

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI



COLLEGE OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

KENYAN GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE PROLIFERATION OF SMALL
ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS: A CASE STUDY OF SAMBURU AND LAIKIPIA
DISTRICTS

BY



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DECLARATION

This dissertation is my original work and has not been submitted for a degree in any other university.




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DEDICATION

I dedicate this study to my brother and mentor Hon. Sammy Leshore, M.P. Samburu East and Assistant Minister for Labor and Manpower Development, for shaping my life and his wise and dedicated guidance throughout this study,

To my son, Sokoine S. Leshore whose company saw me through the most difficult part of this study.

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Several people assisted me to develop and complete this desertation; from the fact that studies of this nature are seldom the outcome of an individual's effort or their authors alone. In real life a research publication such as this is an outcome of a complex mixture of insights that form the author's total experience and worldview during the learning experience.

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Any errors in this thesis, however, remain mine.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACK	Anglican Church of Kenya
CBO	Community Based Organization
CCF	Christian Children's Fund
CDF	Constituency Development Fund
DC	District Commissioner
DO	District Officer
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FBO	Faith Based Organization
GSU	General Service Unit
KPR	Kenya Police Reserve
NARC	National Alliance of Rainbow Coalition
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
SPLA	Sudanese People Liberation Army
SALW	Small Arms Light Weapons

DEFINITION OF TERMS:

Small Arms: Firearms designed primarily to be carried and fired by one person and, generally, held in the hands, as distinguished from heavy arms, or artillery.

Light Weapons: Light weapons are usually heavier and larger than small arms and designed to be employed by a small team or crew of infantry personnel. They include some man-portable firearms and their ammunition, light artillery guns and rockets, and guided missiles for use against armored vehicles, aircraft, or fortifications.

Proliferation: Uncontrolled increase. In the study the term is used to mean the uncontrolled increase of small arms and light weapons among civilians.

State: state is an entity that enjoys extensive autonomy in its domestic economic and social policy, largely free from interference from other states and powers. It is an organized political community occupying a definite territory, having an organized government, and possessing internal and external sovereignty. The state claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.

Northern Kenya: The area including Northern Rift Valley, Northern part of Eastern Province and North Eastern Province.

ABSTRACT

This study investigated the response of the Kenyan government to the proliferation of small arms in Samburu and Laikipia Districts in the Northern part of Kenya. The study focused on the factors fueling small arms proliferation and the government's response through disarmament and recruitment of Kenya Police Reserves (KPR) as a means of filling the security gap.

The main argument in this thesis is that the government has not provided adequate security to the people living in Laikipia and Samburu districts. The result has been resort by the local community to arming as a means of protection and self-defense. The study reveals that disarmament and recruitment of the KPR are positive gestures by the Kenya government. However, the two initiatives have failed to serve the purpose for which they were initiated due to structural weaknesses within the state system and the assumption that security is an issue that can be tackled in isolation.

The study reveals that the government has in deed reacted positively to the problem of small arms in the two Districts through initiation of disarmament process, recruitment of KPRs and other community policing strategies like recruitment of scouts in the conservancies. Such reactions are insignificant considering the magnitude of insecurity menace in Laikipia and Samburu. The key factors undermining the ineffectiveness of government initiatives include lack of proper coordination, bureaucracy and inadequacy of resources.

Further, the study confirms that disarmament can only be effective as a response mechanism if transparently conducted by the agencies involved. However, disarmament calls for the provision of legal arms and boosting of security by the state. The study concludes that small arms problem in Laikipia and Samburu Districts can best be solved through a coordinated effort of the government and local Samburu and Laikipia communities.

CHAPTER I

RESEARCH ISSUES IN SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN KENYA

1.1 BACKGROUND

This project sets out to capture the response of the Kenya government to small arms and light weapons proliferation in Samburu and Laikipia Districts (Rift Valley province) between 1988 and 2006.

Small arms are firearms designed primarily to be carried and fired by one person and, generally, held in the hands, as distinguished from heavy arms, or artillery. Light weapons on the other hand, are usually heavier and larger than small arms and are designed for use by a small team or crew of infantry personnel. They include some man-portable firearms and their ammunition, light artillery guns and rockets, and guided missiles for use against armored vehicles, aircraft, or fortifications.

Small arms and light weapons proliferation is a major international concern today. According to Small Arms Survey 2003, over 639 million of small arms are circulating in the world today. Approximately 60 per cent of the small arms in circulation are in civilian hands. The vast majority of the balance is in the arsenals of national armed forces and police, while about one million are in the hands of

armed groups. The report further points that the global stockpile grows by about 1% annually through production. However, it is the re-transfer of second hand firearms that shapes the global distribution most. About 6.69 million arms enter global market annually.¹

At the global level, small arms and light weapons account for 300,000 deaths in armed conflicts and another 200,000 in criminal activities each year, making them deadlier than tanks and bombs. Millions of people are also injured, terrorized, internally displaced or forced to be refugees.

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons affects national, regional and international security efforts. Prevalence and use of such arms pose a major hindrance to conflict prevention, peace building and sustainable development. Weapons also increase risk of terrorist and terrorist activities.²

Within the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa region, a number of political developments, in the last decade, have contributed to small arms and light weapons proliferation. These developments include internal and cross border conflicts in Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Uganda and Somalia. Relatively stable countries such as Kenya, Djibouti and Tanzania have received small arms and light weapons from the combatants fleeing the conflicts in their countries.

¹ Kenya Action Network on Small Arms Newsletter. July-December 2005. Issue No.1 pg 5

In Kenya, a 2002 Kenya Crime Survey by Security Research and Information Center (SRIC) indicated a high the rate of small arms proliferation. The availability of pistols and rifles in civilian hands has increased violent crimes in the recent years such as robbery and car jacking in urban areas, murder, banditry, cattle rustling and ethnic/land clashes.³

National governments, regional and the UN bodies have made a number of initiatives in response to small arms and light weapons crisis through lobbying, conferences and treaties aimed at curbing arms trade and trafficking. Specific initiatives by the UN include the July 2001 UN conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects in New York; the first Biennial Meetings of States (BMS) on the UN Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects in 2003 and 2005; and formation of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) 1998.⁴

In Africa, the OAU Bamako Declaration on Common African Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons was a step in the right direction.⁵ In the Great Lakes and Horn of African Region, eleven member countries came together in March 2000 and made the Nairobi Declaration. The Declaration resulted in the establishment of the Nairobi

² Nairobi Secretariat on Small Arms Newsletter, 2005

³ Security Research and Information Center, 2002 Survey Report pg 15

⁴ Kenya Action Network on Small Arms Newsletter, Ibid pg 3

⁵ Kenya Action Network on Small Arms OP Cit.

Secretariat on Small Arms and Light Weapons to coordinate Action Against Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the entire region.

Studies have established that many states in the horn of Africa have no capacity to guarantee the security of their citizens.⁶ Some states in the region have thus resorted to overt or covert arming of groups in rural areas for self-protection. Arming of civilians for self-protection has been witnessed in Uganda and Kenya and to a lesser extent other IGAD countries.⁷ Whereas this strategy has created a measurable sense of security in some areas, some civilians seen it as an unambiguous indication that the state has abdicated its duty to protect and defend the citizens. As a consequence affected civilians have sought alternative means of protecting themselves.

Nationally, the Kenya government has enacted a number of measures aimed at stemming the tide of small arms and light weapons proliferation. Also a number of non-governmental organizations have been formed primarily to address the insecurity problem especially in the wake of the rising number of crimes committed with light weapons. Such organizations include the Kenya Action Network on Small Arms (KANSA), Security Research and Information Center (SRIC) and community based organizations.

⁶ Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) in 2002

⁷ Wolde-Gebre K., mason I., small Arms in the Horn of Africa: Challenges, Issues and Perspectives, BICC, Bonn, 202 pg 13-14

These initiatives notwithstanding, small arms and light weapons proliferation continue to pose a major security threat to the Kenya nation with 50,000 illicit arms feared to be in civilian hands. The fact that the phenomenon has increased rather than reduced over the last 10 years makes it compelling to focus on the government response to the crisis using the district as the point of analysis.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Chapter V of the Constitution of Kenya spells out life, liberty and security of the person and protection from any form of violence either from public or private source as fundamental rights to which every person is entitled. The Kenya government has responded to small arms and light weapons proliferation and other forms of armed threats through mopping up exercises (including voluntary surrender of illicit arms). The government has also responded to the crisis by publicly destroying publicly confiscated small arms and light weapons as well as conducting roadblock traffic checkpoints especially along highways.

Gun acquisition by civilians for self protection in Samburu District is recognized as recent development necessitated by the increasing insecurity in the District in the form of banditry and cattle raids by neighboring communities, particularly the Turkana and Pokot.⁸ The Samburu buy guns from Baringo, Isiolo, Marsabit and Turkana. Studies indicate that the Samburus do not trade in guns. However, the proliferation of small arms in the district has been so rapid that most of the adult

male populations in the lowland pastoral areas of Samburu district currently hold guns. The key entry points are identified as the border areas of Wamba Division, Baragoi Division and Nyiro and Waso divisions.⁹

From the above, it is evident that obtaining insecurity challenge is responsible for possession and use of small arms and light weapons in Samburu District. The government has responded in various ways to the crisis. . However, the continuing receipt and holding of guns by the communities in Samburu District pose actual and potential security threat to the district, neighboring communities and the whole nation.

A more efficacious approach needs to be developed in response to the problem as small arms and light weapons proliferation. The communities affected feel that it is only by arming that they can protect themselves and their livestock around which their life revolves. The question to ponder is: how does the state respond to a challenging situation such as the one in which the residents of Samburu district presently find themselves? The study, therefore, sets out to investigate government response to small arms and light weapons proliferation in Samburu district since between 1988 to the present (2006).

⁸ Security Research and Information Center National Survey Report, 2005 Pg 66

⁹ Security Research and Information Center, Ibid pg 71

1.2.1 Suggested Control Measures to Firearm Problem in Samburu and Laikipia Districts

The following are some of the measures that stakeholders can adopt to curd the problem of small arms and light weapons proliferation.

- There should be proper consultations with the local communities before joint disarmament is conducted
- Any arming or disarmament in the district and its neighbors should be done equitably, uniformly and transparently and impartially
- Forceful disarmament by military personnel who are not conversant with local socio-cultural dynamics should be discouraged.
- The state should provide adequate security in terms of more police stations/ posts and security personnel.
- The disarmed members of the communities should be given incentives in form of compensation to enable them start-up business.
- There should be consultations on workable security strategies-including strategic arming of the community members.
- Inter-community dialogue on security-set up in the whole of the North Rift area should be encouraged.
- Transport network in the area should be improved.
- Poverty reduction strategies should be initiated to improve the livelihoods of the locals. Specifically, trade in livestock and livestock products should be promoted in North-Rift region through the establishment of satellite abattoirs and cattle markets.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The broad objective of the study was to investigate government response to the problem of small arms proliferation in Samburu District between 2003 and 2006.

1.3.1 Specific Objectives

- To establish the specific forms and frequency of government responses to curb the problem of small arms proliferation in Samburu District between 1988 and 2006.
- To establish the extent of government involvement of the local community and stakeholders in its response to the problem of small arms and light weapons proliferation in the Samburu District.
- To investigate the effectiveness of government response to the problem of small arms and light weapons proliferation in Samburu District.

1.4 Rationale/Justification of the Study

Even though banditry and cattle raids are a way of life in most of the dry arid and semi-arid northern part of Kenya, very little has been done in terms of research and documentation beyond attributing the conflicts and their tools of trade (small arms) to “primitive pastoralist cultural tendencies”. The onset of the 1990s saw the fall of governments in Ethiopia, Somalia, DRC Congo and the escalated civil wars in Uganda, Sudan, genocide in Rwanda and Burundi. All these recent wars were fought using small arms, some of which found their way to Kenya. The increase in the supply chain of small arms has resulted into devastation,

notwithstanding poor documentation and research. Presently, Samburu district is in the grip of yet another deadly attack by its neighbors. The government is also in the process of selectively disarming the communities in the North Rift region.

Disarmament has elicited bitter protest from the politicians and other residents from the region, who claim that selective disarmament of Police Reservists will only make the Samburu community more vulnerable, as the state has limited personnel and firepower to protect them. Concluded studies and surveys have not focused on the effectiveness of government strategies in combating the problem. Also, local community's attitude towards government response has not been established yet it is core to the success of the disarmament process.

This study examined the problem of small arms, the responses of the government and the reaction of the local Samburus. The study aimed to expose weaknesses in the government responses have to the escalation rather than reduction of small arms problem in the ongoing government interventions.

The study examined small arms and light weapons proliferation as from 1988 because the period witnessed the collapse of Eastern Block that consequently affected security situation in the Great lakes and the horn of Africa region. The wars fought in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Congo DR started during this period resulting into inflow of small arms and light weapons into Kenya.

1.5 Scope of the Study

The scope of this study was limited to the issues of small arms and light weapons proliferation in Samburu District and how it interfaced with the surrounding districts in the North Rift region. The problem being investigated had implications for men, women, children and other stakeholders in Samburu District. Due to cost and time considerations a sample of the population of the residents of the District including institutions, were considered for participation in the survey. This study thus limited its scope to the government response to the small arms problem in the district and how the residents perceive such responses.

1.6 Literature Review

The problem of small arms and landmines has consistently remained high on the agenda of regional and continental initiatives. Governments the world over underscore the importance of peace and stability as a prerequisite for socio-economic development and political transformation. States have adopted diplomatic instruments that attempt to address the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons as well as the eradication of the frustrating impact of landmines.

Hartung W.D. (2002)¹⁰ laments that the contemporary world is undergoing a systematic proliferation of "small wars" whose weapons of choice are not the high items like long range missiles, tanks and fighter planes but small and

¹⁰ Hartung, W.D. "The New Business of War: Small Arms and the Proliferation of Conflicts, 2002.

frighteningly accessible weapons ranging from hand-guns to assault rifles. The fact that these small arms are cheap, accessible and portable has made them a primary factor in the transformation of warfare in the contemporary society.

Understanding the problem of proliferation of small arms has seen attempts at identifying the suppliers or sources of such arms. Bootwell and Klare (2000)¹¹ point out that the trade in small arms and light weapons consume an estimated \$10 billion of the world's \$850 billion per year in military expenditure. The suppliers include a dozen governments who dominate the legal trade and untold number of independent dealers, brokers and middlemen who control the illicit trade. Major government suppliers include the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom (members of the Security Council) along with other suppliers like Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Israel, Italy, and South Africa. Klare, M. (1999)¹² in an earth breaking study concludes that any focus geared towards controlling the arms trade and transfer of arms should give priority in terms of resources to small arms and light weapons. This is because small arms and light weapons are the primary instruments of violence in the vast majority of the world's most intractable conflicts.

In his study, light weapons were the only armaments in forty-six (46) of the forty-nine (49) major conflicts that were fought worldwide during the decade of the 1990s. He further links small arms to the vast increase in the proportion of the civilian deaths generated by the contemporary wars. Klare points out that civilian

¹¹ Bootwell, J and Klare M.T; "A Survey of Small Arms" , Scientific American, June 2000, 48-53.

non-combatants account for an estimated 80-90% of the parties killed in the contemporary conflicts compared with roughly 5% rate of civilian deaths that prevailed during the World War II.

It is with such grim statistics of the effects of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons that the Secretary General to the United Nations in his address "We the People: the Role of the UN in the 21st Century" advocated a re-energized worldwide effort to prevent war. The Secretary General isolated the promotion democracy, human rights and economic development as well as curbing illicit transfers of weapons that help fuel ethnic and territorial conflicts¹³ (p 3) as necessary steps towards the prevention of war.

The Secretary General's strong stand against war saw the establishment of regional and local based coordination units to restrict the availability of small arms. The UN Institute for Disarmament Research (2000) document some of the efforts made in this regard. The Organization of American States (OAS) established the Inter-America Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunitions, Explosives and Related Materials. The OAS accord saw a commitment by member states to tighten up their national laws with respect to the licensing and transfer of small arms and to make provisions for marking and tracing weapons as well as limiting third party transfers (passing of weapons from one nation to another or non-state actors).

¹² Klare, M; "The Kalachnikov Age", Bulletin of the Atomic

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) issued its declaration of moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa bearing in mind the history of violent conflicts in that region-Sierra Leone, Liberia.

The Great Lakes region countries met on 18th March 2000 culminating into the establishment of the Nairobi Declaration on the problem of the proliferation of the illicit small arms and light weapons in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa. Parties to this accord are Burundi, DRC, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda and Tanzania.

The literature on small arms proliferation is also marked by attempts to understand the forces that underpin the problem. Musah Abdel Fatau (2002) points out that attempts by African states to control the proliferation of small arms is impeded by the issue of privatization of security. He posits that private military companies, their partner arms brokers and local warlords have become the principal actors in the proliferation of weapons. His thesis is that "corporate mercenaries" that form the African landscape in the form of privatization of security have turned out to be a debilitating element in internal conflicts in Africa.

Musa Fatou documents how the civil war in Sierra Leone offers a great insight into the link between private military companies and arms proliferation in the region. He illustrates how the Sandlink Executive Outcomes-a transnational

¹³ Anan Kofi; " We the People: the Role of the UN in the 21st Century" www.un.org/millennium/sg/report

Sub-Saharan Africa with 260,000 weapons being destroyed as of May 2001 using the fragmatizer method.

Mohamood Juma Omar (2002) in a study of disarmament experience in Somaliland illustrates the indigenous systems employed by Somaliland government in managing and controlling small arms. There is the decentralization of disarmament process that take place within the clans to the extent that gun ownership appears to be the preserve of the clan and not the individuals. The study points out, however that, that this process is not producing the results as expected since most of the respondents pointed out that they needed guns for self protection, protection of property and protection of the nation as they believe that they would one day be attacked in an effort to annex Somaliland to the greater Somalia.

Omar's study points out that much of the arms in Somaliland can be tracked back to the Cold War period during the reign of Siad Barre. The government of Somalia stockpiled arms intending to use them in the current struggle to create a greater Somalia, which was to include parts of Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia. The forced unity of Somaliland to Somalia saw the former rise up against the Somalia government led by Somali National Movement (SNM), which in the course of its armed struggle distributed a lot of weapons to sympathizers and auxiliary forces supporting its cause with the help of Ethiopia. This saw a lot of arms get into civilian hands.

mercenary conglomerate- was responsible for the shipment of arms to the junta in return for continued mining operations by its affiliate Branch Energy. He further show how Sandlink International brokered the shipment of 35 tons of AK-47 assault rifles, ammunition and mortars in Sierra Leone in February 1998 in spite of the UN security council prohibiting the supply of weapons to Sierra Leone in may 1997. The study points out that the Mano River Union (Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone) region has become a key market for small arms and light weapons, with the UN estimating that the number of small weapons in circulation within the region being 7 million.

The problem of small arms proliferation has further been analyzed within the legal perspective. Gillart Chiarra (2000)¹⁴ brings an interesting debate in the problem of identifying or determining what precisely constitute an "illicit" transfer. He further poses the question whether legal (government sanctioned) trade in small arms is not a source of dangerous proliferation that needs to be restrained if there is to be practical progress in limiting access to small arms and light weapons. Chiarra's worry is that the UN and governments have mostly focused on "illicit" flows of small arms and not legal or government sanctioned trade in arms.

Other studies on small arms and light weapons have sought to come up with ways of combating arms trafficking. Meek Sarah and Legett Ted (2000) presents recommendations on what governments and non-state actors can and should do in the field of small arms regulation and control. For instance, the authors

propose that it would be excellent to keep track of weapons. They posit that the international community must establish standard, detailed reporting mechanisms on small arms production and trade at the national, regional and international levels. This should include the publication of detailed annual reports by governments concerning specific information on small arms transfer, deliveries and licenses, the establishment of regional small arms registers modeled on the UN register of conventional armaments and on the creation of an agreed upon international collection point for data on individuals and organizations involved in weapon trafficking.

Studies on small arms proliferation and their effects on the society have not been spared the contemporary fad in the academia. The feminist debates-Amani El Jack (2002)¹⁵ questions the scholarship on small arms and light weapons by pointing out that it lacks an integrated gender analysis. El Jack challenges the view that “women are innately peaceful” by illustrating women’s vulnerability in circumstances where they are mobilized to use small arms and light weapons as actors in conflict thereby endangering themselves and their communities.

Some scholars have cast aspersions on the manner in which the United Nations and member governments have been addressing the problem of proliferation of small arms. Chris Smith (2000) present some of the challenges the UN and the states have to face on arriving at the ultimate goals of action on the problem of

¹⁴ Gillard Chiarra Emmanuela, “What’s Legal? What is illegal?” in Lora Lunpe ed. *Running Guns: the Global Black Markets in Small Arms*, London, Zed Books, 2000.

small arms. He posits that the basic issue is on whether the small arms trade is primarily an arms control problem or should the UN and its member states tackle the underlying political, economic and security factors that are the driving forces of the ubiquitous small wars that are being fueled by the small arms.

Case studies have been conducted all over Africa on the steps being taken to control the menace of small arms proliferation or the effects it has on the population. Obusi, N (2000)¹⁶ in a study on small arms proliferation and disarmament in West Africa points out that on 31st October 1998, the West African states signed the ECOWAS moratorium on exportation, importation and manufacture of light weapons. As a regional initiative on small arms proliferation, state parties to the moratorium include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

The study however emphasizes on the case of Nigeria, pointing out the disarmament efforts by state governments in the delta region without much success among the warring ethnic groups in the Niger delta, Ijaw, Urhobo and Itsekeri. In the Warri area, the disarmament process failed too despite the government's offer of cash, short-term vocational training and job opportunities to the militant youths.

¹⁵ Amani El Jack, Gender Perspectives on the Management of Small Arms and Light Weapons: Regional and International Concerns, BICC Brief 24, July 2002.

The study the points out that in 2000, the federal government of Nigeria took several measures to address the problem of SLAW in the country by establishing a 12 member national committee on the proliferation and illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons (NCPTAW). This committee was to investigate illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, collate necessary information and recommend appropriate ways of dealing with the problem.

Obusi points out that in July 2001, the federal government of Nigeria carried out its first destruction of arms and ammunition seized by security agencies across the country valued at 50 million naira. Adedeji, E. (2003)¹⁷ in an essay on the gun control in Senegal, illuminates on the methods used by the Senegalese government to control the proliferation of small arms. It points out that in Senegal, surplus and out-dated military arms were destroyed in April 2003 (pg.35) and that there may be indications some 8000 weapons were destroyed after the visit of the US president George Bush to Senegal in 2003.

Marks S; and Stoff N. on disposal of surplus weapons in southern Africa reveals that¹⁸ South Africa had earmarked surplus, redundant and obsolete and confiscated small arms in its possession for destruction. The operation Mouflon by the South African Defense force saw the largest destruction of small arms in

¹⁶ Obusi, N; "Small Arms Proliferation and Disarmament in West Africa: Progress and Prospects of ECOWAS Moratorium", Apophyl Production, Abuja 2000.

¹⁷ Adedeji, E; "Small Arms and Control in West Africa", West Africa Series No 1, section 6.13, 2003.

¹⁸ Marks S.; and Stoff N; "Destroying Surplus Weapons: An assessment of Experience in South Africa and Lesotho", UNIDIR and SAS, November 2003.

The study by Omar investigates the dynamics of small arms proliferation in Somaliland, putting into context the indigenous systems applied by the Somaliland government in managing and controlling small arms. On the source of the arms, the study points out that a large number of small arms came into Somaliland during the Cold War period when Somalia was aligned with the then Eastern Block countries that armed it as a socialist ally against capitalism. Secondly, the large number of arms is attributed to the former president-Siad Barre regime that armed separatist rebel movements in neighboring countries like the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) against Ethiopia, and Shiftas against Kenya.

However, the study points out that there is illicit trade in firearms with the black market in Birao being the single most important source small arms entering Somaliland. States like Yemen, Libya and Eritrea and Djibouti are known to give arms to warlords in southern Somalia. These arms then infiltrate into Somaliland as contraband through black market.

In Ethiopia, Sisay, H and Selassie, G.S.¹⁹ conducted a similar study on the two dominant ethnic groups in Gambella, Ethiopia-the Anywak and the Nuer. The former are cultivators with supplementary activities of hunting and fishing. The Nuer on the other hand are cattle herders who are nomadic pastoralists that sees them mobile in search of pasture and water. This eventually culminates in to conflict over issues of power and access to natural resources.

¹⁹ Sisay, H and Selassie, G S; "The Gambella Region of Ethiopia: Small Arms in a Border Area" BICC 2002

The conflict pitting SPLA and the Khartoum government has seen the trafficking of arms within the Sudan and Ethiopian border at Gambella. When Riek Machar's broke away from SPLA, his Nuer people retained their weapons and were mostly based at Gambella where they could move freely from the Ethiopian side of the border into southern Sudan to stage attacks. This increased flow of arms into Gambella courtesy of SPLA-saw their inter-ethnic conflicts between the Nuers and the Anyuaks assume the character of a modern warfare as the war in Sudan enhanced the flow of arms.

At an International Conference on Small Arms Trafficking in the border regions of Sudan, Uganda and Kenya held in Jinja²⁰ from November 9th to 13th 2001, investigation reports were presented on the flow, sale and use of small arms and light weapons. The reports pointed out that that the government of Sudan actively formed and armed ethnically based militia groups to destabilize areas held by SPLA. The report also pointed out that the rogue elements of the Uganda Peoples Defense Force were among the major sources of small arms trafficking in Uganda. The report further confirmed that the Kenya government security forces were doing too little to stop arms trafficking into the country.

Another report presented in the same workshop²¹ pointed out that the Sudan government has been arming and training members of the Lord's Resistant Army,

²⁰ The East African, November 20-December 2, Cathy Maitory; "Small Arms: Only a Regional Approach can Stop the Trade, Cathy Majtanyi.

Merile, Muntaria, Toposa as well as Didinga as a way of gaining ground over the SPLM/A. This report further points out that senior SPLA officials and deserters are involved in the illicit trafficking of small arms. The report gives the example of the East Equatoria where soldiers desert at will, stealing weapons from the stores and selling them to willing buyers.

In Uganda, ADOL Research and Workshop Report (2000)²² analyzed the process of disarmament targeting the Karamoja region that has experienced persistent insecurity and instability as they terrorize their neighbors within Uganda, Kenya and Sudan. The report points out that by 2003, the voluntary exercise of Karamojong disarmament had harvested close to 10,000 weapons including small arms and light weapons in exchange for ox-plough and water wells to Karamoja people. However, the same report noted that the process is confronted with difficulties as a result of other security threats especially the frequent invasions by the LRA into the Tirso region, which neighbors the Karamoja.

Secondly, the study points out that the problem of SALW in the Karamoja region is regional, whereas the Uganda government embarked on the disarmament of the Karamoja; the governments of Kenya and Sudan did not disarm the Turkana and the Didinga respectively. For disarmament to succeed, the report concludes, there is need to have parallel/simultaneous exercises in the neighboring countries.

²¹ Illicit Firearms Proliferation and Implication for Security and Peace in the Sudan, Kenya and Uganda Border Regions. Report of Research carried out on the Sudan side of the Common Borders.

Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation in Kenya

Many studies have been conducted in Kenya on proliferation of small arms and light weapons in both urban and rural settings. In an October 2000 study on the sources of firearms in Nairobi, Sabala Kizito²³ sought to establish the sources of firearms in Nairobi, identify the routes used to transport them to the city and the efforts made to address the situation.

The study found that that instability in neighboring countries such as Somalia and Sudan remain the major sources of illicit firearms reaching Kenya. Poor policing of the expansive borders between Kenya and its neighbors has also facilitated the influx of large quantities of small arms into Kenya with towns close to the border with Somalia and Ethiopia such as Moyale, Mandera and Elwak being the major entry points for illegal firearms. According to the study, other sources of illegal firearms include diversion of arms destined for neighboring countries and arms returning into the country with refugees, arms stolen from murdered police officers or civilian having licensed guns. Sabala points out that it is these illegal arms that are used in car jacking, kidnapping, rapes, mugging, and bank and forex bureau robberies in the city of Nairobi, thereby explaining the alarming increase in gun related crime in Kenya.

²² "Feasible Participatory and Sustainable Disarmament of the Karamojong"; ADOL Research and Workshop Report, October-November 2000.

Peter Marwa (2002)²⁴ conducted a study on the *Sungu-Sungu* (community response to small arms fueled by rising insecurity) community-policing phenomenon in Kuria District. He argues that the availability of the small arms and light weapons exacerbates and prolongs conflicts, fans instability and fuels crime and banditry among the Kuria and their neighboring communities. He asserts that the presence of small arms among the Kuria has fostered the development of a culture of conflict and violence that maintains and deepens poverty, which itself is again a reason for the demand for small arms.

Marwa describes how the *Sungu-sungu* initiative is used in curbing the proliferation of small arms among the Kuria as an answer to the menace of cattle rustling in the region. The initiative involves working collaboration among community members to eliminate violent cattle rustlers. He observed that the respondents in this study believed that the *Sungu-sungu* system was superior to state responses to the escalation of violence stemming from the use of small arms by cattle rustlers and criminals. He points out that the system was succeeded in achieving the demobilization and disarmament among the Kuria, identify the sources of the small arms, the routes, the traffickers as well as the dynamic of circulation.

²³ Sabala Kizito: "The Proliferation, Circulation and Use of Illegal Firearms in Urban Centers: Case of Nairobi Kenya" (BICC, March 2000-38).

²⁴ Marwa Peter: *Sungu-sungu in Kuria: An indigenous Approach towards the control and management of small arms-in BICC vol 23, March 2002.*

The study traces the source of the small arms in Kuria to the government of Kenya's home guard policies that saw the Maasai community being armed better than the Kuria thereby triggering an arms race between the two communities. Secondly, small arms came through the demobilization of soldiers after the 1979-1980 Tanzania-Uganda war. These ex-combatants introduced another level of cattle rustling in the region that now became a war-like operation.

Marwa's study is an illustration of how the Kuria community has revitalized the old governance mechanism of *Sungu-sungu*, a committee of villagers who have cases reported to them. This process, asserts Marwa, has seen incidences of cattle rustling within Kuria District decline and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons controlled. The government supports the *Sungu-sungu* system by discouraging the police from interfering unless their help is sought in arresting violent characters. The system has been in operation for more than five years and has a bright future. The new concept of "community policing" whereby, the government officials acknowledge *Sungu-sungus* as core security managers is readily acceptable to the community. The study recommends, however, that there is need for a legal framework defining the limits of operation of the *Sungu-sungus* in the field of arrest, interrogation and punishment and the harmonization of the *Sungu-sungu* security system with state security system.

Small Arms Proliferation in the North Rift Region

A study conducted by Security Research and Information Center (SRIC)²⁵ in 2001 pointed out that the Kenya government has implemented many strategies aimed at controlling the proliferation of small arms. Such measures include setting up of police check points staffed by armed police, hosting gun amnesty programs in Trans-Nzoia District, deploying anti-stock theft units etc. The report however concludes that the government's control measures have been highly cosmetic at best.

Jan Kamenju, Mwachofi Singo and Francis Wairagi (2003)²⁶ conducted a research for SRIC between January 2001 and December 2002. The study concludes that the problem of rising insecurity in the urban areas is traceable to Kenya's North Rift region where illegal firearms flow freely. They continued that trafficking on the small arms in the region is not only fuelling insecurity in the region, but also informs the surplus weapons that find their way to the urban areas. They singled out the Districts of Turkana, West Pokot, Trans-Nzoia, Uasin-Gishu, Marakwet, Baringo and Samburu as being a wash with illegal firearms, thus undermining security, while at the same time eroding prospects of development and fuels social disintegration. The study traces the sources of small arms in the region to the fall of governments in Uganda (1979-80), Ethiopia (1991) as well as the continued conflict in south Sudan.

²⁵ Determining the Issues and Setting of the Standards: Report on the Proliferation of Small Arms in the North Rift Region of Kenya", Security Research and Information Center, 2001.

The study found out that most if not all mature adults possess personal guns among the pastoralists of West Pokot, Turkana, Samburu and East Baringo. The study also reveals that purchase and ownership of arms is organized communally in Marakwet District. The authors asserts that the proliferation of small arms in the North Rift stems from pressure on the communities to arm themselves due to forces of security and competition for resources. The shrinking natural resources especially pasture and water, triggered by environmental degradation have increased competition over these resources causing conflicts and wars, which in turn have lead to the proliferation of small arms (pg.47).

Small Arms Problem in Samburu and Laikipia Districts

The same study by Jan Kamenju, Mwachofi Singo and Francis Wairagi (2003)²⁷ captures arms proliferation in Samburu District. The authors point out that the Kenya government provides a section of the Samburu population with guns under the Kenya Police Reserve Program necessitated by increased threats and attacks from their neighbors, especially the Turkana. Through this program, the government has issued about 1000 guns in Samburu District to individuals selected by local chiefs as persons of integrity and good conduct.

²⁶ Terrorized Citizens: Profiling Small Arms and Insecurity in the North Rift Region of Kenya. Security Research Information Center (SRIC) 2003

²⁷ Terrorized Citizens: Profiling Small Arms and Insecurity in the North Rift Region of Kenya. Security Research Information Center (SRIC) 2003

The authors point out that the Samburu get guns from Baringo, Isiolo, Marsabit and Turkana. The Pokots of East Baringo, the Somali and Borana from Isiolo and the Rendile of Marsabit are known to supply illicit arms to Samburu. The study also established that the prices range for different guns. However, they stress that Samburu District was largely a recipient of illegal arms and that they do not sell arms themselves. This is because the community is a victim of conflict and is only responding by beefing up security as a self defense mechanism.

According to study findings, Small Arms and Light Weapons have had a number of negative impacts on the District. It has led to loss of life due to fighting during cattle raids by the Turkana and the Pokot. It has also led to displacement of persons e.g. in Barago. The majority of persons displaced camp at Baragoi shopping center-or Maralal town. Besides, Small Arms and Light Weapons problem has led to an increase in levels of poverty and negatively affected business due to lack of investments. Wild life is in danger as Samburu District has several reserves. Wild animals are thus killed indiscriminately because of easy accessibility to the gun. Lastly, it has led to general insecurity on the main roads necessitating police escorts.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

The issue of proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons touches on the theories of state and state formation. A state is an organized political community, occupying a territory, and possessing internal and external sovereignty, that

enforces a monopoly on the use of force²⁸. The word "state" in contemporary parlance often means the *Westphalian state*, a reference to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and is used most often in political science.

Max Weber in "Politics as a vocation" (1918)²⁹ gave an oft-cited definition of the State in contemporary political theories. According to Weber, "Every state is founded on force. If no social institutions existed which knew the use of violence, then the concept of 'state' would at be eliminated, and a condition would emerge that could be designated as 'anarchy,' in the specific sense of this word". Hence, Weber defines the state as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory." In that sense, Weber claims, "the state is considered the sole source of the 'right' to use violence".

Weber's definition is important as he puts forth the notion that the state is the ultimate depository of power. In that sense, power, as opposed to, for example sovereignty, organization, allocation and other attributes, is the most important concept associated with the state in contemporary political science

²⁸ Wikipedia, the Free encyclopedia

²⁹ Peter Evans, Theda Skocpol, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., *Bringing the State Back in*, Cambridge University Press, 1985.

2.2.1 Theories of the State

There are four theories about the origin (and indirectly the justification) of the state. They are:

2.2.2 The state as Supernatural or Natural Authority

In this view, the state is either ordained by a higher power (such as God for the "Divine right of kings") or arises naturally out of a presumed human need for order and authority.

2.2.3 The State as Protector of Natural Rights

According to this theory, human beings have certain rights that are "natural" (the implications of this word may vary), and establish states for the protection of those rights. Liberalism, in the classical sense, is based mainly on the natural rights theory. In this view, some or even all "rights" exist *naturally* and are not created by the state. For example, John Locke believed that individual property rights existed prior to the creation of the state, while the state's main job should be to preserve those rights. Historically, liberals have been less concerned with determining what the state *should* do and far more interested in stipulating what the state *shouldn't* do. The liberal philosophy of the state holds that the powers of any state are restricted by natural rights that exist independently of the human mind and overrule any social contract. However, there has been considerable debate among liberals as to what these natural rights actually *are*.

2.2.4 Social Contract Theory

This idea holds that the state is established by the people (i.e. through the consent of the governed) in order to provide for various collective needs that cannot be satisfied through individual efforts, such as national defense, public roads, education, "the general welfare", etc.

Contractarianism, as the name implies, is based on the social contract theory. It is also the only major philosophy of the state that does not fall within any single political ideology - perhaps because several different ideologies have adopted it as their own. Contractarianism is the foundation of modern democracy, as well as most forms of socialism and some types of liberalism. In contractarian thinking, the state should express the public interest, the interests of the whole society, and reconcile it with the separate interests of individuals. The state provides public goods and other kinds of collective consumption, while preventing individuals from free-riding (taking advantage of collective consumption without paying) by forcing them to pay taxes.

There are also liberals who subscribe to the contractarian theory. In most cases, they fall on the left wing of liberalism, being social liberals ("New Deal" liberals; see American liberalism) and arguing for a welfare state. They stand in opposition to adherents of the natural rights theory, who tend to be libertarians, falling on the right wing of liberalism and arguing for a "minimal" state.

2.2.5 Conflict Theory

This theory holds that the state did not arise out of any conscious decision, but merely as the result of violent conflict. Various groups of people fought each other for control over land or other resources, and the winning side imposed its domination on the losing side. The Marxist philosophy of the state is based on the conflict theory - specifically, on the idea of class conflict. In this view, the primary role of the state *in practice* is to enforce the existing system of unequal property and personal rights, class domination, and exploitation. The state also mediates in all types of social conflicts, and supplies necessary social-infrastructure conditions for society as a whole. Under such systems as feudalism, the lords used their own military force to exploit their vassals. Under capitalism, on the other hand, the use of force is centralized in a specialized organization which protects the capitalists' class monopoly of ownership of the means of production, allowing the exploitation of those without such ownership. In modern Marxian theory, such class domination can coincide with other forms of domination (such as patriarchy and ethnic hierarchies).

In anarchist thinking, the state is nothing but an unnecessary and exploitative segment of society. Totally rejecting the Hobbesian notion that only a state can prevent chaos, anarchists argue that the state's monopoly on violence creates chaos. This is a form of the conflict theory of the state. They believe that if people realized that they could figure out how to work together peacefully and unleash individual creativity, the state and its restrictions on individual freedom would be abolished - and/or vice versa. Contrary to the Marxist perspective, the anarchists

see the state as an unnecessary evil, rather than a tool to be used in the class struggle.

2.2.6 Contemporary Theories of the State

A useful way to understand the current debates in political science makes it necessary to follow Stephen Krasner (1984) explanation. According to Krasner, political scientists go around four different conceptions of the state: -

- The state is government or as an actor on its own right . In some of these approaches the state is a self contained unitary actor in which the state interacts with others to maximize their interests³⁰.
- The state is a public bureaucracy and institutionalized legal order. The pluralist theories of the state assumed that the state was composed of different political actors and that the well-being of the state depended on allocating power to the most representative groups or individuals³¹.
- The state is ruling class (Marxist theories of the state). In this view the state is a distortion of social life as it serves the interest of the ruling class, perpetuating the exploitation of humans against humans³². The state is normative order (symbolic and cultural theories of the state). In general, these views spouse the idea that the state is the resultant symbolic, normative, cultural and moral expression of social life³³.

³⁰ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 1979

³¹ Robert Dahl, *Who Governs?*, 1961

³² Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*

³³ Clifford Geertz, *Negara: The Theater State in Nineteenth Century Bali*, 1980

Each of these approaches concentrate on different functions and attributes of the state and, hence, give way to different explanations for political outcomes. However, in general, contemporary political science studies the state as a problem of rule power and not as a problem of allocation (pluralism). Ultimately, the best way to study the state is through its institutions as most political scientists do. (institutionalism, historical institutionalism, new institutionalism).

2.3. Working Hypotheses

- The government of Kenya has responded inadequately to the problem of small arms and light weapons proliferation in Samburu District as a consequence of which the affected communities have resorted to arming as form self defense against real or envisaged insecurity threat .
- Government policy of forceful small weapon mop ups and selective arming of police reservists in Samburu district is misplaced, biased, and detrimental to the security of Samburu community.
- The Samburu and neighboring communities in the North Rift favor a small arms control policy that incorporates local community participation in development and implementation of programs.

1.9 Research Methodology

Research involved the planning, execution and interpretation of scientific observation (*Singleton et al, 1988*). Thus the key elements and considerations in the overall plan is what is referred to as research design. Given the nature and the scope of this research, qualitative and quantitative research methods were employed.

Site Selection and Description

The survey was conducted in Samburu and Laikipia Districts of Rift Valley province, Kenya. Samburu is one of the 18 districts in Rift valley province. It is divided into 2 administrative divisions namely Samburu West and Samburu East. The district has a population of 143,547 people. Samburu is the least densely populated district in Rift Valley together with Turkana, with 7 people per square kilometer. The district is marked with insecurity and poor infrastructure, hence less socio-economic activities.

Target Population

This study targeted government institutions and personnel in Samburu and Laikipia Districts as well as the Rift Valley provincial head quarters and Nairobi. It also targeted the people living in Samburu and Laikipia Districts who included the men, women and children both as victims and perpetrators of the proliferation of small arms and, other stakeholders who included organized groups like CBOs, NGOs, traders organizations, FBOs and community opinion leaders.

Unit of Observation

Observation unit or unit of data collection is an element or aggregation of elements from which information is collected (*Singleton et al, 1988*). In majority of cases, the unit of analysis and observation are often the same, though this is not always the case. The units of observation in this study were adult males and females and children and the key informants.

Unit of Analysis

The entities under study are referred to as units of analysis (*Singleton et al, 1988*) It refers to some attributes that must be the subject of the study. The unit is simply what or who is to be described or analyzed. In this case the unit of the study is how the Kenya government has responded to proliferation of SALW in Samburu District.

Types and Sources of Data

Primary and secondary data was collected. Primary data was collected from the members of the community living in Samburu District, provincial administration both in Samburu, Provincial headquarters and in Nairobi, community leaders and other stakeholders in the District. Secondary data was obtained from government records, local and international published and unpublished works and the Internet.

Data Collection Techniques

Emphasis was be put on obtaining both qualitative and quantitative data as follows:

Library Research

The study utilized both published and unpublished material to obtain the secondary data required. These included books, journals, development plans, official statistics, and reports of previous surveys among others. In addition the study utilized some gray literature from the Internet. The purpose of using this method was to explore the nature of the problem and to supplement and/or cross check the information obtained from the primary data.

Survey (structured) Interviews

This constituted one of the two main sources of primary data needed to meet the study objectives. The researcher designed household questionnaires (with both pre-coded and open-ended questions) that were used to record responses from sampled residents of the District. Face to face interviews were conducted and questions were asked in such areas as availability, access, sources and markets for firearms in the district and beyond; disarmament strategies, the strengths and weaknesses of current gun control methods etc.

Trained research assistants were employed to administer the questionnaires. The questionnaires were be pre-tested in selected sites in Samburu before the official launching of the study.

Key Informant Interviews

Interviews were also carried with persons strategically placed to possess vital perspectives on the issue of proliferation of small arms in the District and beyond. Such informants included responsible personnel in Office of the President (police, and provincial administration), NGOs, CBOs, and FBOs. Specifically targeted were officers that deal with security, opinion leaders like politicians, elders and women leaders. The study sought their opinions on the small arms in the District and government response to the problem.

Sampling Procedures

"Sampling is the process of selecting a subset of cases so as to draw conclusions about the entire set" (*Singleton et al 1988: 163*). The procedure for selecting a sample is called a sampling design. The major distinction among designs is between probability and non-probability sampling. Probability sampling is based on the process of random selection, which gives each unit of observation an equal chance of being included in the sample (*ibid*). Holding a sample constant, one will be assured of greater precision with stratified sample.

In view of the expansiveness of Samburu District, it was possible to view each individual and all the groups. It thus became necessary to obtain a sample of the units of observation that was representative of the entire population of the Samburu. Stratified random sampling technique was identified as the most efficient and will thus be used. A list of divisions in the district was obtained. Random sampling was used to choose two divisions for study. Within the

divisions a further list of all locations was developed and further subjected to random sampling to enable selection of four locations for the study. Within each selected location, sub-locations were randomly sampled. Consequently, the study reclined on sub-location as the basic sampling unit. Randomly selected adult males, females and children were used as units of observation. The other sub-sample for this study included the DC, DOs, Chiefs and their assistants, leaders of women groups and other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) officers working in the District.

Sample size Selection

Due to time and cost constraints, a sample of 72 respondents was chosen. A balance was struck between adult males, females and children.

Data Analysis

This concerns methods and ideas of organizing and describing data using graphs, numerical summaries and more elaborate mathematical descriptions. With the aid of a computer, quantitative data received from the interviews was analyzed to assist presentation and collation of research findings using SPSS. As far as practicable, tables and figures were used to capture the required information. Throughout the research, efforts were made to provide answers to the research questions. Analysis of the research findings was based on the conceptual framework of the study.

Qualitative data derived from secondary data, key informant interviews, focus group discussions and field notes were evaluated and analyzed to determine the

adequacy of information and the credibility, usefulness, consistency and validation of the hypotheses.

1.10 Chapter Outline

Research issues on small arms proliferation in Kenya constitutes chapter one of the study. Chapter two deals with insecurity in Samburu and Laikipia District, while chapter three focuses on Government response to small arms in Samburu District. Chapter Four of the analyses the study findings on Kenyan Government's response to the proliferation of small arms in Samburu and Laikipia Districts. The study ends with summary, conclusions and recommendations in chapter five.

CHAPTER II

2.0 INSECURITY IN SAMBURU AND LAIKIPIA DISTRICTS

2.1 Introduction:

This chapter examines the current security conditions in both Samburu and Laikipia Districts. It focuses on Mukogodo Division in Laikipia and Waso Division in Samburu District. Specifically, the chapter makes a comparison of the present and past security conditions in each the district with the aim of establishing any positive or negative changes. It further inquires into the factors believed to be fuelling the proliferation of small arms in the two districts, the types of small arms that are readily available, sources, ease of acquisition, prices of arms and the hotspots for small arms in Laikipia and Samburu. The chapter also examines the consequences of proliferation of small arms especially on different groups i.e. women, children and adult males.

2.2 Security situation in the Laikipia and Samburu Districts

In seeking to determine the prevailing security conditions in the two districts the respondents and key informants were asked to describe the

security conditions in their own communities. Most of the survey respondents (49%) replied that security condition in their communities is good. 26% maintained that security is neither good nor bad, while 25% feel that it is bad. Chart 1 below shows respondents overall perception about the current security conditions in the two districts.




Chart 1: Current security conditions in Samburu and Laikipia Districts

Opinion about security conditions vary in the two districts. An overall 51% of the respondents interviewed in Samburu District (Waso Division), said that the security situation in their community was good with 11% saying that it was very good. Only 9% of the respondents felt that security situation in the community is bad. A key informant from the district

pointed out that the situation has improved drastically since 2003 when NARC government came to power. The informant pointed, out however, that security still needs to be improved because Waso Division lacks enough security personnel, transport and communication facilities. The table below (Table.1) summarizes respondents perception about the security conditions in their communities.

		Districts		Total
		Samburu	Laikipi a	
In general how would you describe the security condition in this community	Very bad	2.2	33.3	13.9
	Fairly bad	6.7	18.5	11.1
	Neither bad nor good	40	3.7	26.4
	Fairly good	40	33.3	37.5
	Very good	11.1	11.1	11.1
Total		100%	100%	100

Table 1: Security conditions in Samburu and Laikipia Districts

slightly over half (52%) of the survey respondents in Laikipia District (Mukogodo Division) said that the security situation in their communities is bad, with 33% saying that it is very bad. On the other hand, 44% said it is good (see table.1 above). The key informants from the division attributed the bad situation to the recurrent conflicts in the division over pasture pitting the Samburus from Isiolo with the local Maasai settled around Kipisi area. Respondents have also reported cases of firearms inflow into towns, increasing cases of banditry a long Rumuruti–Maralal road, and cattle rustling in Rumuruti, Umande and Doldol areas. However, there is unanimous agreement among respondents that the situation is relatively calm at present following voluntary relocation of local Maasai to other areas in search of pasture and water for their livestock.

Ana cumulative total of 70% said that security situation in their district was it is better at present than it was 10 years ago. 26% of the respondents maintained that it is worse compared to 10 years ago. A dismal 1% held that security situation had not altered, while 3% confessed ignorance about the subject matter of investigation. At the individual

district level, more respondents in Samburu District hold that the security situation in their community has improved in the last ten years than the respondents in Laikipia. Responses on past and present security situation in Laikipia and Samburu is summarized in table 2 below.

		Districts %		Total
		Samburu	Laikipia	%
How would you rate the security conditions in this region compared to 10 years ago?	Worst	11.1	14.8	12.5
	Worse	8.9	22.2	13.9
	Same	0	3.7	1.4
	Better	66.7	33.3	54.2
	Much better	11.1	22.2	15.3
	Don't know	2.2	3.7	2.8
		100	100	100

Table 2: Present (2006) security conditions in Samburu and Laikipia districts compared to 1997

In overall, majority of the respondents (33%) attributed the improvement in security in the community over the last 10 years to disarmament, reduction in banditry (25%) and low incidents of cattle rustling (25%). Increasing consciousness about security (25%), introduction of scouts (17%), general improvement in security (17%) and the fact that people are more settled today than before (8%) are some of the explanations that respondents gave to explain the improved security condition. Another 8% of the respondents in each District cited freedom of movement, peace meetings, and improvement in communication system. Chart 2 below summarizes respondents explanation for the reduction of small arms menace in Laikipia and Samburu Districts over the last 10 years.




Chart 2: Reasons for the improvement of security in Samburu and Laikipia Districts in the last 10 years

Factors that Encourage Trade in Illicit Firearms in Samburu and Laikipia Districts

The survey respondents were asked to state three factors that encourage trade in illegal small arms in their districts. 34% of the respondents cited general insecurity as the leading factor behind trade in illegal small arms. Some 19% consider small arms trade as business and a means of income generation available to the local population, while 11% attributed the

proliferation of illegal small arms to cattle raids. 12% of the respondents attributed the trade to unemployment and poverty, while 8% attribute it to the challenges of nomadic lifestyle. Other responses that were received include poor government response (5%), ethnic animosity and differences (3%), ready availability of guns (2%), closeness to the border (1%), employment by the British soldiers (1%) and individual criminal tendencies (2%). Chart 3 below summarizes factors that encourage trade in small arms in Samburu and Laikipia Districts.




Chart 3: Factors encouraging trade in small arms in Samburu and Laikipia Districts

The key informants from Laikipia and Samburu Districts confirmed the views of other respondents on the issue of factors encouraging trade in small arms in the two districts. Key informants in Samburu District mentioned general insecurity, fear and distrust among the local communities, lack of capacity by the government to provide adequate security in the district. Other explanations that key informants gave include the vastness of the district and bureaucratic red tape employed by provincial administration.

Competition by different pastoralist communities over grazing land and water especially in Loroki and Losuk (important dry season pastures) also emerged as a major factors behind the acquisition and trade in small arms. The Pokots are presently pitted against other ethnic communities over control of Loroki and Lasuk grazing land in which no particular community is in control. Communities also acquired arms to protect and increase their stocks, leading to the perpetual traditional raids, which in turn increases enmity between communities. Cattle raids are often accompanied with a high level of brutality that often result in loss of lives.

The youths often engage other communities in cattle raid for prestige and as a source of bride price that enables them to acquire wives when they are old enough to marry. The key informant also blamed inter-tribal warfare among the pastoral communities on the negative cultural beliefs and practices of the local communities. Other factors are high illiteracy rates, long periods of drought, low income levels among the local populace and an arms competition (race) among neighboring communities.

in Laikipia District (Mukogodo Division) the key informants blame proliferation of small arms on the vastness and inaccessibility of the division. Mukogodo has a population of about 20,000 people. Inaccessibility incapacitates the operation of small security of government security force based at the divisional headquarters. Other reasons cited include the perennial rivalry between the Samburu and Maasai that settle Laikipia and Samburu Districts. The Samburu often fight with the Maasai over Tasia and Kijabe lodges, which they claim to have liberated from the Shiftas in their 1996-7 war. The Samburu also accused the Maasai of

settling beyond their traditional district boundaries. The other reasons advanced include efforts local Maasai to protection livestock from the raiders and rustlers from Samburu, Pokot, Somali, Baringo and Isiolo.

The small arms become useful during to raids which are widely accepted as a cultural practice. A key informant stressed that proliferation of small arms in the district is not fueled by poverty as often alleged, but by greed for more livestock. Many warriors involved in organizing and conducting cattle raids normally are owners of 200 or more herds of cattle. The pastoralist Maasai community in Laikipia District also engage in conflicts pasture (grazing land) and water with the Samburu, Marakwet from Baringo and the Pokot herders.

2.3 Types of Small Arms Readily Available in Laikipia and Samburu Districts

The study established that AK47 and G3 are the most common types of small arms illegally held by a wide section of the adult population in Laikipia and Samburu Districts. The others are Carbine, MP5, Pistols

(mostly in the towns), Mark 4, mortars, bullets and bombs. Rifles, grenades (mostly left by British training camp), Alben, M4, M5, SLR, Brent and M16 are also available.

Majority of the respondents (64%) pointed out that most of the small arms found in their districts originate from Somalia, while (51%) maintain that arms originate from Ethiopia. Others sources cited include Isiolo (24%), Sudan (20%), Samburu (14%) and Marsabit (10%). 9% of the respondents mentioned Pokot; while 7% each of the respondents mentioned Turkana and Moyale. Another 6% of the respondents mentioned Uganda as source of small arms.




Chart 4: Sources of illegal small arms in Samburu and Laikipia Districts

The key informants from Samburu District concurred with other respondents that guns originate from Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia. Locally, Isiolo remains an important source. The other sources are Wajir and Marsabit. Key informants from Laikipia also maintained that the illicit guns in the District originate from Uganda, Sudan and Somalia. The informants attribute source to the civil wars that occurred in countries in the 1990s. Approximately 25 per cent of Somalis presently settled in Mukogodo Division migrated from Somalia in the early 90s with guns when war broke in their country . Between 1996 and 1997 the Maasai and Samburus were forced to arm and eject the incoming Somalis from the area, leading to the increase of small arms proliferation in the area. The two communities Maasai and Samburus turned against each other after driving away the Somalis. Other notable sources of small arms are Isiolo (transported by Somalis for sale in Samburu), Maralal, Baringo, Samburu, Laikipia West (Rumuruti and Olmoran), Nyeri, Meru and Pokot.

Respondents maintain that the main suppliers of illicit small arms in the Samburu and Laikipia include Somalis (30%), Boranas (23%), Samburus

(20%), youths from both communities(17%), people settled along the borders (16%), retired soldiers and policemen (14%), Pokots (14%), Turkanas (7%), and bandits (7%).

Prices and Transportation of Illicit Firearms

The average cost of a gun in Samburu District ranges between Kshs. 35,000 and 40,000 in the black market. This amount is equivalent to 5 cows in the local market. Key informants valued a gun to five bulls costing between Kshs. 50,000 and 75,000. A key informant from Laikipia said the trade is mainly in form of batter, whereby a G3 rifle goes for 5 cows, while an M16 fetches between ten and fifteen cows. The price of a gun is also determined by the age of the firearm.

Individuals involved in illegal fire arms trade in Laikipai and Samburu Districts transport them by foot through the bushes. They use bush tracks with numerous stopover points that they have developed over the years. Some traders are known to use lorries that operate along the local routes for transportation of firearms.

2.4 Ownership and Use of Firearms in Samburu and Laikipia Districts

It is relatively easy to procure a gun in Laikipia and Samburu Districts. One can acquire a gun within hours after showing interest. However, it is easier to procure a gun in Isiolo than in other towns in the North Rift.. Prior to 2003 gun ownership was considered a prerequisite condition for each family living in Samburu District. Many families owned two or more guns; a small one for the goats/sheep herders and a bigger one for use by cattle herders. Guns became particularly useful Samburu herdsmen moved along buffer zones (tribal borders) in search of water and pasture.

The security situation and community perception has, however, changed today. 71% of the respondents in Samburu maintain that only the officially sanctioned government officials should hold fire arms compared to only 25% that still maintains that households should be armed for community security. 3% of the respondents feel that it did not matter who holds arms as long as community safety can be guaranteed.

Acquisition of Firearms

The study also sought to establish the rates of fire arm acquisition, usage and sale. 71% of respondents in Samburu and Laikipia denied having illegally acquired firearms as a means of enhancing family security. 44% of the respondents maintained that they would never obtain or use fire arms in future, while 26% maintained that they would do so should situation demand. Among 25% of the respondents who have procured and used guns 11% are regular users of firearms, while 8% use guns infrequently i.e. once or twice.

38% of the respondents swore that they would never use firearm for whatever security reason. 29% of the respondents have not used but would do so if situation demands. 32% of the respondents have used a gun, with 15% having done so often, 10% several times, and 7% only once or twice.

Most of the respondents (67%) admitted having witnessed usage of illegal guns in the past one year, with 21% having done so more than twice.

Again 29% of the respondents admitted having witnessed sale of illicit firearms, while 31% of the respondents reported having witnessed sale of bullets. Chart 5, below summarizes the interaction of the Samburu and Laikipia residents with guns and bullets.




Chart 5: Incidents of usage and sales of guns and bullets in Samburu and Laikipia Districts

Areas with High Firearm Incidents

Small arms are concentrated in Sere Olipi, Ndongyo Wasin, Ngutuk Ongiron, Archer's Post, Nakwamor, Losesia, Larisoro, Longeina, Losuk, Amaya, Longeina, Manjor, Suguta Valley and South Orr in Samburu District. Most of the border points and high mountains are also

important reservoirs of illicit small arms because they offer good grazing lands and watering points. The mountains include Ndotto, Nyiro, Sabache and Kirisia. Others are Mpasion, Kauro, Lkalkaloi, Nkuposerogi and Merille. The other areas are Sugura Muge, Kona Mbaya Daaba Gotu and Notoworu. Areas with high concentration of illicit small arms in Laikipia District include Mumonot location, Makurian, Ilinguesi, Tasia, Lentile, and Olmoran. Rumuruti Division, Kipsing, Oldonyo Nyiro and Lewa Downs.

2.5 Consequences of Firearm proliferation in Laikipia and Samburu Districts

Key informants in Samburu District pointed out that livestock rearing has been adversely affected by proliferation of small arms. The pastoralists are unable to access some areas with good pasture and reliable water as before. The problem of firearms proliferation has thus restricted pastoralists to traditional grazing lands, hence leading to reduction of their livestock whenever drought strikes. The health of the herds has also become poor. Also in response to the insecurity threat, each member of the community has made effort to acquire a gun by selling their herds

animals. This has led to the further reduction livestock numbers and has caused immense strain on family income and wealth status. Frequent raids conducted with the aid of small arms has also reduced herds in Samburu and Laikipia District rendering some families destitute overnight.

Transport Laikipia and Samburu District has been adversely affected. Many private public transporters have withdrawn their services owing to frequent incidents of violent car jacking incidents that occur along the roads. The car jacking incidents increase during dry seasons (i.e. between February and April). The incidents are common along Isiolo–Marsabit road and Isiolo–Archers–Merti road. In February 2006, an Italian priest and a catechist was murdered on the road near Archer’s police Post.

Insecurity has therefore slowed business in the two districts due to lack of reliable transport means for passenger and goods. Hours of business have also been reduced. Traders close before 6 in the evening to avoid night robbery. The social lifestyle in urban areas has also been disturbed.

Discos and bars do not operate at night thus effecting business and socialization. Trade in commodities like foodstuffs and other essential services like veterinary and human health services have also been affected by the proliferation of small arms. Also affected is the flow of tourists. Few tourist are able to visit worldwide renowned spots in North Rift Kenya such as Archer's Post and Ngutuk and conservancy areas like Shaba Lodge; Serena Intrepids and Samburu national reserve.

Education in the division has been negatively affected. Most of the primary schools in Loroki have closed down because of insecurity. Schools in Nakwamoru and Losisia have also been closed since 1994. Lasoro primary school has had to restart from class 1 since attackers demolished classes. Many families are unable to provide school fees because their cattle have been raided, forcing their children to drop out of school. Other children are forced drop out of school due to insecure learning environment to join the warriors. Looters have also moved into the vacated homesteads and institutions and have vandalized property.

proliferation of small arms has also created a tension between the warriors and the elders. Warriors are meet in the bush and do not consult with or involve community elders. Th elders are therefore losing their traditional decision making roles and control over warfare. Presently, elders have reclined curses as the only sanctioning warfare in which youths are involved. There exists a general feeling of insecurity among community members. A wide proportion of the population have lost their family members during raids or have been physically disabled because of illegally held firearms.

Many women are reported to have miscarried whenever conflicts break. Many people have also suffered displacement and dispossession especially in the hot spots. It has become difficult to involved displaced and dispossessed persons in meaningful development activity.

Mukogodo Division in Laikipia District host important tourist spots. However, insecurity occasioned by the proliferation of small arms has affected eco-tourism and business for tourist lodges/hotels. Education is

affected as well because pupils drop out of school to acquire guns which they use for raid. There is general insecurity for both teachers and students in boarding schools. Schools, for instance closed down in OlMoran area in 2005 due to displacement of the local population after raid by Pokots. The conflict between Samburu and the Pokots in OlMoran has continued to displace the local population. Some members of Samburu community who sought refuge outside Samburu District have united with the Maasai to fight the Pokot, hence complicating the conflict. The two communities occasionally unite and conduct cattle raids in central Division. The ongoing conflict has affected livestock marketing as well as food security especially in Olmoran area. The government has had to offer food relief to the displaced people in the area. Children are worst affected because they can not get milk.

2.6 Effects of Firearm Proliferation on Communities

Majority of the respondents (70.8%), mentioned rape and death (12.5%) as key security risks that women face in the two districts as a result of insecurity. The other threats include assault (5.6%) and abduction/

kidnapping (1.4%). The main perpetrators of different forms of violence against women are bandits/thugs (41.7%), morans/youths (20.8%), cattle rustlers (16.7%) and local (civilian) population 12.5%. The weapons used against women include guns 48.6%, rúngus (12.8%), swords/knives (15.2%), spears (2.8%), and stones (1.4%).

The key informants in the two districts also pointed out that women usually suffer general insecurity within homesteads because men often use the illicit guns to threaten and subdue them. Some women forcefully accompany with their husbands to the battle field as weapon carriers. Besides many cases of miscarriage, many women are widowed, while some are forced to flee their matrimonial homes thus exposing themselves to other security and health risks.

The respondents identified security threats to children as rape and defilement (27.7%), deaths (20.8%), physical assault (2.8%), abduction and kidnapping (16.7%), child rights abuse including child labor (8%), displacement (2.8%), wild animals (1.4%) and stress (1.4%). The perpetrators of child abuse include youths/morans (51.4%),

bandits/cattle rustlers (31.9%) and civilian community members (5.6%).

The weapons employed against children include guns (43.1%), rungus (12.5%), simis/swords and knives (7%), spears (8.3%) and other forms of small arms (4.2%).

The respondents identified key security threats against male adults to include rape and defilement (1.4%), death (70.8%), physical assault (7%), theft (7%) and displacement (2.8%) among others. Bandits and cattle rustlers are responsible for 77.8 % of security threats to men. The threats also come from morans (3%) and men from within the community (8.3%).

Guns and other arms account for 68% of the weapons used to administer violence and threats against adult males. The others are rungus (4.2%), simis/knives (7%) and spears (7%).

The major problems that adult males in Laikipia and Samburu include victimization and intimidation especially for who are unable to acquire arms. Most male adults feel they are not men enough whenever they are unable to protect their animals and their families. Consequently, many male adults take risk and die during attacks. Others suffer permanent disabilities, while a wide section is left poor and miserable after loosing

their animals to attackers. Those who sell their livestock to raise money for firearms are left poor. As a result, they make relentless attempts to increase their livestock by organizing and participating in raids. Some men forced to migrate with their families to safer grounds, which are often areas that lack adequate pasture and water. This predisposes them to destitution and famine. It has also led to disease infections, high medical expenses and family fractures.




Chart 6: Weapons used against different community members in Laikipia and Samburu District

Solutions to Firearm Problem in Samburu and Laikipia Districts

The study sought to establish community-based mechanisms of controlling firearms problem in Samburu and Laikipia Districts. The study has confirmed that the local community is not agreed upon a single strategy of combating firearms menace in their respective areas. 58% of respondents approve the proposal that the government should collect all firearms in civilian hands in return for monetary compensation. 32% of the respondents oppose this strategy. Majority of community members (57%) approve the proposal that the government should allow each community to independently decide on the best modality of disarming its civilians. 32% of the respondents are opposed to this strategy, 6% are not decided.

94% of the respondents approve the proposal that the government should secure its territorial borders so as to control inflow of firearms into the districts. Also, 53% of the respondents recommend that civilians caught in possession of illicit firearms should face severe legal penalty. 32% of

the respondents are opposed to any form of punishment to holders of illicit firearms, while 8% are not decided.

Majority of the local leaders in Samburu and Laikipia are however opposed to the strategy of offering monetary compensation in return for firearms. The leaders argue that offering cash as an incentive for the surrender of firearms is counter-productive because it will motivate illicit arms holders to purchase more guns. Additionally, the strategy will accord monetary value to firearms, thus encouraging gun raids and further complicating conflict in North Rift.

Chart 6.b below summarizes opinions of various categories of respondents on strategies of controlling firearms problem in Samburu and Laikipia Districts.




Chart 6.b: Possible options for dealing with the small arms problem in Samburu and Laikipia districts.

46% of the respondents maintain that disarmament is the most effective strategy of controlling firearms proliferation in Samburu and Laikipia Districts. However, 24% of the respondents suggest that the state should beef up security. Another 17% of the respondents suggest that illicit firearms in civilians should be licensed and holder sensitized to use them responsibly as a means of involving the community in addressing the maneece. 14% of the respondents hold the opinion that only the police should be armed.

Community leaders suggest that local population should be actively involved in tackling firearms menace. Local community involvement should involve such processes as holding frequent peace negotiations and *barazas*. 9% of the respondents suggest that community policing be introduced and intensified as a mechanism of detecting and reporting inflow and possession of illicit firearms. Similar proportions of respondents suggest that the government should enforce security at borders.

Job creation and poverty reduction among local population emerge as an important strategy of controlling firearm proliferation in Samburu and Laikipia District. 7% of the respondents hold the opinion that the government should invest on poverty reduction projects such as irrigation and agriculture with the aim of diversifying economic opportunities available for Samburu and Laikipia residents. 6% of the respondents suggest that KPR be well armed and better remunerated. In addition, government should offer financial motivation to community members directly involved in the disarmament. Meting harsher penalty to

holder of illicit firearms, on offenders, improvement of government response, adequate training for the police, arming of chiefs as well as improvement of infrastructure are other options that should be considered.

Local leaders hold a relatively different opinion on firearms proliferation management strategy. The leaders maintain that the government should use a combination of force and persuasion to disarm the local people. The government should also mobilize the local communities for the development of physical and social infrastructure such as building roads, schools as well as water supply especially in conflict prone areas of Samburu and Laikipia. They also recommend that government should increase the number of security personnel on the ground including KPRs and scouts who should be better armed. The security personnel should be hosted in better-staffed police posts with serviceable vehicles to facilitate quick response in hot spots. Only on occasions where the police are overpowered by invading groups should the army be called in to restore order

Community leaders further suggest that disarmament exercise should be synchronized in the whole country including. The exercise should extend to Isiolo, Samburu Laikipia, Isiolo, Marsabit, Wajir, Baringo and Turkana as in the neighboring countries. The local communities should be sensitized through regular public *barazas* on the dangers of small arms proliferation to the local population and the country at large. The local community should also be sensitized about the legal procedure of procuring firearm.

NCOs and CBOs have an important role to play in the disarmament process. The organizations that have demonstrated interest in disarmament in the respective communities should be fully involved and supported by both the government and local community. Community policing strategy should integrate services of KPR and scouts. not The number of the KPRs should be increased immensely.

Community leaders also suggest that government officers responsible with disarmament should decentralize the process and fully incorporate the local representatives. This will make the process transparent and rid

it off suspicion. Bureaucracy and red tape should be removed because they delay and make disarmament the process less effective. More police roadblocks should be erected at border posts and corridors.

2.7. Conclusion

The security conditions in Laikipia and Samburu Districts has degenerated over time. However, there was marked improvement in 2003 following the inception of a new government in Kenya that enacted a more sensitive program of handling the delicate situation. Improved security situation in the two Districts is an indicator that the local communities are appreciating and responding to government's intervention. However, a wide section of community members still feel that the government is not taking the issue of small arms seriously because of the scant presence of security personnel, poor or non existent infrastructures like roads, telephone, etc.

Local and cross border sources and the markets for the firearms are known to the public. Procuring the guns is also an easy exercise in the

two districts as judged from the number of respondents who claim to have witnessed transfer of illicit guns. This indicates a high level of small arms circulation in the two districts.

Disputes over pasture and cattle raids/rustling are the two major causes of insecurity in Laikipia and Samburu. The disputes increase demand for small-arms leading to high incidents firearm proliferation. Once procured firearms lead to poverty, increased insecurity, fear, and uncertainty. Consequently, the acquisition of guns result into more cattle raids; rivalry over pasture and watering points and greed for wealth. Respondents, however, deny that poverty is a motivating factor behind illicit firearms acquisition.

The proliferation of small arms has devastating effect on livestock farming, business, tourism and transportation of people and goods. Different categories of the local population have also suffered negative consequences of small arms proliferation. In particular, children have not been able to go to school due to displacement. At household level,

family members have been killed, maimed, raped, and kidnapped. The worst affected in this regard are women and children.

Men have been targeted for murder. Men are also subjected to psychological torture when they find themselves unable to own guns for the protection of their families and livestock. Many a family has been plunged into abject poverty overnight as a result of cattle raids.

Majority of the residents of Samburu and Laikipia Districts prefer small arm in the right (official) hands. At the same time, the residents feel vulnerable without. This points to the fact that though they appreciate the danger of guns in the civilian hands, the local population object to a situation where their neighbors are armed while they are not.

Again, 26% of respondents who demonstrate interest in owning a gun if given a chance further indicates an increasing need by the residents Laikipia and Samburu to entrust themselves with their own security. This implies that the state has not been able to provide the residents of the

two districts with adequate security, thus forcing them to seek alternative
by looking to themselves.

CHAPTER III

THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO SMALL ARMS PROLIFERATION IN SAMBURU AND LAIKIPIA DISTRICTS

3.1 Introduction

This chapter examines Kenya government's response to proliferation of small arms in Laikipia and Samburu districts. It examines the twin initiatives of disarmament and recruitment of Kenya Police Reserves (KPR). The chapter also examines the attitude of members of the two communities to the disarmament process; the process itself; successes so far realized; the shortcomings, and the nature of efforts that groups and individuals have accorded the initiative. The chapter examines the level of satisfaction by the communities with the KPR initiative and its work. The chapter also assesses the activities of other stakeholders like NGOs, communities and individuals in dealing with proliferation of small arms.

Nature of government intervention

In 2005 the government appealed to the residents of Samburu and Laikipia Districts who held illegally acquired firearms to voluntarily

surrender them to the authorities within a stipulated period. The government also provided information on the procedures for returning the firearms. According to a key informant, the process was voluntary and peaceful and the residents responded promptly. To strike the balance the government also introduced scouts with radios (40) and other communication gadgets purchased partly with Constituency Development Funds (CDF). The government extended the amnesty period so as to mop out more firearms. Councils of elders became useful as contact persons for firearms surrender during the exercise especially by those who did not want to be noticed by government authorities.

In Laikipia District, the government first negotiated with the communities through elders and chiefs (without application of force) to disarm community members who held illicit firearms. The government engaged chiefs and village elders to disseminate the information and create awareness about the disarmament exercise in the district. As an incentive, the government promised to legally arm those who surrender illegally held guns. A six-month amnesty was declared in 2005 and

further extended by two months in 2006. The amnesty was still in force even at the time of the study (July–August 2006). Government appeal led to the surrender of a sizable number of guns to the provincial administration, the police or church organizations in both districts.

Response of Local Communities to Government Intervention

The study established that the majority of the residents of Samburu and Laikipia districts have faith in the government's ability to undertake disarmament task. Besides, the majority (43%) believe that the government is able to address small arms problem. (33%) of the residents believe that the government can address all of their security needs, while 15% felt that the government can only address half of their problems. 4% lack faith in government ability to respond adequately to their security needs. Table 3 below summarizes the perception of respondents in Laikipia and Samburu Districts about the government's ability to address the firearms problems in their respective communities.

		District of interview		% of responses
		Samburu	Laikipia	
What proportion of the District's small arms problems do you think the government can solve?	Very few of them	6.7	0	4.2
	Some of them	22.2	15.3	15.3
	Most of them	24.4	74.1	43.1
	All of them	42.2	18.5	33.3
	Don't know	4.4	3.7	4.2
		100%	100%	100%

Table 3: Portion of the District's Small arms problem that the government can solve

3.2 The Disarmament Process

The attitude of Samburu and Laikipia residents towards disarmament is varied. 35% of the respondents maintain that it was better for their respective communities to be armed for protection of their families and livestock even if the general security of the area remained poor. This implies that the same 35% of the residents are not willing to surrender illicit firearms to the detriment of their personal safety and the security of their families and livestock. 33% of the respondents are willing to surrender all the illegally held guns, 25% are undecided. The remaining

7% of the respondents have not developed opinion on the issue. Table 4 below summarizes community response on the disarmament initiative.

		District of interview		Total %
		Samburu	Laikipia	
It is better to arm oneself in order to protect our families and livestock	Agree strongly with A			
	Just agree	15.6	48.1	27.8
It is better to surrender all illegally held guns, even if personal security of families and animals is not yet assured	Agree strongly with A	6.7	7.4	6.9
	Just agree with B	15.6	18.5	16.7
	Agree very strongly With B	11.1	25.9	16.7
	Agree with neither	40		25.0
	Don't know	11.1		6.9
Total		100%	100%	100

Table 4: Arming oneself/surrender of illegally held arms

Majority of the respondents (71%) hold the opinion that firearms should remain in the custody of government forces, and not civilians. Majority of the respondents, therefore, object to holding of firearms by civilians in their respective communities as a means of ensuring personal security. The same number of respondents (71%) is opposed to ownership of firearms by other groups other than officially sanctioned government

forces. 25% of the respondents hold the opinion that locals should be allowed to arm, while 3% do not care who holds firearms so long as they can guarantee security. Chart 8 below summarizes different opinions held by residents of Samburu and Laikipia Districts on the issue of gun ownership.




Chart 7: Residents' attitudes towards gun ownership in Samburu and Laikipia

3.2.1 Problems Associated with Disarmament

The problems facing disarmament process in Laikipia District include poor means of communication. The district is mountainous and vast. The Maasai culture is also a major barrier. There exists strong element of

group solidarity among the Maasai that outsiders find hard to penetrate. The Laikipia District security personnel also accuse human rights bodies operating in the district of protecting persons found in possession of illegal firearms in the guise of defending their rights. The human rights organizations are therefore viewed as a security threat and an obstacle to the disarmament process.

The local Maasai community feels historically marginalized and oppressed by the government. The community claims that they have been systematically robbed of their land simply because they are a minority group. They thus feel that the on-going disarmament is an extension of their persecution. The failure by the government to offer them legal firearms as earlier promised in exchange for illegally held ones has made the community feel cheated. This suspicion has led to dismal turnout in surrender of firearms during 2005 and disarmament exercise.

The government employed poor disarmament strategy in Samburu District. The Kenya army intimidated and molested civilians during the

disarmament process. People were beaten up, especially in Donyo Wasin area where army personnel assaulted a headmaster in front of his pupils and their parents. Such development has led to poor cooperation between the community members and the government.

Other challenges to the disarmament exercise included poor means of transport. The chief of Donyo Wasin location, for instance covers a distance of 100km on foot to get to divisional headquarter (Maralal). Besides, he is forced walk at night due to insecurity problem. The residents also attributed their reluctance to surrender firearm to the inability of the government to beef up security in the District. Some members of the police have also been accused of selling bullets to civilians due to low pay. Such developments make the police unable to respond to security crisis.

The study found out that politicians are against peace and are hence opposed to the disarmament exercise for selfish reasons. Politicians in Samburu and Laikipa have over the period taken advantage of insecurity

problem to garner votes. The creation of Samburu North constituency has spread apprehension among the Samburu. The Samburu fear that a Turkana candidate would win the Samburu North parliamentary seat during the forthcoming 2007 elections, leading to the domination of the Turkana over them.

Disarmament success

50% of respondents in Laikipia and Samburu Districts are dissatisfied with the way the government has carried out illegal firearms mop up exercise. 19% out of this number maintain that they were not at all satisfied, while 28% are not very satisfied. 3% of the respondents believe that the government has not done enough to mop up illegal arms.

However, 35% of the respondents say they were satisfied with the disarmament exercise. 6% of the respondents are very satisfied with the government-led exercise while 10% are not aware of the ongoing illegal firearm mop up exercise. Chart 9 below summarizes residents' levels of satisfaction with the manner in which the government has carried out illegal firearms mop up.




Chart 8: Satisfaction with government's handling of the small arms' proliferation

The key informants in the Samburu and Laikipia were divided on the issue as to whether the disarmament exercises had succeeded or failed. In Samburu District, the provincial administration praised the disarmament process as a success, citing that most of the guns have been voluntarily returned. 52 guns were returned in one location alone in Waso East division. The provincial administration further maintains that the government did not use force. Instead, it first disseminated information about the voluntary disarmament before finally giving an ultimatum. The

local Samburu saw introduction of the scouts with radios in the conservancies as striking the balance.

Other key informants in Samburu find government disarmament response wanting especially because members of the community have not returned all the firearms in their possession. Community members only surrender firearms in state of disrepair due to widely held apprehension that the government may not respond swiftly to protect the community in case of attack. The disarmament process had also been pegged on the government's promise of increasing the number of KPR, which had failed to take effect by the time disarmament exercise ensued.

The communities also felt that the government was biased, as it did not disarm all the districts uniformly. Samburus are wary that the Maasai from Laikipia, Somalis in Wajir, the Pokots in the north and Boranas from Isiolo are still a danger to their security as long as they are not yet disarmed. The government also reneged on its promise to adequately provide the KPRs with new guns and ammunition. Instead it only issued

the KPRs with old Mark 4, Mark 5 guns and few bullets. Hot spots in Samburu District lack police posts, while the number of administration police in the few posts available is dismal compared to security challenge. Equally, roadblocks have not been erected to facilitate control of trafficking in illicit small arms. The border posts with Ethiopia and Sudan and arms trafficking corridors to Laikipia, Isiolo, south Orr and Turkana i.e. Merile, Losesia, Suguta and Maralal, Ngato-Kol-Muget and Ngumet etc need roadblocks. The number of Government security personnel on the ground to monitor arms proliferation is small.

Some key informants in Laikipia District praised the disarmament process as successful. A senior provincial administrator pointed out that there were no complaints from the community because the process was conducted in a humane way. They further pointed out that police have recovered 80 firearms since 2005 in Mukogodo Division while 147 guns have been recovered in the district as whole.

A section of key informants, however, contend that the exercise has failed. The informants said that most of the guns that were returned were the unserviceable because the communities felt that the process was not conducted in neighboring districts as well, especially in Isiolo. The people of Laikipia have complained bitterly against victimization. According to one key informant, community members are still in the process of ascertaining commitment of the government to the disarmament process. Another impediment to successful disarmament in Laikipia District is the fact that the Maasai strongly hold culture of non-betrayal. Owing to this culture, community members have been reluctant to divulge information about individuals and families that hold illegal firearms.

Inadequate personnel to do the job, lack of monetary motivation for those involved, improper coordination, exclusion of NGOs operating in the area and collaboration among the forces involved have hindered the success of disarmament operation in Laikipia District. The recruitment of KPRs has been dragging especially because the exercise is riddled with

bureaucratic bottlenecks. Majority (52%) of respondents in Laikipia are dissatisfied with the manner the in which government has handled moping up of illicit firearm. 26% of the respondents said that they are fairly satisfied, 22% is not aware about government involvement in the process. Table 5 below summarizes satisfaction levels among the respondents of Laikipia and Samburu

		Districts of interview		Total
		Samburu	Laikipia	%
The government of Kenya and other stakeholders has done a lot to mop up illegal small arms and provide security in the district. How satisfied are you with the way the authorities have handled the issue?	The authorities have not done much	0	7.4	2.8
	Not at all satisfied	20	18.5	19.4
	Not very satisfied	28.9	25.9	27.8
	Fairly satisfied	40	25.9	34.7
	Very satisfied	8.9	0	5.6
	Don't know	2.2	22.2	9.7
		100	100	100

Table 5: Satisfaction with the way the government have handled the disarmament issue

Challenges Associated with Disarmament Process

The arming police reservists in illicit firearms mop up has failed to improve security situation in the Samburu and Laikipia districts. 29% of local leaders have observed that the KPRs lack equipment and firearms, while 21%, maintain that the reservists lacked motivation and support from the government. 15% of the respondents observe that KPRs lack training while another 18% say that the reservists were in a corrupt manner, promoting some of the officers to provoke violence.

The KPRs are few in number. 13% of the respondents say that the disarmament process lack proper coordination, while 7% have reported that said disarmament was not conducted in their community. A small number of respondents (6%) believe that mop up exercise ha left large quantities of illicit firearms in civilian hands. The same number (6%) felt that the police posts and personnel are few and scattered, while 3% cite lack of cooperation by the community members. The table below summarizes community perception about KPRs involvement in disarmament.

If in your view, arming the police reservists and mopping up of illegal small arms have not led to improvement of security situation, what are the reasons?	Districts		Total
	Samburu	Laikipia	%
KPRs lack motivation and support	11.1	37	20.8
Some KPRs promote insecurity	4.4	22.2	11.1
Lack of equipment and firearms	22.2	40.7	29.2
Lack of training	4.4	33.3	15.3
Corruption in recruitment of KPRs	13.3	22.2	18.3
Lack of adequate police posts and personnel	6.6	3.7	5.6
Reluctance by the community	4.4	0	2.8
Disarmament not done in the community	4.4	11.1	6.9
There is still a lot of illegal arms	4.4	7.4	5.6
There is no proper coordination	0	33.3	12.5
KPRs are few	0	29.6	11.1
Don't know	13.3	7.4	11.1

Table 6: Reasons why arming the KPRs and mopping up illegal small arms have not improved security situation

Disarmament Efforts by Individuals and Groups

Individuals and groups that have made significant effort to address the problem of small arms proliferation in Samburu and Laikipia Districts include chiefs, elders and peace mediator, provincial administration, village groups, family friends and armed forces. In order of ranking, 58% of the respondents single out chiefs, elders and mediators as those who have made the most significant efforts against the small arms proliferation in the two districts. 24% of the respondents associate the exercise with the provincial administration, 4% with village groups, and another 4% family and friends. The armed forces (supported by only 3% of the respondents) come last as the least significant disarmament effort. Chart 9 and 10 below summarizes the ranking of individuals and groups as per their contribution in the disarmament exercise.




Chart 9: Number one ranking of those who have helped to solve the small arms problem

Overall, chiefs, elders and mediators lead in the first ranking, followed by local administrators (including the DOs and DCs) and then vigilante groups. In the second ranking provincial administration come first, followed by chiefs/elders/mediators. Vigilante groups and religious organizations come third. In the third ranking, armed forces lead, followed by provincial administration. NGOs came third. Chart 11 summarizes overall ranking of groups and individuals that have made greatest efforts towards the disarmament exercise.




Chart 10: Overall ranking of those who have made most efforts in disarmament

The study also sought the opinion of the respondents over the role that the president of Kenya, provincial administration and NGOs/CBOs, made towards the control of small arms proliferation in Liakipia and Samburu districts. Majority of the respondents (70%) regard president's contribution as positive. However, 17% of the disapproved of his role, citing his passive stance over insecurity issue in the North Rift. 14% of the respondents are not aware of any action that the president has taken

to address the small arms problem. Half the respondents (50%) are not informed about NGOs efforts in the disarmament exercise. However, 46% approved of NGOs role. 4.2% of the respondents see NGOs role as both insignificant and negative.

An overwhelming 81% of the respondents approved of the provincial administration effort towards disarmament. Only 14% of the respondents strongly disapprove of the involvement of provincial administration in mopping up illicit firearms. 92% of the respondents commend the effort of community elders in the disarmament. A dismal 3% of the respondents disapproved of the role of community leaders in disarmament, while 6% are ignorant about any efforts that elders have made towards disarmament in Laikipia and Samburu Districts.




Chart 11: Approval of actions by president, NGOs, Provincial administration, and elders in tackling small arms problem

3.3 Contribution of Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs) on Disarmament Exercise

31% of the respondents maintain that the Samburu and Laikipia communities are dissatisfied with the performance of the police reservists in the maintenance of security and control of illicit arms proliferation. However, 69% of the respondents say they are satisfied. Respondents in the two districts expect police reservists to make more effort towards the maintenance of security and control of small arms.

		District of interview		Total %
		Samburu	Laikipia	
As you know that the government has armed the local police reserve force to beef up security in the district. How satisfied are you with the way the reserve force has led to reduction of insecurity in the district?	Very satisfied	13.3	3.7	9.7
	Fairly satisfied	64.4	51.9	59.7
	Not very satisfied	20	11.1	16.7
	Not at all satisfied	2.2	33.3	13.9
	It has not worked	0	0	
		100	100	100

Table 7: Satisfaction with contribution of KPRs towards security maintenance

There is a higher satisfaction level among Samburu with the effort of KPRs than in Laikipia. However, most respondents exempt KPRs from blame over constant insecurity problem on the grounds that their number is insignificant compared to the challenge (between 40 and 60 in Waso Division). Locals in Laikipia and Samburu feel that KPRs need more training especially in gun handling and combat so as to avoid numerous accidents its personnel have incurred over the recent past. Locals also

appreciate the fact that the government had provided KPRs with 40 radios as well as the transparent recruitment process that involved the provincial administration i.e. chiefs, District Officers and the council of elders.

The government recently introduced Tourist Police Unit to safeguard tourists that visit lodges and parks in Laikipia and Samburu Districts. A General Service Unit (GSU) camps have also been built in hot spots in the district like Merile, Nkupo Sorogi and Nachola. Besides, a contingent of Kenya army is permanently based in Baragoi. The government has also armed and provided scouts in conservancies with communication gadgets to enhance quick response to security crisis.

Most of the respondents in Laikipia District (55%) are satisfied with the work of KPRs. There were 42 KPRs in Mukogodo Division including 8 chiefs. Locals, however, feel that the number of the KPRs should be increased because their response is permanently required in hot spots such as Olmoran, Rumuruti and Umande. The provincial administration is in the process of increasing KPRs through location committees, especially

in OlMoran. Divisional security committee, comprising the DOs, administration police and other security intelligence officers appoint the KPRs. KPRs are first vetted by elders, while police undertake background investigation of each individual vetted so as to ascertain character, role in the community, availability and past conduct. The KPRs serve as volunteers.

Areas such as Mukogodo are yet to forward names of the already vetted KPRs to the Commissioner. Locals feel that the number of KPRs so far recruited and armed is dismal compared to the task involved. Secondly, KPRs operating in Laikipia and Samburu Districts are scattered and lack incentives that can inspire them to take risk. Besides, there is a lot of bureaucracy involved in supplying KPRs with arms and ammunition. These obstacles have made KPRs register only 50% success in confronting insecurity challenge in both Liakipia and Samburu Districts.

3.4 NGOs Involved in Firearms Control in Laikipia and Samburu Districts

There is no NGO presently addressing small arms problem Mukogodo Division. Two NGOs are active in the area i.e. Osiligi and IMPACT but are not directly involved in small arms control. ITDG, Christian Children's Fund (CCF), Arid Lands (local), and Oxfam are some of the civil society organizations that support peace initiatives in Samburu District. In particular ITDG and Oxfam have initiated peace activities in the District dubbed Samburu Peace Initiative. The two organizations have so far organized a series of meetings in Merile, Archer's Post, Isiolo and Meru North. Community Based Organizations (CBOs) are also involved in the peace initiative. Primarily, CBOs serve as channels through which the local population surrenders illegal arms. Others agencies involved are conservancies and Peace Elders.

The contribution of NGOs has won praise among local leaders. Local leaders maintain that peace initiatives are successful notwithstanding numerous challenges that such bad terrain that hinders communication, and lack of incentive for peace elders. Local leaders have praised NGO

peace initiatives as a useful strategy for intensify the recovery of small arms still lying in the custody of civilians. However, are disappointed by low level of NGOs involvement disarmament initiatives in Samburu District. They also accused some NGOs for taking advantage of the local people to pursue projects not related to disarmament. Local leaders given the example of CCF that erected people's pillar in Amaya and Suguta Marmar without the involvement of local community.

Churches also contributed significantly to peace initiative through homilies. The National Council of Churches of Kenya printed pamphlets and disseminated information in local languages against small arms. The Catholic Church has made successful initiatives in Baragoi where it has managed to bring the warring communities together for reconciliation. The Catholic Church built hall in Poro (Amani hall) Baragoi-Amaya. It (Catholic Church) also started a peace taxi that carries the Samburu, Turkana and the Pokot to initiate peace in Maralal (Poro Morijo) through interaction. ACK and the Pentecostal Church are also involved.

3.5.1 Communities' Own Initiatives

40% of the respondents say that community members report cases of firearms to government authorities whenever they sight them in civilian hands. 31% of community members have participated in peace meetings. However, approximately 20% of the local population have purchased new firearms to replace confiscated ones. The Samburu and Laikipia communities exact heavy penalties and fines on persons found in possession of firearms as a deterrence measure. Elders deeply involved in firearms control negotiations and actual disarmament process. Some families caught up in conflict (10%) migrate to less conflict prone zones.




Chart 12: Communities coping mechanisms to small arms proliferation

Community leaders observe that the government, through the provincial administration, has initiated public education against firearms. Such forms of education are conducted through public *barazas* where the chiefs, DOs and the community members meet and discuss security, firearms proliferation and disarmament. Peace committees have been formed at location and divisional levels for public education purposes. Participants at such fora are elected at sub-location levels. Their work involves public campaign against firearms. They also respond whenever

violence breaks between two groups by making immediate reconciliation efforts.

The government has been praised for beefing up police patrols in some parts of Samburu and Laikipia and for working closely with conservancies.

The government has also improved communication by arming and providing VHF radios and vehicles to the conservancies. Besides, the government has also initiated and encouraged other forms of community policing. In Nanyuki town, for instance, the local community provides vehicles and help in intelligence gathering. Others assist by writing anonymous letters to the police. The strong and well-funded security group in Nanyuki town has helped to address security concerns within the municipality. The group collaborates very well with the provincial administration and the police. The community volunteers information to the police and identifies suspect.

There is only one road barrier at Lipoley in Mukogodo Division. This is not effective considering the vastness of and also the fact that firearm

peddlers do not use main roads. There are no roadblocks in Samburu District, however. The government removed the roadblock at Sere Olipi in 2005.

The Amaya Peace Agreement of 1998 made important strides towards establishing sustainable peace between the Turkana, Pokot and Samburu. A symbol was erected at the boundary of each district to serve as a constant reminder to the community members about their obligation to each other. The agreement was renewed in 2001 with financial support from CCF. However, the motives of the peace agreement remain suspect. Samburu and Laikipia residents observe that it was imposed on the local people because CCF wanted to build a multi-million-education center. The agreement did not, therefore, mature because it was not locally initiated.

The local communities confirm that peace committees are successful because they are voluntary and involve no monetary compensation. The involved are part of the community hence cannot betray the initiative.

Community policing has not been effective in containing insecurity menace. Security committees are involved in a number of initiative efforts in the trading centers but their operations only appear effective because they are sedentary in nature. Families that move from place to place in search of water and pasture are still predisposed to a lot of insecurity risks.

Individual Initiatives

Individual community members have also taken steps that demonstrate their concern about the proliferation of small arms in their localities. Such steps include discussing the firearms problem with their neighbors and convening meetings to raise security concerns. 87.5% of the respondents say that they had participated in such discussions; 33.3% has done so often, while 27.8% has participated in the discussions several times. 25% said they did so once or twice. Only 5.6% of the respondents have not been participated in community meetings that discuss firearms problem.

Individual initiatives against small arms proliferation in the two districts




Chart 13: Individual initiatives against small arms proliferation

Conclusion

One of the hypothesis of the study was that the government of Kenya has responded inadequately to the problem of small arms and light weapons proliferation in Samburu and Laikipia Districts. The citizens have thus resorted to arming themselves against real and imagined insecurity threats. From the study findings largely validate the hypothesis. The government has responded through periodic disarmament and piecemeal

enlisting of members of the local communities as Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs).

Whereas it is apparent that the two measures have achieved alot, the gaps that triggered these responses remain unresolved. The responses have been widely criticized as biased, inefficient, ill coordinated and less inclusive. It is also clear that attempts at community disarmament without availing enough security personnel on the ground can only precipitate cynicism. As the study has shown, the end result is that only old and useless guns are surrendered.

Lack of coordination in the disarmament exercise is also evident. Some communities in both Laikipia and Samburu have confessed ignorance about the exercise. This helps to account for large quantities of firearms still feared to be in civilian hands. The government has made positive efforts to involve elders, chiefs and provincial administration as the frontline team in the fight against small arms in the two districts. However, absence of NGOs and independent community initiatives is a

glaring gap in the fight against small arms proliferation in Samburu and Laikipia Districts. Also disappointing is the report that the army used force in disarming the Samburu.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF STUDY FINDINGS

Introduction

This chapter analyses the study findings captured in chapter two and three. The chapter seeks to interpret meaning and short/long term implication of the emerging issues on small arms proliferation both to the community and the country at large. It gives specific focus to the disarmament process and the agencies involved.

Influence of Internal Politics on Firearm Control

The security situation in Samburu and Laikipia Districts has improved since 2003 when the National Rainbow Coalition assumed reigns of the state. Kibaki government came up with a strong policy to control small arms proliferation in the country as a strategy of improving economic growth and assuring safety of citizens. This implies that maintenance of security is an important policy issue. It also implies that regime change has direct influence on government policy. New elites that replace the

old political class always bring new ideas and policies to address challenges of the day including insecurity.

Location of conflict within a national territory determines the urgency and effectiveness of state response. The government has responded more effectively to firearms problem in urban centers especially Nairobi City. Armed robbery in Nairobi has reduced drastically. Circulation of firearms within the city has equally registered a downward trend. This implies that the state always protects strategic interests first. Arms circulation in urban areas is not only a threat to government stability, it also threatens business and the security of diplomats and other international personalities.

The fact that small arms problem in the North Rift has continued unabated for decades is a function of poor representation of the communities settled in this part of the country. Poor representations can be attributed to co-option of elected leaders by the regime or lack of numerical strength in state representative organs such as parliament and

local councils. The Samburu and Maasai who dominate Samburu and Laikipia District respectively are among the minority communities in Kenya. The previous regimes in Kenya are accused of having ill-treated and exploited minority communities. The fact that majority of their population is not well educated due to ecological and cultural constraints have added to their predicament.

Political actors can frustrate government policies especially if they represent homogenous groups such as tribes. The study has shown that political leaders in Samburu and Laikipia are opposed to the disarmament exercise on ground that it will make communities they represent vulnerable to attack. Whether real or imagined, politicians take advantage of people's insecurity and frustrations to win votes. Incitement by leaders has made the security situation in the North Rift difficult to resolve.

The previous and incumbent regimes have developed middle ground (i.e. less aggressive) policies in addressing firearms problem in Samburu and Laikipia districts. Such policies aim at winning confidence and political

support communities involved in conflict against each other. Preoccupation with regime preservation strategies is therefore, partly responsible for unresolved arms problem and conflict in Samburu and Laikipia Districts.

Stability in neighboring countries has a direct influence on internal security. Armed conflict in the Horn of Africa i.e. Somali, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Northern Uganda is responsible for high proliferation of firearms to Kenya's North Rift. Attempts to permanently address small arms menace must therefore incorporate regional and international effort to bring stability to conflict ridden countries the Horn of Africa.

Influence of Socio-economic Environment on Firearm Control

Social and economic lifestyle of the ethnic groups involved in conflict in Samburu and Laikipia have a direct impact firearm control. The Samburu, Maasai, pokot, Turkana, Somali and Borana are nomadic communities. They rely on livestock for livelihood. The culture of these communities

also put special premium and value on livestock ownership. The number of herds a family owns determines upward mobility and status in the community. The obtaining value system explains why the nomadic communities acquire and use firearms. As the study has shown, violence erupts mainly because of cattle raids or due to conflicts over grazing land and water. This implies that the means of economic survival has a direct influence on the magnitude of aggression and violence that a community can apply against real or imagined enemies.

The economic significance of the region involved in conflict also determines the rapidity and effectiveness of government response to insecurity threat. The Kenya government has over the year ignored North Rift region in its development planning because of its economic insignificance. Livestock keeping is the main economic activity. However, many families keep livestock for cultural reasons. Even though the demand for meat and other livestock products has expanded in urban areas, the distance between the two districts from major urban center make them less central as supply area. Consequently, the state is slow to

respond to security threats because it does not lose much. The study has confirmed that the government has employed special security forces to guard tourists those visits Samburu and Laikipia. This can be explained on the account that tourism brings higher income to the government than does livestock and livestock products especially from North Rift. The tourist facilities are owned and operated by private investors with close connections with the state.

Communities always rise up as a collectivity to defend themselves and their wealth where government forces are less effective. Group solidarity increases and inter-ethnic suspicion increases. The study has shown that insecurity situation and small arms problem has spread in Samburu and Laikipia districts due to ineffectiveness of government response. This implies that groups will always look to themselves first for survival before the state comes in. The fact that respondents dismissed poverty as cause for the proliferation of firearms imply innocence on the part of firearm holder; they do not acquire arms to commit crime as urban thugs do but to protect themselves and their livestock. The government has only

responded through periodic disarmament and piecemeal enlisting of members of the local communities as Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs). While it is apparent that such measures have achieved a lot, the reasons that trigger inter-ethnic violence remain unresolved. State responses have been widely criticized as biased, inefficient, ill coordinated and not less inclusive.

Also communities/groups that share certain characteristics may also gang up against another. The study has shown that The Samburu and Maasai occasionally unite and attack Bantu communities in Central division. This serves to complicate conflict scenario.

Delayed response to a crisis turns it into a normal/cultural practice. North Rift communities have co-existed with conflict and arms problem for so long that they have internalized it as part and parcel of their daily life. A workable intervention strategy needs to be not only slow but also to appreciate the predicament and historical circumstance of the communities. This explains why the two communities are reluctant to

surrender all firearms to the government. Besides, both local and cross border sources and the markets for the guns are well known to the local population. Procuring firearm is an easy endeavor as judged by the high number of respondents who claim to have witnessed exchange and use of illicit fire arms.

The distance between the local communities and the government also affects trust level and the success of state policies. Majority of the local communities settled in Samburu and Laikipia only see the government through provincial administration, police or security forces that come to intervene whenever violence erupts. That the government has failed to build roads, schools, health facilities, provide water or establish development projects explain why a wide proportion of the local community does not take the call for disarmament seriously. Had the government created alternative means of income i.e. agriculture or established permanent cattle watering points, conflicts over water and grazing land would reduce because a portion the population would seek employment in agriculture. Promotion of education would also keep the

youth in school and reduce the number of cattle raiders. Such developments would reduce dependence on livestock as the only source of livelihood and thus demand for firearms.

Little development can thrive in conflict prone areas. Small arms proliferation in Laikipia and Samburu Districts has affected livestock farming, general business, and transport, and tourism. Different categories of people have also borne the brunt of conflict. Children have not been kept out of school as families get displaced and youths have joined inter-tribal war and cattle raids. Equally, individual community members have been killed. Others –especially of women and children– have been maimed, raped, or kidnapping. Men have been mainly targeted for murder. They also suffered psychological problems when they cannot acquire guns to protect their families. The study has also shown that many families have been plunged into abject poverty overnight because of cattle raids.

Role of Individuals, Civil Society and Local leaders on firearm Control

The civil society can play an important role in the formulation and implementation of peace agreements, reconciliation and disarmament.

The study has shown that a section of Laikipia and Samburu population surrender firearm to churches and missions instead of state security personnel. This can be explained on the account of lack of trust between citizens and government due to distance. Church organization and NGOs directly affect the lives of citizens especially in harsh environment in which nomadic communities are settled. This explains why CCF has been entrusted with renewing Amaya peace agreement that brings together Turkana, Pokot and Maasai.

The role of local leaders especially community elders and chiefs has equally been acclaimed in both Samburu and Laikipia. The government should therefore encourage civil society and local leaders to play a leading role in the disarmament process because of the trust that people have invested in them over the years. However, the civil society and local leaders must be careful not to betray such trust.

Government intervention process is non-sustainable unless it incorporates input and active participation of the local community. Lack of coordination is evident in the fact that some members of communities in the two districts have reported not being aware of the on-going disarmament exercise. The government has responded with excessive force in Samburu district through the army. This can only serve to make the people more opposed to disarmament because they see the state as another enemy and not protector. Giving strict amnesty deadlines may also fail to deliver the required result. The holders of illicit arms do not necessarily respond to intimidation but persuasion and consultation.

The fact that local communities advocate severe penalty for individuals found in illegal possession of firearms is defensive and merely illustrates their dilemma. The local population detests firearms because of known threats they pose to security. However, they cannot imagine existing without the very firearms that they hate to see in possession of opponents. This explains why they prefer to be involved in the

disarmament so as to enable them monitor the process in terms of its advantages and risks.

Individual community members in Laikipia and Samburu Districts have developed independent mechanism of seeking an end to firearms menace. This is attested by the fact that 87% of the respondents have either convened or participated in local meetings at which firearms menace is discussed. Such initiatives imply that firearms pose a major threat to the security and of the community settled in the two districts. However, community initiatives need to be supported by the state and other agencies for so that they bear positive results.

Conclusion

Different factors have influenced the proliferation of firearms into Samburu and Laikipia Districts. These include politics, local economy, and cultural lifestyle of the indigenous communities. The same factors have served as obstacles to the control of firearms in the two Districts. The government has moved in as an external agency and tried to implement disarmament. However, the exercise has not realized full results because

factors responsible for firearm proliferation have not been removed. This implies that approaches towards successful disarmament must go in tandem the removal of the factors that make local community purchase and use firearms.

Various agencies are involved and have indeed played an important role in the firearm control in Samburu and Laikipia Districts. The agencies include the government, non-governmental organizations (including churches), local leaders, and individual community members. The government has dominated the process and has made less effort to involve the local population in the disarmament exercise. The contribution of the civil society is particularly significant. However, there is more work to do than the available NGOs and church organizations can contend with. Each agency has an important role to play in the search for sustainable peace in Samburu and Laikipia, which goes beyond mere disarmament.

Different categories of respondents hold divergent views about how best to address firearms menace in the two Districts. Some support disarmament while others propose legalization of the illegally acquired firearms presently in civilian hands. Some respondents also support use of force/severe punishment against those found in illegal possession of firearms. The responses reflect awareness levels among the respondents as well as their extent of exposure to the real situation on the ground. Despite divergence in opinion, respondents are unanimous in their disapproval of monetary compensation for the surrender of illicit firearms. Besides, all respondents are agreed that firearm pose a threat to their security and general progress as a community.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary of the findings

Firearm proliferation has been a problem in Samburu and Laikipia Districts for decades. Conflict in the Horn of Africa region (especially Sudan, Somali, Uganda and Ethiopia) during the 1980s and 1990s is largely responsible for firearm proliferation into North Rift where the two Districts are located. Beginning 2003, the Kenya government came up with disarmament as a strategy. Disarmament strategy aims to mop up firearms in civilian hands. It involves voluntary surrender of guns to government security personnel or civil institutions such as churches or NGOs. The government has also introduced Kenya Police Reserves (KPRS), which consists of contingent of locally armed civilians legally mandated to intervene in cases of security threats.

Though widely commended by residents as positive, disarmament and recruitment of police reservists have not succeeded in containing firearm

problem in the two Districts. Large quantities of firearm remain in civilian hands. Further, the demand and supply chain of firearms in the region remains undisturbed. Civilians know where to purchase guns from, how much different makes of guns cost and how to use them. Many years of interaction with firearm have made guns so popular in the two Districts that men who cannot acquire them lead frustrated lives.

Government intervention has been faulted on the grounds that it is less inclusive and consultative. The local communities have lamented that they are not actively involved in design and implementation of the programs. Besides, the programs are poorly coordinated and lacking in resources and prerequisite manpower. More importantly, government interventions have been seen as insensitive to the underlying reality. Samburu and Laikipia communities are confronted with difficult security situation that demands they acquire and use firearms for protection. Inability to appreciate this reality has led to near failure of the government led disarmament strategy.

Firearm problem has had a devastating effect on social and economic life of the Samburu and Laikipia population. Cases of cattle raid are numerous as are murder, kidnap and rape. Education has also been disrupted because of frequent movement/displacement. Besides, it has proved difficult to undertake serious development effort under insecurity. Majority of Samburu and Laikipia resident are therefore subjected to a life of uncertainty and indignity.

5.2 Conclusions

Control of firearm proliferation is a complex processes that demands appreciation of internal and external realities. Internally, it requires an understanding of the reasons that result in the demand for and use of firearms by civilian population. It also requires development and implementation of sensitive and non-partisan control strategy that incorporates local actors and issues. Above all, state agencies involved in the development of intervention programs need to appreciate that

Samburu and Laikipia residents are victims and not perpetrators of violence.

The Kenya government also needs to appreciate that external environment has a direct impact on internal security. In particular, it has proved difficult to control inflow of firearms into North Rift due to political instability that still obtains in the neighboring countries. Efforts to contain small arms proliferation into Kenya must thus incorporate regional programs that aim to achieve sustainable peace in the Horn of Africa.

The central thesis of this study is that the Kenya government has responded ineffectively to the problem of small arms and light weapons proliferation in Samburu and Laikipia Districts. The citizens have thus resorted to arming themselves against real and imagined insecurity in the two districts. From the study findings, it is clear that this hypothesis has been validated. Disarmament of the communities has been attempted

without consultation, resources, and adequate security personnel to enforce the process.

5.3 Recommendations

- The government should tackle the issues of small arms proliferation from a broader perspective. The interventions should therefore be holistic in that the issue of development should be looked into important agents of development like education, infrastructure and provision of security.
- Development of livestock industry in the region should be speeded up through investment by the government in veterinary services, building of abattoirs, and provision of credit and purchase of excess livestock during the bumper seasons as a control mechanism for overstocking. Livestock markets should be developed and secured at strategic points in the districts.
- KPRs should be recruited in a transparent and accountable manner. Their number should be commensurate to the level of insecurity in their communities. They should also be vetted appropriately to

weed out the bad elements, be trained properly to avoid unnecessary accidents, be kitted appropriately with modern guns and enough ammunition. However a system of accountability in their usage of the guns and ammo should be formulated to avoid misuse of the firearms. Bureaucracy in recruitment and provisioning should also be tackled as it slows down the KPRs. Ways of motivating the KPRs should also be found, whether monetary or otherwise.

- Disarmament of the residents of the two districts should be conducted in a humane and transparent manner. Information about the process and its purpose should be disseminated to all the communities before the actual process begins. They should also be informed about the same activities elsewhere within the region and beyond so that each community does not see it as a government's way of punishing them for real or imagined wrongs. Disarmament should also be coordinated with those taking place in other neighboring countries like Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda. Borders with countries that have not initiated such a process

because there is no formal government like in Somalia, security should be beefed up and vigilance given more attention.

- Since the members of the two communities really appreciate the importance of security, ways should be found, other than through KPRs, to enhance community policing. To start with the government officials could coordinate more closely with community leaders to sell the idea that security and lack thereof largely depends on actions of omission and commission emanating from within the community. They should therefore be at the forefront of promoting it. NGOs and CBOs could also be co-opted more vigorously so that they are able to pool resources to achieve maximum security for all. Initiatives like arming and provisioning of the scouts within the conservancies are successful trials of community policing that have born fruit in the two districts.
- Vigilance must also increase on the part of the police. The routes, markets and peddlers of small arms in the region are well known and well connected, yet little is being done to apprehend them and smash the rackets. This suggests that they could be operating with

some tacit approval of some members of the security forces. The report that some members of the forces are involved in sale of bullets to the raiders in the communities should be taken seriously. Such errant officers should be weeded from the forces and corruption that allows them to thrive checked.

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ANNEX 1. QUESTIONNAIRES

SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS INTERVIEW CHECK LISTS

A. KEY INFORMANTS INTERVIEW GUIDE:

1. What are some of the issues that are very important and are always debated in the district?
2. When you hear of illicit small arms/weapons, what comes to your mind first?
 - a. What are some of the illicit small arms that are readily available in this community?
 - b. Where do they originate?
 - c. Are they readily available? If yes, why so?
 - d. Do you know of a place where one can purchase a gun within the district?
 - e. What of from outside the district?
 - f. How much does a gun cost in the community?
3. Whom could you say is responsible for bringing the illicit small arms in to the District?
4. Which are some of the areas worst hit by the illicit small arms proliferation problem? If there are, why?
5. What are some of the reasons why people are ready to arm themselves with illicit small arms?
6. What are some of the problems that this community face due to ready availability of illegal firearms?
 - a. How do members of the community cope with the problem?
 - b. What are some of the initiatives that the community has put in place to deal with the problem?
 - c. Are they succeeding? If yes, how?
 - d. If they have failed, what could be the reasons?
 - e. What else could the community do to solve the illicit small arms proliferation problem in the district?

7. Do you know of any government initiative to reduce proliferation of small arms in Samburu district? (If you know)
- Which ones are they?
 - How successful have they been?
 - What are some of the problems they have faced?
 - What are some of the mistakes the government has made in the initiatives?
 - What could they do to help mop up the small arms?
8. Are there some NGOs/CBOs/FBOs and other local initiatives that have come to help tackle the small arms problem here?
- Which ones are they?
 - How successful have they been?
 - What are some of the problems they have faced?
 - What could they do to help mop up the small arms?
9. Do you think it is difficult for some members of the community to surrender their firearms?
- If you do, why think so?
 - What do you think could be done to change this situation?
 - Do you think people should be compensated for surrendering their guns?
 - How much should they get?
10. How has the problem of small arms:
- Affected women?
 - What of men?
 - What of children? (Boys/girls)
11. Is there any last comment you would like to make with regard to small arms in Samburu District?

B. KEY INFORMANT GUIDE FOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS:

1. Can you comment on the security situation in Samburu District for the last 10 or so years?
2. Why is Samburu District so prone to small arms driven raids?
3. Please tell me what you know about illicit small arms in the district over this period? (Those readily available, their origins, markets)
4. Whom could you say is responsible for bringing the illicit small arms in to the District?
5. Which are some of the areas worst hit by the illicit small arms proliferation problem? If there are, why?
6. What are some of the reasons why people are ready to arm themselves with illicit small arms?
7. What are some of the problems that this community face due to ready availability of illegal firearms?
8. Do you know of any government initiative to reduce proliferation of small arms in Samburu district? (If you know)
 - a. Which ones are they?
 - b. How successful have they been?
 - c. How many small arms have been discovered?
 - d. What are some of the problems they have faced?
 - e. What are some of the mistakes the government has made in the initiatives?
 - f. What could they do to help mop up the small arms?
9. Could you make a comment on the Police reserve unit in the district as a coping mechanism?
10. Are there some NGOs/CBOs/FBOs and other local initiatives that have come to help tackle the small arms problem here?
 - a. Which ones are they?
 - b. How successful have they been?
 - c. What are some of the problems they have faced?
 - d. What could they do to help mop up the small arms?

11. Do you think it is difficult for some members of the community to surrender their firearms? (If you do).
 - a. Why do you think so?
 - b. What do you think could be done to change this situation?
 - c. Do you think people should be compensated for surrendering their guns?
 - d. How much should they get?

12. How has the problem of small arms:
 - a. Affected women?
 - b. What of men?
 - c. What of children? (Boys/girls)

13. Is there any last comment you would like to make with regard to small arms in Samburu District?

C. FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Introduction (10 minutes)
2. Warm up
 - a. First tell me how things are going on in Samburu District these days?
 - b. Are things better or worse?
 - c. What is the best/worst thing about the current situation in the region?
 - d. Who is responsible for that?
 - e. What about in your own county?

3. When you hear of small arms/weapons, what comes to your mind first?
 - a. What are some of the small arms that are readily available in this community?
 - b. Where do they originate?
 - c. If they are readily available, why so?

- d. Is there a place where one can purchase a gun here?
 - e. How much does a gun cost in the community?
 - f. Where else can they be got easily?
4. Whom could you say is responsible for bringing the small arms in to the district?
5. What are some of the problems that this community face due to ready availability of firearms?
 - a. How do members of the community cope with them?
 - b. What are some of the initiatives that the community has put in place to deal with the problem?
 - c. Are they succeeding? How?
 - d. If they have failed, what could be the reasons?
 - e. What else the community to solve the problem could do?
 6. What has the government done to solve the small arms problem in the region?
 - a. What of the police?
 - b. What of the army?
 - c. What of the politicians from the district?
 - d. What of the neighboring districts?
 7. Are there some NGOs that have come to help tackle the small arms problem here?
 - a. Which ones are they?
 - b. How successful have they been?
 - c. What are some of the problems they have faced?
 - d. What could they do to help mop up the small arms?
 8. Do you think it is difficult for some members of the community to surrender their firearms?
 - a. If you do, why think so?
 - b. What do you think could be done to change this situation?
 - c. Do you think people should be compensated for surrendering their guns?

- d. How much should they get?
9. How has the problem of small arms:
- a. Affected women?
 - b. What of men?
 - c. What of children? (Boys/girls)
10. Is there any last comment you would like to make with regard to small arms in Samburu District?

SAMBURU DISTRICT

**PERCEPTIONS ABOUT GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO SMALL ARMS
PROLIFERATION IN SAMBURU DISTRICT**

Document revised: May 2006

[Office use only]

Field Number:

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[Allocated by

[Supervisor Use Only]

Questionnaire checked by:		EA: [Circle one]
[Supervisor signature]		Urban
		Rural

[Interviewer: Write names in the boxes]

	Sub location	
	Village	

Household Selection Procedure

Interviewer: It is your job is to select a random (this means any) household. A household is a group of people who presently eat together from the same pot.

Start your walk pattern from the start point that has been randomly chosen by your Field Supervisor. Team members must walk in opposite directions to each other. If A walks towards the sun, B must walk away from the sun; C and D must walk at right angles to A and B.

Use the day code to determine the sampling interval. For example, on the 5th, 14th and 23rd of the month, the day code (and sampling interval) is five. So you choose the fifth dwelling structure on the right. On the 6th, 15th and 24th of the month, the sampling interval is six. So you choose the sixth dwelling structure on the right. And so on.

Good day. My name is _____. I am conducting the survey for The University of Nairobi. I do not represent the government or any political party. We are studying the views of residents of Samburu District about the proliferation of small arms in the District and how the government has responded to it. We would like to discuss these issues with a member of your household.

Every person in the District has an equal chance of being included in this study. All information will be kept confidential. Your household has been chosen by chance. We would like to choose an adult from your household.

Would you help us pick one

Note: The person must give his or her informed consent by answering positively. If participation is refused, walk away from the household use the day code to substitute the household. If consent is secured, proceed as follows.

Respondent Selection Procedure (Respondent must be 18 years and above)

Interviewer: Within the household, it is your job is to select a random (this means any) individual. This individual becomes the interview respondent. In addition, you are responsible for alternating interviews between men and women. Circle the correct code number below.

	Male	Female
Previous interview was with a:	1	2
This interview must be with a:	1	2

BEGIN INTERVIEW

PERSONAL SECURITY

Let's begin by talking about Security conditions.

1. In general, how would you describe: *[Read out response options]*

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very Bad	Don't know [DNR]
A. The present security condition of this community?	5	4	3	2	1	9
B. Your own present personal security conditions?	5	4	3	2	1	9

2. If the response to 1 above is fairly bad or very bad, what are the reasons? *[Enter up to three verbatim responses in English]*

(a) _____	Post		
	Code		
(b) _____	Post		
	code		

3. In general, how do you rate: *[Read out response options]*

	Much Worse	Worse	Same	Better	Much Better	Don't know [DNR]
A. The security conditions in this District compared to those in neighboring Districts?	1	2	3	4	5	9
B. Your security conditions compared to those of other residents of Samburu District?	1	2	3	4	5	9

4. What are the reasons for your rating in 3 above? *[Enter up to three verbatim responses in English]*

(a) _____	Post			
	Code			
(b) _____	Post			
	code			

5. Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to 10 years ago? *[Read out response options]*

	Much worse	Worse	Same	Better	Much Better	Don't know [DNR]
A. Security conditions in this region?	1	2	3	4	5	9
B. Your own security conditions?	1	2	3	4	5	9

6. What are the reasons for your rating in 5 above? *[Enter up to three verbatim responses in English]*

(a) _____	Post			
	Code			
(b) _____	Post			
	code			

7. In your opinion, what does it mean to feel "personally insecure?" *[Interviewer: Prompt if necessary: When you hear that a person is insecure", what is the first thing about them that comes to your mind?]* *[Enter up to three verbatim responses in English]*

(a) _____	Post Code			
(b) _____	Post code			
(c) _____	Post code			
(d) _____	Post code			
(e) _____	Post code			

8. Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion? *[Read out statements. Only one option to be chosen]*

STATEMENT A: It is in order for everybody to be armed since it is the only way to ensure personal security.	3
STATEMENT B: Only officially sanctioned government forces should bear arms of any kind in the community	2
STATEMENT C: For someone like me, it doesn't matter who bears arm within the community.	1
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9

Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B.

[Interviewer: Probe: Do you agree or agree very strongly? Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion]

9.

A: It is better to arm oneself to be able to protect our families and cattle, even if the general security in the area is poor.		B: It is better to surrender all illegally owned guns, even if personal security of our families and animals is not yet assured.	
Agree Very Strongly With A	Agree With A	Agree With B	Agree Very Strongly With B
1	2	3	4

Agree With Neither <i>[Do not read]</i>	5
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9

10. The government of Kenya and other stakeholders has done a lot to mop up illegal arms and provide security in the district. Overall, how satisfied are you with the way the authorities have handled the issue of child soldiers? *[Read out options]*

Very satisfied	4
Fairly satisfied	3
Not very satisfied	2
Not at all satisfied	1
The authorities have not done much to reduce proliferation of illegal small arms <i>[Do not read]</i>	0
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9

11. As you may know, the government has armed the local police reserve force to beef up security in the district. Overall, how satisfied are you with the way the police reserves have led to reduction of insecurity in the district? *[Read out options]*

Very satisfied	4
Fairly satisfied	3
Not very satisfied	2
Not at all satisfied	1
The government disarmament drive has not led to reduction in proliferation of small arms <i>[Do not read]</i>	0
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9

12. If arming of the police reserves and mopping up of illegal small arms have not led to improvement of security situation, what could be some of the reasons *[take first three reasons]*

I.	Post Code
----	-----------

li.	Post Code	
lii.	Post Code	
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>		9

13. During the past year, how often have you had to use following types of small arms? *[Read out options]*

	Never	Only once	A few times	Often	Don't know <i>[DNR]</i>
A. A gun	0	1	2	3	9
B. A grenade	0	1	2	3	9
C. A pistol	0	1	2	3	9
G. Some other armful weapon (specify) _____	0	1	2	3	9

14. During the past year, how often have you witnessed illegal usage of the following types of small arms? *[Read out options]*

	Never	Only once	A few times	Often	Don't know <i>[DNR]</i>
A. A gun	0	1	2	3	9
B. A grenade	0	1	2	3	9
C. A pistol	0	1	2	3	9
G. Some other armful weapon (specify) _____	0	1	2	3	9

15. During the past year, how often have you witnessed illegal sale of the following types of small arms? *[Read out options]*

	Never	Only once	A few times	Often	Don't know <i>[DNR]</i>
A. A gun	0	1	2	3	9

B.	A grenade	0	1	2	3	9
C.	A pistol	0	1	2	3	9
D.	A land mine	0	1	2	3	9
F.	Bullets	0	1	2	3	9
G.	Some other armful weapon (specify) _____					

16. In your opinion, who are the three main suppliers of small arms in your community?" [Interviewer: Prompt if necessary:

[Enter up to three verbatim responses in English]

(a) _____	Post Code			
(b) _____	Post code			
(c) _____	Post code			
Don't Know				99

17. In your opinion, where do the small arms that end up in your community originate from?" [Interviewer: Prompt if necessary]

(a) _____	Post Code			
(b) _____	Post code			

(c)	Post code			
18. In your opinion, what are the three factors fuelling trade in illegal small arms in your District? [Interviewer: Prompt if necessary]				
(a)	Post Code			
(b)	Post code			
(c)	Post code			

19. Who, in your opinion have made most effort to resolve small arms problem within the District? <i>[Do not read options. Code from responses. Record up to three answers]</i>			
	1 st answer	2 nd answer	3 rd answer
No-one	0		
The people involved in perpetrating the insecurity	1	1	1
Family/friends/neighbors	2	2	2
Traditional chiefs/elders/mediators	3	3	3
Traditional courts	4	4	4
Local courts	5	5	5
Local administration	6	6	6
A religious organization or leader	7	7	7
A non-governmental organization (including community-based)	8	8	8

A vigilante group	9	9	9
The armed forces/ police	10	10	10
Other government agencies	11	11	11
National courts	12	12	12
International mediators (UN)	13	13	13
Insecurity cannot be resolved	990		
No further reply		996	996
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	999		
Other (1 st response) <i>[Specify]:</i> _____	Post code		
Other (2 nd response) <i>[Specify]:</i> _____	Post code		
Other (3 rd response) <i>[Specify]:</i> _____	Post code		

20. There are many ways to deal with small arms problems in a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives? *[Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion]*

	Strongly Dis-approve	Dis-approve	Neither Approve Nor Disapprove	Approve	Strongly Approve	Don't know <i>[DNR]</i>
A. The government secures all the borders, so that no one brings in firearms from outside Samburu district..	1	2	3	4	5	9
B. All guns in civilian hands are collected and compensation paid to those who own them as an incentive.	1	2	3	4	5	9
C. Stiff penalty be meted on those caught with illegal arms.	1	2	3	4	5	9

D. Each community decides on the modality of disarming its people.	1	2	3	4	5	9
--	---	---	---	---	---	---

21. Currently how are members of your community dealing with small arms menace <i>[Interviewer: Prompt if necessary]</i>						
(a) _____	Post Code					
(b) _____	Post code					
(c) _____	Post code					
22. In your opinion what are some other ways in which the small arms menace could be tackled? <i>[Interviewer: Prompt if necessary]</i>						
(a) _____	Post Code					
(b) _____	Post code					
(c) _____	Post code					

23. What proportion of the District's small arms problems do you think the government can solve? <i>[Read out options]</i>	
All of them	4
Most of them	3
Some of them	2
Very few of them	1
None of them	0

Don't know *[Do not read]*

9

24. Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have acted to reduce proliferation of small arms in Samburu District over the past ten years, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? *[Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion]*

	Strongly Disapprove	Disapprove	Approve	Strongly Approve	Don't know/ Haven't heard enough [DNR]
A. President of Kenya	1	2	3	4	9
B. The NGOs/CBOs	1	2	3	4	9
C. The Provincial administration	1	2	3	4	9
D. Your Community leaders	1	2	3	4	9

25. How many of the following people do you think are involved in small arms trade, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? *[Read out options]*

	None	Some of them	Most of them	All of them	Don't know/ Haven't heard enough [DNR]
A. The members of the community	0	1	2	3	9
B. Leaders of the community	0	1	2	3	9
C. Government officials	0	1	2	3	9
D. Police	0	1	2	3	9
E. Other armed forces	0	1	2	3	9
F. Women	0	1	2	3	9
G. Local businessmen	0	1	2	3	9

H. Foreign businessmen	0	1	2	3	9
I. Children	0	1	2	3	9
J. Religious leaders	0	1	2	3	9
K. Leaders of NGOs or community organizations	0	1	2	3	9

26. Over the past year, how often (if ever) have you or anyone in your family: *[Read out options]*

	Never	Just once or twice	Several times	Many times	Always	Don't Know <i>[DNR]</i>
A. Feared armed robbery in your own home?	0	1	2	3	4	9
B. Had something stolen from your house?	0	1	2	3	4	9
C. Been physically attacked?	0	1	2	3	4	9
D. Heard of a rape case within your community	0	1	2	3	4	9
E. Witnessed a murder in your community	0	1	2	3	4	9
F. Had your cattle raided	0	1	2	3	4	9
G. Had your crops stolen						
H. Heard of a kidnapping of a member of you community	0	1	2	3	4	9
I. Had to carry a gun when traveling	0	1	2	3	4	9

27. What security threats do the following groups of people in you community face often, and who are the perpetrators?

Group	Security threat	Perpetrator	Weapon of choice
Women			
Children			

Men			
The elderly			

28. Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as members of communities to enhance their security. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. [If yes, read out options 2-4]. If not, would you do this if you had the chance? [For No, read out options 0 and 1]

	IF YES (use codes 2-4)			IF NO (use codes 0 and 1)		Don't know [DNR]
	Yes, often	Yes, several times	Yes, once or twice	No, but would do it if had the chance	No, would never do this	
A. Discussed arms problems with friends or neighbors	4	3	2	1	0	9
B. Attended a community security meeting	4	3	2	1	0	9
C. Got together with others to raise security issue	4	3	2	1	0	9
D. Attended a demonstration or protest march	4	3	2	1	0	9
E. Used a gun or other weapons for a security cause	4	3	2	1	0	9
F. Acquire firearm to improve security of your family	4	3	2	1	0	9

29. In your experience, how often do violent conflicts arise between people: [Read out options]

	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Always	Don't Know [DNR]
A. Within your own family?	0	1	2	3	4	9
B. Within the community where you live?	0	1	2	3	4	9
C. Between different ethnic groups in this region?	0	1	2	3	4	9

30. Over what sort of problems do violent conflicts most often arise between different groups in this region?
 [Enter up to three verbatim responses in English]

Within families	Post code			
Within communities	Post code			
Between different ethnic groups	Post code			

31. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B.

[Interviewer: Probe: Do you agree or agree very strongly? Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion]

If you were a victim of a violent crime, you would turn to the police for help.		B. If you were the victim of a violent crime you would find a way to take revenge yourself.		
Agree Very Strongly With A 1	Agree With A 2	Agree With B 3	Agree Very Strongly With B 4	
Agree With Neither [Do not read]				5
Don't know [Do not read]				9

Finally, let us record a few facts about you.

How old were you at your last birthday?

[Interviewer: Enter three-digit number. Don't Know = 999]

	No	Yes	D kr
32. Are you the head of the household?	0	1	

33. What is the highest level of education you have completed? *[Code from answer. Do not read options]*

No formal schooling	0
Informal schooling only (including Koranic schooling)	1
Some primary schooling	2
Primary school completed	3
Some secondary school / high school	4
Secondary school completed / high school	5
Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from a technical college	6
Some university	7
University completed	8
Post-graduate	9
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99

34. What is your main occupation? (If unemployed, retired or disabled, what was your last main occupation?) [Do not read options. Code from responses.]

Never Had A Job	0
Farmer (produces only for home consumption)	1
Farmer (produces both for own consumption and some surplus produce for sale)	2
Farmer (produces mainly for sale)	3
Farm worker	4
Fisherman	5
Trader / Hawker / Vendor	6
Businessperson	7
Professional Worker (e.g., lawyer, accountant, nurse, engineer, etc.)	8
Supervisor / Foreman	9
Clerical Worker	10
Miner	12
Domestic Worker / Maid / Char / House help	14
Teacher	15
Government Worker	16
Armed Services/ Police / Security Personnel	17
Student	18
Housewife / Works In the Household	19
Retail worker	22
Artisan/skilled manual worker in the formal sector	23
Artisan/skilled manual worker in the informal sector	24
Unskilled manual worker in the formal sector	25
Unskilled manual worker in the informal sector	26
Other [Specify]: _____	Post code
Don't know [DNR]	999

35. How much money do you (and your spouse together) earn per month? <i>[Do not read options. Code from responses.]</i>	
None	0
Less than KSH. 500	1
KSH. 501-1,000	2
KSH. 1,001-2,000	3
KSH. 2,001-4,000	4
KSH. 4,001-6,000	5
KSH. 6,001-8,000	6
KSH. 8,001-10,000	7
KSH. 10,001-20,000	8
KSH. 20,001-50,000	9
Over KSH. 50,000	10
Refused	98
Don't know	99

THANK YOU VERY MUCH. YOUR ANSWERS HAVE BEEN VERY HELPFUL.

END INTERVIEW

ANNEX II

RESPONDENTS' DEMOGRAPHYCS

3.1.1 Respondents' Demographics:

This phase of the research included a survey and interviews with key informants. The eligibility to participate in the survey was pegged at 18 years and above. The survey targeted 72 respondents. Of these 45 (62.5%) were from Samburu District, while 27 (37.5%) were interviewed in Laikipia District. 41 (56.9%) of the respondents were men, while 27 (37.5%) were women. 4 (5.6%) of the respondents did not indicate their gender. Among the key informants interviewed for the study were one District Commissioner, two District officers, two Officers Commanding Police Stations, a Catholic Priest, two NGO personalities, one chief and two community leaders. Table 0 below shows the demographics of the study sample.

	Demographics	District of interview		Total
		Samburu	Laikipia	
Age	20-25 years	8.9	0	5.6
	26-30	13.3	3.7	9.7
	31-35	20	14.8	18.1
	36-40	17.8	11.1	15.3
	41-45	11.1	11.1	11.1
	46-50	11.1	7.4	9.7
	51-55	4.4	3.7	4.2
	56+	4.4	3.7	4.2
	No response/DK	8.8	44.4	22.2
Education	No formal schooling	44.4	56.3	50
	Informal schooling only	6.7	0	4.2
	Some primary schooling	8.9	7.4	8.3
	Primary schooling completed	4.4	7.4	5.6
	Some secondary schooling	0	11.1	4.2
	Secondary schooling completed	11.1	0	6.9
	Post secondary qualification	13.3	14.8	13.9
	Some university	4.4	0	2.8
	University completer	2.2	0	1.4
Don't know	4.4	0	2.8	
Occupation	Never had a job	2.2	3.7	2.8
	Farmer	2.2	7.4	4.2
	Trader/worker/vendor	2.2	0	1.4
	Business man/woman	17.8	0	11.1
	Professional worker	2.2	14.8	7.0
	Domestic worker	0	7.4	2.8
	Teacher	11.1	3.7	8.3

	Government worker	8.9	0	5.6
	Armed service	2.2	0	1.4
	Student	2.2	3.7	2.8
	Housewife	26.7	14.8	22.2
	Retail worker	2.2	7.4	1.4
	Artisan	13.3	18.5	19.5
	No response	6.7	18.5	11.1
Monetary expenditure	None	0	11.1	4.2
	Less than 500	2.2	0	1.4
	500-1000	6.7	3.7	5.6
	1001-2000	11.1	40.7	22.2
	2001-4000	2.2	18.5	8.3
	6001-8000	8.9	0	5.6
	8001-10000	13.3	0	8.3
	10000-20000	15.6	3.7	11.1
	20000-50000	8.9	7.4	8.3
	Refused	15.6	7.4	12.5
Don't know	15.6	7.4	12.5	

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