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COLLEGE OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

**A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF WOMEN
IN PEACE-BUILDING: A CASE STUDY OF BURUNDI AND
SOMALIA**

**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AWARD OF A MASTERS
DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

BY

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
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Declaration

This dissertation is my original work and has not been submitted for a degree to any other University.




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This dissertation has been submitted for examination with my approval as university supervisor.



Dr. Makumi Mwangi

29 October 2021

Date

Dedication

**To all women involved in peace-building
and institutions supporting their initiatives**

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List of Abbreviations

| | |
|------------|---|
| AIDS | Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome |
| AWCPD | African Women's Committee on Peace Development |
| CAFOB | Collectif des Associations et ONGs Fémines du Burundi |
| CSMN | Military Committee of National Salvation |
| CNDD | Conseil National pour la Defense de la Democratie |
| COGNO | Coalition of Grassroots Women Organization |
| FDD | Forces pour la Defense de la Democratie |
| FRODEBU | Front pour la démocratie au Burundi |
| GNP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| HIV | Human Immune Deficiency Virus |
| IGAD | Inter-governmental Authority on Development |
| LWI | Liberia Women's Initiative |
| MNF | Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation |
| NSC | National Salvation Council |
| OAU | Organization of African Unity |
| OMIB | OAU Observer Mission in Burundi |
| PALIPEHUTU | Parti pour la Liberation du Peuple Hutu |
| PHRN | Pence and Human Rights Network |
| PDC | Christian Democratic Party |
| PP | Parti du peuple |
| PEP | Parti de l'émancipation populaire |
| RRA | Rahawayn Resistance Army |
| SCG | Search for Common Ground |
| SNM | Somali National Movement |
| SNF | Somali National Front |
| SSDF | The Somali Democratic Front |
| SPM | Somali Patriotic Movement |
| SDM | Somali Democratic Movement |
| SOWDA | Somaliland Women Development Association |
| SRC | Supreme Revolutionary Council |
| SNPC | Somali National Peace Conference |
| TNC | Transitional National Assembly |
| TNG | Transitional national Government |
| USC | United Somali Congress |
| UPRONA | Union for National Congress |
| USA | United States of America |
| UPROHUTU | L'Union pour la Promotion Hutu |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNOSOM | United Nations Somalia Mission |
| UNIFEM | United Nation Development Fund for Women |
| UNITAF | United Nations International Task Force |

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Abstract

Violent conflicts, political instability or unjust policies and practices in different societies often result to human suffering – men, women and children alike. Short-term humanitarian aid, military intervention, diplomatic intervention just to name but a few are insufficient in the aftermath of conflict. Recognizing this short-coming, a global awareness has grown on the need for post-conflict reconciliation, reconstruction and peace building, with the goal of restoring conflict-destroyed structures and relationships.

As a sub-field of International Conflict Mangement, peace building is fast becoming a popular field of concern for most scholars, conflict management analysts, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, different groups and individuals working in the area. As individuals who are affected by conflict in different ways, women have been playing a significant role in the rebuilding process of the countries. Although women's role has been documented in different conference reports, project documents and publications, very little analytical reflection has been made to see to what extent their role has been effective, what problems they have encountered in the process, and what strategies they have employed to carry on with their activities.

Such analysis is relevant in improving on knowledge of the specific challenges of peace building in general and on women's role in peace building in particular. It is my hope that this knowledge would definitely influence the above mentioned stakeholders and other interested parties, to take into account women's issues when planning and practicing post-conflict peace building activities and initiatives.

Chapter 1

1.1 Introduction

Despite the hopes of the world at large, the dramatic end of the Cold War did not yield peaceful relationships and interactions within and between states. Notable outcomes of the post-Cold War era in Europe are the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of Germany on the one hand, and the collapse of the Soviet Union on the other. In Africa, internal conflicts sky-rocketed as many countries like Angola, Algeria, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, just to name but a few, have been and are still being “afflicted by ethno-nationalist and secessionist movements, which challenge diverse forms of government and generate particularly virulent and atavistic nationalisms.”¹

Writing about the causes of conflict, John Burton developed the human needs theory which is based on the assumption that human beings do have basic needs that have to be met. And if these needs are not met, the society is bound to plunge into conflict. The conflict will further bring about instability in the society. Burton describes this as follows:

“We believe that the human participants in conflict situations are compulsively struggling in their respective institutional environments at all social levels to satisfy primordial and universal needs – needs such as security, identity, recognition, and development. They strive increasingly to gain control of the environment that is necessary to ensure the satisfaction of these needs. This struggle cannot be curbed. It is primordial.”²

¹ K.P.Clement, ‘Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation’

<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/clements.htm>

² J.Burton, ‘Conflict Resolution as a political System’ in Vamik Volkan, et al (eds), *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships: Volume II: Unofficial Diplomacy at Work*. (Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1991), p.82-83.

To enhance the hypothesis of his needs theory, Burton again proposed the frustration-aggression theory which focuses on the “stimulus-response hypothesis.” He argues that because human needs are not met, human beings become frustrated. The frustration subsequently leads to aggression and eventually conflict. Burton states:

“Now we know that there are fundamental universal values or human needs that must be met if societies are to be stable. That this is so thereby provides a non-ideological basis for the establishment of institutions and policies. Unless identity needs are met in multiethnic societies, unless in every social system there is distributive justice, a sense of control, and prospects for the pursuit of all other human societal developmental needs, instability and conflict are inevitable.”³

On his part, Mitchell⁴ sees conflict to be caused by incompatible goals between two parties about something. This cause political tensions between governments and regimes on the one hand and the opposition on the other. The opposition in such cases resents the regimes inability to maintain order and peace and to provide freedom. Reinforcing Mitchell’s point of view, Holsti says conflict emerges “from a particular combination of parties, incompatible positions over an issue, hostile attitudes, and certain types of diplomatic and military action.”⁵ All these conflicts impact a great deal on the human toll for individuals and families, on social structures, national economies, and political institutions among others. In a Global Survey conducted on High and Lower Intensity Conflicts, Jongman and Schmid note that, during the period 1994-1995 alone, “there were 1.2 million deaths in high intensity conflicts and at least 10,000 others were killed in smaller conflicts...wars were more than 1,000 deaths per year.”⁶ The upsurge of conflict has also brought with it a humanitarian crisis. There is massive migration of

³ J.Burton, ‘Political Realities’ in Volkan, 1991, Ibid., p.21.

⁴ C.R. Mitchell, *The Structure of International Conflict*. (London, Macmillan, 1998), pp 15-25.

⁵ K.J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*. (Prentice-Hall International Inc, 1988),p.396

⁶ A.J. Jongman and A.P. Schmid, ‘Comtemporary Conflicts: A Global survey of High and Lower Intensity Conflicts and Serious Disputes.’ (PIOOM Newsletter, 7 (1):15

people. Lawlessness and insecurity have taken hold of many countries, fear and uncertainty of the unknown grip citizens. According to the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU):

Conflicts have cast a dark shadow over the prospects for a united secure and prosperous Africa which we seek to create... conflicts have caused immense suffering to our people and, in the worst case, death. Men, women and children have been uprooted, dispossessed, deprived of their means of livelihood and thrown into exile as refugees as a result of conflicts. This dehumanization of a large segment of our population is unacceptable and cannot be allowed to continue. Conflicts have engendered hate and division among our people and undermined the prospects of the long-term stability and unity of our countries and Africa as a whole.⁷

Burundi has experienced a cycle of ethnic and political violence since it obtained independence from Belgium in 1962, after which a Tutsi minority became dominant in the government. The current wave of violence was sparked in 1993, when the first Hutu elected as president was assassinated. In 1995, a power sharing government was established between members of the opposing political parties which was brought to an end by a Tutsi-dominated military coup. The coup instigated massive civil disobedience and instability in the region. As a result, economic sanctions were imposed on Burundi with the view of forcing the government to go to the peace table. Efforts to initiate a peace process failed when the government of Burundi put the uplifting of the sanctions as a precondition for any peace initiatives to begin. After several consultations with the government and the regional neighbours, the peace talks began in 1998 with 17 political parties and five commissions established to address different issues.

On its part, Somalia has faced internal rebellion since its defeat at Ogaden by Ethiopia between 1975-1978. The conflict situation in the country became aggravated

⁷ OAU, Resolving Conflicts in Africa: Proposals for Action (Addis Ababa: OAU Press and Information Series 1, 1992), p.3

when the abortive coup led by the Mijerteen officers led to the formation of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front in the north-east regions to oust the dictatorial regime of Siad Barre. Another opposition movement, the Somali National Movement (SNM) was created in the north-west regions for the same purpose. By 1988, a full scale war erupted in Somalia which led to several deaths and destruction of towns and infrastructure. The conflict spread tremendously. By the end of 1992, it was estimated that more than 500,000 people had died in the war and famine in Somalia.⁸ The majority of this total was made up of women, children and the elderly.

However, in such human tragedy, conflicting parties, human beings and development partners alike always yearn for post-conflict reconciliation and the building of peace. This desire to build peace becomes more meaningful and successful when there is a total involvement of all members of the society. Women like men have a fundamental stake in building peaceful communities, in the development of civil society and democratic institutions. While post-war effects are felt differently in different situations, "women have, and are still searching ways to be part of the peace efforts in a bid to ameliorate the tragic effects of war".⁹

The conflicts in Burundi and Somalia have impacted adversely on women. They have suffered bereavement on the killing of their husbands and relatives. They have also faced the issue of separation, which have forced them to become displaced within their respective countries and outside as refugees. They have assumed the sole responsibility of taking care of the living children and other family members with no support from relatives and parents. In Somalia, "rape has become regular practice, evolving from an

⁸ J. Prendergast, *Crisis Response: Humanitarian Band-Aids in Sudan and Somalia*. (London: Pluto Press, 1997), p.115

occasional criminal transgression to a systematic instrument of inter-group violence and humiliation.”¹⁰ Given the different impact of war on women, it is but logical that they should participate in and benefit from post-conflict development policies and negotiations if fruitful conflict resolution and peace-building initiatives are to be achieved.

Encouraging contributions and testimonies have been recorded from different parts of the world on the role women have played in restoring peace in their communities. In Cambodia, Guatemala, North Ireland, Pakistan, the Middle East, Sierra Leone, and South Africa, women have braved discrimination, obstacles, and political differences to make a difference in their peace-building efforts. The case of Guatemala, Liberia and Cambodia attest to this. In Guatemala women peace initiatives led to the incorporation of:

“a range of issues critical to women’s development into the peace agreement. They included equal access to land, credit and productive resources, health care and education and training. The agreement affirmed women’s rights to a paid job, eliminated legal discrimination and imposed penalties for sexual harassment. It also set up a new Office for the Defense of Indigenous Women’s Rights and mechanisms to promote women’s political participation.”¹¹

In Liberia, the Liberia Women’s Initiative (LWI) “successfully advocated for a new unit for women and children in the Ministry of Planning and proposed for the establishment of a separate women’s ministry.”¹² Women’s initiatives in Cambodia led to “their participation in the drafting of the new constitution, where they won constitutional guarantees of equal rights, including the right to vote, the right to participate in politics and the right to choose their professions.”¹³

⁹ UNIFEM, *Women at the Peace-table Making a Difference* (UNIFEM, New York, 2000),p.12

¹⁰ UNIFEM, *Somalia Between Peace and War: Somali women on the Eve of the 21st Century*. (African Women for Peace Series, Nairobi, United Nations Office, 1998),p.49

¹¹ UNIFEM, *Women at the Peace-table Making a Difference*, op.cit., pp. 39-40

¹² Ibid. p.40

¹³ Ibid.

Several debates have emanated from different fora, scholars and researchers on the relationship between women and peace-building. Some argue that women are more peaceful as compared to their male counterpart. According to this argument, Cheryl Bernard is of the opinion that women should be accorded a greater role in the public arena so that peace and security should increase in society.

Underlying the debate is the concern to highlight the relationship between women, war and peace. It has been globally acknowledged that the conditions and effects of war have different impacts on women and men. While women are outstanding victims of sexual assaults, become refugees and are displaced, more men die at the war-front. Apart from facing these consequences, women also support war by providing for the combatants, the children, taking care of the wounded and mourning the dead.

As members of the society, women also lose in violent conflict like men even though they are most of the time not consulted when the decision to go to war is made by men. And when peace issues are being discussed, they not consulted nor invited. If peace is to be discussed for the benefit of the entire society, it is important for women to be involved in the process. The role of women in peace-building has further been validated recently by the United Nations Security Council as captured in Resolution 1325 (2000):

Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and peace-building, and stressing the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution, invites the Secretary-General to carry out a study on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peace-building.¹⁴

This study has critically analyzed the role of women in peace building and established the extent to which the inclusion of women in peace negotiations in Burundi

and Somalia have contributed in building peace within their communities. It has further identified constraints on their efforts and recommended ways through which women's peace-building in these countries could be improved.

1.2 Research Problem

Conflicts impact negatively within and outside of the countries in conflict. They displace whole populations and make millions homeless. “Civilians, mostly women and children, bear the brunt of war, accounting for over 80 per cent of war victims. Conflicts contribute to the feminization of poverty: women are not as mobile as men, do not have the same access to credit and resources.”¹⁵ With these consequences of conflict on different sectors of the country and the population, there is always a desire to resolve conflict and return to normal life. When relative calm has been established at the end of conflict, efforts to rebuild the country begin. This suggest that what was destroyed has to be rebuilt.

The pre-conflict social environment cannot be re-established when people have died, populations moved and families split. Reconstructing war-torn societies means “reconstructing human beings, souls and bodies, social structures, culture, environment, a peace culture of reconciliation, repentance, forgiveness, healing and collectively and individually acting out the sorrow etc...”¹⁶ To undertake these tasks, it is imperative for the conflicting parties and other actors to be involved. Peace-building is the stage in the conflict cycle that generally aims to create “positive peace’ – a stable equilibrium in

¹⁴ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000)

¹⁵ Conflict Prevention, A Guide: ‘Cost and Causes of Conflict in the Greater Horn of Africa’
<http://www.caii-dc.com/ghai/costcaus.htm>

¹⁶ J.Oberg, ‘Conflict Mitigation in Reconstruction and Development’
<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pes/oberg.htm>

which the surfacing of new disputes does not escalate into violence and war.”¹⁷ It is argued that :

“in peace-building activities special attention should be attached to the roles and obligations of the parties to a conflict, as well as to the local population. Since the co-operation of the parties is essential to the success of peace-building, increased effort should be made to secure their consent and support their activities.”¹⁸

As part of the local population that is affected by consequences of conflict, Burundi and Somalia have been mobilizing and organizing at different levels to promote healing, conflict resolution and peace-building. They have been actively involved in influencing the political processes from transition to reconstruction and development of their countries. This suggest that women have an important role to play in peace-building and in reconstructing the social and moral tissue of the society at the end of conflict. It is this role in their peace-building efforts that this study has assessed and analyzed.

1.3 Objectives

This study has:

1. established the role played by Burundi and Somalia women in peace-building;
2. assessed the role of women in peace-building;
3. identified constraints on their efforts

1.4 Justification of the Study

The devastating effects of conflicts cannot be overemphasized. It has been argued that the 1990s have been characterized by intense and deadly conflicts which have been aggravated by forms of ethnic conflict and have not been matched in intensity at least

¹⁷ J.Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. (Sage:London, 1996), pp.1-3

since the origins of the Cold War.¹⁹ Whether conflicts are of internal origins or have significant international dimensions, they bring about the total collapse of communities, nations and loss of human lives. It would be appropriate at this juncture to provide a brief explanation on the dynamics of internal, international and internationalized conflict. Internal conflict is a conflict that occurs within a state. International conflict is a conflict between two or more states, while internationalized conflict occurs when the internal or domestic conflict becomes linked to the international through the process of internationalization.²⁰

This process is made possible by agents of internationalization which Mwangi lists as “interdependence, marked by a complex pattern of relationships and the connections between various actors”²¹; ethnicity and ethnic relations caused by the partition of Africa, which led to the separation of many ethnic communities in Africa by territorial borders; the media which renders internal conflicts to be “known instantaneously (or almost instantaneously in different parts of the world;” refugees problem caused by people “crossing an international border” to another country. All these issues portray the dynamics of internal, international and internationalized conflict which have to be taken into account when plans are made for the management of conflict.

The conflict in Burundi and Somalia display the above dynamics. Both conflicts began as internal upheavals but quickly became internationalized through the interplay of the internationalization agents mentioned above. The effects of these conflicts are worth

¹⁸ W. Kuhne (ed.), ‘The transition from peace-keeping to peace-building: Planning co-ordination and funding in the twilight zone’, International Workshop, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen, 1997, New York, p.41

¹⁹ O.R. Slater, ‘Conflict and Change in the International System,’ in Slater, O.R., Schutz, B.M. and Dorr, S.R. (eds.). *Global Transformation and Third World*. (Boulder: Lynne Rienne Publishers, 1993), p.311-324

²⁰ M.Mwangi, *Conflict, Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*. (Nairobi: Watermark Printer, 2000), p.61

mentioning. Mwangi is of the opinion that “ the effect of conflict, wherever it is located, is to dislocate valued relationships, and to cause stress on the structure on which relationships are based”.²² Both conflicts caused devastating effects on the population of the two countries and serious repercussions for the stability of the region. Specifically, conflicts have psychological, physical and material impacts on the lives of women. “For many women, seeing their children sometimes forcefully conscripted into the army by the government, and subsequently perish or come back as handicapped invalids, is a shocking experience.”²³

In Burundi, “women and their families suffered considerably from the persistent conflict in terms of nutrition, health and education, and also from its physical and moral consequences.”²⁴ In Somalia, “tens of thousands of men were killed, leaving widows and orphans behind. Thousands more women faced the pressures of displacement, poverty and despair.”²⁵ Because conflict impact negatively on the entire population, including women particularly, within the context of defining ways of rebuilding war-torn societies, women have been demonstrating significant talent as active peace-builders of their communities. Within the context of peace initiatives, they have inspired debates by contributing to the understanding of challenges encountered by the civilian population and suggested possible ways of handling the issues.

Using the case of Burundi and Somalia, the study has assessed the role women in these countries have played in peace-building. In assessing their role, the study has

²¹ Ibid. pp.58-70

²² Ibid. p.4

²³ N. Issa, ‘Women in War: A View from Ethiopia’ in *Women, Violent Conflict and Peace-building: Global Perspectives* (International Alert, London, 1999), p.28

²⁴ ‘Burundi’ in <http://www.fasngo.org/en/activities/Burundi.htm>

²⁵ UNIFEM, *Somalia Between Peace and War: Somali Wwomen on the Eve of the 21st Century*, opcit., p.49

identified the gaps and shortfalls in their efforts. Of course this study has contributed to the theoretical knowledge in the area of women and peace-building.

1.5 Literature Review

The literature of this study is derived from research that has been conducted by scholars, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations on conflict and peace-building. The review is based on an extensive survey of published and unpublished literature. There is some literature which recognizes the role of women in peace-building. The subject of peace-building is linked to the larger subject of conflict. In this regard, the review of the literature begins with that of conflict, women and conflict, followed by that on peace-building.

1.6 Literature of Conflict

Conflict refers to confrontation and disagreement. This means a negative situation or atmosphere. According to Morton, conflict is a disruption of normal, desirable social interactions, a 'dysfunctional' state of social relations.²⁶ In contextualizing conflict, Mwangi argues that conflict relates closely to the cultural setting. What may be considered wrong and divisive in one culture may not be considered so in another.²⁷ Lederach agrees with Mwangi's position when he says that the problem of the different cultural perceptions about conflict has not been addressed satisfactorily.²⁸ Writing about Conflict, War and Conflict Management in International Relations, Mitchell states that "wars and civil wars may be the most obvious examples of organized human behaviour in

²⁶ D.Morton, 'Subjective features of conflict resolution: psychological, social and cultural influences', ed. Vayrynen, R., *New Directions of Conflict Theory, Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation*. (Sage;London, 1991).

²⁷ M. Mwangi, *Conflict, Theory, Processes and Institutions and Institutions of Management*, op.cit., p.1

²⁸ J.P.Lederach, *Beyond Prescription: New Lenses for conflict Resolution Training Across Cultures* (Waterloo: Ontario, 1992).

situations where salient goals are perceived as incompatible.”²⁹ He expands his point of view by stating the origins of human conflicts which he finds in the social structure and the mal-distribution of resources (material and symbolic).”³⁰

Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff define conflict as a condition in which one identifiable group of human being (whether tribal, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, socio-economic, political, or other) is engaged in conscious opposition to one or more other identifiable human groups because these groups are pursuing what are or appear to incompatible goals.”³¹ In analyzing the issues of peace in Africa, Hansen argues that conflict resolution is “only a minimal condition for the achievement of peace”.³² He traces the causes of conflict, its nature and dynamics, its patterns and effects to be linked to other “deeper issue”, such as the quest for material needs and resources.³³ Hansen concludes his analysis by declaring that “for lasting and reliable peace to be attained, it is important to fashion economic systems which can generate sustained economic growth, guarantee for the mass of the population a certain minimum of material existence and basic needs”.³⁴

Coser defines conflict as a “contest over values and demands to limited status, power, and resources in which the aims of the rival are to offset, ruin, or get rid of their rivals.”³⁵ He expands his definition of conflict by looking at the positive functions of conflict which to him have been neglected. He states thus: “far from being being only a

²⁹ C.R. Mitchell, ‘Conflict, War and Conflict Management’ in M.Light and A.J.R. Groom (eds.), *International Relations A Handbook of Theory*. (London: Pinter Publishers, 1985)p.121

³⁰ Ibid. p.123

³¹ O.R. Slater, ‘Conflict and Change in the International System’, in Slater. O.R., Schutz, B.M. and Dorr, S.R. (eds.), *Global Transformation and the Third World* (Boulder:Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), pp.311-324

³² E. Hansen, *Africa Perspectives on Peace and Development*. (London: Zed Books Ltd, 1987).pp.12-13

³³ Ibid

³⁴ Ibid.

“negative” factor which “tears apart”, social conflict may fulfil a number of determinate functions in groups and other interpersonal relations; it may for example, contribute to the maintenance of group boundaries and prevent the withdrawal of members from a groups”³⁶

Commenting on the historicity of conflict, Bushra states that “any specific conflict should be understood in relation to its historical antecedents, and as moving towards a variety of potential outcomes.”³⁷ To Burton,³⁸ conflict is a social phenomenon that can either lead to a peaceful end or degenerate into a destructive end. He supports Zartman’s view that conflict is inescapable condition so far as human relations are concerned. He warns that if an attempt is made to suppress conflict, the society will be rendered static. Therefore, human beings must learn to live and cope with conflict since “conflict is endemic in society.”³⁹ Deutsch⁴⁰ devotes his time in presenting and analyzing different types of conflict. He distinguishes between “a bitter-end conflict and a joint-survival conflict and between a fundamental conflict and an accidental or transitory conflict.”⁴¹

He posits that in a bitter-end conflict, only one of the two contending actors is likely to survive, at the price of the destruction or practically complete surrender of the other. On the hand, the actors of a joint-survival conflict are likely to survive and able to cooperate in future. A fundamental conflict is rooted in some permanent basic structure

³⁵ L. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict*. (New York: The Free Press, 1956), p.3

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p.8

³⁷ J.E.Bushra, ‘Transforming Conflict: Some Thoughts on a Gendered Understanding of Conflict Processes’ in S.Jacobs, R.Jacobson and J. Marchbank (eds.) *States of Conflict: Gender, Violence and Resistance* (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2000), p.67

³⁸ J.W. Burton, *World Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp.137-138

³⁹ K.Webb, ‘Structural Violence and the definition of Conflict’ in *World Encyclopaedia of Peace*, Vol. 2 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1986), pp.431-434

⁴⁰ K.W Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations*. (Prentice-Hall International, Inc, 1988), pp.136-137

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

of one or both of the contending parties and is likely to occur again, while accidental conflict is based on fortuitous and passing circumstances, which may not happen again in the future.

To inform the debate on conflict, Galtung⁴² framed the term structural violence to refer to any constraint on human potential caused by the structures in society. Structural violence exist “in those conditions which human beings are unable to realize their full potential: where their somatic and mental realization are below the potential realization.”⁴³ Unequal access to resources, to political power, to education, to health care, or to legal standing are forms of structural violence embedded in social structures which cause direct violence. Expounding on the notion of structural and violent conflict, and to link to Galtung’s debate, Mwagiru⁴⁴ states that “violent conflict is nested on behavioural violence while structural conflict is nested on structural violence.” He sums up his argument by stating that “if there were no relationships in society, then there would never be structural violence or conflict.”⁴⁵ Commenting on the same issue of structural conflict, Berridge⁴⁶ says this is caused because of the anarchical structure of the states-system itself.

Building on the same line of thought, Adam Curle as one of the exponents of structural violence identifies a third dimension which according to Mwagiru, “does not fit into classical dichotomy between peace and war.”⁴⁷ In this third dimension, Curle⁴⁸

⁴² J.Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace and Peace Research’ *Journal of Peace Research* Vol.3, 1969, pp. 167-191; and Galtung, ‘Cultural Violence’ *Journal of Peace Research* Vol.27, 199, pp.291-305

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ M. Mwagiru, *Conflict, Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, op.cit., p.23

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp.24-25

⁴⁶ G.R. Berridge, *International Politics: States, Power and Conflict since 1945*. (Prentice-Hall, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1997), p.72

⁴⁷ Mwagiru, *Conflict, Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, op.cit., p.23op.cit.

⁴⁸ A.Curle, *Making Peace* (London:Tavistock Publications, 1971).

argues that societies can be in either conditions of peace, or of war or in neither. He calls this kind of condition as “unpeaceful,” because despite the physical manifestations of violence, peace is absent “because the relations in those societies are organized in such a way that the potential for development of some (significant) numbers of the society is impeded”⁴⁹ By socio-politico-economic and psychological factors.

Because conflict occurs as a result of the disequilibriums and inequalities that are manifest in the structures in society, and since this is made possible by the relations and interactions between groups (women’s groups, youth groups, political groups to name but a few) in society, the conflict can only be resolved if these groups are involved in reforming these structures. Within the scope of this study, women should be involved in the reforming processes. Deborah Winter and Dana Leighton⁵⁰ propose that the very structures in society that breed structural violence could be used to encourage and empower citizens to develop systematic ways to mitigate and reduce its effects.

1.7 Literature on Women and Conflict

The literature under this section will focus basically on two key aspects: women as victims in conflict and women as actors in conflict. In her review on women and war, Lindsey⁵¹ stipulates the impact of war on women and the part women take in mounting hostilities during war. She says women in conflict experience rape and sexual violence. As members of the civilian population, they “endure indiscriminate bombing and attacks as well as lack of food and other essentials needed for a healthy survival.”⁵² As combatants, they join the armed forces voluntarily or involuntarily, performing both

⁴⁹ Mwangi, *Conflict, Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management* op.cit, p.26

⁵⁰ D. Winter and D. Leighton, ‘Structural Violence Introduction’

<http://www.people.whitman.edu/%7ELeightdc/svintro.html>

⁵¹ C. Lindsey, “Women and War” in *International Review of the Red Cross*, 2000, N0.839, pp.561-579

support and combatant roles. She cites the case of the US forces who served in the 1990-1991 Gulf War, where 40,000 were women.

In the same line of argument, Matthews⁵³ distinguishes the impacts of conflict on states and on the civilian population. She states that conflicts have “impeded the socio-economic development of states, and the effects are often worst for women and children.”⁵⁴ She agrees with Lindsey that women also fight alongside men and soldiers during conflicts.

In her report on women in war, Marshall reaffirms the fact that war has different effects on men and women differently. Men are more involved in war than women as such, more men die. In addition, the decision to go to war is often made by men. On their part, “women tend to be victims of wartime rape, become refugees, suffer displacement and deprivation.”⁵⁵ These differences are continuously being neglected when elaborating peace agreements at the end of a conflict. Nevertheless, women still pursue their efforts in the quest for a just and sustainable peace. To repeat her words, “women are the glue that holds crumbling communities together in the stress of conflict.”⁵⁶ Commenting on the impact of conflict on women, Mwagiru and Karuru say:

“Conflict affect women in various ways. The whole process of fleeing and finding shelter in other countries or areas is dehumanizing, and this has a debilitating impact on women and by implication, children, this impact can be categorized as general, health, social and psychological.”⁵⁷

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ S. Matthews, “*Women in Conflict*” in *Conflict Trends*, 2000, NO. 4, ACCORD.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ D.R. Marshall, *Women in War and Peace: Grassroots Peace-building*. (United States Institute of Peace, 2000), p.8

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ M.Mwagiru and N. Karuru, *Women’s Land and Property Rights in Conflict Situations*. (Centre for Conflict Research and Women and Law in East Africa- Kenya, Nairobi, 1998), p.36

1.8 Literature on Peace-building

The term, “peace-building” is relatively new in the international community and scholarly vocabulary. Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined peace-building as “post conflict action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”⁵⁸ Boutros Ghali emphasized that for effective peace-building to be achieved, efforts to identify and support structures that would consolidate peace, advance a sense of confidence and sustain economic reconstruction and well being should be pursued. In this regard, he suggests that “the concerns of all parties to the conflict have to be considered in all peace-building mechanisms.”⁵⁹ The concerns of women, which are the integral focus in this study, should therefore be reflected in the mechanisms.

In her review of women and peace-building, Anderson states that peace-building includes the practice of non-violence and peace-building projects should be emphasized as a central aspect of any peace-building initiative.⁶⁰ Such projects should include non-violence training for grassroots women’s groups and regional consultations which bring women from opposite sides of conflicts to dialogue and deepen the understanding on peace-building.

Mazurana and Mckay broadly define peace-building to include gender-awareness, and women’s political, social economic and human rights empowerment. According to their findings, peace-building fosters the ability of women, men, girls and boys in their own cultures to promote conditions of non-violence, equality, justice and human rights of

⁵⁸B.B. Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*. Document A/47/277-S/24 111, June 1992 , <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>

⁵⁹ Ibid.

all people to build democratic institutions and sustain the environment.⁶¹ Six lessons for effective peace-building are recommended. They are, a gender perspective; reconciliation, healing and building of relationships, documentation and evaluation of all peace-building activities; and co-operating and networking. All these help to facilitate peace-building. They state that grassroots women are the "major stakeholders in conflict situations" and as such they are the ones who emphasize the centrality of addressing human needs in their peace-building work. Nevertheless, their essay does not examine the apparent significant role women play in sustaining conflicts. It depicts women's grassroots peace-building and gives examples of peace-building work being done by South Sudanese women and North Ireland Women's Coalition.

In a survey of the literature on Demilitarization and Peace-building in South Africa, Lamb argues that "the validity of peace-building has received wide recognition over the past five years. He says peace-building has been to include efforts to prevent the outbreak of potential conflict, such as the introduction of early response programmes.⁶²

Nevertheless, Mwangi captures this in what he titles "Early Warning of Conflict".⁶³ He argues strongly that because conflict develops over time, manifested in early symptoms of restiveness and tension, preventive measures should be put in place. These measures include activities which deal with the building of trust and confidence between the conflicting parties. He goes on to explain that preventive diplomacy needs to be applied since it is part of the process of consolidating the peace that has been

⁶⁰ S. Anderson, (1999) 'Review of Women and Peace-building'. *Women's Human Rights in Conflict Situations*, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 8-9.

⁶¹ D.E. Mazurana, and S. Mckay, S., *Women and Peace-building* (Montreal:International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, 1999).

⁶² G. Lamb, *Demilitarisation and Peace-building in Southern Africa: A Survey of the Literature*, 1997 in http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/staff-papers/guy-demil_peace.html

⁶³ M.Mwangi, *Conflict, Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, op.cit. , p.9

negotiated. In this connection, he recommends that post-conflict “peace-building should immediately take centre stage”⁶⁴ after the process of conflict management.

Writing about peace-building, Bush states that peace-building is a two-fold process, which requires both the deconstruction of the structures of violence and the construction of the structures of peace.⁶⁵ Without the removal of the root causes of conflict, the path to reconstruction will be futile.

The United Nations considers peace-building as one dimension of the peaceful settlement of disputes. Speaking on the peace-building role of United Nation's Operations, Michael Harbottle says peace-building is the paramount practical interactive approach to address the apparent structural causes of conflicts and violence on the ground. He traces chronologically the steps leading to peace-building by stating that when conflict ends, actors like the military step in to keep peace. This means they help in reducing the level of violence. When the low level of violence is achieved, peace-making using Tract One diplomacy comes in. This involves the coming in of diplomats, international organizations and leaders to negotiate peace. At the end of such negotiations, peace-builders are needed immediately to consolidate the negotiated peace.

To Lederach, “peace-building must be understood as a comprehensive term that encompasses the full array of stages and approaches needed to transform conflict toward sustainable, peaceful relationships and outcomes”.⁶⁶ He emphasizes that the process entails pre and post peace accord activities. In his examination of the components of peace-building, Lederach argues that peace-building deals with a long-term commitment

⁶⁴ Ibid., p.11

⁶⁵ K. Bush, *A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict Assessment of Development Projects in Conflict Zones*. Working Paper No.1. IDRC, 1998.

to a process that embraces investment, gathering and coordination of resources and materials. He stresses that the transformation of relationships is peace-building's main focus, and that "sustainable reconciliation" has to do with structural and relational transformations.⁶⁷ He further states that peace-building and reconciliation processes should contain within them leadership at the various levels of society. These levels which include the top, middle range and grassroots levels will enhance the peace-building process.

For Wolfgang, peace-building "must aim at reviving a country's economy, establishing participatory systems of governance and accountable administrations, and improving judicial and police system".⁶⁸ His position supports the general concerns that peace-building is a process which is initiated at the end of conflict with the goal of empowering actors to undertake the initiative. In this regard, women as members of the society are equally actors within the framework of peace-building.

Reflecting on the nature of peace-building, Roland Paris find it too blurred because "scholars have devoted relatively little attention to analyzing the concept of peace-building itself, including its underlying assumptions."⁶⁹ From Paris' line of thought, it is obvious that the entire concept and assumptions of peace-building need more exploration.

⁶⁶ J.P. Lederach, 'Building Peace. Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies', Paper submitted to the United Nations University Tokyo, 1994; J.P. Lederach, *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures* (New York, 1999), p.8.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ W. Heinrich, *Building The Peace: Experiences of Collaborative Peace-building in Somalia, 1993 – 1996*.

⁶⁹ R. Paris, 'Peace-building and the Limits of liberal Internationalism,' *International Security*, 1997, Vol.22, No.2. p.55

1.9 Assessment of Literature

The review provided a clear picture of the different types of conflict in society, their causes and impact on the society and the civilian population of which women are a part. It came out strongly that conflict occurs in society because of the structures in society and the relations of different groups in society with these structures. A common stand point that emerged in the literature is the strong recognition that conflicts, no matter the type impact negatively and differently on women. As a result, their concerns and priorities for the rebuilding process are equally diverse.

The review also suggested that as victims of conflict, with specific interests and concerns to be addressed at peace negotiations, women are neglected when peace negotiations are being conducted at the aftermath of conflicts. In this light, a common challenge reflected is the crucial issue of increasing women's access to political power, political decision-making and during peace negotiations.

The review has also revealed that peace should be understood as a process that deals with building relationships. As a result, several activities and roles from all areas and levels of society should be considered. The bulk of the literature mentioned the need to take into consideration the consent of the conflicting parties and the local population when discussing and planning peace-building initiatives. This study is useful in improving on the ongoing research, projects and programmes dealing with women and peace-building and post-conflict resolution. It has generated a body of information that could inform scholars and policy-makers on their scholarly work and policy interventions respectively.

1.10 Hypothesis

The following assumptions guided the work of the study:

1. Women's active involvement in peace-building initiatives contribute to conflict resolution and the restoration of peace.
2. Having women in decision-making structures influence peace-building negotiations and agreements.

1.11 Conceptual Framework

By conceptual framework we mean "a set of conceptual glasses"⁷⁰ through which the problems and issues relating to women's peace-building should be examined and analyzed. The study was guided by the postulates of peace processes, how they come about, their purpose and their actors. According to Lederach,⁷¹ it is expected that peace processes will provide changes both in stopping the direct violence and addressing the structural issues they feel gave rise to the conflict in the first place.⁷² He expands his observation by stating that "peace processes have delivered a reduction of direct violence but have rarely attained the aspirations of desired structural change."⁷³

Peace processes begin when conflict that was already in progress culminates into violent conflict, followed by negotiations and peace agreements. Lederach gives a summary of the cycle of conflict to capture significant events that result into peace processes. He describes thus:

"First, situations move from latent status into open conflict and direct violence when people feel there is significant issue of justice and human or group rights

⁷⁰ M. Mwangi and N. Karuru, *Women's Land and Property Rights in Conflict Situation*, (Nairobi:CCR-WLEA Publications, 1998).

⁷¹ J.P. Lederach, 'Just Peace –The Challenge of the 21st Century' in *People Building Peace: 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World*. (Utrecht: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999), p.31

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

that must change and which there exist few if any other avenues for achieving due recourse.”⁷⁴

When the conflict reaches the point of saturation, which to Lederach is the stage that “direct violence is added onto the existing latent structural violence,”⁷⁵ the process of re-evaluation of goals begins. At this stage people start thinking in terms of negotiation and redefinition of their relationship. This is the stage where they go to the negotiation table.

The process toward peace consists of both formal and informal process. Different actors make up both, and are better suited for either. In the formal process, foreign offices, ambassadors, special envoys, officials representing governments, political leaders and international organizations are better. The formal process is also referred to as Tract One which Havermans argues “is more powerful and affluent, but in many ways more restricted in its scope.”⁷⁶ In the informal process, peace efforts are carried out by unofficial non-governmental organizations, groups and individuals who specialize in conflict management. The informal process which is Tract Two “perceives its role as being part of a process of developing mutual understanding between larger groups of people.”⁷⁷ He cites the US diplomat John McDonald’s point of view, that the informal process “helps participants arrest the dehumanization process, overcome psychological barriers, focus on relationship building, and reframe the conflict as shared problem that can be resolved collaboratively.”⁷⁸

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ J. Havermans, ‘Power and Peace’ in *People Building Peace: 35 Inspiring stories from Around the World*. (Utrecht: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999), p.135

⁷⁷ Ibid., ‘Private Professionals for Peace Ibid, p.166

⁷⁸ Ibid.

Both processes need to complement each other as has been articulated again by Havermans.⁷⁹ He states that the impact of Tract One can be enhanced enormously when its efforts coincide with complementary initiatives taken by Tract Two or other non-official tracks of diplomacy. He cites the case of the signing of the ban on landmines in 1998, which was as a result of a successful campaign by international non-governmental organizations, of which Tract One played a key role to “anchor the agreement and supervise its implementation.”⁸⁰

Women can contribute much in the informal processes among other actors like non-governmental organizations, churches, arts, sports just to name but a few. Surely also, whether women participate in the formal processes depend on whether they are part of the formal set up stated above. Whether they are not is a separate question which rather goes beyond the scope of this study. Speaking on the peace negotiations in Israel, Sharoni states:

Among the more general points I addressed were the exclusion of women from the negotiation table and how ironic it was that high-ranking Israeli generals, who spent a good portion of their lives waging war, have now become the ultimate voices of authority of peace while the perspectives and experiences of women peace activists have been rendered trivial.⁸¹

The cases of Burundi and Somalia are different from that of Israel. At an earlier peace conference in Mogadishu, the Somali women were invited. At the beginning of the peace talks in Arusha, Burundi women were granted temporary observer status. This meant that, they did not have enough access to influence the discussions held on their future. The situation changed later during which the women participated in the peace

⁷⁹ Ibid., p.135

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ S. Sharoni, *Gender and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Politics of Women's Resistance*, Syracuse, (New York, Syracuse University Press, 1995).

talks and initiatives for their respective countries. The outcome was fruitful as has been demonstrated in the particular chapters of this study.

1.12 Methodology and Data Collection

Secondary and primary data was used in this study.

1.12.1 Secondary Data Collection

Secondary data included the use of library materials, including published and unpublished books, newspapers, scholarly journals, magazines, articles, press releases, conferences proceedings, reports, and the internet. All these were carefully reviewed and analyzed accordingly.

1.12.2 Primary Data Collection

Primary sources of data included the interviewing of the women who were participants of the Arusha Peace Talks and the Arta Peace Conference respectively. Senior officials of United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation who were instrumental in bringing the Burundi women together at the All-Party Burundi Women's Conference in Arusha were also interviewed. Discussions were held with people who are knowledgeable and are familiar with the issues related to the study. For instance the Office of the United Nations Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region and the United Nations Political Office for Somalia were contacted to gather information on the peace initiatives for these countries.

1.13 Chapter Outline

The study is organized into six chapters. Chapter One is the introduction. Chapter Two provided reflections on the theoretical framework within which the study falls. Chapter Three examined the background to the conflicts in Burundi and women's

involvement. Chapter Four equally examined the background to the conflict in Somalia and women's involvement. Chapter Five provided a critical analysis on the role the women of Burundi and Somalia have played in their peace-building efforts. Chapter Six contains the conclusion of the study.

Chapter 2

2.1 Theoretical Issues and Frameworks of the Study

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the frameworks within which this study falls. This discussion will begin by examining the demarcation that exists in the different theoretical propositions of the paradigms of conflict. It will compare the strategist, the conflict researcher, and the peace researcher paradigms before examining what agenda they contain from women. A theoretical appreciation which will consider key issues of peace processes will be provided. In particular, the following issues will be deliberated upon: the purpose of peace process; the structure of peace process; participation in peace process (during which women's participation will be looked at); ownership of peace process and implementation of peace process. This will be followed by an examination of the Burundi and Somalia peace processes.

2.2 The Strategist

As the first paradigm in this discussion, we have the strategist school of thought which is "seen exclusively within the framework of power politics and the manipulation of threat systems."¹ In other words, the strategist is of the opinion that conflict is caused by the struggle for power and domination and how that power can be manipulated to establish the most dominant state within the world system.

This view is forcefully linked to realism in international relations whose father – Hans Morgenthau states that:

"it is sufficient to state that the struggled for power is universal in time and space and is an undeniable fact of experience...The drives to live, to propagate and dominate

¹ A.J.R. Groom, 'Paradigms in Conflict: the Strategist, the Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher,' in J.Burton & F. Dukes (eds) *Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution* (London: Macmillan, 1990), p.71

are common to all men...The tendency to dominate, in particular, is an element of all human associations.”²

Because the relation between two states is based on coesion or power, peace can only be maintained when there is a balance of power. Threats are always applied to preserve and/or change the status quo. According to Groom “if the drive to dominate cannot be eliminated, as it is instinctive, it can only be channeled into tolerable forms by the threat of sanctions.”³ This old tradition of power politics and state-centric phenomenon has now been affected by current trend in world politics. The increase in civil wars which are now inter and intra-state as well as changes in warfare have impacted the balance of power. As a result, the strategist has moved ahead to “consider concepts such as relative deprivation, status disequilibrium and structural violence,”⁴ which is a strategy to accommodate both intra and inter-state relations. In all, the strategist apply the above concepts with the bottom line aim to dominate and maintain power.

He believes that conflict can only be managed by the use of negotiation and ratification. This means after a peace process that results into a peace accord being signed, ratification of the peace accord by member states would enable peace to be restored at least in a post-conflict situation. Because strategists are “too pro-status quo and they are not peace oriented”, it is clear that their approach to have a “vrai-semblance” of peace is in the long run to consolidate their power in all decision-making structures.

² H. J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Alfred A. Knorpf, 1959), p.30-31

³ A.J.R. Groom, ‘Paradigms in Conflict: the Strategist, the Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher,’ in J.Burton & F. Dukes (eds) *Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution* op.cit., p.83

⁴ Ibid.

2.3 The Conflict Researcher

The conceptual operation of the conflict researcher is encoed in the world society paradigm which “provides a critique of the very essence of power politics”.⁵ Confining the analysis to one level, such as the inter-state, is too constraining and so is a limitation to one facet of behaviors, be it economic, legal, sociological, or political”.⁶ The paradigm is based on non-partisanship as an important element in conflict resolution.

The conflict researcher rejects the argument that conflict occurs because of an embedded instinct in man to dominate. To him conflict is caused by an actor’s perception of the environment. To Groom because conflictual behavior is “a learned behavior triggered by circumstance and to the extent that the environment can be manipulated, so can conflict behavior which is dysfunctional”.⁷

To the conflict researcher therefore, force is not the fundamental instrument to manipulate the environment and solve a social problem. When the management of conflict is based on power, there is a tendency for it to collapse. The goal of the conflict researcher is to look for options that will accommodate the goals and values of the conflicting parties. He therefore tries to create a supportive structure or a perfect mechanism through which all parties benefit. Burton has stated this clearly when he states thus:

“where there are important values at issue, as distinct from negotiable interests, the use of coercion or pressure in any form, to force an apponent party to compromise is likely to be dysfunctional in that it will tend to promote protracted conflict, even after a settlement.

It is only in respect to interests – quantities, roles, advantages, privileges – that power bargaining has a role. Moreover, it needs to be noted that in power bargaining situation... what appear on the surface to be interests frequently are a

⁵ J.W. Burton, *Dear Survivors* (Massachusetts, Frances Printer, 1982), p.54

⁶ A.J.R Groom. *Opcit.*, p.76

⁷ *Ibid.*, p.86

manifestation of some basic fears and values that have not, because of the requirements of bargaining, been admitted, perceived or defined.”⁸

The key goal therefore of the conflict researcher is to encourage the parties to the conflict to have a proper understanding of the sources of conflict before resolving it by using the problem solving workshop mechanism. This mechanism is made up of participants who are principals or influential. Influential are “people who have some influence within the community and even with the leadership.”⁹

2.4 The Peace Researcher

The conceptual operation of the peace researcher is associated with the structuralist paradigm in international relations.

“Structuralists assume that human behaviour cannot be understood simply by examining individual motivation and intention because, when aggregated, human behaviour precipitates structures of which the individuals may be unaware. By analogy, when people walk across a field, they may unintentionally create a path. Others subsequently follow the path and in doing so “reproduce” the path. The process of reproduction, however, is neither conscious nor intentional.”¹⁰

Based on the structuralist perspective, the peace researcher is interested in “the deep rooted structure” which gives rise to conflict within societies. This calls to mind the issue of structural violence which according to Groom “connotes a situation in which overt violence is absent but in which structural factors have virtually the same compelling control over behavior as the advent threat or use of force”.¹¹ More details on the notion of structural violence have been provided in Chapter One. Nevertheless, structural violence is made manifest in society when actors or different groups of people, in society

⁸ J.W. Burton, “The Means of Agreement: Power or Values?” (Washington, D.C., March 1985), p.23

⁹ H.C. Kelman, ‘Interactive Problem-Solving: A Social-Psychological Approach to Conflict Resolution’ in J. Burton & F. Dukes (eds), *Conflict: Readings in Management Resolution* (London: Macmillan, 1990). Pp.199-215

¹⁰ R. Little, “Structuralism and Neo-Realism,” in Light and Groom (eds), *International Relations*: 76

are constrained by structural constraints, from developing its talents or interests in a normal manner.” An outstanding example put forward by Groom, and which falls within the scope of this study is “the role of women” among others like class, race and religious discrimination.

To the peace researcher then, when incompatible interests in society are built into a structure, these give rise to conflict. Hence resolving conflict will require that the structures of the society are changed. Of course, the process of effecting such change is not easy. To precipitate the process of effecting structural change, the peace researcher takes the role of supporting the under-dogs in the struggle to change the power relationships between the top dogs and the underdogs so that the system breaks down, before he begins building a new structure. The peace researchers does this by using the principle of empowerment to “empower that party to overthrow the oppressive structures that benefit the top dogs and thus to enhance the cause of social justice”.¹²

Having examined the three paradigms and their propositions, women’s agenda can comfortably fall within the peace researcher, and the conflict researcher approaches the former approach as discussed above deals with structures that hamper the interests of different actors and groups in society. As a class in society, women’s role have been marginalized in decision-making structures in society. They therefore need, if there is any such representation, more of it in these structures – economic, political, social, legal, religious psychological etc. in order to reduce the inequalities that exist in the different sectors.

¹¹ A.J.R. Groom, ‘Paradigms in Conflict: the Strategist, the Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher,’ in J.Burton &F. Dukes (eds) *Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution*, op.cit., p.92

¹² Ibid., p.95

That is why the peace researcher approach suggests that the under-dog – which in this case being women should be empowered to address conflict. According Mwagiru, empowerment is based on the idea that where two actors have a conflict, the stronger of the two would not be willing to enter into negotiations or any other peaceful method of resolving the conflict, precisely because it is in a position of greater strength and power.¹³

The latter approach is “both non-judgmental, highly participatory for all the parties and seeks to impose no guidance in the form of a clear suggested outcome.”¹⁴

The conflict researcher is therefore not interested in empowering the parties, he/she seeks to disempower “to make the parties symmetrical.”¹⁵ This implies that the power of the stronger party is reduced to the extent that there is some degree of balance. The end result of empowerment and disempowerment as argued by Mwagiru lead to a re-alignment of the power relations of both parties, making them more or less equal.¹⁶

These three different approaches or paradigms of conflict clearly show that there is a difference between the settlement and resolution of conflict. This brings us to another discussion relevant to this study – the issue of settlement and resolution of conflict.

2.5 Settlement of Conflict

Settlement of conflicts is informed by the idea that, given the anarchical nature of society, and the role of power in relationships, “settlement merely re-adjusts and regulates conflict relationships”.¹⁷ With the discussion on the different paradigms of

¹³ M. Mwagiru, *Conflict, Theories, Processes and Institutions of Management*, op.cit., p.30

¹⁴ A.J.R. Groom, ‘Paradigms in Conflict: the Strategist, the Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher,’ in J.Burton &F. Dukes (eds) *Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution* op.cit., p.95

¹⁵ A.J.R. Groom and Keith Webb, “Injustice, Empowerment and facilitation in Conflict,” in *International Interaction*, Vol.13, No.3 1987

¹⁶ M.Mwagiru, *Conflict, Theories, Processes and Institutions of Management*, op.cit., p.30

¹⁷ Ibid., p.39-40

conflict provided above, conflict settlement process and outcome is defined by the power possessed by the conflicting parties. When the existing power relationships between the parties is unequal, the weaker party usually have no choice but to accept the outcome because it has no power and strong position to contest it.

A conflict settlement process is also informed by the aspect of bargaining. In this context, bargaining demonstrates the “wills and power” of the parties. That is, their ability to bargain a better deal for itself. The question of whose power is dominant is crucial here. In Burundi, the power rivalry between 19 political parties clearly illustrates this. The power relationships among and within the political parties themselves have always thwarted all settlement efforts in the past. Because each conflicting party was not able to bargain a better deal for itself, cease-fire was far from being achieved. The same situation applies to the Somalia case. The different power relationships between the political parties, and the warlords of different clans and sub-clans always aggravated the conflict which ended up sabotaging all plans made for settlement. This goes to support the fact that settlement and outcome based on power and bargaining “is at best tenuous and cannot endure.”¹⁸

2.6 Resolution of Conflict

While settlement of conflict is based on power relationships, bargaining processes, and “within the win-lose framework, where the more powerful party predominates,”¹⁹ resolution of conflict rejects both power and bargaining processes and views the structure as a win-win one. The fundamental goal of the resolution of conflict

¹⁸ Ibid., p.41

¹⁹ M Mwangiru, “Conflict and Peace Management in the Horn of Africa: Theoretical and Practical Perspectives” paper at the International Conference Resource Group Conference, Mombasa, Kenya, 1996, p.5

is based on post-conflict relationship which is based on the belief that at the bottom of every conflict, are certain needs which are not negotiable.”²⁰ When these needs are not fulfilled, conflict is inevitable. Hence “conflict management should aim at identifying ways in which these needs can be fulfilled for both parties”.²¹ The primary stand point of resolution is the availability of these needs. Since these needs “are not in short supply”, the needs of each conflicting party can comfortably be satisfied without affecting the other party. Therefore, the mutual satisfaction of the parties’ needs is the central goal within the structure of conflict resolution. According to Mwangi,

“In the process of conflict resolution, the parties analyze their conflict, and make adjustments to their relationship. The goal is for the parties to re-perceive and redefine their relationship. This leads to the creation of a new set of values between them which they can pursue in a non-coercive and mutually self-sustaining way.”²²

Since the outcome of resolution is void of power and coercion, it is enduring as it addresses the basic causes of the conflict between the parties. Wolfgang is of the same view. In the same vein like Mwangi, he states that the aim of conflict resolution is to “stop violent confrontation and reducing the overt expression of conflict.”²³ One significant way through which conflict management is carried out is through problem solving workshops —this is an occasion which brings together the conflicting parties to analyze the causes of their conflict and “develop structures for the post-conflict relationship.”²⁴

With this informed background of the differences between the conflict management processes of settlement and resolution, a further dimension to this

²⁰ J. Burton (ed) *Conflict Human Needs Theory* (London: Macmillan, 1990)

²¹ M.Mwangi, *Conflict, Theories, Processes and Institutions of Management*, op.cit., p.41

²² Ibid., p.42

²³ H. Wolfgang, *Building Peace Experiences of Collaborative Peace-building in Somalia 1993-1996* (Life and Peace Institute, Uppsala, 1997), p.4

²⁴ Ibid.

discussion will consider how these processes relate to the conflict situation in Burundi and Somalia.

2.7 Theoretical Appreciation of Peace Process

2.7.1 Purpose of Peace Process

Although each conflict situation is unique in its own right, marked by its own history and influenced by its own actors, there are common aspects that one can reflect and learn from different conflict experiences, particularly in the area of peace process. Peace within the field of conflict is to stop the violence, “to still the gunfire that kills innocent children and brings immense sadness to families and communities.”²⁵ Nevertheless, for peace to endure, social change is a precondition. This change can only come via a peaceful process “that transforms situations characterized by violence and fear into opportunities for social justice, participative democracy and reconciliation to take root and thrive.”²⁶

Relationships are crucial in the building of peace. It is almost impossible to begin debates on peace without first mending the relationships that were broken during conflict. These relationships include those between the conflicting parties, between men and women. Since all of these actors had a stake in the conflict, they need to be included in negotiation processes. Commenting on peace accords, Lederach is of the view that:

Peace accords are often seen as a culminating point of a peace process. In the language of governments and the military, the accords are referred to as an end scenario...In reality, the accords are nothing more than opening a door into a whole new labyrinth of rooms that invite us to continue in the process of redefining our relationships.²⁷

²⁵ E. Garcia, “People’s Participation in Peace Processes: Reflecting on Selected Experiences from Asia, Africa and Latin America” in <http://www.dse.de/ef/disarm/garcia.htm>

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ J.P.Lederach, ‘Just Peace-the Challenge of the 21st Century,’ from *People Building Peace*, op.cit.

This is because, as proposed by Iklé, negotiation is a process in which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realization of a common interest where conflicting interests are present. It is the confrontation of explicit proposals that distinguishes negotiation from tacit bargaining and other forms of conflict behaviour.²⁸

As the beginning of formal negotiations, peace processes do not result to instant peace. According to Stedman²⁹, violence and threats of violence continues to effect the scope, pace and agenda of talks. In most cases, political violence prevails and it is used as a means by “spoilers” to derail the peace process or sabotage it completely. Sisk explains that: “what happens in the street is continuing military engagements, death, squad activity, terrorist bombings, assassinations, deadly riots and faction fighting.”³⁰

Sharing his thought on peace process, Ambassador Jean Arnault, the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Representative to Burundi said “ the process of peace not only involves silence ‘des armes’ but a project ‘de société’ which could provide a common roof to the different sectors of society: indigenous peoples and ladinos, farmers and landowners, civilians and military.”³¹ Lederach observes a language problem when analyzing the idea of a peace process. According to him, “process paints the image that peace is dynamic and ongoing, that leads to no substantive outcome.” He argues that peace is not a process and peace is not a structure. Peace is both a process and structure which means in other word that, peace process is a process that is based on specific

²⁸ F.C. Iklé, *How States Negotiate* (Harper and Row, New York, 1964).

²⁹ S.J. Stedman, “Spoilers in International Peace Processes” *International Security*, 1997.

³⁰ T.D. Sisk, “Peacemaking Processes: Preventing Recurring Violence in Ethnic Conflicts” <http://www.ccpdc.org/pubs/zart/chp.4.htm>

³¹ Ibid.

procedures or has a structure that it follows to attain its goals – to reach a settlement. The structure is summarized below.

2.7.2 The Structure of Peace Process

2.7.2.1 Pre-negotiation Phase

Parties in a conflict begin to think or contemplate to go to the negotiating table when they perceive a common deadlock in the fighting. This is the period when they have been convinced that neither party will win and that if fighting were to continue, it will have a serious socio-politico-economic, military and other implications in cost. Pre-negotiation centres on designing a framework within which issues identified as problems of the conflict have to be defined and addressed. The pre-negotiation process deals with defining the agenda. The agenda includes:

“agreeing on the basic rules and procedures; participation in the process and methods of representation; dealing with preconditions for negotiation and barriers to dialogue; creating a level playing-field for the parties; resourcing the negotiations; the form of negotiations, venue and location; communication and information exchange; discussing and agreeing upon some broad principles with regards to outcomes; managing the proceedings; timeframes; process tools to facilitate negotiations and break deadlocks the possible assistance of a third party.”³²

It is very important to take into consideration the internal and regional environment within which the conflicting parties are trying to negotiate an agreement. Inside the country for example, issues such as personal and economic security are important. If this is not guaranteed, serious questioning on whether the peace process should continue or whether it is necessary will emanate. In the region, it has to be established whether neighbouring countries are willing to support the process. If the region is characterized by

³² D. Bloomfield, C. Nupen and P. Harris, “Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Negotiation Processes” http://www.idea.int/publications/democ...ep_rooted_conflict/ebook_chapter3.htm

conflict like is the case of Burundi and Somalia, the peace process would be destabilized and it will be very difficult indeed to reach a durable and implementable agreement.

2.7.2.2 Negotiation Phase

Equally important, the negotiation stage has clearly defined procedures. Participants to the negotiations and methods of representation have to be spelt out. Participation is crucial and has always been problematic in several peace processes. For instance in the Burundi Peace Process, the issue of which political parties could participate in the talks sabotaged the first round of talks. In Somalia the same issue sabotaged thirteen attempts to peace talks. Participants “who carry out negotiations must possess – and be seen by the opposition to have – adequate power and authority mandated to them from their own side.”³³ The negotiation stage is part of a continuum – this is the stage where actual debates are held on the deep-seated needs that underpin the issues and demands expressed by the conflicting parties. Iklé defines negotiation as:

“a process in which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realization of a common interest where conflicting interests are present. It is the confrontation of explicit proposals that distinguishes negotiation from tacit bargaining and other forms of conflict behaviour.”³⁴

2.7.2.3 The Post- Negotiation Phase

The post-negotiation stage in the peace process is the consolidation stage which is very crucial at the end of the peace – when an outcome has been reached. It is a very challenging stage which requires the selling of the peace agreement negotiated to the

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ F. C. Iklé, *How Nations Negotiate* op.cit., p.131

constituents. Mwangi is of the opinion that in order to avoid problems of re-entry, consultations should go on continually throughout the negotiations.³⁵

2.7.3 Participation in Peace Process

Participation in peace processes remains a major concern difficult to resolve. Not only are there several parties and opinions in a particular conflict, there are also internal issues within the political parties that cause problems of participation. Within the scope of this study the focus will be on women's participation.

2.7.3.1 Women's Participation in Peace Processes

Generally, a peace process is designed to articulate mutual gain approach to bargaining. This means that all parties to the conflict should benefit from the outcomes. It aims at providing solutions, which are beneficial to all parties. In this regard, women's main concerns in relation to post-war political negotiations and reconstruction revolves around their participation in the negotiation process, recognition and protection of their rights and interests in the emerging political system. In the same line, Moore says:

“time and time again, a pattern has emerged where women play a significant role during the armed struggle, but once the revolutionary government is installed, women's needs and interests fade from the political agenda, and the political rhetoric fails to give rise to active programs for women's emancipation.”³⁶

All situations of conflict affect the most vulnerable members of the society such as social groups – small ethnic minorities, and the local peoples. Most of the recorded information on impact of conflict show that civilians in general and women and children in particular are the most hit. This gives a clear reason to make the issue of women's participation a significant element in peace processes and peace-building. Their participation brings

³⁵ M Mwangi, *Theories, Processes and institutions of Management*, op.cit, p.41

³⁶ H. Moore, *Feminism and Anthropology*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1988

about significant contribution to conflict. Their positive contribution can be recorded in the area of conflict prevention, peace negotiations and post conflict reconstruction. It is also argued that when women's perspectives are incorporated into the political process, politics will be "more reflective of the society with which it deals and less biased toward the perspectives and behaviours of only one segment".³⁷

In designing the peace structure therefore, in the three major phases of peace process (pre-negotiation, negotiation and post-negotiation, also known as the implementation phase), all constituencies have to be identified so as to maximize their participation. If this is done, women's interests will be heard during the negotiation and implementation stages. The issue of women's participation and inclusion in peace processes is significant. It has been stated that "women should be included around the negotiating table because their experiences, values and priorities, as women, can bring a perspective that can help find a solution to the conflict."³⁸ Aderlini agrees with this point of view when she states that "participation at the peace table can offer women the opportunity to secure political gains on wide range of issues that are related to the advancement of women's rights and gender equality."³⁹ These political gains she says include "economic security, social development and political participation."⁴⁰ Therefore, engendering peace processes is a significant issue that needs to be considered.

2.7.4 Ownership of Peace Process

Unless a peace process becomes more acceptable in its totality, the process will face a hindrance in achieving the goals set for it. If the process is not an inclusive one,

³⁷ D. R. Marshall, *Women in War and Peace: Grassroots Peace-building*, op.cit.

³⁸ Harris and Reilly, op.cit.

³⁹ UNIFEM, *Women at the Peace Table: Making a Difference*, op.cit., p.7

⁴⁰ Ibid.

where all interested parties feel involved in it, feel they have been heard and their views accepted and respected and that “the process has permitted them to make a contribution to the ultimate settlement, they are far more motivated to put subsequent effort into making that settlement work.”⁴¹ On the other hand when a group feels excluded from the process, the group will more likely challenge the legitimacy of the settlement and oppose efforts to its implementation.

Ed Garcia supports the same line of thought when he states that “at the heart of every peace process is people – local people who live and suffer through conflicts.”⁴² No peace process can survive or thrive unless the people themselves make it to happen, and make it work – often, under the most difficult conditions. Therefore it is significant to consider people’s ownership of processes as a core ingredient when designing and planning negotiating panels. Hence “putting people at the heart of peace processes is a major challenge.”⁴³ As members of the society, women should be part of the group that should own and benefit from the negotiated peace.

2.7.5 Implementation of Peace Process

Writing on *Implementing Peace Agreements*, Stedman defines peace implementation as “the process of carrying out a specific agreement. He argues that the issue of implementation “focuses on the narrow relatively short-term efforts to get warring parties to comply with their written commitments to peace.”⁴⁴ He reinforces his argument by stating that the success of implementation is measured in relation to the

⁴¹ D. Bloomfield, C. Nupen and P. Harris, “Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Negotiation Processes” op.cit

⁴² Ed Garcia, “People’s Participation in Peace Processes: Reflecting on Selected Experiences from Asia, Africa and Latin America” <http://www.dse.de/ef/disarmnt/garcia.htm>

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ S.J. Stedman, *Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars: Lessons and Recommendations for Policy-Makers*, (New York: International Peace Academy, 2001),p.7

conclusion of the war on a self-enforcing basis: when the outsiders leave, do the former warring parties refrain from returning to war?

He sees implementation to be the link between mediation and peace building. To him, while measures of peace implementation are narrower, (which renders the possibility of attaining peace implementation within a short period of time) the indicators of peace building are broad because it contains “the basket of goods (e.g. the amelioration of root causes of conflict, and the promotion of justice, positive peace, harmony, and reconciliation of enemies), are but broader than the accomplishment of specific, mandated tasks.”⁴⁵ In this analysis, he identifies a number of issues, which hinder the implementation of peace agreement. Some of them are: difficulty of the environment, the pressure of valuable spoilers, lack of resources, the regional powers’ interests, lack of strategic and coherence and implementation. Stedman’s analysis demonstrates how complex and challenging is the issue of implementing a peace agreement. Selling a peace agreement to the constituents requires all heads put together.

2.8 The Burundi Peace Process

The Burundi Peace Process began in June 1998 after which the country had been plunged into severe crisis following the assassination of its first democratically elected president – Mechior Ndadaye on 21 October 1993. The conflicting parties as well as outsiders had perceived a “hurting stalemate”, “a sterile situation, which by definition precludes any opportunities for change or progress.”⁴⁶ As a result, the Organization of African Unity and the international community called upon the then President of Tanzania, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere to lead the Burundi Peace mission as facilitator.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

This was followed by a signed declaration of commitment by the political parties to the peace talks. After the signed declaration of commitment, the first round of talks officially began in Arusha. Participants included government delegates, members of the National Assembly and the 19 political parties of Burundi. However, the issue of who to participate in the talks derailed the talks. The need to be inclusive refers to both the different parties and to the different points of view within parties. Participation as core issue which forms a strong source of problem in peace processes, was equally a major issue in the Burundi Peace Process. At one stage, a decision was reached to grant observer status to civil society. However, after several consultations with participants, the second round of talks began with the setting up of five Committees to address the following five themes:

- “Committee I, The Nature of the Burundi Conflict, Problems of Genocide, and Exclusion and Solutions;
- Committee II, Democracy and Good Governance, which dealt with the electoral system, government, administration, parliament;
- Committee III, Peace and Security for All, on matters of security and the role of armed groups;
- Committee IV, Reconstruction and Development;
- Committee V, Guarantees on Implementation of the Agreements Emanating from the Peace Negotiations”⁴⁷

Upon the death of facilitator Julius Nyerere, former President Nelson Mandela of South Africa was chosen by the regional leaders as new facilitator. In his inaugural speech delivered in Arusha, Mandela “stressed that small parties should not be marginalized in the negotiation. But he also warned against divisive elements, saying parties should resolve their internal differences before coming to the negotiating table”.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ P. Harris and B. Reilly, ‘Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators’
http://www.idea.int/publications/democ...rooted_conflict/ebook_chapter3_12.html

⁴⁷ UNIFEM, *Engendering Peace: Reflections on the Burundi Peace Process* (UNIFEM: Nairobi, 2001), p.5

⁴⁸ “Burundi Peace Talks” www.horondelle.org

In a way, Mandela injected a new impetus into the talks which at the time of his appointment had almost reached a “grinding halt”.

Under his leadership, the talks progressed relatively despite some hitches. The international community was fully involved as well as other political parties and Hutu rebel groups. The strategy of inclusion was adopted by the facilitation team, which helped in precipitating the conclusions of the peace talks. After several rounds of talks and work from the five committees, and for over a period of two years, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi was signed in August 2000. An Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC) to monitor, ensure the effective implementation of all provisions of the agreement, give guidance to all activities of the commissions and sub-commissions had been established. By the time the study was being finalized, an agreement for a transitional government to last for the period of three years was signed although contested by some Burundians. Women were equally given a chance in the peace talk after a long struggle.⁴⁹

2.9 IGAD –led Somalia Peace Process (referred to as The Arta Peace Initiative)

Several initiatives and efforts to bring peace and reconciliation to Somalia have been going on for many years. Before the ground-breaking Arta Peace Initiative of the year 2000, peace efforts had moved from national to regions levels. To a greater extent, this was preferred because Somalis felt, “regional cooperation and regional coexistence, would possibly lead to a federal state based on several clan-based states.”⁵⁰ Following unsuccessful attempts by different bodies – the Arab League, the Organization of Africa Unity and the United Nations, to stop the fighting, “over twenty clans signed the Cairo

⁴⁹ See Chapter Three, section on Burundi Women and Conflict Management in Burundi

Declaration to establish a 13-person Council of Presidents, a Prime Minister, and National Assembly.”⁵¹ Despite the establishment of these institutions, the situation did not change. Instead clan leaders in the north-east proclaimed the formation of the Puntland state in 1998, which has not been regionally and internationally recognized as sovereign.

The Djibouti Peace Process which took place between the month of May to August 2000 marked the thirteenth peace efforts since the collapse of the Barre regime in 1991. The Peace Process focused on “civil society groups rather than on faction leaders.”⁵² Having passed through a traumatized period of war, and experiencing a hurting stalemate, and coupled with the fact that the prestige of the armed factions continued to decline, the Somali people welcome the peace initiative spearheaded by the Djibouti President, Ismail Omar Guelleh

In his address to the fifty-fourth Session of the United Nations General assembly in September 1999, H.E. Ismail, Omar Guelleh, presented several proposals for an alternative direction in the quest for peace and return to government of Somalia. As stated in his address: “the essential purpose of the peace process and conference is to re-establish the sovereign state of Somalia and initiate those steps necessary to realize a democratic government and administration under a framework which fairly with liberty and justice for all,”⁵³ while the specific objectives of the entire peace process were peace, legitimacy, reconstruction and government. The Somali National Peace Conference (SNPC) was officially launched on 2 May 2000 in Arta and has since referred to as the Arta Peace Conference. During its first phase, the conference was attended by traditional

⁵⁰ ‘Somalia: From Permanent Conflict to More Peacefulness’

<http://www.oneworld.org/euconflict/sfp/part2/156.htm>

⁵¹ “Rebirth of Somalia State” <http://www.peace.ca/somali-rebirth.htm>

⁵² UNHCHR 10 July 2002, para.5

and clan leaders from all over the country representing most of Somalia's clans. Furthermore, representatives of business interests, political factions and civil society participated in the deliberations leading to the adoption of an agenda for the second phase and a system of representation of Somalia's various clans. The "Somalia four major clans (Hawiye, Dir, Darod and Digil/Mirifle) were accorded 180 delegates each. Each clan allotted 20 seats for women. The alliance of minorities was accorded 20 seats (including 10 for women)."⁵⁴ Clan elders who participated in the first phase were allowed to participate as members of their clan delegations without voting rights. This wide clan participation gave the conference a much-needed legitimacy and anchored it on solid traditional structures. Nevertheless, it is significant to note that "despite the initial calls for the inclusion of civil society groups and these groups' euphoric advocacy for the peace initiative, the delegates agreed to make clan affiliation the sole basis of participation in the conference."⁵⁵

The second phase of the SNPC began on 17 June 2000 with six thematic committees adopted: "Charter Committee, Economic and Social Affairs Committee, Education Committee, Security Committee, the Special Status of Mogadishu Committee and the Agriculture and Fisheries Committee."⁵⁶ After a month of deliberations in the respective committees and plenary sessions, "the conference adopted a National Transitional Charter, a form of constitution for a three-year transitional period to be followed by general elections."⁵⁷

⁵³ Speech by H.E. Ismail Omar Guelleh at the 54th session of the General Assembly, New York, September 1999.

⁵⁴ Excerpts on the Arta Peace Conference from the United Nations Political Office of Somalia.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ "Somali National Peace Conference: Peace Plan" <http://www.banadir.com/whatisthere.htm>

⁵⁷ Ibid.

In August 2000, a Transitional National Assembly (TNA), of 225 members was elected on the basis of clan nomination and quota with Mr. Abdalla Deerow Issaq elected as Speaker of the TNA. On 26 August the TNA elected Mr. Abdikassim Salad Hassan as President out of 16 finalists. Between September and November 2000,

“the newly elected President visited several countries and participated in various regional and international events including a ministerial meeting of the League of Arab States, the millennium summit and the UN General Assembly meeting, the summit of the League of Arab States, the summit conference of the Organization of Islamic Conference and the IGAD summit. In October, he appointed Mr. Ali Khali Galaydh as Prime Minister. The latter appointed an all-male cabinet of 22 Ministers representing all major clans. Subsequently, he appointed 45 assistant ministers, five ministers of state and a governor for the Banadir region. Of these, four were women. The Transitional National Government (TNG) and the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) moved into Mogadishu in October and continue to discharge their functions from there.”⁵⁸

Despite the apparent success of the SNPC, it remains uncertain as some important political forces inside Somalia have refused to recognize the TNG and remain opposed to it. These forces comprise the government of the breakaway self-styled “Republic of Somaliland,” the administration of Northeastern Somalia (Puntland), the Rehenwiyne Resistance Army’s (RRA) leader, Shatigudud (with strong support from some segments of the RRA power-base, the Digil/Mirifle) and the various Mogadishu-based warlords (including Hussein Aideed, Musa Sudi Yalahow, and Osmal Ali Atto). Externally, Ethiopia, Somalia’s stronger neighbor, who initially welcomed the TNG’s formation, reportedly opposes it today and backs factions challenging its authority.

Participation and representation was inclusive of all legitimate group of Somalis (elders, religious groups, the business community, women and intellectuals, and the civil

⁵⁸ Excerpts form the Arta peace Conference, op.cit

society) unlike previous initiatives which focused on “power sharing among faction leaders, based upon clan hegemony.”⁵⁹

The process was divided into two phases- the elders’ conference which took place between the month of May and mid-June and the political conference which convened and finally elected a Transitional National Assembly. The conference had clan leaders participation from most of the clans. Of the six major clans, four participated in the conference. When the conference ended in August 2000, it took a period of almost three weeks to elect a Transitional National Government who is headed by President elect Abdul Kassim Salat Hassan and a clan-based 245 member parliament.⁶⁰ However, this government is not supported by Mogadishu warlords and Somaliland and Puntland leaders.

⁵⁹ ‘Somalia National Peace Conference’ <http://www.banadir.com> whatisthere.htm

⁶⁰ International Federation of the Red Cross, “Somalia: Humanitarian Assistance Appeal N0.01.11/2000 Situation Report N0.2, 18 October, 2000,

Chapter 3

3.1 Background to the Conflict in Burundi

3.1.1 An Overview of the State of Burundi

This chapter begins by first providing a brief history and geography on the country. Secondly, it looks at the different levels of conflict in Burundi, their causes, actors and issues. Thirdly it provides a discussion of how these conflicts have been managed and whether this has been successful or not. Fourthly, it will look at women's participation in the conflict and their role in the management of these conflicts.

3.1.2 Geography and People

Burundi¹ is a mountainous country geographically located in Central Africa, half way between Cape Town and Cairo, with Bujumbura as its capital. It is a small landlocked country in the heart of the African continent and currently among the ten poorest nations of the world. It is bordered by Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda. It occupies an area of 27,830 sq. kms. As of June 2000, the population was estimated at 6.2 million inhabitants, with three major ethnic groups - Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. The country has an estimated annual growth rate of 3.54%. In sub-saharan Africa, Burundi has the second-largest population density and most of the inhabitants live in farm houses which have been built near areas with fertile soil. The major religions of the country are Roman Catholics comprising 62 per cent, Protestants 5 per cent, traditional beliefs 32 per cent and Muslims 1 per cent. The main languages spoken country-wide are Kirundi, French, Kiswahili and English. Kirundi and French are official languages, but Kirundi is the common language spoken by all.

¹U.S. Department of State, *Background Notes: Burundi Bureau of African Affairs*, August 2000. http://www.state.gov/www/background-notes/burundi_0008_bgn.html

3.1.3 Government and Political System

Burundi obtained independence from Belgium on 1 July, 1962 and it has a republic type of government with power vested on the executive, transitional government (de facto military regime). It has a multi-party system which was introduced in 1998.

The frontline political parties are FRODEBU (the Front for Democracy in Burundi) dominated by Hutus with very few Tutsis and UPRONA (The National Unity and Progress Party), which is the country's most political force, is dominated by Tutsis, with very few Hutus. Other political parties include PARENA (The Party for National Redress), ABASA (The Burundi African Alliance for the Salvation, Tutsi inclined) PRP (The People's Reconciliation Party), CNDD/FDD (The National Council for the Defense of Democracy/Front for the Defense of Democracy, consisting of two Hutu groups), PALIPEHUTU (The Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People) and FROLINA/FAP (The Front for the National Liberation of Burundi/Popular Armed Forces).

3.1.4 Economy

The economy of Burundi is agriculture-based which accounts for its GDP which was estimated at US\$4.1 billion in 1998. Nickel, Uranium, rare earth oxides, cobalt, copper, platinum are the country's major natural resources. The principal cash crop is coffee, which is supplemented by tea, sugar, cotton fabrics, oil, corn, sorghum, sweet potatoes, bananas, cassava, beef, milk, hides, and livestock feed. These are the agricultural and natural produces of the country which stood at 49.4 per cent of the GDP in 1998. Agriculture constitutes the main source of labour force in the country, which stands at 90 per cent with subsistence farmers being the majority. The agricultural sector made the country self-sufficient in food production but with the outbreak of the civil war,

magnified by overpopulation and soil erosion, the country has now become dependent on international humanitarian assistance with food importation which stood at 17 per cent in 1997.

The country is industrially weak as it only processes agricultural exports. Because of its distance from the sea, its industrial development has always been affected. One of its significant trading point is Lake Tanganyika. As is the case with most other African countries, Burundi depends highly on bilateral and multilateral aid. As of 1997, its external debt was estimated at US\$ 1.247 billion. Because of the cyclical conflicts that ensued in the country, several initiatives by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to reform the coffee industry and foreign exchange system, liberalize imports, diversify export were hampered and suspended.

3.1.5 Foreign Relations

Security issues in Burundi caused by the conflict have impacted severely on her relations with its neighbours. Several Burundian refugees have at different conflict periods migrated to Rwanda, Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Acts of insurgence by rebels have been masterminded from neighbouring countries. Its diplomatic relations with neighbouring countries went sour in 1993 when these regional states imposed an economic embargo on Burundi. However, these relations have improved since 1999 because of the progress made by the government of Burundi in advancing national reconciliation through the Burundi peace talks. Its relations with the United States of America (USA) are good as the USA is and still supports the Arusha Peace Process aimed at national reconciliation, the formation of a constitutional

government, the long-term security interests of the country while promoting a stable, democratic community.

3.1.6 The History of Burundi

As early as 1861 Leopold II, King of Belgium had written the following: “the sea bathes our coast, the world lies before us. Steam and electricity have annihilated distance. All the non-appropriated lands on the surface of the globe (mostly Africa) can become the field of our operations and our success.”² This is how the colonization of Burundi was prophesized and planned as was the case of many other African countries.

Around the 16th Century, Burundi was a Kingdom with a hierarchical political authority. 'Mwani' a king “with divine powers and symbol of national unity,”³ was the head of the indigenous head of the people and princely autocracy referred to as ‘Ganwa’ (families of the nobility with royal antecedents) which owned most of the land and required a tribute, or tax, from local farmers and herders". This royalty which was led by Tutsi consolidated power over land, production and distribution in the mid 18th Century. This subsequently led to the establishment of patron-client relationship in which the entire population received royal protection in exchange for tribute and land tenure. This meant that prior to these periods, the different ethnic groups lived together and were ruled by one King. They shared the same culture and a life that was crowned by cordial relationships - economic exchanges, cordial links between neighbours, inter-marriages and a general atmosphere of solidarity.

² R. Olivier and A. Atmore, *Africa Since 1880* (Cambridge University Press, 1994) p.103

³ R. Kay, ‘Burundi Since the Genocide’, in *The Minority rights Group*, 1972,N0.2 p.3

In 1899, Burundi came under German East African administration after which it was occupied by Belgian troops in 1916. After the end of the First World War, the League of Nations mandated Ruanda-Urundi territory which is present day Rwanda and Burundi to Belgium. Colonized by Belgium, the country was administered by indirect rule, which built on the Tutsi-dominated aristocratic hierarchy. At the end of the Second World War, Rwanda-Urundi became a United Nations Trust territory under the Belgian rule. By 1948, Belgium permitted multipartism in the country. This led to the emergence of two political parties - the Union for National progress (UPRONA) a multi-ethnic party which was led by Tutsi Prince Louis Rwagasore and the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) supported by Belgium. After a legislative election in 1961, in which UPRONA emerged victorious, Prince Rwagasore was assassinated.

On 1 July 1962, Burundi attained full independence from Belgium. Tutsi King Mwambutsa IV established a monarchy made up of equal representation of Hutus and Tutsis. In 1965, the Hutu Prime Minister, Pierre Ngendandumwe was assassinated. This is the year that a cycle of mounting violence began in Burundi.

“The bloody lessons of that time is richly instructive. First, they show clearly that certain Hutu leaders, attracted by the Rwandan model, had decided to take power on an ethnic basis. Second, it is quite clear that Tutsi politicians, in a security reflect that some of them made use of this for purposes of excluding Hutu, were keener and keener on monopolizing power by trying gradually to take control of the army services and exclude Hutu from the highest authorities in the country, the single UPRONA party and the administration.”⁴

This situation clearly showed that Tutsi politicians were strategizing to exclude Hutus from the decision-making structures of the country and from the administration. This culminated in hatred and distrust within the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups. This led to

⁴ R.Olivier and Atmore *Africa Since 1880*, op.cit., p.103

Hutu revolts and governmental repression. In 1966 King Mwambutsa was overthrown by his son, Prince Ntare IV, who in turn was dethroned by Capt. Michel Micombero. Capt. Micombero abolished the constitutional monarchy and declared a Burundi republic. From this political takeover, a military regime emerged.

“The ethnic violence reached its height when in April 1972, in a situation of social and political malaise characterized not only by ethnic division but also by regionalism, a Hutu rebellion spreading from Tanzania broke out in the south of Burundi. Tutsi – men, women, old people and children – were massacred. However violent the attack had been, the repression that followed on the part of an irresponsible Government that went too far was just as severe, affecting mainly the Hutu intellectual, military and social elite. The reprisals that followed on this civil war, which had affected a large part of the country, cost massive numbers of victims and caused massive floods of Hutu refugees to the neighboring countries.”⁵

As a result of an aborted Hutu rebellion in 1972, several Burundians left the country to neighbouring countries. This was followed by civil unrest and factional conflict which “continued to supply the inner-dynamics of Burundi politics in the post-monarchy years”.⁶

The social and political situation at the time was then characterized by ethnic divisions with the spread of a Hutu rebellion from Tanzania into the South of Burundi. Several people - men, women and old people were massacred. The holocaust of 1972 took the lives of “roughly 5per cent of the population, with perhaps 2000 Tutsi murdered by a simultaneous Hutu attacks in Bujumbura.”⁷

This unrest mounted and eventually led to a bloodless coup in 1976 which brought to power Colonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, as head of a Tutsi dominated military regime. He advocated for land reform, electoral reform and national reconciliation.

⁵ Ibid

⁶ M. Crowder, *The Cambridge History of Africa from 1940-1975*, (ed) (Cambridge University Press, 1975) Vol. 8, p.737

⁷ Ibid. p.738

Within a period of three years “his regime became very unpopular due to the deterioration of his human rights records.”⁸ He suppressed religious activities and detained political opposition members.

Because of increased resentment of his rule by the populace, he was overthrown by Major Pierre Buyoya in 1987, who dissolved opposition parties, suspended the promulgated constitution of 1981 and instituted his ruling Military Committee of National Salvation (CSMN). Tension increased between the ruling Tutsi and majority Hutus which resulted in violent confrontations between the army, the Hutu opposition and Tutsi hard-liners in 1988. These confrontations “led to the killing of 150,000 people with increased spill-off of refugees to neighbouring countries.”⁹

A commission of inquiry was set up by the Burundi Government to investigate the causes of the unrest. By 1991 a Constitution that had a president, non-ethnic government and a parliament was approved by Buyoya after which Mechior Ndadaye of the Hutu-dominated-FRODEBU party was elected as Burundi first President in 1993. He was later that year assassinated by factions of Tutsi-dominated armed forces. His assassination “plunged the country into a civil war which killed and displaced several people before the coming to power of Cyprien Ntayamira in January 1994.”¹⁰

Despite Ntayamira’s coming to power, the situation in the country became worse. Barely three months after his election, President Ntayamira and Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana were killed in a plane crash. Their deaths marked the beginning of the genocide in Rwanda, while it aggravated violence and unrest in Burundi.

⁸ R.Kay, ‘Burundi Since the Genocide’ op.cit. p.3

⁹ Good Governance and Conflict Management in Burundi, op.cit

¹⁰ Ibid

Upon Ntayamira's assassination, Sylvestine Ntibantunanya was installed as president for a four-year term. This did not change the situation in Burundi as "security declined, massive flow of refugees increased, the new government became more destabilized."¹¹ In a bloodless coup in 1996, former President Buyoya returned to power. Upon his return, he banned opposition groups, imposed a nation-wide curfew, suspended the National Assembly and declared himself as president of a transitional republic.

The coup was regionally condemned and as a means to demonstrate their grievances, on 31 July 1996 these countries (Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Zaire, Ethiopia, Zambia with support from the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations) "imposed economic sanctions on Burundi pending a return to a constitutional government."¹² In 1996, Buyoya liberalized political parties, in 1998 a transitional constitution was promulgated and partnership between the government and the opposition-led National Assembly was declared.

The economic sanctions were lifted, a regional initiative for negotiated peace in Burundi announced and the then President of Tanzania, late Julius Nyerere appointed as the facilitator. Upon his death in October 1999, former President Nelson Mandela of South Africa was appointed by regional leaders as facilitator of the Arusha peace process. Under his guidance, the peace process recorded significant progress with the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi in August 2000.¹³

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ See Chapter Two for more information on the Arusha Peace Talks.

3.2 The Causes, Actors and Issues of the Conflict in Burundi

According to Zartman's observation, "conflicts of interest and policy escalate into crises whose runaway dynamics dominate parties and bystanders elite".¹⁴ Since 1993, "inter-ethnic violence between 15 to 20 per cent Tutsi minority and the 80 to 85 per cent Hutu majority in Burundi has taken an estimated 150,000 lives".¹⁵ The violent conflict in Burundi is apparently different from most others elsewhere in the continent in the extent to which "elite led, politico-ethnic rivalry for power has become entwined with mass killing and fears of group extinction."¹⁶ At least 800,000 Burundians have lost their homes, including "approximately 250,000 refugees, 250,000 internally displaced persons, and 300,000 forced into official "regroupment camps".¹⁷

Generally, the conflict of Burundi is basically the issue of political interests - to accede power in public enterprises, the army, judicial system, and educational system. Hence reaffirming the opinion of many observers and conflict management analysts that the "at the root of the ethnic conflict is a political leadership ambitions to mobilize support by means of manufactured tribal hatreds."¹⁸ There are several inter-linked causes or dimensions of the conflict in Burundi. These are political, institutional, economic, psychological, socio-cultural and sub-regional. This chapter analyses each dimension in turn. With the seeds of ethnic crystallization sown in the pre-colonial and colonial periods, the post-colonial period had no alternative but to harvest what was sown 30 years after.

¹⁴ W. Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p.3

¹⁵ S.R. Weissman, *Preventing Genocide in Burundi: Lessons from International Diplomacy* (Washington: United States Institute of peace, 1998), p.2

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidm/mar.burundi.htm>

"After independence, and throughout the different regimes, there have been a number of constant phenomena that have given rise to the conflict that has persisted up to the present time: massive and deliberate killings; widespread violence and exclusion have taken place during this period".¹⁹

Political parties were formed along veiled lines of ethnic discrimination., for instance *Parti du Peuple (PP)*, *Parti de L'emancipation populaire (PEP)* and *L'Union pour la Promotion Hutu (UPROHUTU)*. The colonial master- the Belgians "helped the 'mwani' to increase his authority through measures of centralization, which ironically have facilitated the consolidation of power by UPRONA in the past decade."²⁰ Although the colonial master spearheaded the violence in Burundi, the elites of Burundi also had a major part to play. The political class had been craving to remain in power with the goal to continuously enjoying the benefits that accompany such power.

3.2.1 The Political Dimension

3.2.1.1 Pre-colonial Burundi

Pre-colonial Burundi did not know any ethnic conflicts. There is no recorded date at which a distinct group of Tutsis arrived Burundi and conquered a fixed body of Hutu people. The names represent categories based on occupation. Hutus were cultivators and Tutsis pastoralists."²¹ "All the ethnic Umwami", believed in the same god *Imana*, had the same culture and same language, Kirundi, and lived together in same territory". Social cohesion was enjoyed during this period as "large-scale ethnic killings do not seem to have occurred".²²

¹⁹ *Draft Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi*, (Arusha, July 2000)p.7

²⁰ R.Kay, 'Burundi Since the Genocide' op.cit

²¹ Ibid.

²² Mike Dravis, *Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi* <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidem/mar/burundi.htm>.

This issue of social cohesion has been forcefully argued by Rene Lemarchand who "rejects contention that the fundamental Tutsi-Hutu schism of today is the natural consequence of historical developments".²³ Hence the critical role played by aspiring Hutu and Tutsi politicians should be recognized in mobilizing ethnic identities. However, there were some traditional practices that embedded injustice and frustration among the Bahutu and the Batutsi and among the Batwa. These practices include among others "Ukunena, Ukivi hutura, Ubugeregwa, Ubugabire, Ukunyaga, Ukwanyagaza, Ugutanga ikimazi-muntu, Ugushorererwako irika".²⁴

3.1.1.2 Colonial Burundi

Colonial Burundi saw a reinforcement of these injustices and frustrations as colonial ideology and administration demonstrated that Burundi was made up of two different races - one being superior to the other. Colonial legacy brought about race hierarchy. German and Belgian rulers "considered the Tutsis to be born to rule and decided to administer the country indirectly using the power structure they had found in place". By using the principle of divide and rule, "the colonial administration injected and imposed a caricatured, racist vision of Burundi society, accompanied by prejudices and cliches which introduced an identity card which indicated ethnic origin".²⁵

This strategy of introducing the identity card to indicate ethnic origin "enabled the colonial master to accord specific treatment to each ethnic group in accordance with its theories".²⁶ In addition to the favours that were extended to the Tutsis by the colonial administration, was the doctrine propagated by Christian missionaries who preached that

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ *Draft Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi*, opcit., p.8

²⁶ Ibid.

the Tutsis descended "from the mythical biblical tribe of Ham in Ethiopia". This doctrine further justified Tutsi dominion over the Hutu, hence a pointer to the fact that the colonial masters were to a larger extent responsible for tribal identities among the Tutsis and Hutus.

3.1.1.3 Post-Colonial Burundi

The first four years after independence in Burundi were characterized by "overlapping conflicts between *ganwa* clans, the monarchy and its opponents, *ganwa* and anti-royalist Tutsi, regional Tutsi and Hima groupings".²⁷ In 1966 the First Republic was declared, which advocated and endorsed a single party system of government. As a result the National Unity Party (UPRONA) was the only party operational and its Secretary-General Michel Micombero became the President of the Republic and Head of State and Government. His regime was "authoritarian as he concentrated all power in his hands and governed the country along sectarian lines."²⁸ As a Tutsi elite, he opposed the formation of democratic institutions. Corruption and Nepotism was the order of the day. This aggravated ethnic division.

The situation spilled over into the Second Republic between 1976-1987. Freedom of expression and religion were challenged; "arbitrary arrests increased and incidents of exclusionary behavior on an ethnic, regional and class basis skyrocketed."²⁹ This led to the frustration of the population. As a result, Hutu extremist movements were established with the goal to counteract the situation.

²⁷ M. Crowder, op.cit, p.735

²⁸ L. Ndambagiye, op.cit

²⁹ N. Weisman, "Hutu and Tutsi of Rwanda and Burundi" Background Briefing: <http://www.backgroundbriefing.com/hututs.html>

The regime of the Third Republic in 1987 came in and tried to restore the confidence of the population. It gave equal number of cabinet positions to Hutus and Tutsis, more Hutus were recruited into the civil service, a national commission to study ethnic violence was established. It guaranteed fundamental rights and freedoms to the population which it however never provided. Molestation and killings continued, "the army began to play a key role on the political arena; the national unity clause contained in the Charter of National Unity which was approved by a referendum in 1991,"³⁰ the Constitution of 1992, the Political Parties Act and the Electoral code was breached of their substance. All these unorganized structures within institutions enhanced mistrust among citizens and increased violence in the country.

3.2.2 The Institutional Dimension

From the history of Burundi, it is evident that since Burundi gained independence in 1962, no democratic or political government has established adequate structures for conflict prevention and management for the last 40 years. This has been due to the fact that its institutional capacity has been devastated by war and polarized by "ethnic selectivity in key positions of government and civil society."³¹ The Constitution of 1962 "provided for a constitutional monarchy of the parliamentary type". The monarch reigned but failed to govern. He was not known to the people. Hence because of the absence of these structures, tensions and conflicts were exacerbated.

3.2.3 The Economic Dimension

As one of the dimensions of the underlying causes of the conflicts in Burundi, it is quite evident that Hutus and Tutsis held different positions in the economic structures of

³⁰ Good Governance and Conflict Management in Burundi, op.cit

the state. As the principal employer, the state is "viewed by a certain number of the elite as a cow ripe for milking, meeting all one's needs for power and economic survival".³² With this in mind, "competition to win power and manage the national cake by political leaders and elites increased."³³ In Burundi therefore, Tutsis believe that if they lose control of the government, "they will lose economic security as well."³⁴ Appointment to top government positions depended on personal relations or vote-catching instead of merit. This instead multiplied grudges and paved the way for ethnic, regional and inter-clan confrontation over scarce resources.

Within this economic dimension, the educational level of a citizen determined whether he/she would be appointed to hold a state post. In other words, without a formal training with a diploma or certificate, there was no hope to be appointed on a state post. This factor has also seriously contributed to the conflicts in Burundi.

Access to land is one of the factors of production on which most families depend on for survival, has been a key problem in Burundi. Because it is an agricultural country, land is a major asset craved for by citizens. Several politicians have been using the land issue for their political campaigns, while at the same time, instigating violence in the country.

3.2.4 The Psychological and Socio-Cultural dimension

The conflict in Burundi has a psychological factor which has been instigated by fear, manipulation, anger and emotions. The idea that the Hutus and Tutsis are completely different from one another has been internalized in the minds of the

¹¹ Richard Griggs, *The Great Lakes Conflict: Strategies for Building Long-Term Peace* (Centre for World Indigenous Studies, 1997) <http://www.cwis.org/burundi.html>.

¹² Good Governance and Conflict Management in Burundi, op.cit

¹³ Ibid.

Burundians. According to Jean-Pierre Chrétien, “les Tutsis étaient des européens noirs...les nobles du pays, fier avec tailles distingués et teints clairs”³⁵ (Tutsis were considered as black Europeans, the noble of the country, proud, physically well-built).³⁶ While the “les bahoutous sont des paysans noir de la race bantou, ils sont forts...avec leur grosses levres et nez écrasé, mis simple, si bon si fidèle.”³⁷ (Hutus were peasants from the bantu race, were physically strong, have thick lip, flat nose but they are kind and faithful).³⁸

The image of one ethnic group - Tutsi -murdering another -Hutu- cannot be over emphasized. The idea of dominance and that of arrogance all generated a psychological effect on the ethnic groups. One ethnic group looks at the other with fear and suspicion. This fear has been justified by the "blood fend between Hutu and Tutsi, which had its birth in the collective memory of cyclical violence which has taken a toll over the country since 1965." ³⁹ Each ethnic group claims to have monopoly on suffering and actually sees itself threatened by the other. These psychological effects have also been aggravated by the deterioration of the socio-cultural foundations of the country. The moral values of social harmony – “respect for life, respect for other people's property and rights, tolerance, a cult of justice and truth - have given way to antithetical values which are dangerously undermining the society.”⁴⁰

³⁴ M. Dravis, *Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi*, (<http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/burundi.htm>)

³⁵ J.P. Chrétien, *L'histoire retrouvée:25 ans de metier d'historien en Afrique* (Editions Karthala, Paris, 1993), pp321-322

³⁶ This is my own translation from the original French version.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ This is my own translation from the original French version

³⁹ M. Dravis, “*Hutu and Tutsi in Burund*”i op.cit, <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/burundi.htm>

⁴⁰ Ibid

3.2.5 The sub-regional dimension

The sub-regional dimension of the Burundi conflict is based on the Rwandan Revolution of 1959 which was supported the Belgian administration and the Catholic Church.

“The “Rwandan Revolution” had a major impact on the sub-region and on Burundi in particular. Although some Hutu leaders had been attracted by the Rwanda model, which would have allowed them to take power easily after the massacring the Tutsi, other Tutsi politicians, seeing the conditions in which the Rwandan Refugees were living, feared for their own political and /or physical survival and so developed their instinctive security reflex, relying on a policy of excluding the Hutu elite.”⁴¹

The Revolution caused the monarchy to be abolished, thousands of Tutsis were killed while several migrated to neighbouring countries. The impact of this revolution was equally severe on Burundi and on the sub-region as a whole. In Burundi, Tutsi politicians were scared of what had happened in Rwanda.

While the Tutsis in the sub-region were worried about the ideology of genocide, the Hutus were making plans on a Machiavellian project with the main purpose of setting up a Hima empire made up of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda with the goal of dominating the Bantu inhabitants. The refugee problem is another issue that has caused great problem in the sub-region, particularly on the receiving countries. In addition, some political leaders are using the issue as a strategy and weapon for "destabilizing the refugees' countries of origin."⁴² Weissman has argued persuasively that “elements of Burundi conflict have spread to the Democratic republic of Congo, and military tensions has grown between Burundi and its other large neighbour, Tanzania.”⁴³ From the

⁴¹ Good Governance and Conflict Management in Burundi, op.cit

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ S.R. Wiessman “Preventing Genocide in Burundi”
http://www.usip.org/pubs/pworks/weissm22/chap1_22.html

discussion, it is very clear that the conflict in Burundi has an unprecedented ethnic as well as political undertone. It has been established by scholars that the socio-political order in Burundi since time past is a "Tutsi one". This "Tutsi order has been of an untold injustice towards Burundi citizens from Hutu ethnic groups".⁴⁴ The order has been characterized by the segregation of Hutu in the management of the socio-economic issues of the country, in employment and education.

To reinforce this line of argument, the draft Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi states in Article 4 that: "with regards to the nature of the Burundi conflict, Parties recognize that: (a) the conflict is fundamentally political with extremely important ethnic dimensions; (b) it stems from a struggle by the political class to accede to and/or remain in power."⁴⁵ In their struggle to monopolize state power and the uncountable benefits which accompany such power, the elites of Burundi have chosen genocide as their strong card to maintain and legitimize the same.

3.3 Actors and Issues in the Burundi Conflict

Generally conflicts become complex as a result of the actors and issues that interplay. For effective conflict management to be undertaken, a proper understanding of the issues and actors involved have to be taken into consideration. Like Vayrynen, Mwangiri is of the opinion that "the involvement of different actors transforms the conflict significantly."⁴⁶ Because parties to a conflict "have different relationships among themselves,"⁴⁷ it makes the management more complex. The conflict in Burundi has been between the government "(military regime led by Major Pierre Buyoya, with security

⁴⁴ L. Ndarubagiye, *Burundi: The Origins of the Hutu-Tutsi Conflict*, Nairobi, 1995

⁴⁵ *Draft Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Accord for Burundi* (p.9)

⁴⁶ M. Mwangiri, *Conflict, Theories, Processes and Institutions of Management*, op.cit., p.97

⁴⁷ Ibid.

forces made up of the army, the gendarmerie and the judicial police, versus the opposition parties Conseil national pour la defense de la democratie (CNDD)/Forces pour la defense de la democratie (FDD) and Parti pour la liberation du peuple (PALIHEHUTU),”⁴⁸ which are dissatisfied and disillusioned with the leadership and the ethnic problem of Hutu and Tutsi.

Like actors who render a conflict complex, the issues in conflict equally render the conflict complex. Mwangiru argues that this occur “because each of the parties entering a conflict brings its own concerns and interests.”⁴⁹ He elaborates further by stating that “ the most immediate issues are those which led originally to the conflict.”⁵⁰ The conflict in Burundi like most others illustrates this appropriately. Weissman posits that “colonial-induced animosities and subsequent competition among ethnic elites have fueled a three-decade-long political conflict in Burundi, turning the country into a powder keg primed by fears for personal security.”⁵¹

3.4 Conflict Management in Burundi

As has been stated in the section that captured the history of Burundi, the conflicts in Burundi began when the country became independent in 1962. Since then the country has experienced cyclical conflict which has been managed by the different leaders who took over government. The different leaders have used different structures and mechanisms ranging from state, non-state, regional and international conflict management structures to manage the conflicts. This will be examined in three phases – conflict management in Burundi during pre-colonial period; conflict management in

⁴⁸ “Armed Conflict Report 2000- Burundi” <http://www.plouhshares.ca/ACR/ACR00/ACR00-Burundi.htm>

⁴⁹ M. Mwangiru, *Conflict, Theories, Processes and Institutions of Management* op.cit., p.99

⁵⁰ Ibid.

Burundi during the colonial period and conflict management in Burundi during the post colonial period.

3.4.1 Conflict Management in Pre-Colonial Burundi

Although pre-colonial Burundi did not experience ethnic conflict per se, different kinds of conflicts such as those between the political authorities and their subjects or constituents, and between the subjects themselves warranted management using adequate structures and mechanisms. The discussion here will specifically focus on the power of the monarch and the institution of *bashingantahe*.

In this regard, conflict management was mainly the task for the monarch and the administration authorities (chiefs and their second-in-command). Since the personality of the monarch was sacred, the King was considered to be the Father of all Burundians. He was “Burundians” last resort when they were wronged in the sense that he was the supreme judge”.⁵² His power was handed-down throughout the land by authorities chosen from all ethnic groups. Because he possessed the incontestable power of redistribution and had the ability to listen and monitor public opinion which he exercised through his courtiers, the King was the keystone of the whole framework of conflict prevention and management”

3.4.1.1 The Institution of Bashingantahe

The *Bashingantahe* is a traditional institution or tribunal which played a crucial role in the managing conflicts and affairs in Burundian society. It brings prominent persons together, who were mature, upright, honest and truth-loving. The task of the

⁵¹ S.R Weissman, “Burundi and the Crisis inn Central Africa” op.cit

⁵²“Good Governance and Conflict Management in Burundi, op.cit.

Bashingantahe is to reconcile, restore the peace among individuals and establish justice and equity”.⁵³ According to the Burundi tradition, the role of the *Bashingantahe* is:

“to settle disputes by conciliation or judgement, according to the level of the dispute; to reconcile individuals and families; to authenticate contracts (in relation to marriage, succession, sale etc; to oversee the maintenance of justice; to ensure the security of life and property; to provide guidance and balance to politicians in the exercise of their mandates; and to emphasise respect for human rights and common good, whenever the need arose.”⁵⁴

During a conflict, the wronged individual approaches a *Mishingantahe* (a member of the *Bushingantahe*) and requests his or her case to be brought before the *Bashingantahe*. The process of reconciliation goes thus:

“The reconciliation process begins when the leader of the *Bashingantahe* asks the plaintiff why he had caused the *Bashingantahe* to convene. After listening to the case from both sides and having done everything possible to arrive at the truth, the wise men retire to a secluded place to deliberate and to decide on the case. After they have reached a consensus they return to the people. A chosen spokesperson delivers the verdict. But before he does that, he summarises what was said during the litigation. After the verdict is given, the spokesperson pleads with the litigants “to become brothers as before.” The litigants accept the decision of the wise men and the last sign that reconciliation has taken place is the performance of the drinking ritual. The litigants share a drink between themselves and among the *Bashingantahe* and the other people who had come to follow the case.”⁵⁵

Other prominent persons such as religious leaders, the ritualists, who guarded the secrets of enthronement, the tambourine players, court buffoons, magicians and the soothsayers, employed their respective mechanisms for the prevention and management of conflicts through discussions, arbitration and reconciliation.

⁵³ J. Bingumwani, “Les Bashingantahe: Institution traditionnelle d’arbitrage et de conciliation au Burundi” paper presented at the all Africa-Conference on African Principles of Conflict Resolution and Resolution, (Addis Ababa: United Nations Conference Centre – ECA 1999), p.57

⁵⁴ B. A. Ntabona, “Suggestions to Escape from Ethnic Totalitarianism” from *Au Coeur de L’Afrique* N0.1, 1995.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*

3.4.2 Conflict Management in Colonial Burundi

The coming of the colonial power disintegrated the traditional mechanisms that previous regulated the socio-political relations in the country. For instance, numerous traditional posts that were previously shared among the ethnic groups (chiefs, deputy chiefs, chief counselors, local counselors) were suppressed. The colonial government diluted the powers of the notables, undermined the *Bashingantahe* institution and dismissed the traditional Hutu Chiefs and replaced them with *Ganwa* and Tutsi, “as bureaucrat working on behalf of the colonial administration”.⁵⁶

Forms of punishment that were unknown previously to traditional Burundi were put in place – prisons, the “chicotte” (whipping and monetary fines. Power shifted from the local collecting towards administration centre of the region. Grassroots communities were deprived of their self-regulating responsibilities in the area of conflict prevention and management. As if that was not enough, the missionaries who arrived with colonial masters replaced the *bashingantahe*. These missionaries included catechists and other clerics “who by virtue of having attended school, were deemed to be qualified to rule or to settle differences between parties to a conflict”.⁵⁷

From the above discussion, it is clear that the traditional structures and mechanisms for the management of conflicts in Burundi, were totally destabilized during the colonial period: with the Burundi people have been completely neglected and marginalized from the decision-making process. Hence the law of the colonial master became the only one that was applied. This therefore culminated to that new structures,

⁵⁶ “Good Governance and Conflict Management in Burundi” op.cit

such as the judicial and administrative apparatus, were now given the responsibility for the prevention and settlement of conflicts.

3.4.3 Conflict Management in Post Colonial Burundi

Following the assassination of the elected President Melchior Ndadaye, the members of the government found themselves in two types of situations: “the side that was close to the political situation represented by the assassinated President sought refuge in diplomatic missions, while the other side, made up of members of the former opposition, returned home.”⁵⁸ The feeling of persecution, the reflex towards solidarity and the constitutional void that ensued created a climate of distrust within the Government and the National Assembly. This spread later to the administration and the entire population. The crisis had serious consequences in as much as it has remained engraved on the collective memory of Hutu and Tutsi alike and even now determines the attitudes and everyday behaviors of each ethnic group.

It was within this specific context that, an initiative of the civil society and of the Special Representative of the United Nations in Burundi, that “a process of rapprochement, conciliation, arbitration and negotiation of the Convention of Government between the two main political parties was elaborated and gradually implemented.”⁵⁹ It was within this framework that a national debate was planned without any clear indication as to whether or not it would include negotiations with the rebellion.

The composition of the Government which emerged from the 1994 Convention of the Government suffered from several arguments between personalities of the two political groupings (FRODEBU and UPRONA) and from the differences and internal

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

struggles within these parties. This internal struggles “paralyzed the National Assembly which at this time lacked a quorum.”⁶⁰ Peace campaigns held to counter the rebellion failed while violence became reinforced, particularly as the judicial system was incapable of suppressing crime.

It was in this climate of frustration and tensions that former President Julius Nyerere, now late, entered the picture as a mediator. He opted to support a partnership between FRODEBU and UPRONA with the aim of re-examining the systems advocated in the Convention of Government and strengthening the Government. This approach underestimated the strength of the smaller and opposition parties which, even though unable to rally crowds behind them, demonstrated a remarkable capacity to create trouble. Furthermore, Nyerere’s bi-polar vision (FRODEBU on the one hand and UPRONA on the other) did not take into account the internal differences within each of the two political alliances.

When Nyerere’s bi-polar failed to bring about some resolution, he proposed a new formula which was based on the idea of a military intervention together with the regime of the Convention. This plan still failed to gain support from the groups close to the opposition and the army. It was this plan that finally led the political forces to effect a change in Government on 25 July 1996 outside the scope of the Constitution and the provisions of the Convention of the Government. Against this backdrop of change, the countries of the sub-region, with the encouragement of the mediator, Julius Nyerere, attempted another strategy: an economic blockade against Burundi. During the period of “what became a hastily decreed embargo and outside the framework of any legal basis in

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

international law, the Government of Burundi and some political partners remained preoccupied with any action that might be taken to remove the embargo.”⁶¹

3.4.4 The Rome Initiative

The Rome Initiative of 1997 came as a result of the previous failure of mediator Nyerere to restart the Arusha peace process during the later half of 1996. Aggravated by the decision to impose economic sanctions, “the Government of Burundi declared it was not prepared to pursue the Arusha solution because it organized in a climate of suspicion and diplomatic tension between Burundi and the sub-region.”⁶² The Government therefore initiated contacts with the San Egidio Community of Rome with a view to conduct secret peace talks between the government and the CNDD armed rebellion, which was considered as the most important rebel movement. The Rome-based Community of San Egidio is the “Catholic group that helped mediate an end to the civil war in Mozambique in 1994.”⁶³ Between December 1996 and May 1997, three meetings took place. A preliminary agreement on the agenda for the negotiation was signed in 1997.

The secret negotiations in Rome had a decisive impact on the peace process. At the domestic level, “the taboo was removed from the principle and idea of negotiating with the armed rebellion.”⁶⁴ In a broad debate that followed these revelations, a broad section of the domestic public opinion came to support the idea of including the armed rebellion in the negotiation process but within the Arusha framework. In addition, the FRODEBU party which has thus far been reluctant and distrustful of the Government’s

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ S.R. Weissman, *op.cit*

⁶⁴ Ibid.

commitment to negotiations realized that it was in its own interest to become involved in the process both at home and abroad. At the external level, “the Arusha Peace Process built on the achievements of Rome, the agenda that had been agreed in Rome was incorporated into the Arusha process”⁶⁵ and the discreet phase gave way finally to open and more inclusive negotiations in Arusha which finally culminated to the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi in August 2000.⁶⁶

3.4.5 OAU and the Conflict in Burundi

Since the tragic assassination of the President Melchior Ndadaye and the ensuing and unfortunate development, the International Community, “including the OAU, has consistently worked towards the defusion of tension and the resolution of differences among the component groups and interests in the country.”⁶⁷ Specifically, apart from a number of visits undertaken personally by the Secretary General to Burundi, the OAU (OMIB) headed by the Special Representative of the OAU Secretary General, and initially, comprising military and civilian components. Specifically,

“efforts undertaken to promote dialogue and negotiation in furtherance of a process of peace and national reconciliation among the parties, culminated in the signing of a Convention of Government between the various Burundian political parties on 10 September, 1996, as well as the formation, subsequently, of a Government of National Unity.”⁶⁸

However, trust and confidence among the parties which ought to have been an important prerequisite for the implementation of the Convention of Government were absent. As a result, relations between the main political actors became dominated by suspicion and mistrust. The resulting failure of the implementation of the Convention of

⁶⁵ “Rising Violence forces Buyoya to rethink tactics at the Arusha Peace Talks” *Africa Confidential*, No.40 1999, pp.4-5

⁶⁶ See Chapter Two for details on the Arusha Peace Process

⁶⁷ “OAU and the Conflict in Burundi, <http://www.oau-oua.org/document/mechanism/english/mech05.htm>

Government, thus occurred, reportedly against a background of killings and massacres by rebels and retaliation by elements of the security forces. The further worsening of the political and security situation did, indeed, “spawn a paralysis of the institutions set up within the framework of the Convention of Government, including the office of President.”⁶⁹

In view of the acute security situation in the country and of the urgent need for an enabling environment for negotiations, the then-Government of Burundi requested the countries of the Great Lakes Region, meeting at Summit Level on 25 June, 1996 at Arusha, to provide security assistance. That request, however, met with the objections of some politicians in Burundi as well as the army. Eventually, on 25 July, 1996, the long drawn-out constitutional impasse led to a coup d'état that brought Major Pierre Buyoya to power. The coup d'état drew widespread condemnation on the part of the International Community and the OAU as they called on OAU Member States and the International Community as a whole, “to isolate any illegal regime which might, in consequence be installed. The Central Organ expressed its readiness to impose sanctions on any illegal regime which might emerge.”⁷⁰

In response to the new developments in Burundi, leaders of the countries of the region met in a Summit at Arusha, Tanzania on 31 July, 1996, condemned the coup and imposed economic sanctions in Burundi (as the most cost effective and least painful means available) “to ensure a return to normalcy in the country, in the shortest possible time.”⁷¹ The stand taken by the above-mentioned Regional Summit was fully endorsed by

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

the Central Organ of the OAU. At the Sixty-fifth Ordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers held in Tripoli in February, 1997, it was emphasized that there was a need for the countries of the region to undertake an objective assessment of the question of sanctions, especially with regards to their impact on the people, and that such a review should be undertaken in the light of any progress achieved so far in the negotiation process.

At its Sixty-eighth Ordinary Session held in Ouagadougou in June, 1998, the OAU Council of Ministers expressed "satisfaction at the progress made in Burundi", particularly the pursuit of the national debate and the establishment of a partnership for peace between the Government and the Parliament, enlarged to include political parties and the civil society. The OAU Council of Ministers expressed the hope, further, that the new developments would contribute to the revival of the Arusha Peace Process and lay the basis for genuine national reconciliation. It "expressed satisfaction at the initiatives taken by the Facilitator to convene the inter-Burundian talks in Arusha on 15 June, 1998 and urged all the parties concerned to participate and endeavour to ensure that they were successful,"⁷² in order to pave the way for a peaceful solution based on the principles of security and democracy for all Burundians. The Arusha Process took off, despite political instability and violence that continued during the talks. The process was not an easy one like most peace processes. However, it ended up with an accord being signed in August 2000.⁷³

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ See Chapter Two for details on the Process.

3.4.6 The OAU and African women's support for peace in Burundi

As part of the efforts by the OAU to involve women in issues relating to peace and security in Africa and in Burundi in particular, an African Women's solidarity mission was undertaken to Burundi from December 13 to 20, 1997. The Mission was sponsored by the OAU. The aim and objectives of the mission were :

“to support and encourage the women of Burundi to actively participate in the peace process; to meet with policy makers to learn about the conflict situation in Burundi; to share experiences of African women leaders with Burundian women on peace building; to promote peace and peaceful resolution of conflicts; and to provide basic training on peaceful conflict resolution techniques, as a means of strengthening the capacities of Burundian women in the peace process.”⁷⁴

Since then, Burundi women have actively involved in the peace process and rebuilding of their country.

3.4.7 Burundi Women and the Burundi Conflict

Women and their families have suffered as a result of the complex conflict in Burundi. Hundreds of thousands of them lost their lives. Those living have been impoverished, “particularly by the loss and lack of economic opportunities, an increase in food shortages, a worrying health situation, increases acts of gender-based violence.”⁷⁵ In addition, the conflict has been characterized by deliberate rape of women, forced displacement, abduction and torture. Risks for the “refugee and internally displaced populations have been especially pronounced for women and their children, who constitute 65 and 85 per cent of refugees and displaced persons.”⁷⁶ According to the observations of the OAU sponsored African Women Solidarity Mission in Burundi,

⁷⁴ OAU and the Conflict in Burundi, op.cit.

⁷⁵ UNIFEM, Engendering Peace: Reflections on the Burundi Peace Process, (UNIFEM Nairobi, 2001), p.8

⁷⁶ Ibid.

“there was a high level of poverty, illiteracy, poor health, particularly acute malnutrition among children; a strong recognition of the role women should play in conflict resolution particularly at the family and community levels; about three quarters of the returnees, displaced and regrouped persons were women and children.”⁷⁷

At the peak of the conflict in the country, the women of Burundi launched a number of initiatives, “including broadcasting messages of peace and reconciliation on the radio and television and organizing awareness-raising demonstrations.”⁷⁸ Elderly people, the *inararibonye* also played an important role. At times at the detriment of their own lives, the Burundi women took upon themselves to support refugees, sheltering abandoned children and protecting their neighbour’s property from looters.”⁷⁹

3.4.7.1 Burundi Women and Conflict Management in Burundi

When the brunt of ethnic violence had reached its greatest height between 1996 and 1998, coupled with the unbearable economic sanctions levied on Burundi by its neighbours namely Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, for their refusal to come to the negotiating table, both Hutu and Tutsi women grouped together to appeal to the respective Heads of States for the sanctions to be lifted.

In 1997, they made their appeal in Addis Ababa during an African Regional Conference on Best Practices for Peace-Building and Non-Violent Means of Conflict Resolution. Their appeal was tabled to Vice- President Speciosa Kazibwe of Uganda and the then Minister of Gender Affairs of Rwanda, Aloisea Inyumba. The outcome was a peace conference for Burundi women sponsored by the OAU African Women’s Committee on Peace in 1998, with the following objectives: (i) to “seek support from the president of Uganda and from other African women to lift the embargo; (ii) to achieve participation of Burundi women at the peace talks in Arusha and (iii) to create an

⁷⁷ OAU and the Conflict in Burundi, op.cit

⁷⁸ “Women’ activities” <http://www.fasngo.org/en/activities/Burundi.htm>

⁷⁹ Ibid.

opportunity for dialogue between women living inside and outside the country.”⁸⁰ After several consultations and deliberations with the president of Uganda and the then mediator, late Julius Nyerere, the economic sanctions were lifted at a Special Session in Arusha in 1999.

The next step the women embarked on was to lobby for their participation at the peace talks which like their other counterparts in other parts of the world saw as a right being denied to them. According to them, their non-participation at the talks makes the peace process non-transparent and non-inclusive. They lobbied international communities, in particular donors represented at the talks; they lobbied the facilitation team, international bodies, regional leaders and African women’s organizations to get support for their cause.”⁸¹ This resulted in their being granted observer status to attend the peace negotiations. Generally, in a conflict situation, the observers “provide a watchful, compelling physical presence that is intended to discourage violence, corruption, human rights violations, or other behaviour deemed threatening and undesirable.”⁸² In the case of Burundi women, they only gained access into the plenary sessions, and only had the opportunity to listen to discussions that ensued. Nevertheless, this was better than was the case before where they were not allowed to have such a status.

At the national level, the women for peace movement was formed with its umbrella organization called CAFOB (*Collectif des Associations et ONGs Féminines du Burundi*). This organization established links with other international organizations

⁸⁰ Ibid. p.3

⁸¹ Ibid. (p.12)

⁸² C. Sampson, “Religion and Peace-building” in *Religion, The Missing Dimension Statecraft* (New: Oxford University Press, 1994).

working for women's empowerment and peace-building namely International Alert, Search for Common Ground and the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). The women organized successful Peace Torch parades, training of trainers workshops to train women in leadership skills and peace-building techniques. Through their respective associations and women's groups, "they had acted at the local level, calling for calm and peace and mobilizing public awareness."⁸³ All these initiatives by women inspired the Burundian authorities who realized that "women were sufficiently organized to undertake region-wide activity, that they was solidarity among the women, and that women supported one another through an existing networking system."⁸⁴

The future of women's inclusion became more promising when in June 2000 the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation sought advice on how women's issues could be part of the formal Burundi accord from UNIFEM (the women's fund at the United Nations that provides financial and technical assistance to innovative programmes and strategies that promote women's human rights, political participation and economic security).⁸⁵ It was a high-level briefing during which the heads of the 19 political parties, the 18 member Facilitation Team and other interested parties were made to understand that a peace accord with the inclusion of issues such as the protection of women's rights, women's contribution to the national economy and their role in conflict resolution and post-conflict resolution has a better chance in developing the Burundi society. The briefing team was made up of experts selected from Eritrea, Guatemala, South Africa and Uganda, who had played a significant role in negotiating peace accords in their respective countries.

¹ UNIFEM, *Engendering Peace: Reflections on the Burundi Peace Process*, op.cit., p.10

² Ibid., p.14

³ UNIFEM's Mission Statement revised, (UNIFEM New York, 2000)

The briefing culminated to the holding of the All-Party Burundi Women's Peace Conference of July 2000 organized by the UNIFEM and the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation (MNF). The conference was the ever first occasion Burundi women had access into the peace talks and made pertinent recommendations on the peace agreement and its implementation. The main objective of the conference was "to bring together women from the different sides of the conflict, including refugee women and internally displaced women, to analyze gender aspects of the peace agreement and come-up with concrete proposals in making the peace agreement more gender sensitive and inclusive."⁸⁶ Keeping their political and ethnic differences aside, "women delegates formulated an official agenda for peace and reconstruction that would guarantee women's rights to rebuild and govern, alongside men, a new Burundi society."⁸⁷ Two women delegates represented each of the 19 parties; also attending were women representing other groups such as refugees, women from the Diaspora, from the professions and from civil society, as well as the 7 women observers. In all, some 50 women attended.⁸⁸

The following strategies were employed to address gender-specific issues in the peace agreement:

"women must be represented in all aspects and stages of the peace process including building its structure and negotiating, monitoring and implementing it; all participants in the peace process must fully comprehend the impact that conflict has on women; gender dimensions of all substantive issues and mechanisms under discussion must be addressed."⁸⁹

⁸⁶ UNIFEM, *op.cit.*, p.19

⁸⁷ UNIFEM, *Engendering Peace: Reflections on Burundi Peace Process*, *op.cit.*, p.16

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

They addressed the gender perspectives of the five themes adopted by the five committees which are: (Nature of the conflict, Democracy and Good Governance, Peace and Security, Reconstruction and Development, Guarantees on Implementation).

The outcome was successful, as a large number of the women's recommendations were adopted and incorporated into the final peace accord that was signed in August 2000. The women's efforts were appreciated globally by different institutions, media houses and individuals. The United Nations Security Council endorsed "the women's recommendations and expressed appreciation for the recognition of the role and positive contribution of women in the Burundi peace process through direct involvement in the negotiation and facilitation."⁹⁰

The issues captured and narrated portray the path which the women in Burundi have undertaken to achieve their collective goals "in contributing to the reconstruction and development of a post-conflict Burundi, in the healing process of the conflict, in pressing for peace for the country. Considering the varying conceptions and priorities of peace,"⁹¹ it has not been an easy road. Their peace-building efforts have come a long way. Through trial and error and despite their different political affiliations and ethnic backgrounds, they have struggled to obtain a successful outcome because of their quest for peace for their beloved country. This is the same opinion that Kriesberg⁹² depicts in his paper "Quest for Peace." In this paper, he says although nearly everyone wants peace, most people seek other goals as well: many strive for individual and collective freedom or for justice, many want equality;... but our quest is to understand how to build peace

⁹⁰ M. Zoll, 'Women Join Peace Process in Burundi' in *Choices* (United Nations Department of Public Affairs, New York, 2000)p.9

⁹¹ UNIFEM, op.cit., p.23

without jeopardizing other important values.” These events of the year 2000 with regards to the peace talks gave Burundians and the international community unprecedented hope for a peaceful future. By the time this study was being concluded, an Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC) was already established to monitor the implementation of the August 2000 Agreement.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has offered an overview of the history, geography, the people, the economy, foreign relations and political situation in Burundi. It has also provided the fundamental causes of the conflict in Burundi which is connected to the colonial and post colonial periods. An examination of how different interventions have been made to managed the conflict has also been highlighted. From the examination, it has been revealed that the main concerns that have often brought conflict in Burundi is political interests to accede power. This has often been done through the crystallization of ethnic hatred.

⁹² L. Kriesberg, *International Conflict Resolution: The U.S.-USSR and the Middle East Cases* (Yale University Press, 1992), p.1-2

Chapter 4

4.1 Background to the Conflict in Somalia

4.1.1 An Overview of the State of Somali

This chapter begins by first providing a brief history and geography on the country. Secondly, it examines the different levels of conflict in Somalia, their causes, actors and issues. Thirdly it provides a discussion of how these conflicts have been managed and whether this has been successful or not. Fourthly, it looks at women's participation in the conflict and their role in the management of these conflicts.

4.1.2 Geography and People

Somalia¹ is located north of the Equator and on the East Coast of Africa. It faces the Arabian Peninsula with which it has had commercial and cultural relations for centuries. Its capital city is Mogadishu. It is bordered by Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya. It occupies an area of 637,660 sq.kms. with a coastline covering 2,720 kilometers. It "inhabits a beautiful land of cool mountains, rich tropical river valleys, wide savanna plains and semi deserts beyond one of Africa's longest and most spectacular coastlines".² Its population is estimated at 7,347,554 inhabitants, with three principal ethnic groups - Somali, Bantu and Arabs. Its annual growth rate is estimated at 15.58 per cent. Somalia is made up of Italy's former Trust Territory of Somalia and the former British Protectorate of Somaliland.

Somalia is a homogeneous nation of one people who speak one language, practice one religion - Islam - and have one culture."³ The principal languages spoken

¹ U.S. Department of State: "Background Notes: Somalia, July 1998
(http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/Somalia_0798_bgn.html)

² A.J..Ahmed, *The Invention of Somalia*, (The Red Sea Press, Inc, Lawrenceville, 1995) p. 43

³ J.M. Ghalib, *The Cost of Dictatorship: The Somali Experience* (Lilian Barber Press, Inc, NY, 1995), p. xi

countrywide are Somali, Arabic, Italian and English. The official language is Somali. Somali society is a product of interactions among small groups of herdsmen, farmers, "itinerant sheykhs, and townsmen who came together under diverse circumstances in the past and whose modern sense of national identity derives less from primordial sentiments than from a set of shared historical experiences."⁴

4.1.3 Government and Political System

Somalia obtained independence on 1 July 1960 "from a merger of British Somaliland, which became independent from the United Kingdom in June 1960, and Italian Somaliland, which became independent from the Italian-administered UN Trusteeship on July 1960 to form the Somali Republic".⁵

In 1961, a constitution was adopted which gave political parties freedom for political campaigns. This led to a proliferation of political parties which brought about disorder and indiscipline during parliamentary debates. As if that was not enough, mechanisms had to be put in place to integrate the two administrative structures of British and Italian territories into one. This was a crucial issue. Again, the need to bring Somalis still living under colonial rule in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti under the Somali flag was another issue of concern. This political dilemma encountered just after independence continued until the state's collapse in 1991. At moment, Somali has no central government governing the country. It has been without a functioning government since 1991 when Major General Mohamed Said Barre's government was overthrown by the United Somali Congress (USC).

⁴ Ibid. (p.xi)

⁵ U.S Department of State: "Background Notes: Somalia, July 1998, op.cit.

Currently, "the political situation is one of anarchy, characterized by inter-clan fighting and random banditry with some few areas enjoying relative peace and stability."⁶ It has administrative sub-divisions covering eighteen regions, namely Awdal, Bakook, Banaadir, Bari, Bovy, Galguduud, Gedo, Hiraan, Jabbada, Dhexe, Jubbada Hoose, Mudung, Nugaal, Sanaag, Shabeellaha Dhexe, Shabeellaha Hoose, Sool, Togdheer, Woqooyi Galbeed. Each of these regions is governed by a Regional Revolutionary Council. The following organs in the government, legislature, Judiciary are not functioning. In a nut-shell, things have fallen seriously apart in Somalia and the centre is no longer holding.

4.1.4 Economy

Like most countries in Africa, Somalia is "on the periphery of the world economy."⁷ Its role in the world economy has long been as a supplier of primary products and an importer of manufactured goods. The economy of Somalia is pastoral and agricultural, with livestock such as camels, cattle, sheep and goats being the main source and form of wealth. Livestock has been recorded as the economic backbone of the country. "pastoralism remains the most vibrant sector of Somalia's economy. In the mid-1970s government statistics revealed that there were 34 million domestic animals in the national herd of which 5.3 million were camels, 4.2 million cattle, 9.5 million sheep and 15 million goats."⁸ Agriculture⁹ alone accounts for 55 per cent of the country's Gross National Product (GNP). Its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was estimated at US\$ 1.8. The main agricultural products are bananas, corn, sorghum and sugar. Due to irregular

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ D.D. Laitin and S.S. Samatar op.cit, p.100

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ U.S. Department of State: "Background Notes: Somalia" op.cit

rainfall, farmers face the problem of cultivation. Four years of poor rains brought about a near devastation to the pastoral economy. Farming is limited only to some coastal areas like Hargeisa, the Juba and Shabelle River valleys. The banana plantations located in the South are maintained by the use of modern irrigation systems.

Somalia has a fish industry in the northern part of the country where tuna, shark and other warm-water fish are caught. The fishery sector is hardly affected by natural factors. Due to its vast resource base, it is almost unexploited. Almost 10,000 tons of fresh fish is harvested annually.¹⁰ The country possesses a small forest area which produces anomatic woods-frankincense and myrh for export. Petroleum, natural gas, and uranium are in the country but have not been exploited commercially. The country has no railways, it conducts its internal transportation services by truck and bus. Currently, the UN and other NGOs provide transportation by air.

4.1.5 Foreign Relations

Somalia¹¹ has since independence adopted the foreign policy of non-alignment. The United States, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Soviet Union and China have assisted Somalia with economic aid. During the 1960s, the Soviet Union provided both military and economic aid, while China provided considerable development assistance. The US provided development aid only."¹² Currently most countries have severed their diplomatic relations with Somalia because of the absence of a central government. The status of Somalis in the diaspora is also an important factor in its foreign policy. The main goal of "Somali nationalism is to unite the other Somali -

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid

¹² Cultural Orientation Net, "Somalis: Their History and Culture"
<http://culturalorientation.net/somali/shist.htm>

inhabited territories with the republic consistent with the objectives of Pan - Somali tradition".¹³ The conflicts that have occurred between Somalia and Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti and between Somalia and Kenya have been as a result of the aim of uniting all the Somalis in these countries under one flag. Hence since independence "virtually all of Somalia's foreign policy has centered around this single goal,"¹⁴ The fact that the entire Somalia nation is not ruled by a single Somali State, makes Somalia a nation in search of a state.

Its diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom soured during the period following the "dispute over Kenya's northeastern region (Northern Frontier District) an area inhabited mainly by Somalis".¹⁵ The United Kingdom backed Kenya's position of refusing Somalia's standing of self-determination for the people of the area as it would threaten Kenya's territorial integrity. Similar problems have been recorded from Somalia's boundary with Ethiopia, specifically in the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia.

However, Somalia's relations with Ethiopia and Kenya improved. In the case of Kenya, both government sought for a rapprochement that led to exchanges between Kenyan and Somali officials in May 1983, and a visit to Mogadishu by President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya. In the case of Ethiopia, Somalia's president at the time declared at the Nonaligned Movement Summit in New Delhi that "Somalia harbours no expansionist aims and is willing to negotiate with Ethiopia. Since the overthrow of Siad Barre government, Somali foreign policy has focused on lobbying and advocating to win international support for its numerous objectives of national reconciliation. The country seems to have recently "broken out of the diplomatic doldrums in which it has languished

Ibid

A.J. Ahmed, *The Invention of Somalia*, opcit., p.129

since the Ogaden venture; it now joins the Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia as bona fide western clients in the Red Sea Region."¹⁶

4.1.6 The History of Somalia

Historians have traced the origin and development of the Somali people to the descent of "an Arab Sultanate, which was founded in the seventh century A.D. by Koreishite immigrants from Yemen."¹⁷ Although there undoubtedly is "an infusion of Arab blood among Somalis,"¹⁸ their origin is traced to a much earlier time in the region.

"By the 12th century, the ancestors of some clan families were established in their present territories. Southward movements of others, however, continued into the 19th century. When the borders of present-day Somalia were set by the colonial powers toward the end of the 19th century, large numbers of Somalis are living in eastern Ethiopia and northern Kenya. The existence of Somalis outside the country's national borders continues to be a source of conflict in the region."¹⁹

Somalia was also ruled by Portuguese traders around the 15th and 16th centuries. In the later part of the 19th century, the modern history of the country began. This period was marked by a great influx of European traders into the area. Key among them were the British to safeguard their trade links. They gained control over the northern part of Somali "through treaties with various Somali chiefs who were guaranteed British protection".²⁰

The first two decades of the century saw Britain attacked by the Islamic nationalist leader Mohamed Abdullah. At the end of the day, Abdullah was defeated by the British when his base in Taleex was bombed by British warplanes. By 1885, Italy established and obtained trading links in the area specifically with the assistance of the

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid p.154

¹⁷ U.S. Department of State; Background Notes on Somalia", op.cit

¹⁸ A.J. Ahmed, *The Invention of Somalia*, op.cit.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

Sultan of Zanzibar. A couple of years after, precisely in 1924, the Jubaland province of Kenya and Kismayo was given to Italy by the United Kingdom. This was followed by an expansion into the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia by Somali and Italy. In 1940, the Italians drove out the British garrison, as their troops over-ran British Somaliland. In 1941, a counter-attack was launched against Italian Somaliland, which eventually led to the greater part of it under the British control.

“From 1941 to 1950, while Somalia was under British administration, transition toward self government was begun through the establishment of local courts, planning committees and the Protectorate Advisory Council. In 1948 Britain turned the Ogaden and neighbouring Somalia territories over to Ethiopia.”²¹
Briefly, Ogaden is in Eastern Ethiopia and it is made up of two distinct areas. The

southeast which is made up of the Upper Jubba and Shabelle rivers of which “the people are Somalis of the Ogaden clan family.”²² The northeast is made up of the Haud which is a “key seasonal grazing area for Somalis of the Isaaq and Dir clan families.”²³ In the 19th century, Ethiopians militarily defeated the Somalis after which they exploited the resources and wealth of the land rendering it barren and neglected. When Somali gained independence in 1960, their goal was to gain back the Ogaden.

In 1949, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution that recommended Italian Somaliland be put under a 10 year international trusteeship with Italy being the administering power, followed by independence for Italian Somaliland. Somali nationalists in Italian Somalia won assurances of independence in a decade. These assurances in due course inspired Somalia in the British Protectorate to press for independence and unity with Italian Somalia. Hence in 1959, the Somali government requested the UN General Assembly to put the date of independence to 1 July 1960

²¹ U.S. Department of State; “Background Notes: Somalia” opcit.

²² A.J. Ahmed, *The Invention of Somalia*, op.cit., p.135

instead of 2 December 1960. This arrangement was made because it suited the Somali government which by this time was fighting for self-government.

Independence brought about unity and democracy. Nine years after independence, the people of the newly independent republic enjoyed a high level of political participation regardless of their background. During this period of parliamentary democracy, clan and regional differences were worked out through frequent democratic elections involving many political parties. Nevertheless towards the later part of 1960, the government became very unpopular as "corruption, nepotism, mal-practices and mismanagement became the hallmark of the administration, creating an opportunity for the military take over in 1969."²⁴

On coming to power, Barre introduced a one party system while he categorically denounced clan loyalty as "backward and primitive". In the process of transforming Somalia society, Barre's government became over-centralized and authoritative which brought a general feeling of suppression to the citizens. By 1984, the situation worsened and analysts described Somalia as a country that resembled "a colony under foreign military occupation".²⁵ The government became more repressive, and ironically "strongly clan-based." His clan "enjoyed numerous privileges and profited most from the development aid and foreign assistance".²⁶ To counter the repressive government, opposition groups sprang up in the northwest of Somalia. Barre retaliated by waging what has been termed "a most savage war against the civilian population in the

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ M.O. Omar, *Somalia: A Nation Driven to Despair, A case of Leadership Failure* (Somali Publications Co. Ltd, New Delhi, 1996),pxiii

²⁵ I.M. Lewis, "The Recent Political History of Somalia", eds Barcik, K. and Normark, S., *Somalia - A historical, cultural and political analysis* (LPI: Uppsala, 1991),p.xiv

²⁶ Ibid.

northwest."²⁷ Villages and cities were indiscriminately bombed, waterholes and wells were destroyed, livestock was confiscated, human rights were massively and systematically violated. To counter the repressive government, opposition groups sprang up in the northwest of Somalia. Barre retaliated by waging what has been termed "a most savage war against the civilian population in the northwest." The most affected were "the coastal communities of Magadishu, Merka, brava and Kismayo, the farming communities of the Shabeelle and jubba valleys and the inter-riverine areas of Baidoa, Buur Hakaba, Diinsoor, Xuddur, and Qansaxdheere."²⁸ After a series of guerrilla attacks for almost a decade, Siad Barre was overthrown and the regime collapsed in 1991. Despite his defeat, hostilities did not come to an end. Clan competition and fighting for power continued, with severe effects on the civilian population.

4.2 The Underlying Causes of the Somali Civil War

There are several interconnected causes that led to the conflict and anarchy in Somalia. The causes range from individual or group volition to structural inequality and injustice. Specifically, "internal political instability, fostering disputes with its neighbours, a fragile economy, unreliable foreign friendships and ecological crisis have haunted Somalia since independence."²⁹ The causes are also linked to "the clash between the traditional, mostly pastoral society, which is strongly characterized by clan - individualism, and straitjacket of the modern state."³⁰ The following dimensions have been considered: the political, which is sub-divided into pre-colonial, colonial and post-

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid

²⁹ M.O. Omar, *Somalia: A Nation Driven to Despair, A case of Leadership Failure*, op. cit, p. 153

³⁰ European Platform for Conflict and Transformation, "Somalia: From Permanent Conflict to More Peacefulness". <http://www.oneworld.org/euconflict/stp/part2/156.htm>.

colonial periods; the institutional, the economic and ecological, the psychological and socio-cultural dimensions.

4.2.1 Political Dimension

Internal political instability as one of the root causes of the civil war has been classified into three phases: precolonial, colonial and post-colonial.

4.2.1.1 Pre-colonial

An analysis of the Somali conflict would only be complete if due consideration is given to Somali's pre-colonial period which was "based on clan loyalties and genealogy".³¹ Pre-colonial Somali was divided into five: the Darod, the Hawiye, the Isaaq, the Gihil and Rahaweyne, the Dir. Clan elders settled all disputes among the different clans. On some occasions, they used the compensation system which to a certain extent hardly resulted to problems. The Somali clan system has been recorded to be a source of great solidarity as well as that of conflict. Clans put their efforts together for protection, access to water, land and political power. The clan system in Somalia is characterized by instability, changing alliances and temporary coalition. Clan politics is captured in a saying popular among nomads:

"My full brother and I against my father, my father's household against my uncle's household, our two households (my uncle's and mine) against the rest of the immediate kin, the immediate kin against non-immediate members of my clan, my clan against other clans, and my nation and I against the world."³²

4.2.1.2 Colonial Period

This period brought about a colonial system which had a centralized system of government. The system did not so much care about the authority of the clan elders.

³¹ J. Clark, "Debate in Somalia", in *Foreign Affairs*, 1993, p.110, see also K. Ali, Galayah, Notes on the Somali State in *Horn of Africa* No. 1 and 2 January-March and April-June 1990, pp 1-28.

³² M.O. Omar, *Somalia: A Nation Driven to Despair, A case of Leadership Failure*, op.cit, p.xiii

Their authority was undermined but without erasing the clan loyalties. With the advent of colonial rule, Somalia was subjected to three distinct colonial systems of administration (Italian, British and French). Without any doubt, there was bound to be confusion and uncertainty about how to handle state issues by the new independent Republic of Somalia. Despite its independence, the British Somaliland and the former Italian Somaliland continued the functioning of its central organs.

4.2.1.3 Post – colonial period

Post-colonial Somalia was under the rule of President Siad Barre. His government favoured the South (former Italian Somaliland) at the detriment of the North (former British Somaliland). This was resented by the northerners, the Isaaq who are the "majority of the Somali National Movement around 1981".³³ The question of clan structures dominated the post-colonial era as "the initial struggle for food and pasture was replaced by political positions and states resources".³⁴

Somali leaders had tried to curb down the clan problem "by emphasizing Somali nationalism, the latest being that by Major General Mohamed Siad Barre in the mid 1970s."³⁵ When Siad Barre took power in October 1969, he advocated for one party system of government which had state-centred economic and military policies. As if that was not enough, he adopted a socialist ideology called scientific socialism which "may be said to have rested on two pillars: mass organization, and a rapidly expanding security apparatus network with unlimited powers of search, arrest, detention without trial and

³³ Clark, op. cit., p.11

³⁴ *Africa Recovery*, No. 7, 1993, p. 17

³⁵ H. Amadi: *The OAU Involvement in African Conflicts: The Case of Somalia Civil War*. (MA Thesis in International Relations, Department of Government, University of Nairobi 1998) p. 160

torture."³⁶ This ideology also reflected economic dependence on the Soviet Union, community development through self-reliance, a variance of socialism based on Marxist principles and Islam. Through it, wide-spread campaigns were organized with the goal of promoting "boarder nationalism to support clan loyalties through propaganda, literacy drives in Somali languages".³⁷ Moreso, he emphasized the issue of self-determination in "recovering" Somali inhabited areas of the neighbouring countries.

These policies partially "had a negative effect in Somalia's relations with neighbouring Ethiopia, whose marxist revolution of 1974 had loosened its grip on the Somali-inhabited region of Ogaden".³⁸ This culminated to a civil war between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1977 which also saw the involvement of the US supporting Somalia and the Soviet Union backing Ethiopia. Clan tensions intensified in the 1980s, while "the mediating role of traditional elders"³⁹ became even more undermined. After the defeat at Ogaden, Barre decided to depend on three sub-clans within the Darod grouping for his rule: "the Mareham, his clan, the Ogaden, his mother's and the Dulbahante, his son-in-law's".⁴⁰ This exacerbated the clan tensions.

In 1988, both leaders agreed to refrain from supporting their respective dissidents. As a result, the SNM was evicted from its base in Ethiopia. This led to outrageous fighting which has been recorded down in history as a period which Somalia faced "the largest insurgencies it had witnessed since its independence".⁴¹ The Isaaq community were severely attacked by the Bare regime. This resulted in the formation of the United Somalia Congress in 1989 which ganged together to force Barre's group southwards

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ African Recovery No. 17, 15 January 1993, Briefing Paper, p.17

³⁹ Ibid.

towards Kenya. Around this time, Barre's reprisals were geared towards the destruction of Hawije section of Mogadishu. Most of the infrastructure was destroyed which provoked more violence in the country.

By 1991, precisely 26 January, Barre stepped down from power and fled to Kenya. He was pursued by the faction of USC which was led by General Mohammed Farah Aideed. While Aideem faction pursued Barre, Ali Mahdi Mohammed's faction remained in Mogadishu and installed him as interim president. This arrangement was not in line with what was earlier discussed and agreed among the rebels in 1990: that after ousting Barre, the appointment or election of the interim president would be done after consultations".⁴²

This disagreement on the appointment of Ali Mahdi as interim President brought about another degree of violence in the country as the other faction of USC did not support it. This was again worsened by the 1990-1991 drought and famine in the country. To make matters worse, the North-Western part of Somalia, which is dominated by the SNM seceded and formed an independent state known as the Republic of Somaliland.⁴³ This was outrightly denounced and rejected by the USC which considered the move as destructive. In the absence of an acceptable government, power and food were in the hands of those with guns.

Abdel-Rahman Ahmed Ali of the SNM ignored the rejection by USC, by going ahead "to announce its government on 4 June 1991, with 13 of its 17 members from the

⁴⁰ M.O. Omar, *Somalia: A Nation Driven to Despair, A case of Leadership Failure*, op.cit., p. 161

⁴¹ *The Economist*, London, 9 July, 1988, pp. 46-48

⁴² See Makinda, *Security in the Horn of Africa Adelfu Papers No. 269* (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, Summer 1992).

⁴³ *Ibid.*

Isaaq clan".⁴⁴ President Hassan Gouled Aptidon of Djibouti used his good offices to sponsor peace talks that brought together leaders of the USC, SSDF, SPM and SDM. Unfortunately the SNM leaders turned down the invitation, while the others agreed on a cease-fire. To derail the peace talks, and reconciliation process was also the absence of Aideed's faction of the USC.

In July 1991, President Aptidon made further attempts to bring the parties together to no avail. The situation worsened as "new clan-based parties continued to proliferate as old ones split amidst formation, dissolution and reformation of alliances".⁴⁵ For example the Somali National Front (SNF) formed the Marehan sub-clan of the Darod was formed, the Islamic fundamentalist group was formed from the north-west part of Bossasso. Furthermore, there was "the increase of heavily armed gang and marauding bandits who owed little or no allegiance to any political faction"⁴⁶. In June 1961 a nationwide referendum was held which led to the adoption of Somalia's first national constitution. This constitution provided for a democratic state with a parliamentary type of government based on European models.

In the post-independence period, political parties reflected clan loyalties which, brought a split between the regional interests of the former British-controlled and the Italian controlled South. In addition, there was severe conflict between pro-Arab, pan-Somali militants on national unification with the Somali-inhabited zones in Ethiopia and Kenya; and the "modernists" who advocated for economic and social development as well, as for the improvement of relations with other African countries. The Somali Youth

⁴⁴ M.O. Omar, *Somalia: A Nation Driven to Despair, A case of Leadership Failure*, op.cit., p. 162

⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 163

⁴⁶ Africa Recovery, No. 7, 1993, p.10

League formed at the time, under British auspices had a dominant position, which facilitated its cutting across regional and clan loyalties.

Between 1967 to 1969, Mohamed Ibrahim Egal was the Prime Minister of Somalia. During his two-year leadership, Somalia improved its relations with Kenya. The issue of party-based constitution democracy stopped. However, General Mohamed Siad took power in a bloodless coup. When Siad Barre took power, he became the head of the 20-member Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) which was the body that possessed executive and legislative power. This means that Barre had the authority "to legislate new law and repeal old ones and guide ministers on administrative issues".⁴⁷ This also explains why Siad Barre had the powers to become a socialist dictator. "Post-colonial period" saw corruption, malpractices, nepotism and killings, creating an opportunity for the military.⁴⁸

4.2.2 The Institutional dimension

In contrast to most societies, which have established structures and institutions of authority, "the Somali Society is characterized by an almost absence of formally institutionalized authority".⁴⁹ The conflict in Somalia has also been caused by institutional factors. Closely linked to the political one, institutions during the reign of Barre were developed along clan lines. Of course it was dominated by the ruling clan which led to resentment among the other clans and citizens. Water supplies, sanitation, health and educational services were enjoyed by very few Somalis. Most citizens did not benefit from government administration. The administration extracted resources without

⁴⁷ A.J. Ahmed, *the Invention of Somalia*, op.cit., p. 81

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ H. Wolfgang, *Building the Peace: Experiences of Collaborative Peace-building in Somalia 1993-1996*, (Life and Peace Institute Uppsala 1997),p.xiii

giving much in return. This in due course eroded the confidence and trust people had in the administration.

Furthermore, the legislature, the judiciary and the police system tended to victimize citizens instead of acting for their interests. There was no proper functioning of these institutions. For instance, shortly after taking over, Barre abolished the National Assembly, suspended the constitution, prohibited any form of political association, and put some prominent politicians into custody. Loyalty to Barre replaced job qualification as a criterion for any government appointment into the civil service. All these led to widespread dissatisfaction and gross inequities throughout the country - hence conflict.

4.2.3 Economic and ecological dimension

From the general overview of the Somali nation, in the introductory section of this chapter, it was revealed that the country's economic strength lies in its livestock and agriculture. During the colonial period, large sugar, banana and cotton plantations and irrigation systems were created in the southern part of the country by the Italians. The Shabeelle Valley hosted these plantations because of its recorded amount of rainfall in a year, which was used for irrigation. These plantations provided jobs for many Somalis.

After independence, the agriculture and livestock sector of the economy thrived for a period of time. There was some remarkable harvest from which the Somali society depended on for their self sufficiency. As a result of drought for over five years, their livestock was destroyed. The plantations were affected and there was general scramble for food. Starvation was the order of the day as Somalis fled out of their country in search of greener pastures in neighbouring countries like Ethiopia and Kenya. Apart from the effects of starvation that caused them to leave the country, there was the effect of the

Ogaden War of 1977-1978. The war brought "in its wake a human tragedy of horrible proportions which the government estimates that 2 million Ogaden inhabitants were displaced, faced homelessness, starvation, thirst and disease."⁵⁰ The manufacturing sector that had initially employed a negligible number of the population was near collapse.

The drought threatened the very existence of the Somali nation, and added to Somalia's agricultural problems. Several economic sectors were destroyed, the nation's economic growth dwindled; several human lives were lost to famine and starvation. Poverty took hold of the whole country as the socialist government at time "taxed farmers by paying far less than the world market price for their output, thereby creating a disincentive to produce."⁵¹

The situation was further aggravated because the government could not easily interfere with the livestock since the sector was dominated by traditional northern Isaaq traders. Hence post-revolutionary Somalia "remained economically poor as it exported animals to Arabia and bananas to Europe."⁵² Somali's foreign debt was also significant element. By 1985, it had increased at a commensurate rate with increased earnings from exports. All these economic and ecological problems affected different sectors of the economy. The population was seriously affected.

Nevertheless, "the unprecedented drought that culminated in 1994 had great implications for the development of Somali pastoralism in general and the cooperative movement in particular."⁵³ There was an outpour of rain for four successive years which almost deviated the pastoral economy. According to one pastoralist

⁵⁰ A.J. Ahmed, *the Invention of Somalia*, op.cit.,op.cit., p.146

⁵¹ Ibid.p.118

⁵² Ibid. p.119

⁵³ Ibid. p.112.

"I encountered a shocking experience. By the time I got there, my family had lost 500 head of sheep. The sheep died within a space of five weeks. My water reservoirs were depleted. My cattle died as well. But some of my camels escaped from the affliction of the famine and went to wet areas. In addition to the severity of the famine, we were afraid that diseases might spread from the decomposing carcasses of all those dead animals."⁵⁴

Furthermore, because of Barre's culture of militarism, violence became more manifest in the country. It was even aggravated because natural resources were scarce, and the "lack of justice, good governance and education were strongly felt"⁵⁵ Regardless of the Islamic faith, the distribution of economic resources was so markedly uneven, because cultural patterns and political ambitions differ so widely regarding the main clans of the Horn of Africa, thus impelling the matters to get out of hand. The end result was violence and civil disobedience.

4.2.4 The psychological and socio-cultural dimension

There is apparently no doubt that the conflict in Somali has a strong psychological and socio-cultural effect which is founded on its clan system. As stated earlier, Somalia has a clan-based system where each clan is affiliated to its clan elder. The clans are the Darod, Haviye, Isaaq, Dir and Digil Rahawayn. Most issues revolve around this "geneologically clan-based system with its alliances and coalitions."⁵⁶ These coalitions sowed seeds of clan-base jealousy sometimes over water, livestock and power.

During the civil war, clans living in the different parts of the country felt victimized by the Isaaq dominated clan of Barre's governments. For instance in the Somaliland districts of Elayo and Laascano, which border north-east Somalia, the clans felt they were discriminated against and "would prefer not to be part of Somaliland".⁵⁷

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

This clan divide brought about fear and antagonism among the different clans, as each clan craved for a balance between warlords and their militias. This has culminated to the deterioration of the long-standing socio-cultural stronghold of the country.

4.3 Actors and Issues in the Somali Conflict

In Chapter three, it was posited that a proper understanding of the issues and actors in a conflict is significant if there is to be an effective conflict management. The conflict in Somalia has been between three fighting forces: “the factional militia groups, the clan or community militia groups, and the militia men who join the factional or clan militia whenever their services are required.”⁵⁸ The factional militia groups are not properly organized and they do not conform to the regular perception of formal army nor of an organized guerilla movement. The clan or community militia groups constitute young men who are controlled and maintained by the clan elders of the communities. They act as the defense mechanism for the communities. The militia men who join the factional or clan militia are “freelance”. They are also referred to as the “Morans” in different parts of Somalia are not gainful employed. Hence the main fighting has been between the faction headed by Ali Mahdi Mohamed and the other USC branch led by the General Mohamed Farah Aideed. The key issues in the conflict in Somalia is clan-based fighting for power and other benefits of the national cake.

4.4 Conflict Management in Somalia

Like other African countries affected by numerous localized and national conflicts, Somalia has in the last thirty years been afflicted by the effects of the civil war that stroke the country since the ousting of President Siad Barre. However, conflict was

⁵⁸ “Problems and Prospects” *Life and Peace Review*, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1994, http://www.sas.upenn.edu/African_studies/Newsletters/peace.html

managed by traditional institutions of peace and reconciliation in the past. The different elders and leaders of the clans and sub-clans have had to resort to traditional structures of conflict resolution. This section will examine how conflict in Somalia has been managed in the colonial and post colonial period.

4.4.1 Conflict Management in Colonial Somalia

Conflict management in Somalia during the colonial period used indigenous conflict management and resolutions mechanisms, which used local actors and traditional community based judicial and legal decision-making mechanisms to manage and resolve conflicts within and between communities, clans and sub-clans. Through the influence of poetry, the role of elders, disputes were resolved. The following paragraphs will explain these issues.

4.4.1.1 The Use of Poetry

Poetry is held in high esteem in several societies. Poets are honoured in the community and have been actively involved in peacemaking. In several cultures, poetry is widely understood and enjoyed, and has the ability to influence public opinion. For instance in Somalia, poetry “can help move people toward either war or reconciliation.”⁵⁹ It can help identify grievances, argue for causes, rights and responsibility and justify the views and demands of different groups.

⁵⁹ Indigenous Conflict Management Mechanisms (Community-Based/Traditional/Indigenous Mediation; Community-Based Conflict Mitigation: Grassroots Approaches to Peace, <http://www.caii.dc.com/ghai/tookbox4.htm>

4.4.1.2 The Role of Elders

Traditionally, Somali elders were usually solicited to resolve conflicts on the basis of “mutually agreed principles involving existing *xeer* and legal precedent.”⁶⁰ The elders function as a court “with broad and flexible powers to interpret evidence, impose judgements, and manage the process of reconciliation.”

“Traditional settlements involved different kinds of compensation for the party offended. It ranged from the payment of money *diya* or *xaal* in the form of camels, horses or other livestock. The offer of a woman referred to as *godobtir* to the offended party was practiced chiefly to strengthen inter-communal ties in the wake of disputes.”⁶¹

Disputes were managed by the elders during the gatherings of elders, traditionally called the “*hirs*”. These elders represented different clans and communities and they handled the day-to day affairs of the communities. Elders have “an executive authority, but instead acts as mediators and peacemakers, and said to be able to ‘see beyond the fight’.”⁶² In Somaliland for example, all the clans and some of the larger sub-clans now have their own Supreme Council of Elders, *the guurti*. It fulfils a dual role as “the legislative and executive, and deals with the everyday questions arising within the clan and also handles arbitration between different clans.” In the absence of legitimate institutions, clans and sub-clans have had to resort to their own traditional structures of conflict resolution. But the replacement of customary laws with judicial law changed and eroded the structure of the traditional system.

⁶⁰ UNIFEM, *Somalia Between Peace and War: Somali Women at the Eve of the 21st Century*, (African women for Peace Series, UNIFEM Nairobi, 1998), p.51

⁶¹ *Ibid.* p.51

⁶² M. Bradbury, “A Comparative Study of Somalia Approaches to Reconciliation” paper presented at the All- Africa Conference on African Principles of Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation, Addis Ababa, 1999, pp.49-51

4.4.2 Conflict Management in Post Colonial Somalia

The Somalia conflict evolved dramatically after the collapse of the Barre regime in 199. Since then several attempts have been made by the international community to bring about peace and reconciliation in Somalia. This section of this study will attempt to look at the different international interventions towards the restoration of peace in Somalia. Specifically, it will look at the United Nations and the Somalia conflict, the OAU and the Somalia conflict, IGAD and the Somalia conflict.

4.4.3 The United Nations and the Conflict in Somalia

United Nations involvement in the Somalia crisis began January 1992 with the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 733, which called for an arms embargo, UN humanitarian assistance and a cease-fire. However, there was little implementation of this resolution in practice. As a result, Resolution 751 on 24 April 1992 had created the United Nations Somalia Mission (UNOSOM), which was to send 50 military observers to monitor a cease-fire accepted by the warring parties on 3 March 1992. The first observers (Pakistani soldiers) had been deployed, with very little achievement. Another UN Security Council voted Resolution 775 (28 August 1992), which called for a humanitarian airlift but remained rather vague as to what the contents of the 'intervention' should be. The United Nations was hesitating on the verge of full-scale involvement.

The problem with the way the whole operation was conceived is that while the technical issues were very carefully thought out, its general policy framework was completely neglected. The U.S./UN forces, grouped under the United Nations

International Task Force (UNITAF) banner, entered into Somalia unaware of what awaited them.

4.4.4 The UNITAF Period (December 1992 – May 1993)

From the beginning, the UNITAF intervention displayed its main strengths and weaknesses. Its main strength was the speed with which humanitarian aid was deployed throughout the area of intervention. Mention should be made here of the fact that “the UNITAF intervention took place in seven of Somalia’s fifteen provinces with about 35 per cent of the country’s territory and about 60 per cent of its population.”⁶³ Mogadishu was quickly secured, the provinces of Hiran, Baqol, Bay, Lower Shebelle and Lower Jubba were brought under partial but sufficient control for food distribution and conflict and starvation quickly receded. After a couple of months, one could cautiously conclude that the operation had been a success.

4.4.5 The OAU and the Conflict in Somalia

A significant number of initiatives aimed at assisting in resolving the conflict have been undertaken by the International Community at large, including the OAU, the UN (initially through its UNOSOM operation which ended in 1995), the League of Arab States, the OIC, and the European Union, and individual States namely Italy and the United States of America. Countries in the Horn of Africa sub-region, particularly “Ethiopia (which was mandated by the OAU to act on its behalf in facilitating the Peace Process in Somalia) and Kenya, have also made a contribution within the framework of the sub-regional organization, IGAD.”⁶⁴ The Cairo Agreement (facilitated by the

⁶³ G. Prunier, “Somalia: Civil War, Intervention and Withdrawal 1990-1995”

<http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/country/writnet/wrisom.htm>

⁶⁴ “OAU and the Conflict in Somalia” <http://www.oau-oua.org/document/mechanism/english/mech15.htm>

Government of Egypt), was the twelfth such Agreement sponsored by the International Community.

From 10 to 15 October 1996, a meeting of the three main faction leaders of Mogadishu, namely Messrs Ali Mahdi, Osman Atto and Hussein Aideed, was convened in Nairobi under the auspices of President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya. A joint Communique which was issued at the end of the meeting made declarations on critical issues as “a cessation of hostilities with immediate effect; the free movement of people in Mogadishu; the removal of all roadblocks leading from one region to another; the cessation of hostile media propaganda; and the facilitation of delivery of humanitarian assistance.”⁶⁵

Soon after the initiative led by President Moi’s initiative, another development of considerable significance took place. Twenty-six Somali political movements met in a high level consultation at Sodere, Ethiopia, from 22 November 1996 to 3 January 1997. The Conference was facilitated by the Government of Ethiopia under the mandate conferred on it by the OAU and IGAD. It followed a series of consultations which the Government of Ethiopia had conducted with the Somali leaders and their representatives between August to October 1996, at Addis Ababa and elsewhere.

After eight weeks of continuous consultations at Sodere, “an Agreement was signed on the establishment of a forty-one member National Salvation Council (NSC) consisting of an eleven-member National Executive Committee.”⁶⁶ It was led by a five-member Co-Chairmanship with the authority to act and speak on behalf of the NSC. It was aimed at paving the way for the eventual establishment of a Transitional National or

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

Central Authority for the country, to be known either as the Transitional Central Authority or the Provisional Central Government.

The International Community continued to observe the continuing rivalries with concern. Thus, on 26 February 1997, the UN Security Council called upon all the Somali factions to cease all hostilities and cooperate with regional and other efforts for peace and national reconciliation in Somalia, including the Sodere and Nairobi initiatives. Similarly, the OAU Council of Ministers meeting in Tripoli in February, 1997, urged the Somali parties, which had not participated in the Sodere Conference, to join the peace process in order to bring about an all inclusive political settlement in the country.

Subsequently, a number of initiatives were undertaken to bring the leaders of the two main groups together. Meetings were held accordingly to resolve disputes at the intra-clan and inter-factional levels. These initiatives were undertaken variously by the Somali leaders themselves, involving elders from the various clans in Mogadishu, and IGAD and the International Community at large, including Italy. Among the first of these initiatives was a meeting which was convened in Mogadishu on 10 January 1997 by a Special Envoy of the Italian Government, between Mr. Ali Mahdi (of the NSC) and Mr. Hussein Aideed.⁶⁷ The outcome of that meeting was an agreement on a cease-fire and the formation of a Joint Police Force to monitor the cease-fire and enforce the removal of checkpoints in the city. Agreement was also reached on the establishment of a Joint committee to work on the question of the re-opening of the seaport and airport and to implement the provisions of the above-mentioned Nairobi Communique of October, 1996.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

Efforts by the Somali leaders, IGAD and the International Community led to additional meetings, especially among the three main faction leaders of Mogadishu who were afforded the opportunity to talk more among themselves. It is important to note that some of these meetings between the factional leaders in question occurred without the facilitation of a third party.

In a nutshell, these talks “constituted an important confidence-building measure.”⁶⁸ Nonetheless, it is equally important to note, that most of these discussions took place in terms of generalities and no concrete decisions were taken, for example, regarding such critical, outstanding issues as the re-opening of the airport and seaport. Nevertheless, the 2000 IGAD led Peace Initiative in Arta, Djibouti, broke some remarkable record in the history of peace initiatives in Somalia.⁶⁹

4.4.6 Somali Women and the Conflict in Somalia

Because violent conflict and its effects are felt differently by different groups of people and at different times, their approach to conflict management, conflict resolution and peace-building is different. Somali society is structured according to clans and sub-clans and women are not considered full members of the clan system. This clan structure most of the time impedes women’s active involvement in socio-politico-economic decision-making issues and in peace agreement forums concerning their country. In the traditional set-up, “women are not considered for formal positions of power in society and are typically excluded from formal meetings regardless of whether these are focused on conflict resolution or other community concerns.”⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ See Chapter Two for details on the Arta Peace Initiative for Somalia.

⁷⁰ UNIFEM, *Somalia Between Peace and War: Somali Women on the Eve of the 21st Century*, op.cit., p.51

As members of the civil society, Somali women have equally been affected by the civil war and have been struggling to broker peace in their communities. Through women's associations and women's peace groups, prayer walks and meetings have been held to protest against continuous civil strife. Women have played significant roles in the different peace initiatives held in different regions in Somalia. For instance, in Mudug in the Bari region, women's efforts helped to reduce political tension within the SSDF faction.

4.4.6.1 Somalia Women and the Management of the Conflict in Somalia

Despite these impediments, Somali women from different clans have been undertaking different initiatives and strategies to reduce the effects of civil war in the country, to restore peace and security in their communities as well as take part in the national reconciliation process. The women have come to realize that working together in one accord is crucial and that "peace does not come unless everyone respects others."⁷¹ In other words several people including women from different backgrounds should be involved in peace-building.

This same point of view has been emphasized by Tongeren. In his contributing article on 'Reflections on Peace-building', he lists fifteen key points among which he stresses that many people and sectors as possible be involved in peace-building. In his own words he says "it is an obvious point but one which is, nevertheless, frequently overlooked: it is essential that as many sectors of the society as possible be included in any peace-building process."⁷²

⁷¹ D. R. Marshall, *Women in War and Peace: Grassroots Peace-building* op.cit., p.13

⁷² P. van Tongeren, 'Reflections on Peace-building' in *People Building Peace 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World* (Netherlands: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999)p.124

From restoring demolished schools to establishing clean water sources, addressing internal displacement and migration, opening of inter-clan dialogue on peace as well as creating strategic alliances with other actors and sectors of the society such as religious leaders, the business community and the military, Somali women have been involved in several initiatives, meetings and conferences to deliberate on peace and security for the society. They have organized demonstrations against war and its effects. For example, in 1995, during the International Women's day Celebrations, the women held a peace demonstration during which they sang slogans such as "Somali women want peace not war."⁷³ Sometimes they reacted by physically attacking men who carried arms in a bid to say enough is a enough.

In 1992, the Somaliland Women Development Association (SOWDA) was formed in the north-west part of Somalia which in collaboration with some NGOs established a police force with the goal of "creating a peaceful and secure environment for the public to conduct their daily affairs without fear of being robbed, or attacked by armed militia on the prowl for their next victim."⁷⁴

In the north-east of Somalia, specifically in Bosaso, the Hufan initiative was born. This initiative named after the woman who fought single-handedly and lobbied "to secure a monthly allocation of funds from the Bosaso Port helped to create and manage a police force and a prison to ensure prevalence of peace and security in the town."⁷⁵ This initiative drastically cut-down the rate of crime in Bosaso.

⁷³ A. Warsame, *The Civil War in Northern Somalia (Somaliland): Its Impact on Pastoralists, Especially Women and Children*, paper prepared for the Institute of Social studies and NOVIB project on pastoralism and resource conflicts in Eastern Africa, Uppsala, 1996.

⁷⁴ F. Jama, 'Somali Women's Role in Building Peace and Security' paper presented at the United Nations Security Council Arria Formula Meeting on Women, Peace and Security, October, 2000.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

The Southern part of Somalia, to be precise Merca, had another initiative. A demobilization project was launched in 1997 by the Women Development Organization with the objective of “offering education, housing and alternative income opportunities for one hundred and fifty boys and men who were part of the militia. They exchanged their guns for a higher future.”⁷⁶

The scenario in Mogadishu which is the capital was exciting as the women took upon themselves to challenge the civil society “to play a more proactive role in promoting peace after warlords failed to reach agreement after 12 reconciliation meetings.” Led by the Coalition for Grassroots Women’s Organizations (COGWO) and with the support of Peace and Human Rights Network (PHRN), different sectors of the civil society (media, youth, women, ex-militia, sports groups and traditional leaders) were brought together to coordinate and establish a strategy for peace-making with the goal of developing a culture for peace and human rights in the capital city and in the region.

It was on the basis of the above initiatives that the Djibouti Conference took a different turn with regards to women’s participation. Unlike the Mogadishu Peace Conference in 1995 where Somali women were granted observers status, this time around, the women were actively involved in the mediation discussions. Women were recognized as a clan of their own – a clan referred to as the sixth clan since Somalia has five major clans. The “Sixth clan was formed as a result of the discussions and agreement that resulted from the Djibouti Symposium”.⁷⁷ This is a symposium that was held prior to

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ A. Hagi Elmi, “Women Participation in Peace-building and Mediation Process: The Sixth Clan: Somali Women’s role in the Arta Peace Process” paper presented at a seminar on Gender Mainstreaming in IGAD Peace-Building and Conflict Resolution Programmes, 15-16 October, 2001.

the peace conference itself to provide technical advice and information on crucial issues that would guide the deliberations of the peace process.

Women have played significant role in the quest for peace and security in Somalia to the extent that they are often referred to as the 'social and economic back-bone of Somalia.'⁷⁸ They actively participated in all sub-committees and in the Charter drafting Committee, which drew up the interim constitution of Somalia. Somali women were able to "put their direct input into the Charter, especially on issues dealing with human rights, women's rights, women's participation in governance and all decision making processes and minority rights."⁷⁹ At the end of the day, twenty-five seats in the proposed assembly have been reserved for women. According to one woman delegate who participated in the Arta Peace Process, the outcome is "a dream come true and this is what we have been struggling for, and we believe that it is a notable achievement for Somalia women and we are very much delighted on that."⁸⁰

The above discussion has clearly shown that women no doubt are actors who are indispensable in post-conflict recovery and in rebuilding of war-torn societies. Despite their commitment and desire for peace in their war devastated societies, their cultural and social structure most often impede their activities and involvement in peace decision-making processes. In Somalia for example, the recommendation to include at least one woman to the Transitional National Council was rejected by many clans who belief a woman belongs to her father's clan.

⁷⁸ Life and Peace Institute: 'We Cannot Have peace, We Also Have to Live' in *People Building Peace 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World* (Netherlands:European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999),

p.201

⁷⁹ UNIFEM Narrative Report on the Regional Peace Project, 2000, p.6

⁸⁰ BBC News Africa: 'Haggling at the Somali Peace Talks'

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_869000/869516.htm

Nevertheless, women's valuable contributions in peace processes and peace-building need to be supported. Building on women's resources and capacities and supporting their projects "for rebuilding is important and necessary to avoid their marginalization, but it cannot be done without a view to the wider conditioning and constraining processes of rebuilding society after civil war."⁸¹

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has offered an overview of the history, geography, the people, the economy, foreign relations and political situation in Somalia. It has also provided the fundamental causes of the conflict in Somalia which is connected to the colonial and post colonial periods. An examination of how different interventions have been made to managed the conflict has also been highlighted. From the examination, it has been revealed that the main concerns that have often brought conflict in Somalia and the Greater Somalia is the goal of bringing all Somalis under one flag on the one hand and on the other, power and control over economic resources and opportunities. Barre exploited clans differences and rivalries as a way to remain in power. The European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation summarizes the issues and situation in Somalia thus:

"The issues at stake for the warlords in Somalia are power, money, land and other natural resources. These national resources include pastures, water points, urban poverty and markets. The control of the capital and other cities, of ports and airports, of export crops such as cattle, bananas have been permanently contested."⁸²

⁸¹ UNRISD, *Women and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Issues and Sources*
(<http://www.unrisd.org/wsp/op3/op3-12.htm>)

⁸² Ibid.

The collapse of the Somali state and the disintegration of Somali society after the overthrow of Siad Barre's military authoritarian rule in 1991 has among its several consequences prompted Somali elites, citizens, political as well as conflict management analysts to question the very existence of the state and society over which the political struggle had been waged for over two decades. It has been revealed also that sources of the conflict have also stemmed from the traditional political institutions which "promote a curious blend of democracy, equality and anarchy."⁸³ The conflict has made Somalia not to have "no international recognized polity, no national administration exercising real authority, no formal legal system, no civil administration and no public institutions."⁸⁴

⁸³ A.J. Ahmed, *The Invention of Somalia*, op.cit., p.41

⁸⁴ Ibid., p.xi

Chapter 5

5.1 Critical Analysis of Women's Role in Peace-building

This study set out to examine the role of women in peace-building using the case of Burundi and Somalia. Chapter One provided the context, the problem, objectives, justification, literature review, hypothesis, the conceptual framework and methodology of the study. In this chapter it was established that the end of the Cold War did not yield any fruitful results in terms of stable and peaceful relationships between states. As a result, political antagonism, distrust, suspicion, incompatible positions over an issue, hostile attitudes, and certain types of diplomatic and military actions,¹ have brought about violent conflicts and severe effects on countries. This has been the situation with Burundi and Somalia, the case studies for this study.

In these two countries and in many others in the world, the consequences of conflict have been severe on women. Although, there are other consequences faced by different sectors of the economy, these go beyond the scope of this study. The question was raised as to women's contribution in bringing about peace in their countries. It was again demonstrated that women do play an important role in peace-building and conflict resolution. Having identified the problem, the objectives of the study were provided which are to establish specifically the role played by Burundi and Somali women in peace-building, assess their role and stipulate their hindrances towards these efforts. The justification enhanced the research problem and throughout the analysis, gaps and shortfalls have been identified in women's peace-building efforts.

¹ K.J. Hosti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis* (Prentice-Hall International Inc, 1988) p.396

Some of these gaps are their lack of support from their respective governments, under-representation in political structures, lack of training in conflict resolution and peace-building. An in-depth examination of these gaps will be provided later. The literature reviewed suggested that women should be part of the peace-building team after conflict. From the study, the two hypothesis stated are: women's active involvement in peace-building initiatives contribute to conflict resolution, and including women in decision-making structures influences the outcome of peace negotiations.

Chapter Two discussed the theoretical issues and frameworks of the study. A theoretical appreciation of a peace process was provided. During the analysis, three stages of peace negotiations were given (pre-negotiation phase, negotiation phase and post negotiation phase). The assumptions of the three stages were discussed which eventually culminated to another discussion on Tract One and Tract Two diplomacy - (formal and informal negotiations). In the light of the study, it was inferred that women as non-state actors in peace negotiations, are mostly involved in Tract Two diplomacy. Theories and processes of conflict management were examined.

In Chapter Three, a discussion on how conflicts originate in general was given. Specifically, the different levels of conflicts in Burundi, their causes, their actors and issues were examined. A discussion of how these conflicts have been managed by different conflict mechanisms and institutions was provided. Of course women's participation in the conflicts and their role in the management of these conflicts was equally discussed. It was posited that without an understanding of the background on a particular conflict, it would be difficult to grasp the issues on the ground, hence difficult to achieve any fruitful post-conflict initiatives like peace-building. This Chapter revealed

that the continuous cycle of violence between the Hutu and the Tutsi actually started after Burundi gained independence in 1962, after a recorded period of peaceful cohabitation. The conflicts which reached their peak in 1965, 1972, 1988, 1991 and 1993 “were attributed both to ethnic manipulation during the colonial period and to disastrous management of the country by Burundian elites from the 1960s on.”²

The study demonstrated that, the conflicts were subjected to different conflict management mechanisms like the monarchy, the *bashigantahe*, different international, regional and non-governmental organizations, with the aim to find appropriate responses to the conflict. It further looked at the peace process that ensued –the Burundi Peace Process. In the case of Burundi, a peace accord was the end result. At the time the study was being undertaken, plans for implementation were being made with the establishment of an Implementation Monitoring Committee and a Transitional Government. Burundi women were at a later stage included in the peace process, a good number of their recommendations were incorporated into the final peace accord. The women are currently being trained on capacity building for the implementation of the accord.

Chapter Four in turn examined the different levels of conflicts in Somalia, their causes, their actors and issues. A discussion was also provided on how these conflicts have been managed through different conflict management mechanisms and institutions. Women's involvement in the conflicts and their role in the management of these conflicts was also examined. It equally considered further the peace process that ensued –the Arta Peace Initiative, which ended up with the establishment of an interim government. Women's role in the peace process was captured.

² “Good Governance and Conflict management in Burundi, op.cit

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² “Good Governance and Conflict management in Burundi, op.cit

Chapter Five sets out to examine the interconnection of all these issues in the preceding chapters with the goal of achieving the stated objectives of the study. It will begin by first giving an overview on the concept of peace-building. In the process, the following concerns will be considered: the aim of peace-building, the means of peace-building, the time of peace-building, the actor and the process of peace-building, the organization of peace-building, women's under-representation in political structures and women's lack of training in conflict resolution and peace-building. From the overview, women's peace-building roles will be adequately contextualized and analyzed.

Since peace-building falls within the broad discipline of conflict management, the analysis has further been strengthened by examining theoretical issues and frameworks within the scope of this study. The study adopted an analytical framework which focused on the assumption that in undertaking any analysis on peace-building, conflict and conflict resolution aspects have to be taken into account. In this light, the concepts of conflict, conflict resolution, conflict management and settlement of conflict have been examined.

5.1.2 The Aim of peace-building

The overall aim of peace-building according to Galtung³ is to create peace with which he associates two concepts: negative peace and positive peace. To him negative peace implies the total absence of violence while positive peace means there exist a dispute which has not or does result into violence. On the basis of this, Galtung sees the task of peace-building to be that of promoting positive peace. With this proposition,

³ J.Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict Development and Civilization*. (Sage: London, 1996), pp. 1-3.

peace-building analyses have focused on addressing the “root causes of conflict.”⁴ But these “root causes” are profound and complex and not easy to identify and understand for would-be peace-builders. In developing countries, some of these root causes often include skewed land property structures, environmental degradation, and unequal political representation at state level.⁵

In this light, it is therefore significant for women to have a proper position in these structures to enable them undertake their peace-building activities accordingly. From Kenneth Bush’s point of view, peace-building is not about the “imposition of ‘solutions’, it is about the creation of opportunities, and the creation of political, economic and social spaces, within which indigenous actors can identify, develop and employ the resources necessary to build a peaceful, prosperous and just society.”⁶ From the point of view of Clements, peace-building should be aimed at channelling the energy generated by conflict in constructive, non-violent rather than destructive and violent directions. He explains that the “aim is not to eliminate conflict but to utilize conflictual processes for generative and positive change.”⁷

5.1.3 The Means of Peace-building

Peace-building like any post-conflict endeavor requires funding. Without sufficient funds kept aside for this, peace-building measures and ventures would fail. If “peace is built on social, political, economic and ecological foundations that serve the welfare of the people, funding is inevitable to accomplish these components of the peace-

⁴ United Nations, DAC guidelines on conflict, peace and development co-operation. (OECD, 1997), p.49.

⁵ I.W. Zartman (ed.), *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an end to civil wars*. (The Brookings Institution, New York, 1995), p.5

⁶ K. Bush, *A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) Of Development Projects in Conflict Zones*. (IDRC: Ottawa, 1998).

⁷ K.P. Clements, “Peace-building and Conflict Transformation”
<http://www.gmn.edu/academic/pes/clements.htm>

building process. This equally denotes that women's peace-building activities need substantial financial support. Burundi and Somalia women have through their initiatives and activities, lobbied for funds from bilateral donors. This has always compelled them to develop relevant proposals.

5.1.4 The Timing of Peace-building

The life cycle of conflict as has been captured in Chapter One of this study goes through the stages of: early stage or relative calmness stage where there is no manifestation of tension, and there is stable peace. It then moves to a state of tension or mid-conflict stage where there is unstable peace manifested by the presence of low-level political conflict and political instability which brings the stage to near crisis. From the near crisis stage, it progresses to the open violence stage where there is crisis, incipient violence and high intensity conflict. Finally it moves to the late stage, which is the post-conflict stage manifested in the total breakdown of civic society and abject humanitarian crises.

The question here is at what time, period or stage of the conflict cycle do peace-builders come in. Some schools of thought have argued that peace-building should commence before the actual manifestation of violence, when there is stable peace. For example, it has been proposed that at this stage, because chances of violence are low, stable relations and institutions should be maintained. In addition, "domestic, political, social and economic institutions, procedures and other decision processes that define the public problem agenda, goals and policies should be created, strengthened and reformed."⁸

⁸ Conflict Prevention A Guide, 'Stages of Conflict and Peace with Corresponding Policy Tools' in <http://www.caii-dc.com/ghai/stablepeace.htm>

In Lederach's view, peacebuilding should recognize four overlapping time frames:

“the immediate action to intervene in a crisis; short-range planning which should focus on training and preparation to address the conflict at hand; peace-building activities which should respond to longer range plans, focusing on producing desired social changes over the next decade, and finally over the next generation.”⁹

Using Lederach's models of conflict and peace-building, Prendergast argues that poorly conceived short-term peace-building interventions have exacerbated increased long-term difficulties. He cites the case of Rwanda where the international community failed utterly to prevent or stop the Rwandan genocide. The International community mounted a massive relief project to aid the Rwandan refugees in neighboring countries. However, these aid programs failed to distinguish between the victims and supporters of the genocide regime.¹⁰ He further argues that, in their immediate response, to the Rwanda situation, “humanitarian agencies furnished aid that, though it saved lives, reinforced the authority structures of the perpetrators of genocide.”¹¹

If women are not represented in the government structures they cannot be able to influence the socio-politico economic reforms, agendas and other policy issues relevant at the peace-building stage of the conflict cycle. Without delving into the other stages, it very clear that women need ample representation in the political structures to be able to influence policies that will enhance their peace-building initiatives at the different stages of the conflict cycle.

⁹ J.P.Ledarach, *Building Peace*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), p.171

¹⁰ J. Prendergast, “The Time Dimension in Peace-building: The Case of Rwanda”

<http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/example/pren7419.htm>

¹¹ Ibid.

5.1.5 The Actors and the Process and Action Dimension of Peace-building

The issue of who are the key actors of peace-building is an important aspect in peace-building processes. Because peace-building is made of a set of concrete actions, it is important to identify its actors and processes. According to Kuhne¹² peace-building is a concept that promotes the participation and domination by external actors. To him if peace-building actions are dominated by external actors only, less attention will be paid to those actions undertaken by other groups, for instance women. Haugerudbraaten¹³ has suggested that peace-building can be conceptualized in two different ways: either as the concrete actions taken to support and promote peace or as an aggregate process. By this process, peace-building becomes “an outcome that depends on the combined effects of a number of actions occurring at different levels.”¹⁴ These aggregate actions are actions of peace-building undertaken at the local level by indigenous actors, which is the level that women have demonstrated more visibility. Peace-building can be applied at all stages in a conflict, as it develops and threatens to generate into violence, when violence has been made manifest and when violence has stopped or when a peace settlement has been reached between the conflicting parties. Specifically,

“peace-building in a pre-violent context involves correctly identifying the latent tensions in a society, and creating or supporting institutional mechanisms to address these tensions...In the midst of violent conflict or in its aftermath, it is about consolidating disrupted or new relationships and re-establishing functional cooperation between and among the victims of violence...In a post-war situation, peace-building is about the resuscitation or invention of more effective means of mediating conflict, so the need to revert to the use of force is avoided.”¹⁵

¹² W. Kuhne (ed.), *Winning the Peace: Concept and Lessons Learned of Post-Conflict Peace-Building* Report from an International Workshop, Berlin, Stiftung Wissenschaft und politik, Ebenhausen, Germany, 4-6 July, 1996, p.5.

¹³ H. Haugerudbraaten, 'Peace-building: Six Dimensions and Two Concepts' in <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/7.6.peacebuilding.html>

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ “Conciliation Resources: Community Peace-building” <http://www.c-r.org/cr/commompeace.htm>

5.1.6 The Organization of Peace-building

The concern of the key actors in peace-building is interrelated to how it should be organized and coordinated. The saying “two is better than one” is applicable here. When efforts of peace-building are centralized, there is bound to be a successful outcome. Peace-building that is based on the ground- referred to as “peace-building from below” by Lederach is a condition that is destined for success. However, it is also agreed that the top-down perception of peace-building or “peace-building from above” would adequately complement with that from below and yield an absolute positive outcome in the process.

Considering the fact that the process of transforming a post-conflict society towards a positive level of peace takes a long time, and acknowledging the fact that women contribute to peace-building initiatives, it is an inevitable prerequisite for them to work in close collaboration with the external actors and all other actors with the same interests.

An adequate analysis of women’s role in peace-building cannot be achieved without taking into account the type of actors women are in conflict and peace-building issues. As non-state actors, they bring “different values and points of view to the conflict management process”.¹⁶ (This has been examined in Chapter Three).¹⁷

In this study, it has continuously been reiterated that in conflict situations women become active agents in the survival of their societies. They have been the major victims of the conflicts in Burundi and Somalia. Nevertheless “the traditional exclusion of women from political and economic spheres has left women unprepared to assume their

¹⁶ M.A. Spiegel, “The Namibian Negotiations and the Problem of Neutrality” in S. Touval & I.W. Zatzman (eds), See also M. Mwangi, *Conflict, Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management* op.cit., p.52

¹⁷ See Chapter Two for details.

rightful roles in the reconciliation and development processes.”¹⁸ This line of thought has been put forward by several authors. For instance Stiehm arguing on international peacekeeping argues that: “the idea of combining women’s peaceful and men’s aggressive abilities is an advantage. This will be an adequate opportunity to achieve equality between the sexes.”¹⁹ This neglect of the participation of women in peace processes “is one example of the failure to recognize and build upon the strengths and resources of local communities”.²⁰ Despite the fact that women’s groups have been trying to initiate peace processes in different parts of the world, political obstacles discourage their contributions, and their efforts and can lead to the perpetuation of conflict. For instance, to move a step off the study, “there were no women involved in the Dayton peace negotiations in November 1995.”²¹

Coming back to the case under study, “Somalia women were excluded from United Nations peace conferences, which merely gave legitimacy and increased the power to the Somali warlords who were not accountable to the local communities”.²² Burundi women were relegated to the background when the Arusha peace talks began in 1998. Alice Ntwarante states that: “the most difficult moment for us was when we arrived at Arusha and saw that no one wanted us.”²³ The women’s efforts to remain in one accord despite their political differences were questioned by some of the delegates. “They tried to separate us she says. They asked, “why are you together as one? You should be

¹⁸ Mohamed I. Farah, “Promoting Grassroots Participation of Somali Women in Peace and Development, *Life and Peace Review*, Vol.8, No.4, 04/94, p.11.

¹⁹ J.K. Stiehm, ‘United Nations peacekeeping: Men’s and Women’s work,’ in M.K. Meyer and E. Prugl (eds), *Gender Politics in Global Governance* (Rowmann Littlefield, New York, 1999)pp.55-56

²⁰ (Center for Conflict Resolution 2000, “New Developments in Conflict Resolution part 3 [http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/dislearn/3-part 3.html](http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/dislearn/3-part%203.html))

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid

²³ UNIFEM, *Women at the Peace Table Making a Difference*, op.cit., p.29

supporting your own parties.”²⁴ This chapter analyzes in particular the roles Burundi and Somali women have played in contributing to peace-building in their conflict infested countries. It further examines the strategies they employed in their efforts and factors that have hindered and are still hindering their commitments to peace-building.

It was again established that women are the worst victims of war. They “suffer displacement, loss of home and property, involuntary disappearances, sexual slavery, rape, sexual abuse and forced pregnancy”.²⁵ Common effects for women, in addition to the direct suffering caused by rape itself include: “ social stigmatization, physical and mental injury (as many war rapes are multiple and accompanied by other forms of violence), illness (from sexually-transmitted diseases, usually with negative impacts on reproductive health), as well as death itself (from HIV/AIDS and assault).”²⁶ Even when they are not perpetrators of war, they are often the first to start demonstrating against war while calling for peace. In many parts of the world women are actively involved in peace-building and reconciliation activities.

In Georgia, for example internally displaced women’s association have organized to bring together children from Georgia, Abkhazian and Ossetian. Model villages are being built in Rwanda to accommodate Hutus and Tutsis. All these efforts have the goal to “improve relations and build a sustainable, long lasting peace”²⁷ Furthermore, they go to enhance the fact that “the presence of women seems to be a potent ingredient in

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ J. N. Kamau, *Assessment Report On: Women’s Participation in the Peace Process* (Economic Commission for Africa, 1999), p.3

²⁶ C. Twagiramariya, and M. Turshen, ‘Favours to Give and Consenting Victims. The sexual Politics of Survival in Rwanda,’ in Turshen, M and Twagiramariya, C. (eds.), *What Women Do in Wartime*. (Zed Press, 1998), pp.101-117

²⁷ S. Anderson, “Women’s Many Roles in Reconciliation” in *People Building Peace: 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World* (European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 2000), p.230

fostering and maintaining confidence and trust among the local population".²⁸ Cheryl Bernard reaffirms that it is important to bring women into the entire processes that lead to peace-building. He indicates that in conflict prevention, peace negotiations, or conflict mediation and post-conflict reconstruction, women make significant contributions.²⁹

After conflict women are hardly recognized for their contributions as bread winners and carers, let alone reward for their roles as social and political organizers. They usually receive much less support than male fighters in post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation projects. The support women receive is insufficient, hence women need more support for their peace-building initiatives as El Bushra suggests: "although peace-building initiatives to assist ex-combatants are important, it is also essential to consider the need of women and recognize the burdens placed upon them."³⁰

The study has established that peace-building is a long-term process which specifically depends on the involvement, commitment and capacity of the domestic population. In current usage, peace-building is an attempt after a peace has been negotiated or imposed, "to address the sources of present hostility and build local capacities for conflict resolution."³¹ In Chapter One, it was argued that peace-building has strategies, and these strategies seek to address the underlying causes of violent conflicts and crises either to prevent them or if they have occurred, to ensure that they will not recur.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ C. Bernard, 'Bringing Women In' in D.R. Marshall, *Women in War and Peace: Women in Grassroots Peace-building*. (United States Institute of Peace, 2000), p.9

³⁰ J.El Busbra, 'Gendered Interpretations of Conflict: Research Issues for COPE,' Working paper, ACORD, February 1998, p.29; United Nations Commission for the Status of Women, *Resolution on Women and Armed Conflict*, 1998:B

³¹ M.W. Doyle and N. Sambanis, *International Peace-building: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis*. (American Political Science Association, 2000), p.2

However, a peace-building strategy must be designed to address a particular conflict, broad parameters that fit most conflicts can be identified. According to Doyle and Sambanis, peace-building strategies should address "the local sources of hostilities; the local capacities for change and the (net) specific degree of international commitment available to assist change."³² This again reaffirms that all actors and parties to a conflict, including men and women should be involved in the implementation of post-conflict peace-building activities in communities. In the Middle East, "mothers' demonstrations and lobbying of parliamentarians led to Israel's pull-out from Lebanon. In Kosovo, Servian women went to the streets against the conflict. The demonstration persuaded Yugoslav President Slobadan Milosevic to call off the fight a couple of days later."³³

Peace-building is now becoming a frequent vocabulary on the agenda of peace practitioners, international organizations and individual governments. Continuous focus to peace-building issues is revealing the complex nature of the subject. Despite its exaltations, peace-building still requires careful study since "the fluid and insecure nature of conditions on the ground and the divergent motives of the parties can often be traced back to centuries of tension and conflict".³⁴ It has been demonstrated that during the period when conflict is in progress, women become preoccupied with subsistence issues and day to day survival. As a result, peace-building requires a focus on "subsistence issues where women in conflict zones have, of necessity acquired a particular expertise.

³² Ibid., p.5

³³ Canadian Peace-building Initiative, <http://www>.

³⁴ Heidi Hudson, 'Mainstreaming Gender in Peacekeeping Operations: Can Africa Learn from International Experience?' *Africa Security Review*, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2000, p. 18.

Shifting resources from strategic to subsistence concerns shifts the focus from fighting the war to building the peace,³⁵ where women's contributions are particularly notable.

The study has revealed that the situation on the ground needs to be seriously examined before peace-building activities begin. Within this complex peace-building phenomenon, there is a broad under-representation of women issues in this field, despite the fact that they are part of the population and civilians. The proposition to involve all parties to conflict in peace-building has enabled women to start taking part in the rebuilding and reconstruction of their war-torn communities. Women are increasingly being recognized as “essential “tools” in the peace-building process.”³⁶ Women’s intervention towards peace-building can be analyzed at two distinct levels: the internal and external. At the internal level, “women can positively influence social relations with the peace-building operations, and externally, they can be in close contact with the local population”.³⁷

It has been documented, women are perceived to make the following contributions to peacekeeping and peace-building operations:

“Their presence, especially in decision-making roles, send a clear message in favour of equality and non-discrimination against women.; women’s presence puts new items on the agenda, such as the sexual conduct of male peacekeepers... women are perceived as being more empathetic, which enhances their reconciliatory and political work as negotiators. They are perceived to foster confidence and trust – an important factor considering the fact that losing the trust of the local population may result in the increased vulnerability of peacekeepers... women provided valuable assistance to victims of sexual violence; women may have better and important access to women within a host country, especially in cases where culture and religion are deeply intertwined; they are seen as defusing tension rather than trying to control events; when there is a critical mass of women, it may have the effect of mobilizing women in the host country to

³⁵ D.R. Marshall, op.cit., p.18.

³⁶ Ibid. p.20.

³⁷ A. Helland and A. Kristensen, *Women in Peace Operations, Women and Armed Conflicts – A Study for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs* (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, 1999), p.83

become involved in peace-building, democratization, development and the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; adequate female presentation also tends to inhibit men's licentious behaviour. The presence of women generally has a positive influence on social relations within the broader organization and among the troops."³⁸

Any discussion on peace for every country that has struggled or is still in the process of recovering from war will not be complete if women are not mentioned. "Women dominate the process. Women's groups are the most motivated, the best organized, and arguably the most effective at lobbying."³⁹ Mention should be made of the fact that women's peace-building efforts and plans begin "long before the war breaks out."⁴⁰ For instance, in Kosovo, "they begin to come out as a niche in the long period of instability that began in 1989, when Serbian revoked the autonomy of Kosovo."⁴¹

In Africa women's concern on peace issues came to the limelight after the outcome of a process that began with the Kampala Action Plan on Women and Peace (1993, the African Platform of Action on Women, (Dakar, 1994), the Fourth World Conference on Women, (Beijing, 1995) and the Women's Leadership Forum on Peace (Johannesburg, 1996). It is with this background that the OAU and ECA "jointly established and launched in November, 1998, the African Women's Committee on Peace and Development (AWCPD) which is a major cornerstone of women's inclusion in peace processes and empowerment endeavors in the region since Beijing."⁴²

Burundi women were also not included when the Arusha Peace Talks began in 1998. The non-involvement of women in these processes have meant neglecting the potential resources women possess in effecting their roles as "bridge builders". Conflict

³⁸ Ibid. pp.84-85

³⁹ (OTR Kosovo 2, Volume 10, Issue 4, 2000, <http://www.advocacynet.org/news-22.html>).

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

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³⁸ Ibid. pp.84-85

³⁹ (OTR Kosovo 2, Volume 10, Issue 4, 2000, <http://www.advocacynet.org/news-22.html>).

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

resolution processes of which peace-building is a part, “could benefit by consulting more with local women about the root causes of the conflict, how their communities are affected by the conflict, how the obstacles to peace negotiations can be removed, and how traditional practices can offer alternative ways of ending the conflict”.⁴³

This opinion has been reinforced by Adam Curle and John Paul Lederach. They have both proposed and emphasized the idea of “peace-building from below”⁴⁴ which seeks “to identify, promote and build on resources and mechanisms within a cultural setting for constructively responding to and handling conflict”.⁴⁵ In other words “peace-building from below” means the significance of giving and empowering people at all levels in conflict-affected communities to build effective peace. Curle is of the opinion that

“since conflict resolution by outside bodies and individuals has so far proved ineffective [in the chaotic conditions of contemporary ethnic conflict – particularly, but not exclusively, in Somalia, Eastern Europe and the former USSR], it is essential to consider peacemaking potential within the following conflicting communities themselves.”⁴⁶

On his part, Lederach sees peace-building as ‘indigenous empowerment’ which

“suggests that conflict transformation must actively envision, include, respect, and promote the human and cultural resources from within a given setting. This involves a new set of lenses through which we do not primarily ‘see’ the setting and the people in it as the ‘problem’ and the outsider as the answer.”⁴⁷

These thoughts reinforce the analysis of this study. Women as local actors in peace-building need to be empowered and encouraged. As non-state actors, women’s

⁴² African Women’s Concern for Peace,
http://www.bellanet.org/partners/...ucab_womens_concern_for_peace.htm

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ ‘New Developments in Conflict Resolution’ http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/dislearn/3_part3.html

⁴⁵ Ibid

⁴⁶ A. Curle, *Another Way: Positive Response to Contemporary Conflict*. (Oxford University Press, 1996), p.96

⁴⁷ J.P. Lederach, *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures*. (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995), p.212

involvement in negotiation and reconciliation processes before, during and after conflict is noticeable in examples of women's peace initiatives in recent times. Non-state actors "bring different values and points of view to the conflict management process."⁴⁸ In pre-conflict situations, preventive measures such as early warning systems, preventive diplomacy and peace education are required. Women in several instances have demonstrated their role as agents of peace. For instance the role of South African women is commendable: "they served as active agents in preventive diplomacy as they are action-oriented and promote dialogue; and they can work successfully in dangerous and isolated areas".⁴⁹

During conflict, women mobilize to promote the resolution of conflicts at local, national and regional levels. They bring together women peace activists, educators and community leaders and raise each other's consciousness. For instance, the Women's Peace Centre in Burundi works to reduce ethnic conflict and to encourage reconciliation. The results have been encouraging. On average, 200 women visit the center each week. It is one of the few places where Hutu and Tutsi women can meet openly, and women's groups from around Burundi use it as a meeting venue in addition to attending the Center's activities".⁵⁰ Somali women played a significant part in mediating the releasing of several hostages. They have mobilized and taken the initiative to begin "restoring destroyed schools, establishing clean water sources and opening an inter-clan dialogue on

⁴⁸ M. A. Spiegel, 'The Namibian Negotiations and Problem of Neutrality' in S. Touval and I. W. Zartman (eds), *International Mediation in Theory and Practice* (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1985), pp.111-139

⁴⁹ "A Gender Perspective to Conflict"/ by Women for Human Rights (WWHR)

<http://www.undp.uz/GID/eng/TURKEY/SEMINARS/inout.html>.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

peace.”⁵¹ Women’s groups in Somalia have helped in improving the plight of internally displaced persons and have taken the initiative to start educating youths.

After conflict, “truth, justice and reconciliation are the key steps in a post-conflict healing process”.⁵² Women from conflict situations have been instrumental in searching for the truth. Different women’s groups and networks have been established to carry out research and legal literacy training which in turn create solidarity across ethnic lines.

5.2 Strategies of Women Peace-building Efforts

Through partnerships and alliances or what are also called coalitions, women have to a certain extent confronted discrimination and pressed on for their peace-building commitments. Women with other allies have been actively engaged in promoting a culture of peace through dialogue, mediation peace campaign, peace education, seminars and conferences. In addition, they are seriously involved in reconciliation activities and efforts, demilitarization and the healing and rebuilding of human relationships. They have also been using media technology to promote peace-building:

“In Burundi, at the Women’s Peace Center, multiple activities to further ethnic reconciliation in the country include conflict resolution training and dialogue between Tutsi and Hutu women: Women learn simple technology such as how to use a fax machine or telephone. In conjunction with Studio Ijambo, the radio studio operated by Search for Common Ground (SCG) to reduce ethnic violence and counter hate radio, the Women’s Peace Center uses the opportunity presented by media technology to reach out to women all over the country with its programming.”⁵³

During the conflict that broke out in Somaliland between 1994-1996, the Women’s Peace Group of the Committee of Concerned Somalis in Hargeisa “organized

⁵¹ D.R. Marshall, *Women in War and Peace: Grassroots Peacebuilding*, op.cit., p.13

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ D. Mazurana and S. McKay, “Raising Women’s Voices: Peacebuilding” in <http://www.ifuw.org/peace/peacebuilding/raising-women's-voices.htm>

'walks of life' and a prayer meeting on 28 March, 1996 in New Hargeysa at the Beerta Sayidka."⁵⁴ Almost simultaneously, a group of 22 women submitted an official letter to the government in Hargeisa to protest against the outbreak of civil strife. Its text read as follows:

"Since 1991, we have been hoping to have a stable life and to taste the fruits of our freedom, but unfortunately our destiny is dictated by senseless wars. Therefore the women of Somaliland need a lasting peace since your intention seems to be the following: that you kill vulnerable people; that you have forgotten your long-fought-for-freedom; that you have increased the number of orphans and disabled; that you kill indiscriminately both humans and non-humans. Therefore we, as mothers, ask ourselves, who among you is going to take care of your wives and sisters? In particular, the answer to this question is for those who have their families inside the country, not for others who moved their families to other countries. Based on the above analysis we call upon you: to cease all forms of hostility; to sit together and negotiate. The interest of the people and the country lies in permanent peace."⁵⁵

This statement was picked up by the press and several women's articles on peace were written and published. This in turn developed "a broader discussion on peace among the community."⁵⁶ In the Kismayo, women became directly or indirectly involved in the peace process:

"They mobilized, organized and encouraged men to reconcile; recited Burranbur, the traditional Somali poems that are composed and recited especially by women; used gentle terms like brothers or cousins while talking to the members of opposition delegations; prepared meals for delegates during the negotiating period; consulted informally with prominent delegates; provided them with financial support, and persuaded them to reach agreement with other groups (Rugiya Xirsi Jaama, Kismaayo)."⁵⁷

⁵⁴ African Women for Peace Series, *Somalia Between Peace and War: Somali Women at the Eve of the 21st Century* (UNIFEM Nairobi, 1998), pp.57-58

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

Other strategies employed by women in their peace-building commitments also include “creating public forums, reaching out to marginalized groups, and strengthening links between governments and civil society in order to ensure more participatory and transparent systems of governance.”⁵⁸

5.3 Structural and Cultural Challenges Encountered by Women

Despite these strategies women still face a lot of problems. In addition to having been affected differently by the war than were men, women encounter challenges related to their traditional position and status within society. They face resistance from political decision-makers. In Burundi, women are “still second class citizens and hostages of old traditions and cultural values.”⁵⁹ In Somalia, many women find their responsibilities restricted to the domestic sphere, where the possibility for self-development and interaction with other women is limited.⁶⁰ Women peace activists express the concern that “governments and policy makers are reticent or, in some cases unaware of the need to take action.”⁶¹ This points to the fact that, lack of political will on the part of decision-makers to support women remains a crucial barrier to achieving women’s peace-building efforts generally.

⁵⁸ S. N. Anderlini, *Women at the Peace Table Making a Difference* (UNIFEM New York, 2000)p.56

⁵⁹ Z. Cervenka and C. Legum, “Can National Dialogue Break The Power of terror in Burundi?” *African Issues*, No.17, (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1994), p.4

⁶⁰ Somali Between Peace and War, p.23

⁶¹ Ibid. p.50

Chapter 6

6.1 Conclusions

This study has analyzed critically the role of women in peace-building using the case studies of Burundi and Somalia. The successes they achieved and the challenges they encountered in the process of their peace-building efforts bring to attention a couple of pertinent issues to be reflected upon on the subject. This chapter therefore sets to present the findings of the study and suggestion possible recommendations that will inform future research in this area. According to Mazurana and Mckay, "if progress is to be made towards building more peaceful, cooperative and just societies where human security is valued as paramount, building peace must more deeply involve women and women's approaches."¹

Different gaps were identified to be hindering women's peace-building activities. They are under-representation of women in political structures which complements with lack of support from their respective government; lack of training in conflict resolution and peace-building which equally complements with women's illiteracy rate, cultural barriers and funding.

The strong concern of women's under-representation in political structures ties in so well with the argument for increasing women's participation in these structures. It is felt that, which but logical, that if one were to have any influence in a nay forum, that person's physical presence is almost indispensable. It is therefore correct to a larger extent to argue that if women need to influence decisions concerning the rebuilding of

¹ Dyan Mazurana and Susan Mckay, *Women and Peace-building* (Montreal: International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, 1999).

their countries at the end of conflict, they should have access to the decision-making structures that deliberate and make such decisions on such issues.

The issue of under-representation as already mentioned, complements with that of women's participation. If women are not first of all represented in the socio-politico-economic structures of their countries, how would they effectively participate in the rebuilding process? It should be acknowledged here, just as the study has established, women have been informally involved in peace-building activities even they have not had any formal access to the above-mentioned structures. But the key concern here is that, their peace-building activities will become more effective when they are given the opportunity to have equal access to these structures.

The same concern of participation applies to women's participation in peace processes. Some individuals have argued that women's participation is not required in peace processes because their participation bears an almost insignificant relevance to the process. The line of thought is being disapproved in the new discourses on post-conflict peace-building. This study has equally revealed that women's participation in peace processes enhanced their understanding of the debate on conflict, which subsequently helped them in selling the signed peace agreement to their constituents and in the process of undertaking their peace-building activities.

The case of Burundi and Somali women attest to this. In Burundi for example, women's participation in the Burundi Peace Process (which was only made possible after four year of struggle to gain access) yielded successful results. A huge number of their recommendations were included into the final peace accord. In the case of Somalia, women's participation led to their involvement in the different drafting committees, and

particularly that of which drafted the Charter. The final outcome of such involvement women the opportunity to gain twenty-five seats in the parliament. Hence the issue of women's participation remains critical to their efforts in peace-building and desperately needs not only the support of their individual countries but also that of the international community. Several calls have already been made, and more are still being made to governments, international and regional intergovernmental institutions to this effect. The question is when will these calls be put into practical action? Even where these calls are being responded to, women still have to embark on persistent lobbying to see into it attention is paid to their request. Actually, a radical change of attitude by governments and all institutions involved in supporting, promoting and working in the are of conflict resolution and peace-building in general and women's peace-building in particular is required.

Another gap identified which is a critical concern to be considered is women's lack of training in conflict resolution and peace-building. From the study, it was demonstrated that peace-building is a long-term process which has specific strategies and time frames to guide the process. If successful outcomes are to be expected these strategies and time frames need to be followed. The question is, of course women have been involved in peace-building but in an ad-hoc manner, without proper coordination if one were to say. This does not imply that their ad-hoc or uncoordinated activities are not recognized. They are recognized and even documented for precedence.

But the point made being made here is that, if women are properly educated in the field of conflict resolution and peace-building, they would organize and coordinate their activities better, they would understand the various concept and strategies of conflict,

conflict resolution, conflict management, conflict transformation, reconciliation and peace-building. When these issues are not understood, most of their efforts will not come to fruition. Women involved in peace-building activities need adequate training on conflict resolution and management. With such training, they will be exposed to understanding important in that through it, they become more aware of the international instruments from which they are informed of their rights, on issues of peace-building and conflict resolution. For instance the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Beijing Platform for Action are such instruments in this regard. In Burundi and Somalia, the former has been translated into local language Kirundi and Somali languages respectively. Only some sections of the latter have been translated in both languages.

The study also found out that women's peace-building roles are sometimes hindered by traditions and cultures. As a result, when undertaking peace-building initiatives, cultural issues have to be taken into account. This culture issue has also been pin-pointed by Kevin Avruch and Peter Black on the one hand, and Dyan Mazurana and Susan Mckay on the other. Avruch and Black argue that "to understand conflict behaviours, it is necessary to pay attention to the indigenous understandings of being and action which people use in the production and interpretation of conflict behaviours".² On their part, Mazurana and Mckay commend that "peace-building is culturally specific. Local approaches to peace-building should be recognized, honoured and built-upon; this

² Kevin Avruch and Peter Black, 'The Culture Question' (<http://www.gruce.dedu/departments/ICAR>).

includes traditional peace-building approaches and the peace-building inventions of women-centered and local groups." ³

A further recommendation relevant to this study is that, for effective peace-building to be exerted in different communities in general, and in Burundi and Somalia in particular, it is important to have dialogues across all classes in society. Such dialogues should encompass those of class, those that exist between persons locked into cultures of violence and those working to build cultures of peace, as well as those that flow from gender and ethnicity". ⁴

Chapter Five examined some strategies that have been employed by women in their peace-building efforts. It was noted that women's movements and associations were established to facilitate their activities. To this effect, it is important to maintain these movements and associations and build on the existing solidarity. This can only be achieved through financial support from bilateral donors and the international community at large.

Institutions which are accountable and capable of supporting women's activities in peace-building are weak or are lacking. In this regard, a sound political environment and genuine political culture is an issue that has to be embraced and put in place by governments. With such an atmosphere, women's zeal to contribute to the rebuilding of their country will be enhanced. In other words, state institutions need to empower all actors, particularly the local people, including women, who can best devise and implement projects and programmes relevant to their context and who eventually must live with the results.

³ Dyan Mazurana, op.cit

A cursory glance at the study depicts the fact women's struggles and difficulties in conflict situations have recently featured on the international agenda. Equally, their positive contributions to peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction have began gaining momentum – which goes to support the objective that women's peace-building initiatives are far from being insignificant. Nevertheless, this study revealed that concrete analytical studies in the field are still unavailable and fragmented. For the way forward in this area therefore, it is important to continue the documentation of women's positive initiatives, their struggles and challenges, with the goal of building on existing material. In addition to this, it is equally important to always undertake a reassessment of the existing analytical to inform a better understanding of women's peace-building role. These are the issues that have emanated from this study. They might not however have been exhaustive, but they have contributed to informing our knowledge in the area of study. Whatever gaps that have been identified in this study should of course offer additional areas for more research and analysis into the role of women in peace-building.

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⁴ Kevin P. Clements, "Peace-building and Conflict Transformation",
(<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pccs/clements.htm>)

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