

**FROM CONFLICTIVE TO COOPERATIVE INTERACTION:
A STUDY IN KENYA-CHINA RELATIONS, 1963-1991**

EAST AFRICANA COLLECTION

BY

EDWARD OMARI MOGIRE


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
DECLARATION

This Thesis is my original work and has not been presented to any University for a degree.



Edward Omari Mogire

This Thesis has been submitted for examination with my approval as the University supervisor.



Dr. Peter Wanyande.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

DEDICATION

To my grandparents Laban Mogire and Jemima Mokeira and parents James Omari and Bathsheba Kwamboka.

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E. O. Mogire

University of Nairobi

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ABSTRACT

A look at relations between any two countries shows that international interaction is characterized by both conflict and cooperation. This has been true of the relations between Kenya and China. In this study, we were concerned with analyzing relations between the two countries using conflict and cooperation as our poles of reference. More particularly we were concerned with analyzing and unearthing the factors that were salient in these states' relations. Two questions were dealt with. First, why cooperation was carried out between Kenya and China even when conflict existed. Second, the factors that accounted for the shift in relations from that state of conflict towards a state of cooperation without conflict.

In our attempt to answer these questions we argued that consideration for economic and political interests were salient in explaining conflict and cooperation. Compatibility of economic and/or political interests pursued by the two states led to cooperation while incompatible political interests led to conflict.

In identifying the two states' national interests, we argued that these interests were articulated in the foreign policies they followed. Thus China's interests vis-a-vis Kenya were seen in her foreign policy behaviour and action towards Kenya. The same was with Kenya's interest in relation to China. The conflict existing between the two states especially during the

first decade of their interaction, we argued, was largely due to the incompatible interests followed by the two states and the tactics used in attaining their political goals. However, not all political interests were incompatible, some were compatible and in those instances relations were cooperative.

Cooperation was largely due to the common economic interests. Shifts in relations towards high levels of cooperation without conflict, we argued, was due to the economic and political interests to be gained through friendly relations. Hence as the two states realized that they stood to gain more through cooperation than conflict, cordial relations between them developed.

At the end of our analysis, we argued that, by looking at the trends which relations had taken since the mid 1970s, it is likely that in the foreseeable future relations are likely to remain cordial.

We used the national interest theory to explain the behaviour of the two states towards each other. That is, the major considerations of the two states was to maximize their interests such that when their interests concurred cooperation ensued and when they pursued divergent interests conflict occurred. The study was able to show that states can pursue both conflictive and cooperative interests simultaneously.

In such a study we obviously encountered some problems. The major being the fact that we could not be able to obtain any useful data from the primary sources we identified. In the informal interviews that we were able to carry out, the officials could not

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION.

1:1 Nature and Purpose of Study.

This study deals with relations between Kenya and China. It seeks to analyze cooperation and conflict as characteristic interactive patterns between the two states' relations. In this light, we are interested in determining the factors that account(ed) for this kind of relations. We shall also endeavour to account for the shift of relations from conflict towards cooperation. The period covered is from 1963 to 1991. However these dates are not strictly adhered to. Various aspects of the two countries' relations have been analyzed in the major elements of cooperation and conflict.

1:2 Justification of Study.

Cooperation and conflict are both integral parts of social and political behaviour. Thus conflict and cooperation within and among states are frequent occurrences in domestic and international politics. Studies in international relations have devoted much attention to conflictive patterns of state interaction than to instances of cooperative interaction.¹ This is so in spite of the fact that interactions between states are mainly more cooperative than conflictive. J.K. Holsti, has attempted to explain this tendency by observing that, "often we assume that collaboration (cooperation) and conflict are opposites and that international

politics is primarily a conflictive process. This view is understandable because our attention is frequently called to the great world crises, while we are less often made aware of the tacit or overt collaboration-even in conflict situations- which exists in the world.² Studies by Rummel,³ Zinnes,⁴ Scott,⁵ among others, have dealt with conflict in a generalized and theoretical manner without doing so at an interstate level. It is our argument that a study of state interaction can only be meaningful not only when done at an interstate level but also if it encompasses both conflict and cooperation as characteristic of all states' behaviour on the international scene.

Thus in heuristic terms, this study intends to fill gaps in the study of relations between China and African states. First, no one study has attempted to explore relations between Kenya and China. Studies by Hutchison,⁶ Ogunsanwo,⁷ and Larkin⁸ among those scholars who have dealt with China's relations with Africa, have only given a cursory descriptive reference to relations between her and Kenya. This forms a gap that is intended to be filled by the present study.

Second, no one study has explored the economic and political factors underlying relations between the two states. This study intends to explain conflict and cooperation between the two states relations in terms of their economic and political interests.

This study is significant in contributing to the generation of new insights on the two states' relations. Such new insights will accrue from examining the economic and political trends that have

characterized the dyadic interaction and in effect the possible trends that are likely to ensue. Thus the study will be able to speculate on the likely future interactive trends between the two states. This will become helpful for policy makers concerned with the formulation of foreign policy to gain from an examination of the most recent analysis of the interactive pattern of these states. This is based on the fact that for any policy to be successful, adequate, appropriate and realistic information is vital.

In theoretical terms, the concern for inconsistent relations is crucial for various reasons. Basically cooperative and conflictive patterns of interaction have characterized the two states relations. Besides this, the actual economic and political interaction have shown a marked inconsistency with the declared foreign policy stance of the two states, making an investigation into this inconsistency necessary.

We have chosen to focus on the period 1963-1991 which covers the entire independence lifespan of Kenya to date. The year 1963 is important because it delineates colonial legacies and post-independence economic and political policy. The year 1990 is equally important to the extent that it brings us to the most recent dyadic interaction. The study is comprehensive to the extent that it includes not only certain conflictive and cooperative events that have characterized the nature of the two states' interaction, but also because the periods of regime changes in both countries thus enabling us to determine continuance and/or change

in relations.

1:3 Statement of the Problem.

Literature on Kenya-China relations that there has been inconsistencies in these states' relations. This is because their relations have been both cooperative and conflictive. The core theme of this study is that relations between the two states have not only been cooperative in spite of instances of conflict, but they have moved from being conflictive to more cooperation over the years.

Our concern with these states' relations is the inconsistency in their relations. This inconsistency is seen in cooperation when conflict is existing. The search for factors that explain this inconsistency will be the major task of this study. In pursuing this major task, we shall also attempt to explain how and why relations have shifted towards cooperation. This study shall mainly embark on showing the economic and political factors that have been salient in these interactive patterns as illustrated below. Although socio-cultural factors affect state relations, we shall not be primarily be concerned with them as main interactive features between the two states. However we shall deal with any socio-cultural factor(s) that may have a bearing on either political and/or economic interaction.

Trade figures between Kenya and China since 1963 show that China's exports to Kenya have been increasing unproportionately vis-a-vis her imports. Hence, China's exports rose from a value of

0.09 million pounds in 1963 to 1.59 million pounds in 1968 whereas imports rose only from 0.36 million pounds in 1963 to 1.09 million pounds in 1967 and then fell to 0.44 million pounds in 1968.⁹ During this period (1965-1968) as the volume of trade increased, a conflict existed between the two states as shown by the expulsion in 1965 of a New China News Agency (NCNA) correspondent from Kenya, expulsion of the third secretary in the Chinese embassy and demand by the Kenyan parliament that relations with China be severed.¹⁰ How can we explain this inconsistency ?

Through the increase in volume of trade, and the increase in the number of delegations exchanged between the two countries, we can argue that cooperation between them increased. At the same time, those conflictive acts such as threats, condemnations, propaganda, accusations and others had stopped and had been replaced with statements of support, and other cooperative actions such as resumption of diplomatic relations. To look for factors that explain this shift of relations deserves an inquiry as presently carried out in this study.

In short, this research is aimed at examining and explaining the relations between Kenya and China using conflict and cooperation as our poles of reference and showing why and how relations have shifted towards cooperation.

1:4 Review of Literature.

J.K. Holsti has argued that "virtually all relationships contain characteristics of conflict. Even in the most collaborative

(cooperative) enterprises between governments, some areas of disagreement will arise. Conflict emerges from a particular combination of parties, incompatible positions, over an issue, hostile attitudes, and certain types of diplomatic and military actions."¹¹ Parties to a conflict seek certain objectives such as prestige, alliances, world revolution, the overthrow of an unfriendly governments, changes in the United Nations (UN) procedures, and many other things. In seeking to achieve or defend these objectives, their demands, actions or both will run counter to the interests and objectives of other parties thus causing conflict.

Collaboration (cooperation) according to Holsti,¹² include several different characteristics. Cooperation may include , (1) perception that two or more interests, values, or objectives coincide and can be achieved, promoted, or satisfied by both parties simultaneously; (2) the perception or expectation by one state that the policies of the other in seeking to achieve its objectives might help it realize its own interests or values; (3) agreements on the substance of the transactions between two or more states to achieve their common or coinciding objectives; (4) official or unofficial rules taken to implement the transactions and (5) the transactions between the states to fulfil their agreement.

Thus the interests of the party to be achieved will determine the nature of relations between states. As Morgenthau argues, the primary interest of any state is to survive politically as well as

physically or to attain a minimum level of security.¹³ How has this affected relations between Kenya and China? This study will attempt to test how the national interests of the two states been relevant in Kenya-China relations.

Although the history of the Chinese empire goes back 3,000 years, China's current participation in the modern international system only started with the accession to power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949, and her diplomatic activity abroad has been conducted since in the teeth of American and Western opposition. Her task however has not been eased by the Sino-Soviet conflict.¹⁴

Ratliff,¹⁵ has argued that sub-saharan Africa has occupied a distinctive and moderately important place in the global strategy of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) since the early 1960s. Similarly Ogunsanwo agrees that "the important factor in China's African policy is the awareness of the interlocking of her African policy with her international strategic interests and thus the relative incomprehensibility of the former without the latter".¹⁶

In a major pronouncement on foreign policy on the Peoples Democratic Dictatorship written in 1949, chairman Mao Tse-tung laid down the guiding principle for the regime that was to take over the central administration of the country

Internationally we belong to the anti-imperialist front, headed by the Soviet Union...The Chinese people must either incline towards the side of imperialism or that of socialism. There can be no exception to the rule. It is impossible to sit on the fence. There is no third road...It would be the task of the new regime to unite in common struggle with those nations of the world which treat us as equals and unite with the peoples of all

countries.¹⁷

George T. Yu,¹⁸ argues that China perceived the importance of Africa in terms of three intercedent functions. First, China has seen Africa as a stage in the world's unfolding revolutionary struggle against imperialism; in turn the unfailing support, materially and verbally of African liberation movements serves the vital function of establishing and maintaining China's revolutionary credibility. Second, Africa serves as a battle ground to combat both American imperialism and Soviet revisionism. Finally, within the specific context of Lin Piao's "world countryside" China has perceived the importance of securing the recognition and international support of African states.

A detailed article in the World Today has examined the historical background of present Chinese policy towards East Asia and the more distant territories accessible by sea. The author shows that maritime South East Asia traditionally played a strategic role in promoting Chinese interests much further afield, especially in countering the influence of India, and concludes that today "it is probable that Afro-Asian contacts of such countries as Indonesia are being deliberately encouraged and manipulated to carry a favourable image of communist China as far as Africa."¹⁹ Richard Lowenthal,²⁰ also in discussing Chinese interests in Africa argue that "China's interest is mainly security. Since China is not a nuclear power (at that time) she was not capable of assuring her own security against a major power. To China the only chance of preventing the kind of imperialistic attack is to keep the

imperialists and above all the main enemy, the United States (US) busy elsewhere. The Chinese have a positive interest in local conflicts further away and among other things in local conflicts in Africa". Hinton,²¹ and Hutchison²² in their study of Chinese policy towards Africa are of the same opinion. Consequently these scholars all concur on the fact that the primary and consistent determinant of Chinese policy in Africa has been Peking's perception of national and geo-strategic interests in the context of fluctuating competition and conflict with the US and the Soviet Union.

Cooley²³ has observed that Chinese interest in Kenya had started earlier and had been more sustained than in most African countries. He bases his argument on the fact that Peking propaganda had supported the Mau Mau movement from the early 1950s, repeatedly lauding it as a patriotic and anti-imperialistic organization. He further argues that the Chinese interest in East Africa and thus Kenya was closely linked to its even greater interest in the Congo.

The preceding literature though showing the Chinese interests in Africa is inadequate for a number of reasons. First, the literature does not tell us what Kenya's interests were. That is how did Kenya perceive her interests to be served in her relations with China ? The inadequacy of the literature to tell us this deserves an investigation as presently carried out.

Second, the literature does not tell us what role Kenya could play or played in this Chinese strategy. How could relations with Kenya particularly serve the Chinese interest ?

Third, the literature does not deal with the role of political

and economic factors specifically in Kenya- China relations, and how they affected the nature of relations between the two countries, making an investigation into this matter vital.

Finally this literature does not deal with shift in relations between Kenya and China and the factors that explain this shift of relations from conflictive to cooperation.

Further literature on Kenya-China relations shows that official relations commenced on 15 December 1963, three days after Kenya's independence day. Looking at the diplomatic history of the two states, one could realize that, despite the diplomatic setbacks, relations continued up to 1967 when Kenya recalled her ambassador to Peking. From that time it was not until 1978 that Kenya reopened her embassy in Peking. The most interesting thing is that despite this, China maintained an active diplomatic mission in Nairobi. This is more interesting when one realizes that China did not have any projects it was carrying out in Kenya during this period. What factors can explain these contradictions ? Why was China interested in maintaining a diplomatic representation in a country that had shown hostility towards her openly ? Why did Kenya allow the Chinese mission in Nairobi to operate when she had shown hostile towards her government which prompted her to recall her ambassador from Peking ? Why did Kenya resume full diplomatic relations when it did ? The lack of data to answer these questions makes a systematic investigation into these not only necessary but important.

Apart from the diplomatic disputes as indicated by the

expulsion of the diplomatic officials such as Yao Chua, the third secretary, in February 1966. Chinese Charge d'Affairs being declared persona non-grata and in revenge the expulsion of Kenya's charge d'Affairs, expulsion of Wang teh Ming, a NCNA correspondent in July 1965, protests and denunciations, other political conflicts existed. Thus when Chou En-lai, the Chinese Premier, said in Dar es salaam in 1965, that Africa was ripe for revolution, Kenyan officials were quick to censor him, asking revolution against whom ? Some members of parliament demanded that relations with China be severed. The Chinese embassy protested against this. In 1966, the Daily Nation in an editorial of 10 May accused China of subversion in supporting the opposition in Kenya by financing them and arranging guerilla military training for Kenyan youths. In spite of all these accusations, relations were never severed. Why ?

Trade trends show further the inconsistency that existed in the two states' relations. Despite the conflicts in the political field, trade between the two countries increased. By 1968, the total trade between the two countries had gone up to 2.6 million pounds in value from 0.456 million pounds in 1963. Throughout the 1960s until China was admitted into the UN, Kenya voted in favour of the admission of the representatives of the PRC and the expulsion of the representatives of Chiang Kai Shek. What factors explain this inconsistency ?

Further literature, on the economic and political relations, between the two countries, shows that relations have improved remarkably. The total trade between the two countries increased in

value from a total of 1,832,000 Kenya pounds in 1970 to 6,763,000 Kenya pounds in 1980. By 1990 the total trade between the two countries for that year was 103,241,000 Kenya pounds.²⁴ Agreements for cooperation have also been signed. Hence in 1978 the two countries signed a bilateral trade and economic agreement. From 1980 onwards, several economic and technical cooperation treaties have been signed. The PRC also resumed economic assistance to Kenya in 1980 which she had not done since the 1960s.

Trade exchanges between the two states shows a relationship which is very unequal. Throughout the period under study, apart from 1966, 1972, and 1973 China has enjoyed a positive balance of trade. This trade deficit for Kenya has been growing over the years. Thus whereas the deficit was -2,722,000 Kenya pounds for the 1960 to 1969 period, it had risen to -14,467,000 Kenya pounds for the 1970-79 period. And for the 1980-90 period this deficit was valued at -106,379,000 Kenya pounds.²⁵ What other interests do Kenya get from her relations with China that has necessitated her to continue with such relations? By correlating trade with political factors we hope to determine why Kenya has continued to participate in this trade.

In the political field, relations have greatly improved. The most important indicators are; the reopening of Kenya's mission in Peking, Moi's visit to Peking in 1980 and a reciprocal visit by the Chinese premier in 1984. During this period, there were other delegations exchanged between the two countries. All these indicate an improvement in relations. This literature however does not tell

us the factors that have played upon these countries to improve relations. The present study endeavoured to investigate and unveil the political and economic factors that underlie this improvement of relations towards cooperation.

Using the national interest(s) of these two states, we explained the relations between the two states in light of conflict and cooperation. We also showed the factors were salient in Kenya-china relations. Using the national interest of the two states we were also able to explain the shift in relations from being conflictive to a state of cooperation.

1:5 Theoretical Framework.

In such a study that deals with bilateral relations, the question is: what theoretical framework is more appropriate as an analytical tool ? Hoffman ²⁶ has defined a theory as "a systematic study of observable phenomena that tries to discover the principle variables, to explain behaviour and to reveal the characteristic types of relations among national units". J.D. Singer ²⁷ defines it as "a body of internally consistent empirical generalizations of descriptive, predictive and explanatory power". Thus a theory is an analytical, tool that facilitates study, analysis, and understanding of certain phenomena.

In the study of cooperation and conflict as characteristics of state relations, numerous theories abound to explain their occurrence and/or their perpetuation. These include; the power theory, interdependence theory and decision making theory.

The choice of our theoretical framework is mainly determined by the need to show the factors that underlie conflict and cooperation as characteristic patterns in the two states' interaction with the view of explaining the inconsistency that is seen in their interaction. Consequently we analyzed this problem from the perspective of the power theory, especially by using the national interest approach. This approach has proponents such as Carr,²⁸ Morgenthau,²⁹ Wolfers,³⁰ and Kenan.³¹ Before justifying this model it is useful to examine the theories alluded to above.

Interdependence theory posits that strong positive interdependence tends to support solidarity or cooperation whereas strong negative interdependence tends to promote conflict, and weak interdependence tends to make but little difference either way.³² Thus even though interdependence elucidates the reasons for interstate relations, it does not explain why certain dependencies should continue in events of conflict. However, this theory is inadequate to this study. To argue that interdependence theory does not adequately address the intercedents of interstate relations under study is to say that it does not answer the question of inconsistent relations.

Decision making theory has proponents such as Graham T. Allison,³³ Burton Sapin, Richard Snyder and H.W.Bruck,³⁴ Alexander George,³⁵ and Robert North.³⁶

Snyder, Bruck and Sapin focuses on specific decision makers who speak and act in the name of the state. To them, the real world does not matter what matters are the perceptions of the decision

makers. They compared the team of high level officials advising the chief executive to a filter that processes countless valuables including the decision maker's beliefs and roles, bureaucratic demands, political and societal interests and constraints on their policies that arise in the rest of the world.

Charles Lindbloom and David Braybrook³⁷ argues that most political decisions fall into the category of disjointed incrementalism, that is, most political decisions are not arrived at rationally and comprehensively nor are they designed to promote society's common good. Rather these decisions are marginal steps taken by various branches and sub-branches of government.

Allison,³⁸ George,³⁹ and Halperin⁴⁰ have studied the dynamics of bureaucratic imperatives. Allison is the representative of scholars called "bureaucratic watchers".⁴¹ Allison has analyzed three models that help analyze the foreign policies of nation states. The "Rational Actor Model" portrays nation states as monolithic entities whose decision makers rationally maximizes national interest. He argues that this model cannot explain foreign policy. Nation states are not homogeneous "black boxes" and for this reason analysts should understand internal policy making dynamism.

He then proposes the "Organizational Process Model". In this model different organizations acting with standardized capabilities and routines considerably restrict the range of available options that lie before the president and his advisors. The national interest emerges in most instances as an outcome of inter-

organizational debates, differing perceptions and manoeuvre that confound attempts at rational explanation of policy.

In the "Bureaucratic Policy Model" a few people converge to make momentous decisions in times of crisis. Each member of the decision making team is expected to take positions designed to protect and enhance the interests of the department or agency he or she leads. This has led Allison to summarize this view with the simple maxim "where you stand depends on where you sit".

Thus from the foregoing it is clear that the decision making theory is concerned with the processes, that is , how decisions are made. This theory is inadequate to the present study to the extent that it does not take as its main concern the "why,' that is, the explanations for certain policies taken which are either cooperative or conflictive. We consider this theory inadequate also in explaining changes or shifts in policies which results into changes in relations.

As we indicated earlier, we shall adopt the national interest approach of the power theory. We consider it imperative at this point to elaborate on the national interest approach and its relevance to this study.

The concept of national interest is of central importance in any attempt to describe, explain, predict or prescribe international behaviour. Students of international relations agree that the primary justification of state action is national interest.⁴²

Morgenthau⁴³ equates national interest to the pursuit of state power where state power stands for anything that establishes and maintains control by one state over another. He defines national interest as "a compromise of conflicting interests". It is not an ideal arrived at scientifically but it is rather a product of constant internal political competition. Scholars like, Kolko⁴⁴ and Pareto⁴⁵ subscribe to this view.

The national interest of nation states is articulated by their statesmen. Statesmen being the representative of the entire cross-section of competing interests are meant to transcend the factional dichotomies of these entities. The residual meaning inherent in the concept of national interest is survival. In Morgenthau's view, the minimum requirement of nation-states is to protect their physical, political and cultural identity against encroachment by other nation-states. From these general objectives, statesmen can derive specific cooperative and/or conflictive policies. This is based on the fact of an "anarchical" international system overly subsumed in competing whims of nation-states making the search for power, its sustenance and perpetuation the sole concern of statesmen.⁴⁶ Consequently, whereas classical realist theory suffers from the inconsideration of the overwhelming interests of the statesman and his class, structural realist theory takes into account the various structures and classes that emerge from the nation-state, aspects that are keenly considered in defining national interest. In this context therefore, structural realist perspective of national interest is more relevant.

Kenya-China relations have been characterized by conflict and cooperation. The points in time when conflict occurred are explained in terms of clash of the national interest of the two countries. Cooperation is explained in terms of congruence of national interests of the two states. It is argued that the convergence of national interests of the two countries accounts for the shift of relations towards cooperation. That is, as the two nations realized that more of their interests would be met through cooperation, their relations shifted from being conflictive to being cooperative.

As Good ¹⁷ argues, security and survival of nation-states are not static points in the international system. The factors that determine the way nation states relate to each other are divergent, multi-various and always changing. These changes over time, it was argued, accounted for the shifts in relations as the two states realized that cooperation would serve their various interests. This further makes this approach appropriate for the study of Kenya-China relations over time.

1:6 Hypotheses Conceptualization.

	Economic	Cooperation
Kenya	Political	Conflict
China	Economic/Political	Conflict/cooperation
Independent Variable	Intervening Variable	Dependent Variable

The figure above is meant to illustrate our hypotheses. As indicated, the intervening variables are sub-divided into economic and political factors. These variables may explain the cooperative and/or conflictive nature of relations between the two states. A correlation between economic and political factors is done and related to various conflictive and cooperative events. Consequently, the figure demonstrates the kind of matrixes that guided our explanation of the hypotheses. The particular hypotheses tested are:

- (1) Whenever economic interests are compatible cooperation between the two states will occur.
- (2) Whenever political interests (policies and objectives) converge, cooperation between the two countries will ensue.

1:7 Methodology.

Library research constituted the main source of information. Consequently, this study is essentially documentary based mainly on secondary sources of data. These sources include; published books, journals, magazines, newspaper reports, statistical abstracts, annual trade books, public documents, and United Nations reports. In using these sources, informal interviews with relevant officials were conducted to fill gaps that occurred from using the secondary sources. In this regard, we interviewed embassy officials of the PRC, Kenyan officials from the foreign affairs Ministry, and officials of Chinese companies operating in Kenya.

1:8 Definition of Concepts.

(a) Conflict.

For the purpose of this study, conflict will refer to any situation(s) characterized by one or more of the following activities in the two states' relations; expulsions of diplomatic officials, recall of officials, accusations, threats, demonstrations, withdrawal and or freeze of aid, threats of and/or sanctions, denials, protests and propaganda against the other state at home and abroad.

(b) Cooperation.

Cooperation will refer to a situation where the perception of two or more interests, values and /or objectives of the cooperating states coincide and can be promoted, achieved or satisfied by the two states simultaneously. Cooperation is characterized by bilateral trade, financial and technical assistance, diplomatic intercourse, recognition, exchange of delegations both governmental and non-governmental, cultural exchanges such as sport and students, support in the international arena, statements of support by other heads of state and joint actions in achieving certain interests.

(c) Shifts in Relations.

A shift in relations towards cooperation between Kenya and China refers to a situation whereby relations were previously both conflictive and cooperative or only conflictive but after sometime moved towards a state of cooperation without apparent conflict.

(d) Internal Political development.

This refers to the internal or domestic political situation either in Kenya or China which affects relations between the two countries. These include; internal power struggles, change of government policy, socio-cultural changes with political effect and changes in political leadership.

1:9 Chapter Outline.

There are six chapters in this study. Chapter two is a general introduction to the study of Kenya-China relations. It puts the study into context dealing mainly with the foreign policy goals and objectives of the two states. In this chapter we have argued that the national interests of the two states are projected in their foreign policy goals and objectives. It is argued that the coincidence of national interests led to cooperation whereas divergent interests resulted in conflict.

Chapter three deals with the economic factors explaining cooperation. In this chapter we have argued that there was a coincidence in economic factors leading to cooperation. This cooperation is explained in terms of the economic and political interests to be achieved through economic cooperation.

Chapter four deals with the political conflict that existed in the two states' relations. Conflict between Kenya and China is explained in terms of divergent political interests and tactics followed in achieving their interests.

Chapter five gives a description of political cooperation in the two states' relations. Political factors that not only underlie but also tilted the two states' relations into cooperation are analyzed here.

Finally chapter six is a summary of the findings and general conclusions of the study. It gives an evaluation of the entire study, it tests the hypotheses and speculates on the nature of the likely future trends the relations of the two states will take.

FOOTNOTES.

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CHAPTER TWO

BACKGROUND TO KENYA-CHINA RELATIONS

2:1 Introduction.

Interaction between states rotates around shared interests. Cooperation among states results from common interests whereas divergent interests would inevitably result in conflict. In the words of George Liska¹ "all associations depend on the existence of identical interests. For cooperation to take place, all interests need not be shared; disparate and even conflicting interests can be present in an association thus having conflict within a cooperative relationship and vice versa. The important thing is that some interests disparate or otherwise converge into joint action and association".

In looking at Kenya-China relations, interests of the two states which have propelled them into conflict and/or cooperation were analyzed. These interests can be identified in the foreign policy goals and objectives of the two states. This chapter examined the historical background to Kenya-China interaction and then analyzed the foreign policy goals and objectives of the two states. By so doing we were able to identify those areas of cooperation and /or conflict. This chapter thus forms the basis of our later analysis of interaction between the two states.

2:2 Historical Interaction Between Kenya and China.

Before Kenya's attainment of independence, China had very little experience with Kenya. This, however, does not mean that China did not have any contacts with Kenya at all. Chinese awareness of East Africa, it is claimed, began in the T'ang dynasty 618-907.² It was during this period that the Chinese heard of East Africa, but no direct contact existed. Direct trade did not exist between China and East Africa. It was carried out by Arab middlemen. Relations increased during the Sung dynasty (670-1270). A flourishing indirect trade developed between China and modern day Kilwa, an important trade centre on the East African coast. Among the products reaching Africa at that time were textiles and porcelain.

Direct contact between China and East Africa was established in the Yuan dynasty (1279-1368 A.D). Between 1329 and 1345 the explorer Wang Ta Yuan reached the East African coast and visited Zanzibar. The height of Chinese-East Africa relations took place during the Ming dynasty (1368-1644). In this period the Chinese navigator Cheng Ho reached East Africa. It was also the era of expansion in foreign trade. Chinese tea, textiles, porcelain, lacquerware, utensils and copper money were exchanged for African elephant tusks, rhinoceros horns, gold and animals. Kenya's contact with China was thus based on a long standing relationship founded upon close cultural and commercial interaction established between China and East Africa.

Modern interaction with Kenya can also be traced to the pre-independence period. In the commercial field, China was trading with Kenya and by 1958 her exports to Kenya amounted to 0.04 million pounds in value. By 1963, China's exports to Kenya were valued at 0.9 million pounds.³ On the other hand, Kenya's exports to China by 1958 were valued at 0.21 million pounds and by 1963 it had increased to 0.36 million pounds.⁴

By late 1950s cultural contacts between the two countries had been established. For instance in 1958 after the Anti-atomic Bomb Conference in Tokyo, the Chinese delegation to the conference invited Kenya's nationalist leader Oginga Odinga to visit their country.⁵ Other contacts were also made in the front organisations that had been established by China. In 1957, delegates from Kenya and China joined delegates from Asia and Africa in the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Conference.⁶ Kenyan delegates also attended the World Federation for Democratic Youth festival in 1959 in Peking.⁷ By 1961, Kenyan students were among the students from the Third World who were studying in China.⁸

On the political front, China identified with Kenya's struggle for independence. As Cooley⁹ writes, "by the late 1950s, Peking's propaganda supported the Mau Mau movement as a patriotic and anti-imperialist organisation. During Odinga's visit to China, he was given money to support Kenya's liberation movement."¹⁰

2:3 China's Foreign Policy Goals.

On the whole China's foreign policy in Africa has resulted from the initiative of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) rather

than the African states themselves.¹¹ "Chinese policy" argues Ogunsanwo, "is both a reaction to the international environment as interpreted by the Chinese and an attempt to change those aspects of the international environment which are inimical to China's interests".¹² Chinese interests in Kenya have been stated both directly and within the context of China's interests in Africa and the Third World. Some of the earliest statements relating to China's goals were made in late 1863 and early 1964 by Premier Chou En-lai, in the course of his visit to Africa. Though the statements were directed towards Africa specifically and the Third World in generally, China's interest in Kenya was chiefly drawn from the latter's role in the Third World. At a press conference in Cairo he said

One of the main contents of Chinese foreign policy is the active support of the national democratic movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America. China is a country which has been liberated from the colonial shackles of imperialism. We naturally sympathize with and support the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America since we share the same experiences. Furthermore, since China has already won its own victory, it has the obligation to support those states which have not yet achieved victory or are about to win it.¹³

Thus on the whole three basic policy goals were stressed. These were; support for liberation struggles, Asian, African and Latin American unity, and mutual support among the peoples of the Third World.

2:3:1 Support of Liberation-Revolutionary Movements.

China's support of liberation-revolutionary struggles among the Third World peoples has long been obvious. In essence, the

policy promoted a world revolutionary struggle against imperialism, and the ideas that the primary enemies were the American imperialists and the Soviet revisionists. China's goal of mobilizing the Third World was best publicized in the celebrated statement by Lin Piao in 1965

Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called "the cities of the world" then Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute the "rural areas of the world". Since world war II, the proletariat revolutionary movement has for various reasons been temporarily held back in North America and Western Europe capitalist countries, while the peoples revolutionary movements have been growing vigorously. In essence the contemporary world revolution also presents a picture of the encirclement of the cities by the rural areas. In the final analysis, the course of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggle of the asian, African and Latin American peoples who make up the overwhelming majority of the world's population. The socialist countries should regard as their internationalist duty to support the people's revolutionary struggle in Asia, Africa and Latin America."

Throughout his African tour, Chou sought to emphasize China's full commitment to the goal of revolutionary struggle. He defined Africa's situation in terms of waging "heroic struggles to win independence and freedom and finally opposing aggression and interference, subversion and infiltration by the imperialists and all external forces. In Ghana, the rapid and irresistible advance of the national liberation movement were stated in unqualified terms

The purpose of our coming to Africa is to warmly extend our congratulations on the great victories of the national liberation movements and to express our fraternal sympathy with and support for the African people who are

fighting heroically for independence and freedom.¹⁵

China's policy goal in relation to the revolutionary movement was an all out Chinese support to enable them carry the struggle against imperialism to complete victory. The Chinese goal is related to her foreign policy objective in Africa, which is to eliminate Western, particularly American imperialism and since the 1960s, Soviet revisionism. China's support of liberation struggles among Third World peoples in practice, as, Ogunsanwo argues would further Chinese interests.¹⁶

Chinese support of liberation movements was based on the dialectical perception of society which sees human and material relationship in terms of contradiction. According to Marxist-Leninist postulates the three contradictions of capitalism are (a) between labour and capital, (b) between imperialists competing for markets and raw materials and (c) between colonial peoples and imperialists. These three kinds of contradictions lead to three kinds of wars: (i) between the proletariat and the capitalist; (ii) imperialist wars; and (iii) wars of liberation. From this follows the Leninist view that imperialism can be weakened by engaging the imperialist forces on one of the three fronts. Thus objectively, the struggle of the colonial people for freedom from imperialist exploitation contributes to the eventual and inevitable success of the proletariat revolution and therefore must be promoted.¹⁷

There is no doubt that Africa's role in the world revolutionary struggle and the imposed duty of China to support the

movement constituted a primary component of China's Kenyan policy. Kenya had been identified as being revolutionary and as such Peking supported her liberation movement. Kenya, Algeria and Cameroon were categorized by China as advanced colonial areas to whom an all out Chinese support would be given. The importance of Kenya's revolutionary movement among other African countries was underscored by the Chinese Communist Party organ the Peoples Daily which editorialized

The people of Egypt and Sudan, countries in which used to be considered "Dark Africa" have achieved independence. The people of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Kenya Rhodesia and other countries of Africa have awakened. Their heroic struggle against colonial oppression has shaken the whole world.¹⁸

Before the Cairo conference¹⁹ of 1955, Peking had staged a rally at which Kuo-Mojo²⁰ voiced Chinese support for national liberation movements in Algeria, Cameroon, Uganda and Kenya.²¹ At the Cairo conference Kuo-Mojo was struck by the extent and quality of African participation

More African delegates attended the Cairo conference than in any previous international conference. It marked the first time in the recent history that the oppressed African nations had played an important role in the stage of international affairs. Delegates from Algeria, Kenya, Cyprus, Oman, Cameroon, Uganda, Somaliland, Zanzibar, Chad and Palestine now in the forefront of the anti-colonial struggles received particular welcome and respect from the conference.²²

From the foregoing, it is clear that Kenya's importance to China's foreign policy goal stemmed from the former's role in the liberation and revolutionary struggle against imperialism. As long

not communism. He went on to say "the snake in the bush is less dangerous than the snake in our house which is imperialism. Why seek a non-existent enemy when we already have a fight on our hands against imperialism ?"²⁶

The role of Kenya's anti-imperialist struggle was praised by Chen Yi in a welcome speech to Mr. Achieng Oneko, Kenya's Minister for Information and Broadcasting, on his visit to China. Yi said "the Kenyan government pursues a policy of peace, neutrality and non-alignment, opposes imperialism and old and new colonialism and is devoted to the cause of strengthening African solidarity, promoting Asian-African solidarity and defending world peace".²⁷ This common view or rather stand on liberation movement was the basis of cooperation between the two states.

Conflict between Kenya and China on the other hand in regard to the issue of liberation -revolutionary movements stemmed from the differences on the methods and tactics to be followed in achieving liberation and fighting imperialism and second China's claim that Kenya was supporting imperialism. Whereas the Chinese favoured revolution from below based on the Chinese model, the Kenyan leaders thought that it would not be applicable in the African situation. According to Tom Mboya, African society was not divided between the capitalists and workers, the landlords and the landless. The areas of division were very limited. The divisions that may be there were those of tribe or individual ambitions, but very rarely could there be genuine ideological or class

differences.²⁸ The Kenyan leaders also opposed the Marxist-Leninist type of revolution.

On attaining independence, Kenya followed a cautious foreign policy of reconciliation and working closely with the former colonial masters and other Western powers. In this context Kenyatta was viewed as being too pro-capitalist to lead the fight against imperialism. With this China started providing financial assistance to Odinga, Kenya's Vice-president but implicitly Kenyatta's rival and according to the Chinese his successor. This made Kenyan leaders to view China with a lot of suspicion accusing it of engaging in subversive activities. This led Kenyatta to warn

It happens in many young countries that members of parliament may become targets of some foreign government or subversive institution. Forces may become unleashed spurned on by external pressures. The government of Kenya will meet any threat of subversion with the fullest rigours of law.²⁹

Kenyatta may have been referring to Odinga his most eastward leaning rival in whom both Peking and Moscow had shown the most interest. Chinese actions of supporting Kenyatta's rival led to a collision course in the two countries relations.

2:3.2: Third World Unity

Chou made Afro-Asian solidarity a major Chinese objective. Setting his appeal in Cairo he stressed two primary points. First, there would always be differences among states, but the important thing was to seek common grounds, combatting imperialism and old and new colonialism; opposing foreign aggression and intervention; demanding the withdrawal of foreign troops and bases; supporting

the national liberation movements and territorial integrity. Secondly, he stated that Third World states should settle their differences without imperialist intervention. "We Asian and African states" said Chou, "sharing common historical experiences, share common goals for which to strive. We should and we can settle our own problems".³⁰

The objective of unity was to safeguard and consolidate the independence and develop the economies of the Asian and African states. Chou proclaimed that "our common fate and shared responsibilities demand that we Asian and African states increasingly strengthen our unity and cooperation".³¹ On the eve of his departure from Africa, Chou summarized China's position on Asian, Africa, (and Third World) unity

The continuous strengthening of the unity of the Asian and African people against imperialism is the common interest of the Asian and African people.³²

The question, according to Chou, was achieving and maintaining freedom in the face of colonialism and imperialism. Thus in the final analysis China's goal of seeking unity was therefore tied to the mobilization of Africa as the battleground against imperialism. This has to be understood in the context of China's foreign policy goal of combating American imperialism and subsequently Soviet revisionism and social imperialism. The Chinese employed the phrase "social imperialism" in describing Soviet Union hegemonism or expansionist policies. Thus in 1975 Chou En-lai said

China's foreign policy was to support not only the countries of the Third World against this new form of imperialism or hegemonism (from

the Soviet Union) but those countries in the West and Japan in this process of forming a united front with other nations against super power hegemonism. China would however continue to improve relations with the United States and at the same time do all that she can to isolate the Soviet Union from the Asian power balance.³³

Thus anti-hegemonism became a major objective in Chinese foreign policy. Hua Guo-feng singled out the Soviet Union's role in the world politics as "the most dangerous source of world war".³⁴

On another level the search for Third World unity focusing on revolutionary struggle sought to obtain and maintain Africa's direct involvement in China's battle with the US and the Soviet Union. This sought to demonstrate who was Africa's true enemy and who was her real friend.

China not only sought Third World Unity but also tried to identify with the Third World. The Chinese leaders considered China to be part of the Third World. Qiao Quan-hua, head of Chinese delegation to the 26th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in November 1971 said "like the overwhelming majority of the Asian and Latin American countries, China belongs to the Third World".³⁵ Mao Tse-tung personally declared on 22 June 1973 that "we belong to the Third World and we are a developing country".³⁶

This Chinese line of thought must be understood in the context of the role the Third World was assigned in the wider international system. Within the international system, the Third World was assigned a significant position as the representative of change. In a speech to the UNGA Den Xiao Ping underscored this point

In this situation of great "disorders under heaven", all the political forces in the world have undergone drastic division and realignment through prolonged trials of strength and struggle. A large number of Asian, African and Latin American countries have achieved independence one after another and they are playing an even greater role in international affairs. As a result of emergence of social imperialism, the socialist camp which existed for a time after world war II is no longer in existence. Owing to the law of uneven development of capitalism, the western imperialist bloc too is disintegrating.... The developing countries of the world constitute a revolutionary force propelling the wheel of world history, and are the main forces combating colonialism, imperialism and particularly the super powers.³⁷

Thus the role of the Third World so identified, the virtues of uniting against imperialism were extolled. The Chinese policy toward Africa in the 1980's was reported by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) organ Peoples Daily on the occasion of a visit to China by Guinean president Sekou Toure.

The African people are now working to build up their countries in the light of their specific historical conditions. They need to strengthen their unity and support one another against racism and to win liberation for Southern Africa. They oppose super power interference in African affairs. To unite against imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism is the main trend in international affairs in Africa today, whereas all attempts and efforts to go against the will of the African People to interfere in the internal affairs of African countries and to control and manipulate them are doomed to failure.³⁸

Thus since the 1960s, the Chinese goal of seeking Third World unity has been consistent in her relations with African states. Consequently China's relation with Kenya can be seen in this

context of seeking unity against imperialism and revisionism. Kenya's position on imperialism and colonialism was hailed by Chinese leaders. Kenya, like other ex-colonies had been subjected to various forms of hostile action by the imperialists and their friends and as such shared the same experience as China. The common experience suffered by both countries under colonialism has been repeated on a number of occasions. Thus on a visit to China, Kenya's Information Minister, Achieng Oneko set the cue by saying that

The attainment of freedom was only the beginning of a phase to get rid of all the injustices which the people of Kenya have had for over 70 years.... Our struggle for liberation has been in many ways identical to that of the Chinese people. Both countries have at one time or another been oppressed and exploited by foreigners who entered these two countries without being invited by the rightful owners

As earlier on shown, China hailed Kenya's anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist stand. With the two countries recalling their common experience under various forms of imperialist oppression, they indeed needed to unite against the common enemy.

2:3:3 Mutual Support

Finally Kenya's importance to China is manifested from the latter's goal of seeking mutual support. Chou spelled out China's interest in getting recognition and international support of the African states in his 1963-64 African tour. There were four major points: the restoration of China's legitimate rights in the United Nations; recognition of the Chinese Peoples Republic as the

legitimate government of China; support for China's struggle to liberate Taiwan and opposition to an attempt to create two Chinas. On the question of China's United Nations membership Chou told a press conference in Cairo at the beginning of his African tour that the issue was one of restoring China's legitimate rights in the world organization. He said

If the United Nations expects to maintain its original objectives and secure the confidence of the people of the world, it must rid itself of the representative of the Chiang Kai-Shek gang and restore to China its legitimate rights.⁴⁰

In Somalia, Chou reiterated that his government's position was that it is the sole lawful government of China and that there is only one China. Chou accused the United States of showing hostility towards China by supporting the "Chiang Kai Shek gang" in Taiwan as the representatives of China and of opposing the restoration of China's legitimate rights in the United Nations.⁴¹

China's relation with Kenya was directly linked to its objective of securing formal recognition and international support. China was the fourth country to recognise Kenya after the latter's attainment of independence. Three days after recognition diplomatic relations were established on 15 December 1963. Thus immediately after Kenya recognized the PRC as the lawful government of China and consequently did not recognise the government of Taiwan. This formed another basis of future cooperation.

On the question of who should occupy the Chinese seat in the United Nations, the Government of Kenya categorically supported the PRC as the lawful representative of the Chinese people and the

should be the Chinese representative in the world body. This was stated in unequivocal terms by Prime Minister Kenyatta:

One great imbalance within the United Nation's structure springs from the exclusion of the peoples Republic of China. The participation of China in the exchanges and activities of the United Nations is vital for lasting peace. There is no other world forum in which conflicts, suspicions and injustices can be dissolved by those dedicated through a charter to the brotherhood of man.⁴²

On another occasion, during a visit to China Achieng Oneko, stated Kenya's position on the question of the Chinese seat in the UN saying that "the government Kenya supported China's legitimate claim to be a member of the United Nations".⁴³

There can be little doubt that relations with Kenya served an important Chinese foreign policy goal. Given China's drive for international recognition and support, and its emphasis upon relations with the Third World it was essential that China develop close relations in the area. Thus the importance of Kenya's recognition and support extended beyond the relationship between the two nations. Kenya symbolizing Africa secured and gave substance to China's Third World policy. As Oneko said

... Both young and old have demonstrated to us the deep rooted friendship between the peoples of China and the people of Kenya. Indeed, this has been a clear sign of the friendly relations between not only the people of China and Kenya, but also between the Chinese and the people of Africa in a wider context".⁴⁴

This goal of mutual support has survived the test of time and has thus continued to be an important aspect of the two states' relations. Though the PRC secured the Chinese seat in the UN in

1973, other aspects which require international support have not all been resolved. This includes the Taiwan question which has been and still remains of significant interest to China. The question of Indo-China has been in the Chinese agenda in the United Nations and international support for her position as regards this issue remains important. Another area concerns China's role as a major actor in the international scene competing with both the United States and the Soviet Union. In their competition over various issues of international importance they quite often seek the support of other countries thus making international support still an important consideration in the foreign policy.

Mutual support as a foreign policy goal has also remained an important foreign policy goal for Kenya. This is so because Kenya is still a developing country which needs economic and technical assistance. Mutual support is also important in fighting apartheid and colonialism in the remaining parts of Africa. As president Moi put it in a message to president Kuo feng on the occasion of the 29th anniversary of the founding of the PRC "the cordial and fruitful relations that happily exist between the two countries would grow in strength for mutual advantage of our respective peoples".⁴⁵

Thus from the analysis above, support for liberation movement, Third World unity and mutual support were the major foreign policy goals of China in her relation with Kenya. In subsequent chapters it is argued that where China perceived Kenya as acting in a way which promoted these goals, cooperation ensued. On those occasions

where Kenya's interest opposed any or all of these goals then conflict ensued. Where China used methods or tactics which were perceived by Kenya as unacceptable in achieving or promoting these goals, conflict occurred. Thus conflict or cooperation or both depended on how each state perceived the other's action as either promoting or limiting the achievement of any or all of the stated goals.

2:4 Kenya's Foreign Policy Goals.

Kenya's foreign policy goals have been varied and complex. During the independence celebrations Prime Minister Kenyatta talked of independence establishing sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security of the state. Beyond that, he spoke of the necessity to end colonialism in the rest of Africa, to work for the achievement of African Unity, to support the United Nations efforts and to aim to a course of non-alignment in world affairs.⁴⁶ In her relations with China, however three goals have been predominant: the preservation of the stability hence the independence of the state; economic development and liberation of the whole of Africa from colonialism and racism.

2:4:1 National Independence.

After Kenya gained her independence European settlers continued to farm, and as in Tanzania to hold high offices in the government. Substantial quantity of Western aid flowed to the new government and Britain continued to dominate her trading patterns. The establishment of diplomatic relations with other countries especially the socialist countries became of necessity for national

leaders wanting to assert their non-alignment. Thus the desire to break away from the traditional Western dominance and diversify relations made the Kenyan leaders to start relations with non-Western countries among them China. The desire to strike a balance between and among the major world forces which were divided into the Western and the Eastern blocs, between capitalists and socialists, and to correct the imbalance of the past, whereby relations were only with Western countries by establishing new linkages and examining new approaches to problem solving also made Kenya to look for new relations. These attitudes were expressed in Kenya's policy of non-alignment.

Kenya had been dominated by the Western European countries. Also internationally she did not have an independent stand on various issues as her stand was that taken by her colonial master. Thus non-alignment, it was hoped could correct this situation and thus restore not only economic but also political and international independence. By international independence we mean a situation where Kenya could take a stand based upon consideration of not only her national interest but also on the merits of the issues at stake.

Kenya's non-alignment policy was amplified by president Kenyatta in an address to the National Assembly on return from a Commonwealth meeting in London in 1964:

I made it clear that Kenya follows a policy of non-alignment in world affairs and that our position in this regard must be accepted. I added that Kenya did not attend the meeting with the intention of planning in plotting one cold war bloc or power against another. We are

vitaly concerned with the establishment of peace and tranquillity in the world, but countries committed to the west should fully accept that Kenya does not have to agree or approve of their conduct in the cold war.⁴⁷

In pursuit of her non-alignment policy Kenya sought to cultivate friendship with all states and peoples without discrimination. In the international scene, each problem would be evaluated on its own merit and Kenya had no intention of being either anti-East or anti-West. As Kenyatta said, "the foundation of Kenya's foreign policy is the principle of non-alignment. Our judgement is an independent judgement, not subject to power bloc pressure or appeal".⁴⁸ In a speech at Makerere University Tom Mboya, then Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, said:

We are not going to take sides permanently and automatically with either the Western or the Eastern bloc. If the West present a resolution at the United Nations, no African nation worthy of the name⁴⁹ could be considered an automatic supporter.

Tom Mboya, while addressing a Kenya African National Union (KANU) conference at Nakuru on 10 April 1965, expounded on Kenya's Policy of non-alignment. "We have deliberately chosen a policy of positive non-alignment", he said, "in external affairs we shall follow absolutely and firmly a policy of non-alignment. We shall seek friendship with every nation that will return it. The establishment of such a relationship will not entitle any friend to choose our enemies for us. We fully commit ourselves to support what we believe to be right and just in international affairs. But each case will be judged on its merits".⁵⁰

It is worth noting that establishing relations and recognition of the PRC proscribed Kenya from establishing relations with Taiwan. Thus this statement could better read, " Kenya's desire to establish friendship with all states and people except Taiwan". Until 1963 Kenya like the rest of Africa had been part of the European-centred system of international relations. The European countries had governed Africa, and all relationships they established with it were for their own interests, and the African states had become increasingly tied to the mother states, culturally, economically, politically and militarily. Independence provided an opportunity to correct this pattern of relationship. It was natural that the new states should look upon the former exclusive interaction with some reservations. It was also to be expected that they would attempt to develop and solicit new relationships. In this context, Kenya's policy of non-alignment dictated upon her to develop and solicit new relations not only with other Western but also Eastern countries, Africa and Asia.

Non-alignment was intended to free Kenya from her historical tradition with the West and allow it to move towards an independent position. This was important if Kenya was to be truly free economically and politically. As Odinga argued

...If Africa is to be really free, if we are to attain true economic independence. we must follow a policy of non-alignment of relations with both "East and West", with both "Capitalist" and "Socialist" countries. If our aid and investment come from one source only we can banish the prospect of pursuing an independent policy, for we will be brought under control by the withholding of aid, or by some economic pressure. As an African

non-alignment was in line with Kenya's objective of economic development.

... When we became a sovereign state last year, my government gave an assurance that the conditions necessary for accelerated growth would continue to be maintained and improved. In order to achieve our aims, we decided to spread our commercial and trade contacts to countries to whom these activities had hitherto been either non-existent or negligible. Apart from the need to spread marketing risks, this step suited our approach to international problems. We believe in a policy of non-alignment when we choose some techniques from the East it is not because we approve of their domestic or foreign policies nor should we be accused of being pro-West if we adopt or perpetuate some Western ideas. We are determined to develop Kenya as a democratic African Socialist country. 51

Thus non-alignment served Kenya's interest both economically by benefiting from economic assistance from both the East and West, and politically by developing relations with both " East and West " thus keeping her independent judgement on issues without coercion or undue pressure from either the "East or West. Without doubt, the need to show her political credibility as an independent state and actor in the international scene and economic development dictated upon Kenya to engage in relations with China. Thus so long as the Kenyan leadership perceived China as a reliable partner in the realization of these goals, cooperation could ensure as her interest would be furthered. In the final analysis, the desire to establish new political linkages and assert a degree of independence must be accepted as motivations for Kenya's decision to interact with China. The degree to which this interaction was

perceived as serving her interest forms the basis for cooperation whereas the converse may explain conflict.

2:4:3: Liberation of Africa.

As already noted, relations between Kenya and China developed during the pre-independence era when Kenya was still fighting for her independence. China supported Kenya's independence movement and since then the liberation of Africa from colonialism has been a persistent goal for both China and Kenya. On the total liberation of Africa, one of the earliest pronouncements concerning this was made by Prime Minister Kenyatta in 1963.

My Ministers and I have said many times that Kenya will not feel free until the last traces of colonialism and racial domination have been finally wiped out. We have in mind here the racial discrimination and brutalities of the South African regime. We deplore the oppressive measures of the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique and we are appalled by contempt of democracy shown by the minority government in Southern Rhodesia, which is approaching tyrannical seizure of power by suppressing the will of the people.³⁴

Kenya has supported the total liberation of South Africa and the removal from power of the white minority rule by the black majority. In 1964, Kenyatta said:

I give a pledge that Kenya will do all that is within its power to bring about the liberation of South Africa. We have already made considerable sacrifices in the implementation of the trade boycott. There may be greater contributions for us to make. I am confident that the people of Kenya will gladly make any sacrifice that may be asked for their South African brothers.³⁵

Four days later, while addressing a protest rally against South Africa in Nairobi Kenyatta declared:

Our freedom will be useless if our brothers continue to be enslaved in South Africa. We shed blood in this country and experienced persecution till we won. In the same way we shall fight for our colleagues. We stand together with our brothers and will do everything in our power to liberate them. We in Africa and many countries of Asia and elsewhere in the world, have already given support to the people of South Africa by means of trade boycott and sometimes in more direct ways. We have supported and we have been promised more direct aid by a number of states outside Africa.⁵⁶

This goal of liberation of the whole of Africa did not end with the death of Kenyatta but has persisted to the next Moi regime. On a Kenyatta Day address in 1978 president Moi said:

... We will continue to give direct support to our brothers and sisters still under colonialism in Central and Southern Africa. We sincerely believe that our freedom is not complete unless there is freedom in every part of Africa and indeed in the World as a whole. It is my most sincere hope that the example of our country since independence will convince those who are doubtful that a prosperous happy and multi-racial society can flourish.⁵⁷

From the foregoing analysis it is clear that the liberation of the whole of Africa has been a persistent foreign policy goal pursued by Kenya. The determination shown by Kenya to see liberation in Africa accomplished led president Moi to sanction the use of violence if need be to attain this goal. While in Ethiopia he said:

... In the last thirteen years, the problem of Zimbabwe has pre-occupied the Organization of African Unity. All efforts to overcome the problem through negotiation has failed the last one being the Anglo-American proposals. In our own view there

is nothing to negotiate about the independence of Zimbabwe. What is required now is concrete efforts by the Zimbabwean liberation troops supported by all of us to overthrow the Ian Smith regime and establish majority rule in the country. We see no other solution to this problem. We shall therefore continue to give whatever support we can to the armed struggle in that colony until victory is fully won... The international community must intensify its efforts to ensure that Namibia gets her complete independence in accordance with the decision of the United Nations Organization. Nothing short of this is acceptable...The racist South Africa regime must be told that no amount of oppression will divert the African people from fighting for their legitimate rights in their motherland. ...If that cannot be achieved peacefully then violence becomes necessary...

The fact that Kenya had limited resources whereas the liberation movements required large materials for their struggle compelled it to seek external assistance and inspiration. Kenya's goal of Africa's total liberation dictated that it supported those who adhered to this common objective.

In the final analysis, the role of China in Kenya's foreign policy objectives was governed by economic and political factors. This is also true of the role of Kenya in China's foreign policy goals. Thus in the chapters that follow we have analyzed the economic and political factors that have been prevalent in Kenya-China relations and how they have affected these relations towards either being cooperative or conflictive. It is argued that where both economic and political interest converge cooperation has ensured whereas divergence of both political and economic interests have catapulted the two countries into conflict. In between the cooperative conflictive continuum is a situation where cooperation existed within conflict. This is also explained in terms of political and economic factors underlying such relations.

FOOTNOTES

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34. "Premier Chou En-lai's Speech at the Welcome Rally in Kuolikoro (Mali)" in ibid., p.40
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CHAPTER THREE

ECONOMIC INTERACTION IN KENYA-CHINA RELATIONS

3:1 Introduction.

Just as modern states are politically and technologically interdependent, so do they rely upon each other for resources and commodities which enable them develop and sustain viable economies. For almost any national endeavour, reliance on others has become one of the paramount conditions of modern international relations.¹

This chapter addresses economic relations between the two states. This interaction takes place through trade and aid. Trade trends are analyzed with a view of determining how they have influenced cooperation and/or conflict. It is our argument that trade between the two states has led to cooperation. Trade patterns are analyzed as indicators to show the extent of cooperation between the two states.

Under aid, we were concerned with Chinese financial and technical assistance to Kenya. The motive(s) of aid are analyzed. We also analyzed the nature and amount of aid promised and delivered. In the end the success of Chinese aid diplomacy towards Kenya are be evaluated.

It is argued that coincidence of interest between the two states in the economic field lead to cooperation. It is also argued

that economic interests took precedence over political factors that caused conflict, hence the continuance of cooperation even during periods of conflict.

3:2 Trends in Trade Between Kenya and China: A Case of Compatibility of Interest(s)

Trade relations between Kenya and China were established before Kenya attained her independence. As table 1 shows, such trade interaction had been recorded as early as 1960 when Kenya was still a British colony. However meaningful interaction began when Kenya became independent.

Table 1: Trade Trends Between Kenya and China: 1960-1969 in '000 Kenya pounds

YEAR	EXPORTS TO CHINA	IMPORTS FROM CHINA	BALANCE OF TRADE
1960	351	26	325
1961	54	9	45
1962	170	46	124
1963	364	326	38
1964	394	696	-302
1965	623	954	-326
1966	931	1944	-1013
1967	1092	876	216
1968	437	1592	-1155
1969	477	1151	-674
TOTAL	4898	7620	-3722

Source: Statistical Abstracts Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Planning and National Development, Nairobi 1960-1969.

From table 1 above it is shown that from 1963, trade with China started to improve. Kenya's exports increased in value from 364,000 Kenya pounds in 1963, to a height of 1,092,000 Kenya pounds in 1967. It is noteworthy that conflict existed between the two countries during this period. By 1967 four Chinese diplomats including a NCNA correspondent had been expelled on the charge of interfering in Kenya's internal affairs.² During the same year Kenya's charge d'Affairs in Peking was expelled and in July, Kenya recalled her ambassador to Peking.¹

Thus despite political conflict trade continued to flourish. Imports from China also showed an upward trend reaching an apex in 1966 valued at 1,944,000 Kenya pounds. Though exports to China decreased to 477,000 Kenya pounds in 1968, from 1969 there was steady rise in the volume of exports.

These trends in trade shows no relation to the political conflict that was existing, because trade increased when conflict existed. Therefore we can argue that during this period economic interests took precedence over political considerations. The desire for the two states to increase trade between them encouraged cooperation in the economic field and hence the political conflict was relegated to the background.

The increase in China's imports showed China's need especially cotton. Thus during this period among other purchases, China purchased Kenyan cotton and sisal directly from the cotton list and seed company for the former product. On the other hand increase in imports by Kenya from China can be partly explained by a provision

in the economic and technical assistance agreement between the two countries in 1964 requiring Kenya to purchase Chinese goods to finance part of the aid. The fact that the economic and technical assistance was not in cash but in goods and equipment further explains increase in imports from China.

Table 2 shows trade trends between the two countries in 1970s. The Table, shows that there was a general increase in trade though Kenya's imports from China and her exports to China were unproportional with imports accounting for a large amount.

Table 2: Direction of Trade Between Kenya and China Between 1970-1979 in '000 Kenya Pounds

YEAR	EXPORTS TO CHINA	IMPORTS FROM CHINA	BALANCE OF TRADE
1970	619	1213	-594
1971	1876	1435	-559
1972	1618	1219	399
1973	3070	1677	1393
1974	1785	4627	-2742
1975	1395	1471	-76
1976	413	3055	-2642
1977	1460	5814	-4354
1978	2698	5103	-2405
1979	1917	4804	-2807
TOTAL	15,871	30,418	-14,467

Source: Statistical Abstracts Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Planning and National Development; Nairobi 1970-1979

From table 2, it is clear that the total trade between the two states amounted to 46,289,000 Kenya pounds between 1970 and 1979.

Exports comprised 34.3% while imports from China comprised 65.7% of the total trade.

The table also shows that the upward trend in Kenya's exports to China which started in 1969 continued up to 1973 rising from 477,000 Kenya pounds in 1969 to 3,070,000 Kenya pounds in 1973. There was a decline in Kenya's exports starting from 1974 valued at 1,785,000 down to a low of 413,000 Kenya pounds in 1976. There was an improvement in Kenya's exports in 1977 and 1978 and then a decline in 1979 which continued up to 1982.

Imports from China in the 1970s showed an irregular pattern. Thus whereas imports rose to 1,435,000 Kenya pounds in 1971 from 1,151,000 Kenya pounds in 1969, they fell to 1,219,000 Kenya pounds in 1972 before falling again to 4,627,000 Kenya pounds in 1974. In 1975, imports declined to 1,471,000 before rising to 5,814,000 Kenya pounds in 1977. Starting from 1978 to 1982 there was a decline in imports reaching a low of 310,000 Kenya pounds in 1982.

Several factors explain the trade pattern described. In 1971 an agreement was signed between Kenya and China for the supply of Kenyan cotton to China. The contract was for the sale of a total of 755,000 bales of Kenyan cotton. This was the third direct sale by the Board to China following sales in 1970, 1969, and 1968 valued at 500,000 pounds, 300,000 pounds and 320,000 pounds respectfully.⁴ This sale improved Kenya's exports to China.

Decline in imports between 1975 can be explained in terms of the oil and energy crisis that engulfed the world in 1973. Due to the oil price explosion in 1973-74, Kenya had to use more of the

scarce foreign exchange to import oil, thus a reduction in imports from China. as Barve argues, "changes in the international economic environment notably the over worsening oil and energy crises affecting virtually all non-oil producing countries necessitated a painful adjustment to the Kenyan economy".⁵ China, in pursuance of keeping her trade balanced, may have been forced to reduce her imports from Kenya, thus decline of Kenya's exports to China.

The coffee boom of 1976 and 1977 in which prices for coffee rose from Ksh. 10.40/Kg in 1974 to Ksh. 24.06/Kg in 1976 and even further to Ksh. 43.33/Kg in 1977⁶ may partly explain the improvement in Kenya's exports to China. This is due to the fact that now China paid more for Kenyan coffee. This was reflected in the overall value of Kenya's exports to China. The general increase in trade from 1978 could be attributed to the economic agreement signed on 21 May 1978 which among other things, expected the two countries to increase their trade.⁷ A committee was set up to oversee the successful implementation of this agreement. In 1978 and 1979 exports of tea and coffee from Kenya rose tremendously explaining the upsurge in exports to China.

Trade patterns between 1980 and 1990 are shown in table 3 below. Exports from China declined in value from 1,926,000 Kenya pounds in 1980 to 310,000 Kenya pounds in 1982. There was a rise in exports to 3,285,000 Kenya pounds in 1984 before falling slightly in 1985. By 1986 exports to China were valued at 3,967,000 Kenya pounds. From 1987 up to 1990 there was a steady decline in exports to China

Table 3: Direction of Trade between Kenya and China: 1980-1990
value in '000 Kenya Pounds.

YEAR	EXPORTS TO CHINA	IMPORTS FROM CHINA	BALANCE OF TRADE
1980	1926	7,192	-5,266
1981	633	8,184	-7,551
1982	310	6,608	-6,298
1983	1,879	3,076	-1,197
1984	3,285	8,524	-5,239
1985	2,276	10,878	-8,602
1986	3,967	12,648	-8,681
1987	2,745	14,155	-11,410
1988	2,639	19,724	-17,085
1989	2,679	19,531	-16,852
1990	1,087	22,154	-21,067
TOTAL	26,295	132,674	-106,329

Source: Statistical Abstracts Central Bureau of Statistics;
 Ministry of Planing and National Development, Nairobi
 1980-1990.

The table shows that imports from China on the other hand continued to rise up to 1981 and the fell in 1982 and 1983, reaching a low of 3,076,000 Kenya pounds in 1983. From 1984, there was a

steady rise in imports from China, and by 1990, they were valued at 22,154,000 Kenya pounds.

Kenya's total exports to China between 1970 and 1979 was valued at 15,871,000 Kenya pounds. Between 1980 and 1990 the value of total exports to China was 26,295,000 Kenya pounds. On the other hand imports from China for the 1970-79 period was valued at 30,418,000 Kenya pounds and by the 1980-90 period it had reached a total of 132,674,000 Kenya pounds.

Although the total trade between the two countries rose from a total of 46,289,000 Kenya pounds in the 1970-79 period to 158,969,000 Kenya pounds for the 1980-90 period, the relative earnings accruing to each state became more unfavorable to Kenya. Hence whereas during the 1970-79 period the percentage share of Kenya's exports was 34.3% it fell to only 16.5% for the 1980-90 period.

Decline in export earnings from China may be explained by a couple of reasons. First was the fall of coffee and tea prices from Ksh. 43.33/Kg in 1977 to Ksh. 25.40/Kg in 1981 for coffee and from Ksh. 20.44/Kg in 1977 to Ksh. 16.22/Kg in 1981 for tea. Prices for hides, skins and raw cotton also fell in 1981.⁸ Coupled with this the draught conditions which resulted in the reduction of coffee and tea earnings starting from 1980 and by 1983 up to 1985 there was no earnings at all from coffee and tea.(confirm from table 4 below). Kenya did not export coffee and tea between 1983 and 1985

Further decline in Kenya's export to China from 1987 is partly attributed to the fact that China stopped importing soda ash from

Kenya which had featured among Kenya's top exports to China. China said that "high prices charged for the soda ash, high transport costs and the fact that the commodity is now amply produced in China as the reasons for stopping the importation of the commodity from Kenya".¹ Hence, this supports our argument that economic considerations were paramount in explaining trends in trade between the two states. Kenya's total exports to China between 1970 and 1979 was valued at 15,871,000 Kenya pounds.

During the 1980-90 period total exports had risen to 26,295,000 Kenya pounds. On the other hand imports from China for the 1970-79 period was valued at 30,418,000 Kenya pounds and it was valued at 132,674,000 Kenya pounds for the 1980-90 period. Total trade between 1980 and 1990 totalled 158,969,000 Kenya pounds up from 46,289,000 Kenya pounds for the 1970-79 period. In relative terms Chinese benefitted more than Kenya. The percentage share of Kenya's exports fell from 34.3% of the total trade in the 1970-79 period to 16.5% for the 1980-90 period. Thus China gained 106,379,000 Kenya pounds in positive trade balance during the 1980-90 period as compared to only 14,468,000 Kenya pounds for the 1970-79 period.

It is clear that there has been a remarkable improvement in trade between the two states during the period under study. This increase in volume of trade is an indicator of cooperation between the two states, thus supporting our contention that there has been an increase in cooperation between Kenya and China.

On the other hand, the economic gains from trade accruing to the two states has increased although unproportionally. If, trade was carried out purely for economic terms, then, China could have every reason to continue with it. However since cooperation in trade also translates into political cooperation and the possibility of obtaining aid, Kenya has also continued with the trade relationship although her gains purely in economic terms are less. This explains why China has endeavoured to encourage and develop cooperation both in economic and political field knowing that cooperation in the latter is also essential for the successful performance of the former.

Looking at the nature of trade, we found that Kenya's exports to China have been mainly agricultural products and raw materials. These products have been mainly tea, coffee, soda ash fluorspar and gum arabica.¹⁰ On the other hand Chinese exports to Kenya have been mainly manufactured goods mainly household utensils. As table 4 below shows export of manufactured goods by Kenya to China is very small. Between 1978 and 1979 coffee and tea topped Kenyan exports to China. In 1978 tea and coffee accounted for approximately 42% and in 1979 53% of Kenya's total export earning from China. Inedible crude materials mainly fluorspar, gum arabic, hides and skins and soda ash, were second with chemical dying and tanning in third place.

:Table 4: Kenya's Exports to China 1978-1979
 :Classification by Product Value in '000 K£

YEARS	ARTICLE DESCRIPTION					
	0	1	2	3	4	5
1978	1,134	7.2	863	693	3.7	0
1979	1,030	0.4	133	792	0	0.9
1980	325	0.1	1,549	6	5.1	0
1981	210	0	348	0	11	0
1982	76	0	303	0	0.14	0
1983	0	0	1,892	7.2	0	0
1984	0	0	3,184	0	34	0
1985	0	0	2,098	0	104	0
1986	1,154	0	5,071	0	29	0
1987	631	0	2,068	0	62	0
1988	531	0	3,066	0	95	0
1989	144	0	1,583	0	27	0

Source: Annual Trade reports 1978-1987. Nairobi
 Central Bureau of Statistics; Ministry of Planning and
 National Development.

Notes.

- 0 Tea and Coffee
- 1 Beverages and Tobacco
- 2 Crude Materials -Inedible except fuels
- 3 Chemicals and related materials
- 4 Manufactured goods
- 5 Others not classified above

From 1980 Kenya's major exports have been mainly those classified as crude materials inedible except fuel specifically textile fibres and their wastes being the dominant product followed by soda ash, fluorspar and gum arabica and then hides and skins. Following this in second overall place was coffee and tea. Throughout the 1980s fluorspar, gum arabica, soda ash, and hides and skins have been the major exports to China. From 1982 Kenya's export of coffee and tea had fallen from a value of 210,000 Kenya pounds in 1981 to 76,000 Kenya pounds in 1982 with none from 1983 to 1985. From 1986 coffee and tea have taken the second place in Kenya's exports followed with manufactured goods mainly leather materials followed by articles of precious and semi-precious stones mainly gold and diamond and pearls. Re-exports of food processing machinery and metal working machinery have taken third place of manufactured goods. From 1980 up to 1985 re-exports of machinery for food processing, metal working were the main exports of manufactured goods.

Thus from the foregoing it is shown that Kenya's exports have been mainly industrial raw materials and agricultural products mainly coffee and tea, and from 1986 pyrethrum.

Table 5 shows the nature of Kenya's imports. As it is clearly shown Kenya's imports have been mainly manufactured goods. These goods have accounted for more than 90% of Kenya's imports from China.

Kenya imports various manufactured goods from China mainly iron and steel products; manufactures of metals; cutlery; household equipment of base metals and chains; textile manufacturers; glass

Table 5: Kenya's Imports from China
 Classification by Product Valued in K£ '000

		ARTICLE DESCRIPTION					
YEARS	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
1978	121	0	12	43	0	153	4226
1979	110	0.1	53	148	0	401	3161
1980	280	0.4	14	369	0	4260	5798
1981	148	4	95	230	0	1077	6569
1982	27	1.4	185	14	0	1156	4689
1983	4	14	105	59	0	897	2022
1984	27	2.5	13	263	0	1072	6670
1985	64	27	218	522	1.5	1415	9049
1986	3.4	0	18	549	2.1	1415	13,280
1987	3.4	0	19	549	2.1	3521	11,116
1988	0.4	0	106	519	0	0	16,433

SOURCE: Annual Trade Report: Nairobi: Central Bureau of Statistics;
 Ministry of Planning and National Development. 1978-88

Notes

- 0 Food products
- 1 Beverages & Tobacco
- 2 Crude materials - Inedible except fuels
- 3 Mineral fuels & Lubricants
- 4
- 5 Chemicals and related products
- 6 Manufactured goods

and pottery. The above products constitute the majority of imported manufactured goods. Others include machinery and transport equipment, sanitary, plumbing heating and lighting fixtures and fitting, travel goods, handbags and similar containers, articles of apparel and clothing accessories, footwear, professional, scientific and controlling instruments and apparatus, photographing apparatus, equipment and optical goods, musical instruments and parts and accessories thereof, buttons, baby carriages, toys, games and sporting goods, works of arts, collectors and antics.¹¹ It is interesting to note that apart from the scientific and professional equipments most of the imports under this category are made of unsophisticated manufactured goods China by Broad Product Category, in '000 Kenya pounds.

Chemicals and related products have taken second position of Kenya's imports from China. These have been mainly organic and inorganic chemicals, nitrogen function compounds, dying, tanning and colouring materials, medicinal and pharmaceutical products, essential oil perfume materials, artificial resins and plastic materials. Third position has been taken by mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials with food products taking fourth position.¹²

Thus in the final analysis we found that Kenya's imports from China are made up of mainly manufactured products accounting for over 90% of total imports. Kenya's exports to China on the other hand were mainly industrial raw materials accounting for over 90% of the total exports. This factor alone explains the increasing


imbalance of trade between the two countries in favour of China. China benefits from this trade because her manufactured products fetches a higher price than Kenya's raw materials, hence the former earns more foreign exchange from the trade.

What we can deduce from the trade relations between the two countries is a relationship depicting a situation whereby a developing country in this case Kenya engages in a trade relationship with a major power (China). Like in all such situations this trade relationship benefits the major power and hence the unequal exchange accounts for the imbalances which have been a permanent feature in their trade relationships.

Figure 1 below is a summary of the trade trends between the two countries. The figure reveals that though there has been an upward trend in the pattern of trade, Kenya's imports from China have not been able to keep pace with her imports.

The slow development of trade between the two states is explained in terms of the nature of goods. China needs sophisticated manufactured capital and technical goods whereas Kenya can only export agricultural and industrial raw materials most of which China can amply obtain from her domestic sources. Kenya on the other hand is only able to obtain unsophisticated manufactured consumer goods from China and cannot obtain the needed capital goods and technology. This has indeed affected the development of trade as each of the country is unable to satisfy the requirements of the other.

FIG.1: KENYA'S EXPORTS TO AND IMPORTS



Source: Compiled by author.

Kenya has expressed concern over the large trade deficit. During a visit to Kenya by the Chinese foreign Minister in 1987 president Moi urged him to persuade his government to buy more of Kenya's tea, coffee, pyrethrum and fluorspar to offset the trade imbalance.¹³ A similar concern was voiced by the leader of a Chinese economic delegation which visited Kenya in April 1992. He urged the two governments to increase their trade to meet the imbalance in trade which stood at U.S\$ 20 million annually.¹⁴

Climatic conditions affected trade. Thus from 1980 to 1983, Kenya's export to China fell while imports remained high. We have already indicated that the bulk of Kenya's exports to China were mainly agricultural and industrial raw materials. The production of these products was affected by the long droughts which had hit the country from 1979. Hence, the exports to China fell as coffee and tea which formed the bulk of Kenya's exports in 1978 and 1979 could not be exported. The sharp increase in imports from China during this period is attributed to the importation of food to avert the food crisis which had been brought by the drought. In 1980 Kenya imported food from China valued at 280,000 Kenya pounds, whereas the same products had been valued at only 110,000 Kenya pounds in 1979. As the rains improved, importation of food reduced to a value of only 4000 Kenya pounds in 1983. However as food shortages occurred in Kenya in 1984 and 1985 imports of foods increased to 27,000 Kenya pounds in 1984 and by 1985 it had reached 64,000 Kenya pounds in value.

Throughout the 1980s, trade delegations were exchanged between the two countries to explore the prospects of increasing trade. Delegations by the heads of the two governments also advocated for increase in trade and during such visits, pledges to increase the volume of trade were made. For instance, during premier Zhao Ziyang's visit, Kenya made a case for increased trade with China and received a Chinese pledge that China would buy more of Kenyan coffee, tea, and soda ash.¹⁵ It is worth to note that in 1984, Kenya's export of fluorspar and soda ash almost doubled from 1,892,000 Kenya pounds in 1983 to 3,182,000 Kenya pounds in 1984. There was a general increase in other goods especially manufactured goods and food.¹⁶ A high ranking economic delegation from Sichuan and Shanghai provinces visited Kenya in 1987 to explore the possibility of investing in Kenya and to discuss further Chinese purchase of Kenyan goods.¹⁷

The general trend observed from the discussion is that since 1963, as imports increased also the exports increased, that is , as Kenya's imports from China fell, also the latter's imports from Kenya fell. This has been the general pattern up to the mid 1980s. From 1986 there has been a general rise in imports from China without a reciprocal rise in China's imports from Kenya. This can be attributed to the role Chinese aid plays. Technical and financial agreements are accompanied with agreements to purchase certain amount of goods from China. Also with the aid being more in the construction sector, materials are mainly bought from China.

The increase in the volume of imports of manufactured goods from China may explain the upward trend of imports from China.

From the foregoing analysis, we can conclude that, though good political relations between two countries make good foundations for trade to flourish, it is the economic factors more than political factors which have affected trade between Kenya and China. The economic interests of the two states forced them to cooperate even when political conflict existed.

Though there has been a general increase in trade between the two countries, the volume of trade has been very low. When compared to Kenya's major trading partners, China does not feature among her top trading partners. Even on the Asian and far East region, China comes far behind Japan, Australia and India respectively. This means that trade between the two states is not significant only in economic terms. There are certain factors that account for this state of affairs.

Two major factors affecting the development of trade has been geography and the nature of the two states economies.¹⁸ The incompatible nature of their economies meant that meaningful trade could not develop rapidly. Kenya's main exports were/are agricultural products and industrial raw materials. What they welcomed most were consumer and capital goods. China could not provide these goods in the quantity and quality necessary to match the traditional European suppliers. Because both countries produced unsophisticated manufactured goods and raw materials, no base for extensive exchange was formed thus low volume of trade.

Another factor that affected trade was that China could not purchase Kenyan goods with hard currency, but preferred a barter engagement in their exchange. The fact that both countries' goods were basically the same, a barter trade was not feasible. Furthermore, Kenya needed hard currency to purchase capital goods and technology for her economic development, which the Chinese could not provide because of her needs and the economic problems she was facing. At independence, a commercial delegation had visited the Eastern bloc countries to study the prospects of increasing trade. Trade however could not increase because the Eastern bloc countries could only trade in barter and not in hard currency. As one member of parliament expressed it " Why should we barter for goods we cannot use when West Germany purchases 85% of our coffee with hard currency ?"¹⁹

A major reason as to why China could not buy Kenyan goods in hard or convertible currency is that the Yuan, the Chinese currency is not accepted internationally as a convertible currency. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is the one which decides which currency is convertible and which one is not. The IMF is controlled by Western countries which are the member states, and China is not a member. Thus for China to be able to buy Kenyan goods, she had first to get the Western convertible currencies which were not readily available at her disposal. Secondly during the 1960s and 1970s China was building her industry. For this reason she needed to buy capital and technology from Western Europe. So the little

hard currency she could lay her hands on was spent on buying these important ingredients for her industrialization.

Development of trade was also affected by the traditional patterns of trade which Kenya had developed. For a long time, from the colonial time, Western Europe especially Britain, West German and other European Economic Community member states have dominated Kenya's trade. Britain has been the major trading partner being the major recipient and origin of Kenyan goods. This state of affairs could be attributed to two major factors. First, the British colonial Policy was to develop a clientele relationship with Kenya. Trade with socialist countries was discouraged and kept minimal if any. The aim of this was to develop Kenya as a source of cheap raw materials and a market for her manufactured goods. Trade with the Western countries was at least tolerated. Thus at independence Kenya found herself in a state where her trading partners, were from the Western European countries and without a sound trading base with China and other socialist countries, hence Kenya had no option but to continue with these patterns. Although she tried to reorient her trading patterns to include those countries hitherto omitted, the rate of development was slow. The Western European countries on the other hand had a better chance of expanding trade at the expense of China. As Tom Mboya argued

Of course colonialism imposed certain ties which did not disappear at independence. Indeed we welcome some of them and we ourselves have gone out of our way to increase our connections with them... On gaining independence we were once faced with the need for rapid economic development. This means

increasing investment, seeking more capital and export markets and technical aid. Obviously we looked in the traditional direction for investment and trade. For our own interest we found it necessary to continue economic relations with former colonial masters.²⁰

Secondly, the Western European countries were able to dominate Kenya's trade after independence, because unlike China they were in a position of providing what Kenya required for her economic development. The economic base of these countries was industrial and they could provide capital goods and technology to Kenya. Furthermore because they bought Kenya goods in hard currency and provided aid, the existing patterns of trade which favoured these countries were strengthened. This traditional patterns of trade have persisted as illustrated by Table 6.

Table 6: Kenya's Trade with selected countries 1971-87.

YEARS	(A) Origin Of Imports Valued In K£ '000						
	United Kingdom	West Germany	Italy	U.S.A	Japan	India	China
1971	56,249	16,249	6,951	16,321	19,330	3,649	1,435
1972	50,560	16,867	7,846	17,954	17,870	4,032	1,213
1973	50,742	20,312	8,165	16,762	25,998	6,480	1,613
1974	63,949	36,193	12,396	20,755	40,438	5,922	4,186
1975	69,455	27,028	12,675	24,879	30,006	7,922	3,055
1976	77,043	27,028	12,914	23,672	45,034	7,922	3,055
1977	95,218	57,852	22,006	30,482	65,603	11,720	5,814
1978	145,933	87,755	33,490	29,553	67,912	15,818	5,103
1979	141,349	68,810	23,747	35,378	49,975	10,155	4,804
1980	162,370	77,660	37,680	60,960	88,410	13,010	7,190
1981	156,850	75,110	25,230	63,650	73,460	10,140	8,180
1982	135,760	75,630	22,960	54,380	70,140	12,220	6,610
1983	121,560	70,320	15,680	56,640	85,840	6,670	3,080
1984	152,340	98,060	34,100	50,870	111,760	11,960	8,520
1985	164,260	95,680	42,040	66,190	120,010	15,420	10,880
1986	208,940	146,070	193,710	65,290	146,280	18,230	12,650
1987	244,120	118,290	98,090	101,110	133,660	18,720	14,150

Table 6: Kenya's Trade with selected countries 1971-87.

YEARS	(B) Destination Of Exports Valued In K£ '000						
	United Kingdom	West Germany	Italy	U.S.A	Japan	India	China
1971	15,471	7,047	6,543	5,625	2,648	2,046	876
1972	20,392	9,480	2,909	5,491	2,093	2,378	1,618
1973	20,622	13,571	3,687	7,532	5,031	1,587	3,070
1974	18,702	17,874	4,440	8,029	5,364	2,820	1,787
1975	22,691	19,184	5,771	8,409	6,333	2,862	1,402
1976	36,072	42,123	13,874	18,378	4,551	2,545	413
1977	63,594	85,951	13,442	27,592	5,233	1,623	1,463
1978	57,197	56,813	18,891	18,519	3,907	1,559	2,702
1979	58,792	60,836	23,804	16,737	5,100	2,197	1,959
1980	58,880	56,020	23,730	16,930	3,830	4,080	1,960
1981	59,810	58,420	20,120	19,520	3,740	4,530	630
1982	72,250	60,830	15,200	35,180	3,460	4,530	310
1983	96,250	82,010	14,760	39,100	4,630	4,700	1,880
1984	142,270	98,050	21,280	38,820	6,130	3,080	3,290
1985	135,560	93,460	17,780	54,050	6,230	5,720	2,380
1986	143,060	136,480	20,460	85,790	8,560	5,890	3,970
1987	133,130	79,190	17,010	42,610	7,030	4,280	2,750

Source: The Economic Survey: Nairobi. Central Bureau of Statistics; Ministry of Planning and National Development

In evaluating Kenya-China trade relation we note that a dominant feature is its pragmatism. Throughout the period under study trade interaction between them continued even during times of political conflict. This is reminiscent of China's international trade which has been labelled to be pragmatic.²¹ Thus throughout the period of Sino-Soviet dispute trade between the two states has been going on. China has also continued to trade with her traditional enemy, Japan. In the 1960s Nigeria which did not have diplomatic relations with China was the major trading partner of China in Africa. This pragmatism, is therefore not restricted only to Kenya, but is a feature in Chinese international trade. From this we can conclude that, in Kenya as in those countries where political relations were bad, economic interest was the major force impelling China to trade with her.

The economic factor explaining the development and continuing of trade between the two states was the need for economic development. Immediately after Kenya attained her independence, economic development became the major priority of the Kenyan leaders. African socialism became the economic and social philosophy which guided Kenya's planners and policy makers. The basic tenets of African socialism were outlined in Sessional Paper No.10 of 1965 entitled "African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya". On international trade, the paper states "Kenya places no ideological barriers on trade and expects that trade relationship should be conducted in general on the basis of economic consideration".²² Thus Kenya was prepared to seek and

develop trade with all states of the world as long as that trade did not lead to political domination from any other nation.

To attain economic development trade had to be expanded and diversified. With this in mind, the Kenyan leaders did not hesitate to start or develop trade with countries from the socialist bloc including China. President Kenyatta put this out quite vividly in an address to an assembly of businessmen in 1964:

When we became a sovereign nation last year my government gave an assurance that the conditions necessary for accelerated growth would continue to be maintained and improved. In order to achieve our aim, we decided to spread our commercial and trade contracts to countries with whom these activities had hitherto been either non-existent or negligible. Apart from the need to spread marketing risks, this step also suited our approach to international problems. We believe in a policy of non-alignment.

Trade with the Third World, on the other hand, served an important function to the Chinese. China has always had an adverse trade balance with the Western world. This is because Chinese exports to these countries can not pay for the imports from there owing to the nature of her exports and imports. China imports capital goods and technology from these countries while she exports to them raw materials. However, China's trade with African countries in general has been in favour of the former. Thus China has used this surplus to balance her trade with the Western countries. In this context, it is worth noting that since 1963, apart from 1963, 1967, 1972 and 1973 trade between Kenya and China has been in favour of the latter. This means that, China has used the surpluses she earns from her trade with Kenya to help balance

her adverse trade with Western Europe. This is of great importance to China and can explain why China had continued trading with Kenya since independence even at times of political conflict. As the volume in trade increases, China stands to gain more, hence it is to her advantage to encourage the rapid development of trade and hence explains the interest China has taken in seeing that there has been a growth in their trade.

The role of trade as an indicator of the level of cooperation between two countries cannot be measured solely by economic considerations. As Alexander Eckstein has demonstrated, "China's trade policies have clearly been determined by foreign policy".³¹ Thus important as they are, economic interests do not stand alone, but are linked to political interests which may modify or even override their effects. Hence trade between the two countries has not only reflected an increased level of political interaction, but has also some political motives underlying it. Thus in the 1960s, the political conflict which brought about suspicions hindered the rapid development of trade. The 1970s in which there was low political interaction trade was also low. However as from the 1980s when political activities increased as evidenced by the number of delegations exchanged and the restoration of diplomatic relations, trade interaction increased as the necessary political conditions necessary for signing trade agreements were established and even the number of commercial delegations increased.

Non-alignment, (which is dealt with in dept in chapter five) as a guide to foreign policy is a major impetus explaining the

development of trade with China and other socialist countries. After winning political independence, Kenyan leaders were trying to establish their economic independence. Economic independence meant that the leaders could not only depend on the metropolitan powers alone for economic relations as this could result in economic domination and thus reduce their latitude of action. Economic domination could inevitably lead to political control as the few dominant states controlling the new states' economies would use economic "carrots" and "stick" to see that their dependencies followed what they dictated to them. With this in mind, Kenya adopted a policy of economic non-alignment which would ensure that her economy was not dominated by any one power. Kenya's efforts to reorganize trade to conform to positive non-alignment was followed by a commercial delegation to the Eastern bloc countries to study the prospects of initiating trade. As Oginga writes

... at this time in history if Africa is to be really free, if we are to obtain true economic independence, we must follow a policy of non-alignment of relations with both 'east' and 'west'. With the capitalist and socialist countries. If our aid and investment come from one source only we can banish the prospects of pursuing an independent policy for we will be brought under control by the withholding of aid or by some other economic pressure.."

Kenya wanted to be seen as truly following a policy of non-alignment because it could not only make her feel that she was truly independent but also increased her international prestige. The fact that Kenya is an underdeveloped Third World country following an independent policy in her international relations

meant that her international independence is enhanced and thus her prestige in the non-alignment movement and within the Third World is increased. By international independence we mean the ability to act without undue influence or coercion from any other power in pursuing any line of action in the international scene. The fact that Kenya is able to choose freely to pursue any policy which she thinks is in her interest underlies her independence.

3:3 Chinese Financial and Technical Aid to Kenya.

Financial and technical aid has been an important feature in China's international cooperative role. Aid has been a feature in Kenya-China cooperation. China entered the aid race in 1953 and although being a developing country and needed aid for her economic development she nevertheless started giving aid to Third World countries. Chinese technical and economic assistance is divided into two categories. First is the Chinese assistance governed by the eight principles set forth by Chou En-lai in 1964, and second, is aid governed by the four principles as given by premier Zhao Ziyang in Dar-es-Salaam in 1983. Both types of aid have been given to Kenyan.

The following are the "Eight Principles on Economic and Technical Assistance".²⁶

- (i) The Chinese Government always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in providing aid. It never regards such aid as a kind of unilateral alms but as something mutual.

- (ii) In providing aid, the Chinese Government strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries and never attaches any conditions or asks for any privileges.
- (iii) The Chinese Government provides economic aid in the form of interest free or low interest loans and extends the time limit for the repayment when necessary so as to lighten the burden of the recipient countries as far as possible.
- (iv) In providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese Government is not to make the recipient countries dependent on China, but to help them embark on economic development.
- (v) The Chinese Government tries its best to help the recipient countries build projects which require less investments while yielding quicker results so that the recipient governments may increase their income and accumulate capital.
- (vi) The Chinese Government provides the best quality equipment and materials of its own manufactures at international market prices. If the equipment and material provided by the Chinese Government are not up to the agreed specifications and quality, the Chinese Government undertakes to replace them.
- (vii) In giving any particular technical assistance, the Chinese Government will see to it that the personnel of the recipient country fully master such technique.

(viii) The experts dispatched by the Chinese Government to help in construction in the recipient countries will have the same standard of living as the experts of those countries. The Chinese experts are not allowed to make any special demands or enjoy any special amenities.

These principles show that in extending aid, China was undoubtedly influenced by her experience as an aid recipient and by her economic capabilities and policy goals. Under this program Kenya has received Chinese assistance since 1963. Kenya-China aid relationship started immediately when Kenya became independent. The basis of such aid was an economic and technical agreement signed in May 1964 between Kenya's Minister for Home Affairs and the Chinese government. The agreement provided that China would give Kenya U.S.\$2.8 million cash grant to help her offset a budget deficit. China also promised to give Kenya an interest free loan of U.S\$15 million for Kenya's development for the period starting July 1964 to June 30, 1969. The loan was to be given in the form of complete sets of equipment and technical assistance according to the abilities of the PRC and the requirements of the Kenyan government. The specific items were to be discussed and decided upon by the two governments. The loan was to be repaid within a period of ten years in Swiss Francs or any other convertible currency agreed upon by the two governments.²¹

Early in 1966, reports by the New York Times implied that China lacked the capacity to offer goods useful to African development and claimed that Chinese credits to some African

countries were not being used. The same paper reported that Kenya's allotment was not drawn at all. However by April 29, 1966, the paper reported that credit had began to reach Kenya in the form of goods whose poor quality made them unusable, or else goods which Kenya was already producing in ample quantity.²⁸ Early in 1964, sixteen Chinese experts were reported to have left for Kenya to find ways of implementing the loan. At a party hosted for the experts, the Kenyan ambassador in Peking Mr. Muli, told the experts that Kenya needed textile and canning factories, large irrigation schemes, schools, hospitals and better roads.²⁹

China's aid was not restricted to the technical and economic field alone. She also responded to Kenya's emergencies by giving relief assistance. In 1964, the Chinese ambassador to Kenya Mr. Wang Yu tien presented a cheque of 1000 sterling pounds to assist flood victims. On receiving the cheque, Kenya's acting Minister for Home Affairs, Mr. Achieng Oneko thanked the Chinese government saying that " the gift would go a long way in helping not only Nyanza flood victims but also those affected by floods along the Tana River."³⁰ in 1974, the Chinese Red Cross made a donation of nearly 420,000.

Though aid to Kenya was modest, it nevertheless laid down foundation for friendly cooperation between the two countries. This was vividly expressed by Odinga on his return to Kenya from Peking and Moscow

Kenya's new economic and cultural aid agreement just negotiated with China and the Soviet Union has laid a foundation for further cooperation between the two countries.³¹

Though strictly speaking Chinese aid to Kenya was inadequate in economic terms, China hoped to gain certain political interests through aid. As Ogunsanwo argues, " the Chinese employed aid as an instrument of foreign policy. Their efforts were quite explicitly directed towards political rather than economic ends."³² Thus political significance was shown by the praise her aid was given. Aid could also help establish the Chinese presence and this in turn increased her prestige. As Mr Oneko said:

The assistance given by the Chinese government will assist Kenya a great deal in her exploitation of her national resources. The people of Kenya strongly believe that there should be more and more contacts between the two countries so that their friendship may be more rooted, and gain even more mutual understanding³³

No any other aid promise was made to Kenya throughout the 1960s. However in 1977 China promised to assist in the construction of a sports centre in Nairobi. In 1978 a team of Chinese experts completed a preliminary survey of the proposed sports complex and a source at the Chinese embassy indicated that the PRC was willing to carry out the project.³⁴ The project did not take off the ground immediately. In 1980 President Moi made a five day visit to the PRC. While there, he signed an economic and technical agreement, according to which China would give Kenya an interest-free loan of 20 million pounds to build the proposed project. The Chinese government also agreed to finance rice growing and other development schemes including energy projects. The project was finally started after numerous delays and Premier Zhao Ziyang promised to increase funds to complete the building.³⁵

The Kasarani project was divided into three distinct phases: Phase one was the construction of a stadium with a seating capacity of 60,000 spectators. According to the designers it can not collapse under weight of 100,000 spectators. The stadium has an all year green pitch complete with an irrigation system, a tartaned track and within its superstructure are to be found restaurants, VIP lounges, modern radio and television studios. There is also an athlete hostel with 200 beds. The stadium was handed over in 1987 in readiness for the Fourth All African Games. President Moi thanking the Chinese disclosed that the stadium complex had cost Ksh 930 million, 48% of which had been supplied by the Kenyan government and the remainder as an interest free loan from China.

In 1987, the Chinese government agreed to provide Ksh.8.31 million to finance the construction of a gymnasium with a seating capacity of 5000 spectators. ¹⁶ This comprised phase two of the sports complex. Phase three of the project was the construction of an aquatic stadium of olympic standard with a seating capacity of 2000 people. While the Chinese government undertook to finance the construction of the aquarium, the Kenyan government was to undertake the external works of the project. The project was completed and in April 1992 the Chinese government handed over the sports complex to the government.

After the hand over of the sports complex, the Chinese government left eleven technicians to manage and maintain the equipments at the sports centre; and to train Kenyan personnel to

take over from the Chinese in running the management of the sports centre.

The utilizing period of the loan is five to seven years after which a five year period of grace is given. The payment of the loan would commence over a ten year period. However, in accordance with the eight principles, the period for repayment can be extended. Repayment would be in hard currency and in export of Kenyan goods to China.

The Moi International Sports Centre (Kasarani) has marked a new age of friendship and cooperation between the two countries. It has been described as the sports " Mecca of Africa." This was vividly put by Professor Ng'eno then speaker of the National Assembly. He said that "Kasarani is a monument which will mark the friendship between Kenya and China for many years to come."³⁷

Under the technical cooperation agreement, the Chinese government agreed in 1991 to help in the construction of Moi University Medical School and the expansion of Eldoret District Hospital. These projects include the construction of a students hostel and staff house; construction of a mortuary with a carrying capacity of forty-eight bodies; and an outpatient department.

The second category of Chinese technical assistance to Kenya is that governed by the four principles as set out by Premier Zhao Ziyang, in 1983 in Dar-es-Salaam.³⁸ Under this category, Chinese companies get tenders from the Kenyan government to develop certain projects. The four principles are:

- (i) In carrying out economic and technological cooperation with African countries, China abides by the principles of unity, friendship, equality and mutual benefit, respects their sovereignty, does not interfere in their internal affair, attaches no political conditions and asks no privileges whatsoever.
- (ii) In China's economic and technological cooperation with African countries, full play will be given to the strong points and potentials of both sides on the basis of their actual needs and possibilities and efforts will be made to achieve good economic results with less investment, shorter construction circle and quicker returns.
- (iii) China's economic and technological cooperation with African countries takes a variety of forms suited to the specific local conditions, such as offering technical services, training technical and management personnel, engaging in scientific and technological exchanges, undertaking construction projects, entering into cooperative production and joint ventures. With regard to cooperative projects it undertakes, the Chinese side will see to it that the signed contracts are observed, the quality of work guaranteed and stress laid on friendship. The experts and technical personnel dispatched by the Chinese side do not ask for special treatment.
- (iv) The purpose of China's technological cooperation with African countries is to contribute to the enhancement of

the self-reliant capabilities of both sides and promote the growth of the respective national economies by complementing and helping each other.

Under this category several projects have been carried out by Chinese companies most important among them being China Sichuan International Economic and Technological Cooperation (SIETCO). Among the projects carried by this company are: construction of Kasarani complex, Moi University Medical School and Eldoret district hospital. These projects were as a result of aid from the Chinese government. Contract projects include the construction of two district hospitals and six health centres financed by the African Development Bank (ADB) and Organization of petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) loans. These projects include: Webuye district hospital, Musambweni district hospital, Tengesi and Isenya health centres in Rift Valley province, Keumbu and Kesigi health centres in Nyanza province and Malakisi and Manyala health centres in Western province. Other projects by SIETCO include the construction of United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) offices; Hamiliwy tourist hotel in Malindi; Taita Tourist hotel in Taita Taveta District; Meridian Five star hotel and extension of Safari Park hotel both in Nairobi, Barclays Plaza building, Fuji plaza in Westlands and Pan Paper mill factory. Another Chinese company China Road Cooperation constructed the Eldoret-Baringo road; China Chiansu has contracted in the extension of Egerton University, construction of Baringo teachers training college,

Murang'a teachers college, Kabarnet teachers college and Makuyu training college.

Therefore, it is shown that China's importance as an aid donor has grown. According to the Chinese assistant Minister for Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Mr. Tian Runzhi who led a Chinese trade delegation, Kenya had received up to U.S\$ 1.2 billion in form of aid from China.³⁹

From the above analysis, it is shown that Chinese aid concentrated on projects that could be handed over intact to the recipient state and which did not need expensive capital or material imports to keep them functioning after completion. The construction and development of national sports facilities has been given significance in Africa. The development of sports facilities has been due to a number of reasons. First sport is gaining in importance in Africa not only as a part time but also as a contribution to nation building and a focus of national unity. During the handing over ceremony of Kasarani in 1987, the Chinese representative Mr. Gu Mu (a senate councillor) remarked that " the stadium would be used not by Kenyans alone but by athletes from all over the continent."⁴⁰ The importance of sports has been underscored by President Moi on several occasions. He has demonstrated his belief in sports as " a factor for consolidating harmony among people and nations... It is necessary for all able bodied persons... it is good for relaxing tired minds and equally good for physical fitness. This is because healthy bodies and minds are essential for national development."⁴¹

Second, following the examples of countries such as Cuba and German Democratic Republic, African countries are using sports as an effective political instrument. China was not slow to recognize this and a number of projects were not just aimed at particular nations but at the continent as a whole. For instance in 1979, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Kenya among other countries, boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympic games to protest the Soviet action.

A part from construction and sports development, other areas of technical cooperation have been developed. The Chinese government provides twenty five scholarships annually to Kenyan students to study in Chinese institutions. By 1991 the PRC in conjunction with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) undertook to train Kenyan technicians in rice and vegetable production techniques. By the end of 1991 seven Kenyans had been trained in rice production techniques and five in vegetable and meat processing and agricultural production. These training programs are undertaken in China.⁴²

In March 1987, an agreement was signed between the two states under which the Shen Zhen Electronic Group agreed to assist Kenya in the establishment of an electronics plant to produce colour television sets, cassette recorders, solar energy equipment and electrical appliances.⁴³ In september a commercial delegation from Sichuan and Shanghai provinces visited Kenya to study the feasibility of investing in the country.

From the foregoing discussion, it is shown that aid has been a major element in the two states' cooperation. Though Chinese aid, has been modest when compared to other aid donors from Western Europe, it has indicated a willingness on the part of China in pursuing cooperation in this sector with Kenya.

3:4 Motives of Chinese Aid

Both economic and political considerations were the factors underlying Chinese aid to Kenya.

Foreign aid was a useful tool of foreign policy because it enabled China to compete with the Western " imperialists" without risking nuclear war. Later this applied to the Soviet Union as well. Aid allowed Peking to relate to a number of African countries. It also made it possible for Chinese leaders to embarrass the richer countries and maintain an attitude of moral superiority.⁴⁴ Chinese aid to Kenya in the 1960s was clearly in competition with the Soviet Union and Taiwan which were also using aid diplomacy in Africa.⁴⁵ In 1964, the Soviet Union offered Kenya US\$ 44 million in aid to be used in the construction of a hospital, an institute in Nairobi and installation of a radio station. The Chinese in competition with the Soviet Union in the same year offered an interest free loan amounting to US\$ 15 million and US\$ 3 million cash grant. By 1973 U.S.\$12 million was still unused.⁴⁶

China had found that diplomatic recognition was difficult to attain in an arena of world politics where the U.S. and later the Soviet Union made efforts to see China isolated. Little aid often

paved the way for better relations including recognition.⁴¹ It is worth to note that Chinese aid promises closely followed the establishments of diplomatic relations or in some cases recognition was closely followed with aid promises. After Kenya recognized China, aid was given to show good will and appreciation. It was also a way of showing the target country that through cooperation more aid could be given.

Aid was also given to solicit support for certain Chinese policies from the recipients. Aid to Kenya may have been aimed at buying Kenya's support for the forth coming Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Algeria. China supported the Indonesian President proposal for a second Bandung before holding the non-aligned conference as proposed by President Tito of Yugoslavia. The Chinese could not attend the non-aligned movement because of her ideological alignment. Thus the Chinese took steps in seeking support for a second Bandung which included the giving of aid to African countries and the undertaking of a continental tour by Chinese premier Chou En-lai.

China's endeavour to return to friendly relations with Kenya, as with other countries, after the thaw in foreign policy following the cultural revolution underlies the donation made by the Chinese Red Cross to relieve the effects of draught catastrophe in Kenya. This was the highest donation US\$ 420,000 China had even given to a country outside the Eastern bloc.⁴² It is significant to note that after this donation was handed over, it was the first time in years that a Chinese diplomat was again received by Kenyatta. Important

to note also is the fact that since 1964, it is in 1978 when Kenya reopened her embassy in Peking that China promised to assist Kenya in the construction of a sports complex. Since then, economic and technical assistance agreements have been signed. We can conclude from the above that political cooperation was a prerequisite for aid giving to Kenya. From this, we can also argue that aid is an indicator of political cooperation. Hence since 1978, as aid offers to Kenya have increased, we can doubtlessly assert that political relations between the two countries, have greatly improved.

China also gave aid because she wanted to win a position of leadership among the poor countries. Mao perceived that a wide division existed between the rich and poor nations. He saw this gap as a fundamental contradiction in world politics. As a corollary China is competing with India for leadership of the non-aligned nations. China as well offers its political and economic system as a model for the developing countries. Its economic aid program has been used to further these aims. Thus in this context aid to Kenya is not unique but is part and parcel of its wider policy of giving aid to Third World countries.

On the economic sphere, foreign aid provides China with an avenue for the export of Chinese goods. Almost all of China's aid has been given to purchase Chinese goods. China was short of foreign exchange hence giving her aid in form of goods. However, this was not the only reason of giving aid in goods. Aid projects demonstrates China's technological skills at the same time

reminding the recipient country of the Chinese assistance hence in a way forming a favourable stamp in the minds of the people of the recipient country of the Chinese because of their help. Through aid, China expands markets for her goods. Repayment is in hard currency which China is in need of or in goods which China requires. This has been true in the case of Chinese aid to Kenya which has been mainly in project form and goods.

China's foreign aid program can be related to specific perspectives of the world held by the Chinese leaders.⁴¹ Mao's thoughts on international politics were in large part conditioned by Marxism-Leninism. Like Marx, Mao was an economic determinist who felt that economic forces were largely responsible for political-historical trends and even specific events. He also believed that the forces of imperialism can be dealt with, and that the Third World is crucial to the defeat of imperialism. Thus economics and politics are inextricably related. Manipulating trade and aid as a tool of foreign policy is not only legitimate but is also necessary to accomplish Mao's aims and make China a powerful and important nation. Therefore according to the Chinese official view, by helping strengthen the economies of the recipient countries China frees them from colonial and neo-colonial control and thus strengthens the world's anti-imperialist forces which is in itself a tremendous support to China.

Finally China may have given aid to Kenya to allay Kenyan fears over Chinese military aid to Somalia in view of their territorial dispute. Aid to Kenya was intended to show that China

supported Somalia's territorial claims against Ethiopia and French Somaliland but not Kenya. The Sino-Somalia economic and military aid agreement of August 1963 was signed at a time when Kenya-Somali relations were severely strained. Kenyatta at once made strong private protests to Lui Shao Chi and received assurances that the Chinese would in fact limit the military aid they gave to Somali.⁵⁰

Thus aid to Kenya in 1964 was intended to allay these genuine fears on the part of the Kenyan government. Also Mao had sought a greater presence in Eastern Africa, particularly a base of operation to aid the revolution in the Congo. As Cooper argues, this probably explains why the aid agreement contained a provision for the use of Chinese technicians.⁵¹ Chinese arms were subsequently seen in Nairobi, presumably en-route to Congo.⁵² A convoy of 75 tons of Chinese arms were also intercepted by the Kenyan police in Western Kenya enroute to Uganda.⁵³ It has been argued that these arms were meant for the remnants of the Congolese rebel groups. Hence, Peking planned to use its official connection with the government of Kenya to aid revolutionaries in Congo.

In conclusion both economic and political considerations underlie China's aid diplomacy. In giving aid to Kenya, China hoped to achieve more political than economic goals. Aid was used as a foreign policy instrument but its success up to 1979 was very limited. China hoped to gain political influence through aid but failed. This failure was largely due to the fact that Kenya received large quantities of economic assistance from Western European countries. Britain alone, had contributed \$300 million by

the time China presented her first offer. Also the U.S., West Germany and Japan were major donors. In addition to these countries, the Soviet Union made an offer amounting to \$44 million. China realized that her aid will not have an impact on Kenya and hence she directed it elsewhere to the opposition. Therefore in the first two decades, China did not establish any meaningful aid relationship with Kenya. Chinese aid to Kenya in the 1960s was, hence, used for subversive activities.

From 1980 China became an important donor to Kenya. Her assistance was in those areas where she knows best-how; construction and sports development. With the present international political and economic environment in which assistance from the traditional major donors from Western countries and Western controlled institution such as the IMF and the World Bank, tied to certain conditionalities which the recipient countries must fulfil, China will emerge as a major alternative source of aid. This is because Chinese aid is free of any conditionalities and is usually given on very generous terms-interest free or low interest loan; ten year period of grace and credit spread over a wide period of time. Already as aid from Western countries to Kenya is being freezed bending the fulfilment of certain conditions by the latter, in April 1992 the Chinese government pledged Ksh. 288.5 million loan and a grant of Ksh. 11.5 million in the form of drugs and pharmaceutical products from China. Hence from the 1980s a meaningful aid relationship between the two countries has been

developed. Though aid from China is modest, it is doubtless that this relationship will be strengthened.

3:5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:

In this chapter we set out to test the hypothesis that whenever there is a coincidence of economic interests cooperation would ensure between the two states.

From the data we obtained we found out that economic cooperation continued even at times of political conflict. Thus throughout the 1960s, when political relations were sour, the volume of trade between the two countries increased. Some of the aid which had been promised to Kenya was also given, hence, we can argue that economic interests took precedence over political considerations.

Cooperation in the economic field in the midst of political conflict was also due to the political interests that were to be served by such cooperation. Thus in the case of Kenya, the need for her to be seen as a non-aligned state, and Kenyatta's attempt to please the radicals within parliament, meant that despite the political problems Kenya was experiencing with China, cooperation was necessary.

The data also showed that, there has been an increase in economic and technical cooperation. This cooperation in the economic field has been an indicator of the shift of relations towards high levels of cooperation without conflict. The indicators witnessing this cooperation include, increase in the volume of

trade, resumption of economic assistance from China; increase in commercial delegations between the two countries and technical cooperation.

China used her aid officially to compete with both the Soviet Union and the United States but was unsuccessful. In an epoch when rich countries are getting richer and poor countries getting poorer, China has become a model donor of economic aid. China has demonstrated to the Western industrial countries what she understands by true aid, her aid has been outstanding not only because she offers economic aid loans without interest, but also because her terms of repayment are more favourable than those granted by any other country.

We found that aid was not given only for economic but also for political reasons. Thus economic cooperation was not important for economic reasons alone but also for the political benefits that accompanied it. Thus by cooperating in the economic field, also political benefits could be gained.

Thus as our first hypothesis speculated, whenever there is coincidence of economic interests cooperation between Kenya and China would occur. The analysis of this chapter clearly shows that there was no conflict between the two states as a result of economic reasons. Hence economic interaction served the interests of the two states therefore resulting into cooperation. We can thus conclude that cooperation between the two states in the economic field was as a result of the interests to be gained from such interactions.

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CHAPTER FOUR

CONFLICT IN KENYA CHINA POLITICAL INTERACTION.

4.1 Introduction

Interaction between states usually entails political, economic and socio-cultural exchanges. Inter-dependence makes interaction inevitable as no nation state is wholly dependent or self-sufficient. Different power attributes makes the possibility of equal exchanges difficult and hence interaction between states can be said to be inherently characterized by both conflict and cooperation.

This chapter deals with Kenya-China political relation in the context of conflict. Conflictive relations between any two states result when one or both of the states pursue policies that are perceived to be inimical to the other state's interest. Hence when two states follow incompatible interests conflict will ensure. Certain indicators can be used to measure the level of conflict between states. These include inter alia, number of diplomatic protests, recall or expulsion of diplomatic representatives, threats, denials, withdrawal and/or suspension of aid; demonstrations against the other state, break of diplomatic relations, suspension of visits by heads of states to protest certain activities; and suspension or abrogation of agreements.

In this chapter we endeavoured not only to show or describe the conflict that existed between Kenya and China but also to show the political factors that were salient in explaining this conflict.

4.2 Divergent Interests: A Case of Conflict 1963-1969

On the whole, China took the initiative of establishing diplomatic relations with African countries. African policies towards her have developed in response to a challenge. This response was determined by the nature of the PRC's African policy, its broad principles, its visible objectives and its specific tactics and the concrete interests of the African governments.¹

In Kenya-China relations, China has been the initiator of policy whereas Kenya's policy towards her has been largely a reaction to those initiatives made by China. Hence the resultant behaviour and relationship between the two states depended on Kenya's response to challenges brought about by China's policy initiative. Those policies of China which were perceived by the Kenyan ruling elites as being inimical to their national interest led to responses which were either defensive or taken as a counter-checks eventually leading to conflict. Kenya's response in turn acted as a stimuli on which China based her policy behaviour. Thus if Kenya took a hostile stance then China also took a stance that was aimed at countering these hostilities including actions such as protests and threats. The action-reaction, stimuli response sequence formed a kind of a 'vicious circle of conflict' which persisted. This circle could only be broken when one or both of the states took policies which were favourably perceived and hence acceptable as being in their interest.

Conflict in the two states' relations during this period is explained in terms of China's policy stance and behaviour vis-a-vis

Kenya which the latter perceived as threatening to her interest. However, it is naive to think that conflict was only as a result of China's unfavourable policy stances. Certain internal political factors within Kenya also accounted for the conflict.

The PRC's African policy operates at two levels: The diplomatic and ideological. Under the ideological level the aim of the PRC is to extend socialist revolution to Africa based on the Chinese model. This revolutionary interest in African extends beyond the liberation against the remnants of colonialism to the phase of post-independence construction. The Chinese model of revolution stressed the value of armed struggle in promoting political consciousness and national cohesion. They argued that independence too easily won might be too easily lost. According to Mao Tse-tung, "the masses must be taught to make the revolution themselves, and not receive it as a gift from above".² Conflict in the 1960s was partly due to China's persistence to bring revolution into Kenya as part of her policy of extending revolution to the Third World.

Such conflict was evident as early as 1964. During Chou En-lai's African tour of 1965, while in Tanzania he made a speech about the revolutionary situation in Africa saying that 'Africa was ripe for revolution.'³ This infuriated many Kenyan ruling elites who as far as they were concerned had achieved their independence. Reacting to Chou's statement a government statement said

It is not clear to the Kenyan government what is ripe or what form of revolution he has in mind but the Kenyan government wishes it to be known that Kenya intends to avert all

revolutions irrespective of their origins. Whether they come from inside or are influenced from outside.

The Minister for Finance, Mr. James Gichuru speaking in parliament, in 1965 made a scathing attack on Chou-En-lai. He said "Chou En-lai who has no shame said that the whole of Africa is ready for revolution, but against whom, I must ask. The only thing that China knows is to send arms under disguise through our country".⁵ He was referring to 75 tons of Chinese arms which had been halted by police in Western Kenya under escort of Ugandan soldiers whose destination was apparently remnants of the Congolese rebels.⁶

A controversy between Kenya and China developed over two articles appearing in a book "Revolution in Africa". The two articles were entitled: "African Socialism: A Bourgeois Illusion" and "The Application to Africa of Mao's Precepts of Popular Revolution." Among other things, the first article said that 'certain servants of neo-colonialism who secretly serve their foreign capitalists in their relentless exploitation of the continent attempt to dupe the masses by something called "African Socialism". Such individuals include Julius Nyerere, Leopold Senghor, Kenneth Kaunda, Mandon Dua, Maurice Adoun, David Dacko, Chai Mama and Jean Marie Sewaddo Go".⁷

The other article by a one colonel Karl Mai claimed that

the revolution in Zanzibar was led by a small cadre of Chinese trained activists and said that they were poised to capture control of the United Front in Tanzania just as they did in Zanzibar... The national reactionaries such as Nyerere, Kenyatta and Obote, who try to

... speak out of both sides of their mouth at the same time will suffer the fate of Jamshed (a former sultan of Zanzibar) and his stooge shante-Mushin government".

These two articles drew the wrath of the Kenya government and the book was banned in Kenya. This controversy also showed that conflict was not only due to differences in African nationalist opinion and Chinese outlook but also as a result of a fundamental clash between Chinese ideology and African ideal of democratic socialism.

In 1967 President Kenyatta issued a statement which was seen as a coup de' Grace against any hope of communism entrenching itself in Kenya. He warned

It is true that we have passed through many years of Western imperialism. It is natural that we should detest Western imperialism and associate it with the West... It is naive to think that there is no danger of imperialism from the East. In World politics the East has many designs upon us as the West and would like us to serve their own interest. That is why we reject communism. It is in fact the reason why we have chosen to ourselves the policy of non-alignment and African Socialism. To us communism is as bad as imperialism'

China was constantly accused of organizing and financing the opposition in Kenya. As a short term tactical ploy China chooses individual African leaders who it establishes as its favourites. These privileged leaders are lavishly invested with funds, equipment (usually printing press) and opportunities to extend patronage, (the control of scholarships and trips to China). In Kenya Peking's choice was Oginga Odinga, Minister for Home Affairs and later the Vice President. Colin Legum has argued that there was

some evidence to show that approximately 100,000 pounds had been availed to Kenyatta's opponent to help them capture the Kenya African National Union (KANU) leadership conference in 1966 in which Odinga was deposed.¹⁰ Mr. Daniel Arap Moi, then Minister for Home Affairs stated that between June 1964 and December 1965 some 400,000 pounds had been spent in an attempt to undermine the Kenya government.¹¹ Although no records of donors and recipients was released, in the context, it was clear that China had taken a major role and that the expulsion of a clerk in the Chinese Mission in 1965 was a reprisal measure.

The above claims were later reinforced by Mr. Christopher Olode, a self proclaimed agent for Odinga in dealing with the Chinese and a former official of the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU). After his release from detention in 1970, he alleged that Odinga received more than 50,000 pounds from communist sources between 1967 and 1969. The money, he alleged, came from Russia, China and North Korea and was intended to help Odinga wage a "militant political battle" against the Kenya government.¹²

Mr. Olode further claimed that he personally acted as a contact for Odinga with the Chinese embassy officials in Nairobi, Kampala and Dar-es-Salaam to collect money. He said that he made a one month trip to China and returned with a promise that Mr. Odinga would receive 20,000 pounds through the Chinese Embassy in Dar-es-Salaam. Another 8000 had been sent to him earlier. In 1968 Mr. Odinga arranged for another trip to China during which Mr. Olode would be given US\$ 50,000.¹³

During a parliamentary debate on the exchange control (Amendment Bill) of 1965 Mr. Gichuru told the House that "Apart from controlling the outflow of money in the country, the Bill would ensure that no money entered Kenya from China or other sources without his knowledge and approval". He went on to say "there are Chinese agents in this country and time has come for us to challenge them. They are getting money from China and time has come to control them".¹¹

China was accused of engaging in subversive activities in Kenya. Such accusations were hankered upon claims that China was giving Kenyan dissidents military training in preparation to topple the incumbent Kenyatta government, and that China was aiding the opposition within Kenya. In his bid to gain power, it was claimed that Odinga had arranged for military training in China and Bulgaria for more than one hundred Kenyan students. Attwood has argued that this activity was known to the Kenyan security who were following his moves.¹² Richard Beeston, the London Daily Telegraph correspondent, who was expelled from Kenya for his reports on mounting communist influence in Kenya, reported that an initial group of about forty Chinese trained Luo guerrillas and saboteurs had returned from China and were thought to be at a camp near Kakamega at the shores of Lake Victoria. The Hamburg newspaper Die Welt reported a short time later that eighteen Kenyans were training at Wuhan military academy in central China. These were possibly the original contingent agreed upon by Ho Yung, Chinese ambassador in Dar-es-Salaam and Odinga back in 1963. This

disclosure was made at a reception hosted for sixteen Chinese experts in Peking who were to leave for Kenya and the trainees were among the guests.¹⁶ On March 10, 1966 the defence Minister, Dr. Njoroge Mungai revealed that Kenya had lodged protests with China, the USSR and other countries that some 400 Kenyans were being given military training without consent of the government.¹⁷

Other reports of subversion were based on allegations that China was sending arms to Kenya without the knowledge of the government. In 1964 a British newspaper, the London Daily Express reported that large quantities of medicines, guns, rifles, ammunition and radio sets were being flown into Nairobi airport in unscheduled and unidentified transport aircraft. They were then moved in trucks of the prison department then under Odinga's portfolio to a secret destination. The paper thought this was done without the knowledge of Prime Minister Kenyatta and the rest of his cabinet. To observers on the spot, it seemed likely that these were arms destined for the Congolese rebels. Similar shipments were then moving into Uganda and the Sudan.¹⁸

As relations between Kenya and China continued to deteriorate, KANU recommended in July 1965 the breaking of diplomatic relations with China on the grounds that her embassy in Nairobi had become a centre of subversive activities.¹⁹ Although this was not achieved, a number of Chinese nationals were expelled in March 1966. The most serious setback to China was the cancellation of Chou En-lai's scheduled visit to Nairobi in 1966. The dismissal of the pro-Chinese Vice -President Oginga Odinga in April 1966 and the

expulsion of Chinese charge d'Affairs in June 1967.²⁰ The Chinese Charge d'Affairs Mr. Li Chien was the fourth Chinese diplomatic official to be forced to leave Kenya in two years. Wang Te ming a NCNA correspondent had been asked to leave in June 1965. He was linked to an effort by students of the Lumumba Institute to seize the governing party headquarters. On March 10 1966, a clerk in the Chinese embassy Mr. Chang was ordered to leave. A few days later Yao Chi, a third secretary to the Chinese embassy was ordered to leave. Though no specific charges were made, they were said to be interfering in Kenya's internal affairs.

President Kenyatta aware of what was happening in the Chinese embassy told the U.S. ambassador that "Kenya had a new tourist attraction, the Chinese embassy hidden behind its high walls." He added " we have the great war of China here in Africa. Our police have to use helicopters to see what those people are doing."²¹ In 1966 an editorial in the Daily Nation charged China with subversion, at the same time Kenyan officials accused Mao of plotting to overthrow the government and that he had spent up U.S\$1 million for this purpose.²² On July 12, the Kenya government made strong protests to the Chinese to stop their interference in her internal affairs or face the consequences.

In 1966 with Odinga leaving KANU and forming his own party, Kenya Peoples Union (KPU), Kenyatta warned the communist embassies that financial support to the new party would be construed as subversion and may lead to severance of relations. In the weeks preceding the 1966 Linuru conference, Odinga had spent a great deal

of (presumably) Chinese money to buy votes. Larkin argues that the expulsion of Yao Chi and a Soviet diplomat was linked to accusations that China paid Kenyans opposing KANU.²³ At the same time 100 members of parliament issued a statement denouncing Odinga and his group as agents of rapacious international communism.

With the expulsion of her diplomatic officials, China reciprocated by expelling Kenya's charge d'Affairs in Peking in June 1967. Kenya reacted to this move by recalling her ambassador.²⁴ These expulsions were accompanied by or followed with protest notes. The expelled Kenyan charge d'Affairs Mr. Maitha was given a note protesting what the Chinese called the "Kenyan government's unjustified decision in expelling Mr. Li. Chie the Chinese charge d'Affairs in Nairobi". The note said

The expulsion of Mr. Li was an exceedingly grave step taken by the government of Kenya of willingly sabotaging the relations between China and Kenya. The Chinese people are extremely indignant at this, and the Chinese government hereby lodges the strongest protest with the government of Kenya...The Kenyan charge that the Chinese ambassador in Nairobi made a direct attack on the Kenyan government and interfered in Kenya's internal affairs is a complete distortion of truth."

In 1967 the Kenyan government protested against an attack on her embassy in Peking by the Red Guards. The protest said

The government has learnt with bitter disappointment that its embassy in Peking had been subjected to organized demonstrations by mobs, which had smashed windows and caused damage to property belonging to the Kenya government. The Kenyan government call upon the Chinese government to repair the damage and bring those misdirected and malicious offenders to justice.²⁵

At the same time about fifty KANU members paraded outside the Chinese embassy to protest the Red Guards' demonstration at Kenya's embassy in Peking. They carried banners declaring "Red Guards are behaving like dogs" and "If you attack Kenya's embassy you will be in trouble here". They tried to deliver a note to the embassy but it was rejected by officials at the gate.²⁷

Further instances of conflict were seen when China accused Kenya of being in the service of U.S. imperialism. Three months after the expulsion of Li Chie, Peking attacked Tom Mboya, the then Minister for Economic Planning and Development in a letter to the East African Standard.

Mboya has come out to help U.S imperialism out of its difficulties. He even venomously places U.S. imperialism on a par with the Peoples Republic of China that has been persistently opposing imperialism and uttered the nonsense that not only the American CIA had to be watched but also the Chinese. Mr. Mboya's intention is clearly obvious, that is, to divert the attention of the Kenyan people from the anti-U.S struggle and to sow discord and sabotage the friendship between the Kenyan peoples and the peoples of China. Mr. Mboya's fabrication and slanders can only result in dropping on his own feet the rock he has lifted.²⁸

The Kenya government protested against this attack. A Chinese charge d'Affairs summoned to the Foreign Ministry to receive the protest note refused to comply and the note was made public. In the bluntest terms it said:

The Kenyan government wishes to tell the Chinese embassy that it is no part of its function to indulge in blatant lies and trickery in order to provoke a break of relations between the two countries. The embassy is not supposed to start or involve

itself in campaigns of virulent hatred against the leaders of the Republic of Kenya. If this state of affairs continues, the embassy of the Peoples Republic of China will be held responsible for the serious consequences that may follow.²⁹

Chinese attacks were also directed against the government. In 1969 the PRC accused Kenya in a protest note of trying to sabotage relations with her and being in the service of U.S. imperialism in creating "Two Chinas". The note listed among other things the following allegations: The Kenyan press carried articles highlighting Taiwan's national day; wives of two ministers and an MP's wife visited Taiwan as guests of the nationalist government and that Taiwan foreign minister had been allowed to enter Kenya and had attacked the PRC". The protest went on to say "it must be pointed out in all seriousness that it is by no means accidental that the aforesaid series of anti-China incidents should occur. This is the expression of the Kenyan government's working in the service of U.S. imperialism in creating two Chinas, a grave step taken by the Kenya government deliberately to sabotage the relations between the two countries and an act extremely unfriendly to the Chinese people."³⁰

The Kenya government rejected the note for what it called "its insulting and baseless insinuations. A government statement said, " it is difficult to see how such unfounded allegations and falsehoods against the government of Kenya can improve friendly relations and cooperation between the two countries."³¹

Chinese accusation of Kenya as being in service of imperialism was also based upon the latter's position towards the Vietnam conflict. In 1965 China attacked seventeen non-aligned countries including Kenya who had issued an appeal for the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam and advocated for a political solution to the Vietnamese problem. The Peoples Daily criticized the appeal as the work of the "Tito Clique" done at the bidding of American imperialism. The African reaction was generally of strong resentment. A Kenyan foreign office comment was hysterical.

Our total rejection of imperialism is well known even within China. Yet the Peoples Daily accused Kenya (and others) of placing herself at the service of what it called an American overlord... The Peoples Daily must endeavour to conform to standards of journalistic decency even when reporting on a country such as ours which has rejected communism as a way of life and freely chosen the path of non-alignment and Democratic African Socialism."

China also censored the three East African countries for calling in British troops to help quell the army mutinies which engulfed the three states in succession in early 1964. The Chinese factor was widely believed to be the link between the three East African mutinies and the Zanzibar revolution. Lord Colyton in London's House of Lords believed that "they all had something to do with Chou En-Lai's presence in the area". At the same time there was general talk in the West about an "African Cuba" and East Africa was immediately labelled a "Communist bridge head"."

Kenyatta condemned Chinese propaganda which had tried to portray the British as re-occupying East Africa with military

forces while ignoring the fact that the British troops had arrived in the three East-African states at the specific request of the heads of state of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda.³⁴

Chinese propagandist activities had been a source of conflict. Chinese propaganda was witnessed as early as 1964 when the NCNA correspondent in Nairobi, in an anti-Indian propaganda quoted Dr. F.C. Otieno, a lecturer at Nairobi University College as having said that "the Indian government had sent a number of people to Kenya to carry out activities of preventing Kenyan scientists from attending the Peking symposium". The correspondent further alleged that "Dr. Odhiambo, the secretary of the East African academy, had refused to attend recent international scientist conference in New Delhi because, "my paper" He said, "exposed the notorious activities of U.S. neo-colonists and as such would not be allowed to be represented".³⁵

In 1967 the ruling party, KANU, charged that Chinese agents were trying to undermine the government and influence its foreign policy. A KANU spokesman said that an anonymous document in Kiswahili was being circulated in Nairobi. The document signed "Kenya's friends of China," the official continued, "was part of an organized plan designed to create confusion and spread alarm and despondency." The spokesman charged that "the document was Chinese inspired and designed to inject cold war politics in Kenya and a definite attempt to influence our foreign policy".³⁶

On August 2, 1967, Mr. Moi issued a stern warning to those who circulated what he called "anonymous and seditious statements

intended to discredit the Kenyan government". At a press conference, Moi attacked the Chinese embassy for interfering in Kenya's domestic affairs. He produced a letter allegedly by a Chinese embassy official addressed to Mrs. Ohawa Ondiegi of the Kenana Secondary School in Njoro in which the official offered to provide a list of works of Mao Tse-tung, badges of Mao and quotations from his work. He warned the people that all Mao books had been banned in Kenya.²⁷

Again in March 1968, Vice President Moi told the National Assembly that the government would make formal protests to the PRC over political propaganda by the crew of a Chinese ship which had docked at Mombasa port. The crew is said to have distributed badges bearing the head of Mao Tse-tung to African dock workers.²⁸

Another propagandist material which caused conflict was a pamphlet entitled "New Diplomats will Bring the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution to Africa" issued in Hong Kong under the name of NCNA and reproduced in Kenyan newspapers. The pamphlet said that Chinese diplomats and officials coming to Africa would be considered as revolutionary workers. Chou En-lai purportedly instructed the "New Revolutionary Diplomats" to form local Red Guard units to purify the revolution and perpetuate the glorious Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The KPU, Odinga's party, was praised by the pamphlet as being dedicated to the just demands of all the people of Kenya.²⁹ This language was sure to infuriate highly placed Kenyan leaders. KANU issued a statement expressing no

surprise that a Chinese publication would praise the K.P.U. It then warned

Events in Africa during 1966 and continuing instability in some parts of the continent make it easy and in fact inviting for some countries to feel that they can meddle in the affairs of African states. Forces are anxious to sow seeds of suspicion among neighbouring states; confusion and instability in Africa benefits such forces. It is important that the African countries be in their guard against the intrigue and manipulation of these forces whose only purpose must be to destroy that which we are trying to build. Any party in Kenya which relies on the inspiration and support of outsiders cannot be regarded as a genuine nationalist organization and must be looked upon with suspicion by the peoples of this country.

The Chinese officials denied authorship of the pamphlet and went on to describe it as the work of forgery. In 1969, the East African newspapers reported that China had produced stamps bearing the head of Mao Tse-tung along with that of Odinga and Babu of Tanzania. This report was denied, and subsequent reproduction of those stamps by the newspapers was also denied as the work or forgery by imperialists.

The foregoing discussion has clearly described and shown China's behaviour and actions towards Kenya. The Chinese behaviour and action were hostile and seemed bent towards breaking relations which subsequently resulted into conflict with Kenya. The question which however remains unanswered is; what were the factors that caused such behaviour which could inevitably lead to conflict? The following section is an attempt to answer this question. We shall look at the political considerations, both internal and

external to the two states that underlined the conflict between them.

4:3 Factors that Explain Conflictive Interaction.

As discussed in the previous section, Chinese policy in the Third World was carried out on two levels: diplomatic and revolutionary. Her endeavour to continue and export her revolutionary experience into the Third World contributed to conflictive interaction with Third World countries. Hutchison argues that "China's disruptive policies in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World during the 1960s was understood in the West in the context of Lin Piao's celebrated thesis "Long live the victory of the peoples war."⁴¹ The core argument being that

Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of the establishment of rural revolutionary base areas and the encirclement of the cities from the countryside is of outstanding and universal importance to the present revolutionary struggle of all the oppressed nations and peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America against imperialism and its lackeys...⁴²

In the context of this analysis, the Chinese leadership was concerned with the establishment of revolution both in those countries which had attained independence but were bourgeois like Kenya and in those countries not yet independent. There was a growing disappointment among the Chinese leadership that time was running out and that the newly independent governments established by non-communist figures might stabilize and eventually gravitate back into the Western fold. With this in mind, the PRC continued

with agitation in the newly independent countries in the hope that true revolution would occur. This impatience was voiced by Wang Quitang, the secretary of the Chinese party, in the Red Flag.

The bourgeois which is in power in these countries (Asia and Africa) has played to a certain degree a historically progressive role... It may to a greater or lesser degree go part of the way in opposing imperialism and feudalism. But after all the bourgeois is a bourgeois. When in power it is out of question for these countries to pass to socialism nor is it possible for them to accomplish in full the tasks of national democratic revolution. What is more, even the national independence they have achieved will not be secure... They may emerge bureaucratic capitalism which gang up with imperialism and feudalism. Thus in the final analysis they cannot escape the control and clutches of imperialism.

It is in this context that Chinese disruptive activities in Kenya which resulted into conflict is understood. Thus while maintaining minimal diplomatic relations, Peking veered around to the idea of opening collateral non-governmental channels through which they could attack the West, seek meaningful relations with revolutionary forces in the Third World and implicitly expose the conservative nature of nationalist leaders. Thus in the context of this policy it is easy to understand why China offered support to Odinga and to train Kenyans in guerilla warfare who they hoped would come back and continue with the revolution. As Attwood asserts "Kenya politics rotated around personalities of Kenyatta, Odinga and Tom Mboya". He goes on "although it is true that Odinga was receiving financial support from the communists, he had his own political ambitions which was seen to be Kenyatta's righthand man

and successor...In his bid for power,Odinga had arranged for military training in China and Bulgaria for more than a hundred Kenyan students.⁴⁴

For China and the Soviet Union Kenyatta was not a particularly satisfying leader. His country was too obviously in the western orbit and he had made no pretensions about leading Kenya towards socialism. He had on several occasions made public attacks on communism. Being aware of this, the Chinese rallied their support to the opposition centred upon Odinga. As a short time tactical ploy, Peking had selected certain influential leaders who acted as its fronts in certain countries. Before and after independence Odinga had visited both Moscow and Peking and received money from both.⁴⁵ Cooley observes "that Chinese considered Odinga their man in Nairobi. As exchanges of visits with China increased, they openly and increasingly used him as the recipient of their funds in Kenya.⁴⁶ Odinga had shown a liking of socialism and in his book Not Yet Uhuru he writes, "... When the Tokyo Conference⁴⁷ was over, the delegation from the Chinese Peoples Republic invited me to their country. For the first time I could ask representatives of the communist state: what is communism ? How does it work, what are the real aims of communism? They brought high government officials and university professors to explain to me. They showed me factories, communes, cooperatives, they showed me their plans for housing, for dealing with unemployment, how they organized farming and small industry, how government worked at village level: how plans for factory and agricultural production were worked out. It

was impossible not to be impressed with life in China. So many of the problems of poverty and illiteracy were those of our people, and these problems were being overcome at an impressive rate."⁴⁸ Hence as Ogunsanwo has observed "African visitors were greatly impressed by the ability of the Chinese to organize and mobilize hundreds and thousands of people to achieve desired and defined objectives quickly. The visitors were convinced that Chinese proclamation of support for and solidarity with the Africans in their desire for independence from colonial yoke were genuine."⁴⁹

A further testimony to Odinga's communist leaning is shown when Odinga was reported by a local newspaper to have said that "Communism was the peoples food."⁵⁰ During a Madaraka day speech in 1965 Kenyatta referring to Odinga said:

"some people try deliberately to exploit the colonial hangover for their own interests to serve some external force... to us communism is as bad as imperialism... It is sad mistake that you can get more food, hospitals or schools by crying communism."

Odinga categorically denied that he was a communist. He writes "I am not a communist but I have been a constant target of anti-communist forces for all the years of my political history."⁵¹ Nevertheless Odinga's public speeches endeared him with the Chinese. He told the Pan African Freedom Movement For East, South, and Central Africa PAFMESCA conference in Addis Ababa

The danger in Kenya has never been communism but imperialism and its remnants ...the snake in the bush is less fierce than the snake in our house, which is imperialism. Why seek a non-existent enemy when we already have a fight on our hands against the remnants of imperialism."⁵²

Odinga continues to write

... I am convinced that the external vested interests at play in Kenya are not communist force, but the result of the involvement of an increasing number of politicians in British, American, and West German commerce and big business.³⁴

In May 1965 he told a public meeting

The imperialists have sucked our blood for a long time and even now the sucking tube is still connected to Kenya. The imperialists still have the influence in the country through their stooges.³⁵

As internal political competition developed in Kenya, Odinga became more ruthless in emphasizing the differences between him and Kenyatta. He became more open about his communist affiliations referring to communism as "the peoples food". As he came to rely more on the Chinese for finance, the latter considered him their man in Nairobi.³⁶ Through financing him and training selected Kenyans in guerilla warfare, the Chinese hoped to bring revolution to Kenya hence making her a socialist country. This in the Chinese view would broaden and strengthen the international socialist movement hence directly serving one of their foreign policy goals.

The Chinese were encouraged by the actions of Odinga and other leaders who had received funds from her, that should they come to power they would oppose and eliminate Western, particularly American imperialism from Kenya. This would serve their foreign policy goal of fighting and eliminating imperialism in the Third World. As shown from his speeches alluded to above, Odinga was anti-imperialist. Thus in another rally at Kisumu in 1965, he said

" imperialists are working hard to divide the leaders and give advice on who should be leaders in Kenya. The imperialist agents continue to use weak politicians for their ends and that their only aim was to continue having economic domination in Kenya. It was the American and the British who were creating tension in Kenya..."¹¹

While the Chinese supported the opposition in the hope that it could serve its revolutionary goal and that they would gain more influence, this support was viewed by the Kenyan government as subversion and interference in her internal affairs. The ruling elites whose positions were threatened by the opposition were infuriated by the Chinese support. Inevitably with this incompatible interest pursued by the two states conflict ensued.

Ogunsanwo concurs with this by arguing that where the government was hostile (as in Kenya) the Chinese attention was directed to those levels of opinion which would bring pressure to bear on those governments.¹² In this case individuals and groups could be subsidized to promote Chinese interests openly or clandestinely. Doubtless these individuals wanted Chinese financial support simply to achieve their aims such as struggle for leadership and patronage and hence were not averse to being used for propaganda purposes as long as they were able to achieve their aims. Therefore, China found allies in the opposition. This alliance with the opposition resulted into conflictive relationship with the official government.

Certain internal political developments within China between 1966 and 1969 also contributed to the conflictive relationship with

Kenya. This political developments particularly referred to the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution. During this period Chinese behaviour was seen as moving towards the severance of relations. Her actions were hostile and were viewed as wanting to break relations with Kenya.⁵⁹

Superficially and as presented to the outside world, the cultural revolution was Mao's instrument for safeguarding the purity of the revolution. To other observers, the cultural revolutions's main objective was the elimination of opposition to Mao Tse-tung through coercion and violence. During the three years, Chinese domestic and foreign policy was distorted and disrupted. During its violent and unpredictable course, the head of state was dismissed and the foreign minister was denounced and downgraded.

The Foreign Ministry and its personnel came in for virulent criticism during the revolution. At one time, the foreign ministry was totally occupied by the "Red Guards" and China's foreign affairs was in the hands of a "red diplomat fighter", Yao Teng Shan, a diplomat who had been expelled from Indonesia for interfering in that country's internal affairs. Chen Yi was under constant attack, and the Red Guard Slogan of " Overthrow Liu (Shao Chi) Teng (Hsiao Ping) the Chinese communist party (CCP) secretary general was temporarily replaced with "Overthrow Lui", Teng and Chen".⁶⁰

Chinese diplomats abroad were accused of leading decadent bourgeois life. Due to this, China's ambassadors abroad with the sole exception of Huang Hua in Cairo were recalled for ideological

revision. These domestic turmoil had a spill over effect on foreign affairs. The revolution caused a lot of disruption in the conduct of China's foreign policy during this period and a lot of setbacks that China met were partly due to the effect of the cultural revolution. As the cultural revolution was going on, Chinese actions towards Kenya were seen as wanting to break relations. But why was China interested in breaking relations?

The domestic turmoil connected with the Cultural Revolution occupied the attention of the Chinese leadership. Their involvement in this "closely, locked contest for life or death,"⁵¹ was so great and so consuming that it diminished the level of China's activity in the Third World. Even the Chinese foreign Affairs, hitherto uninvolved in most domestic cases, became a victim of conflicting pressures of the Cultural Revolution.⁵²

The withdrawal of ambassadors and other senior embassy officials left Chinese embassies abroad staffed with subordinates of varying degrees of seniority. In Kenya, the embassy was left under a militant second secretary.⁵³ In the absence of any other guidance, these relatively inexperienced men, like others throughout the world, took their cue from events within China. To prove their revolutionary zeal they tried to propagate the cultural revolution and the Mao cult in the countries in which they were accredited. To parallel the violence of the Red Guards, they used provocatively violent language in some cases actually perpetuating violence themselves. Thus violence of thought, language and deed were hallmarks of the cultural revolution.⁵⁴ Violence became a

feature of Chinese attempt to get its ideology accepted. This behaviour caused conflict with Kenya as it is during this time that the Red Guards attacked the Kenyan embassy, the Chinese charge defers and his Kenyan counterpart expelled and thereafter the Kenya government recalled her ambassador and demonstration against Chinese embassy in Kenya occurred.

Larkin supports the view that conflict was consequent upon the cultural revolution and the hasty acts of men insensitive to the usefulness of Chinese 'presence' in these countries including Kenya where such relations were threatening to break. He also adds that the designers of the provocative steps simply underestimated the readiness of the Kenyan leaders to break relations.⁵⁵

Larkin further argues that the steps taken vis-a-vis Kenya were calculated risks taken to make political gain even at the expense of rupture of relations.⁵⁶ This argument appears more plausible in explaining conflict between the two states. First, the imperative governing Chinese decision was to maintain the plausibility of her radicalism in the eyes of Kenyan dissidents. If China was to abuse the Kenyatta government with impunity, plausibility before the opposition could be maintained. China did not risk breaking contacts with Kenyan dissidents if relations were severed as this could be done from Uganda and Tanzania and probably Somalia. Thus by maintaining her revolutionary credentials China's foreign policy goal of acting as a revolutionary model for the Third World would be maintained. In any case, the usefulness of Chinese diplomatic service in Kenya had been greatly reduced

through the diplomatic setbacks of the mid 1960s. Thus the risks involved due to rupture of relations were considered to be of less importance than the revolutionary benefits to be gained from such actions. The readiness to act was catalyzed by the cultural revolution.

Since the relationship between the two states had already deteriorated before the cultural revolution, Kapur argues that, "if the Foreign Ministry professionals decided to allow the radicals to let off revolutionary steam in areas in which China's vital interest were not at stake, Kenya and Tunisia would have been such places."⁶⁷ This further explains why a lot of belligerent activities during the revolution were targeted at Kenya.

Internal political developments in Kenya during the 1960s also explains the conflict between the two states. The major focus of attention in Kenya during this period was the continuing division within KANU which was reflected into wider divisions in the cabinet and the government. The major factors contributing to the split were personal position and power. Land policy, nationalization and foreign policy were issues in which there was also disagreement. Those members of parliament who advocated for land to be distributed to the poor, advocated for nationalization and called for the government to "lean a little towards the Eastern block" because, they argued, it was too much pro-western were branded the communists or "Radicals". The opposing group was labelled the "Corner Bar Group" or the "Conservatives." Whereas the "Radicals"

were critical of the government policy, the "Conservatives" on the other hand were seen as progovernment

The debate which continued between the two groups took on an ideological orientation. Rivalry between Odinga and Mboya which had existed even before independence emerged and each of them started to solicit for support both in the party and in the House. Odinga sympathized with the "Radicals" and emerged as their spokesman while Mboya emerged as the leader of the "Conservatives". The "Radicals" associated with Odinga came to symbolize a pro-east group in Kenya and there were claims that they were receiving funds from the USSR and China. The "Conservatives" preferred a pro-west stand, and were accused of being agents of imperialism.

The accusation against the "Radicals" as being communists and that they were receiving funds from the Eastern bloc countries was used by the "Conservatives" as a tactic to question their loyalty to the government. The tactical use of communism was influenced not only by the ideas of ownership of property but also by its association with the forcible overthrow of the government and the acceptance of the legitimacy of the use of force. Communist activities within Kenya and in other countries of East Africa encouraged the suspicion of the government.

As the "Conservatives" continued to accuse Odinga of being a communist agent, his position both within the party and the government became untenable. He resigned in 1966 to form his party the KPU. On October 27, 1969 Odinga was arrested and detained and KPU proscribed. The conservatives were firmly left in power. But

the damage had been done, for the victorious pro-western "Conservatives" had nothing good to say about the communist world, especially after the PRC and the Soviet Union had shown themselves as staunch supporters of the enemies of those in power." Kenya's relation with China therefore started on a wrong footing right from the immediate post-independence period and gradually came to acquire ideological overtones. The ideology of the East, communism, or scientific socialism, has become an anathema to Kenya. Indeed Kenyan leaders still associate any criticism of government policies with communism."

The fears of communism association with the opposition were voiced by President Kenyatta in 1967 after "the little general election of 1966." on Kenyatta day, President Kenyatta accused the KPU of attempting to bring revolution to Kenya. He said

Their friends who were here (the communists) have gone away ... they found things too hot ... if the KPU wants to follow them, let them do it ... From today we will call all KPU followers snakes and I say this emphatically, whenever you see a snake you should beat it... From now on the KPU will have to change before it is too late or the doors will be closed behind them. I have been kind for too long ...

Gertzel writing on the communist threat observes

Odinga's statements about communism throughout this period were moreover essentially provocative...The evidence suggests that the tactical use of communism to discredit the Radicals reflected certain genuine fears of communism and an ideological side to the debate...The debate revealed that fears expressed about communism were not entirely insincere.

Perhaps the clash between Kenyatta and Odinga was partly ideological for Kenyatta's sympathies had always been with the west, although he declared for non-alignment. He said "some people try deliberately to exploit the colonial hangovers for their own interests to serve some external forces. To us communism is as bad as imperialism."

Thus as the conflict and competition within Kenya had outlets in foreign policy, relations with those countries which were targeted for accusation as supporting the opposition became sour. As Peking came under constant accusation of financing the opposition centred around Odinga and competition between him and Kenyatta exacerbated, conflict between the two countries ensued. In the final analysis, since it is the governing elites who define the national interest, it became hard to differentiate the national and personal interest. Hence the "Conservatives" whose interests were being threatened by the "Radicals" who were allegedly in the payroll of their communist masters, felt that continuous relations with China was undesirable as it would continue to be a threat to their interests. Thus they wanted to discredit the Chinese who were sponsoring the opposition and hence the resultant conflict.

Chinese propagandist drive in Kenya caused conflict. What was the role of propaganda in Chinese policy? In international relations the objectives of propaganda is to influence the attitudes and behaviour of a foreign or of specific ethnic, class, religious, economic or linguistic group within this populations to create favourable attitudes/image abroad for their own government

policies." The officials making propaganda hope that these foreign groups or ethnic population in turn influences the attitudes and actions of their government.

China used propaganda in Kenya to carry out the ideological challenge (revolution). This challenge rests on the five principles expounded in the arguments against Khrushchev revisionism " (i) To realize the transition to socialism, the proletariat must wage armed struggle, smash the old state machinery and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, (ii) The peasants are the most dependable allies of the proletariat; the need is for a broad united front based on the worker-peasant alliance; (iii) U.S. imperialism is the arch-enemy of peoples revolution in all countries; (iv) The revolution of the oppressed nations is an indispensable ally of the proletarian revolution and (v) A successful revolution requires a revolutionary proletarian party faithful to the revolutionary theory and style of Marxism-Leninism.

The practical advice which accompanied the theoretical statement was that "to promote revolution one must study hard the selected works of Mao Tse-tung ... especially his teachings that the seizure of power by armed forces, the settlement of the issue by war is the central task and the highest form of revolution".¹¹ In fact, the Chinese feel that political independence is not real independence, real independence can only come through struggle which the PRC was able and willing to guide. It is this message that Chinese propagandist activities in Kenya was conveying that infuriated the Kenyan leadership and hence bringing conflict.

Colin Legum argues that apart from the internal problems, Kenya's critical attitude towards the PRC was conditioned by the Zanzibari revolution ...²⁹ Zanzibar's successful revolution in January 1964 was widely attributed to the efforts of the Chinese. Chou En-lai termed this attribution as "an honour for us, but I must tell you that we had nothing to do with the events in Zanzibar".³⁰ The Zanzibari revolution and the possible role of the Chinese received varied reactions in Africa. The East African mainland governments while desiring a change of government, deplored the methods used to achieve it, but certain influential figures notably Odinga in Kenya and Kambana in Tanganyika were ready to welcome the new revolutionary government. The mutinies which the Zanzibari revolution sparked off in Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda strengthened any feelings against revolutionary methods. Chinese criticism of the three governments' decision to call in the British troops to deal with the mutinies was deeply resented as interference.

As Legum argues, "early in 1964, the Kenyatta government became suspicious of Chinese activities in Zanzibar and after Peking's attack on the request for British military support to deal with the mutiny, the government restricted the number of Chinese and other diplomatic missions in Nairobi, limited UNCTA representation and imposed certain travel restrictions".³¹

On the Zanzibari revolution, Odinga writes in his book that the Kenya government became reactive.³² This response, he argues, was due to the fact that the government thought that he was

involved with the Zanzibar revolution. He had visited Zanzibar, and while Babu was in Kenya he slept in his house. John Okello was said to be in contact with him and the government questioned the telephone calls he was making to Tanzania. 33

Kenya's relation with Somali also had an effect on her relation with China. Relation between Kenya and Somali even before independence had been far from cordial. In the then Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya members of a Somali military group "the shiftas" were fighting to separate the region from Nairobi control and annex it to Somali. A prebicide carried out by the British Colonialists in 1962 showed that the Somalis in NFD wanted to secede and join Somalia. As a result of the conflict which had started in 1963, relations between Kenya and Somalia had so much deteriorated that in June 1966 Nairobi had severed all trade relations and had even revoked the landing rights in Kenya of the Somali airlines. 34 At one time Kenyatta seemed to indicate that Peking was aiding the shiftas. 35 In view of the Sino-Somali economic military agreement of August 1962, Kenyatta at once made a strong private protest to Lui Shao Chi and received assurances that the Chinese would in fact limit the military aid they gave the Somalis.

From the foregoing it is evident that Kenya's security was threatened by Somali militarism which was also directed against Ethiopia. It is in this context that the Kenya-Ethiopia defence pact was signed in 1964. Thus her security considerations made her protest against China's military support to Somalia.

The triangular relationship between China and the U.S. and the Soviet Union had an effect on China's relation with other countries. This was not different with the Kenyan case. For a long time, the U.S adopted a hostile policy towards China as evidenced by the massive support she gave the Kuomintang, by her participation in the Korean war, by the oft pronounced policy of containing and isolating the Chinese "menace" and by the fervent anti-communism exhibited in America during the 1950s reaching a peak in the notorious McCarthy era.²⁶ Added to this was the American stance of following a two China policy in the 1960s.

As already said, the Chinese policy in Africa from the early 1960s, was carried out in opposition to U.S imperialism. Hence China attacked those countries including Kenya which supported America as being in the service of imperialism. Since American hostility was targeted at the PRC, any country which supported America was seen as being hostile towards the PRC. Therefore the conflict which resulted between Kenya and China in the 1965 arising from the former's relation with America was partly due to the hostility between China and America.

The Sino-Soviet dispute had an implication on Kenya-China relations. For a long time after the October Revolution in 1917 in Russia, there was no other communist states and Russia acted as the real dictator of the strategy and tactics to be adopted by other communist parties. Though initially the Chinese leaders claimed that their revolutionary experience was relevant to the movements

in colonial and semi-colonial areas, they were in general prepared to defer to Soviet dominance in the communist movements.

After Stalin's death, Mao Tse-tung remained the only communist 'giant' in the world, and the Chinese expected him to play the role Stalin had played, giving ideological guidance to the rest of the communist world. Addressing the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1956, Khrushchev denounced Stalin and spoke of a new policy of co-existence with the capitalist world, the non-inevitability of World War and the possibility of a parliamentary road to power in the non-communist states.¹

With the Soviet Union's successful launching of two artificial earth satellites and an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) in October and November 1957, the Chinese leaders felt that the Soviet military superiority would deter the West from undertaking not only general wars but also local ones. Hence, the communists would encourage revolution in colonial territories with little risk to themselves. Conditions for the resistance to imperialism and colonialism were said to be especially favourable.² Chinese propaganda begun to stress paradoxically that peaceful co-existence could only be achieved through struggle, which had an added advantage of filling the masses with revolutionary consciousness.

This militant line was put forward not jointly with the Soviet Union but tacitly in opposition to what China was later to term the Soviet Union's gross error of principle in asserting that socialism could be achieved through the parliamentary road. China rejected

this and advised that the African struggle for independence should be violent like her own. There would be no cooperation with non-communists.

Internal factors in China led to further split with the Soviet Union. Mao's extreme left supporters with their slogan of "let politics take command" were gaining ascendancy over the more conservative wing of the party which advocated for continual reliance on Soviet aid and guidance. The control of power by the left led to the adoption of a more radical foreign policy abroad and eventually to the split with the Soviet Union.

All these actions coupled with differing attitudes towards the Algerian war marked out China as having a different approach to the world situation from the Soviet Union. As the Sino-Soviet dispute came to the open China made great efforts to exclude Soviet participation in the Afro-Asian meetings hence the dispute was brought into Africa.

The Sino-Soviet split had begun and brought to Africa even before Kenya had attained independence. This dispute manifested itself in front organizations.¹⁹ The Chinese and Soviets competed for friendship and favours from African countries. Such tactics caused these conferences to degenerate into Sino-Soviet wrangles as a result of which discussions of the important problems for which the meetings were called were either postponed or side-tracked. All these things were received with either great misgivings or considerable irritation by many countries of the Third World. At the Afro-Asian solidarity conference in Moshi in February 1963,

ignoring all appeals from the Soviet delegation to avoid public debate on divisive issues, the Chinese carried a ruthless struggle against the "white" Soviet delegation. At the fourth meeting held in Algiers in 1964, the same tactics were pursued, making a member of the Kenyan delegation to complain

We are not Marxist-Leninist and most of us have never read a single line of Das Kapital. So what interest do you have in our participating in your doctrinal quarrels? When I am eating a sandwich I have had enough of being accosted by someone who asks me what I think of the Soviet positions and, when I am drinking coffee, by someone who questions me about the Chinese arguments. I would like to be able to eat in peace.

Sino-Soviet competition in Kenya was seen in the economic and political field. Soviet commentary stressed the importance of East Africa, both because the independence of the three territories was seen as a factor in expediting the independence of other colonies such as Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyanzaland (Malawi), and because in the Soviet Union's view the area was now in the "front-line" in the continent's liberation struggle against the white South Africa regime. In view of future developments Kenya was singled out as having the best opportunity of following a non-capitalist road to development because of the non-capitalist nature of inter-African relations in Kenya. The path East Africa takes will largely depend on what happens in Kenya.²¹

This importance attached to Kenya led both China and the Soviet Union to compete for her favours. Both countries gave aid to Kenya but when the government did not yield to give them any much

influence, the aid was directed elsewhere. In their keen rivalry, the two countries began to compete for Odinga's favours. Hence large amounts of money was directed to the opposition which seemed to favour them within the government. This obviously did not register well with the government and collision was inevitable. Things became worse in early 1965 when a member of parliament Gio Pinto was assassinated as a result of what was generally believed to be an internecine struggle between opposing groups within the Kenyan left wing movement.³² With this open competition for Odinga's favour Kenyatta took a firm stand against the Soviet Union by rejecting their aid, and with the Chinese by expelling their NCNA correspondent. Subsequently other embassy officials were expelled. Hence Chinese competition with the Soviet Union was in Kenya and as a result conflict ensued between China and the Soviet Union.

4:4 Summary and Conclusions

In this chapter we had set out to describe conflict in the two states relations and show the factors that accounted for the conflict. In our analysis we found that there was political conflict existed in the two states relations as evidenced by the diplomatic setbacks suffered by the two states, such as expulsion and recall of diplomats, diplomatic protests, political demonstrations, threats, attacks on leaders, cancellation of visits and engagement in subversive activities. More important was the closure of Kenya's mission in Peking in 1967 after the recall of her ambassador.

We also found out that both internal and external political factors contributed to the conflict. In the case of China, her revolutionary policy and the Cultural Revolution were the major internal factors leading to conflict. On the other hand, the internal political competition within Kenya, exacerbated the conflict. On the external factors, China's policy towards Zanzibar and Somali had a bearing on the conflict. Also China's relation with the Soviet Union and the United States was a source of conflict not only with Kenya but also with other Third World countries.

On the whole the conflict was due to the different interests that the two countries pursued. The two countries pursued quite different political goals. Coupled with this is the fact that different tactics were employed in the pursuit of these interests. Hence in the final analysis the incompatibility of interests between the two states led to conflict.

We had hypothesized that compatible of political interests between states leads to cooperation. The null hypothesis could read that incompatible interests would lead to conflict. This chapter was able to confirm the null hypothesis. Thus we can conclude that conflict between states is a result of competing or conflicting interests. This was also true of the case of Kenya-China relations.

FOOTNOTES

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43. Kapur, op. cit., p.237
44. Attwood, op. cit., p. 241
45. Hutchison, op. cit., p. 118
46. Cooley, op. cit., pp.63-64
47. The Tokyo Conference referred to here is the Anti-Atomic Bomb Conference of 1958
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49. Ogunsanwo, op. cit., p. 34
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55. Ibid., p.292
56. Hutchison, op. cit., p.118
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CHAPTER FIVE

COOPERATION IN KENYA-CHINA POLITICAL INTERACTION.

5:1 INTRODUCTION

Relations between any two states are inherently characterized by both conflict and cooperation. The level of perceptual ties and the political linkages based upon shared interests are vital factors that determine the nature and form of cooperation between nation states. However the successful development and expansion of cooperation is due to cumulative interaction arising from each nation's response to the needs and expectations of the other state. Each level of interaction constitutes the growth and reinforcement of the total patterns and vast varied network of mutually strengthening ties result.¹ A number of indicators can be used to determine and measure the level of political cooperation: educational and cultural exchange programs, volume of trade, amount of aid offered or received, voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly, number of governmental (and non governmental) delegations exchanged and the importance of one state to another.

In this chapter we endeavored to show that cooperation between the two states was going on in spite of the conflict that existed. The political factors that explain cooperation between the two states are also discussed. At the same time we shall shown that relations between the two countries have moved towards high levels of cooperation, and that actually from 1980 up to 1991 relations

were cooperative. Thus in our analysis we have followed a chronological order whereby the period 1963-1991 is sub-divided into three phases: 1963-1970, 1970-1980, and 1980-1991.

5:2 Coincidence of interests: Case of cooperation 1963-1969

Cooperative political relations between Kenya and China commenced immediately the former attained her independence. This cooperation was seen through diplomatic exchanges, exchange of visits, support in the UN, offering of economic aid and statements of support concerning various issues in the international arena. This section is concerned with analyzing cooperation between the two states with a view to determine the political factors that account for this cooperation. The intriguing issue about the relationship is that in spite of the conflict that existed between the two states cooperation still existed. Why ?

China's constructive activities in the international arena have been as important as her destructive activities. Thus in her relation with Kenya cooperation was an important feature. Although formal political relations had started in 1963 when Kenya attained her independence, relations had been developed earlier. Marshall Chen Yi, the Chinese Vice Premier and Foreign Minister represented the PRC at Kenya's independence celebrations in Nairobi.² China was the first among the communist states to announce her recognition of the new state. With this, diplomatic relations were established at ambassadorial level. Marshall Chen Yi made a

courtesy call to Prime Minister Kenyatta and Oginga Odinga. The latter had been a friend of China during the independence struggle. Odinga expressed Kenya's appreciation for China's help during the independence struggle and said that this "support played a key role in the Kenyan people's struggle for independence".³ Chen Yi expressed the hope that after the establishment of diplomatic relations there would be the necessary conditions to carry on closer economic and cultural exchanges, a brotherly mutual assistance and cooperation, and to work for the common task of the Chinese and Kenyan people, to fight against imperialist policies of war and aggression and defend world peace.⁴

Cooperation was cemented through exchange of delegations, and the accompanying statements of support during such visits. Several delegations from Kenya visited China during the 1960s. In May 1964, Odinga, Kenya's vice president and Minister of Home Affairs led a good will delegation to China.⁵ After consultations, with Chen Yi, the latter said that the two parties had reached an agreement on views of fostering friendly relations and cooperation. He said:

Our two parties have reached identity of views...On the other questions of common interest and have signed an agreement on economic and technical cooperation. All these has manifested the sincere desire of the Chinese and Kenyan people for mutual support, friendly cooperation and joint development.

Mr. Odinga's delegation also met Premier Chou En-lai and appealed for China's help in a war against South Africa. At a rally in Peking held in his honor, the audience applauded when Odinga

declared:

The remaining colonial territories in Africa will not be liberated until independent states jointly are prepared to wage war (war against South Africa) and comrades the war in Africa needs your help. Imperialism is your enemy as well as ours. Together we stand in defence of freedom against imperialism and colonialism.

It is worthy noting that Odinga reiterated the common interests of the two states of fighting colonialism and imperialism. Hence by the two states cooperating they hoped to achieve their interests. Therefore similarity of interests led to cooperation.

Other delegations to China included one by the chairman of Kenya Writers Union and his secretary in May 1964,⁸ and another by Kenya's Minister for Information Mr. Achieng Oneko.⁹ While in China Mr. Oneko said that "the attainment of independence was the beginning of a phase to get rid of all injustice which the people of Kenya had for over 70 years." He talked of "the good and friendly relations between the two states" and alluded to the Kenyan experience in the struggle for independence to be similar to that of China declaring that "our struggle has been in many ways identical to that of the Chinese people. Both countries have at one time or another been oppressed and exploited by foreigners who entered the two countries without being invited by the rightful owners". He added that Kenya supported China's claim to be a member of the United Nations.¹⁰

Mr. Oneko met with Chen Yi who praised Kenya's struggle against imperialism and colonialism both new and old. He continued,

political reasons. We had found out in chapter three that Chinese aid was mainly given for political reasons. Trade also followed closely political developments.

From the foregoing discussion we can safely conclude that there was cooperation in the two states' relations. However the question that remain unanswered is, what factors explain this kind of relationship?

The basis for political cooperation can be traced to the pre-1963 period. This cooperation was founded upon China's support to the liberation movement in Kenya. The Mau Mau movement was regarded as a patriotic national struggle by peasant guerrillas under strict discipline. Peking propaganda supported the movement repeatedly lauding it as a patriotic anti-imperialist organization. ¹⁴ China also gave financial support to the liberation movement. ¹⁵ This support may partly explain Chen Yi's invitation to the independence celebration.

While such support served an immediate Kenyan goal of aiding her independence struggle, it also served the Chinese goal of fighting imperialism. Here again we find a concurrence of interest hence cooperation. As Chou En-lai said in 1958, fighting imperialism in the Third World could be done and achieved through supporting the anti-colonial liberation movements in these countries. During the Fifth Session of the First National Peoples Congress in February 1958 Chou said:

The existence of this socialist camp and its powerful support for the national independence movement has inspired all those people

striving to win their freedom and independence, and provides increasingly favorable conditions for them to wage successfully their heroic struggle against imperialism and colonialism.

By supporting the anti-colonial movements the Chinese were hastening the defeat of imperialism. Kenya benefitted from this support. Therefore the convergence of interests in the anti-colonial struggle helped set down the ground for cooperation. It is natural that when Kenya attained her independence, the two states established diplomatic relations since they had been on friendly terms all along during the freedom struggle.

Cooperation between the two states on a higher level was seen by the exchange of diplomatic missions. China sought diplomatic recognition from the newly independent African States, for such relations were likely to bring a lot of benefit to her.¹⁷ First, a breakthrough in Africa would remove the automatic power of the United States resulting from the control of votes she had to block China's admission to the UN. Solidarity of Afro-Asian states would effectively destroy the US attempt to perpetuate the isolation of China and would in effect inflict a setback to the US policy. This was an important consideration in the sense that up to 1973 China had not been accepted as a member of the UN as Taiwan continued to act as the representative of the Chinese people. The PRC's bid to be accepted as a member of the comity of nations forced her to look for enough votes needed to help her unseat Taiwan as the representative of China and get that position for herself. By recognizing Kenya she was expecting reciprocity.

Secondly China sought diplomatic relations with newly independent states because she aspired for greater power status which would be enhanced by her increased acceptance by the world organization. Moreover China's claim to the leadership of the developing countries would be based on firmer grounds if it was seen that the new states were ignoring the wishes of the US.

Lastly, efforts to secure diplomatic recognition were partly due to competition with Taiwan. The latter already maintained diplomatic relations with South African, Libya and Tunisia. In January 1960, Taiwan sent a friendship delegation to West Africa countries to lay a foundation for official recognition from those countries which were soon to become independent. This visit resulted in the establishment of diplomatic relations with Cameroon and raising her status in Liberia to that of an embassy. Peking in bitter rivalry with her over recognition as the representative of the over 700 million Chinese people sought recognition to neutralize this achievement. This was possible because recognizing Peking precluded the possibility of recognizing Taiwan.

Thus cooperation with Kenya was part of a clearly set out Chinese policy of seeking recognition as the legitimate representative of the Chinese people as opposed to Taiwan, and seeking acceptance as a member of the UN. Therefore in an effort to achieve these goals she opted for cooperation with Kenya.

Kenya on the other hand, had her reasons for seeking recognition from, and recognizing China. First, as we had earlier said China helped Kenya in her struggle for independence.

Recognizing China was one way of showing her gratitude and appreciation for the support.

The second and perhaps the most significant reasons which explains why Kenya chose to cooperate with China was her policy of non-alignment. At independence Kenya chose to follow a policy of non-alignment.¹⁸ This policy required that Kenya seek friendship with every nation that would return it. Thus recognizing China was in a way a step towards the implementation of this policy. With more than 70 years of colonialism, Kenya's relations had been largely with the Western European countries. With the coming of independence, there was the need to balance her relations by establishing relations with the Eastern bloc countries. With this desire of starting relations with other countries, she established relations with China. Therefore Kenya's desire to be seen as being non-aligned partly explains why she did not break relations even when China showed hostility in dealing with her.

Thirdly politics in independent Kenya in the 1960s which saw a division among the cabinet and the party into the "Radicals" and the "Conservatives" brought about a kind of foreign policy mix during this period. In matters concerning foreign policy the "Radicals" questioned whether Kenya was really independent and non-aligned as she professed. They argued that Kenya's existing economic structure and her relationship with the Western countries established a commitment to the West which resulted in her domination by the western world. They further argued that the country's economic structure was too capitalistic and too dependent

on Western companies to allow Kenya to call herself non-aligned. Among those members who alleged this Western dominance, there were those who suggested that to redress the balance Kenya should "lean a little more to the East."¹⁹ The "Conservatives" on the other hand had maintained that "Such theories of fifty-fifty balance (as advocated by the "Radicals") were unrealistic,²⁰ and that in her international relations Kenya should not primarily be concerned with emotional and purely political consideration but rather adopt a more pragmatic approach."¹¹ Therefore while the "Radicals" wanted more cooperation to be established with the East, the "Conservatives" favored relations with the West. Kenyatta, regarded as a moderate African leader took an independent and aloof position in this debate and with the hope of controlling both groups accommodated views from the two camps. Thus relations were not only established with China but also with other socialist countries. Also in spite of the accusations levelled against China mainly by the "Conservatives" Kenyatta did not break relations with China in an attempt to remove steam and pressure from the "Radicals". He at the same time appeased the "Conservatives" by the rebuffs he made against the Chinese. ²²

The decision against breaking relations with China was also based on the calculation of risks involved.²³ Relations were not broken because of the importance of having the Chinese presence and keeping a close eye on her. This was due to Kenyatta's fear that if the Chinese were expelled and relations completely severed, they might attempt a more dangerous form of subversion, Cameroon style,

from outside the country. Certainly the unsettled conditions of the North-Eastern District with sporadic warfare going on with the "shiftas", and with a separatist group of disidents within Kenya itself, the Kenyan leadership perceived that the two situations would have offered excellent opportunity to foment disruption under the pretext of helping Somalia. As Kenyatta said, "I like having the Chinese under my nose where I could see them."⁴ Breaking relations was seen as posing a greater danger to the national interest than having them where they could be watched. Thus national interest consideration dictated that relations should not be severed.

It is also possible that Kenyatta did not break relations because he was aware that most of the accusations levelled against China were not true. Kenyatta was aware of the dispute between the "Radicals" and the "Conservatives", hence the insinuations that the Chinese were involved with the "Radicals", was just a move to discredit the latter and more specifically its leader Odinga. Some of the major accusations against China were that she was training Kenyan guerrillas and sending arms into the country to destabilize the government. Odinga in his book Not Yet Uhuru, does not deny the newspaper claims about the two issues, he however denies that this was done without the knowledge of Kenyatta. He writes

I knew, Jomo Kenyatta knew and Joe Murumbi knew how those arms had come to be stored in the basement of my ministry building that they had been ordered by us ... And that the arms had reached Nairobi airport as a shipment consigned to the Prime Minister, and that it was by arrangement among the three of us that

I used the vans of the prison department ... to have the consignment conveyed for storage in the building.

On charges that there were Kenyan students undergoing military training in socialist countries Odinga writes that this had been agreed upon because "before independence Britain would not agree to grant facilities for the training of African officers." He continues that "when the trainees started to return the slander was spread that they were "Odinga boys" and that I would use them against the government. All this was poison dripped into Kenyatta's ear."

Odinga defended himself against the accusations that he was receiving funds from China by saying:

I was a teacher before I joined politics and it is in my blood to assist students. It is in this vein and realization of the urgent need of our people to send students to socialist countries. This not imply my preference for socialism in fact I have send tens of students to other capitalist countries.

The fact that Kenyatta was aware of the untruthfulness of those accusations against China may explain why relations were never broken in spite of these serious allegations. However Kenyatta did not defend Odinga or exonerate the Chinese publicly from these accusations because he wanted to have his rival associated with the Chinese who had been characterized as the "baddies" hence discrediting him as a nationalist and thus enhancing his position in power.

Finally relations were not broken because the "little general election of 1966" resulted in an overwhelming defeat of disidents

who had broken away from KANU.²¹ The latter now occupied a secure position now that the internal divisions had apparently come to an end. The opposition which could be put forward by the breakaway members in the House could be very minimal as only nine members of the KPU were voted into parliament. Conscious of that, the government declined to sever relations despite incidents which could have led to a break in relations in another country. The Chinese hopes of gaining more influence in Kenya and probably making Kenya a socialist stronghold by supporting the opposition were contained. By maintaining a minimal Chinese presence and watching her closely, Kenyatta avoided the appearance of inflexibility in pursuing certain policies. In any case the pursuance of national interest requires the statesman to adjust his policies with the changing situations, choosing the best alternative given the particular situation which is prevailing at that particular time.

5:3 Kenya and China in the United Nations: A Test Case of Cooperation.

This section analyzes Kenya's stand as regards the issue of China's admission to the United Nations. The representation of China in the UN was of major significance to the PRC and hence a major test of cooperation between China and any other state. Kenya's voting concerning this issue was an important indicator of the relations between the two states.

Though the PRC had been independent since 1949 when the

Communist Party assumed power after its victory over the Nationalist regime of Chiang Kai Shek, it was not until 1973 that she was finally admitted into the UN. The question of Chinese representation could have been solved earlier had it not been considered to be closely intertwined with the problem of Taiwan.²⁹

The western powers insisted on keeping Peking outside the UN for twenty one years and had been reluctant to expel Taiwan from the world organization primarily because they believed that it would enable them to push their plan to create "two Chinas" or an independent Taiwan and thereby keep this strategic island in friendly hands.³⁰ China had sought to become a member of the UN not only because such membership would enhance her prestige and reduce her dependence on the Kremlin but also because her admission and subsequent expulsion of Taiwan would have greatly strengthened her case vis-a-vis Taiwan concerning the rightful and legitimate government of China. Her presence at the UN headquarters would have facilitated the establishment of contacts with a larger number of countries. Hence the admission of Peking into the UN constituted a major foreign policy goal, consequently any government(s) supporting her case would have contributed to the realization of this goal.

Peking's bid to join the UN can be traced to as early as 1949 when Chou En-lai sent a telegram in November 15 to Carlos P. Ramto, the president of the UNGA challenging the legal status of the Kuomintang delegation and questioned its right to represent China in the UN.³¹ The Chinese question was first raised in the Security

Council at its 458th meeting on 29 December 1949 when the Soviet delegate, Melik, stated that his government will not regard Mr. T. F. Tsiang the Kuomintang representative in the Security Council as representing China nor as being empowered to represent the Chinese people in the security council.³²

The question of Chinese representation was first raised in the General Assembly at its sixteenth session in 1961. Before the discussions began, Peking criticized the US policy of "two Chinas" and observed that while it was interested in joining the UN, the representative of the Kuomintang clique had to be expelled first.³³ The US and four powers submitted a draft resolution which was subsequently adopted as Resolution 1688 (xvi) of 1961 which declared that any proposal to change the representation of China was an important question requiring a two-thirds majority under Article 18 of the UN charter.³⁴ Subsequent resolutions of the same nature were referred to as "US procedural motion". Albania and other powers, on the other hand, submitted a draft resolution which declared that the General Assembly would decide to restore all its rights to the PRC and recognize the representatives of its government as the lawful representatives of China in the UN and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai Shek from the place which they unlawfully occupied in the UN and in all the organizations related to it.³⁵

Kenya's stand on the representation of China in the UN has been firm. Until she was eventually admitted into the UN in 1973, Kenya voted in favor of the Albania resolutions calling for the

immediate admission of the PRC into the UN and against the US procedural motions. Kenya had supported the PRC even before she was admitted into the UN. Thus in 1963 in a speech during a UN cerebation ceremony in Nairobi Prime Minister Kenyatta said:

One of the great imbalances within the UN springs from the exclusion of the PRC. The participation of China in the exchanges and activities of the UN is vital for lasting world peace. There is no other world forum in which conflict, suspicion and injustice can be dissolved through a charter of brotherhood of man.

In 1964 Kenya supported the recommendation of the conference of Heads of State and Government of non-aligned states in Cairo which asked the UN to restore all rights to the PRC and recognize the representatives of her government as the lawful representative of China in the UN.³⁷ Kenya's stand was based on the following consideration as given to Kenya's delegation to the 21st session of the UNGA.³⁸

- (i) The Peoples Republic of China is the sole representative of the whole of China for it has effective control of the mainland with 700 million people and is recognized as such by a large number of countries including major world powers. The exclusion of a state with one-third of the world's population negates the principle of universality.
- (ii) Taiwan's contention that it represents the whole of China has no validity in common sense, political realism or

international law.

- (iii) A nation should not be excluded from the UN because one nation or group of nations does not like its government.
- (iv) The membership of the UN referred to a state and not a government. The reference of the charter of the Republic of China was the physical entity of the Republic of China rather than those who are holding power over the geographical entity. The geographical entity of the Republic of China is the Peoples Republic of China.
- (v) It is impossible to exclude China from important decisions while at the same time requiring her to subscribe to the obligations imposed by agreements which it had no part in concluding.
- (vi) Kenya believes that the opposition to China is based on ideological differences and Kenya cannot be party to such a move for it is contrary to the principles of international cooperation as laid down by the charter.
- (vii) China is a power to be reckoned with and her influence in the world now and in the future is indisputable. China is a political and a physical reality and is not for the interest of the world peace and security to keep her away

from a body whose sole aim is the maintenance of peace and security.

- (viii) Kenya's delegation to the 21st session of the UNGA should therefore continue to support the restoration of the lawful right to the Republic of China in UN.

Kenya's support for Peking from the above could be seen to have been based both on the realistic consideration of the situation and on her attitudes toward the UN. KANU's manifesto produced at the eve of Kenya's independence talked of the party's attitude towards the UN. KANU promised to lead Kenya to "seek friendship with every nation that will return it" and for this purpose the UN was very useful. The party leaders wrote "... We believe the UN and its leaders are playing an important role in developing international cooperation and friendship ..." Another dimension of the party's consideration was national independence. They made it clear that they did not favor "having friends choosing our enemies for us. " The country could support what we believe is right and just in international affairs and judge each case on its own merit. Thus just like any other Third World leaders, it is apparent that KANU leaders wanted Kenya to participate independently on the basis of equality with other states in world affair. Because Kenya was relatively less powerful, the UN came in handy to give her a chance to participate in international affairs on equal footing with other states of the world.¹⁹ This position is summarized by John Howel who asserts that:

... Most of the states and certainly Kenya sees the UN as essentially an organization for promoting an international morality especially related to the rights of the oppressed peoples and nations...⁴⁰

and that her joining and participating in the UN is

... part of a process of asserting and demanding recognition of the existence of the new Kenya Republic as a respected member of the international community.⁴¹

To these one may add John Okumu's remarks in his discussion on Kenya's foreign policy that

... in the UN Kenya sees a political forum for international understanding and international peace, as well as a framework for multilateral economic interaction between industrialized and poor states.⁴²

Thus on the question of China's admission into the UN the two states' national interests coincided and hence cooperation ensued.

5:4 Towards a state of more Cooperation

From 1970 onwards relations between the two countries started to move towards higher cooperation. This period up to 1979 could be described as a period when relations were quiet without any much political activities. During this period cooperation in trade and cultural exchanges were carried on. It was not until the second half of the 1970s that some political activities could be seen taking place. The Kenyan mission in Peking remained technically closed until 1978 when president Moi announced that Kenya's embassy in China will be reopened at the end of that year.⁴³ In November of that year Kenya's High Commissioner to Delhi was reassigned to Peking thus restoring full diplomatic relations.⁴⁴

The cultural revolution which had been mainly the cause of conflict in the 1960s had come to an end in 1969. Gradual normalization of relations or the "thaw" as it came to be known started to take place. Several signs pointed towards a desire to normalize relations with Kenya. Bartke⁴⁵ asserts that China's endeavor to return to friendly relations with Kenya after the thaw was manifested in an appreciable donation by the Chinese Red Cross to relieve the effects of a draught catastrophe in Kenya. This was the highest donation (Yuan 1 million = US\$ 420,000 one-fifth to be paid in cash, four-fifths in the form of grain and other food stuffs and medicines) China had ever given a country outside the Eastern bloc. After this, Kenyatta received a Chinese diplomat.

Another sign showing China's desire for friendly relations was that violent language was moderated and the revolutionary image firmly played down. Stories carried out by the three English East Africa newspapers in July 1969 that China had issued a set of eight stamps featuring revolutionary figures in the World including Babu and Odinga were labelled "sheer fabrications" and their supposed reproduction in the Daily Nation, a "despicable forgery."⁴⁶

In 1970 a Chinese charge d'affaires gave a donation of 28,834 pounds in relieve aid for draught victims and a further donation of 115,000 pounds in food and medical supplies.⁴⁷ An agreement was signed between the two states for the sale of 750,000 bales of cotton in 1971. In 1976 a Chinese cultural and dance troupe toured Kenya and was scheduled to perform at the Kenyatta International

Conference Center but unfortunately could not perform due to the death of Mao Tse-tung.

On the death of Mao Tse-tung, President Kenyatta sent a message of condolences to the people of China. All flags in Kenya were flown at half-mast to mark the mourning. In his message he said:

the late Mao was an outstanding elder statesman who served his people with devotion honor and dignity. His leadership was an inspiration to the heroic and great people of China and through him China has become a modern state... Chairman Mao was highly respected, not only in China but throughout the world. With the death of Mao China and indeed the whole world has lost a great statesman.⁴⁸

In 1978 when Kenyatta died the Chinese leader in his message of condolences praised him as an elder statesman in the struggle against colonialism. In October of the same year president Moi sent a message of goodwill to the Chinese people during the occasion of the 29th Anniversary of the founding of the PRC. In a message addressed to the Head of the PRC Kuo Feng, Mr. Moi said that the cordial and fruitful relations between the two states would grow in strength for mutual advantage of their two countries.⁴⁹

A group of Chinese technical experts at the request of the Kenya government carried out a feasibility survey for the construction of a sports complex in Nairobi.⁵⁰ During October-November 1979, Hi Ying, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, and former ambassador to Dar-es-salaam visited Kenya and other Middle Eastern countries.⁵¹

All these activities in the 1970s indicates some improvement in relations between the two states.

5.5 Cooperation In Kenya-China Relations 1980-1990

From 1980 relations between the two countries were cooperative, measuring the level of cooperation by the number and level of delegations between the two states, and statements of support made by the heads of state of the two countries.

In 1980 a high ranking chinese delegation led by vice premier Ji Peng fei visited Kenya. Mr. Ji said the purpose of his visit was to strengthen the cordial relations existing between the two countries and hoped that the discussions between his delegation and Kenyan government officials would yield better understanding. He described his visit as a goodwill visit which would lead to extensive contacts between him and Kenyans from all circles.⁵¹ This visit opened the way for a new relationship which had hitherto remained cool since independence. President Moi expressed the wish to strengthen relations with China for mutual benefits, saying that both countries held identical views on major international issues.⁵² The Chinese delegation was made up of 19 men and it spent six days in Kenya.

In September 1980 president Moi led a large delegation of ministers, partly members, and university student leaders to China. During his tour he held talks with premier Zhao Ziyang and vice chairman Deng Xioping. Two agreements were signed on technical and

cultural cooperation.⁵⁴ This was the first ever visit by a Kenyan head of state to China since Kenya attained independence.

In September 1986 the first KANU delegation visited China. A second delegation to China by KANU was in August 1990. This latter delegation comprising of four members was invited by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The aim of this visit was to tour development projects initiated by the CCP with an aim of learning how a political party can initiate and implement development projects.⁵⁵ In 1991, the chairman of Maendeleo Ya Wanawake women group, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs visited China.⁵⁶

Other Chinese delegations to Kenya included a return visit by premier Zhao Ziyang in 1984.⁵⁷ This was the first visit by a Chinese head of state to Kenya and the first trip ever by a Chinese premier since Chou En-lai's in the 1960s. Earlier on, in November 1984, Chinese Minister for information Mr. Mu Quing had visited Kenya and had signed a cultural agreement with his Kenyan counterpart for exchanging information.⁵⁸ In 1985, the Chinese vice premier and politburo member Mr. Tian Ji Yuan visited Kenya and signed a financial agreement to implement phase two of Kasarani sports complex.⁵⁹

In May 1987, Chinese Foreign Minister Mr. Wu Xue quian paid an official visit to Kenya.⁶⁰ In September a commercial delegation visited Kenya. In 1990 the chairman of the China Women's Federation visited Kenya. In 1991 a ten man delegation of the Chinese peoples congress led by the vice chairman of CCP visited Kenya. This was the first parliamentary exchange between the two countries.⁶¹ In

1987 Mr. Gu Mu officially handed over phase one of Kasarani complex in readiness for the 4th All African Games.⁶²

From these exchange of delegations we can deduce that relations between the two states had improved. Exchange of visits led to better relations as leaders from the two states are able to know each other better. During such visits cooperation is stressed.

Thus during president Moi's visit, China's party leader Hua Gio feng stressed the identity of views held by the two states on major international issues. This followed a speech by Mr. Ziyang in which he said that "the unrest in some African areas were caused by Soviet intervention in African affairs which resulted in a split in the countries allowing the Russians to fish in troubled waters." He added that "it is not difficult for African countries to solve their boundary disputes so long as they get rid of foreign interference and act according to the OAU charter through friendly relations."⁶³ Both leaders expressed the significance of further developing friendly relations and cooperation. Ziyang reaffirmed China's position of non-interference in the internal affairs of African states; and support for African peoples' struggle against South African racism and foreign interference.⁶⁴

Premier Ziyang's four week tour to ten African and middle Eastern countries was seen by observers as an effort by the Chinese leader to cement relations with African states and promote economic cooperation as part of a revived policy of cultivating relations with the Third World. A Peoples Daily editorial described Zhao's trip as " a major event in the history of Sino-African relations"

proclaiming that "China always holds that it is its sacred internationalist duty to resolutely support the African and Arab peoples in their struggle against imperialism, colonialism, hegemonism, South African racialism and Israel expansionism."

African diplomats viewed Zhao's visit as having four major goals:

- (i) To overcome strained relations caused when China's policy swung in favor of the US, Japan and Western Europe in the 1970s. In 1978 China had cut its foreign aid program because of the needs of its own modernization program.
- (ii) China wanted to win African support in an effort to win support for the Cambodian resistance coalition headed by prince Narodoum Sihanouk to take Cambodia's vacant seat in the non-alignment summit in March 1985.
- (iii) Zhao wanted to set the groundwork for expanded trade with African countries.
- (iv) Zhao's trip was to pursue a foreign policy revived by foreign minister Huang Hua during an earlier visit to Africa depicting the US and the Soviet Union as superpowers wanting to expand their domination of the Third World. That policy had been revived after a period of normalization with the US.

From the foregoing analysis we assert that cooperation between the two states had greatly improved by the 1980s. Kenyan delegations to China had risen from none in the 1970s to more than eight in the 1980s. The Chinese delegations also greatly increased.

The nature of the delegations was also such that it included not only highly placed government officials but also the heads of state of the two countries. During such visits we found that statements which enhanced cooperation were commonly stressed. Agreements were also signed which indicated that cooperation between the two states was increasing. Doubtless to say, relations between the two states had become cordial. Why or what factors led to this ?

5:6 Factors contributing to Cooperative Interaction.

A common concern for the two states which contributed to normalization of relations was the fear of the Soviet Union. This perceived common enemy led the two countries to cooperate in an effort to contain the danger it posed to them. The 1969 border clashes with the Soviet Union led the Chinese to reassess their foreign policy goals from 1970. The Soviet Union was now considered the greatest enemy, and hence Chinese leaders approved the US political and military presence in the Third World. The US would now be tolerated as a necessary evil countering the Soviet Union. With this goal in mind almost every where in the Third World the linchpin of Chinese strategy was to support all governments (with the exception of Taiwan) that had adopted a critical attitude towards the Soviet Union irrespective of their socio-political orientation.⁶⁶ Warning the Africans on the dangers of the Soviet Union in 1979 a statement Chinese said:

The Soviet Union has become the most dangerous source of war and the main enemy of the world's peoples. The tactics of the Soviet

Union are to get Africa and Middle East countries to encircle and outflank Western Europe. Here are important strategic sea lanes. Without them Europe will be isolated. Therefore Africa becomes one of the hotspots for world rivalry ... We warn our African friends against this new danger. While driving the tiger through the front door they must be aware of the wolf coming through the back door.

Then they go on to advice on how to meet the Soviet challenge

... Opposition to Soviet hegemonism must incorporate all Third World countries. China does not support the domestic policies of some of these countries it has contacts with ... but these and others still have positive factors for the struggle against hegemonism especially Soviet imperialism.⁶⁷

The Chinese were encouraged in their search for friends against the Soviet Union by the extreme reaction around the world to the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Africans in particular had been uneasy about the Soviet Union's Eastern "empire" and her efforts to retain it by force were virulently criticized throughout the continent.⁶⁸ In Nairobi when the government called the invasion "a naked and brutal manifestation of the worst form of imperialism" students carried banners proclaiming "Russians murdered Dubcek" and "Czechoslovakia a lesson for Africa."⁶⁹

Although still occupied with the cultural revolution China naturally joined the anti-Soviet chorus. The intensity of feelings against the Soviet Union and the distrust for her from almost all African countries, may have been noted by policy makers in Peking. They may have calculated that the Soviet action had created

something of a vacuum in Africa; leaders unwilling to rely on the former colonialists, disappointed by the US and now disillusioned with the Soviet Union might be casting for a new "big power" friend. If the hypothesis is correct, it would explain the eagerness of African countries to recognize China once the revolution was over as well as China's generous commitments made during the diplomatic offensive.⁷⁰

Relations between Kenya and the Soviet Union had been an uneasy one. Competition between the Soviet Union and China for Odinga's favors had made the two of them suspect before the government. Samwel Makinda argues that "Kenya's morbid fear of Soviet influence or "Russophobia", goes back to the pre-independence period when the colonial administration regarded all liberation fighters as Soviet inspired communist agitators. When Kenya emerged into sovereign statehood the new leaders inherited the economic base that had been established and the superstructural ideas including Russophobia. Within a few years all leftist elements in the country were silenced, and Kenyan leaders still associate any criticism of government policies with Soviet inspired communism."⁷¹

Russophobia is defined here as a tendency to dislike or fear the Soviet Union and Soviet influence.

Soviet activities in Africa, especially within Kenya and the neighboring states received a lot of criticism from a cross-section of Kenyans. For instance in 1974 the Daily Nation questioned the Soviet Union's intention towards Kenya suggesting that there were

ulterior motives on the part of Russians in that three-quarters of their embassy was composed of high ranking members of the dreaded KGB-the secret police.¹¹ Again in 1955 an article in the same paper questioned the activities of the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean.

The paper wrote:

In the past and in no uncertain terms we have argued that the Indian Ocean should remain a "zone of peace". By that we mean that the Indian Ocean should be free of military presence of nations not bordering its shores particularly the Soviet Union and the US ... With the presence of Soviet missiles at Berbera Somalia and with the refusal of the Soviets to remove them and of Somalia to order their removal the concept of "Zone of peace" is not operative anymore. ... The presence of military bases in any country has in the past (and present too) meant that these nations can interfere in regional and internal affairs of other states. It is naive to think that the Soviets will not use the presence of missiles in Somalia to advance their interest in the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and the adjacent territory.

Another concern by the Kenyan government over the Soviet activities was the latter's transfer of arms to Uganda and Somalia in the 1970s which threatened her security. Kenya's political leadership had become convinced quite early of the importance of maintaining the security of the country's boundaries. Apart from the Sultan of Zanzibar who could lay claim to the Kenyan coast, both Uganda and Somalia at one time or another have claimed Kenyan territory.

The Kenya-Somalia border dispute flared up in 1960, the year Somalia gained her independence. It involved attempts by the inhabitants of Kenya's North-Eastern province to secede at the

behest of the Somalia government, so as to become part of that country.⁷⁴ The result was the shifta affair which was temporarily sorted out in 1967 following an agreement between the two countries. Trouble started again in 1977 when Somalia launched an expansionist war against Ethiopia. There was fear in Kenya that such a war would also be launched against her.

Similarly in February 1976, president Amin of Uganda made claims to parts of western Kenya. Although he immediately thereafter retracted his claims saying that he had no intention of making them good, the incident further made it clear to Kenya's leadership the delicate situation she was in with regard to her territorial integrity and national security vis-a-vis her neighbors.⁷⁵

The security consideration contributed to the estrangement that existed between Kenya and the Soviet Union. Both Uganda and Somalia were receiving substantial amounts of military hardware from the Soviet Union. Between 1967 and 1976, out of a total of amount of external arms supply to Somalia worth US \$185 million the Soviet Union supplied US \$181 million, worth of military equipment. For the same period Uganda received over 80% of her military equipment from the Soviet Union.⁷⁶ This arming of Kenya's potential enemies could possibly have made the Kenyan leadership to blame the Soviets for worsening the situation. Makinda is of the same opinion when he argues that:

... Kenya's fear of the Soviet Union was quite modest and was limited to a concern about Soviet influence in the Horn of Africa generally. Since Soviet influence was, until 1976 confined to Somalia, Kenya's Russophobia

often coincided with her concern about Somalia's ambitions in the region. In that way, Kenya's opposition to Soviet influence in the region was inseparable from her opposition to Somalia's nationalist ambitions.

The concern with Soviet military influence in the Horn not only led to the granting of military bases to the US,⁷⁷ but the capricious policies of the Soviets in East Africa were a real cause for concern to Kenya, and it is in this context that the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with China, and Moi's visit to China soon after can be understood.⁷⁸

China is a traditional enemy of the Soviet Union and Kenya's cooperation with her was an effort to gather around herself a big force to counteract the Soviet Union. It is worth noting that Moi's first visit was to France another country that strongly opposed Soviet policies not only in the Horn of Africa but also the whole of Africa. Hence coincidence of interests occurred between the two states in opposing the Soviet threat and thus explaining cooperation.

Observers have argued that the high level visit to six African countries among them Kenya, Burundi, Madagascar, Seychelles, Mauritius and Djibouti and four middle East Countries by Vice Premier Ji Peng fei accompanied by Gong Da fei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and 17 others,⁸⁰ marked an increase in the significance of Kenya in the geopolitical alignments created by the USA's response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Chinese premier's visit to Oman and Kenya after the two had signed agreements with the US for the increased use of naval and air

facilities for military purposes indicated China's approval of the agreements.¹¹ According to the Guardian the visit signalled a "change in Peking's priorities... The Chinese delegation had chosen to start its two month tour to ten African countries with Kenya where China has had very low profile for the last decade and to leave out of the tour Tanzania where its aid had been significant."¹²

A persistent goal in Kenya's foreign policy has been the desire to keep her sovereignty and her stance of non-alignment. This was greatly impaired when she offered military facilities to the US in August 1980. Kenya like any other developing country did not want to follow the doctrines of a few select countries in the developed world to which they chose to be aligned in return for financial assistance. Thus Moi's visit to China and his desire to improve relations was aimed at underlining Kenya's sovereignty and independence, and her dedication to the principles of non-alignment.¹³

Kenya still wanted economic development. To achieve this, foreign assistance was necessary. By engaging in active political relations with China she hoped to receive economic assistance from the latter. China had maintained her embassy in Nairobi even when Kenya had closed hers in Peking. This shows the importance with which she held her presence in Kenya. Thus when Kenya announced that she will resume diplomatic relations it was only logical that the news were welcome in China.

Finally we can assert that the desire for mutual benefits expected from cooperation explains why relations were normalized.

International support were recurrent themes whenever and wherever leaders from the two states met.

5:7 Summary and Conclusion

From the analysis we found that cooperation has been, an important part in China's policy towards Kenya during the period under study. We also found that during the same period especially from the 1970s there has been a shift towards higher levels of cooperation. The political factors that accounted for this cooperation and shift included: first, the fight against colonialism which meant that Kenya and indeed the whole of Africa would be free from any fears of colonialism and imperialism. At the same time it meant that China's goal of fighting imperialism would be met. Second the desire for diplomatic recognition on the part of China both as a means of getting enough support so as to be admitted into the UN and as a way of competing against Taiwan played upon her to seek cooperation with Third World countries including Kenya. On the other hand Kenya's policy of non-alignment which meant that she would enter into relations with any country that was willing to return it and her desire for economic assistance required for the country's development made her to cooperate with China.

The shift towards higher levels of cooperation as evidenced by increased political activities such as exchange of delegations, resumption of full diplomatic relations, statements of support and increased trade and aid were explained in terms of coincidence of

interests. Thus the common fight against the Soviet threat, need for economic assistance and the expectation of mutual gains to be derived from cooperation and the consideration of Kenya's geopolitical impotence not only made China to seek for normalization of relations but also made Kenya to be receptive to the Chinese overtures and therefore leading to cooperation.

As we had hypothesized in chapter one that coincidence in political interest leads to cooperation between Kenya and China, we found that, indeed common interests not only led to cooperation but also partly explains the shift of relations towards higher cooperative interaction between the two states. This chapter thus confirms our second hypothesis that coincidence of national interests between states leads to cooperation.

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CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

6:1 Summary and General Conclusions.

In this chapter, we have made an attempt to synthesize what the other chapters were driving towards. In addition a summary is given of our main findings and the general conclusions are also made here.

The main objective we had sought to pursue in this research study was to investigate and analyse the nature of relationship between Kenya and China with particular reference to cooperation and conflict as being the major interactive patterns characterising the two state's relations. We had sought to look for data to prove our assertions that relations between the two states had not only been characterised by conflict and cooperation but also that relations had moved towards higher levels of cooperation.

We set out two hypotheses to guide us in our study. The main task was to look for data to test these hypotheses. First we hypothesized that whenever the economic interests are compatible cooperation between the two states would occur. Secondly we hypothesized that whenever the political interests converge cooperation between the two states would ensue.

We asserted that the national interests were the major considerations in the two states' relations. Thus where the national interest of the two states coincided, either in the political or economic field, cooperation ensued. Subsequently conflict occurred when the national interests of the two states were incompatible.

Chapter two of our study attempted to put our study in perspective. It dealt mainly with the major foreign policy goals of the two states. In this chapter we argued that, the national interests of the two states could be identified in the major foreign policy goals and objectives which the two states pursued in their relations. We found that for China, her main foreign policy goals in the Third World in general, and Kenya in particular were: fight against imperialism and colonialism; Third World unity and promoting revolution in the Third World. For Kenya, on the other hand, economic development, non-alignment, and liberation of African countries still under colonial and racial domination were the main foreign policy goals she sought to achieve in her relation with China. Where the two states interests coincided in the pursuit of one (or all) of these goals cooperation occurred and vice versa.

In chapter three, we analyzed economic interaction between the two states. Under economic relations we analyzed trade and aid. On the trade trends, we found that there was a general increase in the volume of trade during the period under study. Thus Chinese exports to Kenya had risen up to U.S\$20.3 million in 1980. By 1990, it

however declined to U.S\$19.4 million, but all the same it was much more than in the 1960s and the 1970s. Kenya's exports to China also improved. By 1970 it was valued at U.S\$1.733 million: and by 1980 it had risen to U.S \$5.3 million , By 1990, Kenya's exports had also fallen to U.S\$3.4 million. Though China does not feature as one of Kenya's main markets, nevertheless trade between them had greatly improved.

The main features we found about Kenya-China trade include its pragmatism. This pragmatism is seen in the sense that trade continued to flourish even at times of conflict between the two states. This factor led us to the conclusion that the benefits from trade which accrued to the two states took precedence over political factors that brought conflict in the two states' relations.

On the nature of trade, we found that, like any other relationship between a big and smaller country, there has been an unequal exchange where by Kenya's exports have been mainly agricultural and industrial raw materials whereas her imports have been manufactured consumer goods. This unequal exchange has made benefits accruing to the two states unproportional with China taking the larger share.

Benefits from trade were not only economic but also political. Trade was a major indicator of political cooperation. Thus since 1963, there has been an increase in trade thus validating our agreement that relations were not only cooperative, but have moved towards higher level of cooperation.

Aid was another significant level at which the two states interacted on the economic level which we considered. China, has offered both technical and financial aid to Kenya. Chinese aid to Kenya, reflected her foreign policy objectives both in the short and long terms. It also reflected strategy and tactics. Peking offered aid as a means of competing with the Soviet Union and Taiwan. Her efforts to win diplomatic relations and to spread revolution was thus seen as much to Sino-Soviet differences as to China's antagonism with the West.

Chinese aid to Kenya in the 1960s was given so as to gain more influence in the country. However China was not able to gain the influence and perhaps the control she required because her modest aid could not match the enormous aid Kenya was receiving from the Western countries, and it was thus directed else-where. We can conclude that Chinese aid diplomacy was not successful in Kenya in the first decade of their relationship.

Most of China's aid was in the form of projects which can be completed quickly and easily with immediate results. The Chinese leaders emphasized the reciprocal nature of their aid. Compared to aid from other sources, China's aid is very generous. It has no strings or conditionalities attached which had made it most welcome, her loans are interest free or very low interests are charged and are repayable over an extended period of time with liberal grace periods and the Chinese experts are paid according to the standards of the countries in which they are working such that

much of the loan is not as in the western loans used to pay for the experts' salaries.

Thus the main feature of Chinese loan is that it was given mainly for political rather than economic considerations to gain influence in Kenya and if possible limit the influence of the Soviet and Western imperialist countries.

Thus on the whole, economic relations were not entirely divorced from political considerations. The resumption of Chinese aid to Kenya was done after the latter had re-opened her embassy in Peking and thus meaningful political relations resumed. Thus, we found that cooperation prospered in their economic relations. This cooperation also spilled over into the political relations. Thus as much as trade and aid were indicators of cooperation in the economic field, they also reflected or acted as indicators of political cooperation.

Kenya-China relations were by no means limited to economic dimensions. In fact political interaction was interwoven with economic relations. Chapter four deals with conflictive political interaction. It was shown that in the first decade, relations between the two states was mainly characterized with conflict. This conflict, as shown in expulsion and recall of diplomats, protests, demonstrations, threats, accusations and cancellation of visits, was due to four main reasons. First China wanted to export her revolution to Kenya which was resented by the Kenyan elites who believed that Kenya had already had her revolution. Second was the great cultural proletariat revolution in China. Third was the

Chinese triangular relationship with the Soviet Union and the U.S competition with the Soviet Union and opposition to U.S imperialism led relations with Kenya to be sour because the latter did not approve to that or did not approve the tactics used.

Lastly, the internal political division in Kenya and competition which resulted from those divisions exacerbated the conflict.

China wanted to use her capacity for exploiting domestic instability as a tool of foreign policy. She financed the opposition and trained Kenyan guerillas who would come back and topple the incumbent government. The Kenyan leaders being conscious that their rule was weak, were very sensitive to the threats caused by China's support to the opposition.

Peking's view of the world requires internal polarisation; the division of the world between friends and foes; hostility and struggle. In Kenya this polarisation was sharpened because her policy makers perceived China's actions as hostile and proceeded to assert that everything Chinese-whether Chinese interests, ideas, styles of organization and tactics, even aid-were themselves a threat to their government and people. Upon hearing such assertions, Chinese policy makers justified and reinforced their original hostility. This cycle was not readily broken and it led to continuous conflict.

Chapter five dealt with political cooperation between the two states. Two main issues addressed in this chapter were why relations were cooperative even during times of conflict, and what

factors explain the shift of relations from one characterized by conflict and cooperation to that characterized mainly with cooperation.

We started by showing in this chapter that there was cooperation between the states even at times of conflict. This cooperation was shown by trade interaction and aid, diplomatic relations, support given to each other, visits and international support. Thus in its political relation China adopted an attitude aimed at obtaining diplomatic recognition. It did this by associating Chinese and Kenyan interests where a similarity of purpose made this possible by making use of visits by political and cultural delegations, and where desirable by attempting first to establish trade relations.

Thus in the 1960s, when conflict existed, cooperation in these states' relation was due to the interests it would serve in attaining their foreign policy goals. Thus for China, she needed Kenya's recognition because it would enable her admission into the UN, and would have helped her in her competition with Taiwan as the representative of China and in her competition with the Soviet Union. Perhaps the major factor was her fight against western particularly American imperialism. Cooperation was based on China's support for Kenya's liberation movement. The need for economic development which required economic assistance and her policy of non-alignment made Kenya to seek friendship with China.

The shift in relations towards higher levels of cooperation without conflict was based on the threat to the two countries from

the Soviet Union. This threat made the two countries to normalize relations and cooperate in their fight against Soviet hegemonism. The common views held by the two states concerning major international issues, and need for mutual benefits and economic development also accounted for this shift. Non-alignment as a foreign policy guide and goal for Kenya was not only responsible for the continuing of relations, it has remained a permanent consideration on the part of Kenya in the two states' relations.

Thus we can conclude that Chinese political relations especially in the 1960s was aimed at making Kenya as anti-western as possible and therefore anti-imperialist as possible by showing that China consistently supported and would continue to support the emancipation of African people from western political and economic domination. Later on, from the 1970s, the Soviet Union became the major enemy and thus sought cooperation in her anti-Soviet policy.

Therefore, in conclusion we can generally assert that whereas in the economic field the two states' interests coincided and thus it led to cooperation both economically and politically, in the political field, pursuit of both similar and conflictive interests led to cooperation and conflict respectively. Also political cooperation usually laid better conditions for economic cooperation. A common theme running throughout their relationship is national interest. Conflict was explained in terms of conflicting interests pursued by the two states, whereas, cooperation was explained in terms of common interests pursued by the two states.

6.2 Testing of Hypotheses.

We had set out to test two hypotheses:

- (i) Whenever the economic interests of the two states coincided cooperation would occur.
- (ii) Whenever political interests followed by the two countries were compatible, cooperation would ensue.

From the data obtained in chapter three we were able to test our first hypothesis. From the data we found that the two states had common interests to pursue in their economic relations. We also found that these interests were compatible and as such cooperation ensued. We can thus say that we were able to prove our first hypothesis that because of the similarity of interest followed in the economic relations of the two states cooperation resulted.

In chapter four and five, we aimed at obtaining data to test our second hypothesis. The null hypothesis could read that, incompatible interests followed by the two states led to conflict.

In chapter four we showed that, because of the conflictive political interests followed, by the two states conflict resulted in their relations. In chapter five we were able to proof our hypothesis that cooperation resulted from the similarly of interests followed by the two states.

Thus on the whole we found that conflict and cooperation were both characteristic interactive patterns of the two states' relations. Cooperation both in the economic and political field and generally in the two states' relations culminated from

compatibility of interests followed by the two states. Conflict on the other hand was due to the incompatible political interests pursued by the two states. Otherwise on the whole, cooperation has been more characteristic of the two states' relations than conflict. Therefore this study shows that states can follow both conflictive and cooperative interactions simultaneously.

6.3 Future Trends in Kenya-China Relations.

From our analysis of the two countries relations we can be able to speculate on the likely future trends of the two states relations.

First it is likely that the trends which saw the two states' relations shift to higher levels of cooperation will be sustained. Though the Soviet Union has ceased to exist as an entity, because of its breakdown and the various states declaring their independence, it is likely, that the need for economic development will make relations between the two states to remain cordial. Both China and Kenya need each other in the International system which is becoming ever more interdependent.

Relations are likely to remain cordial in the foreseeable future since, those issues which were mainly responsible for conflict have been down played. China's foreign policy, does no longer emphasize the primary of ideology which had been responsible for China's policy of exporting revolution to Kenya and other Third World countries which are not socialist as a fait accompli

and as such, it now emphasizes the importance of economic development and cooperation with the Third World. This has made other Third World countries and indeed Kenya to be receptive of China and thus friendly relations are likely to ensue.

China has emerged as an important partner of Kenya in the economic sense. She has not only become a major source of Kenya's imports but also a destination of Kenyan exports. This trend is due to continue into the future. At the same time China is emerging as an alternative source of economic assistance to Kenya. She has proved that she is able and willing to offer aid and as such Kenya has every reason to cultivate her as a source of the needed economic assistance. Furthermore, China's aid will be more acceptable because of its generous terms. With the Western aid having so many conditionalities, if this trend will continue into the future, then Chinese aid will be more welcome. This points to a future of cordial and cooperative interaction.

As economic relations have an effect on the political sphere, it is likely that relations in the political field are also likely to be cooperative. Thus we can conclude that the future of Kenya-China relations is bright in the sense that the two states' relations will be more cooperative.

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