THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN POLICY EXECUTION: CONSISTENCY AND INCONSISTENCY IN KENYA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA - 1978 TO 1992

BY

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DECLARATION

This thesis is my own original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university

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This thesis has been submitted for examination with my approval as a University Supervisor

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DEDICATION

This thesis is gratefully dedicated to JOHN and BERNADETTE KATUMANGA for whom I feel the greatest affection and admiration. And to the 600 plus gallant students without whose ultimate price in the Soweto '76 "Green uprising", apartheid would perhaps still be reigning supreme in South Africa.
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In so far, however, as you may find this work deficient, the fault is entirely mine. I neither deny that someone else could have made a better thesis out of the same material. What I do maintain however, is that the thesis had to be written, some time by somebody.

(iv)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.3.1</td>
<td>The Political Realm</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.2</td>
<td>Economic Realm</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>CHAPTER FIVE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 (a)</td>
<td>Economic Interests as Sources of Inconsistency</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 (b)</td>
<td>Political Interests as Sources of Inconsistency</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 (c)</td>
<td>Transition from Covert to Overt Interactions</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.1</td>
<td>Alternative Policy Recommendations</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.2</td>
<td>Alternative One (Joint Ventures)</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.3</td>
<td>Alternative Two: Co-operation with ANC</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.4</td>
<td>Alternative Three: Establishment of South African Manufacturing Units in Kenya</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.5</td>
<td>Alternative Four: Provision of Demand and Supply of Information</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>BIBLIOGRAPHY</strong></td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER THREE
KENYA’S POLITICAL INTERESTS AS A SOURCE OF INCONSISTENCY IN HER RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA: 1978 - 1990

3.0 INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 87

3.1.1 KENYA’S POSITION ON SOUTH AFRICA IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: POLICY INCONSISTENCY ........................................ 90

3.1.2 (a) The United Nations Organization (UNO) ........................................ 91

3.1.2 (b) The Organization of African Unity (OAU) ........................................ 97

3.2.0 Geo-Political Networking between Kenya and South Africa: A Source of Inconsistency ................................................................. 108

3.2.1 The Case of Mozambique .......................................................... 109

3.2.2. The Case of Seychelles ............................................................ 115

3.3.1. OTHER FORMS OF POLITICALLY DRIVEN INCONSISTENCIES ............ 118

(a) Security Liaisons in Kenya .................................................... 118

(b) Bureaucratic linkages ............................................................ 123

(c) Elite Networking at Political Level ......................................... 127

CHAPTER FOUR
THE DIPLOMATIC SEE-SAW IN KENYA - SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONS: 1990- 1992

4.0 INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 138

4.1 THE POLITICS OF ALLIANCE BUILDING IN THE COLD WAR PERIOD .. 140

4.1 (a) Geo-political Ramifications ................................................. 140

4.1.(b) Economic Ramifications .................................................... 149

4.2 Internal Crises and the Shift in Kenya’s Foreign Policy Towards South Africa from a Covert to an Overt Level .................................................. 154
CHAPTER TWO
KENYA'S ECONOMIC INTERESTS AS A SOURCE OF INCONSISTENCY IN HER RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA: 1978 - 1990

2.0 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 38

2.1.1 A General Overview ............................................................................................... 41

2.1. SECTORAL BREAKDOWN OF TRADE BETWEEN KENYA AND SOUTH AFRICA. 
........................................................................................................................................ 47

(a) Trade in Foodstuffs and Beverages ........................................................................... 47

(b) Trade in the Communication Sector ....................................................................... 50

(c) Trade in Tourism ........................................................................................................ 54

(d) Trade in the Energy Sector ...................................................................................... 56

2.2 TRADE TRANSACTIONS AND INCONSISTENCY IN KENYA'S FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA. 
........................................................................................................................................ 59

2.3 Factors Accounting for this Inconsistency.

2.3.1 Elite Interests .......................................................................................................... 63

2.3.2 The Role of Multinational Corporations (MNCs). .................................................. 71

2.3.3 The Geo-Economic Factor ...................................................................................... 75
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Declaration</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedication</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgement</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>xxvi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>xxvii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER ONE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 JUSTIFICATION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 SCOPE, LIMITS OF STUDY AND PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Scope and Limits of Study</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Problems Encountered</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 LITERATURE REVIEW</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7 HYPOTHESES</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.8 METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Data Collection Techniques</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Data Analysis</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.9 DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table One</td>
<td>Kenya's Exports to East and Southern Africa 1979-1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table Two</td>
<td>Kenya's Imports from Selected East and Southern African Countries 1979-1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table Three</td>
<td>Trade Flows of 12 Major states in East, Central and Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table Four</td>
<td>US Foreign Assistance to Kenya, 1989-1992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the nature of Kenya’s foreign policy towards South Africa. The premise of our investigation is that despite public declarations calling for sanctions against and diplomatic isolation of South Africa, Kenya continued to pursue economic and political interactions with the latter at a covert level.

It is on this premise of policy ambivalence that we analyze the existence of consistency and inconsistency in Kenya’s foreign policy towards South Africa. Specifically, this thesis seeks to account for this disparity between policy declarations and practice in the period between 1978 and 1990, and the emergent consistency in foreign policy and practice in the period after the last quarter of 1990.

We co-vary economic and political interactions between Kenya and South Africa with public statements by Kenyan leaders within Kenya and in the international fora. Our observations from this co-variation is that there existed inconsistency in Kenya’s foreign policy towards South Africa at the level of policy implementation and practice.

We identify economic and political interests, as sources that undergirded inconsistency and argue that, pursuance and furtherance of these interests, generated inconsistency in Kenya’s foreign policy towards South Africa. These interests are defined using the national interest variant of the power theory. We observe that the government attempted to reconcile the pragmatic pursuit of national interests, with the moral principle opposed to the apartheid system, resident at the domestic, regional and international level. The emergent consequence was the pursuit of her interests at a covert level.
Kenya’s decision to abandon the continental alliance arraigned against South Africa in the last quarter of 1990, in preference to regularization of relations with the latter is equally examined and analyzed.

We contend that the shift in Kenya’s foreign policy towards South Africa from a covert to an overt plane in the last quarter of 1990, was a function of the collapse of apartheid, external pressure and internal political and economic crises in Kenya. We equally note that this process generated consistency in Kenya’s foreign policy towards South Africa.

Broadly, this thesis elucidates on the primacy of national interests in dictating the nature of Kenya’s foreign policy towards South Africa. We content that Kenya viewed pursuit of economic, geo-strategic and political interests with South Africa as important to her national interests. The centrality of these interests superseded moral principles ensconced in a continental alliance arraigned against South Africa.

National interest, it is noted, is elite defined and dominated. Specifically, we argued that the politics of foreign policy execution is such that when elite interests are at variance with the general interests of the body politic, elite interests tend to be pursued at a covert level. The net effect of this is inconsistency in foreign policy.
CHAPTER ONE


1.1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Kenya on attainment of independence, supported resolutions CIA/Plen.2/Res 2 of May, 1963 and CM/Rs 13(11) of June, 1964 which called upon the Organization of African Unity (OAU) members to effect a complete boycott of South Africa by forbidding interalia South African planes from flying over their air space and denying planes, ships or any other means of communication to and from South Africa from traversing their territories respectively.1 By legal notice Number 73, and legal notice Number 74 of 10th December, 1963, Kenya banned all trade to and from South Africa. This action resulted into a loss of £2 million pounds a year in trade which the government considered a necessary sacrifice.2

Subsequent to these notices, all Kenyan merchants were advised to dispose off South African goods and warned to cease dealings with South Africa. In conformity with the OAU resolutions Kenya ordered the South Africa’s consulate in Nairobi closed and the Consular subsequently expelled from Kenya. She equally withdrew landing and flying rights previously enjoyed by South African Airways on the Kenyan territory and in her air space.3

Her commitment to the 1963 policy positions on South Africa was publicly reaffirmed through her decision to support resolutions CM/Res. 865 (XXXVII), and CM/RES 855 (XXXVII) of 1981 at the OAU’s Council of Ministers and Heads of State conferences in Kenya.
in 1981 respectively. The two resolutions called for the immediate implementation of sanctions against South Africa in support of Namibian and the South African black people. The decision to adopt and abide by these resolutions was, in line with the international ostracisation of South Africa for institutionalizing apartheid.

By accepting to uphold these resolutions and subsequently issuing out constant public statements that were opposed to South Africa's apartheid system, Kenya was explicitly expressing its policy positions on South Africa. This process equally bound her to a collective continental approach on the South African question. It was thus expected that these policy declarations and stands would find expression and realization at the implementation level. Instead, there existed a disharmony between the former and the actual policy practice until 1990.

In spite of the trade embargo on South Africa for instance, Kenya's trade with the former flourished. For instance, between 1978 to 1990, she imported an average of US$6 million worth of goods from South Africa. This figure was twice her imports from Tanzania at US$3 million, three times her imports from Uganda at $2 million within the same period and more than her total imports from all the Eastern African Countries put together.

Similarly, her relations with South Africa at the bureaucratic level were buoyant. Contrary to her policy declarations, Kenya gave visitors' Visas to numerous South African tourists. Equally, South African military and security officers were not only given access to key security installations but also maintained links with their Kenyan counterparts.
The question we must raise at this point is; What accounts for this disparity between policy declarations and practice in the period 1978 to 1990? In other words, were Kenya and South Africa's economic and political relations, prior to the 90s, largely "explicit" but simply couched in diplomacy consistent with African continental attitudes towards South Africa?

In September, 1990, South Africa's foreign minister Mr Botha visited Kenya, accompanied by Tiny Rowland of the Lonrho companies, for talks with President Moi of Kenya.7 In June 1992, President Moi of Kenya became the first African Head of State to make a state visit to South Africa, since President Banda (of Malawi's) visit in 1971. This was in reciprocation to a similar visit to Kenya on 18th June, 1991 by President F.W. De Klerk of South Africa. Interestingly, this heightened explicit interactions between Kenya and South Africa were taking place against the background of OAU's incessant calls, that no trade or diplomatic contacts be pursued, prior to the total dismantlement of apartheid.8

Apparently, Kenya's insistence on renewing relations with South Africa apriori was consistent with the realpolitik emphasis on amour de soi. By abandoning Africa's collective regional stand on South Africa, she was putting her national interests above regional concerns, a position consistent with the realist view of the national interest.

But at this juncture, we must ask why Kenya rushed to regularize relations with South Africa ahead of all other African countries. Could it be argued that the "rush" to "regularize" relations with South Africa was borne out of Kenya's long standing covert interactions with the former, which were now finding expression on an overt plane? Could we therefore argue that the post 1990 "renewal" of relations with South Africa consisted of a transformation rather than
"creation" of already existing relations? The task of this inquiry is to attempt to answer these questions?

1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

Broadly, this study attempts to provide an explanation to the consistency and inconsistency that has characterized the relations between Kenya and South Africa. In specific terms, the main aims of this study are:-

1. To establish the extent to which the pursuit of Kenya’s economic interests accounted for the inconsistency in the Kenya-South Africa relations.

2. To investigate the extent to which the furtherance of Kenya’s political interests resulted in an oscillation between consistency and inconsistency in the Kenya-South Africa relations.

3. To establish empirically, the relationship between the collapse of apartheid, donor conditionalisation, internal political and economic crisis and the transition from covert to overt interactions between Kenya and South Africa.
The justification of this study is two-fold: Policy and academic. On the academic front, the primary intention of this study has been to fill certain gaps, existing, in works on interstate relations in East and Southern Africa. Although few studies on Kenya-South Africa relations exist, our work is pioneering in that, it not only examines the pursuit of Kenya’s political interests as a source of inconsistency in the Kenya-South Africa relations, it also seeks explanations to the shift in these relations from a covert to an overt and explicit plane as from 1990.

Apart from Vincent Khapoya, and Katete Orwa, no other works delve in considerable detail into the nature of Kenya-South Africa relations. Norman Miller, Sam Nolutsungu, and Victoria Brittain, all treat the Kenya-South Africa relations in a wholistic manner. These dyadic relations are submerged within a collective regional or ideological approach towards the entire Southern African region.

Khapoya and Orwa on the other hand, treat these relations, as a secondary issue. The thrust of their works, is Kenya’s foreign policy as a whole under Presidents Kenyatta and Moi. Essentially, as a result, they do not delve into the actual nature of these relations, nor do they examine and analyze the forces that inform and determine these dyadic relations direction, thrust, and their ultimate transformation from a covert to an overt plane. This study is therefore academically justified in that, it addresses the aforementioned issues in the relations between Kenya and South Africa. It also takes the discourse further, by addressing contemporary issues of Kenya’s policy towards a post-apartheid South Africa.
On the policy front, the study finds rationale in the fact that there is need to understand modalities of foreign policy implementation and dynamics inherent in the policy itself. The aim of this would be to construct a framework for anticipating the direction of the future relations between Kenya and South Africa. This becomes crucial when predicated on the fact that Kenya pursued economic and political relations with South Africa, inspite of her stated policy of isolating South Africa.

We also hope to show the centrality of a post apartheid South Africa to Kenya's trade in the region. For instance, according to Claude Hoekstra (a South African diplomat based in Nairobi) Kenya imported goods worth KShs. 4.176 billion from South Africa between 1987 and 1990 and exported goods worth Kshs. 608m in the same period. The potential of overt economic relations between the two states, is demonstrated by the increase in trade after 1990. For instance, imports rose Kshs. 950 million in 1991 to Kshs. 2.9 billion in 1992. This translates into a 300% increase.15

It is thus pertinent that Kenya anticipates the kind of dyadic relations an ANC led or dominated government is bound to pursue with her. Understanding the current shift in Kenya's foreign policy behavior towards South Africa is important if viewed from the following poles: Whereas South Africa accommodates less than 20% of Sub Saharan Africa's 200 million inhabitants, it generates more than 60% of its gross national product. Suffice it to note that her current trade with Africa totals approximately US $1.82 billion.16
The study is also justified, in that, it attempts an anticipation of South Africa’s likely policy positions the South African Development Co-ordination Council (SADCC), and the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) rivalry, while attempting to proffer new policy recommendations.

1.4 **SCOPE. LIMITS OF STUDY AND PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED**

(a) **Scope and Limits of Study**

The focus of this study is the two periods 1978 - 1989 and 1990 - 1992, which cover President Moi’s administration. The significance of these two periods and hence the rationale for carrying out the research on Kenya and South Africa relations is informed by several factors. Firstly, it was in this period, between 1978 and 1989 that Kenya’s foreign policy assumed a buoyant profile in intra-African state relations. It is noteworthy that Kenya held the Chairmanship of the OAU for two consecutive years in the said epoch. The period was also characterized by incessant condemnations of South Africa’s internal and external policies (with respect to Namibia) and calls for economic sanctions against her by Kenya.

It was also in the course of this period, that the regime undertook a major restructurisation exercise which saw several key actors circulated out of the system on the premise of the fact that they pursued and maintained relations with South Africa in a contradiction to the stipulated policy position of the government. Interestingly, whereas it would have been expected that henceforth, the government would pursue a consistent anti-South African position, the converse was true. If anything, structures which had facilitated interactions with South Africa, were left intact, and were instead filled by other pro-South Africa actors. The 1990 to 1992 period is significant in the sense that, it covered the period during which
Kenya explicitly opted to pursue overt relations with South Africa, in the process establishing consistency in her foreign policy behavior towards the latter.

The extensiveness of this period is considered appropriate in as far as it enables us to depict and in the process allowing us to correlate political and economic factors that underlay the Kenya - South Africa relations. On the other hand, the year 1992 is important in the sense that it is able to bring us to the most recent dynamic interactions between the two states.

(b) Problems Encountered

Several problems were encountered in this study. Foremost among these was the paucity of adequate academic literature on Kenya-South Africa relations. Secondly, there was the problem with general statistical measurements. While IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics measured its statistics under Cost Insurance and Freight (CIF), Kenya's economic survey on the other hand, provided its statistics in Free on Board (F.O.B), consequently, the idea of synchronizing the two was difficult. Thirdly, there was the question of unwillingness of people within the bureaucratic circles to avail relevant data and information on the Kenya-South Africa relations. This stemmed out of what they termed as the "sensitive nature" of these relations.

To overcome these impediments, we ultimately used C.I.F. However, for the purpose of picking out the general trends, we used F.O.B. statistics. With respect to the second problem, we extensively utilized journals, Magazines, Newspapers, Government documents, Njonjo Judicial Inquiry Proceedings, the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, and academic books.
Sam Nolutsungu\(^1\) states that South Africa’s foreign policy aimed at securing an optimal organizational and ideological milieu in Africa. South Africa, he argues endeavoured to gain influence among colonial powers in an attempt to persuade them to retain their empires. When the latter withdrew, Pretoria continued hoping that the erstwhile colonial powers would continue to exert their influence to advance her interests. When met by isolation and rebuff by African states, South Africa’s foreign policy opted to transcend this isolation by offering trade and aid to African states. For South Africa, internal economic expansion underpinned the need for markets while economic aid for African states, on the other hand, was geared towards the buying of influence.

Nolutsungu views South Africa’s relations with African states in terms of an ideological conflict between pro- and anti-apartheid forces. Pretoria, Nolutsungu argues failed to attain leadership in Africa because of its apartheid policies, which formed the basis of hostility.\(^2\) He notes the important roles the economic and external variables can play in shifting state behavior. However his work assumes a generalistic approach of South Africa’s foreign policy towards Africa. Besides, it is centered on the period between 1945 - 71. There is need to provide an analysis of South Africa’s foreign policy, three decades after Africa became independent. More specifically, given Kenya’s salient role as a sub-imperial power in Eastern and Central Africa, an examination of her relations with South Africa in the period between 1978 and 1992 is crucial. There is equally need to provide foreign policy analysis that can explain and capture the dynamics inherent in the shift in Kenya’s foreign policy behavior towards South Africa after 1990.
Barbara B. Brown asserts that South Africa seeks to dominate and control independent nations of Southern Africa in order to preserve apartheid and promote internal economic development. She contends that the country's external interests reflect and are part of its domestic goals. Accordingly white supremacy and economic prosperity are the republic's two "core values" for which sacrifices are made. South Africa, Brown argues, secures these values through its foreign policy.

Brown, like Nolutsungu analyzes South Africa's foreign policy towards Swaziland, Malawi, Lesotho, Botswana and Zambia as a block, and thus does not bring out specific issues that are peculiar to each of these states' dyadic relations with South Africa. Brown's study is mainly centered on South Africa's foreign policy towards African states, but does not capture internal forces within these states, that inform the nature of their relations with South Africa. The study is also confined to the Southern African region. There is thus need to examine Kenya-South Africa relations in order to provide an explanation for her foreign policy behavior towards South Africa.

Richard Bissell, Chester Crocker et al note the importance of South Africa to the West in terms of valued minerals, strategic position and as a bulwark against the spread of communism in the region. Specifically, their works expound on factors informing western states' relations with South Africa. They shed inadequate light on South Africa's dyadic relations in African states like Kenya, yet there is need to provide explanations to the triangle link between Kenya, South Africa and the West. Our study will attempt to investigate and explicate this link. It will equally attempt to explain how pressure from western states and the
shift in their strategic interests helped to shape and influence the emergent post-apartheid Kenya-South Africa relations.

Geldenhays D focuses on the South Africa’s relations with African states after the promulgation of the new constitution. He notes that Pretoria was forced into a defensive position, in its foreign relations with African states. Its domestic base was perceived to be under threat from the dual external pressures of isolation and intervention, which were in many instances aligned to the internal pressures for political change. South African foreign policy, he posits, was designed to counter the rising tide of isolation and the threat of more drastic forms of intervention, thereby safeguarding and ensuring the survival of the state (white power).

Geldenhay’s study is mainly inward looking. It attempts to show how internal political processes and formations influence and inform the post apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy behavior. He does not elucidate on her previous foreign policies towards other regional sub-imperial states like Kenya. While he provides us with a clue, of the likely trajectory of South Africa’s foreign policy, he does not volunteer constructs that can provide an explanation to the sudden shift in Kenya’s foreign policy behavior towards South Africa. This study intends to investigate and explain this foreign policy behavior.

Makinda S. M., while refuting John Okumu’s thesis that sessionist threats to the newly independent state shaped Kenya’s foreign policy behavior argues that the determining factor in Kenya’s foreign policy behavior has been the drive towards attracting more foreign capital, maintenance of commercial links with neighboring states, ensurance of the security of the
borders and the consolidation of the domestic power base. Accordingly, this policy engendered and entrenched dependence on foreign investment and her East African market.25

Variables cited by Makinda to support his thesis confirm realists' proposition of power politics. Thus the interpretation of Kenya's dependency boils down to a balance of power explanation. Kenya entered into alliances with Britain and Ethiopia to ensure the security of her borders. Makinda's work attempts to show how Kenya's economic dependence on the western states influences her foreign policy behavior. However, it does not explicate Kenya's foreign policy behavior towards states like South Africa. It thus cannot help us in explaining the shift in Kenya's foreign policy towards South Africa. Neither does it help us to anticipate the likely trajectory of her future dyadic relations. This is what our study will attempt to do.

Khapoya observes that Kenya's foreign policy behavior is shaped by her strong ties with the West. Her foreign policy behavior in the 1960s and in the 1970s has been referred to as that of a quiet diplomacy by Okumu. This, according to Khapoya was very much in keeping with her emphasis on economic development and most probably a consequence of her dependence on western capital.26 Khapoya notes that Kenya could not afford to be activist and frighten away international capital. Thus, while she constantly voted at the United Nations Organization (UNO) and other fora, against South Africa and met all her financial commitments for the liberation struggle, she avoided any kind of activism that could displease her traditional friends. Hence her verbal support to the freedom fighters in South Africa, while denying them military bases and offices in Nairobi, unlike the case of Zambia and Tanzania. He notes further that while Kenya supported some form of international sanctions against South Africa, she allowed
planes destined for South Africa to refuel in Nairobi and Mombasa, contrary to the OAU resolutions.  

While Khapoya identifies consistency in Kenya’s foreign policy towards South Africa, he does not provide an adequate explanation to this disharmony, between policy declarations and actual practice. This behavior cannot simply be summarized up as a consequence of Kenya’s fear of sanctions from western states. As a sovereign state, there must be other interests Kenya pursued in her relations with South Africa to warrant her contradicting her own policy positions. Khapoya does not equally define what kind of activism would have displeased western states nor does he provide an explanation as to why Western states should be displeased. If there existed an implicit alliance between Kenya, Western states and South Africa that constrained Kenya’s foreign policy towards South Africa as Khapoya seems to suggest, his study does not bring it out clearly. Equally, it does not indicate the interests that were being pursued to warrant this foreign policy behavior. No attempt is equally made to show the role of certain internal forces in Kenya in shaping and influencing the Kenya-South Africa relations. 

Our study’s task is to provide explanation to the disparity between policy declaration and practice. We will equally attempt to explicate how pursuit of certain political and economic interests shape and determine Kenya’s foreign policy behavior towards South Africa. 

Orwa on his part contents that immediately after independence, Kenya slapped a ban on economic, political and cultural links with South Africa, in line with the OAU resolutions, which called on African states to intensify assistance to liberation movements. This stand by Kenya, Orwa argues was militated by domestic conditions. Kenya despite having been a victim of
racism, had resolved to pursue a policy of racial accommodation, and was thus averse to South Africa’s racist policies. Any open interactions with South Africa would have merely undermined her internal milieu. He characterizes Kenya’s refusal to grant military support to freedom fighters in Southern Africa as a pragmatic policy that does not alienate the main trading partners, who have entrenched economic interest in South Africa. This policy, he argues, had the positive advantage of keeping Kenya within the mainstream of intra-African politics while protecting her economic interests in Africa.

Orwa observes further that Kenya’s foreign policy towards South Africa assumed consistency in the early eighties. Orwa’s study however, fails to show and explain factors informing the past inconsistencies and what he calls consistency. It equally does not summon empirical evidence to back his assertions. Our study will attempt to analyzes Kenya’s foreign policy towards South Africa in a bid to provide an explanation of the past inconsistencies. It shall equally attempt to expound on factors informing the current consistency in Kenya’s foreign policy towards South Africa.

T. M. Shaw in his thesis, "Conflict and co-operation in a Regional sub-system" analyses the Southern African state relations from a systemic point of orientation. He views Southern Africa as a partial subordinate state system because of the continuity of both racial conflict and constraints on South Africa’s hegemony. He posits that Southern Africa exhibits different degrees of co-operation and conflict in three issue areas, that is; structure, scope and participation. He examines the complex patterns of relationship to advance an explanation of the low level of integration in Southern Africa despite the tradition of interaction in the region.
According to Shaw, the Southern African region does not have one boundary for all types of interactions. Rather, the scope and character of relations differ between issue areas. Consequently, in the economic issue area, regional exchange and infrastructure extended further into Africa than diplomatic relations directly involving the white ruled states did. He notes that military confrontation has been further limited in extent by political change in Mozambique and Angola.

It is Shaw’s contention that South Africa’s dominance in economic issue area is not matched in the military and organizational issue area. Regional co-operation in economic issue area did not lead to political integration because of racial and economic stratification.

Shaw attributes the direction of political change in Southern Africa to continuing interaction of national and regional actors who maintain a rich diversity of global, continental and transitional organizations. He identifies a large range of international actors with interests in the sub-system, while examining their complex interactions. Shaw argues that Southern Africa is unlikely to be stable or integrated until the transition to majority rule is completed.

Timothy M. Shaw sees Kenya and South Africa as sub-imperial powers whose increasing roles are able to determine continental affairs in the interest of both themselves and their external associates. As sub-imperial states, the two are at the center of the periphery and are able to exert dominance in this region of the third world. Shaw further observes that Kenya’s central position in East Africa as a stage for diplomatic and economic activities, enables her to act to advance foreign and national elite interests. The conclusion thus reached is one which portrays
Kenya as a dependent neo-colonial state whose foreign policy is basically an extension of the imperialistic capitalist states and the multinational corporations.

This is the position taken by Colin Leys, Claude Ake, Geoffrey Lamb et al. who deny that Kenya has a foreign policy independent of those of western powers. They on their part describe Kenya as a neo-colonial state with corporative links with capitalist economies and multinational corporations. In their own view, Kenya is a state in alliance with imperialism with an objective of sustaining opposition to progressive regimes in East and Southern Africa. While Shaw, Leys, Lamb, Ake et al. point out the similar roles played by Kenya and South Africa as sub-imperial states, they do not discuss the nature of Kenya-South Africa dyadic relations.

Their perception of Kenya’s foreign policy, as an appendage of that of foreign states is unrealistic. It basically assumes that Kenya is led by naive leaders who exemplify no sense of both national and elite interests save for that of western states and multinational corporations. This is simply not possible. Domestic factors of given states play a major role in determining what interests their leaders pursue in their states international intercourse with others, in the process influencing their foreign policy behavior. In Kenya’s case, there is need to delineate such factors and show how they influenced her foreign policy towards South Africa.

Suzzane Cronje, Margaret Ling and Gillian Cronje, in their book, *Lonrho portrait of a multinational 1976* acknowledge the prominent role Lonrho plays in the Kenyan economy, notwithstanding her investments in South Africa. They note that Lonrho pursues a dual policy in both black states and white ruled African states. In essence then, Lonrho is at the center of
the process in which Western capital is attempting to restructure its attitudes towards Africa and its nationalist operations. Lonrho’s style of operation, they argue, aims at preparing the ground for a peaceful and gradual resolution to the racial confrontation in South Africa.

Suzzane Cronje posits that Lonrho’s Director, Mr Tiny Rowland is regarded as an extraordinary ambassador, with access to heads of state whenever he wants to see them. She notes further that, so great is Lonrho’s influence in Kenya, that at some point, the MNC became a subject of discussion in the Kenyan parliament for 10 days.

Cronje, Ling and Cronje like Shaw T. M acknowledge the marked role MNCs play in influencing and determining the Kenya-South Africa relations. However, they do not tell us the reason why even with that influence, the dyadic relations between Kenya and South Africa had to be conducted covertly. This study will attempt to explicate why these relations were executed at this level, between 1978 and 1990. It will also attempt to explain the shift towards overt pursuit of dyadic relations from 1990 onwards.

Joseph Hanlon highlights the policy of collaboration between Kenya and South Africa in training and arming Renamo rebels in the war against the Mozambican Government. He argues that, Kenya and South Africa act as bulwarks against the spread of communist inspired regimes in Southern Africa on behalf of the West. Their arming of Renamo is done with the acquiescence of the Western governments.

Norman N. Miller, contends that Kenya’s relations with South Africa are an example of economic and political pragmatism. He notes that Kenya not only imported maize and food
Miller and Hanlon thus acknowledge the existence of economic and strategic relations between the two states respectively. However, they do not explicate the inconsistency in Kenya’s foreign policy towards South Africa. They equally do not elucidate on factors informing this "pragmatic" behavior. Hence, the need to study Kenya’s foreign policy towards South Africa, for the purpose of among others, examining and analyzing factors that underlie this disharmony in policy declarations and implementation.

It is thus evident from the preceding literature review that none of these studies specifically addresses the dyadic relations between Kenya and South Africa. The foregone literature does not explore, capture and explain the gap and disparity between foreign policy declarations and actual foreign policy execution. None equally centers itself on explicating in detail, the political and economic factors (either internal or external) that had over time generated inconsistency in Kenya’s foreign policy towards South Africa.

Equally missing in the aforegone literature is the link that can shade light to the apparent shift in the Kenya-South Africa diplomatic intercourse: that is from the covert to an overt plane, hence the need for an incisive examination of the patterns that have characterized the Kenya-South Africa relations. Such an examination will be geared towards explaining, not only the past covert relations, but also the current overt and explicit form they have taken. To this end, we shall examine and analyze the role played by Kenya’s national interests in determining and shaping her foreign policy towards South Africa.
The importance of theory lies in its main role of description, explanation, analysis and prescription. Utilization of theory equally allows for variable correlation. In the case of dyadic relations between Kenya and South Africa, which exemplify consistency and inconsistency and which are characterized by a shift from a covert to an overt plane, there is need to provide a model capable of capturing as much as possible, the aspects of our investigation.

For our purpose, the theory that can help us analyze, predict and explain the Kenya-South Africa relations especially the consistencies and inconsistencies in Kenya’s foreign policy behavior, is the national interest approach of power theory. However, it is necessary that we examine the other alternative theories like the interdependence and decision-making theories.

The decision making theory’s utility in the study of interstate relations lies in its focus on how and why certain foreign policy decisions that affect interstate relations are taken. The rational actor model of the decision making theory, for instance, assumes the existence of a rational actor, who maximizes state interests and reacts accordingly in the interest of the state after rationalization, while viewing the state in monolithic terms. It also examines the elites who make decisions with particular reference to their social background, biases, peer group and organizational orientation.

These perspectives on the rational actor model have been contested by Robert Dahl, Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr. Dahl’s thesis is that there is no homogenous power elite
group that makes foreign policy and that foreign policy is a product of conflicting interests among groups.

On their part, Bruce Rossett and Harvey Starr (1989) argue that, the existence of elites within a given society does necessarily, limit the impact of the divergence that prevails and that among elites themselves, there are various conflicts which emerge and which may not necessarily be in conformity with the interests of the other members of the society, hence divergence and conflicting interpretation of the foreign policy making process. It is their argument that, differences within the elites and between elites and other societal groups lead to the emergence of constant bargaining and hence the necessity to understand different levels of foreign policy making process.40

Other criticisms levelled against this model is that, it puts too much emphasis on and assumes the rationality of the decision makers and the infallibility of their decisions. The organizational process model or other pluralistic approaches to decision making lays emphasis on decisions as they are formulated, based on competing and divergent interests emanating from the various units, values and interests of the state.

The elite theorists contend that, foreign policy choices are determined by elites whose perceptions of world politics is characterized by active and potential conflict and co-operation among states. This, they argue, stems from scarcity of resources, thus the use of violence is inevitable if states have to achieve their interests as interpreted by elites.41
Interdependence theory, while providing us with an explanation for interstate relations does not capture the underlying dynamics that necessitate the existence of implicit relations as opposed to explicit ones. It also fails to provide an explanation to the inconsistencies that occur in such relations.

In the case of dyadic relations between Kenya and South Africa, that are characterized by a shift from implicit relations, there is need to provide a model capable of bringing out all aspects under investigation. To this end, the national interest model becomes useful.

We can describe, explain, predict, and prescribe the Kenya-South Africa relations more succinctly by utilizing the national interest model. National interest not only defines a state’s perception of its good vis a vis other states, but also determines and shapes the nature of its foreign policy and interactions with other states.

National interest of a state can be defined as a compromise of conflicting interests: it is not an ideal arrived at scientifically but rather a product of constant internal political competition. In Morgenthau’s orientation it is equated to pursuit of power, where power stands for anything that establishes and maintains control by one state over another.

Specifically, it is this process of pursuing national interest through exchanges, interactions, complex and multiple as they may be that constitutes the domain of foreign policy.

In itself, foreign policy can be defined as actions of a state that are designed to achieve particular objectives involving other actors beyond a state’s own boundaries. It is worth
noting that foreign policy is determined by decision makers. It is they who define what constitutes national interests to be pursued and realized, through the foreign policy of a state. Consequently, even though it is supposed to constitute a consensus arrived at, after a multiplicity of divergent interests have been considered, the subjective aspects of the decision makers cannot be overlooked. It is from this orientation that we regard national interest as a synthesis of objective and subjective values of the state and decision makers.

Our argument is premised on the fact that regardless of the type of polity, the iron law of oligarchy is operative. This means that in as much as the broader section of society gives input on, what options should be drawn by the decision makers (elites), the final decisions are often framed in the thinking, reasoning and interest of the elites. Thus, whereas there might be a thin line of distinction between elite interest and the national interest, at the end of the day, it is the decision makers who eventually determine what foreign policy options should be taken and how they should in fact be pursued. Equally, once the most central core of the ruling elites opt to pursue certain interest they deem necessary to their survival, they tend to institutionalize their pursuits. In the process, they tend to create rigid serving bureaucratic structures, such that, even if some of the key actors are circulated out, the inherent stability of these structures is such that, they are able to sustain and engender pursuit of these interests. Even then, they are eventually filled by other "correct" elites.

This is not to argue that there are no interests that can be shared in common by all members of a nation state. On the contrary interests involving sovereignty and territorial integrity are collective, yet majority of foreign policy cases are basically concerned with what K J Holsti calls routine foreign policy matters defined as middle range objectives. Such as
interstates economic, commercial and political relations, including attempts to influence behavior of other states in the desired direction. Thus, it is here that class interests tend to have a decisive influence on the foreign policy making with ideological rationalization coming in forms of national honor, when in essence it is basically the honor interests and security of the dominant class.

I D Levins' arguments then bring to us to what foreign policy of a state entails. In his definition, Levin looks at foreign policy as;

A combination of aims and interests pursued and defended by a given state and its ruling class in its relations with other states and methods and means used by it for their achievement and defence of these purposes and interests. The aims and interests of the state in international relations are realized by various methods and means. First of all by peaceful official relations maintained by a government through its special agencies with the corresponding agencies of other states, by economic, cultural and other contacts maintained by state agencies as well as by public institutions. (economic, political, scientific, religious etc) which provide opportunity for exercising economic, political and ideological influence on other states. Finally, by using armed forces i.e., by war or other methods of armed coercion.  

For the operationalization of national interest and foreign policy in this study, we shall take Levin's definition of foreign policy. This is because it introduces the link between policy and the vested interests it is supposed to service. Consequently, we shall be of the contention that, what a state seeks to promote or pursue as it interacts with other states, must be viewed against the background of its internal social structure and the political power configuration within it. More specifically the class that controls and
wields power necessarily shapes foreign policy and does so while reflecting on its own class interests even though it rationalizes them ideologically, as national interest.48

For Third World states the survival of the ruling elites stems from among other factors, the external support they received through dependency structures put in place by erstwhile colonial masters. The overall aim having been the incorporation of these states into the overall western economy in a bid to facilitate the extraction of raw materials from these ex-colonial states, to the capitalist core, while bringing in manufactured products.

For this colonial objective to succeed in Kenya, there was need to create a class that could identify its own interests with those of other ruling classes offshore. Thus, recruitment into the government was systematically done with an aim of excluding radical pro Mau Mau in preference for what Kipkorir49, calls "the loyalist crowd". According to him, the post independence ruling elite was overwhelmingly composed of those who either denounced Mau Mau or who were passive to it, or were conveniently absent from the country for much of the time.50 Demonstrating this argument further, Kipkorir evidenced that of the seven Kikuyus in Kenyattas' cabinet, five were in this category. While Kenyatta himself was cold to the Mau Mau, James Gichuru had signed a pledge of loyalty to the colonial administration, while Charles Njonjo, Njoroge Mungai and Peter Mbiyu Koinange were all conveniently abroad, presumably on study leave during the entire period of the struggle.
Having been recruited thus, to strengthen his position, Kenyatta recycled into the system other loyalists who had collaborated with the colonial regime thus benefitted from the middle level education accessed to them by the colonial regime as administrators within the central government and the provincial administration.\(^{51}\)

This latter process as Mutahi Ngunyi explains was aimed at ensuring unswaying loyalty on the part of these elites to Kenyatta, who understood the facet that, the process of legitimizing them would generate nothing short of absolute devotion from them to his regime.

These off-shore elites, in co-operation and with the help of the newly created elites, he encouraged the creation of monopolistic tendencies that ultimately led to the emergence and preponderance of multinational corporations in Kenya’s economy. These interests later emerged to control dominant sectors of the economy and in the process constrained the emergence of any meaningful independent economic and foreign policy pursuits.\(^{52}\)

Class structures attendant upon incorporation made Kenya, like other African states hooked to the West. She could not exist without this dependence, neither could she effectively develop with it. This linkage and dependence into the global capitalist system inhibited industrialization beyond import export substitution industries.\(^{53}\) Her economy became integrated to the less dynamic forms of growth associated with agriculture and extractive industries. Incidentally, she could not do without the created dependent status because the ruling elites were sustained by it. This sustenance went
beyond economic aid and investment, to include military aid and subsequently to the stationing of foreign troops in the country. This process was geared towards, protecting the interests of the ruling elites within Kenya and their off-shore allies.

These structures equally, acted as constraints to any attempts at pursuing an independent foreign policy. Essentially, they played the role of what Richard Olson\textsuperscript{54} calls, invincible blockade, to be brought against the ruling elite should it choose to transgress basic rules of the game. The subtle economic weapon to be used would include declines in investments, withdrawal of the same, dwindling loans and grants, or outright elimination of credit lines.\textsuperscript{55}

In a nutshell then, what emerged was a structured domestic rule based on a coalition of internal interests favorable to the international capitalist system. This entailed acceptance of the basic needs of international order (which encompassed containment of communism, and ensurance of the maintenance of western worlds’ control of important raw materials in Southern Africa), if the local elites expected to continue receiving services needed for their continued hold onto power. Thus, even though conflicts occurred between local and the offshore elites, their interests continued to coincide in many respects. Consequently, the two were in an alliance and in the course of time, a symbiotic relationship evolved to exert its own structures that spawned servants, whose needs and survival dictated that, they sustain neo-colonial links, whatever the short term conflict of the interests. As Smith puts it, the ruling elites in Africa are an integral part of the structure of the imperialist exploitation.\textsuperscript{56}
Consequently, the foreign policy postures adopted, reflected the interest of this coalition besides the core national interest, which entailed defence of national territorial integrity and sovereignty. National interest as reflected in the foreign policy, specifically then, was a function of interests of the body politic (which entailed sovereignty and defence of territorial integrity at the core) and the elite interests. Elite interests here does not refer to the interests of one economic class alone, but of a coalition of forces. Central among them being the international capital, local immigrant and indigenous capital and other domestic forces, especially ethnic ones.

Inconsistency (which refers to the disharmony between stated principles and the actual style, and conduct of foreign policy towards South Africa) was a consequence of an attempt to pursue a dual policy. Such a policy aimed at satisfying these forces internal and external which preferred economic links between the two states, and the rest of the body polity which preferred to see South Africa isolated.

To achieve these objectives, economic interactions had to be pursued covertly. This left room for the decision makers to overtly continue to condemn and campaign for South Africa's isolation. However, owing to the collapse of apartheid, economic and embargo by western states and the internal political and economic crisis in Kenya, decision makers in Kenya opted to normalize Kenya's relations with South Africa. Specifically, Kenya decided to pursue overt economic and political relations with South Africa. This helped to establish consistency (taken to mean the maintenance of the same pattern and style of foreign policy behavior that is consistent with the foreign policy declarations) in her relations with South Africa.
Specifically then, the national interest approach of the power theory helps us to describe and view Kenya's foreign policy towards South Africa, as pursuit of power in her national interest. These interests were basically elite dominated. This approach equally situates the inconsistency and shows it, as emanating from an attempt to reconcile pragmatic interests with moral principles. And at this point, it asserts that the pragmatic interests must reign supreme, even though taking place at a covert level. It predicts the transition of consistency in foreign policy formulation and execution as being a function of the perceived national interest.

1.7 HYPOTHESES

1. That the inconsistent nature of relations between 1978 and 1990 was basically a function of Kenya's pursuit of certain economic interests with South Africa. This hypothesis suggests that there existed economic relations between Kenya and South Africa, regardless of Kenya's policy position of isolating South Africa. Specifically, it suggests that decision-makers in Kenya deemed this interests necessary to the extent to which they had to be pursued. Pursuit of these economic interests in contravention of the governments' own stand on trade relations with South Africa, generated inconsistency in Kenya's foreign policy behavior towards South Africa.

2. That Kenya's pursuits of certain politically driven interests accounted for inconsistency in her relations with South Africa between 1978 and 1990.
This hypothesis suggests that the furtherance of certain politically driven interests which included inter alia, prevention of the spread of hostile Marxist/socialist oriented governments for instance, generated inconsistency in the Kenya-South Africa relations. It equally supposes that certain political interests were pursued by Kenya contrary to the values and principles pronounced in public, in the process generating inconsistency.

3. The transition from covert to overt interactions between Kenya and South Africa after 1990 was a function of the collapse of apartheid system, external pressure and internal political and economic crises in Kenya.

In specific terms, the shift from apartheid policies by the South African government towards a democratic dispensation led to consistency in the Kenya-South Africa relations. Essentially, while pursuit of national interests (as determined by decision makers) allowed for the existence of covert but consistent economic relations between Kenya and South Africa, existence of apartheid precluded the existence of any overt contacts between the two states. When such contacts occurred, inconsistency was the result. Removal of apartheid thus allowed for open contacts and hence consistent relations. Consistency here, is taken to mean, maintenance of the same pattern and style of foreign policy behavior that is in conformity with the foreign policy declarations.
1.8 METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH

(a) **Data Collection Techniques**

Library research constituted the main source of investigation. Consequently, the study essentially relied on secondary sources of data. These included journals like *African Confidential*, *African Analysis*, *Direction of Trade Statistics* yearbooks, *International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s)*, *Weekly Review*, *Africa South Magazine*, *Daily Nation*, *The Standard*, *The Kenya Times*, books, *Economic Intelligence*, periodicals like *African Contemporary Records*, public documents and any other such literature that was deemed adequate in providing adequate information.

(b) **Data Analysis**

Relevant data was subsequently collected, recorded and analyzed with emphasis being laid on the association between independent and intervening variables. This was geared towards showing how such independent variables (economic and political) generated consistency and inconsistency in the Kenya foreign policy behavior towards South Africa. The analysis carried out was mainly qualitative and descriptive. Associations were thus drawn to depict causal relationships between variables. Data analysis techniques used, included tabular analysis, descriptive statistics mainly frequency percentages, ratios and prepositions.
1.9 DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS

(a) **Consistency**

In this study it is taken to mean the maintenance of the same pattern and style of foreign policy behavior that is in conformity with the foreign policy declarations.

(b) **Inconsistency**

Inconsistency in this study refers to the disharmony between stated principles, and the actual pattern, style and conduct of foreign policy behavior.

Inconsistency occurs when due to national interests, as defined by the ruling elites, a state is forced to carry out economic, political and cultural relations contrary to the declared principles.

(c) **Overt Relations**

For the purpose of this study, explicit relations shall be conceptualized to entail dyadic relations that are a consequence of a concurrence between stated policy and actual foreign policy behavior. Due to such concurrence there is no need for disguise of political and economic interests. Under overt relations, interactions are guided by actual felt national interest and are conducted openly and explicitly. This, in the process generates consistency.

(d) **Covert Relations**

Covert relations, in this study, entail those dyadic relations that are conducted with disguise and concealment owing to the dichotomy between openly stated declarations
and the actual felt national interest as defined by ruling elites. The paramountcy of the national interest thus dictates that economic and political relations are disguised and conducted secretly.

(e) **Elites.**

We define elites to be a select few in a state who because of access to education and opportunity find themselves in positions of leadership and influence. For instance, in the academia, the armed forces, the bureaucracy, industry, agriculture, commerce, the media, the courts and political associations.

It is these groups' hold onto to power and the economy that enables them not only to determine but also influence the allocation of societal values. Elites not only share views and values over a wide range of issues appertaining to internal and external milieus but also generate policy continuity. As far as elites are concerned, changes in policy must occur incrementally rather than in a revolutionary manner.

For the purpose of this research, we regard power elites to be those actors who are able to influence the decision making process of the state by virtue of the fact that, they are members of parliament, cabinet ministers, or top government bureaucrats. We conceptualize ruling elites as those who wield actual reigns of power, and consequently control the state.
Chapter two examines Kenya's foreign policy towards South Africa in the period between 1978 and 1990 using the economic factors. It attempts to demonstrate and explain the existence of consistent but covert economic relations between Kenya and South Africa. Data on trade between the two states and policy declarations in Kenya are compared and co-varied with a view to showing how the pursuit of Kenya's economic interests accounted for inconsistency in the Kenya - South Africa relations.

Chapter three analyses the Kenya-South Africa relations in the period between 1978 and 1990 using the political factors. Kenya's foreign policy position on South Africa in the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity and policy declarations and statements on South Africa by political leaders and top bureaucrats in Kenya are examined, analyzed and juxtaposed on actual foreign policy implementation and execution. In so doing, we aim at showing how furtherance of certain political interests in Kenya's foreign policy towards South Africa generated consistency and inconsistency in Kenya - South Africa relations.

Chapter four attempts to explain the consistency in Kenya's foreign policy towards South Africa, after 1990. To achieve this objective, we examine and analyze how factors such as the end of the cold war, the collapse of apartheid and internal political and economic crisis in Kenya influenced the shift in Kenya-South Africa relations from a covert to an overt plane.
Our last chapter deals with summaries and conclusions. It is in this chapter that we attempt to proffer a projection and recommendations on Kenya’s foreign policy towards South Africa.
END NOTES


8. Daily Nation. 12th June, 1992


14. Probably because, the overt aspect of these relations is a phenomena that emerges in 1990, well after they had written their works.

15. Daily Nation. 15th February, 1994, pl2, note that these trade figures were provided after South Africa resumed relations with Kenya. This thus differ from those provided by IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics Year books that have mainly been used in this study.


-35-


25. Samuel M. Makinda, "From Quiet Diplomacy to Cold War Politics", Kenya's Foreign Policy, Third World Quarterly, Vol 5 No. 2 April, 1983 pp 303 - 304


27. Khapoya, Ibid p149 - 157


37. Lloyd Jansen, Explaining Foreign Policy. New Jersey, Prentice Hall, pp 40 - 44


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40. Bruce Rosset and Harvey Star Ibid

41. Bruce Rosset and Harvey Star Ibid


43. Morgenthau Ibid

44. C.B.M. Utete, "Foreign Policy and the Developing State" in Utete, Olatunde, Orwa (ed) African International Relations. Longmans Group, 1985 p43 - 44


47. Farrel R. Berry, Approaches to Comparative and International Politics. North Western University Press, 1966, p213

48. Utete Op Cit p 68


51. Mutahi G. Ngunyi, Towards Understanding Politics Maseru Lesotho November, 1992, p 3 - 4

52. Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa. Longman House Hallow Essex, T981 p6 - 8


55. Claude Ake, 1981 Op Cit p6 - 8

56. Tony Smith 1979, Op Cit, p251
CHAPTER TWO

KENYA'S ECONOMIC INTERESTS AS A SOURCE OF INCONSISTENCY IN HER RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA: 1978 - 1990

2.0 INTRODUCTION

Kenya by Legal Notices No. 73 and 74 of 10th December, 1993 banned all trade to and from South Africa. Consequently all Kenyan merchants were advised to dispose off South African goods and warned of subsequent legal action should they breach the law.1 Equally, Kenya became a signatory to OAU’s resolution CIA/Plen. 2/Res. 2 of May 1963 and CM/Res 13 (11) of June, 1964 which called upon OAU members to effect a complete boycott of South Africa by forbidding inter alia south African Planes from overflying their airspace, and denying any other means of communication from traversing their territories to South Africa respectively. Subsequent to these decisions, she ordered South Africa’s consulate in Nairobi closed.2

Two months after being sworn in as President, Daniel Arap Moi reaffirmed this position while addressing the nation to mark its 15 years of political independence in December, 1978. He reasserted Kenya’s commitment to the liberation of Southern African states, from colonialism and apartheid. To this end, he committed his government to upholding sanctions against South Africa and campaigning for her isolation.3 In 1981, Kenya explicitly expressed her commitment to the 1963 OAU resolutions on South Africa by adopting resolution CM/Res. 865. (XXXVIII), which called for the implementation of immediate sanctions against South Africa.4 While
previous resolutions were general in nature, this one was specific and had a time schedule requiring African states to implement sanctions within a given time frame.

It is worth noting that while adopting these resolutions, Kenya was not only expressing intended objectives but also her value systems, yet these did not necessarily conform with her actual foreign policy practice. Yet, it is the actual conduct and practice of foreign policy that reflects the intrinsic intentions and interests of the state.

As K. J. Holsti observes, routine foreign policy matters revolve around middle range objectives, dominated mainly by economic interests. It is here that class interests tend to have an overriding influence while being rationalized as national interest. Thus the actual foreign policy options to be pursued by a state are for the most part chosen by the ruling elite.

Essentially then, where the domestic political setting apparently disallows the pursuit of overt economic and political interests between two states, the ruling elites will tend to pursue such interests covertly. This is as long as they deem them fundamental to their economic and political survival. Consequently then, two types of incongruent foreign policy behavior tend to emerge. The first type is characterized by overt policy declarations and statements, which express intent, while the second type is covert and is usually marked by the pursuit of the actual felt national interests and the state's real intents. The emergence of these two types of policy behavior is what we conceptualize as inconsistency in this study.
Inconsistency is measured in this study using such indicators as presence of trade relations, irrespective of Kenya’s ban on all trade with South Africa; sustainedance of these trade relations by acts of commission and/or omission by government officials; partial governmental implementation of international conventions in spite of her full verbal commitment and being signatory to such conventions; warnings, demands and threats against South Africa that are not followed up by demonstratable concrete action geared towards ensuring that they are attained.

This chapter examines the Kenya South Africa relations between 1978 and 1990 at the economic level. It demonstrates and explains the existence of covert economic relations between the two, despite the explicit policy positions that seemed to suggest the converse. Trade figures and policy statements are compared and co-varied, with a view to showing that Kenya’s foreign policy towards South Africa was characterized by inconsistencies.

The chapter begins by attempting to demonstrate the existence of inconsistency in the area of trade by using available statistical evidence. Firstly, we look at trade flows between Kenya and South Africa followed by sectoral breakdown of trade. We then proceed to situate the existence of trade in the context of publicly stated positions disavowing the same, while demonstrating the existence of these trade relations. We attempt to show the roles played by the ruling elites, multinational corporations, and Kenya’s geo-economic interests, in engendering the pursuit of economic interests, at a covert level. We predicate inconsistency in the Kenya South Africa relations on the pursuit of these interests despite stated policy positions disavowing such interactions.
A General Overview

Kenya’s trade with South Africa between 1979 and 1990 was surprisingly substantial. Statistical evidence summoned from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistic Year Book (IMF - D.O.T.S.Y.B) and compiled under Table one and two shows that South Africa was the third largest African exporter to Kenya, second to Mozambique and Rwanda. Notice however that the trade statistics for Rwanda and Mozambique are inflated by huge exports in only one or two years, while that from South Africa was on average constant. For instance, in 1980, Mozambique exported goods worth US$51 million to Kenya. This basically puts her annual average at US$6.3m. Otherwise, with the exception of 1980, Mozambique’s exports to Kenya averaged US$2 million. In this period, South Africa’s exports to Kenya always averaged at US$6 million per annum which in real terms puts her ahead of the other two.

Table two shows that Kenya’s imports from South Africa (US$5.77m) in the period between 1982 and 1990 were more than those of her former East African Community partners combined (US$5.4). Turning to specific years, in 1983 her imports from South Africa (US$4.1 m) were about one and a
### TABLE ONE – KENYA’S EXPORTS TO EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA, 1979 – 1990 (IN US$ M)

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**SOURCE:** DIRECTION OF TRADE STATISTICAL YEAR BOOKS (IMF WASHINGTON, 1984, 1988, 1990)

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* Trade between Kenya and Mozambique in 1980 stood basically at 51 million USD. But of this, USD 46 million comprised of special consignment of maize. The normal trade level therefore stood at USD 5m. This level reflects the true picture of trade between Kenya and Mozambique in 1980, hence our average figure of 2.03

KEY
N/A DATE UNAVAILABLE
SAS, SOUTHERN AFRICAN STATES (SOUTH AFRICA, ZIMBABWE, BOTSWANA, MOZAMBIQUE, MALAWI, SWAZILAND AND ZAMBIA)
half times those from Uganda and Tanzania combined (US$2.8 m). The same can be said of 1984 when her imports from South Africa (US$5.7 million) were almost equal to those from Uganda and Tanzania combined. (US$5.9 million)

Kenya’s imports from South Africa were also higher than those from the entire Southern African region combined (with the exception of Zimbabwe and Mozambique). For instance, between 1984 and 1990 her imports from South Africa (which averaged US$6 million p.a) were about four times those from Botswana, Malawi and Swaziland combined (US$1.3 million). In other words, out of every good worth US$1 imported from three Southern African states combined, South Africa exported on average, goods worth US$4 to Kenya within this period.

Table one shows that Kenya’s exports to South Africa were low as compared to her imports. These mainly comprised of foodstuffs and beverages. The ratio of exports to imports stood at 1:2. That is, out of every goods worth US$1 from South Africa, Kenya imported goods worth US$3 from South Africa between 1979 - 1990.

Between 1979 and 1990, Kenya exported more goods to South Africa (US$1.85m) than she exported to Zimbabwe (US$0.9 m), Malawi (US$1.2m) Swaziland (US$0.6 m) and Botswana (US$0.1 m) respectively as Table two shows. In essence, she exported more to South Africa (US$1.85m) than she exported to Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Botswana combined (US$1.61 m).
Of all the Eastern and Southern African economies, Table three indicates that between 1984 and 1990, Kenya's balance of trade with South Africa (at US$4.8 million) was the most unfavorable (with the exception of Rwanda at -US$14.75 million), an indication of substantial trade. South Africa exported more goods to Kenya between 1979 and 1990 at US$52 than she did to all the other African states.
### TABLE THREE - TRADE FLOWS OF 12 MAJOR STATES IN EAST, CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AFRICA ANNUAL TRADE FIGURES 1984 – 1990 (IN US$ MILLION).

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**SOURCE:** DIRECTION OF TRADE STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK (WASHINGTON, IMF 1991)

**KEY:**
- EXP = EXPORTS
- IMP = IMPORTS
- BAL = BALANCE

**Note:** Figures may not add up due to rounding.
In percentage forms, Kenya’s imports from South Africa constituted 38.5% of her imports from all Southern African states between 1984 and 1990. This means that out of every 5 goods imported from the Southern African economies, two were from South Africa. By contrast, her exports to South Africa translated to 13.4% of her total exports to the Southern African Countries.

As indicated by Table Three, Kenya’s imports from Southern Africa (US$6.39 m) were almost equal to her imports from Uganda and Tanzania combined (US$6.63 m) between 1984 and 1990. They were higher than her imports from Zambia, Malawi, Burundi and Mozambique combined (US$6.39 to US$ 4.35 million respectively).

Interestingly, South Africa had a better balance of trade with Kenya compared to her balance with her neighbours Zimbabwe and Malawi. Her balance of trade with Kenya stood at US$4.76 million, while that with Zimbabwe and Malawi stood at US$4.27 and US$3.16 m respectively. Thus, as indicated by Table three, we can authoritatively observe that Kenya was one of South Africa’s most important trading partners, irrespective of her policy of isolation.

2.1. SECTORAL BREAKDOWN OF TRADE BETWEEN KENYA AND SOUTH AFRICA.

(a) Trade in Foodstuffs and Beverages

Evidence of trade between Kenya and South Africa in the area of foodstuffs and beverages exists in primary sources. For instance, she imported 83,341 tones of white
and yellow maize from South Africa during the 1980 drought. In 1986, there was also some massive evidence of Kenyan stores selling expired foodstuffs from South Africa.

This trade relation was also a subject of controversial parliamentary debate. In July, 1988 the Likoni MP Hon. Abdul Kadir Mwidau argued in parliament that there existed trade links between a Kenyan based company, Van Rees Limited, and a South African corporation. The evidence revealed that Van Rees sold Kenyan tea to I & M Smith Limited of Box 5687, 2000 Johannesberg, South Africa. A letter bearing Van Rees Limited letterhead, Box 83835, Mombasa read in part:

As per your request for Rasty, we send you below listed standard samples Kenya PRI, Bulk plain 50kgs, KPF I Bulk best 50 kgs. Prices will be quoted on receipt of samples.

Hon Mwidau also tabled documents which contained shipping instructions from Van Rees Limited for sending 10,000 kg of two types of tea to Maputo en route to South Africa, through a vessel called Cold Stream. He also tabled another document addressed to the South African Company dated July 6 1988, which contained a list of several categories of tea. Honorable Mwidau intimated the parliament that, as he addressed the House, Cold Stream was about to set sail to South Africa. Available evidence reveals that, there were no prosecutions proffered against those concerned, nor did the government in this case follow this up with investigation. This was in spite of the fact that the Kenya government was vehemently campaigning for imposition of sanctions against South Africa.
In 1989, the *Kenya Times* Newspaper further provided evidence to the effect that there existed shipping lines in Kenya which transacted trade on behalf of South Africa, using the Kilindini Harbour & Mombasa as their conduit. One of these lines was SAFBANK, whose vessels had been operating in Kenyan waters for many years. SAFBANK was owned by the South African Marine Corporation Limited (SAF MARINE) and Bank Line of London. SAFBANK had three ships operating in Kenya. These were the 21,793 ton Hazel Bank, 21,310 Merchant Patriot, and the 24,000 ton Oak Bank. In 1988 alone SAFBANK made 17 voyages between Mombasa and the USA. It shipped 1420 containers of mainly coffee and tea. By March 1989 she had made two voyages to Mombasa and loaded 200 tons of Kenyan coffee and tea.12

In March 1989, 100 containers whose marks read clearly "SAF MARINE" were off-loaded at Kilindini harbour from a ship operating under SAFBANK. On its way to the USA from Kilindini, it was loaded with 97 containers of mainly coffee and tea. When contacted over the issue, the Minister for Transport and Communication, Mr. J. J. Kamotho, reiterated that if at all it was true, "the ship was violating Kenya's long standing "boycott" of racist South Africa."13 This was inspite of the fact that the 100 containers offloaded at Kilindini were cleared by Kenya's Port Authorities.

It is worth noting that even after the Minister's statement, no investigations were carried out aimed at ascertaining the true position of things.14 Neither could the Kenya Ports Authority explain how goods with South African markings could be off-loaded without its awareness. This was inconsistent with Kenya's policy position as expressed in her public policy statements at home and her adoption of OAU's resolution CM/Res
13 (111) of 3 June 1964, that called on OAU member states, to deny South African bound ships transit facilities.15

(b) **Trade in the Communication Sector**

In January, 1987 Professor Jonathan Ng’eno, the Minister for Commerce and Industry, announced that a fleet of cars manufactured in South Africa had been impounded at Namanga on the Kenya - Tanzanian border. The Minister observed that Kenya had no trade ties with South Africa and anybody importing cars from the country was in violation of the laws.

The impounded cars at Namanga had stamps on their windows indicating that they were manufactured in and approved by the South African Bureau of Standards for export. Most of these cars were driven from South Africa on a seven day journey to Namanga where they would be stored for a period of time. In the meantime, their owners would proceed to Nairobi to seek "authority" to import the cars from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.16

The fact that thousands of such vehicles could well be allowed in the country showed that the problem was not with the Customs Department alone, but with other departments like the police and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commerce. The fact that these vehicles could even pass through the scores of police checks with South African markings suggests that either, the importers were well connected, or that the police department was terribly incompetent.
Professor Ng’eno told a press conference that the government had directed that all cars bearing South African registration number plates be rounded up and their owners questioned with a view to establishing how their cars were imported. Our investigation revealed that this directive was not effectively carried out.

The "laxity" demonstrated by Kenyan officials over illegal car imports called into question the determination of the government in upholding and implementing its own stated goals. These included the isolation of apartheid South Africa internationally and campaigning for imposition of economic sanctions against her. Under her import export regulations, the government required importers to apply for an import license from the department of trade, giving details of the intended imports and reasons for importation. This was a pre-requisite for any clearance of import goods. The importers in this case did not comply with the rule. They instead imported the cars apriori to seeking authority for the same.

No prosecutions followed these disclosures or the investigations thereafter. Equally there was no Ministerial statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs clarifying the government's position on the issue. Arguably, this could have been one of the rent-seeking activities of the ruling elites. This is so because, before 1990, when Kenya-South Africa relations were formalized, any business transactions with South Africa needed elaborate political patronage. This form of patronage was only availed to a small circle of elites. (We shall demonstrate this later).
Kenya also continued to facilitate South Africa’s linkage with the outside world by allowing refueling and stop overs of aircrafts bound for South Africa at Nairobi and vice versa. This was despite the fact that she had adopted the OAU’s resolution (CIA/plen. 2/Res 2) of May, 1963 that called on all member states to effect a complete boycott of South Africa, by forbidding interalia, planes bound for South Africa from flying over their territories.¹⁹

Kenya also adopted resolution CM/Res 13 (II) of 3rd June, 1964 that called on member states to deny any aeroplanes or ships or any other means of communication going to or coming from South Africa, the right to traverse their territories or utilize their facilities.²⁰

Among the airlines that used Kenyan facilities were the Swissair, British Airways, Lufthansa, Alitalia, Iberia, Olympic, K.L.M. and El AL. As far as Kenya decision makers were concerned, there was more to gain economically from this refuelling linkages. For instance, Kenya earned foreign currency through refueling, hotel accommodation for passengers and crew besides the supplying and restocking of the aeroplanes. An end to such stop overs would have denied her access to wide bodied jets linking her to Europe. This would have reflected itself in the loss of cargo space which by 1986 was below demand during seasons when horticultural products were sent to Europe from Kenya. Suffice to note that each of the return flights by European airlines would pick up sizeable cargo for European destinations.²¹
In economic terms, Kenya Airways gained US$13 million monthly in royalties, while the government gained US$60 million monthly in landing fees alone.22 Added to the Air links, Kenya introduced a flight to Gabarone in Botswana in 1987. Flight 707 which Kenya dubbed as an "introduction to the South" aimed at enabling her to fly into Kenya businessmen, journalists and tourists from South Africa. All they would have had to do was to take a 40 minute flight or two hour drive to Gabarone which is 200 miles from Johannesburg. Effectively, this marked the beginning of Kenya’s deficient and open interactions with South Africa in the area of communication.23

In the same year, Kenya allowed Ligne Arienne Seychelles, to operate a weekly service from Nairobi via Mahe’ to Singapore. According to Africa Analysis of 16th October, 1987, Ligne Arienne Seychelles was owned by Mario Ricci, (an Italian national with business interest in Kenya) and other South African investors. Ricci’s other investments in South Africa included Mahe Bunkering Company (MBC).

MBC was known for its activities of supplying oil to South Africa in contravention of United Nations sanctions against South Africa. His main partner in the south was Craig Williamson, an officer with South Africa’s Bureau of State Security (BOSS)24

This airline opened a route for South African tourists to gain easy entry into Kenya. All they needed to do, was to fly to Sychelles, and subsequently, reeconnect to Kenya. It is equally instructive to note that Ricci’s name featured prominently in the Ouko Inquiry Commission, not only as a business partner of Mr. Nicholas Biwott and
Vice President Saitoti, but also as having received several business tenders from the Kenya government.  

(c) **Trade in Tourism**

Under Kenya’s visa regulations, South African citizens were not allowed entry into Kenya, except when travelling as *bonafide* delegates to the United Nations-sponsored or inter-governmental organization conferences. However, over the years, Kenya continued to allow South African tourists to disembark at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport.

Permission to allow these visits was given by the Ministry of Tourism, the Emigration department and the Directorate of Intelligence. For instance, on 12th September, 1980, the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife, Mr. J.A.K Kipsanai wrote to the Department of Emigration seeking visas for 8 South African tourists to facilitate their visit to Kenya. Kipsanai’s letter read in part:

> In accordance with the arrangements already concluded the persons listed below should be issued with the necessary visas to visit Kenya as tourists: The visa application forms are enclosed and please convey the approval to the tour operator concerned. Keeping the ministry informed .......

The Tour Operator concerned was Flamingo Tours Limited based at Kencom House in Nairobi. Flamingo Tours was acting as an agent for a South African firm known as Budget Tours. Mr Mutua, the Head of the Immigration Department in turn wrote a letter to the Chief of Intelligence requesting for security vetting for the tourists. His letter read in part:
These applicants are seeking to enter Kenya in accordance with arrangements already concluded as Mr Kipsanai states in his above letter. I have had a word with Mr Kipsanai who informed me that a move to quietly allow South African tourists in the country ….²⁸ (my emphasis)

Notice at this point that, as Mr. Mutua was reading this letter before the Judicial Commission inquiring into the activities of former Minister Charles Njonjo. The inquiry went into camera before he could finish reading the letter. This is after seeking guidance from the commissioners on whether he should read this letter in an open session or in camera. The commission treated the contents of this letter as confidential and hence the need to go into a camera session. This was an indication of the fact that the government had "apparent" dealings with South Africa she did not want revealed.

This position is supported by Jonathan Franzen, a representative of Budget Tours, who in an interview with a Johannesburg Star observed that his tour firm could get visas for South African tourists intending to visit Kenya. Franzen was quoted as saying that:

_We have established contact at governmental and commercial levels in Nairobi and have been assured that our clients could get visas for Kenya. We can obtain visas for South African passport holders and always managed it during 1982._²⁹

According to the Weekly Review, there existed secret moves by some influential Kenyans that allowed South African tourists to visit Kenya.³⁰ It is instructive to note that Flamingo tours, the company in question was owned by Mr. Cliff Todd Froome, its other directors included William Robert, Mac Allen Spince (an advocate with the Hamilton, Harrison and Mathews Law firm) and Mr. Charles Njonjo. Spence was also
a director of the Moon Kenya Safari Club, Ol Jogi and Ol Pejeta ranching companies. The latter was later acquired by Lonrho.  

Other tour companies that facilitated entry of South Africans in Kenya and which also maintained links with South Africa tour firms included ABC travels. Her proprietors included Rajni B, Acharya J B, P. Kalyanji Jani, the late Bruce Mackenzie (Jewish South Africa and former Minister for Agriculture in Kenya) and Mr. Charles Njonjo. ABC was the sole agent for Kenya Airways tickets in the United Kingdom.

Besides ABC, United Touring Company (UTC) and Abercrombie and Kent also maintained links with South Africa. It is worth noting that, Mr. J. Njenga Karume (Former chairman of the powerful Gikuyu, Embu, Meru Association (Gema) and a member of government and Mr. S. Mwaura (then Assistant Minister for Marketing and Supplies) were prominent share holders in the two firms respectively.

(d) **Trade in the Energy Sector**

In April, 1981, a South African firm was awarded Kshs. 155 million contract to design and supervise the 140WW Kiambere’s hydro-electric project. Watermeyyer Legge, Piesold and Uhlman (WPLUs) who were awarded the contract had their offices on the 103 Simmonds street, Bloemfontein in Johannesburg. Mr. D. A. Piesold signed the contract on behalf of the firm.
When questioned as to whether the awarding of the contract did not contravene the Kenya government's policy of not trading with South Africa, Mr. Amos Ng’ang’a, the chairman of the Kenya Power and Lighting argued that:

The firm with which we signed the consultancy contract is Watermeyyer Legge, Piesold and Uhlman of UK. As you know most of the MNCs which operate in this country have branches in many other countries throughout the world, either under the same name or otherwise. In the absence of effective machinery for monitoring and policing the nature and extent of such international firms business connections, it is not a normal practice to automatically disqualify tenders on the grounds of where else in the world the bidders might be operating.

In essence Mr. Ng’ang’a was not denying the company was South African. He merely attributed the awarding of the tender to the company, on lack of precise information. After learning that the company was actually South African, the K.P.L.C. corporation did not attempt to revoke the tender as would have been expected. The Kenya government on the other hand, did not endeavour to issue any statements to disavow KPLC’s action. Instead, it seemed to silently approve of the same.

Interestingly, inspite of this revelation about its South Africa roots, WPLU was awarded an additional contract by the government of Kenya, as an additional consultant to the 160 Mega Watts Turkwell Hydro Electric Dam. This was despite the fact that WPLU had lost out to a French firm in the initial tendering. In effect, WPLUs was asked to supervise the supervisors under a £0.7 Million Kenya pounds.

In 1989, Africa Analysis, established that Kenya, despite its proclaimed opposition to apartheid and support for international sanctions against South Africa, had
supplying oil to South Africa. This was in contravention of OAU’s resolution CM/Res 865 (XXXVII), which called on member states to take all necessary measures to enforce the existing oil embargo besides imposing deterrent penalties against companies involved in defying the embargo.\textsuperscript{37} According to the 27 January, 1989 Bulletin, on the 47,000 Dwitt Brali registered in Norway and operated by the Bul Khanding Company of Oslo arrived in Mombasa from Australia. After loading 40,200 tons of fuel oil from tanks owned by the Kenya Petroleum Refinery, set sail with its destination given as Italy. It was reported to be passing through Singapore on 1 March, 1989, despite the fact that a voyage to Singapore takes 12 days. According to Africa Analysis, Brali sailed from Mombasa to Cape Town, where it discharged its cargo and picked another load at Durban to sail to the Indonesian port of Teluk Semangka. According to the Bulletin’s sources in Mombasa Ports Authority, Brali had been hired in this export exercise by Kobil Company in Kenya.\textsuperscript{38} Kobil is owned by two top politicians in Kenya and an Israel business concern.\textsuperscript{39}
An examination of the empirical evidence availed to us, indicated that the in
period between 1978 and 1990, Kenya’s foreign policy towards South Africa assumed
an activist role. But when we co-vary this activism, with actual policy behaviour in the
economic realm, what emerges is a situation in which the more intense Kenya’s
condemnation of South Africa was, the higher the trade was, with the same. Before we
demonstrate this with historical and statistical data, we should mention that Kenya’s
condemnation of South Africa was not responsible for this trade increase. The point
here is that condemnation was not reflected in the actual trade relations. In this period,
on the contrary, Kenya’s imports from South Africa increased from US$3.2 m in 1979
to US$8.1 m in 1990, averaging US$6 million annually. Exports on the other hand
averaged US$2 million according to Table One.

In 1980, Kenya’s Minister for Foreign Affairs supported resolution Em /Res. 810
(XXX) which reaffirmed resolution CIA/Plen 2/Res. 2 of May 1963, CM/Rs 13 (II) of
June, 1964 and CM/Res. 734 (XXXIII) Res. of 1979. These resolutions called for all
OAU members, (except for the Republic of Cape Verde), to effect a complete boycott
of South Africa by forbidding inter alia planes of South Africa from flying over their
territories. It also called on member states to bar any ships, planes or any other means
of communication to and from South Africa from using their territories.⁴⁰
Between 1981 and 1982, Kenya increasingly took a fervent stand against South Africa and apartheid policy, primarily because President Moi was the chairman of the OAU in the period. Surprisingly, during the period that the OAU was in Kenya, her exports to South Africa increased by 200%. Imports increased by about 100% in the same period. (see Tables One and Two respectively)

In 1983, the anti-South African attitude intensified. This was as a consequence of the allegations that Mr. Charles Njonjo aimed at using South Africa to topple the government of President Moi. Kenya not only barred passengers alighting from South Africa from disembarking at the Jomo Kenyatta International airport, but also restricted Kenyans going to South Africa.41 Ironically in this period, her trade increased from US$3.2 million in 1982 to US$4.1 million in imports alone. Exports, on the other hand, increased from US$2.8 million in 1982 to US$4.2 million in 1983, up by US$1.4 million. (See Table One and Two)

In 1985, Kenya not only stepped up her condemnation of South Africa but also called for the imposition of more stringent measures against the repressive regime. Kenya’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. Elijah Mwangale directed Kenya’s ambassador to the UN to request for an urgent security council meeting following the killing of 19 mourners attending a funeral service in South Africa. Kenya’s ambassador was asked to request for urgent discussion over the killing and the taking appropriate measures by the security council.42
In the same year President Moi condemned the declaration of the state of emergency by the South African government. Incidentally, Kenya maintained steady trade relations with South Africa amounting to US$5 million in imports and US$1.5 million in exports.

By 1986, Kenya’s open declarations against South Africa assumed a militant stance. For the first time, Kenya called for a collective armed action by African states against South Africa. Kenya’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, while accusing developed western nations of hypocrisy in their dealings with South Africa, observed that Africans’ patience had been stretched to the limit by South Africa attacks on Zimbabwe, Zambia and Botswana.

If there was a way, all Africans can do is to fight South Africa militarily and I do think it is time free Africa did that.

This is the last straw, now we must act. Acts of terrorism proved that South Africa does not see peaceful solutions to the problems facing it.43

The same year saw the Kenya government lead Kenya in a national fund raising aimed at generating funds for the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. This process was aimed at consolidating national efforts towards the above mentioned objectives and demonstrating the government’s seriousness over the issue. Ironically, in this year, Kenya’s imports from South Africa increased by about 20% while exports increased by roughly the same.
In 1988, President Moi, in the process of marking 25 years of uhuru on 12th December, 1988, not only condemned South Africa’s apartheid policy, but also called for strengthening of economic sanctions against her. President Moi also promised more aid to liberation movements in Southern Africa. Yet in the same year, Kenya’s trade with South Africa stood at US$1.7 million in terms of exports to South Africa up from US$1.5 million in 1987 and US$6.9 million in imports, up from US$6.2 million in 1987. By 1989, Kenya’s trade with South Africa stood at US$7.5 million in imports and US$0.7 million in exports.

In 1990, Kenya’s trade with South Africa stood at US$8.1 million in imports and US$1.6 million in exports. However the increase by US$2 million in 1990 can be explained by the fact that Kenya had decided to assume explicit relations with South Africa. This was demonstrated by the decision to allow South Africa Airways to resume stop over flights in Nairobi and Mombasa in December, 1990 twice a week.44

Even then, Kenya showed her inconsistency over the issue, by postponing Kenya Airways maiden flights to South Africa following Mandela’s condemnation of her relations with South Africa. President Moi noted, that Kenya Airways would only fly to South Africa, after apartheid had been fully dismantled. However, it is worth noting that he immediately allowed KQ to fly to South Africa in January, 1991.45

From the above data, we can meaningfully argue that, the more rhetorical and high pitched Kenya’s condemnation of South Africa became, the more her trade with South Africa correspondingly increased. Hence what characterized Kenya’s foreign
behavior was inconsistency, that is, a total disharmony between the foreign policy declarations and the actual style and conduct of the policy.

What we see here is a situation in which the economic national interest of Kenya is at variance with the continental interest. But as we observed in our theoretical framework, statesmen tend to pursue their national interests ahead of all other interests. This explains Kenya's persistent increase in trade with South Africa against her verbal condemnation of the same. The following subsections elaborate on this further.

### 2.3 Factors Accounting for this Inconsistency

#### 2.3.1 Elite Interests

To understand foreign policy orientations of states, perceptions of ruling elites who are the main actors in international politics have to be examined and analyzed. This is because perceptions and belief systems held by decision makers not only bear on, but also provide the means for rationalizing foreign policy choices. Such choices are often made on the basis of interpretation of what the decision makers view as constituting the states' national interests.

Ruling elites who are usually made up of either elected or appointed officials, predominate policy levels either due to their predominant hold onto power, or the economy. In most cases, elites tend to share views and values over a wide range of issues appertaining to the internal and external milieu. Consequently, they tend to
generate continuity. Besides this, the unity of purpose enables elites to maintain themselves in power in pursuit of their interests.\textsuperscript{47}

This control over decision making centers enables the elites to formulate and execute policies in their favor which they rationalize as national interests. Thus, foreign policy in essence tends to be infiltrated by elite interests. It is for this reason that I. D. Levins views foreign policy as a combination of aims and interests defined and defended by a given state and its ruling elites in relation to other states.\textsuperscript{48}

In the case of Kenya, her economic interactions with South Africa were shaped and determined by the orientations and perceptions of the main decision makers; In this case, presidents, Kenyatta and Moi and selected segments of the ruling coalition and top bureaucrats. Both presidents not only favored and allowed for the existence of economic relations with South Africa, but also favored close economic links with international capital. This behavior tended to institutionalize interactions between Kenya and South Africa, despite their having been publicly pronounced as illegal at a covert level, hence, their continuity. Specifically then, this institutionalization of pro-South African policies at a covert level tended to create a "successor" elite group that perpetually filled any "vacuum" left by other elites circulated out of the system.

Several factors facilitated this process. Among these were the preponderance of the institution of the presidency over other national institutions,\textsuperscript{49} and the absence of credible opposition forces in Kenya. Consequently, foreign policy formulation and execution tended to go unchecked and besides being heavily influenced by the interests
of the two presidents and members of their ruling coalition regime. In Kenya the
president was the architect of his own foreign policy.\textsuperscript{50}

In president Kenyatta’s regime, the key decision makers who favored relations
with South Africa included Charles Njonjo, the Attorney General, George Githii, (his
personal secretary), Njoroge Mungai, (the Foreign Minister) and Bruce Mackenzie, (A
Jewish South African settler farmer and Kenya’s first Minister for Agriculture, who also
maintained close links with Israel’s Mosad, British Intelligence and America’s CIA).\textsuperscript{51}
Njonjo and McKenzie\textsuperscript{52} were partners in many companies which maintained business
links with South Africa as we have demonstrated.\textsuperscript{53} The two were also very
instrumental in ensuring that Boer settlers in Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia districts of
the Rift Valley were not expelled at independence.\textsuperscript{54} These Boer farmers were later to
provide business links for the regime with the South African capital.\textsuperscript{55} Further, Njonjo
was incharge of the CID and immigration departments for over 20 years, within which
he not only permitted visits of South Africans into Kenya, but also vice versa.\textsuperscript{56}

Both the Kenyatta and Moi regimes avowed to uphold and honour legal
mechanisms accorded by clause 75(1)\textsuperscript{57} of the Kenya constitution\textsuperscript{58} and the Foreign
Investment Act of 1984, which accorded protection to foreign capital. Among the key
beneficiaries of these mechanisms were Boer owners of agrarian capital in Kenya and
South Africa, among other forms of agrarian capital.\textsuperscript{59} Although these were not geased
specifically at South African’s agrarian capital, it provided protection while reinforcing
it. Among the beneficiaries of these acts were the remaining 3,000 Boer farmers in
Eldoret town and Uasin Gishu.\textsuperscript{60}

-65-
A total of 3,000 Boers remained in Eldoret, the Greater Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia under government protection. These felt their interests were well guaranteed. For those who left, an arrangement was made for them to continue farming while residing in South Africa. Liberal immigration policies pursued by the governments of president Kenyatta and Moi allowed them to constantly visit Kenya to run their businesses and maintain family contacts.

The nature of economic relations Kenya was bound to pursue vis-à-vis South Africa, was laid in place by President Kenyatta's administration. Public pronouncements hostile to South Africa by Kenyatta and his ministers did not prevent him from allowing links to exist. For instance, whereas his Minister for Commerce and Industry Dr. Kiano, called on all Kenyans with South African products to dispose of them within three months or face prosecution, in the same breadth, President Kenyatta allowed his own personal secretary George Githui (who later on became editor of Lonhro's newspaper) to negotiate an investment venture with Rubert of Rothman's cigarettes. Out of this venture Rothmans set up is subsidiary in Nairobi worth US$1.8 million on a 50-50 partnership basis. President Kenyatta appointed vice president Murumbi as the head of this venture.

Murumbi captured vividly the Kenyan elites perception on trade with South Africa. When asked what he felt as the person heading a South African connected company, Murumbi argued:

I have no qualms at all trade must go on. My opinion as a businessman is that business must be promoted and I am concerned with the interests of this country.
According to Murumbi, Kenya’s interests lay in the maintenance of economic links with South Africa. Consequently, South Africa linked companies like Old Mutual, Mackenzie-Dalgetis, Lonrho, Shell BP, BAT, Drum and Mitchell Cotts group, were allowed to continue operating in Kenya, South Africa links notwithstanding.

In the subsequent years, the Boer agrarian capital which remained in the Rift Valley came to constitute a major element in Kenya’s cereal and dairy farming with farms averaging 6,000 acres, some being among the top wheat farms in Kenya. N.K. Gufwoli in a government document, National Cereal and Produce Board: Cereal Sector Reform Programme. (October 19910) evidences that, Kruger (a cousin of Dep. President F. de Klerk) who owns 6,000 acres of land at Surgoit near Eldoret is among the top ten wheat farmers in Kenya and makes an average of 25 million shillings annually from wheat alone. Other top wheat farmers named in this document include Tuitoite and Van Donne, (currently the Head of the Sociology department in Moi University).

Under President Moi, the relationship between the Kenya government and the Boer farmers in the Rift Valley was fortified. Reinforcing links, were historical alliances developed between the KADU party and the settler farmers in the last quarter of 1950. It is noteworthy that, part of Moi’s constituency in the Rift Valley in the 1960s included the Boer farmers. Hence, on becoming president, it was not difficult to revive this alliance.
Some of these Boer settlers intermarried with key Kalenjin political engineers. For instance, Van Doon married the sister to Abraham Kiptanui, one of the chief advisors of President Moi and the controller of the State House.

According to Mutahi Ngunyi, this alliance has been expanded to include the Kalenjin, Indian and Boer capital. It is this capital that has over the years seen the transformation of Eldoret town into a major town of the western Kenya region surpassing Nakuru and Kisumu. It is thus not surprising that when President De Klerk came to Kenya in June, 1991, he had to pay a visit to Eldoret town where he attended a service and presented a bible to the Emmanuel church which was founded by his grandfather.

Under president Moi's regime, apart from Njonjo, Nicholas Biwott, and Mark Too equally favored links with South Africa. It is instructive to note that Biwott, especially after the fall of Njonjo, became the most influential politician in President Moi's regime. He not only substituted Njonjo as the representative and defender of both Indian and international capital in Kenya, but also entered into business deals and partnerships with South African based multinational companies and businessmen. Among these were, HZ and Lima companies, which also tendered for the construction of a pipeline to supply fresh water from Lesotho to South Africa. His company Kobil was quoted by Africa Analysis as having supplied oil to South Africa contravening United Nations oil sanctions imposed on South Africa.

Mark Too an influential power broker in the latter years of the president Moi's reign became the deputy director of Lonrho East Africa replacing Gecaga, who belonged
The South African lobby group in Kenya was also strengthened by the presence and domination of Kenya’s security structures and former colonial officials, who not only maintained links with South Africa, but also advocated for the same. These officers continued to serve the Kenya government up to as late as 1984, when they were quietly ejected from the system following the fall of Njonjo. This group included people like Henry Bond Parkinson, (an assistant commissioner of police attached to the special branch) who admitted to the Njonjo Commission the fact that he not only maintained business links with South Africa but had visited South Africa on several occasions. Parkinson contented before the Inquiry Commission that, links between South Africa and Kenya existed to the extend that he denied knowledge of government policy positions opposing such links. Others include high ranking officers such as, Mr Morgan (in charge of the Israeli trained counter insurgency, GSU), Gontier, (Assistant Commissioner of police), David Gilchrist, Captain Boscovic, J. Walker (Assistant Commissioner of police in charge of fire arms licenses) who licensed illegal entry of guns from South Africa and Mr J. Irwin, (deputy director of and deputy director of CID). All these officers were implicated in a coup attempt that involved South African mercenaries and intelligence network against the government of Seychelles. Others included John Lockley, who served in the Kenya police dog section and later migrated to South Africa but continued to visit Kenya and to maintain close links.
Turning now to Private companies, although the top tour companies in Kenya are foreign owned, a large percentage of their shares are owned by top ruling elites. These include Abercrombie and Kent, United Touring Company, Micato Safaris, Pollmans, Flamingo tours, Universal Safari Tours, ABC and African Tours and Hotels, all of which have developed links with South Africa. All have influential politicians and bureaucrats sitting as directors or share holders. For instance, Pollmans have Mr. S. Kositany an influential farmer in Eldoret and local ally of president Moi in Eldoret. Flamingo tours had as its shareholders people like Njonjo, Kalyanji Acharya (already referred to as an influential Indian political engineer), UST had Allen Gicheru, United Touring Company have J. N. Karume as a shareholder, Abercrombie and Kent had S.M. Mwaura, ABC had Acharya, Bruce Mackenzie and Charles Njono as shareholders.

From the aforementioned evidence, it is clear that the ruling elites do not shy away from defining and executing those aspects of foreign policy that serve them. In formulation and expression of policy, South Africa was condemned consistently by the Kenya government. However, this condemnation did not sift through to actual policy implementation. At this level, the "hostile" policy towards South Africa was "doctored" by the ruling elite who chose instead, to further their own economic interests.

This position is consistent with theory. According to the National Interest theory, prudence must always take precedence over all else, and in particular, ideology. Whereas condemnation of South African policy was seen as an ideological position, the non implementation of such policy was seen as "prudence". And this is what is pursued. But since the mass of the population did not have a way of defining this prudence, the
The Role of Multinational Corporations (MNCs).

Over the years, Multinational Corporations operating in both Kenya and South Africa, have equally played an influencing role in the two states dyadic relations.

Multinational Corporations are mammoth corporations headquartered in one state (base) with branches stretching across various national borders. Their businesses are characterized by the multiplicity of specialized functions (subsidiaries) which complement each other. MNCs’ not only represent a global socialization of production on one hand, but also a highest concentration and centralization of capital in a few policy makers. Whereas MNCs’ might be operating in a given geographical area at a point in time, their strategy is usually that of global expansionism of resources across many borders.

It is this wideness of geographical spread in addition to massive capital control that has over the years made them key players in the Kenya - South Africa relations. According to Legal notices Number 73 and 74 of 10th December, 1963)75 and resolution (CIA/Plen 2. Res 2 of May 1963 and CM/Res 13 (II) of June 1964, to which Kenya was a signatory, she was not supposed to have any direct links with South Africa. It meant blocking MNCs with direct links with South Africa from operating in Kenya. These resolutions therefore meant disallowing MNCs such as Delmonte, Standard
Chartered Bank, Lonrho, Mitchell Cotts, Bata, Brooke Bond, Barclays Bank, Abercrombie and Kent, General Motors, Shell and Unilever, all of which have strong links, not only with South African capital, but also with the apartheid regime and its ruling coalition. Given the centrality of MNCs to Kenya’s economy, although she adopted the resolution nominally, in practice she could not implement it.

For instance, British American Tobacco (BAT) alone contributed over US$4 million in tax revenue to the treasury, while Standard and Barclays controlled over 80% of banking activities in Kenya (if their operations are lamped together with those of Kenya Commercial Bank). Lonrho, on the other hand, paid over Kshs.750 million to the Kenyan government in taxes in 1991 alone. Similarly, upto 75% of Kenya’s exports to Africa come from MNCs.

Multinational corporations contributed revenue to the Kenyan state in job opportunities to many Kenyans at one level, while at another level, there was a strong relationship between the ruling elites and the owners of MNCs. MNCs equally accessed ruling elites with shares in their operations. As a result of this symbiotic relationship between the state capital, the MNC capital and the ruling elites, the MNCs’ have always found it easy to influence policy in Kenya to their favor. Provision of shares to the ruling elites not only accessed them (MNCs) to influence peddling but also gave them opportunity to shape the policy itself.
Over the years, MNC operations in Kenya not only linked capital and technology between the former and South Africa, but also constrained Kenya’s ability to pursue an independent role in Southern African politics. The reason(s) for this lay in the fact that the Kenya government over the years feared losing the economic perks delivered by MNCs, whose main operations that lay in South Africa.

In Kenya’s case 50 to 60% of investments between 1967-1968 were controlled by MNCs. Between 60% and 70% of the manufacturing industries were foreign owned, even though this had been falling due to joint venture policy of the government. It is on the basis of this pervasive spread and influence MNCs have on Kenya that Kaplinsky and Langdon argued that, despite their being externally accountable, MNCs play a major role in shaping the dynamics of markets in Kenya, while imposing constraints on any meaningful economic development. They attributed the inability of the state to control them to the dependence the indigenous elites had on the MNCs.81

In essence then, the Kenya government did not attempt to stop MNCs operating between the two states, even when it was clear they were contravening the UNO sanctions against South Africa or Kenya’s own declarations over South Africa. For instance, Shell Oil Company continued to operate in Kenya even though it was selling oil to South Africa.82 Mr. Tiny Rowland continued to travel between Kenya and South Africa linking his investment spread across the two states.83

Of these MNCs operating in Kenya and South Africa, none had a wider influence on these dyadic relations than Lonrho. Her influence stemmed from her wide range of
investments in the two states. In South Africa her operations included, Platinum mines, Tweefontein collery, Dinka explorations, Witbank consolidated Collery, National Airways Corporation, and West Platinum refinery among others. All these corporations gave her profits amounting to £48 million equally.84

In Kenya her corporations (which employ over 6,500 people) include Motor Mart group (whose operations entail motor vehicles, Franchise trucks and farm machinery), Hotel chains (ranging from Mount Kenya Safari Club to Aberdare Country Club), Express Kenya (which handles air and sea freight services), Lea Agribusiness, (which encompasses Farmers choice and ranching business) and Lonrhos media group (which included the Standard Newspapers).85

This economic investment in addition to Mr. Tiny Rowland’s mode of operation of recruiting members of the family to close ties with the Heads of State, not only provided Lonrho with advantages over other competitors, but also allowed her to play the role of a major actor in these interstate relations. For instance, whereas during Kenyatta’s time Lonrho had Udi Gecaga (his son in-law), as its head in Eastern Africa, it currently has Mark Too, (a close relative of the President) as its head. Mr. Tiny Rowland, the head of the Lonrho equally established business links with main actors in the Kenyan government, like Charles Njonjo whom Mutahi Ngunyi86 refers to as a King maker because of his power broking role in both regimes of Kenyatta and Moi and Mr. Nicholas Biwott.
Tiny's influence was not confined to Kenya and South Africa alone. His immense knowledge and influence in Southern Africa has been sought and used by South Africans Boss, the CIA, M15 and M16 intelligence networks of the US and Britain. It is through him that the right wing groups in the west and anti-communist elements in both the British and the US administrations were able to supply and re-arm the Renamo rebels of Mozambique in their bid to topple the Marxist regime in Mozambique. 

Through Lonrho, Kenya was able to effectively play a major role in the Southern Africa region, to its advantage, for instance, she was able to establish close links and retain her influence over Alfonso Dlakama. While Kenya provided training facilities, Lonrho provided funding to train the Renamo rebels in this Mozambican conflict. The Kenya-Lonrho role in Mozambique is demonstrated further in Chapter three.

2.3.3 The Geo-Economic Factor

Kenya’s relationship with South Africa and Southern African states was two-fold. At one level, Kenya relied on South Africa’s good will to pursue economic interests with Southern African states of Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho. This stemmed from the fact that all these Southern African states were dependent on South Africa in terms of trade and communication network and were thus not only sensitive but also vulnerable to South Africa’s manipulation. At another level, it depended on these states for its covert trade links with South Africa.
Kenya was well aware of South Africa’s might and ability to extract compliant behavior from these states. Consequently, she had to adjust her actions to those of South Africa so as to minimize adverse effects and maximize the favorable ones.\textsuperscript{41} Decision makers in Kenya understood clearly the fact that they did not have necessary military resources needed to back liberation movements in South Africa to the extent to which they could defeat South Africa militarily. To provide military bases to the ANC would be synonymous to courting South Africa’s retaliation, besides also exposing Kenya to possible censorship from the western states, whose interest was paramount in South Africa.\textsuperscript{92} (We demonstrate this elsewhere)

Such a policy had an equal risk of enhancing leftist forces in Kenya in the process awakening the domestic coalition of locally excluded elites, while weakening multinational corporations circuits and alliances in Kenya. Yet these MNCs and ruling elites were the main beneficiaries of the Kenya-South Africa relations. Kenya opted for the maintenance of covert economic relations with South Africa, while openly approving and siding with the African National Congress’s position on liberation of South Africa. Thus, she did not only not grant military bases to liberation movements but had to wait until late 1980s before allowing them to open offices in Nairobi.\textsuperscript{93}

In pursuit of her economic interests therefore, Kenya adopted a less controversial, less radical policy towards South Africa. She maintained closer diplomatic links with conservative regimes like those in Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Botswana. The reason for this lay in the fact that they facilitated Kenya’s trade with South Africa. For instance, for many years, South African exporters used roads and rail links between
Botswana. Zambia and Malawi to ship goods to Mapulungu (in Zambia), before loading them on steamers for onward shipment to Bujumbura (Burundi) for the final transit to Nairobi.  

Kenya Airways equally facilitated economic interactions between Kenya and South Africa. Through its flights to Blantyre (Malawi), Gaborone (Botswana) and Maseru (Swaziland), Kenya Airways managed to ferry in and out of Kenya South African products respectively.

Kenya’s need for South Africa’s co-operation to facilitate the pursuit of her economic interests was buoyed by the collapse of the East African Community (EAC) in 1977. This not only exerbated ideological contests between Kenya and Tanzania but also reinforced Kenya’s views on the need to protect her economic interests in Southern Africa. This rationalization informed her decision to front for and support the formation and support of Preferential Trade Area (PTA) instead of (Tanzanian fronted) SADCC. Kenya’s ruling elites understood the threat a successful SADCC (formed specifically to delink frontline states from South Africa’s economic strugglehold on these states) would pose to her economic interests in the region. Consequently, she opted to join South Africa in supporting Renamo with the specific aim of crippling SADCC’s communication nerve center which revolved around Mozambique.

Kenya also relied on South Africa for her trade with Swaziland, (which along with Lesotho, Botswana and Namibia belonged to South African Customs Union and Rand Common Monetary Area). These two factors tied the economies of these states of Southern Africa. For instance, Botswana received 80% of its imports from South Africa while Lesotho and Swaziland’s figures are 90%. Zimbabwe used South Africa ports for
of its traffic, while Zambia passed 60% of its goods through South Africa. Any hostile policy pursued by Kenya towards South Africa if viewed as hostile in military terms by South Africa would have elicited a negative but fitting response from the latter, which in the process, would have ended up hurting Kenya’s trade with Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, Malawi and Zimbabwe.96

As table III shows, South Africa was equally capable of disrupting Kenya’s trade with Zimbabwe which averaged US$1.71 million in exports and US$6.07 million in imports annually between 1984 and 1990. It is instructive to note that her trade with Zimbabwe later amounted to US$114.74 million in imports and US$119.01 in exports between 1984 and 1990. Zimbabwe was also dependent on South Africa for much of its food. Thirty One percent (31%) of South Africa’s trade with Africa is covered by Zimbabwe. In 1990 alone, South Africa supplied Zimbabwe with goods worth R441 million.97 This huge amount of trade between the two states enhanced South Africa’s ability to force a compliant behavior in the Zimbabwean government. For instance, economic threats levelled against her were enough to force Zimbabwe to limit ANC activities in Harare.98

Zimbabwe, Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho acknowledged their dependence on South Africa by notifying the General Assembly in December, 1980, of their inability to support total economic sanctions against South Africa.99

It is for this reason that Kenya preferred a gradual and negotiated change which would allow for the establishment of moderate regimes that would engender the continued
pursuit of her economic interests. A revolutionary change would not have guaranteed her interests. This explains Kenya’s decision to lend support to both Abel Muzorewa and support American sponsored mediations between the liberation movements and Ian Smiths’ government in Zimbabwe.⁹⁷

Compared to Tanzania, Kenya had more economic interests at stake, for instance, her total trade with Southern African states of Zimbabwe, Malawi, Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique and Swaziland between 1984 and 1990 averaged a total of US$12.15 million in exports while imports totalled US$16.62 million in the same period. (Table III) Comparatively, Tanzania’s imports from the region in the same period amounted to US$4.37 in exports and US$11.72 million in imports. In terms of deficits they had US$4.47 and US$7.35 respectively. (See table III)

Thus while Tanzania’s foreign policy behavior was guided by moralistic trappings, geared towards curving out an economic framework that would serve her in the future, Kenya’s actual foreign policy practice revolved around the thesis that useful alliances are best supported by foundations of reciprocal advantage and mutual security of participating nations rather than ideological or moralistic frameworks. Her foreign policy thus aimed at supporting the status quo while advocating for a gradual change that would put in place moderate regimes. This is within the realist disposition whereby what a state defines as its national interest takes precedence over anything else.

It is thus our contention that Kenya consistently pursued covert economic relations with South Africa between 1979 and 1990. When this economic behavior is co-varied
With the stated political principles that were supposed to guide Kenya's foreign policy behavior, we realize that there was inconsistency. This emerged from the disharmony between stated principles and policy positions, such as, isolation of South Africa until apartheid was dismantled, and the imposition of economic sanctions and actual policy behaviour in the case of the latter. Kenyan elites while pursuing economic interests, with South Africa, equally facilitated her to the rest of the world.
Following the collapse of the apartheid system, new statistical evidence hitherto released emerged. According to Claude Hoekstra, the South African trade attache in Nairobi, trade between Kenya and South Africa stood at Kshs. 4.17 billion between 1987 and 1990, an average of 1.47 billion per annum. (Daily Nation 25th October, 1994) Although this information should be treated with caution, it shows the magnitude of trade between the two countries.


11. IBID


13. IBID


16. Jainidi Kise, Op Cit. p1

17. IBID p 3-4

18. Our investigation and perusal of Highcourt records did not reveal any precautions.
See *Weekly Review*. Nairobi, 9th October, 1981, P13-17 for speech by President Moi at the 1981 Commonwealth meeting in Australia in which he called for sanctions South Africa.


*African Analysis*. Suddenly all flights paths seem to lead to Gabarone, 12th December, 1986, P6


*African Analysis*. Suddenly all flight paths seem to lead to Gaborone, 12th December, 1986, P6

*African Analysis*. Flying in the face of sanctions, 16th October, 1987 p3


*Weekly Review*, 2nd March, 1984 p 9-12

*Weekly Review*, 2nd March, 1984 p6

IBID p6

IBID p6

IBID p6-7

IBID p7

Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife, *Licensed Tour Operations*. MTW LIC DEPT/UTC

Notice that Mr. Ng’ang’a is the man who resigned his position as member of parliament for Kikuyu constituency to allow Mr. Charles Njonjo to vie for the same seat and enter government as Minister for Constitutional Affairs and National Heritage. He was made chairman of Kenya Power and Lighting Company after his resignation.

*Africa Confidential*. Kenya: Electric shock, Vol 27 No.8 p7

Dr. Ouko admitted as much before a conference of Kenyan diplomats at Mombasa in 1989. According to him, the architect of Kenya’s foreign policy was president Moi. Thus, he was more of courier for the president than the actual formulator of foreign policy.

Both Mackenzie and Njonjo were instrumental in the pursuit of liberal policies that enabled many Boer settlers to retain their farms without fear of expropriation by the state.
A resolution tabled in parliament calling on the government to expropriate properties of those who had left Kenya was defeated by Kenyatta's government in 1966 with 26 members of parliament voting against it while 10 members of parliament abstained, four of them ministers.

Herberson Op Cit


Sam S. Nolutsungu, *South Africa in Africa. A study of ideology and foreign policy.* Manchester University Press, p262


*African Confidential.* 15th April, 1987 Vol 38 No.8

*Weekly Review.* 22nd November, 1991 P7

*Africa Analysis.* "Seventy Four Companies and One Billion Lesotho Water Project, 2nd December, 1989.


*Africa Analysis.* No. 60, 11th November, 1988, p3

See *Nionjo Inquiry Commission Findings.* Kenya High Court, 1984, Nairobi

*Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife.* Licensing department MTW LIC/DEPT Files A/24, A/10, A/41, A/75, A/695

*Weekly Review.* 2nd March, 1984

Gertzel Op Cit. p587

-84-


*Kenya Times*. Nairobi, 30th November, 1982


*Africa Analysis*. No. 140 7th February, 1992, P6

Ibid. p6


*Southern Political Economic Monthly*. No 10 Vol 5, p6

*African Confidential*. Vol 32 No 23 p6

*Africa Analysis*. No 132, 4th October, 1991, P1

*African Confidential*. Vol 3 No. 23 p6


-85-
Weekly Review. 6th February, 1976

Katete, 1989, Op Cit. p235


Africa Analysis. 18th December, 1991

Africa Analysis. No 132, 4th October, 1991

INTRODUCTION

Foreign policy involves purposes and values. Those who make decisions on behalf of a community do so, either to change the internal or external milieu, to sustain it, (if it is in their favor) or to re-order the rules, structure, costs and benefits that characterize or accrue from a particular set of relationships.¹

The overall aim of policy is the realization of the states various interests. These interests basically fall under three categories. The first are the core interests. These include the economic welfare, unity, security, territorial integrity, access to critical resources and markets. Middle range objectives constitute the second type of interests. They encompass attempts to create and sustain international institutions, attempts at regional domination, expansion and the development of economic opportunities abroad. The third type of interests are long range goals, and consist mainly of aspirations, plans, dreams and visions concerning an international order the state would like to see set up.²

Most of the foreign policy issues tend to center around middle range objectives primarily because, it is here that class interests tend to stand out, vested with economic rationalization and sometimes defended by force.³ In pursuit of these objectives, states tend to adjust their actions to those of other states, in a bid to minimize adverse actions while maximizing on the favorable ones.⁴
This chapter seeks to explain sources of inconsistency in Kenya’s foreign policy towards South Africa by examining the furtherance of her political interests. Kenya’s foreign policy behavior towards South Africa in international fora, is examined with a view to showing that the pursuit of her political interests generated inconsistency in her relations with South Africa. This is done by analyzing official policy statements by Kenya’s political and bureaucratic leadership. These are then co-varied with actual policy implementation and practice.

The chapter is divided into three main parts dealing with Kenya’s behavior in the United Nations Organization (UNO) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), security liaisons between Kenya and South Africa, Mozambique and Seychelles and political and bureaucratic collaboration with South Africa. By examining foreign policy behavior in these sectors, we intend to show how the furtherance of certain political interests generated inconsistency.

Our discussion in this chapter will be centered on the period between 1978 and 1989. This period is selected for several reasons. Firstly, it is in the course of this period that Kenya’s foreign policy assumed a buoyant profile in intra-African affairs. Secondly, it is also, in contrast the period in which Kenya’s condemnation of South Africa assumed an increasingly fervent disposition. Hence, we have a scenario in which Kenya’s policy postures and declarations in the international fora were diametrically incongruent with actual policy conduct and practice. It is this inconsistency between policy and practice that we aim at unravelling in this chapter.
Inconsistency in this chapter is measured using several indicators which include:

interactions between top political and bureaucratic officials with their South African counterparts; collaboration and joint participation in operations outside their international borders; policy statements and actions that call for and abate interactions between Kenya and South Africa; policy statements and political behavior of state officials that oppose and undermine anti-South African political positions and measures respectively, and partial governmental implementation of international declarations. This indicators not only accord the concept of inconsistency "reality" in Kenya-South Africa relations, but also enable us to ascertain consistency in the absence of the cited indicators.

In this chapter, we observe that inconsistency was a function of the pursuit of Kenya's political interests, within Kenya and the Southern African region. Kenya's core interests in the Southern African region were; ensurance of regional stability, expansion of her trade in the region as a substitute to the collapsed East African Community (EAC), collaboration with the West and South Africa in the containment of the spread of radical regimes in the region and finally, the attempts by certain groups within the ruling elites in Kenya to preponderate their political positions with the help of South Africa. Pursuit of these interests manifest themselves in core middle range and long range objectives.

To protect her core and middle range interests, the Kenyan leadership had to adjust her policies to those of other states in the region. By these, she hoped to minimize adverse effects while maximizing on favorable ones. Specifically, Kenya, as we shall attempt to show supported and encouraged a negotiated settlement to the Southern
African conflict. She also pursued policies aimed at strengthening PTA while weakening SADCC. She collaborated with South Africa in provision of training and military material to Renamo (Resistance group in Mozambique) with an express purpose of keeping the Southern African regimes in check. Notice that most of these were grouped together under SADCC.7

Successful pursuit of these policies hinged on her collaboration with South Africa. Having publicly expressed disapproval of South Africa, meant that Kenya could only pursue such co-operation at a covert level. It is the complementary pursuit of disavowal of South Africa overtly, while co-relating covertly that generated inconsistency in her foreign policy behavior towards South Africa.

3.1.1 KENYA'S POSITION ON SOUTH AFRICA IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: POLICY INCONSISTENCY

In his observation of Kenya's foreign policy, Vincent Khapoya notes that:-

"Kenya constantly voted at the UN and other international fora against South Africa and for liberation struggle. She met her financial obligations (itself a reflection of her relatively greater ability to pay). But the kind of activism that might displease her traditional friends or in any way disrupt economic activities in Kenya or place undue hardship on Kenya was assiduously eschewed. Examples of such patterns of behavior are provided by her verbal support of freedom fighters in Southern Africa while at the same time refusing to allow the presence of guerrillas in Kenya or even permit the liberation leaders to open offices in Nairobi ....... Kenya supported some form of international sanctions against South Africa but continued to permit South Africa bound planes to refuel at Nairobi and Mombasa contrary to OAU resolutions."8
We note that Kenya tended to support and adopt resolutions that would in no way constrain her economic development and the pursuits of her economic and political interests. Support and calls for majority rule in South Africa was a long range objective, which tended to express her leader's vision and dream for a future South Africa. Thus, while adopting international resolutions aimed at realizing this objective, Kenya "bulked" at the idea of practicalising them.

We observe that underlying this reluctance to implement to the letter those international conventions, were what she defined as her core interests in the Southern African theatre. These encompassed attempts at safeguarding and expanding her economic interests in the Southern African region (increasingly under threat from nationalist forces manifesting socialist tendencies); containing the spread of leftist regimes in the region and supporting a negotiated settlement to the South African conflict, in line with her interests and those of her Western allies.

We contend that contribution to the OAU liberation fund and support for international resolutions against South Africa while expressing principle, were aimed at warding off accusation against Kenya for her conservative pro-western policies on the Southern African question, while validating the ruling elites at the domestic theater.

3.1.2 (a) **The United Nations Organization (UNO)**

Kenya consistently voted for resolutions that not only condemned South Africa's apartheid policies, but also called for her expulsion from the UN and her related bodies. This position was merely an expression of principle rather than a radical commitment to
have South Africa isolated. While she voted and publicly censored South Africa, at
the implementation level of policy declarations and resolutions, the only policies
actualized were the inexpensive ones and those that did not impinge on her national
interests.

This behavior, as Orwa observes, was in line with the domestic value systems
Kenya wanted to build. Having been a victim of racism, she opted to build a multi-racial
society. Thus, between 1978 and 1989, Kenyan representatives to the United Nations
General Assembly’s main Annual Session, consistently condemned South Africa for her
apartheid policies and called for imposition of economic sanctions, under chapter VII of
the UN Charter. Kenya equally sponsored resolutions in the UN and her sister
bodies aimed at expelling South Africa from the UN because of apartheid policies.

At the 34th session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1979, Kenya
condemned South Africa and went as far as regarding it as constituting a threat to
international peace due to its racial policies. Contributing to the General Assembly
debate on South Africa’s apartheid policies, Mr. Stephen Maitha, the Under Secretary
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated:

The racist regime has embarked on a policy of fragmentation of the territory into so-called Bantustan areas. Kenya has rejected the concept of establishing Bantustans since they are a form of prison wall in this South Africa ...... opponents of apartheid are subjected to brutal prison conditions, police brutality, harassment and even cold-blooded murder. This inhuman treatment demands not only strong protests but also the highest form of censure and sanctions against South Africa.
In 1981, while addressing the UN General Assembly in his capacity as chairman of Organization of African Unity (OAU), President Moi called for an end to collaboration between UN members and South Africa in politics, sports and commerce. President Moi termed apartheid as "anguish upon the conscience of all civilized men" and called for its destruction. He reminded the UN members of OAU resolutions on sanctions against South Africa. He also called for a global ban on the supply of oil to South Africa.15

In October, 1982, Kenya’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr. Robert Ouko called for declaration of South Africa, as a threat to international peace and security on the basis of the United Nations charter. While addressing the general assembly, Dr Ouko stated:

There is no longer any time left for ambiguity and prevarication over apartheid. We must therefore urge the international community, the Security council and particularly those permanent members of the security council, friends of South Africa to declare South Africa a threat to international peace under the provisions of chapter VII of the charter of our organization. Chapter VII provides for enforcement measures including sanctions in the face of a threat of peace.16

In October, 1986 she sought to have South Africa expelled from an international Red Cross conference. Kenya’s chief delegate Ambassador, Mr. Denis Afande, argued that the South African government delegation should be suspended from the conference, because it represented an evil and inhuman system that failed to respect the principles of the Red Cross.17
However, we note that Kenya tended to implement UN resolutions to the letter only when she was not pursuing and furthering her salient interests. For instance, Kenya did not hesitate to ban her sportsmen, like tennis star Paul Wekesa, Rally driver Rob Collinge, for playing against and rallying in South Africa respectively. She did not hesitate to boycott Commonwealth games and ban Southampton football team from visiting Kenya because of Britain’s decision to allow her citizens to maintain sporting links with South Africa. Kenya argued that she was living upto UN resolutions. 

Implementation of this resolution lay in the fact that no serious national interests were at stake or threatened. The government had more to gain by implementing these resolutions because none of them lay at the core or middle range levels. Specifically, sports issues were shared by the entire polity. Any demonstration of policy consistency would tend to legitimize the regime while at the same time cementing the general belief that such a boycott was a necessary sacrifice to a worthy cause.

On the other hand, Kenya was reluctant to implement UN resolutions that had far reaching effects on her core and middle range interests. Non implementation of UN resolutions stemmed from the perceived threats, the implementation of these resolutions would have had on her interests. In the pursuit of her interests therefore, non-implementation tended to create inconsistency between policy declaration and practice. For instance, whereas she supported UN oil embargo against South Africa, Kobil, a Kenyan oil company supplied South Africa with over tons 40,000 tons of oil. Supply of oil to South Africa at the time when she was facing energy crisis, occasioned by the loss of Iranian oil (following the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran) had a net effect of
demonstrating Kenya’s reliability on South Africa and the West as allies. Kobil, is owned by Nicholas Biwott, a leading political actor in the regime and a former Minister for Energy, whose Ministry handled matters pertaining to oil.21

Whereas Kenya called for South Africa’s international isolation, she not only accessed South Africa citizens with visas to visit Kenya, but also allowed her senior state officials to visit South Africa. These included top level leaders like Charles Njonjo, whose office was in charge of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), the Special Branch (Kenya’s Intelligence Organization) and the Immigration Department, Speaker of the National Assembly, Fred Mati and the former Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Drs. Munyua Waiyaki and Robert Ouko.22 She equally continued to facilitate South Africa’s linkage to the external world by allowing European airlines like the British Airways, K.L.M EL AL and Air France to refuel in Nairobi on their way to and from South Africa.23 Kenya could not bar these European airlines and risk displeasing Kenya’s main allies. In the rationalization of Kenya’s decision makers, the ANC was not a big issue to risk such an eventuality.

In pursuit of economic and political interests that are considered salient by the rational actor, ideological and moral inclinations are usually discarded in favor of actual felt needs.24 It is here that elite interests tend to have a weighted influence. As far as the regime in Kenya was concerned, there was more to gain politically through a sale of oil to South Africa. But at the same time, Kenya could not publicly afford to disown ANC since such a move could cause not only internal dissention, but also outright ostracization at the continental level. A compromise between the two had to be put in
Kenya opted to maximize on both ends by maintaining publicly a critical position against South Africa while acting to the contrary covertly.

As Orwa observes, Kenya was only attempting to use a multilateral forum to reaffirm her public beliefs. Sponsoring of resolutions aimed at expelling South Africa from the UN and its organizations, aimed at diffusing condemnation of Kenya’s conservative stand towards South Africa and validating the regime at home. Specifically, these were limited to collective diplomatic actions and financial contributions. These were commonplace statements which had absolutely no "political price" since they were not for implementation. The Kenyan leadership understood from the onset the fact that the West would not support resolutions calling for South Africa’s expulsion.

Expression of "moral principles" would equally not put Kenya on a collusion course with her erstwhile allies in the West. This is so long as these principles were not backed by demonstrated action geared towards actualizing them. Calls for South Africa’s isolation did not in any way threaten Kenya’s economic and political interests. These included close diplomatic and political ties which the ruling elites had established with the west and which served to entrench their hold to power in Kenya. A serious move against South Africa, would have displeased her Western allies who had entrenched strategic, political and economic interests in South Africa. Equally, the pro-South African lobby group within the Kenya government led by Charles Njonjo and later by Nicholas Biwott and Abraham Kiptanui, could not allow implementation of these anti-South African measures due to the fact that implementation would endanger their political and economic interests.
Instead, her behavior guaranteed her economic and political support while legitimizing the government before the general public. As Khapoya puts it, Kenya in keeping to her emphasis on economic development and as a consequence of her dependence on the western capital could not afford an activist policy and frighten away international capital. This capital embodied by the multi-national corporation in Kenya was also heavily involved in legitimizing the apartheid system in South Africa. A move against these multi-nationals could have had far reaching effects on Kenya’s economy and by inference her political stability.

We can thus meaningfully observe, that Kenya’s foreign policy towards South Africa assumed consistency only when her interests were not at stake. That is, when the stakes were low, Kenya pursued a moralistic policy which was in keeping with her stipulated foreign policy position. At this point, she was consistent. But when the stakes were high, she pursued a pragmatic and interest specific policy, which was at variance with stated foreign policy position, hence inconsistent.

3.1.2 (b) The Organization of African Unity (OAU)

As Hans Morgenthau argues, useful alliances are best supported by foundations of reciprocal advantages and mutual security of participating nation states rather than on ideological and moralistic frame-works. This is what informed Kenya’s foreign policy behavior in the OAU towards South Africa. Her alliances with African states over this question was determined by what she considered to be central to her core interests. Thus, within the OAU, Kenya publicly expressed support for the organizations’ positions
South Africa. She voted consistently for most resolutions that condemned and called for sanctions against South Africa. However, at the implementation level, two models of behavior were discernible.

Like in the UN, she fully backed the resolutions and policies that had no serious implications on her interests. In this connection, Kenya reaffirmed the fact that the liberation of South Africa remained central among her other African concerns. She also pledged active support for the liberation efforts in South Africa. She supported OAU resolutions AHC/Res 124 (XX) which called for arms embargo against South Africa. This resolution equally condemned the United States and Israel's collaboration with South Africa.

She supported resolution EM/Res. 2 of May, 1963 and Res. 1056 (XLIV) Rev. 1 of the 44th Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa, which called for, among others, the redoubling of vigilance to ensure effective application of sanctions against South Africa. Besides adopting resolutions CIA/Plen. 2/Res 2 of May, 1963 and CM/Res. 13 (II) of June, 1964 which called upon the OAU members to effect a complete ban on South African bound planes from flying over their airspace and denying her ships or any other means of communication from traversing their territories, Kenya reaffirmed her commitment to sanctions against South Africa by supporting resolution CM/Res 816 (XXXV) of 1980 and CM/Res (XXVIII) of 1981.

However, beyond the collective public expression of commitment to the liberation of South Africa, Kenya had no serious wish to implement these OAU resolutions to the
At the implementation level, she only actualized resolutions and declarations that did not impinge on her interests. She also exercised support for some resolutions knowing that no specific timetables of actual implementation were provided for, hence the pressures to implement would be deflected on this account. In cases where such timetables were provided and the resolutions in question impinged on her core interests, Kenya did not hesitate to break ranks with African states by voting against them or simply refusing to implement them.\textsuperscript{33}

For instance, in a bid to uphold OAU’s Resolution CM/Res. 856(XXXVII) which banned sporting links with South Africa.\textsuperscript{34} Kenya suspended the Secretary to the Kenya National Sports Council Mr. Robert Ouko and Sam Obwocha (an athlete) for allowing and competing in South Africa respectively. Her Minister for Social Services equally banned Kenyan and other rally Drivers who had participated in the Castro Radio Rally in South Africa from participating in the Safari Rally (in Kenya).\textsuperscript{35} Implementation of this resolution lay in the fact that, like other resolutions on sports, it had absolutely no implications or costs on the state’s interests or those of the ruling elites and their allies.

On the other hand, in defence of her political and strategic interests, Kenya opposed OAU’s clause 2 of Resolution CM/Res. 855 (XXXVII) of 1981 of the OAU summit in Nairobi. Clause 2 of the resolution called upon member states to immediately implement sanctions against South Africa. Such sanctions included the denial of landing rights as already mentioned and the use of member states airspace and
seaports to any aircraft or ship originating from or going to South Africa. When it came to voting on this resolution, she actually abstained.36

The underlying reason for the rejection of this clause went beyond the fact that Kenya stood to loose a total of US$ 60 million in landing fees alone, while Kenya Airways stood to lose Kshs. 13 million in royalties if such action was implemented. Kenya’s Minister for Transport and Communication intimated the parliament that Kenya, due to the financial implications involved, and her intention to uphold international obligations, would not terminate her links.37

Kenya’s opposition to this clause was influenced more by her sensitivity to the interests of her erstwhile allies in the West. These states especially Britain and Israel guaranteed Kenya’s security interests through a military pact and supplies and training of her armed forces respectively.38 To terminate this linkage would have harmed these states’ economic interactions with South Africa. This would have been regarded as an unfriendly act resulting if these states would have reacted befittingly. Underlying this reaction is the fact that commercial links between states, constitute what K. J. Holsti terms as middle range objectives that are usually at the center of most international conflicts.39

Notice that no less than seven European airlines including British Airways regularly stopped at Kenya’s Jomo Kenyatta International Airport for refuelling on their way to and from Europe and Jan Smuts Airport in Johannesburg (others that used these facilities included El Al, Swissair, Lufthansa, Alitalia, Iberia, Olympic and KLM)40
Most of these airlines also had substantial shares in Kenya's leading hotels chains, for instance, El Al had 18.5% shares in the Hilton chain, British Airways and Lufthansa controlled more than a quarter of all the shares in the Sarova chain of Hotels.

While these flights facilitated the western European states’ economic relations with South Africa, they also provided one of the most vital links connecting Israel with South Africa. These flights equally provided South Africa with a link to other African states. Specifically then, Kenya could not risk political isolation from European states who were her main trading partners by implementing economic sanctions against South Africa. Such termination would also generate a loss in cargo space provided by large bellied European carriers. These would not only have hurt her horticultural, coffee and tea industry but also other hotel and food industries that provided services to these flights. It would also have antagonized international capital that not only owned these airlines but which had equally invested heavily in the hotel industry in Kenya as we have shown.

Specifically then, a move aimed at terminating air links with South Africa would have ran counter to the most essential objective of any foreign policy which is to ensure the sovereignty and independence of the home territory and to perpetuate a particular political, social and economic system based on that territory.

Middle range objectives provide the state with the means with which to allocate values to key constituencies needed in any process of power struggle. They equally underlie the proximate goals of any state in the international setting. This includes the
acquisition of power and wealth. Power and wealth are crucial to the states’ survival and pursuit of a wide range of goals within anarchic and competitive international system. Power, as Robert Lieber has argued, is a currency of the political system with which it purchases security and other valued "political goods". Wealth, as Jacob Viner and a group of Keynesian economists have observed, is a necessary means to power and the two are mutually inclusive. It was thus hard for Kenya’s ruling elites to implement any policy that would in the long run call for heavy political sacrifices within the middle range level. The fact that this termination threatened both core and middle range interests meant that Kenya could not implement them.

Kenya’s consistent payments of contributions to the Liberation Committee of the OAU, whose task was South Africa’s liberation, was primarily out of the fact that she was in a position to pay, more than it was an act of commitment. While Kenya promptly paid her dues to the Liberation Committee of the OAU, and consistently vowed to back liberation efforts in both moral and material terms, she refused to grant training and military facilities to the liberation army as was expected of her.

Kenya was committed to seeing a peaceful and gradual change in South Africa, as opposed to an armed struggle that would have seen guerilla armies, supported by communist states overwhelming South Africa. ANC, which was the main liberation movement in South Africa subscribed to a socialist brand of politics that was not very well taken by the regime in Kenya.
It is worth observing that it was such ideological differences that were behind poor relations between Kenya and Tanzania. Similarly, the *de facto* opposition in Kenya professed socialist political pursuits. Kenya’s ruling elites’ greatest fear was that of some powerful states, sponsoring or abetting leftist groups in Kenya aimed at toppling the conservative pro-western regime. In providing military support to groups like the ANC, Kenya feared that, she would strengthen a circuit of socialist movements in the region likely to engulf her and ultimately ramify the nascent socialist segments within her domestic political theater.

This fear was not unfounded. States in this region manifested hostilities to Kenya by giving sanctuary to exiled leftist personalities opposed to the pro-western regime in Kenya. These were mostly those who had supported the attempted coup of 1982 or were bitterly opposed to President Moi’s regime and had escaped prosecution and detention. Zimbabwe’s socialist regime hosted Dr. Wenwa Odinga (Odinga’s daughter), Dr. Shadrack Gutto and other supposedly leftists like, Drs. Micere Mugo, Ngugi wa Miiri and several times played host to Professor Ngugi wa Thiong’o. Tanzania on the other hand, hosted Chelagat Mutai, James Orengo, Koigi wa Wamwere and the coup ring leaders, Senior Private Hezekiah Ochuka and Sergeant Pancras Oteyo Okumu.

In Morgenthau’s view the minimum requirement of nation states is to protect their physical political and cultural identity against encroachments by other nation states. In other words, the preservation of physical identity is equated to the maintenance of territorial integrity of a state, while the preservation of political identity is equated to the preservation of existing politico-economic regimes, such as democratic, socialist or
monolithic one party systems. Preservation of cultural identity is equated with ethnic, religious, historical and linguistic norms of a state. In defence of these three forms of identities, Kenya was therefore naturally inclined not to militarily support any political formation in the region exhibiting socialist tendencies like ANC.

At the implementation level, instead of granting the ANC Umkonto we Sizwe training facilities, a base and offices in Nairobi, she provided training facilities to Malawi and Renamo. Notice that the two had links with South African white regime. Each year, Kenya trained over three Malawian cadets in her military cadet college at Lanet. In keeping with her national interest, this was meant to build a hegemonic security project in the region aimed at forestalling the encroachment of the nascent socialist forces.

Kenya was also opposed to attempts by OAU of creating a joint military command of African states. The aims of such a joint command was to introduce African armies into the South African theater. Although Kenya cited logistical bottlenecks as the underlying reasons for her opposition, the main reason lay in the fact that such a venture would have propelled into power a regime likely to be unfriendly to her. The argument here is, if this regime would come to power through legislation other than a military take over, it would co-opt other forces likely to moderate it.

The success of such a venture would have dealt Kenya a psychological defeat and vindicated Tanzania's position on South Africa. All through, Tanzania had not only backed armed struggle in Africa, but also fronted for such a continental army. Kenya
on the other hand, could not advocate for the formation of a continental army that was likely going to be dominated and controlled by socialist regimes. This was also because she had signed a military pact with the United States in 1980, whose main objective was to facilitate the defence of western strategic interests in Southern Africa, the Indian ocean and the Middle East. Such an army would have been seen as a threat to these interests.

It is safe to imply, as Khapoya has asserted, that Kenya’s dependence on Western capital and strategic security arrangements in the continent, constrained her ability to assume an activist role against South Africa. On issues involving South Africa, Kenya tended to assume conservative positions that were in line with Western states’ inclinations. Compared to her former East African Community (EAC) partners, Uganda and Tanzania, Kenya was not only sensitive to South Africa’s interests but also firmly committed to a peaceful change in the Southern African theater. Unlike Kenya, Tanzania was actively involved in the training and provision of bases to the ANC, PAC and the SWAPO liberation movements, which were engaged in a protracted struggle against South Africa’s defence forces based in South Africa, Angola and Namibia.

Uganda on the other hand, demonstrated consistency and commitment in her foreign policy towards South Africa, by not only condemning and calling for South Africa’s isolation but also providing ANC with military support, following ANC's expulsion from Angola after the Namibian Peace Accords. Kenya on her part, reflecting hard on her interests and in a sensitivity deferment to South Africa, refused to accord the ANC similar facilities. As observed by Morgenthau, diplomatic strategy must be
motivated by national interests rather than by utopian, moralistic, legalistic and ideological criteria. National interest here is equated to the pursuit of state power.

Kenya's support for numerous OAU resolutions which at best expressed moral principles, were meant to create an impression that the government, was seriously committed to the anti-South African moves. This was meant to assuage the public opinion in Kenya in particular and the continental opinion in general, while she simultaneously pursued her concrete national interests (geo-economic) with South Africa. By condemning South Africa and voting for anti-South Africa resolutions, Kenya was attempting to draw attention away from her conservative policies over the Southern African question.

According to Kenya, economic and political support from the West coupled with economic and geo-strategic collaboration with South Africa, were more in her interest than physically demonstratable military support to ANC.

Arguably, she also paid her dues to the liberation committee as a front and because it was inexpensive to her. Incidentally, she was the only African country, alongside Nigeria and Egypt that paid these dues without fail. She prided in this publicly, deriding the vocal African countries whose only support to OAU was verbal.

Acting moderately against South Africa served Kenya's interests well. According to Khapoya and Orwa, Kenya was able to retain her Western investments. We hasten to add that, she was also able to carry on trade with South Africa to her advantage.
This explains why South Africa was agreeable to Kenya’s participation in the Commonwealth and United Nations Organization (UNO) sponsored, peace keeping missions in Rhodesia and Namibia respectively. Interestingly, this gesture was denied to Tanzania in the Rhodesian case and repeated against Uganda, Tanzania and Zimbabwe with respect to the United Nations Mission to Namibia.55

Unlike Orwa’s contention that Kenya begun to implement the UN and OAU economic sanctions against South Africa in letter and spirit in the ’80s,56 we content that, it was during this period that Kenya’s trade, diplomatic and security liaison with South Africa consistently increased. South Africa’s exports to Kenya between 1978 and 1990 averaged US$ 6.0 million (Table II).

We can thus meaningfully argue that, within the OAU and the UN, it was the pursuit of her economic interests expressing themselves as political interests, that generated inconsistency in Kenya’s foreign policy. Inconsistency arose out of her refusal to implement her policy declarations as a result of her felt core interests. In pursuit of both her interests and those of her main allies in the West, Kenya did not hesitate to break ranks with other African States. The rational actors in Kenya opted to base their actions on concrete advantages within the limit of prudence.
Kenya explicitly committed herself to opposing any security co-operation between South Africa and any other UN members. In June, 1983, Kenya reaffirmed this position on South Africa by supporting and adopting Resolutions AHG/Res. 105(XIX) and AHG/Res. 107(XIX). These Resolutions condemned South Africa’s destabilisation projects against sovereign Southern African States, and its undeclared war of aggression. They also denounced her intensification of military, political and economic acts of destabilisation against Mozambique, Seychelles, Angola, and Swaziland.

South Africa’s policy of recruiting, arming, financing, and infiltrating dissident groups, bandits and mercenaries to be used against these states, was equally castigated. In the final communique, OAU member states were urged not to allow their states to be used by South Africa in her campaign of destabilisation. They were also urged to extend more material support to the Frontline States and the liberation armies fighting South Africa. By adopting and supporting these resolutions, Kenya was explicitly reaffirming her commitment to the above stated aim; that of seeing struggling South Africans free from apartheid. In essence, she was using a multilateral diplomatic setting to restate her foreign policy objectives.

However, actual foreign policy practice towards South Africa negated these declarations of intent. Kenya, instead of implementing these OAU resolutions, opted to collaborate with South Africa in her acts of destabilisation against Seychelles and
Mozambique, in her bid to pursue her political interests in the East and Southern Africa theatres. This liaison with South Africa generated inconsistency in her foreign policy.

It is instructive to note that as a means of achieving their objectives, defending their interests and promoting their social values abroad, governments may instead of sending diplomatic notes or making military threats, attempt coup d'etats. They may also choose to use their own territories to organize, train and arm groups of foreign dissidents and thereafter, send them to targeted areas to conduct guerilla warfare or subversion.58

It is worth noting that, even states with relatively weak conventional military capabilities, are capable of mounting campaigns of external subversion and infiltration at little cost in terms of funds and materials.

Covert collaboration between Kenya and South Africa ran counter to her publicly stated declaration that called for isolation and non-collaboration with South Africa on security issues and her isolation at the international level. Collaboration merely helped to engender inconsistency in her foreign policy behavior towards South Africa.

3.2.1 The Case of Mozambique

By 1986, Kenya was actively engaged in the Mozambican conflict in collaboration with South Africa. The first evidence of Kenya’s involvement in the conflict came from South Africa’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr. Roelf Botha. Under intense questioning on South Africa’s contravention of the Nkomati Agreement, Botha intimated that
Renamo’s arms and training were provided for by Kenya. Besides providing training facilities and weapons to Renamo, Kenya allowed her to open offices in Nairobi. It also provided Alphonse Dlakama, (the Renamo President) with a Kenyan passport to facilitate his mobility worldwide.

Joseph Hanlon in his book "Mozambique, who calls the shots", asserts that while South Africa provided Renamo with supplies from the South by air, Kenya supplied the rebels from the North through Malawi. Hanlon notes that while President De Klerk’s meeting with President Joachim Chisano of Mozambique in Maputo in 1989, led to reduced South Africa’s supplies of arms to Renamo, Kenya increased her supplies to Renamo by flights through Malawi.

Kenya’s assistance to Renamo was not lost to its leader Dlakama. Thus under negotiations with the Mozambican government, he insisted on having President Moi of Kenya to co-chair peace talks with President Mugabe of Zimbabwe (whose forces were fighting in Mozambique on the governments side). The idea here, was to balance the forces with the entrenched interests in the Mozambican conflict. On the part of Kenya, this presented an opportunity for her to vindicate her passionate positions that favoured peaceful negotiation as opposed to armed struggle in the Southern African conflict.

Interestingly, despite her co-chairing of these peace talks, Kenya continued to provide Renamo with training facilities and military supplies. Evidence given by Mozambique’s Speaker of the National Assembly, Honourable Mercelino Dos Santos, revealed that there were Renamo people being trained in Kenya and urged the security
council to act fast to curtail Kenya’s assistance to Renamo, since such assistance for Renamo risked jeopardizing the Rome Accord (signed by Renamo and the government).65

Even though Kenya consistently denied that she was assisting Renamo militarily, the capture of Renamo’s communication center in Sofala province, provided fresh evidence of support to the movement from Kenya and Malawi. Materials retrieved from the base equally demonstrated evidence of a tripartite collusion involving Kenya, South Africa and Lonrho, in supporting Renamo rebels. Among the captured papers were elaborate radio messages on a meeting that was dated for Kenya between Renamo and South Africa.66 Africa Confidential observes that this meeting eventually took place in Nairobi. It was in this secret meeting of 8th June, 1991, that President De Klerk raised the issue of arms supplies to Renamo by Kenyan officials via South African dealers.67 This was to be pursued in subsequent dealings.

Apart from collaborating with South Africa, Kenya worked with MNCs and in particular, Lonrho, in supporting Renamo. Lonrho had substantial investment not only in Kenya and South Africa, but also in Mozambique. In her bid to protect these investments, the company opted to maintain close relations with both the Marxist regime and Renamo. Not only did Lonrho provide Renamo with funds. Its chairman, Tiny Roland, also acted as the guarantor of the negotiations between the Mozambique government and Renamo. Tiny Roland equally provided Alfonso Dlakama, (Renamo’s chairman) with an executive jet, in a bid to facilitate his movements around the world.68 He equally played a crucial role in bringing Kenya and South Africa on board with
spect to peace talks. Interestingly, Roland also accompanied South Africa’s Foreign Minister, Mr. Roelf Botha to Nairobi for his first open meeting with President Moi in December, 1990.69

Also involved in the Mozambique conflict on the Kenya, South Africa, Renamo side, were a number of Western nations. These included the United States of America, Britain, Germany, France and Israel. The intelligence networks of these nations provided financial support, military supplies and expertise to Renamo.70. Undoubtedly, all these nations were involved in Mozambique on the side of Renamo, with the intention of containing the "communist threat", thought to be engulfing the Southern African region. The strategic importance of the Cape of Good Hope to the West’s oil traffic called for absolute containment of the spread of the Socialist circuit evolving in this region. To this end, did not hesitate to use force if need be.71

Apart from attempts to contain the growing socialist circuit in the Southern African region, Kenya had to enter into alliance with South Africa on Mozambique’s national question for several other reasons. These reasons were meant to maximise on Kenya’s interests in the region and to minimise on her disadvantages. Her politics of alliance formation on the Mozambique National question, is therefore rationalised theoretically by the realpolitik tradition, which observes that foreign policy is a process whereby a state adjusts its actions to those of other states so as to minimize adverse actions and maximize the favourable actions of foreign states.72 Policy here, is seen not as actions based on some grand design but as a continental process of pragmatic
adjustment to actions of others in the external environment. This is aimed at making the
said environment hospitable or at least less hostile and disadvantaged.

Arguably, as we shall show in a while, Kenya’s alliance with South Africa on the
Mozambique question was also for self-preservation. According to Van Dyke:-73

Self preservation dictates that each state accumulate sufficient power
(military and resources) to be able to defend itself. Where the
national power appears inadequate, it might be necessary to enter
into an alliance with another state(s) so as to balance out the power
of a potential aggressor.

The two interests of maximising on her interests and self-preservation were made
manifest at two levels. This was first and foremost at the geo-ideological level.
Tanzania and Zimbabwe had send troops to Mozambique to fight on the side of
Frelimo.74 This was meant to probe up Frelimo’s resistance against Renamo and to also
keep the western and pro-capitalist African regimes (like Kenya) at bay, in favour of a
socialist arrangement in Mozambique. Kenya viewed this move as a threat to her core
interests in the region, and in as much as she condemned South Africa, covertly she had
to enter into an alliance with her in order to forestall this "socialist" onslaught. This
desire was also propelled by her strong multinational presence, whose interest was to see
the triumph of a market economy in the region over a planned socialist one.75 It is
within this context of dominance of the national interests over regional concern that we
should view Kenyan reluctance to give the ANC a military base and other facilities. This
would have jeopardised her relations with White South Africa’s regime in the pursuit of
border national interests, as in the case of Mozambique.
It is also worth noting that, Kenya and South Africa co-operated on Mozambique in order to retain their position as dominant powers in their respective regions. Both are characterized by high levels of affluence and industrialization, by more corporate and diplomatic representation and by more economic and infrastructural resources, than their neighbouring states. This is the status quo they apparently intended to maintain.

In pursuing this goal, it is important to observe that, the decision to support Renamo was not based on the assumption that Renamo was actually capable of winning the war. On the contrary, this was meant to ensure that the rebels forced about a stalemate in the conflict, a position that would have several advantages for Kenya and South Africa. A stalemate could force the Mozambican government into negotiating for an establishment of a coalition government. This could bring into government Renamo elements on whom Kenya and South Africa could depend.

On her part, Kenya was worried that the growing socialist circuit in the region would encourage insurgence of leftist factions from within. President Museveni and his National Resistance Army (NRA) was seen as a likely patron to such a movement and was thus viewed as a threat to Kenya. He was accused of harbouring and probably supporting leftist resistance movements, like the Kenya Patriotic Front (KPF) and the Kenya Revolutionary Movement (KRM) operating within Kenya. It was therefore in the interest of Kenya’s regime that this apparent socialist coup de grace. was contained for the sake of internal stability. If this had to be done, by collaborating with South Africa, then it was a reasonable decision, so long as it served Kenya’s national interest.

-114-
At the economic level, Kenya and South Africa shared similar aspirations both viewed a strong marxist state like Mozambique aligned to Tanzania as a threat to their conservative allies like Malawi. This threat stemmed from the fact that states like Malawi were central facilitators of Kenya’s economic and political pursuits in Southern Africa. Malawi for instance, provided one of the most vital routes through which Kenya-South Africa was transacted (we demonstrated this chapter two).78 Swaziland, as Sam Nolustungu79 evidenced, on the other hand served as a conduit through which Kenya’s soda ash was exported to South Africa.80

Kenya’s scaled involvement in Mozambique was a direct reaction and a counter move to Tanzania and Zimbabwe’s decision to send their troops to Mozambique.81 This state’s move was aimed at probing up the socialist regime in Mozambique against the Renamo onslaught. Kenya viewed this act as a threat to her core interests in this region.

3.2.2. The Case of Seychelles

Senior officers in the Kenya government and its security apparatus also collaborated with South Africa in her attempt to topple the marxist regime of President Rene in Seychelles. According to president Rene, the main minds behind the scheme were Mr Njonjo and police commissioner Ben Gethi. Although the Kenya government initially denied this, allegations of the plot were later confirmed by the Njonjo commission of inquiry of 1984.82

It was confirmed that Kenya security officers in the paramilitary General Service Unit (GSU), special branch and the CID were involved in this conspiracy. Evidence
Induced before the commission showed that Njonjo visited Malawi and Southern Africa to put final touches to the coup plot. Njonjo’s passports indicated that he landed at Jansmuit airport in South Africa on two separate occasions before the coup attempt, August, 1980. The plot involved the use of South African trained mercenaries, who were to land in and topple the government of President Rene, and thereafter to be replaced by Kenyan police and the GSU.83

The Seychelles government in exile led by former President James Manchem was to be flown in from Kenya by a Boscovic plane arranged for by Bill Parkinson (an assistant commissioner of police in the Kenya police force). Other officers involved in the plot included J.D. Irwin, Deputy Director of Special Branch, J.B. Gordon, Senior Assistant Commissioner of Police Ben Gethi, Commissioner of Kenya police and several other expatriate officers of the Kenyan Security forces.84

Njonjo and the pro-western caucus in the Kenya government not only disliked marxist and socialist leaders but also held their states in contempt. Njonjo for instance not only disparaged Tanzania due to its socialist inclinations, but also actively sought to have the EAC collapsed due to his dislike of socialist President Julius Nyerere. This positions were demonstrated before the Commission of Inquiry by Dr Ouko.85

Collaboration and interactions between Kenyan leaders and South Africa in attempting to topple another African government, ran counter to Kenya’s policy of non-interference in the internal matters of other states. Co-operation with South Africa was equally inconsistent with her policy of isolating South Africa. Consequently, the
inconsistency that arose in her relations with South Africa was the outcome of her furtherance of given political interests.

According to Colin Legum, much as the Kenya government attempted to distance itself from this conspiracy through Njonjo Commission, it was done in her name and involved Kenya's security network. Legum asserts further that it was doubtful whether Kenya would have condemned Njonjo's plot had it succeeded. 86

The above foreign policy behaviour justifies the contention that routine foreign policy matters revolve around middle range objectives. These are usually punctuated with economic and political interests. Yet, it is around this middle range objectives that elite interests manifest themselves while at times overriding the overall body politic interests. For the most part, it is ruling elites that decide what interests to pursue and what means to be used in pursuit of these interests. However once these policies have been formulated ruling elites tend to rationalise them as constituting national interest. 87

The behaviour of security officials in Kenya manifested a convergence of interests between Kenya and South Africa in security matters. They saw their interests being protected through their association with external interests. It is worth noting that most of these officers involved had personal and business links with South Africa. For instance, Lockley, the South African police officer, who had previously worked in Kenya and continued to maintain close links with people like J. Walker (Senior Assistant Commissioner of Police in charge of fire arms), J. K. Mutua (Principal Immigration Officer), J. Gordon (Senior Assistant commissioner of police attached to C.I.D) and J.
While Assistant Commissioner Parkinson like many others had business links in South Africa. It is therefore not a wonder that he could tell the Inquiry Commission that he was not aware that it was wrong to have business links with South Africa.

According to Parkinson, prior to 1983, it was not only possible but easy for anybody to go to South Africa for business. Interestingly few ordinary Kenyans possessed passports. Those who had, had their passports stamped in "useful anywhere except the Republic of South Africa". If it was as easy as Parkinson argued, then this ease was confined to the ruling elites class and its coalition to which Parkinson belonged.

3.3.1. OTHER FORMS OF POLITICALLY DRIVEN INCONSISTENCIES

(a) Security Liaisons in Kenya

The diplomatic calls for South Africa’s isolation by Kenya did not preclude close links between security officials of the two states. For instance in 1980, Kenyan authorities facilitated entry into Kenya of several serving officers of the South African security. These included Lt. Colonel Van Zilj an officer in South Africa's army and John Lockley an officer with the dog section of the South African police. The latter had served in the Kenya police dog section before moving to South Africa. While in Kenya the two officers were accorded access to security installations. The acceptance of these South African officers was facilitated by Charles Njonjo, then Kenya’s Attorney General in Kenya and J.K. Mutua who was the Principal Immigration Officer in charge.
clearing and processing visa applications. Besides having an overall say in the matters
cerning immigration, Njonjo’s office was also in charge of the Criminal Investigation
Department (CID) and the Special branch. Several letters were written on Njonjo’s
behalf to Mr. J.K. Mutua, seeking entry into Kenya of South Africans even though
Kenya had publicly vowed to support the overthrow of apartheid system in South Africa.

In one such letter, Njonjo’s secretary Miss Penelope Hills stated:

Mr Njonjo has agreed that visas be issued to the following gentlemen; Lt Col Van Zilj, passport No. P407618, South African travelling on flight No BA 051 arriving 8 hours on Sunday, 2nd November, 1980. Length of stay was going to be one week.....As you will remember he used to be with the police dog section in Nairobi some years ago. Miss Penelope Hills requests that a copy of this letter to the airport authority be provided as usual.

While in Kenya, Mr. Lockley used to work under Mr. Mutua (by then a Provincial C.I.D. chief) The letter requesting for Lockley’s visa dated 16th May, 1980 stated that:

Some weeks ago Mr Njonjo received a request from an officer in the police dog section in South Africa to be granted a visa to stay twelve days in Kenya, in order to visit our dog section. His name is Mr John Lockley and Mr Njonjo had agreed at the time. I have now received a telex from Mr Lockley with the following details ....... please inform the authorities at the airport in the usual manner.

Penelope’s letters indicate that South African officials had been gaining entry into
Kenya prior to these two officers. They equally indicated the fact that the Kenya
immigration and airport authorities were aware of these arrangements. The fact that
these South Africans used to seek entry into Kenya by applying directly to Mr Njonjo
demonstrates not only his influence and power, but equally the fact that he favoured such
close links between Kenya and South Africa.
What we have here therefore, is situation in which the Attorney General personally allows South African officials to visit Kenya. If the visits did not constitute a total abrogation of policy, clearance and access to security installations certainly did.

Mr Njonjo, equally entertained many top South African political and security leaders. For instance at one time accompanied by his successor, at the Attorney General’s chambers Mr J Karugu, Njonjo wined and lunched with officials from South Africa at the New Stanley Hotel. Among these officials was a Mr. Ray (the in-charge of Boss desk in South Africa’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and his wife. Reacting to the above evidence adduced to the Njonjo inquiry commission Mr Muthoga, the leading council to the commission had this to say:

My Lords, is there anyone in this tribunal or indeed is there anyone who concerns himself with current affairs who is unfamiliar with activities of an organisation called Bureau of State Security (BOSS)? Is there anyone who is of average intelligence who would not know that South Africa security organisation operates through personnel deployed in its various government services including the foreign services?  

Muthoga’s contention was that by wining and lunching with South African officials, indeed maintaining links, Njonjo was apparently networking with representatives of a disengaged system. Arguably therefore, certain elites in the Kenya government not only favoured links with South Africa, but also had a wide latitude through which they could shape and influence foreign policy. If Muthoga’s contention was that these activities were Njonjo’s alone, it shows to what extent interstate activities at times degenerate to serve interests of individual elites. It in effect then, validates I. D. Levins argument that:
foreign policy is a combination of aims and interests pursued and defended by a given state and its ruling class in its relations with other states and the methods and means used by it for the achievement and defence of these purposes and interests.\textsuperscript{96}

Arguably, co-operation with South Africa’s security network was geared towards fronting for and protecting interests of the ruling elites in the process ensuring their survival in office. This underlies the reason why even after Njonjo’s fall from power these liaisons continued. Consequently then, it is the pursuit of these interests that generated inconsistency, in the Kenya-South Africa relations. The fact that these dyadic relations could not be pursued explicitly without disrupting the entire national consensus over the South Africa issue area meant that they could only be conducted at an implicit level.

Njonjo’s contention at the inquiry commission was that, all his dealings with South Africa were done with the approval of both presidents Kenyatta and Moi. Indeed his contention may be valid if Njonjo’s political behaviour was anything to go by.

For instance, despite his 1978 call for the establishment of diplomatic relations between Kenya and South Africa,\textsuperscript{97} president Kenyatta and Moi (then vice president) maintained a studious silence on the issue. Njonjo’s call caused a division in the government which should have been clarified by the president or his vice. Since the official position had been that there would be no links with South Africa, it would have been expected that Njonjo would be reprimanded. This did not happen.
Rather covertly, Njonjo also networked with Kenya’s Chief Firearms Licensing Officer Supuritendent John Walker in facilitating entry into Kenya of South African manufactured firearms. On 31st April, 1981, two Americans brought into Kenya a consignment of several makes of firearms. These included 4,000 rounds of .22 mm ammunition, 210 rounds of bore ammunition, four shotguns, and 20 rounds of 1577mm ammunition. Mr Crane and his colleague were issued with a permit at the airport by superintendent Walker. Walker equally escorted them out of the airport in Njonjo’s personal car, Mercedes Benz Registration number KUD 710.

Njonjo’s other allies like Lord Cole (Chairman of Kenya Airways) arrived from South Africa with cases full of revolvers in what Paul Ngei (Minister) noted was an attempt to bolster Njonjo’s armoury. This in itself was a contravention of OAU’s resolutions AHC/Res. 124(XX) which called for an arms embargo against and an end to any military and security liaison with South Africa. By adopting and supporting this resolution and subsequently contravening its spirit, Kenya was assuming an ambiguous stand. The net effect of this was inconsistency in her relations with South Africa.

Interestingly, Njonjo was suspended as minister and a commission set up to inquire into his activities, South Africa’s nationals were immediately banned from disembarking at Kenya’s Jomo Kenyatta International Airport in 1983. On the other hand, Kenyans wishing to travel to South Africa had to seek special clearance. This was aimed at pre-empting any attempt by Njonjo’s South African allies from initiating any coup attempt. While this was taken as a sign to show that Kenya’s foreign policy towards South Africa had assumed a serious Pan Africanist inclination, it can be
meaningfully argued that this position was a reflection of intra-elite contests for power. This involved attempts by one elite group using the hated South Africans regime as a trumpcard to politically denigrate and vanquish the other. Indeed, one of the main planks to be investigated and on which Njonjo was found to have contravened and undermined Kenya’s national interest was his links with South Africa. This was said to have contravened Kenya’s policy of isolating South Africa.

(b) **Bureaucratic linkages**

Even though the political and the bureaucratic leadership in Kenya consistently called for South Africa’s isolation, their actual conduct was marked by inconsistencies. The ruling elites in the bureaucracy continued to encourage and abate interactions between the two states. The general practice was to assume that no links existed. If and when they were exposed, denials were characteristically issued. For instance, Bill Parkinson while serving as an Assistant Commissioner of Police and chairman of the Automobile Association of Kenya not only maintained links with South Africa but also permitted several Safari Rally drivers to participate in rallies organised in South Africa. These were not only a contravention of Fifa ban on rallying links with South Africa but also OAU’s resolution, which banned sporting links with South Africa. When confronted with evidence of Rob Collinge’s participation, in Castro Radio Five Rally in South Africa, Parkinson initially denied the allegations, only to argue subsequently that he did not have control over what drivers did outside Kenya.
Kenya sports officials equally allowed Kenya sportsmen to compete against South Africa sportsmen in and outside South Africa. For instance Paul Wekesa, Kenya's number one tennis player, a son of Noah Wekesa (Former Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs) played against a South African player outside South Africa. Samson Obwocha, a long distance runner also competed in South Africa. 

What is however observable is that Kenya government, consistently opted to use sports as a medium through which it could demonstrate its commitments to its policy towards South Africa. This was mainly because sports did not really threaten the national interests. For instance, whereas Wekesa, Obwocha, Robert Ouko and Rob Collinge were banned because of contravening the government ban, people like Parkinson were not even reprimanded for having business links with South Africa. This in essence shows to what extent the government was unwilling to clamp down any business links between senior government officers and South Africans.

At another level, several departments either lacked proper co-ordination over the entry of South Africans into Kenya or simply facilitated entry. Whereas the official position was that no South Africans were to be allowed into Kenya, unless they were travelling as bonafide delegates to the UN sponsored conferences, various departments continued to invite them into Kenya. Consequently this created confusion in the general policy conduct and implementation of several occasions many South Africans invited to Kenya ended up being embarrassed at the airport because the airport officials were not sure whether they should be allowed in or not. This prompted the chief secretary and co-ordinator of cabinet affairs Mr Simon Nyachae to issue a circular to various heads of
departments asking them to co-ordinate such invitations with the immigration department in advance so that proper arrangements can be made. Mr. Nyachae’s letter read in part:

...Recently a South African doctor arrived at our airport to attend an international medical seminar. As we have no visa arrangement with South Africa such a tour ought to have been cleared by the principal immigration officer. There are numerous similar cases. Will you therefore ensure that in future any visitor you invite for meetings or any other purpose should be cleared with the immigration department to facilitate their entry...

The fact that South Africans were being allowed in without the immigration department being involved showed inconsistency on the part of the government. It was thus not uncommon for tour operators to use this "go it alone" policy by tour operators to lobby for their South African clients entry into Kenya. For instance, on 17th January, 1978, a Mr Muiruri, marketing manager of African Tours and Hotels wrote to the principal immigration officer requesting that a South African by name Mrs Joyce Basel be allowed into Kenya. Mrs Basel was the owner of the Safari Tours with whom Muiruris (ATH) wanted to develop links. Muiruri’s letter read in part:

.. This office is interested in handling Fun safari tours in the future and would like to request you to give a special consideration to her application. I feel her visit is as important as that of those South African officials who are allowed into Kenya to attend United Nations conferences. These come here merely to discuss their own affairs while Mrs. Basel’s familiarization tour is should benefit the country...

Muiruri in his letter confirmed the fact that South Africa officials visited Kenya not necessarily for conferences but for their own business. His preference was that South Africans coming to discuss business should be encouraged because this would benefit Kenya. Thus any business deals curved out between African Tour Hotels and Fan Safaris would have benefitted its shareholders who were members of the ruling elites. These included people like, Reuben Chesire, (former Assistant Minister and chairman
of the Kenya Farmers Association and a close political ally of President Moi) who was its executive chairman, Mr Youda Komora a politician and former permanent secretary, J Gatuiria (businessman) and H. Daly an Irish businessman. Mrs. Basel was eventually allowed into Kenya.104

The principal immigration officer Mr J Mutua equally gave visas to South Africans to visit Kenya prior to 1983. Mr Mutua confessed to the Njonjo inquiry commission that as long as visa application were referred to the immigration department, such South Africans were allowed into Kenya. These included those who emigrated out of Kenya at the turn of independence and those who had families in Kenya.105 This practice was halted for a short while secretly in 1983, following allegations that Njonjo had intended to topple Moi’s government using South Africa. It was reinstated silently after 1984.106

It was thus on the basis of the foregoing that South Africa Times Newspaper of 2nd November, 1980 argued that Kenya despite its political opposition of South Africa could not ill afford to ignore South Africa’s tourist might. In effect it had continued to permit South African tourists to visit Kenya. According to Brian McMalion a local travel agent in South Africa, the Kenyan market had boomed since July, 1980. Tour prices, he argued favoured Kenya more than Mauritius. It cost R600 for air fare and accommodation on a day 10 self catering holiday as compared to R720 for seven days in Mauritius.107
In essence then, even at this bureaucratic level, what was mainly responsible for inconsistency was the furtherance of individual as opposed to a collective state interests. Furtherance of these interests in turn generated inconsistencies in the Kenya-South African relations.

(c) **Elite Networking at Political Level**

There were sharp differences of opinion among ministers on what approaches to pursue when dealing with South Africa. Specifically, there emerged two contending groups within the Kenyan government. That is, those who favoured economic and political links with South Africa led by Njonjo on one hand and those who opposed such links and were fronted by Dr. Waiyaki and later on Dr. Robert Ouko on the other. Njonjo had as early as 1978 openly called on Kenya to establish open diplomatic links with South Africa. Njonjo observed;

> I am saying things some people won’t agree with. I am not a pessimist, conditions in South Africa are changing, I was educated in South Africa and I don’t regret it.

In a vehement opposition to this call by Njonjo, Dr. Waiyaki (Minister for Foreign Affairs) observed that Kenya would open dialogue with South Africa only "over my dead body". President Kenyatta who had a week earlier benefitted from the medical services of a South African heart specialist and his Vice President Mr. Daniel Arap Moi maintained a studious silence over the issue.

Njonjo equally clashed and differed with Dr Robert Ouko over the South African question in 1981. The clash came about after Dr Ouko had given a speech in which he
brought to bear on South Africa to compel her into abandoning apartheid. In his
evidence to the inquiry commission Dr Ouko stated that Njonjo called and asked him why
he had blasted South Africa. Ouko intimated the commission as follows:

I answered the phone and asked who was calling. He said it was
Charles Njonjo and he asked me, "Why did you do that"? I
answered, "Did what"? and he said, "Why did you blast South
Africa"? I told him that I was the Minister for Foreign Affairs in
Kenya and that it was my duty to explain the Kenya foreign policy
to the rest of the world. I further said that as foreign minister, I
was the official spokesman of the government on these matters and
that what I said about South Africa correctly reflected the
government's policy on South Africa and that even his Excellency
the president had said this about South Africa. Then Mr Njonjo
told me, and I want to quote the exact words as I can remember
them: He said, "Well let him do it but not you".

Dr Ouko told the commission that he told Njonjo that he "must be joking" and
that, he would continue in the similar way to castigate South Africa. Ouko noted further
that Njonjo told him, "You have been warned and you better heed my warning" and put
the receiver down. According to Ouko, Njonjo’s views were at variance with those of
the Kenya government. As argued in the theoretical framework, institutionalisation of
certain practices enables a policy favoured by certain ruling elites to overcome the fall
or circulation from the system of key actors. In Kenya’s case, firstly, the practice of
interacting with South Africa in contrast to the official position seemed to have been
institutionalised with time. While many bureaucrats stumbled on it, they were unable to
bring it to a halt or even voice their misgivings about it openly. This is because they
were scared of the consequences in view of policy. Many of these bureaucrats could
only gather courage to reveal these wide range of dealings under the umbrella of a state
sponsored Njonjo inquiry commission. Within the top level of the government, there
equally seemed to have existed two distinct groups standing in opposition to each other, on the South African question. However, while Dr. Waiyaki could openly challenge Njonjo on this question, Dr. Ouko taking cognisance of Njonjo's position within the power configuration orbit in Kenya, retreated into silence until the commission occasioned him an opportunity to state out his case. Interestingly, Njonjo was not holding any position of power in government at the time in question. We volunteer to argue that it was Njonjo's proximity to power (president) that made him warn Dr. Ouko. What this seemed to suggest was that Dr. Ouko by blasting South Africa was overstepping the normal practice of being less hostile to South Africa. This institutionalisation of covert relations towards South Africa, then explains why even after Njonjo's fall from power, covert relations continued unabated. (See chapter Two)

Kenyan Ministers, too traversed South Africa on several occasions on their visits to Southern African states and South America. This was despite the fact that all Kenyan citizens were barred from visiting South Africa. For instance, all Kenyan passports until 1990 had a stamp that the passport holder was free to travel anywhere except to the Republic of South Africa. ¹¹¹

On 31st June, 1984, Njonjo told the Njonjo Commission of Inquiry that on their way to Brazil he along with Dr. Waiyaki, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Fred Mati the Speaker of the National Assembly stopped over in South Africa. He stated that he had also passed through South Africa and spent at the Rand Hotel in Johannesburg on his way to Botswana to attend the funeral of Sir Khama, the late president of Botswana. ¹¹²
Dr Ouko too visited South Africa several times on his way to three Southern African states. While responding to a question from Njonjo’s lawyer Dr Ouko stated:

Yes I did, Several times on my way to the three Southern African states. This was at the airport.\footnote{113}

These included Botswana, where he had been more than once in July 1980.

If the Kenya government was serious about its policy of isolating South Africa, it would have impressed upon its ministers to use alternative routes. For instance, Njonjo, Waiyaki and Mati did not have to go to Brazil via South Africa. They would have used the London route or equally avoided South Africa by going through Angola. Dr Ouko had better option going to Botswana through Zambia or Zimbabwe. He could have used the road or chartered a plane. The normal practice was that whenever Ministers or top government officials of other states were transiting through South Africa, they were met by their equivalents at the airport and accorded VIP treatment. South Africa’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Miller admitted as much to the parliament when he argued that South Africa used such transits to counter with the ministers on matters of mutual concerns.\footnote{114}

Our argument that alternative routes could have been found if ministers wanted to uphold the government policy on South Africa is strengthened by Karugu’s behaviour as the Attorney General. Njonjo while responding to an invitation by Mr Ray to visit South Africa demanded to stop in South Africa for three days on his way to Barbados commonwealth law ministers meeting. His delegation was to consist of Karugu and the High Court registrar J. Coward. On succeeding Njonjo, Karugu opted to change the
The new travel arrangements involved flying through London.115

In essence then we note that the inability of the government to uphold its policies on South Africa lay with its ministers and bureaucrats. Yet it is they who not only formulate but also implement it. The fact that some of them acted contrary to stipulated policy, contributed to the inconsistencies that were to characterize the Kenya-South Africa relations. The reason underlying this behaviour was their attempt to further their political interests.
ENDNOTES


Ibid 1977 p 145 - 51


8. Ibid 1984 P 153 - 7


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African Analysis. No. 87 8th December, 1989, p8

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Weekly Review. Nairobi, 10th August 1984

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Jacob Viner, *Power Versus Plenty as objectives of Foreign Policy*, In seventeenth and eighteenth century, World Press, 1984 1(1), 1 - 29


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It was not until the late 1989 that Kenya allowed the ANC to open a diplomatic office in Nairobi. This was only after the western countries which had previously regarded the ANC as a Marxist organization began to deal with the latter.


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For our purpose here, power stands for any process that establishes control by one state over another.


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Africa Analysis. No 128, South Africa’s trade drives North, 8th August, 1991 p4, See also Africa Confidential. Vol 32 No 23, p6

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-136-
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<td><strong>Kenya Times.</strong> 28th June, 1984</td>
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<td><strong>Daily Nation.</strong> (Nairobi) 26th March, 1986</td>
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<td>P. Muiruri, &quot;Passports and Visas&quot;, <strong>MTW 10/2/VOL II/184</strong></td>
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<td>August, 24th 1984</td>
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<td><strong>Njonjo Commission Report.</strong> 1984 See also **African Contemporary</td>
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4.0 INTRODUCTION

In 1990 Kenya openly broke ranks with the continental alignment against South Africa and opted to pursue her own national interests. Henceforth, her relations with South Africa translated from a covert to an overt plane. Although this whole process resulted in the restructurisation of foreign policy behaviour, in essence it did not involve changes in the intrinsic relations, but more in the conduct of diplomatic, commercial and cultural relations between the two states.

Several factors influenced this shift. Foremost among these factors was the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet empire. This brought to an end the old super power arrangement that provided aid solely on the basis of ideological perceptions. This was coupled with both economic and political conditionalities.¹

The second influencing factor was, the internal political and economic crisis emergent from donor driven conditionalities. This saw a situation where a mosaic of forces which included local nascent opposition forces, aid organisations and NGOs push for the liberalisation of the monolithic system of government in Kenya.²

The third factor was the debunking of the apartheid system by ruling elites in South African in favour of a democratic dispensation.³ The first two factors generated a political realignment at home. Kenya had to intensively use its foreign policy as a
means through which certain values could be extracted from the external milieu to satisfy the internal setting. The third factor provided the *raison d'être* for Kenya's shift from her traditional foreign policy position towards South Africa.

It is worth noting that foreign policy changes can be effected as a result of external shocks or due to leader driven motivations. Sometimes these two factors may be self-reinforcing. If external forces are the main determinants, leaders may be forced to adjust their foreign policies accordingly to meet the emerging conditions. This is mainly due to the fact that foreign policy is a problem oriented exercise that gears towards using external extraction and validation process in order to create the necessary values needed to stabilise up the internal setting.

This chapter aims at understanding the interplay between these three factors in making covert relations between Kenya and South Africa overt. In other words, we seek to know how these three developments in concert with others made the factors examined in chapter two and three buoyant. It will be the contention of this chapter that the shift in Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards South Africa from their covert nature to their apparent overt plane necessarily generated consistency in her foreign policy behaviour towards South Africa. Consistency here is taken to occur when publicly stated policies and declarations, tally with the actual conduct, style and practice of foreign policy.

To achieve this objective, this chapter is divided into three main parts; the first part treats the effects of the cold war politics on Kenya South Africa relations. The
Second part analyses the political and economic consequences of the demise of the Cold War and the dissolution of apartheid by the South African government on Kenya-South African relations. The last part of this chapter examines the resultant transition from covert to overt relations between Kenya and South Africa.

We shall take the years 1990 to 1992 to constitute the period in which Kenya shifted her policy towards South Africa, from a covert nature to the present overt setting. Specifically, it is during this period that Kenya is seen as pursuing and implementing its felt national interests, as expressed in its foreign policy declarations.

4.1 THE POLITICS OF ALLIANCE BUILDING IN THE COLD WAR PERIOD

4.1 (a) Geo-political Ramifications

Towards the last quarter of the 1970s and the early 80s, three related events within the international milieu had far reaching influence over Kenya-South Africa relations. This coincided with Moi's ascension to the presidency and the early period of regime consolidation. The relationship between these internal and international events is important to our understanding of the early process of "alliance building" between Kenya and South Africa. At the international level, the three events included, the fall of the Shah of Iran, invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, and the increased onslaught of Soviet and socialist armed liberation movements, on the vestiges of colonialism in Southern Africa.5
These events heightened the level of super power rivalry in the Middle East, Indian Ocean and Southern Africa. For the American policy makers, the spectre of a military confrontation over what USA regarded as its salient interests in these three regions became real. Among the crucial USA interests in these regions included, defence of Middle East oil fields (these were necessary for industrial production in the West); defence of conservative Arab regimes against threats from USSR and radical Arab regimes and activism; stemming marxist threats in Southern Africa largely because of the oil traffic around the Cape of Good Hope; ensuring western control of strategic minerals in Southern Africa, and the keeping of the sealines in the Indian ocean free from any interdiction by foreign power(s) mainly the (USSR).

Of these interests, keeping the Indian Ocean sealines under USA control was crucial to her western allies. As Larry Bowman has argued, the West saw it necessary to maintain control of sea lanes around the Cape of Good Hope due to her concern for oil in the Middle East. The cape route shipping lane carried the largest volume of oil traffic in the world. About 2,300 ships navigated the route per month by 1981 (six hundred of these were oil tankers). The total number of ships on this route is 27,000 per year. A half of these ships called into South Africa annually. 68% of western Europe oil and 28% of USA's imported oil passes around this cape route. The west saw a threat to these interests as stemming from the expanded Soviet maritime forces hence saw the need to increase its preparedness in this region. This became increasingly paramount with the frequency of these Soviet Union warships visits to the Mozambiquan ports. Apart from Mozambique, the USSR had treaties allowing it to use port facilities in Ethiopia and South Yemen, on the Red Sea.
What compounded US felt threats on the Indian Ocean strip was the increasing success of the soviet backed liberation forces in Southern Africa, and the rise of "leftist" popular movements in the Eastern Africa region. While the Soviet-backed MPLA forces had taken power in Angola, Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) had taken power in Mozambique. South Africa itself was under the onslaught of SWAPO in Namibia and the ANC from within South Africa. In East Africa, President Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA) was increasingly seen as an extension of the socialist circuit into East Africa especially given its "fraternity" with Libya, North Korea, East German and Cuba. Western states were specifically concerned that further success of these groups would eventually genesize into a situation where "Soviet-friendly" regimes accessed strategic minerals and sealines along the Indian Ocean to the Soviet Union. Of great concern were defence related minerals like vanadium, chromium and uranium. Specifically, the USA's geological surveys identified twenty seven minerals as critical to its survival. Of these, South Africa had the largest reserves, in vanadium, chromium, uranium, platinum and manganese.8

To contain these emergent threats, the US came up with a twin strategy: that of "global empire building"9 and containment. The success of the policy of containment was subject to availability of friendly states in these key regions. In the Middle East, apart from Israel, no other state in the Middle East was willing to play host to American forces and provide military storage facilities. Added to the presence of Soviet bases in South Yemen, in Eastern and Southern Africa, the Soviet had a military base in Ethiopia and transit facilities in Mozambique. This presence effectively gave the Soviet Union an enhanced capacity to interdict shipping lines in the Indian ocean strip. This in turn
threatened the Middle East oil reserves and South African strategic minerals crucial to the West.¹⁰

While the USA had an ally in the Middle East in Israel, she had to depend on pro-western regimes in East and South Africa in order to complete the knitting of her strategic network in the Indian Ocean strip. While Kenya was regarded as a key ally in the North Eastern region and the Horn of Africa, South Africa was seen as a key state in the Southern region. Specifically, the USA saw Kenya and South Africa as strategic partners who could be used to fight the spread of the "communism bogey" in their respective regions while complementing each other.¹¹

Chester Crocker (Assistant Secretary African Affairs) summed up the Reagan administration's perception when he observed that, "the political relationship between US and South Africa had arrived at a cross road of perhaps historical significance". He further observed that after twenty years of worsening relations, the possibility existed for more positive reciprocal relationship between the two states, based upon the government of P. W. Botha.¹²

This search for allies like Kenya, for bases and storage facilities for military materials was captured more succinctly by Chester Crocker who noted to the House of Representatives committee that:-

Africa was a strategic hinterland for defence elsewhere. It is a launching pad for interdiction of and disruption of a maritime
power, a place to hold and control in its own right for intrinsic value as a possession.\textsuperscript{13}

This process of alliance building along the Indian Ocean strip by the US coincided with President Moi’s attempt at regime consolidation after taking over from President Kenyatta. Given the nascent nature of his regime, president Moi’s regime was in search of important external allies on whom his regime could rely for the purposes of regime validation and external resource extraction. The latter was specifically needed for the express purpose of supporting "populist schemes" \textsuperscript{14} and providing economic continuity.

President Moi did not need any arm-twisting by the USA. He readily acceded to the Carter administration’s request for military facilities in Mombasa, Nanyuki and Nairobi. The pact signed with the Carter administration allowed for storage of US arms in Kenya, transit rights to the US military and the right to use Kenya as a staging ground in any engagement in the region and the Middle East.\textsuperscript{15}

The signing of this pact effectively drew Kenya into USA’s global defence structure. Henceforth, Kenya would be used by USA in defence of her interests in the Middle East, Southern Sahara and Southern Africa. This included ensuring that Southern Africa in general, and South Africa in particular did not fall into the hands of hostile socialist groups.

In so doing, Kenya felt its interests could be well served and secured through closer links with the West, especially the USA. As Columbis observes, the residual
meaning in the concept of national interest is survival. And the regime had to survive both internal and external threats in order to consolidate its hold onto power. This was best done through collaboration with powerful and resourceful western states.

What emerged, was a tripartite mutually reinforcing alliance between Kenya, the USA and South Africa. This had a net effect of reinforcing and fortifying the already existing Kenya-South Africa strategic co-operation. By covertly acceding to facilitate pursuit and defence of western interest in South Africa (preventing the Southern African states from falling to a Soviet friendly marxist revolutionary group, access to rare mineral resources, port and airfield facilities and security of sealines around the Cape of Good Hope), Kenya in this process, reinforced inconsistency in her foreign policy behaviour towards South Africa.

This in turn tended to act as a constraining road-block to any concerted attempt towards the pursuit of an activist and credible anti-South Africa foreign policy. It is imperative to observe, that the relations between Kenya and South Africa was not reductionist. It was not for purposes of serving the interests of the west alone. The two also had common areas of military collaboration as we have shown in chapter three. Specifically then, the facilitation of these relations was to their advantage. It equally reinforced the already existing foundation on which the subsequent relations between the two states was to be based.

In return, the USA, Britain, France, Israel and Germany, all of whom had entrenched interests in South Africa, accessed Kenya with military, political and
economic support. For instance, US stepped in to provide urgent maize supplies during
the acute shortage in 1980, provided 12 F5-E F5-F fighter planes and Hughes attack
helicopters and transport planes; Britain provided new Vicker tanks, while Germany
provided troop carriers. Israel provided training for the Air force and the General
Service Unit. France on the other hand provided telecommunication equipment for the
military. By 1987, Kenya was receiving more than $60 million dollars in aid from USA.
This made her the third largest recipient of US aid in the Sahara after Sudan and
Liberia. 16

The USA provided Kenya with US$57m to improve and upgrade her port and
airfields facilities in 1980. Kenya received US$5million under International Militlary
Training Program (IMTP). Between 1980 and 1989, the US trained an average of 100
Kenyan military officers while US$250,000 dollars was given annually by the US for
maintenance of airfields. 17

Increased military and political support to Kenya by western states fortified and
ramified the monolithic tendencies of the regime. She was hence forth able to ruthlessly
crack down on opposition groups which it increasingly denigrated as sellouts and lackeys
of Soviet imperialism. For instance, while presiding over Nairobi University's
graduation ceremony in December, 1981, president Moi warned the students against
agitation and wayward ideologies. 18 In June 1982, the government used the preventive
detention law against four university lecturers, a former member of parliament, an
attorney and a former deputy director of intelligence. The coup attempt of August, 1982
in which many politicians and lecturers with leftist inclinations were implicated saw the
The coup leaders’, strong anti-western states position, which was exemplified by their condemnation of Kenya’s lukewarm support of liberation efforts in Southern Africa and the domination of her economy by MNCs and the West. The granting of military bases to the west, only helped to portray the Kenyan regime as a necessary ally to the west and generated more immediate aid in grants.

Both Reagan and Thatcher administrations responded by providing immediate aid to reconstruct the state. The US also went as far as rebuilding the disbanded airforce. The Kenyan regime in turn accessed transit facilities between the west and South Africa. Not only did she refuse to terminate the use of her air space by South Africa bound planes but continued to facilitate South Africa and the West’s strategic interests (by supporting South African mercenaries in their attempts at toppling socialist regimes) in the Indian ocean. (See Chapter Three).

The net effect of this external support was the entrenchment of the inconsistency in Kenya’s foreign policy towards South Africa. So long as Kenya continued to view her links with the west and her strategic collaboration with the west and South Africa as serving her interests better than actual active and direct military support to ANC, her foreign policy towards South Africa would be riddled with inconsistencies. Her lukewarm support for the liberation efforts in South Africa was increasingly condemned by leftist groups, like Mwakenya. Mwakenya also called for military support for
liberation groups in Southern Africa, the removal of western military bases in Kenya and
the curbing of MNC activities in Kenya. Kenya was thus constrained from attempting
to pursue overt links with South Africa. The regime had nothing to gain by overt links
with South Africa. On the other hand, overt relations would have not only cost her
public support but also led to her ostracisation by other African states.

The regime instead opted to pursue her relations with South Africa covertly, while
overtly calling for the latter's international isolation. Internally, the Kenya regime
stepped up its fight against leftist groups especially Mwakenya. Concurrent to this
behaviour, was the stepped up propaganda war against South Africa aimed at
camouflaging Kenya's covert dealing with the former. For empirically unexplained
reasons, the Mwakenya position might have heightened Kenya's rhetorics against South
Africa against the background of strengthened relationship in the tripartite alliance.
Mwakenya exposed these covert relations, hence the regime's defensive, but loud
response. This response included high-handed tactics against groups like
Mwakenya.

On the other hand pursuit of interests and construction of a tripartite alliance
between Kenya, the west and South Africa can be explained by core assumptions of
foreign policy. As Charlie Herman notes:-

Rulers and their regime, that is, those who create governmental
foreign policy depend for their continuance in office on the support
certain constituencies (those entities whose endorsement and
compliance are necessary to legitimate and sustain the regime)
these may be members of a ruling party, military officers, land owners, external supporters.  

In Kenya’s case, coincidence of interests dictated that she pursued relations with South Africa for the benefit of the tripartite alliance. As Orwa explains, this pro-west policy had never changed since 1963. In this sense, then one has to accept the existence of a coincidence of interests between Kenya and metropolitan powers. Any policy designed to promote and protect Kenya’s economy must out of necessity promote and protect western interests. Specifically then, this relationship with the west reinforced inconsistency in her foreign policy towards South Africa.  

4.1.(b) Economic Ramifications

Kenya and South Africa are dominant in their respective regions, they are characterised by higher levels of affluence and industrialisation and by more economic and infrastructural resources...... both states do have close if not entirely co-operative links with the world economy and with multinational corporations.  

This observation by T. M. Shaw describes the linkages Kenya and South Africa established with the capitalist Western States. Specifically, the two states over the years have acted as the conduit for capitalist penetration in their respective regions. Arguably, both Britain and the international capital set up Kenya as a sub-imperial state in this region.  

Thus, Kenya’s strategic position in the Indian ocean provided an important linkpin to a circuit of capitalist concerns. At one level, she facilitated links between international capital and South Africa and vice versa, while at another she used this role
as a conduit for international capital to negotiate for and fortify links with South African capital. This happened at the covert level. For instance, she was an important centre linking South Africa with not only African states, but also other international players who had to stop over in Nairobi to or from South Africa. This was basically facilitated by airlinks discussed in chapter two.

She also allowed cargo ships bound for South Africa to utilise her Mombasa port. These links facilitated the pursuit of trade interests between South Africa and western countries especially Britain, France, Germany and Israel.

The economic ramifications of this politics of "alliance building" can be viewed within the rubrics of the "symbiosis thesis" of the Kenya debate. According to this thesis, the Kenya state provides an enabling environment for international capital to penetrate the region. In return, the state elite not only receive rents, but also become incorporated as "junior partners" in the international capital concerns. Hence the state elite reproduced and sustained the enabling environment while the international capital provided the "pork" with which the elite bought political patronage and in the process sustaining itself in power.

Arguably, this symbiotic relation assumed an international dimension at the regional level. At the domestic front, international capital was already entrenched providing upto 75% of total Kenya's exports to the Eastern and Southern African markets. In South Africa, international capital had also assumed a significant position in concert with indigenous Boer capital. In both states and in the region at large,
international capital had to network in order to enjoy economies of scale. This could not be done given the political isolation of South Africa. Hence, it had to be pursued at a covert level with a price to the parties involved. In Kenya, the political elite received internal support in form of aid in return for their facilitation of the networking of international capital in the region in pursuit of western interests in South Africa.

It is not thus strange that Kenya was dependent on the West for economic aid and trade. Britain and the USA remained the main investors in Kenya. For instance, British investments in Kenya exceeded £1 billion when official and private commercial interests in agriculture, housing and consumer goods industries are put together. They amounted to £2 billion by 1992. It is worth noting that British commercial interests span into virtually every sector of the economy often constituting the largest establishments. For instance, in the banking sector alone, Barclays bank remains the largest institution in terms of assets and profitability and is only surpassed by the commercial bank group by sheer number of branches, staff and deposits. In 1992 alone, Barclays exceeded a billion shillings Mark in profitability.31

Increased hostile activities by USSR and her allies like Libya, North Korea, Cuba and East Germany in the states neighbouring Kenya generated corresponding response of increased economic activity of the USA in Kenya. This was manifested by increased activities of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in providing technical aid in ranch development, expansion of Egerton University, promotion of livestock and small firm credit systems support and extension of training institutions,
food storage facility, construction, renewable energy and health programme support.  


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Source: CRS Issue Brief Update 5th August, 1991

The USAID staff of 25 and support team of 50 made her mission in Kenya the largest in Africa. Nairobi over the 80s' continued to serve as a nerve centre for US penetration in Southern Africa. It was the aim of the US to transform into a show case story of capitalist success in East Africa. Consequently, Kenya remained the largest recipient of US aid in Africa outside Egypt. In 1990, 1991 and 1992 financial years, Kenya received US$34.2 million, US$26 million and US$26 million respectively.

As western capital flowed into the economy, capitalism spread enabling capitalist oriented institutions to take root. Kenya found herself totally intergrated into the overall
western capitalist mode of production. The net result was the making of the internal political economy more compatible with the western economies hence entrenching interactions whose resultant effect was dependence on the west.\textsuperscript{35}

Kenya's alliance with the west enabled her to get loans and balance of payments support from the IMF and the World Bank. In both 1982 and 1988, balance of payment deficit on the country's current account were in the region of US$500 million, while the public sector deficit continued to hover around 7 - 8\% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).\textsuperscript{36} Huge inflows of concessionary aid from donors in forms of grants and loans alleviated this balance of payment problem. The main donors remained USA, Britain, West German, France, Japan and Denmark. Equally supportive were the IMF and the World Bank. The love affair between Kenya and the donor community enabled her to maintain a high level of investment spending. For instance, by 1990/91 financial year, external grants and loans accounted for 109\% of capital expenditure. Compared to 17\% in 1986/1987 year. In the 1990/91 year the budget deficit was financed by 68\% from external sources.\textsuperscript{37}

Kenya's behaviour is best explained by Hans Morgenthau who observed that useful alliances are best supported by foundations of reciprocal advantage and mutual security of participating nation states. Decisions affecting national interests according to Morgenthau should be based on demonstratable national advantage. In Kenya's case, these advantages lay in guaranteed foreign aid, investments and political support needed to build the social system and provide needed values.\textsuperscript{38}
Hence, the facilitation of western influence in South Africa had a further varying effect. It tended to link the ruling elite with South African capital concerns. This linkage grew with the increasing influence of international capital in the region both at the economic and strategic levels. The benefits accruing from these linkages necessitated for the pursuit of relations at a covert level in the process generating inconsistency in foreign policy execution. Arguably, the significance of these linkages buoyed with the withdrawal of western support to Kenya in the first quarter of the nineties.

This accounts for the speed with which Kenya normalized her relations with South Africa, translating relations from a covert to an overt level. We shall return to this later.

4.2 Internal Crises and the Shift in Kenya’s Foreign Policy Towards South Africa from a Covert to an Overt Level

The end of the cold war had far reaching effects on the strategic and economic alliance on the Indian Ocean strip discussed above. In South Africa, it facilitated the ultimate collapse of apartheid and its regional strategic projects. In Kenya, this ushered in donors demands for a new kind of economic and political order.39

These changes, were compounded by internal economic crisis characterized by worsening debt situation. They also had a mutually reinforcing effect on Kenya. Not only did this liberate internal opposition opposed to the monolithic state, but also reinforced them. There was thus increased pressure and calls for changes in her political and economic structures. Kenya like many other African states had benefited from the
...cold war situation by joining the American security structure. This decision had seen her receive economic, security, political and diplomatic support especially at moments of crises.40

The consequence of this support was the denigration and suppression of democratic forces, while this was overlooked and sometimes ignored by her benefactors more interested in her geo-strategic importance. But the end of the cold war and especially the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1990 brought this situation to an end. Kenya became less significant to the west’s strategic concerns. And as Ngunyi observes, the identity of the regime running the state took less consequence provided a viable alternative existed (that was ready to accept the basic ground rules of international politics and division of labour). The northern powers had no particular interests in blocking its road to political power.41

As for the USA, her existence as a sole super power led to the re-orientation of her hegemonic claims to ground doctrines of economic and political restructurisation. She increasingly called on the Kenyan regime not only to implement economic reforms but also to allow for political pluralism as a pre-condition for future aid allocations.42

This new orientation of the US over Kenya had the net effect of emboldening nascent opposition groups in Kenya, to openly emerge and contest for the expansion of the democratic space. At the top of the list of these groups, were human rights activists led by lawyers, religious leaders, the old leftist coalition led by Oginga Odinga and former ruling elites evicted out of power (represented by Matiba, Rubia, Shikuku) by
President Moi. Most of these forces crystalised to form an opposition front Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD). This new coalition that had within it a sizeable representation of property and capital and professional classes won a popular acceptance in urban and rural areas. For the first time in his political helmsmanship, President Moi's government became increasingly threatened.42

It is instructive to note, that all these political developments taking place at the background of an unstable economic system, had the effect of putting pressure on the political system. There remained a potential threat of the opposition getting out of hand to threaten the prevailing civil order. Riots that accompanied the death of Dr Ouko and Matiba/Rubia's attempt to hold a public rally at the Kamukunji grounds on 7th July, manifested to this. In a resultant clump-down on pro democracy demonstrations of 7th July, 1990, over twenty people lost their lives.43

The reaction of western states like USA was swift. Military and economic aid amounting to US$7million economic and US$8 million in military aid was suspended. There was also increased pressure to force president Moi to introduce the reforms. This embargo coming in the wake of political instability had far reaching effects on Kenya's economic system. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) declined from 4.3% in 1990 to 2.2% in 1991 and 0.1% in 1992.44 Gross fixed capital formation edged upwards from 3.5% in 1990 to negative 2.9% in 1991. In 1992, inflation was 27.5% up from 19.6% in 1991 leading to erosion of real wages by 12%. Agriculture declined by 4.2% while manufacturing sector grew by 1.2% in 1991. Kenya's shilling continued to depreciate...
against major currencies while money supply rose by unprecedented 35% in 1992. The budget deficit was Kshs. 24b or 6.5% of the GDP.\textsuperscript{45}

This situation was not made any better by the fact that 30% of the budget was foreign funded and that Kenya had to service a US $6m debt. Debt servicing charge by 1990 was 30% of the total revenue of the government.

Increased political instability equally affected Kenya's essential tourism industry whose performance plummeted. Investment fell by 16.4% in 1993 after falling by 58% in 1992 and 29% in 1991. In other words, out of every US $5 invested in Kenya, only close to US $ 2 was not withdrawn in the period between 1991 and 1993. In this period alone, American investments fell by close to 40%.\textsuperscript{46}

Raising production costs forced an increase in prices, in the process burdening the already overstretched public. For instance, newspapers increased by 20%, cussons soap 10%, and tyres by 8% in 1992. Manufacturers increasingly lamented the scarcity of foreign exchange which constrained their capability to import industrial inputs.\textsuperscript{47}

This poor economic performance threatened to erode the regime's power base even further. Conflated with growing and popular opposition forces, not only did it threaten support from ordinary Kenyans but also the industrialists who provided the ruling elites with economic power stay.
According to the realists, the ultimate goal of the state is assumed to be self preservation, while the survival of the state in international arena requires the defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation state. Domestically, it demands that the state meets and overcomes challenges from and maintain support of societal groups and coalitions. This is true for both the state and the incumbents who occupy decision making positions in the state apparatus. In their efforts to maintain support and overcome opposition, state officials pursue two proximal goals. First, they seek to acquire control over resources in order to co-opt or coerce challenges and reward supporters. The greater the challenges, to the power and authority, the more the resources they require. Secondly, state officials seek to preserve their legitimacy by having domestic groups accept state claims to the exercise of decision making authority.48

This is what the Kenyan regime attempted to do. At one level, it attempted to engage itself in exercises of internal extraction and mobilisation of resources. The whole purpose of internal extraction was to save and generate resources that could be used to challenge the regimes opponents and to arrest the deteriorating economic situation at home. Towards this objective, the regime attempted to reduce the balance of trade deficit caused more by import of commodities like sugar, and maize. These she hoped to achieve by stimulating growth in agriculture through provision of fertiliser to farmers for utilisation. She also hoped to cut down budget deficit from 3.5% of gross domestic product to 2% in 1993. The Finance Ministry observed that these would be realised through the reduction of government expenditure and increasing revenue collection efficiency. The regime equally aimed at reducing expenditure on wages and salaries and
to use the resultant savings to raise allocations for non wage operations. It also aimed at the reduction of expenditure on projects, and the cut down on the civil service.\textsuperscript{49}

In a bid to steam capital flight the Ministry of Finance introduced several reforms in the foreign exchange regulations. These included the introduction of convertible foreign exchange (forex) certificates of deposit and hoped that, these would encourage influx of foreign exchange. He also abolished forex declaration forms for all arriving passengers.\textsuperscript{50}

To supplement internal extraction, the regime increasingly opted for external extraction and validation strategies. While the former refers to efforts to accumulate resources from outside, a state borders that could be used to achieve domestic objectives in the process reducing reliance on internal extraction strategies, the latter refers to attempts by state officials to utilise their states as authoritative international representatives of the nation state to enhance their domestic political positions.\textsuperscript{51}

Foreign policy as Charles Herman explicates, is a problem-oriented program by authoritative policy makers directed towards entities outside their political jurisdiction designed to address some problem or pursue some goal that entails action towards foreign entities.\textsuperscript{52} It is in this light that president Moi increasingly began to look for an alternative avenue. Throughout 1991, president Moi made relentless efforts to court Uganda and Tanzania in a bid to revive the collapsed East African Community and even allowed for importation of Uganda’s sugar.\textsuperscript{53} All these attempts were part of his validation and external extraction processes.
The most viable economic extraction source at this point, was South Africa. South Africa had been in a strategic and economic alliance with Kenya and the west and important linkages had already been established. But what was now attractive to Kenya was the fact that apartheid had now collapsed and her relations with South Africa would now assume an overt plane with little justification. This involved a redirection of Kenya’s entire orientation towards African affairs. It involved a total shift in Kenya’s role in continental affairs and activities. Henceforth, Kenya began calling for South Africa’s readmission in multilateral organisations like OAU and Commonwealth. In the OAU, meeting at Abuja, in Nigeria, Kenya called for lifting of economic sanctions against South Africa amidst heavy opposition from the ANC and the other frontline states like Zimbabwe.\textsuperscript{54}

Kenya’s policy makers felt South Africa could, if successfully courted, provide the needed industrial inputs like fertilisers at much cheaper costs and under better terms in view of the increasing death in foreign exchange brought about by the slump in tourist and coffee industries. South Africa had a GDP per capita income of US$2,800 compared to Kenya’s US$380.\textsuperscript{55} South Africa’s economy based on vast quantities of gold, diamonds, coal and cheap labour backed by open investments by west, had been for years the economic collosus of Africa. While Kenya spent Kshs. 100 billion annually on industrial imports from Europe, and North America, the same goods could cost her less by 30% if she acquired them from South Africa especially because of the short distance it takes to import goods from South Africa hence saving on transport.\textsuperscript{56}
Kenya's policy makers believed that this could alleviate the problem of forex shortage by using South Africa concessions to import industrial inputs like, steel, plastics, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, iron, technology and other consumer products she had been importing from the west. Specifically then, we can meaningfully argue that the aid squeeze by the west, which generated internal crisis forced the ruling elites to openly embrace South Africa despite the fact that it was still being ruled by white minority regime. That the regime had been abandoned by its cold war allies made South Africa a viable ally hence the shift in Kenya's relations with South Africa from a covert plane to an overt one. The negotiation with white South African regime was for the purpose of providing continuity in a possible ANC led government. The assumption here was that the whites would still control commanding heights of the economy in a new South Africa.

Kenya's decision makers hoped to maximise on the advantages accruing from commercial interaction, sphere building and coalition formulation. Specifically, Kenya hoped to secure industrial inputs, needed in its fore starved economy from South Africa. The attempt at sphere building aimed at consolidating her relations with South Africa while placing her at a strategically advantageous position over other African states by jumping the gun. First, this explains the reason why she broke off from the continental alliance against South Africa.

On the other hand, Kenya also aimed at engaging in the coalition formation between indigenous capital, resident in the hands of ruling and economic elites, Boer capital and international capital. While in the past these coalition formation between
capital operated within an exclusive space, this time round, she aimed at having it operating under an expanded space. This process was geared towards creating a coalition among domestic Indian capital, ruling elites and her Anglo-Boer capital. This, it was expected would fill the gap left by fast disappearing western capital. This resulted in the transition of relations from a covert to an overt plane at the political and economic realms.

4.3.1 The Political Realm

Foreign policy begins with a problem, a threat or an opportunity that motivates concern. It is a process through which a state attempts to meet external challenge to its internal setting. This is especially geared towards minimising adverse actions while maximising on favourable ones. In Kenya's case, the emerging internal milieu dictated that alternative sources of aid, favourable trade, and political support be found to provide values to key constituencies upon which the regime relied.

The first high level open contacts between the two states was initiated by South Africa's Minister for External Affairs who visited Kenya to hold talks with president Moi in September, 1990. In this first meeting, discussions centred on among others, granting of the South African Airline's permission to stop over in Nairobi. This was accepted and subsequently in December 1990, the first South African plane landed in Nairobi after more than 25 years. This was followed by President De Klerk's visit to Kenya in June 1991. It was in the course of this visit that President De Klerk not only posited his idea of having Kenya, Nigeria, Egypt and South Africa acting as an axis around which economic development could evolve in Africa, but also to re-establish official links with
the Afrikaner tribe in Kenya. He also laid ground for re-establishment of explicit diplomatic relations.

In a press conference held in Nairobi, De Klerk disclosed that his discussions in Nairobi with the Kenyan leadership was a culmination of long term contacts between the two states that had now only become explicit.  

In July, 1991, Kenya’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Mr. Wilson Ndolo Ayah made a four day official visit to South Africa. It was in the course of this visit that he emphasized the need for communication between the two states. It is worth noting that increased overt interactions were in contradiction of OAU's call that South Africa’s isolation be maintained.

Kenya started playing the role of South Africa’s advocate in both the OAU and the commonwealth. For instance at the OAU summit in Abuja, Nigeria, president Moi called for the lifting of sanctions against and accommodation of South Africa within the OAU. Even then, this was outrightly opposed and rejected by most frontline states led by Zimbabwe and Tanzania. President Moi, while calling for relaxation of sanctions, vehemently argued against the futility of maintaining sanctions when the rest of the world was willing and was even eager to lift them.

By arguing out a case for South Africa’s re-intergration into the international system, president Moi was effectively abandoning the collective continental position in preference for Kenya’s national interest. As Morgenthau argues, statesmen as
What seemed to emerge from the orientations of Kenyan political leadership was
that, Kenya's national interest, were elite dominated and that the value systems, the
ruling elites seemed to pedal out, were merely ex-post facto rationalisations for purposes
of propaganda. Kenya's new policy positions had been opposed not by African states
alone but also by main actors within the South African arena like ANC, hence, our
contention that these positions reflected inherent interests of the Kenyan leadership than
actual felt change within South Africa.

On the eve of his departure to South Africa, on the 29th June, 1991, Mr Ndolo
Ayah told the world that it was time to have ties with South Africa. He argued that with
the political changes that had taken place in South Africa, it was no longer practical for
the rest of the world not to forge links with South Africa. Responding to criticism of
Kenya's increasingly explicit relations with South Africa, Mr. Ndolo Ayah retorted that
some states had been dealing clandestinely with South Africa, but "Kenya was going to
do it in the open". Whereas he stated that no formal diplomatic ties could be established
until apartheid had totally ended, Kenya did exactly the opposite. By October, 1991, she
had already allowed South Africa to open an interest office in Nairobi. Sources in South
Africa confirmed that preparations for opening full diplomatic ties were well
advanced. These sources in South Africa proved right when South Africa through
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr Reiner Schoeman officially opened South Africa’s mission at Lonrho House in Nairobi on 29th June, 1992. This was before the total collapse of apartheid and its structures. The ceremony was attended by among others, the Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President in charge of internal security, Mr Wilfred Kimalat, officials from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and members of the Diplomatic Corps.

Within the commonwealth, Kenya joined Britain in attempting to persuade members to lift sanctions against South Africa and instead adopt, what Kenya termed as a "positive policy" in appreciation of the changes in South Africa. Ndolo Ayah the Minister for Foreign Affairs concurred with British counterparts on the need to urge for the commonwealth’s understanding of South Africa.

Specifically then, going by the political interactions and policy statements and behaviour of Kenya’s political leadership, we can meaningfully contend that she had shifted from her past practice of conducting her political interactions with South Africa at covert level. In turn, she had established consistency in her foreign policy behaviour towards South Africa. Consistency here, emerged out of the fact that there was an established harmony between policy declarations and the actual policy practice and implementation. What was being stated as the state’s objective was essentially what was being pursued and practiced.

It can be meaningfully argued that by late 1990 Kenya had changed her foreign policy approach towards South Africa. Not only had she entirely abandoned her
adherence to collective continental stance on the South African question but in essence focused herself entirely on her national interest.

4.3.2 Economic Realm

The decision of the Kenya government to lift travel restrictions to South Africa (imposed in 1983), on 3rd of October, 1990, had far reaching effects on the Kenya-South Africa economic relations. Apart from signaling the shift in the two states dyadic relations, it equally demonstrated Kenya's public break with the 27 year old continental position vis a vis South Africa. Whereas Kenya was justifying the lifting of the ban on the basis of the fact that it would allow Kenyans to exploit existing business potential in South Africa, the collective OAU stand was that South Africa was to remain isolated diplomatically and economically.

The lifting of the ban on South Africa, saw over 1109 South Africans visiting Kenya in 1990 alone. By 1991, this number had shot up to 6,000. That is an average of 500 South African visitors each month and close to 18 visitors per day. Between October 1992 and February 1993, this number had shot up to 12,000 South Africans. This implied that while in 1990 there were only 100 visitors from South Africa per month, by 1993 February, there were 1,000 per month.

Specifically put, if 3 visitors were arriving each day from South Africa in 1990, by February 1993, there were 33 more arriving each day from South Africa. The
increase in this tourist flow was facilitated by the decision to allow South African airlines to make stop over flights in Nairobi and Kenya Airways flights to South Africa.

Besides the two states corporations, the Kenya government licensed a privately owned airline known as Flitestar to operate flights between Mombasa and South Africa. Flitestar was licensed notwithstanding the fact that it threatened to snatch at least 5% of South Africa Airlines (SAA) and Kenya Airways passengers. Flitestar started its operations in September 1992 using an Airbus A320. 

Whereas South Africa Airways challenged Flitestar's decision to fly to Kenya in court, Kenya's position was that the tourist industry in Kenya stood to gain. Kenya's representative to Namibia Mr M S Kuria further rationalized this position in a letter to the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife.

...... Flitestar applied to fly directly to Mombasa from South Africa, a move which has been opposed by South Africa. Now that the battle has been won we should expect more tourists from South Africa to Kenya...(by whichever means)... This is in line with the tourism promotion by your ministry in conjunction with travel agents, tour operators and Kenya Airways which started with a workshop on 5th June, 1992 in Johannesburg. 

The government on its part after 1992, began to overtly facilitate interactions between Kenya and South African businessmen. These included seminars, conferences and tours. For instance, on 15th January, 1992, Kenya welcomed in a delegation of 37 business executives from South Africa. In his letter to the Permanent Secretary of the
Ministry of Tourism, Mr J T Arap Leting, executive chairman of investment promotion centre stated:

... we at IPC encourage and promote these contacts as we believe they are useful for further business relations with South Africa. Please note that there are two members of parliament in this group. Mr D Graff who is a Deputy Minister in the department of trade, Commerce and Tourism and Brigadier Bisman ...(I) request you to avail a senior officer of the ministry preferably minister/assistant minister or yourself to address the group at intercontinental ...

Kenya also sent a delegation of tour operators and ministry officials to attend a forum on tourism between 28th and 30th of October, 1992 in South Africa.

Kenyan tour companies equally established collaborative links with their South African counterparts. These included companies like Abercrombie and Kent which formalized links with its South African chapter, KUDU Tours and Safaris, which established links with Tour and Trail of Port Elizabeth (SA). African Tours and Hotels on its part, established links with Baltic travels of South Africa. Universal Safari Tours on the other hand, not only established links with Luxuria tours but also facilitated the licensing of Flitestar to set up flight linkages to Mombasa. In his forwarding letter, P G Duffar chairman of UST wrote to the director of civil aviation board on 26th June, 1992 and stated the following:

... please find herewith a Flitestar temporary license application for 50 charter seats on the following sectors JNB/MBA/BAH BAH/MBA/BAH. We would appreciate your granting us a temporary licence so that we can start with immediate effect.
South Africa demonstrated the importance with which she attached to Kenya by staging her biggest trade fair outside South Africa in Nairobi. Christened contact Kenya, the fair which cost Kshs. 90 million was opened on 1st July, 1992 by South Africa's Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr Reiner Shoeman.76

It is against this background that trade between Kenya and South Africa increased threefold by 1992 to reach 180 million Rand.(1.8 billion Kshs.) According to the head of the South Africa's department of trade and industry, this trade was in favour of South Africa. It was mainly concentrated in coffee, tea, fish, vegetables, steel, plastics, chemical and mechanical equipment.77

Between March, 1992 and March, 1993, trade had risen by 1000%. Dr Denis Worrall (Former South African ambassador to Britain and currently a member of parliament for democratic party of South Africa) attributed this increase to economic liberalization in Kenya and political change in South Africa.78

Addressing the press at the South African embassy in Nairobi, Dr Worrall noted that enormous scope for small and medium sized enterprises existed in the growing Kenya-South Africa relations.

This 1000% increase in the trade between Kenya and South Africa between March 1992 and March 1993 can be explained by the heavy capital inflow into Kenya by South Africa. These went into joint ventures with Kenyan firms. For instance, the conservation corporation of South Africa (with private game reserves and game lodges adjoining
Kruger national park and in Natal) acquired controlling interests in the East African hotel and lodge management company and Windsor hotels international (Windsor holdings in Kenya included Windsor Golf and Country Club, three star Mayfair court Hotel, Siana Springs tented camp in Masai Mara). On the other hand, Protea hotel group (South African) acquired Pinewood village in Mombasa. Equally South African firms have been purchasing going concerns like the Grindleys bank (become stanbick) and Yaya Centre.79

Specifically then, while in 1990 Kenya's total trade with South Africa totalled about 20 million Rand (200 m Ksh), by 1991 this had risen to 60 m Rand (600 m Ksh), 180 m R (1800 M Ksh) in 1992 and in 1993 this had shot up to 1.8 b R (18 Billion Ksh)80

In other words, out of every US $1 traded in 1991, there were US $3 traded in 1992. Thus whereas Kenya traded upto 50 million Kshs with South Africa per month on average in 1991, by 1992, this monthly average had gone up by 150 m. By 1993, this had shot up to 1.5 billion Kshs.

The intensive activity within the economic sector of the Kenya South Africa relations point to K.J. Holsti's contention that routine foreign policy matters tend to centre on so called middle range objectives. These include economic and commercial interests.81 It is here that such interests receive ideological coating and where they are rationalised as national interest. A close examination of these dormant activities pointed more to the interests of the ruling regime and its dominant power elites. It is
these elites (as demonstrated in chapter two) who dominated trade relations between Kenya and South Africa.

Interestingly, Kenya’s trade with Great Britain, her traditional trading partner fell from 9.36 billion shillings in 1990 to 7.66 billion shillings in 1991 and finally to 6.7 billion in 1992. During the same period Kenya’s trade with South Africa rose overwhelmingly from 0.2 billion shillings in 1990 to 1.8 billion shillings in 1992 and Kshs.18 billion in March 1993. This is the indicative of a shift in Kenya’s alliances from the western countries, now "tough" on both economic and political conditionalities, to South Africa, which needed allies like Kenya in order to penetrate the East African market in the post apartheid period.

This worked in favour of Kenya’s trade with South Africa in that inputs from South Africa were about 30% cheaper and South Africa business community gave Kenya credit facilities and better concessions. These enabled them to increase imports from South Africa, which included fertilizer, chemicals, plastics, steel and mechanical equipment. Short delivery time from South Africa due to the distance and technological superiority of this goods (atuned to tropical conditions) also enhanced their marketability in Kenya.

Basically then, the increase in trade between the two states and the heavy capital inflow explains why South Africa was Kenya’s leading trade partner by early 1993. Interestingly, Kenya’s trade with South Africa was about two and a half times her trade with her traditional partner Britain.
Apart from the fact that Kenya’s internal and external challenges could have accounted for these high levels of trade with South Africa, what also accounts for this, is the fact that Kenya already had relations with South Africa in the apartheid years. Business potential had therefore been identified, market knowledge was available and possible business partners existed. All that was needed was for, the hitherto imprisoned forces to be liberated. And once they were, South Africa was able to assume a dominant position as a trading partner with Kenya.
END NOTES


9. As Werner Bierman called it, "the strategy of the global empire" was geared towards stabilising the international system by integrating the USSR. To realise these objective, USA especially the Reagan administration emphasized the policy of containment. The linch pin of this policy in the Middle East, Africa and the Indian Ocean involved, the use of foreign aid as a means of influencing states in these regions, to pursue pro-American policies. States like Zimbabwe which assumed hostile anti-American orientations had aid cut off.
14. In its attempt at winning mass following president Moi’s regime had initiated several programmes. These included free primary school education, Milk Programme for school children, construction of projects and schools in areas felt to be key supporters of the regime and the expansion of the military.
15. Vincent Khapoya, Op Cit. 1984, P153, See also Norman Miller, Kenya, the quest for prosperity, West View Press Inc.

-174-


29. UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee against Apartheid, No. 22 A/41/22/1986 p25

30. Steve Langdon and Kaplinsky (in their works Multi-national Corporations: The Political Economy of Kenya. Macmillan Press, 1981, and Capitalist Accumulation in the periphery: The Kenyan Case Re-examined, ROAPE No. 17, have argued that, relationships between state and foreign capital in Kenya is a "symbiotic one" in which the state strove to integrate local and foreign capital. Nicola Swainson in a counter observation pointed out that this was in line with the fact that in a capitalist system like Kenya's, the domestic bourgeoisie was heavily dependent on state support in its attempts at capital accumulation.

31. Africa Analysis. 1st June, 1992, See also Society Journal Issue No. 98, 29th June, 1992


33. Norman Miller, Ibid. 1984

34. CRS Issue Brief, 5th August, 1991, Op Cit. p10 - 11


38. Katete Orwa, Op Cit. p226 - 229


40. Peter Gibborn, 1912, Op Cit. p2

41. Ngunyi, 1992, Op Cit. p3 - 4
42. Rok Ajulu, 1993 *Op Cit*, p80 - 82
45. *Society*. Weekly issue No 18, 29th June, 1992, 40 - 46
48. Charles Herman, 1990 *Op Cit*, p3-21
52. Charles Herman, 1990 *Op Cit*, p3 - 21
60. *P.T.A. Magazine*. No 47 May 1991, p1
These figures were extracted from the following documents,

(i) Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife KHW/7/03/88 Tourist from South Africa and MS Kuria’s letter to PS Ministry of Tourism

(ii) Flitestar Temporary Licence Application UST/26/6/1992

(iii) Executive Magazine November, 1991, p 17 - 20

Universal Safari Tours, 26th June, 1992, See also, The Citizen, Johannesburg, 16th June, 1992 Flitestar can now fly to Mombasa

M.C. Kuria, Tourist from South Africa Kenya High Commission, KHW/7/03/88, 18th June, 1992, p 1 - 2


Muriithi M’mbui, South African Tourism Forum, 29 - 30th October, Johannesburg, MTW 22/13/115, 19th October, 1992

Universal Safari Tours, Flitestar Temporary Licence application, UST, 26th June, 1992

Daily Nation, 1st July, 1992

Standard, Kenya-South Africa trade surges, 3rd February, 1993 p11

Daily Nation, Kenya-South Africa Trade grown by 1000% Business and Finance 5th March, 1993 p12

Standard, 3rd February 1992


83. *Africa Analysis*. 1st June 1992

Despite the isolation of South Africa by most African countries between 1978 and 1990, Kenya continued to relate with her at a covert level. While acceding to this isolation in policy positions and proclamations, she in practice pursued economic and geo-strategic interactions with South Africa. This tended to generate inconsistency in her foreign policy behaviour towards South Africa. Subsequent to the collapse of the apartheid system in 1990, Kenya transformed her relations with South Africa to an overt and explicit plane.

This investigation sought to understand why Kenya would condemn South Africa and call for her isolation in the international system at the policy articulation level, while pursuing economic and geo-strategic interests at the covert level with her. Similarly, it sought to understand the forces accounting for the speed with which Kenya transited her interactions with South Africa from a covert to an overt plane in the process establishing consistency in her foreign policy towards South Africa.

The investigation advanced from certain theoretical assumptions in understanding the foregoing: That in the event that there is conflict between national interests and regional threats, the national interests will reign supreme. That the national interest is for the most part elite defined and dominated. As I.D. Levin argues, "Foreign Policy is a combination of aims and interests pursued and defended by the given state and its ruling class". In the event of a conflict between elite interests and those of the general
body politic, elite interests assume a covert plane. That nation states will enter into alliances that enable them to maximise on advantages while minimising on disadvantages. If and when such alliances cease to provide given advantages, nation states will shift from the same in search for alternatives.

On the basis of these assumptions, we hypothesized the following:-

(i) That pursuit of economic interests generated inconsistency in Kenya’s foreign policy towards South Africa.

(ii) That the furtherance of certain political interests resulted in consistency and inconsistency in Kenya’s foreign policy with South Africa.

(iii) That transition from covert to overt interactions between Kenya and South Africa after 1990 was a function of the collapse of apartheid, external pressure, internal political and economic crises in Kenya.

5.1.(a) **Economic Interests as Sources of Inconsistency**

Our first hypothesis suggested that there have existed economic relations between Kenya and South Africa. It further suggested that the pursuit of those interests was in total contravention of the government’s own stated stand on links with South Africa. (The official position was that there would be no economic links as long as apartheid remained an official policy in South Africa). This contradictory practice in turn generated inconsistency in Kenya’s foreign policy towards South Africa.
Hence, our first objective, which basically derives from hypothesis one, sought to establish empirically the relationship between the pursuit of economic interests and foreign policy inconsistency towards South Africa. In pursuit of this objective, we centered our study on the period between 1978 and 1990. Our reason for picking on this time was that, it was during this period that Kenya’s foreign policy assumed an activist role in intra-African affairs. For instance, Kenya became more vocal in her condemnation of apartheid. Thus it would have been expected that her actual foreign policy behaviour would remain consistent with the public policy pronouncements. The converse was true. Kenya’s foreign policy pronouncements were inconsistent with her actual foreign policy behaviour towards South Africa, where inconsistency was herein defined as a disharmony between stated principles and the actual pattern and style of foreign policy behaviour. We provided various examples of these inconsistencies.

We showed that while Kenya was signatory to the OAU’s resolution CIAS/Plen. 2/Res 2 of May, 1963 and CM/Res. 13(11) of June 1964, (These resolutions called upon OAU members to effect a boycott of South Africa and to prevent any air and sea communication linkages between their states and South Africa), she consistently continued to allow planes destined for South Africa to traverse her territory. This was inconsistent with her publicly declared stand on South Africa, that is, isolation of the latter until apartheid was brought to an end.

This inconsistency was rooted in Kenya’s pursuit of economic interests with South Africa. These interests included, pursuit of economic relations in communication, energy, tourism, foodstuffs and beverages, construction, mineral and motor vehicle
sectors. At the geo-economical level, we noted that Kenya facilitated international capital interaction between Multinational corporations in Kenya, South Africa and the west, for her own benefit, and that of the international capital. Kenya equally relied on South Africa, in pursuit of her economic interests, in the Southern African region. This reliance was salient in her attempts at countering the nascent socialist circuit that was increasingly becoming a threat to her economic interests.

Kenya's trade with African countries is basically confined to Eastern and Southern African economies. Close to 70% of her trade is with East African countries with Uganda taking up to 50% of her total trade with Africa.4

Much of this trade comprises of exports to these countries. In fact, out of every 8 USD that Kenya exports to these countries, she imports only US $1. Surprisingly, Kenya's imports from South Africa between 1978 and 1990, although conducted at a covert level far surpassed those from her main trading partners, Tanzania and Uganda. These imports standing at US $5.77 m were more than those of Uganda and Tanzania combined at US $ 5.4 million. Looking at a specific year, 1983, imports from South Africa at US$ 4.3m were one and a half times those from Tanzania and Uganda combined at US$ 2.8m.

Turning to Southern African economies where Kenya's trade was in this period, not very buoyant, the evidence we marshalled reveals that South Africa dominated Kenya's trade with the region. For instance, between 1979 and 1990, Kenya exported more goods to South Africa, US $ 1.85 m than to Zimbabwe US$ 0.9 million,
Malawi US$1.2 million, Swaziland US$0.6m and Botswana US$ 0.1 m. Exports to South Africa at US$ 1.85 were more than exports to Zimbabwe, Swaziland, and Botswana combined at US$ 1.61 m.

Kenya has a net exporter to almost all her African trade partners. But this was with the exception of South Africa in this period. Her balances of trade with South Africa between 1984 and 1990, at US$-4.8 m for instance, was the most unfavourable to Kenya with the exception of Rwanda at US$-14.75 m. The unfavourable balance of trade with Rwanda is pecked on the fact that Kenya tended to import a lot of tea consignments from Rwanda for re-export. On the other hand, her imports mainly consisted of manufactured and semi-manufactured components. Hence, making South Africa an important trading partner. Between 1979 and 1990, Kenya imported more goods from South Africa (US $ 52 m) than she did from any other African state except Mozambique and Rwanda (US $ 70m and US $ 60 m respectively). Imports from all Southern African states between 1984 and 1990 amounted to US $ 10 m. This means that out of every 5 goods imported from Southern Africa, two were from South Africa. By contrast, her exports to South Africa accounted for 13.9% of her total exports to the South African region. South Africa had a better balance of payments at US$ 4.26 million, than she had with Zimbabwe at US$4.27 million and Malawi at US$ 3.16 million respectively.

It was our contention that these interactions were mainly elite defined, designed, dominated and sewn. Elites design and determine what interests should be pursued in a states foreign policy.
In Kenya's case, we argued that, these economic sanctions were deemed important to the National interest to warrant their pursuit at a covert level. Specifically, they constituted the core and middle range objectives of the Kenyan state. And as K.J Holsti⁵ observes, they underlie the proximate goals of any state in the International system. Whereas the core objectives, encompass the security of the state, territorial integrity, and economic welfare, middle range objectives include, acquisition of power and wealth. Power and wealth on the other hand are crucial to the state’s survival and pursuit of a wide range of goals within anarchic and competitive international system. Power, as Robert Lieber⁶ has argued is a currency of the political system with which it purchases security and other valued "political goods".

It is the pursuit of these interests, in total contradiction to the explicitly stated policy of isolation of and sanctions against South Africa that generated inconsistency in Kenya's foreign policy.

We observed that the ruling elites in Kenya having realised that overt pursuit of economic relations with South Africa would be vehemently opposed, opted to pursue economic relations covertly. We defined covert relations to entail dyadic relations that are conducted with disguise and concealment owing to the dichotomy between openly stated declarations and actual felt national interests as defined by the ruling elites. We contented that the reason for opting for this, lay in the fact that, while elite economic interest was seen to be paramount, the overall national principles and values (which were opposed to those of South Africa) could not be ignored if the national consensus had to be maintained. In essence, a middle ground option that could allow for marriage and
pursuit of those two was found acceptable, that is, pursuit of economic interests covertly while maintaining a constant critical public disapproval of South African state and its political system.

We further argued that the need of this inconsistent foreign policy conduct generated by pursuit of economic interests ended in 1990 after which economic relations assumed an overt plane.

5.1. (b) **Political Interests as Sources of Inconsistency**

Our second hypothesis was that the furtherance of Kenya’s political interests led to inconsistency in the Kenya’s foreign policy towards South Africa. In specific terms, this hypothesis suggested that Kenya pursued political interactions with South Africa, incongruent to her publicly stated policy of isolating South Africa, as long as she continued to practice apartheid policies.

The evidence we were able to marshall reveals that while Kenya consistently called for South Africa’s diplomatic isolation, in the international fora, she continued to pursue dyadic interactions with South Africa at a covert level. Kenya’s behaviour at the UN and OAU was such that she voted for and implemented only those resolutions that did not impinch on her core interests. For instance, in a bid to uphold OAU’s resolutions CM/Res 856 (XXXVII) which banned sporting links with South Africa, Kenya suspended the secretary of Kenya National Sports Council Mr. Robert Ouko and
We contented that Kenya implemented such resolutions because they did not threaten her core interests. Whenever her core interests, in South Africa were at stake, she did not hesitate to oppose the resolutions, or refuse to implement them. For instance, Kenya supported UN resolutions calling for an oil embargo against South Africa, yet her oil company Kobil supplied 40,000 tons of oil to South Africa.

We observed that Kenya supplied this oil because she viewed this act to be in her national interest and as a process of enhancing her commitment to her geo-strategic partner at an hour of need.

OAU’s resolution AHC/Res 124 (XX) called for the imposition of an arms embargo on South Africa and opposed any military or political collaboration with South Africa. By collaborating with South Africa, in arming and training Renamo, Kenya was not only contravening the OAU resolutions but also contradicting her own publicly stated policy of isolating South Africa.

Our second objective thus sought to establish empirically the relationship between the pursuit of political interests and foreign policy inconsistency towards South Africa. We evidenced that between 1978 and 1990, Kenya covertly pursued political and strategic interactions with South Africa. These were geared towards furthering Kenya’s geo-strategic interests in the East and Southern Africa. These interests were, ensurance
of regional stability, expansion of her trade after the collapse of East African Community. Collaborating with South Africa in containment of the raising tide of radical regimes in the region that were deemed a threat to Kenya's interests.

We evidenced that, Kenya collaborated with South Africa, in arming Renamo and attempting to overthrow the Seychelles government, the purpose of the strategic co-operation was to stem the rising tide of socialist oriented states in Southern Africa and the Indian ocean.

We also evidenced that despite her calls for diplomatic isolation of South Africa, her political and bureaucratic officials continued to interact with their South African counterparts. For instance, not only did South African officers serving with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, visit Kenya, but were also able to interact with senior officers of the Kenya government like the Attorney General, Mr. Charles Njonjo. Senior South African security officers were also allowed into and access to key strategic security installations. These included officers like Lt Cl Van Zilj and Commander John Lockley of the South African police.

We also revealed that key political leaders like Njonjo also paid visits to South Africa contrary to the publicly stated position calling for South Africa's isolation. We also evidenced that whereas Kenya consistently paid her contributions to the OAU's liberation committee, she refused to grant liberation groups like the ANC military and training bases. This, we observed was because Kenya deemed socialist oriented groups like the ANC a threat to her immediate and long term interests. Specifically, it was in
her interest not to antagonise the white regime with whom she had strategic and economic links, by housing the ANC. Essentially, we noted Kenya favoured a peaceful resolution as opposed to an armed struggle.

It is the pursuit of these interests that generated inconsistency in Kenya's foreign policy towards South Africa. It was our contention that pursuit of strategic and political co-operation with South Africa was deemed to be of vital advantage to Kenya's national interest by her decision makers.

This behavior was in line with the realist dispositions. As Morgenthau argues, useful alliances supported by foundations of reciprocal advantages, and mutual security of participating nation states, rather than on ideological and moralistic frameworks.¹¹

Kenya saw her interactions with South Africa as being advantageous to her and more paramount in weight than ideologically driven continental alliances against the latter, that in the long run would have strengthened the socialist circuit which she felt endangered her interests.

As Morgenthau observes further, the minimum requirement of a nation state is to protect their physical, political and cultural identity against encroachments by other nations states and groups. In essence, preservation of physical identity is equated to the maintenance of territorial integrity of a state, while the preservation of political identity is equated to preservation of existing politico-economic regimes, such as democratic,
socialist, or monolithic one party systems. Preservation of cultural identity is equated with ethnic, religious, historical and linguistic norms of a state.

Pursuit of these interests had to be executed at the covert level due to the fact that, while ruling elites favoured them, the rest of the body politic did not. Pursuit of interactions at a covert level while maintaining an explicitly hostile stance against South Africa was deemed the best alternative to reconcile elite interests to those of the body politic without risking domestic disunity and external isolation from the rest of Africa.

5.1. (c) **Transition from Covert to Overt Interactions**

Our third hypothesis stated that the transition from covert to overt interactions between Kenya and South Africa was a function of the collapse of apartheid system, external pressure on Kenya and internal political and economic crises in Kenya. This hypothesis suggested that apartheid system and the cold war environment (which had in place an arrangement that saw aid being awarded on the basis of geo-ideological perceptions) were at the core of covert relations between Kenya and South Africa. Apartheid was anti-thetically positioned against Kenya’s publicly stated principles. Thus, as long as it remained the official policy of South Africa, overt interactions could not be pursued.\(^2\)

On the other hand, the super-power rivalry necessitated and saw the construction of a tripartite strategic alliance encompassing the US, Kenya and South Africa. The alliance, we argued, effectively drew Kenya into the US global strategy
aimed at defending vital western interests. We enumerated these interests as encompassing defence of Indian Ocean sealines and strategic mineral resources, in this region from falling under regimes friendly to the USSR and defence of strategic oil resources in the Middle East and the pro-western conservative Arab regimes.

By signing a defence pact with the USA,13 she aimed at defending these interests. We evidenced that Kenya having been drawn into this strategic alliance, was accessed political, military and economic support. For instance, at the military level, the US on her part provided F5 fighter planes cavalry helicopter gunships, and additional funds for training military officers. She also helped to rebuild the disbanded Kenya Air Force. Prior to this, the US had provided up to US$ 57 million to improve and upgrade air and port facilities in Kenya.

At the economic level, we evidenced that the west provided huge inflows of concessionary aid in form of grants and loans to alleviate balance of payment problems. Western grants and loans accounted for 109% of capital expenditure in 1990/91 financial year, compared to 17% in 1986/87 financial year. The budget deficit in 1990/91 was financed by 67% from external sources.

Kenya in this process enhanced the already existing strategic relations with South Africa. Kenya’s strategic position on the Indian Ocean had over the years provided a linkpin to a circuit of concerns. At one level, she facilitated links between international capital and South Africa and vice versa, while at another level, she used
these new strategic alliance as a conduit to negotiate for and consolidate her links with South African capital. This happened at a covert level.

The net effect of this support, we argued was not only to reinforce the existing Kenya South Africa interactions but also to perpetuate inconsistency in her foreign policy towards South Africa. Equally, it enabled president Moi’s nascent regime to consolidate its hold onto power. We noted that since the alliance had mutually reinforcing benefits, Kenya did not see the need to abandon her covert links with South Africa.

With respect to our third hypothesis, therefore, we sought to establish empirically the relationship between the collapse of apartheid, donor conditionalities and internal political and economic crises and the transition from covert to overt interactions between Kenya and South Africa. Specifically then, we observed that the collapse of the cold war necessitated the end of the "ancient" arrangement that saw states like Kenya receive aid solely on the basis of their geo-ideological orientation. This was replaced by economic and political conditionalities in favour of internal political and economic liberalisation. We evidenced that these donor conditionalizations, had the net effect of not only compounding the deteriorating economic situation but also emboldening and strengthening nascent opposition forces in Kenya. This in the process put more pressure on the increasing fragile political and economic system. For instance, the GNP declined from 4.3% in 1990 to 2.2% in 1991 and 0.1% in 1992. Gross fixed capital formation edged upwards from 35% in 1990 to negative 2.9% in 1991. In 1992, inflation was 27.5% up from 19.6% in 1991, up from 19.6% in 1991, leading to erosion of real wages by 12%. Agriculture on the other hand declined by 4.2%. The
manufacturing sector could only manage a meagre growth of 1.2% in 1991. While the Kenya shilling continued to depreciate against major currencies, money supply rose by an unprecedented 35% in 1992. Budget deficit on the other hand was 24 billion shillings or 6.5% of the Gross National Produce in 1992.

Consequently, the decision makers in Kenya had to seek other alternative alliances that could guarantee mutual benefits to her. South Africa having abandoned apartheid was seen as a better alternative. This was because of several reasons. She possessed a powerful economy with a GDP per capita income of US$2,800 compared to Kenya’s US$380. Thus if courted, provide key inputs to Kenya’s import substitution industries.

South Africa had been in a strategic and economic alliance with Kenya and the west, and important linkages had already been established. But what was now attractive to Kenya was the fact that apartheid had collapsed allowing her to pursue relations at an overt plane with little justification. Kenya’s decision makers, we observed, hoped to maximise on advantages from commercial interactions, sphere building and coalition formation. Specifically, Kenya hoped to secure industrial inputs, sphere building aimed at consolidating her relations with South Africa while placing her at a strategically advantageous position over other African states. Coalition formation at the level capital involved the process of attempting to link local Indian and elite capital with Anglo-Boer capital. While these had previously operated under an exclusive space, this time round it aimed at operating in an open space. It was expected this would fill the gap left by western capital due to withdrawal of aid.
Kenya's behaviour can be explained from a realist perspective. According to the realists, the ultimate goal of the state is assumed to be self preservation, while the survival of the state in international arena requires, the defence of its sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation state. Domestically, it demands that the state meets and overcomes challenges from and maintain support of societal groups and coalitions. This is true of both the state and the incumbents who occupy the decision making positions in the state corporations.\textsuperscript{15}

To realise this objective, statesmen seek to acquire control over resources in order to co-opt or coerce challengers and reward supporters. The greater the challenge to power and authority, the greater the need for more resources. Thus, faced with challenges at home, we argued that decision makers pursued two proximal goals: Internal and external extraction. When the former failed to meet the emergent economic challenges, Kenya opted to re-orient her foreign policy towards South Africa. Foreign Policy, as Charles Herman\textsuperscript{16} argues, is a problem oriented program by authoritative policy makers directed towards entities outside their political jurisdiction. This is designed to address some problem or pursue some goal that entails action towards foreign entities. Specifically, states use foreign policy as a process through which they adjust their actions to those of other states minimising on adverse actions while maximising on favourable ones.\textsuperscript{17} This is what Kenya did.

Following Kenya's decision to shift her interactions with South Africa from a covert to an overt plane, the relations between the two states changed drastically. We evidenced that there was increased level of open political, diplomatic and economic
interactions. Kenya increasingly took over the role of South Africa's advocate at the OAU and the commonwealth conferences. She increasingly began to plead for the latters' readmission into these organisations and an end to the international boycott of South Africa. There was also an increase in the volume of trade and the number of South Africans visiting Kenya. For instance, while the total trade in 1990 amounted to 2 million Rand, (Kshs.20 million), in 1991 it rose to 60 million Rand (Kshs. 600 million). In 1992 it stood at 180 million Rand, (Kshs.1.8 billion). By March 1993, it had shot up to 1800 million Rand (Kshs. 18billion).

We contended that apart from the fact that internal and external challenges could have accounted for these high level of trade between Kenya and South Africa, what also accounted for this was the fact that Kenya already had relations with South Africa in the apartheid years. Business potential had therefore been identified, market knowledge was available while business partners already existed. Thus, what was needed here was for the hitherto imprisoned forces to be liberated. Once they were, South Africa assumed a commanding position as Kenya's key trading partner. This entire process saw Kenya's foreign policy towards South Africa assume consistency. By this we mean, policy declarations were in harmony with actual implementation and practice.

5.2.1 Alternative Policy Recommendations

We shall attempt to proffer policy recommendations for foreign policy makers taking into consideration our findings. We note that no one policy recommendation can be considered absolutely viable given the fluidity of the national interests of the states.
Our recommendations will not focus on inconsistency. This is due to the fact that this has already been resolved. Instead, they will focus on the modalities of Kenya’s relations with the emergent new South African government.

5.2.2. Alternative One (Joint Ventures)

South Africa could transform Kenya into her economic satellite, if proper mechanisms are not put in place to guard against this prospect. This would not be in the national interest of Kenya. With trade running at 1000% within 10 months of explicit relations, the chances for this increased tilt towards South Africa, remains high. South Africa’s goods apart from their being cheap, are also of high quality, thus making them highly preferable to the local market. For instance, an electric kettle retailing at shs. 2300 in Kenya can cost shs. 400 while a gas cooker retailing for Kshs. 15,000 in Kenya costs shs. 3000 if imported from South Africa. This runs the risk of killing local industries and rendering many Kenyans unemployed. This fear has been acknowledged by local industrialists of the local industries most threatened, those manufacturing wines and spirits and beer. Whereas their local brands are expensive, they cannot match the South African brands in quality. South Africa’s castle beer which has been going for less than Kshs. 25 threatens Kenya Breweries Tusker which retails at 30 kshs. It will not be surprising for local manufacturers like Kenya Breweries to call for government protection through taxes on the South African products. South Africans have tried to counter these fears by arguing that they do not intend to compete local industries but USA, European and Japanese manufacturers.19
However, these dyadic relations can be of benefit to the two states if the
governments of the two states can encourage joint ventures by putting into place proper
mechanisms. For instance, co-operation in transport sphere between Kenya and South
African airways can enable Kenya to benefit in the tourist sector. South African Airways
can offer space for Kenya’s horticultural products headed for Europe.20

Co-operation in the tourist sector can enable the two states to utilise weather
variations in the two states to their mutual advantage. For instance, whereas winter in
Southern hemisphere falls between April and September, the traditional low tourist
season in Kenya, a lot of tourists from South Africa can be expected to come to Kenya
then. Tour operators organising joint packages can encourage flow of tourists in both
states, in the process maximally utilizing tourist facilities in both states.21

Kenya could also make do with South Africa’s technology in bee-keeping and
irrigation. It is instructive to note that, whereas agriculture accounts for 28% of the
GDP and 60% of foreign exchange employing of 70% of all Kenyans, only 18% of
Kenya’s land is arable. The rest of the land would need irrigation to be made arable.
Kenya could thus make do with South Africa’s technology in this sector, joint ventures
for manufacture of fertilizer, pharmaceutical products would benefit Kenya a great
deal.22

Joint venture options would enable Kenya to receive investment capital. This
would in turn save the country of foreign exchange expended on importation of fertilizer
and other industrial inputs which costs Kshs. 100 billion each year.23 Equally, Kenya
would benefit from technology transfer in the emergent rural development, which would help to stem rural-urban migration. Joint venture would also help create job opportunities. Agro processing (oil seed pressing, brewing, juices etc) on the other hand would provide and enable Kenya to export and earn foreign exchange through its exportation.

It is essential to note that joint venture operations would limit friction between the two states while enhancing co-operation.

The demerits of the above recommendation lies in the fact that dependence on too much of South Africa’s capital and technology would transform Kenya into a satellite of South Africa, in the process making her vulnerable to South Africa’s blackmail. South Africa would also constrain Kenya’s ability to pursue a independent foreign policy.

5.2.3 **Alternative Two: Co-operation with ANC**

Kenya’s pursuit of covert economic and political relations did not endear her to the ANC and other nationalist organisations in South Africa. Her decision to conduct such relations overtly was viewed as yet another process of undermining sanctions against the white minority regime. This, while pleasing the white establishment in South Africa, generated bitter feelings among freedom movements.

Whereas swift movement into signing co-operation agreements with South Africa has advantaged Kenya over other frontline states, the same cannot be said in the
event that ANC wins elections and forms the majority. There is need to put into consideration the sensitivity of majority black people of South Africa, whose views are represented by the ANC. ANC showed her displeasure over Kenya’s thawing relations with South Africa at the time when she was still calling for maintenance of sanctions, by boycotting president Moi. ANC not only cancelled a meeting between him and Mandela but also condemned Kenya’s economic relations with the South African white government. There is thus need to pursue a policy that puts into consideration ANC’s views.

Pursuit of a policy that is sensitive to ANC’s views has several merits. It would enable Kenya to maintain good relations with the new South African government which may be ANC dominated and prevent Kenya’s isolation on ideological grounds.

The demerits of these are that Kenya could lose out to other African states, especially frontline states which are already eager to establish and fortify links with South Africa. Kenya’s needs were immediate investments, foreign exchange and cheap economic inputs that could stem economic collapse. South Africa, under a white dominated government can offer such inputs cheaply and easily. Courting South Africa right now may just as well enable the government to initiate an economic turn about. This is much cheaper to execute due to the already existing capital links between the two states. This becomes timely when pecked on that fact that economic growth fell from 4.3% to 2.2% in 1991. While gross fixed capital formation edged downwards from 3.5% in 1990 to negative 2.9% in 1991.
5.2.4 **Alternative Three: Establishment of South African Manufacturing Units in Kenya**

On his state visit to Kenya in June, 1991, President F. W. De Klerk called for the compartmentalization of Africa into four regions of the North, South, East and West. These regions were to be correspondingly headed by Egypt, South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria respectively. According to president De Klerk these regions would serve as axes on which the four zones would reinstate economic development to effectively compete Europe, Americas and Japan while co-operating among themselves.25

President Moi while in South Africa pleaded with the businessmen to take advantage of Kenya’s infra-structure to invest in Kenya. He assured them that such a step would access them to a ready market in the East and Central Africa through Kenya.26 It is instructive to note that Kenya’s economic dominance in the PTA stems from the dominant role MNCs play in her economy. Thus, if South African corporations were to establish units in Kenya, they would accordingly benefit from preferential treatment accorded to MNCs based in Kenya. The net effect of this would be the fortification of their domination of East and Southern African regions by Kenya and South Africa. This would confirm Kenya and South Africa as sub-imperial states. Both states would end up playing the role of peripherising their respective regions on their own behalf and that of the metropolitan Europe and the US, whose MNC’s dominate the economies of the two states.27
The merits of this kind of policy is that it would ensure and guarantee Kenya’s industrial domination in the preferential trade area. Access to more capital and technology from South Africa and the market in the PTA would lead to factors such as expanded industrial output. These would create more employment opportunities. It would also mean increased foreign exchanges accruing from exports.

However, this policy of sub-imperialism has several demerits. Its ability to work would be subject to the installation of a white dominated administration in South Africa. This is unlikely to happen as long as ANC remains cohesive. In the event of the first government being ANC dominated, ANC would not support such a policy. In its foreign policy promulgations, ANC categorically rejected South Africa’s pretension of a western power. Accordingly, South Africa would take its place in the underdeveloped South, where it would use its ties to the west to act as interlocutor on development with the industrialised North. This position is totally at variance with the white national party policy which equally sustained and nourished close but implicit relations with Kenya.

ANC, while breaking from the practice of the national party stated in its foreign policy blue print that:

frontline states (Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique, Angola and Botswana) sustained the struggle against apartheid. An ANC administration would repay the debt with close co-operation and economic integration with South Africa’s neighbours. The new South Africa would renounce hegemonic ambitions and reject pressure to become a real super power despite its strong business and industrial base.
In essence the importance of ANC's position is opposed to the views expressed by both presidents Moi and De Klerk. ANC is likely thus to favour South African Development Co-ordinating Committee (SADCC) than it would PTA.

Kenya's decision makers must thus put into consideration the fact that her past policies which were seen to favour the international capital may lose to ideological affinities of ANC and the frontline states which make up SADCC. It must thus move away from promoting and pursuing policies that favour international capital in favour of Pan African policies. Clearly put, pursuit of sub-imperial policies is bound to put Kenya on a collusion course with her partners in the PTA who may likely switch their loyalties more towards SADCC. These would disadvantage Kenya a great deal.

However, a shift towards SADCC by ANC should not be very worrying because whereas it may influence state to state economic relations, it may affect trade between business entrepreneurs within these states. The fact that MNCs in the two states dominate capital means that they can still invest in Kenya while expanding trade between the two states regardless of what ANC feels.

5.2.5 **Alternative Four: Provision of Demand and Supply of Information**

The Kenya-South African relations we noted have been conducted in an inconsistent and ambiguous manner. In many a time, these relations have been conducted in utmost secrecy. There is need to create a "glassnost" environment if these
relations have to mature. The fact that Kenya's infrastructure is more advanced compared to that of her neighbours, Uganda, Tanzania and other PTA partners, may make businessmen in Kenya assume that investors in South Africa would automatically invest in Kenya. This confidence is enhanced by the head start Kenya had in her relations with South Africa. However, it is worth noting that without proper information about Kenya, potential South African investors who may opt to try investing elsewhere, for instance, in the tourism sector South Africans may opt for Tanzania which equally has well developed infra-structure in its back. Kenya's representative in Namibia Mr M S Kuria alluded to this when he stated in his letter to Mr Mwaisaka, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife that;

Kenya contrary to popular beliefs is not well known to most South Africans and therefore there is need for concerted efforts to promote tourism aggressively there by visiting various cities in the country. This country is vast and hence the need to promote tourism in each individual city so as to tap this potential market.

Mr Potgeiter, head of the South Africa's department of trade and industry explained the scarcity of information as a hindrance in trade between the two states. "We know very little about Kenya. What South Africa can provide, what your needs are and what the bottle necks are."29

Notably, there is need to provide adequate and meaningful information on Kenya, on its needs, on its potential as a market for a varied cross section of interests and values, to potential trading partners in South Africa. These should be supplemented, by aggressive marketing techniques that can stimulate demand for interests and values that Kenya can provide to South Africans.
It is imperative that any trading links entered into, should be with companies which respect the human rights of all South Africans.


6. Jacob Viner, "Power Versus Plenty as objective Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuary", World Politics 1984, pp 1-29


8. Daily Nation. (Nairobi) 26th March, 1986


10. Africa Analysis. No. 87 8th December, 1989, p8


12. See KANU Constitution. 1960 pp 1-2, See also KANU Manifesto, 1961


15. Charles Herman, "When Governments choose to redirect Foreign Policy", International Studies Quarterly. 1990, 34:3 - 21:6

16. Charles Herman, Op Cit


18. Weekly Review. 28th June 1991

20. Africa Analysis. 12th December, 1986
24. Society Weekly Issue No. 18, 29th June, 1992 pp 40 - 44
26. Daily Nation. (Nairobi), 16th June, 1992
28. Kenya Times (Nairobi), 15th October, 1993
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