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NON - ALIGNMENT :

AN ANALYSIS OF ITS INTERPRETATION
AND APPLICATION IN KENYA (1963 - 1986)

BY

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DECLARATION

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PREFACE

This study attempts to determine whether Kenya has been non-aligned in practice. The period covered is from 1963 to 1980, however these dates are not strictly adhered to. The central question in the study is to establish when and with regard to which aspects of non-alignment one can talk of Kenya as having been non-aligned or otherwise.

In Chapter One an attempt is made to justify the study on grounds that Kenya's interpretation and application of the principle of non-alignment is of interest both to Kenya's policy-makers and to students of international relations. In the same chapter a review of literature is made and this further establishes the need for a study like the present one and reveals some of the allegations which have been made about Kenya's non-alignment. To facilitate the study, Power Theory is adopted and from it a hypothesis is drawn to the effect that in practice states find it hard to be non-aligned.

For a method of analysis we have borrowed largely from Helge Hveem and Peter Willetts' approach which consists of the analysis of a country's military, economic, diplomatic and United Nations General Assembly voting patterns as indices of alignment. However we

have made certain significant modifications on this method to suit our purposes.

Prior to embarking on actual analysis of Kenya's position vis-a-vis the implementation of non-alignment, in Chapters Two and Three the general aspects of non-alignment and non-alignment in Kenya's foreign policy are discussed respectively.

The discussion on the general aspects of non-alignment is justified by the observation that the common concerns of the member-states of the Non-Aligned Movement have become the fundamental principles upon which the Non-Aligned countries base their decisions. On the other hand, the discussion of Kenya's foreign policy and how non-alignment fits into it is justified by a contention that discussing Kenya's non-alignment without also discussing the general foreign policy of the country would present an incomplete picture since Kenya's non-alignment is part and parcel of the country's foreign policy.

Chapters Four, Five and Six are devoted to analysing Kenya's practice of non-alignment, with each aspect of the principle receiving a separate analysis. In the first section of Chapter Seven all the aspects are analysed together to arrive at an overall evaluation of Kenya's position vis-a-vis the

practice of non-alignment.

This section suggests that Kenya appears to have been aligned to the West. The remaining sections of Chapter Seven provide general conclusions of the study, including policy suggestions. Along with these is a discussion of whether or not the study has achieved its objectives.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AAPO	-	All African Peoples Organization
AAPSO	-	Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization
AFRICA	-	Action For Resisting Invasion, Colonialism and Apartheid
ANC	-	African National Congress
ATM	-	Anti-Tank Missile
ANZUS	-	Australia-New Zealand - United States Treaty
CENTCOM	-	Central Command
CENTO.	-	Central Treaty Organization
CIA	-	Central Intelligence Agency
COIN	-	Counter - Insurgency
DM	-	Deutsche Mark
ECM	-	European Common Market
FRG	-	Federal Republic of Germany
GDR	-	German Democratic Republic
KADU	-	Kenya African Democratic Union
KAF	-	Kenya Air Force
KANU.	-	Kenya African National Union
KPU	-	Kenya Peoples Union
KAR	-	Kings African Rifles
MBT	-	Main Battle Tank
N-AM	-	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	-	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAU	-	Organization of African Unity
OCAM	-	Organization Commune Africaine et Malgache

PB	-	Patrol Boat
PC	-	Patrol Cruiser
PRC	-	Peoples Republic of China
PWF	-	Peace With Freedom
RAF	-	Royal Air Force
RDF	-	Rapid Deployment Force
RDJTF	-	Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
SAM	-	Surface-to-Air-Missile
SEATO	-	South-East Asian Treaty Organization
ShShM	-	Ship-to-Ship-Missile
SIPRI	-	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SWAPO	-	South West African Peoples Organization
TG	-	Tank Guns
UDI	-	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UK	-	United Kingdom
UN (UNO)-		United Nations Organization
UNCHS	-	United Nations Centre for Human Settlement
UNCTAD	-	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNEP	-	United Nations Environmental Programme
UNGA	-	United Nations General Assembly
US (USA)-		United States of America
USACDA	-	United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
USSR	-	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO	-	Warsaw Treaty Organization
WW-II	-	World War Two

CHAPTER ONE

METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

NATURE AND PURPOSE OF STUDY

This study deals with Kenya's implementation of the principle of non-alignment. It seeks to establish whether Kenya, a member of the Non-Aligned Movement has been non-aligned in practice. The period covered is from 1963 to 1986, however these dates are not strictly adhered to. Various aspects of the country's relations with a select group of states have been analysed, first separately and then jointly, at the end of which an evaluation has been done. Both the analysis and the evaluation have been made in the light of what are considered in the study as the essential elements of non-alignment.

JUSTIFICATION OF STUDY

Kenya's interpretation and application of non-alignment has been of interest both to Kenya's policy makers and to students of international relations. The first decade of Kenya's existence as an independent state witnessed some lively debates among the country's political leaders over the foreign policy posture appropriate to the nascent state. Having generally agreed that non-alignment would be one of the main tenets behind Kenya's foreign relations, the leaders however failed to agree on a mutually acceptable meaning of the concept non-alignment and how it was to

be implemented.

Broadly, one-group-composed mainly of the backbenchers and, later, of the opposition Kenya Peoples Union (KPU) party - apparently saw non-alignment as a diversification of Kenya's foreign relations with a view to reducing Western influence in the country by co-operating more with the Socialist states.¹ On the other hand, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) Government seemed to favour maintenance of the close ties with the West. The Government viewed socialist countries' increased involvement in Kenya with open suspicion.²

These contentious debates ceased after 1969 following the ban clapped on KPU and the detention of its leaders. But in view of the fact that the issue of non-alignment came up again after 1980 following a military agreement between the United States of America (USA) and Kenya, it may be argued that no conclusive understanding was reached among the Kenyan leaders over the question, and there appears to be no reasons for supposing that by 1986 it had been resolved.³ Instead, there have been contradictions in the foreign policy utterances and actions with respect to non-alignment among Kenya's leaders such that even the most well-seasoned diplomat can get bogged down.⁴

In view of the above, the present study can be

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of value to Kenya's policy makers and diplomats since it not only attempts to discover any underlying thread of thought within the variety of views expressed by different political leaders of Kenya but also tries to pinpoint the areas in which Kenya's pursuit of the principle of non-alignment is not upto the expected non-aligned behaviour so that the country's decision-makers may make appropriate policy changes.

From an academic perspective, it is apparent from the review of literature below that the analysis of Kenya's non-alignment has been characterised by a plethora of different views among scholars. This can be explained by the use of different criteria to analyse the subject, and partly by lack of a major investigation. These variety of views inhibit an explanation of Kenya's non-aligned behaviour. Our work is intended as a study of Kenya's non-alignment with a view to explaining it and hence contribute not only to the on-going debate on Kenya's foreign policy, but also to the understanding of non-alignment as it is implemented in an individual country.

Finally, from a more general perspective, the present study also contributes to the development of knowledge in the field of international relations. Raymond Platig has identified four functions or tasks of an international relations research. Among these

are: the explanation of the past; the development of methodology; and the development of theory.⁵

Our study involves an analysis of Kenya's international behaviour over a certain period. An attempt has been made to state the facts about certain aspects of the country's international behaviour between 1963 and 1986, and also to interpret these facts to determine whether Kenya has been non-aligned. It is with this in mind that we hold that the present study contributes towards an explanation of the past; in this case the past of Kenya's international relations.

Secondly, the process of theory building requires the knowledge of facts about the subject in relation to which the theory is being constructed.⁶ The literature on Kenya's non-alignment demonstrates the variety of viewpoints that may pervade the understanding of the interpretation and application of non-alignment in an individual state. If this is taken as representative of the state of scholarly knowledge of interpretation and application of non-alignment by individual states that are members of the Non-Aligned Movement, it may be contended that efforts to develop a theory of the international behaviour of states professing the principle of non-alignment are bound to be made difficult by the apparent chaotic state of knowledge in the field. The present study is therefore also intended

as a contribution towards the process of theory construction, in that by attempting to determine to what degree Kenya is non-aligned in practice we will thereby provide a useful basis upon which to construct a theory explaining the interpretation and application of non-alignment by individual states.

Finally, it is also contended that the present study contributes towards the development of a methodology for a study of non-alignment. The method of analysis used in our study attempts to employ all the criteria considered important for an analysis of non-alignment, and which apparently have been used in isolation of each other by most scholars interested in the subject. Our methodology is a modification of one developed by Helge Hveem and Peter Willetts.

The choice to focus the study roughly between 1963 and 1986 has been determined by the following three considerations: first, 1963 was the year that Kenya's imminent and actual achievement of independence set the indigenous political leaders on a path of deciding which principles were to guide the country's foreign policy. Secondly, whereas Kenya's granting of military facilities to the United States (USA) in 1980 led to serious questions being raised by scholars about the nature of Kenya's pursuit of non-alignment, there is no indication that the subject has exhaus-

tively been discussed. Thirdly, 1986 saw Kenya attending yet another Non-Aligned Summit Conference in Harare, Zimbabwe. This signified Kenya's maintenance of her official position that she is still a non-aligned state in spite of what some sceptical academicians and politicians might have said or written to the contrary. Further to this, the extension of our study to include upto 1986 allows for the inclusion of any new perspective that may have arisen in the course of the 1980s.

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

The literature on Kenya's international relations reveals that one of the main characteristics of the country's foreign policy is a tendency towards greater collaboration with the Western capitalist countries.⁷ Because of this, the country's claim that she is non-aligned in her relations with the two cold war blocs has attracted scholars with most of their discussions revolving around the question of whether Kenya, a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (N-AM) is really non-aligned.

Different views have emerged: John Okumu describes Kenya's position as a "Pragmatic orientation to the practice of non-alignment",⁸ while D. Katete Orwa asserts that in Kenya "non-alignment has

been honoured only when it serves the national interest of the state".⁹ Samuel Makinda, on the other hand, asserted in 1983 that after Kenya granted military facilities to the US in 1980, she ceased to be non-aligned.¹⁰ Timothy Shaw and M.C. Newbury, on their part, see Kenya as a "Sub-imperial state" serving the interest of Western capitalism, thereby implying that her claim to non-alignment is spurious.¹¹

Going by the above, it is evident that one person may conclude from the existing literature that Kenya has been non-aligned, while yet another may conclude that she has not been non-aligned. It is our contention that unless these two conclusions refer to different time periods and/or to different aspects of non-alignment, they cannot both be correct. Most of the literature on Kenya's non-alignment, however, do not seem to provide enough grounds for establishing the validity of either or both of these conclusions.

Our study is an attempt to deal with these shortcomings through a presentation of a comprehensive analysis by addressing ourselves to the following central question: In view of her greater collaboration with the Western capitalist countries, to what extent has Kenya, as a member of the N-AM, been really non-aligned?

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A simple answer to this question is made

impossible by what might be seen as contradictory behaviour of Kenya in her international relations with regard to the non-aligned stand of not identifying with either the West or the East. For example, basing themselves on the principle of non-alignment, Kenya's political leaders ordered the closure of British military base at Kahawa, Nairobi, as K.A.N.U. had promised to do before independence. Later, in 1980, she offered the US access to military facilities amid charges that she was violating the principle of non-alignment. One therefore wonders whether Kenya accepts, both in theory and practice, that there should be no military identification with either of the Cold War blocs.

Similar contradictions may be cited regarding Kenya's economic and diplomatic relations with the two opposing blocs. Successive K.A.N.U Governments have always held that they are for a policy of diversifying avenues of exports and sources of imports, technical assistance and aid. In addition they have been insisting that Kenya has always sought friendship with states that are ready to reciprocate. However, as has been shown later in this study, Socialist countries' missions in Kenya have on occasions been closed; Kenyan presidents have on the whole been quite reluctant when it comes to visiting socialist states and more so the U.S.S.R.; and aid packages from countries

such as the Soviet Union have sometimes been rejected.

Samuel M. Makinda has charged that in Kenya the tendency is for government leaders to blame any criticisms of their policies on Soviet-inspired conspiracies.¹² In addition, it is common to find political leaders attacking what they usually call 'foreign ideology' by which they apparently mean socio-economic and political orientations that are not in agreement with the largely capitalist model pursued in Kenya. This transformation of ideological conflicts in the country into anti-Soviet propaganda does not seem to tally very well with Kenya's position that she is ready to make friends with nations on both sides of the world that return it.

From these scattered observations it seems necessary to have a major study on the subject since the existing literature on Kenya's foreign policy appears inadequate for answering the above question. The present study is intended as response to the above necessity. To allege that Kenya is non-aligned or not non-aligned without a detailed study only compounds the problem. Most scholars interested in the subject have, it appears, only been looking at particular events and issues in isolation, from which they make conflicting conclusions.

Our task in this study is to take a long term

view of Kenya's non-alignment and to study the problem issue by issue in order to affirm or disprove all or some of the allegations that have been made about Kenya's pursuit of non-alignment in her international relations. Some of these allegations can be seen when one looks at the literature on Kenya's pursuit of non-alignment.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Whereas there is a growing body of literature on Kenya's foreign policy in general, very little has been done by way of detailed analysis of Kenya's non-alignment.¹³ Her non-alignment is usually mentioned in passing when dealing with the country's general foreign policy, and in most cases, the usefulness of the available analysis are constrained by at least five factors.

First, in some analyses Kenya's non-alignment is not viewed as capable of changing over time. Since non-alignment is a prescription for international behaviour, a country applying the principle at a given time may stop doing so at another, and vice versa. Secondly, some analyses consider only some aspects of non-alignment. Still others appear not to recognise that non-alignment has many aspects, and instead talk of it as a principle with only a single manifestation.

Third, some authors appear to draw their conclusions from a country's membership of the N-AM and whether or not that country's political leaders say that they are non-aligned.¹⁴ Lastly, some analyses lack sound analytical frameworks.

A general categorization of the literature on Kenya's non-alignment reveals at least four schools of thought. First, there are those who seem to share the view that Kenya has been non-aligned at certain periods. Orwa, Makinda, Hveem and Willetts appear to belong to this category.¹⁵

D. Katete Orwa argues that "Kenya adopted and has pursued the policy of non-alignment. But non-alignment has been honoured only when it serves national interests of the state". He goes on to write that "Kenya's leaders have always considered traditional links with the West as being in the best interest of the country" and that "the granting of military facilities to the United States in 1980 was basically a high point in a pro-Western policy which emerged with the state of Kenya in 1963".¹⁶

He is implying that at times Kenya has adopted positions incompatible with non-alignment and that a country can be non-aligned and at the same time be pro-one of the Cold War blocs in some ways. These suggestions by Orwa are significant enough to warrant

further investigations. His views on Kenya's position with regard to non-alignment are, however, more explicitly brought out in an article in which he compares the interpretation and practice of non-alignment in Kenya and Tanzania.¹⁷ Orwa identifies two phases in Kenya's pursuit of non-alignment. The first, 1964 to 1966, was characterised by attempts to balance Kenya's transactions between the East and the West. The second phase started in 1966 and, apparently, was still in existence by the end of 1986. This phase, according to Orwa, has been characterised by a "coincidence of interests between Kenya and market economies" and, Kenya has "entrenched its Western links" while weakening those with the East.¹⁸

Whereas Orwa does not spell it all out, by stating that he takes "a non-aligned country to be one which makes concerted efforts to balance her transactions more or less between the East and the West"¹⁹ and by implying that Kenya's efforts to balance her transactions between the two blocs ceased after 1966, he is implicitly suggesting that Kenya's non-alignment ended after 1966. These assertions and suggestions made by Orwa require further investigation. The present study is an attempt to fulfill this.

Samuel M. Makinda, in an article apparently comparing Kenya's foreign policy of upto 1979 with

that of after 1980, does not explicitly give his position with regard to whether Kenya is non-aligned or not although he states that "her granting of military facilities to the United States in 1980 drew her into Cold War politics, and, to some extent, damaged her image in non-aligned circles".²⁰ Makinda does not explain clearly what he means by this. He appears to have fallen into the trap of judging Kenya's non-alignment exclusively on the basis of military relations. This probably explains why he argues that "until she (Kenya) granted these (military) facilities (to the US) it had been non-aligned playing an independent role in world affairs".²¹ Despite the apparent shortcomings in Makinda's argument, his allegation about Kenya being drawn into Cold War politics and thus ceasing to be non-aligned only after 1980 is, however, serious enough to warrant investigation, especially in view of Orwa's apparent contention that Kenya ceased to be non-aligned after 1966. Our study covers the two years and, hopefully, clears the air.

Helge Hveem and Petter Willetts, in their quite important methodological work, also briefly touch on Kenya's non-alignment.²² One of their conclusions is that Kenya was a "trully" non-aligned country upto the time they conducted the analyses (about 1970).²³ The validity of this conclusion depends on at least three factors: the representativeness of the indices which

Hveem and Willetts employed, the way they analysed their data, and the conclusions' correspondence to reality. Two of these factors may be questioned in relation to Hveem and Willetts' conclusions about Kenya.

The conclusion that between 1963 and 1970 Kenya was "trully" non-aligned is quite interesting in view of the fact that parliamentary debates over the nature of the country's non-alignment had ended inconclusively in 1969. Quite a number of politicians in Kenya strongly expressed the belief that the KANU Government had backed down on its pledge to pursue the principle, and these politicians presented some very convincing arguments.²⁴ What therefore strikes an observer is that while Kenya was in the throes of a crisis over non-alignment among other issues, Hveem and Willetts' analysis indicated that Kenya was trully-aligned. It is true that the opinions of the dissenting politicians may have been wrong, however, some scholars have also expressed the opinion that Kenya's non-alignment around, the end of the 1970s was doubtful.²⁵ All in all, there appears to be grounds for doubting Hveem and Willetts' conclusion's correspondence to what was actually happening in Kenya.

This leads to the second point. If it is true that their conclusion does not tally with the reality

of the time, it then appears that Hveem and Willetts did not employ representative indices for their analysis of non-alignment, having probably been carried away by too much enthusiasm for a quantitative analysis. Our study is therefore timely for affirming or dispelling these fears about the inadequacies in Hveem and Willetts' analysis.

Looking at the above category of literature in perspective, it is evident that whereas Orwa, Makinda, Hveem and Willetts share the view that Kenya has been non-aligned at certain periods, they do not seem to agree on the exact time. Hveem and Willetts suggest that Kenya was non-aligned at least up to 1970, while Orwa implies that the country's attempts at being non-aligned ended in 1966. Makinda, however, seems to suggest that she was non-aligned until 1980. Orwa apparently deviates from the above category when he expresses the view that with regard to certain aspects of non-alignment, Kenya has at times been behaving in an aligned manner. This view brings him into an affinity with the second category of literature which comprises the views expressed by G.F. Wekesa and John J. Okumu.

Apparently G.F. Wekesa's 1977 analysis is the only work to-date that has dealt solely with Kenya's non-alignment.²⁶ This work, which attempts to give

the subject a long-term perspective - it covers thirteen years - is seemingly concerned with establishing whether Kenya is predisposed to the Western - or Eastern bloc countries. However, there is no indication about the quality of data used. Neither is Wekesa clear on his analytical framework, apart from vaguely mentioning that non-alignment can be studied using the 'communications approach'. He does not attempt to apply this approach in his analysis. Moreover, Burton, upon whose arguments Wekesa has relied for saying that this approach is suitable for analysing non-alignment, clearly says that the 'communications approach' - which is quite useful for analysing the relations in a community of interest in which power is not the major consideration - would be appropriate for analysing the relations between members of the N-AM.²⁷ Wekesa, however, ignores this and purports that he can use the approach to analyse whether a single country, Kenya is non-aligned. We therefore contend that whereas he correctly identifies economic factors, military relations, political and cultural factors as valid indicators of non-alignment, Wekesa's faulty basis of analysis renders his conclusions to be of little value.

It should also be noted that Wekesa's conclusion is that Kenya is closer to the West. But since the title of his study is "Kenya's Policy of Non-alignment"

one would have expected him to relate this proximity to the West to Kenya's non-alignment, since closeness to one Cold War camp or the other does not by itself negate a country's non-alignment. Virtually all the members of the N-AM are close to one Cold War bloc or the other in one or more ways. Therefore if 'closeness' were to be the only criterion, then the question of whether or not a country is non-aligned would not arise, for all the one hundred and one member-states of the N-AM would be considered not non-aligned willy nilly.

Finally, if one were to give Wekesa the benefit of doubt- since very little has been written on Kenya's non-alignment so far - still it is nearly a decade since he conducted his study. Within that time Kenya got a new president whose views may not be identical with those of his predecessor about non-alignment, Kenya negotiated a military agreement with a super power, and other such significant developments have taken place. It therefore becomes necessary to give Kenya's non-alignment an updated look. The present study has attempted this, having in mind the shortcomings in Wekesa's dissertation.

John J. Okumu's articles written at the beginning of and in mid-1970s, however, throw considerable light on Kenya's non-alignment.²⁸ He argues

that whereas non-alignment remains a major tenet in Kenya's foreign policy its "principle and practice" have clashed, especially because of the realities and dictates of underdevelopment. Okumu goes on to write that "... Kenya's pragmatic orientation to the practice of non-alignment..." probably stems from her close ties with Western capitalism through private and public capital inflows into the country from the West. To him "Kenya's position seems to be that it is possible to be economically aligned but ideologically non-committed on Cold War issues" and he justifies this by saying that whereas Kenya "...maintains economic, cultural and other ties with one or the other of the major powers..." she "... rejects military bases belonging to ideologically committed nations on her soil...(and guards) against entangling herself in agreements, military alliances and pacts that limit her freedom of action in international affairs".²⁹

In view of Kenya's maintenance of a military agreement with Britain (the UK) which is a member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and in view of Kenya's granting of military facilities to the US Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) in 1980, it may be argued that Okumu's analysis of Kenya's position on non-aligned is simply wrong, or that it has been overtaken by events. As Makinda has indicated, the granting of military facilities to a super power and

for that matter to a committed Cold War country like the UK amounts to taking sides in Cold War politics.³⁰ Orwa has also expressed similar sentiments.³¹

Moreover, Kenya's military agreements have mostly been made with the Western bloc states especially with Britain and, increasingly, with the US. She has been known to reject opportunities to diversify sources of military aid, for example when she rejected Soviet-donated arms in 1965.³² This kind of international behaviour may make the Eastern bloc countries look upon her with suspicion, which would then limit her exercise of freedom of action that the principle of non-alignment seeks to attain. It is therefore necessary to re-appraise Kenya's non-alignment in the light of the new developments in Kenya's relations with the bloc states which have direct bearing on the country's pursuit of non-alignment. Our study offers a new opportunity for looking at the subject from a much wider perspective.

A third category of the literature on Kenya's non-alignment, which features John Howell's article "An Analysis of Kenya's Foreign Policy" in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Volume 6, number 1, 1986) seemingly holds that Kenya is a non-aligned state simply because she belongs to the N-AM and because the country's leaders have been saying so. This assumption

on the part of Howell leads him to directly embark on a discussion of what he considers to be Kenya's brand of non-alignment. There is therefore a further assumption that a given country's non-alignment is not necessarily the same as another's. This latter assumption may be true, but possibly only in a country's interpretation of non-alignment which in, any case, should not contradict the mainstream or official interpretation of non-alignment by the N-AM. Otherwise, a country's interpretation of non-alignment may itself set her on a course of behaviour not compatible with the expected non-aligned behaviour.

Therefore, in spite of the possible truth in Howell's statement that "... for Kenya, non-alignment... (seen as) a renunciation of diplomatic and military alignment with a major power... while (as could have been the case in 1968 when Howell wrote) East Africa remains of minor strategic value to the big powers, and while sensitive African... nationalism deter outside involvement..., has little relevance..."³³ the point is that Howell should have first determined with reasonable certainty whether or not Kenya is actually non-aligned. He seems to have been carried away by official proclamations to such an extent that he failed to realise that these could be statements which have no place when Kenya conducts her foreign policy. If this judgement of Howell's analysis is correct, then

the views he has expressed appear to be useful in understanding the official government line on non-alignment and not for understanding the application of the same in Kenya's foreign policy.

The final category is the school which apparently argues that the interpretation of non-alignment by Kenya's political leaders has not been uniform. Ngunjiri's dissertation belongs to this group.³⁴ The purpose of N. Ngunjiri's study was to analyse the role of Kenya's parliamentary backbenchers in the formulation of Kenya's foreign policy, in the process of which analysis he touched on Kenya's non-alignment. The picture which emerges from his analysis shows a pro-non-alignment backbench pitted against a frontbench inclined towards greater alignment with the West. This war of words over the meaning of non-alignment among Kenya's parliamentarians raged until the end of the 1960's when the pro-West group apparently won after the opponents either crossed the floor or ended in detention.

For the purpose of Ngunjiri's study, the analysis may be sufficient. But if one were to read between the lines with the intention of emerging with an understanding of Kenya's interpretation and application of non-alignment, his work offers very little. This points to a significant fact. The studies dealing

with other aspects of Kenya's foreign policy usually do not provide adequate information on Kenya's pursuit of non-alignment. Moreover, some of the conclusions which can be arrived at may be misleading. For example, it may be correct - as Ngunjiri's study may make one believe - that the disagreements between Kenyan parliamentarians had a lot to do with non-alignment. However, since non-alignment can be subjected to different - and even opposing - interpretations what may be more true is that there was a conflict in interpretation and in the end one interpretation triumphed. But even this is a mere allegation which can only be proved or dismissed by research. The present study attempts also to contribute in this direction.

The above review of literature indicates that students of international politics have made several suggestions and assertions about Kenya's pursuit of the principle of non-alignment, and these require further investigations to ascertain their validity. Hveem and Willetts have suggested that Kenya was non-aligned at least upto 1970, while Orwa has implied that her non-alignment ended in 1966. Makinda argues, however, that she was non-aligned until 1980.

Both Wekesa and Okumu seem to concur that Kenya has been closer to the West, and the latter explicitly says she has been so in economic terms; Orwa also seems

to share the same view. Okumu, however, goes on to suggest that Kenya has been non-aligned in certain respects and aligned in others. Finally, Ngunjiri's dissertation suggests that the first decade of Kenya's independence was characterised by conflicting interpretations of non-alignment among Kenya's political leaders, and further suggests that these conflicting interpretations might have come to an end at some stage. However, he does not identify that stage. It is the inconclusiveness of these studies that has made the present one necessary.

NON-ALIGNMENT: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The contemporary world is mainly composed of units called 'states'. A state may be defined as a "body of people politically organized under one government with sovereign rights and recognised by other states as having legal status". Each state possesses "exclusive legal jurisdiction... within its territory and... freedom to act in international affairs without being subject to any legal control by another sovereign state". States "have to carry on some of their activities in the world environment. Thus they not only come into contact with each other on their own continent, but they also interact with nation-states in other continents."³⁵

If a system is defined as a set of elements or units which interact in some way, constitute a totality, demonstrate a specific structure and are set off from their environment by some kind of boundary,³⁰ then the global interaction of states may justifiably be referred to as a system of states since it exhibits most, if not all, of the characteristics of a system. The system of states is part of a "World-wide interaction (which may be referred to as) the international system".³⁷ Because they operate within the international system, states act as they do because of the nature of the international system, or because of the role which they have been assigned or have chosen to play within the system.³⁸

An analysis of the behaviour of an individual state in relation to other units of the international system properly begins with the identification of the main feature of the international system, which as it were, is the conspicuous absence of:

... a central authority to regulate activities and arbitrate between the conflicting interests of nation-states which constitute the main units operating within it. Thus the relations which nation-states have with each other are characterised by conflict and cooperation.³⁹

A state's survival and safety within the international system therefore requires that she possesses

an ability to withstand the conflicts with other actors in the system and to manipulate her cooperation with them to serve her own perceived interests. This ability is Power. Thus, "in the international system power considerations are of immense importance."⁴⁰ Therefore, as J.W. Burton has pointed out, "states depend for their existence upon, and achieve their objective by power."⁴¹

Power is not only important for the existence and the achievement of objectives of states, but, indeed, is a basic 'bio-psychological' drive in man. Bertrand Russell, who saw man as having a natural "impulse to power", once wrote that "Of the infinite desires of man, the chief are the desires for power and glory". He went on to say that "inequality in the distribution of power has always existed in human communities, as far back as our knowledge extends", and that the weaklings in human society will always "willingly follow a leader... with a view of acquisition of power". Russell also added that "to those who have but little power..., it may seem that a little more would satisfy them, but in this they are mistaken: (this desire is) insatiable and infinite..."⁴² Arguing along these lines, one may justifiably go on to say that by virtue of the fact that states are themselves social institutions, they are also essentially driven by the desire for power for the most part.

The concept 'power' has been variously defined. For the purposes of the present study, however, power is the ability of a state to influence the behaviour of other actors in the international system so as to conform to the given state's own perception of what constitutes a desirable behaviour pattern conducive for the achievement of her own national interests.⁴³

Because their existence and achievement of objectives depend on it, each state seeks power over the other actors in the international system, who, in turn, also seek power. This is why "the behaviour of states in the international system can be best understood... as a struggle for power". This struggle is universal in time and space and "is a fact of experience" which "overrides all other factors." Every government is pre-occupied with this struggle, and every government must adjust its actions to its power requirements".⁴⁴

In all its forms, social power (and hence state power, since states are social institutions) is composed of two fundamental aspects: physical and psychocultural.⁴⁵ Any or both aspects of state power may be derived from any or all of the following capabilities: size of population, strategic position, geographic extend, economic resources and industrial production, administrative and financial efficiency,

educational and technological skills, and moral cohesion.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, the preponderant determinants of a state's international power may be summed up under economic and/or military might.⁴⁷

In the power relations between states there is a continuous search for a power equilibrium; an equilibrium perceived as 'balanced power'.⁴⁸ The balance of power system is a regulatory mechanism through which the actors in the international system "preserve their identity, integrity, and independence through the balancing process."⁴⁹ The balance of power system functions to prevent the establishment of a universal hegemony by one state, preserves the constituent elements of the system and the system itself, insures stability and mutual security in the international system, and strengthens and prolongs international peace by deterring war through the likelihood that a policy of expansionism would meet with the formation of a counter-coalition. The methods and techniques which have been used to maintain and restore international balance include creation of buffer states, formation of alliances, creation of spheres of influence, intervention, diplomatic bargaining, legal and peaceful settlement of disputes, reduction of armaments, arms race and war itself.⁵⁰

The emergence of a loose bi-polar international

system (to use the second of Morton A. Kaplan's models) in the post-second world war (WW-II) period has resulted in a balance of power consisting of two 'hub' states, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., each of which is at the centre of a global alliance consisting of 'core allies' and 'peripheral allies'. The Soviet Union and the United States with their respective allies - core and peripheral - constitute two Cold War blocs: the East and the West respectively. Outside the respective Cold War alliances of the two Super Powers are the non-bloc states for whose favour the United States and the Soviet Union compete.⁵¹

At the roots of the Cold War inter-bloc rivalry is the apparent irreconcilability of two world ideologies - communism (also referred to as Scientific Socialism) and capitalism - the chief protagonists of which are the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. respectively. A conference held in Moscow during the October of 1944 divided Europe into two spheres of influence, with the west going to the United States and the UK, while the eastern side fell under the Soviet Union. This gave birth to the terms 'the West' and 'the East', with it being recognised that the former camp practices and defends the capitalist system, while the latter does so with communism. The two terms have, however been extended to include the major industrialised

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capitalist countries within the term 'the West' irrespective of their geographic position on the globe; and included within 'the East' are the industrialised countries pursuing the communist socio-economic and political arrangements.⁵²

Not belonging to the two Cold War camps are the non-bloc states, the latter which may generally be grouped under two headings: the Neutrals and the Non-Aligned. 'The neutral states', such as Switzerland and Austria, profess and attempt to put in practice non-involvement in international conflicts, and instead prefer an international behaviour bordering on passivity and isolationism.⁵³ 'The non-aligned states', on the other hand have declared that, whereas they desire to belong to neither of the Cold War blocs, they intend to play an "active, positive and constructive" role in international affairs with the objective of attaining "collective peace on which alone collective security can really rest."⁵⁴

A majority of the Non-Aligned states emerged from colonialism at the height of the Cold War in the late 1950's and early 1960's. During this period the very independence and sovereignty of the small, weak and newly independent states were threatened by the declaration of the superpowers that all states had to take sides in the Cold War. Already in Europe

most of the small and weak states had - some of them unwillingly - been drawn by the vortices at Washington and Moscow as a part of the Cold War power calculations of the big two. It appeared that no part of the world was too remote for cold war intrigues. The United States and Britain, for example, were signing treaties of military alliances with strong and weak states alike all over the globe as a part of their geo-political power calculations, to compensate for the West's weakness in conventional military strength compared to that of the Soviet-led East.

In the face of these developments, the Afro-Asian States - most of which had just gained independence and, therefore, still highly charged with nationalistic fervour - joined hand with Yugoslavia from Europe and some Latin American states to find a means of maintaining their sovereignty and independence. The result was the Non-Aligned Movement which comprised states professing the principle of non-alignment. The states that officially adopted this principle as the main tenet in their foreign policies expressed their unwillingness to automatically take sides in the cold war rivalries for fear of losing their ability to make independent decisions and take independent actions, and being involved in conflicts that could jeopardize their security.⁵⁵ Since power is the means by which these aspirations could be achieved, the adoption of

the principle of non-alignment should be seen as an attempt to increase bargaining power of the weak states vis-a-vis the Great Powers who have banded themselves into two hostile camps.

Non-Aligned states' method of seeking power in the international arena is largely influenced by lack of sufficient military and economic capabilities. In a majority of them, unexploited economic resources may be there, but the low level of industrial production, a relative financial and administrative inefficiency, and lack of educational and technical skills prevent the translation of the resources into economic and military might. Therefore, in spite of the fact that some of them are quite highly populated and occupy large land masses, their international power is quite minimal.

Therefore, of the sources of international power, what remain are the strategic positions of some of them in relation to Cold War rivalries, and moral strength. The principle of non-alignment effectively excludes the utilization of the former since the Non-Aligned countries view being mere chips in any Great Power international strategy not only as a compromise of national independence and sovereignty, but also a security risk despite any gains that may accrue as a result of military and other strategic identification

with the Great Powers.

The Non-Aligned states have, therefore, apparently decided to rely on moral suasion and political pressure as alternatives to identification with the power blocs. They seek to acquire moral political power by making "concerted effort(s) to balance all (their) transactions more or less between the East and the West".⁵⁶ This way they hope to retain their independence of choice and action, and security in the face of inter-bloc power struggle. At the same time, the Non-Aligned countries hope to be in a position where they can derive economic aid from countries on both sides of the cold war. Also through balancing, they hope to maintain friendly relations with both blocs and hence play the role of maintaining an equilibrium between them. This would enhance international peace, which the Non-Aligned states believe is a 'sine qua non' for their existence, security and development.

To sum up what has been discussed in the present section, the following may be said: The present study analyses non-alignment within the framework of Power-Theory, a theory of international relations which explains international politics in terms of the historically and universally apparent undeniability of the existence of power struggle among states and these states' continuous attempts at establishing some kind

of balance of power between and among themselves. In this light, non-alignment may be analysed as a principle of foreign policy through which the militarily and economically less powerful states unwilling to join the opposing alliances of the powerful states seek to maintain their independence and sovereignty by balancing their transactions between the East and the West.

STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESIS⁵⁷

The world is made up of the powerful and the weak states, both of which always attempt to increase their power. As Bertrand Russell has stated, the weak in society - in this case the society of states - are usually willing to ally with the powerful in the hope that some of the power of the stronger will this way rub off onto them.⁵⁸ If this is a correct analysis of how most weak states have always behaved in their search for power, then it appears that non-alignment is an attempt by some weak states to deviate from what seems to be a natural course of action open to them if they want to survive; namely allying with the powerful states. In respect to the post WW-II bi-polar international system, this would mean allying either with the Western or with the Eastern bloc.

The weak states that have adopted the principle of non-alignment apparently intend to join neither

side. These states appear to have forgotten that possession of nuclear weapons notwithstanding, the superpowers and other great powers always try to use the weak states to increase their bloc power. For example, the weak states are still important with regard to geo-political considerations in the superpower conventional military strategies; they are sources of raw materials, markets for surplus products, and areas of investment of surplus capital; and they provide new areas of ideological expansion. Therefore, there appears to be very limited grounds for the assumption that the Non-Aligned states will be left alone. In fact, the superpowers and their allies are always trying to persuade them - by force and/or by peaceful methods - to join their camps.

The other area in which the Non-Aligned states seem to be at error is in their apparent belief that they are performing a vital role in maintaining an equilibrium between the two giant contending blocs. More important in the balancing of power between the two cold war camps is the number of the nuclear warheads commanded by each, and the ability to successfully deliver them on enemy targets, rather than the support given by the non-bloc states. As Partha Chatterjee has observed, the kind of situation that may have enabled the Non-Aligned states to perform the

role of maintaining an equilibrium between the power blocs is "something that has become a complete anachronism after the World War Two".⁵⁹

Basing oneself on the above arguments, it appears that neither of the power blocs has any stakes in respecting or ensuring that any of the Non-Aligned countries status of non-alignment is respected. In their pursuit of more power the blocs will trample on the sovereignty and independence of these weak states with impunity as long as they perceive that such actions are in their interests. The governing elite of the Non-Aligned countries may, therefore, continue to profess their desire to be genuinely non-aligned, however the dictates of 'realpolitik' will in many cases force them to identify with one bloc or the other.

The above observations have led us to tentatively conclude that attempts by the Non-Aligned states to balance their transactions between the two blocs may or may not succeed depending on the position of each of these countries in the strategic calculations of the superpowers and their allies (calculations which vary from time to time) and on the given country's perception of what constitute her vital interests in her relations with either or both of the cold war blocs.

Therefore, for the present study our hypothesis is:

That a state pursuing the principle of non-alignment in its foreign policy will adhere to some or all aspects of the principle from time to time.

METHOD OF ANALYSIS

For the present study 'a non-aligned country' is defined as a country which balances her transactions between the East and the West. To operationalise this definition the terms 'the East' and 'the West', 'balancing', and 'transactions' will be given precise definitions.

To determine suitable analytic West and East, the patterns of cold war military alliances have been used as the basic guide. The alliances are:

- (i) The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) of 4th April, 1949;
- (ii) The Australia-New Zealand-US (ANZUS) Treaty of 1st September, 1951;
- (iii) The South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) of 8th September, 1954;
- (iv) The Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) of 15th April, 1955; and
- (v) The Warsaw Treaty Organisation (Warsaw Pact) of 14th May, 1955.⁶⁰

These alliances have at least two distinctively cold

war characteristics. First, except for CENTO (in which the US is strategically an "observer/associate member" since 1959), the superpowers are signatories and, indeed, the initiators of these military alliances. Secondly, each of these alliances has a collective defence clause implicitly for measures to contain any possible future attacks from the opposite cold war camp.⁶¹

Therefore, because the US is the power behind NATO, ANZUS, SEATO, and CENTO, members of these treaty organizations are in effect members of the Western cold war bloc, and hence they constitute 'the West'.⁶² Similarly, because the Soviet Union is the power behind the Warsaw Pact the signatories to that treaty are members of the Eastern bloc, and hence they constitute 'the East'.⁶³ There are, however, countries which may be considered as special cases, and which, for the present study, are excluded from or included in the two blocs.

We have excluded from the two blocs members of the N-AM who are signatories to any of the above cold war military alliances on the grounds that membership to Non-Aligned Movement is an expression of a desire to be excluded from bilateral or regional defence arrangements concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts and assent to attempt to adhere to the criteria

of non-alignment that emerged from the 1961 Cairo Preparatory Meeting.⁶⁴

The other special cases are the two Koreas and the two Chinas, Japan, South Africa, Israel, Byelorussia, Mongolia, and Ukraine. A look at the voting records of Byelorussia, Mongolia, and Ukraine in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly between 1964 and 1985, inclusive, reveals that these three states have in all cases voted with the Warsaw Pact countries.⁶⁵ This points to their total identification with the Warsaw Pact and therefore justifies their inclusion in the Eastern bloc. Similarly, the close socio-political, economic and military identification of Nationalist China (Taiwan) Japan, South Africa, Israel, and South Korea with the Western countries, and North Korea with the Warsaw Pact has determined their inclusion in the Western and Eastern blocs respectively.⁶⁶

The Peoples Republic of China (PRC), however presents a special problem. Following the Sino-Soviet split starting in mid-1950s, the PRC ceased to be a Soviet ally. Still she was not acceptable to the Western allies due to her pursuit of communism. The West continued to band her together with the Eastern bloc as an enemy of the West. Therefore, in the present study the PRC has been listed under 'the East'.

In a nutshell, in this analysis 'the West' and

'the East' have been taken to refer to the following countries :

1. The West

Belgium	Italy	Britain	Israel	Thailand
Denmark	Luxembourg	Australia	Japan	Turkey
France	Netherlands	Canada	Philippines	South Korea
Greece	Norway	New - Zealand	South Africa	West Germany
Iceland	Spain	United States	Taiwan	Portugal

2. The East

Albania	Hungary	Ukraine
Bulgaria	Mongolia	U.S.S.R.
Byelorussia	Poland	North Korea
Czechoslovakia	Rumania	China (PRC)
East Germany (GDR)		

The other term is transaction. A Non-Aligned country is expected to balance her transactions between the East and the West. Paraphrased, this can be taken to mean that a Non-Aligned state is expected to balance

her relations to the West with those to the East in relation to particular aspects of international intercourses. Using the utterances of the Non-Aligned leaders and the documents emanating from the proceedings of the N-AM, Helge Hveem and Peter Willetts have correctly identified the aspects as military, economic, diplomatic, and voting in the UN General Assembly (UNGA).⁶⁷ However, in an attempt to find a basis for analysing "the two possible types of behaviour" - verbal and non-verbal - they propose to use and use voting in the UNGA as an indicator of verbal behaviour.⁶⁸

In our study, voting in the UNGA has been taken as an integral part of non-verbal behaviour of a non-aligned country. The 1970 Lusaka Declaration clearly states in part, that "the promotion of multilateral diplomacy within the framework of the UN..." is part and parcel of expected non-aligned behaviour.⁶⁹ A quantitatively measurable way by which the Non-Aligned states can promote the UN framework is by maintaining non-commitment to cold war intrigues through non-partisan voting in the UNGA. This would ensure that both the East and the West feel secure to conduct multilateral diplomacy within the framework of the UN, and would possibly give the UN system a new lease of life. Further to this, because voting in the UNGA is part and parcel of multilateral diplomacy, we have

decided to include its analysis within the diplomatic aspects of non-alignment.

The existence of verbal behaviour is, nevertheless, acknowledged in the present study, and to facilitate its analysis government policy documents and statements and other recorded utterances of a country's leaders on international issues that are of interest to the Non-Aligned Movement, namely, military, economic, and diplomatic issues, have been taken as valid means of arriving at a reasonable determinations of a country's verbal non-aligned behaviour. After all, even a strictly quantitative means of determining verbal behaviour, such as that employed by Hveem and Willetts is (as they themselves admit) still subject to "... a certain amount of lip service..." just in the same way utterances and statements of a country's leadership are.⁷⁰

It should be noted that in the present analysis the verbal aspects of Kenya's non-aligned behaviour has been taken to refer to the country's interpretation of non-alignment, while the non-aligned non-verbal behaviour has been taken to be synonymous with the application of non-alignment. Because of a given country's application of non-alignment, the present study seeks to analyse the interpretation and application of non-alignment in Kenya as a means of establi-

shing whether or not Kenya has been non-aligned.

In a nutshell, the transactions which a Non-Aligned country is expected to balance between the East and the West, and which consequently determines whether or not a country applies the principles of non-alignment in her international behaviour, are military transactions, economic transactions, and diplomatic transactions (bilateral and multilateral within the UNGA). Last, is the term balancing. A Non-Aligned state is expected to balance its transactions between the East and the West. In our study, this term has been used at two levels. First it is used with reference to a Non-Aligned country's transaction of individual aspects of the principle of non-alignment, namely, military, economic and diplomatic aspects. Secondly, 'balancing' is used in the overall evaluation of non-alignment when all aspects are put together. In order that a country ~~be~~ considered non-aligned at one level it generally has to show non-alignment in each of the aspects, and at another it has to exhibit non-alignment when all the aspects are put together.

At first level, balancing has been used to the mean that a country has to conduct its transactions between the West and the East in such a way that for each individual aspects of non-alignment it does not appear that she favours either of the blocs, in the

sense that she deals approximately equally with both sides. If it is determined that there is more weight in her dealings with one side then she will be considered as not non-aligned with regard to the aspect in question.

Arithmetically, non-alignment with respect to any of the aspects may, therefore, be expressed as follows:

If 'dealings with the West' are designed as 'x' and 'dealings with the East' as 'y', then for a country to be considered non-alignment in any of the aspects of the principle of non-alignment: $-x+y$ should equal zero (0).

Zero (0) denotes 'a balance' and hence non-alignment while any deviation from zero (0) indicates 'an imbalance' and hence lack of non-alignment.

At the second level of analysis, 'balancing' has been extended to the evaluation of all the aspects to determine the overall non-alignment. As indicated above, the aspects of non-alignment are:

1. Military aspects (t)
2. Economic aspects (u)
3. Diplomatic aspects:
 - (i) bilateral diplomatic relations (v)
 - (ii) multilateral diplomatic dimensions: UNGA voting (w).

Ideally, a Non-Aligned country is expected to balance between the East and the West in each of these aspects. Therefore, if 'non-alignment' in each of the aspects is awarded a score of positive one (+1) and 'alignment' a negative one (-1); then:


1. $(t) + (u) + (v) + (w)$ should equal positive four (+4) to denote complete overall non-alignment;
2. Conversely, if the total score is negative four (-4) this denotes complete overall alignment.

However, it is possible that in some of these aspects a country may be non-aligned and not non-aligned in others. In such a case, we have decided that a total score of zero (0) when the scores of all the aspects are put together also denotes complete overall non-alignment, since such a state has successfully 'balanced' the four aspects of non-alignment.⁷¹ We have also introduced the concept 'moderate' with reference to two sets of positions. Moderate overall non-alignment refers to the positions between 0 and +4, and moderate overall alignment to between 0 and -4.

A final note is that one of the possible moderating factors may occur when, for example, a given country may be aligned in all the four indices. However, it may happen that whereas she may be aligned, say with the West in three of the four indices, and aligned with

the East in the remaining one, 'the East' will cancel out one or the 'West' to leave a score of negative two (-2), which is moderate overall alignment.⁷²

To sum up the method of analysis used in the present study, the following diagram represents our method of determining the overall non-alignment, or otherwise, of a given country:



METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION

For the purpose of the present study two sets of information were required: first was information on Kenya's interpretation of non-alignment and any changes which may have occurred in this interpretation between 1963 and 1986; secondly was information on the country's application of the principle of non-alignment in the conduct of her relations with the bloc states. These sets of information were obtained both from primary and secondary sources.

The bulk of information was obtained from

secondary sources, namely: foreign policy documents; speeches of Kenya's leaders in the N-AM gatherings and their other speeches that have a bearing on non-alignment; official reports on parliamentary debates, documents and press releases of Kenya's ruling party, KANU; statistical information on the country's trade, aid and investments; statistics on purchase of military requirements by Kenya; and records of Kenya's UN activity especially voting in the UNGA.

Due to the fact that some official and other documents were not obtainable and that some interviewees were not available or unwilling to divulge the required information newspapers, magazines, journals, periodicals and books were used to supplement the above sources. They were particularly useful for providing information relating to actions and statements of Kenya's leaders with regard to non-alignment.

In terms of primary sources of information, informal interviews were conducted among government officials involved in international relations of Kenya. Some past and present ministers in the relevant ministries were interviewed, along with some senior civil servants in these ministries. The interviews were aimed at getting information pertaining to Kenya's interpretation of non-alignment, diplomatic relations, military policy, overall economic policy, and the

policy of the country at the United Nations.

GENERAL OUTLINE OF STUDY

The analysis of the data and information collected and the conclusions arrived at are detailed in the remainder of this study in the following order. We have started off with a discussion of the general aspects of non-alignment. This is followed by a look at Kenya's foreign policy in general and the place of non-alignment in this policy. Kenya's interpretation of the principle of non-alignment is also discussed in the same chapter. The three chapters which follow deal with her application of the principle, with each aspect of non-alignment discussed in a separate chapter. These aspects are military, economic, and diplomatic (bilateral and multilateral). Chapter Seven gives an overall evaluation of Kenya's pursuit of non-alignment, and this is followed by some conclusions and recommendation in the same chapter.

FOOTNOTES

1. For some analyses of the debates in Kenya's parliament over non-alignment see Ngunjiri, N: "The Interaction of Kenya's Parliament Backbenchers and the Kenya Foreign Policy" unpublished B.A. dissertation (University of Nairobi, 1974) especially pp.27-132; and Wekesa, G.F., "Kenya's Policy of Non-alignment" unpublished B.A. dissertation (University of Nairobi, 1977) especially pp.36-46 and 48-55.
2. Soon after independence Kenya Government expelled some Soviet and Chinese diplomats, the former for allegedly being KGB agents and the latter were accused of formenting a revolution in Kenya. See Africa Digest Vol. XIII NO.2 (Oct. 1965) p.32.
3. Two members of Kenya's Parliament, Koigi Wamwere and Mashengu wa Mwachofi, questioned whether the agreement with the US did not go against non-alignment. In response, a minister in Office of the President in charge of Internal Security, Justus Ole Tipis, said that Kenya's security arrangements cannot be a matter of public debate. See Daily Nation of 28th May, 1980 p.4 and of 31st March, 1982, p.4.
4. For example, in April of 1965, Okello-Odongo, then Kenya's Assistant Minister for Finance, said that to achieve non-alignment in Kenya's economic policy, she must bend a little more to the Eastern bloc "at the moment". Tom Mboya, then Minister for Economic Affairs, reacted to this by asserting that "... in our trade policy as well as in our economic, financial, and technical assistance agreements we are primarily concerned with economic development of Kenya and not with emotional and purely political consideration" (See Africa Digest Vol.XIII NO.6, June 1965 p.155).
5. See Platig, E.R., International Relations Research: Problems of Evaluation and Advancement. Santa Barbara: Clio Press, 1967 p.49.
6. The concept "theory" is understood to refer to generalized propositions or set of propositions designed to explain something with reference to

data or interrelations not directly observed or otherwise manifest (see Platig, E.R., Op.Cit., pp.50-51; and Arnold Bretcht: "Political Theory" in International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences Vol.11 and 12, New York: Macmillan Co. and the Free Press, 1968 p.). For purposes of clarity it is important to note that the contribution to theory building we are referring to is not the construction of a general theory of international relations such as Power Theory but rather to a theory designed only to explain the non-aligned behaviour of states professing the principle. This theory (the term is used in its narrower sense) is on the whole within the framework of the more inclusive power theory adopted for this study.

7. For example, see John Okumu: "Kenya's Foreign Policy" in Aluko, O. (ed), The Foreign Policies of African States London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977 p.158; Samuel M. Makinda, "From Quiet Diplomacy to Cold War Politics: Kenya's Foreign Policy" in Third World Quarterly Vol.5 NO.2 (April 1983) p.302; and D. Katete Orwa, "From Disequilibrium to Equilibrium: Kenya and Inter-state Relations in Eastern Africa" (Unpublished paper submitted to Africa Today Denver, Colorado), 1984 p.11.
8. Aluko O. (ed), Op.Cit. p.158.
9. D. Katete Orwa, op.Cit. p.10.
10. Samuel M. Makinda, op.cit., pp.300-319.
11. Timothy M. Shaw and M.C. Newbury in Delaney, M.W. (ed), Aspects of International Relations in Africa Bloomington: Africa Studies Program (Indiana University), 1979, pp.66-67.
12. Samuel M. Makinda, op.cit., pp.311-312.
13. Examples of the literature on Kenya's foreign policy are, J. Howell, "An Analysis of Kenya's Foreign Policy" in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Vol.6 No.1, 1968) pp.29-48; John J. Okumu, "Some thoughts on Kenya's Foreign Policy" in the African Review (Vol.3 NO.2, June 1973) pp.263-290;

John J. Okumu in Aluko, O. (ed) op.cit., pp.136-162; John J. Okumu; "Foreign Relations: Dilemmas of Independence and Development" in Barkan, J.D. and Okumu, J.J. (eds.) Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania Nairobi: Heinemann, 1979 pp.239-266; Ngunjiri, N., op.cit.; Samuel M. Makinda op.cit., p.300-319; and D. Katete Orwa, "From Disequilibrium to Equilibrium...etc." op.cit. Those on Kenya's non-alignment include Wekesa, G.F. op.cit.; and D. Katete Orwa, "Non-alignment: The East African Perspective" in Jinadu, L.A. and Mandaza, I. (eds) African Perspective on Non-alignment, Harare: Jongwe Press, 1986 pp.34-46.

14. Howell appears to be one of them. See John Howell op.cit., pp.34-36.
15. See the articles of D. Katete Orwa and Samuel M. Makinda already referred to in footnote 13 and Helge Hveem and Peter Willetts: "The Practice of Non-alignment: on the Present and Future of an International Movement" in Tandon, Y.A. and Chandarana, D. (eds) Horizons of African Diplomacy Nairobi: E.A.L.B., 1974, pp.1-44.
16. D. Katete Orwa, "From Disequilibrium to Equilibrium ..." op.cit., pp.10-11.
17. D. Katete Orwa in Jinadu, L.A. and Mandaza, I. (eds) op.cit., pp.39-46.
18. Ibid., p.45.
19. Ibid., pp.45-46.
20. Samuel M. Makinda, op.cit., p.300.
21. See D.Katete Orwa: "From Disequilibrium to Equilibrium..." op.cit., pp.11.
22. H. Hveem and P. Willetts in Tandon, Y.A. and Chandarana, D. (eds) op.cit., pp.1-44.
23. Ibid., p.23.

24. See Ngunjiri, N. op.cit., pp.90-91 for some of these arguments. Also refer to Odinga, A.O. Not Yet Uhuru: The Autobiography of Oginga Odinga London: Heinemann, 1967 p.285.
25. Refer to Orwa's views discussed above as an example.
26. Wekesa, G.F., op.cit.
27. Burton, J.W., International Relations: A General Theory London: O.U.P., 1967 pp.232-240. For further discussion on communications approach see Charlesworth, J.C. (ed) Contemporary Political Analysis, N. York: the Free Press, 1967, pp.273-316.
28. John J. Okumu's article in The African Review, op. cit., and in Aluko, O. (ed) op. cit.
29. Ibid., p.158.
30. See Samuel M. Makinda op.cit. p.300, especially his footnote 3.
31. D. Katete Orwa in Jinadu, L.A. and Mandaza, I.(eds) op.cit., p.46.
32. See Africa Digest Vol.XII No.6 (June 1965)p.155.
33. John Howell op.cit., p.35.
34. Ngunjiri, N., op.cit.
35. D.Katete Orwa, "Theories of International Relations" in Ojo, O.J.B.; Orwa D.K. and Utete, C.M.B. African International Relations N.York: Longman, 1985, pp.1-2.
36. John Beishon's definition has been relied on. See Technological Foundation Unit 1: Systems. Milton Keynes: the Open University Press, 1971, p.7-15.
37. Ojo, O.J.C.B. et al, op.cit., p.1.

38. Jacobson, H.K. and Zimmerman, W. (eds) The Shaping of Foreign Policy N. York: Atherton Press, 1969, pp.7-8.
39. Ojo, O.J.B. et al, op.cit., p.2.
40. Ibid.
41. Burton, J.W. op.cit., p.44. Also see pp.14-19 of the same book.
42. Russell, B., Power: A New Social Analysis (6th impressions) London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971, pp.7, 8 and 12.
43. For other definitions of 'power' and discussion of 'power theory' in general refer to Hoffman, S.H., (ed) Contemporary Theory in International Relations Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1960 pp.63-73; Spanier, J.W., Games Nations Play London: Praeger, 1972 pp.102-190; Morgenthau, H.J. Politics Among Nations (5th ed) N. York: Alfred A. Knoff, 1973, pp.22-44; Modelski, G., Principles of World Politics N. York: the Free Press, 1972; Dougherty, J.E. and Pfaltzgraff, R.L. Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey N. York: Harper and Row, 1981 pp.84-131; and Ojo, O.J.C.B., et al, op. cit., p.7-8.
44. Ojo, O.J.C.B. et al op.cit, pp.7-8.
45. Platig, E.R., op.cit., p.28.
46. Wight, M., Power Politics Leicester: L.U.P., 1978 p.26.
47. See Dougherty, J.E. and Pfaltzgraff, R.L., op.cit., pp.87 and 91.
48. Ojo, O.J.C.B. et al, op.cit., p.8.
49. Dougherty, J.E. and Pfaltzgraff, R.L., op.cit.p.25.

50. Ibid., p.25.
51. Ibid., pp.158 and 110. Also see D. Katete Orwa in Jinadu, L.A. and Mandaza, I. (eds) op.cit., pp.39-40.
52. See Calvocoressi, P. World Politics Since 1945 (4th ed) London: Longman, 1982, pp.2-21.
53. Rao, T.V.S., Non-alignment in International Politics and Law (2nd ed) N. Delhi: Deep and Deep, 1984, p.26.
54. From a joint communique issued at the end of Tito's visit to India in 1954-1955 (see Rao, T.V.S., op. cit., p.26).
55. See Legum, C. Pan Africanism: A Short Political Guide (Rev. ed) N. York: Praeger, 1960, p.60.
56. D. Katete Orwa in Jinadu, L.A. and Mandaza, I. (eds) op.cit., pp.45-46.
57. The term 'hypothesis' has been taken to refer to "a generalization presented in tentative and conjectural terms" (Bill, J.A. and Hardgrave, R.L., Comparative Politics: A Quest for Theory, Columbia Ohio: Merrill, 1973 p.24); a "Tentative assumption of facts or interrelations" (Arnold Bretcht, Political Theory" in International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences Vols.11 and 12, N. York: Macmillan and the Free Press, 1968); or a plausible statement of the expected outcome of a study.
58. Russell, B., op.cit., p.12.
59. Chatterjee, P., Arms, Alliances and Stability N.Delhi: Macmillan, 1975, p.200.
60. Although the 30th April 1948 Organization of American States (OAS) seems to belong to this category of treaties since it shares the same Cold War characteristics given below, we have decided to exclude it from 'the West' because of at least three reasons: the US's irresponsiveness to pressing Latin American needs has made the treaty cease to have any meaningful collective spirit to the contracting parties; Moscow's influence has been able to penetrate some of the member-states of the organization; and some of the Latin American countries have been trying to identify with the N-AM (refer to De'Madariaga, S. Latin America: Between the Eagle and Bear London: Hollis and Carter, 1962, pp. 121-128, 149-152 and 7-8).

61. From Article 3 of The North Atlantic Treaty (as amended by the Protocol of Accession of Greece and Turkey); "...the parties... will maintain and develop their collective capacity to resist armed attack".

Article II of Australia-New Zealand-US Treaty and Article 2 of The South-East Asian Treaty and Protocol have clauses identical to the above. Article 1 of Central Treaty Organisation also states that "...the High Contracting Parties will co-operate for their security and defence". Finally, Article 3 of the Warsaw Treaty states that:

"...Whenever any of the contracting parties considers that a threat of armed attack on one or more of the states parties to this Treaty has arisen, they shall consult together immediately with a view to providing for their joint defense and maintaining peace and security".

62. Members of NATO: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Britain, USA, Greece, Turkey, and West Germany (FRG).

Members of ANZUS: Australia, New Zealand, and USA.

Members of SEATO: Australia, France, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, Britain, and USA.

Members of CENTO: Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and Britain (US "Observer/Associate" member from 1959).

63. Members of Warsaw Pact: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany (GDR), Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and USSR.
64. See Jansen, G.H. Non-Alignment and Afro-Asian States N.York: Praeger, 1966, pp.285-286, for the criteria of non-alignment that emerged from the Cairo Preparatory Meeting of 5th-12th June, 1961.
65. See the 'Roll-calls' and the 'Recorded votes' in Yearbook of the United Nations N.York: UN Office of Public Information (annual issues from 1964 to 1985).
66. Peter Willetts also shares the view that they belong to the respective blocs. See Willetts, P. The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance London: Frances Pinter, 1978, p.253.

67. See H. Hveem and P. Willetts in Tandon, Y.A. and Chandarana, D. (eds) op.cit., pp.7-8. Also refer to Willetts, P. op.cit., pp.21-23.
68. Tandon, Y.A. and Chandarana, D. (eds) op.cit., pp.7-8.
69. Guy Martin: "Theory and Practice of Non-alignment: The Case of Francophone West and Central African States" in Jinadu, L.A. and Mandaza, I. (eds) op.cit., p.22.
70. Tandon, Y.A. and Chandarana, D. (eds) op.cit., p.8.
71. The following example shows how a score of zero can be arrived at: if a given country scores as follows: military (t) = -1; economic (u) = -1; diplomatic - bilateral (v) = +1; and diplomatic-UNGA voting (w) = +1, then (t)+(u)+(v)+(w) = 0.
72. The example may be illustrated arithmetically as follows:

Scores		Direction of alignment
Aspect	Score	
(t)	= -1	West
(u)	= -1	West
(v)	= -1	West)
(w)	= -1	East) } these two cancel each other out

Therefore, overall evaluation is:

$$(t) + (u) + (v) + (w) = -2 \text{ (which is moderate overall alignment).}$$

CHAPTER TWO

NON-ALIGNMENT - GENERAL ASPECTS

In discussing non-alignment, a distinction should be made between non-alignment as a principle "of foreign policy in individual countries" and the Non-Aligned Movement (N-AM) "as a collective movement in world politics" informally grouping certain "nations of Africa, Asia, Latin America, Europe and the Pacific" sharing some common principles and objectives.¹ The present study specifically deals with non-alignment as a principal of foreign policy in an individual state. However, it is imperative to have an overview of the Non-Aligned Movement because, as it has been put by some authors, "the common concerns (of the member-states of the N-AM) became the fundamental principles upon which the Non-Aligned countries base their decisions and activities."²

This chapter is aimed at putting the N-AM, and the common concerns of its member-states in perspective to form a background to the discussion of Kenya's pursuit of the principle. The following are therefore discussed: the historical and political background proceeding the birth of the N-AM, how the movement was created, its objectives, its development from 1961 to 1986, what constitute the principle of non-alignment, non-alignment in practice, and African perspectives on

on non-alignment. The chapter winds up with a look at how and why Kenya came to adopt the principle of non-alignment.

HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND

The circumstances leading to the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement arose in the immediate post-WW-II period, and were more or less products of two sets of development which took place following the conclusion of the War in 1945.

On one hand, military successes achieved against the major imperial powers in the War - Japan over Britain in South-East Asia and Germany over France in Europe - went along way in convincing the colonised that their colonisers were not invincible. This, coupled with increased agitation by colonized people of Africa and Asia, set the stage for a rapid process of decolonization. This process was lent legal force by the United Nations, whose charter expressed "respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples" and an even more decisive strength by an initial anti-colonial posture by both the United States and the Soviet Union. Consequently, a host of relatively weak states mushroomed all over the world. These states' legal standing in the international system was backed, not by military or economic power, but by the

UN which stressed "the principle of sovereign equality of all" states.³

Side by side with the emergence of these weak states was the advent of the cold war, whose "two central elements (were) Russo-American rivalry and the advent of nuclear weapons". The war-time co-operation between the then emerging superpowers hardly survived the two years after the end of the war. Indeed the shared hostility of the USSR and the US to European colonialism was one of the very few areas of agreement between them, and even this did not last, for the United States soon altered her posture. The Euro-American cold war alliance embodied in the NATO created a need for the US to support British, French, and the other European presence in Africa and Asia.⁴

The initial common anti-colonial stand by the two superpowers may be explained by the shift of international power centres from Europe to Moscow and Washington, a happening which reduced the European imperial powers from 'Great Powers' to 'Middle Powers', to borrow the terms used by Trygve Mathisen.⁵ The United States and the Soviet Union, therefore sought to have the colonised territories freed so that they themselves could spread their socio-economic and political influences in these parts of the globe. In addition to this reason, the United States also believed

that imperialism in the European sense had been one of the reasons why the WW-II was fought. Therefore its elimination was seen as essential for world peace.

Nevertheless, there was an emerging rivalry between these two superpowers. Initially, this rivalry was centred in Europe. The United States possession of the atomic bomb gave her a political weapon with which she sought to contain further spread of Soviet influence in Europe. At the same time, the leaders of the Soviet Union saw the United States possession of nuclear technology as a new threat to USSR's security, replacing the war-time German threat. Therefore, while the Soviet scientists were busy working on the atomic bomb - leading to the explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb in September of 1949 - Soviet soldiers continued to occupy territories they had conquered from Germany during the war, as a buffer in the event of United States' attack through Western Europe.

Thus the stage was set for Russo-American rivalry in Europe, a rivalry which saw the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation on 4 April 1949 by the US and her friends in Western Europe, and the Warsaw Pact later on 14 May 1955 by Moscow and her satellites in Eastern Europe. These developments culminated in the delienation and demarcation of Europe into spheres of influence for Moscow and

Washington, which was epitomized by the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1960. From 1947, through the 1950s upto the early 1960s the cold war raged with several incidents bringing the world to the brinks of a nuclear confrontation: these were the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1948, the 'siege of Berlin' between 1948 and 1949, the 'Hungary Crisis' in 1956, and 'the Cuban Missile Crisis' of 1962, to mention but some of the celebrated incidents.

The significance of the cold war was not lost to the leaders or the weak states in Europe and elsewhere including the African and Asian states that had in the meantime become independent. For example, the Soviet invasions of Prague and Budapest demonstrated to these leaders that the right of each state to follow its own chosen socio-economic and political course, was secondary to superpower interests.

In order to survive in the new bi-polar international set up some of the small powers decided to throw in their lot with the blocs - for example, Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Greece and Turkey in effect joined the Western alliance through a series of treaties with the United States and Britain. Other weak states such as Korea, and Vietnam in Asia, and Guatemala, Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Nicaragua

in Latin America, on the other hand apparently could not make up their mind nationally whether to ally with the East or with the West. This led to protracted civil wars and partly contributed to the bisection of Korea and Vietnam, each into two different states.

But there emerged yet another group of weak states, which Peter Calvocoressi calls "the Third World" because:

...it rejected the notion of a world divided into two, a world in which only the United States and the USSR counted and everybody else for the one or the other. It feared the power of the superpowers, exemplified and magnified by nuclear weapons. It distrusted their intentions, envied (particularly in the American case) their superior wealth and rejected their insistence that, in the one case in democratic capitalism and in the other in communism, they had discovered a way of life which others need do no more than copy... Moscow's rigid communist dogmatism and Washington's increasingly rigid anti-communism, offended them. Above all, they felt beholden neither to the United States nor to the USSR for their independence...⁷

This group of states decided to throw in their lot with neither superpower. The critical problem which faced them, however was how to make good their decision, since, as D. Katete Orwa has pointed out, "there was no doubt after 1949 that each of the superpowers wished to incorporate much of the uncommitted world into its own sphere of influence..."⁸ It was in

the process of looking for how to preserve their individual national sovereignty and independence that these third world states came up with the principle of non-alignment and the Non-Aligned Movement.

In a nutshell, the circumstances leading to the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement, and its accompanying principle of non-alignment, can be said to have derived directly from the developments after WW-II. This period was characterised on the one hand, by a mushrooming of relatively weak states and on the other by the cold war which presented these states with a threat to their sovereignty and independence, if not to their very existence. In the process of trying to wriggle out of this predicament, some of these states ended up forming the Non-Aligned Movement which espouses the principle of non-alignment.

Arguments by certain scholars that the origins of non-alignment may be traced back to an earlier period are only justifiable when one reads in the utterances of nationalists of colonised societies and leaders of less powerful states an attempt to evolve a set of ideas to guide their participation in a bi-polar international system dominated by the superpowers. In the same light, the often referred to April 1955 Asian-African Conference held at Bandung, Indonesia can be said to be a fore-runner of the N-AM since, as Peter

Willetts has put it, the conference was "an assertion of independence"⁹.

CREATION OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

As Peter Willetts has pointed out, "it is almost impossible to trace the evolution of ideas with any precision".¹⁰ One author has, however, pointed out that the term non-alignment came into being during 1953-1954 when it was firstly used in the United Nations by V.K. Krishna Menon, then India's representative at the U.N. The same author insists that by that time the "objectives, goals and meaning" of the term non-alignment "were already in the air", with the process of the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement having been set in motion around the same time.¹¹

Three leaders are closely associated with the initial stages of the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement. They are: Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt, India's Jawaharlal Nehru, and Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito.¹² These three held a series of bilateral meetings between 1954 and 1955, culminating in the Brione tripartite summit of July 1956 convened to discuss various international issues of the day. The fact that Tito and Nasser had managed to resist Great Power pressure in 1948 and 1956 respectively, and that Nehru had led India to gain independence from British

rule in the 1940s, made these three leaders enjoy considerable prestige in international circles, particularly among the less powerful states and among nationalists in non-independent territories. Their coming together at Brione, Yugoslavia therefore set off speculations that "a new Third World bloc was being formed."¹³

A year before the 1956 summit, a meeting of Afro-Asian states at Bandung had resolved to promote "goodwill and cooperation among the nations of Asia and Africa (in respect to) social, economic, and cultural problems". Other problems of "special interest" included racialism and colonialism, and "the position of Asia and Africa and their peoples in the world today and the contribution they can make to the promotion of world peace and cooperation." The Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) was also formed in December of the same year by Nasser and Asian communists at a meeting held in Cairo. These meetings led to a regularization of consultations among Asian and African leaders over the problems emanating from colonial heritage, threats or neo-colonialism, and the cold war.¹⁴

With Tito pursuing a policy of independence in relation to the two cold war blocs after 1955, the Afro-Asian group and Yugoslavia found themselves sharing

certain concerns, especially on security and international integrity. In an effort to surround Yugoslavia with a diplomatic buffer of sympathetic states, Tito therefore sought out allies in Asia and Africa by offering Yugoslav support for anti-colonial cause and by offering such token amounts of economic and technical assistance as he could afford. Conversely, the Afro-Asian states were attracted by the Yugoslav system of socialism buttressed by the United States' economic aid.¹⁵

Thus, by late 1950s there already had been established a rapport between Yugoslavia and some Afro-Asian states to an extent that their leaders could meet and discuss their perceived common problems within a generally homogeneous frame of thought. What was therefore missing was a push strong enough to make them formalize their consultations and give it a name. The push presented itself between late 1950s and 1961 in the form of two sets of developments on the African continent and in the Russo-American relations.

First, the 'Third World' group of states was boosted numerically by 1960 when several African states became independent. The independence of these states sharply contrasted with the ferocious colonialism and racism in, say, Algeria and South Africa. Elsewhere

on the continent, Great Power intervention in Congo (Kinshasa) showed the vulnerability of the new states and the disunity which could be caused among and within them if they got mixed up in cold war politics. These gave their leaders more impetus to look for ways of combating colonialism, neo-colonialism and racism. Secondly, the cold war hostilities intensified between 1960 and 1961 mainly as a result of the superpowers involvement in some Third World countries, and also because of new military confrontations between the superpowers in some parts of the world.

Despite the promise of peace between the United States and the Soviet Union following a meeting between Nikita Khrushchev of the USSR and the United States' president General Dwight Eisenhower, their two states almost came to actual military confrontation. Events contributing towards this included the collapse of a proposed Soviet-United States' talks following the shooting down of a United States' U-2 spy-plane in the Soviet Union, a growing tension around Berlin as a result of the construction of 'the Berlin Wall' in August 1961, superpower interventions in such states as Laos and Congo (Kinshasa), and the US pressure upon Cuba capped by disastrous 1961 'Bay of Pig invasion' and the ensuing Cuban Missile crisis of 1962.¹⁶

These tensions gave Tito an opportunity to

point out the dangers inherent in the cold war to the security and national integrity of the non-bloc states. On his initiative, a meeting - attended by Nasser, Nehru, Nkrumah of Ghana, Soekarno of Indonesia, and Tito himself - was organized by Yugoslavia at her permanent mission to the United Nations in New York in September, 1960 to discuss the tensions in World politics, especially the tensions between the US and the USSR. The following year, Tito extensively toured Africa to promote the idea of a conference of like-minded non-bloc states.

The tour achieved the desired objective. A preparatory meeting for such a conference was held in Cairo between fifth and twelfth June, 1961 and was attended by representatives from twenty states, among them Cuba which had just repulsed a US attack. This preparatory meeting laid down some criteria of non-alignment, chose Belgrade, Yugoslavia as the venue for a summit conference of the like-minded non-bloc states, and proposed the agenda for the Belgrade summit. Among the things to be discussed were prohibition of colonialism, and neo-colonialism, racial discrimination, disarmament, abolition of military blocs, peaceful co-existence, the role and structure of the United Nations, the problem of unequal economic development, and economic cooperation.¹⁷

Three months after Cairo, the first summit conference of the Non-Aligned states was held in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. It ran from first to sixth September, 1961. In total, twenty-five states attended as 'full participants', with three others as 'observers'. This was a modest figure compared with the 1986 membership of one hundred and one at the eighth summit conference of the Non-Aligned Movement held in Harare, Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, the first summit was important in that it attempted to put down 'non-alignment' as a coherent set of ideas propounded by a group of relatively like-minded states; and, as Peter Willetts has pointed out, it marked the formal birth of the Non-Aligned Movement.¹⁸

PHASES OF THE NON - ALIGNED MOVEMENT: 1961-1986

Robert A. Mortimer has identified three general phases of Third World organisational politics: from 1955 to 1965; 1965 to 1970; and from 1970 onwards. In a summary form, the first phase, Mortimer holds, was characterised by the emergence of Afro-Asian unity which unleashed new political energies that greatly affected Third World organisational politics in succeeding years. Phase two saw the emergence of non-alignment as a stronger and a more inclusive concept-replacing Afro-Asianism-around which the

Third World could organise itself. The third phase saw the emergence of yet other channels of Third World organisation, such as an increased activity within 'the groups of 77' and so on.¹⁹

Because the Non-Aligned Movement is part and parcel of the Third World Organisational politics, it is conceivable that its development follows the patterns of development in Third World politics. We have identified three general phases in the development of the N-AM between 1961 and 1986: 1961 to 1964; 1965 to 1969; and 1970 to 1986. These phases are based on those identified by Mortimer.

The first phase was characterised by the final showdown between Non-Alignment and Afro-Asianism. The struggle between these two movements may be traced to the late 1950s and basically arose because they consisted of virtually identical memberships. The struggle was manifested in three forms, namely: (i) an attempt by China (PRC) and the USSR to extend their influence in Africa and Asia; (ii) a struggle between, on one hand, a move to organise the new states of Africa and Asia on a geographic rationale and on the basis of a shared history of European colonialism, and on the other hand, the organisation of new and weak states around the more inclusive concept of non-alignment, which was not limited by historical and geographic

considerations; and (iii) a struggle between individual Third World statesmen for leadership.²⁰

By the end of 1961 Non-Alignment and Afro-Asianism were generally on a par. Afro-Asian People Solidarity Organisation (AAPS0) conference had been held in Cairo between 1957 and 1958, and a similar Non-Aligned summit had taken place three years later in Belgrade. Each movement had high hopes for 'a second conference' with Tito advocating a 'second Non-Aligned conference' and Soekarno calling for a 'Second Bandung'. Whereas the planned second Non-Aligned conference was held on schedule in Cairo in the October of 1964, the Second Bandung was fated never to take place. The failure of the latter may be attributed to the polemic exchanges between China (PRC) and the Soviet Union in Afro-Asian meetings which put off a number of states, lack of government support, and the unwillingness of some statesmen to attend another major conference soon after the 1964 Non-Aligned summit.²¹

Non-Alignment therefore prevailed following the debacle of the ill-starred Afro-Asian conference scheduled for 1965. Much of Afro-Asianism merged with Non-Alignment and the membership of the latter movement rose from the twenty-five at Belgrade to forty-seven at Cairo. Virtually all independent African states were invited to the Cairo summit. These states were

signatories to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Charter, which spelt out an "affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs".²² With all Arab and Asian states - expecting those obviously aligned - also invited, Non-Alignment became a merger of Pan Africanism, Pan-Arab nationalism and Pan-Asianism. The presence of Yugoslavia and Cuba, and the invitation extended to some Caribbean and Latin American states further gave the movement a wider scope.²³

During the second phase, 1965 to 1969, the N-AM became quite dormant in spite of several challenging situations arising in international politics. The reasons for the N-AM's virtual inactivity even in the face of these and other developments ranged from lack of similarity of views held by the Non-Aligned leaders, to domestic problems in individual Non-Aligned states. In Africa, the Congo crisis and Ian Smith's 1965 proclamation of a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in Rhodesia led to a rift, not only among African states, but also within the general membership of the N-AM. Vietnam crisis also resulted in a similar development.²⁴

On the African continent, the former Brazzaville group joined hands with Togo and Rwanda to form the 'Organization Commune Africaine et Malgache' (OCAM) in February 1965. In spite of the fact that Moise Tshombe

of Congo (Kinshasa) had been jointly ostracised by members of the N-AM at the Cairo summit, the OCAM states readily accepted him within their ranks. This led to a rift between the OCAM states and the rest of the Non-Aligned countries in their approach to the Congo crisis.¹ Secondly, Smith's UDI led to an emergency meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers. This meeting gave Britain an ultimatum to crush the UDI within ten days on pain of having all OAU members break diplomatic relations with Britain in the event of her failure to do so. Britain did nothing of the sort, but only nine African states broke diplomatic ties with her.²⁵

The United States' involvement in Vietnam was a further cause for discord among members of the N-AM. Tito's initiative which resulted in a joint declaration calling for an end to all hostilities and unconditional negotiations met with very limited support - only seventeen states supported the joint declaration. On one hand Cuba and Mali rejected it because it was not strongly enough worded, and, on the other many of the Non-Aligned states did not want to antagonise United States on this issue.²⁶

In the domestic affairs of some Non-Aligned countries, apart from frequent and unconstitutional changes in government which brought to power leaders who had priorities other than vigorous involvement in

Coups d'état
 world politics, the coup de'tats which ousted Ben Bella of Algeria (1965), Soekarno (1965) and Kwame Nkrumah (1966) dealt a serious blow to the N-AM. With Nehru also absent - he had died in May 1964 - a kind of leadership vacuum was created. This combined with an absence of institutional set up in the Movement to contribute to about five year lull in Non-Alignment activity.

Reactivation of the N-AM occurred at the end of the 1960s following a revival of similarity in sentiments among Third World leaders as a result of a crisis in the Middle East and the continuation of the Vietnam crisis. Once again on Tito's initiative consultative meetings were held in Belgrade and in New York in July and in September 1969 respectively, at which April 1970 was set aside for a Non-Aligned Preparatory Meeting in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. The 'Dar Meeting' was followed by the Third Non-Aligned Summit in Lusaka, Zambia between eighth and tenth September 1970.²⁷

This summit marked a watershed for the N-AM. It began to develop features of a formal institution, a process which continued in subsequent gatherings of representatives of the Non-aligned states. Meetings have been held on a regular basis at a variety of levels of representative. The summits are held after

every three years, while the conferences of ministers are held about twelve months before each summit. In the meantime, other consultative meetings are held as often as necessary.

Secondly, the president or prime-minister of the country hosting a summit is usually appointed the official spokesman - cum - chairman of the movement until the next summit. Thirdly, the movement has evolved two bureaux: 'the Ministerial Co-ordinating Bureau' and 'the United Nations Co-ordinating Bureau'. The former, which is composed of foreign affairs ministers of certain Non-Aligned states chosen on continental basis, is charged with preparing the agenda for future conferences and has a mandate to coordinate the Non-Aligned activity and policy. The latter is composed of countries, identical to those of 'the Ministerial Co-ordinating Bureau', although in this case it is these countries' permanent representatives to the United Nations who meet once a month in New York. 'The United Nations Co-ordinating Bureau' is responsible for maintaining constant working contacts between the Non-Aligned countries at the UN and deciding on when to hold an extraordinary meeting of 'the Ministerial Co-ordinating Bureau'.²⁸

Apparently, these institutional developments have given the N-AM prospects for continuity. Not only

has membership expanded, but after Lusaka five other summits have been held: in Algiers (1973) Colombo (1976), Havana (1979) New Delhi (1983) and in Harare (1986). Because the Non-aligned Movement has continued to operate and has grown in size, one may be tempted to conclude that it is delivering the goods to its members. If this conclusion is correct, it is very likely that the movement will continue to exist in the foreseeable future.

OBJECTIVES OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

Underlying non-alignment is the desire of the Non-Aligned states "to exercise a reasonable degree of independence of policy and action in world affairs."²⁹ This desire for genuine independence has been exulted to an issue of international importance by a historical background of colonial oppression and racial discrimination for most of the Non-Aligned states. It has been realised that even after the attainment of independent status by some of the former colonized societies, the domination which went along with colonialism still persists in the form of neo-colonialism. A majority of Third World states are almost totally dependent on a handful of industrialized countries in economic terms. In addition to this, attempts have been made by more powerful states - especially the two superpowers to dictate the affairs of the small powers.

The Non-Aligned countries have come to appreciate their lack of economic and military power, and also the possibility of acquisition of some form of international power through joint non-bloc international action. Therefore, the objectives that have been put forth are a combination, on one hand, of short-term and long-term aims and, on the other, of modest and ambitious, and often idealistic, objects.

They may be summarised as follows:

- (i) Elimination of colonialism everywhere in the world;
- (ii) Attainment of racial equality;
- (iii) Active promotion of international peace, a peace without which the Third World countries would hardly realize their vital national interests, namely: national security, territorial integrity and economic well-being.³⁰

THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-ALIGNMENT

If the term principle is defined as a set of ideas or beliefs put forth as a guide for the achievement of certain objectives, then it seems correct to assert that the principle of non-alignment is a set of ideas or beliefs through which the member-states of the N-AM seek to achieve the movement's objectives of

decolonization, racial equality, economic development, and international peace.

The ideas that constitute the principle of non-alignment may be summarized as follows: that the above objectives of N-AM can be achieved by:-

1. Support for national liberation and independence movements;
2. Peaceful co-existence with other states;
3. Eschewing multilateral military alliances with the bloc countries and bilateral military agreements with great powers signed in the context of the cold war;
4. Advocating disarmament and peaceful settlement of international disputes; and
5. Promotion of universalism and multilateral diplomacy within the framework of the United Nations system.³¹

Underlying these ideas is the search by the Non-Aligned states for ways of achieving their individual national interests. By not identifying themselves with either of the cold war blocs they hope to be in a position to make useful friendship on both sides if they so choose. There is also the hope that both blocs would leave them alone to pursue their own policies both at home and abroad. The Non-Aligned countries

also see a chance of having a say in big time international issues which, nevertheless, affect them in one way or another, without necessarily first giving up part of their independence to some foreign powers. The strength of their voice would derive from a non-partisan opinion, which is bound to command respect from both East and West and therefore contribute to international peace and security.

The promotion of greater international diplomacy within the United Nations is also geared towards a similar end. Not only would the Non-Aligned states have a say on international issues, but the principles of equality of all states and of majority rule which operate in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) they hope to kind of force the hands of the big powers to pursue favourable policies.

By promoting peace, these states are reacting to realization that in the event of any serious escalation in international tension they would probably be the first to suffer, since the superpowers usually transfer theatres of conflict to other less powerful countries. An atmosphere of international peace would enhance cooperation which could be of use, especially when such cooperation leads to reductions in expenditure on military and an increase on aid flowing to less developed countries. Peace would also create a

favourable atmosphere for a more rational discussion of the plight of the Third World countries and ways in which the developed countries could assist in solving them.

Finally, support of liberation and independence movements is, in essence, a support of the principle of self-determination, a principle upon which the very security of the Third World countries is based, since they do not have the power to effectively safeguard themselves against serious external aggressions. The Third World countries' position is very precarious security-wise especially those among them that are unwilling to seek protection through allying with the big powers. Secondly, support for liberation and independence movements would help the non-independent peoples to gain their independence and subsequently join the Non-Aligned Movement. This way, the movement would constitute a more powerful force by being the movement of the majority of the peoples of the world.³²

In short, underneath the high ideals that constitute the principle of non-alignment there is - like in most foreign policy postures of states - the hope that non-alignment is a means, not to the high sounding aims usually propounded by Third World leaders, but to securing the self-interest of individual Non-Aligned states.

THE PRACTICE OF NON-ALIGNMENT

Since (as Hans J. Morgenthau has observed) "national interest is indeed the last word in world politics"³³ the principle of non-alignment, it seems, is therefore but a means by which the member-states of the N-AM seek to secure their individual national interests. If this assertion is correct, then it can be further asserted by way of a general observation that in the implementation of the foreign policy of a given Non-Aligned state the principle of non-alignment will generally be - to borrow D. Katete Orwa's expression - "honoured only when it serves the national interest of the state".³⁴ In other words, short of repudiating adherence to the principle when it does not serve her interests, a state professing it will seek to interpret the principle in such a way that her actions are justified; or she will try as much as possible to demonstrate how her practical behaviour in international relations is in line with the principle of non-alignment.

Several instances in the practice of foreign policies of Non-Aligned states seem to support this latter assertion. When Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru was criticised in 1949 for an apparent continued political, economic and military alliance with Britain, Nehru reacted by insisting that India's association with Britain - a major power of the Western bloc - was

by free will and therefore in line with non-alignment. Similarly, when the country was attacked by other states, for resorting to use of force in bringing Goa into its fold in 1961, Nehru observed that "under the existing circumstances no government can be pledged to non-violence". In 1971 India signed a treaty with the USSR which provided for defence and security arrangements between the two countries. As a way of justifying this military relation with a superpower, India invoked a criteria for non-alignment which stated that a country having bilateral agreement for military aid with a great power remains non-aligned if the agreement is not concluded in the context of great power rivalry. India has been at pains to try to demonstrate that the article in the treaty which provides for defence and security arrangements lacks the essentials of a military pact. Lastly, when India was criticised for detonating a nuclear bomb in 1974 she argued that this had nothing to do with the principle of non-alignment for even if the nuclear technology was to be used in armaments "in the contemporary world it has become an inescapable requirement to preserve the independence to contain aggression, which constitutes the core of non-alignment".³⁵ These instances in India's practical international behaviour point to the apparent subjection of adherence to the tenets of non-alignment to the practical requirements of that country's national

interests.

Certain aspects of Egypt's international behaviour may also highlight the above assertion about the practice of non-alignment. For example, following Israeli raid on Egypt on February 28, 1955 the latter first sought arms from the US and Britain but was turned down. Nasser therefore turned to the East and concluded an arms deal with the Soviet Union amid accusations from the West that she - Egypt - had become a communist's satellite. Egypt however, as one scholar has observed, considered that despite this military agreement she was "as much anti-Soviet as it was anti-Western" and was acting "in true spirit of non-alignment" by being ready to "co-operate and establish friendly relations with all the countries without unnecessary entanglements."³⁶

A last example may be derived from Yugoslavia's international behaviour vis-a-vis the cold war countries. When in the immediate past - WW-II years she signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union, Tito hailed it "as a great event ... because it is in the interest of our country". This statement came in the wake of continued hostility of the West towards Yugoslavia especially after the signing of this treaty.³⁷

The examples given above from some of the founder states of the N-AM appear to confirm the contention that the practice of non-alignment in most Non-Aligned states

is characterized by adherence to the principle only when it serves the national interests of these states and that when these countries appear to have deviated from the implementation of the principle, they try as much as possible to justify their behaviour so as to appear that they are in line with non-alignment.

AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE ON NON-ALIGNMENT

In this sub-section we will briefly discuss how the African states - especially the sub-Saharan African states - came to adopt the principle of non-alignment and why they subsequently joined the N-AM. The arguments put forth are: one, that the evolving principle of non-alignment expressed the immediate aims and the long-term aspirations of the nationalists and leaders of Africa - this made them adopt non-alignment as the guide to their future international relations and two, that because the leaders who were behind the formation of the N-AM extended a helping hand to the Africans fighting colonialism and gladly welcomed them within their ranks once independence was attained, the African states found it quite natural to belong to the N-AM.

One of the most salient and immediate aims of African leaders in the colonial era revolved around

anti-colonialism and anti-racism. They found a life-line in the solidarity of the Pan-African Movement as an international forum to air their grievances in the favourably disposed post-WW-II international political climate.

Theirs was not a lone cry, for the conference of the already independent Asian and African states at Bandung held to consider, among other issues, "problems of special interest ... (such as) racialism and colonialism",³⁸ included in its declaration calls for an end to racialism and the speeding up of the decolonization process. The Bandung Declaration of 1955 stated that "colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end".³⁹ The protagonists of non-alignment, both individually and as a group, brought into the international limelight specific cases of colonial abuses. For example, Egypt and India successfully included the Algerian case in the 1960 agenda of the UN General Assembly, despite French opposition. Similarly, the case of Angola, included in the General Assembly agenda in 1961 through the effort of the Non-aligned states, can be cited. That these efforts to fight colonialism paid off⁴⁰ is a manifestation that the Non-Aligned countries played an important part in speeding up the process of decolonisation, to the gratification of African

nationalists and statesmen.

Most of the Non-Aligned states also joined the Africans in their struggle against racism. The Southern Rhodesia (now the independent state of Zimbabwe), the South African, and the Namibian questions have found a special place in the N-AM's proceedings, and individual Non-Aligned states have raised these issues in international fora. The question of the racial policies of the South African government was raised in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) by India as early as 1964. Following the 1950 General Assembly 'ad hoc' political committee recommendations, the UNGA has been condemning the policy of apartheid and racial discrimination virtually every year. Material support for anti-racism has also been forth-coming. Following the 1986 Harare (Zimbabwe) Non-aligned summit, the 'Action for Resisting Invasion, Colonialism and Apartheid Fund' (AFRICA Fund) with a nine member committee of Heads of state was launched for the express purpose of "reducing the economic dependence of (Southern Africa) frontline states...on South Africa (and) to assist liberation groups like SWAPO in Namibia and ANC of South Africa".⁴¹ It seems imperative that when these nationalists attain independence they will consider the policies of the N-AM to have played a significant role, the way other African nationalists did. It is therefore contended that

African freedom fighters have had enough reasons throughout the struggle against racism and colonialism to identify their immediate objectives with the principle behind the N-AM.

The long term aspirations of a majority of African leaders in international affairs have generally included an untied and independent policy both at home and abroad without undue external interference; active participation in international affairs without being submissive to the whims of Great Powers; being in a position to positively influence international affairs, morally or otherwise, and the cultivation of friendly relations with countries belonging to both blocs so as to look to both sides for untied economic and technical assistance with which to develop their societies.⁴² The N-AM and its principle promised a means of achieving these aspirations.

One of the cornerstones of non-alignment is adequately summarised in the final communique of the 1955 Bandung conference which reiterates that "All nations should have the right to freely chose their own political and economic systems and their own way of life."⁴³ This ideal coincides with African leaders' "ultimate ambition... (since it promises to) reconcile Africa's weakness with a certain degree of freedom... (and hence fulfill the) desire for a sense of indepen-

dence in spite of" the weakness of these states.⁴⁴

The Non-Aligned states have also been at pains to point out that ~~equating~~ non-alignment with neutrality and neutralism - and hence passivity and suspension of judgement - is spurious. Instead, they have stressed that "non-alignment is an active, positive, and constructive policy" which aims "to keep clear of (power) blocs".⁴⁵ This aspect of non-alignment is compatible with the aspirations of Africans to participate actively in international affairs without being tied to the whims of great powers.

It is, however, hard to imagine that the Africans' motives for adopting non-alignment has not been subjected to the consideration of national security. By seeking to refrain "from involvement in either Eastern or Western - bloc security arrangements and by denying operation of military bases by ... the super powers" the Non-Aligned states "sought to guarantee (their) security". Being weak, African states have found this arrangement attractive. That is why "at the OAU in May 1963 non-alignment was viewed as an essential element of Africa's security posture, one that would ensure the national security of the independent African states themselves" and, consequently "the founding fathers (of the OAU) committed themselves to the principle by incorporating it in Article III of the

OAU Charter".⁴⁶

The Non-Aligned countries' attempts to avoid making enemies in either of the blocs by committing themselves to neither in cold war terms is also an attempt to make friends within both blocs. At first, both super powers viewed states professing non-alignment with a lot of suspicion. the US referred to them as "immoral" states suspected of playing "communist games" and conniving at "communist expansion" while the Soviet Union called them "nationalist bourgeois" and agents of imperialism. However, by the 1960s the efficacy of non-alignment had been recognised by the two camps.⁴⁷ This gave the Non-Aligned countries an opportunity to interact with countries committed in cold war. Therefore in adopting non-alignment, the African states also wanted to cultivate these friendly relations. Through these they could derive economic aid and technical assistance from countries on both sides of the cold war so as to speed up development in the nascent African states.

Finally, the move by the African states to join the N-AM was also aimed at getting the benefits of numbers. Individually, African and other Third World states were of little consequence in international affairs. But since African leaders had an eye on - at the very least - having a say in international

affairs, the N-AM provided an opportunity for them to team up with other states with similar predicaments so as to be heard and possibly influence the direction of international events in a desirable and useful path.

From another perspective, it may be argued that because the architects of the N-AM regarded the African nationalists - who were later to become African statesmen - as their peers even before the attainment of independence, the first generation African leaders found it quite natural to belong to the N-AM and adopt its principle. Historically, Africans' contact with non-alignment may be traced through Afro-Asianism and Pan Africanism. For one, the objectives of Pan-Africanism and the N-AM were quite similar: independence, commitment to peaceful means of resolving international conflicts, and faith in the Atlantic Charter (and hence faith in the United Nations Organisation), to mention but a few.⁴⁸ Therefore, in a way, "non-alignment became a vehicle for Pan-African goals."⁴⁹

Secondly, African nationalists were welcome to attend the Afro-Asian conferences. For example, although the 1955 Bandung Conference was meant only for the independent Asian and African states, nationalists from Gold Coast (Ghana) and Sudan were invited. Two years later, in the 1957-1958 Cairo Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organisation' (AAPSO) nationalist delegates

from African colonies such as Kenya Colony also attended.

Following the collapse of active Afro-Asianism, in 1965, African statesmen, including Kenya's, concentrated their international activities within the fold of the N-AM. Earlier, in May 1963, they had committed themselves to the principle of non-alignment by incorporating it in Article III (7) of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Charter.

ADOPTION OF NON-ALIGNMENT IN KENYA

Kenya became independent on December 12, 1963 after sixty-eight years of British rule, and a year later she became a Republic. She attended the October 1964 Cairo Summit of the Non-Aligned States as a new member of the Non-Aligned Movement (N-AM) and has since remained a member.

The nationalists who led the country to independence had been closely associated with the Pan-African Movement, and through these contacts, become influenced by the ideas of this continental movement. One of these ideas - as stated in Article III Section 7 of the OAU charter - was that the principle of non-alignment would be the most suitable foreign policy posture for African states once they became independent.

The Pan-African activists of pre-independence Kenya included Jomo Kenyatta, Peter Mbiyu Koinange, Tom Joseph Mboya, and Gikonyo Kiano. Kenyatta, later to become Kenya's first president, was among the African nationalists who attended the 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress. His detention by the colonial government of Kenya Colony did not sever Kenya's African nationalists' contacts with the movement. Apart from Koinange, who had been a Pan-African activist since his student days in the United States, both Mboya and Kiano were greatly involved in the Movement in the dying years of the 1950s. The former chaired the 1958 All African Peoples Conference held in Accra while the latter was elected one of the joint secretaries of the newly formed All-African Peoples Organisation (AAPO). Koinange, Mboya and Kiano later became cabinet ministers of the Republic of Kenya.⁵⁰

Pan-Africanists' ideas influenced Kenya's decision to adopt the principle of non-alignment. Tom Mboya, described by one author as "the ideologue, and overlord of the development strategy in the critical years of (Kenya's) transition from the colonial to the post-colonial order", stated that some of the reasons why Kenya would adopt the principle of non-alignment were: concern with the dangers of nuclear politics, desire to decide every international issue on its merits, the

security of the country, freedom to trade with and seek aid from either cold war blocs, and the desire to be free to choose a suitable socio-economic and political system without undue external influence. These concerns expressed by Mboya are more or less a carbon-copy of the arguments put forward earlier on by other Pan-Africanists, notably Kwame Nkrumah, Modibo Keita, Abdul Nasser, Sekou Toure, and Tafawa Belewa.⁵¹

It is on the basis of the above that we hold that one of the ways in which Kenyan nationalists came to adopt non-alignment as the most suitable foreign policy posture for the country, once independence was attained, was through their association with the Pan-African Movement. The Pan-Africanists, on the other hand, ingested the principle in the process of their participation in the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement (N-AM).

The future African statesmen of Kenya had another more direct route to the ideas of the founders of the N-AM. This was through their involvement in the Afro-Asian Movement. For example, they sent a delegation to the 1957-58 Cairo Conference at the end of which the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) was formed. Therefore, when Afro-Asianism merged with the N-AM after the failure of the proposed

'Second Bandung', there was nothing to deter Kenyan nationalists from channelling most of their participation in Third World activities within the organisational framework of the N-AM.⁵²

The above historical explanation aside, it has been argued below that Kenyan nationalists, like their counterparts in other parts of the African continent, adopted the principle of non-alignment because the concerns for which non-alignment attempted to find solutions, on the whole, fitted in well with the nationalists' own perception of the problems independent Kenya would face and the role she was to play in the international system.

First, membership to the N-AM and the adoption of the principle of non-alignment apparently promised these nationalists freedom of decision and of choice in independent Kenya's relations with other states; in effect a promise of untied and independent foreign policy. Secondly, through the N-AM and the observation of the principle of non-alignment Kenya would have an opportunity to participate in international affairs in spite of her weakness in relation to other more powerful states of the world. Thirdly, non-alignment would protect Kenya's imminent independence by making her not replace the yoke of British colonialism with neo-colonial relations apparent in the relations

between the cold war powers and their satellites among the weak states. Fourthly, by maintaining friendly relations with both blocs, the Kenya nationalists probably saw a possibility of looking up to countries on both sides for untied economic aid and technical assistance with which to hasten development once independence was attained. Finally, non-involvement in bloc politics would mean non-involvement in conflicts which do not directly concern Kenya, and hence a greater degree of national security in the event of a transformation of the cold war into a 'hot-war'.⁵³

Therefore, as early as 1961 the two dominant nationalist parties in Kenya Colony, Kenya African National Union (KANU) and Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), had declared their commitment to non-alignment. The former, which has led Kenya since independence, emphasized in its 1960 constitution that it would support liberation and independence movements and adhere to and promote international peace and peaceful settlement of international disputes. The 1961 KANU election manifesto also expressed non-alignment as an integral part of Kenya's foreign policy. On arms race, it promised to lead Kenya to join other Non-Aligned states in pressing for super power disarmament. Support for the UN was also affirmed.⁵⁴

To make good this foreign policy posture after independence, the KANU Government led Kenya to join the Non-Aligned Movement during the 1964 Cairo Summit of the Non-Aligned states held from fifth to tenth October. Since then Kenya has been attending the Non-Aligned gatherings and takes every opportunity to reiterate that she is a Non-Aligned state pursuing the principle of non-alignment in her foreign policy.⁵⁵

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter set out to give a general overview of the N-AM and its accompanying principles of non-alignment. In the first three sections we argued that the historical and political circumstances leading to the birth of the N-AM derived directly from developments after WW-II. They were in the form of an emergence, one, of several weak states all over the world, and two, the commencement of the Cold War. The actual creation of the movements came about through the efforts of such leaders as Abdul Nasser, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Josip Broz Tito. This started about 1954, but it was not until late 1950s through to 1961 that increased cold war tensions and the attainment of independence by several African states that the movement got a final push leading to the first conference of the Non-Aligned states in September 1961.

We further argued that between 1961 and 1986, the N-AM underwent three phases. From 1961 to 1964 there was a showdown between it and Afro-Asianism at which the N-AM emerged victorious. There followed a period of dormancy after 1964 and this state of affairs lasted until towards the end of the decade when the movement was reactivated. After the 1970 Lusaka Non-Aligned summit the N-AM began developing features of a formal institution. This development was continuing by the end of 1986.

In the fourth section of the chapter we looked at the objectives of the movement and identified them as: attaining decolonization and racial equality everywhere in the world, finding solution to fundamental economic problems and promoting international peace. The fifth section was devoted to analysing the ideas underlying the principle of non-alignment. We argued that essentially they are: (i) support for liberation and independence movements; (ii) peaceful co-existence; (iii) eschewing cold war military alliances; (iv) advocating international peace; and (v) promotion of universalism and multilateral diplomacy within the framework of the UN system.

In the sixth section we looked at the practice of non-alignment and came to two conclusions. First was that in most Non-Aligned states the principle is

only adhered to when it serves the national interests of the state. Secondly, we argued that in the event of a deviation from adherence to the principle, the state concerned will usually attempt to make it appear that her actual behaviour is in fact in line with the expected non-aligned behaviour.

In the seventh section, we looked at Africa's perspectives on Non-Alignment in which we contended that the African states adopted the principle, first, because it expressed the immediate aims and long-term aspirations of African leaders and nationalists. We also argued that the other reason for its adoption was that leaders behind the formation of the N-AM aided African nationalists during the fight for independence and later gave them immediate international acceptance once independence was attained.

Finally, we discussed how and for what reasons the principle of non-alignment came to be adopted in Kenya. The essence of our arguments were as follows:

1. that one of the ways in which post-independence Kenya's leaders came to adopt non-alignment was through their association with the Pan-African Movement, the latter which had ingested the principle in the process of its leaders' participation in

the formation of the N-AM;

2. that the leaders of Kenya also acquired the principle through their participation in the Afro-Asian Movement and consequently in the N-AM; and
3. that Kenya, like most African states, found the principle to be fitting in well with her own national aspirations.

Having concluded this chapter with a discussion of how and for what reason Kenya adopted the principle of non-alignment and joined the N-AM, we have gone on to discuss the country's official interpretation of non-alignment in the context of her foreign policy in general. This discussion is contained in the next chapter.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Willetts, P. The Non-aligned Movement: the Origins of A Third World Alliance op.cit.pp.(xvii), and 44; Guy Martin in Jinadu, L.A. and Mandaza, I. (eds) African Perspectives on Non-Alignment op.cit. p.20; and Singham, A.(ed) The Non-Aligned Movement In World Politics Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill and Co., 1977 pp.(ii) - (iii). The first two quotations are from Willetts and the third is from Guy Martin.
2. Singham, A.W. and Hune, S., Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments Harare: College Press, 1986 p.14.
3. The quotations in this paragraph are from Charter of the United Nations Ch.1, Arts. 1:2 and 2:1. For a discussion of the role of WW-II in the decolonization process refer to Mazrui, A.A. and Tidy, M., Nationalism and the New States in Africa Nairobi: Heinemann, 1984 pp.10-21.
4. Calvocoressi, P., World Politics since 1954 op.cit. p.2. Also see p.94 of the same book.
5. Mathisen, T., The Functions of Small States in the Strategies of the Great Powers Oslo - Bergen - Tromso: Universitets - for - laget, 1971 pp.17-21.
6. For brief discussions on the struggle between communists and anti-communists in these states refer to Calvocoressi, P. op.cit. pp.54 - 60; 299-312 and 451-481.
7. Ibid., p.94-95.
8. D. Katete Orwa in Jinadu, L.A. and Mandaza, I.(eds) op.cit. p.39.
9. See Willetts, P., op.cit. p.3. Subba Rao has attempted to trace non-alignment back to the pre-WW-II period, in his case, specifically in India's struggle for independence which goes as far back as 1985 (see Rao, T.V.S. Non-alignment in International Politics and Law op.cit. pp.43-54).
10. Willetts, P., op.cit. p.2.
11. Rao, T.V.S. op.cit., p.19.
12. We have excluded Soekarno of Indonesia from this list of leaders in view of Peter Willetts' convincing

argument that tracing non-alignment to the Asian-African conference held in Indonesian city of Bandung in 1955 (a conference in the convocations and proceedings of which Soekarno played a leading role) is tantamount to giving the N-AM "false roots" (refer to Willetts, P. op.cit. 3).

13. Ibid., p.11.
14. Mortimer, R.A., The Third World Coalition in International Politics. Boulder; Westview Press 1984 pp.7 and 8.
15. Willetts, P., op.cit., p.4.; and Mortimer, R.A. op.cit., p.10.
16. Willetts, P., op.cit., p.11 - 14.
17. Refer to Rao, T.V.S., op.cit. p.102.
18. See Willetts, P., op .cit., pp.2-3 and 14.
19. Mortimer, R.A., op.cit., esp. pp.6, 22 and 29.
20. For detailed discussion of the confrontation between Afro -Asianism and non-alignment see Ibid., pp.7-15.
21. Ibid., pp.11-12.
22. Charter of the OAU Article III Section 7.
23. Willetts, P. op.cit., pp.16 and 50 (especially footnote 50 on that page).
24. In Congo (Kinshasa) Patrice Lumumba's forces were defeated by Moise Tshombe's with the support of Belgium Paratroopers dropped from American planes; a putsh in the Dominican Republic designed to bring back to power a former president, Bosch, was crushed by 20,000 American troops and President Johnson, then at the White House, reiterated that the US "cannot, must not, and will not permit the establishment of another communist government in western hemisphere"; and in Vietnam there was a major escalation of US involvement in early 1965, with a sustained programme of bombing of N.Vietnam by America. In the wake of these super power involvements in Third World politics, one would have expected the N-AM to come out strongly in defence of Third World states (refer to the Willetts, P. op.cit., p.32.)

25. The members of the 'Brazzaville Group' were: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Dahomey (Benin), Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta (now Burkina Fasso).
26. Refer to Willetts, P., op.cit. p.32.
27. Ibid., pp.36-41.
28. Guy Martin in Jinadu, L.A. and Mandaza, I. (eds) op.cit., p.21.
29. Refer to L.Adele Jinadu: "West African Perspectives on the Non-aligned Movement" in Jinadu, L.A. and Mandaza, I. (eds) op.cit. pp.1-3; and to Rao, T.V.S. op.cit. pp.23-26.
30. See Legum, C. Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide N.York: Praeger, 1965 p.60; Jinadu, L.A. and Mandaza, I. (eds) op.cit. pp.21-22 and 40; Jansen, G.H., Non-alignment and Afro-Asianism op.cit.pp.285-286; and Singham, A.W. and Hune, S., op.cit., pp.14-15.
31. Rao, T.V.S., op.cit., pp.18-22.
32. Quoted in Dougherty, J.E. and Pfaltzgraff, R.L., Contending Theories of International Relations op.cit. p.99.
33. D. Katete Orwa, "From Disequilibrium to Equilibrium: Kenya and Inter-state Relations in Eastern Africa" op.cit. p.10.
34. Rao, T.V.S., op.cit., pp.47-59.
35. Ibid., p.76.
36. Ibid., pp.88 and 82.
37. Mortimer, R.A., op.cit., p.7.
38. Refer to extracts from "The Bandung Declaration of 1955" in Legum, C., op.cit., p.156. Also see Rao, T.V.S., op.cit., p.137.
39. For example, in 1960 the UNGA adopted a resolution recognizing the right of Algerian people to self determination.
40. See Daily Nation: February 9, 1987, p.15.

41. Refer to Legum, C., op.cit., pp.113-117; and Quaison-Sackey, A., Africa Unbound: Reflections of An African Statesman N. York: Praeger, 1963 pp.100-101 for recorded speeches of some African leaders expressing these aspirations.
42. Quoted in Quaison-Sackey, A., op.cit., p.104.
43. Mazrui, A.A., Towards a Pax-Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1967, p.169.
44. Quotations are from Rao, T.V.S., op.cit., p.26; and Quaison-Sackey, A., op.cit., p.106.
45. D. Katete Orwa, "National Security: African Perspective" in Arlinghaus, B.E. (ed) African Security Issues: Sovereignty, Stability and Solidarity Boulder: Westview Press, 1984 p.205.
46. See Rao, T.V.S., op.cit. p.16.
47. See the resolutions of "the Manchester Pan-Africa Congress of 1954" and "the Bandung Declaration of 1955" in Legum, C., op.cit., pp.153-155 and 165 respectively. Also see Mortimer, R.A., op.cit.p.7; and Rao, T.V.S. op.cit., p.26.
48. Mortimer, R.A., op.cit. pp.11-12.
49. Refer to Legum, C. Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide op.cit., pp.13,27,30-31, and 243.
50. Refer to Goldsworthy, D., Tom Mboya: The Man Kenya Wanted to Forget Nairobi and London: Heinemann,1982, p.292; Mboya, T. Freedom and After London: Andre Deutshe, 1963 pp.235-238; Quaison-Sackey, A., African Unbound: Reflections of an African Stateman N. York Praeger, 1963 pp.100-123; and Legum, C. op.cit. 113-117. The quotation is ~~from~~ Goldsworthy.
51. See Foderaro, S. Independent Africa Gerrardo Cross: Colin Smythe, 1976, p.25; and Willetts, P.op.cit. p.15.
52. Refer to Legum, C., op.cit. pp.113-117; Mazrui, A.A. Towards a Pax-Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1967, p.169; D. Katete Orwa, "National Security: An African Perspective" in Arlinghaus, B.E. (ed.) African Security Issues: Sovereignty, Stability and Solidarity op.cit. p.205; and Mboya, T. The Challenge of Nationhood: A collection of speeches and writings London: Heinemann, 1970 pp.233-240.

53. Refer to Kenya African National Union: Constitution Nairobi: Press and Publicity Department of KANU, 1960 pp.1-2; KANU Manifesto: What a KANU Government offers you., Nairobi: Press and Publicity Dept. of KANU, 1961 pp.23-32; and to D. Katete Orwa in Jinadu, L.A. and Mandaza, I. (eds) op.cit. pp.41-43.
54. See KANU: Kanu Manifesto: Vote for KANU Nairobi: Press and Publicity Dept. of KANU, 1967 p.22; and D. Katete Orwa in Jinadu, L.A. and Mandaza, I., (eds) op.cit. pp.41-43.

CHAPTER THREE

NON-ALIGNMENT IN KENYA'S FOREIGN POLICY

The purpose of this chapter is to put non-alignment within the context of Kenya's foreign policy as a prelude to analysing the country's application of the principle of non-alignment. To this end, first, we have surveyed the post-independence foreign policy of Kenya. This has been followed by a discussion of the general understanding of non-alignment in Kenya. Finally, we have looked at the country's interpretation of the various dimensions of non-alignment. This latter allows us to draw a parallel between the interpretation and the application of non-alignment in Kenya in the subsequent chapters of the present study.

KENYA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE

By 'foreign policy' we are referring to the ruling elites of a given state's decisions that define goals, set precedents, lay down courses of action, and the actions taken to implement these decisions in the relations between that state and other states.¹

One scholar of international relations, Christopher Clapham, has suggested that a discussion of foreign policy of any country should take into account four sets of factors: the historical and

geographical setting of the country; the nature of the external environment in which that country operates and the constraints which it places upon the policy-makers; the form of the domestic society and the political structure, and the pressures which these create for external policy, together with the linkage which arises between internal and external factors; and the decision making apparatus, perceptions and goals of the group of individuals who control it.² In our overview of Kenya's foreign policy we have used these as guiding points.

Whereas many writers differ in their analyses of Kenya's foreign policy depending on each one's theoretical stand point, at least five major issues which have conditioned Kenya's foreign policy are distinguishable:

- (i) the question of territorial integrity and national security;
- (ii) the nature of the country's economy and economic policy in general;
- (iii) a struggle for power among the country's elite;
- (iv) a general uniformity of perception of what constitutes the vital national interests of the country among the successive ruling elites

of the country; and

(v) the initial lack of qualified manpower to manage the country's foreign policy.³

On territorial integrity and national security, it appears that Kenya's political leadership became convinced quite early of the importance of maintaining the security of the country's geographic boundaries. Apart from the Sultan of Zanzibar who could lay claims to the Kenyan coast - although he never seriously considered doing so - both Somalia and Uganda have at one time or another claimed parts of Kenya's territory. When Kenya became independent, Somalia started supporting clandestine military activity by ethnic Somalis in the then 'Northern Frontier District' of Kenya. These Somalis wished to secede and be part of Somalia. The resulting 'Shifita Affair' was temporarily sorted out in 1967 following an agreement between Kenya and Somalia. Trouble started again after 1977 when Somalia launched an expansionist war against Ethiopia. There was fear in Kenya that such a war would also be launched against Kenya. Similarly, in February of 1976 President Idi Amin of Uganda made claims to parts of western Kenya. Although he immediately thereafter retracted his claims the incident further showed Kenya's leadership the delicate situation she was in regarding her territorial integrity and national vis-a-vis her neighbours.⁴ / security

Coupled with this was a realization that a military option to tackling the security problems was potentially costly. For example the Kenya-Shifta conflict cost the Government of Kenya \$ 70 million in unplanned for expenditure which the nascent state could hardly afford. Therefore, rather than pursuing a militaristic policy, she signed treaties of military cooperation with both Ethiopia and Britain in 1964. Similarly, when both Uganda and Somalia showed signs of hostility in mid-1970s, not only did Kenya renew her treaty of military cooperation with Ethiopia in February 1979, but she also asked for United State's help, a call to which the latter positively responded.⁵

Apart from entering into military agreements with other states, apparently Kenya has also pursued a good neighbour policy partly for security reasons. She has been a strong advocate of cooperation and peaceful co-existence with neighbouring states. Government officials often reiterate non-interference in other country's affairs as the corner-stone of Kenya's foreign policy.⁶

Security considerations have not only entrenched Kenya's greater military attachment to external powers who have readily come to her aid - the Western countries - but may also have contributed to the estrangement that has existed between her and the Soviet Union.

Both Uganda and Somalia were receiving substantial amounts of sophisticated military hardware from the USSR. Between 1967 and 1976, out of a total amount of external arms supply worth \$185 million to Somalia, the Soviet Union supplied \$181 millions worth of military equipment. For the same period, Uganda received over 80% of her military requirements from the Soviet Union. This arming of Kenya's potential enemies could possibly have made the Kenyan leadership blame USSR for worsening the country's border insecurity.⁷

However, what appears to have contributed a lot to uneasy relations with the Soviet Union, and the East in general, was the power struggle between the so-called 'radicals' and 'conservatives' within the ruling party, KANU. The former, associated with Oginga Odinga, came to symbolise a pro-East group in Kenya, and there were claims that this group had been receiving funds from USSR and China (P.R.C.) even before Kenya's independence. The conservatives, associated with Tom Mboya preferred a pro-West stand, and were accused of being agents of Western countries and of speaking Western ideologies. The Odinga group lost the power contest and were not only ousted from KANU, but also had KPU, the party they formed, banned and most of its leaders detained. The conservatives were therefore left firmly in power. They, however, had nothing good

to say about the Communist world, especially after the Soviet Union and the P.R.C. - the Chief powers of the communist world - had shown themselves as staunch supporters of the enemies of the politicians in power in Kenya.⁸

Kenya's relations with the East therefore started on a wrong footing right from the immediate post-independence period and gradually came to acquire ideological overtones. The ideology of the East, communism or scientific socialism, has since become an anathema in Kenya. Indeed, "Kenyan leaders still associate any criticism of government policies with... communism."⁹

This anti-communism posture also had effects on Kenya's relations with her immediate neighbours. She began feeling quite uneasy when neighbouring states seemed to be going socialist especially between 1967 and 1969. During this period Tanzania, Uganda and Somalia and Sudan flirted with socialism and Kenya was thus threatened with socialist encirclement. Kenya's ruling elite seemed to fear that socialist neighbours could offer launching pads for sabotage by Kenyan dissidents most of whom apparently professed socialism. Naturally, therefore, the regional status quo ante-1967 seemed to be preferred by Kenya's rulers, and this made one author remark that Kenya's regional relations

was "governed by a rather more conservative and legitimist thinking notably when any radical departure from the status quo is contemplated."¹⁰

Kenya's foreign policy was also conditioned by an initial lack of individuals with experience in diplomacy. This not only meant that inexperienced personnel manned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the country's diplomatic missions abroad, but also that stands taken by the Minister of Foreign Affairs also more or less determined the official foreign policy stand of the country. Kenya's foreign policy statements therefore revealed a lack of clearly defined background objectives in the early years of the country's independence. The situation was exacerbated by the initial ideological differences among the leaders of the ruling party. Joseph Murumbi, independent Kenya's first Foreign Affairs Minister, distinguished himself for radicalism in foreign affairs. However, the then Cabinet, dominated by conservative leaders, at times had to disown his statements. For example, it was reported that Murumbi received a cable from Nairobi during an O.A.U. meeting in Lagos, Nigeria in October, 1965 telling him that the Cabinet of Kenya could not support his advocacy of force as a means to settle the Rhodesian (U.D.I.) crisis.¹¹

Radical posture by some foreign affairs ministers on

occasions landed Kenya in situations that caused diplomatic embarrassments to the country. The case of the Rhodesian 'U.D.I.' aside, the radical foreign policy of Murumbi may have played a part in Kenya's chairing of the ad hoc O.A.U. Congo Conciliation Commission, in the event of which she came to appreciate the futility of an attempt by weak states to meddle in affairs that intimately involved the great powers. While Kenyatta was busy trying to reconcile the different factions in Congo (Kinshasa), the U.S. and Belgium resorted to a military solution by parachuting in troops to support Tshombe, and thus ignoring the efforts of the weak African states to bring a conciliation. Apparently, Kenya thereafter felt that there were certain international questions which she was not qualified to get involved in, especially questions that involved direct great power confrontations. The trend she developed in international behaviour has been described by one scholar as a "cautious policy", by which it is meant that she shunned getting involved in international issues which could jeopardise the pursuit of the country's vital national interests.¹²

The pursuit of this cautious, and indeed 'pragmatic', foreign policy led to another development in the management of Kenya's international relations. If

this policy was to be pursued effectively, the control over foreign policy had to be wrestled out of the hands of Foreign Affairs Ministers and their assistants in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - who so far had led Kenya to leap into international politics without looking - and put firmly in the pragmatic hands of President Kenyatta. D. Katete Orwa has described this development as "the emergence and institutionalization of the dominance of the presidency in the formulation and management of (Kenya's) international affairs" and he also attributes it to lack of qualified man-power to manage Kenya's foreign policy.¹³

It appears that the pragmatism in foreign policy which developed during the Kenyatta years has continued after his death. This apparent continuity after 1978 may partly be explained by a corresponding continuity in Kenya's ruling elites' general perception of what constitutes the country's crucial interests. The succession did not lead to any fundamental changes in the ideological composition of Kenya's ruling class. President Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi, who for twelve years had been Kenyatta's deputy, took power with a pledge to follow his predecessor's 'nyayo' (footprints).

At least one writer, Samuel Makinda, has advanced the argument that serious changes have taken place in Kenya's foreign policy, with the military

agreement between the U.S. and Kenya in 1980 as an indicator of this change in policy. Another scholar has refuted this saying that "the granting of military facilities to the United States in 1980 was basically a high point in a pro-western foreign policy which emerged with the state of Kenya in 1963".¹⁴

Our contention is that the issues which have determined Kenya's foreign policy and the means which she has used to settle these issues have basically remained the same. As Samuel Makinda himself has pointed out, Kenya's foreign policy has been concerned with the security of her borders and economic development. To this list D. Katete Orwa adds national unity and stability. Kenya's method of dealing with these issues has been to enlist external support, if necessary, through treaties and agreements. Her serious involvement with the U.S. goes back to 1976 when both Uganda and Somalia posed a serious threat to the security of her borders. Apparently, the U.S. satellite tracking and communication station on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia monitored Uganda and Somalia intentions and warned Kenya, who immediately asked for U.S. assistance. In response the United States sent an aircraft carrier and four support ships to the East African coast. Although Somalia and Uganda never actually attacked, the threat was sufficient to make Kenya (which had not invested in military build-up as

a security measure) to approach the U.S. for purchase of military aircrafts and other armaments. U.S.'s positive response and the effectiveness with which their presence on the East African coast had deterred potential aggression on Kenya combined with U.S.'s food-aid to Kenya following the drought of 1979 to make Kenya concede the use of her military facilities by the United States in 1980. Kenya's reaction in this particular case is not different to her signing of a military agreement with Britain in 1964 in the face of a threat from Somalia. Therefore, we see a consistency in the issues, and methods of tackling them, in Kenya's foreign policy.¹⁵

Makinda's own argument can further be turned against him. He has argued that Kenya's foreign relations is "to a large degree, circumscribed by the dominance of foreign capital" and he maintains that apart from the need to ensure the security of her borders and consolidate the domestic power base, Kenya's foreign policy has mainly been shaped by the need to attract more foreign capital and maintain commercial links with the neighbouring states. The "local auxiliary bourgeoisie", he states, have "developed a harmony of interest...(with) foreign capital."¹⁶

If Makinda's premise is taken as valid and if it also kept in mind that changes which took place in

Kenya in 1978 were cosmetic in the sense that what took place was a horizontal elite mobility such that the same "local auxiliary bourgeoisie" and "petty bourgeoisie" who were in power prior to 1978 continued to be in power after this year except for some changes in faces, then apparently it is inevitable that they would continue with the same foreign policy. Alternatively, if the change that had taken place had brought to power representatives of a different social class, then changes could have taken place in Kenya's foreign policy.

Nevertheless, Makinda's discussion of Kenya's economic life as a significant factor in the formulation of Kenya's foreign policy cannot be dismissed so easily. The gist of his argument is that Kenya's economic life, which she inherited from her historical past with little or no alterations, has necessitated her continued dependence on capital from western countries. This means that the country's policy-makers are not in a position to pursue an altogether independent foreign policy. To make the issue more complex; some of these decision-makers have no desire to break the chains tying Kenya to the western metropolises, since they are the main beneficiaries of such a relationship in Kenya.

Since the benefactors of Kenya's ruling class

are from the West, Kenya has been at pains not to antagonise the western countries. Instead, she has been reciprocating for the beneficial ties with the west by playing the role of "a sub-imperial state... at the centre of the periphery" where she, as a "client" state, utilizes her relatively more developed economy allegedly "to exert dominance" and form a link between the metropolitan centres of international capital and the peripheral East African region.¹⁷ In order to play this role effectively Kenya has therefore been pursuing a good neighbour policy and looks with suspicion developments that tend to have disruptive effects on the status quo in East Africa partly for this reason.

Whereas the neo-Marxian dependency theorists such as Makinda are - according to Bertrand Russell - "mistaken in supposing that economic self-interest could be taken as the fundamental motive in social science"¹⁸, Makinda's assertion that the nature of Kenya's economic life has influenced her international relations is however a valid one in that Kenya, like most economically dependent states, finds it relatively difficult to directly confront her major economic partners among the developed countries. Instead, she would generally adopt a conciliatory attitude despite periodic emergence of some discord between her and some of these countries.

Having looked at the five major factors which have conditioned Kenya's foreign policy, this section may be concluded by an assertion that "communities... may seek wealth as a means of power" since "love of power is the cause of the activities that are important in social affairs" - to borrow further from Russell.¹⁹ If this is true then it is imperative that Kenya, like most Third World states, seeks sufficient power for survival, securing her independence, and for development. Because the country is relatively weak in terms of international power configurations, her political leaders have on the whole adopted a realistic approach to most international issues.

These leaders have evolved "a pragmatic rather than idealistic foreign policy" and "pursue a conservative course within Eastern Africa and beyond". Kenya has kept her "traditional links with the West as being in the best interest of the country" since she is, as "a consequence of colonial history", a dependent state whose development, especially economic, "reflects developments in Western European and north American economies." In the relations with her neighbours, Kenya "seeks respect for its territorial integrity, recognition of its independence and sovereignty". In order "to ensure her effective participation...in regional commerce and trade and guarantee the country's self-preservation", she adopted the policy of good

neighbourliness towards regional states". In a nutshell, "the basis of post-independence Kenya's foreign policy is ... a commitment by leaders to vigilantly safeguard national interests".²⁰

It is because of this commitment to serving the national interests and avoiding unnecessary, and possibly counter-productive, entanglements in issues that concern only the great powers that the KANU Government made it quite clear right from the start that "in (Kenya's) external affairs we shall follow absolutely and firmly a policy of non-alignment".²¹

NON-ALIGNMENT IN KENYA'S FOREIGN POLICY: GENERAL ASPECTS

The KANU Governments of Kenya have always held a bi-polar view of the world, seeing it as bifurcated ideologically into "the communist world led by the Soviet Union, and the Western countries, led by the United States". These two power blocs of roughly equal strength are poised, it seems, on the brink of a nuclear warfare and are engaged in "the build-up of nuclear weapons of absolute destruction" which, to the KANU Governments, "is suicidal madness".²²

Tom Mboya, reputedly "the architect of the (KANU) party manifesto (and)... the ideologue and overlord of

the development strategy in the critical years of (Kenya's) transition from the colonial to the post-colonial order", and who is said to have "dominated policy-making in Kenya between 1963 and 1969", elaborated this world view in his writings and speeches.²³

To him, Kenya and other new states came "into existence in a world dominated by two strong power blocs, each having some ideological, economic and military unity". However, Kenya does not "intend to let (herself) be drawn into one or other of the two antagonistic camps", and neither does she wish to follow the example of "some small states" which have "followed a policy of isolationism and non-involvement in world affairs". Instead, Kenya sees herself as belonging "to the growing Third World which believes in a policy of positive non-alignment".²⁴

Like Nkrumah of Ghana, Mboya saw non-alignment - or 'positive non-alignment' as he prefers to call it - as having come into existence as a "protest and a revolt against the state of affairs in international relations caused by (this) division of the world into opposing blocs of East and West". The reprieve for the world thus threatened by a nuclear holocaust appeared to lie with a "third force" which would be "holding a balance of power" and therefore "prevent either of the two sides from starting a major war".

In other words, given the constant threat of universal destruction posed by the two antagonistic blocs, the point was that "the more unaligned nations there are, the wider the non-committed area of the world, the better the chances of human survival". In any case, the involvement of any African state in the cold war alliances might unnecessarily draw her "into areas of conflict which so far have not spread below the Sahara". Above all "we believe the peace of the world in general is served, not harmed by keeping one great continent (Africa) freed from the strife and rivalry of military blocs and cold wars".²⁵

These ideas of Mboya, on the whole, found their way into KANU. In the 1961 KANU Manifesto, it was "declared that a KANU led government would pursue a policy of non-alignment with either Eastern or Western ... blocs".²⁶ It was further stated that "Kenya will add its voice to those of the Non-Aligned nations who are pressing these dangerous giants to disarm" so that "the resources, the skills and the manpower wasted in preparing for destruction could be diverted and part of them devoted to succouring the sick and starving of the underdeveloped world".²⁷

Having thus taken a stand vis-à-vis non-alignment right from the beginning, successive KANU governments have all reiterated commitment to the principle

of non-alignment in Kenya's international relations. As the discussion in the section below shows, party leaders have attempted to conceptually apply the principle of non-alignment in all aspects of the country's interaction with the bloc states. For the purposes of the present study, these aspects have been identified as the military, the economic, the bilateral diplomatic dimension, and voting at the United Nations General Assembly (multilateral diplomacy).

OFFICIAL INTERPRETATION OF NON-ALIGNMENT IN KENYA

Military Aspect:

From the writings of Tom Mboya, it is evident that to Kenya non-alignment conceived in military terms initially led to a posture of "equidistance". It meant a "rejection of military alliances with either East or West and ... a refusal to have military bases on African soil"; although Kenya would "insist (that she is) as much concerned with nuclear politics and the whole question of disarmament" with the hope that she, like the other "new African states, with their traditional African positive neutrality can inject into these discussions (on disarmament) fresh views which are objective". The rejection of military alliances with either of the East or the West and the refusal to have foreign military bases would protect the country "from

embroilment in an East-West conflict - if (she) had one sides' military bases on (her) soil, (she) would be an immediate target". Military non-identification with either of the blocs would also enable Kenya "to become a useful instrument of world peace", since she will be "free to censure the foreign and military policies of any nation when they deserve censure".²⁸

Mboya attempted to have the country adopt this radical military posture even before independence was attained. For example, in November 1961 he moved a Legislative Council Motion calling on Britain, a major power and an ally of the United States, to stop further military activity in Kenya and take steps to remove her (British) bases at Kahawa and other camps such as Gilgil and any other naval, airforce, and army bases in the country. Mboya warned that there would be no negotiations over the bases between the Government of independent Kenya and Britain. This motion was rejected. Instead, Wilson Nthenge's (also a member of KANU) amendment urging "that the future of the bases should be negotiated during the transition to independence" won the support of both sides of the House.²⁹

Despite this tactical moderation of Mboya's views by some party members on military relations with bloc states, the 1961 KANU Manifesto virtually expressed his exact sentiments when it stated that:

...no foreign military bases would be allowed in Kenya because Kenya would not be transformed into a battle ground in the event of an East-West military conflict. Nor would Kenya allow its territory to be used by NATO or Britain in any localized conflicts involving NATO or British forces in any part of Africa, Asia, or the Middle East. For this reason, Kenya would act immediately to dismantle the British military bases at Kahawa in Nairobi.³⁰

Kenya therefore became independent led by a KANU Government holding rigid ideas about how the country was to relate, in military terms, to the superpowers and their cold war allies. Not only did the Government reject military alliances with, and military bases of, the power blocs, but it also insisted "that any mutual defence pacts between her and a major power must not prevent her (the country) from developing her own internal material power and strength upon which her own security depends". In a nutshell, the Government rejected all forms of military identification with any of the cold war blocs. It is apparent that Kenya stood by this posture by 1964 when Mboya, in his address at Makerere University College (Uganda) in the August of the same year, reiterated this stand of Kenya.³¹

However, by 1965, traces of a shift in military policy were already identifiable in the face of major differences of opinion between members of the Government of Kenya over how to interpret non-alignment. The

contrasting interpretations arose essentially as a by-product of the continuation of pre-independence power struggle within KANU between the so-called 'KANU conservatives' and 'KANU radicals'. The latter associated themselves more with the Eastern bloc states and shared a belief in the efficacy of 'Scientific Socialism' as a national ideology. The former, however, associated themselves more with Western states and were in agreement with the main tenets of the capitalist socio-economic and political system.³²

The KANU radicals, led by Oginga Odinga and including Bildad Kaggia, Achieng' Oneko, Tom Okello-Odongo, and J.D. Kali, basically argued that because Kenya's colonial inheritance had led her to identify herself with the West, it was necessary for her "to bend a little more to the Eastern bloc at the moment" to achieve non-alignment in her foreign relations. This would enable the country to strike a "balance" between the two cold war blocs.³³

In military terms the implementation of the radicals' 'balancing' process would apparently mean not only getting armaments from Britain and other Western countries, but also trying to receive an equal amount of military hardware from the Eastern countries. This way Kenya would not be at the mercy of either of the blocs in military terms.

Representatives of the 'KANU conservatives' included Tom Mboya, Charles Njonjo, Mbiyu Koinange, James Gichuru, Bruce MacKenzie and Gikonyo Kiano. This group maintained that "such theories of fifty-fifty 'balance' (as advocated by the radicals) were quite unrealistic",³⁴ and that in her international relations Kenya should not primarily be concerned with "emotional and purely political considerations", but rather adopt a more pragmatic approach.³⁵

Mboya and his 'conservative' associates therefore preferred to have Kenya maintain close links with the Western countries arguing that this would be "in accordance with the policy of interpreting non-alignment on the merits of each case". Mboya especially held that the communist countries could "introduce evil" to Kenya and turn the country into a ground for "cold war and ideological rambling".³⁶

These views of the KANU conservatives carried the day and held sway in the official government policy. In terms of Kenya's military policy, it meant, as the then Defence Minister, Njoroge Mungai, said in the country's legislative assembly in April, 1965 that "Kenya was buying arms from whichever country it wanted to. If the weapons and the price were right it did not consider whether the supplier was a capitalist or communist". At face value, this military posture appears

to take its cue from the non-aligned policy of independent choice in international affairs. However, looked at closely, Kenya's stand given by Mungai had deviated from the tenets of non-alignment, in that if it so happened that "the weapons and the price were right" only on weapons from one cold war bloc, then Kenya would go right ahead to rely on that bloc for its military requirements irrespective of whether or not that way she would have identified herself militarily with that bloc. Indeed, it seems that to the Kenyan officials, the principle of non-alignment belonged to the "emotional and purely political considerations" which Mboya now insisted should not concern Kenya in her foreign policy.³⁷

Therefore, although the 1966 KANU manifesto reiterated that "in external affairs KANU government have maintained and shall continue to adhere to a policy of positive non-alignment" the official government military policy had parted company with the principle of non-alignment. She was ready to identify herself militarily with any cold war bloc in the pursuit of what was considered as the country's vital national interests. The group of politicians who thought that the long term national interests of Kenya would best be served by adhering to military equidistance in relation to the two cold war blocs were already out of

the Government, having registered an opposition party, KPU on May 22, 1966.³⁸

The opposition never had time to influence the Government military policy, for three years after the registration of KPU, the party was banned and its leaders detained. Some of the KPU leaders later found their way back to KANU, but by then "the formulation and management of (Kenya's) international affairs" had been taken away from Kenya's Parliament and put in the hands of the President.³⁹

The KANU Government, it seems, has stood by its post-1965 military policy. For example, in 1976 James Gichuru, then Minister of Defence said in defence of close military ties between Kenya and Britain, that these ties were crucial for the security interests of Kenya. He reiterated that the ties would continue as long as necessary.⁴⁰

Following the virtual ceasation of discussions of Kenya's foreign policy in the country's National Assembly, the Government became quite touchy about any discussion of the country's military policy. The standard government argument became that "Kenya's security arrangements cannot be a matter of public debate". Nevertheless, a few backbenchers have continued to question the country's military policy, while

the government has maintained its position that "any agreements between Kenya and foreign governments were aimed at enhancing Kenya's security and sovereignty".⁴¹

It appears that the 1978 change in Kenya's leadership did not substantially change the country's official military policy of unshackling Kenya's military posture from an observation of the principle of non-alignment in favour of a short-term-national-interest-oriented military policy. Kenyatta's successor, President Moi, whose philosophy of "Nyayo" rejects militarism on grounds that "large and unstable national armies" are a "frequent cause of national and regional instability" appears to be against the establishment of military bases belonging to the superpowers and their allies on Kenyan soil. However, his agreement to allow the US to use military facilities in Kenya following a 1980 pact appears to have enhanced even further Kenya's deviation from the principle of non-alignment which rejects "the provision of military... facilities for great powers", among other issues. During an international press conference in Bonn, West Germany on 13 February 1980, President Moi stated categorically that "what we (Kenya) have done, and will continue to do, is offer military facilities to that nation (the US)". On the twenty first of the same month, he assured the United States' president, Jimmy Carter, that "the US

navy will be allowed increased use of Kenyan port facilities."⁴²

Changes that may have taken place in Kenya's military posture, therefore, can be said to only pertain to what may be referred to as a further removal of theoretical pretensions of adherence to the policy of non-alignment in Kenya's military affairs. In her readiness "more than ever before to defend all her borders against internal or external aggression" - to use the words of Jeremiah Kiereini, former Chief Secretary and Head of the Civil Service - the KANU Government has shown that in principle it does not subscribe wholly to non-alignment with regard to military matters, in spite of the government officials' insistence that the country has adhered to the principle of non-alignment.⁴³

The officials admit that Kenya's military alignment with one of the cold war camps is inevitable as a result of historical ties. They argue that a diversified purchase of military hardware is not realistic and is too expensive. Such a diversification is also capable of creating problems in the country's army by leading to a division of the army into the "Western camp" and the "Eastern camp". On military facilities the officials contend that availing these facilities for use by the great powers has certain fringe benefits

such as expansion of the facilities using foreign help, increased foreign exchange earnings, joint military exercises, and military training by personnel of the armies of the great powers. The officials are, however, at pains to add that these facilities are available to any country with which Kenya has normal diplomatic relations, and that in the past, in the words of Robert Ouko, Kenya's Minister for Foreign Affairs - "Kenya has always accorded visiting naval vessels from friendly countries seaport facilities at the commercial harbour of Mombasa" and that she has "accorded normal seaport facilities to navy vessels from Britain, USSR, USA and France".⁴⁴

From the above, it seems that what the government of Kenya is still firmly against is the provision of military bases to the cold war countries and joining military alliances specified by the 1961 Cairo Preparatory Meeting of the Non-Aligned States as being cold war alliances.

Economic Aspect:

Kenya's Development Plans and the Sessional Paper NO.10 of 1965 are generally agreed that the basic economic objectives of independent Kenya governments are: (i) freedom from want, disease, ignorance and exploitation; (ii) expansion of the economy, with

equitable sharing of its benefits; (iii) equal opportunity of advancement for every individual Kenyan; and (iv) integration of the national economy. The same government documents are also generally agreed that in order to attain these objectives the right policy for economic development for Kenya is a policy of rapid economic growth. Jomo Kenyatta, then Prime Minister of Kenya, succinctly expressed this in the introduction of the country's first development plan (1964-1970) when he stated that "we believe that rapid economic growth is essential to our goals". President Daniel Arap Moi, in the first development plan produced by his regime, also affirmed his government's pursuit of a similar policy by saying that "in our further efforts to promote our development, the basic philosophy and objectives that have guided us in the past will be maintained".⁴⁵

The policy-makers of Kenya further hold that rapid economic growth would be achieved when, among other factors, the country possesses domestic capital, trained, educated, and experienced manpower, and foreign exchange. However, successive KANU governments have acknowledged that there is a shortage of these in Kenya. This shortage, coupled with a further realisation that "economic development is very much dependent on cooperation among different countries" and that economic

isolation in the contemporary world is neither possible or desirable, have made Kenya's decision makers to accept the inevitability and the desirability of economic cooperation with other countries of the world".⁴⁶

In respect to economic relations with other states, Kenya's leadership has stressed over the years that Kenya is guided by economic non-alignment. The arguments of Tom Mboya are an important pointer to the underlying ideas behind KANU's choice of economic non-alignment as the most suitable posture in Kenya's economic relations with other states.⁴⁷

David Goldsworthy has observed that the broad framework of Mboya's economic thinking was greatly influenced by the notions of development by "take-off" and "foreign stimulus" which had acquired wide currency in the 1960s. Mboya, like those who shared the same school of thought was wont to argue that a "difusion", or transfer of sufficient wealth and technology through trade, investment and aid from the economically affluent countries to the poor ones would enable the latter to "break through" into "self-sustaining growth". To the extent that Mboya was "the ideologue and overlord of development strategy" in post-independence Kenya upto 1969, it can be argued that the official government economic policy of Kenya of that period was also influenced by the same ideas.⁴⁸

Because of the need to attract wealth and technology from the more developed countries - which are to be found both in the East and in the West,- Mboya, on the eve of independence, advocated the pursuit of economic non-alignment as a sure way of being able "to trade with East and West alike". He argued that the pursuit of such a policy would enable Kenya to determine for herself "what is the best (development) programme without being committed to any foreign nation and "to create for herself "an economy which is not based on the circumstances in another particular area".⁴⁹

On recognition that "it is difficult to isolate economics completely from politics" and that "development fund money" from foreign sources are usually tied with the donors' "bows and strings", Mboya went on to assert that "if we are to depend upon one country or group of countries as far as markets for our main crops are concerned, our diplomats and hence our foreign policy, will be subjected to all sorts of pressures both subtle and not so subtle". He added that "similarly, if the same countries supply us with a large portion of our imports the opportunities for pressure to be brought upon us in political matters will be so obvious".⁵⁰

On the basis of these it appears plausible to maintain that Mboya was for a policy of economic diversification, since this would prevent undue exertion of political

influence by the economically affluent states on Kenya.

As to the nature of this diversification, Mboya had the following to say: "If we trade with both the East and West we shall be able to create for ourselves an economy which is not based entirely on the circumstances of one specific bloc". He went on to suggest that "we can build a structure of our own design... drawing what we consider appropriate both from the East and the West" and that "as the representatives of neutral (positively non-aligned?) nations we must express our determination to devise such systems as we think fit without having them interpreted in terms of leaning Eastward or Westward".⁵¹ In other words, for Mboya of the transition period, economic non-alignment necessitated a diversification of Kenya's economic transactions between the Eastern and the Western blocs, and borrowing suitable technological knowledge and economic methods from both blocs without letting ideological considerations deter such a move.

In a nutshell, what we have been saying is that at the end of the colonial era and during the first few months of Kenya's independence, Mboya advanced at least four reasons to support his contention that non-alignment^{should} and would be extended to Kenya's economic relations with other states. Not only would the pursuit

of such an economic policy help Kenya avoid being politically tied to any particular country or group of countries, but also that ideological considerations would not bar Kenya from picking useful economic ideas from, and developing advantageous economic relations with, countries' on both sides of the cold war world. Thirdly, the country would be in a position to determine for herself what would be the best development programme without direction from any foreign country. Finally the country would be free from being tied to economic developments in other countries or group of countries.

We have also argued that during this period, Mboya explained economic non-alignment to mean a diversification of Kenya's economic transactions not only among all the economically affluent states but more specifically, the diversification of Kenya's economic relations between the West and East such that neither side would be in a position to exercise a decisive influence on Kenya's policy choice.

Finally, we have also expressed the view that these economic ideas of Mboya are more or less representative of those held by KANU at independence, since, as David Goldsworthy has observed, Mboya was the principal drafter of KANUS's 1963 election manifesto.⁵²

The aforesaid manifesto expressed an awareness

that "colonialism can take more subtle forms and can come from communist as well as from capitalist sources", and thus, in principle, agreeing with Tom Mboya's expressed wariness with regard to economic relations with either of the cold war blocs. The manifesto further showed that there was a borrowing of economic ideas from both blocs, when on one hand, it was stated that "we shall welcome private investment in Kenya" (apparently borrowed from the laissez-faire capitalist economies); and, on the other hand, that "in keeping with our desire to create a socialist society we believe in a wider measure of government control of the economy in the national interest" (possibly borrowed from the Marxian advocacy of state control of the economy). While KANU expressed its willingness to follow "a liberal policy with regard to foreign capital", it was at pains to add, however, that "investments must be made in accordance with Kenya's interests" such that "to the extent that they serve our needs we shall protect them". The party also sought to lessen the country's inherited total economy reliance on the West by insisting that "we have no intention of seeking Associated Territory status with the European Common Market (ECM)... (because) we are not satisfied that membership will not involve political strings, nor do we believe that the terms would be wholly advantageous to our economic plans". On this note, KANU therefore reiterated that "we shall seek

satisfactory trade agreements with ECM countries as with other states of the world", and thereby expressing the party's desire for economic diversification.⁵³

On the basis of the above, we have been led to conclude that at independence the KANU government of Kenya held ideas of economic relations with the bloc countries that more or less tallied with the understanding of economic non-alignment used in the present study. The party proposed to diversify the country's economic transactions to ensure that no country or group of countries, whether Eastern or Western, would exercise decisive influence on Kenya's policy. There was an expressed desire to lessen Kenya's inherited economic dependence on Britain, a member of the Western bloc, and the party leaders outlined an economic system which apparently drew some of its ideas both from the East and the West.⁵⁴

The first year of Kenya's independence opened with a continuation of the pre-independence struggle within KANU. Economic policy to be pursued by the country was also an area of clash between the 'radicals' and the 'conservatives'. The former called for greater economic cooperation with the socialist countries at the expense of the West if non-alignment were to be attained.⁵⁵

The latter led by Tom Mboya (who apparently

had, sometime between August 1964 and April 1965 modified his earlier views) maintained that economic, financial, technical and trade agreements with other states be "primarily concerned with economic development of Kenya and not with emotional and purely political considerations". The conservatives reiterated that "such theories of fifty-fifty 'balance' (advocated by the Odinga group) were quite unrealistic". Therefore, they argued further, "whether or not we increase our trade and technical assistance programmes with the Eastern countries will be dependent on terms and opportunities offered and not on predetermined percentages". The group further argued that since the fact was that the best opportunities came from the West, Kenya's close economic links with the countries in that bloc should be continued. This, according to them, would "purely (be) in accordance with the policy of interpreting non-alignment on the merits of each case".⁵⁶

It appears reasonable to point that neither of the above two interpretations of economic non-alignment by the two groups in KANU could be said to have held full sway of the government's economic decisions between 12 December, 1963 (the independence date) and 27 April, 1965 (when Sessional Paper NO.10 of 1965 was presented to the Kenyan House of Representatives).

Two arguments can be put forth in favour of this opinion. First, within that time period, while Odinga and his associates were busy shuttling between Moscow and Beijing signing agreements of economic cooperation, Gichuru and other members of the opposing camp, notably McKenzie, were also busy negotiating similar agreements with Britain and other countries of the Western bloc. In other words, each of the two groups pursued its economic policy as if it had the full backing of the government of Kenya.⁵⁷

Secondly, Prime Minister Kenyatta, who - as the subsequent events were to demonstrate - actually held the power to tip the government balance in either direction, sought to play an aloof and magisterial role during the period in question. As David Goldsworthy has suggested, apparently Kenyatta still hoped to accommodate the two groups and interests within the party where he could exercise some sort of control over them. Consequently, until he finally made up his mind to support the Mboya group, he kept on going along with the ideas of one faction at one time and with the other factions at another, such that the leaders of the two groups on the whole apparently believed that since 'the Head of Government - and later of state - was with them, their ideas enjoyed the support of the government officially.⁵⁸

In view of this state of affairs, there appears to be justification for holding that between the independence date and April 1965 the economic ideas floating among Kenya's political leaders were - in terms of whether or not they tallied with the understanding of economic non-alignment employed in the present study - of two kinds. On one hand were the KANU 'radicals' whose economic policy for relations between Kenya and the cold war blocs tallied with our understanding of economic non-alignment. This group was for an economic move to the left until such a time that Kenya attained a balance in her economic transactions with the West and the East.

On the other hand were the KANU conservatives who advocated an economic policy derived from a concept of non-alignment but which, in our view could not lead to economic non-alignment in view of Kenya's starting point of economic dependence on the Western bloc countries. Premising themselves on the assumption that a non-aligned country is one which decides on every issue on its merits the leaders in this group went on to argue that since economic relations with the West offered better prospects for Kenya's economic development (defined as 'rapid economic growth'), Kenya should cultivate these relations even more. From our point of view, such a policy would only end

up entrenching even further Kenya's inherited economic identification with the Western bloc countries.

In the event of such a development, the western countries would be in an even stronger position not only to influence economic decisions in Kenya (and hence blow up the hopes the country had nurtured of economic independence), but also have more leverage on Kenya's political decisions especially those pertaining to East-West issues. By extension, therefore, the freedom of Kenya to decide every international issue on its merits upon which the conservatives based their arguments would be an illusion.

The statement between the two views on how Kenya was to relate economically with the cold war bloc countries was broken towards the end of the first half of 1965 when President Kenyatta apparently decided to throw in his lot with the 'conservatives'. One author has advanced the argument that the President was jolted considerably when he learnt that scientific socialism was being taught at the Lumumba Institute which had been established to provide KANU officials with organizational and ideological training. Whatever the reasons behind Kenyatta's change of mind, the point is that by April 1965 not only did Mboya and himself publicly attack "alien" ideologies and the activities of "traitors" within Kenya, Kenyatta also directed Mboya and his

ministry (Economic Planning and Development) staff to immediately prepare a definite documentary statement of Kenya's guiding political philosophy and its practical implications.⁵⁹

The resultant document, Sessional Paper NO.10, 1965: On African Socialism and Its Implication to Planning in Kenya was, for the purpose of the present discussion, a major turning point since it marked the victory of the economic view of the 'conservatives' over those held by the 'radicals'. President Kenyatta's endorsement of and his written introduction (in which he stressed that the document "should bring to an end all the conflicting, theoretical and academic arguments that have been going on") to this document effectively muzzled the 'radicals'. By the time the latter were able to establish a new forum from which to publicly condemn the Sessional Paper, they were already out of the Government, having formed the opposition KPU political party. Therefore Sessional Paper NO.10, 1965 emerged as the official expression of the Government of Kenya's political philosophy and what the KANU leaders held as the corollary economic policy which would, among other uses, guide Kenya's economic relations with the bloc states.⁶⁰

The trend of argument running through the Sessional Paper generally corresponds to the 'conser-

vatives' argument outlined above. Basing itself on the assumption that economic growth is the means by which the government of independent Kenya could best attain a greater welfare for all citizens, the Paper sought to establish means by which the country could "mobilize its resources to attain a rapid rate of economic growth for the benefit of its people". It is recognised that the ingredients necessary for rapid economic growth, namely capital, technology and trained personnel, are limited in Kenya. Therefore, the paper proposed that these, and "proven economic methods", had to be borrowed from other countries.⁶¹

"Unlike many countries that have eliminated many successful economic mechanisms on narrow ideological grounds" the drafters of the Sessional Paper insisted that Kenya should be "free to pick and choose those methods that have been proven in practise and are adaptable to Kenya's conditions regardless of the ideologies that others may attach to them." Kenya therefore rejects "both Western Capitalism and Eastern Communism" and instead chooses for herself "a policy of positive non-alignment" in her economic relations with other countries. The two social systems which are based on "marxian socialism and laissez-faire capitalism" respectively, are rejected because they "rigidly (view)... the ownership of property...(as an) indivisible right subject only to complete control or

none". In the pursuit of "a policy of positive non-alignment" Kenya chooses a "practical system" by which "the resources of society are ... guided into proper uses by a range of sensitive controls (by the state) each specifically designed for the task to be performed".⁶²

In a nutshell, Kenya adopted "African socialism" in which the word 'African' "is not introduced to describe a continent to which a foreign ideology is to be transplanted". Instead, Kenya's African socialism" is used to describe "an African political and economic system that is positively African not being imported from any country or being a blue print of any foreign ideology but capable of incorporating useful and compatible techniques from whatever source". The underlying motive is to ensure that the country's development is not "dependent on a satellite-relationship with any other country or group of countries", for such a relationship "is abhorrent and a violation of the political and economic independence so close to the hearts of the people".⁶³

According to the Sessional Paper, in Kenya's economic relations with other states, the country's development policy thus conceived would mean that whereas Kenya is to "borrow funds and trained persons²¹ from other countries... aid from abroad will not be

welcomed if it is designed to promote the economic and political dominance of the aiding country". In addition, "Kenya places no ideological barriers on trade". In terms of "foreign ownership and management of productive assets" in Kenya (which is encouraged "in order to compensate for our shortage of domestic capital"), the country recognises that whereas it is necessary to "stimulate the inflow of ... capital from abroad", the country must constantly be on the look out lest "economic decisions in Kenya ... be dominated by foreign rather than domestic considerations".⁶⁴

It is the above that lead to the Paper's conception of "economic non-alignment" not as "a policy of isolationism, any more than political non-alignment implies a refusal to participate in world affairs. On the contrary it means a willingness and desire: (i) to borrow technological knowledge and proven economic methods from any country without commitment; (ii) to seek and accept technical and financial assistance from any source without strings; and (iii) to participate fully in world trade - without political domination."⁶⁵

Kenya's guiding philosophy and its practical implications to the country's relations with other countries so far outlined appears to conform to the conception of economic non-alignment used in the present discussion. The Sessional Paper expressed the

desire of Kenya to achieve development without losing economic independence, and consequently some measure of political independence in the process. This, in our judgement, is in line with the principle of non-alignment.

However, what has so far been outlined above already contain a germ of what leads to a deviation from the principle of non-alignment. The catch is in the country's definition of economic development in terms of economic growth. Apparently it is this that makes the Paper insist that Kenya should conduct her economic affairs "on the basis of economic considerations" and not on the basis of "political or emotional considerations". It therefore seems that when the Paper reiterates that Kenya is to seek what she requires from other countries "without commitment" and "without strings", these phrases have a double meaning. On one hand, they point to the desire of Kenya to see that other countries do not influence her policy choices (which is consonant with the objectives for the pursuit of economic non-alignment); and on the other, they may mean that Kenya is not to tie or commit herself to "political or emotional" considerations when conducting her economic transactions with other states. Instead, in her trade policy, as well as in her economic, financial and technical assistance agreements - to

recall the 'conservative' arguments stated above - the country is to go for those economic relations that offer her the best terms and opportunities for economic growth.⁶⁶

The view that this latter meaning is implied appears to be given credibility by the Paper's further insistence that in order to avoid problems of foreign exchange, the country should stay away from "bilateral trade and aid agreements (which) can lead to specific currency problems". In this respect the argument is that trading with and seeking financial assistance from countries with non-convertible currencies would not only put Kenya in a situation where she would have to buy goods from and sell only to those countries, and lead her into "problems of financing the local costs associated with the capital equipment these countries can supply in foreign aid"; but the country would also have to "mortgage ... (her) future production" to those countries. Consequently, the country "must scrutinize all aid offers" to ensure that "aid terms must be related to the productivity of the project and its positive contribution to our economy". The Sessional Paper concludes the discussion on the importance of the convertibility of currencies by saying that "these are matters which must not be decided upon just on political or emotional considerations".⁶⁷

Be it as it may that the above arguments are grounded on sound reasoning of economic realism, we contend that in the case of Kenya they could only lead to more economic identification with the West than to economic non-alignment. We hold that when a country willingly and deliberately decides that the pursuit of a policy based on the principle of non-alignment in her economic relations with other states is in her national interest, it is incumbent upon that state to ensure that she applies this 'political or emotional' consideration - as the Sessional Paper seems to refer to the principle of non-alignment - in her international economic transactions. Defining non-alignment as we have done, this would mean trying to balance economic transactions between the two cold war blocs. Since at independence Kenya inherited an economy which was bound up with those of the Western states, until such a time that she was not in such a position, economic non-alignment would in her case mean either moving away from over-dependence on the West, or alternatively, deliberately increasing her economic transactions with the East. However, the economic policy emerging from the Sessional Paper NO.10 of 1965 could achieve neither of these.

In the first instance, the Paper advocated an economic policy which seeks engaging only in those economic transactions which would ensure the economic

growth of the country. Given that Kenya emerged into an international system in which the Western countries offer better terms for economic growth, the policy would only lead Kenya into increasing even further her economic transactions with, and hence greater economic dependence on, the West. Secondly, with regard to the issue of the convertibility of currencies it can be argued that because the currencies of virtually all the Eastern bloc countries are not convertible into those of the economically gigantic states - which happen to be found in the West - Kenya's chosen economic policy would only lead her into limiting her trade with the Eastern bloc states and seeking little or no financial and technical assistance from them.

Based on the assumed validity of the above argument, it is our contention that on 27 April 1965 the government of Kenya officially adopted an economic policy which, as far as the country's economic transaction with the bloc states is concerned, did not tally with the economic policy that the principle of non-alignment would have dictated in Kenya's situation.

The above lengthy discussion of the Sessional Paper NO. 10, 1965 has been prompted by our further contention that the economic policy it advanced has been Kenya's official economic policy since then - at least until 1986. The Sessional Paper, to borrow

David Goldsworthy's expression, "passed into use as political datum", and all important subsequent official government statements on Kenya's economic policy have used it as their starting points. For example, in Kenya's Development Plans for 1970 to 1974, 1974 to 1978, 1979 to 1983 and 1984 to 1988 it is maintained that Kenya's economic development policy is guided by and based on African Socialism as defined in the Sessional Paper NO.10, 1965, and that the economic objectives laid down in the paper are still the ones pursued by Kenya. The means for attaining these objectives, namely through rapid economic growth, and the ways of achieving this growth have also basically remained as stated in the Sessional Paper.⁶⁸

There is evidence to suggest that even after the changes in Kenya's top leadership in 1978 following the demise of 'Mzee' Kenyatta, the country continued to rely on the economic policy laid down in the Sessional Paper. A year after he took the presidency of the Republic of Kenya, President Daniel Arap Moi introduced the 1979-1983 Development Plan by stating that "in our further efforts to promote our development, the basic philosophy and objectives that have guided us in the past will be maintained." Robert Ouko, then Kenya's Minister for Economic Planning and Community Affairs, further confirmed adherence to the tenets of the Sessional Paper when the preface of the same document Lin

(the 1979-1983 Development Plan) he said that "Kenya will continue to seek foreign private investments... as well as grants and loans from international donors... to augment our domestic resources."⁶⁹

By 1986 the Sessional Paper NO.10, 1965 still enjoyed the esteem of Kenya's leadership and its basic philosophy was still upheld. In his book, Kenya African Nationalism: Nyayo Philosophy and Principles, published in 1986 President Moi referred to the Sessional Paper as having advanced "a practical and adaptable system which would take into account the changing circumstances of a nation in modern setting" and that it "put forward the national ideology, based upon the traditional African heritage". In addition, he also stated that "our most direct and natural line of cultural continuity in development is through African Socialism...(which) precludes the necessity for the import. of other foreign, socio-cultural systems of lifestyle management". He castigated "wholesale socio-economic imports" saying that "such inordinate transplants may eventually cause it (the economy) to collapse". Reiterating that "Kenya Africans were never communists; nor were they traditionally capitalists", President Moi went on to say that a "calculated injection of adaptive practices" should accompany the adoption of systems borrowed from other countries. These assertions are more or less in agreement with

the philosophy outlined in the Sessional Paper. If this is true, then it confirms our earlier statement that at least until 1986, Kenya's leadership still upheld the basic philosophy of the April 1965 Sessional Paper; and this goes in the way of affirming our contention that between 1965 and 1986 Kenya's policy of economic relations basically remained the same having emerged from the political philosophy of the said Sessional Paper.⁷⁰

Finally, another document which seems to support our contention stated above is Sessional Paper NO.1 of 1986: On Economic Management for Renewed Growth. This looks towards the year 2000 and sets out to establish how Kenya will accommodate her rising population. The national objectives set out in it echo those of the Sessional Paper NO.10 of 1965; these are rapid economic growth, improved distribution of national income, and provision of basic human needs. It is also specifically stated in the 1986 Sessional Paper that "much of the development strategy announced in this Sessional Paper is derived from past development plans and other sessional papers". This statement indicates a projected continuation in Kenya of the economic policies pursued since 1965 in the post-1986 era, with some changes in areas of emphasis.⁷¹

Bilateral Diplomatic Aspect:

One scholar has observed that "the basis of the post-independence Kenya's foreign policy is found in two documents, the 1960 KANU Constitution and the 1961 KANU Manifesto".⁷² This statement appears to be a valid one, more so with reference to Kenya's bilateral diplomatic relations with the bloc states at independence.

Taking its cue from Kenya's nationalists' expressed pre-independence desire: (i) 'to decide on every (international) issue on its merits without encumbrance of ideological considerations; (ii) to give Kenya a chance to borrow ideas, institutions, and get material assistance for development from both the East and the West; and (iii) to make Kenya "a force for good in world affairs" by adopting a diplomatic behaviour that would contribute towards peaceful co-existence between the East and the West,⁷³ the aforementioned KANU Manifesto stated that:

In external affairs we shall follow absolutely and firmly a policy of non-alignment. We shall seek friendship with every nation that will return it. The establishment of such a relationship will not entitle any friend to choose our enemies for us... We fully commit ourselves to support what we believe to be right and just in international affairs. But each case will be judged on its merits.⁷⁴

Underlying this foreign policy statement by KANU's leaders on the eve of independence are the twin desires to eradicate all forms of foreign domination of Kenya and to vigilantly safeguard national interests of the country, desires which had already been explicitly stated in the 1960 KANU Constitution.⁷⁵

An inference which may be made from this pre-independence foreign policy posture of KANU nationalists is that once independence was attained, KANU would lead the country into a quest for reciprocal friendship with all states, including those belonging to the Eastern and Western cold war blocs. In particular, developing friendly diplomatic relations with the cold war states would be important if Kenya were to be a force for good in world affairs for it would give her a chance to ease the tension between the two blocs. The country would also be in a position to draw benefits from both sides for her own development while not jeopardizing her independence from both the cold war blocs or risking being drawn into the cold war as a permanent protagonist for one bloc.

If this inference is valid from Kenya's foreign policy posture at independence vis-a-vis her proposed diplomatic relations with the cold war bloc states was in line with the principle of non-alignment, for the latter's advocacy that Non-Aligned states are not to

have permanent diplomatic identification with the cold war blocs does not mean that they should not have diplomatic relations with the countries belonging to the two blocs. If anything, the opposite is true. For the Non-Aligned countries to positively promote peace and cooperation among all nations it is imperative that they promote friendship with the bloc-states so as to act as a bridge which would help ease the cold war tension, a tension which presents one of the greatest threats to the post 1945 global peace. Therefore when KANU leaders - and hence independent Kenya's leaders - proposed in their manifesto that they would seek friendly relations with all states, but at the same time restrict this friendship in such a way that it would not entitle her friends to choose which states would be her friends or enemies, it may be validly asserted that their position and that of the principles of non-alignment concurred.

In the immediate post-independence period - 1964 to 1966, a period which David Goldsworthy prefers to refer to as an era of 'Cold War' in Kenya's domestic politics, like in the economic and military spheres of Kenya's foreign policy, there co-existed within the government two virtually parallel policy views on how to diplomatically relate to the two super powers and their respective allies. As the above mentioned author

has noted one of the major causes of the struggle between the 'conservatives' and the 'radicals' within KANU was how to relate with the Great Powers.⁷⁶

The 'radicals' were advocating the cultivation of closer ties with the Eastern bloc states to counter-balance Kenya's inherited close links with Western countries. On the other hand, 'conservatives' preferred to have Kenya maintain close links with the Western countries arguing that this would be "in accordance with the policy of interpreting non-alignment on the merits of each case". Mboya specifically held that the communist countries could "introduce evil" to Kenya and turn the country into a ground of "cold war and ideological rambling".⁷⁷

When Kenyatta finally made up his mind to drop his magisterial role between the two groups, and instead started to identify more with the 'conservatives' after mid-1964, Odinga and his 'radical' colleagues found themselves being eased out of their leadership positions within the ruling party. The views of the 'conservatives' therefore began to hold sway within KANU. On April 14, 1966 Odinga tendered his resignation as Kenya's Vice-President and as a member of KANU saying that he could no longer be part of a government "ruled by underground masters serving foreign interests" and leaning too heavily on the Western countries. In his outline of

KPU foreign policy programme, he reportedly stated that the "hardening attitudes towards the Eastern bloc has been shown in such a way as to make it obviously doubtful whether in fact Kenya is a non-aligned country". The KANU Government reacted to these accusations by insisting that Odinga and his associates were seeking "to transform (Kenya) into a blue-print for some foreign ideology (and were therefore) betraying the nationalist cause". Daniel Arap Moi, then Kenya's Home Affairs Minister, was more forthright in his accusation. He named China and Russia as being pay-masters of the new opposition party.⁷⁸

As the foregoing may demonstrate, ambiguities in Kenya's official position vis-à-vis the two cold war bloc states began to clear by mid-1966 following the ouster of the 'radicals' from the Government. Whereas the 'conservative' - dominated Government appeared to view the Western countries as extending to Kenya "an honest field of cooperation and trade" - to use Kenyatta's words, the Eastern ones were viewed as financiers of the opposition, to the established government of the Republic of Kenya and using Kenya as their centre of espionage in East and Central Africa. To make matters worse, the Kenyan authorities saw the Soviet Union as an indirect arms supplier to the rebels in Kenya's North Eastern Province through her military

aid to Somalia, part of which was allegedly being diverted to help the 'shifta' rebels. In January 1967 the government of Kenya dispatched a protest to the USSR Embassy in Nairobi about this. On the same issue of the North-Eastern Province problem, Britain was providing Kenya with logistical and technical support for the Government's military operations there. Therefore, Government officials in Kenya saw Britain as a true friend of Kenya, helping to sort out a domestic crisis which was partly being indirectly promoted by the Soviet Union.⁷⁹

With these factors taken into account, in combination with the KANU 'conservatives' strong aversion to the communist ideology, it seems imperative that officially Kenya would, in turn, have an aversion to things emanating from the East. Kenya - as Tom Mboya remarked in one of his 1966 contributions to a debate in the country's National Assembly - still wished "to continue the friendship with the Soviet Union (and for that matter, with all Eastern countries) ... on the terms already defined in our Sessional Paper" (NO.10 of 1965: On African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya). Incidentally, this Sessional Paper - as demonstrated in our discussion on Kenya's economic foreign policy elsewhere in the present study - was essentially a pro-capitalism document. Further to

this, the paper was against the introduction of "foreign ideology" in Kenya, which, in the view of the post-1966 KANU leadership, was the Soviet Union and Chinese inspired communism.⁸⁰

Therefore, Kenya's post-1965 diplomatic relations with the Eastern countries became characterised by suspiciousness and a general coolness. She broke off diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China on June 29, 1967 arguing that the Chinese Embassy in Nairobi was carrying out "unwarranted attacks ... on Kenya Government and other foreign countries with which Kenya has diplomatic relations". China reacted by declaring Kenya's charge d'Affairs in Beijing, Mr. S.M. Maitha, a 'persona non grata' and ordered him to leave within forty-eight hours. 'Around the same period - 1965 to 1968 - certain Soviet, Chinese and other East European citizens and diplomatic staff were expelled from Kenya on grounds that their activities in the country were not in keeping with their status.'⁸¹

As Kenya's relations with the Eastern countries worsened in the remainder of the 1960s and most of the 1970s, her relations with the Western states, especially with the US, was meanwhile waxing. The warming of relations with the latter was demonstrated, for example, by the fact that while Kenya was expelling some Soviet, Chinese and East European citizens, news agents, and

diplomats working in the country, she was at the same time welcoming the Peace Corps volunteers from the United States to operate in Kenya. In addition, a US press agency and cultural funding organisation, 'Peace with Freedom' (PWF), was allowed to set up operations in Kenya, and as one of its workers in Kenya stated, the organisation intended to leave "no gap (in Kenya) which some other country or ideology could fill". Tom Mboya had fairly close contact with PWF personnel in spite of allegations that the organisation was a front for the US's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).⁸²

Kenya's diplomatic relations with Britain, another major Western ally, also basically remained cordial despite periodic discords and disagreements. Issues over which their relations could sour were smoothed without major negative diplomatic impacts registered. For example, on the eve of independence, Tom Mboya remarked that one thing KANU had pledged was that if Britain granted independence to the white minority in Southern Rhodesia (now the independent state of Zimbabwe) Kenya would withdraw from the Commonwealth. However, in 1965 Ian Smith announced a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in South Rhodesia, but Kenya neither withdrew from the commonwealth nor was she willing to let this issue overstrain her relations with Britain in spite of an OAU

resolution - of which Kenya was a party - that member states of the continental organization should sever diplomatic relations with Britain. Another example is when in May 1974 Kenya decided to sever all sporting links with Britain in protest against a rugby tour by a British team of South Africa. A few days later Kenya's National Sport Council was having second thoughts, and all sporting ties except, in rugby, with Britain were resumed within the next few months.⁸³

With the few major changes in Kenya's domestic political scene until 1978 it can be argued that the country's bilateral diplomatic position in relation to the states belonging to the two cold war blocs generally remained the same between 1966 and 1978: Kenya's officials were suspicious of the intentions of the Eastern countries, while what they said in reference to the Western ones indicated intimacy. When Daniel arap Moi took over the Presidency in 1978 there appeared to be a softening in the relations with the Eastern countries. Kenya re-established diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China on 30 November, 1978, and although quite a number of President Moi's initial trips outside Kenya were to the Western countries - he visited France in 1978, Britain and Netherlands in 1979, and West Germany and the United States in 1980 - he also visited the People's Republic of China in September 1980. However, as our discussion below on Kenya's military

relations with the Western countries may demonstrate, the relations between Kenya and the Western states, especially the US, have also nevertheless been quite warm, if not warmer, when one takes the level of military cooperation as an indicator of the diplomatic relations between states. This is not to say that there have not been times when tensions have characterized these relations in the Moi era. For example, when in a speech on May 6, 1983 President Moi accused certain foreign governments of interfering in Kenya's domestic affairs by grooming a Kenyan - presumably Charles Njonjo, then Kenya's Minister for Constitutional Affairs - to take over the presidency, it was generally assumed that the foreign governments that the President was referring to were Britain and the United States since Njonjo had reportedly been moving large sums of money from these countries into Kenya around the same time. But as one analyst in the 1984 issue of African Guide magazine observed, the "disclosure" that the US and the UK were involved "was later discretely put aside".⁸⁴

One may therefore justifiably conclude that the post-1978 political leaders of Kenya seem, on the whole pro-Western states in their foreign policy utterances, although the cooling of heated verbal exchanges with the Eastern countries which started sometime in the

1970s have also accelerated considerably. As D. Katete Orwa has observed, Kenya's leaders have continued to "consider traditional links with the West as being in the best interest of the country and there have never been any official attempts to undermine this linkage". What may be added to this is that there have been attempts in the period after 1978 to ease the apparently poor relations between Kenya and a good number of the Eastern states. President Moi's regime - better known locally as the 'Nyayo Regime' - generally shares the foreign policy orientation of the preceding regime. From what the President himself wrote in 1986, it may be said that he shares his predecessor's (at the helm of KANU leadership after 1966) abhorrence of imperialism, neo-imperialism, foreign ideology, and "a renewal of political ... subservience to any external power". Still, there appears to be little evidence from what the post-1978 Kenya's political leadership have said to suggest that when they are referring to 'foreign interference', they are not for the most part talking about active involvement of socialist states in the affairs of Kenya. This can possibly make one agree with Samuel M. Makinda's assertion in 1983 the Kenya's ruling elite suffers from "Russophobia". Indeed, the temptation to extend this conclusion to cover upto the end of 1986 is quite great since in Kenya the term foreign ideology is usually used to refer to communism,

rather than to capitalism.⁸⁵

To sum up what we have been trying to say about the position of Kenya's political leadership regarding the country's bilateral diplomatic relations with the bloc-states in the above survey of Kenya's diplomatic history between 1963 and 1986, the general picture which emerges is the following: (i) that at independence in 1963 Kenya's political leaders were advocating a diplomatic policy which concurs with bilateral diplomatic non-alignment, when the latter is taken to mean attempting to establish friendly diplomatic relations with states belonging to the two cold war blocs, but not letting these relations fetter one's diplomatic independence; (ii) that between 1964 and 1966 one section of Kenya's national political leadership (the KANU 'conservatives') advocated an anti-East diplomatic policy while the other section (the KANU 'radicals') were for anti-West diplomatic policy, and neither of these positions was in line with the principle of non-alignment; and (iii) that after 1966 when the KANU 'conservatives' emerged victorious, Kenya's diplomatic policy seemed to favour close diplomatic relations with the Western rather than with the Eastern countries and that because of this the policy has not been in line with bilateral diplomatic non-alignment despite efforts after 1978 to ease the tension in relations with the Eastern countries,

since the principle of non-alignment advocates a balanced bilateral diplomatic relations with states of both blocs.

Kenya and the United Nations - Kenya's Official Policy Towards the U.N. And UNGA (Multilateral Diplomacy):

Kenya became independent on 12 December, 1963. Four days later, on December 16 she was admitted as the one-hundred and thirteenth member of the United Nations Organization (UNO) bringing the number of independent African states in the UN to thirty-four. The decision that Kenya would join the United Nations had been made earlier by KANU when in its 1960 constitution the party stated that this decision was a move "to promote and consolidate international peace and the peaceful settlement of international disputes". As D. Katete Orwa has observed, this statement by KANU showed the party's preference of "collective action through multilateral organizations in handling international disputes... to unilateral and violent approach".⁸⁶

KANU's manifesto produced on the eve of Kenya's independence expanded on the party's position on the United Nations. KANU promised to lead Kenya to "seek friendship with every nation that will return it" and for this purpose the UN was seen as particularly useful.

The party leaders wrote: "... we believe the United Nations and its agencies are playing an important role in developing international friendship and cooperation...". The choice of the UN as an important means of giving Kenya the opportunity to make friends with other nations was, apparently, also dictated by yet another consideration. Whereas KANU leadership sought to promote friendship between Kenya and every nation that would return it, they made it clear that they did not favour having "friends" choosing "our enemies for us". In other words, national independence of choice was to be maintained such that the country could "support what we believe is right and just in international affairs", and judge each case on its merit. Therefore, like most Third World leaders, it is apparent that KANU leaders wanted Kenya to participate independently, conscientiously, and on the basis of equality with other states in world affairs. However the comparative weakness of the country by international standards posed a problem. The United Nations therefore came in handy to give Kenya a chance to participate in international affairs on equal footing - at least formally - with the other states of the world. In the UN Kenya could hope to influence international events - in collaboration with like minded states and states in circumstances similar to hers - by bringing moral pressure to bear on other states in the pursuit of what is right. 87

National interests aside, KANU was also outward looking when it decided to lead Kenya to join the United Nations. In a book written at around the same time as the KANU manifesto referred to above, Tom Mboya, one of KANU's stalwarts and indeed one of its founders, pointed out the belief by the party that when Kenya joined the UN she would be joining other countries in the search for international peace and security. Mboya wrote that KANU acknowledges that "there are communist states and states which are democratic (capitalist states?) but... (also that) the world is so small that both must find ways to live together". To promote co-existence between these two competing world systems, Kenya would seek "in ... international incidents, (to) separate the ideological factors from the basic rights and wrongs". She would "not take sides permanently and automatically with either the United States or the Soviet Union". US and Soviet resolutions presented to the United Nations would not be automatically supported or get "unthinking backing".⁸⁸

Kenya would also use the UN to press "the dangerous giants (the nuclear powers) to disarm" and stop "the build-up of nuclear weapons of absolute destruction...". "The resources, skills and manpower" hitherto "wasted in preparing for destruction could be diverted and part of them devoted to succouring the sick and starving peoples of the underdeveloped world".⁸⁹

Other uses to which Kenya hoped to put the UN system included expressing her commitment to decolonization and the struggle against racialism, and promoting the other objectives of the Non-Aligned group of states, such as economic development of the Third World states, and breaking the monopoly by the great powers in major international decision-making; instead also secure for the new countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America a role commensurate with their numbers at the United Nations.⁹⁰

In view of the above, John Howells' assertions seem to summarize Kenya's view of, and her reasons for joining, the UN ^{when} he wrote that:

...most of the new states, and certainly Kenya, see the UN as essentially an organization for promoting an international morality especially related to the rights of oppressed peoples and weak nations...⁹¹

and that her joining and participating in the United Nations is:

...part of a process of asserting, and demanding recognition of, the existence of the new Kenya Republic as a respected member of the international community.⁹²

To these assertions one may add John J. Okumu's remarks in his discussion on Kenya's foreign policy, that:

...in the UN Kenya sees a potential

forum for international understanding and international peace, as well as framework for multilateral economic interaction between industrialized countries and poor states.⁹³

Having made the decision to bring Kenya within the fold of the United Nations the political leaders of Kenya's KANU led government have, on the whole, been reiterating the country's support of the UN and adherence to its principles. In a speech reported in the East African Standard of 11 December, 1965 Robert S. Matano, then Kenya's Assistant Minister for External Affairs, stated that the main cornerstones of the country's foreign policy included the support of the UN and its principles. Kenya has also been expressing her support for the UN resolutions as the need arises. For example, in June of 1964, in a joint communique with Ethiopia, she expressed her support for the United Nations' resolution urging the government of Britain to ensure that the white population of South Rhodesia did not establish a minority government in Rhodesia. About eighteen months later, on December 2, 1965 Kenya announced a complete ban on trade with Southern Rhodesia in accordance with the UN resolution which urged all member-states to impose a total trade boycott. Further to this, she (Kenya) joined Tanzania and Uganda in imposing a complete ban on all postal services and telecommunications links with Southern Rhodesia. The East African

Airways (owned jointly by the three East African States) also cancelled its flights to Salisbury (now Harare).⁹⁴

Apart from sending delegations to all the UN General Assembly annual gathering within the period of the present study (1963-1986) Kenya has also been active in other arms and agencies of the United Nations. During the 1964 Congo crisis for example, she participated in the proceeding of the UN Security Council. Kenya has been a host to some international meetings organized under the UN auspices. In May 1976 she hosted the fourth United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD IV). Similarly in 1985 she hosted the UN Conference marking the International Decade of Women. In addition to these, the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) and the United Nations Centre for Human Settlement (UNCHS, also known as 'Habitat') have their permanent headquarters in Kenya, constructed on land made available by the Government of Kenya.⁹⁵ These and others point to Kenya's commitment to contribute towards the furtherance of the aims and objectives of the United Nations so that the world body grows in strength.

There appears to be justification in contending that up to the end of 1986 the attitude of Kenya towards the UN mentioned above remained unchanged.

In an article published in the September 1983 issue of Drum magazine (about five years after the accession of President Moi, following Kenyatta's death in August 1978) Dr. Robert Ouko, Kenya's Minister for Foreign Affairs of the day, implied Kenya's continued adherence to principles and purposes of the United Nations when he wrote that "Kenya's foreign policy is based on ... friendship with all countries of the world" and that the country believes "that every country in the world has the right to choose its own leadership, its own ideology and its own economic programmes". Dr. Ouko further reiterated that Kenya "may differ on ideological or political grounds" with another country "but ^{it} does not mean that we cannot work together in other areas". He concluded by saying that Kenya would "not automatically support the East or the West in international issues but we deal with each issue as it arises", and that she would not interfere "in the affairs of other countries".⁹⁶

President Daniel Arap Moi, in his 1986 book outlining the tenets of 'Nyayo Philosophy', has also reiterated Kenya's belief "in the equality of sovereign states and subscribe to the United Nations Bill of Human rights". In addition, he writes that Kenya has "striven to promote peace by advocating and practising love" and that in his view "negotiations are the only sane channel for ... international concord".⁹⁷

From these it may be construed that under President Moi's leadership, the purposes and principles of the UN are still upheld as a matter of Kenya's official foreign policy position since what he and his ministers say is generally an echo of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

On the basis of the above discussion of Kenya's foreign policy vis-a-vis the United Nations it may be said that at the policy level, Kenya has generally been consistently expressing her support for the UN and the desire to see that the world body continues to operate effectively as a centre of multilateral diplomacy. She has also been expressing her support of the principles of the United Nations and pursuit of its objectives. In this connection it therefore seems that Kenya has been consistent with the Non-Aligned states' policy of supporting and promoting the United Nations Organization so as to make it a more effective tool for achieving the objectives of the Non-Aligned Movement, namely international peace, security, and cooperation.

Summary and Conclusions

This chapter was intended to put non-alignment in the context of Kenya's foreign policy. First, we took a brief look at Kenya's foreign policy. We argued

that at least five major issues influenced Kenya's international relations in the period from 1963 to 1986. They were:

1. the question of territorial integrity and national security;
2. the nature of the country's economy and economic policy in general;
3. a struggle for power among the country's elites;
4. a general uniformity of perception of what constitutes the vital national interests among Kenya's successive ruling elites; and
5. the initial lack of qualified man-power to manage the country's international relations.

In general, we argued that because of these issues:

1. Kenya pursued a policy of good neighbourliness;
2. she entered into treaties of military cooperation with Ethiopia, Britain, and the US;
3. there was a general enstrangement between Kenya and most of the Eastern bloc states;

4. Kenya pursued a generally pro-West and anti-communism/socialism policy; and
5. she adopted a pragmatic rather than radical approach to international issues.

We then looked at the general understanding of the principle of non-alignment in Kenya. We saw that the KANU Governments have generally held a bi-polar view of the world, with the two antagonistic cold war blocs seen as poised on the brink of a nuclear war. Kenya leaders were shown to have expressed a desire not to belong to either of the blocs. Neither are they seeking non-involvement or isolation. Instead, they have expressed faith in a policy of 'positive non-alignment', a policy in which international issues are to be judged on the merits of each case. This policy is argued to have come into existence as a protest against ideological bifurcation of the world. Kenya's leaders see the efficacy of non-alignment as a guiding principle to the country's relations with other states for they view it as a means of playing a greater role in international affairs by placing the country among the group of states that hold the balance of power between the contending cold war blocs.

In the final section we attempted a detailed analysis of Kenya's official interpretation of non-alignment. The first sub-section was devoted to

surveying Kenya's military policy and we concluded that at independence this policy coincided with the military policy advocated by non-alignment. However, it was argued, by 1965 Kenya's official military policy had begun to deviate from the principle such that by 1986 it was apparently only in the issue of preventing the establishment of military bases in Great Powers for Cold War purposes that she was in ~~agreement~~ agreement with non-alignment.

The country's economic policy was discussed in the second sub-section. We argued that at independence in 1963 it generally tallied with our understanding of a policy of economic non-alignment. The first year of Kenya's independence, however, saw a competition between two economic policies within the Government. Of these, one policy appeared to tally with a policy of economic non-alignment. The situation changed around April 1965 with the adoption of the Sessional Paper NO.10, 1965, a paper whose political philosophy and economic policy appeared to have been operational among Kenya's ruling elite until the end of 1986. In our view, the economic policy it advocates does not seem to tally with a policy of economic non-alignment.

In the third sub-section, Kenya's diplomatic policy was analysed. It was concluded that at independence Kenya's diplomatic policy appeared to be in line

with diplomatic non-alignment. However, from 1964 to 1966 the country's diplomatic policy oscillated between two extremes, none of which tallied with diplomatic non-alignment. After 1966, the country's diplomatic policy was apparently still not tallying with non-alignment and this, in our view, was the situation by 1986.

Lastly, in the fourth sub-section we surveyed Kenya's policy towards the UN system and came to the conclusion that in theory the country seems in general to have been committed to promoting the UN system, just as required by non-alignment throughout the entire period from 1963 to 1986.

Having surveyed the general aspects of Kenya's foreign policy, the general understanding of the principle of non-alignment in Kenya, and the country's official interpretation of the various aspects of the principle of non-alignment, we will in the next three chapters analyse whether Kenya has implemented these dimensions of the principle in her actual international behaviour. The analysis of each aspect will begin with a discussion of an analytical meaning of the aspect in question, to be followed by an analysis of Kenya's position vis-a-vis that aspect.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Holsti, K.J., International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (2nd ed.) Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc. 1972, p.21 for a definition of 'policy'. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (1984 reprint) defines 'foreign' as: "concerning a country or nation that is not one's own". We have used these two definitions to say what we understand by 'Kenya's foreign policy'.
2. Refer to Clapham, C. (ed), Foreign Policy Making in Developing States. Westmead: Saxon House, 1979 p.165.
3. Refer to John J. Okumu in Aluko, O. (ed) op.cit., p.136; Samuel M. Makinda in Third World Quarterly op.cit. pp. 302-303 and 307-308; D. Katete Orwa: "From Disequilibrium to Equilibrium..." op.cit., pp.7 and 9; and John Howell in The Journal of Modern African Studies op.cit. pp 29-20.
4. See John J. Okumu in The African Review op.cit. pp. 266-271; Samuel M. Makinda in Third World Quarterly op.cit. pp. 306 and 316; and African Guide 1977 p.162.
5. John J. Okumu in The African Review op.cit. p.271; Africa Digest (Vol. XI, No.4 Feb. 1964) p. 100; Africa Digest (Vol.XII, No.1 August 1964) p.14; Africa Guide 1980 p.211; and Annual of Power and Conflict 1976-1977, p.193.
6. See The Standard April 9, 1987 p.1 for an example.
7. The figures are from Foltz, W. and Bienen, H.S. Arms and the Africans: Military Influence on Africa's International Relations. New Haven: Yale Univ.Press. 1985 pp.38-41.
8. Refer to Samuel M. Makinda op.cit. pp.301-302; Africa Digest Vol.ix No.4 Feb 1962 pp.113-114; Vol.xiii No.1 Aug. 1965 p.7, Vol.xiii No.6 June 1966 p.129, and Vol.xiv NO.1 Aug. 1966 p.7; and Africa 74-75 p.78.
9. Samuel M. Makinda op.cit. pp.311-312.
10. John Howell in The Journal of Modern African Studies op.cit., p.29. Also refer to Africa Guide 1977 pp. 157-158; and John Okumu in The African Review op.cit., pp.272-273.
11. Refer to D. Katete Orwa: "From Disequilibrium to Equilibrium..." op.cit. pp.9-10; and to John Howell op.cit. p.48.

12. See John Howell op.cit, p.31 and John J. Okumu in The African Review op.cit., p.266.
13. D. Katete Orwa: "From Disequilibrium to Equilibrium..." op.cit. p.10.
14. Compare Samuel M. Makinda op.cit., pp.300-301 with D. Katete Orwa: "From Disequilibrium..." op.cit.p.11.
15. Refer to Samuel M. Makinda op.cit. p.300; Annual of Power and Conflict 1976-77 p.193; and D. Katete Orwa: "From Disequilibrium..." op.cit. p.11 (Note that the information concerning the US's monitoring of Somalia and Uganda intentions and the subsequent relay of this information is to be found in the Annual of Power and Conflict 1976-77 p.193).
16. Samuel M. Makinda, op.cit. p.301-302.
17. Timothy Shaw and M. Catherine Newbury in Delancy, M.W. (ed) Aspects of International Relations in Africa op.cit., pp.66-67.
18. Russell, B., Power: A New Social Analysis op.cit., p.9.
19. Ibid.
20. D. Katete Orwa: "From Disequilibrium to Equilibrium..." op.cit., pp.2,10,11,5,4,12, and 6.
21. KANU: What a Kanu Government Offers you. op.cit., p.27.
22. KANU: What a KANU Government Offers You. op.cit.p.28.
23. The two quotations are from Goldsworthy, D. Tom Mboya: The Man Kenya Wanted to Forget op.cit. p.292 and D. Katete Orwa: "Non-Alignment: the East African Perspective" in Jinadu, L.A. and Mandaza, I.(eds) Africa Perspectives on Non-Alignment op.cit. p.42, respectively.
24. Mboya, T. The Challenge of Nationhood: A Collection of Speeches and Writings London: Heinemann, 1970 p.234.
25. Opoku Agyeman: "Kwame Nkrumah and Tom Mboya: Non-alignment and Pan-African Trade Unionism" in Pan-African-Journal Vol.x NO.1, 1977 pp.51-52.
26. D. Katete Orwa in Jinadu, L.A. and Mandaza, I (eds) op.cit., p.42.

27. KANU: What a Kanu Government Offers You op.cit.p.28.
28. Mboya, T. Freedom and After op.cit. pp.235,236 and 237.
29. Ibid., p.237; and Africa Digest Vol.ix No.1, August 1961 p.114.
30. D. Katete Orwa in Jinadu, L.A. and Mandaza, I.(eds) op.cit. p.42.
31. John Okumu: "Kenya's Foreign Policy" in Aluko, O. (ed) The Foreign Policies of African States op.cit. p.158; Mboya, T. The Challenge of Nationhood.... op.cit. pp.233-240.
32. Refer to Goldsworthy, D. Tom Mboya: The Man Kenya Wanted to Forget op.cit., pp.237 and 232.
33. Ibid., p.232. The quotation is from Tom Okello-Odongo's speech of 6 April, 1965 recorded in ibid., p.236; and Africa Digest Vol.xii No.6 June 1965, p.155.
34. Goldsworthy, D. op.cit., 232 and 236; and Africa Digest Vol.xiii No.6 June 1965, p.155. The quotations are from Mboya's response to Okello-Odongo's speech referred to above.
35. See Africa Digest Vol.xii No.6 June, 1965 p.155.
36. Goldsworthy, D. op.cit. pp.236 and 238; and Daily Nation 12 April 1965.
37. See Africa Digest Vol. xii No. 6 June, 1965,p.155.
38. KANU: Kanu Manifesto: Vote for KANU Nairobi: Press and Publicity Dept. of KANU, 1967 p.22.
39. D. Katete: "From Disequilibrium to Equilibrium..." op.cit. p.10.
40. See Africa Guide 1977 p.161. The close military ties between Kenya and Britain is discussed in detail in Chapter Four.
41. This statement was made by Justus Ole Tipis, then assistant minister in the Office of the President, in Parliament in answer to Mashengu wa Mwachofi's (member of parliament) question in which he wanted to know whether Kenya would dishonour a military agreement between her and the US giving the latter

the use of Kenya's military facilities, considering that members of OAU were against military bases being established on the continent (see Daily Nation of 31 March 1982. Also see Daily Nation of May 28, 1980 for another backbencher's, Koigi Wamwere, concern over the country's military non-alignment in the face of the 1980 Kenya-US military pact).

42. See Moi, D.T. Kenya African Nationalism: Nyayo Philosophy and Principles London: Macmillan, 1986 p.161; United Nations Security Council Forty-First Year (A/41/341/18065 28 May 1986) N. York: UN Office of Public Information, 1986 p.12 (par.15); Daily Nation of February 14, 1980; and Daily Nation of February 22, 1980.
43. This statement of Kiereini is quoted in Daily Nation of 18 Nov. 1979.
44. Refer to extracts from discussions with Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials in 'Appendix II' of the present study. For the quoted statements attributed to Robert Ouko, see Daily Nation of 1 Feb., 1980.
45. Republic of Kenya Development Plan: For the Period From 1st July, 1964, to 30th June, 1970 Nairobi: Ministry of Economic Planning and Development (presented in June 1964) p.(i); Republic of Kenya Sessional Paper NO.10, 1965: African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya Nairobi: Ministry of Economic Planning and Development (presented on 27 April, 1965) p.1; Republic of Kenya Planning for progress: Our Second Development Plan - A Short Version of the Development Plan 1970 - 1974 Nairobi: Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 1969 p.1; Republic of Kenya Development Plan for the Period 1977 to 1978: Part I Nairobi: Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 1977 p.(i); and Republic of Kenya Development Plan 1984-88: Part 1 Nairobi: Ministry of Finance and Planning, 1984 p.(ix). Kenyatta's statement is quoted from Development Plan 1964-1970 op.cit. p.(i), while that of President Moi is from Development Plan 1979-1983 op.cit. p.(i).
46. Refer to Sessional Paper No.10, 1965 op.cit. pp.18-19 and 8. The quotation in the paragraph is from Kenyatta's speech on 21 February, 1964 when he was opening the East African Oil Refineries Ltd at Changamwe, near Mombasa (see Africa Digest Vol.xi No.5 April 1964, p.137.)

47. Sessional Paper NO.10, 1965 op.cit. p.8; D.Katete Orwa: "Non-Alignment: the East African Perspective" in Jinadu, L.A. and Mandaza, I. (eds) African Perspectives on Non-Alignment op.cit. pp.42-43; and Goldsworthy, D. Tom Mboya: The Man Kenya Wanted to Forget op.cit. pp.203-292.
48. Goldsworthy, D. op.cit., pp.258, 203 and 292. As a demonstration of the influence of the "diffusionist" ideas of Mboya on Kenya's economic policy see Sessional Paper NO.10, 1965 op.cit. pp.8-19, and 18-21; and KANU: What a Kanu Government offers you op.cit., p.21.
49. Mboya, T., Freedom and after op.cit. pp.237-238.
50. Ibid.; and Mboya, T. The Challenge of Nationhood... op.cit. p.236.
51. Mboya, T., The Challenge of Nationhood... op.cit. pp.238 and 237.
52. Goldsworthy, D. op.cit. p.234.
53. KANU: What a Kanu Government Offers you op.cit. pp.28, 21, 22, and 31.
54. Compare KANU's position with the definition of economic non-alignment given below (i.e. in Chapter five of the present study.).
55. Goldsworthy, D. op.cit. p.232. The quotation is from Tom Okello-Odongo's speech of 6 April, 1965 recorded in Ibid. p.236 and Africa Digest Vol.XII No.6 June 1965, p.155.
56. Ibid., The quotations are from Mboya's response to Okello-Odongo's speech referred to above.
57. In the middle of May, 1964 Odinga returned home from a visit to the USSR and the PRC which he signed agreements of economic cooperation with and aid from the two countries to Kenya. The following month, June of 1964, it was reported that Kenya had concluded an economic aid agreement of over £60 million with Britain, an agreement to which Gichuru showered Britain with the following praise: "We feel it is only Britain which could be so generous because of the contact we have had all these last seventy years" (see Africa Digest Vol.xii No.1 Aug. 1964, p.14.)
58. Goldsworthy, D. op.cit. p.232.

59. Ibid., p.234.
60. See Sessional Paper No. 10,1965: African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya op.cit. p.(ii) for the quotation. Also refer to Goldsworthy, D,op.cit. pp.252-225.
61. Sessional Paper No.10, 1965 op.cit., pp.1,8 and 9.
62. Ibid., pp.8, (i) and 6.
63. Ibid., pp.2-3, 8 and 12.
64. Ibid., pp.9, 13 and 19.
65. Ibid., p.8.
66. Ibid., pp.9, 24 and 8.
67. Ibid., pp.23-24.
68. See Development Plan: 1970-1974 op.cit. p.i; Development Plan: 1974-1978 op.cit. p.1; Development Plan: 1984-1988 op.cit. p.(xi).
69. Development Plan: 1979-1983 op.cit. pp.(iv) and (iii).
70. Moi, D.T., Kenya African Nationalism: Nyayo Philosophy and Principles London: Macmillan, 1986 pp.35 and 37.
71. Refer to: Republic of Kenya Sessional Paper NO.1 of 1986: On Economic Management for Renewed Growth Nairobi: Ministry of Planning and National Development, 1986 pp.1, 3 and "the Preamble".
72. D. Katete Orwa: "From Disequilibrium to Equilibrium..." op.cit. p.6.
73. Mboya, T. Freedom and After op.cit. pp.235,240, 241, 243 and 244; Mboya, T. The Challenge of Nationhood... op.cit. pp.234 and 236; and KANU: What a Kanu Government Offers You op.cit. p.27.
74. KANU: What a Kanu Government Offers You op.cit.p.27.
75. See D. Katete Orwa: "From Disequilibrium to Equilibrium..." op.cit. p.6.
76. Goldsworthy, D., op.cit. pp.237 and 232.
77. Leys, C.,op.cit. p.221; Goldsworthy, D. op.cit. pp. 236,237,228, 189, and 238; Africa Digest Vol.ix no.4 Feb.1962 pp.113-114 and Vol.xii No.1 Aug. 1964 p.14;

and Daily Nation April 12, 1965.

78. Refer to Goldsworthy, D., op.cit. pp.228,243 and 247; Africa Digest Vol.xiii No.1 August 1965 p.7, Vol.XIV No.1 Aug. 1966 pp.7 and 8, and Vol.XIII No.6 June 1966 p.129; East African Standard 29 April 1966; and The Reporter 22 April, 1966.
79. Kenyatta's words are from his public address on second anniversary of Kenya's attainment of self-government (quoted in Africa Digest Vol.xiii No.1 Aug. 1965 p.7). Other reference for the paragraph are Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Vol. 3 1966 p.498; and Africa Digest Vol.xiv No.4 Feb. 1967 p.73 and Vol.xiv No.7 Aug. 1967 p.132.
80. Mboya's speech is found in Hansard Vol.8, 3rd Session, Column 1539 March 1, 1966. Other references from the paragraph are Sessional Paper No.10,1965 op.cit. pp.2-3; and Samuel M. Makinda: "From Quiet Diplomacy to Cold War Politics...etc" in Third World Quarterly (Vol.5 No.2) op.cit. pp.311-312.
81. D. Katete Orwa: "From Disequilibrium to Equilibrium... etc" op.cit. pp.10-11; Africa Digest Vol.xiv No.7 Aug. 1967 p.132; Africa Research Bulletin: Political Social and Cultural Vol.4 1967 pp.805, 826 and 987, Volume 2 1965 p.345, and Volume 3 1966 p.498.
82. Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Vol.2 1965 p.326; also refer to Goldsworthy, D. op.cit. pp.237-238.
83. Mboya, T. Freedom and After op.cit. p.244; John Howell, "An Analysis of Kenya's Foreign Policy" in The Journal of Modern African Studies vol.6 no.1 1968 p.47; Africa Guide 1977 pp.156 and 161; Africa Report Vol.20 No.4 July-Aug 1974 p.26, and Vol.20 No.3 May-June 1974 p.26; Annual of Power and Conflict 1978-79 p.283; and Africa Guide 1981 pp.200-201.
84. Africa Guide 1984 pp.173-174.
85. D. Katete Orwa: "From Disequilibrium to Equilibrium etc" op.cit. p.11; Moi, D.T., Kenya African Nationalism...etc op.cit. p.159; and Samuel M. Makinda in Third World Quarterly op.cit., p.311.
86. KANU KANU Constitution Nairobi: Kanu Publicity Office, 1960 pp.1-2. Also see D. Katete Orwa: "From Disequilibrium to Equilibrium..." op.cit. p.17.
87. KANU What a Kanu Government Officers' You op.cit. pp.27, 30, 23 and 28.

88. Mboya, T. Freedom and After op.cit. pp.243,244 and 245.
89. KANU What a Kanu Government Offers You op.cit.p.28. Also see Mboya, T., Freedom and After op.cit. p.236; and D. Katete Orwa:"From Disequilibrium to Equilibrium..." op.cit. pp.8-9.
90. KANU What a Kanu Government Offers You op.cit. pp.25 and 30; and D. Katete Orwa: "From Disequilibrium to Equilibrium..." op.cit.,p.10.
91. John Howell: "An Analysis of Kenya's Foreign Policy" in The Journal of Modern African Studies Vol.6 No.1 1968 p.34.
92. Ibid., p.35.
93. John J. Okumu: "Some Thoughts on Kenya's Foreign Policy" in The African Review Vol.3, No.2 June 1973 p.290. Similar remarks are to be found in John J. Okumu: "Kenya's Foreign Policy" in Aluko, O.(ed.) The Foreign Policies of African States op.cit.p.159.
94. Refer to John Howell in The Journal of Modern African Studies op.cit., p.34; African Digest Vol.xii No.1, August 1964 p.14, and Vol.xiii No.4, Feb. 1966 p.86.
95. See John Howell in The Journal of Modern African Studies op.cit. p.31; and Mortimer, R.A. The Third World Coalition in International Politics op.cit.p.85.
96. Refer to Drum Nairobi: Drum Publications East African Ltd., September 1983 pp.14-15 for Dr. Robert Ouko's article. A good summary of the purposes and principles of the UN/to be found in United Nations: Basic Facts about the United Nations (DPI/869) New York: UN Dept. of Public Information, 1985 p.1.2. In brief the purposes and principles are the following: purposes: 1. Maintenance of international peace and security; 2. Development of friendly relations among states; 3. International cooperation in all areas. Principles: 1. Sovereign equality of all member-states; 2. Adherence to UN Charter; 3. Peaceful settlement of international disputes; 4. Avoidance of the threat of use of force among states; 5. Assistance of the UN in any action; 6. Non-interference in matters of domestic jurisdiction of other states.
97. Moi, D.T., Kenya African Nationalism: Nyayo Philosophy and Principles op.cit. pp.5, 186 and 187.

CHAPTER FOURKENYA AND MILITARY NON-ALIGNMENTMEANING OF MILITARY NON-ALIGNMENT

The final document of a meeting of the Ministerial Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned countries held in New Delhi from 16th to 19th April, 1986 states, inter alia, that the Non-Aligned countries are:

...Committed not to be party to, nor to take action leading to, great-power confrontation and rivalry or strengthening of existing military alliances and interlocking arrangements arising there from particularly through the provision of military facilities and bases for great-power military presence conceived in the context of great-power conflict.¹

This is a reaffirmation of the June 1962 Non-Aligned Foreign Minister's declaration in Cairo that with regard to military behaviour, a Non-Aligned country ought not to be a member of a multilateral military alliance concluded in the context of great power conflicts. In case she has a bilateral military pact with a great-power or she is a member of a regional defence pact, the pact should not have been concluded in the context of great-power conflicts. The same applies if she has leased a military base to a foreign power.²

Julius Nyerere of Tanzania summarized - although

in a modified form - the above in his April 1970 address to the Dar-es-Salaam Preparatory meeting of the Non-Aligned states. He asserted that military non-alignment is a "... refusal to be party to any permanent ... military identification with the Great Powers".³

There are various ways in which a country may show its identification, or otherwise, with the Great Powers in the context of non-alignment. These are through:

- (i) membership of multilateral military agreements signed in the context of the East-West conflict;
- (ii) bilateral military pacts with the bloc countries, especially when such pacts serve bloc interests;
- (iii) over-dependence on either of the blocs for supply of military requirements; and
- (iv) any other expression of military identification with either of the blocs.⁴

In an attempt to measure military non-alignment quantitatively Helge Hveem and Peter Willetts have compared the values of arms obtained from the United States, and those obtained from the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China only, arguing that "... given the structure of the arms trade, making major

purchases from countries such as Britain and France did not in practice violate non-alignment". However, Guy Martin, who in principle applies the quantitative method developed by Hveem and Willetts, apparently prefers the inclusion of all bloc countries in such an analysis.⁵

Taking into account our argument in Chapter One of the present study that countries such as Britain and France are bloc-states with which when a country deals, such transactions are significant for the determination of the alignment or non-alignment of the state in question, we have used the information on the purchase of military hardware, and all the other military transactions with, all the bloc states in the analysis of Kenya's position with regard to the military aspect of non-alignment.

It should also be noted that in the analysis of Kenya's military position with regard to non-alignment, her military arrangements with all the bloc countries have been taken to be important in the "context of Great Power conflicts", since the security issues which these bloc states intend to promote by agreeing and seeking military arrangements with Kenya are tied willy-nilly to the overall interest of the bloc they represent. Attempting to separate these countries' non-bloc military interest from the bloc military

interest they stand for would probably be an exercise in futility. As Willetts has put it:

... to make any distinction as to the 'context of Great Power conflicts' is to make distinctions that are too fine to be recognised in the real world.⁶

Therefore, in the present analysis of Kenya's position with regard to military non-alignment, the following have been taken into account:

- (i) sources of Kenya's military hardware, military advisors and foreign military training personnel;
- (ii) multilateral military agreements which Kenya may have signed with the bloc-countries;
- (iii) bilateral military pacts which Kenya may have entered into with the bloc states; and
- (iv) any military bases which Kenya may have leased to the bloc states and other facilities which she may have made available to them for military use.

AN ANALYSIS OF KENYA'S POSITION WITH REGARD TO
APPLICATION OF MILITARY NON-ALIGNMENT

An evaluation of whether Kenya has implemented the principle of non-alignment in her military relations

with the bloc countries is perhaps best began by looking at where she has been buying her arms.

Helge Hveem and Peter Willetts have developed a method whereby the purchase of arms by a given country from the bloc states are used to construction of an index of military non-alignment. The approach is postulated on the assumptions that non-alignment is a refusal to accept military identification with either of the cold war blocs, and that over-dependence on one bloc for supply of military requirements of a given country is an indicator of that country's military identification with the bloc in question. From these premises Hveem and Willetts posit that in order to measure military non-alignment, the arms purchases from each bloc are given monetary value, and the total is worked out for each bloc. The value of arms purchased from the East can be given a positive sign while those obtained from West a negative sign. A country's military non-alignment or alignment is determined by adding the values from the East to the values from the West. If the sum is a positive figure, then the country in question is aligned with the East. Conversely, if it is a negative then the country is aligned with the West. A score of zero denotes non-alignment.⁷

If this method is used to analyse Kenya's

military non-alignment, the conclusion would be that she has been aligned with the Western bloc in military terms. The 1985 issue of World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook points out clearly that "Kenya has never imported any weapons from the Socialist countries"⁸. As the table below (table 1) shows, her major arms requirements namely military aircrafts, naval vessels, armoured vehicles, and missiles - have been met by the arms producing states of the Western cold war bloc.

For all the years considered when compiling the above table-1970 to 1975, 1978 to 1980 and 1982 to 1984 - it is only in 1975 that it is recorded that Kenya ordered for armanent from a Third World country, namely Iran (she joined the N-AM in 1979). Kenya was to get between ten to fifteen 'Northrop F-54 Freedom Fighter' ex-Iranian airforce fighter warplanes. But even then, the transaction was to be financed by the United States through a low interest loan of US\$ 5 million to Kenya. Iran was still a member of CENTO and therefore, in effect, a member of the Western Cold War bloc. These, coupled with Kenya's denial of the transaction, may lead one to conclude that apparently Kenya has been buying virtually all her major military hardware from the core group of states within the Western alliance, namely the United Kingdom (Britain), the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), Canada and Italy.⁹

TABLE 1

REGISTER OF WORLD ARMS DELIVERY TO KENYA

SUPPLYING COUNTRY	NUMBER OF ITEMS	WEAPON DESIGNATION	WEAPON DESCRIPTION	DATE OF ORDER	DATE OF DELIVERY
Canada	2	DHC - 4A Caribon	Transport	1971	1972
	4	DHC - 5D Buffalo	Transport	1976	1977; 1978
F.R.G.	6	Do-28D-2	Transport	1977	1978
Isreal			Patrol Boat (PB)	1978	
	36	Gabriel-2	Ship-to-ship (ShShM) Missiles	1982	1982; 1983
	16	Gabriel-2	ShShM	1981	1981; 1982; 1983; 1984.
France	6	SA-330L Puma	Helicopter	1977	1978
Italy		Otomat	ShShM	1984	
UK	5	Scottish, aviation Beagle B125 Bulldog	Trainer	Oct 1969	197-
	6	BAC 167 Strikemaster	Counter- insurgency (COIN) Trainer	1977	1978
	3	HS Hunter FGA.9	Fighter	1973	1974
	3	HS Hunter T.7	Trainer	1973	1974
	1		Large PB Brooke Marine Type 39.5m, Displacment 130 tons (Disp 130t)	1972	Feb. 1974
	3	Brooke Marine Type 32m	Large PB Disp. 150t	May 1973	

Table 1 Continued...

SUPPLYING COUNTRY	NUMBERS OF ITEMS	WEAPON DESIGNATION	WEAPON DESCRIPTION	DATE OF ORDER	DATE OF DELIVERY
UK (Cont..)	2	BN-2A Defender	Transport	1977	1978
	9	BulDog-103	Trainer	1977	1978
	12	HS Hawk-1	Trainer/Ground; attack	1978	1980
	38	Main Battle Tank (MBT) -3	MBT	1978	1978; 1979; 1980.
	60	Commander	Tank Transport-	1979	1979
	12	Hawk T - 52	Advanced Trainer	1978	1980
	22	MBT - 3AC	Recce AC	1979	
		Rapier	Landmob Surface to Air Missile (SAM)		
	1920	Swingfire	Anti-Tank Missile (ATM)	1978	1979
	40	MBT - 3	MBT	1979	
	4		PB	1980	
	70		Tank Guns (TG)	1981	1981; 1984
	42	MBT - 3	MBT	1980	1981; 1982; 1983
2	Type 56m	Patrol Cruise (PC)	1984		
US	1 (or more)	Piper Navajo	Transport	about 1973	
	2100	BGM-71A TOW	ATM	1979	
	32	Model 500 MD	Helicopter	Mar. 1979	2 in 1979
	2	F-5F Tiger-2	Trainer	1979	1978
	10	F-5E Tiger-2	Fighter	1976	1977; 1978
	2	F-5F Tiger-2	Trainer	1980	1982
	1	Navajo	Transport	1980	1980

SOURCES: SIPRI World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI YEAR BOOK Stockholm:

Almqvist and Wiksell (annual issues of 1972, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1983, 1984 and 1985). Note that the issues for the other years were not available to us. However, it is contended that the above information is sufficient for illustrative purposes, since the fact that Kenya has never imported arms from the socialist countries.

This conclusion becomes more credible when account is taken of the fact that out of about US\$210 million Kenya spent buying major arms between 1976 and 1980, US\$125 million was spent on arms purchased from the US, France, Britain, the FGR and Canada (see Table 2 and Table 3 below). Within the same period Israel, also a member of the Western bloc, was supplying Kenya with a substantial quantity (refer to Table 1 above). This means that Israel was also receiving part of the remaining fund Kenya spent on arms within that period. Similarly Canada also received part of the money. If this concentration of purchases of military requirements is representative of the country's military purchase within the period of the present study, then it adds strength to the contention that in so far as arms purchase is an index ^{of} military alignment or non-alignment, Kenya has been aligned with the West in her international military behaviour. This is because over the years she has shown great military dependence on - and hence military identification with - the core states of the Western alliance. It can be argued that Kenya had a choice to diversify sources of her military requirements. She could have bought arms from the socialist countries, apparently the main arms suppliers to black Africa (see Table 4 below). Alternatively, if socio-economic and politico-ideological differences between Kenya and the Socialist countries prevented

TABLE 2:**KENYA'S MILITARY EXPENDITURE ON PURCHASE OF ARMAMENTS, 1969-1982 (in Million US\$)**

Year	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
Value	0	0	10	10	0	30	11	0	10	50	90	60	130	70

Sources: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (USACDA) World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfer, 1971-1982 Washington, DC: Defense Program Analysing Agency, April 1984 p.75; and Arlinghaus, B.E. (ed) Arms for Africa: Military Assistance and Foreign Policy in the Developing World Lexington: DC.Heath, 1983 p. 41.

TABLE 3:**WORLD ARMS DELIVERY TO KENYA, COMULATIVE 1967-1976 AND 1976-1980****(in million US\$)^a**

Period	Global Total	US	USSR	France	U K	F R G	Canada ^b
1967-1976	51	5	-	5	35	1	
1976-1980	180	50	-	30	40	-	5

Sources: Foltz, W. J. and Biçnen, H. S. Arms and the Africans: Military Influence on Africa's International relations New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1985 p.38; and Arlinghaus, B.E. (ed) Arms for Africa... op. cit. p. 8.

NOTE: a) Statistics are for arms, spare parts, ammunitions and military support and other equipment.
b) The figure for Canada covers 1974-1978.

TABLE 4:**TOTAL WORLD SUPPLY OF MAJOR ARMS TO AFRICA, CUMULATIVE 1978-1982 (in million US\$)**

EAST		WEST
Warsaw Countries	China (PRC)	UK, US, France, and other NATO
14719	652	3613

SOURCE: Compiled from USACDA World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfer op. cit. p. 99.

her from buying arms from them, then Kenya could at least have increased importation of arms from the Third World arms - producing states such as Argentina, Brazil, United Arab Republic (Egypt), and India so as to reduce her military dependence on countries embroiled most in bloc politics.¹⁰

Purchase of arms aside, other aspects of Kenya's military relations with the bloc countries appear to confirm that the country identified with the West military-wise between 1963 and 1986. Kenya army grew out of three battalions of the former British 'Kings African Rifles' (KAR), which, in the last few years before Kenya's independence, cost the British government about Sterling £1.5 million annually to maintain. Britain had a military interest in the country and this had led her to construct a base at Kahawa, near Nairobi, at a cost of Sterling £5.5 million. There were other British military camps at various points in the country. Apart from the cost of maintaining the KAR, Britain was spending a further Sterling £9 million a year on the maintenance of British Navy, army and air force personnel in Kenya.¹¹

Britain therefore showed a keen interest in maintaining close military links with Kenya when independence was approaching. A report in the October 30, 1963 issue of The Times of London indicated that

UK Government officials had expressed their country's hope to secure training, staging and leave facilities in Kenya in exchange for experts to advise Kenya army. This was in the wake of Kenya nationalists' opposition to the presence of British military bases in Kenya.¹²

A tentative compromise was reached between the nationalists and Britain in 1961 to the effect that "the future of the base should be negotiated during the transition to independence". In the last few months to independence a negotiation apparently took place. A Government "White Paper" issued in 1963 carried the outcome when it stated that Britain would not retain a military base after independence since "neither British nor the Kenya government desired it". However, it was agreed that because "the orderly run-down of British forces will take time", the withdrawal "of these forces should be effected over a period of upto twelve months from the date of Kenya's independence". The paper stated further that "the question of defence facilities which Britain and Kenya might be able to offer each other after independence would be a matter for further discussion."¹³

Meanwhile, the British Government had evolved a scheme to send Kenya Africans to Aldershot Staff College in Britain to be trained as military officers to provide Kenya with between fifty and a hundred African officers

by independence. This, in addition to US\$9.8 million worth of arms and equipment plus another US\$23.8 million in military assets, mainly installations, given to the Kenya army upon independence on December 12, 1963 meant that at the start of the period being dealt with in this study Kenya was virtually dependent on Britain military-wise.¹⁴

When independence was attained, unlike in the past when the nationalists had strongly protested against close cooperation between Kenya and Britain, the new African government of Kenya apparently lauded the possibility of increased cooperation. In his 'Independence Day Speech' on 12 December, 1963 the new Prime Minister, Jomo Kenyatta, said:

...with Britain we now enter a new relationship. The close ties which have bound our two countries are not severed today. Rather they will grow in strength as we work together...¹⁵

These words not only summarized a development which had begun, but they were also prophetic. The first year of the existence of Kenya as an independent state saw a further entrenchment of the country's military links with, and dependence on, Britain.

To begin with, a substantial portion of the Sterling £60 million aid given by Britain to Kenya as an 'Independence Settlement' went to the Kenya armed

forces. This was in the form of the out-going British forces' arms, equipment, vehicles and aircraft worth about Sterling £3.5 million; military training of the Kenyan forces by the British Army and Royal Air Force personnel; and the transfer to the Government of Kenya most of British military property and fixed assets in Kenya and Britain's interests in military assets in Kenya owned jointly by Britain, Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya. Responding to these arrangements, Kenya's Minister for Defence, James Gichuru, described it as a real gesture of friendship and a demonstration of Kenya's good relations with Britain. He stressed that "we feel it is only Britain which could be so generous because of the contact we have had all these last seventy years".¹⁶

At the beginning of 1964 - January 24 and 25, to be precise - there was an army mutiny at the headquarters of the 11th Battalion of Kenya Rifles stationed at Lanet, near Nakuru, in protest against continued British Officers' presence in top command positions of Kenya army, and also against inadequate pay. The Kenya Government responded by calling in British troops to deal with the mutiny.¹⁷

This was followed by the signing of a military agreement with Britain. Although British troops were to be withdrawn by December, the incident enabled

Britain to extract an agreement allowing her to retain training facilities for her army, to get over-flight and staging rights for the Royal Air Force, and the right to use Kenyan naval facilities for the Royal Navy. In return, Britain promised Kenya upto US\$3.6 million for the establishment of a navy. A seaward defence vessel was loaned to Kenya, and US\$2.1 million was to be spent on the purchase of three British patrol boats to be delivered to Kenya in 1966. Britain also agreed to provide Kenya with air, logistic, and technical support, in addition to military training aid.¹⁸

Around the same time, a group of Kenyans were undergoing training in Israel under a scheme financed by Israeli government. From Israel, these Kenyans went to Britain for an officers' training course in Aldershot, after which they returned home to become the nucleus for the Kenya Air Force (KAF) launched on June 1, 1964 by President Kenyatta. The British Royal Air Force (RAF) undertook to train the new force under the already mentioned 1964 agreement which also provided that the RAF officers were to remain in command of KAF until 1973.¹⁹

From the foregoing it is apparent that the story of Kenya's international military relations in the 1963-1964 period is but a catalogue of the inheritance and continuation of military dependence on Britain and the

West in general in so far as Israel is seen as a member of the Western bloc. That this development was encouraged by Kenyan authorities is evidenced by the fact that the government of Kenya thereafter repeatedly spurn offers and opportunities of military aid from, and cooperation with, the states of the orient.

For example, as John K. Cooley has observed, Communist China had displayed a military interest in Kenya long before Kenya's independence. Beijing hailed the Mau Mau Rebellion as a "patriotic national struggle by peasant warriors". Oginga Odinga, then Kenya's Vice-President and Kenyatta's number two in the ruling party KANU, apparently tried to take advantage of the opportunities in the East. He sent eighteen young Kenyans for a one-year guerilla training course at China's Wuhan Military Academy, and further made use of his contacts with the USSR and East European countries to secure military training places for more Kenyans such that by mid-1965, one hundred and eighty Kenyan students were taking military courses in China (PRC), the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and East Germany (GDR).²⁰

To understand events that followed immediately thereafter, it should be noted that the above 180 students were officially sponsored by KANU as a result of pressure from the radical wing of KANU led by Odinga. They were not sent by the Kenya Defence Ministry. When

the breach between the two wings in KANU (the 'radicals' and the 'conservatives') finally ruptured leading to the formation of KPU by KANU 'radicals', Kenya's Ministry of Defence, in March 1966, asked that the students taking military courses in the communist countries be switched to civil courses, or else be allowed to return home in the event of which they could apply to join the Kenya armed forces "like any other citizens and be admitted or rejected on their merits".²¹

The cold shoulder given to these students contrasted sharply with the warm reception a year earlier accorded to their counterparts who had gone for training in Israel and later in Britain. The latter lot were immediately absorbed in the KAF, with one of them (they were five initially), Dedan Gichuru, later rising to the position of Air Force Commander following his appointment by President Kenyatta in 1973 to replace a Briton.²²

Military contacts between Kenya and Eastern bloc countries ended when the de facto links in these contacts on the Kenya side broke away from KANU to form KPU. The Government subsequently charged KPU leaders of having China and Russia as its 'paymasters'. Prior to the formation of KPU, a nominated KANU member of Kenya's National Assembly, a Mr. Malinda, had 'disclosed' that there was a secret plan by which "arms

and ammunitions...(were) continuously being smuggled by communist and foreign countries into and through Kenya for the purpose of staging an armed revolution to overthrow our beloved government or involve us in external conflicts".²³

The event recounted above led to the ^Usowering of relations between the KANU Government and the chief powers of the communist world, USSR and PRC. The distrust with which the Kenyan officials regard military relations with the communist world was demonstrated by the rejection of a shipload of Soviet arms which arrived in Kenya on 30 April, 1965. These arms were supplied following an agreement between Kenya and Russia in the spring of 1965 under which the latter offered to provide Kenya with a free consignment of weapons along with a group of Russian military technicians. President Kenyatta rejected the arms only hours after they had been discharged at Mombasa saying that the arms were too old and second-hand and "would be of no use to the modern army of Kenya". The Soviet technicians were also sent packing back to Moscow.²⁴

The military relations between Kenya and China also never took off. In Mid-1965, the Kenya Government sternly rebuked Chou En-Lai, the Chinese Prime Minister, for his suggestion made at a rally in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania that Africa was ripe for revolution. An

official statement from the Government of Kenya said that it was not clear to Kenya "what type or what form of revolution he had in mind". The statement reiterated that the "Kenya Government intends to avert all revolutions irrespective of their origin or whether they come from inside or are influenced from outside". The scheduled visit to Kenya of Chou En-Lai was postponed and it was fated never to take place, for on June 29, 1967 Kenya broke off diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China in the wake of Chinese's Nairobi Embassy attack on Tom Mboya for allegedly siding with the United States in a Kenya National Assembly debate on espionage.²⁵

On the basis of the above account it can, with fairness, be said that in the first few years of independence, the Government of Kenya, while accepting military aid from the Western countries with an obvious show of gratitude, was at pains to justify the sever^{ance} of any military contacts that might have been developing between the country and the communist world. This amounted to a rejection of an opportunity to diversify the sources of military aid to Kenya between the East and the West. Without delving into the socio-economic and politico-ideological considerations which propelled this choice of military position by the ruling elite of Kenya, for the purposes of the present study it is apparent that the choice to diversify, and hence achieve

a balance, presented itself to Kenya and was rejected. Instead, Kenya chose to identify herself with the West. Not only did she opt to continue heavy reliance of Britain for military aid (see Table 5 below) she also signed a military pact with her (Britain), a staunch member of the Western bloc, providing the latter with access to Kenyan military facilities. On the other hand, the aid that found its way into Kenya from the Soviet camp and China (PRC), as has been pointed out in SIPRI's The Arms Trade with the Third World, were "unofficial", meaning that the Government of Kenya did not officially ask for them or, for that matter, approve of them.²⁶

TABLE 5: U.K. MILITARY AID TO KENYA, 1964-1968
(in thousand US\$)

1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
2.344	33.544	7.288	0.787	0.122

Source: SIPRI The Arms Trade with the Third World op.cit., p.237.

Other military aid donors to Kenya during the same period included West Germany, whose military aid, in terms of training and equipment, between 1966 and 1970 totalled deutsche mark (DM) 16 million. After 1973, she also provided training for KAF personnel.²⁷

Otherwise, for most of the 1960s and the first few years of the 1970s Kenya was mostly dependent on Britain, a situation which was favourable to the latter since Kenya "occupied a special place in British strategic calculations". Between 1959 and 1968 she received US\$40 million of the total \$57 million in military aid Britain delivered to Africa and this figure rose to \$44 million out of the \$65 million by 1971. In 1966 three hundred British commissioned and non-commissioned officers were still serving on secondment to the Kenya armed forces, and those in top command posts in KAF were replaced by Kenyans only after 1973. Kenya reciprocated by continuing to honour the 1964 agreement. Indeed, in 1974, as reported in the South African Rand Daily[†] of 8 April 1974, Kenyan authorities were prepared to offer the British Royal Navy (in addition to what Kenya authorities described as "long-standing and hospitable arrangements for bunkering") expanded facilities at the port of Mombasa.²⁸

The second half of the 1970s opened with what is recorded in Africa Guide as a "distinct cooling of relations" between Kenya and Britain over, among other reasons, a series of articles carried by the British Sunday Times in August 1975 which discussed the possible political motives behind the assassination of Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, a prominent Kenyan politician, and

connected the family of President Kenyatta with wealth grabbing, poaching and indiscriminate destruction of forests in Kenya. Another development with significance for Kenya's international military relations was the increased insecurity of Kenya's borders after 1975.²⁹

This last development occurred in the wake of President Amin's claim on January 15, 1976 that Western Kenya was an integral part of Uganda. Kenya's relations with Uganda deteriorated further when the Israeli planes which raided Entebbe on July 4, 1976 called in Kenya during the operation. In the same month Somalia invaded the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and this caused fear among Kenyan officials that Kenya's north-eastern frontier districts would be the next Somalia target. The U.S.'s satellite tracking and communication station on the Indian Ocean Island of Diego Garcia reportedly monitored Ugandan and Somali (both armed comparatively heavily by USSR) movement of troops for a possible attack on Kenya, and the United States officials warned Kenya accordingly.³⁰

It seems that because of the cooled relations between Kenya and Britain, Kenyan officials decided to ask the US for assistance instead. The Americans responded immediately, dispatching an aircraft carrier and four support ships to the East African coast. Although the anticipated attack on Kenya never took

place, a start had been made for the future serious military cooperation between Kenya and the US. The threat on Kenya was sufficient for her officials to start looking for more arms. Naturally, she approached the recently more friendly United States for the purchase of twelve supersonic F-5 Tiger-2 aircraft (two trainers and ten fighters). The US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, agreed to this request on 16 June 1976. The aircraft were delivered in 1977 and 1978.³¹

Thus Kenya not only switched to getting most of her armaments from the Superpower of the Western bloc (see Table 6 below) rather than obtaining them from Britain as before (although she continued to get some arms from Britain and other Western countries), she also joined the group of Third World countries acquiring sophisticated missiles and aircraft. This shift, however, only affected the country's already close military identification with the West by degrees, in that it was taking Kenya even closer to greater heights of military identification with the Western military alliance.³²

In the same period, Kenya further diversified the source of her arms within the Western camp. Apart from six SA-330L Puma helicopters which she ordered from France in 1977 (they were delivered in 1978), in the

course of a visit to France by Kenya's new President in 1978, the French Premier, Raymond Barre expressed France's willingness to give Kenya easy credit terms to enable the country to buy more defence weapons such as helicopters, armoured vehicles, and communication equipment. Meanwhile, in the course of 1977-1978 Kenya ordered for and obtained military hardware from Canada, West Germany and Israel.³³

TABLE 6: MILITARY TRANSFERS FROM THE U.S. TO KENYA,
1950-1980 (In million US\$)

Total	1950-1970	1971-1975	1976-1980
69.6	-	5.6	64.0

Source: Arlinghaus, B.E. (ed) Arms for Africa: Military Assistance and Foreign Policy in Developing Countries op.cit., p.191.

In late 1979, the United States approached Kenya to make available her territory for use by US forces. Kenya's Nairobi Times reported that in November 1979 a US Government spokesman had confirmed that the US had initiated talks with Kenya for this end. A delegation headed by the US Deputy Assistant Defence Secretary, Robert Murray, had left Washington for a week-long tour which would also include a stop in Kenya for talks with Kenyan officials. By April 1980, in a report to the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee

on Europe and the Middle East, an Under-Secretary of Defence, Robert Komer, revealed that talks with Kenya were going on well. Predicting it would only take a couple of months to work out the details, he said that "politically, the atmosphere is good" and disclosed that access to existing facilities was being sought because "a large fixed US presence, especially a base, could create political problems for the host country, and might limit our flexibility". He reiterated US's interest in the region of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf oil flow, security of Israel, and in deterring the Soviets from seizing the oil fields."³⁴

These reports followed a visit by Kenya's head of State to the US in February 1980 with the main purpose being, according to Daily Nation (12.2.80, pp.1 and 4), "to meet President Carter... to discuss US proposals for closer military ties with Kenya". The Standard of 22 February 1980 reported that in the course of the visit President Moi gave President Jimmy Carter "assurance that the US Navy will be allowed increased use of Kenyan port facilities". The military agreement between the US and Kenya was finally signed on 27 June, 1980.³⁵

Under this agreement the US forces could use port and naval facilities at Mombasa as well as air stations at Embakasi (in Nairobi) and Nanyuki. In

addition, the US could store fuel and military equipment in Kenya. In return, Kenya would get increased US military aid. The US was also to improve facilities at Mombasa's international airport and to build, to the tune of US\$26 million, naval support facilities at Mombasa's naval port.³⁶

The purpose for which the US sought the use of Kenya's military facilities shows the importance of the 1980 agreement with regard to Kenya's position in terms of military non-alignment.

Several traumatic events between 1978 and 1980 led to concern within the Carter administration that there was a decline in American influence and prestige abroad. A revolution in Iran brought to power an anti-American Islamic revolutionary regime in place of America's strongest ally in the Gulf region, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. The militants of the new regime seized the American Embassy in Tehran in November 1979, taking the embassy officials hostages. Meanwhile, while American's position in the region was weakening, that of the Soviet Union seemed to be growing in strength following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, and the stepping up of the naval build-up and military assistance to client regimes in the region, especially South Yemen and Ethiopia. The outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq in September 1980 further

eroded the stability of the region and - in the perception of US officials - increased the possibility of the Soviet Union taking control of the world's foremost oil exporting region.³⁷

Therefore, arguing that "any attempt by an outside power to gain control of the world's foremost oil-exporting region would be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force", Carter took several steps which included the reinforcement of US naval presence in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean region, and the development of a "quick reaction force" or "rapidly deployable force", the United States Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF-established at McDill Air Force Base, Florida early in 1980; now known as CENTCOM).³⁸

It was in the process of looking for places for supporting, servicing and liberty calls for increased US presence in the Indian Ocean region that the Carter administration approached Kenya to make available her territory. By agreeing to the use of her military facilities by the US, Kenya in 1980 became part of the US's "global military policy thought through in world geopolitical terms and in terms of American military technical requirements", and, hence an integral participant on the side of the Western alliance in the East-

West military competition.³⁹

Kenya's military cooperation with the United States, was as a result, stepped up in the nineteen-eighties and Kenya emerged as one of the largest buyers of US arms in Africa. Still she received substantial quantities of arms from other Western countries such as United Kingdom, France and Italy (see Table 7 below). The US also increased her military aid to Kenya considerably (see Table 6 above and Table 8 below).⁴⁰

TABLE 7: VALUE OF ARMS TRANSFERS TO KENYA, CUMULATIVE 1978-1982 BY MAJOR SUPPLIERS (in million US\$).

US	FRANCE	UK	ITALY	OTHERS	TOTAL
100	60	90	30	120	400

Source: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfer 1972-1982 op.cit., p.95.

TABLE 8: US SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO KENYA, 1983-1985 (in million US\$)

	FY 1983 (Actual)	FY 1984 (Estimated)	FY 1985 (Proposed)
FMS	10	10	-0-
Foreign Military and Construction Sales	16.6	35	20
ESF	30	40	55
MAP	8.5	12	23
IMET	1.4	1.5	1.8
TOTAL	66.5	98.5	99.8

Source: Bakken, H.L. "United States Strategic Military Access In North-East Africa" (Postgraduate thesis) Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, December 1984 p.135.

The increased Kenya's military cooperation with the US sharply contrasted with her poor, if not non-existent, military relations with the Soviet Union. For example, soon after the signing of the military agreement with the United States, despite protestations by Robert Ouko, then Kenya's Foreign Affairs Minister, that Kenya always accorded "normal" facilities to visiting military vessels from Britain, USSR, USA, France and any other country with which Kenya has normal diplomatic relations, when on 30 April, 1981 two Soviet military transport planes made an unscheduled landing at Nairobi's international airport, they were detained and thoroughly searched by Kenyan authorities.⁴¹

On the other hand, Kenya participated in the US Rapid Deployment Force 'Operation Bright Star Joint Exercise' held in 1982 and 1983. Five amphibious ships from the United States' 'Sixth Fleet' participating in the exercise had earlier on docked at Mbaraki in the port of Mombasa. Kenyan authorities, however apparently refused to have 1,800 American Marines on the Kenyan soil during the exercise.⁴²

Nevertheless, the role of Kenya in CENTCOM

indebted the US to her so that, in spite of a revelation by Pentagon officials that Kenya was falling behind in repayment of arms purchases from the US, the officials quickly added that "late payments would not necessarily preclude further loans for arms purchase by US allies and friendly nations". The US, therefore, went ahead and supplied almost two-thirds of Kenya's increased arms purchases in 1982-1983. A draft of US Government's military aid budget for 1984 allocated to Kenya an estimated US\$98.5 million in military aid in the form of credits for purchase of military hardware from the US and "economic support funds" to strengthen the military infrastructure of Kenya. The dredging of the entrance to Kilindini harbour in Mombasa (by American Great Lakes Dredging Company) to allow US warships to anchor at port was completed in 1983, having cost the US defence department about US\$100 million. Earlier, in October 1982, the US Defence Department had signed a contract with the East Africa Molasses Company for fueling US naval vessels at Mombasa's Mbaraki jetty.⁴³

By the end of 1986, Kenya's military agreements with Britain and the US of 1964 and 1980 respectively were still operational. There was no indication of any important changes in Kenya's military policy of the first half of the 1980s. With these two in mind, it can be stated with a reasonable amount of certainty that

by the end of 1986 Kenya was still identifying herself with the West in military matters, because not only did she have military agreements with two of the West's major powers, but she was also receiving most of her military aid from the West.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In Chapter three of the present study we looked at Kenya's military policy. It was discovered that at independence the official military policy of the ruling party, and therefore of the Government, on the whole coincided with the military policy advocated by the principle of non-alignment. However, by 1965 Kenya's official military policy had began showing important traces of deviation from the military policy advocated by the principle of non-alignment such that by 1986, it was apparently only on the issue of preventing the establishment of military bases by Great Powers for Cold War purposes that she was in agreement with the principle of non-alignment.

With this background information on the state of Kenya's military policy, in theory vis-a-vis the principle of non-alignment, we set out in the present Chapter to evaluate whether or not Kenya is militarily non-aligned in practice; with 'military alignment' seen as military identification with either the Eastern

bloc or the Western bloc. A country which does not identify herself in military terms with either of the blocs is, therefore, non-aligned military-wise. 'Military identification' was defined as: 1. being a member of a multilateral military agreement signed in the context of the East-West rivalry; 2. having bilateral military pacts with bloc states; 3. leasing military bases to, or allowing the use of one's facilities for military purposes by, foreign powers engaged in East-West rivalry; 4. over-dependence on either of the blocs for acquisition of military equipments; and 5. any other expression of preference of either of the blocs in military relations.

We then proceeded to look at where Kenya has been buying her arms and discovered that she has been getting them from the Western bloc countries only. It was therefore concluded that if buying arms from one bloc only is an index of military alignment, then Kenya has not been non-aligned military-wise in practice since independence.

A survey of Kenya's reception of military aid and the military agreements she signed with the bloc countries between 1963 and 1986 seemed to confirm that Kenya is aligned with the West in military terms. She rejected military aid from the East and any little military aid which found its way into the country

from there was not officially acknowledged or encouraged. On the other hand, she appeared to have encouraged military aid from the West and went as far as signing military pacts with Britain and the United States in 1964 and 1980, respectively. These treaties allowed their forces to use Kenyan facilities for military purpose.

On the basis of the above findings, the following conclusion can be made: that in so far as military identification with one cold war bloc is taken to mean military alignment with the given bloc, and military identification is defined as more military dependence on one cold war bloc and allowing members of that bloc to use one's territory for military purposes, it seems that on the whole, from 1963 to 1986 Kenya was aligned with the Western bloc in military terms.

FOOTNOTES

1. United Nations Security Council: Forty-First Year (A/41/341, S/18065 28 May 1986) N. York: UN Office of Public Information, 1986 p.12 (par.15).
2. See Willetts, P., The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance op.cit. pp.18-19.
3. Quoted by H. Hveem and P. Willetts in Tandon, Y.A. and Chandarana, D (eds) Horizons of African Diplomacy op.cit. p.3. Also see Willetts, P. op.cit. p.127.
4. Refer to Tandon, Y.A. and Chandarana, D. (eds) op.cit. pp.13-18; Willetts, P., op.cit. pp.127-132; Guy Martin in Jinadu, L.A. and Mandaza, I. (eds) African Perspectives on Non-Alignment op.cit. p.26; D. Katete Orwa in Arlinghaus, B.E. (ed) Security Issues: Sovereignty, Stability and Solidarity op.cit. p.25; and Jansen G.H. Non-Alignment and the Afro-Asian States op.cit. pp.15 and 285-286.
5. See Tandon, Y.A. and Chandarana, D. (eds) op.cit. p.27; and Willetts, P., op.cit. p.129; Guy Martin uses data on arms delivery from France, in particular, and the world, in general, to analyse Francophone West and Central African States military non-alignment (see Guy Martin in Jinadu, L.A. and Mandaza, I. (eds) op.cit. pp.26-28 and 35-36).
6. Willetts, P., op.cit. p.128.
7. Refer to H. Hveem and P. Willetts in Tandon, Y.A. and Chandarana, D. (eds) op.cit. p.15; and Willetts, P. op.cit. pp.129-132.
8. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) World Armaments and Disarmaments: SIPRI Yearbook 1985 Stockholm:Almqvist and Wicksell, 1985 p.314.
9. Refer to "Arms Trade Register" in SIPRI Yearbook 1976 under the column "Kenya". The phrase "the core group of states within the western alliance" has been used to refer to the UK, the US, the FRG, France, Canada and Italy simply because they are signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty, a treaty which more or less launched the Western Alliance.
10. For some of the Third World arms producing states refer to SIPRI: The arms trade with the Third World Stockholm:Almqvist and Wicksell, 1971 pp.724-730.

11. Dupuy, T.N., Hayes, G.P. and Andrews, J.A.C., The Almanac of World Military Power (3rd edition) Dunn Loring and New York: T.N. Dupuy Associates (in association with R.R. Bowker Co.), 1974 p.227; Africa Digest Vol.ix No.1 Aug. 1961 p.114; and Mboya, T. Freedom and After op.cit. p.237.
12. Africa Digest Vol.XI No.3 Dec. 1963 p.72.
13. Africa Digest Vol.1X No.1 Aug. 1961 p.114; and Vol.XI No.1 August 1963 p.11.
14. Africa Digest Vol.1X No.1 Aug. 1961 p.114; and Dupuy T.N. et.al., op.cit. p.227.
15. Quoted in The Guardian Dec 13, 1963 (see Africa Digest Vol.XI No.4 Feb. 1964 p.99).
16. Africa Digest Vol.XII No.1 Aug. 1964 pp.13-14.
17. Dupuy T.N., et.al., op.cit. p.227.
18. SIPRI Arms Trade with the Third World op.cit. p.640; and Africa Digest Vol.XIV No.7 August 1967 p.132.
19. Refer to Daily Nation (Nairobi) 22.8.82 pp.1 and 13.
20. John K. Cooley: "From Mau Mau to Missiles" in the Africa Forum: A Quarterly Journal of Contemporary Affairs (New York: the American Society of African culture) Vol.2 No.1 Summer 1966 p.48; and SIPRI Arms Trade with the Third World op.cit. p.640.
21. John K. Cooley op.cit. p.48.
22. See Daily Nation 22.8.82 pp.1 and 13.
23. Refer to Africa Digest Vol.XIV No.1 Aug.1966 p.7; and Vol.XIII No.6 June 1965 pp.155.
24. See SIPRI Arms Trade with the Third World op.cit. p.641; and Africa Digest Vol.XII No.6 June 1965 p.155.
25. Africa Digest Vol.xiii No.1 August 1965 p.7 and Vol. Xiv No.7 August 1967 p.132.
26. SIPRI The Arms Trade with the Third World op.cit. p.640.
27. Source: Arlinghaus, B.E. (ed) Arms for Africa...etc. op.cit. p.157; also see Daily Nation 22.8.82 pp.1 and 13.

28. Refer to SIPRI The Arms Trade with the Third World op.cit. pp.235 and 640; and Daily Nation 22.8.82. The Rand Daily report is recorded in Africa Report Vol.20 No.3 May-June 1974 p.26.
29. Africa Guide 1977 pp.158-159.
30. Ibid.; Annual of Power and Conflict 1977-78. p.189; Annual of Power and Conflict 1978-79 p.164.
31. Annual of Power and Conflict 1978-79 p.164. Also refer to Table 1 of the present study; Africa Guide 1979 p.161; and Africa Guide 1978 p.159.
32. Freedman, L., Atlas of Global Strategy: Global War and Peace in the Nuclear Age London: Macmillan, 1985; and Foltz, W.I. and Bienen, H.S. Arms and the Africans.. etc. op.cit. p.181.
33. See Daily Nation 15.11.78 pp.1 and 13.
34. Nairobi Times 23.11.79; and Daily Nation 5.4.80.
35. See Annual of Power and Conflict 1980-81 p.263.
36. Daily Nation 27.7.80; Africa Guide 1981 p.201; Africa Guide 1982 pp.27-28; and Daily Nation 14.2.80 pp.1 and 4.
37. Refer ^{to} Wormser, M.D. (ed.) US Defence Policy Washington, D.C: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1983 pp.179-180.
38. Ibid. Also refer to Foltz, W.J. and Bienen, H.S. op.cit. p.27; and Freedman, M. op.cit. pp.40 and 46.
39. Foltz, W.J. and Bienen, H.S., op.cit. p.192,
40. SIPRI SIPRI Yearbook 1980 p.111.
41. Ouko was reported in Daily Nation of 1.2.80; also see Annual of Power and Conflict 1981-82 p.287.
42. Refer to SIPRI Yearbook 1985 p.314; and Nairobi Times 27.7.80.
43. Daily Nation 16.7.82; SIPRI Yearbook 1985 p.314; Standard of 6.2.83 and of 5.4.83; and Daily Nation 8.4.83.

CHAPTER FIVEKENYA AND ECONOMIC NON-ALIGNMENTMEANING OF ECONOMIC NON-ALIGNMENT AND ITS ANALYSIS

Non-Aligned states have always been concerned with economic issues. T.V. Subba Rao has pointed out that the April 1955 Bandung Afro-Asian Conference discussed, among other issues, some aspects of economic problems faced by the participating states. Apart from calling for mutual cooperation with regard to trade and transport problems, an 'Economic Committee' was also set up. When the first Non-Aligned summit was convened in Belgrade in 1961, economic issues once again were discussed and these discussions - in Rao's words - "laid the foundations for...(and) led to the Cairo Economic Conference in 1962 and the first UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) gathering in 1964". The second Non-Aligned Summit of Cairo, on its part, issued a 'Declaration on Economic Development and Cooperation'.¹

It can therefore be seen, as Helge Hveem and Peter Willetts have observed, that although abstention from permanent identification with either of the two cold war blocs was primarily defined in military terms initially, economic issues were nonetheless not far from the surface of the forces of the Non-Aligned Movement

(N-AM).² L. Adele Jinadu has adequately brought out the rationale for the economic dimension of non-alignment in his discussion of Anglo-phone West African perspective on the N-AM. He asserts that "The starting point for the identification of (the) economic dimensions (of non-alignment) must be in the realization by the members of the movement of their economic dependence on the West" and that "of particular importance are the implications of such a dependence not only for their own development but also for world peace and equitable (economic) growth in the world."³

In other words, the argument is, as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania pointed out in his address to the April 1970 Dar-es-Salaam Non-Aligned Preparatory Meeting, that the 'economic weakness (of the Non-Aligned states) very often enabled the Big Powers to impose their will without using military strength at all'. He added that:

with much less difficulty to themselves and less danger of getting themselves bogged down in endless anti-guerilla activities - they can use their economic strength for the same purpose of reducing our independence of action. The real and urgent threat to the independence of almost all the Non-Aligned states thus come... from the economic power of the big states.⁴

The articulation of the economic dimensions of non-alignment has been generally traced by scholars

to the Dar-es-Salaam Meeting referred to above and the ensuing Lusaka Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned states held in September, 1970. There was a realisation by the member-states of the N-AM of the "absolute necessity to achieve economic independence, in addition to political independence in order to give full meaning to the concept of sovereignty".⁵ The August 1972 Georgetown (Guyana) meeting of the Ministerial Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned States picked up this economic theme and issued the 'Action Programme for Economic Cooperation' in the preamble of which it was stated that:

...the Non-Aligned countries believe it is fundamentally important to stress that the full exercise of their sovereignty over natural resources is essential for economic independence, which is closely linked with political independence and that the latter is consolidated by strengthening the former. The sovereign right of each state to dispose of its natural wealth and resources ... is inherent to the principle of self-determination of the peoples and of non-intervention.⁶

To realize the desirable measure of economic independence that is conducive for the exercise of self-determination, the Non-Aligned states have sought to limit the possibility of economic domination by the economically more powerful states. Whereas the need to develop, and the absence of domestic economic resources with which to attain development, necessitates receiving aid, technical assistance, and loans from the

well-to-do states, the Non-Aligned countries have to guard against being drawn into a dependence which would force them to limit their own choice of action in international affairs and the judgement of every international issue on its own merits. The Non-Aligned states, therefore seek to diversify their economic transactions. And since the economically powerful states are found on both sides of the cold war world, this economic diversification - in the words of Guy Martin - "must (be a conscious) endeavour to strike a delicate balance between the two blocs lest they might fall in the dependency trap".⁷

Basing ourselves on the above understanding, economic non-alignment has been taken in the present study to mean a given state's pursuit of an economic policy which seeks to balance economic transactions between the Eastern and Western blocs, with the aim of not being overly dependent economically on one bloc or the other.

Not only is a Non-Aligned state expected to diversify the sources of her economic aid, technical assistance and loans between the two blocs, but she is expected to trade more or less evenly with them. This way she stands a better chance of limiting the extent of her economic dependence on either of the blocs, and hence maintain a reasonable amount of independence

vis-a-vis the cold war bloc politics.

To assess whether or not a country is economically non-aligned, Helge Hveem and Peter Willetts have proposed that "trade seemsto offer a more reliable and equally valid indicator of economic relations".

Their argument is that:

Trade is largely an expression of political relationships. This is especially true of trade with the communist countries which comes directly under government control. Most of the newly independent nations had practically no trade with the communist bloc when they attained independence. The extent to which they trade with the communist bloc is therefore a measure of the extent they have broken away from previous restrictions and have attempted to limit the former dominance of the metropolitan countries.⁸

Guy Martin seems to go along with the above proposal part of the way when he also asserts that "in the area of trade, the destination of exports and origin of imports are generally accepted as reasonable indicators of dependency". However, unlike Hveem and Willetts who apparently advocate the sole use of trade - more specifically the imports from the communist countries - for constructing the index of economic alignment (because, as they argue, "imports may be taken to be under greater control of the receiving country, which can pick and choose where to buy from" ,

and that "there is much less freedom of manouvre in selling exports. They must go to whoever will buy.) - Martin goes on to say that "the analysis of aid patterns (together with trade patterns) give a more balanced view of the economic relations", since some of the socialist Non-Aligned countries have negligible trade with the East while some capitalist Non-Aligned countries have significant trade with the East.⁹

In the present study trade and aid patterns have been used for the analysis of Kenya's economic non-alignment, or otherwise. We have accepted as valid Hveem's and Willetts' assertion that import figures of trade are, as it were, a reasonable indicator of economic relations. Nevertheless, Martin's observation has also made us accept the need for a further analysis of export trade patterns of Kenya, and her sources of aid and loans so as to emerge with a more balanced view of Kenya's economic relations with the bloc countries.

Our method of analysing imports into Kenya, however, deviates from that proposed by Hveem and Willetts in that whereas they only use imports from the communist countries to determine economic non-alignment, we have used imports from both the Eastern and Western blocs in an attempt to see if there is a relative balance in Kenya's trade relations with blocs.

A balance has been equated with economic non-alignment while a lack of balance has been taken to represent economic alignment with whichever side Kenya imports most of her merchandise.

Yearly percentages of Kenya's total imports have been worked out for each bloc. The percentages for imports from the Eastern bloc countries have been awarded a positive sign (+) while those for the Western bloc countries have been given a negative sign (-). For each year the two percentages have been added and if the result for any of the years is a zero (0) we have taken this to mean a balance and hence economic non-alignment. A positive (+) or negative (-) figure arrived at after the addition of the percentages for each year has been taken to mean alignment with the Eastern bloc or the Western bloc, respectively.¹⁰

Figures for Kenya's export trade, aid and loans from the two blocs have, in general been similarly dealt with, although not necessarily on a yearly basis, since they have only been used to affirm or modify the conclusions arrived at using the import figures.

AN ANALYSIS OF KENYA'S POSITION WITH REGARD TO
APPLICATION OF ECONOMIC NON-ALIGNMENT

An analysis of Kenya's imports indicates an

economic alignment with the Western bloc. For the entire period of 1963 to 1986, while she was getting an annual average of 64.32% of her global imports from the Western bloc, the annual average from the Eastern bloc amounted to only 2.65% of Kenya's global total imports. The highest point in Kenya's import-trade alignment with the West was in 1964 when the difference between percentage imports from the West and from the East was 89.13% in favour of the West. In that year she had a record high imports from the West, for 93.81% of her total global imports came from that bloc. The lowest percentage for the West was in 1982 when only 47.88% of her imports came from there. But in that same year she also got only 1.09% of her total imports from the Eastern bloc. Indeed in the following year (1983) the East scored only 0.5% marking the lowest point in Kenya's import-trade with the East, the highest being in 1974 when it was 6.77% (.see Table 9 below.)

Even if one were to use Helge Hveem's and Peter Willetts' method of analysing the import trade, in which they suggest that the extent to which a country trades with the communist bloc is a measure of that country's economic non-alignment, the conclusion would still be that generally Kenya has been economically aligned with the West. The two writers argue that since the Western bloc countries dominate international trade (for example, between 1965 and 1967 only 11.5% of the

TABLE 9:

KENYA'S IMPORTS FROM THE EASTERN AND WESTERN BLOCS, 1963-1986

YEAR	KENYA'S GLOBAL IMPORT-TRADE ANNUAL TOTALS	TOTAL IMPORTS FROM BLOC COUNTRIES		BLOC 1- AGE TOTAL IMPORTS	DIFFERENCE IN THE 1- AGES	DIFFERENCE IN THE 1- AGE ROUNDED	DIRECTION EAST (+) OR WEST (-)
		BLOC	IN POUNDS (£)				
1963	73,500,000	West(W)	51,237,000	69.89	68.56	70	(-)
		East(E)	974,000	1.33			
1964	76,550,000	W	71,808,000	93.81	89.13	90	(-)
		E	3,585,000	4.68			
1965	88,950,000	W	60,443,000	67.95	64.10	65	(-)
		E	3,429,000	3.85			
1966	112,250,000	W	75,388,000	67.16	63.11	65	(-)
		E	4,550,000	4.05			
1967	106,500,000	W	65,258,000	61.28	58.88	60	(-)
		E	2,556,000	2.40			
1968	114,650,000	W	78,946,000	68.86	65.86	65	(-)
		E	3,434,000	3.00			
1969	116,850,000	W	82,945,000	70.98	68.14	70	(-)
		E	3,323,000	2.84			
1970	142,050,000	W	102,482,000	72.15	70.06	70	(-)
			2,962,000	2.09			

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YEAR	GLOBAL IN US DOLLARS(\$)	IMPORTS FROM BLOCS		BLOC AGES	DIFFERENCES IN 1-AGES	ROUNDED	EAST (+) WEST (-)
		Bloc	IN US DOLLARS (\$)				
1971	515,480,000	W	334,605,000	64.91	58.99	60	(-)
		E	30,526,000	5.92			
1972	497,280,000	W	362,252,000	72.84	72.44	70	(-)
		E	21,919,000	4.40			
1973	576,240,000	W	425,444,000	73.83	69.52	70	(-)
		E	24,878,000	4.31			
1974	988,540,000	W	616,149,000	62.32	55.55	55	(-)
		E	66,965,000	6.77			
1975	986,160,000	W	551,622,000	55.93	51.55	50	(-)
		E	13,634,000	1.38			
1976	944,640,000	W	591,517,000	62.62	60.19	60	(-)
		E	22,971,000	2.43			
1977	1275,480,000	W	828,720,000	64.97	62.54	60	(-)
		E	30,961,000	2.43			
1978	1718,990,000	W	1221,903,000	71.08	69.08	70	(-)
		E	34,474,000	2.00			
1979	1610,180,000	W	1048,699,000	65.13	63.68	65	(-)
		E	23,280,000	1.45			
1980	2493,478,000	W	1427,406,000	57.25	55.90	55	(-)
		E	33,628,000	1.35			
1981	2035,792,000	W	1114,782,000	54.76	53.37	55	(-)
		E	28,349,000	1.39			

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YEAR	GLOBAL	IMPORTS FROM BLOCS		BLOC 1-AGES	DIFFERENCE IN 1-AGES	ROUNDED	EAST (+) WEST (-)
		US \$ (DOLLARS)	BLOC				
1982	1701,369,000	W	814,660,000	47.88	46.79	45	(-)
		E	18,571,000	1.09			
1983	1360,160,000	W	704,125,000	51.77	51.27	50	(-)
		E	6,822,000	0.50			
1984	1515,850,000	W	824,210,000	54.37	53.45	55	(-)
		E	13,980,000	0.92			
1985	IN POUNDS (£)		IN POUNDS (£)				
	1057,108,000	W	598,958,000	56.66	55.30	55	(-)
	E	14,344,000	1.36				
1986	1140,849,900	W	630,890,000	55.30	53.63	55	(-)
		E	19,090,000	1.67			

SOURCES: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstract (1966, 1968, 1967, 1970, 1972 and 1986 issues) Nairobi: Statistical Division of Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, pp. 26, 42, 41, 43, 50 and 48 of the Annual publications, respectively; Republic of Kenya Economic Survey Nairobi: Central Bureau of Statistics of Ministry of Planning and National Development, 1987 pp.95-96; and United Nations: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics Vol.1 (1978, 1983 and 1984 issues) New York: Statistical office of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, published 1979, 1984 and 1985 respectively.

NOTE: For the countries of each bloc, refer to Chapter One present study.

non-communist world's imports came from the communist bloc) a country whose percentage import-trade with the communist ^x ranges from 6.5% to 16.5% is non-aligned in trade relations. A figure below this range would represent trade alignment with the West, while that above the range would represent alignment with the East.¹¹

For Kenya, it is only in 1974 that she narrowly found herself in the range by scoring 6.77% imports from the communist world. But taking into account the fact that Hveem and Willetts themselves admit that "there seems to be no objective way that a range about this norm (i.e. 11.5%) can be chosen" so that their decision to use a range of 5% is made "arbitrarily"¹², Kenya's score of 6.77% appears not to present enough grounds for concluding that the country was economically non-aligned in 1974. It should also be noted that in that year she obtained well over half of her imports - 62.32% to be precise - from the Western bloc countries (see Figure 2 below.)

Other aspects of Kenya's economic relations with the bloc countries seem to confirm our conclusion arrived at after the analysis of Kenya's import-trade with the countries within the two blocs that Kenya is economically aligned with the Western bloc. In the area of the country's export-trade, Kenya exported

FIGURE 1: ILLUSTRATION OF KENYA'S IMPORT-TRADE ALIGNMENT, 1963-1986





FIGURE 2: ECONOMIC ALIGNMENT USING HVEEM'S AND WILLETT'S METHOD



59.23% of her total export merchandise to the Western bloc countries between 1963 and 1970. In the same period only 3.06% went to the Eastern bloc countries. From 1971 to 1984 40.19% went to the West, while only 1.44% went to the East. Finally, from 1985 to 1986 she exported 53.87% of her export-merchandise to the Western bloc countries while only 1.67% went to the Eastern bloc countries (see Table 10). A graph constructed on the basis of the differences in these percentages of exports to the East and to the West shows a clear export-trade alignment with the Western bloc (refer to Figure 3 below).

A look at Kenya's sources of loans also indicates that the country has been receiving most of her loans from the countries belonging to the Western cold war bloc. For example, out of a total loan of £142,152,000 Kenya received between 1963 and 1977, £74,755,000 came from Western bloc countries namely Britain, USA, West Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Canada and Denmark. This represented 52.59% of the total, leaving only £26,408,000 to come from all the other countries put together (Table 11 below). In the post-1977 period the Western bloc countries apparently continued to be Kenya's major suppliers of loans. West Germany, for example, was a major supplier. In 1978 alone she provided Kenya with a loan of KShs 409,000,000 (£26,752,000) to be followed in 1980 with further loans totalling ^{KShs} 22,880,000. Other

TABLE 10:

KENYA'S EXPORTS TO THE EASTERN AND THE WESTERN BLOCS

CUMULATIVE 1963-1970, 1971-1984, AND

1985-1986

		1963-1970	1971-1984	1985-1986
Kenya's Total Export-Trade		£485,950,000	\$12448,889,000	£624,745,000
Total Exports to Bloc Countries	Western	£287,820,000	\$5003,780,000	£875,301,000
	Eastern	£ 14,860,000	\$ 178,689,000	£ 27,080,000
Bloc %-ages of Total Exports	Western	59.23	40.19	53.87
	Eastern	3.06	1.44	1.67
Differences in %-ages		56.17	38.75	52.20
Roundings of Differences		55	40	50
Direction of alignment		West	West	West

Sources: Same as for Table 9.

FIGURE 3: ILLUSTRATION OF KENYA'S EXPORT-TRADE ALIGNMENT, CUMULATIVE 1963-70, 1971-84 AND 1985-6




TABLE 11:

LOANS RECEIVED BY KENYA, CUMULATIVE 1963-1977
(BILATERAL SOURCES) - IN £ '000

UK	U S A	F R G	JAPAN	NETHER- LANDS	CANADA	DENMARK	OTHER COUNTRIES
36,654	13,385	11,583	6,988	356	2,768	3,021	26,408
TOTAL FOR 7 COUNTRIES ABOVE				TOTAL LOANS TO KENYA ^a		% - AGE FOR THE ABOVE 7 COUNTRIES OF TOTAL	
74,755				142,152		52.59	

^a Total includes loans received from non-governmental sources:

SOURCE: Wanjohi, N.G. "The Politics of Foreign Aid in Kenya since independence, 1963-1977" (PhD Thesis, University of Nairobi 1980) pp 601-602.

main suppliers of loans to Kenya in the 1980s included Britain, Canada, United States and Japan. It should be noted, however, that Kenya also received some loans from the East, notably from China which in 1980 agreed to provide Kenya with a £ 22.32 million for the construction of a sports complex at Kasarani, on the outskirts of Nairobi, following a visit by President Moi to Beijing in the September of 1980. Nevertheless, compared to the loans received from the Western countries, those from the East appear to be only symbolic.¹³

On the side of aid and grants, the main bilateral aid donors to Kenya have been the United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, United States, Sweden, Japan, Denmark, Norway, Netherlands and Canada. Apart from Sweden, all these countries are members of the Western Cold war alliance, and between them they provided Kenya with a total of US\$1096,860,000 in aid between 1963 and 1977. Of these countries the UK, West Germany, Denmark and Norway were the main providers of grants to Kenya within the same period.

The relations between Kenya and the Eastern bloc countries as far as aid and grants are concerned have been relatively cool. For example in 1966 the Government of Kenya rejected at least five offers of aid from the Soviet Union, arguing that since the latter

had promised aid in the form of Russian goods the process involved "would take too long". In the same breath, the Government spokesman on the issue, Tom Mboya, announced that alternative western donors had been got to take over the projects which were to be sponsored by the Soviet Union. On the other hand, by 1977, it was only in 1965 that Kenya received a grant from the Peoples Republic of China of £1,071,000. Otherwise, in view of the fact that between 1967 and 1978 there were no diplomatic relations between Kenya and China it is probable that Kenya received very little, if not nothing, from the latter within that period.¹⁵

On the basis of the above analysis of Kenya's export-trade, and sources of loans, aid and grants, it may be contended that the conclusion arrived at after the analysis of the country's import-trade is valid since the other aspects of Kenya's economic relations with the bloc countries appear to support it.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In Chapter three of the present study we looked at Kenya's economic policy. It was concluded that at independence in 1963 the policy generally tallied with our understanding of a policy of economic non-alignment. The first year of Kenya's independence, however, apparently saw the competition of two economic policies

within the ruling party KANU, and hence within the Government of Kenya. Of these, one policy-stand appeared to tally with a policy of economic non-alignment, while the other seemed not to. The situation changed around April 1965 when the Government officially adopted the Sessional Paper No.10 of 1965, a paper whose political philosophy and economic policy appeared to have been operational among Kenya's ruling elite until the end of 1986. In our view, the economic policy advocated by this paper does not tally with a policy or economic non-alignment.

With the above background information on the state of Kenya's economic policy in theory with regard to the principle of non-alignment, we set out in the present chapter to evaluate the degree of Kenya's economic non-alignment or alignment in practice, with 'economic non-alignment' seen as the pursuit of an economic policy which seeks to balance a given state's economic transactions between the East and the West. In order to assess Kenya's position, the following dimensions of Kenya's economic policy were used as the main areas of analysis: 1. Kenya's import-trade with the bloc-states; and 2. Export-trade and sources of Kenya's economic aid and loans. The second set of areas were analysed only briefly to give a more balanced view of Kenya's economic relations with the

bloc states.

Our analysis of Kenya's import-trade revealed that in so far as import-trade is a valid indicator of economic relations between states, Kenya was economically aligned with the Western bloc from 1963 to 1986. A further overview of the country's export-trade, sources of economic aid and loans seemed to confirm Kenya's economic alignment with the Western bloc.

On the basis of the findings given above, we have been led to conclude that in so far as economic non-alignment is defined as the balancing of economic transactions between the countries of the two cold war blocs, between 1963 and 1986 (inclusive) Kenya was aligned with the West in economic dimensions of the principle of non-alignment because: 1. except for the immediate period around her attainment of independence Kenya's economic policy in theory appeared not to tally with a policy of economic non-alignment and 2. in the area of practical economic behaviour she showed a greater degree of economic identification with the Western bloc countries.

FOOTNOTES

1. Rao, T.V.S. Non-Alignment in International Law and Politics op.cit. pp.100 and 104. Also refer to Mortimer, R.A. The Third World Coalition in International Politics op.cit. p.7.
2. H. Hveem and P. Willetts, "The Practice of Non-Alignment: On the present and future of an International Movement" in Tandon, Y.A. and Chandarana, D. (eds) Horizons of African Diplomacy op.cit. pp.1-2. Also refer to L. Adele Jinadu: "West Africa Perspectives on the Non-Aligned Movement" in Jinadu, L.A. and Mandaza, I (eds.) African Perspectives on Non-Alignment op.cit. p.11.
3. L. Adele Jinadu in Jinadu, L.A. and Mandaza, I.(eds) op.cit. p.11.
4. Quoted in H. Hveem and P. Willetts in Tandon, Y.A. and Chandarana, D. (eds) op.cit. p.4. Also see Rao, T.V.S. op.cit. p.107.
5. Guy Martin: "The Theory and Practice of Non-Alignment: The Case of Francophone West and Central African States" in Jinadu, L.A. and Mandaza, I. (eds) op.cit. pp.28-29.
6. Quoted by L. Adele Jinadu in Jinadu, L.A. and Mandaza, I. (eds) op.cit. p.12.
7. G. Martin in Jinadu, L.A. and Mandaza, I. (eds) op.cit. p.29.
8. H.Hveem and P. Willetts in Tandon, Y.A. and Chandarana, D. (eds) op.cit. pp.7 and 18-19.
9. G. Martin in Jinadu, L.A. and Mandaza, I. (eds) op.cit. p.29. Hveem and Willetts' views quoted in the paragraph are taken from H. Hveem and P. Willetts in Tandon, Y.A. and Mandaza, I. (eds) op.cit. p.29.
10. See Ch. 1 of the present study for further explanation of this methodology.
11. H.Hveem and P. Willetts in Tandon, Y.A. and Chandarana, D. (eds) op.cit. pp.19-20.
12. Ibid.
13. Refer to Annual of Power and Conflict (1978-79, 1979-80, 1980-81, and 1984-85 issues) pp.282, 164, 262, 288 and 276 respectively .

14. Wanjohi, G.N. "The Politics of Foreign Aid in Kenya since Independence, 1963-1977" (Ph.D Thesis, University of Nairobi 1980) pp.605 and 604.
15. Refer to Africa Digest Vol.XII NO.5 April 1965 p.106, and Vol.XIV NO.7 August 1967 p.132; and to Wanjohi, G.N. op.cit. p.603.

CHAPTER SIX

KENYA AND DIPLOMATIC NON-ALIGNMENT

BILATERAL DIPLOMATIC DIMENSION

Meaning of Bilateral Diplomatic Non-alignment and Its Analysis:

One of the main objectives of the Non-Aligned states is to maintain their freedom of manoeuvre in international affairs and the right to side with one or the other of the cold war blocs in any particular dispute depending on their own judgement of which bloc, or any of its members, is wrong or right. As Nyerere has put it, non-alignment is a "statement by a particular country that it will determine its policies for itself according to its own judgement about its needs and the merits of the case."¹

In order to attain and maintain this independence in international policy decisions, a Non-Aligned state is expected not only to eschew identifying herself militarily and economically with either of the cold war blocs, but also to avoid automatic diplomatic identification with any of them. Therefore while a Non-Aligned state can side with either of the blocs in any particular dispute she is "not to do so on a regular basis" - to use Peter Willetts words.²

Asserting that diplomatic aspect of non-alignment is a criterion "more or less equal in importance to military relations", Helge Hveem and Peter Willetts have gone on to say that "a nation cannot be considered as non-aligned if it has any permanent diplomatic identification with the Great Powers" in the continuing conflict between the East and the West in the diplomatic arena. Guy Martin also supports this assertion.³

Taking the above observations into account, Nyerere's conception of diplomatic aspects of non-alignment - which, as Hveem and Willetts have noted, is not so different from the one which emerged from the 1961 Belgrade Conference and also from the 1964 Cairo conference - has formed the essence of our definition of 'bilateral diplomatic non-alignment' in the present analysis. In his address to the 1970 Dar-es-Salaam Preparatory Meeting of the Non-Aligned States, Nyerere contended that non-alignment is also "a refusal to be party to any permanent diplomatic identification with the Great Powers".⁴

This contention by Nyerere seemingly presupposes that the Non-Aligned states are to have bilateral diplomatic relations with most, if not all, of the bloc states as a matter of policy so that they can use these relations to promote the international peace process. What he is pointing out, then, is that bilateral diplomatic

relations should be with the states of both blocs rather than only with those of one bloc. In other words, a Non-Aligned state should balance her bilateral diplomatic relations with both the Eastern and the Western states.

In the present analysis, we have therefore taken bilateral diplomatic non-alignment to mean the balancing of diplomatic relations between the Eastern and the Western cold war bloc states.

On the basis of this definition, an attempt has been made to construct an index of bilateral diplomatic alignment for Kenya from 1963 to 1986 partially using the method developed by Helge Hveem and Peter Willetts. The two have argued that such an index of bilateral diplomatic alignment may be constructed by giving weights to certain categories of diplomatic representations that emerge from the hierarchical character of the diplomatic exchanges between countries. They have identified the important categories to be: (i) the sending of an ambassador; (ii) the accreditation of a non-resident ambassador; and (iii) diplomatic relations below ambassadorial level, with or without direct representation. ⁵

In another work Peter Willetts has suggested that greater weight be given to the decisions by the

sending country, which are directly under its control, than to the decisions made by other countries as to which diplomats it will be able to receive. For Kenya this would mean that greater weight is to be given to the diplomats the country sends to cold war bloc states than to the diplomats she receives from these countries. Willetts has suggested further that in addition, greater weight be given according to the level at which relations have been established. Consequently, he has come up with the following weights:⁶

	Diplomats sent	Diplomats received
Resident Ambassador	5	2
Non-Resident Ambassador	3	3
Relations but no missions	1	1
No Relations	0	0

In the present analysis we have decided to deviate a bit from the above weights and, instead, use the ones given below:

	Diplomats sent	Diplomats received
Resident Ambassador	5	2
Other kinds of diplomatic Representation	3	2
No diplomatic representation indicated	0	0

Two sets of reasons have determined our reducing of the number of categories to three instead of the four given by Helge Hveem and Peter Willetts. First, we have taken into account the fact that in matters of diplomatic precedence and protocol, the persons occupying ambassadorial ranks seem to be in a higher class than those occupying other positions of diplomatic representation since the former have the right, among others, of access to a head of state while the others do not. For this reason the sending of a resident ambassador to another country has been assigned more weight over all other kinds of diplomatic representation. Arguing along the same lines that all other kinds of representation are below that of a resident ambassador in significance, all other forms of diplomatic representation have been assigned the same weight, for apparently the decision by a country to have other forms of representation other than a resident ambassador, other reasons aside, also represent the low level of bilateral diplomatic transactions between states.⁷

Secondly, for information on the levels of bilateral diplomatic relations, just like Helge Hveem and Peter Willetts, we have depended basically on the annual issues of The Europa Yearbook. However, as Willetts has noted, in some cases other diplomatic representations below the the level of the resident

ambassador are not specified in the above source. Indeed, most of the Europa Yearbooks after 1980 only give information regarding the diplomatic relations in which countries are represented by resident ambassadors. In a bid to try to overcome this deficiency, Kenya's Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Directory of Diplomatic Corps and International Organisations and annual Diplomatic Precedence, Africa Guide and Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural have also been used as sources of data. Nevertheless, even in these publications, information relating to diplomatic exchange below the level of a resident ambassador is quite scanty. For this reason, and for the first reason already given above, we decided to avoid an inaccuracy in data presentation by putting all forms of bilateral diplomatic representation, other than those at the level of resident ambassador, in one category and give them the same weight.⁸

The issue of categories and levels of bilateral diplomatic representation aside, our method of analysing Kenya's bilateral diplomatic relations with the Cold War bloc-states varies from the one employed by Helge Hveem and Peter Willetts in at least two other important ways. First, whereas the two authors only use the two Germanies, the two Koreans, the two Chinas, and the two Vietnams, our analysis includes the use of all the states within the two blocs. The main reasons for

deviating from Hveem and Willetts' method are the following:

(i) we contend that by concentrating their analysis around the eight countries mentioned above, they are essentially trying to demonstrate a given state's diplomatic sympathy with either of the blocs rather than analysing that country's actual bilateral diplomatic relations with the bloc states themselves. Since our task in the present analysis is to show whether or not Kenya has been balancing her transactions between the two blocs, we found it imperative to use Kenya's bilateral diplomatic relations with all the bloc countries as the basis of analysing Kenya's bilateral position vis-a-vis non-alignment; and (ii) if one were to assume the validity of Hveem and Willetts' choice of states to use in measuring bilateral diplomatic alignment at the time of their writing (about 1970), the value of this choice for determining the post-1970 diplomatic alignment of any given state appears to be dubious. Underlying their choice of states is the assumption that Germany, China, Korea and Vietnam were split between the opposing camps in the East-West conflict such that to have diplomatic relations with one or the other half of these divided countries is to align oneself in the cold war. However, as Willetts himself admitted later, the appropriateness of the four sets of states for the construction of an index

of diplomatic alignment is brought to question by the thawing of diplomatic isolation of the Communist China after 1969, the easing of the strain between West Germany and the Eastern bloc at the beginning of the 1970s, the subsequent re-unification of the two Vietnams in mid-1970s, and the agreement on the principle of re-unification by peaceful means of the two Koreas in 1972. Taking the above into account, we were forced to find an alternative means of constructing an index of bilateral diplomatic alignment that would more or less uniformly cover the period from 1963 to 1986. To this end we hit upon the use of bilateral diplomatic relations with all the bloc states in our analysis.⁹

The other way in which our method of analysis varies from that of Hveem and Willetts is that whereas they apparently presuppose that their method gives a picture of a given country's diplomatic relations in totality with all verbal aspects of non-alignment represented by the voting in the United Nations General Assembly, we take the method we have adapted from Hveem and Willetts' to give only a picture of the non-verbal aspects of diplomatic alignment. As we have already stated in Chapter One of the present study, we take that each dimension of non-alignment has both verbal and non-verbal aspects such that when one is talking about the diplomatic dimensions of non-alignment, one has to differentiate between the verbal and non-

verbal aspects of diplomatic dimensions of non-alignment. We also stated inter alia that in the present analysis verbal aspects of diplomatic non-alignment would be analysed from the utterances of the country's leaders and policy statements by the country's officials with respect to the diplomatic relations with the member-states of the Eastern and Western blocs.¹⁰

An Analysis of Kenya's Position with Regard to Bilateral Diplomatic Non-Alignment:

Like in the other dimensions of non-alignment, the essence of our analysis of Kenya's bilateral diplomatic non-alignment is to determine whether or not the country has been balancing her bilateral diplomatic relations between the East and the West. An index for Kenya's bilateral diplomatic non-alignment has been constructed by giving weights to certain categories of diplomatic representation. These categories and the weights for each category have been identified as follows:

	Diplomats Received by Kenya	Diplomats She sent
Resident Ambassador	2	5
Other kinds of diplomatic representation	2	3
No diplomatic representation	0	0

We also indicated that in order to determine whether or not there has been balance in Kenya's bilateral diplomatic relations with the two cold war blocs, Kenya's diplomatic exchanges with all the states in each bloc have been considered for each year for the period 1963 to 1986. The bloc states used in the analysis are the following:

The West: Portugal, Luxembourg, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, West Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, USA, Israel, Japan, Phillipines, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, and South Korea (total - 25 states).

The East: Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Ukraine, USSR, North Korea, Peoples Republic of China, and East Germany (total 13 states).¹¹

It will be noticed that there are more states in the Western bloc (a total of 25 states) than in the Eastern bloc (only 13 states). This means that even if Kenya were to send and receive resident ambassador from all the states belonging to the two blocs the annual scores for the two blocs will not be equal. The West will score 175 (that is, 2 points for the resident ambassador received plus 5 for the resident ambassador sent, multiplied by 25, the total number of the 'Western' states: $(2+5) \times 25 = 175$), while the East will score 91

(2 points for resident ambassador sent, multiplied by 13, the total number of 'Eastern' states: $(2+5) \times 13 = 91$). There is therefore a need to add extra weights to the scores for the East so as to cancel out the Wests' numerical strength.

For this reason, each year's total score for the Eastern bloc has been multiplied by 1.923077, such that if the East scores a total of 91, this will equal 175 when multiplied by 1.923077. The figure 1.923077 has been arrived at by dividing the total number of states belonging to the West by the total number of states belonging to the East ($25 \div 13 = 1.923077$).

Having made the above correction, the maximum annual score which can be obtained for the bilateral diplomatic relations with each bloc is 175. This happens when a country sends and receives resident ambassadors from all the states belonging to the bloc. Alternatively, when a country has no representation in and receives no representatives from all the states in the bloc, that country's annual score will be zero for that bloc. This therefore means that the minimum annual score which can be obtained by a state for her relations with a bloc is zero (0).

To make it possible to determine whether or not the annual scores for the two blocs balance, we have decided to assign a negative (-) to the scores for the

West and a positive (+) to those for the East. Therefore, the possible maximum and minimum annual scores ^{for} the West are -175 and 0 respectively while those for the East are +175 and 0.

A given state has a 'balance' in her bilateral diplomatic relations with the two blocs only when the sum of the annual scores for the two blocs is a zero (for example: $+175 + -175 = 0$). This 'balance' has been equated with bilateral diplomatic non-alignment. Any deviation from zero is an 'imbalance' and hence bilateral diplomatic alignment. If the sum is a negative (-) figure, then the given country is aligned with the West; but if it is a positive (+) the country is aligned with the Eastern bloc.

In Tables 12 and 13 below we have listed the weights of the categories of diplomatic representation between Kenya and individual countries in the Western and the Eastern blocs respectively, for each year from 1964 to 1986.¹² Table 14 (also below) shows: (i) the annual total scores for each bloc before additional weights are given to the scores for the East (see the second and third columns); (ii) the annual total scores for each bloc after additional weights have been given to the scores for the East, with the negative (-) and positive (+) signs also given to the scores for the West and East respectively (see the fourth and fifth

columns);(iii) the sum total of the annual scores for the West and the East given in the fourth and fifth columns (see the sixth column); and (iv) the bloc with which, as shown by the index used, Kenya was diplomatically aligned with for each year (see the seventh column), Finally, figure 4 (also below) is a graph plotted to show Kenya's non-verbal diplomatic alignment for the period 1964-1986.

From the graph in Figure 4 it is apparent that for the entire period Kenya has been aligned with the West as far as bilateral diplomatic dimension is concerned. The graph also indicates that the degree of this alignment has been varying occasionally with the peak being in 1985-1986 period, and the lowest point in 1966. The apparent changes in the degree of the the country's diplomatic alignment have been brought by the establishment of new diplomatic relations, the breaking of established relations, and changes in the level of diplomatic representations.

For example, the period from 1964 to 1968 was the time when diplomatic relations were being initiated between Kenya and most of the bloc countries, and the graph points to the constantly changing diplomatic equation. There followed a general 'diplomatic stability' between 1968 and 1973 which was broken in 1973, and this was basically as a result of Kenya severing

her diplomatic relations with Israel in that year. Another 'instability' came in 1978 when Kenya established diplomatic relations with Portugal. The following year relations were established with Iceland. These changes were followed with further changes in the level of diplomatic representation between Kenya and Portugal, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.

As concerns Kenya's bilateral diplomatic relations, with the Eastern bloc, apart from the 1964-1967 period when diplomatic relations were being established, there has generally been more 'stability'.

The only significant changes were in 1967 when Kenya broke her relations with Communist China and in 1978 when she re-established these relations. Otherwise, most of the other 'diplomatic instabilities' depicted by the graph were as a result of the changes in the levels of diplomatic representations between Kenya and the Western bloc states. It may also be noted that starting from 1978, in so far as the index used in the present analysis is valid, the bilateral diplomatic alignment of Kenya with the West was on the rise such that between 1979 and 1986 the level of alignment was higher than ever before, building to a peak in the 1985-1986 period.

To go back to our concern in the present analysis,

namely whether or not Kenya has been balancing her bilateral diplomatic relations with the East and the West, the conclusion seems clear enough, in so far as the sending and receiving of diplomatic representatives is a valid indicator of the strength or weakness in the bilateral diplomatic relations between states and in so far as the bilateral diplomatic non-alignment of a state may be determined using these relations, Kenya appears not to have been non-aligned in terms of the bilateral diplomatic dimension of non-alignment for the entire period 1964 to 1986. Instead, she was aligned with the West.

Summary and Conclusions

In Chapter three of the present study we looked at Kenya's diplomatic policy. From the discussions it appeared that:

- (i) at independence in 1963 Kenya's official diplomatic policy tallied with a policy of bilateral diplomatic non-alignment;
- (ii) From 1964 to 1966, Kenya's official diplomatic policy oscillated between two extreme positions: one group within the Government advocated an anti-West diplomatic policy while the other was for an anti-East policy. We observed that neither of these diplomatic positions was in line with a

policy of diplomatic non-alignment which calls for having friendly relations with the two cold war blocs, and consequently we concluded that at a theoretical level Kenya's diplomatic policy was not tallying with the principle of non-alignment; and

(iii) After 1966 when the pro-West 'conservatives' within KANU emerged victorious, the country's official diplomatic policy appeared to favour the strengthening of the ties with the Western countries. The intentions of the Eastern states were looked at with suspicion. This situation appeared to continue well after 1978 when there were major, but non-fundamental, changes in Kenya's top political leadership positions. Some attempts were made after this date to promote friendly relations with some Eastern countries, but on the whole the diplomatic policy seemed to prefer the West to the East. In view of these observations we concluded that even after 1966, going upto 1986, the official diplomatic policy of Kenya apparently favoured closer diplomatic identification with the West, and was therefore not compatible with a policy of diplomatic non-alignment.

With the above background information we proceeded to analyse whether or not Kenya has in practice

been non-aligned with respect to the bilateral diplomatic dimension of the principle of non-alignment. The starting point of our analysis was the definition of 'bilateral diplomatic non-alignment' as the balancing of diplomatic relations between the Eastern and the Western cold war bloc states. This definition was arrived at in a view of the observation that whereas a Non-Aligned state is expected to promote friendly diplomatic relations with the bloc states, she should not have any permanent diplomatic identification with either of the blocs.

By constructing an index of bilateral diplomatic alignment for Kenya using the different categories of diplomatic representations between her and the cold war states, we found out that Kenya appeared to have been aligned with the Western bloc for the entire period from 1964 to 1986.

Looking at both the theoretical and the practical aspects of Kenya's bilateral diplomatic relations with the bloc states, we have arrived at the conclusion that except for the few days of 1963 when Kenya had just become independent and when she had barely begun conducting her practical bilateral diplomatic relations with the cold war states, for the rest of the period of the present study - 1964 to 1986 - the country was not non-aligned in bilateral diplomatic terms.

TABLE 12: KENYA'S BILATERAL DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES WITH THE WESTERN BLOC-STATES, 1963-1986

YEAR	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y
	R/S																								
1963	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1964	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 5	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	0 0	2 5	0 0	2 3	0 0	2 5	2 3	2 3	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0
1965	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 5	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	0 0	2 5	2 3	2 3	0 0	2 5	2 3	2 3	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0
1966	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	0 0	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	0 0	2 5	2 3	2 3	0 0	2 5	2 3	2 3	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	2 3
1967	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	0 0	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	0 0	2 5	2 3	2 3	0 0	2 5	2 3	2 3	0 0	0 0	0 0	2 3	0 0	2 3
1968	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	0 0	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	0 0	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 3
1969	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	0 0	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	0 0	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 3
1970	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	0 0	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	0 0	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 3
1971	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	0 0	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	0 0	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 3
1972	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	0 0	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	0 0	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 3
1973	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	0 0	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	0 0	2 5	0 0	2 3	2 3	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 3
1974	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	0 0	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	0 0	2 5	0 0	2 3	2 3	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 3
1975	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	0 0	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	0 0	2 5	0 0	2 3	2 3	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 3
1976	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	0 0	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	0 0	2 5	0 0	2 3	2 3	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 3
1977	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	0 0	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	0 0	2 5	0 0	2 3	2 3	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 3
1978	2 3	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	0 0	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	0 0	2 5	0 0	2 3	2 3	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 3
1979	2 3	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	0 0	2 5	0 0	2 3	2 3	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 3
1980	2 3	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 5	0 0	2 5	0 0	2 3	2 3	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 3
1981	2 5	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 5	0 0	2 5	0 0	2 3	2 3	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 3
1982	2 5	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 5	0 0	2 5	0 0	2 3	2 3	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 3
1983	2 5	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 5	0 0	2 3	2 3	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 3
1984	2 5	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 5	0 0	2 3	2 3	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 3
1985	2 5	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 5	0 0	2 3	2 3	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 3
1986	2 5	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 3	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 5	2 3	2 5	0 0	2 3	2 3	0 0	0 0	2 3	2 3	2 3

NOTES: i) "R" stands for the diplomats received by Kenya, while "S" stands for the diplomats sent by Kenya.

ii) The weights assigned to the different levels of diplomatic exchanges are as follows:-

	DIPLOMATIC RECEIVED(R)	DIPLOMATIC SENT(S)
1. Resident Ambassador	2	5
2. Other kinds of Diplomatic representation	2	3
3. No Diplomatic representation indicated	0	0

COUNTRIES WHOSE RELATIONS WITH KENYA HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED ARE:

- A - Portugal
- B - Luxembourg
- C - Belgium
- D - Denmark
- E - France
- F - Greece
- G - Iceland
- H - Italy
- I - West Germany
- J - Netherlands
- K - Norway
- L - Spain
- M - Britain
- N - Australia
- O - Canada
- P - New Zealand
- Q - U S A
- R - Israel
- S - Japan
- T - Philippines
- U - South Africa
- V - Taiwan
- W - Thailand
- X - Turkey
- Y - South Korea

SOURCES: The European Yearbook: A World Survey op. cit. (1977-1986 issues); Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural op. cit. (vols 1-21 issued from 1964-1985); Africa Guide op. cit. (1977-1986 issues); Kenya's Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Directory of Diplomatic Corps (1984 and 1985 issues) and Diplomatic Precedence (Dec 1986 issue).

TABLE 13: KENYA'S BILATERAL DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES WITH THE EASTERN BLOC-STATES, 1963-1986

YEAR	ALBANIA		BULG.		BYLOR.		CZECH		HUNG.		MONGOL		POLAND		ROMANIA		UKRAINE		USSR		N. KOREA		P.R.C.		G.D.R.	
	R	S	R	S	R	S	R	S	R	S	R	S	R	S	R	S	R	S	R	S	R	S	R	S	R	S
1963	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1964	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	0	0	2	3	0	0
1965	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	0	0	2	5	0	0
1966	0	0	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	3	0	0	0	0	2	5	0	0	2	5	0	0
1967	0	0	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	3	0	0	0	0	2	5	0	0	2	5	0	0
1968	0	0	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	5	0	0	2	3	0	0
1969	0	0	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	5	0	0	2	3	0	0
1970	0	0	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	5	0	0	2	3	0	0
1971	0	0	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	5	0	0	2	3	0	0
1972	0	0	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	5	0	0	2	3	0	0
1973	0	0	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	5	0	0	2	3	0	0
1974	0	0	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	5	0	0	2	3	0	0
1975	0	0	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	5	0	0	2	3	0	0
1976	0	0	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	5	0	0	2	3	0	0
1977	0	0	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	5	0	0	2	3	0	0
1978	0	0	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	5	0	0	2	3	0	0
1979	0	0	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	5	0	0	2	3	0	0
1980	0	0	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	5	0	0	2	3	0	0
1981	0	0	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	5	0	0	2	3	0	0
1982	0	0	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	5	0	0	2	3	0	0
1983	0	0	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	5	0	0	2	3	0	0
1984	0	0	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	5	0	0	2	3	0	0
1985	0	0	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	5	0	0	2	3	0	0
1986	0	0	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	5	0	0	2	3	0	0

NOTES: i) "R" stands for the diplomats received by Kenya, while "S" stands for the diplomats sent by Kenya.

ii) The weights assigned to the different levels of diplomatic exchanges are as follows:

	DIPLOMATS RECEIVED (R)	DIPLOMATS SENT (S)
1. Resident Ambassador	2	5
2. Other of diplomatic representation	2	3
3. No diplomatic representative indicated	0	0

SOURCES: The Europa Yearbook: A World Survey op. cit. (1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986 issues); Africa Research Bulletin op. cit. (vols 1-21 issued from 1964 to 1985); Africa Guide op. cit. (1977-1986 issues); Kenya's Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Directory of Diplomatic Corps (1984 and 1985 issues) and Diplomatic Precedence (Dec. 1986 issue).

TABLE 14: DETERMINATION OF DIRECTION OF KENYA'S BILATERAL DIPLOMATIC ALIGNMENT^a


YEAR	TOTAL SCORES		TOTAL SCORES, WITH THOSE OF EAST MULTIPLIED BY 1.923077		SUM OF THE SCORES: WEST + EAST	DIRECTION OF ALIGNMENT
	WEST	EAST	WEST	EAST ^b		
1963	-	-	-	-	-	-
1964	62	18	-62	+35	-27	West (W)
1965	71	20	-71	+38	-33	W
1966	83	34	-83	+65	-18	W
1967	88	34	-88	+65	-23	W
1968	103	37	-103	+71	-32	W
1969	103	37	-103	+71	-32	W
1970	103	37	-103	+71	-32	W
1971	103	37	-103	+71	-32	W
1972	103	37	-103	+71	-32	W
1973	98	37	-98	+71	-27	W
1974	98	37	-98	+71	-27	W
1975	98	37	-98	+71	-27	W
1976	98	37	-98	+71	-27	W
1977	98	37	-98	+71	-27	W
1978	103	39	-103	+75	-28	W
1979	108	39	-108	+75	-33	W
1980	110	39	-110	+75	-35	W
1981	114	39	-114	+75	-39	W
1982	114	39	-114	+75	-39	W
1983	119	39	-119	+75	-44	W
1984	119	39	-119	+75	-44	W
1985	121	39	-121	+75	-46	W
1986	121	39	-121	+75	-46	W

- NOTE:**
- a. For the figures used for the determination of the totals in columns two and three refer to Table 12 and Table 13 respectively.**

 - b. The figures given in this column have been rounded to the nearest whole numbers.**

BILATERAL

FIGURE 4. ILLUSTRATION OF KENYA'S DIPLOMATIC ALIGNMENT, 1964-1986



MULTILATERAL DIPLOMATIC DIMENSION: PROMOTION OF
DIPLOMACY WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION

Meaning of Promotion of Multilateral Diplomacy
within the UN and Its Analysis:

Virtually all the declarations issued by the Non-Aligned states at the conclusion of every summit of the Non-Aligned states have contained sections or clauses concerned with strengthening the United Nations Organization and with endorsing the UN resolution.¹³ It appears that the Non-Aligned states are convinced that one of the ways through which they can achieve their objectives is by strengthening their activities within the United Nations system. Indeed, the Non-Aligned states hold that their strengthened role in the UN is capable of making the latter more effective. The 1970 'Lusaka Declaration' adopted at the third Non-Aligned summit summarizes the Non-Aligned thinking with respect to the United Nations when it is stated, among others, that the Non-Aligned states will continue:-

...the pursuit of world peace and peaceful co-existence by strengthening the role of the Non-Aligned countries within the United Nations so that it will be a more effective instrument against all forms of aggressive action and the threat or use of force against the freedom, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of any country; the fight against colonialism and racialism... the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, the ending of arms race followed by universal disarmament; opposition to great power military alliance and pacts; opposition to the

establishment of foreign military bases on the soil of other nations in the context of great power conflicts and colonial and racial suppression; the universality of and the strengthening of the UN; and the struggle for economic independence and mutual cooperation on a basis of equality and mutual benefit.¹⁴

In a nutshell, the UN is a means by which the Non-Aligned states hope to achieve their objectives.

Because the Non-Aligned states are generally small, weak and endowed with limited human and financial resources, and because these states are nevertheless convinced (as they stated in the 1961 'Belgrade Resolution') that their active participation in international affairs is "one of the most important factors for safeguarding world peace", the United Nations is of great importance to them. Peter Willetts has identified three important ways in which the UN has been of crucial relevance to the Non-Aligned states. First, membership to the UN gives the final seal to a state's independence by giving that state international recognition and granting her a formal equality through the 'one-state-one-vote' system of voting used in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) sessions. Secondly, once a state has joined the United Nations its being called upon to vote on many issues - the majority of which may be of no immediate interest to that state - forces that state to be involved in all international issues.

Finally, the collective action at the UN offer the Non-Aligned states a highly useful forum for promoting their interests such as colonial emancipation and economic development.¹⁵

It is probable that the perception by the Non-Aligned states of these advantages ensuing from membership to, and participation in, the UN has been greatly responsible for their persistent efforts - at least in principle - to promote the United Nations system. Therefore, apart from the fact that the Non-Aligned states do appear to be more active than other states in sending delegates to the meetings of the UNGA, one of the recurrent themes which have characterised the Non-Aligned gatherings has been - in the words of Guy Martin - "the promotion of multilateral diplomacy within the framework of the United Nations."¹⁶

In the view of the Non-Aligned states, most of the post-1945 international discord has been engendered by the cold war rivalries. By extension it may also be suggested that the Non-Aligned view the bloc arrangements and rivalries as one of the main threats to the strength and even the very existence of the United Nations as the main international centre of multilateral diplomacy. This being the case, the Non-Aligned states therefore see it incumbent upon themselves to try to dissuade the cold war combatants from

extending their conflicts into the United Nations.

To maintain the UN as a centre of multilateral diplomacy, the Non-Aligned states are therefore expected to strive for non-alignment in their participation in all the United Nations affairs. In other words, whereas a Non-Aligned state is entitled to side with whichever cold war side is right regarding the issues brought before the UN, she is expected to avoid identifying herself or being identified with either of the Super-powers and their respective cold war allies. Therefore, for the purpose of analysing Kenya's non-alignment or otherwise in her activities at the United Nations, we have defined non-alignment at the United Nations as the avoidance of permanent identification with either the East or the West at the United Nations.

In an effort to develop a quantitative means of determining whether or not any given Non-Aligned state is in practice Non-Aligned at the United Nations, Helge Hveem and Peter Willetts have emerged with a method of analysis, which involves the use of information regarding how states cast their votes at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). They appear to justify their choice of the proceedings at the UNGA as the focus of analysis by arguing that:

... 'lip-service' (in the UNGA, is) considerably restricted by the

formality of the proceedings the political give and take in the lobbies, and the awareness of the actors that their behaviour on the whole is expected to be consistent with their foreign policy, as expressed in other settings.¹⁷

The essence of Hveem's and Willett's method of analysis is that a state which tends to vote most of the time in agreement with one of the superpowers, and not with the other, is identifying herself with the former, and hence is not Non-Aligned with respect to voting in the UNGA. Such a state can therefore be taken not to be Non-Aligned at the United Nations since voting in the Assembly seems to be a valid index of Non-Alignment at the UN.¹⁸

In his book, The Non-Aligned Movement: the Origins of a Third World Alliance, Peter Willetts explains this method of analysis in details. Saying that there are three distinct categories of activity that take place during any UNGA meeting - namely lobbying, sponsoring resolutions and voting - Willetts contends that voting is probably the most reliably and easily analysable, for 'roll-calls' and 'recorded votes' taken when the delegation of a member-state requests for one provided analysable information on how each state represented has voted regarding the proposals brought before the UNGA.¹⁹

Willetts has further pointed out that whereas

only a minority of the decisions are taken by 'roll-call' or 'recorded vote', the selection of these votes for analysis is not arbitrary since the fact that a given state's delegation decides to request for a 'roll-call' or 'recorded vote' can be taken to mean that the issue in question is important enough. Willetts also mentions that two sets of roll-calls or recorded votes can be identified: (i) those of the plenary session of the General Assembly, and (ii) those of the seven Main Committees of the Assembly. He dismisses analysing both sets of roll-calls or recorded votes together on grounds that some of them are duplicated. Instead, he proposes that roll-calls and recorded votes of the plenary session should be analysed solely since the small states - a group of states within which most, if not all, Non-Aligned states are to be found - often are not able with their small delegations to attend all the meetings of the Main Committees and at the same time cope with all other diplomatic work. So in most cases they attend all the plenary sessions, but only a few of the sessions of the Main Committees.²⁰

Having chosen what to analyse Willetts goes on to elaborate on how to analyse it. He argues that since what is intended is to measure whether or not a pair of states are in agreement in their voting at the UNGA, the simplest method would be to count what

percentage of times the two states voted in the same way. In this regard Willetts points out that A. Lijphart has proposed an index of agreement that is suitable for analysing United Nations voting as it takes into account all the three recognized ways of casting a vote in UNGA, namely: (i) voting in favour; (ii) voting against (including the decision by a state that she is 'not participating') and (iii) ~~abs~~entention (note that when a State is 'absent' or is not a member of the UN at a particular time, for 'Lijphart Index of Agreement' this is treated as missing data).²²

There are two implicit assumptions when one uses Lijphart Index of Agreement to measure the UNGA voting agreement between a pair of states. First is that 'abs~~e~~ntention' is regarded as representing a position that is half-way between 'in favour' and 'against' on an imaginary metric of the issue dimension. Second is that all roll-calls (and recorded votes for that matter) are of equal weight and that all forms of agreements are of equal weight.²²

The Lijphart Index of Agreement is defined in the following way:

$$I_A = \frac{(f + \frac{1}{2}g)}{t} \times 100$$

where 'I_A' is the Index of Agreement; 't' is the total number of roll-calls or recorded votes that both states participated in; 'f' is the number in which they cast

identical votes (in favour/in favour, against/against, and abstain/abstain combination); and 'g' is the number in which they showed partial agreement (in favour/abstain or against/abstain combinations).²³

It may be noted that the figure obtained after calculations using the above formula shows the percentage of voting agreement between the two states in question.

In order to use this percentage to determine the UN non-alignment or alignment of a given country, Helge Hveem and Peter Willetts have proposed that what is required is the obtainance of this percentage of agreement for the given country and the United States of America (USA). A score of 100% indicates a voting pattern identical to the US's while a score of 0% indicates a voting pattern identical to the Soviet Union's. The mid-point of 50% represents a non-alignment score, which can be produced by a high rate of abstentions or by alternative voting with each side.²⁴

The two authors also propose that the percentage of agreement should only be obtained for votes in the UNGA plenary sessions that are dealing with issues regarding which the Non-Aligned states have an interest. Hveem and Willetts are not specific on how to identify these issues. However, in their 1970 analysis they identified four non-alignment issues:

- (i) USSR's 'troika' proposals to destroy the post of a single UN Secretary General;
- (ii) the credentials of the Hungarian delegation to the UNGA (in the years before 1963);
- (iii) voting on the question of China's (PRC) admission as a member of the United Nations; and
- (iv) the maintenance of United States' troops in South Korea under the UN flag.²⁵

In our analysis of Kenya's 1963 to 1986 UN non-alignment or otherwise, basically we have used the above method of analysis, although with some significant reservations. First, unlike Hveem and Willetts who propose that only identified non-alignment issues be analysed, we have analysed all the roll-calls and recorded votes given in the United Nations Yearbooks (or the United Nations Press Releases for the annual UNGA proceedings, for the years for which the Yearbooks were not available to us) for the relevant years. We contend that, on the whole, all the issues that are voted on at the UN General Assembly - namely (i) political and security questions; (ii) economic and social questions; (iii) questions relating to Declaration on Granting of Independence and to International Trusteeship System; (iv) questions on the International Law; and (v) UN Administrative and budgetary questions - are of interest to the Non-Aligned states.²⁶

Our reasons for the above view are the following. First, because the Non-Aligned states are committed to promoting the United Nations as a centre of multilateral diplomacy, their non-alignment should be apparent in their voting on all the issues that come before the UN General Assembly. It would be illogical and self-defeating for them to be non-aligned over some issues and partisan regarding other. Secondly, the above argument aside, it appears valid to assert that the above mentioned issues that come up for discussion in every UNGA session are essentially the same issues that are of interest to the Non-Aligned Movement (N-AM). As stated elsewhere in the present analysis, the objectives of the N-AM are: the completion of the decolonization process and the attainment of racial equality, solution of fundamental economic problems of the third world states, and promotion of international peace and security.²⁷

The relations between what is discussed in UNGA meeting and the objectives of the N-AM are clear as far as decolonization racial equality and economic development are concerned. This leaves out the questions on international law, the UN administration and budgetary questions. In our opinion, even these two are related, although not so directly, to the objective of the N-AM of promoting international

peace and security. First, International Law may be seen as providing a code of norms for the conduct of affairs between states so that peace and security are maintained. Secondly, since the Non-Aligned states see the UN as means of maintaining international peace and security, it appears imperative that when the world organization's administrative and budgeting issues are being discussed in the UNGA the Non-Aligned states would be keen to try to ensure that cold war rivalries do not make the UN any weaker, lest it ceases to be important for the preservation of international peace and security.

If the above arguments are valid, it seems appropriate to analyse - as we have done - the recorded votes and roll-calls for all the issues that come for discussion before the UNGA in order to have a more reasonable determination or whether or not a given country - in our case Kenya - has been Non-Aligned at the United Nations.

Our method of analysing Kenya's UN Non-alignment also varies in other important ways from the method proposed by Hveem and Willetts. Whereas the two are for the use only of percentages of voting agreement between a given country and the United States, we have analysed the percentages of agreement between Kenya and the US and between Kenya and the USSR. Our argument

for this deviation is as follows: We set out to see how Kenya votes in the United Nations, and whether in her votings she balances between the US and the Soviet Union. Based on this understanding, analysing her voting agreement with the United States only and assuming that if she is in agreement with the US, say to a level of 40% then automatically she is 60% in agreement with the Soviet Union would be faulty since the two percentages of agreement - as we discovered in our calculations (see the sixth column of Table 15 below) - do not always add up to 100%.

We therefore had to find an alternative means of comparing the percentages of agreement obtained for Kenya and the US and for Kenya and the Soviet Union. It was decided that the purpose of the present analysis of comparing Kenya's UN voting agreements with the US and with USSR would be served by determining the differences in the two sets of percentages for each year. The differences were got by awarding negative signs (-) to Kenya's percentages of voting agreement with the US and positive signs (+) to those with USSR, after which for each year the sum of the two percentages was worked out. It was decided that if the sum was a zero (0) it would be considered that for that year Kenya was non-aligned at the UN, since she balanced her voting between the two superpowers. A deviation from zero would indicate 'no balance' and

hence alignment at the UN. If the figure obtained had a negative (-) it was taken to show greater voting agreement with the US and hence UN voting alignment with the United States. Alternatively, a positive sign (+) would show greater voting agreement with USSR, and hence UN voting alignment with the Soviet Union.

Data on Kenya's, United States', and USSR's roll calls and recorded votes in the United Nations General Assembly plenary sessions were obtained from the United Nations Yearbooks (1965 to 1980 issues) and from the United Nations General Assembly Press Release (1981, 1984 and 1985 issues). We were not able to locate either sources to give us data on 1982 and 1986 UNGA votings. 1963 and 1964 were treated as 'missing data' because, one, Kenya was admitted as member of the UN on December 16 1963, just a day before the conclusion of that year's UNGA meeting. Therefore she never took part in UNGA voting in that year. Two, in 1964 the Soviet Union and the United States imposed a ban on voting in the 19th (1964) Session of the General Assembly. Therefore no country voted.

An Analysis of Kenya's Position with regard to Voting at the UNGA:

Using Kenya's voting in the United Nations

General Assembly (UNGA) as an index for measuring whether or not Kenya has been non-aligned at the United Nations between 1963 and 1986, we found out that for all the years for which we had the data (that is, the entire period of the present study excepting 1963, 1964, 1982, and 1986) the percentages of UNGA voting agreements between her and the USSR were much higher than those of Kenya and the United States. The highest percentage of voting agreement between Kenya and the Soviet Union was in 1976 when the agreement stood at 90% and the lowest was in 1979 when it was 72.52252%. Incidentally, the lowest figure for the percentage of voting agreement between Kenya and the Soviet Union is higher than the highest percentage of voting agreement between Kenya and the United States. The highest for the latter was in 1971 when it stood at 67.42424%. The lowest was 20.40816%, the figure for 1985 (refer to Table 15 below, especially the sixth column).

In the fourth column of Table 16 (below) we have given the differences between the yearly percentages of Kenya's voting agreement with the United States, and with the Soviet Union. The fact that for all the years analysed none has a difference of zero (0) percent is significant for it indicates that in so far as UNGA voting agreements is an index of non-alignment at the UN, Kenya appears not to have been

non-aligned in all those years analysed.

Having assigned negative signs (-) to figures for agreement with the Us and positive signs (+) to those with USSR (see second and third columns of Table 16), we were able to determine the direction of Kenya's UNGA voting alignment for each of the analysed years. All the figures in the fourth column of Table 16 have a positive sign (+) and, as stated earlier in the present sub-section, a positive sign next to the sum of the two percentages indicates alignment with the East in UNGA voting. On the strength of this observation it has been concluded that for all the years analysed Kenya appears to have been aligned with the East in her UNGA voting.

Figure 5 (also below) is a graphical representation of Kenya's alignment in the UN General Assembly voting. Apart from clearly showing the country's apparent alignment with the East in her UNGA voting, the graph also demonstrates the different degrees of voting alignment. We see that for the years analysed Kenya seemed to have been closest to non-alignment in 1971 when the difference between the two percentages was only +10.93396%. She seemed most aligned with the East in 1985 when the difference was +62.2449%.

For the purposes of the present analysis,

however, what is of significance is that the figure for the years analysed seem to suggest that for the entire period for the present analysis (excepting 1963, 1964, 1982 and 1986 for which data was missing) Kenya was not Non-Aligned in her UNGA voting and that instead she was aligned with the Soviet Union. From this one may conclude that in so far as alignment or non-alignment in the UNGA voting is a valid index of the UN alignment or non-alignment of a state, Kenya appears not to have been aligned with the Soviet Union, and hence with the East.

Two things may be said in connection with the years 1983, 1984, 1982, and 1986 for which data was missing. First if one may take as valid the argument that the years analysed suggest a trend of UN alignment with the East for Kenya, it appears reasonable to suggest further that even for the years for which data was not available, Kenya probably stuck to the trend, that is, being aligned with the East at the United Nations. The validity of this suggestion is, of course, subject to empirical verification. However, a second argument seems to add strength to this suggestion. As Robert A. Mortimer has observed in an analysis of Third World politics, starting from early 1960s there was a general drift towards the left in Third World politics, politics of which the Non-Aligned

Movement is a part.²⁸ Taking into account that at the UNGA Third World states,²⁹ and more so the Non-Aligned states, tend to vote as a bloc, it is conceivable that one can argue that Kenya, a Third World state - for the years for which data was not available to us - probably remained with her Third World compatriots in their Eastern leaning in their approach to issues brought before the United Nations. Once again, this is a hypothetical argument which may or may not be upheld by empirical investigations.

However, it is held in the present analysis that these two arguments, plus the analysis done for the other years, appear to be grounds firm enough from which the following conclusion can be made: that in general it appears that in her United Nations participation between 1963 and 1986, Kenya was aligned with the East. In other words, it seems that she has not been non-aligned at the United Nations. This is in the sense that she seemingly was more in agreement with the Soviet Union and hence with the East- than with the United States, and hence with the West.

Someone may possibly argue that since most Non-Aligned states have, like Kenya, shown greater UN voting agreement with the East, there appears not to be enough validity in the assertion that Kenya has not been non-aligned, simply because she has been with

the majority of the Non-Aligned states. In anticipation of such an argument, we counteract it in the following manner: If all the Non-Aligned states decided to act in an aligned way with respect to a particular dimension or aspect of the principle of non-alignment, that unanimity of action is not enough to make one to assert within plausible reasoning that 'Non-Aligned' action conforms to the principle of non-alignment because all the Non-Aligned states have acted in the same way. Since as far as the present analysis is concerned, only a state which adheres to the principle of non-alignment can be validly referred to as non-aligned, it is possible for all or some of the Non-Aligned states (that is, the states that belong to the Non-Aligned Movement) to be non-aligned or not non-aligned, depending on whether they adhere to the principle or not.

Therefore, despite the possibility that by voting in agreement with the East at the UN Kenya is only doing what a majority of the Non-Aligned States are doing, this does not exonerate her from being viewed as not being non-aligned at the UN. Similarly, even if it is the Eastern bloc countries which have a tendency to support the Non-Aligned states at the United Nations, we take it that it is incumbent upon the Non-Aligned States to make sure that such an

identification is minimized since it alienates them from the Western bloc states, and the latter may be discouraged from using the UN as a centre for multi-lateral diplomacy.

Summary and Conclusions :

In Chapter Three of the present study we surveyed Kenya's policy towards the UN and came to the conclusion that in theory the country seems to have been committed to promoting the UN system just in the same way other Non-Aligned states are. With this as the background information, in the present chapter we set off by observing that a Non-Aligned state is expected to help in the promotion of the United Nations as a centre of multilateral diplomacy by avoiding identification with either of the blocs at the UN. In our search for a means of determining whether or not Kenya has in practice been non-aligned at the United Nations (that is, whether or not she has been identifying herself with either of the cold war blocs) we adopted (with modifications) Helge Hveem and Peter Willetts' method of analysis which uses the percentages of UNGA voting agreements between states as an index of UN non-alignment of a state. In the process of presenting our findings using this index for Kenya, we attempted to show that in practice the country appeared not to have been non-aligned, but instead aligned with

the East at the UN.

On the basis of the above conclusions on Kenya's statement of principle and her practice as far as promoting the UN as a centre of multilateral diplomacy is concerned, the apparent lack of non-alignment in practice while she seemingly in principle insisted that she was non-aligned at the UN may lead one to make a further conclusion that as far as Kenya's adherence to the promotion of multilateral diplomacy within the UN is concerned, there appears to have been a clash between principle and practice for the period studied, 1964 to 1986.

TABLE 15:

UNGA VOTING AGREEMENT FOR KENYA-US, KENYA-USSR, 1963-1985

YEAR	VOTING AGREEMENT BETWEEN	f ^a	g ^b	t ^c	I _A ^d
1964 ^e	KENYA-US	-	-	-	-
	KENYA-USSR	-	-	-	-
1965	KENYA-US	10	6	24	54.16666%
	KENYA-USSR	18	5	23	89.13043%
1966	KENYA-US	5	13	24	47.91666%
	KENYA-USSR	16	7	24	81.25%
1967	KENYA-US	7	12	24	54.16666%
	KENYA-USSR	17	7	24	85.41666%
1968	KENYA-US	9	7	26	48.07692%
	KENYA-USSR	20	3	26	82.6923%
1969	KENYA-US	9	12	27	55.55555%
	KENYA-USSR	18	7	27	79.62962%
1970	KENYA-US	9	16	37	45.94594%
	KENYA-USSR	24	12	37	81.08108%
1971	KENYA-US	34	21	66	67.42424%
	KENYA-USSR	44	17	67	78.3582%
1972	KENYA-US	35	30	79	63.29113%
	KENYA-USSR	56	19	79	82.91139%
1973	KENYA-US	25	33	74	56.08108%
	KENYA-USSR	53	17	74	83.1081%
1974	KENYA-US	11	30	55	47.27272%
	KENYA-USSR	38	13	55	80.90909%
1975	KENYA-US	17	33	70	47.85714%
	KENYA-USSR	45	20	70	78.57142%
1976	KENYA-US	17	39	74	49.32432%
	KENYA-USSR	59	17	75	90.0%
1977	KENYA-US	30	41	91	55.4945%
	KENYA-USSR	68	19	92	84.23913%
1978	KENYA-US	39	42	112	53.57142%
	KENYA-USSR	74	28	115	76.52173%
1979	KENYA-US	33	40	111	47.74774%
	KENYA-USSR	73	15	111	72.52252%
1980	KENYA-US	19	34	93	38.70967%
	KENYA-USSR	66	16	93	79.56989%
1981	KENYA-US	24	42	132	34.0909%
	KENYA-USSR	96	16	133	78.19548%
1982 ^f	KENYA-US	-	-	-	-
	KENYA-USSR	-	-	-	-
1983	KENYA-US	21	38	143	27.97202%
	KENYA-USSR	109	10	143	85.81081%
1984	KENYA-US	14	39	148	32.63513%
	KENYA-USSR	122	10	148	85.81081%
1985	KENYA-US	12	36	147	20.40816%
	KENYA-USSR	117	9	147	82.65306%

- NOTES: a. f = the number of votes in which the two states voted in agreement.
- b. g = the number of votes showing partial agreement (yes/abstain or no/abstain combination).
- c. t = the total number of votes that both participated in.

- d. I_A = the Lijphart Index of Agreement. The Index is defined as follows:

$$I_A = \frac{(f + \frac{1}{2}g)}{t} \times 100$$

the result is the percentage of agreement in the voting by the two states.

- e. There was no voting in the 19th Session (1964) of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) following a ban imposed on voting by the Soviet Union and the United States. Consequently there is no data on the voting agreements (for reasons of the ban refer to Willetts, P. The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins or a Third World Alliance op.cit. pp.33 and 53 especially footnote no.112.)
- f. We were not able to find the sources to give us the data for this year (1982). Similarly, our efforts to trace the sources for 1986 were futile, and this led to analyse only upto 1985. It may also be noted that Kenya never took part in the 1963 UNGA voting.

- SOURCES:
1. United Nations Yearbook of the United Nations (volumes 18,19,20,21,22,23,24, 25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32 and 33) New York: Office of Public Information, 1964 to 1980.

 2. United Nations United Nations Press Releases (GA/6375 of 21 January, 1981; GA/6546 of 4 January 1982, GA/6935 of 16 January, 1984, GA/7095 of 21 January, 1985; and GA/7272 of 13 January, 1986) New York: Department of Public Information, Press Section.

TABLE 16:

DETERMINATION OF KENYA'S UNGA VOTING ALIGNMENT, 1963 - 1985

YEAR	1-AGE OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN KENYA AND US ^a	1-AGE OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN KENYA AND USSR ^a	SUM OF THE TWO 1-AGES	ALIGNED OR NON-ALIGNED	DIRECTION OF ALIGNMENT
1963 ^b
1964 ^c
1965	-54.16666	+89.13043	+34.96377	ALIGNED(A)	EAST (E)
1966	-47.91666	+81.25	+33.33334	A	E
1967	-54.16666	+85.41666	+31.25	A	E
1968	-48.07692	+82.6923	+34.61538	A	E
1969	-55.55555	+79.62962	+24.07407	A	E
1970	-45.94594	+81.08108	+35.13514	A	E
1971	-67.42424	+78.3582	+10.93396	A	E
1972	-63.29113	+82.91139	+19.62026	A	E
1973	-56.08108	+83.1081	+27.02702	A	E
1974	-47.27272	+80.90909	+33.63636	A	E
1975	-47.85714	+78.57142	+30.71428	A	E
1976	-49.32432	+90.0	+40.67568	A	E
1977	-55.4945	+84.2391	+28.74463	A	E
1978	-53.57142	+76.52173	+22.95031	A	E
1979	-47.74774	+72.52252	+24.77478	A	E
1980	-38.70967	+79.56989	+40.86022	A	E
1981	-34.0909	+78.19548	+44.10458	A	E

CONT.

1982 ^d					
1983	-27.97202	+85.81081	+57.03879	A	B
1984	-32.63513	+85.81081	+53.17568	A	B
1985	-20.40816	+82.65306	+62.2449	A	B

NOTES: a. For how the percentages given in column two and three are arrive at, ^{see} Table 15 above.


b. Kenya joined the UN just a day before the closing of the 1963 Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). She, therefore never voted in that Session.

c. There was no voting in the 1964 Session of the UNGA following a ~~ban~~ by the United States and the Soviet Union (see Willetts, P.op.cit.pp.33 and 53 for explanation).

d. We were not able to locate sources of data for 1982.

Other Note: The negative (-) and positive (+) signs assigned to figures in columns 2,3, and 4, are to facilitate analysis.

FIGURE 5. GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF KENYA'S ALIGNMENT IN UNGA VOTING, 1963 - 1965



(Turn to next page for notes on the diagram)

NOTES: 1. For the figures used in construction of the graph refer to the fourth column of Table 16. The figures derived from that column have, however, been rounded off to the nearest whole numbers for convenience of plotting. After the roundings the following figures emerged and were used for plotting the graph:

YEAR	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1967	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
FIGURE	-	-	+35	+33	+31	+35	+24	+35	+11	+20	+28

1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
+34	+31	+41	+29	+23	+25	+41	+44		+58	+53	+62

2. The dotted section of the graph (...) has been constructed arbitrarily since we lacked the data necessary for working out the actual figure for 1982.

FOOTNOTES

1. Willetts, P. The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Movement op.cit. p.114; and Helge Hveem and Peter Willetts, "The Practice of Non-Alignment...etc." in Tandon, Y.A. and Chandarana, D. (eds) Horizons of African Diplomacy op.cit. p.3 for the quotation from Nyerere.
2. Willetts, P. op.cit. p.114.
3. H. Hveem and P. Willetts in Tandon, Y.A. and Chandarana, D. (eds) op.cit. pp.3 and 8; and Guy Martin: "The Theory and Practice of Non-Alignment ...etc" in Jinadu L.A. and Mandaza, I (eds) African Perspective on Non-Alignment op.cit. p.25.
4. H. Hveem and P. Willetts in Tandon, Y.A. and Chandarana, D. (eds) op.cit. p.3 (Nyerere's quotation is got from the same page).
5. Ibid. p.9.
6. Willetts, P. op.cit. p.117. Note that in the already mentioned earlier work with Helge Hveem, the weight Willetts proposed for a Resident Ambassador received was a score of 4. However, in his later solo study on non-alignment Willetts assigned to a Resident Ambassador received a score of 2 arguing that 4 is rather too high for the reception of a Resident Ambassador since the decision to assign such an Ambassador does not lie with the receiving country but with the sending country. Willetts further pointed out that as far as the receiving country is concerned the decision is to receive a resident ambassador, a non-resident ambassador or other kind of diplomatic representation should have the same weight since the onus to decide of representation lies with the sending country. For this reason he assigns the score of 2 to both a resident ambassador and non-resident ambassador (see *ibid*).
7. Refer to Feltham, R.G. Diplomatic Handbook (4th ed) London: Longman, 1982 p.3.
8. See Willetts, P. op.cit. p.119. The Europa Year-book: A World Survey referred to is published annually in London by Europa Publications Limited.
9. See H. Hveem and P. Willetts in Tandon, Y.A. and

- Chandarana, D.(eds) op.cit. pp.8-9; and Willetts, P, op.cit. pp.114-116.
10. See H. Hveem and P. Willetts in Tandon, Y.A. and Chandarana, D. (eds) op.cit. pp.7-8.
 11. See Chapter One of the present work for how the states taken to belong to the two cold war blocs have been determined.
 12. It will be noticed that the rows for 1963 in the two tables indicate no scores. This is because Kenya only became independent in the December of 1963, such that the establishment of diplomatic relations with other states began in 1964 (refer to African Research Bulletin: Political Social and Cultural Vol.1 1964 pp.28-29, 44, 63 and 81).
 13. For example refer to 'Belgrade Final Declaration' points 1,2,3,4,8,10,18(b),20,21,24-26; 'Cairo Declaration' Sections 1 (13 references) II (1 reference), III (2 references), iv (all aimed at the UN), V (2 references), vi (all aimed at the UN), VII (5 references), VIII (1 reference), IX (all); (7 references); 'Lusaka Declaration on Peace' paragraphs 1,2,12,13 (f), 13 (g), and 'Lusaka Declaration on Economic Progress' end of preamble, all of Section C and mention in 13 of the 15 resolutions.
 14. Quoted by Guy Martin: "The Theory and Practice of Non-alignment..." in Jinadu, L.A and Mandaza, I. (eds) African Perspective on Non-Alignment op.cit. p.21.
 15. Willetts, P. The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance op.cit. pp.20-22 (also see p.58). Other references for the paragraph are: Guy Martin in Jinadu, L.A. and Mandaza, I. (eds) op.cit. pp.25-26; Rao, T.V.S. Non-alignment in International Law and Politics op.cit. pp.146-147; and Helge Hveem and Peter Willetts, "The Practice of non-alignment..." in Tandon, Y.A. and Chandarana, D. (eds) Horizons of African Diplomacy op.cit. p.16.
 16. The quotation is from Guy Martin in Jinadu L.A. and Mandaza, I. (eds) op.cit. p.22. the conclusions that the Non-Aligned states appear to be more active in sending delegates to UNGA meetings is from Peter Willetts' findings (Willetts, P. op.cit. p.89).

17. H. Hveem and P. Willetts in Tandon, Y.A. and Chandarana, D. (eds) op.cit.p.8.
18. Ibid.,p.17.
19. Willetts, P. op.cit. pp.89-90. Also refer to United Nations: Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly (UN document A/520/Rev.147) New York: United Nations Publications, 1982 p.19 (Rule 87a and 87b) for the regulations governing voting in the United Nations General Assembly. It may be noted that 'roll-calls' refer to the pre-1968 method of UNGA voting in which, following a request by a delegation, the other members had to call in their votes and a record was made of how each state had voted. Since the 23rd Session in 1968, however, machine voting has been used such that at the request of a member, the machine used for voting prints out a 'recorded vote' giving details of how each state has voted. From the foregoing, it is evident that 'roll-call' and 'recorded Vote' mean the same thing: a list showing how each state has voted on a proposal put before the assembly.
20. Willetts, P., op.cit. p.90-91.
21. Ibid.,pp.92-93.
22. Ibid., p.94.
23. Ibid., pp.93-94. Also see H. Hveem and P. Willetts in Tandon, Y.A. and Chandarana, D.(eds) op.cit:p.43.
24. H. Hveem and P. Willetts in Tandon, Y.A. and Chandarana, D. (eds) op.cit. p.17.
25. Ibid.
26. The issues that we have listed as the ones discussed in the UNGA are the headings under which all the discussions that have been taking place in the assembly are put. Refer to the annual issues of the United Nations Yearbook for 1963 to 1985, especially the list of 'contents'.
27. The objectives of the N-AM are given in Chapter Two of the present work.
28. Mortimer, R.A., op.cit. p.20.
29. This conclusion has been arrived at by Peter Willetts in his analysis of the cohesion between the Non-Aligned States in their UNGA voting (see Willetts, P. op.cit. pp.89-112, especially p.109).

CHAPTER SEVENOVERALL EVALUATION OF KENYA'S NON-ALIGNMENT
AND GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

This is the final chapter of the present study and in it an attempt has been made to synthesize what the other chapters were driving towards. In addition, it has some general conclusions. In the first section of the chapter we have tried to arrive at an overall evaluation of Kenya's position vis-a-vis the practice of non-alignment. The remaining sections round off the study in the form of a brief summary of the whole study, a discussion of whether or not the central question has been answered; the extent to which the study has proved or disproved the hypothesis put forth; the possible contributions that the study has made to the academia; and some recommendations to Kenya's policy makers and diplomats.

OVERALL EVALUATION OF KENYA'S NON-ALIGNMENT

In Chapter One of the present study, we indicated that in the evaluation of Kenya's overall position vis-a-vis non-alignment, we would attempt to analyse together the four positions emerging from the analysis of the individual aspects of the principle of non-alignment. The aspects were identified as:

1. Military aspects (t)
2. Economic aspect (u); and
3. Diplomatic aspect:
 - (i) bilateral diplomatic relations (v);
and
 - (ii) multilateral diplomatic dimension(w)¹.

We further stated that in an ideal situation a non-aligned country is expected to balance between the East and the West in each of these aspects, such that if 'non-alignment' in each of the indices is awarded a score of positive one (+1) and 'alignment' a negative one (-1) then:


1. $(t) + (u) + (v) + (w)$ should equal positive - four (+4) to denote complete overall non-alignment;
2. Conversely, if the total score is negative - four (-4) this denotes complete overall alignment.

In view of the possibility that in some of the above indices a country may be non-aligned, and not non-aligned in other, we decided that a total score of zero (0), when the scores of all the aspects are put together, also denotes complete overall non-alignment since such a state has literally 'balanced' the dimensions indicated above. We also introduced

the concept 'moderate' with reference to two sets of positions. Moderate overall non-alignment refers to the positions between 0 and +4 and moderate overall alignment to between 0 and -4.

Further to these, we noted that one of the possible 'moderating' factors may occur when, for example, a given country may be aligned in all the four indices. However, it may happen that whereas she may be aligned, say, with the West in three of the four indices, and aligned with the East in the remaining one, the score for the East will cancel out one score for the West to leave an overall score of negative two (-2) which falls under moderate overall alignment.

To sum up our method of determining the overall position with regard to pursuit of the principle of non-alignment, we emerged with the following diagram as a summary of most of what has been said above:



In Chapters Four, Five and Six of the present study we attempted analysis of Kenya's positions with

regard to various aspects of the principle of non-alignment. The conclusions obtained are summarized in the following table:

ASPECTS		DIRECTION OF ALIGNMENT	SCORE
Military		West	-1
Economic		West	-1
Diplomatic	Bilateral	West	-1
	Multilateral	East	-1

From the scores indicated in this table it can be seen that Kenya has obtained a total score of negative four (-4). However, as per the method of analysis indicated above, we cannot say that she falls under the category of complete overall alignment. This is because in the 'Direction of Alignment' column of the table above, it can be seen that she has been aligned with the West in three indices and with the East in one index. The 'Eastern alignment' therefore acts as a 'moderating' factor by cancelling out one of the scores for the West. The final total score will therefore be negative two (-2) rather than former negative four (-4).

Referring to the diagram giving the place of

different positions when the scores of all the aspects of non-alignment are worked out together, it is visible that a score of negative two (-2) falls under moderate overall alignment. On the basis of this we have made the conclusion that in overall terms - that is, when all the indices are analysed together - it appears that Kenya has been moderately aligned. In other words, she has not been non-aligned.

Going a step further, as we have indicated above, whereas in the index for multilateral diplomacy (UN voting) Kenya appears to have been aligned with the East, in the other three indices - namely military, economic, and bilateral diplomatic relations - she seemed to have been aligned with the West. After cancelling out one Western score with the score for the 'Eastern alignment', the remaining two negatives are for alignment with the West. Because of the apparent preponderance of alignment with the West (in three indices) and not East (alignment in only one index) we concluded that Kenya has been generally aligned with the Western cold war bloc.

In a nutshell, our overall evaluation of Kenya's position vis-a-vis the practical pursuit of the principle of non-alignment in her international relations is as follows: that because Kenya has been moderately aligned with the Western cold war bloc - in

three out of the four indices which have been used to measure the level of non-alignment - it can be said that on the whole, she was NOT non-aligned for the period studied, that is, 1963 to 1986.

With the above general evaluation of Kenya's pursuit of non-alignment having been made, we can now go on to give an overall summary of the whole study before we move on to the general conclusions. This has been done in the section which follows.

OVERALL SUMMARY OF STUDY

We set out to determine whether Kenya (a member of the Non-Aligned Movement) has been non-aligned in practice, arguing that such a study would not only be beneficial in the furtherance of knowledge in the field of international relations, but also important to Kenya's policy makers and diplomats. The central problem of study was to establish when and with regard to what aspects of non-alignment one can talk of Kenya as having been non-aligned (or otherwise) roughly between 1963 and 1986.

A survey of literature on Kenya's foreign policy revealed, first, that this question has largely been left unanswered and, two, that attempting to come up with an answer not resulting from empirical investigation only compounds the problem. This spurred us to

attempt a full fledged study, and for a theoretical approach power Theory was adopted.

On the basis of this theoretical approach we were able to argue that because of international real-politik member-states of the N-AM usually find it extremely difficult to apply the principle of non-alignment in their practical international relations. We therefore put forth a hypothesis to the effect that non-alignment as a principle of a states' international behaviour is negatively correlated with the realities of international politics.

To facilitate the analysis, we operationally defined non-alignment as the balancing of transactions between the East and the West. On the basis of the patterns of cold war military alliances, we were able to identify certain countries as belonging to 'the East' and others as belonging to 'the West'. The 'transactions' were identified as the various aspects of non-alignment, namely military, economic and diplomatic (bilateral and multilateral).

Lastly, 'balancing' was adopted to be used with different meanings at two levels of analysis: (i) with respect to analysis of individual transactions it was taken to mean conducting transactions between the East and the West in such a way that for each aspect of

non-alignment the given country deals approximately equally with both cold war blocs; and (ii) in the overall evaluation of the given country's position vis-a-vis non-alignment, the term was used to refer to either being non-aligned in all the aspects, or being non-aligned in half of the number of the aspects such that in the final analysis the given country is as dependent on one bloc as she is on the other.

With the above serving as our analytical framework we were able to analyse whether or not (and when) Kenya has been non-aligned in the various aspects of the principle of non-alignment. Our findings were as follows:

1. That from 1963 to 1986 Kenya had, on the whole, been aligned with the Western bloc in military terms;
2. That during the same period she had also exhibited economic alignment with the West;
3. That the same applied to her bilateral diplomatic relations; she had generally been aligned with the West; and
4. That with regard to multilateral diplomacy, however, we discovered that she appeared to have been aligned with the East.

In other words, for all the individual aspects

of non-alignment, Kenya seemed not to have been non-aligned for the entire period of study. Nevertheless, we could not say that in overall terms she had been 'completely aligned' with either of the blocs. This is because her alignment with the East in the multilateral diplomacy aspect (as opposed to her alignment with the West in the other aspects) acted as a 'moderating factor'. Therefore we concluded that in overall terms, Kenya appeared to have been 'moderately aligned with the West' from 1963 to 1986.

Having analysed Kenya's position with respect to application of the principle of non-alignment in her international relations, our final task involves discussions on:

1. How far we have answered the central question of the study, and thereby have achieved the aim of the present study;
2. What the present study has proved about the hypothesis we put forth;
3. The extent to which our findings contribute in the field of international relations; and
4. The possible recommendations which may be made to Kenya's policy-makers and possibly to her diplomats.

CONCERNING THE CENTRAL QUESTION

The central question we addressed ourselves to in this study was: 'In view of her greater collaboration with the Western capitalist countries, to what extent has Kenya, as a member of the N-AM, been really non-aligned?' The period covered by the study was generally from 1963 to 1986.

Our analysis showed that in general Kenya apparently had not been non-aligned in all the aspects of non-alignment throughout the entire period of study, especially from 1964 to 1986. Except for the multi-lateral diplomacy aspect - where she had shown an alignment with the East - Kenya seemed to have been aligned with the West in all the other aspects.²

By further analysing the conclusions arrived at after the analysis of each aspect, we were able to determine whether to say she had been non-aligned in practice, or vice versa. We concluded that Kenya seemed not to have been non-aligned during the period of study. Instead, she seemed to have been moderately aligned with the Western cold war bloc from independence upto 1986.³

From what has been said in the present section, it is our contention that we have not only answered the central question of the study, but have also used

the answers to come to what appears to be a reasonable conclusion regarding Kenya's position in relation to the implementation of the principle of non-alignment in her international relations.

ON THE HYPOTHESIS

Our hypothesis was that a state pursuing the principle of non-alignment as a main tenet of its foreign policy will adhere to some or all aspects of the principle from time to time. In other words, on the basis of the Power Theory which was adopted for the study, we argued that because of international real-politik, member-states of the N-AM usually find it extremely difficult to apply the principle of non-alignment in their practical international behaviour.⁴

Whereas the analysis of Kenya's interpretation and application of the principle of non-alignment above does not conclusively prove or disprove this hypothesis, the finding that Kenya appears not to have been non-aligned between 1963 and 1986 brings us closer to proving or disproving it. The study has shown that a country may claim to be non-aligned while in fact she acts aligned most of the time. To fully prove or disprove our hypothesis other similar studies may be necessary for other non-aligned countries. When the results of such studies are analysed together it may

be possible to make a firm conclusion about this hypothesis' validity.

CONTRIBUTION OF STUDY TO THE ACADEMIA

In the justification of this work we contended that the study would make certain contributions with respect to the discipline of international relations. These contributions included establishing a base from which to explain Kenya's behaviour as a Non-Aligned country and hence contribute to the on-going debate on Kenya's foreign policy.

Secondly, and from a more general perspective, the study was also expected to contribute towards an understanding of the past of Kenya's international relations, the efforts to develop a theory of the international behaviour of states professing non-alignment, and the development of a method for analysing the extent of non-alignment or alignment of a given state.⁵

It has already been stated that the conclusion of this study that for the period 1963 to 1986 Kenya appeared to have been aligned with the Western cold war bloc is an important first step to explaining why, internationally, Kenya behaved the way she did. If this is a correct statement it can then be argued

further that the study has not only contributed towards the process of theory building (the next question to ask to complete this process is 'why?'), but also to an understanding of Kenya's past international behaviour (she seemed not to have been non-aligned in the period 1963 to 1986) and to the on-going debate on Kenya's foreign policy in general (in that it can possibly be said that in spite of the country's maintenance that the principle of non-alignment is one of the cornerstones of her foreign policy she appeared not to have adhered to it in practice from independence to 1986.)

With respect to the development of a method of analysing whether a country is non-aligned we indicated in Chapter One that we accepted, with certain reservations, the method of analysis developed by Helge Hveem and Peter Willetts. The method used in the present study was therefore intended as an improvement on that used by the two scholars. If the modifications we made on their method are valid, then it can correctly be claimed that our study has contributed towards the development of a method for analysing whether a given state is non-aligned.

SOME RECOMMENDATIONS TO KENYA'S POLICY-MAKERS AND DIPLOMATS

Kenya's policy-makers may care to note that

according to the findings of our study, Kenya's actual international behaviour has not been in line with the principle of non-alignment. The policies she has been pursuing (especially in the post 1964 period) in military, economic, and bilateral diplomatic relations with the Western bloc states seem to be geared towards the promotion of greater alignment with the states of the Western bloc, rather than towards achievement of non-alignment. Therefore, if Kenya's policy-makers are genuine in their desire to see that Kenya is non-aligned in practice, it may be necessary to alter some of the country's policies to make it possible to move away from the apparent alignment with the West. The pursuit of a more pro-East policy may be desirable so as to bring some kind of balance in her relations with the two cold war blocs.

At the United Nations General Assembly, however, Kenya and indeed the majority of Third World states - may have to re-examine their voting pattern if they are to succeed in making the Western bloc states see that the UN is in fact not an international forum through which 'an alliance' of the Third World and the Eastern bloc is attempting to thwart all their (Western bloc's) international interests. In other words, the high degree of UNGA voting agreement between Third World states and the Eastern bloc is

not conducive for maintaining the UN system as the centre for multilateral diplomacy since the Western bloc states may get put off.

FOOTNOTES

1. The alphabets next to the dimensions have been awarded arbitrarily to allow for an arithmetical expression of the overall position.
2. Refer to Chapter Four, Chapter Five and Chapter Six of the present study for detailed summaries of our findings and conclusions.
3. See the first section of the present Chapter for how we arrived at this conclusion.
4. See 'Theoretical Framework' and 'Statement of Hypothesis' above (Chapter One).
5. Refer to Chapter One of the present study.

APPENDIX I

The following model questions guided our informal interviews and discussions with some past and present Kenya government officials (including cabinet ministers and senior civil servants in ministries relevant to the present study, especially Foreign Affairs Ministry). These interviews and discussions were aimed at getting information pertaining to Kenya's interpretation of non-alignment, diplomatic relations, military policy, economic policy, and the country's policy towards the United Nations Organization.

1. What is Kenya's official definition of non-alignment?
2. Why did Kenya decide to pursue non-alignment? or: What are the perceived advantages in terms of the pursuit of national interests/goals/objectives (namely national security, territorial integrity, and economic development)?
3. How has Kenya implemented the principle of non-alignment in her practical international behaviour?
4. Some scholars and politicians have asserted that Kenya's non-alignment is only on paper, but not in actual foreign policy behaviour. What is your reaction to this?
5. Looking at the world, it may be said that it (the

- world) is divided into two: the Eastern socialists bloc and the Western Capitalist bloc. Comparing Kenya's relations with these two blocs, which of the two blocs would you say Kenya interacts more with , politically, military and economically?
6. Most of Kenya's military equipment and training personnel come from the West. However, the principle of non-alignment generally holds that the member-states of the N-AM should diversify their sources of military purchases and aid in order that they remain independent to judge the East-West issues objectively. How far, therefore, is Kenya's military behaviour compatible with the principle?
 7. In economic terms, non-alignment means a diversification of one's economic interaction between the East and the West. What is Kenya's position with regard to this?
 8. Similarly, in diplomatic terms, a non-aligned state is expected to attempt encouraging friendship with countries on both sides of the cold war so as to be of kind bridge between them. What is Kenya's stand vis-a-vis this contention?
 9. The Non-Aligned states aim at strengthening the United Nations system as a centre of multilateral diplomacy. One possible way of doing this is by

being non-partisan at the UNGA sessions. A look at the voting records of a majority of the Non-Aligned countries, including Kenya, shows that most of the time they vote in agreement with the USSR and the Eastern bloc in general. Is not this contrary to the objectives of the N-AM? Otherwise, what is Kenya's official policy towards the UN?

10. Generally what would you say is the impact of non-alignment on the formulation and implementation of Kenya's foreign policy?

APPENDIX II

The following are summaries of the responses we received in the course of our informal interviews and discussions. We have withheld the names of individuals interviewed at their request for anonymity:

1. Kenya's official definition of 'non-alignment' follows the definition given by the founding fathers of the N-AM such as Tito, Nasser, Nehru, etc. She however emphasizes 'positive non-alignment' i.e. each issue is to be considered on its merits.
2. Kenya, wishing to pursue an independent policy in world affairs, decided to adopt non-alignment as the most suitable posture for the achievement of this. Apart from promising to safeguard the national independence of Kenya, through the N-AM Kenya saw an opportunity to promote her desire to see that all colonised peoples gain their independence.
3. Kenya has implemented non-alignment in the following ways:
 - (i) She is not aligned to any power-bloc and has no military alliances with the Great Powers;
 - (ii) She has actively pursued a policy of eliminating remnants of colonialism and

- advocates the independence of all people of the world. She has worked together with other members of the N-AM for the eradication of apartheid in South Africa;
- (iii) She has worked closely with other members of the N-AM to attain a high degree of economic cooperation amongst themselves;
- (iv) Kenya does not practice racism, nor does she discriminate on religious or ethnic grounds.
4. The accusations against Kenya as not being non-aligned are ^{not} justified at all. Kenya met the criteria necessary to be allowed to join the N-AM. When a country applies to become a member, the application is examined using the following criteria:
- (a) independence in policy;
 - (b) non-alignment in relation to the power-blocs with respect to the blocs military alliances;
 - (c) undertaking to promote the principles and objectives of the N-AM.
- Kenya met these requirements, and so far she has not been expelled from the Movement. This means that she is actually non-aligned in practice. In any case, it is not possible to be a member of the N-AM and yet not be non-aligned.
5. Kenya is friendly with both blocs in most aspects

of international relations. Nevertheless, her closer relations with the West is a function of Kenya's background history. Culturally and in terms of language there is a close identity between Kenya and the West. The same applies to education. Language has played quite an important role in the determination of all forms of exchanges between Kenya and other countries. Trade has also encouraged other kinds of contacts. Removing the barriers between Kenya and the non-Western societies will definitely take a long time. Non-alignment encourages dealing with all countries. This will help remove the barriers between Kenya and any other country, and any misunderstanding that may be existing between them.

6. Kenya's purchase of military hardware is influenced by historical ties. A diversified purchase of military hardware is not realistic and is too expensive. Military purchase from both the East and the West creates problems in the army. There is a greater possibility of camps being created in the military. Kenya does not have a foreign military base. Mombasa is not a military base for the US; neither is Nanyuki for the British. What Kenya does is that she allows her facilities to be used in exchange of which she gets certain benefits.

All states interested in using these facilities are welcome as long as they do not use these facilities directly for war against other states. In any case, what soldiers docking in Mombasa do after leaving the port is of no interest to Kenya. What Kenya is interested in is that the soldiers observed the laws of the land when they are on her soil. The reason why the American soldiers are more frequent than Russians in Mombasa is because they (US) have a bigger fleet in the Indian Ocean. USSR may be taking advantage of this for propaganda reasons. If USSR or the US, or any other country wants to use Mombasa, they must observe that "only innocent passage is allowed". Very many countries of the Indian Ocean coast are also willing to provide the facilities Kenya is providing. Their problem is that they are not strategically well-placed the way Kenya is. Therefore, if they are raising any questions they are only doing so out of jealousy.

It should be noted that the military relations between Kenya and Britain is a two-way deal beneficial to both: Britain uses Kenya's soil for tropical military training, while Kenyans receive military training from British military institutions. Therefore Kenya's military arrangement with Britain is in line with Kenya's national interest which must be protected at all costs. The survival of the

Republic is paramount.

7. Running Kenya's economy like some other country's does not mean that Kenya is aping that country. It may be a mere coincidence. Kenya is not a stooge of the West. Learning from other countries is not bad if Kenya finds that their methods suit her situation. Investment in Kenya is open to all the individuals and organisations interested and those that are ready to abide by the conditions put by Kenya. In accepting aid Kenya tries to go for those without vested foreign political interests. Kenya's official policy is economic independence. Aid from Eastern countries are usually restrictive. The West is not a 'bloc' as such when it comes to economic matters. Each country acts individually e.g. Japan, USA and Britain are rivals. In trade matters, the East prefers the 'barter system' a system which is not preferred by Kenya. As far as trade is concerned, Kenya buys where she can get better terms e.g. good prices and provision of services. Kenya had tried commercial dealings with the East. But the East has not been found to be suitable for her purposes. The quality of the goods from the East are low and they do not usually provide services with their goods. Kenya therefore only deals with the East where conditions are favourable. It should be noted that the Eastern countries are

trying to sell their products to Kenya while they themselves import and use similar products from the West. Kenya would rather buy good quality goods from the West too.

8. In diplomatic terms Kenya pursues a policy of friendliness with both blocs. Kenya's close relations with the West is a function of history rather than a deliberate policy on the part of the Government of Kenya. Indeed, Kenya advocates a policy of friendly diplomatic relations with all states - East or West, north or south.
9. In the UNGA Kenya votes with the Third World countries, whose voting depends on the issue in question e.g. on South Africa, USSR usually votes in agreement with the Non-Aligned states while United States, Britain and West Germany do not. Nevertheless, on other issues the Non-Aligned states are not usually in agreement with the Soviet Union e.g. the Non-Aligned states have always voted for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The above shows the consistency in the policy of non-alignment in its demand for justice, what is right, etc. If the Soviet Union is wrong she is told so, the same applies to United States. This shows that at the UNGA the Non-Aligned states - including Kenya - have always voted as the case demands without favouring

either the United States or the Soviet Union.

10. The principle of non-alignment is one of the three "main cornerstones" of Kenya's foreign policy. The others are the promotion of African unity and the eradication of colonialism.

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