THE OAU INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICAN CONFLICTS:
THE CASE OF THE SOMALI CIVIL WAR

BY
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A Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of M.A. in
International Relations

Department of Government
University of Nairobi

April 1998
DECLARATION

This Thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any University.

Sign: ___________________________ Date: 29/5/98

HENRY AMADI

This Thesis has been submitted for examination with my approval as a University Supervisor.

Sign: ___________________________ Date: June 16th, 1998

PROFESSOR PATRICK O. ALILA.
This work is dedicated to the memory of my Late Father, Frederick Felix Odongo.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is almost impossible for me to thank all those who have contributed to the writing of this Thesis.

Special acknowledgements must however go to the Gandhi Smarak Nidhi Fund, for a partial Scholarship with the help of which I managed to go through the postgraduate program.

I am also very grateful to my Supervisor, Prof. Patrick O. Alila for going through this work despite his busy schedule as the Director of the Institute for Development Studies, at the University of Nairobi. I would also like to thank the staff of the Department of Government and especially Dr. Nick G. Wanjohi and Dr. Peter Wanyande for their wise guidance during the initial stage of research proposal.

My special acknowledgements must go to my kindred, without whose support I might not have managed to go through the whole study. These include my dearest aunt Selina Apondi, under whose small roof I was able to stay throughout the period of study and my brother Thomas Adala and cousin Prof. Henry S. Adala, both of whose support saw me through the crucial part of the program.

I am also most grateful to my colleagues from the M.A. class, Government Department, particularly Daniel K. Lekupe, Jonathan L. Lodompui, Dina Kimwattan, and Kennedy G. Mokaya for the comradely support that they extended to me during the most trying moments of the study.

Finally, I must thank M. Jackline Aluvi, Dorcas Addah, Antony Okoth, D.J. Onyango and Mr. Kamau for their computer services that proved most invaluable for the final preparations of this study.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ARPS</td>
<td>The Aborigines’ Rights Protection Society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHA</td>
<td>The (UN) Department of Humanitarian Affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>The (UN) Economic Commission for Africa.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>The Economic Community of West Africa States.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FROLINAT</td>
<td>The National Liberation Front of Chad (French Acronym).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-12</td>
<td>The Group of Twelve (Somalia).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>The Gross Domestic Product.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPRA</td>
<td>The Algerian Provincial Government (French Acronym).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUNT</td>
<td>The Transitional Government of National Unity in Chad (French Acronym).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAFA</td>
<td>The International African Friends of Abyssinia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IASB</td>
<td>The International Africa Service Bureau.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICO</td>
<td>The Islamic Conference Organization.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>The International Committee of the Red Cross.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGADD</td>
<td>The Inter-Governmental Agency for Drought and Development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>The International Monetary Fund.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPS</td>
<td>The Inter-Press Service (Italy).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAFTA</td>
<td>The Latin America Free Trade Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPA</td>
<td>The Lagos Plan of Action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAACP</td>
<td>The National Association for the Advancement of the Coloured.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NADAF</td>
<td>The New Agenda for Development for Africa.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>The North Atlantic Treaty Organization.</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCBWA</td>
<td>The National Congress for British West Africa.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>The Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIEO</td>
<td>The New International Economic Order.</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>The Organization of American States.</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>The Organization of African Unity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCAM</td>
<td>Organization Commune Africaine et Malgache.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>The United Nation Operations in the Congo (French Acronym).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAF</td>
<td>The Pan-African Federation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAFMESCA</td>
<td>The Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central and South Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAIGC</td>
<td>Partido Africano da Independencia e da Guine e Cabo Verde.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>The Republic of South Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADCC</td>
<td>The South Africa Development Coordination Conference.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAPS</td>
<td>The Structural Adjustment Programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDM</td>
<td>The Somali Democratic Movement.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNA</td>
<td>The Somalia National Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNF</td>
<td>The Somalia National Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNM</td>
<td>The Somalia National Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOS</td>
<td>Save Our Souls (An Austrian NGO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>The Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSDF</td>
<td>The Somalia Salvation Democratic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNC</td>
<td>The Transitional National Council (Somalia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAR</td>
<td>The United Arab Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGCC</td>
<td>The United Gold Coast Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>The United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>The United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>The Unified Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN(O)</td>
<td>The United Nations (Organization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>The United Nations Operations in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US(A)</td>
<td>The United States (of America)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>The United Somali Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASU</td>
<td>The West African Students Union (London)</td>
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<td>WSLF</td>
<td>The Western Somali Liberation Front</td>
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## CHAPTER ONE

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   2.1.8 The Algerian Question and The 1962 Lagos Conference of Independent African and Malagasy States

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ABSTRACT

This Study attempts to determine the extent to which the adherence to Article III of the OAU Charter has conditioned the selective involvement of OAU in African civil wars and in particular the extent to which this has been responsible for the low level of involvement in the Somali conflict (1991 - 1995).

In Chapter one, an attempt has been made to justify the study both as a policy guide and in terms of its contribution to scholarship. It is useful not only to African policy makers but also to the international community. It underlines the gaps, both in theory building and literature, which the study is likely to fill. The review of the literature which has been done in the same Chapter, has further emphasized the need to investigate the selective involvement of the OAU in African Civil wars.

The study is guided by the systemic Theories of International Relations from which one hypothesis is drawn, namely, that there is a positive correlation between the level of threat to African regional status quo and the OAU's involvement in a given African civil war. Our choice of the Systems Approach has also been strengthened by the fact that the Somali conflict took place in the wake of a shift in international power among the superpowers.

In terms of its methodology, the study has relied largely on secondary data and qualitative rather than quantitative analysis of the data.

Chapter Two gives the historical background of the OAU, namely, the historical evolution of Pan-Africanism and the latter's tendency to always prefer integrative tendencies to the disintegrative ones. This background has been given in the belief that it provides a good precedence for the subsequent selective involvement of the OAU in African civil wars.
Chapter Three relates the OAU Charter to Africa's historical experience on the one hand, and to its desire to preserve the post-independence status quo on the other. The threat to status quo is linked not only to the fragile international boundaries in Africa, but also to the tendency of the former colonial powers, and the Cold-War protagonists to exploit African differences for their own gains.

Chapter Four is the main chapter of the thesis and is devoted to analysis of the Somali conflict. The focus is to establish the extent to which the low level of involvement of the OAU in the conflicts were a result of its low level of threat to the African regional status quo. In it, the low level of involvement of the OAU has been made evident, together with the high level of extra-African involvement, albeit at a later stage. As a result, the systematic factors are linked not only to the OAU's low level of involvement, but also to the delay in international involvement in general.

Chapter Five gives summaries, conclusions and some policy guidelines. The conclusions point to the fact that the OAU's adherence to Article III of the OAU charter did affect its involvement in the Somali conflict, although there were a number of intervening factors which did moderate the conflict's level of threat to African regional status quo by changing the notion of sovereignty on their part of the international community in general and the OAU in particular. These include the proliferation of internal wars following the collapse of the Soviet Bloc and the concomitant pressure on the international community to do more for the resultant victims, and the IMF and World Bank Conditionalities which began to focus on issues which had heretofore been viewed solely as the reserves of the state.

The policy recommendations are designed to reflect the policy relevance of the study as contained in Chapter One. The major prescriptions underlined can be summarized as: self-reliance on the part of African States, transformation of international economic circumstances
which are deemed unfavorable to African States in particular, and the Third World in
general, political union as the panacea for Africa’s colonial legacies of arbitrary boundaries
and uneven incorporation into the OAU’s structural weaknesses with a view to making it
more responsive to African civil wars.
CHAPTER ONE

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Civil wars are violent conflicts which occur within the boundaries of states at any given time. Scholars have attempted to distinguish between the inner conflict and the external or social conflict. The former, according to the international encyclopedia of social sciences refers to conflict as a quandary that emerges when incompatible values present themselves to an individual in the form of an actual or potential choice or decision. However, when groups and organisations are considered, the inner conflicts of a given unit are undoubtedly social conflicts (i.e. conflicts between antagonistic actors) when viewed from one systemic level; at another level they are also sometimes analogous to inner conflicts or quandaries of an individual.

Along the same lines, violent conflicts can also be grouped into two; internal and external (inter-state) conflict. While the subject of external or interstate wars has been extensively dealt with by scholars, internal or civil wars have been given less attention. It is only up to very recently that scholars have made serious attempts to study civil wars. As Harry Eckstein (1964) has noted, for centuries civil wars have been regarded by the international community as internal affairs of individual states. There is however a strong indication that civil wars are gaining prominence in international affairs. Scholars such as Walter S. Jones (1988) have for instance argued that states strive to achieve internal cohesion through external conflicts. Jones continues to argue that due to external intervention, the distinction between civil and international wars have become blurred. He gives the example of the landing of American troops in Russia at the close of the World War I to demonstrate how internal wars sometimes give rise to external conflicts.
Evans Luard (1972) has also noted that in the modern international system, aggression in the classical sense (attack across recognised frontiers) has become an increasingly rare phenomenon. In Luard’s list of internal and external wars that have occurred since 1945, only seven cases of external wars appear against thirty significant cases of civil wars.

This proliferation of civil wars in the modern world has also been accompanied by the fact that a good number of them have occurred within the African continent. These include inter alia, the Congo crisis, the Nigerian civil war, the war of Secession of Eritrea, Sudanese civil war, the Somali civil war, the civil war in Chad, the Angolan civil war and the Liberian civil war. While the OAU has shown a remarkable involvement in resolving some of these conflicts (e.g. the Congo crisis, the Nigerian civil war and the civil war in Chad), it has also exhibited a notably low level or lack of involvement in others such as Somalia, Liberia and even Uganda. In a nutshell, the OAU’s involvement in African civil wars had been selective. It is with this background in mind that we wish to examine the nature of involvement of the OAU in African civil wars.

1.2 Problem Statement

When the Organization of African Unity was formed in 1963, one of its major objectives was conflict resolution as enshrined in Article VII of its charter. At the same time, Article III of the same charter, in arguing for the non-interference in internal affairs of the OAU member states, militates against the organisation’s endeavours, especially with regard to resolution of civil wars.

Many scholars and political practitioners have expressed misgivings about the Article III of the OAU charter. Barongo (1980) has argued that the OAU charter is concerned exclusively with extra-African interference. Thomas (1985) on the other hand argues that the
wtunr refers to both extra-African and intra-Africa interference. At the same time, Nyangira (1979) urges for the need to refine more clearly the principle of non-interference.

In a letter written by a group of students from Burundi studying in Belgium to the OAU Heads of State meeting in Tanzania in 1972, the latter were castigated for their inaction regarding the massacres in Burundi of Hutu people by the ruling Tutsi ethnic group.

On another occasion, the principle came under attack in 1975 when Nyerere and other members of his government objected to the choice of location of OAU summit in Kampala. According to a statement issued by the Tanzanian government explaining why it was staying away from Kampala summit, the silence of African states could not be justified by the "non-intervention" clause in the OAU charter "while at the same time African leaders feel obliged to condemn apartheid". Tanzania was therefore "not going to participate in the mockery of condemning colonialism, apartheid and fascism in the headquarters of a murderer, an oppressor, a black fascist and a self confessed admirer of fascism...".

Given the fact that OAU has failed to involve itself in some African civil wars (e.g. Liberia (1990), Burundi (1972) and Somali (1991) while involving itself in others e.g. Nigerian civil war (1967 - 1970), the civil war in Chad (1965 - 1982) and the Congo crisis (1964 - 1965), to what extent is such selective involvement conditioned by its adherence to Article III of the OAU charter? In cases where the OAU has failed to involve itself in such civil wars, to what extent has Article III militated against the OAU's involvement? This study therefore seeks to investigate the extent to which OAU's hands have been tied by Article III of the OAU charter in the face of African civil wars.
1.3 Objectives of the Study

This study has both broad and specific objectives. Broadly it seeks to examine the factors underlying the selective involvement of OAU in African civil wars. Specifically, it seeks:

i) to examine the relationship between the level of threats to the regional status quo and the OAU’s involvement in African civil wars.

ii) to examine other factors which condition the OAU’s selective involvement in African civil wars.

1.4 Justification and Significance of the Study

This study has both policy and academic justification. Policy justification will refer mainly to policy implications while academic justification refers to the contributions made by the study to what is already known in the area studied.

1.4.1 Policy Justification

The policy justification of this study is derived from the fact that over time, civil wars have been considered by policy makers, both domestic and international as internal affairs and therefore of no consequence to the international community. This has been the case despite the fact that in recent years cross-border conflicts have become an increasingly rare phenomenon. At the same time intra-state conflicts have considerably proliferated, particularly in the Third World.

For example, in Luard’s list of wars that have occurred since 1945, only seven cases of cross-border wars appear against thirty significant cases of civil wars\(^{12}\) (see table 1 below).

According to a 1988 survey of states in armed conflict, out of 111 cases, 63 were reported to
be internal and 36 as wars of state-formation, that is, involving one government and opposition group demanding autonomy or secession for a particular ethnic group or regime

According to another report, state sponsored massacres of members of ethnic and political group is responsible for greater loss of life than all other forms of deadly conflict combined.

As noted by Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr (1987):

"...on the average, between 1.6 and 3.9 million unarmed civilians have died at the hands of the state in each decade since the end of World War II..."14.

Despite these astounding figures, the international community has done relatively little to arrest the situation. Although the UN was formed in 1945 with a primary aim of achieving peace, its intervention in civil war cases has always been precluded by its Article 2(7) which refers to non-interference in internal affairs of member states15. Although the UN Security Council has been given powers, under Article 34 - 35 of the UN Charter, to investigate disputes or situations which, if they develop into disputes might endanger international peace, and although under the same Articles of its Charter, the member state experiencing such disputes may notify the Security Council, it is not clearly defined as to the level at which a local dispute may constitute a threat to international peace. Indeed, despite the fact that a number of internal conflicts had posed real threat to international peace, namely, the Vietnam war and the Korean crisis, this Article(34) of the UN Charter could not be invoked during the Cold War period owing to wide ideological rifts within the UN Security Council.

Hence, it is only in the post Cold War period that we have seen modest attempts on the part of the UN to do something substantial about the people imperiled by the scourge of civil strife16. These have been reflected in the creation by the UN General Assembly of the position of High-Level Emergency Relief Coordinator in December 1991, intervention of the US, UK and France in Northern Iraq to establish a separate form of Kurdish state in 1992
and UNITAF's military intervention in Somalia in December 1992. Given the persistence of some internal conflicts, e.g. in Sudan, Liberia, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and even Russia (a member of commonwealth of independent states which succeeded the USSR), it can be plausibly asserted that the UN is still ill prepared to deal with the current wave of internal conflicts.

The policy implication of this study to the OAU on the other hand derives not only from the fact that a good number of the recent proliferation of internal wars have occurred within the African continent, but also from the fact that to some extent, they have been seen as both a cause as well as a result of Africa's economic crisis. Since the OAU has a primary role to play in Africa's resolution of conflicts as reflected in both Article 52 of the UN charter and Article VII of its charter, it is significant that it was not up to 1993 that it decided to take a bold step in tackling the problem of internal wars, namely, through the creation of its mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution. The continuation of some civil wars in Africa e.g. in Liberia and Sudan coupled with the potentiality of others to explode, e.g. in Burundi, Algeria, Nigeria, etc, however testify to the fact that a lot more needs to be done in the areas of conflict resolution in Africa to pave way for its economic development.

The need for more to be done with regard to conflict resolution in Africa is also underscored by the budgetary problem, which have hampered the OAU's peacekeeping efforts in the past and continues to do the same even today. Indeed, this was partially responsible for a wide divergence of opinion in the wake of the formation of the OAU mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution as some member states believed that the task of peacekeeping should be left strictly under the UN. In 1995, for instance, the Kenyan Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr.
Musyoka was quoted in a press release as saying that: "Africa should not pretend that it can handle some of these problems alone…….

Pointing out that the OAU's mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution created in Cairo in 1993 had failed to take off because of insufficient funding from the member states, Mr. Musyoka said that Africa's best hope was in the use of diplomacy and mediation to prevent conflict. However, once these blew up, the job of restoring peace and order is an international one. This study will therefore attempt to give policy guidelines at the national, regional and international levels as regards this controversy.
TABLE I: CIVIL WARS 1945-70

Ideological

(Wars in which a widely recognised government has been in conflict with elements declaring communist or anti-Communist sympathies)

Greece 1944-9
Philippines 1946-50
China (including offshore islands) 1946-50, 1954-8
Burma 1948
Indian 1948-50
Malaya 1957-60
Laos 1959
S Vietnam 1959
Indonesia 1965
Venezuela 1965-8
Bolivia 1967
Muscat and Oman 1969
Cambodia 1970

Political

Colombia 1946-58
Paraguay 1947
Cuba 1953-9, 1961
Muscat and Oman 1957-9
Lenanom 1958
Indonesia 1958-9
Cameroon 1958-62
Congo 1960-5
Yemen 1962
Dominican Republic 1965
Jordan 1970
Pakistan 1971

Minorities
Burma (Karens, Kachins, Shans and others) 1948
China (Tibet) 1951
Iraq (Kurds) 1961-70
Sudan (Southern Sudanese) 1963
Rwanda (Tutsi) 1963
Nigeria (Ibos) 1967-70
Chad (Arabs) 1968
India (Nagas and Mizos), sporadic
Ethiopia (Eritrea), sporadic

(This List does not include a number of civil conflicts involving sporadic and disorganised engagements between government forces and hostile elements, not amounting to full-scale civil war, as in Peru, Guatemala, Thailand, Northern Ireland, India (Bengal) and other areas.

1.4.2 Academic Justification

In the first instance, the academic justification of this study is derived from its heuristic value, namely, it will attempt to fill a theoretical gap in the study of international relations. Rosenau (1964) has observed that while "the domestic aspects of civil wars are yet to be processed for both theoretical and empirical analysis, the international aspects have received even less attention neither have the newer, more theoretical formulations of international politics stimulated attention to the external aspects of civil wars".

According to the modernisation paradigm, which has for long dominated thinking in the social sciences, the process of social change leads from the traditional to the modern, from the simple to the complex, from "particularism" to universalism (to use the concepts developed by scholars in the Weberian tradition). In this framework, ethnic issues pertain to the "particularistic" or premodern world and are hence swept aside.

In a similar vein, the structural functionalists emphasise the comprehensive nature of transformation of the sub-national units and loyalties into a wider polity. Here again, ethnic issues are considered a stumbling block in a more general process of change.

Berko Wild (1971) for instance argues that the OAU, like the 19th century concert of Europe, has worked for the preservation of the existing political systems through action or inaction, but fails to focus on how this has affected the organisations resolution of African civil wars.

Marxist approaches on the other hand, relate ethnic conflicts basically to economic interests in which the groups tend to be social classes defined in terms of their position vis-a-vis the system of production. Where social relations of production are paramount in determining power relations in a society and at the international level ethnic issues might appear as decidedly of secondary importance.
In general, therefore, the liberal, functionalist and Marxist approaches, have neglected the importance of ethnic issues and conflict. The result is that few theoretical models exist to guide research in these contemporary issues.

This theoretical lag has been responsible for the fact that many studies on international aspects of internal wars lack in proper theoretical guidance. Even though systemic theories of international relations have had a salutary effect on the study of international aspects of civil wars, they have also tended to close off certain lines of inquiry. This, according to Rosenau, is attributable to the fact that systems approach focuses on equilibrium and order, thereby drawing attention away from phenomena which, like internal wars, move international systems in disorderly directions. Like sovereignty, the concept of "systems" necessitates the assumption that all international actors have similar characteristics and motives.

Hence, in attributing the selective involvement of the OAU in African civil wars to systemic factors, this study will attempt to shed more light into systems theory as a theoretical tool of analysis in "the international aspects of civil wars".

Secondly, this study is academically justified in that it will contribute to what is already known in the area of OAU and conflict resolution and more particularly the factors underlying the selective involvement of the OAU in African civil wars. Most studies which have been conducted by a number of scholars have not comprehensively tackled this question.

Thus, while Berko Wild's action or inaction might refer to involvement or non-involvement of the OAU in African civil wars, her structuralist functionalist analysis by passes the issue of resolution of civil wars to focus more on the relationship between the radicals and the moderates within the organisation.
While other scholars have examined factors underlying the OAU's lack of effective involvement in African civil wars, they have not attempted to explain the organisation's lack or low level of involvement in some African civil wars as contrasted with its high level of involvement in others. These include Frey-Wouters (1979) and Amadu Sesay et al (1984)\textsuperscript{29}. Other scholars such as Woronoff (1970), Thompson (1969) and Asante (1987) have associated the OAU's intervention in African civil wars with the desire to maintain or restore the status quo without giving a proper theoretical explanation\textsuperscript{30}. Amate (1986), on the other hand argues that the OAU has intervened in some African civil wars not-with-standing the provisions of Article III of its charter, albeit on the side of the status quo. Here again, no proper theoretical explanation is given\textsuperscript{31}.

It is only Clark (1993) who analysed the delay and subsequent failure of the international involvement in Somalia and the irrelevancy of the OAU involvement therein, in terms of the post- Cold War international environment. He, however, talked generally of international involvement and hence failed to focus more clearly on the low level of the OAU's involvement in the Somali conflict\textsuperscript{32}. It is in the light of the foregoing that this study will attempt to fill these gaps.

1.5 Scope and Limitation of the Study

While it would have been a worthy venture to study the OAU and conflict resolution in general, this is not possible due to limitation of space and time. As such, this study is mainly going to focus on the OAU's involvement in resolving African civil wars.

Secondly, although many civil wars have occurred in Africa which need to be investigated in order for us to come up with more accurate findings, this study will not concern itself with all of them. As such, this study is only going to concentrate on one case;
that of Somalia. The choice of Somalia represents a case where the OAU's level of involvement was low as compared to other cases such as the Nigerian civil war, the Congo crisis and the civil war in Chad where the organisation exhibited a relatively higher level of involvement. The time scope of this study will therefore be from 1991 to 1995. We have restricted our study to this period due to the difficulty of getting the most recent literature on the conflict (which is to date far from resolved). Both the Somali case and the time scope are significant in that they coincide with changes in systemic power relations.

1.6 Review of Literature

Quite apart from their international aspects it is only recently that internal wars have seriously been studied. This is mainly owing to the fact that for centuries, it was assumed that these were domestic affairs and thus beyond the jurisdiction of either international law or international agencies.

The first ambitious attempt to deal with international aspects of internal wars was made by Rosenau, Modelski, Falk and Scott in 1964. Their essays largely dealt with incentives to intervention in civil wars, processes leading to elimination of civil wars and the search for a theoretical framework that may stimulate attention to the external aspects of civil wars. Hence they never touched on the role of international organisations in resolving civil wars, let alone attempting to give a proper theoretical explanation as to the factors which underlie selective involvement of some international or regional organisations in the resolution of civil wars.

Among scholars who came later such as Caroline Thomas (1985), Rosalyne Higgins (1972), Norton Moore (1969) and J.G. Merril (1984), the main concern was with how the norms associated with intervention can be reformulated if a more stable world order is to
emerge. Although they dealt with the role of international or regional organisations in resolving civil wars, they fell short of seeking theoretical explanations in cases of low level or lack of involvement of these bodies in the resolution of such conflicts. This study will therefore seek to make a contribution towards the filling of this gap.

Even among the scholars who have dealt with OAU’s involvement in African civil wars, few have attempted to theoretically explain the selective involvement of the organisation in the resolution of these conflicts. Many have simply sought explanations for the OAU’s weakness and failure to effectively get involved in civil war situations in Africa.

Zartman (1989), for example, explains the OAU’s paralysis in handling some disputes in Africa by referring to its definition of these (disputes) as “internal affairs.” His analysis is hence inadequate in explaining the low level or lack of involvement of the organisation in some African civil wars. Frey-Wouters (1974) attributes OAU’s lack of effective, responsible and non-partisan involvement in civil wars to lack of autonomy, consensus and integration.

Cervenka (1977), in his examination of the Congo crisis (1964 - 1965) and the Nigerian civil war (1967 - 1970) attributes OAU’s failure to resolve the Congo crisis to foreign intervention and Nigeria’s civil war to the Article III of the OAU charter. Sesay et al (1984) in his analysis of OAU’s performance after twenty years attributes the organisation’s failure to resolve the civil war in Chad to lack of resources for conflict control. Amate (1986) in his book, “Inside the OAU; Pan-Africanism in Practice” contends that Article III of the OAU charter does not prevent the organisation from intervening in some civil wars. Such interventions, however, he contends, have always been on the side of status quo. Amate, however, falls short of giving a theoretical explanation for this trend.
Other scholars who have associated the OAU's intervention in African civil wars with the desire to maintain or restore the status quo without attempting a theoretical explanation include Woronoff (1970), Thompson (1969), Asante (1987) and Nyangira (1979). While Woronoff talks of OAU's conviction that any slight change in Africa's post independence boundaries would lead to chaos (and hence its opposition to secession)\(^4\), Thompson talks of the OAU's (especially the organisation's radical wing's) tendency to associate secessionist movements with imperialism and neo-colonialism\(^1\). Asante, on the other hand contends that the OAU's commitment to the preservation of the status quo and the territorial integrity of member states (as guaranteed under Article III of its charter) has contributed to its ineffectiveness in regulating or bringing to a peaceful solution conflicts within its member states, particularly those concerning secessionist claims\(^2\). According to Nyangira, the OAU has had more failures in intra-African conflict resolution than successes. He however notes that it is in dealing with serious internal problems that the OAU is the weakest, and attributes this to Article III of its charter\(^3\).

While Clarke (1993) wrote of the failure of international involvement in general and the irrelevancy of OAU's involvement in particular in the resolution of Somali conflict (1991 - 95) he failed to give an adequate theoretical explanation for this phenomenon especially with regard to the OAU. His observation that in the Post-cold War period, the international attention was focused away from Africa, however, is closely related to our systemic analysis of the OAU's low level of involvement in Somalia\(^4\).

Patricia Wild (1971) in her analysis of the radicals and moderates in the OAU has compared the organisation to the post-Napoleonic concert of Europe. According to her analysis which is also closely related to this study, the OAU has worked for the preservation of the existing political systems, either through action or inaction. However, Wild's work
differs from this study in that its theoretical tool of analysis is structural-functionalism as opposed to systemic theories of international relations. Moreover, her main focus is not the nature of involvement of OAU in African civil wars per se. Rather, it is on the relationship between radicals and moderates. The foregoing literature clearly demonstrates that there is plenty of scope for further research into the nature of involvement of the OAU in civil war situations in Africa. It is therefore the intentions of this study to make a contribution towards filling this gap.

1.7.0 Theoretical Framework

For the purpose of this study, we have decided to adopt systems approach as a theoretical guide. This is because our major preoccupation in this study is with systemic issues, especially at the regional level. It is not denied that other alternative theories can also be useful in studying the phenomenon of the OAU involvement in African conflicts. Indeed, most of the realist assumptions only serve to complement those of the systems approach. Realists' theory and general system theory represent approximation to macro-theory. For realism, it is because its proponents generally seek to isolate one variable, power, in order to explain and predict a broad range of behaviour. Besides, it provided frameworks for analyses of both international politics and foreign policy. At the level of international system, realist writers often used a classical balance of power framework, similar to the balance of power model, subsequently developed by Kaplan (1967).

It is true that Kaplan's development of systems theory undermined in several respects the realist assumptions given its behavioural background. Not only were behavioralist attempts to cross subject boundaries opposed to realist encouragement of a separate discipline of international relations; its positivistic orientations were also in a sense quite at odds with
the realist notion of social science as reflected in Morgenthau's explicit desire to make
normative statement. Besides Morgenthau's reliance on observable laws of human nature
ran counter to the positivists' definition of a theory which started with a desire to explain the
observable. While Morgenthau's concept of the system was based on history, Kaplan's
alternative models of international system was based on hypothetical structure which also
indicated that the structure of the system could change thereby producing different
characteristic modes of behavior.

By and large, realists in the traditional mode have for the most part concerned
themselves with elements of national power, and for comparative purposes, developed a
classificatory scheme for analyzing the respective capabilities of nations. Nevertheless, in the
case of at least the pre-eminent theorist practitioner, Henry A. Kissinger (1964), an effort
was made to relate foreign policy behavior to alternative models of status quo and
revolutionary system respectively, thus taking account of what Singer (1961) referred to as
the "level of analysis problem in international relations." Indeed, the most extensive
elaboration of the level of analysis was done by Waltz (1959&1979).

Since the late 1970s, conceptualization delineating various levels of analysis has been
built upon by the proponents of the neo-realist theory, who have sought to delineate
propositions about the impact of international systemic structures themselves as an
independent variable upon the foreign policy making behavior of interacting units. In so
doing they have emphasised both the enduring importance of power and the impact of
systemic structure.

However, neither the realist writers nor the neo-realist writers have highlighted the
systemic influences to the level nearing that of the writers on systems theory. The efficacy of
the realist approach is also limited by the fact that the notion of sovereignty on which it is
comes under strict scrutiny in the process of this study. At the same time, the efficacy of systems approach is strengthened by a common history, on the basis of which Africa has acquired a "sub-systemic outlook vis a vis the rest of the international community."

Although systems approach has had a salutary effect in the field of external aspects of civil wars, it has also tended to close off certain lines of inquiry. For instance, it focuses on equilibrium and order, and hence draws attention away from phenomena like internal wars, which tend to move the international system, in disorderly directions. Moreover, like sovereignty, the concept of systems necessitates the assumption that all international actors have similar characteristics and motives. Hence, as Rosenau observes, it is only natural for students of international systemic process to view every international actor as speaking with a united voice - that is, that of its government - rather than being represented by two or more domestic factions each claiming authority to engage in international action.

Besides Rosenau, a wide range of scholars have contributed to systems theory in the field of international relations. According to Kaplan (1962) a system connotes "a set of variables so related, in contradistinction to its environment, that describable behavioral regularities characterize the internal relationships of a set of individual variables to combinations of external variables."

Kaplan (1967) constructed six models of hypothetical international systems that provide a theoretical framework within which hypotheses can be and have been generated and tested. These represent a spectrum ranging from more loosely to more tightly organised international systems models. In Kaplan's scheme, material actors are classified according to structural categories - directive or non-directive systems, which in turn may be system dominant or sub-system dominant. Kaplan is concerned with:
i) the organisational focus of decisions, including the nature of actors, objectives and the instruments to attain them

ii) the allocation of rewards, including the extent to which they are allocated by the system or by the sub-system

iii) the alignment preference of actors

iv) the scope and direction of political activity and

v) the flexibility or adaptability of units in their behaviour.

Kaplan's models have been widely applied in the study of international relations. In his application of Kaplan's models to the study of the Chinese Warlord System of the early twentieth century, Hsi-Sheng Chi (1968) observed that it was basically a "balance of power system operating under many unfavorable parameters" and where many of the essential behavioral rules were either deliberately or unwittingly violated by the actors.

In his application of Kaplan's models to the study of Italian City-States system of the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries, Franks (1968) concluded that, by and large, the essential rules contained in the balance of power model were not violated, essential and even non-essential actors were preserved, the territorial capabilities of actors did not change greatly; equilibrium became both less static and less stable, leading to systems disintegration.

Meanwhile, testing of the hypotheses drawn from Kaplan's balance of power model was done by J Mc Gowan and Robert M Rood (1975) in their examination of the rate of alliance formation in the period between 1814 and 1914. The data, on being analysed, strongly supported Kaplan's balance of power model.

Another scholar who has contributed much to the development of systems theory in the field of international relations is Richard N. Rosecrance (1963). In an attempt to construct and validate models of international behaviour, Rosecrance divided European
history into nine historical systems (or periods), each of which is demarcated by significant changes in diplomatic techniques and objectives. In his analysis, Rosecrance is concerned with conditions for international stability and selects as his basic elements, disturbance inputs, the regulator mechanism that reacts to the disturbance (consisting of capabilities such as those derived from the concert of Europe or the UN), the environmental restraints that influences the range of possible outcomes and finally the outcomes themselves. Rosecrance judges systems to be either equilibrial or disequilibrial, depending on whether the regulator or the disturbance was greater. From these elements Rosecrance develops and examines four basic determinants for each of his nine systems; elite direction (attitudes), degree of elite control, resources available to the controlling elites and the capacity of the system to contain disturbances. Given these determinants, Rosecrance obviously attaches considerable importance to the domestic determinants of international behaviour, especially the elites of the national units. Using Rosecrance's work, it is possible to construct two models of international system, i.e., a stable system (where the amount of disturbance was at a minimum and the regulator was able to cope with the actor disturbance; where its elites were satisfied with the status quo; where political views, except in the latter periods, were less under the influence of ideology; and where elites were willing in most part to resolve their disputes by means short of war) and an unstable system (where the inverse was the case). Rosecrance's conclusion was that there is a correlation between international instability and domestic insecurity of elites.

Other students of systemic processes in international relations have theorised on the relationship between power distribution and the incidence of war. Deustsh and Singer (1964) for instance, argue that "as the system moves away from bipolarity towards multipolarity the frequency and the intensity of war should be expected to diminish".
According to them the international system is but a special case of the pluralist model, namely that "one of the greatest threats to the stability of any impersonal social system is the shortage of alternative partners". Interaction with a great number of nations produce crosscutting loyalties that induce hostility between any single dyad of nations. Another hypothesis in support of correlation between the number of actors and war is based on the degree of attention that any nation in the system may allocate to all of the other nations or to possible "coalitions of nations". Some minimal percentage of a nation's external attention is needed for behaviour tending towards armed conflict, and the increase in the number of independent actors diminishes the share that any nation can allocate to any other single actor. Such an increase is likely to have a stabilising effect upon the system.  

In marked contrast to Deutsch and Singer, Kenneth N. Waltz (1967) argues that a bipolar system is more stabilising than a multipolar one. He continues to argue that since the superpowers have the capacity to inflict and control violence, they are "able both to moderate others use of violence and to absorb possible destabilizing changes that emanate from uses of violence that they do not or cannot control".  

Rosecrance (1966) on his part, is critical both of the Deutsch - Singer and Waltz's models. According to him a bimultipolarity is more preferable, since a bipolar world is essentially a zero-sum game where the motivation for expansion and the potential for conflict between the bloc leaders are said to be greater as compared to a multipolar world. As regards multipolarity Rosecrance contends that although it reduces the intensity of conflict, it also increases the frequency of conflict because of greater diversity of interests and demands. Besides, while reducing the significance of any change in the power balance, multipolarity increases the uncertainty as to what the consequences will be, hence making policy-making complex and achievement of stable results difficult. Rosecrance's proposed alternative
system thus combines the positive features of bipolarity and multipolarity without their attendant liabilities.  

More recently systems theory has been applied by Schweller, Schampel and Midlarsky. Schweller (1993) has devised a systems theory that yields determinate balance of power predictions, and has applied it to the analysis of tripolar dynamics, to a discussion of alliance patterns and to an explanation of alliance strategies of the great powers during the period 1938-1945. Choosing the World War II as a case study, Schweller argues that by 1938, the international system was tripolar with Germany, the US and the Soviet Union comprising the three poles, while Britain and France had fallen from the first tier, joining Japan and Italy as middle powers. Taking "interest" to refer to revisionism or maintenance of the status quo, he attempts to explain the alliance behaviour of all the seven major actors through the use of two elements, the capabilities and interests of the great powers (see Table 2). According to Schweller's analysis, tripolarity (which was the case in 1938) is typically unstable because two power maximisers (as was Germany and the USSR) are highly motivated to augment their resources at the expense of the lone status quo pole (as was the US). Schweller's essay has attempted to show how systemic level factors played a crucial role in the outbreak of the World War II, unlike most students of international relations and prominent game theorists who prefer to employ a villain-sinners image to explain the same.  

In another article focusing on change rather than the static systemic conditions such as preponderance, parity, bipolarity, multipolarity or geographic contiguity, Schampel (1993) has attempted to broaden the investigation concerning the factors which contribute to the onset of war. The hypotheses tested was that the speed of change in the rate of material capacity of two proximate national actors predicts to the onset of an event, for example war or peace. This change of focus seems to be compatible with most other systemic level analyses because as Singer
TABLE II: THE CAPABILITIES AND INTERESTS OF THE MAJOR POWERS, 1938

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>POWER</th>
<th>INTEREST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Pole</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>Revisionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Pole</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Status quo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>Pole</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>Revisionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRITAIN</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Status quo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAPAN</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>Revisionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Status quo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Revisionist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Randall Schweller, tripolarity and the second world war International Studies Quarterly (1993), 37, 86.
states. "most of systems properties rest upon and can be inferred from the relationship among its components". According to Schampel, therefore, it seems appropriate to look directly at the components for factors contributing to the onset of war. In conclusion, the findings indicated that the median velocity increase is apparent for those dyads experiencing war while a trend of median velocity decrease is apparent for those dyads experiencing peace64.

In another recent application of systems theory in the study of international relations, Midlarsky (1993) accounts for Hopf's (1991) findings by proposing a relationship between polarity and war that is contingent upon scarcity of international desiderata. He argues that if such desiderata are abundant in the international system, then there is not much, if any, difference between the stability of bipolar and multipolar systems. Under conditions of scarcity, however, there is a great difference between the two, with the multipolar systems tending towards greater instability, the greater the scarcity of the desired commodities. Bipolarity, Midlarsky contends, is not subject to such constraints, experiencing stability whether under conditions of scarcity or abundance65.

Examining the overall environment of scarcity or abundance in the periods chosen for Hopf's study of bipolar and multipolar systems. Midlarsky sees no reason why the two periods should behave differently with regard to indicators of stability since both periods were part of an overall period of expansion in the European and world systems that Braudel (1972 - 1973) dates at least from 1470 - if not 1450. Among the periods subsequent to Hopf's periods of study, ie, after 1559, the first serious choice demonstrating serious scarcities is presented by the beginning decades of the 17th Century. Here again, Braudel talks of the general conditions in the Mediterranean region, but which had echoed throughout Europe66. Midlarsky therefore demonstrates the level of instability of multipolar systems under conditions of scarcity as opposed to the same system under conditions of abundance by
referring to the intensity of the thirty years wars. He goes further to explain the conflict patterns prior to World War I in Europe with reference to scarcity in the availability of colonies that diminished rapidly towards the end of 19th Century. All these theorizing and application demonstrates the level to which systems approach can go in explaining and even predicting international phenomena. In our analysis of the factors underlying the selective involvement of the OAU in resolving African civil wars, therefore, systemic factors are going to be seen to play a crucial role, not only at the continental level, but also at the global level. In other words, we are going to investigate the extent to which the OAU's low level of involvement in Somali civil war was conditioned by events prevailing within the African continent and how these were in turn conditioned by global events, namely the collapse of the Soviet bloc, etc.

At another level, the OAU will be seen as a "sub-system" of the international system. The civil wars will therefore constitute disturbance inputs while the OAU is going to be seen as a regulator mechanism. In this respect, this study has also been considerably influenced by Rosecrance particularly his notion of the security or insecurity of the national elites. This is more so in view of the fact that systems theory is basically concerned with how inputs or problems are processed into outputs, decisions or solutions.
1.8 Hypotheses

This study is going to be guided by one major hypothesis. It will be assumed that the ruling elites of African states have a mutual interest in preserving the regional status quo. The rules governing African countries in their relationship with one another, including article III, as embodied in the OAU charter, are thus meant to preserve the regional status quo. Our dependent variable is as already suggested by the topic, "The OAU involvement in the Somali Civil Wars". Our independent variable, however, is going to be "the level of threat to the regional status quo, or, to the security of the ruling African elites". The lower the threat posed to the regional status quo by a civil war, the lower the level of OAU involvement in that war. Conversely, the higher the level of threat posed to the regional status quo by a civil war, the higher the level of involvement that is expected of OAU.

1.9 Operationalisation of Concepts

1.9.1 Civil Wars

Civil wars in this study will refer to violent conflicts within the boundaries of individual African states. This is as distinguished from inter-state wars which will occur between two independent states. Civil war cases, in this study will not include cases of massive human rights violation normally identified with police states except in as much as these occur within the context of violent intra-state conflict.

1.9.2 Regional Status Quo

Status Quo refers to the prevailing social, political or economic order within the African region. Hans Morgenthau in his treatise on "Politics among Nations" has argued that
at any given time in the international system, there are two groups of powers: the status quo powers and the imperialist powers. The former are identified with those who have a mutual interest in preserving the present order, while the latter refer to those that are in favour of upsetting the present order. Regional status quo will therefore refer to either social, economic or political order that exists within a region, in this case the African Continent, at a particular time. Thus regional status quo is in this study identified with the nature and perception of the ruling African Elites immediately after independence.

1.9.3 Threat

In this study, 'threat' has been used to refer to civil wars or conflicts which call for major territorial changes (as opposed to mere changes in government) e.g. secessionist and irredentist wars. Such changes, it is perceived, would act as precedence for further similar changes which might eventually destabilize the continent given its arbitrary boundaries.

At another level, the term 'threat' has been used in reference to a high level of extra-African involvement in a given civil war or conflict, whether secessionist or revolutionary. This is because of the fear among African elites that the former colonial powers (including the superpowers) are likely to take advantage of such wars to create further divisions within and among African states. Indeed it is through the manipulation of such wars and the fuelling of ethnic animosity that the former colonial powers gained stronghold in Africa during the pre-colonial period (see Chapter Two below for a more elaborate exposition on this subject).

1.9.4 Involvement

In this study, involvement will refer to any activity (diplomatic, military or otherwise) by the OAU which is geared towards the resolution of a given civil war. Although individual
OAU member states might unilaterally undertake to mediate or even militarily intervene in a civil war. Such activities do not constitute involvement of the organization, unless they have the latter's endorsement. In effect, the OAU ad hoc mediation committees are considered by this study as specific forms of OAU involvement, while the OAU members' states' contribution of troops to UNITAF UNOSOM peacekeeping forces are not. Conversely, non-involvement will refer to the absence of any activity by the OAU geared towards the resolution of a given civil war. Non-involvement will, however, not refer to the failure to resolve a given internal conflict.

1.10 Methodology

This study is going to rely almost entirely on secondary sources of data. These shall be derived from library research and will include books, articles in periodicals, dissertations dealing with OAU on the one hand and with internal wars on the other, et cetera. References shall also be made to the documents of OAU meetings, minutes of speeches made by OAU officials and Heads of State of the OAU member countries and utterances made by OAU council members where these are available.

We shall therefore adopt in this study a qualitative and descriptive analysis with the use of secondary data which shall go along way in providing the background information regarding the OAU on the one hand and African civil wars on the other. Our choice of Somalia has been guided by the fact that it was the only civil war where the low level of involvement of the OAU was most discernible. Somali conflict is also appropriate to our systemic analysis since it coincided with a shift in global power relations.
Footnotes


4. Luard, E, Civil Conflicts in Modern International Relations, in Evans Luard (ed) International Regulation of Civil Wars (London: Thames & Hudson, 1972) PP. 7 -13


Over the last half a century the Security Council had developed a wide array of instruments to deal with conflicts between states. But it had few tested mechanisms to guide it as it faced the worldwide explosion of internal strifes that took root in the Post- Cold War period. See Africa Recovery, No. 7, 15 January 1993, BRIEFING PAPER, pp. 2-3.

This was in reaction to increased international demands for the UN to do more for these people, especially at a time when states were no longer able to provide protection to large numbers of its citizens.


19 This was clearly demonstrated during the OAU’s first peacekeeping efforts in Chad in 1981 when it had to rely on the US and the UK for logistical and financial support (See Chapter 3 of this text). More recently, it was demonstrated when the OAU laboured to raise 200 strong force to keep peace in Burundi in 1993.

20 *Daily Nation* (Kenya), No. 10677, Wednesday, 5 April 1995.


A major contribution in this field, with strong emphasis in social psychology as an explanatory factor is Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic groups in Conflict* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1985).

Rosenau, op.cit.

Wild, op.cit.


Clark J., "Debacle in Somalia", *Foreign Affairs*. 1993, pp. 109-120

Rosenau, op.cit, pp. 8 - 13


Frey Wouters,op.cit.,pp.456-496.

Sesay et al. op.cit.

Amat. op.cit.


Thompson, V. B., op.cit. pp. 123-141.


Nyangira. op.cit., pp. 11-12.

Clark. op.cit. pp. 109-120.

Wild. op.cit.


What is referred to here is the reviewal of the concept of sovereignty by the international community in general and by the OAU in particular in the wake of the collapse and disintegration of the communist bloc. See Chapter 4 of this text.

Given the fragile nature of African boundaries as inherited from independence and their common history of exploitation and dependence, Africa seems to suffer the same fate through and through, albeit with minor differences, namely between the sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of Africa.

Rosenau, op.cit.


Kaplan M. A., the Great Debate: Traditionalism and Science in International Relation, op._cit


Rosecrance R.N., Action and Reaction in World Politics (Boots: Little Brown, 1963)


The Bipolar nations, and in particular the superpowers, would seek to restrain each other from attaining predominance while acting together from a mutual interest in minimizing conflict or challenge in a multipolar region of the globe. The multipolar states would on the other hand have common interest in resisting the ambitions of the bipolar powers. The probability of war would therefore be much lower in a bimultipolar system than in either a strictly bipolar or multipolar system. Rosecrance R. N., "Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the Future", Journal of Conflict Resolution, X (Sept 1966) p. 318

Schweller R. L., "Tripolarity and the Second World War, International Studies Quarterly (1993), 37 p 73 - 103. His choice of World War II as a case study was justified by the fact that in applying his definition of a "pole" to the correlates of war computation of major capability shares, only one instance of tripolarity existed in the post - 1815 period, the 1936 - 39 system. Furthermore, the analysis examined the alliance strategies of all the seven major powers (i.e, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Soviet Union and the US).


Midlarsky M. I.; Ted Hopf, Polarity and international stability, American Political Science Review (March 1993), Vol 187, No. 1, 173 - 180. In his article in June 1991 issue of this review, Ted Hopf challenged the argument that Bipolar systems are inherently more stable than multipolar systems. He suggested that the international situation in the 16th Century Europe became only marginally more stable with a shift
from multipolar to bipolar system. He therefore argues for attention to the offensive -
defensive balance rather than systemic polarity.

66 See Braudel, F., The Mediterranean World in the Age of Phillip IV 2 Vols (New
1495 -1559, which is well within the period whose ending coincides with the ending
of the 16th century or if not, later in the early 17th century, as economic process
slowed down and in some instances actually reversed course.

67 Midlarsky, op.cit, pp. 175 - 176.

68 See Rosecrance (1963), op.cit.

69 Morgenthau, op. cit
CHAPTER TWO

2. THE OAU: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Organisation of African Unity is the culmination of a movement which began to manifest itself among the Africans of Diaspora as far back as the 19th century. It is a practical expression of the Pan-African ideas which initially envisaged the unity of blacks the world over and slowly degenerated into the unity of the continent of Africa. These ideas initially found their expression in anti-slavery and anti-racism organisations (and protests) but later were also directed towards anti-colonialism specifically in the continent of Africa, but generally in all colonial lands. In the latter part of the struggle, therefore the movement finds its expression in nationalist movements which later resulted in the attainment of sovereignty of all the colonial territories.

This Chapter will therefore be indispensable to our analysis of the nature of involvement of the OAU in resolution of civil war in Africa. The Chapter will be divided into three main parts. The first will deal with the historical evolution of Pan-Africanism culminating in the formation of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963. The second part will deal with Pan-African thought on the one hand and disunity on the other hand and how the two are inherently not compatible, not only after the attainment of sovereignty by most African territories, but also in the pre-independence period. The OAU’s reaction towards civil wars is not without its historical foundation, as we shall attempt to show. In the third part, we shall draw conclusions as regards the whole chapter.
2.1. Historical Evolution of Pan-Africanism

2.1.1 Back to Africa Movement

The remotest causes of Pan-African movement is slavery and its attendant racial oppression which evoked the spirit of revolt among Africans. The first feelings of Pan-Africanism therefore found their expression in Anti-slavery protests within the new world and was essentially physical in nature. It is instructive that the abolitionist efforts in many countries, eg Britain, France and America were also supplemented by anti-slavery revolts, eg those of the Jamaican Maroons, which were successful, and the insurrection of Haiti led by Toussaint l’ouverture which was a decisive factor in the entire struggle for the abolition of the trade. With the emancipation of a nucleus of slaves, the violent protests slowly began to transform themselves into intellectual and even reasoned argument for the abolition of the obnoxious system.

The total abolition of slavery only gave way to racial oppression of Blacks who were now considered as inferior in a foreign land. From this moment on, the struggle of blacks in diaspora to achieve racial equality manifested itself in two main forms - that of emigration from their respective lands of residence ie, West Indies and America and that of more integration into these respective societies. The initial emigration movements were actually not “Back to Africa movements” as they were directed not specifically to Africa. Thus apart from Dr. Martin Delany’s, perhaps the first man to use the expression “Africa for Africans”, attempts to consider the colonisation of East Africa by Afro-Americans and his later exploratory expeditions to the Niger Valley, there were also other attempts during the same period to explore the possibility of settling in Canada and even Central America of persons of African origin in the United States of America. These were in fact echoes of the "Back to
Africa Movement which preoccupied some of the Afro-Americans and the Afro-Caribbeans in the 19th and early 20th Centuries.

One of the earliest pioneers of "Back to Africa Movement" was a Businessman named Paul Cuffee, whose activities culminated in the transportation of some thirty eight Afro-Americans to Africa in 1815, although at a great cost to himself. Cuffee's death in 1815, however put an end to this venture. Even though these efforts resulted into colonisation of Monrovia (Liberia) and Free Town (Sierra Leone), they did not result into a major movement back to Africa. Nevertheless, they did succeed in injecting "the idea of an African identity into the conscience of Africans, both at home and abroad".²

It is this movement that was revived in the interwar period by Marcus Mosiah Garvey, a Jamaican, in the form of Black Zionism. His organs of transmission were organisations such as the Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities Imperial League, both of which he founded. In an attempt to fulfil his earlier dream of a Negro empire, Garvey convened his first "Parliament" on 1 August 1920. He proceeded to create other institutions as well as appoint dignitaries all of which he noted were lacking among the Black race. With the help of the Black Star (shipping) Line, a company whose establishment he also sponsored, he hoped to transport the Africans of Diaspora back to Africa.

Garvey's movement however did not realise any of its stated aims. Garvey himself was deported from America in 1929 and, back in Jamaica he tried unsuccessfully to mobilise Negroes to return to Africa. His movement disappeared soon after he died in 1940. The movement was later to have a lot of impact in African nationalist leaders who kept on referring to the notion of "African Personality".
The "Back to Africa Movement", however, did not lack its opponents. There are those who argued relentlessly for assimilation of Afro-Americans into the American society, the chief of whom was Frederick Douglass. The activities of Douglass and his successors aimed, not at emigration, but at full intergration of blacks into the American society through extinction of racism. Later on, other efforts were directed at establishing schemes for the rehabilitation of the down-trodden Afro-Americans. An example is Booker T Washington's establishment of the Tuskegee Institute in Alabama in 1880. A distinctive feature of Washington's endeavours was his acceptance of a more or less subservient position for the Afro-Americans as enunciated in his "Atlanta Compromise" of 1895. In a speech delivered by Booker T. Washington in Atlanta on behalf of the Negro race, he assured the whites that "in all things that are purely social, we can be as separate as fingers, yet one as the hand in all things essential to human progress". The same earned him the hostility of a section of the Negroes led by Dr. W E B Dubois, who, of course did not discredit his scheme for the enhancement of the masses.

The activities of Dr. Dubois and his team led to the convening of a conference in 1905 out of which sprang a new protest organisation known as "The Niagara Movement". Five years after its inauguration the Niagara Movement was joined by a group of white liberals resulting into the formation of the "National Association for the Advancement of the Coloured People" (NAACP) which grew to become the most acknowledged defender and champion of the Negro rights in the United States. After his contribution towards the formation of this propaganda organisation, Dubois turned his attention to the colonial question in Africa.
2.1.2 Pan Africanism

The real originator of the term Pan-Africa was a West Indian Barrister, Henry Silvester Williams, who practised law in London. He is also the one who convened the first Pan-African Congress in London in 1900. Dubois was reportedly at the conference, where he also made his widely publicised statement, "The problem of the twentieth Century is the problem of the color line". The conference was convened "as a forum of protest against the aggression of the white colonisers and at the same time to appeal to the missionary and abolitionist traditions of the British people to protect the Africans from the depredations of the white empire builders". It was attended by thirty people from England and West Indies including a few from North America. One of its important achievements was the attainment of a promise from Queen Victoria, through Joseph Chamberlain, "not to overlook the interests and welfare of the native races". Unfortunately, Mr. Silvester Williams died soon after his return to West Indies and it was through Dr. Dubois' efforts that the concept of Pan-Africa was revived in the inter-war period. Dubois is most remembered for the five Pan-African Congresses he convened between 1919 and 1945.

The first one was convened in Paris immediately after the World War I in 1919. The choice of Paris was strategic in that it was aimed to coincide with the peace negotiations in Paris. However, had it not been for the influence of Blaise Diagne, a Senegalese member of French Parliament, the whole project would have failed. The congress petitioned the victorious powers to place the former German African colonies of Togo Land, Cameroon, South West Africa and Tanganyika under international supervision to be held in trust for the inhabitants as future self governing countries. Although the Mandates system of the League of Nations emerged out of the peace conference, it is by no means certain that the victorious
powers paid much attention to the Pan-African congress. Other resolutions of the congress aimed at acquiring more economic, political and social rights for the natives of Africa.

The second Pan-African Congress was held in London, Brussels and Paris respectively between August and September 1921. It was more representative than the preceding one, with 113 delegates from Africa, the US and West Indies. Although a number of ‘moderate’ declarations were accepted at the second Pan-African Congress, Dubois’ major aim of setting up a permanent secretariat in Paris backfired owing to divergence of opinion between the Paris based group and the Afro-American wing. According to Dubois, the Paris based group veered towards the Garvey approach of integrating the Pan-African struggles for recognition and regeneration with commerce, a view which the American group could not take. As a result, when Dubois called a Pan-African Congress in early 1923, the Paris Secretary postponed it.

The two congresses which followed continued to degenerate in strength as compared to the preceding ones. As Woronoff (1970) notes, they became "mere acts of faith and then almost of desperation". The attendance of the third congress, held in London and Portugal respectively in 1923, was therefore lower than the previous occasions. Its second session was held in Lisbon with a view to exert pressure upon the Portuguese authorities with regard to abolition of forced labour and other reforms which it was deemed were overdue in her African colonies. The congress was addressed by two former colonial ministers of Portugal who promised to use their influence in getting their government to make the necessary reforms. Such pledges were never kept.

The Fourth Pan-African congress took place in 1927 in New York immediately after the collapse of Garvey’s Black Zionism. It was attended by some 200 delegates from 12 countries. Although the congress made headway in sponsoring more explicit proposals on
issues like self government, education, labour and world peace, there was little room for the implementation of these proposals.

Dubois' plan was to hold the next conference in African soil for the first time. His plan, however, hit a snag when the French authorities vetoed his attempt to hold the next conference in Tunis. As alternative plans were hurriedly being made, depression set in. Above all, this implied that the much expected Negro upper middle class contribution towards the fifth Pan-African Congress could no longer be counted on. The congress was therefore postponed till further notice.

Thus while the first and second Pan-African Congresses were promising as regards the growth of Pan-African idea, the third and forth were disappointing and revealed a diminution of its force. To be sure the four congresses had achieved nothing in terms of self determination by the time the Pan-African Federation was formed in 1944.

2.1.3 African Contributions to Pan-Africanism

In the preceding paragraphs, we have noted how the Pan-African movement originated from Africans of Diaspora in the Western Hemisphere. For us to get a clear picture of events which took place after the fourth congress, however, it is imperative to assess the African effort towards the development of Pan-African idea. The actions of Africans from West Africa, and especially African students studying abroad are very important in this regard. Of considerable importance is the exchange of ideas not only between Africans of Diaspora and African students abroad but also between African Students abroad and Africans at home. The influence of Dr Edward Wilmot Blyden, not only on the thoughts of Dr Dubois and Mr Garvey, but also on the West African lawyer cum journalist Mr Joseph Casely-Hayford is one among the many examples of such interchange. Dr
Blyden, a Dutch West Indian born Negro, who later migrated to Liberia, was the foremost exponent of the notion of "Africa personality" in the late 19th and the early years of the 20th century, aside from being a chief advocate of emigration of both Afro-American and Afro-Caribbeans to Africa. His influence particularly in the thought of Mr Casely-Hayford has been attested to in the latter's book, Ethiopia Unbound.

It is the activities of people like Casely-Hayford which place West Africa as the African Cradle of Pan-Africanism, although its birth place still remains in the new world.

Already within the first two decades of the 20th century, an attempt had been made to forge a bond of union between the Africans at home and those abroad. Joint activities such as the International Negro Conference held in Tuskegee Institute, Alabama in 1912 under the inspiration of Booker T Washington are clear testimony. The announcement of the impending conference gave a new impetus to West Africans like Casely-Hayford who had already began to stir up the idea of African nationality. Its organisers received many regret letters from Africans who, even though could not attend, expressed their interest in the purpose of the proceedings. Among such letters was one from Casely-Hayford:

"We feel that the great work that is being done at Tuskegee is a mighty uplifting force for the race. It may be possible, however, to be influenced by the great national tendency, which is the basis of our education system here.

There is an African Nationality and when the Aborigines of the Gold Coast and other parts of West Africa, have joined forces with our brethren in America in arriving at a national aim, purpose and aspiration, then indeed will it be possible for our brethren over the sea to bring home metaphorically to their nation and people a great spoil."
You have a great influence for good, under God, and venture to hope that the thoughts which are moving West Africa as one body will appeal through you and other leaders of our race to our people on the other side of the Atlantic.  

It was under the inspiration of Casely-Hayford that the National Congress for British West Africa (NCBWA) was founded in March 1920, the inauguration of which was attended by delegates from Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Gambia and Gold Coast, all of which were at the time British territories. Between 1920 and 1930 Casely-Hayford, through the NCBWA promoted cooperation among Africans of the four British dependencies of West Africa.

Almost at the same time that the NCBWA was being formed, a Nigeria Professor, Adeoye Deniga wrote and published a pamphlet on "the need for West Africa federation".

Another West Africa personality during this period was Ladipo Solanke, who was the organising head behind the founding of the West African Students Union (WASU) in London in 1924. The union had the following aims:

1) To promote and maintain a Hostel (or residential club) for students of African descent and others approved by the Hostel Board of Management

2) To act as a Bureau of information on African History, customs and institutions.

3) To act as Centre for research on all subjects appertaining to Africa and its development.

4) To promote self-help, unity, cooperation and the spirit of true leadership among its members.

5) To promote through regular contacts, the spirit of good wish, better understanding and brotherhood between all persons of African descent and other races of mankind.

6) To present to the world a true picture of African life and philosophy, thereby making a definitely African contribution towards progress of civilisation.
7) To foster a spirit of national consciousness and racial pride among all African people.
8) To establish a monthly magazine called WASU.
9) To raise necessary funds for the carrying out of the above mentioned objects.

Following the launching of WASU, Solanke completed in 1927 his unpublished manuscript entitled "United West Africa (or Africa) at the Bar of the Family of Nations", the circulation of whose copies among the African students in Britain helped in arousing the general national consciousness. Efforts were also made to establish branches of WASU throughout West Africa, many of which survived till after the World War II.

WASU and NCBWA were in constant touch with one another and there was mutual acknowledgement of each other's activities. On 5 November 1926, for example, the NCBWA founder, Casely-Hayford addressed members of WASU in London. In his speech, Mr. Casely-Hayford laid stress on the importance of continuity in the endeavours of the union in order to facilitate activities by future students; emphasised the importance of unity and cooperation among Africans so as to facilitate the path to the establishment of "West Africa Nationhood" and; advocated what he called "African International Union and Solidarity" between Africans and persons of African descent living in the Western world:

"We in the mother country, West Africa, Aboriginal Element; we who by God's grace are striding ahead, is it anything out of the way for us to stretch out our hands to our brethren over the Atlantic who have brotherly yearnings for us, as we have for them? I believe it is not, and there lies our hope of African International Union and sentiment. The time has come that Africans from the North, South, East and West of the Globe, should join together not for struggle, but in the way of saying to other men - we, too, are men; we too have found our place in the world"; this, gentlemen, is our work."
This speech derives its importance from the fact that it contains what in the post war period was to be crystallised as the assertion of the "African Personality" whether on a regional or continental level, the proponents in the first phase of Pan-Africanism were in their activities, speeches and writings also exponents of the "Negro or African Personality".

The WASU hostel also acted as a meeting ground for students from all over Africa together with people of African descent from Antilles and America where there occurred discussions and exchange of ideas. Through such channels the ideas of Garvey and Dubois were constantly transmitted to the West African students and hence to West Africa, or Africa. This is more so in view of the fact that the NCBWA itself, drew most of its members from WASU, most of whose members returned to their respective homes to join the former on completion of their studies. It was also the WASU that continued to carry the mantle of NCBWA after the latter's demise in 1930s following the death of its founder, Joseph Casely-Hayford in the same year. At the 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress, WASU was among the active participating bodies.

2.1.4 Background to 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress

The Fifth Pan-African Congress has always been given a special treatment in the history of Pan-Africanism. Not only was it more militant in its resolutions as compared to the preceding four congresses, but it was also more representative. This unique feature of the Fifth Pan-African Congress can be explained by two important events which preceded it and which had direct bearing not only on the future of Pan-Africanism, but also on the possibility of any attainment of self-government by African dependencies: the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1936 and the Atlantic Charter of August 1941.
Just before Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia, two missions had arrived in England from the Gold Coast, later Ghana, one of which was headed by Nana, Sir Ofori-Atta, a leading paramount chief while the other consisted of two officers of the Aborigines' Rights Protection Society (ARPS). The purpose of these missions was to protest to the Secretary of State for colonies against certain "obnoxious laws" while at the same time demanding a reform of the constitution. The presence of these missions drew a lot of interest from the politically minded Negroes in Britain, whose reaction was to form an ad hoc committee with the aim of assisting the ARPS delegated in organising their public meetings so as to enable them present their case to the British Authorities. With Mussolini's declaration of war on Ethiopia, that body was reconstituted to become "The International African Friends of Abyssinia (IAFA) with the aim of arousing sympathy and support from the British public towards Ethiopia and "to assist by all means in their power in the maintenance of Ethiopia's territorial integrity". Among its officials were: Mr. C.L.R. James of Trinidad as Chairman, Dr. Peter Milliard of British Guiana, Honourable T. Albert Marryshaw of Grenada as Vice Chairmen, Mr. Jomo Kenyatta as Honorary Secretary and Mrs. Amy Ashwood Garvey as Honorary Treasurer. These together with George Padmore, Mr. Sam Manning of Trinidad and Mr. Mohammed Said of Somaliland, formed the Executive Committee. It is this body which organised a reception for Haile Selassie together with other members of the Royal family when they arrived to spend years of exile in Britain in 1936. However, as soon as a number of British friends and admirers of Haile Selassie took over the work of propaganda under the auspices of Abyssinian Association, later replaced by Anglo-Ethiopia Society, the IAFA abandoned these activities. In 1937, it joined forces with other enthusiasts to form the International African Service Bureau (IASB), the forerunner of the Pan-African Federation of 1944 which was also to prepare the way for the Manchester Pan-African Congress of 1945.
Being a representation of the progressive and enlightened public opinion among Africans and people of African descent, the IASB owed allegiance to no political party, organisation or group in Europe. It stood for democratic rights, civil liberties and self-determination not only in Africa and Asia, but also throughout the colonial world. Its membership was confined to Africans, although Europeans whose interest in African affairs was authentic could become associate members. The true impact of the Italian invasion of Ethiopia has been depicted by Professor James Coleman:

"The Italian invasion of Ethiopia gave African racial consciousness a far more influential boost. One of the most militant and uncompromising nationalists in Nigeria, informed me that the Italian conquest of Africans, historic kingdom made him aware for the first time that the struggle of the future was between white and Black. Ethiopia to the African was a symbol of racial achievement. The subjugation of Ethiopia branded as futile all the gains the Nigerians had made or hoped to make towards equality and independence. The subsequent failure of the European powers, especially the United Kingdom, to carry out sanctions against Italy, and the ease with which they accommodated themselves to Italy's conquest, served to strengthen conviction that the whitemen were by instinct and interest united against Black men."

In the meantime, WASU influence continued to grow. It forged links with the Fabian Society Colonial Bureau whose Chairman was Arthur Creech Jones, later Colonial Secretary and with organisations such as the Congress Against Imperialism and the International Union of Students in Prague. Having also registered its protest against the Italian violation of territorial integrity, it continued to mount its pressure on the British colonial authorities. In
1940, WASU informed the Colonial Secretary of the "desire of the West African people to become, remain and form a definitely distinct and integral political unit".14

Soon after the publications of the Atlantic Charter in 1941, WASU submitted a Memorandum to Clement Atlee (Colonial Secretary) which drew his attention to the fact that Great Britain has in the Atlantic charter proclaimed her determination to re-establish and support the national independence of the colonies of Europe, Ethiopia and Syria, but what about West Africa?15 Later, WASU convened a conference on West African problems and submitted a resolution to the Governor of Nigeria, requesting inter-alia, "a united Nigeria with a federal constitution based on a Swiss or USA model with necessary modifications........Local tribal loyalty (should) be gradually transcended, submerged and suppressed by the creation and development of Nigerian National Loyalty".16 On 6 April 1942, WASU submitted yet another Memorandum to the Under Secretary of State for the colonies stating that:

"In the interest of freedom, justice and true democracy, and in view of the lessons of Malaya and Burma, as well as giving the people of the empire something to fight for, the WASU in Great Britain strongly urges for the British West African colonies and protectorates internal self government within five years after the war".17

The Memorandum evoked no response from the British Authorities.

It was not only WASU which responded to the ambiguities of the Atlantic Charter, Article Three of which the signatories, including President F.D. Roosevelt of the US and Mr Winston Churchill of Britain, had declared that they "respect the rights of all people to choose the form of government under which they live, and they wish to see the sovereign rights and governments restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them".18 The proponents of Pan-Africanism, both in West Africa and Britain as well as the other side of the
Atlantic rejoiced in the belief that the era of self-government had dawned. Soon afterwards, however, their hopes were thwarted when Mr Churchill's statement in the House of Commons went contrary to their beliefs:

"At the Atlantic meeting, we had in mind, primarily the restoration of sovereignty, self-government, and national life of the states and nations of Europe now under Nazi yoke and the principle governing any alterations in the territorial boundaries which may have to be made. So that is quite a separate problem from the progressive evolution of self-governing institutions in the regions and people which owe allegiance to the British Crown."¹⁹

Aside from the hostile reactions this evoked from both sides of the Atlantic, West Africa's reaction was noteworthy. Furthermore, a counter-statement by President Roosevelt in February 1942 suggested that the Charter applied to "all humanity". Encouraged by Roosevelt's statement, a West African Press Delegation led by Dr Namdi Azikiwe, then a foremost spokesman on political matters in West Africa, and sponsored by WASU, visited London in August 1943 to protest against West Africa's exclusion from the declarations in the Atlantic Charter. They submitted a Memorandum entitled "The Atlantic Charter and British West Africa" to the Colonial Secretary²⁰. Once again, the Memorandum evoked no response from the British government. Back home, Dr. Azikiwe's disappointment was expressed in a private letter to Dr. Akintola:

"Nigeria has very few friends in England so far as our political aspirations are concerned. (We) must close ranks, work cooperatively and carry forward any reconstruction that is practicable show that we are able to rise beyond our minor internal differences most of our critics use that argument to prevent the realisation of our aspirations."²¹.
From that time onwards, Azikiwe became increasingly militant. Such tendency towards increased militancy, added to the already tense atmosphere following the Italian invasion of Ethiopia was to eventually give the Fifth Pan-African Congress a different quality while at the same time enhancing its convention.

The tension characterising the period preceding the Fifth Pan-African Congress also manifested itself in the change of strategies among the Pan-Africanists. The unity of intellectuals and plebeians was increasingly seen as being crucial to the progress of Pan-Africanism. As a result, the organisers of Pan-African Federation (who were also to organise for the first time the Fifth Pan-African Congress) saw to it that they hijacked the occasion of World Federation of Trade Unions which met in February 1945, and to which the British labour party had invited labour representatives from British colonies. In that meeting the attention of the gathering was diverted towards Pan-African issues. The result was a PAF delegates conference at Manchester in March, where it was decided that the next Pan-African Congress should be timed to coincide with the next WFTU meeting due from 25 September to 9 October that year in Paris.

At the same time of PAF delegates conference, a provisional agenda and programme for the Fifth Pan-African Congress was approved and rapporteur appointed. The preparatory work was assigned to a special international conference secretariat which included Dr. Peter Milliard (British Guinea) as Chairman; Mr. T.R. Makonnen (Ethiopia) as treasurer; Mr. George Padmore (Trinidad) and Mr. Kwame Nkrumah (West Africa) as joint secretaries; Mr. Peter Abrahams (South Africa) as publicity secretary; and Mr. Jomo Kenyatta (East Africa) as assistant secretary. These were to report to the second delegates conference due in August about the progress it had made in corresponding with the various African and West Indies countries whose delegates were expected to attend the congress. The agenda was reported as
widely approved and where distance hindered some organisations from sending representatives, local representatives in Britain were appointed to act on their behalf.

In the meantime, the hopes of Pan-Africanists were again briefly raised by the victory of the Labour Party of Britain in July 1945. Such hopes which were based on the belief that the Labour Government would be more sympathetic to the Pan-African ideals than the Tory Government, found their expression in a letter addressed to Mr Clement Attlee, later Lord, part of which read:

"To condemn the imperialism of Germany, Japan and Italy while condoning that of Britain would be more than dishonest, it would be a betrayal of the sacrifice and sufferings and toil and sweat of the common people of this country. All imperialism is evil."\(^{23}\)

The response from the Labour Government was however far from satisfactory. Later on, Nkrumah expressed his disappointment:

"Our hopes in the Labour Party were completely dashed to pieces. In fact, we saw little difference between Labour colonial policy and that of the Tories."\(^{24}\)

This incident served to remind African nationalist leaders that they had themselves and only themselves to rely on in the struggle against the white domination. It is this realisation more than anything else which shaped the events that followed the Fifth Pan-African Congress.

2.1.5 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress

At the Fifth Pan-African Congress, the continent of Africa was divided into regions in order to facilitate detailed discussions as well as adequate resolutions. There were both general resolutions pertaining to the conditions of "coloured people" and local resolutions
reflecting the peculiarity of the various regions. The resolutions adopted centred on the demand for freedom, the dismantling of colonialism, the repudiation of racism, and the call for unity under the banner of a socialist United States of Africa. The conclusion of the congress saw the delegates dispersing to their respective homes although some stayed in London to set the Pan-African Federation on a firmer ground. Back at home, the Pan-Africanists engaged in mass mobilisation which also saw the rise of "mass" political parties.25

Even though African unity was not the dominant issue during this period, the preoccupation with self-determination and elimination of Western rule was in accord with the aims of Pan-Africanists. Thus even though the Egyptians achieved a successful revolution under General Neguib and Colonel Nasser in 1952, and although Libya, Tunisia, Morocco and Sudan achieved their independence between 1951 and 1956, before any West African country, it was Ghana’s independence which brought the North and the South of the continent together as never before. Nkurumah’s contribution is therefore crucial to the understanding of events during this period and after 1957, when Ghana attained its independence.

After the Manchester Fifth Pan-African Congress of 1945, Nkrumah together with some Pan-African stalwarts such as Padmore, Makonnen and Kenyatta laboured unsuccessfully to establish a permanent home in London for the Pan-african Federation which was still based in Manchester. On failing to achieve this objective, they contented themselves with organising a West African National Secretariat whose objectives would be to assemble a West African Congress which would direct its efforts towards achieving self-government for both British and French West African colonies. Such efforts culminated into a number of congresses which were also attended by representatives from French speaking West Africa. In this regard, the West African National Secretariat and the convening of congresses was an
unconscious revival of the National Congress of British West African idea of Joseph Casely-Hayford, although the latter's endeavours were confined to British West Africa.

In British West Africa, events were moving even faster. Already in Gold Coast, Dr. J.B. Danquah had taken steps to found the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC). He proceeded to invite Nkumah to come and aid the national effort for self-government, the acceptance of which meant that Nkumah's battle ground was shifted from London to West Africa. With Nkumah's return to Gold Coast, the tempo of political agitation increased, and soon, he was to part company with organisers of UGCC which he found not to be radical enough and formed the C.P.P.

Through the Convention People's Party, Nkumah propelled his country towards independence. The embodiment of his parties activities were summed up in a programme of "Positive Action" which he defined as:

"The adoption of all legitimate and constitutional means by which we could attack the forces of imperialism in the country. The weapons are legitimate political agitation, newspaper and educational campaigns and, as a last resort the constitutional application of strikes, boycotts and non-cooperation based on the principle of absolute non-violence, as used by Gandhi in India".

The first of Pan-African success was thus achieved when Ghana attained its independence in 6 March 1957 through the successful implementation of the "positive action" as adopted by the Fifth Pan-African Congress. On the occasion of Ghana's independence, Nkumah reiterated in a speech that Ghana's independence was meaningless while the rest of Africa lived under colonial rule. He thus took the initiative of convening the first Conference of Independent African States in Accra in May 1958, which was attended by the eight independent African states.
From this moment on, the Pan-African movement began to enter what has been called the "realm of practical politics". All the Pan-African ideals which had been developed over time, and which were enshrined in the resolution of the various congresses could now be implemented by the independent states. One immediate trend at the conference of independent African states was that of moderation as regards the element of unity. The independent African rulers began to show their unwillingness to sacrifice their sovereignty at the altar of unity, a phenomenon which was to manifest itself in almost all the succeeding congresses up to the Addis Ababa congress of 1963.

The point to note here is that there began to develop major divisions which deepened over time. One group seemed to favour political union leading to the United States of Africa as envisaged by the resolutions of the Fifth Pan-African Congress. Another group, however was of the view that such a union would be hazardous to Africa and therefore preferred cooperation. It is this issue which prompted Nkrumah and Sekou Toure who had placed themselves at the vanguard of African unity to call the All African Peoples Conference in December 1958 in Accra. It was believed that the latter conference, composing delegates of national political parties, including opposition parties, trade unions, and men's and women's organisations would be better placed to spearhead the move towards African unity. Although the All African People's Conference adopted more militant resolutions, it had no means of implementing these resolutions (a duty which was still reserved to the independent African states).

2.1.6 Francophone Africans

Meanwhile other events were to continue emphasising the divergence of opinion. We have already noted how the French North African territories attained their independence by
1956. A major exception in this group was a French North African territory of Algeria. Thus even though the Egyptian revolution of 1952 went along way in enhancing the political activity of North African territories, the French Authorities continued to hold onto Algeria under the illusion that the latter was an overseas territory of France. This trend continued for seven years, during when Algerians engaged France in a protracted war of independence. On 28 August 1958, Algerian Provisional Government (GPRA) had been constituted, the recognition of which was to cause a major divergence of opinion within the ranks of Pan-African movement. In fact the issue of Algeria had featured at the Accra Conference of Independent African States where participants committed themselves to "make every possible effort to help the Algerian people towards the attainment of independence".

At the French West and Equatorial Africa, issues were very much unlike those in their British counterparts. The french policy of assimilation had meant that French subjects in these two regions were more preoccupied with being Frenchmen than with attainment of self-government. Their feelings towards Pan-Africanism were even less favourable. This is in fact well attested to by Diagne's letter to Garvey on 3 July 1922 in which the former disapproved of the latter plus his African emancipation programme:

"We french natives wish to remain French, since France has given us every liberty and since she has unreservedly accepted us upon the same basis as her own European children. None of us aspire to see French Africa delivered exclusively to the Africans as is demanded, though without any authority, by the American Negroes, at the head of whom you have placed yourself. The French native elite who are responsible for the natives of our colonies, could not allow, without failing in their duties, the revolutionary theories of separation or emancipation, to which you have given your
name, to introduce trouble and disorder where calm and order are the indispensable factors for the security of all.”

Self government and independence therefore came against the wishes of the French West and Equatorial African elite who continued in large part to advocate for a greater union with France. When in 1958 they were given a choice between remaining in French community and independence, all the French territories in West and Equatorial Africa opted for the former except Guinea (Conakry) which attained her independence on 2 October 1958. However, before the community could solidify, the constitution of the Fifth Republic was modified in 1960 to ensure that members of the community could become independent while retaining membership of the community. The attainment of independence by this group of states was largely responsible for deepening the gap that had began to manifest itself between the radical states on the one hand and the moderate states on the other. Their independence coincided with the eruption of the Congo crises during when the differences in the approach to Pan-Africanism by independent African states began to be increasingly evident.

2.1.7 Congo Crises

Already, the so called radical states had shown that their sympathy lay with Lumumba’s view of a centralised government as opposed to the Kasavubu group. This included Ghana, United Arab Republic, Mali, Guinea and Morocco. On the other hand, Liberia and the former French colonies constituting the Brazzaville group, after their meeting in December 1960, lent their support to Kasavubu’s and Tshombe’s federalist tendencies. The Brazzaville meeting of former French West and Equatorial Africa was taken as a challenge by the militant leaders of the continent. Shortly after the Brazzaville conference therefore another meeting was held in Casablanca in January 1961 which was attended by
Algeria's Provisional Government (GPRA), Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mali, Morocco and the UAR. Following the prevention of Lumumba by the UN troops from using the radio station in Leopoldville, the radical states had strongly condemned the UN move which seemed to compromise its impartiality. The Casablanca meeting therefore resolved that the participating states should withdraw their troops from the UN command. While Guinea, Mali, Morocco and the UAR later withdrew their forces, Ghana did not, thus again causing division within the radical states. Out of that meeting sprang the Casablanca Group whose radical line also alienated them from the other independent African states who joined with the Brazzaville group in May 1961 at Monrovia to form the Monrovian group. The Monrovian group originated out of the desire to bridge the gap that already existed between the Casablanca group and the Brazzaville group of states. However, the failure of the Casablanca group to accept the invitation to the Monrovian conference served to deepen the gulf between the "Casablanca" and what came to be known as the "Monrovian group" of African states. The true seeds of division which were now being confirmed by the Monrovian conference had been in fact sown at the earlier conferences. These divisions revolved around unity, foreign policy (non-alignment), the boundary problem and the recognition of the Algerian Provisional Government (GPRA).

According to the Casablanca group, there seems to have been identity of views by the participants of the earlier conferences on the question of African unity, which was later watered down to mean "cooperation". Such watering down of the idea of "unity" to mean "cooperation" comes out very clearly when we look at the Sanniquellie Communique in which Ghana, Guinea and Liberia agreed to the formation of the community of independent African states as contrasted to the Addis Ababa conference of independent African states in 1960 when president Tubman alternatively pressed for a "programme of West African
Regional Cooperation. At the latter conference, moreover, Nigeria referred to the idea of the union of African states as premature. Later at the Monrovian conference, the whole idea of political union was rejected.

Again, as regards the common foreign policy as envisaged by the first conference of independent African states in Accra, the comment by Nigerian head of delegation at the Addis Ababa conference put the issue in doubt.

"The idea of neutrality in international affairs should be ruled out since no one country can stand alone without having anything to do with another country. ... As I was saying, each country should formulate its own foreign policy based on the circumstances prevalent within the country. We in Nigeria for example feel that Nigeria has her acknowledged friends."

As regards the case of frontier, boundary and other disputes, the Accra conference of 1958 had directed that violence should not be employed, but that the nations involved should seek "direct negotiations to settle differences among African independent states". At Addis Ababa in 1960, however, Liberia seems to have gone back on the decision at Accra conference when her Head of Delegation, Mr. Rudolf Grimes, spoke as follows:

"It is quite true that the existing boundaries in Africa were made without ethnic, tribal or economic consideration by the colonial powers. The Liberian government suggests that the African states agree to the principle of generally accepting the present boundaries between their respective states."

The question of recognition of the Algerian Provisional Government (GPRA) also seems to have suffered between the first conference of independent African states in Accra and the second conference of independent states in Addis Ababa. While such recognition had been envisaged at the former conference, and while such recognition was positively
recommended at the succeeding Sanniquelle conference, the Addis Ababa conference recommended that France and Algeria enter into negotiations.

2.1.8. The Algerian Question and The 1962 Lagos Conference of Independent African and Malagasy States

The issue of the recognition of the Algerian Provisional Government became so prominent at the Lagos Conference of Independent African and Malagasy states in January 1962 (called by the Monrovian group as a sequel to the Monrovian conference of May 1961) that the delegates of Sudan and Tunisia withdrew from the Lagos conference in protest against the non-recognition and non-invitation of the Algerian Provisional Government. The members of the radical Casablanca group also gave as one of the reasons of their failure to attend the Lagos conference, the non-recognition of the provisional government of Algeria. In Lagos, a principal charter was adopted, which was to become the charter of the Inter-African and Malagasy States Organisation. The charter was to be submitted to all states for detailed comments, which were subsequently to be reconsidered by a committee of representatives of all the governments concerned. That committee was to meet within three months and incorporate all comments into a revised charter to be submitted to the next conference of Heads of African and Malagasy states for approval and signature.

Thus by stressing on the sovereign equality of all African states, the non-interference by African states in one another's internal affairs and the "non-acceptance of any leadership", the Lagos conference adopted a charter of cooperation and even the economic union was at that time not aimed at achieving unification.
2.1.9 Ethiopia and The 1963 Addis Ababa Conference

The absence of the Casablanca group, however, coupled with the Emperor of Ethiopia's speech together with the comments by the British West Africa press helped towards the reappraisal of the division. The Emperor of Ethiopia, to the surprise of most of the participants of the Monrovian group, stated thus: "To escape exploitation, and to overcome the political deficiencies which beset us, Ethiopia urges that while we press ahead with all urgency and speed in those economic areas in which rapid advances can be achieved, parallel steps should simultaneously be taken to explore the possibilities of achieving increasing future political unity among us..... He went further to express Ethiopia's commitment to the principle of political unity among African states and also his belief that the only difference as regards African unity arises from the speed with which such desirable goals could be attained. The major task was therefore to devise the means by which this basic agreement might be most rapidly advanced. On another note, the Emperor lamented the absence of the radical states. "We must express our regret that representatives of the Algerian Provisional Government are not numbered in our midst, and that their absence has caused a number of other nations whose representatives should be seated in this hall to decline invitations extended to them. We cannot but feel that our tasks are made more difficult because several African nations are unrepresented in these halls. But we feel even more strongly that no African can escape the circumstances which have brought us together in Lagos or evade his solemn duty to work with his fellow Africans for the cause of this great continent, and we pledge ourselves to labour unhesitatingly in the discharge of this obligation during the days ahead". 37

Elsewhere the Emperor said: "Ethiopia considers herself a member of one group only - the African group. We contend, accordingly, that no wider and unbridgeable gap exists
between the various groupings which have been created. It is our belief to the contrary that a

close and careful analysis of the policies adopted by the African nations today on a wider

range of questions emphasises, not the differences among them, but the large number of
views which they share in common".36

In short, as was to be shown in the Addis Ababa conference of May 1963, it was the

Emperor's diplomacy that had helped the reconciliation. It is also that conciliatory speech

which paved the way for the Addis Ababa conference of 1963.

The Addis Ababa conference was a landmark in that in it, the divisions which had

characterised the preceding conferences temporarily came to an end and a charter of African

Unity was adopted. However, the deepseated misgivings were far from overcome. Neither

had the methods of achieving unity become unified. The important thing was that there was

redefinition of the Pan-Africanist perspective where upon unity became the accepted goal as

embodied in the Emperor's opening speech:

"Through all that has been said and written and done in these years, there runs a

common theme. Unity is the accepted goal. We argue about means, we discuss
tactics, but when semantics are stripped away, there is little argument among us. We
are determined to create a union of Africa. In a very real sense, our continent is
unmade. It still awaits its creation and its creators. It is our duty and privilege to
rouse the slumbering giant of Africa, not to the nationalism of Europe of the
nineteenth century, not to regional consciousness, but to the union of a single African
brotherhood bending its united efforts towards the achievement of a greater and nobler
goal.......But while we agree that the ultimate destiny of this continent lies in
political union, we must at the same time recognise that the obstacles to be overcome
in its achievements are at once numerous and formidable".37
2.2 Pan-Africanism and Disunity Before 1963

Disunity is a term which has never been held in high esteem, not only in the African continent, but also in all other parts of the world, hence the famous phrase "divide et impera".

2.2.1. African Disunity and European Conquest

Nations have since time immemorial sought to conquer and dominate other states by keeping them divided hence easy to govern. It is this situation which can in fact be applied to the African continent before the attainment of independence. During this period, the western powers were the dominant powers over all the African continent, save in Ethiopia and Liberia which were nominally independent. These powers, which include Great Britain, France, Portugal, Belgium, Holland, Italy and German before the World War I all sought to maintain that status quo or equilibrium. Needless to say, they sought to keep their African subjects divided by using every means at their disposal.

Tribal wars are not a new phenomenon in the African continent. They in fact existed in the precolonial period and it is these wars, more than anything else which lured the white man to come under the guise of pacification. In this process of intervention, the white man grabbed the opportunity and signed treaties of protection with various African chiefs whom he also began to supply with guns. While the Africans continued to fight against themselves, the Europeans waited to grab the spoils.

Without delving into a long story of European conquest of Africa, the prevalence of disunity in the African continent during this period is overwhelming. It only suffices to say here that the European encroachment and final conquest of Africa is owed to this African disunity. During the colonial wars, the Europeans did not only use one tribal group to fight
another, they also used one tribal group to fight against itself. Examples abound in the African continent but due to the limitation of space, we cannot give all the details here.

Table 3 summarises the situation in Kenya between 1884 and 1914.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>War</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>End</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Between</td>
<td>The Kikuyu and</td>
<td>1895</td>
<td>The Kikuyu were subdued.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Between</td>
<td>The Masai and</td>
<td>1890</td>
<td>The Masai were subdued.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Between</td>
<td>The Kikuyu and</td>
<td>1894</td>
<td>The Kikuyu were subdued.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Between</td>
<td>The Masai and</td>
<td>1897</td>
<td>The Masai were subdued.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Between</td>
<td>The Kikuyu and</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>The Kikuyu were subdued.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Between</td>
<td>The Masai and</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>The Masai were subdued.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Between</td>
<td>The Kikuyu and</td>
<td>1902</td>
<td>The Kikuyu were subdued.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Between</td>
<td>The Masai and</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>The Masai were subdued.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Between</td>
<td>The Kikuyu and</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>The Kikuyu were subdued.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Between</td>
<td>The Masai and</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>The Masai were subdued.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

66
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Enemy</th>
<th>Auxiliary</th>
<th>Number killed</th>
<th>Livestock confiscates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov 1893</td>
<td>Kabete Kikuyu</td>
<td>87 Maasai</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Many</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1894</td>
<td>Githunguri</td>
<td>124 Maasai</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1894</td>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
<td>220 Maasai</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 1894</td>
<td>Bukusu (Luhya)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1895</td>
<td>Bukusu (Luhya)</td>
<td>Maasai (Luhya)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 1895</td>
<td>Bukusu &amp; Other Luhya</td>
<td>900 Ganda Maasai</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Luhya</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 1895</td>
<td>Ist Nandi</td>
<td>25 Ganda</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 1895</td>
<td>Mwala Kamba</td>
<td>800 Maasai</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>560</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 1896</td>
<td>Northern Kamba</td>
<td>300 Kikuyu 900 Maasai</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Many</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Many</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Many</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 1897</td>
<td>Southern Luhya</td>
<td>Luhya Maasai</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 1897</td>
<td>Kilungu Kamba</td>
<td>Maasai Kamba</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1897</td>
<td>Tugen (Kamasai)</td>
<td>200 Maasai</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1897</td>
<td>2nd Nandi</td>
<td>400 Maasai</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Few</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 1899</td>
<td>Kamelito (Nandi)</td>
<td>75 Maasai</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 1899</td>
<td>Central (Luo)</td>
<td>Luo Luhya Maasai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Many</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1900</td>
<td>3rd Nandi</td>
<td>1,000 Tugen Luo</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>29,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1901</td>
<td>Pokot (Ribo)</td>
<td>500 Maasai</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Enemy</td>
<td>Auxiliary</td>
<td>Number killed</td>
<td>Livestock confiscates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
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<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;British&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Enemy&quot;</td>
<td>Cattle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep &amp; Dec 1902</td>
<td>Marakuet &amp; Tetu Kikuyu</td>
<td>300 Maasai</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 1903</td>
<td>4th Nandi</td>
<td>700 Nandi</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 1904</td>
<td>Matheria Kikuyu</td>
<td>450 Maasai</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1905</td>
<td>Sotik (Kipsigis)</td>
<td>900 Maasai</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 1905</td>
<td>Gusii</td>
<td>150 Maasai</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 1905 to Jan 1906</td>
<td>5th Nandi</td>
<td>1,500 Maasai Somali Tugen</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1906</td>
<td>Embu</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1908</td>
<td>Gusii Nandi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 1911</td>
<td>Marakwet (Kalenjin)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2.2 European Response to African Quest for Unity

Even if unity was not forthcoming, Africans realised before long that in unity lies strength and in disunity, weakness. It is in this light that we can clearly understand the Pan-African thought with regard to disunity in the colonial period. Such an African conception was even enhanced by the reaction of the colonial authorities towards the African attempts at achieving unity. This is clearly evident with regard to the attitude of the colonial powers towards the early Pan-African proponents such as Dubois and Garvey. The ideas of unity which were being propagated by these two were not compatible with the desire of colonial authorities to perpetuate African divisions and hence maintain their domination of the continent.

In the first case there was a conscious attempt by the colonial authorities at preventing the flow of such ideas from their origin in the new world into Africa. This found expression not only in the banning of such newspapers as the "Negro World" of Marcus Garvey by the colonial authorities, but also in the imposition of heavy penalties on those who were found with such newspapers. That was not the end. The colonial authorities also exhibited a strong determination to prevent at all costs the convening of the Pan-African congresses in Africa. This was clearly demonstrated when the French authorities firmly objected to attempts by Dubois to convene for the first time a Pan-African congress in Africa, namely Tunis in North Africa. Dubios was, however, permitted to hold his congress in any French city but not in Africa.

Another hostile attitude towards Pan-African endeavours on the part of the colonial authorities found expression in the latter's persistent identification of Pan-African movement with communism. Thus on the eve of the second Pan-African Congress session in Brussels, a Belgian newspaper called Brussels Neptune of June 1921 had this to say:

"Announcements have been made of a Pan-African congress organised at the instigation of the National Association for the Advancement of the Coloured Peoples of New York. It is
interesting to note that this Association is directed by personages who it is said in the United States have received remunerations from Moscow (Bolsheviks). The Association has already organised its propaganda in the lower Congo, and we must not be astonished if some day it causes grave difficulties in the Negro village of Kinshasa, composed of all the ne'er-do-wells of the various tribes of the colony aside from some hundreds of labourers.40

Such reactions did not only manifest themselves in verbal terms; occasionally threats and intimidations were used to ensure that the goals of the Pan-Africanists, namely, African unity and independence were thwarted. Such intimidations did succeed in persuading the Liberian Government to change its mind regarding Marcus Garvey's plans to send his first batch of "Negroes' to Liberia in line with his African colonisation endeavours. It is alleged that initially the Liberian president, King had sanctioned the idea, but later changed his mind owing to strong cautions from his neighbouring colonial powers, that is, Britain and France. The two informed the Liberian president that they would not tolerate the presence in Liberia of an organisation which had as its major aim, the overthrow of European supremacy in Africa.43 The importance of that threat is clearly expressed in the comments made by the Governor of Sierra Leone after Monrovia's change of attitude and the consequent failure of Garvey's plans:

"May I say how warmly we in Sierra Leone appreciate your courage and applauded your statesmanship in taking prompt and vigorous steps to show that Liberia would have nothing to do with any movement having as its avowed object the formenting of racial feeling of hatred and ill-will. Your excellency, by slamming the door on spurious patriots from across the Atlantic, men who sought to make Liberia a forum of racial animosity in this continent, deservedly earned the gratitude not only of every West African government, but of all who have the true welfare of the African at heart".
Such threats may also provide explanation as to why the only independent African states which were looked at by the Pan-Africanists as the symbols of African independence, that is Ethiopia and Liberia, failed to raise the banner of Pan-Africanism till it reached a very advanced stage.

Such hostile reactions against any attempt to raise African consciousness was not only directed at the Pan-Africanists of diaspora. For back in Africa and especially in West Africa, movements towards unity were already a foot. The case of the formation of the National Congress of the British West Africa is a clear example. During the inauguration of the congress in March 1920, Joseph Casely-Hayford, who is also its founder, expressed such misgivings about the colonial authorities in his opening speech:

"The idea of West African Unity was mooted five years ago (1915), but at the time it was thought undesirable to press the matter forward, in view of the great struggle in which the empire was engaged, and as the conference, it was feared, might embarrass His Majesty’s government."

In the same speech, Casely-Hayford was at pains in explaining the essence of unity:

"We desire further as the intelligensia of the British West Africa, to promote unity among our people. You all know the importance of unity, and you remember the parable of the man who, when dying, called his sons together and when they were come, asked them to bring him a bundle of wood. You all know how he asked them to loosen the bundle and how each of them was taken out and could be easily broken and how they were put together and could not be broken. It is in the same manner that our people are learning the importance of unity. Nigeria has joined hands with Gambia and Gambia with Sierra Leone and Sierra Leone with Gold Coast, etc and it is our hope by this ambition, to express our views in a way that can be effective."
Unity, whether national, regional or continental became an ideal of Pan-Africanism and the West African unity was conceived as a step towards the eventual African unity. Conversely, African unity in whichever form was far from being in the interest of the imperialist powers, whose system thrived on African disunity right from the continental to the national level. The West African unity itself did not sound sweet to the ears of British West African authorities. Sir Hugh Clifford, the Governor of Nigeria and once a high government official in the Gold Coast (later Ghana) in his address to the Nigerian Council on 29 December 1920 referred to the National Congress of British West Africa in the following derisive terms:

"There has during the last few months been a great deal of loose and gaseous talk on the subject of popular election of the members of the council in Nigeria - talk which has for the most part emanated from a self-elected and self appointed congregation of educated African gentlemen who collectively style themselves the "West African National Congress". Whoever is responsible for this title has singularly little understanding of the meaning of the words..........

"For it can only be described as farcical to suppose that - I will not say British West Africa - but continental Nigeria can be represented by a handful of gentlemen drawn from half a dozen tribes - men born and breed in British - administered towns situated on the sea-shore, who in the safety of British protection, have peacefully pursued their studies under British teachers, in British schools, in order to enable them to become ministers of the christian religion or learned in the laws of England........

"I can only add that the suggestion that there is, or can be in the visible future, such a thing as a "West African Nation' is as manifest an absurdity as that there is, or can be, an "European Nation" - at all events until the arrival of the millenium when we may perhaps hope to see a Sicilian brigand falling into the arms of a Wee Free Scott trader of Glasgow.
claiming him as his European brother, and a Burra highlander of Biu, disembarrassing himself of his poisoned arrows the more cordially to embrace a Fanti barrister from Cape Coast.... it is the consistent policy of the government of Nigeria to maintain the support of the indigenous forms of government which the people concerned have evolved for themselves, and which are to be regarded as the natural expressions of their innate political genius"42.

The British colonial policy of indirect rule, especially in Nigeria, was thus a deliberate attempt by the colonial authorities to perpetuate the ethnic divisions within the colonial territories and in effect perpetuate their colonial domination in the African continent. As will be made clear in Chapter three of this text, the Nigerian internal instability of the late 1960s owes much to this British technique of "divide and rule". Nor were other colonial powers exempted from applying this policy. For even the French authorities' policy of direct rule which also embodied the assimilation policy was a deliberate attempt to keep the African elite as far away from the masses as possible. In this policy of administration, France made legal classification of her subjects, namely sujets francaise (French subjects), notables evolues (natives of privilege status because of their advanced education) and citoyens francaise (French citizens). While the first group enjoyed no privileges the latter two constituted a minority which for a time, were alienated from the multitude of their compatriots. The success of the French policy of "divide and rule" is derived from the fact that while it succeeded in isolating the French West and Equatorial African territories from Pan-African movement which was abhorred by all colonial authorities, it also managed to keep the elites of the African territories and their masses divided thus delaying the emergence of nationalist movement in that region by a great margin. It is in fact argued that with the exception of Guinea, independence in French West and Equatorial Africa was not a desirable goal. On the contrary, most French African elites were more preoccupied with how to attain French citizenship43.
The Pan-African thought with regard to disunity developed over time to attain maturity in the period after the fifth Pan-African Congress of Manchester. African nationalists slowly came to realise that so long as they remained divided, independence was still to be a far dream. The factor of disunity continued to be a valid excuse for denying Africans most of their nationalist aspirations such as the independence of British West Africa. Repeated memorandums sent to British colonial office, especially after the declaration of the Atlantic Charter in 1941, evoked no response from the British authorities. In 1943, for instance, a press delegation headed by Dr. Namdi Azikiwe sent a memorandum entitled *The Atlantic Charter and the British West Africa* to the colonial secretary. The failure of the British authorities to respond to this memorandum was a great disappointment to Azikiwe and his team. Such disappointment was later expressed in Azikiwe's letter to Dr. Akintola Maju, president of the Nigerian Movement (for the exact words see page 14 of this text). He pointed out that disunity was the major stumbling block to African Nationalism and suggested that the only panacea was unity. To be sure, the issue of disunity was more applicable to Nigeria during this period than in the rest of British West Africa.

We have already discussed above how Pan-Africanism registered the first success with the attainment of Ghana's independence in 1957 and how this was followed by a wave of other African territorial units' attainment of independence. We have also noted above how through Ghana's initiative the Conference of Independent African States was convened in 1958 followed in the same year by the All African Peoples Conference. Through such conferences the subject of African unity was moving from the realm of ideas to that of practical politics. At the same time the idea of a United States of Africa as envisaged by the Fifth Pan-African Congress of 1945 in Manchester began to appear less real with most independent African States hesitating to sacrifice their sovereignty at the altar of unity. This was of course with the exception of Ghana and Guinea. Though still strong, the idea of unity was slowly downgraded to imply cooperation, and the latter concept began to gain more
sympathy with the moderate African states. The idea was, in the words of Mr. Dunduza Chisiza, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Finance in Nyasaland and one of President Banda's most effective lieutenants, "to begin building from downwards, not upwards". Continental nationalism which had gained prominence in the eve of the Fifth Pan-African Congress began to yield to territorial nationalism and phrases such as "respect for territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs" were a common feature in most of the conference resolutions.

2.2.3 The Emergence of Balkanization

Concomitant to these features was the emergence of the concept of "Balkanisation" which was closely associated with neo-colonialism. In his book "Africa Speaks", Sekore Toure (1961) contends that:

"The colonialists are ready to "finance" as much independence as one wants, they are ready to flatter African governments and to wax enthusiastic before the three million free Guineans, before the thirty million Nigerians, etc. But their machiavellian plan still aims at dividing the African in order to remain master of the continent".

In his address to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London on 7 June 1961, Madibo Keita (the president of Mali) had this to say:

"We are concerned that the states of Africa shall never be independent, in the full sense of the word, if they remain small states, more or less opposed to one another, each having its own policy, its own economy, each taking no account of the policy of the others".

According to Prime Minister of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere (later president) in his memorandum on East African Federation for PAFMECA Dar es Salaam, in January 1961:

"The balkanisation of Africa is a source of weakness to our continent. The forces of imperialism and of neo-imperialism will find their own strength in the basic weakness of our
continent. Surely, one would have expected that if we have a chance to re-do part of the harm that has already been done by this "balkanisation" of our continent, we would not hesitate in taking that chance.48.

The Ghanaian Foreign Minister in his address to the second conference of independent African states in Addis Ababa in 1960, put it even more blatantly:

"As the former colonial territories become independent, new dangers await us. The European colonial powers, although they are now being compelled by the force of African nationalism to grant independence, are none the less planning to continue to dominate Africa by a new system of foreign domination, namely, the balkanisation of Africa. They are ready to grant independence, but under certain conditions, such as the negotiation of defence agreements and the guarantee of economic advantages such as would satisfy the demands of African nationalism. By this means, they expect to be able to create a large number of small independent states, but which shall continue to depend upon the former colonial powers perpetually for their economic, technological, social and cultural development.49.

Among the instances of Balkanisation which have been frequently cited by Pan-Africanists before the formation of Organisation of African Unity are the secession of Katanga, the separate independence of Mauritius and Togo, and the Mali Federation. The leaders of these emerging smaller states and their supporters, naturally take a different view, which is akin to Dr Azikiwe's, perspective:

"From the evidence at our disposal, it would appear that whilst European nations may be rightly accused of balkanising Africa in the nineteenth century, yet they have atoned for it by federating many African territories, which are now being balkanised by African nationalists on the attainment of independence of their countries. The British West Africa, the French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa are examples of balkanisation by African
nationalist and the Central African Federation is an example of balkanisation in the process brought about by the racial segregation and discrimination practices by a small minority of European settlers against the African majority who are the owners of their countries".\(^{50}\)

Whether initiated by the European interests or African nationalists, "balkanisation" which connotes disunity and in effect disintegration, is a term abhorred by the Pan-African stalwarts. Its close allies, that is tribalism and federation have not escaped the fury of Pan-African stalwarts either.

In Nkrumah's opinion:

"The Congo cases provide a striking example of how federation can be used as a cloak to conceal new colonialism. In fact this type of federalism is not federation at all. Its is separation. It does not unite, its balkanises.......... Fundamentally the reason African ethnic groups failed to maintain their independence and succumbed to colonialism was that they were too small and not economically viable. The whole story of colonial penetration of Africa was the history of colonial powers supporting one ethnic group against the other and exploring African differences so that, in the end, all came equally under the colonial yoke..... But we have, or should have an effective answer to balkanisation and the answer is African unity".\(^{51}\)

Moreover, according to Nkrumah, it was not only sub-nationalism which constituted balkanisation. Some regional groupings, while hiding under the skin of Pan-Africanism were already tending towards balkanisation. While raising his fears over regionalism, Nkrumah had in mind not only the Union Africaine et Malgache (UAM), but also the Pan-African Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA). Thus on 4 June 1962, he stated that 'regional groupings can only be other forms of balkanisation unless they are conceived within the framework of continental union".\(^{52}\). Thus while Nyerere would have preferred to postpone Tanganyika's independence in the
spirit of East African Federation rather than risk the balkanisation of East Africa. Nkrumah’s view of such a federation remained:

"A form of balkanisation on a grand scale... where as it may be inexpedient geographically or otherwise for Ghana to join an East African Federation, there would be no difficulty for Tanganyika, let us say, joining a political union of Africa".

2.2.4 The Congo Crises

The Congo crises of 1960 - 63 was significant in that it did not only illustrate the aversion of Pan-Africanists to secessionist movements, but also set a major precedent to the form that future OAU involvement into African civil wars would take.

The Belgian authorities had never envisaged handing over power to the Congolese people. There had been a conscious attempt by the Belgian authorities to limit the native training not only in administrative fields, but also in technical ones. This was unlike other colonial authorities, namely British and French, who in the period of transition to independence, managed to train a sizeable number of technical and administrative staff to man positions left by the former colonial staff. It is however not the intention of this study to dwell in the subject of Belgian colonial policy. On the contrary, our purpose here is to assess the Pan-African presence in these crises of which the subject began to feature in the Pan-African congress even before the eruption of the first crisis and continued to feature in most, if not all of the succeeding Pan-African conferences. Some of the conferences in which the subject of Congo featured or dominated are:

- the Addis Ababa Conference of Independent African states, convened between 25 and 30 June 1960
- the Leopoldiville Conference of Independent states of August 1960
the Brazzaville conference de l'expression Française of December 1960
the Casablanca conference of January 1961
the Tanarive conference March 1961
the Third All African Peoples' conference in Cairo of March 1961

At Addis Ababa, the impending crises at the Congo had formed one of the dominant topics in the discussions as well as resolutions. Although the participants had been keen on avoiding "interference in the internal affairs of the Congo, they nevertheless raised their concerns over the factional strife in the Congo which was likely to impact on African unity. Neither did the leadership rivalry between the two nationalist leaders of that territory, that is Patrice Lumumba and Joseph Kasavubu, escape their attention. In their resolutions, the rival leaders were urged to reconcile their differences.

The Katanga secession of 11 July 1960 which constituted the major crises, had been preceded by another crises, namely, the intervention of the Belgians on behalf of their nationals in the face of an army mutiny by "Force Publique" against its European officers. It is this military intervention by Belgians, viewed as recolonisation by most Africans, which prompted the Congolese Government to appeal for aid from the United Nations. This appeal was backed with a common front within the United Nations and on 14 July, the Security Council sent the United Nations Operations in the Congo (ONUC) to replace the Belgians. By September 1960, the Belgian troops had been virtually replaced by those of the UN composed of African, Asian and even European troops. Katanga secession came a day after the arrival of the Belgians, with Moise Tshombe as the head of the seceding government and backed by 15,000 men "gendarmerie" led by former Belgian officials, political officers and mercenaries. The persistence of that secession also inspired another one at the "Mining State of Kasai" with Albert Kalondji as the "King".
Besides the United Nations, the government of Lumumba had also made appeals to individual African states (who agreed to serve under the United Nations forces) to help him stabilise the country and expel the Belgians. Lumumba's understanding that the United Nations force would help him put down the secession hit a snag when he learnt that the UN would "not interfere in the internal affairs of the Congo", a realisation which prompted Lumumba to call a conference of independent states in Leopoldiville between 25 - 30 August 1960. This was done in the belief that the thirteen states that were invited would support his demand for UN evacuation. The African leaders, however, did not live to the expectations of Mr Lumumba, who later turned in desperation to the Russians as a last resort. Apart from supporting Lumumba's struggle against Tshombe as well as condemning the secession and colonial manoeuvres, the conference supported the continuance of the United Nations Operations in the Congo, and on this, opinion was divided with Guinea finding herself in accord with the Congolese Prime Minister over the overthrow of the secessionist government of Tshombe. Such undertones of division beneath the seeming unity, coupled with the failure to offer any panacea to the secession testifies to the failure of the conference.

Another conference in which the Congo featured and in which the impending divisions within the ranks of Pan-African movement became further pronounced was convened in Brazzaville, capital of (French) Congo in December 1960 and was a direct consequence of the attainment of independence of the former French west and Equatorial African territories. In a bid to address themselves more freely to African problems, the new group of mainly moderate states, convened a three day "Summit" in Abidjan (capital of Ivory Coast) in which issues affecting the Belgian Congo, Algeria and Manila were discussed. Brazzaville conference del expression Francaise was thus a follow up of this conference. Apart from giving rise to the Brazzaville group, which was later to constitute one of the
major divisions within the Pan African ranks, the conference can be said to have achieved nothing in terms of African unity. Whether it laid the ground for another conference composing the Brazzaille group which was held in Tanarive, Malagasy in March 1961, is far from clear (Tanzania conference is discussed below). It was however a direct instigation of the Casablanca conference of radical states in January 1961.

In the meantime Lumumbas's appeal for Russian aid had been made without consulting president Kasavubu, who, consequently began to distance himself from Lumumbas's schemes. On 5 September 1960, Kasavubu finally dismissed Lumumba, replacing him with Joseph Ileo, the president of the senate. Lumumba in turn dismissed Kasavubu before the two leaders were confirmed back to their respective position with the backing of the African nations. In the process of their struggle, the United Nations seized the radio station at Leopoldville and continued to deny Lumumba its use while Kasavubu managed to get access to the Radio Congo in Brazzaville. The UN action seriously embarrassed Ghana whose troops it was that had actually stopped Lumumba. Ghana, like other African states whose troops were serving under the UN command had for a time found itself in the dilemma of trying to pursue diametrically opposed objectives namely supporting Lumumbas centralist policies, while at the same time committed to the United Nations operations in the Congo. Such a dilemma is clearly depicted by Nkurumah's letter to the Prime Minister:

"I am fed up with the way the United Nations is treating you. But as you may already know, I have taken some steps in the matter. I have asked the United Nations to recognize you as Prime Minister, and head of Government of the Republic of the Congo and have indicated that if it does not do so I shall with draw my troops, who will then join yours, and at the same time I shall appeal to all independent African
states to withdraw their forces and to create a Pan-African High command to assist your troops. We are taking tactical action so that whatever happens, the world will support us. I have asked Mr Djiu and some of my officers to assure you of my personal consideration in this matter and of their readiness to act in your favour as soon as I have given them the sign."59.

The radical states, of which Ghana was one, favoured the United Nations military termination of the Katangese secession. The United Nations, on the other hand refused to engage in actions which may draw it "into the internal affairs of the Congo" (at least for the time being).

The situation was further complicated by Kasavubu's suspension of parliament on the 14 September 1960, followed by Col Mobutu's announcement that he was taking over the Government and his dismissed of both Lumumba and Kasavubu.60 The recognition by the United Nations later on of a Government resting on Kasavubu-Mobutu-Ileo trio caused a big rift between the United Nations and the African Group. Observing the position, a commonwealth correspondent, Mr Colin Legum wrote.

"To acknowledge a Government that did not rest on some recognizable basis of legitimacy would involve the creation of a dangerous precedent in Africa. If African states lent their support to such a precedent it would open the way in future for "colonialists" to help overthrow other legitimate governments and to replace them with "stooge governments" who could then appeal to the United Nations for recognition and support. The only safe course was to proceed from recognition to where the people's mandate lay."61

In the succeeding period, one event followed another. The Ghanaian Ambassador to Congo was thrown out by the Kasavubu trio's government. The clamour for the withdrawal
Hanaian and Guinean troops from the United Nations command was raised. Taking
advantage of the preoccupation of the Central Government of Congo, the United Nations and
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met in January the following year, the release of the members of the legitimate government (including Lumumba) and parliament was mandatory. On 18 January 1961, Lumumba was transferred to prison in Elizabethville where he was later brutally murdered together with his two companions. With Lumumba's death, the polarization of African states became complete. The event has also been considered as one of the most tragic periods in the history of Pan-Africanism. While the Casablanca group promptly announced their unconditional support of the Gizenga regime and increased their harassment of the UN operations, the moderate states, consisting of the Brazzaville group and other non-committed lot came out in favour of the Kasavubu trio regime and expressed their wish for continued UN presence in the Congo to avoid the worst. The latter group also sought to re-integrate Katanga back to Congo peacefully rather than by crushing the Tshombe regime.

The Brazzaville Group, in an attempt to narrow the rift in the Congo and in Africa, convened a Round Table conference in Tanarive, Madagascar, between 5 - 13 March 1961, where they invited all the factions involved in the Congo crises. However, while three of the factions came (Kasavubu, Tshombe and Kalondji), Gizenga's party was conspicuously absent. At Tanarive, the Brazzaville group agreed in principle that the unitary form of government be replaced by a loose federation of mainly sovereign states with Kasavubu as its head. However, Kasavubu, who was a federalist at heart based on his Bakongo ethnic group and ABAKO party, felt uncomfortable with such a federation. At a subsequent conference held at Coquilhatville in April 1961, President Kasavubu was to make himself clear that he would be more comfortable with a federation which conferred certain powers to the central government. The insistence of Mr Tshombe on Tanarive line later led to the break down of the conference with the subsequent arrest of Mr Tshombe, whose release later on was to further deepen the crises.
Meanwhile the Third All African conference held in Cairo in March 1961 castigated the Tanarive Round Table conference and denounced it as a "meeting of Puppets". In its resolution of 23 March 1961, the conference condemned Lumumba's "savage assassination" and proclaimed him "Hero of Africa". It called for the immediate punishment of those responsible for his death, namely Kasavubu, Mobutu, Tshombe, Kalondji and Dag Hammerskjold. Following in the traditions of the Casablanca group, the conference called on all African states to recognise the government of Antoine Gizenga as the only legitimate government of the indivisible republic of the Congo. The UN was accused of serving the rival "puppet government" and was urged to cease its "imperialistic military interventions" in the Congo and "restore peace and order by the normal functioning of Parliament". The African states were urged to "help in every possible means, the brother people of the Congo to continue their struggle for liberation and unification of their territory".

Meanwhile the chances for reconciliation in the Congo still looked uncertain. After failing to obtain Tshombe's cooperation in ending the secession, President Kasavubu soon turned to Gizenga, with whom he opened negotiations culminating in the re-assemblement of parliament under the UN protection in July 1961. On 2 August 1961, a new national government was formed with Cyrille Adoula as Prime Minister and Antoine Gizenga as his Vice-Premier. It was not long, however before Gizenga fell out of favour with Adoula's government and retreated back to Stanleyville where he was later arrested and imprisoned by the central authorities in January 1962. The subsequent struggle between the central government (aided by the United Nations troops) against Mr Tshombe's mercenaries continued up to 14 January 1963 when the mercenaries were beaten and Tshombe decided to end the secession.
In the final analysis, the Congo crises, instigated by the Katanga secession and worsened by the Belgian intervention managed to polarise the Pan-African opinion in a way unprecedented and the number of conferences in which it featured testifies to its importance to Africa as a whole.

Before we conclude this chapter, we must touch on other two incidences which were also of considerable concern to Pan-Africa movement. The first one is the disintegration of the Mali Federation formed on 17 January 1959 and the second, the separate independence of Mauritania in 1960.

2.2.5 The Case of the Mali Federation

The Mali Federation, originally conceived at a conference in Dakar, Senegal, in January 1959, was intended to regroup the Soudan, Dahomey, Senegal and Upper Volta. France, however, had openly opposed the idea and by using unsubtle economic pressures, encouraged Upper Volta and more especially Dahomey to withdraw leaving only Senegal and the Soudan. Although the greatest pressure might have come from Ivory Coast, whose leader Houphouet-Boigney was able to exercise more direct pressure on Upper Volta aside from being a traditional opponent of Leopold Senghor, the French role cannot escape being dubbed as another attempt by a former colonial power to balkanise Africa. After the withdrawal of both Upper Volta and Dahomey, the Mali Federation broke up after only a few months. Thomas Hodgkin and Ruth Schachter have listed the "deep seated" conflict between the policies of the UPS (Union Professiste Senegaliase) and the Union Soudanaise, both ruling parties for Senegal and the Soudan respectively among the reasons for Mali’s failure.

2.2.6 The Mauritanian Question
As regards Mauritanian’s separate independence, there was almost another polarisation within the Pan-African ranks as to whether it should be admitted into the United Nations. While Moroccan historical claims to that state was supported by both the Casablanca group, of which Morocco was a member, and the Soviet Union, which vetoed Mauritania’s attempts to gain admission to the UN, the moderate states maintained that Mauritania had attained her independence through negotiations and were surprised that the Soviet Union, which had earlier recommended that same method would veto Mauritania’s application for membership to the UN. Meanwhile the moderate states, mostly former French West and Equatorial African territories, urged other African states to recognise Mauritania’s independence and at the same time avoid dragging cold war politics into the issue.

The failure of the Casablanca group to recognise Mauritania’s independence for a time was however prompted by their unwillingness to incur the displeasure of their ally, namely Morocco. For while balkanisation could be cited by the Casablanca group, it was far from clear who was the imperialist. Of the three incidences given above, the Congo crises stand out as one single event which managed to draw the most attention within the Pan-African circles. As it were, the Congo crises did not cease completely and was to re-emerge after the OAU’s formation in a different form. It will therefore be discussed further in third subsequent chapter of this study.

2.3 Conclusions

In the foregoing discussion, we have attempted to trace the historical evolution of Pan-Africanism from the late nineteenth century right to the second half of the twentieth century when the OAU came into being. In addition to that, we have attempted to draw a
relationship between the Pan-African thought during this period and the concept of disunity, which in the post independence period, is closely related to the phenomenon of civil wars. On the eve of the Addis Ababa conference which gave birth to the OAU, the concept of disunity acquires a new terminology, namely Balkanisation, which is a phenomena alive today as it was during that period.

The main purpose of this chapter was to throw light on the fact that the selective involvement of OAU in the resolution of African civil wars has got historical precedents. During the colonial period, Europeans were the dominant powers in the African continent and in an attempt to rid themselves of colonialism. Africans adopted the strategy of "unity" so as to counter the former's strategy of "divide and rule". During that period too, Africans became increasingly aware that in unity lies their strength and also that in disunity lies their weakness. This was of course expressed in many a verbal speech by the Pan-African stalwarts during that period. The desire of the European powers to maintain the status quo through the policy of divide and rule did not cease with the advent of independence. Already at the period of decolonisation, many statements by Pan-Africanists pointed to the fact that the colonial powers were not going to let go of their colonial possessions that easily. Thus "balkanisation" of Africa began to be closely associated with colonial puppets.

Although African territories became independent with the determination to promote non-racial states, the major pre-occupation of Pan-Africanist still remained the extermination of colonialism. It is only natural therefore that any attempt by the colonial powers to make a come back, as enshrined in the theory of balkanisation, would meet with stiff African resistance. This resistance would manifest itself in a marked involvement by the continent in general in the issue.
The issue of "Balkanisation" becomes even more touchy, when we consider the fact that African boundaries were drawn arbitrarily, meaning that once a secessionist movement has been endorsed by the continental powers, other secessionist movements elsewhere would have a *locus standi*. The result of this would be chaos in the whole continent, and not only would the ruling African elites be threatened, but the greater threat would constitute the success of the imperialist designs which would in turn threaten the post-independence status quo. In such a state of affairs, the principle of non-interference into the internal affairs of member states would little apply since the affair would be construed to mean that of the whole continent, eg the Congo crises (1960 - 9163). Conversely, such a state of affairs is not likely to be the result if the civil war was only a struggle for power within a consolidated territory.

The above literature has prompted us to draw a number of conclusions. First, during the colonial period the Europeans were the dominant powers in the African continent and through such dominance they were able to derive alot of privileges and wealth at the expense of the African subjects. As such, the European powers had a vested interest in the maintenance of that status quo and the policy of "divide and rule" was the most readily available tool at their disposal. Secondly, Africans were the dominated lot and thus oppressed and exploited. As such they had as their major objective the overthow of the status quo and by preaching unity, both nationally and continentally, African elites hoped to achieve freedom and independence. Thirdly with the advent of decolonisation and final independence, the status quo that was favourable to the colonial powers was shaken and finally overthrown. The new regional status quo, which was characterised by the maintenance of the territorial boundaries, exalted African elites to the dominant position in the continent. However, even though independence had been attained, African elites still
remained wary of the neo-colonialist designs of the colonial powers which were exhibited in the process of balkanisation of Africa. Such a mode of thought has shaped the African attitude towards civil wars, not only in the post-independence but also in the period of decolonisation process, namely during the Congo crises (1960 - 1963).

It is with this in mind that we now proceed to our third chapter to look at the OAU and resolution of civil wars in the period after 1963. The phenomena of civil wars in Africa will be looked at in general. It is hoped that such an overview will sharpen our minds before we embark on the main object of this study, namely the OAU involvement in the resolution of civil war in Somalia, the fourth chapter.
FOOTNOTES


5 Blaise Diagne was a close friend of Georges Clemenceau, the Prime Minister of France. In 1917 when France was faced with a military disaster, Blaise Diagne was appointed the Commissaire-General for West African charged with the duty of recruiting African troops to help stem the German offensive at the battle of Marne in July 1918. See Ibid pp. 119 - 123 for details of Diagne’s contribution to the first Duboisian Pan-African Congress of 1919.


7 During this period, "Contract labour" which is undistinguished from slavery. was still a common feature in most Portuguese African territories. For more information on this, see George Padmore, op. cit., p. 141-2.

8 See V B Thompson, op cit., p. 13.


10 See V B Thompson, op cit., p. 13.

12 WASU, No.2, December 1926, p. 28.
14 Ibid, p. 239.
15 The West Africa Pilot, Lagos, Nigeria, 5 October 1951.
16 Memorandum of WASU in or the West African Pilot, Lagos, Nigeria, 5 October 1941. Also resolutions of a "conference on West Africa problems", London, 29, 30 August, 1941.
17 Memorandum of WASU to the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, 6 April 1942. See also WASU Magazine, Vol 1, May 1943, pp. 7-8. This resolution was reaffirmed at the WASU conference on West African problems held in August, 1942.
18 The Atlantic Charter, Cond 6321, 14 August 1941, HMO London.
20 Memorandum by West African Press Delegation (Among them were Dr. Azikiwe, I.B. Thomas, Mallam Abubaker Iman, T.C. Tackie, R.B. Wuta-Ojei, C.V. Jawett, T.D.J. Thompson, C.W. Downes Thomas representing newspapers in Nigeria, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and Gambia). The memorandum which also dealt with the Post war reconstruction of British colonies and protectorates was submitted on 1 August 1943.
22 These were mainly labour movements form British colonies in Africa and West Indies
23 The New Leaders, 20 October, 1945.

It was a campaign of non-violence and non-cooperation.


The eight independent African states included Ghana, Ethiopia, Liberia, Egypt (The UAR), Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan and Libya.


The Monrovia Group was a result of a Monrovian meeting of 1961 of "Brazzaville" states together with some moderate African states which had no strong commitment to either "Brazzaville" or "Casablanca" group. Among the active members of this group were Senegal, Togo, Nigeria and Liberia.


Ibid, *Speech by Head of Liberian Delegation, J Rudolf Grimes*.

The Press in English Speaking West Africa had already expressed disappointment at the failure of the Lagos Conference to reconcile the Monrovian and the Casablanca groups. The papers consulted were: Ghana: *Daily Graphic* (Accra), *Ashanti Times* (Kumasi); Nigerian Daily: *Daily Times* (Lagos); *Daily Express* (Lagos); *West African Pilot* (Lagos); Twice Weekly *Nigerian Citizen* (Zaria), 22 - 7 January. (various


George Padmore, op cit., pp. 95-96 and 143. This was the fourth Duboisian Pan-African Congress.

The Brussels Neptune, op cit., pp 237.


J. Casely - Hayford, Opening speech at the first session of the National Congress for British West Africa. Accra, 11 March 1920.

Sir Hugh Clifford, Address to the Nigerian Council, 29 December 1920, pp 18 - 23.

The full text shows the strength of the official opposition to the unity idea for West Africa as well as Africa.

For more information on French and British Foreign Policy, see George Padmore, op cit. pp. 186-208.

See Vincent, B. Thompson, op. cit., p. 70


Address to the Royal Institute of International Affairs. London, June 7 1961.


For more information on Belgium Colonial Policy, see George Padmore, op cit, pp. 209-226.


Thirteen States present at Leopoldville were: Congo (Leopoldville), Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Liberia, Morocco, Sudan, Togoland, Tanganyika, Tunisia, the UAR and GPRA (given the status of independent states). Nigeria's exclusion expressed undertones of division since it had been present at the Addis Ababa conference of Independent States in June 1960.

At this time, Morocco, a member of the erstwhile Casablanca group was laying claims on Mauritania and refusing to recognize the latter's independence. The General Assembly of the UN approved the independence of Mauritania in spite of
Morocco's protests, but the recommendations of the Security Council that Mauritania should be a member of the UN was delayed by a Soviet veto


60 It is alleged that Mobutu was discovered as well as supported by the American CIA. See Paul W. Blackstock, The Strategy of Subversion: Manipulating the Politics of Other Nations (Chicago, 1964) p. 290.


62 After the dismissal and subsequent arrest of Lumumba, Antoine Gizenga (his Vice) withdrew to establish a rival government at Stanleyville, which was accorded support by the Casablanca states.

63 The Conference asked the UN to "safeguard" the unity and independence of the Republic of Congo and "preserve its territorial integrity", disarm the "lawless bands" of Mobutu and release the members of the "legitimate" government and parliament, restore the airports and radio stations to the government and reconvene parliament; prevent Belgium from using Rwanda - Urundi as a base to commit aggression". Quoted in J Woronoff, op. cit., p. 61.

64 The ties between Lumumba and AAPO had always been very deep and Lumumba had been a permanent member of the organisation's governing body.


66 The Brazzaville Declaration, December 19, 1960, Quoted in Colin Legum, Pan-Africanism, op cit.
CHAPTER THREE

3 THE OAU AND REGIONAL STATUS QUO IN AFRICA

As African states attained independence, there began to be an increasing feeling among them, and especially the radicals, that Africa should exhibit a distinct personality in international affairs. Such feeling was later fulfilled in their decision to join the non-aligned movement with the object of staying aloof from Cold War politics. The membership in the non-aligned movement of some ardent communist adherents like Cuba slowly began to pose a lot of questions as regards its status vis-a-vis Cold War politics. Nevertheless, Africans have overtime expressed the desire to coordinate their foreign policies with a view to keeping the Cold War outside the continent. Such attempts have been extended even to the United Nations forums as indicated by the formation of Africa group within the UN in order to help coordinate African opinion on major issues. Thus the encroachment of Cold War politics has always been frowned upon by Africans but these have not stopped the Superpowers from seeking allies within the continent.

At the Addis Ababa conference of May 1963, both the issues of balkanisation and non-alignment found expression in Article III of the OAU Charter which has received wide recognition as the bastion of status quo in Africa. In the first part of this chapter, we shall deal with the implication of internal order for the OAU. This will be followed in part two by an assessment of the OAU and civil wars in perspective and then conclusions drawn.

3.1 The OAU and Internal Order

The subject of internal order is considered as a very explosive subject given the arbitrary boundaries which the independent African states inherited from the former colonial powers. This has meant that every African state has got some members of ethnic, religious
or racial group who are related, if not the same as those in the neighbouring African state. As such there has been danger not only of irredentism as is experienced among some Somali nationals in both Kenya and Ethiopia, but also of secession as was experienced in the Zairean province of Katanga in mid-1980s. Both have been unacceptable to the African opinion due to the chain of reactions which may be triggered by a small change in the territorial status quo. The resulting chaos would not only attract imperialism, since the international system like nature, abhors vacuum, but would also be a fertile ground for Cold War politics, that is, before the collapse of the communist block.

An attempt was therefore made at the Addis Ababa conference to shelve the internal domain of the OAU member states from anything that may disturb the territorial status quo inherited from the colonial powers. This was embodied in Article III of the OAU Charter which provides for *inter alia*: sovereign equality of all member states, non-interference in the internal affairs of member states; respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence; peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration; unreserved condemnation in all its forms of political assassinations as well as of subversive activities on the part of any neighbouring state; absolute dedication to the total emancipation of territories which are still dependent and lastly; a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.

3.1.1 The OAU Commission of Meditation, Conciliation and Arbitration and Internal Order

In Article VII, the fourth paragraph of Article III is extended with the naming of the commission of mediation, conciliation and arbitration. In Article XIX, the commission is
formally established by the adoption of a protocol defining its composition, the service conditions of its members and the procedures for settling disputes.

During the commission's first formal meeting in Addis Ababa, in 1968, the disputes over which the commission would have jurisdiction were enumerated by its President, Mr. Justice M.A. Odesanya. These did not include internal disputes. The disputes were to be entirely interstate thus precluding any OAU intervention. Matters related to internal order were, therefore, to be strictly internal affairs of the OAU member states and any attempt at OAU intervention would be considered interference in the internal affairs of member states of the organisation. Even though the OAU as an organ of conflict resolution would be the most competent in resolving civil wars, it had this great barrier which is also reflected in the paragraph two Article III of the OAU charter. Another handicap of the commission's protocol was its legal and technical orientation which precluded disputes with political content, the prevalence in Africa of which prompted African states to seek solutions within the ad hoc committees involving heads of state as opposed to the more judicial commission of mediation, conciliation and arbitration. Indeed attempts were made in vain by the OAU Secretary General to lure the member states to submit their disputes to the commission by blending the commission's judicial standards with political considerations. The main object was to persuade the OAU council of ministers to release funds to cover the operations of the commission.

Towards this end, the Secretary General recommended that the protocol of the commission should be amended so as to retain the member states' political influence on the commission while leaving unchanged the judicial procedures by which the cases would be settled. He further suggested that the Chairman of the Assembly should be among the parties that could refer disputes to the commission (the others were the council and the Assembly).
These recommendations were submitted to the thirty-first ordinary session of the council of ministers in July 1978. The latter in turn decided that delegates should take the proposals home to study and send their comments to the Secretary General who would in turn convene a meeting of legal experts to consider these and then submit an amended protocol to the thirty third ordinary session of the council of ministers for consideration. By the time the council met in its thirty third ordinary session in July 1979, however, not a single member state had submitted such comments to the Secretary General. The latter had nevertheless convened a meeting of legal experts, who met in Addis Ababa in March 1979 and made their own proposal for the amendment of the protocol which reflected a blend of law and politics with a view to facilitating speedy and effective means of settling inter-African disputes. After considering the amendments the council again ruled that the proposal should be referred to the OAU member states for their comments. This was inspite of the sense of urgency which had motivated the fourteenth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State in Libreville in 1977, to resuscitate the commission once again. An earlier attempt was in 1970 when the commission was reconstituted as an ad hoc institution with new members.

Thus by 1980, the commission of mediation, conciliation and arbitration could logically be considered unworkable. A few of the disputing OAU members tried to take their cases to the UN security council but this also was not to the liking of the OAU whose determination to shelve African issues from the Cold War confrontations within the UN was not unknown to its members. Examples abound of cases where inter-African disputes taken to the UN Secretary General and Security Council by one party or another were referred back to the OAU largely due to pressure from the Africa group at the UN. These included the disputes between Burundi and Rwanda, Guinea and Ivory Coast, Angola and Zaire, and Libya and Chad.
Moreover, the view of the OAU that African disputes should be solved by Africans was not opposed to what the UN officials felt about the same issue. In his address to the fourth ordinary session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State, the UN secretary General, U Thant made the position quite clear:

"The Secretary General is not always in a strong position to influence member governments to cooperate with him in resolving such problems. I cannot help feeling that the collective will of the heads of state and heads of government of the OAU could in such cases be brought to bear very effectively on member governments of the OAU in order to influence them to settle their differences in a manner consistent with their obligations as members of the OAU as well as of the UN."4.

The many ad hoc committees appointed by the OAU to handle disputes that arose between its member states were therefore intended to go along way in bringing the collective will of its member governments to bear on the disputing parties. Whether this aim was fulfilled is another matter. For the committees, which varied from good offices to mediation, conciliation or judicial committees, more often than not resorted to deliberations rather than direct mediation. Thus after listening to the disputing parties, the committees would appeal in general terms to the quarrelling parties to respect the relevant OAU principles, namely, the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and its inalienable right to independent existence and the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation and arbitration, principles which precluded the possibility of OAU intervention in cases of internal disorder within its member states. Moreover, such appeals were likely to go unheeded by the disputing parties who would then continue to enforce a military rather than a political solution which was more preferable to the OAU. In other cases, the disputes purely
political, would simply disappear as a result of change of government in one of the disputing countries. As an organ of conflict resolution therefore, the OAU had many short comings, the most notable of which was the failure of its charter to address issues related to internal order which were to prove the most tricky in its future role of conflict resolution. As it was to be observed later, some of the issues which the OAU disregarded as internal affairs were to prove too explosive for it to ignore. Mostly, they would be issues posing a real threat to the regional status quo within the African sub-system.

3.1.2. The OAU Defence Commission and Internal Order

Another major indication that the OAU was meant to be an organ of conflict resolution in Africa was the creation of the Defence Commission under Article XX of the Charter. It held its first ordinary session in Accra from 29 October to 3 November 1963, where Nkrumah made a major attempt to influence it by proposing the creation of an all embracing monolithic military High Command for all Africa, designed to service his continental union. Nkrumah's proposal was, however, rejected by majority of the delegates, not only owing to its unrealistic financial and material cost to the OAU member states, but also due to the fact that such proposals would infringe the national sovereignty of the member states, contrary to the OAU Charter. The commission therefore proceeded to consider four other proposals submitted by the delegations of Ethiopia, Nigeria, Mauritania and Guinea, respectively. Finally Guinea's proposals proved to be the most acceptable and were thus adopted with only minor alterations by the first ordinary session of the Defence Commission as "recommendations on the organisation and functions of the Defence Commission". Among the functions proposed by Guinea with regard to the Defence Commission was the establishment of an emergency force for the maintenance of peace on the recommendations
of the council of ministers in the event of an outbreak of conflict between member states, following the decision of the Heads of State. Even though Guinea's proposal bestowed upon the Defence Commission the duty of conflict resolution, inter-alia, its reference to conflict between member states again precluded the possibility that such an emergency force could be used to restore internal order within the OAU member states. It was Nkrumah, who in his relentless pursuit of his first proposal of the need of African High Command, cited the breakdown of law and order in Zaire, which led the Zaire government to ask for a UN peace keeping force. He further referred to the armed conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia where such an African force could have been used to separate the warring parties.

When the Defense Commission met in its second ordinary session in Freetown, in February 1965, other proposals were heard, among which the most notable one was Sierra Leone's. The latter's delegation gave a more pointed proposal for the creation of an African defense organisation, for the maintenance of peace and security on African continent. It continued to say that such a force, which would remain stationed within the respective countries that had contributed to it at their expense, would be mobilised and used under the auspices of the OAU only at the express request of one or more member states attacked from outside Africa or suffering from serious internal trouble, or in conflict with another OAU member state. Many fears were expressed by the delegates as regards such a continental force namely:

- its possible misuse in maintaining oppressive and unpopular governments in power
- the financing of its operations and
- the security implication that the use of these forces would have for the countries in which they would operate.
The commission wanted these and other problems that the proposals entailed to be studied thoroughly before the final decision would be taken on them. Unfortunately the subsequent sessions, beginning with the third one, of the commission, met with very poor response from the member states that they had to be called off.

In his report to the seventh ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State, in September 1970, the OAU Secretary General, Diallo Telli lamented what he described as Africa's indifference to its own security. Two months after Mr. Telli's reminder, the third ordinary session of the Defence Commission which had been postponed in 1967 was summoned hastily to meet jointly with the seventh extra ordinary session of the council of ministers, in Lagos on 7 December 1970. This was prompted by the landing of Portuguese troops on the beach of Conakry in an attempt to overthrow President Sekou Toure and capture the headquarters of PAIGC. Still little attempt was made towards establishing such a force by African states. Instead, resolutions were passed condemning the Portuguese government and calling on the international community to impose sanctions against Portugal. When in 1975, the Defence Commission was called into an extraordinary session in Kampala to consider what the OAU could do to end the Angolan civil war, all it did was to set up an "OAU Advisory Committee" to advise the OAU Chairman on the military aspects of the Angolan situation. The committee, however, never had time to meet since the Angolan leaders rejected all the OAU offers to help them in their civil war. Even the later attacks by the white minority regimes of Southern African on the bases of liberation movements within the Front Line States, namely Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique and Angola could not help stimulate the Defence Commission into devising ways and means of deterring such attacks. Instead the council's delegates would engage in long and rumbling speeches by which one after another condemned the "racist regimes" (and "their imperialist" allies in Western
Europe and the United States) whose attacks, as if by design, were launched immediately before or during their meeting. On almost all of these occasions, the question of a Pan-African defence force came up again and again with certain delegates calling for serious consideration to be given to its early establishment. Such calls became particularly pervasive during the council's thirty first ordinary session in Khartoum in July 1978 in the wake of Zaire government's use of troops from Morocco and other African countries transported in aircrafts supplied by Belgium and other Western countries. It invoked a long debate which ended in the council's adoption of a resolution which affirmed that every state had "the inalienable right to take any measures it deems necessary to safeguard its sovereignty, freedom and independence and protect its security", but also that "Africa's defence and security are the exclusive responsibility of the Africans". To be able to achieve this, the resolution called for the reactivation of the OAU Defense Commission to consider "the desirability of establishing an inter-African military force under the aegis of the OAU".

The sixth ordinary session of the Defence Commission (extended from 1975 to 1976 and never held) in Addis Ababa in 1979 therefore confirmed the desirability and necessity of an inter-African military force known as "OAU Defence Force" whose role would be to support member states in cases of aggression from outside the continent; to provide peace keeping and observer forces in the event of conflict between OAU member states; to assist liberation movements in their war of independence and; to cooperate with the UN in matters of defence and security affecting OAU member states. The commission further recommended that the force would be governed by the Assembly of Heads of State through a Defence Council of ten member states, which would be elected by the Assembly on a geographical basis for two year term and which would constitute the policy making body. The commission finally recommended that the defense force would be established by a statute.
which would be a protocol of the OAU Charter. The report was submitted by the Secretary General to the thirty third ordinary session of the council of ministers in Monrovia in July 1979. The council, after considering the report, decided that the member states should be given time to reflect on the substance of the document and then communicate their views to the General Secretariat. The council was in turn to receive these so as to enable it to decide whether it could be recommended to the Assembly of the Heads of State. While the council was waiting, the OAU was faced with an urgent practical problem of peace keeping in Chad, which for several years had been plagued by one civil war after another. Following the surprise announcement of a merger between Chad and Libya, adding another dimension to the Chadian crises, the bureau of the OAU standing committee on Chad met in Lome, Togo, in January 1981 and decided to send to Chad as a matter of urgency a peace keeping force composed of troops from Benin, Togo, Congo and Guinea (reasons as to why the OAU had to make such a decision are examined in Part II of this chapter). The deployment of the OAU peace keeping forces into Chad was to be the first instance in which the inter-African force was to be used with the aim of bringing peace and security in Africa and more specifically within an OAU member state. Several instances of internal disorder had in the meantime been ignored by the OAU.

The OAU's propensity to intervene even militarily in some cases of internal disorder while ignoring some could find no better explanation than its desire to maintain the boundaries as inherited from the colonial powers as well as keep the Cold War outside the African continent. This, more than anything else, constituted the new status quo in Africa. It is this newly acquired status quo which was bulwarked by the OAU principles as provided in Article III of the OAU charter.
3.1.3. African International Boundaries and Internal Order

The implications of any attempt to revise the African boundaries as inherited from the colonial powers sent a wave of cold chill down the spine of many African states. The present boundaries separating African states are a product of Berlin Conference of 1884-5 in which the western imperialist powers, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal, partitioned the African continent without any regard to the existing states, homogenous ethnic groups or even families. The ethnic Somalis for example were divided into five different territories (see p. 109). In other areas, the boundaries drawn were incomplete such as that in the Sahara desert between Morocco and Algeria. Accordingly, to Amate (1986), this was a time bomb that was bound to explode when the people responsible for that state of affairs had left the scene. When the question of what to do with the boundaries that had been inherited from the colonial powers was raised at the Addis Ababa conference of 1963, the consensus was that these should be accepted as the international boundaries of the newly independent African states, as any attempt to redraw the boundaries would create confusion and chaos in the continent. The Sierra Leonian Prime Minister suggested that African states should enter into bilateral and multi-lateral agreements with the neighbouring states to define the boundaries between them and deposit these agreements with the Secretary General of the OAU. Whenever agreements could not be reached, he suggested that the commission of mediation, conciliation and arbitration be invited to intervene. According to President Tsiranana of Malagasy, who had no border problems with his island state, in the event of any attempt to alter the boundaries on the basis of racial, religious or linguistic criteria, "a few states would be blotted out of the map". In the view of most radical African states moreover, the resulting "balksanisation" of the continent would provide fertile ground for the imperialists with a possible recolonisation of the continent. In the view of the radical
Nkrumah, the solution of the problem would be to do away with the boundaries altogether so that all Africa could be brought together under one continental government.

There were however two notable dissenting voices to the call of recognition of African boundaries as inherited from the colonisers. President Aden Abdullah Osman of Somalia had already asked that the Somali case be given a special consideration, while Morocco's King Hassan, whose absence in Addis Ababa had been a result of OAU's recognition of Mauritania, signed the charter in September 1963 with the reservation that his country's membership of the OAU did not imply that it was accepting the existing boundaries or that it was renouncing its rights.

These two states immediately plunged the OAU into two of the most explosive disputes that the organisation was to face in its career of conflict resolution.

3.1.4 The Algero-Moroccan Border Dispute and Internal Order

Soon after its independence in July 1962, Algeria fell prey to the Moroccan territorial claims resulting from the boundary between the two states which had been "incompletely" drawn by their former French colonisers. Earlier on in July 1961, Morocco had signed an agreement with the Algerian Provisional Government (GPRA) of Ferhat Abbas in which the latter recognised the territorial problem created by the boundary and also agreed to the possibility of bilateral negotiations between the two governments with a view to solving the problem.

However, with the taking over of Ben Bella's revolutionary government soon after the Algerian independence, the earlier agreement was endangered with Ben Bella refusing even to admit that there was a boundary problem between the two states. While Morocco urged for bilateral negotiations as the best solution to the problem, Algeria was quick at calling for
OAU intervention, the majority of whose members it was aware, favoured the preservation of the status quo. Even though the OAU was able to intervene through the creation of an ad hoc committee at an extraordinary session of the council of ministers in Addis Ababa on 4 November 1963, it was admittedly not in a position to give a lasting solution to the Algero-Moroccan border dispute which had escalated into armed hostilities between the two countries. Such a solution would of course entail nothing short of revision of the boundary between the two parties to the dispute, a move which according to the Algerian Foreign Minister, Bouteflika, was likely to "create a precedent or an unfortunate jurisprudence for the future of many African states". The ad hoc committee nevertheless managed to obtain the two parties' acceptance of a ceasefire as well as the withdrawal of their troops back to the positions they had occupied before the outbreak of hostilities. With the help of the ad hoc commission, the two states continued with the steps towards normalising their relations through exchange of prisoners and property seized during the hostilities and rehabilitation of persons displaced by the conflict. By January 1969, the dispute had been finally settled and a general treaty on cooperation and solidarity as well as on the boundary demarcation was signed between the two states in 1970. Even though the settlement was hailed as a major achievement on the part of the organisation, the dispute remained unresolved and could thus flare up any time depending on the political climate within the two states.

3.1.5. Somali Irredentism and African Regional Status Quo

A similar issue arose in the Horn of Africa shortly after the era of decolonisation of the region. Already the Somalia issue had caused the only unpleasantness at the Addis Ababa conference of 1963 with the Somali President Aden Abdallah Osman pleading the case for the
Somali nation and urging the reunification of the Somali territories. The post-independent Africa saw the Somalia people divided among four entities:

- the Republic of Somalia
- the French territory (Djibouti)
- Ethiopia and
- Kenya.

In the last two cases, the Somalis found themselves in countries dominated by people alien to them and rather than remain in these states, they sought to breakaway and join their brothers in the Somali Republic. The backing of their demands by Somali Republic led to increased tension not only between Somalia and Ethiopia, but also Somalia and Kenya. In particular the Ogaden region between Ethiopia and Somalia, which was inhabited by about one million Somali people, mostly nomads, was a great source of tension between the two governments. Repeated raids by Somali residents of this region later developed into armed hostilities between the two neighbouring states, thus threatening the peace in Africa. This was shortly before an extraordinary session of the OAU was to be held in Dar-es-Salaam, and as such, the council of ministers decided to place the dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia in its agenda. There was no hope of settling the dispute, but at least, the protagonists could be separated and a relative unstable peace restored. The unstable peace was complicated on 25 August 1966 when General de Gaulle’s visit to Djibouti evoked increased clamour for independence in that territory to which De Gaulle responded in the affirmative. The possibility of Djibouti’s independence highlighted the tempo of conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia with each laying claim to the French Somaliland. While the colony had always been the fifth point in the Somali star, Djibouti was also an essential port and the terminus of the Franco-Ethiopian railway that connected Addis Ababa with the sea.
via Dire Dawa. Moreover, despite its name, the countryside of French Somaliland was inhabited by Danakili or Afars who were related to the nearby population of Ethiopia. If the colony chose independence in the impending referendum proposed by President de Gaulle, it would probably be rent into two by the rival tribes and bitterly fought over. The dilemma finally found expression in the council resolution of 6 November 1966 in Addis Ababa, the most cautious stand ever adopted by the organisation regarding decolonisation, which was later approved by the Assembly. Rejecting the Somali (together with some radical states) proposal, urging the population to choose independence, and demanding OAU or UN supervision of the referendum, the organisation merely asked that the referendum be free and impartial and called upon the population "to unite in confronting its destiny." To be sure, the referendum turned out in favour of those who preferred the continuation of looser federation with France to the utter annoyance of Somalia whose Ambassador in Addis Ababa burst out that the OAU was "evading its responsibility out of fear" and had done nothing to help the "freedom fighters in Djibouti".15

Although cessation of hostilities in the dispute was possible, a lasting peace just like in the case of Algero-Moroccan border dispute, could only be attained by a complete redrawal of the map on ethnic lines. Such an undertaking was obviously beyond the reach of the OAU and further more, it could do little so long as the position of its three members Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia were diametrically opposed as the indications were showing. For while Somalia continued to advocate for self determination for the Somalis in Kenya, Ethiopia and even French Somaliland adding that the only equitable long term solution would be a plebiscite to determine their wishes16, neither of Somalia's neighbours found this acceptable. According to Kenya and Ethiopia there was no denying that the inhabitants of the areas in question were Somalis and even a plebiscite would be unacceptable for it would provide a
basis for the ceding of the two territories. Their major worry was where such an amputation would end, not only for Kenya, and Ethiopia but also for the rest of Africa. Moreover, in their view, the principle of self determination did not apply to the independent states of Africa, notwithstanding the fact that it was also highly dangerous. The Kenyan OAU delegate at the extraordinary session of the council of ministers in Dar-es-Salaam in 1964 even went as far as urging that the principle of recognising a state's borders existing at the time of independence be inserted in the charter. In the long run, the council of ministers at Dar-es-Salaam did not try to force the disagreements into the open. Neither did they lay down any general rules on respect of frontiers. Rather, it left the matter to the disputants to patch out their differences as best as they could and suggested "direct negotiations" between each pair of the countries. No attempt was made at finding a permanent solution and no OAU ad hoc committee was established to look into the merits of the case, probably due to their disappointment at the lack of any concrete results in the Algero-Moroccan border dispute. As it were, the Somalia claims were even too explosive to handle.

In the final analysis, every party to the dispute made its own unilateral attempts to contain the situation within its own borders with Kenya launching a more ambitious programme in its Northern Frontier District and Ethiopia doing like wise in its Ogaden region. These were of course enhanced by the conclusion by Ethiopia and Kenya of a mutual defense agreement earlier on (November 1963), which had stimulated discussions on joint action. These also continued.

Following the failure of Dar-es-Salaam meeting to make any headway, the other countries of the Horn of Africa, growing more and more anxious, began to play a more active role in trying to reach an agreement. Such attempts were considerably facilitated by the new Head of State of Somalia, Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, who took power in mid-1967.
The resulting semblance of peace in the region was also obviously a result of the eruption of the Arab-Israeli war in June 1967, which ruled out the earlier backing that Somalia had been receiving from the Arab world. Whatever its motivation, however, towards the end of 1968, calm had returned to the region following direct negotiations between Kenya and Somalia on the one hand, and Ethiopia and Somalia on the other.

That such calm was just temporary was demonstrated by occasional exchange of hostile propaganda and armed clashes along the borders of Ethiopia and Somalia. The issue was not however taken up again by the OAU until 1973, when violent clashes again broke out between the two countries. The tenth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State in Addis Ababa in May 1973 decided to set up an eight nation good offices committee to help the two countries "normalise their relations by helping bring permanent peace". These included Nigeria (Chairman), Cameroon, Liberia, Lesotho, Mauritania, Senegal, Sudan, and Tanzania. These met with the representatives of Somalia and Ethiopia in Algiers in September 1973 and again in Mogadishu in June 1974 during the eleventh ordinary session of the Assembly, and helped a great deal in reducing tension.

By early 1977, tension between the two countries began to increase again with the Ethiopian government accusing Somalia government of sending troops under the guise of Western Somali Liberation Front fighters across the border to attack Ethiopian government buildings and military installations. By the time the fourteenth ordinary session of the Assembly met in Libreville in July 1977, the conflict had dangerously escalated. The Assembly reactivated the good offices committee to deal with the matter. When the latter convened a meeting at ministerial level with the representatives of the warring parties in Libreville from 5 - 8 August 1977, the Somali Foreign Minister insisted that unless the representatives of the Western Somali Liberation Front were invited to participate in the
conference, his delegation would not participate, and he proceeded to walk out, on objection
to this by both the committee and the Ethiopian delegation. Before leaving however, the
Somali Foreign Minister had registered his strong feeling that unless the basic problem,
namely the destiny of the Western Somali people was addressed by the meeting, no useful
purpose would be served by the committee. He further gave as his government's condition
for the settlement of the dispute; the removal of all foreign troops, namely Cuban and
Russian troops, from the area of conflict.

Inspite of the walkout of the Somali delegation, the committee went ahead and listened
to the Ethiopian Foreign Minister and deliberated on how to help resolve the issue. The
Ethiopian Foreign Minister, in his turn blamed what he described as "Somali's expansionist
and annexationist ambitions' for the conflict and went ahead to give his government's
conditions for the settlement of the dispute: Somalia should publicly renounce its claims to
territories in Ethiopia; declare its acceptance of UN and OAU principles of non-interference
in the internal affairs of other states and the inviolability of the territorial integrity of all
states; pledge to respect international agreements and non-use of force in international
relations and; commit itself to pay adequate compensation for war damages in Ethiopia. In
its resolutions the committee simply reaffirmed the earlier OAU resolutions on the issue and
the Charter provisions which call for respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non­
interference in the internal affairs of the OAU member states. The committee further
appealed to the two countries to cease all acts of hostilities and refrain from taking any action
that could be detrimental to the achievement of understanding between the two countries. It
is significant that no reference was made to the Charter principle that advocates the right to
self-determination and independence on which the Somali government based all of its cases.
No wonder, the latter rejected the committee's resolutions. Attempts by the Chairman of the
committee, General Olusegun Obasanjo, to pursue the matter further met with disappointment as both parties to the conflict insisted on fulfilment of their conditions for the settlement of the dispute before they could attend any further meeting of the good offices committee. In the meantime, the increasing involvement of foreign troops in the war provided another source of worry to the committee. When the Assembly met for its fifteenth ordinary session in Khartoum, the Nigerian Head of State, Olusegun Obasanjo, recounted the efforts that his government and the good office committee had made to get the two countries to resolve their differences without success. He further expressed concern about certain developments that threatened to internationalise the conflict and informed the Assembly of the "great efforts" he had made to stop the Western powers from taking the conflict to the UN and to the non-aligned states. During a visit to Washington, the year before, he said, he had sought and obtained assurances from President Jimmy Carter of the United States to refrain from any involvement in the conflict. He had also sent a special envoy to Moscow to seek a similar assurance from President Leonid Breznev of the Soviet Union. In the meantime, despite the failure of the good office to secure a peaceful settlement to the Ethiopian-Somali dispute, the committee would continue with its mediation efforts with a view to finding a just and lasting solution.18

Apart from Moroccan and Somalia's explosive territorial claims, several other states which had not raised the issue at the 1963 Addis Ababa Summit conference soon found themselves quarrelling over where their borders should be. For instance, the dispute between Ghana and Upper Volta which was brought before the third ordinary session of the council of ministers and subsequently before the first ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of state in Cairo in July 1964, was finally settled in the way of direct negotiations between the two
countries on the basis of the statement of the representative of Ghana at the third ordinary session of the council of ministers. The dispute was never brought before the OAU again. There are many other similar disputes which arose in other parts of Africa, some of which were resolved through direct negotiation while others simply disappeared with time. For our present purposes however, the border dispute between Algeria and Morocco on the one hand and that between Ethiopia (and Kenya) and Somalia on the other, serves to clearly demonstrate that even though no specific guidelines were given by the OAU Charter with regard to maintenance of internal order, the subject was a major concern to the organisation in general and the member states in particular. So much so that in cases of severe threat to internal order such as the border disputes cited above, the principle of self-determination (paragraph 6 Article III) was always given a second consideration. The case of Somalia residents in both Kenya and Ethiopia are a clear indication. But a more pointed example is the case of independence of the French Somaliland.

In the second part of this chapter, we shall continue to examine how the OAU’s propensity towards the support of the regional status quo has conditioned its selective involvement in African civil wars over time.

3.2 The OAU and African Civil Wars in Perspective

Given the concern that the African states exhibited towards the Congo crises (1960 - 63), it is ironical that the Addis Ababa conference failed to address the subject of civil wars throughout its sitting. In fact, the Congo crises was not the first instance of civil war in Africa. It was rather the first instance of civil war in which the Pan-African involvement was most expressed.
3.2.1 The OAU and The Sudanese Civil War

The case of Sudanese civil war (1955 - present) is a sharp contrast to the Congo crises given the lack of Pan-African involvement before the Addis Ababa conference of 1963 and lack of OAU involvement since. Sudan is a gigantic country in the Horn of Africa in which the Southern Negroid Christians have engaged the North Muslims in one of the longest guerrilla wars since 1955. The issue of Islamic laws which at present are being applied by the Northern government has pitted the South against the North in the fear that the Southern Christian identity would be jeopardised. In fact, there has been mutual fear of domination between the Northern and the Southern region. While the South advocates for a secular government which guarantees the rights of Muslims, the North advocates for Islamic government which caters for the rights of the Southern Christians. Secession has however not been made a primary goal by the Southerners although given the nature of Sudanese society, there is a big threat.

In 1972, the Numeiri government managed to reach an agreement with the Southerners in which the latter were granted a large measure of autonomy thus ending the long war. Corruption, tribalism and misgovernment which followed however, justified the position held by the Northern advocates of Sharia laws that a separation would not work for the South. Since 1983 however, the Islamic laws have been increasingly applied in Sudan thus reviving the old civil war with more dangers of foreign intervention, namely, Egypt and Uganda but not an OAU one. Traditionally there have been charges between Sudan and Ethiopia that each was harbouring the others rebels, but while that of Eritreans so strained the relations between the two that it was raised by Sudan at the fourteenth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State in Libreville in 1977, the case of the Southern Sudan, never
exploded. Sudan has also pointed fingers at Libya for aiding the rebels but the issue never reached the OAU. There is however a general belief that should the Southern Sudanese's demands advance to the level of complete secession, they would be met by Africa's anti-secessionist instincts, which has become a dogma. In a recent interview in London, the SPLA leader John Garang seemed to suggest that in future election, he would be sure of all the southern votes and those of the Southerners resident in the North. That speech does not appear to be envisaging a separation as for the moment. The Sudanese civil war is at present being resolved within the framework of Inter-governmental Agency for Drought and Development (IGADD). It is difficult to speculate whether it will culminate into a separation or not.

3.2.2 The OAU and Ethiopian Civil War

The Ethiopian civil war on the other hand is rooted in the demands of the Eritreans in Northern Ethiopia for complete independence, which they attained in 1991 after over thirty years of armed struggle. Having been an Italian colony from 1889 - 1941, Eritrea was administered by Britain from then upto 1952 when under a United Nations plan, it became an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia. Ethiopia however never observed the terms of the federated settlement and following its annexation of Eritrea in 1961, the latter engaged in a protracted armed struggle in pursuit of its independence.

Thus while Haile Selassie of Ethiopia was busy helping resolve other African disputes, he had his own problems at home into which he never approved of any interference. In Amate's view, the failure of other African Heads of State to get as much involved into Ethiopian problems is attributable to the influence that Haile Selassie commanded within the continent. Apart from Sudan and Somalia, no other African state had shown as much
sympathy to the Eritrean cause as had been shown by a number of states towards the Biafran secessionists or Christopher Gbenye's rival regime in Kisangani, Zaire.

Before his overthrow in 1974, Emperor Haile Selassie managed to keep the Eritrean question outside the OAU forum. Shortly after his overthrow however, the issue became a source of tension between the Ethiopian government and the government of Sudan. The situation deteriorated so much that at the fourteenth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State in Libreville in 1977, the two countries heaped blames on one another for the estranged relationship. It was in that conference that the Sudanese government made explicit the fact that the root of the problem between the two countries was the Eritrean conflict and that it was not possible to talk of the relations between the two governments without touching on the Eritrean problem. According to the Sudanese government, an attempt by President Numairi towards the end of 1974, to mediate for a peaceful solution of the Eritrean problem had been rebuffed by the Ethiopian government.

The nine nation ad hoc mediation committee, under the Chairmanship of Sierra Leone, created at Libreville to resolve the issue, however, did not attempt to address the Eritrean problem, as a basis for resolving the dispute. Instead it ended up referring to past relevant resolutions, the Charter principles on non-interference in the internal affairs of member states and the convention on African refugees and called for the two government to apply them, especially those dealing with the non-violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states. Another important recommendation of the committee, namely, that the two governments should refrain from bringing foreign powers into their dispute (especially extra-African powers) is a manifestation of the OAU's propensity towards maintenance of the regional status quo (ie power equilibrium) within Africa. Cold war politics is at best an anathema to Africa, the OAU holds.
The improvement of relations between the two countries, however left the Eritrean question untackled. This was inspite of the widespread famine within Ethiopia, to which the civil war was no mean contributor. At the twentieth ordinary session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State in Addis Ababa on 12 November 1983, Colonel Mengistu, the outgoing Chairman received a warming praise from his counterpart, the Zambian President Kaunda, for his "contribution to African development". The Ethiopian civil war, and its attendant famine was completely ignored. According to a special correspondent of the Economist (London) in 1984, the OAU sticks to its anti secessionist doctrine even in cases of Western Sahara and Eritrea, where the insurgents carry legal weight. In the wake of its independence in 1991, the Eritrean Head of State Mr Issias Afwerki was able to lament the OAU's negative contribution towards his country's struggle for independence.

3.2.3. Other Cases of OAU Inaction

The lack of OAU's condemnation of the Burundi massacres of the Hutu in 1964, 1972 and 1988 have also not passed unnoticed. We have already referred to the strong castigation that the OAU received from Burundi students studying in Belgium in 1972. Moreover, the omission of the subject on Burundi massacres by the OAU summit in Rabat, Morocco, with which it coincided, did not pass unnoticed by the Economist of London. Even if the Burundian case were to be exempted as mere reprisals of the government in execution of its duties, it would be difficult to do the same for Uganda which from 1971 to 1979 was ruled under an oppressive military dictatorship of Idi Amin. The evident lack of order which followed after Amin's ouster with the help of Tanzanian troops in 1979 ending only with the assumption of power by President Yoweri Museveni after a long period of guerilla war should have provoked the revival of the debate on OAU peacekeeping force. The only
OAU itself was not blind to the fact that it ignored issues relating to human rights. Hence, the announcement of the idea of African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights by meeting of the OAU's ministers of justice in Brazzaville in 1969. This was also made in force in 1986 after receiving the signatures of majority of OAU member states for having failed to denounced human rights abuses in Uganda over the previous years, thus appearing to breach the OAU's chartered principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of the Charter. However, the OAU has continued to ignore some issues which have human rights abuses in the 1990s, notably in Liberia, Rwanda and Burundi, to mention a few. In sharp contrast to these cases of OAU's lack of intervention, some cases like Nigeria (1967 - 70) and Chad (1983 - 83) provided us with cases characterized by intervention, militarily, diplomatically or otherwise.

OAU and The Congo Crisis

Literally noted in the last chapter how the African case was based proved to be an African solution to the Katangese secession during the Congo crisis (1960 - 64). When UN troops left the Congo (Leopoldville) on 10 June 1964 and only five days later returned to assume the premiership following the resignation of Cyrille
Adoula. The latter could not cope with the growing disaffection which continued to erode the Central Government’s control over the vast country. Even Tshombe came to realise that he could not restore order without the military aid that he was soon to seek from America. The 35,000 man army under General Mobutu were poorly officered, weak and unnerved. And just like in his Katangese days he began to recruit several hundreds of mercenaries as a backbone to the Congolese army. Further more, he reactivated the Katangese gendarmes. The mercenaries were largely recruited from Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa just like in his Katanga days. Again the main rebel group against whom he was now using his mercenaries, with a reasonable degree of success of course, was the group that had belonged to the nationalist leader Patrice Lumumba, who had been assassinated under mysterious circumstances. Other rebels had escaped across the river and established bases in Brazzaville namely, Comite Nationale de Liberation (CNL) headed by Christopher Gbenye. This coupled with the flow of refugees and rebels into the neighbouring states led to deterioration of relations between the Congo (Leopoldville) and its neighbours, especially Congo (Brazzaville) and Burundi. In short the Congo crises in one way or another was an African problem, notwithstanding the fact that it was an internal affair.

To many African leaders, Tshombe was a traitor to the African course and he had earlier on demonstrated this in a number of ways: in leading a rebellion (secession) against a legitimate government of his country, he had recruited mercenaries from countries which were, to say the least, enemies of Africa; further still, he was considered as a stooge of western imperialism who had a vested interest in controlling the mineral resources of Katanga (now Shaba) province. In effect, his return to Congo had been unfortunate to many African states, who did not only condemn him openly but also supported the Lumumba faction which had by now established a rival government in Stanleyville. This group included Congo
(Brazzaville), Tanzania, Uganda, Sudan, Algeria, Egypt, Guinea, Mali and Ghana. Even the moderate African states, which were opposed to an active OAU involvement were in agreement with the radicals on the fact that the OAU should play some role towards solving the Congo crises.

Even though pressure mounted within the OAU for the organisation's involvement in the crises, the OAU's involvement had to wait until such a time as President Kasavubu's cooperation was attained. In this respect, the principle of respect for Congolese sovereignty proved to be a major stumbling bloc.

As soon as Kasavubu himself accepted an OAU solution to the problem, the council of ministers met in Addis Ababa on 5 - 10 September 1964 in an extraordinary session to whom the gravity of the situation was stressed by the Ethiopian Emperor in the following manner:

"It is not only the future of the Congo which is in the balance but in a very real sense that of the entire continent"35.

After a long debate which not only exposed the wide gulf that existed between Tshombe and the OAU member states, but also between the member states themselves, the council adopted a resolution appealing to: the Central Government of Zaire to stop recruitment of mercenaries immediately and expel those already there as soon as possible so as "to facilitate an African solution"; all parties to the conflict to cease hostilities, to pave way for national reconciliation and restoration of order with the help of the OAU; all OAU member states to refrain from any action that might aggravate the situation and all powers that were intervening in the internal affairs of the Congo (Leopoldville) to end their interference36.
Tshombe's interjection that the recruitment of mercenaries could only be stopped and even the present ones dismissed if these were replaced by an African force was dismissed by the radicals as unpatriotic. It was further held by the council that the expulsion of the mercenaries would lead to reduced influx of refugees culminating into improved relations between Congo (Leopoldville) and its neighbours.

However, since normalisation of relations between the disputing countries involved verification of some charges and counter charges, the council decided to send a fact finding and good will mission to the respective countries in response to the latter's invitation.

Inspite of the foregoing resolutions, the Congo crises was to prove longer lasting and the remaining task was to be accomplished by a special commission on the Congo consisting of ten states under the chairmanship of Kenya's Prime Minister (later president) Jomo Kenyatta.

The ad hoc commission's first sitting in Nairobi on 18 September 1964, however, disagreed with Tshombe's uncompromising stance in refusing to sit together with the rebels, and continued to hear the rebels' side of the story even after Tshombe had walked out in protest. This, coupled with the decision by the commission to send goodwill missions to Zaire, Congo (Brazzaville) and Burundi and another mission to Washington DC to desuade the US against giving further military assistance to the Congolese (Leopoldville) Central Government, culminated in Tshombe's decision not to cooperate with the commission. Instead he got his white mercenaries to step up the fight against the rebels in Stanleyville (later Kisangani) whose withdrawal was accompanied by their holding of several Europeans as hostages.

At the request of the US government, Prime Minister, Kenyatta offered his good offices in a meeting at his home town of Gatundu on 23 November 1964. Present were the
US ambassador to Kenya William Atwood, the rebels representative, Thomas Kanza as well as the OAU Secretary General. The meeting was to negotiate the release of hostages. In the process of negotiations, however, the Belgian paratroopers landed in Stanleyville (Kisangani) to rescue the hostages. Naturally, the act was severely condemned by the ad hoc commission which summoned a second meeting immediately on 27 November 1964. Furthermore, the commission drew up a more comprehensive plan for reconciliation in the Congo considering that the initial plan had not been honoured by the Congo (Leopoldville). This included a ceasefire, withdrawal of mercenaries, an end to foreign intervention and a general amnesty. Then under the OAU supervision there would be around table conference of all Congolese leaders and free elections.

To Tshombe the recent acts by the commission did not only constitute flagrant interference in the internal affairs of Zaire, but were also outside the mandate given to the commission. This, coupled with the fact that during its first meeting in Nairobi the commission had listened to the rebels whose views on reconciliation had even been supported by some members of the commission led to great friction between the latter and the Congo (Leopoldville). Already on 23 September 1964, Zaire's President Kasavubu had sent a strongly worded statement to the OAU Secretary General accusing the commission of having:

"called the Congo's independence into question by seeking to prevent the execution of agreement which the Congo, as a sovereign country and in accordance with international law has made with friendly countries."

This was of course in reaction to the commission's attempt to stop the military aid given by the US to Zaire.

When the OAU council of Ministers held its fourth extraordinary session in New York on 16 December 1964, to consider the provisional report of the Ad hoc commission on
Zaire, its decision to extend the commissions mandate; to take up the issue of foreign military intervention to the UN Security Council and; to recommend an African solution to the problem in Zaire was counteracted by Zairean government's appeal to the UN Security Council to convene to discuss what it termed as flagrant intervention in the internal affairs of Zaire by Algeria, Sudan, Ghana, Egypt, China and Soviet Union. Indeed, since Stanleyville crises, the whole radical bloc of the OAU provided some sort of backing to the Zairian rebels with Ben Bella of Algeria immediately pledging "arms and volunteers to aid rebels". As the rebels fled to Sudan, plain loads of weapons began to arrive from Egypt and Algeria which were then flown to Southern Sudan and distributed to the rebel bands. Tshombe was not, therefore, off the mark. Moreover, these allegations were not denied by President Ben Bella of Algeria, who proudly announced that he had kept his promise of aiding the insurgents and that Algeria was thus fulfilling its duty to the Congo and to Africa. The steady supply of arms from Khartoum was only curtailed with the realisation of the Sudanese government that many of the weapons also fell into the hands of its own rebels in the South.

Even East Africa, which had remained relatively quiet during the initial stages of the crisis, (especially since President Kenyatta was the chairman of the Congo Commission) was progressively drawn on the side of the rebels as the latter were forced back towards the Ugandan border. With the war at its border and its territory bombed, the Ugandan Prime Minister, Obote, lashed out against Tshombe and the Americans. On 13 January 1965, the three East African Heads of State: Obote, Kenyatta and Nyerere, respectively met Christopher Gbenye, the leader of the Lumumbist group of rebels, at Mbale, Uganda, where no secret was made of their sympathy for the rebel cause. They even promised support.
Accordingly, as soon as Sudan stopped its shipments, the aid was channelled through Uganda.

As for the moderate states, they were quite opposed to what they termed as radical intervention and instead gave moral support to the "legitimate" government. The moderate stand was clearly expressed at the founding session of the Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM) in Nouakchott Mauritania in February 1965. In that meeting, the OAU's policy of partiality was severely criticised. This partiality they considered, was due to "the lack of respect given to the OAU Charter", particularly the respect for the sovereignty of states and non-interference in their internal affairs. To them, peace could only be restored in the Congo through the Channelling of aid to the legal government.

Even after the renewal of the ad hoc commissions mandate, it could not keep track of the events after the Stanville crisis, which steadily gave rise to polarisation of Africa into rival camps. Such intervention from the radical group as were to make reconciliation even more difficult received not a single condemnation from the Commission. When the UN Security Council convened on 30 December 1994 to consider the requests made by the fourth extra-ordinary session of the OAU Council of Ministers in New York on 16 December 1964 together with Tshombe's protests, it adopted a resolution appealing to all states "to refrain and desist from intervening in the domestic affairs of the Congo" and for cease fire in the Congo in accordance with the resolution of the Organisation of African Unity dated 10 September 1964. It further "encouraged the OAU to pursue its efforts to help the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo to achieve national reconciliation in accordance with the above mentioned resolution of the Organisation of African Unity". According to the resolution moreover, the OAU was to keep the UN Secretary General informed of any action it might take under the OAU resolution. 45
The subsequent events as regards the Congo crisis, however, did not tally with the Security Council resolution. The gap existing between the Congo Commission and Tshombe on the one hand and between the radicals and the moderates on the other, continued to widen. So far, the commissions' appeal for reconciliation had been largely unheeded and the mercenaries were still in Zaire. At the ad hoc Commission's third meeting in Nairobi on 29-30 January 1965, a sub-committee consisting of Guinea, Ghana and Nigeria was formed to visit the three countries most affected by the crisis, namely; Congo (Brazzavile), Zaire and Burundi. Further more, the Chairman of the ad hoc commission President Kenyatta informed the commission of the meeting that he and other two leaders of East Africa, namely Uganda and Tanzania, had had with Christopher Gbenye, the leader of the rebel regime. However, apart from taking great exception to the meeting between the three East African leaders and Gbenye, Tshombe also rejected the commission's sub-committee, two of whose members (Ghana and Guinea) could not be impartial given their role (together with other members of the ad hoc Commission) in aiding the rebels with weapons. In those circumstances, cooperation between Tshombe's government and the Commission was still an illusion, inspite of the Security Council resolution. Sensing failure in its attempts at reconciliation, the Commission ended up only drawing an official report and recommendations to be submitted to the next meeting of the Council of Ministers to be held in February 1965.

The rift between the supporters of the legal government of Zaire and that of the supporters of the nationalists was already so wide that before the Council opened, rumours were in the air that the OCAM states or radical states would boycott the meeting. Nevertheless, the council met in one of the most bitter confrontations between Prime Minister Tshombe, on the one hand and the radical members of the OAU together with the Commission on the other. During the meeting, two resolutions were proposed by Cameroon
and Ethiopia and rejected. As a result, no decision was taken on the issue for the moment so as to avoid a split in the organisation and the issue was deferred to the Assembly of Heads of State a half a year later.

The OAU played no further role in the Congo and the final decision was a military one, namely, the defeat of the rebels by the government forces. As early as December 1964, Prime Minister Tshombe felt that the revolt had been dismantled and by June 1965, he claimed that the rebellion had been crushed for good. Neither did the resolutions both by the UN and the OAU, stop the intervention from the radicals, which only ceased after the rebel front collapsed.

Moise Tshombe seemed to be the winner all around, as was indicated even by the position of strength obtained by his Conakat party in March and April elections. He was well on his way towards national reconciliation on his own terms when on 13 October 1965, President Kasavubu dismissed him and offered to expel the mercenaries and seek reconciliation with the neighbouring countries. Following this, the Congolese question was dropped from the OAU agenda. Shortly afterwards, on 25 November 1965, Mobutu once again assumed power in a bloodless coup d'état and installed himself as the new President of Zaire. Mobutu, continued to adopt a hard line in which he manifested Zaire's independence from its former backers, especially Belgium.

Another subsequent event in Zaire which caught the attention of most OAU member states was the revolt on 5 July 1967 by the mercenaries and other Zairean soldiers still loyal to Tshombe against the central government shortly after Tshombe was kidnapped and flown to Algeria. The rebellion, which set off in Kisangani and Bukavu took a political turn as a rebel "government of Public Safety" was set up under Colonel Leonard Monga, a close associate of Tshombe. "The Zairean army in turn besieged Bukavu for almost two months
and by the time the fourth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State was held in Kinshasa, Zaire, in September 1967, the rebels were still holding out.

At the meeting, it was unanimously agreed that "the existence of the mercenaries constitutes a threat to the security of the member states". Furthermore, the racial conflict and hatred generated by the presence of the mercenaries who were largely white in Africa, was not overlooked by the assembly. In a resolution condemning the aggression of the mercenaries and demanding their immediate departure, the Assembly added that if they did not leave, all OAU member states should "lend their whole hearted support and every assistance in their power to the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo". The United Nations was called upon to take action to eradicate the practice and the states of the world were called upon to make the recruitment and training of mercenaries in their territories a "punishable crime", and to deter their citizens from enlisting as mercenaries.

Further more, a ten-nation ad hoc commission was created under the Chairmanship of President Ismael El-Azhari of Sudan to take all steps necessary for the evacuation of the mercenaries in co-operation of the Chairman of the Assembly, President Mobutu and the OAU Secretary General.

After fierce fighting between the mercenaries and the Zairean government in late October and early November, the mercenaries retreated into Rwanda on 5 November 1967, where they were detained by the Rwandese government after being disarmed. For a time, the mercenaries caused a friction between the Zairean government and Rwanda as Rwanda refused to accept some of the demands made by the ad hoc commission during its first meeting on 5 to 18 November 1967. These were to the effect that the Rwandese government should detain the mercenaries "under the exclusive political authority and the exclusive control of the OAU ad hoc committee" until such time as a just and equitable compensation,
to be suggested by a five nation sub-committee, had been paid to the Zairean government for material damage and wrongs of all kinds inflicted on the government and the people of Zaire by the mercenaries themselves or by the states or organisations to which they claim to belong. The Rwandese government objected to these demands, not only because they were not in accord with the mandate given to the ad hoc committee by the Assembly, but also because they constituted an infringement on its domestic jurisdiction. It was on the same grounds that the Rwandese government rejected demands by the Zairean government to hand over the mercenaries to it for trial. The result was the severing of diplomatic relations between Zaire and Rwanda on 11 January 1968.

In March 1968, the two states finally reached an agreement, with the help of the Chairman of the ad hoc committee, to allow the mercenaries to return to their homes with the help of the International Red Cross on condition that their respective countries promised never to allow them to return to Africa. Following this agreement, the diplomatic relations between Zaire and Rwanda was restored.

The OAU intervention in the Zairean civil war has presented us with a situation where the organisation is obstinately fighting to maintain, if not restore, the regional status quo. Even if Tshombe came back from exile to lead the Zairean Central Government with a broad programme of reconciliation, he had already lost his credibility within the African nationalist circles and was increasingly categorised in the same group with other agents of imperialism. The fact that he again resorted to the old, abhorred mercenaries did not in the least improve his image. The more reason being that they were largely recruited from the racist, white minority regimes from southern Africa. The pattern of OAU involvement in the Zairean civil war was underlined by the polarisation of African opinion either on the side of or in opposition to either of the parties to the conflict, and at the peak of its involvement the OAU
was almost torn apart. What made the Congo crises more of an African problem in comparison to either Uganda or Sudan was not only the fact of disintegration which was symbolised by Tshombe. Geographically, according to Aluko (1981), Zaire occupies the largest area of Africa of over one million square miles with common boundaries with eight other African countries. In addition it is immensely endowed with mineral resources, some of which are strategic hence likely to attract the attention of the superpowers, namely uranium, copper, cobalt, diamond, zinc, sulphur, manganese and gold. The involvement of the super powers, which was already apparent in the Congo, if we go by Tshombe's allegations to the security council would mean internationalisation of the conflict. The move by the fourth extraordinary session of the council of ministers in New York in 1964 to take up the issue to the OAU security council was not only aimed at the Stanleyville crisis, but also to China and Soviet Union both of which were implicated in the act of intervention by Tshombe. Zaire was indeed, in the words of Kenya Times of London, an "African heartland" and no African nation could ignore it.

3.2.5. The OAU and the Nigerian Civil War

The OAU intervention in Nigeria provides an entirely different course of action. Having inherited from the former British colonies an artificial unity embodied in a rather loose federation of largely autonomous tribes in separate regions, the tendency towards disintegration grew much stronger with time culminating in a civil war between May 1967 and 1970. The declaration by Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu of the Biafran state in the former Eastern Region of Nigeria was immediately countered by the Nigerian Head of State Colonel Yakubu Gowon's mobilisation of the rest of Nigerian armed forces still loyal to the federal government and by his warning to all African states against Biafran recognition. On 6 July
1967, fighting broke out between the Federal Government and Biafra. Although several African states expressed concern in one way or another, with Lesotho in particular suggesting that the issue be brought before the OAU to prevent the situation from degenerating into a civil war, the Nigerian government kept on denying that there was any civil war and that whatever was happening in Nigeria was purely an internal affair. The apparent expansion of Biafra westwards, following its victory in mid west, however, prompted the Nigerian Head of State, General Gowon, to change his strategy from "police action" to "total war" in which he began receiving British weapons for the ground forces followed by Soviet aircrafts.

Biafra seems to have been expecting the sympathy of progressive circles including Guinea and Algeria. But as the fighting continued, however, it began to appear like a tribal feud and thus lost its ideological touch. In the view of Woronoff (1970), the very fact that Biafra had chosen secession rather than convert the whole country into its view was an inhibiting factor, for secession, more than revolution, frightened the African states having as they did their own dangers of tribalism and separatism. It was therefore natural that the African states, both moderate and radical, would come unanimously against the threat. Although many African states expressed their concern over the unfolding events, it was only Egypt (UAR) and Sudan which acted and the latter’s strong position can be closely connected to secessionist tendencies within its own borders. The two sold to the Federal Government of Nigeria a number of their aircrafts, including bombers, and Egyptians came to pilot the Soviet fighters and bombers used by Nigeria.

Meanwhile the growing desires among African leaders for reconciliation soon began to give in to pressures for action by the Organisation of African Unity following the arrival of Soviet military supplies accompanied by increased destruction. The escalation of the conflict was making it more than ever, an African affair. It was nevertheless far from easy
persuading the Nigerian state to have the matter discussed at the OAU for it continued to insist that the matter was internal. Finally, Nigeria was prevailed upon by the other OAU members, the same ones that had been pressing for reconciliation, and the matter was discussed at the fourth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State in Kinshasa from 10 - 14 September 1967. In the ensuing resolution the Assembly set up a consultative committee consisting of six Heads of State with Emperor Haile Selassie as Chairman. The others were President Ankrah of Ghana, President Tubman of Liberia, President Mobutu of Zaire, President Ahidjo of Cameroon, and President Hamani Diori of Niger. The committee was charged with the responsibility of going to the Head of the Federal Government of Nigeria to assure him of the Assembly's desire for the territorial integrity, unity and peace of Nigeria. In the same resolution the Assembly reaffirmed its adherence to the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, its condemnation of secession in any member states, its recognition of the "situation as an internal affair, the solution of which is the primary responsibility of the Nigerians themselves", and its desire to explore the possibility of placing the services of the Assembly at the disposal of the Federal Government of Nigeria.

At its first meeting in Lagos in November 1967, the consultative committee, with the agreement of the Nigerian Head of State, assigned the task of establishing contact with Odumegwu Ojukwu to General Joseph Ankrah of Ghana, with the object of conveying to him the text of the Assembly's resolution and obtaining his reaction. However, before General Ankrah succeeded in contacting Ojukwu in July 1968, the latter had already denounced the Kinshasha resolutions which were obviously not in his favour. He alternatively opted for the mediation of the English speaking Commonwealth Secretariat under whose auspices the secessionist and the Federal Government were to commence negotiations in May 1968, in
Kampala. The commonwealth negotiations, however, ended in failure as both sides were not ready to compromise.

Meanwhile as the war intensified, Biafra grew smaller but did not collapse. There were major stalemates during which the federal army intensified the war against Biafra with the aim of pushing it to surrender. In the process, atrocities were committed by the Federal Government which attracted the displeasure of world opinion. These were compounded with hunger and talk of genocide. Biafra had never grown enough food and blockade by the Federal Government prevented imports. The longer the bloodshed went on, the more obvious it became that the Biafrans could not coexist with the other people of Nigeria. Moreover, the sacrifice which the Biafrans had undergone since the war began to convince some African states and governments of their will to independence. As a result, some influential circles in Black Africa began to show disapproval of the prolonged war while at the same time supporting the Biafran cause. This group of radicals, including Tanzania and Zambia began to feel that the Biafran case was one of genuine effort to self-determination and not one which like Katanga in Zaire, would make off with oil revenues of Nigeria. The moderates, on the other hand, especially those along the Coast, openly disapproved of destruction and death.

In view of the above, Tanzania, on 13 April 1968, finally became the first country in the world to recognise Biafra as "an independent sovereign entity", while at the same time recognising that this was a setback to African unity. It however made it clear that a refusal to recognise Biafra would have meant tacit support for the war against the people of the Eastern Region in the name of unity. The recognition was, however, condemned by the Nigerian Federal Government which regarded it as a declaration of war amounting to complete severance of relations. Luckily, the recognition did not trigger off a chain reaction and
many of the other leaders disapproved of the action, including Hamani Diori of Niger whose country had a common frontier with Nigeria both sides of which was inhabited by Hausa’s; Madibo Keita of Mali who warned that the secession was a very serious precedent for political unity of every country; President Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal who, ruling out recognition, lamented the conflict and urged for a rapid conclusion. Even Somalia despite its own demands for self-determination leaned on the side of the Federal Government. Other backers of Lagos were Chad, Upper Volta, Sudan and Egypt, the latter two giving active support. Chad’s support was obviously related to its internal disturbances back home. As one moved south, however, only Cameroon, after its own civil war, and situated next to Biafra, they were seriously disapproved of the secession. The rest, including Kenya, Zambia, Togo, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Gambia expressed some solidarity with Biafra while more or less critical of the bloodshed.

Tanzania’s recognition of Biafra paved the way for that of three other states, namely Gabon on 8 May 1968, Ivory Coast on 14 May 1968 and Zambia on 20 May 1968. The latter’s Foreign Minister of Zambia, Rouba Kamanga, explained that his country was “horrified at the massacre of innocent citizens. The heritage of bitterness stemming from this horrifying war will make it impossible to create any basis of political unity of Biafra and Nigeria”\(^{37}\). In the view of the four states which joined in the recognition, unity however precious, could not be imposed on people. Neither should it entail destruction of the people. Needless to say, all the four states had their diplomatic relations with Nigeria broken.

Shortly after the failure of the commonwealth negotiations, Emperor Haile Selassie convened a second OAU consultative meeting on 15 - 19 July 1968 in Niamey. The Niamey meeting which succeeded in persuading the two parties to the Nigerian conflict to start preliminary talks under the chairmanship of Hamani Diori of Niger from 20 - 26 July 1968,
paved the way for the Addis Ababa talks of 5 August 1968 under the auspices of OAU which agreed in principle on the creation of air and land ‘mercy corridors’ for the transportation of relief supplies to the civilian victims of the war. There was however no agreement as to how or where the mercy corridors were to be established. Neither was there agreement on any other issue for all the five weeks that the negotiations took. Just as in Naimey talks, and Kampala before it, the two parties to the conflict held mutually incompatible views. While the Nigerian Federal Government insisted that no peace could be worked out outside one Nigeria, Colonel Ojukwu took the stand that no agreement which precluded an independent sovereign Biafra was possible. His conclusion was:

"Our survival cannot be separated from the sovereign independence of other states. No one who has studied the past contribution of our people to the cause of African freedom and unity can doubt our awareness of the need of the whole of Africa to unite. Nevertheless, we have learnt by bitter experience that unity must come in stages through cooperation and mutual understanding in fulfilment of that purpose we offer to discuss with Nigeria the closest form of Association which does not detract from our right to ensure security at home and abroad."58

The head of Nigerian delegation, Chief Enahoro, called the speech provocative and after an exchange of words Ojukwu left Addis Ababa. The talks however continued, during which the Nigerian delegation presented its terms of settlement which presupposed the renunciation of secession59. The Biafrans were not interested in the terms for their re-admission into the federation. Rather they wished to maintain their sovereignty. When asked by the Emperor of Ethiopia to outline their "minimum requirements" for security, they were, according to one Dr Eni Njoku of Biafran Delegation: Biafran control of its own army and police; the right to an international personality and membership in international organisations
and power to conclude international economic agreements and manage its own resources, industries and economic development. The only concessions were for maximum economic cooperation and services with Nigeria.

In the meantime Nigeria continued to gain grounds in the field and its commanders wanted another few weeks to end the war. At the same time France had also suggested that the conflict be settled on the basis of self-determination of the "Biafran people," thus instilling more hope in the secessionist leaders and increasing African anxieties. Attempts to have Nigeria cease hostilities failed and on 17 August 1968, the Federal army received orders for the final offensive. Sensing failure, the Emperor turned to the only item on which some agreement could be attained, the initiation of relief operations.

The failure of Addis Ababa talks coincided with Nigeria's final offensive. The Biafran territory had been reduced to only a fifth of its original size. Attempts by humanitarian organisations to get food and medicine to the Biafrans failed as their flights were banned and transport planes fired at. Talks of genocide persisted more than ever. These were later disapproved by six observers from Canada, Poland, Sweden, Great Britain, the United Nations and the OAU who came at the invitation of the government of Nigeria. It was in this mood that the Assembly met in its fifth ordinary session in Algiers in September 1968.

The break in the OAU ranks following the recognition of Biafra by some African states came to a head in Algiers with the host, President Boumedienne, accusing the recognising countries of fronting for the imperialists. He went further to make a comparison between the Katangese secession and the Biafran secession observing that the states and organisations that supported Katanga were now aiding the Biafran secessionists. He
maintained that the only means of putting an end to the Nigerian crisis was the restoration of unity which was being prevented by such recognitions.

It is true that the Ibo's of Eastern Nigeria were the most progressive people in Nigeria and would have expected to obtain assistance from other progressive states like the Soviet Union. Instead, the Soviets opted to side with the more powerful and larger Nigerian Federal Government to which it continued to lend assistance while at the same time waging a propaganda war against the imperialist designs of Biafra. Obviously such a move caused a major concern in other quarters and especially Washington which had categorically stated that it recognised Lagos as the only legal government in Nigeria while denying having at any time "encouraged, supported or otherwise been involved in the secessionist movement". It thus issued a statement expressing regret as regards the Soviet conduct. Moscow had thus injected an "element of Great Power competition in the internal affairs of friendly state". In fact, according to Woronoff, Nigeria was saved from the Cold War. In a way it was the scene of what Radio Biafra called the "British - Soviet conspiracy". Britain had responded to Lagos' appeal for arms by sending a "small quantity" of "defensive" arms, mainly anti-aircraft guns. The fact that Biafran aid was mainly coming from Portugal which permitted or promoted an operation that used its African possessions could have prompted Boumedienne's accusations. There was also some danger of mercenaries as former Katanga and foreign legion types came to Biafra in defiance of Colonel Mike Hoare's (an old Congo hand) warning that the position was hopeless.

Whether true or not, Boumediene's allegation did not amuse President Kaunda of Zambia who left Algiers after the debate on Nigeria. In the process of the debate, however, all the four countries which had recognised Biafra explained why they had done so. Nigeria also described the underlying reasons for the civil war, which according to Chief Awolowo,
were tribal more than anything else. Although he regretted the war, Chief Awolowo insisted that the rebellion had to be crushed. In his opinion, all the suffering could be brought to an end if Biafra surrendered.

In its resolution on the Nigerian issue, the Assembly appealed to the secessionist leaders to cooperate with the Federal authorities in order to restore the peace and unity of Nigeria "and to all OAU and UN member states to refrain from any action detrimental to peace, unity and territorial integrity of Nigeria". It also called for a ceasefire to be followed by a declaration of a general amnesty by the Nigerian government and its cooperation with OAU "in ensuring the physical security of all the people of Nigeria alike until mutual confidence is restored". The Assembly was also addressed by the UN Secretary General in whose speech the OAU efforts at resolving the Nigerian crisis were endorsed. In his address to the Sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly, the UN Secretary General reaffirmed his endorsement of the OAU efforts.

Attempts by the Chairman and other members of the consultative committee to get the two parties to accept a ceasefire between the fifth and sixth ordinary session of the Assembly met with failure. At the sixth ordinary session, the committee submitted its report to the Assembly and received a new mandate to continue offering its good offices. In its final resolutions the Assembly laid emphasis on the overriding interest of Africa namely, the Nigeria unity. This very presupposition of Nigeria unity precluded Biafra cooperation for the stand Biafra took entailed total independence. In its adoption of such resolutions the OAU was simply paving way for a military solution which was not far off.

A more ambitious attempt by Emperor Haile Selassie to bring the two parties together at a negotiating table without preconditions, that is unity on the part of Nigeria and independence on the part of Biafra, met with last minute disappointment when Biafran
delegation announced on the eve of its departure that its participation in the negotiations would exclude the good offices of the OAU consultative committee. Following this announcement the Nigerian delegation never turned up and the Biafran delegation left on 18 December 1969 after waiting for two days for the former. Two weeks later the issue resolved itself with the flight of Ojukwu and his replacement by Colonel Philip Efiong who negotiated a surrender. On 15 January 1970, Efiong signed the act of surrender ending the Biafran secession which was immediately followed by the government announcement of cessation of hostilities. Following mediation efforts of the Ethiopian Emperor between Nigeria and the four countries that had recognised Biafra, diplomatic relations were resumed. And in the view of Dialo Telli, "Africa had achieved one of its greatest victories".  

While in the Congo crises (1963 - 67) the OAU was reacting against the symbols of secession and imperialism namely, Tshombe, in the Nigerian case the reaction was against secession itself and imperialism.

3.2.6. The OAU and The Civil War in Chad

The Chad civil war which commenced with the formation of a common front, FROLINAT69, in 1965 by the northern rebels with the aim of fighting the southern government of Francis Tombalbaye provides us with a unique case of OAU intervention in that it entailed military involvement of the OAU peacekeeping troops besides diplomatic and other involvements. More over it did not only threaten the territorial status quo but also geopolitical. The independent Chad inherited from the French a geographically diversified country with the Christian south being more affluent than the moslem north. Tombalbaye's government which assumed power at independence never bothered to address the issue and hence the increasing disaffection of the north. The Chadian situation grew more fragile with
the mutiny of the military units in Tibetsi district bordering Libya thus prompting Tombalbaye to call in French troops for the restoration of order. Tombalbaye's oppressive rule drove several south based politicians into exile in Sudan from where they organised their incursions into the country. This gave rise to strained relations between the two countries over which President Hamani Diori of Niger tried to mediate without success. Inspite of the presence of some 3,000 French troops and inspite of President Diori's good offices, President Tombalaye was toppled and killed in April 1975 by his Southern military officers and Colonel Malloum assumed presidency. Malloum also never made any effort to bridge the North - South gap and hence the continuation of the fight by FROLINA with Libyan backing. Libyan adventures in Chad which can be traced back to the early 1960s have been frowned upon by many African states. According to an American report in the early 80s, 45 countries had suffered from Libyan meddling, including Sudan in 1976 abortive coup against President Numeri, Uganda in 1979 in an attempt to rescue the Amin Regime and Egypt.

In 1975, Libya had unilaterally annexed the uranium rich Aozou strip between its border with Chad. The earlier attempts by the neighbouring countries to bring the Chadian factions together and form a government of National unity were a reflection of their desire to see a strong Central Government in Chad which could recover the Aozou strip from Libya. Such attempts were made by President Jaafar Numeiri resulting in the Khartoum Agreement of August 1978 in which General Malloum remained the President while Hissene Habre, a leader of the Chadian faction of FROLINAT became Prime Minister. The new government, however, broke up following Habre's accusations against Malloum of discrimination and injustice against the Northern people. Another such attempt was made by Nigeria when it invited five countries sharing common boundaries with Chad together with an OAU representative to meet with four representatives of Chadian parties in Kano, in March 1979.
The meeting gave rise to the first Kano accord in which the leaders of the four parties agreed to a ceasefire throughout Chad, and an independent Commission to monitor and ensure the implementation and observance of the ceasefire, an effective peace keeping force to be provided by Nigeria, a general amnesty for all political prisoners, the dissolution of the existing armed forces, the replacement of the government of national unity by an integrated national armed forces command structure and a transitional national union government. The meeting was followed in April 1979 by another one also in Kano, for the purpose of working out the details of the agreement and the practical measures to be taken towards its implementation. In that meeting, a fact finding mission was set up to go to Chad and verify the relative strength of the four parties and other parties and factions wishing to be signatories to the Kano accord. Following this, the Nigerian Government convened another conference in Lagos in August 1979 attended by as many as eleven Chadian factions. The meeting gave rise to Lagos Accord according to which agreement was reached on the formation of the transitional government of national unity or GUNT in France. Malloum according to this accord was to be replaced by Goukouni Weddeye and Kamougue was to be the Vice President. After eighteen months, during which the terms of Kano accord would be observed, a constitutional committee would be set up to draft a constitution and hold a referendum and an election to bring about a popularly elected government. Under this accord, all the neighbouring states were to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of Chad and from doing anything that would influence developments in the country. It was signed by all the participating countries and Chadian factions and the transitional government of national unity was duly inaugurated on 11 November 1979. Habre was the Defence Minister while Ahmat Acyl was the leader of the Joint Armed Forces (FAC).
In mid-March, fighting broke out again between Habre's faction and other factions constituting GUNT. This was owing to intensified power struggle within the GUNT. Having been instructed not to use force in restoring peace, the Nigerian troops found themselves in a helpless situation and was soon withdrawn.

The situation in Chad was brought before the seventeenth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State in Freetown in July 1980. The architects of the Lagos Accord were commended and a standing committee under the Nigerian Chairmanship with the purpose of getting the Chadian leaders to cease fighting and implement the Lagos Accord, formed.

Fighting continued however, until Goukouni drove Habre's forces away in Mid December 1980. This was done with the help of Libyan forces. Immediately after, on 24 December 1980, the OAU standing committee on Chad convened a meeting and issued a communique reaffirming the Lagos Accord as the only basis of achieving peace and security in Chad. It called on all Chadian leaders to abide by the Accord. This was followed by a joint communique reporting a merger between Goukouni's government and Qaddafi's government in Libya. This evoked an emergency meeting of the bureau of the OAU standing committee on 14 January 1981 in Lome where the reported merger was condemned. The merger did not only evoke a sharp reaction from Africa, but also from the international circles the most notable being France. France always retained some close links with its former colonies after independence. In the first place, France was infuriated with Libya's annexation of Aozou strip which is believed to be rich in uranium. French forces had just been removed from Chad the year before under pressure that their presence in Chad would be objected to by the African leaders. The merger moreover, unnerved such French allies as Niger, Mali, the Central African Republic and Cameroon which were all too close to Chad.
All these regarded France as their guardian of stability and together with others, began to clamour for French military move to stop Colonel Gaddafi.

As a first reaction therefore France decided to send several hundreds of troops to a base in Central African Republic near the Chad border in the hope of restoring its credibility in the eyes of its African friends. These were to reinforce some 7,000 troops based in Africa (including 4,000 in Djibouti). President d'Estaing had earlier blocked a handsome oil deal with Libya, the award of which Libya chose to announce almost at the same time as the merger was proclaimed. Besides stopping the oil deal, France issued a very strong warning to Libya condemning the merger as invalid. "The project unmasks ambitions which constitute a threat to Africa's security", the statement said. In addition France pledged military support towards any African state which feared for its security. Even Sudan which though bordering Chad, has no intimate ties with France, was visited by a French military mission.

Even the United States which had hitherto shied away from any active policy on Chad reacted sharply. The US reaction was obviously motivated by the possibility that Russia might profit from Libya's expansion. Mr Alexander Haig, President Reagans' unconfirmed Secretary of State called the merger scandalous.

The Southern Chad, inhabited by 60% of non-Muslims already described the merger as "an impossible marriage". In the meantime, the Lome meeting called upon foreign powers to withdraw their forces from Chad while at the same time condemning the merger. It also decided to send an OAU peacekeeping force to Chad composed of troops from Benin, Togo, Congo and Guinea. It gave mandate to the OAU Secretary General to organise a free and fair elections by the end of April 1981. The OAU peace keeping operations in Chad
however, were a dismal failure and had to be recalled back without achieving its assigned
tasks.

To many neighbours of Chad, Libya's ventures in that country was the first stage in
Qaddafi's quest for a "United States of Sahara". Apart from the Nigerian and Niger's
attempt to unite the factions by forming a coalition government, other neighbouring states,
namely Egypt and Sudan, simply armed the factions in Chad which were opposed to Libyan
ambition. All these actions, as were the attempts by both Nigeria and Niger, were aimed at
regaining the former status quo, that is, before the Libyan occupation of the Aozou strip.

Six months after Libyan forces were replaced by the OAU peace keeping forces,
Habre's forces entered N'djamena and ousted Mr Weddeye. The 5,000 OAU peacekeepers
could do nothing to stop Mr Habre since they had not been instructed to protect Mr
Weddeye's government. In the view of most Africans, moreover, Mr Weddeye had been
unable to form a successful government of national reconciliation after being installed for that
purpose in 1979 by the OAU. In the western eyes, Weddeye was associated with Qaddafi, a
Soviet ally. Mr Habre, on the other hand, had the virtue in the western eyes of being
Qaddafi's enemy. Earlier on, in the spring of 1982, France had provided logistic support to
Mr Weddeye's government against Mr Habre\textsuperscript{74}. As the latter ousted Mr Weddeye, the
French policy increasingly changed from supporting Mr Weddeye to Mr Habre. This is
more so because after his ouster, Weddeye began fighting his way back to power moving as
far south as Faya-Largeau before French troops arrived in August 1983 to impose a ceasefire.
The OAU had not been able to do anything to prevent Libyan aggression of Chad. Even
Chad's appeals to the UN Security Council were fruitless. The latter's paralysis was
understandable given the fact that the Soviet Union could have vetoed any move by the UN
Security Council that challenged the Libyan aggression. In fact the Soviet Union had been quick to denounce France's actions, while keeping silent on Libya's.

As regards the OAU inaction, the friendship between Colonel Mengistu, the OAU Chairman in 1993 and Colonel Qaddafi, which was in fact waning could not provide an adequate explanation. The more satisfactory explanation was obviously the Soviet pressure on Mengistu. The Soviet Union had been aiding Ethiopia in its fight against internal disturbances.

Qaddafi's acceptance in 1981 to withdraw his troops from Chad was apparently due to his expectation of becoming the OAU Chairman in 1982. Now that this expectation was no longer there as the OAU summit in Tripoli had failed to attain a quorum, Libyan ventures in Chad were renewed. And the western world was not amused as Libyan air attacks using Soviet made aircrafts continued at Faya-Langeau in Chad. As a result, American and French aid began to flow into Chad and these increased as the situation continued to deteriorate. At the same time France was delivering statements which appeared to be at crossroads. According to the statement of French Defence Minister, it was Libya that had internationalised the conflict and "what Libya does, we will do also". A few hours earlier, the French Foreign Minister had denied that France was co-ordinating its actions with America or that French decisions were being influenced by America. At the same time, Libya's propaganda machine was depicting the whole struggle as American led onslaught on Libya, including the American exercises in Egypt and its naval movements in the Mediterranean.

The whole episode ended up in a stand off between the French troops in the South and Libyan troops in the North together with an apparent Libyan occupation of the Northern Chad. At that moment, the official French policy was in line with the OAU's view that
African boundaries should remain the way they are and that the man to give backing is the current President. This was inspite of some suggestions from French Communist quarters that Chad should be divided\textsuperscript{77}. At the same time, Libyan ventures into Chad were reflecting on its Arab neighbours. Captain Thomas Sankara who had seized power in Upper Volta on 4 August 1981, and of whose support Qaddafi was sure, had already stated in his first press conference that he still admired Colonel Qaddafi, but did not go as far as endorsing the latter's claims on Chad. The visit by Liberian president Samuel Doe to Israel, the first from a black African state in twelve years, in 1983 and the subsequent restoration of links between the two countries was in the view of his hosts a result of the mounting fears over Libyan intrigues and aims in West Africa. Thus, the indications were that while Qaddafi was losing more ground in Africa, his Arab partners would also see him as embittering the relations between the African and the Arab world to Israel's clear advantage. Libya's attempts to woo his Western neighbours, that is, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, had only attained meagre results while towards its east, Egypt and Sudan had not hesitated to denounce its "flagrant military intervention" in Chad. Zaire to the South had already sent 2,000 troops to help Ndjamena against Libya, while Ethiopian Colonel Mengistu, a once close ally of Qaddafi, was showing a prudent detachment since he became the OAU Chairman\textsuperscript{78}. Already, he had received a special envoy from France who impressed upon him the fact that the best way to end Chadian conflict was by an African solution. France's belief was that diplomatic pressure from within the OAU would finally force Qaddafi out. Another alternative in France's view was total withdrawal of all foreign troops which would help Libya have a face-saving withdrawal, especially if these were replaced by the OAU forces\textsuperscript{79}. 148
In contrast to this view, Hissene Habre was of the opinion that without French and American assistance, he would not be able to retain power in Chad.

Separate attempts by the OAU, Ethiopia and Zaire had so far failed to bring Mr Habre and Mr Weddeye together, for just as was the case in 1982 when Weddeye was the President fighting against Mr. Habre, so was the case now with the latter insisting on first being recognised as President and not just a leader of a warring faction. France, on its part, wanted negotiations between the two to be mid-wifed by the OAU in accordance with its opinion that "African problems should be solved by Africans". By sending troops into Chad to prevent its total occupation, France had only acted to buy time. But apart from the 2,000 Zairean troops in N’djamena, the question of OAU peace keeping troops was a remote possibility. It had failed dismally to keep peace in Chad in 1982. For some time, France contemplated a "federation" which would in effect have meant a partition of the former French colony between the Southern chunk commanded by Mr Habre and the Northern part that has since July 1983, been occupied by rebels led by Weddeye and other Libyan backers;

To the utter relief of Mr Habre and other African leaders who were intent on preserving the sanctity of boundaries as inherited from colonial days, the 1983 October 3rd and 4th summit meeting of African countries in eastern France never saw the suggestion repeated. Instead, Mr Mitterand assured the leaders and other representatives of the 38 African States of his belief in their right to "territorial integrity". The meeting however failed to come up with a good idea regarding how such a principle could be re-established in Chad and Mr Weddeye could still not be brought to a negotiating table and an attempt towards this end was even blocked when members of the relevant subcommittee disagreed. Finally, on 17 September 1984, a total and concomitant evacuation from Chad was announced by the French Foreign Minister Mr Claude Cheysson after a weekend of shuttling between Tripoli and Paris.
Observers to monitor the plan were to come from Nigeria, Senegal and Morocco. Upto that time however, no talks had yet been arranged between the government of Chad and the rebels meaning that the possibility of a Libyan come back was very high. Moreover, Libya had totally refused to discuss the subject of Aozou strip, into which it was withdrawing its forces, claiming that the territory rightly belonged to it. France considered the strip to be legally part of Chad, while Chad believes that Libyans will use the strip as a base to return into Chad.

Whether the Libyan soldiers would come back to Chad or not, is another issue. The important thing here is that following the paralysis of the OAU after its peace keeping failure in Chad in 1992 as well as the internationalisation of Chadian conflict, the African states turned to France rather than just sit back to witness a change in the status quo. At the same time, France, for one reason or another, was in agreement with the maintenance of the status quo, as indicated by its reference to "African solution to African problems" and to its belief in the right of Africans to territorial integrity. Having observed this trend of selective OAU involvement, we now proceed to draw our conclusions.

3.3 Conclusions

In this chapter, we have attempted to look at the major provisions of the OAU charter as regards conflict resolution in Africa and their major omissions, with regard to issues related to internal order, omissions which we have attributed to the fear of the OAU as well as of its member states of any move which might mean revision of colonial boundaries as inherited at the time of independence. We have cited the cases of border disputes between Somalia and her neighbours on the one hand and Morocco and Algeria on the other.
This mode of thought, we noted, has not failed to influence the selective involvement of the OAU in resolving civil wars in Africa. We have cited Burundi massacres which were probably genuine attempts to restore law and order and Uganda which exhibited a very minimal OAU involvement at best. There is also the case of Sudan in which although the idea of secession has not become a major priority, is however loaded with that threat and the issue of which the OAU has hitherto not addressed itself. As regards the explosive issue of Eritrean war of independence in Ethiopia, however, we have noted that several attempts of the OAU to address the issue were blocked by the influential Emperor as well as his successor, Colonel Mengistu, hence the minimal involvement.

As contrasted to these, we have cited three other cases in which the OAU involvement was remarkably high, although with little success in the area of resolution. Such involvement, we noted varied from diplomatic intervention in the cases of Zaire and Nigeria on the one hand to military intervention, in the case of Chad, on the other. The latter stands out as the one single civil war in Africa in which the OAU has gone to the level of sending peace keeping forces in accordance with its creation of a Defence Commission under the article XX of the OAU charter. The extent to which the Chadian case merited the peace keeping force has been acknowledged by citing not only the weak Central Government and the threat of partition, but also the persistent tendency towards internationalisation of the conflict in question.

Given the above, we have come up with two major conclusions in this chapter. One, that even though the framers of the OAU Charter envisaged its role of conflict resolution and made adequate provision, namely the creation of the Commission of Medication, Conciliation and Arbitration and the Defence Commission, these provisions did not cater for the resolution of conflicts arising within the domain of the OAU member states. Neither have
the member states been enthusiastic in making use of these institutions of conflict resolution
even with regard to interstate conflict between member states. Secondly, that since the
OAU Charter gave more or less the same consideration to the subject of conflict resolution as
the maintenance of regional status quo, such internal conflicts as were likely to pose major
threats to the regional status quo had to be nevertheless addressed by the organisation. It is
with these in mind that we now move on to the fourth chapter, to examine the extent to which
the OAU's propensity towards the maintenance of the regional status quo has conditioned its
minimal involvement in the Somali civil war in early 1990s.
The Ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State were amazed by the number of disputes pending on its agenda and hence the decision to restructure the Commission's protocol so as to respond more quickly to African disputes.

The Republic of Somalia is a result of a merger between the former British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland. For more information on Somalia see Chapter 4 of this text.


For the dispute between Amin and Nyerere, see Amate, op.cit, pages 427 - 430.

Also see Chapter 1 of this text, page 3.

See Olajide Aluko, op.cit.

Resolution ECM/5 (III).
The Zairean rebels were increasingly referred to as nationalists by the ad hoc commission on the Congo after their first meeting in Nairobi on 18 September 1964 due to their willingness to cooperate with the Commission in its pursuit of peace in Zaire.

In July 1966, President Mobutu ordered the Africanisation of the names of many Congolese cities: Leopoldville to Kinshasa, Elizabethville to Lumbumbashi and Stanleyville to Kisangani.
The Observer, 28 April 1968.

Herald Tribune, 15 April 1968.

Address of Colonel Ojukun on 5 August 1968. "Biafra Ministry of Information"


Le Monde, 14 August 1968.


Le Monde, 11 August 1967.

AHG/Resolution 54 (V).

Amate, op.cit., page 444.


FROLINAT means in full the National Liberation Front of Chad.


Ibid., 20 November 1980.

Ibid., 17 January 1981.

Ibid.

Ibid., 16 July 1983.

Ibid., 13 August 1983.

At that time, Libya and America were locked in a struggle over the Sirte Islands of the Mediterranean Sea.

The Economist (London), 20 August 1983.

Ibid., 27 August 1983.
79 Ibid., 24 September 1983.

80 Ibid., 8 October 1983.

81 Ibid., 22 September 1984.
CHAPTER FOUR

4 THE OAU AND SOMALI CONFLICT (1991-95)

We have noted the Pan-African opposition to the divisive tendencies prior to the formation of the OAU in May 1963. In addition, we noted the selective involvement of the OAU in African civil wars depending on the level of threat posed to African regional status quo. It is in the light of these that we are now going to examine the underlying factors resulting in the OAU’s low level of involvement in Somali civil war from 1991 to 1995.

This chapter is therefore going to be divided into three parts. The first part will deal with a historical survey of the Somali conflict, while the second will deal with the level of international involvement in Somalia’s conflict resolution. In the third part, we shall critically examine the level of threat posed by Somali conflict to African regional status quo with a view to confirming, disconfirming or revising our hypothesis, namely the higher the level of threat posed by a civil war to the African regional status quo, the higher the OAU’s level of involvement.

4.1 The Somali Civil War: A Historical Survey

The Somali history is crucial to the understanding not only of the Somali civil war, but also of the subsequent nature of the international involvement therein. The Somali civil war is traceable to three distinct sources: Pre-colonial, Colonial and Post-Colonial legacies.

4.1.1 Pre-colonial Legacy

No analysis of the Somali war can be complete without reference to Somali’s pre-colonial decentralised system of polity based on clan loyalties and geneocology\(^1\). According to one classification, the pre-colonial Somalia had five major groupings; the Darod (35%),
the Hawiye (23%), the Isaaq (23%), the Dighil and Rahanweyne (4%) and the Dir (7%). Disputes which were based on the struggle for food and pasture were settled through mediation by the clan elders and by a system of compensation. In this system, social peace was precarious at best and multiple conflicts raged, albeit without degenerating into anarchy.

4.1.2 Colonial Legacy

The advent of the colonial government and its central administration undermined the authority of the clan elders without erasing the clan loyalties. Instead, it added another dimension to the Somali problem, that of exposing the Somalis to three different colonial administrations (Italian, British and French) and this became a problem to the independent Republic of Somalia which inherited two disparate colonial systems of administration, that is former British Somaliland and former Italian Somaliland, which continued to debilitate its central organs despite an apparent achievement of integration in 1965.

4.1.3 Post-Colonial Legacy

Somalia's post-colonial administrations, especially President Barre's, tended to work in favour of the South (former Italian Somaliland) and in disfavour of the North (former British Somaliland). It is thus not surprising that one of the earliest opposition to Mr Barre's rule arose from the North-western region of Somalia, namely from the Isaaq dominated Somali National Movement (SNM) in 1981. The post-colonial period continued to exacerbate the problem of Somali clan structures by replacing the initial struggle for food and pasture by that of political positions and state resources. In the parliamentary periods of 1960s for example, clan tensions were reflected to some extent in the divisions among various political parties which amounted to sixty at some point in time.
Some national leaders of Somalia tried to regulate this clan competition by emphasizing Somali nationalism, the latest one being that by Major General Mohammed Siad Barre in mid-1970s. Following his 1969 coup d'état, Barre created a one party state with state centred economic policies and expanded military. He further adopted an official ideology which emphasised socialist terminology, including an intense campaign to promote broader nationalism to support clan loyalties through propaganda, literacy drives in Somali language, the out-lawing of the outward expression of clan allegiance and a renewed emphasis in "recovering" Somali inhabited areas of the neighbouring countries.

These policies partially had a negative effect in Somalia's relations with the neighbouring Ethiopia, whose Marxist revolution of 1974 had also loosened its grip on the Somali-inhabited region of Ogaden. In 1977, the sour relations exploded into a full scale war which also highlighted the extent of superpower confrontations in the Horn of Africa. Prior to the Ogaden war, Somalia had benefited from Soviet military assistance on account of its official ideology. At the same time, the pre-revolutionary feudal regime of Emperor Haile Selassie obtained support from the US. In a remarkable switch of alliances, the US then became Somalia's chief arms supplier, while Ethiopia, on the basis of its Marxist revolution of 1974 obtained large quantities of Soviet bloc armaments. As a result Somalia became even more militarised with a large army and extensive stocks of weapons that later served to fuel the civil war. As the clan tensions sharpened in the 1980s the mediating role of traditional elders had not only been undermined by the advent of the colonial government, but also by the ready accessibility to arms by the Somalis.

In a sense, President Barre's decision to wage the Ogaden war also proved to be his undoing. Although opposition to Barre had predated the Ogaden war, it was considerably exacerbated by the Ogaden defeat. Thus while the Majjerteyne (sub-clan of the Darod group)
which dominated Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) had contributed to Ogaden
defeat by weakening the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) in Ogaden, the 1978 coup
attempt (in which the SSDF was involved) together with the rest of the opposition movements
were a result of that defeat, directly or indirectly\textsuperscript{13}. In 1981, the SNM was formed among
the Isaaq community of North-west Somalia, whose initial resentments to the southern social
injustice had been aggravated by the resettlement in the north of mainly Ogadeni refugees
from Ethiopia, some of whom were given Isaaq properties or conscripted to fight against the
Isaaq community\textsuperscript{14}.

Having come into contact with the initial forms of dissidence, more over, Barre
increasingly tended to rely on the three sub-clans within the Darod grouping, the Marehan,
his own, the Ogaden, his mothers and the Dulbahante, his son-in law's, hence poisoning even
further the clan tensions\textsuperscript{15}.

It was, however, the increased reprisals against the SNM that brought down Barres
regime. In its initial stage, the SNM, composed largely of conservative muslims of the north,
had carefully avoided any contact with the christian Ethiopia. However, following a day's
rioting in the provincial capital of Hargeisa in February 1982 in which 30 people died, the
SNM leaders began to seek help from Ethiopia, the attainment of which further strengthened
the opposition\textsuperscript{15}.

Even with the Ethiopian help, the rebel activities were able to be contained upto
1988, when a series of events were set in motion culminating in Barres' deposition in January

In 1988, President Barre of Somali made a deal with Colonel Mengistu of Ethiopia
according to which both leaders would cease supporting each others dissidents. Following
that deal, the SNM was kicked out of its bases in Ethiopia and rather than face isolation, the
rebels came home fighting. Within two months, Somalia was faced with one of the largest insurgencies that it had witnessed since its independence. As Barre heightened his reprisals against the Isaaq community, the rebels spread southwards, notably among the Hawiye of Central Somalia and Mogadishu, among whom the United Somali Congress (USC) was formed in 1989. In his last desperate attempts to stay in power, Barre turned his army loose on the Hawiye sections of Mogadishu, destroying much of the infrastructure and provoking a violent uprising.

On 26 January 1991, Barre abdicated and flew southwards towards the border with Kenya. As Barre flew southwards, he was pursued by the faction of USC commanded by General Mohammed Farah Aideed, while the other faction remained in Mogadishu and installed their leader, Ali Mahdi Mohammed, as the interim president. This was contrary to an agreement among the rebels in August, 1990 that this would follow consultations. Not surprisingly therefore, the government of Ali Mahdi failed to attain general acceptance. Instead, it led to another wave of violence amidst anarchy which was severely aggravated by the drought of 1990 - 1991 and the subsequent famine. On 18 May 1991, the president of SNM, Abdel-Rahman Ahmed Ali, confirmed the reports of the secession of the North Western part of Somalia to form an independent state, the Republic of Somaliland.

The USC rejected the secession as "destructive" and a contravention of the accords between the two movements. Nevertheless the SNM proceeded to announce its government on 4 June 1991, with 13 of its 17 members from the Isaaq clan. Between 5-15 June 1991, leaders of the USC, SSDF, SPM (Somali Peoples Movement), and SDM (Somali Democratic Movement), met in Djibouti under peace talks sponsored by President Hassan Gouled Aptidon of Djibouti. The SNM's leaders, however, turned down the invitation. The different groups agreed on a ceasefire, the final assault against the remaining supporters of
Barre and sent envoys to persuade the SNM to join them in a transitional government. The absence of Aideed's faction of USC also made reconciliation more difficult. A similar attempt was made by President Aptidon in July 1991 without success. New clan-based parties continued to proliferate as old ones split amidst the formation, dissolution and reformation of alliances. From the Southern part of Somalia sprang the Somali National Front (SNF) based on the support of the Marehan sub-clan of the Darod. From the northwest town of Bossasso, an Islamic fundamentalist group was formed, challenging the dominance of SSDF. In addition, there was an unprecedented proliferation of heavily armed gangs and marauding bandits who owed little or no allegiance to any political faction.

4.2 The Somali Civil War and International Involvement

The Somali civil war exhibited the involvement of a wide range of international bodies, both national and international. It is in the light of this general nature of involvement that the OAU's low level of involvement in the Somali Conflict must ultimately be conceived.

4.2.1. The Early Regional Peace Efforts and The OAU Inaction

Even before the fall of the Siad Barre regime, there were attempts by some members of the international community towards restoring peace in Somalia. In particular Italy on account of its long standing relationships with Somali and Egypt, on account of its membership in the OAU, the ICO and the Arab League, tried unsuccessfully to mediate between President Barre and the opposition. Following Barre's deposition, three other unsuccessful attempts were made by Egypt, Italy and Djibouti to avert Somaliland's
secession. Underlying the latter's involvement besides its membership of the OAU, was its proximity to Somali, hence a possible refugee destination.27

Indeed, the subsequent flow of refugees into the neighbouring countries meant that the peaceful resolution of the Somali conflict would be in the interest of the entire region of the Horn of Africa. Hence the involvement of Kenya and Djibouti in the early mediation efforts of June and July 1991 both of which were hosted by President Hassan Gouled Aptidon in Djibouti28. The July conference was attended by President Moi of Kenya as well as representatives of Germany, France, Italy, Yemen, the OAU and the Arab League. In that meeting the Somali leaders were urged to take the opportunity to work for a lasting peace in their country. The same theme was contained in a speech read on behalf of the OAU Chairman, Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria29. When in mid-July 1991, the breakaway Republic of Somaliland sent an urgent appeal to the ICO for assistance, it was rebuffed with the reply that the SNM ought to take part in the peacetalks that would ensure the reconstruction and unity of Somalia29.

At another meeting between President Moi of Kenya and President Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia in Addis Ababa in November 1991, the two leaders expressed concern over the situation in Somalia and called for an end to the internal conflict to enable the repatriation of refugees from the neighbouring countries. At the same time, the two leaders issued a joint communiqué calling for the convening of an international conference to bring home hundreds of thousands of people in the region who had fled civil wars in their countries30.

Another regional initiative from the Horn of Africa to resolve the Somali crisis came as a response to the limitations of the UN initiated ceasefire of 3 March 1992 which was not only confined to Mogadishu but also left out the neutral gunmen within the streets of Mogadishu. The imperative of a broader political settlement, coupled with humanitarian
concerns due to escalating famine and the tampering of relief operations by gunmen were therefore the major motivating factors that prompted the standing committee for the Horn of Africa to invite the main political movements to Bahir Dir, Ethiopia from 31 May to 3 June 1992. 

Up to this time, the OAU had proved largely irrelevant to the Somali conflict, despite the fact that the organisation's headquarters was only a few hundred miles from Somalia. That the OAU was incapacitated by the Article III of its charter was underscored by the comments of the OAU Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim on an official visit to Kenya when he visited the refugee camps in Mombasa in late March 1991. In an interview with the Italian Inter Press Service (IPS), the OAU chief hailed Kenyan hospitality to the Somali refugees as "Pan-Africanism in its highest form". At the same time, he noted that the clause in the OAU charter that decrees non-interference in the internal affairs of the member states had outlived its usefulness and that it had tied the hands of well-meaning countries that might have helped in resolving bloody internal conflicts such as that in Somalia. Indeed, one of the few OAU responses to Somali crises was to reject a plan for intervention proposed in 1992 by the Eritreans on the basis that Eritrea was not an OAU Member. While the OAU had failed to make any concerted effort to place Somalia on the agenda of the UN Security Council, the American senate had adopted a resolution in April 1991 not only calling for an active US initiative, but also encouraging mobilisation by both the UN and the OAU, which was of course rejected by the Bush Administration. When finally the UN Security Council adopted the Somali crises in its agenda on 23 January 1992, and passed a resolution calling for a ceasefire and imposing arms embargo on Somalia, the OAU's lack of action was underscored by the UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali's appeal to the Arab League and the OAU to help organise peace efforts in Somalia.
4.2.2. The Early UN Peace Efforts and The OAU Inaction

Before the adoption of the Somali crisis in the UN security council's agenda, however, some attempts had been made by the UN agencies at resolving the Somali crisis, prompted by humanitarian concerns. The mass evacuation of international relief agencies and NGOs in the wake of Siad Barre's fall had left only the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Medical Corps, Save the Children Fund (UK), Medecins Sans Frontiers and the Austrian Non-profit Group, SOS, to assume obligations that should have fallen to the UN (according to whom Somalia was too dangerous for its personnel). Nevertheless, UN agencies struggled to ensure a steady inflow of funds and relief inputs to sustain projects with the NGOs and the private relief organisations. In particular, the UNICEF's Somalia representative Mr. David Bassiouni and its regional director Mrs. Mary Racelis visited Somalia in March, 1991 on the first UN flight to Mogadishu since the evacuation and gathered information upon which other international relief organisations were to base their initiatives. Further more they initiated discussions with various authorities in Mogadishu in April and May 1991 with the aim of facilitating UN relief operations. Following further talks through the UN inter-agency mission to Somalia in May 1991 a few UN staff returned to Mogadishu in June 1991 and in August 1991 the UN offices were able to be fully opened, only to be closed again in mid-November due to intensified fighting.

On 28 December 1991 the former UN Secretary General Javier Peres de Cuellar assigned to the UN Under-Secretary General James Jonah a mission to Somalia which was to culminate in the ceasefire agreement between the two Mogadishu warlords on 3 March 1992, at the UN headquarters in New York\textsuperscript{37}. Although the conference was held under the auspices of the UN, the OAU, the ICO and the Arab League, the latter three evidently remained in the background.
Moreover, following the adoption of Somali crisis on the UN security council's agenda, the OAU continued to remain in the background as the UN Secretary General struggled to push the issue higher up the UN agenda. It was for instance the UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali who made a number of proposals in his two reports to the Security Council in March and April 1992 respectively which culminated in the establishment of UNOSOM on 24 April 1992 with the aim of protecting relief operations in Mogadishu as well as to monitor ceasefire.

As the situation continued to deteriorate in Somalia amidst the long delay in the deployment of the first UNOSOM force consisting of 500 Pakistan troops, no effort was made by the OAU to highlight the situation so as to direct the international attention from the Eastern Europe to the Horn of Africa. When it became obvious that the members of the Security Council were applying double standards by concentrating more on the "rich man's war" in the former Yugoslavia, it was the UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali who in July 1992 came up even more forcefully and challenged the international community to turn the spotlight towards Somalia. Consequently, a series of international initiatives followed, including the American airlifts of food to Somalia and Northern Kenya in August 1992; the arrival of the first contingent of 500 UNOSOM peacekeepers in Somalia in September 1992 following the announcement by the White House of US air transport for the Pakistani troops and; the UN mobilisation over Somali famine in October 1992.

In his two reports to the Security Council in July and August 1992 respectively, the UN Secretary General pressed for the strengthening and expansion of the UNOSOM to cover the entire country. Consequently the Security Council expanded UNOSOM to 4,200 troops to be deployed in four different zones of the country besides Mogadishu. As the UNOSOM peacekeeping force proved increasingly incapable of handling the complex situation in
Somalia, it was still the UN Secretary General on the advise of his new special envoy in Somalia, Mr Ismat Kittani (Mr Mohammed Sahnoun had already resigned in early November in protest over the inordinate delay of UNOSOM's deployment) who in late November 1992 made further proposals leading to the adoption of the historic resolution 794 on 3 December 1992 which gave the UN Secretary General and the members states the authority to use "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia". It was that resolution which facilitated the widespread delivery of humanitarian and other emergency relief under the American led international force, the UNITAF, which arrived on 9 December 1992. Besides it enabled the UN Secretary General to proceed with the strengthening of UNOSOM, which took over from UNITAF on 4 May, 1993.

4.2.3 The UNITAF and the UNOSOM II

Though under American command, the UNITAF soon acquired an international outlook as governments from around the world announced their contributions of troops to its operation. Among the troops to arrive in the immediate wake of the first US troops were those from Botswana, Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Given the subsequent participation of over twenty countries with a total commitment of over 10,000 troops, the US lowered its initial commitment of 28,000 troops to around 24,000 (see Table 4 for troops contribution). Apart from the contribution of military contingents, some countries pledged financial support, with Japan committing $100 million and Saudi Arabia $10 million (see the Table 5 for financial contributions). In particular, the participation of a number of African and Islamic countries was instrumental in convincing the Somalis that the action was truly international. Nevertheless, the action had not been initiated
by the OAU and hence was extra-African. Moreover, the fact that the OAU had given its full support to the UN's authorisation of the UNITAF and the subsequent UN peace enforcement operations (UNOSOM II) meant that the OAU's previous notion of "African solution to African problem" was severely compromised.

Having accomplished what it considered to be the mandate given to it by the UN security council's resolution 794, the UNITAF peacekeeping operation was taken over by UNOSOM II on 4 May 1993. That resolution, however, had not been clear on how the "secure environment" for humanitarian relief operations was to be attained. Shortly before the adoption of the resolution however, Boutros-Ghali had stated his clear opinion on this: "It would be necessary for at least the heavy weapons of the organised factions to be neutralised and brought under international control and for the irregular forces to be disarmed. He also called for a ceasefire throughout Somalia between the organised factions and for the heavy weapons to be concentrated in designated locations where they could be supervised by the UNITAF and later by the UNOSOM. In his report of 19 December 1992, he went on to state that since small arms are held by many individuals, ways should be found to induce them to handover their weapons. In his letter to President Bush in December 1992, the Secretary General stated that: "Unless the entire country has been secured, armed groups would be able to simply withdraw to portions not controlled by the UNITAF, to await the forces departure before resuming their harassment and the exploitation of international relief effort". Mr. Boutros-Ghali's views continued to be echoed by the national reconciliation conferences before UNOSOM II took over the peacekeeping operation. On 11 December 1992, the two principal Somali protagonists in Mogadishu agreed to remove their heavy weapons and military vehicles from the streets of Mogadishu besides recommitting themselves to an earlier ceasefire. This followed face to face talks at a meeting chaired by
the US Special Envoy to Somalia Ambassador Robert Oakley. Also present in the meeting was the UN Secretary General’s special representative in Somalia Ismat Kittani. On 28 December 1992, the two again met at a large public rally in the capital where they pledged to eliminate the security checks along the "green-line" that had divided the city.

At the Addis Ababa conference of 4 - 15 January 1993, the UNITAF and UNOSOM forces were given the crucial role of monitoring the ceasefire and of disarming and encampment of the militia groups. The resultant Addis Ababa accord also set 15 March 1993 as the date for national reconciliation although there was no agreement on the latter’s agenda or its expected participants. While General Aideed felt that only those factions which helped in removing Mr Barre should participate, most of the other clan leaders believed that a more broadly based participation was crucial to the success of the national reconciliation. This latter belief was also shared by the UN Secretary General, who together with Ethiopian President Meles Zenawi, co-chaired the conference. While the choice of Addis Ababa as the venue of the two conferences and of Zenawi as its co-Chairman were both symbolic of OAU’s presence, there is no denying the fact that the main initiative was that of the UN, which in cooperation with the Somali NGOs, business, religious and political organisations urged for the convening of the conference back in December 1992 at a Somali Aid Coordination Conference in Addis Ababa. Hence, the imperative of involving these "silent voices" in the search for peace and reconstruction in Somalia.

In any case, the "silent voices" were in Addis Ababa for the third UN conference on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia which had been neatly timed to take place a couple of days before the national reconciliation conference of March 1993. At the former conference, the UN Under-Secretary General in charge of Humanitarian Affairs was expected to allocate $250 million towards the re-establishment of local administration, health and education.
systems, to get the land back to use and to bring the refugees home\textsuperscript{50}. It is little wonder therefore that at the national reconciliation conference of 15-27 March 1993, the 15 Somali factions agreed to the formation of autonomous regional and district councils which would be responsible for the task of reconstruction\textsuperscript{51}. In addition, the factions agreed to the formation of Transitional National Council (TNC) consisting of three representatives from each region which would be responsible for running the country before the elections\textsuperscript{52}.

However the Addis Ababa accord of 27 March 1993 failed to be implemented owing to the disagreement among the Somali parties over the composition of the TNC which was to be submitted to the UNOSOM by the factions\textsuperscript{53}. The non-implementation of the accord is also attributable to the fact that some of the most powerful Somali factions (especially General Aideed of SNA and Mohammed Egal of SNM) were suspicious of UNOSOM's intentions\textsuperscript{54}. Besides, an eruption of fresh factional fighting in Kismayo had disrupted the peace talks which were only resumed after Aideed, whose ally Colonel Omar Jess had been thrown out of Kismayo by General Morgan, returned following assurances by the US military and the UN investigators that the situation had been adequately dealt with\textsuperscript{55}.

All said and done, the failure of the Somali factions to implement the Addis Ababa accord of March 1993 dealt the final blow to the UN's vision of disarmament which was envisaged by the accord in a clause that committed the Somali factions to a "complete and simultaneous disarmament throughout the entire country within 90 days of the agreement". At the time of the agreement, the UNITAF had only managed to seize 5,000 small arms, 90 heavy machine guns and around 1.3 million rounds of ammunition\textsuperscript{56}. Events had after all not worked in favour of the UN Secretary General who had initially been of the view that the UNITAF would work "to obtain security" while the UN dealt "with the political and humanitarian approach to Somali crisis". Consequently, the precise task of UNOSOM II and
its areas of deployment including its size, composition and timing took a prominent place in the UN debates prior to its takeover on 4 May 1993.57 "In particular, Mr. Boutros-Ghali called attention to the situation in the north, where the SNM which was not a signatory to the Addis Ababa accord of March 1993 had declared an independent Republic of Somaliland in May 1991. Although the UNITAF was not operating in this area, it was included in the deployment plans for the UNOSOM II. The failure to disarm the north, Mr. Boutros-Ghali argued, could thwart such efforts in the rest of the country.58"

It was against this background that on 28 March 1993 only a day after the conclusion of Addis Ababa accord, the UN security council unanimously approved the deployment of 30,800 strong military and civilian operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) to replace the US-led UNITAF operation. In view of the gravity of the situation, UNOSOM II was given an unusually broad mandate which did not only entail working towards national reconciliation and reconstruction, but also using force to deal with gangs as well as confiscating weapons.59

The 30,800 strong UNOSOM II also contained thousands of UNITAF troops which at its peak was made up of about 37,000 people from more than 30 countries, especially logistic units.60 When fully fielded, UNOSOM II had some 20,000 military personnel, 8,000 logistical support and 2,800 civilians all under the command of a Turkish Lieutenant General Civik Bir.61 These, however, included around 5,000 American logistical support who broke precedent by serving under American Commander.62 Moreover, despite the fact that the 20,000 strong military personnel of UNOSOM II were under the overall command of a Muslim (Turkish), its command structure was still dominated by the Americans.63 Nevertheless, the fact that it had a muslim commander, coupled with the participation of a number of Arab and African countries was very significant, given the religious as well as regional dimensions of Somali conflict.64
Right from its inception, however, UNOSOM II was subjected to Aideed's incessant accusations that it was not only meddling in the affairs of Somalia and thus abusing the trust which Aideed had placed on the American led force, but also that it had conspired with Aideed's arch-enemy, General Muhammad Siad Hersi Morgan against his ally, Colonel Omar Jess over their contest for Kismayo. As a result, Aideed's supporters spent much of May 1993 jeering and throwing stones at the UN peacekeepers. When on 5 June 1993, 24 Pakistani peacekeepers were killed while inspecting one of General Aideed's arsenals in Southern Mogadishu, however, the UN decided to act. An emergency meeting of the UN security council was called almost immediately by the Pakistani government and one day after the incident, resolution 837 was adopted condemning the killings and calling for the punishment of the perpetrators. That call was also echoed by the OAU meeting in Addis Ababa in early June 1993. The stage was thus set for the three month hunt for General Aideed, backed by the US and other western powers which only ended after Clinton's announcement of the withdrawal of American troops from Somalia by 31 March 1994 shortly after the killing of 18 US rangers on 3 October 1993 in a street battle against Aideed's men.

By the time the hunt for Aideed was called off in October 1993, it had not only claimed the lives of nearly 100 peacekeepers, but also of many innocent Somali civilians. As such its rationale had already come into question as early as July 1993. Shortly after the killing of the Pakistanis, their remaining counterparts opened fire on Somali demonstrators killing twenty of them. The UN, however, jumped on to the defense of the Pakistanis on account of their argument that Aideed's men had used women and children as shields. Following an attack by US helicopters on Aideed's command centre on 12 July 1993 killing 50 people a wide range of countries and organisations called for a review of the UN policy, notably, the OAU, Italy, Ireland, the Vatican and World Vision.
At the same time, cracks were already appearing within UNOSOM's structure of command with Italians, who believed they had a special relationship with Somalis, asking for more say in the American dominated UN command structure. This demand was in response to their successful opposition to American attempts to destroy the Pasta Factory from where Somalis fired with much effectiveness. Also related to the Italian demand was the confusion over the mandate of UNOSOM II. Sources from the UN camp in July 1993 revealed that contingents from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) had orders only to defend themselves and not to take part in the coercive disarmament of the warlords.70

In the period following the departure of American troops together with those of their western counterparts, that confusion was underlined by the lack of their co-ordinating, logistical and communications roles on the one hand and the resurgent wave of violence on the other. By April 1994, senior UN military commanders at UNOSOM headquarters in Mogadishu were saying that their troops were no longer under orders to disarm the Somalis, although this was opposed by the new UN Special Envoy in Somalia, Hansana Kouyate. "If they show weapons, we have to seize them, even the light ones". As regards peacekeeping, UNOSOM II became increasingly less inclined towards intervening in trouble and more inclined towards the handling of casualties and the supplying of blood and doctors while militarily, their duties were reduced to protecting certain facilities such as Mogadishu airport and seaport besides facilitating humanitarian operations134. In the words of a Colonel A.K. Singh, this was the revised mandate of UNOSOM II.71

Regional as well as religious dimensions were even more telling. The UN's search for Aideed had so enhanced the latter's stature that by the time of UNOSOM's departure, Aideed had already attained the position of a martyr in the eyes of some Islamic and African radicals. Among other factors, this became very instrumental in prompting the Libyan
recognition of Aideed’s government in September 1995, the only one so far since the latter’s formation in June 1995. At the same time, the search so tainted the image of the UN and the US that the former’s mediation efforts in resolving the Somali conflict were rendered unworkable. Given the previous roles of the US in both the former Yugoslavia where it had condoned the muslims’ massacre by the Serbs and Iraq where it took pleasure in bombarding civilian targets, this was not surprising. Now that it had brought sophisticated C130 armed planes to bombard Aideed’s residence and other civilian targets, killing hundreds of innocent muslims, Somali youths were not only joining Aideed’s militia in mass to fight the “infidels”, but were also accusing the islamic countries in the UN operation of serving the interests of United States, namely to christianise the whole muslim world. Indeed, the UN peace efforts were at stake, and hence the resurgence of regional initiatives towards the end of 1993 and early 1994.

4.2.4 Resurgence of Regional Peace Efforts And The Role of The OAU

In early December 1993, President Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia chaired informal talks in Addis Ababa between two rival Somali camps (the G-12 and SNA) as a follow up to the Addis Ababa accord of March 1993. The talks however collapsed owing to the failure of the two camps to agree inter-alia on the membership of the TNC which had been proposed by the previous accord. In particular, the G-12 group allied to Ali Mahdi, accused President Zenawi of bias in view of his proposal for the review of Addis Ababa accord of March 1993, in agreement with Aideed, and also his support for Aideed’s appeal to have the UN release his eight supporters. President Zenawi finally walked out of the talks with the remarks that the "Somalis are not ready to reconcile".
### TABLE IV

**INTERNATIONAL TROOP COMMITMENTS TO SOMALIA FOR UNIFIED TASK FORCE (UNITAF) AND POSSIBLY EXPANDED UN OPERATION IN SOMALIA (UNOSOM)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>NO. OF TROOPS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>60*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>40,700</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures are approximations only.

* Represents despatch of a transport contingent of personnel and equipment to serve with UNOSOM.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>AMOUNT IN US DOLLARS ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>115,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>100,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phillipines</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>114,215,000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goal</strong></td>
<td><strong>400,000,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the UN sponsored peace talks at the UNEP headquarters in Nairobi in early January 1994, the port of Kismayo was the dominant subject. In late December the previous year, the Belgian troops who had ordered both General Morgan and Colonel Omar Jess to stay out of the port had been replaced by the less equipped Indian and Zimbabwean troops amidst resurgence of violence. As such, the Nairobi talks aimed inter-alia at reducing the tensions in which 7 people had died and 42 others wounded.

In the meantime, some of the Somali warlords had a score to settle with the UN. In a statement released in Nairobi in Mid-January 1994, Aideed declared that he would only accept a reconciliation arrangement initiated by Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda and Eritrea. Hurling several accusations at UNOSOM II, he called for a review of its objectives and role as a matter of urgency suggesting the removal of its soldiers and officials. On a slightly different note, the leader of SNM's self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland in North-Western Somalia in an interview with the Weekly Review (Nairobi) in mid-January 1994, accused UNOSOM II of ignoring the place and significance of Somaliland. In addition, he also accused it of excluding Somaliland from its reports about the situation in Somalia a fact which he attributed to UNOSOM's jealousy of Somaliland's success where the UN had failed.

In early March 1994, the G-12 led by Mahdi met in Cairo at the invitation of the then OAU Chairman Hosni Mubarak and came up with what they considered to be a possible solution to Somali crisis, namely a proposal for the formation of a Transitional National Salvation Council (TNSC) with a rotating presidency. Aideed's three member SNA group had, however, rejected the invitation to the meeting on the basis of the argument that no agreement reached outside Somalia would resolve Somali conflict. In any case, the SNA viewed the Cairo talks as an Egyptian attempt to sabotage Aideed's previous reconciliation.
efforts in Nairobi, a factor which underlined the concurrent attacks on Egyptian and Pakistani contingents of UNOSOM II from Somali gunmen in Southern Mogadishu, Aideed’s stronghold.

Hours before the last US troops serving under UNOSOM II were pulled out of Somalia on 25 March 1994, there was an apparent break through at the UN sponsored peace negotiations in Nairobi when 15 Somali factions agreed on a ceasefire. In addition they agreed to hold another meeting on 15 April 1994 to set up an agenda for a proposed national reconciliation conference in mid-May 1994 that would see the election of an interim administration. That agreement however, came the day after a warning by UNOSOM through its spokesman George Bennet that the UN would cease funding their stay in Nairobi (amounting to $150,000 a day) if no agreement was reached the following day. Nevertheless, General Aideed and Ali Mahdi expressed their commitment to the implementation of the Nairobi Accord by the end of April 1994.

Their second meeting of 15 April 1994, however, never materialised. Instead, the two warlords began to fight afresh, a situation which the poorly equipped remaining troops of UNOSOM II found itself incapable of managing.

As the UNOSOM’s mandate drew towards its end in late 1994, a glimmer of hope was provided by Aideed’s plans to hold a national reconciliation conference on 27 October 1994 with a view to forming a government of national unity. Already the UN had given a warning through its chief peacekeeper Kofi Annan that unless Somalis showed immediate commitment to forming a government, it would bring UNOSOM II to a swift end. This followed an extensive tour of Somalia by Kofi Annan with a view to determining whether an extension of the $1.5 billion a year operation would be worthwhile. Aideed however failed to invite a broad section of the Somali factional leaders. Instead of Mr. Ali Mahdi, for
instance, he invited a top USC official called Mohammed Kanyare Afrah, who had fallen out with Mahdi two months before. In response, Mahdi declared that he would not have attended the meeting anyway unless it was chaired by the UN as any meeting which did not include all the factions would only aggravate the situation. The UN, which had initially been inclined towards chairing the meeting (to the utter dislike of Mahdi) later concurred with Mahdi when it confirmed that it would only chair a broadly based meeting. Even President Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, who had mediated between the Somalis in several peace talks before, called for a postponement of the meeting to allow it to be more broadly based.  

4.2.5. The Last Days of the UNOSOM II

Meanwhile, following deliberation on a report by a fact finding mission sent by the UN security council to determine whether or not the UNOSOM’s mandate should be extended beyond 1 November 1994, the Security Council decided in early November that the deadline for UNOSOM’s withdrawal would be 31 March 1995. Given the increase in wave of violence and crime, however, the UN Secretary General requested from the member countries air and naval support to back the final evacuation. In its final days in Somalia, the remaining troops of UNOSOM II retrenched themselves into the heavily fortified airport and seaport of Mogadishu pending the arrival of the task force to be composed of some 18 combat and support ships as well as thousands of marines and airforce personnel and crafts.  

By early February 1995, an American and Italian task force consisting of 2,600 Americans and 500 Italian marines had gathered off the coast with instructions to act only when requested by the UN chief of mission. These were expected to cover the departure of the last members of UNOSOM II and according to a spokesman of American Defence Department, to reclaim the equipment left behind by the UN troops which, it was feared
would fall into the hands of the warring factions. The ones that they could not take away with them would be destroyed.

It was in the midst of this gloomy environment that the last contingent of UNOSOM II consisting of 1,500 Pakistani troops withdrew from Somalia. Despite the gloomy departure, however, the UN might have inadvertently achieved most of its originally stated objectives.

In Baidoa, which had been the main famine area in early 1990s, local councils had taken control of the agricultural heartland and were even running a local police force. Although Kismayo still remained under the control of General Morgan it was quiet and the port busy. Although the northern bit of Mogadishu was still under the nominal control of Ali Mahdi Mohammed, it had fallen under the control of Islamic fundamentalists who imposed sharia laws. As a result, most of the intolerable crimes were ruled out. The light ones were, however, condoned. In Southern Mogadishu, however, Aideed had lost his main source of finance in Ali Hassan Osman (Atto) following his plans to resist the evacuation force of marines.

Besides, some of the sub-clans affiliated to him had also turned against him by suggesting that a multi-clan committee be created to manage the seaport and the airport of Mogadishu. Indeed Mr Osman even went as far as sending his own men to drive General Aideed’s men away from the airport gate. However, Aideed was able to bounce back after a day long battle which left five people dead.

4.3 Somali Conflict and the Regional Status Quo in Africa

Given declaration of independence in Somaliland, coupled with the high level of international and especially extra-African involvement, the Somali conflict could justifiably
pass as a real threat to African Regional status quo. However, given the international environment in the context of which the civil war occurred, coupled with the nature of the Somali society, such a conception could easily be misplaced. The Somali conflict occurred within the context of some major international and regional trends which directly impacted on what constitutes the threat to African regional status quo. These included the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, the increased competition for western financial assistance that this implied and Africa's response to these changes.

4.3.1 The Post-Cold War World And African Regional Status Quo

Signs of the demise of the Soviet bloc and the beginning of the New World Order began to be evident in mid-1980s when the Soviet Union began to send signals that it would abandon the Breznev doctrine in foreign affairs and also its communist development strategy at home. The subsequent release from oppression and forced ideology unleashed a wave of nationalist and sub-nationalist sentiment and resentment which culminated not only in the collapse and disintegration of the former Soviet Union, but also in the outbreak of a bloody ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia.

Following this wave of internal strife, demands multiplied for the international community to do more for those imperilled by internal conflicts. This was especially owing to the fact that states were no longer able to provide protection to large number of their citizens. In response to such demands the UN Assembly strengthened the role of the UN in humanitarian crisis by creating the position of High-level Emergency Relief Coordinator. As the UN Under-Secretary General Jans Eliasson, who was appointed to that mission observed later: "...tragedies such as Somalia and Bosnia have vividly shown how inadequately prepared the international system still is to deal decisively with humanitarian crisis. He and
others echoed the UN Secretary General’s proposals in his Agenda for Peace, for a readily available peace enforcement units for deployment by the UN security council as a way to reduce or diffuse crisis before they turn into disaster. 93

Another lucid illustration of the Post-Cold War tendency to put the interest of the individual above that of the state was given by the intervention in northern Iraq by Washington, London and Paris with the aim of establishing a separate form of Kurdish state. 94 This constituted not only a challenge to Baghdad’s sovereignty, but also an unprecedented innovation in the policy of humanitarian intervention, a moral justification which, basing its legitimacy on article 34 of the UN charter, obligates the UN Security Council to "assume primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace". During the Cold War period such a task was next to impossible. It is also in this light that we must see not only the United Nations Security Council’s involvement in Somalia from 23rd January 1992, but also its adoption of resolution 794 on 3rd December 1992, with a view to establishing a "secure environment" for humanitarian operations in Somalia.

As the new primordial forces swept across the globe, the possible disastrous effect on Africa acquired greater importance for two reasons: the prevalence of authoritarian regimes in Africa on the one hand and the fragility of African colonially imposed boundaries on the other. The latter was particularly important given the fact that for three decades, the OAU had inculcated in its member states the necessity of maintaining African international frontiers as inherited from the colonial powers since any slight change in them would lead to chaos and anarchy.

It is hence not surprising that many observers on the African scene foresaw a continent rocked with ethnic strife, challenges to boundaries and a growing number of civil wars. According to Volmen (1993), the major characteristics of the new world order include
increased political demands for political democracy and the intensification of ethnic and other conflicts which call national integrity into question.\textsuperscript{95}

As regards challenges to African international boundaries, the Economist (London) of 1991 put it even more lucidly: "that is something Africa will have to put up with. Peaceful secessions, based on the freely expressed wish of the peoples, may be preferable to decades of debilitating civil war. It need not mean a wholesale redrawal of frontiers, or a license to every prosperous pocket in the continent to copy Katanga. But after a generation of independence, Africa may have to shed some of its shibboleths to catch up with the rest of the world." \textsuperscript{96}

While a role model had already been provided by the former communist block, a more pointed illustration was in Africa, where Ethiopia's post-Mengistu administration had already endorsed Eritrea independence in 1993. It is hence no wonder that even though there was no government in Mogadishu with which to negotiate Somaliland's independence, the SNM leader, Ibrahim Egal, in an interview with the Weekly Review (Kenya) in early 1991 in Nairobi, was hard put to explain the secession in terms of global trends: "...secession is the mode of the day today .... the whole of Eastern Europe has broken up...." \textsuperscript{97}

Although at the moment the OAU was already struggling to relieve itself of the limitations of its charter, its dilemma on the issue and the most likely options confronting the continent remained as conceptualized by a leading British scholar at a Cambridge conference back in 1991:

" .... although the majority of Africa's current frontiers will almost certainly remain, there may be occasional cases where divorce along the lines of the Bangladesh secession becomes the answer, or, alternatively an opposition movement may retain tacitly accepted control over its home region, because the central government cannot
conquer it and the insurgents cannot gain formal recognition of independent statehood".98

4.3.1.1 The IMF and World Bank Conditionalities

As these new forces continued to besiege the notion of sovereignty, they were reinforced by the economic and political conditionalities, which in themselves had become the hallmark of the Post-Cold War World. Following the collapse of the Eastern bloc, the IMF and the World Bank found it necessary to implement the western determination of transforming the Post-World War II international economic order based on the principle of economic liberalism.99 During the Cold War period, this was not possible as the Eastern bloc had provided a viable alternative to the Western lending. The Post-Cold War World was characterized not only by dwindling financial resources, but also multiplication of claimants as the members of the former Eastern bloc joined in the race for Western funding. These, coupled with the diversion of traditional assistance flows to humanitarian emergencies such as famine and drought, especially in Africa, so heightened the competition for scarce financial resources that countries which lacked good governance and sensible economic policies, like Africa, risked losing it. In the Post-Cold War period, moreover, Africa had lost its geopolitical significance which in the Cold War period, had enabled it to derive a disproportionate influence from the superpower confrontation.100 To quote Stephen Rosenfield, editor of the Washington Post, the west had lost:

"..... interest by virtue of having won the Cold War ...(Africa) stands a fate worse in some respects than being fought over ...... being ignored"101

The danger of marginalisation combined with Africa's deepening economic crisis in the 1980s, to make it especially intolerable to the IMF and World Bank conditionalities.102 In
the eyes of most donor governments, Africa had become a bottomless pit which did not merit any further aid from the West. Nevertheless, the West’s long standing historical and moral commitments to Africa, ensured that, in whatever form, aid would continue to flow from the industrialized world.

It was against this background that a historic session on Africa at the UN headquarters in 1986 culminated in the IMF and World Banks’ decision to demand implementation of economic reform programme as a precondition for the giving of further developmental assistance to Africa. Thence forward, aid was to be tied to the establishment of good governance, the lack of which, it was believed, was the root cause of Africa’s economic predicament.103

Being the lenders of last resort, Africa had to abide by the bank’s policies or perish.104 Moreover, political reforms were increasingly seen as a sine-qua-non for the success of these policies, including movement towards democratic institutions, accountability and improvement in the field of human rights observation.105

Besides the fact that these policies were an infringement in the sovereign rights of the African states and other less developed countries, they were expected to play a formidable role in aiding the Post-Cold War ethnic nationalistic sentiments which in themselves were already besieging the traditional concept of sovereignty.

Over the years, political excesses and massive human rights violations in Africa had been a major concomitant to rising economic difficulties. There was thus the danger that political reform might be seen as a panacea to economic difficulties. Should such political reform fail to yield economic prosperity, there was very real dangers of a return to disenchantment with the attendant instability. This danger was underscored by two major factors: in the first instance Africa, by itself, was unlikely to alter its unfavorable
international economic circumstances. Secondly the economic reforms inspired by the IMF and the World Bank had the potential to have very adverse effects on the poor segments of the society, as has clearly been depicted by Payer:

"The IMF has quite definite ideas about who should bear the burden of spending cuts - also definite ideas that wages should be repressed and social spending curtailed while tax concessions are given to foreign investors and laws are changed if necessary to facilitate foreign participation in the economy. It is in fact the rich and the powerful elites who enjoyed the fruits of earlier borrowings and who were responsible for accumulating the foreign debts who benefit from the IMF austerity programmes. The poor, those who have gained nothing from past borrowings, have to shoulder the burden of economic adjustment."

As the economic reforms continue to alienate the poor sections of the society, it was expected that this would lead to polarisation of particularistic groupings as parties crystallise around tribal, regional or religious interests rather than common ideologies or political principles. As a result, the unity of the state would be severely jeopardised. As an observer put it:

"All endeavours of economic and democratic transformation... will fail if a far more basic malaise is not overcome. The division, even antagonism between the modern territorial state and ethnicity... one may even say that ethnicity is well and alive whereas the African state is not."

Once the ensuing ethnic conflict gets out of hand, it has the potential to plunge the country into full scale civil war with all its disastrous economic, political and social effects. As such, Baynham argued rightly that:
"for the remainder of the century one of the hardest tasks will be that of maintaining support for policies which inevitably make most people poorer without simultaneously destroying the ambition and will to succeed in the years to come."^{109}

The fear has indeed been underscored by the cautious approach that some western countries have exhibited towards Africa as noted by the Nairobi bureau chief of the *Times Magazine* in 1992:

"France made it clear this year in several West African countries that democracy is relative, and that Paris would not promote chaos over stability. The British seemed to prefer stability as well. US Envoy Smith Hampstone's relentless three year derive for multi-party democracy in Kenya had British diplomats irate over its naivete'............"^{110}

In a nutshell, the Post-Cold War resurgence of ethnic nationalism, coupled with the Post-Cold War advent of the IMF and World Bank's economic and political conditionalities, were more than anything else the driving force behind the Post-Cold War shift in the OAU's notion of sovereignty and hence of what constitutes an African Regional Status quo.

4.3.1.2 The OAU Shift inPosition

Such a change of notion was intricately linked to the application of the article three (III) of the OAU Charter, which, it was believed, was the Achille's heel of the organisation with respect to its resolution of Africa's civil wars. As early as 1991, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda had asked --"does genocide against one's own people constitute an internal affair?" in reaction to the then helpless situation in Liberia.^{111} During an official visit to Kenya in early 1991, the OAU Secretary General, Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim in an interview with IPS, noted that the non-interference clause of the OAU Charter had outlived its usefulness: "I
think this was a wrong reading of the Charter of OAU. The basic premise of the OAU is sanctity and dignity of the African people.\textsuperscript{112}

This new current of thought was also reflected in the many International Conferences in the Post-Cold War period. At one such conference held in Arusha, Tanzania in 1990, jointly sponsored by African peoples' organisations, African governments and the UN agencies, an \textit{African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation} was adopted. In its conclusion the charter declared that: "It is manifestly unacceptable that popular participation be seen as anything less than the centre piece in the struggle to achieve economic and social justice for all"\textsuperscript{113}.

At another conference jointly sponsored by the \textit{African Leadership Forum, the OAU and UNECA} in Kampala, Uganda in 1991, it was agreed that while lasting solutions to the problems of security and instability was a \textit{sine qua non} for sufficient progress towards development and democracy, the security, stability and development of every African country affected every other African country. In other words, the sovereignty of African states did not preclude their interdependence. In its final report, the conference proposed the establishment of a Permanent Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA). In its call for the establishment of a continental peacekeeping machinery and for the domestic lowering of military spending by African states, the meeting further besieged the African concept of the sovereignty of states.\textsuperscript{114}

The theme was taken up by the OAU's Secretary General and at the subsequent OAU conferences, African leaders began to confront global security issues by seriously considering how they might cooperate to reduce inter-state and domestic conflicts and in the process create conditions conducive to democracy and sustained development.
It was at the OAU summit in Dakar, Senegal in 1992 that the OAU Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim first proposed an OAU mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution. At the 1993 OAU summit in Cairo, Egypt, this was established with the result that the concept of sovereignty of African states was severely transformed. At the OAU summit in Tunis in 1994, African leaders demonstrated their support for the new thrust for preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution when they pledged to eradicate the root causes of refugee flows, adopt a code of conduct for intra-African relations and "scrupulously observe the principle of non-interference in one another's internal affairs". Indeed, the crisis in Rwanda and Africa's efforts to manage its internal conflicts dominated the Agenda of Tunis summit, with President Mandela of the Republic of South Africa declaring that the terrible slaughter of the innocent in Rwanda was a "stern and severe rebuke" to African leaders. He further stated that: "We have it in ourselves as Africans to change all these. We must in action assert our will to do so."1

It is hence logical to state that the Post-Cold War shift in the notion of sovereignty and the impact that this had on what constitutes a threat to Africa's territorial status quo had considerably moderated the threat that the Somali conflict had on Africa's regional status quo. In effect Somaliland's secession was just another manifestation of the resurgence of the premordial forces following the collapse of the bipolar world. Hence rather than intervene in a manner reminiscent of its involvement in Nigeria in 1967 or Zaire in 1964, the OAU decided to adopt a "wait and see" approach in case a new government would emerge in Mogadishu to recognise Somaliland's secession. Indeed, this was the general position taken by those who participated in the early peace making efforts in Somali, which involved, not only Somalia's former colonial powers, Italy and Britain, but also a Superpower, the US. For instance, during the "National reconciliation" talks held in Djibouti in 1991, the African
Bureau of the US State Department carefully avoided statements that went beyond the desires of either Italy or Great Britain and hence, favoured the preservation of the Republic of Somalia as originally constituted in 1960. As explained by a Foreign Service Officer (FSO) in the African Bureau:

"We'll deal with a legally constituted government in Mogadishu because that is what the Europeans and especially Italy wants.........the most likely scenario in which we might recognise the northern independence is if the north and the south extend mutual recognition of the internal legitimacy of both governments and this decision is diplomatically recognised by both Italy and Great Britain".117

This stand of the African bureau was first an early manifestation of the silence which was displayed by the subsequent national reconciliation conferences as regards Somaliland's secession, especially following the latter's uncompromising stand, and which came to clearly irritate the SNM and its leadership.118 It is little wonder that the ICO rebuffed the SNM's urgent appeal for assistance in July 1991 with the reply that it (the SNM) ought to take part in the peace talks that would ensure the reconstruction and unity of Somaliland.119 Even the modest reference to "Unity of Somalila" by the ICO did not rule out the recognition of Somaliland should the pace have been set by Mogadishu itself, as the subsequent endorsement of Eritrean Independence by Ethiopia in 1993 was to demonstrate. It is, in short, difficult to ignore the Post-Cold War shift in the notion of sovereignty and especially its impact on the African continent if we seek to give a critical look at the level of threat posed by the Somali conflict to Africa's Regional status quo.

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4.3.2. Somaliland’s Secession And The Somali Society.

Somalia differs from other African Countries in that it lacks in major ethnic and religious divisions which had rendered the civil wars in Nigeria, Zaire and Chad rather explosive. Instead the Somali Republic has a common language, religion and culture. Nevertheless, the post-independence Somalia had its own divisions which included inter alia; its social and occupational stratification; differences between rural and urban; clan forms of social organization and its north-south regional divide. Of these divisions, that between the north-western former British Somaliland and the southern former Italian Somaliland was the most explosive, given the former’s past accusations against the latter of exploitation and oppression, a major underlying factor for the rise of SNM in 1981. Even during the initial stages, it was not unrealistic for the SNM to consider secession. Somaliland had a long history of self-reliance based on nomadism and export of cattle. Further more it had close religious and trading links with the oil producing states of Gulf besides having the strategic card of the port of Barbera.

In the words of the SNM leader, Mr. Ibrahim Egal during an interview with the Weekly Review (Kenya) in Nairobi in January 1994, "Somaliland became independent four days before the Italians gave independence to the south and the union was voluntary. At the time, the idea of a greater Somalia was very appealing to the northern Somalis. Hence the partition should be voluntary." Egal further noted that for thirty years, Somaliland was practically a state within a state. Indeed, just like Eritrea, no new map would be needed to accommodate Somaliland’s secession if we are to go by the 1935 map of Africa. Hence, had Somaliland’s secession been preceded by a protracted war of independence similar to that of Eritrea, the overall trend could have been that of a return to, rather than a threat to Africa’s territorial status quo.
It is however, instructive that prior to the removal of President Barre and the subsequent fall of the Somali government, the idea of secession or independence had not featured in Somali conflict. This was even the case despite the fact that a northern secession would be difficult to contain by the Somali government. If it flew over the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, there was the danger of involving Ethiopia in the conflict. If it moved northwards around the triangle of the Ogaden, the southern troops would find themselves in a semi-desert, surrounded by the hostile nomads of the northern Isaaq tribes and subjected to guerilla attacks from the Ethiopian bases. While a southern force small enough to live off the land was likely to be massacred, a force large enough to win the first few battles of the major war would starve. Indeed, a northern secession had the potential of bringing down Barre's government, given the nature of the Somali Society. Nevertheless, the SNM only began to pursue secession as a goal following the collapse of the Somali government. According to a statement made by the former colonel of the Somali army, the primary goal of the SNM was the removal of the Somali government and its replacement with one that would give real regional autonomy to the north. Alternatively, he added, "we will take the north out of Somalia all together."¹²⁶

Further evidence of the unity of the opposition prior to the fall of President Barre's government is provided by the rebel agreement of August 1990 according to which the opposition movements were to consult one another prior to the formation of the post-Barre government. Indeed, Ali Madi's installation as President by a section of the USC following the removal of President Barre was in direct contravention to this agreement and hence the northern secession¹²⁷.

Unlike the Ethiopian case therefore, Somaliland's secession did not lead to the collapse of the central government. On the contrary it was the collapse of the Central
Government which, in a sense, induced Somaliland’s secession. Even in the more explosive cases such as the Nigerian civil war or the Congo crises, the subject of secession dominated the conflicts from beginning to end and in some cases such as the Nigerian civil war, the defeat of the secessionist forces also marked the end of the conflict. During such conflicts, the moral and sometimes diplomatic support from the OAU and its member states to the central government played a crucial role in influencing the defeat of the secessionist forces. In this respect, the absence of a credible government in Mogadishu can be viewed as having been a major deterrent to the OAU involvement. In the same respect, Somaliland’s secession can be viewed as having been a part of the overall problem of the collapse of the Central Government and hence its low level of threat to the territorial status quo.

Somaliland’s threat to African territorial status quo can also be examined in the light of Somalia’s past history of irrendentism. Underlying such irrendentist forces were not only the wish of the Somalis to unite under one Somali government, but also the Somali government’s policy to down play its clan and regional differences by emphasizing the “recovery” of the Somali inhabited areas of the neighbouring countries. The resultant nationalistic tendencies did not auger well for the OAU since they threatened to change the colonially imposed boundaries, not only within Somali but also in the neighbouring Somali inhabited countries in the region, namely, Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. To the extent that Somaliland’s secession reduced such irrendentist forces, it was not likely to be viewed as a major threat to Africa’s territorial status quo. This is especially emphasized by the fact that the union between the former British Somaliland and the former Italian Somaliland was a major facet of such irredentism in the early 1960s.

In sum, the level of threat that Somaliland’s secession posed to African territorial status quo can be examined at three stages: its threat to the immediate post-independence
status quo; its threat to the territorial status quo prevailing at the time of the secession and; its overall threat to African territorial status quo both at the time of independence and at the eve of the secession. It posed a low level of threat to the immediate post-independence territorial status quo, given the colonial background, separate independence and long history of self-reliance within the union of 1960. Its level of threat to the territorial status quo at the time of secession was also considerably moderated by the fact that it featured as one major consequence of the collapse of the Central Government in Somalia. In general, moreover, Somali irredentism of which the union of 1960 was one major facet, has posed considerable threat to African territorial status quo, both at independence and on the eve of the secession. The low level of threat that Somaliland secession posed to African territorial status quo can be observed in the light of its negative implications on Somali irredentism. This argument is reinforced even further by the fact that Somalis share a common language and religion, also major underlying factors for such irredentism.

4.3.3 Somalia's Geo-political significance and African Regional Status Quo in the Post-cold War period

One major effect of the end of the Cold War was the loss of strategic significance which had been enjoyed by a number of African countries including Somalia. Such strategic factors were responsible for the fact that superpower confrontations were increasingly extended into Africa, especially the horn of Africa, culminating into what was appropriately viewed as a threat to African security. Such Cold War encroachment into the African continent in turn evoked an OAU response which was increasingly aimed at keeping the superpowers out of African disputes. For instance, at the OAU summit in Libreville in 1977, a Senegalese sponsored resolution condemning all non-African interference in the continent
was adopted unanimously. Similar resolutions were passed in Khartoum in 1978 where a number of committees were also set up to resolve inter-state conflicts that often invited external intervention. The summit condemned the policy of force and intervention in Africa regardless of the source and opposed all plans to recolonize Africa as well as any attempts or acts incompatible with the principles and objectives of the continent. While reaffirming its commitment to the principle of respect for Africa sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, it rejected the French inspired pan-African security forces and added that "the responsibility for the safety of peace in Africa is the responsibility of the Africans only".129

Finally, the summit agreed that the OAU security council might be set up in order "to contain and solve all our (African) conflicts and problems in a peaceful manner and in an African spirit."130

The subsequent encroachment of Cold War politics into the UN and even the Non-aligned Movement was responsible for the fact that the OAU's suspicion was even extended to these bodies. At the OAU summit in Khartoum in 1978, for instance, the Chairman of the eight nation special committee created by the 1973 OAU summit to resolve the dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia, Olusegun Obasanjo, recounted the efforts he had made to stop the Western powers from taking the conflict to the UN and to the non-aligned states. Indeed, a number of inter-African disputes which had been taken to the UN Secretary General or Security Council were referred back to the OAU due to the pressure from the African Group at the UN. These include the disputes between: Burundi and Rwanda; Guinea and Ivory Coast; Angola and Zaire and; Libya and Chad.131

Besides its strategic importance however, Somalia could not boast of any other Superpower interest even during the Cold War. Without any mineral resources comparable to Zaire's uranium; Chad's platinum, uranium and oil and; Nigerian oil, Somalia's geopolitical
significance was doomed to end following the thawing of the superpower confrontations. The presence of the strategic uranium mineral in both Zaire and Chad was particularly a contributing factor for the fact that both the Congo crisis and the civil war in Chad were increasingly "internationalized". The move by the extra-ordinary session of the OAU council of Ministers in New York in 1964 to refer the issue of foreign military intervention in the Congo (Leopoldville) to the UN security council was not only aimed at some African states, which aided the rebels, e.g. Algeria, Sudan, Ghana and Egypt but also to China and the Soviet Union, which were involved. In the civil war in Chad, the Soviet Union was viewed by some Western powers as a beneficiary not only to Libya's annexation of the Uranium rich Aozou strip in 1975, but also to Libya's expansionist policies which were highlighted by the merger between President Weddeyes government in Chad and President Qaddafi's government in Libya in 1980. Hence the high level of involvement in Chad of France and later, the U.S. In response to the high-level of presence of the foreign troops in Chad, some OAU member states decided to take a common stand as was reflected in the seventeenth ordinary session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State in Freetown in July 1980, in which the civil war was discussed and the standing committee created under the chairmanship of Nigeria.

During the meeting of the Bureau of the OAU Standing Committee on Chad in Lome in November 1980, the Heads of State decided that all forces engaged in the battle for N'djamena should withdraw to a distance of at least 60 miles from the city. During its Lagos summit on 23 and 24 December, 1980, the Standing Committee agreed that all foreign forces should be removed from the country. The subsequent announcement of the merger evoked an emergency meeting of the Bureau of the OAU Standing Committee on 14th January, 1981 in Lome, where it was decided that an OAU peacekeeping force be sent to Chad to replace
the foreign troops whose removal was also called upon. At the same time, the OAU Secretary General was given the mandate to organize a free and fair elections by the end of April 1981.\textsuperscript{135} Even in the Nigeria civil war, the arrival of Soviet military supplies was quite instrumental in inducing higher levels of OAU involvement.\textsuperscript{136}

In the Post-Cold War period, however the loss of strategic influence has reduced the threat which the Superpower confrontation implied to African security and hence its regional status quo. Nothing is more indicative of this fact than the failure of the international community to treat the Somali crisis with the same kind of urgency as it did other crises outside Africa which were still geo-politically perceived to be important, namely Iraq and the former Yugoslavia. According to many policy makers and national security analysts in the US, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the movement of socialist regimes in Africa towards multiparty democracies and private enterprises had eliminated the chief threat to the American interests in the continent. They further contend that at a time when the US confronts domestic problems, and crises in other parts of the world, Africa should be at the bottom of the Superpower's list of international priorities. Moreover, they point out, American allies in Europe, especially France are also reluctant to become involved in African conflicts because their attention is focussed on conflicts in Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{137} According to Volmen's study, for instance, conflict engulfed six countries which had traditionally been the focus of American interests in Africa between 1990 and 1993 namely, Somalia, Liberia, Ethiopia, Chad, Kenya and Zaire. Yet it was only in Somalia that the Bush administration managed to militarily intervene in December 1992, almost two years after the collapse of the Government in Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{138}

The two year delay was itself ironic given American share of responsibility to Somalia's political instability. For as the clan tensions sharpened in the 1980s, the mediative
Reinforcing the above arguments is Michaelson's contention that owing to the lack of foreign interests, Somali conflict posed no visible threat to international peace. Noting that the only manner in which the Somalia conflict could be perceived as a threat to international peace was in view of refugee problem, he proceeds to rule this out as a plausible explanation for the UN decision to militarily intervene in Somalia: "nowhere have I seen the refugee issue offered as an explanation or justification for the UN intervention."

Hence, the UNOSUM/UNITAF intervention were seen as strictly humanitarian. It is only in this light that one can clearly comprehend not only the OAU's low level of involvement in the Somali conflict but also its apparent endorsement of as high level of an extra-African involvement as the UNOSOM/UNITAF military intervention in December 1992. While the OAU's low level of involvement in the conflict was clearly conditioned by the low level of threat that, it was perceived, it posed to African territorial status quo, the low level of threat that the UNOSOM/UNITAF intervention posed to Africa's Post-Cold War security was a major contributing factor towards the OAU's endorsement of that external intervention. Hence, the overall low level of threat to African regional states quo and the concomittant low level of the OAU involvement.

4.4 Conclusions

The establishment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in 1993 seems to have rendered Article III of the OAU Charter almost irrelevant to the subsequent roles that the organization has played in resolving some of the African civil wars as demonstrated by its participation in the Arusha peace accord which was secured
role of the somali traditional elders had not only been undermined by colonial and post-
colonial administrations, but also by the ready accessibility to arms by the Somalis in the post-
colonial period. Hence the UN Secretary General’s charges in 1992 that, "there are more
arms than food in Somalia, these arms were not fabricated by the Somalis, they were given
by the outside world to serve outside interests. Those who provide arms are parties to the
crime."139

The initial foot dragging within the UN security council in dealing effectively with the
Somali crises was also a reflection of Africa’s and especially Somalia’s Post - Cold War lack
of geo-political importance to the US, the then President of the security council, and other
western powers. This was also clearly pointed out by the UN Secretary General Boutros
Boutros Ghali in his charges against the members of the UN Security Council in July 1992.
Subsequently, a series of international initiatives followed including American airlifts of
food to Somalia and Northern Kenya in August 1992, the announcement by the White House
of US air transport for the 500 Pakistan UNOSOM peacekeepers and the arrival of the latter
in Somalia in September 1992 and the UN launching of the "100 Day Action Programme for
Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia" in October 1992.140 In an attempt to
explain the delayance of the international community in intervening in Somalia, Clark has
written of Somalia having fallen "through the cracks of the international system: "No longer a
strategic flash point with the end of the Cold War, Somalia simply could not garner the
political attention required for the scale of sustained and complex humanitarian assistance it
needed to avert catastrophe".141

Prior to his resignation as the UN Secretary General’s special envoy in Somalia in
November 1992, Mr. Mohammed Sahnoun also attributed the delayance to systemic factors:
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between the Rwandese Patriotic Front and the Rwanda government in August 1993. Following the October 1993 wave of killings in Burundi, the OAU's action of despatching a team of 33 military and civilian observers is further testimony to the fact that Article III of its Charter was becoming increasingly inapplicable. This was further underscored by the role that the OAU played in diffusing a rapidly developing crisis in the Congo by sending the former UN Secretary General's special envoy to Somalia, Mr. Mohammed Sahnoun. The most contemporary testimony to the OAU's change as regards its notion of sovereignty is perhaps the recent decision by its member states at a mini-summit in Arusha in 31st July 1996, to enforce sanctions against Major Pierre Buyoya's military government in Burundi in a bid to persuade it to unconditionally abide by the Arusha peace initiative, Mwanza peace process and in particular, restore constitutional order.

All these cases sharply contrast with the previous cases during the Cold War period since the OAU's involvements have not been conditioned by any threat of secession, irredentism or extra-African involvement. The situation in Somalia, however provides a departure from this trend. since by and large, Somalia is still cut off from the rest of the World with no semblance of a national government. It is still in no one's agenda to help Somalia do better beyond the supply of food aid and medicine. Two weeks after General Farah Aideed's death on 1st August 1996, the UN security council spent a few minutes taking cognisance of Somalia since March 1995 and only agreed to pay more attention and not to do anything further. The death of General Aideed while attacking Medina, a stronghold of his rival from Southern Mogadishu, Osman Ali "Atto", ushered in new hopes among the Somalis that this would be followed by a political breakthrough. Indeed, his rivals in Mogadishu, Osman Ali "Atto" and Ali Mahdi Mohhamed called for a ceasefire only to be replied with a
vow from the general’s son and successor, Hussein Mohammed Farah Aideed that he would “exterminate” his father’s enemies and renewed attacks.\textsuperscript{146}

Nevertheless, prospects for peace in Somalia have been increased by the declaration by Hussein Aideed of lack of ill-will against his accepted country or his local and more potent enemies. Indeed, this was translated into reality in mid-October 1996 when, at the invitation of President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya he travelled to Nairobi for talks with the other two factional leaders in Mogadishu, Ali Mahdi Mohammed and Osman Ali “Atto”, the first such meeting since 1994. The result was a joint communique on 15 October 1996 declaring an immediate ceasefire, including the dismantling of all road blocks along the green-lines, the cessation of negative “media propaganda” and the facilitation of humanitarian aid.\textsuperscript{147}

A former resident of Southern California in the US, Hussein Farah Aideed had returned to Somalia in mid July 1995, ostensibly to introduce his Somali American wife and young son to his father. On 17 September 1995, however, only two months later, General Aideed’s forces had captured the town of Baidoa and the former US Marine stayed on as Security Chief in this area. His tour finally got indefinitely extended when he was chosen by clan elders and high ranking politicians to lead the SNA and assume “Presidency” of the Republic of Somalia a few days after his father’s death. It is far from clear how much influence Hussein Aideed actually has. What is clear is that he is a hostage to his father’s legacy, his father’s advisors and his father’s enemies. Most important, he is hostage to his American citizenship.\textsuperscript{148}

In the meantime, only the north-west, the self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland has anything like a recognizable government with police, court and even taxes. Even here, however, Egal has been facing pockets of resistance engineered by General Aideed. In the west, towards the Ethiopian border, a small area is owned by Al-Itahad, an Islamist group
reportedly financed by Saudia Arabia. Its enforcement of Islamic Laws, which have the
capacity to transcend the various clan divisions has already attracted the attention of Ethiopia
which in early August, sent troops across the border, ostensibly against Islamic groups that
have been launching attacks inside its borders. According to the Ethiopians, they killed 232
"international terrorists". 149

There are, hence clear indications that the Libyan and Sudanese backed "government"
of Mr. Hussein Farah Aideed has a onerous task of reuniting Somalia back to a single state.
FOOTNOTES


3 Ibid.

4 Gataydh, op.cit., pp. 28


6 Clark, op.cit., p.11

7 *Africa Recovery*. No. 7, op.cit., p. 17

8 See Alim, K., Galaydh, op.cit.


10 Clarke, op.cit., p. 110.


12 Clark, op.cit., p. 110.

13 Clark, op.cit., p. 111.


15 *The Economist* (London) 6 March 1982, pp. 63-64.


17 Clark, op.cit., p. 111:


19 Clark, op.cit., p. 112.


See Makinda, op.cit.


Clark, op.cit., p. 116


Weekly Review (Kenya), 10 January 1992, p. 27.

Clark, op.cit., p. 117.


Clark, op. cit., 116.

Many Arab and African countries which volunteered to contribute troops to the UNITAF also indicated their willingness to transfer their units to UNOSOM II. See
part II of this chapter.


71 Ibid., 16 April 1994.


73 Ibid., 3 September 1993.


75 Ibid., 21 January 1994.

76 Ibid., 18 February 1994, p. 35.

77 Ibid., 18 March 1994.


80 Ibid., 11 March 1994, p.42.

81 Ibid., 18 March 1994.

82 Ibid., 1 April 1994, p. 31.

83 Ibid., 21 October 1994.


85 Ibid.
Ibid., Also see Ibid, 10 February 1995.


The Economist (London) 1 March 1995, p. 49.

Ibid., 18 February 1995.

Ibid., 1 March 1995.


Africa Recovery, No.7, op. cit., p. 3.


Baynham, op. cit.

Quoted in Africa Recovery, Vol. 314, October - December 1990, p. 10

Ibid., For further details on Africa's economic crisis, see Marguerite Michaels, "Retreat from Africa", Foreign Affairs, Vol 72, No. 1, 1993, pp. 95-96 and Simon.

103 Keller, op.cit., See also Baynham, After the Cold War: Political and Security Trends in Africa, op.cit

104 Mlambo, op.cit.

105 *Financial Mail*, 26 April 1991, p.28. In a leading article on the impact of World Bank/IMF policies, the Weekly continues on the same page, as follows: "Whether Banks' policies have been a success in Africa is open to argument. Certainly, the (World Bank) appears to have evidence of substantial and durable progress in other parts of the Third World, in particular, South America. It certainly acknowledges that African countries have indulged in such extreme and intransigent economic and social degradation that too many of its small national economies have become basket cases".


109 Baynham, op.cit.

110 Quoted in Marguerite Michaels, op.cit.


116 Schraeder, op.cit.


120 The Economist (London) 6 March 1982.


122 The Economist (London), 6th March 1982. The Superpowers were unlikely to be interested in the less strategic South incase of a Northern secession.


125 See Ibid, 6 March 1982.
127 See Makinda, op.cit.


132 Ibid., p. 436.


138 Volmen, op.cit., p. 4.

139 African Recovery, No.7, op.cit., p. 11.


141 Clark, op.cit., pp.112-116.


148 Ibid.

149 The Economist (London) 31 August 1996.
CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter shall consist mainly of summaries, conclusions, policy recommendations and then lastly, issues for further research. In our conclusions, we shall state our final findings, namely, whether our hypotheses have been confirmed or not. Our policy recommendations shall target not only the OAU and its member states, but also the international community at large.

5.1 Summary

In chapter one of this study, we stated that we intend to investigate the extent to which Article III of the OAU Charter has conditioned the selective involvement of the organisation in African civil wars and in particular, the extent to which that article has been responsible for the low level of OAU's involvement in Somali conflict (1991-1995).

Drawing from the systems theory, which we had chosen as our theoretical tool of analysis, we hypothesized that the higher the threat posed to African regional status quo, the higher the involvement of OAU in a given civil war and vice versa. Our choice of the systems theory and the Somali conflict was particularly significant in that the latter coincided with an important systemic event, namely the collapse of the Bipolar World.

In our methodology in chapter one, we also stated that this study would almost entirely depend on secondary sources of information supplemented by only a few primary documentary data. We further stated that our method of analysis would mainly be qualitative as opposed to quantitative since the former was deemed to be more appropriate to our secondary research.

In chapter two, we looked at the historical background of the OAU, that is, the historical evolution of Pan-Africanism and disunity before the formation of the OAU in 1963. The main intention of the chapter was to throw some light on the historical roots of Article III of the OAU
Charter, namely the desire of African leaders to preserve the post independence regional status quo. Our observation in Chapter Two, was that African conquest by the European colonial powers was more than anything else, attributable to their sense of disunity into tribal and sometimes sub-tribal groups. We also noted that after the conquest, the European colonizers continued to exploit Africa’s ethnic differences in order to perpetuate the domination and economic exploitation of Africa. The Africans on the other hand became increasingly aware that in disunity lies their major weakness and hence began to associate disunity with colonial domination and unity with freedom and independence. In chapter three, we noted how in the wake of the formation of the OAU, its member states increasingly exhibited a propensity to maintain the colonial boundaries as it was believed that any slight change in them might result in the redrawal of the whole map of Africa. We also noted how this fact was instrumental in influencing the insertion of Article III of the OAU Charter, whose main role was to perpetuate or preserve the post independence status quo. This was clearly demonstrated in the organisation’s intervention in the Congo crisis, the Nigerian civil war and the civil war in Chad on the one hand, and its low level or lack of involvement in the Sudanese civil war, the Burundi massacres, the Ugandan civil war and more recently the Somali conflict on the other.

It was in the light of this selective involvement that we set out in chapter four to investigate the extent to which Article III of the OAU Charter has been responsible for the organization’s low-level of involvement in Somali conflict between 1991 and 1995. This low level of involvement was particularly noted to be disturbing given the SNM’s declaration of an independent Republic of Somaliland to the north on 18 May 1991. This according to the African mode of thought, pointed to the possibility of redrawing the whole map of Africa. However as we are going to note below in our conclusions, a number of variables intervened to reduce the threat that this secession poses to the regional status quo in Africa.
5.2 Conclusions

Given the fact that we adopted qualitative analysis in our study, it is difficult to give figures indicating the relationships between the variables. Consequently we are going to state whether our dependant and independent variables have exhibited a positive, negative or no relationship at all.

On the basis of the available data, we have confirmed our hypothesis, namely, that the low-level of OAU's involvement in Somali conflict has been conditioned to a considerable extent by the low-level of threat that the conflict posed to the regional status quo in Africa. This positive relationship between dependent and independent variables has however to be qualified in the light of some other intervening variables that were encountered in this study.

In the first instance, the proliferation of internal wars following the collapse of the Eastern Bloc evoked a lot of pressure from many influential quarters for more to be done to assist victims of internal wars. This combined with the economic and political conditionalities which were related to the fall of the Soviet bloc but also to Africa's increasing economic woes, to change not only the international community's, but also more specifically the OAU's notion of sovereignty. In particular the OAU's change of view was responsible for the organizations' involvement in Burundi (1993), Rwanda (1994) and Zaire (1993).

Secondly, the Somali case differed from other African internal conflicts in that Somali had not been as ethnically or religiously divided as some other African countries. Indeed we noted that Somalia's real threat to Africa's post-independent status quo sprang not from its internal divisions but from its nationalistic tendencies which also stressed the "recovery" of Somali inhabited areas of the neighbouring states. The SNMS's declaration of northern independence only came in response to the collapse of the Central Government unlike most other secessions in Africa where the subject of secession has dominated the conflict almost totally. In case of Ethiopia, for instance, it led to the collapse of the Central Government. All the opposition movements in Somalia had been previously
united in removing President Barre as was indicated by their agreement in August 1990. Lastly, we noted that since Somalia was only a product of the merger between the British Somaliland and the Italian Somaliland in 1960, the secession, even if it had been top in SNM's agenda, could not have prompted any redrawal of African boundaries. In general, however, the Post-cold War international environment had changed the OAU's view of what actually constituted the regional status quo in Africa. Hence, Somali's level of threat to this emergent status quo was low as opposed to what could have been the case during the Cold War period.

Besides the low level of threat to African regional status quo, other factors might also have conditioned the OAU's low level of involvement in the Somali conflict. A notable factor would in this case be the organisations lack of resources (especially financial and logistical). Africa's economic backwardness dates back to the pre-colonial period when it was referred to as the "dark continent." This was, however, aggravated by its colonial history during when its mineral and agricultural endowments were exploited by the colonial powers. As regards conflict resolution, Africa's economic backwardness was particularly detrimental to its peacekeeping efforts as was demonstrated by the civil war in Chad. As regards other methods of involvement besides peacekeeping, Africa's economic backwardness have not counted much as was demonstrated by the OAU's involvement in the Congo crisis and the Nigerian civil war. Even without considering the creation of ad hoc committees, the OAU's level of involvement could be reflected in the appearance of the issue in question, in its agenda, its discussion within the OAU proceedings, the issuance of diplomatic statements by the OAU leadership as regards the issue in question, et cetera. All these required less or no financial and logistical support as compared to the peacekeeping operations in Chad.

All in all, the economic underpinnings of the selective involvement of OAU in African civil wars cannot be ignored, especially given the fact that towards the end of 1980s, Africa seemed to be
in economic crisis.\footnote{1} It is hence possible that the member states were too pre-occupied with their political and economic problems to have any room for events happening within the boundaries of the neighbouring states and more especially if these did not affect their immediate interests.\footnote{2}

Economic underpinnings could hence provide another possible contributing factor to the selective involvement of the OAU in African civil wars in general and for its low-level of involvement in Somalia in particular. There is however need for further investigations before a more conclusive view is arrived at.

5.3 Policy Recommendations

We shall in this study advance only policy guidelines and not attempt to give any final prescriptions to Africa’s problem of internal strife. The focus will be mainly on pointing out some weaknesses in past national, regional and international policies which, if taken into account by policy makers, may contribute to more viable policies. Such policy guidelines will, of necessity include the major contributing factors to civil strife in Africa. It is our belief that as policy makers become increasingly aware of such causes, they will formulate national, regional and international policies which have more bias towards eradication of such causes.

Many reasons may be given to explain the phenomenon of civil wars in Africa. However, both scholars and political practitioners concur on the fact that Africa’s political instability is deeply rooted in its low level of development. Among the scholars who have associated African civil wars with economic deprivation are Nyong’o (1986)\footnote{3}, Asante (1987)\footnote{4}, Cornwell (1991)\footnote{5}, Timberlake (1988)\footnote{6} and Lipset and Schneider (1987)\footnote{7}. The pursuit of peace and that of development is therefore seen in this study as synonymous.

Although the IMF/World Bank inspired SAPs might succeed in removing Africa’s structural policy defects, which have for decades constrained Africa’s development, African leaders should
implement them with a lot of care given their adverse effects which might prove even more disastrous for Africa’s development and hence its security. The notion of good governance should not only be applied with a view to achieving economic prosperity, but should also be applied with their social and security dimensions taken into account.

African leaders should strive to reduce their dependence on the west, for this, as has been demonstrated, can lead to a sense of blackmail on African countries to adopt policies designed to benefit, not themselves but the foreign interests. Such a strategy should envisage a steady and progressive replacement of the vertical north bound orientations of their economies with horizontal trade links, first within Africa, and then, with other Third World countries. Alternatively Africa might use the strategy of diversification with a view to reducing their dependence on a few markets in the west whose high level of technological growth is steadily displacing the primary commodities on which Africa depends for export. As Asante has noted, diversification, not elimination of dependence in the initial stages of regional adventure would seem to be almost a sine qua non for regionalism in Africa. This has also been stressed by Ali Mazrui in his Reith lectures:

"there are occasions when freedom begins with the multiplication of one’s masters. If one is owned and controlled by only one power, freedom is often particularly restrictive. But if one African society cultivates the skill to have more than one hegemonic power competing for it, this has possibilities for Liberation. To be dependent on two giants, especially when the giants have rivalries between them, is sometimes an opportunity to play one against the other and maximize options".

Meanwhile, African leaders should strive to reduce their dependence on the IMF/World Bank by maximizing on the scarce resources they have and only borrow when they have to. This would not only reduce the vulnerability of African economies to some questionable IMF/World Bank prescriptions, but would also enhance their role in alleviating Africa’s debt burden.
In acknowledgement of the difficulties entailed in such an inward looking strategy, we recommend that international community assist African efforts towards the attainment of self-sustained economic growth which, according to Nyong’o will need special concentration in industrial and agricultural sector, both of which provide the motor for development in African economies. Although the Lagos Plan of Action has dismissed the notion that African industrial maladies can be cured by market forces and although it has hence proceeded to place the task of initiating and sustaining the process of integrated economic and social development of Africa squarely in the hands of Africa, it is still kind of ambitious to assume that Africa's industrialization can succeed without action from other international actors. For the NIEO, as envisaged by the LPA, to succeed, there is need for a radical transformation of international economic, political and social system, which will entail the adjustment of primary commodity prices to the levels renumerative enough to compare favourably with the prices that producer countries pay for the capital goods and inputs; increase of assistance in real terms by the international social forces that control the Official Development Assistance (ODA) so that African countries can rely less on international commercial borrowing to finance their development and; adjustment of interest rates by the international banking and lending institutions and the renouncing of some debts in order to allow African countries a breathing space to begin implementing the Lagos Plan of Action by African states.

Civil wars and border conflicts in Africa can be traced to as far back as the 19th century Scramble for Africa, when African boundaries were arbitrarily drawn in order to suit the interests of the imperialist powers. These boundaries, which cut across ethnic groups, religious groups and even families were left intact following the attainment of independence by African states. As a result, underlying Africa’s pursuit of development has been real fear of border conflicts, secessionism, irredentism and ethnic tensions. Such fears have of course been justified by the subsequent range of border conflicts and civil wars in Africa. This according to Nyong'o’s
As Asante has rightly observed, far reaching changes, especially in the military establishments, are necessary before Africa is able to attain a sustained economic growth. Between 1976-80, for example, Africa’s import of foreign arms amounted to $55.5 billion while the rest of the Third world imported arms to the value of US$26.5 billion during the same period. While public expenditure in Africa in 1980 was estimated at $26 per capita, expenditure per soldier averaged $9.449.

The implication of high level of military spending on democracy has not only been a big worry to African leaders of late (see the Kampala Document in chapter 4 of this text) but also to some foreign actors who have in recent years spearheaded the drive towards democracy in Africa. As such for both political and economic reasons the US’s Post-Cold War policy framework envisaged a more broadened and deepened US involvement in programmes to reduce and rationalize the continent’s military establishments.

At another level, Africa’s colonial legacy has been a major contributing factor in undermining Africa’s development in that the struggle for independence was expected to culminate in economic prosperity for the continent. These expectations were even raised higher by the few democratic institutions which were created subsequent to Africa’s independence. The subsequent realization by African leaders, however, that such expectations could not be fulfilled by the small economies of African states, was instrumental in the subsequent stifling of democratic institutions and their subsequent replacement with personal rule dictatorship. In this era of the SAPs, African leaders should give adequate attention to the tendency of some of their subjects to associate SAPs with future economic recovery, especially given the juxtaposition of economic and political liberalization.
Many empirical indicators have pointed to association of democratic values with stability and development and authoritarianism with instability and underdevelopment. Ninalowo has for instance related democratic properties to ameliorative/progressive social change on the one hand and authoritarianism to retrogressive social change or underdevelopment on the other.17

Although most of the implications of underdevelopment on African stability have already been examined at the beginning of this chapter, it is also important to note that conflicts and particularly civil wars in Africa are also attributable to uneven development within and among nation states as a result of uneven ways in which colonialism incorporated them into the world market. As noted by Nyong'o, out of such situations have sprang secessionism as well as social and political conflicts.18 This might also be a contributing factor to the post-independence surge in military spending, authoritarianism and the resultant high level of political instability.

From whichever way one looks at it, the chain of reactions are patently clear. The problem of African civil wars can be tackled right from its roots; Africa's colonial legacy, of either arbitrary boundaries or uneven incorporation into the world economy. Although both have been aggravated by the domestic policy inadequacies of independent African governments, they can still be resolved by the African leadership, with assistance from the international community.

Even before the formation of the OAU in 1963, Kwame Nkurumah had prescribed a political union for this malady.19 Although major disagreements arose with regard to means, there was a clear consensus that political union was the ultimate goal of the Organisation of African Unity.20 More recently, Nyong'o has suggested that the solution to the legacy of international discord and instability arising out of conflicts over territorial boundaries lies not in irredentism, but in regional and sub-regional programmes of development.21 If we are to go by the suggestions of Nkurumah and Nyong'o, then the long term achievement of the objectives of LPA of 1980 will go along way in resolving Africa's problems not only of arbitrary boundaries and uneven development, but also of
high military expenditures and authoritarianism. As the distinguished International Relations scholar Hans Morgenthau observed, men do not fight because they have arms, but acquire arms because they deem it necessary to fight.\(^22\)

It is also necessary in this context to point out some of the structural weaknesses of the OAU and how these can be changed to make the organisation more responsive to African conflicts in future.

One structural weakness of the OAU, namely, the Article III of its Charter, which has prevented it from intervening in some African civil wars, has so far been rendered ineffective with the creation at the 1993 Cairo summit of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.\(^23\) However, the suggestion of Dr. Bakwesegha, who is also in charge of the OAU's conflict division, that Africans should be the sole guarantor of the success of this body in terms of resources as well as support seems quite presumptuous.\(^24\) Its presumption springs from the fact that the OAU's weakness in terms of material resources has affected its effective involvement, not only in internal wars (the most revealing one is Chad), but also in cross border conflicts, especially since 1973. Besides, the OAU's weakness in resources has been responsible for the fact that it has not only been ineffective in meeting the challenge of foreign intervention in African affairs, but has also done so more often than not with a divided mind. This was clearly demonstrated by its 13th summit in Libreville in 1977 and its 14th summit in Khartoum in 1978, at the latter of which the organisation only managed to reach a disturbing compromise on the issue of foreign military intervention; the right of African states to appeal for help in countries of their choice, amounting to an unofficial invitation for foreign powers to intervene in the affairs of the continent.\(^25\)

It is hence necessary that the international community aid the OAU's efforts in conflict resolution through its newly created Peace Fund. The more reason for this is that the $300-400 million required by the Peace Fund represents only 10 percent of the $3-4 billion which the
international community has spent in resolving the previous conflicts in Africa. Currently the Fund
is reported to have $3.5 million with the OAU allocating to it $1 million, approximately 5 percent
of its annual budget per year.26

A more credible suggestion is Lunn's African Regional Security Council which should be
closely linked to the UN security council in a more or less loose federation of international peace
keeping force. This, according to this study will not only remove the duplicating roles of the UN
security council and the regional peace keeping operations, but would also be cheaper in the long
run.27

The fact that the US State Department has envisaged an identity of interest with the OAU in
the Post-Cold War conflict resolution is, therefore reassuring. In this facet of policy dimension, the
US State Department urges that Washington should support Africa's initiatives to enhance OAU's
capabilities, especially in logistical and communications requirement. In the meantime, the rise of
apartheid free South Africa provides a glimmer of hope for the OAU's future role in conflict
resolution. One major contributing factor for the OAU's structural weakness has been the fact that
unlike the OAS or the NATO it lacks the membership of any of the world's superpowers. Hence the
South African Republic, which is better placed both economically and militarily, can be able to fill
this gap. This fact has also been acknowledged by the policy makers in the west and in particular the
US whose Post-Cold War policy of reducing and rationalizing Africa's military establishment has
exonerated the RSA.28 In the meantime, the use of preventive diplomacy should be taken seriously
by African leaders so as to avert potentially explosive civil wars which, if they explode, might
require the more expensive peace keeping operation which Africa cannot afford.

Closely related to the OAU's weakness in terms of material resources is the limitations of the
authority granted to the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration under Article XIX of
the OAU Charter. Like the ICJ, it lacks the authority to require that the conflicting parties appear
before it. While the World Court is able to interpret the UN Charter, however, the Commission lacks the authority to interpret the Charter of OAU, a major structural weakness. Likewise under article 94, the World Court decisions may be enforced by the UN Security Council while the OAU Commission of Mediation, Reconciliation and Arbitration lacks the provision for the enforcement of its decisions, a fact which again calls for Lunn's proposal of African Regional Security Council.

Lastly, there is a need to strengthen the powers of the OAU Secretary General, especially given the recent creation of the OAU's Machinery for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. Currently, the Secretary General has an office constitutionally similar to that of the Secretary General of the Arab League but weaker than that of the OAS or the UN.

5.4 Issues for Further Research

This study has also opened new areas of interest for further inquiries, especially in the area of the Organisation of African Unity and conflict resolution in Africa.

One particular area of interest is the implementation of the OAU's resolutions. Ever since its inception, the OAU's resolutions have been implemented half-heartedly or not at all by a number of African countries. It would hence be interesting to attempt to investigate the underlying factors for this kind of behaviour. The findings of this research, if utilized adequately by the policy makers in Africa, might go along way in enhancing the efficacy of OAU's resolutions and would hence assist the move towards Africa's integration.

Another area of interest to this study is the contribution which African regional organizations other than the OAU have made in conflict resolution in the continent. In comparison to the OAU, such African micro-regional organizations such as the ECOWAS, SADCC, EAC, IGADD, PTA etc, have been little explored, notwithstanding their potential to provide workable alternatives to the OAU methods, which the current study has found rather wanting.
FOOTNOTES


2 Such immediate interest were for instance related to the preservation of national integrity and sheer survival.


8 See Asante, op.cit., p. 136.

9 Nyong’o, op.cit.

See chapter 3 of this text for details on African boundaries.

Nyong'o op.cit.

Asante op.cit., p.138.

Baynham, op.cit.

Nyong'o, op.cit.


Nyong'o, op.cit.

See Chapter 2 of this text.


Nyong'o, op cit.


See *African Recovery*, vol.9, op.cit., p. 10.

Bakwesegha, C.J., The need to strengthen the Regional Organisations: A rejoinder in Organization of African Unity - The report of OAU Secretary General on the establishment

25 Asante, op. cit.


28 See Baynham, op.cit., p.41.
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