# IMPACT OF HEALTH INSURANCE ON HEALTH CARE UTILIZATIO CASE STUDY OF NAIROBI PROVINCE, KENYA.' 

## BY

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Research paper sulbmitted to the Deparment of Economics, University of Nairobi, in fulfilment of the requirement for the Degree of Masters of Arts in Econonuics.

## DECLARATION

This research paper is my original work and has not been presented for degree in any other university

Signed


John Muinde Mutua

Date............................................................

## APPROVAL

This project has been submitted for examination with our approval as university supervisors

1. Signed

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2. Signed.

$2^{\text {nd }}$ Supervise r Prod Masai W.


## DEDICATION

To my Parents Mutua and Nduku and my entire family for their prayers, encourngement and moral support

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank (iod for his abundant love, sound mind and geod hoalth upon my hfe. Ill nelory and honor to the King of kings.

I have to take this grand opportunity to appreciate the support both intellectual, noral and financial support which have been able to get from first and foremost the University of Nairobi and the Department of Economics for giving me a chance to pursue M. Economics.

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To my parents and family whose sacrifice and support cannot be gainsaid.

However, this views expresed in this paper are tny own and do not bear the views of the named petsons or institution. I bear all the responsibility for any crors and omissions

## TABLE OF CONTIENTS

DE:CLARATION ..... ii
DEDICATION ..... iii
ACKN(OWLEDGEMENTS ..... iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..... v
IIST OF TABLES ..... vii
ABSTRICT ..... vii
CHAPTER ONE ..... 1
1.0 Introduction ..... 1
1.1 Background. ..... 2
1.11 Health Insuramie Corerage in Kenys ..... 2
1.12 Private bealth insarame ..... 3
1.13 Public Insurance - The Nattional I ospital Insuramie Fwnd (NIMI). ..... 4
1.2 Statement of the Problem ..... 7
1.4 Objectives of the Study. ..... 7
1.5 Justification of the study ..... 8
CHAPTER TWO ..... 9
2.0 LIIERATURE REVIEN: ..... 9
2.1 Theorettial Litcrature. ..... 9
2.12 Empirical Literature ..... 10
2.13 Literature Overview ..... 14
CHAPTER THREE ..... 15
3.0 Methodology: ..... 15
3.1 Theoretial model. ..... 15
3.1 Empinial Model ..... 18
3.2 Diagynstic tests ..... 20
33 DATA SOURCES ..... 20
Chapter four ..... 21
4.0) Results and Discussion ..... 22
4. 1 Descriptive statistics ..... 22
4.2 lests for Multicullinearify ..... 28
4.3 Empirical results. ..... 28
CIIAPTER FIVE ..... 38
5.0 Conchasions and Recommendation ..... 38
5.1 Policy Recommendation ..... 3)
5.2 Aras of Further Rescarch. ..... 40
5.3 Limitations ..... 11
REFERENCES ..... 42
APPENDICES ..... 46

## LIST OF TABLES

Table L. Letization of Imeath Care by Insurance Status, Wisemsin ..... 11 1998 and 1999
Table 1: Definirion of variables and Descriprive statistics ..... 22
Table 2: Frequency distribution for the dummy explanatory varibles ..... 23
Table 3(a): Incidence of illnesses and the distribution of insurance cover, ..... 24 and medical services
Table 4: Cross tabulation of insurance cover and rype of medical services ..... 26 offered
Figure 1: Irequency distribution for health insurance repe ..... 27
Table 5: Probit marginal effects - probability of visiting health provider/ourpatient ..... 28services
Table 6a: Darginal coefficients for the probability of seeking preventing ..... 31 health care.
Table $6 b$ : Marginal coefficients for the probability of seeking preventive ..... 35 $(\mathrm{n}=407)$
Table 7: Marginal coefficients for the probability of utilizing inpatient services ..... 36
Table 8: OLS estimates of the log-linear model for the intensity of ..... 36outpatient healdh care visits - equation (7)


#### Abstract

This paper uses data from "The Kenya Natonal Healeh Aceomets. Ifourdohe Jealth expenditure and L'tilization Surver, 2003.". Ministry of Heath, we examine the impact of health insurance on health care utilization in Narobi. Health care utization is categorized into preventive health care, ourpatent services and inpatient services. Csimy probit regression model, the findings are that insurance coserage increases undization of modern health care, while it does not have any effect on the use of inpatient health care services. Education plays a significant role in the use of preventive health care as is indevidual's health. status and other social demographic characteristics. The higher the income the more the intensity in outpatent visits.


## CHAPTER ONE

### 1.0 Introduction

Health insurance is a mechanism of protecting families against the unexpected high costs of illness. This is done by sharing the risk of future costs among heathy and sick population in the form of regulat predictable payments. Ltilization of health care is simply measured by: counting the health services events/consultations (example, a hospital stay or visit to a physician). There is a mutually dependent relationship between an individual's health insurance decision and medi-care utilization is quite. On one hand, health insurance and in particular, the characteristics of one's health insurance plan influence consumption of medical care. On the other hand, one's expected medical care utilization and expendirure influence the decision to purchase health insurance and choices among different plans (Arrow 1963).

User fees in Kenya took effect in 1987 after the introduction of World Bank cost recovery measures. They were suspended in August 1990 and reintroduced back again in April 1992 (Collins et al, 190Ga, 1996b). Several studies provided ex-ante guidance on the effects of user fees in Kenya and in other developing countries. For instance, Ellis (1987) studied the effects of user fees in Kenyan health facilites and concluded that user fees had the potential to generate revenucs but would exclude a substancial portion of the population from the healthcare. Proponents argue that people may be more willing to pay for health insurance rather than being heavily taxed or charged user fees. However, other studies ( $\lambda \mathrm{kin}$ et al 1985; Mwabu and Wang'ombe 1997) argued that demand for healtheare was price inclastic and utilization rates would not be affected by changes in user fees, while other studies showed that it was price clastic (Yoder 198); Waddington \& Enyimaych; 1990).

According to Bedi et al (200-4), user fees promote allocative efficiency, by reducing potentially unnecessary utilization of free health care services, which could be facilitated by social heath insurance. But Nganda's (20)2), findings showed that overall scrvice utilization in public health facilities declined by only $10 \%$ in Nairobi, despite upwards adiustments in user fees in all government facilities. There were increased urilization of some categories ot preventive care services, nutahly antenatal and child health services. However, Nganda's work was based on a limited survey of health facititics.

With health insurance one does not have to pay at point of use unless the insurance contract has some deductibles or co-payment. Therefore, health insurance tends to increase an individual utilization of health care services (laws of Demand), which in turn could lead to better health outcomes. There is a mwin causal link benween health insurance and uedization of health care, that is, from insurance to the utilization of health care services and from utilization to health starus. A number of papers [e.g. Cartwright et al (1097), Cameron et al (1998)] have examined the relationship between insurance status and health services utilization. Most of them have been observational studies, which analyze outcome differences berween insured and uninsured population (Levy and Meitzer 2001). Having insurance increases the utilization of health care services, (Brown et al 1998). But observational studies are compounded by observable and unobservable differences between patients with insurance and those without. This can lead to inconsistent estimates of the impact of insurance coverage on health care utilization.

Kenya's health insurance can be broadly categonzed into public (National Hospital Insurance Fund, (NHIF)) and private (employer based, individual, community based, others). The measures of usage are mainly inpatients and outpatients services. This proposal focuses on the effects of health insurance (mainly: private individual, NHIF, employer based insurance and other types of insurance) on health care use in Nairobi, Kenya.

### 1.1 Background

### 1.11 Heallh Insurance Coverage in Kenya

According to Kinuthia (2002), approximately 300,000 Kenyans have health insurance cover with private firms either through their employees or individual initiatives, with an estimated promium income of approximately (Kenya shillings) KShs. 3 billion.

This figure $(300,000)$ is approximately about $10 \%$ of the Kenyan population, implying that a huge segment of Kenyans are still not covered hence the burden of paying hospital bills lies with themedves or through fund rasing. Most of the insurance firms or Health Maintenance organizations ( $\mathrm{H} M \mathrm{O}$ )s) are located in urban areas where a sulstantial number of population can afford as compared to rural areas. Hence leaving the population in the rural areas uninsured.

The government has stated its intention that all the citizers obteain social health insurance cover that is yet to be rolled out (subject to parliament bill consent). This is a commitment of health sector reforms to guarmene accessibility of basic packages of healeh services to all, based on need and not ability to pay. The step towards realization of this goal was the creation of National Hospital Insurance Fund (NIIIF) in 1066 under NHIF Act. The members of NHIF contribute a mandatory fee ranging from Kishs 30 and kshs 320 per month, which is primarily low compared to other types of insurance like employer based insurance scheme and private individual insurance.

Manda et al (2004) show that health insurance in Kenya has been provided by both private and public systems. As in insurance detinitions the main objective of the health systems has been to insure Kenyans against health risks that they may encounter in future. The two categories can be divided into the following:

### 1.12 Private bealth) insurance

I Iealth insurance is referred to as private when the third party (insurer) is a profit-driven organization, however with a pursuit to promote the general health of a people \{Government of Kenya, (2003)]. In private health insurance, people pay premium refated to the expected cost of protiding seriecs to them. Thus, people who are in ligh health risk groups pay more, and those at low risk pay less. Cross-subsidy between people with different risks of ill health is limited.

There are two categories of private health institution in Kenya: direct private health insurance and employer based insurance (Wang'ombe et al, 1994). Direct private health insurance is very expensive and only the middle and high-income groups afford it (Nderitu, 2002). For the employer-based plans, the employer provides care directly through employer owned on site health facility or through which the employer relies on contracts with health facilities or health care organizations. Under direct private heath insurance we have JMOS which can be categerzed into two. Those that provide heald care through their own chnics and hospitals (example A.IR I Icalth services) and second categry of IIMOs provides health care through third party tacilites (Example: I Ealth First International).

HAOS are registered under the Compmes Act. The concept ornanted in the CS, where HMOs also help the government on diseminate preventive messages to the publice They were introduced in Kenya in 19) 4 . In IISIOs, the patients pay a fixed ammal fee, called a capitation fee to cover their medical costs. They are accused of restricting their members to visit their own doctors except in specialized cases where reference is by HMO family doctors. HMOs operate neither under the insurance nor under the health laws and as a result take advantage to operate both as health insurance and s healtheare provider.

### 1.13 Public Insurance - The National Hospital Insurame Fwhd (NIHI)

The NHIF was established by an Act of parliament in 1966 as a department in the Ministry of Health, which oversaw its operation but was responsible to the government treasury for fiscal matters. The fund was set up "to provide for national contributory hospital insurance scheme for all residents in Kenya."

The law establishing the NHIF provided for the enrolment in the NHIF of all Kenyans berween the ages of 18 and 65 and mandates employers to deduct premium from wages and salanes. The level of contribution is graduated according to income, ranging from Kshs. 30 to Kshs. 320 per month. Contributions and membership are compulsory for all those salaried employees earning a net salary of Kshs $1000 /$ month or more. The fund covers up to 180 inpatients hospitals days per member and his/her beneficiaries per year. Besides selffinancing and sclf-administering, the fund monitors its own collection and distributes benefits to providers. The NHIF Act also provides for the fund to make loans from its reserves to hospitals for service improvement.

The fund was transformed into an autonomous parastatal with a board of Ditectors, according to the NHIF Act, 1998. Its goal is to have as many Kenyans as possible with access to quality and affordable health care against a background of dwindling share of resources. The current NIIF membership stands at 1.8 million.

According wo the amended act, beneficiaries are both in patients and outpatients, but oupaticnts scrvices are yet to be operational. NIIIF: mamagement board pays beretits to
declared hospitals for expenses incured ar those hospitals by any contributor, his/her named spouse, child or other named dependant. According to the NIIIF Aet, the benetits payable from the fund are limited to expenses incurred in respect of drugs, laboratory tests and diagnostic services, surgical, dental, or medical procedures or equipment, physiotherapy care and doctors' fees, food and boarding costs (Gowemment of Kenya, 199). However, a member eannot claim benefit from the fund if he or she is entited to compensation for hospitalization and illness from another source such as the workmen's compensation Act.

I'or NHIIF, financing medical delivery intolves the paying for the actual delivery of medical services by physicians and other health care providers who are the major determinants of what services are delivered, their frequency and intensity, cost incurred, and outcomes in terms of patients' satisfaction. Private and mission proriders may provide uncovered services, which have additional cost implications for members in terms of co-payments. At present the Fund exercises little influence over providers, the intensity and type of care provided to members and the cost.

Ill NHIF approved facilices (hospitals, maternity homes and nursing homes in the public, non-governmental organization (NGO) and private for profit sectors) make claims for reimbursement for care provided to NIIF members and beneficiaries. Facilities are reimbursed a flat rate per day irrespective of the type of ailment. In order to qualify to make chaims from the NHIF, the Ministry of health acting through the agency of the Medical Practitioners and Dentists Board must first approve inpationt facilitics. Facilitics are thereafter inspected by the NHIIF and approved if the minimal condition is met.

The critcria used in determining the reimbursement rates for these hospitals are based on facilities available like X-rays, Intensive Care L'nits, number of doctors, nurses and clinical officers among others. Doints ranging from one to five are awarded to each of these facilitics according to the crucial role each phas in life sames. Those with highest points are put in category "A" and attract rebates of Kishs, 2000 per day, whereas those with the lowest points are placed at a rebate of Kishs Hen. Kengata narional hospital is considered special hospitals and is granted a rembursement rate of Kishs. 2000 per day per person.

According to the NIIF Act Scction 5(8), special contribution for those in polygamous unions, who wish to name beneficiaries from among those who do not qualify for the compulsory contribution and those who earn less than Kish 1000 . Married women/men are only excmpted form contributing if their spouses have named them as beneficiaries under the scheme. However, a member under the scheme is allowed to name only one spouse and his or her children as beneficiaries. As noted by Muchai et al (1995), many people are not aware of the special contribution option and, therefore, few exercise it. Moreover, the Act does not stipulate who is liable to pay the special contribution and under what circurnstances.

At the onset of NHIF, members were supposed to pay a standard contribution each month. This limited the amount of funds that it could collect, limiong the claims that it could manage to settle. However, when contribution was changed from standard to a sliding scale, membership contribution rose from Kshs. 88 million in 19081/82 financial year to 738 million in 1990/91. Medical claims also started to drop, as in the case of $1989 / 90$, where it dropped from $81 \%$ of the contributed income to about $44 \%$ in $1990 / 90$. This led to a surplus of about 1 bilion Kenya shillings in the financial year 1992/93 (Manda et al, 2004).

With the accumulaing surpluses came increased pressure to spend NHIF's reserves. More private facilities were gazetted for reimbursement purposes and daily rates increased. The result was that within one year, beginning financial year 1992/93, contribution net of benefit fell by almost 50 percent while reimbursement, primarily to non-government facilities skyrocketed. The NHIF suddenly was on the verge of insolvency. Until recently NHIF was highly centralized in Nairobi, where all claims were processed. Health facilities in the rest of the country were required to make monthly trips to Nairobi to pursue claims but it has now decentralized the claims. NHIF has a strong branch network with twenty-three branch offices, which are spread across all provinces, both in urban and rural areas to scrve contributors in over 400 accredited health providers countrywide. This has made it easier for the members and accredited health providers to make claims at a relatively low cost (Manda ct al, 2004-4).

### 1.2 Statement of the Problem

U'se of health care services is a multidmensional phenomenon. Family dymmes, conomes factors, insurance status and characteristics of health care systems and health care provider may affect health behaviors (fohnson and Rimsza, 2(0)3).

Most studics (Cameron et al 1988, Meer and Rosen 2002; Johnson and Rimsza 2003; I [olly; et al 1997; Domenighetue et al 1996) indicate a positive correlation berween having insurance and urilizing health care scrvices. This means that an individual's probability (frequency) of using medical services is increased if s/he is insured. The fact that these studies have been done in developed nations is caution enough, not to generalize their findings to developing countries, for instance, Kenya because of the obvious differences in social, economic and political settings and the health care institution structures. Even though, the priori expectation is a positive relationship between the two, this prompts a study to be done on the effects of health insurance on health care use in Nairobi, Kenya. Is the difference in health care utilization really a function of insurance coverage or are factors to access health conditions income, education among others, equally important? 'The tact that previous studies have shown a positive correlation between health insurance and health care use, could depend on whether its outpanent or inparient services or some particular measures of health care like dental care, physical check up and the like. Therefore, the interaction between insurance coverage and other characterisucs (demographic and Individual) could determine the true diection and magnitude of insurance effects on health care use.

There seems to be no clear picture on the direction of causality betwecn insurance and health care use in Kenya. Could the problems of health insurance: moral hazards and adverse selection lead to under/overestimate of health insurance effects?

### 1.4 Objectives of the Study

The objective of this study is to establish the reianonship berween health insurance and the udization of health care in Nairobi province. The study ams to achicte the forlowing specific objectives:
i) To assess the patterns of healthcare utilization in Nairobi province.
ii) To test the signiticance of insurnace status (N1IIF, private indwidual and employer based insurance schemes) on health care utilation compared to other social conomic factors lake age, education, income among others;

### 1.5 Justification of the study

The overall goal of the Kenyan governments is to promote and improve the health status of its population by making health services more effective, accessible and affordable. The health status of a country plays an important role in its economic growth, evidenced by the causal link between health starus, labor productivity and economic growth (Bloom et al 2003). Financial barriers and other access variables like distance have hindered health care access. Firstly, people have been forced to think about alternative solutions, as health care at the public facilities is no longer offered for free and the introduction of user fees has had negative effects. Secondly, the cost of illiness as evidenced in the literature has shown that illness/ health shocks often force households to high cost implications/risk. Iccess to insurance could reduce these costs substantially: (Weinberger \& Jutting 2000, Asfaw et al 2001)

However, there is a lack of information in Kenya on the relarionship berween health insurance and the urilization of health care services. Mso, the reasons that promote and foster the development of health insurance have not been analyzed in depth so far. Nithough health insurance is neither necessary nor sufficient to obtain health care yet coverage remains one of the most important factors in obtaining access to health services. Health insutance coverage has been deemed to be an essential element of gaining access to health services. And the receipt of health services is critical to maintaining and improving health

The objective of this study is of find out whether this relationship leads to beter health eare outcomes(ike gond health, longetivity) with the influence of individual characteristics, so as to advice policy makers in the health sector according? This would contrimate to ways of alleviating health probleme brought about by decliang health care use.

## CIIAPTER TWO

### 2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

## 2. 1 Thearetical Literature

Historically, health insurance developed as a way of solving the problem of access to an income to replace earnings when sick, and generally later to secure the provision of an acecptable standard of health care (idbel-Smith 1989).

The current meaning of health insurance has two aspects: first, it is a way of raising all or part of the moncy to pay for health care and sccondly, it is a way of securing the provision of services. The ways of securing the provision of services is classified into the direct method and the indirect method, according to Intemational Labor Office. In the former classification, professionals are salaried and the fund built and organized the facilities where the services were provided. While in the latter the existing local providers are contracted.

The literature has largely emphasized that the demand for health care is conditioned by the health insurance status of the user. Arrow (1963) suggested that there is an intimate relation between the demand for health care and health insurance: there is moral hazard problem given that effective price of health care is distorted by the presence of health insurance. More comprehensive insurance coverage encourages more use of health services. In addition, the insurance decision itself depends on expected future consumption of health services; thus, individuals who ancicipate more health care utilization select more comprehensive insurance (the adverse selection problem). The rescarch on the relationship benween health insurance and health care demand is extensive, however the majority of studies have been done for the LS and other developed countrics. One important set of studies use the RAND health insurance Experiment 1970. Individuals were randomly assigned to insurance plans, in order to eliminate selectivity problem that characterizes health insuranec demand.

Gcil et al (1997) examine the effects of socialized insurance on demand for haspitaization in Germany. Their results sugese that insurance status is mot an inportant deterninant of hospital demand Cartwright et al (1997) inspects the impact of prixate supplemental insurance to Medicare on heafth servees utilization in the clderle poppolaton. They tind that
higher levels of cowrage are associnted with higher uritation kevels. Manning of at (10ni) used data from the RINI) medical experinent to sudy the impact of oost sharing on heath care utilization. They found thet instarance status affects bealth care demand and the coinsurance elasticty of demand is approximately - 0.2. Cameron et al (1998) used lustralian data to model the simultaneous demand for health insurance and health care. They tind that insurance status affects udization positively. Deb and Trivedi (1997) use a fiate mixfure approach to investigate the effect of insurnace status on health cate demand. Their rescults indicate that insurance status is an important determinant of some types of health care.

### 2.12 Empirical Literature

Jutting (2001) earricd out a study, in rural areas of Senegal using a Dakar houschold survey to analyze the impact of mutual health organization' on the access to health care. The survey was carried out in two phases (a pre test and a final survey)
The paper adopted a two step logit and log linear models (by manning et al 1987) to measure the effect of health insurance on udilization of health care and financial protection. The results of the study were based on the individual, houschold head and community characteristics. The findings of the estimates suggested that members of an insurance scheme had a better access to health care services to non-members. The probability of making use of hospitalization increases by a $2 \%$ age point with membership and expenditure in cases of need reduced by about $50 \%$ compared with non-members.

Holden et al (2001) uses four measures of healtheare utization in their study namely: visits to a physician, registered nurse (RN) or physiscian assistant (PD); dental visits; scheduled health checkups and heaving a usual source of medical care. Overall rates of health care utilization differed substantiatly. The results based on bivariate data analysis showed that utilization rates vary positively with insurance coverage.

[^0]

Source: $1998-1999$ Family Health Surve', W"isionsin D partment of Health and Family Senvies

From table 1 above, we can see that the difference benveen those with full and part year coverage is insignificant. All the four measures (as listed above) of health care utilization rates tend to increase with insurance coverage. The major difference in utilization rates is witnessed in reported check ups and dental visits across the insurance coverage.
As compared to no insurance, people with full insurance coverage were 4 times likely to have visited a doctor, 3.3 times to have had a scheduled checkup and 6 times have risited a dentist. While compared to partial insurance, individuals with full insurance coverage were as likely to have visited a doctor, 1.6 times as likely to have had a scheduled check-up and 2.5 times as likely to have visited a dentist. However other factors besides insurance coverage have an effect on health care use. Further analysis of this relationship included "control for" effects of other factors that are related to use of health care services: age, gender, race, cducation, household structure, residential location, poverty stams and health status. All these factors had independent statistically significant effects on utilization.

Holly er al (1998) investigates the effects of alremative insurance plans on the utivation of health care services in Switzeland. Their econometric analysis was based on 1992-1093 Swiss Ilealrh Survey (SIS) data. It contained informanom on participants urilization of health services in the course of the twelve precedny months, in verme of: frepuency of
recourse to different care providers, indicators of the quality of bencfits provided and the alternative heald insurance plans purchased. The insurance phans were manly separated into basic insurance, semi-private and private. But the latere wo supplemental health insurance plans were grouped together. They considered a simulaneous two equation model which related use of medical services per person during the twelve preceding months. The first simultaneous equation is a reduced form equation determined by a set of exopenots variables. It shows that once a person is ill, the determinaion to use inpatient services depends on the insurance plan he/she purchased. While the second equation is a structural form equation, which is simultaneously determined by, the dichotomous variable associated with the first equation and a set of exogenous variables. It shows the propensity that someone will have at least one inpatient stay, given that s/he has used some medical treatment, conditional on the type of insurance plan $s /$ he has selected.
They found out that insurance plan has a significant effect on the probability of inpatient use if we "control for" all other covariates, with a coefficient of 0.2033 and significant at $1 \%$. The effect of supplemental insurance is to increase the probability of a person to have at least one inpatient stay given that he has used some medical treatment holding other variable constant. In a related study Domenighettie et al (1990) used SHS data to analyze the variation in the consumption of 5 specific surgical procedures across sulgroups of the Swiss population. It showed that surgical rates were much lower for those who had basic insurance and higher for those with semi-private or private insurance. Hence, came up with the same conclusions as the study undertaken by Hoily er al (1998)

Yourkavitch (2003) evaluated the predictors of health services utilization based on secondary data in Iran. She assessed the effects of a package of intervention on two potential outcomes: utilization of antenatal care and uplization of health workers as birth attendants to evaluate predictors of health service care. The odds of health services utilzation for demographic characterisucs assessed before and after an intervention in district. Data is analyzed in both univariate and multivariate logiste regression medels in a bascline and fimal data. Overall results show that religion and celucation (measured by literacy) are statistically significant main predictors of health service utilization and shoukd be considered in rural Irian laya.

Meer and Rosen (20103), used the Medical Expenditure Pancls Survey (Mi:1'S) drawn form . 1996. 1997 and 1998 to examine the effects of healch insurance on the utalization of health care services. The MEPS provides infermation on the urilization of heahth care services which include: visiss to providers (such as physicians, dentist), and preventanive care (such as blood pressure check, breast exam, flu shots)

In their analysis, they wished to estimate how a variety of medieal services utilization measures depend on insurance stans and other covariates. These covariates include age, agesquared, gender, race, family size, education, indicator for insurance and region. Their study was carried out in two different alternative model specifications. The first one used a conventional probit model without taking care of endogeneity problem of insurance.
From the estimated results, there was a positive and significant effect of insurance on most measures of utilization with the exception of 2 measures. For example having insurance increases the probability of visiting office based care provider by 24.9 percentage points (marginal effects 0.2491 (32.9)).

However, as noted insurance status may well be endogenous to utilization of health care decisions (Gruber 2000). To deal with this problem of endogeneity they used a two-stage estimation procedure with an instrumental variable (IV) framework. They chose individuals self-employment status as the suitable instrument to be used.
The findings were similar to the first specification but increased the magnitude effect of insurance. For example, the effects of insurance on visiting an office based provider increases from 24.9 percentage points to 35.2 percentage points.
The change between the two alternative specifications is even more pronounced for the preventative care measures. It appears that ignoring endogencity leads to underestimates of impact of insurance coverage on udilization.

Johnson and Rimsza (2003) used a 1999 Yuma County Community Ilcalth Data System for $30,50+$ children ( $0-19$ years odd) from a rural Arizona County, L'S, to estimate the independent influence of demographic characteristics, insurance coverage and access to pediatric care on emergency department (ED) utilization. They designed a multivariate logit model for the estimation. Childen who received care from a private practice pediatric group were $73^{\%} \%$ less likely to utilize IED if insured and $93^{\prime \prime}$ in less likely if uninsured than childrea who had not visited a pediatrician, after controlling for the demergaphic factors. Unmsured
children were nearly 4 times more likely to use the lid than insured chitiren. Amoteg insured chiddren those covered by Medicaid (public insurance) were 5 tioless likely w use the Ed than childen with private insurance. They conclude that, aceess to pediatric care is associated with a marked dectease in ED utilzation regardless of the insurance status.

### 2.13 Literature Onervicuy

The consensus of the literature review shows a positive relationship between insurance and health care utilization. They find that higher levels of coverage are associated with higher utilization levels regardless of varied estimation methods used. With the exception of Geil et al (1997) and Johnson and Rimsza (2003) which show heath insurance not to be an important determinant in health care use. The reasons for these contrary findings could be that first, universal social health insurance could bring opposite effects of demand through long queues and waining time costs. Most of the studies used multivariate estimation method Like logit estimations, probit estimations and simultaneous cquations. This study best suited estimation technique is probit method because it's supposed to show a unidirectional impact of health insurance on health care use, unlike a simultaneous estimation technigue which shows both the demand for insurance and health care. The empirical literature also underscores the fact that individual socio-demographic characteristics play a big roke in determining or influencing health care utilization. The different insurance status/phans bring about varied rates of utilization across the measures of insurance from inpatient services to -• outpatients' services.

## CHAPTER THREE

### 3.0 Methodology

### 3.1 Thereretical mudd

This model is based on Cameron et al (1988) and Bertranou (1998), on their use of a basic individual utility maximizing model for linearized versions of both the demand for beath insurance and the udilization of health care services. This model relies on the conomic proposition that choices about utilization of health services depend on the same variables and parameters, as do choices about insurance. The only difference being that the choice of insurance is made before uncertainties about health states while the decision of demand for healtheare services is made after the occurrence of an illness.

Consumer theory can be used to integrate these two demands through maximization of the utility functions that yields both the choice of health insurance coverage and the amount of healtheare services that maximize utility. Thus, the insurance coverage decision is made before the individual knows whether s/he will be sick or nor, and the individual chooses the level of coverage that provides the maximum expected uelity over different health states. Once the individual knows whether s/he is sick or well, they demand health care services in order to maximize utility.

This model considers a consumer with an intertemporal utility function $\mathrm{U}\left[\mathrm{C}_{1}, \mathrm{C}_{3}\right.$. If ( D , $s / A, B)]$ where consumers derive utility (U) from their health (H) and consumption in two periods $\mathrm{C}_{1}$ and $\mathrm{C}_{2}$. Health is produced through a production function that depends on health care scrvices, $D$ and health status, $s$, conditional on vectors $A$ and $B$.
Vector A refers to consumers' exogenous characteristics such as age, gender, education; while vector $B$ refers to the insurance attributes. The utility function is as follows:

$$
\begin{equation*}
U=U\left[C_{1}, C_{2}, H(D, s / A, B)\right] \tag{I}
\end{equation*}
$$

The following assumptions hold:
i. There is uncertanty in the model because when, health insurance is chosen, the furure health status of consumers is unknown. Consuncers health status follows the conditional probability with, given by $\pi=\pi(s / \lambda)$.
ii. Models assume a bimited number $;$ of different health insurance coverage tepes (Nillf: private (employer and individual based), community based or no insurance conerage at all.)
iii. Consumers can defer consumption by buting certain risk free assets a, which yedd an interest rate, r. The individual solves the following expected unility maximization problem:
$\operatorname{Max} E(U)=\int_{s} U\left[C_{1}, C_{2}, H(D, s / A, B)\right] d \pi(s / A)$
Subject to:

$$
\begin{align*}
& Y_{1}=Y_{1 i}+I_{1}  \tag{3}\\
& Y_{1}=C_{1}(s)+a(s)  \tag{-t}\\
& Y_{2-1}+(1+r) a(s)=C_{2}(s)+P_{i} D(s) \tag{5}
\end{align*}
$$

Equation (3) states the allocation of autonomous income $Y_{1}$ to insurance premium $I_{1}$ and income $Y_{1,}$ (for consumption of goods and savings in the $1^{1 "}$ period).
Equation (4) individual allocates $Y_{t_{1}}$ for consumption $C_{1}(s)$ and the risk free assct a (s). Finally, the constraint (5) shows that $\mathrm{Y}_{21}\left(2^{\text {nd }}\right.$ period income) and the savings accoing from $1^{\text {th }}$ period ( $1+\mathrm{r}$ ) a ( s ) is allocated to goods for consumption $\mathrm{C}_{2}(\mathrm{~s})$ and health care services D ) (s). $P_{j}$ is the price per unit of health care services $D$ net of reimbursement under health insurance plan j .

Therefore, the lifetime budget constraint becomes:
$Y_{11}+Y_{2_{1}} /(1+r)=C_{1}(s)+C_{2}(s) /(1+r)+P_{1} D(s) /(1+r)$

Where lifetime income is assumed to finance health insurance premiums, consumption of other goods besides, health care in both periods and health expenditures in second period. Assumprions:
i. Income in the first and second periods $Y_{1}$ and $Y^{\prime}$, respectively does ont depend on health states.
ii. Health capital and past health states are not incorporated in the health production functions.

Solving the maxinization problem to get demand equations for $\mathrm{C}_{1}, \mathrm{C}_{2}$, and D : :
The expected demand function for health care services, (D) conditional on the choiee of insurance plan j is:
$\mathrm{E}\left[\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{k}}(\mathrm{s} / \mathrm{j})\right]=\exp \left[\mathrm{N}^{\prime} \beta_{\mathrm{k}}+\delta \mathrm{HI}\right]$
Where:
XI the vector of explanatory variables (socio-economic and demographic characteristics).
HI a vector of dummies for different health plans.
$\beta$ and $\delta$ Coefficients to be estimated
The linearized form of demand for health care services is:
$D_{\mathrm{ik}}=X \beta_{\mathrm{k}}+\delta \mathrm{HI}_{\mathrm{v}}+\mu_{\mathrm{ik}}$
Demand for health insurance (HI) equation is as follows:
$\mathrm{HI}=\mathrm{X} \beta_{\mathrm{k}}+\varepsilon$
Since this paper is dealing with a qualitative dependent variable, that is, probabily to utilize health care, regression procedures that can be used are either linear probability models (LPM), logit models or probit models (Aldrich and Nelson 1984). However, lincar probability models have some serious limitation that would make it second to the other two regression techniques. These limitations include:

- Non-normality distribution of estimators and the error term
- The predicted values of the probabilistic dependent variables stretch outside the interval ( 0,1 ).
- The model is heteroscedastic because the vanance of the error term is not constant

Therefore, logit and probit models would serve as the alternatives to LPM. These models have similar regression estimates, the only difference being the cumulative distribution function of the error term. The choice between the no models is sometimes left at the

[^1]discretion of the researchers, because of the profound simbarics of the two models in terms of the estimates. Probit model follows a cumulative normal probability distribution function

### 3.1 Empirich Model

This model trics to estimate the effect that insurance affiliation has on use of hath care services, taking into account endogeinity of the affiliation variable. It examines heath care variables that represent use (dichotomous variables) such as being hospitalized, having medical consultations and consumed medicines as well as variables that show intensity of use, such as the number of hospital days or visits. The study is divided into two secrions.

Firstly, to estrmate how a variety of medical services utilization measures depend on insurance status and other covariates. In the model of the urilization of various health care senvices, the dependent variable ( $\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{k}}=Y$ ), takes a value of one if the individual used the senvices in question during that year and zero othervise. The independent variables in the basic model include; age, gender, household size, education, houschold income, dummies for health status and dummy variables for health insurance status (III) (public and private insurance or no insurance).

This can be denoted as follows:
$Y_{1}=1$ if an individual i used medical services.
$Y_{1}=0$ otherwise

To model this outcome, we denote it as follows
$Y_{i}=\beta X_{i}+\delta(H I)+\varepsilon_{i}$

$$
\begin{equation*}
\operatorname{prob}(Y=1)=\Phi\left[\alpha_{0}+\beta X_{i}+\delta(H I)+\varepsilon\right] \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

This is going to be estimated by the following maximum likelihood function

$$
\begin{equation*}
L=(Y / X, \beta, \delta)=\prod_{i=1}^{N}\left[\Phi\left(\beta Y_{i}+\delta(H I)\right)\right]^{\gamma_{1}}[1-\Phi(\beta Y+\delta(I I I))]^{1-1} \tag{i}
\end{equation*}
$$

Taking logarithms:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\log L=(Y / X, \beta, \delta)=\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left[Y_{i} \log P_{i}+\left(1-Y_{i}\right) \log \left(1-P_{1}\right)\right] \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

The probability of utilizing health care services is also estimated using a two-part modet (ГРМ) (eg Manning er al 1987). The two step process is:

1. Whether or not to use medical care
2. How much care to use given that one is already using care.

The first part of the uses a probit model. Whether or not an individual makes use of healh care services is a dichotomous outcome: an individual uses/consults medical services or does not.

This can be expressed as follows:
$P_{i}=\dot{\alpha} Y_{i}+\beta_{i}(i n s)+v_{i} \quad v_{i} \approx N(0,1)$
$\operatorname{prob}(P=1)=\Phi\left(\alpha_{0}+\alpha_{1} Y_{i}+\beta(i n s)+v_{i}\right)$
where:
Y is a set of explanatory variables
ins - dummy for the insurance status
$\Phi(\bullet)$ the cumulative normal distribution
In the second part of the model we use a log linear model to determine the intensity of healtheare use (I).
$\log (I / P>0)=\delta Y_{i}+\gamma(i n s)+e$
The empirical strategy will use OLS estimation by first controlling for health insurance status using a dummy variable for health insurance. There could be some endogeincity problems caused by the interrelation between health insurance and health care use as cvidenced in the literature. This will have to be accounted for by carrying out a llausman specification test, which will require a different estimation method if it exist.

### 3.11 Hypothesis of study

The hypothesis to be tested is a Two-Tail test depicted below:
$\mathrm{H}_{10}: \beta_{1}=0 \rightarrow$ there is no significant impact of health insurance on health care utilization.
$I_{1}: \beta_{1} \neq 0 \rightarrow$ there is a significant impact of health insurance on heath care urilizationt.

### 3.2 Dias,

Information matrix ( M ) test for probit models, which examines issues of specificanom, heteroscedasticity, endogencity and validity of instruments.

Hausmans specification model to test for exogencity is used However, if endogeinity is encountered from the insurance status and utilization, it will be corrected using Instrumental Variable (IV) framework.

Given that the variable of hospital days takes positive integer values, the study will employ a count data model, namely the negative binomial II (negbin II) model for this application.

### 3.3 DATA SOURCES

Data from "The Kenya National Health Accounts-Households Health Expenditure and Utilization Survey, 2003."- Ministry of Health is used. The target population for the study was households in Kenya, but only data for Nairobi is extracted as the area of study. The choice of Nairobi is based on the fact that it is well entrenched with both public health insurance and moreover, private health insurance institutions than the rest of Kenya. The National representative survey collected information from 88.44 houscholds in all 70 districts in the country. Nairobi has a cluster of 1080 households. The survey was conducted between February and March 2003. The Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) National sampling frame (NASSEP IV), which, is stratified by urban and rural was used to draw the sample. There ate six major towns that were covered and further sub-stratified into five socio-cconomic factors. The houschold survey covered a wide range of economic, demographic and healthrelated behaviour, udilization and expenditure patterns of each member of the houschold

## Variable Selection

The dependent variable is mainly the probability/likelihood of utilizing health care services which are divided into health provider visits/outpatient, admission to health facility/utilization of inpatient services and lastly preventive health care use.

The explanatory variables used in this sudy are socio-conomic and demographic characteristics of the individuals and of course their insurance sratus and health status as eridenced in related literature.

Insurance is used as a dummy, having insurance cover or nor, or used as a sot of dumme's (three) for different types of insurance: NHIF, private individual based insurance and employer based insurance. The insured are expected to show positive sign.

The main socio - economic variables will be the individuals monthly income proxied by their monthly houschold expenditure. The expected sign between health care urilization and income levels is positive. The choice of houschold expenditure as a proxy for monthly income is believed to be the true estimate for the monthly income as opposed to the figures for income variable entry that is full of blanks. Income levels appear to be important in explaining health insurance choice. The other variable for socio cconomic status is the individual's employment status. Those individuals who are employed are expected to depict positive relation towards health care use. Employment status is very important for the Kenyan case because it determines those who are insured and in which type of insurance. For instance, NHIF cover is for the in the formal sector, who could also have other insurance types like employer based or private individual insurance. The other variables used here are dummies for marital status, with a positive sign expected for the married, household size ( + sign). These variables influence once decision to be affiliated with insurance scheme. Also, once family size determines the beneficiaries of the insurance scheme especially so, for NHIF.

The education level has four dummies - nursery, primary, secondary and university level. The expected sign for education level to health care utilization could be u-shaped in that the primary level (+ sign) and - sign for university level.

Lastly, a dummy for health status indicating whether individual is in good health condition or a poor one. Its important has been pointed out in literature several times and its wrong specification of health status could lead to biased estimates. This varable determines the demand for health care use. The only variable not used in this study of Nairobi, although used the literature is the residence variable. The reason for not capturing residence of an individual is that Nairobi is generally urban homogenous, although there are differences in housing conditions: urban class, middle class and low class slum areas.

## CIMAPTER FOUR

### 4.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### 4.1 Descriptive statistics

In this section we give a description of the main variables that have been used in estimation of the model and their associated summary statistics as shown in Table 1. Some of the variables used have observations ( N value) less than the total sample size. This may be attributed to missing values in the primary data or other unexplained crrors and omissions.

Table 1: Definition of Variables and Descriptive Statistics

| Explanatory sariables | Description | Obs | Mean | Std Dev. | Min | Max |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Ace | Age of individuals in years | 3374 | 24.82306 | 16.25227 | 0 | 93 |
| marsts | Marital status, dummy, 1 if single, 0 othenvise | 3279 | . 5727356 | . 4947567 | 0 | 1 |
| zploystst | Employment status, dummy, 1 if employed, 0 othervise | 3283 | . 3588182 | . 4797268 | 0 | 1 |
| altsts | Rating of health status, dummy, 1 if good status. 0 if poor status | 3330 | . 8861862 | . 3176327 | 0 | 1 |
| ses | Sex of individuals, dummy 1 if male, 0 if female | 3359 | . 4876451 | . 4999218 | 0 | 1 |
| Shsize | Household size, the number of members in a family | 3379 | 4.721515 | 2.211102 | 1 | 15 |
| Fusery | Dummy, 1 if attained nursery schooling 0 otherwise | 3379 | . 1876295 | . 3904738 | 0 | 1 |
| simary | Dummy, 1 if attained primary: schooling, 0 otherwise | 3379 | . 3566144 | . 4790704 | 0 | 1 |
| secondary | Durnmy, 1 if attained secondary schooling, 0 othervise | 3379 | . 353359 | . 4780837 | 0 | 1 |
| miversity | Dummy, 1 if attained university schooling, 0 othervise | 3379 | . 0938147 | .291614 | 0 | 1 |
| 23 | Insurance cover, dummy 1 if individual has ins, 0 otherwise | 3068 | . 243807 | . 4294476 | 0 | 1 |
| Enc | Fouschold income proxicd by monthly houschold expenditure | 3379 | 17,151.2) | 25682.25 | 0 | 223,505 |
| Fhac | Log of income, proxicd by monthly houschold expenditure | 3373 | $9.136(4) 1$ | 1.112948 | 2.995732 | 12.31719 |
| nins | Dummy, 1 if private individual insurance, 0 otherwise | 3379 | .06392+2 | .24+165.41 | 0 | 1 |
| -gloyins | Dummy, 1 if employer based insurance, 10 otherwise | 3379 | . 153886.21 | . 2257788 | i) | 1 |


| 3 | Dummy, 1 if NIIII insurance, 0 otherwise | 337) | . 1059485 | . 3078173 | $1)$ | 1 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| mmins | Dummy, 1 if community based insurance, 0 othervise | 3379 | 0 | 0 | () | 1 |
| mersins | Dummy, 1 if other type of insurance, 0 otherwise | 3379 | 0002595 | . 05.43284 | 0 | 1 |

Table 2: Frequency distribution for the dummy explanatory variables

| Explanatory variables - dummies | Frequency |  | Missing values |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Marital status -single | 1878 | $55.6 \%$ | 100 | $3.05 \%$ |
| Health status - good | 2951 | $87.3 \%$ | 49 | $1.5 \%$ |
| Employment status - working | 1178 | $34.8 \%$ | 96 | $2.8 \%$ |
| Insurance cover - insured | 748 | $22.1 \%$ | 311 | $9.2 \%$ |
| nursery | 634 | $18.8 \%$ | - | - |
| primary | 1205 | $35.7 \%$ | - | - |
| secondary | 1194 | $35.3 \%$ | - | - |
| Cnirersity | 317 | $9.4 \%$ | - | - |
| Education level (Missing) | - | - | 29 | $0.8 \%$ |
| Sex - male | 1638 | $48.5 \%$ | 20 | $0.6 \%$ |

We can see that about $49 \%$ of male averaging 25 years of age sought medical care from the health providers mentioned in the survey (Table 2). These providers range from modern health care to traditional health care and self care. The overall insurance coverage stood at a mere $748(22.1 \%)$, bearing in mind the presence of some missing information, which accounted for $9.2 \%$ out of the total number of respondents' interviewed 3379 .

From table 1 above, household size had a mean size of 5 members per family, while the household income, averaged Kshs 17, 151. The household size ranged from 1 to 15 which was the largest family size interviewed in Nairobi.

The education levels between primary level and secondary level show a little disparity in terms of enrollment, with $35.7 \%$ and $35.3 \%$ respectively. This could be supported by the fact
that the survey was done in Narobi, capital city of Kenya, which has faitly high levels of literacy and school enrolment as compared to other districts in the coumry.

The number of respondent who are single (never married) was 1878 which is about $566^{\prime \prime}$ o ot the total respondents in the marital stans category. At the same time those individuals who reported to having good health status compared to other individuals of the same age were $87.3 \%$. The average houschold income was Kishs. $17,151.30$ per month with the maximum income being Kshs. 223,505 per month, while the proportion of those formally and informally employed stood at around $35 \%$. The remaining percentage is composed largely of students at $13.5 \%$ and a category of others ( $27 \%$ ). This is a group that could not be categorized under any of the groups in the employment status question.

Table 3: Incidence of illnesses and the distribution of insurance cover, and medical services

| Variables | Valid (N) | Missing | Frequency |  | percent |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | yes | no | Y'cs\% ${ }^{\circ}$ | 人0\% |
| Illness in the last 4 week | 3379 | 0 | 469 | 2910 | 13.9 | 86.1 |
| Visit to health provider | 3379 | 2910 (86.1\%) | 424 | 45 | 12.5 | 1.3 |
| Preventive healch care | 3379 | 15 (0.5\%) | 149 | 3215 | 4.4 | 95.1 |
| Admission to health facility | 3379 | 3274 (96.9\%) | 96 | 9 | 2.8 | 0.3 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Insurance cover | 3379 | 311 (0.2\%) | 748 | 2320 | 22.1 | 68.7 |
| Private <br> insurance individual | 3379 | 3150 (03.2\%\%) | 229 | - | 6.8 | - |
| Employer based insurance | 3379 | $3196(9+.6 \%)$ | 183 | - | 5.4 | - |
| NHIF | 3379 | 3008 (80\%) | 371 | - | 11.0 | - |
| Other types of insurance | 3379 | $3369(99.7 \%)$ | 10 | - | 0.3 |  |

The estimation will not include the missing values but will be based on the yes and no responses under the frequency column (Table 3).
There are several measures of health care urilization mentioned in the survey wheh were captured broadly as inpatient medical services, outpatient services and the preventive healh care services. Out of a population of 3379 individuals, the incidences of illacsses reported were 460 cases, in the preceding 4 weeks to the survey. This represents a prevalence rate of $13.9 \%$ of the total population.

According to the survey, persons who reported an illness were asked whether they consulted a health provider, preventive/promotive health care or whether they needed almission in a health facility. From table 3 above, we can see that those individuals who consuled/risited a health provider were 42.4 representing $12.5 \%$ of the total observations. In all $46 \%$ individuals reported being ill but 45 individuals did not consult medical care services. These health providers comprise three categories:
i) modern health care (government, private, mission hospital, dispensarics and nursing homes)
ii) traditional health care ( traditional healers, self care, village health workers, among others
iii) pharmacy/chemists

There were various reasons given for sceking health care, mainly: illnesses, showing signs/symptoms and other health related serrices. Out of the 469 respondents' who reported illness cases, $424(12.5 \%)$ visited health providers (outpatient scrvices), 149 respondents' utilized preventive health care and lastly 96 individuals were admitted in a health facility (inpaient services). Some of the illnesses mencioned are malaria, TB, respiratory infections among others, while the symptoms that prompted some people to seek health care included high blood pressure, sudden weight loss plus many more. Lastly the health services offered were mostly preventive in nature and included physical check ups, immunization, family planning, voluntary counscling test (VCT) and other counscling and therapeutic services as well as dental, prenatal/antenatal care, delivery, physiotherapy among others.

Table 4: Cross tabulation of insurance cover and the type of medical services offered

| Cases |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Valid |  | Missing |  | Total |  |
|  | N | Percent | N | Percent | N | Percent |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Private Individual } \\ & \text { Scheme * Inpatient } \end{aligned}$ | Insurance 11 | . $3 \%$ | 3368 | 99.7\% | 3379 | 109.0"in |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Private Individual } \\ & \text { Scheme * Out patient } \end{aligned}$ | Insurance7 | . $2 \%$ | 3372 | 99.8'\% | 3379 | 1090.0\% |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Private Individual } \\ & \text { Scheme * Borh } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | Insurance 25 | . $7 \%$ | 3354 | $99.3 \%$ | 3374 | $1190.10^{\circ \prime}$ |



Out of the 469 respondents who reported illness cases, it's only about 81 respondents that were insured by the various health insurance schemes. Those covered by private individual insurance numbered 23, employer based insurance scheme had 21 and NHIF covered 39 respondents. Table 4 , shows those individuals who reported sick cases and are covered by the three insurance schemes as shown. 31 individuals with inpatent cases are covered by NHIF. The total number of people covered by all the health insurance topes is $748\{22.1 \%$, with 92 individuals reported sick. The true figure is 81 , the difference of 11 coming from those people who reported use of both outpatient and inpatient services.

Figure 1: Frequency distribution for health insurance types


NHIF has the largest coverage between ( 350 and 400 iindividuals) as depicted in the graph (figure 1) followed by private individual insurance with just under 250 insured respondents. Employer based insurance coverage follows closely, while community based insurance (no coverage) and other types of insurance have an insignificant coverage size.

### 1.2 Tests for Multicollinearity

Multicollinearity is a common feature in cross-section studes It incta, wi.... a ..... independent variables are linearly dependent or can be expresed as baca cas: $\therefore$. the other. A high degrec of correlation could lead to rejection of null han, wa nir. : should actually be the contrary. There are several ways of deales uth man............. namely:

- Dropping one of the two wriables that is bringing about this coll:acan:
- Secondly, one could increase the sample size, by going back th the tit! tav. , board in order to reduce precision problems.
- If the multicollinearity is not serious then the variables that are calinexe :u ca : other can be retained.

Table A1, in the Appendis, presents tests for multicolineanty and it shws that rew... status to be highly co-related with marital status. The level that constimes man: $p>0.5$.

### 4.3 Empirical results.

The following probit estimate results are based on the tespondents whe teprent: cases in 4 weeks preceding the survey. Hence conditional on being ill retuce the wa; ; are to 469 observations.
Table 5: Probit marginal effects - probability of visiting healh provider/ oupationt services (Standard deviations in parenthesis)

| Variable | Model 1 |  | Model 2 | Maxde 3 | Mindal |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Constant | 2.1115 | * (.8617) | $\begin{aligned} & 1.9025^{\circ} \\ & (8561) \end{aligned}$ | coive | $\because$ |
| Age | . 0016 | (0013) | 1014 (min) | $\begin{gathered} 112 \\ 1 \therefore 3 \end{gathered}$ | , ${ }^{+}$ |
| Marital status ( $=$ single ) | . $0922{ }^{*}$ | (05(1) | $\begin{aligned} & .0911 \cdots \\ & (04 \times 4 \end{aligned}$ | 1.9 $\cdots$ | ! : |
| Health status ( $1=$ grood health $)$ | . 0184 | (034 6 ) | 11183 (120.4 |  |  |
| Houschold size | -.10134 | (0) 0168$)$ | min 6.1046 |  |  |


| Sex（ $1=$ malc $)$ | －．0589 ${ }^{\circ}(0.0994)$ |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | － 105110 | $\begin{aligned} & 1112_{2}^{2} \\ & \because 20 \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Primary | －．0835＊ | （0．481） | $(1073)$ | 115\％． | ：－ |
|  |  |  |  | い10 | ： |
| Secondary | －．0376 | （0．48） |  | （1，\％ 1 ， |  |
|  |  |  | － 0 2M0（047） | 川只 | $\cdots .1$ |
| University | －． 1391 | （．1480） | －0．403（11137） | （110）$\square^{\circ}$ | $\cdots$ |
|  |  |  |  | 11345 | $1 \cdot 1$ |
| Log of income（expenditure per household member） | －． 0158 | （．0143） | －．0309（0130） | （15\％） | 1：11 |
|  |  |  |  | 11\％ | $\because$ |
| Insurance cover（ $1=\mathrm{if}$ individual is insured） | ． 0375 | （．0316） |  | $\begin{aligned} & (1201 \\ & 12^{2} 10 \\ & (0,0) \end{aligned}$ | $\cdots \cdots$ |
| Private bascd insurance |  |  | －．04．44（．08017） |  | 191 |
| Employment based insutance |  |  |  |  | 116： |
|  |  |  | ． $0466(.03) 8$ ） |  | に！ |
| NHIF |  |  | ． 0478 （0328） |  | 111.19 |
|  |  |  |  |  | 1．1．1 |
|  |  |  |  |  | － 1.41 |
| Number of observations | 410 |  | 450 | 419 | $11^{\circ}$ |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.0499 |  | 0.0007 | （1）1？ 1 | mily |
| LR Chi2（10） | 13.07 |  | 16.93 | 9.19 | $4: 1$ |
| Prob $>$ chi2 | 0.2198 |  | 0.1521 | 11554 | 11＂： |
| Log likelihood | －124．5382 |  | －131．11517 | 206 410 | 2121！ |

The results in table 5 show the marginal effects of the probit analysis for the pron＇s：a $n$ visits to health provider／outpatients services．Four different models were craluated，dittre：？ in their dummy for insurance and visits to health providers．Model 1 and 2 mperen ther
 modern health care and informal／traditional health care．But Model 1 has inutrance atatina a dummy（ 1 if an individual is insured， 0 othervise）．Model 2 is estimated asime a ect if insurance plan dummies，namely NHIF，private insurnace and employer banct ma：ame Models 3 and 4 represent the probability of using modern health care server．winh mand；
 in the estimation of insurance plan dummies．

It（table 5）shows the probit results for the probabilet of onparat conter wa

marital status. Both models 1 and 2 have stmilar results, in that variables; sex, marial status and primary school level are significant at $5 \%$ and $10^{\circ}$ o levels.

In model 1 - having insurance increases chances of visining/consulting health providers but this variable is not significant. This could be explained by the few numbers of the insured ( $22 \%$ ) bearing in mind that NHIF ( $11 \%$ ) only covers inpatient services. Model 2 indicates a positive sign between, the probability of visiong health providers for both NHII: and employer based insurance, but negative for private individual insurance, which is rather unexpected. Although the coverage for outpatient is relatively low. These insurance plans are however, not significant. Model 4 has similar results as model 2. There is a positive relationship between having insurance and visiting modern health providers, like government, private mission hospitals, and nursing homes among others, in model 3. Insurance cover is statistically significant to the use of modern health care, though not significant at $5 \%$ level. Therefore, insurance cover increases the chances of visiting modem health providers by 12 percentage point.

In model 1 and 2, marital status is statistically significant to the probability of consultung outpatient services at $5 \%$ level (model 2). There is a positive relationship between the two variables. This implies that the singles (never married) tend to tatize outpationts services more than the married. The only explaining factor could be their numbers $287(63 \%)$, which may be contributing to the high demand. Being single increases the probability of visiting health providers by $8.3 \%$ percentage points in model 1 while this probability is increased by 2.1 percentage point in model 2. When it comes to visits to the modern health care providers, model 1 shows that a positive sign between the probability of visits to modern health care and marital status, while in model two it is negative. However, this variable is insignificant when it comes to the probability of visiting modern health care.

Again from Model 1 and 2 , the female population seems to urilize ourpaticnt services mere than their mate counterparts. The gender variable is also statistically signticant in explaiting the probability of visinng/consulting health provider for medien purpores. The reawn why the female perpulation chances of visiting health providers has to do with their obserical necds and the fact thate they end up visiting physicians as they take their chuldren wo the
hospital (i.e for the mothers). These models show thar, the probability of visiting health providers' increases by 5.9 and 5.5 percentage points for female respondents in modell and 2 respectively. For models, 3 and 4 , the chances of visiting modern health providers increases with male respondent though not significant.

Primary school education level is statistically significant to the probabiity of risiting health provider in models 1 and 2, even though they are inversely related. This implies that attaining this level of education would make one less likely to visit health provider, by 8.4 percentage points in model 1 and 8.6 percentage point in model 2 . This is contrary to economic expectations. Having attained primary school level increases chances of visining modern health providers, for model 3 while it is contrary for model 4 and insignificant for both models.

Since the sample size has reduced tremendously from 3379 to 469 (sick respondents) the pseudo R2 is affected and tends to be rather low. A low sample size for probit model brings about model specification problems hence high Prob>chi2. This affects the significance of variables, but not in a major way. The number of observations is deviating from the 469 illness cases because of some missing information.

Whole data for the prevenive health care. The reasons for using the whole data is that preventive health care use does not necessitate anyone to be ill, even though its use is dependent on characteristics like gender for pre/antenatal services and age for immunization services among other preventive services.
Table 6(a): Marginal coefficients for the probability of seeking preventive health care

| variable | $\mathrm{dy} / \mathrm{dx}$ | Std. Err. | 2 | $\underline{P}>_{z}$ | [ 95\% C.I.] | X |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| age | $-.0012474$ | .00028 | -4.39 | 0.000 | $-.001804-.0000691$ | 25.0870 |
| marsts* | -.0390154 | (0)0975 | -4.00 | 0.000 | -. $058122-.019000$ | . 56.4799 |
| hltsts* | -.0372265 | . 01295 | $-2.87$ | 0.004 | $-.06261-.0118+3$ | .883809 |
| hhsize | -.0086691 | .00155 | -5.59 | 0.000 | -. $011711-.1415627$ | 4.67686 |
| sex" | -.0259622 | . 010592 | -4.3) | 0.000 | -.037559 -. 1114365 | . 488.884 |
| primary* | -.02206008 | . 010681 | -3.24 | 0.001 | -. 03554160.1087716 | . 360605 |
| second $y^{-r}$ | -.0100.476 | (101761 | -2.50 | 0.012 | -. $033964-.1041131$ | . 355792 |
| univer ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | -.0282551 | .10050) | -5.58 | 0.000 | -.038178-.018332 | (0)0409 |
| Inhinc | .0001692 | . 10277 | 0.06 | 0.951 | -.005266 065604 | 9.10150 |


| ins* | -.0106888 | .00608 | -1.76 | 0.079 | -.022609 .001231 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |$\quad .242605$

- After dropping employment status due to multicollinearity

Table $6(a)$, above, presents maximum likelihood estimates of equation (2). The dependent variable is the utilization of health care services which will be divided into three groups, preventive health care, ourpatient medical services and lastly inpatients services. This table will deal with the probit estimates of the impact of insurance and other explanatory variables on the probability of seeking preventive health care scrvices.

After carrying out a multicollinearity test, employment status is dropped from the equation because it was linearly dependent with the variable marital status. The reason for dropping the variable employment status is that its effect could be captured in similar ways by the household income variable which is in loganithm form. In overall, the results indicate that the equation fits the model well, according to the $\log$ likelihood ratio Chi2 of 134.84 . The variables in a bold face were found to be statistically significant at $1 \%$ and $5 \%$ levels.

The insurance status variable is not statistically significant to the probability of sceking preventive health care, hence the fact that it is shows a negative relationship with the dependent variable is really not relevant. From health economic theory preventive health care services are offered as public/merit goods because they are meant to provide a greater social benefit as opposed to private benefit. This health care service is generally not covered by insurance firms but provide to the public complerely free of charge or subsidizad by the government. However, it still fall: under health care use and the determining insurance effects on its use is important as some services like antenatal care may be covered by insurance.
festimates in the table $G(a)$ above show that there exist an inverse relationship berwew eand the probability of seeking preventive health care. This implies that older respments se less likely to scek preventive health care (immunization, family phaning VCI). This atiable was found to be highly statistically significant at $1 \%$ level. This shows that it is an mportant variable in explaining the probability of seeking preventive health care. The revuls seem to concur with economic theory in that most of these services like immunization are geared towards children under the age of five years, while family planning is directed towards the reproductive age group and VCT and other counseling services are meant for the youth (15-35 years old). The young age group increases the likelihood of seeking preventive health services by 0.1 percentage point, though this marginal effect is rather low.

One's marital status is highly significant in explaining one's likelihood/chances of seeking preventive health care. There is a negative relationship between being single and secking preventive health care. This means that those respondents who are married are more likely to seek preventive care as compared to the single individuals. We can not really explain the reason for this negative relationship. The services cover mainly the lower age group (immunization), and middle age group (reproductive health, VCT). However, the mean age of the respondents which stands at 25 years could be linked to a farly large proportion which is married and as a result family planning or other preventive sertices like prenatal/ante natal care could be having a higher demand as compared to the other services. Being married increases the probability of seeking preventive health care by 3.9 percentage point.

It appears like the respondents in good health condition/starus do not utilize preventive health cate services (negative sign). These services scem to be utililized more by the individuals in poor health condirion. Health status ranable is important in exphining its relationship with preventive health care use. There are several factors that contribute to a good health status like good nutrition, clean environment and good sanitation regular exercising, among other factors of which preventive health care is included. Ones health condrion determines the usage of preventive health care more se, if it's poor. The likelihood of secking preventive health care increases b: 3.7 percentage point for those in pror condition.
ie bigger the household size the less the use of preventive health care, this sems to be in ntrary to economic theory in that numbers would tend to have a high demand for a publec ood like preventive health care service. There could be a number of reasoms fot this thavior, of which literacy levels come to mind. For instance, $54 \%$ percent of the ental population has attained nursery and primary education level and may not attach much mportance to preventive health care. Though, it is highly significant in its effect on preventive health care. The significance is diminished by the fact that the probability of using preventive health care increases by a mere 0.9 percentage point, the smaller the household size.

The gender variable has a negative effect on the probability of seeking preventive health care. This implies that female respondents are more likely to seek preventive health care as compared to their male counterparts. Hence, a gender disparity in terms of the use of preventive health cares. This variable (sex) is also highly statistically significant in explaining its impact. Female respondents increase the chances of preventing health care use by 2.6 percentage point.

Education status is also important in explaining its impact on the use of preventive health care. There are four dummies for education levels with nursery acting as the base dummy/ reference point. Primary, secondary and university education levels are expected to show a positive sign towards utilization of preventive health in reference to nursery the lowest education level. More education is associated with less preventive health care use. As much as higher educated individuals may assign higher value to benefirs of using health services, on the other hand, education can be correlated with medical knowledge; thercfore higher educated people improve their health more efficiently by using services less often. Having attained primary education level decreases use of preventive by 2.2 pereentage point, while the secondary and university cducation level decreases the same by 1.9 and 2.8 percentage points respectively.
ge higher the income the more the use of preventive health care, this is depicted by their sitive correlation. However, income is not an important varable in explaining the fiects/determinants of preventive health care use. It is stadstacally insignificam.

The following is a disaggregated (illness cases in the last 4 weeks) data for the probability of using preventive health care.
Table 6b: Marginal effects - probability of seeking preventive health services.


Probit estimates

Log likelihood $=-178.99493$

| Number of obs $=407$ |
| :--- |
| LR chi2 $(10) \quad=45.43$ |
| Prob $>$ chi2 |
| Pseudo 20.0000 |

When the estimation is disaggregated into those respondents, who were ill according to the survey, the probit results (Table 6b) show that age, houschold size and sex variable are statistically significant at $1 \%$ level. Again, insurance cover is insignificant to the likclihood of udizing preventive health care services and income level is not insignificant but also showing a rather unexpected sign.

The younger the respondents the more likely to use preventive health services by 0.5 percentage points, while female respondent are more likely to use preventive health care more than their male counterparts by 10.7 percentage points. The smaller the houschold size the higher the probability of using preventive health care by 4.5 perecutage points.

$$
\begin{gathered}
\text { H:GT MYATTA MEMDRIAL } \\
\text { MAS: }
\end{gathered}
$$

ic 7: Marginal coefficients for the probability of utilizing inpatient ices/admission to health facility



These results according to the table 7 , above show a decrease in the obscriation numbers compared to the previous tables. The reason is that these estimates were for those respondents who sought hospitalizaion/admission in the health providers. The insurance status variable does not have any effect in the model and its dropped out duc to co lincarit!. There are very few people who ate insured and this brings about precision problems.

The only variable that seems to be explaining the probability of seeking inpatieat healh care services is marital status. The married individuals are likely to be hospitalized more than the unmarried. We can sec that being married increase hospitalization chances by 28 percentage point. This is largely confirmed from a theoretical perspective where women in child bearing age and older people do need hospitalization care more offen. The rest of the variables are not significant at all.

Table 8: OLS estimates of the log-linear model for the intensity of oumation hath care visits-equation (7)


| Model 101721135 | 10 | 11972113 | Probirl $\quad=11.3554$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Rautuali 12333514 | 5. | （18），（1） | 18 yuared $=11.1657$ |
|  |  |  | ． W d K－aphared $=010153$ |
|  | 67 | ハリずらに |  |


| Lumatjutno Coct． |  | Sid．1im． | 1 | $\mathrm{l}>\mathrm{t}$ | 195＊\％Conf． | Interial） |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Per |  | M18～ッフ5 | 112 | 11.193 | －．111） 3155 | （120）157 |
| miral． |  | 152195 | （リ） | 11.327 | － 1517160 | ． 4501289 |
| hinc． | 1170127 | 18931 | （1．19 | 11850 | $-16.2198$ | ． 9962833 |
| hbuct | ハーツリラリ | 1122094．4 | 1.30 | 11．19．8 | －．1）160733 | ．17559）23 |
| sc | ． $\left.1130.4^{9}\right) 26$ | $11^{\sim}(1)^{-11} 0$ | 10.48 | 11630 | －．18）2211 | ．1154362 |
| prmary | －．1124212 | ．1262821 | （1） $\mathrm{S}^{\prime \prime}$ | 0.375 | －． $36.50,1)(.8$ | ．1401543 |
| secomdiry | －．11033331 | ．1559131 | d． 11 | 11.6 .58 | －． 35160.37 | 2429375 |
| maivercity | － 386 ロリア7 | ． $356.3: 61$ | －111） | 11292 | －1．101429 | ． 32 （18331 |
| Inhinc | ． 1147585 | ．0576，353 | 1.99 | 0.051 | －．0006542 | ． 2301713 |
| ins | ．07．47771 | ．1083951 | 0.69 | 10.495 | －1432816 | ．2928358 |
| ＿cons | $-4.451026$ | ．533－0．16 | －0．43 | 11.418 | －1．513828 | ．0236224 |

The probit estimate models were used on measure the rate of wination of outationt， inpatient and preventive health care services．The intensty of outpatient heath care use is defined as the number of ourpatiens healh care visits during the time period survesed，this include revisits．

Insurance coverage has a positive relationship to the batensiry of outpatient vists bat it is not statistically signifeante．Other variables like age，houschold size and sex have the expected sign towards the intensity of ourpatient visits，ewen though insignificant．The problem with insurance is that very few are covered and NIIIF which is the bigest component of the five types of insurance plans does not cover the outpatient health care service．The only variable that seems to explain the intensity of outpatient health care visits is the logarithm of housebold income．The more the income the more one frequents health care providers，a one percent change／rise in income increases the number of outpatients／visits to health providers by 11.5 ＂io．The rest of the explanatory variables do not explan the intensity of outpatient visits．hatensity of inpatient／hospital days hindered by the sample size in the data， as explained in the limitations section（5．3）

## CHAPTER FIVE

### 5.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The paper has examined the impact of health insurance on health care use in Nairobi province, Kenya, controlling for other covariates of interest, like education, gender, health status, age, marital status, household size, household income and employment stans.

First, the respondents in Nairobi who utilized ourparient health care/visits to health protider were ( $42^{\circ} 4(12.5 \%$ ). [Table 3], as compared to the other two measures of health care use: preventive health care and inpatient medical services. Preventive health care was second in terms of utilization rate with a total of $149(4.4 \%)$ respondents and inpaticnt services trailed with $96(2.8 \%)$ individuals. These percentages are out of the whole sample size which was 3379. The difference in these frequencies can be attributed to the fact that for one to be an inpatient, s/he may have started as outparient. The only astounding fact is that preventive health care is not leading in terms of utilization and yet it's not conditional on being ill. The illness prevalence rate was $13.9 \%$.

Secondly, the number of the insured was found to be about 748 respondents ( $22.1 \%$ ) out of the whole population sample size. Those without an insurance cover were 2320 individuals. NHIF had the highest coverage of $11 \%$ followed by private individual insurance ( $6.8 \%$ ), employment based insurance ( $5.4 \%$ ) while the others category was last with a mere ( $0.3 \%$ ), which totals up to $23.5^{\circ}$ instead of $22.1 \%$ due to rounding off the decimals (rable 3 ).

The empirical results can be divided into three categones of health care services meanures Most of the explanatory variables in the estmation (age, mantal satus, houschold size, cducation, sex and health status) are statistically significant ( $\alpha=0.05$ ) to the probability of secking preventive health services. They have the expected sisw with the excepton of
education level and household size which were negative instead of the expected posinte sign. Insurance status is not only insiguificant but also inversely related to the probabitery of seeking preventive health care. A higher income leads to a higher use of prevenive health care but is rather insignificant.

Insurance coverage is also not significant in the use of outpatient services/risits to health providers (formal and informal), although, positively related to it. Both NIIF and ernployer based insurance are positively related to health care provider visits. The only surprising thing is that private individual insurance has a negative sign and NHIF which does not cover ourpatient services has a positive sign. Sex, manital status and primary school cducation level, are the only significant variables towards health care provider visits. However, primary school level has unexpected negarive sign contrary to priori expectations. Insurance cover only becomes statistically significant and positive when we estimate probit results for visits to modern health care service. Having insurance increases the probability of visiting modern health care by 12 percentage point. The higher the income levels the more the intensity of visits to health provider. Insurance is positively related to the number of wisits to health provider only that it is insignificant.

There is a probicm of model specification which leads to unbiased estimates brought about by the low number of those insured and hence rendering insurance status insignificant. This is very odd bearing in mind that inpatient services account for high medieal cost hence necessitating use of insurance cover (NHIF). The only variable significant to the probability of using inpatient services is marital status. The married individuals tend to use more of inpatient services than the single.

Most of the variabies in the regression for the intensity of outpatient use were not significant. It is only income that was statistically significant to the intensity of outpatient/visits to providers.

### 5.1 POLICY RECOMMIENDATION

There are some policy implications that can come out of the findings of this study. First, increasing insurance coverage will definitely increase utilization of modern bealth care services/outpatients utilization. This is supported by the fact only modern facility providers participate in health insurance schemes. But of course not all of them do, especially the primary cate facilitics. It is not clear which insurance plan contributed to increased modern health care utilization, but employer based insurance had a positive sign as the contrary was for private individual insurance

Second, our results indicate that high income levels would increase the intensity of visits to health care providers, both formal and informal. This implies that insurance status does not have much influence on the frequency of outpatient service use. This means it's only the rich who can afford to have several visits to health care providers. The recommendations here need to be channcled in a way of countering adverse effects of over-udization, like waiting time costs. Since the poor are the culprits in this situmion, the policy makers can consider subsidies if they want to raise the intensity of health provider visits in a certain community or have some of social health insurance scheme, like community based insurance schemes which provide a channcl for pooling of risk.

Lastly, use of preventive health care is not dependent on insurance but positively related to income even though not significant. Education staras is highly significant to disbursement of preventive health care. Therefore to increase utilization of preventive health care, policy makers will have to increase the education levels too. Higher literacy levels would be associated with higher use of preventive health services.

### 5.2 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Future research should include the study of the relation between specific insurance types (private, employer based insurance) on specific measures of health care utization like dental visits, physical check ups, hospitalization and the like. Due to the low insurance coverage one should think of estimation methods that can work well with small sample size.

Another issue to explore is the demand or determinants of participation or affilation to a certain health insurance, which could help clarity the viabilty of a universal social health
insurance. Mso how private and social insurance interact, so as to come up with policy reforms intended to mitigate adserse selection and moral hazard problems:

### 5.3 LIMITATIONS

This study is limited to the secondary data in this survey. Some factors like culnural background and other inherent factors tend to influence health care utilization but are not captured in the data. Aso, this data does not provide precise and detailed measures of coverage (such as coinsurance rates, deductibles). Carring out an intensity of inpationt health care use/hospital days is hampered by the low sample size of 21 respondents who spent more than a day in the health facilities. Even a combined inpatient and ourpatient estimation is not possible since outpatients questions were for a period of 4 weeks preceding the survey while inparient admission was for the last one year preceding the survey.
The data did not address the question of respondents' residence in Nairobi. For instance, the upper class residents, middle class and the low class (slums) residents and so on. There was also a problem of missing information especially in the area of access to insurance and medical services covered by the various insurance tpes. This has led to precision problems in the estimation procedure.

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## APPENDICES

Table A1: Molticollincarigyess


| menst, | 1.11 (\%9) |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| capherst | -0.6844 | $1.06 \% 1$ |  |  |  |  |
| henes | 10.0.42 | -1, ¢073 | 1.1010) |  |  |  |
| proms | -101720 | (1.055) | 0.0 .493 | 1.(m)k |  |  |
| employins | -11157.4 | (0.093) | 0.0.102 | (0.02) | 1.000010 |  |
| nhit | -0,0575 | 0,00)3.4 | -0.036, 3 | -(1), 0.455 | 10.0082 | 1.0000 |
| cotrmins |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| othersins | -0.006. | 11.0145 | -10.029 | -1, 1)1\%6 | -10.0134 | -0.0193 |
| hhize | 0.1842 | -1.2.2.18 | 0.0158 | -1).0.31) | -0.(1)22 | 0.0072 |
| sex | -().0316 | $11.22(1)$ | 0.0139 | 00125 | 0.0187 | 0.0014 |
| murscty | 0.3366 | -0.3331 | -(m以) | -1006(1)8 | $-0.0329$ | -0.0.1278 |
| primary | 0.0671 | -0.0988 | -1.0138 | -11.1.36, | -0,0898 | -0.06,27 |
| secondary | -0.2422 | 0.239リ | -()0213 | 0.0189 | 0.0227 | 0.0876 |
| universiry | -0.1550) | 0.2167 | 0.0603 | 0.2839 | 1).1610 | 0.0421 |
| ins | -0.1143 | 0.1405 | 0.0276 | 0.4806 | 0.4439 | 0.6403 |
| lnhinc | 0.009 .4 | 0.01071 | 0.0315 | 0.2079 | 0.1671 | 0.0196 |
| ape | -0.4705 | 0.4727 | -0.0682 | 0.150 .4 | 0.0452 | 0.0090 |

others~s hhsi\%e sex nursery primary second~y univer~y

| othersins | 1.00009 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| hhasize | -0.0.457 | 1.00000 |  |  |  |  |  |
| sex | 0.0273 | -0.0753 | 1.0000 |  |  |  |  |
| nursery | -0.0257 | 0.0623 | -0.0235 | 1.0000 |  |  |  |
| primary | -0.0256 | 0.0921 | -0.0584 | -0.3609 | 1.0000 |  |  |
| scoondary | -0.0258 | -0.1065 | 0.0330 | -0.3625 | -0.5555 | 1.0900 |  |
| university | 0.1217 | -0.0606 | 0.0671 | -1). 1532 | -0.2347 | -1). 2358 | 1.00000 |
| ins | 0.0929 | -0.0367 | 0.0212 | -0.0675 | -1). 1708 | 0.10779 | 0.2563 |
| lnhinc | $0.06+6$ | 0.1865 | -0.0)201 | -0.0924 | -0.1535 | 0.100106 | 0.2876 |
| are | 0.0222 | -0.170.4 | 0.1072 | -0.4873 | -0.0)705 | 01.30.45 | 0.26.10 |

ins lnhituc age

| ins | 1.0000 |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Inhinc | 0.2186 | $1.0000)$ |

cor age marsts employstst hltsts hasize sex nursery primary scondary univers

## TABITE A2: NORMALIIY'IES'I

Skevness/Kurtosis tests for Normality

| Variable l' | I'r(Shewness) | $\operatorname{Pr}($ linrtosis) adj chi2(2) |  | ) P'ro |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 3 | 0.11) 1 | 0.606 | 9.48 | 0.0087 |
| marsts | (0.010) | 0.8.41 | 14.99 | 0.00006 |
| hltsts | 0.001 | 0.0100 | 26.08 | 0.0000 |
| hhsize | (0.0)16 | 0.092 | 7.76 | 0.0206 |
| sex 0.062 | 2 | . | . |  |
| primary | 0.001 | (0.000) | 311.29 | 0.0000 |
| sccoundary | 0.0) 010 | 0.077 | 14.73 | 0.0006 |
| university | 0.6190 | 0.)(0) 0 | $\cdot$ | 0.00000 |
| ins | $0.000)$ | 0.013 | 26.23 | 0.00000 |
| lnhine | 0.073 | 0.134 | 5.3 .3 | 0.0697 |
| lnoutpatos | 0.0105 | 0.123 | 11.83 | 0.0045 |

## TABIEA3: IIETEROSCESDASTICITY

Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity using fitted values of lnoutpatnos Ho: Constant variance
$\operatorname{chi}(1)=0.01$
$\mathrm{Prob}>$ chi2 $=0.9178$


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ Mutak hatath orgamation is synonymous to commanty-based bealh organization. (Atim logs:

[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ See Cameron et al 1988 for a tractable function calculation of utility problem to the final demand functions.

