

University of Nairobi

Institute of Diplomacy and International Relations

FORMULATION OF A REGIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR EAST AFRICA

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
STUDENT DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, declare that this is my original work and has not been submitted to any other College, institution or university other than the University of Nairobi for academic credit.

Signed:  Date: 8/11/2011

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This project has been presented for examination with my approval as the appointed supervisor.

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Prof. Makumi Mwangiri

Abstract

This research examines the formulation of a regional security strategy for East Africa. Its beginning point is that although there have been important efforts to formulate a regional strategy, there is a gap on issues of security strategy. The research argued that the biggest challenge is in the approach of the strategy formulation and contents. The research hence challenges the traditional concept of security and regional security strategy in East Africa and makes a case for the review of the concept and the dynamics of security.

The Research examined the relevant documentation, which included reports, and various policy documents, and many others as indicated in the references. The purpose of the documentary review was to collect published data and information on the subject as a basis for further verification. The research also held interviews with various stakeholders, including officials from the East African Community Ministry because it represents and deals directly with the member states in the East African Community, Ministry of Foreign Affairs because it is the key player in the international relations and is involved in policy formulation. The researcher also interviewed officials from the East African Standby Force as a non-state actor representative and an organization that implements some security programmes in the region in collaboration with the member states' governments. The researcher also interviewed officials from the Regional Center on Small Arms and Light weapons as non-state actor.

It is argued that the study of security strategy must incorporate aspects of human security implemented by the mandate of a long-term strategy comprising of military, economic, diplomacy and coordination aspects of a strategy, the lack of which renders regional security efforts fruitless. Eventually the research advances the view that member

state of the region may wish to rethink the formulation of the strategy and regional approach of implementation.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this research specifically to the East Africa Community and the continent of Africa.

ABBREVIATIONS

COMESA-Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa

DRC -Democratic Republic of Congo

EAC- East African Community

EASBRICOM-East Africa Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism

EASF- East Africa Standby Force

EU- European Union

HUGE- Human, Gender and Environmental Security

IGADD- Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification

IGAD-Intergovernmental Authority on Development

KANU-Kenya African National Union

MOU-Memorandum of Understanding

NATO-North Atlantic Treaty Organisations

NSC- National Security Council

PLANELM- planning element,

RECSA- Regional Center of Small Arms and Light weapons

SADC- Southern Africa Development Cooperation

UNCED-United Nations Conference on Environment and Development

UNDP- United Nations Development programme

UNEP-United Nations Environment Programme

UN-United Nations

USA-United States of America

WW II- World War II

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

East Africa region is geographically regarded as a single entity with similar problems, challenges and opportunities. Member states share common historical, social, economic, cultural and political beliefs. For years, the international system has perceived East Africa not by its geographic location but often by common conflicts and policies. The three East African states often encounter similar policy, security and economic challenges. For instance, conflicts in Horn of Africa and Great lakes region affect East African states either directly or indirectly. Insecurity threats from terrorism have also had an equal measure on the region. In addition, there are economic and development opportunities spread across the East African States and among them is a trade network dependent on each other.

While conflicts are negative to the region, development opportunities have potential to be harnessed to enhance development. There is need for a common approach to conflicts, cooperation can help states to respond better to external conflicts and enhance development. Although, there has been progress in regional economic cooperation through the formation of East African Community, cooperation on security and foreign policy issues are waning. The centrality of a regional security strategy will ensure that, East African states are well placed to plan ahead and consolidate their individual plans. The process of creating a regional strategy cannot be separated from the processes of establishing democracy, governance, institutional capacity and peace. There

STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Since independence, East Africa region has witnessed numerous internal conflicts among states and a few interstate conflicts. The region surrounding East Africa is a hotbed of long ranging conflicts in South Sudan, Somalia and Congo. The effects of these conflicts affect social, political and economic stability of states. Considering that wars displace people, means that cross border immigration will increase, influx of refugees to one state can create competition among locals and force the receiving state to divert state priorities to respond to them. This will result to a state prioritizing refugee issue over its interests. Internal conflicts in the region have led to increase in small arms, small arms account for criminal activities among East African states. The conflicts in the region have rendered states like Somalia as weak states, considering that Somalia has the longest coast line in the region implies that states, the port can be used for illegal activities like trade in contraband goods, narcotics and piracy. Contraband goods affect the local industries, industries provide employment for local people, and hence people will be rendered jobless. Narcotics are partly responsible for money laundering, narcotics also cause inflation, are responsible for increase of prices for goods that eventually cause price hike. The magnitude of these effects is beyond the capacity of one state to accommodate them; in addition, states are forced to change policies to accommodate these changing trends. Considering that security problems affects all states and all sectors of state operation, implies that states can not contain them within the precepts of statehood, there is need for

all states in the region to cooperate and respond to this challenges from a regional perspective. It is for this reason that, this research seeks to examine the formulation of regional strategy in the region.

OBJECTIVES

The objectives of this research are (i) to examine the formulation of a grand security strategy among East African states

- ii. To examine the relevance of a regional security strategy within East African states.
- iii. To examine the most suitable approach in formulation of a regional security strategy.
- iv. To examine the link between grand strategy and regional security.

Literature Review

This section reviews literature relevant to grand security coordination. It starts with a general discussion of grand strategy formulation, then examine the traditional discourse upon which grand strategy was founded and examine the three arms of the grand strategy. This is followed by an examination of contemporary underpinnings of grand strategy like human security, then finally assess the centrality of the coordination arm of grand strategy.

Whalley observes that, the need for national strategy is traced back to the Leviathian period, when states were described as being anarchic and operating in lawlessness.¹ To survive in such a state of affairs called for reordering of states interests. In the modern state system, states prioritized needs, but generally re-grouped them into three broad categories namely; security, economic and military needs. The need for state preparedness against external threats, required states to plan how the three issues could be

¹ John Whalley, globalization and Values: University of Western Ontario, p.6.

utilized to sustain states, this was referred to as national security planning, and the plan referred to as a grand strategy. Rousenau defines a grand strategy as the totality of a state's military, diplomacy and economic strategies, aimed at providing a long term plan of how a state is to survive in long term.² Often, a grand strategy integrates all aspects of national power which are in a states disposal in its endeavor to advance the states national interest.

Howard defines strategy as the theory of the use of combat for the object of war,³ while Freedman defined strategy as a theory of the application of power, where power is the ability to produce intended effects.⁴ From the above, strategy can be described as the application of means to achieve a political objective and consequently, a grand strategy is the art of using all elements of power to accomplish a politically agreed aim, and the objectives of a nation or of an alliance of nations in peace and war. A grand strategy comprises the carefully coordinated and fully integrated use of all political, economic, military, cultural, social, moral, spiritual and psychological power available. Ullman describes National Security Strategy as the basic document that substantiates national defense planning.⁵ Overall, a grand strategy seeks to achieve the greatest aims for a state using minimum costs.

National security Strategy is therefore the political illustration of the fundamental attributes of a state. According to Renner a national strategy synthesizes objectives, makes clear definitions, and correlates policy actions for all the entities engaged in ensuring the security of the country, in order to substantiate, in a unitary and coherent

² J. Rosenau, 1995, 'Governance in the twenty-first century,' *Global Governance Journal*, Vol:1: pp 13-15.

³ Michael Howard, 1983, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p.2

⁴ Barry Posen, *Sources of Military Doctrine*

⁵ R. H. Ullmann, "Redefining Security". Vol. 8, No. 1 (Summer 1983). pp. 129-131.

way, the actions and the specific regulations of the state institutions of the rule of law and the constitutional power wielders responsible for implementing, safeguarding and asserting fundamental interests.⁶ Liotta argues that national security strategy represents the basic document that defines these interests, as well as the objectives for their achievement, and materializes the political expression and highest level settlement of a State, and at the same time, the instrument for substantiating and directing the actions within the whole system of national security.⁷

Security strategy is marked by current developments, and the realities of state and region, as well as by short and medium term foreseeable perspectives of domestic and international life. The fundamental responsibility for the country's security rests, with the head of state, Parliament, Government, and other state institutions according to each one's constitutional responsibilities. However, Liotta argues that, the complexity of the aspects that influence this area makes it necessary that within the system of national security that represents the instrument by which the Security Strategy becomes operational.⁸

A grand strategy can only be formulated after the desired aim and objectives have been determined. The aim, the objectives and the power needed to attain them are the indispensable fundamentals of any strategy. Grand strategy is, as Posen argues, a state's theory about how it can best cause security for itself. As such, it is an exercise in public worrying about the future and doing something about it.⁹ At the dawn of the Cold War,

⁶ M. Renner, 'State of the World 2005: Redefining Security', in M. Mwagiru and O Oculi (eds) *Rethinking Global Security: An African Perspective?* Heinrich Boll Foundation, pp 1-11.

⁷ P.H. Liotta, and Timothy E. Soames, 'The Art of Reperceiving: Scenarios and the Future,' in *Selected Readings in Strategy and Force Planning*, Vol. 1 (Newport, RI: Naval War College, CDE, 2002), pp.532-534

⁸ *ibid*

⁹ Barry Posen, *Sources of Military Doctrine*. op. cit.

states initiated the practice of publicly articulating individual national security strategy. According to Mathews, the most well known of these early articulations was George Kennan's 1947 "X" article in *Foreign Affairs*, which provided the rationale for the containment strategy that became the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy throughout the Cold War.¹⁰ The practice of issuing national security strategies did not become routine, however, until the Nixon administration released an annual State of the World Report. Congress made the submission of a national security strategy mandatory as a matter of law when, as part of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, it required the president to report regularly on this subject to Congress and the American people.

The traditional underpinnings of a grand strategy argue that, strategy is set on three arms namely; military, economic and diplomacy. Prendergast argues that, these three arms of a grand strategy are important for a state because they are the basis upon which national goals and areas of common concern are identified.¹¹ The three arms are based on realist theory. Realism considers state security, survival and sovereignty as the main elements for which states are founded, the three can be utilized to affirm, regional security, regional foreign policy and regional economic development. In addition, the three arms forms a protection layer against external interference to a states peace and security.

Rosenau argues that, the fact that traditional grand strategies were restrained and defined within the limits of military power, limited the analysis of grand strategies¹². This limit is confined to realist school of thought, realism theory, recognizes states as the only actors

¹⁰ J.T. Mathews, 'Redefining Security', *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1989 Vol:62, No: 2, pp.135-162: 140.

¹¹ John Prendergast, "Building for Peace in the Horn of Africa: Diplomacy and Beyond", Special Report, U.S. Institute of Peace (June 28, 1999), p. 2;

¹² *ibid*

of international relations that states seek relative gains and that states pursue power to betterment of their own needs. However, with the end of the cold war era and the realization among that states cannot achieve their plans in solitary, created the need for states to pursue joint goals with other actors. Keyman observes that the above realization that the realist view was narrow in regard to grand strategy formulation¹³ prompted the creation of regional economic organizations by the African Union. like the East African Union, Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and MAGRHEB union. The institutions were founded on liberal school of thought. The theory of liberalism recognizes state and non state actors and their role in international relations. The principles behind formation of grand strategy will be argued in this proposal as being propounded by state and non state actors of diplomacy.

The first leg of a grand strategy is that of diplomacy. Mwagiru argues that diplomacy is intangible and involves activities such as propaganda, negotiation, communication and signaling a specific policy or change in policy to other actors in the system.¹⁴ Hoffman conceptualizes diplomacy as the practices and institutions by which nations conduct their relations with one another.¹⁵ The fact that governments in the region are unpredictable creates the urgency for regional institutions to guide the activities of integration using diplomacy. In practice, diplomacy is best guaranteed by democratic, accountable and stable governments presiding over sustainable development.¹⁶ There is universal

¹³ Fuat Keyman, 'Problematizing the State in International Relations Theory', in *Beyond Positivism: a Critical Reflections on International Relations*, ed. Cox W. & Sjolander C. (Lynne Rienner: Boulder, 1994) p.155

¹⁴ M. Mwagiru coordination of National Security Strategy: perspectives on Grand strategy Formulation in Kenya, NDC Occasional papers on security, No. 1, 2008, P.5

¹⁵ S. Hoffman, *Theory in International Politics and Foreign Policy*, New York: Free Press, 1969, p33

¹⁶ Strobe Talbot, *Globalization and Diplomacy: A Practitioner's Perspective*, No. 108 (Autumn, 1997), p.

consensus that diplomacy is the official tool for implementing the aims of African union and making the existing institutions work, including governments, is part of the wider African Union agenda.

There are three types of diplomacy, track one, track two and track two and half diplomacy.¹⁷ Track one diplomacy involves states as the main actors in the conduct of diplomatic affairs. The term track one, or 'official diplomacy, is used to refer to peacemaking activities conducted by officially appointed people, governmental agencies like diplomatic and defense organizations, and inter-governmental organizations like United Nations. Track two diplomacy on the other hand include Non state actors, civii society organizations, businessmen, citizens, media, independent research institutions, and conflict resolution professionals. Track two actors of diplomacy also are described as constituted of research institutions and unofficial people appointed by track one to support the negotiations following a framework agreement. Finally, track two and half involve individuals who are regarded in the international stage as people of measurable command and influence.

In general Chazan *et al argue* that Africa has historically been forced, coerced and manipulated into adopting a foreign political methodology that has resulted in its underdevelopment, and general integration into the lower levels of the global economic and political network, despite its wealth of potential.¹⁸ Okoth argues that amid the tremendous and invaluable diversity of African people, there is also a set of cultural

¹⁷ *ibid*

¹⁸ N.Chazan, *et al. Politics and Society in Africa*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1993, pp.45-46

commonalities that can be utilized to advance a common diplomacy strategy.¹⁹ In addition, Fantu adds that a common diplomatic strategy would encourage African people to see the commonalities they share, and also a cultural renaissance that would promote African people in meeting the demands of modernity and the contemporary challenges with a problem solving methodology, created in its own image and cultural context.²⁰ Thus, according to Fantu, culture is best qualified to highlight a people's common need for diplomacy strategy.²¹

Nobles argues that, the destruction of a people's indigenous culture is the necessary requisite to the effective colonization and political domination of the people's policies, he adds that, common policy will aid people to achieve a fundamental role in achieving political and economic self determination. Finally, Talbott argues that African foreign policy must be *Afrocentric* in that it should prioritize the needs and concerns of African people first, and consider the long term implications of any foreign policy for the masses of regional people.²²

The realist definition of state security presupposes threats from other states in the unregulated and dangerous anarchical international system. The problem with this definition is that the state can be secure from any external military threat or from aggression that other state actors perpetrate and yet its citizens suffer insecurity in terms of physical attack, genocide that internal, non state aggressors commit, including state

¹⁹ Godfrey Okoth P., "Uganda-Sudan Relations: The Fallacy of Conflict Management Via Bilateral Diplomacy, 1953-1995 Conflict in Contemporary Africa edited by P.G. Okoth and B.A. Ogot, Nairobi: Jomo Keryatta Foundation, 2000, pp.94-96.

²⁰ C. Fantu, *A Challenge to the New World Order: Promoting Transnational Civil Society in Africa* Washington, D.C.: The American University, 1997, p.5

²¹ *ibid*

²² Strobe Talbott, *Globalization and Diplomacy: A Practitioner's Perspective*. op. cit.

officials.²³ On the other hand, according to Chidozie, the realization that the realist view was narrow in regard to military strategy formulation, prompted the creation of regional economic organizations by the African Union, like the East African Community (EAC), Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and MAGRHEB union²⁴.

The second arm of the grand strategy is the economic, Baker argues that a doctrine of economic intervention as stipulated by the grand strategy does not yet exist at the regional level.²⁵ For instance, East Africa Community has experience of regional enforcement, notably by East Africa Community and Common Market for East and central Africa (COMESA), but their interventions have encountered serious political problems as well as difficulties in seeing operations through to a successful conclusion. Both doctrine and capacities for this kind of intervention need a regional functional economic strategy. A security strategy will address the questions of what kinds of situation warrant intervention, plus the role and mandates of different sub regional, regional and international organizations.

Clapham argues that economic development in East African and the region as a whole must take place on regional terms.²⁶ He adds that the concept of development within the precept of grand strategy has been colonized and defined on Western terms. Borrowing through the experience of the European Union Clapham suggests that strategic development should be prioritized through the creation of free internal trade, leading to a

²³ Peter Katzenstein, "International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrialized States"(International Organization, 1975), p.24

²⁴ Chidozie O., "Domestic Economic Interest Groups and Foreign Policy" In: Economic Development and Foreign Policy, G. O. Olusanya et al. Lagos: Nigeria Institute of International Affairs, 1988, pp.114-116

²⁵ P.H. Baker, "Africa in the New World Order." *Review* 10, no.2, (Summer/Autumn, 1991/1993): pp.139-152.

²⁶ C. Clapham, "International Relations in Africa after the Cold War." In *After the Cold War: Security and Democracy in Africa and Asia*, edited by W. Hale and E. Kienle, London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies. 1997. p.99.

future, full continental common market. This, in turn, to judge from European Union experience could prepare the way for a possible future common East African currency, something which could contribute significantly to improving the terms of trade between East Africa and other developed economies.

The third arm of traditional strategy is security, Keyman argues that the tradition definition of security is modeled on the realist perspective and covers explicitly the security interest of the state especially its two core properties, namely territorial integrity and international sovereignty and, to a limited extent, the security of the state leadership, certain fundamental aspects of the way of life within the state, and values like democracy, freedom, and religion.²⁷ This definition pays little attention to the living conditions of individual citizens, domestic social groups, and local communities; it also assumes the state to be an abstract entity that is devoid of humanity and is autonomous from the domestic society. The failure to look beyond the limited realist view of the state and to examine matters like composition and constraints of states and the constituency they represent can lead to the erroneous observation that the state is secure, whereas the reality can be different.

Mwagiru argues that the above traditional view of grand strategy is based on traditional thinking about national security and strategy.²⁸ He notes that it suffers from three main shortcomings, first is that the strategy based on three leg model does not take into account emerging perspectives particularly concerning security issues particularly those of third

²⁷ Fuat Keyman, "Problematizing the State in International Relations Theory", in *Beyond Positivism: Critical Reflections on International Relations*, ed. Cox W. and Sjolander C. (Lynne Rienner: Boulder, 1994) p.155

²⁸ M. Mwagiru *Cordination of National Security Strategy: perspectives on Grand Strategy Formulation in Kenya*. NDC Occasional Papers on Security. No.1. 2008. p.5

world countries. Secondly its conceptualization of the character of security is faulty since it does not consider major domains of security like societal security. Third, the model does not address issues of coordination of national security formulation and implementation.

Hence, Mwagirus contribution to analysis and understanding of security strategy is that a solid security strategy should include the important component of coordination.²⁹ The pillar of coordination therefore captures the external visions of national security threats and most importantly introduces the aspect of coordination among the three models. With coordinated, as the link between the other three, a security strategy can then operate and be implemented. Finally, Talbott argues that African foreign policy must be *Afrocentric* in that it should prioritize the needs and concerns of African people first, and consider the long term implications of any foreign policy for the masses of regional people.³⁰

Contemporary Security Concerns

As the Cold War sense of security slackened, Buzan observes that the intellectual ambiguity of national security became more pronounced.³¹ New definitions of security began to gain dominance towards the end of the Cold War, this definition is based on liberalist concepts of international relations, the new conceptualization of national security broadens the scope of threats beyond the military limits and includes many non military threats to national security. The issue of environmental security emerged among the first of the threats that confront national security.³²

²⁹ Ibid, p. 7

³⁰ Strobe Talbott, *Globalization and Diplomacy: A Practitioner's Perspective*, op. cit.

³¹ Buzan O.Wæver & J. de Wilde, *Security, A New Framework for Analysis*.

³² United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994*, New York: United Nations Development Programme 1994, p.15.

Mwagiru argues that the period of 1970's marked a paradigm shift on a number of issues in the international system, for instance, it introduced new actors who participated in agenda setting, new dimensions of security and perspectives of security.³³ The field grew in new directions, including environmental security, societal security, and the study of migration, pandemics, terrorism, human security, and the trafficking of both people and drugs. Holsti explains, states remained the critical actors of international politics because they command the allegiances of peoples occupying defined territory which possess the capabilities to employ ultimate threat which is war.³⁴ Also, states, unlike most transnational organizations are concerned with the full range of welfare and security issues of a population and enjoy sovereignty.

Homer-Dixon argues that during the 1970's conceptualization of security argued that military threat to national security was one of the many threats that governments had to address.³⁵ The new threats to security derived directly or indirectly from the rapidly changing relationship between human needs and development. Human security needs called for a shift in security thinking from state security to human security of the people, which includes both individuals and communities. Shurke argues that the debate about human security concerns the separation of direct physical violence from structural violence.

Physical violence demands security for physical state security while structural violence exists when resources are unequally shared between members of a society.³⁶ Mudida

³³ M. Mwagiru, 'Africa in International Security Agenda Setting', in *Human Security, Setting the Agenda for the Horn of Africa*, Africa Peace Forum, Nairobi, p.1

³⁴ K.J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, 5th ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995), p.65.

³⁵ T. Homer-Dixon, 1994, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases." *International Security*, Vol:1, No:9, pp.5- 37:20.

³⁶ A. Suhrke. 'Human security and the interests of states' *Security Dialogue* pp.176-265:76.

argues that human security compliments state security by being people centered, in addition, human security addresses threats that traditionally were not considered as state security threats, and it also furthers human development and enhances protection of human rights.³⁷ As the state continues to have the fundamental responsibility to security, security challenges have become complex and new actors emerged to compliment states, a paradigm shift from state centric security broadens the focus from human security to environmental security.³⁸

Brown notes that, the expansion of the concept of security into non military issues led to a reconsideration of the political structures through which security could be achieved.³⁹

With the expansion of the concept of security issues, security threats were also perceived in broader terms. While threats to the territory of the state are primarily identified in military terms, societies and individuals face a multitude of dangers ranging from the inadequacies of political and social structures, to environmental degradation.

Regionalism based on political and economic cooperation came into fashion after their realization of the necessity to exploit the advantages of interdependence. Huntington argues that, there was a clear realization that collective regional activities gave individual states a greater competitive edge and higher bargaining power than when operating singly.⁴⁰ Mathew argues that military force might be necessary in situations that pose a threat to national interests, military forces should be brought in only if their use advances U.S. interests,⁴¹ if they are likely to accomplish the stated objective, if the costs and risks

³⁷ R. Mudida, *The Security-Development Nexus: A structural Violence and Human Needs Approach*, in K. Bruchmann et al: *From Conflict to Regional Stability, Linking Security and Development*. 2008, p. 12.

³⁸ R. Brown, 'Information Technology and the Transformation of Diplomacy', *Knowledge, Technology and Policy*, Summer. Vol 18, No.2. 2004, p 344-386:345.

³⁹ *ibid*

⁴⁰ S. Huntington *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1968. p. 15

⁴¹ I. T. Mathews. 'Redefining Security'. *op. cit*

of their deployment are commensurate with the interests at stake, and if other nonmilitary means are incapable of achieving our goals.

In addition the broad array of existing security threats can not be handled without expanding cooperation with other states and helping to strengthen international coordination. International system requires that important decisions of war, peace, and development be made after consultation with other nations and international institutions. This means that neighboring states must play a role in defining security threats and the responses to them. After the end of the cold war period in late 1980's, national security strategy and force structure began to anticipate and reflect a new emphasis on dealing with the changes in the security environment. In assessing the recent history of national security strategy, two landmarks stand out the Cold War, and the post-Cold War decade culminating in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. This period ushered in the era of regionalism and integration among most African states. The criteria for integration are not founded on any basic formula but on geographical location of states. Among the integration blocs was the East African Community.

Theoretical Framework

Liberal institutionalism has been the most influential theoretical approach to the study of international cooperation and represents a general theory for understanding the resurgence of regionalism. Liberalists base their analysis on a number of core arguments. In the first place, increasing levels of interdependence generate increased demand for international cooperation. Institutions are viewed as purposively generated solutions to different kinds of collective action problems.

Liberal institutionalism is concerned with ways in which states conceived of as rational egoists can be led to cooperate. Institutions matter because of the benefits that they provide, and because of their impact on the calculations of the players and the ways in which states define their interests. They achieve this through the provision of information, the promotion of transparency and monitoring, the reduction of transaction costs, the development of convergent expectations, and facilitation of the productive use of issue linkage strategies.

Liberal institution theory then, concentrate on the ways in which strategic interaction may lead to the emergence of cooperation in a given area of international relations. This theory would seek to identify the ways in which processes of regionalization and regional economic integration create, first, material problems and international policy externalities that require collective management; and, second, incentives for reducing transaction costs and facilitating intra-regional linkages.⁴²

From liberalist perspective, the emergence of regional security regimes should not be viewed in terms of the balance of power or alliance formation.⁴³ Rather the theoretical perspective states that they have been created, and will survive, because of the benefits they provide: by facilitating communication, information, transparency; by reducing mutual threat perceptions and worst-case thinking; and by undercutting the self-fulfilling prophecies that lie at the heart of the security dilemma. Finally regional cohesion would emerge, on this view, not from grand proposals to create new federal structures but from the way in which individual or issue-specific cooperation comes to form an increasingly

⁴² Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann (eds.), *The New European Community. Decision Making and Institutional Change* (Boulder: Westview, 1991, p.10.

⁴³ *Ibid.* 12

dense network where cooperation on each new issue becomes embedded in a larger and more complex whole.

Hypothesis

A well formulated grand regional security strategy has a direct link to regional development and security.

Research Methodology

The researcher used both primary and secondary data to collect information for this research. In using primary data the researcher utilized both published and unpublished sources. In using unpublished sources, the researcher used interviews, Focused Group Discussions (FGD) and Observation methods. While using interviews, the researcher interviewed the director of East African Community at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kenya, the Senior Political Officer in the Ministry of East African Community, Director of East African Standby Force (EASF), the researcher at Regional Center on Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA).

The researcher used unpublished documents for primary data, unpublished documents are important because they are specialized and specific to this particular project. The study used unpublished documents from the East Africa Community Ministry, Regional Center for Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA), Ministry for Foreign Affairs and National Defense College. Information from these offices was important to determine the existing contribution by the said agents; it is also useful since its up-to-date literature.

The study used published data to get information among government institutions. for instance. by utilizing government's minutes, the researcher benefited by understanding the view of the partner states in relation to power disparity issues. Also this are important since they specify not only the position of governments during integration negotiations, but also by understanding the people involved in the negotiation, and hence predict the importance that partner states have on integration.

In using secondary data, this research used books of diplomacy to argue out its contribution, it used books on regional integration to trace down the debate on regional communities and formulating of grand strategies, the information is important to draw comparison and experiences from already established regional communities like the European Union and avoid duplicating any prior research information on the same. And finally, it used journal articles to ensure the data used is current and updated.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

Chapter One

Introduced the topic of this study research, objectives, literature review, Theoretical frame work and statement of the problem.

Chapter Two

Analyses the formulation of grand strategy and examine the pillars of grand strategy under the traditional phase and modern perspective.

Chapter Three

This chapter examines the emerging trends of security.

Chapter Four

This chapter conceptualizes and examines the case study for this research study.

Chapter Five

Chapter Five discusses reflections from the study and the conclusions of the research.

CHAPTER TWO -Grand Strategy

Introduction

The previous chapter presented the purpose, methodology and theoretical framework for this research study. In the process, it highlighted relevant literature in an endeavor to examine debates and discussions on the national security strategy and aspects of national security strategy. This chapter will attempt to analyze the development of the national strategies in the international system. The first section will examine development of national security strategy and the pillars of national strategy in the traditional setting represented as the three legged stool. The second section will examine the pillar of coordination as represented under the four legged stool. The third section will look at the regional security structures.

In the international system, Mwagiru argues that, all states claim survival in the international system on the basis of a grand strategy.¹ This claim implies that, a grand strategy is central to state survival and is a pillar upon which national security rests. As such all elements that are important to state survival must form the substance of grand strategy. Morgenthau describes this as national interest, National interests are thought of in terms of national security.² National security according to Buzan, focuses on the nation, a nation is a group of people who either live in a definite geographical location or are dispersed but share a common language, culture, and share common historical experiences.²

¹ M. Mwagiru *Cordination of National Security Strategy: perspectives on Grand Strategy Formulation in Kenya*, NDC Occasional Papers on Security, No.1, 2008, p.5.

² H. J Morgenthau, *The Problem of the National Interest*, in: *Politics in the Twentieth Century University of Chicago Press*: Chicago, 1971, pp. 204-237.

³ Buzan B. 1983. *People, State and Fear: National Security Problem in International Relations*, Prentice Hall, Hertfordshire, p. 48

Lippmann argues that the use of the term national security came first into full usage in the United States political discourse in the year 1943 during World War II (WW II) period.³ During this time, national security issues were regarded as a preserve of the president in office and their administration. As such national strategies were conceived in a narrow way to accommodate and achieve the goals of the administration. But since the end of WW II, each administration in the United States sought to develop and perfect a reliable set of executive procedures and institutions to manage national security policy beyond their administrations life in office.⁴

Lippmann argues that this development reflected two main issues, first it showcased that a strategy can be a short term plan of how a state or administration tend to survive its term and second, with the realization that a strategy ought to live beyond the sitting administration, reflected that, national strategy can be a long term goal, which was often regarded to be between five and twenty five years.⁵

The first national strategy was formulated and enacted when the United States of America Congress stepped into the debate of security issues and passed the National Security Act of July 26, 1947. This in among other things created the National Security Council (NSC) under the chairmanship of the President to coordinate foreign policy and defense policy, and to reconcile diplomatic and military commitments and requirements. It should be mentioned however that, the 1947 National Security Act only went so far in assisting Presidents in formulating foreign and domestic policy. Mwangi notes that, diplomatic pillar represented intangible issues like propaganda, negotiations and

³ Walter Lippmann, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*, Boston: Little & Brown, 1943, p.49.

⁴ Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, "History of the National Security Council: 1947-1997," August 1997; www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/text/history, accessed 05 July 2011.

⁵ Walter Lippmann, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*. op. cit.

communications.⁷ Diplomacy and Military issues were central at this time of the WWII because of two main issues.

First, there was struggle for power among European states and United States. Most European states were colonizing underdeveloped states and hence had access to more natural resources. Colonialism was forced occupation and America's strategy was to win states through peaceful means, thus diplomacy was essential. Secondly, the Cold War period divided the international system into a bi-polar system. The race for arms dictated the pace of most issues as states endeavored to align themselves behind the two competing powers. The military strength of United States of America and Soviet Union, though not a requirement, was arguably essential in determining how states aligned themselves. As such, military and diplomacy were engraved as essential blocks of a national security strategy.

The period mentioned above was before the end of the WWII. In this period states did not make a habit of publishing their national strategy prior to pursuing it. Snider and Nagl argue that, at the dawn of the Cold War, states initiated the practice of publicly articulating individual national security strategy.⁸ Mathews notes that, the most well known of these early articulations was George Kennan's 1947 "X" article in *Foreign Affairs*, which provided the rationale for the containment strategy that became the cornerstone of United States foreign policy throughout the Cold War.⁹ This strategy was codified the following year by the Truman administration's National Security Council Document 68 (NSC-68).

⁷ M. Mwangi, 2008, 'Coordination of National Security Strategy, op, cit, p.5

⁸ Don M. Snider and John A. Nagl, 2001. *The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision* (The U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, p.128.

⁹ J.T. Mathews. 'Redefining Security'. *Foreign Affairs*. Spring 1989 Vol:62, No: 2, pp.135-162

The practice of issuing national security strategies did not become routine, however, until the Nixon administration released an annual State of the World Report.¹⁰ Congress made the submission of a national security strategy mandatory as a matter of law when, as part of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, it required the president to report regularly on this subject to Congress and the American people.¹¹

The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act stipulated that Congress amend the National Security Act of 1947 to require an annually written articulation of the nation's grand strategy from each succeeding President.¹² The Congress's rationale behind this edict was that the Executive Branch had more often than not failed to formulate, in an integrated and coherent manner, the judicious use of resources drawn from all the elements of national power, a mid and long term strategy necessary to defend and further vital national interests.¹³

Mathews argues that, proponents of the reform realized that no institutional means for coordination of foreign and defense policy existed, and that the informal management techniques employed by President Roosevelt during WW II and President Truman after the war were not suitable for the long haul.¹⁴ The Congressional logic was premised on the believe that, the United States was one of two super powers left after WWII and without a process and institution in place to coordinate national security, the nation faced the real threat of heading down the wrong path.

¹⁰ Ibid

¹¹ Ronald Reagan, 1988, *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, Washington, D.C.: p.1.

¹² Ibid

¹³ Don M. Snider and John A. Nagl, *The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision*, op. cit.

¹⁴ J.T. Mathews. 'Redefining Security'. op. cit.

Security Concepts and Approaches

Security refers to several dimensions, applies to states and individuals, issue areas, societal conventions, and its conceptual definition evolves with changing historical conditions and circumstances. Security is an aspiration of nation states and of political actors that require extraordinary measures. As a societal value to be achieved, security is linked to protection, certainty, reliability, trust and confidence, predictability in contrast with danger, risk, destruction, disorder and fear.

The League of Nations (1919) used the concept of 'collective security' in its Covenant, and it is central to the UN Charter (1945). The 'social security' concept gradually evolved since the 19th century for the security of the citizens covering the home, livelihood, and social insurance. The right to social security is stipulated in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (Article 22), which was adopted in 1948. The 'national security' concept emerged during World War II in the United States. Security depends on a normative core that cannot simply be taken for granted. Security has real world effects and guides action of policymakers, thereby impacting on political order.

The 'security concept' has gradually widened and deepened since the 1980's. Wolfers pointed to two sides of the security concept: "Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked." Security in an objective sense refers to clearly identified dangers related to sectors (social, energy, food, water, health, livelihood and now also soil), while security in a subjective sense refers to perceptions expressed in security concerns by government officials, media representatives, scientists or the people who securitize dangers through responses to security concerns. Security refers to

existential threats for survival and requires extraordinary measures to face and cope with these concerns. Security concepts offer tools to analyse, interpret, and assess past actions and to request or legitimize present or future activities¹⁴.

Review of the Debate on the Reconceptualization of Security

The reconceptualization of security has gradually emerged since the 1990's in response to: a) the end of the Cold War as a global bipolar order; b) the process of globalization; c) the recognition of GEC as security issues in the Anthropocene. The Copenhagen School¹⁵ of security studies widened the traditional narrow military and political focus to embrace economic, societal and environmental dimensions. They also deepened the reference to the nation state by adding international, regional, societal and individual actors (referent objects). But this school did not analyse the sectorialization of security and human and gender security concepts (table 1).

Table 1: Dimensions of security and levels of interaction

Security dimension ► Level of interaction ▼	Military	Political	Economic	Environmental ▼	Societal
Human ►			Securing soil, water, food, health, livelihood and energy for human beings combining all levels of analysis & interaction ▼▲		
Village/Community/Society					
National	Security dilemma of states		Social, energy, food, health, livelihood and soil threats may pose a survival dilemma in areas with high vulnerability Security of the International/Regional/Global territory		
International/Regional/Global					

¹⁴ Wolfers, Arnold, 1962: "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol", in: Wolfers, Arnold: *Discord and Collaboration. Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press): 147-165.

¹⁵ Wæver, Ole, 1997: *Concepts of Security* (Copenhagen: Department of Political Science).

A combination of human, gender and environmental security (HUGE) represents a widened security concept, which includes vulnerable groups, such as women, children, elders, indigenous and other minorities with a human-centred focus on environmental security challenges, peace building and gender equity¹⁷. This embraces livelihood, food, health and other sectoral security issues, including the new soil security concept related to agricultural practices and sustainable drylands management.

Theory of Securitization

Wæver¹⁸ argued that by declaring development as security problem, or as an existential threat to sovereignty, the state has been the major securitizing actor. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde¹⁹ introduced securitization as being “above politics” and as a “more extreme version of politicization.” They argue that any public issue could be located in a spectrum between *nonpoliticized* (no state action is needed), *politicized* (requiring government decision and resources), and *securitized* (existential threat that requires emergency measures). They state that the securitization of environmental issues could also be enacted by non-state actors.

With the securitization approach the emerging policy debate as a new international, national, and human security concern can be analysed. The securitizing actor that declares a threat is not solely the nation state but may also be a transnational

¹⁷ Oswald Spring, Ursula, 2008: *Gender and Disasters Human, Gender and Environmental Security: Challenge* (Bonn: UNU-EHS).

¹⁸ Wæver, Ole, 1997: *Concepts of Security* (Copenhagen: Department of Political Science).

¹⁹ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for the International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. London. Harvester Wheatsheaf. 1991. p. 187.

epistemic community. The referent objects are not only the state and the international community but primarily individual human beings and humankind.

From a state-centred national security perspective the securitizing actor and the referent object remains the nation state (policy-makers and political elite), while from a wider environmental and deeper people-centred security outlook the scientific community has become a new securitizing actor. The referent object is not only the state but are the vulnerable groups that are most exposed to these emerging security issues.

One of the major themes that have emerged in international relations generally, and security studies in particular at the turn of the twenty first century, is that not only is the term 'security' essentially contested, but that it needs to be redefined. This redefinition of the term is intended to capture two issues: the broadened concerns of the concept and content of security; and the special security perspectives of third world—and African—states. This latter concern is prompted by the fact that the traditional (western) understanding of what constitute security threats to states are not wholly applicable in the African setting where threats to security are conditioned by its different operating environment¹⁹.

The beginning of the twenty first century has also been surrounded by the realities of globalisation in all its multiple aspects. The realities of a globalised and globalising world have shaped emerging discourses in a wide variety of fields, including International Relations, security studies, and their relationship to the international political economy. In particular, the issue of how the process of globalisation intersects with, and influences security, has emerged as one of the mainstream debates spawned by

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

the process of globalisation. Globalisation, and its processes, has also introduced new dimensions of national security which are IT and computer based²⁰.

The largest contribution that the interaction of globalisation and security has created has been the enlarging of the targets of security. Traditionally, security issues were considered to be purely the domain and concern of states. However, that state centric perspective has been changed drastically; it is now not contested that security is not just concerned with states and regimes, but also with individuals—and peoples. This emerging dimension of human and societal security has been a central emerging thread in contemporary discourses about security.

The movement away from the traditional concerns and understandings about security has further encouraged security analysis to move beyond the state, and to encompass the wider environments in which the state operates. This enlarging of analysis has encouraged security to be seen within larger, regional contexts. The rationale for this is supplied by the processes of internationalization (of national affairs, conflicts and politics), and those of interdependence, including contemporary complex interdependence. And both these have provided the case for systems analysis if ever such a justification was needed.

The regional perspective to security issues raises fundamental questions about security and foreign policy. It raises issues to do with the security and foreign policy of individual states in the region; and it also raises questions about the emergence of a regional security and foreign policy, and the content of such a policy. And this in turn focuses attention on the regional institutions that can—or should—spearhead the emergence of a regional and security policy. It raises fundamental questions about

²⁰ *Ibid*

whether the existing regional and sub-regional organizations in Africa are prepared to spearhead such a debate, and to provide the engines that will drive the emerging regional security and foreign policy²¹.

From the above, Snider and Nagl describe, National Security Strategy as the art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power, which are diplomatic, economic and military to achieve objectives that contribute to national security.²² Ullman describes National Security Strategy as the basic document that substantiates national defense planning.²³ National Strategy is therefore the political illustration of the fundamental attributes of a state.

According to Renner a national strategy synthesizes objectives, makes clear definitions, and correlates policy actions for all the entities engaged in ensuring the security of the country, in order to substantiate, in a unitary and coherent way, the actions and the specific regulations of the state institutions of the rule of law and the constitutional power wielders responsible for implementing, safeguarding and asserting fundamental interests.²⁴

Snider and Nagl note that, the term national security strategy implies a planned, systematic, and rational process, where a consideration of national interests, values, and priorities decides policy objectives, and an analysis of available resources, and the external security environment determines the strategy to achieve these objectives.²⁵ Liotta argues that national security strategy represents the basic document that defines these

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Don M. Snider and John A. Nagl, *The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision*, op. cit

²³ R. H. Ullmann, "Redefining Security," *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Summer 1983), pp. 129-131.

²⁴ M. Renner, "State of the World 2005: Redefining Security", in M. Mwangi and O Oculi (eds) *Rethinking Global Security: An African Perspective?* Heinrich Boll Foundation, Regional Office East and Horn of Africa, Nairobi, pp 1-11.

²⁵ Don M. Snider and John A. Nagl, *The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision*, op. cit.

interests, as well as the objectives for their achievement, and materializes the political expression and highest level settlement of a State, and at the same time, the instrument for substantiating and directing the actions within the whole system of national security.²⁶

Marshall argues that, the formulation of National Strategy is marked by prevailing developments in the international system, realities of the region and state, as well as by short and medium term foreseeable perspectives of domestic and international life.²⁷ The fundamental responsibility for the country's security rests, with the head of state, Parliament, Government, and other state institutions according to each one's constitutional responsibilities. Dixon notes that institutions involved in formulation of grand strategy in the traditional aspect are ministries of defense, foreign affairs and the treasury.²⁸ These ministries feed directly to the pillars or legs of national security strategy which are military, diplomacy and economic.

Most states utilize the three institutions in grand strategy formulation, the premise for entrusting national security formulation on the above ministries is that, security issues are high political issues, hence the fewer the number of institutions involved, the better it is for security purposes. However, Mwangi contends that this approach can be self defeating, in that, when the elite control national security formulation, some important elements of security are bound to be left out and particularly when states confine themselves to high political issues as the main ingredients of national security formulation.²⁹

²⁶ P.H. Liotta, and Timothy E. Soames, 'The Art of Reperceiving: Scenarios and the Future,' in *Selected Readings in Strategy and Force Planning*, Vol. 1 (Newport, RI: Naval War College, CDE, 2002), p.14

²⁷ George C. Marshall, 2003, European Center for Security Studies, "National Security Strategy: Processes and Structures," p.3

²⁸ J. Dixon et al. 1984. *National Security Policy Formulation: Institutions, Process and Issues*, Washington D.C, National Defense University, pp. 44-47

²⁹ M. Mwangi. 2008. *Coordination of National Security Strategy*. op. cit. p. 7

Rosenau observes that, any strategy for national security must begin with the role a state will play in the international system and near abroad.³⁰ A national strategy must allow its Government to make choices about the risks they face. This is so because, in an age of uncertainty the unexpected can happen, and states must be prepared to react to that by making our institutions and infrastructure as resilient as they possibly can.

Regional security structures

In the post-cold war era states had to reexamine the nature of their interaction to enhance their security goals. Three schools of thought came up with three different theories that relates to the prospects of security co-operation. This were the realist, institutional and constructivists. Realists argue that as states are power or security maximisers they may not cooperate with each other even if they share common interests because the self help internation system makes cooperation difficult³¹.

Aspects of Security "Dilemma"

With the end of the Cold War, insecurities over ethnic and national identities have become more important than insecurities over state sovereignty; these insecurities have resulted in many of the cases of intrastate conflicts. In order to understand these phenomena, one needs to look at the changing notion of security since the fall of the bipolar world. In this context, the broader concept of 'security dilemma', including societal security besides the traditional state security dilemma, can offer an innovative approach in addressing the sources of insecurity and the response to it³².

³⁰ J. Rosenau, 'Governance in the twenty-first century,' *Global Governance Journal*, Vol:1: 1995, pp 13-43:16

³¹ Craig A. Snyder": *Contemporary Security and Strategy*

³² Steve Smith, "The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies: Conceptualizing Security in the Last Twenty Years".

Institutionalists argue that institutions help to overcome international anarchy by helping to shape the interests and practice of states.³³ Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye argue that realists and institutionalism are compatible with one another. For institutionalists, economic and political incentives are just as important as military security. The constructivists school look at international politics as socially constructed where the system is not just concerned with the distribution of material resources but also include social interactions and this shape the actors identities and interests not just their behaviours. Constructivists argue that a social structure exist not only that we think it exists, but because policy makers believes it exist and as such acts in accordance with the shared knowledge. Wendt gives the example that the cold war was a structure of shared knowledge that governed great power relations for forty years. But once they stopped acting on this basis it was over.

Collective security

This approach adopts a narrow realist definition which focuses on the prevention of direct military threats to sovereign states. This approach only considers military threats at the expense of non military threats

Collective security is member states, not necessarily likeminded agree to use force to resolve their difference and respond collectively to any violation of security. It seeks to regulate international behavior by transforming the competitive nature of state interaction.

³³ Ibid.

Concert Security

A small group of great powers work together to prevent aggression. There are three conditions to be met. First each of the states must be vulnerable to collective action. That is no one state can be so large that if all the other states in the system were to combine they would still not pose a preponderance of power. The major powers should also agree on what constitutes an acceptable international border.

Concept of Comprehensive Security

Like developing states in other parts of the world, East African states have been especially concerned about their sovereignty, and so have mostly defined their security in a conventional way. However, most of their security threats have actually originated from within, from domestic issues and from the encounter of those issues (such as poverty and lack of economic opportunity for individuals and for certain groups) with outside forces that have insidiously infiltrated the general population.

³⁴Other security issues in the region result from long-standing political disputes, both with neighboring countries and with groups within a state. This category of issues has claimed most of the attention of those leaders who are most attached to the conventional, or traditional, state-focused security approach.

With this approach countries have to look at external and internal threats-- both military and non-military-- that have the potential to destabilize their world and put their survival as nations at risk. This comprehensive security concept is an expanded version of the traditional Realist concept of security, in that it considers threats caused not only

³⁴ Abdul Monem Al-Mashat. *National Security in the Third World*. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985); Caroline Thomas. *In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations*. (Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1987); Brian L. Job, ed. *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of the Third States*. (boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner. 1992); Mohamed Ayoob. *The Third World Security Predicament: State making, Regional Conflict and the International System*. (Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

by “high politics” such as military attacks, but also threats originating from the arena of “low politics,” such as economic issues.³⁵
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?hl=en&q=cache:NA4o1PJ7mcll: http://www.afes-press.de/pdf/Hague/Othman_Human_Security.pdf+Debate+about+the+concepts+of+security-literature+review&ct=clnk - 8#8

Realists view security in general as “high politics,” and other national issues as “low politics,” and thus it has been difficult for them to consider as important the many complex “peripheral” issues related to the security agenda.

The idea of comprehensive security is broader than the more traditional concept, including “high” as well as “low” political issues. It goes beyond the traditional threats that come in a military form, or even in the form of internal violence and disorder, such as that which arises out of ethnic conflicts. It includes other issues such as illicit drug trafficking, maritime piracy, famine, environmental pollution, illegal immigration, illicit drug and weapons trafficking, and trafficking in human beings—to name just a few—as threats to the stability of the region. The concept of comprehensive security thus acknowledges the potential of both internal and external sources, military and nonmilitary issues, as threats to their survival. At the same time, comprehensive security does not neglect the importance of military security.

Liberal Perspective of Security

Liberal perspective of security includes Common Security and Cooperative. Security
Cooperative security is broader and more flexible than comprehensive or common

³⁵ Comprehensive National Security Group, *Report on Comprehensive National Security*. July 2, 1980, pp.: 19-24 as cited in Alan DuPont, “New Dimension of Security,” p. 35. In Denny Roy, ed. *The New Security Agenda in the Asia Pacific Region* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997).

security. It recognizes the value of existing bilateral and balance-of-power arrangements in contributing to regional security. The key focus of cooperative security is the habit of having dialogue and moving toward inclusive participation in addressing any given conflict. Cooperative security is the most effective regional security structure. It give non states actors a voice in international for a, takes a gradual approach to the development of cooperation, it combines military and non-military components of security, it is primarily focused on preventing inter-state conflicts and as such tend to work to preserve the status quo between and within the states. It is a liberal approach.

All of East African countries are focused on domestic matters as important to meet their national security goals, and those goals generally include political stability, economic well-being and social harmony.³⁶ Preserving the territory is still a main objective of national security for these countries, recognizing that they are still vulnerable to both internal conflict and external intervention. Therefore, their responses are multidimensional in that they encompass political, legal, socio-economic, military and diplomatic measures and inevitably must include cooperation with other countries for bilateral and multilateral security, as well as cooperation regionally.

Although comprehensive security is common among states, with political stability, economic development and social harmony continuing to be important elements of their survival, they do not have a common perception of external threats.³⁷

³⁶ David Dewitt, "Common, Comprehensive and Cooperative Security." *The Pacific Review* 7, (1994), 31, pp. 1-15.

³⁷ Carolina Hernandez, "Comparative Security Needs in the SE Asian and Pacific Regions," *Disarmament*, (1990), 23.

No 2, pp : 100-101.

It is proposed that the concept of comprehensive security should encompass the security of individual persons and their families and communities, as well as the security of the state. http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?hl=en&q=cache:NA4o1PJ7mcIJ:htt p://www.afes-press.de/pdf/Hague/Othman_Human_Security.pdf+Debate+about+the+concepts+of+security-literature+review&ct=clnk - 11#11 Thus, a threat to the well-being of individual human beings is ultimately considered a threat to comprehensive security of the state, signaling that comprehensive security includes interdependence among various dimensions of society, and the security of a state is not assured until it is secure and resilient in every dimension. In a similar vein, Jim Rolfe has also looked at the linkage between national and regional concepts of comprehensive security. Comprehensive security includes political and social stability, economic development, migration and the health of the population.³⁸ http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?hl=en&q=cache:NA4o1PJ7mcIJ:http://www.afes-press.de/pdf/Hague/Othman_Human_Security.pdf+Debate+about+the+concepts+of+security-literature+review&ct=clnk - 11#11

³⁸ Jim Rolfe. "Pursuing Comprehensive Security: Linkages between National and Regional Concepts, Some Applications." In Mohamad Jawhar Hassan and Thangam Ramnath, eds. *Conceptualizing Asia- Pacific Security*. (KL: ISIS, 1996).

Regional comprehensive security can be achieved, when states consider each other's needs and cooperate. Nearly all problems interlink with each other and efforts to solve them mutually reinforce each other. He suggested formal and informal institutions as means to improve security, and further proposed that security should be focused on the individual as a member of a society, aiming to produce a society that meets the needs of its members.

Although threats to stability in the region include non-military sources, little has been discussed about how any of these threats specifically have more impact on this particular region more than others. In other words, the concept remains underdeveloped in many ways. The primacy of the state and its territory still dominates, even though states in the region have come to see security issues somewhat differently than those who have the Realist perspective.

Security Dilemma

Security Dilemma covers both the processes at the inter-state level and processes at the intra-state level. By analogy with the (state) security dilemma, a societal security dilemma might exist when the actions of one society, in trying to increase its societal security (strengthening its own identity), causes a reaction in a second society, which in the end, decreases its (the first society's) own societal security (weakens its own identity).

Such a reality shifts scholars' interest from the previous 'classical' concerns on inter-state security matters to more contemporary issues regarding intra-state security. This scholarly shift of interest has been accompanied with a change on the notion of

security. The first and most fundamental change regards the supremacy of the state, both as the actor and the object to be secured.

Second, the agenda of security has been 'broadened and deepened' since the threats to security today are not only confined to inter-state relations but also, and most importantly, to other matters regarding intra-state security. Third, the final goal of security has been focused more on individuals as human beings rather than on state sovereignty. Among others Smith will argue that "the central assumptions of neorealism, that the state was the key actor in world politics and that the main, almost defining, issue for the discipline was military security, are now less central to the discipline"³⁹.

The diverse contributions to the debates on 'new thinking on security' can be classified along several axes. One attempts to broaden the neorealist conception of security to include a wider range of potential threats, ranging from economic and environmental issues to human rights and migration. This challenge has been accompanied by discussions intended to deepen the agenda of security studies by moving either down to the level of individual or human security or up to the level of international or global security, with regional and societal security as possible intermediate points".⁴⁰

Opponents of the dominant school of traditionalists "urge a refocusing of the core values of the realist school of thought to consider the human being as the core referent in security thinking".

⁴⁰ Keith Krause and Michael Williams, "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods", *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (October 1996), pp. 229-230.

In order to deal with these new realities, new concepts had to be invented while analytical and theoretical approaches were revisited. In this respect, it is argued that the traditionalist approach – although it does provide some analytical background knowledge mostly in terms of levels of analysis and partially of actors involved – falls short of explaining the security problems of today.⁴¹

David Baldwin concludes that the answers to today's problems are not to be found in the writings of cold war literature. Here he also admits it is not to neglect all the merits of the previous literature. The point is that the contemporary issues need a more refined and critical approach.⁴²

Security from the Traditional Approach to the Critical Approach

The term 'security' refers to the condition where individuals, groups, communities and states as a whole are free from armed or unarmed threat to physical, social, psychological, material, and political well being, and possess adequate resources to deal with such threats whenever they occur.

The definition goes beyond the realist perspective and captures a new scope and meaning of security. The term security can be applied refer to states and non-state actors, including individuals and communities, and to military and non-military aspects of states and societies. Furthermore, the definition suggests that threats to security can have both internal and external sources and solutions. It presupposes the use of strategies that

⁴¹ David Roberts, "Review Essay: Human Security or Human Insecurity? Moving the Debate Forward" *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 37, No. 2 (June 2006), p. 257.

⁴² See. David Baldwin, "Security Studies and the End of the Cold War," *World Politics*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (October 1995), p. 141.

involve cooperation and collaboration by far more than self-regarding state pursuit of power and the continual exploration of military options.

The Traditional Approach to Security

Inter-state relations were first described by realist scholars and their belief states are situated in the anarchy of world politics where every state purely looks out for its own national interest. In order to protect their national interests, states try to increase their power, especially their military power. By increasing their military power, states improve their security in the international arena. But the more a state tries to improve its security, the less safe other states will feel. Increasing the security of one state will produce a relative loss of security for all others, creating the so-called 'security dilemma.' In such anarchic world politics, all states are potential enemies.⁴³

The idea is that all states are potential enemies and the insecurity created may devolve into inter-state conflicts. Once initiated these conflicts may become a unending struggle since every state, in order to survive, will continue to fight. Opposite to the use of force is the institutionalist philosophy. Institutionalists believe that states can achieve security through international institutions which can provide the mechanisms for facilitating cooperation.⁴⁴ Realists assume first that "the international system is anarchic" in the sense "that the system comprises independent political units (states) that have no central authority above them" and secondly, "states are potentially dangerous to each other".

⁴³ John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions", *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), p. 9-10.

⁴⁴ Patrick Morgan. "Liberalist and Realist Security Studies at 2000: Two Decades of Progress?". *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1999).

The presence of international institutions harmonizes the anarchy in world politics and instead of the use of force and military power; they promote the use of diplomacy as a tool to resolve inter-state disputes. Although different in the ways of achieving security, both liberals and realists start from the presupposition that “there can be no security in the absence of authority.”

The object to be secured, in the view of both schools of thought, is the state. In the realist view, what has to be secured was the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the state where the use of force and military power is necessary. For liberals also, the object to be secured is still the state since international institutions are created by the states and respond to state interests although often they reflect only the interest of the most powerful members.⁴⁵

In the traditional concept of security, which dominated both the academic and the political worlds until the end of the Cold War, the only focus was the state and its territorial integrity. Such paradigms, although long prominent in the field, seem to be weak in explaining the post-Cold war period, where conflicts more than between the states are happening within the states.

The Critical Approach to Security

In order to take proper account of the post-Cold War reality, the Critical Security Studies paradigm was developed as an alternative way

In his seminal work, John Mearsheimer maintained that “[t]he most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, or even increase it. In this view, institutions are essentially ‘arenas for

⁴⁵ Keith Krause and Michael Williams, “Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies...”, p. 232.

acting out power relationships". Institutions do not provide the only possible coordinating mechanism. However, in complex situations involving many states, international institutions can step in to provide "constructed focal points" that make particular cooperative outcomes prominent. Note here that although many scholars have discredited the realist approach post Cold War, there are still prominent authors in favour of a realist approach.

Challenging the Traditional Dominant Paradigms

Its merits stand not only for 'broadening' the security agenda by including other issues in addition to military issues, but mostly for 'extending' the security agenda in order to include other so-called referent objects for security in addition to the state. The main criticisms of the traditional approach to security had to do with the centrality of the state and their focus on certain aspects while ignoring others.⁴⁶

So in an attempt to re-define the object of security, questions of whose security was being talking about and who needs to be secured had to be re-addressed. In traditional terms when talking about security, we are talking about the security of a particular state, not that of its citizens. This is because "the security of 'citizens' is identified with (and guaranteed by) that of the state". By only focusing on the state as the object of security, we are assuming that maintaining the security of the state *ipso facto* guarantees the security of the individual.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ see William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War", *International Security*, Vol.19, No.3 (Winter 1994), pp. 91-129.

⁴⁷ Reference from Alice Ackerman, *Making Peace Prevail: Preventing Violent Conflict in Macedonia*, Syracuse, N.Y., Syracuse University Press, 1999. p. 66.

It is the 'Copenhagen School' which took the first step and made the distinction between state and society, arguing that security studies need to adopt an understanding of the 'duality' of security – that it involves a combination of state security concerned with sovereignty and societal security concerned with identity.

States are political units and as such it is this political integrity which needs to be secured but states are also composed of societies and societies are about identity, that is, what enables a group of people to refer to themselves as 'we'. It is the 'we' (identity) that matters for societies and is used as a means to collectively identify the object to be secured. The issue of societal security becomes important since often the boundaries of nations and states do not overlap; instead states can include diverse societal ethnic groups.⁴⁸

The Fact of Different Societal Collectives

In the ethnically-mixed state, it is impossible to create compact national states in which only members of one nation can live. This is an absurdity which can hardly be realized in Africa ... Perhaps one nation can win a victory here and there, but then this would only lead to revanchism on the part of the others, and thus, there would inside a state may create a societal security dilemma, in the same way as with the state security dilemma.

So the idea of societal security, identical to state security, comes as an additional factor to the traditional security issues. The kind of relationship between 'the self' and 'the other' inside the state becomes crucial for its security. The security of the state itself will depend on the inner state construction and relationships, specifically whether the

⁴⁸ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for the International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, London. Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, p. 187.

state is an open and inclusive self of all its societal groups or if it is an exclusive one. When the state ceases to represent the interests of all its societal groups, the excluded collectives perceive a threat to their identity and that their survival as a community is endangered.⁴⁹ These perceptions will lead the threatened societal groups to search for ways to increase their security; requests by the excluded groups for increased community security will cause insecurity for the state itself.

Normative Question of Security for Whom

The deepening of the notion of security after the fall of the bipolar world added more actors to be considered when dealing with security matters. As scholars have rightly noted, "any attempt to study security has to face the problem of seamless web." Security, especially in multiethnic states, is multidimensional and has to be understood and explained at all levels. The most comprehensive approach is achieved if the discussion about security is focused on the three interlinked levels. In a bottom-up approach, one has to start at the sub-state level.⁵⁰

(Multiethnic) states are composed of societal groups, which are important political units and can play a crucial role in the political life of a state. As such, when dealing with security issues, one has to look first at the communities-state relations. The second analysis has to be undertaken at the state level considering inter-state relations. The

⁴⁹ Andrea Carla, "Community Security: Letters from Bosnia A theoretical analysis and its application to the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina", *Peace, Conflict and Development: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, Vol. 7 (July 2005), p. 225.

⁵⁰ Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Morton Kelstrup, and Pierre Lemaitre, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, London, Pinter, 1993, p. 25.

regional contexts and the probable influence of other states on a state domestic issue for matters of their concern are also an important point to never be an end".

What to look at when dealing with the security issue

The last point to be investigated is the role of the international community in security matters which aggregate to violence and whose importance becomes of international concern. In order to fully comprehend the security issues, one has to examine them at all these levels and understand the relationship between them as well as the role they play in security issues. Getting into the analysis at the sub-state, state and supra-state levels gets wider and bolder. This triple analysis in fact does not imply that the three levels are mutually exclusive; in fact there is a great degree of interaction among them.

This kind of approach studies security from the bottom-up and will try to answer, every time, the question: security for whom? Although the analysis in this paper is conducted in three parts to consider societal groups, states and the role of international community, the focus is still on this one question. In fact, at all of these levels of analysis, the security of individuals should take precedence. The 'object' to be secured, rather than the state *per se* as an abstraction, is the well-being of individuals.⁵¹

Although the security dilemma starts from the bottom and may escalate up-wards, the reverse answer applies where security should be provided, that is all levels – the

⁵¹ "Critical security studies is the most sustained and coherent critique of traditional security studies". Steve Smith. "The increasing insecurity of security studies:...", p. 88.

'international community', states and societal groups should all provide security to individuals⁵².

Societal Security as an Important Part of the State Security

In such multiethnic states, the role of the state is crucial to societal security. This is because even if the state represents a solution to the security needs of one group of people, it may be a source of threat to another. Many states, after the fall of their communist regimes, did not represent all of their societal groups.⁵³ Furthermore, they sometimes represented threats to those societal groups by taking sides in intra-societal conflict. This made the threatened social groups react and become able to act alongside the state, becoming credible and significant political units posing a security problem for their states. Often the sense of insecurity and threats to these societal groups comes as a result of their status as a minority group within a state.

In such cases, the basis approach of the state itself (the desire to create ethnically homogenous states) becomes *a priori* exclusive for some societal groups distinguishing between 'first-class' and 'second-class' citizens. As a result, those who are or feel excluded may become a possible threat to the state itself. "Having a nationality and being recognized a citizen of a country is a key element of human security... Having a nationality is a fundamental human right, and citizenship is 'the right to have rights'".⁵⁴

Any rejection of such rights may lead those communities who are excluded to become a threat. But the real threat to security comes when parties involved (such as state

⁵² Keith Krause and Michael Williams, "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies:...", p. 232.

⁵³ 14 Nizar Messari, "The State and Dilemmas of Security: the Middle East and the Balkans", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 33, No. 4 (December 2002), p. 417.

⁵⁴ UN Commission on Human Security, "Human Security Now" Final Report, New York, 2003, p. 31.

– usually as representative of the majority – and guerrillas – as representative of the minority) attack each other.⁵⁵ By analogy with the (state) security dilemma, a societal security dilemma might arise and societal groups will use arms to defend their identity while states will do so to defend their sovereignty. The problem we are left with here, however, is that the processes of the resultant societal security dilemma would closely resemble those of the state security dilemma,⁵⁶ a game where no one wins.

The International Community: A Decisive Actor On Security Matters

International guarantees of the country's security illustrate once more that the state has not been able to guarantee security on its own. This inability of states makes them believe that they are more likely to achieve their security goals within, rather than outside of, multilateral institutions.⁵⁷

A series of political options are available to the international community, ranging from non-coercive ('soft') measures including diplomatic talk, political or economic sanctions, to more coercive ('hard') measures, including the use of military force.⁵⁸ Some of the main actors 'behind the international community' are the US, the EU and other leading Western countries, as well as international organizations (for example United Nations). On the issues of security, the international community particular concerns are the human rights, armed conflict and justice-based solutions. They

⁵⁵ Clément, "Conflict Prevention in the Balkans:...", p. 16.

⁵⁶ Alice Ackermann, "Macedonia: Another Piece in the Balkan Puzzle?" (Viewpoints), *Security Dialogue* Vol. 32, No. 3 (September 2001), p. 378.

⁵⁷ Emil Kirchner, "Security Threats and Institutional Response. The European context", *Asia Europe Journal*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2005), p. 180.

⁵⁸ *ibid.*

legitimized their actions by proclaiming that their goal is to reduce the conflict, end the war and restore peace.

In other words, 'collective' rather than 'national' interests were being promoted as a response to the old ethnic national calculations of a region. As a consequence of this logic neither the state institutions, including the military, can be seen as the only agent of security strategies and actions, nor can armed groups substitute for this role.⁵⁹ The international community's involvement is more a reaction to recover from its previous failures of not intervening at the right time with right measures, as well as to avoid any spill-over of the conflict further in a region.⁶⁰

The security threats, both at the interstate and intrastate levels, have been related to national identity. Apart from the threat and influence of neighbouring countries in domestic affairs, the main threat and the entire chaotic situation in the country was a result of societal security. Such a societal security problem often arises in multiethnic states when the government considers the existence of different communities inside their territory to be a threat to their sovereignty, so as to justify exploitation and denial of citizenship to the members of these communities. In this way, groups cannot participate in the economic, social and political life of the society.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Claire Piana "The EU's Decision-Making Process in the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Case of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2002), p. 212.

⁶⁰ Claude Bruderlein, "People's Security as a New Measure of Global Stability", Paper presented to the International Security Forum, Geneva, 15 – 17 November 2000, p. 7.

⁶¹ Peter Wallensteen, *Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System*, London, Sage Publications, 2002, p. 271.

This type of exclusion makes societal groups act similarly and parallel to the state. If the state neglects these societal groups, or in the worst case attacks them, then the state itself becomes the source of, and not the solution to, security problems. The inability of the state to resolve the security problem may cause the international community to intervene. The use of incentives rather than punishments proved to be more effective in preventing conflict.

All the above issues bring to the argument that the main values that need to be protected by the international community, states and non-state actors are the personal safety and freedom of the individuals.

What is clear from the analysis presented in this paper is that the study of security is a multilayered process involving community, state, regional and international actors, each with their own characteristics regarding preferences and roles. The final aim of the preceding list of actors should be the achievement of security for all, and not for only a few. "The death of soldiers and civilians is to be strongly condemned. They were unnecessary victims of disorientation, chaos, irresponsibility, incompetence, ignorance, narrow personal and party interests and ambitions, and above all, cowardice."⁶²

These threats to people's safety and freedom, which derive from the fact that human beings aggregate in diverse communal groups, are the main concern of societal security. Indeed, societal security stresses the importance of the protection of human rights and individual freedoms, aiming to give each individual, of whatever community, the possibility to expand his or her capacity and improve his or her quality of life.

⁶² Mirce Tomovski, "Political and Security Crisis in Macedonia: An interview with Mirjana Maleska", Puls, 14 September 2001. available at http://www.newbalkanpolitics.org.mk/OldSite/Issue_3/maleska.interview.eng.asp.

In examining the way in which security policies have to construct appropriate responses to the threats, of course, the formula "security through integration and cooperation" needs to gain a broad acceptance by all – actors and non-actors at all levels – as being essential for the stabilization of the situation in a region.

In this context, the concept of societal security can offer an innovative approach to address the sources of insecurity and the response to it. If the threats/insecurities have an upward escalation, starting from the community level going to state level, and perhaps degraded at the regional/international level, then security should be provided back.

Aspects of Security "Dilemma" downwards from the international to the regional level, from the regional to the state level, from the state to the community level having as a final aim the individual. Real security can only be reached by completing the localisation of security functions at the individual level.

It is this critical moment that requires state attention to find a balance so as to consolidate its relationships with its own societal communities. One way is through consolidating the democratic regime with "state policies that grant inclusion and equal citizenship and that give all citizens a common 'roof' of state-mandated and state-enforced individual rights."⁶³

The realist school of thought is founded on the premise that as a tool for the policymaker the national interest is intended to identify what is in the best interest of his state in its relations with other states.⁶⁴ The term "best" is defined in terms of power and

⁶³ Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, Baltimore. John Hopkins University Press, 1996, p. 33.

⁶⁴ Iain McLean. *Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1996. p. 333.

security. Realists view national security as the primary basis of a state's national interest because of the threat of anarchy and constraints on sovereign states that are part of the international system. Anarchy in the international system would be manifested as "disorder, disarray, confusion, or chaos." This could either be interpreted as a description of the general condition of the international system, or as the absence of any authoritative institutions, rules, or norms that are more powerful than any sovereign state actor and, thus, have the ability to ensure security in the overall system.⁶⁵ The result is a lack of security for the actors that are members of the system.

In addition to anarchy, realists are also very sensitive to threats to a state's interests that are posed by "external constraints on their freedom of manoeuvre from international treaties, the interests and power of other states, and other factors beyond the control of the (state) such as geographic location and dependence on foreign trade."⁶⁶

According to realism, the absence of security caused by anarchy and constraints in the system causes states to orient their interests on "the acquisition and management of power," more often than not to be related to some form of the military element of national power.⁴⁴⁶⁷ The result, according to Morgenthau, is the need to focus an actor's national interests on meeting its security requirements by "protect(ing) (its) physical, political, and cultural identity against encroachments by other nations."⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Evans and Newnham, pp. 18-19.

⁶⁶ McLean, p. 333.

⁶⁷ Griffiths and O'Callaghan, p. 204.

⁶⁸ Hans J. Morgenthau, "Another Great Debate: The National Interest of the United States," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 46, No. 4, 1952, p. 972. as quoted in Jutta Weldes, *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999, p. 5.

For the national interest, the emphasis in realism is on doing what is primarily and almost solely to the advantage of that particular state actor. It is done with an express focus on power and security⁶⁹. In contrast, morality-based interests are defined "more broadly to encompass intangible values like human rights, freedom from economic deprivation, and freedom from disease." While military power could still be the national power element of choice, morality-based interests would promote concepts such as "the values of national self-determination and economic egalitarianism."⁷⁰

Formulating a National Security Strategy

Marceila describes a strategy as the art of controlling and utilizing the resources of a nation or coalition of nations including its armed forces, to the end that its vital interests shall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual, potential or merely presumed.⁷¹ A national strategy is also conceptualized as a combination of ends of what states are seeking to achieve, ways by which they seek to achieve those ends and means states can devote to achieving the ends. A National Strategy must reflect the context in which it is developed, the particular strengths and skills that states can bring to bear in areas of comparative advantage, they should be clear, but also flexible, to take account of uncertainty and change.

On one hand a national strategy comprises the carefully coordinated and fully integrated use of all political, economic, military, cultural, social, moral, spiritual and psychological power available. On the other hand, grand strategy can only be formulated

⁶⁹ Robert Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations*, Chicago, IL, 1953, p. 4, as quoted in Nuechterlein, 1973, p. 5. 12

⁷⁰ James F. Miskel, "National Interests: Grand Purposes or Catchphrases," *Naval War College Review*, Autumn 2002, p. 97.

⁷¹ Gabriel Marceila, *National Security and the Interagency Process*. (Department of National Security and Strategy Text Book, Volume II, Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 2003), p.276.

after the desired aim and objectives have been determined. The aim, the objectives and the power needed to attain them are the indispensable fundamentals of any strategy. Grand strategy as Posen argues, is a state's theory about how it can best cause security for itself. As such, it is an exercise in public worrying about the future and doing something about it.⁷²

Sarkesian argues that, a states national strategy must take into account of the activities of other states, by considering the positive contributions of allies and partners and of the private sector; and the negative effect of adversaries seeking to hinder them from achieving their interests.⁷³ Therefore a strategy must also be based on creative insight into how best a states aims to achieve its own objectives and prevent adversaries from achieving theirs. In theory, a coherent and effective National Strategy would efficiently align and balance the strategic ends, ways, and means in pursuit of states national interests in consonance with the states social values. It encompasses national defense, foreign relations, and economic relations and assistance.

Ikenberry argues that, a strategy is only useful if it guides choices of state and protects political and social life from all major risks that can affect states directly. Nonetheless, a strategy involves making choices.⁷⁴ To inform the Strategic Defense and Security Review, it has been essential to prioritize risks in order to prioritize capabilities. It must balance the ends, ways and means. The ways and means by which a state seeks to achieve its objectives must be appropriate and sufficient and the objectives must also be realistic in light of the means available.

⁷² Barry Posen, *Sources of Military Doctrine*, op, cit.

⁷³ Sam C. Sarkesian, 1995, *US Nation Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p.260.

⁷⁴ G. John Ikenberry. *American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror*, (Department of National Security and Strategy Textbook, Volume IV, Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 2003), p.132.

Zelikow argues that, every states National Strategy starts with a states mental image of the international system.⁷⁵ Drew and Snow note that, as a process the National strategy involves determining what interests the nation has, what priorities to place on those various interests, and what national instruments of power are available and appropriate for achieving individual interests and the aggregate of those interests.⁷⁶

The fundamental, strategic nature of a National Strategy is threefold in that, it furnishes a historical perspective to past strategic structure; it delineates the interest of a state, it analyzes the threat and objectives of a state, and the means to achieve these objectives.⁷⁷

There are four important factors to a systematic study of the development of the National Strategy and all of them center on the President. First, the President's leadership style, his personality and character as critical determinants of how office functions with respect to national security policy and process. Second, how the President views the powers and limitations of the office and how he sees his role in furthering its prestige and power. Third, the President's mindset regarding states national interests and the international security environment and how these affect the national security policies and strategic posture his administration attempts to put into place. Lastly, is the President's ability to bring the first three components to bear upon the National Security

⁷⁵ Philip Zelikow, *The Transformation of National Security – Five Redefinitions*, (Department of National Security and Strategy Textbook, Volume IV, Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 2003), p.1.

⁷⁶ Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, *Making Strategy: An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems*. (Alabama: Air University Press, 1988), 13.

⁷⁷ Ronald Reagan, *The National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, January 1988), p.1.

Establishment so as to synthesize and integrate its efforts toward coherent policy and relevant options.⁷⁸

Traditional Underpinnings Of A Grand Strategy

Ikenberry argues that, under the traditional realm, National Security Strategy is bundled on three arms, namely security, economic and diplomacy pillars. these pillars are based on assumptions about how best to advance national security and build international order.⁷⁹ The three pillars encompass both planning for the use of the various aspects of state power and attention to the domestic policies needed to produce and maintain them over the long run.⁸⁰

Military

The military pillar provides the structure upon which security decisions for a state are determined. Security is paramount to sovereign states to protect particularly against external attack and internal threats, a good security strategy means stability to the state and potential to protect nationals or respond to threats. States are the sole actors bestowed with the responsibility to provide security. Booth, in defense of military pillar argues that, national self preservation or survival gives prominence to national security as the primary element of national security strategy.⁸¹ Mwagiru argues that, focusing on military issues is narrow minded particularly to developing states, and not in line to contemporary issues.

⁷⁸ Sam C. Sarkesian, *US Nation Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics*. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), p.260.

⁷⁹ G. John Ikenberry, *American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror*, (Department of National Security and Strategy Textbook, Volume IV, Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 2003), p.132.

⁸⁰ Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Making of American National Strategy 1948-1988," *The National Interest*, Number 11(Spring 1988): p.65

⁸¹ K., Booth, ed. 2005. *Critical security studies and world politics*. Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, p.34

concern on military security was central at a time when threats to national security were largely physical and considered to emanate from outside the state.⁸²

National security according to Buzan, focuses on the nation. a nation is a group of people who either live in a definite geographical location or are dispersed but share a common language, culture, and share common historical experiences.⁸³ National security can therefore be described as a condition or feeling of being secure or safe. it also refers to universal aspirations to live in the expectation that life and physical integrity will not be threatened by any other person, group or society.⁸⁴

Morgenthau argues that the international system is anarchical and determined by power. In the Cold War period notions of security were based on the use of force to preserve important state interests based on realism or power politics. Security was viewed as an absence of threat or a situation in which occurrence of consequences of that threat could be either.

Nye, contend that during the cold war period, use of soft military power was in vogue, such nontraditional components of a nation's power such as its cultural sway, the strength of its ideas, and the quality of its commercial goods can exert influence in world affairs. While this idea sounds great in theory, it does not work in practice. He adds that preempting our enemies and maintaining military dominance, while necessary to winning the war against terrorism, are not alone sufficient to ensure our victory.

⁸² M. Mwangiru. 2008. 'Coordination of National Security Strategy. op. cit, p.6

⁸³ Buzan B. 1983, *People, State and Fear: National Security Problem in International Relations*. Prentice Hall, Hertfordshire. p. 48.

⁸⁴ Ibid, p.50.

Mathew says that military force might be necessary in situations that pose a threat to national interests, military forces should be brought in only if their use advances U.S. interests.⁸⁵ if they are likely to accomplish the stated objective, if the costs and risks of their deployment are commensurate with the interests at stake, and if other nonmilitary means are incapable of achieving our goals.

National security strategy should also be distinguished from military strategy or doctrine. As Clausewitz recognized, military strategy should flow from, and be subordinate to, overall national security policy goals, even if the resultant potential for political interference in military planning and operations can often be frustrating for those in uniform.

According to Morgenthau, security studies were policy oriented and focused on rational choice theory, technology, and the improvement of weaponry.⁸⁶ During the Cold War, security was considered to be about the use of military force. Military security was an attribute of relations of a state, a region or a grouping of states with others. Buzan argues that Cold War security centered on military measures to protect sovereign interests and physical survival of states.⁸⁷

National security was largely a product of competition among states, its persuasiveness was increased by the realist view that security is the primary national goal and that in international politics, security threats are permanent. Security was also seen as the protection of state boundaries from external interference, according to the realist view this physical value is so basic that no other goals can be pursued in its absence.

⁸⁵ J.T. Mathews, 'Redefining Security', op. cit.

⁸⁶ H.J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 5 edition. New York: Knopf. 1978. p. 4.

⁸⁷ B Buzan O.Wæver and J. de Wilde, *Security, A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder-London, 1998, p 7.

According to Organiski, national interests are important that states pursue them by all means. During the Cold War this means included use of military power or use of force. To protect and achieve national interests, states created national security strategies. In the days of the Cold War, the world was more or less determined by the Westphalian Order.⁸⁸ Strategies could be based on the assumption that the opponents were state actors and would probably apply a similar, if not the same, logical sequence in choosing their actions.

Economic

The economic pillar of national security strategy takes care of what generally the economy can do in supporting a state. The economy of state is important factor in national security formulation, a strong economy implies that, a state can take care of a broad range issues. It also can accommodate issues beyond the near abroad region into the international system. Smith argues that, the economic pillar also determines how easier it is for states to implement their national strategy once formulated.⁸⁹ This claim is premised on the fact that, a state with a strong economy is able to allocate resources to cater for the many requirements of national security strategy, unlike a state with a weak economy, which in most cases is forced to prioritize resource allocations.

Economic threats are difficult to determine due to the nature of economics itself. As Buzan points out, the normal condition of actors in a market economy is one of risk, aggressive competition and uncertainty,⁹⁰ this insecure nature makes economic security

⁸⁸ Buzan B, 1983, *People, State and Fear: National Security Problem in International Relations*, op, cit.

⁸⁹ P.M. Smith, 1987, *Creating Strategic Vision: Long Range Planning for National Security*, Washington D.C. National Defense University Press, p.2

⁹⁰ Buzan B, 1983, *People, State and Fear: National Security Problem in International Relations*. op. cit.

hard to disentangle. The threshold of what is acceptable based on an inherent instability and what is a threat can be difficult to identify.

Buzan argues that, it is easy to see that, military pillar is dependent on economic security due do budget constraints and limits.⁹¹ Furthermore, economic security can be considered a key indicator as to the general security of a state. If developed and developing countries are compared, it is clear that with economic security other levels of security become easier to establish. In some states, economic policy alone can drive the whole security strategy process.

The economy of state is a major tool for policy implementation, economic well being of state means how well a states economy can support state affairs. Wendzel argues that a national security strategy must be designed with the economy of a states in mind, failure to consider the economic status of a state implies that, whatever strategy is adopted will be difficult to implement because of economic constraints.

Diplomacy

Barston defines diplomacy as the art of conducting relation between one state and another without resort to war or use of violence. In National strategy studies, diplomacy is the structure upon which the foreign policy strategy is implemented. The early traces of diplomacy in national security strategy were in the United States where. after the end of Second of WWII, the US implemented diplomacy to achieve it is national interest abroad. Diplomacy was also used in advancing domestic needs of the US in other states.

In the advent of national security formulation, diplomacy was conceived as a preserve of the ministry of foreign affairs. The need for diplomacy indicated the desire of states to develop relations and achieve national interests in the near abroad. The premise

⁹¹ Ibid

for diplomacy was that, for a state pursuing a national strategy to succeed, the near abroad must also be stable.⁹² Conflicts in a region could affect a state pursuing a national security strategy from achieving its goals. Prevailing situations in a region would often dictate the course that a states strategy would follow. In addition prevailing situations in the near abroad could often dictate the foreign policy a state pursues. As such, Rosenau argues that a states national security strategy aims first at the near abroad.⁹³

Modern Underpinnings Of Grand Strategy: Coordination

After the end of the cold war period in late 1980's, national security strategy and force structure began to anticipate and reflect a new emphasis on dealing with the changes in the security environment. In the traditional setting, the pillars upon which national strategy is founded are regarded as distinct and different from one another. Each is examined as a pillar supporting a heft of national issues, from a far, this appears to reflect that, the pillars of national security strategy are self sufficing, upon close analysis, Mwangiru argues that, a national security strategy can not be effectively be implemented without coordination of the three pillars.⁹⁴

The pillar of coordination therefore captures the external visions of national security threats and most importantly introduces the aspect of coordination among the three models. With coordinated, as the link between the other three, a security strategy can then operate and implemented. Coordination helps in allocation of resources central

⁹² R. O. Keohane, & J. S. Nye, Jr. "Introduction." In: *Governance in a Globalizing World*, Joseph S. Nye, Jr and John D. Donahue, (Eds). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2000, pp.1-6.

⁹³ J. Rosenau, 'Governance in the twenty-first century,' *Global Governance Journal*, Vol:1: 1995, pp 13-43:15.

⁹⁴ M. Mwangiru, 2008, 'Coordination of National Security Strategy: op. cit. p.2

to the needs of a states national interest. It also avoids pitfalls of favoring some sectors in national sector more than the others and who may be equally important.⁹⁵

Smith argues that coordination is important in planning for long term planning for national security issues.⁹⁶ Long term planning is important since, without it, national security strategy becomes a hostage to bureaucratic wars among government organs, ministries and individuals that rare engaged in national security formulation.

Regarding that, in national security formulation many issues emerge and contend for recognition and implementation creates the need for a mechanism that can coordinate this affairs. Hence, Mwangiru notes that, the coordination of national security policy formulation and implementation can rationalize the securitization of contending and competing issues and priorities.⁹⁷

Finally, coordination helps to harmonize contending policies and programs which include foreign, defense, economic and social policies. Hence, Mwangiru argues that coordination of pillars of a national security strategy, ensures that, none of the pillars grows longer or larger than others, because once this occurs, it creates national security dysfunction within the state that implemented it.⁹⁸

The next chapter examines the development of security in the international system from the end of the World War II period. It also examines dimensions of security, this includes, health security, water security, food security, economic security and environmental security.

⁹⁵ *Ibid*.

⁹⁶ P.M. Smith, 1987, *Creating Strategic Vision: Long Range Planning for National Security*, op, cit.

⁹⁷ M. Mwangiru. 2008. 'Coordination of National Security Strategy: op, cit, p.12

⁹⁸ *Ibid*

CHAPTER THREE

Emerging Trends Of Security

Introduction

The previous chapter examined grand strategy, in the process it analyzed the aspects of traditional three legged stool and the modern grand strategy arm of coordination. This chapter will analyze the dimensions of security and consider how security has evolved. The chapter will introduce the concept of security in the international system and examine how security issues have evolved through time. Then it will examine dimensions of security.

Security in regional cooperation: overview

Security in regional cooperation is imperative for the realization of its aims and goals. The security of human collectivities is affected by factors in five major sectors, namely: military, political, economic, societal and environmental.¹ Military security concerns the two-level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states and their perceptions of each other's intentions. Political security concerns the organizational ability of states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy.

Economic security concerns access to resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal security concerns sustainability within acceptable conditions for the evolution of traditional patterns of language, culture, religion, national identity and customs. Environmental security

¹ Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History." *The National Interest* (Summer 1989).

concerns the maintenance of the local, regional and planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all the other human enterprises depend. ²These five sectors, however, do not operate in isolation to ensure that a state, a cooperative body, or a system, has a counter check mechanism against insecurity.

The defense mechanism must act beyond the normal physical security. It must ensure that these sectors of security are safeguarded against disruption. It is within this definition of security that this chapter examines the responses of two sub-regional institutions, namely, the new East African Community (EAC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to security issues in the era of globalisation. The Cold War period saw Africa's place in the Western agenda determined by geopolitical considerations. Interest in Africa ebbed and flowed with shifts in perceptions of the potential impact of African events on the global interests of the west and the Soviet Union. ³

African states have also reacted to the end of the Cold War by abandoning the old tactics of playing the superpowers against each other. The majority of states have responded by putting up sub-regional frameworks to ensure economic development and political solidarity.

² W.G. Hyland, *The Cold War is Over* (New York: Times Books, Random House, 1990); R.L. Garthoff, *The Great Transition: American Relations and the End of the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994).

³ *Ibid.*

The emergence of a strong desire to have sub-regional cooperation is a clear reaction to the realities of the end of the Cold War. Sub-regional states' political and economic cooperation has come into fashion, especially after their realization of the necessity to exploit the advantages of interdependence. There is a clear realization that collective regional activities give individual states a greater competitive edge and higher bargaining power than when operating singly. Regional and sub-regional cooperation is essentially part of a strategy for economic transformation in Africa. The strategy is mainly dictated by some peculiar geographical characteristics.⁴

Thus states of the same geographical locality come together to pursue integration towards common economic, political and social goals. The desire to have a sub-regional body has been fostered in East Africa by Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. They signed the treaty for the establishment of the new EAC on November 30, 1999. Earlier, in 1986, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD), was formed. The forerunner of IGAD, this sub-regional organisation comprises Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda.⁵

Buzan notes that, the development of security has witnessed an ever expanding scope of issues regarded as security; it has also been shaped by a history of wars among states, interdependence between states and change in the centrality of the object of

⁴ 3 B. Buzan, *Peoples, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era* (London and New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991): pp.19-20.

⁵ Ibid.

referent.⁶ As such, there have been various security conceptualizations: security is underpinned by the emphasis placed on the unit or group under consideration. The considerations reflect the three levels of security analysis, these include: the individual level, the state level and the regional level. While the state is the object of referent in the state and regional level, the individual is the point of referent in the human level.

In contemporary international system, security issues can be analyzed from three perspectives, these three perspectives correspond to the three phases of the development of security. The perspectives are: the international system, the nation state and the individual view. At the level of the international system, security is thought of in terms of the security of all states. At the national level, security is considered in terms of responses to critical threats of a military kind, here, diplomacy is used as the state craft of force which employs actions such as deterring aggressors, building up coalitions, threatening or warning opponents and seeking international support of legitimacy for the use or control of force. At the individual level, security is considered in terms of the relationship between the state and the individual and the extent to which states incorporate interests of individuals within their national security considerations.

Generally Barston defines security as the level of tension or violence and the corresponding extent to which actor's interest can be accommodated through diplomacy, without recourse to violence on the basis of mediation, rule and norm setting.⁷ Security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile. Buzan argues that, the bottom line of security is

⁶ Barry Buzan, 1991, "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century" *International Affairs*, Vol.67.No.3 pp. 432-433.

⁷ R.P Barston, 1988, *Modern Diplomacy*: Longman, London. p. 184.

survival, but it also reasonably includes a substantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence.⁶

Posen says that security was conceptualized from three phases, the phases start from the period during the World War, then the period during the Cold War and the period after post cold war period.⁷ The centrality of examining the three phases is that, security discourse was determined by events informing these phases. The following section analyses the three phases of security namely under three sections, section one examines security in the World War period, section two examines security during the Cold War period and the third section examines security in the post Cold War period.

Trends Of Security In The East African Region

From Border Disputes To Shared Resources

The state framework that was arguably the most important colonial legacy became the greatest source of insecurity between states in the light of the numerous border disputes, irredentism, secessionism, and ethnicity within states that also had implications for inter-state relations.

However, incidents of border disputes in Africa have become increasingly few and far between. The traditional concern for territorial mercantilism as a function of preponderant power appears to have given way to concern for socio-economic progress and refinement of the domestic political conditions through democratization and respect for individual rights and freedoms.

⁶ Barry Buzan, 1991, "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century" *International Affairs*, Vol:67. Vol:3. pp. 432-433.

⁷ Barry Posen, *Sources of Military Doctrine*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1983. p. 13.

The more African countries face challenges to deliver on the domestic front and increasingly come under the control of domestic political groups and civil society generally, the less leverage they find for aggressive territorial incursions in neighboring countries. While inter-state conflicts still exist, they are no longer based on border questions, but on claims over access to shared resources.

Homer-Dixon has argued that scarcity of resources can arise from three possible conditions: increased demand due to population growth, decreased supply due to environmental degradation, and widespread inaccessibility due to socially inequitable formula for distribution. The three models apply to Africa, including the IGAD sub-region. IGAD was established initially to confront threats from environmental degradation especially drought and desertification and the realization that the causes of the problem transcended national boundaries and had therefore to be dealt with collectively. The spread of the desert and the incidence of draught were clearly a function of land use practices within the region.

Bad land use practices in one country could be environmentally hazardous to another, to the region as a whole, and a source of conflict. However, the activities of IGAD have not fully restored environmental equilibrium in the sub-region. Drought is still a major problem for nearly two-thirds of the total population of the sub-region. Communities in most scarcely watered areas invariably engage in nomadic pastoral economic activities rather than crop production because the former type of land use allows for movement in search of water and pasture. Such nomadic economic activities are an important source of conflict over the supply-driven pasture and water resources.

Pastoral communities' criss-cross national borders in search of water and pasture and thereby provoke conflicts with each other over claims of ownership of the disputed resources and the tendency to defend the resources from 'external' encroachment. Furthermore, the pastoral communities also engage in cross-border livestock rustling in order either to replenish numbers decimated during drought or for varied other cultural reasons that are nevertheless tied to scarcity of natural resources and the harshness of the physical environment. While such conflicts are a historical feature of the communities involved rather than an emerging security issue, the infiltration of firearms in the affected pastoral areas and communities mostly from the mid-1980s onward has exacerbated the magnitude—the frequency and scale of atrocity—associated with the conflicts.

The increased use of firearms rather than the traditional spears and arrows has elevated the military technology applied in the defense or acquisition of scarce water and pasture and thereby transformed conflicts from the previously occasional mid-night raids to outright and drawn out war. Conflicts between the Karamoja and the Turkana and Pokot on the Kenya-Uganda frontier is a case in point.

The problem of the infiltration of firearms in the civilian population within the IGAD region is a major problem. Indeed, the easy accessibility of the civilian population to firearms following the civil wars in nearly all the countries except Kenya has added a new and important dimension to the security problem in the IGAD region. The entire population in the IGAD region—rural or urban, pastoral or agricultural—all face increased threats to life and property as a result of increased presence of firearms in criminal civilian hands. Today, danger to national security looms more from within countries than from without as in previous decades.

The high rate of the generation of refugees in Africa has added a new dimension to conflict over the use of shared resources among communities. Armed conflict within IGAD member states, especially the civil wars in Ethiopia, Uganda, Somalia and Sudan has created a large number of refugees and internally displaced persons.

From Interstate To Internal Security Threats

In the early years of independence African countries faced threats interstate disputes that in some cases culminated in war. Countries like Somalia and Kenya, Eihopia and Somalia, and Uganda and Tanzania actually went to war with each other between the 1960s and 1970s. The greatest security threat for all the countries in the region emanated from neighboring states rather than from internal sources. However, none of the IGAD member states today faces external threats to its territorial integrity or its sovereignty.

Kenya has faced challenges in regard to internal democratization struggles that frequently involve violent ethnic clashes that conservative state operatives instigate. Uganda faces an internal rebel movement and demands for multiparty political order. Sudan still faces internal challenge from the secessionist conflict in the south against the SPLA/SPLM and in the northwestern province of Darfour. Somalia is torn with clan-based, warlord conflicts including the secession of Somaliland and the semi-autonomous Puntland province. Ethiopia faces internal secessionist challenge from the Oromo Liberation Front in the south of the country.

The IGAD sub-region has experienced three notable cases of secessionism: one successful (Eritrea), one virtually successful (Somaliland), and two ongoing, namely the

Oromo under the Oromo National Liberation Front (Ethiopia) and the SPLM (Sudan). The sub-region has also witnessed one failed case of irredentism—the Shifta effort in Kenya. While both irredentism and secessionism have ethnic connotations, the forces of ethnicity that act short of separatism also generate considerable conflicts within IGAD member-states.

In Kenya, for example, the advent of the multiparty electoral system and the resistance of the KANU government to the arrangement involved ethnic clashes especially in three provinces—Coast, Rift Valley and Western—during the 1992 and 1997 general elections and resulted in loss of life, social dislocation, loss of property, and an influx of internally displaced persons.

Security In The World War Period

Ullman argues that, at the end of first World War security was based on balance of power among some states.⁸ States were the main objects of reference and were regarded as the main actors with ability to regulate security. Security threats were considered as being external to a state, hence when a state is regarded as being stable then security is deemed to be stable. During the World War period, the realist perspective was dominant in explaining security issues in the international system. Realism found solace on the fact that, under it, states are the main actors who are described as being in a state of anarchy. Realism argues that states are in a constant search and struggle for power, a state that was powerful militarily was considered as the dominant actor. The danger of states seeking power is accredited to the arms race and rise of some states as hegemonies.

Security In The Cold War Period

⁸ R. Ullman, 1983, *Redefining Security*, *International Security*. Vol.8, No.1. pp. 5-12

The defining feature of Cold War security was the bipolar nature of the international system. The Cold War concept of security borrowed its core thinking from the realist school of international relations. The realist school argues that the international system is anarchical and determined by power. In the Cold War period notions of security were based on the use of force to preserve important state interests based on realism or power politics. During the Cold War, international security was dominated by the highly militarized and highly polarized ideological confrontation between the superpowers. This confrontation divided the industrialized North into the First World (the West) and the Second World (the Soviet bloc). Because their rivalry was intense, the danger of war was real, and political/military concerns dominated the security agenda.

The period of 1970's marked a paradigm shift on a number of issues in the international system, it introduced new actors who participated in agenda setting, new dimensions of security and perspectives of security.⁹ The field grew in new directions, including environmental security, societal security, and the study of migration, pandemics, terrorism, human security, and the trafficking of both people and drugs. Holsti explains, states remained the critical actors of international politics because they command the allegiances of peoples occupying defined territory which possess the capabilities to employ ultimate threat which is war.¹⁰ Also, states, unlike most transnational organizations are concerned with the full range of welfare and security issues of a population and enjoy sovereignty.

⁹ M. Mwangi, 'Africa in International Security Agenda Setting', in *Human Security, Setting the Agenda for the Horn of Africa*, Africa Peace Forum, Nairobi, p.1

¹⁰ K.J. Holsti, 1995; *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, 5th ed. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, p.65.

New definitions of security began to gain dominance towards the end of the Cold War, this definition are based on liberalist and pluralism concepts of international relations. the new conceptualization of national security broaden the scope of threats beyond the military limits and includes many non military threats to national security. The issue of environmental security emerged among the first of the threats that confront national security.¹¹

During the 1970's conceptualization of security argued that military threat to national security was one of the many threats that governments had to address. The new threats to security derived directly or indirectly from the rapidly changing relationship between human needs and development. Human security therefore, calls for a shift in security thinking from state security to human security of the people, which includes both individuals and communities.

Human Security

At the individual level, security is considered in terms of the relationship between the state and the individual and the extent to which states incorporate interests of individuals within their national security considerations. The definition of security acquired a new, broader meaning that involves threats from external non state actors; threat from internal actors; threats to individuals, groups and communities; and 'civilian' threats to human well being (health, nutrition, education, fairness, rights and freedoms, dignity). The new conception of security has profound implications for all other aspects of security.¹² The debate about human security concerns the separation of direct physical

¹¹ United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994*. New York: United Nations Development Programme 1994, p. 15.

¹² B Buzan O. Wæver and J. de Wilde, *Security, A New Framework for Analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder-London, 1998. p 7.

violence from structural violence.¹³ Physical violence demands security for physical state security while structural violence exists when resources are unequally shared between members of a society.¹⁴

Human security compliments state security by being people centered, in addition, human security addresses threats that traditionally were not considered as state security threats, and it also furthers human development and enhances protection of human rights.¹⁵ As the state continues to have the fundamental responsibility to security, security challenges have become complex and new actors emerged to compliment states, a paradigm shift from state centric security broadens the focus from human security to environmental security.¹⁶

The expansion of the concept of security into non military issues led to a reconsideration of the political structures through which security can be achieved.¹⁷ With the expansion of the concept of security issues, security threats were also perceived in broader terms. While threats to the territory of the state are primarily identified in military terms, societies and individuals face a multitude of dangers ranging from the inadequacies of political and social structures, to environmental degradation.

According to the UNDP report, this notion contends that people centered security necessitates national, regional and global stability. The term human security can be traced back to the 1994 Human Development Report of the United Nations Development

¹³ T. Homer-Dixon, 1994, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases." *International Security*, Vol:1, No:9, pp.5- 37:20.

¹⁴ A. Suhrke, 'Human security and the interests of states/ Security Dialogue 30 (September 1999), pp.176-265:76.

¹⁵ R. Mudida, *The Security-Development Nexus: A structural Violence and Human Needs Approach*, in K. Bruchmann et al: From Conflict to Regional Stability, Linking Security and Development, 2008, p. 12.

¹⁶ R Brown, 'Information Technology and the Transformation of Diplomacy', *Knowledge, Technology and Policy*. Summer. Vol 18.No.2, 2004, p 344-386:345.

¹⁷ *ibid*

Programme (UNDP).¹⁸ The UNDP report considered issues that were less visible such as job security, health security and environmental security as central to re-conceptualization of security. According to United Nations Development Programme, the term human security implies, safety from chronic threats, such as hunger disease, and repression, on the other hand, it implies protection from harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life whether in homes or jobs.¹⁹

The UNDP report listed seven separate components of human security namely; economic security (assured basic income), food security (physical and economic access to food), health security (relative freedom from disease and infection), environmental security (access to sanitary water supply, clean air and a non-degraded land system), personal security (security from physical violence and threats), community security (security of cultural identity), and political security (protection of basic human rights and freedoms).²⁰ The following section will examine the main dimensions of security as conceptualized within the realm of security in the international system. The dimensions include environmental security, food security, water security, economic security and political security.

Environmental Security

Environmental security became a common security issue due to the recognition that the environment provides the fundamental life support system. Environmental security became a concept during the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment

¹⁸ United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994*, New York: United Nations Development Programme 1994, p.15.

¹⁹ United Nations, Human Development Report 1994; Sverre Lodgaard, 'Human security: concept and operationalization,' Paper presented to the Expert Seminar on Human Rights and Peace 2000, Palais Wilson, Geneva 8-9 December 2000. pd/hr/u.1, United Nations/Naciones Unidas, University of Peace, Universidad Para La Paz.

²⁰ United Nations Development Programme. 1994. op. cit

and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro.²¹ The concept of environmental security considers the environment *per se* in assessing the consequences of policy decisions.

As a consequence of the Rio process, Foreign Affairs and other ministries, especially those dealing with environmental affairs, defense and finance, were no longer able to dismiss environmental issues as irrelevant in the context of more strategic aspects of national policy as well as defining national interests. Brunee et al says that at this point, it was established that the environment and its protection should be a shared responsibility between actors of diplomacy.²²

Environmental security refers to the prevention or management of conflict over scarce or degraded resources to ensure that people who depend on the resources utilize them mutually for collective benefit.²³ Ullman defines environmental security as any action or sequence of events that threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state or threatens significantly to narrow the policy choices available to the government of a state or to the private, non governmental entities within the state.²⁴ In summary, environmental security refers to the maintenance or re establishment of environmental balance between states to preserve and sustain human needs.

According to Gleditsch the concept of environmental security may be understood as a result of two important trends in the international system. The breakdown of the bipolar geopolitical structure that characterized the Cold War and the shift of

²¹ F. W. Frey, The Political Context of Conflict and Cooperation Over International River Basins. *Water International*. Vol:18: No:54, p.1-68:5-8.

²² J. Brunnee and S. J. Toope, 'Environmental Security and Freshwater Resources: Ecosystem Regime Building', *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 91, No. 1 (January 1997), pp. 31-54:32.

²³ R.P Barston. *Modern Diplomacy*, Essex, Pearson, 1997, p. 192

²⁴ R. Ullman, *Redefining Security*. International Security. 1983, p. 133

environment issues from social issues to political and national security issues. Institutionally, the international system began to recognize that the scale of human economic activity was affecting a number of basic global and regional biological systems. Buzan *et al* argue that the link between security and environment is established at the point that environmental degradation is a severe threat to human security and all life on earth.

Homer-Dixon says that environmental issues started to gain prominence with the realization that a secure environment is a prerequisite for sustainable development.²⁵ Homer-Dixon defines environmental security as the protection of the people from environmental threats and threats of an environmental origin, he adds that environmental problems qualify to be security issues when the state is forced to respond with extraordinary measures to curb or regulate environmental induced threats.²⁶ The social element of environmental security is that, when human induced activities like pollution, deforestation and dumping of waste contributes to deterioration of the environment, then environmental security is challenged.²⁷

Food Security

Gregory argues that, food security is the outcome of food system processes all along the food chain.²⁸ Food security is defined as a situation when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. Food

²⁵ T.Homer-Dixon T, *The myth of global water wars*, Forum International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva pp 10-13.

²⁶ T.F. Homer-Dixon, On The Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict in: International Security, Vol. 16, No. 2 (fall 1991), p. 6-76:5-15.

²⁷ Ibid

²⁸ P. J Gregory. J.S.I Ingram. and M Brklacich, 2005. Climate change and food security. *Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences*. Vol.360: p. 2139

security is not narrowly defined as whether food is available, but whether the monetary and non-monetary resources at the disposal of the population are sufficient to allow everyone access to adequate quantities and qualities of food.

Ellis and Sunberg observe that, food security is determined by the options people have to secure access to own agricultural production and exchange opportunities.²⁹ Food security exists when all people at all times have physical or economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.

Food security and rural livelihoods are intrinsically linked to water availability and use. It is determined by the options people have to secure access to own agricultural production and exchange opportunities. These opportunities are influenced by access to water. Morton argues that, the biggest problem for food security will be the predicted increase in extreme weather, which will damage crops at particular developmental stages and make the timing of farming more difficult, reducing farmers' incentives to cultivate

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Water Security

Gleick argues that, water stress occurs when the demand for water exceeds the available amount during a certain period or when poor quality restricts its use.³¹ Water underpins the very fabric of human life; the food and drink we consume, the societies we live in, the length and quality of our lifespan. Maintaining and ensuring the security of

²⁹ F. Ellis, and J Sunberg. 1998. Food production, urban areas and policy responses. *World Development*, Vol.26, No: 2: pp213-225.

³⁰ Morton, J.F. 2007. *Climate change and food security special feature: the impact of climate change on smallholder and subsistence agriculture. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Vol.104: pp.19680-19685:19684*

³¹ P.H Gleick. 1993. *Water in crisis: A guide to the world's fresh water resources. New York, Oxford University Press: p. 67.*

water and the ability to supply demands from the water resources available, is essential to humankind. Freshwater is a natural resource which, through the hydrological cycle, benefits from a replacement process. However, it is only a very small proportion of the total water available on the earth. It also suffers from intense competing demands and has no surrogate.

The fundamental role that water plays in food security, energy security, economic growth, maintaining health and reducing poverty, means there is a constant and ever increasing pressure on it as a natural resource.

Water is a key challenge for food production due to the extreme variability of rainfall, long dry seasons, and recurrent droughts, floods, and dry spells. Water security is defined as availability of, and access to, water in sufficient quantity and quality to meet livelihood needs of all households throughout the year, without prejudicing the needs of other users.

Water resource endowment and distribution across the world are spatially and temporally non-uniform and exhibit variations in availability across and within regions.³² There are more problems with inequitable resource endowment than with water scarcity in many regions.

Water security is under severe pressure from many sources; a world population explosion, rapid shifts of people from rural to urban areas, the impact of dietary change as countries develop, increasing pollution of water resources, the over-abstraction of groundwater and the not insignificant issues created by climate change.

³² Ibid

Health Security

Sachs and Malaney observe that health security aims at guaranteeing a minimum protection from disease and unhealthy lifestyles.³⁴ Health is instrumental to human security because good health enables the full range of human functioning. Health permits human choice, freedom and development. There are various shades of health security, most emanate from issues that are beyond the scope of health but are central to sustaining it. For instance, scarcity of clean water can lead to health problems. Scarcity of water can be as a result of drought or excess water due to heavy rain, this therefore compromises supply of potable water and hygienic conditions which eventually expose humans to health threats.

Klare argues that, while droughts minimize the amount of runoff, they can also cause the water quality to decrease.³⁵ Sediment and minerals, such as iron and manganese, are more concentrated towards the bottom of the water supply.

During a drought, when the level of water decreases, the concentration of sediment and minerals in the water increases. Floods can increase human exposure to pathogens, as contaminants are spread by floodwaters. Developing countries are particularly susceptible to this, as water carries wastes, shallow water provides breeding conditions for mosquitoes, and drainage and sewage systems can become backed up. Floods can also transport fecal matter from the ground or sewers that have overflowed, and contaminate wells, boreholes and surface waters.

³⁴ Sachs, J. and P. Malaney 2002. "The economic and social burden of malaria." *Nature*, pp.680-681.

³⁵ Michael T. Klare, 2001. *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict*. New York: Metropolitan. pp. 4-7

Infectious Diseases

Homer and Robinson argue that there are three main categories of diseases that result from floods.³⁶ The first category includes waterborne diseases, the most common being a variety of diarrheal illnesses. The second grouping includes mosquito-borne diseases, as low-lying water provide adequate breeding conditions. The final category is infections caused by exposure to water, and include fungal skin diseases, eye infections and respiratory illnesses. Rising temperatures, shifting rainfalls patterns, and increasing humidity affect transmission of diseases by vectors for example mosquitoes and through water and food. Extreme weather events can increase the frequency of storms, heavy rain, and heat waves kill people, destroy homes, and cause outbreak of diseases. Climate variability can also affect agricultural yields, compromises food security, and exacerbate malnutrition.

Economic Security

Adger and Kelly argue that, economic security is described as the ability of the society to satisfy the basic needs of it is people.³⁷ Economic security requires that the society assures basic income for individuals usually from productive and remunerative work or in the last resort some publicly financed safety asset. Economic insecurity is showcased by considering the rate of unemployment which contributes to underlying political tensions and ethnic violence which encompass the countries in the region.

³⁶ J. Andrew Hoerner and Nia Robinson, 2008, *A Climate of Change*, Oakland: The Environmental Justice and Climate Change Initiative, p.11.

³⁷ W. Adger, and P. Kelly, 2001, *Living with environmental change: social vulnerability, adaptation and resilience in Vietnam*, Routledge, London, p. 5

Political Security

Burgess argues that, political security is about the states and more specifically the relationship between citizens and citizens and the state.³⁸ Political security assures that people live in a society that honors their basic human rights. The concept of political security is based on democratic governments and the protection of human rights. This is because; human rights are perpetrated by states on their own citizens with the excuse of protecting national security. The notion of political security tackles two main issues, the reciprocal rights and duties that individual owe to one another and the nature and scope of the sovereign institutions designed to safeguard these rights and duties.

The pursuit of military and economic security has been conducted in a single minded manner with little regard paid to environmental consequences. Military operations are routinely exempted from environmental assessments that apply to other sectors of society. Mische argues that, adding an environmental dimension to security thinking places societal values in a more appropriate hierarchy.³⁹

In conclusion, state security concerns the two level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states, and states' perceptions of each other's intentions. Political security concerns the organizational stability of states, systems of government, and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. Economic security concerns access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal security concerns the ability of societies to reproduce

³⁸ J.P Burgess, 2007, *Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks in Western Europe*, Paris, UNESCO, p.24

³⁹ P. Mische, 1989, 'Ecological Security and the Need Reconceptualize Sovereignty' *Alternatives*, Vol.14, No.4, pp. 389-428

their traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom within acceptable conditions for evolution.

Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend. These five sectors do not operate in isolation from each other. Each defines a focal point within the security problematic, and a way of ordering priorities, but all are woven together in a strong web of linkages.⁴⁰

Gender And Regional Security

Conflict and instability are driven by failures in governance, health issues and environmental degradation. Further, globalisation and technological change have increased interdependence and magnify security-related impacts of development challenges around the world. The lack of societal consensus on fundamental issues and unrepresentative and repressive states, coupled with the destabilizing impact of economic and social disparities results in conflicts between genders and within genders.

These emerge in concert with other sources of tension. Inequalities among the genders are attributable to cultural perceptions of femininity and masculinity, which in turn may influence legal regimes. Women as a gender component of society have been systematically removed from fully participating in the development process despite their active participation in the production processes alongside men. This impinges on the capacity of women to impact on security in states and in regions. Women are therefore perceived as victims of insecurity rather than as actors with the capacity to contribute to the maintenance of security and its restoration when insecurity ensues. In an analysis of

⁴⁰ Barry Buzan. *People, states and fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-Cold War era* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1991):

gender, armed conflict and political violence. Cockburn explains how in making war, men form the military groups and gangs of warlords for diverse reasons ranging from patriotism, honour, self-defence to liberation. She argues that male positioning in the patriarchal gender systems and masculine identities, underscore these reasons.⁴¹

Cleansing rituals may form part of the process of preparing for war or of political violence. In the ethnic clashes that occurred in Kenya in the 1990s, there was the call by some communities to return to cultural practices that they had discarded in an effort to 'cleanse' the community and eliminate factors that had brought about the destruction of the property of those communities. In certain areas, female genital mutilation was reintroduced. Militia groups that have terrorized Kenyans such as Mungiki also advocate female circumcision in an attempt to attain cultural purity.

Law to a great degree validates the exclusion of women from participation in the security apparatus and therefore denies them the chance to participate in the search for security at the national and international levels. Feminists' perception of law is that it is male and espouses male values. They argue that the defining characteristics of the legal person are closely related to the world-view of the socially powerful. This assertion has been made in reference to both international and national law. At national levels the best exemplification of the masculinity of laws is the tenor and application of gender-neutral laws. Thus while legal provisions are couched in gender-neutral language, the enjoyment

⁴¹ Cynthia Cockburn, 'Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence', in Section 2 Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence (Workbook/Readings/3, On file with the author).

of equal rights and privileges in practice is an elusive concept. Gender-neutral laws have, in many instances, resulted in de facto discrimination. As Dahl aptly points out, *"As long as we live in a society where women and men follow different paths in life and have different living conditions, with different needs and potentials, rules of law will necessarily affect men and women differently. The gender-neutral legal machinery ... meets the gender-specific reality ..."*

At the international level, the point is poignantly made in reference to international humanitarian law, which it is argued

Takes a particular male perspective on armed conflict, as a norm against which to measure equality. In a world where women are not equals of men, and armed conflict impacts upon men and women in a fundamentally different way, a general category of rules that is not inclusive of reality for women cannot respond to their situation.

In essence therefore, the notion of formal equality in the realm of the search for regional or national security and its suitability is questioned.

CHAPTER FOUR

Formulation Of A Grand Security Strategy in East Africa

Introduction

This study sought to primarily examine the formulation of a grand security strategy among East African states, and specifically: to examine the relevance of a regional strategy within East Africa Union states; to find out the link between grand strategy and regional security and finally to assess the significance of a regional strategy among states. The methodology used by the researcher was intended to achieve the set objectives as outlined in the terms of reference, as indicated below:

Conditions in contemporary East Africa region are simply terrible. The deteriorating economic, political, social, diplomatic conditions have generated a lot of afro-pessimism. The East African crisis is no longer defined in technical and economic terms, but as problems of security, human rights, social and political impasse. The total suffocation, fragmentation and encapsulation of civic society, containment of democratic civil pressure and the depoliticization of civil society have frustrated growth stability, peace and development. The erosion of security and the stability of the region is one of the forces of continuing crises and acts as a major impediment to the creation of sound economies and the establishment of an effective intra and inter-East African co-operation.

¹ Executive Director, Kituo cha Katiba, Uganda: Ihonvibere Julius: Africa in 1990 and Beyond: Alternative prescription and projection, Future vol. 28, No 1(1996), pg 16-17.

Relevance Of Regional Security Strategy

In the international system, all states claim survival on the basis of a grand strategy. It is a pillar upon which national security rests encompassing economic, military, diplomatic and co-ordination of the above for the purpose of asserting the states presence in the international system.²

Peace and security are pre-conditions for other essential political goals and at the same time they are dependent upon other developments. Security is not only about states (we have to put human security in the center of the security agenda)³. It's extremely important who is able to define the global security agenda, who is heard and who is sidelined. It is thus one task to strengthen the East African voice in the international security debate.

There is need to join forces to develop the transnational public sphere. Strong civil societies and transnational information, communication and action are very much needed as: An early warning system for upcoming conflicts; As a counterweight to transnational companies; To raise public awareness and to influence public opinion; To enfold pressure on national governments and international organizations; and to develop a network of transnational solidarity. Government policy and interaction of states are key to promoting peace and security. But the experience of the last decades shows very clearly, that civil society has to be the driving force.

² See, for instance, chapter two in this research.

³ See chapter three of this research.

What Constitutes A Good Strategy

A good strategy guides the use of power as events emerge. Without a good strategy, one can only react to events as they occur, yielding the initiative to the enemy by allowing the enemy to select the time, place, and terms of the competition. All instruments of power are brought to bear in a good strategy. There are limits to what can be achieved with any instrument of power, including the hard power provided by the military instrument. Failure to recognize the limits of military power is a dangerous trap. The complementary use of all instruments is more efficient and more effective.

In short, a good strategy: pits strength against weakness; denies the enemy the ability to determine the time, place, and terms of the competition; distinguishes between vital and peripheral interests; pursues clear objectives and judiciously applies scarce resources (subordinates means to ends); employs all instruments of power; is consistent with national philosophy; and is relevant to the time, e.g., consistent with *contemporary* international politics, military developments, available technology, and domestic attitudes.


The regional perspective to security issues raises fundamental questions about security and foreign policy. It raises issues to do with the security and foreign policy of individual states in the region; and it also raises questions about the emergence of a regional security and foreign policy, and the content of such a policy. And this in turn focuses attention on the regional institutions that can—or should—spearhead the emergence of a regional and security policy. It raises fundamental questions about whether the existing regional and sub-regional organizations in Africa are prepared to

spearhead such a debate, and to provide the engines that will drive the emerging regional security and foreign policy.

Link between grand strategy and regional security

A grand strategy also known as a national security strategy, traditionally refers to the three pillars of a security strategy namely economy, military and diplomacy. However the current concept includes another pillar referred to as coordination, making it a four legged structure as shown below:⁵

Figure 1: Grand strategy



Globalisation and its processes seem to ignore the old borders. It has opened up new frontiers for internal relations and political economy and to guarantee development of the region the member states have no choice but to adopt a common structure that will facilitate its participation in the international; system. And with the common internal and external security threats, such as trans border crimes, proliferation of weapons , terrorism,

⁵ibid

piracy, internal conflicts over resources all these call for a common approach to a common sustainable solution or strategy.

A good strategy should be based on the following premises:

Strategy is all about how (way or concept) leadership will use the power (means or resources) available to the state to exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations to achieve objectives (ends) that support state interests. Strategy provides direction for the coercive or persuasive use of this power to achieve specified objectives. This direction is by nature proactive.

A strategy reflects the time frame and the end results. Only by analyzing and understanding the desired end state in the context of the internal and external environment can the strategy be appropriate to objectives leading to the desired end state.

In formulating a strategy the ends, ways, and means are part of an integral whole. Thus a National Security Strategy end could be supported by concepts based on all the instruments of power and the associated resources. For the military element of power, the national military strategy would identify appropriate ends for the military to be accomplished through national military concepts with national military resources. In a similar manner a Theater or Regional Commander in Chief (CINCPAC) would have specific theater level objectives for which he would develop theater concepts and use resources allocated to his theater.

A strategy promotes the foreign policy of a region. Policy is the expression of the desired end state sought by the region. In its finest form it is clear articulation of guidance

for the employment of the instruments of power towards the attainment of one or more end states

A strategy is hierarchical and involves track I, II and I and a half actors of diplomacy. Foster argues that true strategy is the purview of the leader and is a "weltanschauung" (world view) that represents both national consensus and comprehensive direction. From this National Security Strategy the major activities and departments develop subordinate strategies. For the military this is the National Military Strategy. In turn, the National Military Strategy leads to lower strategies appropriate to the various levels of war.

That is to say, while the strategist may be devising a strategy from a particular perspective, he must consider the whole of the strategic environment in his analysis to arrive at a proper strategy to serve his purpose at his level. He is concerned with external and internal factors at all levels. On the other hand, in formulating a strategy, the strategist must also be cognizant that each aspect--objectives, concepts, and resources--has effects on the environment around him. Thus, the strategist must have a comprehensive knowledge of what else is happening and the potential first, second, third, etc., order effects of his own choices on the efforts of those above, below, and on his same level. The strategist's efforts must be fully integrated with the strategies or efforts of senior, co-equal, and subordinate elements. Strategists must think holistically--that is comprehensively. They must be cognizant of both the "big picture," their own institution's capabilities and resources, and the impact of their actions on the whole of the environment. Good strategy is never developed in isolation.

For East African Community to have a viable regional security strategy, it would be prudent that its strategy is formulated with the above premises in consideration. In recognition for the need of a strategy in the region, the East African Community re-established in 1999, formulated a strategy which sought to widen and deepen cooperation among the partner states in political, economic, social and cultural fields. It had the vision to create wealth, raise standards of living for all people of East Africa, and enhance international competitiveness. Although its priority is economic cooperation, the East Africa Community has tried to play a role in enhancing regional stability. In 1998, as a demonstration of the new spirit of cooperation, 1500 soldiers from Kenya Uganda and Tanzania took part in a joint training exercise in the desert area of Northern Kenya. The one month exercise, code named 'Natural Fire' was undertaken with assistance from the US army.⁶

A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on cooperation in defense was signed in April 1998 and revised in 2001. On 18th October 1998 an EAC summit on the security situation in the DRC took place in Nairobi. The summit agreed to support SAFDC efforts already under way in consultation with the UN and OAU.⁷ The EAC has established a sectoral committee on cooperation in defense as well as an inter-state security committee. During 2003 this committees held meeting to exchange information on implementation of national action plans in line with the Nairobi declaration on Small Arms and Light Weapons, to draft modalities for a common refugee registration

⁶ Interview with the Director of East African Community Desk at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs./

⁷ *Ibid.*

mechanism and discuss joint exercises on peace keeping operations, counter terrorism and military level participation in disaster response.⁸

A grand strategy is formulated for a minimum period of five years and a maximum of 25 years, where the parties are bound by a strategy, but in this case the region sought to cooperate in the implementation of security programmes basing their cooperation on an MOU which is not binding and whose time frame is never stated. This cannot be a strategy. This opinion was echoed by the Director East Africa Standby Force (EASF).⁹

According to the EAC security strategy Article 124 (5), the partner states agreed to enhance cooperation in the handling of cross-border crime, provision of mutual assistance in criminal matters including arrest and repatriation of fugitive offenders and the exchange of information on national mechanisms for combating criminal activities. However there is no framework in the strategy stipulating how matters relating, for example to one of the head of states being overthrown in a military *coup d'état*, or an invasion of any of the members by non-partner states or any mechanism to activate military personnel to deter any injury to security in the region.¹⁰

The article further says “any armed threat or aggression directed against any member state shall constitute a threat or aggression against the entire community” and hence the undertaking in the article “To give mutual aid and assistance for defense against any armed threat or aggression”. Its mutual assistance on defense is envisaged for three specifically defined circumstances; 1. Armed conflict between two EAC member states; 2. External armed threats or aggression directed against member state of the

⁸ *Ibid op.cit.*: East African Community Magazine, Jan, 2011.

⁹ Director East Africa Standby Force (EASF): Retired Major General Cyrille Ndaikuyire.

¹⁰ The Director EAC desk at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shared this opinion.

community; 3. Internal armed conflict within any member state engineered and supported actively from outside likely to endanger the security and peace in the entire community. But neither the protocol on non aggression nor the protocol related to mutual assistance on defense provides for the right of EAC to intervene without invitation by a member state and a written request for a military assistance in case of need.¹¹

According to the protocol, collective security management shall consist of the authority of Heads of States and Government, the Supreme decision-making organ, the defense Council consisting of the Ministry of defense and Foreign Affairs of member states, the defense commission made up of the chief of staff from each member state headed by EAC executive secretary. It is understood from this article that planning for conflict management is anchored on the increasingly outdated assumption that inter-state warfare constitute the dominant threats top peace and security. Besides the increasing intervention of regional institutions in security situation, many EAC states have overcome the dogma of sovereignty and allowed external mediation of eminent persons. These developments are in conformity with liberal institutionalism.

Since inception in 1999 EAC has taken bold steps to create a framework and structures to address issues of peace and security. However the effectiveness of the structures are hampered by clear strategic direction on the critical areas of cooperation.¹² It is against this background that the council of ministers upon recommendation by the sectoral committee on inter-state security established an experts group to develop a regional strategy which was adopted by the thirteen council of ministers' meeting held in November 2006. But this strategy only deals with some security issues leaving out other

¹¹ Opinion shared by the Senior Political Officer at the Ministry of East African Community; Mr. George Arogo.

¹² Director EAC Desk at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

more pertinent issues on security, such as human security, time frame for implementation and still considers the traditional concept of security with a weak [pointer top early warning mechanism. It has confined its actors to the states and other regional agencies such as EASF and Regional Center of Small Arms and Light weapons (RECSA)¹³.

Even though the region has made some progress, the strategy still lacks on a number of issues. It is not comprehensive: neither does it address human security issues or intra-states sources of insecurity. It equally lacks a time frame for implementation and is faced with financial constraints, since the member states have not entered into a binding documents apart from the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and security protocol.¹⁴

For the implementation of security programmes the region heavily relies on regional organizations such as EASF and RECSA which are not owned by the region since these organizations have members from other regions of the continent.

East Africa Standby Force (Easf)

The renaming of the ESASBRIG was changed to East African Standby Force (EASF), during the 6th Extraordinary Council Ministers Meeting held in Nairobi Kenya on 18th June 2010, to show the existence of multi-dimensionality on issues of defense and security. In the absence of a home REC the legal framework of EASF is an MOU signed by all member states, but not yet adopted by ESASBRICOM meeting at the Summit level.¹⁵ The EASF Operates with the vision to contribute to regional and continental

¹³ Senior Political Officer at the EAC Ministry, Mr George Arogo.

¹⁴ Director EASF; Retired Major General Cyrille Ndayikuyire.

¹⁵ Draft Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation between the East Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Unpublished).

peace and stability, through a fully operational and multidimensional joint and integrated Eastern Standby Force ready for deployment by 2015, with an initial operational capacity by 2010.

In this regard, EASF has developed a strategic Development plan 2010-2015 approved during the 2nd Ordinary Summit of Heads of States and Government held in Moroni, Comoros, in March 2010. The standby Force headquarters in Nairobi is responsible for generating and preparing the standby Brigade in liaison with the planning Element. It is composed of military and civilian staff seconded from the member states. The planning element, (PLANELM) located also in Nairobi, serves as a multi-national and multi-dimensional full time planning headquarters of EASF (Military, police and civilian components fully operationalized). All 10 EASF Member states are represented within the PLANELM. Co-ordinating with the police and civilian components, the PLANELM plans, trains and monitors EASF. The PLANELM is doing multifarious capacity building activities within itself as well as within Member states of the region to ensure that all the multi-dimensional elements of the force are on standby in their respective countries for AU peace support operations.¹⁶

This organisation is faced with a number of challenges. It does not fully represent the region and suffers inadequate funding to support its activities and it has no binding documents other than the MOU. It does not address other issues of grand security strategy and has no implementation time frame.¹⁷

¹⁶ EASBRIG Force Structure and Capacity Report(Unpublished)

¹⁷ Opinion shared by the Director : Retired Major General Cyrel Ndaikuyire during my interview with him.

Regional Center On Small Arms And Light Weapons (RECSA)

Regional Center on Small Arms and Light weapons (RECSA) is a regional organization that was established in March 2005 to fight the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. It draws its membership from eleven countries in the Great Lakes Region and the horn of Africa. Since it was established its member states have signed protocols on harmonization of laws on small arms and light weapons. It is funded by different donors and it is faced with the challenges of harmonisation of laws in some member states besides reluctance to remit their contributions. In addition the protocol signed is not fully binding since some countries have not adhered to the clauses of the protocols and no legal action can be taken against them. East Africa region can not claim ownership of this organization.¹⁸

RECSA like EASF is equally faced with a number of challenges despite initiatives and the current strategy on security. The challenges include harmonizing its laws: For instance, what is considered as a crime in one country might not be a crime in another country. A lot of emphasis is put on armed security which is entirely physical. Security issues should be broadened to encompass human security on a wider scope and member states should be more committed towards the project and a clear cut strategy should be put in place. The current strategy is lacking on a number of issues. Even the current programmes on security are not owned by the region, since membership is drawn

¹⁸ Agreement on the Establishment of the Regional Center on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (Unpublished).

from far distant states like Sudan and Seychelles¹⁹. In addition non state actors need to be involved in the preparation as well as implementation of the strategy.²⁰

Economy

The objective of the regional strategy is to provide a coherent and focused framework to guide in support of regional cooperation and regional programmes since economic imbalance or deprivation fosters intra and inter-states conflicts. The strategy is structured around 3 pillars and one cross-cutting theme, namely expanding and upgrading regional infrastructure, including transport networks, energy and telecommunications, institutional cooperation for economic integration, through trade measures to improve regional environments for business, investment and industrial development, and coordinated interventions to provide regional public goods, in particular through the improvement and management of shared water resources, increase in agricultural productivity and the setting up of regional and sub-regional programs to address the cross border dimensions of major health issues.

The Strategy tried to avoid the shortcomings of the earlier integration initiatives. It also took into account the on-going process of globalization, which was characterised by the intensification of competition arising from the liberalisation of trade and financial markets.

Accordingly, the Treaty laid emphasis on the following areas: The development of policies and programmes, for widening and deepening cooperation among the Partner States in political, economic, social and cultural fields, research and technology, defence, security and legal and judicial affairs. A key guiding principal in the achievement of this

¹⁹ Researcher at the Regional Center on Small Arms and Light weapons (RECSA); Mr Francis Wairagu.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

objective was people-centred and market-driven cooperation; Economic cooperation, which was expected to form the basis for political cooperation in the long term; The integration process to be carried out in a participatory manner, involving broad participation of key stakeholders, including women, the youth, the private sector and civil society; The vision of regional cooperation in East Africa being to create wealth, raise standards of living of all people of East Africa and enhance the international competitiveness of the region through increased production, trade and investments; and The East African regional cooperation process to be progressive starting with a Customs Union as the entry point to the Community; to be followed by a Common Market, then a Monetary Union, and ultimately a Political Federation.

However, the economic challenges have been the multiplicity of membership where some member states belong to different regional organizations like SADC and COMESA. Besides, there is mistrust between member states, eg where Tanzania thinks its economic opportunities might be taken over by countries like Kenya and Uganda.

The economic cooperation is based on protocols, but protocols are never fully binding because a member state may sign and fail to ratify a protocol. In addition a protocol is never detailed like a strategy.²¹

Regional Diplomacy

During the 12th Ordinary Summit of EAC heads of states at the Ngurdoto Mountain Lodge in December 2010, EAC partner states undertook an important step in enhancing cooperation among themselves. At the December meeting, the region's Ministers of Foreign Affairs signed a protocol on Foreign policy coordination. Under

²¹ Opinion shared by the Senior Political Officer at the East Africa Community Ministry: Mr Arogo: Director EASF; Retired Major General Cyril Nfdaikuyire

pinned by article 123 of the strategy, EAC partner states committed to establish common foreign and security policies, the protocol upgraded their MOU on foreign policy coordination signed on 22 January 1999.

The states committed to collaborate in diplomatic and consular matters, for example one partner state would provide consular and visa services on behalf of another that does not have a diplomatic mission or consulate in a foreign country.²² However due to lack of a clear framework, this objective has not been achieved.²³

Schools Of Thought On EAC Achievements

On the achievements of EAC there are two schools of thoughts. One school of thought feels that the region has made commendable achievements by signing protocols on the common market, security and diplomacy even there is yet a lot to be achieved.²⁴ Whereas another school of thought feels the region needs to rethink its strategy by strengthening its regional institution through a regional strategy since the current one is not comprehensive and leaves out important issues related to human security and above all it lacks the time frame. They feel the region should not peg itself on other regions' organisations. It should formulate a well coordinated, binding strategy.²⁵

Conclusion

This research examined the formulation of a grand security strategy on the premises that it is the only vehicle towards regional stability and prosperity. The study realizes that a four legged grand strategy with the dimensions of military, economic, diplomacy and coordination are the cornerstones for development. East African region

²² Director EAC community at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

²³ Opinion shared by the Director EAC at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the interview.

²⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs –Kenya.

²⁵ Personal opinions of Director EAC at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Researcher RECSA; Director EASF; Senior Political Officer. Ministry of EAC-Kenya.

with its external and internal security threats compounded with insecurity dilemma needs a common approach that would guarantee it a voice in the international system, especially during the ongoing globalization process. Security and development are interchangeably interdependent on one another.

Insecurity in one partner state affects the entire region, hence the need for concrete national security strategies which ultimately merge to form a grand regional strategy. With the ever changing challenges of security from border to intra-states, a common approach departing from the traditional concept of armed security is inevitable. Since the region shares geographical borders and interdependency between states, coordination of a consensus security approach must be coordinated.

The study reveals that the member states of the region realized the need to have a strategy which unfortunately is lopsided and short-lived, thus confirming the hypothesis of the study; A grand strategy has a direct link to the development of the region and its absence will place the region where it is today with various intra-state conflicts, diplomatic skirmishes and human insecurity.

The study further noted, the most suitable approach to implementation of a strategy must involve state and non-state actors because security is a public good that calls for corporate efforts as advocated for by the liberalist approach. The study looks at different regional structures and comes out strongly for corporate security structure. The region may wish to look at a long-term security strategy for its future stability and prosperity. Short-lived efforts such as programmes dealing with contemporary issues may render the regions efforts to waste.

The region needs to wake up to technological security threats for the sake of securing itself from any potential attacks. Similarly, it may consider using its resources, since over dependence on donor funding limits its ownership of the strategy.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS

Earlier concepts of security looked at it as state-centric and a domain of the states to militarily protect territorial boundaries from external threats. It was structural security approach based on tenets of realism which regards states as the main actors in the international system. A security strategy on the other hand was considered to be the states plan to counter external threats and aggression. It was a totality of states military, diplomacy and economic strategies aimed at providing a long-term plan how states is to survive in long-term using minimum cost.

After the Cold-War and precisely in the 1970s there was a paradigm shift on a number of issues in the international system. New actors participated in the setting of the security agenda and the concepts widen to include other dimensions such as the environmental security, human security and drug trafficking.

Similarly, states realized the need to exploit the advantages of interdependence since regional activities gave individual states a greater competitive edge than when operating singly. The trends of security changed from border to intra-conflicts and concerns such as shared resources. Likewise, the dimensions of a strategy changed to include coordination as a reinforcing factor. East Africa region with the advent of globalization realized the importance of integration which called for formulation of different plans of action such as economic plan and security. The earlier integration of the region collapsed due to lack of coordination and commitment from some member states. But due the inter dependence of the member states brought about by their geographical locality, the integration was revived. A security strategy was formulated and protocol

signed to implement its contents. However, it lacked sight of many vital issues such as human security, intra-state resource, implementation time frame and never involved non-state actors. Subsequently, two schools of thoughts emerged: one of the schools commended the efforts, while the other school felt a better approach should be used. The former cited the signing of protocols as a major stride towards a brighter future, whereas the later felt a strategy is never formulated on the premise of unbinding protocols or limitless Memoranda of Understanding being implemented by organizations that are not entirely. From the region, hence the region should reformulate a comprehensive security strategy to secure it from threats of insecurity.

In future the region may formulate a four legged strategy that runs for a minimum period of five years or a maximum of twenty five years involving track one, track two and track two and a half, actors of diplomacy. The region may in future seek to avoid over-dependence on foreign aids and instead use it regional organizations with regional funding. That would ultimately guarantee it's economic, political and security development for the good of the region

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- ii) Senior Political Affairs Officer at the Ministry of East Africa Community*
- iii) The Researcher at the Regional Centre on small arms and light weapons*
- iv) The Director East African Stand by force*
- v) University Lecturer*

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. *Do the East African States have a security strategy?*
2. *What is the time frame for the strategy if there is one?*
3. *What are the key components of the strategy?*
4. *Who are the key players in the formulation and implementation of the strategy?*
5. *Who funds the strategy?*
6. *What are some of the challenges faced?*
7. *Where do you see East Africa in the next 20 years?*
8. *What is the role of civil societies in the implementation of the strategy?*
9. *What are the current pillars of the security strategy in East Africa?*

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