

KENYA - U.S. RELATIONS : AN INTERPLAY OF NATIONAL

INTEREST , 1963 - 1991. /

BY

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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT OF
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI.

DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT


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
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A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Bosire R. Moegi', written over a horizontal dotted line.

Bosire R. Moegi

This thesis has been submitted for Examination with my approval as a University Supervisor.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Sam Rohio', written over a horizontal dotted line.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my late father Fred Bosire Kinanga who passed away in January, 1978,

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

Acknowledgement.....	vi
List of Tables	vii
Abbreviation	ix
Abstract	xi
CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Background	1
1.2 Definition of Concepts	3
1.3 Statement of the problem	4
1.4 Objectives	9
1.5 Justification	10
1.6 Literature Review	12
1.7 Hypotheses formulation	22
1.8 Theoretical Framework	23
1.9 Methodology	28
Notes	29
CHAPTER TWO: ECONOMIC INTERACTIONS BETWEEN KENYA	
AND THE US: CONVERGENCE OF NATIONAL INTERESTS	
2.1 Introduction	34
2.2 U.S Investments in Kenya: An Interplay of National Interests	37
2.3 Trade Interaction between Kenya and the U.S	52
2.3.1 Kenya's Import Trade with the U.S: Convergence of Interests	57
2.3.2 Kenya's Exports to the U.S: Concurrence of Interests	76
2.4.0 U.S aid to Kenya: Interplay of National Interests	84

2.4.1	U.S aid to Kenya and U.S National Interests	87
2.4.2	Kenya's National Interests in seeking U.S aid	105
2.2	Conclusion	116
	Notes	120

CHAPTER THREE: THE ROLE OF GEOPOLITICS IN KENYA - U.S

	RELATIONS	129
3.1	Introduction	129
3.2	U.S. Strategic Interests and Kenya's Geopolitical location	131
3.3	Kenya's Security Interests: A Call for U.S. Support	153
3.3.1	The Somalia Security Threat	156
3.3.2	Uganda-Sudan-Libya: A Triangular Security Threat to Kenya	164
3.4	Conclusion	175
	Notes	178

**CHAPTER FOUR: HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY AS INSTRUMENTS OF
INTERACTION BETWEEN KENYA AND THE U.S**

4.1	Introduction	187
4.2	Human Rights and Democracy in Kenya: A Divergence of Interests	192
4.3	Conclusion	214
	Notes	217

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ..	221
5.1 Summary ..	221
5.2 Hypotheses and Findings ..	222
5.3 Recommendations ..	230
Notes ..	236
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..	237

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LIST OF TABLES

PAGE

Table 1:	Estimated Book-value of Direct Foreign Investments in Kenya, 1971/72	46
Table 2:	U.S. Direct Investments in Kenya, 1972	47
Table 3:	Percentage value Estimation of imports by SITC classification, 1964-1971.	50
Table 4:	Percentage of imports by Source	60
Table 5:	Kenya - US Trade 1961 - 1965	60
Table 6:	Kenya's Imports from the U.S. Value of S.I.T.C Sections by principal Country of origin (U.S.).	66
Table 7:	Kenya's Imports from the U.S in the years 1967 to 1970	68
Table 8:	Kenya's Imports from the U.S. in the period 1977 to 1989.	72
Table 9:	Percentage distribution of major Export, 1964 -1972	78
Table 10:	Kenya's Export Earnings from the U.S. in the period 1966 to 1972.	80
Table 11:	Kenya's Exports to the U.S. - Value of principal Domestic Export Commodities 1967-1972.	81
Table 12:	Value of Kenya's Exports to the U.S in the period 1973 to 1989.	83
Table 13:	Long Range Plan by Appropriation Account F.Y. 1990.	115

Table 14:	Total U.S. Development Assistance to Kenya in the period 1960-1997.	118
Table 15:	Arms Transfer Deliveries by Major Supplier and Recipient Country, 1970 to 1989.	120

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1:	Kenya-US Trade 1961-1965	64
Figure 2:	Kenya-US Trade 1977-1989	74
Figure 3:	US Economic and Military Aid to Kenya 1962-1991	132

ABBREVIATIONS:

- ADB - African Development Bank.
- AFL - CIO - American Federation of Labour-Congress of Industrial Organizations.
- A.I.D - Agency for International Development.
- ALICO - American Life Insurance Company.
- CIA - Central Intelligence Agency.
- CNN - Cable News Network.
- CSIS - Centre for Strategic and International Studies.
- EAC - East African Community.
- FIPA - Foreign Investment Protection Act.
- FMS - Foreign Military Sales.
- FY - Fiscal Year.
- GDP - Gross Domestic Product
- GNP - Gross National Product
- GSP - Generalised System of Preferences.
- IBAS - International Bar Association.
- IFIS - International Financial Institutions.
- IMF - International Monetary Fund.
- KANU - Kenya African National Union.
- KPU - Kenya Peoples Union.
- LDC - Less Developed Country.
- MAP - Military Assistance Programme.
- MNCs - Multinational Corporations.
- NFD - Northern Frontier District.
- NIEO - New International Economic Order.
- OAU - Organization of African Unity.
- OPIC - Overseas Private Investment Corporation.

PANAM	-	Pan-American.
PDRY	-	Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen.
PLO	-	Palestinian Liberation Organization.
RDF	-	Rapid Deployment Force.
SITC	-	Standard International Trade Classification.
SPLA	-	Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army.
U.K.	-	United Kingdom.
UN	-	United Nations.
U.S.A.	-	United States of America.
USAID	-	United States Agency for International Development.
USSF	-	United States Special Fund.
USSR	-	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic.
W.B.	-	World Bank.

ABSTRACT

This study examines the nature of relations between Kenya and the U.S. The main thesis of the study is that despite persistent conflicts between the two states, cooperation has continued to exist. This inconsistency is the core of this investigation on conflict and cooperation.

Conflictive and cooperative interaction are correlated to various factors that affect the relationship. Economic interests which comprise trade, investments and aid, form one side of the tri-factor relationship. These factors are analysed to demonstrate how Kenya and the U.S cooperate within a conflictive relationship.

Apart from the economic factors, our concern is focused on Kenya's geopolitical location vis-a-vis U.S strategic interests. Kenya's air and nava facilities have had considerable attraction to Pentagon, hence their acquisition in exchange for military and economic assistance was a vindication of a high degree of cooperation between the two states. Kenya's security interests called for such assistance.

The end of the cold war ushered in a new era of democracy and human rights, into international politics. This new era, and its sudden penetration into Kenya-U.S relations has generated a lot of friction which has resulted into conflictive interaction between the two states. However, these aspects of interaction have beneficial economic, political and cultural implications.

Simply, this study is anchored in the supremacy of national interest in explaining inter-state behavior. The convergence of national interests between Kenya and the U.S cultivates cooperative interaction while their divergence culminates in a conflictive interaction. It is due to this convergence and divergence of interests that Kenya-U.S relations are characterized by cooperation and conflict.

Chapter one puts into proper conceptual perspective the relations between Kenya and the U.S., giving a clear scope of the statement of the problem. Chapter two deals with the analysis of economic determinants of Kenya-U.S. relations. It examines the influence of trade, investment, and bilateral aid on cooperation and/or conflict that characterize the relations between her and the U.S.

Chapter three deals with the role of Kenya's geopolitical location on the Horn and her security problems in influencing the conflictive and/or cooperative interaction between Kenya and the U.S. This examines U.S. acquisition of air and naval facilities in Kenya to bolster its interests in the Horn and Middle East regions, and Kenya's security threats from Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. These aspects have significant impact on Kenya-U.S. interaction.

Chapter four attempts to unveil the influence of U.S. assertiveness on Kenya's human rights record in explaining the relations between the two states. The end of the cold war and fall of the Berlin Wall culminated in the shift of emphasis from strategic facilities acquisition to the aspect of observance of basic human rights. These developments explain cooperation and/or conflict that characterize the relations between Kenya and the U.S.

The fifth chapter synthesizes the whole thesis, giving a clear indication of the findings of the study. This chapter proves or disproves the suppositions of the study, giving certain general policy recommendations.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Interstate relations is a phenomenon that is as old as human society. This is true with the states-as-actors approach which assumes that states have generally similar traits and interests. Similarly, if states are to be thought of as human, they must have human-like characteristics. They must be capable of fear, of anger, of satisfaction, they must make choices, have preferences and deliberate. And states must not merely be somewhat human in this way, they must also experience common motivations. They must be on the look out for gain, they must be reluctant to part with possessions, they must desire power and wealth.¹

It is clear that geopolitical considerations are vital in interactions among states on the international geographical chessboard. Contiguity between states may aggravate conflict or cooperation between them. States propinquity to waterways, harbours, another state's interest zones, would likewise have an impact of conflict or cooperation between such states. In the later case, distance between states does not serve its traditional role of accessibility. In the world of developed technology, distance has become less important in interstate interactions. Generally speaking, such levels of analysis of geopolitical considerations of inter-state relations can be viewed as vital in the analysis of relations between Kenya and the U.S.

It is important to note that interactions between states with unequal capabilities are determined by each state's vulnerability to suffer negative

setbacks in case their relations are severed. Such vulnerability would take the form of cutting the flow of assistance, reduction of capital investments, denial of access to strategic facilities and support in international fora, in adopting certain courses of action.

Notwithstanding is the economic policy which naturally flows from a political economy perspective which emphasises capital accumulation and sees economic interests and issues as the mainstay of political activity. As Moon argues, with the exception of foreign aid only recently have analysts began to consider most aspects of foreign economic policy; that is nationalization, foreign investment restrictions, tariffs and commercial policy towards the New International Economic Order(NIEO).² The political economy of states, therefore, has profound impact on and shapes the behaviour of states. Thus an explicit theory of the states must consider the structural constraints on behaviour and recognize state interests in relation to its society as well as relative to other international actors. The environment which shapes the behaviour of states must therefore be understood in global terms with respect to both economic and political phenomena.

Beside the cold war motivations for the flow of aid from the U.S. to Kenya is the new ingredient of human rights and democracy. Within the web of these concepts are economic implications of such foreign policy motivated by these factors. An Administrator to U.S. Congress noted that:

America faces a radically changed world in which new opportunities are replaced by old challenges. ... Our national interest is best served by a world in which promises of justice and improved standards of living are being realised by rich and poor nations alike. This is only possible if developing countries as well as those who are struggling to create a new democratic society, share with us benefits of expanding trade, dynamic

market economies, democracy and justice within nations and fairness between nations. This would help remove the occasion for armed conflict between and within nations, strengthen international cooperation and provide expanding markets for U.S. products and services.³

This shift of policy has had various bottlenecks ranging from approach to the "new environment" to consequences emanating thereof.

Actors seek to achieve certain gains from their interactions with others. These benefits are what the "needs theorists" call interests. This could include increased volume of trade, foreign assistance, capital investments, strategic facilities, among others. In order for each state to realize its interests, it has to sacrifice interests of others and compromise some of its own. This kind of policy mix often results into a dichotomous relations of conflict and cooperation. The convergence of interests leads to cooperative interaction while divergent ones culminate in conflict. Political conflicts are in most cases ideological though with tangible results to the warring actors.

The complexities involved in the "interests mix" of nation states as noted above is even compounded the more when there is an abrupt shift of international political environment as it is currently. This shift in itself is vital for investigation in the study of foreign policy.

1.2 Definition of concepts

(a) Foreign Policy: Foreign policy is the image a nation-state puts on in the international system. People do not agree on exactly what should be included here, but they are concerned with the policies that states declare, the decisions taken within governmental circles, the actions actually taken by governments and the consequences of the behaviour of governments and their

official representatives. Foreign policy is the output of a state into the global system, the outcome of whatever foreign policy process exists within that state.⁶⁵

(b) Convergence and Divergence of interests: Convergency refers to a situation where interests come together to the same point. It is a situation of "indifference" that the actors in question find themselves to agree upon. The situation leads to mutual gain and hence fostering the cordiality of relations among nation-states. "Divergence" on the other hand means that the relationship is characterized with differences to the extent that each actor is repulsive to the other. Generally, when there is a divergence of interests, there emerges a conflictual relationship between the actors.

(c) Conflict: Conflict is a condition of misunderstanding between actors, which emerges out of a divergence of national interests. In this study, conflict is expressed in freeze of the flow of assistance, demonstrations, accusations, insistence on contradictory statements/courses of action to either of the two states.

(d) Cooperation: In our case, cooperation is an offshoot of convergent national interests. This is expressed through diplomatic visits, continued trade interaction, flow of assistance, offering of military bases and support in international fora, which characterize Kenya-U.S. relations.

1.3 Statement of the problem

Kenya - U.S. relations have been occasioned with cooperative and conflictive relations that characterize all interstate relations globally. In this

regard we recognize cases of conflict and cooperation in the interaction between Kenya and the U.S. These trends are analysed concurrently with factors explaining their occurrence.

Kenya - U.S. relationship was occasioned by conflict in 1964, over the Congo crisis issue. The Congo crisis, especially the November 1964 rescue in Stanleyville of white hostages by Belgian paratroops ferried by U.S. aircraft, put a severe strain on Kenyatta's prestige in the country, and relations between Kenyatta's supporters and those of Oginga Odinga. Kenyatta headed the Organization of African Unity Conciliation Commission, which had been ineffectual in the crisis. Under his auspices, United States and Congolese rebel representatives met in attempts to find a formula to save the hostages and end hostilities between Premier Moise Tshombe's government and the rebels. Just as the talks broke down, the paratroops and Congolese National Army both arrived simultaneously at Stanleyville. There was a wave of anti-American feeling throughout Africa. Visibly discouraged, Kenyatta evidently authorised a big anti-American demonstration in Nairobi. This got out of hand and gasoline bombs were thrown. U.S-Kenya relations began to deteriorate ⁴.

American involvement in the Congo was motivated by the cold war rivalries. An extract from a speech made by U.S Under-Secretary, Averell Harriman, on 18th August, 1964, stated:

We are continuing our aid to the Congolese Government now, just as we have in past,.... The frequent contacts between the rebel leaders and the Chinese communist embassies in Bujumbura and Brazaville are well known to those living in these capitals. Guerilla handbooks of chinese origin have been found in the Congo, translated into French and published in May, 1964. The tactics used by the rebels show unmistakably Chinese communist inspiration.⁵

The OAU Ad Hoc Commission on the Congo crisis position on the issue was non-interference in the internal affairs of Congo by foreign governments and members unanimously supported an "African Solution to African problems" approach.

Hoskyns further argues that the reaction of African and of the Eastern countries was not only violent but also dangerous for American interests.⁶ From Djakarta to the Western tip of Africa, American policy was suspect and, in the case of countries whose governments refused to protest officially for fear of annoying the U.S.A, Washington was informed that public opinion was "shocked" to such an extent that the New York Times inspired to write "the risk of America being engaged in a racial war in Africa was beginning to cause serious embarrassment to American policy makers". This was in connection with the hostage rescue mission which sabotaged the OAU efforts to end the crisis.

Amidst such a conflictual relationship, U.S. post-independence economic and technical assistance to Kenya was growing and totalled to more than \$32.2 million⁷. Our major question is: Why was the relationship between Kenya and the U.S. characterized with such inconsistency?. Why did we have a continuity of cooperation in economic and diplomatic avenues of international interactions amidst a conflictual political relationship?

Such inconsistency was also witnessed in 1967. In June, 1967, Kenya-U.S. relations were marked with conflict over a book published by former U.S. Ambassador to Kenya Mr. William Attwood, entitled The Reds and the Blacks. The Ambassador was accused of having released Kenya Government secrets, which amounted to espionage. The book created a strained relationship

between Kenya and the U.S., and more particularly with the C.I.A. In the same year the then U.S. economic officer Mr. J.R. Jacyno, said that since independence trade between Kenya and U.S. had increased from \$7 million to \$16 million. There had also been an enormous increase in the number of American tourists visiting Kenya. He noted that more than 65 American businesses had established themselves in Kenya in addition to thousands of local agents selling American goods.⁸

During the same year, 1967 a motion was tabled in the Kenyan National Assembly seeking a break of diplomatic relations with the U.S., Britain, and Israel. This was in regard to clashes in the Middle East between the Arab Nations on one side and Israel on the other. The U.S. and Britain were alleged to have sided with Israel which was considered to be an aggressor in the war. In the war, it was felt that Egypt, an OAU member-state, was threatened by "foreign forces" stationed in Israel.⁹ As a matter of OAU fraternity, opposition leaders in the Kenyan National Assembly sought the severance of relations between Kenya and U.S. This issue generated considerable friction between Kenya and the U.S. However, this legislation was not vetoed by the Kenya government. Despite this conflictual interaction, investments and trade flow between the two countries continued to flourish.

U.S. economic assistance to Kenya has been rising since independence. Kenya received a total of \$678.9 million of which \$443.0 million were in form of grants and \$235.9 million in form of loans in the period 1962 to 1986. In the same period, Kenya received military assistance totaling to \$236.7 million. In the year 1987 U.S. economic assistance totalled \$52.8 million while military

assistance totalled \$11.6 million. In 1988, the economic and military assistance totalled \$57.0 million and \$6.2 million respectively.¹⁰ In 1990, Kenya received a total amount of economic assistance of \$40.6 million and military assistance of \$10.0 million.¹¹ From these data, we can observe that there is inconsistent rising and decline of U.S assistance to Kenya throughout the independence period. Hence our concern is to explain why this nature of inconsistency has existed throughout this period. What vital interests command the continuity of cordiality of economic and diplomatic interactions amidst sour political relations?

Kenya-U.S relations witnessed a moment of close cooperation in 1978 and 1980. In 1980, Kenya offered the U.S. air and naval facilities¹². Likewise in February, 1991, the U.S. - Kenya relations were characterized with a gesture of close cooperation. At this moment the U.S. released Kshs. 120 million military aid to Kenya, frozen during the aforementioned 1990 conflict between the two states based on Kenya's abuse of human rights. The U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, Mr. Smith Hempstone, talking about the release of the money said that "Kenyans have been extremely cooperative to us in recent weeks so we are expressing our appreciation"¹³. This was in regard to Kenya's support to the U.S. during the 1990 Gulf War.

The nagging issue which intrigues us into research is: why have Kenya - U.S. relations been characterized with such inconsistency? What factors explain this trend of relations? What are the vital interests of the two states that determine their international behaviour towards each other? Simply put the nature of interstate interaction between the U.S. and Kenya has been

characterised with cooperative and conflictive tendencies. We are, however, mainly concerned with the aspects of this interaction that depict continuity and / or discontinuity in the continuum of interaction. Consequently the question that the study seeks to unravel is "even within periods of discontinuous and disharmonious interactions, there are aspects of continuous and harmonious interactions." Thus whereas the question "why" will be sought to be answered, the question about the nature of their interaction will be unearthed.

1.4 Objectives

Broadly stated, this study projects at analyzing and explaining the patterns of conflict and cooperation that have characterized Kenya - U.S. relations. The study is hinged on the premise that despite frequent misunderstandings or conflict between Kenya and the U.S., cooperation has continued. This study, therefore, aims at identifying and analyzing the linkages between various aspects of foreign policy behaviour between the two states hinged on politico-economic factors. In particular, this study aims at proving or disproving the "national interest interplay equation" as being central in explaining Kenya-U.S. relations. Kenya shares with the U.S. vital political and economic interests of regional and global magnitude, especially global security and regional concern for peace. The study intends to analyse the trends of conflict and cooperation between Kenya and the U.S. with a view to determine continuity and/or discontinuities in the relationship. More specifically, the study aims at the following:

1. To show how economic interactions between Kenya and U.S. influence the nature of their relationship, that is either conflictive or

cooperative interaction.

2. To examine the role played by U.S. military assistance to Kenya in influencing the nature of their relationship.
3. To show how Kenya's geopolitical position in the Horn of Africa and her security have influenced the nature of Kenya - U.S. relations.
4. To examine the role of U.S. assertiveness on Kenya's human rights record in determining the nature of their interaction.
5. Filling the gap in the scholarly sphere i.e. lack of a comprehensive study on Kenya - U.S. relations.

1.5 Justification

This study is projected at filling certain gaps that exist in the scholarly sphere, that is, the importance of national interest, theoretically, as central in understanding Kenya-U.S. relations. There is the notion that small, and developing states get co-opted into international politics inevitably as dependent entities. However, in our view, states act as autonomous entities which cooperate at the event of a situation that is affinitive to the realization of their interests. Kenya - U.S. relations is a case taken to find out how poor states relate to wealthy ones in a struggle to satisfy their national interests.

So far, no comprehensive study has been carried out on Kenya-U.S. relations. This study is aimed at filling this gap. The study is also aimed at assisting policy-makers with information that can assist in designing better approaches to Kenya-U.S. interactions. For them to make sound foreign and domestic policies, they need massive information with which they can effectively

weigh the risks involved in taking certain courses of action concerning the relationship between the two states. The study could therefore be a source of information for decision-making.

In reference to studies carried out on the nature of relations between Kenya and the U.S., none has covered the whole spectrum of economic, geopolitical and human rights variables. Only patches of the relations are found in regional conflict and strategic studies. Adar¹⁴, Makinda¹⁵, Khapoya¹⁶, Langdon¹⁷ and Swainson¹⁸ have recognized and analysed U.S. - Kenya interaction in relation to politics in the Horn, and Kenya's economic infrastructure. To this end, Adar and Makinda do not give salience to economic aspects of the relations but to security and strategic interactions. They see the U.S. as preoccupied with the search for strategic facilities while Kenya as a threatened entity seeking for military and financial support to protect her territorial integrity.

On the other hand, Khapoya, Langdon and Swainson see the relations as hinged on economic interactions. They attribute the penetration of U.S. multinational firms into the Kenyan economy as having been facilitated by the Kenyan leadership. However, they maintain the position that both states benefit from these interactions.

The scholars mentioned above, therefore, have not exhaustively addressed the issue of cooperation and conflict in Kenya - U.S. interaction. The perspectives only address the relations indirectly. This ipso facto demonstrates one of the gaps to be filled by this study.

Scholars have likewise neglected the salience of economic aspects such

as trade and investments as linchpins in the relations between Kenya and the U.S. This study, likewise, addresses these aspects of international economic relations. Notwithstanding is the aspect of human rights in the interactions between the two states. At the collapse of the Berlin Wall and disintegration of the Soviet empire, human rights and democracy have taken precedence in world politics. This gap in the study of interaction between Kenya and the U.S. would be filled.

This study also carries epistemological significance, that is its contribution to generating insights on Kenya - U.S. relations. Such insights would be composed of trends of interaction and likewise the prediction of trends that may ensue in future. This would aid decision makers in both states to design policies suitable for a sustained mutually beneficial relationship.

We have chosen to focus on the period 1963 - 1991 which covers Kenya's independence lifespan upto date. There would have been contacts prior to 1963 but we neglect this period due to the fact that Kenya was not a sovereign state by then. Such a vast period is considered appropriate in as far as it depicts and allows a meaningful correlation of economic, geopolitical and human rights factors that underlay Kenya - U.S. relations. Due to the continued cooperation and occasional conflicts, a comprehensive analysis of the states interaction must encompass this period.

1.6 Literature Review

Whereas much has been written about the determinants of foreign policies of African states, and with particular reference to Kenya's relations with the neighbouring states, scholars have neglected the foreign relations between

Kenya and the U.S. In particular, no comprehensive study has covered conflictive and/or cooperative interactions between the two states, so far.

The roots of the partnership between Kenya and the U.S. can be traced back many years. In 1950s, because the U.S. Government and its people were confident that Kenyans were on their way to a bright and independent future, they decided to devote resources and expertise available in the U.S. to support Kenya's development efforts. During the pre-independence period, about \$8 million of assistance was provided. Of particular importance was the American help in building the University College of East Africa, (presently the University of Nairobi).¹⁹

The U.S. played a significant role in the education of Kenyans in 1961. There were three airlifts funded by the U.S. that gave over 600 Kenyan students to study in the U.S. Tom Mboya, one of the Kenyan organizers of the airlift wrote in 1961 to President John. F. Kennedy noting that the airlift was "the most meaningful thing in all our relations with the U.S. so far"²⁰. The 1959, 1960 and 1961, airlifts were a truly joint effort and represented an early American commitment to provide assistance to Kenya based on Kenya's development priorities and objectives. Upon the death of President J.F. Kennedy of the U.S. in 1963, President Kenyatta's message echoed the cooperation between Kenya and the U.S. at that time. He said:

We in Kenya, have yet an additional and special reason to remember President Kennedy: this is because of his generous interest in assisting our young boys and girls to go for studies in the U.S. through the student airlift.²¹

The U.S. foreign policy is hinged on specific interests which it champions in the international arena. This was depicted in President Franklin D. Roosevelt's

message which read:

In the field of world policy, I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbour. Our foreign policy is...to defend the honour, the freedom, the rights, the interests and the well-being of the American people.²²

President Roosevelt's views underscore the historical ambiguity of American foreign policy, National interest, be it military, diplomatic or economic, is paramount, but it is assumed to be in harmony with good neighbourliness. Kenya meets some of the U.S. national interests which would be demonstrated to be foundations of their relations in this study.

The relationship between Kenya and the U.S. has been recognized by both scholars and practitioners of international politics as being cordial. The leaders of the two nations have remarked from time to time that the relationship is for reciprocal gain for the peoples of the two states, hence the relationship can be described as a mutual one. Aluko and Shaw²³ argue that according to Basil Davidson²⁴, the 1960s were a time of reaction for African foreign policy, 1970s one of new experiments, the 1980s a period of experimentation, not least among various forms of political economy, is the national policy goals. Kenya's foreign policy vis-a-vis the U.S. is hinged on her domestic economic environment. Both development and foreign policies pursued by the two states and ways of approaching them are in a state of flux.

Aluko and Shaw have argued that Kenya relates to the U.S because of the nature of her domestic social system, relationship to external interests and type of development strategy.²⁵ Kenya intends to maximize independence, promote economic development, and ensure socio-political stability in a way that enhances national power.

Khapoya on the same footing argues that Kenya's domestic economic environment is predominantly agricultural.²⁶ In order to industrialize Kenyan leaders went out of their way to attract investments from abroad. As early as 1964, the Kenya Government enacted the Foreign Investment Protection Act (FIPA), which in effect, guaranteed foreign firms investing in Kenya the repatriation of their profits if they wished to do so, the payment of interest and loan capital secured abroad with earnings from Kenya, generous depreciation allowances for equipment and machinery, and the protection of the domestic market against any products which might compete with what the foreign firms were producing.

Bruce Moon has argued that modern theories of foreign policy behaviour are sensitive to the economic bases of national power and many empirical studies have examined circumstances under which economic instruments of influence can be used successfully.²⁷ Since the foreign policy of states must take into account changes in the economic system, the current state of the system is a major determinant of foreign policy in both a direct and indirect way. The motivation for foreign policy behaviour may derive from certain functional requisites of system maintenance rather than from the imperatives of national interest defined as power.²⁸

Among the determinants of relationships among states is the aspect of geopolitics. This aspect has gained credibility in foreign relations for two reasons: (1) because geographic dimension identified by such terms as locations, distance, space, distribution and configuration - are nearly always significant dimensions of political undertakings and the operational results

thereof, and (2) because geographers have given much attention to certain environmental relationships. Every political community rests upon a geographic base. Territory is universally recognized to be one of the essential attributes of statehood. Probably the geographic exhibits most familiar to most people are the maps that delineate the boundaries and differentiate the territories of national and subnational political communities.²⁹ This aspect of International relations affects the relationship between Kenya and the U.S.

Nation-states survey their environment in order to make sound policies which are always purposeful. The U.S. has over time had security- strategic interests in sub-saharan Africa including the Horn of Africa. Concern with U.S. interests of a security-strategic nature in the region is focused almost entirely on the vulnerability of western shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean and around the Cape of Good Hope. It is often pointed out that almost all Western Europe's oil supply and a major portion of U.S. oil imports are carried in these shipping lanes, and that by blocking them, the former Soviet Union would rapidly apply an economic stranglehold on the western alliance. This possible access by the former Soviet Navy to basing facilities in the Horn of Africa, and the East African Coast, was viewed as a great alarm by some, who saw them as providing the means of such a blockade. The existence of a now defunct former Soviet naval base at Berbera in Somalia and the possibility that former Soviet/Cuban involvement in Ethiopia could provide the former Soviets with a base at the Eritrean port of Massawa have drawn attention to the Horn of Africa because it was feared that such bases would be used to blockade oil tankers moving from Persian Gulf through the Red Sea to the Suez Canal.³⁰ This strategic paradigm

with which a significant threat to U.S. security interests is seen to exist predominantly in the Horn of Africa where Kenya is one of the states, with adequate port facilities.

There is the notion which existed in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s that a radical regime coming to power in Africa with aid from the former Soviet Union would as a matter of course be so subject to Soviet influence that it would allow its ports to be used as bases for offensive naval operations against the west. In regard to the strategic paradigm, Price argues, carrier task forces can be resupplied and refuelled at the Diego Garcia Base, its airfields can accommodate the full range of planes in the U.S. arsenal, and it is the U.S. facility in the region at which the P-3c Orion anti-submarine warfare plane and the Kc-135 tanker plane are based (the former is important for control of ocean depths, and the latter can refuel B-52 bombers in flight). In addition, Diego Garcia offers a potential port for submarines.³¹

On careful examination, then, the "security of shipping lanes doctrine" turns out to be based on an interlocking set of assumptions: Concerning the relationship between radicalization and former Soviet influence in Africa, on the one hand, and the nature of former Soviet capabilities and motives on the other.³² Thus, the argument that pro-western governments on the Horn are vital to the security of the west because of the proximity of these areas to the oil shipping lanes may be sustained.

Makinda argues that the American presence in the Horn from 1953 to the 1970s appears to have been concerned primarily with the desire to gain influence in the area, to enhance its policy of containment in the Middle East

and to try to prevent the former Soviet Union from having influence there.³³ He further argues that the economic and military aid which Washington supplies to its friends appears to have been given partly with the view of those goals. He writes:

Kenya's main security consideration is to survive as a national entity. Kenya has been motivated by the need to protect her borders and prevent any attempts to undermine its territorial integrity, by slicing off any part of its territory. The biggest threat to dismember Kenya came from the Somalis when guerillas of the Mogadishu - based NFD Liberation Front (also known as shiftas) and Somalia tried in the 1960s to take the North Eastern region.... In the 1980s, however, economic needs and American influence in the country combined with other factors made Kenya seek accommodation with Somalia.³⁴

Kenya's relations with the U.S. had been good since independence in 1963, but it was not until 1974 that Washington started what was latter described as a "Small Military Assistance Programme". In 1976, when Kenya was facing an increasing threat from Somalia and Uganda, which were both being armed by the former USSR, the U.S. Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld visited Nairobi to complete details for the sale of 12 F-5 Jet Fighters.³⁵ These activities suggested that the U.S. was taking precautions to maintain substantial presence in the Horn of Africa even if relations with Ethiopia were strained at the time of the overthrow of Haile Sellasie. In March 1978, President Jimmy Carter received a Kenyan delegation led by Vice-President (now President) Daniel arap Moi which stated Kenya's concern about the situation in the Horn and requested for greater arms support. Carter reaffirmed American arms and financial support to Kenya and promised to maintain an arms embargo on Somalia.³⁶

Another aspect of U.S. strategic interests in Kenya regards the linkage that Kenya has with the Diego Garcia military installations. Ogunbadejo Oye argues

that the U.S. recognizes Kenya's position in her security network in relation to the Diego Garcia base.³⁷ The Moi administration signed an agreement with Washington, offering the Americans the use of the port of Mombasa as well as the airfields of Nairobi and Nanyuki. Washington in turn earmarked \$26 million for the essential improvement of Mombasa which is destined to play an important linkage role with the facilities at the Diego Garcia base, particularly in offering additional places for strategically positioned ships. In addition, the Reagan administration increased the aid to Kenya from 1981 to 1982, much of which consisted of arms sales.³⁸ Farer further elucidates that the American base on Diego Garcia boasts a sophisticated communication facility and an 8,000 feet runway supporting reconnaissance patrols over most of the ocean. The runway has been extended to the 12,000 feet required for KC-135 aerial tankers, and the lagoon has been equipped for anchorage, bunkering, and supply for a carrier and its support ships.³⁹

In November 1979, Iranian Militants held in captivity the American Embassy personnel in Tehran. At about the same time, the American Embassy in Pakistan was burnt down and three American diplomats killed, while in Libya the American Embassy was attacked. These incidents prompted Carter to accept the idea of augmenting the American presence in the Horn region.⁴⁰ U.S. policy analysts have often noted that "in order to protect the Gulf, however, the U.S. has to work in its periphery as well; in the areas that are not only important to the U.S. but also to its friends who are there".⁴¹ This is why the U.S. acquired the aforementioned facilities in Kenya.

The foreign policy implications of economic ties are important in the U.S. -

Kenya relations. In any analysis of foreign policy implications of economic ties, it is exceedingly important to keep in mind the distinction between private and public (national) interests. The criteria separating the two do not reside in the question of legal ownership of capital investments, but rather in a determination of whether a threat to the interest in question would have a significant impact on the continued functioning of a nation's economic system. Statistics on U.S. trade and foreign investments indicate that sub-saharan Africa has a very limited economic significance to the U.S. Only 3% of U.S. direct investments abroad are found there, and the region purchases a similarly small portion of total U.S. exports. It might be argued that while the overall economy would not be greatly harmed, some of the U.S. Corporations would be damaged, with negative effects on the nation in the areas of employment, the maintenance of R and D efforts, and the like.⁴² What would be the impact, on the Kenyan economy if her relationship with the U.S. is severed?

Economic self-interest has become an increasingly prominent rationale for U.S. development assistance efforts, though the great bulk of existing program resources are oriented towards essentially political or humanitarian objectives. Until relatively recently, U.S. government development assistance was viewed as a transitory part of the evolving relationship with any LDC. Aid would lay the groundwork for sustained domestic growth as well as U.S. private investments and trade flows.⁴³ Foreign aid, therefore, has inherent U.S. interest of boosting investments in the Third World countries. Do these aspects have any foreign policy implications on kenya-U.S. relations?

Gordon David argues that the most important contributor of foreign

assistance to Kenya is the U.S. This was witnessed in the 1980s when the U.S. became the largest source of Kenya's assistance.⁴⁴

Kenya is an agrobased economic entity which is frequently faced with a tide of changing weather conditions and fluctuating prices of agricultural products in the world market. In her endeavour to diversify her economy, Kenya has sought to industrialize via foreign investments. There are more than 140 U.S. firms that are represented in Kenya.⁴⁵

At the zenith of the cold war, the U.S. laid a lot of emphasis on its "credibility" as an international actor. Once an international situation is publicly defined as threatening to U.S. interests or, as to increasingly common, as a test of the country's will, determination, and resolve, then a lack of U.S. response might well place in jeopardy the psychological dimensions of U.S. power.⁴⁶ Such aspects, to-date, influence Kenya-U.S. interaction.

Unfortunately, one of the cornerstones of limited war theory and the doctrine of credibility as they have evolved in the past decades is the completely open-ended definition of the situations that test U.S. determination vis-a-vis the former Soviets. Starting with the conception of world politics as essentially a titanic and zero-sum struggle between the western and former Soviets "Sphere" any activity of the former Soviet Union beyond its prescribed sphere involves ipso facto a corresponding reduction in the western "Sphere" and thus calls for a credibility-bolstering response.⁴⁷ Note that within this foreign policy paradigm the maintenance of credibility is divorced from the protection of tangible interests. Every situation involving former Soviet activity, demanded a successful US blocking action regardless of whether significant tangible

interests were at stake. We are then left with the question as to what credibility degradation on the part of the US, would be realized if Kenya-US relations were severed? How does Kenya boost US credibility in the Horn of Africa?

Democracy and human rights observance have become important aspects of American foreign policy vis-a-vis Kenya. Beginning with the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the fall of the Berlin Wall, democracy and human rights have rapidly come to the central focus of U.S foreign policy. Kenya's human rights violation and "undemocratic" practices called for U.S. assertiveness on the same and consequently souring their relations in late 1980s and early 1990s. Foreign aid being the servant of American national interest has often been used, as in the past, to induce third world countries, and Kenya in particular, to adopt policies that are favourable to the U.S.

1.7 Hypotheses Formulation

Our independent variables are economic, geopolitics and security and human rights, while the dependent variables, are conflict, cooperation or both i.e. the nature of relations at a given time. The independent variables may explain the nature of relations between Kenya and the U.S. which are either conflictive, cooperative or both. A correlation between the independent and dependent variables explain the relations that emerge thereof. The hypotheses that would guide the study are given herebelow:

- (a) Economic interaction influences conflict and/or cooperation between Kenya and the U.S. The components of economic interaction considered here include: investments, trade and foreign aid.
 - (i) In particular, this supposition suggests that if investments and aid

from the U.S. to Kenya increase, then cooperation is likely to ensue.

(ii) It, likewise, suggests that cooperation may be a function of increasing volume of trade between the two states.

(b) Kenya's geopolitical location in the Horn of Africa and her security problems influence conflict and/or cooperation between Kenya and the U.S.

(i) Precisely, this hypothesis suggests that Kenya's geopolitical location on the Horn of Africa is important to the U.S. security interests and that Kenya's granting of strategic facilities to the US cultivates cooperation and probably denial of use of such facilities brews conflict between the two states.

(ii) It also suggests that Kenya's security problems calls for U.S. support and are likely to foster cooperation between them.

(c) U. S.'s assertiveness on Kenya's human rights record influenced/influences conflictual and cooperative relations between the two states.

(i) Specifically the hypothesis suggests that Kenya's seemingly poor human rights record cultivated a conflictual relationship between Kenya and the U.S.

(ii) It also suggests that U.S. silence on Kenya's human rights record fostered cooperation between the two states.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

Theory has always been the basis of discovery in both physical and social sciences. It has four major roles in the study of social sciences. These include

description, explanation, analysis and prescription. Theory enables us correlate variables to show trends, explain them and consequently predicting, with certain degree of precision, the trend of events in future. Many theories, in this regard, have been postulated to explain conflict and cooperation which generally characterize interstate relations. Such theories include power theory, decision-making theory, environmental theory, dependency theory, among others.

For a meaningful coverage of a study on Kenya-U.S. relations : An Interplay of interests, a theory that will capture aspects of cooperation and conflict in the relations between the two states is necessary. Within the menu of theoretical frameworks given above, we desire to use the national interest approach of the power theory in the study.

Dependency theory advanced by Gunder Frank⁴⁸, Samir Amin⁴⁹ and Immanuel Wallerstein⁵⁰, among other scholars view the relationship between a less developed country and a developed country as inevitable and attributes it to the nature of the world economic system. For instance the "dependence school" argues that centre countries are autonomous and self-centred in their development unlike the less developed countries. The basic proposition here is that the centre countries were responsible for the drain of surplus from the peripheries which denied the latter any prospect of internal accumulation. This theory adequately looks at the mechanisms underlying inter-state economic relations but fails, more or less, to address conflict and the pursuit of independent interests by peripheral states.

Decision-making theory gives a very vital input into the study of inter-state relations. Its importance resides in the processes that culminate in certain

decisions that affect inter-state relations.⁵¹ There are various models under this theory. To commence with, the rational actor model postulated by Braybrooke and Lindblom,⁵² among others, examines the elites who make decisions with particular concern to their social backgrounds and organizational orientation. It assumes that the society is homogeneous and unitary and that the decision made by the elite is rational and the best for the society. The elitist model postulated by C. Wright Mills⁵³ stipulates that foreign policy posture of a state is determined by elites, whose perception of world politics is characterized by active and latent conflict and cooperation among states. There is also the organization process model of decision making postulated by Graham Allison,⁵⁴ among others, which is characterized with a pluralistic tendency. Central to this model is the emphasis that decisions are a result of various opposing interests accruing from the various units, values, needs and interests of the nation-state. It is a process of pulling and hauling among the units. The theory, therefore, only addresses the process through which decisions are arrived at but, fails to explain conflict or cooperation that may result from such decisions, hence its inadequacy.

Despite the fact that the theory of interdependence, postulated by Keohane and Nye⁵⁵ would explain inter-state relations, it fails to address the question why certain dependencies are perpetuated in events of conflict among states. The theory gives the impression that states are restrained from conflict by their vulnerability to suffer certain setbacks in their interactions. It, therefore, sees states as being always cooperative. This renders the theory inadequate to the study on Kenya-U.S. relations which is characterized by both conflict and

cooperation. The study therefore takes the Power Theory as a framework of analysis. This theory was coined by Hans Morgenthau.⁵⁶ This is what he calls Political Realism which is an empirically and logically coherent theory of understanding world politics. Our analysis is centered, mainly on the concept of national interest.

The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of national interest defined in terms of power. This concept provides the link between reason trying to understand international politics and the fact to be understood. It sets politics as an autonomous sphere of action and understanding apart from other spheres, such as economics (understood in terms of interest defined as Wealth), either aesthetics or religion. Without such concepts a theory of politics, international or domestic, would be altogether impossible, for without it we could not distinguish between political facts, nor could we bring at least a measure of systematic order to the political sphere.⁵⁷

National interest (Material or ideal), not ideas, dominate directly the actions of men.⁵⁸ The concept of national interest was first used by Plato, in describing his elitist theory of philosopher king. This is what he calls the "public good" or "the good of the polis". For Aristotle, national interest is the "general welfare". For him the process involves open and continual debate and the expression of various perceptions regarding the collective interest. Morgenthau argues that diplomatic strategy should be motivated by national interest than by utopian and dangerous moralistic, legalistic and ideological criteria.⁵⁹

The residual meaning inherent in the concept of "national interest" is

survival. The minimum requirement of nation-states is, therefore, to protect physical, political, and cultural identity. Physical identity is equated with the maintenance of the territorial integrity of a nation-state, political identity is equated with the preservation of existing politico-economic regimes, and cultural identity is equated with preservation of ethnic, linguistic and religious norms.

The concept national interest, as argued by Russett and Starr, may indicate certain core values or goals that most citizens share to some degree (such as peace, prosperity, and security).⁶⁰ This theory stresses the importance of economic motivations in influencing foreign policy. The concept of national interest, therefore, is seen as most appropriate in the study of Kenya-U.S. relations.

As Thomas Bailey argues, what we condemn as selfishness in an individual, we condone as self-interest in a nation.⁶¹ When a statesman is pursuing goals that will promote peace, the word "realism" would often be a better one to use than "selfishness". A diplomatist has been defined as a person with anonymous wit who can make his country's greed seem like altruism. Self-interest is the mainspring of foreign policy and if it is not the primary motivation in shaping foreign relations, it ought to be. A government is not a charitable institution, it exists as a trustee of its people.⁶²

However, inherent in the national interest concept is the aspect of prudence. This means that nation-states have to balance their interests with those of others. There are no enduring international friendships, only enduring national interests. When the mutuality in interests fades, the friendship usually fades.⁶³

1.9 Methodology

This study follows what Zinnes⁶⁴ has distinguished as "additive" and "integrative" cumulation. Additive cumulation occurs when a study adds to and builds upon the existing literature through such activities as citing previous research, using previously collected data, re-analysing extant data, and incorporating new variables into the analysis. With integrative cumulation, a new study goes beyond earlier analyses by "(tying) together and explain(ing) a test of research findings". Both methods are important in covering the study on relations between Kenya and the U.S.

This study predominantly relies on documentary sources of data. The sources of data would include books, Kenya and U.S. Official documents, newspapers, journals, magazines, statistical abstracts, annual trade reports, among other relevant sources that would be seen adequate in giving appropriate information.

The data would subsequently be recorded and analysed using tables and graphs with an aim of detecting and explaining trends of trade, aid and investments and other variables as related to conflict and cooperation which characterize Kenya-U.S. relations.

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CHAPTER TWO

ECONOMIC INTERACTIONS BETWEEN KENYA AND THE U.S.; CONVERGENCE OF NATIONAL INTERESTS

2.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses our attention on the implications of economic factors on Kenya - U.S. relations. Our major contention is that economic intercourse between the two countries express a mutually beneficial relationship and fosters cooperation between them. Central to our analysis are the aspects of investments, trade and aid. Investments, being a U.S. undertaking in developing countries, and Kenya in particular, serve the national interests of the two states. U.S capital investments contribute immensely to Kenya's economic development endeavour. This is in respect to their contribution to the development of physical infrastructure like improved port and airport facilities, development of roads and improvement of accessibility, with subsequent ease in exploiting economic resources; creation of employment opportunities and technology transfer. On the other hand investments contribute to U.S. foreign exchange earnings through the sale of technology and equipment, and products produced thereof.

The relationship between Kenya and U.S. is, therefore, based on

two governments to identify the economic needs of their peoples, to recognize the limitations involved in their pursuit and work out "well defined and well ordered sets of foreign policy objectives" to be realised.¹ Decision makers of the two states must make decisions about the general needs of the state and work out strategies for attaining them, including a determination of which goals can be attained only through interaction with other states in the international system.² This view forms the basis of rational foreign policy decision-making. Kenya has several economic goals which can only be met through her interactions with the U.S. These include foreign aid, capital investments, markets for her agricultural products, food for peace and loans for economic development. Investments promote rapid economic development in a country whose economic infrastructure is as weak as that of Kenya. As noted above, investments avail technical knowhow to the country of operation, promote the development of physical infrastructure such as ports, airports, roads and also participate in various development activities such as support to agricultural development which is undertaken by U.S agribusiness firms, and providing job opportunities for the Kenyan workforce.

Investments are carried out by U.S multinational subsidiaries. As Stephen Langdon argues, the subsidiaries represent something more than the simple export of capital into seemingly capital-scarce

economies, like that of Kenya; it represents the extension of a distinctive, well-defined pattern of business enterprise from industrialised, richer countries where the pattern emerged into much poorer parts of the world.³ The U.S benefits from such investments and it is important to note that this is one of the economic interactions in which the interests of the two states converge. The subsidiaries of the U.S multinationals are characterised by extensive market power, by considerable control over technology which is used to defend that market power, by sophisticated organisational capacity designed to coordinate activities across the world, and by a powerful and essential drive to accumulate and transfer large sums of capital.⁴

On the one hand, these realities highlight the important inputs that multinationals could conceivably provide to less developed countries through a subsidiary - not just capital but managerial, technical and marketing knowledge. But on the other hand, they also point toward potential problems subsidiaries are likely to bring with them into poorer countries - reliance on sophisticated foreign technology, preferences for production of advanced-country goods, experience in shaping monopoly-power market positions, and pressures towards high profit remission to the parent country abroad.⁵ These point at the benefits the U.S derives from her subsidiaries operating in Kenya.

U.S assistance to Kenya, likewise, explains the relations between the two states. During periods of conflicts between the two states, the U.S automatically freezes the flow of aid until normalization of the relations. This chapter comes out clearly that aid responds positively to cooperative interactions while it declines during conflictive interaction.

2.2 U.S. Investments in Kenya: An Interplay of National Interests.

At independence, Kenya wanted to diversify her predominantly agricultural economy into an industrial one. The result was an inflow of predominantly industrial capital from not only the U.S. but also from Britain, West Germany, France and other countries. Since Kenya seemed to provide a welcoming and reasonably stable base, with apparently highly profitable investment opportunities, the flow of direct investments into Kenya exceeded that ~~into~~^{of} neighbouring countries.⁶ The U.S. gains from the relationship as it provides employment for its people, earn foreign exchange from goods produced by multinational firms operating in Kenya. Apart from high profits (which can be repatriated with relative ease) and the apparent political stability which contrasts with the situation in the surrounding countries, there are guarantees on expropriation, and Kenya is geographically situated as a nodal distribution point for companies wishing to serve Central and

East African markets.⁷ It is apparent from the above argument that the U.S. has economic gains, from her investments in Kenya.

It can be argued that this "investment-development" strategy has given rise to a mutually beneficial relationship between Kenya and U.S. This economic interest interplay, on the part of Kenya, is that foreign investments, mainly American, have come to play a significant role, particularly in the manufacturing sector of the Kenyan economy, which accounts for a substantial share of net capital formation, and is an important source of foreign exchange. Hence, there is a mutual compatibility of goals in Kenya-U.S. economic intercourse.

It is important to note that a sound economy is the basis of any nation's political, military and socio-cultural strength. Defence policies of nation states are hinged on their economic capabilities. In regard to this, in 1960, the U.S. presidential candidate, John F. Kennedy echoed the preponderance of U.S. economic strength in designing and supporting her cold war strategic policies. Kennedy stated:

Today as never before, America needs a strong economy... to demonstrate to other nations... that the way to freedom is the way to strength and security - that their future lies with U.S. and not with the Soviet Union.⁸

This statement, though overloaded by cold war rhetoric, underscores the fact that a strong economy was prerequisite to military and strategic superiority. The reality of this statement is demonstrated in

cases when the U.S. uses economic rewards to Third World states in exchange for strategic facilities, and support in the U.N. General Assembly. It would be safe to conclude, therefore, that economic prosperity is an important interest area in the U.S. foreign policy agenda.

Immediately after Kenya's independence, in 1963, the U.S. raised its existing Consulate to Embassy status and rapidly became the major source of economic assistance. American aid took the form of technical assistance, and development loans. Technical assistance involved a wide variety of skills in agriculture and education. Peace corps volunteers arrived in the country in June, 1965.⁹ These American efforts laid the foundation for the inflow of economic investments. However, these efforts were compatible with Kenya's economic development strategy which emphasized reliance on foreign investments for economic growth.

A major impetus towards cooperative relations between the two countries stemmed from Kenya's basic economic policy which sought to encourage overseas investment. The U.S. was the major potential source of all these, although Britain remained the unrivalled primary source of aid and investment.¹⁰ Kenya's economic interests necessitated the formulation of foreign economic policies which attracted many U.S. firms into the country.

Public speeches by government officials have most often been in line with their countries' foreign policies. Foreign policy decisions are often revealed in public address. This was evident in 1989, when the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs released a statement to Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programmes Appropriations Committee, which read:

The relations between the U.S. and Kenya have been close since Kenya's independence. We have a deep multifaceted relationship with this key country. Over 100 U.S. companies are active here. We have large economic assistance and peace corps programs, and a significant degree of military cooperation. Over the years, Kenya has followed a free-market approach which has made its economy an envy of many neighbours. In Kenya's relatively open political system, the coups which have plagued many other African countries have been absent.¹¹

This statement underscores the preponderance of Kenya's economic policies in facilitating cooperative interaction between the two states. However small the turn-over of American firms operating in Kenya would be, they are vital ingredients for building the U.S. economic capability.

During the years following Kenya's independence, Kenya attained such a high rate of economic growth that it came to be widely regarded as something of an "economic miracle".¹² The average growth rate for sub-saharan Africa was less than 4%. According to World Bank (WB) figures, Kenya's economy attained an average growth rate of 6.4% per year from 1965 to 1980.¹³ The central premise

of Kenyan development policy in the first 15 years of independence was that it would stimulate the greatest possible amount of economic growth rather than encouraging redistribution of the country's limited resources.¹⁴ This policy in liaison with cooperation with the U.S. has led to the realization of her development objectives.

Some theorists have emphasised the argument that cooperation between states occurs when actors adjust their behaviour to the actual and anticipated preferences of others through a process of policy coordination. To summarize more formally, they argue that intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives!¹⁵ This is true with Kenya - U.S. economic relations which have been cordial and for mutual gain for more than 30 years.

The foundation of economic cooperation between Kenya and the U.S. can be traced in the attitude adopted by Kenyan leaders who came to control the government, particularly the late President Jomo Kenyatta. These men emphasised pragmatism, moderation and a continuing reliance on the Western World as a source of needed funds and technical assistance for national development.¹⁶ In economic relationships with the outside world, national development ranks first in Kenya's domestic and foreign economic policy menu of

priorities. In overall foreign policy priorities, regime survival and territorial integrity rank higher than national development in Kenya's priority list. The economic strategy adopted by the leaders has often been described as "State Capitalism". This can be justified by the 1964 enactment of the Foreign Investment Protection Act (FIPA). This is in line with section 75 of the Kenyan Constitution. The term may also reflect the Second National Development Plan's (1970-74) intention to see greater "collaboration between foreign firms and the government", which has been witnessed through the unrestricted acquisition by the government of shares in banks, oil companies and other international corporations. But we should be clear as to what these trends add up to: there is no intention to cut down the role of foreign investments nor to reorient the economy to internal as opposed to external stimuli. Indeed the plan called for "more active and coordinated efforts to be made to attract foreign investments."¹⁷ The convergence of this economic policy with the American economic interests solves the "economic interests interplay equation". Both states benefit from this economic relationship and this consequently cultivates cooperation between them.

However, the U.S. firms operating in Kenya have a long standing reciprocal relationship with the Kenyan government and more especially with "individuals who matter" in their operations. The U.S.

firms' goal is to make high profits which account for two thirds of U.S. foreign exchange in their global turnover, and their operations are closely linked with other economic instruments of foreign policy such as trade, global financial transfers, among others. The world economy, therefore, is marked by the unprecedented linking of trade, private investment and global financial transfers.¹⁸ This has always been the closely knit mode of operation adopted by U.S. multinational firms operating in Kenya.

Kenya's success in the national development endeavour would probably bring about success to the U.S. investment policy, championed by its multinationals. A question of principal concern is: to what extent are the great corporations able to influence the politics of small powers, and Kenya in particular, and for what reason? There are many shades and variations of the relationship between the corporations and the governments of the countries within which they operate. It is not merely a question of the extent to which the corporations are involved in the economy of the producing countries, but also the nature of the activity and the political and cultural development of the producing countries. It is also a question of the extent to which the corporations' state of origin is able and willing to interfere on behalf of the corporations. Normally the corporations are merely interested in those aspects of politics which affect their

operations.¹⁹ It is pertinent to note that the U.S. crusade for world peace is aimed at facilitating uninterrupted economic operations by her multinationals, which are the major vehicles in her endeavour to realize economic interests.

Foreign investments have accounted for much of Kenya's economic progress. The important role of the M.N.Cs is evident in regard to specific sectors of the Kenyan economy. In manufacturing, the ILO report estimated that M.N.C. sector investment projects (including local capital sources) accounted for 57% to 60% of investment in the country in 1967 and 1968. Over 50% of expected new manufacturing investment for 1967-73 was directed to no more than eight projects managed by multinational firms. This M.N.C. role remained central in 1974-78 National Development plan. Multinational subsidiaries dominate production in most of Kenya's manufacturing sub-sectors. The eight projects were to manufacture (or refine) sugar, canned pineapples, paper, tyres, oil and textiles, are dominated by U.S. M.N.Cs. M.N.C subsidiaries engaged in the primary and tertiary sectors generated 32% of 1972 employment. About 70% of U.S. subsidiaries have invested in hotels and tourist operations.²⁰

Kenya is not endowed with minerals of strategic importance which would attract major U.S. mining companies. However, mining has become much more important in Kenya, due to a fluorspar mining

project which was expected to earn at least £4.0 million a year in foreign exchange. An American firm, Continental Ore, plays a central role in the project. Other U.S multinational firms are also investing in oil and gas exploration in Kenya.²¹ These firms include Louisiana Land and Exploration Kenya Inc., Whitehouse Kenya Petroleum Co., Texas Pacific Kenya Inc. and American Oil Company (AMOCO).²² These American companies are going on with oil exploration, which if successful would earn Kenya foreign exchange, generate employment opportunities, and would save massive foreign exchange spent in the importation of oil and gas. Such aspects of cooperation between the two countries would yield benefits to both states. Such transactions have been going on without disruption during periods of conflict between the two states.

Other American firms operating in Kenya include General Motors, Union Carbide, Firestone, Hilton, Caltex, Kenya Cannery, Intercontinental Hotel, ALICO, Singer Industries, ESSO, among others. In 1969, a group of American companies based in Nazareth, Pennsylvania, embarked on a project of expanding hotel facilities in Kenya. Their development plan meant an additional 1,500 beds or more for tourists on a series of circuits linking national parks, hunting blocks and fishing areas.²³ Tourism has for a long time, especially in the 1980s, been one of Kenya's leading foreign exchange earners.

From a Kenyan perspective, the 1,500 beds was a significant contribution towards the improvement of the tourist facilities and consequently promoting the tourist industry. These investments by US companies have, therefore, played a significant role in Kenya's economic development. Despite Kenya's criticism of U.S policy on the Congo crisis in 1965 and her involvement in the Vietnam war, and in the Middle East conflict of 1967, U.S firms continued investing in Kenya. This explains the reason why there was continuity of cooperation amidst conflicts.

US investments accounted for 20% of the total investments in Kenya in 1971/72. Britain took the lead with 67%. US contribution has currently, however doubled. The following table shows the level of economic investment in Kenya per country.

TABLE 1: Estimated Book-value of Direct Foreign Investment in Kenya, 1971/72.

Source of Investment	Amount (K£)	% of Total
U. K.	87 million	67
U. S.	26 million	20
Germany	6 million	5
France	5 million	4
Japan	1 million	1
Total	125 million	100

Handwritten annotations in the table:
 - Next to 67: +67 → 97%
 - Next to 20: 20
 - Next to 5: 5
 - Next to 4: 4
 - Next to 1: 1
 - A vertical line groups 5, 4, and 1 with a bracket and +10 written next to it.
 - At the bottom right: 97% Fair

Source: Raphael Kaplinsky, Readings on the MNC in Kenya²⁴, P 136

Table 2 shows the spread of US investments in Kenya's industrial sector. By 1972, 46.7% of US investments in Kenya were in the manufacturing sector and were worth 34.8 million dollars, 35.5% were in petroleum refining and distribution with a book value of 26.5m dollars while mining and smelting accounted for 0.21m dollars. Other sectors constituted 17.5%. Currently, the level of US investment has gone up considerably and the manufacturing sector continues to take the lead.

TABLE 2: US Direct Investments in Kenya, 1972.

Area of Activity	Book-Value end of 1972 (US & million)	% of Total
Manufacturing	34.79	46.7
Petroleum	26.45	35.5
Mining/smelting	0.21	0.3
Other	13.05	17.5
Total	74.47	100

Handwritten notes in the table:
 - Next to 46.7: 53.3, 46.7, 100.0
 - Next to 0.3: 35.5, 17.8, 33
 - Next to 100: ✓, 40.2

Source: Raphael Kaplinsky, Readings on MNC in Kenya, P. 139.

Apart from capital investment, Kenya received financial benefits from the MNC sector from its shareholdings particularly in profitable subsidiaries and from tax revenues.²⁵ By 1965, over 20 American companies had opened offices in Nairobi, doubling the number of direct subsidiaries of overseas firms. This keen interest by American firms in Kenya indicated the confidence of American businessmen in

the future of Kenya.²⁶ This was said by an American economic attache at the US Embassy in Nairobi. During this time the US government was engaged in strengthening her relations with Kenya following the exorcization of Britain, the former colonial power at independence. However, this endeavour was initiated by Kenya, and the US responded positively by sending experts to the country to investigate Kenya's environment for industrial development.²⁷ In this regard, the Kenyan government called for a serious interest on the part of American business and banking circles in the economic development of Kenya through investment and trade²⁸. Kenya's economic development goals have been realized mainly through her cooperation with US investors. The aforementioned call was an impetus on the part of Kenya, towards the realization of rapid economic progress.

Following the call, the number of US firms in Kenya had risen from 20 in 1965 to 73 in 1968. Total US investments had exceeded \$100 million.²⁹ In 1978, the then US Ambassador to Kenya, Mr. Wilbert Le Melle, noted that the relationship between the two countries was "exclusive and productive, offering considerable benefits to both countries". He said:

American confidence in Kenya's future is also demonstrated by the growing presence of private American enterprise.³⁰

Compatible ideas regarding the role of the private sector in economic progress championed by both states, is one explanation of the growth

of US investments in Kenya. Both countries are pursuing their national interests whose convergence has led to continued cooperation amidst conflict. The two states have a common goal of fostering their national economic strength. The period 1968 was marked with conflict though there was a continuity of cooperation between the two states dictated by national economic interests. .

The level of US investments continued to rise in the late 1970s and 1980s that the two countries derived economic benefits from such investments. In 1978 there were over 200 US companies in Kenya that had invested a total of \$200 million. This reflects and affirms the assertion that the US was quickly becoming one of Kenya's most important economic partners.³¹ In the US, institutions such as Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and Eximbank facilitate for US investment abroad through their own surveys, financing, insurance and equity participation in investments. In 1978, Eximbank financed businessmen taking up sales in Kenya of aircraft, locomotives, hotel equipment and sugar milling machinery. The two organizations' representatives visited Kenya in 1976 and identified for Americans investment opportunities in food processing, beef production, energy systems, synthetic fibres, paper conversion and basic industrial chemicals.³² In the same year, the US Ambassador to Kenya, Mr. Andrew Young remarked that Kenya was the most hopeful

country in Africa and that the US was proud of its links with Kenya. He said:

Kenya is the steady sure way to enhance trade and services and the development of industrial capacity. American people can look to Kenya with pride for US companies like General Motors and Firestone have helped in building this new Kenya.³³

In 1986 the commercial attache to the US Embassy in Nairobi declared the US investment position in Kenya. He said that the then level of American investments in Kenya was estimated at Ksh. 5.6 billion. The Attache, Mr. James M. Wilson, added that there had been an increase of American firms in Kenya over the years, 1984/85, because of oil exploration exercise going on in some parts of Kenya and in which a number of American firms were interested.³⁴ The exploration is taking place at the Coast, North and North Eastern regions of Kenya. However, 1986, was a year that realized stagnation in the rising trend of American investments in Kenya. This was caused by an overall decision by US private companies which tended to invest less overseas in the early 1980s and Kenya had been affected by this trend. Mr. Wilson said that there were certain conditions that were considered to be vital for a company to invest in Kenya. The investments were required to be labour intensive, make use of local raw materials, and be export-oriented, in line with the Kenya government's policy. He observed that seasoned investors would not go into investments which have no blessing from the host government;

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35 he said that of the total American companies operating in Kenya, 50% were in manufacturing business. He, however, emphasised that the constraints felt by the investors in Kenya were price controls which he described as the "disturbing factors" to investors. During this period, the Kenyan government was looking into the problem with a motive of finding a solution for mutual benefits.³⁶ This implies that the investments were an expression of convergence of interests between Kenya and the U.S. They fostered cooperation between the two states in the late 1980s.

In 1990, Kenya-US economic relations were noted as being significantly cooperative. During this period, the US Ambassador to Kenya, Mr. Smith Hempstone noted that the relationship between the two states was good and for mutual benefit of their peoples. He noted further that the US was the second-largest foreign investor in Kenya with investments of approximately US\$270 million.³⁷ Kenya's major goal has always been economic development through external capital.

Within this policy web are the goals of employment opportunities ✓
generation, earning revenue from taxes and foreign exchange obtained ✓
from the exportation of products produced by export-oriented firms,
development of economic infrastructure and fostering cooperation ✓
with the US. These goals have been realized to a greater extent, while the US likewise derives substantial economic benefits from the

relations.

The relationship between Kenya and the US is strongly anchored in development-economic investment cooperation. The US government uses Kenya as a nodal point of production supplying the East and Central African Market. However, these interactions in themselves, not only cultivate the cooperative nature of the relations, but also reflect the presence of such a relationship. Continued in-flow of investments from the US into Kenya would lead to an even more cooperative relationship. Therefore, the hypothesis that investments promote cooperation between Kenya and the US is affirmed. The sustenance of this argument demonstrates that the relationship is characterized with a realistic interplay of national interests. These interactions have continued to foster cooperation between the two states even within periods of conflict. This is a case of convergence of interests between Kenya and the U.S.

2.3 Trade Interaction between Kenya and the U.S.

✓ Trade is reputed as one of the traditional instruments of foreign policy. Kenya's national goal of economic development is pursued through various avenues among which is trade. Being an exchange of goods or/and services for money or other goods, trade between Kenya and her foreign partners has contributed substantially to the

realization of her domestic economic needs. Trade demonstrates the existence of mutual relations between the participants who assume the roles of "buyer" and "vendor". However small the volume of trade between Kenya and the US would be, most significant is whether a threat to their trade interactions would have a negative impact on their respective economic systems. Kenya would probably be more vulnerable to such impact should her relations with US be strained. Obviously, the trade relations between the two states is asymmetrical.

Trade is, therefore, one of the major avenues through which Kenya would achieve her national objectives. These objectives can be summarised as: improving the standard of living of her people, promoting economic infrastructure in the country, and improving the earning capacities of Kenyans, and to ensure the security of her borders from external aggression.³⁸ The aspect of economic development would have important ramifications that would give the U.S. certain practical material benefits. It would open up new sources of raw materials and goods, markets for US products from farms and factories.³⁹ Trade is therefore one of the avenues through which the two states realize their respective national goals.

There are imbalances in Kenya's trade with the US. This is so because Kenya's imports from the US are mainly industrial products which are more costly compared to US imports from Kenya which are

predominantly agricultural. The value of Kenya's imports, therefore, is higher than that of her exports. However, Kenya has been US trade partner since independence. Trade relations have often continued to flourish within a politically strained relationship. This means that trade is an expression of continuity of cooperative interaction. In this section, our contention is that trade between the two countries demonstrates the presence of a cooperative relationship, and cultivates the continuity of such a relationship. The strain caused by political events, on the interactions between the two states, were inconsequential and did not spill over to impair trade interactions. However, trade requires a friendly atmosphere between states. As one scholar remarked that a shrewd businessman makes it a rule not to quarrel with his best customers, or infact, with any customers. "The customer is always right" is a time-honoured aphorism that also applies to foreign trade. Nations have sometimes been restrained from fighting by the realization that warfare might result in a mutual cutting of economic throats. Commerce cements friendship and vice versa.⁴⁰ Trade between Kenya and US, therefore, cements their relationship and their friendly relations, in turn, cements and strengthens their trade ties.

Trade is a two-way street, and if traffic slows down on one side, it usually slows down on the other.⁴¹ When exports slow down, it ipso

facto affects the import trade of a country. Kenya traditionally has a deficit in her merchandise trade account, and this has gradually widened as domestic resources have come under immense pressure. The trade deficit grew quite slowly during the 1960s, when imports increased a little faster than GDP and exports a little more slowly. Most of the deficit was covered by Kenya's net receipts from "invisibles" particularly the sale of services to Uganda and Tanzania, and expanded earnings from tourism. Thus, until the end of the 1960s, Kenya's balance of current account either was favourable or reflected a deficit which could easily be met by foreign private investment and increased foreign aid.⁴² However, after the 1973 oil shock and the break-up of the East African Community (EAC), Kenya's deficit gap continued to widen and consequently continued to propagate an "increased trade policy" with the US.

The promotion of external trade has been the preoccupation of the Kenya government since independence. It was stated in the National Development Plan of 1984-88 that:

By selling more of our goods and services abroad and earning more foreign exchange, a larger proportion of the cost of essential imports can be financed from our own resources. This is another important means of mobilizing domestic resources for development.⁴³

There is however, long trade cooperation between Kenya and the US which serves a common interest. Since World War II, the US has

advocated a kind of international economic system characterised by cooperation among sovereign states. It has always been the case that no country would engage in lasting cooperation unless its interests were served.⁴⁴ This is the premise within which trade cooperation between Kenya and the US thrive.

Bilateral trade relations between states generally covary with their other foreign contacts. We can, therefore, pursue the argument that changes in verbal exchanges, conflict behaviour, diplomatic contacts, trade patterns, or voting behaviour in international forums will seldom covary in the same direction unless a major, fundamental change is executed in the relationship between any states.⁴⁵ Trade relations between Kenya and the US is one of the variables that have caused deviation from the preceding assertions that the continuity of trade interactions within a conflictual relationship between the two countries explain this trend.

US economic and commercial objectives underscore the fact that her trade relationship with Kenya has a multifaceted function. A major objective of the US is to encourage economic growth, which converges with Kenya's national objective of economic development, and free market-oriented economies. This reinforces the US goal of economic and political stability which would in turn lead to increased trade and investment for US entrepreneurs.⁴⁶ This affirms the

interest-interplay in Kenya-US trade relations.

2.3.1 Kenya's Import Trade with the U.S: Convergence of Interests

Kenya started importing goods and services from the US in early 1960s. In 1963, Kenya's imports from the UK dropped a little but sharply increased from the US, EEC and Japan. The adverse balance of Kenya's merchandise trade was reduced from £20 million in 1961 to £17 million in 1962.⁴⁷ By mid 1963, Kenya had established a good and strong trade relationship with the US.⁴⁸ In 1966 Kenya imported a huge amount of maize from the U.S. which was used to supplement the maize shortage in the country.

Table 3 below shows Kenya's imports from the U.S, which are predominantly manufactured goods, machinery and transport equipment. The U.S. supplies a good percentage of these goods into the Kenyan market which earn her foreign exchange. Kenya likewise benefits from such imports as they constitute the basis for industrial development, and offering services to her peoples. Importation of tobacco and beverages declined during the 1964-71 period due to Kenya's reliance on locally produced varieties and the penetration of the production of these commodities by multinational firms.

TABLE 3: Percentage Value Distribution of Imports from the US by SITC Classification, 1964-71

Import	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Food and live animals	11.1	12.9	11.7	7.0	6.8	5.1	6.1	7.3
Beverage and Tobacco	2.6	2.3	1.5	1.7	1.3	1.0	1.5	1.4
Crude Materials	2.0	2.1	2.0	2.2	2.7	3.0	2.5	3.0
Mineral fuels	11.0	10.6	9.9	10.5	10.9	10.4	9.5	8.5
Animal and Vegetable oils	2.3	3.3	2.1	1.7	1.9	2.3	2.0	2.3
Chemicals	8.1	8.9	7.9	7.3	9.4	9.9	9.9	9.5
Manufactured goods	25.5	26.5	24.9	25.5	26.5	26.8	26.7	25.6
Machinery and transport equipment	26.4	22.8	29.6	34.4	29.2	32.0	31.2	32.5
Miscellaneous Manufactures	6.9	6.6	6.7	6.0	7.3	7.0	7.6	8.9
Other Commodities	4.1	4.0	3.7	3.7	4.0	2.5	3.0	1.0
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Table 19. - Statistical Tables: World Bank Report on Kenya 1975.

From 1964 to 1981 Kenya's direction of merchandise trade was unfavourable. Generally, there have been imbalances in the terms of

trade. Western Europe was the major buyer of Kenyan exports, followed by the U.S., Kenya's exports to the U.S. remained low at 4 to 6 percent of the total with a mildly declining trend. Imports from the U.S. remained low and steady at 4 to 7 percent of the total.⁴⁹ Kenya's agricultural products' prices have been fluctuating since 1964. Since then, the international purchasing power of a tonne of coffee had fallen by 50% and that of a tonne of tea by 68%. Hence despite a four-fold increase in the production of tea since 1964, tea exports in 1981 could finance 7.7% of imports as compared with 9.6% in 1964.⁵⁰ Table 4 below shows U.S. position in Kenya's overall imports.

TABLE 4: Percentage of Imports by source for selected years, 1964-1981

Source	1964	1966	1968	1970	1972	1973	1974	1977	1979	1981
Western Europe	45.9	50.0	49.3	48.8	53.3	30.8	46.8	48.5	51.5	40.2
USA	5.5	9.1	6.2	7.5	6.3	7.7	5.6	5.7	5.6	6.8
Uganda	8.2	5.9	6.8	6.4	4.0	2.1	1.0	0.1	0.1	0.1
Tanzania	4.8	3.1	3.1	3.8	3.1	3.5	2.8	0.3	0.0	0.0
Others of which	35.6	31.8	34.5	33.5	33.4	35.9	43.9	45.9	42.7	52.9
Middle East	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source : National Development Plan, 1984 to 1988 p. 22.

Table four illustrates the position of Kenya's imports from the US in the period 1964 to 1981. A larger volume of Kenya's imports during this period came from Western Europe as a bloc but largest from the US in single country frame. The trend indicates a mild rise of the volume of imports from the US. The nature of imports from the US being manufactured goods and industrial equipment, constitutes a larger percentage of such imports by value.

Kenya's imports from the U.S. maintained a steady trend of between K£ 4 million and K£ 5 million in the period 1961 to 1964. The conflict between the two states did not have a significant impact on

trade interaction between the two countries, though political relations were strained. The U.S. involvement in the hostage rescue mission in the Congo sparked off a lot of protests in most of African countries. In relation to this, U.S was condemned of siding with Mr. Moise Tshombe's government during the crisis. A memorandum issued by protesters in Nairobi said that it was a shame that since 1960, when Congo attained independence, the Congolese people had never known peace. The message further stated that the fault was not theirs but it lied with the interventionists-foreigners, headed by the U.S government. The tragedy would have been ended long ago if the Americans had heeded the cease fire appeal by President Kenyatta. The memorandum described the American help to Mr. Tshombe as an "affront to African Unity" and added that OAU proposals were failing in the Congo because the western powers were continuing to back individuals headed by the US puppet, Tshombe against the will of the Congolese people.⁵¹ This incident strained political relations between the two states while trade interaction continued.

However, another incident connected with the crisis was the bombing of Ugandan villages of Goli and Paidha, by US planes. This was alleged to have been carried out by Mr. Tshombe who accused Uganda of plotting with the Congolese insurgents. He had claimed that Uganda supplied them with arms and accorded them rest

camps in Ugandan territory. The bombing was alleged to have been carried out by Congo Air Force planes piloted by Cuban refugees from the US.⁵² In Kampala, Uganda, there was a big demonstration against the US government for its involvement in the bombings. The demonstrators pulled down the American flag at the US Embassy.⁵³

The political sphere of relations between Kenya and US was strained due to the events in the Congo. In Nairobi, hundreds of students shouting "Yankee go home" marched into the American Embassy. The demonstrators handed over a memorandum to the Charge d' Affairs Mr. James Richit. The American Ambassador, Mr. William Attwood was in Washington for consultations. The students carried placards some of which read "Johnson is the leader of Darkness, Murder and scourge of democracy"; "Yankee go home"; "Hands off the Congo, Vietnam, Cuba, and East Africa".⁵⁴ Trade between Kenya and the US was not shocked by the strained political relationship between the two states. Trade between the two countries, probably, restrained the two countries from severing their relations. This explains the continuity of cooperation amidst conflict


TABLE 5: KENYA-US TRADE 1961- 1965
(Value in k£'000)

	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Exports	5018	3754	3060	4754	2643
Imports	4183	5693	4060	4838	8511

Source: Statistical Abstract, Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Planning and National Development, Nairobi, 1971, pp.51/63

The statistics show a trade imbalance between the two states as shown in figure two and explained below. This trade imbalance in itself shows that the relationship between the two states is mutually beneficial but not for equal gain. The terms of imports were in favour of the US because Kenya's imports from the U.S were growing at a higher and more consistent rate than exports. Imports almost doubled while exports almost halved. The economic interests of the two states continued to command trade cooperation within a politically strained relationship. However, the trade imbalances are attributed to the fact that Kenya imports were mainly industrial products while her exports were predominantly agricultural. In the period 1963 to 1966 Kenya's imports from the US were, cumulatively, worth k£ 28.6 million.⁵⁵ Table 6 shows the nature and value of Kenya's imports from the US.

Figure 1: Kenya USA Trade; 1961-65



Source: Data obtained from Statistical Abstract, 1971 PP. 51/63.

60

The political relationship between Kenya and the US was

strained in 1967. Kenya's stance vis-a-vis US policy towards Africa during this year could be described as "suspect". There were no clear-cut events which led to the lodging of such feelings by Kenya, but the relationship assumed an unfriendly posture. Mr. Oginga Odinga, then a member of the opposition party Kenya Peoples Union (KPU), noted that Africa-American relations should be based on the acceptance of the reality of independence in Africa and that the concept of a power vacuum in Africa to be filled by a "big brother" must be discarded. He castigated US foreign policy, and accused C.I.A.-financed organizations of promoting dishonest, selfish and corrupt leaders in Africa.⁵⁶ This accusation was countered by the then US Ambassador to Kenya, Mr. Glenn W. Ferguson, who called the accusation "a direct attack on American foreign and domestic policy and criticism of US Peace Corps in Africa".⁵⁷ Odinga had also claimed that the US was using "the communist bugey" as a cover for interference in the internal affairs of African independent states. Another setback in the political relations was felt when the book, Reds and Blacks, was printed and released in the US. The book was written by a former US Ambassador to Kenya, Mr. William Attwood. He had been liked as Ambassador and had contributed considerably to the growth of harmonious relations between the two countries but the book's public exposure of conversations that Kenyan leaders had

considered to be in confidence considerably disturbed them. Kenya had also voiced her opposition to US involvement in Vietnam.⁵⁸ Despite this conflictual relationship, trade interactions continued. However the relationship was not "very active" in the years 1966 to 1968 simply because America's foreign policy was concentrated in the Vietnam war.

TABLE 6: Kenya's imports from the US; value of SITC sections by principal country of origin (US) (K£ '000).

Commodities	1863	1964	1965	1966
Food and live animals	244	214	3024	4699
Beverages and tobacco	110	141	122	128
Crude materials, indible except fuels	8	42	21	59
Mineral fuel, lubricants and related materials	103	278	210	155
Animals and vegetable oils and fats	8	35	197	440
Chemicals	450	568	753	690
Manufactured goods clasified by meterial	642	886	1150	1669
Machinery and transport equipment	1586	1916	2321	2559
Miscellaneous manufactured articles	844	758	713	873
Commodities	1	--	--	5
TOTAL	4000	4838	8511	11275

Source: Annual Trade Report, 1967, P 61.

Note: SITC stands for "Standard International Trade Classification".

This is a classification that was approved by the United Nations and amended slightly to cater for East African needs and has been used since 1st. January, 1954.

Table 6 illustrates the nature and value of Kenya's imports from the US. Kenya's major imports are machinery and transport equipment and manufactured goods. There is a rising trend for both imports. Kenya's imports in 1963 were amounting to K£ 4.0 million while that of 1966 was K£ 11.3 million with an annual mean increment of K£ 1.8 million. This increase was significant within the period 1963 to 1966 and facilitated a cooperative interaction within a politically strained relationship.

Trade imbalances between Kenya and US continued to exist in the period 1967 to 1970. The total value of imports amounted to K£ 36.33 million while that of exports was K£ 19.01 million. The imports grew tremendously compared to the 1963-65 period. During the 1967 to 1970 period, imports maintained an average volume of K£ 9.08 million annually while that of the previous period was K£ 7.5 million annually. There is, therefore, an average annual growth rate of imports by value of about K£ 2 million. The cooperative relationship between the US and Kenya in the period 1967 to 1970, therefore, was sustained by economic interactions as political ties between the two states were strained. Table 7 shows the nature and value of imports during 1967-70 period. The conflict between the two states in 1967 did not affect trade interaction.

Kenya's imports from the US during the 1967-70 period (as shown in table 7) depicts an increasing reliance on American manufactured goods by Kenya. Importation of machinery

and transport equipment total to K£18.0 million in the period under review, while the value of the same goods continued to rise annually. The total value of imports from the US during this period amounted to 36.4 million Kenya pounds.

TABLE 7: Kenya's imports from the US in the years 1967 to 1970 (K£ '000)

Commodities	1967	1968	1969	1970
Food and live animal	590	334	195	1035
Beverages and tobacco	62	54	48	97
Crude materials, inedible except fuels	119	130	146	160
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials	14	273	96	366
Animal and vegetable oils and fats	41	80	44	151
Chemicals	858	1278	1185	1754
Manufactured goods classified by material	1794	1758	1406	1763
Machinery and transport equipment	3735	3465	5047	5791
Miscellaneous manufactured articles	587	549	569	789
Miscellaneous transactions and commodities	1	1	-	-
TOTAL	7801	7922	8736	11906

Source: Annual Trade Reports, Ministry of Planning and National Development, Nairobi, 1971 p 64.

There is an interplay of economic interests expressed through the trade interactions between Kenya and the US. This trade interaction, therefore, demonstrates the presence of a cooperative relationship and is likewise a linchpin of the relations.

Kenya's endeavour towards economic development was constrained by unfavourable terms of trade in the 1970s. Her balance of payments position started showing strains in the early 1970s. With the first oil shock in 1973, the terms of trade worsened, a situation that persisted with the exception of the coffee boom period of 1976-77. This boom, which resulted from higher world coffee and tea prices, led to a temporary recovery in the balance of payments position. The sharp fall in the prices of such commodities in 1978 and the government's inability to reduce imports drastically owing to the existence of many projects that began in the boom period led to a sharp deterioration in the balance of payments situation.⁵⁹ As the country was trying to cope with the challenges, the second oil shock set in during the period 1979-80. The situation was exacerbated by the decline in coffee and tea prices as well as a fall in export volume.⁶⁰ Faced with all these difficulties towards realizing her national interests, Kenya had to seek increased trade cooperation and economic assistance, from the US.

During the period 1971 to 1976, Kenya imported goods from the US worth K£ 115.8 million while her exports earned K£ 51.9 million.⁶¹ This means that during this period the trade relationship was favourable to the U.S. U.S. strong economic base, which underlies her military might, is to a more or less extent dependent on her

external trade. However small Kenya's contribution would be, her contribution is a positive step towards building the U.S economy. However, Kenya also gains markets for her agricultural commodities, through their mutual and cooperative relationship.

Trade is playing a growing and essential part in the warm and expanding relationship between Kenya and the U.S. In fact, the U.S is quickly becoming one of Kenya's most important trading partners. In 1977, the U.S. was Kenya's third largest buyer of exports. Likewise U.S. exports to Kenya grew to more than \$56 millions in 1977. Aircraft and aviation equipment have been the U.S leading exports, followed by fungicides, insecticides and telecommunication equipment.⁶² In 1978 Kenya imported various items from the U.S which included 25 advanced diesel locomotives and 3 Boeng 707s. The U.S has also been a large traditional supplier of cereals, measuring and controlling instruments, and office machines (e.g. IBM computers and type - writers) photographic supplies, road tractors, agro-industrial machinery and equipments. The U.S designated Kenya as one of the 135 beneficiary developing countries which were allowed to import into America a wide range of articles duty-free. Over 2,700 product categories were eligible for duty-free treatment under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), which was designed to offer new industries in developing

countries a preferential advantage in the US marketplace until they become fully competitive.⁶³ It would be safe to conclude, therefore, that there is need for Kenya and the US to constantly look for new and better opportunities to facilitate trade between them with due emphasis on the fact that a mutually profitable trade relationship is one of the best international bridge-builders. Cooperation between the two states would continue to revolve around the trade interaction.

There was a continuity in the hitherto described trend of trade between Kenya and the US in the period 1977 to 1989. There was increased value of imports as opposed to falling prices of exports. Table 8 shows the trend of Kenya's imports from the US in the above mentioned period. The up-shooting value of imports presupposes that the US earned higher foreign exchange from her exports to Kenya in the period under review. US economic interests were realized to a greater degree through this trend of trade. The trade relationship expressed in the table indicates a continuous increase of imports with minimal annual fluctuations.

TABLE 8: Kenya's imports from the US in the period
1977 to 1989 (value in K£ '000)


Year	Value
1977	30482
1978	41096
1979	34925
1980	60998
1981	63640
1982	54380
1983	56640
1984	51050
1985	66190
1986	65290
1987	101110
1988	83310
1989	164210
TOTAL	878321

Source: Compiled from Economic Surveys of 1978, 1982, 1987 and 1990.

In the fourteen-year period, the US earned a total of K£ 878.3 million in foreign exchange from her exports to Kenya. The trend of trade was not responsive to conflictive interactions between the two states as shown in figure three. The value of imports continued to rise whereas that of exports continued to decline. This worsened Kenya's economic problems and would in future impair Kenya's economic progress. However, this trade

relationship expresses a cooperative interaction between the two states.

Figure 2: Kenya USA Trade; 1977-89



Source: Data obtained from Economic Surveys 1978, 1982, 1987 and 1990, and Statistical Abstracts 1982 and 1990.

The Kenyan economy is faced with several bottlenecks. The recently revised 1990 balance of payments estimate shows a \$250 million deficit while only in 1989 Kenya experienced \$80 million balance of payments surplus. The external shocks to Kenya's balance of payments may force the government to slow and/or back off from commitment to its import liberalization programme. This sharp decline in the terms of trade highlights the need for Kenya to move quickly to implement its broad-based export development strategy. Kenya has so far chosen to draw down resources but will soon have to make difficult choices, including more pronounced exchange rate depreciation and curtailing of certain imports. The effect of the terms of trade decline on the economy will be substantial leading to an economic showdown.⁶⁴ Kenya will have to shop around for economic assistance to offset the impending financial crisis. The 1990s would be a period of economic problems for Kenya. There is need for increased search for opportunities to promote the sale of Kenyan goods in the American market-place. Increased economic cooperation between Kenya and the US would be a positive step towards Kenya's economic recovery and progress.

Kenya needs to step-up her food production in order to cut down her corn imports from the U.S. There has been occasional importation of food from the US, more

particularly in periods of shortages in the country. For example, between mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, Kenya's expenditure on food imports had soared, increasing from about 6% to almost 12% of the total imports by value.⁶⁵ Much of this increase was caused by growing urban affluence and the strong preference of urban consumers for wheat-based products instead of maize. Kenya's wheat imports began to rise dramatically during this period and, by the mid-1980s, wheat imports were averaging more than 225,000 metric tonnes a year, at a cost of between \$30 million and \$35 million.⁶⁶ Much of these grain imports were from the US. Kenya's economy is agrobased but has to rely on food imports to supplement the inadequate quantities produced locally during droughts, and generally, during food shortage periods. This component of trade elevates cooperation between the two states.

2.3.2: Kenya's Exports to the U.S.: Concurrence of Interests.

Kenya is an agrobased economic entity whose exports are predominantly agricultural. The major objective of export trade is to earn foreign exchange, which is a vital input towards the realization of Kenya's goal of national economic development. However small Kenya's earnings from her exports to the US would be, they contribute substantially to the payment for her imports.

Kenya's exports include: coffee, sisal, tea, pyrethrum, hides and skins, among others.

Kenya's exports have remained to be agricultural in nature over the years. However, Kenya has undertaken the task of exploration of valuable mineral deposits but has not yet succeeded. The few minerals such as fluorspar, trona, limestone, gold, among others, are found in insufficient quantities and most of them are of limited economic importance and consequently earn a meagre amount of foreign exchange. Oil exploration continues in the country, and US firms are the major investors in this exercise. However, as shown in table 9 below, the composition of Kenya's exports is dominated by coffee, tea and petroleum products. Petroleum products are mainly marketed within East and Central Africa, while coffee, tea pyrethrum, among other agricultural products are sold mainly in the American and European markets. The earnings from Kenya's exports are a major ingredient that buoys Kenya's economic development process.

TABLE 9: Percentage Distribution of Major Exports,
1964-72

Category	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Coffee	21.9	18.4	21.6	19.7	15.2	18.2	21.6	18.3	20.0
Tea	8.3	7.9	10.0	9.3	11.8	12.2	12.3	10.4	13.2
Petroleum products	6.3	12.2	11.6	14.2	12.4	13.5	13.3	14.3	12.3
Meat products	3.0	3.2	3.4	3.6	3.5	2.8	2.8	3.1	3.9
Petroleum extract	3.4	2.8	2.7	3.0	2.9	2.3	1.7	2.3	3.0
Sisal	8.2	5.0	3.7	2.6	2.1	1.8	1.8	1.3	1.7
Hides and skins	1.7	2.3	2.9	2.1	2.0	2.0	1.6	2.0	3.0
Cement	2.3	2.3	1.9	2.1	2.6	2.4	2.9	2.6	2.2
Dairy Products	1.6	2.2	1.8	2.1	0.8	2.3	1.6	1.8	2.4
Cereals	3.6	2.7	1.6	2.5	2.3	2.3	1.6	0.7	2.0
Soap and soap preparation	1.9	1.4	1.3	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.3	1.5	1.1
Paper and paperboard	1.2	1.4	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.2
Metal manufacture	2.1	2.2	2.0	1.8	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.0
Other	35.4	36.0	33.9	33.7	39.5	35.4	34.5	38.8	33.0
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Tables 17 and 18 Statistical Tables: World Bank Report on Kenya, 1975.

As shown on table 5, Kenya's exports to the US in the years 1961 to 1965 contributed K£ 19.23 million of

foreign exchange. The trend of export trade continued to improve though the value of imports increased at a higher pace. Improvement of export trade being one of Kenya's economic growth strategies has been realized through the cooperation of U.S. in buying Kenya's coffee, tea and other products. These trade interactions express a cordial and cooperative relationship between the two states.

As stated above, the political relationship between Kenya and the US during the 1964-67 period did not have significant impact on their trade relations. Though Kenya's exports to the US kept rising and fluctuating by volume and value, they were not aggravated by the conflictual relations between the two states but by conditions of world economic environment. The new nation, Kenya, dedicated a lot of effort to improving her export earnings as a strategy towards realizing socio-economic progress.

In the years 1966 to 1972, Kenya earned less from her exports to the US than in the mid 1970s. The total value of exports for the period was K£ 34.5 million. The average annual earnings of the export trade with the US were K£ 5.0 million.⁶⁷ Table 10 shows Kenya's export earnings from the US in the years 1966 to 1972.

TABLE 10: Kenya's Export Earnings from the
US in the period 1966 to 1972 (K£ '000)

Year	Value
1966	5282
1967	3603
1968	4043
1969	5007
1970	6357
1971	6357
1972	5259
TOTAL	34476

Source: Figures obtained from Statistical Abstracts,
1971 pp 51/63 and 1982 pp 61/75

It is important to note that in the years 1964 and 1967 Kenya's exports to the US rose by K£ 1.75 and K£ 0.44 million respectively. There was no relationship between this trend and the conflictual relations that pervaded the interaction between the two states. The nature and value of principal commodities of Kenya's exports to the US are tabulated below.

TABLE 11: Kenya's exports to the US - Value of Principal Domestic Export Commodities (K£ '000), 1967-1972.

Commodity	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
Coffee not roasted	1359	1472	1848	3788	1495	1310
Tea	742	1175	1514	1238	1461	1686
Sisal fibre and tow	69	66	76	20	62	-
Pyrethrum flowers	97	5	2	-	-	20
Pyrethrum extract	794	691	820	537	1061	1485
Petroleum products	-	-	1	-	-	-
Hides, Skins and fir skins undressed	6	13	11	5	8	19
Wattle bark extract	2	4	6	5	5	5
Pineapples tinned	3	-	-	-	-	-
Beans, peas and lentils	12	42	13	20	29	19
Oil seeds, nuts, kernels	25	19	10	10	98	76
All other commodities	491	556	706	734	782	701
TOTAL	3600	4043	5007	6357	5001	5321

Source: Statistical Abstracts, 1971 p 50 and 1973 p 60

Table 11 shows the nature and value of Kenya's exports to the US in the period 1967 to 1972, which were dominated by coffee, tea and pyrethrum extract. The earnings were notably low with a seven-year aggregate of K£34.5 million. The implication of this trade interaction, however, was that they constituted one of the major components of Kenya-US cooperation. Trade was not responsive to the conflictive interaction that occurred in 1967-69 period over US involvement in the Vietnam war.

Kenya's exports to the US soared in the years 1973 to 1989. Much of the increase was realised during the coffee boom of 1976-77. The export earnings started deteriorating in 1978 and showing an upward trend in 1980. From 1980, the trend kept on favouring Kenya until 1989. Specifically, the 1975 value had tripled by the year 1977. The boom period helped Kenya to offset the bottlenecks that faced her during the 1973 oil shocks. This had caused the stagnation of development projects started prior to the oil shock. The total value of exports to the US from 1973 to 1980 was K£ 116 million, while that of the 1980s was K£ 405 million.⁶⁸ The trend seems to have been favourable for Kenya's export earnings but given the paradox of increased import prices, its contribution to development was minimal. Table 12 shows

the trends explained above. These trends are also shown in figure three.

TABLE 12: Value of Kenya's Exports to the US in the period 1973 to 1989 (K£ '000)

Year	Value
1973	7304
1974	7919
1975	8268
1976	18256
1977	25673
1978	16655
1979	15786
1980	16135
1981	18915
1982	33345
1983	38694
1984	38369
1985	53670
1986	84571
1987	42222
1988	45473
1989	49350
TOTAL	520605

Source: Figures obtained from Statistical Abstracts, 1982 pp 59/73 and 1990 pp 60/71.

Trade relations between Kenya and the US remarkably flourished in 1985 and were praised by US Embassy in Nairobi. Addressing local businessmen in Nairobi, the

then minister Counsellor of the Embassy, Mr. George Trail, praised the friendly relations between Kenya and the US. He underscored the fact that Kenya's trade with the US had grown considerably and that in 1983, the US was the second largest buyer of Kenya's coffee, the third largest buyer of its tea and the largest buyer of its pyrethrum. The trend was expected to improve and did so in the 1986 to 1989 period.⁶⁹ The trend of Kenya's export trade with the US was favourable to Kenya in 1985. Though the value of US exports to Kenya was higher in 1985 than that of 1984, Kenya's export earnings increased by an impressive 44% above the 1984 figures. According to the figures released by the US Department of Commerce in February, 1986, total Kenyan sales reached Kshs. 1.54 billion up from about Kshs. 1.0 billion in 1984.⁷⁰ Kenya's national economic interests converge with those of the US and are realised through the friendly and cooperative relationship between them. Trade is one of the major ingredients in the pursuit of national goals by the two states.

2.4.0 U.S. Aid to Kenya: An Interplay of National Interests

The commonest instrument of influence in Kenya-U.S. relations is foreign aid. U.S. aid to Kenya demonstrates the existence of a relationship between the two countries and that there are inherent interests pursued by the two states. These interests could be humanitarian, strategic, political or economic. It is worth noting that the U.S. has vital interests to pursue and protect in Kenya using aid as a bridge. Such U.S. aid disbursements have to be

approved by Congress, whose main rationale of approval is: to what extent would the disbursements in aid lead to the realization of American political, economic, strategic and humanitarian interests? On the other hand, Kenya needs such assistance to offset her balance of payments and the funding of her development projects. U.S. aid, therefore, facilitates the realization of interests of both countries. Kenya's need for external support to economic development converge with U.S. national priorities, championed through her foreign aid programme.

Kenya's performance in agriculture, which is the backbone of her economy, has not been very successful in the recent times, to guarantee self reliance in promoting and sustaining economic development. However, Kenya has enjoyed more than 25 years of agricultural growth, sufficient magnitude and strength to afford spillover benefits to other economic sectors. The key to Kenya's positive performance has been sustained growth in the productivity of its agricultural sector and, especially, the fact that agricultural exports have consistently generated sufficient, but not enough, foreign exchange earnings to permit the acquisition of goods and other inputs necessary for the well-being of its industrial and manufacturing sectors.⁷¹ U.S. assistance is mainly concentrated in agriculture, education, population control, and defence.⁷² Consequently, U.S. aid is a multifaceted instrument of policy. U.S. support to Kenya's development endeavour is a strategy geared towards creating greater market for U.S. goods. U.S. support to export-oriented farmers has fostered an economic environment

that has helped buoy Kenya's economic development.

It is pertinent to understand the nature of politico-economic landscape within which Kenya operates so as to have a clear picture on the role of the U.S. assistance in the country's economy. This is important simply because foreign policies and relations among states are an avenue through which states realize their domestic interests. Economic needs are fundamental sources of a state's foreign policy. The economy of a state is in turn fundamental to its capabilities and therefore to its power. Kenya's economy, being agrobased is often prone to various natural/climatic and market bottlenecks. These are price fluctuations in the world marketplace, drought and population pressure, which concertedlly give rise to reduced local capacities to import manufactured goods from the U.S. and other countries. Faced with these constraints from time to time, her reliance on external resources has been increasing rather than diminishing.⁷³ Expenditures have often been growing more rapidly than earnings. This has necessitated extensive borrowing from the U.S. and other countries and international institutions.

During the cold war era, U.S. aid to Kenya was realistically an exchange for basing facilities and support in international forums. This view was held salient till the end of the cold war in 1990. This was mainly in regard to military assistance. During the Carter Administration, the United States pursued a policy of unilateral restraint. Under guidelines set by President Carter in May, 1977, arms support was viewed as an "exceptional foreign policy instrument", one whose use was carefully and rigorously

constrained.⁷⁴ The underlying U.S. interests in aiding Kenya, therefore, were diverse and include acquisition of facilities, base or transit rights for U.S. armed forces; promoting standardization of equipment and doctrine; providing a symbol of U.S. commitment; promoting a pro-U.S. orientation in Kenya; gaining support for the U.S. negotiating posture on international issues, among others.⁷⁵ It would be safe to argue, therefore, that U.S. assistance to Kenya is intended to yield tangible and intangible benefits to the U.S.

The flow of U.S. aid to Kenya started prior to Kenya's independence. In the period 1953 to 1961, Kenya received economic assistance amounting to \$ 7.2 million.⁷⁶ Aid therefore, plays a significant role in the relationship between the two states. In view of the above arguments, it would be safe to assert that there is an interplay of national interests of the two states expressed in the aid relationship.

2.4.1: U.S Aid to Kenya and U.S National Interests

At the eve of Kenya's independence, the U.S. stepped in as one of her major aid donors. The U.S. was compelled to help Kenya, and other new African states by the fear that failure to do so would be interpreted as a mark of American disinterest with the new African states. However, a more concrete reason for American engagement was its concern about the Soviet Union. There were, likewise, U.S. economic interests in giving such assistance to Kenya and other third world countries, in general. As it has often been said by U.S. policy makers, the basic economic function of foreign aid is to increase the recipient nation's access to imports. Since a

nation must pay for imports with foreign exchange, the problem of gaining access to more imports is one of acquiring more foreign exchange. Since 1945, the U.S. policy makers in the executive branch have considered trade and aid to be the alternative techniques of statecraft.⁷⁷ Others are diplomatic representation and military force. Military assistance, in particular, is given for several reasons. Improving the U.S. balance of payments position; enhancing employment opportunities in the U.S., providing tax revenues; promoting access to critical resources; promoting associated commercial sales; and reducing the unit costs of U.S. military equipment.⁷⁸ In view of these, it is evident that U.S. aid to Kenya serves the interests of the two states.

Since 1951, the annual U.S. foreign aid bill has continued provisions for both military and economic aid. The latter is administered by the aid agency (USAID), and the Defence Department administers the former, under the overall "guidance" of the State Department in harmonizing their own interests with those of the people and governments of the countries in which they operate.⁷⁹ The U.S. has laid much emphasis on more aid to friendly and strategically situated governments, particularly in her Middle-East strategic network and in her defence systems towards the former Soviet Union. This explains why much of U.S. assistance goes to peripheral states to the Persian Gulf, for example Egypt, Israel, Ethiopia, Kenya, among others. This component of U.S. economic and military assistance to Kenya has fostered cooperation between them as it serves interests of both states.

The U.S. continued to use the foreign aid strategy in many years later in order to facilitate the realization of her interests. As a way of illustration, in 1989, Kenya and other peripheral states to the Persian Gulf collectively received \$ 1.1 billion which was designated to fund programs of such key regional friends of the U.S. in the Middle East, East Africa and Africa, some of which provided, or were pledged to provide when needed, access to strategic base facilities to U.S. forces.⁸⁰ Simply put, U.S. aid policy works under the dictum that "we must put our money where our mouths are". Most predominant is what the aid would yield for the U.S. and not what it would yield for the recipient countries. Economic and military aid is usually given to assist "friends and allies".

Following the above view is a case in which the U.S. gives aid, both military and economic, to dictatorial regimes in Africa, and elsewhere, for strategic advantage. The justification given by the U.S. for such aid is that such assistance is intended to protect the dictators against external aggression. One of the perennial problems connected with such aid is the possibility that it can be used to suppress legitimate internal dissent. This problem underscores the contradiction inherent in present day American foreign policy - the U.S. wants to stimulate the development of political systems in which governments rule by consent of the governed instead of by military force.⁸¹ It would be safe, therefore, to conclude that U.S. aid to Kenya is designed mainly to facilitate the realization of U.S interests, which are

mainly strategic. It is probably a matter of coincidence that such aid goes to democratic governments. However, economic aid promotes development in the recipient countries.

U.S. aid has often been used for compensatory purposes. More often than not economic aid functions either as payment to an ally whose political support was actively sought or as a trade-off to induce it to adopt a favourable policy.⁸² Acquisition of bases and adoption of policies favourable to the U.S. are some of the goals of U.S. aid. Kenya positively reacted to the former in early 1980s. Such a policy is tailored within a shrewd web such that the recipient - Kenya thinks about the U.S. and its policies in naive terms. As one author puts it, "the great powers are often looked upon as the beneficiaries of the small ones, while in reality they should be regarded as more or less selfish creatures seeking their own advantages".⁸³ The subsequent gain attributed to U.S. aid policy towards Kenya is intended to and serves the interests of the U.S.

The U.S. strategic interests during the cold war were strongly anchored on the "predominance of allies paradigm". In 1964, President Johnson echoed the importance of cold war alliances in the giving of foreign aid. He told congress that:

We are engaged in this great effort (foreign assistance) for many reasons. We seek to alleviate poverty, starvation and disease. we seek also to alleviate aggression and to promote independence and self-determination for the people of other nations.⁸⁴

President Johnson's words underscore U.S. interests in giving aid

to Kenya during the cold war era. Our central view is that, such a speech carried policy issues which greatly influenced the relationship between Kenya and the U.S.

Aid being one of the most politicised instruments of statecraft, its flow was considerably affected in 1965 when Kenya - U.S. relations were notably strained. This was due to the events in the Congo and the alleged Soviet arms to Kenya during that year. At this time, U.S. cold war interests were threatened by the Soviet Union's offer of a huge consignment of arms, in an attempt to enhance its cold war aims. A group of Soviet technicians arrived in Nairobi on April 22, 1965 and a consignment of Russian arms (reported to include 34 World War II tanks) was discharged at Mombasa on April 29, from the Soviet ship Fizik Lebedev. Only a few hours later President Kenyatta, after talks with the Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Yuri S. Lavrov, issued a statement in the presence of most Cabinet Ministers to the effect that the arms were "too old and second hand", that they "would be of no use to the modern army of Kenya", and that the government had therefore "rejected and sent back the arms". A Kenyan ministry of Defence Official said on April 30 that the Soviet technicians would shortly leave Kenya.⁸⁵ This event demonstrated American success in gaining influence in Kenya. Kenya had received assistance from the U.S. which facilitated the adoption of such a favourable policy to the U.S. This assistance was in the form of three aircraft, spares and insecticides worth \$ 500,000 for locust control. The U.S. continued to aid Kenya after settling their political dispute of 1964-65. The USAID gave Kenya

107 lorries to aid the National Youth Service.⁸⁶

At this level, our argument is that U.S. had cold war interests in aiding Kenya.

This motive of U.S. assistance to Kenya was not only prevalent as regards economic and military assistance, but also for humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian aid for its own sake is championed with some political and national security motives which are held to be paramount by some, and still others make the case for commercial advantage. The view of assistance as a temporary tool whose success would lead to LDCs "graduating" from aid relationships lay behind U.S. decisions in the 1960s and 1970s to end major U.S. assistance programmes.⁸⁷ This rationale of giving aid can be partially refuted due to the fact that the U.S. has interests other than these in giving such assistance and that foreign aid continues to be an instrument of policy todate.

The trend of U.S. aid to Kenya remained unabated throughout the 1970s. The major political events that were vital to the U.S. in which Kenya's positive role was rewarded were the 1976 Israeli Commando raid of Entebbe Airport, Uganda; the 1979/80 offering facilities to the U.S. during momentous events in Iran, Libya and Afghanistan; and Kenya's boycott of the 1980 olympic games held in Moscow. The case of Israeli Commando raid demonstrated Kenya's close cooperation with Israel, a great ally of the U.S. In the raid, which resulted in the killing of twenty Ugandan troops, and leaving MIG jet fighters in flames, Kenya was implicated as having colluded with Israel in the operation. Uganda further alleged that

10 Israeli and American aircraft were detected by radar approaching from Kenya on their way to attack Uganda. This was totally denied by the Kenyan Government which in turn condemned Israel for having violated Kenya's airspace and that of other OAU member-states. Whether Kenya was involved in the operation or not, the fact remains that the role Kenya played in the operation was significant, as the wounded hostages were treated in Nairobi and the Israeli jets refuelled, before leaving for Tel Aviv. The operation shows that Kenya and the U.S. have shared images about international terrorism, and the perpetual existence of Israel. Another important issue in this operation is that Uganda was being armed by the Soviet Union, and Kenya's position in this case was pro - U.S. This explains the cooperation between Kenya and the U.S.

In March, 1978, a delegation headed by the Vice-President of Kenya, Mr. Daniel arap Moi (now president) held talks with President Jimmy Carter in Washington. President Carter reaffirmed the U.S. Government's long standing policy of close cooperation with and support for Kenya and assured Kenya that the U.S. would continue to supply it with economic and military assistance. Both states seemed to have similar perceptions as to how to solve the then escalating conflicts in the Horn region.⁸⁸ After the Washington meeting, \$ 10 million in credits to Kenya was approved towards the purchase of a squadron of F-5 fighter planes. This was as a result of Kenya's security threats from her neighbours - Somalia and Uganda - who had acquired sophisticated arms from the Soviet Union. This tangible support for a friendly and cooperative

ally was deserved. U.S. cold war strategic interests coincided with Kenya's need for economic and military assistance. This convergence of interests cultivated the cooperation that emerged thereof.

According to American officials, the bulk of U.S. military assistance programmes and foreign military sales, called MAP/FMS respectively, have been concentrated in a few key countries in sub-Saharan Africa such as Kenya and Sudan. In justifying U.S. assistance to these countries for fiscal year 1984, Chester Crocker explained the primary objective of this aid when he said:

Our interests in East Africa and the Horn reflect to a great extent the region's considerable strategic significance to the west because of the shipping and oil tanker lanes leading to Europe. Kenya and Somalia are critical to our logistical supply systems in the event of a security crisis in the Gulf or Middle East, The three recipients of a major portion of our assistance account for \$ 498.9 million of the total of \$ 520.6 million we are requesting for East Africa and Indian Ocean countries in 1984.⁸⁹

It is, therefore, evident that U.S. aid to Kenya is mainly anchored on her security interests. The above statement also affirmed that Kenya's strategic significance to the U.S. stems from Kenya's propinquity to the Middle East - Persian Gulf region. It was in this view that Crocker, in his testimony to the House Sub - Committee Foreign Operations in April 1983, said:

Our strategic interests in the Horn of Africa are strictly corollary to our broader interests in South-West Asia and the Indian Ocean and our military activity in the Horn including our acquisition of access rights in Kenya....⁹⁰

Kenya had just accorded military facilities to the U.S. when American aid to Kenya doubled. But it is interesting to note that Kenya would use her privileged relations with the U.S. in a

different way. Nairobi first applied itself to denying, and then maximising and trivialising, the breadth of facilities, it offered the U.S., before demanding economic benefit to be gained from this deal (marked increase in food aid). On the other hand, all actions in alignment with the U.S. (on Afghanistan and the boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow) were presented as acts of Kenyan sovereignty, and not related to any sort of alignment. Significantly, Nairobi announced its boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games two days before the arrival of an American delegation sent to persuade it not to go to the Soviet Union. On the domestic level, Kenya's economic prosperity, reliant on close economic ties with the west, especially the U.S., very naturally drew its leaders to come up with a balance or a cover for some of this reality through acts of national confirmation.⁹¹ The events of 1980, therefore, confirm the convergence of U.S. aid objectives and Kenya's needs that call for such aid.

Following these cooperative interactions between Kenya and the U.S., the Reagan Administration, in 1982, sought to triple economic aid to Kenya under the 1983 Security Assistance Programme. The Administration sought approval of Congress for \$ 30 million in economic support funds for Kenya in fiscal year 1983, compared with US \$ 10 million in fiscal year 1982. Some US \$ 36.5 million was sought for various military programmes in 1983, compared to slightly more than US \$ 43 million in 1982. The proposed military/economic aid package of US \$ 66.5 million was the third largest sought for African nations under the Security Assistance

programme. According to the State Department, the Security assistance Programme is aimed at providing military strength and economic stability of the recipient.⁹² The State Department had the view that both U.S. and Africa's security interests were served by the aid. Using Kenya as an example, the then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Mr. Lannon Walker, said that:

Countries involved ... are strategically located, strategically significant, and we have to be concerned about threats to their independence and security, we are also concerned as well about our own security in that part of the world.⁹³

The late 1980s and 1990/91, was a period of momentous events regarding the development of democratic political systems in Eastern Europe and Africa. Much of U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis Kenya was based on economic and democratic reforms. Hence, suspension of the flow of assistance to Kenya was evident as Kenya did not tow the track as regards democracy and human rights. Prior to this, however, there was an emphasis on U.S. aid and her strategic concerns in Third World States. Kenya, Chad and Somalia were the main recipients of U.S. military assistance, as a report from the Regional Conflict Working Group, a division of the Commission of Integrated Long Term Strategy (security) indicated. Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa has been diminished to the point that the whole country programmes would probably have to concentrate what little was left in the more threatened countries, i.e., Kenya, Somalia and Chad ⁹⁴. The report was entitled: "Commitment to Freedom: Security Assistance as a U.S. policy

Instrument in the Third World". The report cited the commission's view that in the first decade of the next century, the Third World may well be "quite different and probably more dangerous". The group maintained that future security threats to U.S. interests in the Third World, however, should not be estimated only, or even primarily in East-West terms. It urges the U.S. leadership to seek greater assistance from western friends referred to as "Cooperative Forces" to aid African States such as Kenya, Somalia, Chad and Djibouti".⁹⁵ During this period, U.S. aid was concentrated in a few strategically important allies. *d. J. ...*

The U.S. has often used debt forgiveness as a measure of commitment to assisting its allies. She adheres to the dictum that "a nation cannot collect debts by impoverishing its debtors, and often it has to forgive its debtors if it wants prosperous customers".⁹⁶ In 1990, Kenya received \$ 60.8 million in debt forgiveness from the U.S. Government on standing development assistance loans. In 1991, Kenya was eligible to receive another \$ 57.7 million in similar debt forgiveness.⁹⁷ In the same year, 1991, Kenya received debt cancellation of a total of \$ 40.4 million in development assistance owed to U.S. A total of \$ 38 million was to be cancelled in January, 1992.⁹⁸ This was a token to Kenya for having maintained a pro-American stance during the 1991 Gulf War. Kenya supported the United Nations Resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. Kenya's stand was unfolded by the Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Minister who stated that Kenya stood by the resolutions of the U.N. Security Council

because they represented a collective response to the August 2nd invasion and annexation of Kuwait by Iraq.⁹⁹ Following this, in February 13, 1991, the U.S. released KShs. 120 million in military aid to Kenya frozen in the previous year over claims of human rights violations. The U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, Mr. Smith Hempstone, said that Kenya had been "extremely cooperative" to the U.S. in the year and cited:

- (1) Kenya's support to the Allied position in the Gulf and demand that Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, unconditionally withdraws from Kuwait.
- (2) Kenya's support to U.S. security measures against potential Gulf - sparked terrorist threats.
- (3) Allowing the use of Kenya's airports in the evacuation of U.S. citizens from Somalia's war torn capital and from Sudan where security fears prompted a reduction in U.S. Embassy staff in Khartoum.¹⁰⁰

It is evident from the above argument that U.S. aid to Kenya caters for U.S. national interests and varies with the nature of interests at stake. Such aid promotes cooperation between the two states. Aid in this case was used as a reward to Kenya's positive response to facilitate the realization of U.S interests in the Gulf and Horn regions.

The U.S. Government further aided Kenya in September 1991. It cancelled Kenya's debt amounting to US \$ 100 million. A statement released by the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi said that Kenya was among eight African countries that benefited from the relief totalling \$50

US \$ 419 million. The statement was attributed to U.S. Vice President, Dan Quayle, when he spoke to members of African Development Bank (ADB) group and the African Business Round Table.¹⁰¹ Such assistance has cultivated even greater cooperation between the two states.

Moreover, U.S. aid to Kenya is used as a tool to facilitate the realization of U.S. economic interests. Though there has been little distinction between aid given for economic gain and aid given for military advantage to the donor, much of U.S aid to Kenya has shaped and also contributed to economic development. Such aid is often referred to as "development assistance". "Development assistance" has always been an important element of U.S. diplomacy in Africa. Since the African countries attained independence, the U.S. has been a major contributor of assistance both bilaterally and through International Financial Institutions (IFIs), primarily the IMF, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank.¹⁰² This development component is demonstrated by U.S. goals in giving such aid. These include: better management of domestic economies; stronger competitive free markets to replace centralized and parastatal systems; higher private sector-led growth; increased long-term agricultural and industrial productivity and improved food security.¹⁰³ Such an endeavour has helped meet Kenya's economic development goals. However such economic reform strategies championed by American aid programme to Kenya would increase the earnings of U.S. multinationals operating in Kenya.

The economic interests tailored within US aid policy were

however, echoed by the Assistant Administrator for Asia and the Near East, Agency for International Development, in April 1989. He underscored the fact that US aid to Third World states was most predominantly, for economic reasons. His statement read:

By providing assistance for economic adjustment and growth ... we will strengthen possibilities for economic stability and at the same time, help alleviate poverty and provide market and investment opportunities for US business.¹⁰⁴

It is, therefore, safe to conclude that US aid to Kenya has an inherent economic interest geared towards benefiting the US. Continued cooperative interactions between the two states, and continued flow of assistance would cultivate even greater cooperation between them. There is an apparent and gradual shift of emphasis in US aid to Kenya. The shift is from just a flow of assistance to one on actual development achievements. A U.S. official summarised this shift as follows:

Since 1961, aid programs have shifted emphasis from assistance to emphasis on development. All US commitments are measured against three general criteria. What assistance is available from other sources? Can the recipient country use aid effectively? What are the ... economic implications for the US?¹⁰⁶

Taking into account the fact that economic development was a much more desired goal in Kenya, and other Third World countries, the US policy makers tailored their aid policy which emphasised development, a component behind which vital US economic interests are pursued.

In this regard, therefore the US aid disbursements to Kenya have considerably helped in the country's development process. The so called development assistance has been disbursed through various

organs with different strategies and in different forms. These are: bilateral and multilateral aid; promotion of private investment; providing foreign exchange; debt rescheduling of official debt for reforming countries, and forgiveness of official debt for reforming countries in exchange for domestic economic reforms, such as establishment of realistic exchange rates; reduction or elimination of government budget deficits; parastatal reform; and market-based interest rates.¹⁰⁶ Foreign aid provided with such a motive is intended to benefit the donor country. However, such US assistance plays a significant role in Kenya's economy and consequently increasing US earnings from her investments. There are shared economic interests between Kenya and the US which have resulted in cooperation between the two states. Foreign assistance remains as one of the major linkages between these interests.

The trend of US development assistance to Kenya has been improving since 1963. This has mainly taken the form of loans and grants. In 1963, the US gave Kenya a development-oriented loan to boost Nairobi's water supply, amounting to £ 786,000. This assistance was disbursed by US Agency for International Development (USAID). This was intended to step up the Nairobi water supplies by 50%. The loan was to be repayable to the US government over a period of 40 years with a grace period of 10 years.¹⁰⁷ In further supporting Kenya's development undertakings, the US government, through the Rockefeller Foundation made a grant of £ 30,700 to aid the Ministry of Agriculture towards the cost of maize improvement research and training. This assistance, evidently was development-

oriented and therefore benefited Kenya, and indirectly the US, whose agribusiness investors would gain considerably from a developed agricultural sector.

During the same year, 1963, the US gave Kenya about £ 1.3 million assistance to train Kenyans as mechanical, civil and electrical engineers. The US Special Fund (USSF) provided £ 115,000 in a ten-year period for buying training equipment for the Kenya Polytechnic. Another £ 800,000 was provided by the US government later in the year and another of £ 430,000 by the Special Fund. Part of the aid was to pay for ten international experts in various fields of engineering who were to advise and train the students.¹⁰⁸ The conditionality attached to the US aid to Kenya, apparently indicate that the US had national interests in giving such aid. The most vivid example is the creation of employment opportunities for its nationals. As a way of elaboration, there were various conditions attached to the aforementioned assistance to Nairobi Water Supplies. First, an American firm of Consultant Engineers was to be employed on the scheme to raise Sasumua Dam, and secondly, that an American be appointed chief resident engineer for the construction work at a salary of £ 17,000. These were accepted without question, given that Kenya was more or less to gain from the assistance.

Within the US aid policy is the Food for Peace Programme. This programme's intentions are to benefit the US. USAID specifically addresses food issues through its public law 480 food assistance programmes. Food for peace enables USAID to sell food commodities

such as wheat, rice and corn to the government of Kenya at concessional prices. The programme supports policy measures which encourage privatization of grain imports, domestic grain marketing, better collection of agricultural data, and improved crop production forecasting ¹⁰⁹. The US benefits from this programme due to the fact that foreign exchange earnings from the sale of food would be remitted back to the US treasury. Kenya likewise uses the income generated by the sales of these commodities to revamp related development activities.

The basis for the programme of Food for Peace is the belief that where hunger, disease and ignorance prevail, conditions leading to violence occur. This was affirmed by the Johnson Administration in 1966. According to this doctrine, the US could better protect its interests by removing those conditions. Hunger relief programmes, which are partly a means of disposing of excess US grains were implemented. President Johnson, probably, in an attempt to convince Congress to pass the foreign aid said:

The dividends from the investment (aid) are lives saved, schools opened and hunger relieved. But they are shots that did not sound, blood that did not spill, the treasure that did not have to be spent to stamp out spreading flames of violence.¹¹⁰

Inherent in this statement is the truism that US aid to Kenya is used to pursue multidimensional interests. It is important, however, to note that although the public impetus for the Food for Peace Programme has been mainly humanitarian, it has also benefited US farmers. During the 1950s and 1960s, food aid accounted for the lion's share of US agricultural exports to developing countries.

Also local currency is realised through the sale of the surplus.¹¹¹

In 1967, the US Ambassador to Kenya Mr. Glenn Ferguson noted that the aid given by the US to Kenya was intended to assist Kenyans to fully use their natural resources so that they would use the economic wealth generated to improve their living standards. At the same time, the Director of USAID in Kenya, Mr. C.S. Hinman, said that America's aid to Kenya totalled to more than £ 23 million. He noted that three-fifths of it was in the form of grants and two-fifths in the form of loans. Much of the assistance was used in agriculture, education, community development projects and in equipping the National Youth Service. The US had also helped established institutions for training public servants. It had also loaned 100 American advisers to the Kenya government.¹¹² This aid was actually injected into development activities in Kenya, which in turn, as argued above, would create a favourable climate for US investors. Therefore, such aid is intended to benefit both countries politically and economically and hence explain the cooperative relations that emerge thereof.

The US has often assisted Kenya in her development endeavours through the peace corps programme. The first peace corps volunteers came to Kenya in 1965. The peace corps programme in Kenya is the largest in Africa with 200-300 volunteers serving each year. The individual programmes undertaken by peace corps are in accord with Kenya's development priorities and assist in building local self sufficiency. They have over the years worked on development projects such as secondary education, agroforestry

water/sanitation, agriculture, fisheries, vocational education, among others.¹¹³ The aim of the programme is to assist countries to develop and to help Americans understand other parts of the world.¹¹⁴ The peace corps objective is essentially humanitarian, though it also connotes paternalism, spread of news about "good life" in America and promotion of private enterprise and democracy.

Our argument in this regard, therefore, is that US aid to Kenya is intended for economic gain, and access to Kenya's port and air facilities. The economic gain discussed are access to Kenya as a market for US goods for investment and as a base. Aid, whether economic, humanitarian or military, is given in a form of goods or services. Military equipment, industrial goods and technology, among others, earn the US foreign exchange. Aid, therefore, acts as a bridge for the US to reach the Kenyan ports and marketplace. The question of access to facilities has been explained and its apex was reached in 1980 and 1990 when Kenya granted the facilities to the US in exchange for aid. It has, however, been demonstrated that the aid is intended to promote economic development in Kenya, which in turn cultivates an enabling climate for US investments. It could be safe, therefore, to conclude that US aid to Kenya is inherently geared towards the realization of U.S national interests. It cultivates even closer cooperation when it converges with Kenya's national politico-economic interests.

2.4.2: Kenya's Interests In Seeking US Aid.

Since independence, Kenya's interests have been the security of her borders, internal political stability and rapid economic development. These three interests are often complementary. For security and political stability are considered as requisite conditions for economic development and vice versa. A policy of rigorous economic progress would not be successful if Kenya relied on her meagre domestic resources. As argued above, Kenya's agro-based economy has been subjected to various economic and environmental vagaries which in turn have necessitated heavy reliance on external resources for development. The strategy of cooperation with the US and other western states is the best alternative for Kenya. Such assistance took the form of military sales and support, development assistance and humanitarian food aid. This external reliance was partly a function of the local ruling elite and Kenya's historical past. Kenya inherited an economic infrastructure developed along capitalistic lines; and the leaders who took power at independence worked for the consolidation of that system.¹¹⁵ It is in this vein, therefore, that Kenya had to seek aid from the US.

Kenya's good neighbour¹¹⁶ policy based on mutual interdependence and understanding between her and her neighbours was seen as a logical step for the security of her people and territory. This was likewise used as a wider scheme for looking for markets within Eastern Africa. This area also served as a market for US goods produced by U.S firms operating in Kenya. This security strategy was proved inadequate for Kenya, where she

continued receiving threats of aggression from Uganda and Somalia. The US became the major pillar in her struggle towards maintaining her security and economic prosperity. Cooperation between Kenya and the US, therefore, is hinged on Kenya's vital interests which are met through US assistance. The national interests of the US in aiding Kenya are reciprocal to Kenya's national interests.

In the years following Kenya's independence, American assistance focused on three areas: education, public administration and agriculture. The rationale of these priorities would easily be understood since the major task that was facing Kenya in the 1960s was nation-building. A concerted effort to develop education and strong public institutions was essential. USAID assisted in funding the construction of numerous schools and developing teacher training colleges while peace corps provided additional teachers for secondary schools.¹¹⁷ In agriculture, USAID worked with the Kenya government to boost agricultural production and improved the marketing of commodities during the shift from a primarily expatriate-based agricultural sector to a Kenyan-owned and Kenyan-developed one.¹¹⁸ This means that US aid was channelled into Kenya's development priority sectors. This consequently fostered cooperation between the two states.

In May, 1965, Kenya received humanitarian assistance from the US in which Welfare Training Centers in Nairobi received several hundred yards of dress materials and clothing from the US, which were consequently used for humanitarian purposes.¹¹⁹ This was an act of cooperation between the two states.

Economic development has been the grand objective for the Kenya government to achieve through US aid, whose success would result into the realization of other objectives such as to alleviate poverty, disease and illiteracy. In this regard, the main objectives of seeking development assistance from the US are:

- (a) rapid economic growth which would increase domestic savings and finance industrialization;
- (b) to exploit agricultural and other natural resources such as mining, tourism and so forth, which would earn Kenya greater foreign exchange;
- (c) attraction of foreign investments;
- (d) equitable distribution of income.¹²⁰

These, in brief are Kenya's economic goals which prompted her seek US assistance. Between 1962 and 1986, Kenya received US economic assistance totalling to \$ 678.9 million, much of which was in the form of grants. During the same period Kenya received military assistance worth \$ 236.7 million of which \$ 155.0 million was in the form of loans, while \$ 81.7 million was in the form of grants.¹²¹ The total economic and military assistance during this period was \$ 915.6 million.¹²²

In the 1970s, the endeavour to create opportunities in the rural areas, for the benefits of economic development to be shared by all Kenyans, by the Kenyan government, received a boost from the US government. This critical endeavour meant:

- (a) relying on Kenyan private entrepreneurs to supply

agricultural inputs and products for domestic processing and export;

- (b) continuing to improve Kenyan agricultural research and extension capabilities;
- (c) providing training in management and technical expertise to agricultural entrepreneurs.

The USAID undertook to assist Kenya in these critical options towards development by giving financial assistance to Egerton University which amounted to \$ 35 million. \$ 23 million was in the form of loans while \$ 12 million was in the form of grants. With the help of USAID, Egerton University and the University of Illinois in the US, which is renowned for its expertise in agriculture and agricultural research, have linked to exchange ideas and share knowledge.¹²³ This means that Kenya's national interest to realize rapid economic development received US support and hence promoting cooperation between the two states. However such cooperation often spills over to other interest areas.

In 1976, as Jimmy Carter emerged the winner in the presidential elections in the US, President Kenyatta of Kenya echoed the friendly and cooperative relationship that existed between the two states. Kenyatta's message stated:

I note with great satisfaction the close cooperation that exists between our two countries in the economic, social and political fields. It is my wish that the cordial relations existing between our two countries will continue to grow for the benefit of our people. Kenya ... looks forward to an era of even closer cooperation with the US in the promotion of freedom, justice, prosperity and peace in the world.¹²⁴

This statement underscores the fact that Kenya's major

preoccupation during that period was economic development and had to relate cooperatively with the US to receive the required aid to boost this aspect of national interest. It is in this vein that president Kenyatta undertook to boost cooperation in all spheres of the relations. This period was occasioned with cooperation as witnessed in the Entebe raid incident.

In 1977, American aid to Kenya increased substantially, reaching \$ 30.0 million from \$ 17.0 million in 1974. Relaying this information in Nairobi, the US Ambassador to Kenya Mr. Wilbert J. Le Melle said that the US had granted loans to the Government of Kenya to permit increased agricultural credit to Kenyan farmers.¹²⁵ Such aid followed Kenya's reassertion on her relationship with the US during the above mentioned Carter's inauguration into office as US President in 1976. The two states continued to cooperate in all spheres of their relationship.¹²⁶ In 1978, Carter echoed US interest in supporting Kenya. A statement issued by White House said:


President Carter reaffirmed the US Government's long standing policy of close support to Kenya and assured Kenyans that the US will continue to supply ... economic and military assistance.¹²⁷

In early 1979, the US started a weaving project in Nyandarua. This was funded by the US government through USAID. In 1980, Kenya received a total of \$ 35 million of aid from the US. In the previous year, 1979, the US government through USAID gave Kenya loans amounting to \$ 32.0 million.¹²⁸ There was an acute food shortage in Kenya in 1980 caused by drought. In response to this catastrophe, the US aided Kenya with 40,000 tonnes of wheat to

arrest the situation. The 1984 drought in Kenya sounded a threat to Kenya's food security, in which Kenya likewise, appealed for assistance from the US. Consequently, the US provided Kenya with 20,000 tonnes of maize.¹²⁹ This kind of assistance continue to characterize the relationship between the two states. Kenya's interest to feed its people, and its correlative - political stability - were and will continue to be realized, to a greater extent, through US cooperation in providing assistance. The US has therefore, in various occasions rescued Kenya from such devastating food shortage conditions.

In 1987, Kenya received a total of \$ 64.4 million of assistance from the US of which \$ 52.8 million was economic assistance while \$ 11.6 million was military assistance. In 1988, economic assistance rose to \$ 57.0 million while military assistance dropped to \$ 6.2 million bringing the total to \$ 63.2 million. In 1989, Kenya received a total of \$ 83.9 million of assistance while that of 1990 dropped to \$ 51.6 million. In 1991, the assistance dropped to \$ 30.3 million. This is illustrated in figure three.

Fig 3: US Econ. and Milit. Aid; 1962-91



With the above background to Kenya's domestic economic environment, we could speculate the constraints within which Kenya would operate in the 1990s. During the year 1989, Kenya's imports realized a growth of 26% compared to 7% growth of exports. This left a large foreign exchange gap which was influenced by inflow of donor-financed foreign capital. Higher international oil prices coupled with lower coffee prices and lower tourism receipts contributed to Kenya's balance of payments shortfall in 1990. Heightened donor concern over political issues, including human rights problems, and

economic performance in Kenya combined with domestic economic constraints in donor countries, provided indications that commitments of donor resources that have been vital for the functioning of Kenyan economy might decrease in future years.¹³¹ It is evident that Kenya would continue to request for greater financial support from the US in the 1990s. Reduced assistance or curtailing it would seriously hurt Kenya's development process. The US remains to be Kenya's major source of assistance. In 1990, the US was the fifth largest bilateral and seventh largest overall donor, providing 9% of bilateral and 6% of total donor funding.¹³² However, US emphasis on aid shifted to human rights and democracy.

Kenya's image on human rights was alleged to be bad in 1989, and consequently prompted her to lobby for aid in the US Congress. The Kenya government hired the Washington public relations firm Black, Manafort, Stone and Kelly to boost its image in the US, according to an agreement signed on 1st. April, 1989, by Permanent Secretary at the Finance Ministry. The decision to engage the firm was probably a panic reaction to the refusal by the appropriations sub-committee to grant further aid to Kenya on account of its human rights record.¹³³ The Kenya government had curtailed press freedoms, arrested opposition figures and harassed the church. Its special police had been accused of torture by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Black, Manafort had been lobbying to protect Kenya's aid package, which was widely supported in Congress.¹³⁴ Kenya's effort to boost its image underscores the fact that US aid to Kenya is of considerable significance to the realization of the

country's national goals. The freeze on the flow of assistance in 1989 spelt considerable threats to Kenya's economic well-being. This demonstrated the presence of a conflictive relationship between the two states and how aid responded positively to the changes in their relations.

Similar human rights violations and subsequent conflict between Kenya and U.S occurred in November, 1991, when the Kenya government rounded up members of the opposition calling for multiparty democracy. Considerable pressure was put on Kenya from Washington and other donor nations. However, political conditionalities on aid to Kenya worked successfully at Moi's sudden conversion to multiparty politics in December 1991.¹³⁵ During this period, the Kenyan leadership saw the whole "aid-democracy" controversy as a creation of the US Ambassador to Kenya. Kenya's Foreign Minister alleged that US Ambassador, Mr. Smith Hempstone, had acted inappropriately and that he had abetted opposition elements in Kenya. He further asserted that the Ambassador's behaviour and statements reflected his personal views rather than those of the US government. These events drew the two countries into a conflictual relationship. However, the US government clarified that the US Ambassador to Kenya was President George Bush's personal representative in Kenya and that he was championing U.S foreign policy. A statement issued by the office of the Assistant Secretary of State in Washington D.C., on 18th November, 1991, stated that "President George Bush had full confidence in the Ambassador's ability to carry out US policy towards Kenya."¹³⁶ This

is an indication that the US uses foreign aid as a weapon to achieve her desired goals in Kenya.

In 1990, Kenya received US aid amounting to \$ 6.4 million, which was to assist various development undertakings such as education and human resources development, population planning, private sector, energy, and environmental protection. This was scheduled for Kenya in a Long Range Plan by Appropriations Account. The following table shows the distribution of the assistance.

TABLE 13: Long Range Plan by Appropriations Account (\$'000)
F.Y. 1990

Actual Disbursement		Account
Grants	2,683	Population planning
Loans	2,683	
Grants	245	Education and Human Resource
Loans	245	
Grants	248	Private Sector, Energy and Environment
Loans	248	

Source: USAID/KENYA: Assessment of program Impact, October 31, 1990.

Kenya would continue receiving economic assistance from the US in the 1990s. The US assistance is projected to increase tremendously in the period. However, it would be far too little compared to the 1980s and before. Table 14 shows the projection of the assistance for the period 1990 to 1997.

TABLE 14: Projected Development Assistance to Kenya in the period
1990 - 1997 ('000).

F Y	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
TOTAL DA	34,206	26,000	26,000	26,000	29,000	31,000	35,000	35,000
GRANTS	34,206	26,000	26,000	26,000	29,000	31,000	35,000	35,000
LOAN								

Source: USAID/KENYA: Assessment of Program Impact, Oct. 31, 1990.

The above projection of US assistance to Kenya demonstrates that there would be a continuity in the flow of aid from the U.S to Kenya. Aid will continue to command a significant part of the nature of behaviour that would prevail between the two states in the 1990s. Kenya is destined to benefit a great deal from the US assistance. By the end of 1997, Kenya would have received Development Assistance totalling to \$242.24 million. This demonstrates that U.S aid to Kenya would continue to foster cooperation between the two states. However, there is perceived reduction of the level of U.S assistance to Kenya.

2.5.0: Conclusion

The above analysis has demonstrated that economic interaction is a preponderant ingredient in foreign relations. Trade partners relate cooperatively because of the fact that conflict or break of ties between them would lead to mutual cutting of economic throats.

Kenya and the US have a reciprocal trade relationship, which promotes cooperation between the two states. Kenya's spending on her imports from the US is received as foreign exchange in the US, and vice versa. Therefore, it would be safe to conclude that the two states relate cooperatively due to the convergence of their trade interests.

Investments, trade and aid facilitate cooperation between the two countries. The continuity of cooperative interaction between Kenya and the US has been a function of their economic interactions. Hence, our assumption that the cooperative relationship is hinged on economic factors is affirmed. Continuity of economic interactions within politically marred relations has been demonstrated in our analysis. Thus Kenya-US cooperation has, essentially, been cultivated by economic factors.

In this regard, Kenya would not sever relations with the US, during periods of conflict, due to the gain obtained from the relationship. The relationship between the two states revolves around the concept of national interest, and in this case economic interests.

The flow of U.S. investments into Kenya have fostered cooperation between the two states. They are an illustration of national interest interplay as it is one of the areas where the interests of the two states converge. The periods of conflict analysed in this chapter include the Congo crisis, U.S. involvement in the Arab-Israeli and Vietnam wars and the 1990 democracy-human rights clash with Kenya. The persistent increase of U.S.

investments in Kenya upto 1986, when there was a marked stagnation, demonstrated the existence of cooperative interaction between the two states.

Cooperation between Kenya and the US has always ensued when their interests converge. Aid has been and continue to be one of the media of expressing this cooperation. The US gives aid to Kenya with an intention of gaining access to Kenya's port and air facilities. This was evident in 1980 when Kenya granted these facilities to the US in exchange for aid. During this period, Kenya was facing severe economic constraints, which prompted the adoption of such a policy posture. Within such interlocking interests between the two countries, the relationship that emerged was mutually beneficial. However, the benefits obtained from their relationship are asymmetrical, as the countries have unequal capabilities. Kenya gains more tangible benefits from the aid relationship.

Development aid from the US has considerably benefited Kenya. This aid not only contributes to but also shapes Kenya's development process. Aid is given with conditionalities, and has specific sectors into which it is injected and consequently shaping the development process. As has been discussed in this chapter, much of US development assistance is concentrated in agriculture, human resources development, education, environmental protection, among other sectors. This means that US aid is an essential input to both planning and implementing Kenya's development plans. Aid conditionalities have always expressed US interests and Kenya's

compliance reveals the preponderance of such aid to the realization of her interests.

US aid has, however, been used as a front to push for democratic and economic reforms in Kenya. Though such a policy has been repulsed ferociously by the Kenyan authorities, it has not caused serious negative repercussions on their relationship. Human rights and democracy dominated the relations between the two countries from 1989 to 1992. US demand for improved human rights record has received some success after effecting a temporal freeze on assistance to Kenya. Kenya, on her part, has met some of the demands which would probably lead to the resumption of the flow of aid.

In brief, Kenya's economic problems have in most instances been solved via US assistance. US aid accounts substantially to Kenya's economic well-being and, therefore, Kenya would continue to gain from her relationship with the US. However, the US has benefitted from her aid policy which is intended to cater for her strategic, economic and political interests, especially in gathering support in International forums particularly the UN General Assembly. The interplay of national interests continue to be the fulcrum of the relations between the two states

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CHAPTER THREE

THE ROLE OF GEOPOLITICS IN KENYA-US RELATIONS

3.1: Introduction:

The security of a nation state is the most fundamental and sensitive issue in the formulation of foreign policy. Kenya's security has from time to time been threatened by its neighbours and consequently making Kenya design defense policies that can guarantee its survival. Since independence, Kenya's major security threat has been Somalia, which claimed part of Kenya's territory, inhabited by ethnic Somalis. This threat was exacerbated by the introduction of sophisticated arms from the Soviet Union in Somalia. This threat received immediate attention from the Kenyan authorities who sent troops to the area to fight back the Somali aggression. In addition, Kenya requested the US to supply it with arms and financial assistance to augment her poorly equipped army. Another security threat emanated from Uganda, particularly during the reign of Idi Amin in the 1970's when he aspired to annex part of Kenyan territory to Uganda. The latest threat to Kenya's security, which emerged in the 1980's, was from Sudanese-Libyan collaboration who attacked parts of the Kenyan territory. This is in regard to the bombing of Lokichoggio - a Kenyan remote town close to the Kenya - Sudan frontier.

The US likewise has its security-strategic interests. It is important to note that the major threat to US interests was the Soviet Union and its allies from the 1960s to late 1980s. The threat was both to oil shipment from the Persian Gulf to the West and minerals from Southern Africa including the protection of US allies in the Indian Ocean and Middle East regions. The US was duty bound to defend and protect its allies, its economic interests, particularly getting access to markets for her manufactured goods and acquisition of strategic facilities for its defence in case of any attack from a hostile state beyond the East African region. The major preoccupation of the U.S, therefore, was to enhance its security within the Indian Ocean region, Horn of Africa and the Middle East. In particular, Kenya plays a significant role in the US Middle-East strategic network. The relationship between the two states is hinged on the convergence of their national interests. The US acquisition of naval and air facilities in Kenya further strengthened their relations.

This chapter seeks to examine US security interests in the Horn of Africa, Indian Ocean Area and the Middle-East and how Kenya's geopolitical location has assisted US strategic policy planning. The chapter also explores Kenya's security interests and how the US military sales and assistance contribute to the realization of these interests. The relationship between the two states is hinged on their reciprocal strategic - security interests. It is demonstrated that the convergence of interests cultivate cooperation between the two states.

3.2 US Strategic Interests and Kenya's Geopolitical Location.

The US has over time had strategic interests in Kenya. This was mainly in regard to the Cold War environment which demanded military preparedness and presence in the Super Power struggle for strategic advantage. The major motivation for US strategic crusade, during the cold war, was the perceived threat of the Soviet Union to US economic, political and military interests. In this regard the US sought for a naval presence in the Indian Ocean in order to deter any naval blockade of international shipping through the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. Moreover, the Soviets had acquired naval and air facilities in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea area.

It has often been argued that states, generally, pursue similar basic strategic interests. This is common with the literature on national interest and in several recent works on foreign policy. Theories of national or strategic interest thus attribute the actions of the US policy makers to their perceptions of security requirements and realpolitik. By this explanation, American policy makers thought in terms of military security, balance of power, containing the Soviet expansionism, containing power centres in general, and the importance of honouring the commitments to defend one's allies.¹ This is the reason why America sought and obtained her foothold in Kenya.

Security being the core objective of all nation states and governments, governments commit their very existence to it. This is usually related to survival of the state and is stated as a basic

principle to be accepted without question. In seeking survival, states are seeking to protect their sovereignty, autonomy, and territory and the lives and well-being of their people.² The United States is committed to these tenets of statehood. Its autonomy to pursue interests, other than security, were threatened by the Soviet Union, particularly its presence, in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa. This has been the vital interest of the U.S, which prompted her to seek strategic facilities in Kenya and the Indian Ocean Islands. Kenya has served as a sort of advanced base or stepping-stone in the grand strategies of expansion of US influence and provides military facilities in the greater strategy of US defence.

Every administration in Washington, since the onset of the cold war, defined national security in excessively narrow and military terms. Politicians have found it easier to focus attention of an inattentive public on military dangers, real or imagined, than on non-military ones. Political leaders have found it easier to build a consensus on military solutions to foreign policy problems than to get agreement on the use (and, therefore, the adequate funding.) of the other means of influence that the US can bring to bear beyond its frontiers.³ Even the Carter Administration, which set out self-consciously to depart from this pattern, found in its later years that the easiest way to deflect its most potent domestic critics was to emphasize those aspects of the dilemmas it faced that seemed susceptible to military solutions and to downplay those that did not.⁴ This policy underpinnings

underscore the fact that the U.S security interests have always ranked top on her foreign policy menu.

Security as a concept can be interpreted to mean different things. In addition to examining security tradeoffs, it is necessary to recognize that security may be defined not merely as a consequence - this means that we may not realize what it is or how important it is until we are threatened with losing it. In some sense, therefore, security is defined and valorized by the threats which challenge it.⁵ Security, however, is very vital for human existence and development. It is for this reason that the US sought strategic facilities in Kenya in order to protect a wider spectrum of interests, globally. The motivation for this task stems from the fact that if the Soviet Union or any hostile state blockaded the flow of minerals from Southern Africa and oil shipment from the Persian Gulf, the U.S economy would be strangled. Apart from this, the US image and psychological power would decline if, in such circumstances, the U.S were not in a position to act. The Polity would have lost its long-treasured sense of being free from exterior intimidation. In James Schesinger's phrase, the Americans might become "a mean-spirited nation", for it is bad for people to come to a time of having to think of better days in the past tense. To the extent that these considerations count, national security would be impaired.⁶ To this end, the U.S would not allow the Soviet Union to acquire irreversible strategic preponderance in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East - Persian Gulf regions.

Underlying the U.S global strategic interests is John Locke's doctrine of the morality of private property and the right of self-defense. These beliefs are at the core of the norms which have guided U.S foreign policy since the early years of nationhood up to the present.⁷ In line with this is the Monroe doctrine which asserted that the U.S was unlike any other state and thus responsible for the expansion of "freedom" throughout the World.⁸ For example, the US involvement in the Congo crisis was seen as a "liberating rescue mission". The doctrine attained a more modern version with Harry Truman in the Cold war era. Americans believed that they were engaged in a "jihad" against communism around the globe.⁹ This was one of the motivating factors that necessitated the U.S search for strategic facilities in Kenya. The strategic role of the U.S in the Southern seas including the Indian Ocean is centred on specific and general interests. In the broader geopolitical context of the Southern Seas, appropriate military policies for the U.S are more clear cut. In order to balance and deter the Soviet Union, low-keyed U.S initiatives to maintain a military footing in the Indian Ocean and Southern Atlantic would be continued.¹⁰

In view of these broad geostrategic interests, Kenya serves as a base for the US to facilitate the realization of her interests, either within the Horn of Africa or elsewhere. First, U.S interests reside in uninterrupted flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to the West, and this interest is enshrined in the "Security of shipping lanes doctrine"; second, containment of the Soviet Union from

Having influence in East African Coast, the Horn of Africa and the Middle East; third, to maintain and protect friends and allies in case of a crisis in the Horn and the Middle East region; and finally, the security of the flow of minerals from Southern Africa. Kenya is, therefore, a vital point on the U.S Indian Ocean Middle East security network. This geopolitical factor has cultivated cooperation between Kenya and the U.S

By 1953, the U.S had a foothold in the Horn of Africa and its preoccupation was to gain influence in the area because of its strategic significance. Much of the U.S presence in the region was in the Indian Ocean. American interests in the area took root much earlier than 1953. According to an American analyst, William Stivers, formerly of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, U.S naval strategists saw decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s as a force that would upset the balance of power in favour of anti-Western interests. The navy's fears were that as the dismemberment of friendly colonial empires into neutralist nationalisms proceeded, the US would lose access to foreign bases and ports vital for sustained operations.¹¹ Thus, U.S presence in Kenya was a positive step towards securing strategic facilities for use by the U.S navy.

It is pertinent to note that Kenya and other Sub-Saharan African states have drawn the attention of the U.S policy makers at the highest level at times of particular crises. The breakdown of public order in the Congo at independence involved the Kennedy administration. The collapse of Emperor Haile Selassie's rule in

Ethiopia, the seizure of power in the country by a radical military regime and the war in the Ogaden between Somalia and Ethiopia occupied the Carter Administration and his predecessor. Drought, famine, coups d'etat in a number of countries, refugee problems, and the aberrant actions of such leaders as Idi Amin have of course sometimes monopolized the headlines and briefly brought Africa to the forefront of the U.S policy agenda.¹² Libya's involvement in terrorist activities involved the Reagan administration while Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, structural reforms, emergence of multi-party democracy and humanitarian operations in several needy countries involved the Bush Administration. This implies that each U.S. Administration has been preoccupied with a particular issue in the African continent.

The crisis in the Horn of Africa drew the attention of the U.S as far as the cold war was concerned. It is true that Africa received more attention from the Carter Administration, in part because the U.S was looking for regional powers as U.S surrogates in the post-Vietnam period, and in part because of the special role of Andrew Young in the Carter Cabinet. The Horn of Africa became a salient issue in the corridors of power because it was, or threatened to become an East-West issue.¹³ The Soviets had acquired facilities in the Indian Ocean and, therefore, this prompted the U.S to acquire such strategic facilities in order to deter the Soviets from blockading the shipping lanes and thus, jeopardizing U.S interests in the area, and in the Middle East.

The crisis in the Horn involved Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya. The Ogaden war of the late 1970s, between Ethiopia and Somalia, had a lot of implications on the U.S strategic position in the area. Somalia received huge consignments of arms from the Soviet Union, prior to the conflict. The U.S, likewise, supplied Ethiopia with weapons and military personnel to secure port facilities in the country. This was motivated by the need to ensure that no part of Ethiopian territory was slashed by Somalia in case of a defeat on the side of Ethiopia, and that Eritrea would not gain autonomy, as it received support from the Soviet Union, Cuba and Arab States. This was seen as capable of turning the Red Sea into an Arab Lake, as its aftermath would create an all Arab-surrounded Red sea. This was perceived as a threat to the free movement of oil in the area and likewise as a threat to Israel's survival. In the 1960s and early 1970s, therefore, the U.S supported Ethiopia in order to lobby for port facilities which she would use in her Middle East strategic policy planning. Somalia found itself surrounded by states that were now having it as their common enemy, having had territorial claims on both Kenya and Ethiopia. Naval facilities were, however, the major target of the U.S and Soviet Union Horn policies. The strategic significance attributed to the ports on Africa's Horn is based upon their location near the entrance to the Red Sea, from which it is possible to control access to the Southern entrance of the Suez Canal.¹⁴

During this period, the Soviet Union had already obtained access rights to the port of Massawa in Somalia. However, the facilities were most essential for bunkering and minor repairs, at least in times of low tension. For those purposes, ports such as Aden in South Yemen (PDRY), Hodeida in North Yemen, Umm Qasyr in Iraq, and, far to the South, port Louis in Mauritius and Beira and Lourenco Marques in Mozambique. They could, moreover, use protected anchorages of Maldiva Islands and the South Yemeni Island of Socotra for resupply. But only in Somalia would they have airfields capable of handling the largest planes in their inventory; communication facilities (which if the U.S. experience was any guide were yet fully replicable by satellites); a secure place for missile storage, testing and loading; and barracks where crews could be rested or held on reserve.¹⁵ Such threats to U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean were watched with great concern by U.S. policy makers. Kenya's offer of facilities to the U.S. spearheaded a balance for U.S. strategic presence in the Indian Ocean and the Horn region. This cooperation was achieved because of the national interest interplay that exist between the two states. The U.S. entered serious strategic engagement with Kenya in mid 1970s. This period marked increased U.S. security concerns given that during this period the British had withdrawn from East of Suez. The withdrawal was announced in 1968.¹⁶ Thus the U.S. came in to fill the "vacuum" left by the withdrawal and much of her concerns were centered on the Indian Ocean's strategic importance to the security of allies in the area and that of the flow of oil from the Gulf. A

larger debate has over the years prevailed in the U.S foreign policy making circles. This is in connection with what, actually, the U.S interests in the Horn, Indian Ocean and Middle-East are, or would be. Two perspectives surfaced and these were "globalist" and "regionalist". The "globalist" view was stressed by those who favoured an expanded military presence in areas of U.S interest, while the "regionalist" perspective was advanced by those who advocated that American involvement in the areas should be oriented primarily towards developmental and humanitarian goals.¹⁷

The globalists assert that the Horn is strategically important to the U.S for the following reasons:

- (i) to protect the Persian Gulf oil which must pass through the sea lanes off the Horn and is thus vulnerable to disruption.
- (ii) to enable America to supply Israel with arms, a crucial ally without disruption or delay in the event of a conflict in the Middle East;
- (iii) to counter the Soviet/Cuban presence in Ethiopia since 1977;
- (iv) to help deny the Soviet Union access to the Arabian Sea and thus disrupt their shipping from the Black Sea to the Soviet Far East; and
- (v) to increase the presence of the U.S nuclear war-head-carrying submarines in an area within range of large parts of the Soviet Union.¹⁸

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assistance to countries on the Horn would polarize regional politics and that the associated use of physical facilities (as those in Kenya) to launch military action in other regions would only widen such crises and drag countries in the Horn-and the U.S - into conflicts not of their making nor in their interests. They pointed out to U.S military assistance to Somalia as having encouraged territorial claims on Ethiopia's Ogaden and Kenya's N.F.D, and feared that America might have been drawn inadvertently into local conflicts between Somalia and its neighbours, thereby identifying the U.S in the eyes of Kenya another local ally, with the aggressor, and so damaging the U.S diplomatic position on the African continent. They also emphasized that the region's principal needs were developmental and humanitarian not military.¹⁹ Both perspectives underscore the fact that the U.S has key interests in the Horn. The globalist perspective emphasizes strategic interests with a military approach to their realization while the regionalist perspective emphasizes development and humanitarian interests, with non-military approach. However, the U.S policy towards the crisis in the Horn was conditioned by its geostrategic interests in the region.

The importance of the Indian Ocean port of Mombasa to the U.S, contributed enormously to the promotion of U.S interests in the area. The area is important to the U.S in various ways. First, the Indian Ocean provides the U.S with strategic spot for deployment of sea-based missiles aimed at the Soviet Union. The geographic location of the waters around the Red Sea, provides some of the

best locations for the U.S to deploy such weapons. Second, as the land-based missiles become increasingly vulnerable, the undersea long-range missiles have become the key to U.S offense and defense. Third, the U.S economic interests in the Indian Ocean are considerable and these interests are advanced as justification for a U.S buildup in the area.²⁰

U.S presence in the region was reasserted in 1973; when a meaningful military-strategic engagement was sought. The U.S policy towards this region stretches from the Nixon Doctrine of partial reliance on allies in the region to bolster U.S interests in the area to Carter's retaliatory threat doctrine.²¹ President Nixon said, in his 1973 message to Congress, that:

the Nixon Doctrine recognizes that we cannot abandon friends, and must not transfer burdens too swiftly. We must strike a balance between doing too much and thus preventing self-reliance and doing too little and thus undermining self-confidence.²²

The key to the Nixon Doctrine was a balanced U.S role that would continue to represent U.S interests in the Indian Ocean area but would also encourage the friendly littoral states (Kenya in particular) to contribute to their own security. The Reagan Administration picked up, to a certain degree, from former President Carter's strategy of acquisition of bases in the littoral states. Thus, Kenya, Somalia, and Oman were added to the list of littoral states offering bases.²³

The U.S policy on arms transfers has been in line with her

strategic interests. For more than three decades, the U.S program of arms transfers has been viewed with remarkable consistency by successive presidents. The basic tenet has been that such programs, designed "to strengthen allied and friendly nations", "to contribute to a common defence posture", significantly enhance the security of the U.S and the prospects for world peace. Although the scope and character of U.S arms-transfer programs have changed since their inception to reflect shifts in the international environment, the central rationale has remained the national interest-as perceived by each resident of the White House.²⁴ Kenya receives arms through the arms transfer programme which facilitates the realization of U.S national interests. Such support benefits both states and promotes their cooperation.

TABLE 15: Arms Transfer Deliveries by Major Supplier and Recipient Country 1976-1989 (Millions of Current Dollors)

Cummulative 1976-1980

CUMMULATIVE 1976-1980

SUPPLIER/ RECIPIENT	TOTAL	US	USSR	FRANC E	UK	MID EAST	CHIN A	OTHE RS
Kenya	180	50	-	30	40	-	-	60
Ethiopia	2225	80	1900	10	-	-	-	235
Somalia	750	-	150	40	10	-	-	550
Tanzania	470	-	320	5	10	-	-	135
Uganda	60	-	45	-	5	-	-	10

CUMMULATIVE 1979 TO 1983

Kenya	450	60	-	11	130	-	-	150
Ethiopia	1900	-	1800	-	-	-	-	100
Somalia	580	30	-	5	5	-	50	490
Tanzania	390	-	270	-	10	-	40	70
Uganda	150	-	10	20	20	-	-	100

COMMULATIVE 1985 TO 1989

Kenya	180	30	-	-	120	-	-	30
Ethiopia	3805	-	3600	-	-	-	20	185
Tanzania	290	-	270	-	-	-	10	10
Somalia	160	-	50	10	-	10	5	85
Uganda	195	-	40	-	-	20	5	130

Source: Data Extracted from World Military Expenditures and Arms 1980, 1985 and 1990 (Table 3)

Table 15 shows US Arms Transfers in the Horn of Africa in the period 1976 to 1989. It is evident that this is a very vital component of US diplomacy in the region. Arms transfers responded

positively to the shift of alliances in the Horn during the cold war era. For instance in the period 1979 to 1983, Soviet Union supplied Ethiopia with Arms worth 1800 million dollars and no arms at all to Kenya and Somalia. During the same period, the US supplied Kenya with arms worth 60 million dollars and Somalia with 30 million dollars while Ethiopia received none. This is evident from the table and illustrates the fluidity of the arms transfers diplomacy. Among the five countries analysed in the table, only Kenya has consistently relied on the US for arms support.

The US, however, needs to put into practice the claim that it nurtures a long-standing policy on "full-scope safeguards" on arms transfers. Massive arms transfers has been an instrument of US policy but needs to cease to be. Recently the US has tended to emphasize the need to curb destabilizing arms transfers particularly nuclear arms, without due consideration to unsophisticated conventional weapons. Such transfers have exacerbated regional and civil tensions in many parts of Africa which have often degenerated into interstate conflict or civil wars as in the case of Sudan and Somalia. Instead the Nuclear Suppliers Group, at US initiative, have agreed to control a substantial list of dual-use, nuclear-related equipment and technology. There is need to have a similar framework for conventional arms transfers on which Kenya-US relations is hinged.

In september, 1976, U.S secretary of state, Henry Kissinger visited Nairobi. His talks with President Kenyatta were centred on peace talks in South Africa and U.S - Kenya links. The U.S - Kenya

links were anchored on their security and Kissinger reiterated that the U.S believed in the security, freedom, peace and prosperity of Kenya. Kissinger re-emphasized on Kenya - U.S cooperation when he ended his speech with the call; Harambee! Harambee Kenya na America.²⁵ In the same year, a U.S Defence Secretary visited Kenya. Defence Secretary Rumsfeld met with Kenya's Minister of Defence, to discuss security in the Horn region. Later in the year, as Kenya celebrated Independence Day, U.S Marine corps jets flew over Nairobi as a gesture of good will.²⁶ This incident demonstrates U.S-Kenya cooperative interaction.

Kenya has supported the U.S in the pertinent issues in the global political arena. On the other hand the U.S, since 1960s, has had a favourable security policy towards Kenya and other allies. The President Johnson's State of Union message, inauguration for his only full term in White House, in January 1965, underscored the very vital commitment of the U.S to her security and the well-being of her friends. He said :

But the unity we seek cannot realize its full promise in isolation... our concern and interest, compassion and vigilance, extend to every corner of a dwindling planet. Yet it is not merely our concern but the concern of all free men.... Let the foes of freedom take no comfort from this. For in concert with other nations we shall help men defend their freedom. Our first aim remains the safety and well-being of our own country. We are prepared to live as good neighbours with all, but cannot be indifferent to acts designed to injure our interests, our citizens, or our establishments abroad....²⁷

The question of U.S support to Israel requires our attention. The U.S had a favourable defense policy towards Israel because of its interests. In 1966, the U.S Department of State confirmed that

the U.S had sold patton tanks to Israel to enhance its security. A statement released by the State Department said:

... the established policy has been to refrain from becoming a major supplier of arms in the area {Near East} while retaining the option of helping the countries of the area to meet their defense requirements through occasional selective sales.... Over the years, to meet modernization requirements, we have sold to the Government of Israel various items of military equipment to help it meet its own defense and internal security requirements. These have included patton tanks.²⁸

Israel is important to the U.S as far as U.S Middle East security interests are concerned. Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, among other allies within or at the periphery of the Middle East are likewise important for the realization of such interests. It is U.S policy not to discuss the specifics of this type of transaction with Israel. Accordingly, the U.S was not in a position to go into details of military material furnished to individual countries beyond stating that supply by these states has been in accordance with U.S established policy.²⁹ In 1974 President Nixon visited Israel. His statement issued in Tel Aviv contained the following commitments:

- (a) that President Nixon had reiterated the commitment of the U.S to the long-term security of Israel and to the principle that each state has the right to exist within secure borders.
- (b) that Prime Minister Yishak Rabin had expressed his appreciation for U.S military supplies to Israel during the October, 1973 war and there after.
- (c) that the president had reaffirmed the continuing long-term nature of the military supply relationship between the two

countries and reiterated his view that the strengthening of Israel's ability to defend itself was essential in order to prevent further hostilities and maintain conditions conducive towards peace; and

- (d) that an Israeli defence ministry delegation would shortly visit Washington to work out concrete details relating to long-term military supplies.³⁰

It is evident therefore, that the U.S policy towards the Gulf and Middle East as a whole is hinged on the security of allies, particularly Israel. Kenya's close ties with Israel would probably be seen as a spillover of the Kenya - U.S cooperation.

Kenya's strategic importance was emphasized in 1979 when crises in the Middle East prompted the Carter Administration to realize the importance of littoral states to the Persian Gulf, and U.S security in the region. It can be argued that serious U.S strategic engagement with Kenya was evidently witnessed in 1978, when Mr. Daniel arap Moi became President of the Republic of Kenya. Geostrategic considerations, therefore, constituted the core of America's relationship with Kenya's President Moi in the 1980s and the regime of Somalia's Siad Barre; who is currently in exile after a coup d'etat in Somalia in late 1991. Both leaders have actively supported U.S rapid deployment force within Indian Ocean bases after the 1979 momentous events in the Middle East and Afghanistan. Neither leader cared to consult local opinion on those decisions, any more than did the late president of Liberia, Samuel Kanyon Doe,

caretaker of the hub of the U.S-African communications network in Monrovia.³¹ The main interest of the two leaders was to tap U.S assistance and arms transfers. The primary purpose of the arms transfer was to serve U.S geostrategic ends. Such ends include U.S overflight rights and/or access to ports, harbours, airfields, and other transit facilities in Kenya, Somalia, Morocco, Sudan and Egypt - as well as "negative denial" with respect to similar Soviet ambitions. In addition such assistance underwrites other objectives:

- (1) linkage of the region to other U.S and NATO security interests;
- (2) continued adherence by Egypt to 1979 Camp David peace accords with Israel;
- (3) symbolic linkage with the U.S as a counterpoise to Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi; and
- (4) maintenance of internal stability for "moderate" governments confronting a combination of difficult economic and security problems.³²

This argument underscores the fact that the U.S has gained access to basing facilities in Kenya, and other African States through granting these states military aid, economic assistance, arms sales, which have played a central role in the process of obtaining these facilities.

The U.S sought the Kenyan air and naval facilities in 1979 when the strategic-security environment in the Middle East worsened in the decade, stemming from a series of crucial developments of

cardinal importance to the State Department was the collapse of the imperial regime in Iran in early 1979 and its replacement by a self-styled, militant Islamic Republic. This coupled with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December, 1979, raised danger in the largest oil producing area of the world.³³ Whatever the historical verdict on the Pahlavi regime in Iran, the fall of the Shah in February, 1979, and the creation of an Islamic republic under Ayattollah Ruhollah Khomeini was a watershed in Middle East history. It served as the U.S strategic ally, allowing sensitive intelligence installations located on Iranian Soil.³⁴

For the U.S, the fall of the Shah required considerable reappraisal of Middle Eastern security priorities and policies. During most of the 1970s the Shah was the recipient of extraordinary quantities of American arms. Iran was the primary beneficiary, in the Middle East, of the so called Nixon doctrine approach to regional problems. Growing out of the Vietnam war, this view maintains that U.S cannot afford to supervise directly all its global interests, and therefore needs to encourage, and strengthen regional allies which would play a stabilizing role on behalf of American interests. The Shah was an enthusiastic supporter of this concept and enjoyed giving the impression that Iran was an emerging power of great strategic importance to the U.S.³⁵ Apart from the fall of the Shah and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, other events with similar threats were the hostage crisis in the U.S Embassy in Iran and the attack on U.S Embassies in Pakistan and Libya. The events prompted the U.S request for, and Kenya's subsequent

granting of basing facilities. This was the climax of the realization of U.S strategic interests in Kenya. Moi signed agreements in 1980 granting the U.S access to Mombasa as part of the RDF.³⁶ These facilities play a preponderant role in the relations between the two countries. U.S strategic interests in the Indian Ocean are realized through Kenya's linkage with the Diego Garcia Base. These links were vital during the cold war, during the 1991 Gulf war and remain to be vital to the U.S. If the western facilities in the Indian Ocean were humped together, which for certain contingencies is realistic, they constitute a far more substantial infrastructure than the Soviet Union was able to assemble. This U.S interest concurred with Kenya's need for aid.

It can further be argued that the dynamics of the relationship between Kenya and the U.S are geared towards producing results that are profitable to both countries. There is, however, unequal vulnerability and imperfect reciprocity between the two states. The two countries seem to have similar perceptions of terrorist activities worldwide. Libya, being one of the states that support terrorism has often been seen as a common enemy to the two states. Libya has been at the forefront of such activities for many years, and the U.S has over the years expressed concern over such activities, especially during the Reagan and Bush Administrations. Kenya, on the other hand, expelled Libyan envoys and subsequently demanded the closure of the Libyan Embassy in Nairobi in 1987, due to Libya's interference in Kenya's internal affairs. The embassy has not been reopened to date. Currently the U.S and Western

Cooperative Allies are demanding for the handover of two Libyans suspected to have bombed a PANAM airliner in the Scotland airspace. This is intended to have the suspects tried in one of the countries in the "allied group". The Libyan leader has, however, negatively responded to this demand. Kenya might have been influenced by the U.S to close the Libyan Embassy in Nairobi. However, it is a case of cooperation between the two countries.

Kenya served a vital strategic function to the U.S Middle East interests during the Gulf crisis of 1990-91. In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and declared it as part of the Iraqi territory. This incident threatened U.S national interests in the Gulf. Kuwait's economy is dominated by western capital investments. A majority of oil companies operating there are American. The invasion, therefore, threatened U.S economic interests, the flow of oil from the Gulf and U.S. credibility as a powerful nation, capable of defending its allies. The perceived attack on Israel by Iraq was seen as an imminent provocation of a U.S ally, which would have probably triggered a war between Israel and Iraq, which was likewise envisaged to degenerate into an Arab-Israeli war which would consequently jeopardize American security interests in the area. This crisis was a test to the post cold war d'etente between the U.S and the Soviet Union. Both the U.S and the Soviet Union portrayed a high degree of restraint and cooperation in the security council when they condemned the invasion and called for Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait and subsequently imposing sanctions on Iraq and Iraqi-occupied Kuwait when this did

not occur.³⁷ To enforce these sanctions, the Bush administration proceeded with the largest U.S troop build-up since the Vietnam war in order to be ready for an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia and Israel with an estimated force which, by late 1990, exceeded 400,000 troops in Kuwait and Southern Iraq plus 3,500 tanks.³⁸ The Bush administration, as a final resort, went to war with Iraq, supported by allied troops and consequently ejecting Iraq out of Kuwait. Kenya was cooperative to the U.S during the war. Kenya supported the Allied position in the Gulf and demanded that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein unconditionally withdraws from Kuwait. Kenya likewise supported U.S security measures against potential Gulf-sparked terrorist threats.³⁹ From this argument, it is evident that Kenya's geopolitical position vis-a-vis the Gulf has tremendous influence on Kenya - U.S relations. Though the Soviet Union has disintegrated, there is a likelihood that Third World States would be "more dangerous" to U.S security.⁴⁰ Some analysts, however, have argued that the end of the cold war has changed the agenda of U.S security interests. They assert that "U.S geopolitical interests in Africa are greatly diminished".⁴¹ The Gulf crisis and Libya's terrorist activities, among other crises-prone areas, are examples that support the former contention. Thus, allies and strategic facilities continue to be the cornerstone of U.S security policy. Because of the importance of bases for defence of both the Pacific and Indian Oceans, the U.S has committed resources to the construction of alternative bases at Guam or other Mariana Islands at an estimated cost of \$4.0 to \$6.0 billion as the agreement with

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the Philippines lapsed in 1991.⁴²

U.S presence in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Kenya, will continue to be hinged on strategic-security interests. The prospects for peace in the area seem to have mixed fortunes. Although the civil war in Ethiopia has subsided, civil wars drag on in Somalia and Sudan, and land clashes continue to threaten Kenya's internal security. These cases of instability generate large numbers of refugees and exacerbate draught-induced hunger. The U.S is a major donor of relief supplies particularly food and medical assistance. The U.S. is also prepared to contribute diplomatic resources to peace-making and internal reconciliation in the Horn.⁴³ Former U.S President Jimmy Carter, offered his good offices to mediate in the civil war in Sudan and that of Somalia. This region, therefore, remains crucial to U.S security interests.

3.3 Kenya's Security Interests: A Call for U.S Support.

As noted in the preceding section, a state's security from external aggression is the most sensitive aspect of its foreign policy and is actually the essence of its existence. External aggression, therefore, threatens the very existence and survival of a state. In this regard, Kenya has a national objective to secure and consolidate her borders, which have persistently been threatened by her neighbours. However, Kenya's military capacity to meet this goal was inadequate at independence and therefore, requested for assistance from the Western states to boost this capacity. Consequently, the U.S emerged as the major supplier of

military assistance and arms sales to Kenya. It can, thus, be argued that Kenya-U.S relations are a function of U.S military assistance to Kenya. U.S strategic interests in Kenya and Kenya's need for military supplies coincided to make a strong foundation for the cooperative interaction between the two states.

Nation states exist within the context of many other states and international actors. Some states possess great military and economic capabilities while others do not, some control important natural resources while others do not, the arrangement of states includes their political-geographical arrangements as well.⁴⁴ This view supports the contention that the geographical location of states influences their behaviour. Contiguity accelerates cooperation or conflict between states. Kenya is situated between an "occasionally hostile" environment which calls for the need to improve her security in order to perpetuate her existence.

Kenya is surrounded by countries whose names make headlines only as examples of tragedy - Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania. In the last two decades, Eastern Africa experienced political upheavals, famine, and crushing poverty and economic destruction under Idi Amin in Uganda, relentless civil war in Sudan, and civil strife in Somalia.⁴⁵ These conditions have served as major threats to Kenya's security since independence, in 1963, particularly from Somalia, Uganda, and later Sudan. Somalia's threat was the earliest and most alarming. Kenya struggled to protect her territory by preventing Somalia's attempt to undermine Kenya's territorial integrity, by slashing some part of the North

Eastern region of Kenya. This act of aggression from Somalia was prevalent mainly in the 1960s while the threat from Uganda was exacerbated in the 1970s. Somalia, however officially dropped its claims on Kenyan territory in the 1980's. Another threat to Kenya's security came into scope in late 1980s. This was the Sudan-Libya threat to Kenya's security. Kenya was alleged to have been supporting the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA), and that her close relations with U.S was suspect in regard to the supply of arms and ammunition to the SPLA forces. Kenyan territory was bombed by Libyan jet fighters in collaboration with the Khartoum regime, in which Kenya alleged that Uganda was responsible for the bombings. The 1980s, therefore, were dominated by the Uganda-Sudan-Libya triangular security threat to Kenya.

As noted above, the Eastern African countries have been centres of misery for a long historical period, and it is precisely because Kenya does not receive such coverage that it deserved U.S attention and support. In the midst of crisis and chronic troubles, Kenya has enjoyed relative peace and prosperity.⁴⁶ However, continued peace, and prosperity for Kenya requires sustained cooperation with the U.S for supply of military ware to counter the sophisticated arms possessed by its neighbours' aggressive and expansionist policies.

This section explores the actual and perceived security threats to Kenya stemming from Somalia and Uganda-Sudan-Libya triangular alliance. In our analysis we demonstrate how the U.S military support to Kenya has helped her to realize this security

goal. However, we sustain the argument that such cooperation between the two countries is a function of reciprocal strategic-security interests.

3.3.1 The Somalia Security Threat

Somalia irredentism was Kenya's major security threat at Kenya's independence in 1963. The conflict between the two countries was characterized by a high degree of emotional and patriotic attachment to principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty, national security, and survival. Rational or not, these abstract principles tend to define conflict in absolute terms and promote the idea of the national interest, a narcissistic component of a political entity.⁴⁷ Reduced to the defence of the self, Kenya struggled to remain intact within its territorial confines. This was realized through U.S cooperation in military sales and assistance. Somalia's claim of the Kenyan territory was based on the concept of self-determination. This was not only directed at Kenya but also at Ethiopia and Djibouti. However, the clash between self-determination and territorial integrity in part attracted the Soviet Union and the U.S into the Horn. Kenya remained cooperative to the U.S throughout the cold war era while in Somalia and Ethiopia were marked shifts in alliances between U.S. and Soviet Union.

This external component in the dispute between Kenya and Somalia was aggravated by the fact that the Soviet Union had given massive arms support to Somalia. The Kenyan authorities argued that if this had not happened, there would have been no dispute between

them. Kenyans stressed the significance of this point by noting that Somalia was being looked at by the Soviet Union as a stepping stone to Eastern Africa and therefore being substantially armed.⁴⁸ As Adar argues, the supply of modern weapons to Somalia was viewed by Kenya as a threat to its territorial integrity.⁴⁹ Somalia, however, retaliated by pointing a finger at Kenya as having been equally armed by the West.

The root of the conflict was that Somalia supported the Kenyan Somalis of North Eastern Kenya to fight protracted war with the Kenyan government forces from 1963-1967, with a view of detaching that region from the rest of Kenya.⁵⁰ These activities, together with the increased incidence of armed Somalis crossing the border into Kenya led to a deterioration of relations between the two countries in 1975 and 1976. During this period Somalia aroused hostility in all its neighbours. At this time the Soviet Union had established sophisticated military facilities at the Somalia port of Berbera, among which was a missile handling facility.⁵¹ These events prompted Kenya to expand its hitherto very small military budget and led to the first important agreement with the U.S to supply it with military hardware. Kenya decided to increase ties with Washington with hopes of gaining American leverage against any Somali efforts to more actively threaten Kenya.⁵² However, the U.S interests of battling the Soviet Union in the cold war was affinitive to Kenya's security interests. The Carter administration saw the necessity of having access to naval facilities in Kenya. Kenya's linkage to U.S Indian Ocean policy during the 1970s was

reasserted when the U.S developed the Diego Garcia base. This linkage is unparalleled in U.S Indian Ocean strategic interests. In this period the U.S had problems to resupply Israel with arms, especially during the October 1973 war, which required U.S naval presence in the region. The Diego Garcia factor was, therefore, very significant to the U.S to the extent that a congressional committee remarked:

the short answer given (for the decision to upgrade Diego Garcia) revolves around the October 1973 Middle East war, the U.S need for continued access to the Persian Gulf and its oil resources, and the desire of the Defence Department to have logistical support necessary for the regular deployment of carrier task force to the Indian Ocean.⁵³

During the 1973 period, Kenya was likewise threatened by the Ugandan aggression. Kenya's national security interests, therefore, coincided with those of the U.S. This interplay of interests cultivate cooperation between the two states.

During the Kenya-Somalia conflict, the Somali raiders concentrated their activities on attacking border posts and police stations. This prompted the declaration of a state of emergency in the North Eastern region by the Kenya government. As a result in late 1963, the government of Somalia rejected a tripartite offer of more than \$10 million in military assistance from the U.S, West Germany and Italy because of "quantitative inadequacies" and above all because of political conditions which accompanied it. Instead, the Somali government decided to accept a substantially larger Soviet military aid offer-unofficially reported at about \$30 million.⁵⁴ On the other hand, by 1964, the U.S had assisted the

Kenyan army with \$1.5 million military assistance. This included training in the U.S. construction of a public school, and provision of radio communication equipment, two patrol boats for anti-smuggling operations, aircraft and vehicles. The senate passed a motion in June 1966, urging the Kenyan government to send troops across Kenya-Somalia border to hunt down armed shifta bandits from Somalia.⁵⁵ This security concern by the Kenya government is a case in which the U.S. played a significant role towards its realization.

Kenya searched for all available alternatives to enhance her military capability. The intensification of Somalia's active engagement in acts of aggression in the NFD region of Kenya prompted Kenya to sign a Mutual Defence Pact with Ethiopia. This treaty strengthened the relationship between Kenya and Ethiopia. The Mutual Defence Pact, the first to be signed after Kenya's independence, specified that if one were attacked by Somalia, the other would go for her aid. The agreement was signed when Somalia stepped up her military activities in Somali-inhabited areas of Kenya and Ethiopia.⁵⁶ After several skirmishes, mediation effort by President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia resulted in the signing of a memorandum of understanding in Arusha, Tanzania, in 1967. In the memorandum, each side recognized the inviolability of Kenya's territorial integrity and pledged to improve the peoples on both sides of the Kenya-Somalia border.

However, this understanding did not hold back the two countries from exchanging hostilities. Somalia further became a security threat to Kenya in 1969 when a military coup d'etat replaced a civilian government in the Republic of Somalia and Siad Barre, who came to power, immediately announced that he intended to develop Somalia into a Socialist State. It was not clear whether the military regime would revoke the terms of the detente which had existed between the civilian government of Somalia and Kenya regarding the disputed North-Eastern province (NFD region). The two countries had resumed diplomatic and trade relations in 1967. The new military regime in Somalia, however, immediately established cordial relations with Tanzania. This rapprochement between the two states intensified the perceived threat to Kenya's security as Kenya was being encircled by Socialist states.

In 1978, Somalia invaded the Somali inhabited Ogaden region of Ethiopia. During the invasion, Kenya envisaged the imminent escalation of the conflict to the NFD region of Kenya. Arab countries, particularly Egypt, supported Somalia morally and with arms supplies. During this period an Egyptian plane carrying arms to Somalia was intercepted by the Kenya Air Force and forced to land in Nairobi. The Kenya government impounded the arms. This subsequently strained the relations between Kenya and Egypt. In retaliation, Egypt seized two Kenyan Airways planes, which were flying to Europe. Envisaging the weight of the consequences that would be involved in the seizure, Kenya released the Egyptian plane in exchange for the passenger planes. Following these events, Iran

closed its embassy in Nairobi as a result of charges that Iran was supporting Somalia. Kenya's friends continued to be western countries, led by the U.S. These events prompted Kenya to purchase military hardware comparable to those of Somalia. In this regard, president Moi, then Vice President, went to Washington for arms shopping. In march, 1978, President Carter received a Kenyan delegation headed by Moi, which stated Kenya's concern about the situation in the Horn and requested for greater arms support. Carter reaffirmed American arms and financial support for Kenya and promised to maintain an arms embargo on Somalia. The U.S reacted in support of Kenya by immediately sending the P-3 anti submarine aircraft to Nairobi and an American Naval Force from the 8th fleet.⁵⁷ As noted in the previous chapter, Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, visited Kenya and signed a \$75 million arms deal involving twelve F-5 fighter bombers to enhance Kenya's security. In appreciation, Kenya granted naval and air facilities to the U.S and joined the U.S in boycotting the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games. U.S military supplies and assistance focuses on a few countries in Africa, mainly Kenya and Chad, which are threatened by their neighbours.

Another factor that enhanced Kenya's security was U.S relationship with Somalia during the year 1983. Radio Mogadishu reported on December 6th, 1983, that Somalia had renewed her relationship with the U.S. First; Vice President and Defence Minister, Lt-General Mohammed Ali Samatur, had prepared dinner for delegation by the commander of the U.S Navy in the Pacific, and for

another delegation led by the Commander of the U.S Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) that arrived in Somalia on the 5th December, 1983, to conduct military exercises in Somalia airspace. Members of Somali Air Force and Air Defence took part in the exercises. "U.S. F-15 aircraft conducted exercises in Mogadishu and its environs that morning," said the broadcast.⁵⁸ This was one of the gestures of rapprochement between Washington and Mogadishu. This normalization of relations between Washington and Mogadishu minimized the Somali threat to Kenya's security. From that time U.S reasserted its influence in the Horn by maintaining its presence in Kenya and Somalia. Due to its geographical position, East Africa has special attraction for the Pentagon. It lies between the oil regions of the Arab World and the rich mineral resource of African countries. It is, therefore, pertinent that the U.S has been building its military presence in this region with special intensity. The U.S have converted Mombasa into a permanent base in the Indian Ocean and spared no money to build and equip a naval and airbase in Berbera on Somali territory.⁵⁹ It was not until 1980 that Mogadishu signed the agreement granting U.S forces access to the Somalia airfields and ports including Berbera where a £23 million harbour and airfield improvement project got underway. This American - Somali rapprochement resulted in a reduction of tension between Kenya and Somalia. This further strengthened the cooperative interaction between Kenya and the U.S.

On the other hand, Somali-Soviet Union relations were strained in the period 1977 to 1983. This resulted to a closer relationship

between Somalia and the U.S. The cause of the strain was the Kremlin's interference and involvement in the Horn crisis, especially the 1977-79 Ogaden war. An estimated £ 700 million in Soviet weaponry and some 20,000 Cuban troops helped Ethiopia reverse the initial setbacks and handed Somalia a military defeat.⁶⁰ The Somali President Siad Barre, however, called on October 21st 1983 for normalization of relations with the Soviet Union.⁶¹ Having had a foothold in the ports and airfields of both Kenya and Somalia, the U.S sealed off Kenya's security fears.

Kenya's security interests still remain salient after the thawing of the cold war. Somalia still remains to be a particularly explosive factor in Kenya's security. In 1991, matters were no better when time and luck finally ran out for Somalia's ageing dictator, Siad Barre, and forced to flee from his official residence in the capital Mogadishu, as rebels took control of the city after a month of heavy fighting. According to reports from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (U.N.H.C.R), at least 24,000 Somalis by January, 1991, had fled Mogadishu to cross the border into Ethiopia and several thousands, including three Somali government ministers had fled into Kenya.⁶² The worry on the Kenyan side about these events is: what policies would a new Mogadishu regime pursue? Would it renew the ageing irredentism against Kenya? How would the new regime relate with the U.S? Kenya would probably have a conflictive relationship with the new regime as the deposed Barre escaped into and stayed in Kenya for a month before leaving the country for Nigeria where he has been granted political asylum.

There have been some reports that Kenya has been arming remnant troops loyal to Barre to fight back into power. This would probably strain the relationship between Kenya and Somalia. However, the U.S continues to relate with Kenya cooperatively, given that their interests are reciprocal Kenya's ties with the U.S stand to yield a wide range of benefits to her military capability. The U.S has played a significant role in arming and training the Kenyan army, navy and air force. U.S military assistance remains to be the mainstay of Kenya's military capability. Kenya's support to U.S relief supplies to Somalia in 1991 was a case of continued cooperation amidst their conflictive interaction over human rights.

3.3.2 Uganda-Sudan-Libya: A Triangular Security Threat to Kenya

Kenya's foreign policy has been and continues to be hinged on the protection of her territorial integrity. She has tried various options to realize this end, including a strategy of cooperation with the East African regional states. This was evident in the defunct East African Community (E.A.C.), which was aimed at forming an integrated regional bloc. The dissolution of the community, however, brought about an environment of uncertainty and insecurity to Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. The breakup led to the closure of the Kenya-Tanzania border, in 1977. However, Tanzania was not Kenya's major security threat. The major security threat was Uganda, especially during the reign of Idi Amin who declared his aspiration to invade and annex a large part of Kenyan territory into Uganda from early 1970s. This threat was magnified and exacerbated by Soviet arms supplies to the Amin regime.

The Uganda-Soviet arms deal of 1972 intensified Uganda's threat to both Kenya and Tanzania. During this period, Moscow welcomed the first Ugandan military delegation of Amin's regime. A year later, in November, 1973, Moscow began to send a considerable quantity of military material to Kampala, including two squadrons of MiG-17s and MiG -21s and approximately one hundred heavy tanks. It dispatched three hundred on-site advisers and trained two hundred Ugandan military cadres in Moscow.⁶³ There was a long verbal war between Kenya and Uganda following President Milton Obote's overthrow by Amin in 1971. This ensued until April, 1979, when Amin's government was overthrown by Ugandan exiles taking refuge in Tanzania, assisted by the Tanzanian government. Kenya and Uganda almost entered a physical confrontation during this period. The U.S, however, supplied Kenya with military assistance and arms which helped Kenya to deter Amin's expansionist aspirations.

Amin's territorial claims on Kenya were most pronounced in February 1976. He claimed that Western Kenya and the Southern Sudan were historically part of Uganda and that the border was wrongly moved by Britain in the early years of the century. These claims led to the closure of the Uganda-Kenya border which consequently halted deliveries of petrol and other goods to Uganda, followed by a boycott of Ugandan goods by dockers at the port of Mombasa. In retaliation to this claim, Kenya reiterated that it viewed with great concern Amin's claim that almost half of Kenya belonged to Uganda and pointed out that although it had never denied Uganda access to the sea, this was not an automatic right. The government

statement noted that as a faithful member of the OAU, Kenya adhered to the charter of the Organization which calls for the respect of sovereignty and territorial rights of all member states. The statement said:

Kenya respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all neighbours, including Uganda, and expects Uganda which is a member of the OAU and whose president is the current chairman of the Organization to adhere to OAU charter and respect her sovereignty and territorial integrity.⁶⁴

In a statement, released on February 17th, 1976, Kenya warned Amin that it will not yield a single inch of its territory. The statement noted that Amin's claim to parts of Kenya were "based on colonial history". However, in February 18, 1976 Amin repeated his claims that western Kenya and Southern Sudan were "illegally" transferred from Uganda by Britain in early years of the century. He subsequently sent a message to all African Heads of State emphasizing that he had no intention of going to war with Kenya and Sudan but saying that it was his duty to inform Africans about their borders.⁶⁵

During Amin's reign, Uganda's relations with Israel and the U.S deteriorated solely because of Amin's errant conduct of the country's foreign policy. In the case of Israel, Amin had considerable influence from Libya. Amin visited Libya early in February 1972, and in a communique signed by him and Col. Gaddafi, the Libyan leader, he attacked "zionism" and "imperialism" which he equated with Israel and U.S respectively. A Libyan mission later visited Kampala. The spillover of the Amin-Gaddafi relations was realized in March 30, 1972 when Amin announced at a "security

conference" of commanders of his country's armed forces that the Israeli Embassy in Kampala had been ordered to close down and its diplomats given 10 days to leave Uganda because of alleged subversive activities by Israelis living in the country.⁶⁶ This shift of the relations between Uganda and Israel had an effect on Kenya-Uganda relations. Israel and Kenya subsequently had a common enemy, and given the two countries were collaborating on various interest areas, they viewed Uganda with suspicion. Although President Amin and Mr. Wanume Kibedi, the Ugandan Foreign Minister, had previously denied that the Uganda anti-Israel measures were in any way a preparation for the receipt of financial and military help from Arab-States, the Ugandan president announced on April 23 that Libya would train Air Force pilots and Army personnel, and would also build and equip two 100-bed hospitals in Uganda.⁶⁷ This change of alliances, actually, exacerbated the deterioration of the relations between the two countries, whose ramifications were extended to Kenya and the U.S. President Amin himself had received paratroop training in Israel, had visited Israel twice after his accession to power and had bought an executive jet aircraft flown and maintained by Israeli pilots. Therefore, it is probable that Amin responded positively to Gaddafi's string-pulling by severing Uganda's relations with Israel.

Uganda's relations with the U.S deteriorated in the period March-July, 1973. It was disclosed in Washington in March 9, that Mr. Thomas Melady, the U.S Ambassador in Kampala, had been recalled for consultations after the U.S government had described as

"totally unacceptable" two messages to President Nixon in which Amin had severely criticized U.S involvement in Vietnam. These criticisms were followed by a temporal detention of 111 U.S. peace corps volunteers en route Zaire, on the ground that they "might have been mercenaries or Israelis". Amin, however, told Mr. Robert Keeley, the U.S charge d'affairs, on July 10 that his security forces were closely watching the activities of Americans in Uganda and that he would punish any of them who engaged in subversion.⁶⁸ Amin's provocation to the U.S ensued when he alleged that the U.S was planning to invade Arab oil-producing states, according to Radio Uganda monitored in London on February 20, 1975. The Radio quoted a message from the Ugandan leader saying that American destroyers and aircraft carriers were in the Indian Ocean off East Africa. The message said:

I believe it is the intention of the U.S and Britain to protect South Africa militarily, or it may even be possible that the U.S.A is planning to invade Saudi Arabia and other Oil-producing countries.⁶⁹

These allegations led to the deterioration of U.S-Uganda relations. The hostility might have been brewed within the Amin-Gaddafi relationship. These events were, likewise, threatening Kenya's security. However, as argued in the previous chapter, Kenya collaborated with Israel to liberate the Israeli hostages during the Entebbe raid. In appreciation, the U.S and Israel supplied Kenya with both military and economic assistance.

Libya entered Kenya's security map when Kenya asserted her close relations with the U.S and Western governments. This was in

1980s when Libya's leader, Muammar Gaddafi declared an ideological war against the U.S and its allies. Libya's enmity was transferred from the U.S to Kenya. Owing to Libya's support to terrorist activities worldwide and its anti-U.S policy, the U.S administration announced, on March 10th 1982, its decision to boycott Libyan oil in protest against "the unacceptable behaviour" of the regime headed by col. Gaddafi. The announcement by the State Department included a ban placed on American companies against the sale of high technology to Libya. A senior State Department official emphasized that the U.S was no longer prepared to tolerate Libyan misbehaviour world wide. The official said that Col. Gaddafi called in November, 1981, to assassinate several hundred U.S citizens in Sudan. In the attempt, American authorities uncovered a particularly outrageous plot in which Libya tried to place two powerful bombs in an American club in Khartoum, consequently a terrible catastrophe was narrowly avoided. The Libyan leader has on various occasions been accused of links with or financing terrorist groups ranging from Irish Republican Army (I.R.A), Japan's Red Army, to Italy's Red Brigades.⁷⁰ This Libya-Sudan collaboration encouraged international terrorism and threatened the interests of the U.S and Kenya.

We cannot, however, underrate the fact that the cold war environment influenced Libya's relations with the U.S and its allies, mainly Kenya and Chad. The Soviet Union signed a friendship pact with Libya in 1983. This was disclosed in a communique on March 19th after a visit to Moscow by Major Abdel-Salam Jalloud,

Col. Gaddafi's righthand man.⁷¹ During that year a Libyan plane was grounded in Brazil for more than a month after it was discovered that it was carrying arms for Nicaragua and not medical supplies as claimed by Libya.⁷² In September, 1983, the U.S Vice-President George Bush made a six-day long tour to Northern Africa, a region which the U.S considered threatened by Libya. Before leaving for the trip, Bush stressed the American government's concern at the magnitude of the Libyan attempts at destabilizing the area and had repeated President Reagan's willingness to help Chad to "face Libyan aggression".⁷³ American determination to thwart Libya's aggressive and terrorist policies has been fruitful using various means including the isolation of Libya by U.S allies. Consequently, Kenya broke diplomatic relations with Libya, essentially because of Libya's policies and American influence.

Libya has often openly affirmed her involvement in terrorist activities. In July 1984, Col Gaddafi vowed that his country would export terrorism to the heart of America. In a broadcast speech at Maitiqah Airbase - a former U.S Air Base - he referred to foreign press reports which he said reflected U.S involvement in a plot to carry out sabotage and assassinations in Libya. Col. Gaddafi declared:

we are capable of exporting terrorism to the heart of America. We are also capable of physical liquidation and destruction and arson inside America. If we have to export terrorism, we shall export terrorism to it.⁷⁴

The speech marked the fourteenth anniversary of the closure of U.S bases in Libya. This argument illustrates the nature of relations

between Libya and the U.S. Such hostilities were extended to Kenya and other U.S allies.

Kenya-Libya relations worsened when the former alleged that the latter was in collaboration with Uganda in an incident in which some 200 Kenyans were undergoing guerilla training in Libya after being flown to Tripoli through Uganda. This Uganda-Libya factor became more alarming in 1987 when Uganda likewise accused Kenya over alleged harassment of Uganda nationals living in Kenya and those who travelled to Kenya for official duties. The Kenya government, however, promptly denied the allegations and in turn accused Uganda of assisting political fugitives from Kenya to flee the country through Uganda to carry out their anti-government activities in European cities. There have been unconfirmed allegations that some Kenyan dissidents were being granted guerrilla training facilities in Uganda and later taken to Libya for further training with the ultimate aim of returning to Kenya to fight against the government.⁷⁵ However, the allegations seem to underscore one fact; that the persistent rift between Kenya and Uganda may have something to do with the close political ties between Museveni of Uganda and Gaddafi of Libya. Early in April 1987, it was reported from London that Museveni held a secret meeting with Gaddafi in Tripoli on March 1. Top on the agenda of that meeting, according to the report, was Museveni's request for military assistance from Libya. The report quoting "reliable sources" in London, claimed that already, there were about 1,000 Libyan military advisors in Uganda and added that Gaddafi agreed to

send a contingent of his Arab Foreign Legion (mercenary recruits from the Middle East, including P.L.O elements) to Uganda to help Museveni to deal with rebels fighting his government in the North and Western regions of the country.⁷⁶ These arms and personnel would, probably, be used against Kenya which is a close ally of the U.S. It is important to note that when Museveni returned from Libya, he announced that Uganda supported Libya's Gaddafi, and that was on Libya's side in its fight against American "aggression" against Libya. While Museveni was reportedly conferring with Gaddafi, Moi was in America soliciting for military and financial assistance. . In Washington President Reagan, who launched a military attack on Libya in early 1986, and who described Gaddafi as "the most dangerous man in the world," assured Moi that Kenya was America's greatest friend in Africa. Hardly a fortnight after Moi's return from the U.S, he hit at the Libyan Embassy in Nairobi for allegedly interfering in Kenya's internal affairs.⁷⁷ American support to Kenya, whether material or psychological, enhances Kenya's security. This has helped Kenya, to a great extent, deter her hostile neighbours from launching military attacks on her. This national interest interplay fosters cooperative interaction between Kenya and the U.S.

Kenya's security was again threatened by Uganda in 1987 when conflict between the two states culminated in the closure of the Kenya-Uganda border. More worse, Kenya ordered the expulsion of the Ugandan High Commissioner immediately after closing the Libyan Embassy in Nairobi. The closure of the Libyan Embassy reflects the

prevalent belief by the Kenya government that Col. Gaddafi was using Uganda to undermine Kenya's sovereignty. There were claims in the Kenyan press that Libya was involved in the fighting at the Kenya-Uganda border, on the Ugandan side. In relation to the expulsion of the Ugandan High Commissioner and the closure of the Libyan Embassy, Ugandan soldiers arrested six Kenyan diplomats in Kampala, the Ugandan capital, questioned them at a military barracks, then held them hostage at their embassy for 19 hours. At the intervention of the Kenya government, however, the diplomats were finally released.⁷⁸

Kenya's security fears were intensified by Libya's success, in collaboration with rebels from Chad, in deposing the Chadian leader Hissen Habre, in 1990. Idris Derby was the leader of the rebel forces. However, the Ugandan threat to Kenya's security has eased given that diplomatic relations between the two countries were restored on 17th August, 1990.

On the other side of the triangular confrontation is Sudan. Sudan entered Kenya's security schema in 1989. The 7th March, 1989 bombing of the North-West Kenyan town of Lokichoggio led to the Kenya government's angriest verbal attack on Uganda, one of the members of the triangular security threat. The bombing was alleged to have been carried out by Uganda though it was later discovered that it was carried out by the Khartoum regime in collaboration with Libya. The Kenya Times, owned by KANU stormed that "Uganda's crackpot ruler" was "trying to draw Kenya into war". In the bombing, five people are believed to have died, when what the

Nairobi government described as unmarked military plane which it claimed was Ugandan, dropped two bombs on the remote town. What is puzzling, apart from the unlikelihood of a Ugandan bombing raid on Kenya, is that the Ugandan Air Force is not believed to have any bombers.⁷⁹ But at Juba in neighbouring Sudan, a number of Libyan MiGs flown by Libyan pilots have been operating against the S.P.L.A. Lokichoggio is the key entry point to Sudan for supplies and personnel for the SPLA. It was claimed that a third country was using Kenya to supply arms to SPLA, and that this country was probably Israel, which would be in retaliation to Gaddafi's support to the Khartoum regime. Quite apart from wishing to embarrass Uganda, therefore, perhaps Kenya was trying to disguise the extent of its own support for the Sudanese rebel movement.⁸⁰ This is evident in the sense that the Nairobi government is not likely to support the Khartoum regime because of its close ties with Libya. The influence of the U.S. in the adoption of such a policy stance on the part of Kenya cannot be underrated.

The Lokichoggio report blamed a "triangular conspiracy" of Uganda, a hostile power and a third country in collaboration with dissidents. It left no doubt that the countries concerned were Sudan and Libya. President Moi has consistently maintained that Uganda was responsible for the bombing. Uganda denied the accusation. However, the scatter bombs were dropped, apparently by a Libyan MiG. U.S intelligence is known to have told the Nairobi government that their satellite had tracked two jets bombing SPLA-held areas, before flying south to the Kenyan border. Civilians in

the SPLA-held town of Pibor and SPLA fighters in Torit also said that they heard the jets.⁸¹ This military action against Kenya increased Kenya's vulnerability to attacks from its neighbours. This prompted Kenya to augment the largely American-supplied Air Force after disbanding it following its involvement in a bloody coup attempt in August 1982. Kenya, in 1990, therefore, bought portable anti-aircraft missiles from France to help plug gaps in its defence, a French daily newspaper Liberation, reported on 31st July, 1990. The two countries had agreed in principle that a French defence firm Matra would supply Kenya with Mistral Truck-Mounted Missiles in a deal worth approximately \$113 million.⁸² This was mainly in response to the Lokichoggio bombing by Libyan and Sudanese MiG jet fighters. It is, therefore, evident that Kenya's security interests would continue to be predominantly met through her collaboration with the west, particularly the U.S. The "triangular" security threat to Kenya was real and remains to be potentially explosive.

3.4 Conclusion

In this chapter we have demonstrated U.S strategic interests in Kenya during the cold war and post-cold war era. Strategic preponderance was the main attraction towards U.S policy in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East. U.S sought strategic parity with the Soviet Union, whose presence in the Horn of Africa was felt from as early as late 1960s. U.S interests in the region are: the security of the oil shipping lanes from the Persian Gulf; the

security of its allies; the deterrence of hostile states from launching offensive on U.S interests; the continued existence and security of Israel; keeping U.S psychological power and credibility alive by sustaining its presence in the Horn region and keeping a foothold in the area for supply of relief and humanitarian assistance. All these constitute U.S security and strategic interests in the area. Kenya plays a vital role in the U.S-Middle East security network which facilitates realization of these interests.

On the other hand, Kenya has security interests which she realizes through her relationship with the U.S. Kenya's security has over the years been threatened by neighbouring states. Somalia has been Kenya's traditional rival, which has confronted her through its support to acts of aggression on the Kenya-Somali border. The center of such confrontation has been Somalia's irredentism and expansionism, whose aspiration has been the unification of all ethnic Somalis into a greater Somali Republic. This was exacerbated by Somalia's possession of Soviet sophisticated arms. In retaliation, Kenya collaborated with the U.S which supplied her with arms and financial assistance to ward off the Somali security threat. Kenya's other security threat was Uganda. Under Idi Amin in the 1970s, Uganda threatened to attack Kenya militarily with an intention to annex part of the Kenyan territory into Uganda. There have been likewise several border clashes between the two countries during Yoweri Museveni's regime, but the two states have never entered into full-scale war. Sudan in

collaboration with Libya constitute another security threat to Kenya. The 1989 bombing of the Kenyan town of Lokichoggio is a case in point which illustrates the extent to which Kenya's vulnerability to external aggression is imminent. The U.S supplied Kenya with military hardware and assistance for the purpose of strengthening its armed forces.

It is evident, therefore, from the above analysis that Kenya-U.S cooperation is hinged on the interplay of their strategic-security interests. Their interactions are geared to cultivate even greater cooperation. It is important to emphasize the truism that there is no assured regional or global security even after the end of the cold war. In this regard, therefore, Kenya would and continues to feature prominently in U.S strategic network, particularly in the Horn and towards the Middle East. Likewise, the U.S remains as Kenya's greatest donor and supplier of military hardware and security assistance. These aspects of cooperation will continue to command a great influence in their interactions in future.

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Introduction

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CHAPTER FOUR

HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY AS INSTRUMENTS OF INTERACTION BETWEEN KENYA AND THE U.S

4.1 Introduction.

Kenya-U.S. relations have often been significantly influenced by the factors of democracy and human rights. The two countries have often had divergent views on the conception and application of the two concepts and hence have often stood apart on these issues. However, both states claim to be pursuing democracy, a system of government which would only be fully understood when one defines human rights. These aspects received considerable attention, particularly towards the end of the 1980s and are likely to take a centre stage in directing foreign policies of the two states in the 1990s. Democracy and human rights have been given limited attention in foreign policy agenda in the past as other policy issues took precedence. However, these issues are not new phenomena in the foreign policies of the two states.

Currently, human rights and democracy are worldwide phenomena which should not be seen as uniquely a Western artifact that can never apply in other cultures. The term democracy indicates both a set of ideals and political system. Democracy is a principle of legitimacy. From this viewpoint nobody denies that power is legitimate only when it is derived from the authority of the people and based upon their consent. The standard definition provided by most authors, describes democracy as a system based on competitive

parties, in which the governing majority respects the rights of minorities. The discussion is focused on the concept of representation, majority rule, opposition, competition, alternative government control and the like - hardly ever on the notion of a self-governing people.¹ Democracy in this case has social, economic and political connotations. The social aspect of democracy revolves around the notion of "equality of estimation" which may thus be defined as an ethos and a way of life characterized by equal treatment and equal respect for every man. Political democracy, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with political and juridical equality. The economic aspect of democracy revolves around the notion of equalization in the distribution of wealth. This label denotes a democracy whose primary policy goal is the redistribution of wealth and the equalization of economic opportunities.² The U.S has in the late 1980s and early 1990s expressed concern on Kenya's adherence or non-adherence to democratic practice. However, Kenya's perception of democracy deviated from the ideal conception in the sense that the government banned all political parties except KANU, banned trade unions, the President interfered with judiciary hence suppressing individual freedoms and overused the detention law. This has more often than not caused friction between her and the U.S.

Contrary to such perceptions, a healthy democratic society is not simply an arena in which individuals pursue their own personal goals. Democracies flourish when they are tended by citizens willing to use their hard-won freedom to participate in the life of their society - adding their voices to the public debate, electing

representatives who are held accountable for their actions, and accepting the need for tolerance and compromise in public life. The citizens in a democracy not only enjoy the right to individual freedom, but they also share the responsibility of joining with others to shape a future that will continue to embrace the fundamental values of freedom and self-government.³ In a democratic society, majority rule must be coupled with guarantees of individual human rights of minorities.⁴ It is important, hence, to note that Kenya's view of democracy overlooks the second vital clause, i.e. claiming to be ruling by majority and denying minorities of their freedoms, particularly freedom of association and expression which makes her view divergent from that of the U.S hence causing conflict between them.

It is important to note that democratic governments are based on principles of human rights. This view is held salient by all democratic regimes and particularly, the U.S. which has always emphasized this aspect in her foreign policy. Thomas Jefferson, former U.S President, founding father of the U.S. and author of American Declaration of Independence echoed U.S commitment to democracy and human rights when he said:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights, that among those are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.⁵

Inalienable rights include freedom of speech and expression, freedom of religion and conscience, freedom of assembly and the right to equal protection before the law. Freedom of speech and expression is the lifeblood of any democracy. To debate and vote,

to assemble and protest, to worship, to ensure justice for all - these rely upon the unrestricted flow of speech and information. Human rights have been and continue to be an integral component of U.S foreign policy, due to the fact that the democracy crusade lingers on in Africa and Kenya in particular, and the aspect of human rights being at its core. U.S human rights policy is to promote wholesale rights that are recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a basic document which the U.N. approved in 1948. In 1977, the U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance defined human rights as perceived by the Carter Administration as "the right to be free from governmental violation of the integrity of a person", which includes torture, unlawful arrest, invasion of home, "the right to the fulfilment of such vital needs as food, shelter, healthcare and education", "the right to enjoy civil and political liberties", as freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech and the press.⁶ In July 20th, 1977, President Carter declared the U.S. policy on human rights:

Because we are free we can never be indifferent on the fate of freedom elsewhere. Our moral sense dicates a clearcut preference for those societies which share with us an abiding respect for individual human rights.⁷

This policy statement underscores the vital role played by human rights in influencing American foreign policy vis-a-vis Kenya during Carter's reign. American diplomacy became increasingly concerned with the issue of human rights since the Helsinki Conference of 1975. The provisions of the third section of the Final Act signed in Helsinki served as a catalyst to an intensive American reaction to cases of rights violation. The new policy contrasted with the 1974 one, when human rights were considered

"the stepchild of U.S foreign policy".⁸

Free speech is, what defines democracy. It is a basic human right. One democrat remarked that "democracy is communication; people talking to one another about their common problems and forging a common destiny. Before people can govern themselves, they must be free to express themselves."⁹ These are the basic principles of democracy and human rights which are currently one of the major determinants of U.S. policy towards Kenya, and the world in general. Violation of such principles in Kenya invited American response in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This created tension in the relations between the two states.

American policy on democracy and human rights has often been silent when other policy concerns took precedence, particularly geopolitical and economic. In such cases, the U.S. considered democracy as normative and futuristic in the sense that democracy becomes a long-range projection unrelated to current deeds. This is evident in cases where the U.S. has resorted to war or assassinations as in Iran, Panama, Libya, among other countries, to restore democracy or order in these countries. The use of undemocratic means to achieve democratic ends finds its justification precisely in this attitude. During President Jomo Kenyatta's reign, Kenya had limited confrontation on human rights violations as U.S policy makers were preoccupied with the cold war. Security considerations were rated higher than democracy and human rights. It was during President Jimmy Carter's reign that Kenya began attracting U.S. concern on these issues. However, Carter was drawn into searching for strategic facilities in the late 1970s, as

discussed in chapter three, hence underplaying the human rights factor. President Ronald Reagan continued with Carter's strategic facilities crusade. More specifically, Reagan was more preoccupied, in his two terms in White house, with stamping out terrorism in the world over. There was a continuity of the U.S flow of aid to countries that offered strategic facilities to facilitate the realization of this goal. The cold war likewise was one of his major preoccupations. This explains why there was no conflict between U.S and Kenya on issues of democracy and human rights. The foreign policies of the two states were silent in this respect.

The Bush administration continued with the military-security strategy, in part, though as the cold war subsided, democracy and human rights became an important ingredient in directing U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis third world. It is, therefore, important to note that U.S. foreign policy with regard to democracy and human rights has been inconsistent due to the fact that intrusion of other factors mainly geopolitical, and economic subordinated this aspect of foreign policy. This inconsistency should be kept in mind for one to understand U.S. policy in this respect, and its subsequent relations with Kenya. However, democracy and human rights have economic and political implications to both states.

4.2 Human Rights and Democracy in Kenya: A Divergence of Interests.

Taking a glance on the Kenyan constitution, one would conclude that Kenya nurtures a humanistic and democratic political system that respects human rights. If juxtaposed to the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights, the Kenyan constitution would reveal a real interest and commitment, by the Kenya government, to protect human rights and respect to the rule of law. The 13 sections of the constitution known as the Bill of Rights were drafted in 1962. The bill of Rights provides strong and detailed protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual. Both substantive and procedural rights are affirmed, as are traditional political and civil liberties. Inhumane treatment of prisoners and arbitrary search and entry into premises are forbidden. Persons who are charged of a criminal offence are guaranteed a fair and speedy trial. Freedom of conscience, including freedom of thought and freedom of religion are affirmed. Freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, including the right to form labour unions or other special interest associations, are also guaranteed. Political freedom was hindered, however, by a constitutional change in 1966 providing a preventive detention law. The law, passed the same year, allowed the government, specifically, the Minister for Home Affairs to detain persons or restrict their movement if he "is satisfied that it is necessary for the preservation of public security". Public security was undefined, and no limitations were placed on the Minister's power to make such a decision. The substance of the charges against the persons need not be revealed, all communications with them can be restricted. There is no recourse to courts; and there is no limit to the length of detention. Thus the amendment and the use of the subsequent legislation have served as the major infringement of the Bill of Rights.¹⁰ The Bill of Rights has been violated from time to time

by the Kenya government. Detention without trial, torture of suspects, crushing of dissenting opinions, the immeasurable censorship of the press, among other violations, form a myriad of Kenya's human rights violations.

Much attention to human rights violations, in Kenya, by the U.S. came to the centre stage of their relations in late 1980s when changes in Eastern Europe sounded this global dynamism in foreign policy. The U.S has often taken democracy and human rights observance as prerequisites for giving foreign assistance. American assistance, therefore, has an inherent interest of promoting democracy and human rights in Kenya. Former Secretary of state Cyrus Vance underscored this fact when he noted:

A primary object of American aid, both military and economic, is first of all to enhance the condition of freedom in the world. The U.S should not provide aid to any government - anywhere in the world - which uses secret police, detention without charges, and torture to enforce its powers.... The U.S. should be open and unashamed in its exercise of diplomatic efforts to encourage observance of human rights in countries which receive American aid.¹¹

It is evident from Vance's policy statement that the main objective of U.S aid is to promote democracy and that American aid would be given to democratic regimes. However, U.S policy makers have often found themselves at cross-roads when such a policy conflicts with other national interests. The situation changed after the cold war. Being free from the bipolar, ideological competition and political tradeoffs which have for so long characterized world politics, the U.S is vigorously crusading for democracy and human rights. The reason behind this crusade is the American desire to shape a world order that is more responsive to human operations.¹²

Changes in the international system in the 1980s prompted U.S. assertiveness in advocating for and pursuing the course of democracy and human rights. The unexpected collapse of the Soviet empire and the afore-mentioned emergence of an independent and soon to be consolidated Europe ushered in a new period of global restructuring unlike any that has occurred in a time of peace. The new world order that is emerging is predicated on the twin notions of democracy and human rights which, over the next decade, will be at the centre stage of international economic and political development. The begrudgingly but now broadly accepted principles of international human rights have led to demands for greater political expression, if not democracy in authoritarian countries.¹³ It is in U.S. national interest to advocate democracy and human rights as these doctrines have economic, political and cultural implications. Politically, the factors would act as a global unifying force and would likewise cultivate a common culture which would eliminate the few remnant stalks of communism from the world political arena and therefore, alleviate confrontation to the West and consequently bring about global peace.

The crusade for human rights and democracy is not welcome by Africa's dictators who have failed to accept the changing global political terrain. In the past, they would align, or threaten to align, with the Soviet Union or U.S in exchange for the support that allowed them stay in power. Now, just as changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are pushing African countries into uncertain political terrain, the end of the cold war has begun to alter foreign policy in Third World. Generally, it is now easier

for U.S policies to match its democratic principles and rhetoric. In Africa, how the end of the cold war has affected American policy has been most visible in Kenya, where the American Ambassador, in 1990-1991, has been astonishingly outspoken in support of democracy. That candor has created resentment among powerful Kenyan political leaders and caused unease in the state Department, where the Ambassador's style conflicts with traditional diplomacy.¹⁴ Democracy and human rights are currently seen as requisite for free human operations which are perceived to yield economic benefits to both Kenya and the U.S. The assertiveness of the U.S. on these factors has caused conflict between Kenya and the U.S.

It is important to emphasize the economic significance of U.S. policy of supporting democracy and human rights. In August 29th, 1991, U.S. Assistant Secretary of state for African Affairs, echoed the economic implications of the "democratic revolution" when addressing a conference on U.S., Japanese, and African cooperation at Gotemba, Japan. He noted:

Pluralistic democracy is the friend of structural adjustment and economic growth, rather than their enemy. The single-party system is inherently unfair and inimical to economic growth. Pluralistic democracy channels resources to the most productive populations and gives maximum scope to the private sector. The one party state is arbitrary and incompatible with the rule of law, thereby discouraging private investment.¹⁵

He further noted that the U.S. and other donor countries had a role to play during this period when Africa is moving towards democracy. In 1986, at the UN Session for African Development, the assembled African chiefs of state assigned responsibility to themselves for the unproductive economic policy choices of the 1960s. At the same time, the international donor community felt some guilt for the unproductive lending in the 1970s which served only to prolong the lives of terminally ill economic systems. Herdan Cohen noted that it was in the interest of the international donor community that, at the end of the current transition period, Africa emerges healthy rather than chronically ill. He further noted that a self-sustaining, productive, and trading Africa can only contribute to the international community's collective well-being.¹⁶ The arguments advanced by Cohen demonstrate that it is in the national economic interest of the U.S to support the "democratic revolution" in Kenya and other African countries. Cohen summed up his address by reiterating that the U.S insisted on the importance of a vigorous private sector and the creation of a favourable climate for investment. The crusade is believed to be capable of eliminating the cancer of democracy which is corruption and consequently its setbacks on economic development. It is vital to note that U.S interests championed through the democracy - human rights crusade are three-fold. First, an enabling climate for investment which is believed to ensue in a democratic environment; second, economic self-sufficiency for Kenya which implies less U.S aid; and finally the fact that a democratic regime cultivates good governance, eliminates corruption and protects human rights.

The U.S policy makers believe that the past three decades of political and economic dictatorship in post colonial Kenya have achieved little gain for Kenyans and even lesser for Americans. This is also true for much of the African continent. However, the thirty years have given way to pluralistic democracies. The command, marxist-oriented economic controls are being replaced by free market systems which allow the private sector to flourish. The driving force behind this change has been African people themselves due to the fact that the system has aggravated poverty in most African states. Post independence Kenyan political and economic system, therefore, has been shown to be inadequate for the challenges of modernization. In clarification of this policy stance, Herman Cohen, addressing in the Voice of America symposium, in Washington, DC. in September, 1991 said:

...Africans want accountability and transparency in their governments. Africans want meaningful participation in the decision-making process. Africans want economic opportunity; in short, Africans want liberty - freedom from both economic and political authoritarianism.¹⁷

This policy statement demonstrates U.S. interests in the democracy and human rights crusade. The most vital objective is the economic implications of these principles. This is why the promotion and consolidation of democratic values is considered as "the preeminent challenges to U.S foreign policy."¹⁸ For this reason, the U.S has adopted a policy of assisting countries that nurture democratic systems. In this era of escalating demand for scarce resources, the U.S as noted by Congress cannot waste non-humanitarian assistance on governments which refuse the path of democracy. This

policy stance generated a lot of friction in the relationship between Kenya and the U.S in late 1980s and early 1990s. To certain degree, Kenyan authorities felt that the U.S insistence on human rights issues was an interference with Kenya's sovereignty. These divergent view points have often led to misunderstandings between Kenya and the U.S. For the U.S., democratization and economic empowerment are sides of the same coin. A stable, democratic climate is increasingly a precondition for necessary foreign and domestic investment for economic recovery and growth. The Kenyan authorities on the other hand have little or no vision of correlation between human rights and economic growth.

To implement this democratization policy, the U.S supports institutions and policies that can realize democracy in Kenya. Support for the opposition in the side of the U.S is in line with U.S foreign policy, while to the Kenya government it is wholesale interference in its internal affairs. In clarifying this policy, Herman Cohen stated the U.S position as:

The United States will also help support non-governmental democratic institutions. The development of a "Civil Society" is another ingredient in the democratic mix. Just as a "loyal opposition" is important in politics, decentralization is crucial in the non-governmental sector. We intend to assist African countries (including Kenya) to cultivate this "Civil Society" with multiple centres of power and influence. Democratic labour Unions, literary and cultural groups, bar associations, and traditional human rights "Watchdog" groups all have a role to play in Civil Society.¹⁹

This is one of the policy positions that has drawn a wedge between Kenya and the U.S.

The divergence of interests between Kenya and the U.S on democratization is a new ingredient in their relations. There was

no conflict of such interests in the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s when events in Kenya and the world over dictated this kind of relationship. Domestically, Kenya's human rights violations are an old tale. In 1982, Moi banned all political parties except KANU, subsequently making Kenya a de jure single-party state. This subsequently generated ill feelings in the country's learned population. Consequently, there emerged underground movements which called for democracy and more particularly, pluralistic democracy. The U.S. did not come to the centre stage of these developments because of its preoccupation with the cold war. In the 1980s, Moi also axed workers rights by infringing on their right of association. Though most workers in Kenya are free to form or join unions, there are hinderances, and in particular, the exceptions are the civil servants whose union was deregistered to facilitate for Moi's autocratic leadership.²⁰ This marked a major infringement on the Kenyan people's rights. The U.S was preoccupied with the search for strategic facilities, which Kenya offered in 1980. The rights violations by the Moi regime were relegated to the bottom of the U.S policy menu.

Beginning in March, 1986, opposition to the Moi regime continued gaining strength in an accelerated pace as government and anti-government forces met each other's challenge with bolder and bolder moves. But by far the most noted opposition to the Moi government came from an underground movement called Mwakenya. Mwakenya first came to the Kenyan public's attention in March, 1986 when the Kenya government announced arrests of several university lecturers and "dissidents". Before that time few people had ever

heard of the movement or its allegedly seditious publication Mpatanishi (Swahili for "the arbiter"). Ironically the government gave the "dissidents" their biggest boost by publicizing the movement. The scope of the movement caused the government to place large amounts of discretionary powers in the hands of the secret police, known as Special Branch, which served only to alienate Kenyans who would rally support for the "dissidents". The Special Branch began a nation-wide crackdown, arresting anyone who might be an instigator or who had been found in possession of Mpatanishi.²¹ However, these human rights violations did not attract much attention of the U.S. It can be asserted, therefore, that during this period the principles had little significance on Kenya-U.S interaction.

Kenya-U.S relations continued to be cooperative though in November, 1986, Moi advanced his dominance over the government and subsequently stripping Kenyans of their human rights. He officially declared that the party (KANU), well under his control, superseded the authority of the parliament. The parliament, always limited in its power, was reduced to an advisory role. Moi subsequently suspended the tenure of the Attorney General and the Controller General, making the posts political appointments under his personal control. The Controller General had originally been independent to give the office holder latitude in investigating cases of financial misconduct, and the Attorney General's independence was to ensure objectivity in the enforcement of law. Consequently, the Moi regime created for itself a lee-way for corruption, and violation of human rights, with the assistance of its secret police. In terms

of corruption, Moi now ranks a close second to Mobutu, as a western diplomat in Nairobi said adding that "and he is not done yet."²² This invited a lot of criticism from the local press and later, in 1990, became of a major concern to the donor community.

Reports of human rights violations and corruption, increased tension between Kenya and its two main Western allies, Britain and the U.S. In January, 1986, the chairman of the U.S. Congress Foreign Relations Africa Subcommittee, representative Howard Wolpe visited Kenya to investigate charges of human rights violation. Despite the Moi Government's promise of cooperation, a meeting between Wolpe and "dissidents" was disrupted by Kenyan authorities. Moi said that the views expressed by Wolpe were those of Kenyan "dissidents" on the "Congressman's payroll" and that the praise Moi had earlier received from U.S Secretary of State George Shultz on his January, 1986, visit to Kenya was a better indication of the true sentiment of the U.S. Wolpe sounded a warning that large amounts of US assistance to Kenya were jeopardized by Kenya's failure to deal with human rights violations. Several days after Wolpe left, Moi infringed further on press freedom by initiating moves to "thin out" the foreign press contingent based in Nairobi, blaming it for inaccurate and misleading reporting.²³ However, in early 1987 an underground movement called UKENYA condemned President Moi of violation of human rights. In a statement, UKENYA asserted that the government had created a huge gap between the rich and poor through massive corruption, eroded national identity and murdered students and political opponents. The chairman of UKENYA declared that; "Time is now...we have reached the peak of

many years of oppression."²⁴ The U.S. all along had been monitoring such violations but nothing or little was done to deter Moi's regime from oppressing Kenyans. Consequently these rights violations did not create a significant impact of Kenya-U.S interaction.

Another component of human rights-democracy crusade is corruption which has taken root in Kenya and has and would continue to erode civil morality in the country. The abuse of the constitution, more paramountly the Bill of Rights, would continue if the ills of corruption are not uprooted. Human rights abuse, therefore, is of major concern for every friend or foe of freedom. John Calhoun's words seem to have been directed at the Kenyan situation when he wrote:

That which corrupts and debases the community politically must also corrupt and debase it morally. The same course in governments of numerical majority gives to party attachments and antipathies such a force as to place party triumph and ascendancy above the safety and prosperity of the community, and will just as certainly give them sufficient force to overpower all regard for truth, justice, sincerity, and moral obligations of any description.²⁵

In 1989, Kenya engaged herself in a selfish venture by involving lobbyists in US Congress so as to improve her human rights records in the face of Congress. This was Kenya's national interest, that is protecting the inflow of U.S. aid. The Moi regime had abused the right of Kenyans to self-governance through massive rigging of the 1988 general elections. The regime has refused to accept that civil and political rights are preconditions for development. Just like most of his colleagues in leadership in Africa, he had to struggle to satisfy U.S. Congress that he adhered to principles of human rights and democracy. However, most African

"patrimonial autocracies" like Kenya, can inspire little or no sympathy anywhere.²⁶ In lobbying for sympathy in Washington, Moi lured the Washington public relations firm Black Manafort, Stone and Kelly to boost Kenya's image in the U.S, according to an agreement signed on 1st April, 1989, by a Permanent Secretary at the Finance Ministry. The decision to engage the firm was probably a panic reaction to the refusal by the Appropriations Sub-committee of the House Foreign Relations Committee to grant aid to Kenya on account of its human rights record.²⁷ The firm hustled to secure the nearly \$60 million in aid, and collected for itself \$500,000 and the obligatory expenses.²⁸ Moi's campaign for continued assistance from the U.S did not stop at the level of engaging lobbyists in Congress. He visited Washington in February, 1990, to help make clear "the true state of affairs" in Kenya, contrary to the "negative picture" painted by some "unpatriotic Kenyans".²⁹ This was in regard to human rights abuse in Kenya. The human rights record in Kenya had evidently gravely deteriorated. Moi claimed that the uneasy relations between Kenya and U.S were then smooth. His talks with Secretary of State James Baker comprised a wide range of issues among which were attempts to stop the decline in U.S aid to Kenya on account of human rights violations. This divergence of interests and strategy of pursuing them explains the conflictive interaction between the two states during this period.

However, the U.S President George Bush has consistently maintained American support to human rights and democracy and declared that America would always be a friend to freedom loving people all over the world. This position conflicts with that of

Moi's regime which waged total war on freedom loving Kenyans. President Bush emphasised on the American position on freedom when he said:-

.... And I intend to speak for freedom, stand for freedom, and be a patient friend to anyone, East or West, who will fight for freedom.³⁰

This statement underscores the fact that U.S support for human rights and democracy in Kenya is a matter of policy and not intended antagonism or interference in Kenya's internal affairs. The policy stance vis-a-vis Kenya's should be conceived as "policy conflict". More important is the American assertion that respect for fundamental rights and more responsive political systems are a vital corollary of economic progress.³¹ The U.S supports democratic forces in Kenya, believing that human rights cannot be secured in Kenya, without political pluralism.

U.S human rights and democracy policy was most vigorously championed by the American Ambassador to Kenya, Mr. Smith Hempstone, who in 1990 reported that there was a strong tide flowing through the U.S Congress to concentrate America's economic assistance on nations that nourished democratic institutions, defending human rights and practised multiparty politics, noting that this was a statement of fact about political life in America.³² This remark was not in the good taste of the Moi regime. In countering this policy position, the Moi regime alleged that Hempstone was supporting "dissidents" to overthrow the Kenya government. A few days later, an opposition figure, Mr. Charles Rubia was quizzed by security officers regarding the formation of an illegal political party, among other accusations. In a

statement, Mr. Rubia said, he was questioned by Government security officers on his alleged receipt of funds from the U.S government and private individuals and countries through the American Ambassador, Mr. Hempstone.³³ This created sour relations between Kenya and the U.S. Moi claimed that the U.S assertiveness on multiparty democracy would lead to grave consequences to the Kenyan people. He asserted that a multiparty system would only exacerbate conflicts among Kenya's 40 ethnic groups. He dismissed those calling for pluralism as "dictators and puppets of foreign masters" and threatened to hunt down his opponents "like rats". This was a further affirmation that his regime had little respect for human rights. The divergence of beliefs on human rights and democracy caused conflict between Kenya and the U.S.

Temperatures soared high in July, 7 1990, popularly known as "Saba Saba" when opposition figures called for a meeting in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, to express their views about the need for democratic pluralism, as a system of governance that safeguards fundamental human rights. Prior to the meeting, the Moi regime began rounding up the leaders of the multiparty movement. The first to be arrested were Kenneth Matiba and Charles Rubia. Before his arrest, Rubia had been a guest at an American Independence Day celebrations at the residence of Ambassador Hempstone. This was noteworthy, because in authoritarian countries that are America's allies, American diplomats tend to shun dissidents. The arrests sparked off riots which lasted just four days, in part because of a tough response by the Kenyan police. At least twenty people were killed. In the aftermath of the riots, the International Bar

Association (IBA) saying that it was concerned about the safety of its delegates and the detention of several lawyers who were advocates of a multiparty system, cancelled their annual convention it had scheduled to hold in Nairobi, in September, 1990. They also referred to the state of human rights in Kenya. They said that:

Many of our members hold the view that by proceeding with our conference the IBAS would be lending support to a regime that has suppressed those attempting peacefully to express their political views and exercise their internationally recognised human rights.³⁴

This was a sign of increasing international pressure on Kenya's repressive government. The convention was held in New York.

In response to the July, 1990 arrests, the US State Department issued a statement declaring that it was "distressed", and added:

we believe very strongly in the principle of public expression of dissent and the right to peaceful assembly, and that these rights, both principal tenets of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, should be integral parts of all political systems.³⁵

However, the Kenya government protested the U.S Embassy's statement and activities and asserted that the U.S involvement in the democratization process was an interference in its internal affairs. The government claimed that its activities were lawful as they were steps taken in defence of law and order, and the security of the state. The government's statement read:

The American embassy has openly given solace and support to elements within the country bent on distabilizing the constitutionally elected government of Kenya.³⁶

Though the reaction of the Moi regime to the U.S intervention in the multiparty crusade may be disingenuous and self-serving, the form of intervention does give rise to troublesome questions about how the U.S. and the Western world at large, can or should, go

about promoting democracy. Kenya expressed her anti-colonial feelings, in regard to its reaction towards the U.S. President Moi was angered by Ambassador Hempstone's involvement in the Kenyan political events and warned that, Kenya was a sovereign state and equal to other states and did not require any guidance from outsiders on how to run its affairs.³⁷ This remark was followed suit by other politicians in the Kenyan arena who warned that Kenya would not tolerate treasonable activities by Americans living in Kenya. This conflict of interests between Kenya and the U.S created a sour relationship between the two states.

Apart from Ambassador Hempstone's mighty assertiveness on the Kenyan soil, the U.S Congress was concurrently debating on human rights situation in Kenya. On 19th July, 1990, the House of Representatives proposed the suspension of all American aid to Kenya on account of human rights violations. This was a request put forward by Senator Edward M. Kennedy. Kennedy's statement read:-

During the past few weeks, government security forces in Kenya arrested, detained, assaulted, and killed peaceful advocates of human rights and democratic reforms. This escalating cycle of violence and repression in Kenya is a deep concern of all friends of democracy. The U.S should not be backing governments that deny the most basic rights to their citizens. If we are true to our heritage, we should stand with the forces of freedom, not those who deny it. Therefore, I am introducing legislation calling on the Administration to suspend military and economic assistance to the government of Kenya. The resumption of this assistance would be conditioned on the restoration of democratic freedoms and the release of all persons arrested and detained for the peaceful expression of their views.³⁸

Kenya is the largest recipient of U.S aid in sub-saharan Africa. It was scheduled, in 1990, to receive \$ 46 million in aid, including \$ 11 million in military assistance. The Administration

had requested \$ 42 million aid for Kenya in 1991, \$ 16 million of which was in military assistance and economic aid.³⁹ All these amounts were frozen due to Kenya's poor human rights record.

In October, 1990, the U.S congress resumed discussion on Kenya's human rights violations. The Speaker of the Senate session, Mrs Kassebaum, noted that Kenya's President Moi had banned the Nairobi Law Monthly - a popular and influential journal which had championed political freedom, basic civil rights, and multi-party democracy. There was an increased repressive political environment in Kenya. In reaction to this, the Senate decided on the U.S. policy in relation to human rights violations in Kenya. A statement issued by Mrs Kassebaum said:-

I believe that the situation in Kenya has reached the point where we must send a clear and firm message to the government in Nairobi that we will not tolerate continued suppression of basic human rights and civil liberties. In order to convey our strong disapproval of the current policies, I support the cessation of all military aid and economic support funds to Kenya until the human rights situation improves.⁴⁰

This statement, therefore, underlines the interests of the U.S. in Kenya. The U.S. continues to rally for freedom world wide and kenya came to its central focus in the 1990s. The relationship was hinged on the twin concepts of democracy and human rights, during this period. Their interaction was evidently conflictive.

Kenya's human rights record continued to deteriorate as the government never gave up using secret police, kidnapping opposition figures, torturing and using false evidence to convict such elements, and intimidating judges and hence interfering with court process and subsequently manipulating outcomes thereof. In November, 1990, the Kenya government was reported to have arrested

a dissident, Koigi Wa Wamwere on the Kenyan soil with firearms and ammunition ready to engage in sabotage and assassinations. However, reports have emerged that Wamwere was not arrested in Kenya but kidnapped in Tanzania. Amnesty International said he was kidnapped in Tanzania in October 16th, 1990, and smuggled across the border in a sealed Land Rover. He was apparently in Dar-es-Salaam arranging for his mother's emigration from Kenya to Tanzania. The Kenyan and Tanzanian security police have in recent years been accused of arresting and swapping political dissidents across the border. Wamwere was apparently exchanged for a Tanzanian fugitive who "disappeared" in Kenya and reappeared behind bars in Tanzania.⁴¹ The arrest of Wamwere drew strong protest from the Norwegian government. The Norwegian Ambassador to Kenya, Mr. Neils Dahl, had initially expressed concern in the manner of the arrest, the torture and delays in bringing Mr. Wamwere to court. The Embassy was subsequently closed down and it has not yet been reopened. In reacting to the Ambassador's views, Kenya Times, Kanu's mouthpiece reported: "Norway could keep its dirty money... we will not trade our sovereignty for 30 silver coins."⁴² The ties between Kenya and the U.S. were not broken, though the U.S. was at the forefront of the human rights crusade. Kenya would not dare jeopardize her vital interests by severing relations with the U.S. A wedge had developed in their relations and therefore required positive response from the two states to harmonize their interests. In this regard, the U.S. Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, visited Kenya in August, 1990, to try patch up America-Kenya relations which had clearly

been frayed by U.S assertiveness on multiparty politics and human rights in Kenya.

The U.S. continued monitoring Kenya's political environment with a view to see an improvement in its human rights record. In 1991, Senator Deconcini visited Nairobi to observe and subsequently report to Congress of human rights conditions. Deconcini cautioned that as political changes were sweeping across the African continent, dictators unwilling to heed the calls of their people for democracy were becoming increasingly desperate, isolated, and thankfully obsolete. Deconcini stated that U.S expressed in no uncertain terms that continued abridgement of basic human rights and freedoms in Kenya was unacceptable. Democracy and government accountability are likely to benefit all Kenyans in the long run.⁴³

In November 14th, 1991, President Moi continued with human rights violations just as he did in July 7th, 1990, when his government engineered a violent and brutal crackdown on the democratic forces in Kenya, which realized 23 civilians killed and over 1000 demonstrators arrested. The government vigorously renewed its policy of repression in November, 1991 when it arrested seven leading opposition leaders including ageing Oginga Odinga. Two days later, the government violently suppressed an opposition rally in Nairobi, dispersing several thousand peaceful demonstrators. Five more well known democratic activists were arrested.⁴⁴ Mrs. Kassebaum, chairing the Congressional deliberations on this issue stated the U.S position, sent to the Kenyan leader, as:-

We are deeply worried about the future of your nation; we believe that the repressive policies of your government

threaten the economic success and political stability of Kenya; and until the human rights situation improves, the U.S will not send any military aid or economic support funds to your government.⁴⁵

Apart from this conflictive interaction, Ambassador Hempstone spelt out U.S position on the events of November 14th and 16th, 1992 which was basically in line with that of Kassebaum. However, he came under intense fire from Kenyan politicians in the parliament urging the Kenya government to declare him "persona non grata". But the U.S state Department came to the envoy's rescue declaring that the ambassador's views were in line with U.S policy towards Kenya. The State Department reiterated that Hempstone was the personal representative of President George Bush and that the American leader had confidence in the diplomat's ability to carry out U.S policy towards Kenya.⁴⁶ A statement issued by the office of the Assistant Secretary of State read:

The U.S Government wishes to make it clear that Ambassador Smith Hempstone is the president's representative in Kenya. The President has full confidence in his ability to carry out U.S policy towards Kenya. The US position in Kenya is to support the basic principles of universal human rights. The US government encourages, in particular, the right of the Kenyan people and peoples around the world, to the basic freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly. The U.S, however, does not encourage any given Kenyan political figure or group.⁴⁷

This position was obviously not in favour of the Moi regime. It is important to note that the Kenyan foreign minister's condemnation of U.S Ambassador as a "racist" with a "slave - owner mentality" was met by local demonstrations and protests in the letters columns of Kenya's print media. Refuge in white imperialism - bashing is not the popular gimmick it once was. Candid self reproach and recourse to realistic policy choices are

increasingly gathering popular momentum in international politics.⁴⁸

The Kenya government's latest political crackdown and the resumption of a war of words with the U.S - was certain to sharply diminish the standing of Moi's regime with foreign donors at the very moment when the government had prepared a new appeal for foreign aid. Kenya was already facing a difficult donors meeting because of western exasperation with the regime's behaviour towards political opponents, as well as its record of burgeoning official corruption, disregard for human rights and poor economic performance. The session was critical because Kenya depends on such help for about 30% of its budget. Therefore, what topped the list of donor concerns was economic mismanagement along with corruption and human rights violations. At Paris Consultative Group meeting at the end of November, 1991, Kenya's political and economic environs had drawn a lot of concern. The greater source of worry for Kenya was that every bilateral and multilateral donor of significance was present in Paris and concurred with the degree of conditionality established. The U.S was though to consider truly competitive multi-party elections a crucial test of intentions. Not least for logistical reasons, these would not be held in less than six months.⁴⁹ This stand was maintained in the Paris club meeting and all aid was suspended. In December, 1991, Moi was suddenly converted to multiparty democracy and promised his commitment to human rights. The reform package, which has still to be worked out in its entirety, was a direct response to the move by donor nations at the Consultative Group meeting in Paris on 25th to

26th November to suspend their decision on aid to Kenya for six months pending economic and social reforms. This is one of the stark examples to date of political conditionality forcing an African government to change course. An alliance of donors led by U.S, Germany and Britain agreed to confront the Moi government over corruption, democracy and human rights at the Consultative Group Meeting.⁵⁰ This event demonstrates a conflict of interests between Kenya and the U.S in regard to democracy and human rights. This is a case of interest divergence as opposed to interest interplay demonstrated in economic and geopolitical interactions. Kenya held multi-party elections on 29th. December, 1992 and is currently muddling through with other political and economic reforms, hoping for a resumption of aid flow.

4.3 Conclusion

From the above analysis, it is evident that the U.S has specific interests in fronting for democracy and human rights in Kenya. These are economic and political in nature. It has been argued that democratic pluralism guarantees human rights and facilitates for free human operations. This would cultivate an enabling climate for U.S investment in Kenya. Such U.S investments would probably generate more profits which would contribute substantially to the US economy. Democracy is believed to cultivate transparency and accountability as opposed to corruption which is burgeoned by one party political systems. This would probably create a favourable climate for economic liberalization and structural adjustment programs, which are believed to be the right options towards world economic recovery. This implies that

Kenya's better economic performance would lead to a reduction of U.S economic and military assistance. This policy would benefit both Kenya and the U.S. Democracy and human rights are aimed at ridding the world of the remnant stalks of communism and subsequently cultivating a relatively homogenous political culture and a new world order.

It is worth concluding that the late 1980s and the early 1990s has been the era of democracy and human right. The American assertiveness on these issues and their development in Kenya led to a conflictual relationship between the two states. The Kenyan ruling elite, which is responsible for making domestic and foreign policies, though dominated by Moi, found a bad taste in the U.S view of democracy and human rights in Kenya. Being a dictatorial clique, democracy outrightly threatened to dislodge their selfish interests. Therefore, they had to cling to power, using all means at their disposal including the use of secret police. This exacerbated the divergence of interests between the two states.

The U.S continues to assert that its foreign policy towards Kenya would be strongly hinged on the twin concepts of democracy and human rights. Political conditionality forced Moi to change his course from one-party state to multi-party democracy. However, the human rights conditions in Kenya have not yet improved because the press is still operating under severe censorship by the government, political prisoners are not yet released or tried in court, detention laws and secret police continue to exist, though multi-party elections have been held. Therefore, the rift between the two countries has partly been filled. The U.S continues to

maintain the freeze on aid disbursement to Kenya. However, the two countries continue to pursue their national interests with reduced friction. Moi's conversion to multi-party politics gives hope to the normalization of their relations and continued cooperation in the 1990s.

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION .

5.1 Summary.

The purpose of this study was to examine the factors that influence Kenya-U.S conflictive and/or cooperative interactions. The key factors analysed include economic, geopolitics and security and human rights. Within the web of the economic component is trade, investments and bilateral aid. Geopolitical and security considerations were analysed in the light of U.S security interests in the Indian Ocean, Horn of Africa and Middle East and Kenya's security interests in the Horn region. Finally, human rights considerations were focused on in the light of American insistence on Kenya's human rights record and economic and political implications enshrined therein.

These factors are held salient in any realistic analysis of foreign relations. They have often had varying impact on the relationship between the two states. Cooperation has always ensued when the interests of the two states are reciprocal. On the other hand conflict characterizes the relationship between the two states when their interests are divergent or when styles of pursuing such interests conflict.

To provide a comprehensive explanation of what has been realised in this study, a summary of the findings is offered in line with the hypotheses that guided the study. Consequently, we embark on a meaningful forecast of the future relations between the two states. This would be found in the policy recommendations provided. This list of recommendations is however not exhaustive

but would be a guideline on what can be undertaken to realize a mutually beneficial relationship between Kenya and the U.S.

5.2: Hypotheses and Findings

Our basic assumptions in this study have generally been affirmed. To commence with, trade, investments and foreign assistance affect the relationship between Kenya and the US. These comprise what is analyzed in chapter two as economic factors. The economic intercourse between the two countries cultivates a cooperative relationship. Such intercourse are not affected by ideological or political conflicts that have occasioned the relations. Economic needs of nation states, being the basis of their foreign policies, are some of the objectives that can only be realized through interactions with other states. Therefore, both Kenya and the U.S gain from their economic relations. It is, however, important to conclude that the gain derived from the interactions is asymmetrical. The asymmetry is a result of the unequal capabilities possessed by the two states. The U.S is an economic giant while Kenya is just a "rodent". Therefore, Kenya's gain from the relationship is very vital for her economic survival. While the U.S could have diversified sources of imports, Kenya has limited alternatives on markets and sources of foreign aid. This is the reason why the U.S has greater influence on Kenya's economic behaviour.

Import and export trade between the two countries constitute the mainstay of their economic relations. Kenya's imports from the U.S are composed of manufactured goods and foodstuffs while U.S imports from Kenya are mainly raw agricultural products of which

coffee and tea are the most common. Kenya's earnings, from her exports to the U.S is used to meet part of the cost of imports which are more costly than her exports. This has been and would continue to be one of the major areas of cooperation between the two countries. Such relations are aimed at realizing a wider national goal of acceleration of economic progress in the part of Kenya. The interplay of trade interests has always fostered cooperation between them even within politically strained relations.

Investments have likewise been one of the major pillars of economic interactions. There are over 200 American companies operating in Kenya. American multinational firms contribute to the growth of the economies of both states. They provide employment opportunities for both Kenyans and Americans; they develop infrastructure in their areas of operation; and generate capital and revenue through taxation in Kenya and repatriate massive profits to the U.S. As Kenya saw the importance of foreign investments to the country's national economic goals, she enacted the Foreign Investment Protection Act, to safeguard the interests of the investors and those of her own. This consequently brought about the monopoly of particular manufacturing sectors of the Kenyan economy by U.S multinational firms. U.S firms have invested in a wide range of industrial and manufacturing businesses which include sugar refining, pineapple canning, paper manufacture, tyres, oil exploration, textile manufacture, including a wide range of service industry and small scale mining. Therefore, the assumption that cooperation between the two states is hinged on

economic factors, is affirmed.

U.S aid to Kenya constitutes another influential instrument in the relations between the two states. The nature of Kenya's economic terrain calls for financial support from International Financial Institutions (IFIS) and the U.S, among other bilateral and multilateral donors, which has helped buoy her economic progress. The U.S. has likewise, specific interests to pursue through the aid relationship. Aid is often used as a bait to lure Kenya to adopt a favourable policy posture in regard to strategic facilities or voting behaviour in the U.N. General Assembly. Aid, therefore, has played the role of a commodity in exchange for strategic facilities. This aspect of exchange came to the centre-stage of U.S policy in late 1970s, early 1980s and 1990s when U.S interests in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean region were threatened. Apart from this, part of the aid, as argued in this study, was for the support of development activities in Kenya, hence its reference "development assistance".

There has been an inconsistent flow of aid from the U.S, throughout Kenya's political lifespan. Aid increases whenever Kenya adopts a policy that facilitates the realization of U.S interests. Such a trend was prevalent mainly during the cold war era, in which the interests championed by the U.S were mainly geopolitical in nature. For instance, the freezing of aid to Kenya was applied by Western donor countries as a measure to force Kenya adopt political pluralism and structural reforms in the 1990s. This strategy hit success as the intended policy impact was realized.

U.S aid is given with an aim of strengthening possibilities for economic stability and in turn political stability and at the same time help alleviate poverty and provide market and investment opportunities for U.S. businesses. In this sense U.S assistance benefits both countries. Development assistance has always been a vital component in U.S diplomacy vis-a-vis Kenya. Such assistance has helped to finance Kenya's budgetary deficits and has to a more or less extent contributed to economic progress. It is, therefore important to conclude that U.S aid to Kenya is one of the major ingredients of Kenya-U.S. cooperation. However, this is one of the instruments, if manipulated, leads to the dichotomous relationship of conflict and cooperation between the two states.

It is evident from the analysis above that cooperation between Kenya and the U.S has always ensued when their interests converge. For instance, in 1980 Kenya was facing severe foreign exchange bottlenecks which necessitated her granting of naval and air facilities to the U.S in exchange for aid. Aid conditionalities that usually accompany U.S military and economic assistance express her interests in Kenya and Kenya's compliance likewise connotes the nature of her interests that calls for such assistance.

The second hypothesis suggested that geopolitical and security considerations play a significant role in Kenya-U.S relations. Geopolitical concerns were the major motivators of U.S. policymakers during the cold war. U.S. security map encompasses the Middle East-Persian Gulf region, the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea areas. In this regard, Kenya's air field and port in Mombasa, Nairobi and Nanyuki acted as link-up points for the Raf

Deployment Force from late 1970s to the present. U.S. interests in the region were: the security of the oil shipping lanes from the Persian Gulf; the deterrence of hostile states and the Soviet Union from threatening such interests; continued security and supply of arms to Israel, a crucial ally; maintaining linkage with the U.S. facilities in Diego Garcia; and safeguarding U.S. credibility as a major power, in the Middle East and Indian Ocean areas.

Kenya's granting of the facilities to the U.S. in the 1980s therefore, was a hallmark of Kenya-U.S cooperation. This proved to be an important component of their relations in 1991 Gulf war, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, the U.S. expressed its satisfaction on the vitality of the Kenyan facilities during that period.

However, Kenya has security interests which are realized through her interaction with the U.S. Since independence, Kenya's security has been threatened by the neighbouring states. Somalia constituted the major threat to Kenya's security in the 1960s and mid 1970's, Uganda in the 1970s, and Sudan-Libya-Uganda triangular alliance in the 1980s and early 1990s. Throughout this period, the U.S. supplied Kenya with arms and finances to deter such threats. Likewise, the U.S. rapprochement with Somalia in the 1980s greatly helped calm the wary relationship between Somalia and Kenya. However, Somalia is currently economically, politically and militarily disintegrating after a one-year reign of civil war coupled with drought and famine. The U.S. is currently supplying the country with relief food, and the Kenyan territory is the avenue of this operation. As discussed in chapter four, Sudan-Libya-Uganda triangular confrontation forms a real threat to

Kenya's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The alliance's bombing of Lokichoggio, a border town in North-Western Kenya expressed Kenya's vulnerability to military attack from her neighbours. In response, the U.S and France supplied Kenya with military equipment and financial support to ward off any further attacks. Due to the fact that foreign policies are motivated by national interests, it is pertinent to conclude that state survival is one of the universal tenets of statehood. In view of this, both Kenya and the U.S. have security interests which are basically geared towards the maintenance of their statehood. This is one area in which national interest-interplay between Kenya and the U.S. is evident.

The third hypothesis suggested that democracy and human rights are the factors that have prominently featured in the Kenya-U.S relations in late 1980's and early 1990s. It was argued that at the event of the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the fall of the Berlin wall in late 1989, human rights and democracy came to the centre stage of American foreign policy vis-avis Kenya, and third world in general. This does not mean that such factors did not constitute part of American foreign policy agenda before then, but that these factors were relegated to the bottom of foreign policy priorities menu. Kenya's human rights record was not good in the 1970s but due to U.S. preoccupation with the cold war, it received limited attention. As the cold war was over, the U.S therefore, reasserted its concern about observance of human rights in Kenya. Such assertiveness created a sour relationship between the two states in the 1990/91 period.

It has often been observed that democracy and human rights are ideological or normative issues of foreign policy which could not be the subject matter of political realism. Our study conflicts with the assertions by pointing out that a state's interests can be pursued using numerous avenues including intangible and ideological ones to realize tangible gain. In this regard, the U.S. has perceived tangible interests in fronting for democracy and human rights in Kenya. As argued in chapter four democratic pluralism guarantees observance of human rights and facilitates free or unhindered human operations. These are economic, political and social-cultural operations which would cultivate an enabling environment for U.S. investments. Democracy is likewise believed to cultivate transparency and accountability as opposed to the cancer of corruption which is burgeoned by one-party political systems, with state command economies. The result of adopting democratic pluralism would be economic liberalization and structural adjustment programmes, which are believed to be the right steps to be taken to realize global economic recovery and progress. Democracy and human rights crusade is, therefore, aimed at achieving economic and political benefits to both Kenya and the U.S. Kenya-U.S. cooperation in this respect, demonstrates an interplay of national interests between the two states.

There is increasing focus on democracy and human rights by U.S. policy makers. U.S. aid to Third World countries, and Kenya in particular, strongly emphasize these variables. As recently stated by the Administrator to U.S. Congress, U.S. aid would continue to be a vital instrument for forging a new pattern of global partnership

within which America's political, economic and humanitarian interests can flourish. In general the U.S Administration will focus its overall efforts and resources on five major challenges:

1. promoting and consolidating democratic values;
2. promoting market principles;
3. promoting peace to achieve stability essential for economic growth and political freedom;
4. protecting against transnational threats; and
5. meeting urgent human needs.²

This abrupt shift of policy from cold war to democracy and human rights and economic growth is a case of inconsistency of U.S policy vis-a-vis Kenya. This post cold war component has pushed third world countries into uncertain political terrain.

This inconsistency is one of the most frequently heard criticisms of U.S. foreign policy. Consistency is the first casualty when strategic and other geopolitical concerns intrude. Hence, one can conclude that there have been conflict between the U.S and Kenya which seem to mock U.S values, particularly democracy and human rights. If Kenya can be perceived not as part of the East-West chessboard, it would appear that the U.S would permit itself the luxury of choices not driven by cold war imperatives. In this regard, the U.S has chosen democracy and human rights as its basic drive in her foreign policy vis-a-vis Kenya. Initially, in 1990, U.S assertiveness, in this respect, was received with great hostility by the kenyan authorities. The hostility has subsided more as Kenya adopted political pluralism in December, 1991 which she is currently nurturing. There is perceived closer

cooperation between the two states in the 1990s.

5.3: RECOMMENDATIONS.

(1) As the cold war is now over, the U.S should work closely with Kenya and other allies to end regional and civil wars which were sparked off by the East-West rivalry. Somalia has been dismantled by a civil war which culminated in the overthrow of President Siad Barre in 1991. Famine and war had claimed 100,000 lives by the end of September, 1992. The U.S is engaged in availing food and relief supplies to Somalia. Two million people are critically at risk, and aid officials say that up to 500,000 people could die by the end of december, 1992. Some members of the U.S. Congress have called for a more active U.S military role in Somalia to end the civil war and starvation. Kenya granted the U.S transport planes authority to land in Moi Airport, Mombasa and the use of the port as a gateway for relief supplies to Somalia. The two countries therefore, need to enter into even closer cooperation to work towards ending the civil wars in Somalia and Sudan. It is vital for the two states to appreciate the importance of ending civil war in the Horn of Africa through a strategy of policy cordination.

(2) Kenya likewise needs peace because a peaceful Kenya would also be an economically healthier one, capable of developing and exploiting its natural resources, and getting off the international dole and back into the global marketplace. The traditional U.S. zeal to help the needy, respect self-determination, and support political pluralism, will have new scope as ideological considerations seem to be on the wane. There is much to be done to

construct and revivify Kenya in its unfavourable political and economic environment. Clearly, the new age is a time not without danger. Moreover, policy-makers should urgently seek to contain the economic crisis prevailing the world over.

The strategy to revamp Kenya's economic growth should take into account the following:

(i) Trade between Kenya and the U.S exhibits acute imbalances. There is need for the Kenyan decision-makers and private businesses to intensify the search for markets for Kenya goods in the international marketplace. Trade between Kenya and the U.S should be increased to guarantee relatively balanced benefits derived thereof. The U.S should explore the possibility of increasing quantities of imports from Kenya.

(ii) A continued flow of aid from the U.S to Kenya would help sustain Kenya's economy particularly during the current period when the country is faced with economic problems. However, Kenyan decision makers need to discern national interests of the U.S such that Kenya's policies do not jeopardise such interests. A rational policy mix between the two states could yield tangible benefits to them. Aid, however, should be injected into development projects.

The Clinton Administration should not relegate Kenya to the footnotes of U.S foreign policy. Instead, Kenya should be given the top-tier attention it deserves. The administration should undertake a debt forgiveness initiative to help the

country settle its ever increasing debts that cripple its economic progress. Statutes such as the Brooke/Alexander Amendment which forbids the disbursement of American funds to any country which fails to pay any American debt for a period of one year after the due date, should be repealed. Termination of assistance in honour of the "Brooke dates" would be unfair on the part of Kenya taking into account the economic milieu under which Kenya operates.

(iii) There is need for increased U.S investments in Kenya. The Kenyan leadership need to design attractive economic structures and policies that could capture the interests of American businesses. Opportunities exist for U.S. investors or exporters to Kenya but will be limited by Kenya's slower economic growth. Agribusiness investors, particularly those who are export oriented are specially welcome. If the Kenya government can streamline the investment process and reduce administrative delays, an increase in the current book value of U.S. investments could be expected in the next five years. The Kenya government is considering a reduction in the tax rates, which has tended to discourage some foreign firms from opening regional offices in the country. Therefore, there is need for Kenya to create an attractive environment for U.S investors, which would benefit both states.

(3) The current crisis in the Horn of Africa, particularly the military coup in Somalia and consequent civil war and starvation has demonstrated a considerable degree of cooperation between Kenya and the U.S. Kenya's air and naval facilities are still important

to the U.S. in implementing her military and humanitarian undertakings within the Horn region. U.S. image remains very prominent in the map of world politics. Kenya needs to reappraise the areas of cooperation discussed herein and evaluate the benefits she derives from the cooperation. Conflict of interests is normal in foreign relations, but should not be left loose to jeopardize vital interests pursued through such relations. Kenya's policy makers should desist from emotional approaches to conflictual interests between her and the U.S. Kenya - U.S. relations would continue to be a "partnership for mutual progress", so long as their national interests are served through their interaction.

(4) As democracy and human rights have found their way through the international political landscape, into determining relations between Kenya and U.S, Kenyan policy makers need to understand the complexities involved in approaching the new phenomenon. The abruptness of the shift from "the cold war era" to "the democracy and human rights era", obviously had to release shock waves which threatened to tear the web of relations constructed during the former era. The Kenyan position that American assertiveness on the importance of these variables in directing future international interactions as amounting to an interference in its internal affairs, should be appraised to reflect a clear understanding of "democracy and human rights diplomacy". Such hostile responses have been overstretched to portray the U.S as Kenya's enemy state. Policy makers should take note that all aspects of interaction between the two states currently revolve around the twin concepts of democracy and human rights.

Likewise the U.S should take cognizance of the fact that democracy and human rights observance have some cultural implications. In this connection, therefore, a coherent and long-term rational policy to guide the new era should be designed. Having the attributes of dying hard, old dictatorial cultures cannot easily give way to the "new culture". They need a long period of time to be faced out gradually. This must be coupled with the emergence of new political and social structures that would lay ground work for its sustenance. U.S policy makers, therefore, need to have a gradual policy of pushing these concepts through Kenya's political structures without causing serious negative economic, political and social setbacks. It is important to note that U.S legislators have not developed a definite approach to issues of human rights and democracy in world politics. This is evident from its silence on similar violations in Zaire currently. To avoid the generation of excessive friction in her relations with Kenya, the U.S needs to develop such a policy which must take into account Kenya's social, political, economic and historical realities.

(5) Finally, Kenya's security from external attack is vital for the state's survival. As per our findings Kenya's security threats are mainly centered on Uganda-Sudan-Libya triangular bloc and Somalia. The conflicts between Kenya and these states were not imaginary but real and their setbacks generated a lot of concern in Kenya's decision-making circles. Kenya like any other sovereign state should be prepared adequately to protect its territory and sovereignty. However, the best option to dissolve any conflict in the Horn region, involving Kenya and its neighbours, should be

through diplomatic means as opposed to armed struggle. U.S military assistance to Kenya should not be curtailed as it plays a preponderant role in Kenya's defence network. The two states, therefore, should perpetuate their military cooperation.

Notes

- 1 Agency for International Development, Congressional Presentation Fiscal Year (Washington D.C., 1992) p.10
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