such as: the kind of conflicts monitored by the mechanisms; institutional set-up and level of development; current level of development of early warning products; and clarity of linkages with response strategies in the respective mechanisms

Conflict early warning practice in the continent with their own implications for harmonization of conflict early warning in Africa in as much as the various mechanisms are expected to operate in harmonized manner "with a shared and compatible early warning methodology, purpose and terminology" within the CEWS framework. On analytical level, the major differences shown earlier can also be conceived as precursors indicating the need for the creation of some form of consensus in terms of "institutional norms" and collective behaviour which are considered as prerequisites both for forming an integrated continental early warning

arrangement via the CEWS and for the full-functionality of the African Peace and Security

Architecture (APSA) as a security regime

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Interview guide

1. What are the causes of the conflict in the CEWARN area of reporting?

2. What effect does conflict have on the community?

3. What tools do you use in preventing the conflict?

4. Outline the Early warning mechanism that you use in conflict management

5. What are the dynamics of levels of conflict in Kenya

6. What is the role of CEWERU?

7. What are the potential conflict spots and has the CEWERU been able to mitigate conflicts?

8. What has been the response of the community in regards to conflict prevention?

9. Are there any traditional early warning mechanisms? Do you incorporate these mechanisms?

10. How do you collaborate with other actors in managing the conflict? (Local/ external/regional) If so how?

11. What challenges do you face in conflict management?

12. What roles do political and opinion leaders play?

13. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the existing EWR mechanisms?

14. Have they been put to appropriate use in predicting and preventing violent conflict by regional organizations?

15. What is the experience of regional organizations in implementing EWR mechanisms?

16. Why did some regional organizations abstain from establishing such mechanisms?

17. Can regional organizations capitalize on the most recent progress in EWR research?

18. Give any other comment.