"ARAB-ISRAEL RIVALRY FOR SUPPORT IN BLACK AFRICA: THE CASE OF EAST AFRICA, 1961 - 1971"

By

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DECLARATION

This Thesis is my original work and has not been presented for examination to any other university.

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This Thesis has been submitted to the University of Nairobi with my approval.

Dr. Nicholas Nyangira
(Supervisor)
This work was undertaken when I was a full time Charged Fare of the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Nairobi. I had to work mostly on weekends, during holidays and evenings. It is however, not possible to acknowledge all the people who gave me intellectual and moral assistance.

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ABSTRACT

One of the areas that continue to have high political tension threatening to explode into violence is the Middle East. This is an area occupied predominantly by the Arab people but also by Jews concentrated in the state of Israel. The Arabs occupy the states of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt to name only a few.

This thesis examines the Arab-Israeli conflict insofar as it relates for rivalry for support in East Africa. It attempts to analyze methods used to achieve diplomatic support from each of the three East African countries namely, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.

The study examines the constant threat of war which dominates Israeli policy makers and the fear of being isolated internationally. Given this fear of isolation the Israelis are constantly working hard to win friends internationally, at the United Nations (U.N.), within the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and for the purpose of this study the three East African States of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. Israel has gone out to develop economic interest in Africa. It sees Africa as a potential market for manufactures' goods, as an area where corporate investments can be made.
Since it has a surplus of skilled labour, it can provide some of it to Black African Countries in need. The study looks at how Israel has used these programs to secure recognition and diplomatic support for its rivalry with the Arabs.

The Arabs on their part have also gone to win support in international and regional forums for their cause against the Israeli State. Arab League has from time to time worked to diminish Israeli presence in Black Africa. The Arabs have staunch supporters of the Liberation struggles in Black Africa. Cairo has been a centre of assistance to Liberation movements. Radio Cairo has been lending moral and ideological support to Liberation movements in Black Africa. In the 1960's it was broadcasting in seven different African languages. Egypt has over the years sent teachers to several African countries as part of Arab contribution to development of these countries.

The study goes on to examine how the three East African countries of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania responded to the Arab-Israeli rivalry by analyzing official government statements on the Middle East situation particularly their reaction to individual events, exchange of State visits, voting pattern on Arab-Israeli conflict at the United Nations.
Finally, the study concludes that both the Arab and the Israelis have fared differently in their rivalry for support in East Africa. During the period under study Israel secured diplomatic recognition from all Black African states, East African states included. At the United Nations, Uganda was more Pro-Israel during early years of Idi Amin rule, while Tanzania was Pro-Arab, and Kenya was more or less neutral. On the other hand Israel failed to force the Arab states to recognize her i.e. during the period under study.
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### ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>Av</td>
<td>Average</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dar</td>
<td>Dar-es-Salaam</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Minister of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAR</td>
<td>United Arab Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UDI</td>
<td>Unilateral Declaration of Independence</td>
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INTRODUCTION

Ever since the flare-up of open hostilities in the Arab-Israel conflict in 1967, the dispute spread far beyond the confines of South-west Asia and North Africa. Arab nationalism accounted for the expansion of direct participation in the conflict across North of Africa prior to 1967. But several other factors have accounted for its dissipation throughout the world, and particularly into Africa South of the Sahara where the conflict has taken the form of an intense Arab and Israeli rivalry over support from that newly independent bloc of nations, since that time.

Increased media coverage of the conflict, especially of the 1967 war, the Israeli retaliatory strikes, the Arab war of attrition and the ensuing mediation attempts of United Nations Special Envoy Gunnar Jarring, the Roger's Plan, and other "big four" proposals, has made people throughout the world very conscious of it. It is no longer an isolated topic from an isolated region about which only erudite scholars concern themselves.

The involvement of the major powers of the USSR and U.S. in support of the Arabs and Israelis, respectively, has further brought attention to and created an
explosive situation of potentially far greater proportions than previously existed in the Middle East. Hence, what might have remained a regional problem has taken on both global proportions and global concern.

Furthermore, frequent introduction and discussion of resolution on the issue in world bodies such as the United Nations and the Non-aligned Nations Summit Conferences and in regional associations such as the Organization of African Unity and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conferences have not only brought about a greater consciousness on the subject, but also forced individual nation-states to formulate policies and make decision on the issues involved.

A direct diplomatic offensive by both the Arabs and Israelis further accounts for the expansion of the conflict, particularly in the continent of Africa. Although it is rare for an African head of state to comment directly on the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is no secret that frequent diplomatic visits from the Middle-Eastern protagonists involve more than discussion of their common desire to see an end to racism and colonialism in southern Africa.

Finally, the spread of the conflict has been facilitated by the fact that the continuance of hostilities has had adverse effects on some other regions
of the world. This is especially true in East Africa, where prices on goods from previously heavy traffic of trade through the Suez Canal have risen as a result of the longer journey required for European goods around the Cape of Good Hope.

A number of studies have dealt with this topic of the expansion of the Arab-Israeli conflict into a rivalry for support from Africa south of the Sahara. But none of these have gone into greater detail than a description of the African foreign policy based on an examination of African voting on selected United Nations General Assembly resolutions or official government statements on individual incidents in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The problem with which this thesis will deal will be first to suggest the Arab and Israeli objectives and the methods utilized to achieve those objectives, and second to determine the foreign policies of the three nations in the region of East Africa, Kenya, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania in response to those objectives on the basis of more than a surface look at their voting on several United Nations General Assembly resolutions or isolated statements. Hopefully, such a detailed description will enable a differentiation between the rhetoric and the reality of their foreign
policies, as well as some explanation for why they differ. But most important, the descriptions of Arab Israeli objectives and the East African response to those objectives will enable an estimation of the relative "success" of the Arabs and Israelis in this particular region. For the purpose of this study "success" will be defined as having been attained in those instances in which the Arabs and Israelis have been able to achieve their objectives.

East Africa was chosen as the region for study for three reasons. First of all there is a great deal of similarity (until the recent Ugandan coup of January, 1971) in the political systems in the three countries. Each was a one-party state, whose leader had been a head of state since independence and who presently headed the single party. Although they pursued somewhat different economic policies, the three were related by the East African Community which presented them with some economic problems and means to deal with them. But more importantly, the three have similar past. They have a common colonial background and hence inherited parallel institutions to handle their foreign policy determination and procedures. Since their Ministers of Foreign Affairs and decision-making processes in general are similar, any comparative study of their
foreign policies is made easier.

Secondly, the region is of interest because as just mentioned East Africa has been directly affected by the continuance of hostilities in the Middle East. Each of the three nation-states has the United Kingdom as its major trading partner, with EEC and other European countries close behind. The closure of the Suez Canal increased prices on imports from these countries by necessitating shipment around the Cape rather than through the more direct route via the Mediterranean. The economic impact of the closure of the Suez Canal was noticed in each of these three East African nations. Hence, the nations of the region have an added interest in the situation in the Middle-East, beyond that imposed on them through the media, recurrent resolutions in world and regional bodies, and by the diplomatic offensives by the Middle-Eastern protagonists. Their own economic wellbeing was at stake.

A third and final reason East Africa was chosen as a region for study is because it is a major recipient of Israeli foreign aid. For example, out of the approximately 6000 Africans who have received training in Israel since 1962, nearly half have come from the three East African nations of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. This added factor of significant aid indicates a distinct
Israeli interest in the region and is indicative of the efforts each of the Middle-Eastern protagonists is making in Africa south of the Sahara. By examining such a region not only is more data on the situation available, but evidence is also derived from a region which is more likely to have a reciprocal interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Before proceeding any further, some definition of the ambiguous and often elusive term, "foreign policy" should be attempted. For the purpose of this thesis, the foreign policy of a state will be defined in general terms as being composed of both its objectives and its methods employed to accomplish those objectives. An elaboration of this definition would describe the foreign policy toward a given situation as being composed of (I) a nation-state's objectives and interests in the given area (determined from among alternatives in the light of given conditions to guide and determine present and future decisions) and (2) the methods and means utilized to realize and defend such ends (determined by a specific decision or set of decisions together with the related actions designed to implement them).

Since the foreign relations between nation-states are influenced by the interacting policies pursued by each, and since this study is concerned with an assessment of the relative "success" of the Middle-Eastern Protagonists, a description of Arab and Israeli policies toward Africa, and particularly E.Africa, will first be presented.
CHAPTER I

ISRAELI AND ARAB FOREIGN POLICIES TOWARD AFRICA

There is little doubt that the continent of Africa has been of great importance to each of the opposing sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict. From the writings of the major authors behind the diametrically opposed movements of Zionism and Arab nationalism through to the deliberate policies of the Israelis and the Arabs at the present time, this distinct interest in Black Africa, at times pursued with missionary zeal, is clearly present.

Such an interest was clearly presented in Altneuland written in 1898 by Theodor Herzl, the man under whose authorship Zionism "... was given its maturest shape, and was brought to world awareness." Herzl wrote:

I am not ashamed to say, though I may expose myself to ridicule in saying so, that once I have witnessed the redemption of Israel, my people I wish to assist in the redemption of the Africans.

It is also clear that Gamal Abdul Nasser, the driving force behind contemporary Arab nationalism views a similar, interest and a neo-missionary role in the continent of Africa. He wrote:

I would say, without exaggeration, that we cannot, in any way, stand aside, even if we wish to, away from the sanguinary and dreadful struggle now raging in the heart of Africa between five million whites and two hundred million Africans. We cannot do so for one principal and clear reason, namely that we are in Africa. The people of Africa will continue to look up to us, who guard the northern gate of the continent and who are its connecting
link with the world outside. We cannot, under any condition, relinquish our responsibility in helping, in every way possible, in diffusing the light of civilization into the farthest parts of the virgin Jungle.  

Based on these ideological pretexts by major authors behind the Zionist and Arab nationalist movements, both the Arabs and Israelis have evolved foreign policies with their respective objectives and methods that express a similar interest in Africa and move to accomplish those declarations and other objectives in real terms.

The Israeli Policy

Leonard J. Fein has suggested that "everything that happens in Israel happens against the backdrop of the threat of war with the Arabs," and its foreign policy formulation toward Africa is no exception. With the emergence of "positive neutralism" as an important force in the international arena for example, Israel has faced "the prospects of isolation from this group due to Arab identification with this movement." Thus one of Israeli's objectives is to build and strengthen itself in Africa south of the Sahara in an attempt to overcome this diplomatic isolation.

Once normal diplomatic relations have been attained with African states the Israelis will have defeated Arab attempts to isolate them diplomatically. And as the Israelis hope they will further another objective; that the Arab states might realize the futility of their war of attrition and be influenced toward a negotiated settlement based on similar, official diplomatic recognition of Israel.
Perhaps the most obvious of Israeli foreign policy objectives in Africa south of Sahara is to secure support for its position in world bodies, especially the United Nations. This is particularly significant considering the decisive influence the African nations hold in that international body and the fact that the creation of the State of Israel was an act of it. Support in the United Nations was also important because the presence of the UN Truce Supervision Organization and the UN Emergency Force stationed in the Egyptian-held Gaza Strip between 1956 and 1967 directly affected Israel's national security.

A fourth objective of Israeli policy in Africa has been to encourage African nations to involve themselves as potentially important catalysts for the negotiation of a settlement in the Arab-Israeli conflict. As Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, suggested in May of 1971, the O.A.U. should:

... encourage Middle East negotiations ... on one hand, the efforts aimed at the re-opening of the Suez Canal, and on the other hand, dialogue by the Jarring mission.

The remaining Israeli foreign policy objectives in Black Africa are not directly related to the Arab-Israeli conflict, but are economically oriented.

Israel's economic interest in Africa south of the Sahara is threefold. Africa serves as a potential market for absorbing surplus Israeli goods, particularly farm commodities and manufactured products. Accordingly, Israeli exports to Africa have increased from $2 million in 1956 to $24.4 million in 1967. The expectations for 1970
were that Israel's exports to black Africa would be in excess of $40 million.\textsuperscript{14} This is approximately 6% of Israel's annual exports.

Secondly, Israel has surplus of skilled laborers in certain fields which it can profitably and conveniently export to developing countries in Africa. This is particularly true in the field of irrigation and water resources development\textsuperscript{15} and has led some observers to suggest that Israel's extensive program of foreign assistance "may be motivated, at least in part, by the desire to dispose of surplus manpower."\textsuperscript{16}

A third economic objective is to see that foreign markets are opened for Israeli corporate investment. As Ephraim Eylon has stated:

Being a small developing country, poor in natural resources, forced to devote a record proportion of her human, economic, and monetary potential to defense, Israel is herself greatly in need of cheap finance and investment, if she is to achieve economic independence.\textsuperscript{17}

Hence, Israel's foreign policy objectives in Africa south of the Sahara can be summarized as responses to the Arab-Israeli conflict (to overcome Arab attempts of encirclement and isolation of Israel, to force Arab diplomatic recognition of the State of Israel, to gain support in the United Nations and other world bodies, and to further a negotiated settlement of the conflict) and domestic economic exigencies (to provide a market for Israeli exports, to ease unemployment difficulties with surplus, skilled laborers and to open new areas for foreign investment).
As defined in the introduction, "foreign policy" consists of both a nation's objectives and its methods employed to accomplish those objectives. Hence, having described Israeli foreign policy objectives in Africa south of the Sahara, a description of Israeli methods to accomplish these objectives in Africa as a whole, and in the region of East Africa, in particular, will complete the discussion of Israeli foreign policy.

The methods employed by Israel largely fall under the three categories of foreign assistance, diplomacy and propaganda. The Israelis have placed the greatest emphasis on the first two; but will employ propaganda methods when deemed convenient or necessary.

For its physical size and economic stature, Israel operates one of the most extensive foreign assistance programs in the world. Working primarily in the fields of agriculture; education; defense; and labor organization, the Israelis have provided aid working through a number of different devices in Africa.

Among those devices are Israeli-sponsored experts working on long-term projects in regional planning and rural settlement, pioneer youth movements, specialized agriculture, hydraulic engineering; medicine and education, among others. Between 1958 and 1966 Israel sent a total of 2548 technical assistance experts in these fields to the continent of Africa.
A second device extensively utilized by the Israelis is technical assistance granted through special training courses conducted in Israel. These courses of study are generally designed for experienced middle-level personnel rather than novices, and are conducted by the Israeli Ministry for Foreign Affairs, often at the Mount Carmel Training Centre, it staffs as well as the Defense Ministry and non-Ministry Israeli institutions such as the Histadrut (Federation of Trade Unions) in its Afro-Asian Institute for Cooperative and Labour Studies. In addition to these usually short-term courses, students from Africa are also granted scholarships to pursue individual academic studies in Israeli universities. Between 1958 and 1966, a total of 6640 Africans attended both long and short-term training courses and individual academic studies in Israel.

A third device used to extend foreign assistance to Black Africa is to conduct "on-the-spot" courses in African countries. This type of training was developed as a way to overcome the difficulties presented by insufficient training facilities in Israel and to reach a larger number of potential candidates otherwise unable to meet the costs of training in Israel. Through its "on-the-spot" training courses the Israelis reached 3649 African trainees between 1962 and 1966.

In his study of the U.A.R.--Israel rivalry over aid and trade in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1957 and 1963, Joseph Churba has concluded "that Israel's aid program in emergent Africa (constitutes), the basis of its international relations
in that continent."\textsuperscript{28} And there is little doubt that this fundamental part of Israeli policy is utilized to attain Israeli foreign policy objectives in Africa south of the Sahara. As Leopold Laufer has suggested:

The experiences of Israel and other developing countries indicate that mutual aid can bring both partners rich rewards. In the political sphere it can promote friendly relations and increase a country's international stature; in the material sphere it can lead to expanded trade and enriching professional exchanges; and in the sociopsychological sphere it can enhance the morale of other countries, as it has enhanced Israel's. There are other concrete advantages that are immediately apparent.\textsuperscript{29}

Israel's foreign assistance is very present in the East African nations of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. Israel signed cooperation agreements with each of them (Uganda in 1962, Tanzania in 1963, and Kenya 1966), and has supplied them with technical assistance, special advisors and requisite materials ever since.

Semi-public contractors such as Soleh Boneh and Water Resources Development-International (W.R.D.) are an important extension of Israel's foreign assistance program which together have employed thousands of East Africans and won construction contracts for development projects worth a total more than $50 million.\textsuperscript{30} Among the more prominent of their projects have been the Nairobi Hilton and International Life Building in Kenya, a sprawling house project in Kampala, Uganda, and Dar-es-Salaam's Kilimanjaro Hotel in Tanzania.

Among the aid projects staffed with Israeli advisors have been agricultural ones such as bilateral cooperation between poultry breeders in Kenya and Israel,\textsuperscript{31} the
establishment of citrus plantations in Uganda, and the creation of agricultural pilot projects, "ujamaa villages", some of whose methods of communal farming and marketing have been patterned after the Israeli "Kibbutz." In the field of medicine Israeli Ambassador to Kenya, Reuven Dafni responded to an urgent request by the Ministry of Health during the outbreak of cholera in Kenya; by bringing 1,300,000 doses of vaccine against the disease from Israel in a few days. And an eye clinic was set up in Tanzania under Israel's eminent eye specialist, Professor I. Michaelson. Israeli advisors have also supervised the construction of new highways, particularly the new highway linking Ethiopia and Kenya and Uganda's Kabale-Ntugnmo road in its western region.

Other prominent assistance projects to East Africa include Israel's cooperation with the Kenya Government in establishing and operating the joint Israel-Kenya School for Social Work in Machakos; building a national youth movement in Tanzania based on the Israeli models of Nahal (Fighting Pioneer Youth) and the Gadna (Youth Battalions), and providing extensive military assistance and paratroop training in Uganda. East Africa has also sent numerous students and trainees to attend special courses and regular academic studies in Israel. As mentioned in the introduction, of the approximately 6000 Africans who have received training in Israel between 1962 and 1966, nearly half came from East Africa: 900 from Kenya, and 1000 each from Uganda and Tanzania.
Furthermore, East African cabinet officials and other major figures have journeyed to Israel to attend special conferences; such as Kenya's former Minister for Education; Dr. J.G. Kiano, who attended an Education Minister's conference in Israel in 1969. Israel has also attempted several of its "on-the-spot" short training courses in East Africa. Among them were a ten week course in Uganda conducted by a team of agricultural extension instructors and several three month "pioneer camps" conducted by ten Israeli experts for the Tanzanian African National Union (T.A.N.U.) Youth League.

Having provided a lengthy discussion of Israel's extensive foreign assistance program and its manifestations in East Africa, mention should be made of the second method, utilized by Israel to attain its foreign policy objectives in Black Africa, in general, and in East Africa, in particular: diplomacy. The Israel Foreign Ministry places most of its emphasis on its foreign assistance program in attempts to achieve policy objectives. But traditional and some rather unorthodox methods of diplomacy are also employed in Africa south of Sahara.

Among its more traditional forms of diplomacy have been official state visits by Israel's Prime Ministers and Presidents as well as reciprocal state visits by African Heads of State to Israel. Beginning with an early but important tour of Africa in 1958 (including visits to nations still under colonial rule). Foreign Minister Golda Meir visited the continent four times before 1964.
In 1962, an ailing President Ben Zvi undertook an extensive
tour of West Africa. In 1966, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol
criss-crossed the continent; visiting Senegal, the Ivory
Coast, Liberia, Congo (Kinshasa) now Republic of Zaire, the
Malagasy Republic, Uganda and Kenya, in a tour which
reportedly "left Israel's relations with the African
continent considerably strengthened." More recently
Foreign Minister Abba Eban has visited Africa in 1969
and as recently as May 1971.

Reciprocal visits to Israel have been made by such
African Heads of State as the late President Tubman of
Liberia and by the Ivory Coast's President Houphouet-
Boigny. As Samuel Decalo has commented: "By 1967, a large
number of African heads of State had included Israel at
least once in their itineraries of state visits." By
extending invitations to and amicably receiving these heads
of state in its own territory, Israel has a better opportunity
to present its case and lobby for support of its position in
the Arab-Israeli conflict than it has by only visiting the
African nations. The opportunities for proselytizing are
greater in the host coun't where the issues at stake have
an immediacy not found at a great distance.

Another diplomatic method employed by Israel is to
establish a maximum number of diplomatic missions on the
continent of Africa, as well as to encourage the reciprocal
establishment of African missions in Israel. At the present
time, Israel maintains embassies in every country of Black
Africa except two: Somalia and Mauritania. By comparison
with this number; only twelve African nations reciprocate with embassies in Israel. However, this remains a significant number considering the costs behind the maintenance of a foreign mission and the limited financial capabilities of nearly all Black African nations. The presence of so many diplomatic missions is a clear method utilized to overcome the encirclement and diplomatic isolation the Israelis hope to avoid.

Israel has also sought to make its presence known by attending and if possible participating in any trade fairs or other commercial exhibitions held on the continent of Africa. Such a presence not only helps obtain the obvious objective of improving its economic position vis-à-vis Africa, but also to publicize and propagandize about bilateral cooperative efforts between Israel and the host country.

A final diplomatic method employed by the Israelis to attain their objectives in Black Africa is to engage in direct lobbying either in support of Israel's positions or in opposition to Arab ones; in world and regional bodies such as the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. There is nothing novel about such practices in the U.N. where Israel is a member-state. But Israel has even taken on the rather unorthodox position of direct lobbying against Arab positions in the O.A.U., an organization of which Israel is not a member. At an O.A.U. Heads of State conference held in Addis Ababa in 1969, Israeli Ambassador Mussa Lisha, a member of the Israeli delegation to the U.N. made no secret about his intentions to block anti-Israeli
resolutions being presented by Arab delegates by sending out statements and holding meetins with various African delegations.

In order to make its diplomatic offensive in Black Africa; including its state visits; establishment of diplomatic missions; participation in trade fairs; and direct lobbying, more palatable; Israel has abandoned its policy of non-identification in the anti-colonialism struggle. This is a recent development of the last two years; as Israel has encountered increased difficulty in achieving its policy objectives despite such methods as its economic assistance and strong diplomatic offensive.

In 1971 alone Israel severed its relations with Rhodesia (which at one time had provided Israel with a very favourable trade balance), greatly reduced its association with other South African regimes, notably the Republic of South Africa and the then Portuguese colony of Mozambique, and for the first time offered aid in the form of food, medicines and blankets to various African Liberation movements operating in southern Africa. By reducing its undeclared support for the racialist regimes, Israel has joined in the anti-colonialism struggle in hopes of bolstering its already strong diplomatic position in Africa.

The diplomatic methods described above have been utilized in East Africa quite extensively. Official State visits were made by the then Foreign Minister, Mrs. Golda Meir, who visited each of the East African nations, including Kenya; still under British colonial rule in 1963. Both Kenya and Uganda were included in the Prime Minister Eshkol's
1966 tour, and Foreign Minister Abba Eban included Kenya in his May 1971 trip to Africa. Several reciprocal visits have been made by Uganda's new head of State; Gen. Idi Amin, since his ascendancy to power in January 1971, and will be described in greater detail later.

Israel maintains diplomatic missions in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania at the ambassadorial level. Uganda is the only nation of the three which reciprocates by maintaining an embassy in Israel. Israel has also taken pains to attend and exhibit in East African trade fairs. An Israeli exhibition was included at the Saba Saba National Agricultural and Trade Fair in Dar-es-Salaam in 1968. Israel has also made major entries in the annual Nairobi show. In 1970 their pavilion was winner in the best foreign government class and was awarded the Gailey and Roberts Diamond Jubilee Perpetual Challenge Cup. Their participation in the 1971 Nairobi Show was described in Nairobi's Daily Nation:

The Israelis are just about to take this year's Nairobi show by storm—the Israelis are sparing no effort to ensure that their pavilion will be something to remember. More than 50 Israeli companies will participate in this year's show. Many will be looking for local counterparts with the hope of starting joint ventures.

The third and final category of methods by which Israel attempts to achieve its foreign policy objectives in Black Africa is through the use of propaganda. Although the volume of Israeli propaganda in no way compares to that annually proliferated by the Chinese and various Arab embassies in Black Africa, the Israelis will nevertheless offer press releases when the situation presents itself.
The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs has either published or sponsored publication of a number of pamphlets extolling Israel's program of Foreign assistance, among them Together We Build, Israel—Africa: A Story of Cooperation, and Lighten Mine Eyes. The Israel Information Services also publish a monthly news bulletin distributed by Israel's foreign missions abroad. Furthermore special supplement in both Israeli and African newspapers, when made available, are utilized to extol Israel's foreign assistance with the relevant African country or to propagandize about "threats" to Israel's national security from the Arab states.

As in the rest of Black Africa, Israeli propaganda to East Africa is minimal compared to its foreign assistance programs and diplomatic offensives there. On the date of Kenya's independence a special supplement to the Jerusalem Post was devoted to Kenyan-Israeli cooperation. Israel has also used space provided by Nairobi's Daily Nation to support its position in the Arab-Israeli conflict and to emphasize Israeli aid to projects in Kenya. The Israeli embassies in each of the three East African nations regularly distribute tracts provided by the Israel Information Services.

Hence, Israel's methods employed to attain its foreign policy objectives in Africa south of the Sahara, outlined earlier, can be summarized as involving its extensive foreign assistance program, its concerted diplomatic offensive, and to a much lesser extent, its propagandistic operations.
The Arab Policies

For the purposes of this thesis, the "Arab nations" will be defined as those nations of North Africa and Southwest Asia who comprise the Arab League: Algeria, the Arab Republic of Egypt (A.R.E.); Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Tunisia, and the Yemen. However, evidence frequently will be cited only from the A.R.E., not only because of its leadership position in the Arab League, but also because it is the sole Arab nation equipped to have devised and maintained an aggressive foreign policy in Black Africa.

Like Leonard Fein's observation regarding the prominence of the Arab-Israeli conflict in all Israeli policy formation, in Nasser's Egypt, Peter Mansfield has suggested that "... the Palestinian problem and the possibility of war with Israel are overriding considerations in all Egypt's policies."53

One obvious objectives of Arab foreign policy would be to win support for its position in world and regional bodies. But its primary reason for gaining such support would be to complete its boycott of Israel and to encircle it with hostile neighbours. As Joseph Churba has suggested:

... an effective extension into the African world of Arab diplomatic boycott of Israel would imperil the latter's position in the United Nations--the very birth place of Israel.54

The Arab states would desire such a diplomatic and even economic isolation of Israel to gain support for their position of non-recognition of the United Nation's creation and to injure economically their major adversary.
In a sense, the Arabs are on the defensive in Black Africa in the wake of Israel's foreign assistance programs, and diplomatic "blitz." Hence a further objective of Arab policy in Black Africa is to counteract the Israel's, for the same obvious reasons they have attempted to isolate them. As Jacques Baulin has suggested:

The Egyptians in particular, and the Arabs in general, are clearly afraid of Israel's energetic initiative. They have decided therefore, to counter-attack on every possible front.55

The Arab League has devoted a number of its sessions to the problem of how to diminish Israel's presence in Black Africa, and the A.R.E.'s President Nasser vowed to "chase" Israel from Africa.56

Although it lacks the surplus of trained manpower in certain specialized fields which Israel possesses (this may change after the recent completion of the Aswan High Dam which has provided a surplus of engineers and agriculturists), Egypt has a similar need for foreign markets for some of its manufactured goods, particularly textiles.58 In addition to textiles, a Ministry of Economy statement on African trade issued in July 1964 also mentioned ready-made clothing, pipes, tyres, shoes, canned foodstuffs, bicycles, leather goods, iron, reinforced rods, electric refrigerators, rice, onions and garlic as additional products the A.R.E. was willing to provide to Africa.59 Other Arab nations particularly Persian Gulf states such as Kuwait, export large quantities of petroleum products (much of it already refined) to Black Africa.
Although the percentage of the A.R.E.'s total exports which go to Black Africa was small in the Early 1960's, as in the case of the Israelis, it has been rapidly increasing. From just under $4.6 million in 1962, the A.R.E.'s annual exports to Black Africa had risen to $84 million by 1969, an increase of from 1% to 10% of the A.R.E.'s total annual exports. The Arab states, particularly the A.R.E., also have an economic objective of paving the way for economic investments in the lesser developed nations of Black Africa. Hassan Abbas Zaki, Egyptian Minister of Economics in 1962 explicitly stated Egypt's policy in this field when he remarked that the government would encourage investment in Africa "in order to help stimulate its (Africa's) industrial development and exploit its (Africa's) wealth."

A further policy objective of the Egyptians related to their economic well-being, is protection of the Nile water resources. Nasser described the Nile as "the artery of life of our country," and Tareq Ismael has described the protection of the Nile resources as having been "the primary goal of Egyptian policy makers." Considering the importance the Nile has had and continues to have for Egypt's economy, it is easy to understand the A.R.E.'s intense interest in the protection of its water resources. The East African nations have participated in several Nile water projects talks in Cairo with the A.R.E. and the Sudan.

A remaining foreign policy objective of the Arabs in Africa south of the Sahara is an extension of the Arab ideological position. Egypt has long regarded the nationalist movements in the neighbouring countries as
potential bases of influence that could bring pressure to bear on the Western colonizers. And as the vanguard proponent of Arab policy in Black Africa, the A.R.E. has set its goal to end all remnants of colonialism in all of Africa. It was to this objective that Nasser was referring when he wrote of "the second circle" in his Philosophy of the Revolution in 1954.

Hence, Arab Foreign policy objectives in Africa south of the Sahara can be summarized as responses to the Arab-Israeli conflict (to win support for its position in world and regional bodies, to expand the diplomatic and economic boycott of Israel and to counteract the Israeli offensives in the continent); domestic economic exigencies (to provide foreign markets for exports, and to open new areas for foreign investment) and to a lesser extent, to rid the continent of its remaining vestiges of colonialism.

The methods employed by the Arab nations to accomplish the policy objectives just described generally fall under the same three classifications employed by the Israelis: foreign assistance, diplomacy, and propaganda. However, for the Arab states, propaganda has been most often invoked as a method. Only recently have foreign assistance and diplomacy begun to approach the efforts spent on Arab propaganda methods.

Foremost among the Arab propaganda methods is Cairo Radio. The A.R.E. apparently attaches great importance to its large broadcast network and spares no expense to increase its transmission power. Between July 1952 and March 1960 the power of Cairo Radio transmitters was increased from 20Kw to over 1000Kw. Over the same period
its daily broadcasting hours increased from 14 to 91 hours. By 1964 it had reached a phenomenal 364 hours of daily broadcasting.

In 1961 Cairo Radio was broadcasting in twenty-two different languages. At present, Cairo Radio broadcasts for four hours daily in Amharic, Swahili, Lingala, Sesotho, Nyanja, Somali and English to East, Central and South Africa, and in French, Fulani, English and Hausa to West Africa. The London Observer has commented: "Cairo Radio is already broadcasting in more African dialects than the B.B.C." Further, it has been claimed by some Arab nationalists that Radio Cairo makes the A.R.E. the second most important broadcasting nation in the world, after the Soviet Union, but ahead of China, Great Britain, and the United States.

In addition to operating Cairo Radio, the A.R.E. 's African Section of its Ministry of Information also handles the preparation and publication of reports of investigations into African problems. It publishes books and pamphlets for distribution in Africa and produces regular bulletins. Among the most prominent of these publications is the Voice of U.A.R. (publication has retained its title with "U.A.R.") a political propaganda monthly covering the Arab-Israeli conflict with an emphasis on the implications for Africa, distributed through A.R.E. embassies in Africa. Other periodicals published in the A.R.E. such as Nahdatu Afrigiya and al-Rabitat-- al-Afriqiya are also used for propaganda purposes and distributed in select African capitals when articles contained within them are particularly relevant.
Like the Israelis, the Arabs also utilize newspaper space for propaganda purposes, when it is made available by the African press. Press attache's attached to A.R.E. embassies in Africa also take every opportunity to argue the Arab side of the Arab-Israeli conflict, through the rather unorthodox practice of official embassy letters to the editors, that is frequently done when the Arab embassy feels that the local African press has been particularly partial in its coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Such partial and prejudiced coverage is largely the result of the heavy dependence of the African press on Western news agencies.

Propaganda methods have not only been applied by individual Arab embassies, but by the Arab League as well. In September 1960 the Arab League decided to intensify its political activities in Africa. The Permanent Information Committee of the Arab League subsequently devised a detailed program for the struggle against Israeli infiltration in the African continent. Some of the techniques employed in this extensive propaganda network include frequent analogies between Israeli moves in the Middle-East and the white minority regimes of southern Africa. It is not uncommon for a Voice of A.R.E. issue to contain a photographic editorial depicting scenes such as "Palestinian freedom fighter," and "Southern African freedom fighters," "the Sharpeville Massacre and Israel's Massacre in Karama, Jordan," or "The Freedom Fighters: A Palestinian woman, An African woman." The monthly publication also regularly carries feature length articles comparing the Israelis
to the South African racialist regimes and attacking their sometimes amicable relations with each other.

Another technique employed in this vast network of propaganda has been to play the religious affinity the Arabs have with many Black Africans. In his description of the A.R.E.'s drive to influence the sub-Saharan states, Joseph Churba has written that the A.R.E. has attempted to exploit advantages such as its geographic position on the continent and religious affinity with many African states "especially through its powerful radio network . . . and by zealous promotion of Islam as an alternative faith for African paganism as opposed to 'colonial' Christianity."73

The Arab propaganda network, particularly that of the A.R.E., has played a major role securing Arab objectives in Black Africa. As Jacques Baulin has written of the A.R.E.:

The Egyptian news syndicates, the official or semi-official publications, and all those responsible for official propaganda are mounting the counter-attack to check what they brand as "the expansion of Israel in Africa."74

These propaganda methods have been very present in East Africa. As mentioned before, Cairo Radio broadcasts to East Africa for four hours daily in English and Swahili. It also beams Arabic broadcasts to the Indian Ocean coastal populations. In November 1955, an Egyptian based radio station, "Voice of the Swahili;" commenced its daily broadcasts.75

The Voice of U.A.R. and other Ministry of Information publications are distributed from the A.R.E. embassies in East Africa. The embassies of Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, and
the A.R.E. have jointly provided information for special supplements in East African newspapers. Kenya's "leftist" monthly news magazine carried an eight page special supplement of Palestine in its May 1971 issue, for example.

Final evidence of Arab propaganda methods in East Africa has been amply supplied by the A.R.E.'s Press Attaché in Kenya, Saad El Zarki. El Zarki has taken every opportunity to describe and defend the Arab position in the Arab-Israeli conflict by encouraging interviews with the A.R.E. staff (most often himself) and by becoming a frequent writer of letters to the editor of Nairobi's leading English-language dailies, the Daily Nation and the East African Standard.

Foreign assistance programs offered by Arab states, particularly the A.R.E. as a result of its leadership position in the Arab world and its economic capabilities, are on the ascendency and are fast approaching the level of propaganda methods employed. Like Israel, throughout most of the 1950's, none of the Arab nations was able to provide any foreign assistance to African nations south of the Sahara. However, despite its difficult economic position, Egypt invested a great deal of effort and capital by sponsoring the African Association, founded in 1955 and composed of representatives from African nationalist movements. The Egyptian-sponsored association existed to provide mutual aid and advice for the various African nationalist movements, as well as to conduct propaganda campaigns in support of the independence effort throughout the rest of the world and particularly in the other Arab
The African Association aided African nationalist leaders by assisting them with the publication of pamphlets and periodicals and also provided them with air time on Cairo Radio.

Through its sponsorship of the African Association, Egypt played a key role in the African continent's struggle for independence between 1954 and 1964. By providing such assistance, Egypt was able to extend an opportunity many nationalist movements could not have otherwise had. Such assistance was not likely to be forgotten quickly and would later aid the A.R.E. and other Arab states in some of their foreign policy objectives.

As more and more African nations gained their independence, by the early and mid-1960's, the African Association decreased its activity. However, support has not ceased for the African liberation movements that remain. Arab countries such as Algeria and Morocco have been active in the training of African guerrillas to fight against the Portuguese. Furthermore, Arab states and the Arab League continue to provide substantial financial support for the African Liberation movements in southern Africa.

Since the early 1960's other forms of foreign assistance have been offered to Black Africa by the Arab states. In November 1969 at a meeting of Arab Labour Ministers, plans were formulated to create a technical assistance bureau to coordinate aid to be extended by the Arab countries to the African states.
The A.R.E. has sent teachers and some technical experts to a number of African Countries. In 1964 approximately 270 Egyptian technical experts were serving in such a capacity, and 392 Egyptian teachers were employed in Black Africa. Kuwait has extended some capital assistance but the precise amount that goes to sub-Saharan Africa is not known. Saudi Arabia and the A.R.E. have also offered development loans to nations of Black Africa.

Several cooperative programs have also been developed between African states and the A.R.E. involving tourism cooperation, an agricultural training center, and a U.N.D.P. assisted Center for Industrial Design.

Again like Israel, the A.R.E. also serves as an educational center for young Africans. As early as 1962 there were 4000 non-Arab African students in Egypt. They were enrolled in a number of different institutions ranging from Cairo's famous religious university, Al-Azhar to government institutions offering short-term training scholarships in irrigation, land-use, and scientific training. By providing so many academic positions, the A.R.E. has played a role comparable to Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union, as an educational center for young Africans.

A final form of assistance provided by the Arab States for nations of sub-Saharan Africa involves the sponsorship and funding of African meetings; conferences, and federations of various sorts. In the past few years, Arab states have hosted and sponsored the All-Africa Trade Union
Federation, the first African Airlines Conference, a conference of African Tourism Ministers, a Small Industries Conference, an International Voluntary Work Camp for Youth, the International Seminar on Human Rights in Africa, the Conference on Development and Trade Exchange, the General Association of the Higher Council for African Sports, a session of the Scientific Council of Africa, the conference of the African Worker's Federation, and even an African basketball championship, to name only a few.

The nations of East Africa have been very much involved as recipients in all of these Arab foreign assistance ventures. Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika and Zanzibar all maintained bureaus related with the African Association in Cairo. The East Africans apparently haven't forgotten the salaries of LE/100 a month, free tickets for travel, and propagandistic devices provided for them during the crucial stages of their struggles for independence. On the occasion of President Nasser's death in 1970 then President Obote of Uganda issued a statement in which he reminded his fellow countrymen of the support they had received from Egypt under President Nasser during the early days of their struggle for national independence. 87

In technical assistance fields, both Kenya and Tanzania have received substantial amounts of foreign assistance, primarily from the A.R.E. Press Attache, S&ad El Zarki in 1971 offered to send hundreds of experts to help Kenya in its development projects, especially in medicine and social welfare. 88 He went on to state:
"We are ready to cooperate with Kenya on the media by offering training programs, exchange personnel and films." Previous to this time, the A.R.E. had sent doctors to help train Kenyan medical staffs.

Tanzania has been the recipient of even more Arab aid. The A.R.E. agreed to give assistance in starting navigation schemes and also to provide teachers for secondary schools as early as 1963. Cairo's Al-Azhar University has also provided teachers of Arabic to Tanzania. President Nyerere expressed his thanks to President Nasser during his 1966 state visit to Tanzania: "... for the generous assistance which the A.R.E. had made available to Tanzania in the form of experts in various professional and technical fields."

Interestingly, there is very little evidence of foreign assistance provided for Uganda. A similar pattern is found in the African students pursuing academic studies in the A.R.E. Both Kenya and Tanzania have sent students for study in Egypt, but there is no mention of Ugandan students.

Again, in special conferences held in the A.R.E. and other Arab countries, little mention is made of Ugandan participation. However, Kenyans have attended courses offered by the A.R.E. Agricultural Training Centre, and Tanzanians have attended conferences of the All-African Trade Unions Federation in Cairo.

In comparison to the Israeli diplomatic offensive in Black Africa, Arab efforts appear very slight. State visits by Arab heads of States (which outnumber Israel by thirteen to one) don't keep up with the pace set by Israel.
Few Arab heads of state have toured Africa south of the Sahara. Arab States have received delegations from Black Africa, but such visits barely keep up with the number received by Israel, much less surpass it by a margin of thirteen to one.

One of the diplomatic methods employed by Egypt has been to dispatch a personal representative of President Anwar Sadat, Dr. Hafe Ghanem, to call on African Heads of States and deliver personal messages from President Sadat on recent developments in the Middle-East. Arab states also make sure to offer exhibitions in African trade fairs, and supplement such activities with trade group visits. North African Arab states have an easier time participating in All-African and the forthcoming O/A/U/ trade fairs than Israel, which lies outside the continent.

Largely as a result of its position in the non-aligned nations movement, the A.R.E. is represented by foreign missions at the ambassadorial level in nearly as many sub-Saharan nations as Israel. A comparable number of African states reciprocate by staffing embassies in Arab nations, predominantly the A.R.E.

Other diplomatic methods employed by Arab states lavishly celebrating African solidarity and "anti-racism in Southern Africa" days, providing a club for African diplomats in Cairo, introducing anti-Israeli resolutions in world and regional bodies whenever the opportunity presents itself, and issuing cables of commendation to African Heads of State when such resolutions are passed with their
support. Through such methods, the Arabs are able to keep the Arab-Israeli conflict and their own position every present.

Like Israel, the Arabs have had to make some policy concessions in order to make their diplomatic methods more palatable. As a member of the O.A.U., Egypt had had to take an almost paradoxical step in the name of African solidarity. In reference to the A.R.E.'s diplomatic break with Britian, P.J. Vatikiotis has commented:

"... the real source of friction between the two had been the question of Aden, yet Cairo abstained from breaking off relations at the obvious moment in September (when Britian suspended the Aden constitution), and did so instead on the lesser issue of Britain's Rhodesian policy."

Vatikiotis goes on to comment that this action was only taken reluctantly, "in order to keep solidarity with a number of African states." On other touchy issues in Black Africa Egypt has occasionally invoked a policy not doing anything explicit, either for or against one of the conflicting states. By doing so, it remains out of such partisan conflicts and can emerge as a peacemaker, if the opportunity presents itself.

Arab diplomatic methods, outlined above, have been utilized in East Africa. In one of his few state visits to Black Africa, President Nasser visited Tanzania in 1966. President Nyerere reciprocated his visit by touring the A.R.E. in the same year and had previously visited Algeria in 1963. President Anwar Sadat's representative, Hafe Ghanem, visited both Kenya and Tanzania in his January 1971
mission to East and Central Africa. He described his task as: "... to put our friends in East Africa in the picture before the cease-fire expires on February 5 ... Whatever may happen, we shall discuss and exchange views with our African friends."^{99}

The A.R.E. and most of the other North African Arab states have been regular participants in the Saba Saba trade fair in Dar-es-Salaam, the annual Nairobi Show, and have made plans to participate in the First All-Africa Trade Fair which opened in Nairobi on 25 February 1972.^{100}

Algeria, Kuwait, Morocco, Southern Yemen, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, and the A.R.E. all operate diplomatic missions in East Africa. Furthermore, Egypt, which conducts some of its foreign policy by not doing anything explicit such as remaining out of disputes between conflicting African states, has followed such a policy in regard to the Kenya-Somali war. For example, it has not supported the Somali rebels in northern Kenya, while it has supported them against Ethiopia. The A.R.E. takes a position in effect favouring Kenya over neighbouring Ethiopia (with which the A.R.E. has much worse relations) by not supporting the Kenyan secessionists. Its relations with Kenya would undoubtedly be severely strained, if it did not pursue its policy of not doing a thing against the Kenyans.

Hence, Arab methods employed to attain their foreign policy objectives in Africa South of the Sahara, outlined earlier; can be summarized as involving their extensive
propaganda network, their increasing foreign assistance programs, and to a somewhat lesser extent their diplomatic moves.

Having described the Israeli and Arab foreign policies toward Black Africa in general and toward East Africa specifically, it is now necessary to turn to a description of the East African policies. After describing and documenting the Kenyan, Ugandan and Tanzanian policies toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, it will be possible to assess to some extent the effectiveness of the various Israeli and Arab methods employed, and more importantly to assess the "successes" they have achieved in terms of their objectives as just described.
CHAPTER II

THE EAST AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICIES

The most obvious place to begin a comprehensive description of East African foreign policies toward the Arab-Israeli conflict is by examining all official, government statements on the situation in the Middle East. From there, an examination of official East African reactions to individual events in the Arab-Israeli conflict will add further data to the study. Mention of official statements regarding the international relations between any of the East African nation-states and any of the protagonists in the Arab-Israeli dispute will also be made on the comprehensive description of the Kenyan, Ugandan, and Tanzanian foreign policies toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.

However, the description of East African foreign policies doesn't end here. What governments say they believe or what they state as their policy doesn't necessarily correlate with their actions. Thus, an examination of official East African governmental statements does not suffice to provide an accurate, comprehensive description of policy.

A second indicator in the description of foreign policy is an examination of diplomacy. The diplomacy executed by a nation-state is a way of carrying out its policy as stated or otherwise and may be as subtle or trite as seeing that visiting ministers of equal rank from either of the antagonists in the Arab-Israeli conflict are met with
Official state visits by either Heads of State or high-ranking delegations are also an indication of policy preference for either Israelis or Arabs. Questions such as how often and where has the East African Head of State visited in the Middle East should be asked. If any of the East African nations has restricted its official visits to either antagonist in the Arab-Israeli conflict, it should be an indication of the policy pursued as opposed to the policy as stated (if there is, indeed, a difference).

Again a word of caution should be suggested. When attempting to determine a nation's policy as indicated by its diplomacy, it should be considered whether the individual event was intended for public or private consumption. Frequently, what can be readily observed about a diplomatic occasion, such as Nixon's "cool" airport reception in Peking in 1972, might be intended primarily for public consumption. If that event alone had been used as a policy indicator, a misleading picture of the entire summit conference might have emerged.

A third indicator, and perhaps the most informative, is an examination of voting on resolutions on the Arab-Israeli conflict presented in world and regional bodies. When posed with an "in favour," "against," or "abstention" decision a nation-state often must put its declared policy to a test. A vote on a crucial resolution can indicate whether its rhetoric differs from the reality of its situation.
A word of caution should be noted concerning the use of U.N. and other world or regional body resolutions. Unfortunately, there is rarely, if ever, a resolution introduced which definitively puts the question "do you support the Arabs or the Israelis?" Hence, resolutions which tend only to favour either of the opposing sides in the conflict must be utilized. Also, there remains the problem of the nation which knows that a motion which it favours will pass without its support and might be inclined to vote with the opposition in a gesture of "support." Furthermore, there is often a problem of interpreting the abstention. That is, is such a vote truly neutral, or does it in effect aid either side by preventing its opponent from receiving the requisite majority or blocking the two-thirds majority vote required to pass an "important question"?

A fourth indicator in the description of East African foreign policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict is an examination of "non-events" and other indicators. "Non-events" are a way of implementing a policy while appearing or in fact remaining neutral. The A.R.E. invoked a "non-event" policy toward Kenya with the Shifta (Kenya-Somali war) secessionist movement of the mid-1960's and was better able to argue the position with Kenya as a result.

Other indicators involve an examination of policies pursued toward incidents which are related to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Uganda's position on the Sudanese civil war and Tanzania's stand on recognition of Biafra both fall
under this category of other indicators, which will be discussed in greater detail in the individual nation profiles which follow.

A final indicator of foreign policy pursued is to examine press editorials and commentray in East Africa's daily newspapers and periodicals. This is particularly useful in Tanzania where several of the newspaper dailies are fairly reliable indicators of government policy. In both Kenya and (even more so) in Uganda, government reaction to positions taken by the local press can also add to an understanding of the policy.

Because of the caution mentioned about the misleading aspects of each of these policy indicators (official government statements, diplomacy, U.N. voting, non-events and other indicators, and press editorials and commentary), no one of them can alone give an accurate indication of policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. Hence, a discussion of each of them; followed by a summary of position, will be presented for each East African nation. This summary will provide the comprehensive foreign policy description desired for this assessment of the relative "successes" of the Arabs and Israelis in this region of Black Africa.
Before commencing any discussion of official Kenyan Government statements; some attempt to ascertain who formulates its policy should be made. Such determination will eliminate the possibility to inaccurate policy declarations based on the commentary of a Member of Parliament or some lower ministry official, who state their own policy rather than that of the Government of Kenya.

In his discussion of decision-making among African Governments I. William Zartman has suggested that in examples of one party states under a charismatic leader, policy is determined primarily by the President and his immediate advisors. In the field of foreign policy determination this would include the President or Head of State, the Vice-President, the Foreign Minister or Special Presidential Advisor for Foreign Affairs, and other ministers, approximately in that order.

In Kenya, as in other one-party states of Black Africa, foreign policy determination is the nearly exclusive prerogative of the President and his elite corps of advisors. The party structure of KANU (the Kenya African National Union) has been weak since 1960 when rival leaders discouraged a strong national organization and has remained so to the present.
Hence, the party and party leadership could not have played a significant role (if any) in foreign policy determination except in cases where they occupy parallel positions high in the government.

The Parliament of Kenya along with its Speaker and special committees has played a non-role similar to that of KANU in the field of foreign policy determination. Among the powers and duties which are expressly conferred upon Parliament by the Constitution of Kenya are the making of laws, the approval of all taxation, borrowing, and expenditure by the Government, the termination of a President's appointment by a resolution of "no confidence" and the regulation of its own procedure, subject only to the express provisions of the Constitution. Hence, any influence the Parliament of Kenya might be able to bring to bear the determination of Kenya's foreign policy would be peripheral, at best.

The bureaucracy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also not sufficiently entrenched to have developed any form of procedural policy which determines policy on the basis of past commitment (there are none), on general procedures, or in direct opposition to existing government policy.

The individuals most directly responsible for Kenya's foreign policy could be best seen in their roles during the recent mediation efforts that Kenya provided in the settlement of the dispute that had plagued relations between Uganda and Tanzania and which had threatened to break up the East African Community since General Amin's ascendancy to power in January
of 1971. The leading role was played by President Kanyatta. Foreign Minister, Dr. Njoroge Mungai and Vice President Daniel arap Moi also played important roles. Other leading spokesmen included the Minister of State in the President's Office, Mr. Mbiyu Koinange as well as leading Ministers such as Mwai Kibabi, Ronald Ngala, and Attorney General Charles Njonjo.

Kenya officially follows a declared policy of non-alignment in foreign affairs in general, and towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, in particular. In an article on Kenya's foreign policy the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Njoroge Mungai, commented:

Even at the time of our independence, it was unequivocally stated that Kenya would adopt non-alignment as its basic policy in foreign affairs . . . we decide on the merits of each case objectively without any form of dictation or pressure from any external source.

Kenya's policy of "non-alignment" is largely defined in terms of "Cold war confrontation (and) of ideological warfare." That is Kenya remains "non-aligned" in any major power confrontations. Kenya's non-alignment does not however mean that it remains aloof with a "wait and see" position on such issues as British arms sales to South Africa or its normalization of relations with the rebel regime in Rhodesia. Like many other independent nations of Black Africa, Kenya's foreign policy is based on the concept of "positive non-alignment." That conception of non-alignment enables Kenya to take deliberate stands on issues largely relating to Black Africa, while at the same time remaining uninvolved in cold-war confrontations and ideological warfare.
Official government statements have applied this concept of non-alignment both toward the Arab-Israeli conflict in general, and toward specific incidents of the dispute. Many statements on the conflict go no further than to wish for a peaceful settlement in the near future. Rarely does Kenya spell out or make any attempt to explain what it considers a "just settlement" of the conflict.

For example, when a delegation of four Israeli parliamentarians paid a good-will visit to Kenya in December 1970, they were told by Vice-President Moi: "That Kenya was hopeful that a permanent solution would be found sooner or later towards a peaceful settlement on the Middle-East crisis." Similarly on his departure for Kinshasa and the O.A.U. conference on the Middle East, Foreign Minister Mungai said no more than: "Peace in the Middle East is very important to us in Kenya." By no stretch of the imagination can either of these statements be construed as indicating a preference for either the Arabs or Israelis.

In the single substantive statement of Kenyan policy which attempts to spell out what it considers a "just settlement on the basis of the Security Council resolution of November 1967, Dr. Mungai goes on to state:

We have maintained that any durable solution must be based on justice and realism. It is not to the advantage of any power to perpetuate a situation of armed confrontation which has already led to a tragic loss of life and property. It is not in the interests of any party to have the Suez Canal closed to international trade and shipping. In the cause of world peace and security, it is imperative that normality should be resorted to this area. Kenya Government has welcomed all peace initiatives--the meeting of the ambassadors of four countries in New York, the Gunar Jarring Mission, the Roger's mission, etc.
Kenya's support for the U.N. Security Council resolution (242) of November 1967 does not indicate any preference for either the Arabs or Israelis. The resolution passed unanimously with the consent of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Furthermore, despite the much heralded clause (i) which calls for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 war, the resolution cannot be termed "pro-Arab" in its over-all content. The resolution also makes concessions to the Israelis in their drive for "secure" boundaries. Clause (ii) calls for:

Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for the acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.110

The resolution also affirms the necessity for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area.

A line by line analysis of Dr. Mungai's statement indicates Kenya's non-aligned stance even further. In his second sentence Mungai reiterates Kenya's stand on security Council resolution 242 (1967) by calling for a durable solution based on "justice and realism." The "justice" behind the solution alludes to Israeli withdrawal, and "realism" to Arab recognition of the State of Israel, both provisions of the resolution.

In the third through fifth sentences of his statement, Mungai calls for an end to the perpetuation of a situation
of armed conflict, a reopening of the Suez Canal, and a restoration of normality to the area in the cause of world peace and security. None of those declarations tend to favour either Arabs or Israelis. Mungai concludes his statement by supporting all peace initiatives; again, such support cannot be constructed as preference for either the Arabs or Israelis.

Kenya's policy of non-alignment also has been applied to specific incidents and major flare-ups in the Arab-Israeli conflict. For example, on the issue of the six day war in 1967 Kenya declared its non-alignment and stated that Kenya's citizens should not become involved in a question that does not concern Kenya as a nonaligned power.111

If a sentence by sentence analysis such as that used in the examination of Mungai's statement and U.N. Security Council resolution 242 (1967), is applied to six of the most explicit official Kenya Government statements on the Arab-Israeli conflict, their non-alignment is clearly stated. Out of the fifteen sentences involved, Kenya has made what could be termed neutralist or non-aligned statements in fourteen of them. In only one instance did the content of their statement indicate a preference. And that was a mildly-worded statement by some senior officials of Kenya who joined Dahomey's Foreign Minister in supporting freedom of navigation in the Strait of Tiran, an Israeli demand just prior to the six day war.112

Thus, the over-all public tenor of official Kenya Government statements has been non-aligned toward the Arab-
Israeli conflict. On the basis of its official declarations, Kenya has only once verbally indicated a preference on an issue involved in the conflict. And that was in the form of a mildly-worded statement which was in agreement with one aspect of Israeli policy just prior to the six day war.

As in its official statements, Kenya's diplomacy is executed with its non-aligned position on the Arab-Israeli conflict in mind. Diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level are maintained between Kenya and both antagonists in the dispute. At present, the Arab League nations of Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Morocco, the Sudan, Tunisia, the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Yemen either maintain embassies or have declared their ambassadors in either Addis Ababa or Dar es Salaam to represent them in Kenya. Israel also maintains a large embassy in Nairobi.

Reciprocally, Kenya operates an embassy in Cairo with a representative assigned to Iraq. Interestingly, there is no embassy staffed in Israel. But as mentioned previously, the costs behind the maintenance of a foreign mission as well as Kenya's limited financial capabilities inhibit the establishment of more than ten embassies throughout the world. The A.R.E. is included among those nations which contain Kenyan missions largely because of its position as a leader in the world-wide non-aligned nations organization as well as the O.A.U.

In addition to the large number of foreign missions received by Kenya, a corresponding reception of official state or ministerial delegation visits has also been made.

Since it attained independence in December 1963, Kenya has received lesser delegations from Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Tunisia and Yemen.

Kenya has also received a large number of high-ranking Israeli officials. As mentioned previously, even before Kenya had been granted independence, the then Foreign Minister, Mrs. Golda Meir, went there on an unofficial visit. The Prime Minister, Mr. Levi Eshkol embarked on an official state visit to Kenya in 1966 during which he spoke with President Kenyatta "on the problem of the Middle East." The former Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, visited Kenya twice; once in July of 1970 and in May of 1971.

Kenya has reciprocated with official visits to both Arabs and Israelis. Kenya's Ambassador to the A.R.E. has visited other Arab nations with intent to improve relations and trade. Kenya's Vice-President Moi visited Cairo in May of 1967. Ministerial and other delegations have come to Israel from Kenya. And in January of 1962 KANU leader Tom Mboya (later key Minister of Economic Planning who played an important role in foreign policy determination until his assassination in July 1969) also visited Israel.
Kenya's diplomacy generally reflects its declared position on non-alignment. Not only are both Arabs and Israelis represented through diplomatic missions in Nairobi, but they have also received high-ranking Kenyan officials and delegations. If anything, however, Kenya's diplomacy has indicated a slight preference for the Arabs. Although Kenya is represented in Cairo, it is not in Israel. Furthermore, no individual or delegation of rank comparable to Vice-President Moi has visited Israel, as it did to Cairo in May of 1967.

It is interesting to note that the single official Kenya Government statement which might be interpreted as pro-Israeli was made at approximately at the same time as Moi's Cairo visit. Hence, any pro-Arab preference in Kenya's diplomacy should be considered minimal at best.

As mentioned previously, U.N. voting can be the most accurate indication of whether a nation's foreign policy toward a given issue realistically reflects its declared position or in practice makes the declared policy rhetorical. However, caution should be exercised when using United Nations General Assembly resolutions. For if a nation doesn't indicate the reason for its vote in a speech before the General Assembly, there is no definitive way to determine why it votes and precisely what that vote means.

Since no two resolutions contain identical content, it is difficult to assess whether an individual nation voted in a certain way by direction of its political
leadership or perhaps even by a mistake of misinterpreting its instructions or the content of the resolution itself. It is not statistically sound to base any conclusion on a single vote. And since no two resolutions are identical there is no objective way of obtaining a larger sample. Finally, there is the problem of selecting the resolutions for analysis. There have been far too many votes for such a detailed analysis to be made of every resolution within the context of this study.

In spite of all of these methodological difficulties, an attempt at such an analysis of key resolutions will be made for each of the East African nations. However, before that is begun, there is a quantitative measure by which individual votes (on the twenty-two resolutions which have pitted the Arabs against the Israelis on the situation in the Middle-East since 1965) can be analyzed.

The following method was devised to give the most accurate quantitative measure of voting based on the largest number of resolutions available. To every resolution on the situation in the Middle-East brought forth and put to a roll-call vote since 1962 when the first East African nation (then Tanganyika) entered the U.N., the following procedure was applied.

First the content of the resolution was examined. Many resolutions classified under "situation in the Middle-East" dealt not with the Arab-Israeli conflict but with the sovereignty of Oman, particularly in the early 1960's.
All resolutions, except those pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict, were then disregarded. That left 22 resolutions from 1965 through 1970 dealing with the problems of Palestinian refugees, the Israeli occupation of Arab territories, the status of Jerusalem and the Holy places, and the establishment of the Jarring mission. In each of these 22 resolutions the Arabs and Israelis voted in opposition to each other.

The nations of East Africa faced choices on these 22 resolutions to 1) vote with the Arabs, 2) vote with the Israelis, or 3) vote with neither. If the nation voted with either protagonist in the Arab-Israeli conflict, that vote would be considered a vote in favour of that side. That is, if Tanzania voted with the Arabs when it could have supported the Israelis or cast an abstention or other ballot in favour of neither side, its vote would be considered "pro-Arab." By assigning values to "pro-Arab," "pro-Israeli" or "neutral" votes, it is possible to translate the numerical results of x "pro-Israeli," y "neutral," and z "pro-Arab" votes into a single average over time. The preceding results will then be graphed to reveal possible voting trends and breakdown the voting into separate years.

The twenty-two resolutions being considered include two from 1965, one from 1966, fourteen from the key year of 1967, one from 1969 and four from 1970. Kenya voted on all of these resolutions except the second one in 1965. Out of a total of twenty-one votes Kenya has supported and voted with the Arabs only twice; one in 1965 and once in 1970.
The Kenyan delegation has voted with the Israelis only four times, all in 1967. However, the most prominent position taken by the Kenyan delegation has been the neutral vote, always in the form of an abstention. Kenya has voted with neither Middle-East protagonist on fifteen occasions since 1965. Interestingly, seventeen of its twenty-one votes have been abstentions. Its fifteen neutral votes were all abstentions. Israel has twice abstained with Kenya, accounting for the difference between Kenya's total abstentions and its neutral votes.

If a rank order of votes is assigned such that a vote paired with Israel is valued at one, a neutral vote at zero, and a vote paired with the Arabs at negative one, Kenya's four "pro-Israeli" votes yield four units, its fifteen "neutral" votes yield zero, and its two "pro-Arab" votes yield negative two. When the sum of two is divided by the number of votes involved, Kenya's average is determined. Obviously an over-all average above 0.5 would be a strong pro-Israeli record. Similarly, any average less than -0.5 would be a strong pro-Arab record. Kenya's average is +0.09, a generally neutralist record with a slight tendency to support the Israelis.

The following diagram graphically illustrates the pattern of Kenyan voting on the twenty-two resolutions on the Arab-Israeli conflict beginning with the 20th
General Assembly Session of 1965:

If any specific resolutions should be examined in detail they should include the 17 power draft resolution submitted by Yugoslavia on 30 June, 1967 and the 20 power draft resolution submitted by twenty Latin American nations on 4 July, 1967. Not only were these resolutions introduced during the key Fifth Emergency Special Session of 1967, but they were also the most representative of the Arab and Israeli interests, respectively, at the time.

The significant differences between the two resolutions were the sole emphasis of the non-aligned resolution on Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories and the inclusion of guaranteed freedom of transit on the International waterways in the region of the Latin American resolution. Kenya voted the same way on these "opposing" resolutions. In both instances, the Kenyan delegation abstained.

In a closer examination of Kenya's four "pro-Israeli" votes in 1967, Kenya's slight tendency to support the Israelis is somewhat weakened. On two occasions the Kenyan vote was paired with that of Israel only because Israel happened to abstain rather than directly oppose the Arab bloc with affirmative votes. The two votes in which
the Kenyan delegation joined the Israeli delegation in opposition to the Arabs were on an Albanian and a Cuban amendment to the nonaligned resolution presented by Yugoslavia, just described. Both amendments were soundly defeated by the General Assembly (by votes of 78 to 20, with 22 abstentions and 66 to 32, with 22 abstentions respectively). It is also interesting to note that the major non-aligned sponsors of the resolution such as Indian, Tanzania and Yugoslavia who usually supported the Arabs (as their draft resolution indicated) all abstained or voted with Israel in opposition to the amendments.

In sum, although the quantitative calculations indicated a slight preference for Israel, a closer examination indicates that Kenya doesn't deviate as far from its declared nonalignment as might have previously been expected. Kenya seems comfortable with a noncommitted abstention in most cases.

Too much weight should not be given to "non-events" as reliable indicators. In the case of Kenya, however, they do appear to support its declared position of nonalignment and neutralism toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The first indication of this neutralism was the official Kenyan Government reaction to the disclosure that A.R.E. supplied weapons were being used against the Kenya Army in the Shifta-Somali secessionist war of 1966. Although the Kenyan press was up in arms over the disclosure, the government never publicly criticized the A.R.E. over
its implied involvement. Furthermore, there was no direct retaliation to some official support for the Israeli position in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite what some Kenyan M.P.'s termed as an Arab provocation, the Kenyan Government refused their suggestions to retaliate.

A second "non-event" indication occurred after a number of embassy propagandistic enterprises received criticism, again in the press and parliament. The guilty parties in this instance of distributing "hostile and offensive literature" were essentially China and the A.R.E. In his "stern warning" issued publicly on 5th August 1969, Kenya's Vice-President Daniel arap Moi explicitly stated that Kenyan was not to be used as a diplomatic battleground. He cited The Peking News as an example of such offensive literature used as an instrument for attacking friendly countries (i.e., the U.S.S.R.).

Although the A.P.E.'s Voice of U.A.R. was clearly as guilty as The Peking News, the Vice-President made no mention of the publication. Rather than publicly criticize either Middle-East protagonist, Vice-President Moi simply commented:

I would like to warn against this (offensive and libalistic propaganda), and to say that our attitude also applies to any attacks or counter-attacks in the conflict between Israel and the United Arab Republic.

Thus as these two "non-events" have indicated, Kenya is willing to go to some lengths to accommodate the Arab behaviour. Rather than jeopardize its declared policy of non-alignment, the Government appears willing (at least publicly) to tolerate their behaviour by not retaliating
or placing all the blame on them for their more blatant propagandistic efforts.

Press editorials and commentary can be reliable indicators of government policy only when they serve as a mouthpiece for official policy (a role frequently played by the mass-circulated party newspaper in the one-party state) or are subject to strict censorship which forces them to report on and laud government policies. In Kenya the KANU party did not sponsor a mass-circulated newspaper or periodical then and there is no strict censorship of the press. Hence, press editorials and commentary are not reliable indicators of Kenyan Government foreign policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In fact, they can be quite the contrary. Just prior to, during, and immediately after the six-day war in June of 1967 the Kenyan press was overwhelmingly pro-Israeli. On the editorial pages there were calls for Arab recognition of Israel long before demands for an Israeli withdrawal were ever even mentioned in news stories. One Daily Nation editorial declared that "war" (was) forced on the Israelis."125 There were several satires on the war and its outcome in weekly columns, unquestionably pro-Israel in much the same vein as their counterparts in the Western press, which callously suggested "Come to Israel and visit the pyramids."126

The reason for the preceding description of press reaction to the six-day war is not to emphasize the freedoms that enable the Kenyan press to take a stand in the conflict when its Government has declared a neutralist, non-aligned
policy. In fact; such an emphasis might be a bit premature at this point. For an incident occurred in the wake of the press support of Israel which not only casts some doubt on the amount of press freedom in Kenya but also reveals something about the official Kenyan Government policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

On 13 June, 1967 the Minister of State, Mr. James Nyamweya issued the following statement to the Kenyan newspapers:

"... Although the Kenya Press has been free and generally responsible since independence, the trend in the last few months has caused concern... there is enough evidence to believe that the Kenya Press, especially the two daily newspapers, are occasionally deflected from their normal courses and get involved in publishing material that tends to inflame Kenya relations with certain friendly countries... Although the Government owns no newspaper of its own, it is to be expected that the free Press of Kenya will follow the Government example."

Although there is no explicit mention of the press support for Israel or even of the Arab-Israeli conflict anywhere throughout the entire statement excerpted above, it is clear that that was the issue in Mr. Nyamweya's mind. Not only was the statement issued at a time when the Kenyan press was reaching a crescendo in its support for the Israeli position, but it is also interesting that despite its failure to mention the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Daily Nation's Librarian had decided to include the statement in the 1967 clippings file on the Middle-East.

This incident of press support for the Israeli position and the resulting Government response reveals more than a look at "subtle" Government press repression in
Kenya. It also indicates that extent to which the Kenya Government will go to maintain its declared policy of non-alignment in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

From its over-all foreign policy of non-alignment, Kenya has adopted a neutralist policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the basis of its official Government statements it is clear that the Kenya Government desires to remain fully impartial in the dispute.

It is also quite clear that the realities of Kenya's policy do not differ significantly from its declared rhetoric. Kenya's diplomacy, U.N. voting records and Government actions on the Shifta War, Arab propaganda and the pro-Israeli press all reveal a consistent, concerted attempt to remain impartial toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. Kenya has not only declared its non-alignment, but has also been able to remain so in reality.

As described by I. William Zartman, a nation's foreign policy toward an issue is determined by a combination of both its national interest and its ideology, where the former usually predominates. In Kenya, ideology is rarely discernable and plays no apparent role in determining policy. Statements of Kenya's policy on all issues other than those dealing with continued colonialism in Africa tend to be non-committal, much to the chagrin of those who want Kenya to take positions on other issues and bemoan its "wait and see" behaviour.

Further, Kenya has no distinct interests in the Middle-
East. Although it remains a recipient of large amounts of Israeli aid, Kenya is by no means dependent on it. And it has little to gain from a wider commitment from the Israelis. Kenya's prime interest is that the Suez Canal be reopened; and it appears doubtful that siding with either Middle-Eastern protagonist is likely to foster that objective.

Hence, Kenya's non-aligned stance toward the Arab-Israeli conflict appears to be a policy derived out of convenience. Since ideology is not important to it and since its national interest is not threatened, Kenya's non-alignment with either protagonist in the conflict is the most convenient policy to pursue. It not only keeps open the option for receiving aid from both the Arabs and Israelis, but also prevents Kenya from having to face defending a policy of support for either protagonist; a position which has proven quite uncomfortable for many nation-states.

In a chapter entitled "Describing the Foreign Relations of a State," David O. Wilkinson has suggested an explanation of why certain nations pursue non-aligned policies on certain issues which largely concurs with the preceding discussion:

A successful policy of neutrality toward and non-involvement in all international disputes makes a state an "isolate," a role pleasant to weak states who have little to gain and much to lose from foreign entanglements.129

Such an explanation appears viable when applied to Kenya's position toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. For despite its incessant modernization, Kenya still cannot be described
other than as a "weak" state . . . economically and diplomatically; and as described previously, it has obviously little to gain from any foreign entanglements in that part of the world.

As in the case of the description of the Kenyan policy, note commencing any discussion of official Ugandan government statements, some attempt to determine who makes policy in Uganda should be made. Uganda poses a special problem in that it is the only nation of the three in East Africa with which this study is concerned in which a complete change of government has taken place. Hence, throughout the discussion of Uganda's foreign policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict a dichotomy between the pre-coup policy under Obote and the post-coup policy under Amin will be made.

Under Obote, from independence until his ouster in January 1971, Ugandan foreign policy determination was entirely the prerogative of the President (or Prime Minister) and his close advisors. Gartman's hypothesis about decision-making among African Governments applies to Uganda as well as it did to Kenya.

As in Kenya, the single party in Uganda's one-party state, the Ugandan People's Congress (UPC), has been weak and unable to achieve a centralized organization or an efficient party machine, as many of its key leaders were
CHAPTER IV

THE UGANDAN POLICY

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As in Kenya, the single party in Uganda's one-party state, the Ugandan People's Congress (UPC), has been weak and unable to achieve a centralized organization or an efficient party machine, as many of its key leaders were
absorbed into the national government. Since there is no competing party, the leaders are not concerned with strengthening the UPC structure while in office, hence it remains weak. Furthermore, Uganda's parliament has played a non-role similar to that of Kenya's in the field of foreign policy determination. Hence, any influence the UPC or the Parliament of Uganda might be able to bring to bear on the formulation of Uganda's foreign policy would have been peripheral, at best.

There is little doubt that in the post-coup period under General Amin, foreign policy has continued to be formulated and declared by the Head of State and his immediate (mostly military) advisors. With Parliament disbanded and all political parties banned, the military leadership and its appointees are the only official sources of policy. In an interview with a Voice of America correspondent on 18 September 1971, Ugandan Foreign Minister Kibedi stated that Uganda's foreign policy was determined by direction of the President in consultation with his cabinet.

Prior to the coup, the individual most responsible for Uganda's foreign policy included first Prime Minister and later President Obote, his Secretary for Research, Picho Ali, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sam Odaka. In the period since the coup the individuals most directly responsible for Uganda's foreign policy could be best seen in their roles during the recent negotiations between Uganda and Tanzania arbitrated by Kenya. The
leading Ugandan role was played by President Amin. Foreign Minister, Wanume Kibedi, and his personal assistant, D. Taliwaku, also played key roles. Other leading spokesmen included William Naburri, the Minister for Information, J.M. Zikusoka (Works, Communications and Housing), and E.S. Wakhweya (Finance).

Both before and after the recent coup Uganda has officially pursued a declared policy of non-alignment. Initially, President Obote made no distinction between non-alignment and neutralism. In his first foreign policy outline for independent Uganda given in Parliament on 13 November 1962 however, the Prime Minister essentially opted for the former, although he did not explicitly state it. He suggested:

"... the question of neutrality or non-alignment (was) not appropriate for Uganda or Africa. Uganda must express herself, criticize what was wrong, and support what she thought was right."\(^{132}\) This sounds very much like Kenya's concept of "positive non-alignment." Later, President Obote directly stated that Uganda "was not aligned to any one of the big blocs."\(^{133}\)

President Amin has also emphasized Uganda's foreign policy of non-alignment and stressed that Uganda intended to remain friendly to all countries of the world and would not be aligned to any country "even in the purchase of arms."\(^{134}\)

And in an interview on Uganda's foreign policy, Foreign Minister Kibedi operationalized the concept "non-alignment"
in the much same way Obote appears to have done. On the surface, at least, there appears to have been no change in Uganda's stated foreign policy.

Prior to the coup, Uganda's policy declarations, sparse as they were, appear inconsistent and ambiguous. In a joint communique issued by Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol and President Obote in 1966, Uganda expressed its support for a check to the Middle-Eastern arms race and the peaceful solution of international disputes. Considering the battering they were then taking in the United Nations for their retaliatory airstrikes into Syria, Israel must have been pleased with obtaining such support from Uganda. President Obote even stated his intention to deepen the basis of their mutual relations still further. At virtually the same time President Obote was issuing the joint communique with Prime Minister Eshkol, Uganda's representative as a temporary member of the U.N. Security Council was stressing that Uganda "did not condone any reprisal action by any party" in reference to the Israeli retaliatory airstrikes.

On other occasions, official declarations of Ugandan policy toward the Arab-Israeli dispute are similarly inconsistent and ambiguous. In an interview with the daily newspaper The Uganda Argus, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sam Odaka, stated: "Uganda's position on the Middle-East crisis has always been on the side of peace." Since he did not elaborate, it is impossible to determine
whether he was indicating non-alignment or neutralism, pro-Israeli or Pro-Arab support.

However, by late 1969 and 1970 Uganda's official policy declarations began to sound more consistently pro-Arab in content. There was talk of "the struggle of the Egyptians and our brothers in the Arab world." And Uganda's ambassador to Cairo, Mr. P. Ofwana went so far as to state: "To us at the present time Egypt is the bulwark against our would be destroyers. To strangle Egypt is to suffocate Africa."

Wanume Kibedi, Uganda's Foreign Minister under Amin has complained that under Obote there were many inconsistencies in Ugandan foreign policy. In terms of Uganda's foreign policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, it appears that Kibedi's criticism is appropriate. If any pattern emerges from the ambiguities of official statements under Obote, it is that in late 1969 or early 1970 (interestingly roughly coinciding with Uganda's "move to the left") Uganda began pursuing a declared policy of greater support for the Arabs.

It is interesting that if a sentence by sentence analysis of official policy declarations (like the one applied to Kenya) is made, of the eight sentences involved in the five statements, three are "pro-Arab," three "neutralist or non-aligned," and two are "pro-Israeli." Thus, under Obote, policy statements on the Arab-Israeli conflict average out to give Uganda the "non-alignment" it stated that it followed on foreign policy in general. Closer examination however, reveals that such average was
not the result of any consistency in statements which were largely "neutralist" or "non-aligned," as in the case of Kenya, but rather of the inconsistencies involved in having taken all three positions during the nine years the Obote Government was in power.

Since his ascension to power in January 1971, General Amin and representatives of his Government have generally expressed their official policy of "non-alignment" toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. But where President Obote's Government had begun to lean in support of the Arabs, the Amin Government took an opposite turn. If it varied from its declared path of "non-alignment," it was always in the direction of the Israelis.

In many ways, the public declarations of the Amin Government have sounded very much like those of neutralist Kenya. President Amin has expressed his confidence in the O.A.U.'s Mediation Committee and the Jarring Mission, and has gone on to state: "Uganda's position on the Middle-East conflict (is) one of neutrality," and had previously stated: "Uganda . . . takes no sides in the Middle-East conflict between Egypt and Israel." And much like this counterpart in Kenya, Uganda's Foreign Minister Wanume Kibedi stated that "... we would like to see peace in the area and we certainly support the U.N. resolution of 1967 (resolution 242 discussed previously in the description of Kenyan policy)."

A closer examination of official statement and the context in which they were made indicates some distinguish-
able pro-Israeli sentiment. For one, General Amin has described Uganda's relations with Israel as "excellent." No comparable comment has been made about relations with any of the Arab states. Secondly, when Cairo's Al Ahram charged that the Israeli Chief of Staff, General Haim Bar-Lev, had paid a secret visit to Uganda, a spokesman for President Amin's office denied the report, but unabashedly stated that "Uganda would welcome a visit by General Bar Lev any time in his capacity as Israeli Chief of Staff." A sentence by sentence analysis of official statements issued by the Amin Government since its ascension to power reveals a tendency to support the Israelis. Of the seven sentences involved in the four statements, four have been "neutralist or non-aligned," and three have been "pro-Israeli." There has not been a single statement issued which indicates any reference for the Arab position in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Like Kenya, Uganda hosts diplomatic missions from both protagonists in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Since no new states have established embassies in Kampala since Obote's ouster, there is no need to describe the missions represented in Uganda both before and after the coup. It is interesting to note, however, that both the Arab states of Yemen and Iraq have established diplomatic missions in neighbouring, neutralist Kenya since Amin's take-over with no obvious overtures to the new Ugandan Government.
At present, Algeria, Morocco, the Sudan, Tunisia, and the A.R.E. are the only Arab states represented in Uganda. Israel also staffs a very large embassy in Kampala. Under President Obote, much like his Kenyan neighbours, Uganda's only diplomatic mission in the Middle-East was based in Cairo. Significantly, the Amin Government has opened another mission in the Middle-East, and this time in Israel. It is also significant that the Ugandans elected to place their mission in Jerusalem rather than Tel Aviv, the capital for which Israel seeks wider international recognition.

Like many of the official Government statements under Obote, the official state or ministerial visits to Uganda from the Middle-East and reciprocally from Uganda to the Middle-East appear inconsistent and lack any pattern. Uganda played host to numerous high-ranking Israeli delegations, and only one Arab delegation (from the one Arab nation it has historically had the most difficulty with, the Sudan). When she was Foreign Minister, Mrs. Golda Meir visited Uganda in 1963. She was followed in 1966 by then Prime Minister Eshkol who was reportedly "warmly received everywhere." In his July 1970 African tour, Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban also included Uganda on his itinerary. The only Arab head of state to visit Uganda under Obote was Prime Minister Mahgoub of the Sudan in April 1966.

Interestingly, no official Presidential or high-ranking delegations visited Israel under Obote. His only state visit to any of the nations directly involved in the
The Arab-Israeli conflict was to the Sudan in March 1963. Uganda's relations with the Sudan throughout this period reveal some further perplexing relationships and will be discussed in more detail later under the section on "other indicators."

In sum, Ugandan diplomacy under Obote appears as difficult to generalize about as the official statements which emanated from his Government. Despite the lavish interest shown by the Israelis, nothing in the way of official high-ranking delegations were ever sent in return. The fact that no such delegations were ever dispatched to either protagonist in the Middle-East may have been the way the Obote Government elected to remain neutral and non-aligned in the conflict. Or, it may simply be a reflection of the instability which existed in Uganda under Obote, which ultimately erupted into his ouster. Prior to his trip to the Singapore Commonwealth Conference in January 1971, President Obote had rarely traveled outside Uganda or as much as dispatched any high-ranking delegations on diplomatic visits, for fear of such a possible coup.

Although he has been in power for less than a year at this writing, the diplomacy executed under President Amin has followed a very consistent pattern. If statements issued by the Amin Government have had a "tendency" to support the Israelis, then its diplomacy must be termed as overwhelmingly pro-Israeli.

To begin with, Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban was sure to include Uganda on his May 1971 African tour,
despite the fact that the O.A.U. Heads of State Conference originally scheduled to be held in Kampala in June had been moved to Addis Ababa, because of difficulties over the legitimacy of the Amin Government. Significantly, Egypt's Hafez Ghanem did not make any attempt to meet with General Amin, in spite of the fact that his proximity in neighbouring Kenya and Tanzania made such a visit very possible. It is also well known that relations between Uganda and its Arab neighbour, the Sudan, have been through a strained period since President Idi Amin seized power.  

In terms of his official state visits, President Amin has made it clear that he feels much more comfortable with the Israelis than he does with the Arabs. In his first trip outside Uganda after his ascendency to power the President and Foreign Minister visited Israel. The Ugandan delegation was given a red carpet welcome by Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and Foreign Minister Abba Eban before being whisked off by helicopter for a meeting in Jerusalem with Prime Minister Golda Meir. After an official visit to Britain, the Ugandan delegation returned to Africa via Israel. Similarly en route to and again in return from his state visit to France, President Amin made stops and held discussions with Israeli leaders in both Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. The most attention the Ugandans have paid to the Arabs has been sending a new ambassador to Cairo to replace the Obote appointee.
Israelis visiting Uganda have been accorded red carpet treatment similar to that received by the Ugandans in Israel. In addition to Uganda's declared receptivity to a possible (or perhaps past) visit by General Bar-Lev, the new Israeli Ambassador to Uganda, Mr. D. Laor, who arrived in Uganda in July 1971, was greeted at the airport by three Ugandan Ministers, two of which (Naburri and Wakhweya) were mentioned as prime spokesmen for Uganda foreign policy in the post-coup period. Such a red carpet airport welcome is unusual for an arriving Ambassador.

In sum, Ugandan diplomacy since Amin's ascendancy has indicated a clear preference for the Israelis. By opening an embassy in Jerusalem, making frequent (four to date) official visits to Israel, and lavishly welcoming Israeli officials while all the time fastidiously ignoring the Arabs, Uganda's foreign policy under the Amin Government appears destined to favour the Israelis when pressed to a decision on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Utilizing the same method applied to Kenya to achieve an accurate, quantitative measure of U.N. voting, the inconsistencies and vacillations observed in official Ugandan Government statements under Obote re-emerge. Unfortunately, the usual dichotomy between Obote and Amin cannot be made in the analysis, since the Amin Government has yet (or is presently in the process at this writing) to be forced to take stands in the U.N. General Assembly. However, data are available from eight of the nine General Assembly sessions in which the Obote Government participated.
Out of a total of twenty-one votes Uganda has supported and voted with the Arabs nine times; five times in the key year of 1967 and four times (on every roll-call vote) in 1970. On eight occasions, Uganda has voted with neither the Arabs nor the Israelis; once in 1965, and once in 1966, five times in 1967, and once in 1968. And on four occasions, the Ugandan delegation has voted with the Israelis all in the crucial as 1967. It is significant that in a year as crucial as 1967, Uganda's support split almost evenly on behalf of the Arabs, the Israelis, and neither side.

If a rank order of votes is assigned such that a vote paired with the Israeli delegation is valued at one, a neutral vote at zero, and a vote paired with the Arabs at negative one, Uganda's four "pro-Israeli" votes yield four units, its eight "neutral" votes yield zero, and its nine "pro-Arab" votes negative nine. When the sum of negative five is divided by the number of votes involved, Uganda's average is determined. Its average is -0.24, a more than neutral tendency to support the Arabs over time, but certainly not a clear "pro-Arab" position.

The following diagram graphically illustrates the pattern of Ugandan voting on the twenty-two resolutions on the Arab-Israeli conflict offered into the U.N. General Assembly since its 20th session in 1965:

(Kenya on page 53).
If a closer examination is made of the two resolutions reportedly "most representative" of the Arabs and the Israelis, the 17 power draft resolution submitted by Yugoslavia and the 20 power draft resolution submitted by twenty Latin American nations, respectively, Uganda appears to be consistent in its support for the Arabs. It voted with the Arab states in support for the "Yugoslav resolution" and against the "Latin American resolution."

A closer examination of another key resolution from the Fifth Emergency Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly in 1967 reveals a perplexing inconsistency in Ugandan voting, however. In another "pro-Arab" resolutions submitted by Albania, Uganda did not vote with the Arab bloc in favour of the resolutions. In fact it did not even abstain with neutralist Kenya. Instead, the Ugandan delegation joined the Israelis in opposition to the resolutions. Uganda did this in the same meeting (1548) of 4 July 1967 in which it had voted against the "pro-Israeli" resolution submitted by the twenty Latin American powers.

An examination of the diagram on the preceding page reveals further inconsistencies. Where Kenya over a period of years supported either side one key resolutions, Uganda did so in a matter of minutes. In the General Assembly's crucial meeting on the six day war (1548), a meeting from which resolutions five through fifteen were extracted (which included the Albanian, Soviet, Latin American, and U.S. resolutions) Uganda vacillated from a "pro-Israeli" to a "pro-Arab" vote or vice versa three times in less than
four hours. It is interesting to note that in one "pro-Israeli" vote, Uganda was the first nation in the U.N. General Assembly that stated its position in the roll-call.

Much like the official statements issued by the Obote Government, no consistent pattern emerges in U.N. voting until after 1968. Then, perhaps as part of Ugandas's "move to the left" a trend to support the Arabs emerges. It is this latter trend which accounts for the over-all average of Ugandan votes to appear somewhat "pro-Arab."

Before 1969, the inconsistencies of the Ugandan U.N. delegation voting average out to yield an essentially neutralist position of approximately -0.05 less deviation than observed in the opposite direction by the Kenyan delegation.

Largely the result of its geographical position, Uganda's foreign policy toward an issue not directly involved with, but related to the Arab-Israeli conflict might provide a further indication of its preference (if any) for either protagonist in the dispute. This "other indicator" is Uganda's foreign policy toward the situation in the Southern Sudan, its neighbour immediately to the north.

Ever since the Sudan was granted its independence in 1956, the essentially Christian and pagan black southerners have fought a civil war for regional autonomy against the "Arab" northerners. Israel makes no secret of its sympathy
for the southerner's cause, as the Arab states predictably express their backing for the northerners. Hence, Uganda's policy toward the Southern Sudanese conflict may add information (as an "other indicator") to Uganda's policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.

There is every reason to believe that Uganda would be sympathetic to the southerner's cause. Not only do many of its people feel religious, racial, linguistic and even tribal affinity with the southerners, but regular Sudanese armed forces have on a number of occasions crossed into Ugandan territory destroying lives and property in pursuit of the "Anya nya;" the Southern Sudanese guerilla forces. In addition, Uganda has received the largest number of refugees from the Sudanese conflict whose influence (or burden) might play a factor in affecting Ugandan policy, much like the Bengali refugees influenced Indian policy prior to the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War.

Under Obote, Uganda's relations with the Sudan were frequently strained, largely the result of frequent Sudanese incursions into Ugandan territory. However, President Obote was opposed to the use of force in securing frontier changes. He also opposed to secessionism as well as any types of foreign intervention in Africa, "especially to intervention based on his own territory." Hence, it does not appear likely that Obote consciously allowed the Israelis to use Uganda as a staging base for support missions into the Southern Sudan, as has been suggested in
some quarters. Furthermore, in their study of Uganda-Sudan relations between 1962 and 1966, Yash Tandon and A.G.G. Gingyera-Pincwa concluded that there was an apparent lack of official support by Uganda for the Anya nya in the Sudan.

Uganda's "lack of support for the Anya nya" should not be construed as the existence of support on behalf of the Sudanese Government in Khartoum. For Ugandan troops have exchanged fire with the Sudanese regulars in pursuit of the Anya nya, and despite their "rapprochement," in 1969, Uganda continues to allow relief supplies, though not arms, to pass across the frontier. There were also persistent reports that Anya nya received training from the Ugandan Army at a camp near the frontier. In Legum and Drysdale's *Africa Contemporary Record*, such reports were described as "probably true." Furthermore, despite frequent complaints regularly filed by the Sudan Embassy in Kampala, Uganda showed no sign of changing its policy towards the rebels which, officially, was to allow them refuge but not to permit them to indulge in politics or other activities in the country.

In sum, under Obote, Uganda's official policy toward the Southern Sudanese civil war was largely one of laissez-faire neutralism. In reality, however, the Ugandan Army very likely might have aided the Anya nya in their bid for autonomy. This would make Kampala's official "neutrality" under Obote compatible with the reports of "support" for the Anya nya described above.
Although there has been no chance in official declaration on the Sudanese conflict, there are a number of reasons to believe that there exists more official support (albeit discreet) for the Anya nya under the Amin Government.

For one, in a discussion of Uganda's "putative rapprochement" with the Sudan as being not universally popular in Uganda in 1969, Lecum and Drysdale have written: "Leaders from the northwest, including the Commander of the Armed Forces, Major-General Amin, have shown strong sympathies with the southern Sudanese cause." Shortly after he attained power, General Amin charged that the Sudanese were aiding "pro-Obote guerillas" from northern Uganda. Following those initial charges, relations between Uganda and the Sudan, "which for some months had been badly strained after the military coup in Uganda," had even deteriorated to the extent of some Sudanese diplomats being expelled from Uganda.

Sudanese President Numeiry went as far as to charge that Uganda was directly aiding the Anya nya by supplying them with training and Israeli's ammunitions in a BBC interview on 20 September 1971. When a spokesman for the President's Office officially denied the allegations, his words were not particularly conciliatory. He declared that if General Amin wanted to help the Southern Sudanese guerillas he would do so directly and not through Israel. The official took exception to the implication of Israeli involvement, not the issue of Uganda's support of the Anya nya.
Relations between Uganda and the Sudan were worsening in mid-December of 1971. Following reports of fresh unrest in the southern Sudan and increased refugee migration into Uganda, President Amin ordered Uganda's Army and Air Force on alert. He went so far as to mention possible Ugandan intervention in the situation. It is not altogether impossible that Uganda could find itself in a situation similar to that faced by India with the refugee problem from East Pakistan, and that its leaders may have had a similar solution in mind.

In sum, since the Amin Government came to power, there appears to have been a change from the "laissez-faire" official neutralism of the Obote Government toward the Sudanese civil war. Just how far the Amin Government will move in support of the Anyanya and the southern Sudanese separatist movement is yet to be shown. However, as an "other indicator" of Uganda's policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, it appears that Amin's diplomatic preference for the Israelis may well be an indication of a "pro-Israeli" policy preference in general.

From the time it attained independence in 1962 until sometime in 1969, Uganda's foreign policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict followed an incoherent and inconsistent path. Based on the declared policy of "non-alignment," Uganda's policy in reality vacillated between support for both protagonists. It was not until sometime in 1969, roughly coinciding with Uganda's "move to the left," that
any discernable pattern began to emerge. From that time until its ouster in January 1971, the Obote Government pursued a policy of support for the Arab position in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

With the suddenness of the military coup, Uganda's policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict has made an about face. On the basis of its subtle policy statements, its blatant diplomacy preferences and its position on the Sudanese civil war, Uganda has clearly made a complete turn around from its support of the Arab position in the latter days of the Obote administration. Uganda's present policy is one of reserved support for the Israeli position in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Zartman's hypothesis that foreign policy is determined by a combination of a nation-state's national interest and its ideology applies much better to Uganda than it did to Kenya. Perhaps the most significant factors involved in an explanation of Ugandan policy has been related to its national interest (see Appendix also). They involve first the unique relationship between Israel and Uganda since the latter's independence in 1962 and second, the related conflict that has raged in the Southern Sudan since 1956.

The technical assistance agreement which first brought the Israelis into Uganda (largely to train the military in 1962) was negotiated directly by then Prime Minister Milton Obote, against the advice of the departing British. They had initially hoped to retain influence in the former colony through their own military advisors and were allegedly wary of the Israeli motives behind their generous aid offer.
As it turned out, the Israeli offer was indeed not quite as generous as it initially appeared. The Ugandans made some considerable concessions to the Israelis for the military training and equipment they supplied. For example, the arriving Israeli advisors were granted tax free entry of private cars and numerous other luxury goods in greater quantity and over a greater period of time than technical advisors from other countries. Although this is not likely to create a significant burden on the Ugandan economy, such an unrestricted inflow of high-demand goods was not likely to do it any good. The Israeli advisors were similarly granted very liberal mobility back and forth Uganda's borders with very little of the resistance encountered by other expatriate nationalities. The Israeli technical assistance program was incidentally the only program that operated beyond the control of the Ministry of Planning, the coordinators of every other technical assistance program operating during the Obote administration.

Over time, as the sole advisors to Uganda's burgeoning military establishment, the Israelis were able to penetrate that important sector (according to a Makerere University professor) and the Ugandan Government became increasingly obliged to appease Israeli demands. The Israeli strength in Uganda increased to the extent that on a number of occasions the Israeli ambassador is known to have stormed into the office of President Obote without appointment to directly confront him with demands and complaints about
Ugandan actions in the U.N. or elsewhere diplomatically.

The amount of Israeli influence and the aggressive diplomacy it was known to have unleashed upon Obote appears a very tenable explanation for Uganda's erratic behaviour toward the Arab-Israeli conflict under Obote. It is quite conceivable that Uganda's tendency to vacillate from a pro-Arab to a pro-Israeli position in a matter of days . . . or even hours . . . might very well have been brought about by one of the incidents when the Israeli Ambassador stormed into Obote's office with demands and threats regarding Uganda's military. Thus, it is highly probable that even had the Ugandan Government wanted to support the Arab position earlier than it eventually did, during the '67 war for example, it couldn't as a result of the Israeli's dominant presence in Uganda.

The Southern Sudanese conflict should also be mentioned in evaluating Uganda's policy since the coup. It should be remembered that President Amin had urged the Ugandan Government to actively support the southerners in 1969. Amin was born in the southern Sudan and his sympathies on behalf of the south, perhaps influenced by his childhood memories of northern-Arab oppression and conscious of his extended family still residing in the South, are well known. It is even rumoured that he was involved in channelling aid to the Southern secessionists and actually used Anya nya battalions to squelch uprisings by Acholi and Lango Obote loyalists in the north of Uganda shortly after the
coup. Hence, it is also probable that Amin has navigated Uganda into a position of support for the Israelis not only as a result of his gratitude to and friendship toward the Israelis previous to his ascension to power, but also in an effort to further support for the cause of regional autonomy or total independence for the Southern Sudanese.

In sum, the pervasive Israeli presence in Uganda has largely accounted for its erratic policy up until its ideological "move to the left" in 1969 and since the January 1971 coup. The related problem of the Southern Sudan has not only served as an indicator of Ugandan policy, but also as an explanation, particularly since Amin's ascension to power.
CHAPTER V

THE TANZANIAN POLICY

In keeping with the procedure established for the descriptions of Kenyan and Ugandan foreign policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, before commencing any discussions of official Tanzanian Government statements, some attempt to determine who makes the foreign policy in Tanzania should be made.

In the case of Tanzania, it is possible to draw on T. M. Shaw's study of Tanzanian foreign policy (1961-1968) for a direct treatment of who actually determines and declares policy. Shaw has suggested that in his role as Head of State, Commander-in-Chief of the Tanzanian People's Defense Forces, Minister of Foreign Affairs and TANU President (TANU is the abbreviation for Tanzania's single-party, the Tanzanian African National Union), Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere has a natural and constitutional dominance in foreign relations.  

Like his counterparts in Kenya and Uganda, President Nyerere also has a small number of close advisors who play an important role in the formulation and declaration of Tanzanian foreign policy. Shaw has suggested that the determination of Tanzanian policy is in part "a function of
the decision-making elite who define and implement state
goals. Shaw has also observed that the influence of
formal and informal groups (including TANU and Parliament)
in Tanzania on Presidential decisions on foreign policy
decisions is minimal and limited to policy modification
rather than initiation.

The individuals most directly responsible for
Tanzania's foreign policy could best be seen in their roles
during the recent negotiations between Uganda and Tanzania
arbitrated by Kenya in Nairobi. The leading Tanzanian
role was naturally played by President Nyerere. His Minister
of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Isael Elinewinga, also
played a key role. Other leading spokesmen included
Peter Kisumo, Minister for Administration and John Malecela,
Tanzania's representative as the East African Community's
Minister for Finance and Administration.

In terms of its foreign policy in general, Tanzania
follows an officially declared policy of non-alignment.
This was reaffirmed as recently as September 1971, when in
a major policy report to the 15th national conference of
the ruling TANU Party, President Nyerere reaffirmed
Tanzania's stand on non-alignment when he discussed foreign
policy.

President Nyerere has gone to some lengths to define
precisely what "non-alignment" means in terms of the
practical application and implementation of declared foreign
policy. On a stopover in the U.S.S.R during his 28 day
State visit which began on 28 September 1969, President Nyerere gave the following definition of his country's policy of "non-alignment''

We are African nationalists first; all other aspects of our policy come after that . . . Our policy is therefore one of friendship to all, but non-aligned in the great power conflicts and non-involvement in world ideological conflicts which are irrelevant to Africa. In standing outside these great conflicts, we are not trying to pretend that we have no interest in them. On the contrary, we wish to join with other peoples in the work of overcoming human injustice and human suffering. Our first international interest is therefore in the promotion of peace and justice.168

This is much more elaborate and eloquent clarification of the "positive non-alignment" alluded to by Kenya's Foreign Minister, Dr. Mungai, which pledges non-involvement in the major power disputes but does not mean neutralism toward all conflicts, particularly those in Africa.

While Kenya's "positive non-alignment" makes no provision for pursuing more than a strict neutralist policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, Tanzanian policy dictates that the situation in the Middle East clearly falls into the category of the struggles of "other peoples in the work of overcoming human injustice and human suffering" and not of great power ideological conflicts. Hence, the Tanzanians make no excuses for their deliberate support for the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In October 1966, President Nyerere openly expressed his support "for the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations."169 And throughout 1967 Tanzania consistently
supported the Arab position. Even before the six-day war began, President Nyerere cabled Egyptian President Nasser offering aid "in defense of your rights against imperialism."

Throughout the stormy 5th Emergency Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly held in June and July of 1967, "Tanzania declared its support for the Arab states." Not only was it one of the co-sponsors of the 17-power draft resolution, the resolution used as the most "pro-Arab" or representative of the Arab interests in both this study and Samuel Decalo's "Africa and the Mid-Eastern War," but in the official explanations of policy and voting Tanzania consistently supported the Arab position.

Tanzania shared the Arab view that Israel had launched "an aggressive assault on its neighbours on 5 June." And during the General Assembly discussion on the war, Tanzania made the point that:

... one of the striking features which had accompanied the growth of Israel had been its use of armed force as a means of territorial expansion. Nowhere in the statement of the representative of Israel was it categorically asserted or admitted who fired the first shot; but it was clear from the record of events who did. Israel had committed aggression against the Arab states, aided and abetted by colonialist and imperialist powers.

Tanzania supported the Arab preconditions that an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces, together with non-recognition of the acquisition of territory by force be met before negotiations on other issues were begun. And the spokesman for Tanzania, Mr. John Malecela, shared the view of the Arab states that
the Palestine refugee problem had been too long aggravated by failure to implement the General Assembly's resolutions—reiterated since 1948—on repatriation or compensation of the refugees, largely due to Israeli intransigence in its part in implementing such resolutions.

Tanzania has continued its fervent support for the Arab position since 1967. President Nyerere "loyally continued to support his close, personal friend, President Nasser, until his death." And in October 1969 the Tanzanian Ambassador in Cairo, Mr. George Nhigula, announced the shock of the Tanzanian Government and people at the burning of the Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem "at the hands of Israel." The Tanzanian Ambassador went on to reaffirm Tanzania's condemnation of "the aggressive Israeli policy" and denounced Israel for not implementing the U.N. resolution calling for its withdrawal from the Arab territories it occupied.

More, recently, President Nyerere again described Israel as "a conquering state (which) has taken over territories and peoples belonging to others." And at the Mwanza TANU Conference held in May 1970 President Nyerere bitterly attacked Israel:

The establishment of the state of Israel was an act of aggression against the Arab people. . . . The international community accepted this. The Arab states did not and could not accept that act of aggression. . . . the Arab states cannot be beaten into such acceptance. On the contrary, attempts to coerce the Arab states into recognizing Israel—whether it be a refusal to relinquish occupied territory, by insistence on direct negotiations between the two sides—would only make such acceptance impossible.
And finally, describing the Israeli decision not to deliver the aid it offered to the O.A.U. Liberation Movement Committee, a spokesma, for Tanzanian's Ministry of Foreign Affairs questioned how Israel could support "freedom fighters" in Africa when it was suppressing them in the Arab territories it occupied.180

Only once in the decade of Tanzania's independence has it as much as expressed any sympathy for the Israeli position in the Arab-Israeli conflict. And that was in a weakly worded statement issued by the then Tanganyikan delegation following the 47-nation non-aligned conference held in Cairo in 1964. The conference, endorsed "full restoration of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine to their homeland," and the spokesman from Tanganyika reportedly "expressed reservations."181 It is interesting to note that this "sympathy" for the Israeli position was expressed early in Tanzania's decade of independence.

It is not surprising that if a sentence by sentence analysis of official policy declarations (like the ones applied to Kenya and Uganda) is made; the Tanzanians emerge exceedingly "pro-Arab." Of the 27 sentences involved in the 16 statements, 25 are "pro-Arab," one "neutralist or non-aligned," and only one "pro-Israeli" (described above).

Thus, on the basis of its official policy declarations, Tanzania has pursued a consistently pro-Arab policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict in the decade which has passed since it attained independence in December 1961.
Like Kenya and Uganda, Tanzania hosts diplomatic missions from both protagonists in the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, Tanzania has more Arab states represented than either Kenya or Uganda alone. At present, Algeria, Iraq, Morocco, Southern Yemen (Yemen), the Sudan, Syria, and the A.R.E. staff embassies in Dar es Salaam. As it does in Kenya and Uganda, Israel staffs a large embassy in Tanzania.

Reciprocally, Tanzania has established embassies in the Sudan and the A.R.E., with their ambassadors posted in these two countries assigned to other Arab states including Algeria, Iraq and Syria. Tanzania does not staff an embassy in Israel.

In terms of official state or ministerial visits to Tanzania from the Middle-Eastern combatants, Tanzania has received both sides. It is significant, however, that the last (and only) Israeli state visit took place in February of 1963, when the then Foreign Minister Golda Meir went on an official visit to Tanganyika.

There have been two state visits from Arab Heads of State. Sudanese Prime Minister Mahgoub visited in July and August 1965, and as mentioned previously in one of this only state visit to Black Africa, Egyptian President Nasser visited Tanzania in September 1966. It is known that Presidents Nyerere and Nasser exchanged views on the situation in the Middle East and that President Nyerere expressed his support for "the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations."
In regard to reciprocal ministerial and state visits from Tanzania to the Middle East; the favour is definitely to the Arab states. President Nyerere has visited two Arab states, Algeria in July and August of 1963 and the A.R.E. in April 1967. Tanzanian first Vice-President Karume accompanied President Nyerere on the Egyptian trip. Other high-ranking Tanzanian delegations to Arab states have included two prior to the Tanganyika-Zanzibar merger in 1964. One was by Tanganyikan Vice-President (now prime minister) Rashidi Kawawa to Egypt in April 1963. The other was made by the Chief Minister of Zanzibar, Sheikh Mohamed Shamte Hamadi also to the A.R.E. in November of the same year. And as recently as July 1971, Tanzanian Foreign Minister, Isael Elinewinga, arrived in Cairo for a two-day visit and talks with Egyptian officials.

Only one "high-ranking" official from Tanzania has visited Israel. That was a visit made by Agriculture Minister Bomani in June 1961. His visit, incidentally, was made six months prior to Tanzanian independence and before the time at which it began pursuing an independent foreign policy.

Thus, although it has received delegation and diplomatic missions from both the Arabs and the Israelis, Tanzania's reciprocal diplomatic moves have virtually snubbed the Israelis. At no time since independence has a single high-ranking (or even low-ranking) state or ministerial delegation visited Israel. Tanzania's diplomacy, like its
official Government statements, indicates a clear preference for the Arabs.

Utilizing the same method applied to Kenya and Uganda to achieve an accurate, quantitative measure of U.N. voting, the consistent Tanzanian policy of supporting the Arab position in the Arab-Israeli conflict is manifested.

Out of a total of twenty-one votes, Tanzania has supported and voted with the Arabs fifteen times; ten times in the crucial 1967 sessions alone, once in 1965, and four times (on every roll-call vote) in 1970. On six occasions Tanzania has voted with neither the Arabs nor the Israelis; once in 1966, four times in 1967, and one in 1968. Since it has been in the United Nations, (beginning with the 17th General Assembly Session in 1962), Tanzania has never voted with the Israeli delegation on any resolutions concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict.

If a rank order of votes is assigned such that a vote paired with Israel is valued at one, a neutral vote at zero, and a vote paired with the Arabs at negative one, Tanzania's six "neutral or non-aligned" votes yield zero units, and its fifteen "pro-Arab" votes negative fifteen. When the sum of -15 is divided by the number of votes involved, Tanzania's average is strikingly pro-Arab -0.72

The following diagram graphically illustrates the pattern of Tanzanian voting on the twenty-two resolutions
on the Arab-Israeli conflict beginning with the 20th
General Assembly Session of 1965:

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(Kenya on page 53 and Uganda on 72)

If a closer examination is made of the two resolutions reportedly "most representative" of the Arab and Israeli positions, the 17-power draft resolution submitted by Yugoslavia and the 20-power draft resolution submitted by twenty Latin American nations respectively, it is no surprise that Tanzania remained consistently in support of the Arab position. The Tanzanian delegation voted with the Arab bloc in support of the 17-power "pro-Arab" draft resolution submitted by Yugoslavia (indeed, Tanzania was a co-sponsor of that resolution). And it voted with the Arab bloc against the "pro-Israeli" 20-power draft resolution submitted by the twenty Latin American nations.

A closer examination of the six votes in which the Tanzanians cast a neutral ballot reveals that three of them dealt with Arab-Palestinian property rights and were highly unfavourable to the Israelis. None of these three came remotely close to the two-thirds majority required for passage.

The other three neutral ballots were cast on "radical"
amendments and a resolution, one amendment submitted by the Cuban delegation and one amendment and resolution by the Albanian delegation. Each of the amendments was overwhelmingly defeated; the Cuban proposal by a vote of 78 to 20 with 22 abstentions and the Albanian proposal by a vote of 66 to 32 with 22 abstentions. The Albanian resolution was rejected by a vote of 71 to 22 with 27 abstentions.

This closer examination reveals that the Tanzanian support of the Arab position is not monolithic. However, it only deviates from voting with the Arab bloc on amendments and resolutions which are exceedingly harsh or biased against the Israelis.

Thus, Tanzania's U.N. voting pattern is consistent with its pro-Arab official policy statements on the conflict and its obvious diplomatic preferences for the Arabs.

There is one rather insignificant and one fairly significant "other indicator" which reveal Tanzania's close relations with the Arab states.

The first is that shortly after Tanzania's recognition of Biafra, the Biafrans "hoped that President Nyerere's close friendship with President Nasser would influence him to withdraw Egyptian pilots flying MIGs" against the Biafrans. According to a Biafran radio announcement, such a request was in fact made for them by the Tanzanian Government. The facts that 1) such a request was made, and 2) that it was indeed carried out, indicate that relations between Tanzania and the A.R.E. have been extremely
good, no doubt much to the chagrin of Israeli policymakers.

The second "more significant" other indicator is the little known and little publicized fact that Tanzania and the A.R.E. have a defense agreement, the details of which are not fully known. The fact that such an agreement does exist, however, is truly an indication of Tanzanian support for and commitment to the Arab position, particularly if the agreement includes a mutual defense clause.

In its decade of independence (first Tanganyika and Zanzibar independently and later united as Tanzania) Tanzania has consistently pursued a pro-Arab policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. Emanating from a declared policy of non-alignment in international affairs, Tanzania's interpretation and adaptation of the concept of "positive non-alignment" has enabled it to take a stand on a conflict it considers outside the prohibited areas of major power or ideological disputes.

On the basis of its deliberately pro-Arab official policy declarations, overtly pro-Arab diplomacy; strongly pro-Arab U.N. voting record, and other indicators such as its excellent relations with the A.R.E. and its defense agreement with Cairo, Tanzania's foreign policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict has been and continues to be a pro-Arab one.

An obvious place to begin any explanation of its distinctly pro-Arab policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict would be with an examination of the possible influence of its relatively large Muslim population. It is very possible
that Tanzania's substantial Muslim population (which accounts for close to 40% of the total population) might influence its foreign policy on the basis of its religious affinity with the Arabs, somewhat along the lines envisioned by Nasser in his description of "the third circle."

But as described earlier, the influence of formal and informal interest groups on Tanzania's foreign policy decisions is "minimal and limited to policy modification rather than initiation." Furthermore, neither President Nyerere nor any of his immediate foreign policy advisors are Muslim, a factor which otherwise would have required greater consideration as a possible explanation for Tanzania's pro-Arab position.

Economic exigencies which might provide some explanation for Tanzanian policy (i.e. Zartman's national interest determinants of policy) are similarly inconclusive. Tanzania receives substantial aid from Israel despite its policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict and it carries on a comparable amount of trade with both protagonists. A much more substantial explanation for Tanzania's pro-Arab position is provided after a consideration of its ideological position, both domestically and internationally. Like many of the other "radical" governments in Africa, Tanzania's domestic policies of African socialism evolve into policies of support for similar governments internationally. Such governments are also adamant in their opposition to any remnants of European colonialism, neocolonialism and imperialism both in their home areas and abroad.
Tanzania's support for the Arab position accomplishes several objectives in a direct relation to its ideology. In the first instance it is an open expression of support for governments whose ideological posture, both domestically and internationally, is very similar to its own. Secondly, it is a consistent policy in that Tanzania views Israel in its role as the imperialist aggressor, many of whose moves are dictated by former colonialist powers. That Tanzania must support the Arab position is wholly consistent with its ideology founded on domestic African socialism and international opposition to colonialism and imperialism of any kind.

However, as I. William Zartman has suggested, "no state operates entirely on the basis of ideology; such a policy would be one of self-abnegation and would run the risk of suicide." Thus, mention should also be made of the close friendship that has persisted between Tanzania and the Arab Republic of Egypt since independence, and particularly of the relationship that developed between Presidents Nasser and Nyerere as additional factors.

Tanzania's support for the Arab position might be further explained as a sort of "repayment" to Cairo for its support given to Tanzanian nationalists just prior to independence in 1961, and more significantly for its solidarity with Tanzania and other "radical" Black African Governments immediately following UDI in Rhodesia in 1965. As described previously, the latter action was taken by the A.R.E. reluctantly "in order to keep solidarity with a
number of African states." Finally, mention should be made of Tanzania's international objective of attaining African Unity. It is highly probable that Tanzanian support for the Arab position might be influenced by its aspiration for greater continental unity . . . particularly between north and Black, sub-Saharan Africa.

In sum, Tanzania has deviated from the security of the "isolate," neutralist position toward the Arab-Israeli conflict as pursued by Kenya, to a pro-Arab position, largely because of the importance of its ideology and the resultant commitments to Arab governments in the Middle East that that policy has dictated.
On the basis of the preceding description of Israeli and Arab policy objectives and methods, and the subsequent descriptions and analyses of East African foreign policies, it is possible to gauge to some extent the "successes" (that is those instances in which they have been able to achieve their objectives) and effectiveness of methods employed by the two protagonists in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Both sides have scored their individual successes, thus a point by point discussion of these must be carried out to determine what advantages (if any) either has gained.

In reference to their economic objectives, both the Arabs and Israelis have been successful in the three East African nations of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. Both have been able to find markets for their major exports. . . . Israel for its manufactured goods and processed foods, and Arab states for their textiles and oil.

The three nations of East Africa have also served to alleviate to some extent problems of unemployment for technical specialists. Although their number remains small in relation to the total of such trained personnel presently unemployed, technical assistance in the field of
water resource development has provided some employment for both Arabs and Israelis, whose services are no longer needed to the extent that they once were in the Middle East. This is particularly true at present in Egypt, which has had unemployed engineers since the completion of the High Dam.

Finally, the parallel Arab and Israeli objectives of opening Black Africa, and particularly the proximate East Africa, for foreign investment have also been secured. Israeli business interests have flourished in East Africa, notable Amcor, Assis, Vered, Agridev, Israel Aircraft Industries, Alubin, Mlonot and Amiran in the private sector and Solel Boneh and Water Resources Development-International from the public sector. The A.R.E.'s semi-public firm of El-Nasr has performed a similar, although much less extensive, function for the Arabs.

In the political sphere, however, the two Middle Eastern protagonists have fared somewhat differently. In terms of their objective to overcome Arab encirclement and isolation the Israelis have been wholly successful. During their least popular period between late 1969 and the Ugandan coup, the Israelis were never in danger of being isolated from the nations of East Africa. And, even the Tanzanians, who have remained staunch supporters of the Arab position since their independence, have never questioned the right of the State of Israel to continue to exist.
However, the Israeli objectives to force Arab diplomatic recognition has been wholly unsuccessful as its overcoming of diplomatic isolation was successful. Despite the fact that virtually all Black African states have recognized the legitimacy of the State of Israel, there has been nothing even remotely resembling any kind of bandwagon affect upon the Arab states, as Israel had desired. Even if any individual Arab state commences a normalization of relations with Israel, it is more likely to be done so as a result of domestic exigencies or development in the Middle East, rather than as a result of extensive or continued recognition from Black Africa.

In regard to its objective of gaining support in the U.N. and other world bodies, Israel has fared differently over time. Up until late 1969, the erratic support lends by Uganda coupled with Kenyan neutrality and Tanzanian support for the Arabs accounted to give the Arabs a slight diplomatic advantage, particularly in the U.N. It has always fared worse in other world bodies; notably the non-aligned nations conferences and the Afro-Asian solidarity conferences. From late 1969 until the Ugandan coup, the Israelis fared even worse, largely the result of Uganda's "move to the left." Following the coup, however, the Israelis moved into a position of receiving greater support from East Africa, both diplomatically and in the U.N. At the present time with Tanzania and Kenya maintaining their past policies of pro-Arab and neutrality, respectively,
Uganda's pro-Israel stance has secured Israel at best a stand off with the Arabs in the region of East Africa. And that's the best they've been able to accomplish to date.

As previously described, the Arab objective of a diplomatic and economic boycott of Israel by nations of Black Africa has been totally thwarted by Israel's directly related, successful objective of overcoming such encirclement and isolation. The Arabs have also taken a setback diplomatically and in the U.N. Obviously, as the Israelis have improved their position, the Arabs have taken a corresponding loss.

Finally, the Arabs have taken a further setback in East Africa in their attempts to counteract the Israeli influence throughout the area. Again since the Ugandan coup, the Arab objectives have been dealt a blow. Overall, from their position of dominance in obtaining political and economic objectives, the Arabs have lost ground to the Israelis since the ascension of the Amin Government in January of 1971.

It is difficult, if not impossible to accurately gauge which methods have served most effectively to accomplish the Arab and Israeli objectives; and more specifically which methods are related to which objectives. However, if a balance sheet-type approach is utilized, it is possible to determine to some extent which Middle Eastern protagonist is making the most progress for its expenditures.
Considering their differing approaches, it is obvious that the Israelis have invested a good deal more time, capital, and energy in accomplishing their political and economic objectives in Black Africa. After all, an aid program as extensive as that of the Israeli Government takes a lot more investment than the propaganda network sponsored by the Arabs.

On the basis of the conclusions derived from this study, it appears that for the greater part of the past decade, the Arabs have secured the greater objectives with a lesser investment of time, capital and energy than the Israelis. Even at the end of 1971 when Israel's favourable position in East Africa reached its peak, they had managed to secure a stand-off of sorts, with Tanzanian and Uganda supporting opposite positions and Kenya taking a neutralist line whenever possible. Thus at least up until the present, the Arabs have been able to manage fairly well in this important region with a seemingly modest investment.

The conclusions derived from this study differ markedly from those of similar studies assessing the Arab-Israeli rivalry over sub-Saharan Africa, or the diplomatic effectiveness of Israel's extensive aid program to Black Africa.

In his study of "Africa and the Mid-Eastern War," Samuel Decalo examined U.N. voting and diplomacy during the six day war and concluded that on the whole, "... Israeli diplomacy appears to have paid off."
Admittedly, Decalo was considering all of Africa, not only East Africa. But had his less comprehensive approach (restricted to U.N. voting and diplomacy) been applied to East Africa, a distorted picture, particularly in the case of Kenya, would have ensued.

Without the assessment of public statements and "other indicators" such as the Government action with the "pro-Israeli" press or with its inaction in the censuring of propagandistic embassies, Kenya would have emerged far more "pro-Israeli" than it has shown to be in this study. It would be premature to say that Israel's diplomacy had "paid off" in Black Africa, when the results from such a cursory examination might be as distorted for the rest of the continent as they were for East Africa.

In his study of the U.A.R.-Israel rivalry over sub-Saharan Africa, Joseph Churba has come to much the same conclusion as Decalo when he writes that Israel "has succeeded in . . . circumventing its archrival, the U.A.R." Churba utilized diplomacy and public statements in his assessment and it is clear that his omission of U.N. voting would make a significant difference at least in his analysis of Uganda's policy under Obote. Given its stated neutrality and the substantial Israeli presence, Uganda's "pro-Arab" overtures would be completely lost in Churba's assessment of East Africa.

Netanel Lorch's examination of the diplomatic "advances and accomplishments" from Israel's aid programs in Black
Africa faces a problem of potential distortion quite similar to those of Decalo and Churba, as just described. Lorch concentrated his assessment on public statements about the aid programs. In the case of Tanzania (where Israeli aid is generously meted out despite Tanzanian policy), it would not be unlikely for a Tanzanian official to be publicly appreciative of Israel's support. But that should in no way imply, as Lorch would, that Israel has "won spontaneous goodwill . . . manifested particularly at the United Nations . . ." If it weren't for the fact that Lorch's study was published in August of 1963, when virtually no data were available from U.N. voting records, it would appear that he had not ventured near reports from that institution.

A more realistic appraisal of the Arab-Israeli rivalry over sub-Saharan Africa comes from Fouad Ajami and Martin H. Sours' study of Israeli and Black African interaction. Drawing on public statements, U.N. voting, and to some extent on the diplomacy of African nations, Ajami and Sours have diverged from the traditional view of Israel's great "success" and suggested that: "In the final analysis, Israel might not have been able to secure the total support of all the African states, but was able at least to neutralize sub-Saharan Africa." This appraisal, based on a more thorough examination of different policy indicators, corresponds to the conclusions of this study of East African policies much more closely that did the appraisals of Decalo, Churba or Lorch.
As shown with the description of the Kenyan, Ugandan and Tanzanian policies, Israel has been able to secure a stand-off of sorts in the region of East Africa, or as Ajami and Sours suggest, "neutralize" it.

In the final analysis, there appears to have been a trend in the assessments of Israel's "success" in its rivalry with the Arab states over Black Africa. The initial assessments made in the early or mid-1960's of Israel's achievements use few indices encompassing all of Africa, which may have distorted the conclusions. These assessments have been modified over time to conclude that perhaps too much was made of the early (apparent) accomplishments and that in reality, Israel has only been able to "neutralize" Black Africa. The conclusions of this study tend to verify this latter assessment. Whether this trend will continue remains to be seen. There is now some evidence that even Ajami and Sours' assessment may have to be modified in the near future. The recent expulsion of all Israeli civilian, military and diplomatic personnel from Uganda suggests that Israel may not even be able to continue to maintain its "neutralization" of Black Africa and may begin to fare much worse than originally anticipated by not only the authors just described, but by the Israelis themselves.
In light of recent developments between Israel and Uganda, namely the expulsion of Israeli military and technical assistance advisors, it might appear that serious revision of the discussion of the Ugandan policy and the conclusions of this thesis would be necessary. Admittedly, the description of Uganda's policy has been turned 180° on its axis. After all; the once "pro-Israeli" President Amin has recently (March 1972) joined Libya's Col. Muammar Qadhafi in a communique condemning Israel as the aggressor in the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, the conclusions of this paper are not as far off as it might seem on the surface.

In the explanation of Ugandan policy it was pointed out that religious, economic and ideological factors were "dubious" as explanations of Ugandan behaviour toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. Rather, it was pointed out, "... the most significant factor(s) involved in an explanation of Ugandan policy (has) been ... the unique relationship between Israel and Uganda since the latter's independence in 1962. ..."199

Most recent news accounts have cited an offer of financial help of Libyan oil revenues to "replenish some of Uganda's foreign exchange reserves, which have sunk to a dangerous level" (International Herald Tribune, April 1972) as an explanation of Uganda's recent policy change. But then the question might legitimately be asked, what prevented former President Obote from making a similar move in the late 1960's and throughout 1970, something
which might have salvaged his regime from the economic decay which plagued it? He was certainly ideologically disposed to make such a gesture, considering Ugandan policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict during that period. And the necessary funds were becoming available from the Arab states at that time.

As in the previous examination and attempted explanation of Ugandan policy, we must again turn to the dominant Israeli presence in Uganda, particularly among the military. Ever since the 1966 power struggle between Obote (then prime Minister) and the Kabaka (then President) which culminated in the Kabaka's exile and the declaration of the Republic of Uganda, Obote's control over Uganda had been precarious. He rarely ventured outside the country for fear of losing his position and allegedly went to the January 1971 Commonwealth Conference in Singapore against his better premonitions only at the insistence of his good friend, Julius Nyerere.

As a result of the pervasive Israeli penetration of the Ugandan military and his need to keep the military in support of his precarious administration, Obote was unable to ever make a significant split with the Israelis. Even though he disagreed with them ideologically and, according to a Makerere University professor, even grew to regret having ever invited them into Uganda, Obote was not able to order them out for fear of how the military might react or be spurned to seize control from him. Thus, despite his 1969 outburst at the Mbale UPC conference over the
Israeli behaviour in Uganda, Obote never moved directly against their presence.

During his first year in power, General Amin courted the Israelis for every favour he could get. The precise reason Israel has fallen from favour in Uganda might be the result of its inability to compete with Libya's excess revenues at a time when Uganda's economy was rapidly deteriorating or its dissatisfaction with the unpredictability of General Amin's flamboyant style and frequent rash statements. But the precise reason why such a change has come about will probably not be fully known for some time. All that we can speculate about at this juncture is how Idi Amin, who had always supported Israel, was able to expel the Israelis when Milton Obote, who did not support them, could not rid his country of their presence.

The explanation of "how" again brings us back to a discussion of the dominant presence of Israeli military advisors in Uganda. As previously mentioned, Obote could never afford the expulsion of the Israelis for fear of what affects this might have on its relationships with the military. But now that the military is the government, there no longer exists the fear of the political implications such as expulsion might induce. Only the military could have taken the bold move of President Amin, without fear of significant opposition. And it appears to have succeeded in its objective. What remains to be seen and that which will be of great interest to study in the near


10. Ibid., p. 20.


15. Laufer, Israel and the Developing Countries, p. 79.

16. Ibid.


18. Laufer, Israel and the Developing Countries, p. 17.


21. Ibid., pp. 78-79.


23. Laufer, Israel and the Developing Countries, p. 156.

25. Israel's Programme of International Cooperation, p. 81.

26. Laufer, Israel and the Developing Countries, pp. 174-5.

27. Israel's Programme of International Cooperation, p. 83.


29. Laufer, Israel and the Developing Countries, p. 265.

30. Schaar, Israel Aid and Trade (No. 1), p. 4.


36. Ibid., p. 143


41. Laufer, Israel and the Developing Countries, p. 177.
42. Schaar, Israel Aid and Trade (No. 2), pp. 2-3.
52. Ibid.
54. Churba, U.A.R.-Israel Rivalry, p. 211(I);
58. Mansfield, Nasser's Egypt, P. 123.
59. Baulin, Arab Role, p. 53.
60. Mansfield, Nasser's Egypt, p. 123.
63. Nasser, Philosophy of the Revolution, p. 76.


66. Baulin, Arab Role, p. 77.

67. Ibid., p. 48 (one broadcast hour equals one hour of daily broadcasting time per language ... that is, if Cairo Radio broadcast only between II and 12 on three different frequencies beamed to three different areas and in different languages it would be considered three hours of "broadcast time" in that day).


69. Ibid., p. 117.


71. Baulin, Arab Role, p. 48.

72. Ibid., p. 108.


74. Baulin, Arab Role, p. 108.

75. Ibid., p. 40.

76. Ibid., p. 47.

77. Mansfield, Nasser's Egypt, p. 118.


80. Ibid., Nov. 1969.

81. Laufer, Israel and the Developing Countries, p. 250.

82. Mansfield, Nasser's Egypt, p. 118.

83. Laufer, Israel and the Developing Countries, p. 252.

84. Baulin, Arab Role, p. 47.

85. Laufer, Israel and the Developing Countries, p. 249.

86. Nasser's Egypt, p. 117.
89. Ibid.
91. Africa Diary, Africa Publications, Delhi, India May II+I7 1963, p. II52.
98: Ibid.
100. Ibid., 6 July 1971.
102. Ibid., p. I32.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid., No. 67, November/December 1970, p. 3
111. Ajami and Sours, "Israel and Africa", p. 410.
120. Data from the 26th General Assembly Session of 1971.
121. Decalo, "Africa and the Mid-Eastern War"; p. 60.
124. Ibid.
125. Daily Nation, 10 June 1967.


135. Mawanzo, Vol. 3, No. 1; a publication of the Faculties of Arts and Social Sciences, Makerere University, Kampala, June 1971, page 10.


137. Ibid.


141. Ibid.

142. Mawanzo, p. 3.


144. Ibid., 9 Sept. 1971.


153. Ibid.
158. Ibid., p. B 218
159. Ibid., p. B.196.
160. East African Press and Intelligence Digest, No. 70; May/June 1971, p. 6.
164. Shaw, Foreign Policy of Tanzania, p. 41.
165. Ibid., p. 38.
166. Ibid.
173. Ibid.
174. Ibid., p. 200.
I75. Ibid., p. 214.
I76. Legum and Drysdale, Africa Contemporary Record, p. 173
I84. Legum and Drysdale, Africa Contemporary Record p. 220
I86. Shaw, Foreign Policy of Tanzania, p. 49.
I90. Decalo, "Africa and the Mid-Eastern War."
I91. Ibid., p. 61.
I93. Ibid., p. 2851.
I94. Lorch, "Israel and Africa."
I95. Ibid., p. 368.
I96. Ajami and Sours, "Israel and Africa."
I97. Ibid., p. 413.
I98. Lorch's article was published in 1963, Churba's in 1965, and Decalo's in 1967.
I99. See page 92.
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