Declaration

This dissertation is my original work and has not been submitted for a degree to any other university.

Pauline C. W. Kathambana Date

This dissertation has been submitted for examination with my approval as university supervisor.

C’U^ut^tn^ 2 f • to- loo 2.

Ir. Soita Chesoni Date
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## List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADR</td>
<td>Alternative Dispute Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNDD</td>
<td>National Council for the Defense of Democracy</td>
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<td>CNP</td>
<td>The National Council of Patriots</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>FDD</td>
<td>Forces for the Defense of Democracy</td>
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<td>FNL</td>
<td>National Liberation Forces</td>
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<td>FRODEBU</td>
<td>Front for Democracy in Burundi</td>
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<td>FROLINA</td>
<td>National Liberation Front</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>IMC</td>
<td>Implementation Monitoring Committee</td>
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<td>MEPROBA</td>
<td>Movements of Progressive Burundian Students</td>
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<td>PALIPEHUTU</td>
<td>Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>PALIPEHUTU/FNL</td>
<td>Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People/National Liberation Forces</td>
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<td>PDC</td>
<td>Partie Democrat Chretien</td>
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<td>RDC</td>
<td>Rally for Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPRONA</td>
<td>Union Pour Le Progress National</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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Operationalisation of key concepts

For purposes of this work, the term *facilitation* will be used interchangeably with the term *mediation*. According to the Glossary of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) terms¹, the term facilitation is defined as a dispute resolution process in which the neutral facilitator helps multiple parties, often more than two, negotiate a settlement. In many respects, it is akin to mediation with more than two parties. The term *mediation* is defined as a dispute resolution process in which a neutral, the mediator, helps parties communicate with each other, brainstorm and negotiate their own settlement to their dispute. Another definition of the term *mediation* is given by Touval and Zartman who state that "mediation is a form of third-party intervention in conflict for the purpose of abating or resolving that conflict through negotiation."²

In all literature on mediation, what comes out clearly is that mediation is a form of third party intervention which does not involve the use of force and is not intended to help one or the other of the participants in the conflict to win or prevail. Indeed, mediation to a conflict must be acceptable to all adversaries in that conflict. Additionally, facilitation/mediation enables disputants to resolve their disputes out of court. The two processes also aim at resolving the conflict as opposed to settling the conflict. *Conflict resolution* means that the conflict is

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¹ Ohio Commission on Dispute Resolution & Conflict Management
http://www.state.oh.us/cdr/terms.htm

tackled by looking at its root causes and thus ensuring that it does not recur again in the future.

The term conflict includes all explicitly and implicitly competitive or coercive relationships involving human beings interaction as individuals and as groups, regardless of whether the type of 'violence' employed is physical or psychological, military or economic, actual or threatened and/or implied.³

Abstract

As conflict continues to ravage Africa and the world as a whole, various methods of peace building continue to be used. Increasingly states have pulled out of the process and this has resulted in peace building being left in the hands of non-governmental organisations and individuals. Less state involvement in peace building has meant less use of violent means of conflict resolution and greater emphasis on non-violent ways of resolving conflicts. Therefore, there has been a decrease in military interventions and increase in the use of methods such as facilitation and mediation. Additionally, there has been a move to encourage conflicting parties to come up with homegrown solutions to resolve their conflicts. This move has seen more and more conflict resolution processes utilise mediators and facilitators. These options are attractive as they give the conflicting parties the chance to sit and discuss the root causes of their conflict and agree on how to resolve it. They guarantee a win-win situation.

This study seeks to look at the role facilitation/mediation has played in resolving the conflict in Burundi. It is premised on the hypothesis that facilitation/mediation leads to the resolution of conflict. The study examines the historical aspect of the conflict and the origins of the different rebel groups involved. The study then analyses the different theories of conflict and the interests of the actors involved in the conflict.
This study concludes that to the extent that one of the main objectives of the facilitation in the Burundi peace Process was to end violent conflict and have the various adversaries in the conflict sigh an agreement, then the facilitation was partially successful.

However, the facilitation has not been successful in ensuring a total ceasefire. It is this study's recommendation that even as the Implementation Monitoring Committee continues to implement various aspects of the agreement, the facilitator still has a role to ensure that all groups are brought on board to ensure a total cease fire is achieved. This is the first step in ensuring all other aspects of the agreement are implemented expeditiously.
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CHAPTER I : An overview of the study

1.1. Introduction

The term conflict has proven to be continuously difficult to define for many scholars. According to Ross Stagner "Conflict is a situation in which two or more human beings desire goals which they perceive as being obtainable by one or the other but not both. This compact definition can be opened out and clarified by saying that there must be at least two parties; each party is mobilizing energy to obtain a goal, a desired object or situation; and each party perceives the other as a barrier or threat to that goal."\(^1\)

Although it is possible to have a situation of genuine conflict without any party behaving in a manifestly violent manner, this has not been the case in Africa.

African conflicts tend to erupt in countries with limited scope for action by citizens to call their leaders to account and they tend to intensify authoritarian and militaristic government.\(^2\) More often than not, they often originate with or develop an ethnic element which in its extreme form could result in genocide. Such conflict and ethnic violence can result in entire

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**Ross Stagner:** *Psychological Aspects of International Conflict*, Belmont, California, Brooks/Cole, 1967
**C. R Mitchell:** *The Structure of International Conflict*, Great Britain, Macmillan, 1981
countries or even whole regions being caught up in a cycle of war and genocide. ³

The past three decades have seen an alarming escalation of violence in the Great Lakes region. The region has become prone to conflicts that have had a devastating effect on the millions of people who inhabit the area. These conflicts have resulted in an increase in the trade of small arms, loss of thousands lives, heightened insecurity within the region and an influx of refugees into neighboring countries. This has, in turn, contributed to the continued impoverishment of the region.

Dating as far back as the 1950's, the conflict in Burundi has tended to be labeled simply as 'an ethnic conflict' between the majority Hutu and the minority Tutsi. However, recent research into the conflict suggests that the conflict in Burundi is essentially a politically instigated one, and that the ethnic dimension exists as a result of political manipulation.

A new dimension to many conflicts in Africa is the growing tendency for neighbouring countries to intervene directly in their neighbours' internal conflicts. It is known that Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi assisted Laurent Kabila's forces in the civil war that overthrew the Mobutu regime in the

³ ibid
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1996. Two years later, when the Rally for Democracy (RDC) spearheaded the rebel movements against the Kabila government, these three countries became engaged on the side of the rebels while Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Central African Republic and Chad joined forces with the DRC government to crush the rebellion. Thus, nine neighbouring countries have been involved in the ongoing civil war in the DRC.  

By the mid 1990's after a succession of coups, and counter coups, the conflict in Burundi had seen thousands of refugees pouring into the neighboring countries. Additionally, rebel factions continued to use the DRC, and north-western Tanzania to launch attacks into Burundi. The continued destabilization of the region prompted the regional heads of state to take initiative to resolve the conflict in Burundi.

Their efforts were assisted by a major political 'realisation' that occurred in Burundi in 1998.  

It seems to have been triggered by 'war weariness' more than anything else. Some scholars have described it as a 'security impasse', or stalemate, which forced the various conflicting parties towards political dialogue. Neither of the two main ethnic groups appeared to have the


capacity either to physically destroy the other, or to ensure total protection for themselves.\textsuperscript{6}

The regional states began pushing for all-party political negotiations, by imposing economic sanctions on the government of Burundi, and supporting a mediation process under the auspices of former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, dubbed the Burundi Peace Process. There followed a series of domestic and international efforts to reach a negotiated settlement to the crisis, and saw several rounds of peace talks held in Arusha, with Julius Nyerere as the facilitator in 1998 and 1999.

The Buyoya government agreed on a political agenda for transition with the re-established National Assembly, thereby partly resolving a long-standing political impasse. The political agreement provided for two vice-presidents, assuring a senior position for each of the main political parties. The National Assembly was enlarged to include more opposition parties and independent representatives from 'civil society'.\textsuperscript{7} This agreement was far from a return to the democratic framework established in 1993, but was seen as the only possible compromise at the time.\textsuperscript{8}

\textsuperscript{6} ibid
\textsuperscript{7} ibid

At a summit in Arusha in 1999, East African leaders, in a bid to encourage the peace negotiations, decided to suspend the sanctions that had been imposed on Burundi following the coup in 1996.

After Nyerere's death in 1999, former South African president Nelson Mandela, took over as facilitator of the peace process in December. In August 28th 2000, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi was signed, though two rebel groups refused to commit themselves to it. After signing of the agreement, the 19 parties involved continued talks on details and issues related to implementation. They formed part of the Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC) which has 29 representatives from regional governments, the United Nations (UN), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and Burundi.
1.2. Statement Of The Problem

Since the 1950's Burundi has been beset by cyclic periods of war and conflict. These have become of great concern not just to Africa but to the world as a whole. The conflicts have continued to be blamed on the fight for superiority between the two major ethnic groups in the country, the Hutu and the Tutsi.

By the early 1990's it looked like there was at last hope for peace after the democratic election of a new president, Melchior Ndadaye. Unfortunately Ndadaye was assassinated shortly after his election and, Burundi was engulfed in a prolonged crisis. The governments of Presidents Cyprien Ntaryamira who succeeded Ndadaye, and Sylvestre Ntibantuganya after him were not able to stop the violence, which eventually led to a coup d'etat by Pierre Buyoya 1996.

The continued conflict in Burundi caused a lot of concern to regional leaders and the international community. This concern saw several attempts being made to bring peace to the troubled Great Lakes country. These attempts culminated in what is known as the Burundi peace Process. This was a series of meetings and summits which brought together regional heads of state and their representatives, together with the government of Pierre Buyoya and the leaders of several rebel groups involved in the Burundi conflict, to try
and bring lasting peace to Burundi. The process was facilitated first by Julius Nyerere from 1996, and is currently being carried on by Nelson Mandela after the death of Nyerere in 1999.

The study seeks to examine the Burundi Peace Process, and the extent to which the mediation has contributed towards the resolution of conflict in Burundi.

The study will examine the historical causes of conflict in Burundi, the events that culminated in the decision to have Julius Nyerere facilitate the search for peace, the parties involved, the issues under discussion, the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi and the success of this agreement up to May 2002.

1.3. Objectives Of The Study

This study has two main objectives:

i. Broadly, to study the Burundi conflict in general, and

ii. More specifically to analyse the efforts made to resolve the conflict through facilitation and to examine whether this intervention has led to the resolution of peace in Burundi.
1.4. Justification Of The Study

Although there has been a lot of prior studies on Burundi and the conflict, not enough has been done on the facilitation process, in terms of the background, circumstances and actors involved. There is thus an information gap on the process.

This study will provide a useful source of information for policy makers and practitioners on conflict management.

(i) On policy grounds, the information gained from this study would be a contribution to foreign policy makers on the policies to formulate towards Burundi

(ii) From a scholarly point of view, there are gaps in terms of the amount of literature available on the Burundi Peace Process.
1.5. Literature Review

This study's attempts to search for literature on the Burundi Peace process revealed that there is a lot of literature on the history of Burundi, and many reports done on the conflict, however, not enough has been done concerning the facilitation process.

In an effort to understand the Burundi conflict and the role of mediation in the Burundi peace process, this study will benefit from research carried out by various scholars and non-governmental organizations on conflict in general, on Burundi in particular as well as mediation and conflict resolution. It will also examine various papers presented at different fora concerned with the Great Lakes region.

The literature review has thus been categorized as follows:

- Literature on Conflict in general
- Literature on the background to the Burundi conflict
- Literature on the facilitation Process

1.5.1. Literature on Conflict in general

The term *conflict* has been a challenging one to define for many scholars. It has, time and time again, been defined in relation to *war*. In their definition of the concept of war, Couloumbis and Wolfe say that the most
comprehensive definition would classify war as part of a more general phenomenon in human affairs called conflict. And further, that "conflict could include all explicitly and implicitly competitive/coersive relationships involving human beings interacting as individuals and as groups, regardless of whether the type of 'violence' employed is physical or psychological, military or economic, actual or threatened and/or implied."\(^9\)

On his part, C.R Mitchell defines a situation of conflict as "Any situation in which two or more social entities or 'parties' (however defined or structured) perceive that they possess mutually incompatible goals."\(^{10}\) Mitchell further states that "a relationship of genuine conflict may exist even though none of the parties behave in a manifestly violent manner" and gives the example of two individuals in a court case who are undoubtedly 'in conflict' but both using essentially non-violent methods in order to achieve their goals.\(^{11}\)

Origins of conflict are manifold and complex, rooted in international and national arenas, and encompassing economic, political, cultural and social parameters. Some international parameters have been identified as 'the support of various regimes and dictatorships by countries such as the United States of America (USA) and former Soviet union in their Cold War, with


\(^{10}\) Mitchell, C. R: *The Structure of International Conflict*; Great Britain, Macmillan, 1981 pp17

\(^{11}\) ibid pp 15
disregard to how it has affected the people of these countries and the consequences derived from the end of the Cold War and its aftermath. \(^{12}\) Such involvement by the super powers resulted in an influx of small arms into many third world countries and thus a prolonging of wars for decades.

The economic causes of conflict include a hostile economic environment, African vulnerability to the changes in external conditions such as terms of trade, external debt burden, the shift from a global economy based on the exploitation of natural resources (the base for most African economies) to one based on the exploitation of knowledge and information. Other factors are food insecurity, increasing poverty and poor economic performance.

On the socio-political and cultural side, conflicts, especially those in Africa, have been found to be directly related to the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of independence by African countries, and to the multi-ethnic composition of the independent states. Emphasising this point, Nyong'o \(^{13}\) states that the artificial boundaries set by colonial rulers in Africa had the effect of putting many different ethnic people within nations that did not reflect or have the ability to accommodate or provide for the cultural and ethnic diversity.

^tPV/www.globalissues.organization: Conflicts in Africa-Introduction
Although the OAU did try to solve this problem with its doctrine of *uti possidetis juri* ("as you hold possession by right") whereby the colonial boundaries were declared unquestionably legitimate, African states are discovering the problems, conflicts, claims, and overlaps associated with artificial territorial limits on human activity, and the doctrine of *uti possidetis juri* is likely to face greater tests in the future.\(^\text{14}\)

The role of ethnic multiplicity in intra-state conflicts is widely debated. It is however generally agreed that ethnic conflict is often a cover for a "conflict among the elites" for power, though it eventually acquires a life of its own. This is because ethnicity or tribalism is not simply a matter of objective data such as language, culture and religion. "The Hutu and Tutsi speak the same language, share the same territory and follow the same traditions" yet this did not stop the genocide of the Tutsi by the Hutu in Rwanda in 1994.\(^\text{15}\) Thus ethnic identity is more a question of perception than an absolute phenomenon and the identity can be perceived by a group or can be attributed by outsiders.

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\(^{14}\) yong'o, An'Vang' P. *Arms and Daggers in the heart of Africa: Studies on Internal Conflicts*, Academy of Sciences (AAS) 1993 pp 3


There's growing evidence to support the view that the elites in African societies particularly members of the political class, have shown no restraint in manipulating the people through feeding them with prejudices against and stereotypes about other ethnic groups to win their support for achieving their own self centered objectives. Personal interests and ambitions of such leaders are framed in ethnic terms and the bells of ethnic solidarity are rung to rally group support, even at the risk of developing animosity against another group which is considered the enemy.\textsuperscript{16} This can degenerate into incidences of violence, and has been the origin of genocide in the history of humanity. De Waal, agreeing with this view, talks of "the tendency of African rulers and their adversaries to fall back on ethnic mobilization in one form or another at some point, resulting in ethnicity becoming militarized and ethnic divisions becoming sharpened."\textsuperscript{17}

This then brings in the role of the 'state' in maintaining peace in a country. Hans Morgenthau posits that "the state's contribution to domestic peace is indispensable, but it is not in itself sufficient. Without the state's contribution there can be no domestic peace, but with nothing but the state's contribution there can be no domestic peace either."\textsuperscript{18}

Morgenthau argues from the point of view that states are the main actors in the international arena. He defines the state as the compulsory organization of the society - for the legal order that determines the conditions under which society may employ its monopoly to organized violence for the preservation of order and peace.\(^{19}\) He goes further to argue that the existence of the state does not, in itself, assure the preservation of domestic peace, but rather it is the nature of the state itself which will assure the preservation of peace. This is because the state, far from being a thing apart from the society, is actually a part of the society and will therefore decay or prosper as the society it sprung from decays or prospers.\(^{20}\)

Various theories have been used to analyse conflict and conflict resolution, and this study has benefited from the writings of various scholars on this issue. In his study on the paradigms of conflict, A. J. R. Groom\(^{21}\) discusses three approaches to conflict namely the strategist, the conflict researcher and the peace researcher. Groom compares the three approaches of conflict in a bid to give the reader various points of view as regards conflict.
1.5.2. Literature on the background to the Burundi conflict

The Burundi conflict is a complex historical problem that is an amalgamation of the challenges of creating an African nation state intertwined with the complexities of colonization.

Many researchers who have studied the history of Burundi, and especially its political crises, have expressed the opinion that some form of external intervention was required to assist the two principal components of the population, the Hutu and Tutsi, to work out and establish mechanisms that would prevent the periodic blood letting.\(^\text{22}\)

The late 1990's saw the conflict reach a level where neither the government-led army, nor the rebel-led movements were able to defeat the other. According to the *European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation*, this security impasse, where neither of the two ethnic groups appeared to have the capacity to either physically destroy the other or ensure total protection for themselves, actually forced the different antagonists into political dialogue.\(^\text{23}\)

\[^{22}\] Mwal* Ikaweba, Mwansasu, B, Bgoya, Walter: Overview of the Burundi Peace Process, Eu**
\[^{23}\] European Foundation: http://www.nyererefoundation.or.tz/researc/centre.htm
Various researchers who have studied the conflict in Burundi agree with the view that the facilitation team led by Julius Nyerere took advantage of the Yipe moment in the on-going conflict to intervene. Jan Van Eck, expresses this view in his Burundi Report of 1999, where he says "The fact that the rebels cannot defeat the army and vice versa, creates the kind of stalemate that further encourages a negotiated settlement."\(^{24}\)

In his 1998 report on Burundi, Van Eck, analyses the external signals needed to further stimulate internal and external negotiation processes. While giving the background to the peace process Van Eck states, that the exclusion of the CNDD, a main rebel group in Burundi, has been a serious shortcoming of the entire facilitation exercise, a view shared by this study.

Further, Van Eck's view that stable state institutions are essential for resolution of the conflict is shared by Edward R. McMahon\(^{25}\) and Filip Reyntjens. Reyntjens asserts that "the search for a constitutional arrangement will therefore have to be included in the global agenda...." And that "...these issues will have to be put on the table simultaneously, so as to allow all actors to give and to take and to strike a global compromise."\(^{26}\)


Of the literature studied, the most authoritative literature on the rebel
groups was provided by the International Crisis Group (ICG)\textsuperscript{27}. The ICG
report traces the different rebel groups from their inception, looks at their
leadership, alliances and roles in the Burundi conflict.

1.5.3. Literature on the facilitation Process

Considering that the Burundi Peace Process is current and on going, there is
a limited amount of literature that has been written on the subject.

The most comprehensive description of the peace process has been provided
by the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation\textsuperscript{28}, who give a detailed narrative of the
process from the point when Julius Nyerere began getting involved with
Burundi to his death.

A thorough study on the conflict in Burundi would be incomplete without
referring to the work done by Stephen R. Weissman, \textit{Preventing Genocide in
Burundi}. Weissman does a thorough analysis of the roots of the conflict,
various interventions that have taken place in Burundi, dwells on the
regional African diplomacy for a negotiated political settlement, and

\textbf{International Crisis Group (ICG) Africa:} \textit{The Burundi Rebellion and the Ceasefire Negotiations,}

riefing P\textsubscript{aperj} N\textsubscript{ajobo}/Brussels August 6 2002
discusses briefly the track two unofficial diplomacy and other non-governmental initiatives that have occurred in Burundi.

One of the issues agreed on during the signing of the August 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, was the integration of the Armed Forces into one national military force, combining specified numbers of Hutu and Tutsi. This study considers this as one of the greatest hurdles in the resolution of the conflict, a view shared by Anthony D. Marley, in his paper, "Integration of the Armed Forces and Demobilization of Excess Combatants in Burundi: A Conceptual Analysis."

The fact that all except two of the antagonists in Burundi were able to sit at table and sign and agreement can be considered a success in itself. The Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation comprehensively analyses the talks that paved the way to the signing of the agreement, starting with the Mwanza Talks of April 1996, the regional summits, through to the All party talks of 1998.

The road toward resolution of conflict in Burundi was given a nudge in the right direction by the economic sanctions that were imposed on Pierre Buyoya's government by several regional African countries. Burundi: The

Current Political Dynamic, a presentation by Frederick Ehrenreich of the US. Department of State, takes a critical look at the effect the economic sanctions have had on the Burundi Peace Process. This work backs this study's assertion that these sanctions were an important effort towards persuading the Buyoya Government to go to the negotiating table.

The facilitation, leading as it did to the signing of an agreement, is seen by many as a success, able to achieve what other efforts had been unable to do. Previous efforts included a reconciliation and mediation effort led by then UN Special envoy Ould Abdallah. This effort, although succeeding in brokering a power sharing between the Tutsi led UPRONA party and the Hutu majority FRODEBU party, still did not manage to bring all the conflicting antagonists to the negotiation table.

Another effort was the organizing of secret talks between the government and one of the main rebel groups, the CNDD, by the community of Sant'Egidio, the Rome based lay Catholic group that helped mediate an end to the civil war in Mozambique. This effort was not successful as the

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Marley Anthony D.: Integration of the Armed Forces and Demobilization of Excess Combatants in Burundi: A Conceptual Analysis United States Institute of Peace: Conference on Burundi DttBlZZw_Ww.usip.org


parties reached a stalemate on the first agenda item on constitutional principles.

Considering that a total cease fire was another of the issues that was agreed on during the signing of the agreement, Jan Van Eck, in his May 2002 Burundi Report\textsuperscript{33}, argues that the absence of a cease-fire threatens the Burundi Peace Process. In a critical look at the progress made so far, Van Eck discusses the factors which undermine the creation of a cease-fire process and how they can be overcome.

As stated above only the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation has attempted to put together a description of the facilitation process, and even so they have not attempted to analyse the interests of the various actors involved.

1.6. Hypothesis

This study was guided by the assumption that facilitation/mediation leads to the resolution of conflict.

1-7. Theoretical Framework

Whenever a third party intervenes in a conflict, the issue of interest always arises. in this regard, this study has considered using the theory of realism

\textsuperscript{Eck, Jan Van: Burundi report April/May 2002, ‘Absence of Peace dividends undermines legitimacy of whole Transition; War Continues and Poverty Grows’ Unit for Policy Studies (UPS) Centre for National Political Studies (CIPS) Report no. 2002/1}
as a way of explaining the behaviour of those involved in the mediation. Mediators can intervene in a conflict for different reasons, maybe to protect the interests of their countries/region or for their own personal gain.

In recognition of the fact that realism may have some shortcomings in explaining the Burundi Peace Process, this study will also consider using the Conflict Research Theory, which falls under the world society school of thought, where the mediators/facilitators try to put in place structures and mechanisms which ensure that a conflict is resolved in a peaceful manner, and that the needs of all parties are met so that the result is a win-win situation. Their approach is not about sharpening the conflict, but about getting into the conflict at the right moment where the conflicting parties can be persuaded to interact, talk and come up with their solutions to their conflict.

1.8. Methodology

This work will rely largely on secondary data, including reviews of available data, literature and documentation. It will entail review of texts, journals and reports, as well as some informal interviews as a way of supplementing secondary data.
1.9. Chapter Layout

Chapter I: An overview of the study

Chapter II: A Historical Background to the Conflict in Burundi

Chapter III: The Burundi peace process

Chapter IV: The Role of Facilitation in Conflict Resolution: A Critical Analysis

Chapter V: Conclusion and Recommendations
CHAPTER II : A Historical Background To The Conflict In Burundi

Burundi is a small country located in the central part of Africa. Burundi gained independence from Belgium in 1962. It has a republic type of government with powers vested in the executive arm of the government. The country's neighbours include Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda. It covers an area of 27,830 and has a population of about 6.5 million people. The Burundi population is composed of 85% Hutu, 14% Tutsi and 1% Twa.

The conflict in Burundi can be traced as far back as 1950's. There has been a tendency to oversimplify the nature of this conflict by calling it an ethnic conflict between the majority Hutu and the minority Tutsi. However, in the hundreds of years that their histories have been joined, the Hutu and Tutsi have shared lifestyles and intermarried to a point that at present it is difficult to tell them apart by visual identification. This then leads one to accept the argument by some analysts that the conflict in Burundi is essentially a politically instigated one, and that the ethnic dimension exists as a result of Political manipulation.

This theory is backed by several factors. If one takes the standard definition of a tribe as "a territorially bounded and culturally discrete entity"\(^34\), then

\(\text{Drav's, Mike: Burundi}\) \url{http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/burundi.htm} 30/1/95
the Hutu and Tutsi of Burundi can not be differentiated as tribes. In terms of physical characteristics, Tutsis were once depicted as tall, lighter-skinned with long necks, narrow noses and Ethiopian or more European in appearance, while the Hutus were depicted as short, squat, broad featured, with darker skin tone. While these features may have been distinct a long time ago, similar lifestyles and intermarriage promoted genetic resemblance over time, so that now it difficult to distinguish a Hutu or Tutsi from their physical features.

Similarly, neither language nor geography can be used to distinguish the Hutu from the Tutsi and vice versa. Both speak a common language known as Kirundi and even shared other aspects of culture such as dance and music. In terms of geographical location, there is no region which can be identified as a historical Tutsi or Hutu homeland, although there are some sections where one group may be more prominent.

It is important to note that although the two groups are clearly not two distinct tribes, they perceive themselves as distinct and competitive, and in times of extreme danger, they identify themselves as either Tutsi or Hutu, Possibly in the hope of finding safety in numbers.
2.1. Pre-colonial Era

In the 16th century, Burundi was a kingdom characterized by a hierarchical political authority and tributary economic exchange. The king (mwami) headed a princely aristocracy (ganwa) which was pre-dominantly Tutsi and owned most of the land and required a tribute or tax from the local farmers and herders.  

There are no records showing ethnic confrontations between the Hutu and Tutsi in those early days. "Through the mode of management of national affairs, there were no known ethnic conflicts between the various groups during this period." Any violent confrontations reported erupted during the expansion of chiefdoms. The two communities lived as one with no 'ethnic' distinction between them. Indeed, diverse biographies attest that personal qualities rather than fortune of birth were considered very important, and that social ascent could be attained through individual merit irrespective of ethnicity. Mike Dravis, in his overview on Burundi, argues that far from representing separate tribes, the two group names represented classes or amorphous categories based on occupation. The Hutu were cultivators while the Tutsi were pastoralists. In fact, a Hutu who accumulated sufficient

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US Department of State: Background notes: Burundi Bureau of African Affairs, August 2000  
Bu
rendi Peace Negotiations Arusha: Committee I - IV: Draft Protocols Arusha International  
Ad dren Ce Centre (AICC) Arusha 2000  
A b djej, Adebayo: Comprehending and mastering African Conflicts, The search for sustainable  
wealth could become Tutsi, while a Tutsi who fell on hard economic times could fall into the ranks of Hutu. The principal political rivals were not Hutu or Tutsi but members of a small royal group, the *ganwas* or *princes of the blood.* Thus the system of monarchy that existed at the time was able to realize a true nation state through subtle alliances between the different groups.

The literature available does however show that although there was some degree of movement up and down the social and political hierarchy, the Tutsi seemed to benefit more from the system, forming the warrior-aristocracy of traditional Burundian society.

### 2.2 Colonial Era

Prior to the coming of the colonialists to Burundi, the country was inhabited by Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. All three are believed to have lived together, speaking the same language and having similar cultural practices, and were all known as the Barundi. When German colonialists arrived in the capital of Bujumbura near the end of the 19th Century, Burundi was a long-established
decentralized kingdom. it was ruled by a king, known as mwami, who was considered the father of the nation and ran the country.

With the coming of the German colonialists in 1899, and then the Belgians after Germany lost the First World War, the basic social fabric that held the Barundi together was eroded. The Belgians introduced a system of administration that ignored kinship and dynastic rule. Further, they introduced the concept of 'tribes' and classified the people of Burundi as Tutsi, Hutu and Twa. The new Belgian policies promoted the social and political advance of the 'noble' Tutsi, whose 'fine' bearing alone guaranteed them considerable prestige over the worthy Hutu, less clever, more simple, and more trusting. In addition to the pro-Tutsi favoritism of the colonial administration, some researchers say that Christian missionaries touted a doctrine under which the Tutsi were said to have descended from the mythical biblical tribe of Ham in Ethiopia, which further justified their domination over the Hutu.

Between 1926 and 1933 a major administrative reform took place in Burundi that saw all Hutu leaders removed from office. Thus the colonialists are seen as being largely responsible for creating the tribal identities among the Hutu and Tutsi that eventually resulted in ethnic rivalry.

Wessman, Stephen R: Preventing genocide in Burundi: United States Institute of Peace, Chpt2,
2.3. Post Colonial Era

In the late 1940's and the 1950's the Belgian administration began to move towards the democratization of Burundi. At this time two political parties emerged as the country geared up for independence. The two parties were Union Pour Le Progress National (UPRONA) led by Prince Louis Rwagasore and the Partie Democratte Chretien (PDC) which was considered the party of opposition. Burundi got independence in 1962 with Rwagasore elected Prime Minister. Rwagasore was a Tutsi well known for his efforts to unite the two ethnic communities. Two weeks after his election, Rwagasore was assassinated. It is widely believed that he was assassinated by agents of PDC.

After the death of Rwagasore, the country was governed by the mwami (king) who was a Tutsi. In 1965, new elections were held and won by a Hutu, Gervais Nyangoma. However, the mwami refused to accept the Hutu victory and instead appointed a Tutsi Prime Minister, Leopold Biha. This resulted in the Hutu attempting to take political power. The Hutu attempt failed, and in the resulting political unrest, thousands of Hutu were killed and many others fled as refugees to Rwanda and other neighbouring countries. A trend began to appear where uncoordinated Hutu attacks on Tutsi were
followed by organised counter-attacks by the Tutsi. There seemed to be a deliberate effort by the Tutsi to purge the Hutu from the military as well as politics. The continued persecution of Hutu and their obvious exclusion from politics resulted in a crystallization of a distinct Hutu political consciousness.

After a further two coups, the monarchy was finally overthrown and the then Prime Minister, Captain Michel Micombero announced that the country would henceforth be a republic. Further, there would only be one political party, which was dominated by the Tutsi.\(^4^4\)

Since the Tutsi seemed to have seized power, several Hutu officers and politicians attempted a violent coup in 1972.\(^4^5\) A serious armed attack by the Hutu in which thousands of Tutsi men, women and children were killed, led to a severe retaliation by the Tutsi, which was aimed mainly at the Hutu elite. The severity of the initial attack and the attendant repercussion of the retaliation spread over the whole country and resulted in refugees pouring into neighbouring countries.\(^4^6\)

What is significant about this particular conflict in the history of Burundi is the chilling and systematic way in which the Tutsi run government went
about in trying to eliminate the entire elite class of the Hutu. This included all those with some education, government jobs or money. The government tried to kill all those who had any government jobs, including Hutu soldiers, then tried to kill all Hutu who had enough wealth for potential leadership, and finally tried to kill all educated Hutu. Thus almost all Hutu university students, many Hutu secondary school students and perhaps half the country's Hutu teachers were killed. The Tutsi government seemed to feel that it could guarantee itself power for at least another decade by eliminating all potential leaders from the Hutu side. There was never any government effort to conduct any official inquiry into the events of 1972, nor were any reconciliation measures considered. In fact, the events of 1972 created deep and lasting hatred on both sides of the ethnic divide.

In 1976, Micombero was overthrown by Colonel Jean Baptiste Bagaza, another Tutsi. The Bagaza regime abolished the sole political party and instead introduced a Supreme Revolutionary Council under military control which was to rule the country. The regime also launched a drive against the Catholic Church for supporting the Hutu community by providing education and medical treatment to poor Hutu. Bagaza ruled until 1987 when he was deposed by yet another Tutsi, Major Pierre Buyoya. Under the rule of


Buyoya, there was an attempt at a transition to democratic civilian rule. In addition, Buyoya made progress towards ending discrimination against the Hutu by appointing a Hutu Prime Minister and allocating more government posts to the Hutu. With this semblance of a return to peace, many Hutu refugees began to return to Burundi, while more Hutu were absorbed into the civil service. However, the army continued to be Tutsi dominated.

In 1993, democratic elections were held and Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, defeated Pierre Buyoya. Ndadaye's Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) party also swept the legislative elections winning 65 of the 81 seats in Parliament. Ndadaye sought to bring ethnic balance within his government by naming a female Tutsi Prime Minister, opening the government to all groups and having nine out of 23 cabinet seats being held by Tutsis.

In response to the installation of a Hutu majority government, the Tutsi-led army attempted to stage a coup in October 1993. Their attempt failed, but they killed Melchior Ndadaye and many other senior Hutu members of government. The events triggered ethnic massacres of Tutsis by Hutus in revenge while the Tutsi army killed many Hutus in retaliation. The ethnic
clashes of 1993 can be seen as the starting point of the current phase of Burundi's conflict. 48

Ndadaye was succeeded in January 1994 by Cyprien Ntaryamira, who died after two months in office when the plane carrying him and the Rwandese President, Juvenal Habyarimana, was shot down over Kigali. A coalition government was announced in October 1994, led by a Hutu, Sylvestre Ntibantuganya, from the FRODEBU party and incorporating an UPRONA prime minister, various Tutsi militia and small Tutsi parties. However, the violence continued to spiral fuelled by Hutu led insurgents from the relatively new National Council for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD) and backed by almost half of FRODEBU'S increasingly powerless parliamentary majority.49

This situation triggered a coup d'état in July 1996, bringing Major Pierre Buyoya back to power, while effectively removing the last of Hutu political power. With Buyoya's take over, the intensity of the conflict decreased, as did the selected killings of Hutus.50 Buyoya's government, however, doubled
the size of the army and undertook a massive forced temporary Yegroupment' of hundreds of thousands of Hutu peasants.\textsuperscript{51}

\textbf{2.4. History Of The Rebel Movements In Burundi}

Buyoya's second stint as President of Burundi has been neither smooth nor easy. The political situation in Burundi has changed drastically since 1987 when Buyoya became President of Burundi having deposed Col. Bagaza. Buyoya has had to contend not just with the other political parties fighting for power, but also with several large and well organized rebel groups.

The International Crisis Group (ICG), in their briefing paper of August 6 2002, provides a context for understanding the rebel factions by analyzing their history, objectives and internal politics.\textsuperscript{52}

According to this report, Hutu survivors of the 1972 massacre orchestrated by President Micombero and his men, sought refuge in Rwanda. Here they organized themselves into two political groups known by their acronyms, UBU and TABARA\textsuperscript{53}. UBU, which was born among the Movements of Progressive Burundian Students (MEPROBA), developed a Marxist reading of the conflict but chose to stick to non-violent political action. TABARA found

similar inspiration in Marxist theory but developed a clear ethnic interpretation of the Burundian political system. They focused on the Hutu exploitation by the Tutsi oligarchy and advocated armed struggle. UBU eventually created the FRODEBU party and went back to Burundi when Jean Baptiste Bagaza overthrew Micombero.

Many of the members of the TABARA movement were eventually granted political asylum in Tanzania. On April 18 1980, TABARA became the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu people (PALIPEHUTU). It was led by Remy Gahutu and advocated for armed struggle to achieve distribution of political and administrative positions proportional to the ethnic and regional spread of population. In 1985, an armed wing of PALIPEHUTU was organized by Donatien Misigaro, a former commander of the Burundi army. Misigaro trained this wing in the forests of Western Tanzania.

Although PALIPEHUTU'S armed wing continued to grow, its inability to organize any significant armed force led to the first split within the movement in 1990. This split resulted in Joseph Karumba, a former executive of PALIPEHUTU, launching the National Liberation Front (MOLINA).

ibid pp 9
PALIPEHUTU, led by its new leader Etienne Karatasi, launched attacks on Bujumbura in November 23-24, 1991. This attack was a dismal failure as PALIPEHUTU was not able to deliver the expected ammunition, weaponry and logistical support. The failed attack led to another split in the movement resulting in the formation of the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu people/National Liberation Forces (PALIPEHUTU/FNL).

Under the leadership of Cossan Kabura, a former deputy of Karatasi, PALIPEHUTU/FNL remained a minor force until the then President of Rwanda, Juvenal Habyirimana, used some of its forces to fight against the Rwandan Patriotic Front in the Rwandan civil war. FNL's contact with the Rwandan army and militias bolstered its military capacity considerably. Additionally, some former Rwandan militias fled to Burundi after the genocide in Rwanda and joined the FNL. In February 2001, Cossan Kabura was accused of mismanagement and discredited by his direct contacts with Pierre Buyoya from whom he allegedly received large sums of money, and was replaced by Agathon Rwasa.

The assassination of the first elected president of Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye, together with several other key Hutu political leaders in 1993, was seen as a justification by some members of the remaining political elite to
create an armed military movement "capable of protecting them". This led to the formation of the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD).

When the FDD was formed in December 1993, FRODEBU leaders supported it financially although they decided against any formal association. This is because FRODEBU was at that time, actively seeking foreign intervention in Burundi. In February 1994, Leonard Nyangoma, who was at the time Minister for Home Affairs in Burundi, decided to join the armed struggle and launched the National Council for Defense of Democracy (CNDD). This became the political wing of FDD.

At its formation, CNDD was a coalition of all Hutu political forces who argued that armed struggle was the only way to force the army to accept the 1993 election results. For them, democracy had been hijacked by the Tutsi parties, and FRODEBU, despite its electoral victory, was forced to function within an imposed and unfair power sharing arrangement.

Leadership wrangles within FDD weakened its internal cohesion and strategic capabilities. During the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) war of 1996-1997, FDD rear bases were destroyed and supply routes disrupted. Nyangoma fled first to Kinshasa, then to Dar-es-salaam. He was involved in

\[54\] ibid ppg
secret negotiations with Pierre Buyoya in Rome, with the assistance of the community of Sant' Egidio, but these talks collapsed after they were leaked to the media.

With the loss of FDD bases and accusations of mismanagement, Nyangoma was ousted and replaced by his Chief of Staff Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye. This paralleled a split between the movement's political and military wings and occurred a month before the start of the Arusha negotiations in 1998. The intensification of the Congo conflict in 1998 saw Ndayikengurukiye's FDD ally itself with Laurent Kabila, the DRC President, for ammunition, equipment and funding, thus giving it a new lease of life. In January 2001, FDD went to Libreville for consultations on Burundi's peace process. These negotiations were under the auspices of President Omar Bongo of Gabon and aimed at revisiting the framework of the Sant' Egidio negotiations. FDD has continued to demand for an alternative process to Arusha and direct negotiations with the Burundian army.

Leadership wrangles continued to dog FDD with differences appearing between those members based in the Congo and those based in Burundi. Hussein Rajabu who was Secretary General of the movement between June 1998 and October 2001 was replaced by Peter Nkurunziza. Upon his
dismissal, Rajabu returned to Burundi and mobilized his supporters in a bid to take over the internal structure of the movement. Thus in October 2001 Rajabu deposed Ndayikengurukiye and replaced him with Nkurunziza as General Coordinator. This new leadership presented itself as The National Council of Patriots (CNP). According to the ICG report, it is still difficult to establish who controls what within the movement. Additionally, with the internal fighting still going on, ICG has expressed the opinion that the Rajabu-Nkurunziza take over is still incomplete.

Rajabu's takeover benefited from support from FRODEBU, which successfully lobbied Tanzania and the DRC for him. However, no sustainable alliance has been struck between FRODEBU and FDD-CNP. According to the ICG, Ndayikengurukiye controlled only four unit commanders, and their fighters were tremendously weakened by lack of supplies and FDD-CNP attacks.

Inside Burundi, the FDD-CNP continues to gain ground over the CNDD-FDD. By October 2001, Congo army officers had taken command of FDD units based in North and South Katanga, fearing that their defense positions would collapse if fighting broke out between the movement's two factions. The Congolese also restricted radio communications between the rebel leadership and field units. However, after the failure of the Inter-Congolese
Dialogue the clamp down on FDD activities was reversed. The FDD-CNP has regained access to Katanga while the CNDD-FDD leaders are trying to re-organise the remaining FDD unit bases in South Kivu.

Within Burundi, the FDD-CNP has been trying to reinforce its control over fighters through assassinations targeted at those individuals who still maintain connections with Ndayikengurukiye. These actions have resulted in a drop in morale within the entire movement.

The CNDD-FDD has, for its part, directed a number of its officers to infiltrate the FDD-CNP for intelligence purposes and to attempt to eliminate the FDD-CNP leadership. These attempts have however not been successful. Ndayikengurukiye's attempt to re-establish his authority inside Burundi in November 2001 ended in failure after the four officers he had sent were killed.

Confusion, low morale and fear reign among FDD fighters with many considering retuning to refugee camps. The FDD leadership is now forced to lure teenagers to join the movement as adult Hutu have refused to join. In the meantime, FDD-CNP is busy taking over the entire FDD movement inside Burundi. According to the ICG report, FDD-CNP wants to form a common...
front with FNL to repel the army's offensives. FDD-CNP is believed to be re-organising operations inside Burundi and learning how to fight without external rear bases.
CHAPTER III : The Burundi Peace Process

Introduction

After the assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye, Burundi was engulfed in a prolonged crisis. The governments of Presidents Cyprien Ntaryamira and Sylvestre Ntibantuganya were not able to stop the violence and this caused a lot of concern to regional leaders and the international community.

Several attempts were made to bring peace to the troubled Great lakes country. This included efforts by the then UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali, the Community of Sant'Egidio and the Organisation for African Unity (OAU).

3.1. Boutros-Boutros Ghali's Proposal

Boutros Ghali's attempt at promoting peace in Burundi was brought about by the fear that if nothing was done to stem the spiraling violence in Burundi, there could be a repetition of the tragic genocide that had occurred in Rwanda. Indeed, in a statement to the United Nations (UN) Security Council on December 29, 1995, Boutros Ghali noted that "There is a real danger of the situation in Burundi degenerating to the point where it might explode into ethnic violence on a massive scale," even "a repetition of the tragic
events in Rwanda". With this statement, the Secretary General launched a campaign for UN authorized contingency planning for the deployment of a multinational force in Burundi. Boutros-Ghali was convinced that a credible threat of force would complement any political dialogue between the parties in Burundi.

Boutros-Ghali's proposal was however not successful, mainly because he was not supported by two key members of the Security Council, namely the United States and France. These two had strong diplomatic interests in Africa and when it came down to offering actual support, they chose to straddle the fence, with France arguing that preventative diplomacy was the best course of action while the United States declined to pledge any ground troops, no doubt still smarting from it's experience in Somalia.

Additionally, Boutros-Ghali was proposing to invoke Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which deals with 'threats to peace, breaches to the peace and acts of aggression'. This includes military intervention without the consent of the warring parties. This proposal gave the impression that it was mainly concerned with humanitarian intervention without giving much consideration to the political element in the conflict. The Tutsi were particularly resistant

*ft8jiZwww.usip.org/pubs/pworks/weissm22/weissm22_.html
to the proposal because Hutu politicians had repeatedly called on the UN to intervene militarily after the assassination of Ndadaye.

At the same time, Julius Nyerere, the newly appointed regional facilitator for Burundi, expressed his concern that controversy over the UN proposal was making it difficult for him to bring the conflicting parties together for negotiations. And so, Boutros-Ghali's proposal did not take off. This writer is of the view that had the proposal sought to adapt to on-going African and other initiatives to mount all-inclusive political negotiations, it might have had a chance at success.

3.2. The Community of Sant'Egidio

In the middle of 1996, the Community of Sant'Egidio\textsuperscript{58} began to arrange secret peace talks between the government of Pierre Buyoya and the CNDD.\textsuperscript{59}

Four rounds of talks were held between September 1996 and May 1997 in Rome. The purpose of these talks was, according to participants, 'to achieve a suspension of hostilities based on agreement regarding the general

\textsuperscript{58} The Community of Sant'Egidio is the Rome based lay Catholic group that helped mediate an end to the civil war in Mozambique.


"http://www.usip.org/pubs/pworks/weissm22/weism22.html"
principals of a political settlement.' This would then establish the framework for future Nyerere-led all party negotiations. The talks received a lot of support from the European Union and the United States. The two sent special envoys to attend the talks as observers although they did not participate directly in the discussions. Also present was a South African Special envoy and, beginning December 1996, Nyerere's top aide, Felix Mosha. Since these talks only involved two parties in the Burundi conflict, they were a source of great suspicion to the main groups that were excluded. These included PALIPEHUTU rebels, FRODEBU parliamentarians and party leaders, UPRONA officials, several Tutsi-led parties as well as the military and civilian sympathizers of the deposed Bagaza.

By March 1997, a written agreement had been produced as a result of the talks. However, this agreement only touched on the framework of the ongoing discussions and their agenda. The parties would first consider the establishment of a constitutional and institutional order,' 'questions of defense forces and public security' and 'a suspension of hostilities.' If an agreement on the fundamental principles for resolving all three issues, their modalities of application and guarantees could be reached, then a suspension of hostilities could go into effect. This would then be followed by a discussion on 'the question of the functioning of justice (including and
international tribunal to judge genocide and other political crimes since independence and the proscription and repression of the ideology of genocide); 'the identification and modes of engagement of other parties' and the cease-fire.\textsuperscript{63}

The CNDD was not inclined to put down its main instruments of self defense based on what they called 'vague promises of a mono-ethnic army.'\textsuperscript{64} As with insurgent movements all over the world, they required more specific political commitments and actions before voluntarily agreeing to anything more than unilateral or short-term interruptions in fighting.

By May 1997, the parties were at an impasse on the first agenda item: constitutional principles. While CNDD demanded a return to the 1992 constitution, parliament and party rights, the current government insisted on a new constitution. This impasse together with the leaking of the peace talks to the press led to a breakdown of the negotiations. Buyoya had to call a press conference to defend the talks against internal Tutsi opposition and with the talks now an open secret it became impossible to justify renewed discussions that did not include a broad variety of groups.\textsuperscript{65}
3.3. The OAU and the Burundi Peace Process

Even as Boutros-Ghali was putting his proposal forward, several African Presidents, members of the Organisation of African Unity had already begun developing a broader peace initiative for Burundi. This initiative involved the governments of Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, Zaire, Kenya and Ethiopia and was later joined by Zambia.  

The initial step was taken in mid-1995 by the new OAU Chairman, Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and veteran Secretary General and former Tanzanian Foreign Minister, Salim Salim, who began to encourage former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere to get involved in Burundi. By November of 1995, former US president Jimmy Carter, through the Carter Center, facilitated an African Summit Conference in Cairo where the presidents or representatives of the presidents of Zaire, Uganda Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi discussed the persistent tensions, hostilities, insecurities and recent genocide in the Great Lakes region. At this conference, a structure for peace making began to emerge, although Nyerere was unable to accept an invitation to help mediate in Burundi. Subsequently he made several visits to Burundi and discussed his possible role with UN officials in New York.  

During his initial visits to Burundi, Nyerere met and discussed at great length with all the leaders in the government, the political parties, the army and the Gendarmerie. His discussions focused on three major items. Firstly, he wanted to acquire a better understanding of the issues and the views of the various actors regarding the crisis as well as get ideas about a possible solution. Secondly, Nyerere wanted to ascertain that outside intervention was acceptable to all parties and thirdly, that he was the best suited person to play that role.\(^6^8\) There was a general agreement that the situation in Burundi had reached a point where intervention was required and it was regionally agreed that this intervention should come first from the region itself.

Thus at a summit held in Tunis in March 1996, Julius Nyerere accepted the mandate to "assist the people of Burundi in finding means to achieve peace, stability and reconciliation," including "the resolution of fundamental problems relating to the access, control and management of power, so that either the ethnic or political minority is reassured."\(^6^9\) There followed a series of meetings and summits that came to be known as the Burundi Peace Process.\(^7^0\)

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\(^{68}\) Weissman, Stephen R: Preventing genocide in Burundi: Regional African Diplomacy for a Negotiated Political Settlement: United States Institute of Peace, 1996-97

\(^{69}\) Bunting, Ikaweba, Mwansasu, B, Bgoya, Walter: Overview of the Burundi Peace Process, walimu Nyerere Foundation: http://www.nyererefoundation.or.tz/researc/centre.htm In their overview of the Burundi Peace process, Bunting, Mwansasu and Bgoya, take a detailed look
3.3.1. Mwanza I Talks: 22-26 April 1996

Mwanza I and II, were the first formal meetings of the parties in conflict. UPRONA and FRODEBU being the two parties represented in parliament, were the parties involved at this initial stage. However, the Mwanza talks turned acrimonious and it was clear it would be impossible to make progress at that first meeting. The two parties quarreled over whom to include on a list of genocidal killers and whether or not to endorse the largely moribund Convention of Government. 71

At the end of Mwanza I, Nyerere drafted a statement for consideration and possible signature by UPRONA and FRODEBU leaders in which they would declare, inter-alia, that:

- "There cannot be a solution to the conflict in Burundi through the use of arms or other forms of violence, because the nature of the conflict is political [para 3(c)]."
- "They condemn violence, political killings and assassinations as means of achieving or returning political power or settling differences with political opponents" [para 4(a)] and that they

at the evolution of the peace process at Arusha, from the Mwanza I and II meetings (22 - April 1996, 3-9 June 1996) between UPRONA and FRODEBU, the six summit meetings the region's Heads of State and Government through to the sixth Arusha summit of 23 January 1999.

"Reiterate our total commitment and adherence to the use of political and constitutional means for the achievement of political objectives".  

On the surface of it, it seemed that the Mwanza I talks broke down because of failure to agree on those paragraphs. However, the problem was clearly much deeper than that.

### 3.3.2. Mwanza II Talks: 3 - 6 June 1996

Mwanza II continued the debate over the document from Mwanza I. Upon returning from Bujumbura after a recess, seven days of heated discussions and last minute intervention by the Burundi Prime Minister Nduwayo, the UPRONA Party delegation was still reluctant to sign the declaration. Additionally, UPRONA rebuffed Nyerere's efforts to broaden the discussion by inviting delegates from the armed rebels.

### 3.3.3. Arusha Regional Summit I: 25 June 1996

The Summit was convened in response to the failure of the Mwanza talks. It included the Presidents of Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire. Prior to the meeting, consultations had taken place

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73 Weissman, Stephen R: Preventing genocide in Burundi: Regional African Diplomacy for a Negotiated Political Settlement-. United States Institute of Peace, 1996-97
between President Ntibantunganya and Nyerere in Dodoma, Tanzania (20th June), between Prime Minister Nduwayo and President Museveni in Kampala (22 - 23 June) and between President Ntibantunganya, Prime Minister Nduwayo and the Burundian National Security Council in Bujumbura (24 June 1996). After those consultations, the delegations of the President and Prime Minister left that same day for Arusha. 74

To the surprise of the regional Heads of State, President Ntibantunganya and Prime Minister Nduwayo made a joint request to the Heads of State to provide assistance in the form of military/police personnel that would guarantee peace and security for all Barundi. The regional heads responded positively and agreed to set up a technical committee, to be headed by Tanzania that would study the modalities of extending such assistance. By early July, the regional technical committee had convened in Arusha and had reached a preliminary agreement, with the support of the UN, for the intervention force to be composed of units of the Ugandan and Tanzanian armed forces and police officers from Kenya.75

Weissman argues that Burundi was domestically ill-prepared for a regional peacekeeping force and was only responding to the pressure from the insurgency and the United Nations, as well as to President Museveni’s arguing that they reform the army the help of outside trainers. Bunting, Mwansasu and Bgoya, support this view in their assertion that "the events that followed the return to Bujumbura by President Ntibantunganya and Prime Minister Nduwayo, in retrospect, could have been predicted. Nduwayo suggested that the president was attempting to neutralize the country's military capacity, and at a mass rally of Tutsi dominated opposition parties, the prime minister joined other political leaders in rejecting foreign military intervention and criticising Ntibantunganya's alleged encouragement of external interference in domestic affairs. The idea of foreign security intervention is never, even at best of times, easy to sell to any state and especially to one where its armed forces have been used to ruling the country. In a situation of such political polarisation, whatever one side supported, willy-nilly the other side opposed."

Three other important conclusions came from the Summit:

**Weissman, Stephen R:** Preventing genocide in Burundi: Regional African Diplomacy for a Negotiated Political Settlement. United States Institute of Peace, 1996-97


**Newsafrica.com:** Burundi Post-Colonial History

^ww. newsafrica.com/history/burundi/post_colonial.asp

**Bunting, Ikaweba, Mwansasu, B, Bgoya, Walter:** Overview of the Burundi Peace Process, Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation: [http://www.nyererefoundation.or.tz/researc/centre.htm](http://www.nyererefoundation.or.tz/researc/centre.htm)
a) That from then on, the Burundi talks would involve all political parties

b) That a durable settlement must be based on democracy and security for all and

c) That the regional heads remained committed to a negotiated peaceful resolution of the Burundi conflict.\footnote{79}

According to Bunting, Mwansasu and Bgoya, the short-lived common position of the President and Prime Minister was not acceptable to the armed forces and to the political class in power in Bujumbura. Insecurity, assassinations and chaos increased in intensity leading to the coup d'etat of 25 July, one month after the Arusha meeting.\footnote{80} This coup brought Pierre Buyoya back to power, and is said to have "brought greater coherence to the government while removing the last of remnants of Hutu political power"\footnote{81}

\subsection*{3.3.4. Arusha Regional Summit II: July 1996}

Arusha Regional Summit II was convened on 31 July 1996, six days after Major Pierre Buyoya's second coup d'etat that brought him back as President. Buyoya abolished the constitution, suspended the national assembly and prohibited political parties. Burundi consequently withdrew
it's request for a regional peace keeping force, and all the work that preceded Arusha II was suspended. The new status quo brought 'polities' to a stand still; parliament was suspended, political parties were banned. Additionally, Buyoya announced that a largely civilian, broadly based government of national unity would be promptly installed, and that future negotiations with all Hutu groups would be considered. 82

Buyoya's actions caused serious problems for the international community on how it should handle a government coming to power through a military coup nullifying a democratic government that was elected only a few years earlier. The second Arusha summit therefore imposed comprehensive economic sanctions against the regime. This was thought to be the only feasible alternative between:

(1) Non-action which would have meant abandoning all attempts at a peaceful solution and letting the situation take its own course and;
(2) Military intervention which had been contemplated in some circles, but which the UN Security Council was not prepared to consider. 83
Nyerere was against military intervention from the start, because in addition to the propensity for such interventions to complicate situations even further, the region did not have the resources to put it into effect and to sustain it without the big powers via a UN Security Council resolution.

The sanctions were conditioned upon the restoration of the National Assembly, the unbanning of political parties and the immediate and unconditional negotiations with all political parties and armed factions.  

With the support of the OAU, the regional leaders demanded the re-establishment of the pre-coup parliament, free political activities and negotiations between the different partners.

The decision by regional Heads of state to impose sanctions on Burundi was a fundamental shift in inter-African state relations. For the first time a group of leaders declared that they would no longer accept an individual who came to power through a coup d'etat as a legitimate Head of State. It was a significant shift not only because it departed from the previous trade unionism of Heads of State, but because it also set out new criteria for legitimisation and acceptance; a mandate of the people, arrived at through an accepted method of ascertaining their views - at any rate not through the

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usip.org/pubs/pworks/weissm22/weism22. html
overthrow of existing legitimate authority. This position was later endorsed by the OAU in its Heads of State summit held in Algiers 1999.  

The conditions for suspension/removal of the sanctions were spelled out:

1. Restoration of parliament,
2. Removing the ban on political parties and;
3. Beginning negotiations with all parties in Arusha.  

The next two Arusha summits and the periods in between were entirely dominated by the Burundi government's campaign for the removal of sanctions, to the extent that the sanctions issue eclipsed the problems - the root causes of the crisis.  In early August 1996, the composition of a new 23 member, multi-ethnic cabinet was announced. This was soon followed by another announcement by Buyoya that an expanded transitional national assembly, incorporating existing elected deputies, would be inaugurated during September for a three-year period.  

ibid  
^ ibid  
9 Newsafrica.com: Burundi Post-Colonial History  
"www.newsafrica.com/history/burundi/post_colonial.asp
3.3.5. Arusha Regional Summit III: October 1996

At the third summit, following appeals from many organisations inside Burundi, sanctions were eased to enable importation of fuel, medicines and other supplies, especially for the international Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) community in Burundi that was paralysed by the sanctions. The regional leaders also granted sanctions exemptions for the importation of fertilizer and vegetable seed. This was because of "President Buyoya's partial steps toward resurrecting the parliament and parties". It should be noted however, that Buyoya had been invited to this meeting not as a president but as a factional leader. As such he declined the invitation, as did Nyangoma (of the CNDD), thus Nyerere was unsuccessful in bringing together the government, FRODEBU, the CNDD and UPRONA together for any discussions. While the regional leaders however still stressed on the centrality of unconditional and inclusive negotiations, Buyoya was unwilling to enter into negotiations until the economic sanctions were eased.

3.3.6. Mwanza III Talks: December 1996

In December of 1996, Nyerere held a Mwanza III meeting. This meeting attracted representatives from the government, CNDD, FRODEBU and many

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90 Weissman, Stephen R: Preventing genocide in Burundi: Regional African Diplomacy for a Negotiated Political Settlement: United States Institute of Peace, 1996-97

1 NewsAfrica.com: Burundi Post-Colonial History
www.newsafrica.com/history/burundi/post_colonial.asp
of the smaller Tutsi parties. Notably UPRONA, which was no longer a
governing party under the coup regime, did not attend. At this meeting,
Nyerere held individual 'consultations' with the parties about their positions
and made some useful informal contacts among the delegates. A more
ambitious effort was hampered by the fact that two key parties, the
government and CNDD, were involved in secret negotiations for a
suspension of hostilities under the auspices of the Community of
Sant'Egidio.92

Towards the end of 1996, Buyoya's government instituted a policy of
Yegroupment'. This involved the transfer of the population of villages
affected by violence to guarded camps from which agricultural activity had to
be carried out under military supervision. This severely curtailed the
country's agricultural production. Notably many of the villages affected were
Hutu.93

3.3.7. Arusha Regional Summit IV: April 1997

At the fourth summit held on 16th April 1997, sanctions were eased to
certain products including "all food and food products, all items relating to

Weissman, Stephen R: Preventing genocide in Burundi: Regional African Diplomacy for a
Negotiated Political Settlement: United States Institute of Peace, 1996-97
^tBlr//www.usip.orQ/pubs/pworks/weissm22/weism22.html
Newsafirica.com: Burundi Post-Colonial History
*ww.newsafirica.com/history/burundi/post_colonial.asp
education and construction materials as well as all types of medicines, all agricultural items and inputs in order to alleviate the sufferings of the people of Burundi. In actual fact, the list of exempted goods seemed to include everything except arms. Subsequently other conditions deemed favourable for successful talks at Arusha were added, such as allowing the Speaker of the National Assembly, Hon. Leonce Ngendakumana, ex-Presidents Ntibantunganya and Bagaza freedom to travel and to participate in Arusha talks. The personal safety of the three leaders and dismantling the "regroupment camps" were two other demands of the regional leaders. On this occasion, Buyoya was invited to attend as president rather than faction leader.

On 29th July 1997, Nyerere announced his intention to call the first All Party Talks for 25th August 1997. This was after consultations with and in the presence of the special envoys to the Great Lakes region. Matters on which the special envoys were consulted were: responses of the parties inside and outside Burundi to the planned all party meeting and the situation inside Burundi. Although the Burundi government had indicated that it would
send a delegation to the talks, at the last minute it refused to send a
delegation and also refused to let other delegations from inside to attend.

The Burundi government insisted on a three week postponement to the talks
citing it's worsening relations with Tanzania on account of what Burundi said
was Tanzania's 'ever-increasing campaign' for sanctions and its alleged
toleration of armed attacks by Burundian refugees from its territory. The
Burundi government challenged that such circumstances made the
mediation by a Tanzanian citizen very hard for Burundians to accept.

However, some western diplomats stated that the government's withdrawal
was infact caused by Buyoya's inability to overcome internal resistance to
allowing the speaker of the assembly, another high FRODEBU official and
former President Bagaza to travel to Arusha. These sources also say that the
absence especially of the speaker would be intolerable for Nyerere.97

However, delegations from political parties outside Burundi or who had
already left for Arusha before government's decision to boycott the meeting,
met and made important declarations.98

97 Weissman, Stephen R: Preventing genocide in Burundi: Regional African Diplomacy for a
Negotiated Political Settlement: United States Institute of Peace, 1996-97
ffibiZ/www.usip.orQ/pubs/pworks/weissm22/weism22.html

98 Bunting, Ikaweba, Mwansasu,B, Bgoya, Walter: Overview of the Burundi Peace Process,
Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation: http://www.nvererefoundation.or.tz/researc/centre.htm
3.3.8. Arusha Regional Summit V: 3 - 4 September 1997

The fifth Arusha summit was held in Dar Es Salaam from 3 - 4 September at which the decision of the Burundi government not to attend the 25th August all party talks was discussed. The summit expressed:

(1) "Disappointment over the refusal of the government of Burundi to take part in the first session of all party negotiations in Arusha,"

(2) Reaffirmed that the objective of the negotiations is to achieve a new dispensation based on the principles of democracy and security for all. In this respect, it is expected that negotiating parties will come up with transitional mechanisms towards the attainment of this ultimate objective

(3) Insisted on Arusha as the venue of the talks

(4) Called on Burundi government to halt trials that were then in progress

(5) Maintained sanctions, and

(6) Declared its preparedness to adopt additional measures to deal with any obstruction to the negotiation process."

After presiding at this meeting, Mwalimu Nyerere informed the heads of state of his desire to step aside as Facilitator of the Burundi Peace Process. Therefore, the summit was firmly of the view that the continued role of
Nyerere was crucial for the negotiated settlement of the conflict in Burundi, and urged him to continue. At the same time, the summit also rejected president Benjamin Mkapa's offer to no longer host political negotiations.\textsuperscript{100}

Additionally the summit established a new secretariat to ensure that the existing sanctions were scrupulously applied. It also called on the government to create a propitious climate for the talks by disbanding regroupment camps, halting the trials for the 1993 massacres until a negotiated solution was in place to deal with such crimes, and permitting the speaker as well as former Presidents Ntibantunganya and Bagaza to travel freely and participate in the talks.\textsuperscript{101}

\textbf{3.3.9. The First All Party Talks: June 1998}

Nyerere was finally able to convene the first all party talks in June 1998. On 21st June 1998, a "Declaration by the Participants in the Burundi Peace Negotiations involving all the parties to the Burundi conflict" was signed by seventeen parties and representatives from civil society organisations including the Chamber of Commerce, women's and youth associations. The signatories committed themselves: \textsuperscript{102}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{100} Weissman, Stephen R: Preventing genocide in Burundi: Regional African Diplomacy for a Negotiated Political Settlement: United States Institute of Peace, 1996-97
\item \textsuperscript{101} Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{102} Ibid
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
- "to engage in serious negotiations until we reach a just and lasting solution to this crisis in our country
- to resolve the Burundi conflict through peaceful means, and to put an end to all forms of violence, and
- Accordingly, all parties to the conflict declare a suspension of hostilities to take effect not later than 20th July 1998."^102

However, both the government and the FDD immediately distanced themselves from the agreement, thus undermining its effectiveness. 103

The declaration also decided on the issues for negotiations:

1. Nature of the conflict in Burundi and problems of genocide and exclusion and their solutions;
2. Democracy and good governance; constitutional arrangements; questions of justice and the fight against impunity; judiciary, system of administration and transitional institutions.
3. Peace and security for all: Issues of public security and defence; cessation of hostilities; permanent cease - fire arrangements;
4. Rehabilitation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons; economic and social reconstruction and development.
5. Guarantees on implementation of the agreement emanating from the Burundi Peace Negotiations.  

It also decided to establish committees to deal with each one of the above five issues.

3.3.10. The Second All Party Talks: July 1998

The second session (Arusha II) started on 20th July 1998 and committees began their work under Chair and Vice-Chair persons proposed by Nyerere discussed and agreed upon by all parties.

Each committee drew up its agenda, and by and large, worked independently of the other committees but always in regular consultations with the Facilitator who also had at least one member of his team in each one of the committees.

After several consultations, it became clear that the target date for the completion of the work of the committees set for the end of 1998 would not be met. On the other hand, at the 23rd January 1999 summit, President

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Buyoya promised that on government's part an agreement could be reached before the end of 1998.

The committees still covered a great deal of ground though it must be admitted that some issues remained unresolved. However, given the continued engagement of all parties in the process, the development of confidence, mutual respect and realisation of the basic imperative of any negotiations - give and take - it was felt that the problems may not be insurmountable after all.

In committee I, for example, which was dealing with the Nature of the Burundi Conflict, after a lot of discussions and disagreement, it became clear that all the groups could not objectively analyse their history. It was finally suggested that it may be necessary to ask independent historians to write a history of Burundi that could be considered 'objective' and to which Burundi could refer in their search for common understanding of their past.

From the negotiations and consultations there was a general agreement that atrocities, genocide and exclusion and crimes against humanity have taken place in Burundi since independence. And that these crimes were not acceptable to the Barundi people. It was then agreed in principle to create
either one or two commissions of national and or international enquiry on
Genocide and exclusion. Though the details were not worked out, these
commissions were expected to carry out investigations dating back to
independence and to make recommendation based on those enquiries to an
international tribunal. It was not however clarified whether these
commissions would have a legal mandate or not or would be similar to the
Truth Commission of South Africa.

Nyerere also encouraged the development of identifiable groups as
negotiating groups within each committee G7, G8 and the G3 (Parternatiate
government, UPRONA and National Assembly).\textsuperscript{106} Initially this idea was
opposed by some parties on the grounds that it promoted 'ethnic identities'
and 'ethnic interests' but it was been shown in practice to increase the pace
of the negotiations.

In line with the Joint Communique of the Fifth Arusha regional summit,
negotiating parties were expected to present in the Arusha session of 5th
July 1999 comprehensive proposals regarding "transitional mechanisms

\textsuperscript{106} At Nyerere's instigation, to speed up negotiations, the 18 delegations attending the peace talks in
Arusha, Tanzania, merged into three groupings. One grouping known as the G3 comprised
of government and pro-government delegations, while the G8 consisted of PARENA and smaller Tutsi
ominated opposition parties. The third grouping was called G7 and comprised of FRODEBU, allied
dominated parties and Hutu-dominated armed opposition groups. In August 2000, the pro-
wing of UPRONA and another Tutsi dominated party that came into the negotiations in
2000 joined pro-Tutsi group which thus became known as G10. With the shift of UPRONA the
ment group was reduced to two groups and became G2." Immigration & Nationality
orate: IND - History www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/default.asp/pageid=1394
towards the attainment of a new dispensation based on the principles of democracy and security for all." These would constitute the core of the negotiations leading to final agreement.¹⁰⁷

3.3.11. Arusha Regional Summit VI: January 1999

The sixth Arusha Regional Summit was held on 23 January 1999. At that meeting, after clear evidence that the Burundi government was irreversibly committed to continuing to participate in the Arusha negotiations, sanctions were suspended.¹⁰⁸ This move, although welcomed by many within and outside Burundi, was dismissed as premature by the CNDD. Notably, the CNDD-FDD was officially excluded from this meeting.¹⁰⁹

3.3.12. September Consultations And Arusha IV September Committee Sessions

At the closing of the July 1999 session of the committee meetings of Arusha IV, Nyerere informed the plenary that he would be conducting interim activities and consultations prior to convening the next session which was scheduled to begin on September 6th.

These consultative meetings included special envoys to Burundi and the consultations that took place in Dar-Es-Salaam. Additionally, the Facilitation called some groups for consultation on specific issues based on the submissions of their various positions. The Facilitation put together leading groups that are supposed to constitute leadership of the clusters (G7, G8 and G3 (the Partnership). In doing so the facilitation was recognising leadership responsibility of the family groups.

The purpose of these consultations was twofold:

1) To take the delegations through their submissions and ask them for clarity on specific issues that were ambiguous in the statements.
2) To work toward compromises and try and see if they can start thinking about harmonising the positions that they were in disagreement about in order to speed up the process.110

In addition, there were specific issues that the Facilitation wanted the groups to address in their presentations for clarification based on the papers they submitted as the G-clusters

The identified issues were:

109 Newsafrica.com: Burundi Post-Colonial History
newsafrica.com/history/burundi/post_colonial.asp
10 Bunting, Ikaweba, Mwansasu, Bgoya, Walter: Overview of the Burundi Peace Process,
walimu Nyerere Foundation: http://www.nyererefoundation.or.tz/researc/centre.htm
• The establishment of a national and/or international tribunal and commission on Genocide and Exclusion.
• The electoral system
• The transition
• Reform of Security Forces
• Integration of fighting forces
• Permanent cease-fire.
• Return of refugees, their property and their security.
• Agree on what the end product of Arusha should be (are we trying to come out with a constitution or principles).
• Identify guarantees and implementation;

The presentations from the parties were based on the group papers of what had been circulated.\textsuperscript{111}

With regards to the question of participation by some belligerent groups, Nyerere clearly laid out the conditions for participation. Despite the fact that much of the fighting in and around Bujumbura, especially Bujumbura Rural was attributed to a breakaway faction of FROLINA, the Jean Bosco CNDD-FDD faction continued to receive the most publicity in the international
media and expressed concern. Nyerere addressed the issue in his closing statement of the July session of Arusha IV as follows.

"...Jean-Bosco represents a breakaway group from CNDD. CNDD is a party to these negotiations. If I simply invite Jean-Bosco to come - to come as what, as a member of CNDD or as a separate group? If he is coming as a member of CNDD it has nothing to do with me. It would be an invitation from his leader Nyangoma. But they are quarrelling. So I myself have made a number of proposals of how we can get Jean Bosco to come.

(1) - If he wants to come as a member of CNDD he can have reconciliation with his leader, Nyangoma. If he has this reconciliation with his leader of course he can come. He can come as part of the delegation of CNDD. If that is not possible I have made another suggestion.

(2) - If he wants to come as the leader of CNDD he should replace Nyangoma in accordance with the constitution of CNDD. If he replaces Nyangoma on the basis of their constitution I will of course invite him. I invite the authentic leader based on their constitution.

(3) - My proposal number three is that if 1 and 2 aren't possible then Jean-Bosco can form his own party, a separate party, which has nothing to do with CNDD. I will invite him, and if Nyangoma and any other group object I would ask them why?
4) The fourth suggestion is that we arrange discrete talks between Jean-Bosco and president Buyoya.

I would invite him, but my invitation does not mean he would be automatically accepted. He would still have to be approved by the plenary in accordance with the rules of procedure. But I would put forward the case. If that is not possible we must ask why? ...¹,¹¹²

The negotiations continued during 1999 but had to be suspended in October, following the death of Julius Nyerere. It was felt that the peace process suffered a serious setback with the death of Nyerere. Indeed these sentiments were expressed by the Ambassador Robert R. Fowler, permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations Security Council "A new facilitator must become engaged soon is the momentum generated by the negotiations to date and by the commitment of the parties to the process is to be sustained. We encourage the Secretary-General to use his good offices to help identify an appropriate successor to Mwalimu Nyerere as Facilitator of the Burundi peace process."¹¹³

In December 1999, a regional heads of state meeting in Arusha selected former South African president, Nelson Mandela to take over as the new
facilitator in the Burundi peace process. This decision was applauded by among others, the UN Security Council which stated in part that, the Security Council

"Warmly endorses and strongly supports the designation by the Eighth Arusha Regional Summit on December 1 1999 of Nelson Mandela, former President of the Republic of South Africa, as the new Facilitator of the Arusha peace process, successor to the late Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, expresses its strongest support for his efforts to achieve a peaceful solution to the conflict in Burundi, and welcomes the successful meeting in Arusha on 16 January 2000 launching his initiative;"™

### 3.3.13. Signing Of The Peace Agreement: August 2000

The negotiations continued into 2000 with Mandela determined to have a peace deal signed by mid July 2000. This date changed to August because a number of issues remained unresolved. The government of Burundi insisted on a cease-fire before any deal could be signed. They also wanted President Buyoya to preside over the transitional period set to last 30 months. Most pro Hutu organizations backed Domitien Ndayizeye for the presidency during the transition period, although the CNDD was reportedly in favour of
Majority of the political parties were opposed to Buyoya leading the transition period which would end with the election of a new President. However, it was finally agreed that the transitional president would not be eligible to stand in the presidential poll scheduled to follow the transitional period.\textsuperscript{115}

Finally, on August 28, 2000, president Buyoya, Hutu parties and six of the ten Tutsi parties signed the agreement.\textsuperscript{116} The CNDD-FDD as well other rebel groups like PALIPEHUTU-FNL refused to commit themselves to the Arusha accords.\textsuperscript{117} The Tutsi parties that did not sign the agreement all acknowledged that if they did not change their position they would not have any say in the choice of the government.\textsuperscript{118}

After signing of the agreement, the 19 parties involved continued talks on details and issues related to the implementation. Although a cease fire failed to get included in the agreement, the parties did agree on the composition of an Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC) which was set up to oversee the 28 August peace agreement. The IMC would have 29 representatives drawn from regional governments, the UN, the OAU and the Burundi parties,

\textsuperscript{117} Immigration & Nationality Directorate: IND - History Jfww.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/default.asp?pageid=1394
\textsuperscript{Z} ibid
\textsuperscript{1} European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation: Burundi;
\textsuperscript{1}Hym.euconflict.org/euconflict/sfp/part2/197.htm
and an ii-person permanent executive council would be set up within the committee.\textsuperscript{119} The IMC was officially established on 27 November 2000.\textsuperscript{120}


In a summit held in Arusha in February 2001, the regional heads of state proposed alternating the presidency over a transitional period of three years. The recommended a Tutsi President and Hutu Vice president for the first 18 months and vice versa for the second 18 months. FRODEBU stated that it had not approved of the power-sharing agreement and saw it as entrenching ethnicity in an already divided country. However, eventually all parties present accepted the proposal. A number of parties agreed to submit Col. Epitace Bayaganakandi and FRODEBU's Domitien Ndayizeye as candidates for the transitional leadership. The names were however rejected by both the Burundian government and the regional heads. The CNDD, stated that whilst it backed the Arusha accord, it would not join the transitional government unless a negotiated cease-fire agreement was concluded.\textsuperscript{121}

On April 4 2001, President Buyoya announced that his government had decided to implement the peace agreement signed in Arusha un August
2001. Consequently, the Burundi transitional government was sworn in on 1 November 2001. The transitional government makes provision for cabinet posts to be split between Hutus and Tutsis, for the establishment of an ethnically-balanced defence force and for a general election to be held after the three year transition period. Accordingly, the transitional administration, which will be held by President Buyoya for the first 18 months will have a cabinet comprising 26 portfolios, 14 of which will be allocated to Hutu political parties and the remaining 12 to the Tutsi. Additionally, communal and council level elections are expected to be held by the end of the first half of the transition, with senatorial elections envisaged to take place during the second half. Immediately after that the senate and the national assembly are expected to convene to elect the first president for the post-transitional phase of the government.\footnote{Naidoo, Sagren: Burundi, Challenges for Burundi’s Transitional Government Institute for Global}
CHAPTER IV: The Role of Facilitation in Conflict Resolution: A Critical Analysis

4.1. The Theories of Conflict

Having looked at the historical background to the Burundi conflict, the different actors involved in the peace process and the peace process itself, this section will now attempt to analyse the role facilitation has played in the resolution of the conflict in Burundi. Mediation or facilitation as it has occurred in the case of Burundi, can be seen to have been guided by two major theories, namely realism and world society.

Most analysts agree that mediation is often intertwined with other motives such as self-interest. This is however not to say that it cannot be done for humanitarian purposes. Humanitarian reasons are rarely the ones that drive, say governments, to be involved in a mediation process. It has been argued that, in view of the considerable investment of political, moral and material resources that mediation requires and the risks to which mediators expose themselves, it is reasonable to assume that mediators are no less motivated by self-interest than by humanitarian impulses.\textsuperscript{123} Touval and Zartman further assert that to some extent the mediator is a player in a plot of relations surrounding a conflict, and has some interest in the outcome,
otherwise why would they mediate? This falls within the realm of realism, which considers power as its currency and is all about the self-interests of states. Thus, one can therefore deduce from this that where a state is involved in a mediation process it is likely to be protecting or looking out for its own self-interest.

Touval and Zartman draw an unexpected parallel in regard to the parties in conflict, by stating that it would be unlikely for these parties to invite or accept a mediator or facilitator simply because they are interested in peace. Indeed, they too probably expect the mediator's intervention to work in their favor.\textsuperscript{124}

In recognition of the fact that the theory of realism may have some shortcomings in explaining the facilitation process in the Burundi Peace Process, this study looked to the conflict research theory of conflict, which falls under the wider umbrella of the world society theory.

The conflict researcher, when involved in a mediation or facilitation, will try to put in place structures and mechanisms which ensure that a conflict is resolved in a peaceful manner, and that the needs of all parties are met so that the result is a win-win situation. Their approach is not about sharpening

\textsuperscript{124} ibid
the conflict, but about getting into the conflict at the right moment where the conflicting parties can be persuaded to interact, talk and come up with their solutions to their conflict. The conflict researcher will tackle a conflict from its root so that the conflict can be resolved and not merely settled.

4.2. The Actors in mediation

The Burundi Peace Process brought together various parties in a bid to resolve the conflict. It brought in states, non-governmental organizations, and church groups all under the guidance of one individual facilitator. One can speculate on the interests of each of the parties involved in a bid to understand why they have chosen to be involved in the process. For some of the regional states, their interest was economic and tied to their security, in that they wanted to curb the influx of refugees into their countries, as it was not only a strain on national resources but also a threat to internal security.

Another reason that may have led states to be involved in the mediation of the conflict is that the conflict risked upsetting the regional balance. Thus the states as party to the mediation sought to protect their own interests. This is the reason why the regional states under the umbrella of the OAU chose to be involved in the resolution of the conflict in Burundi.
In reality, the regional states have been the driving force behind the mediation process in Burundi. Rarely have neighbouring states shown such single minded determination to resolve a conflict. The truth of the matter is that each and every one of these neighbouring states involved in the mediation all have certain interests to protect and those interests can only be protected if the conflict in Burundi is resolved.

On the other hand, a state that is party to the mediation may be interested in extending or increasing its influence over one of the conflicting parties. Although the state may not openly throw its weight behind one of the parties, it may be able to, within limits, succeed in increasing its influence one side in a conflict, particularly if its relations with the other side are closer at the onset of the mediation. Tanzania's long-standing relationship with Burundi can be seen in this light.

Mediators are rarely indifferent to the terms being negotiated. However, the fact that they are not impartial does not mean that they will not conduct the process impartially. Indeed, the very fact that the mediator is partial to one party to the conflict can mean that they are able to exert their influence to push the favoured party to a resolution of the conflict.
The disputing parties may also have their own self-interests in inviting or accepting a mediator. One reason could be the expectation that a certain mediator will help one party gain a more favourable settlement than would otherwise be expected. Additionally, parties may accept mediation in the hope that involving a third party will reduce some of the risks that come with compromises such as a protecting their own image and reputation when making concessions. There may also be instances where allowing the mediation provides an opportunity for the disputing parties to improve their relations with the mediator while souring the relations between the mediator and the adversary. Mediation therefore can be looked at in terms of advancing the self interests of the mediator, the adversaries and all other groups involved in the process.

In as far as mediation is motivated by the need to promote a state's self interest, this can be explained using the theory of realism. However, realism looks at conflict as a struggle for power between states. Realism will thus explain only the regional state's involvement in the conflict in Burundi, but not the involvement of the individual facilitator, NGO's and other groups. This is because the conflict is involves not just the state of Burundi as a country by also the different rebel groups within the state. Realists only recognize states as actors in the international system and thus cannot

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explain ethnic conflicts, nor does realism look inside a state to see how what happens inside the state affects the international system or indeed has any bearing on a conflict.

The theory that may explain the role of the individual facilitators, in this case Julius Nyerere and Nelson Mandela, as well as other groups would be the conflict research theory. Conflict researchers look at the world as being made up of people who have needs. If their needs are not met, this leads to conflict. Conflict researchers try to come up with a situation where everyone's needs are met so as to avoid conflicts. The approach of the conflict researcher involves bringing the conflicting parties together, where the mediator can listen, let the two parties interact and encourage them to come up with their own solution. This approach was clearly what Julius Nyerere and Nelson Mandela used when they attempted to bring the various parties in the Burundi conflict together. The two facilitators recognized not just the legitimate political parties but the rebel groups, as well as the church organizations, women's groups and NGO's. This was in recognition of the fact that there are some basic societal needs that must be addressed in order for the conflict to be resolved.

In the cases where the conflict research theory is applied in the mediation of a conflict, the facilitator or mediator will be involved in activities such as
provision of good offices, that is helping the adversaries to communicate, endeavoring to change the images of the adversaries to each other, or suggesting compromises including bargaining, negotiating and cajoling, if need be, in an attempt to induce the adversaries to change their stance. Conflict researchers are generally interested in peaceful means of conflict resolution and try to create mechanisms and structures which can lead to the fulfillment of needs for all in a bid to have a win-win situation.

This is the reason that states are not capable of mediating a conflict successfully and why other parties such as church groups and NGO's find themselves involved in the process of mediation. As stated above, since states always have interests to protect they would not be able to deal with the societal issues which would assist in getting to the root cause of a conflict. On the other hand, groups such as church organizations and other NGO's are usually motivated by humanitarianism. The mediation process in Burundi has benefited from some involvement by the religious organizations as well as women's groups. However, these have not been give much consideration in the process and most of their participation has been as observers.

Individual facilitators or mediators also fall in this category. They are mainly motivated by a humanitarian need to end suffering and ensure that the
needs of various parties are met. In the case of the Burundi conflict, the facilitator, after sitting with the adversaries and having listened to each side encouraged them to come up with a structure where all their needs could be met in a peaceful manner. And this resulted in the drawing up of a power sharing agreement. This means that there are no losers in this situation as the needs of each side are met.

4.3. The timing of the mediation

The timing of mediation or facilitation is another aspect that should be considered when it comes to the resolution of conflicts. In his studies on conflict, Zartman,\textsuperscript{126} talks of the cycles of conflict and the ripe moment to intervene in any conflict. He gives four models to indicate this moment.

The first is the \textit{hurting stalemate}. This is the point where neither of the parties can see the possibility of realizing their goal using the strategies that they are applying. The parties realise that they are suffering from fatigue, and yet none of them have any chances of victory, while at the same time neither of the parties is hurting or being hurt significantly. Thus the parties are likely to seek a negotiated resolution to the conflict at this time.

The second model is that of the *imminent mutual catastrophe*. This is the point at which the parties to the conflict consider mediation only when they are faced by an imminent major catastrophe.

The third model talks of *entrapment*. In this situation, parties feel that they have invested so much in the conflict that stopping the conflict will mean that all that investment was for nothing. Therefore they are entrapped in a situation where they feel that the only way of justifying the losses and investments is through victory. However, eventually there is a realization that victory is not imminent and the continuation of the conflict only results in further losses. It then becomes a matter of the leaders or policy maker to decide that the time has come to cut their losses. It is at this moment that the mediator can come into the conflict.

The fourth model presented by Zartman is the *enticing opportunity*. This is an opportunity that presents itself, usually by chance and it presents an enticing moment for a mediator to intervene in a conflict and to try and resolve it. This opportunity can come as a result of a change of leadership, for example.

In looking at these for models, the Burundi situation can be likened to the hurting stalemate model. Indeed it is said that the current peace process
seems to have been triggered by 'war weariness' more than anything else. This situation has been described as a 'security impasse', or stalemate, which forced the various conflicting parties towards political dialogue. Neither of the two main ethnic groups appeared to have the capacity either to physically destroy the other, or to ensure total protection for themselves. This was indeed the ripe moment both for the conflicting parties to invite and accept mediators and for Julius Nyerere to get involved as facilitator.

Having looked at the two major theories that may be used to explain facilitation as way of resolving conflict, we have to ask ourselves whether, in the case of the Burundi conflict, the facilitation has indeed resulted in the resolution of conflict. How does one judge that a mediation has been successful? For some people, just the fact that the conflicting parties have agreed to sit and talk is already a sign of success. For others it is the signing of an agreement which signifies the success of that mediation. For others still it is when the issues contained in the agreement are implemented.

The Burundi peace process had several broad objectives. These included the ending of overt conflict and a complete cease fire, having both the rebels and government sit and agree on a workable power sharing agreement, the

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integration of more Hutus into the mainly Tutsi dominated armed forces and
the repatriation of refugees into the country.

Although there is no standard way of measuring the success or failure of any
mediation or facilitation, the fact is that the warring parties in Burundi have
to a large extent laid down their weapons and engaged in dialogue in a bid
to resolve the conflict. This, in itself can be seen as one of the successes of
the facilitation. For many years, this has been an impossible task to achieve.
As a matter of fact, the Arusha process has been praised for its ability to
'bring together political parties, individuals in government and outside that
were previously unable to communicate, let alone attempt to see eye to eye.
They, in time, have learned to debate peacefully; to relate humanly to one
another and to realise that peace will only come when there is genuine
concern for the welfare and interests of the other. Both sides of the great
divide are developing consciousness of the fact that security cannot be
guaranteed by arms alone in the hands of a minority, or by figureheads
alone of a powerless majority.\(^\text{128}\)

Thus, it would be correct to say that as at May 2002, the facilitation process
in the Burundi conflict achieved a limited amount of success because it was

\(^{128}\) Bunting, Ikaweba, Mwansasu, B, Bgoya, Walter: Overview of the Burundi Peace Process,
Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation: http://www.nyererefoundation.or.tz/researc/centre.htm
able to bring the warring parties to the negotiating table and has seen them agree on a power sharing agreement.

However, the total success of the facilitation process has been undermined by the fact that not all groups have been involved in the negotiations. Indeed, two rebel groups which refused to sign the peace agreement, the Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD) and the National Liberation Front (FNL), have increased their attacks on both civilian and military targets.\textsuperscript{129} With this state of a lack of a cease-fire, the situation in Burundi remains volatile. There is always the risk of a renewed escalation of violence. At the same time the mediation's failure to involve more actively groups such as the religious organizations, the women's groups and various NGO's has meant that the basic needs of the people of Burundi are not being addressed fully.

The result has been a facilitation mainly driven by the regional states and thus solving issues at a purely political level, while the basic needs of the people are ignored. Societal issues such as the animosities and insecurities that exist between the Hutu and the Tutsi need to be addressed. As the mediation process progresses, the facilitator has the duty to ensure that the process is handled not just from the realist point of view where only the
interests of the regional states are served, but also from a world society viewpoint, where by the needs of the people of Burundi at a societal level are met.

From this study's discussion on the conflict research theory, it was clear that for a mediation or facilitation process to be totally successful, it is important that parties needs are met or at least that all their views are considered and their considerations heard out. In the case of FDD and FNL the fact that they have not been included in the negotiation process means that have continued to launch hostilities at the Burundi government. This then means that the other objectives such as repatriation of refugees from Tanzania back into Burundi or even the integration of the armed forces cannot be realised.

It is therefore this study's conclusion that in the case of the Burundi conflict, facilitation has only led to a partial resolution of the conflict. Further, this study holds the view that facilitation would lead to resolution of conflict if the facilitator involves all parties to the conflict in the negotiation process.

CHAPTER V: Conclusion and recommendations

From the study, it is possible to conclude that the facilitation process in the Burundi peace process resulted in partial resolution of the conflict. The major stumbling block was the exclusion of two major rebel groups and other groups from the negotiation process. The exclusion of the two main rebel groups meant that a ceasefire agreement could not be reached, while the exclusion of other groups resulted in continued insecurities and hostilities among the people of Burundi. This study therefore, recommends that the facilitator makes every effort to include these parties in the negotiations. This is the only way in which the rest of the peace agreement signed in August 2000 can be implemented.

The facilitator, still has a duty to continue bringing the different groups of Burundians into the process until all people feel they are fully represented. There is a great need for equal opportunity of citizens to be provided in all sectors of national life. However, this job cannot be left to the facilitator's team alone. This study concurs with the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation's assertion that the duty of informing the people of Burundi lies with all the parties involved in the peace process because regular and accurate information is a big asset in peace education and advocacy. 'Eighteen parties Participate in Arusha peace negotiations. If every party prepared one fifteen Minute radio programme, reporting accurately what transpired at the end of
each session, or wrote one article for the newspaper, or addressed a few hundred people on a "colline" speaking positively about Arusha, all Barundi would by now be well informed and would be supporting the process fully.¹³⁰

It is this study's recommendation that the integration of the armed forces, which was one of the issues in the agreement be done expeditiously. This would involve having more Hutu in the mainly Tutsi army and would go a long way in making the people of Burundi feel more secure. Indeed the committee concerned with negotiating issues of defence and security agreed that the defence and security forces belong to all the people of Burundi and that they must be an instrument for the protection of all the people, and that all the people must recognise themselves in the armed forces.

This study also recommends the continued development of economic and social policies which will ensure the economic growth of the country. This requires the absence of war as well as the promotion of a culture of peace and tolerance through the development of the sense of patriotism of citizens and mutual solidarity through education and training of all political and technical officials. What this study has established is that ethnicity in itself does not necessarily lead to conflict. In the case of Burundi, the ethnic factor has been manipulated by political elites to manifest fear and hatred amongst

¹³⁰ Bunting, Ikaweba, Mwansasu, B, Bgoya, Walter: Overview of the Burundi Peace Process,
the people. With the defence and security forces integrated, it will be much easier for political leaders and organisations to promote and develop the ideals of peace and national unity within themselves. It would be the work of the IMC to ensure that the ideologies of exclusion, racism and genocide are purged from the Burundi society.

One limitation experienced in the course of this study was the scarcity of material written on the facilitation process in the Burundi conflict. Although the process has been going on for almost six years not much has been written about it. Also, most of the literature available was written in French language thus making it difficult for non French speakers to fully appreciate it. It is hoped that as this peace process continues, it will a subject of study for more scholars.

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