

U SOCIO-POLITICAL INFLUENCES
ON BUREAUCRATIC RESOURCE ALLOCATION
AND UTILIZATION FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT:
A Case Study of Tongaren Settlement
Division of Western Kenya. 4

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
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
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26/9/90

This thesis has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor.



WALTER OUMA OYUGI (Ph.D.)
Associate Professor.

Date...26/9/90.....

To
my father Isaiah Ludeki
and mother Esther Milehane for their decisive,
albeit subtle hand of
encouragement

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Work on this thesis began in July of 1986 and continued until December of the following year. Its success is owed, in part, to a measure of contributions and assistance received from various individuals and institutions. Funds for carrying out the research and indeed the entire graduate work were made available by the University of Nairobi through her generous offer of a scholarship. But the crucial exercise of data collection, analysis and presentation would have been much more difficult without the technocratic hand of Professor Walter Oyugi. He guided me through every stage of this work. To him I am greatly indebted.

This thesis is drawn mainly out of raw data obtained from various sources in the field. Among these sources, I would like to cite and thank those Divisional government officials in Kimilili and Tongaren, as well as those at the District level in Bungoma, the Provincial level in Western and the headquarters of Government Ministries in Nairobi. They gave me access to records important for this study and also co-operated so much in responding to my questionnaire and sharing with me their rich reservoir of information. I also wish to thank the farmers in Tongaren and Kimilili Divisions who spared some time out of their busy schedule during harvest in order to attend to me and to divulge some of their knowledge of experience. However, the exercise of collecting this oral information would have been much

more laborious without the much appreciated research assistantship offered by S. Locho, D. Asige, E. Livaga, J. Mugazia and J. Musalia.

The discussions with my friends and colleagues at the University were quite resourceful in augmenting the ideas expressed in this thesis. They include, Njeru, G.; Nakitare, M.; Outa, G.; Okiri, O.; Kihurani, A.; Hussein, A.; Khadaka, L; and Kieni, G. These too variously created a social setting that is favourable for successful academic performance. Of particular importance in this last regard is Emily Otieno to whom no form of expression can sufficiently convey my deep appreciation of her loving company and association which often was a great source of inspiration and hope.

Last but, not least, I wish to thank Mr. E.R. Kariuki, whose skill transformed the original manuscript into typed material, while Jeniffer prepared the Map.

However, responsibility, for any errors, misjudgements or other shortcomings that may be present in this thesis remains mine alone.

Ludeki Chweya

December, 1987.

ABSTRACT

The quest for rapid rural development in Kenya is a priority factor on the agenda of not only the government but of the majority of the affected communities as well. But the attainment of the concrete objectives of rural development has continued to be elusive since independence. Where some positive results have been realized, in the past, the conditions have subsequently turned back and assumed a degenerating trend. It is out of this unfavourable rural development scenario in Kenya in general and Tongaren in particular that grows the need for continued research efforts that aim at reaching a more lasting solution to the problem of development in the rural areas. This study is a response to this need.

The thesis is primarily a case study. It focuses attention on Tongaren Division of Bungoma district in the Western Province of Kenya. Apart from being only a rural area, Tongaren has the uniqueness of being the only settlement division in the whole district. (Bungoma district has a total of six divisions). Settlement Schemes were established here in 1965 for occupation by African settler-farmers soon after the departure of their white predecessors. The major economic activity designed for the area was maize and dairy production. Thus, rural development in Tongaren, especially with regard to employment and income, was set to rely quite substantially on agriculture.

The central thesis of this study is that today Tongaren is experiencing poor rural development conditions. This is true in spite of the relatively large amounts of basic resources, notably land, dairy animals, credit facilities, marketing organizations, agricultural and veterinary extension services, multi-purpose co-operative societies, etc., which were placed at the disposal of the settlers at the time of the establishment of the settlement area. Furthermore, Tongaren does not manifest any measures in rural development higher than the adjoining non-settlement divisions, notably Kimilili, which were not as advantaged as Tongaren as far as the receipt of such initial resources is concerned. Thus, under normal circumstances Tongaren settlement area was expected to realize higher measures of rural development than the rest of the district. This has, however, not turned out to be the case. In fact, the initial objectives of the settlement programme, namely reliable source of employment, higher incomes and higher standards of living have not been realized satisfactorily.

The primary objective of this study, therefore, is to determine the factors responsible for the poor or deteriorating rural development conditions in Tongaren. Specifically, the question we seek to answer is: What went wrong in the initially well designed and well intended rural development programme for Tongaren? The answer to this question is sought within the perspective of the interaction

between the administration and its socio-political environment in decision-making for resource allocation and utilization.

The research findings reveal the variables that inhibit the development of Tongaren as to include: deliberate restriction of resource flow to the area by the local bureaucratic officials; ineffectiveness of the local political leadership and representation in the decision-making organs for resource allocation; inadequacy of maize production as a source of employment and rural incomes; failure of the new settlers to utilize fully the available resources, and; ineffectiveness of the local administrative institutions in charge of the management of rural development.

INTRODUCTION

The Problem of Rural Development In Tongaren.

Tongaren Settlement area constitutes a distinct administrative division in Bungoma District of Kenya's Western Province. The Division covers an area of approximately 378km² with a population of about 47,840 and a density of roughly 131 persons per square kilometre.¹ Due to the relatively large parcels of land owned by the individual settlers, these population figures are the lowest in the District.

Tongaren was a part of the former European Scheduled areas occupied by large scale white (mainly British) settler-farmers. Between 1964 and 1965 the white settlers vacated the area which was then demarcated into smaller plots and reallocated to hitherto landless Africans. The plots were laid out into four categories based on acreage. Category A contained fifteen acre plots; category B, nineteen acres, category C twenty-seven acres; category D, thirty seven acres; and category Z (special plots), one hundred acres. The settlers were required to make certain amounts of down payment prior to occupying the plots. The amount varied according to the category of the plot, and was meant to cover various costs as shown in table one below.

The amount of money for land purchase was allocated to the individual settler in the form of a loan ^{provided} by the Settlement Fund Trustees (SFT). In addition the settlers in categories Z

TABLE 1: Payments for Land Purchase as made by the
Prospective Settlers (in K. Shs.)

Category of Plot	Purchase Price	Working Capital	Conveyance fee	Stamp Duty	Regist-ration fee	Develop-ment
A	2,300	nil	20	60	20	nil
B	2,300	nil	20	60	20	nil
C	6,300	620	20	140	20	3200
D	6,300	620	20	140	20	3200
Z			40	300	40	4000

Source: Central Land Board: Letters of allotment to the settlers. (proforma)

C and D were offered a development loan of K.Sh. 3,200, those in category A and B were offered K.Sh. 2,000 while those in Z K.Sh. 4,000. This amount was expected to enable the farmer to purchase dairy cows, to build a farm house to fence the plot and to establish the first crop. The amount for dairy animals was offered in kind (i.e. in form of the animals themselves which had belonged to the departed white farmers and had hitherto been under the custodianship of the department of Settlement).

A number of mild conditions were attached to these land and financial allocations. According to the letter of allotment.

- (a) The land purchase loan was supposed to be repaid by the settler within a period of ten years by twenty equal and consecutive half-year instalments of K.Sh. 240 and at an interest rate of 6½ per cent. The Grace period was nine months.

- (b) The land Development loan was supposed to be repaid over the same period but at half-year instalments of K.Sh 200.
- (c) The land which was offered as freehold was supposed to be used only for agricultural purpose.
- (d) It was not expected to be subdivided, charged, let leased or transferred without prior knowledge or consent of the Central Land Board (CLB).
- (e) The settler was required to cultivate at least four acres of his plot upon arrival on the scheme.

If the settler failed to meet any one or a combination of these conditions he stood to be evicted from the plot. In view of these conditions the settlers realized that contrary to their expectation, land in the settlement scheme was first, not free, and second, security of tenure was not guaranteed as the land appeared to remain in the last resort, a property of the government. This disappointment on the part of the settlers was due to negatively affect their performance in developing the area.

In addition to these resources the government exposed the settlers to a short term (annual) agricultural credit system administered by the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC). The objective of this loaning system, then called Guaranteed Minimum Returns (GMR), was to assist the farmers to increase their level of farm productivity. This credit facility was necessary given ^{the} poor economic background of the new settlers as they were recruited from among the landless and unemployed.

The government was also aware of the limitations of the inexperienced settlers for individual action and decision-making in animal and farm husbandry. Accordingly, cooperative societies were established (one for every scheme) to assist the settlers in the cultivation and marketing of their produce. The settlers found these already established and charged with the responsibility of providing farm inputs notably, fertilizers, seeds, herbicides and pesticides.

fertilizers, seeds, herbicides and pesticides. Every cooperative society also owned a tractor which the members of that society or scheme were eligible to hire at subsidized rates. In addition the cooperative society was set to channel or market all the farmers' produce (both milk and crop) partly as a measure to provide a marketing agency closer to the people and partly as a means by which loans advanced to the settlers could be gradually recovered from the farmer's proceeds.

Through the Department of Settlement, the government attempted to maintain a close supervision of the settlers' performance by providing agricultural extension and veterinary services. Rural access roads were constructed, albeit on a rudimentary scale. They were then called 'Settlement Roads'. One health centre was opened at Ndalú. This had been established by the colonial government in 1948 but it was later turned into a District Officer's office, only to be reopened again in 1965. An average of two primary schools per scheme were established by the Roman Catholic (RC) and Anglican Church (AC), but were run by the County Council. One 'Harambee' secondary school was started at Naitiri. In short, all these actions by the government placed Tongaren on the threshold for rural development. The area was in fact better prepared than the adjoining non-settlement scheme areas that form the rest of the District. Tongaren was, therefore, expected to realize a higher measure of rural development than the rest of the District. However tangible evidence does not show this to have happened.

The data presented in Chapter Four shows, for example, that only one half of the targeted level of farm out-put as well as income derived there from has been realized. The current average settler-income is KSh. 2,056 and KSh. 955 from maize and beans production per annum, respectively.³ Such poor performance in agriculture is due to the inefficiency of the bureaucratic departments and agencies involved in promoting agricultural development in the Division as well as to the relatively inferior production methods and techniques that are employed by the settlers. For example, 48.5% of the settler-farmers have shifted from the use of tractors to the use of ox-ploughs while 42% do not use the recommended varieties and quantities of the chemical fertilizers. The use of manures and animal waste has, in fact, become a predominant practice. The affected farmers claim to have adopted these methods because their incomes are too low to enable them afford the recommended techniques and methods of farm husbandry. As already pointed out, the settler's cost of production had been set to be moderated substantially by the cooperative societies. Unfortunately, however, all these institutions did collapse within ten years of their inauguration, except that of Ndalu Scheme. The activities of this particular society are, nonetheless curtailed by the tendency of the majority of the farmers to act outside the society's machinery.

The AFC's credit programme which was expected to assist the settlers out of their financial difficulties, does not run as smoothly as had been expected. Currently, only 28.6% of the needy settlers utilize the credit facility. This category of the settlers, together with those who have stopped utilizing the facility, are heavily overburdened with outstanding loan arrears arising from a high rate of default in repayment, which is in turn due to the low profitability of maize - the area's cash crop. The Kimilili Branch of the AFC which caters for Tongaren as well as the

non-settlement divisions of Kimilili and Webuye is owed a total of Ksh.67 million in outstanding loan. It is noteworthy that 95% of this amount is owned by farmers from Tongaren Division. However, for reasons we shall examine shortly, only 11.6% of the Kimilili farmers are clients of the AFC.

Dairy production in Tongaren has performed much poorer than crop cultivation to the extent to which the level of milk out put has dropped by approximately 75%. Problems in this sub-sector are caused mainly by the deteriorated quality of veterinary services that are available in the Division. In particular, the inability of the veterinary personnel to control the outbreak of East Coast Fever in the area between 1973 and 1976 resulted in the death of an estimated two-thirds of the dairy stock. The settlers attempted to adapt to this poor situation by replacing the grade animals which are more vulnerable to diseases with the indigenous or cross -bred varieties which are considered to be more resistant but are inferior in productivity. In short, dairy like maize cultivation has failed substantially as a reliable source of employment and income for the settlers in Tongaren.

Low agricultural output and the related low settler income in Tongaren is also reflected in the widespread default in the repayment of the SFT loans. According to the 1969 Annual Report of the Department of Settlement, three Settlers in Tongaren had been evicted from their plots on account of loan default within the first four years of settlement. When eviction was discontinued two years later the rate of default increased to the level that prompted the government to revise the existing regulations on settlement schemes. Thus, in 1979 the ban against sub-division and sale of the plots by the settlers was lifted. Plot owners may now do so on condition that a part of the proceeds from such sale of land be used to pay off any outstanding loan balances which the concerned settler may be owing

the SFT. At the moment 52% of the settlers in Tongaren have sub-divided and sold off parts of their plots. These developments signify the inability of land to provide a reliable source of employment and incomes to the extent that it has to be itself sold off to raise additional income for the settlers and in particular to enable them meet their loan obligations.

Aside from poor performance in agricultural production in Tongaren, a review of the performance in other general aspects of rural development does also reveal unsatisfactory results. A report of the Settlement Controller for Western Region describes the state of the road system in Tongaren as follows:

Most of the feeder roads become completely impassable during the rains and as such the farmers find it difficult to deliver their farm produce to the markets.

The case here is that no single stretch of the settlement roads has been upgraded since they were constructed twenty years ago at the time of demarcation. A notable development, however, is the construction of ten bridges by the National Youth Service between 1973 and 1975. These were however too few to solve the problem. One of our respondent remarked, for example, that "we have to go round the 'cape of Good Hope' to reach the markets".

The farming activity most adversely affected by the poor road communication system is dairy. The truck which collects the farmers milk for delivery to Kenya creameries cooperative in Kitale, for example, does not turn up regularly during the rainy seasons since the roads are impassable. This causes the farmer much wastage and, in particular, the associated losses in income. Furthermore, the cost of transporting farm inputs to the plot is much higher than the ordinary rates in view of the poor road conditions.

Telephone facilities are an important factor for rapid rural development. In Tongaren, however, this facility is available only in parts of Ndalú, Kiminini and Tongaren Schemes, leaving out the rest of the six schemes. Although the electric power line supplying Kitale town traverses the division, the area remains unelectrified. The power application forms which the settlers were asked to complete twelve years ago in 1974 have not resulted into any developments on the ground.

The 'Little Nzoia Water Supply Project' that caters for Tongaren and the neighbouring settlement schemes in Kakamega District, namely Lugari, Lunakanda, Matunda Soy and Moi's Bridge was completed in 1976. Although water pipes have reached every home in Tongaren, not all of them receive water. 32.8% of the settlers, especially those in the western parts of Naitiri and Kamukuywa schemes have never had water flowing in their taps. This is because the project itself is small. It has a capacity of 360 cubic metres per day yet the consumption rate is much higher i.e. over $700 \text{ m}^3/\text{day}$.⁶ Thus, the project planners had failed to take into account future consumption rates or population increases. Even for those who receive water, the rate of flow is so irregular - an average of four days a week.

The only health centre at Ndalú and the three dispensaries at Tongaren, Kirima and Naitiri are chronically in short supply of essential drugs particularly for Malaria - the commonest disease in the entire western region. The so-called kit-system of supplying drugs to the various health institutions in the rural areas packs an equal amount of assorted drugs to all dispensaries and health centres without taking into account the differing needs for type of drug and quantity. Thus a dispensary in a malarial region such as Tongaren, receives the same quantity of chloroquine as does a dispensary in non-malarial areas such as Nyeri. Anti-malaria drugs in Tongaren's health institutions are

therefore, exhausted within the first two weeks of every month. (Kits are supplied to health centres and dispensaries only once a month). Patients arriving after the exhaustion of drugs and medicines are given prescriptions to purchase the required drugs from private chemists: the nearest being in Kitale or Webuye. However, interviews with the respondents on the subject revealed that about 52 per cent do not actually buy the prescribed drugs especially because the families do not have money to pay transportation fares to Kitale or Webuye, besides having the money for the purchase of the prescribed drugs. Interviews with health officials at Ndalu, Tongaren and Naitiri health centres as well as their clients further revealed that difficulties in the delivery of health services are sometimes so stretched as to require patients to bring along their own pieces of paper on which to have their prescriptions written. At another level many patients go back home without having been attended to as the one or two attendants at the health centers would be away either giving evidence in a law court in an assault case he may have treated or have gone to the district headquarters for official (administrative) functions, etc.

The above discussed state of development affairs in Tongaren is a living testimony to the fact that prospects

for the initially expected high rate of rural development i.e. expanded employment opportunities, higher levels of agricultural productivity, higher incomes, and a general improvement in the living standards of the settler-farmers have become even more difficult to realize. Indeed, a traveller commuting between Webuye and Kitale can hardly discern any change in the development scenario as he crosses over from Kimilili (a non-settlement division) to Tongaren. Thus the two neighbouring areas depict a similar outlook as far as rural development is concerned.

The disparity between the expected pace of rural development in Tongaren (especially in view of the relatively abundant primary resources initially allocated to the settlers) and the present rural development realities of the area is what constitutes the core of our research problem. Indeed, Bashir Omar writes that a research problem emerges when there is a "deviation or conflict between ideology (however defined) and new experiences", hence the need "to try to reconcile the two".⁷

In order to bring out the peculiarities of rural development issues in a settlement area (Tongaren) vis-a-vis the ordinary non-settlement areas, it becomes important to include Kimilili, the adjoining non-settlement division in our study for comparative or control purposes. Kimilili division is a part of the former African reserve, or, what is the same thing, the former non-European Scheduled areas. The

reserve in Kimilili was created when the then colonial administration forced out the Bukusu original inhabitants of the area that is present day Tongaren into Kimilili in the 1920s when the land here was being alienated for European settlement. Arising from this immigration, Kimilili had to accommodate a higher population, which in turn led to overcrowding, land shortage, unemployment and general poverty in the area. The observation made by the 1933 Carter Land Commission is useful in bringing out the socio-economic conditions in the Kimilili area at that time. The commission's report ran in part:

The first point that strikes us is the very large population in these reserves. The position is that rather more than one-third of the total population of the colony is inhabiting rather less than one-thirtieth part of its total area ... The average yield per acre is extremely small, having regard to its quality of the land and the fact that a large part of it will yield at least two crops per annum; and secondly, the amount of produce sold per house-hold is also small, amounting only to some Sh. 12/= 8 in North Kavirondo (i.e. Kimilili inclusive).

Today, the division covers an area of approximately 396 km² with a population of 99460 and a density of roughly 252 persons per km².⁹ The area was not blessed with as much resources as was Tongaren. The farmers in Kimilili, for example, own relatively small parcels of land-an average of 10.1 acres with 66.6% of them falling below this figure, while the average farm holding in Tongaren is 24.5 acres which is more than double the size in Kimilili. Secondly

Kimilili, unlike Tongaren received neither land purchase, nor land development loans offered by the SFT. Thirdly, in the period before the introduction of the AFC's Seasonal Crop Credit Scheme in 1980 which scheme requires a prospective loanee to have a minimum of five acres in order to be eligible for a loan, Kimilili farmers had been technically disqualified from the AFC's GMR credit programme in so far as it required needy farmers to own not less than fifteen acres of land for which the loan was being sought.

Such disadvantages as described above notwithstanding, there are certain aspects of development in which Kimilili has out-paced Tongaren. Electrification process, for example, is now complete - at least for those residents who applied for it. Two stretches of bituminized roads serve the area. They are the Webuye - Kitale, and the Kamukuywa - Kimilili roads. At the moment (1987) the contractor is on site to tarmac the Bungoma - Chwele - Kimilili - Misikhu road. These stretches are supplemented by well maintained and accessible all-weather roads. In the other areas of rural development such as schools, health centres and dispensaries, water supplies, etc, Kimilili is at par with Tongaren. The area has got, for example, a health center at Bokoli besides the two Mission hospitals at Misikhu and Lugulu. It has also a major water project, namely Kimilili-Makuselwa water supply scheme, etc. It is therefore surprising that in terms of rural development Kimilili should be at par with the originally more advantaged division of Tongaren.

Objectives of the Study.

In the chapters that follow, we attempt to explain the factors responsible for the development ailment of Tongaren Settlement Division. In particular, we seek to answer two basic questions:-

(1) Why is Tongaren experiencing a low rate of rural development in spite of the relatively large amounts of basic resources initially placed at the disposal of the area's African settlers?

(2) Why hasn't the area realized a higher level of rural development than the adjoining non-settlement Divisions that never received as much initial resources as did Tongaren?

Answers to these questions are sought within the context of the socio-political factors influencing the behaviour and performance of the administration in its task of resource allocation and utilization. In this regard, we first examine the socio-political characteristic of Tongaren's environment of administration. We, for example, assess the ethnic composition of the settlers, their political activities and behaviour, as well as their cultural orientation. This assessment is done with a view to establishing the nature, mode of articulation and extent of the demands for development resources which the local people place upon the decision makers. More importantly, an attempt is made to find a linkage between these socio-political factors and a lack of rural development. Within the same perspective of the

decisions and actions of the administration in resource allocation and utilization.

The willingness and ability of the settlers to utilize the development resources exposed to them by the administration is crucial in facilitating rural development process. Discussing this point in relation to the utilization of agricultural resources, John Howell notes:

An agricultural manager is responsible for the provision of services to the farmer and for projects designed to improve livelihoods from the land. However, the use of resources - such as land, and water, labour, technology, capital - is determined not by the manager but by the individual producers. Ofcourse the agricultural manager has some resources under his direct control; his staff, a budget, vehicles, etc. Yet as far as the most important resources are concerned the agricultural manager can only attempt to induce change in the behaviour of those who are outside his control.¹⁰

Accordingly, we include in our study objectives the need to determine the relationship between the settlers' willingness and ability to utilize the provided resources, and the lack of faster rural development in Tongaren.

Since decisions and actions of the administration are not always influenced by socio-political factors, efforts are made in this thesis to determine the extent to which the administration may solely be held responsible for the lack of rapid rural development in Tongaren.

Justification of the Study.

The justification of this study addresses itself to the choice of, inter-alia, rural development as the key issue-area for research, as well as the choice of Tongaren Settlement Division as the geographical location of the research. It is however noted that much more than anything else, this study is justified by the existence of the research problem as described earlier.

One quarter of a century has now passed since a majority of the African countries achieved their political independence and quickly identified socio-economic development as a priority objective to be pursued by their respective governments. ^{But} there is enough evidence today that the passage of time has not altered the paramountcy of this objective. Claude Ake has argued that infact the desire for development by most governments is seen as a passion or ideology whose objective is not only the improvement in the socio-economic ^{welfare} of their countries but also the legitimation of their authority.¹¹ In Kenya the desire for development is equally great.

In the words of President Moi:

We in Kenya hold the view that development of a country must mean the development of all its peoples and, consequently, whatever development programme or project is implemented it must have the development of the people as its main objective. That is one of the reason why in our planning process we give high priority to rural development programmes and the provision of such basic services as education, health and water supply.¹²

Although the objective of development has been followed by some practical measures and approaches towards achieving it, these efforts have not been quite rewarding. Infact the desire for development is becoming more and more urgent as the socio-economic conditions in the developing countries continue to assume tendencies towards deterioration. In one of its reports on Africa, the World Bank has made the following observation regarding the problem of rural development:-

No list of economic or financial statistics can convey the human misery spreading in sub-Saharan Africa ... In many African countries people are having to do without any public service. Features of modern society to which many Africans have been exposed are withering.¹³

The situation described here is closely a kin to the Kenyan case in general and to Tongaren in particular.

It is, therefore, on the strenght of the persistence of poor socio-economic conditions among the majority of the people in Africa in general and Kenya in particular that grows the need to carry out research on the development of the rural ^{areas} where the overwhelming majority of the people live and where, as opposed to the urban areas, the values of socio-economic development have been least introduced. Specifically, the study is called for by the need to establish responsibility for the poor rural development conditions in Tongaren. Hopefully, the findings of this research will be replicated to other parts of Kenya and Africa as a whole.

The linkage, between bureaucracy and rural development development in this study is not without reason. The bureaucracy is currently the leading single agent for rural development not only in Kenya but in the other African countries as well. The supremacy of the bureaucracy in this regard lies in the fact that the private sector has not developed and spread out on such a scale as to be able to take an active role in the development of the rural areas. Besides this, the resources, including incomes, that are locally available in the majority of the rural areas are not adequate in making these areas self reliant or self sufficient in so far as the process of rural development is concerned. This reality immediately places the burden of rural development administration on the public bureaucracy. The President of ^{the} World Bank once made the following observation about the situation in Africa:-

The public sector will have to meet the extensive needs for infrastructure, education, health, and other services. The efficient provision of these services will place enormous demands on administrative and managerial capacity - the scarcest resource in all countries.

It is this relatively crucial role of the bureaucracy as an agent for rural development as compared to such other agencies as the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Foreign Governmental Technical Assistance, Private firms and the rural residents themselves, that this study is designed to focus its attention on the ways and means by which the administration may better mobilize, distribute and utilize

the resources that are available to it for the purpose of rapid rural development.

Tongaren Settlement Division has been selected as the focal area for this research. This factor immediately places the study among the other works that have been carried out on the establishment and development of settlement schemes in Kenya. However, Tongaren provides a better opportunity for comparison between the settlement and the non-settlement areas as concerns rural development. This is due to the unique position occupied by Tongaren as the only Settlement Division out of the six divisions that constitute Bungoma District. Thus, rural development problems as well as opportunities in a settlement area can only be better understood, grasped or appreciated if they are related to the conditions in the non-settlement areas under the same administrative or bureaucratic unit. This reality, to a larger extent, explains the inclusion of Kimilili Division, as a control research area in the study.

Short of comparison with non-settlement areas, other scholarly works have been carried out on settlement schemes in Kenya. The works of Robert Chambers,¹⁵ John Harbeson and Gary Wasserman,¹⁷ are cases in point. The existence of other literature, such as these, on the subject of settlement schemes does not, however, render the current study a duplication of what has already been documented. On the contrary, this study attempts to do some of what the previous ones failed to do as well as to correct some of the conclusions reached by the

previous studies as a result of overgeneralization.

In the first place, a majority of the previous studies on settlement schemes in Kenya were carried out immediately after the schemes had been established. Such studies tended to concentrate mainly on, the political events and activities in the later colonial period as well as ⁱⁿ the immediate post-independence period that, directly or indirectly, led to, or caused, the establishment of settlement schemes. The studies go further only to consider the administrative issues of the settlement schemes such as the demarcation and allocation of the plots, the selection of the new settlers, the provision and organization of the credit, marketing and extension facilities; and the like. Notable among such studies include Robert Chambers and John Morris' 'Mwea, An Irrigated Rice Settlement In Kenya',¹⁸ which discusses the socio-political circumstances of the establishment of the Mwea Scheme, notably the 1952 state of emergency and the land pressure among the Kikuyu. The study comes to an end with the establishment of the scheme and the allocation of the plots. John Harbeson's 'Nation-Building in Kenya',¹⁹ which discusses settlement schemes in Kenya within the general context of the politics of land reform, is another notable study in this category. Gary Wasserman's 'Politics of Decolonization',²⁰ like Harbeson's work, focuses on the political conflicts in Kenya that gave rise to the transfer of land from the colonial settlers to the Africans. The study ends in 1965 when the land is finally demarcated and allocated.

In short, these studies, while appreciably concentrated on some scholarly issues, did not give adequate attention to the impact of the settlement programme on the process of rural development which, of course, formed the main background to the establishment of the settlement programme itself. It is this question or omission which this study attempts to correct. Admittedly, a number of such other early studies attempted, to some limited extent, to consider the question of settlement vis-a-vis the socio-economic welfare of the people affected. These studies provide an inaccurate account of the situation as it is today. This is because most such studies were carried out rather prematurely. Coming up within approximately five years of the establishment of the settlement schemes, research work for such studies was carried out during a period of structural change: before the settlement machinery had gained momentum and before the concrete results of the settlement programme had begun to manifest themselves. Our study, coming up approximately twenty-five years later, is able to offer a more accurate account of the performance of the settlement programme in the area of rural development.

The Theory of the Ecology of Development Administration:
A Framework for Analysis.

This study is primarily concerned with the possible influences of the socio-political factors in Tongaren on the behaviour and performance of the

administration in the process of resource allocation and utilization in the area. The study further examines the impact of this web of influences upon the process and tempo of rural development in the area. Since it attempts to link the administration with its outer environment, the study has a better foundation in the ecological theories of development administration.

The basic assumption or tenet of the theory is that in its task of managing the process of development the administration does not operate autonomously. Rather, it is continuously influenced by the socio-economic, political and cultural activities and events that take place in its task environment. At the same time, the administration itself continuously attempts to influence these environmental factors. It is the dynamics of these inter-relationships that remarkably determine the nature of the decisions, and the efficacy of the administration. One exponent of this theory explains the strengths of this analytical framework thus:

...in order to fully understand its structure and function it (the administration) must be studied in the context of its inter-relationship with other institutions. In systems theory terms, bureaucracy as a social institution is continually interacting with the economic, political, and socio-cultural systems in a society and is both a modifying influence on these systems as well as being modified by them.²¹

We shall herebelow isolate and discuss the various components of the ecology of administration as expounded by its theorists.

Taking the political environment first, political institutions are said to be functionally overlapping with the administration. In the first place political institutions, notably legislatures are the supreme organs of the state. They make laws and formulate policies that govern the operations of the administration, and indeed ^{of} all the other institutions and individuals in society. Within this arrangement the administration is bound to take the interests or directives of the politicians into account in its decision-making process.

Secondly, individual politicians being representatives of parochial interests in society, they attempt to influence the administration to make decisions that are in favour of those parochial interests or localities which they represent. As Donald Rothchild states, there is often "the tendency ... for political actors to concentrate on promoting the material claims of their constituencies."²² This practice has the consequence of introducing the element of subjectivity in the administration's decision - making process. Ultimately, those localities whose political representatives or spokesmen exert higher pressure upon the administration, receive more attention or favourable considerations, and vice versa.

Milton Esman²³ has argued that the administration can only manage its basic tasks of development in an efficient and effective manner (making rational and objective decisions)

in an atmosphere of political consensus and legitimacy. The author notes, however, that in a majority of the developing countries the political environment is characterized by conflicts and rivalry which often penetrate or are reflected in the bureaucracy; form alliances within it and inhibit collective or consensus in decision-making. Thus, different segments of the administration attempt to pursue or propagate the interests of their respective or favoured political groups or personalities in society. This is what has led to the whole question of political patronage within the administration. In Nigeria, for example, Murray²⁴ reports that politicians have penetrated the bureaucracy seeking to have the institution to allocate resources discriminatively with a view to punishing (through deprivation) political opponents and rewarding supporters through favourable allocations.

In short, it is arguable that the more the intra - and extra-bureaucratic political pressure or demands for resources from a particular locality, the more the resources the bureaucracy will allocate to that locality, and vice versa. The first hypothesis of this study then is:

There is a low rate of rural development in Tongaren because political actors do not influence bureaucratic resource allocation in favour of the Division.

Apart from influencing the administration with regard to resource allocation, Milton Esman further argues that

political actors in the society assist the administration in 'selling' to the people the various innovational or development projects and programmes that it launches. The politicians are said to be more suited for this role because of their characteristic of being less formal, less rigid and less authoritarian in dealing with the people. This approach gives them (politicians) an edge over the bureaucracy in the process of stimulating and increasing the peoples propensity for change and innovation. As Esman himself puts it:

... It is unlikely that ... even with much stronger administrative resources, the administrative system alone would be able to carry the burden of programme operations under conditions prevailing in most of the developing countries... Social-economic progress are not only technical but profoundly political processes. To counter the resistance of bitter and often powerful oponents of development programmes, to mobilize clientele to relate effectively with governmental activities, to overcome apathy or suspicion through discussion, demonstration and persuasion - these are not acts in which most bureaucrats shine.²⁵

It may therefore be infered that the more the support local politicians give to the administration in effecting development and innovation among the people the faster the rate of innovation and development the locality realizes, and vice versa.

The second hypothesis of this study then is that:

There is a low rate of rural development in Tongaren because of the failure of the local political leadership to assist in mobilizing the local people and their resources for development.

Closely tied to the political environment is the social one. Its basic characteristic has been condensed by Fred Riggs in his theory of the Prismatic Society and Sala Bureaucracy.²⁶ According to Riggs, the society in the developing countries is prismatic in the sense in which there is 'value overlap' between the traditional (fused) and the modern (refracted) socio-cultural beliefs and practices. Influences from this environment mould a kind of bureaucracy called the Sala. In other words, the prismatic society is composed of a multiplicity of ethnic groups (poly communalism) and individual bureaucrats perform their duties in favour of their respective ethnic groups. The result is the negative practices such as nepotism, ethnicity and favouritism in bureaucratic role performance. Secondly, salaries are indeterminate and services offered discriminatively hence there is produced and stimulated a tendency toward bribery and corruption within the bureaucracy as it performs its duties.

Discussing the social environment of administration in East Africa in particular, Goran Hyden²⁷ points out that the society is characterized by what he terms as the 'Economy of Affection' that is a result of the prevailing peasant mode of production. This kind of society produces relations that are based on family, kin, clan or community ties. As bureaucrats are also bound by such ties and allegiances, they become more prone to corruption, nepotism

and favouritism in the process of discharging their duties. Accordingly efficiency and effectiveness are undermined. Secondly, Hyden argues that in this same society there is a highly contested tug of war among the various clan leaders as each attempts to secure a larger share of the already meagre national or bureaucratic resources for his own clan. Thus, in this peasant society resources for development are scarce hence the rivalry. This tendency is also underscored by Donald Rothchild in the following words:

Resource scarcity can give rise to intense political action of an essentially utilitarian nature, as group brokers or intermediaries strive to secure favourable allocations.²⁸

It may, therefore, be inferred that the more the social cleavages or groups in society the more the bureaucrats are influenced to perform their duty (allocate resources) in favour of the particular groups to which they individually owe allegiance. Our third hypothesis is therefore that:

"There is a low rate of rural development in Tongaren because ethnic or clan forces in the District influence the administration to allocate resources in disfavour of Tongaren.

The local people's culture (traditions, customs, values, belief patterns) as well as their attitudes and psychological orientations are said to have an impact on the administration's behaviour and performance. These factors

may, for example, be such that they make the local people less innovative or resistant to development and change-efforts as made by the administration. Under such circumstances, the administration has to adopt new methods and approaches to overcoming these obstacles and improve upon the people's response to development and change. On the other hand, cultural factors in society may be such that they predispose or incline the local people toward development and change. In such an environment, the administration's development tasks are greatly eased and the process of rural development smoothed. In the words of Nimrod Raphaeli:

... administrative behaviour is not random. It is an outgrowth of the interaction of cultural traits and values and the administration - in short, ... the administrative culture is an extension of the greater social culture.²⁹

In his article 'Cultural Hurdles in Development Administration', Agehananda Bharati makes the following note about the situation in India:

Regions ... where predominant importance is given to the spiritual world, and religious tradition is the guiding reference for behaviour people may be reluctant to cooperate when innovation seems to conflict with religious tradition. Most cultural hurdles in India derive from the strength of religious tradition. Mundane reasons are considered basically trivial - a powerful impediment to development administration.³⁰

While culture or religious traditions in India constitute a formidable obstacle to development, in Thailand the reverse is true. As Bharati further notes:

The Siamese enthusiastically welcome innovation. They render unto Buddha what is Buddha's ... Siamese planners and administrators do not (therefore) consider that development clashes with tradition, nor is development administration considered trivial.³¹

It may therefore be inferred that the more the people's culture predisposes them to development and change the faster the rate of development the area realizes, and vice versa. Our fourth hypothesis then is that:

There is a low rate of rural development in Tongaren because the settlers' culture and attitudes hinders the efficient utilization of the available agricultural resources.

Research Method:

The study began with a one week reconnaissance tour of Tongaren Division, during which time the area's history and background information was obtained, mainly from the settlement office located at the divisional headquarters. In addition, facts about the area's rural development problems and opportunities were obtained from the various development oriented ministry departments operating in the District in general and in Tongaren and Kimilili Divisions in particular. All this information proved valuable in drawing the research problem and sharpening its focus.

Once the basis of research had been made, it immediately became impractical, in view of the time factor, to focus the study on all the development projects and programmes in the area and to evaluate the socio-political forces that worked for their initiation and implementation. Accordingly

a sample of seven projects/programmes were selected, each according to its own importance in ^{the} study as shown below.

In addition, care was taken to make sure that at least one project was studied from each of the major sectors of rural development notably agriculture, water supply, health, education, transport and communication, electrification, self-help efforts, etc. The selected projects are:

(i) Tongaren Cottage Hospital, which took five years to be allocated funds for implementation once the request had been made, and upon funds being made available, it took seven years before the money was actually released; two years before implementation work could begin, and three years to complete the implementation process. The study of this project was considered useful in contributing to the explanation regarding the low rate of rural development, notably delayed or sluggish initiation and implementation of rural development projects and programmes.

(ii) The Tongaren electrification programme, which was proposed or identified in 1974 when the Jinja-Kitale line traversed the division, but which programme has not taken off to-date. Research information from this project was considered important in contributing towards the explanation for the non-implementation of the much needed and identified rural development projects and programmes.

(iii) Maize production programme. Maize is the major cash crop for the area. The choice of this programme for study

was considered to be important because the designers of the settlement schemes expected maize cultivation to be the primary source of employment, income and consequently higher standard of living for the settlers. Thus rural development as a whole was expected to depend quite significantly on the efficient and effective performance of the maize production programme.

(iv) The Little Nzoia Water Supply Project which was completed in 1983 but which is grossly ineffective. This project was inevitably included in our sample because it is the only water project existing in the Division. Secondly, explanation for its inefficiency would help us account for the failure of rural development projects and programmes to deliver goods and services on the intended scale.

(v) The integrated Animal Production project and the Ndalu Handicraft project, both of which were initiated by a successful (Kalyesa) Women Group in the Division. The choice of the projects was based on the need to obtain information on the capacity of interest groups to influence the allocation and utilization of resources for rural development.

(vi) Naitiri Village Polytechnic, which the Ministry of Finance and Planning denied financial assistance for development purpose during the 1977/76 financial year. Data obtained from the study of this project was deemed to be relevant to the question why Tongaren is unable to

implement some of the much needed development projects

(vii) The Rural Access Road Programme. Tongaren is one of the few Divisions in the Western Province in which this programme was launched. But the area remains with the poorest road transportation system in the District. The study of this project would thus help in explaining the existing discrepancy between decisions and actions on the one hand and results on the other.

It is useful to point out here that within the study of the Maize production programme indicated above, three other programmes closely related to rural development were also covered. These are: The National Extension Programme (NEP), the New Season Crop Credit Programme of the Agricultural Finance Corporation, and the National Cereals and Produce (Marketing) Board. These are programmes that support the production and marketing of Maize, the areas' chief cash crop.

A sample of development projects similar to those in Tongaren was also selected for study in Kimilili Division. The projects are the following:

- (i) Bakoli Health Center
- (ii) Rural Electrification Programme
- (iii) Maize Production Programme
- (iv) Ndivisi Makuselwa Water Supply Project
- (v) Masikini Women Group.
- (vi) The On-going Bungoma-Chwele-Kimilili Misikhu Bitumen road project.

The purpose of studying projects in this Division was to determine whether bureaucracy is influenced differently by an old established society as opposed to a newly settled one. In other words the objective was to find out the environmental factors that restrained Tongaren from developing faster than the adjoining non-settlement areas.

Data were collected through the use of a combined documentary, observation and survey methods. The documentary sources constituted files and annual reports that pertain to the selected projects. This source was especially important in showing, in a historical perspective, the pattern taken by the bureaucracy in selecting development projects as from the time of settlement in Mid-1960s. Documentary sources were also useful in providing the preliminary information of facts and statistical figures that facilitated the definition of the research problem. The observation method involved the attendance of a District Development Committee meeting, a chief's Baraza in each Division and a political (fund raising) rally in Tongaren. Although permission was not granted for the attendance of any District Executive Committee as well as the Divisional Development Committee meetings, use of their recorded minutes sufficed. The benefits derived from those meetings attended was in the form of accessibility to information that would not have otherwise been recorded in the minutes of the committee meetings. Indeed Moser and Kalton have argued that the

observation method of data collection has got the advantage of yielding more accurate and reliable information especially in events where "the informants are unable to provide the information or can give only very inexact answers."³²

The survey interviews were held with a sample of the clients of the selected development projects and programmes. One hundred respondents were interviewed in each of the two Divisions. In determining this sample size, concern was felt more on its representativeness than on its numerical size since it is ⁱⁿ the former criterion, much more than in the latter, that a higher measure of precision and reliability of information is to be found. As Mosar and Kalton have noted: "the size of the sample is not in itself enough to ensure that all is well."³³ This factor notwithstanding, Prewitt's³⁴ guide to the determination of a sample size was found to be pertinent to this study. The author notes that the size of a sample is determined mainly by the extent of the variations expected in the responses, in which case the greater the degree the larger the sample size. Second, is the time and money resources available for the research which would be directly proportional to the sample size, and, the number of variables to be tested as well as the tolerable sample error, both of which would be directly proportional to the sample size, and finally, the sampling technique employed.

All these factors were considered in determining our sample size. In the first place, not much variation was expected in the interviewee responses since the socio-political environment in Tongaren as well as the local bureaucracy was, during the preliminary two week study, found to be of uniform characteristic, thus we expected like causes to produce like effects under similar conditions. Indeed this turned out to be the case in the field. Secondly, with only five variables at hand for testing, a sample size larger than one hundred was considered unnecessary. Thirdly, the type of sampling technique we employed namely, proportionate stratified random sampling technique ensured that each category or stratum of the population was represented in the sample of one hundred, hence no much gain was expected in merely increasing the numerical size of the sample.

In selecting the respondents for the sample survey of the clients of the selected or chosen rural development projects and programs in Tongaren, we used the proportionate stratified random sampling technique. This was considered to be the most suitable technique because the settlers in Tongaren do not constitute a single homogeneous group in every respect. First of all, the Division is divided into nine schemes each of which was initially organized separately, (see Table 5). Secondly, not all the four categories of plot sizes were distributed evenly over the

nine schemes, (see Table 1). Kibisi and Kabuyefwe schemes, for example, carry only category 'A' plots, while the rest of the schemes have varying proportions of each category of plots. Thus in order to derive a properly representative sample, each strata of the settlers had to be proportionally sampled. Acclaiming the strengths of the proportionate stratified random sampling technique, Moser and Kalton point out that "it makes sure that the different strata in the population ... are correctly represented in the sample" and that "proportionate stratification nearly always results in some gain in precision...".³⁵

Accordingly, respondents in Tongaren were drawn from each of the four plot categories and from all the nine settlement schemes in the Division. Table 2 below shows how the one hundred respondents were distributed in each strata of the population.

The choice of the respondents was made using the simple random technique because of the need to rule out any prejudiced or biased selection as may be caused by prior knowledge of the respondent. Our task here was greatly facilitated by the ready availability of full lists of names and relevant particulars of all the settlers in each scheme. Thus we had a ready provision of the sample frame. We then divided the number of respondents we wanted to interview with the total number contained in each stratum. Then we proceeded to interview the settler in the first plot of each group. (The plots in each scheme in the whole Division are systematically numbered).

Table 2: Categories of the Respondents.

Scheme	Total Number of Plots (Settlers)	Proportion Interviewed	Proportion Interviewed based on Plot Category				
			A	B	C	D	Z
Ndalu	189	5	1	1	1	1	1
Tongaren	544	15	3	2	3	6	1
Soy-Sambu	371	11	10	0	0	0	0
Kiminini	365	11	1	2	1	5	1
Moi's Bridge	100	2	1	1	0	0	0
Kamu-Kuywa	552	16	0	5	3	6	2
Naitiri	316	9	1	2	1	4	1
Kibisi	701	20	10	0	0	0	0
Kabuyefwe	395	11	11	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	3533	100	58	13	9	22	6

A second sample of one hundred respondents was drawn from Kimilili; the control Division. The sample was drawn from among the farmers in the division, the total number of whom has been given by the Department of Agriculture in Bungoma as being 5526. On the basis of this figure, we thus interviewed one respondent out of every fifty five farmers. This proportion is obviously lower than in Tongaren because the purpose of carrying out a survey interview here (Kimilili) was only for control purpose. Yet again not much variation in responses was expected hence the adequacy of one hundred respondents.

One notable problem encountered with regard to survey interviews in Kimilili was that no list of the farmers in the area exists and the various plot units are not systematically arranged. These two intertwined difficulties considerably complicated the process of identifying the specific interviewees. However we attempted to resolve the difficulty by traversing the width and breadth of each of the two Locations, Kimilili and Kamukuywa and mapped out every fifty-fifth farmer for \angle interview. Thus using this simple, stratified random sampling technique, we interviewed fifty respondents in each Location of Kimilili Division. All the respondents in both Kimilili and Tongaren were then treated to a uniform structured questionnaire containing both closed and open ended questions.³⁶

Apart from the survey interviews with the farmers, a second sample of twenty five interviewees was selected from among the various government or administrative officials concerned in various ways with the selected rural development projects and programmes in each division. They included the divisional as well as the district heads of the departments of agriculture, health, water development, transport and communications, settlement (for Tongaren alone); and social services, and provincial administration. Others included the Agricultural Finance Corporation's branch Manager, the branch Manager of the National Cereals and Produce Board, and the District Development Officer (DDO).

All these respondents from the administration were treated to a separate structured questionnaire containing both open-ended and closed questions.³⁷ The purpose of interviewing this category of respondents was to obtain information about, as well as an explanation for, the existing problem of rural development in Tongaren especially with regard to the initiation and implementation of development projects. For example, the problems encountered in allocating governmental resources and in dealing with the rural residents of the area, including their leaders; the available opportunities etc.

Apart from sample surveys, informal interviews and discussions were ^{also} held with some members of the District Development Committee, some headquarter officials of the relevant operative ministries, the Ministry of Economic Planning and National Development and the Ministry of Finance.

FOOTNOTES

1. These figures were obtained from the Bungoma District Development Plan for the period 1984-1988. See also the Map in Appendix C.
2. This information was obtained from files at the District Settlement Office, Tongaren.
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4. Personal Interview with the Manager Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC), Kimilili Branch.
5. Republic of Kenya Ministry of Lands, Settlement and Physical Planning op. cit. p. 8..
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25. Milton, J. Esman, op. cit., p. 81.

26. Fred Riggs Administration In The Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society. Boston, Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1964.
27. Goran Hyden: No Short Cuts To Progress. African Development Management In Perspective. London, Heinemann, 1985.
28. Donald Rothchild op. cit., p. 160.
29. Nimrod, Raphaeli. 'Comparative Public Administration: An Overview'. In Raphaeli, N. (ed.) Readings in Comparative Public Administration. op. cit. p. 21.
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31. Ibid., p. 71
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33. Ibid. P. 146.
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CHAPTER ONE

THE ADMINISTRATION OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA: Concepts and Background.

The objective of this chapter is to provide operational definitions of some of the key concepts used in this study, which concepts are quite often a subject of academic controversy in the details of meaning and application. The first of these concepts, one that is the ultimate concern of the entire study, is Rural Development. The second important concept is Rural Development Administration whose importance lies in the fact that the thesis itself focuses its analysis on the behaviour and performance of the administration in rural development. Since the administration utilizes resources as the raw materials in the carrying out of development tasks, the concept of resources will also be defined. In short the first part of this chapter aims at showing the interlinkages between rural development, rural development administration and resource utilization.

The second part of the chapter attempts to demonstrate that the present conditions of rural development in Kenya in general and Tongaren in particular are owed to the past (both colonial and post-colonial) rural development policies and programmes. Thus, the chapter will attempt to trace the trends of rural development process right from the time of the establishment of European settlement upto the departure of the European settlers and the subsequent establishment of the African Settlement schemes in Kenya in general and Tongaren in particular.

On the Concept of Rural Development.

The term 'rural development' has been defined in various ways. Mbithi and Barnes¹, for example, define it as a process that involves supplying food to the rural population; providing such social amenities and services as health and education; expanding rural employment opportunities; raising the income levels of the rural population and reducing socio-economic inequalities among the rural population. The authors also include in their definition the process of increasing popular participation in development efforts and of promoting national (ethnic) integration - thus increasing the capacity of development administration. David Seers simply argues that the process of rural development is synonymous with the reduction in the problems of poverty, unemployment and inequality.² Beyond these lines of definitions, Uma Lele adds that the process of rural development needs also to include the building of a local capacity to initiate development projects and programmes so as to make rural development a self-sustaining process.³

The usage of the concept of rural development in this study will therefore draw quite significantly from the contributions of other authors as discussed above. Thus we define rural development as the process in which some of the basic ills of the rural societies, notably unemployment, poverty, diseases and ill-health, hunger and malnutrition, illiteracy and ignorance, as well as socio-economic inequalities are being progressively eradicated,

and the rural areas themselves are becoming increasingly self-sustaining in terms of rural development. In short, rural development is a process in which efforts are being directed towards the improvement of the general living standards of the rural population.

In order therefore that the objectives of rural development are realized, serious attention needs to be paid to certain areas of operation that are of crucial importance. In the first position, is the agricultural sector. Agriculture is the basic real and potential source of rural employment and incomes, food supply, and generally the mainstay of socio-economic life in Kenya's country side. This factor signifies the need to stimulate and to increase production in this sector. To this end agricultural credit facilities, in-pu supply systems, technical extension services, marketing arrangements, etc, should of necessity be carefully streamlined and improved upon. This will ensure a reliable source of employment, higher incomes, adequate food supply as well as improved nutritional standards.

The provision of adequate health care services is another area of concern that is vital for the alleviation of diseases, high child mortality rate, and ultimately for increasing the life expectancy of the rural population. To achieve these health related objectives, efforts need to be made to establish health institutions closer to the people; supply such institutions with adequate drugs, equipment and medical

staff; and to launch such health programmes as immunization and vaccination. Closely related to good health, there is need to provide accessibility to clean drinking water through the construction of rural water supply projects.

The establishment of educational and training institutions is also important in so far as it has the benefits of enabling the rural residents who utilize the facilities to increase their general awareness and innovativeness as well as their propensity for change and adaptation—all of which are important for enhancing rural development. In addition, graduates of especially the training institutions are able to secure non-farm employment thereby diversifying employment opportunities in the rural areas. These two objectives may be realized by bringing closer to the rural people, primary and secondary schools as well as polytechnics and other centres for training.

Efficient transport and communication system is a crucial factor facilitating rural development process. It, for example, enables the smooth and quick transportation of inputs to farms and outputs to markets; swift movement of government or administrative officials, especially the technical or extension advisory officers engaged in the initiation and implementation of development projects and programmes; and generally in effective coordination of development activities, particularly in the case of the telephone. To attain these goals, efforts need to be made to develop an adequate road network that is

passable in all weathers; efficient telephone facilities and the supply of electricity.

Once the benefits of rural development are in the process of being realized, the area concerned can only be strictly described as being developed if such benefits are enjoyed by a majority of the rural residents rather than a few. This means that the process of rural development should also involve the provision of accessibility to the facilities and benefits of development by as many of the rural people as possible. In addition the process is considered complete if the rural areas substantially cut down on their dependence or reliance on sources 'external' to the area for the major ingredients of rural development. In other words, rural development should finally include a process of capacity-building in respect of the ability of the local people to rely on their own impetus, initiatives, resources and dynamism for the needed development projects and programmes.

Upon gaining political independence, almost all the new nations found themselves faced with development as the most immediate need and demand, variously articulated by the rural population. These needs and demands are a result of the poor rural development conditions in these areas. Robert Chambers has described the situation in the following words:

The extremes of rural poverty in the third world are an outrage ... deprivation, suffering and death are intolerable ... These co-exist with affluence ... The people have to struggle to get enough to eat... are defenceless against diseases ... and expect some of their children to die.⁴

These gloomy rural development conditions have been and still are to certain extents, typical of Kenya today, where they hinge on poverty, unemployment and inequality.⁵ Responsibility for this condition rests with the failure of the departed colonial government to adequately concern itself with the socio-economic welfare of the African peoples. Secondly, the (colonial) government's development policies had a bias in favour of the urban and the European scheduled areas as opposed to the much larger and more populous African 'Reserve' and the rest of the country-side. Even in the immediate post independence period, the skewed development pattern persisted in favour of the urban areas in terms of health centres and hospitals, schools and training institutions, roads, telephone facilities, electrification, water supply as well as employment opportunities and levels of income. As at 1972, for example, the distribution of government medical officers was as shown in Table 3.

As may be deduced from the table, three urban centres alone, namely Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu with less than 0.076% of the entire country's population had 64.5% of the total number of government medical officers. Moreover, the percentage that went outside the four major towns concentrated in the smaller towns in the form of provincial, District and Municipal hospitals. It is because of such imbalances together with the fact that the majority (91%) of the country's population lives in the

TABLE 3: Distribution of Government Medical Officers in Kenya.

PLACE	POPULATION	NO. OF OFFICERS	NO. OF PEOPLE PER OFFICER
Nairobi	509,000	147	3,500
Mombasa, Nakuru and Kisumu	327,000	46	7,100
Elsewhere	10,106,000	106	95,000
Whole Country	10,942,000	299	36,000

Source: Employment, Incomes and Equality: A strategy for increasing productive employment in Kenya. 1972 p. 145.

rural areas, that in its second (1970-74) Development Plan the government declared that henceforth:

"the key strategy (for development would be) to direct an increasing share of the total resources available to the nation toward the rural areas.⁶

On the Concept of Rural Development Administration.

The dire need for development in the new nations is what constituted the major cause and stimulant for the advent of the Development Administration Movement in the early 1950s. The main objective of the movement was to propose ways and means by which national bureaucracies in especially the developing countries could be reorganized

in structure and reoriented in attitude away from the colonial type that was predominantly concerned with "law and order as well as revenue collecting" to a kind that would go further to initiate, stimulate and manage the process of socio-economic change and development. One exponent of the movement, John Montgomery, defines Development Administration as the process of:

Carrying out planned change in the economy (in agriculture or industry, or the capital infrastructure supporting these) and, to a lesser extent, in the social services of the state especially education and public health.⁷

Apart from initiating and accomplishing development goals and objectives, J.N. Khosla argues that development administration does also involve improvement on the capacity of the agency for carrying out development. This includes for example, stepping ^{up} administrative innovation and ingenuity as well as breaking the bureaucratic resistance to change".⁸

The application of the concept of development administration in this thesis will refer to the process which involves the selection and prioritization of development projects and programmes; mobilization and allocation of resources necessary for implementation purpose, and, the accomplishment and operationalization of the projects and programmes. In order for these development goals and objectives to be achieved it is necessary to tie to the activities of development administration, the process of building up the capacity of the bureaucracy in the management of development projects

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and programmes as opposed to the predominant management of law and order. This may be achieved through training, research, reorganisation, etc.

In Kenya, in no more than two years after independence, President Kenyatta urged the civil service, which had been inherited almost wholly from the colonial era, to change in functions and orientation in response to the now more novel and challenging task of socio-economic development. In his words:

From now on civil servants will be judged by their contribution to the development plan. They will be called upon to explain failure to achieve their targets. The best district is no longer the quietest one, but the one which makes most progress towards its development targets.

However, responsibility for law and order, now^a preserve of the Department of Provincial Administration and Internal Security, remains important since it is only in an environment of peace and tranquility that the tree of socio-economic development can flourish.

It is the process of development administration in a rural setting that this work concerns itself with hence the concept rural development administration.

Resources In Rural Development.

The realization of the objectives of rural development depends quite significantly upon the existence or availability of resources that make up the capacity for meeting development needs and targets. A resource may therefore be defined as any factor that contributes toward the

attainment of development goals. It may be in the form of (1) human effort e.g. labour, leadership, technical and administrative knowledge or personnel, as well as commitment to work. (2) Institutional establishments such as agricultural marketing boards, financing agencies, research centres and so on. (3) Physical infrastructure, notably transport and communicational facilities, as well as electricity and water supplies, (4) favourable natural environmental conditions such as climate and soils as well as minerals (5) Financial resources.

Resources are therefore a sine-qua-non for development to the extent to which their quantity and quality determine the degree to which the administration's development plan can be implemented and goals subsequently attained. In other words, the rate at which the process of rural development in a particular area is carried out depends quite significantly on the amount of resources, both local and 'external' that are available to that area and the manner in which the resources are being utilized.

We now briefly take a review of Kenya's experience in rural development, and in particular the events leading up to the establishment of Settlement Schemes in general and Tongaren Schemes in particular.

Background To Rural Development

In Kenya

The prevailing development conditions in Kenya's countryside are a result of various rural development policies introduced by the two successive administrations, namely the Colonial and ^{the} post-independence governments.

(i) The Colonial Period.

The rural development policies of the colonial administration were governed by Britain's objective in colonizing and establishing white settlement in Kenya. This objective centered on the rapid exploitation of the natural resources (mainly agricultural) of the region. As Harbeson explains: "Britain decided that only European Settlement could develop the intervening land."¹⁰ In order to give room for the European settlers, the African original occupants of the land were moved out of these areas that were considered more suitable for agriculture. The 1922 Land Tenure Commission, for example, declared that:

Every scrap of land to which the agricultural development of the country could be extended should be ear-marked and made available for future alienation.¹¹

The Africans whose land was alienated were moved into the agriculturally less favoured areas which were then branded 'African Reserves'.

The policy of land alienation had two major repercussions upon the rural development process in Kenya. (1) The rural areas were divided into two parts, namely the African Reserve and the so-called White Highlands (European settlement areas). (2) Overcrowding of the Africans in the relatively inferior Reserves marked the beginning of landlessness, hence unemployment and real poverty. Infact, land alienation seems to have had an added objective of creating unemployment in order to "secure more labour"¹² for the European farms and plantations. (3) Rural development policy formulation was henceforth to become dualistic in respect of the Reserve and the white highlands. In the reserve, for example, the Africans were not allowed to grow coffee or any other important cash crop until the 1950s. Thus agriculture in these areas remained at the level of subsistence,¹³ while in the white highlands it was modernized.

Clearly, therefore, the colonial administration had no interest in developing the African areas and peoples right from the beginning. Even the paramountcy policy was brushed aside. The policy had been drawn in the British Sessional Paper of 1923, Vol. XVIII(4) thus:

The interests of the African natives must be paramount, and that if and when those interests of the imigrant races should conflict, the former should prevail.¹⁴

The succeeding 'Dual Policy' also failed. It had been formulated in response to the question or problem of labour vis-a-vis agricultural development in the white highlands and the Reserves. In particular, African labour was being compelled to work in the white areas at the expense of their Reserves. The Dual Policy therefore declared the "complementary development of non-native and native production."¹⁵ This of course could not happen for three reasons: (1) Land had become too small in the reserve for any productive development. (2) The growing of more paying cash crop had already been prohibited and (3) Such demands as taxation compelled the Africans to abandon their plots in the Reserve in search of wage employment in the white highlands. Indeed, Dilley has argued that the development of the African areas could not take place side by side with that in the white highlands because "the machinery for forcing the natives to work outside the reserves was more effective than that for forcing them to work within."¹⁶ The consequence is that agricultural out-put in the Reserve steadily declined.

In addition to this, Oyu_{gi} has recorded that:

the colonial economy was geared to the needs of the white population and of the mother land. The economic and social infrastructure (roads, railways etc) was created for the benefit of large export companies. They linked the cities with the white enclaves. Elsewhere, especially roads were used for closer administration.¹⁷

The refusal of the colonial administration to stimulate development in the African areas is what appears to have been responsible for the emergence of African nationalism, roughly in the period immediately after the war. In the words of Harbeson, nationalism was a precipitate of "the failure of the colonial administration to generate the necessary reforms of African economic and social conditions".¹⁸ It was infact the failure of the colonial administration to combat nationalism, especially its militancy, that compelled it (the administration) to undertake measures to meet some of the development demands of the African peoples. It is to this end that the Swynnerton Commission was appointed in January 1953 with the objective of exploring appropriate avenues to raising "the productivity of the African land, its human and stock carrying capacity, the incomes and living standards of the peoples."¹⁹ In what became the "Swynnerton Plan" the commission recommended inter- alia land consolidation and registration, provision of technical assistance, agricultural credit and marketing facilities, water supplies, and above all, the development of cash crops in the 'approved zones'.

The results of the implementation of the plan were significant. According to the first post-independence

Development Plan, within ten years of the implementation of the plan, the value of output from the African areas had shot up from about K£ 5.2 million in 1955 to K£ 14.0 million in 1964 with coffee, whose ban had been lifted in 1951, accounting for approximately 55% of the total increase.²⁰ A concomitant of increased output was an increase in the incomes of the Africans in those areas where the plan actually covered.

Outside the realm of agriculture the colonial administration also, and for the same reasons, undertook some measures that were aimed at improving the development conditions of the African areas. These measures were drawn in the country's first Development Plan which was designed to cover a period of ten years - 1947-57 although this period was cut short in 1954 when a new three-and-a-half year plan (1954-1957) was drafted. The plan covered all the public sectors, notably education, health, roads, water supplies etc.

However, the allocation of resources remained heavily skewed in favour of the European areas. In the education sector for example, the imbalance was as shown in the table below:

TABLE 4: Development Expenditure Allocation for the Education Sector. 1946-1957

RACE	POPULATION SIZE	1946-53 DEVELOPMENT PLAN	1954-57 DEVELOPMENT PLAN
		AMOUNT ALLOCATED £	
African	5,800,000	1,587,713	1,310,500
European	30,000	2,752,800	880,000
Asian	98,000	1,793,900	1,176,000
Arab		129,500	55,600

Source: Colony and Protectorate of Kenya: Sessional Paper No. 51 of 1955. The Development Programme 1954-57. Government Printer, Nairobi 1955 p. 63.

The inadequacy of the colonial government's attempts to bring about socio-economic change and modernization in the African areas and in particular, the continued characterization of poverty and unemployment in these areas further propelled the spirit of nationalism. Now the people were demanding for a return of the 'stolen land' in the White highlands.²¹ Through the 1957 Lennox Boyd constitution, the 1958 Lands Registration Ordinance, the outcome of the 1960 Lancaster House conference and the Ordinance and Registration of June 1960, the British government progressively decided to resettle the Africans in the white highlands. The administration had feared and wanted to neutralize "the threat to political stability posed by large numbers of

landless and unemployed rather than a vehicle for the realization of the goals of African nationalism".²²

From this time on the question of resettlement was destined to occupy a central position in the country's politics and rural development during the ^{transitional} and the immediate post-independence period. In other words, the establishment of Settlement Schemes was seen as an important approach toward resolving the problem of rural development.

(ii) Settlement Schemes and Rural Development

Policies: Post-Independence Period

The first land resettlement programme was launched in January 1961 using £ 7½ million provided by the British government, the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) in terms of grants and loans. This scheme was aimed at settling about 18000 'Yeoman' (later called assisted-owner) farmers on plots designed to earn the settlers roughly £ 250 (net) per annum and about 6000 'peasant' farmers on plots designed to earn them a net annual income of £ 100 each.²³ But due to financial difficulties, the programme was abandoned in 1962 after only 132 plots had been allocated. In its place three other categories of resettlement programmes were started.

(1) The Low Density Schemes which consisted of large scale farms totaling 180,000 acres and financed by CDC and IBRD.

These were designed to carry those Africans who were 'financially and educationally qualified'. In other words since the scheme involved one African settler taking over the entire farm and assets of a departing European, the rate of equity share was certainly high and also the African farmer needed to have a good level of education and experience in farming to be able to perform as better as the former European owner.

(2) High Density Scheme which consisted of 987,000 acres subdivided into about 250,000 to 300,000 small scale plots to be settled on by an equal number of African families. Because of its size it came to be called the Million-Acre Scheme. It was funded by Loans and Grants from the British Government. The objectives of this particular programme have been adequately summarized by Harbeson thus:

"...to accommodate large numbers of landless and unemployed Africans whose situation was too desperate for the slow healing process of economic development and whose numbers and poverty were too great for them to be accommodated in the IBRD/CDC apparatus." 24

The settlers in this High Density Schemes were expected to hit a net annual income of between £ 25 and £ 70. Tongaren was a part of this particular settlement programme.

(3) The squatter settlement scheme launched in 1965 under the special commissioner for squatters. By 1970 the scheme had settled about 18,000 families each occupying an average of 4.5 hectares.

(4) The Harambee Scheme which was announced by Kenyatta in 1960 but implemented much later in 1969-1970. It accommodated 450 families on plots designed to provide each family with a net annual income of between £ 40 and £ 75.

Landlessness and unemployment were the basic criteria for selecting the African settlers for the High Density Schemes. Former squatters were given priority. Those selected were required to make a down payment of an amount that ranged between K.£ 7 to K£ 60 depending on the size of the plot allocated. This amount was meant to cover stamp duty and legal fees. Those with larger plots were required to pay an additional amount as land purchase deposit and working capital. This amount again varied depending on the size of the plot. (See table 1).

Responsibility for the comprehensive administration of settlement schemes was bestowed exclusively upon the then Department of Settlement of the Ministry of Lands, Settlement and Water. Technical officers from other ministry departments were only seconded to and worked under the supervision of the Department of Settlement. This arrangement existed for the first five years of the establishment of each scheme and was designed to enable the new settler-farmers to receive closer supervision that would enable them adapt quickly to the new methods of farming and to realize higher outputs.

Settlement Scheme Performance

The government appears to have summarized its objectives with regard to the establishment of settlement schemes as here below:

The economics of settlement have a vital concern to the nation for two reasons: first because the former scheduled areas are an important source of income foreign exchange and employment for the national economy, and these areas must play their part in the national endeavour to accommodate a growing population at an increasing standard of living, and secondly, to generate the required annual loan service repayment.²⁵

Accordingly, the government expected the settlement areas to depict or yield higher measures of rural development than the former African Reserves.

By 1970 a total of 35,401 families had been resettled on 135 settlement schemes that add upto 492,706 hectares under the Million-Acre Programme alone. This area supported a total of about 300,000 people.²⁶ This is the extent to which the settlement programme may be said to have contributed toward alleviating the problems of landlessness and unemployment in Kenya's rural areas. But as regards increasing rural incomes, the settlement schemes had a poor record particularly because of a declining trend in the levels of agricultural out put. Before the land transfer, for example, the value of production in the mixed farming areas was K£ 15 million and by the end of

1965 when $\frac{1}{3}$ of the total mixed farm had been transferred, the value was only K.£ 250,000.²⁷ Most of the farmers therefore failed to reach their income targets, which is partly why the loan repayment exercise was also poor. By 1970 for example, 44% of the amount billed to farmers was in arrears while the outstanding loan was K.£ 3.1 million.

The poor settlement scheme performance was also underlined in the Stamp Mission as well as the Arkadie Reports of 1965 and 1966, respectively. The government itself also disappointedly observed that the settlement areas are beginning to look just like the poor African Reserve. Accordingly, it relaxed the emphasises on settlement schemes. In the Revised First Development Plan it was decided that: "the major share of public investment in agriculture during the 1965/70 plan period, will go into the former African areas."²⁸ Although land resettlement programme continued, this appears to have been as a result of the political expediency rather than the economic exigencies involved. We now turn to the case of Tongaren to examine its salient and possibly unique rural development characteristics.

Tongaren - Specific Schemes:

The area is a part of the former European Scheduled areas and in particular, the mixed farming zone. European settler - farmers arrived here, (then part of what was Kitale District) in the 1920s, displacing the original

African population (the El-Gunyi) who were moved into the reserves in what was North Kavirondo District. According to the 1933 Land Commission Report:

The policy of the administration in Kitale District is to move the El-Gunyi off the farms, where they are an embarrassment to the European settlers and to Government, and where it is clearly not in their interest that they should be permitted to remain... the District Commissioner has already persuaded a large number of them to move with their stock to Uganda and others to Kitosh (present Kimilili).²⁹

This is how the reserves in the rest of the present Bungoma District came about and room for white settlement created in Tongaren.

In establishing the European settlement, large tracts of land averaging about 500 acres were surveyed and occupied by the European settlers. The settlers here, as indeed in most of the other mixed farming areas owned relatively smaller farms than their counterparts in the ranching and plantation zones where the average acreage per European settlers was roughly 1,000 acres. The settlers obtained the land as 99 year lease but, vide the 1915 Crown Lands Ordinance, this period was extended to 999 - year leases.³⁰ In total there were about 80 European settlers owning land in the area that is present-day Tongaren. They practiced mixed farming, particularly maize production and livestock keeping for milk production.

Once the Million-Acre resettlement Programme was announced in 1962, surveying and land demarcation work started in 1963 and the area was settled in towards the end of 1964 by 3533 families on a total of 35,718 ha. distributed over the nine schemes in the area. The table below summarizes the description of the schemes in the area:

Table 5: Settlement Schemes in Tongaren.

Name of Scheme	No. of Plots	Size (in Ha.)	Financier
Ndalu	189	3310.8	IBRD*/CDC**
Tongaren	544	4488.8	IBRD/CDC
Soysambu	371	3138.0	IBRD/CDC
Kiminini	365	4964.8	HMG***
Moi's Bridge	100	1414.0	IBRD/CDC
Kamukuywa	552	6338.0	HMG
Naitiri	316	3805.6	HMG
Kibisi	701	4910.8	IBRD
Kabuyefwe	395	3448.0	IBRD
TOTAL	3533	35799.6	

Source: Files at the District Settlement Office at Tongaren.

- * International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
- ** Commonwealth Development Corporation
- *** Her Majesty's Government.

The performance of the Settlers in Tongaren in utilizing the available resources for the intended purpose, namely improving on their socio-economic welfare, is a matter that

will be discussed in the substantive chapters of the Thesis. For now we consider the socio-political environment in Tongaren within which the process of rural development administration was expected to take place.

Socio-Political Setting of Tongaren.

Tongaren Settlement schemes, like their neighbours in Kakamega District, namely Lumakanda, Lugari, Soy and Nzoia, were created mainly for the purpose of easing overcrowding in the Luhya reserves that bordered the area. For this reason a majority (95%) of the settlers belong to the Luhya ethnic group. The minority (5%) are non-Luhya who include the Teso, the Sabaot and the Luo. The Sabaot in particular found their way here mainly because their reserve around Mt. Elgon also bordered Tongaren and also because some of them were squatters on the European farms.

Criteria for selecting the would-be settlers were mainly landlessness and unemployment. Former squatters were therefore given priority in the allocation of plots. However, not all the settlers were unemployed on coming to the settlement scheme, although a majority of them (83%) were. The remaining 16.7% were civil servants, teachers or businessmen. Similarly, not all the settlers were landless. 72.1% of our respondents claimed to have owned land in their various places of origin and came to the schemes only in search of larger parcels or to hold their own land titles as opposed to farming on family land, however big ^{their} individual portion may have been.

As a result of the diverse ethnic origins of the settlers as well as their newness to each other, there, immediately

upon settlement, emerged and existed a prolonged tendency toward individualism, self-reservation and mutual distrust among the stranger-settlers. This is the situation that partly delayed the beginning of such cooperation in the area's development as would be manifested through the initiation of self-help and Harambee projects.

The institutions that would have provided a medium for individual and group interaction and integration were the church and the cooperative societies. Apparently, however, the existence and survival of cooperatives depends upon the degree of societal integration and the willingness to cooperate among the settlers themselves. This was too low and hence even the cooperatives themselves (which the settlers found already created by the government) collapsed within the first seven years of their establishment.

The church on the other hand took time to develop as it had not existed in the area at the time of the European settlers. However, once it was introduced it became an agent of societal conflicts rather than an agent for cooperation and integration. There exists, for example severe ethnic conflicts within the Friends Church - the single largest church to which about 28.6% of the area's settlers belong. The source of the conflict is the Bukusu claim that the

church's leadership is dominated by members of the Maragoli ethnic group both at the Church's headquarters at Kaimosi in Kakamega District and in the field or branches. Thus the Bukusu resent being led by 'foreigners'. The conflicts took a violent turn in 1985 when the Bukusu demanded that no Maragoli should enter any Friends Church. The consequence is that the government split the Friends Yearly Meeting church into two (along ethnic lines), i.e. Friends, (Kaimosi) Yearly Meeting for Kakamega District with its headquarters at Kaimosi and the Friends Religious Society (Elgon) with headquarters at Kitale and serving the Bukusu.

However, trouble continues as regards the sharing of the church buildings between the Bukusu and the Maragoli living in Tongaren Division. The Maragoli claim that they cannot be led by the Bukusu whose religious beliefs are based on the Dini ya Musamwa.³¹ Moreover, they are the ones who contributed toward the construction of the church-building and so ownership should automatically go to them. The Bukusu on the other hand claim ownership by virtue of the fact that these churches are now located within the geographical jurisdiction of the Friends (Elgon) Religious Society. This dispute has not been resolved and no Friends Church is operational in the area, as all the church's buildings now have two padlocks^{each} - one locked by the Bukusu and the other by the Maragoli.

A second category of societal conflict is based on ethnicity. First of all, the Bukusu sub-ethnic group which carries roughly 60% of all the settlers are the traditional rivals and enemies of the Tachoni sub-ethnic group that carries about 20% of all the settlers. This inimical interrelationship between the two groups and which historians date back to the precolonial time was caused by rivalry over land and the role each group played in the war of resistance against the British occupation in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

Another set of conflicts is caused and manifested by the rivalry between the Bukusu and the Tachoni in the one hand (with the former on the lead) and the rest of the minority sub-ethnic groups in the other (the Maragoli being the most wanted). The former has taken the offensive demanding that all those who crossed the Nzoia river⁴¹ i.e. the non-Bukusu and non-Tachoni should go back to wherever they came from as the land they now occupy in Tongaren traditionally belongs to the Bukusu and the Tachoni. The other group does not, however, succumb to these demands on the strength that the land they occupy in the settlement schemes was a property of the government. Nevertheless, because of its numerical minority (20%) this group suffers from intimidation and fears as a result of the Bukusu - Tachoni propelled tribal sentiments.

The result of the complex intra-societal conflicts and antagonism is that integration and cooperation - a sine qua non of rural development process - is significantly undermined. As is for example shown in chapter three, ethnicity is the most distinct basis for the formation of self-help groups.

As regards the local people's political behaviour (alignments and voting patterns), this is governed largely by ethnic considerations. Consequently, of the two rival personalities (one Bukusu and one Tachoni) for the area's parliamentary seat, the Bukusu (incumbent) candidate receives an overwhelming majority votes during every general election. This is because, as already seen, the Bukusu by far outnumber the Tachoni, and although the minority ethnic group vote for the Tachoni candidate, the Bukusu people remain the majority. The table below shows the pattern of election results (and therefore local political behaviour) during the last four general elections.

TABLE 6: General Election Trends in Bungoma East Constituency.
1969 General Elections

<u>CANDIDATE</u>	<u>ETHNIC GROUP OF THE CANDIDATE</u>	<u>NO. OF VOTES</u>
E. Mwangale	Bukusu	9902
P. Sifuna	Tachoni	4018
C. Wasike	Bukusu	3553
M. Barasa	Bukusu	2885
W. Nyminyi	Bukusu	2137
J. Kerre	Tachoni	519
J. Sirengo	Bukusu	<u>417</u>
	TOTAL VOTES	<u>23434</u>

1974 General Elections

CANDIDATE	ETHNIC GROUP OF THE CANDIDATE	NUMBER OF VOTES
E. Mwangale	Bukusu	25465
P. Sifuna	Tachoni	5829
M. Kateya	Bukusu	<u>965</u>
TOTAL VOTES		32386

1979 General Elections

E. Mwangale	Bukusu	24617
P. Sifuna	Tachoni	6549
D. Wasike	Bukusu	<u>10064</u>
TOTAL VOTES		42663

1983 General Elections

E. Mwangale	Bukusu	25606
P. Sifuna	Tachoni	5728
M. Wanyonyi	Bukusu	1643
R. Wasike	Bukusu	<u>716</u>
TOTAL VOTES		33693

Source: Daily Nations for 7/12/69 p. 8, 16/10/74 p. 8, 10/11/79 p. 13, 28/9/83 p. 10.

It seems from the table above that the question of who shall represent (lead) the people of Tongaren is a foregone conclusion. This absence of stiff competition for leadership appears to have made the position of the MP rather sinecuratic and thereby undermined the effectiveness of the incumbent. In other words, the incumbent representative is not threatened into stimulating development or generally championing the development cause of the area. This position is analysed further in chapter three.

SUMMARY

Rural development is the process in which the standards of living of the residents of the rural areas are being steadily raised through the establishment of facilities that provide socio-economic services and amenities such as health, food, education, training, employment, higher incomes etc. The chief agent of rural development is the rural development administration which carries out its tasks mainly by planning, initiating, implementing and operationalizing rural development projects and programmes. In doing so, the administration uses the available resources, notably skilled and unskilled labour, materials, equipment, money, etc.

The present pattern and condition of rural development in Kenya as a whole is to the larger part a consequence of the past colonial policies and programmes. In the first place, it was never at all the objective of the colonial administration to improve the socio-economic welfare of the African people. Rather the objective was to speed up the exploitation of the country's agricultural potential for the benefit of the European community in Kenya and abroad. The consequent land alienation policy withdrew the Africans into the agriculturally unfavourable African Reserves that were characterized by overcrowding landlessness and unemployment. The rapid worsening of socio-economic conditions among the African peoples greatly contributed towards the emergence of nationalist agitation which in turn compelled the colonial administration

to meet some of the development needs and demands of the African people. This trend culminated in the resettlement of the Africans in the former European Scheduled areas - a process that began during the transition to independence. Tongaren was one such area in which Africans were resettled.

However, the objective of the independent government that settlement areas should realize higher agricultural productivity, higher incomes and generally higher measures of rural development was not achieved and so these areas continue to depict a development scenario similar to that of the former African reserve. This situation is also typical of Tongaren.

At the socio-political level, Tongaren forms a multi-ethnic area composed of the Bukusu (the single majority group), the Tachoni, the Maragoli, the Kabararas, the Luo, etc. These ethnic groups are characterized by mutual conflicts and antagonism. The political life of the people is very inactive as a result of the absence of active rivalry among the political contestants.

FOOTNOTES

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29. Great Britain. 'Morris Carter. Report of the Kenya Land Commission'. 1934, p. 283.
30. See Ruth Dilley, op. cit., p. 62.
31. This is a superstitious (non-christian) religious sect.
32. River Nzoia marks the longer part of the borderline between Bungoma and Kakamega Districts. Most of the minority sub-ethnic groups in Tongaren came from Kakamega District across the river.

CHAPTER II

CENTRE-LOCAL RELATIONS IN PLANNING FOR
RURAL DEVELOPMENT

The central activity in development administration is the management (allocation and utilization) of resources. The predominant scarcity of resources, in particular, compels the administration to decide carefully what development projects and programmes shall be carried out and which ones shall be waived; what shall come first and what shall come last. Once the projects have thus been identified and prioritized, resources are then allocated appropriately for their implementation. We would like to call this process 'development planning'. Edward Weidner summarizes the activity of development planning as a process that involves:

...goal setting priorities established, programmes of action identified and implementation devised and controls put into effect.¹

Project implementation and operationalization are the ultimate objectives or consequences of a good plan. Accordingly, the matching of development goals and objectives with resource availability is an important component of the planning process. In the words of Albert Waterston, development planning ought to take into account:

The availability of natural resources skilled manpower, and the levels of technical,

administrative and managerial competence
(as well as) institutional framework.²

The practice of development planning has the advantage of producing larger measures of goal accomplishment, (i.e. project completion and operationalization); producing more effective development policies, and acting as a stimulus for external financial assistance. In Kenya's first development plan, for example, it was stated that "finance from external sources is far easier to obtain once a sound development plan has been produced."³

The aspect of planning which this chapter wishes to consider is the structure of its machinery.

The questions we shall be attempting to answer include:

- (a) at what point or level in Kenya's planning organization are decisions for resource allocation and utilization made?
- (b) What values or factors of the socio-political environment come into play in the decision-making process and in what manner?
- (c) What are the consequences of the decision making structure and process upon rural development in Kenya?

Before examining the Kenyan case we briefly discuss the structures of planning organization in general. These may be either centralized or decentralized.⁴ A centralized planning organization is one where the planning decisions are made by the central or headquarter officials, which

decisions are then relayed to the field administrators for execution. Thus, the local level or field officers do not participate in the planning process and always refer any decision-making matter to the centre. In this planning organization (sometimes referred to as planning-from-the-top-down) popular participation is absent. A decentralized planning structure, on the other hand, is one in which the central planning agency has been decongested by delegating some of the decision-making responsibilities to the field units which make such decisions on behalf of the centre. This decision-making arrangement is sometimes referred to as planning-from-the-bottom-up, and largely involves popular participation.

There is also one other form of decentralization worth noting called 'devolution'. In a devolved planning structure, local level administrative agencies or institutions are empowered by statute to plan for the development of their respective spheres of jurisdiction without necessarily having to refer to the centre. Local government organizations as well as regional development authorities and government parastatals are examples of devolution.

However, whether under decentralization or devolution the centre provides the broad policy outlines which the local level units must use as points of departure or reference in their decision-making process.

Rationale for a Decentralized Planning

Structure.

The central advantage of decentralization has been summarized as:

Decongesting government at the centre and thereby freeing national leaders from onerous details and unnecessary involvement in local issues, and facilitating co-ordination and expediting action at the local level.⁵

Efficient decision-making process is, thus, achieved through reduced red-tape between the centre and the locality while the centre itself is enabled to concentrate on more decisive policy matters.

Secondly, by working and living in the rural areas, field administrators make better planners than the headquarter officials as they are more conversant with the development needs, demands, problems as well as development opportunities and potentialities of their respective areas of operation. It is important to note that these factors normally vary from one locality to another.

Further, non-planning at the local level often facilitates inter-sectoral coordination in the development matters as all the field officers operate as a team.⁶

Popular participation, the adjunct of a decentralized planning process has got the advantage of:

Increasing the people's understanding and support of social and economic development activities and, as a result, gaining the benefit of their own contributions to these activities and of personal and group adjustments to needed change.⁷

This is achieved when the local people are involved in the identification of development projects for their area.

Then they are more willing to make their own contributions toward the implementation of the project. Otherwise any project that is imposed by the administration "no matter how technically sound, it is seen as failure bound."⁸

However, decentralization has been criticized first because it tends to put national integration at stake as each field unit strives to achieve autonomy by becoming increasingly authoritarian. Secondly, while the democratic advantage of participation may be achieved, a majority of the local people remain lacking in capacity for making rational and feasible decisions in the planning and implementation process.

Organization of Planning In Kenya

There was not established any permanent organization for planning throughout the colonial period. While no development plans were drawn until after the second world war. Prior to this period planning was done on ad-hoc basis and centralized in such ad-hoc bodies as Royal Commissions.

Working Parties, Committees etc. Once such a body had presented its recommendations about the development issue of the day it was disbanded. Secondly, such bodies were wholly European in composition and in making their recommendations they were guided by the broader colonial economic and commercial interests and objectives. Accordingly, the recommendations that were made went in favour of the development of the European areas while the African Reserves and peoples remained neglected. In short, the planning process during this time was heavily centralized, lacking in popular representation (especially of the African interests) and uncomprehensive. The consequence was differentiated socio-economic development between the European scheduled areas that were favoured and the African Reserves which were largely ignored as a matter of policy.

Development planning as a continuous exercise of government was initiated by the Chief Secretary on 29/4/1944 and in 1946 a Development Committee was appointed to prepare the first development plan ever. The committee perceived planning as:

The use of the national resources of the country ... in a manner calculated to increase the national income of Kenya in the shortest space of time so as to raise as quickly as possible the standards of living of the majority of the inhabitants.⁹

The committee did produce a ten-year (1945-1955) development plan. However, it too was heavily centralized, wholly European and although it was comprehensive (covering all sectors) its allocation of resources remained skewed in favour of the socio-economic development of the European communities. The little attention it gave to the development of the African areas appears to have been a result of the political pressure exerted upon the colonial administration by the emerging African nationalist agitation.

Responsibility for plan implementation was bestowed upon the Development and Reconstruction Authority. (DARA). In particular, this organization (established on 1/8/1945) was expected to oversee:

The expenditure of all sums specifically allocated for development and reconstruction purposes, and for the co-ordinated execution of approved development and reconstruction plans.¹⁰

The authority was initially allocated £ 15,586,000 for this purpose.

Meanwhile, after drawing the ten-year plan, the Development Committee was disbanded and a new DARA Planning Committee was established in 1948. It is this committee that drew the 1954-57 Development Plan - which cut short the ten-year plan by three and a half years.

The DARA was abolished in 1953 and so was its wing the DARA Planning Committee which was substituted by the Development Committee of the Council of Ministers in 1954. This is the committee that drew the 1957-1960 Development Plan.

Upon the dissolution of DARA responsibility for financial control went to the treasury while the individual operative departments under their respective members became the spending or implementing authorities. This kind of planning arrangement continued until independence when efforts to institute structural and organizational changes were begun.

Efforts at Decentralization

Soon after independence, the government undertook measures to reorganize and restructure the country's administrative machinery particularly the planning structure. The first major change to be instituted was the establishment, on 1/7/64^a of a Directorate of Planning in the Ministry of Finance. Above this directorate was the Development Committee of the cabinet while below it were two advisory bodies, namely, the Regional Consultative Council designed to aggregate regional interests but which existed only on paper and second, the planning and development advisory council designed to aggregate the interests of the private sector.

This planning set up was soon to be reorganized when on 12/12/64 the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development (MEPD) separate from that of Finance, was established. It was the Planning Division of this ministry that single handedly dealt with planning matters since the development committee of the cabinet relied entirely upon the MEPD for data and information.

Although there now existed a permanent organization for planning, the planning process itself remained centralized in Nairobi. It was not until 1966 that in its first revised development plan, the government decided to decentralize the planning process by establishing local level development committees as well as the position of the Provincial Planning Officer. This change was aimed at ensuring that "co-ordination and participation are fully effective down to the site of every project."¹¹ The committees were: the divisional, district and provincial development committees, and the district and provincial development advisory committees.¹²

Through these committees the government hoped to involve the local level administrative units in the planning process while popular participation was expected to be drawn in through, especially, the Development Advisory Committees, whose membership included members of parliament, party leaders, chairmen of county councils, and the 'eminent citizens'.

The PPO was the secretary to these committees save the DVDC which was chaired by the DO.

Role Of The Local Development

Committees in Planning

The local level development committees were primarily expected to do the preliminary identification of development projects and programmes. In the case of Western Province, these committees became operational in 1968 when the first PPO (secretary to the committees) was posted to the area.

In practice, however, these committees were given very limited responsibilities in the planning process. They planned for only a few kinds of projects, namely (1) the Short-lived Special Rural Development Programme (SRDP) projects, (2) the District Development Grants (DDG) - the later Rural Development Fund (RDF) projects, (3) the European Economic Community (EEC) micro-projects, (4) Community Development Projects and (5) District Development Plans. Otherwise the bulk of the regular (ministerial) projects continued to be planned from Nairobi as shall be seen shortly.

We shall now briefly discuss the forms of decentralization (i.e. local committee involvement) in the planning of these projects.

First, the SRDP had its immediate origins in the Kericho Conference of September 1966, which was attended

by government officials, researchers from the University College, Nairobi, and representatives of the donor agencies. The underlying theme of the conference whose subject was 'Education, Unemployment and Rural Development' was the need to speed up rural development process in Kenya. This was expected to be achieved through a "pilot programme on comprehensive rural development."¹³ Six Pilot Schemes were selected one of which was Vihiga SRDP in Kakamega District of Western Province. The programme was launched on experiment during the 1969/70 financial year.

With regard to planning in the SRDP areas, the second development plan declared that this would be done within:

the present structure of development committees at various levels, in order to find the most satisfactory participatory opportunities ... and that the people of the areas concerned should be fully involved...¹⁴

It is through the development committees that local socio-political factors found their way into the planning process.. The procedure followed in the identification of projects was somewhat as follows: Every divisional head of a ministry department, on the basis of his experience, observation and information about the development needs and priorities of the area, drafted development proposals or plans. These plan documents were then discussed with other heads of departments and political representatives at the various levels of local development committees. The PFO then

aggregated the outcome of the discussions into a draft development plan for the area before forwarding it to the National Rural Development Committee Secretariat in Nairobi. The Secretariat in turn passed the document round to the involved ministries and to the sectoral officer in the MEPD for comments. The proposals were then returned to the relevant PPOs for a recycle of the process through the development committees and back to the secretariat for finalization.

In the case of Western Province however, participation through representation was not quite feasible as the MPs hardly attended the committee meetings. The SRDP did not in any case exist for long so that by 1976, only seven years after inception, the programme had wound up. The impact of the planning process under this programme upon rural development did not therefore have time to manifest itself.¹⁵

The SRDP had been launched in only six administrative divisions in the country and lasted a maximum of six years. The programme did not therefore preoccupy or concern an overwhelming majority of local development committees in the country. The only important or large planning activity of these committees was for the DDG or RDF projects.

The DDG programme was established in 1971 as a small programme with limited funds. Its aim was to support

"small scale development projects to fill gaps which have been left out by the normally much larger ministerial development programmes".¹⁶ However, the programme which was administered by the Ministry of Finance and Planning did not finance DDG projects entirely, rather the local people who were the expected beneficiaries of the project were required to meet a part of the initial cost of the project by way of self-help contributions. This contribution was in the form of cash, material or labour.

In 1974 a sister programme to the DDG called Rural Works Programme (RWP) was introduced. While its objective remained similar to that of the DDG, namely, to enhance the tempo of rural development, it emphasized the need "to provide temporary employment ... in the rural areas"¹⁷ by undertaking labour intensive projects and programmes. Both RWP and DDG programmes acquired the name Rural Development Fund (RDF). In 1983 the RDF expanded to include training facilities in such fields as planning, marketing, and book keeping.

Until the coming of the District Focus for Rural Development Strategy in 1983 RDF projects were the only ones whose planning had been actually decentralized. Introducing the DDG programme, the Permanent Secretary in the MFP had described the programme as being "to stimulate the initiative of DDCs and to encourage them to take

increasingly active interest in planned local development." ¹⁸
is
This/indeed what eventually happened and continues to
happen.

Right from the inception of the programme, local development committees in Bungoma district as well as the provincial level committees preoccupied themselves almost exclusively with the planning of RDF projects. The procedure took the following fashion: Since the local people had to initiate the project, project proposals originated from the local people themselves. On request, the relevant head of Ministry department presented the proposal to the DDC and onward to the DDAC, PDC and the PDAC for discussion. Project proposals that were finally approved at the local level were sent to the MEPD in Nairobi for final approval and funding.

The available records show Tongaren's DVDC, for example, not having participated in the planning process. Bungoma's DDC records, on the other hand, show the committee's sessions to have predominantly routinized themselves with planning for RDF projects. The committees' agendas were always as follows: ¹⁹

1. Confirmation of previous minutes
2. Matters arising from the previous minutes.
3. Selection of DDG projects
4. PPO's report on DDG projects
5. Any other business.

The same goes for the DDAC meetings. A session held on 9/10/72 for example had its agenda as follows:

1. Confirmation of previous minutes.
2. Matters arising from the previous minutes.
3. DDG grants 1971/72
4. DDG grants 1972/73.
5. District Development Planning
6. Any other business.

Item number five (District Development Planning) was an occasional one since it is not an annual or day to day exercise. It also featured occasionally in the DDG meetings. (We discuss District Development Planning shortly). The local level development committees therefore are important points in the RDF planning process where socio-political forces would easily infiltrate.

However, the MEPD had an important role to play in the planning of RDF projects. It does in three basic ways. First by setting the maximum expenditure ceiling for each District and also the maximum cost of the project. Second, the ministry in charge of planning provides broader framework for selecting the projects. For example, the projects must be outside urban areas, must not be financed in any part from another source, must not be too large (not exceeding K.Sh. 600,000 in cost) and RDF money must not be used to pay compensation on land or pay outstanding bills of

the project. The ministry of Planning rejects any project proposals that are not in consonance with these outlines. During the 1973/74 financial year, for example, the MFP rejected the Naitiri village Polytechnic project proposed by the local development committees on the grounds that it was "out of scope of the DDC grants."²⁰

The Ministry of Planning headquarters is therefore another point at which socio-political influences could have found expression.

The second relatively important role of the local development committees in the planning process was the preparation of the District Development Plans first announced in May 1972 and implemented beginning 1974/78 plan period. This was a leaf borrowed from the then existing SRDP. As the MFP indicated:

It is too early for SRDP to produce tested ideas for intensifying rural development. But certain broad conclusions in the process of planning have emerged. In particular, it has been demonstrated that area based plans can be prepared and implemented by the local staff of the government.²¹

The 1971 Ndegwa Commission Report had made similar recommendations.²²

In introducing District Development Planning the government hoped that first, inter-district or locality differences would be taken into account in the planning

process since "national planning agency gives emphases to homogeneity and tends to ignore diversity."²³ Secondly, a detailed understanding of the development problems, resources in different localities would assist in limiting the "wide disparity which prevails ... between the levels of development in different areas."²⁴ Thirdly, area based planning would avoid the "unrealistic separation between plan formulation and its implementation."²⁵ and fourthly, it is in this way that local peoples "aspirations and needs can be taken into account."²⁶

In the case of Bungoma District, deliberation on District Plan formulation first featured in the DDC meetings on 9/10/72. The procedure for drawing the plan was as follows:

Each district head of a ministry drafted a sectoral development plan for his sector. These draft proposals were then sent round to the DDCs, DDACs, PDCs and PDACs in order to "bring local knowledge and expertise to bear on the sectoral proposals so as to identify (i) inconsistencies, overlaps or gaps among proposed programmes/projects included in the draft proposals (ii) current local programmes/projects which have been omitted from the central list of projects and the draft sectoral chapters, (iii) unfilled needs at the local level."²⁷

The outcome of the District Planning exercise does not seem to have produced the expected results both in Bungoma District and elsewhere in the country.

In Bungoma district, the objective of popular participation in the exercise was not achieved first because the DVDCs were not involved and secondly the MPs who would have represented local interests at the higher committees never attended the committee's meetings. The available records show the MP covering Tongaren, for example, to have attended only one DDAC meeting held on 14/8/72 at which time District Planning had not begun to feature in the meetings. Infact the DDC meeting which ratified the final proposals, was not attended by any MP.

Second, the objective of incorporating District plans into the overall national development plan does not seem to have been achieved. Bungoma's 1974/78 District Plan, for example, was produced in May 1976, over one-and-a-half years after the national plan for the period had been produced.

Third the District Plan failed to match development targets and the available resources because the MFP did not supply such information. The resulting document was not therefore a plan but a mere list of the district's development needs.

Fourth, the production of a District Plan document by the local development committees served no useful purpose in so far as the annual sectoral (ministerial) plans continued to be planned for at the headquarters in Nairobi.

In short the establishment of local development committees in the mid 1960s did not significantly decentralize the planning process since the overwhelmingly greater part of planning continued to take place at Ministry headquarters in Nairobi. We now discuss this Nairobi-centred planning process.

Role of the Centre in Planning:

Centralization Persists

The activities and decisions of the local development committees were not incorporated into the regular planning organization which remained centred in Nairobi. The committees' position in the entire planning structure therefore, became redundant. In the words of one official (a former secretary to these committees in Western Province):

We had no tools to effect our decisions
We would discuss and make proposals,
but we were not given money to implement
the projects. Everything was done in
Nairobi.²⁸

The procedure taken by the centre in the planning process took a more or less the following pattern! Every

operating ministry had a planning unit stationed at the headquarters in Nairobi. This unit was responsible for all the planning duties or functions in the ministry. It identified, prioritized and managed the implementation (assigning of resources both recurrent and development) of the projects and programmes.

Project choice was based on the broad sectoral policies of each ministry, which policies would have been endorsed by the Cabinet. It was the policy of the Ministry of Agriculture, for example, that there should be at least one cattle dip within two kilometres of every livestock Every planning unit of an operating Ministry sent out fact-finding teams to the rural areas to collect data and make recommendations on the projects to be implemented during the ensuing financial year. However, not always were such teams sent to the field, according to one official:

Sometimes only a map was used at the headquarters to determine where a project would be located.²⁹

Whichever method was used in collecting information, each planning unit eventually drew up a plan or annual draft estimates (as the case may be), which was then presented to the Treasury for scrutiny and funding.

In short the bulk of the planning process was carried out by officials of the headquarters in Nairobi while the local

level or field officers were not involved. Their involvement came only at the stage of implementation. Within this planning organization, local socio-political influences on decision making could only have acted at the individual ministry headquarters. This centralized planning organization lived on until 1983 when a more rigorous restructurization or decentralization was made which has ushered into Kenya's administrative structure a new pattern of centre-local relationship that exists to date. It is this new pattern that we wish to finally examine.

Toward Comprehensive Decentralization

The District Focus For Rural Development.

In 1983, the Government's obsession with the euphoria for a decentralized planning structure became even more manifest when it launched a "new" programme called the District Focus for Rural Development. Under this strategy it was declared:

... responsibility for planning and implementing rural development is being shifted from the headquarters of ministries to the districts.³⁰

Under this arrangement, therefore, local administrative units were going to take a leading role in the planning process hence their attempted reorganization.

The local level development committees were revitalized (save the advisory committees which were left out).

Attendance of the committees' sessions was made mandatory for the members. Indeed, the MPs who in the case of Bungoma District had been notoriously absent from the sessions, now do attend the DDC sessions quite regularly. Secondly, the Development Committees now meet more regularly i.e. four times a year as is the requirement. Thirdly, a new institution (the equivalent of the former District Team) called the District Executive Committee has been established as the operational or executive arm of the DDC. At the provincial level, the former PDC was changed in terms of name and responsibilities to become the Provincial Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (PMEC). Finally, the special purpose development committees at the District level, notably, the District Agricultural Committee, District Education Board (DEB), District Community Development Committee (DCDC), Joint Loan Board (JLB), etc, have all been affiliated to the DDC. 31

We now briefly consider the procedures taken in the planning process and how the local level planning units link with the centre. The lowest planning institution is the Sub-locational Development Committee (SLDC). It is here that the need for a development project is hatched. Such needs from various sub-locations are aggregated at the Locational Development Committee, discussed and proposals forwarded to the DVDC. At the Divisional level, development problems and opportunities are discussed and development or

project priorities drawn and forwarded to the DEC. This committee, particularly the Planning unit reviews the proposals as received from the DVDC, eliminating those that are inconsistent with any sector's rural development guidelines. To the remaining projects, the committee assigns priorities. The document is then presented to the DDC which reviews the initial priority ranking of the projects, makes any necessary changes, and endorse it for submission to each ministry and onward to the treasury before funding is made.

The planning process is a three-tier one involving the preparation of four documents before implementation. We shall very briefly look at these stages in turn .

(i) District Development Planning.

This covers a period of five years and is expected to be counter-parts with the national development plan. Its preparation takes the same course as described above, that is, going through the hierarchy of Development Committees. Each departmental head presents the draft development plan for his sector to the DDC. The DDC then makes any necessary changes before endorsing it. The DDO finally integrates the approved sectoral proposals into a District Development Plan. However, the exercise is not carried out entirely or autonomously by the District, rather the Districts are "guided by sectoral and national policies." Such national

policy guidelines include: giving priority to the ongoing or incomplete projects; emphasizing underutilized existing facilities, food and cash-crop production and marketing; preventive health care; ensuring equitable distribution of infrastructural assets, and encouraging greater mobilization of local resources.

With regard to financing the Development Plan, the local level planners are guided by the amount of funds available during the financial year preceding the preparation of the plan, while the cost of the proposed development projects is estimated against the prices existing at the time of drawing the plan. This is hoped to avoid the listing of projects that will not be implemented for lack of adequate funds. In short, the District Plan spells out district development needs as well as the priority projects programmes which the DDC wishes to see implemented during the plan period.

(ii) Forward Budgeting

The exercise of forward budgeting was first introduced in 1973 following the recommendations of the Ndegwa Commission, but it was not taken seriously by ministries until the coming of the DFRD programme when it was given a new impetus.

The purpose of Forward Budgeting is to act as a guide for the formulation of future budgetary requirements. It

is essentially a three-year projection of the budgetary expenditure (both recurrent and development) needs of every ministry department in the District. Each Departmental head prepares the forward budget document by costing the Development Project proposals as submitted by the Divisional Development Committees. This he does against the expenditure (both recurrent and development) ceilings provided by the Ministry. Because these ceilings are usually low, it calls for the prioritization of the projects. The departmental head further takes into account the ministry's predetermined priorities for budget expenditures and guidelines for the sector and also those projects and programmes that are subject to pre-existing government or foreign aid commitments that cannot be altered or abridged. Once the draft Forward Estimates document is ready, the departmental head presents it to the DDC for review and approval before handing it over ^{to} the ministry for further consideration by wholly bureaucratic committees, namely the Budget Secretariat, and Budget Committee. The document is then submitted to the Treasury..

(iii) Annual Expenditure Estimations.

The annual Draft Estimates for both recurrent and Development Expenditures are, strictly speaking, annexes to the Forward Budget in so far as it is based on the approved Forward Budget. It is a document prepared by every AIE

holder and which shows the expenditure needs of his sector or department for the following fiscal year. The estimates are based on the development priorities of the DDC, particularly as regards the District Specific Projects and restricted to the expenditure ceiling provided by Treasury. Once approved by the DDC, the document is submitted to the ministry where it is further acted upon by a series of bureaucratic committees, notably the Estimates Working Group (EWG). Then to the Cabinet before being presented to parliament for approval and voting. Usually, parliament approves the budgets without any alterations. This may be attributed to the fact the bureaucracy will have thoroughly done its homework and also that parliamentarians are also members of local level Development Committees, meaning that they will have already introduced their wishes/opinions already at that level.

Since parliament starts its deliberations on the budget well after the financial year is began, it first passes a 'Vote on Account' before the end of the year which vote authorizes expenditures not exceeding 50% of the printed estimates of the next financial year. After a series of discussions, parliament, then votes for the full amount, usually by September of each year.

Ministries issue authority to incur expenditure to all A.I.E. holders usually in two half-year instalments.

Once the allocation process is complete, the AIE holder is not authorized to reallocate funds from one project to another without authority from Treasury. He may, however, reallocate funds for recurrent expenditure but only between and among 'items' in the same 'head'. Where reallocation is across heads or projects, this is done under the Revised Estimates Procedures, whereby request for re-allocation is made through the EWG to the Treasury's Budgetary Procedures Group. If there is need for additional funds, then the authority of parliament has to be sought by the tabling of the Revised and Supplementary Estimates.

Since the annual draft estimates, like the Forward Budget, is prepared while taking into account the local ideas and opinions as channelled through the Development Committees then it follows that the local units take part in budgeting for the local level development and recurrent expenditure needs.

The District Focus programme has therefore distinguished itself from the previous attempts at decentralization to the extent to which it has taken more sweeping and comprehensive dimensions. First, under the new strategy, all the district specific projects (be they donor assisted or non-governmental organization (NGO) projects) are planned for and implemented largely at the local level. The centre influences the process only by drawing the broad

policy guidelines. Under the District Focus therefore, "the initial idea for a project typically comes from the area that will benefit from its implementation (village, sub-location or location)".⁵² The only exceptions to this policy are the multi-District or national projects whose planning and implementation is carried out by the respective ministry's headquarters. How does the District Focus differ from the previous programmes of decentralization?

- (a) This practice is quite different from the previous one where, as already seen only some projects were planned for at the local level while the majority were planned for from the headquarters in Nairobi.
- (b) The budgeting process has also been decentralized as the local level administrative units together with the Development Committees are responsible for drawing the forward budget as well as the annual budget for both development and recurrent expenditure.
- (c) Financial decentralization is also a remarkable feature of the District Focus Programme. This was felt to be necessary in view of the fact that project implementation has also been decentralized to the district heads of development oriented ministry departments who have become the A.I.E. holders. The Treasury has therefore been decentralized to the districts in order to facilitate the project implementation at the local level. A.I.E. holders are able to make withdrawals more easily and from closeby.
- (d) Popular participation in the planning process has also been taken more seriously under the present strategy by taking the Development Committees and the interests of the people into account. However, in the case of Bungoma District, Locational development Committees have not yet been operational, neither are the sub-locational Development Committees.

What chances of success has the District Focus? The previous decentralization programmes were managed or administered by the ministries in charge of planning. The programmes were therefore an entirely administrative responsibility. The District Focus, on the other hand, may be said to be a creation of the political authorities. It was formally launched by the President at a joint meeting of bureaucrats and parliamentarians at Kenya Institute of Administration in July 1983. Secondly, the management of the District Focus is a responsibility, not of the Planning Ministry as has been the case with similar programmes in the past but of the office of the president, in particular the department of development co-ordination and cabinet affairs. Before the elimination of the position of the Chief Secretary in February 1987, the District Focus was a direct responsibility of the Chief Secretary - the highest office in the civil service. In short it may be said that the management of the affairs of the District Focus by the office of the president, and particularly, the personal involvement by the President himself in monitoring the performance of the programme has added to it formidable authority, and everybody involved has found himself obliged to play his role more effectively. Failure to do so is tantamount to undermining the authority of the President. MPs who had been consistently absent from DDC meetings in the period before the District Focus

have now become regular attendants of these meetings.

These are the basic factors that give the District Focus an edge over the previous programmes of decentralization. They are the same factors that make the strategy a likely success.

SUMMARY

The administration manages rural development tasks through a planning process that involves identification of development projects/programmes, their prioritization, and the allocation of resources toward their implementation. The planning process may be carried out within a centralized or a decentralized administrative structure or a combination of both i.e. a partially decentralized structure. However, a decentralized planning organization is considered to be a more superior and desirable one in so far as it is supposed to lead to more efficient, effective and realistic decision making.

In Kenya the structure of the planning machinery has been changing over time. Throughout the colonial period there was no permanent organization that was charged with the responsibility for planning and plan implementation. The process of planning was carried out on ad hoc basis by appointed parties or commissions each dealing with a specific issue. After the second world war the colonial

government produced a series of development plans each drawn by different committees which were themselves centralized. The 'Plans' were partial in favour of the socio-economic development of the European communities.

In the post independence period a permanent planning organization was created being at different times either an independent ministry or a combined Ministry of Finance and Planning. However, the planning process itself remained centred in Nairobi. Although several attempts were made at administrative decentralization. These largely proved a failure especially because of the unwillingness of the headquarter officials to delegate effective decision making authority to the localities. Such attempted programmes of decentralization included (i) the establishment of local level development committees, (ii) the SRDP, (iii) the DDG (RDF) programmes, (iv) District Planning, and (v) the District Focus strategy. However, the last programme or strategy has been on the ground for only four years. It is however, a more comprehensive decentralization programme. Its chances of success lie in the enormous political support it has: A factor that was lacking in the previous programmes.

FOOTNOTES

1. Edward Weidner: 'The Elements of Development Administration'. In Weidner, E. (ED), Development Administration In Asia. Durham,, Duke University Press, 1970 p. 18.

For other definitions of Planning see, for example, Albert Waterston, Development Planning: Lessons of Experience. The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1965, p. 9 and Jackson, R.H.. "Planning, Politics and Administration' In Hyden, G.; Jackson, R.H. and Okumu, J. (eds.) Development Administration: The Kenyan Experience: Oxford University Press, Nairobi 1970, p. 178.
2. Albert Waterston op. cit. p. 45.
3. Republic of Kenya: Ministry of Finance and Planning,, Development Plan 1964-1970, p. 5.
4. For a detailed definition of these concepts see, for example, Smith, B.C., Field Administration: An Aspect of Decentralization. London, Rowledge and Kegan Ltd., 1967, p. 1; Waterston, A., op. cit.
5. Emil J. Sandy: 'Improvement of Local Government and Administration for Development Purposes' In Raphaeli, N. (ed) Readings In Comparative Public Administration. Boston, Allyn and Bacon Inc. 1967 p. 241.

6. See Julius Nyerere: 'Decentralization', Dar-es-Salaam 1972.
7. Emil Sandy, op. cit. p. 241.
8. Cited in Walter Oyugi: 'Participation in Development Planning at the Local Level' Institute for Development Studies (IDS) Discussion Paper University of Nairobi p. 3.
9. Cited in Colony and Protectorate of Kenya: Sessional Paper No. 55. The Development Plan 1954-1957.
10. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya: Development and Reconstruction Authority Report Covering the period from 31st August 1945 to 31st December 1946. Nairobi Government Printer, 1946, p. 1.
11. Republic of Kenya: Ministry of Economic Planning and Develonment. Development Plan 1966-1970 p. 8.
12. The list of the members to the various committees is given in Appendix.
13. James R. Sheffield (ed.) Education, Employment and Rural Development. Report of the Kericho (Kenya) Conference 1966. E.A.P.H., 1967, p. 17. The authors further discuss details of the conference's recommendations.

14. Republic of Kenya: Ministry of Finance and Planning. Development Plan for the Period 1970-1974, p. 177.
15. For a detailed account of the characteristics and performance of the SRDP in the six programme areas, see Walter Oyugi: Rural Development Administration. A Kenyan Experience. New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House PVT Ltd., 1981.
16. Ministry of Economic Planning and Development 'Rural Development Fund Manual', 1986, p. 2.
17. Ibid. p. 4.
18. Circular letter from the Permanent Secretary, MFP to all Provincial Planning Officers.
19. This information was obtained from the Bungoma District Development Committee Minutes Files.
20. Letter from the MFP to the Provincial Planning Officer Western Province. 12/11/1973.
21. MFP 'District Development Planning': Circular document to all Provincial Planning Officers and District Commissioners, 19/5/1972. p. 1.
22. Republic of Kenya: Commission of Inquiry: Public Service Structure and Remuneration Commission. Chairman, Duncan Ndegwa. Nairobi, Government Printer 1971. p. 112.

23. MFP 'District Development Planning' op. cit. p. 2.
24. Ibid. p. 2.
25. Ibid. p. 2
26. Ibid. p. 2
27. Circular letter from MFP to all Provincial Planning Officer. EPD/WP/164/7 16/1/73.
28. Personal Interview with a former PPO, Western Province for the period between 1970 to 1975. (He is now the Chief Rural Planning Officer, MEPI).
29. Personal Interview with a former PPO, Western Province for the period 1977 to 1980.
30. Republic of Kenya: Office of the President. The District Focus for Rural Development, Nairobi, Government Printer 1984, p. 1.
31. However, available records show that no Member of Parliament in Bungoma District has ever attended a Divisional Development Committee.

CHAPTER III

THE POLITICS OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT

The central concern of this chapter is to assess the socio-political factors that influence the administration's choice of development projects/programmes to be funded by the government, and the siting of these projects. More primarily, the chapter examines the impact of these socio-political influences on the tempo of rural development in Tongaren. Among the questions the chapter seeks to answer are: (1) What is the pattern of resource allocation as drawn up by the various decision-making units (both central and local). (2) Is this pattern in favour/disfavour of Tongaren or is it uniform? (3) Who is responsible for this pattern: politicians or the local community? (4) In what ways are these parties responsible for the existing pattern of resource allocation? (5) In what ways does the pattern inhibit rapid development in Tongaren?

Role of the Local Development Committees in Project

Identification: Administrators and Politicians.

In the period before the District Focus, local development committees in Bungoma District took part in the selection of only three categories of projects, namely, the Rural Access Road Programmes, donor-assisted projects, Community development projects and the RDF projects. The lowest decision-making unit was the LDC.

However, there is no evidence that this committee had any session in Tongren throughout the period before the District Focus. It did not therefore take part in the process of project identification. Accordingly, the DVDC became the lowest decision-making unit.

The DVDC's and indeed all the local committee's membership may be categorized into two parts. First is the administrators, especially the divisional heads of ministry departments; and second, the local representatives, notably, the two county councillors, and the Kanu Divisional Chairman. However, throughout the existence of this committee, there is no record to show that the area MP ever attended its meetings. The MP does not therefore take part in the committee's decision-making process for project identification. There is also no evidence that he does take part whether by proxy or through any other means. The two county councillors in the division are the only local representative attending the DVDC meetings. The ^{locational} chiefs, though dejure members of the administration behave and act in the committees' deliberations in a manner that tends to place them among the local representatives. In selecting development projects, therefore, ^{locational} chiefs and councillors talk in favour of more projects for their respective areas of representation (in case of councillors) and administration (in the case of chiefs).¹ For the county councillors, this behavior may

be explained by the fact that these individuals need to appear to bring development to their respective wards in order to win popularity among the electorate. Besides, being residents of their areas of representation, they also stand to benefit from the advantage of a project in their respective areas. It is primarily for this latter reason that the chiefs also speak for their respective locations.

The administrative members of the committee play the role of "giving the final touches to the proposals and making sure that every area - be it a ward or a location is fairly catered for."²

However, the committee does not play an effective role in the selection of projects. This is so for three basic reasons: First, the meetings were held very infrequently especially in the period before the coming of the District Focus. In 1977, for example, no meeting of the committee was held. In a letter to the DO who is also the committee's chairman, the DC complained:

Through perusal of your sub-committees, it is obvious that these committees were never operational during 1977. Please it is important that these committees do hold regular meetings.³

This means that during those years in which the committee did not meet, it did not take part in choosing development projects/programmes to be funded in Tongaren. Accordingly

popular participation in the exercise (as would have been provided by especially the councillors) was equally absent. Second, during instances when the committee actually met and drew a list of proposals for development projects and programmes, such lists were not taken seriously by the higher committees, notably the DDC. Quite often the DDC ignored project proposals from the DVDC and either selected totally different ones or left out the Division altogether. At a meeting held on 4/4/74 for example, the DVDC prepared a list of thirty projects/programmes to be funded under the RDF programme. The projects included cattle dips, bridges, roads etc. Out of these projects the DDC did not bless any. During that financial year, the District received a total of K.Sh. 402,742 for eighteen projects, and none out of this amount went to Tongaren. All the eighteen projects had been picked by the DDC from the other five divisions in the district. The projects included five water schemes, eight cattle dips, one afforestation programme, one forest nursery, one A.I. run, one dam (repairs) and one fish pond. The DVDC is not therefore decisive in influencing resource or fund allocation.

The DVDC is also not quite often furnished with sufficient information regarding the choice of projects. In other words the committee is not aware of the stipulated criteria for choosing projects. The result is that the committee's choices are rejected and the higher decision-

making organs, notably the DDC, unilaterally select alternative projects without consulting with the DVDC. At a DVDC meeting held on 26/9/86, for example, the committee recommended a number of projects to be financed through the RDF programme. The projects were the following:

(i) In Ndalú Location:

- (a) Tongaren Township-Lukhuna-Malala-Tabini road.
- (b) Makhonge-Mabusi Primary School - Namunyiri river - Soy Sambu Market - Mwikupo - Maresi Market - Narati - Masanga road.

(ii) In Naitiri Location:

- (a) Tabani - Burudi Nabwera Bridge.
- (b) Mbakalu - Kibisi - Lukusi Bridge.
- (c) Bilibili - Atukha - Luuya - Karima road.
- (d) Masa bridge on Kiminini river.
- (e) Lukhuna - Lungai Bridge.

The DVDC members had emphasized roads because "roads in the division are very poor."⁴ However, upon the proposals reaching the DEC they were turned down, presumably because the selected projects were not in line with RDF financing policies. In particular, one policy of the RDF programme is that "In districts where Rural Access Roads Programme is operating rural access roads cannot be financed through RDF."⁵ But DEC did not ask the DVDC to prepare a fresh list, rather it went ahead to unilaterally prepare another

list of proposals on behalf of the DVDC (or Tongaren) which was then presented to the DDC for approval. The list was approved and the projects therein received funds as shown below:

- (a) Tongaren Fodder Bulking project - K.Sh. 50,000
- (b) Tongaren Afforestation Project - K.Sh. 50,000
- (c) Khakoni Bridge in Naitiri Location - K.Sh. 200,000
- (d) Naitiri Soil Conservation: Phase I - K.Sh. 70,000

The failure to furnish the DVDC with the relevant information and guidelines for the selection of projects points towards the lack of seriousness attached to this committee. The DDO who is expected to be the local official most familiar with the criteria for project identification under the various programmes, and who is supposed to be the secretary to this and all the other DVDCs never attends the committee's sessions because:

There is a lot of work here at the headquarters (District). I am always busy with the DDC and DEC meetings and affairs in general-drafting agendas, writing minutes, preparing District Plan Annexes, supervising RDF projects in the field etc. In fact there needs to be an additional staff to the office of the DDO, for example a Deputy DDO and six assistant DDOs - one for each division to act as secretaries to the DVDCs and attend to the other relevant matters.⁶

The DDOs failure to attend the DVDC sessions which would take only twenty four days in a year (i.e. four meetings per division) is not overly burdensome. The idea

seems to be that DVDCs are not critical decision-making organs, hence the DDO is sure to do in the DEC and DDC sessions what he would have liked to do at the divisional meeting.

Secondly, if the role of the DVDC were considered crucial or indispensable in the process of project identification, Tongaren DVDC's proposals in the above example should have been referred back to the committee accompanied with the necessary guidelines for RDF project identification. However, this did not happen since the DDC felt it could effectively provide alternative projects. It is infact for the same reason that the MPs do not attend the DVDCs.

In short it may be said that the Divisional Development Committee is not an effective decision-making organ as regards project identification. It is evident, therefore, that popular participation at this level (as would be provided for by the membership to these committees, of local representatives) is also of no consequence to the manner and pattern of project identification or resource allocation. This applies to both during the District Focus and before.

Project proposals by the DVDC are usually forwarded to the DDC for further scrutiny and endorsement. Membership to the DDC may, like the DVDC, be categorized into two parts: the administrators and local representatives

and the notably, MPs, District Party Chairman (who is also an MP). It is through the MPs that popular participation is expected to be achieved.

Although the 1966-70 Development Plan had not included local representatives in the DDC membership list, the earliest records of DDC meetings, in Tongaren, 14/8/72, show MPs to be official members of this committee. However, these MPs were perpetually absent from the committee meetings and equally so from the DDAC meetings. One MP in the district once wrote to the PPO complaining that notices of development committee meetings are usually very short hence he is unable to attend most of the sessions. However, the PPO responded categorically denying responsibility for MPs' failure to attend meetings, adding that "in some cases we have been very much disappointed at their very low attendance".⁷

From the available records, Tongaren's member attended only one DDC meeting on 14/8/72 for the period before the District Focus. The consequence of an MPs absence from a DDC meeting is that "projects from his area may not get support".⁸

The persistent absence of MPs from DDC sessions meant that the committees' decisions as regards (DDG/RDF) project identification remained largely the business of the administrative members. Right from the start, the DDC

(whose attendants were basically administrators) did not favour Tongaren division in allocating the DDG (RDF) funds. In every year's allocation, Tongaren was either left out or minimally considered. At a meeting held on 22/8/73, for example, the DDC recommended a total of fourteen projects to be funded by the DDG during the 1973/74 financial year. Of these projects three were for Kimilili division, seven for Kabuchai, three for Elgon and only one for Tongaren. The table below shows details of the projects.

Table.7; Distribution of RDF Money According to Divisions.
Financial Year 1972/73.

Name of Project	Division	Estimate	Amount
		Cost £	Allocated
Kamtiong cattle dip	Kimilili	920	460
Matulo cattle dip	Kimilili	800	600
Samicha water scheme	Kabuchai	4232	3847
Namilamā " "	Kabuchai	2955	2448
Chwele " "	Kabuchai	1070	970
Butonge " "	Kabuchai	2840	2255
Kisiwa Village Polytechnic	Kabuchai	3467	2967
Khāsoko " "	Kabuchai	3835	2845
Kabujai Fish Pond	Kabuchai	840	840
Chebweki Water Scheme	Elgon	798	1585
Kabkara " "	Elgon	3386	3076
Natili Village Polytechnic	Kimilili	8256.7	6002.5
Laba " "	Elgon	13601	11327
Naitiri " "	Tongaren	3349	2699
	TOTAL	67477	41921.5

Source: DDC files.

As is noticeable in the Table, Kabuchai Division projects received a majority/(seven) seemingly because the division was the largest. Mt.Elgon and Kimilili were recommended for three projects each while Tongaren for only one. Thus the DDC did not look at Tongaren with favour. However, as was usual at the time, not all the above DDC recommended projects were approved by the MFP. Infact only five were allocated with funds while the rest were cancelled for various reasons. The table below shows details of the approved projects for Bungoma District.

Table 8: Distribution of RDF Money According to Division, 1973/74 Financial Year.

Name of Project	DIVISION	TOTAL EST. COST £	SELF-HELP CONTRIBUTION	AMOUNT GRANTED
Samicha Water Scheme	Kabuchai	4232	385	3847
Namilama " "	Kabuchai	2955	507	2448
Butonge " "	Kabuchai	2840	586	2255
Kabkara " "	Elgon	3386	310	3176
Kamtiong Cattle Dip	Kimilili	920	N/A	400
Matulo " "	Kimilili	800	-	400
Kabuchai Fish Pond	Kabuchai	840	-	840
TOTAL		15973		13366

Source: DDC files. Bungoma

It is clear from the above table that Tongaren did not receive funds for any project during this financial year. This was clearly not the mistake of the MFP because the ministry's general regulation was not to finance village polytechnics (which is the kind of project that had been proposed by the DDC for Tongaren) because "they were out of scope of DDC grants." The mistake lay squarely with the DDC which did not diversify Tongaren's chances by proposing more than just one project.

The neglect of Tongaren by the DDC in allocating the DDG/RDF resources has been manifest throughout the years as more projects are selected from the other divisions in the district and very few from Tongaren. The table below helps to show this trend.

Table 9: Distribution of DDG/RDF Money 1971-1978

YEAR	TOTAL NO. OF PROJECTS	NO. OF PROJECTS FOR TONGAREN	TOTAL AMOUNT ALLOCATED	AMOUNT ALLOCATED FOR TONGAREN
1971/72	5	0	3300	0
1972/73	14	0	7	0
1973/74	15	0	243342	0
1974/75	18	0	402742	0
1975/76	57	6	1629598	223,470
1976/77	14	0	590160	0
1977/78	8	6	246580	196,700

Source: Bungoma DDC files.

The imbalanced resource allocation has continued upto the present. Although it was not possible to get access to most of the crucial records after 1979, the following statement made by Tongaren's DVDC is important in pointing at the imbalances in the allocation of RDF money:

... the RDF (should) be divided equally among the divisions in the district so that each sub-DDC (i.e. DVDC) can allocate these funds.
... the previous (SIC) method of distribution led to unequal distribution.⁹

The DDC's (which was basically administrative) reluctance to allocate resources to the settlement area is explained by the feeling prevalent among the committee's members that the non-settlement divisions in the district were more disadvantaged and lagged behind in development than did Tongaren. In the words of a former PPO for Western Province:

Oh, we were biased against those people (Tongaren). We felt that they had already had quite alot (of resources).¹⁰

Thus it would appear that the administration in the district as well as the province at large had decided to withhold the development of Tongaren beyond the level reached when the area was being prepared for settlement.

The purpose of this decision clearly seems to have been to uplift the level of rural development in the non-settlement areas in order to obtain a balanced or equal levels of rural development.

In the district's first development plan, for example, there was stressed the commitment "to avoid unbalanced development ... (through) a balanced identification of programmes and projects in all sectors."¹¹ The symbol of unbalanced development in Bungoma district appear to have been Tongaren division. The district's development plan further pointed out that the settlement schemes have:

More abundant service facilities than boarder areas. Piped water, roads and co-operative societies are fairly advanced... As high as 55 bags of maize per hectre have occassionally been achieved.¹²

This is the principle and belief that guided the DDC in allocating those funds at its disposal.

There was, however, no rationale in adopting this attitude and behavior as what had been allocated to the settlers in Tongaren, as already seen was basically land and dairy animals. In order that these resources proved productive they had to be developed by, for example,¹³ improving on the road conditions. The two major road arteries in the division - The Mbandu - Turbo road and the Beitini - Brigadier - Ndalu - Pitole road needed urgent attention. An accessible road system would facilitate the transportation of farm inputs and farm produce to the farms and to the market, respectively.

Secondly, there was need to construct milk cooling points in every scheme where the settlers would deliver their

evening milk. This milk usually went (and still goes) to waste as the lorry that collects milk does so only in the mornings yet cows are milked both in the morning and in the evening. Milk coolers required electrical energy hence the need for electrification. Thirdly, there was need to construct the Kenya Farmers Association KFA (the present KGCCU) stores closer to the settlers (at least one in the division). There was also need to construct the equivalent of the National Cereals and produce Board (NCPB) store in the division in order to facilitate the marketing of the settlers' harvest.

The need to build more primary schools in the area was also an immediate one as these had not been considered by the European former-settlers of the area. Equally, there was need for more than just the one health center existing in the division for a long time after settlement. (It was not until 1971 that a self-help cottage hospital was started at Tongaren market).

In short, Tongaren needed an additional amount of resources to stimulate higher production of the basic agricultural resources, namely dairy animals and farm-land. Unless this was done these agricultural resources were bound to be underutilized with the cosenquence of inhibiting development.

Thus, unless additional resources were directed to the area the initial basic resources allocated to the settlers would have been wasted. In the words of the third PPO for Western Province:

Tongaren was a new area hence it needed a lot more resources to be pumped there in order to stimulate development.¹⁴
also

Additional resources would appear to have been an indispensable factor if Tongaren had to become self sustaining in development.

The above mentioned factors go along way to question the rationality for a biased resource allocation against Tongaren.

Of course it was not the policy of the MEPD neither was it a condition or requirement of the DDG/RDF programme or authority from any other higher level decision-making organs, that the DDCs should, for whatever reason, accept an imbalanced pattern in spartial distribution of resources or development projects. The decision was purely localized in the DDC for Bungoma. Certainly, the skewed distributional pattern was not popular among Tongaren's local population as testified above by the local DYDC. There was therefore need for an effective representation of the case of Tongaren in the DDC-to champion the interests of the division and to counter or deter any decisions the committee might take which may be unfairly biased against Tongaren.

However, this kind of effective representation or leadership was lacking in the case of Tongaren. The area Member of Parliament was the expected representative of the local interests in the DDC. But as already mentioned, the MP was absent from the DDC sessions throughout the period before the coming of the District Focus for Rural Development program. Although there existed other channels through which the area MP could have represented the development case of Tongaren to the administration (such as through personal communication to the relevant administrative departmental heads), there is no record of such an attempt having been made except in one case. In a letter to the District Water Officer, Bungoma, the MP sought to have the water for a Kimilili resident reconnected. The undated letter read in whole:

District Water Officer,
Re: Mafumbo Desterio Kwanusu.
This old^{man} has been paying for his water.
Somebody disconnected it wrongly. Can you please
arrange to connect (sic) it.

On receiving the letter, the District Water Officer inscribed on it the words "noted and cited". It is, not clear whether action was actually taken on the matter. When however, the concrete rural development needs and demands of the people of the MP's area of representation are considered a matter such as the above immediately degenerates as to occupy only a secondary position.

Indeed the local population realizes their representation to be less efficacious. When the respondents were asked whether they consider the local representative to be helpful in their development efforts, a majority of the respondents answered in the negative - 51% in Tongaren and 60% in Kimilili. Among the people's expectations are the following (in order of the frequency of mention):

- (a) That the MP should conduct harambee rallies and initiate development project and programmes.
- (b) That the MP should be communicating "our development problems" to the decision-makers.

For the Tongaren's member to be expected to put pressure on the administration to cater for the division's development needs, is really not to put too many or unique demands to him as this is the practice with some of the other MPs in the district. We shall here below discuss one such case.

During the formulation of the 1979/83 District Plan, the DDC had finally proposed two water projects for Mount Elgon Division. These were Chemoge and Kepsokwany water Schemes. However, when the Development Plan was released, no water project for Mount Elgon had been included in it. This means that when the office of the DDO was compiling the

the various sectoral plans into a single Plan for the District these omissions were made. In a letter to the DDO the area MP complained thus:

At the (DDC) meeting there was general consensus among those present that the planning of water projects in the past totally omitted the Mount Elgon area, although all water projects depended on water from Mount Elgon. I had therefore requested for new plans to cover Chemoge/Kapsokwany and the area West of Kapsokwany stretching to Chepkube.¹⁵

However, there is no record indicating documentary response by the DDO to the MPs complaints. Four months later the MP presented the matter to parliament by way of a question to the Minister for Water Development. But the MP asked the question by proxy, through the MP for a neighbouring constituency within the same District. This approach (proxy) may have been used because the Member for Mt. Elgon was an Assistant Minister hence for purposes of the principle of collective cabinet responsibility he had to use a back bencher. However, the question ran as follows:

"(a) How many water projects are due to be constructed in Bungoma District during the 1979/83 plan period?

(b) How many of them are in Bungoma South?

(c) How many of these are intended to serve either wholly or partly the Mt. Elgon Division?"¹⁶

In answering the question, the Assistant Minister for Water Development appeared to have been fully aware that the exercise of District Development Planning was carried out or supposed to be carried out at the local (District) level. Accordingly he referred the MF to Bungoma's DDC. In his reply, the Assistant Minister for Water Development stated that:

None of the water projects mentioned is wholly or partly designed to cater for Mt. Elgon Division. The reason is that when the ministry received the list of projects to be undertaken in the district from the DDC, that list did not include any priority projects in Mt. Elgon Division. If this had been done, the ministry would have included such projects in its present programmes. The member should press the DDC to give priority to a project in the Division and this ministry will act accordingly."¹⁷

The Member for Mt. Elgon heeded this advice and made a second attempt to have the DDC select a project from his area. However, he did it more forcefully this time in a letter to the DC which is as far as possible reproduced below:

I have many a time raised the question of water projects in the Mt. Elgon, in the DDC and other fora and it was my understanding that the secretary to the DDC had always submitted our case to the authorities concerned. Apparently for reasons known only to himself, he excluded Mt. Elgon from his priorities...

... the omission of water projects covering Mt. Elgon can only be interpreted to mean that there was discrimination on the part of the officer concerned (DDO) because all other Divisions in the District were covered. If this attitude is prevailing then how can Mt. Elgon expect any development.¹⁸

The administration took the MP's efforts seriously, for during the following year's allocation of RDF funds the DDC meeting held on 14/7/81 selected two water projects for Mt. Elgon Division/constituency. The projects are Chemoge -Kapsokwany and Chebwek.¹⁹

The member for Mt. Elgon had thus succeeded in having the DDC and, ultimately, the MPPD allocate funds for two water projects in his area. This is the kind of effort that Tongaren's political leadership needed to make in order for the Division to obtain the administration's favourable attitude in allocating resources towards development projects/programmes in the area. The absence of such political support in Tongaren as discussed here lends credibility to the study's first hypothesis which stated that the slow pace of rural development in Tongaren is attributable to the failure of the local political leadership to influence bureaucratic resource allocation in favour of the area.

The tendency for the local administration in Bungoma to allocate fewer resources to Tongaren does not appear to have been based on sociological factors, notably ethnicity as had been alluded to in the study's third hypothesis. The hypothesis had contended that the low rate of rural development in the area was caused by ethnic forces in the district which influence the bureaucracy to allocate resources partially to the detriment of Tongaren. The data obtained from the field revealed that there are about three major ethnic groups in the District, namely the Bukusu, who occupy Sirisia, Kanduyi (formerly Kabuchai Division) Kimilili and parts of Webuye Divisions. The Tachoni occupy the larger part of Webuye Division, while the Saboot occupy the Mt. Elgon Division. Tongaren on the other hand is a cosmopolitan Division with regard to its ethnic composition. Being a settlement areas it attracted settlers from all the three ethnic groups in the district as well as from outside the district as in the case of the Luo, the Maragoli, the Kabras, Banyala, Teso, Bakhayo, etc, although the Bukusu are the majority single ethnic group. (see introduction). Thus Tongaren is not occupied by a single ethnic group which could be discriminated against as a bloc in the allocation of resources.

Claims of ethnic based discrimination in bureaucratic resource allocation in the district are present only in Mt. Elgon Division which is occupied exclusively by the Saboot.

The residents of this Division complain that the local Development Committee favours Divisions occupied by the Bukusu in allocating development projects and programmes. The exclusion of the Division in allocation of water projects during the 1979/83 District development plan for example, was explained by the area Member of Parliament in terms of ethnicity. In a letter to the DDO (already cited above) the politician argued in part:

... You will no doubt agree with me that this kind of revelation can only increase suspicions between the people living in the District. The Abao have always felt that they are discriminated against by the majority tribe (Bukusu) in the District and hence the omission of water projects can be misinterpreted to mean that someone was out to discriminate against them.

There is however, no evidence that the omission of the Mt. Elgon in the allocation of water projects was a consequence of ethnic considerations by the bureaucracy. Indeed the pattern of bureaucratic resource allocation as shown in Table Seven and Table Eight does not indicate that Mt. Elgon Division is discriminated against in the process of bureaucratic resource allocation by the local DDC. In short, the low pace of rural development in Tongaren cannot be attributed to ethnic considerations by the local bureaucracy in decision making for resource allocation.

During the District Focus, the DDCs as already seen in the previous chapter, were conferred with added responsibilities for identifying not only the RDF and donor assisted projects, but also all the District specific projects which include all the district projects voted under the various ministries' development and recurrent budget. It is because of the now tremendous decisiveness of the DDC in the process of resource allocation or project identification that the District's MPs regularly attend the committee's sessions. The presence of MPs appears to have acted as a deterrent factor against imbalanced resource allocation by the administration which constitutes the larger part of the DDC. This tendency is manifested by the near divisional balance in the distribution of development projects and programmes as well as the allocation of recurrent development funds to the projects. The following is an example of the first development expenditure proposals for the Department of Health under the District Focus.

Table 10: Development Expenditure Proposals for the Department of Health, 1984/85 Financial Year.

Name of Institution			Estimate
Division	Particulars	Cost (£)	
Bungoma Hospital	Kanduyi		30,000
Kimilili Health Centre	Kimilili	Buildings	60,000
Karima Dispensary	Tongaren	Equipment	10,000
		Building	10,000

Name of Institution	Division	Particulars	Estimate Cost (£)
Bulondo Dispensary	Webuye	Equipment	10,000
		Buildings	35,000
Tongaren Dispensary	Tongaren	Buildings	8,000
Kabuchai Health Centre	Sirisia	Equipment	10,000
		Buildings	35,000
Kaptama " "	Mt. Elgon	Equipment	10,000
		Buildings	30,000
Kibabii Dispensary	Kandui	Equipment	10,000

Source: DDC files, Bungoma District.

Thus all divisions had at least one project recommended for funding.

The following years' (1985/86) Development Expenditure proposals endorsed by the DDC were as shown below:

Table 11: Development Expenditure Proposals for the 1985/86 Financial Year.

Name of Institution	Division	Particulars	Estimate Cost Allocated
Bungoma Hospital	Kanduyi	Housing	30,000
Karima Dispensary	Tongaren	Equipment	3,000 on going
		Buildings	5,000 DANIDA

Name of Institution	Division	Particulars	Estimate Cost Allocated
Bulondo Dispensary	Webuye	Equipment	3,000 on going IDA
		Buildings	50,000
Tongaren Dispensary	Tongaren	Equipment	20,000 on going EEC
		Buildings	50,000
Kabuchai Health Centre		Equipment	50,000
Sirisia Health Centre	Sirisia	Buildings	10,000 on going FINIDA

Source: Bungoma DDC files.

During that year's proposals only Kimilili Division seems to have been left out. This may, however, be justifiably so because arrangements were already under way for the Kenya-Finland Primary Health Care to 'rennovate' Bokoli health centre in Kimilili Division. Indeed by January 1987 the contractor was already on site. The objective of expanding the Dispensary was really to "elevate it to Health Centre status."²⁰

Other records to which access was got are for the Department of Education Science and Technology. During the 1985/86 fiscal year the DDC endorsed proposals for allocation of Development expenditure funds to various government-maintained secondary schools in the District. The Treasury approved these proposals and allocated funds to the projects. The distribution depicted an even pattern

Name of Institution	Division	Particulars	Estimate Cost Allocated
Bulondo Dispensary	Webuye	Equipment	3,000 on going IDA
		Buildings	50,000
Tongaren Dispensary	Tongaren	Equipment	20,000 on going EEC
		Buildings	50,000
Kabuchai Health Centre		Equipment	50,000
Sirisia Health Centre	Sirisia	Buildings	10,000 on going FINIDA

Source: Bungoma DDC files.

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as shown below:

Table 12: Development Expenditure Proposals for the
Department of Education for 1985/86
Financial Year.

Name of School	Division	Specification	Amount Allocated Shs.
Kimilili Secondary	Kimilili	Electrification	100,000
Luuya Girls High	Webuye	Tuition Block	100,000
Cheptais Secondary	Mt. Elgon	Dormitory	100,000
Chesamisi High	Kimilili	Dining Hall Ext.	80,000
Bungoma High	Kanduyi	Dining Hall (Com- pletion)	40,000
Butonge Secondary	Sirisia	Laboratory	80,000
Kibuk Girls Secondary	Mt. Elgon	Teacher's House	100,000
Naitiri Secondary	Tongaren	Library	100,000
T O T A L			700,000

Source: Bungoma DDC files.

As already pointed out prioritization and shortlisting of development projects and programmes is carried out by the District Executive Committee before presenting to the DDC. Thus DEC is the executive arm of the DDC. This DDC sub-committee is wholly administrative in composition. Politicians or any other local representatives do not attend the committee's meetings. Deliberations are therefore among the bureaucrats themselves.

The procedure taken in the deliberations is as follows. Every head of department who is also the department's A.I.E. holder comes with a list of project proposals which he will have prepared and arranged in order of priority. He will have done this on the basis of the expenditure ceilings legislated by Treasury; the information received from the various DVDCs and other sources; the ministry's sectoral policies etc. The DEC then discusses the sectoral lists in turns. Other members of the committee make suggestions, criticisms and alterations to each of the sectoral proposals before a final list is drawn for presentation to the DDC. This author was denied permission to attend any of this committee's sessions. However, the DDO who is the secretary to the committee described the sessions' process as "a kind of family affair where we really fire at each other so that the final lists to be submitted to the DDC is a product of the entire committee."²¹

Although the DEC is entirely administrative in membership, the politicians' ghost is always present in the meetings and guides the deliberations. In other words, the DEC is always aware that its decisions and conclusions will be subjected to scrutiny by the DDC. It is therefore cautious not to displease any important member(s) of the committee. This refers particularly to the MPs especially during ^{the} present period of the District Focus

when unlike the period before, they are very regular and consistent attendants of the DDC meetings. Thus DEC is guided by an inevitable principle of impartiality in the identification of development projects in the District. As the DDO put it:

"We do this while at the same time looking behind our shoulders because we know that the DDC has an eye on us and what we do. So we always try to predict and take into account how the DDC is likely to receive the proposals we present to them and especially the MPs.²²

During the 1984/85 financial year, for example, DEC had identified five primary schools in the district where lightning arrestors (each costing K.Sh. 30,000) would be fixed. However, of all the five projects, none was located in Mt. Elgon Division/Constituency. When the list reached the DDC the area member was quick at pointing out the omission arguing that incidents of destruction by lightning were equally rampant in his area. However, the MP did not demand for the transfer of one project from a division such as Kimilili which had received two, to Mt. Elgon. He only asked the committee to consider his area when funds are available - a request that was met during the following (1985/86) financial year.

Such failure by DEC to provide for certain areas does not appear to be a deliberate measure to pursue an imbalanced or partial distribution of resources, rather the

administration (DEC) does on occasion fail to remember the political implications of their decisions. Regarding the above case, the DDO considered the omission to be purely an error. In his words:

Surely, nobody at the DEC had noticed that Mt. Elgon had not been allocated a lightning arrester. Had we done so we would have corrected the situation on the spot.²³

During the same fiscal year, one MP caused a DDC meeting convened to approve proposals for the annual development and recurrent expenditure estimates to adjourn because the proposals did not seem to have been "well" prepared. According to the DDO the proposals had not included the Member's area as effectively as he would have liked. DEC was compelled to review its decisions in the light of this.

In short, there^{is} evidence that the presence of MPs in DDC meetings acts as an effective deterrent factor against imbalanced resource allocation by the administration. This is a positive political factor that had been absent before the coming of the District Focus, thereby leading to the neglect of Tongaren.

In the period before the District Focus the PDC and PDAC also took part in decision-making for resource allocation at the local level. However, MPs failed to attend this committee's meetings as often as was the case with the DDC.

PDC and PDAC. Deliberations were therefore left upon the administrative members of the committee. Since DDG/RDF funds are allocated to the individual districts, the exercise of allocating this money was/is carried out at the District level, especially the DDC. For this reason, the PDC which was partly composed of the DDC members had nothing much to do with the proposals they had already made at the District level. There are therefore no records showing that any projects or decisions made by any of the three DDCs in the province were altered or rejected by the PDC. For the only 'new' individuals (i.e. those who would not have been at the DDC meeting) were the provincial heads of departments (save the PPO who was the secretary to the DDCs and any member of parliament from other districts who would have, as they did on occasion, attended the PDC meetings).

There are, however, certain kinds of projects which were not identified at the district level but only at the provincial level by the PDC and the PDAC. Rural Electrification Projects are an example. The government set out a Rural Electrification Committee which "decided on priorities as regards rural electrification programmes"²⁴ in consultation with the PDCs. The electrification committee receives funds from the government and donor countries through the Treasury. We shall here below discuss how Rural Electrification projects were identified

in one PDC meeting held at the Provincial headquarters Kakamega, on 14/11/77.

The General Manager of the then East Africa Power and Lighting Company was in attendance primarily because the basic item on the meetings' agenda was the identification of rural electrification projects. Once the chairman of the PDC (who is also the PC) had opened the meeting; minutes of the previous meeting confirmed; and no matter arisen from the previous minutes meeting, the EAP&L company's General Manager took the floor. He announced that the government had received funds from Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) for rural electrification (the total amount does not seem to have been disclosed. It is also not clear whether the funds were for the whole country or for Western Province alone). Against this amount, said the general manager, a number of projects in Western had been selected by his committee (i.e. the Rural Electrification Committee);

Kimilili division - to be undertaken in 1981
Malakisi location - to be undertaken in 1981
Busia township - in busia district for 1982/83
Hamisi division in Kakamega district-for the next development
Vihiga division in Kakamega which was underway
Mumias division in Kakamega - underway
Webuye town (for the papermill) in Bungoma district-
underway.
Nzoia Sugar Company in Bungoma - survey work completed.

No response had yet been received from Malakisi Cotton Ginnery in Busia District, Lugulu Girls High School in Bungoma District (Webuye Division) and Kabras Sugar Company in Lurambi Division Kakamega District.

It seems that the meeting was not meant to have the PDC select projects for electrification but merely to inform the committee (PDC) of the projects which the rural electrification committee had selected and the order in which the projects were going to be implemented. Nevertheless, every MP who attended the meeting spoke emphasizing the importance or urgency of electrification in his area. Those present were the MPs for Hamisi, Vihiga, Lurambi-South and Busia-North parliamentary constituencies. The member for Hamisi lamented that both Vihiga and Hamisi had been allocated funds for a joint electrification programme yet implementation was underway only in Vihiga while Hamisi had been left out. In response, the general manager for EAP&L Co. explained that although K.£ 100,000 had been allocated to both Hamisi and Vihiga, the cost of electrification in Hamisi was estimated at K.£ 110,000 and K.£ 82,000 for Vihiga. Thus the total cost of the two divisions far exceeded the available funds by almost on half. For this reason the rural electrification committee had decided to fund the Vihiga project first because the available K.£ 100,000 would effectively complete the project yet if Hamisi would have been selected, the amount would not have

completed its project. Hamisi was therefore placed on the waiting list for the next 1979/83 development plan period.

Next to speak was the member for Lurambi-South who only outlined the paramountcy of rural electrification. He did not speak for anywhere else. Third came the member for Busia who likewise articulated his constituency's need for electrification. The only present MP who did not speak on the issue was Vihiga's. This was apparently because his area had already been catered for and implementation ^{was well} work/underway. There was no representation for Bungoma District as no MP from the district had attended the meeting. Accordingly nobody attempted (regardless of the possibilities for success) to push the case for those parts of Bungoma that had not been mentioned for electrification. There was nobody, for example, to remind the rural electrification committee in particular and the PDC in general that the application forms for electrification which Tongaren settlers had filled in 1974 had not been responded to.

The last item on the committee's agenda was 'Any Other Business'. The stage was dominated by the MPs present each of whom stood to speak of the development needs of his area - need other than for electrification which had already been exhausted. The first one to speak was the member for Busia North who called upon the administration to build a separate police division for Busia rather than sharing one with Bungoma as the case was at the time. Next

was the member for Hamisi who also called upon the administration to consider putting up a police station in the Serem-Hamisi area "as a matter of urgency" in view of the escalating Nandi/Luhya conflicts in the area. (These police stations have since been constructed). Finally, the member for Lurambi South appealed to the administration to start a tractor service for Kakamega District's farmers as the available, privately owned tractors were too few and (perhaps as a consequence) very expensive for the small scale farmers to afford.

No demands were made for Bungoma as the MPs from the district who should have done so had all not attended the meeting. Accordingly, Tongaren was not represented. The consequence of a lack of political influence as expressed in our first hypothesis is that project proposals for such areas are often overlooked by the administrative decision makers hence slowed development.

We shall pursue further the issue of electrification now with particular reference to Bungoma District and especially Tongaren Division. The PDC chairman's wish at the 14/11/77 meeting that responsibilities for identifying rural electrification programmes be decentralized from the rural electrification committee to the DDCs and PDCs did not come true until the coming of the District Focus policy which involved decentralizing almost all such decision-making responsibilities. Accordingly in 1981 the rural

electrification committee sent out circular letters to the various DCs, including Bungoma's asking their DDCs to prepare "detailed proposals for electrification of Bungoma district." In doing so the DDC was required to take into account a number of factors,

- (a) Population density of the proposed area.
- (b) Current and projected economic and associated industrial activities that would require electrical energy e.g. agriculture, water development etc.
- (c) Social developments (existing and future) including schools, training centres, hospitals and dispensaries and market centres.
- (d) The extent of electrification to that date.

It seems the electrical committee did not advise the DDC on the amount of funds available for electrifying the District. Consequently, the DDC, upon being asked to propose programmes for electrification decided to list down all the areas that had not yet been covered. They are Kimilili, Kapsokwany, Tongaren, Chwele, Sirisia, Malakisi, Cheptais and Kapsiro. Although the MP for Tongaren did not attend the meeting, his area was not neglected since all areas in the District where electrification programme had not reached were named. Nevertheless in spite of its enormous economic importance in the District, Tongaren was third in the list of priority areas. However, it was not until the 1985/86 financial year that the DDC

approved the allocation of K.Sh. 400,000 toward electrification programme in Tongaren. The project is not yet started.

The Role of Local Interest Groups in
Project Identification.

We have demonstrated that popular participation in the process of project identification through the local development committees has not, in practice occurred. This was because of the ineffectiveness of the instrument for the local peoples representation on these committees. As a remedy, the local population has organized itself in groups of various kinds through which they make development demands to the administration in general and the decision-making centres for resource allocation, in particular. Notable among these groups are (1) Project Committees, and (2) Self-help groups.

Project committees come into being when a community with the felt need for a development project organizes itself around a team of appointed leaders, notably chairman, secretary and treasurer. The committee is appointed from among the ordinary members of the community. This committee then takes the responsibility for organizing local contributions in terms of money, material and labour toward the start of the needed project. The committee further oversees the

implementation of the project.

Quite often, the local contributions are not adequate enough to complete and operationalize the project (normally it goes upto only about 20% toward completion). It is at this stage that the project committee approaches the administration usually the DO, DC or the Ministry Department underwhich the project in question would ordinarily fall, for financial support. If the request is successful, such projects get funded through the Department of community development and social services, RDF or donor assistance through the DDC. There are about 71 such committees or projects in Tongaren Division and about 23 in Kimilili. We shall now describe the origins and development of such a project in Tongaren. It is the Tongaren Health Centre.

The need for a health centre at Tongaren Market was realized immediately after settlement, for the nearest health institution (and the only one in the Division) was at Ndalú Market which is about 14 kilometres away. The other health institutions to which the population around Tongaren Market could go to included Misikhu Mission Hospital which is thirty Kilometres away, Lugulu Mission Hospital - fourty kilometres, and Kitale District Hospital fourty kilometres.

District to be financed by the EEC. In a meeting held on 18/10/76 the DDC selected two projects for this purpose. They were Tongaren Health Centre in Tongaren Division and Mateka-Machwele water scheme in Kabuchai Division. It may be important to note here that the area's (Tongaren) MP did not attend this particular DDC meeting. Secondly, the DVDCs had not been requested to initially participate in the identification of the EEC micro-project. There is therefore no evidence that Tongaren health centre was the choice or suggestion of either the area's representative (MP) in the DDC or in the DVDC. There is however evidence that the suggestion or choice was made by the Ministry of Health in reaction to the numerous demands for expansion which the Tongaren local community had been making to this department through the Tongaren Cottage Hospital's project committee since 1972. The failure of Tongaren's representative in the DDC to attend this particular committee's session (and 'without apology') in spite of the PPO having sent out letters of invitation to all members indicating all the items of the agenda (including the selection of EEC micro-project), points in the direction of a lack of keenness in championing the cause of development ⁱⁿ his area of representation.

However, of the two project proposals made by the DDC, the MFP approved the Tongaren Health Centre.²⁵ The project involved the construction of a "standard Health

centre block" to provide facilities for both out - and in-patients as well as maternity services. Second was the construction of one class 'E' and three class 'G' staff houses. Third was power and water installation. The total cost of the project was estimated at K.£ 78,400. Of this amount, the local community was required to contribute K.£ 19,600 which is 25% of the total cost of the project, the government of Kenya through the Ministry of Health, had to contribute an equal amount of K.£ 19,600 which is again 25% while the EEC would meet the balance being K.£ 39,200 which is 50% of the total cost of the project.

Of the required K.Sh. 392,000 self-help share contribution, the local community was able to raise only K.Sh. 30,000 through individual donations or contributions. This of course was a very insignificant fraction of the required amount, yet the EEC could not release its contribution until the entire 25% had been raised by the local community. From 1977 to 1980 therefore the project committee was faced with a virtual deadlock. A full-fledged harambee rally would seem to have been a more effective and perhaps traditional way out. However, the project committee did not conceive itself as being able to hold a successful rally, it was also "not easy to get someone influential enough to conduct one".²⁶ As a last resort, the project committee entered into negotiations with the Tongaren Farmers

Co-operative Society in early 1979 to have the latter surrender its building block and site that was adjacent to the cottage hospital in exchange for a section of the hospital's empty site. For the next one year the two parties could not reach an agreement. Meanwhile, the cottage hospital was running the risk of forfeiting the EEC donation because of the long delay in meeting its contribution.

On 11/3/80 the DC, having not concerned about the delays, ^{he} asked the DO (Tongaren) to "call a DVDC meeting and sort out the matter between the Project Committee and the Co-operative Society." At the same time, the DC also decided to "keep the local MP informed of the trend of events so that he does not blame any one in the event of us advising the EEC to give the money to another but more deserving project."²⁷

Although the MP was now formally informed, there is no evidence showing that he involved himself in the matter. In response to the DC's instructions the DO had summoned a DVDC meeting on 24/3/80 to resolve the issue i.e. the controversy between the project committee and the farmers' co-operative society. The Ministry of Health, the District Co-operative Assistant and the DDO were some of the headquarter officials in Bungoma who travelled to Tongaren to attend the DVDC meeting. The area's MP did not

turn up for the meeting. The outcome of the meeting (whose only agenda was the question of the cottage hospital) was that the co-operative society's officials agreed to let the Tongaren Cottage Hospital take up its building block in exchange for the hospital's empty site. Renovation work started immediately. On 29/10/80 an EEC delegation visited the site to inspect the extent of the self-help contributions. It is the K.Sh. 30,000 that the community had raised together with the acquired building block that the project committee presented to the EEC delegation as the local contribution. The delegation then formally announced its donation of K.Sh. 750,000 toward the project.

A few points of inference may now be drawn from the case of the Tongaren Cottage Hospital. First, it demonstrates the eagerness or a high desire for development and change that characterize the settlers in Tongaren. In other words, the settlers, governed by a felt need for development projects are ready to mobilize their locally available resources (in terms of money, material or labour) in contribution toward the initiation and implementation of the needed development projects.

Secondly, the settlers have a high capacity to place demands for development upon the administration and in the process, do influence the allocation of development and

subsequently recurrent expenditure funds to their division. Thus the Tongaren Cottage Hospital Committee, acting as an interest group was able to influence in its favour the DDC decision on the utilization of the EEC money allocated to the district.

The case of Tongaren Cottage Hospital Project also reveals the inability of the local politicians to play their role of mobilizing the people for development purpose. Once the DDC had decided to allocate the EEC money to the Cottage Hospital and the local community having been unable to make enough contributions to cover the requisite 25 per cent of the cost of the project. It was only plausible for the area MP to organize a full fledged Harambee rally in order to raise the required amount of K£ 196,000. Had this happened the EEC would have released its donation about four years earlier than it did. The inability of the political leadership to take such initiatives confirms the second hypothesis of this study which attributes the slow rate of rural development in Tongaren to the inability of the local political leadership to mobilize the people as well as their locally available resources for the purpose of initiating development projects.

Although Tongaren eventually received the EEC funds, the delay incurred had inevitable consequences. First,

given the increasing rate of inflation (now at 4%) the cost of implementation (prices of materials and labour) goes higher with time, hence the amount of funds that are allocated and estimated to be adequate for completing the project progressively diminishes in value and ends up not completing the project at the time it is utilized. Secondly, delays in implementing and completing the project means delays in tapping the services and benefits accruing to the project. Under normal circumstances Tongaren Health Centre should have become operational at the end of 1978 i.e. within two years of the allocation of funds. But this did not happen until 1985, which is more than eight years from the date the money was made available. However, although the local people had made their contribution by 1980, implementation work did not start until early in 1984. The mistake did not lie with the local people but it lay, squarely with the faultiness of the administrative machinery for project implementation.

Formation of project committees of this kind is not restricted to Tongaren alone. The origins and development of Bokoli Dispensary in Kimilili Division took more or less the same pattern as did Tongaren Health Centre. A project committee had been established in Mid-1960s to oversee the establishment of a health dispensary at Bokoli. Self-help and harambee contributions were donated by the local people and a building block was put up. Once the

project was completed, its committee requested for and subsequently received "continous governmental supply of staff, drugs and equipment, while construction of dispensary building and its maintainanceremained the responsibility of the community of Bokoli Location."²⁸

Frequent requests by the project committee and the Location's Assistant Chief for expansion of the dispensary and the construction of staff houses was for long not met by Bungoma's Ministry of Health. The Location's Assistant Chief then in August 1984 wrote a letter to the Lake Basin Development Authority (LBDA) asking for assistance in expanding the dispensary. After consultations with the DDO, the LBDA wrote the Assistant Chief on 6/3/85 saying it shall contact a possible donor. Five months later on 27/8/85, the Kenya Finland Primary Health Care in Western Province wrote the DDO with a copy to the Bokoli's Assistant Chief offering to renovate and expand the institution "provided that the DDC and District Health Management team provide additional funds... (otherwise) the development will be delayed and perhaps be transferred elsewhere upsetting your priorities."²⁹

Meanwhile the Bokoli residents had sent a memorandum to the DDO which said in part:

It is time you gave Bokoli location special consideration because it has been left behind (in development) as

compared to the rest of the locations
(presumably in Kimilili Division),³⁰

Among the demands contained in the memorandum were the need to construct new roads and repair the old ones and the need to expand Bokoli dispensary by constructing an administration block, an out-patient wing, wards, staff quarters, kitchen, abolition block and to provide an ambulance.

During the next 1986/87 financial year, the DDC allocated a total amount of K.Sh. 100,000 to augment the K.Sh. 340,000 donated by the Finish government under the auspices of The Kenya Finland Primary Health Programme. The required amount of contribution from the local population was made by way of monetary donations which went toward the purchase of a five acre plot adjoining the dispensary. This is the site of the expansion project and the contractor is already on the ground.

The second kind of interest groups is the self-help organizations, notably women groups, men groups and youth clubs. There is currently a total of 101 such groups in Tongaren. Underlying the creation of these groups is the common need felt by a number of individuals to start a development project or programme that is income-generating. In this way the group members hope to improve on their living standards. Membership to these groups is initially

determined by the ethnic factor. Namunyiri women group, for example, is made up of Tachoni, Kalyesa is composed of all the Maragoli women in Ndalu Location, while Siumbwa is composed of Bukusu women. Ethnic considerations are crucial in group membership because, as one official of such groups put it:

If we include people from other ethnic groups in our self-help group cooperation will be difficult to achieve especially now-a-days when there is a lot of hatred among the ethnic groups in the schemes.³¹

Self-help groups have a remarkable capacity for successfully influencing the administration to give financial support to their projects. We shall here below discuss the manner in which this is done with reference to the Kalyesa self-help women group.

Kalyesa women group was formed in 1976 primarily for the purpose of engaging in commercial ventures that would generate income for its members. The group started off by leasing pieces of land on which it planted maize, beans and sunflower using funds contributed by its members. Proceeds from the harvest and sale of these crops was shared among the members while a part was used for reinvestment. In 1984 the group started buying farm produce such as maize, beans and sunflower and then selling the same to the National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB) at a profit. Thus it had assumed the role of middle-man in the marketing of

these items. In 1985 the group started an Integrated Animal Production Project out of its own reserve of funds. This money proved inadequate for completing the project. The group presented its request for financial assistance through two channels: first through the hierarchy of community development committees (from the sub-location committee, through the district committee) and second by way of a letter to the PPO written by the group's secretary. During the 1984/85 financial year, the group was allocated an amount of K.Sh. 132,000 out of the RDF to be utilized in completing the Integrated Animal Production Project. It is not clear which of the two channels used by the group to obtain financial assistance became the more fruitful one. There is, however, reason to believe that it was the community development committees because this time (1984) the PPO had ceased to be the secretary to the DDC which identifies RDF projects. He does not therefore seem to have been any longer influential.

In 1984 the Kalyesa Women group further started a handicraft centre at Ndalul Market. Before completing the project, the group requested for financial assistance through the Community Development Committees. Out of the following year's RDF allocations, the group received K.Sh. 120,000 for the completion of the project.

Outside Tongaren Division in Kimilili, there are about 38 women groups. Among them are Nabangale, Masikini,

Umoja, Khaka, Titikhana and Nyayo. None of these groups seem to have undertaken development projects of the magnitude Kalyesa in Tongaren has. In Kimilili Division all the existing women groups engage themselves only in maize production and bee-keeping. They have therefore not had any record of influencing governmental allocation in their favour.

Although a majority of women groups undertake projects whose benefits are restricted to the group's members only and not spreading out to benefit the general community, the Namunyiri women group in Tongaren Division (Soy Sambu scheme) marked a departure from this trend in 1984 when it undertook to construct a bridge.³¹

In relation to women groups in Tongaren two points of observation may be made. First, they have a high capacity, both real and potential, for influencing administrative resource allocation. Secondly, as applies to all other women-groups the country over, they receive assistance mainly from the RDF. As it is the policy of the programme (i.e. RDF) not to start any project from scratch, Most groups which do not have adequate money of their own with which to start ^a project before such a project can attract ^{the} assistance from RDF, have either collapsed (such as was the fate of Kavogoi women group) or their development has stagnated. They do not therefore have any significant

impact upon bureaucratic decision-making for resource allocation and utilization. Such groups are the majority in Tongaren. In a circular letter to the DC s the CRPO infact outlined RDF top project priorities to be as follows:³²

- (a) On going projects requiring supplementary funding in order to complete them and make them operational.
- (b) RDF projects requiring rehabilitation i.e. those that had been rendered unoperational through natural calamities such as floods.
- (c) Any viable underutilized projects which fall within the funding guidelines of RDF.

It is the inability of a majority of women groups in Tongaren as well as in Kimilili to start self-help projects (mainly because of low incomes as shall be discussed in the next chapter) that in turn makes them unable to influence or attract governmental assistance.

The settlers in Tongaren do not attempt to influence bureaucratic resource allocation only through organized community effort, namely Project Committees and Women groups, rather the role of uncoordinated individual settler efforts was also found to be significant. Thus individual settlers make development related demands to the administration which demands are drawn from a wide range of development problems. These include the need to introduce other sources of income to supplement or to replace maize production;

(mentioned by 35 per cent of our respondents); improvement of the road and bridge condition (27 per cent); reliable supply of water, (20 per cent); introduction of dairy farming (18 per cent). Other demands included additional cattle dips, schools, youth polytechnics, telephone lines, electrification etc. The administrative officials interviewed also admitted to receive these demands.

The channel preferred most for the purpose of communicating demands to the bureaucracy is the department of Provincial administration, notably, the sub-chief, the Locational Chiefs and the District Officer. 37 per cent of our respondents claimed to use this channel. The Provincial administration is preferred as a channel for conveying demands because the local people consider the department to have supremacy over the operative departments all of which fall under its authority. Thus officials of the department of Provincial administration are considered to be more effective channel through which demands are conveyed to the bureaucracy and positive results achieved.

Our participatory observation at a chiefs Baraza confirmed the employment of the provincial administration, specifically the Locational Chiefs by the settlers in Tongaren as a channel for communicating demands to the administration. The observation also revealed that the bureaucracy, in particular the operative departments use the provincial administration as a channel for communicating

governmental policies, orders and directives to the local people.

At a baraza^{held} on 13th February, 1987 at 10.30 a.m., the Locational Chief for Naitiri announced that the purpose of the day's meeting was to have the people addressed by officials of the Ministry of Health from the District headquarters in Bungoma regarding the out break of typhoid disease in the area. The Health Official then talked at length touching on the causes of the disease, its symptoms, what to do when suspecting to have it; and, more importantly what hygienic measures to take in order to prevent an attack by the disease. He then asked the people to stay behind after the speeches for the purpose of vaccination. Thus the department of health had in effect used the chief's baraza to communicate governmental health policy as well as advices and instructions to the people.

Shortly before the session of vaccination began, the Chief asked anybody with a question to raise it. One by one the people made complaints about a wide range of issues most of which unrelated to the meeting's agenda. The people complained about, for example, the frequent out break of army worms that destroy the maize crop; refusal by the AFC to approve applications for loan; the failure of the NCPB buying centers to make payment for the farmers' deliveries and its relationship to the expulsion of students from secondary schools for non-payment of the first

instalment of fees, etc. Other people complained of wide spread witchcraft in the area, especially among the women while others complained of an increasing rate of thuggery and insecurity in the area especially after dusk. With the exception of the case of witchcraft which he described as baseless or ineffectual, the area chief promised to represent the peoples' problems to the relevant government departments.

Our survey showed also that 18 per cent of the people in Tongaren channel their demands for development and change directly to the Divisional as well as the District heads of the operative Ministry departments concerned with the problem at hand. This they do either by way of personal visits or through written communication. In a letter to the District Water Officer, Bungoma, for example, a settler from the Kamukuywa Settlement Scheme wrote:

I would like to register with you our complete dissatisfaction about the service we have been getting from your Naitiri Water Supply Scheme (sic). Since the beginning of November 1980, our water pipes have been empty and the reason, we are told is that there is low pressure as a result of low water supply to your main supply dams.

In our view, not enough has been done to supply us with water because a majority of our neighbours have continued to get water when we go to the stream. A similar situation prevailed in the years 1976/77/78 and we found ourselves confronted with water bills to the tune of K.Shs. 500/=, for water that was not flowing in our pipes! That we paid the bill was not to accept the liability but rather to ensure uninterrupted water supply. Our

account is now upto date in December 1980 and we do not get the water even then.

I would like to know what action you intend to take in ensuring that the money paid by us in advance for water supply is either refunded to us or made use of only when the water supply resumes in our lines.³³

The problem of the inadequacy of the Little Nzoia Water Supply Project in meeting the settlers' consumption needs was in fact found to be a general problem affecting almost all the farmers in Tongaren. When the respondents were asked how regular the flow of water in their taps is, only 8.6 per cent answered, "all the time"; 58.5 per cent answered "sometimes especially during the rainy season"; 25.7 per cent answered "never at all" while 7.1 per cent had no answer to this question as water supply to their plots had been disconnected due to non-payment of bills.

90 per cent of the respondents claimed to have lodged complaints regarding the problem of water to the Project Officials stationed at Naitiri Booster plant and at the Tongaren office of the officer-in-charge, 2 per cent to the District Officer, and to the area chief; and one per cent to the area MP. The remaining 5 per cent claimed not to have presented any complaints to the authorities since, being consumers of the same water, they already are aware of the existing problems.

The case of water supply was also brought to the attention of the Divisional Development Committee. In the

minutes of the meeting held on 2nd July, 1986 it was entered that "the members strongly felt that the Little Nzoia Water Supply is not giving enough water"³⁴. Our interview with the officer-in-charge of the Water Project revealed that the capacity of the project (100M³ per day) has turned out to be inadequate in the phase of the expanding population size which has now brought the volume of consumption to approximately 360 M³ per day.

In short, the settlers in Tongaren have made strong demands to the administration for the expansion and regularization of the Little Nzoia Water Supply Project. Bureaucratic response to these demands has been slow in forthcoming. It was not until the 1985/86^{financial year} infact that the DDC endorsed the construction of Phase II of the Project , referred to as the Little Nzoia West Project. Construction work has not yet began.

The problem of water supply is not restricted to Tongaren alone. It is also existent in the non-settlement area of Kimilili. The Division is served by the Ndivisi-Makuselwa Rural Water Supply Project, a Ministry of Water Development Project which went into operation in 1973. However, unlike the case in Tongaren, the Water Project in Kimilili did not lead water to every home. Rather, the water pipes run along main lines and any interested farmer is expected to purchase sufficient pipes and other materials

so that some water maybe diverted to his home. Accordingly, only 20 per cent of the local people have so far managed to have water connected to their homes while 8 per cent of the respondents claimed to have submitted applications for the water. However, an overwhelming 72 per cent have no water in their homes due to lack of money to purchase the materials required as well as the inability to obtain a leave of way from the farmers lying between the prospective water consumer and the main water line. It seems therefore that the settlement area, Tongaren was more advantaged than the non-settlement area of Kimilili Division in so far as piped water in the former area was led directly to every home without requiring the settlers to make any contribution toward the implementation of the project.

60 per cent of the residents of Kimilili who receive water also complained of irregularity in its flow. Such complaints are mostly forwarded to the project officials at Kamtiong station (source), and at the District Water Office in Bungoma. The residents of Kimilili also use letters to communicate their demands to the water administration. In a letter to the Provincial Water Officer, a consumer from Kamukunya Location of Kimilili Division wrote:

...the issue is that we are the first people on the main line and we regularly (at least every week) miss water for three or four days, whereas our fellow Wanainchi (citizens) on this main pipe who are in the second place to us, approximately one mile away and the rest from the main reservoir tank, NEVER miss their supply.³⁵

In a letter to the District Water Officer, another farmer from Kimilili complained of the toll which the absence of water was taking on his dairy business. In his words:

"recently my cattle were attacked by foot and mouth disease due to the fact that they mixed up with sick ones at the river when drinking water, and as a result caused great damage."³⁶

Unlike the case in Tongaren, the residents of Kimilili do also use collective action approach in making written demands to the bureaucracy. On 3rd November, 1978, for example, the residents of Makhonge Village wrote to the District Water Officer a collective letter bearing 210 names and signatures. In that letter they outlined the water-related problems they face and then asked the Water Officer to expand the project as a remedy to the problems. The residents of Kibingei Sub-Location used the same approach, but their letter was publicly read to the District Water Officer when he visited the area. Residents of five villages namely Wabukhonyi, Sinoko, Misemwa, Kamukuywa and Lukhuna also wrote a letter of complaint to the District Water Officer which letter bore 1514 signatories.³⁷

Such demands for improvement in the effectiveness of the Ndivisi-Makuselwa Rural Water Supply Project became so intense that in a letter dated 10th April, 1979 the District Water Officer complained to the Operator-in-charge of the project thus:

It has been observed that lack of initiative and responsibility at your supply and all the staff is on the increase. Of late various consumers have been lodging complaints to this office after your office failing to give necessary assistance to them. I appeal to you that serve wanainchi (citizens) as required otherwise your supply can spoil the good name of the Ministry of Water Supply (sic)³⁸

The result of pressure from the residents of Kimilili has been the initiation of extension work to the Ndivisi-Makuselwa Rural Water Supply Project. Infact, to speed up the implementation of the annex project the residents of Kimilili Division have volunteered to dig the trenches themselves through self-help efforts while the Ministry of Water Development provides the required materials and technical expertise.

It is evident, therefore, that the settlers in Tongaren individually make demands to the bureaucracy for resource allocation. Such demands are quite often positively responded to. This practice is also present in Kimilili - a non-settlement area where in addition to individual action, the local residents often enter into adhoc joint action to pressurize the bureaucracy to meet particular development needs of the area. The existence of the spirit of collective action in Kimilili may be attributed to the presence of unity among the people, a factor that is in turn based on the local people's ethnic homogeneity and common cultural heritage. In Tongaren on the other hand, there was no evidence

of adhoc concerted action to articulate particular development demands to the administration, a factor that may be attributed to a lack of general unity among the settlers which in turn could be traced to the existing ethnic and cultural diversity as well as the prevalence of inter-ethnic hostilities as discussed in Chapter One.

The tendency for individual local people to successfully articulate their development needs and to influence bureaucratic resource allocation is not present in Tongaren and Kimilili alone. In his study of the management of RDF projects in the Meru, Embu, Machakos and Kitui Districts of the Eastern Province of Kenya Ntwiga Nthiga also reports on the existing ability of the local individuals to influence the allocation of funds for the initiation and implementation of development projects and programmes.³⁹

It should be pointed out here, however, that the capacity of the settler-farmers in Tongaren to individually influence bureaucratic resource allocation is much lower than the potential capacity of a Member of Parliament since the latter sits on key decision-making organs notably DVDC, DDC, Parliaments and sometimes the cabinet. The tendency for the individual settlers in Tongaren to influence bureaucratic resource allocation cannot be construed to be an adequate substitution for the ineffective political leadership.

The Role of Centre in Project Allocation

The central bureaucracy in Nairobi, particularly the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development in conjunction with that of Finance, has a significantly decisive role in

influencing the management of rural development projects and programmes at the local level. In the first place, the center authoritatively determines or decides the amount of funds that will be allocated to each district for both the development and recurrent expenditure purpose under the various programmes. (Inter-district allocations are not uniform). At the second level the center also determines the kind of development projects that will be selected for funding or financial support by the field units under the various development programmes.

In the period before the District Focus, project identification at the local level only involved three kinds of projects, namely donor assisted, RDF and community development projects. The last two project types were selected yearly. The selection process was/is carried out by the local development committees against the background of maximum expenditure levels provided by treasury. As already pointed out, these maximum expenditure levels are not uniform for all districts. Their variations are determined by a number of factors, notably, the population size of the district which determines the basic allocation which is then adjusted to (i) the proportion of high quality agricultural land in the district. (ii) the proportion of wage employment to total population and (iii) the incidence of famine/disaster in the district.

During the 1984/85 and 1985/86 financial years, RDF allocations to the various districts varied as shown below:

Table 13: Allocation of RDF money by province and District.
1984/85 and 1985/86 Financial Years.

CENTRAL PROVINCE

DISTRICT	KEY%	AMOUNT
Kiambu	2.85	48300
Kirinyaga	2.16	36607
Murangá	3.07	52027
Nyandarua	2.62	44401
Nyeri	2.12	49485

COST PROVINCE

DISTRICT	KEY%	AMOUNT
Kilifi	2.61	44231
Kwale	1.88	31859
Lamu	1.49	25254
Taita Taveta	2.00	33893
Tana River	2.28	38638

EASTERN PROVINCE

Embu	3.58	60669
Isiolo	2.72	46096
Kitui	3.15	53384
Machakos	3.43	58127
Marsabit	2.82	47789
Meru	3.16	53551

NORTH EASTERN PROVINCE

Garissa	2.42	41011
Mandera	1.79	30336
Wajir	3.15	53383

NYANZA PROVINCE

Kisii	3.29	55755
Kisumu	3.12	52875
Siaya	3.20	54230
South Nyannza	3.39	57450

WESTERN PROVINCE

Bungoma	3.25	55077
Busia	2.93	49655
Kakamega	3.51	59483

RIFT VALLEY PROVINCE

Baringo	2.34	39655
Eldama Ravine	2.29	38810
Kajiado	2.03	34402
Kericho	1.77	29996
Laikipia	1.71	28980
Nakuru	1.85	31351
Nandi	2.28	38640

Narok	2.05	34741
Samburu	1.72	29150
Trans-Nzoia	1.96	23216
Turkana	1.77	29996
Uasin-Gishu	2.24	37961
West Pokot	1.84	31182

	<u>1985/86</u>	
Province/ District	District Allocation	Actual Allocation
<u>Central</u>	375.962	376.363
Kiambu	85.446	85.446
Kirinyaga	59.812	59.812
Muranga	85.446	85.946
Nyandarua	65.588	65.509
Nyeri	79.750	79.950
<u>Coast</u>	341.784	337.723
Kilifi	71.205	77.954
Lwale	62.660	47.167
Lamu	42.723	49.079
Mombasa	45.571	43.582
Taita-Taveta	54.115	54.116
Tana River	65.509	65.825
<u>Eastern</u>	541.158	525.354
Embu	96.839	97.842
Isiolo	79.750	74.594
Kitui	88.294	88.294
Machakos	96.839	94.485
Marsabit	85.446	79.004
Meru	93.991	91.135

<u>North-Eastern</u>	207.919	208.057
Garissa	79.750	79.687
Mandera	45.571	45.528
Wajir	82.598	82.842
<u>Nyanza</u>	373.114	359.430
Kisii	96.839	87.221
Kisumu	85.446	89.014
Siaya	93.991	92.260
South Nyanza	96.839	90.935
<u>Rift Valley</u>	737.684	770.319
Baringo	59.812	59.812
Elgeyo Marakwet	62.660	69.152
Kajiado	54.116	83.057
Kericho	54.116	55.142
Laikipia	48.419	47.336
Nakuru	51.268	52.879
Nandi	68.357	58.361
Narok	54.116	54.156
Samburu	51.268	51.268
Trans-Nzoia	56.964	57.773
Turkana	62.660	62.455
Uasin-Gishu	59.812	59.812
West Pokot	54.116	54.116

Province/ District	District Allocation	Actual Allocation
<u>Western</u>	270.579	269.878
Bungoma	93.991	81.383
Busia	79.750	79.430
Kakamega	96.339	109.065
<u>KENYA TOTAL</u>		

Source: Files at MEPD, RDF section

The above two tables do not show any form of discrimination against Bungoma District in the allocation of RDF money. In the 1984/85 allocation, for example Bungoma was fifth in line with regard to the amount distributed to the forty-two districts in the country, while during the 1985/86 allocations she was thirteenth in line. Tongaren cannot therefore be said to suffer on account of discrimination by the centre. Accordingly responsibility for discrimination allocations against Tongaren lies entirely at the local DDC level.

Ministerial allocations of both development and recurrent expenditure is also not even to all districts. The amount varies depending on a number of factors, notably. the population size of the district, rate of project implementation, and the number of on-going harambee or self-help projects that require governmental assistance for completion.

This last factor considers the current policy of utilizing existing facilities first, that is to say, completing the already started projects before new ones can be considered. This policy has led to a situation where those districts that have higher capacity for starting projects on self-help basis receive more allocations than those with a lower capacity.⁴⁰

This criterion for allocating funds has an indisputable consequence of accentuating imbalanced development levels among the various districts - in particular between those districts with higher per capita income and those with lower. Bungoma District, and Tongaren in particular happen to be in the latter category.

In the period before the District Focus, the choice and management of ministerial projects was carried out in Nairobi at the headquarters of every operative ministry. We herebelow discuss the case of Little Nzoia Water Supply Project to illustrate the process by which the centre managed development projects during this period.

The decision to supply water to Tongaren Settlement Schemes was a part of the national or general policy of the then Ministry of Lands Settlement and water. According to the policy, the ministry was to supply piped water to all the high density settlement schemes as part of the

attempt to prepare these areas for higher economic yields especially with regard to dairy.

During the 1966/67 financial year (i.e. about one year after settlement) a total of K.Sh. 6 million was allocated toward the implementation of the Little Nzoia Project. The ministry headquarters remained the A.I.E. holder. Implementation work started in 1967 and was carried out from Nairobi through what is called Direct Labour System. Under this system the ministry headquarters would send to the site material and technical personnel from Nairobi. Unskilled labour was hired locally. The project was completed in 1976.

The source of the water^{is}/River Ziwa in Uasin-Gishu District - a distance of about 35 km from the nearest point on Tongaren boarder. The water reaches its various destinations by way of gravitational force.

On completion the project was handed over to the operations and maintenance section of the ministry in Nairobi. This is the section that dealt with matters pertaining to staffing. However, the officer in charge of the project stationed at Corner Mbaya in Moi's Bridge Scheme became the A.I.E. holder with regard to the maintenance funds. But in 1984 the A.I.E. was transferred to the Kakamega District Water Engineer. (The project serves both Bungoma and Kakamega settlement schemes).

The Little Nzoia Water Project cannot therefore be said to have been initiated as a result of any form of socio-political influences from Tongaren. The project appears to be a product of a decision made by the ministry's administrative machinery in Nairobi. Indeed, this author failed to trace any ministerial project in Tongaren which was initiated as a result of local socio-political influences or pressures.

Since the introduction of the District Focus in 1983, responsibility for the identification and management of all district specific projects has been decentralized to the field units. The policy is to reduce the role of the centre in this process. One circular letter from the MFP, for example, declared that:

In preparing its Draft Annual Estimates, the ministries will not seek to change the proposals from the districts as this could be inconsistent with the District Focus strategy of delegating decision-making responsibility to the districts.⁴¹

We have already seen the impact of socio-political factors at the local level.

The allocation of donor assisted funds at the headquarters (MEPD), appears to take an even distributional pattern. Under the EEC micro-projects, for example, districts receive allocations in rotation. The first Tranche of the EEC project was distributed among twenty

districts while the remaining twenty-two districts received their share in the following second Tranché. Thus by this time (1976) each district had had one EEC micro-project. Out of the nine Tranches so far distributed, Bungoma District has received three projects, namely Tongaren Health Centre in Tongaren Division, Matili Village Polytechnic in Kimilili and Samicha Water Scheme in Sirisia.

The allocation of EEC money appears, therefore, to be based on a purely rational administrative need for equality among districts, rather than a direct response to socio-political influences from the various localities in the country.

Although the planning of development projects and programmes has been to the larger extent decentralized, the centre still retains a significant measure of influence upon the choice of development projects by the local units. This, the centre (either the MEPD or the individual operating ministry) does by way of providing guidelines, criteria and other instructions on which the local development committees base their decisions. In selecting an EEC micro-project for example, the following are the guidelines provided by the MEPD:

- (1) There should be a genuine self-help participation

- (ii) The maximum total estimated cost of each project (including self-help contribution, government of Kenya contribution, and the EEC contribution) should be about K.£ 300,000
- (iii) The self-help contribution in the form of cash, materials, and unskilled labour should not be less than one sixth of the total estimated cost of the project.
- (iv) The government of Kenya contribution in the form of technical services like designing, supervision, and payment of salaries will be at least one sixth of total estimated cost of the project.
- (v) The balance of the total estimated cost of the project is expected to be met by the EEC. This will in any case not exceed K.£ 200,000.

If the DDC finally selects a project that is not in line with these guidelines, the MEPD (EEC section) often rejects the choice. Under the fourth Tranche of the EEC micro-projects for example, the Bungoma DDC selected Sang'alo Institute of Technology which required more than K.£ 300,000 - the maximum cost of an EEC project. Upon the proposal reaching the MEPD, it was rejected because it was "too big" a project. The DDC was then referred to select a different project which turned out to be the Matili Village Polytechnic. The MEPD has the same behaviour in approving the RDF projects. In the 1973/74 allocations, the then MFP rejected all the village polytechnics contained in the list of proposals made by Bungoma's DDC because the projects were 'out of scope' of the RDF financing policies. Thus the

MFP considered the projects to have been too large yet the RDF programme was merely a 'gap filler'.

From the foregoing account of decision-making at the centre, a few points have become apparent. First, that headquarters officials have a significant influence in the identification of projects by the locality, either by determining the amount of funds available for the locality or providing guidelines for project identification, or both. Secondly, decision making at the centre appears to be based more on the administrative realities than on extraneous socio-political considerations. This does not, however, mean that there is not attempted influence by, especially the MPs, on the decision-making process by the centre. These individuals quite often approach the Rural Planning Section of the MEPD with intent to having projects from their respective constituencies funded through either the RDF or the EEC programme but they are "often referred back to their local DDC's".⁴²

Third, by requiring local communities to initiate projects to some level (usually 25%) of completion as a prerequisite for financial assistance from the government, the centre creates a situation where those areas or localities whose local inhabitants do not have the propensity or capacity for mobilizing local resources or have a meagre local resource base for initiating development

projects, do not attract financial assistance from the government, and vice versa. This policy was recently reiterated by the government in its Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986. Tongaren, as shall be seen in the next chapter is not one of those areas in the country that are renowned for having enough funds to start projects on self-help basis.

By limiting the amount of development expenditure funds allocated to the various ministries and other development oriented agencies, the centre clearly indicates the scarcity or dearth of funds and other resources available for rural development purpose. As early as 1964, the government was already experiencing the problem of the inadequacy of resources to fully meet its development goals. In the first Development Plan it was stated that:

Limited resources ... seriously retard the pace of progress. The constraint of limited resources is perhaps the dominant one in Kenya.⁴³

Project implementation officers at the local level do therefore find the amount of funds allocated to them to be extremely little that it cannot complete projects or, in case of the recurrent expenditure, the funds cannot enable ministry departments to give services throughout the financial year. Under this unfavourable economic conditions

the provision of services by the administration suffers. Tongaren is a victim of these economic circumstances as much as are other parts of the country.

Under the circumstances the local population has to initiate and complete a majority of the needed development projects without relying almost exclusively on the government for financial support. This means that the rate of rural development in an area will invariably depend upon the willingness and ability of its local population to initiate and complete development projects and programmes using their own locally available resources. This may be achieved by way of harambee and self-help effort. The immediate questions that arise from this reality then are: (1) What is the capacity of Tongareni's local population to contribute toward self-help and 'harambee' projects and thereby attract financial assistance from the government? (2) What is their capacity to initiate and complete development projects using their locally available resources and without support from the government? Implicit in these two questions is the whole factor of rural income levels. In Tongaren, as already noted in chapter I, rural incomes were and still are expected to be derived primarily from the agricultural activities of the settlers. The next chapter therefore, will concern itself with agricultural performance of the settlers and the impact of this performance on the area's rural

incomes and consequently rural development.

SUMMARY

The most decisive decision-making unit at the local level is the DDC. Prior to the coming of the District Focus, this committee allocated resources available at its disposal in a pattern that was against Tongaren. Thus more development projects were sited in the other Divisions of the District and very few in Tongaren. The committee attempted to rationalize this behaviour by the contention that Tongaren had already received abundant resources at the time of the preparation of the settlement schemes. The DDC's discriminatory behaviour therefore contributed toward the slowed development rate in Tongaren.

The DDC had a free hand in taking this pattern of resource allocation because of the ineffectiveness of Tongaren's representation in the committee. While representatives of other areas in the district successfully influenced the DDC to allocate resources to their respective area, nobody did the same for Tongaren. Inefficient and ineffective local representation or political leadership, therefore bears a significant measure of responsibility for the development predicament of Tongaren.

However, accompanying the District Focus Strategy, were policies that, inter alia made it mandatory for all DDC members to attend the committees sessions. Consequently,

the regular attendance of the committee by the MPs including Tongaren's act as a deterrence against discriminatory resource allocation hence the emergent equitable distribution of development resources among the various Divisions in the District.

Apart from the development committee, the local community too does influence the pattern of resource allocation. Through their informal community leaders the local population organizes themselves into forms of interest groups such as projects and; then successfully request for governmental assistance. However, the people do often find themselves handicapped by inadequacy of local resources for initiating projects on their own. This inadequacy curtails the capacity of the people to attract more governmental resources. The local people also individually make demands to the administration.

The central decision-making units too take part in the process of project identification and location, especially in the allocation of money. The Ministry of Finance in conjunction with the MEPD determine the amount of money a district receives and also determines the kind of projects a particular financing programme should cover. However, decision making at this level is not under the influence of local socio-political environment. Secondly, by demanding that the local community starts projects using its own local resources first before governmental funds can be extended to it, the centre places areas with low levels of incomes at an unfair disadvantage over those with higher incomes. Tongaren happens to fall in the former category.

FOOTNOTES:

1. Interview with the District Officer who is also the secretary to the Divisional Development Committee.
2. Ibid.
3. DVDC Meeting Minute 5/86.
District Commissioner - Letter to the DO Tongaren 12/7/78
4. DVDC Meeting held on 26/9/86 Minute 3/86.
5. Ministry of Economic Planning and Development RDF manual, 1986, p. 7.
6. Personal interview with the District Development officer (DDO) January, 1987.
7. Letter from the Provincial Planning Officer to Honourable Nathan Munoko, Member of Parliament for Bungoma Central constituency.
8. Personal interview with a former PPO, Western Province for the period between 197 to 1975.
9. Minutes of Tongaren DVDC meeting held on 26/9/86 minute 2/86.
10. Personal interview with a former PPO, Western Province for the period 1972-75.
11. Republic of Kenya. Bungoma District Development Plan 1974-78 May 1976, p. 18.
12. Ibid., p. 9.

13. Much of the information about these development needs was obtained from interviews with the settlers.
14. Personal interview with a former PPO, for Western Province for the period 1975-1979.
15. Letter from the Member of Parliament for Mt. Elgon constituency to the DDO 11/3/80, DDC Files.
16. The Member of Parliament for Bungoma South constituency. Questions asked in Parliament. Hansard minute 15/4/80.
17. Assistant Minister for Water Development. Parliamentary Hansard Minute 15/4/80
18. Letter from the MP for Mt. Elgon to the District Commissioner, Bungoma, 8/10/80.
19. Minutes of DDC meeting held on 14/7/81 Minute 10/81.
20. Interview with the Medical Officer of Health, Bungoma District January 1987.
21. Interview with the District Development Officer August, 1987.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. The General Manager, East African Power and Lighting Company. Speech to the Provincial Development Committee on 14/11/77, Minute 11/77

25. The other alternative project that had been proposed by the DDC (i.e. Mateka-Machwele Water Scheme) was later converted by the DDC into a DDC project and subsequently allocated K.Sh. 130,000 from the RDF.
26. Interview with the Project Secretary.
27. District Commissioner, Bungoma, in a letter to the District Officer, Tongaren.
28. Secretary, Bokoli Dispensary Project Committee. In a letter to the Ministry of Health Bungoma.
29. Kenya Finland Primary Health Care. In a letter to the DDO and Bokoli Assistant Chief, 27/8/85.
30. Bokoli residents in a memorandum to the DDO on 28/8/85.
31. Interview with an official of Kalyesa Self-help women group. Information about this group reached the Chief Rural Planning Officer by way of a country-wide study of women groups, carried out by a team from the MEPD. The CRPO was so impressed as shown in a circular letter to all DCs and DDOs. There is therefore certainty that the group will receive financial assistance especially from the RDF.
32. This information was obtained from files at the MEPD, RDF section.

33. Letter from a Settler in Tongaren (name withheld) to District Water Officer Bungoma. In the files at the Department of Water Offices, Bungoma.
34. Office of the President, District Officer's Office, Tongaren. Minutes of the Divisional Development Committee held on 2nd July, 1986, p. 2.
35. Letter from a resident of Kimilili Division, (name withheld) to the District Water Officer, Bungoma. In the Ndivisi-Makuselwa Rural Water Supply Project file at the Department of Water Supply, Bungoma.
36. Letter from a resident of Kimilili Division addressed to the District Water Officer, Bungoma, op. cit.
37. All this information was obtained from the Ndivisi-Makuselwa Project file at the Department of Water supply, Bungoma.
38. Ibid.
39. Nthiga Ntwiga 'The Management of Rural Development Fund Programme'. Thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Arts in Government, University of Nairobi, 1978.
40. Interview with an official at the MEPD May, 1987.
41. MFP (Rural Planning Division) 'Planning and Budgeting Procedures for the District Focus: Incorporation of District inputs into the Ministry Budgets'. March 1985 P. 3.
42. Interview with the Chief Rural Planning Office-, MEPD.
43. Republic of Kenya. MFP, Development Plan 1964/70, p. 2.

CHAPTER IV

UTILIZATION OF AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES

Land was the basic resource which the government allocated to the settlers in Tongaren. In addition to it, other agriculture-related resources were also allocated. These include dairy animals, AFC credit facilities, agricultural extension and veterinary services, agricultural marketing agencies, etc. In doing this, the government's primary objective was to make agriculture in this and indeed all the settlement schemes "an important source of income, foreign exchange and employment".¹ Thus it is upon the proceeds from agricultural activities that the local resource capacity, such as for project initiation depended. This is especially so considering that 74.2% (i.e. 74/100 of our respondents) do not have any off-farm occupation. The remaining 26% are either public servants (16%) or businessmen (10%). It is because of its primacy that any discussion of rural development in Tongaren has to inevitably consider the contribution of agriculture.

This chapter attempts to assess the performance of the settlers in utilizing the agricultural resources that were placed at their disposal. More importantly, the chapter attempts to link the settler's agricultural performance on the one hand with the lack of development in the area on the other.

The questions for which answers will be sought include the following: (1) What is the capacity of the settlers to put the available agricultural resources to productive use? (2) Is this performance in any way responsible for the lack of development in Tongaren?

Local Perception of the Settlement Programme:

The Initial Period:

The settlers' perception and reaction to the settlement programme appears to have changed through two stages: the first one was roughly during the first ten years of settlement (i.e. 1965-1974), and second, the period beginning ^{about} mid - 1970s.

Right from the time of the struggle for independence, the people understood colonial liberation to be synonymous with the struggle for the recovery of the 'stolen land'. Free land was therefore the anticipated reward for the struggle. Thus when in 1964 the government advertised plots in the settlement schemes, there was a remarkable rush for them by the landless and the unemployed. However, the rush was not initially geared by the enormous economic or commercial value of the land but by its socio-political value. Thus land acquisition became an end in itself. Indeed when the people were asked why they left their original homes to acquire land in Tongaren, most of the answers received had no commercial implications. Among such answers included:

- (a) Bandwagon tendencies, i.e. the settlers acquired the land because many other people were also doing it.
- (b) The desire to own larger pieces of land which would be divided among the settlers' sons when they grow up, (30%)
- (c) The desire to possess one's own land as opposed to sharing the ancestral land among many brothers. (8%)
- (d) The desire to own a larger piece of land that would ensure adequate supply of food for the family. (7%)
- (e) The desire to own a piece of land having been landless (6%). This category included squatters.
- (f) The desire to obtain a source of employment and incomes, (17%).

It may therefore be deduced that only about 17% of the new-comers had a commercial motive in acquiring land in Tongaren. Thus, an overwhelming majority of the settlers perceived the settlement scheme programme on such a circumscribed scale in terms of ambition, that it went against the objectives of the government as seen earlier. Eventually, it was the failure of the settlers themselves to immediately undertake the exploitation and commercialization of their land that significantly delayed the beginning of a rapid process of rural development in the area. In other words, agricultural production remained at the level of subsistence as opposed to income generation

The second factor that delayed the commercialization of agriculture was the wrong settler-perception of the objectives of the settlement programme as set out by the government, in particular the Department of Settlement, which (perception) was caused by the settlers' misinterpretation of the conditions set out in the letter of allotment to the newcomers. On the basis of these conditions, the settlers realized that first, security for land tenure was not guaranteed; second, the land was not free after all; third, the settler could not subdivide the plot among his sons; and, more importantly, the farmer stood to be evicted from the land in the event of failing to meet any or a combination of these conditions. Indeed by 1971, before eviction was stopped, about thirty settlers in Tongaren had fallen victim of land eviction.² In the eyes of the settlers, land appeared to remain in the last resort a property of the Government. Infact according to one respondent "there was a lot of talk about the government having to reposses the land sometime in the future."

The result of this state of affairs is that the settlers lost much confidence in the Settlement Programme and consequently lost enthusiasm in undertaking full-scale utilization of the agricultural resources allocated to them. By 1972, for example, nine-years after settlement, only a total of about 105,240 acres of land was under maize cultivation.³ The amount of maize marketed was about

1,473,360 bags. Going by the reigning price of maize at this time i.e. Sh. 28 per gunny bag the total amount received was about K.Sh. 41.3 million. The average income received by each settler during that year was therefore only K.Sh. 3,000. This is what may be considered as the per capita annual settler income derived from maize production at that time. This amount seems to have been so little that there was hardly any to be directed toward harambee or self-help development projects.

Within the same period, the number of settlers utilizing the AFC credit facility was very small. About K.Sh. 180 per acre per settler was available for lending under the GMR programme. However, only 11% of the settlers utilize this money.⁴

It is clear therefore that the propensity of the settlers in Tongaren toward commercialization of land resources in order to increase their level of incomes and consequently that of their socio-economic welfare was very low in the early years of settlement.

Other factors also contributed to the low level of maize production during the period under review. The settlers lacked the necessary knowledge and experience in modern agricultural practice upon which the success of the settlement programme significantly depended. This is because of the nature of ^{the} background of the settlers. About 89% of the respondents for example claimed to have come directly from the 'reserves' where

agricultural production methods were still traditional. Another 8% claimed to have been squatters on European farms, while only 1% claimed to have been working and living in the urban areas. The settlers had therefore lacked the benefits of exposure to agricultural modernity. Consequently farm management techniques such as arrangements for purchase of inputs; chasing of invoices; hiring tractors; selecting and obtaining herbicides and pesticides; making marketing arrangements; organizing for land development loans etc, were not an easy affair for the new settlers. According to a now retired extension worker in the area:

We had to teach the farmers (about modern farm husbandry) almost from the level of a e i o u.⁵

In short, the settlers had carried with them, and continued to apply, the traditional techniques that they had always used for subsistence production in the reserves. This situation was not, however, restricted to Tongaren alone. Discussing all the High Density Schemes in general, the Van Arkadie Commission noted for example that:

Due to the absence in the selection process of any factor which chooses those applicants with proved farming ability, most high density settlers have little or no knowledge or experience of the type of farming that they are being asked to adopt, and they need a lot of guidance.⁶

Ofcourse proven farming ability was not a criterion for the selection of settlers here as it was in the low density

Schemes. Here, priority in the allocation of plots was in fact given to the landless and unemployed. Ordinarily, such individuals could not have been in possession of knowledge and experience in modern agricultural practices. It was because of this that the government established the Lugari Farmers' Training Centre as an institution that would instil in the settlers some of the fundamentals of modern farming techniques and practices. However, this institution appears to have been rendered redundant mainly because of the settlers' non-attendance. Only 14.2% of our respondents claimed to have ever been to the centre. The failure by the majority of the settlers to utilize this important training facility is a result of the lack of keenness in undertaking measures to commercialize the exploitation of agricultural resources as discussed above. Discussing the question of agricultural education, the Department of Settlement in Bungoma District noted in one of its annual reports that:

No farmers' courses are being offered by the FTC. But (extension) information is passed on to the farmers through the chiefs and Assistant Chiefs' Barazas which are also addressed by agricultural extension officers. 7

The efficacy of the agricultural extension and veterinary service depends upon the ability and willingness of the settlers to adopt the recommended methods and techniques of modern farm husbandry as

introduced to them by the extension worker. Due to the absence of serious attention to the exploitation of the agricultural resources, the willingness and ability of the settlers to adopt the extension recommendations was significantly low. In the words of a former extension worker in the area:

Many farmers were not interested in their farms and in the agriculture people. First of all they cultivated an average of only four acres of the whole plot. Secondly, work on the farm was carried out mainly by the wives and children or hired workers. These are the people we used to find at home during our visits. The settlers themselves were always away. It appeared difficult for wives or the hired labourers to adopt the new methods we taught them.

A former FPO for Western described some of the settlers as being "telephone farmers" who had acquired plots, employed labourers to look after them while they themselves continued to work and/or live wherever they had been in the reserve and in towns. It was therefore difficult for the extension worker to reach such people.

The inability of the settlers to utilize fully the existing extension services perpetuated the continued use of the old non-commercial and non-economic agricultural production methods and techniques.

In any case maize growing was not a new activity to the settlers. In a general discussion of all the high density schemes in Kenya, Harbeson observes that:

The growing of maize as a cash crop demands fundamental behavioral changes on the part of the settlers ... Because it is not new to the settlers and has been raised and sold profitably in African markets in the past, the government has had difficulty persuading settlers of the necessity and desirability of raising and selling maize in new and different ways.⁹

In view of all the above factors, the settlers realized very low production levels, hence low incomes. Thus, agriculture had failed as a reliable source of employment and higher incomes. The evidence adduced here supports the fourth hypothesis of the study which attributed the low rate of rural development in Tongaren to the failure of the settlers to utilize the available agricultural resources sufficiently. We shall briefly examine the situation in Kimilili Division as regards the utilization of agricultural resources by the local farmers.

First of all Kimilili, unlike Tongaren is an old society. The attitude and feeling of newness and uncertainty among the local farmers did not therefore exist. They occupied their ancestral land which by 1971 had already been mapped and land titles issued. However, this does not imply that agricultural resources were utilized in a more efficient manner than they were in Tongaren. The problem in Kimilili lay with the persistence of the traditional approach to agricultural production which was a result of the refusal by the colonial administration to stimulate modernized agricultural practices in this and, indeed,

all the former African reserves. By independence, therefore, the people remained short of experience and knowledge in the modern agricultural production methods and techniques. Efforts by the government in establishing the Mabanga Farmers Training Centre as an institution that would oversee the development of modern farming techniques among the farmers, proved less rewarding in so far as only 5% of the respondents claimed to have ever been to the centre.

Responsibility for inculcating the recommended methods of modern farm husbandary eventually remained, as was the case in Tongaren, with the agricultural extension establishment. However, this approach appears to have been quite unreliable. In his half-year report, the Assistant Agricultural Officer made the following observation.

...only about 20% of the farmers have so far accepted the use of hybrid maize seed...¹⁰

This variety of seed had been introduced to the area in 1966 while the report was prepared seven years later in 1973. This is one example of the attachment of the Kimilili farmers to the traditional approach and techniques.

Secondly, like in Tongaren, the farmers in Kimilili did not, during this period take a commercial approach in their agricultural activities. This is indicated by

the relatively small scale of operation vis-a-vis the available land. According to the 1973 Divisional report, only 1,300 hectares were under maize cultivation. (Maize occupied about 87.7% of all the cultivated land). The total marketed out-put was estimated at 766,028 bags which fetched about M.Sh. 21.5 million as per the existing price. Considering that about 90% of the local farmers do not have any off-farm employment this figure could roughly be said to be the total annual income for the Division. Thus, maize or agriculture production in Kimilili was as in the case of Tongaren an inadequate source of employment and rural incomes.

The Changing Attitude Toward the
Settlement Programme: -After Mid-1970s

In the period toward the mid-70s the settlers perception and attitude toward the settlement programme began to show positive tendencies. This was a result of three main factors: First, eviction on account of default in loan repayment had been discontinued by 1970. In doing so the government had argued that:

If eviction continued it would be defeating the very purpose and objectives of the establishment of settlement schemes-viz to resolve the problem of landlessness and unemployment.¹¹

The consequence of this move was an improvement in the settlers' certainty about their future in the area. Talks about the government having to repossess the land also stopped

and thirdly, the hitherto telephone farmers' working and/or living in far off places began to trickle back and to effectively settle on their plots. The result of these developments was an improvement, in terms of efficiency and effectiveness in the farmers' capacity to utilize the available agricultural resources, notably, land, extension services, credit facilities, marketing organizations, in an effort to step up production and increase the level of incomes. We shall briefly discuss the utilization of these resources in turns.

(i) Land Utilization.

As the table below shows, the scale of land utilization had reached its peak by 1986.

Table 14: Area Under Cultivation in Tongaren and Kimilili

<u>TONGAREN</u>		<u>Kimilili</u>	
<u>Crop</u>	<u>Hectares</u>	<u>Crop</u>	<u>Hectares</u>
Maize	22,000	Maize	18,000
Beans	7,000	Beans	6,000
Bananas	100	Sweet Potatoes	800
Millet	150	Cassava	250
Sweet Potatoes	120	Sorghum	200
Vegetables	100	Millet	200
Citrus Fruits	70	Ground nuts	60
Cassava	60	Irish Potatoes	40
Irish Potatoes	50	Bananas	25

<u>TONGAREN</u>		<u>KIMILILI</u>	
<u>Crop</u>	<u>Hectares</u>	<u>Crop</u>	<u>Hectares</u>
		<u>'Industrial' Crops</u>	
Sorghum	50	Coffee	1678.2
Sunflower	655.0	Sugar Cane	1724.89
<hr/>		<hr/>	
TOTAL	30,393		10,977.9
<hr/>		<hr/>	

Source: Divisional Extension Officers. Half Year Reports for Tongaren and Kimilili. June, 1986.

Thus it may be inferred that the settlers now looked upon land in a commercial perspective - as a means of employment and source of income. In particular, maize was produced not only as a food crop but even more importantly as a cash crop. Indeed, when we asked the respondents whether they considered maize production to be an important activity to them and why, only 14.2% gave negative responses while the other 85.6% were positive that maize production is an 'important' source of income. This response is perhaps an inevitable one especially because the majority of the settlers (74.2%) do not have any off-farm occupation. It must be quickly pointed out that settler attitudes towards farming have not entirely been commercially oriented. Although the amount of land under cultivation or productive use has increased since the establishment of the settlement schemes in 1965, (30,393 Ha out of a total of 35,799.6 Ha is now under cultivation - compare table 5 with table 14), the mode of land use does

not manifest commercial motivation among the settler-farmers. Specifically, the Assistant Agricultural Officer, Tongaren, observed that most^{of} the settlers still apply less fertilizers, fail to weed the crops or harvest late. The area AFC manager explained this behaviour on the part of the settler-farmers in terms of their failure to treat farming as a business, lack of innovativeness and the inability to choose the right farming enterprise. All these factors stem from the plentiful availability of food in the area which in turn causes complacency among the settler-farmers.

It seems, therefore, that the availability of land alone and even its sheer cultivation is not a sufficient factor to ensure increased agricultural productivity and higher incomes for the settlers in Tongaren. The attainment of these intertwined objectives is dependent quite significantly on, first, the availability of other agricultural support-facilities and institutions that complement the cultivation of land, and second, the ability and willingness of the farmers themselves to utilize these support facilities and institutions. Accordingly, the following section examines the capacity of the settler-farmers in Tongaren to utilize the available agricultural institutions in order to raise the level of their productivity and to realize higher levels of income.

Utilization of the Agricultural Extension
Services: The National Extension Programme
(NEP).

The importance of agricultural extension work in a newly established settler-farmer area can not be overemphasized. Specifically, the extension service plays the link-man's role between the agricultural research institutions where the latest research findings are obtained, and the farmers to whom the findings are transmitted for adoption and application. This is what goes on in the first way process. In the second one, extension workers convey the current agricultural problems from the farmers to the research centers for fresh research and experimentation. David K. Leonard describes the process more succinctly when he writes:

The essential role of an agricultural extension field service is that of a linking mechanism. Its classic function has been to link agricultural research centers and farmers, transmitting new technologies to the farmers and current farming problems to the researchers.¹²

The overall objective of extension work is to stimulate improved agricultural productivity and increased rural incomes. In order to assess the impact of the agricultural extension work on the farmer performance in Tongaren, we take an incisive evaluation of the operations of the NEP.

The NEP was introduced in 1984. It is sponsored by the World Bank and administered by the Kenya Government through

the Ministry of Agriculture. The purpose of the programme is to "increase per capita productivity and consequently per capita incomes by way of intensifying the transmission to the farmer of messages about new and improved methods of agricultural production."¹³ The programme which covers the entire district as well as other parts of the country, has three basic approaches to reaching the farmer. The first one is through the so-called Training and Visits (T&V). This approach basically involves the conventional method where extension officers visit the farmers individually on their plots and advise them accordingly. The second approach is referred to as On-Farm Trials and Demonstrations. In this approach selected contact farmers give out a piece of their plot to be used by the extension agents as demonstration grounds for new agricultural methods and techniques. This is the extension approach William A. Wayt recommends on account of its overriding advantage of "keeping the extension agent's recommendations 'practical' with emphases on those new techniques and innovations that are feasible".¹⁴

The third approach used in the NEP constitutes 'Field Days'. This is a kind of farmers' rally which is addressed by extension officials. In other words, important extension messages are transmitted to the farmers through a collective approach.

In Tongaren, the NEP is managed by the Divisional Staff and equipment of the Department of Agriculture. There are

twenty graduates of Sang'alo Institute of Agriculture (roughly two per sub-location) being the extension workers. There are three officers (graduates of Egerton College of Agriculture) in the office at the Divisional headquarters. The former category of staff use bicycles while the later category has one open pick-up vehicle and one motor-cycle. We shall now briefly look at the efficacy of the programme.

This depends upon two factors, namely the performance of the agricultural staff and the capacity or readiness of the farmers to adopt the messages received. In the first place available data shows the number of settlers reached by the extension administration to be very low. Asked how regular the agricultural extension worker visits their farms, responses from the interviewees were as shown below:

Table 15: Frequency of Visits by the Agricultural Extension Worker to the Farmers (In Percentage).

	None at all	WEEKLY	MONTHLY	HALF-YEAR	YEARLY
TONGAREN	21.4	17.1	16.0	3.2	43.2
KIMILILI	61.6	6.6	10.0	11.2	16.6

Source: Survey Interview in Tongaren and Kimilili Divisions.

The table above shows that much of the agricultural research findings do not reach the majority of the farmers.

In the words of one respondent in Tongaren:

The agriculturman never visits my shamba (farm). Whenever, I meet him at the market place he simply tells me for example, that he noticed when he was passing by the road that I had ploughed the farm so nicely.¹⁵

Unlike the findings of David K. Leonard in the other (exclusively non-settlement) parts of the Western province there was no evidence that the extension workers in Tongaren concentrate their efforts on the progressive farmers.¹⁶

(We shall consider the problem of organizational deficiencies within the extension service itself shortly).

Extension visits, ~~also~~ however do not guarantee improved farmer performance. What may offer this guarantee is the quality of the messages conveyed to the farmers. Of the 78 respondents who claimed to be visited by the extension workers 77.1 per cent consider the extension officials not to be important people in their farming activities. This contention is based on the extension worker's tendency to routinize their messages as though each year they meet totally new or different clients. In other words the extension officials always talk to the farmers repeatedly about timing, selection of seed variety, fertilizers, herbicides, etc. for the same crop-maize. According to one respondent, "the extension officials merely rehearse through what we

already know."¹⁷ Elsewhere in the Settlement schemes, John Harbeson has noted that indeed "having been growing one main crop (maize) year after year, the farmers are fully aware of the essential requirements for a good harvest especially as concerns timing, seed-bed preparation, selection of fertilizers, etc".¹⁸ This in part, explains the tendency among the settlers in Tongaren not to take the extension worker seriously. In one of his Monthly Reports for example, the Assistant Agricultural Officer (AAO) registered that:

Attendance of field days is poor. In Ndalu Scheme, only 10 farmers attended. 80 in Moi's Bridge and 21 in SoySambu.¹⁹

It is therefore evident in the case of Tongaren that the Extension Work has at the moment outlived its usefulness and has thus become a redundant organization in the farming activities of the settlers. Both parties - the extension administration and the settlers have a shared responsibility for this startling phenomenon. To begin with, the settlers do not depict any innovative manifestations as far as the search for new farming enterprises is concerned. 88 per cent of the settlers consider maize to be an important crop although 48 per cent of them admitted that the crop is not beneficial. They recommended the introduction of more profitable crops and activities such as dairy and horticulture to supplement maize. However, the settler-farmers have not followed up such innovative sentiments with practical efforts to open up new farming engagements that would render new or

appropriate technical advices and recommendations a compelling need. It follows, therefore, that as long as the settlers continue to grow maize as their chief crop, the role of agricultural extension service will remain misplaced.

Unless, on the other hand, the extension officials successfully stimulate innovativeness among the settlers by, for example, suggesting and demonstrating to them the profitability of other farming endeavours and thus diversifying agricultural production, their importance in the eyes of the settler - farmers in Tongaren will continue to dwindle.

The responsiveness of the settlers to some of the innovative messages introduced to them by the extension officials is not entirely positive. The District Agricultural Officer for example, had the following observation to make about the NEP:

All technical recommendations were adopted by the farmers except the intra-row spacing in maize and two rows of beans in an inter row of maize. These recommendations were not rejected without reasons. Concerning the inter-cropping of two lines of beans between an inter-row of maize the problems experienced (by the farmers) are: (a) Laborious in planting especially to large scale farmers, (b) Difficulties in weeding, especially those farmers who are abit mechanized - use oxen in weeding.²⁰

The problem with adoption as outlined by the DAO above are as typical in Tongaren as they are everywhere else in the District. According to the AAO, Tongaren, the major problem with adopting the recommended methods is that the "farmers are reluctant to accept any form or element of

innovation that involves extra costs of production, for example a more expensive fertilizer."²¹

In his report the Kimilili Divisional Extension Officer made a similar observation for his area. Thus, "some of the contact farmers are not willing to give plots and also some farmers cannot afford to buy fertilizers for planting."²² In short, it may be said that poor adoption of extension recommendation in Tongaren is a result of the heavy financial burden that is usually associated with such recommendation. The farmers do not therefore, benefit from the available extension facilities, and hence continued low out-put and low incomes. These findings tally with the view expressed in the study's fourth hypothesis already cited above.

Shortfalls within the extension administration itself inhibit the efficacy of the NEP. In his semi-annual report, for example, the DAO submitted that:-

Inadequate transport hampered supervision more so at the locational level where the locational extension officers are immobile.²³

This in part explains why many farmers are not reached adequately by the extension worker. In discussing the problem in his Division, Tongaren's Divisional Extension Officer underlined the problem of immobility with special reference, first, to inadequate vehicles. The motor-cycle has been lying unserviceable for about one year, while the only available van - an open pick-up can only accommodate

two officers at any one moment. Secondly, there is a "frequent problem of lack of fuel which results in some field trips being cancelled".²⁴ In his Monthly report for April 1986, the Assistant Agricultural Officer for Tongaren wrote: "the bottlenecks (in the implementation of the NEP) were inadequate funds for bicycle and motorbike allowance, plus insufficient funds for subsistence claims during Training and Visits, supervision, etc."²⁵ The problem of inadequacy of funds to run the NEP is caused not by financial mismanagement or embezzlement by the extension administration, but by the failure of the Ministry of Finance to allocate enough funds for the departments and indeed for most other departments', recurrent expenditure vote. In the same report for April 1986, the AAO, complained thus - "in most cases approved estimates for development or even recurrent expenditure fall far below the draft estimates."²⁶

Financial difficulties facing the NEP in Tongaren were also found to hamper the success of the programme in Kimilili. The Divisional Assistant Agricultural Officer for example, made the following entry in his Monthly report for May 1986:

"the GK (Government) vehicle is grounded and hence no supervision work was possible. The bicycle allowance is also necessary for the smooth running of T&V programmes."²⁷

The failure of the extension administration to honour such claims as for bicycle and subsistence allowances for

its frontline staff has also contributed quite significantly, towards demoralizing this cadre of workers and dampening their enthusiasm with the result that the frequency of visits to farmers, as seen in Table 15, has diminished. Infact, we located two out of our six extension worker interviewees, respectively at Ndalu and at Naitiri trading centres while three ^{were} traced at their houses, in each case during working hours. Only the AAO - the Divisional head, was in the office at Tongaren Divisional headquarters. Jon R. Moris's observation elsewhere also reveals that low morale and averseness to difficult tasks among the "ill-trained, and poorly supported 'bicycle men' who represent the government to peasants"²⁸ are some of the problems inhibiting efficient performance of the extension organization.

The foregoing as well as those seen earlier are some of the contending administrative - environmental problems that constrain the realization of the objectives of the NEP in particular and the entire process of rural development in general. Thus, low agricultural productivity in Tongaren may be attributed in part, to an intricate problem involving first, inadequacy of the capacity of the organization for extension service to effectively transmit the required technical information to the settler - farmers, and second, the failure of a majority of the settlers to adopt some of the important extension recommendations that reach them. Low productivity has in turn diminished the importance of

agriculture as a reliable source of employment and higher rural incomes. It is clear therefore that the ultimate benefits of agricultural research and training which Bruce Johnstone and William Clark argue as being to "narrow the 'yield gap' between the levels of yield that are technically possible and those that are actually realized by the great majority of the farmers,"²⁹ are not enjoyed by most of the settler-farmers in Tongaren. Neither do those in the non-settlement areas of Kimilili. We now turn to examine the local utilization of yet another important agricultural institution - the credit system.

Organization and Utilization of the Credit

Facilities: The New Seasonal Crop Credit

Scheme.

Agricultural credit is an important ingredient for increasing farmer productivity especially in the third world countries such as Kenya where an overwhelming majority of the farmers are poor and lack self-sufficiency as far as the financing of agriculture is concerned. Ted Jones has argued that in fact:

Agricultural credit can be a powerful economic force for development if used to inject appropriate capital inputs into agriculture that are not otherwise available to farmers from their own financial physical and labour sources.³⁰

This observation is especially relevant to the case of Tongaren where the new settlers were recruited from among the landless and the unemployed. Such poor socio-economic

background of the settlers in Tongaren immediately made the availability of credit facilities an urgent factor if they had to take-off as far as agricultural production is concerned. The government realized the need for this facility long before the arrival of the settlers and thus extended the operations of the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) to the area.

The AFC is the only important agency involved in financing agricultural activities in Tongaren as well as in the non-settlement area of Kimilili. Of all the respondents who obtained loans for the cultivation of maize during the 1986 crop year, (28.6 per cent in Tongaren and 2.1 per cent in Kimilili) only one respondent from each Division claimed to have obtained the loan from elsewhere - commercial banks. The rest obtained their loans from the AFC. This situation immediately distinguishes the AFC as an important potential contributor to the rural development process in Tongaren as far as the financing of agriculture is concerned,

According to the corporation, its basic objective is to assist in the development of agriculture and agricultural industries by making loans to farmers. Cooperative societies, incorporated group representatives, private companies, public bodies, local authorities and other persons engaging in agriculture or agricultural industries.³¹

However, in keeping in line with the government's policy of making the country self-sufficient in food production, the corporation has redirected its lending priorities to small scale farmers under the seasonal crop credit scheme. The primary objective of this scheme is to:

Permit farmers to increase their income by increasing their productivity by increased size or improvement in the quality of their operations ... Every AFC borrower should be able to generate enough income to pay his family's living expenses, repay his AFC loan when due and have a reasonable reserve for emergencies and incentives.³²

The scheme was initially funded by the government through the Cereals and Sugar Finance Corporation which lends funds to the AFC at an interest rate of 13 $\frac{1}{2}$ %. The AFC then administers the loans to the farmers on behalf of the government. However, since 1984 the AFC administers the loan as principal rather than an agent of the Sugar Finance Corporation.

The budgetary process for the scheme is confined within the organization itself, but branch managers in the field prepare annual budget proposals based on estimation of the volume and nature of the loaning activities and requirements, as well as, of course, the overall policies priorities predetermined by the corporation. The proposals are then handed over to higher decision-making

levels for consideration and endorsement.

The forerunner of the SCC Scheme was the GMR system which had been in existence from 1945 to 1980. The GMR system required a farmer to own or lease for at least three years, a minimum of fifteen acres of land for planting either maize or wheat. Secondly, the technical staff from the department of agriculture had to certify the viability of the proposed crop in the proposed area. Thirdly, the farmer had to meet 25% of the total cost of the project as equity share. This would be in terms of labour and general management of the project although it was not strictly adhered to. Fourth, security for the loan was uniform of the farmer signing an irrevocable order authorizing the then marketing agency - Kenya Farmers Association (KFA) to deduct the equivalent of the loan principal plus interest owed by the farmer, and remit the same to the AFC upon the farmer delivering his crop to the KFA. Another remarkable feature of the GMR system was its inclusion of an insurance component whereby a farmer's loan would be waived in whole or in part if he experienced a crop failure due to natural hazards. Such failure would first have to be verified by a visiting sub-District Agricultural Committee.

However, the GMR system was abolished in 1978 and replaced by the New Seasonal Crop Credit Scheme which started its operations during the 1979/80 crop year. The new system differed from the preceding GMR in four basic respects. (i) The minimum size of farm for which a loan would be applied was lowered to five acres. (ii) Tangible security for the loan was required in terms of, say, land or title/charge on movable assets. (iii) The insurance component was eliminated hence a farmer had to repay the loan in full plus interest under any circumstances. (iv) Credit-worthiness of the applicant is first assessed, for example his managerial abilities, and past performance. This activity is carried out by the District Loans Supervisory Committee.

At the moment, the AFC offers the loan at a rate of K.Sh. 1,360 per acre of land to be cultivated, which loan has to be repaid after twelve months and at an interest rate of 14%.

The importance of the SCC scheme in Tongaren's rural development process is a function of the willingness and ability of the settlers to productively utilize this potentially important resource factor. However, the number of settlers utilizing the credit facility has remained significantly low as shown below:

Table 16 Responses to the AFC Credit Facilities:

DIVISION	% Farmers Obtained Loan in 1986	% Farmers Obtained Loan Previously and Stopped	% Farmers Never Obtained Loan.
Tongaren	28.6	51.4	20.0
Kimilili	2	11.6	76.6

Source: Survey Interviews with Farmers in Tongaren and Kimilili Divisions.

The failure on the part of the majority of the settlers to utilize the SCC facility is not a result of any feeling that the facility is unnecessary, rather it is because of what the settlers see as unfavourable lending terms and conditions as imposed by the AFC. The respondents gave the following explanations for the non-utilization of the scheme (in order of frequency of mention).

(a) The interest rate (14%) is so high that it diminishes the profit margin.

(b) There are excessive delays in processing the loan - a factor that leads to late planting and hence poor harvest.

(c) The removal of the insurance component has made loan repayment difficult in cases of crop failure.

(d) Disqualification for being in loan arrears

(e) Requirement for security against which loan is disbursed. (An overwhelming majority of the settlers have not completed the repayment of their land purchase loan, hence have not received their land titles which would act as security).

There were, however, certain other explanations advanced by the respondents but which have no direct linkage to the AFC itself. These are:

(f) Possession of a substantial ability to finance the crop without a loan.

(g) A refusal to invite a situation of being indebted which might cause the land to be auctioned.

Most of these explanations are also evident in Kimilili. For example, claims of high interest rates; delays in processing the loan; too old to involve oneself in debt commitments; and fear of the risk of losing one's land upon failing to repay the loan. However, a lack of security is the most mentioned explanation for non-utilization of the SCC scheme in Kimilili. This is because although a farmer subdivides his farm among the deserving sons, he himself continues to hold the land title for the whole farm. Thus, the sons are not able to obtain credit for

their individual plots on the basis of the title. It is only after the old man dies that the sons, as it were, sue the grave in court ^{before} / the land is surveyed and titles issued to each of them.

As a result of the inability/^{or}unwillingness to utilize the SCC scheme, and considering that 74% of the settlers do not have any off-farm source of income, the settlers depend on proceeds from the previous crop to finance the next one. These proceeds are often inadequate in meeting the family's expenditure needs as well as reinvesting some back to the farm. Indeed when we asked the settlers what they consider to be the main problem they encounter in producing maize, an overwhelming 43% cited the lack of capital for the requisition of the necessary/^{farm}inputs. Consequently, the settlers use relatively inferior or inadequate farm inputs. The survey showed for example that 52% of the settlers in Tongaren use ox-plough as opposed to a tractor while the remainder 48% use the tractor. Those using the oxen-plough were unanimous that they made this choice because the tractor is 'too expensive'. (It costs K.Sh. 230 to plough one acre of land by a tractor while by an ox-plough ^{it} costs K.Sh. 80 per acre) In Kimilili the survey showed 7% of the respondents to be using the tractor, 3% the hoe and 90% the ox-plough. On this score Tongaren seems to be doing better than Kimilili.

However, the settlers who obtained the SCC loan had a better harvest in proportion to the acreage than those settlers who did not take the loan in 1986. The total amount of maize produced by the one hundred respondents was roughly 14,161 bags. Of this figure the 28 farmers who had obtained the SCC loan contributed 5880 bags which is about 42% of the total production. It is arguable therefore that those settlers who utilize the SCC facility realize larger measures of out put than those who don't. It seems however, that those settlers who obtain AFC loan, usually realize higher out-put but they do not do any better than the non-loanees in terms of net incomes. This is mainly because the repayment of the AFC's loan plus interest off-sets any higher (basic) income that these loanees receive over the non-loanees. This is often the case especially where crop failure is experienced worsened by the absence of the insurance factor in the SCC. We shall now briefly relate the experience of one settler in Naitiri Scheme, whose case is quite similar to twenty six others related by the respondents.

The settler occupies a twenty-seven acre plot. Of these acres fifteen are under maize intercropped with beans ; three under sunflower; five under pasture; and four constitute the homestead.

In 1986 the settler obtained a total loan of K.Shs. 20,200 for the cultivation of maize. However, the maize crop was "doing very well" until in August when wind and hail-storm struck. The almost bearing maize stems were "flattened to the ground and the leaves reduced to those of onions". The settler was thus destined for a crop failure. He harvested a total of 185 bags although the target of the Ministry of Agriculture for a 15 acre crop is a minimum of 375 bags. The farmer stored fifty bags for the family's consumption and sold the other 195 bags. At the current price of K.Shs. 170 per bag, the farmer received a net payment of K.Shs. 32,850. Out of this amount he repaid the AFC loan plus interest a total of K.Shs. 24,000. This left him with a balance of K.Shs. 8,850 before costing such other inputs as family labour, managerial efforts etc. This is the amount the farmer considered to be his total income for that year. It is important to note that this amount falls far below the standard target set for Tongaren by the Department of Agriculture. Thus one acre of maize is expected to realize an average of 20 bags of maize, in which case the farmer in the above example should have obtained 300 bags from his 15-acre farm resulting into net returns of K.Shs. 31,250. This figure is about three times higher than what he actually received.

On the other hand, the average number of bags produced by the non-loanees was 86.1 while the average amount stored

for consumption was 30 bags. Out of the 56.1 bags sold the average proceeds were about K.Shs. 9,520. This is what may be considered to be the per capita annual income of this category of settlers, as derived from the maize crop.

It seems therefore that those settlers who utilize the SCC scheme do not actually realize any much higher income than those who do not. It is however true that in the absence of the SCC its beneficiaries would lack the capital for investing in the land. It is also true that the settlers who utilize the SCC facility realize higher out put although much of it goes into the repayment of the loan. When all is said and done, it is the government which benefits more in the sense in which the SCC increases the amount of maize stock available for the nation.

Further evidence in Tongaren revealed that the net income received by the clients of the AFC is in some cases so low that it leads to two other problems in the area's agricultural development. In the first place, 40 per cent of the settler-farmers are in loan arrears with the AFC. Records at the AFC's local branch which caters for both Tongaren and Kimilili Divisions show the branch to be owed by the local farmers a total of K.Shs. 65 million in loan arrears. Out of this figure, about K.Shs. 60 million is owed by the farmers in Tongaren. In all the available annual reports compiled by the local branch of the AFC,

the problem of default in loan repayment and the consequent accumulation of outstanding loan arrears was cited as the most formidable obstacle to the efficient and effective performance of the New Seasonal Crop Credit Scheme. In the current, 1986 report, for example, the local AFC branch pointed out that:

the future smooth running of Seasonal Crop Credit Scheme depends on instituting strict lending conditions ... so as to instil credit discipline to the corporation's loanees.³³

Poor returns on maize production as a cause for not default in loan repayment is restricted to Tongaren alone. The findings of Uma Lele in Vihiga, a non-settlement Division in the same Province, also testifies to this phenomenon. In his own words:

The poor repayment rate (in Vihiga) may be explained by the lower-than-expected profitability of the maize enterprise.³⁴

There is however no evidence that the high rate of default in loan repayment in Tongaren is a result of a deliberate action by politically powerful settler-farmers to evade loan repayment obligation, as is reported, for example, in Ethiopia's Chilalo and Walamo Agricultural Development Units.³⁵

In Kimilili, our control experiment, cases of loan default are insignificant because, as already seen earlier, only two per cent of ^{the} local farmers utilize the AFC's credit facility.

The second problem related to low net returns on maize production among the clients of the AFC is that the farmers are only able to pay off the cost of production (i.e. the AFC's loan for that season). Thus they are not left with any substantial profit balance some of which could be reinvested in the land. This compels the farmer to approach the AFC for yet another loan. Thus such farmers, about 32 per cent in Tongaren, rely on the AFC during every crop-year for the purpose of capital requirements. Ideally, agricultural credit should provide the initial capital requirement for the production of maize during the first, and possibly the second crop-year, but there after, the farmer is expected to have developed a self-sufficient capacity to finance the cultivation of his farm out of the proceeds of the previous year's crop or out of his own savings. Thus in the case of Tongaren, the AFC was expected to steer the settler-farmers up to a self-sustaining stage. However, the AFC has not achieved this purpose, hence 32 per cent of the farmers continue to depend on this credit organization for the cultivation of their farms year in, year out. This means that the AFC has not tangibly transformed the economic welfare of the settler-farmers as far as agricultural productivity is concerned. Discussing a similar factor, Ted L. Jones reaches the following conclusions:

If the individual farmer lacks sufficient financial, physical, or labour resources within his family, together with those supplied

through the proceeds of a loan to increase his production and income so the loan can be repaid with interest, and at the same time improve his level of living, no economic purpose will be served by the granting of agricultural credit. A loan on an uneconomic basis becomes a grant, and may destroy repayment discipline, thereby contributing to the deterioration of the financial strength of credit institutions.³⁶

In the case of Tongaran, the AFC is quite flexible in its lending terms in so far as it is able to offer a Seasonal Crop Credit Loan to farmers who are still in loan repayment arrears. This is because of the government's fears of the political repercussions of inadequate food supply to the nation arising from the financial inability of the farmers to produce, (The AFC is a government Corporation). It appears therefore that the flexibility of the AFC and ultimately, the government with regard to lending terms is conditioned by the desire to avail adequate food stock to the country and to maintain political tranquility, rather than really to improve on the socio-economic welfare of the farmers in Tongaren. This practice by the government was more evident during the 1985 crop-year, the year succeeding a nationwide draught in 1984. During this crop-year, all the farmers who applied for AFC loan under the SCCS were granted the facility without reference to their previous loan repayment records, nor to whatever other criteria for determining credit worthness. As soon as the levels of national food stocks returned to normal, the established lending regulations went back into force.

In short, the farmers in Tongaren have attempted to utilize the available agricultural credit facilities, as fully as possible, and although this has increased their level of productivity, it has not significantly increased their net incomes. This is mainly attributed to the unprofitability of maize production - the area's chief cash crop. The question of profit, and by implication, that of producer prices vis-a-vis the cost of production imposes upon us the need to examine the performance of the organization for marketing maize.

Organization & Utilization of the Marketing Institution:
The NCPB.

The institutions responsible for the purchase of the farmer's harvest in Kenya have been changing both in structure and name. Since 1942 there has been in existence two marketing organizations, namely Maize Control (for maize) and Produce control (for products such as Bixa, Castor oil, cashew nuts groundnuts etc). In 1959 these two organizations were replaced with two others, namely the Maize Marketing Board and the Kenya Agricultural Produce Board. The latter performed its function of purchasing the farmers harvest, through two agents - the Kenya Farmers Association (in the European Areas) and the West Kenya Marketing Board in the African Areas of the Western and Nyanza Provinces and the East Kenya Marketing Board for the rest of the country. In 1966 the Maize Marketing Board and the Kenya Agricultural Produce Board were joined to become the Maize and Produce Board, and finally, in 1979 the

MPB was joined with the Wheat Board of Kenya to become the National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB) which is in operation todate.³⁷

Apart from these governmental marketing organizations, some private traders have quite often been licensed to purchase maize from the farmers, although in the areas of Bungoma and Trans-Nzoia Districts such traders are more often than not, discouraged in order that farmers channel their their yields to the NCPB directly so that the loan they owe the AFC may be repaid by deducting from their dues the equivalent of the loan owed plus interest accruing thereto and remitting the same to the AFC.

However, there are a number of factors or problems that have persistently characterized the maize marketing arrangement, which problems have negatively affected the performance of the settlers in Tongaren. These problems include low price levels, lack of room on the market i.e. non acceptance of the harvest by the Marketing Board, delayed payments to the farmer, lengthy distance to the buying centres, poor transport and road system etc.

The settlers have often found the prices offered for maize by the government to be too low especially in relation to the cost of inputs such as fertilizers, machinery, labour and transportation/^{etc.} which is high. Accordingly, the farmer's profit margin is very small and so

is his income. The average yield per acre of maize in Tongaren, was found to be thirteen bags. Which brings the average gross income of the farmer to K.Shs. 2,210 per acre. For those farmers who utilize AFC credit facilities they have to repay AFC's loan plus interest at a rate of about K.Shs. 1400 $\frac{1}{2}$ per acre. (The AFC grants its loan at a rate of K.Shs. 1360 per acre with an interest rate of 14%). Thus the farmer's income from maize farming (the only significant cash crop) is so inadequate that he is not able to comfortably re-invest in the land during the next season, let alone being able to contribute toward harambee and self-help projects in the area.

Secondly, the farmers are often denied a chance to deliver their maize and other produce to the Board due to the absence of room in the stores, implying that probably the market is flooded. Under such circumstances the Board has had to raise the minimum qualifications for entry of maize to the stores. This has been the percentage of moisture content in the maize which is often lowered down to about 11%. This is a very low figure that can hardly be met in view of the fact that the rainy season sometimes extends right into the harvesting period. Some farmers have infact had to be turned back with their maize after they have expensively transported the harvest for a distance of over 40 kilometres from their farms to the Board. As the Wabuge committee once observed:

...The maize and produce board is not fulfilling its responsibilities and ... it has let the nation down. The board is supposed to provide for the efficient collection and marketing of farmers' surplus maize, and yet farmers find that they cannot deliver their maize at times.

Thirdly, and related to transportation, until 1983 the marketing or purchasing units were centred in Kitale, Webuye, Turbo etc. ^{all of} which are well over thirty-five kilometres from Tongaren. The problem here lies in the fact that transportation costs (the cost of hiring lorries and trucks) from the farms to these market centres were extremely high, which considerably narrowed the farmers profit margin. This problem was, however, alleviated in 1983 when the NCPB decided to decentralize its structure for purchasing maize by opening up numerous buying centres throughout the area and indeed where need be in the country. This has of late drastically brought down transportation costs.

However, the poor road communication system still possess a major problem in the area. First of all no tarmac road traverses the division except for the Kitale-Webuye road which runs across the Western tip of the division for a distance of only five kilometres. Otherwise roads in the area are very rough during dry season and very muddy during the rains when they are infact almost totally impassable. Additionally, distances in the division are elongated by the absence of bridges on certain strategic stretches hence the farmers have to curve long

distances to deliver the crop or to bring in farm inputs.

Since about 1982 the NCPB has not been paying the farmers promptly for the crop they deliver to the board. Quite often it has taken the NCPB an average of five months to do this. The majority of the farmers, for example, delivered their 1986 harvest to the NCPB between the months of November 1986 and February 1987 and upto the time of writing (June 1987) the farmers had not yet received their dues. These delays have four repercussions upon the settler's development efforts. First, he finds himself without funds to reinvest in the land since farm preparation for the new crop-season begins around January and planting^{is} done between mid-March and mid-May. Thus if the farmer is paid after, say April, as is often the case, he accordingly either delays in preparing and sowing his farm or out of the little monies he may be having he obtains and uses less amounts of inputs, especially fertilizers, than is recommended, or resorts to the use of animal wastes^{as} fertilizer and ox-plough rather than a tractor for tilling. The result is that the harvest is poor hence incomes^{are} drastically lowered.

Delays in receiving payments from NCPB also delays clearance for a further loan from the AFC. As the Assistant Agricultural Officer notes:

The failure by the National Cereal and Produce Board to pay farmers in time has made it impossible for them to acquire this year's credit.

Although the settler repays his loan by way of signing an irrevocable order authorizing the NCPB to deduct the equivalent of the money owed plus interest and remit the same to the AFC, delivery of the crop to the Board, just by itself does not signify, at least to the AFC, that the farmer has repaid his loan. In other words, the AFC will not clear the settler for another loan until the NCPB has actually credited the AFC's account. By delaying to pay the settler, the NCPB also delays in crediting the AFC's account thereby causing continual increase in the charges for interest. The Divisional Extension Officer's report for Tongaren summarizes the maize marketing problem thus:

Marketing of maize is tailing off. Farmers who sold their crop through the depots in the Rift Valley (neighbourhood)..... have not been paid their dues. This has made it impossible for them to acquire inputs especially for those who rely on AFC loans..... This trend of events, if not resolved soon, our targets will not be met.⁴⁰

The existing poor relationship between the NCPB and the AFC and the repercussions of this relationship on the farmer also brings out the problem of inter-agency coordination in rural development at the local level. Thus the A.F.C. and the NCPB relate to the farmer independently without comparing notes and trying to harmonize their activities so as to benefit the farmer more. Jan R. Moris has noted that infact:

Weaknesses of horizontal coordination have strong adverse effects in agricultural development, because field enterprises often require more than one kind of technical support.⁴¹

The farmer in Tongaren is, therefore, left to deal with the problems arising from each of the agencies, himself. This awkward situation has lowered efficient and effective farmer performance in Tongaren. Accordingly, Agriculture, in particular maize production, has not turned out to be a reliable source of employment and high incomes for the settlers in Tongaren.

Implications of Low Incomes for Rural Development

Absolute figures on rural income levels are of no immediate importance to the rural development process of the area concerned unless such figures are linked to the development and recurrent expenditure needs of the people. In the case of Tongaren the little amounts of net incomes received by the settler - farmers was found to be further diminished by the settlers' large family sizes. The Bukusu who constitute about 70 per cent of the settlers are characteristically a polygamous people whose social status in society is determined by among other things, the number of wives and children an individual has. This is also true of Kimilili Division whose local population is exclusively Bukusu. Accordingly the mean number of wives per farmer in both Divisions is two, while the mean number of children per family

was found to be 10.2 with 40 per cent of the farmers having children above this mean figure. In one of his annual reports for example, the Medical Officer of Health, Bungoma made the following assessment of the size of families in the District:

Most of the adult population is polygamous and pronatalist attitudes are strong in the district. Bungoma women marry young and most unions are stable and permanent, forming a high fertility trend.⁴²

Under circumstances of rapid population growth in Tongaren therefore, the capacity of land as an adequate source of employment has considerably decreased particularly because, to borrow the words of Adrian Mukhabi, "the land base per worker declines due to a rising farm population"⁴³. Thus the initial objective for the establishment of Tongaren settlement area, namely provision of employment, has rapidly been undermined by rapid growth in its population.

Back to the question of income, rapid population growth in Tongaren has had the consequence of lowering per capita family income while increasing per capita family expenditure needs and requirements. The ultimate effect on the socio-economic welfare of the settlers is the incapacity to meet their development related family obligations, notably, payment of school fees, provision of clothing, provision of medical care that is usually required to supplement what is offered by the government health centres and clinics; accessibility to nutritious foods unavailable locally on the farm, etc.

In short, poverty is gradually reestablishing itself among the settlers in Tongaren. Such relationship between population growth, income and poverty has also been found by Johnston and Clark to be existing in other parts of the developing world.

In the words of these authors:

the prospects of reducing rural poverty in most of the contemporary low-income countries ... appears still to be jeopardized by the persistence of high rates of fertility.⁴⁴

Tongaren settlement area is thus acquiring the same poor rural development features as the non settlement areas.

The impact of low income levels on the ability of Tongaren to initiate development projects is obvious: They have found it increasingly difficult to meet the family level expenditure needs which they consider to be more immediate, and still have some money left for the purpose of contributing towards community level projects, such as the self-help and harambee projects. Indeed when we asked the respondents what they consider to be the major problems that hinder the development of the area, 47 per cent mentioned factors that directly and indirectly suggest inadequate incomes.

The case of Tongaren cottage Hospital, seen earlier, is a suiting example of the argument being developed here. The local people were required by the EEC to raise Ksh 392000 as the self-help share contribution. However, the local community was only able to raise Ksh 30000 in form of cash and

materials. Upon failing to raise any more money, the project committee entered into a negotiation with the neighbouring Tongaren Farmers Cooperative Society whereby the latter agreed to donate its building block towards the cottage Hospital. It is the value of this building, in addition to the already collected Ksh 30000 that the project Committee presented to a visiting team of EEC Officials as the people's self-help contribution. It was upon this basis that the EEC finally released its donation. Thus, the inability of the local community in Tongaren, to raise the required monetary contribution delayed the EEC's release of funds by seven years.

Delayed implementation of projects has the adverse effect of rendering the initial process of project costing and budgetary planning inapplicable in view of the continuous upward variation in the prices of materials as well as labour. As Barbra Thomas has aptly pointed out:

The escalating cost of building materials means that by the time the community has collected enough money, to begin work, it is likely that the costs have gone up and their original assessment of costs of construction and transport of material was inadequate.⁴⁵

Delayed implementation of projects inevitably also leads to the delayed enjoyment or utilization of such projects by the local people for whom they were intended.

Low levels of rural incomes in Tongaren has made it difficult for a majority of the settlers to tap some of the development values that the administration brings closer to them.

When our interviewees were asked whether they consider electricity an important facility the response was 91.5 per cent positive. However, only 35.9 per cent of those who gave positive answers claimed to have applied for its supply. But a majority 55.6 per cent claimed not to have made the application due to a number of reasons: (a) fear of expected (high) costs (22%) (b) ownership of a poor house (mud walls and grass thatched) (15%) (c) unawareness of the opportunity to apply (27%).

Similar responses were obtained with regard to the supply of tap water. As indicated in chapter one, the Little Nzoia Water Supply project was completed in 1976. Water pipes were laid leading to every home without first requiring the settler to make any application. Once the project became operational, every settler was required to pay a flat rate of K.Sh. 15 per month for the supply of water. Asked whether they consider the supply of tap water to be an important facility to them, 95.8% of the respondents answered in the affirmative. However, the survey showed 28.5% of the settlers not to receive tap water at all, either because the water flow does not reach their tanks (11.4%) or that the taps have been disconnected for non payment of bills (17.1%). The survey further showed those settlers living within a distance of about one-and-a-half kilometres from a river to be the most affected by disconnection. Such settlers argued that they did not wish to waste K.Sh. 15 per month to receive tap water when they can easily

obtain a plentiful supply of free water at the river. Thus the value of clean and treated water is sacrificed or lost in an effort to save only K.Sh. 15.

Similar findings were also obtained in Kimilili. This Division, is now traversed by a net-work of power lines serving especially trading centres and schools. However, none of our respondents has tapped electricity to his home and only 5% have applied for its supply. Only 2% claimed not to see the need to electrify a home as such a facility is only useful 'in schools, hospitals and towns'. However, those who value electricity but have not applied for its installation claimed not to have done so either because they (a) fear the expected (high) cost of such a project (42%) (b) don't have proper houses (21%) (c) are unaware of the possibilities of electrification (37%).

All the above cases indicate that low incomes or relative poverty plays a role in inhibiting the settlers' ability to tap or draw development values as exposed to them by the administration and its agencies. Consequently the people look upon the administration to meet the whole cost of implementing, operationalizing and maintaining development projects and programmes.

SUMMARY

Agricultural resources that were allocated to the settlers constitute the expected basis for rural incomes

FOOTNOTES

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5. Interview with a retired agricultural extension worker.
6. Republic of Kenya. B. Van Arkadie. Report, of the Mission on Land Settlement in Kenya . Government Printer, 1966, p. 242.
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8. Interview with former extension worker for the period 1965-1984.
9. John Harbeson. Ibid. p. 265.
10. Ministry of Agriculture. Tanganyika Division, Half-year Report, July 1986, p. 2.

11. Interview with the District Settlement Officer, Bungoma.
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15. Interview with a settler in Tongaren.
16. David K. Leonard, Reaching the Peasant Farmer... op. cit., Chapter 4.
17. Interview with a settler in Tongaren.
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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

As stated earlier in the introduction the primary objective of this study was to analyse the mode and pattern of interaction between the administrative decision making units and agencies and their socio-political environment in the process of resource allocation and utilization. The outcome of this analysis was expected to provide an explanation for the lower-than-expected measures of rural development in Tongaren. In this concluding chapter, therefore, an attempt is made to pull together some of the salient features of bureaucracy - environment relationship. In addition, some specific pointers are marked toward some of the basic problems as well as opportunities in rural development as they arise from this interrelationship.

In allocating the resources at its disposal the administration bases its decisions on a set or sets of criteria drawn out of rationality or in part consideration of the real and potential socio-political needs and demands of the locality it serves. Where it fails to take into account such local needs and demands, the decision made stimulates 'interference' from especially the political environment. The administration then reacts to these interferences in one way or the other. It, for example, meets all or some of the particular demands of the environment or it rejects them and maintains its earlier decision.

However, the former is more often the case. The final decision taken, favourable or unfavourable, has a corresponding effect on the process of rural development in the area concerned.

Right from the time of the establishment of Tongaren settlement schemes up to the coming of the District Focus Strategy for Rural Development, the local administration in Bungoma, notably the DDC premised its decisions for resource allocation on the need to correct and avoid imbalanced development among the various Divisions and localities in the District. Accordingly resources were allocated in a discriminatory pattern against Tongaren. The administration had felt that the settlement area was endowed with more resources which had been pumped in at the time of the establishment of the Schemes, than the other (non settlement) Divisions of the District. While this argument is true, nevertheless, an additional amount of resources was necessary for stimulating the already provided 'raw' or primary ones, notably land. In the absence of this measure such primary resources were destined to be underutilized, with the consequence of retarding the process of rural development in the area.

In the first hypothesis, it was tentatively held that Tongaren is lacking in rural development as a result of the failure of the local politicians to influence the administration to allocate resources in favour of Tongaren. Empirical evidence shows this to be indeed the case. The local administration's policy of allocating resources in disfavour

of Tongaren was obviously detrimental to the development of the area. That being the case, there was need for the area's political leadership to present the case of the area to the administration's decision-making units and to bargain for more resources. However, the local political leadership conspicuously failed to involve itself in the matter and so the administration continued to ignore Tongaren in the process of resource allocation.

The political representative in Tongaren has the ability to influence the administration's decisions for resource allocation but did not attempt to do so. On the other hand attempts or tendencies by the local administration to neglect certain other areas of the district in the process of resource allocation do spark-off successful strong complaints from the political representatives of the area concerned, demanding favourable considerations. The Mt. Elgon and Bungoma South (the present Sirisia) constituencies/Divisions are cases in point. It may, therefore, be concluded that the poor rural development conditions in Tongaren are partly explained by the failure of the local political leadership to influence the administration to consider the area more favourably in ^{the} ~~allocation~~ ^{of} resources. Thus, the more the pressure for resources a political leader exerts upon the administration the more the resources the area receives and the faster the area's process of rural development. The vice versa is also true.

The central administration has one important policy that guides the allocation of development expenditure funds. The policy emphasizes that priority is given to ongoing projects that have been started by the local population through self-help or harambee efforts. This criteria for allocating funds distinguishes and favours areas with higher local resource (mainly income) endowment, which resources form the basic enabling factor for the initiation of self-help projects. This ^{criteria} /also favours areas where the local population has a high propensity for development and a willingness to contribute towards the initiation and implementation of projects. Finally, the criteria favours those areas where the local leadership has the willingness and ability to mobilize the people as well as their local resources for the purpose of project initiation and implementation. Thus it is areas with a good combination of these attributes that will attract more resources from the administration and consequently realize higher measures of rural development.

However, in all the above prerequisites for attracting financial support from the government Tongaren is disadvantaged. In the second hypothesis of this study, it was stated that Tongaren is lacking in rural development because of the failure of the local political leadership to actively participate in mobilizing the local people and their resources for rural development. This was considered to signify a lack of the required initiative from the local people. Research finding proved this to be indeed the case.

First of all, the local people in Tongaren have very low income levels. (This point will be considered again shortly). Their ability to contribute toward the initiation and implementation of local development projects and programmes is therefore significantly inhibited.

Shortages in local resources (incomes) alone cannot justify the inability of Tongaren to initiate local development projects. It can only lower the scale to which this may be done. In other words, the available resources could be mobilized in order to initiate a matching number of projects. However, the available data indicates Tongaren to be lacking in the kind of political leadership that is prepared to mobilize the people and their resources for the purpose of project initiation and implementation. Such leadership is expected to be provided more by the parliamentary representative for the area. The representative does not however, involve himself in the development affairs of his area of representation - a factor that could be attributed to the absence of any formidable challenge from the other political contestants in the area. Such challenge would compel the incumbent representative to live up to the expectation of the electorate by initiating development projects and thereby winning popularity.

The local people themselves show a remarkable willingness and readiness to make some contributions towards the initiation of the needed development projects, But the lack of influential

organizational leadership as discussed above, has contributed toward the unexploitation of this local potential. It may now be concluded that local resource scarcity and a lack of local political commitment to development are two important factors that have curtailed the rate at which self-help projects are being initiated in Tongaren. Consequently, the area's capacity for attracting financial assistance from the government is significantly low. The result is the low level of rural development.

The ineffectiveness of the local political leadership in managing rural development activities in Tongaren has rendered greater importance to the informal community leadership. The people, in their various localities have appointed and relied on leaders from amongst themselves who perform the important function of mobilizing the people in various kinds of groups and organizing the initiation of self-help projects. Once the implementation of such a project is well underway, the project leaders then approach the administration for financial assistance in completing and operationalizing the project. In this way the local people through their various groups are able to influence the administration to allocate resources in favour of their area.

It may now be inferred that local interest groups that are development oriented have a capacity to influence the administration to allocate resources in favour of their

projects and localities. Areas that have more active groups receive correspondingly more financial support from the administration. The effectiveness of interest groups in influencing bureaucratic resource allocation also depends on the level of local resource availability, in particular incomes. This determines the peoples ability to initiate self-help projects which in turn acts as poles of attraction for governmental support. Besides, high level of local resource availability enables the people to initiate, implement and operationalize development projects without necessarily seeking governmental support. In short, higher levels of rural incomes leads to higher levels of local project initiation which in turn leads to higher levels of governmental resource allocation to the area and consequently, higher measures of rural development. The vice-versa is also true. Tongaren's rural development problems predominantly hinge as the low levels of the incomes of the people.

As discussed in chapter four agriculture (dairy and maize production) was set to be the main source of employment and incomes for the settlers in Tongaren. Accordingly the area's rural development process was destined to depend heavily on the settler's performance in utilizing the agricultural resources exposed to them. It is in this regard that it was suggested in the third hypothesis that there is a lack of rural development in Tongaren because of the poor performance

of the settlers at utilizing the agricultural resources placed at their disposal by the administration. The resources include land, dairy animals, credit facilities, extension services, marketing organizations etc. Evidence obtained from the field showed that indeed the agricultural performance of the settler farmers in Tongaren is remarkably poor. This is owed to a number of reasons. First of all, the settler-farmers failed to look upon land as well as the other agricultural facilities from a commercial perspective during the first decade of settlement. This factor delayed the generation of higher incomes from agriculture. Furthermore the settlers lacked the necessary background knowledge and experience in the modern farming methods and practices as demanded by the settlement programme. This factor was worsened by their poor adoption rate of the extension programme. Finally a majority of the settlers have throughout the years been reluctant to utilize the agricultural credit facility as availed by the Agricultural Finance Corporation although there is evidence of need for the facility. Under these circumstances the level of agricultural productivity has remained low and hence the level of incomes derived therefrom.

However, the efficient utilization of agricultural resources for higher profit is a collective responsibility of the farmers themselves and the administration. Thus there is need for functional complementarity between the

farmers and the administration if the objective of increased productivity and incomes is to be achieved. The provision of primary agricultural resources to farmers, for example, is, alone not adequate. The farmer needs continuous support, assistance and encouragement from the administration. He needs, for example, access to the latest research findings on modern methods of farm husbandry which is expected to be provided by the agricultural and veterinary extension officers; he needs a well organized and efficient marketing services; he needs credit facilities with favourable terms and conditions; he needs efficient transport and communication facilities (especially roads), etc.

In the case of Tongaren, however, the provision of the aforesaid facilities and services by the agricultural administration and the related agencies is poor. This is owed to the inadequacy of the current budgetary allocations which inhibit the launching of additional programmes as well as the effective sustainance of the existing ones. The agricultural extension staff, for example, is often without enough fuel to enable them carry out field tours and trips; the department of Transport and Communications lacks enough funds for the repair and maintenance of feeder roads and bridges; while the NCPB lacks enough funds from which to pay for the farmers' marketed produce. This situation has adverse repercussions on the performance of the farmer; on his incomes; and ultimately, on the general pace of rural development in the area. It may, therefore, be inferred that the poor

rural development conditions in Tongaren are in part a result of the inability of the administration to facilitate and encourage the farmers to utilize the agricultural resources in an efficient and effective manner.

In discussing the sociological aspects of the theory of ecology of administration earlier in the introduction, it was hypothesized that there is a lack of rural development in Tongaren because ethnic forces in the district influence the administration to allocate resources in disfavour of the area. However, the available data shows the ethnic or clan factor as not having any relationship with the process of resource allocation by the local administration. This may be because the Bukusu people who are the overwhelming majority ethnic group in the entire district do also have a predominant presence in Tongaren. Moreover, out of the four Parliamentary representatives in the district (including the one for Tongaren) three belong to the Bukusu ethnic group. It is therefore unlikely that Tongaren will be discriminated against in the process of resource allocation on the grounds of ethnicity. It is now plausible to argue that in areas or regions where the simple majority belong to a single ethnic group, their localities are unlikely to be discriminated against, in terms of resource allocation, on the grounds of ethnicity.

Ultimately, it is the lack of local political support, coupled with the inability of the settlers to generate high incomes and the inefficiency of the administration itself that

appear to be the major factors inhibiting rapid rural development in Tongaren. Bureaucratic inefficiency is interiered with by the shortage of funds at the disposal of the administration, which (funds) would be utilized to stimulate rural development in the area. Second, the local people do not have adequate incomes that would in various ways speed up the area's development. The problem of low incomes in particular, points towards the failure or inadequacy of agriculture (especially the production of maize) as a reliable and beneficial source of employment and incomes for the settlers. This further calls for the need for the farmers in conjunction with the administration to explore and experiment on other economic activities which can bring higher incomes for the local people and consequently enhance the process of rural development. In this regard the reintroduction of dairy farming as well as horticulture appear to be the two more promising points of departure.

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APPENDIX A

RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN TONGAREN AND

KIMILILI DIVISIONS

Questionnaire to Settlers

1.1 Background Information

1. Name of Settler
2. Scheme or Location Plot No.
3. Age Ethnic group
4. Religion
5. Marital Status Number of wives
6. Number of Children in total
7. Level of formal education attained:
 - (a) CEE
 - (b) Standard 8
 - (c) KJSE
 - (d) 'O' Level
 - (e) 'A' Level
 - (f) University
 - (g) None
8. Training Received:
 - (a) TTC
 - (b) Polytechnic
 - (c) Farmers Training Centre
 - (d) Others (specify)
9. Do you have any off-farm occupation?
 - (a) Business
 - (b) Public Service
 - (c) Private/non-governmental
 - (d) None.
10. How much income do you receive per month, from this off-farm employment?

2.1 ATTITUDES TOWARD DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE

11. What do you want done in this area that you feel would benefit you most? (in order of priorities)

- (i) | (ii)
- (iii) | (iv)
- (v)

12. Have you made any attempt to call for these development needs (a) Yes ... (b) No

13. If no, give reasons:

- (i) | (ii)
- (iii) | (iv)

14. If yes, to whom did you make these demands (appeals)

- (a) The MP | (b) The Councillor
- (c) The Chief | (d) The DO
- (e) The DC | (f) Others

15. How did you organize or channel these demands?

.....

16. What response have you so far received about the demands you have requested? Explain

17. At what rate would you say this area is developing?

- (a) High | (b) Average
- (c) low rate than you expect?

18. What would you say are some of the reasons that retard development in this area?

- (i) | (ii)
- (iii)

3.1 ATTITUDES TOWARD THE POLITICIANS (LEADERS)

19. Do you find the following people very useful in your development effort?

(i) Councillor (a) Yes (b) No

(ii) MP. (a) Yes (b) No

(iii) Kanu leader (a) Yes (b) No.

20. If no, why don't they come to your assistance?

Reasons: (i).....

(ii)

(iii)

21. If yes, in what ways does each of them assist you?

(i) MP

(ii) Councillor

(iii) Kanu leaders

22. In what ways would you like these leaders to help you?

(i) MP

(ii) Councillor

(iii) Kanu leaders

4.1 SPECIFIC PROJECTS: THE ROLE OF THE PEOPLE IN THEIR CHOICE AND UTILIZATION.

(a) Water Supply Project

23. Have water pipes been laid upto your home?

24. If no, where have they reached?

25. What kind of water-related problems did you have before this project was initiated?

- (i)
 - (ii)
 - (iii)
 - (iv)
26. When did you realize the need for piped water?
.....
27. Who then initiated it?
28. Did the people of this area request for this water project?
29. If yes, to whom was the request made?
- (a) The MP
 - (b) The Councillor
 - (c) The Party
 - (d) The DO
 - (e) The Chief
 - (f) The DC
 - (g) Others:
30. How was the request channelled to him?
31. Do you now receive tap water? (a) Yes (b) No.
32. If not, what is the reason?
- (a) It has been disconnected for non-payment of bills.
 - (b) Never applied for the water.
 - (c) Asked for it but the water does not just reach the tank.
33. If (b) give reasons.
34. If the water flows in, how regular is that?
- (a) All the time.

(b) Sometimes.

(c) Rarely.

35. If the water flow is so irregular or is absent, have you ever complained?

36. If yes, to whom?

37. Whenever there is no water flowing in the taps, what is your alternative source?

(a) a well/borehole

(b) a river

(c) others (specify)

38. Do you strongly feel that water is a major problem that needs attention?

(b) Rural Electrification Programme.

39. Have you received electricity in your house? (a) Yes
(b) No.

40. Do you strongly feel that the supply of electricity in this area will benefit you most? (a) Yes (b) No.

41. If yes, in what ways would you benefit from the supply of electricity?

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

42. Have you applied for its supply? (a) Yes (b) No.

43. If no, give reasons:

(a) Does not have a proper house.

(b) Fears the costs

(c) Not aware of the possibility of electrification
(option for Tongaren only).

44. If yes, what has the response been?

45. If the response has been negative have you made any
appeals? (a) Yes (b) No.

46. If yes, to whom?

47. Who benefits from the facility?

(c) Rural Health Programme

48. Where do you go for treatment in case of illness?

(a) Hospital (health centre)

(b) Say prayers

(c) See traditional medicinemen

(d) Any other (specify)

49. When you go to the health centre, do you receive
adequate treatment? (a) Yes (b) No.

50. If no, give reasons (tick those applicable)

(a) Lack of drugs (b) Lack of material and equipment

(c) Lack of doctors (c) lack of beds

(d) lack of beds (e) others (specify)

51. Where do you then seek for supplementary treatment?

(a) Another hospital (which one specify)

(b) Traditional medicine

(c) Prayers

(d) Any other (specify)

52. Do you feel this health centre is such an important project for the people of this area? (a) Yes (b) No.

53. If yes, in what ways do you feel the services of this health centre should be improved upon?

(a)

(b)

(c)

54. Have you made any requests for these improvements?

55. If no, give reasons:

(a)

(b)

(c)

56. If yes, to whom did you make these requests?

57. What has been the response?

(d) Rural Roads Improvement Programme.

58. How would you describe the transportation (road) system in this area?

(a) Good (b) Bad

(c) Very bad.

59. If not good what are some of the transportation problems you encounter in this area?

(a)

(b)

(c)

60. How do these problems affect your activities as a farmer and resident of this area?

- (a)
- (b)
- (c)

61. What are some of the measures you would recommend for the improvement of the transport system in this area?

- (a)
- (b)
- (c)
- (d)

62. Have you made any appeals for the solutions? (a) Yes
(b) No

63. If yes, how did you do that?

64. What has the response been?

(e) Maize Production Programme

65. What is the size of your holding? acres.

66. Do you plant maize on your farm? (a) Yes (b) No

67. If yes, on how many acres? acres.

68. What else do you grow apart from maize and on how much land? (a) Sunflower acres

(b) Beans acres

(c) Coffee acres

(d) Pasture acres

69. Do you consider the production of maize to be an important activity to you? (a) Yes (b) No.
70. If yes, in what ways do you benefit?
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
71. What did you use for tilling the land under maize in?
(a) 1984 (b) 1985
(c) 1986
(i) tractor (ii) ox-plough (iii) hoe
(iv) others (specify).
72. If not a tractor give reasons (i)
(ii) (iii)
73. Did you obtain a loan for the cultivation of your maize this year? (a) Yes (b) No.
74. If no, when did you last obtain a loan for this purpose?
75. Why did you stop borrowing? (i)
(ii) (iii)
(iv) (v)
76. How else do you finance the cultivation of your maize crop? (a) own money (b) borrowed from another source (specify)

77. If you obtained a loan, from which source was it?
.....
78. If you obtained the loan in terms of inputs, do you apply on the farm all the inputs or do you direct a part of it to some other uses which you consider equally important? Explain:
79. Do you feel the AFC loan is so important to you as a maize farmer? (a) Yes (b) No.
80. If yes, explain
81. Have you had any difficulties in repaying the AFC loan? (a) Yes (b) No
82. If yes, what has been the major problem? (i)
(ii) (iii)
83. In what ways, would you say, the AFC should change in order to assist you better?
(i) (ii)
(iii) (iv)
84. Do agricultural extension officers visit you?
(a) Yes (b) No
85. If yes, how frequent is that? Once (a) a week
(b) a month (c) a year.
86. What are some of the reasons for which an extension officer visits you? (i)
(ii) (iii)
(iv)

87. Do you find extension officers extremely important people to you as a maize farmer? (a) Yes (b) No
88. In either case give reasons: (i) Useful
(ii) Not useful
89. How many bags of maize did you produce in (i) 1985
..... (ii) 1986
90. In each case how many bags did you keep for consumption and how many did you sell? (i) Consumption
(ii) Sell
91. Where do you sell your maize on harvesting?
(a) To traders (b) To the Maize and Produce Board
92. If (a) give reasons: (i)
(ii).....(iii)
93. In either case how long does it take between the time you deliver the produce and the time you receive payments?
(i) Traders.....(ii) M&PB
94. How much income did you receive from the sale of your maize this year? Sh.
95. What would you say are some of the problems you encounter as a maize farmer? (i)
(ii)..... (iii).....
(iv) (v)
96. Before you acquired this piece of land where had you been living?

97. Why did you decide to leave that place and acquire this piece of land?

- Reasons: (i)
- (ii)
- (iii)
- (iv)

98. Do you now find life better in this area than where you came from? (a) Yes (b) No.

99. If yes, in what ways is that so?

- (i)
- (ii)
- (iii)
- (iv)

100. If no, give reasons.

- (i)
- (ii)
- (iii)
- (iv)

APPENDIX B

RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND UTILIZATION IN
TONGAREN AND KIMILILI DIVISIONS.

Questionnaire to Heads of Ministry Departments/
Project Leaders.

1. Name of Project _____
2. Name and designation of leader. . _____

3. How was the decision to initiate this project made?

4. Who financed the project _____
5. Are there any problems this project is facing? _____

6. If yes, what are they? . _____
7. Would you say this project is serving the people as
fully as it had been intended? _____
8. If not, what are some of the problems facing the
project? _____
9. Does your Ministry/Department introduce development
projects and programmes before the people themselves
ask for them? _____
10. How do the people respond or react to such projects
or programmes? (a) They co-operate fully _____
(b) They resist for a while then accept _____
(c) They resist totally _____
11. How would you explain this response _____

12. In case of resistance how do you normally overcome this obstacle? _____
13. Do you receive demands or complaints from the people regarding the performance of this project? _____

14. If yes, what are some of these complaints/demands that you receive? _____
15. In what ways do the people channel these demands/complaints to you? _____
16. Do you normally find such demands/complaints worthwhile? Please explain your answer. _____

17. In your assessment would you say the people of this area demand alot from your department? _____
18. Do you normally take into account such demands/complaints from the local people in your decision making exercise. Please explain you answer. _____

19. Are there cases where you need the assistance of the local representatives (e.g. MPs councillors) in your task of initiating and implementing development projects and programmes in this area? _____

20. If yes, in what ways do you need such assistance? _____

21. Do you then find the assistance forthcoming. (Please explain your answer). _____


22. Are there situations where in your task of initiating and implementing development projects you feel the local representatives should not be involved? Please explain your answer giving examples. _____

23. Are there any occasions where the local representatives or other personalities request you to perform your duties in favour of their respective localities? _____

24. If yes explain giving examples. _____

25. Do you normally consider such request? Please explain your answer. _____
26. What measures do you recommend for the improvement of this particular project? _____
27. Being an administrator in this area, what form of your experience would you say are some of the major problems inhibiting rapid development? _____

28. What would you say are some of the advantages the people of this area have that stimulates development? _____



MAP SHOWING TONGAREN SETTLEMENT AND KIMILILI NON-SETTLEMENT DIVISIONS