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"The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Intra-State Conflict Management in Africa Period 1989-2004. A Comparative Analysis of MONUC and UNAMSIL."

By

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DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation is my original work and has not been submitted for a degree in any other university.

Signed:  Date... 27th October. 2005..
Atieno Mercy

This dissertation has been submitted for examination with my approval as the University Supervisor.

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DEDICATION

This project is dedicated to my dear parents Margaret and Mark for their prayers and love for the education.

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First and foremost I would like to thank the Almighty God for bringing me this far.

I would like to specifically thank the following for their contribution to the successful completion of this dissertation. I am deeply indebted to many of whom I cannot mention here.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADF	Allied Democratic Front
AFDL	Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo Zaire
AFSL	Armed Forces of Sierra Leone
AU	African Union
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration
DDRP	Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration Programme
DDRRR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DPKO	The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FAC	Congolese Armed Forces. Presently DRC-Kinshasa government military.
FAZ	Zairian Armed Forces. Mobutu's military forces.
FDLR	Forces for the Democratization and Liberation of Rwanda.
FAR	Rwanda Armed Forces,
GoSL	Government of Sierra Leone
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
JMC	Joint Military Commission
LRA	Lords Resistance Army
Mayi Mayi	Traditional militias in the Eastern DRC, active in the 1970s and today.
MILOBS	UN Military Observer
MLC	Movement for the Liberation of the Congo
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NCDDR	National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
OAU	Organization of African Unity
UNEF	United Nation Emergency Force
UNGOMAP	United Nation Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UPC	Union of Congolese Patriots.
UPDF	Ugandan People's Defence Forces
ONUC	Operation Des Nations Unies au Congo
PSO	Peace Support Operation
RCD-Goma	Ressement Congolais de la Democratie-Goma
RCD-K-ML liberation	Ressement Congolais de la Democratie-Kivu-mouvement de la liberation
RCD-N	Congolese Rally for Democracy -National. Led by Roger Lumbala.
RDF	Rwandan Defense Force (former name: RPA) The army of Rwanda.
RPA	Rwanda Patriotic Army. The army of Rwanda now called the RDF.

RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front became the RPA then the RDF.
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SLA	Sierra Leone Army
SLPP	Sierra Leone Peoples Party
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	United Nations Mission in Rwanda
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNAVEM	United Nations Verification and Monitoring Mission in Angola
UNDPKO	United Nation Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNOSOM II	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group (Namibia)
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (Middle East)

ABSTRACT

This study sets out to investigate the role of United Nation peacekeeping operation in the management of internal conflict in Africa during the post- Cold War period from 1989 to2004. It provides an over view of United Nations peacekeeping operations role in conflict management. It focuses on the nature and profile of international involvement in the United Nations most challenging missions in Africa namely the Mission in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo with the view to using comparative study of the two cases.

The basis of argument is that commitment gap in terms of political will between undertakings of states in the Security Council Resolution and resources they are willing to devote remains a crucial problem. Lack of political will in ending conflict, interest of actors in conflict, economic constraint are some of the emerging challenges affecting the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations.

On several cases the Security Council and member states, found themselves unable to take action to halt the escalation in violence. At the same time, they recognized that multilateral action would require the international community to become involved in internal matters and therefore had to face the prospect of breaching the important and vital principle of respect for national sovereignty.

The study has concluded that alignment of political will and resources devoted by the international community contributes to ultimate success in the peacekeeping operation in any situation. This is coupled with long-term commitment in ending the conflict as evidenced in the two case studies.

Chapter 1

1. Peacekeeping: An Overview.

This chapter examines the concept peacekeeping, its characteristics and subsequent development as a way of managing conflict that threatens or can potentially threaten international peace and security. This is necessary to better situate the conceptual and doctrinal basis of peacekeeping and thus its relevance in contemporary conflict management in Africa. It will also deal with the general introductory elements: introduction of the study, statement of the problem, objectives of the study, justification and significance, formulation of hypothesis, methodology and theoretical framework.

1.1. Introduction

Internal conflicts are one of the major problems that African countries have had to contend with since independence. These conflicts within the continent have continually weakened and reduced African countries capacity to achieve their development agenda and their ability to respond to natural calamities and disasters.¹

Following the end of Cold War, there was optimism that there would be new era of peace and general stability in Africa. However Africa still faces the monumental challenge of attempting to hold in check the forces that are wreaking havoc on the continent. Effective conflict analysis is one small step towards an Africa, which can live up to its full potential of peace and security.²

Perennial internal conflict in particular poses a threat not only to the very existence of the African states but also endangers international peace and security. Most intra-state conflicts have taken the form of identity and ethnic conflict in the emerging Post-Cold War international system and the main challenge facing the African continent is how to manage these conflicts.

Most conflicts after this period have been intra-state in character and guided by several factors. These include struggle for reform and transformation of political system, change in political process from an overtly exclusive system to more inclusive system, ethnic and religious competition, struggle to redefine power sharing mechanism, dispute over land boundaries between communities among others

There have been several attempts to tackle the problem using various peaceful methods like mediation, negotiation and conciliation, however little has been realized. The perceived to be successful IGAD mediation effort for the southern Sudan is yet to be realized just but to mention a few. Continuing conflicts in Eritrea and Ethiopia, Somalia, Congo, Sierra Leone, Sudan (Darfur region), Burundi and Angola attest to this fact.

Due to this peacekeeping therefore has been resorted to in a number of cases in order to prevent conflict from degenerating to violence and stopping violence where it has already started. The idea behind peacekeeping is to create a condition under which lasting solutions can be looked for.

It has been argued that because peacekeeping was conceived in the Cold War environment where major focus was inter-state conflict, it can also be an effective tool

for the management of internal conflict. This argument is enhanced by the proliferation of peacekeeping missions in recent years, which have played a major role in ending internal conflict in Africa.

This study sets out to investigate the role of United Nation peacekeeping operation in the management of internal conflict in Africa during the post- Cold War period from 1989 to 2004. It provides an over view of United Nations peacekeeping operations role in conflict management. More specifically it reflects on the current peacekeeping operations and discuss international contribution to peace in Africa. In this regard it focuses on the nature and profile of international involvement in the United Nations most challenging missions in Africa namely the Mission in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo with the view to using comparative study of two cases: DRC and Sierra Leone to explicate this.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

The concept of peacekeeping to Africa has become less meaningful in the 21st century both in theory and practice. The complexity of peacekeeping operations in the immediate past and the challenges facing the operations currently make it worthwhile for the scholars and practitioners to study the situation critically with the view of finding better ways of handling the emerging challenges in the post 2000 context.

The commitment gap in terms of political will between undertakings of states in the Security Council Resolution and resources they are willing to devote remains a crucial problem. Lack of political will in ending conflict, interest of actors in conflict, economic

constraint are some of the emerging challenges affecting the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations.

Experiences of United Nations peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and Democratic Republic Congo are indicators of the some of the difficulties in the implementation of post 2000 recommendations.

UNAMSIL can be perceived as an example of a successful United Nation peacekeeping mission. Why is UNAMSIL perceived to have succeeded when so many other missions are perceived to have failed? Is there better approach to help eliminate some of the bottlenecks that have continued to hinder effectiveness of peacekeeping operations?

The study will look at peacekeeping as a conflict management tool using comparative study of two case study Sierra Leone and DRC to explicate this.

1.3. Objective of the study

The main objectives of the study will be:

- To assess the role of peacekeeping in conflict management in Africa with specific reference to MONUC and UNAMSIL in the DRC and Sierra Leone conflicts respectively.

Specific objectives:

- To situate peace keeping within Post Cold War security context.
- To establish the significance of peacekeeping as conflict management tool in Africa

- To come up with appropriate recommendation for effective peacekeeping role in the Post 2000 challenges.

1.4. Justification and Significance of the study

In terms of academic relevance, the study contributes to the better understanding of the United Nations Peacekeeping role in conflict management in Africa. It contributes knowledge and adds to the literature on peacekeeping challenges in the 21st century.

This study therefore hopes to provide some insight on the unique problem of internal conflict and also help to fill the knowledge gap in the theory of collective security and peacekeeping in relation to internal conflict in Africa.

In terms of Policy relevance this study will deepen the approach of understanding on better ways of enhancing effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. The information and the specific recommendations generated will influence the experience of MONUC and UNAMSIL.

By examining the role of peacekeeping in internal conflict, this study will contribute knowledge to the ongoing debate surrounding post-Cold War peacekeeping challenges. The findings will be of interest to United Nation Department of Peacekeeping Operation.

1.5. Formulation of hypothesis

The study will test the following hypothesis:

- Alignment of political will and resources remains determinant of the success of peacekeeping operation.

- Success of peacekeeping is a function of long-term commitment to ending conflict.

1.6. Scope and Limitation of the study

This study is focused on the role of peacekeeping in internal conflict Management in Africa during the post-Cold War period 1989 to 2004.

Focusing on peacekeeping as one of the methods of conflict management by the United Nations emphasis will be put on Africa and particularly internal conflicts, which have continued for a long time taking case study of Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone.

The study select case study because Sierra Leone and Democratic Republic of Congo share key characteristics for example in terms of nature of governance, richness in natural resource, history of resource exploitation thereby providing the comparative basis required and also features significant differences which could help fine-tune the over all analysis of effectiveness of peacekeeping in conflict management.

The study has certain limitations, which include focus made only in Africa while there are other areas with similar situations like Asia and Europe.

1.7. Methodology

In the course of assessing the role of Peacekeeping in conflict management in Africa, the study will employ both primary and secondary sources of data. Most information will be from secondary data.

1.7.1. Primary Sources

Primary data will be collected through informal interviews to gather information from scholars, diplomats and high-ranking officials who served in the two peacekeeping missions. Questionnaires will also be administered through e-mails.

1.7.2. Secondary Sources

This study will be based on analysis of secondary data including UN reports, and reports of other International Organization, published analyses and academic papers and articles. This will be subjected to critical analysis and evaluation.

1.8. Theoretical Framework

A theory has been defined as a systematic study of observable phenomena that tries to discover the principle variables to explain behaviour and real characteristic types of relationships among national units.¹ A theory seeks to describe, explain and prescribe phenomena.

This study will use mainly Collective Security theoretical framework to compare United Nations Peacekeeping role in internal conflict management in Africa.

1.8.1. Collective Security

Collective Security is an arrangement among states by which all are committed to aid any country threatened with armed attack by any other country. The essential elements of an effective Collective Security system are consensus, commitment, and organization. At minimum level of consensus states must agree that peace is indivisible and that threat to peace everywhere are the concern of all, commitment to act in accordance with collective

Security principles. States are committed to refrain from unilateral use of force to achieve purely national objectives. A fourth prerequisite is power. This theory is relevant in that it forms the benchmark for the function of United Nations.

1.9. Definition of Concepts

Complex emergency is defined as a crisis in a country, region or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing United Nations country Programme.⁴

The study uses **internal conflict** to refer to generalized, sustained political violence, ranging from civil strife that involves the use of arms to massive guerrilla insurgency and full-scale combat between armed troops within a state.

Conflict resolution refers to addressing the root causes of the conflict and the elimination of the underlying causes of conflict. It is a social situation where the conflicting parties in (a voluntary) agreements resolve to peacefully live with and/or dissolve their basic incompatibilities and henceforth cease to use arms against one another. Conflict Resolution stresses the importance of addressing needs, which are neither negotiable nor in short supply. The parties can therefore redefine and re-perceive their needs.

The term **conflict management** is defined in this study as the ability of a state to develop norms, institutions, and mechanisms to transform situations of conflict and potential conflict into non-violent outcomes.⁵

Peacekeeping is defined according to International Peace Academy as a method of conflict management that is employed when a conflict escalates beyond the point where preventive action can be successful. It defines peacekeeping as the prevention, containment, moderation, and termination of hostilities through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organized and directed internationally using multinational forces, soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace.⁶

1.10. Chapter Outline

Chapter One: Peacekeeping: An overview will deal with the general introductory elements: introduction of the study, statement of the problem, objectives of the study, justification and relevance, formulation of hypothesis, methodology, theoretical framework and literature review. In the literature review the concept peacekeeping, objectives, its characteristics and the role it has played in ending conflicts in Africa giving examples of existing peacekeeping missions in Africa.

Chapter Two: Peacekeeping and the challenges of the 21st century will put peacekeeping in context by examining, its evolution, subsequent development, transformation of peacekeeping and emerging challenges in post 2000.

Chapter Three: Case Study of DR Congo and Sierra Leone will explore in detail MONUC and UNAMSIL respectively. This section will provide an overview of both Sierra Leone and DRC conflict, processes leading to establishment of mandates and execution, decision making process of peacekeeping operations, key factors explaining successes and failures, major challenges, impact and assessment of both missions and give recommendations.

Chapter four: Comparative Analysis: This area will explore the similarities and differences encountered in chapter three and bringing out the key recommendations to enhance effectiveness.

Chapter five: Conclusions and Recommendations. This summarizes the findings drawing conclusions and making recommendations for future research.

2.0. Literature Review

The literature review will be divided into the following sections discussed as under:

2.1. The Concept of peacekeeping

A critical analysis of the operations of the United Nations in handling conflicts and crisis will illustrate the variety of third party intervention techniques that have been developed and this will make some general assessments about the role of United Nations in meeting its primary task of maintaining International Peace and Security and resolving conflicts.

Since its creation, the United Nations has been involved in preventing disputes from escalating into war and helps restore peace when conflict breaks out. Over the decades, the UN has helped to contain and end numerous conflicts, in many cases through deployment of peacekeeping operations.

Peacekeeping as mode of third party intervention has received different definitions. According to Groom, peacekeeping means operations undertaken by an international body, usually of an actual or potential military character in an actual or potential conflict situation, which are based on the consent of all significant parties to such conflict.

To him, peacekeeping operations which comprise peacekeeping forces, observation group and fact finding mission are usually deployed between parties or in situation of conflict to act as a buffer.⁷

According to the International Peace Academy, peacekeeping is a method of conflict management that is employed when a conflict escalates beyond the point where preventive action can be successful. It defines peacekeeping as the prevention, containment, moderation, and termination of hostilities through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organized and directed internationally using multinational forces, soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace.⁸

Paul F. Diehl defines peacekeeping as the imposition of neutral and lightly armed interposition forces following a cessation of armed hostilities and with the permission of the states on whose territory these forces are deployed in order to discourage a renewal of military conflict and promote an environment under which the underlying disputes can be resolved.⁹

United Nations defines peacekeeping as an operation involving military personnel but without enforcement powers established by the United Nation to help maintain or restore peace in areas of conflict. United Nations peacekeeping is based on the principle that an impartial presence on the ground can ease tension between hostile parties and create space for political negotiations.

Boutros Boutros Ghali in his Agenda for Peace defines Peacekeeping as the deployment of a United Nation presence in the field, hitherto with consent of all parties concerned,

normally involving United Nations military and /or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. To him peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and making of peace. ✓

Other definitions of peacekeeping each vary in some way but all these differences reflect the conceptual perspective of the author. According to Groom's definition, emphasis is made on the consent of all significant parties since he belongs to pluralist thought. Diehl on the other hand uses the realist school, which emphasizes more on the role of the state in his definition.

Peacekeeping can help bridge the gap between the cessation of hostilities and a durable peace, but only if the parties to a conflict have the political will needed to reach the goal. Initially developed as a means of dealing with Inter-State conflict, peacekeeping has increasingly been used in Intra-State conflicts and civil wars, which are often characterized by multiple armed factions with differing political objectives and fractured lines of command.

A peacekeeping operation is generally envisaged within the framework of African crises when the political, administrative and economic structures of a state are failing or may even no longer be in existence. Such state is the scene of internal conflict colored by clan, or ethnic rivalry, thousands of civilians victims, large number of refugees outside the country or displaced persons within the borders. Within this framework solutions to violent intractable conflicts can be mediated and ameliorated.

2.2. Objectives of Peacekeeping

The main objective of peacekeeping is to prevent violence from breaking out or to contain or curtail it where it has already broken out.¹⁰ Peacekeeping aims to stop hostilities and to control conflicts so that they do not develop into broader conflagration.¹¹

Diehl view peacekeeping forces as trying to ensure that none of the protagonists engage in acts that violate the agreement that established the peacekeeping operation and the cessation of military hostilities. By imposing themselves between the protagonists, peacekeeping forces hope to prevent isolated hostile incidents or accidents that can escalate to full-scale war.

2.3. Characteristics of Peacekeeping

This area explores the various characteristics of peacekeeping operation, which forms the benchmark of its operations. This is discussed as under:

2.3.1 Consent of Parties

Peacekeeping operation in general can be set up in areas of conflict only with the consent of parties concerned.¹² The principle of Consent also applies to the troop contributing governments, which provide the required military personnel. It is argued that these governments would be reluctant to volunteer personnel if these soldiers were to be sent to an area of conflict to combat duty.¹³

Stressing the significance of the consent of the host states, Diehl points out that any attempt to station troops without permission of the host country would inevitably

precipitate a military confrontation and this to him would not only defeat the purpose of limiting hostilities in the area, but would also be suicidal for the troops in that they generally lack the military capability to confront a determined adversary.¹⁴

Groom concurs with both Liu and Diehl on the importance of consent of the parties and point out that once the consent is given is not given for all time. He further argues that if it were, then few governments would give their consent because the risk of peacekeeping operation becoming a de facto enforcement would be great. Peacekeeping forces depend largely on the cooperation of the host states. They cannot function independently of such cooperation.¹⁵

In cases of internal conflict, obtaining consent of the host government alone and ignoring other parties to a conflict may not be enough. Consent of all significant parties be obtained to ensure that they do not sabotage the peacekeeping operation .

2.3.2. Impartiality

One of the key principles of the traditional peacekeeping operation is that it must not interfere in the internal affairs of the host countries and must not in any way favour one party against another.¹⁶ This requirement of impartiality is fundamental not only in principle but also to ensure that peacekeeping operation is effective. It is argued that a peacekeeping operation cannot take sides without becoming a part of conflict, which it has been set out to control or resolve.

Impartiality means that the peacekeepers give all the parties equal treatment. Classically it was thought that this was crucial for a successful outcome. Some observers have

however questioned whether complete impartiality is possible or even necessary. Groom argues for example that peacekeepers have their own interest in the conflict.¹⁷

According to Fabian, while impartiality is difficult and hard to sustain for a long time under conditions of stress, it is prerequisite for whatever effectiveness, authority and leverage peacekeepers have.

The impartiality of peacekeepers means they can be invited in the first place and because of it they are able to carry out certain functions with which the parties could not trust each other and which would not be accepted from other outside party not considered impartial.¹⁸,

In the case of United Nation peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Secretary General has to seek the opinion of member states with legitimate political concern about the composition of each new mission.

In the Cold War era it was customary to exclude the major powers on the Security Council and all states having interest in the dispute. As much as possible neighboring was excluded from peacekeeping operation on the presumption that they are likely to have partisan interest in the conflict. While it is true that neighbouring states could be more committed to the search for a peaceful end to conflict, there is always the fear that they have vested interest

2.3.3. Non-Use of Force

Peacekeepers are prohibited from using force except in self-defence, defending the position of peacekeepers on the ground and free movement of peacekeepers/According

to Brian Urquhart, non-violent nature of United Nation peacekeeping operation as the most important. It is this characteristic, which makes peacekeeping forces acceptable to all parties engaged in conflict and the governments that contribute the troops.

This principle of non-use of force sets peacekeeping forces above the conflict they are dealing with and the violation of the principle may lead to the peacekeepers becoming part of the conflict and therefore part of the problems.¹⁹

Liu echoes Urquhart sentiments by arguing that parties to a conflict are more likely to accept peacekeeping operation if the latter has no offensive intent and capability and will in no conceivable circumstances become a threat to them.²⁰

Fabian argues that the most persuasive rationale for the emphasis on Non-Use of Force is that it assures the United Nation the most leverage with disputants and maximal opportunity to modify their behaviour. He argues that restriction on the use of force are logical, inescapable corollaries of impartiality and consent, because as he puts it... "above a certain point in the scale of coercion, the parties will no longer cooperate voluntarily. The intermediary will then have changed from collaborator to adversary"²¹

The principle of Non Use of Force is the main distinguishing characteristics between peacekeeping and Collective Security. While the latter is premised on the identification of an aggressor against whom the international community may act militarily, peacekeeping in contrast eschews use of military force and instead hopes to prevent or stop hostilities by separating the parties and helping to create conditions under which conflict can be negotiated or mediated.

Apart from the above characteristics, it is also important to note that peacekeeping operation, if they are by the United Nation have mainly been established by the Security Council. This means that no operation can be established without a broad consensus within the international community. Further, the military personnel who serve in peacekeeping operation are provided by member states on voluntary basis.

Once provided they pass under Secretary General in all operational matters. Those who serve in the observer mission are unarmed. Those who serve in peacekeeping forces are equipped with light defensive weapons but not authorized to use force except in self-defence.

Traditional model of peacekeeping are workable in cases where the United Nation is called upon by the warring parties to police a ceasefire. However it appears unworkable in situation where the UN is invited to facilitate demilitarization but the combatants fail to comply with the terms they agreed on earlier for example the DR Congo is case in point. It is also debatable to continue practising impartiality the traditional way.

The presence of peacekeepers act as a deterrent for any party against the use of force for fear of international condemnation if such action could cause injury or lead to loss of life.²² It is clear that peacekeeping is designed to create or restore as the case may be an environment in which a peaceful solution to the problem at issue can at least be contemplated.²³

According to the United Nations peacekeeping operations are intended to be provisional and thus temporary measures, which on their own can never resolve a conflict. They tasks

are essentially to stop or contain hostilities thus help to create conditions in which the conflict under dispute can be negotiated because it is believed that parties to a conflict are likely to be conciliatory as long as the forces are in active combat²⁴

- Despite the expanded role of peacekeeping and the challenges it faces, the ultimate objective of peacekeeping still remains helping to create conditions under which the other methods of peaceful management of conflict like arbitration, conciliation, mediation and negotiation can be put to work.

2.4. The Role of Peace Keeping In Africa.

The primary aim of peacekeeping is to halt armed conflict and to prevent its recurrence. It acts as a physical barrier between hostile parties, monitors military movements and create a stable environment for negotiations. In the right environment peacekeeping operations can make a difference between war and peace in Africa. Peacekeeping can achieve in the most challenging environment when deployed with credible deterrence capacity, equipped with appropriate resources and backed by sufficient political will.

Boutros Boutros Ghali first underscored the expansion role of peacekeeping in his supplement to an agenda for peace in 1995 in what he termed as second-generation operation.

He outlined the expanded role to include supervising ceasefires, demobilizing forces and reintegrating them into civilian life; designing and implementing demining programmes; returning refugees and internally displaced persons; providing humanitarian assistance; supervising existing administrative structures; establishing new police forces; verifying

the respect for human rights; designing and supervising constitutional, electoral and judicial reforms; conducting, observing, organizing and supervising election; and coordinating support for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction.

In Africa peacekeeping has played several roles in promoting an end to conflict. Some of these roles include separating the protagonists and monitoring their conduct. In this situation the operation function on the basis of a limited agreement or understanding between parties. They monitor ceasefire and their presence enable combatant to pull back to safe distance from each other, where an atmosphere conducive for negotiation may be created. This can be a critical confidence building measures in difficult situation.

Another significant role is the implementation of comprehensive settlements. In Africa operation of this type was carried out in Angola, Mozambique, and Namibia and perceived to be successful. Where a comprehensive settlement to conflict has been reached, the deployment of a multidisciplinary peacekeeping operation may well represent a chance to establish peace and build foundation for lasting development, based on respect of human rights and the rehabilitation of civic institutions. In this role the international community must provide support to demonstrate commitment to peace.

Third role is that of preventive deployment as a response to threat to conflict. It has made a difference in Africa as elsewhere by providing reassurance presence. This prevent miscalculations that can lead to violent conflict by allowing time for grievances to be settled hence in this case acts as confidence building measure for peace.

Protecting humanitarian interest is also another role that has been performed by peacekeepers in Africa. Humanitarian actors have worked with peacekeepers and independently of them to negotiate access and defend humanitarian principles.

In a new spirit of cooperation the Security Council established larger and more complex United Nation Peacekeeping Operations often to help implement comprehensive peace agreement between protagonists in intra state conflicts. Furthermore peacekeeping came to involve more and more non-military elements to ensure stability.

The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia, provide an important turning point. Established in 1989 to aid South Africa in facilitating Namibia's transition to independence, the mission gave the UN experience in guiding a transition process as well as preparing for and conducting elections. Another significant action was the 1992-3 UN mission in Cambodia (UNTAC), which was much more extensive and challenging.

There are also peacekeeping operations, which are characterized as second and third generation's missions. Second generation missions are characterized by United Nations involvement in guiding peace settlements among combatants in civil conflict who have willingly entered into negotiation. Third generation missions, by contrast, involve interposing the United Nation in the midst of ongoing conflicts. These third-generation operations were prompted by the resurgence of ethnic and cultural conflict suppressed by the Cold War. These missions have been launched where there is no peace and international will exists to support humanitarian assistance while attempts is made to find a political solution to the conflict.

They have been much more involved with internal conflict resolution and peace building. These missions have ranged from supervising ceasefires within member states and delivering humanitarian supplies to helping transitions toward independence and democracy by overseeing implementation of comprehensive peace accords, institution building and conducting elections.

Currently peacekeeping roles goes beyond the confines of just monitoring, demilitarized zones, to include strengthening the rule of law, monitoring human rights violations, tackling issues related to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons.

2.5. Examples of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa and their role in conflict management from 1989-2004

Table I

Country	Date	Peak Force Size	Operation	UN Role in conflict management
Angola	1991-1995	476	UNAVEM II	Verify compliance with peace accord to end civil strife in Angola
Somalia	1992-1993	550	UNOSOM I	Monitor ceasefire between Somali parties. Protect shipment of relief supplies.
Mozambique	1992-1994	7,500	ONUMOZ	Supervise internal peace accord in Mozambique, disarm combatants, establish a non-partisan army,

				hold national elections, conduct humanitarian program.
Rwanda	1993-1994	100	ONOMUR	Observer mission in Uganda – Rwanda, monitor arms shipment.
Rwanda	1993-1996	5500	UNAMIR	Stop massacre of defenseless population of Rwanda, assist refugees, report atrocities.
Liberia	2003-ongoing	15,000	UNMIL	Observing and monitoring the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement; Working towards disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); Facilitating humanitarian assistance and promoting human rights
Ethiopia Eritrea			UNMEE	Monitoring Temporary Security Zones, Coordinating humanitarian and human rights activities.
DRC	1999-to date	11570	MONUC	
Sierra Leone	1999-to date	9634	UNAMSIL	

Among those who have contributed the existing literature on peacekeeping is Alan James who attributes the emergence of peacekeeping as a device for conflict management to the

failure of the United Nation Collective Security System envisaged by the founding fathers²⁵. According to him peacekeeping at this stage appears to be influenced by the realist paradigms, which perceive international system as a system in which state is regarded as primary actor. To him the distinguishing characteristics between peacekeeping and collective security is their attitudes towards associated issues of force and consent. While collective security relied on the mandatory use of force, peacekeeping eschewed force except in self-defence and required the consent of the host state for the admission of the United Nation personnel.²⁶

Looking at peacekeeping operation since end of cold war James concludes that peacekeeping has hardly been a great success and attributes this poor performance by examining issues like alleged shift from border peacekeeping to internal peacekeeping, the increased number and size of peacekeeping operation, increased number of states taking part in UN Peacekeeping Operation, prohibition to use force and wider responsibilities that now peacekeepers have to undertake.

He disputes the assumption that most Cold War peacekeeping operations involved inter-state conflicts and to him peacekeeping has not undergone complete change. While conceding that internal missions are often more complex than border mission, he argues that this does not necessarily mean they are bound to fail. He dismisses the view that the rapid increase in the number of contributor states has affected the quality of peacekeepers and contributed to the problems the peacekeeping is experiencing. He is opposed to the idea of institutionalizing use of force in peacekeeping due to the implication it has on the impartiality.

In this view, once a mark is overstepped, the mission is embarking on a new conceptual and operational area and this activity ought to be distinguished from peacekeeping.²⁷

Other writers who share similar views are Bowett, Boyd, Claude and Wainhouse²⁸ Among essential elements of peacekeeping are the consent of the parties and the actual or potential military character of the operation. The element of impartiality of the peacekeeping force as between the parties and in fulfillment of its mandates is also essential.²⁹

They see peacekeeping as being primarily a United Nations activity involving the deployment of international forces between the parties in a conflict to act as a buffer.

The main aim of peacekeeping is to cool down local violence, to minimize the risk of escalation and outside military intervention and ensure an atmosphere as conducive as possible to constructive negotiation.³⁰ In this setting, peacekeeping is supposed to be used where the conflict has an international character.

This view of peacekeeping and conflict is state centric as it creates the impression that only interstate conflict is international and thus worthy of United Nation involvement. This division between internal and international is also unrealistic as there are internal conflicts that have been internationalized due to flow of refugees, domestic sources, human rights violation, media and interdependence hence cannot be restricted to border disputes only.

According to Liu and Fabian focus is made on the concept of non-use of force in peacekeeping. Liu for example argues that a United Nations peacekeeping operation will

only be acceptable to the parties to a conflict if it has no offensive intent and capability and will in no conceivable circumstance become a threat to them.³¹

Diehl on the other hand examines the concept of peacekeeping, its origin and development over the years. His problem is the distinction he tries to make between peacekeeping operation and observer mission.³² This goes against the general understanding of peacekeeping operation. His attempt to equate peacekeeping operation to peacekeeping forces only creates confusion. Otherwise his coverage of the issues concerning both traditional and contemporary peacekeeping is quite useful.

2.6. Conclusion

In conclusion, peacekeeping can be defined as the deployment of UN or other multilateral personnel in the field as a tool of conflict prevention, management or resolution.³³ Attempts at defining peacekeeping more specifically have always bedeviled by the particular nature of the concept and practice. Peacekeeping has never been guided by the established theory or doctrine.

Peacekeeping can only be as credible as the peacekeepers mandate and resources and effective peacekeeping must be able to adapt to peculiarities of wars they are sent to resolve.

Chapter 2

2.0. Peacekeeping and the challenges of the 21st Century

This section assesses the UN's response to peacekeeping challenges in the DRC and Sierra Leone. It reflects in particular upon the current shortcomings of the UN system when operating in situations where conflict has not resulted in victory for any side. In addition, it endeavours to shed light on the implications of these shortcomings in view of the fact that the UN is still the international authority with the responsibility for dealing with international peace and security —especially in Africa where the demands for peacekeeping are arguably the greatest. It gives also the evolution of peacekeeping operation till the current generation. Finally, special attention is given to the emerging challenges in the post 2000.

2.1. Evolution of Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping has evolved rapidly, as the strategic environment in which it has occurred. Changing patterns of conflict from inter-state to intra-state and major power relations, the evolving structure of regional security arrangements have all enhanced and shaped the evolution of UN peacekeeping.

The United Nation became the primary scene for diffusing international conflict in the post-World War II period. The growing role of the United Nations is internal, rather than international, conflict in the 1990s emanated from ambiguous interpretation of its own charter, exposing internal contradictions within the charter itself. The dilemma is depicted by the contrast between the United Nation support for national sovereignty and self-determination, and its involvement in the internal conflicts of other nations.

Several phases of United Nations peacekeeping operation have evolved during the Cold War era as a means of resolving conflicts between states through the deployment of unarmed or lightly armed military personnel between belligerent parties.

The rise in the number of intra-state conflicts, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, has resulted in a shift towards multidimensional peacekeeping operations. These have often been mandated to support the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement between parties to a civil war. To some extent this has also led to an expansion of the non-military component of peacekeeping operations whose success is dependent on the work of civilian experts in key areas.

Peacekeeping as conflict management tool is comparatively recent having been first used by the United Nation in the late 1940s. The United Nation by end of World War II developed the concept of peacekeeping because of the increasing mistrust between the two super powers having made the Collective Security system enshrined in the Charter unworkable.

Peacekeeping operation was devised as a practical mechanism to contain armed conflict and to facilitate their political settlement by peaceful means despite constraint of the Cold War³⁴ There emerged a number of conflicts during the process of decolonization, which could not be resolved. A way of dealing with these conflicts had to be found hence peacekeeping evolved as a temporary measure to contain a problem while solutions were sought.³⁵

Peacekeeping was used then to refer to non-threatening and impartial action in the diffusing the tension between the parties to a conflict. It could only take place with the consent and cooperation of parties in conflict. The end of cold war also precipitated a dramatic shift in the United Nations and multilateral peacekeeping.

In a period about forty years, from the first mission that was established in 1948 to supervise the truce in Palestine (UNTSO), to just before the launching of the first major multidimensional peacekeeping operation in Namibia (UNTAG) in April 1989, the UN organized fifteen peacekeeping operations. Most of these operations were concerned with conflicts between states. The mandates of the missions consisted primarily of monitoring or supervising truces, cease-fires, troop withdrawals and buffer zones. Significantly, these were consent-based operations, marked by adherence on the part of the peacekeepers to the principles of cooperation, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense. Operations carried out during this period can be considered the first phase of peacekeeping.

This situation underwent significant changes in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The end of the Cold War, the success of operation in Namibia, created enlarged expectations about what the organization could accomplish. This led to a second phase of peacekeeping. In a space of only six years (1989-1995), the UN established twenty new peacekeeping operations. Unlike in the previous era, most of these missions (seventeen) were inserted in the context of conflicts within nations, with considerably broadened mandates, including human rights monitoring, administrative support of civilian police, election monitoring, supporting and coordinating humanitarian assistance, and national

reconstruction and rehabilitation. The high points of this period were marked by the relatively successful completion of the operations conducted in Namibia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Cambodia and Mozambique.

The success of Mozambique in particular testifies to the contribution that the United Nations can make as an impartial and legitimate actor for peace. It also indicates the Organization's potential to strengthen and direct international engagement within a conflict that might otherwise be exacerbated by negligence or by manipulation from outside, and the extent to which unanimity of purpose and willingness to act in a coherent manner can enhance the authority of the international community.

Among the early peacekeeping operation Force was United Nation Emergency Force (UNEF I) in 1956 following the Suez Crisis precipitated by the invasion of Egypt by British, French and Israeli Forces. With the Security Council paralyzed by the British and French vetoes, the issue was brought to the General Assembly under "Uniting for Peace Resolution" which a special emergency session decided to establish a United Nations Force.

The United Nations became involved in supporting transitions, particularly in decolonization processes. The first UN transitional authority mission was in Dutch West New Guinea in 1962-63. However the adverse experience in the Congo in 1960-64 made the UN reluctant to take on other such multifunctional operations, as it was not fully prepared to provide the central authority that was needed for such an operation.

The United Nation mission therefore involved interposing forces between two states that had willingly agreed to the UN presence. These missions did not so much resolve the conflict as they rarely created the conditions necessary for peace.

The United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), for example established in 1988, provided a new direction for the United Nation. The mission was to monitor the implementation of a political settlement. The mission successes helped to build confidence within the United Nation in the changing global political climate that was making Security Council cooperation more.

From its Cold War roots, more peacekeeping operations have been established since 1989. The Period after 1989 has witnessed the emergence of a new form of peacekeeping called Second Generation, muscular, extended, wider advanced or enforced.³⁶

While in 1988 the UN operated just 5 peacekeeping missions, by its peak year of 1993 it had 18.³⁷ Of the 5 peacekeeping operations deployed in 1988, only 1 was in situation of intra-state conflict³⁸ and the 21 operations that have been there since then only 8 have related to inter-state wars whereas 13 have related to intra-state conflict and of the 11 operations established since January 1992 all but 2 relate to intra –state wars. Of the 32 UN peacekeeping operations launched since 1989, 13 have been in Africa, more than in any other region in the world.

More peacekeeping personnel have been deployed, for example in 1988 the UN had only 9950 troops in the field, and by 1993 it had a record 80000.³⁹ At the end of July 1995, approximately 65,000 military personnel were deployed in 16 peacekeeping

operations.⁴⁰ The numbers of civilian police and other civilian personnel have also increased substantially. As of the end of July 1995 the UN had 1700 civilians police in the field (an increase from 35 in 1988) and 6000 civilians' personnel (from 1500 in 1988).

According to Goodrich,⁴¹ peacekeeping operations of the UN have been the most controversial, the most highly publicized and in many respects, the most constructive and successful of its peace and security activities. For instance, between 1945 and 1987, there were 13 peacekeeping operations, 528,000 military; police and civilian personnel had served under the flag of the UN by 1992 up to when it had been estimated to cost US\$8.3 billion.⁴²

The number of operations and peacekeepers in Africa has grown dramatically in the last five years, a response to opportunities for peace. Currently, the UN leads 16 peace operations, seven in Africa: Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, and the Western Sahara. These African missions account for over 80 percent of all UN peacekeepers deployed worldwide. Of the seven missions in Africa, six began after 1999, supported by roughly 49,000 UN peacekeepers. More troops will be needed for a potential mission in Sudan. As a result, costs are increasing with the demand for deployments. Of the projected UN peacekeeping costs for 2004-2005, approximately 70 percent are associated with missions in Africa. In addition to the increase in missions and mission personnel, many of these operations are complex, multidimensional, and operating with Chapter VII authority.

Many recent African operations are hybrids, where multiple organizations have played a leading role in the peacekeeping mission in concert with the UN. In Liberia, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed troops in the summer of 2003, assisted by the US, and then transitioned the mission to the UN in October 2003. In Burundi, the African Union (AU) led a peacekeeping force with a deployment of 2,870 peacekeepers primarily from South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique before the UN took over in June 2004. The European Union authorized a French-led force to eastern DRC in the summer of 2003 to secure the Ituri region for three months, giving time for a more robust and expanded UN force to take its place in the fall. And in Sudan today, the African Union leads an observer force, with the United Nations planning a potential peacekeeping mission there.

The evolving environment has had profound implication for the way in which the humanitarian community, the United Nations and military forces engage under a United Nations flag have reacted to peace support operations.

The UN peacekeeping has evolved in response to the new political environment. Three particular important principle concepts are the consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence. The operations that have strictly adhered to the above principles have succeeded, while those that have not respected some of the above principle have been less successful. Although there have been instances where peacekeeping operations have overlooked these aspects at the risk of being judged as partial or using force other than in self-defence. Such situation included cases where there was need to protect humanitarian operations during continuing warfare, protecting

civilian population in designated safe areas and pressing the parties to achieve national reconciliation.

According to Boutros Ghali, the contrast between the cost of the UN Peacekeeping and the cost of alternative war, between the demands of the organization and the means provided to meet them, would be absurd were the consequences not so damaging to global stability and credibility of the organization.

Propositions of Ghali regarding the future of United Nations peacekeeping operations is important as fundamental decision must be taken to enhance the capacity of the organization in this innovative and productive exercise of its function.¹³

Despite the fact that peacekeeping is not clearly provided for in the United Nations Charter, the practice of conducting such operations has created a number of norms that have generally been accepted as forming the legal basis for their conduct. These are consent, impartiality and use of force in self-defense. Further more legal norm are created by the application of legal sources such as the status of force agreement for specific missions, guidelines for conduct of peace operations issued by the Secretary-General, and the guidelines and directives issued by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

In the absence of effective military capabilities and other multilateral mechanisms to deal properly with the crises as they occurred, the international community continued to use UN peacekeeping. In addition traditional UN peacekeeping is sometimes not appropriate as was the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, in the early and mid-1990s

peacekeeping was the only tool available for the application of broadly based international action.⁴⁴

The major involvement of the humanitarian community, importance given to human rights, need to establish and re-establish institutions of law and order and good governance, the demands of reconstruction and restoring the social and economic fabric, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and other tasks serve to complicate the roles of peacekeepers, military and civilians alike.⁴⁵

It became clear that action to restore and enforce peace was often more appropriately a role for coalitions of willing states with the agreement of the Security Council, a development later noted in the report on the United Nation Peace Operations.⁴⁶

On several cases the Security Council and member states, found themselves unable to take action to halt the escalation in violence. At the same time, they recognized that multilateral action would require the international community to become involved in internal matters and therefore had to face the prospect of breaching the important and vital principle of respect for national sovereignty.

The Post Cold War period saw significant changes in the nature and incidence of violent conflict. The Security Council found itself increasingly confronted with situations of intrastate conflict, which required new and complex tasks and the traditional peacekeeping tools were often found inadequate for the new tasks.

By the end of 1990s establishment and maintenance of peace had taken on a much broader and deeper meaning as shown in operations deployed in East Timor, Sierra Leone, Kosovo and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

2.2 Transformation of Peacekeeping over the Years.

2.2.1. Overview

The classical peacekeeping model derives from early United Nations peacekeeping operations in the 1950s and 1960s. At that time, the now well-established tenets of traditional peacekeeping that is the consent of the parties to the conflict, the impartiality of the peacekeeping force, and the prohibition of use of force except in self-defence began to take shape. Until the end of the Cold War era UN peacekeeping forces were stationed in the affected areas with the consent of the parties that signed the agreements.

Peacekeeping operations had two broad tasks, namely to stop or contain hostility, thereby creating conditions for peace by negotiation, or to supervise the implementation of an interim or final settlement negotiated by the peacemakers. To accomplish peacekeeping tasks, the UN deployed two categories of forces: observer missions consisting primarily of lightly armed officers; and peacekeeping forces which consisted of light infantry with the necessary logistic support. For example, with the inception of Operation Des Nations Unies Au Congo (ONUC) in the Congo in 1960, the mission only had lightly equipped troops without any land or air transport. The ONUC commander was charged with establishing law and order, acquiring freedom of movement for UN relief efforts, disarming and retraining local military forces and preventing unilateral superpower intervention.

Post-Cold War instability between 1990 and 1994 led to huge UN peacekeeping operations and the cost of these operations increased with time. Troop strength burgeoned from about 12 000 to well over 70 000, with costs growing from half a billion dollars to over three billion. This gave a new role to peace forces for example combat conditions, combined with hostility towards the UN from at least one of the parties (in contrast with the consent and co-operation on which traditional peacekeeping operations were based), led to the partial or limited use of enforcement action in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN. It is against this background that the generations of peacekeeping will be examined

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2.2.2. First Generation Peacekeeping Operations

These are typical of the first forty years of UN peacekeeping (five are still in operation).

It calls for the interposition of a force after a truce has been reached. They are characterized by unarmed or lightly armed troops deployed to stabilize cease-fires between the regular armies of states, while a political solution to the conflict are being sought. These operations are predicated on the consent of the warring parties, and dependent for success on the neutrality and impartiality of a UN force, which would only use arms to defend their lives or their mandate.

First generation peacekeeping operations were designed to respond to interstate crisis. According to F.T.Liu monitoring, consent, neutrality, non use of force and unarmed peacekeepers were the principles and practices of this operations which constituted a stable and interdependent combination.

2.2.3. Second Generation Peacekeeping Operations.

These were conceived during the termination of the Cold War. It presented the opportunity to end proxy Cold War conflicts through negotiated settlements. The second generational peacekeeping relied heavily on the consent of parties. The UN or other multinational organizations guided the adversaries to political settlements based on compromise (Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique and Angola). The UN became involved in ending internal conflicts through a multi dimensional process that included activities such as the separation of combatants; the disarmament of irregular forces; the demobilisation and transformation of regular and irregular forces into a unified army; the establishment of new policing systems; and the monitoring of elections for new governments.

2.2.4. Third Generation Peacekeeping Operations

Third generation operations operate with Chapter VII mandate without a comprehensive agreement reflecting parties' acquiescence. They see United Nations sponsored and sanctioned forces deployed with robust mandates and are prepared to move to peace enforcement where necessary. It requires strong leadership, domestic political support and proper preparations for the complex task of peace enforcement.

These operations were precipitated by the resurgence of more primordial animosities, which had been suppressed, rather than addressed, during the Cold War, leading to conflicts marked by the most despicable abuses of human rights in the midst of anarchic conditions.

Peacekeeping operations are launched where there is no peace to keep, but where there is a strong international desire to support humanitarian assistance efforts while attempts are made to find a political solution to the conflict.

The efforts of the peacekeeping mission are thus focused on the more limited objective of providing humanitarian relief, rather than the brokering of a comprehensive settlement. Consent may be absent because authority has collapsed, or be meaningless because of a proliferation of groups claiming authority; agreements are non-existent or worthless, and international law and conventions are openly flouted. The two most salient (and often cited) examples of this type of operation are those conducted in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, while the Rwandan mission is recognized as the most obvious failure.

2.2.5. Hybrid peacekeeping Missions

Throughout the 1990s, there have been several variants of hybrid peacekeeping missions

Peacekeeping is evolving rapidly, as is the strategic environment in which it occurs.

Changing patterns of conflict, changing major power relations and the evolving structure of regional security arrangements shape the evolution of UN peacekeeping. Already the post-Cold War era has seen at least three phases of UN peacekeeping evolution.

New generation of missions, involving new sets of responsibilities, especially in the civilian, post-conflict sphere, and new actors, often in partnership arrangements have also formed what can be termed as 'hybrid' missions. Changing strategic environments has caused peacekeeping to evolve creating a new generation of 'hybrid' missions.

These hybrid missions can be categorized in terms of the formal relationships between the sponsoring operations, including integrated, coordinated, parallel and sequential operations or by the functional features of the mission, which themselves can be divided into short-term military support.

Several hybrid operations, for a limited time period, have provided enhanced military support to an existing or newly deploying UN operation. These include: the UK bilateral operation in Sierra Leone that bolstered UNAMSIL when it was under threat in 2000; the EU Operation Artemis in Bunia, the D.R. Congo, which enabled the expansion of MONUC; the US-supported ECOWAS force in Liberia in 2003, which paved the way for the arrival of UNMIL. The relationships between UNITAF and UNISOM I in Somalia had a similar relationship.

There is also Linked Peacekeeping-Observer Operations— where the UN and another operation provide a combination of peacekeeping and observer capacities in separate but coordinated commands. The two clear examples of this are UNOMIG, where the UN provides an observer force alongside the CIS peacekeeping force; and UNMEE, where the AU provides an observer force alongside the UN peacekeeping force. A similar arrangement held in Rwanda where the OAU deployed NMOG alongside UNOMUR.

Thirdly there is Hand over Operations— where the UN precedes or follows a regional or multi-national force operation. Clear examples of this include the move from the OSCE's KVM in Kosovo to NATO and, in turn, to the UN; and the transfer from ECOWAS to UNOMSIL in Sierra Leone in 1998, Artemis-MONUC also involved handovers of

responsibilities, as did the US-led MNF for Haiti in 1994, which was followed by the UN's Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).

2.2.6 Conclusion

There seem to be no major conceptual problems with the future conduct of the first two peacekeeping categories, although financing and the willingness of member states to contribute personnel is increasingly a major problem. First generation operations are conducted according to an unambiguous set of principles, which have evolved through four decades of UN experience. A pool of appropriate and viable doctrine has also developed over the past five years for the successful conduct of second generation, or 'wider' peacekeeping operations. It is the third category that creates headaches at the conceptual and operational level. The fundamental problem is the absence of, or ambivalent consent, the conceptual cornerstone of the first two categories of peacekeeping operations. Where the consent of one or more conflicting parties is lacking, agreements are broken, and force is used against peacekeepers, which necessitates at least a limited application of the type of enforcement actions authorized by Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Munro has described the process as follows: *"Where suffering is the consequence of conflict, a military presence dedicated to keeping the peace and to the protection of relief operations can find itself all too often drawn into confrontation with one or more of the warring factions. At this point its impartiality is called into question and its capacity for deterrence through its presence alone starts to lose credibility. Peacekeeping starts to become transformed into peace enforcement, a role requiring the enhancement of military capability to a force level which the international community is today showing itself loath to contemplate."*⁴⁷.

2.3. Emerging Challenges of Peacekeeping in Post-2000.

The UN has often found itself unable to respond effectively to peacekeeping challenges in situations where at least one of the parties was not seriously committed to ending the conflict.

There are numerous challenges facing the African continent in its attempt to manage its own conflict through peacekeeping in the Post 2000.

The timely passing of a Security Council Resolution and the quick response of member nations are important preconditions for successful peacekeeping operation. Security Council resolutions are wordy and at times not exactly to the point and clauses in the mandate can not be executed with the number of troops available in some cases

Following the Post 2000 experiences on United Nations peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and Democratic Republic Congo are indicators of the some of the difficulties in its implementation. The commitment gap in terms of political will between undertakings of states in the Security Council Resolution and resources they are willing to devote remains a crucial problem.

The interest of actors in the conflict is also another emerging challenge within the African context. There are always actors who profit economically and or by gaining power from a sustained level of tension and who are bent in disrupting the peace process.

Shift in mandate of an ongoing peacekeeping operation is also another threat. Peacekeeping operations initiated under coalition will slowly face challenges due to shifting conditions in their environment for example the dynamic situation on the ground

varying all the time with different mission task in different areas of the country. This case is evidenced in the case of DR Congo where the 6000 MONUC peacekeepers were deployed with different task for example 740 deployed in Kinshasa and 800 in Ituri as neutral forces.

Economic constraint or financial limitation can pose a major challenge to the success of any peacekeeping. Operation. Unsecure funding can also limit the activities of the force making it to select certain task and concentrate on particular regions instead of pursuing the entire mandate as defined. Organizations like African Union and SADC have not ventured fully into peacekeeping due to lack of funds. Willingness of the member states to honour their obligation financially is still a problem since there is no other way the peacekeeping operations can be supported other than from contributions of all members of the United Nations.

Logistical problem is also another difficulty encountered. Military history shows that it is upon sound logistics that any operation depends for success. Most developing countries have fragile economies. They can hardly look after their own domestic problems let alone stock-piling stores and equipment for peacekeeping operations. Contingents from such countries arrive to the mission's area with only personal gear, weapons or in some cases can only manage little office equipment, field cookers among others. However major and expensive items such as vehicles, communication equipment are above their economic means.

There is also the aspect of the United Nations lacking expertise in the distribution systems for example some equipment could be in excess in one mission area and lacking

to keep their assignment on course. These lapses in logistics can be attributed to be the cause of failures recorded in most of the United Nations missions.

Lack of information and intelligence, can lead to or hamper security forces engagement in the operation. A Fragmentized information system has characterized most peacekeeping operations within the African continent for example poor coordination and suspicion between peacekeepers and civil society at times hinders sharing of information. Peacekeeping operation may also be reluctant to share information with other actors in the country for fear of compromising operational sources.

African Organization are also still not capable of conducting operations without external support, their missions still need skilled troops, observers and civilian police. Increasingly peacekeeping have been deployed in internal wars or complex situation of civil and international war.

Peacekeeping operations are also taking up tasks that are beyond their scope. Peacekeeping may now protect relief shipment, provide services to victims, respond to refugee needs, enforce embargoes, remove mines and seek to disarm warring parties.

Many peacekeeping operations also currently involve a large civilian dimension, encompassing election monitoring, Human Rights verification, humanitarian relief, administrative management, institution building and restoration of infrastructure services.

Rules of engagements governing the use of force have also been strengthened allowing peacekeepers in missions where this is warranted to use all the necessary means to protect civilians in their immediate vicinity and prevent violence against UN staff and personnel.

Sale and smuggling of weapons and ammunition through neighboring states to the one in conflict is also a major challenge. Many conflicts in Africa witnessed continuous flow of weapons and ammunitions, which in turn prolongs the conflict.

The major focused on peacekeeping issues rather than conflict prevention or peace building has also been a major challenge.

2.4. Conclusion

Peacekeeping can help if it reduces the parties' fear of victimization by providing security, improves the flow of information to prevent the political manipulation of fear by elite, facilitate the negotiation and implementation of a ceasefire, reassure parties of each other compliance with the terms of a negotiated settlement, identifies, moderates and offer them inducement to cooperate in building participatory political institutions.

International context of the implementation of peacekeeping challenges is slightly different from the 2000 report context in that without the renewed commitment on the part of member states, significant institutional change and increased financial support, executing critical peacekeeping and peace building task will be difficult. The United Nations is heavily dependent on the willingness and ability of member states to empower it. Secondly it must be emphasized than even though UN Peacekeeping troops are deployed into a conflict zone, in the final analysis politics takes its course.

CHAPTER 3

3.0 Case Studies of Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone

Overview

This chapter will discuss the contemporary intra-state conflict in perspective in general and two case studies trying to draw attention the various processes, issues, challenges that affect peacekeeping operations of these countries. It will give over view of the two conflicts and conditions that led to formation of the peacekeeping operation.

3.1. Contemporary Intra- State Conflict in Perspective

Most conflicts after Cold War are internal. New generation of conflicts besides being intra-state in character, have also changed in pattern of external involvement in African conflicts.

These conflicts have been guided by several factors like struggle for reform and transformation of political systems and changing the political process from an overtly exclusion system to more inclusive system.i.e from authoritarian to democratic system.

Secondly ethnic and religious competition and the struggle to redefine power sharing mechanism have shaped the minds of people hence people challenge ways in which they are governed and denial of access to economic and political power, disputes over land boundaries between communities.

During the Cold War, systemic or global were the major focus of scholarly work. This in turn led to focus on interstate wars and the vast majority of the studies centered on

strategic studies issues, nuclear deterrence and balances of power, alliances and arms race as well as the incidence, frequency and duration of interstate wars.

A shift of focus has occurred in explaining these conflicts. Analysts and policy makers have turned away from the systemic level analysis and began to focus on local actors and local situations to better understand the reasons behind these conflicts. This shift in focus has strongly influenced the development of conflict types by analyst seeking to clarify the nature of issues in conflict.

The causes of conflicts have in fact become the most invoked typology and as Singer points out within these territory, ideology, dynasty, legitimacy, religion, language, ethnicity, self-determination, resources, markets, dominance, equality and of course revenge are found.

To a large extent this explains the plethora of definitions that now exist for contemporary wars and the relentless search for the formula applicable for all. Ethnic conflicts became the most prevalent term in the beginning of the 1990s, and last resort in explaining the contemporary social conflicts. There have been two main scholarly approaches to ethnicity. On one hand ethnicity is considered a primordial or inherited group characteristics that some scholars would argue is biologically based. On the other hand ethnicity has been conceptualised as an instrument, a contextual, fluid, and negotiable aspect of identity, "a tool used by individuals, groups or elites to obtain some large, typically material end."

According to Timothy Sisk ethnic identity wax and wane, contingent on a wide variety of variables, including the capacity and skills of political entrepreneurs who can effectively mobilize groups for collective aims and articulate beliefs about common ancestry and destiny.

According to structuralist ethnic identity is socially constructed, often created or de-emphasised by power seeking political elites in historically determined economic and social arrangement.

The distinction made above to some extent may appear academic but the extent to which scholars see ethnicity as immutable and innate versus socially constructed influences beliefs about the type of political system that can best ameliorate conflict along ethnic lines. In this context contemporary analysis has gradually realised that they can be describing the same thing.

According to Lake and Rothchild ethnicity is not something that can be decided by individuals at will but is embedded within and controlled by the larger society and therefore it can only be understood within relational framework.

Consequently it becomes important that the conflict researcher critically analyses situations that may be described by participants and outsiders as ethnic conflicts. This includes understanding that basic human needs, identity, and ethnic identity is fluid, malleable constructed and negotiable.

To Ted Gurr, cultural identity may be stronger and more enduring than most other collective identities and it is most likely provide the basis for political mobilization and conflict when it provides a basis for invidious distinctions among people.

Contemporary conflicts are also influenced by economic agendas. Recently studies have shown that there is a role played by resource at the onset and continuation of violent conflicts. Rupsinghe and Anderlini for example considers that stagnation and protracted income decline in poor and middle-income countries (as is the case of Algeria, Sierra Leone and Liberia), unequal growth and an equal distribution of resources and changing distribution of resources may act as a trigger of violent conflict. Higher per capita incomes reduces the duration of civil war and the probability of its occurrence. Civil war is overwhelmingly a phenomenon of low-income countries.

According to resource proposition groups engaged in violent conflicts are motivated essentially by economic agenda hence could be perceived as greedy. To this end rebels will conduct a civil war if the perceived benefits outweigh the cost of rebellion.

As regards natural resources, it can be argued that possession of natural resources initially increases the duration and the risk of civil war but then reduces it because of the taxable base of the economy constituting an attraction for rebels wishing to capture the state.

The conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been an ethnic war, but also a war over mineral resources. The DRC has vast wealth of minerals, particularly diamonds, coltan, cassiterite, tin, and copper. Coltan, (short for Columbite-tantalite), is essential for the power-storing parts of cell phones, nuclear reactors, Play Stations, and

computer chips. Coltan is increasingly exploited in the mountains in the conflict torn eastern part of the country. The Rwanda and Uganda backed rebels have primary control over the ore and are reaping huge profits, which maintain and finance the protracted war.

Analysts have also argued that countries with larger population have higher risk of war and that these wars last longer for example Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo. Population size also affects rebel movement coordination and that highly fractionalised societies are more prone to war than highly homogeneous.

War enhances the opportunistic character in business affecting business practices. It increases criminality-affecting assets holding and forcing people to send their assets abroad, markets become disrupted, information is unreliable and costly.

According to Vivienne Jabri war is a multicausal phenomenon, where different causal sequences may apply in different conflict situations and also as a result of decision making paths which far from suggesting rationality as defined by strict criteria of consistency, point to the view that rationality is bounded by institutional roles and established norms which impact upon the informational and analytical loops which actors may go through prior to the onset of war.

From the above analysis intra state wars have actors in those conflicts ranging from conventional armies, to paramilitary units, local warlords, mercenary groups or even criminal gangs.

Analysts tend to increasingly turn to the state level analysis in particular to the groups in the conflicts and their claims. Analysts of these conflicts need to begin at unit level

analysis by looking at conflict groups themselves. In this respect Ronald Fisher posits that it follows that the central unit analysis in these conflicts is the *identity group* (sic) defined in ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic, or other terms for it is through identity that compelling human needs are expressed in social and often in political terms. Communal identity is dependent upon satisfaction of basic needs for security, recognition and distributive justice.⁴⁸

According to Edward Azar, the sources of these conflicts are the denial of those elements required in the development of all peoples and societies and whose pursuit is a compelling need to all. These are security, distinctive identity, social recognition of identity, and effective participation in the process that determine conditions of security and identity.

Mitchell points out that conflicts are not static phenomena and hence the dynamic aspects of conflict, which alter both structure and interplay relationship over time are essential aspects of any satisfactory analysis.

Luis Kriesberg in social conflict introduces a behavioural perspective by looking at social conflict as a social relationship. To him at every stage of conflict the parties interact socially, each party affect the way the others act, not only as each group respond to others but also as each may anticipate in the responses of the others. Furthermore, Kriesberg emphasises that any conflict situation will be the result of many interlocking conflict.

From the above intra-state wars will be characterized by wars whose intractability stemmed from more dynamic factors like: Weakness or collapse of a state, which

necessarily leads to diffusion of violence, Proliferation of warring parties which entails shifting alliances and complicates the search for comprehensive settlement, Development of a resource- based war economy that raises the stakes while increasing means to continue fighting, Existence of regional linkages that add another dimension to the conflict and broaden the number of stakeholders and Resilience to peacemaking efforts as shown by a number of past failed agreements

3.2 Case Study of Democratic Republic of Congo – MONUC

3.2.1. Overview of the Congo Conflict

DRC is one of Africa's biggest countries with a population of more than 45 million. It is one of the best examples to depict a complex emergency. After capturing Kinshasa from Mobutu Sese Seko in May 1997 the newly proclaimed president of the DRC and leader of the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Kinshasa, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, was unable to establish his authority over the entire country, especially in the east.

Although the rebel advance across the DRC slowed towards the end of 1998, the rebels won an important battle on 12 October with the fall of Kindu, a town in the eastern part of the DRC. This situation specifically demonstrated the rebels' strength as the Rwandan and Ugandan-backed Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie¹³ (RCD) deployed some 9 000 troops against around 6 000 on the government side.

It is evident that the DRC government lost control of a considerable part of its territories. This is an important feature of a complex emergency. Shortly after Kabila's victory over

Mobutu Sese Seko it became clear that Kabila's forces were too weak to control the whole country. In fact, Kabila's forces became almost wholly dependent on assistance from Angolan, Zimbabwean and Namibian forces who engaged in the conflict in support of the DRC leader in August 1998. In 1999, it was estimated that the rebels controlled almost 40 per cent of DRC territory.

It can also be pointed out that the population of the DRC has been suffering. This is typical of a complex emergency. In terms of human security, the situation in the DRC has become unsafe for a large part of the local population. Earlier reports indicated an estimated 660 000 internally displaced people and an estimated 117 000 DRC refugees in the Central African Republic, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.

It should be clear that the conflict in the DRC over the past years has been more complex than mere fighting between a government and a single rebel group. At least three rebel groups have been operating in the DRC since 1997, not only and always against the Kabila government and its allies (Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola), but against one another as well. In short, the RCD was the largest group, but it has split into two factions. One faction is led by the original leader Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, based in Kisangani (the third largest city in the DRC) and backed by Uganda, which wants to put pressure on Kabila to step down or secure its border.

The other is led by Emile Ilunga, who has been elected by the RCD to replace Wamba dia Wamba. Based in Goma, in Kivu, Ilunga is backed by Rwanda whose main concern is the interests of Tutsis. The third rebel group, the Mouvement de Libération Congolais (MLC)

is led by Jean-Pierre Bemba and mainly operates in the northern parts of the country. This group is also backed by Uganda (for the same reason as above).

Various armed groups or tribal militias who oppose Tutsi dominance, such as the Mai-Mai in south Kivu and the Wangilima in north Kivu further complicate the situation. In addition, there is the Union pour la Démocracie et le Progrès Social, which has been the best-supported opposition party over the past decade. Its leader, Ettiene Tshisekedi, seeks negotiations between all parties as well as the withdrawal of foreign troops. Finally, violent clashes in Kisangani between former allies, Uganda and Rwanda, have added further fuel to the crisis in the DRC.

3.2.2 Background to the DR Congo Conflict

From 1874-1908, the DRC was recognized as Congo Free State, then a private concession of King Leopold II, King of Belgium. In 1908 the DRC became an official colony of Belgium. In June 1960 DRC became independent, with Patrice Emery Lumumba as the prime minister and Joseph Kasavubu, as the first president.

Lumumba was assassinated shortly thereafter and the country experienced a series of rebellions and secessionist movements. After the second parliamentary general election, colonel Mobutu Sese Seko successfully organized a coup and assumed power, with the support from United States in the newly renamed Zaire. He ruled for 32 years

In 1997 Mobutu regime was overthrown by an alliance nominally under the leadership of Laurent Desire Kabila backed by a number of other governments. Laurent Kabila was

consequently assassinated in January 2001 and replaced by his son, Joseph Kabila, as president of the DRC.

From the above DRC has engaged in many wars since its independence in 1960. Most wars are linked to the external exploitation of its colossal natural resources.

The misuse of Congolese resources remains one of the constant parameters in analysis of the various violent episodes that have shaped the DRC as a state from slave trade to the Mobutu regime, from King Leopold II exploitation of rubber for the Belgian colonial system, to copper after independence and coltan in recent years.

The disruption of the Congo affecting mainly Eastern part of DRC began with the exodus of some 1.2million Hutu refugees across the border from Rwanda, following the capture of Kigali by the Tutsi-led Rwanda Patriotic Front in July 1994. Among the refugees that fled into Zaire at the time were many members defeated Rwandan army (Forces Armies Rwandaise or FAR) and Hutu militias (Interahamwe) who had perpetrated the mass killing of some 800,000 Tutsi.

The presence of refugees into Zaire created a new security risk along the border between the DRC and Rwanda, since it altered the existing demographic dynamic and ethnic balance in the eastern part of the Congo. It can be argued that the refugee crisis of 1994-95 exported the Rwandan ethnic and political conflict to Zaire greatly contributed to the further escalation of the conflict in the DRC.

During the early 1990s a number of clashes occurred along the eastern border between Zaire and Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda, primarily between communities of Tutsi origin (Banyamulenge) resident in Zaire and local communities of other ethnic origin.

Zaire's internal conflict dynamics were thus reinforced by the influx of the large number of Rwandan refugee and armed Hutus, exacerbating tension between Hutus and Tutsis in the North Kivu, as well as between the local population and the Banyamulenge Tutsis of South Kivu. Many localized conflicts between various communities (such as the Hema/Lendu/Ngiti in the Oriental Province, Banyamulenge and Bembe/Fulero/Vira in the South Kivu province) also emerged.

The war in Zaire intensified in the 1996 between the Zairian forces of Mobutu and the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL). At the time the AFDL, a rebel movement was led by Laurent Desire Kabila and supported by Angola, Rwanda and Uganda. The AFDL was formed as a response to plans by the central government to take away the Zairian citizenship of the Banyamulenge, at the time when President Mobutu tried to tap into local ethnic resentments in order to shore up his influence in the east. The announced restrictions on the peoples of Tutsi descent-who had lived in DRC for generations acted as a major triggering event and provided the opportunity to recruit armed rebel movement that galvanized the Tutsi and other groups in opposition to Mobutus government in Kinshasa.

Kabila received direct and indirect support from neighbouring countries, including Angola, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Eritrea, while the Rwandan military forces prominently provided aid and direction to rebellion that included Tutsis and other

discontented groups. Clearly, Rwanda's primary rationale for its support to the rebellion was to press into eastern Zaire in order to rid the area of all Interahamwe and ex-FAR forces who had fled Rwanda after the genocide but continued to create instability in their home country. Rwanda had objected to Mobutus policy of tolerating the Hutu militant camps.

This new wave of rebellion added another dimension to the conflict in the DRC that, from its original focus on the East, developed into a national war of rebellion aimed at the overthrow of Mobutus regime in Kinshasa. The campaign of AFDL proved successful and, in May 1997, its troops took over Kinshasa shortly after Mobutu fled the country. Laurent Kabila soon announced that Zaire would henceforth be known as The Democratic Republic of Congo.

In October 1996, attacks by Tutsi-led militias supported by the Rwandan army on Hutu refugee camps created further refugee flows. While some returned to their home countries, large numbers-and, in particular, armed Hutu insurgents-marched further into Zaire and became victims of the militias fighting under the flag of the AFDL.

In August 1998, fighting erupted again in the northern, eastern and western parts of the DRC, this time between the Congolese forces under Laurent Kabila and several rebel factions. Violence in the DRC soon dragged in a number of other countries as each side gained support from allied governments in the neighbouring or nearby countries. In particular, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Sudan and Chad initially backed Kabila while Rwanda and Uganda had been aiding the rebel factions.

Although Sudan, Chad and Namibia had withdrawn their troops from Congolese territory, this phase of war saw the dramatic escalation and regionalisation of conflict and polarization in the central Africa region.

The fighting challenged the central government. There was no difference realized during Laurent Kabila's regime. In addition, the relations between Kabila and the governments of Rwanda and Uganda had also begun to deteriorate, as they felt that he was unable to pacify rebel movements based in the eastern Congo.

Rwanda and Uganda had started working with the new rebel forces, with the intention to create a buffer zone in the highly volatile eastern Congo in order to contain the continuing problem of insurgencies into north-west Rwanda and north-west Uganda from the Congolese territory. In this context, the claim was made by Rwanda that Kabila was not containing the Hutu, Interahamwe but, in fact, contributing to their arming and training.

In the mid-1999, the rebel movement had managed to capture one-third of the DRC, thereby installing a new balance of power in a country, which was now divided into certain occupation zones. The rebel movement that had formed a political party to present their demands (e.g. Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie, or RCD) split into three main factions in June 1999, supported by Rwanda and Uganda. In particular, they differed in terms of their willingness to pursue negotiations or to continue fighting. Moreover, the rapid military gains by the rebels-especially by August 1998-prompted a series of peace initiatives which provided the background for the signature of the Lusaka

Accords of July 1999, currently being implemented in the DRC and the region through various additional agreements and instruments such as MONUC.

The Post Cold War conflicts in DR Congo have come to be associated with periods of domestic, economic and political liberation and to reflect the impact of rapid democratization in weak states.

Proliferating conflicts in central Africa can also be perceived to reveal how internal conflict can generate armed forces that in the absence of effective national and regional conflict settlement mechanisms can export as well as nurture violence in neighbouring countries, for example during 1994-1995 in the DRC, when there was influx of Hutu refugees who had been pushed out of Rwanda after the genocide.

The Interahamwe and ex-FAR forces were continued to launch insurgencies into Rwanda in order to reinstate a Hutu government. The presence of Interahamwe and ex-FAR in the camp had negative effect within Zaire and in turn renewed internal ethnic clashes and hatred.

Absence of effective regional interstate mechanisms has also contributed to the further escalation of conflict in the DRC especially in 1998. Other factors contributing to escalation of DRC conflict include arms proliferation and the instrumental exploitation of ethnicity leading to ethnic alliances both at national and regional levels.

The inflow of refugees can be argued to threaten the existing social, ethnic and political balance and in this sense provide a breeding ground for radical groups preparing the overthrow of neighbouring government, while itself become a target for militias or army.

Cooperation and competition particularly in the exploitation of natural resources have also contributed to the clashes over interest. This is particularly evident during the 1994-1995, parties to the conflict especially neighbouring states tried to gain access to the large natural resources of the DRC through their presence and engagement in the territory.

It is therefore right to conclude that internal conflict in which the neighbouring states overtly or covertly interferes in a partisan way, escalation or conflict is almost inevitable.

3.2.3. The Process leading to Peacekeeping Mandates and Execution.

A Peacekeeping Operation is normally envisaged within the framework of African crises. This is depicted by the political, administrative and economic structures of a state failing or may no longer be in existence. Such states will be characterized by scene of internal conflict, thousand of civilian victims, large number of refugees outside the country or displaced persons within its borders.

Peacekeeping has been important mechanism of conflict resolution in Africa. Peacekeeping involves deployment of troops by the UN or by regional organizations such as the African Union (AU), ECOWAS and the SADC, or even individual neighbouring countries. In most cases the process of peacekeeping follows the signing of the peace agreement in order to foresee its implementation and prevent the re-eruption of the conflict.

3.2.3.1. Lusaka Peace Agreement

The peacemaking process began at the outset of DRC war before many interlocutors understood the dynamics of the conflict.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo and five regional States that is Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999 for cessation of hostilities between all belligerent forces in Democratic Republic of Congo. This sought to put heavy burden on the United Nations peacekeeping force.

The Agreement made provisions on the normalization of the situation along the DRC border and its neighbours; the control of illicit trafficking of arms and the infiltration of armed groups; the holding of a national dialogue on the future government of DRC; the need to address security concerns; and the establishment of a mechanism for disarming militias and armed groups. It also provided for a Joint Military Commission (JMC) composed of two representatives from each party.

The Joint Military Commission (JMC) representing all the signatories was established under ceasefire agreement to regulate and monitor the cessation of hostilities until the United Nation peacekeeping mission was deployed.

3.2.4. Decision Making Process for Peacekeeping Operation.

The Charter of the United Nations gives the UN Security Council the power and responsibility to take collective action to maintain international peace and security. For this reason, the international community usually looks to the Security Council to authorize peacekeeping operations. In other cases, where direct UN involvement is not considered appropriate or feasible, the Council authorizes regional organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Economic Community of West African States or coalitions of willing countries to implement certain peacekeeping or peace enforcement functions.

When the DRC conflict was perceived to constitute a threat to regional peace and security, the Security Council reaffirmed the need for all States to refrain from interference in each other's internal affairs and called for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of foreign forces.

The Council noted the need for national reconciliation respectful of the equality and harmony of all ethnic groups and leading to democratic elections hence set up MONUC on 30 November 1999, incorporating UN personnel authorized in earlier resolutions.

MONUC authorized maximum strength comprising military personnel: 16,700, civilian police personnel 475, civilian personnel include specialist in human rights, humanitarian affairs, public information, child protection, political affairs medical and administrative support.

Current strength as at 30th November 2004 is 11,570 total uniformed personnel including 10,848 troops, 567 military observer, 155 civilian police supported by 707 international civilian personnel and 1135 local civilian staff.

3.2.5. Nature of the peacekeeping

The primary objective of peacekeeping is restoration of public order and prohibiting the conflicting parties from escalating the conflict.

MONUC has been carrying out its work in four phases. The mandate of this UN peacekeeping force was to help implement Lusaka Peace Agreement. This was to be carried out through working with the JMC and OAU to implement the agreement,

observing and monitoring the cessation of hostilities, investigating violation of the ceasefire and taking necessary measures to ensure compliance.

In the first phase it involved deployment of military observers (MILOBs) and liaison officers. The end of 2000 completed this phase. Other tasks included supervising the disengagement of forces and redeployment of forces to defensive positions in conflict zones, providing and maintaining humanitarian assistance, protecting displaced persons, refugees, scheduling and supervising the withdrawal of foreign forces with JMC and OAU

During the second phase 2001-2002 new ceasefire lines were drawn and completed. During the third phase 2003, the mission has been monitoring and verifying the ceasefire lines using 90 MILOB teams. The third phase has mainly been concerned with the DDRRR programme.

The DDRRR means disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of the armed forces in the DRC. This constitutes the main focus of the MONUC during the third phase. Arising out of the objectives of the third phase the strength of the MONUC's force was raised from 4,250 to 8,700 by December 2002.

The authorized strength set in January 2002 was only 5,537. The strength was raised to that level in order to enable the mission extend its activities to eastern Congo where the situation is very complex as noted earlier.

The implementation of the DDRRR is carried out not by the MONUC alone but through coordination with various governments, UN agencies and NGOs. However, in carrying out its activities the MONUC has been experiencing a number of problems.

The fourth phase of the MONUC carried out during 2004. The main objective of this phase was to ensure transition to peace building. This involved the process of reintegration of the armed forces and establishment of a new national army. However, success of the fourth phase greatly depended on success of the third phase. It has been observed that the successful implementation of the DDRRR process is critical to building peace in the DRC and the whole Great Lakes Region.

3.2.6. The Mandates of the peacekeeping

MONUC was mandated among others to develop an action plan for the overall implementation of ceasefire agreement by all with particular emphasis on the objectives.

According to Security Council resolution 1291 (2000) of 24 February 2000: MONUC, in cooperation with the joint Military Commission (JMC), had the following mandate:

To monitor the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and investigate violations of the ceasefire; To establish and maintain continuous liaison with the headquarters of all the parties military forces; To develop, within 45 days of adoption of resolution 1291, an action plan for the overall implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement with particular emphasis on the following key objectives: the collection and verification of military information on the parties forces, the maintenance of the cessation of hostilities and the

disengagement and redeployment of the parties' forces, the comprehensive disarmament, demobilization, resettlement and reintegration of all members of all armed groups.

To work with the parties to obtain the release of all prisoners of war, military captives and remains in cooperation with international humanitarian agencies; To supervise and verify the disengagement and redeployment of the parties' forces. To monitor compliance with the provision of the Ceasefire Agreement on the supply of ammunition, weaponry and other war-related materiel to the field, including to all armed groups. To facilitate humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring, with particular attention to vulnerable groups including women, children and demobilized child soldiers.

Acting under chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council also decided that MONUC may take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions and as it deems it within its capabilities, to protect United Nations and co-located JMC personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.

Further by its resolution 1565 (2004) of 1 October 2004, The Council decided that MONUC would have the following mandate: To deploy and maintain a presence in the key areas of potential volatility in order to promote the re-establishment of confidence, to discourage violence. To ensure the protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel, under imminent threat of physical violence, To ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel.

To establish the necessary operational links with the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), and with the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi, in order to coordinate efforts towards monitoring and discouraging cross-border movements of combatants between the two countries, To monitor the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 20 of resolution 1493 of 28 July 2003, including on the lakes, in cooperation with ONUB and, as appropriate, with the Governments concerned and with the group of experts referred to in paragraph 10 of resolution 1533 of 12 March 2004, including by inspecting, as it deems it necessary and without notice, the cargo of aircraft and of any transport vehicle using the ports, airports, airfields, military bases and border crossings in North and South Kivu and in Ituri,

To seize or collect, as appropriate, arms and any related materiel whose presence in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo violates the measures imposed by paragraph 20 of resolution 1493 and dispose of such arms and related materiel as appropriate, To observe and report in a timely manner, on the position of armed movements and groups, and the presence of foreign military forces in the key areas of volatility, especially by monitoring the use of landing strips and the borders, in particular on the lakes.

The Council decided that MONUC would also have the following mandate, in support of the Government of National Unity and Transition: To support operations to disarm foreign combatants led by the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including by undertaking the steps listed in paragraph 75, subparagraphs (b), (c), (d) and (e) of the Secretary-General's third special report, To facilitate the demobilization and

voluntary repatriation of the disarmed foreign combatants and their dependants, To contribute to the disarmament portion of the national programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of Congolese combatants and their dependants, in monitoring the process and providing as appropriate security in some sensitive locations, To contribute to the successful completion of the electoral process stipulated in the Global and All Inclusive Agreement, by assisting in the establishment of a secure environment for free, transparent and peaceful elections to take place.

Other emerging new mandates include promoting peace and security in the east involving performing many different tasks for MONUC like enforcing arms embargo, mediating local conflicts, ensuring DDRRR/DDR, and promoting the normalization of regional relations.

Under Resolution 1493 (2003) the Security Council assigned MONUC task of enforcing the arms embargo which is probably the most difficult task given the resources, vastness and inaccessibility of the area. MONUC tried to fulfill the mandate through systematic and proactive manner. They covered as many entry points as possible combining both ground and air patrols.

In local conflicts resolution efforts MONUC approached this in two levels. At tactical level, it monitors and verifies the Bujumbura ceasefire agreement, and at political level it takes the initiative of easing tension between the Mayi Mayi and RCD-K-ML (Lubero area), the Mayi Mayi and RCD-Goma (Bukavu area), and RCD-Goma and Interahamwe (Goma area).

The disarmament and repatriation of non-Congolese combatants remains one of the key objectives of MONUC.

3.2.7. Key factors explaining success and failure of MONUC

There are several factors explaining failure of the MONUC. These include poor logistical facilities particularly transport infrastructure. The DRC is a very large country, the third largest from Libya and Sudan. Other forms of infrastructure such as education, health and water supply forms of infrastructure were not developed. The MONUC has, therefore, mainly been depending on expensive air transport.

The second problem has been the principle of voluntarism in carrying out the DDRRR Programme. This means, for instance that armed groups have to be disarmed on voluntary basis. Those that are not willing cannot be disarmed. Some leaders of military groups would like to continue fighting.

The third factor involves the complexity of some of the armed groups. For instance the Interahamwe forces require identifying the masterminds of the Rwanda genocide of 1994 and those of the lower ranks who were also involved in the genocides. There are also normal refugees not involved in the genocide. All these different groups need different modes of repatriation. Some need to be sent to the Arusha UN tribunal, others to be repatriated to a third country, while others notably normal refugees to be repatriated to Rwanda for resettlement.

The major factor affecting MONUC is illicit exploitation of resources of the DR Congo. This should be ended and the resources including mineral wealth be directed towards the

development of its people. Congo is said to be leading in terms richness of economic resources in Africa including mineral, agricultural and forest resources.

Congo is rich in a variety of minerals. It has the largest river basin in the world. Its vast thick equatorial forests are among the leading rich timber resources in the World. Thus the potential for fast socio-economic development is very high. This is also a factor that has prolonged the conflict since there are people who benefit from such practice.

3.2.8. Major Challenges of the Peacekeeping Operation. (MONUC)

The U.N. mission in Congo faces challenges as the transition period comes to an end. The Kinshasa government still does not have political and security control outside the capital, especially in the eastern part of the country. In early June 2004, rebel groups led by General Laurent Nkunda and Colonel Jules Mutebutsi attacked and captured the eastern town of Bukavu, killing many civilians and forcing MONUC forces to flee the town.

The DRC government accused the Government of Rwanda of backing the rebels. Rwanda denied that its forces were involved in eastern Congo. The Bukavu incident intensified tensions between Rwanda and Congo and it seemed the DRC might once again plunge into a major conflict.

According to the Third Special Report of the Secretary General, "the atmosphere of mistrust among the parties has grown and the lack of political will of some influential players to implement the transitional agenda remains a serious hindrance to progress."⁴⁹

Organizing and conducting free and fair national elections in the absence of security in parts of DRC is also a major challenge facing MONUC.

The limited resources available to MONUC are directly linked to continued reluctance of the international community to fully commit to the Congolese peace process. Consequently, the UN operation suffers from inadequate means and has to prioritize its resources accordingly. Practical needs have to meet within the constraints of restrictive political decisions. Other UN initiatives, namely the UN Panel of Experts and the planned Great Lakes Conference face similar problems.

For the international community, the challenge is to become a decisive facilitator, balancing Congolese ownership and safeguarding international priorities such as human rights and regional stability. Moreover, although a transitional government is in place, the current situation remains fragile and potential spoilers might decide to return to violence

Lack of basic infrastructure could be a major challenge to the fragile Transitional Government. Moreover, lack of progress on the military integration of the various groups in the Transitional Government has raised serious concerns about lasting peace in Congo. Since the deployment of regional military commanders in late 2003, little progress has been made in force integration and other areas.

Another complicating factor for MONUC is how to deal with the Interahamwe militia and former Rwandan forces active in eastern Congo. MONUC does not have the mandate to disarm these militia groups, a major source of instability in the Congo. The government of President Kabila has been unable or unwilling to disarm the Interahamwe, and negotiations with neighboring countries to create a mechanism to deal with this problem have been stalled.

Mandate is ambiguous and open to interpretation. MONUC is a Chapter 6 operation with one Chapter 7 component that allows self-protection and limited protection for the civilian population. MONUC does not have the capacity to be able to ensure full protection of the civilian population in the DRC. MONUC troops currently deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are not equipped, trained or configured to intervene rapidly to assist those in need of such protection.”

The mandate is a function of what member states are likely to bear and what troop-donating countries are willing to commit to

3.2.9. Assessment or Impact of the Peacekeeping Operation (MONUC)

The United Nations Mission (MONUC) has achieved progress in the Democratic Republic of Congo. From a small observer mission in 2000, MONUC evolved to become first disengagement and monitoring mission, then assistance and verification mission for disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement programmes and now a complex mission tasked with facilitating the transitional process through national election in 2005.

Through maintaining contact with all its parties of transitional government MONUC has helped create an enabling environment for the adoption of key legislation related to the reforms of the army and police and competencies of the various ministries and transitional institutions.

Many parts of country is now at peace, and steps have been taken towards re-unification: the new national flag flies in territories formerly controlled by belligerents; the Congo

River has reopened to traffic; commercial airlines fly between Kinshasa and cities once under rebel control; postal and cellular phone networks have expanded. This has allowed MONUC, which has an authorized strength of 10,800 troops, to deploy contingents to the northeastern district of Ituri, where unrest continued in early 2004.

3.2.10. Recommendations

There is need for alignment of political will and resources to put an end to instability in Congo from the international community.

3.3. Case Study of Sierra Leone-UNAMSIL

3.3.1. Overview of the Sierra Leone Conflict.

The crisis in Sierra Leone is typical complex emergency. It began in March 1991, when Liberian warlord Charles Taylor armed a group of dissidents hit back at the Sierra Leonean government for allowing its territory to be used by Nigerian planes for bombing missions against the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).

The RUF was faced with weak and incoherent opposition from the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF), which it managed to overrun. The RUF then began seizing diamond-mining properties the main source of hard currency for the government. By 1995, RUF forces had effectively laid siege to the capital city of Freetown.

Anarchic conditions prevailed, with thousands of civilians being slaughtered, raped and maimed in a relatively short time — all in a bid to gain power through fear. In fact, the RUF became famous for its particular brutal practice of hacking off limbs in order to terrorize and subjugate the population.⁵⁰

The Sierra Leonean government then turned to Executive Outcomes; a South African based Private Military Company (PMC), to deploy its personnel in Sierra Leone against the RUF with effect from May 1995. By late 1995, the siege of Freetown had been lifted and the RUF headquarters to the east of Freetown had been destroyed. This paved the way for peace talks between the government and the RUF on 22 February 1996. Shortly after, on 26 and 27 February 1996, the people of Sierra Leone went to the polls, long before there was any sign of a firm cease-fire or peace agreement. After two rounds of voting, and amidst gross intimidation of the voter population, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People's Party emerged as President.

This came to an abrupt end on 25 May 1996 when Kabbah was violently overthrown in a typical coup d'état by Major Johnny Paul Koromah. The international community immediately responded with condemnation of the take-over. On 26 May 1996 the OAU also condemned the coup and called for the restoration of constitutional order in Sierra Leone.

Nigeria was especially swift to respond and took military action against the coup makers under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). ECOMOG's efforts to dislodge the junta were met with fierce resistance by Koromah's Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), but in February 1998, ECOMOG managed to stamp its authority on the situation. This led to the collapse of the junta and its expulsion from Freetown. Thus President Kabbah was returned to office.

However, ECOMOG couldn't establish its authority on the hinterland much beyond Freetown and rebels continued to brutalise and terrorize the local population. The situation devolved into a bloody and inconclusive enforcement engagement by the Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces.

In June 1998, the Security Council decided to establish the United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) for an initial period of six months. The mission had the task of monitoring and advising efforts to disarm the combatants and restructure Sierra Leone's security forces. By the end of August 1998, UNOMSIL had 40 military observers, a Chief Military Observer and a medical team of 15 personnel.

No meaningful progress could be made towards the UNOMSIL mandate in a highly unstable security environment. Fighting continued in Sierra Leone with the rebels exercising control of the countryside. Moreover, they controlled the diamond-mining areas that created most of Sierra Leone's wealth.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) also found it extremely difficult to support their peacekeeping forces due to the extreme financial drain on their fragile economies. Under these circumstances, the rebels began to retake Freetown and managed to overrun most of the city. In December 1998, all UNOMSIL personnel were evacuated.

The UN Special Representative then initiated a series of diplomatic efforts aimed at opening up dialogue with the rebels.

Negotiations between the government and the rebels started in May 1999 and on 7 July of that year all parties to the conflict signed a peace agreement in Lomé, Togo with a view to ending hostilities and forming a government of national unity. The parties to the conflict also asked for an expanded role for UNOMSIL and on 20 August the Security Council authorized 210 military observers for Sierra Leone.

3.3.2. Process leading to peacekeeping mandates and execution

Peace agreement was signed in Lome Togo between Sierra Leone Government and the Revolutionary United Front (major rebel force). Other rebel factions include pro-government independent militia though not a signatory but were nonetheless included in provisions of the accord.

The Security Council established UNAMSIL, on 22 October 1999 to cooperate with the Government and the other parties in implementing the Lome Peace Agreement and to assist in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan. On 7 February 2000, the Council revised UNAMSIL's mandate. It also expanded its size, as it did once again on 19 May 2000 and on 30 March 2001.

The RUF and government of Sierra Leone came up with the July 1999 Lome Peace Agreement, the November 2000 Abuja Ceasefire Agreement and the May 2001 Abuja ceasefire Review Agreement (Abuja II), all emphasized the need for sustained DDR of ex-combatants from both sides of the conflict. These agreements also mentioned groups such as women and child soldiers. DDR also formed the integral part of the mandate of UNAMSIL.

3.3.3.1. Lome Peace Agreement

Lome Peace Agreement was concluded between the government of Sierra Leone and RUF and made provisions for cessation of hostilities, power sharing between the government of Sierra Leone and RUF; General amnesty for all war related atrocities and crimes; Encampment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants; Restructuring of armed forces, UNAMSIL monitoring of ceasefires; Mechanism and structures for promotion of human rights, humanitarian relief. and post-war reconstruction and specific guidelines for DDR of women and children especially child soldiers.

3.3.3.2 Abuja Ceasefire Agreement

This agreement aimed at creating momentum and putting in place a renewed legal basis for the application of the Lome Agreement.

3.3.3.3. Abuja ceasefire Review Agreement (Abuja II)

This provided for declaration of a ceasefire to be supervised by UNAMSIL; deployment of UNAMSIL troops throughout the country; restoring authority of the government of Sierra Leone throughout the territory; facilitating the free movement of goods and persons, especially unhindered movement of humanitarian relief staff, refugees, returnees and IDPs; and resumption of the DDR Programme.

Clearly it was the Abuja II that provided the breakthrough in the peace process by reviewing the progress made on the implementation and agreeing on the mechanisms for moving the entire process forward including the DDR. In addition UNAMSIL was also

given an explicit disarmament mandate within the context of the previous agreement between the RUF and Government of Sierra Leone.

3.3.4. Decision making process for peacekeeping operation (UNAMSIL)

A Peacekeeping Operation is generally envisaged within the framework of African crises when the political, administrative and economic structures of a state are failing or may no longer be in existence. Such states are the scene of internal conflict, thousand of civilian victims, large number of refugees outside the country or displaced persons within its borders.

For example in the case of Sierra Leone United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) was envisaged when the fighters of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched a war from the east of the country near the border with Liberia to overthrow the government. With the support of the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Sierra Leone's army tried at first to defend the government but the following year, the army itself overthrew the government.

The Security Council authorized the establishment of UNAMSIL, a new and much larger mission with a maximum of 6,000 military personnel, including 260 military observers, to assist the Government and the parties in carrying out provisions of the Lome peace agreement in 22 October 1999.

UN peacekeeping presence in Sierra Leone was slow in coming amidst continuing rebels attacks and ceasefire breakdown. By early 1999 the UN had drawn down its military

observer forces leaving peacekeeping responsibility to Nigerian led regional forces of ECOMOG- the military component of ECOWAS.

3.3.5. The Nature of UNAMSIL

United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) for initial period of six months and UNAMSIL to date.

In total maximum strength authorized include 17,500 military personnel including 260 military observers (S/RES/1346) and up to 170 civilian police personnel (S/RES/1438).

Strength as of 25th November 2004 include 3327 total uniformed personnel including 5,240 troops, 169 military observer and 118 civilian police supported by 271 international civilian personnel and 519 local staff.

3.3.6. The Mandate of the peacekeeping operation.

According to Security Council resolution 1270 (1999) of 22 October 1999, UNAMSIL has the following mandate: To cooperate with the Government of Sierra Leone and other parties in the implementation of the Peace Agreement, To assist the Government of Sierra Leone in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan, To establish a presence at key locations throughout the territory of Sierra Leone, and ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, To monitor adherence to the ceasefire agreement of 18 May 1999 (S/1999/585, annex) through the structures provided for therein, To provide support, to the elections, which are to be held in accordance with the present constitution of Sierra Leone, To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and support the operations of United Nations civilian officials,

including the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and his staff, human rights officers and civil affairs officers.

Through Security Council resolution 1289 (2000) of 7 February 2000, (acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations) the mandate was revised to include the following tasks: To provide security at key locations and Government buildings, in particular in Freetown, important intersections and major airports, including Lungi airport, To facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance along specified thoroughfares, To provide security in and at all sites of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, To coordinate with and assist, the Sierra Leone law enforcement authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities, To guard weapons, ammunition and other military equipment collected from ex-combatants and to assist in their subsequent disposal or destruction

According to Security Council resolution 1346 (2001) of 30 March 2001: *"The Security Council ... Welcomes the revised concept of operations for UNAMSIL as set out in paragraphs 57 to 67 of the report of the Secretary-General [S/201/228 of 14 March 2001] of which Paragraph 58 of the report reads as follows: "The main objectives of UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone remain to assist the efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone to extend its authority, restore law and order and stabilize the situation progressively throughout the entire country, and to assist in the promotion of a political process which should lead to a renewed disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and the holding, in due course, of free and fair elections."*

3.3.7 Key factors explaining success and failure.

UNAMSIL is widely acknowledged as one of the United Nation most successful peacekeeping missions. It has proved that UN Peacekeeping missions can successfully end conflict and help restore stability in the state.

Success or failure can be a subjective term when applied to an ongoing mission. This will be discussed in a narrow sense: prior to May 2000 the country was engulfed in civil war. In June 2002, there was no war and the country conducted first peaceful democratic election since 1996 and refugees who had left the country had begun returning home. In those terms the mission can be termed successful.

The 1990s was a decade of disaster for most missions including Sierra Leone. First armed conflict began in March 1991 and over the next decade the violence continued despite regional attempts to broker peace. Several agreements, elections and ceasefires were negotiated over years only to be derailed by more violence, coups and general destabilization.

The following key factors led to failure in UNAMSIL:

Bad assessment of the situation: The UN leadership felt that all parties had accepted Lomé agreement, which RUF clearly did not. Bad assessment led to bad decision about the mandate and size of force hence mandate and rules of engagement lacked clarity of purpose and robustness.

Lack of initiatives and determination turned out to be a problem through out entire operation.

Problems of interpretation of impartiality and neutrality in the mission.

Command control and procedures fragmented in many ways that is between political military leadership and the civilian administration, Lack of common operational culture between different national contingent: language, national reins, racial mobbing, Reluctance to allocate sufficient resources for equipment and Financial crisis and piecemeal logistic support that were deficient

Convergence of events both external to and within UNAMSIL shaped its ultimate success. Most essential success factors are discussed under:

Alignment of political will and resources: The international community committed to the success of the mission with the right mandate and the resources (manpower, equipment, and training) to carry out the mandate. In February 2000 the Security Council by its Resolution 1289 revised the mandate of UNAMSIL to include additional tasks and expand the military component to a maximum of 11,100, military personnel, including the 260 military observers.

The role of the British: As a permanent member of the Security Council, it played a critical role in garnering support for UNAMSIL from other members and was committed to supporting the Sierra Leone government. According to the Brahimi report the United Kingdom also deployed troops to Sierra Leone at a critical point in the crisis (outside United Nations operational control) providing valuable stabilizing influence. The British also gave UNAMSIL time and space to improve performance by helping secure Freetown and have continued to contribute to Sierra Leone successful transition to democracy.

Alignment of military force with stability programs that help foster positive alternatives to conflicts such as Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and civil affairs project.

Thirdly is the **long-term commitment to ending conflict**. This was the immediate goal of peacekeeping because without peace there can be no stability. Stability is needed to allow elements good governance such as democratic election, system of courts and law, credible police and national military forces to be put in place. Without the international will to succeed none of the following success factors could have occurred.

3.3.8. Assessment or Impact of the Peacekeeping Operation (UNAMSIL)

The hard work of the international community to end the civil war and move the country towards peace have enabled Sierra Leone to enter a period of democratic transition and better governance with the assistance of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).

From the time of elections held in May 2002, Sierra Leone has enjoyed improved security environment, the completion of the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the beginning of full operational activities by the Special Court for Sierra Leone. UNAMSIL provided support to both organizations and continues to work towards consolidating the peace. Key achievements include completion of the disarmament and demobilization of some 75,000 combatants, including almost 7,000 children, and destruction of their weapons. UNAMSIL peacekeepers have reconstructed roads; renovated and built schools, houses of worship and clinics; and initiated

agricultural projects and welfare programmes. UNAMSIL is expected to withdraw at the end of 2004, pending careful assessments of regional and internal security.

3.3.9. Recommendations

From the above analysis the following recommendations will enhance the effectiveness of future peacekeeping operations. Firstly the United Nation Security Council should review the roles of the military Observer Missions especially in areas where armed conflict still exists. This is very important as it led to the success of UNAMSIL.

Secondly the Security Council refines its assessment that defines the type of conflict most suited for peacekeeping solution and this must be agreed on leading to consensus among donors as to the mandates, missions and composition of peacekeeping operation.

The missions should be supported at the strength determined by assessment for the duration of the peacekeeping and mission mandates provide peacekeeping forces with latitude to protect themselves and civilians at risk.

Chapter 4

4.0. Comparative Analysis and Findings.

4.1. Introduction

As the United Nations faces increasing challenges in attempt to succeed in new and even more challenging peace operations it is constrained by limited resources and political will. While the problem of assessing the success of peacekeeping can be difficult doing a comparative analysis between two ongoing peacekeeping missions is even more challenging.

4.2 Comparative Analysis

This section will do a comparative analysis there by clearly bringing out the basis of comparison. Similarities and differences will be discussed in order to come up with recommendations

Key elements on the basis of which the two countries have been taken include: Nature of governance, presence of rich natural resource, and history of exploitation fuelling the conflict, long duration, processes leading to formation of peacekeeping mandates and execution, nature of peacekeeping missions and key factors explaining successes and failures of these peacekeeping operation.

Conflict and intractability stemmed from more dynamic factors like: Weakness or collapse of a state, which necessarily leads to diffusion of violence, Proliferation of warring parties which entails shifting alliances and complicates the search for comprehensive settlement, Development of a resource- based war economy that raises the

stakes while increasing means to continue fighting, Existence of regional linkages that add another dimension to the conflict and broaden the number of stakeholders, Resilience to peacemaking efforts as shown by a number of past failed agreements.

It is against this background upon which comparative analysis of the two peacekeeping

4.2.1. Similarities

This part will explore the similarities of the two peacekeeping operations in their attempt to manage conflict.

The situations in the DRC and Sierra Leone fit the background basis mentioned above. In each case the United Nation is presented with operational environment very different from where the prototype doctrine that is consent impartiality and use of force only in self defence would apply.

It is clear from the above that the principles of consent, impartiality and defensive force did not feature as hallmarks of the recent UN peacekeeping endeavours in the DRC and Sierra Leone.

Peacekeeping challenges in these countries have been and still are immense and by no means a simple task. Both required a credible peacekeeping force with adequate financing from states that have sufficient political resolve to stay the course. It could also be argued that conflicts such as those in the DRC and Sierra Leone constitute regional security threats and that they generate immense suffering for ordinary citizens. It is also clear that rebel groups are able to sustain their operations over long periods through transcontinental smuggling of precious and strategic minerals or other commodities.

In terms of processes leading to peacekeeping mandate and execution, both MONUC and UNAMSIL, the process of peacekeeping formation followed the signing of the peace agreement in order to foresee its implementation and preventing re-eruption of the conflict for example Lusaka Peace Agreement and Lome Agreement respectively.

Both are multidimensional peace operations involving the settlement of internal conflict by helping to reduce tension between combatants, assist in the implementation of peace accords and facilitate the transformation to a sustainable peace.

Sierra Leone can be perceived as a collapsed state after 1997 the central government and national army were no longer in control a reason for the disintegration, while the Democratic Republic of Congo can be viewed as a failed state. In this case both DR Congo and Sierra Leone, it is the incapacity of the state to provide security that prompted the civilians to protect themselves or seek the protection of a faction.

The exploitation of high value resources fuelled each war for example all kinds of natural resources in DR Congo while mainly diamonds in Sierra Leone. In Sierra Leone and the DR Congo where every belligerent got involved, resource exploitation contributed to the military stalemate by leveling capacities thereby underlining further weakness of the government.

Both in Sierra Leone and DR Congo war seemed to be gradually seen as a profitable business and an end in its self.

In terms of decision-making process for peacekeeping operation, in both cases it was the UN Charter that gave the UN Security Council the power and mandate to establish

peacekeeping forces. Both UNAMSIL and MONUC were established to help in the implementation of peace agreement and assist in the implementation of disarmament demobilization and reintegration.

To a large extent failures of the Abidjan Agreement for Sierra Leone in 1996 and the Lusaka Agreement for the DR Congo in 1999 were rooted in the deficient enforcement mechanism that is United Nations Mission on the ground UNAMSIL and MONUC could only make show of their weakness and incapacity to deal with obstinate parties. Solution began to take shape after the more robust action without prior consent of the parties was taken. United Nation Peace enforcement mission were dispatched and granted the mandate and capacity to “use all the necessary means”.

In both Sierra Leone UNAMSIL and DR Congo MONUC, limited force was made use of. The rationale was not to bring a military end to war but to provide some security by monitoring the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and convey message that spoiling behaviour would no longer be tolerated.

Non-armed UN Observer was sent to Sierra Leone and the DR Congo when the violence reached its peak and was granted an enforcement mandate, as peace was about to be resolved. Similarly a weapon embargo was decided only years after hostilities had broken out in Sierra Leone in 1998 and after the conflict ended in the DR Congo in 2003. Alignment of political will and resources as a, measures to curb the Sierra Leone war economy were finally applied in 2000 almost a decade after the conflict started, while the Security Council failed to implement the United Nation Panel of Experts

Recommendations for the DR Congo. These decisions would have been more relevant earlier when the situation demanded it.

4.2.2 Differences

In the case of DR Congo external interference went as far as dispatching foreign troops on the Congolese territory qualifying the conflict as genuinely regional in case of Sierra Leone the role of British Force was viewed as interference from the capital thus contributed to the failure of UNAMSIL initially but in the final analysis is attributed as success factor for UNAMSIL. The British deployed troops in Sierra Leone at a critical point in the crisis providing valuable stabilization. The British also gave UNAMSIL time and space to improve performance by helping secure Freetown and have continued to contribute to Sierra Leone successful transition to democracy.

In the DR Congo, the strong inclination of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands from their traditional partners in the Great Lakes region (Rwanda and Uganda) was equaled only by the French and the Belgians support for the unity of the Congo and its head of state.

In the Sierra Leone, sanctions advocated by the United Kingdom against Liberia were long delayed and ultimately restricted the scope because of the French governments accommodating attitude towards Charles Taylor.

In terms of decision making process leading to peacekeeping process, UNAMSIL was envisaged when fighting of the RUF launched war to overthrow the government hence was to assist the government and parties carrying out provisions of Lome Agreement in

October 1999 while MONUC was envisaged when the DRC conflict was perceived as a threat to international peace and security.

In terms of key factors explaining failures in MONUC, these factors emerged: poor logistical facilities, principle of voluntarism in DDRRR Programme, limited resources available to MONUC and continued reluctance of international community to fully commit to the Congo peace process.

In Sierra Leone initially there was bad assessment of situation, lack of initiative and determination, problem of interpretation of impartiality in the mission, problems in command control and procedures. However convergence of both external and internal shaped its ultimate perceived success.

These factors include alignment of political will and resources by the international community committing to the success of the mission with the right mandate and resources, role of British, alignment of military forces with stability programmes that helped foster positive alternative to conflicts and finally the long term commitment to ending conflict.

Chapter 5

5.0 Conclusions and Recommendation

5.1. Conclusion

From the above analysis without the international will to succeed and the resources devoted with it none of the following success factors could have occurred in Sierra Leone. Prior to May 2000 when the international community committed itself to success in Sierra Leone and United Kingdom brought forces to stabilize the military situation, UNAMSIL can be said to be doomed to failure. Without this international will to succeed none of the following success factors could have taken place. This will be discussed as under:

Proper assessment of challenges and mission: Initially UNAMSIL was perceived not to have done well because of bad assessment of the situation. It was assumed that all parties had accepted the Lome Agreement, which RUF clearly did not. The bad assessment led also to the bad decision on the mandate and size of the force.

Deploy strong enough mandate force properly equipped to accomplish the mission: In the case of Sierra Leone UNAMSIL, most authorities agree that its initial mandate was strong enough to accomplish the mission but the interpretation of the mandate was weak.

Speed of deployment: According to 2000 Report paragraph 87, the first six to twelve weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord are often the most critical period for establishing both a stable peace and the credibility of the peacekeepers. This was

experienced in the case of UNAMSIL when the United Kingdom provided credible rapid response in May 2000 when the UN lacked the capacity to mobilize fast enough.

Agreement among warring parties: The combined effects of British military presence, arrest of Foday Sankoh and increased size of UNAMSIL force combined to bring RUF in negotiating table.

UNAMSIL can be perceived to be successful in that after a weak start, the mission had strong support of the United Nations Security Council and the International Community. The support translated into strong mandate and a force with sufficient strength, logistics and training to carry out its mandates. Secondly, long-term commitment to demobilization and disarming combatants and then to integrate them to the society, so that they don't pose a threat to the stability of the country was considered victory for all leaders.

Finally winning trust and support of the civilian population to help them develop and restore good governance at local and national level.

In the situation in DRC, there were several challenge factors still hindering the progress in the operation of peacekeeping as shown in the analysis. However there is urgent need for the alignment of political will and resources the international community devotes to achieve ultimate peace and stability in the entire country.

In conclusion the study has succeeded in testing the hypotheses. In the first instance, it has shown that success of peacekeeping missions is positively correlated to the alignment of political will and resources. This is shown by the international community

commitment to the success in the mission in Sierra Leone with the right mandate and resources to carry out the mandate.

In the case of DRC alignment of international political will and resources is yet to achieve the desired stability in the whole country as indicated in the recommendations.

The study has also achieved the main objectives by assessing the role of peacekeeping in conflict management in Africa in general and with particular reference to Sierra Leone and DRC.

The second hypothesis has not been successfully tested due to the instability in some parts of DRC. The presence of peacekeepers in both countries however is a sure indication that the process of conflict management is still on course.

The study has also contributed to understanding peacekeeping by situating peacekeeping within post cold war security context and establishing the significance of peacekeeping as a conflict management tool in Africa. The recommendations given in the study will be of value to further research on the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations.

Lastly, it has also achieved its main aim of comparing peacekeeping as a conflict management tool in two cases where one is perceived to have succeeded and the other is on the road to success amidst challenges.

5.2. Recommendations.

From the analysis and conclusion made above the study recommends the following for effective peacekeeping operation.

The United Nations should be actively involved in the negotiations of peace accords, cease-fire agreements or other accords that define its role in a conflict situation. Before the Organization takes on a peacekeeping task, the parties must demonstrate a commitment to implementing the accords.

The UN Security Council refines its assessment procedures that define conflict best suited for peacekeeping solution. This should lead to consensus on mandates, mission, compositions and the resources devoted to it.

The mandate for a peacekeeping operation should be clear, realistic and practicable and provide for the necessary means for implementation. The mandate of an ongoing operation should be adjusted to take account of changing circumstances and conditions in the mission area.

The Secretariat and Member States should provide the Security Council with all relevant information in order for the Council to take an informed decision when framing or readjusting a mandate. The mission, through the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), should provide information gathered by all components -- political, military, humanitarian, civilian police and human rights -- to the Secretariat to assist it in better informing the Security Council.

In seeking an in-depth assessment of potential crisis situations before formulating a mandate, the Security Council may consider expanding its sources of information to include informed views of military experts, academics, concerned media representatives, non-governmental organizations and agency staff. Other ways of obtaining information

could also be pursued, such as fact-finding missions; ongoing consultations with parties to a conflict and other local actors; consultations with potential troop-contributing countries; and participation in negotiating cease-fire and peace agreements in order to determine how they can become the basis of realistic, manageable mandates.

The Security Council, the General Assembly and Member States, collectively and individually, should provide a peacekeeping operation with adequate means and resources to implement the mandate. If a mandate is changed or adjusted, the mission must be provided with the necessary resources to implement the modified objectives.

The study proposes further research on other factors determining success of peacekeeping operation in other parts of the world experiencing these challenges and also widens the scope in Africa since it was limited to two case studies only.

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