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Role of Media in Government Counterterrorism Strategy
A Case Study of Kenya

Benson Nalo

REG. No: R50/5081/2017

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**A research project submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the award
of Master of Arts Degree in International Studies**

SEPTEMBER 2017



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DECLARATION

I Benson Nalo hereby declare that this research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

Signed:  Date: 4/12/17

This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University supervisor.

DR. PATRICK MALUKI

Signature:  Date: 6/12/2017

DEDICATION

This study is dedicated to father Shem David Nalo who advised me in March 1972, one month before his death, that hard work and obedience to teachers was the key to success.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

A number of people assisted me in one way or another during the execution of this study and I am not able to list all the names here.

First to be acknowledged is my supervisor Dr. Patrick Maluki of the IDIS, University of Nairobi, for his mentorship throughout the study period. There were times when it was so difficult to proceed with research due to pressure of work and Dr. Maluki through University of Nairobi, granted extra thirty days to enable our class complete the project. Dr. Maluki's phone was always available whenever I called to consult on the way forward about my study or had a question about my research.

Secondly, I appreciate the efforts of Brigadier C R Imanene, Senior Directing Staff, National Defence College for his valuable inputs and encouragement during very difficult times at the National Defence College. This study could not have been completed without efforts from Brigadier Imanene who always ensured that every chapter was completed on time and submitted to the supervisor within the stipulated timeframes. Even after being transferred from National Defence College to Kenya Air Force Headquarters, he still continued to call me to inquire about the progress. Your persistence enabled me to complete on time.

Third, I must express my very profound appreciation to my family and specifically my son Wycliffe who was always available to deal with my errands so that I get enough time to concentrate on my study.

Last but not least, I acknowledge the efforts of colleagues and workmates for the valuable support and encouragement granted to me during this study. This achievement would not have been possible you. Thank you all.

ABSTRACT

This study aimed at examining media's role in government counterterrorism strategy. The motivation for the study arise from the fact that governments all over the world are confronted with threat of terrorism and strive to win public support in their counterterrorism strategies. Depending on their view of terrorists, government have apply various counterterrorism measures such as extensive intelligence gathering and use of military force; establishment of special anti-terror police units; and use of criminal justice system where terrorists are viewed as criminals. The use of media in counterterrorism has eluded most states in Africa and Kenya in particular. On the other hand, terrorists use media extensively to promote their ideology and goals. They have developed a symbiotic relationship with media whereby terrorists feed media with news items and media is a channel through which terrorists advance their goals. It is in this light this study focused on role of media in counterterrorism strategy. In doing so, the study focused on answering three key questions: what is the relationship between media and terrorism; what role can media play in counterterrorism; and how can government collaborate with media to come up with sound counterterrorism strategies. In attempt to answer these questions extensive literature review was conducted and primary and secondary data collected and analyzed. Both quantitative and qualitative approaches were adopted in data collection and analysis from 318 respondents coming from security agencies, media houses and citizen randomly selected from six counties in Kenya. The study found a interdependent relationship between media and terrorists with implications for government counterterrorism efforts. The study also established that media influences public perception by setting the agenda on what people should think about and also the media reminds people how important the issues are by continuous broadcasting of the same issues over and over until it resonates with the public. This agenda setting practice has implications for counterterrorism strategy especially when government has no control or influence on what the public feels about war on terrorism. The study determined that Government-media relationship in Kenya is adversarial in nature due distrust between media personnel and government officials. The study proposes a number of ways through which collaboration between media and government may yield better counterterrorism strategies during coverage of terrorist attacks and during peacetime. They include joint trainings of selected personnel from both government and media who will be accredited to cover terrorist events. Together with family security units the two parties can be deployed to handle terrorism issues pertaining to media. The study recommends regular seminars attended by leaders selected from both sides to discuss openly coverage issues. Sustained collaboration between government and media in Kenya will greatly change people's perception on terrorist matters and produce better counterterrorism strategies that involve government, media and the citizen in safeguarding the country against terrorism.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

The immediate aftermath of any terrorist attack creates a desire for information that makes people pay focused attention to media by either watching or reading updates. Emotionally, people are left in shock of the attack, the sorrow of victims, sadness for deaths, destruction, and anxiety about rescue of survivors. The media becomes a central rallying position for all parties including government, terrorists and the public. This means there is need to reflect upon the presentation of these events by media in order to create perspectives that would handle a series of questions surrounding the issue of terrorism.

Media and terrorism have a strange relationship as observed by Margaret Thatcher who called media publicity the “oxygen” of terrorism.¹ She called upon democratic states to find means through which terrorists are suffocated of the much needed oxygen of publicity.² In many instances, it is only media personnel that senior terrorists have accepted to visit and have interviews. For instance, Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden granted interview to Bergen who was then a CNN national security analyst in 1997. Farah Shirdon, an ISIS terrorist, also granted an interview with Vice News from where he revealed the Islamic State agenda. Here in Africa, Al Shabab terror groups have equally employed the use of the media and even produced videos to publicize their cause. This demonstrates that media and terrorism exhibit some kind of symbiotic relationship that can be explained by the desire for publicity that terrorists have.

¹ www.digilib.gmu.edu accessed on 11th September 2017

² Thatcher. M. cited in Cottle, S.. *Mediatized Conflict: “Development in Media and Conflict Studies”* Open University Press, England 2006. p.44

Goldstein observed that between government and citizen stands the media with a role to gather and transmit information from both sides. From government, the media collects information about policies and the working of government while from the citizen the media collects and transmits to the government public approvals by citizen.³ However, conflict do arise between government and media due to the manner in which media presents information to the citizen. The role of media as public watchdog and critic of government actions and powers forces this relationship to be frosty.⁴ The relationship become acrimonious when the media exposes to the public that which the government wants to hide. For instance, the governments of Chad, Uganda, and Congo-Brazzaville block media during elections for fear of negative reports. On the other hand, governments' need for public approval forces them to work closely with the media. Governments use media in their struggle for favorable reporting in order to get public approval for their foreign and domestic policies. The Arab Spring demonstrated the capability of the media in shaping public perception.⁵

All in all, both government and terrorists require the media because they all need publicity in order to win the public's perception on issues. In terrorist strategy media publicity is an important element. The goal is largely to achieve maximum awareness of the act of the terrorists and therefore induce maximum fear or sympathy. On the other hand, the government's objective would be the same to win the hearts of the public and therefore the support of the public for their cause which gives political dividends. The end result therefore is to ensure that the public in general behaves in a way that both the terrorists and the government carry the day in as far as their

³ Goldstein J.S., "The role of Public Opinion in Foreign Policy", *International Relations*, 2006.

⁴ *ibid*

⁵ Goldstuck Author on BBC News "How Africa Governments Block Media" 25th April 2016

respective pursuits are concerned. Since the theatre is about influencing the perception of people, the clearest instrument that does this at the least cost for both is the media.

All terrorist attacks do not receive the same coverage, some events receive more coverage from the media while others do not based on the nature and magnitude of the attack and geographical location.⁶ For instance after the terror attack in Paris, the editorial boards of the television news network BFMTV, and newspapers *Le Monde* and *Le Parisien* decided not to publish the photographs of Islamic terrorists arguing that it was meant to “avoid glorification” of the jihadists after their deaths.⁷ This raises a fundamental question about what informs such a decision. If media in other parts of the world can decide to broadcast or refuse to broadcast terrorism activities, it means that knowledge of how such a decision is arrived at may assist in understanding the political goals that inform media strategy.⁸ This study therefore aimed at understanding the factors that influence media decisions to dedicate attention to terrorist violence and how such coverage may be used in counterterrorism strategies.

Media plays significant role in shaping public opinion, attitudes and behaviors of members of the public, government and terrorists. The key factors that may inform our understanding of this relationship are the historical experience of the state in regard to the terrorist threat; the existing counterterrorism policies, the role media plays in relation to terrorist threat *vis a vis* government’s countermeasures and the resultant relationship among government, media, and public. This study explored the possibility of using this relationship in government counterterrorism strategies.

⁶ www.econ.iwu.at Accessed on 11th September 2017.

⁷ Friedman Victoria French Media Censor Identities of Terrorists – ‘To Avoid Glorification’ 28th July 2016

⁸ *ibid*

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Government all over the world are confronted with the challenge of winning wider public support in the fight against terrorism. Wider public support on government counterterrorism strategies would make the citizen resonate well with government efforts, avail necessary intelligence pertaining to suspicious activities related to terrorism, and encourage the populace to rally around the national flag during terrorist attacks in support of government actions. Despite the use of strategies which for a long time relied on the use of force and intelligence, the government have not managed to win the minds and souls of citizen in their counterterrorism wars hence these strategies have proven ineffective. Media as a means of communications is capable of informing wider public about government counterterrorism strategies and influence public perception through its agenda setting role. If used effectively, media is able to leverage / aid government counterterrorism efforts by shaping public opinion and providing networks necessary for countering terrorism. This study is organized around three research questions namely: (a) what is the relationship between media and terrorism (b) what role can media play in countering terrorism and (c) how can the government use media in counterterrorism war?

1.3 General Objective of the study

The aim of this study was to examine the role media can play in government counterterrorism strategy in Kenya using global examples for illustration.

Specific objectives

1.3.1 To investigate the relationship between media and terrorism

1.3.2 To determine the role of media in counterterrorism.

1.3.3 To explain how the government and media can work in counter terrorism.

1.4 Justification of the study

Studies on media and counterterrorism have been done from many perspectives. For instance Klapper examined how media influences political opinions and voting patterns.⁹ Unfortunately, studies fail to deal with the question of media and counterterrorism. For this reason, this study contributes to the existing body of knowledge by explaining the role of media in counterterrorism strategies. In this sense the study highlights how media and government can collaborate in counterterrorism strategies, with the media largely helping to shape people's opinion and perception within the framework of government counterterrorism strategy. In terms of policy this study creates a platform through which both government and media can partner in dealing with the terrorist phenomena in Africa with Kenya as a case study. The study is beneficial to the wider public in the sense that media will offer correct perspective of terrorism hence change the minds of potential recruits.

1.5 Literature Review

This section reviews both theoretical and empirical literature on existing studies that are relevant to this study. Several media paradigms are examined such as manufacturing consent, contest for media and media culture.

⁹ Klapper J. T., "What We Know About the Effects of Mass Communication". The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 4. 1957. Available at www.osce.org Accessed on 23rd April 2017

1.5.1 Manufacturing consent paradigm

This paradigm is attributed to Herman and Chomsky.¹⁰ In this perspective, the media is an effective ideological instrument that carry out a publicity function without overt coercion, the media is assumed to rely on market forces, internalized assumptions, and self-censorship. It does this by focusing on structures, production and communications.¹¹ Gurevitch studies on political economy of the media found that media operates as a capitalist enterprise, corporate transmitter of cultural characteristics, deception and dominant prevailing ideology. Adorno and Horkheimer while upholding the dominance of corporate media and their influences of production and distribution around the world, confirms the critique of media under contemporary circumstances.¹² Herbert Marcuse also describes media's function as an ideological state machinery that defines the terms by which people think about the world.¹³

From a political economy perspective, it is possible and also necessary to use media in consumerist belief system. Many scholars have used political economy to analyses how the media supports prevailing interests and the perpetuate division in society.¹⁴ For instance, Curran and Seaton's found that media houses operate as businesses industries in pursuit of profits where conditions allow them to do so.¹⁵ Herman and Chomsky also concluded that media is significantly influenced by advertisers who exert a lot of pressure on them and influence by choosing and supporting media outlets that can promote their products.¹⁶ These researchers affirm that media industries rely on

¹⁰ Herman, E. S. and Chomsky, N. "Manufacturing Consent". New York: Pantheon Books, 1988, p. 306. Available at www.claws.in Accessed on 12th August 2017.

¹¹ Garnham, N, 'Contribution to a Political Economy of Mass Communication' Media, Culture and Society, volume 1, number 2, Academic Press, London. 1979

¹² Adorno and Horkheimer, "The culture Industry: Enlightenment as mass Deception" 1944 p.95-135

¹³ Marcuse Herbert., "The Crisis of Marxist Media" London and Berkeley: Macmillan, 1944.

¹⁴ Boyd-Barrett, O., "The political economy approach: Approaches to Media, Oxford University Press, 1995

¹⁵ Curran, J., and Gurevitch, M., "Mass Communications and Society": Sage Publications, 1979, available at www.transnationalterrorism.eu Accessed on 11th September 2017..

¹⁶ Herman, Edward S.; Chomsky, N. "Manufacturing Consent". New York: Pantheon Books, 1988,

generating funds through advertisements rather than sales, a situation that elevate advertisers to a level of economic importance, with potential to influence editorial team, which translates into a patronage culture.¹⁷ On their part, Schlesinger, Tuchman and Fishman argue that media routinely rely on government and corporate sources to grant them privileged access to information and advance preferred views and values hence serving both sides of the divide equally.¹⁸

Numerous studies have also focused on how governments can be able to discipline the media without direct censoring of information. For instance, Herman and Chomsky discusses the means of disciplining the media through 'Flak'. This is where people with vested interest such as governments clandestinely organize sections of the public or politicians to send negative responses to the media through the feedback platform. The ability to produce flak is directly related to agenda setting and can work directly or indirectly. When used directly, flaking involve, for instance, phone calls from the State House to media houses. On the other hand, indirect use of flak can be achieved through influencing various parties to boycotts media programs, or by setting up political parties or lobby groups to negatively air voices against media.¹⁹

The above discussion sheds some light on what influences media choices on selecting news items and explains the basis of the propaganda model where the media is involved in the processes of manufacturing consent. However, critics of manufacturing consent like Schlesinger and Robinson argue that similar studies have also demonstrated bad blood between media and the powerful in

¹⁷ Cottle. "Mediatized Conflict, 2006

¹⁸ Schlesinger, P., "Media, Culture and Society: Rethinking the Sociology of Journalism; Source Strategies and the Limits of Media-Centrism", SAGE, London, Vol.13, 1991. Available at www.thepdfportal.net.

¹⁹ *ibid*

society.²⁰ While criticizing the manufacturing of consent model Solosky argues that media ethics and professionalism are capable of preventing the powerful from influencing media.²¹

1.5.2 The contest for Media coverage

This section examines the struggle between the government and other interest groups such as terrorists for media coverage. As observed by Habermas, the notions of media as a public entity creates a media contest between government and other interest parties.²² In this contest, both governments and terrorist groups compete for media attention with each side attempting to promote their version of the conflict in order to win public support and to mobilize necessary support for its cause. The support can be economic, social, political or logistics.

Some scholars argue that the distinction between political contest model and manufacturing consent is insignificant. Wolfsfeld, for example, argues that political contest model is built on assertions derived from the manufacturing consent approach.²³ To him, any political contestation is likely to attract media attention for news because it is cheaper for the media to report on events happening elsewhere instead of creating them.²⁴ At the same time, the contestants in the political process are likely to influence the media to advance their goals. Wolfsfeld view such a scenario as a contest where politicians determine who owns the media and also control what the media broadcasts.²⁵ In other words, the dominant political contestant determines how media houses are registered and controls what can be broadcasted to the public. In this scenario, the level of control,

²⁰ *ibid*
Thomson J.B.. "The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of Media" Stanford University Press. 1995 Available at www.scientific-publications.net

²¹ Solosky J., "Media Organization and Production" edited by Cottle Simon, SAGE Publications, 1989. P.15

²² Habermas J., "Theory and Practice - Editorial Review", Beacon press, 1974.

²³ Cottle, S. Mediatized Conflict: Issues in Cultural and Media Studies, Open University Press, 2006.

²⁴ *ibid*

²⁵ Cottle, S., Mediatized Conflict, 2006

by the dominant party, of political environment, becomes a variable in determining the media performance in a political contestation. For instance, when government dominate the political struggle outside the domain of media, it becomes easier for government officials to control the media environment. On the other hand, when government is losing control to other contestants, it provides the media with an increased array of perspectives where the other contestants may be able to control media and promote their own agenda.²⁶

The role of media in a contestation may not be constant and predictable. For instance, the role of media may vary over time and circumstance depending on political context of the contestation and the resources available to both sides.²⁷ It may also vary depending on the relationship it has with each contestant, the state of public opinion and events in the conflict environment. Wolfsfeld noted that the competition among the contestants must be seen from two dimensions in order to understand the possible roles of the media.²⁸ From one dimension, competition for access to media triggers a structural analysis of the interactions and dependencies between sources of news and the media. On the other hand, competition to set public agenda through the media prompts cultural analysis of how media culture influences the construction of news.

As much as government as a dominant political contestant may have incredible advantages over other contestants when it comes to news coverage, smart contestants have managed to overcome this disadvantage and equally compete with government for media coverage. Terrorists have managed to gain adequate media coverage even more than government through what is referred to as breaking news which media crave for all the time. According to media contest perspective,

²⁶ Cottle, S. "Mediatized Conflict", 2006.

²⁷ Wolfsfeld, G. *Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle East*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997

²⁸ Cottle, S. "Mediatized Conflict", 2006.

mediatized conflicts are complex, they involve unequal contestants with different determinants, different opportunities, and all these can change with time as the struggle continues.²⁹ Proponents of this view believe that media is more dynamic, oppositional and politically dependent rather than as mouthpiece for dominant interests. For this reason, media may be forced by prevailing political dynamics to cover other more important events such as terror attacks against the will of any government.

1.5.3 Kellner's theory of Media Culture

Kellner's theory view media from a democratic context where politics is treated as entertainment and image is more important than substance. The theory assumes that media ownership is monopolized by corporations that define the standard practice on how the media cover political events. In this scenario the media has political power derived from ownership and historical basis for the formulation of media culture.³⁰ According to Kellner this media culture has come up with imageries and sounds that shape the fabric of social life and has dominated people's social behavior.³¹ The culture provides mechanism through which people define their identities.³² It also provides the lens through which people view the world and make their own judgment.³³ This media culture not only consumes significant people's time and energy but also provides plenty of materials for influencing how people think, behave and define themselves.

The relevance of media culture to counterterrorism is that people can use mediated images and ideas in order to resurrect deep rooted values, morals, commitments and sense of collectivity. For

²⁹ Cottle, S. "Mediatized Conflict", 2006.

³⁰ Kellner Douglas "Media Culture: Cultural Studies, Identity, and Politics between the Modern and the Postmodern" Routledge, London and New York. 1995.

³¹ *ibid*

³² ³² *ibid*

³³ Cottle, S. "Mediatized Conflict", 2006.

instance, the so called historical injustices committed against some communities in Kenya has always been used to galvanize the support of coastal people of Kenya against the government. A conflict can therefore solicit public support especially when media continuously transmit to the public mediatized images. This approach by the media can be applied when counterterrorism is viewed as conflict between the terrorists and the government in order to appeal for public support of government strategies.

1.5.4 Agenda Setting/ framing and priming perspective

Agenda setting is a theory attributed to Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw in 1972 and is about how media determines what people view as newsworthy as media attempts to influence public perception.³⁴ Media can set public agenda by framing news items in a format that resonate with the public mood and present them as prime news at a time when most people are in their living rooms and likely to watch or listen to news.³⁵ Neumann and Gerbner conclude that media news can have a strong and long-term effect on people based on the amount of information broadcasted and how well it resonates with them.³⁶ Conventional media and entertainment television were identified by Gerbner as the main culprits in shaping public perceptions by advancing motivated worldviews.³⁷ Priming occurs when the media alters the norms that people use to make political evaluations, for instance when news items suggest to audience the need concentrate on security issues instead of political. The media therefore influence people to form attitudes based on salient security issues presented to them for decision making.³⁸ Gamson found a direct correlation

³⁴ Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw in 1972

³⁵ McQuail, D. "Mass communication theory" (5th Ed.). London: Sage, 2005. Available at www.ir.canterbury.ac.nz Accessed on 11th September 2017.

³⁶ Noelle-Neumann, E., "Studies in Broadcasting," Return to the concept of powerful mass media" 1973, p. 9, 67-112.

³⁷ Gerbner, G., & Gross, L. Public Opinion Quarterly, "System of cultural indicators". 1973. P. 38, 460-461.

³⁸ Hastie, R., & Park, B. "Psychological Review: The relationship between memory and judgment depends on whether the task is memory-based or on-line", 1986. Available at www.canterbury.ac.nz Accessed on 9th September 2017.

between people's judgments and attitude with the ease through which events could easily be recalled.³⁹ In this way the media directly influences what people should think about by easily retrieving from their mental image templates.

Framing is a perspective associated with Erving Goffman in 1974. It anchored on the premise that media provides a news environment tailor-made to influence how people will understand or evaluate whatever is presented to them. It can occur through different levels as noted by Shoemaker and Reese that framing operate at both a macro and micro levels constructs.⁴⁰ At macro level, framing occurs when news is presented in a way that resonates with deep rooted schemas among citizen such as historical injustices inflicted by an entity to a community.⁴¹ In this way the media would like the audience to recall those injustices and compare with the news broadcasted and make decisions. At a micro level framing occurs when news is presented in a way that guides people on how to consume information presented to them in order to make decisions. For instance, the media may interview analysts after a terror incident to discuss the events and this in this way guide the audience on what to think about when making decisions.⁴²

The above literature review demonstrates the power of media in setting national agenda and focus citizen attention on selected issues. The media informs people about public affairs and they also prioritize issues based on importance. The media therefore is the primary source mental images of reality. What people know about terrorism will largely depend on what media presents to them.

1.5.5 Empirical Literature

³⁹ Tversky, A., & Hahnemann, D. Cognitive Psychology, 1973.

⁴⁰ Shoemaker, P. J., & Reese, S. D." Mediating the message: Theories of influences on mass media content" (2nd Ed.). White Plains, NY: Longman.1996

⁴¹ www.researchbank.rmit.edu.au Accessed on 11th September 12, 2017

⁴² *ibid*

This section discusses some empirical evidence concerning the symbiotic relationship between terrorists and media. Media's role in covering terrorist events always resurface after every terror event hence the need to highlight this relationship. Terrorists rely on media as an important vehicle to communicate to their audiences. One way of communicating grievances is by executing a deadly attack on innocent people. When media attention is drawn, terrorist achieve their goal of influencing the magnitude and scale of news coverage.⁴³ Terrorist attacks trigger instant news expectations combined with intense competition between media outlets on who becomes the first or the most comprehensive news coverage. This rush leads to false information by media.⁴⁴

Empirical evidence indicate that media can reveal to terrorists certain security operational details knowingly or unknowingly that help terrorists to improve their work. By airing live video or pictures of a terror scene, the media risks the safety of security forces and obstruct rescue operations. The media is unaware that information provided may endanger both rescue operation and the hostages. Hoffman cited evidence of a case where the cameraman who saw a carrier lifted up by a string to the fifth floor of a building under siege.⁴⁵ Later on it was realized that some people evaded the terrorists and secured themselves in a room. The terrorists who held people hostage on the eighth floor were unaware of their presence but patrolled the lower floors until late. It is believed that the terrorists were informed about the presence of these men by the media when the pictures were broadcasted but the gunmen were unable to break the door.⁴⁶

⁴³ Hoffman, B., "Inside terrorism". New York: Columbia University Press, 2006 Available at www.eprints.nottingham.ac.uk Accessed on 12th July 2017.

⁴⁴ www.cjr.org Accessed on 8th September 2017

⁴⁵ www.dtic.mil Accessed on 10th October 2017

⁴⁶ Fromm, J., "TV: Does it Box in President in a Crisis, US News and World Report". Vol. 99, 15 July 1985, pp. 23-24.

In another incident, careless reporting dangerously aggravated a hostage situation involving journalists. Khaalis was a Black Muslim in US and his parents were murdered by Black Muslims. One day he learned from media that some hostages were capture and held in a room. He forced his way into the room where hostages were held and demanded to kill one of them in retaliation.⁴⁷ Police on rescue operation advised hostages to promptly apologize to and Khaalis was eventually calmed.⁴⁸

There is evidence to the fact that media attention to terrorists improve terrorist political influence, confers political status to some terrorist leaders, and enhance public's fear for insecurity. The political influence of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) significantly improved after the 1972 terror attacks in Munich. The PLO became an entity that world leaders considered the need to negotiate with the organization. This elevated the position of Yasser Arafat to a world leader. Bob Simon of CBS confirmed this argument by admitting that media was part of the problem. According to him, the media just like any other person is taken hostage by terrorists and the international agenda is set by some terrorist in the Middle East.⁴⁹

On his part Yonah Alexander identified three kinds of relationship that develop between media and terrorists that work in favor of the latter. According to him, the media, impede effective police responses to terrorist activities by interfering with operations, or intensify the pressure on the government, or harass affected people by pressing for interviews.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ www.dtic.mil Accessed on 10th June 2017

⁴⁸ Linda Fuller, "Terrorism as Treated by the Christian Science Monitor, 1977-1987", *Political Communication and Persuasion*, 1988, p.121-137.

⁴⁹ Wendy O'Donnell and Farnsworth S. W., " Prime Time Hostages: A Case Study of Coverage during Captivity, *Political Communication and Persuasion.*" Vol. 5, No. 4, 1988, p. 244.

⁵⁰ Fox, William F. "Legal Aspect of Terrorism: Terrorism. Vol. 12, No. 4", 1989, pp. 297-3 15.

Empirical evidence also supports the allegation that the amount of media coverage accorded to terrorism attack increases the possibility of other attacks.⁵¹ Michael Jetter concluded that there is a direct correlation between increased media coverage of terror attacks and an increase in their frequency.⁵² According to him, terror attacks that receive extensive media coverage such as suicide bombings, or hostage taking are considered by terrorists as proven success and are likely to be repeated many times.⁵³

Olivier Roy also demonstrated that media coverage assists terrorist organizations to recruit and mobilize supporters.⁵⁴ He says that the agenda setting role of media and reaction by politicians on terrorism events can provides potential recruits with a sense of belonging and meaning.⁵⁵ This may occur particularly when news is presented in a way that resonate with existing associated historical injustices.

It is also argued that comprehensive media coverage assist terrorists in improving their operational skills and effectiveness. Javier Delgado Rivera concluded that terrorists learnt through the media how security agencies followed the network of the San Bernardino killers with data retrieved from their mobile handsets.⁵⁶ Through the media, terrorists became aware of how the French police were able to link one of the colleagues involved in Paris attack to another attack that occurred in Brussels by analyzing information recorded on parking tickets. In all these cases, live

⁵¹ www.ethses.whiterose.ac.uk accessed on 15th August 2017.

⁵² Jetter Michael, "Terrorism and the Media," 2014, Accessed from www.prc.uu.se on 14th June 2017.

⁵³ www.cri.org Accessed on 14th August 2017

⁵⁴ Archetti, C, Understanding terrorism in the age of global media: A communication Approach , Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2012

⁵⁵ Roy Olivier "Jihad and Death: The Global Appeal of Islamic State, Hurst, 2017

⁵⁶ www.cri.org Accessed on 14th August 2017

media coverage on police operations unintentionally helped terrorists to avoid past mistakes and refine their modus operandi.⁵⁷

On the other hand, collaboration between media and government can significantly enhance the effectiveness of rescue operations. For instance, during the Lindt Cafe terror attack, the media had significant knowledge of police operations put in place and the two sides agreed on the coverage of operations after which police were expected to use picture feeds. The video coverage assisted the police to assess and evaluate the success of their operations. There was also agreement with the media not to broadcast sensational live coverage and to delay them until the rescue operation was complete.⁵⁸ This example demonstrates how collaboration between government and media may strengthen government counterterrorism strategy.

1.6 Theoretical Framework

This study is moored on agenda setting theory credited to McCombs and Shaw⁵⁹. This theory states that the media does not reflect reality when communicating issues but instead, they filter and shape it. The media sets public agenda by concentrating on a few selected issues which makes public believe that those are the important issues to think about. For instance, when media repeatedly broadcast terrorist attacks, people are likely to believe that their security is the most pressing issue that should dominate the agenda at all levels. According to this theory, people have a habit of thinking more about the ideas presented in the media compared to others. In this sense, agenda-

⁵⁷ Rivera J. D. "Does the media say too much when reporting on terrorism?" Open Democracy, 2016 Available at www.cir.org Accessed on 2nd September 2017.

⁵⁸ Reason, Chris "Sydney siege: A chilling Account of the Barbaric Night" News.com.au, 2014

⁵⁹ McCombs, M., and Shaw, D. "The agenda-setting function of mass media. *Public Opinion Quarterly*", 1972, 36, 176-185.

setting theory appropriately helps explain the prevalent role of the media when covering terrorist activities.

In performing its agenda setting role, McQuail and Windahl, observed that media usually have three cards to play in the process of communication between media to the public.⁶⁰ First card contains the media agenda where issues are evaluated and ranked according to content. Second card contains the public perception where media personnel are concerned with how the public might view and rank the media house. Third card contains the policy agenda where media is concerned with ethics and other legislative bodies that have a role to play in h media operations such as the media council of Kenya.⁶¹

When media concentrates on content as overriding factor in selecting news, it emphasizes content with total disregard to others and in this way the media has wide latitude in making the choice. For instance, the media may decide that terrorist information is more important to their viewers at a certain time and then ignore all other news items that do not carry terrorism. In choosing and displaying news this way, the media becomes a key instrument in shaping political reality. People not only learn about the issues, but also how much it is important to them based on the amount of information, time allocated to it and how much emphasis is placed on it. Consequently, media has the ability to choose what is considered as news, present it in a manner that shape perceptions, influence the reaction and subsequent behavior of decision makers. Subsequently media can help government in its effort to rally support for a cause of action or help other interest groups gain the same. The government therefore has a chance in collaborating with the media in winning public support, for its counter terrorism strategies.

⁶⁰ www.bradleywilsononline.net accessed on 3rd July 2017

⁶¹ www.ethese.whiterose.ac.uk Accessed on 8th July 2017.

Hypotheses

1. **Media can aid government counterterrorism strategy by shaping public opinion.**
2. **Lack of a media strategy impacts negatively on Kenya's counterterrorism efforts**

1.7 Methodology

This section addresses itself to research design, data collection, sampling methods and research instrument.

Research Design

Social science researchers are not in agreement about the nature of social reality and how one goes about researching it. Although, positivists advocate the use of quantitative data collection approaches, such as surveys where the emphasis is upon the reliability and representativeness of data collected the interpretivists reject their view by advocating qualitative methods that emphasize validity in research. This study is therefore a mixed survey research. It combines both qualitative and quantitative methods.

1.8 Study Site



Fig. 1: Map of Kenya and showing neighboring states

Kenya has a land perimeter of 3446 kilometers including boundaries with Sudan (306km), Ethiopia (779km), Somalia (682km), Tanzania (769km), and Uganda (772km). These boundary segments are porous with several associated security threats such as terrorism, proliferation of firearms, drug trafficking, environmental crimes, piracy, human trafficking, and poaching, contraband goods among others. The youth constitute more than 40 percent of the population and most of them are unemployed which makes Kenya a suitable ground for recruitment into radicalization

1.8.1 Target Population

The target population for this study were media houses, security agencies and Kenyans who consume media products. The study could not deal with the entire populations because of practicality constraints hence the selection of a representative sample from the target population.

1.8.2 Sampling Frame/ sample size

In this study, non-probability and probabilistic sampling techniques were used. The probability sample were obtained through random sampling while non-probability sample were obtained through purposive sampling.

The sampling frame of the study comprised of a total 418 respondents out of which samples were selected. The sampling frame was stratified into six strata: ten from Kenya Defense Force, ten from National Intelligence Service, ten from Kenya Police Service, three senior staff from six main media outlets, ten senior government officials from ministry of Interior, and 300 members of public spatially distributed within the republic. Purposive sampling was used to select officers from KDF, NIS, and KPS. Criteria for selection involved seniority and nature of duties involving terrorism or counterterrorism on a daily basis. Purposive sampling was used to select officers from media houses based on their roles in decision making. Multi stage probability sampling was used to select from the public. Universities presented a good representation of the Kenyan public. Random sampling was used to select eight universities out of which another random sampling was used to select from the various faculties as well as to select twenty students to participate in the study. The same process was used to select twenty respondents each from six counties.

1.8.3 Data Collection Methods

This study relied on both qualitative and quantitative data. Qualitative data were collected from senior officials who deal with counterterrorism from the Ministry of Interior by use of scheduled interview. The same method was used to collect data from media officials. The quality of research designs was pegged internal validity, external validity, construct validity. Quantitative data were collected by use of questionnaire. Both instruments are attached in the appendix A.

1.8.4 Validity and Reliability of Data Collection Instrument

It is important that data collected for any study be useful to the researcher in meeting his objectives. As noted by Warwick and Linninger, a questionnaire strives to meet two basic requirements, to obtain data needed to meet study objectives and to collect this data with maximal reliability and validity.⁶² The following procedure was applied to ensure that data gathering instrument measure in a consistent manner what was intended in the study.

Validity

Validity is about the degree to which a data collection instrument measures what it is expected to measure.⁶³ Mason and Bramble pointed out that there are three approaches to validity as content validity, construct validity and criterion validity.⁶⁴ He referred to content validity as the degree to which the items tested in the data collection instrument adequately measures the construct of interest. For instance, in this study, the researcher was interested in evaluating whether media shapes public opinion; what informs media content; and whether government can collaborate with

⁶² Warwick, P.D., and Linninger, A.C., "The Sample Survey Theory and Practice" McGraw-Hill, 1975. Available at www.shareok.org

⁶³ www.espace.curtin.edu.au accessed on 10th September 2017

⁶⁴ Mason, E.J., & Bramble, W.J." Research in education and the behavioral sciences: Concepts and methods". Madison, WI: Brown & Benchmark, 1997.

media in counter terrorism strategies. The question is whether the research instrument measures what should actually be measured in order to meet study objectives. The test items were developed by the researcher ensuring that all of them represented the domain of interest no area remained untested. The development of the data collection instrument was achieved by having approval from an expert familiar with the construct of interest. The expert reviewed all the items for comprehensiveness and came to agreement as to which items should be included in the final instrument. The experience of the expert in the area under investigation ensured that the instrument used was suitable in terms of content validity.

Mason and Bramble defined construct validity as the degree to which a research instrument measures the characteristic that it is intended to measure.⁶⁵ According to Hunter and Schmidt, this should be a quantitative question rather than a qualitative, it is a matter of degree.⁶⁶ To be able to perform construct validity properly, the instrument should have two parts, one evaluating the theory behind the construct being measured and another part for the adequacy of the instrument in measuring the construct. For instance, the research instrument used in this study contained a section testing whether media shapes public opinion and another part testing how this has been measured. To be sure that this was achieved correctly, an expert supervisor examined and approved the construct validity as developed by the researcher. The expert's experience was therefore relied upon in evaluating construct validity.

Criterion related validity is conducted in order to detect the omission of one or more criteria used to represent constructs which the researcher is interested in measuring. One way of conducting such a test is by administering the instrument to a group similar to the proposed sample. In this

⁶⁵ www.eap.uonbi.ac.ke Accessed on 23rd July 2017.

⁶⁶ Hunter, J. and Schmidt, F. "Methods of meta-analysis: Correcting error and bias in research findings. Beverly Hills CA: Sage, 1990

study, the instrument was administered to the National Defence College participants from similar backgrounds with the intended targets. Test results received the approval of an expert supervisor before commencement of data collection. The figure 2 below is summarizes the kinds of validity tests normally executed for a research project.




Figure 2: Different types of validity by Bhattacharjee, Anol, (2012).⁶⁷

Reliability

Reliability test is executed to determine whether the research instrument consistently measure what it is designed to measure.⁶⁸ The question is whether all respondents understand the question in the same way the researcher expect them to understand it. This cannot be calculated but there are four acceptable estimators that are normally used. One is the inter-rater reliability referring to the degree to which different raters give consistent answers to the same question. Another one is the Test-

⁶⁷ Bhattacharjee, Anol, "Social Science Research: Principles, Methods, and Practices", 2012. www.mybooklibrary.com

⁶⁸ www.uni.kassel.de accessed on 10th Septemebr 2017

Retest method where the consistency of a measure evaluated has been evaluated over time and found to be adequate. A third method is called the Parallel-Forms Reliability where two tests are conducted in a similar way from the same content. In this study, the experience of an expert supervisor was relied upon in guaranteeing reliability. In this study, the first method was applied by having the instrument administered to different raters who responded in the same way as expected by the researcher.

1.8.5 Data Analysis and Presentation

In this study, data was collected from four main sources namely security agencies, media personnel, government officials whose role involve policy on terrorism matters and general public. Numeric data collected from the public was analyzed using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). The information was then presented in terms of bar charts, pie charts, and tables. Quantitative data analysis aimed at describing, aggregating, and presenting the information of interest in statistical terms. Data collected from security agencies, government officials and media personnel were qualitative in nature. Qualitative analysis focused the statistical testing of hypotheses: that media can aid government counterterrorism strategy by shaping public opinion or lack of media strategy impacts negatively on Kenya's counterterrorism strategy.

1.8.6 Ethical Considerations

In this study, fundamental ethical standards were observed as a norm in any scientific research. The following ethical considerations, recommended for any social science study were observed during the study:⁶⁹

⁶⁹ www.studylib.net accessed on 10th September 2017

i. Voluntary participation and harmlessness

Participants involved people that hold sensitive offices in government, media and security agencies. For this reason no one was coerced or influenced unfairly to participate in the study. They were all informed that their role was volunteer and they had the choice to pull out at any time from the exercise without any negative consequences. In addition they were made aware that would not be hurt in any way by participating or not participating in the study. To ensure that they participated voluntarily, all of them received and signed a copy of informed consent indicating their right to participate or not in the research before their responses were recorded.

ii. Anonymity and confidentiality

As stated above, this study involved government officials and security officers whose identities must be protected for several reasons. The objective is to ensure that any person reading the final product should not be able to link a given response with any specific respondent. This was achieved by giving codes to all respondents in the study for instance CTMK FGD 1 stood for respondent number one in focused group discussion while CTMK 014 stood for respondent number fourteen in the questionnaire. The above measures is sufficient enough to guarantee confidentiality in a way that only the researcher can identify a person's responses, but he/she is under obligation not to reveal that respondent's identity in any report, paper, or public forum.⁷⁰

iii. Analysis and reporting

Any scientific study have certain responsibilities to the academic community in terms of how data is analyzed and reported in a research.⁷¹ The researcher must disclose fully any unexpected or findings in the study even if they question the way study design was conducted. It would be

⁷⁰ www.studylib.net accessed on 11th September 2017.

⁷¹ *ibid*

considered unethical for a researcher to present such findings as if they emanate from his research design. Similarly, it is not ethical to cook data into other sections with a purpose of proving or disproving research hypothesis of interest, or to create several papers all claiming different data sets. In this study, no unexpected findings were observed, the data used in the study speak for themselves as shown in chapter four.

1.8.7 Scope and Limitations

The study focused the period after the August 1998 bombing of US embassy in Kenya. Main media outlets were considered include electronic media, print media, as well as the Internet, since these have had significant influence in the population. Although the geographical focus is on Kenya, ideas presented cuts across Africa whatever is relevant to Kenya often applies to other countries in Africa as well.

One key limitation in this study is the availability of information from the government officials especially their attitude in working with media in counterterrorism strategies without invoking the national security classifications of such information. However, ten senior officers from each security agency were considered as adequate sample for the study.

1.9 Chapter Outline

Chapter One: Introduction

Chapter one presents all essential elements of research proposal such as research problem and questions, justification to the study, literature review, and methodology.

Chapter Two: Media and terrorism

Chapter two discusses the relationship between media and terrorism focusing on how media covers terrorism activities and what informs media coverage of terrorist events. The chapter endeavors then to widen the scope of discussion in order to bring out a wider understanding of the problem and issues involved between the media and terrorism.

Chapter Three: media and counterterrorism

This chapter discusses role of media in counterterrorism with global and local examples. It explores various counterterrorism strategies and how media could be used to strengthen these efforts. The chapter also discusses the role of women in counterterrorism and the issue of recidivism after incarceration of convicted terrorists.

Chapter Four: Collaboration between government and media in counterterrorism efforts

This chapter presents the results of data analysis aimed at determining whether collaboration between government and media may result in sound counterterrorism strategies. It also discusses challenges that may hinder this collaborative to work effectively. It does so by presenting the results of a survey conducted in Kenya on media, terrorism and the government.

Chapter Five: Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations

CHAPTER TWO

MEDIA AND TERRORISM

2.0 Introduction

Chapter one discussed issues pertaining to the main literature in this study, the methodology and raised pertinent issues concerning the procedure and the instruments used in conducting this study. This chapter focuses on the discourse that informs the relationship between media and terrorists. It examines the collaboration between media and terrorism by analyzing how terrorists use media to achieve their objectives and also how media also benefit from terrorism. The chapter examines media environment in order to establish what informs the content of media broadcast. The chapter endeavors to widen the scope of discussion in order to bring out a wider understanding of the problem and issues involved. The whole discussion revolves around answering the question of how media shapes public opinion by using evidence from empirical studies.

2.1 The significance of public opinion

In this study public opinion is used to mean people's view on political decisions and actions by government concerning terrorism matters. It is this public opinion that both government and terrorist organization crave for in their counterterrorism strategy. Public opinion is critical to both parties since political decisions are normally driven by public perception of issues. Public opinion also assists in explaining the behavior of officials who crave for public opinion in order to understand what people want them to do. For instance, when terrorists execute an attack, they communicate their grievances to the public and expect the public to pressurize the government to behave in a certain way. Similarly, when government initiate counterterrorism strategies they are driven by public concerns on security matters. For this reason, public opinion has impact in decisions made by government and it is difficult to find a major policy in democratic states that

did not have majority support at the time it was made. For instance, the anti-terrorism law in Kenya took a long time to be enacted due to lack of public approval.

2.2 Relationship between Media and Terrorism

Terrorists and media have a strange relationship. Terror attacks are carefully planned and executed to draw the attention of the media as observed by Brian Jenkins.⁷² For instance, terrorists that attacked Westgate mall in Nairobi rented shops within the premises and even conducted business for long before they executed their mission. The reason can be explained in terms of waiting for a ripe moment to execute the attack in a way that creates maximum impact and media attention. On the other hand, the media responds to these ploys with unrestrained eagerness.⁷³ The media was the first to break the news of terror attack in Westgate when government officials like Inspector General of Police and Cabinet Secretary for Internal Security were still grappling with robbery theory. In this sense, the media was in a hurry to break the news and terrorists waited for the government response. In this way, the media get breaking news from terrorists and terrorists get their message passed on through the media. This is what is normally referred to as symbiotic relationship between media and terrorists.

Terrorists do not just execute attacks, instead attacks are crafted to draw communicate their cause such as advancing a religious agenda, promoting a political goal or in the case of Kenya, demanding the removal of Kenyan forces from Somalia.⁷⁴ For instance, Garissa University terrorist attack and many other small scale attacks in Kenya were aimed at pushing the Kenya

⁷² Brian Jenkins quoted in Hoffman 2006 ,p. 174

⁷³ Hoffman, B., "Inside Terrorism", New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.

⁷⁴ www.globalcenter.org Accessed on 3rd September 2017

government to withdraw its forces from Somalia. Fawaz Gerges describes how the use of media is so important for terrorist organizations to the extent that they can reach any length to ensure adequate coverage.⁷⁵ After the Garissa university attack, the media's role of agenda setting was evident when some members of the public and leading opposition parties were demanding the withdrawal of Kenyan forces from Somalia. In this case, the Garissa attack was successful since it accorded Al Shabab support and sympathy from the public. This explains why Margaret Thatcher described media as the oxygen that gives terrorists life and suggested that one way of ending terrorism is by media desisting from broadcasting terror events.⁷⁶

Bruce Hoffman also noted that terrorist attacks without media coverage is considered a waste of time and resources since the impact will be known to immediate victims of the attack, instead of the intended wider target audience.⁷⁷ Terrorists using media for publicity was also affirmed by Brigitte Nacos who pointed out that publicity has been a key goal of terrorists throughout history as a means of communicating their cause changing from time to time.⁷⁸ Consequently, winning media attention, and by extension local and global publics, and government policy remains a key objectives of terrorists.⁷⁹ Accordingly, terrorists judiciously chose places where an attack is most likely to win greatest media coverage.⁸⁰ By selecting Norfolk Hotel, US Embassy and Westgate Mall, terrorists were sure of attracting international and local media attention. Terrorists need media for publicity and to communicate their cause to both government and the public with a focus on influencing people's perception as witnessed in the Kenyan case.

⁷⁵ Gerges, F.A., "The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global", New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

⁷⁶ Muller, E.R. et al. Trends in Terrorism Alphenaan de Rijn: Kluwer, 2003.

⁷⁷ Ibid p.174

⁷⁸ Nacos, B.L.. "Terrorism and Media in the Age of Global Communication," 2006, p. 81-102. Accessed from www.aerospaceindia.org on 23rd June 2017

⁷⁹ ibid

⁸⁰ ibid

Terrorists provide media with breaking news items as they advance their cause. In Kenya, reports on terror attacks are broadcasted at least once a week not realizing that continuous reporting of terror events induces fear in societies.⁸¹ By executing attacks, terrorist's main goal is not to hurt as many people as possible, but to influence public opinion regarding the legitimacy of their causes.⁸² When media eagerly wait and compete for being the first one to air breaking news, the media promotes both terrorists acts of violence and their political messages. However, terrorists are not interested in the number of victims in the attacks as noted by Boaz Ganor, instead they let people work for them.⁸³ In fact, it is possible for terrorist to achieve their goals without executing any attack. Panic and fear can be inflicted on people through the media's persistent broadcasting of potential threats through media interviews and analysis, live images of victims and all familiar methods of psychological warfare.⁸⁴ Terrorists' objective is therefore not to kill but to instil fear, panic and psychological warfare with government. The media is a critical instrument for executing this task on behalf of terrorists.

When media bring experts and opinion leaders to discuss and analyze terrorist event, they broadcast it all over the world in order to draw the attention of both local and global outreach.⁸⁵ In this sense, media becomes quite strategic in transmitting terrorist messages not only locally but globally. Agenda setting theory of media posits that when media pays more attention to a given phenomenon, it becomes more prominent in people's minds. In this way the media influences

⁸¹ www.socialcosmos.library.uu.nl Accessed on 23rd may 2017

⁸² *ibid*

⁸³ Ganor, B., "Terror as a Strategy of Psychological Warfare", July 15, 2002

⁸⁴ *ibid*

⁸⁵ Schmid, A.P., & De Graaf, J. "Violence as communication: Insurgent terrorism and the Western news media." London: Sage, 1982

public agenda hence their perception on matters of terrorism. It is argued later on that government may also use media to advance their counterterrorism strategies in the same way.

Terrorists use media for many other reasons as pointed out by Yonah Alexander who identified attention, recognition and legitimacy as some of the areas for terrorists' interaction with media.⁸⁶ Robin Gerrits added to the list by arguing that psychological interaction exist between terrorists and the media in form of demoralizing enemies such as governments, demonstrating strength, gaining empathy and creating fear and chaos.⁸⁷ For instance, when leaders and citizen all stand helpless before terror attacks, they demonstrate that terrorists are a force to reckon with. In Kenya, leaders even volunteered to negotiate with al shabab during the Westgate attack but the terror group turned them down. Terrorists would like to draw the attention of the public that they are tough and by using media they want the rest of the world to advertise their political causes, inform both friends and foes about the motives for terrorist deeds, and explain their rationale for resorting to violence.⁸⁸

Media assist terrorist leaders to gain status similar to other world leaders who are accepted as legitimate leaders.⁸⁹ In other words, they use media as an instrument for lessening the power symmetry between terrorists and their political leaders they fight in real ideological warfare. The media construct an environment of fear, anxiety when they reach a wider audiences, and at times force leaders to negotiate with terrorists.⁹⁰ Terrorists are therefore rational actors who execute attacks with full recognition of the power of the media coverage on almost every part of a society

⁸⁶ Alexander, Y., Carlton, D., and Wilkinson, P., "Terrorism: Theory and Practice, Boulder": Westview Press, 1979. Available at www.grin.com

⁸⁷ Gerrits, R.P.J.M., "Terrorists' Perspectives: Memoirs," in: Paletz, D.L., and Schmid, A., *Terrorism and the Media*, London: Sage, 1992. p. 29-61.

⁸⁸ Nacos, Brigitte L. "Terrorism/Counterterrorism and Media in the Age of Global Communication". United Nations University Global Seminar Second Shimame-Yamaguchi Session, *Terrorism—A Global Challenge*, 2006.

⁸⁹ www.e-ir.info Accessed on 2nd June 2017

⁹⁰ *ibid*

and government.⁹¹ To illustrate this point, public rating of the PLO Arafat changed significantly after the 1972 Munich Olympics attack. The PLO became a force to be reckoned and powerful nations accepted to negotiate with them. At the same time, Yasser Arafat exalted himself to the status of world leader. Media personnel understand these arguments and sometimes they concur with them. During Westgate attacks in Kenya, the government made several attempts to negotiate with terrorists, a move they could not have taken under normal circumstances. Ayman al-Zawahiri is on record when he emphasized that that al-Qaeda was at war and more than half of the fight was taking place in the media to win the hearts and minds of the *ummah*.⁹²

Media attention is strongly related to agenda setting theory in the sense that as terrorists appear on media for a long time and they become well known to the public. During this time, they attempt to influence audience through the media by spreading their cause.⁹³ Media therefore becomes a proxy through which terrorists promote propaganda. For instance, the attacks on the transit system in London on 7th July 2005 explains how terrorists try to gain attention given the fact that G-8 summit was very close there in Scotland. The terrorists took over the news and pushed the G-8 leaders off the front pages.⁹⁴

Liebes and Kampf noted that people tend to get used to a certain extent of violence for instance, low-profile attacks may become less of an issue.⁹⁵ In Kenya for instance, a number of small scale attacks occur but they do not receive media attention compared to deadly attacks that occurred in the US embassy in 1998, Westgate attack in September 2013 or the Garissa university

⁹¹ *ibid*

⁹² Seib, Philip and Dana M. Janbek. "Global Terrorism and New Media" Routledge.2011.

⁹³ Clutterbuck, R. The media and political violence. London: Macmillan. 1981

⁹⁴ Segell Glen "Terrorism: London Public Transport- Strategic Insights, Volume IV, Issue 8, 2005

⁹⁵ Liebes, T., and Kampf, Z., "Routinizing Terror: Media Coverage and Public Practices in Israel, 2000–2005," The International Journal of Press/Politics, Volume 12, No. 1, 2007, p. 108-116.

attack in 2015. As a result, terrorist come up with more devastating events or more striking ways to exploit these events in order to keep audience attention through media at the desired level. For instance, the killing of more than one hundred soldiers in El-Adde, Somalia was received with grief and shock to many Kenyans and the entire world. In the above cases, the media continuously repeated the events thereby influencing people's minds by replaying the videos over and over again and sometimes inviting analysis to discuss the failures and weaknesses in security apparatus. Through the media's role of agenda setting, terrorists want to be known to the audience and to pass their message across through the media. This has been achieved by carrying out attacks forcing the audience to ask itself why people do such things as suicide bombers.⁹⁶ To get to know the cause for which terrorist do this would be a logical next step for them. The effects of this media strategy can be increased by trying to make the media present the issues in a certain way. In some cases, the media can even give a positive argument to the cause, or attempt to compare the means terrorists use to means that are used by others who are considered more legitimate than terrorists, thus lending some recognition to the terrorists.⁹⁷

Media is important to terrorists because they not only relay information but also interpret it as well. By media deciding which terrorist attacks to report and which ones to blackout or by intentionally or unintentionally expressing approval or disapproval creates a climate of public support, apathy, or anger.⁹⁸ For instance, the media in Kenya deliberately disapproved the sluggish manner in which the government responded to the Garissa university attack by highlighting how the aircraft that could have transported rescuers instead travelled to Mombasa on a private mission.

⁹⁶ ibid

⁹⁷ www.transnationalterroism.eu Accessed on 10th July 2017.

⁹⁸ ibid

This created a lot of anger and resentment from members of the public who felt that government officials were not concerned about lives of citizen.

Gaining Respect and Sympathy is another goal terrorist strive to achieve by using the media. When a government is at war with terrorism and then it decides to exercise repression and profiling of sections of citizen, there are ways in which terrorists benefit from such actions.⁹⁹ Repression motivates others to sympathize and support the cause of terrorism. Repressive action on the part of security agencies also tend to display governments' darkest side, thus leading to low approval rate on the part of the general public.¹⁰⁰ The media is used to portray the supposedly repressive nature of security agencies within any particular context.¹⁰¹ Mohammed Adow of aljazeera notes that the ease with which al-Shabab has managed to get foothold in Kenya has baffled many, but not the keen observer. According to him, Kenya's Muslim community which accounts for 11 percent of the population has long claimed political and economic discrimination by successive governments.¹⁰² In addition, Human Rights Watch report on Kenya mentioned killings and disappearances of young Muslims by anti-terror police. Kenyan Muslims were subjected to abuses by anti-terror police unit including extortion, harassmet and arbitrary detention.¹⁰³

These potential supporters are the people in whose name the terrorists claim to act and they must be impressed by showing, they want to show potential supporters that they can deliver. In Kenya, Al Shabab gained respect from the radicalized youths who were willingly recruited into the terrorist organization and received military training in Somalia.¹⁰⁴ In this way, people with some

⁹⁹ www.socialcosmos.library.uu.nl Accessed on 12 September 2016

¹⁰⁰ *ibid*

¹⁰¹ Paletz, D.L. & Schmid, A.P., *Terrorism and the Media*. London: Sage.1992

¹⁰² Adow Mohammed "Why al-Shabab has gained foothold in Kenya" *Al Jazeera America*, April 5 2015 Issue.

¹⁰³ Human Rights Watch "Deaths and Disappearances: Abuses in Counterterrorism Operations in Kenya" 2015.

¹⁰⁴ Chanji Tobias "1500 Kenyan youths recruited by Al Shabab have surrendered" *Standard Digital*, 23rd February, 2016.

interest in terrorist activities or ideas view government as a weaker side compared to terrorists and these people may become more respectful or sympathetic toward the terrorist cause or organization.¹⁰⁵ If the terrorist succeeds in having the media present their cause as expected, it may succeed in getting even more respect and sympathy than if it fails to do so. For instance, after 9/11 and other attacks, Bin Laden became more popular among groups in the Muslim world.¹⁰⁶ Hezbollah, for instance, has gained fame by demonstrating how it is capable of dealing with Israel something many Arab nations have not been able to do. The organization has an extensive media strategy.¹⁰⁷

Gaining legitimacy is another major goal through which terrorists strive to achieve through media. When media accord terrorist regular appearance on TV, terrorists try to become a legitimate representative of their own cause.¹⁰⁸ When media treat terrorists during media shows the same way they handle legitimate world leaders, media can be accused of according terrorists the status of world leaders. The media achieves this objective through feedback platforms where terrorists promote their views and viewers ask questions. Media also provide adequate airtime to terrorists for interviews and recorded videos or messages. Agenda setting is very important in this. If terrorists succeed in having the media present their leader much like any other world leader, the audience may get the impression that the two are comparable. If, on the other hand, media make a clear distinction between actual world leaders and terrorist leaders, the audience will act in the same way consciously or not. For instance, Al-Qaida's Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri

¹⁰⁵ Ibid p.176

¹⁰⁶ Haqqani, H., "Why Muslims always blame the West; worshipping the warriors," International Herald Tribune, October 16, 2004

¹⁰⁷ Zakaria, F., "Why Do They Hate Us?" Newsweek, October 15, 2001

¹⁰⁸ www.transnationalterrorism.eu Accessed on 3rd May 2017

extensively use this strategy, by regularly sending in videos to the media portraying themselves as leaders of the (Muslim) world.¹⁰⁹

Terrorists' communications strategy depends on technological advancements and changing audience behavior. Since 1975 when terrorists attacked Kenya for the first time, media as a vehicle of communications has greatly changed mostly because of the global reach of the Internet and cellular phones.¹¹⁰ Media provide tools that enable terrorists to publicize their messages globally and to reach a wider audience.¹¹¹ Moutot, observed that terrorists do not need newspapers anymore to deliver their message.¹¹² According to him the mainstream media has been replaced by internet which is much easier to use, much quicker and much more effective.¹¹³ It can be argued that the Internet has enhanced the scope of terrorist operations and a perfect tool for terrorists in terms of promoting their operational goals. Terrorists usually clinch the latest information, track the latest technological developments to be state-of-the-art. They use state of art communication technologies but this does not indicate a shift from old technologies in terms of tactics and trends. For example, terrorist organizations even today rely on *hawala*, the informal network of money exchanges that dates back to 8th century.¹¹⁴

The picture above suggests that terrorists need the media to receive free publicity for their cause, transmit their messages, and garner support, recognition, and legitimacy. Given the emerging trends in the media and communications technology, it is likely that terrorists will

¹⁰⁹ Rick van Amersfoort, in an interview conducted within the TTSRL framework, Amsterdam, April 21, 2008

¹¹⁰ Nacos, Brigitte L. "Mass-Mediated Terrorism." Rowman and Littlefield, 2002a

¹¹¹ Baran, Jessica. "Terrorism and the Mass Media: A Change of Course?" *The Peace and Conflict Review* 3, 2008. Available at www.transnationalterrorism.eu Accessed on 3rd May 2017

¹¹² www.transnationalterrorism.eu Accessed on 3rd February 2017

¹¹³ *ibid.*

¹¹⁴ Feldman, Robert. "Fund Transfers – African Terrorists Blend Old and New: Hawala and Satellite Telecommunications, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 2006. Available at www.e-ir.info

employ more innovative tactics to achieve their goals.¹¹⁵ Terrorism is a class of political violence, which is projected to influence foreign and domestic governments, as well as communities.¹¹⁶ Terrorism capitalize on its immediate victims and targets for semiotic and symbolic purposes.¹¹⁷ Attacks are calculated to create an atmosphere of insecurity.

Terrorist in whichever form, need for media promote their agenda and media's thirst for large number of viewers and profits form a symbiotic relationship between terrorism and the media. The government can however break that cycle by forcing one side of the equation for instance by forcing the media to act in a more responsible, more conscious, and more cooperative manner. By breaking the symbiotic relationship between media and terrorists, the government denies terrorists the oxygen of publicity on which they depend.

2.3 The Media Using Terrorists

Terror attacks are attractive for media coverage because viewers rate highly media outlets that break the news for the first time and reports in details the events of the attack. In addition, terrorism has elements that make them attractive news for the media. For instance, terrorism involves drama, danger, blood, human tragedy, miracle stories, heroes, shocking footage, and action.¹¹⁸ Terrorism become attractive for media because violence is a defining factor in in contemporary television culture and is key to the semiotic and financial drive of current media

¹¹⁵ www.e-ir.info Accessed on 9th December 2016

¹¹⁶ www.e-ir.info Accessed on 12th December 2016

¹¹⁷ Lewis, Jeff. "Language Wars: The Role of Media and Culture in Global Terror and Political Violence". London: Pluto Press, 2005.

¹¹⁸ European Commission, "Transnational Terrorism, Security, and the Rule of Law, 2008.

organizations.¹¹⁹ The emergence of huge media stations have resulted in greater competition between media outlets forcing them to crave for shocking and sensational news aimed at keeping the audiences captivated.¹²⁰ The need for high profit margins also force media into irresponsible reporting in the context of terrorism as witnessed by high number of leading media executives coming from the corporate world and not from the ranks of journalists.¹²¹

The problem about the media is not why the media covers terrorism but instead how the media covers terrorism. Media covers terrorist events using sensation-seeking especially on who is to blame, repeating the same images over and over again, and thereby creating new syndromes.¹²² In addition, the media traumatizes viewers by exaggerating the security threats posed by terrorism for instance, in the case in the US after 9/11 media broadcasted nonstop footage of combat scenes.¹²³ According to Altheide, the politics of fear is a dominant motive for news and popular culture today. He argues that within this framework, news reporting about terrorism is linked with victimization images and stories that make crime, danger, and fear very real in society.¹²⁴

A better understanding of how media presents terrorists and covers related stories and news can be gained by taking closer look at the mediums the media employs. The media uses agenda setting and framing to emphasize certain issues and presenting them as more conspicuous than

¹¹⁹ Lewis, Jeff. *Language Wars: "The Role of Media and Culture in Global Terror and Political Violence"*, Pluto Press, 2005.

¹²⁰ Nacos, Brigitte L. "Terrorism/Counterterrorism and Media in the Age of Global Communication: United Nations University Global Seminar Second Shimame-Yamaguchi Session, Terrorism—A Global Challenge, 2006.

¹²¹ Biernatzki, William E. "Terrorism and Mass Media. : Communication Research Trends", 2002.

¹²² Vasterman, Peter, C. Joris Yzermans, and Anja J. E. Dirkzwager. "The Role of the Media and Media Hypes in the Aftermath of Disasters." *Epidemiologic Reviews* 27, 2005.

¹²³ Long, David E. "Coming to Grips with Terrorism after 11 September: *Brown Journal of International Affairs* 8, 2002.

¹²⁴ Altheide, David L., "Terror Post 9/11 and the Media". New York: Peter Lang, 2009.

others. Agenda setting is the theory that the more attention a media outlet pays to a certain phenomenon, the more importance the public attributes to such an issue.¹²⁵ Framing is another tool used by media to select some aspects of news that resonate with the public.¹²⁶ The media carefully select words and images that distinguish the frame from the rest of the news by their capacity to stimulate support of or opposition to the sides in a political conflict.¹²⁷ Nacos illustrates media behavior arguing that after 9/11, Muslims and Arabs were framed as suppliers of oil or as potential terrorists.¹²⁸ This framing has left very scanty details of the human density, the Arab-Muslim life has been magnified even to those whose profession it is to report the Islamic world.¹²⁹ Similarly, the media covered the 9/11 attacks in such a way that emphasis was placed on the death of thousands of civilians through terrorism and ignoring the reasons for which terrorists acted in that manner.¹³⁰ Both examples indicate that public perception may be altered by media's presentations based on its bias toward certain groups, and framing of certain ethnic and/or religious groups as terrorists, and of events as acts of terrorism.

The drama created by terrorists is beneficial to the media through broadcasting of sensational news. By employing the agenda setting or priming or framing techniques the media may directly or indirectly serve the interests of terrorists by watering down stories for the viewer to the extent that it has no impact. Repeating the sensational scenes of traumatized people may also be the goal of the terrorists of being in the media as frequent and long as possible. In this way

¹²⁵ European Commission, "Terrorism and Media: Transnational Terrorism, Security, and the Rule of Law", 2008

¹²⁶ Papacharissi, Zizi and Maria de Fatima Oliveira. "News Frames Terrorism: A Comparative Analysis of Frames Employed in Terrorism Coverage in U.S. and U.K. Newspapers: The International Journal of Press/Politics", 2008.

¹²⁷ Entman, Robert M., "Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House's Frame After 9/11." Political Communication, 2003.

¹²⁸ www.transnationalterrorism.eu Accessed on 2nd July 2017

¹²⁹ Nacos, Brigitte L. and Oscar Torres-Reyna., "Muslim Americans in the News before and after 9-11, Harvard University, 2002.

¹³⁰ *ibid*

terrorists use media as a tool for creating an atmosphere of fear thereby creating conditions for propaganda and recruitment following any terrorist attack. Given these, it can be argued that the goals and objectives of terrorists are highly related to agenda setting and framing, and that the way media covers news and stories has a crucial impact on the way terrorists communicate, carry out attacks, and gain a foothold on a daily basis.

Terrorists understand well the interplay between them and media since the more coverage they receive the more attacks they execute. A study by Brigitte Nacos concluded that just like terrorists, the media require public opinion in order to exist because media ratings by public are directly related to advertisement income.¹³¹ As people follow news from a particular channel, more money is generated in terms of revenue. According to Shapiro media preference for news endorsing or strengthening terrorism threat without questioning is apparent in many cases.¹³² Muller notes that sessional news dominate the media and terrorism fits this description very well. According to him, a story may have more characteristics instead of sensation only.¹³³ For instance, the media in Kenya demonstrated this fact by showing live pictures of rescue operations at the Westgate Mall with bleeding victims mainly women and children being carried out of the building. By showing live images of more than one hundred students killed in Garissa University, the media was condemned by security agencies who felt it was traumatizing victim's families who had not been informed about the deaths.

Secondly, Jenkins confirms the media is notorious in skewed reporting on matters of terrorism, for instance it focuses on sensational aspect of terror like blood, gore and the horror of

¹³¹ Nacos, B.L., "Terrorism and Media in the Age of Global Communication," In: Hamilton, D.S., (Ed.), *Terrorism and International Relations*, Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2006. p. 81-102.

¹³² Shapiro, S., "Conflict Media Strategies and the Politics of Counter-terrorism," *Politics*, Volume 22, No. 2, 2002. Available at www.transnationalterrorism.eu Accessed on 2 October 2017

¹³³ Muller, E.R., Spaaij, R.F.J., and Ruitenberg, A.G.W., *Trends in Terrorisme*, Alphen aan de Rijn: Kluwer. 2003.

the victims.”¹³⁴ When media focuses on actions as it does in war reporting the media is likely to present an unbiased depiction of the intensity of the conflict.¹³⁵ Journalists become promoters of terror activities by holding the view that violence is news as opposed to peace and harmony.¹³⁶ The media uses the human tragedy in terror attacks as well as miracle stories and heroism in order to create news.¹³⁷ The Westgate massacre in Kenya for instance, proved how horrific terror activities can linger in people’s mind for a long time. It even forced the Kenya government to formally suspend CNN over terrorism slur.¹³⁸ The media therefore admires many people watching for a long time.

The media craves for large audience market and higher revenue through advertisement. Wilkinson reiterates that it a blunder to think that the media obsession with terrorism is a mistake.¹³⁹ To achieve this goal, speed is paramount. Wilkinson and Ockrent mention competition and speed as necessary ingredients in shaping the attitude of the media. To them, competition is also a major issue and in the past decade many news organizations have sprung up and competition has become more intense.¹⁴⁰ In Kenya there were more than 100 radio stations and over fifty TV stations by 2015. This has compelled media houses to shift emphasis on breaking news especially on terrorism so that they can stay ahead of the rest and thereby making it hard for the audience to shift to other news stations consistently. Banner headlines on terror makes terror events get a head start in its goal. Media in Kenya operate. Media in Kenya operate under liberal economy and media ownership is monopolized by political families who intensely compete for relevance and

¹³⁴ *ibid*

¹³⁵ *ibid*

¹³⁶ Walter Laqueur. “The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction,” Oxford University Press, 1999, p.44.

¹³⁷ www.transnationalterrorism.eu Accessed on 1 September 2017

¹³⁸ Murumba Stella, Kenya suspends CNN deal over terrorism slur, *Business Daily* 7th August 2015.

¹³⁹ Wilkinson, P. (2006), *Terrorism versus Democracy, The Liberal State Response*, (Second Edition), New York: Routledge.

¹⁴⁰ Nacos, B.L. , “Accomplice or Witness? The Media’s Role in Terrorism,” *Current History*, Volume 99, No. 636, April 2000, p. 174-178.

profit. Political economy of media can easily set political agenda in the country including terrorist views if it is the highest bidder.

Video footage of terror attacks are a darling of many news channels as they crave to be the first amongst firsts to present the story. The fastest coverage of such news is what most journalists strive for. Shlomo Shpiro states that speed is critical to global news coverage.¹⁴¹ To him, in a competitive media environment, media outlets which cannot provide up to date news for whatever reason, be it technical, political or financial reasons, cannot be market leaders may lose intensely.¹⁴² The result is that news is presented directly to the audience without scrutiny. In the event of scrutiny, time is too short to allow for an in-house position on whether a news item is suitable for public consumption. Public broadcast of horror pictures instill fear on the audience. Due to fear competition from other players, it is common to find other normal programs being replaced by horror stories and bloody images.¹⁴³ Whereas this is meant to keep or inform the audience, it does not add value to news stories.

Barnes notes that media have some personal reasons at times, for instance, some journalists may gain fame covering terror events extensively.¹⁴⁴ In Kenya for example, Hussein Mohammed of KTN became famous for investigative journalism on terrorism and corruption matters but this may not be applicable to all media houses. The empirical evidence discussed above is a testament that speed and competition in the media are crucial stimulating factors for drama and human interest stories.

¹⁴¹Shpiro, S., "Conflict Media Strategies and the Politics of Counter-terrorism," *Politics*, Volume 22, 2002.

¹⁴² *ibid*

¹⁴³ Liebes, T., and Kampf, Z., "Routinizing Terror: Media Coverage and Public Practices in Israel, 2000–2005," *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, Volume 12, No. 1, 2007, p. 109.

¹⁴⁴Barnes, F. , "Shiite Spin Control," *The New Republic*, Volume 193, Issue 3/4, July 15,1985, p.

2.4 Media Environment

The relationship between the media and terrorists is symbiotic. Terrorists gain when their activities and actions are relayed to the public because this instils fear which is an important goal for them. The media attracts a larger audience which is a source of revenue and popularity. In this relationship, giving terrorism publicity is dangerous and public deception is also possible due to poor verification of news and lack of context. This makes terrorism activities more impactful and attracts more potential recruits to join. Prejudices and stereotypes can also affect the way agenda is set and news portrayal of news activities.

Media houses deny that they set terrorist agenda but most professionals in the industry argue that terrorism is a public policy issue that should get the attention and coverage that it deserves.¹⁴⁵ Systematic empirical evidence on whether media sets terrorist agenda is mixed. Nelson and Scott concluded that media coverage of terrorism does not necessarily enhance terrorism but it is terror activities that attract the media.¹⁴⁶ However, on their part, Rohner and Frey contradicted this finding by arguing that terrorism attract the media and encourage more terrorist attacks in future.¹⁴⁷ They supported their argument using the effects of globalization and explained that Nelson and Scott published their findings fifteen years earlier.¹⁴⁸

According to Scott, the symbiosis perspective would mean that media organizations give terrorists activities maximum attention which is not the case.¹⁴⁹ To him, just a handful of terrorist

¹⁴⁵ Bennett, W. L., & Paletz, D. L.: Taken by storm: The media, public opinion, and U.S. foreign policy in the Gulf War." Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

¹⁴⁶ Nelson, P. S., & Scott, J. L. "Terrorism and the media: An empirical analysis: Defence Economics", 3(4), 1992, p 329.

¹⁴⁷ Rohner, D., & Frey, B. S. Blood and ink! The common-interest-game between terrorists and the media. *Public Choice*, 133, 2007, p.129–145.

¹⁴⁸ *ibid*

¹⁴⁹ Scott, J. L. "Media congestion limits media terrorism: Defence and Peace Economics", 12(2), 2001, p. 215–227.

attacks attract a significant media attention. Media is very sensitive to public preferences which is not in favor of news about terror activities. This being the case, media houses are interested in increasing their audience share hence very sensitive to their mood.¹⁵⁰ Scott argues that other attacks that are not terror oriented make the media to shift attention away from terrorism.¹⁵¹ This proves that the audience do not enjoy fully news about terrorism but they have to do so because public agenda is set by the media.¹⁵²

It is a claim that competition for audience influences what the media focuses its attention on. However, Hoffman et al disagrees with this argument claiming that competition in the media environment is dangerous to market share enjoyed by mainstream media houses forcing them to remain relevant by focusing on terrorism.¹⁵³ According to them, the competition among media organizations leads the media to focus attention on violent attacks at the expense of other news items.¹⁵⁴ Hoffman et al also noted that news on terrorism are granted bigger space and time on print media.¹⁵⁵ In conclusion, media continue to cover terrorist attacks comprehensively at the expense of other news items due to pressure and competition in the media industry. By doing so, media promote terrorist agenda, instil fear among the audience, and encourage increased future attacks. Through its agenda setting role, media captivates their audience by striving to be the first to release breaking news which in turn lead to higher ratings in the public opinion arena.

¹⁵⁰ibid

¹⁵¹ ibid

¹⁵² Ibid. p.126

¹⁵³ Hoffman, A. M.; Jengolley, D. H. A.; Duncan, N., Buehler, M., & Rees, M. L." How does the business of news influence terrorism coverage? Evidence from The Washington Post and USA Today: Terrorism and Political Violence 22(4)" 2010, p. 559–580.

¹⁵⁴ ibid

¹⁵⁵ ibid

2.5 Effects of Media Attention

This section presents empirical evidence on media attention on public perception and counterterrorism strategies. Generally, it is believed that terrorism activities are covered by media in a way that spreads fear and increased attacks. In Israel, Keinan, Sadeh and Rosen concluded that continuous broadcasting of live horrific images of victims' attacks was related to the development of psychological conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder.¹⁵⁶ In Kenya media attention on terrorist scenes lead to introduction of a tougher approach in fighting terrorism as well as new security legislation and administrative procedures which, among other areas, seek to put more control on how the media cover issues related to terrorism and violent extremism in Kenya.¹⁵⁷ The laws partly targeted media because it was viewed as a platform through which terrorist groups advance their course.

In the USA, research by Schuster *et al* revealed high stress levels among respondents throughout the country after 2011 terror attack.¹⁵⁸ They attributed their findings to media coverage broadcasting sensational images countrywide.¹⁵⁹ Again in USA, Huddy et al found that fear created by terrorism compel citizen to support use of force and intelligence as well as visa restrictions.¹⁶⁰ Huddy et al concludes that the emotional content of media reports has a significant influence on policy makers.¹⁶¹ Subjects exposed to media reports with emotional content were more likely to support the use of military force, support spending on foreign policy, and approve

¹⁵⁶ Keinan, G., Sadeh, A., & Rosen, S. "Attitudes and reactions to media coverage of terrorist acts: *Journal of Community Psychology*, 31, 2003, 149–165.

¹⁵⁷ McLuhan Marshall "Without communication, terrorism would not exist." *A Handbook on Reporting Terrorism*, Media Council of Kenya, 2016.

¹⁵⁹ Schuster, M., Stein, B. D., Jaycox L. H., Collins, R. L., Marshall, G. N., Elliott, M. N., et al. "A national survey of stress reactions after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks: *New England Journal of Medicine*, 345," 2001, 1507–1512.

¹⁶⁰ Huddy, L., Feldman, S., Taber, C., & Lahav, G. Threat, anxiety, and support of antiterrorist policies. *American Journal of Political Science*, 49(3), 2005, p.593–608.

¹⁶¹ *ibid*

of specific counterterrorist and foreign policies. On his part, Cho *et al.* found that sensational media coverage of terror events has impacts on respondent's reaction to government counterterrorism strategy, they become more likely to support stiffer penalties on terrorists.¹⁶² Stone also confirmed that respondent's experienced fear as compared to those not exposed to sensational coverage.¹⁶³

Fear and anxiety resulting from terrorism may have impact on government policy on counterterrorism. In Kenya for instance, people living in areas affected by terrorism support government in use of force as counterterrorism strategy. On the other hand, the Muslim community who are accused of terror attacks castigate government for use of excessive force when dealing with terrorists. Human rights watch report on Kenya indicate that deaths and enforced disappearances occur among the Muslim youths in Wajir, Lamu, Mombasa and other parts of the country perceived to be associated with radicalization.¹⁶⁴

The decision to sympathize with or to support terrorist acts depend on a number of conditions. Paul identified degradation, hate, suppression, exclusion, foreign occupation, as some of the grievances that motivate those who support terror activities.¹⁶⁵ Homegrown terrorists in Kenya have continuously blamed government policies on counterterrorism using these factors to defend their goal. In addition, the coastal Muslim community have for long expressed grievances on political and economic exclusion, historical injustices and discrimination. On the other part those who support terrorist activities are motivated by media presentation of terrorist groups as

¹⁶² www.politicalscience.uncc.edu Accessed on 12th September 2016

¹⁶³ Stone, M. "Responses to media coverage of terrorism: *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 44(4)," 2000, p. 508–522.

¹⁶⁴ Otsieno Namwaya, *Police Brutality threatens Rights in Kenya*, Human Rights Watch Report on Kenya, 2016.

¹⁶⁵ Paul, C. "How do terrorists generate and maintain support?" In P. K. Davis, & K. Cragin (Eds.), *Social science for counterterrorism: Putting the pieces together*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009, p.113-149 . www.politicalscience.uncc.edu Accessed on 12th September 2016

strong, good, and kind people just defending their cause.¹⁶⁶ Lemieux and Asal observed that the level at which those people are exposed to grievances will determine whether they adopt violence as a means of conflict resolution.¹⁶⁷ Exposure to sensational terror images affects people in many ways. It creates fear and anxiety, it motivates affected people to either support or condemn terrorism acts and it also has far reaching psychological effects of the audience.

2.6 The Social Media

Technological advancements specifically internet have led to development of social media outlets like Twitter, Whatsapp, Facebook among other channels through which people communicate and share information. Aware of this new development in media industry, terrorist's use social media extensively to advance their goals, as observed by Schmid and de Graaf.¹⁶⁸ In the event of terror attack, terrorists become active viewers/ readers of media to assess how their grievance are presented and also how the targeted government and citizen respond. In this sense, media assist terrorist to correct past mistakes and enhance their skills in attacks. Although they choose carefully their location, target and the right moment to attack, they don't participate in crafting the media content. Information on the attack of Westgate in Kenya was first broken by social media as those in the mall and its environs flooded Twitter, Facebook and Instagram accounts with messages and images.¹⁶⁹ Strangely enough Al Shabab were among the people observing and communicating with the public through Facebook account which was later on shut down by Google. Social media therefore assist terror groups in evaluating the success of their actions.

¹⁶⁶ Weimann, G., & Winn, C. *"The theater of terror: Mass media and international terrorism."* Longman, 1994.

¹⁶⁷ Lemieux, A. F., & Asal, V. H. "Grievance, risk, and enemy images in the choice and justification of terror versus protest.: Manuscript, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism," University of Maryland, 2009

¹⁶⁸ Schmid, A.P., and De Graaf, J., "Violence as Communication, Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media," London: Sage Publications, 1982.

¹⁶⁹ www.apo.org.au Accessed on 3rd June 2017

Another way through which terror organizations influence the public is to decide exactly what they want people to know then send it direct to the media houses. It is believed that terrorists communicate directly with the populace using pseudo names to evaluate the success of their actions. When media engages the public on feedback platform, terrorists using pseudo names get opportunity to engage media and the public directly. On social media platforms terrorists' use pseudo names to exchange ideas with the public as they try to sway them in disproving government actions against terror attacks. In such a scenario, media's role in counterterrorism is critical because it has final decision on whether to edit the message, broadcast, add illustrative narrations, or to ignore it completely. In the case of Kenya, the media allow the public to post questions directly to the analysts hosted to discuss terror events, in this way, the analysts cannot guarantee whom they are answering, and it could be the perpetrator trying to justify their cause.

The last and most dangerous way through which terrorist use media is by owning the media house in its entirety. In this way, they can have media broadcast messages as terrorist would want them done. Most terrorist groups have started their own newspapers and television channels, websites for direct communications with the public. The most recent example is a case where the Arab states forced Qatar to shut down Al Jazeera Television arguing that it represented the views of terrorists. The situation in Kenya is very conducive for terrorist to reach this level by simply owning or having shares in media houses. The laws governing media ownership in Kenya are quite liberal and any person or group can easily operate a media house in Kenya even by proxy. Secondly, the competitive environment for profit in the Kenyan media environment can easily lead to this situation.

Social media has enabled terrorists to create their own content and broadcast according to their wish. Social media have caused an information upheaval that terrorists joyfully ride on.

Bruce Hoffman noted that this development has significantly enhanced the operations of terrorists and insurgents with capability to develop and broadcast their own message as they wish with total disregard to mainstream media outlets.¹⁷⁰ Terrorists use Internet for a number of various reasons including cyber-terrorism, planning and coordination of attacks, clandestine communication with members, fundraising, recruitment among others. In Kenya, Institute of Security Studies identified the internet as a major tool to radicalize and recruit youths to join terrorist groups such as al-Shabab and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).¹⁷¹ The report indicated that social media allowed violent groups from other parts of the world to recruit and spread propaganda in Kenya.

Internet can be used to achieve the four goals identified by Brigitte Nacos in which agenda setting theory plays a key role. Internet being a worldwide network assists terrorists to gain attention and awareness throughout the world when messages are transmitted and shared online by different people in different parts of the world. For instance, the movie clips of Nicholas Berg and Daniel Pearl beheading by terrorists raised eyebrows in all parts of the world thereby creating fear and anxiety among the audience. That is exactly the intended objective of beheading the two gentlemen. Nadya Labi noted that the video showing the murder of Berg using a slash and knife represented the most successful online terrorist campaign by creating deadly fear and sense of helplessness among the public.¹⁷²

Internet can be used by terrorists to gain recognition since it allows them to create their own content and set public agenda by continuously broadcasting the same in a format of their choice. Their intended audience simply need to search known website and access the material

¹⁷⁰ Hoffman, B. , "Inside Terrorism (Revised and Expanded Edition)", New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. Available at www.bppa-online.org

¹⁷¹ Jumah Ally, "Terrorist groups recruiting Kenyan youth through social media" Standard Digital, 8th July 2015

¹⁷² www.transnationalterrorism.eu Accessed on 5th March 2017

relevant to them of course with a prior interest. It is also easier for others who may not be aware of terrorist objectives to meet such material in the course of their interaction with the Internet. Such people meet this information already formatted to suit terrorists' objectives and it may easily persuade them to view terror activity as a genuine cause.¹⁷³

Internet can as well be used by terrorists to gain respect and sympathy from their sponsors. When sponsors open terrorists' websites and see successful attacks complemented videos and messages in addition to propaganda, the attackers are likely to gain respect. This may result in more funding, recruitment radicalization and mobilization through the internet.¹⁷⁴ Al Shabab continues to produce video attacks showing how Kenyan troops have been killed in Somalia with El Iade attacks being the most deadly and chilling video. The video is normally posted online for people from all over the world to view.

Terrorist use internet to gain a quasi-legitimate status especially when state leaders are forced to negotiate with them in order to rescue their citizen. During Westgate attack, the Kenya government had no choice but to negotiate with Al Shabab to stop killing innocent people. A request that Al Shabab turned down arguing that Kenyan government deserve that treatment. In this way the terrorist group gain the status of leaders that are a force to reckon with. By Al Shabab circulating a desperate Kenyan government on social media, they gain status and respect from their sponsors. To gain advantage in the war of perception terrorists have used media extensively to promote their goals. They establish media stations, own television, newspapers and radio channels to communicate with millions of people over satellite broadcasting technology. Unfortunately,

¹⁷³ Weimann, G., "How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet," USIP Special Report 116, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, March 2004. P. 6

¹⁷⁴ Hoffman, B., "Inside Terrorism (Revised and Expanded Edition)" New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, p. 214-219.

Kenya government still believes that terrorism is a battleground war fought by use of military force. Military should complement other counterterrorism efforts but not the only one.

For counterterrorism strategy, the relationship between media and terrorist can be analyzed on two levels, the public and the government. At the public level of analysis, an attempt is made to determine the extent to which media used the terrorist event to influence public perception on terrorist grievances and who are the main targets? In this way, the public are expected to agitate against their government against taking certain actions. For instance, after the Garissa attacks when major political parties turned against the government by demanding immediate removal of Kenyan forces from Somalia. The second level of analysis therefore look at the actions of the government for instance when Kenya security agencies resorting to excessive use of force against certain community thereby opening a new avenue for terrorist sympathizers and recruitment.

2.7 The effect of terrorism on the media audience

Media broadcasting of terrorism has tremendous effect on the audience as determined by Brigitte Nacos that people who follow terror attack images are engulfed with fear compared to those who do not follow.¹⁷⁵ The fear becomes worse when the source of information is not known than when a president or senior officials come out to allay the public fears and anxiety. In Kenya for example, the citizen became more fearful about continued stay of Kenya Defence Forces in Somalia after the El-Adde attacks because more information to the public originated from al shabab themselves through recorded videos and the media. The government never issued any

¹⁷⁵ Nacos, Brigitte L. "Terrorism/Counterterrorism and Media in the Age of Global Communication: *A Global Challenge*," 2006, p.88.

official communications to build public confidence and the media argued that they simply filled the vacuum left over by the government by at least informing the public.¹⁷⁶

Another effect of sensational images on media has to do with psychological anguish which is more predominant than the body injuries resulting from terrorist event. A study by Michelle Slone, in Israel, established a relationship between viewing terrorism news footage and a sharp state of anxiety.¹⁷⁷ Pfefferbaum, also concluded that terrorism have long term effect on children who watch television even if they don't have relatives affected by the event, they still suffered from post-traumatic stress symptoms.¹⁷⁸ In their contribution to media effects, Norris and colleagues categorized the disorders into five categories: first is the psychiatric illness for example PTSD and depression; second is distress symptoms without a specific diagnosis, such as demoralization, perceived stress, and negative effects; Third is health problems; fourth are concerns for example somatic complaints, sleep disruption, increased use of sick leave; fifth are chronic problems of living for example, social disruption, family conflict, financial and occupational stress.¹⁷⁹ In Kenyan context, psychological impact of terrorism has not been adequately analyzed with a focus on their contribution to anti-social behavior facing the government in long term. Counterterrorism strategies should include psychological treatment of victims and their families as a preventive measure by the government. This study proposes the establishment of such a department within the counterterrorism strategy framework.

¹⁷⁶ Gichuhi, Roy "Presentation by Media Houses to National Defence College" 2017

¹⁷⁷ Slone, M., "Responses to Media Coverage of Terrorism," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Volume 44, No. 4," August 2000, p. 508-522.

¹⁷⁸ Pfefferbaum, B. et al., "Media Exposure in Children One Hundred Miles from a Terrorist Bombing: *annals of Clinical Psychiatry*, Volume 15, No.1," March 2003, p. 1-8.

¹⁷⁹ Norris et al. "Understanding the Psychological Consequences of Traumatic Events, Dissasters, and Terrorism: Preparing for Psychological Consequences of Terrorism: A public health Strategy, 2002.

Chapter conclusion

Public opinion is important to both government and terrorists. It is critical to both parties since political decisions are normally driven by public perception of issues. Public opinion also assists in explaining the behavior of officials who crave for public opinion in order to understand what people want them to do. Terrorists also want to win the hearts and minds of people hence the need for public approval.

Terrorists and media have a symbiotic relationship between them. Terrorists use media to promote their goals and media use terrorist attacks to get breaking news and good public approval for being the first media house to footage the news.

Media environment provide stiff competition for breaking news, profit and relevance that forces journalists to crave for sensational and bleeding news. Continuous broadcasting of terrorist attacks has long term effect on both children and adults. Major effects include psychological disorders and traumatization.

Social media has significantly enhanced the operational capability of terrorists. They use social media to radicalize, recruit, fundraising, plan and monitor attacks as well as communication with members in different cells.

CHAPTER THREE

MEDIA AND COUNTERTERRORISM

3.0 Introduction

Terrorism is one of major security challenges in Kenya. The government has employed, with no significant success, various methods to counter terrorism including the use of criminal justice system, anti-terror police units, use of force by military, profiling, and intelligence among others. Terrorists want to use violence to communicate their cause. In most cases, terrorists' acts are encapsulated in political objectives, they want to force government to change or stop doing certain things and this they communicate through violence. It is for this reason that this chapter explore various counterterrorism approaches with a focus on role of media to strengthen government strategies. Kenya counterterrorism strategy has been discussed and compared to the United Nations model prescribed for states. Apart from media being a key player in counterterrorism strategy the role of women is extensively discussed. One area that has been neglected in most counterterrorism approaches is rehabilitation of returnees in order to prevent recidivism. Corrective institution has also neglected their role and become universities for radicalization.

3.1 The Threat of Terrorism and the need for countermeasures

Terrorism remains the biggest security threat in Kenya. The main threat emanates from the Somalia based Al Shabaab group based in Somalia and has links with of Al Qaeda. The group is driven by an ideology that pits Muslims against purportedly Western democratic systems and that seeks to foster conflict between religious faiths. The group has targeted Kenya as a site for inclusion in Eastern African region of a global caliphate. In recent times, Al Shabaab has scaled-up their operations in Kenya and have acquired weapons and other materials for attacks in the country and the region.

Kenya has experience several terrorist violence in recent times leading to massive loss of innocent lives. For instance, the attack on Norfolk Hotel in 1980 that killed 20 people and wounded several others, the 1998 attack on United States where than 200 people perished and hundreds of others wounded. In 2002, terrorists targeted and missed an Israeli aircraft using missiles in Mombasa airport. At the same time, Paradise hotel in Mombasa was also attacked by a vehicle carrying explosives killing more than ten people and injuring many others. Another wave of terrorism emerged from 2012 when Kenya suffered a series of terrorist attacks, including the deadly attack on the Westgate Mall where over 70 people died, the attack on Mpeketoni in Lamu. Northern Kenya which had endured low key grenade attacks and targeted assassinations, was subjected to large scale attacks with twin massacres in Mandera in December 2013, of the shooting to death of 28 kidnapped civil servants who were travelling home for Christmas, and 38 quarry workers who were slaughtered in their sleep. It is evident that the on-going violence at the coast has greatly affected the tourism sector and will certainly undermine Kenya's economic growth. The situation continues to widen with the closure of over 30 Hotels and sacking of between 5000-7000 due to declining tourist numbers and earnings.¹⁸⁰

Kenya's national interests and national objectives are threatened by the frequent terrorist attacks in recent times. Apart from loss of innocent lives, terrorist attacks have other consequences on physical, economic, social and political stability of a state. In Kenya, terrorism has caused physical destruction of buildings and infrastructure such as Cooperative bank plaza that was extensively damaged; Ufundi Cooperative House that was completely flattened; West gate Mall had to be bombed by Kenyan Security forces to flush out hiding terrorists with high cost of

¹⁸⁰ Were Anzette, "This is exactly what terrorist attacks are costing Kenya.", Business Daily, April 2015.

renovations afterwards. These are a few examples of physical damage the country has incurred due to terrorism activities.

Terrorism attacks has cost implications directly and indirectly. In terms of indirect costs, the country's ability to attract FDI is jeopardized due to perception of unsecure place for investment. Some analysts argue that the presence of the risk of terrorist attack has a direct relationship to a decline in the FDI estimated at five per cent of GDP.¹⁸¹ This is attributed to the creation of climate of uncertainty that envelopes the country whenever attacks happen. Indirect costs of terrorist attacks also affect the transportation industry due to fear of terror attacks, passenger fares decline.

In terms of economic losses, terrorism has cost the country unemployment, homelessness, deflation, causing psychological and stress in families. The consequences are evident in industries related to tourism such as aviation industry, hospitality industry, hotels and business that cater for tourism and allied services.¹⁸² The input of tourism in Kenya is enormous to the extent that any downturn in its prosperity through travel advisories and actual fear by investors becomes a worry to the government. According to Richter, terrorists achieve several goals by targeting tourism industry, for instance they gain publicity, economic disruption, and ideological opposition to tourism.¹⁸³ Terrorists achieve the exposure they crave and the media assists in achieving this goal by setting agenda in a way that resonates well with the citizen.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸¹ Global Terrorism Index, 2016 available at www.arrow.dit.ie accessed on 8th September 2017

¹⁸² Reisinger, Y., and Mavondo, F. "Travel Anxiety and Intention to Travel internationally: implication of Travel Risk perception. *Journal of Travel Research*, 2005, p. 212- 245.

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¹⁸⁴ Richter, L.K. & Waugh Jr., W.L., "Terrorism and Tourism as Logical Companions: Tourism Management", 1986, p.230-238

Apart from tourism, the fear of terrorism reduces future expectations of companies and consumers and forces the government and businessmen to divert funds to unbudgeted security measures instead of investing in what they are mandated to do.¹⁸⁵ For instance, many firms in Kenya recruit security guards and procure electronic screening gadgets at all entrances which is not part of their core business. They have to invest in surveillance camera and other investments that add no value to their products.

Another major threat remains terrorist's acquisition of biological and chemical weapons with capability to cause mass destruction in societies. Al Shabab terrorist group or any motivated individual, being an affiliate of Al Qaeda and has connections with ISIS can easily acquire weapons of mass destruction. Kenya does not have the prior experience in handling the magnitude of disaster imagined when this occurs. Terrorism therefore presents an existential threat to a state due to their objectives.

3.2 Various Counterterrorism measures

Counterterrorism strategies revolve around the perception and definition of terrorism. States define terrorism from two perspectives described by Wilkinson as either criminal justice model or war model.¹⁸⁶ The war model consider counterterrorism as war against terrorists and the use of military as state instrument for war features prominently in counterterrorism strategy. In such a model, military power is used extensively to bomb and destroy terrorist organizations. This model has been used in Kenya extensively by the military viewing counterterrorism as war against

¹⁸⁵ *ibid*

¹⁸⁶ Wilkinson, P., "Frameworks for Conceptualizing Terrorism", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 2006.

al shabab. In war model, preservation of evidence that may be used for prosecution is irrelevant since the war on terror is fought in the battlefield.

On the other hand, counterterrorism strategies modelled along criminal justice model view terrorists as criminals and emphasize on the rule of law.¹⁸⁷ This model treats terrorists as criminals to be processed through a criminal justice system starting from arrests-courts system-correctional facilities-back to the community. In Kenya, this model has not been very successful since it led to arbitrary arrests of suspected Muslim communities based on intelligence reports.

It is sometimes difficult to draw a line between the two models, for instance in Kenya the two models seem to operate at the same time. Ami Pedahzur and Magnus Ranstorp note that the two models seem to converge as criminal justice model focus on the preservation of civil liberties but again military force is required to counter terrorist attacks.¹⁸⁸ For instance, the government of Kenya collapses both approaches into one by having both military and anti-terror police unit operate at the same time. However, the war model takes precedence after terrorist attacks.

The United Nations, in an attempt to harmonize various approaches adopted by different states, developed a four pillar approach to counterterrorism and member states signed a treaty on a common approach to counterterrorism.¹⁸⁹ The approach to counterterrorism incorporated both elements of human security and physical security including conditions that make terrorism lucrative, use of media and public diplomacy, addressing socioeconomic conditions and maintenance of effective rule of law. Kenya being a member state is expected to adopt the UN global counterterrorism strategy but the country faces numerous challenges in meeting all of them.

¹⁸⁷ *ibid*

¹⁸⁸ Pedahzur Ami and Magnus Ranstorp. "A Tertiary Model for Counter Terrorism in Liberal Democracies: The Case of Israel: Terrorism and Political Violence", 2001, pp. 1-26.

¹⁸⁹ United Nations Counter Terrorism Implementation Matrix, May 2006




Figure 3: UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2006

Counterterrorism strategy focusing on conditions conducive to terrorism

The United Nations identified certain push and pull factors that make force people into terrorism. They include protracted battles, stigmatization of terror victims, weak judicial system in a country, and abuses of human rights, negative ethnicity, discrimination along religious or nationality, political exclusion, economic marginalization, poor governance.¹⁹⁰ However, the UN general assembly emphasized that none of these conditions should be used as an excuse for involvement in terror activities or to justify terrorism. While terrorist attacks in Kenya are mainly organized from the above factors has led to homegrown radicalization and has since gradually become a growing source of concern. In part, this development has been facilitated by the tense relations between the Kenyan state and its Somali minority, primarily residing in Kenya's north eastern provinces. The predominantly Swahili speaking Muslims of the coastal region does not enjoy rosy relationship with the Kenyan state, and secession sentiments have been prevalent for quite some time. Al Shabaab claims that their attacks in the country are retribution for Kenya's

¹⁹⁰ ibid

military intervention and continued stay in Somalia. In addition, al Shabaab seeks to sow discord between the Somali minority and the majority population in Kenya, provoking the state to overreact, with increased radicalization as a result.

Public diplomacy and media publicity are critical in counterterrorism efforts as pointed out by Pillar.¹⁹¹ He argues that when a government designs a counterterrorism strategy focusing on the root causes and issues that drive youths to terrorism, and use media publicity to educate the public, they are likely to succeed. Based on this understanding, knowing what the group considers to be important that stimulates them to execute an attack is important for the development of counterterrorism strategy. The media would then be used to emphasize counter-narrative measures aimed at deciphering terrorism and correct the misperception that governments are hostile to Islam, since most counterterrorism efforts are directed at the Muslim community.

Poor socioeconomic development was identified by Lee Wee Ling as one factor that drive youths into terrorism, and has to be considered when designing any counterterrorism strategy¹⁹². He argues that socioeconomic development is important to alleviate the root causes of terrorism by winning the hearts, minds, and souls of the affected communities.¹⁹³ While addressing socioeconomic conditions as a counterterrorism measure, media and public diplomacy becomes handy in promoting government efforts. Campbell and Flournoy also pointed out that poor socioeconomic conditions can force people to advocate anti-government ideology making them easy prey for terrorist recruitment.¹⁹⁴ For instance, Campbell observed that some Muslim communities

¹⁹¹ Pillar, Paul. "Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy". Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001

¹⁹² Lee, Ling Wee. "War against Global Terrorism: Winning the Hearts, Minds, and Souls of the Muslim World". Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2004.

¹⁹³ *ibid*

¹⁹⁴ Campbell, Kurt M., and Michele A. Flournoy., "To Prevail an America Strategy for the Campaign against Terrorism". Washington, DC: Center for Africa Strategic Studies, 2001.

in Africa embrace religious charity organizations in order to qualify for social services such as schools, hospitals, food donations to support themselves.¹⁹⁵ Terrorist organizations intending to recruit find fertile grounds in such charitable organizations. For this reason, good counterterrorism strategy campaign should include measures to address the socioeconomic disparities to prevent terror groups from taking advantage of them.

Kenya new constitution provides for a devolved government aimed at ensuring that socioeconomic disparities are addressed, however, there is need monitoring the distribution of resources to ensure that marginalization does not occur at county level of governance. Government counterterrorism efforts would be enhanced by media focusing on development projects initiated by the devolution of resources to counter terrorist's narrative of marginalization. Media has capability to set public agenda and frame them in a way that resonate with the people. In this way the media the media would be appropriate tool in addressing historical injustices.

The United Nations first counterterrorism pillar recognize maintenance of effective rule of law as another counterterrorism effort. In this strategy, emphasis is placed on the development and maintenance of an effective rule of law and a judicial system capable of ensuring that people collaborate with terrorists in terms of economic support, logistics, or any other way is brought to justice without violation of his/her human rights and fundamental freedoms. This would address persistent complaints about ethnic profiling that create resentment against the government hence providing fertile ground for terrorist recruitment. The media is critical for success of this strategy in positively informing the public about government initiatives and objectives.

¹⁹⁵ *ibid*

Preventing and combating terrorism as a countermeasure

The United Nations in her second pillar propose counterterrorism measures that include prevention and battle with terrorism in order to deny them access to potential target for attack. Within the state itself, putting in place comprehensive physical security, target hardening and persistent surveillance on critical infrastructure would prevent attackers from advancing their motives. The involvement of neighboring states is also critical in prevention of terror attacks since terrorism is a transnational crime. Collaboration and integration between regional states is encouraged to ensure that no member state engage in activities that enable terrorists to achieve their goals.

Military force as a counterterrorism strategy remains the most effective instrument to eliminate terrorists as witnessed in Somalia through frequent bombings by United States and AMISOM where terrorist's hideouts were dismantled and a number of them killed or captured. However, critiques argue that use of force can sometimes be counterproductive and may not serve as deterrents measure. Instead uncoordinated attacks may increase the publicity of terrorists' cause, boost their importance; and reinforce the message that Muslims are being targeted. Military force should therefore act as a signal or early warning to terrorist group of what may occur should they continue with their attacks.

In support to this strategy, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu argued that military action is effective in defeating terrorists and discouraging complacent states from sponsoring terrorists.¹⁹⁶ For example, the 1998 missile attacks in Sudan after the bombing of US embassy in Nairobi sounded a warning to Al Bashir of Sudan the cost of supporting terrorists would be high hence the

¹⁹⁶ Netanyahu, Benjamin." *Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies can Defeat the International Terrorist Network*". New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001.

need to make rational choices. Netanyahu did not consider the negative consequences of using force for instance terrorists become used and seasoned in pursuing their cause by creating narratives on the effects of killing innocent people through strikes.¹⁹⁷ In Kenya the continued presence of military force as a counterterrorism measure has resulted into retaliatory attacks and killing of innocent people.

Building state's capacity to handle terrorism

The third pillar deals with building of capacity of state to handle terrorism. This can be approached from two angles for instance hard and soft approaches of handling terrorism. The hard approach focuses on developing the capacity of security agencies to deal with terrorism.¹⁹⁸ Its implementation involves the judicial branch, intelligence agencies, and police service such as Anti-terror Police Unit (APU), the National Counterterrorism Agency, immigration and military force among others. On the other hand, soft power approach involves all stakeholders including government, formal education, religious, and community. Interagency cooperation on the anti-terrorism campaign includes religious, regional, community, and political leaders. Media is quite critical in airing voices of both convicts and former convicts involved in anti-terrorism campaign.

Soft approach focuses on convicts, as well as their families, offering to cover the costs of kids education, wives' and employment in order to counter negative socioeconomic influences.¹⁹⁹ Formal education also plays a significant role in counterterrorism. Therefore, national strategy focuses on revising curriculums that advocate extremism and violence. It seeks to intensify early education and religious education efforts to prevent the terrorism, violence, or extremism.²⁰⁰ The

¹⁹⁷ Juergensmeyer, Mark., "Terror in the name of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence. California: University of California Press, 2001.

¹⁹⁸ Nahdliyyin, "Socializing the Peace, Tolerant, and Nationalist Islam", Indonesia, 2011

¹⁹⁹ Cetak biru deradikalisasi nasional, BBC Indonesia, 2012

²⁰⁰ Tiga Penyebab Munculnya Terorisme Menurut, 2009.

religious community is involved in such campaigns by performing moderate lectures, seminars, workshops, and dialogues, particularly with hardline figures and at boarding schools. In addition to these strategies, the community also plays a role in early detection of unusual behavior.

Countering terrorism through civil liberties and Rule of law

A country practices rule of law when government officials and security agencies, individuals and private entities are subjects of law. Before enactment of counterterrorism laws in Kenya there were numerous grievances about arbitrary arrests, killings and disappearances of youths in Lamu, Kilifi, Mombaasa counties in Kenya, due to suspected role in terrorism. Counterterrorism laws have now been made clear and publicized but still issues to do with protection of fundamental rights, including the security of persons remain a challenge. Questions were raised concerning the process by which the laws were enacted, with Muslim communities claiming that the US pushed Kenya into enacting draconian counterterrorism laws in exchange with financial support. Currently, government officials complain that counterterrorism laws are too weak making prosecution of suspected terrorists very difficult. They argue that suspected terrorists are arrested only to be released by courts on bail as a fundamental right guaranteed within the constitution. In Kenya therefore, there are challenges on prosecution of suspected terrorists due to the country's constitution that protects the right of every individual irrespective of the crimes committed.

The role played by courts for the success of any counterterrorism strategy is significant. Counterterrorism campaign need to consider specific judicial process and training of judges involved in handling counterterrorism cases. The need of specialized training for judges emanate from the fact that terrorists target noncombatants who are innocent civilians. Shapiro and Suzan emphasized the need for specialized training for law-enforcement officers involved

in terrorists arrest, investigation, prosecution and judges that hear terrorist-related cases.²⁰¹ According to them, a country can establish courts countrywide to deal with terrorist-related cases. As counterterrorism measure training of criminal justice system officials would enhance their ability in investigation, prosecution, and determination of terrorist cases.

3.4 Kenya's counterterrorism strategy

Counterterrorism strategy of Kenya is a mix of both criminal justice model and war model as spelt out in the country's Prevention of Terrorism Act 2012.²⁰² When viewed from criminal justice model, the Kenyan strategy define activities considered to be pointers of terrorism prosecutable through criminal justice system. While the national strategy of the country is tilted toward the criminal justice model, it again calls for all peace-loving and law abiding Kenyans to join hands in war against terrorism. Accordingly, the ultimate goal of the Government of Kenya in counterterrorism efforts is to rally all sectors of Kenyan social, religious, and economic life to emphatically and continually embrace peace and democracy and reject terrorist ideologies and to eliminate opportunities for terrorist groups to operate in Kenya. It is evident in this approach that media's role in educating the public and reaching out to all citizen concerning government efforts is paramount. Specifically, Kenya's national strategy is expected to achieve the following goals of which without media there can be no success:

One is to counter violent extremism messaging by inspire, rally and facilitate a local, communal, national and global efforts in rejection of terrorist ideologies antithetical to the Kenyan, and popularize narratives that diminish sympathy for terrorism as a means to change society or

²⁰¹ Shapiro, J. and Benedict S. "The French Experience of Counterterrorism" Washington, DC: The International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2003, Page 89

²⁰² Prevention of Terrorism act, Kenya Constitution 2012

politics. This may involve the use of media communicating government strategy to the public and crafting narratives that challenge terrorist grievances. Working with the media to develop effective messages responsive to local conditions and disseminate them using a comprehensive media and online strategy may enhance government efforts in achieving this goal.

Second objective is to enhance government support to local communities that are targeted for recruitment by terrorists. This involve the development of a comprehensive approach to support local communities and to address communal grievances upon which terrorist recruiters mobilize support. The media's role in highlighting government successes in supporting affected communities is crucial in achieving this goal. The media would then televise development projects, budget allocations, scholarships awarded among other efforts aimed at assisting effected communities to build resilience.

Third counterterrorism strategy of Kenya aims at rehabilitation and reintegration for individuals who disengage from terrorist activities. Develop and implement a framework for a coordinated government and community-based approaches to ensuring effective demobilization and reintegration of violent extremists who have disengaged or responded to amnesty offers, including psychosocial support, education and training. Media's role is fundamental in achieving this goal. For instance, the stigmatization of returnees require a concerted effort educate the public accept these people as normal citizen. On the other hand, it requires the media to educate security agencies on handling stigmatized people who feel rejected by society, in order to prevent them from slipping to recidivism.

The fourth strategy aims to develop expertise in non-coercive approaches to counterterrorism. This involves the development of capabilities of relevant government agencies and personnel including the Judiciary, prisons, remand centers, probation processes, counselling,

urban and development planning, youth program, communications regulators and county authorities. The focus is to ensure that similar initiatives are effectively enforced through laws that do not promote the use of force but instead enhance fundamental human rights. The state requires the services of media to set public agenda for the success of this strategy. The media would, for example, encourage recruits to voluntarily surrender to the police in exchange with amnesty.

Kenya's fifth counterterrorism strategy is to effectively utilize law enforcement to reduce opportunities for recruitment of Kenyan youths by terrorist groups. It focuses on efforts to reduce the time, space and opportunity for terrorist groups to radicalize Kenyan citizens by ensuring that the legal boundaries against incitement, intimidation, and other illegal conduct are strictly enforced wherever radicalization occurs. This effort has a robust media dimension with media playing the role of highlighting issues related to terrorism and educating citizen about government's efforts to save youth from radicalization.

Lastly, Kenya's strategy focuses on the role other stakeholders can play in counterterrorism. The strategy offers clear pathways and guidelines for citizens, communities, civil society, the private sector, media, and multilateral and bilateral partners to effectively and productively engage in counterterrorism efforts. A multi-agency effort when pursued in collaborative and coordinated fashion will immensely advance the security of Kenyan citizens, communities and protect our democratic way of life. A national Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) has been created as the lead agency to coordinate actors (state, non-state and bilateral and multilateral partners) involved in the implementation process. The NCTC performs the role of monitoring and evaluation including an annual assessment of the impact of major counterterrorism initiatives and funding.

In response to youth Indoctrination the country's responses have ranged from increased security surveillance, security operations, community policing to development of counter-terrorism strategy. The Government has intensified security measures such as screening at border stations, increased positioning security officers hot spots as well as tourist hotels. In addition, enhanced intelligence gathering and sharing of information between agencies has enhanced government efforts in countering terrorism. However, the recent attack in Lamu County where terrorist killed over 60 people and pillaged the town of Mpeketoni for hours has shown the capacity of the terrorist groups, and the requirement of even more effort from the state to counter radicalization to prevent such phenomena at the root.

The State launched a security operation dubbed 'Operation Usalama' in many urban centers in order to mop out suspected individuals engaging on youth radicalization. However, the security operations were resisted by Muslim clerics, opposition leaders and human rights activists who argued that security agencies were targeting a particular community. A good counterterrorism strategy is one where members of local community are involved.

3.6 Role of Women in Counterterrorism

Terrorism eradication efforts have long been considered the exclusive purview of men based on the assumption that terrorism, like war and violence, is primarily the purview of men. However, things have changed and today terrorist organizations have realized the need to involve women in their planning and execution of terror attacks as witnessed in Boko and Taliban

kidnaping and training girls and women to become terrorists.²⁰³ In some cases, including women in terrorism has increased the effectiveness of terrorist organizations. Reasons for this include the idea that women are considered more loyal to their duty, and that they are viewed with less suspicion by security forces. Given this background, it follows that women's participation in various fields, including combat, counterterrorism, and conflict resolution can bring better results. The question relevant to this study is the role Kenyan women can play in counterterrorism efforts.

The reasons that women in Kenya may support or participate in terrorism the same as those for men. They include grievances pertaining to economic marginalization, political exclusion, and fanatical adherence to religious or ideological beliefs.²⁰⁴ Fink et al noted that main issues surrounding women participation include a reaction against inequality, discrimination, violence, and injustices just like men.²⁰⁵ In fact, he pointed out the strong relationship that exist between gender inequalities and terrorist organizations. Gender inequality according to Fink provides fertile ground for terrorists to take advantage of women.²⁰⁶ For instance, the increased female participation in terrorism as suicide bombers is so common in states that relegate women to a lower social status.²⁰⁷

Women in Kenya can play a major role in counterterrorism if they are empowered to do so. Traditionally women has a role to shape the behavior of young people and this grants them the potential to prevent radicalization in relation to the family, identifying early signs of radicalization

²⁰³ Mirahmadi, H. et al "Empowering Pakistan's Civil Society to Counter Violent Extremism." Brookings Centre for Middle East Policy, 2015. Available in www.gsdrc.org accessed on 7th September 2017.

²⁰⁴ Fink, N., Barakat, R. and Shetret, L. The Roles of Women in Terrorism, Conflict and Violent Extremism: Lessons for the United Nations and Other International Actors. Centre on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC) Policy Brief., 2013

²⁰⁵ OSCE." Women and Terrorism Radicalization": Final Report, 2013.

²⁰⁶ *ibid*

²⁰⁷ Fink, N., Zeiger, S. and Bhulai, R. "A Man's World: Exploring the Roles of Women in Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism". Hedayah and Global Centre on Cooperative Security, 2016.

and countering terrorist extremist narratives.²⁰⁸ The experience Kenyan women have as teachers or parents in bringing up the young ones can assist the government in developing sound counterterrorism strategies targeting early stages of counter radicalization. By granting more women opportunity to serve in security agencies and participate in the implementation of counterterrorism strategies, government efforts can be more effective.²⁰⁹

Kenyan constitution guarantees 30 percent of women opportunity in employment and other public forum engagements. Fink pointed out the strong correlation that exist between gender inequality, of women and terrorism.²¹⁰ This argument led to the promotion of gender of r equality in the recommendations of the United Nation’s Counterterrorism Plan of Action (UNCA).²¹¹ This gender equality and empowerment of women can be translated into positive gains when applied to counterterrorism strategies. In this way women are empowered through education, better critical thinking and enhanced opportunities in public sector and can therefore play their role in counterterrorism.²¹²

In developing the UNCPA member states pledged to implement measured aimed at empowering women including involvement of women in deliberations and development of counterterrorism strategies; countries to produce context-specific research the role women can play in counterterrorism. States are also expected to develop counterterrorism strategies focusing on

²⁰⁸ Majoran, A., “Mothers & Wives: Women’s Political Role in Countering Violent Extremism”. The Mackenzie Institute, 2015. Available in www.gsdrc.org accessed on 7th September 2017.

²⁰⁹ Bhulai, R., Peters, A. and Nemr, C. “From Policy to Action: Advancing an Integrated Approach to Women and Countering Violent Extremism”, Global Centre on Cooperative Security, June 2016.

²¹⁰ Fink, N., et al. “A Man’s World: Exploring the Roles of Women in Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism”, Global Centre on Cooperative Security, 2016.

²¹¹ UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism. Report of the UN Secretary General, 2015

²¹² Couture, K. “A Gendered Approach to Countering Violent Extremism: Lessons learned from women in peace-building and conflict prevention applied successfully in Bangladesh and Morocco”. Brookings Institute Policy Papers, 2014

women empowerment, gender mainstreaming, and monitoring of counterterrorism strategies.²¹³ Such programs would assist women in three ways. First in building their capacity to shape the thinking and behavior of their children, families and homes. Second, in building their capacity to participate in the counterterrorism and other national security agendas. Third, is the promotion of economic wellbeing and social empowerment thereby raising the status and voice of women in their families, communities and nationally. In this way women's vulnerability to terrorism is significantly reduced.²¹⁴ It is however important to note that vulnerability of women to terrorism may vary from one place to another depending on local context and drivers or factors of recruitment and radicalization. A sound counterterrorism strategy focusing on women should therefore include gender dynamics and tailored to specific region.

Successful case studies of women empowerment indicate different focus areas. For instance, in Morocco counterterrorism strategies focuses on economic, political and social development of women as well as giving them a say in religious matters. This has been achieved through a trainings offered to women murshidats (preachers) who later on are recruited to work as religious monitors in communities while preaching moderate Islam ideologies.²¹⁵ On the other hand Bangladesh program for women empowerment focuses on poverty alleviation and gender equality key to countering violent extremism. This has been achieved through better education for girls, offering jobs to women in industries and provision of microcredit to women.²¹⁶ Kenya is

²¹³ Peters, A. "Creating Inclusive National Strategies to Counter Violent Extremism". Inclusive Security, 2015.

²¹⁴ Couture, K. "A Gendered Approach to Countering Violent Extremism: Lessons learned from women in peace-building and conflict prevention applied successfully in Bangladesh and Morocco". Brookings Institute Policy Papers, 2014

²¹⁵ El Haitami, M. "Women in Morocco: Re-conceptualizing Religious Activism", the American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 30(4): 2013, p. 128-141.

²¹⁶ Couture, K. A Gendered Approach to Countering Violent Extremism: Lessons learned from women in peace-building and conflict prevention applied successfully in Bangladesh and Morocco. Brookings Institute Policy Papers, 2014

already ahead of these two countries in terms of women empowerment and all that is required is coordination between relevant government agencies to participate in counterterrorism initiatives.

Besides their role in families, women play a big role in shaping communities where they play the role of mediators and initiators of counter-narratives against terrorism.²¹⁷ Their voices can be compelling when they express themselves as out as victims or survivors of terrorist attacks. To be able to perform the role of minders and informers of their children for the government, women must hold esteemed status in society. If they are relegated to marginal status, counterterrorism strategies may not be very successful. A critical instrument in women education and empowerment is the media. Incorporation of media and women can therefore enhance government efforts in fighting terrorism.

3.5 Rehabilitation of Terrorists as counterterrorism strategy

Communities produce terrorists and terrorists get to communities after undergoing through criminal justice process or when they return from terrorist training. However, a number of issues are raised when communities are expected to receive their sons and daughters back. The main issues are related to where released terrorists will go, who will monitor them, recidivism, and the possibility to turn them away from terrorism during incarceration. In addition, there are security issues to do whether they can attack again, resentment and feelings of injustice among victims of terrorism.

Despite the above concerns, a number of states including Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Egypt have started terrorist rehabilitation programs arguing that their national security are threatened if no arrangement to facilitate and manage the reintegration of convicted terrorists back to society

²¹⁷ OSCE: "Women and Terrorism Radicalization", Final Report, 2013

is put into place.²¹⁸ The objective of such programs is to change terrorists' behavior through rehabilitation or de-radicalization so that those that have been incarcerated are prepared for reintegration into society.²¹⁹ The programs are anchored on the belief that terrorists rational thinkers who can be engaged in a way that change their behavior and reduce the risk of recidivism upon release.

To date, most scholars have not agreed on what constitutes success in rehabilitation of terrorists and even what constitutes reform. However, terrorist rehabilitation programs still represent creative and innovative approaches to counterterrorism efforts. They offer benefits that could not be imagined in attempting to reduce the risk of recidivism of terrorist offenders. For instance, when terrorists decide to disengage by themselves voluntarily, they can assist the government in counterterrorism efforts by preventing others from getting to the same trap they found themselves. Until that potential is realized, however, de-radicalization programs must be rigorously evaluated to determine their effectiveness with regard to a host of issues. The most important step in increasing the inherent effectiveness of these programs and enhancing proper risk assessment is a greater understanding of the processes by which members of terrorist groups disengage and re-engage with terrorism.²²⁰

Kenya government can initiate terrorist rehabilitation programs based on experience from other countries. Incarcerated terrorists can be participating in a tightly structured program focusing learning and socialization activities that pursues a strategic objective of re-education, rehabilitation, and reintegration. The program may begin from correctional facilities and later on

²¹⁸ Bjorgo T. and Horgan J. "Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement" New York: Rutledge, 2009

²¹⁹ *ibid*

²²⁰ Monica L. And Christopher D., "Intervening with Extremist Offenders," *Forensic Update* 105, 2012, p. 35-38

extended to aftercare post release activities.²²¹ For successful implementation of these programs, correctional facilities need to be staffed by social workers and psychologists capable of teaching critical thinking skills aimed at changing terrorist views concerning the legitimacy of their previous life. While offering these programs, the goal should not only be changing former terrorists, but also to evaluate their individual chances of recidivism and to equip them with the social and psychological instruments needed for reintegration into society. In Saudi Arabia, those who ran the programs claimed impressive success recidivism rates of 10 to 20 percent, depending on which media profile of the program one read.²²²

Rehabilitation programs can focus on different aspects depending on the needs of a participant. For instance, some initiatives may attempt to counter ideological extremism, others to focus on reintegration or at least as a nominal first step demobilization. Some of these initiatives can be developed as efforts to win public perception in the war against terrorism, whereas others emerge from efforts to turn former terrorists into potential witnesses. The language, terminology, and official descriptions of these programs remain as varied as the expectations surrounding them, they are a product of their own time and place and not easily transferable.

The acquisition and development of cognitive skills formed the basis for some of the programs in the states that have initiated them. However, programs leading to total disengagement from terror activities or the rejection of an extremist ideology were not evidenced from the objectives of rehabilitation programs conducted. Some programs, such as those in Yemen and Algeria, did require a renouncement of the former group or its leader, but many did not require the individual

²²¹ Bjorgo T. and Horgan J., "Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement", New York: Rutledge, 2009.

²²² Christopher M. Blanchard, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009, p. 26.

to conclude that what he or she had done was wrong. The Kenya government experts may develop a program that focuses on aspects of terrorism that participants need to disengage from for the program to be successful. On a more promising note, psychologists managing the program can develop one where those who have totally disengaged from terror activities compare notes and share with others in order to avoid recidivism.²²³

Terrorist rehabilitation program is not tailor made to suit all types of terrorists. Different methods could be tailored to different types of individuals. For instance, de-radicalization approaches focus on disrupting terrorist's adherence to a particular ideology. It may be applicable to a captured and convicted terrorist where ideology played a significant role in his or her mobilization. But given the fact that not all radicals involve themselves in terrorism, it follows that not all terrorists hold radical beliefs, and therefore a new approach has to be developed for those attracted to terrorism through other means different from ideology.²²⁴

A treatment program designed to promote reduced risk of involvement may address very different sets of issues depending on the individual in question. The most important considerations must include individuals' initial motivations for becoming involved, the idiosyncratic experiences and meaning they derived from their involvement, and their own pathway out of the group. An attempt to help an individual reinterpret hadiths is far less important than understanding the meaning of their involvement, the factors that mobilized them into action in the first place, and what led to their disengagement.²²⁵ Though disengagement may be voluntary or involuntary, identifying and

²²³ Lloyd M. and Dean, C., "Intervening with Extremist Offenders: Forensic Update 105", 2012, p. 35-38

²²⁴ *ibid*

²²⁵ Bjorgo T. and Horgan J., "Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement", New York: Rutledge, 2009.

addressing those individual -level experiences is critical to developing a person-specific, and not doctrine-specific, prioritization of treatment objectives to reduce recidivism.

3.6 Role of Prisons in Counterterrorism strategy

Prisons are referred to as correctional facilities because of the role they are expected to play in rehabilitation of offenders. However, it is common knowledge that prisons have become schools where petty offenders graduate into hard core criminals and convicted terrorists learn to become more dangerous. However, this insight has escaped prison officers when it comes to radicalization in countries targeted by terrorists such as Kenya. Terrorist organization are equally aware that prisons are fertile grounds for radicalization and recruitment. Prisons offer terrorists the opportunity to offer sophisticated recruitment and training methods for potential attackers.

Radicalization and recruitment by terrorist organization pose a major challenge to countries. However, different countries have dealt with this challenge in different ways. For instance, European parliaments and even Kenya before the promulgation of the new constitution enacted draconian laws that curtailed prisoners' fundamental rights and increased police powers of surveillance and arrest. The legislation allowed police to arbitrarily arrest and detain a suspect for as long as they wished, force them into confession through torture and subject them to all kinds of human rights abuse. In this way, it was a normal police procedure to thwart terrorist attacks by building an understanding of terrorist ideology, leadership, and operational capabilities.²²⁶

²²⁶ Cuthbertson, Ian M. "Prisons and the education of terrorists." *World Policy Journal*, 2004.

In dealing with radicalization in prisons, inmates' rights were heavily reduced as correctional institutions viewed them as different category of prisoners that were more dangerous. Privileges such as receiving mails were removed and surveillance of prisoners enhanced in order to prevent jailed terrorists from recruiting while under incarceration.²²⁷ But again, different countries had their own way of dealing with recruitment within prison cells. For example, Britain used to isolate detained terrorists from other criminals.

Kenya needs significant changes in their correctional facilities in order to counter terrorist recruitment and radicalization in prisons. Currently, maximum security prisons hold dangerous terrorist inmate in order to enhance security and to incapacitate their ability to radicalize and recruit others. In other category of prisons, inmates who are terrorists are separated from inmates who convicted of their radical extremism. The ultimate solution is to have different prisons for terrorists. President Uhuru Kenyatta has said one of the ways his government will tackle terrorism in the country is by building a separate prison for terror suspects and convicts. The President believes that this is a way to curb mass recruitment techniques carried out by terror cells in the country.

A popular radicalization hotspot in Kenya is the Shimo La Tewa prison located in Mombasa, where jihadists freely mix with regular prisoners due to overcrowding. Shimo holds international jihadists, pirates, terrorism architects and soldiers who have been court-martialed for desertion. For instance, people like shoe bomber, Richard Reid and Jermaine Grant are currently serving sentences in Shimo. They are alleged to be associates of Samantha Lewthwaite, commonly referred to as White Widow. Shimo La Tewa prison does not have isolation places for terrorism

²²⁷ Ibid page 101

so terrorists are able to intermingle and spread their ideologies to other prisoners. The radicalization network is so intense in Shimo is so intense and mainly targets the youth, first time offenders and other petty criminals. However, those who end up being recruited by these jihadists in prisons, are often unaware of the real conditions associated with the fighting force they agree to become a part of the group. One self-confessed, who joined when he was serving time for robbery and drug dealing, he had no idea what his handler was really up to until it was too late. When he found out what he had signed up for, he didn't have the courage to question the ideals the terror group stood for. He narrated how they were made to believe that Islam was under threat that we needed to rise up for our Muslims brothers and sisters. They were promised great rewards and virgins if they while defending Islam.

This chapter has presented the threat of terrorism and the need to develop sound counterterrorism strategies. It emphasizes the role of media in augmenting government counterterrorism efforts through setting public agenda and communicating government efforts positively. There are various counterterrorism strategies depending on how a country defines terrorism. However, the United Nations provides counterterrorism framework and implementation strategy. Kenya has a counterterrorism strategy implemented through National Counterterrorism Center. Women have a key role to play in any counterterrorism strategy but they need to be empowered in order to play their role. Prisons have changed their roles from correctional and rehabilitation centers into radicalization schools where petty offenders graduate as terrorists.

CHAPTER FOUR

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ROLE OF MEDIA IN GOVERNMENT COUNTERTERRORISM IN KENYA

4.0 Introduction

This chapter reports and analyses primary data collected from the field. Its aim is determining role of media in government counterterrorism in Kenya. In addition, the chapter gives the findings from this analysis and compares it with what the literature review and other information adduced for evaluation. The collection of data focused on three objectives of the study: the role of media in shaping public opinion; relationship between media and counterterrorism and how government and media can collaborate in counterterrorism strategies. The first category of data collected captured demographic characteristics of respondents such as gender, age, occupation, residence, level of education and employment status. The second category of data collected focused on knowledge of media and terrorism including counterterrorism strategies. The third category of data focused mainly on relationship between media and government and targeted respondents from security agencies who deal with terrorism and government officials.

In terms of analysis quantitative methods were used to analyze information from interview schedules and Focused Group Discussions (FGDs). Quantitative data analysis on the other hand was done structured interview schedules with the aid of SPSS 20.0. Results from the two methods were later synchronized, interpreted, collated and used to provide the thematic areas of this chapter's contents. Based on the thematic areas, the chapter divided into three as per research objectives.

A standardized sample not proportionate to the population was collected. Although the sample was small, having been reduced due time limitations and nature of study, it provides an

adequate overview of the types of constituents in which the issues under study were being investigated.

4.1 Sample Size

The study intended to sample 418 respondents stratified into six strata including ten respondents from the Kenya army, ten from National Intelligence Service, ten from Kenya police service, and three each from the six media outlets, ten senior government officials, and the public. The study used random sampling to select respondents from six counties Kisumu, Kilifi, West Pokot, Mombasa, Meru, and Nakuru which were also randomly selected from a total of forty-seven.

	West Pokot	Kilifi	Nakuru	Mombasa	Meru	Kisumu
Total	40	44	43	45	39	39

Table 1 Return Rate per County

Three categories of respondents all familiar with media and international terrorism were interviewed. The first comprised of four public officials including scholars who teach international security at a local public university, a political scientist who also works as a researcher for an international research institution and a professor of international studies with special interests in foreign policy and regional security. The second, ten media editors working with local mainstream media both print (seven) and electronic (three-TV). Third, thirteen respondents working with various security agencies in Kenya including Kenya Defence Forces, National Intelligence Service, National Police and the Ministry of Interior and Coordination. Most of the respondents included 223 post graduate and undergraduate students from four local Universities. A total of 250 respondents representing 85%, of the targeted 318, responded to the questionnaires.

4.2 Demographic Characteristics

4.2.1 Age of Respondents

One of the key demographic characteristics of concern was age. Age affects the socio-economic situations and they determine the level of participation of a person in decision making processes concerning an individual and the society. In this study age was a key factor. Targeted were persons of 18 years and above, considered as adults in a society and therefore able to make decisions. From the structured interview schedules, the 250 respondents had a minimum age of 18 years and a maximum of 38 years. The mean age was thus 23.10 years.

Table 1 Summary Statistics of the Age of the Respondents

Statistics	Frequencies
N	250
Mean	23.10
Std. Deviation	13.149
Minimum	18
Maximum	38

4.2.2 Gender of the Respondents

Gender was another demographic characteristic taken into account. Gender, a social construct, of women and men, varies in time and place, and between cultures. The findings in this study indicated that a government counterterrorism strategy is likely to have equal gender

representation given that the percentages of respondents represent 51 percent men and 49 percent women. Whereas women play crucial roles in families and society at large, their participation in counterterrorism can bring new perspectives in countering terrorist radicalization, different from men. Nakuru and Kisumu had the highest number of male respondents' while Mombasa had the highest number of respondents at 45, this also included the highest female respondents' followed by Kilifi, West Pokot and Meru respectively.




Figure 4: Gender Distribution
 Women have a big role to play in any sound counterterrorism strategy especially in relation to preventing and countering violent extremism. Terrorism has for quite some time been viewed as a male dominated phenomenon as noted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). They observed that women are specifically targeted for terrorist radicalization and trained to execute terrorist attacks.²²⁸ For this reason, women's roles have been viewed as critical in any counterterrorism strategy. It has been recognized that sound counter-terrorism

²²⁸Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Women, terrorism and counter-terrorism Workshop on "Supporting Civil Society Initiatives to Empower Women's Roles in Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism," Istanbul, 13 May 2014

initiatives must be gender-sensitive, observe human rights and rule of law. In fact, violent extremism, terrorism and counter-measures may have different impact on women and men.

4.2.3 Level of Education

Another demographic characteristic considered was level of education. In this study, seventy-two percent of the respondents had post-secondary education including 123 first degree holders and 112 diploma holders. In addition, all the respondents had at least secondary education. This is attributed to data collection points that focused mainly urban areas, universities and selected rural counties such as West Pokot.

Table 3 illustrates that approximately 1.6 percent of the respondents had post graduate level of education, 49.2 percent at undergraduate level and 44.8 percent had diploma while 4.4 percent completed secondary level of education. This demonstrates that the respondents had a high literacy level, attributed to data collection points which were mainly within institutions of higher learning with the exception of Mombasa, Kilifi and West Pokot.

Table 2 Level of Education of the Respondents

Level of education	Frequency	Percent
Secondary Level	11	4.4
Diploma Level	112	44.8
Bachelors Level	123	49.2
Post Graduate Level	4	1.6
Total	250	100.0

The relationship between level of education and counterterrorism was acknowledged by Brockhoff.²²⁹ In her findings, Brockhoff concluded that counterterrorism strategy emphasizing education only in underdeveloped areas is not effective in winning war on terror and at times can produce unintended consequences. She pointed out that education produced great expectations and could result in radicalization leading to enhanced terror activities if the expectations are frustrated. To be useful as counterterrorism strategy, the promotion of education should go hand in hand with local, regional and international efforts to ameliorate poor socioeconomic conditions, political institutions, and demographic conditions to make it possible for the promise of education to actually materialize. In this scenario, the media would play the role of communication carrier for government counterterrorism strategy to the people in order to neutralize terrorist narratives concerning marginalization and exclusion.

4.2.4 Location of Residence of the Respondents

The last demographic characteristic considered was the location of residence of the respondents. Location of residence determines the type of media and hence frequency and perception of a respondent. In addition, location of residence is a pointer to the level of heterogeneous a society becomes. The study established that 161 representing 64.4 % of respondents live in urban areas while the rest in rural set ups.

The fact that huge population of Kenyans prefers living in urban centers has implications for both counterterrorism strategy and the media. Terrorists judiciously select their places and

²²⁹ Brockhoff, S., et al: "More Education = Less Terrorism? Studying the Complex Relationship between Terrorism and Education", 2015.

targets for attack, they continuously evaluate costs and benefits in target selection and the urban places hold significant advantages in terms of publicity. Urban areas have unique characteristics in the sense that population is both high and dense and more heterogeneous which provides more room for inconspicuousness. Anonymity in population allows terrorists to camouflage with the public and be able to plan, recruit and attack without detection by security agencies. The general public provides the eyes, ears and intuition that make it easy to recognize a suspicious person who is anonymous and mixes seamlessly into the environment in which he is living and operating.²³⁰ Media can effectively enhance government battle against terrorism by having a feedback program where members of the public report what they see and media alerts police. This includes creating public awareness to keep a steady eye on tentative or errant behavior in the neighborhood and sharing of information of suspicious movements with point persons in the police and intelligence agencies.²³¹

4.3 Media and Terrorism

4.3.1 Knowledge of Terrorism activities in the country

This study sought to know whether Kenyans are aware of terrorist activities in the country and through which sources. The respondents were asked to give an overview of situation regarding terrorism in Kenya: how it has been in the past few years, the current situation and what they see as the future.

²³⁰ www.claws.in Accessed on 15th June 2017

²³¹ *ibid*

Respondent M1 cited information gathered in the course of their work that youths are being radicalized and disappearing from their homes. Respondent S2 cited intelligence reports about people who had apparently disappeared without trace to support their view that Al Shabab was active in Kenya and busy recruiting. News of actual attacks on media outlets like radio, TV and the Social Media give a majority of respondents the certainty that the terror groups are still active in Kenya. Respondent M2 cited evidence of radicalization especially when children are sent to Muslim religious classes- Madrassas, which they had raised in their news coverage. Another respondent S7 was sure that Al Shabaab is still active in Kenya as the terrorists continued issuing threats, and actualizing them by hitting targets in Kenya. He quoted terrorist atrocities in North Eastern Kenya where people have been raided in the middle of the night and killed after which Al-Shabaab claims responsibility. The respondent P7 further explained that the intelligence officials were aware of the intensified mobilization of youths by Al-Shabaab within the coastal and northern parts of Kenya.

Respondents from across the strata (security, Media, and Public), felt that the numerous terrorist attacks on Kenyan citizens is clear evidence that Al-Shabaab is active in the country. This finding is an indicator that most Kenyans are aware of the terrorist activities in the country hence the need for a counterterrorism strategy.

4.3.2 Sources of Knowledge about Counter/Terrorism

The study sought to examine the influence that media has in peoples' understanding of terrorism. The respondents were required to indicate their main sources of information pertaining to terrorism or counterterrorism. All the respondents acknowledged that they have encountered the term terrorism from media reports. While there were a variety of sources of information provided in the questionnaire, approximately 75% of those interviewed became aware of existence of

terrorism through the mainstream media, social media, radio and television. These results are in agreement with studies conducted by Frost & Sullivan who concluded that Kenya is among countries with highest growth of smart phone rate and Internet penetration rate in Sub-Saharan Africa.²³² Only 15% of the respondents had first known of terrorism from the print media. However, a majority of 85% kept abreast of the news through the social media.




Figure 5: Sources of Information on Counter/Terrorism

Asked to select the sources through which they get information on terrorism, the respondents mostly selected radio, social media and television respectively. The radio and social media platforms recorded the highest source of information access. Television and print media also had a strong affinity at 76% and 72% respectively while 64.8% of respondents use social for information compared to radio. Social media in this case refers to a combination of Facebook, Twitter, Whatsup among others.

²³² Frost & Sullivan, "Report on the State of Blogging & Social Media in Kenya", 2015.

This study established that over 70% of the respondents use social media for information pertaining to terrorism. This indicates that Social media is huge in Kenya and a key driver in social communication. Facebook, twitter, and whatsapp are the biggest social media platforms according to the study in Kenya. However, there is minimal government presence on social media where real war is fought on the minds and perceptions of the people. These findings of this study confirm the conclusions of a similar one conducted by Tom Mzungu which concluded that radio had significant levels of interaction amongst Kenya's adult population. Mzungu found that ninety percent of Kenyan people listen to the radio on a weekly basis. The study also confirms the role of media in setting the agenda as observed by McCombs and Shaw²³³. McCombs and Shaw concluded that media may not necessarily reflect reality; instead, they filter and shape it.

Social media provide terrorists with an ideal platform for communication and to promote their ideology as was witnessed during the 2013 attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi. respondent S4 confirmed this view by narrating how Al Shabab provided a running commentary of the attacks on Twitter (account, @HSM_Press_ Shabaab) adoring the militants, provocative to the Kenyan security forces, and vindicating their actions. The respondent S4 stated that even after the Twitter account was shut down, it reemerged later with a different user name. When government officials attempted to negotiate through calls and the Twitter account, they were ridiculed through messages sent from the same Twitter account. Eventually Twitter administrators shut the account in compliance with Twitter's terms and conditions of service which compels users not to publish or broadcast threats of violence against others.

Despite the use of social media to incite and spread violence, it can also be used to unite people and spread peace. This was witnessed when social media's power of agenda setting became

²³³McCombs, E. M & Shaw, D.L "The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol.36, No.22 1972, p.176-187.

handy in uniting Kenyans with messages of solidarity after the Westgate attack. Kaigwa reports how the “hashtag #WeAreOne” was used in political speeches informing people of Kenya-Somali community to unite against common enemy.²³⁴ In this way, social media assisted in preventing retaliatory attacks by the Christian faiths who believed that Muslim faithful’s were attacking them.

Another finding from this study was that security agencies do recognize the power of media in shaping public perception on terrorism and counterterrorism matters. For instance, respondent M8 quoted retired Chief of the Defence Forces Julius Karangi who noted that the secret army for fighting terrorist is the media. Karangi stated that media coverage holds the key to whether counterterrorism war succeeds or not. In this sense, Karangi recognizes the agenda setting capability of media as far as counterterrorism is concerned. The role of media as enshrined in Article 23 of the Media Council of Kenya code of ethics for journalist compels journalists to avoid broadcasting live acts of violence.²³⁵ This article presents a conflict between freedom of media versus national security, a long time cause of discord between government and media. This study proposes that instead of using law to curtail the media, the government need to bring media closer and collaborate with media on counterterrorism matters.

Figure 2 illustrates that there is extensive use of social media in Kenya. Since it could not be ascertained whether among the social media users, some are terrorists under camouflaged names, it is believed that terrorists crave for social media to promote their cause. A study by Noguchi concluded that 90 percent of terror activity is conducted on social media and the Internet and that platforms are secure enough to safeguard the identities of terrorists who participate in

²³⁴ Mwangi, M. “Global Development Professionals Network: Voices from the South,” December 2013.

²³⁵ Media Council of Kenya Code of Ethics Media Act 2010, and Code of Conduct for Practice of Journalism in Kenya 2007.

forum discussions and they offer users opportunity to make direct communications with terrorist agents to ask questions, seek jobs, fund raise to help out the cyber jihad.²³⁶

Given that war on terror is between terrorists and government, the aggressiveness in social media usage between the two cannot be compared. The government may be lagging behind with continued war on terror as the battle field has shifted and the enemy is winning hearts and minds of Kenyan citizen. A sound counterterrorism strategy may require the government to use all instruments including social media in order to counter terrorists' narratives. Social media as stated by von Clausewitz represents a continuation of terrorist war by other means.²³⁷ Cyberspace, has abundant and developing online platforms, which challenges to security agencies and requires dramatic shifts in strategic thinking regarding national security and countering terrorism. As pointed out in the literature review, media concentration on a few issues and subjects leads the public to perceive those issues as more important than other issues. In this sense, media has ability to choose and emphasize certain topics, thereby causing the public to perceive these issues as important.

4.3.3 Media and reporting of terrorist attacks

According to the agenda setting theory, media shapes political reality by choosing and displaying news in a manner that resonate with people's way of thinking at the moment. In doing so, the media advances the goals of terrorist groups. This section reports the finding from respondents pertaining to media reporting of terrorism in Kenya. Differentiation is made between mainstream media and social media. Respondents were asked to say whether media coverage of

²³⁶ Cited in Yuki Noguchi, "Tracking Terrorists Online," Washington Post, April 19, 2006

²³⁷ Yuki Noguchi, "Tracking Terrorists Online," Washington Post, April 19, 2006

terrorist events advance the counterterrorism or the message of terrorism. Over 70% of respondents are of the opinion that the media has reported fairly when reporting previous terror incidences. However, 28% have a different opinion that media has reported poorly. While this may mean that using media in counterterrorism strategy may be fruitful, it can also be argued that media has been unbiased in reporting of both government and the terrorists.




Figure 6: Media Coverage and the cause of Counterterrorism

The following are some of the views provided by respondents who consider media to be performing poorly in coverage of terrorist events. According to respondent S7, print media has unconsciously or consciously advanced the al-Shabaab cause through terrorist stories they print on newspapers. Respondent M5 supported this view with reference to “Operation Usalama Watch” arguing that Daily Nation and the Standard reported the operation in April 2014 in a manner that paid much attention to terrorists by detailing how they executed the operation. Apart from its role

of informing the public on threats they face, the media scored highly in setting the agenda for the public by granting the Al shabab much needed publicity. Respondent S9 adds that even those who did not know its existence started asking who al-Shabaab was and what their grievances were. This was an ideal entry point for al-Shabaab recruiters especially when they target vulnerable youths.

On how stories are placed, the respondent S9 further notes that both the Nation and The Standard placed a lot of al-Shabaab stories on the first 5 pages of their papers the Nation had 43% and the Standard had 36%. The nation had 9% of al-Shabaab stories on the last 4 pages of their paper while the Standard had only 1% on the last 4 pages of their paper. She further indicates that headlines are attended to more than other stories in a Newspaper hence media can easily be an accomplice of terror unknowingly or unknowingly.

Respondent S3 expressed concern on how media use kind narratives to describing terrorists and such metaphors are certain to adore them and hence motivate their followers: “Kenyan media may have been used by Al-Shabaab to promote the feeling that Somalis are being victimized for their ethnicity and religion. Media provides a window to al-Shabaab to recruit from among members of this community who felt victimized, especially the young. It also magnified the al-Shabaab threat, creating a feeling of impotence among the public.” Respondent S9 linked the numerous calls by members of the public and opposition for the withdrawal of Kenyan Defense Forces from Somalia to persistent media reporting and demands routinely made by the al-Shabaab. The respondent blames media for reports creating fear among potential tourists that led to travel advisories by Western countries. Consequently, the government’s capacity to hit back against the terrorists, rally public support or even convince citizens who are rendered jobless by low tourist visits has been seriously compromised.

On the other hand, respondent S8 noted that the media with the banner of human rights tend to emphasize the victim side of terrorists. He noted that TV has aided the cause of terrorists arguing that TV broadcasts violent scenes of security operations which have a potential to draw in sympathizers. The respondent cites the case of Masjid Musa mosque operation in February 2014 where a local TV station showed graphic images of the operation in the mosque as a case in point. Again, even when such scenes are broadcast, angling of stories and interviews for the same are often biased against the state in a manner that create emotional feelings among the Muslim community that they are the targets of antiterrorism war.

Respondent S6 was categorical that: “media reporting the Westgate attack assisted to advance terrorists goals by exposing gaps within government security agencies hence hampering counter terrorism operations. Terrorists could have escaped as the operation proceeded since they received security gaps through the media.” Respondent S6 argue that “this kind of reporting equally elevates the operational success of al-Shabaab beyond that of a state. It is the kind of narrative al-Shabaab would like told since it reinforces the idea that they are invincible and are winning. This not only perpetuates fear, but also aids in their recruitments, and denting the trust of Kenyans on the capacity of state to offer them adequate protection against terrorist organizations.”

This section has presented findings on how media reports terrorism events. It concludes that Kenyan public agrees that media reporting on terrorist events are fair as shown on figure 3. However, government officials have a different view as represented by respondents S3 and S6. Government officials believe that media reporting compromise counterterrorism operations. They argue that the dramatic and sensational way the media use to broadcast terrorist events encourage further terrorist attacks. But, if terrorist events are not reported sensationally, it may have less

impact on both society and government officials who may not take it seriously. On the other hand, the media has a mandate to inform the public precisely on issues affecting their safety. The implications for counterterrorism effort in this finding is that both government and media use different lenses for viewing terrorism as national security issue as well as media's role in setting public agenda for the public. A deliberate effort by government to bring on board the media as partner in counterterrorism strategy may be essential without compromising the media's role to inform the public.

4.4 Media and Counter/ Terrorism

One of the objectives in this study was to determine whether media has any role in counterterrorism strategy. The objective of this question was to ascertain whether respondents were consistent in responses with the previous questions of whether media reports terrorism matters fairly. If the two questions agree, it would be easier to determine the position of respondents accurately on matters pertaining to role of media on terrorism hence counterterrorism strategy. Respondents were asked whether in their view media was important factor in countering terrorism in Kenya. Around 80% of the respondents were of the opinion that media can be an important medium for counter terrorism in Kenya. However, about 20% of respondents have a different opinion.

MEDIA AS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN COUNTER-TERRORISM IN KENYA




Figure 7: Media as an important factor in Counter Terrorism

Respondent S9 pointed out that: “media promoted terrorist agenda by their choice of news sources. Respondent S9 cited how Abubakar Sharrif Makaburi, a radical Muslim was sought after by the media when they started using him as news source over Muslim radicalization. Makaburi was not a Muslim Imam but just a mosque caretaker... but journalists often sought his comments in every matter relating to radicalization and war on terror. Such people should not be given airtime... or if they are given, then the media should seek alternative other authoritative sources.”

Respondent S8 narrated that: “Terrorist groups recognize the power of the mass media in their operations which they use very effectively to justify violence and influence the public perception. They use three rhetorical structures: One, portraying themselves as underdogs hunted and persecuted by military; Two, demonizing and delegitimizing their perceived enemies by shifting the responsibility for violence from themselves to their victims; three, portraying themselves as a non-violent organization that only seeks negotiations to achieve what is denied from them. During the Westgate Mall attack Al-shabaab circulated from on their twitter account:

“You could have avoided all this and lived your lives in relative safety. Remove your forces from our country and peace will come. Mujahedeen has no desire to kill women & children and have done everything practically possible to evacuate them before attacking.”

S8 continued to report that: “These titles are aimed at demonize and delegitimize the KDF in Somalia while depicting al Shabaab as only protecting their religion and their streets. Evidently, this sustained reporting has had an impact in shaping the public discourse on counter-terrorism in Kenya. For instance, terrorist group saw big success on their way when scenario changed after the Westgate, and Garissa University attacks when the Kenyan opposition leadership began a campaign calling on the government to withdraw troops from Somalia, a position consistently advocated by the al Shabaab.” The findings in this section are consistent with previous question that media coverage of terrorism has been fair according to majority of respondents. However, some respondents mainly from security agencies who believed that media coverage of terrorism was unfair also believe that media has no role in counterterrorism. For instance, respondent S8 argued that media shapes public opinion positively toward terrorists and negatively on counterterrorism matters. These findings indicate that a problem exist in the professional relationship between government and media and it is a hindrance to collaboration between the two on counterterrorism strategies.

Trainor, concluded that military doctrine is duty, honor, country, and hate the media.²³⁸ According to him, distrust of one profession for the other is the underlying factor that need to be resolved before media and government can collaborate on counterterrorism efforts.²³⁹ Suspicion drives media to breach national security laws imposed by government and to pursue victims’ families, to interview terrorists’ extensively and await for new terrorist demands for broadcasting.

²³⁸ Alter, Jonathan. "Ten Ways to Fight Terrorism." Newsweek, 1st, July, 1985, pp. 26-29.

²³⁹ www.dtic.mil Accessed on 12th September 2017

The media does not deny the role they play in promoting terrorists goals. Instead, they defend their actions by arguing that government authorities prevent them from reporting the truth. According to media, this scenario compels them to seek the truth outside the government machinery.

Respondent S4 reported that:

“Terrorists use Social Media to transmit coded messages, to plan attacks, to coordinate training of new recruits, and provide logistical support and operational assistance which involve tricks on how to bypass roadblocks, handle firearms and explosives, locate and use cyber-weapons, loopholes in security arrangements and counter investigation by security agencies. These are functional competences that terror attacks, including those mounted by terrorists cannot do without. Social media by virtue of it being a mass media, needs to be monitored and substantially controlled by state security agencies; this is because of anonymity, minimal control by governments’ and has proved to be the ultimate tool for terrorist groups.”

This narrative explains why security agencies and government in Kenya increasingly become intolerant to social media as reported by the Freedom House’s report on the state of Internet Freedom in Kenya.²⁴⁰

Social media is a reality in Kenya and journalists use social media as key instrument in their reporting arsenal, allowing them to bypass traditional outlets and connect directly with readers. However, respondent S4 argue that freedom of expression must be enjoyed in a responsible manner. On the other hand, respondent M3 narrate that during the El Adde attacks, “the public was anxious to know what was going on”, yet mainstream media channels were not covering the incident. “Social media gave me an opportunity to give information to the families and the public.” This finding has counterterrorism implications in the sense that there seems to be a vacuum created during terror attacks that the media attempt to fill against the will of the government. Social media is always the first to break unconfirmed news, however they blow it out

²⁴⁰ <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedomnet/2013/kenya> accessed on 10th June 2017.

of proportion. This explains why terrorists' target social media for promoting their cause and mainstream media also give reference to social media.

There is need for government to collaborate with social media to enhance their war on terror. For instance, social media companies have terms and conditions that could be invoked by government to shut down social media that violates terms and conditions of usage. Twitter for instance managed to shut down Al shabab account when it was used to spread violence and glorify terrorists. Secondly, the government in her counterterrorism efforts can use social media to counter terrorists' narratives directly.

4.5 Media and Government collaboration on counterterrorism strategies

A third objective of this study was to determine whether collaboration between government and media in counterterrorism strategies would work for Kenya. Respondents were asked whether media and government work closely. From figure 6 a majority of the respondents (59%) are of the opinion that media does not work closely with the government security agencies in counter terrorism efforts.

MEDIA WORKING WITH GOVERNMENT IN COUNTER TERRORISM



Figure 8: Media working closely with government

Respondent P4 explained that if government and media were working together, they could not seem to be contradicting each other or operate at loggerheads during attacks. The respondents attributed this frosty relationship to neglect of media houses by the government when formulating counterterrorism and national security policies. The role of government in national security and media's role to inform the public diverge in the way it is done and converge in the need for a secure environment in which both media and state survives.

MEDIA HOUSES FACE CHALLENGE WORKING WITH GOVERNMENT



Figure 9: media houses face challenge of working with Government

Asked about forces that influence media information in Kenya, three out of six respondents from leading media houses in Kenya identified monopolization of media houses by influential political families. They concur that media in Kenya has not been independent since the forces that finance them undermines the independence of media when they s operate as agenda setting instruments for competing political forces. The respondents emphasized that overreliance on official sources as source of information by media will make it difficult to obtain the truth about issues. They argued that official sources may favor government and this will create conflict between media and the people.

Respondent M9 stated the following when asked on how to interact and enhance the relationship with government: “there is always a rift background training and protocol. Media works for the citizen public who are supposed to benefit from media since they pay for it. Problems about media and military (government) is mainly about terror attacks. Unlike other ministers who are always on news due to various reasons. Media reports are accurate since media has a feedback platform that provides what it asks from the public and also what they get as feedback. In addition, media gets reports from a number other sources such United Nations on particular issues and evaluates the information in compliance with media Council requirements. The bad relations with government is about media revealing the truth which government would like to hide.”

Respondent M6 said that:

“Media would wish to be told what the national security is about and how or what not to report concerning national security. In all recent attacks such as Westgate or El-Adde, no government official came out to provide official government position on the attack while citizen were eagerly waiting to hear about the incident. This created a vacuum that media had to fill by providing information to the public. Since there was nothing coming from government, the media had to seek information themselves and report to the Kenyan citizen. The government promised its citizen information on El-Adde attack which up to now has not been forthcoming. Again, it is not only the mainstream media that appears to fill up the information vacuum created by government but also social media that presents

stiff competition to both in terms of time leave alone accuracy. The government should always have official position before complaining that media is not supporting national security strategies”

To be able to determine level of awareness of existing counterterrorism initiative in place, respondents were asked whether they had come across counter terrorism literature or media coverage. 52 % of respondents had not come across counterterrorism literature, coverage or campaign by media. This finding reflects the secretive nature of operations by the anti-terrorist police unit. On the other hand, 48% of the respondents who have heard about counterterrorism initiatives got it from government officials.





Figure 10a: Counter Terrorism Reporting Initiatives

Figure 10b: Knowledge of Counter Terrorism

This may be interpreted that government may always have a position on either terror

attacks or counterterrorism strategy but they do not make it to the wider public and this creates a vacuum in some areas. It may also mean that very few of government counter terrorism messaging get to the intended consumer, as such, the citizen may not be aware of the complexities counterterrorism strategies. This may be attributed to frosty relationship between government and

media which transmits government strategy to the public. There is need for deliberate effort to create awareness among the public on terrorism activities such as recruitment, funding, suspicious activities among others. The success of this initiative requires partnership between the government and the media to set public agenda on what to think about concerning terrorism.

Respondents were also asked about the institutions the media can develop relationship with to have better counterterrorism reporting. The essence of this question was to determine whether respondents were aware of other government agencies involved in counterterrorism efforts. As indicated on the chart, social media, National Police Service and the National counter terrorism centre were the three most preferred institutions according to respondents, scoring 52%, 51% and 45% respectively. This finding points to the fact that social media has a role in counterterrorism strategy developed by the government. However, social media technologies have not been cooperative in disclosing to states all details of the culprits due to security reasons.




Figure 11a: Institutions the Media can engage to counter terrorism

Though media-police relations were fronted as key to success of counter terrorism measures, most security agents. Respondent S10 was concerned about international media outlets arguing that media houses like Al-Jazeera have proved to be sympathizers of terrorist acts and groups. He however was optimistic to a smooth relationship with the media, and suggested of joint exchange programmes to establish an understanding and responsible reporting.

A majority of media houses in Kenya don't engage in counter/terrorism reporting. This is because the venture comes with risks that outweigh the opportunities according to most media respondents. Only 22% envisioned a retaliation from terrorist groups if media houses resolved to report on their activities this is due to the influence the media has first on the terrorist message whom survive because of the coverage and to the government actions.




Figure 11b: Media and Counterterrorism

According to a respondent, media influence on government actions, policies and responses on counter-terrorism issues is evident even in Kenya where the response from attacks has been almost media influenced. The attacks have resulted in harsher tones and harsher retaliations. For

example, it is argued by a respondent that the attacks in Garissa, April 2, 2015, resulted in wide media coverage and calls for tougher response and answers from the government.

Asked whether media engagement could interfere with governments' efforts to counter terrorism 61% of respondents and 53% believe Media engagement in counter terrorism would translate to resilience by the public. On the other hand, 53% are of the opinion that counter

terrorism as early warning can be enhanced if media dedicate their air time to government counter terrorism strategies. According to the findings from the survey, Social media is the most

Counter Terrorism Platforms




Figure 12: Media Counter Terrorism Platforms

preferred counter terrorism media platform, 57% of the respondents opine that a media created desk counterterrorism desk would enhance the cause of counter terrorism. Only 9.8% advocate for resilience coverage and 47% advice for the media to adopt governments counter terrorism policy.

Asked about the most effective way, respondents felt that having a counter terrorism desk is the most effective platform the media can adopt according to the respondents. A majority also (54% and 51% respectively) think developing a counter terrorism reporting policy and use of social

media are the most effective. Developing a counter terrorism reporting policy also came out strongly with all respondents across the strata.




Figure 13: Most Effective Platform for Counterterrorism

Respondent P3 was categorical that a counter terrorism reporting policy would create sanity in the field of counter terrorism; it should insist on factual, accurate reporting and consult/involve security agencies extensively. He argues that ethical issues should be given prominence in the policy, publicity of violent and terrorist acts by the media and the relationship of such reporting including usage of images and media messaging in reporting issues of terrorism which may have the potential to escalate or legitimize such courses and hamper a clearer and honest interrogation of issues, especially when such reporting is viewed and perceived as supportive of such courses need to be addressed.

On his part respondent M1 cited a famous quote that “four hostile newspapers are more to be feared than one thousand soldiers.” He stated that media in Kenya has a code of ethics and

subjected to Media Act unlike social media that is not answerable to a number of government institutions. He noted that main stream media define itself in terms of ethics that must be practiced. He cited examples of media council that provides a recourse for redress and media Act 2013 complaints commission that sits to listen to media complaints from the people. He stated that media houses also regulate themselves through editorial policy of a media house as guided by the code of conduct of Media Council of Kenya. The respondent explained that media understood national security in terms of broadened perspective of security and not just state security. According to him, main stream media disagrees with how national security is interpreted on security matters on the face of glaring evidence that may bring down the nation with media inside it. He argued that if government could share security information with media, the latter would frame it in the best way possible that do not injure any side.

Majority of respondents, 59% are in agreement that the media needs a counter terrorism reporting policy in Kenya. The respondents feel that media and government can explore effective ways to counter terrorism.

Media and Government can explore effectively Counter Terrorism in Kenya




Figure 14: If Media and Government can collaborate in Counterterrorism,

138 respondents agree that media and government can explore ways of strengthening their relationship and have effective means of counter terrorism engagements. They need to have joint exercises and exchange programs to ensure that they operate on the same page.

On whether they consider Kenyan media a good partner in combating terrorism, a media respondent pointed out that in most judicial references, courts usually side with government in law suits and institutions of government are in sync and in support of government. He noted that the relationship between government and media is that of tension due to the above.

Respondent M7 stated that media is the best medium for informing the public and media seeks to influence policy by interviewing political figures from both sides of government and opposition. The respondent noted that during armed conflict, media undergo a lot of restrictions

from government and that embedding media on security may undermine media objectivity. Media embodying on security has direct influence on policy. The responded noted that cooperation can be achieved by opening avenues for regular communications in order for both parties to be in sync but he cautioned that this may undermine the objectivity and independence leading to media losing its role of informing the public. To him a journalist report without the answers to (the 5Ws) what, where, when, who, and when in not complete for public consumption

4.6 Chapter Summary

This study has demonstrated the significance of demographic data such as age, gender, level of education and area of residence in counterterrorism. It also illustrated the role of women in counterterrorism thereby ending the myth that terrorism is a male dominated phenomenon. Women can play a key role in counterterrorism if empowered to do so. A sound counterterrorism strategy need to focus not only the strengthening of education, especially in underdeveloped areas, but also improvement of socioeconomic conditions, political institutional, and demographic conditions to make it possible for the promise of education to actualize itself. Otherwise it can be counterproductive.

Media has a major role in counterterrorism when the issue of distrust between media and security agencies is ironed out. Government's efforts alone are not sufficient to win counterterrorism war. The study recommends the collaboration between media and government in developing sound counterterrorism strategy. If the media and government work together on counterterrorism efforts, it can be a devastating venture for terrorist strategy especially when the media and political leadership mobilize public opinion and strengthen public's resilience.

The media and the government have common interests in ensuring that media is not manipulated by terror organizations who seek to promote their ideologies. Both media and government would like to see peoples' fundamental rights guaranteed and counterterrorism strategies succeed. However, this remains a dilemma that require each side compromising on professional endeavor. Media-government collaboration is critical for the success of any counterterrorism strategy. For this reason, governments must not allow the media to become an instrument in the wrong hands. Through collaboration, media can be used as a weapon in counterterrorism war.

Terrorist organizations have moved their war to social media leaving government behind to fight in battlefield. There is need for government to intensify war against terrorists in the media by actively countering terrorist ideologies online through camouflaged identities. Social media represents an increasing continuation of war by other means.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

The main objective of this study was to examine the possible role of media in government counterterrorism strategy. In attempting to answer this question, the subject was further divided into three parts: one to investigate the relationship between media and terrorism; two is to determine the role of media in counterterrorism; and three to explain how the government and media can work together in counterterrorism. This chapter presents short summary, conclusion and recommendations from each part of the study.

5.1 Summary

In Kenya, the media has freedom to perform its role of informing the public about current affairs including terrorism issues. In fulfilling its mandate, the media strives to answer the six interrogatives what, where, who, when, why and how of terrorism. For any terrorist attack, the public would like to know where it has occurred, when the event occurred, who is responsible, and how the situation is being handled. There is heavy demand for news during other dangers or safety issues such as collapse of a building, a major accident, or terrorist attack. The media remains a key instrument for information and setting agenda on what the public must think about but not how to think about the event. The first media house to break the news to the satisfaction of the public gets very positive media rating.

The media becomes a central rallying point for reporting at times when the public crave for news during terror attacks. The demand for news makes presents dilemmas and paradoxes to media whose mandate is to inform the public timely, objectively, fairly and accurately. In attempt to fulfil its mandate, a number of questions arise on the way media reports terrorist activities. One of the questions is whether or not the media, in search of breaking news, are collaborators with terrorists who also crave publicity and means to promote their goals. The other question is whether media, through broadcasting of terrorist activities, actually amplifying the threat and fear in people as some major goal terrorists would want to achieve. The third question is whether media are objective and accurate when reporting terrorist matters especially in their narrative and framing of terrorists' issues. The study found that media and terrorists enjoy a symbiotic relationship in the sense that media provides a communication channel through which terrorists promote their agenda and in return, terrorists provide media with breaking news which members of the public crave for hence positive media rating.

The study found that the exaggerated and melodramatic ways used by media to report terrorist events are likely to encourage further terrorist attacks. Other findings indicated that sensational reporting of terror events is likely to trigger a reducing effect on such activity. Simplification of terrorist events without broadcasting historical details of other attacks and motives behind such attacks may not be useful in compelling relevant agencies to reduce terrorism. Sensational reporting of terrorism aims at unleashing common trends and patterns of emotional display-thrill of anger, tension, and grief. Media achieves this through constant broadcast of dramatic and sensational images of horror. In this sense, the media becomes a ready collaborator for the accomplishment of the terrorists' goals of creating fear in the minds of the public.

The study indicated that media's coverage of terrorist events provokes publicity for terrorists and also promotes terrorist objective of instilling fear and uncertainty in the minds of people. In this way, terrorists are inspired and get the courage to raise the threshold of their attacks. By media continuously emphasizing successful terror attacks, terrorists are emboldening and inspired to repeat similar attacks. The study found that there is no general agreement on whether media coverage of terrorist attacks contribute to engulfing the public with fear. Jenkins argue that terrorists gain publicity and not propaganda through media while Hoffman argues that the publicity terrorists receive cuts both ways.²⁴¹ He argues that public perception and behavior that terrorists hope to influence through terror attacks are both less predictable and less malleable than the terrorists believe.²⁴²

Persistent terrorist attacks lead to the introduction of a tougher approach in fighting terrorism and has also led to new security legislation and administrative procedures which, among other areas, seek to put more control on how the media cover issues related to terrorism and violent extremism in Kenya. The laws partly target media because it is perceived as platform through which terrorist groups advance their goals. The justifications for increased control of media coverage of terrorism include the lack of patriotism, poor quality journalism and lack of ethics in work is supporting the course of the terrorism by giving exposure to the terrorist acts, spreading fear and indirectly contributing to public legitimization of terrorists' actions. Some of the key findings raised in the study include: harmonizing laws on national security and freedom of expression; ethical considerations in reporting such as accuracy and fairness; how to strike a

²⁴¹ www.transnationalterrorism.eu Accessed on 1st October 2017

²⁴² *ibid*

balance between objective coverage and sensationalism; sources: reliability and credibility; national security versus media freedom; effective media and security relations.

Social media is present and heavily used in Kenya especially among the youth, it enables anyone to publish or access information, and it's not subjected to any kind of scrutiny by a government agency like mainstream media. While mainstream media has a code of conduct and ethics unlike social media that is not answerable to a number of government institutions. Social media in Kenya present terrorist groups with numerous advantages that enhance their operations: First, terrorists target the youth and this study demonstrated that social media is very popular with youths in Kenya. Social media are user-friendly, secure and not controlled by government. Lastly, terrorists can reach a large number of audience through networking on social media channels. In this way, terrorists are able to propagate online propaganda, radicalization, recruitment and recruitment. They monitor social networks to identify and develop lists of potential recruits or sympathizers after which they apply a targeting strategy known as narrowcasting. This is a means of sending messages to identified lists of recipients defined by values, preferences, demographic attributes, or subscription. These methods enable terrorists to target youth especially. Their suggested method is to always access it via proxy, otherwise you're in danger.²⁴³ The study therefore concluded that social media enhances terrorist operations making it difficult for government to monitor their activities.

On their part government officials consent that social media as a threat but lack the technical capability to deal with it, instead most African countries opt to shut down the entire social networks to control information flow to the public. The study found that shutting down or

²⁴³ www.scribd.com Accessed on 12th June 2017

censuring media may not be an effective counterterrorism strategy. Collaboration with media on counterterrorism strategies offers better results. The government may start by dedicating a small cyber police with a role to counter terrorist's messages targeting the youth online. This strategy may work better when the youth are involved in the exercise.

One key finding in this study is that continues broadcasting of terrorist attacks have a significant influence on political decision making. Citizen exposed to emotional media broadcasting are likely to push government to use military force, profiling or influence foreign policy of countries associated with terrorists. This happened in Kenya when majority of citizen supported government's decision to send forces into Somalia hoping to transfer the war on terror out of the country. Harsh legislations have also been passed in parliament during frequent terrorist attacks. In this way, the media influences government decisions on terrorist matters.²⁴⁴

It is undisputable fact from this study that media depends on violence news and whichever media broadcasts the most violent and dramatic stories wins significantly in terms of popularity. However, this may not be about freedom of speech, instead it is about profits and a good share of the audience. Through their feedback surveys, viewers and listeners provide media with direction on what pleases them as audience. Terrorist groups capitalize on this feedback platform to communicate directly with media and also share their thoughts with the public using camouflaged identities. By allowing media to air their television shows, participate on feedback programs, the media actually enable this group to exploit its information campaign.

Media broadcasting of terror events eventually produces a number of sympathizers to terrorists' groups who become willing to offer active support to the group. The study found a

²⁴⁴ Guttry, A, "Foreign Fighters under International law and Beyond", 2016

number of conditions that leads to individuals sympathize with terrorist group. They range from hatred of certain communities; repression and abuse of human rights by security officials; foreign occupation for instance the case between West Sahara and Morocco; lack of political freedom in a country; and other specific grievances are some possible reasons motivating support for terrorism.²⁴⁵

5.2 Conclusions and Recommendations

The study noted that counterterrorism strategies focusing on strengthening of education in underdeveloped places may not be useful in the war on terror and may instead be counterproductive. Education produced great expectations and could result in terrorism if the expectations are frustrated.²⁴⁶ Government should therefore consider a counterterrorism strategy that focuses the promotion of education should be accompanied by domestic and international efforts to ameliorate poor socioeconomic conditions, political institutional, and demographic conditions to make it possible for the promise of education to actually materialize.

Government and media can collaborate on counterterrorism matters to enhance national security objectives. However, both media and government share a common objective of serving the public, but pursued differently. While government strives to protect their citizen from threats of terrorism, media has a mandate to inform citizen about what threats surround them, from where, by who, when and what their governments are doing to safeguard them against such threats. The media therefore uncovers and reports to the public what the government would like to hide especially issues to do with security operations. Media for instance breaches national security

²⁴⁵ www.sites.duke.edu Accessed on 19th August 2017

²⁴⁶ www.politicalviolenceataglance.org. Accessed on 10th July 2017

rules by harassing victims' families with too many questions and interviews; hosting terrorists and interviewing them; honoring terrorist demands by broadcasting their grievances among others. The study noted that media collaboration with government leads to blackout of terrorist oxygen, media promoting government counterterrorism strategies may actually reduce terrorism. This conclusion supports the hypothesis that media can aid government counterterrorism strategy by shaping public opinion.

Government security agencies dealing with terrorism are highly and specialized in their work and do not lend themselves to publicity. Any attempt to present their faces on media would compromise their security and usefulness for the work they do. Consequently, all covert operations they execute on counterterrorism must remain clandestine and media cannot be allowed to film. On the other hand, media feel that information should be shared to avoid government's obstructionist tactics. Such information could then be reviewed by media for them to decide whether reporting it would to miscarriage of security or endanger someone's life. Media personnel argue that they would never do anything to jeopardize security operations or harm anyone intentionally. To be able to eliminate this distrust, the study recommends regular training of both media personnel and security officers who would be handling terror events. By allowing media contribution on counterterrorism strategy, the two parties would begin to trust each other.

Another area of distrust between government and media fraternity is social media that provides terrorists with capability to instantly transmit scenes of their actions to the rest of the world. Media houses argue that technology allows them to fulfil their mandate of informing people instantly in order to prevent panic, dispels rumors and reassures the public of governments' efforts

in dealing with the problem.²⁴⁷ On the other hand, the government would like live coverage delayed until the end of security operations in order to provide time for footage to be reviewed by more experienced editors who will ensure that information released does not place terrorists at an advantage. The debate between the government's need for security and the public's right to know suggests that role of media is quite crucial for the success of counterterrorism. The card played by media determines whether government strategy succeeds or not.²⁴⁸

As a counterterrorism strategy, it is recommended that government initiates joint trainings and rehearsal exercises organized for personnel selected from both media and government security agencies. The joint training should include detailed guidelines various aspects of terrorism coverage for instance, the kind of language to use, handling government officials, as well as context, accuracy and balance of information. By training media personnel and security agencies together, the government builds trust between them. Once the personnel have been trained, they become accredited by government and authorized to cover terrorist events and determining the reporting requirements. Concerning the footage, the team would then feed to all media outlets with a predetermined delay sensational images are released to the public. In this way, the agenda setting role of the media will be in tandem with government counterterrorism strategy.²⁴⁹

Besides establishing a database of trained security officials and media personnel capable of handling terrorism issues there is need to establish family security units. These are people trained in the needs of the media and can be dispatched on request within a very short notice to the homes of victims and their immediate families. Their role is to prepare the families on human

²⁴⁷ www.dtic.mil Accessed on 11th June 2017

²⁴⁸ www.dtic.mil Accessed on 11th June 2017

²⁴⁹ www.imir.org Accessed on 12th June 2017

rights protection so that media does not hound them with interviews. They also provide psychological counseling where they are needed. In this way the government and media will be working from the same wavelength with no party claiming that they are obstructed from doing their work at a terror scene. It would also ensure that victims' families have the same right to privacy as that afforded by the media to other families.²⁵⁰

It is evident from this study that terrorism must be reported by media but in a responsible manner such that public agenda as set by media does not give undue advantage to adversaries of a state. Media and terrorists have a symbiotic relationship which can be altered to work in favor of the government. The same way government securitize and also de-securitize issues, media can adopt similar approach and de-securitize terrorism acts by broadcasting terror attacks as ordinary events not warranting breaking news footage. This may not only prevent terrorists from using media coverage as an instrument of publicity, but also prevent an atmosphere of fear from emerging at public level.²⁵¹ By working closely with media, government may perceive terrorism issues differently for instance appreciating that interviewing terrorists may reveal how they should be countered.

The use of media tools for propaganda have been successful in some parts of the world especially counter narrative warfare. This strategy may not succeed in Kenya where media is subjected to numerous checks and balances. The strategy may also be counterproductive since the study found that media propaganda amplifies the perceived power of a terrorist organization. It is therefore recommended that instead, media can be utilized as a public affairs and public diplomacy tool for influencing potential recruits. To this end, without propaganda, through the media tools,

²⁵⁰ www.dtic.mil Accessed on 20th May 2017

²⁵¹ www.e-ir.info Accessed on 27th February 2017

the extremist narrative can be countered with an equally clear and appealing narrative that resonate with members of public especially the youth.²⁵²

The study recommends intensified war on cyber terrorism since cyberspace has become a center for debate among groups affected by terrorism. The focus of this strategy is to deny terrorist the opportunity to use cyber space for recruitment, fundraising, and spread fear. Kenya has existing cybercrime law that currently present a challenge due to conflict between censorship and the freedom of speech, privacy, and press freedom.²⁵³ To be effective, this law require additional counter cyber initiatives such as establishment of cyber police department who will not be in uniform but stay at home for purposes of monitoring and mapping illicit activities in the cyber space.

In conclusion, this study therefore proves the two hypotheses that lack of media strategy has negatively impacted on government counterterrorism strategy and also that media can aid government counterterrorism strategy. Implementation of the recommendations in this study would greatly enhance government counterterrorism efforts.

²⁵² www.e-ir.info Accessed on 27th February 2017

²⁵³ *ibid*

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: NACOSTI permit to conduct research

Appendix 2: Plagiarism Analysis Report 14 %

**THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT:
MR. BENSON ONYANGO NALO
of UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI, 30091-100
Nairobi, has been permitted to conduct
research in Marsabit , Mombasa ,
Nairobi, Westpokot Counties**

**Permit No : NACOSTI/P/17/34226/19332
Date Of Issue : 4th December,2017
Fee Recieved :USD 9.3**

**on the topic: ROLE OF MEDIA IN
GOVERNMENT COUNTER TERRORISM
STRATEGY CASE STUDY OF KENYA**

**for the period ending:
4th December,2018**



A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Benson Onyango Nalo'. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

**.....
Applicant's
Signature**

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'J. Kalewa'. The signature is more formal and blocky than the applicant's signature.

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Director General
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


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Date **4th December, 2017**

Benson Onyango Nalo
University of Nairobi
P.O. Box 30197-00100
NAIROBI.

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Following your application for authority to carry out research on *“Role of media in government counter terrorism strategy. Case study of Kenya,”* I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in **Marsabit, Mombasa, Nairobi and Westpokot Counties** for the period ending **4th December, 2018**.

You are advised to report to **the County Commissioners and the County Directors of Education of the selected Counties** before embarking on the research project.

Kindly note that, as an applicant who has been licensed under the Science, Technology and Innovation Act, 2013 to conduct research in Kenya, you shall deposit **a copy** of the final research report to the Commission within **one year** of completion. The soft copy of the same should be submitted through the Online Research Information System.



**GODFREY P. KALERWA MSc., MBA, MKIM
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