

**IDENTITY CRISIS AND NATIONALISM IN SUDAN: THE CASE STUDY
OF SOUTH SUDAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT FOR STATEHOOD 1983-2005**


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
DECLARATION

This research project was my original work and has not been presented to other institution of higher learning for similar award.


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DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to parents who taught me during childhood to be hardworking child to stand on my feet and work independently.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION	ii
DEDICATION	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	iv
ABBREVIATION	vii
ABSTRACT	viii
CHAPTER ONE : INTROUDCTION	1
1.1 Background to the Study	1
1.1.1 The Struggle for Independence in Sudan.....	3
1.2 Statement of Research Problem	5
1.3 Research Questions	6
1.4 Objectives	6
1.4.1 Specific Objectives	6
1.5 Justification	6
1.6 Scope and Limitation	7
1.7 Literature Review.....	7
1.8 The Conceptual Framework.....	11
1.8.1 Nationalism and Identity.....	14
1.9 Research Hypothesis	17
1.10 Methodology of Study	17
1.10.1 Sampling Design.....	18
1.11 Ethical Issues in the Study	19
CHAPTER TWO : THE RISE OF SOUTHERN SUDAN PROTEST MOVEMENT 1955-2005	20
2.1 Introduction.....	20
2.1.1 A North-South Confrontation	20
2.2 British Policies of Divisive Unification.....	23
2.3 The Genesis of Identity Crisis in Sudan	24
2.4 The Persistent of National Identity Crisis in Sudan.....	26
2.5 Conclusion	27
CHAPTER THREE :ANGLO-EGYPTIAN POLICY OF SEPARATE ADMINISTRATION FOR THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN SUDAN, 1920-1947	28

3.1 Introduction.....	28
3.2 The dilemmas of Northern Domination.....	30
3.3 War and Peace in Sudan	30
3.4 The Role of Religion in the North-South Conflict.....	40
3.5 Conclusion	43
CHAPTER- FOUR : THE IMPACT OF CONFLICT OF IDENTITY CRISIS IN SUDAN, 1983-2005	46
4.1 Introduction.....	46
4.2 Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)	48
4.2.1 The SPLA’s External Support.....	49
4.2.2 Nimeiri’s Approach to the Conflict.....	50
4.2.3 Khartoum’s Counterinsurgency	51
4.2.4 Splits in the SPLA	53
4.2.5 Peace Talks and War in Sudan	54
4.2.7 Mounting Local Hardship	55
4.2.8 Foreign Policy and Comprehensive Peace Agreement	56
4.2.9 Garang’s Challenges.....	58
4.3 Conclusion	60
CHAPTER FIVE : CONCLUSION.....	63
5.1 Introduction.....	63
REFERENCES.....	68
APPENDICES	72
Appendix I: Certificate of Correction.....	72
Appendix II: Turnitin Report	73

ABBREVIATION

CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
NASC	National Alliance Coalition
NCP	National Congress Party
NIF	National Islamic front
NUP	National Unionist Party in Sudan
PDF	Popular Defense Forces
SPLA	Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement
U.S.S.R	United Socialist Soviet Republics
UMMA	Nationalist Party of the Sudan
UNSCO	United Nations Scientific Cultural Organization

ABSTRACT

This study explores the origin of Identity Crisis and Nationalism in Sudan, 1983-2005. The study was based on three objectives: Investigate the Anglo-Egyptian policy of separate administration for the Northern and Southern Sudan and the emergence of identity crisis in Sudan. Examine the conflict of identities between Islamic and Christian/African cultures in Sudan and assessed the impact of conflict of identity crisis between Northern and the Southern Sudan. Secondary and primary data were primarily important to carry out study. The secondary sources focused on evaluating the scholarly books, journal articles, reports by private and public institutions whereas the primary sources included newspapers, letters, minutes, and speeches. The study found out that pre-colonial and postcolonial governments in Sudan who immediately took over power from Anglo-Egyptian regime from 1955-1983 had really worked to undermine the spirit of oneness and nation building from the onset of independence of Sudan, which came into effect in 1956. The British policy of Closed Districts Ordinance which was initially meant to protect the identity of the peoples of Southern Sudan from being subjected to Islamisation and Arabisation policy employed by the Northern Sudan was deemed to have created bitter hatred between the North and South.

CHAPTER ONE

INTROUDCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Geographically speaking, Sudan is the largest country in Africa, spanning a vast area of almost one million square miles. It borders nine other countries, including Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea to the east, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to the south, the Central African Republic, and Chad to the west. The Red Sea is the only thing separating Sudan from its tenth neighbor, Saudi Arabia.¹

Three historical and political elements shaped Sudan's early state building processes: the legacy of indirect colonial control, the character and substance of nationalism during the decolonization era, and the practice of slavery and slave trade during state formation.² Various ethnic groups' identities were constructed and formed by these historical and political processes, which also shaped the excluded ethnic groups' political reactions during the colonial and postwar era.³

The start of the seventeen-year Civil War (1955–1972) on August 18, 1955, was due to a nationalist revolt in southern Sudan, hampered Sudan's transition to independence. The order to move Number 2 Company of the Equatorial Corps from Southern Sudan to the north was one of the primary causes of the uprising, but it was also the outcome of a fast political upheaval. The 1953 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement was preceded by negotiations between northern politicians and the Egyptian government, in which the southerners had not been represented. The administration of the province was quickly

¹ Ricardo and Francis M. Deng *et al* (2005). *Borders, nationalism and African states*, pp.33-42.

² Amir Idris (2013) *identity, citizenship, and violence into two Sudans*. Palgrave Macmillan, USA. Pp.26-30.

³ Ibid.... (2013)

Sudanised between June and November 1954 following the elections held in November 1953⁴.

The "Southern Policy" of 1930–1947, which allowed the south to be governed independently of the north, was the most important feature of British control. The idea was to allow the British to propagate Christianity in an area where the majority of people practiced traditional African religions, while shielding the south from the influence of Islam and Arab culture. This policy prohibited northern Sudanese from moving to or residing in the South without a specific permission from British authorities. In Southern Schools, English was taught instead of Arabic. However, pressure from Egypt and northern nationalists forced the British to abandon their "Southern Policy" in 1947. In the absence of a wider southern consensus, the British government combined the North and the South by establishing a single administrative framework for the entire nation.⁵

Sudan's path to independence had involved much more than the "nationalisation" of a "colonial" state, it had involved the Sudanese in manoeuvres with three governments, in Sudan, Britain, and Egypt, which all claimed some right to decide the outcome of British imperialism in Sudan. In practice this involved Sudanese politicians agreeing to apply leverage first to eject the British and then to resist union with Egypt. The outcome appeared to be rejection not only of the British imperialism but of unity with Egypt as well, which in turn implied that a separate and independent "Sudanese" state could exist, distinct from the state in Egypt. That, in turn required the question of "Sudanese" identity, as well as to the question of how others might look on Sudan and

⁴ Douglas H. Johnson (2003) *The Root Causes of The Sudanese's Civil Wars*, British Library. London, United Kingdom.

⁵ Francis M. Deng (1995) *War of Visions or Conflict of Identities in Sudan*, Washington Dc. USA.

the extent to which there would be any external expectations about the role in Africa and Arab worlds , in both part. Clearly international politics would continue to have significance, and not only in terms of questions of identity, sympathy, and foreign policy, but also in terms of some impact on internal politics in Sudan^{6 6}

British policy had shifted between unifying the south and the north and establishing the south as a buffer zone of Black Christians against the North's growth of Islam. Education had been left almost entirely to the Christian missionary-societies, with their meagre resources, and their restrictions, could barely touch the problem of illiteracy. Consequently, as compared with the north, which had a large body of educated people, the south lacked enough educated people to provide good leaders, administrators and military officers.⁷

1.1.1 The Struggle for Independence in Sudan

The demand for independence gained great moment after the World War II. Northern Sudanese felt ready for it- they had experienced civil servants, educated people, and politicians. The South was not ready. The opinions of the Southerners on important matters of governance were ignored, after Sudan became independent. The North was jubilant. The Southerners, felt betrayed by the Northerners and abandoned by the British. This so-called Sudanese state was, in reality, Northern institution handed over by the British. Southern Sudan, therefore, a mere appendage attached to it for political expedience. Indeed, since 1956, the Sudanese state has represented the economic, social

⁶ Alan B. Ogot. *Liberty or Death, Southern Sudan's March to independent* (2010) p.15-39

⁷ Robert O. Collins (2008) *History of Modern Sudan*, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom.

and cultural interests of the Muslim and Arab Northern Sudan, and Southern Sudanese have therefore been accommodated merely on account of the “Southern Problem.”⁸

The elites in the north, who assumed power after the end of the colonial period later divided the country’s wealth and power amongst themselves, seek to associate themselves with the Arab world. The period of Sudanisation (1954-6) was the time in which the Arab elites in Khartoum began to build their political and financial domination of the country. The pure Africans in the South did not accept the Arabisation and Islamisation policies imposed on them by their northern counterpart.⁹ There were differing perceptions on the content of nationalism in North and the South. In the South, nationalism meant freedom, economic justice and respect for their distinctly African culture and identity. In North, it meant the end of the Anglo- Egyptian colonial domination, the annexation of South Sudan to the North, and the establishments of a sovereign Sudanese Arab- Muslim State ruled by the Northern Muslims⁹. The Condominium authority concentrated economic, administrative development in the North at the expense of the South. In this way, the British were effectively and formally helping the Arab to annex half of Sudan to Middle East and thereby extending the process of Arabisation and Islamisation southwards. Another result of this colonial policy was the uneven development of the two parts, with priority being given to the North. The South was treated as a “Sphere of Influence” from which the Belgians, French and other foreign powers to be excluded. There seemed to be no

⁸ Alan B. Ogot. *Liberty or Death, Southern Sudan’s March to independent (2010) p.15-39*

⁹Elke Grawert (2010) *After Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan*, James Currey, UK, *Eastern African Series*.

acute necessity for spending either the money or energy on remote south whose peoples were looked upon as a wild and untamed creature that were left alone.¹⁰

1.2 Statement of Research Problem

Identity crisis and Nationalism in Sudan has influenced National Movement for Statehood in South Sudan from 1983-2005. The Arab policy of political assimilation aimed to elevate Arab nationalism, gave rise to the identity crisis that has emerged. Because of this, the political elites in Southern Sudan demanded that Sudan be governed under a federal structure. The central government saw it as a cover for the Khartoum government's independence. Either the political and historical dimensions of the war were either disregarded or dismissed.¹¹

The long-standing opposition to the North's imposition of Arab and Islamic culture, which united them as Black Africans and directed them toward Christianity as a method of battling Islamism and Arabism in Sudan, has largely created the identity of Southern Sudan.¹²

For many in the South, Islam represents more than just a religion; it's also associated with Arabism, a cultural entity that has historically oppressed them as slaves and continues to marginalize them as Black Africans who follow other faiths. For a very long time, Southerners have opposed the reshaping of their religious and ethnic identities. This research, therefore, endeavors to examine intersections that speak to identity at the core of the rise of the South Sudan from Sudan.¹³

¹⁰ *Ibid*..... (2010)

¹¹ *Amir Idris (2013) identity, citizenship, and violence into two Sudans. Palgrave Macmillan, USA. Pp.26-30.*

¹² *Ibid*.....(2013)

¹³ *Ibid*.....(2013)

1.3 Research Questions

- i. Was Anglo-Egyptian policy of separate administration between Northern and Southern Sudan, the cause of identity crisis in Sudan?
- ii. Was the conflict of identities in Sudan, a real clash of Islamic and African cultures in Sudan?
- iii. Did the impact of conflict of identity crisis in Sudan contribute to the broader conflict of identities between North and South?

1.4 Objectives

1.4.1 Specific Objectives

- i. Investigate Anglo-Egyptian policy of separate administration for the Northern and Southern Sudan and the emergence of identity crisis in Sudan
- ii. To examine conflict of identities in Sudan between Islamic and African cultures in Sudan
- iii. To assess the impact of conflict of identity crisis in Sudan between North and South.

1.5 Justification

Crude binary antagonism between Arabs and Blacks, Muslims and Christians, democracy and dictatorship, secularism and theocracy, and, eventually, North and South, were the root cause of the civil wars that erupted in Sudan between 1983 and 2005. The authorities chose to employ the ferociously radical Muslim Janjaweed and mujahedeen armed groups to convert millions of people to Islam. Those who refused to convert were slain and driven from their homes. It is true that the socio-political dynamics and history of the Sudan have made them susceptible to oversimplification. The Sudan's wars have really been characterized by explosive tensions between a powerful centre in the country's capital, Khartoum, and a vast periphery of the massive

state. Hence, this study seeks to fill the gap on identity crisis and nationalism in Sudan and the rise of South Sudan National Movement for Statehood from 1983-2005¹⁴.

1.6 Scope and Limitation

The study was to assess, examine and investigate the Identity Crisis and Nationalism in Sudan, and the rise of South Sudanese National Movement for Statehood 1983-2005. However, the study was conducted in South Sudanese capital Juba, Central Equatoria State, with primary purpose in point to obtain concrete information from respondents in the city. This research had faced immense problems; chief of these are the problems faced by the researcher during data collection survey such as many respondents preferred to be interviewed in Arabic language not English language as an official language in South Sudan, financial constraints, internet challenges, high inflation and price hike in South Sudan, additionally, long distances had to be covered by the researcher during the data collection survey from the Case Study Centre in Juba to University of Nairobi Campus where the researcher frequently report to Supervisors from time to time.

1.7 Literature Review

According to Robert Collins, the main driving force behind the 1956 Sudanese civil wars was the quest for an identity that would allow native African cultures to coexist peacefully with imported Arab cultures in a country where neither the state nor society was dominated by the attempts to impose an Arab-Islamic identity through autocratic rule based in Khartoum, which in turn sparked the civil wars in Southern Sudan. It is important to realize that this tendency was the continuation of nearly two centuries of tense relations with the Northern and Southern peoples of what would later become the

¹⁴Arnold, M., & LeRiche (2013) *South Sudan: from revolution to independence*. Oxford University Press (UK).

Sudan, and that it did not start with independence. According to Amir Idris' 2013 argument, from the sixteenth century, the state that has developed in the Sudan has produced groups of people who are less valuable to the state.¹⁵

Ann M. Lesch (2005) The broad contrasts between the Arab and African ethnic and cultural aspects of the Sudan play a key role in both internal and foreign policy. Some Sudanese visualized their country as a multicultural middle ground that links the Arab and African worlds. Others feel Sudan must choose between the Arab and Africa. The country's identity is complicated by the reality that more than half the population view themselves as African, even though the majority speaks Arabic as the official language. Moreover, Muslim believers in Sudan comprise at least 70 percent of the population, and the rest adhere to African beliefs or Christianity. A Muslim Arab minority, concentrated in the central provinces along the two Nile, dominates political and economic life and seeks to integrate the country into Arab and Islamic worlds. Non-Arab and non-Muslims of the peripheral regions tend to look toward Africa for their symbol of identity. So, the centrifugal forces pull apart the country and hamper efforts to create a coherent identity.¹⁶

As stated by Mathew Arnold and LeRiche (2012). Combustible tensions between the ruling core in the capital city of Khartoum and the vast periphery of the large state have defined the civil wars in Sudan. The conflict has been understood by the people of the South "primarily in racial and religious terms," while many in the North saw the "Southern Sudan Problem" as the result of foreign intervention in the internal affairs of the Sudanese State. As a matter of fact, these wars were the consequence of successive

¹⁵ Robert Collins and Francis M. Deng (1956) *the British in the Sudan. The Sweetness and Sorrow*, London, UK

¹⁶ Ann Mosley Lesch (1988) *Contested National Identities in Sudan*, the American University in Cairo, Egypt.

Sudanese State. Whether manifest as economic underdevelopment, ethnic and religious repression and resistance to authoritarian rule, this stark core and periphery divide marked enduring decades of violence in Sudan.¹⁷

L.A Fabunni (1956). Three main schools of thought are discernible. Firstly, there are those we called the ‘Atomistic School’, to which many British Administrators, some Arabs and a few Sudanese, most especially, Southern Sudanese under British influence belong. These schools speak of the Southern Sudan as the home of numerous Negroid tribes. They argue that in Upper Nile and great part of Bahr El-Ghazal Provinces majority of people belong to three most famous groups¹⁸.

The next group of opinion may be described as the Amalgamate School, or Euro-Africanists. According to E.E. Evans-Prichard, writing for the Anglo-Egyptian Administration in the Sudan, he stresses that two main racial types have contributed to the racial characters of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudanese; namely, the Negro and the Caucasian or the Black and the white¹⁹.

There is a third school of thought which is called political Unitarians. Its members recognised that the Sudan or any country for that matter can be divided into several geographical and administrative units or wholly homogenous, which is predominantly Arab religion. They would contend that since no nation or state’s ethnically, religiously or culturally homogenous, it is not impossible to administer the whole –North or the South –as one political unit, provided, of course, that there is the will to do so through

¹⁷ Arnold, M., & LeRiche, M (2012) *South Sudan: from revolution to independence*. Oxford University Press, UK

¹⁸ *ibid*..... (1956)

¹⁹ *ibid*..... (1956)

the use of such instruments as education, communication and administration to promote the concept of oneness –common nationality²⁰.

Ricardo and Robert, el at (2005) from the discovery of petroleum reserves in Southern Sudan has complicated the process of national unification in that war-torn country. Since finding significant oil reserves in 1980, the Khartoum government has focused on controlling this valuable asset. Controlling such asset, however, remains problematic because the inhabitants of the South have sustained a rebel movement against the North for decades. The relationship between Southern and Northern people is an extraordinarily complex one driven by profound issues such as racial, cultural and religious differences. The fear of the continuation of these historic inequalities between the North and the South helped to provoke many series of all sorts of conflict in Sudan, Sudanese civil wars is deeply-rooted by the South Sudanese quest for full secession from the North. In addition to the subsequent discovery of additional reserves of oil in South Sudan during the 1990s, slowly transformed the war between the North and the South and accelerated the relevance of natural resources in warfare²¹.

According to Amir Idris (2013), the ruling class's interpretation of national identity, which rejected Sudan's social and cultural reality, guided the government's unfavourable response to the region's call for federalism. The colonial political conceptions of Arab and African identities which were perceived as immutable, adversarial, and static were replicated in this political vision of the state and nation. Considering that a large number of post-independence civilian and military regimes were dominated by Northern political elites who had profited politically and

²⁰ *ibid*..... (1956)

²¹ Ricardo and Robert el at (2005) *Ethnic Grievances or material Greed Borders, Nationalism and African States, African renaissance: towards a New Sudan. Forced Migration Review 24 (2005): 6-8.*

economically from the colonial system. The elites who embraced the nationalist rhetoric of Islam and the Arab world were unlikely to significantly alter Sudan's political and economic landscape. Tim Niblock asserts that the two types of imbalance or inequality that had emerged under the Condominium Government which distinguished the nation's regions and socioeconomic groupings within them persisted and even grew more pronounced..²²

W. J. Berridge (2017) the problems facing the Sudan are national. It is a multilingual in which a majority speaks Arabic but demands have increased for the preservation of non-Arabic cultures. It is a multi-religious state where Islam predominates but where a minority will not tolerate the universal application of Islamic Law. It remains a multi-ethnic state wherein, a Sudanese identity has been recognised and fostered, without provocative reference to either 'Arabness' or 'Africanness'. Yet the Sudan remains subject to political paralysis, sectarian rifts, appeals to regional, ethnic, and tribal feelings. Then, there is chasm between rich and poor, despite the yawning gap between the centre and periphery, the modern and undeveloped, which is no longer seen as accidental or natural, but, as a result of policies adopted by both parliamentary and military governments in Khartoum to advance the interests of the metropolitan elite²³

1.8 The Conceptual Framework

In Sudan, the argument over race, citizenship, and state gave rise to two opposing nationalist narratives. On the one hand, the prevalent perspective among northern nationalists asserts that racism and the concept of race originated with European imperialism, specifically British colonialism. This perspective minimises the influence

²² Amir Idris (2013)

²³ Ibid..... (2017)

of local slavery on the development of the relationship between the state and its peripheries and assumes that racism and Sudan's history were externally driven. However, proponents of southern nationalism contend that the region has a unique identity that sets it apart from the North. According to this narrative, the collective memory of political compulsion and slavery at various points in Sudanese history has brought together the country's many ethnic groups in the south. This experience is said to be similar to that of other colonised peoples who went on to found their own independent states.²⁴

Historians contended that the relationship between the North and the South has primarily been one of internal colonisation, wherein the people of Southern Sudan were forced to adopt the culture and religion of the north. For this reason, most Southerners believe that no Khartoum government has any authority over their area. According to these theories, northern authority represented the British colonial power being transferred to the South's longtime foes in the North.²⁵

As Dunstan Wai explains, the North's monopoly of political power convinced them that a second colonial era had begun. However, the North believed it had the authority to make and implement national policies that would impact the entire nation. The South's sense of isolation and its perception that the North's policies were similar to those of the British colonial successors were constantly reinforced by the Northern Sudanese politicians' inability to share political power with South African elites during the country's independent era. Additionally, attempts to force the South into the North's

²⁴ Amir Idris (2013) *Identity, Citizenship, and Violence in Two Sudans*. Palgrave Macmillan, USA

²⁵ Francis M. Deng et al (2005). *Borders, Nationalism and African States*, USA. Pp.33-424

embrace only served to reinforce the view that the Khartoum administrations are illegitimate, which in turn encouraged violent resistance..²⁶

On the other hand, they believed that it was their duty to employ Islamization and Arabization to disseminate the word of Islam. In addition, their purpose is to undo the cultural practices and traces of Christianity that the British had left in the South. But southern resistance was not so much to Islam or the Arab culture, which had already been accepted in certain parts of the south, especially in urban centres, as it was to the rigidity of the assimilationist's policy and the forceful ruthlessness of its implementation. Consequently, the nation descended almost uncontrollably into a state of acute violence, which exacerbated the divisions in identity between the northern and southern regions and reinforced the perception of the former as colonialists or Sudanese nationalists. The government adopted brutal assimilationist measures and coupled them with a strong stance against religious influence and missionary education in the South.²⁷

As critically stated by Mansour Khalid, the goal of national integration and unification was to incorporate the South's culture into the North's Islamic and Arab traditions. The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, which put an end to hostilities between the North and South for ten years, was a well calculated tactical move intended to force the South to adopt the assimilationist goals of the North agenda. It did not signify a sincere acceptance of southern identity as a blueprint for the long-term development of regional or national harmony. Its goal was made evident by the pact's steady erosion of the south's autonomy, which was also made clear by President Jaafar Nimeiri, the main

²⁶ *Ibid*..... (2005)

²⁷ *Ibid*..... (1995)

proponent of the deal, who unilaterally revoked it, which ultimately led to the return to arms in Southern Sudan²⁸.

1.8.1 Nationalism and Identity

Here, the term "identity" refers to how people and groups define themselves and are defined by others in relation to factors such as race, ethnicity, religion, language, and culture. Identity is a notion that, in the context of group dynamics, provides the individual a deeply ingrained psychological and social meaning, regardless of the driving causes. Groups may cooperate, compete, or engage in conflict as they fight for resources, power, and other values. Conflict arises not so much from differences per se, but rather from how compatible or incompatible the interacting identities and their aims are with one another. Within the framework of the nation-state, identity conflicts frequently arise when groups create their own identities and exclude others. Their elites rebel against what they perceive to be intolerable oppression by the dominant group, which manifests itself in ways such as marginalization, exclusion from mainstream society, denial of recognition, and possibly even the threat of cultural or physical eradication.²⁹.

In the nationalist attitude, which may be understood as an internalized sense of belonging that grounds people in a shared past and future, nationalism and identity are intimately related. This link is very internal, impacting on the core of a person's or group's sense of self and reaching well beyond their relationship to the official political systems. National consciousness is frequently understood as a transcendental norm in which all individuals and groups within the state share a single, cohesive self-concept

²⁸ *Ibid*.....(1995)

²⁹ *Ibid*..... (1995)

after having reconciled and synthesized their differences in race, ethnicity, and religion. One way to think of the process of becoming a nation as an emergent one that involves resolving conflicts between different identities and creating a cohesive vision of the nation and self.³⁰.

The way that the northern identity has been given a composite character that blends aspects of ethnicity, culture, and religion is one of the main causes of misunderstanding in Sudanese politics. This is accomplished in this way by disguising the true problem at hand behind racial masks. Even for the Arabized Muslims living in the South, the subjective racial aspect of Arabism exacerbates the division between the North and the South, making it challenging to cross the racial and cultural barrier.³¹

Another issue is the racial differences in Sudan. The British Society for International Understanding asserts that the South is hostile to the North because of the slave trade ‘combined with the obvious differences of race and religion’, which led the British to declare the Southern Provinces as ‘closed areas. The differences of ‘group’ feeling and religious attitude do exist in the Sudan as indeed they do in other parts of the world (including Britain)³²

In the power politics of the Nile Valley, the question of race and nationality of the North and the South and the Sudanese and the Egyptians became one of the serious points of disagreement in various Anglo-Egyptian talks³³

Whatever the merits of the racial argument, political annexation of the South Sudan to British Uganda would not have changed the ‘race’ of the Southerners; because, it has

³⁰ *Ibid*..... (1995)

³¹ ²⁷ *Fabunmi, L.A. (1956) the Sudan, the Study of Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1800-1956. London, Pp.1-11,215-40*

³² *Ibid*... .. (1956)

³³ *Ibid*..... (1956)

not been proved, even in this context when the word ‘race’ is loosely applied that the peoples of Uganda and those of the Southern Sudanese are racially homogenous. Therefore, at best the race argument is valid in part. Common citizenship rather than race determines nationality. Most people are aware of the fact that each nation is composed of different racial elements and that the composition changes in the course of time³⁴

People who value their autonomy also value their national culture, since their culture provides the most important context within which people develop and fundamentally exercise their own autonomy. Therefore, promoting integration into a societal culture is not only part of national cohesion but also a state identity-building project. A state in its simplest meaning is a legal entity, which primarily possesses sovereignty and collectively determined the social convention that varies over time. Both internally and externally, is a central aspect of statehood and represents the physical underpinning of the state as well as at the social level over its members. According to Karl Marx, who defined the role of the state, as the institution used by the ruling class of a country to maintain its rule. In contrast, the state is an organisation with an effective monopoly on the use of legitimate violence in a particular geographic area. State identity would refer to the distinguishing features of a state that form the basis for its self-respect or pride. However, the identity requires it to have a sense of self- definition and identification, which distinguishes it from state policies³⁵.

³⁴ *Ibid*..... (1956)

³⁵ Gellner, E (2008) *Nations and Nationalism*. Cornell University Press

1.9 Research Hypothesis

This study has employed the following hypotheses in order to facilitate the data collection and interpretation.

This research hypothesis is to :

- i. The Anglo-Egyptian policy of separate identities for the Northern and Southern Sudan created the identity crisis in Sudan
- ii. The conflict of identities in Sudan from 1983 and 2005 between Muslim-Arab in North and Christian/African in South increased the South Sudanese National Movement for Statehood.
- iii. The impact of conflict of identity crisis in Sudan resulted into racial divisions between the Muslim-Arabs in North and the African-Christians in the South.

1.10 Methodology of Study

The research was conducted in three levels. The initial level involved consulting available literature in libraries which informed the relevance of the study. The secondary sources that were reviewed and analysed in this level include books, scholarly journal articles. The main libraries consulted for the purpose of this research are Jomo Kenyatta Memorial Library of the University of Nairobi; Catholic University of South Sudan and University of Juba libraries were most fundamentally instrumental in accessing the secondary data.

The second stage of the research involved the use of primary sources of data, which include newspapers, speeches, and annual reports on domestic politics in Sudan.

The third stage of the research involved oral interviews. The research was carried on ontological position, where people's knowledge, views, understanding and interpretations become meaningful for the generation of the knowledge. Through the research interviews which adopted a conversational tone, the oral interviews were guided by some structured themes, which kept the oral interviews focused on key issues, note-taking was essentially used to collect primary data during an oral interviews.

The purposive snowballing and sampling techniques were used to guide the study in choosing the respondents. The researcher started choosing the respondents who, in his assessment and discretion were relevant before being directed to other respondents. The study employed mainly the qualitative research which made it possible to start with an open and flexible approach, which is essential in framing and analysing data.

1.10.1 Sampling Design

According to Sarantakos (1997) sampling is the process of choosing the units of the target population which was included in the study in such a way that the sample of selected elements represented. In order to get better results, the purposive (where the respondents were included because the researcher believes that he/she possesses the information needed) was used to select key respondents were (lecturers, youth leaders, teachers and Human Resource Personnel). These respondents were selected and interviewed from their place of work in Juba, South Sudan.

1.11 Ethical Issues in the Study

Social research always involves people; therefore, any research must be sensitive to ethical considerations. Ethical guidelines serve as standards and a basis upon which a researcher can evaluate and assess his own conduct. A researcher has the responsibilities to fellow researchers, to any participant in the research, to society as a whole, and most importantly to himself/herself. In other words, a researcher is expected to be ethically correct in a number of ways. Most importantly ethics denote honesty in terms of the methods and results emanating from the study (Goddard and Melville, 108). In this study, issues related to ethics, such as confidentiality, consent, voluntary participation and respect to all members of the society and anonymity are strictly to be observed and adhered to research procedures. This is done in anticipation that a situation which may expose respondents to physical or psychological harm has to be avoided during the data collection survey.

CHAPTER TWO

THE RISE OF SOUTHERN SUDAN PROTEST MOVEMENT 1955-2005

2.1 Introduction

2.1.1 A North-South Confrontation

The initial demand of Southern Sudan political elites was federalism as system of government in Sudan. Their political demand was informed by their understanding of the root causes of the crisis between North and the South. This was viewed by the central government as a pretext for separation, which was immediately rejected by the central government in Khartoum³⁶.

When independence came in 1956, the Northern Sudanese Muslim naturally took control of political power because they were far more numerous than the southern peoples. They were left with institutions, and means and methods of government. But instead of helping the southern peoples to share in government on a federal basis, the northern Sudanese sent down officials to take the place of the British, instead of southerners to run their own affairs within a federal Sudan, the old distrusts and differences between south and the north gradually began to emerge³⁷.

The relationship between North and South, historians, argued, has essentially been one of internal colonialisms. In which northern culture and religion were forcibly imposed on the people of Southern Sudan. Meanwhile, Southerners did not regard any governments in Khartoum as having legitimacy over their region. In their view, northern rule was a transfer of colonial system from the British to the South's traditional enemies in the North³⁸

³⁶ Amir Idris (2013) *Identity, Citizenship, and Violence in two Sudans*. Palgrave Macmillan, USA.

³⁷ *Ibid*.....2013

³⁸ *Ibid*..... (2005)

As Dunstan Wai elaborates, the North felt that it had the legitimate right to formulate policies and carry out those policies which would affect the entire country. The failure of Northern Sudanese politicians to share political power with political elites from the South continually reinforced a feeling of alienation by the South and the belief that the Northern policy was, in essence, a colonial successor to British. Also, attempts to coerce the South into the North fold worsened rather than benefitted the perception of Khartoum governments as illegitimate, ultimately leading to armed rebellion³⁹.

For the south this meant that the true struggle for self-liberation had just begun with independence. But southern resistance was not so much to Islam or the Arab culture, which had been accepted in certain parts of the south, especially in urban centres, as it was to the rigidity of the assimilationist's policy and the forceful ruthlessness of its implementation. As a result, the country was almost inexorably plunged into extreme violence that deepened the identity cleavages between the two parts of the country and strengthened the image of the northerners as colonialists or true nationalists of Sudan. The government ruthless moved has in its assimilationist policies that combined with a tough line against missionary education and religious influence in the South⁴⁰.

As Mansour Khalid has critically voiced that, national unity and integration were to be achieved by assimilating the South into the Islamic and Arab culture of the North⁵⁰. The Addis Ababa Agreement that was reached in 1972 halted the North-South hostilities for a decade, but it was a tactical move that sought to make the South swallow the assimilationist aspirations of the North doses. It did not represent a genuine recognition of southern identity as a model for a long -term evolution of regional or national

³⁹ *Ibid*..... (1995)

⁴⁰ *Ibid*..... (1995)

reconciliation. Its purpose was manifested in the gradual erosion of the autonomy of the south under the agreement, which was also made explicitly by President Jaafar Nimeiri, the principal force behind the agreement, whom he abrogated it unilaterally, triggering the return to arms. Nimeiri's betrayal of the South --- by abrogating the agreement and subsequent imposing of Islamic laws on the country ---may have been deliberately crafted in alliance with the Muslim fundamentalists, or it have been a clever ploy to undermine the religious authority of the Islamist leadership that continuously eroded his authority. Nevertheless, it set the Sudan on a course that deepened the polarisation of the country along religious lines and placed additional obstacles in the path of accommodation⁴¹.

North Sudanese regard themselves as Arabs; whereas South Sudanese identify themselves as predominantly African, or rather call themselves by the specific ethnic groups to which they belong. The Sudanese society has become terribly polarised along these perceived racial lines as each group is engaged in either proving the superiority of its culture or disproving the allegations of inferiority made against it. The violent enslavement of Southerners is a result of enslaving communities having developed a racial ideology which ascribes subhuman status to the enslaved communities. One of the notions used to promote slavery has been the alleged natural inability of the Dinka to confront the more intelligent and militarily Baggari Arab. The conflict is both of a racial in nature and a religious one, between the Arabised, black-skinned north and the Negroid – Africans, Christians and animists, called by the Muslims the 'Abids', which means 'slaves', a mention of Islam or imposition of Islam or Arab culture as important factors in the North-South strife in Sudan frequently arouses discord with non-Sudanese

⁴¹ *Ibid*.....1995)

Muslims and Arabs. They often express unease about this supposedly unfair characterisation of Islam and Arab as violent and intolerant⁴².

2.2 British Policies of Divisive Unification

The intention of the British administrators to prevent Arab and Islamic influence in Black Africa played a major role in shaping the policy of separate administration for the North and South. Long before the Sudan was conquered, the concept of limiting the spread of Arab influence throughout the interior of Africa was conceived. Prominent members of the British community have voiced concerns about the stability of East Africa, where the British were imposing their rule.⁴³

The North feared that independence would bring the country back to the horrors of the past, with slavery being the main problem in Southern Sudan. This policy of divided unification for both the North and the South as well as the Northern regions themselves played out inequities promoted by the system designed along regional, racial, ethnic, and cultural divisions with Muslim Arabs favoured over the non-Arabs within the North.⁴⁴

In its grueling journey of self-discovery as a contemporary state, Sudan has seen civil conflicts with originally secessionist goals that were later reframed as efforts to rebuild the national structure and create a new Sudan, therefore transforming the conflict into a struggle for the nation's soul. The confluence of these developments has led to a conflicted understanding of nationhood, with unity in a rebuilt Sudan increasingly entwined with division. The interests of the region and the world at large have invested

⁴² *Jok Madut Jok (2001) War and Slavery in Sudan. University of Pennsylvania Press.Pp.5-8.*

⁴³ *Francis M. Deng et al (2005). Borders, Nationalism and African States, USA. Pp.33-42*

⁴⁴ *Ibid... (2005) pp.33-4*

themselves in the process and are still influencing the parameters of the talks and the growing narratives of the parties' competing identities.⁴⁵

2.3 The Genesis of Identity Crisis in Sudan

The demand for independence gained great momentum after the World War II. Northern Sudanese felt ready for it- they had experienced civil servants, educated people, and politicians. The South was not ready. The opinions of the Southerners on these important matters were squarely ignored, after Sudan became independent. While the North was jubilant, the Southerners, felt betrayed by the Northerners and abandoned by the British. This so-called Sudanese state was, in reality, a Northern institution handed over to them by the British. Southern Sudan, therefore, a mere appendage attached to it for political expedience. Indeed, since 1956 the Sudanese state has represented the economic, social and cultural interests of the Muslim and Arab Northern Sudan, and Southern Sudanese have therefore been accommodated merely on account of the “Southern Problem⁴⁶.

There were differing perceptions on the content of nationalism in North and South. In the South, nationalism meant freedom, economic justice and respect for their African culture and identity. In the North, it meant the end of Anglo- Egyptian colonial domination, the annexation of Southern Sudan to the North, and the establishment of a sovereign Sudanese Arab- Muslim State ruled by the Northern Muslims⁴⁷.

To make matters worse, the Condominium authority concentrated on economic development in North at the expense of South. In this way, the British were effectively and formally helping the Arab to annex half of Sudan to Egypt and the Middle East by

⁴⁵ *Ibid*..... (2005)

⁴⁶ Alan B. Ogot. *Liberty or Death, Southern Sudan's March to independent (2010) p.15-39.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid*..... (2013)

extending processes of Arabisation and Islamisation southwards. Another result of this colonial policy was the underdevelopment of the two parts, with priority being given to the North. The South was treated as a “Sphere of Influence” from which the Belgians, French and other foreign powers had to be excluded in the south. There seemed to be no acute necessity for spending either the money or energy on remote south whose peoples were looked upon as a wild and untamed creature that were best left alone⁴⁸.

Before declaration of Sudan’s independence, on January 1, 1956, the attention of the outside world has been attracted by reports of the persecution of Christians in the Southern Sudan. But the situation appears that the authorities discourage the spread of Christianity, while fostering the Islamisation of the South. Islamisation and Arabisation are seen as indispensable and connected means of promoting national unity in an ethnically and linguistically heterogeneous state. The Islamisation of the Nilotic Sudan has passed, historically, through two main phases. In the first stage, between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries, Islam and its degree of Arab culture established themselves on the main Nile and in the Eastern region. The second phase, was in the middle years of the nineteenth century, witnessed Arab and Muslim breakthrough into Upper Nile and Bahr- EL Ghazal regions respectively. The nature and penetration rendered the amount of Islamisation and acculturation very slightly: the association of the northern immigrants with the predatory trade in ivory and slaves rendered them suitable as agents of a religious and cultural transmission, while dissolution of southern tribal societies was unfavourable to the reception of Islam. Under the Mahdist state, which was preoccupied with events in the north, the area of Arab settlement diminished, and the situation of Islam in the South was, at best, static; while under the condominium,

⁴⁸ *Ibid*..... (2013)

because of deliberate administrative policy, it lost ground. The suppression of a British administration, favourable to Christian Missionary enterprises, by a government led by Arab and Muslim in ethos has inevitably produced friction. No regime can hope to produce a neat programme for the integration of the Southern peoples, and no quick ending to the present state of friction between the two regions. The solution of the problem of the South will be gradual work of economics and education⁴⁹.

2.4 The Persistent of National Identity Crisis in Sudan

The central Arab riverine regions were relatively more privileged and developed than the peripheral non-Arab regions, which were marginalized and the south was the most neglected and subjugated region under the Anglo-Egyptian system. The British, the dominant partner in the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, governed the country as two in one. The British initially left open the possibility of the south being independent or becoming absorbed by East Africa. They made the decision to unite the nation under a centralized form of governance when colonial control came to an end.⁵⁰

With independence on the horizon in August 1955, the South launched a separatist insurrection out of fear that the Arab-Muslim regime would perpetuate the previous oppression of its people. A settlement known as the Addis Ababa accord, which gave the south regional autonomy within a united Sudan, brought the war to an end seventeen years later. Ten years later, the man who first made it possible, President Jaafar Nimeiri, unilaterally renounced the Addis Ababa accord. This sparked the second war,

⁴⁹ Holt. P.M, (1961). *Modern History of the Sudan. UK, 193-194*

⁵⁰Kevin Shillington (2005) Editor, *Encyclopedia of African History V.III. United States of America and London.Pp.1497.*

which was conducted under the SPLM/A's leadership and concluded in 2005 with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).⁵¹.

2.5 Conclusion

The political elites of Southern Sudan first demanded that Sudan be governed under a federal structure. Their awareness of the underlying roots of the North-South conflict influenced their political demand. The central authority in Khartoum instantly rejected this perspective, viewing it as a justification for future independence.

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⁵¹ *Ibid*..... (2012)

⁵².*Ibid*.....(2012)

CHAPTER THREE

ANGLO-EGYPTIAN POLICY OF SEPARATE ADMINISTRATION FOR THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN SUDAN, 1920-1947

3.1 Introduction

As British officials departed, they were largely replaced by northern Sudanese, enhancing southern fears about northern domination. Following independence, just six of the eight hundred prominent positions in the civil service were given to Southerners. Thus, in their interactions with the local population, the presence of northern officials and instructors in South Sudan quickly stoked long-standing animosities.⁵²

Politicians from the north pledged in the months leading up to independence to take into account the demands of the south for a federal constitution that would shield the provinces from being ruled by the north. However, after seizing power, northern parties ignored the southern argument, claiming that a federal system would be a step toward dividing Sudan. General Ibrahim Abboud sought to spread Islam and the Arabic language throughout the South when the army seized power in 1958, thinking that this would foster national unity. He viewed Christianity as an alien religion that had been forced on the people of South by foreign missionaries, who also placed limitations on their daily lives.

As violence against protesters in the South increased, several politicians from the region fled into exile, where they were joined by former mutineers. The Sudan African Nationalist Union, the movement they founded in exile, declared its intention to see south Sudan become an independent nation.⁵³

⁵² Amir Idris (2013) *identity, citizenship, and violence in two Sudans*. Palgrave Macmillan, USA

⁵³ *Ibid*..... (2013)

Aside from the historical lack of trust among Northerners brought on by the Arab slave trade in the nineteenth century, the main source of unhappiness was a change in government policy in 1947, which kept the South off limits to Northerners. While Christian missionaries were allowed free reign, the use of Arabic and Islam was strongly discouraged. The British administration realized that collaboration with the North was essential for the economically and educationally underdeveloped south to thrive. This policy was introduced too late to foster a shared sense of national identity. The Southerners saw independence as little more significant than a shift in the Northern Sudanese people's subjugation under British rule. When the Southern soldiers of the Sudan Army rebelled and killed the Northerners in the South in 1955, they demonstrated their mistrust and terror. The Southerners' political ambitions were recognized in December 1955 when the parliament, debating the Declaration of Independence, decided that the Constituent Assembly had not fully taken into account the claims of its Southern Members. The matter was barely discussed in committee when that Assembly convened after March 1958, which infuriated the Southerners.⁵⁴

Like the rest of the Sudanese, the majority of Southerners were denied the opportunity to express their political aspirations with the arrival of military authority. The government persisted in its use of force to unite the nation through Islamic and Arabic policy, refusing to consider the prospect of federal rule. Many of the dissidents in Southern Sudan were then in a state of rebellion, thus the military approach to quell them down failed since many northerners were offended by the atrocities carried out during those operations. By 1964, the government realized the foolishness of its approach and appointed a 25-member commission to investigate the reasons behind

⁵⁴ *Fadul Hassan (2003 the Studies of Sudanese History, Khartoum-Sudan*

North-South mistrust and offer solutions. Also, people were encouraged to freely voice their opinions. It was well applauded when the government removed its limits on the right to free speech.⁵⁵

3.2 The dilemmas of Northern Domination

Sudan plunged into civil conflict once more. In the garrisons of Bor and Pibor, there were mutinies; thousands of soldiers from the south deserted and regrouped in Ethiopia, where they established the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), led by Colonel John Garang de Mabior, a Dinka officer who had received military training at Fort Benning, Georgia, and a doctorate in agricultural economics from Iowa State University. Garang advocated for a united, secular, socialist Sudan free from Islamic control in addition to the secession of the southern regions. According to his portrayal, the SPLM is a national movement that aims to free all Sudanese citizens. Because of the most severe government repression in the south, the movement had its start there. Rebellion in the South now has an extremely low marginal cost—zero or negative—meaning that it is profitable. Throughout 1984, SPLA guerillas extended from the border regions, penetrating more into the interior.⁵⁶

3.3 War and Peace in Sudan

The North-South peace deal in Sudan lasted for just eleven years before straining more and more. There were groups on both sides that were never able to come to terms with the concessions made in the 1972 accord. The federal government's prolonged authority over economic planning in the South and the meager resources it provided for the region's development infuriated Southerners. When oil deposits were discovered in the

⁵⁵ *Ibid*..... (1995)

⁵⁶ *ibid*..... (2003)

South in 1978, it became especially contentious. The South Regional Government wanted a refinery to be built there, near the oilfields; President Nimeiri, however, ignored their demands and ordered the building of an oil refinery in the North and a pipeline to the Red Sea for the direct export of crude oil. Other disputes broke out over Nimeiri's persistent intervention in southern politics. There was further distrust in the south at Nimeiri's rapprochement with Islamic factions⁵⁷.

Nimeiri announced an Islamic revolution in 1983, abandoning the cautious equilibrium he had previously attempted to strike. He insisted that Sudan would become an Islamic country under Islamic law. The national application of traditional Islamic law would entail punishments like flogging for alcohol consumption, amputation for theft, and execution for apostasy. Government officials and military commanders were required to give a pledge of allegiance to Nimeiri as Muslim ruler. Nimeiri even attempted to take the title of Imam, albeit was not successfully. By presidential order, new Islamic laws were added in piecemeal fashion to suit Nimeiri whims, without consultation with the attorney -general or the chief justice. Circumventing the established judiciary, he setup special prompt justice courts. Thousands were arrested and brought before government-appointed judges who routinely handed out punishments such as flogging. Nimeiri forbade dancing and dumped \$11 million worth of alcohol into the Nile to demonstrate his commitment to the Islamic system. ⁵⁸.

Meanwhile, increasingly more fervent and brutal prosecutions were made of Bashir's jihad in the south. A new front in the conflict emerged in the Nuba Mountains and South Kordofan, where the local populace—both Muslim and non-Muslim—joined the SPLA

⁵⁷ ⁶⁵*Martin Meredith (2005) the States of Africa.*

⁵⁸*Ibid..... (2005)*

campaign in protest of northern merchants' alleged property grabs. A fatwa outlining the status of all those who resisted the government was released by religious scholars in 1992 since Muslims were suddenly being singled out for retaliation. Islam has given the right to kill both of them since an insurgent who was once a Muslim is now an apostate and a non-Muslim is a non-believer acting as a barrier to the propagation of Islam.⁵⁹

Mass massacres took place in the South as a result of the freedom to kill. Bombings of villages and relief centers were carried out without warning; government-sponsored militias and PDF units killed residents and pillaged their belongings, including animals, at will. Thousands of women and children were enslaved after being taken as war loot. A large portion of the population, uprooted from their homes, suffered famine and relied on foreign aid supplies passing through conflict areas to survive.⁶⁰

Both sides conscripted child soldiers. Profiting from the split, the Khartoum government reached an accommodation with Machar, supplying him with weapons to fight Garang and steering clear of combat in areas under Machar's control⁶¹.

Alarmed by Bashir's vision of a regional jihad coming from Khartoum, neighboring governments countered by aiding the southern revolt, greatly complicating the battle in the south. Uganda played a significant role in providing Garang's army with weapons and ammunition. As payback, Bashir started backing rebel groups in northern Uganda, most notably the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which was headed by the messianic psychopath Joseph Kony, a specialist in kidnapping, raping, and disfiguring children.

⁵⁹*ibid.*..... (2005)

⁶⁰*ibid.*..... (2005)

⁶¹*ibid.*..... (2005)

In response, the US administration gave Museveni's Kampala government further assistance. Among the other participants experimenting in southern Sudan were Christian Fundamentalists. Western organizations engaged in programs for the redemption of African slaves⁶².

Even after being reduced to a wasteland, oil remained the ultimate aim for both sides in southern Sudan. Bashir's government was resolved to capitalize on Sudan's oil potential from the beginning after oil was discovered in the Upper Nile area in 1978, north of Bentiu. Both oil and Islamist ideology dictated its approach.⁶³

The majority of the oilfields were in Dinka and Nuer territory. The government launched an ethnic cleansing campaign to defend the region from rebel attacks. The army and Baggara militias were used to expel the native population and install mercenary forces around the oilfields. Additionally, it used the Nuer faction led by Riek Machar as a stand-in force to repel the SPLM\SPLA, raising the possibility of an oil revenue split.⁶⁴

Several peace initiatives were launched during the 1990s but never made any progress. The ruling NIF clique in Khartoum participated for tactical reasons, with no intention of making concessions to the rebels. A protracted power struggle between Bashir and Turabi culminated in Turabi's arrest in 2001 but did not alter the NIF's commitment to its Islamist agenda. Nevertheless, Bashir was keen to shed Sudan's status as a pariah state and break out of the isolation imposed on it by neighbouring states and Western governments⁶⁵.

⁶² *Ibid*..... (2005)

⁶³ *Ibid*..... (2005)

⁶⁴ *Ibid*..... (2005)

⁶⁵ *Ibid*..... (2005)

He was also far more amenable to the idea of negotiations to end the war. A special envoy for peace in Sudan, Senator Danforth was appointed by President Bush. For almost two decades, Senator John Danforth told President Bush in September 2001 that the Sudanese government was "waging a brutal and shameful war against its own people." And this isn't right and must stop. The government has targeted civilians for violence and terror. It permits and encourages slavery. And the responsibility to end the war is on their shoulders. They must now seek peace and we want to help".⁶⁶

Danforth proposed four tests for the two sides. He wanted: a ceasefire agreement in the Nuba Mountains, an area north of the old 1956 border between Northern and Southern Sudan: an agreement not to attack or target civilian structures and property: an agreement to respect zones of tranquility in the conflict area to enable medical humanitarian agencies to carry out immunisation programmes: an agreement to appoint a commission to investigate slavery in Sudan⁶⁷.

The peace process that emerged containing inherent laws. No one in Sudan other than the two main protagonists was involved. The NIF government represented only a relatively small northern faction that over a period of twelve years had successfully suppressed all opposition in the north, relying on security agencies to keep itself in power. Using imprisonment without trial as a principal weapon and enforcing rigid media control. Excluded from the process were opposition parties with significantly more support than the NIF, like the Democratic Unionist Party and the Umma Party. Other northern factions, active in subversion inside their own regions, were openly antagonistic to the NIF administration, particularly in Darfur to the west and the Beja

⁶⁶ *Ibid*..... (2005)

⁶⁷ *Ibid*..... (2005)

territory in the Red Sea hills to the east. None concurred with the Islamist brand of government that the NIF was determined to maintain⁶⁸.

The SPLM/SPLA, for its part was charged as a Dinka-led organisation dominated by Garang but riven by shifting rivalries. It aimed to establish a united secular state but otherwise lacked an ideological base. A large proportion of southern opinion, meanwhile, harboured an abiding hatred of Arab and Islamic rule and favoured independence for the south. But southerners possessed little sense of national identity; their attachment to tribe and clan was far stronger. Not only was there considerable animosity between government---supported Nuer factions and SPLA Dinka supporters but a host of other tribal militias---the Murle in Jonglei and Taposa of Eastern Equatoria; the Fartit of Western Bahr El Ghazal ---opposed the SPLM⁶⁹.

Nevertheless, the peace process at least held out the prospect of some respite from a conflict that by 2002 had resulted in 2 million dead and 4 million displaced. The NIF administration and the SPLM convened for five weeks in the Kenyan town of Machakos, where they came to an understanding on a number of important topics. As per the provisions of the Machakos Protocol, which was signed in July 2002 and concluded in 2004, the southern region was granted the autonomy to make its own decisions. Southerners would vote in a referendum to determine whether to become an independent state or stay part of the United Sudan after a six-year transitional period that started in 2005 with the signing of a definitive peace agreement. The north and the south were treated differently when it came to the religious issue. Outside of Khartoum, sharia was confirmed as the source of law in the northern Sudan, home to two thirds of

⁶⁸ *Ibid*..... (2005)

⁶⁹ *Ibid*..... (2005)

the population, while the south of the country was allowed to function as a secular state. Therefore, sharia law would still apply to the approximately 5 million non-Muslim residents of the north. The possibility of creating a secular state for the entirety of Sudan was not taken into account, despite the fact that many people in the north and south of the country shared this goal.⁷⁰

In November 1993 the Inter-Governmental Authority and Development, an organization of East African States, began mediation efforts. In January 1994 the mainstream SPLM and SPLA-United joined in calling for self-determination for the south, a call that amounted to recognition by John Garang of the popularity of his rivals' position on this all-important issue. While successive IGAD -sponsored talks between the government and the rebels failed, Garang followed up this shift in policy with a comprehensive reorganization of the SPLM/A, an amnesty for defectors, and establishment of an administrative infrastructure under the rubric of a 'New Sudan'. Meanwhile fighting between government regular and militia forces and the mainstream SPLA intensified, and mass migration, famine and civilian casualties in hundreds of thousands briefly captured the international attention. The government's grim determination was enhanced by the capture of several SPLA strongholds and the collapse of the SPLA-United, whose leaders one by one defected from or were dismissed by Riek Machar. In September 1994 Riek Machar renamed his rump group the Southern Sudan Independence Movement; Nassir, Riek's base, fell to the government in March 1995, and some of the former leaders of his movement later made separate deals with Khartoum⁷¹.

⁷⁰*Ibid*..... (2005)

⁷¹*Ibid*... (2005)

Agreements signed by the SPLM and the northern parties at Chukdum and Asmara in late 1994 provided framework for settling Constitutional questions after the overthrow of the NIF. International efforts, whether those of IGAD, Church groups, former US President Jimmy Carter or others, continued to be used by both sides, for tactical advantage, for their basic political positions, never changed. The more active intervention by the neighbouring states, both in promoting negotiations and in supporting the rebels, further isolated the NIF regime, while by 1996 the military pendulum was again swinging in the SPLA's direction. Yet none of these developments gave serious reason to hope for a permanent solution to the chronic problem of defining the Sudan's identity as a state. Further, history had long taught that even the overthrow of a national regime because of its policies in the south gave no guarantee that its successor would behave differently. Moreover, the endemic fractionalization of southern politics, no better or worse than that of the northern parties, gave no hope that a victorious rebel could hold the loyalty of large and important ethnic minorities within the region itself⁷².

A bright spot in region's relations with its neighbours was improvement of diplomatic ties with Ethiopia after the fall of Mengistu. But just as this cost the SPLM -SPLA its principal foreign base -other neighbouring states in black Africa stepped support of the southern rebels. The Sudan's relations with Uganda were severely strained, as each state reportedly supplied rebels in the other, and in the 1995 diplomatic relations were broken off; the continuing war in south made rapprochement impossible. Relations with Kenya, which had long provided safe haven for Southern Sudanese rebels, remained similarly poor, although a mutually beneficial façade of civility was maintained. With

⁷² *Ibid*.....²⁰⁰⁵

the newest state in the region, Eritrea, relations deteriorated throughout the 1990s, and were complicated by presence of large number of Eritrean refugees in Sudan and by Eritrean regime's support for the Sudanese opposition parties⁷³.

On the other hand, General Lazarus Sumbeiywo who was mandated to oversee mediations was now strongly supported by envoys from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, and international observers from the troika and Italy. After a month of intense negotiations, the Machakos Conference ended on 20 July 2002 with a protocol signed by Ghazi Salahuddin Atabani, who conveyed Khartoum's rejection of the DOP in 1994, and Salva Kiir on behalf of the SPLM/SPLA, and witnessed by Sumbeiywo. It was landmark agreement, a dramatic breakthrough in what many had regarded as an intractable and irreconcilable confrontation of radically different views. The protocol was essentially a great compromise whereby the North accepted that sharia law would be the source of legislation in the North in exchange for the South's right to self-determination. After a six-year transition period during which the Islamist administration committed to the possibility of an independent Southern Sudan, the right to self-determination would be resolved by a referendum. The protocol alluded to sharia law as the source of legislation in the North but was very clear that the source of legislation in the South would be by "popular consensus".⁷⁴

Oil plus other circumstances made the CPA possible. After 1998, without Ethiopian military support, the SPLA could not mount military operations capable of taking and holding large towns, and could not halt the government's oil extraction. Facing the prospect of vastly increased government military capacity, it might in fact lose. In

⁷³ Robert O. Collins (2008) *History of Modern Sudan*, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*..... (2008)

January 2001, the incoming administration of President George W. Bush promptly abandoned its predecessor's policy of regime change by proxy. The Cheney Report on US energy dependence prompted American interest were keen for a major American oil company to bring technology that would enable them to extract Sudan's heavy crude oil much more efficiently⁷⁵.

The main goal of the negotiations that resulted in the CPA's signature in January 2005 was to create a rent allocation formula that would appease the NCP, the SPLA, and the Movement that it was linked with (SPLM). The math was made possible by the rapidly growing budget, which allowed Khartoum's ruling cartel to provide a substantial incentive without facing any consequences. On the basis that the CPA promised peace, national unity and normalization of relations with the US, Bashir agreed to sign. In a movement of characteristic humor, he waved the document in public, and said, 'la ilaha illa Allah' paused for a moment, and continued, 'Hallelujah'. He hailed the CPA as 'Sudan's second independence'. The core provisions of CPA were a Government of National Unity (NCP plus SPLM with other parties given a minor role⁷⁶.

For the year 2005-11 Interim Period saw two parallel and competing patronage systems in Sudan. The NCP run a complex rentier political market. Lacking institutions to regulate nationwide political competition, and determined to remain in power, its party managers and security chiefs inadvertently contributed to price inflation in the cost of loyalty, so that even though revenues increased geometrically, they were always outrun by spending. Government deficits caused concern at the World Bank, which noted the

⁷⁵ Alex De Waal (2015) *the Real Politics of the Horn of Africa*. UK. Pp.72

⁷⁶ *Ibid*.....(2015)

political pressures on provincial administrations to spend more, particularly on salaries, and to inflate expected state revenues to match the projected spending⁷⁷.

In the south, the system was cruder: the SPLA had an expensive security strategy and the southern elites rushed to emulate their northern peers' self-enrichment. By the time the northern political managers realized that the SPLM/A had deliberately inflated the price of loyalty in southern Sudan, such that the northerners could no longer compete, it was too late. The two ruling elites were jointly in danger of pricing themselves out of their own political marketplace⁷⁸.

3.4 The Role of Religion in the North-South Conflict

The civil war in North and South Sudan, which started in August 1955 and has lasted until recently, is commonly understood to be a struggle between the dominant, more developed Arabized Muslim North and the less developed African South, which is predominantly African in its beliefs and has modern, Christianized leadership. This oversimplifies a complex scenario where the roots of conflict are deeply ingrained in the social, cultural, historical, and economic development of Sudan's diverse society. These include societal complaints, mistrust between the two Sudanese regions, hostility, and unequal economic growth. The conflict between the North and the South eventually turned into an ideological war between Christians, secularists, and Islamists.⁷⁹

President Nimeiri's abrupt proclamation in September 1983 making sharia law the official state legislation brought the religious issue to the forefront. These consist of the

⁷⁷ *Ibid*..... (2015)

⁷⁸ *Ibid*..... (2015)

⁷⁹ Yusuf Fadul Hasan (2003) *the Studies of Sudanese History, Burri-Khartoum, Sudan*

death penalty and other traditional sanctions based on sharia law. The Church, politicians in the South, and the recently formed Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its armed wing, the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA), led by Colonel John Garang De Mabior, denounced the imposition of Islamic laws. Colonel De Mabior demanded that Islamic laws be removed from the statute book prior to acknowledging any peace initiative. Given that the majority of Sudanese Muslims consider the application of sharia law to be a fundamental tenet of their religion, it appears that the impasse will persist. According to Fadul and Deng who contended that somehow religion become symbol of identity of power sharing, even of management and control of resources, and certainly, of the culture that gives sense of who we are and to whom we relate to in the world. --- has become the symbolic embodiment of fundamental issues in Sudan⁸⁰.

Thankfully, there have been numerous attempts to halt the civil war during the past few decades. The Government and the SPLM/SPLA, the two opposing parties, are realizing more and more that they cannot use force to impose their will on one another, nor that secessionism is a genuine option. The Koka Dam Declaration, which was endorsed in March 1986 by the National Alliance for National Salvation and the SPLM/SPLA, representing important trade union and professional organizations, was the first tangible step toward peace in Sudan. The declaration's action plan aimed to create a conducive environment for holding a National Constitutional Conference to address all matters concerning the entire Sudan. The second-largest party in the nation, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which was strongly backed by the Khatmiyya, and the Sudanese Peace Initiative (SPLM/SPLA) signed the agreement on November 16, 1988. The

⁸⁰ *Ibid*..... (2003)

agreement outlined the requirements for holding the National Constitutional Conference. The Koka Dam Declaration called for the repeal of the sharia rules, but the Sudanese Peace Initiative Agreement called for their suspension until a conference was held and new laws were established.⁸¹

The Arabs, who have a stronger affinity with the Arab Islamic world, have always been hostile to Western values and initiatives that challenge the nation's Arab-Islamic orientation. The idea held by the North that people in the South lack autonomy and is under the authority of the Western Christian-Zionist bloc was linked to this action. Even humanitarian aid that is sent to the south can occasionally be seen as directly interfering with a nation's internal affairs and endangering that nation's sovereignty.⁸²

The conflicting impact of foreign actors suggests that Sudanese national vision perspectives are not solely based on the Sudanese people. While Arabs believe that the West and Black Africa would not have been able to help the South withstand the North's integration into the country's Arab-Islamic orientation, Southerners view the North as having the backing of the Arab-Islamic world.⁸³

The ambivalence of the Arabs is reflected in the belief held by the Arabs that they are not actually Sudanese, despite the fact that the Arabs themselves majority feel they are. Being less conflicted than Arabs is a notable distinction, particularly considering the South's clear marginalization within the framework of political power and financial distribution.⁸⁴

⁸¹ *Ibid*..... (2003)

⁸² Ricardo and Francis M. Deng et al (2005). *Borders, Nationalism and African States*, pp.33-42

⁸³ *Ibid*..... (1995)

⁸⁴ Oystein H. Rolandsen and M. W Daly (2016) *a History of South Sudan from Slavery to Independence* Cambridge University Press.Uk.

In Sudan, a multireligious, multiethnic, and multicultural society, religion is a significant factor in ties between the North and South. Instead of fostering a shared identity, attempts to force uniformity on the Sudanese peoples have led to strife. Sudan's diversity makes being willing to compromise extremely important. Religion has a major role in the politics, history, and social dynamics of Sudanese reality and identity, both past and present. In this regard, compromise—rather than fundamentalism—is sorely needed. Due to the large followings of Christianity, Islam, and indigenous religions in Sudan, Sudanese politics have a significant influence there.⁸⁵

There is little doubt that since Arab tribes from Upper Egypt and across the Red Sea invaded Sudan in the middle Ages, the country has been gradually becoming more and more Arabised and Islamic. Both those who believe that Arabization is a natural and inevitable process that was interrupted in its final stages by British intervention and those who see it as an external threat that should be stopped by organizing an indigenous African opposition recognize the Arab invasion of the Sudan as historical fact.⁸⁶

3.5 Conclusion

The idea of holding talks to end the conflict was far more acceptable to the US government. A special envoy for peace in Sudan, Senator John Danforth was appointed by President Bush. Bush declared in September 2001 that "the government of Sudan has waged a brutal and shameful wars against its own people" for almost twenty years. This has to end because it's wrong. The government has targeted civilians for violence and terror. It permits and encourages slavery. And the responsibility to end the war is on their shoulders. They must now seek the peace, and we want to help".

⁸⁵ *Ibid*.....(2011)

⁸⁶ Douglas H. Johnson (2003) *the root causes of the Sudanese's civil wars*, British library, London, United Kingdom

Agreements signed by the SPLM and the northern parties at Chukdum and Asmara in late 1994 provided framework for settling Constitutional questions after the overthrow of the NIF. International efforts, whether those of IGAD, Church groups, former US President Jimmy Carter or others, continued to be used by both sides, for tactical advantage, for their basic political positions, never changed. The more active intervention by the neighbouring states, both in promoting negotiations and in supporting the rebels, further isolated the NIF regime, while by 1996 the military pendulum was again swinging in the SPLA's direction. Yet none of these developments gave serious reason to hope for a permanent solution to the chronic problem of defining the Sudan's identity as a state. And history had long taught that even the overthrow of a national regime because of its policies in the south gave no guarantee that its successor would behave differently. Moreover, the endemic fractionalization of southern politics, no better or worse than that of the northern parties, gave no hope that a victorious rebel could hold the loyalty of large and important ethnic minorities within the region itself.

On the other hand, General Lazarus Sumbeiywo was now strongly supported by envoys from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, and international observers from the troika and Italy. After a month of intense negotiations, the Machakos Conference ended on 20 July 2002 with a protocol signed by Ghazi Salahuddin Atabani, who conveyed Khartoum's rejection of the DOP in 1994, and by Salva Kiir on behalf of the SPLM/SPLA, and witnessed by Sumbeiywo. It was landmark agreement, a dramatic breakthrough in what many had regarded as an intractable and irreconcilable confrontation of radically different views. The protocol was essentially a great compromise whereby the North accepted that sharia would be the source of legislation in the North in exchange for the South's right to self-determination. After a six-year transition period during which the Islamist administration committed to the possibility of an independent Southern Sudan,

the right to self-determination would be resolved by referendum. The agreement made reference to sharia as the source of law in the North but made it very clear that "popular consensus" would be the source of law in the South.

Oil plus other circumstances made the CPA possible. After 1998, without Ethiopian military support, the SPLA could not mount military operations capable of taking and holding large towns, and could not halt the government's oil extraction. Facing the prospect of vastly increased government military capacity, it might in fact lose. In January 2001, the incoming administration of President George W. Bush promptly abandoned its predecessor's policy of regime change by proxy. The Cheney Report on US energy dependence prompted American interest were keen for a major American oil company to bring technology that would enable them to extract Sudan's heavy crude oil much more efficiently.

The year 2005-11 Interim Period saw two parallel and competing patronage systems in Sudan. The NCP run a complex rentier political market. Lacking institutions to regulate nationwide political competition, and determined to remain in power, its party managers and security chiefs inadvertently contributed to price inflation in the cost of loyalty, so that even though revenues increased geometrically, they were always outrun by spending. Government deficits caused concern at the World Bank, which noted the political pressures on provincial administrations to spend more, particularly on salaries, and to inflate expected state revenues to match the projected spending.

CHAPTER- FOUR

THE IMPACT OF CONFLICT OF IDENTITY CRISIS IN SUDAN, 1983-2005

4.1 Introduction

The elites in the north, who assumed power after the end of the colonial period later divide the country's wealth and power among themselves, seek to associate themselves with Arab world. The period of Sudanisation (1954-6) was the time in which the Arab elites in Khartoum began to build their political and financial domination of the country. On the other hand, the pure Africans in the South did not accept the Arabisation and Islamisation policies imposed on them by their northern counterpart. The Southern identified as Africans, sometimes as Christians and believers of African religions⁸⁷.

The South---North context of Sudan is one in which social realities of cultural diversity are struggling against the ideals of unity. There are many different angles to the problem, but cutting across this is the issue of racio-cultural identity around which history, policy, and economic development have entered. Both aspects of the problem and their interaction were enumerated in 1956 by a special commission as points in mind in order to understand the 1955 southern revolt which generated the civil violence that continued for sixteen years⁸⁸.

The main obstacles to state and nation formation that the identity issue presents for Sudan have been identified in the special Commission report. The major barrier to peace, unity, and stability is still the fissure emerging from this fundamental crisis of nationhood, which has been at the center of the ongoing war the nation has faced since its independence and has overthrown several governments. The chasm between Sudan's

⁸⁷ Elke Grawert (2010) *After Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan*, James Currey, UK, Eastern African Series.

⁸⁸ Francis M. Deng (1973) *the Dynamics of Identification*, Khartoum University Press, Sudan

people has simultaneously gotten smaller and wider. From a policy standpoint, the rising complexity and polarity of the Sudanese national character poses a challenge to the development of a shared sense of national identity as well as a political foundation for removing psychological barriers to a common denominator. In fact, there may be an ambiguous propensity to acknowledge both the reality of diversity and the goal of unification. While the North's Arabization and Islamization have led to an overabundance of identification with Islam and Arab civilization—which were syncretistically introduced and assimilated along the lines of pre-existing African religions, cultures, and ethnicities—the Commission's emphasis on racial and cultural differences requires some qualification. As a result, the dominant Arab culture, race, and religion in the North are distinctively Sudanese.⁸⁹

The belief of North that merely reversing the British policy and Arabising and Islamising the South Problem would be solved, fell short of a contextual approach—they did not take into consideration the pre-existing British context: the manner in which Arabisation and Islamisation were brought about the North and the history of slavery and other hostilities in the south, nor did they predict the repercussions of suddenly reversing a policy which had grown deep roots in the south, particularly among the educated class⁹⁰.

However, Sudanese identity issues continue to exist and could potentially cause conflict in future South-North ties. It seems unlikely that the Southern Sudanese will be satisfied with regional participation and unconcerned with such significant national and international concerns as what Sudan's identity should be, even though regional self-

⁸⁹ *Ibid*..... (1973)

⁹⁰ *Ibid*..... (1973)

rule offers a temporary solution to the South-North problems. A label that unites rather than divides is the only one that can be recommended.⁹¹

4.2 Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)

The leadership of the SPLA has declared that their primary objective is to create a "New Sudan" of social and economic justice, equality, and freedom for all nationalities to develop their own cultures. They also want to ensure that no one religion is chosen as the state religion, those human rights are respected and acknowledged, and that a privileged few do not hold all the power in the country. These goals broadcast over the SPLM/SPLA radio they are almost bound to have appealed for the Southern Sudan, the present theatre of the war and the areas of recruitment; they also appeal to two other target groups.: they backward areas of eastern and western Sudan; a few members of the intelligentsia in Northern Sudan, centrist in tendency who are disillusioned by sectarian control. To these groups the call for a unified Sudan has a particular appeal. But support for the SPLM/SPLA is also within this group's own reaction to sectarian control and religious oriented upsurge. It is a radical change from what it was over 24 years ago when this group led a popular revolution against the military regime⁹².

Although there were tensions in both the military and political wings, the SPLM/SPLA was clearly a more coordinated and sophisticated movement than the one that had existed in the 1960s. It was also clearer on its aims, which were radical rather than specifically socialist, to build a new Sudan. Politically it would remain a single state, for the SPLA was not secessionist, though it would have a form of local autonomy,

⁹¹ *Ibid*..... (1973)

⁹² Abel Alier (2003) *Too Many Agreements Dishonoured Southern Sudan. Khartoum Sudan, Pp.45-290.*

either on a federal basis or one of the regional devolutions under a national government. The SPLA did not specifically seek a one-Party State, but spoke of liberalism and democracy in a way that aimed to give power to the masses. The SPLA also opposed the dominance of what was described as small Khartoum-based elite of Party and military leaders. Economically there was a need to tackle uneven development and promote economic and social justice through developing Sudan's undoubted resources for the whole people. Socially the SPLA stood to end racism and other forms of discrimination, while on religion it sought secularism, a cause that received a great boost in the South with introduction of sharia in September 1983.⁹³.

4.2.1 The SPLA's External Support

John Garang's new approach to Sudan's problems convinced countries from Ethiopia, to Cuba, to Gaddafi's Libya, and many others, to provide military assistance almost unprecedented in history of South Sudan's quest for freedom. The leaders of these countries had two common goals: the SPLA's commitment to the unity of Sudan and removal of Nimeiri from power⁹⁴.

Qaddafi cared nothing for political aspirations of people of Southern Sudan, but he wanted to support them to get rid of Nimeiri.⁹⁵ During the two years between the founding of the SPLA in 1983 and the fall of Nimeiri in 1985, Qaddafi supported the insurgency with enough military equipment to last the SPLA for many years, affording it more significant victories against the SAF than any other foreign assistance. But Libya's attitude towards the South became very clear after the fall of Nimeiri in 1985.

⁹³ Peter Woodward (1990) *Sudan 1898-1989, the Unstable State*, London, UK. Pp.162-63.

⁹⁴ Jok Madut Jok (2017) *Breaking Sudan, the Search for Peace and Security*, Great Britain, London. Pp.138-145.

⁹⁵ *Ibid*..... (2017)

Gaddafi terminated his assistance; evidence of his initial interests and virtual intentions⁹⁶.

John Garang's first fight to change the dictatorship in Khartoum resonated with Mengistu was not only convinced by Garang's new insights on Sudan's political crises but also ready to host SPLA, provide training and offer the Sudanese people an opportunity to restructure the governance of their country. Mengistu recognized the Marxist explanations beneath Garang's words and beliefs, as the Cuba. They agreed to host the training of an officer corps and the would-be military training and revolutionary leaders of a restructured Sudan, Such as Pagan Amum Okiech and others who rose to great heights of military command and political leadership within the SPLM Party⁹⁷.

4.2.2 Nimeiri's Approach to the Conflict

Even though the SPLM/A launched the civil war in 1983, Nimeiri delayed considering negotiations until March 1985. At first, the government viewed the uprising as a minor mutiny, easily contained. Then Nimeiri thought he could persuade Garang to stop fighting by offering him the post of First Vice President and granting the SPLM six cabinet posts. Nimeiri set up High Committee for peace under a respected elder statesman. As his regime unravels, Nimeiri proposed a cease-fire and a settlement along the lines of renewed but modified autonomy for the south while ignoring the differences involving Islamic law and dictatorial rule⁹⁸.

Garang was suspicious of Nimeiri's proposal and feared that the cease-fire would be used to resupply garrisons before the onset of summer rains, He also emphasized that

⁹⁶*Ibid*..... (2017)

⁹⁷*Ibid*..... (2017)

⁹⁸*Ann Mosley Lesch (1993) Negotiations in Sudan, Making War and Waging Peace in Africa, United States Institute of Peace Press. Washington. USA.*

restoring autonomy would be insufficient: Nimeiri had flouted the constitution, and his commitments could not be trusted. The SPLM insisted on overthrowing the regime. SPLA radio, based in Ethiopia, broadcast appeals to army garrisons in the south to open direct negotiations with the SPLA and join it in uprooting Nimeiri's rule. Nonetheless, Garang did propose a means to hold comprehensive negotiations: a "national congress to be organized by the SPLA, progressive and patriotic elements in the Sudanese Army and other democratic forces in the country to discuss the essence and the programme for the formation of a New Sudan and its New Army consistent with its particularity". That concept of a broad-based constitutional conference was soon developed more fully by the SPLM and became the key to its approach to negotiations⁹⁹.

4.2.3 Khartoum's Counterinsurgency

Nimeiri's government and the subsequent governments, embarked on a practice little known in history of Sudan's multiple wars: a counterinsurgency that recruited militias to fight the south by proxy. The goal was to deny the SPLA support base among civilians by pitting southerners against one another. This policy marks the second historical movement that allows contextualising the state of affairs regarding violence in South Sudan. The National Islamic Front (NIF/ NCP), took counter-insurgency to a new level, more oppressive than Nimeiri could have envisioned. At the start, there were three types of potential proxies, although other types developed in later years when the system had proved effective¹⁰⁰.

The first, and most obvious, proxies were groups of South Sudanese who opposed the SPLA on ideological grounds such as the question of separation versus liberation of the

⁹⁹*Ibid*..... (1993)

¹⁰⁰*Ibid*..... (2017)

country from the corrupt elites of Khartoum. The most prominent of these groups was Any-Any II, initially made up of veterans of the previous war, who had been separatists, all their lives and bitterly disagreed with Garang on the philosophy of liberating the whole Sudan. When Garang outwitted them, and ordered killings, the remaining armed groups fell into the embrace of Khartoum, and they were used by the SAF to fight the SPLA, with little success¹⁰¹.

The second proxies were ethnic groups of South Sudan that listened to Khartoum's anti-SPLA war propaganda. Khartoum portrayed as a Dinka movement, telling the Mundari from Juba region, the Dedinga and the Taposa from eastern Equatoria and the Fartit from Wau that the SPLA was not the liberation army; an army they had to fight if they wished to free of its abuses. Small groups answered Khartoum's call to arm themselves against the SPLA and the Dinka. This conflict not only wreaked havoc in the lives of the Dinka and Juluo people who lived in Wau, and the non-Equatoria who lived in Juba, but also in the lives of the ethnic groups themselves as the SPLA responded against their communities. The deadly consequences of the reprisals almost proved to these communities that the SPLA was indeed an occupational force, as Khartoum's agents suggested the situation posed serious questions about nationalism.¹⁰².

The third proxies were the groups of urban vigilantes that the government had identified and recruited in the garrison towns of Juba, Wau and Malakal. Their chief task was to point out possible "fifth columnists", people who suspected either of supporting the SPLA or the clandestine activities such as secretly recruiting the young people to join the rebel movement. Suspects arrested on such charges faced terrible fates. Indefinite

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*..... (2017)

¹⁰² *Ibid*..... (2017)

detention, sexual abuse, disappearances and summary executions became the leitmotif of a regime desperate for a legitimacy it believed could only be achieved through extreme violence. The hunt for fifth columnists intensified every time the government forces were defeated in battle; every incident in which Khartoum's forces heavily affected was the cause for security agents take out their anger on suspected young people. The counter-insurgency created deadly rifts between the Dinka and non-Dinka communities, especially in Wau where the military commander of the garrison, General Fadalla Burma Nasir, dubbed anti- SPLA vigilantes under General Tom Al-Nur the "friendly forces".¹⁰³

4.2.4 Splits in the SPLA

Chief among the other historical moments that had repercussions on the stability of the new movements are the many splits that occurred within the SPLA. The splits began in 1991 when Riek Machar and Lam Akol, then among the most senior commanders of the movement, staged a coup against John Garang. Their claim was that he had become too autocratic in his leadership style and the way he ran the movement day-to-day failing to take over the organisation, they broke away, causing the deadly confrontations among the Southern Sudan between 1991 and 1998. The confrontations were especially severe between Nuer and Dinka, until reconciliations achieved through the so-called People to People Peace initiative¹⁰⁴.

The split made the SPLA weak, and granted major victories to the SAF. The SAF regained areas the SPLA had controlled for many years, and had lost many men in wresting the land from Khartoum's forces. The pain of losing places such as Jokou in

¹⁰³*ibid...* (2017)

¹⁰⁴*Ibid.....* (2017)

Upper Nile, which had been liberated at a tremendous cost by the SPLA forces, is still lamented, and something for which it was thought Riek Machar and Lam Akol would never be forgiven. However, history is sometimes more lenient in passing judgment; Riek Machar became Vice President of South Sudan, Lam Akol became Sudan's Foreign Affairs Minister on the SPLM ticket after CPA. These concessions were made to buy peace and stability, to the consternation of some citizens who clung to the memories of 1991 coup¹⁰⁵.

The longest- lasting impact of the splits were ethnic rifts. Their split, and the confrontations that followed, went from ideology to a completely ethnic character; both sides saw the support of their tribes as the only way to fighting as to stand a chance of winning. Nuer and Dinka elders later characterized these drawn- out confrontations as the “wars of the educated”, because the way they fought, and the forces that fanned them, were completely different from traditional rural feuds the Dinka and Nuer had always known. This reconfigured the relationship between the two groups and their sub-groups, and led to a massive number of deaths. The consequence of the splits haunts South Sudan to this day¹⁰⁶.

4.2.5 Peace Talks and War in Sudan

On the other hand, the NIF voice had often appeared to be most vocal view in north-South discord. NIF's program, as defenders of the Islamic ideal, represented a significant advancement in the religious aspect of the Southern Question. It did not stray from the sharia and maintained its longstanding dedication to it. Nevertheless, the National Salvation Revolutionary (NSR) government made an effort to cease the

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*..... (2017)

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*..... (2017)

hostilities and started a round of peace negotiations. Dr. Lam Akol, representing the SPLM\SPLA, and Colonel Muhammad al-Amin Khalifa, a member of the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation, met for the first time in Addis Ababa on March 19, 1989. Despite the fact that nothing major was settled, both parties decided to maintain open lines of communication and resume discussions at a later time.¹⁰⁷

The series of talks that followed were sponsored by various mediators including former Presidents such as President Jimmy Carter of USA, I. Babangida of Nigeria, Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya and the countries of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), were held in Nairobi, Abuja, Entebbe, Frankfurt and Barcelona. Most of the mediators were aiming at getting the contending parties to get talking without being involved in the issues that divided them. Once they started talking and the principal issues were raised by both sides to declare their positions. Through mediators who raised the question of separation of religion and state among other controversial issues. Most likely, the most significant result of these mediators was the Declaration of Principle (DOP), which was reached at the IGAD mediators' initiative. The signatories were instructed to review the DOP and provide a report for the July 1994 session that followed.¹⁰⁸

4.2.7 Mounting Local Hardship

The Government of Sudan recruited new companies from Europe, Canada and Asia to continue with oil exploration and drilling in the midst of the war. In 1999, Sudan began exporting crude oil, but at the same time, levels of violence against civilians escalated

¹⁰⁷ Yusuf Fadul Hasan (2003) *Studies in Sudanese History. Burri-Khartoum Sudan. Pp.224-5.*

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid*..... (2003)

to never-before-seen proportions. The SAF and militia groups were better able to conduct war and carry out crimes against civilians who fled to Southern Sudan because to oil facilities like highways and airstrips. After the war, egregious violations of civilians ended but local complaints against the actions of the oil companies did not cease. The central government Ministry of energy and mining (MEM) and the oil companies rapidly expanded oil operations, earning the government a fortune but causing hardship for local people. Many Southern Sudanese, however, are suspicious of the motives of the (MEM) and the main companies involved in this oil boom, CNPC, PETRONAS, and ONGC. As one Southern Sudanese geologist remarked:

The government is trying to drain all the oil in the South before the self-determination vote in 2011. People suspect that the output of oil exceeds the amounts reported and the secret of reservoirs have been constructed in the north to store the excess of oil by Chinese companies are involved in the deception¹⁰⁹.

This view is supported by northern Sudanese aid workers active in Upper Nile State in 2006. Who claimed that the central government had dramatically increased oil production in order to exhaust the estimated 3 billion barrels of reserves in southern Sudan before referendum scheduled 2011.¹¹⁰

4.2.8 Foreign Policy and Comprehensive Peace Agreement

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 was a result, of conjunction of interests within Sudan and internationally. On the domestic front, the two parties to the agreement, the National Congress Party (NCP), formerly the (NIF) and the SPLM/A, both saw advantages in peace; while internationally there was wide support and no

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid*..... (2011)

¹¹⁰ *Ibid*..... (2011)

significant spoilers. Domestically the NCP had come to realise that there was little chance of military victory in the south, while peace could stabilize access to oil and potentially open up further oil fields. The SPLA recognized that it could not stop the existing of oil flows, though they were intermittently interrupted, and that the NCP was being strengthened by oil revenues on which it was entirely missing out. The unsuccessful peace talks since 1994 had also gone a considerable way to creating an agenda for negotiation, especially on the thorny issue of Islam. Building on IGAD's 1994 Declaration of Principles, the Machakos Protocol of 2002, which preceded the negotiation of the full CPA framework, stated that there would be Islamic law in the north of Sudan and secular South, with the latter holding a referendum on separation; in the meantime, both parties would endeavour to make unity attractive during the interim period¹¹¹.

International support for the CPA came from Sudan's neighbours and three outside countries with particular interest in its policies. IGAD was the responsible regional organization sponsored the talks, in which Kenya played a leading part as well as hosting the various rounds of negotiations. Other IGAD members were less involved, but none had an interest in seeking to disrupt the talks. Kenya looked not only for kudos but also economic links with Southern Sudan, as did Uganda, Ethiopia was developing economic links with Northern Sudan, especially on oil, while Eritrea wished to retain links with Sudan rather than provoke it while the Eritrea -Ethiopia dispute remained unresolved. Egypt and Libya had sought a peace initiative of their own but had been discouraged by the US, which they had no wish to offend. For its part, the Clinton Administration had begun sharing intelligence information on Islamism with Sudan in

¹¹¹ *Ibid*..... (2011)

2000, following attacks in East Africa and Yemen, while the incoming Bush Administration was backed by the Christian right, which had a particular concern for Southern Sudan. Norway had a similar concern, while Britain, as the former imperial power, felt a residual responsibility. The US, Norway and Britain together formed what was known as troika, who played a role in furthering the negotiations. Sudan's new economic partners in Asia and Gulf were supportive, seeing stability and eventual unity as benefiting their own interests in the country¹¹².

The US spoke of genocide and manifested sanctions on Sudan in spite of the CPA. The European powers were softer but knew their publics were hostile to the Sudan government. Arab and African states were concerned, with Chad also becoming a major factor. Sudan's new Asian friends remained largely uncritical in public, though China appointed an envoy and engaged in diplomacy. The major dividing issue internationally turned out to be the International Criminal Court (ICC) which had been established by UN Security Council. Following the Security Council's referral of Darfur to the ICC, three Sudanese were charged of war crimes against humanity, including President Bashir. The ICC had been contentious from the outset, and the international community was now divided over the issue of arresting Bashir; with his Asian friends amongst the reluctant. By 2010 the disarray in Sudan and internationally was combining to threaten the CPA process itself.¹¹³

4.2.9 Garang's Challenges

Unionist Garang maintained with pride that the SPLA's initial conflicts were with the Anyanya II guerillas' secessionists. This provided tactical benefits throughout the war,

¹¹²*Ibid*..... (2011)

¹¹³*Ibid*..... (2011)

particularly with Ethiopian and opposition groups in Northern Sudanese support. Ali Osman Taha was also convinced by Garang's unionist stance that he was a reliable partner in the CPA. However, Garang was also a fervent unionist, believing that they should be entitled to a fair portion of the riches and power at the center. The majority of Southerners were persuaded by their leaders' strategic approach rather than his vision of a unified Sudan; the true agenda of the combatants was embodied in the Dinka proverb that was often used by fighters:

'Ke tharku, angicku', 'what we are fighting for we know'.

Joseph Ukel Garang, a Communist, observed in his well-known 1961 article "The Dilemma of the Southern Intellectual" that an independent South Sudan would serve as a colonial power's pawn. He made the conflict between the north and the south subservient to the anti-imperialist movement. John Garang explicitly appealed to the "African" majority in western, eastern, and southern Sudan, rephrasing the internal problem as one between the center and the periphery.¹¹⁴

For the two Garangs ---one an orthodox and the other a flexible Marxist southern Sudan was an inauspicious place to achieve social transformation. During colonial days just a handful of British officers presided over an ethnographer museum with a 'care and maintenance' administration pared to the absolute minimum. In the 1970s the regional government relied on subventions from Khartoum that covered per cent of budgeted expenditures, with the result that when money ran short as usual southern leaders congregated in Khartoum and spent their time petitioning for handouts. South Sudanese decried the method of individual patronage, but their politicians emulated their northern

¹¹⁴ Alex De Waal (2015) *the Real Politics of the Horn of Africa, Money, War and the Business of Power*. Cambridge, UK.Pp.93.

peers in trying to acquire wealth as quickly as possible, and allocated the jobs and project funds that they had to their clients and constituents¹¹⁵.

When the peace talks with Khartoum began in 2002, Garang explained that he had three parallel strategies, which a negotiated settlement between SPLM/SPLA and government was just one. The other two were the military overthrow of the government with the neighbourly assistance and new insurrections in eastern and western Sudan and a ‘protected uprising’ in which a coalition of northern civilian political parties, and trade unions staged non-violent protest while SPLA and other armed units of the opposition National Democratic Alliance rushed to Khartoum to secure their triumph. The international supporters of the peace process briefly gave more inclusive peace talks some thought, but they were unable to match Garang's insistence that the government should wait for southern Sudan to sign the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005, and that the SPLM/SPLA should be Khartoum's only partner in peace talks held in the Kenyan town of Naivasha.¹¹⁶

4.3 Conclusion

The elites in the north, who assumed power after the end of the colonial period later divide the country's wealth and power amongst themselves. Seek to associate them with the Arab world. The period of Sudanisation (1954-6) was the time in which the Arab elites in Khartoum began to build their political base and financial domination of the country. On the other hand, the pure Africans in the South did not accept the Arabisation and Islamisation policies imposed on them by their northern counterpart.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid*..... (2015)

¹¹⁶ *Ibid*..... (2015)

Sometimes identifying as Christians or followers of African religions, the people of Southern Sudanese descent recognized as Africans.

The leadership of the SPLA declared that their objective was to create a "New Sudan" of social and economic justice, equality, and freedom for all nationalities living in the nation. They also said that they wanted to avoid any one religion being adopted as the state religion, recognize and uphold human rights, and prevent a select few from holding all the state's power. These goals broadcast over the SPLM/SPLA radio almost bound to have appealed for Southern Sudan, the present theatre of the war and the areas of recruitment; they also appeal to two other target groups.: they backward areas of eastern and western Sudan; a few members of the intelligentsia in Northern Sudan, centrist in tendency who are disillusioned by sectarian control. To these groups the call for a unified Sudan has a particular appeal. But support for the SPLM/SPLA is also within this group's own reaction to sectarian control and religious oriented upsurge. Qualitatively the support is quite important. It is a radical change from what it was over 24 years ago when this group led a popular revolution against the military regime.

The international support for the CPA came from Sudan's neighbours and three outside countries with particular interest in its policies. IGAD was the responsible regional organization sponsored the talks, in which Kenya plays a leading part as well as hosting the various rounds of negotiations. Other IGAD members were less involved, but none had an interest in seeking to disrupt the talks. Kenya looked not only for kudos but also economic links with Southern Sudan, as did Uganda, Ethiopia was developing economic links with Northern Sudan, especially on oil, while Eritrea wished to retain links with Sudan rather than provoke it while the Eritrea -Ethiopia dispute remained unresolved. Egypt and Libya had sought a peace initiative of their own but had been

discouraged by the US, which they had no wish to offend. For its part, the Clinton Administration had begun sharing intelligence information on Islamism with Sudan in 2000, following attacks in East Africa and Yemen, while the incoming Bush Administration was backed by the Christian right, which had a particular concern for Southern Sudan. Norway had a similar concern, while Britain, as the former imperial power, felt a residual responsibility. The US, Norway and Britain together formed what was known as the troika, who played a major role in furthering the negotiations. Sudan's new economic partners in Asia and the Gulf were supportive, seeing stability and eventual unity as benefiting their own interests in the country.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

5.1 Introduction

The demand for independence gained great momentum after the World War II. Northern Sudanese felt ready for it- they had experienced civil servants, educated people, and politicians. The South, however, was not ready. The opinions of the Southerners on these important matters were squarely ignored, after Sudan became independent. The North was jubilant. The Southerners, however, felt betrayed by the Northerners and abandoned by the British. This so-called Sudanese state was, in reality, a Northern institution handed over to them by the British. Southern Sudan, therefore, a mere appendage attached to it for political expedience. Indeed, since 1956 the Sudanese state has represented the economic, social and cultural interests of the Muslim and Arab Northern Sudan, and the Southern Sudanese have therefore been accommodated merely on account of the “Southern Problem.”

There were differing perceptions on the content of nationalism in North and the South. In the South, nationalism meant freedom, economic justice and respect for their distinctly African culture and identity. In the North, it meant the end of the Anglo-Egyptian colonial domination, the annexation of Southern Sudan to the North, and the establishments of a sovereign Sudanese Arab- Muslim State ruled by the Northern Muslims. At the expense of the South, the Condominium Authority centralized administrative, political, and economic progress in the North. By assisting the Arabs in nominally and practically annexing half of Sudan to Egypt and the Middle East, the British were advancing the processes of Arabization and Islamization southward. Another result of this colonial policy was the uneven development of the two parts, with priority being given to the North. The South was treated as a “Sphere of Influence”

from which the Belgians, French and other foreign powers had to be excluded. There seemed to be no acute necessity for spending either the money or energy on remote south whose peoples were looked upon as a wild and untamed creature that were best left alone. Therefore, the British not so much governed, as held, the southern Sudan.

President Nimeiri's abrupt proclamation in September 1983 making sharia law became the focal point of the religious debate. Among the traditional punishments drawn from the sharia were the death penalties. Politicians in the South, the Church, and the recently formed Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its armed wing, the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) led by Colonel John Garang De Mabior, objected to the imposition of Islamic laws. Colonel De Mabior demanded that Islamic laws be removed from the statute book before he would accept any proposal for peace. But given that the majority of Sudanese Muslims consider the application of sharia law to be a fundamental tenet of their faith, it appears that the impasse will continue. That religion has in some way come to represent identity, power dynamics, resource management and control, and most importantly, the culture that helps us understand who we are and how we interact to others in the world has come to represent all important concerns in Sudan symbolically.

John Garang's new approach to Sudan's problems convinced countries from Ethiopia, to Cuba, to Gaddafi's Libya, and many others in between, to provide military assistance almost unprecedented in the history of South Sudan's quest for freedom. The leaders of these nations shared two objectives: Nimeiri's overthrow and the SPLA's dedication to Sudan's unity.

Although Qaddafi had no regard for the political goals of the people of Southern Sudan, he was willing to assist them in their efforts to remove Nimeiri. More military hardware

was provided by Qaddafi to the insurgency than any other foreign aid during the two years between the SPLA's creation in 1983 and Nimeiri's collapse in 1985, giving the SPLA significant successes over the SAF. However, following the fall of Nimeiri in 1985, Libya's position toward the South became abundantly evident. Gaddafi terminated his assistance; evidence of his initial interests and virtual intentions.

Mengistu was not only convinced by Garang's new insights on Sudan's political crises but also ready host SPLA, provide training and offer the Sudanese people an opportunity to restructure the governance of their country. Mengistu recognized the Marxist explanations beneath Garang's words and beliefs, as the Cuban. They agreed to host the training of an officer corps and the would-be military training and revolutionary leaders of a restructured Sudan, Such as Pagan Amum Okiech and others who rose to great heights of military command and political leadership in the SPLM.

On the other hand, the NIF voice had often appeared to be the most vocal view in the North-South discord. As defenders of the Islamic ideal, NIF'S programme constituted an important development in religious dimension of Southern Question. It upheld its traditional commitment to the sharia and did not budge an inch from it. Nevertheless, the government of the National Salvation Revolutionary (NSR) tried hard to put an end to armed conflict and initiated a series of peace talks. The first round of talks was held in Addis Ababa (19-20, 1989) between Colonel Muhammad al-Amin Khalifa, a member of the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation, and Dr. Lam Akol representing the SPLM\SPLA. Although nothing significant was resolved the two sides agreed to leave the channels of communication open and to continue their dialogue at a later date.

The series of talks that followed were sponsored by various mediators including President J. Carter, USA., I. Babangida, Nigeria, Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya and the countries of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), were held in Nairobi, Abuja, Entebbe, Frankfurt and Barcelona. Most of the mediators were aiming at getting the contending parties to get talking without being involved in the issues that divided them. Once they started talking and the principal issues were raised by both sides to reaffirm their declared positions. Through mediators who raised the question of separation of religion and state among other controversial issues, no discernible progress was attained. Probably the most important outcome of these mediators was the Declaration of Principle (DOP) concluded under the initiative of the IGAD mediators. The signatories were asked to study the DOP and report back to the following session of July 1994.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 was, a result of conjunction of the interests within Sudan and internationally. On the domestic front, the two parties to the agreement, the National Congress Party (NCP), formerly the (NIF) and the SPLM/A, both saw advantages in peace; while internationally there was wide support and no significant spoilers. Domestically the NCP had come to realise that there was little chance of military victory in the south, while peace could stabilize an access to oil and potentially open up further oil fields. The SPLA recognized that it could not stop the existing oil flows, though they were intermittently interrupted, and the NCP was being strengthened by oil revenues on which it was entirely missing out. The unsuccessful peace talks since 1994 had also gone a considerable way to creating an agenda for negotiation, especially on the thorny issue of Islam. Building on IGAD's 1994 Declaration of Principles, Machakos Protocol of 2002, which preceded the negotiation of the full CPA, stated that there would be Islamic law in the north of Sudan

and a secular South, with the latter holding a referendum on separation; both parties would endeavour to make unity attractive.

The international support for the CPA came from Sudan's neighbours and three outside countries with particular interest in its policies. IGAD was the responsible regional organization, in which Kenya plays a leading part as well as hosting the various rounds of negotiations. Other IGAD members were less involved, but none had an interest in seeking to disrupt the talks. Kenya looked not only for kudos but also economic links with Southern Sudan, as did Uganda, Ethiopia was developing economic links with Northern Sudan, especially on oil, while Eritrea wished to retain links with Sudan rather than provoke it while the Eritrea -Ethiopia dispute remained unresolved. Egypt and Libya had sought a peace initiative of their own but had been discouraged by the US, which they had no wish to offend. For its own part, the Clinton Administration had begun sharing intelligence on Islamism with Sudan in 2000, following attacks in East Africa and Yemen, while the incoming Bush Administration was backed by the Christian right, which had a particular concern for Southern Sudan. Norway had a similar concern, while Britain, as the former imperial power, felt a residual responsibility. The US, Norway and Britain together formed what was known as the troika, who played a role in furthering negotiations. Sudan's new economic partners in Asia and the Gulf were supportive, seeing stability and eventual unity as benefiting their own interests in the oil rich country.

Overall, the question of identity crisis and nationalism in Sudan remains an important question to the future of this great country and indeed serves as a lesson to other African states.

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APPENDICES

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
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
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
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