

**THE ROLE OF RELIGION  
IN THE SOMALI DISPUTES**

**BY  
AHMED HIRSI FARAH**

**A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment for the Degree of Master of Arts  
in the University of Nairobi**

**Department of Religious Studies**

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## Declaration


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
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This thesis has been submitted for examination with our approval as university supervisors.



Dr. Douglas W. Waruta

Date 11-11-2001



Dr. Peter Mumo

Date 14-11-2001

## **Dedication**

To my mother

*Salado Adan Weheliye*

# Acknowledgement

I extend my thanks to my supervisors: Prof. D. W. Waruta and Dr. Peter Mumo, this work would not have been completed without their assistance. I also express my thanks to Dr. Qasim Hersi, Ahmed H. Adan and Abdullah A. Rashid who assisted me in the data collection and processing. I would also extend my deep thanks to all my friends who helped me in the accomplishment of this study.

Finally, I should express my thanks to the management of the Department of Religious Studies of the University of Nairobi, under those auspices the study was done.

# Abbreviations

A. N. C.	African National Congress
N. F. D.	Northern Frontier District
N. G. O.	Non Governmental Organization
N. S. S.	National Somali Security
P. B. U. H.	Peace be upon Him
S. N. A.	Somali National Alliance
S. N. F.	Somali National Front
S. N. M.	Somali National Movement
S. P. M.	Somali Patriotic Movement
S. R. C.	Supreme Revolutionary Council
S. S. D. F.	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
U. N.	United Nation
U. N. D. P.	United Nations Development Program
UNOSOM	United Nations Intervention Somalia
U. S. C.	United Somali Congress
U. S. P.	United Somali Patriotic
U. N. E. P.	United Nations Environmental Program

## Abstract

It is almost a decade since the demise of the Military leadership in Somalia, but the country is yet to get a functional government. The power vacuum left behind has had unprecedented disastrous effect on the civilian population. Somalia has been reduced to one of the world largest producers of displaced persons and the only modern society without government. Numerous efforts with the aim of re storing normalcy have been employed by various governments and inter-governmental bodies but in vain. The methodologies employed are as different as are the sponsors of the efforts.

The collapse of Somalia is more disturbing as it was a nation that had all the ingredients for successful state formation. Its cultural, religious and even consanguinal homogeneity is unique in the continent. Somalis have a rich pastoral culture with well-developed institutions for conflict prevention, transformation and management. However, the current acute conflict seems to be beyond the capacity of traditional institutions. The huge human and property toll of the conflict makes the traditional compensation practice in such cases impossible.

The conflict has been exacerbated by the misuse of religio-cultural institutions of the Somali by the political elite and thus making them non-effective in the resolution of the on-going conflict. Recent efforts to employ cultural institution of conflict resolution in isolation seem not to be bearing fruits. Similarly, the militant use of religion by the different Somali groups frustrates the potential use of the religious leaders who have also been repositories of the Somali traditional culture from using their "good offices" to resolve the conflict.

The study utilized both primary and secondary data. It heavily draws from the different Somali ethnographical works and collaborate them with field research that involved interviews of both “secular” and “religious” leaders and the common Somalis.

A popular conclusion of the Somali conflict is that it is beyond comprehension and intricately complicated. This study is an effort to shed light on the impact of religion in the conflict and thus a humble effort toward understanding the issue involved in the conflict. It more specifically analysis both the potential contribution in resolution and actual impact of religion in the perpetuation of the conflict.

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## 1.0. INTRODUCTION

### 1. 1. BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM

Somalia is geographically located on the Horn of Africa. It borders Kenya to the South, Ethiopia to the west, while Djibouti and the Gulf of Aden are on its north, and the Indian Ocean on its east. It has one of the longest coastal strips in Africa. It runs along the Indian Ocean for more than a thousand miles.<sup>1</sup>

The origin of the name “Somali” has been not conclusively established. There are two strands of arguments presented to explain its genesis. Some trace the word “Somali” to a legendary father of all Somali speaking people who was called *Samaale*. On the other hand there are those who trace the word to a combination of the Somali words “*Soo maal*” (which literally translates to “Milk the camel”). They argue that, as per the hospitality traditions of the Somalis, a visitor was normally welcome with fresh milk as such the most frequently used words or phrase upon the arrival of visitor(s) was “*soo maal*” hence the name Somali.

Similarly the exact origins of the Somali speaking people has not been scientifically established. However, despite the various historical accounts presented there is a general consensus that the Somalis are of Afro-Arabic extraction. In consonance with this view, the Somalis are said to have originated from the Quraysh lineage of Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). They trace their genealogy to a legendary Aqeel, a member of the

Quraysh tribe of Arabia and a descendant of the prophet (p.b.u.h). He is a great grandfather of Hiil, who was the father of Sab and Samaale.<sup>2</sup> Sab and Samaale are believed to be the forebears of present day Somali clans.

Given the geographical proximity of Somalia and the Arabian peninsula Somalis developed close social-cultural links with the Arabs. The settlement of the Arab traders along the Somali coastline in the antiquities led to the development the ancient coastal cities such as Zayla and Berbera in North Somalia, Mogdishu, Merka, and Barawe in the South.<sup>3</sup> This perhaps explains the deep Arabic influence of the Somali language and culture.

One major cultural similarity of the Arabs and the Somalis is patriarchal Organization of their kinship into blood paying or *dia* groups that is closely nit by complex social-cultural mores that defines the groups identity vis a vis others. This primordial collective mutual insurance instill deep sense of belongingness to the individual members of the group and determines social interactions of the Somali.

By blood paying or *dia* group we refer to that culture where in the case of homicide, members of the one who committed the murder is collectively held responsible and required to pay a predetermined compensation or blood money. For instance, if someone from tribe X kills someone from tribe Y ( who are then referred to as '*dhibane*' i.e. the "owner of the blood"), all members of tribe X are held responsible. And ideally all members of the aggrieved family take upon themselves to ensure justice is done either by

collecting the blood money or avenging the murder of one of their own by killing any member of tribe X. However, in order to avoid such feuds that can last generation, the Somalis generally opted for the payment of the *dia*. Such payment can be staggered and paid for a long time or written off through payment of other misdemeanors committed by members of the initially aggrieved tribe X against tribe Y. This is a complex mixture of Islamic *Shari'ah* and Somali traditions.

Islam was first introduced in Somalia at about A. D. 622, when Muslim refugees settled in what was called Habash in present day Ethiopia. Later Arab merchants and seamen who founded settlements along the Somali Coast spread the new religion through preaching and inter-marriages. The Somalis are overwhelming Muslims, Sunnis, and adhere to Shafite school of thought.

Despite the seeming homogeneity, the Somali have over the years acquired and nativized various brands of Islam. Most importantly Somalis acquired saint veneration (*tariqa*, enthusiastic belief in the mystical powers of charismatic roving holy men - *awliya*) and a tenuous measure of allegiance to Sufi brotherhoods (*Her or Tariqah*)<sup>4</sup>. These orders are in fact the main organized groups that provided the first resistance to colonial rule of their country.

The European colonialists<sup>5</sup> who occupied Somalia in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> Century employed indirectly rule and were initially very reluctant to fully administer the country as other colonies. They "entered into agreements" with different clan elders at different stages

whom they convinced that they were providing protection of their clans and lands from “imagined” enemies. Proper colonization did not start till 1884.<sup>5</sup> Due to diverse clan systems in Somalia the colonialists policy of “divide and rule” led to absolute political division of the land and the people.

Though Somalia never had a history of centralized administration, it comparatively suffered the most under the arbitrary partitioning of Africa by the colonial powers. Somalia’s colonial powers, the English, French and Italians and later the Ethiopian under Menelik, divided their pastoral country into five provinces amongst themselves. With the development of nationalism this subdivision of otherwise homogeneous people had serious impact on the new post-colonial neighbours. Somalis engaged in two disastrous secessionist wars with their neighbours – Kenya and Ethiopia – with the hope of re-establishing the “Greater Somalia”.

At independence two Somali colonies, the former British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland unified to form a unitary government under Aden Abdulle Osman (Adan Adde) in 1960. The new nation experienced a brief democracy that so a peaceful transition of power from Farah to Abdi-Rashid Ali Sharmarke. However, this was shortlived as President Sharmarke was elected by the people was assassinated in 1969 and Mohamed Siyad Bare an army General took over the government in a bloodless *coupe de tat* on 21<sup>st</sup> October 1969.

In the initial years President Siyad Bare tried to eliminate the influence clanism in the

public arena but later vigorously employed when faced with economic crises and other political problems. President Siyad aware of the importance of clan alliance, resorted to use the clan against the other in order to put down challenges to his leadership. This technique divided his enemies and entrenched clanism.<sup>6</sup>

Despite the predominance of Islam amongst the Somalis, Bare did not rule this Muslim country in accordance with Islamic *Shari'ah*. This partly explains the unpopularity of his regime. In opposition to his rule some sheikhs and *ulamas* (Muslim scholars), started campaigns aimed at discrediting the regime and calling for jihad. They preached religious messages in specially tailored sermons at different mosques, focusing on the need for Jihad<sup>7</sup> (an Arabic word that translates to striving in the way of God and not limited to the use of sword and the shedding of blood as is misunderstood by some people<sup>8</sup>.) against the government as it was equated to a heathen system and an obstacles to Islamic Daa'wah (advancement). This opposition was further developed after his adoption of Marxism, which is basically anti-ethical to religious expressions of any form.

The struggle against the oppressive regime later took a clan twist and in the process inter-clan hostility emerged. The first effective clan-based rebels movement started in 1988 in Northern Somalia. This marked the beginning of the proliferation of clan-based rebellion against the government of military dictatorship. The rebel groups letter on organized themselves into political movements based on clan, tribal and Islamic sentiments. The Majerten clan had the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), formed in 1978, Isaaq clan formed the Somali National Movement (SNM) while the Hawiye clan formed

United Somali Congress (USC).

With the collapse of Bare's regime in January 1991, Somalia disintegrated into fratricidal clan warfare. The clan based movement amoebically fussed into further smaller groups that engaged each other in bloody conflicts Since then. Somalia has never had a central government and is perhaps the worst manifestation of unprecedented total state collapse. In the chaotic environment, armed robbers and bandits moved all over the country, warlords battled for the control of the capital, Mogadishu, and the adjacent provinces and majority of the population was either decimated, displaced or killed by subsequent draught and disease outbreaks. The decade long conflict is yet to be resolved. All attempts to bring the warlords to agreement have not succeeded. The United Nations, Islamic and other friendly nations have tried to reconcile the conflicting parties but in vain.

## **1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM**

Somalis are predominantly muslim. Islam as a way of life has a developed methodologies of conflicts resolution and social control. Ideally they are supposed to follow and apply Islamic methodologies to resolve their conflict. Apart from this. Somalis also have a rich pastoral culture that can adequately be employed for the same purpose. The impact of these two, at time conflict systems, on their capacity to resolve their conflict has not been properly analysed.



This study focused on the role that the religion played and may continue to play, or is expected to play in the problems afflicting the Somali Muslims. The study also analyzes the role of religion in the Somali disputes. The role of religion in the on-going conflict has not been studied before. Therefore, this study will investigate the impact of religion both actual and potential in the quest to resolve the conflict.

The need to document the role of religion in the Somali conflicts vis a vis the conventional modern systems that have been employed so far in the efforts aimed at resolving the conflict and their applicability to the Somali situation need not be gain said.

### **1.3. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY**

The study investigates:

1. The role of religion in the Somali conflict both in terms of escalation and resolution
2. The role of the leaders in the disputes and their employment of religion.
3. The trend of groupings and group formation that came out within the Somali society after the collapse of the central government.

#### 1. 4. JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

The Somalia is perhaps the most homogeneous country south of the Sahara as her people share the same religion, culture and language. However, despite this, Somalis have been in constant conflict. Historically such conflicts were manageable and successfully resolved. This trend seems to have been broken in the on-going conflict, which seems to be defying all attempts aimed at resolution and reconciliation.

The Somali traditional pastoral lifestyle seems compatible with the modern civilization. The transformation of the nomadic pastoralist into sedentarized urban dwellers couple with the absence of adoption of social cultural mores relevant to their new status may perhaps shed light to the complexity of the on-going conflict. In less than 22 years of Bare's regime, Somalis rapidly urbanized and changed their traditional occupation of animal husbandry to other modern economic occupations. However, there has not been a parallel cultural revolution that will facilitate their re-invention into modern urban residents. The religious men and traditional elders have been at pain to reconcile the "modern" Somali with their traditional culture and Islamic values in an attempt to fill the new vacuum. This extends to the local initiatives aimed at resolving the on-going conflict and in the process may inadvertently contributing perpetuation of conflict.

## 1. 5. SCOPE

This study focuses on Somalis who are more than 99% Muslims. And investigates the conflict and the role of religious groups and orders, spiritual leaders, clan elders, and warlords. The study is confined to the religion of Islam and Somalia as defined by its geographical boundaries.

## 1. 6. LITERATURE REVIEW

Numerous works has been written on aspects of Somali society but little attention has been focused on the role of religion in Somali on-going dispute. Most important are the ethnological works, which shed light on complex Somali social organization. Literature on the role of religion is hardy available but scanty mentions are found in works that discuss the Somali conflict from other perspectives.

In Area Handbook Series Somalia A Country Study. 1991, Nelson. Harols D, provides a basic insight and understanding of the society under observation. He gives historical antecedents and on the cultural. political, and socioeconomic characteristics, which contribute to cohesion and cleavage within the society.

He expounds on the origins and traditions of the people who make up the society, their dominant beliefs and values, their community of interests, the issues on which they are

divided. the nature and extent of their involvement with the national institutions, their attitudes toward each other and toward the social system, and political order within which they live.

In his works Somaliland. Angus Hamilton, mentions the Somalia close social cultural link Somalis and Arab. In his account of the Mad Mullah, Hamilton argues that there was nothing to suggest in his movements that he was about to respond in so vigorous a fashion to the demands of his faith<sup>9</sup>. One can infer the presence of religious undertones in the brave resistant to colonial power by the Somalis and to look at it parallel to the exploits of the Mad Mullah as ably explained by Hamilton. Bali, Mohamed Saleh Somaliland. 1996/1997 on the hand shed light the conflict between clans.

A more personal account of Mohammed Abdullahi Hassan is given by Sheikh Abdi's, Divine Madness Mohammad Abdulle Hassan 1856-1920 Abdi. He provides detailed accounts of the battles between Mohammed Abdullahi Hassan with the British Colonial administration and an insightful description of the personality of the man and religious ideology<sup>10</sup>.

As pointed out by Sir, Richard Burton. First footsteps in East Africa. 1966, Somalia did not provide alluring resource to the Western colonial powers and its colonization was more or less as a result of rivalry of the colonialists. The main concern of the British colonialist was to safeguard the source of meat for her Sana and while the French wanted to have a cooling station for their vessels on their root to Asia.

Lewis, I. M., A pastoral Democracy a Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa 1961, doyen of Somali ethnography, ably outlines the history of Somali people, their culture, religion, and conflicts such as the wars of Imam Ahmed Garan with the Abyssinians in the fifteenth century. He points out their bravery and daring and dedication to the cause of Islam, and that their lineage is similar to the current one.<sup>11</sup>

In The Functions of Social Conflicts 1968 Lewis A. Coser, discusses the changes of social culture, focusing also on political organizations and groups. Most importantly Coser clarifies the concept of social conflict, and in so doing examines the use of the concept in empirical sociological research. He also discusses conflict and Group Boundaries, hostility and tensions in conflict relationships, Inter-group conflict and group structure, conflict with out-group structure and others on these conflict issues.

John Drysdale, The Somali Dispute 1964, highlights Somali political history according to its borders and divisions of the colonial powers from 1950s. He informs of the dynamics that led to the division of Somali into five different colonial administrations. He argues that the most crucial issue that affected the Somali most was the limitation of the movement of the nomadic pastoralists by the boundaries established by the colonial powers<sup>12</sup>.

Mohammed Farah Aidid & Dr. Satya Pal Ruhela, in The Prepared Future Development in Somalia, 1993, demonstrate the religious dimension of the on-going conflict. Hussein Aidid, a son of the warlord is quoted saying “my father died with me on his bedside. I swore, I would not let him down. That is a covenant I made with him”<sup>13</sup>. Most warlord are convinced that they are undertaking a religiously sanctioned campaign against what they perceive as wrong<sup>14</sup>.

Ayatullah Mahmud Taleqani, Ayatullahi Murtada Mutahhari & Dr. Ali Shari’ati in Jihad And Shahadat Struggle and Martvrdom in Islam, 1986, expound on the doctrine of Jihad from a shiite perspective. They give an insight to the concept and address some of the misconception associated with Jihad.

## 1. 7. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Somalis are fervent Muslims, they belong to the Sunni sect and follow exclusively the Shafi’ite school of Muslim Law.<sup>15</sup> Their attachment to Islam is firmly integrated in their lives; socially, politically and economically. Islam has a mechanism of solving problems. It has been used in other countries as a unifying factor. Allah says in the Qur’an:

“If two parties among the believers fall into a fight, make ye peace between them; but if one of them transgresses beyond bounds against the other, then fight ye (all) against the one that transgresses until it complies with the command of Allah; But if it

complies, then make peace between them with justice, and be fair; For Allah loves those who are fair (and just).<sup>16</sup>

Somalis believe in the mystical powers of religious ancient men (saints) who among others include Abdul-Qadir Jiilani, the founder of the Qadiriyyah, Ahmed bin Idris Al-Fasi (1760-1837) the great Moroccan mystic and teacher and founder of the Ahmadiya and Ahmed bin Idris', Sudanese student, Muhamed Salih,<sup>17</sup> the founder of Salihiya in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. They venerate some of the great Muslim Scholars' and periodically visit the graves of those were buried in Somalia such as Abdirahman Zayli's in the north, Sheikh Uways' in Biyole, Sheikh. Ali Maye's in Merka, and Sheikh Nur, near Jilib.

The Sufi orders formed after each saint have their own hierarchies. Most notable character of the order is their substitutive function. Members of the order cease belonging to their respective kin groups and alternatively attach themselves to the orders acquire a new genealogy attached to previous heads of the order from a chain of blessing (*silsilad al baraka*) whom they cherish as ancestors. However, this identity change is limited to the individual follower as his family remains attached to their genealogical clans for political and economic security.

In the Somali cultural organization, the *heer* (family lineage) forms the basis of political sanctions. A covenant of *heer* may be made by members of one lineage. The agreement incorporates families from the same clan along with allied groups from other clans. They are usually guided by Islamic legal arrangements but often have their own regulations of

determining such questions as how much compensation should be paid for homicide, wounding, or insult. The *heer* have their own council who meet (*shir* - meeting) from time to time in order to resolve conflicts. All male members of the clan can participate in the *shir*. *Shir* is the fundamental institution of the clanship (*tol*). These meetings have the authority to declare war or peace.

Somali religious teachers (*wadaad*) also play important role of offering leadership. People depend on them because of their religious devotion, knowledge, and leadership qualities. Some of them are active members of a religious sect, sufi order and practical groups. The emergent system is a sophisticated web of cultural and religious mores intertwine in a complex system. The influence of both culture and religion in Somalis' social, political and economic lives cannot be stressed more. The employment of either in the resolution of conflicts depends on the context and circumstances at hand but the precedence of cultural instruments over Islamic methodologies have been overwhelming.

Somali cultural practices differ to some extent from the true Islamic teachings, especially as regards ancient Somali rituals.<sup>18</sup> Unlike Islam, Somali politics is organized along kinship lines which are patriarchally organized and tracing descendant to a common male ancestor from whom they take their corporate name.<sup>19</sup>

Clan family in Somalia is a very important social organization in the community and has base in their political and economic organisation and structures. Clan family is the upper limits of social organization and more or less defines territorial location and resource



control. The clan family is headed by a clan-head (*Kaaba Qabiil*). On the other hand, the Sub clan nominates a male person who coordinates and builds relations between individuals, in a certain area within the clan environs. The primary lineage there is the political unity referred to as the *dia* or blood paying group and is headed by elders (*Akils*).

The covenant of *heer* that regulated the numerous Somali clan seem to have decayed leaving a regulatory vacuum. In the absence the cultural regulatory framework and given the lack of universally accepted and appropriate alternative system of social control the Somalis have slipped into a spiralling conflict that is continuing to decimate them. The only viable alternative regulatory system that can be adopted by the Somalis is Islam. The profound influence of Islam amongst Somalis and its similarity to their cultural more for social control makes it an alternative system that can be readily applied to resolve their conflict.

## 1. 8. HYPOTHESIS

1. Somalis interpret jihad as fighting for other interests rather than religion.
2. Clanism is the focal point of defence in the Somali Social organizations and supersedes the role of religion in cases of disputes.
3. Clan leaders are respected more than national leaders

## 1. 9. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Various methods for data collection were utilized in this research. They included library research that took over four months. The researcher used Nairobi University Library, Wor-torn Society Library, United Nations' Library in Nairobi. The library research provided useful information on Somali dispute. The research made referred to literature material of relevant subject such as Islamic, political and cultural books, journals, newsletters and magazines.

The study also collected primary data through field research. Twenty questionnaires were administered to twenty key respondents. Out of the twenty questionnaires five were not returned while three were spoiled. To supplement this, oral interviews were conducted with ten prominent politicians, fourteen religious and traditional leaders and thirty-two ordinary Somalis. The oral interviews were conducted with the assistance of pre-developed questions, which were used as a guide for the different interviewees according to their positions in the Somali community.

The researcher undertook three field observation of two areas in Somalia under different factions. He visited Kismayo, which was controlled by General Mahamoud Hirsi Morgan on 16/11/97, and Balidoogle, which is under the control of Hussain Mohamed Farah Aided. On 1<sup>st</sup> April and 1<sup>st</sup> May 1997. The reason of these visits was to observe the peace making and conflict resolutions based on Islamic methods which, were being conducted. The main advantages of observation were; the opportunity to the conflict

exactly as it was. Secondly, it enabled the research establish the factors mitigating against use of Islamic principles on conflict resolution despite its potential benefit.

## **1. 10. LIMITATIONS**

The study area – Somalia, is still in turmoil and thus the researcher could not possibly travel deep into Somalia to observe and carry out field research as would have ideally been desired.

The subject of the research is very sensitive to most of the identified respondents.

The researcher lacks the requisite linguistic competence in English given his Arabic background.

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## END NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Saadia Touval, Somali Nationalism International politics and the Drive for unity in the Horn of Africa. Massachusetts, Harvard University Press Cambridge, 1963, p. 5.

<sup>2</sup> I. M. Lewis, A pastoral Democracy a study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa. London, International African Institute by Oxford University Press 1961, p. 12.

<sup>3</sup> David D. Latin and Said S. Samatar, Somalia Nation in Search of a State. Westview Press, United States of America, 1987. P. 8.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 45.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. p. 49.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. p. 91.

<sup>7</sup> Jihad is an Arabic word meaning a struggle or striving.

<sup>8</sup> . Doi Abdul Rahman I., Shari'h the Islamic law. Jeddah, Abul Qasim Bookstore, Saudi Arabia, 1984, p.437.

<sup>9</sup> . Angus Hamilton, Somaliland. West Port Conn, Negro University Press, United States of America 1970.p.49.

<sup>10</sup> . Sheikh Abdi's, Divine Madness Mohammad Abdulle Hassan. 1856-1920 Abdi. p.8.

<sup>11</sup> I. M. Lewis, op. cit. p. 16.

<sup>12</sup> . Jhon Drysdale. The Somali Dispute. London and Dunmow, Pall Mall Press. 1964 , P.7.

<sup>13</sup> The Sunday Nation, Daily News paper from Nairobi – Kenya, No. 1182, April 19, 1998.

<sup>14</sup> Mohamad Farah Aidid & Dr. Satya Pal Ruhela, The Perfect Future Development in Somalia. New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House PVT LTD, 576 Masjid Road, Jangpura. 110014, page ii.

<sup>15</sup> . I. M. Lewis, op. cit. p. 26.

<sup>16</sup> . Qur'an. Chapter 49:9.

<sup>17</sup> . David D. Latin and Said S. Samatar. op. cit. p. 45

<sup>18</sup> . Harold D. Nelson.. United States Government Somalia. A Country Study. Washington D.C., American University 1982. P.106.

<sup>19</sup> . I. M. Lewis, op. cit. p.17.

# Chapter Two

## 2.0. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO SOMALI CONFLICT

### 2.1. Introduction to Conflict

The term “conflict” defies a scientific definition. Different author defines “conflict” differently. This difference may sometimes be just semantic while at other times stressing a particular perception or the type of conflict under discussion. Makumi Mwangiro’s definition provides four different definitions based on the nature of the conflict, he states:

1. Conflict is when people fight each other
2. Conflict is war
3. Conflict is disagreement between people
4. Conflict is having different points of view<sup>1</sup>.

Conflict in personality theories, is usually considered as a state of discomfort or stress caused by an individual’s experiencing two or more desires or needs that are incompatible<sup>2</sup> or as an arousal of two or more strong motives that cannot be solved together<sup>3,4</sup>. On the other hand the new Caxton encyclopaedia defines conflict, as disaccord between incompatible motives deriving from needs, desires or tendencies<sup>5</sup>.

Conflicts are divided into two types: 1. Violent conflict and 2. Non-violent conflict.

1. Violent conflict: is a physical one and people can understand it or see it, because it leads to injuries, death, loss, and the destruction of property. It has a negative aspect

Not all conflicts are harmful. but there are some beneficial which are dynamic, healthy and promote social, national and global progress. Such beneficial conflict encourages us to promote the social, intellectual, cultural and material progress to be made. Such progress is guided by the common sense (customs, traditions and rules) which leads to resolve disagreements by peaceful means<sup>8</sup>.

Generally speaking, conflict is a concept that covers wide set of phenomenon and with different manifestations. Its complex nature explains the difference in its definition and related methodologies of resolution. The methodologies of conflict resolution are basically contextual depending on the prevailing conditions of the environment of the conflict. This characteristic of conflict makes a set of methodologies that are successful for resolution of specific conflict, inapplicable in other situations. As it is widely acknowledged by leading conflict experts, western concepts of conflict management and resolution cannot be successfully applied to African realities<sup>9</sup>.

In some societies war and peace are not mutually exclusive. In warrior cultures, war need not be shameful, nor peace necessarily good. In the west, conflict is incompatible with civil society, while violence in the form of war is legitimate<sup>10</sup>. The difference in perception impacts heavily on the development of resolution mechanism. It is generally accepted in contemporary debates on conflict that it is appropriate to understand the context of individual conflicts and the perception of its parties to make any meaningful contribution<sup>11</sup>.

Conflict exists where people have incompatible goals. Every person or group of people may have different goals despite their relationship. In the case of incompatible goals and where they do not accept each other's point of view, then a situation of disagreement is created. This situation of disagreement will lead the parties to a conflict. This conflict can either be a violent or non-violent one<sup>12</sup>.

Where there is a conflict we realize that things are going wrong in our relationship. Therefore, in order to manage such conflict we have to search what is wrong in our relationships, and improve them mutually. At the same time build a better foundation for our relationships. This kind of relationships can run between two person's status.

Conflict may occur with several objectives and when it is difficult to specify, the internal conflict may become protracted. Thus, internal conflicts come through some common issues mainly: ideological conflict, governance and authority conflict, racial conflict, environmental conflict, identical conflict, etc. Ideological conflict, which is our focus in this context, occurs between the state and insurgent movements. Social inequality between classes is a dominant theme. Ideologically it may become identification or racial according to that particular environment.

In reality, a neutral objective approach to conflict assumes a certain neutral objective view of the world. Clearly this has little relevance in, for example, a Muslim society<sup>13</sup>. The legitimacy and authority of the mediator is not based on their distance from the fray, but their insider knowledge. Furthermore, while western approaches to conflict resolution

have tended to focus on the thoughts and impulses of individuals, other cultures recognize conflict as a group issue. In order to make political judgements in cultural situations the sociological aspects of conflict need to be better understood. In the case of Somalia, the initial international response was based on ignorance to the nature of the Somali conflict; their characterization of the conflict as a petty clannish warfare may have contributed to the disastrous failure of the effort aimed at ending the fratricidal mayhem.

At the national level, the issue of who should define national security and what constitutes a threat to a country's national security is crucial since it also determines when, where and why the armed forces are employed to safeguard a nations security. In Somalia, when the current civil war was in its early stages, the wrong perception of the government contributed to its own defeat and eventual collapse. Threat was perceived to be coming from the Northern part of the country where all military garrison were stationed leaving behind the south, with thin defence against any uprising.

Ideology also has impacts on conflict resolution process. It not only influences the perception of the nature of the conflict but also its resolution. And in case where the parties to the conflict adhere to different ideological beliefs. the conflict becomes more complicated as the difference in perception and plausible resolution mechanisms proposed by the two may be antithetical. In case of Somalia, her conflict has been perpetuated by the adoption of two antithetical ideologies by the parties involved. In the early 1970s, Bare's regime vigorously adopted Marxism ideology and forcefully



propagated its adoption specifically amongst the arm forces. On the other hand, the larger population emotionally remained Muslims despite the overt and at time forceful propagation of Marxism. Despite the irrelevance of the Marxist ideology to the general problems of the Somalis, its adoption specifically by the military elite who later came to control the factional movements and its non-adoption by the larger masses, may explain the intricacies of the on-going conflict. While the factional leaders (popularly referred to as Warlords) insist on non-Islamic resolution mechanisms, the larger population are convinced the conflict can be ably resolved with existing Islamic instruments.

Armed conflicts are deeply traumatic experience for individuals, communities, and institutions operating in war situations. Causes of armed conflicts are multiple and interconnected. They range from the choice of individuals and groups of actors, to structural inequalities and institutionalized injustice. They include unresolved historic issues of identity and sovereignty, issues of governance and democracy, issues of poverty, uneven development, and environmental change. Types of conflicts are about struggles over power and rights to ways of life. They concern issues of material, physical, social, and psychological well-being, as well as justice, environment, and participation: all of which are parts of the eloquence of long-term development. Clearly, not all armed conflicts need be postponed or generate complex emergencies. Conflicts might become complex and protracted when the causes and solutions are difficult to notice.

Perpetuation of contemporary armed conflicts are chiefly local but always linked to the transformations in international political, economical, and military structures brought

about by the ending of the cold war. Thus effective resolution of armed conflicts require a multi-faceted approach that put into consideration the entire gamut of issues involved that including political, economical, religious and social factors both locally and internationally.

Conflict is inevitable to our every day lives. All societies are caught up in a complex web and diversity of conflict. because wherever there are people there will always be conflict. Although, these conflicts are different according to its nature, type, character, period etc. Thus it is more important to understand what conflict is all about and later think about how to manage it creatively and effectively. Ordinarily, internal conflicts, like that of Somalia. occur upon in difference of governance, power. ideology and social inequality.

## **2.2. Conceptual Understanding of the Sources of Somali Inter-Clan Conflicts**

Understanding the dynamics of Somali civil war needs a comprehensive analysis of the sources of Somali inter-klan conflicts. While the Somali society seems to be homogeneous as far as the conventional definitions of ethnicity is concerned, there are a number of factors emanating from their clan culture and socio-religious settings, that suggests otherwise. This is reflected in their inter-klan relationship characterized by deep-rooted conflict akin to other African inter-ethnic conflicts. These factors among others, include:

1. The prevalence of deep-rooted fear of suppression and elimination among the various Somali clans, which resulted widespread feud and suspicion. As Sefulazuz Milas

suggests “there are also deep-seated ethnic distinctions between clans and intra-clan rivalries which underlie and fuel Somalia’s armed conflicts<sup>14</sup>”.

2. The structural weakness reflected by the nature of Somali segmentary system as is reflected in:

- A. Somali traditional authority’s structural instability arising from the fluidity of the segmentary system<sup>15</sup>
- B. The un-centralized nature of the segmentary system which poses variance to the society’s homogeneous nature in becoming one nation state. be it centralized or decentralized.
- C. In accordance with the centripetal and centrifugal tendencies of the segmentary system as an indicator for genealogical levels of cooperation, forces of dissemination have apparently overcome the ones of assignments in the recent years of civil war resulting to the Somali communities to become more loyal to clan ties than nationalism ties. This is proved by the historical dominance of clanism in the socio-religious and political affairs of the Somali society at the expense of nationalism. Prof. M. H. Mukhtar reflecting on this argues that “ the genealogical levels of cooperation is very high in the lower units of the segmentary system<sup>16</sup> ”.

Somali cultural inclination, to some extent, promotes violence. It celebrates revenge and reprisal aspects, which entrenches violence. Due to the limited natural resources in their harsh pastoral environment. Somali folklore praises and admires people who are known

for their notorious killing and looting actions and it dismisses and scorns peace advocates as being weak and worthless

Both the colonialist and subsequent Somali regimes failed to appreciate the importance of clan and ostensibly tried in vain to eliminate it from public life. However it is instructive to note that their interactions with clan was basically aimed at promoting their respective political interests and in the process promoted the negative aspects of clan politics. The misuse of clans for political reasons exacerbated the traditional suspicions and deep-rooted fears between the clans making their conflicts more acute and complex.

Despite attempts of adoption of different ideological beliefs, the Somali clan identity has continued to exert more influence. Bare's regime initially tried to stem out clan as a factor and later fervently used it to perpetuate his hold on power. The proliferation of clan-based factional groups in 1980s against Bare's regime and later against each other aptly demonstrates the spiraled suspicion and conflict between clans that was institutionalized by his regime. Most of the emergent factional groups overtly advance the interest of their respective clan to the detriment of national aspiration. The cultural hold of clan on an individual is not limited to those in the country but extends even to those in the Diaspora. As Bryden and Steiner say have organized themselves in clan-based groups whose views are as polarized (sometimes even more) as within Somalia. Even amongst those in the refugee camps in the neighboring countries "patterns of clan identification and ethnic discrimination have tended to persist, despite people's common experience as refugees"<sup>17</sup>

As mentioned earlier, the Somalis have cultural institutions of conflict resolution, which have served them quite efficiently in their historical development. However, the effectiveness of the said cultural institutions has to be analyzed in the context of the types, duration and scale of the traditional conflicts. It can safely be argued that traditional Somali conflicts, which were patterned and similar to other pastoral conflicts, were limited both in terms of scale, losses, and duration of the conflicts. The current conflict defies these patterns and as such limits the use of traditional methodologies of conflict resolution. As Bryden and Steiner say “the scope and dynamics of the current civil war have overwhelmed traditional methods of conflict management and resolution”<sup>18</sup>.

Somalis who are pastoral-nomadic have never lived in fixed geographical boundaries. They have been roaming their arid terrain despite the existence of fluid clan localities. The “...history of pre-colonial migration and conquest explains the scattered, non-contagious nature of clan settlement through the country” adding that “though most clans have a home region” where they are concentrated, Somali clans are found in pockets throughout the country often in very confusing and complex pattern”. These overlaps in settlement were regulated by complex cultural institutions most importantly the provision that allowed a small clan to ‘peg’ its clan identity to that of the big clan they share pasture with. This is referred to as “*Shegato*” in Somali and at time led to the complete assimilation of the small clan.

The pastoral land of the Somalis can be characterized zero-sum natural resources terrain. Such geological limitation predisposes its inhabitants to competition for the scarce pastoral resources (water and pasture) and hence conflicts. The complex cultural institutions at time could not efficiently control the nomads' demand for the resource but generally managed to limit conflicts to minimal scales. All these factors make us term the Somali conflict as a deep-rooted and similar to other inter-ethnic African cultures despite the popular perception of clan conflict.

According to Dr. Amoo, deep-rooted conflicts are defined as not merely involving negotiable group interests but rather involve deep value-laden motivations and needs that cannot be compromised. They are not disputes that can be settled by driving solutions from common legal, political or cultural norms". Parties of such conflicts do not participate in or have access to a legitimized system of norms and institutions. These can be conflicts which can be resolved only through identification and elimination of systemize causes". He adds that sources of conflicts in Africa are located in basic human needs for group (ethnic) identity, security, recognition, participation and autonomy as well as in the circumstances, policies and institutions of political and economic systems that attempt to deny or suppress such basic needs. Furthermore, having clanism proved to be a cultural factor, it apparently becomes a primordial but the fact that it can be promoted structurally and institutionally, then it becomes instrumental in nature.

Despite their seeming homogeneity, the Somalis have always been excessively independent, a characteristics that is reflected in their respective ethnic groups (clans).

Clans' relations have always been characterized by both overt and latent (covert) conflicts. And from the foregoing it suitably fits under the (Burton's) *Human Need Theory*.

Different forms and approaches are used in conflicts management and resolution for different social groups, such as women and men, boys and girls, pastoralists and sedentary farmers. In order to identify the necessary forms of intervention that can mitigate suffering or bring a resolution to conflicts we need to move beyond the immediate symptoms of conflicts to understand their causes, and also their impact upon societies. In understanding the causes and impact of current armed conflicts this study draws on three analytical approaches, considered in the following three sections:

The first provides a political analysis of conflict, which explains armed conflicts as the result of structural factors at local level. Current wars are explained as arising from the process of state development and the outcome of development policies. Central to this line of analysis is the relationship between the state and civil society. Current levels of armed conflict and the protracted nature of these conflicts are explained as a result of a systematic crisis, manifest in global political, economic, and social transformations taking place since the 1980s<sup>19</sup>. This analytical approach is concerned with political and economic processes of change, and the relationship between core and encircling areas and groups.

The second analytical approach examines the impact of conflict on society, and we use, as an example, the gender analysis of conflict. This takes a more actor oriented approach, and suggests that conflict needs to be understood in terms of its differential impact on women and men, across social groups, in terms of their socio-political and economical status. The gender analysis of conflict can serve as basis for the analysis of the impact of conflict on different groups within society. Gender analysis also helps us to understand how conflict can arise from culturally determined structures of power within families and communities, and illustrates the need to consider conflict at all levels of society, from the micro to the macro, from the personal to the public.

The third approach is concerned with analyzing the process of change itself, and in particular with the velocity and turbulent nature of change and development<sup>20</sup>. This line of analysis is concerned with the implications for operational programs in a context of instability.

By identifying the conflict we shall understand the type of conflict it is. Every conflict has its own personality that distinguishes it from other conflicts. Hence to successfully manage or even resolve the conflict a proper analysis to identify its nature (type) is of paramount importance. Additionally its also more beneficial to have the capacity to identify and intervene in a conflict at its early stages as such approach prevents the complication of the conflict and hence its resolution.



One requires all the three approaches to adequately analyze the Somali conflict given its complex nature. With reference to the structural approach, the escalation of Somali conflict coincided with adoption of the Marxist ideology during the cold war, which was basically antithetical to the Islamic values of the Somalis. The slow inapplicability of the ideology to the Somali context was evidenced with the spirited resistance of the citizenry led by their religious leaders. This resistance continued despite the heavy reprisals of the government and is in fact proved to be the watershed of the armed resistance to the regime. The disastrous Somalia-Ethiopian war of the 1978 spent the power of the regime and exposed it to the wrath of the disgruntled army officers who were bitter with the decision to surrender. This was further exacerbated by the later collapse of the communist bloc, which left the regime with no strategic partners, and assertive civic population demanding more say in their governance.

Disgruntled members of the arm forces and politicians also played a role in the escalation and perpetuation of the conflict. Most faction leaders had served in the former regimes and were at one time or the other fallen from favour. These individuals who are mostly men have developed lucrative economy within the on-going conflict and in fact identified as an impediment to the resolution of the conflict. The groups that have suffered most in the Somali conflict are basically the members of the riverine Somalis, women and children. Using the third approach one can also argue that the sudden speed with which the communist bloc disintegrated may have found the Bare regime unprepared to face more militant civilian population without the help of a strategic ally.

### 2.3. The Concept of Islam

The word Islam means "submission to the Will of Allah (God)," thus a Muslim is any one who submits him/herself to Allah's ordainment. The term Islam is an Arabic word derived from the root word *salam* means peace, or to be an integral whole. Islam as applied means to surrender to God's Will. Islam was found in 628 AD by Muhammad Abdillahi in the Arabian Peninsula. Islam's basic tenet is stated in its creed: "there is no god but (Allah) and Muhammad is his prophet." All Muslims adhere to five fundamental Beliefs, which include recitation of the creed, daily prayers performed according to prescribed rules, fasting during the lunar month of Ramadan (when Muhammad received his initial revelations), almsgiving, and the pilgrimage to Mecca.

Islam is a complete way of life. It contains instructions that govern the behavior of its adherents. It has its own political and economic ideology. The basic teaching of Islam is embodied in the Koran, which is believed to have revealed to Muhammad (p.b.u.h) by Allah through the Archangel Gabriel. The Koran is supplemented by *Hadith* or *Sunnah*, which are basically detailed accounts of the sayings and life of the prophets. *Sunnah* literally means "a well trodden path", but it was used before Islam in reference to usage or laws of a tribe and certain norms of inter tribal conduct accepted by various tribes as binding<sup>21</sup>. The reformative spirit of Islam is embodied in the provision, which allows its scholars to issue rulings (*Fatwa*) on matters that are not clearly provided in the two principal source of Islamic *Shariah*.

Unlike other world religions, Islam overtly asserts its role in public life. Islam's political system is based on the structure of the early caliphate where respected scholars and/or leaders through consensus select the Caliph or Imam. The Caliph is the Head of the entire Muslim population (*Ummah*). The ideal Islamic state is based on divinely ordained social welfare system, which caters for the basic needs of its citizenry. The state operates a social fund termed *Baitu ul Maal* from which the needy are catered for. All Muslims are suppose to contribute 2.5% of their annual earnings to either the fund if it exists or to directly assist the needy amongst them.

As said earlier Islam is a complete way of life and hence contains instructions that expressly govern conflicts. It is prohibited in Islam for Muslim to fight another Muslim. The Holy Koran provided stiff punishment for homicide criminals and instructs other Muslim to intervene whenever such conflicts occur. Therefore, the basic tenets of Islam are to cover all parts of human conduct and lifestyle collectively. Islam provides for conditions and issues on which war (holly war – *jihad*) can be waged. It also has rules that govern the conduct of the jihad and provides for the reconciliation process.

#### **2.4. Islam in Somalia**

Islam was probably brought to Somalia by early followers of Prophet Muhammad. The adoption of Islam by a growing number of the Qureishies made the proud tribe of Qureish apprehensive of the new religion, which was reforming most of the tribal laws. This developed into open hatred and some of the leading personalities started a campaign of terror against the converts of the new religion. In order to avoid persecution, some of

the prophet's disciples fled from Mecca to Eastern Africa particularly "Abyssinia" (Ethiopia) where they may have dispersed to Somalia, Djibouti, and Eritrea. Islam later came to Somalia through contacts with Persian and Arab merchants and seamen who settled along the Somali coast 1,000 or more years ago. The split of the Muslim Ummah caused by the controversy on the succession of the leadership of the community that led to the formation of the Sunni and Shi'a had minimal impact on the spread of Islam in Somalia.

The adoption and spread of Islam by Somalis underwent very interesting social engineering process. The new religion was intricately "nativized" to not only compliment existing cultural practices but also provide some of the Somali traditions a divine source. This had two contradictory implications to the religion. At one point the Somalis could easily identify with the new religion as a reformed version of their culture and thus adopt it without much difficulty. On the other hand, the same frustrated the adoption of the orthodox religion. However, the spread and adoption of the Islamic religion the Somali was relatively faster than other parts of the continent. Today Islam is the only religion practiced by almost the entire Somali population.

Up to the civil war, religious training was readily available in urban centers where there were special Koran schools commonly known as "madarasa" or wherever mosques existed. The significance of teaching Koran to the Somalis is aptly demonstrated by the belief that such training cleanses the mouth of the child from satanic words and ideas. The training was mostly provided to boys who were trained to memorize parts of the

entire Koran. The traditional Koran teachers traveled on foot from place to place, depending on the generosity of others for their living. They also served the community by preaching, leading prayers, blessing the people and their livestock, counseling, arbitrating disputes, and performing marriages. Few teachers were deeply versed in Islam, and they rarely stayed at the same locality long enough to teach more than rudimentary religious principles. The traditional teachers (*wadaad*) include a form of folk astronomy based on stellar movements related to seasonal changes. Though this they influence nomadic migration, determined ritual calendars and at time employed them in ritual healing, averting misfortune and seeking divine interventions.

This partly explains the modification of Islam in Somalia. For instance the practice of the wandering teachers to bless (*baraka*) nomadic communities has had a profound social significance that persists to date. A spiritual leader is believed to have powers to bless and curse. When a clan leader visits the leader of another clan, the host's relative receives him first to draw off some of the visitor's power so that his own chief may not be injured. The realization of the significance of these powers in social control has led to its adoption by clan elders who use it as an instrument of monopolizing power and keeping the younger age sets at bay.

Islam is a strict monotheist religion, it prohibits its believers from associating the worship of God (Allah) with other deities. It also disapproves intercession of priests or saints. However, despite these clear commandments, the early Somalis developed a practice of depending on the few learned individuals from their community for intercessionary

religious functions. These persons later acquired sainthood status and led to the relative fast adoption of religious orders developed elsewhere.

Despite Islam's uncompromising monotheism, Muslims everywhere believe in the existence of mortal spirits (jinn), said to be descended from *iblis*, the fallen angel. Most Somalis consider all spirits to be evil but some believe there are benevolent spirits. Certain kinds of illness, including tuberculosis and pneumonia, are believed to result from spirit possession, namely, the *wadaado* (the religious elder world of the spirit). These conditions are treated by a human *wadaad*, preferably one who has recovered from the sickness. He reads portions of the Koran over the patient and bathes him with special perfumes, which in Somalia is associated with religious celebrations.

In the case of possession by the *zar* (a spirit), the patients are treated through the conduct of special ritual ceremony of exorcism. The victims of such spirits are mostly women with grievances against their husbands. The symptoms are extreme forms of hysteria and fainting fits. A woman who has had the affliction and thus has supposedly acquired authority over the spirit in the process of her healing conducts the exorcism ritual. The ritual consists of a special dance in which the victim tends to reproduce the symptoms and fall into a trance. The "illness" enables a disgruntled wife to express her hostility without actually quarrelling with her husband.

A third kind of spirit possession is known as "gelid" (entering), in which spirits of an injured or aggrieved person troubles the offender. For example, a young girl cannot

openly complain if a promise of marriage arranged has been broken a suitor. Her spirit, however, enters the young man who broke the promise and makes ill. The exorcism consists of readings from the Koran and commands from a *wadaad* that the spirit leaves the afflicted person. *Gelid* is also thought to be caused by the curse or evil power of a helpless person who has been injured. The underlying notion is that those who are physically or materially weak are mystically endowed. Such persons are supposed to be under the special protection of God, and kind acts towards them bring religious merit, whereas unkind acts bring punishment. Thus, members of the *Yibir*, the numerically smallest and weakest of the special occupation Somali groups and traditionally the lowliest, are the most feared for their supernatural powers.

The Islam does not differentiate between what is secular and religious. Islam has a wholesome perspective on all matters and provides instruction for them. However, among Somalis this perspective has been readily acquired by residence of the northern regions than those of Southern parts who have developed a dual perspective that differentiates matters as either secular or religious. Among nomads, this dual perception is expressed on the basis of age groups (warriors (*waranle*) verses religious elders (*wadaad*)).

Somalis also engage in rituals that derive from pre-Islamic practices and in some cases resemble those of other eastern cushitic-speaking peoples. Perhaps the most important of these rituals are the annual celebrations of the clan ancestor among northern Somalis –a remainder of their common ancestry- and the collective rainmaking ritual (*roobdoon*) performed by sedentary groups mostly in the south.

Generally most Somalis, both agro-pastoralist and nomads adopted all Islamic rituals for purification, such as washing after contact with unclean things. However, the degree of conformation to Islamic rules and rituals differed from community to community. Some, particularly those communities with religious orders, are more likely to observe Islamic rules than nomads. By the 1960s, ordinary urban Somalis paid less attention to religious observance. This may partly be explained by colonialism, later adoption of Marxism and low awareness of the religion amongst most urban dwellers. Somalis simultaneously performed Hajj (pilgrim to Mecca and in the process acquire the valued title of Al-Hajj bestowed on persons who have undertaken the pilgrimage, for its social prestige) and visited the tombs of the local saints despite the express rule against saint veneration.

The role of religious functionaries began to shrink in the 1950s and 1960s as some of their legal and educational roles and responsibilities were transferred to secular authorities. This trend drastically accelerated after the 1969 Military coup revolution, which vigorously adopted scientific socialism. In order to reduce opposition to the new ideology, the regime presented the Marxist ideology as an advanced form of Islamic social welfare system. This did not however, deter resistance from Islamist forces who were informed of the philosophical difference of the two ideologies. Bare's regime ruthlessly suppressed any dissent to its socialist policies. At the height of his rule, Islamic clerics were either assassinated or exiled. Such ruthless approach had the effect of causing the recoil of religious leaders from public life and instead concentrated on simple domestic issues while others seem to have accommodated themselves with the government, despite their convictions against them<sup>22</sup>.



## 2. 5. Conflict within Islamic Sub-groups and Somali Cultural

Despite the adoption of Islam by the Somali centuries ago, their traditional culture has resiliently survived. As both a system of life they are bound to have both differences and similarities. Here we will be interested with the difference and the impact of such in the effectiveness of two in the on-going conflict. It should be noted that the concurrence existence of conflicting value system in a society is source of perpetual conflict by itself. This is further exacerbated the adoption of contradicting or differing versions (as evidenced by the ritual differences of the different religious orders adopted by Somalis) of the same value system. For instance, people living in north and central parts of Somalia reject veneration of saint and visitation of their graves but the practice is rampant amongst the southerners. This controversy goes back to the prolonged disputes between Qadiriyaah and Salihivah.

The most important departure of the two value systems is in their views on expressive art. While Islam prohibits performing art (more specifically drama) Somali rich oral culture seems to have defied this and continued to play central role in communication. The centrality of oral culture amongst the Somali is widely acknowledged and even facilitated the quick spread and adoption of Islam in Somalia. However, its dramatized forms conflict with the strict Islamic values<sup>23</sup>. Such contradictions have severally been source of conflict between traditionalist and Islamist forces within the country. One example is the

dance performing during *mviko* and spirit-possession rituals which are viewed as repugnant and as improper behavior by Islamists.

Another interesting aspect of such religious difference is their transformation or adoption to traditional clan difference. For instance concepts of "orthodoxy" are based on the practices of a given area and used by its adherent as litmus for other practices from elsewhere. A good example is the perception of nomadic Somalis of the litanies (*qasiido*) composed and regularly performed by the agro-pastoralists in the Southern in Somali language as "un-Islamic". Such regional differences are further entrenched by claims of orthodoxy by each group and at times used to foster existing clan disputes.

Thus characterizing some people as non-orthodox became a pretext for rejecting aspects of their behavior, which appear in any way unacceptable. However, the local categories of "orthodoxy" in religious identities do not neatly coincide with ethnic or lineage differences, nor with brotherhood affiliation. The Majeerteen (a clan found predominantly in the Northeast) for example, who have been living in Kismayu and the surrounding areas do not show the same dismissive attitude towards the communities of the saints and their massive pilgrimages as their clan brethren in the north. Nor do they reject spirit-possession rituals so resolutely; rather, they see spirit-possession dances as spectacles one can enjoy watching.

## 2.6. Early Religious Conflict in Somalia

Around 18th century, probably in the horn of Africa, a religious African nationalists movement emerged known as “Ethiopianism”. This movement’s primary objective was to nativize Christianity to suit the needs of the Ethiopians. The strong nationalistic fervor of this Movement was expressed in the desires of its protagonist to establish Ethiopian control of the entire Horn of Africa<sup>24</sup>. The concept of quasi-spiritual nationalistic movement springing from the loins of organized African Christianity is not an Ethiopian phenomenon or limited to Christianity. About the same time, as the religio-nationalistic concept of Ethiopianism emerged, a momentous event of religio-political movements based on Islam took place and which profoundly affected the lives of many of African<sup>25</sup>.

The dispute between Ethiopia (particularly the Amhara tribe) and Somalis preceded the introduction of Islam in horn of Africa, but their difference were further deepened by the adoption of Islam by the Somalis. The missionary nature of the two religions aggravated the conflict between the two neighbours further as each sought to win convert from the other. The nationalist aspect of the Ethiopianism is also to be blamed for the age old conflicts of the two neighbouring communities. The Imperial ambitions of subsequent Ethiopian emperors ended with the colonization of parts of Somali lands in the height of colonialism. The experience of the Somalis under the Ethiopian rule has left a deep historical hatred between the two communities, which at time has taken religious twists.

The most celebrated resistance movement to colonial rule amongst the Somalis is the wars between Mohamed Said Abdula Hassan and the British colonial administration in the early 1900s. This politico-religious movement urged the Somalis to return to orthodox Islam traditions and reject westernization, which he equated with heathenish culture. The sufi brotherhoods were at the forefront of this movement. His success is said to have been as a result of successful use of religion to mobilize the nomads against the colonial administrations. A very good example was the belief he instilled in the nomads that if killing a foreigner earned a Muslim nomad an automatic ticket to heaven.

During the colony, Italian court adjudicated some provisions of the Shariah related to marriage, divorce, family disputes, and wills. The Italian option of this point was nothing, but to attract the attention of the Somalis, so that all the three governments came to power post independence followed the same policy by applying few parts of Shariah to convince the people. During the 1960s a unified penal code and a code of criminal court procedures were introduced, and a unified civil code relating to inheritance, personal contracts, and house rents was completed in 1973. Customary law was sharply curtailed by the military regime's efforts to eradicate tribalism. Clan or lineage rights over land and water resources and grazing were abolished payment of diya (blood money) as compensation for death or injury was limited to the victim or close relatives rather than to an entire diya-paying group. Later payment of diya entirely prohibited<sup>6</sup>

## 2.7. The 21<sup>st</sup> October 1969 Revolution Impact on Religious Disputes in Somalia

The constitution of 1961 guaranteed freedom of religion but also declared the newly independent republic of Somalia as an "Islamic state"<sup>27</sup>. However, this did not translate in the adoption of Islamic Shariah or political system. The claim of adoption of what was termed "Islamic Socialism" had nothing to do with real Islamic social-economic edicts but mostly on the emerging Arabic nationalism movement led by Jamal Abdinasir, the president of Egypt at the time. Jamal developed a unique ideology based on Arabism and Islam. The ideas appealed to a number of Somalis, especially those who had studied in Cairo in the 1950s and 1960s.

The October 21.1969 military coup, installed a radical regime that claimed to be committed to deep-rooted changes. The Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) published an editorial that dealt with the relations between Islam and socialism and with the differences between scientific and Islamic socialism. Since Somalia was largely a Muslim dominated country, its first constitution (article 1 Sec. 3) stated "Islam is the official religion of the government"<sup>28</sup>. However, this constitution was abrogated on 26 February 1970 and replaced with a new one the following September<sup>29</sup>. These acts alienated the Muslim constituency and planted the seeds of the opposition movements that culminated to his demise in early 1990.

In the process of consolidating his reign, Gen. Bare centralized the administration of the government under a Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC). In 1972 when the SRC was

established all Islamic judicial officials were dismissed and replaced with young trained in common and civil law. Minister of Justice and Religious Affairs, Sheik Abdiqani Sheik Ahmad was arrested and replaced with Hassan Abdullahi who subscribed to the views of the military dictatorship. He took tough measurements to eradicate any religious activity that was not approved by the government. Islamic clerics who expressed Islamic opinion that contradicted what was viewed as authentic Somali traditions or government policy were summarily killed or jailed. This was supplemented with negative propaganda campaign against Islamic clerics and values that were contrary to official position.

Bare's ideological wandering made him unreliable strategic partner. His regime courted the Soviet Union, the West and the Arabs and in all cases failed to establish sustainable relationship. The Soviet Union viewed Baree's ideological base weak and opted for the neighbouring Ethiopian regime in the Ogadenia war of 1978 to the chagrin of Baree. The growing isolation of the regime and internal opposition forced the regime to make overtures to the Arab nations and relax his ruthless anti-Islamic policies.

In order to continue with his confused version of socialism, they equated Marxism with Islamic socialism and tried to convince the masses that opposition to the socialist policies was anti-Islamic<sup>30</sup>. On September 4, 1971, more than a hundred religious teachers were assembled in the capital and exhorted by Siad Baree to participate actively in the building of a new socialist society. He criticized their method of teaching the Koran and said that some of them used religion as a source of personal profit. The regime also tried to create distinction between secular and religious issue and urged the religious leaders to leave

governance to politicians and concentrate on religious matters. Non-acceptance of this ideas and subsequent opposition to them met ruthless reprisal from the security apparatus, which climaxed in the arrest and execution of protesting religious leaders<sup>31</sup>.

The campaign for scientific socialism and, parallel to it, the attack on what the regime referred to as the traditional upper classes (including the religious leaders) intensified in 1972. On the occasion of id al-ad-ha (the most important Islamic festival of the year in the Islamic calendar), the president defined scientific socialism as half practical work and half ideological beliefs. He declared that their work and belief were entirely compatible with genuine Islam because the Qur'an condemned exploitation and usury system in money lending and urged compassion, unity, and co-operation among fellow Muslims. But he stressed the distinction between religion as an ideological instrument for the manipulation of power and as a moral force. He condemned the anti-religious attitude of confirmed Marxists. Religion, he said, is an integral part of the Somali world view, but it belonged in the private sphere whereas scientific socialism dealt with material concerns such as poverty. Religious leaders should exercise their moral influence but refrain from interfering in political or economic matters<sup>32</sup>. In the years since that time, the compatibility of Islam and scientific socialism has been reiterated in print and orally.

In 1973 the national adult education center in Mogadishu began a training program for Koran teachers. After one session in July the press reported that the sixty participants had accepted the truth of scientific socialism and had promised to pray for its success henceforth. In early January 1975, Siad Bare, recalled the message of equality, justice,

and social progress contained in the Koran, announced a new family law that gave women the right to inherit equally with men. The occasion was the twenty –seventh anniversary of the death of a national heroine, Hawa Othman Tako, who had been killed in 1948 during political demonstrations. Apparently, this was seen by some Somalis as proof that SRC wanted to undermine the basic structure of Islamic society. In Mogadishu twenty-three religious leaders protested inside their mosques. They were arrested within hours and charged with acting at the instigation of a foreign power and with violating the security of the state. Ten of them were executed on January 23. Most religious leaders, however, kept silent. The government has continued to organize “training courses, for sheiks from time to time, thus keeping them abreast of development”, according to *heegan*. There have been no clear public signs of opposition by religious leaders since mid – 1970s, but their views have not been reported. One observer, Somali historian Abdi sheik-Abdi, has suggested that the regime remains sceptical of religious leaders<sup>33</sup>.

During the inaugural party congress in 1976, a committee was appointed to draft a new constitution for the republic to replace the independence constitution that was suspended in 1969. The draft constitution of 114 articles adopted at the extraordinary congress of the SRC in January 1979 was submitted to the people for approval in a referendum in August, and elections followed at the end of the year. The results as reported by the government showed that 3,597,692 voters supported the new constitution while only 7,898 opposed it.

Article 31 of the constitution stated that every Somali citizen whose age is above 18 is free to convert, believe, and practice any religion he/she wishes. This, finally, triggered



serious dispute between the government and civilians. Civil society saw the article as the first step to eradicate their religion and custom. They condemned the government as facilitating non-Muslims, especially Christian, to disseminate their religions lawfully through the country, while Islamic expansion is suppressed.

## **2.8. The Impact of the Somali Socio-Political Conflict**

Some Historians argue the Somalis have always had pastoral conflicts and that the current conflagration is but an escalation of this cultural practice. Nevertheless conflict is not peculiar to Somalis, as it is a general human phenomenon. The principal cause of conflicts has been the question of resource distribution. The scarcity of resource the world over predisposes human beings to competition. Therefore it logically follows that where resource are in acute shortage, conflicts are more prone. Most developing countries have undergone civil strife at one point in time, a phenomenon that has been attributed to their relatively high poverty levels.

The Somali conflict has been classified as “complex emergency”<sup>34</sup>. Complex emergencies are distinguished from the so-called natural emergencies such as droughts and floods. They are protracted political crises, which characteristically involve predatory political organizations, which survive on war economies sustained through the violent transfer of assets<sup>35</sup>. Under these conditions famine, food insecurity, nutritional stress, and vulnerability are not the product of simple demographic, climatic, environmental or

economic change, but the result of political and ideological victimization such as religious expansion and religious defence. In 1993 there were 26 UN designated complex emergencies benefiting for 59 million people<sup>36</sup> affected by war in Mozambique, Liberia, Angola and Somalia. The objective of these operations was to stop man to man wars and trying to rebuild the broken countries. in order to liberate their nations from hunger and starvation.

To deliberate destruction of cultural institutions and ways of life in wars may be as traumatic as individual acts of violence. In Somalia (as in other conflict areas) violent acts such as the mutilation of kin by kin and the cross-dressing of warriors suggest a total breakdown of normal societal values that cannot be explained purely by rational survival strategies. The destructive nature of war makes it relevant to ask to what extent societies can survive to provide a template for post-conflict rehabilitation<sup>37</sup> Free from societal constraints, breakdown may be so severe that social continuity and a return to normality may no longer be an option<sup>38</sup>. The emergence of millennial cults. such as the Alice Lakwena holy spirit movement or religious fundamentalism such as the proliferated movement IN Somalia suggests an active search for new meanings. to re-order disorder<sup>39</sup>.

Today, the Somali internal conflict would not only harm civilians accidentally. but harms them by making its main target. Inhuman actions of genocide. rape. robbing, torture and mutilation carried out against families, communities, and minority religious groups who differ in some beliefs are attempted to destroy the social fabric of society, and thus the

first level of coping mechanisms. The trauma, dislocation, and loss of a sense of community<sup>40</sup> and the destruction of community level organizations, makes survival recovery more difficult.

The impact of conflict on individuals is mediated through social, political structures, and personal attributes<sup>41</sup>. In this context, our focus is on religious aspect but it is indispensable to have a look at the other relative aspects of social structure. Conflicts and disputes disrupt social security networks provided by household and extended kinship systems. In Somalia, conflict has hardened segmentation between clans, and the practice of exogamy has been relaxed. This has the effect of disrupting economic relations and increasing inter-clan hostility, insecurity, and therefore vulnerability. Wars disrupt the socialization of children, and combined with their exposure to and perhaps involvement in armed combat, can cause trauma and exacerbate tensions between age-groups that create long-term problems for social reconstruction<sup>42</sup>. Conflicts transform social relations and cause demographic changes which affect people's economic livelihoods. As usual, fighting always causes the breaking up of relationships and displacement of families. It impairs human lifestyle by creating havoc in way economic growth.

The impact of the Somali civil war has generally been very devastating. Social welfare services have been crippled, productive agricultural areas laid to waste, industries and public utilities vandalized as human beings were massacred, maimed or displaced. The power vacuum left by the demise of Bare's regime is yet to be effectively filled. Somalia had effectively left the international community of Nation and is yet to retrace its way

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back. Meanwhile Somali continues to be faced with seasonal famines and flood that decimate the already torture civilian population.

At the personal level, the psychological impact of conflict on the individual is yet to be fully appreciated. The trauma the survivors are suffering from is hard to fathom. Officials of the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees who process cases of the asylum seekers at time find hard to believe the orgy tales of torture, rape and massacres narrated by the applicants. A whole generation of young people is effectively been displaced from normal life. Despite the general combat fatigue of most Somali people there are constituencies that are not aware of any other form of living apart from looting and high way robbery.

Forced conscription and killings can mean that households no longer have sufficient labour to carry on productive work; landmines can make farming unavailable for years; merchants and markets are often the targets of armies, And trading systems collapse. Households are stripped of assets through looting, destruction or displacement. Coping or survival strategies are disrupted by violence, and the sale of assets by the weak enriches the powerful. The incidence of HIV increases as a result of widespread sexual violence, with dare consequences for the livelihoods of families and whole communities. Human rights abuses against civilian populations in war have direct impact on economies and livelihoods. Human rights and livelihood rights are therefore inter-related<sup>43</sup>

The different capacities and vulnerabilities of men and women determine their ability to cope with and survive conflicts<sup>44</sup>. For example where women's mobility is constrained they may be less able than men to flee from conflict. Wars usually increase the number of female-headed households, and women often have to fulfil their own and men's responsibilities for family provision. Obtaining resources and credit, difficult in normal times, is likely to become harder for women without a male interlocutor. In Somalia some women have resorted to marry gunmen for protection. Conflict exacerbates the trends worldwide towards the "feminization of poverty". Added to the costs of the destruction of infrastructure, production capacity, communications, markets, and environmental resources, are the social costs to countries of maintaining a war. Post-war country building and reconstruction costs uncountable and unexpected property to loose, but this automatically affects world's booming economy. The effects of trauma and changing social relations, and the need to absorb demobilized fighters into communities are long-term problems. Because of the protracted nature of many conflict-created emergencies, the usefulness of making a distinction between long-term and short-term needs has diminished.

The maintenance and rehabilitation of households, communities, civil organizations, professional associations, and governmental structures need to begin during war. Reconstruction needs to be informed by an understanding of social relations, so as not to reinforce existing disadvantage or further marginalize vulnerable groups. The solution to end up warfare that elongated genocide like that in Somalia should be ideological motives such as religious awareness and other community based institution. While the

immediate impact of current wars on already impoverished countries is to deepen poverty and vulnerability, armed conflict, fought with ideological motives, may be a positive agent for change. Civil groups, such as women's organizations, NGOs, and community-based institutions, often emerge in response to armed conflicts and can all be positive forces for change. Groups may take up arms to challenge inequality and injustice, as did the ANC under apartheid, and the Zapatista movement in Mexico. In certain situations war may seem preferable to an unjust peace. During the recent fighting in Rwanda, some agencies argued against calling for a cease-fire on the grounds that this would have prolonged the genocide<sup>45</sup>

### **2.9. Impact of the Social Segmentary Structure of the Somali**

Somali are structured in clan based segmentary groups. Conflict relevant cultural feature of the segmentary groups is the collective responsibilities of members of the same clan family for all actions of its individual members. More specifically is the lack of the concept of individual culpability. When a man commits a homicide, for example, the guilt does not remain with him solely as an individual murderer as in most western societies; the crime is attributed to all of the murderer's kin, who become guilty in the eyes of the aggrieved party by reason of their blood connection with the perpetrator. Members of the aggrieved group then seek revenge, not just on the perpetrator, but on any member of his lineage they might chance upon. In the Somali lineage system, one literally may get away with murder because the actual killer may escape while an innocent kinsman of his may be killed. Second, the system is vulnerable to external manipulation and always has the

potential of occasioning protracted feuds, which overwhelm traditional institutions of conflict resolution.

The segmentation Somalis is aptly captured in an Arab Bedouin saying: "my full brother and I against my half-brother, my brother and I against my father, my father's household against my uncle's household...". In a system of lineage segmentation, one does not have a permanent enemy or a permanent friend-only a permanent context. Depending on the context, a man, a group of men, or even a state may be one's friends or foes. This fact partially explains why a Somalis cannot hesitate to support a supposed quintessential foe if that foe happens to come from the same segmentary level as opposed to that of the other party.

The excessive independent spirit of the nomadic Somali coupled with lineage segmentation militates against any evolution and endurance of a stable, centralized power structure. The experimentation of centralized system can be said to have miserably failed in Somalia. Though it has been severally argued that the misuse of clan polarized the already segment Somalis, the cultural reality of decentralized power structure as demonstrated by their traditional institutions of power (characterized as pastoral democracy) is not compatible with modern tendencies to centralized power. Questions are raised on the viability of recent efforts aimed at restoring normalcy, as they seem to be biased toward centralized power structures.



After the collapse of the communist bloc Somalia lost her strategic importance and hence international allies. Toward the end of the 1980s, the regime started to lose control. All theatrics aimed at stalling the mounting opposition could not stop the eminent collapse of the government as every clan established their own faction to fight the regime. The most prominent clan based armed groupings included the Somali National Movement (SNM) of the Isaq clan, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) of the Majeerten and the United Somali Congress (USC) of The Hawiye clan. These armed groups used their respective religious clerics to mobilize for support from within their clan ranks and some went as far as promising to install Islamic rule as the SNM did in the northern parts.

In a bid to oust their archenemy, the Ethiopian government organized the rebel groups inside their country and developed a strategy in the town Mustahil, Ethiopia. The efforts were basically aimed at complimenting their respective forces and spreading the defense structure of the regime through concurrent engagement with government forces in all the fronts they represented. It should be noted that despite their common enemy, the armed rebellion groups did not cooperate at any level and had no common post-Bare vision for Somalia. Every group had the parochial interest of the group they represented in mind.

On 28 December 1990, firing inside Mogadishu instantly commenced the operation. Every other immediately moved from their basis in Ethiopia and rushed to their respective regional homes to engage the armed forces. The SPM moved to southern part of the country while SNM moved to the north part and USC engaged the military in Mogadishu. The urban warfare in Mogadishu continued for thirty consecutively days till

the departure of Bare. What ensued after the demise of the military dictatorship was a state of anarchy as the groups fragmented further and scrambled for power.

The Somali tragedy hierarchically increased to an imaginable extent. Clan segmentation and unplanned expulsion has been permanently going around horn of Africa. Emigrant started in east Africa since entrance of socialism, specially the break down of Somalia and Ethiopia borders disputes. Though many think that horn of Africa's permanent refugee and vagrant life is caused by political turmoil, it is, in reality, Socio-religious conflict rather than politics. Whenever, dispute arose in somewhere in the area, religion has a crucial causal relationship with that particular main cause. One million refugees fled from Ethiopia to Somalia subsequently ½ a million Somalis fled from north west of Somalia to Ethiopia in order to escape from the government's punishment to Somalia National Movement (SNM). The central government collapsed and civil war break out all in the country that increased the problem hierarchically.

This necessitated to every sub clan to return their original base of territories, this was difficult to many people those who can not cross another clan's territory and had no way rather than the bordering countries, such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Arabia through the see. Somali refugees in camps met with the worse treatment in their camps; many of them died suffering for health and hunger, they have been threatened, raped, outraged and terrified especially in Kenya and Yemen. Many others fled to Europe, U. S. A., Australia and Canada where they have been in hesitation of religion and culture.

By August 1992, up to one-third of all Somalis were facing starvation caused by drought and the fighting, which prevented farmers from planting crops. One million Somalis had fled to Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen and Djibouti.

Another response triggered the Somali problem after Bare's regime was the idea of the modern Islamic movements who insist to reform Islam by reinterpreting it. From this perspective, early Islamic tradition practiced by Somalis was mostly seen performed in incorrect ways while Islam was initially as protest against abuse, corruption, and inequality; reformers therefore Somali Islam rendered the world intelligible to Somalis and made their lives more bearable in a harsh land. Amidst the inter-clan violence that characterized life in the early 1990s, Somalis naturally sought comfort in their faith to make sense of their national disaster. The traditional response of practicing Muslims to social trauma is to explain it in terms of a perceived sin that has caused society to stray from the "straight path of truth" and consequently to receive God's punishment. The way to regain God's favour is to repent collectively and rededicate society in accordance with Allah's divine precepts.

On the basis of these beliefs, a Somali brand of messianic Islamism (sometimes seen as fundamentalism) sprang up to fill the vacuum created by the collapse of the state in the disintegrated. Somali world of early 1992, Islamism appeared, firstly, to be largely confined to Bander Qasim, a coastal town of Majeerteen zone. Relatively, a Yugoslav doctor who was a member of the United Nations team sent to aid the wounded was gunned down by masked assailants there in November 1991. Reportedly, the assassins

belonged to an underground Islamist movement whose adherents wished to purify the country of "infidel" influence.

The collapse of Barre's regime, in fact, resulted from certain features of Somali lineage segmentation. Somali clan organization is an unstable, fragile system, characterized at all levels by shifting allegiances. This segmentation goes down to the household level with the children of a man's two wives sometimes turning on one another on the basis of maternal lines. Power is exercised through temporary coalitions and ephemeral alliances between lineage. A given alliance fragments into competitive units as soon as the situation that necessitated it ceases to exist. In urban settings, for example, where relatively large economic and political stakes are contested, the whole population may be polarized into two opposing camps of clan alliances. To varying degrees, the poles of power in the politics of independent.

The present militiamen and political situation in other clan's territories in the country evidently calls for a reappraisal of the official policy of the reconciliation meetings, which has been repeatedly sat since 1992, and has become invested in the clanism systems with the character of religious dogma. All these promises are in ruins. Nowhere has it dislodged or even weakened. The majority of people might have eventually fair parliamentary representation, but guerrilla attacks have been wholly ineffective. One of the biggest reasons is the fallacy of believing that generalized social theories, such as the anti-clanism doctrine, can dissolve concrete and very diverse political institutions and win

automatic acceptance from individuals and communities regardless of their particular interests and situations.

There is no question that all tribal warlords warring in Somalia are against any law, faith, custom, and principle. They are, according to Islamic law and teachings, purely enemy to Islam, Muslims, and humanity. Islam never allows waging a war against innocent civilians regardless of their belief, nation, race, or kind. Islam always recommend to help civil society, even when there is a war between Muslims and non-Muslims, it is obliged Muslim military men to give the first priority of their aim in the war to help the poor, female, innocent, sick, children, aged, and disabled people of their enemy.

Even when performing worship, it is to give priority to safeguard the vulnerable group of people. It is reported that the prophet (P.B.U.H.) Delayed the congregation of night praying performance – *esha* until midnight, then, said; “I would order to perform this type of praying to this time, if I am not warring about the weak people<sup>46</sup>”. One more time, the prophet expedited the praying and answered when asked why? “ I heard child crying, and I am afraid the mother of the child is among the congregation<sup>47</sup> “.

To wage war against Muslim society is out of question. It is ordained in the Koran incase war broke up between two Muslim communities others to rush making negotiation between the two, but if either of two is aggressive and refuse to stop the aggression, then, to give lesson by attacking altogether from one side.

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## CHAPTER THREE

### 3.0. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISLAM AND POLITICS

#### 3.1. The Role of Politics in Islam

According to the modern civilization, religion so aptly defined by Mathew Arnold as morality touched by emotion that often plays a vital role in the affairs of mankind. A society is made up of religious sects. For instance, an economic order is governed by religious principles and the propagation of a culture is inspired by religion zeal. In politics too religion is the strongest fiber in the stuff of which patriots, or nationalism is made. Religion is in fact the daily life breath of an individual and the over powering passion in all his activities<sup>1</sup>

Besides that, the modern politicians, warlords and clan chiefs in Somalia try their best to convince the society that they are spiritual men in order to get their attention. They employ some religious symbols such as the way of dressing, holding a piece of chain called *tasbeeh*, which is used for counting words to say for God's memory, etc. Notwithstanding, they also argue that they are the most upright members to lead the society, because they are religious as well as political leaders. Moreover, they are warlords or clan chiefs.

These complicated factors led the society and their either traditional leaders or modern politicians to mark some linked ideas between the religion and the politics. However, this



concept gave birth new confusion and dilemma that made the situation more complex and deteriorated. It created religio-phobia in the minds of the society by expanding lack of trust to any body talking about religion and its teachings. They believed that any body who wishes to play a political role will resort to Islam. in particular, in order to get the attention of the mass population.

A comprehensive example is the ruthless acts made by one of the greatest warlords in Somalia, Mohamad Farah Aideed. In reality, it seems that Aideed during his clan mission was trying his best to imitate one of the most prominent Somali saints ever known in the history - Sayid Muhammad Abdille Hassan. He struggled to follow footsteps of the Sayid, for instance, the Sayid used to cover his head (as narrated through stories) with either *Imama* (a piece of cloth cut for heard cover as veil) or cup. Similarly was done by Aideed during his operation. Surprisingly, Aideed tried to say poems as done by the Sayid and never refrained its struggle though he failed many times and was condemned by the people of poems. One day in 1992, he was interviewed by British Broadcasting Coordination (BBC), Somali branch inquiring to reply a condemnation came from his contra warlord, Ali Mahdi who blamed him welcoming the chased Daarood people, but he refused to reply normally and insisted that he has to answer in poem. He was allowed to do so. but he said absolutely irrelevant words. which were far from common methodology of poems<sup>2</sup>. Then. many of his relatives became angry with him and asked him why he did so, while he is not a poetry man. He replied "when shall I revenge from Daarood, if I am not called "the Sayid". He practically used all personal instruments used by the Sayid such as *Tasbiih*, water poet (the water was said once that

Sayid used to put his water for ablution. Then, Mr. Aideed has done both). Now the question is why Aideed was doing all that?. The answer is quite clear and it is that he saw people largely respecting the prominent saint -Sayid Mohamad because he was a religious man as well as warrior, so that he tried to make himself the same.

Another significant example is the behavior of Mohammed Sa'id Hersi "Morgan". The long standing warlord controlling Majeerteen militias in Kismayu. Morgan has been normally performing regular fast two days in the week; Thursday and Monday claiming he is a great saint who devoted himself in following the prophetic Sunna. In addition, he left his beard grow over and over to show that he wants to assimilate the prophet himself. Since, most of the Somalis just consider what they see at that particular time, they never ask him whether the prophet was a clan warlord or international teacher.

Another important factor that complicated the relationship between Islamic religion and politics as well as the concept of war in Islam is the use of certain Islamic teachings that is mistranslated. Once a particular tribe is forced out from its residence, the leaders remind the community to return and get their land, prestige, property and power back. Otherwise, they will neglect their religious ordainment and personal or group dignity. They trace some evidences from the Islamic teachings to support their ideas and missions, while their main purpose is political approach and they do not give any intention to the Islam itself and their community interest as well.

Therefore, when an individual intends to do evil adopted showing off some religious signs and some times arguing that he is a religious man, so that having higher dignity and power to bless or curse. Through such meysterious way many men sought power.

### 3. 2. Islam as a Political Resource

Most of the political groups, not only those who are mentioned as religious groups, have incentives to participate in religious activities, in order to get opportunities to pursue their goals through religio-political action.

It is obviously remarkable that religious activities always motivate the approach of political intention. It gives its members full encouragement and confidence to promote themselves into political roles and leadership. Moreover, the community gives full respect and trust to those who enroll into politics through religious aspect. Explicitly, people are in search of trustee leaders and they consider religious schools the only source of producing trustee and faithful leaders. It seems that people do not concern much about the effectiveness and the qualification of their leader. This is because they are not in the position to think about development and civilization. They prefer to get justice and sincerity which are the basic needs of the man, in order to maintain their daily lifestyle. Religious groups, however, feel they are superior to the layman and have full right to rule over them.

These motivate politicians in different factors, and create quality that can prove reliable actions. These actors grow out of divine force. As the people are committed in powerful source of motivation, which has real relation with their faith, and carries them to act them fulfill. This influences their circumstance to the field.

Lack or less of pure Islamic knowledge is another detrimental factor. Those who attend Islamic schools and profound into Islamic pure studies are approximately 17% of the matured people, while it is 50% of the youngsters. According to the traditional procedure, almost 85% of the Qura'nic school children neglect their studies at the adulthood age, and forget all about education after they reach the age of forty and above. In addition, almost 80% of the Islamic schools do not give deep and comprehensive teaching of the Islam and its relative science. It is, merely, the mosque classes, which provide some haphazard courses to the matured men in particular. These courses are mostly related to the necessary way of worshipping and moral conduct as well as business transaction and Islamic law.

As a matter of fact, Somali men have ever been traditionally divided into two groups: priests and warriors. A man of religion was one who was dedicated to the worship of Allah and to the dissemination of Allah's word. Such men do not engage in war activities, though there were always some sheiks who encourage their clans either to attack another clan or defend themselves. Similarly, they were not involved in certain antisocial practices that were specially preserved for laymen such as adultery, killing, meaningless tales, and looting. Sheikhs and full-time students of religion do not act on

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clanism sentiments, do not carry weapons and took no part in clan wars. Therefore, religious men (*wadaad*), children and women were never counted to engage in war and trouble.

Thus, religious men, though were shown full respect, they were undermined on the other hand. They were considered as vulnerable people just like women and children. That is why the Somali proverb goes to say: a question arises: “ who is more in number men and women? Then the answer became; if *wadaads* (priests) are counted along side with the women, then it is women who are more in number.”

On the other way round, however, religious men often played a major role in the mediation and reconciliation of warring clans. As a result of their holy and neutral status, men of religion could make any movement between two hostile clans regardless of the specific clan they belonged to. Moreover, during their travel they were not in need to carry food rations or travel expenses. They were respectable guests wherever they go to, so that they were provided whatever necessary.

Furthermore, traditional priests were mostly believed to possess supernatural powers bestowed upon them by Allah as a reward for their piety, and that their blessings and curses were effective, either harmful or benevolent. Thus it was a commonly-held belief that anyone who killed a priest, or caused him harm in any other way, had committed the most evil of deeds, and that inevitable punishment for such a crime would soon come to the perpetrator in this world as well as hereafter. In some occasions leaders of certain

brotherhoods acted in open complicity with the government. They were used as political tools to fulfill the ideas of the ruling regime.

The above factors caused that religious individuals are in dilemma of their way to survive and disseminate Islamic teachings. Some would like to be pure religious people but are in confusion of their precedent activities and tales told, so that are hussy of what to do. Both the obedient individuals and those who give priority their self-interest may not distinguish the difference between Islamic policy and contemporary political agendas as they could hardly distinguish between political issues. It is quite possible for a group to stand out as relatively conservative to policy and adopt a much more liberal position.

Many politicians who are new in the field of politics employ political approaches through religious values. They do so because religious ideas are seen potentially powerful resources of commitment and motivation. As history has repeatedly shown most of the spiritual leaders believe themselves to be driven by a divine force. Thus, such religious elders and sheiks encourage them of participation in the field and highness of their moral value. There have been revealed ideas, long histories, and cultural debates that usually overshadowed these conflicts and appeals to traditional values.

### **3.3. Group Structure and Encouragement of Political Action**

As stated earlier, throughout Somalia, the ideal of Islam is a society organized for the implementation of Islamic precepts in which no distinction between the secular and the

religious spheres obtains. Among the Somalis, this ideal had been approximated only occasionally – and less fully in the north than among some groups in the settled regions of the south where religious leaders were an integral part of the social and political structure. Among nomads, the exigencies of pastoral life have greater weight to the warrior's role, and religious leaders were expected to remain aloof from political matters.

Generally, Somalis' belief and practice has differed to some extent from that required in Islam, either because ancient Somali ritual has persisted or because Somalis cannot or will not submit to the rigors of Islamic practice. Whatever the discrepancies between the requirements of Islam and Somali practice, their Islamic identity is integral part to Somalis' conception of behavior and culture.

Since its first introduction, Islam had been the main political source of Somali leaders and traditional administration. The role of religious functionaries, however, began to shrink little by little in the 1950s and 1960s as some of their legal and educational powers and responsibilities were transferred to secular authorities, but their situation changed substantially after the revolution, whose leaders introduced an ideology they called Scientific Socialism. These leaders insisted that their version of socialism was not at odds with Islam, but compatible with Qura'nic principles, and they condemned sphere, and religious leaders were warned not to meddle in politics.

The new government instituted changes in law that some religious figures saw as contrary to Islamic precepts. The regime reacted sharply to criticism, executing some of



the protestors. Subsequently, religious leaders seem to have accommodated themselves to the government, but their private views were not so clear to the public.

Though, recently, Islamic movements are powerful compared to the warlords, they are under warlords' depression and criticism. The chief reason of this is that the young Modern Muslim Movements, generally, consider such kind of civil war going in Somalia is strictly prohibited in Islam. They could have only fight when the purpose of fighting is to defend the Islamic religion attacked by its enemy – non-believer. Warlords struggling to convince the West mostly argue that Islam should not interfere governmental administrative activities. They insist that it must be confined in the ministry of justice and religious affairs and must not be included in the political sense, the contest for leadership as an opinion, alternative over democracy and the democratically elected authorities.

It is irrational to exclude from politics and policy-making anyone who have acquired eminence and distinction in religious affairs; instead these are more faithful, trustworthy, steadfast and incorruptible. Furthermore, one should know that we can speak of an evil fame as in USC's hierarchy, but not of evil honor and the religious man is generally honored by the society. It happens so frequently that Somalis select improvident *Qaat*, chewed branches of green leaves that may cause alcohol sipper or venturous persons, while there are equitable, benignant, benevolent and scrupulous Islamists who might outnumber the erratic politicians who lead Somalia in crooked paths and devious routs<sup>3</sup>.

Pre-independent, there were religious scholars who had neither been opposition nor competitive with the clan or community leaders. They had full confidence in their position which was to consider them as a great teachers and divinely respectable members of the community. As a result, the meaning of religion and leadership had been in clear-cut concept. Furthermore, there were a close co-operation between the two leading groups - sheiks (religious scholars) and the community traditional leaders who usually come through inheritance and rarely through election.

Their co-operation resembled that of the court and the judiciary men. The chiefs had to demand the applicable judgment of the cases appeared their contemporary religious educators, and, then, fulfill the prosecution or property division in the light of the Islamic law. On the other hand, sheiks had never been in the mood of playing a political role to gain leadership position. Likewise, they did not concern whether their *fatwa* (a religious judgment or instruction given by the well educated members of the Islamic law) is enforced by the chiefs or not.

However, the situation has been changed recently with the modern civilization and the new lifestyle. Nowadays, it seems that sheiks moved from their position, which was to devote in religious teachings to leadership stage, and argued that they are the most upright persons to lead the community. Therefrom, a group of politico-religio leaders came out and shown a tough measurement to compete with the politicians. Though these groups are strangers into the field, they play a major role in Somali political turmoil. This is what made the matter more complex and chaos.

Sheiks played a considerable role in cease fire measurement. While the men of religion belonged generally to the category of respected community leaders, they enjoyed additional esteem and deference because of their knowledge of the islamic religion and the laws of the sharia. It followed from that fact that somali priests took an active and prominent role in the prevention and quelling of wars. Whenever there was a flare-up of hostilities, the priests in the community raised copies of the holy Qura'n as well as pieces of white cloths with holy writing on them and stood between the two hostile groups, calling on them to stop the fighting, and threatening to call down a curse on the party that refused. Due to the great respect they command, the men of religion were often successful in their missions<sup>4</sup>. Though the cooperation between the chiefs and the sheiks was constant, there have been many religious conflicts among themselves too.

### **3. 4. Religion and Political Values**

To clarify the link between political and religious values, even after recognizing the potential obstacles to a relationship what is to be recorded in mind is the following points:

1. To recognize that the deeper content of religious values is imperfectly dominated by certain sheiks and clan elders.
2. To abstract that there is deep mix between religion and culture in the Somali community culture.

3. To acknowledge that there is a great skepticism of sheikhs to one another
4. To recognize that there is a need for fair religious intelligence in the community.

The religion provides a broadly unifying element in Somali political life. Though Somalia was Scientific Socialist State during her powerful government ever passed, care has been taken since the 1969 revolution to reconcile socialism with Islam, which has constitutional status of state religion. The most significant clash between religious and secular elite occurred in 1975, when religious leaders protested at a new law giving equal inheritance rights to women<sup>5</sup>.

Some tension persists and the opposition Somali National Movement SNM, engaged in civil war in the North of the country, emphasizing its commitment to Islam. This intern, however, may be a tactical device designed to exploit a potential area of government weakness, disguise the SNM's own embarrassing dependence on Ethiopia, and profit from the leading role in Islam sects of the clans from which it draws its main support. SNM was made extremely angry when Gen. M. S. Hersi Morgan, the Commander of the military detachment in North Somalia held a beauty competition ceremony in Hargaisa that young girls exhibited their beauty in different styles with indecent dressing. As a consequence, civil society saw the government a repugnant Socialist whose aim is to destroy their culture and religion.

The Italian Bishop in Mogadishu, Salvatore Colombo was shot to death outside the cathedral in July 1989<sup>6</sup>. Bishop Salvatore lived in the country for 45 years as an

ambassador of the Vatican religious government to Somalia. He had been disseminating Christianity in the country with some other missions for such a long time but failed to influence not more than 10 –20 people out of not less than 8 millions of people. This, in fact left terrifying manner on the stability, where civilians strongly hired hatred against the government for religious purpose. It is worth to mention that the first step taken by the police was tough measure to investigate the murderer of the Bishop promising that any one who brings news about him will be rewarded in one and half million Shilling Somali. This was actually the beginning of sparking off a new phase of repression and conflict. Civilians took into fighting against Non-Muslims in the country without discrimination. When USC clan militias entered into Mogadishu the only two official churches (both were belonged to Catholic) in the country were put under fire.

Some observers have not been reluctant to attribute religious-groups in political differences to the values, teachings, and ideas of the various traditions. The application of religious creeds to politics is most visible when the spiritual leaders assert that their religion demands a particular political stance.

In Somalia, the religious interference of politics that leads conflict and dispute has not been traditionally common as it is today. During the traditional living system community chiefs were given divine respect that has its base in religious perception. Therefore, such spiritual leaders were left to guide the community according to their discretionary administration and judgment.

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The Muslim scholars are, in majority, community elders that the layman could hardly counter-argue with them. Thus, they are responsible to get details of the reasons of hostility without hiding that may be collected by committees from different sides and fairly thinking for the sake of the community in general. The religious intellectuals with the help of the community elders could have produced comprehensively prepared proposals on reconciliation, so that they can discover an applicable policy administration compatible with their peoples' mind and way of thinking. Through such kind of networking and unity, the responsible individuals could have reached a level where they can disarm the citizens, and weapons can be used merely for security purpose.

It has been successful in 1993, when two groups of religious delegates from two hostile clans; Marehan and Rahanweyn. met in Gedo region and took the decision to negotiate between their own clans after prolonged wars. The delegates involved in their mission and finally staged peace and security in the area that remained up to the present day.<sup>7</sup>

The role of Muslim scholars in the field of peace process is depicted in the religion, but playing it significantly is another issue. Reaffirming its conviction that peace can be created only through the effective implementation of the security system provided by the Qura'n and Sunnah, one may bear in mind that the religious men are to maintain national peace and security. Therefore, we can allude that the Somali religious men fall behind their duty regarding the conflict in their own clans.

Today, everywhere in the country is full of gang robbers with the existence of religious groups. The level of insecurity fluctuates widely from one region to another and can flare up unexpectedly. Even where there is likened temporary peace due to the residents are homogeneously from one particular clan, there is gun-toting bandits looting small business kiosks and households. Young men with guns are omnipresent and looting of property is widespread. When there is an international aid one can witness such bandits looting food supplies to starving children, hijacking food convoys to remote areas, vandalizing public and private properties, and wanton killings.

The Islamic principles show a clear example in the practice of the prophet and his companion in the development system that can be followed footsteps by the contemporary Muslim scholars. It teaches many viable ways of development process through associating income generating projects and job opportunity. These imperial methods lifted the community up to the stage where every body was receiving monthly income. If the person is working, then, such particular employer should cover the needs of his or her staff, but if not working it is the responsibility of the government to pay monthly feeding from the Social Security Fund (*Baitulmal*). Infants, for instance, were earning monthly payments from the central treasure of the Muslim government.

### **3.5. Islam and Political Interests**

During Mohamed Siyad Bare's regime, there were certain Qura'nic verses and prophetic traditions which was in daily use due to the interest of the government. The verses and



Action or decisions of religion has been very important in the Somali dispute. The Somali people, however, did not agree upon one decision, as the world history witnessed the distress and dismantling of Somalia whereby many learners of the Islam participated the civil war, and also gave their efforts to support a specific side of the warring factions. The question, then, comes to heads is: Did the religious men have an authority to play a significant role in the rival disputes? Or Do they have an adequate manpower and army to face a war? On the other side, Do they have an ability to associate their own power, which is separate from their respective clans? Is there any possibility of their success in war against their contemporary non-learned warriors - *mooryaan/jirri* in the country? If they defeat the *mooryaans/jirris* will they triumph to bring peace and security? If they bring so will the civil society recognize them as governmental power or merely religious men? Can they, without the acceptance of the public, bring prosperity and development? The answer appears from many aspects;

Religious groups create a common consciousness that may extend to political ideas. Recently, most of the religious people are already registered informally to be a member of a specific Islamic movement. By participating in that group, the individual learns what is expected of him or her by changing his/her behavior patterns. This is first and foremost requirement for the maintenance of membership in that particular group. This is permanently learned from the Qura'nic traditional schools, institutions and, in many occasions the mosques.

Initially, it is worth noting that the Somalis have interpreted or modified much of Islam in terms of their pre-Islamic heritage and their particular situation. The so-called spiritual leaders came up with many cases even to perform miracles and *Baraka*, by claiming to bring good luck, as he has the ability to avoid potentially dangerous events that could have happen. It was funny peculiar. one of the president Barre's secretariat says, when I witnessed one day a self-styled sheik or spiritual leader entered in the secretariat office of the president in the presidential residence. He cried to say "oh, I 'm feeling heart pain/burning, hot in whole my body and weakness". They asked the reason and he said: "i have come to know that God would warrant to put upon the people of Gedo region (president's home town) seven types of hells. I cried to God and asked him to stop that, but he told me that the hells are already prepared and sent from the heaven so that it must be upon any where. Then, I preferred those hells to be kept in my heart. though I'm not a very great *wali* "who can sustain all that hell in heart"9.

As we have mentioned earlier, many warlords who are politically childish tried and publicized to became religious fanatic whose chief ambition was to rid the country certain clans, by claiming they are ridding off mischievous people who fall under apostasy degree.

The religious groups develop interests that may require defense in the political realm. Of concern in this regard is how the assertion of institutional interests may affect the basic attitudes and loyalties of the groups and its supporters. Interests do not have to be restricted to the financial sphere or single issues. Political leaders attempt to convey to

members of religious groups their understanding of the group's situation and sympathy for its goals. Eventually, if the conditions are ripe and religious centers effected political elite can forge strong ties between a party and the members of the religious groups.

Indeed, the function leaders and their militiamen put their efforts on how and were they earn from for themselves, not for the public requirements. For example fund-rising program was carried out for the benefit of Islamic court in Mogadishu, some militias arrived to loot the funds and cancel the program to obstacle the Islamic court, they exchanged fire with the court supporters 10. The looting operation was well planned and scheduled before the time being by mixed of minor rank warlords and city gangs with the help of some clan chiefs. It was also suspected that some other religious groups confronting the operation of the court had in hand to initiate the violence.

In addition to that, other militiamen who were told to vacate a house that its owner has unnoted to the court, have refused until clan elders negotiated to settle the problem and finally convince them to vacate 11. Moreover the leader of USC/SSA tried to add some other forces, this is in order they become employed by the court. Though. the clan interest and emotion appeared in the task, Ali Mahdi succeeded to contribute 300 armed militiamen to strength those of the sheik involving in the court's implementation. The sheikh of the court was necessarily paused whereby 300 forces left with their weapons and guns. 12

Finally, conflict occurred between the leader of USC/SSA Ali Mahdi and the leader of Islamic Court Sheik Ali Sheik Mohamoud concerning the system of the court and rule, until the forces of the court were attacked by Ali Mahdi's militiamen and Sh. Ali said the attack was done under the command of Ali Mahdi.

Despite permanent disputes between islam and politics, *ulemas* or religious scholars have a remarkable role to play in the absence of a wandering teacher, nomads depended on persons associated with religious devotion, study, or leadership. These men usually called wadaddo or ulima. The wadaddo constituted the oldest stratum of islamic literate people in somalia. They functioned as basic teachers and local notaries as well as judges and authorities in religious law. They were previously rarely theologians; some belonged to a religious brotherhood, or to a lineage with a strong religious tradition. In the latter case, they were not necessarily trained. but were entitled to lead prayers and to perform ritual sacrifices at weddings, on special holidays, and during festivals held at the tombs of saints.

There is undeniable role played by many sheikhs in the somali community, in terms of blessing and cursing. No matter whether the person sought bless is aggressive or not. he or she would definitely hope that through the sheik's blessing every thing will go nicely and will bring happy and proesperous, and vice versa. It is worth noting, that no clan would wage war against another unless verses of the Holy Qura'n is rec upon using arms and militias as well as the transport. Warlords frequently present themselves to certain sheiks who are mostly among their relatives to be rec Quran. Quran was rec on Ali

Mahdi Mohamed on 18/3/98 in the house of Omar Jeego, and Ali Ugas, Mahd's political advisor was allowed to attend the venue in order to gain *baraka* - blessing too. This is because qur'an can be used as a tool to give the person health and prosperity and success<sup>13</sup>

*Wadaddo* help avert misfortune by making protective amulets and charms that transmit some of their *baraka* to others, or by adding the Quran's *baraka* to the amulet through a written passage. The *baraka* of a saint may be obtained in the form of an object that has touched or been placed near his tomb.

Although *wadaddo* may use their power to curse as a sanction, misfortune generally is not attributed to curses or witchcraft. Somalis have accepted the orthodox Muslim view that a man's conduct will be judged in an afterlife. However, a person who commits an antisocial act, such as patricide, is thought possessed of supernatural evil powers.

### 3. 6. Islam and Clanism

One must bear in mind that it is common character to fire out and isolate any clan member who go against the sheik or the warlord of the clan. Such person usually is considered as former member of the clan who is sacked because he sold out to the enemy of the clan (*shisheeye kalkaal*). When such person is in need has no courage to seek help from his clan. Similarly there is no way he<sup>14</sup> may ask help any of the other clans that he is sacked for the sake of them. Therefore, it is not easy one to confront his clan's

suggestions given to him as well as helping them in any circumstance by any means. This type of behavior is some times seen as a part of religious commandments.

Islam ordains every body to make good relation (*silatu rihim*) with his or her relatives giving the priority to the immediate one . There are several Qura'nic verses and prophetic traditions encouraging the *silat rihim*. Among them the first verse of surat Al-nisa which says: " And fear Allah, who you ask him and your relatives"<sup>15</sup> and the prophet Peace Be Upon Him ordered the same in several passages. Among his famous encouragement on the issue: " He who would like to live longer let make good relation with his relatives"<sup>16</sup>. He once gave absolute bequest one his close companions and said to him: "keep intimate relation with your relatives even if they cut your relation with them"<sup>17</sup>

As a matter of fact, the concept of these verses and prophetic traditions is quite different from the common interpretation given in the Somali custom that is clanism opportunity. The exact meaning of this religious commandment is to behave with the people, especially the immediate as well as far distant relatives with the excellent manner and tolerance.

A remarkable example of the Somali mistranslation is how the following verse is translated verbally. This means though the verse and its relevant other verses and tradition of the Prophet are correctly interpreted when writing and explaining publicly, it is still believed as tribal and clanism encouragement. The verse says: "And we brought you tribes and societies to know each other"<sup>18</sup>

They thought that the verse gives an order which says, "let every body join and help in any thing his clan" Regardless of whether he is aggressive or aggressed

However, the exact meaning of the verse include as below:

1. It discourages the animosity based on clan by informing that clans, tribes and races are common and ordinary in the worldwide population, and there is a special prestige to particular nation.
2. To set a good introduction, relation, treatment, and being assisting one another among the whole human being with their racial and language differences. This is to deal with human being as the best as one is enable, without discrimination of race, color, culture, language, ideology, etc.
3. To inform that the clan can give no help or respect belonged to certain individuals or groups, while others are undermined.
4. To discourage any source of mixing worshipping God with clan or tribal affairs.
5. To distinguish between the people that one wishes to make friends or relatives and showing that the intimate friend and relative of the believer is the one active in worshipping and obeying God. other than that belongs with the same clan or relative
6. To avoid marriage with an immediate relatives in order not to interrupt blood relation and putting every thing under regular management.

It is therefore, religious threaten to every person to stand for clan interest other than common or public interest, personal interest, religious interest, etc. Explicitly, then. the religion has been translated into political principles.

Attempts to assess the connection between religious belief and political outlook have yielded mixed results. The most consistent relationships between theological beliefs and political outlook have been found with samples of the clergy, a group that shall have the firmest grasp of the political implications of religious thought. In almost every study of the clergy I have located commitment to a conservative religious style correlated with conservative outlooks on politics and social issues. Several studies have found that in general, religious groups tie religious and political attitudes together, as well as religious and social roles. It so that declares political values derive from the content of the religion. Even when survey findings have appeared to support connection between attachment to traditional religious behaves.

On 7th/11/98, when I reached at Baladhawo district of Somalia, I met with two cousins Mr. X and Mr. Y. discussing about their clan's interests and problems. In the course of their discussion one asked the other the following questions and bilateral debate was opened as below:

Mr. X. Why do you refuse to contribute to the fundraising for fighting against other clans? And why do you refuse the collection for the fund raising for the family box, in order to make financial capacity ready in case of any trouble? Do you believe that such fundraising is wrong to be contributed as Al-itahad group do believe? Mr. Y.: Yes, I believe it is wrong because it will be used for civil war between two Muslim groups, so that if I side with either of the two groups, I am afraid to go to hell in the judgment day.



Mr. X. Are you now going to teach me about Islam, do not you know that I came from such and such descendent and my great grand father is Mr. B.

The argument prolonged until both of them went to one of the prominent sheiks in the village to seek *fatwa* (knowledge to reach the correct answer from Islamic perspective). However, when the sheik was told that the two men are arguing about Islamic question firstly inquired the sub-clan belonged to each of the two men. He was told that one of the two is from C. clan while the other is from D. clan. Then, he was astonished of the news and woke up in misery. He was asked again what is the answer, and he surprisingly said: "if you live longer and keep wandering over the world you will see many surprises and unimaginable things happening. Let every body now forget about this world and be ready for hereafter. Perhaps, it is a sign of doomsday". He was once more asked the answer, then he replied to say: "don't you see the surprise and the aggression. that a man from D. clan is confronting a man from C. clan in religious issue. This is, really, serious aggression".

One can allude from the above narrated story that most of the religious concepts nursed by the Somalis in minds, though that is about to eradicate nowadays. is nothing but false assumptions and imaginations.

In retrospect, different clans and sub-clans have fought over water holes, grazing grounds for their herds, and personal conflicts, but mediation through elders and religious leaders kept the disputes under strict control. The clan warfare was incited through deliberate

raising of clan fevers by renaissance deep-seated complexes. Like these circumstances, sheiks had a powerful role to play in making negotiation. If one rejects their decision, he would anticipate terrifying and detrimental curse that might lead to complete destruction or death.

The relationship between the religion and State presents two sets of problems for all governments. On the most fundamental level, governments must decide what legal status to grant to the religion, the institutional expression of religion. Should government take account of religious sentiments. she may treat religious group as just another type of interest group, or may try to restrict the public role of the religion? The problem arose when in Somalia many religious groups associated by clansmen used the religion as a weapon to achieve their political agenda. Actually, they put this effort in inappropriate place and in inappropriate time. because what influenced them heedlessly is their political desire.

The clan political leaders, recently, take precaution from religious leaders as they always try to distress their future plans. They discourage people to attend the spiritual talks and permanent lectures held in the mosques and Islamic centers. However, the civilians simply ignore their advises and regularly attend all the courses and non-regular lectures which are usually held by visiting sheiks. Thus, the civil people have sufficient confidence from the public more than the former government or the clan warlord currently functioning. Religious beliefs may incline the individuals to undertake actions that violate the duly established laws of the state.

The government of Somalia after independence has never had purely religious ruled system. Consequently those group leaders' politics grown up in the same ideology and attention from the religious people. There has been always gap between the two sides. It became common those who learned Islamic studies to combine practicing both religious and clan practices. Since they face difficulties if they neglect either of the two, they prefer to mix between the two and see what may come out.

As we have mentioned else where, Islamic teachings do not contradict one to work for the betterment of one's clan. but what brings the problem is that the interest of the clan do not follow that of the religion. The clan objectives always depend on its members' desires and interests without discrimination that they think will bring their vital role.

The religious motivation and behavior in secular realms, religion provide full guidance about how people should survive in the world and at the same time fully serve for God, in order to remain in heaven. eternal life of hereafter. In some cases. however, religious ideologies may cause individuals to undertake actions that may violate the duly established rules and regulations of certain State or leader. The ruler may, rarely, demand behavior that the religion prohibits to practice to be interpreted according to his view, in order to permit what is basically prohibited.

As a matter of fact. Islam has a significant impact on the Somali life in all sides. They are 99.8% Muslim and Islam reached there in its early days of revelation. Many historians

## ENDNOTES

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9. Interview held with Qasim H. Farah, a previous government officer in Somalia
10. Mogadishu Times News paper in Mogadisu Vol. 395, 25/2/98
11. Xiddigta Banadir News Paper Vol. 158 2/3/98
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13. Mogadishu Times news paper Vol. 414, 19/3/98
14. Female is never considered as full member of the clan. Though woman is perplex and dilemma of which clan does she belong to, she mostly rely on the clan she married from. Therefore, women are not counted when wagging war and hostility.
15. Qura'n, 4:3.
16. Reported by abuDaud in his Sunan, Bab silat rihim,
17. Reported by AbuDa'ud and Nisai in their sunans, Bab Silat al-rihim
18. Qura'n. 49:13

## CHAPTER FOUR

### 4.0. RELIGIOUS ORDERS IN SOMALIA

#### 4.1. Role of Traditional Muslim Movements (Sufi Orders) in Somalia

The role of religious functionaries began to cower, in the Muslim world, from early 20<sup>th</sup> century when new currently civilization came to exist. Some of their legal and educational powers and responsibilities were transferred to secular authorities by the colonies and, then, the followed post-independent governments did the same. In Somalia, the position of religious leaders changed substantially after the 1969 revolution and the introduction of scientific socialism. Siad Barre insisted that his version of socialism was compatible with Koranic principles, so that Muslims can follow its footsteps. On the other hand, he condemned atheism. Religious leaders, however, were warned not to interfere in politics. The new government instituted legal changes that some religious figures saw as contrary to Islamic precepts. The regime reacted sharply to criticism, executing some of the protesters. religious leaders seemed to accommodate themselves to the government.

Generally speaking, religious orders have played a significant role in the expansion and teaching of Islam in Somalia. Thus, Islam in Somalia is market by the significance of religious orders. The rise of these orders which are known as (*turuq*; sing., *tariqa*, "way" or "path") was connected with the development of Sufism, a mystical current in Islam

that began during the ninth and tenth centuries and reached its height during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Up to the 12<sup>th</sup> century Sufism was a matter of limited circles of a spiritual elite that might be aptly described as “schools” with different spiritual techniques and even different spiritual ideologies.<sup>1</sup> In Somalia, Sufi orders appeared in towns and farmer villages during the fifteenth century and rapidly became a revitalizing force. Followers of Sufism seek a closer personal relationship to God through special spiritual disciplines. Escaping from emotional acts and self desires was among the top dogmas encouraged by the Sufi order. This led many people not to involve in this world's lifestyle affairs such as hard working to gain personal profit or national development at large. This disgusting behavior finally became among the top elements simplified poverty, seclusion, and other forms of self-denial to come. Members of Sufi orders were commonly called dervishes<sup>2</sup>. This became common especially during late 19<sup>th</sup> century and early 20th century. It was known the followers of Mahdi of Sudan and Said Mohamad (known by mad mullah) of Somalia. Leaders of branches or congregational prayers of these orders are usually given the Arabic titles of “*Sheikh*”, and- “*Aw*”<sup>3</sup>

Dervishes wandered from place to place, teaching and receiving gifts from the people. They are best known for their ceremonies, called “*Zikr*”, in which states of visionary happiness are affected by group of Sufi members celebrating of the mass in religious texts and by rhythmic gestures, dancing, and deep breathing. The object is to free oneself from the body and to be lifted into the presence of God. Dervishes have been important as founders of agricultural religious communities called “*jamaat*” (sing., *jamaa*)<sup>4</sup>. A few of these were home to celibate men only as educational camping ground, but in many

centers of *jamaat* were inhabited by families. Most Somalis were nominal members of Sufi orders but few underwent the rigors of devotion to the religious life, even for a short time.

Each order has its own hierarchy that is supposedly a substitute for the kin group from which the members have separated themselves. Veneration is given to previous heads of the order, known as the Chain of Blessing, rather than to ancestors. This practice is especially followed in the south, where place of residence tends to have more significance than lineage.

Membership in a brotherhood order is theoretically a voluntary matter unrelated to kinship. However, lineage is often affiliated with a specific brotherhood and a man usually joins his father's order. Initiation is followed by a ceremony during which the order's *Zikr* is celebrated. Novices swear to accept the branch head as their spiritual guide. To ensure this, a young Novice running under training should keep serving for the saint or being his body guard in his fresh years. He should carry his water calabash for the use of ablution, religious text books and stick. Similarly, he might keep marching after him when traveling or going for short visits. In addition, the young novices may drink the remaining water and milk drunk by their saint.

Leaders of orders and their branches and of specific congregations are said to have *baraka*<sup>3</sup>, a state of blessedness implying an inner spiritual power that is inherent in the religious office and may cling to the tomb of a revered leader, who, upon death, is

considered a saint. However, some saints are medieval because of their religious reputations whether or not they were associated with an order or one of its communities. Thus, each saint and assistant is respected and considered as enabling either to harm or empower some one according to the stage of his religious reputation.

Sainthood also has been inscribed to others because of their status as founders of clans or large lineage. Northern pastoral nomads are likely to honor lineage founders as saints; passive Somalis venerate saints for their piety and *baraka*. Because of the saint's spiritual presence at his tomb, pilgrims journey there to seek aid (such as a cure for illness or infertility). Members of the saint's order also visit the tomb, particularly on the anniversaries of his birth and death. It is worth noting, although visiting tomb is conditionally allowed, taking journey to it is absolutely prohibited in Islam, let alone to consider it as pilgrimage and seek aid from it.

#### 4. 2. THE SUFI ORDER IN SOMALIA

Sufism: the main spring of Sufism lay in the desire to cultivate the inner life and to attain a deeper personal understanding of Islam<sup>6</sup>. Thus, Sufism doctrine is not based in Islamic expansion, so that their activities of Da'wah – Islamic propagation was not active in Somalia compared to that of the currently functioning Islamic fundamentalists. However, their slow movement is remarkable. They have been combating illiteracy towards Koran by teaching children how to read and write Koran, while adults were to teach its interpretation and recitation.



Generally speaking, there had been, before the arising and the growing of the various Modern Islamic Movements, three popular Sufi orders with various subdivisions in Somalia namely; Qadiriyah, Salihiyah and Ahmadiyah (also known as Idrisiyah). Rafaiyah, a subsidiary branch of Qadiriyah that may be considered sometimes as fourth independent order, is mainly common in Mugadishu and the surrounding areas. In terms of Order association, there had never been strict conditions to be a member of any order or society regardless of one's particular clan. However, membership of Rafaiyah seems traditionally controlled by its environment. The majority of its members are from certain sub-clans of Heer-Hamar. Ordinarily, membership in a brotherhood is theoretically a voluntary base, except that, some times, to serve for the leader of the order and keeping his obedience as spiritual leader is pre-required or contracted as a condition of dismissal from the Order. Though it rarely happens, one can be dismissed from Order because of disobedience of the Sheik. This always has a close relation with the disciplinary issues. Therefore, some Sheiks examine new members by employing them to go for short trips with them.

It is customary for some sheiks to keep travelling on foot from place to place with their novices, depending on the generosity of others for their living. In the absence of wandering sheiks –teachers, nomads depend on a person associated with religious devotion, study, or leadership, called *wadaad* (pl. *wadaaddo*). The *wadaado* constitute the oldest stratum of literature people in Somalia. They function as basic teachers and local notaries as well as judges and authorities in religious law. They are rarely theologians; some are active members of a religious

brotherhood, or belong to a lineage with a strong trained but were nevertheless entitled to lead prayers and to perform ritual sacrifices at weddings, on special holidays, and during festivals held at the tombs of saints. However, lineage is often affiliated with a specific brotherhood and, generally, a man joins his father's order<sup>7</sup>.

Somali community had viewed one of God's mercy to and public prestigious to host a group of religious men at least once a blue moon, so that they can get sources to pay alms. Otherwise, they anticipate dooms for not paying alms to righteous people.

These three Sufi Orders: Qadiriyyah, Ahmadiyah and Salihiyah had been prominent in Somalia before the emergency of the young new Islamic Movements during early 1980s.

An introduction to each of those Islamic Movements is stated below:

#### **A. Qadiriyyah**

Qadiriyyah, the oldest order in Somalia was founded in Baghdad by Sayid Abd al-Kadir al-jilani in A.D. 1166 and introduced into Harar (Ethiopia) in the fifteenth century. It spread during the eighteenth century among the Oromo and Somalis of Ethiopia, often under the leadership of Somali sheiks. Its earliest known leaders in northern Somalia was sheikh Abdirahman al-Zailawi, who died in 1883. At that time, Qadiriya adherents were merchants in the ports and elsewhere. In an apparently separate development the Qadiriya order was also introduced into the southern Somali port cities of Brawe and

Mogadishu at an uncertain date. In 1819 sheikh Ibrahim Hassan Jebro acquired land on the Jubba river and established a religious center in the form of a farming community that became the first of the Jama'ah in Somalia. Upon settlement, the Order disseminated Islamic primary schools over the area according to its educational system and methodology. Outstanding figures of the Qadiriya in Somalia include sheik Awes Muhammad Barawi (died 1909), who spread the teaching of the order in the southern interior<sup>8</sup>. Sheik Awais was killed by Sayid Mohamad Abdille Hassan's soldiers of Darwish because of his refusal to fight against the Italian colony.

Sheik Awais has written or verbally read much devotional poetry in Arabic and attempted to translate traditional hymns from Arabic into Somali, working out his own phonetic system. Another leading Qadiriya leader was Shaikh Abdirrahman Abdullah of Mogadishu, who stressed deep mysticism. Because of his reputation for sanctity, his tomb at Mogadishu became a pilgrimage center for the Shabeelle people and some other minority clans living in the area surrounding Mogadishu. His writings continued to be circulated by his followers in the early 1990s.

## **B. Ahmadiyah**

The Ahmadiyah-Idrisiyah order was founded by Ahmad ibn Idris al Fasi (1760-1837) of Mecca. It was brought to Somalia by Shaikh Ali Maye Durogba borrowing it from Merca, a distinguished religious poet who joined the order during a pilgrimage to Mecca was written. His visions and the miracles attributed to him gained him a reputation for

sanctity, and his tomb became a popular objective among pilgrims. The Ahmadiyah-Idrisiyah, the smallest of the three orders in Somalia, has few ritual requirements beyond some simple prayers and hymns. During its ceremonies, however, participants often go into trances.

A conflict over the leadership of the Ahmadiyah-Idrisiyah among its Arab founders led to the establishment of the Salihiyah in 1887 by Muhammad ibn Salih. The order spread first among the Somalis of the Ogaden area of Ethiopia, who entered Somalia about 1880. The Salihiyah's most active proselytizer was Shaikh Mahammad Guled ar Rashidi, who became a regional leader. He settled among the Shidle people (Bantu-speakers occupying the middle reaches of the Shabeelle River), where he obtained land and established an independent jamaa. Later he associated another *jama'a* among the Ajuran (a section of the Hawiye clan-family) and then returned to establish still another community among the Shidle before his death in 1918<sup>9</sup>.

### C. Salihiyah

Generally, the Salihiyah and the Ahmadiyah-Idrisiyah leaders were more interested in the establishment of *jamaat* along the Shabeelle and Jubba rivers as well as the fertile land between them than in Islamic teaching and dissemination because only few of them were learned Islam adequately. Their early efforts to establish farming communities resulted in cooperative cultivation and harvesting and some effective agricultural methods. "In

Somalia's revering region. for example, only *jamaat* members thought of stripping the brush from areas around their fields to reduce the breeding places of tsetse flies”<sup>10</sup>.

Local leaders of brotherhoods customarily asked lineage heads in the areas where they wished to settle for permission to build their mosques and communities. A piece of land was usually freely given; often it was an area between two clans or one in which nomads had access to a river. The presence of a *jamaa* not only provided a buffer zone between two hostile groups, but also caused the giver to acquire a blessing since the land was considered given to God. Tenure was a matter of charity only, however, and sometimes became precarious in case of disagreements. No statistics were available in 1990 on the number of such settlements, but in the 1950s there were more than ninety in the south, with a total of about 35,000 members. Most were in the Bakool, Gedo, and Bay regions or along the middle and lower Shabeelle River. There were few *jamaat* in other regions because the climate and soil did not encourage agricultural settlements.

The most active proselytizer was sheik Muhamad Guled ar Rashidi, who became a regional leader. Perhaps, the best known of the Salihiya leaders in Somalia was Mohamad ibn Abdullah Hassan. leader of a long lasting resistance to the British and what he saw as errant Somalis in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Sainthood has been some times ascribed to others simply because of their status as founders of the clans or large lineage. Northern pastoral nomads are likely to honor lineage founders as saints; sedentary Somalis revere saints for their piety and *baraka*.<sup>11</sup>

### 4.3. MODERN ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS

In the eighteenth century, against a background of general stagnation, a puritanical fundamentalist movement erupted in Arabia. Mohamad bin Abdilwahab (1703 – 1792) was leading such movement. The modern movement called for a return to the purest Islam of the Koran and the Sunnah and its unadulterated monotheism, un-compromised by the popular cults of saints and their shrines<sup>12</sup>.

Like most of Arabian Peninsula, in Somalia, a large number of the religious people changed the old system of sheiks by employing new fashion. These are mostly the young generation who have grouped themselves into not less than three major groups namely; al-Ittihad, al-Islah, and Tabligh. The latter is common in all over the world and never ever involves into politics or controversial issues. They simply preach people in what is common and under agreement of all such as the fundamentals of Islam; worshipping one God, praying, fasting, giving alms, and visiting pilgrimage by those who afford the travel expenses to reach there.

The Modern Islamic movement in Somalia started in the mid of 1970s when Sheik Nur Ali Olow used to propagate it in Baled weyne and Sheik Mohamad Moalim used to give religious lessons in Abdulkadir mosque in Mogadishu. Though Sheik Moalim was later on imprisoned for a long time, the Islamic lectures continued and many new youths enrolled to Islamic studies and finally became very effective bodies who caused new

religious movements. Thus, those youths became the initial Islamic awareness and movements, which has been considered as rebel to the government.

In 1978, the Western Somali liberation brought many refugees from Ethiopia to Somalia. Somali Ogaden were quite happy that many of them were dancing men and women for their freedom crusade against Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Somaliland was not benefited ever because all the regimes ruled Ethiopia before Prime Minister Melassanawi were careless of the Somali ethnic people live in Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Let alone to develop the region, they used to collect taxes and seize their property by force. Only one intermediate school was in Shilabo town.

Being the situation of the Western Somalia so, most of their youths immigrated directly to Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia and the surrounding areas. There, they benefited from the educational crash programs introduced by the 1969 revolution of Somalia. There was compulsory education in the country, where by the sign and saying of "*Bar ama baro*" which means "learn or teach" was commonly expanded. In addition, the Bare's regime of Somalia had never recognized either the Ethiopian-Somali border or that of Kenya-Somalia. He strictly believed what is so-called "Great Somalia or ban Somalism". Therefore, no identification was needed as long as the person looks like Somali in figure and speaks in Somali language.

Thus to the Somali government, every Somali ethnic was nothing but Somali citizen, and had a full right of thing matter that any other Somali has a right to get. On the other hand,

the government had a full right upon them as any other Somali person. As a result, the Somali-Ethiopian youths grasped that opportunity and learned sufficiently from primary education to the level of university. They had learnt from various types of schools including those, which are taught in English, Arabic, or Somali language studying divergent fields of knowledge. Consequently, from early 1980s there were a large number of graduates who were well armed with both Islamic knowledge and modern science. Many of those learned youths went to Saudi Arabia for further studies and finally came back with the ideology of new Islamic movement. Then, both those who graduated from Saudi Arabia and the group remained in the country took a tough measurement to expand the norm of the Modern Islamic Movements.

Modern Islamic movements argue that since Somalis have all accepted the orthodox Muslim view that a man's conduct will be judged in an afterlife, the application of the *sharia* must be brought on the stage. One response was to stress a return to orthodox Muslim traditions and to oppose westernization totally.

The Modern Islamic Movements are nothing other than political organised authorities that they dispense justice. In early days of Feb.1990s. when the civil war broke up in the country, the first group gathered in Kismayu tried to over take the rule benefiting the opportunity of the government vacuum. This group who were from Daarood clan in majority promised they will rule the country in Islamic law. It was good opportunity that there were no separation among the Islamic Movement at the time; neither al-Ittihad nor al-Islah was publicly recognized.



Few months later, the strongest Hawiya militiamen attacked the city of Kismayu to chase the Daarood therefrom. The Islamic Movement, then, felt the responsibility to defend the city for they are appointed to administer it. The Darod warlords including Morgan (from Majeerten sub-clan of Darod), Bedel Farah (from Marehan sub-clan of Darod) and Jees (from Ogaden sub-clan of Darod) compromised with the Islamic Movement to hand over the rule to them and they defend the city from Hawiye. However, the Islamic Movement did never agree in involving in war and clan affairs. Some suggested arming the youths who are previously well trained in Islamic teachings and associates military camps, in order to capture the whole country. Some others rejected the idea and saw it additional *finah* (detrimental and corruption act). They recommended that devotion to teaching and public awareness would be the best way to approach the nation, while the establishment of armed soldier in this critical circumstance will definitely contribute to the serious problem. Therefrom, the Islamic Movement divided themselves into two major groups; al-Ittihad and al-Islah. Though both names had existence before the matter, they were not considered as potential agencies but just a matter of name. Al-Islah withdrew the cooperation and started propagandizing war activities while advertisement of peace reconciliation and public awareness were to spread.

The Modern Islamic Movements are ordinarily scattered in the respective clans, and mostly have joint-work and information exchange, but, it seems, they are not yet free from mixing between the religious commands and the clan interest. Explicitly, most of the members of the Islamic movements would struggle to make their clan strong and powerful who are at the same time religious teachers and scholars. As a result, each of

them nurses the hope of that his clan will be the ruling power of the country by applying the Islamic law. This made necessary every body to struggle in being famous leader whose base is Islam and introduces people the righteous acts.

Then, such kind of idea itself caused both cold and hot war. There has been envy and quarrel based on jealousy and competition among the members themselves. This conflict again contributes to that between two or more clans, because a member of Modern Muslim Movements may have the suspect of that his co-member is in the opinion and the support of his genealogical clan and the vice versa.

Though many individuals of the modern Islamic movements directly or indirectly support their henchmen warlords, it is not officially announced to support any of the respective warring functions. Thus, the supporter of both Islamic movement and his clan usually says, when talking about the matter, “ actually, none of the warlords and the militiamen is good or in right path, but they are not in the same position in wrongdoing”. Then, when the speaker analyzes their bad behaviors reaches the conclusion that those of his clan are the nearest to be accepted and close to the reality.

Therefrom, his co-member or colleague takes into account that his friend is a man of clan and hypocritically hiding himself under the umbrella of the Islam. As a matter of fact, those newly founded religious groups have mostly disagreed with the tribal warlords and chiefs. However, since there are many individuals and even groups who simply kept in getting support to their political missions from the religious teachings, be it correctly

translated or mistranslated. people are in suspect of one another. It is worth noting that the suspect is always the integral part of the Somali conflicts and rifle disputes.

The currently Somali Modern Islamic Movements are included into six groups. Two major groups; al-Ittihad and al-Islah and other minor four groups namely:

1. Wahdata al-Shabab al-Muslimin (based in the Northern part of Somalia)
2. Al-Ansar al-Sunna (based in Mogadishu)
3. Tabligh (globally known as wandering Islamic propagators)
4. Aala Sheik (based in Mogadihsu)

#### **A. Al-Islah**

AL-Islah group is scarcely available in the Mogadishu, Kismayu, Beled waine and some other few areas. Al-Islah is known as a branch of al-Akhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim brothers) founded by Hassan al-Banna, an Egyptian Islamic scholar lived during Gamal Abdinasir's regime of early 20<sup>th</sup> century. The socialist government pressured this group with some other Muslim scholars in Somalia, which marked them to take it really, many people fled to the neighboring countries for fear such as Yemen, Kenya, Sudan, Saudi Arabia and other Muslim countries. They currently play a significant role in the teaching field covering educational side of the urgent Somali needs. Their heard quarter is Banadir region. Sheik Ali Sufi mosque in Kasabalbalare particularly. Among their prominent leaders; Dr. Ali Sheik, Dr. Ebrahim Dassuqi, Dr. Mohamad Ebrahim, Dr. Abdirahman Badiyow, Sheik Qurdubi and others.

Al-Islah paid a lot of efforts to challenge with their contemporary religious groups and politicians. They usually preach people not to engage in civil war as clan militias and not to associate armed Islamic movement as done by al-Ittihad. They completely devoted to social service and national politics by providing some basic welfare services, and peace negotiations. One of their leaders, Dr. Ali Sheik, for instance, is the head of Majma's al-musalaha (Reconciliation Committee) who showed much efforts in peacemaking in several places of Southern Somalia. Similarly, he is the founder and Rector of petite university associated in Mugadishu, despite the civil war was going. Like that, the group concentrates on civil matters by helping and integrating community elders. They, however, condemn international community for not helping them in their viable activities. Yet, al-Islah is condemned by many people, mostly people from Darod clan who claimed that members of al-Islah are purely from Hawiya clan, particularly from Shikhal<sup>13</sup>.

In April, 1992 a group of al-Islah lived in Kenya but originated from Somalia announced their separation from the union of Somali office by strengthening Kenyan office since they became Kenyan citizens, they decided to live there permanently. Most of these members were mostly well educated who could empower all kinds of educational activities going in Somalia. Thus, this tragedy became a great setback to the Movement and persisted their political decision making bottle-necked.

Western Somalia also associated their own name 'Al-Tathamun Al-Islami' 'Uniting Islam'. The founders of this group are purely former prominent members of Al-Islah, who relinquished from Mogadishu headquarter to establish new offices in Ogaden region, perhaps for political purpose. Whether their separation from Mogadishu group is as agitated way or under acquiescence is not yet clear. This group never participated in civil wars, but tried to reconcile some functions. They named committee for the reconciliation such as 'Majlis al-Musalaha' containing some scholars and politicians who did not participate the war.

## **B. Al-Ittihad**

Al-Itihad Al-Islami movement is originated from "Salafiyah Movement" founded by Sheik Mohammad Bin AbdulWahab, Saudi Arabian Islamic scholar born in '18<sup>th</sup> century. This group's main task has been to oppose any innovations included allegedly in Islamic teaching after the time of the Prophet's life and his companion, that is called in Arabic-religious term "*Bid'a*", meaning "innovation in religion". They mostly concentrate on Tawhid and Aqidah (God's unity and pure faith issues), in order to correct one's way of worshipping God by eradicating to associate some other minor Gods beside him. They also give priority-preaching activities to transfer the Islamic message directly without fear or respect of those who are against them. When the civil war broke out in the capital city – Mogadishu and spread over the various regions, Al-Itihad that consisted of different clans in Somalia associated its own forces and based training camps in different areas in the country. Kismayu was the first one of the considered bases. Their basis were

both religious centres and feeding centres, where they organized self help systems to assist the needy people, especially orphanage in their areas. They also took into protecting some other vulnerable groups of people, specially women and children who were at risk to be killed or harmed only because they were from certain clans. They also have been playing a significant role in Islamic dissemination by sending preachers to variety of mosques over the country, albeit they rarely concern on towns and nomad villages.

Al-ittahad did not even fall behind to inquire chances to co-operate with both local and international humanitarian organization -NGOs. They got chance to manage the port of Bosaso after the government collapsed that they assured thanked activities and development which attracted the people and gave them prestigious name. The situation has, then, been worsening from time to time that every person should contact his clan people and their territorial. including the high politicians and Muslim scholars.

#### **4. 4. Disputes Between Al-Ittahad and other Groups.**

Generally speaking, Somalia under went two main types of conflict during the decade of civil war that dragged people into perplex vagrant life, whole spread destruction. upheavals, detrimental hunger and senseless killing. Though the direct rival experience of the Somali clans and sub-clans was that of the inter clans, the al-Ittahad al-Islami, one of the most prominent Islamic Movements existing in Somalia. contributed to the battle field by taking part of the rival disputes. This, in fact. led Somalis to strand between two

hells; warlord' clan-based destruction and wars occurred between Islamic fundamentalists and other political parties.

Despite hand to hand disputes, Al-Ittihad also involved in some other religious or political cold disputes with both other religious groups and political groups. The following are the most outstanding wars that run between al-Ittihad and other groups:

1. Rival conflict between al-ittahad and USC of Hawiye clan that took place in Kismayu in 1991,
2. Conflict between al-Ittihad and SSDF of Majerten, Darod sub-clan in Bosaso in 1992.
3. Conflict between al-Ittihad and SNA of Habargidir, Hawiye sub-clan in Gedo in 1993,
4. Conflict between al-Ittihad and SNF of Marahan, Darod sub-clan in Gedo in 1996 – 98,
5. Conflict between al-Ittihad and UNOSOM in Gedo and Mogadishu in 1993,
6. Conflict between al-Ittihad and Ethiopian arms in Gedo in 1996-99 and
7. Occasional disputes that happened between a branch of Al-Itahad based in Doublei and Muqaabul, a sub-sub clan of Ogaden on one side and the other side that branch of Al-Itahad and SPM faction led by M. S. Morgan in Kismayu.

Although Al-Ittihad frequently suffered from aggression, both from foreign arms and national militias, it was expected to succeed in playing significant roles to avoid any reason that may drug them down to such kind of wars, by using prevention system in

early stages. This is so, because they are religious group that has a profound knowledge in Islamic method of peace making.

#### **A. Al-Ittihad Contra UNOSOM in Gedo:**

In 1993 United Nation Troops called UNOSOM arrived in Somalia to disarm all Somali people for peace process and to deliver foodstuff to the needy Somali population. Al-Itihad viewed not to attack them but to defense whenever it is needed. The UN troops reached most of the areas in South Somalia. When they first stepped in Balad Hawa district that located at the border between Kenya, Somali and Ethiopia, where al-Ittihad's control and administration was functioning. The UNOSOM intended to have an unorganized dialogue with the Police Station Officer in the district, but they were simply ordered to go back to their heals. Not only that. Al-Itihad officials with some ordinary members followed after them with one technical vehicle to avoid them involving in any illegal activity during their way back. They drove not longer than 50 Kilo Meters when the UN troops opened fire on Al-Itihad vehicle, leaving behind the Police Station Officer Hassan Ali killed, and wounded two other important members seriously. United Nation Troops rushed to their centre in Bardhere veering from their main road and following through some other improper roads to access Bardhere. Al-Ittihad also went back to their centre in Balad Hawo with their casualties.

#### **B. Al-Ittihad Conflict with SNF in Gedo**

Al-Itihad had a power in Gedo region of Somalia were they ruled most of the main areas. Their rule had came out through the time, with out fight or any difficulties between them



and the community residing the area. Omar Haji Massale the head of Somali National Front (SNF) claimed to be the real leader of Gedo region but Al-Ittihad strongly refused to relinquish. Some elders from the area tried to reconcile but failed to do so. Omer promised he will destroy al-Ittihad's power in the region and it was after short period when mixed of Ethiopian army and detachment of SNF led by Omer attacked Balad Hawo, Dolo, and Luq districts where Al-Itihad had their biggest Islamic bases for Daawah activities. Al-itihad were overthrown by Ethiopian armies together with some Somali militias who did not want Itihad's management which is based on religion but would give priority to their sub clan interests.

Ethiopian Minister Milesanawi declared that, it was revenge of the Muslim Fundamentalist who frequently fought in Ethiopia and the government suspected that they mobilize themselves from basis of them in Somali – Ethiopian borders including Luq and Baladhawo<sup>14</sup>. General Omar Haji Massale threatened the non-Marehans who are in Gedo region of Somalia. where Marehan settled mostly. He claimed that his forces SNF killed 58 non-Marehans in the first attack and only 2 Marehans insisting that all non Marehans who were killed in the area came wrongly in the region. so that disserved to be killed.<sup>15</sup>

Consequently, Djibouti trailed some Somalis in the suspect of being members of Islamic fundamentalist<sup>16</sup>. The same has done by self-styled government of Somaliland. She trailed some youths who were suspected to be those who attempted to kill the Ethiopian Minister Abdul Majid. Mr. Igal Somaliland president declared that his government will

never object but appreciate any activity that Ethiopia measures to demolish fundamentalists' areas in Somalia<sup>17</sup>. Furthermore, he wrote to the Prime Minister of Israel Ishak Rapin in 3 July 1995 requesting him to recognize Somaliland government because they have struggled in the destruction of Islamic fundamentalists. Mr. Egal condemned and refused Muslim woman's style of dressing called *Hijab* – veil in public talk in Hargaisa, the capital of the so-called "Somaliland"<sup>18</sup>.

### C. Al-Ittihad Conflict with USC in Kismayu

Aideed spread his authority from Mogadishu south to Kismayu south. Al-Itihad, then, who were building their power in Kismayo area faced Aideed's militiamen and fought where many lives were lost from both sides but Aideed finally conquered the area. Few members of al-Itihad has resigned and associated what they later on called "al-Ansar al-Sunna". Others resigned too when the organization involved in fight against particular sub-clan of Darod, Majerten with the political part of SSDF in Bosaso district in April, 1992, which caused many people to have lack of confidence in the al-Ittihad group. Consequently, the al-Ittihad group was automatically recognized as a political group, instead of religious preachers.

Though al-Ittihad was more little in number and arms compared to any of the clan militias, they were extremely brave to defend themselves. They immediately lined themselves into the front line of field war near by Kismayu. On the other side, they tried to make some kind of negotiations with the Hawiya rivals by requesting delegates from

Hawiye members of Islamic movement to mediate between them and the Hawiye warlords. Col. Hassan Dahir Aweis, one of the most prominent members of al-Ittihad was chosen to have a dialogue with both sides. He was a full member of both al-ittihad and Hawiye, albeit many people saw him as a partial to al-Ittihad. Since he had full experience in military tactics, he assumed that al-Ittihad will be defeated by Hawiye, so that he asked al-Ittihad to vacate the area and never try to counter fight or defend themselves. However, they rejected arguing that God will help them as long as they are aggressed. They employed some Koranic verses as reliable evidence of their support from God's supernaturally power. They read " If there are hundred of you, patient and persevering they will vanquish two hundred and if a thousand, that will vanquish two thousand with the leave of Allah"<sup>19</sup>

On the other hand, al-Ittihad rejected to co-operate with Darod warlords and militias by fighting beside each other. Though they had no military experience, they said since they are not fighting for the sake of Darod; they will never follow warlord's advises and instructions.

Hawiye militias met with Al-Ittihad in Arare, only 30 km far from Kismayu and hugely attacked them. Al-Ittihad resisted their enemy for three days and finally were badly defeated. Not less than seventy members of al-Ittihad youths who were Hufaz al-Koran<sup>20</sup> were killed within a day. This indeed, resembled the well known battle of Uhud that took place between the first group believed in Islam including Prophet mohamad himself and non-believers around Madina district of Sa`udia Arabia. Both quality and quantity of the

casualties from the sides of believers at that time and Al-Itahad at this time were the same in any side.

#### **D. Al-Ittahad Conflict with SSDF in Bosaso:**

After the collapse of the central authority and all other institutions as well as the prolonged vacuum created by the collapse of the centralized Somali state, have provided fertile ground for experimentation with an orthodox models of ruling attempt. The Islamic movement of al-Ittahad, which has historically flourished during periods of national crisis, now seems well-placed to capitalize on the continuing institutional crisis and the genuine need for law and order. In particular, the al-Ittahad has promoted itself and its rigid religious rule among the people as an alternative to disorder and misrule. Al-Ittahad, with clearer purpose and structure, emerged as one of the better-organized groups. They exploited the situation of chaos and certainty to propagate their message of religious Puritanism and devotion to Islamic principles of piety. As a result, ordinary people were quick to trust them initially and their activities were rarely opposed. In fact, there were some obvious reasons to facilitate civil war between SSDF and al-Ittahad as suggested by mr. Abdisalem, one of the regional researchers of War-Torn Societies Project:

1. feeling of compassion and tolerance for religious revival
2. widespread desire to give a chance to an alternative system of rule
3. distrust of politicians and discredited political elite

- 4 Sentiment of disgust and disillusionment of most people with the type of centralized rule that is associated with past atrocities<sup>21</sup>.
- 5 In 1991, al-Ittihad secured agreement with the Northeaster political part, SSDF and the traditional elders that the movement be entrusted with the management of the Bosaso port. They were granted a certain percentage of the income from the port as a fee for their service<sup>22</sup>, however, a number of problems soon developed. The SSDF leaders involved in organizing and financing the defense efforts of the front line began to suspect that al-Ittihad deliberately supporting their rival clan of Hawiya, by delaying, sabotaging and, obstructing delivery of logistics to the SSDF battle front as well as employing a large number of Hawiya (their enemy), while it was almost impossible one of the SSDF supporters to visit the area controlled by the Hawiya. let alone to be recruited. The dispute continued for some months. until finally conflict arose between the two, that necessitated al-Ittihad to began building its own military bases and openly recruiting its own militia, which required the diversion of even large portions of the port revenues. The stage was eventually reached when al-Ittihad's leaders felt that they could openly challenge the north-Eastern establishment and they arranged to conquer the region. They simultaneously announced at 5. 00 a.m on 18 June 1992 that they over took almost all the towns of the region for governance as well as they are going to over take the whole country soon. Perhaps, they felt the responsibility of the country's administration since the country was lack of central government and under severe destruction and unprecedented detrimental. However, many people interpreted the act only a challenge against SSDF. Abdulgafar, a

regional researcher stated some consideration that have been cited as influencing the timing of the coup which are the following:

1. Over-confidence of the armed wing of al-Ittihad, as they underestimated the strength of the SSDF. It has been advanced but never proven that the political arm of al-Ittihad strongly opposed the timing of the military action and argued for more time to prepare it more thoroughly.
2. An increasing portion of the SSDF leadership was beginning to understand the policies and programmes of al-Ittihad and were openly campaigning for the management agreement on Bosaso port to be revoked, and al-Ittihad wanted to forestall any such move. At the time of the attack, an extraordinary meeting of the top leadership and the traditional leaders was in progress in Garowe. with an agenda that included the revision of the port agreement.
3. The attacking al-Ittihad forces in the Northeast were led by a Habargidir military officer, who was said to be close to Aydid. This incensed many people and implied that there was collusion and
4. Collaboration between al-Ittihad and Aideed's forces in Kismayu and Mudug, but this was never substantiated (indeed it may be considered as verging on conspiracy theory).

At all events, on 19 June 1992, while the top leader of SSDF, the traditional leaders and many members of the business community were meeting in Garowe, al-Ittihad proclaimed that they had taken over government in Northeast Somalia and set up and Islimist authority. Bosaso, Qardho, and Burtinle were completely in their hands initially,

they also managed to capture Garowe, attacking in the early morning prayer time, and placing the assembled leaders under arrest, who were staying in a compound. However, a few who had spent the night in Garowe town and not the military camp where the meeting had been taken place managed to escape<sup>23</sup>.

Those SSDF leaders who had escaped were able to mobilize the SSDF militia with uncountable number of contingents immediately, ordering the strong SSDF militiamen garrison led by former military officials in Galka'yo, and crushing the al-Ittahad troops. The hand to hand fighting continued not less than six months and a great number of lives were lost on both sides. Tragically, most of the dead among the al-Ittahad was well-educated young intellectuals mostly from the Northeastern region. This was the most repugnant war ever happened in Somalia, where brother killed his brother and father killed his own sons. The al-Ittahads well believed they are involving themselves into holy war – Jihad because their aim is to apply Islamic law in the country and administer every thing according to Islam. However, the same believed by the mass society because their Islamic tradition was mostly contradicting what the al-Ittahads came up with. They simply announced their ruling without introducing themselves the society. People were previously skeptical of their faith and ideology and sometimes considered them as non-Muslims. Thus, all the nomad pastorals who had heard many criticism against the al-Ittahad and never met with one of their members, let alone to know about their faith and ideology, rushed to defend their custom and religion considering themselves as crusaders who are engaging in holy war. They found it difficult to comprehend the savagery and ruthlessness shown by the al-Ittahad during their short campaign, as well as the timing of

the coup, when SSDF forces were preparing their defense against an anticipated USC offensive. In the consequence of this war with former disapproved propaganda against al-Ittihad, public opinion turned decisively against al-Ittihad and as a military force it was neutralized. However, the political and traditional leadership of the Northeast agreed to negotiate with the political leadership of Al-Ittihad and the following is the points agreed:

1. Al-Ittihad would be declared an illegal organization, in any form in the Northeast.
2. Individual members, both civilian and military of al-Ittihad, were allowed to return to their homes provided they settled within their community and refrained from any suspect activities.
3. Individuals complying fully with these two conditions would be free to perform any purely religious propagation<sup>24</sup>.

Now, the political intentions of al-Ittihad eventually became clear as the group attempted to impose its rigid interpretation of Islam upon the society, so that popular support shifted back to the SSDF.

Although the al-Ittihad, finally, withdrew from the SSDF territory into Warsengeli land, the military campaigns totaling seven did not succeed in eliminating them. Casualties on both sides exceed 3,000. In the ranks of SSDF, there have been always two factions, the military faction, who see themselves as the sole legitimate inheritors of Siad Barre, and the group of old politicians, tribal leaders, and intellectuals, who are fed up with the copper and zinc alloy. Both groups have been unanimously in agreement in fighting



against USC – Aideed faction, but not against the Islamic groups<sup>25</sup>. This is among the forefront reasons hindered any possibility to eliminate al-Ittihad from Bosaso and the surrounding areas.

To sum up, as the Islamic Modern Movement of al-Ittihad who evaluated their followers on religious commitment rather than limited tribal allegiance, attracted the masses as an alternative solution to national crisis, the SSDF started persecuting them.

#### **4. 5. The Role of Religious Groups in Cease Fire**

Many clan functions and individuals viewed young new Islamic Movements as they are siding with certain clans, so that is nothing but parts of the warring clan based factions. Ali Mahdi's group, for instance, viewed and condemned that some groups of Islamic Movements are in the support of Aideed, and Aideed saw vice versa.

As a matter of fact, The effective activities regarding to cease the Somali civil war that played by the religious groups cannot be ignored. Many different sheiks have tried to settle the problem both individually and as a group. Sheiks of Majma'al Ulama, for example, have tried to affiliate the fighting groups of Hawiye in Mogadishu, as well as to unite, at least, the Islamic Movements having their centers in Mogadishu under the umbrella of Hawiye authority that is assumed to be established in Mogadishu. Among those Sheiks: Sheikh Ibrahim Suley, Sheikh Mohammad Mo'alim, Sheikh Omar Al-Faruq and others. The last proposed a general meeting in September 1996 for all sides

engaged in the Somali civil wars. They mostly agreed on that, the meeting was supposed to take place in Mogadishu but the self-styled rulers of Mogadishu Mahdi and Aideed rejected.

Sheikh Mohammad Maalim has also attended many meetings and conferences to bring together all sides of clan leaders in Islamic way of unity. Cairo Conference attendants including; Raajis, Mahamed Xaamud, A/Rahman Qanyare, Omar Haji Massale and Hasharo, and the Ampasadour of Egypt to Somalia suggested Sheikh Mohammad Maalim to be recognized as the official Sheek –saint of the country. The Sheik himself had a speech in the conference, where he told the participants that, it is prohibited in Islam to proclaim leadership without the choice of the people<sup>26</sup>. Therefore, should one seek ruling power in Muslim society he/she should come through free and fare election. There is no other possible way that one can seek power. As a matter of fact, many viable roles to be played are neglected by the religious groups due to less of financial capacity, proper field knowledge and manpower.

The situation, in fact, indicated that Muslim groups could not stop the dispute because they had been having an entire conflict among themselves in the country. There have been verbal conflicts between the old system of *wadaads* – religious groups - Sufism brotherhoods i.e. Qadiriya, Ahmadiyah and Salihya and the modern Muslim movement namely al-Ittihad and al-Akhwan al-Muslimun. Moreover, there is sensitive animosity between the two major modern movements mentioned above whom their faith is based on the same of Mohammad bin Abdul Wahab's mission on God's unity renewal. They

both consider the Sufism system as very much back-warded Somali traditions that is not compatible with either of the Islamic pure teachings nor modern civilization. They condemned them of using principles of some non-authoritative traditions and tales while ignoring Koranic injunction and authentic Prophetic traditions. However, the new young Muslim Movements have their own socio-political differences, which is always deteriorating by the current severe circumstance.

This entire hostility of religious scholars brought up the mistrust among the Muslim groups themselves as well as the civilians. Thus, should one side try to bring an idea or develop any kind of progress, others would never hesitate to oppose them. It is also common if one of the religious groups tries to overtake the ruling power of a particular area the other would cause a conflict against them. Thus, explicitly, if all Muslim organizations would intend to unite their politics and religious activities for the interest of the public they would neither have enough ability nor constant management. This may bring an extra conflict emerging hatred among the clans and the individuals too.

Mostly the sheiks do not have a way rather than that of their clan-ship (*tol*) system of administration, where they have real consideration of talks or directing people to a specific point by expressing their ideas freely. Yet, we can not ignore that some sheiks do not have a considerable authority to arm or disarm their clans.

All Somali religious men who supported the clan system based on groups offered for the distraction of the nation. The situation explains that they demolished with either of their

hands or the hands of others by encouragement of their politics. They fixed on aggression side, enemy to the truth and fairness, with their decision on the issue, which created warlords to reject any Islamic resolutions. Civil society remained in dilemma of any decision to reach in being loyalty to either of Warlords or Islamic Movements; Would the warlords have authority to influence the public until they loose their worth and lives to the others? Would the warlords challenge to bring change from the current repugnant situation to lead the nation to betterment? What is the real relation between this dispute and the belief of the Islamic religion? And many other related questions have been daily asking one another by the civil society.

Proponents of this view argue that the intervention of the elders should be limited to mediation between sub-clans, settlements of differences of approach on customary legal issues, advice to political and administrative organs on key issues, and crisis management within the political structure. As guardians of traditional faith and moral values, the chiefs, for instance, should guard all about traditional issues controlling its systematic ongoing and protecting any misleading may occur on it. On the other hand, sheiks or spiritual leaders should guard the Islamic faith and morality by expanding Islamic moral teachings and advice people not to follow heedlessly any anti-Islamic behavior that may contradict the way and the objectives of the Islam.

In fact, each of the major groups have played their role instantly, emphasizing consensus decision-making through the mechanism of ratification and sanctioning of consensus

decisions reached generally by leaders of the community as well as preaching and moral awareness system.

The sheiks can empower, enforcement of their ruling due to their authority is based on moral authority, respect, and consent of the people. The sheiks and elders can lead legitimacy to direct law enforcement exercised by an assigned traditional administration body while avoiding open execution of power. In this way, the traditional leaders provide a social robe holding the community together in this difficult traditional period. One of the major experimental political steps that independent Sheiks of Mogadishu have done during about the decade of civil war was the press release of 23/7/98 in Mogadishu that they appealed massively the need to open the Port and Airport of Mogadishu.

An alternative interpretation of the role of the sheiks argues for a more assertive leadership style: either through incorporation within the political and administrative arrangements, to which they would thus contribute their legitimacy, or as wielders of the ultimate decision-making power. This view asserts that even overtly political issues and national reconciliation matters should be reserved for the sheiks, or should not be taken without leaving any consultation with them and obtaining their consent. Given the historical background, present configuration and possible future development of traditional authority structures, there are a number of issues, which are stated below to be considered:

- A. Gradual erosion and transformation of the powers of traditional leaders had been taking place for more than centuries before the state collapsed, leaving the institution weakened and disoriented.
- B. Alternative institutions claiming the right to deal with issues of politics, administration and national reconciliation have emerged, some times denying a role for the Sheiks.
- C. Traditional leaders and sheiks themselves are not homogenous and manifest different attitudes towards their new role.
- D. Instrumentalization of the traditional system in the service of political leadership has generally weakened the institution of the sheiks and attempting to do so now may provide counterproductive.
- E. The vital social role of the traditional leadership suggests that any future arrangements will have to accommodate the sheiks. if it is to straps and buckles their energy in support of the reconstruction process.

The leadership role of the sheiks has definitely increased since the state collapsed. They automatically moved from their common position to the top level of social administration. They directly involved themselves in socio-political affairs beside being religious advisers and community preachers that led them to be in charge of purely political issues, so that most of the community interests could hardly be engaged unless consulted with them. The following issues are mostly sought for advice and interference of the sheiks:

1. To take steps in actively participating in the ongoing political local activities, together with the clan elders, but without trying to override them or lay hold of any powers from them.
2. To uncoordinated and individual attempts to claim all political administrative and social traditional powers for themselves to the exclusion of formal political organs.
3. To be called to arbitrate at the highest level of the political spectrum. at times getting so involved that serious schisms have arisen between them.
4. Recent efforts to patch up past differences and return gracefully to their original position of authority of last resort, wielding moral and traditional power while leaving politics to politicians until needed. as with other institutions. the development of an accepted and respectable role for the sheiks will have to take its full course .  
Whatever this turns out to be, it is evident that the erosion of their powers has at least temporarily been reversed.

Governance crisis and shortage of charismatic and credible political leaders in Somalia foster widespread confusion and lack of clear political perspective and strategy. Thus large sectors of the population seem to consider the spiritual leaders and the tribal chiefs as the authority of the last resort. as they have been able to keep the fragile peace in the country since the collapse of the central government. Many Somalis believe that the matter of resolving political differences within the various clans should be left entirely in the hands of the Islamic political movements (whether their political activity is clear or hidden). Yet others feel that the clan warfare themselves should rule the country according to the Islamic law and cover the need of the Islamization in Somalia. From

their position as the highest authority in the territory of their respective clans before the advent of colonization, the sheiks and community elders have seen their responsibilities eroded, their prerogatives challenged and their subjects enticed away by non-traditional leaders. Their role has been taken over by the government in power, and was no longer one of genuine representation of the interests of their kin groups. Similarly, a vacuum of power and instituted leadership was created in Somalia following the collapse of the central government in early 1991. In the respective regions the elders and the sheiks rose to the occasion, taking upon themselves the responsibility of managing the affairs of their people and creating stability and safety in their cases. They did not act alone, or challenge the position of others, but rather worked in co-ordination and understanding with the political leadership of the communities.

Unlike the conventional Somali factions, the Islamists pursue clear-cut social agenda, winning support through their outreach to a war-weary people. Underpinned by extensive holding in the private sector, including hotels, *Xawaalad* system (money transfer service), and import export concerns, the most sophisticated often medical care, schooling and training, as well as support to struggling entrepreneurs. Practices vary, but in many cases these social services come with strings attached: membership in the group, regular attendance at certain mosques, and complying with a dress code and behavior-particularly for women. Tension between the fundamentalists and the proponents of Somali Islam is already sharp. Many Somalis resent the foreign roots of the Islamists and the suggestion that their own Islamic are somehow inadequate. Others resist what they perceive as a clear political agenda to establish a conservative Islamic Somali State. A number of more



traditional dariiqas pride themselves on defending their Islamic beliefs from any kind of encroachment.

Islam's potential to overcome Somalia's divisions and to nurture a lasting peace is thus at odds with the divisiveness and violence represented by competing fundamentalists ideologies. Most disturbing, perhaps, is the overt ambition of the most vigorous movement to reintroduce the kind of centralized, authoritarian leadership Somalis have fought so hard to overthrow.

## ENDNOTES

1. A term usually reserved for these learned in Islam and rarely applied to ordinary wadaddo.
2. From the Persian plural, daraawish; sing., darwish, one who gave up worldly concerns to dedicate himself to the service of God and community.
3. a term usually reserved for these learned in Islam and rarely applied to ordinary wadaddo.
4. An Arabic religious term used for congregational prayers particularly and Muslim unity as general. Literally it means "group".
5. a state of blessedness implying an inner spiritual power that is inherent in the religious office and may cling to the tomb of a revered leader , who, upon death, is considered a saint. However, some saints are medieval because of their religious reputations whether or not they were associated with an order or one of its communities.
6. Mircea Eliade (Editor in chief), The Encyclopedia of Religion vol. 7. New York, MacMillan Publishing Comp., p. 315.
8. SUPRA.
9. see Sayyid Mahammad's Dervish Resistance to Colonial Occupation, ch. 1, p. 2
10. Harold d. Nelson, Somali, a Country of Study. Washington D.C., 1982, P. 111.
11. Ibid. P.112.
12. Mircea Eliade (chief editor), The Encyclopedia of Religion. vol.7. New York, Macmillan Publishing Comp, USA, p. 318.
13. sub-clan of Hawiye who were former independent clan but have close coalition with H/gidir.
14. see Sayyid Mahammad's, Dervish Resistance to Colonial Occupation. chapter. 1. p. 2, Radio Ethiopia. Codka Nabada Soomaaliyeed, Warka madaxdiisa. 27, July 1996.
15. Qaran News paper in Moqdishu vol. 1828, 22/3/98.
16. Radio Hargaisa, Faalada wararka. 28 July 1996.
17. Wargeyska Qaran, Muqdisho, 29, July 1996.
18. Al-Moslemoon No. 616, 22nd Nov. 1996.
19. Qur'an: al-Baqra- 2: 66.
11. Mohamad Said Samatar. Somalia a country of Study. (1st Ed. U.S.A, 1982) p. 109.
12. Sa`dia Tauval, Somali Nationalism International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa. Cambridge, Massachuserrs. Harvard University Press, 1963, p. 31.

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13. Harold d. Nelson, Op.cit. pp. 41-45.
  14. ibid. p. 112.
  15. SUPRA.
  16. A newly founded sub-clan of Hawiye who were former independent clan but have close coalition with H/gidir.
  17. The Somali voice broadcast, Mogadishu.
  18. Qaran News paper in Moqdishu vol. 1828, 22/3/98
  19. Al-Moslemoon Newspaper, Al-Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, No. 616, 22nd Nov. 1996.
  20. Qaran News paper in Moqdishu vol. 1828, 22/3/98
  20. Al-Moslemoon No. 616, 22nd Nov. 1996.
  20. those who can read the holy Qura'n fully by heart without referring to any book .
  21. Abdislem Ali Farah, War-Torn Societies Project Northeast Somalia Regional Reports Bari,Nugal and North Muddug Regions. (UNRISID Plais des Nations: Geneva, March 1998) p. 63.
  22. Abdulgaffar H. Maahamud Abdulle, War-Torn Societies Project Northeast Somalia Regional Reports Bari,Nugal and North Muddug Regions. (UNRISID Plais des Nations: Geneva, March 1998) p. 39.
  23. Abdulgafar, ibid.p. 40.
  24. SUPRA.
  25. Odey Biiq II, The Ugly Face of the Somali Drama. (Kampala: Uganda). P. 10.
  26. the Somali voice broadcast, Mogadishu.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### HUMAN RIGHTS PERTAINING TO CUSTOMARY AND ISLAMIC LAW IN SOMALIA

#### 5: 1. Somali Traditional Justice and Shariah

The clan or sub-clan councils with the help of sheiks who provide religious instructions are the principle authority with the capacity of both to hold their armed members accountable for human rights abuse and common crimes, and to provide redress for abuse. In Somalia, traditional justice system councils of elders provide a forum through which an aggrieved party seeks restitution of goods, other payment for injuries received. Payment of *diyah* or blood-money is a matter negotiated between the *diyah* paying group of the offender and that of the victim<sup>2</sup>. Traditional justice also results in judgements of guilt or innocence for crimes and the determination and execution of punishments. Each community have their own elder, who may send representative to each household seeking the service of the clan's young men. This community base can serve as an obstacle to discipline and accountability, in that the elders must in turn be accountable for any punishment to a misbehaving member's family.

Although traditional systems of justice are now making somehow an augmentation against the currency anarchy, these systems are themselves to a denial of due process of law, and harsh punishments. Somalis may be executed if held responsible for crimes

under traditional justice systems that are taken by the authority of councils of clan elders.

Amputation has also been reported in some areas under Shariah law. Execution style killings, however, may also be carried out in whole arbitrary basis, on the order of traditional authorities or war-leaders. As a representative of a Muslim relief agency told human Rights Watch, "Torture is not common in Somalia, but killing is"<sup>12</sup>

Recovering law and order machinery was a desire expressed to Human Rights Watch by a wide range of Somalia. Through the vacuum has still to be filled, Shariah and traditional systems function with a degree of overlap, Shariah law has acquired increasing importance in several regions of the country. One observer described the support for violence, murder and rape have declined immensely where it is introduced<sup>3</sup>.

In April 1993, UNOSOM created a justice committee. M. Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi did not welcome it because the appointees were not factional, the SNA constantly condemned it over the Radio. UNOSOM eventually dismissed the committee and allowed M. F. Aideed and Ali Mahdi to appoint their own committee the people of the original committee have had to hide up. Fearing for their safety<sup>4</sup>.

Thus, most of the Somalis give priority to their own interest and culture, no matter whether that is contradictory to Islam or not.

## **5: 2. Somalis' Violence in the Light of Islamic Law**

When Islam first appeared in the Arabian peninsula in the 7<sup>th</sup> century AD, it had found the Arabs divided and warring on each other along clan lines just like the Somalis

did traditionally and are doing to day. Islam has a great extent unified this people and had replaced their clan-based identities with one based on the Islamic faith. At the same time, Islam forbade any fighting between Muslims, but it at the personal or group levels.

Prophet Mohamed, my Allah's peace be upon him, said: "if two Muslims confront each other with their two swords, then the one who killed and the one who is killed shall both end up in Hell". Even when waging the jihad against aggressive non-believers, Allah and his Prophet enjoined on Muslims to display a morally superior behavior that reflected the superiority of their faith. Muslim was forbidden to finish off the wounded or mutilate the bodies of their slain enemies. They were urged not to kill women, children, the aged or the hermits whom in seclusion. They were also forbidden to cut down fruit-bearing trees, burn crops. destroy buildings or needlessly kill animals.

Although all Somalis profess Islam. adherence to this faith did not prevent them from engaging in clan warfare and looting each other's property similarly, they intentionally destroyed buildings, farms, public clubs by putting them under fire repugnantly women were raped and killed and children were killed or severely battered. This may be explained fact that, among Somalis. clanism sentiments were always stronger then loyalty to religious teachings, and that to be disgraced in this world was for more serious to them than being damned in the next. as evidenced by their quoted saying: "men prefer damnation to oppression".

This attitude of defiance notwithstanding, Somalis traditionally greatly revered apparent symbols and manifestations of religion. Though few cases were reported in early civil wars, for example, in any war, places of worship and religious study such as: Mosques, Qu'ranic schools, saint's shrines etc, were not violated. No weapons could be taken in to them: no homicide or any other harm would be committed inside their walls; and no person who had sought refuge inside them could be dragged outside to be executed. However, Somalis today behave completely different behavior that is against all types of Islamic teachings. They did opposite of all the above mentioned symbols.

The destruction or looting the Mosques and other religious places was something that had never taken place prior to the current civil war. Likewise, if someone from the enemy was caught by his pursuers and he raised a copy of the Kor'an or the wooden tablet used by students of the Kor'an saying; "o Kor'an of Allah, I place myself under your protection", he was usually left alone unharmed. A Somali saying that demonstrated respect for places of worship goes as follows: A mosque is a house of God; he who shows reverence towards it shall not fail to be rewarded<sup>5</sup>

Traditionally, most of Somalis involved in religious and territorial wars pitting them against neighboring people of other religious and ethnic affiliations. yet, they used to respect holy places and heritage buildings. Likewise religion-based clashes related to different interpretations of Islam did sometimes occur among the Somalis themselves. The main aim of such wars never being to destroy the opposing part completely, but either to relinquish them from a particular place or to stop their strange propaganda. Of

these the most famous is the war of the Bardhere Community whose events were narrated as following:

In the land between Afgoye and Walanweyn, which once came under the rule of the Sultanated of Geladi, only the Qadiriya Sufi of Islam was practiced, and this was headed by the sultan himself. A mulah by the name of Sheikh Hassan Jeberow tried to initiate an Ahmadiyah brotherhood in the same area, but his efforts were thwarted by the sultanate. Sheikh jeberow migrated therefore to the area of Bardhere in 1982 and there he successfully established the Ahmadiyah brotherhood whose followers engaged in cultivation and religious study. The center was called "the Bardhere community". After the passing away of Sheikh Jeberow, he was succeeded as leader of the community by Sharif Ibrahim with Sharif Abdirahman as deputy.

Sultan Yussuf Ahmed of the Geledi strongly resented the success and growing appeal of the Ahmadiyah sect based in Bardhere which he saw as a threat to his own Qadiriya branch. He there for, decided to chase them the area, in order to protect any ideology and religious methodology other than that ordinarily exist and people are already convinced in it. To this end, he bordered his subject and co-religionists to prepare for a jihad campaign to eradicate the offending community which threatened the existence of their own sect. This was done in 1843 when Sultan Yusuf, at the head of an community which become the scene of intense fighting and merciless. The members of the community, who were outnumbered by a ration of five to one, were conquered and brutally massacred. Among the casualties were Sharif Ibrahim and Sharif Abdirahman, the two leader of the community. Also, the community's homes and farms were burned down completely. The ruins kept smoldering for a long time and Bardhere was a desolate and uninhabited place for the following twenty years or so<sup>6</sup>

However, the Somali warlords behaved with the people as non-human being. They had never had a goal and objectives in their fighting in the first place. Secondly they did not target to a particular type of people in their ruthless and unlawful wars. Thirdly, they did genocide against innocent women, children, sick, old parents, handicapped and strangers. They indiscriminately looted and ransacked all the properties found. They even killed thousands for having no property when asked to displace it.



My visit to Kismayo in November, 1997, when it was under the control of General Mahamed Sacid Hirsi "Morgan", the airport has big land and each of old buildings around was demolished either completely or partially, heavy war tracks and hand weapons were being carried by unnumbered militia men, most of them youth age. Everyone had access into the Airport as he wishes and the faces of the people showed the tiredness and readiness of firing in any minute. The priority of every militiaman seemed only to earn money or *mira*<sup>7</sup>. The divide the management of the Airport among the clans in the area occasionally, where the management considered the clan system based on theory rather than developed management.

About 80% of those interviewed showed that. to the respective clans, it became quite disputable whether a function leader of another clan is a Muslim. This is because every clan have the assumption that they are on the right path while the rest on astray; ignorant, nomad. uneducated, unfaithful, unman, enemy, less political vision and less population. If any of the leaders is serving for the sake of the Muslim Somali community, one may ask him/herself where does it show to serve in clanism and disgracing the Muslims? Obviously, it is clear that in many cases the leaders take the decision to wage a war for certain wishes of prestige making that mostly arranged by the chief of his clan and his henchmen in order to clarify, tactful and that he is a hero man.

For questioning only whether their arms can destroy or burn others' houses and property, as well as to rape their daughters in public or enslave them is the main reason of such acts. Though these types of actions are strictly forbidden in Islam, the Somali warriors

would interest to act them in order to show their power. Furthermore, it had never happened of a particular clan or sub-clan to be thanked or given dignity in that activity.

As a matter of fact, the Warlord's objectives are nothing but to keep the Somali nation in terrible wars and misery life. As a result, this is only what comes out from all their actions and plans, because it is common that events are the result of deeds. The Prophet (P. B. U. H.) has said: " All deeds initialize from the mid"<sup>8</sup>. Thus, since, the result we have is, generally; genocide, rape, rob, and chasing from land that all are against innocent civilian people, then, no doubt, the aim of the war was intentionally to do so.

The warlords and clan chiefs as well as the local politicians are aware of that no particular clan of Somalia can put themselves in power position over others by force and then keep ruling the rest by force and depression. Similarly, they aware of that they cannot practice in colonial activity, which has no space in Islam, but the Islam, prohibited and combated with. They also have an idea that it is impossible all clans and sub clans to have the presidential position or Prime Minister in once.

Muslims commonly know that fighting for the sake of clan is a serious offence that one may commit a crime or at least a horrific ignorance in it, and he or she will be responsible of the consequence in hereafter. The Prophet said in the meaning of whoever fights for the name of his clan, both the killer and the one who is killed will get into hell. This is because the one who is killed himself was trying to kill his brother, so that the two are in the same category due to their intention of killing.

However, the Somali Muslims never give full attention to such Islamic teachings, so that the war left behind with them in the worst situation ever passed by human being. It became a focussed issue for Somalis when having tea together or normal conversation to discuss about the effects of the war, yet the wars and animosity among them is hierarchically increasing day by day.

Pumping and blasts which caused death, injury and homeless to civilian citizens when victims were attacked in their houses (mainly Mogadishu residents) in the war between Siyad Barre's regime and the USC antigovernment militia of Hawiye clan as well as that run between two factions of Hawiye; Habargidir and Abgal may be taken as pragmatic terrorist attacks and aggressive actions against Islamic law and humanity. The attack was intentionally deplored from angry minds that can be explained as "middles violence". I witnessed more than once, where a peaceful towns were hitten with pumps and heavy grenades and then civilians escaped from their houses without glancing their properties and in some cases not remembering their children at all.

The militia-men who overtake the town consider day-light looting, robbing and raping more than any thing else. If they sometimes do not able to collect the property they put it under fire. Inhabitants have no choice but to try their best to escape for the safety of their lives. The leaders of the factions encourage the militiamen to keep on looting, in order to influence them in the continuation of the war. Otherwise, the militiamen will not follow

them to participate in the battles. This, actually, is a mindless violence, which has no clear target and any procedure to follow.

The operating machine of this ruthlessly violence may include those who are acting this way without any reason, but it leads personal or group interest. Warlords, on the contrary, seek to persuade the people of his immoral and unmanly acts. They appeal on primitive principles that are reasonable in the sight of the supporters, but, in reality, it is hard to believe that any of their acts has a base in religion. It is commonly known that man takes decision either from his own mind or given sources of idea

The thief, for instance, steals but when police arrests may believe that he or she is embarrassed. Not like that, the gangs enclave the territory of Somalia are nomadic youths who are unaware of whatever goes over the world. They only get instructions and advice from the warlords, thinking that such ideas are the most upright and useful ones. The ranks of terrorist may include those'who are acting this way without espousing any cause; perhaps, the main cause they advocate provides only an occasion for or a rationalization of violence.

The war wagged by USC of Hawiye against the government show ruthless violence and such violence simply approved only as anticipated by their contra Darod elders who always warned that Hawiye's movement will only cause open ended destruction and genocide which will bring the nation into stateless and vagrant life. Though the Darods themselves were fat from serving for the cause of justice and peacemaking, whether it be

to preserve internal order, to resist aggression or to assist the victims of injustice, their heart was clean from envy compared to the Hawiye. The Hawiye people nursed in mind serious envy and animosity against Darod for a long time and it is only that which led them not to think about government and administration. They only opted to revenge the old critics they met from the Darod's aggression before Barre's regime, so that they involved in bloodshed instead of overtaking power. According to East African culture, this is no unbridled license for slaughter. It follows that, while so much force may be used as it is necessary to victory, it should always be as much as required in the circumstance regardless of their training and order making. That is why it was common to see mass genocide against innocent people which any harm against them is unlawful under any law and regulation. This has been found enunciated by moral theologians in all ages, though it sometimes seems inevitable, especially with the destructive power of modern weapons, that some will be killed per accidents at least in any major military operations. This was the basic reason for the outright condemnation of the use of weapons of wholesale destruction by the second Vatican Council which stated as "any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their population is a crime against God and man too. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation"<sup>9</sup>.

Generally speaking, the Somali civil war was strongly lighted in the capital, Mogadishu, by the Hawiye clansmen either from within or without justification, but the probable results are too horrible to complete. They extremely caused political turmoil and injustice within a critical situation for all Somali clans including themselves. Furthermore, light-

headed religious people and academicians of either sides did never think about the use of the ethics and theology of revolution they learned. This is what mainly accelerated the lack of trust in the religious groups and individuals existing today.

Victory or defeat of Barre's regime is not in itself an indication of the justice or injustice of a belligerent. But did a frank assessment of the relative failure of the anti-Daroodism wars what is so-called "clan liberation" after almost one decade suggest that right is not on the side of this offensive. Blatantly speaking, Hawiye clan with the help of many of clanless individuals and families lived in the southern Somalia did not delay to take their best efforts to contribute the tough measurement of the genocide operation against Darood clans and some other minority clans as well as ransacking their property and that of the government. On the other hand, the Daarood's bulk of population believed that they are exercising their natural and inalienable right of self defense. Whatever the motives of their adversaries or the defects of the Somali form of government. Both the initial incursions and the subsequent *Mooryaan* intrusions, aimed at organizing subversion having been mounted from foreign basis. In point of fact the defense, both Hawiye's self-style politicians and their henchmen. in the sense of social endeavor to restore and protect the community against the disruption, has been sustained with increasing trouble and terror. It was assimilated by Dr. Ahmad Warsame, as the thief stolen the directory book of how to drive an airplane, when the thief came in the airplane and it is already in the heaven, he tried to land it down but could never know how to land it. because he left the book behind.

Obviously, the Hawiye militiamen have never had clear objectives. They inadvertently hugged the war that they could never anticipate its consequence. This verifies how the Hawiye warlords were never been sincere in their ardent desire to reach betterment for the lot of the Somali people by replacing the Darood's rule to their own, thus sustained as they have been seen by the world wide surge of anti-colonialism as Hawiye claimed later on. This, then, shows a clear picture how Somalis give the first priority to the clan interest when religion, country, nation, social, education, economic, etc comes competing with clan affairs, the clan problem is the first and foremost issue to be solved.

In terms of criminality, it is common moral to consider war criminals that those who start a war first in any condition are first hand criminals. These are logically and deniably responsible for all the killing and the wounding, on both sides of the conflict and the social dissolution which inevitably follows the killing and the torture. The question of "was there a just cause of war, and what just cause is it after all " comes into minds. To reply this, one must bear in mind that there are two aspects which led fighting between Daarood and Hawiye; one of the two pertaining to internal war, since there have been rumours saying the Daroods are foreigners who overtook the land of Hawiye. Notwithstanding, they still support foreign nations to inhabit the land such as the small communities of Bantu origin and Persians or Yemanians lived in the main areas of farming and commercial land. The other pertaining is to uprising, since their attacks are intended to stimulate and meaning to assist land conquering.

As John Appertain stated under the natural law for Almighty God, to kill people is the gravest and most exceptional right which any human ruler or agent of the law can exercise in this imperfect world to counteract injustice, self defense against physical attack being the only spontaneous justification of it<sup>10</sup>.

Thus, the great moral weakness of all the clan-based belligerents which have resorted to violence is that they ruthlessly waged non-organized wars while they contain of extremely ignorant youths and few criminal warlords. There was no public authority to organize and mobilize the clan militias in any of these clan-based movements. Therefore, their efforts ended into detrimental vagrant live and prolonged sadness.

### **5: 3. Establishment of Modern Islamic Courts**

Environment has changed allot nowadays and where many individual and groups are paying much effort in finding solution for the problem. Since there has been no monitorial authority, looting, robbing, raping, killing, threatening, restless life and grave adversity became the normal process of people's living condition. To finalize or combat this, it was proposed that some Muslim courts would be organized. This is a clear evidence shows that the civilians would choose Islamic courts for their way of salvation.



Recently, there are a large number of so-called Islamic courts in different areas of the country, especially where the problem of the civil war affected seriously. The most famous courts situated in Mogadishu, Gedo and Hiran.

Mogadishu: in 1993, the religious groups of Wadajir district emulated the Luq'a Islamic court and opened their own Shariah court in south west of Mogadishu. Sheik Hamud Sheik A. Siyar was elected to be the court's president, while Mr. Musa Sudi Yalahow became the delegated authority of both districts. In order to function, the court abrogated the sub-clan regulations in that area, as the first abscission from the two tyrant faction leaders of this war-ravaged capital of Somalia, Mogadishu. Gen. M. F. Aideed disgusted the court since he was arguing long ago that the area was his and under his command and assailed several times in an attempt of capturing it, but the inhabitants of these two districts do not spare efforts to defend the court and the people.

On August 11, 1994, after an effective effort of Sheik Ali Mohamad (Sheik Ali dheere), the north of Mogadishu Islamic court was opened too. Sh. Ali's persuasive endeavors included to collect signed papers as consent of the resident's prominent elders and religious groups for implementation of the court, thus, impelling the politicians to sign their prepared lists. In opening ceremony, among those who addressed the public were Mr. Ali Mahdi, Sheik Sharif, Sheik Hassan Adde and Sheik Ali dheere. Sheik Ali dheere became the president of the court, and he eagerly started his security operations in and around Si-Si, the most horrified zone which was the home of looters<sup>11</sup>

Sheik ali dheere was the most dynamic person who bravely and swiftly chastened the thieves, burglars and looters and killed for executed for killing crimes, as well as for married adultery. Gradually, sheik Ali dheere extended his hunting against the evil generating youth in north Mogadishu<sup>12</sup>. However, only after one year of relatively peaceful situation, the politicians assembled their sessions secretly and discussed how to find ways of controlling the growing power of Sheik Ali dheere or how to minimize the public court relations. The wipe-out attempts exacerbated when Mr. S. Illing visited north Mogadishu and termed the court operations as human-rights violations, expressing stipulations that he, will lead to Somalia the relief agencies of the UN and the NGOs if the politicians can manage to stop the human-rights violations<sup>13</sup>.

Besides the application of Islamic law, Islamic courts involve in some other necessary activities to combat armed conflicts and delinquency behavior. They encourage reconciliation programs moral education, creating job opportunities and hard working and eradicating unlawful entertainment while associating other types of entertainment which are approved or acceptable in Islam such as sports instead.

On 13, March, 1998 the chairman of Islamic court in Northern Mogadishu Sheik Musa Adde opened officially football play in Stadium Coins” play ground in Mogadishu. The sheik talked about the importance of football in the community and that it brings brotherhood among the society. “In our condition today it interprets the existing peace” he said<sup>14</sup>. Sheik Ali Dheere was welcomed by a large number of people in Mogadishu when he returned from Saudi Arabia on 18/7/98. Such people were so vivacious where by

they were carrying his photos and, sometimes, praising him in songs. Not less than 25 vehicles mounted on machine-guns were protecting him-self and the general security in the occasion<sup>15</sup>. This indicated their love and respect to him. This is nothing but because of his activity in the application of the Islamic law. People saw as last resort after the country has been overshadowed by robberies who are taking the opportunity to benefit from the civil war circumstance that Somalis are in. while Sheik Ali Dhere was in abroad, the bandits increased in the country because Islamic courts has declined.

GEDO: when armed Al-Ittihad group was chased from Kismayu in April, 1991, they instituted two main military camps; one in Doblei and the other in Gedo, Bladhawo particularly. Since Gedo was more urbanized compared to Doblei the camp in Gedo became very popular and active that led finally to be recognized as head quarter of al-Ittihad. Initially, Al-Ittihad did not interfere region's public affairs but persisted in preaching, warning from God's punishment that may cause by the continuation of the civil war and daylight looting. They concentrated on teaching and giving public lectures in both mosques and streets but they rarely tried to direct advises to the community elders.

1<sup>st</sup> June, 1992 M. F. Aideed's militiamen captured Gedo chasing almost all Marehan clan the people lived there including late president M. Siyad Barre but excluding al-Ittihad members. Al-Ittihad vacated the area before USC led by M. F. Aideed reached, in order not to be condemned of siding with their clan's men of Marehan<sup>16</sup>. They situated in a private farm located at the borders of Kenya \_ Ethiopia \_ and Somalia, and declared they

are an independent politico-religious part who never opt to engage in civil war. After 29 days, 29 Jun, 1992 M. Aideed's militiamen were badly defeated and chased from Gedo. Almost all their militiamen and leaders were left killed. Only few of them including Aideed himself (he was also injured)<sup>17</sup> were returned in very critical condition. Gedo region came back into the hands of its owners, Marehan but they could hardly reside and resist there due to lack of financial resources and rehabilitation. Then, they compromised with Al-Ittihad to defend the region and overtake its control and administration ever after<sup>18</sup>.

Al-Ittihad headquartered Luq, the most heterogeneous district of Gedo where they established their first Islamic high court. Then, they deplored their rule over the region by targeting some delinquency behaviors such as illegal sexual intercourse or illicit, chewing Mira (qaat), smoking, watching movies and even listening music and songs. Within a year Luq automatically became the main Islamic center in Somalia. Many Somalis immigrated from different regions to Luq and many others were repatriated from abroad to reside in Luq for good.

However, some of SNF – Marehan's political part were never convinced in the previous agreement. so that they insisted Al-Ittihad should abstain from politics and remain in religious affairs. There had been prolonged disputes on "who is responsible of the region". Finally, the leader of that group of SNF, Col. Omer Haji Masalle restored to request arms and financial support the government of Ethiopia. Since Ethiopia itself was suffering from Al-Ittihad's pressure – both inside her country and outside – Somali,

backed him up with pleasure. Ethiopian arms confronted Al-Ittahad face to face relying on the strong support of SNF, Omer Haji's faction. They destroyed all Al-Itahad's buildings, institutions and centers. They also captured the whole region and chased its owners. Uncountable number of militiamen and civilians were killed there. However, Al-Itahad rejected to cease-fire unless Ethiopia withdraw the region. They hugged garrulous attacks against Ethiopian arms in their temporary basis in the region several times. Almost all the districts and towns in the region including; Bladahawo, Luq, Garbahare, Dolow, Eilwak, Burdhubo and others became battlefield for a long time. The wars continued not less than two years and most of the leaders from both sides were killed.

Many individuals tried to bring negotiation between Al-Ittahad and Ethiopian arms as well as between Al-Ittahad and SNF of Merahan. Though Al-Ittahad could hardly forget or forgive the death of some of their leaders such as "Adan Garwaine", a great financial supporter killed in Eil-wak, they finally requested for negotiation, but the Ethiopian forces were extremely aggressive to them and the people of the region as a whole. This led finally their best friend who firstly brought them, Col. Omar H. Massale to flee from the area and hide himself in Mogadishu. Some religious groups and individuals persisted to seek negotiation in order to bring peace in the region. Sheik Omar al-Faaruuq (himself Shikhal, Rer Aw-Hassan, a subsidiary part of Hawiye founded lately during the current civil war) was among the most effective people reconciled between Al-Ittahad and SNF. He was behind their last agreement that took place both in Nairobi and inside the region in November 1998. However, the region remained battlefield that has always been running between Ethiopian forces and another group of Marehan. Ethiopian government

formed new faction of SNF against Col. Omar H. Massale. The latter group were consisted of Marehan youths lived in Ethiopia, so that have no interest in Somalia and the Marehans living inside Somalia too. They repeatedly attacked the region and destroyed it using almost kinds of weapons belonged by Ethiopian forces.

HIRAN: People living in Baladwaine, the capital city of Hiran region endorsed the implementation of Islamic court on Monday 12 – 06 - 1995<sup>19</sup> under the auspices of an equitable team of Uluma from Mogadishu, but born of Hiran descent, the court opened with a day-long jubilation and the selected judiciary body lists were read. Unfortunately, deceitful appearances of what is termed as the “UNOSOM” established administration supported and the protected by the most subterfuge USC/PM dissimulation and publicity experts interrupted the expected harmony of dragging on regarding the ways to extol admissible security of the region<sup>20</sup>

Sheik Ali Barqadle, the president of the court, was not so tenacious like Sheik Ali Dhere and he got confused to get many advises of a culprit who was sensible of his degradation; at least, the cognizant of such a weakness, enticed the “*Mooryaan*” to impede the inertia of the court. which may be subjected to indemnity or to various disabilities. Any one who interacts with the “*Mooryaan*” ought to be duty bound to be alert to controvert any liable subversion in order to confute if his Shariah engagement refused<sup>21</sup>.

## 5: 4. Terrorism in the Somali Conflict

A mind hostile activity that can be called “just war” broke up in Somalia. “just war theory” allows that, as an external aggressor may probably engage in force and rival disputes against the aggresses, self defense is to be resorted. likewise, Somalis bear in mind that a tyrannized acts is to be protected and eradicated if it may take source. As a result, most of the Somalis are in alert of any domination and tyrant act, that led them not to remember religious teachings, which is commanding peaceful phenomenon. This has been pragmatically practiced during the Somali civil war from January 1991, when Barre’s regime was ousted.

Barre used to strengthen his red-Bret bands by depressing the citizens who may upraise against his rule. He believed that a ruler who oppresses his people rather than acting for their good will finalize his power in dooms, yet he had no but to keep on tyrant acts. Rebel clans involved in terrorism activities that they used to genocide citizens regardless of their member clans. Though they targeted to some particular people, the genocide was mass against every citizen, because the targeted people were from both rebel clans and obedient clans. They have killed many prominent men from their own clans, in order to get the attention of their clans-men in unity, as they have killed others for clan animosity and revenge. They were also pumping foreign centers and clubs, in order to chase foreign diplomats and bog-down their aids to the ruling regime and the public as a whole.

When all these were openly practiced and rarely proposed a reliable solution to him, Barre believed that he is no longer a beloved president and the only way he can survive is to counter-act the bad behavior used by his rebels. He trained a large number of his special red-Brets for antiterrorism and making tribal conflicts, in order to prolong his rule. In fact, the clanism war is corruptive tyrannized, representing it self as having the justification of someone without tyrannicides intentions impermissible ends. This is because those who are attacked are targeted for no reason. The corruption of functioning militias is essential misdeeds and unmanly. It is not easy to see why it should be so regarded. First, an interview motive is not as such inconsistent with having the right intention. Eg: every clan employs violence with the long-term intention of eradicating others and invading their land, or at least compelling them to remain as their own slaves. Secondly, while it may sometimes be right to claim, that, the warlords have no interest in resorting national constitutional rule, what often the case to be is that, the form of government under which the allegedly oppressive regime operated is held to be itself incapable of preserving the right of the people and hence as needing to be dismantled.

Generally speaking, every warlord's justification is to claim defending his community against abuse of power by any other community. So that clan militia mean illegible act any malice activity to gain power for themselves. They also in doing so go beyond any conscious motive and notion.



When the rule cross the religious borders most of the people is adequate to cross. Its values come because of missing supporters. These come through the change of situation in that particular community.

### **5: 5. United Nation Met with Violence**

Those who supported their henchmen base their view on political account that serves for self-desire. When the United Nations interfered the Somali disputes in 1993, each clan claimed that the UN's task is to side with the other clan against them, so that it is now the real time to fight for self-defense as Jihad. every one therefore was thinking that the United Nations may bring up with another clanic clashes and disorder. Morgan, the leader of SSDF that controlled kismayo district, for instance, claimed that the UN troops are siding with the Hawiya Militiamen, because the head of UNOSOM Mr. Jenetal How had a special talk with Mahdi and Aideed, on April 1993. Morgan taking an opportunity of this meeting has got justification to encourage his sub clan function into the battlefield.

The same condemn against UN was coming from the Hawiye side, Aideed and his loyalties including Omar Jees (himself Darod) condemned UNOSOM that they had given full hand of support Morgan militiamen to capture Kismayo and the surrounding coastal areas.

The supporters of each function explain their leader as Holy man mujahid. When the United Nation troops fought Aideed, the Hawiye explained as jihad although some of the foreign forces were Muslims still they recognize them as servant of United States of America, who seemed dragging an international colonization to Somalia. United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA) led by Gen. Aideed argued that those who sacrificed or killed in this battle are muhahidin, while all the rest is dying the death of infidel and they will get in to hell. On the other side of SNA fighters would straightforward get into Paradise. SNA was founded in Bardhere on 10/8/92, after USC had collaboration with Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM) and United Somali Congress (USC).

They believed that they fought for Jihad against Siyad Barre because his stay in the Country was obstacle on development of the country. And the nation could not appoint its leaders. so that many of Hawiyas religious men argued that the all those who sided with Aideed were Mujahidin.<sup>22</sup> Mohamed Farah Aideed was considered as President by his sub clan (Sacad) but could not take care of responsibility of those around the area and not even his militias, Aideed was finally killed in clan clashes in Mogadishu on 1/8/1996. One of his supporters said: "he was a brave man. hard decision maker. his blood and bones were made of holy war *halgan*, he spent all his live time in the struggle of a correct path and process. After three days his death his son Hussain was elected for his position.

## 5: 6. Violence Against Women in Somalia

The different capacities and vulnerabilities of men and women determine their ability to cope with and survive conflicts<sup>23</sup> As mentioned earlier in some where else in this research. For example here women's mobility is constrained they may be less able than men to flee from conflict. Wars usually increase the number of female headed household, and women often have to fulfil their own and men's responsibility for family provision. Obtaining resources and credit, different in normal times, is likely to become harder for women without a male interlocutor. In Somali some women have resorted to marry gunmen for protection. Conflict exacerbates the trends worldwide towards the "feminization of poverty".

Seeking main factors triggered the Somali civil war and hostility among the various clans, one can say that religio-women's issue has a causal relation with the war tragedy. Among the most outstanding issue polygamy custom though the polygamy is limited to maximum four wives, and it is not encouraged in Islam, there are some irrelevant concept alluded by most of Muslims.

Since most of the populations are not educated and Sheikh does not teach them all about Islam sufficiently, dynamic concept is misunderstood. Men having incomprehensive idea about the permissibility of the polygamy would interest to practice it. As a result, it is common in the society of both urban and nomad areas to have sharp disputes concerning on this issue. This may some times lead partners into constant fight and separation as well

as it may lead to a total breach of relationship between the two groups involved. This usually arose from a violation of the code of conduct related to women.

Women are traditionally free to go between two warring functions regardless of the clan she belonged to. Thus, taking these opportunity women initially used their chance in a wrong way. They, in majority, provided the war information from one clan's militia to another. Even there were many women who directly participated in the wars. However, after the war seriously damaged the whole society and most of the men died or being chased from the country, many women faced difficulties in live, so that they realized the pragmatic situation.

Then they started to practice the Islam accordingly as wearing the Hijab and going to the mosques to gain Islamic knowledge. Consequently, a large number of women from various regions commenced breaching their husbands and close relatives in the house. They even involve in seeking reconciliation between two hostile clans. Many are reported went for reconciliation to a far distance. A remarkable example is that in 1993 a group of women from the north part of the country went to some strange clans for peace negotiation telling the men the Islam.

Traditionally Somali women have no role to play in the national politics. Let alone the national politics, they have no full right to interfere about the clan affairs or the interrelation between clans. Moreover, women cannot take any decision about the

household affairs. Looking the matter from any side there is no way a woman can participate in the political affairs for some reasons. Firstly: female gender is normally considered as different type of human beings whose level is below. In *diyah* paying when the victim is female she has been given half of that of the male. Similarly, a daughter is given half of the inheritance given to her own brother if the property is inherited from their deceased father.

The *diyah* payment and the inheritance are read from the Islamic law, but it is worth nothing that there are several controversial issues, in terms of its way of application, in the Islamic law. The amount of *diyah* given to a woman murdered is half of that of the man as agreed by most of the Muslim jurists. Only few of them lived in different centuries disagreed this verdict and insisted that women should have the same amount of *diyah* of a murdered female person is only halves of the amount paid in case the murdered would be a male. It is only recently that a young author called 'Dr Qasim Hersi Farah' has published a book titled '*Magdhawga Dumarka oo Loo eegayo Shareecada*' meaning: "Blood compensation of women according to Shari'ah". Dr Qasim stated in his book that there is no difference between the blood money given from a female and that of a male. The author has employed several Qura'nic injections and Prophetic traditions to support his argument. However, the publication of the book accelerated the conflict and created new contradiction among the sheiks themselves. Since the idea was new to the Somalis, they could hardly accept it. Many women, themselves, disagreed it and condemned the author. Nevertheless, an adequate number of young educators who mostly studied in the West are in the support of this idea which

itself is based on Islamic law. Consequently, the supporters of the idea are at risk of animosity and disputes, if not rival attack.

The Social revolution of 1969 has changed some of the previous criminal codes and launched a campaign against *diyah*-paying system and the concept of collective responsibility for crimes. This concept is the most distinctly Somali tradition of any in the criminal justice system. The regime instead concentrated on extending the influence of laws introduced by the British and Italian<sup>3</sup>. This, in fact, increased the regime's control over an area of national life previously regulated largely by customs and old fashion traditions. The penal law prohibited collective punishment, which was contrary to the traditional sanctions of *diyah*-paying groups.

The penal laws stipulated that if the offence constituted a violation of the code, the perpetrator had committed an unlawful act against the state and was subject to its sanctions. Judicial action under the code, however, did not rule out the possibility of additional address in the form of *diyah* through civil action in the courts. Siad Barre's regime attacked this tolerance of *diyah* and forbade its practice entirely in 1974<sup>24</sup>.

Generally speaking, Somalian legal system during Barre's regime had been circulating around four different and contradicting sources namely: Somali culture, customary law, socialism and small party of the Islamic law, family law section. This is what the regime called "the scientific socialism" which is a combination of all the four law sources<sup>25</sup>. Another major source of law during Barre's regime was "presidential circular". President Barre used to judge some new cases that had no precedent and some others that are being seen giving another interest by presidential circular which was very effective in application.

In terms of the inheritance; between brothers and sisters is among the top figures caused the Somalis main tragedy and conflict. In 1975, President Mohamad Siad Barre introduced that the Islamic law which codes girls should get half of the share of the boy when dividing inheritance to them is banned and replaced to a new man-made one that codificates an equal amount<sup>26</sup>. When this presidential circular was announced, a large number of protests and rebel actions were staged by Sheiks from various regions of the country. This led the death of many people including ten of the most prominent Sheiks who where sentenced to death and executed on the spot.

According to political status of women, the question of *diyah* payment for women became as similar to the inheritance rights was forced to be equal. Moreover, girls were sent to mixed schools wearing the same uniform of boys – trouser and shirt. This accelerated the envy and mistrust against the government. Civilians believe much, that the government's main is to eradicate Islamic norms and practices. Politicians also benefiting from the opportunity campaigned to expand that the government is not a Muslim and it is inquired people to disobey the government. Government employees, for instance, to strike. Yet, the role of women has changed to one of greater participation in the government's efforts to achieve national development goals<sup>27</sup>.

Siad Barre insisted the change of law that some religious figures chiefly the family law saw as contrary to Islamic percepts. On Sep. , 4<sup>th</sup> 1971 more than a hundred religious

teachers were assembled in the capital and exhorted by Siad Barre to participate actively in the building of a new socialist society<sup>28</sup>.

On 30/3/93, they agreed on particular points for reconciliation and signed. Unfortunately that agreement did not produce fruits, every leader was hiding his own agenda and showed the rest that he is considering the points, which might come and signed. Every clan was analyzing their points. For Somali traditional system and believed it is prohibited to break out reconciliation once signed by the representatives of a particular community as their decision is the result of clan politic in Somalia. In the Somali tradition it is not easy to change a part of whole of the law by replacing it a foreign legal system, be the law based on Islam or that based on the custom.

Women, in reality, played an important role in accelerating the current Somali dispute by stirring up the people, preparing dry food for the clan-militia, and fund-raising campaigns. However, we can still recognize the role of women in society that cannot be ignored. Within the confines of the household and the family, Somali women have always participated actively in the decision-making process of family affairs. Their views are respected within that environment, though this may differ from region to region due to established traditions and history. Some respective well women's ideas and option, while others consider them irresponsible. But even those who viewed them irresponsible do not refuse their decision and wanting, due to feeling shy. The hash, independent nomadic way of life, where women shoulder their fair share of the work in the household and exercise direct managerial responsibilities, has contributed to this situation of



acceptance. Somali women have, in general, always shied away, however, from too much exposure to an involvement in issue that transcend the family business. Religious conservatism, in contradiction to a counter-balance to the free-spirit of nomadic life, is ever present and contributes to the shaping of this self-denial. With urbanization, women initially lost much of the progressives and decision-making enjoyed under the nomadic life. Without the livestock to manage, without the perennial cycle of fight for survival, and with bread winning responsibilities left to the male, urban women became more focussed in making, repairing, arranging and utilizing household chores.

With time the social mobility of women becomes improved with opportunities for education, professional careers. In this setting, how to achieve equal political rights with men becomes an ever-present uphill battle. Urban men, partly influenced by the proximity of Arab culture with its more rigid attitudes towards liberalization of women, resisted women ascendancy in the high political officer and to top management in business and government. Barre's regime, in fact, paid some service to women advancement appointing some merited women to some junior and middle management and political posting of a transitory nature.

As a matter of fact, the role played by urban women during the upheavals leading to and following the civil war suddenly catapulted women into positions of responsibility and economic importance (increasingly becoming the effective breadwinners) and social standing (seen as the upholders of family unity and saviors) and has gained them more importance and added prestige. Today, women visibly dominated the small-scale

business in all the markets. Their growth and potentiality in terms of income generating and upward movement is being impaired by lack of entrepreneurial skill, appropriate opportunities. The over whelming majority of these women could greatly benefit from provision of custom-tailored training packages and availability of adequate credit finance schemes, and could thus realize their potential as the most dynamic human resources capital harnessed for development.

Women would have to move into other, hitherto, male dominated sectors in great number in future. Their demographic number, their proven enterprise, the need to mobilize all available human capital resources in the land, and historic inevitability all point to that direction. Women are moving, in asserted manner. in the field of social voluntary and social service provision sector. As the country settles down to better and more strengthened governance institutions, women will have to move into the arena of public administration and political life. They have to become part of the decision-making mechanisms in the country. Therefore, more attention need to be given to the following issues:

- A. More assertive education for girls at all levels and development of career opportunities for women.
- B. Better and more custom-tailored as well as generalized training skill. professions and management and
- C. Continuous, incessant awareness building, mobilization and political education.

The young and upcoming administrations and the overall political leadership of the land need to face this urgent task and to afford the deserved priority. The international development agencies' performance has been lack-luster, at best, in its delivery of effective development programs targeting women in particular manner. What has been there so far, very much gives the impression of being meant only and exclusively to ferment unrest and political turmoil. In the social sphere, women have a long war to fight and win. Negative traditional rules and out-dated traumatic customs, like the barbaric female genital mutilation, the resistance to give proper and equal education to girls by some sectors of the society and many others are still there, and need to be confronted with effective and well-coordinated programs of intervention. Women have to stop expecting to be given, and need to develop their own leadership. For that, women in Somalia need to wake up from the permanent transition, which keeps this society captive to unknown and dark future.

## **5: 7. Violence Against Minority and Marginalized Groups**

In retrospect, a welter of competing authorities in Somalia has gradually filled the vacuum left by the collapse of central government in 1991. The human right situation of the ordinary Somali depends largely on his or her place within this patchwork, largely of clan and sub-clan, into which much of Somali society is divided. A level of authority can be found in each of these clan-defined fragments of the body politic with varying capabilities to protect the rights of its members or to abuse the rights of others.

These authority structure combine traditional forms that bring together the elders, merchants and religious leaders of a clan with the modern administrative systems promoted by the United Nations. These authorities also have a capacity to collaborate with others across clan lines, through largely traditional mechanisms of arbitration and alliance building. They may mobilize forces dedicated to exclude others from the exercise of their fundamental rights or to be the instrument of the deprivation of such rights.

The human rights situation of the ordinary Somali depends on these local authorities. It is principally through their clans that they relate to powerful war-leaders, and to members of other clans and sub-clans. The clan elders act through the district and regional councils that can bring different communities together in local government. These local authorities can be the agents of either protection or abuse in Somali communities.

The atrocities against civilians mainly women, children, ethnic and religious groups which have occurred in current conflict have raised awareness of the need to address humanitarian rights as inevitable issue. The denial of human rights can exacerbate conflict and even generate new oppressions. In fact, human rights, as a general, remain a delicate issue. Human rights, self-determination, and democracy are used as rallying calls in war. Justice, freedom of religious expression, and the right to own personal property are full of cultural meaning and values. The idea of human rights being embodied in the individual, rather than as a citizen of a State, is a relatively new concept that passed into international law in the 1948 UN Universal Declaration<sup>29</sup>. In Islam the *Ummah* (Islamic

community) is held to be more important than the State or the individual, in contrast to the rational liberalism of the West. Although humanitarian agencies advocate the protection of individual rights, actively monitoring or discussing human rights can place humanitarian agencies, and their staff, in danger as has been the case in Rwanda<sup>30</sup>.

In Somalia, nowadays the objectives of the United Nations human rights programs are confused by the civil society. Some of Islamic fundamentalist, especially Al-ittahad opposed frequently the issue in public speeches. They blamed them of that the human rights opted to protect is not that of human kind as a whole, but merely that of the Western people. They viewed that the main aim of the human rights claimed by the West is to subjugate Muslims and poor nations.

The fragmentation of the Somali nation has left a crowd of de facto authorities, often competing, sometimes collaborating, and almost inevitably backed by a degree of armed forces. Based largely on the division of Somali society into plenty of clan families these largely traditional authorities provide the body of leaders from which the warlords derive their authority. A clan's authority ultimately lies with its traditional authorities of which they are only a part of it, but not leaders. These local authorities engage in complex interaction with neighboring local authorities even from nominally rival communities. It is primarily at the local level, where these authorities and their communities are organised largely on a sub-clan basis, that limited progress has been made toward establishing systems of orders, dispute resolution mechanisms, and religious educational relations. These measures by local authorities can provide a check on the power of the warlords.

Discriminatory treatment shapes much of the human rights situation in Somalia's divided society: an individual may be singled out for summary execution, rape, or expulsion from a community solely by reason of clan affiliation. The coercive agents of Somali *de facto* authorities, in turn, are required along clan and driven by clan loyalties. The remedies to abuse and to commit crime too are largely reduced to a form of commensuration between clans, with punishment and compensation a question arbitrated, although Islamic courts applying Shariah are functioning in many areas.

Although the relation to authority of most Somalis is through traditional clan structures, significant sectors of the population fall outside this multi-tiered system. Those who have no clan to stand behind them, or who come from Somalia's large Bantu ethnic minority populations, may be marginalized by traditional and modern authority of ethnic Somalis, however. The clan elders are their intermediaries in dealings with other clans and with regional and national figures. The sub-clan provides the means through which they seek justice, mobilize in temporary grassroots militia, and secure access to essential resources.

Vulnerability comes through several ways, which may differ in some aspects and resemble in some others. It partly stems from the break-up households and communities and the targeting of specific minority groups who are condemned because of their faith, race, ethnic, color, lifestyle tradition, and so on and so forth<sup>31</sup>. Such vulnerable people are not targeted because of their individual status, but because they are members of a particular group. Focusing on community, or group rights, rather than individual rights

might focus humanitarian efforts to work through and support community or civil structures and thus help to reduce individual vulnerability.

In some areas, Bantu farmers are protected, while reduced to a form of servitude in that they are regularly subjected to looting of their crops and goods by their nominal protectors. One interviewee described the Bantu situation in areas under Habargidir control as fairly positive. The Habargidir are using the Bantus as laborers, by this account, but the Bantus are not slaves, they are contract farmers<sup>32</sup>. Such accounts should be balanced, however, against evidence of other measures to prevent Bantu leaders from organizing independently, including attacks on those who threaten to ally themselves with rivals<sup>33</sup>.

The displaced who are members of ethnic minority groups, or agricultural communities expelled from their land, are frequently targeted. So too are members of these communities in areas disputed between more powerful groups. A pattern of raiding, sometimes with an aim to strip communities of their harvests, in other cases to expel them from the land, has been the frequent context of clan-based murder, rape and terror. In the civil war of 1991 – 1992, raiders frequently stripped whole communities of the very means of survival destroying wells and looting or destroying food stores, tools, seeds and livestock. A consequence of these scorched –earth tactics between the Jubba and Shabelle rivers, the country's principal agriculture, was that the effect of famine were magnified for precisely those food-producing communities on which the Somali people had depended. Today the survivors of these agricultural communities continue to be

subject to raiding and land-grabs. One interviewee said simply: " the most vulnerable now are those who always were: the Bantus and the Rahanwains"<sup>34</sup>.

Some areas in the country controls by Hawiye, but largely belongs to Rahanwain, were exercised over criminal activities. In Baidawo, for instance, some fifty detainees were held in prison. and that the elders had decided in October 1994 being found guilty through the traditional medium of the council of elders itself. The elders often do not test their authority, but sometimes they react. A Rahanwain relief worker told Human Rights Watch that the punishment of crime commuted by people with strong clan affiliation in Baidawo was largely left up to their sub-clans. In the matter of the death penalty, according to this source, only the Lisan sub-clan had taken action<sup>35</sup>.



## END NOTES

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- <sup>3</sup> . Somali UNOSOM Official, Human Rights Watch interview, Nairobi, 19 January, 1995.
- <sup>4</sup> . Ibid.
- <sup>5</sup> . Red Cross..p.51.
- <sup>6</sup> Red Cross, p. 200.
- <sup>7</sup> . chewed green leaves which has some substances or degree of drug.
- <sup>8</sup> . Ibnu Hajar al-azqalani, Bulugh al-Maram, Bab al-Amal. See also: Forty Hadiths, No: 1. P. 1.
- <sup>9</sup> . John Eppstein, Does God Say Kill?: an investigation of the justice of current fighting in Africa, (Tom Stacey: London, 1972) p. 16.
- <sup>10</sup> . John Appstain, op cit. P. 112.
- <sup>11</sup> . Abdinur Nur Hashi, opcit, p. 29.
- <sup>12</sup> . ibid, p.106.
- <sup>13</sup> ibid, p. 102.
- <sup>14</sup> . Qaran daily news paper, vol. 189, Mogadishu, 14/3/98. P. 2.
- <sup>15</sup> . Bel-Deeq, vol. 123, Mogadishu, 19 July, 1998. p. 1
- <sup>16</sup> . Almost 99% of the al-Ittihad members camped there were originated from Marehan, Darood sub-clan.
- <sup>17</sup> . Dr. Mohamad Abdirahman, the doctor cured him in Baidawo
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- <sup>24</sup> . D. B.. Adams, Somali's armed conflict, New press: Mombasa, 1992) pp – 12-21.
- <sup>25</sup> . Renato Angeloni, The Somali Penal Code with comments and annotation based on Parliamentary Studies. (Glufre: Milano, 1967) p. 98.
- <sup>26</sup> . Xidigta October. 12 Jun. 1995
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- <sup>29</sup> . United Nations. United Nations Declaration of Human Rights 1948. (Geneva: Switzerland, 1948) p. 5.
- <sup>30</sup> . Mark Adams and Mark, ..... p. 51.
- <sup>31</sup> . Bantu displaced in Kismayu, Human Rights Watch interview, (Kismayu, 26 Jan.. 1995)
- <sup>32</sup> . ibid. p. 28.
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## END NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> . Aid Official, Human Rights Watch interview, Nairobi, January 19, 1995.
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## CHAPTER SIX

### CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMENTADIONS

To understand the specificity and logic of the religious and political process in Somalia, one need to understand the interrelationship between the concept of Statehood and society from both the Islamic and Somali traditional concept of governance. Although Islam is ethnically inclusive the Somali traditional power structure is excessively devolved and subject to segmentary membership.

In the first two chapters, we have discussed historical background of Somali disputes. In the course of our discussion we have discovered that Somalis have been always at war but situations were different according to prevailing circumstance. Most importantly, the fact is that the low levels of earlier conflicts were within the capacities of the Somali traditional institutions of conflict resolution. The only difference between the current civil war and previous ones is that this civil war has affected the entire country simultaneously and its and seem to have over whelmed the traditional institutions.

Modern military technology and its indiscriminate employment coupled with such natural calamities like famine and floods have had adverse effects on Somalis.

On the other hand, the coincidence of political and clan identities among the combatants, the manipulation of kinship ties as political and military resources, and the lack of

cohesion within the principal factions have contributed to the defeat of conventional attempts to restore peace.

The unique character of the Somali conflict has been clearly demonstrated. Modern military technology, governmental central administration, modern political systems, rapid urbanization, and changing pastoral lifestyle are among several inter-related factors collectively changed the Somali traditional system of inter-clan wars. Most of political conflicts, for instance, are as result of economic and political structural rigidities that translate to political dominance disputes and gross violation of human rights. Though these also constitute some of the factors that led to the on-going Somali conflict, the underlying religio-cultural environment of the conflict may adequately enable one to explain and contextualize the conflict.

In the analysis we have tried to understand the import of the Islamic egalitarian political ideology in the context of the excessive independence and exclusive Somali traditional power structures. This complication further exacerbated by the infusion of Western political systems particularly Marxism, which has the tendency to centralize power. All these contribute in one way or the other in the perpetuation of the conflict. as they tend to neglect the cultural identity of the Somalis.

The fast spread of Islam in Somalia was influenced mostly by such factors as the early contact with the Muslim refugees who come to Abyssinia, early trading activities in the Red Sea, proximity to the Arabian peninsula, genealogical relation with the Arabs and

more importantly the intricate accommodation of Somali culture even after adoption of Islam. Today, it continues through the emergence of Islamic based political spectrum and development of NGOs. Though some argue that new Islamic institutions have complimented Somali traditional institutions we have seen that they at times divided the already segmented nomads especially as where they adopted different religious orders which promote contradictory interpretations.

In the discussion of religious orders, we have found that since early nineteenth century, Sufis orders have been growing in Somalia gradually, but are slowly being loosing ground to new movements. Three major orders namely; Qadiriya, Salihya and Ahmadiya had been powerful and very effective in the country. In reality, they have all played a significant role in the maintenance of Islamic values amongst the Somalis and at time source of conflict. These orders were also effectively employed by successive administrations to consolidate power.

Their participation in politics and general public issues has ever been indirect. They usually keep giving advises and instructions to the administration bodies, especially in cases of conflict between two or more clans or sub-clans. Few of the prominent old Sufi orders were occasionally blamed for their participation in clan conflicts. During the last central government of Somalia, 1969-90 these groups were very weak, undermined, and alienated from the public through massive negative propaganda by the state. However, they reasserted their central role during the rebellion against the Bare regime.

In the subsequent chaos, relatively new young Islamic fundamentalists, chiefly; Al-Ittihad and Al-Islah have rapidly spread throughout the country especially in the Southern and Central parts. These groups are directly involved in the current conflict with their own militia and Islamic courts. On the other hand, they engaged themselves in social development with the alleged objective of returning the country back to normality by enforcing Islamic law. Interestingly these groups are also structured more or less along clan lines and condemn earlier religious orders as heretics. Nevertheless, these groups have also been unable to settle the prolonged Somali civil war for the same reasons; chiefly, inappropriate approach which denies the basic cultural identity of the Somali society.

Generally speaking, Somali civil war has passed two main stages; one on its preparation from 1978 until 1990, and the other from 1991 up to the present time.

Religious groups have played some roles, both positive and negative, in the conflict. During the rebellion stage, they managed to mobilize people against the ruthless dictatorship in their respective faction groups but at the same time failed to impress upon the fighters of the overall goal of replacing what they viewed as evil with good. At the later stage, they ostensibly engaged in the conflict to wrestle power from the marauding warlords but in the process became party to the conflict. Thus, their war activities did not only destroy their reputation but also expanded the conflict to include foreigners who intervened in the conflict to deal with what they termed terrorists.

Furthermore majority of their members came from the Daarood clan, so that Hawiye and Isaaq population had given their voices less attention. On the other hand, Al Islah group has tried several times to seek reconciliation and community development but also have started their duty lately when animosity between clans became very strong and trust was dead.

Sheikhs have done such kind of job were mostly coming from certain clans, so that neither their own clans had accepted nor others. They were harshly condemned of making conspiracies against certain clans. Among the reasons made the New Islamists groups less effective is that they are both poor in foreign relations, where they consider international community as their major enemy.

Religion has a causal relation with the onset of the Somali dispute. Civilians became angry with the Socialist government, when not less than 15 prominent sheikhs were executed in 1975 only because they objected the enforcement of Socialist family law that would replace Islamic family law. This is still the major condemnation that clan based militias rely on when reasoning for their rebellion operation against Barre's regime.

Traditionally speaking, in Somalia mixed of Islamic and customer law is applied to settle individual disputes as well as group disputes. Their traditional settlement generally involves in various kinds of compensation for the offended party: usually the payment of *mag* (blood compensation), *haal* (render with making shame upon the offender) usually in the form of paying camel, horse or any other valuable livestock, *godobtir* (special offer

for a woman insulted or harmed in any action that may damage her dignity, especially when the offender is her husband) etc.<sup>2</sup> The reason of making two clans or at least between two families. It is also to strengthen inter-communal ties between the disputed parties.

## RECOMMENDATION

To begin with, one of the first and foremost suggestion to be given is that, no doubt, more efforts are to be paid in order to enhance reconciliation exertion in the various Somali rival clans. In fact, an obvious factor that triggered the role of religion in the Somali dispute as well as religious disputes is the emergence of new religious orders. Thus, there is an urgent need of commencing open-ended face to face dialogues between the old and new religious orders, and even among the divergent new religious orders.

This may play a major role in bringing together both the concept of religion and tradition. Similarly, the concept of politics and traditional clan based civil war behavior.

Implicitly. Somalia has historical background of being war ton society but the newly founded war technology has fueled the situation to such an extreme extant. Therefore, international community should take tough measures to embargo weapons imported to Somalia through both marine and land via. Religious leaders should also play a significant role by preaching people not to use their weapons negatively. They should discourage all unlawful activities that may probably lead disorder and controversy.



To find absolute solution for the currently complicated disputes, one of the main steps to be taken is to reconcile secular politicians and religious leaders. There is an outstanding need of removing the misunderstanding between these two major groups. It is to clarify the ordained role of Islamic law in the involvement of politics and public affairs.

On the other hand, in the process of making politics and administration towards the country, it is to take into account that almost every instrument must be based on the civil society's concept of faith and belief.

Intersect education and training that may run between the two groups must be enhanced in order to enlighten both sides. For instance, secular politicians should have sufficient knowledge about Islam and its main principles. Likewise, religious leaders must be familiar with modern systems of politics and development, so that they are enable to interpret Islam according to the contemporary situation. This will endeavor to remove the gap between secular politician and spiritual leaders as well as among traditional elders who are currently in dilemma of whether to follow advises given by the secular politicians or the Islamic orders. Moreover, spiritual leaders will no more remain undermined or ignored.

Newly founded Islamic orders must be requested to draft a very clear and comprehensive Islamic law and principles that would be applicable to the current Somali situation. This draft would be amalgamated with upcoming amendment of the country's national constitution. Should Islamic orders dismiss radical Islamic extremist individuals and

groups, could have attract people's intention as well as the intention of the international community. Thus, all sorts of Islamic orders and institutions are recommended to ensure immediate dismissal or rehabilitation against the known extremists. Otherwise, they would all be condemned equally. Young Islamic movements can also play a noteworthy role by augmenting their activities towards voluntarily social services. Another crucial step to be taken by such groups is to remove any clan based differences among themselves.

In terms of treating with the neighboring countries, it is worth to note that Somali clans neighboring to Ethiopia should develop close socio-political relation with Ethiopia. This is so, because Ethiopia has been nursing great animosity against the race of Somalia since long centuries. Therefore, she will always be alert and precaution to the Somali movements by being very sensitive to, even, minor incidents.

Necessarily, Somali tradition must be distinguished and categorized into two categories; a negative type and positive type. Negative customs must be sorted out and disclose their negativity to the public by isolating them separately, while the positive customs are to be encouraged and publicized throughout the respective clans. This can be done by frequent campaigns of public awareness. Religious group, clan elders, politicians, women groups, youth groups, NGOs and any other civil society groups have collectively the most appropriate incumbent to disseminate such approved cultures and traditions.

A considerable fact that led the prolonged Somali civil war, has been the large employment of youths as a military during the decade of war between Somalia and Ethiopia, 1977 until 1987. Most of such youths are still armed to teeth and practice their war profession. Now to combat such war-careers religious and other educated youths must organize themselves and form their own clubs, so that they can create new phenomena of assortment and exchange of ideas. Given this non-Warrior youth clubs, clean-hearted civil society NGOs may be established from grass-root hidden agenda to the stage of country domination. On the other hand, militarily trained Warlords must be encouraged to respect and support civil society organizations and their various activities.

Finally, Somalis, in general, should consider their faith rather than traditional factors. In this endeavor, each should forget some rights, so that they can reach an stage where they can come together to the table of compromise and negotiation. Religious leaders are particularly expected to serve for the sake of their own nation as a whole rather than running after clan or personal interests. The same can be applied to any other community in the world who may suffer from the same ideological problems.

#### END NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> . UNIFEM, prepared by Matt Bryden, Somalia. between peace and war. (1<sup>st</sup> Ed. Nairobi: Kenya. 1998) p. 51.

<sup>2</sup> . Codka Soomaalida Cusub, An Electronic Journal issues through internet .  
[www/Angelfire.com/codkasomalidacusub/chcs.page.html](http://www/Angelfire.com/codkasomalidacusub/chcs.page.html), Friday, 15 Jan. 1999.

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# Appendix I

## Interview Schedule for all respondents

Name: \_\_\_\_\_ Sex : [ ] Male. [ ] Female  
Age: \_\_\_\_\_ Worked in Somalia ? [ ] Yes. [ ] No. Occupation of \_\_\_\_\_  
Period \_\_\_\_\_

Q1. Do you support your sub clan religiously [ ] Yes . [ ] No. If yes, how How do you support them ?

\_\_\_\_\_

How did you first come into contact with your clan defense/offence? \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

When was this? Month \_\_\_\_\_ Year \_\_\_\_\_ where was this? \_\_\_\_\_

When did you link to your clan ? \_\_\_\_\_

Why did you particularly related to them ? \_\_\_\_\_

What were your expectations at clan supporting in your religion and social rights?

\_\_\_\_\_

Have they been met or you expect them ? [ ] Yes . [ ] No.

Please explain \_\_\_\_\_

Please describe what Islam says about clansm ? \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Do you have relatives from other clans ? [ ] Yes . [ ] No.

If yes , how do you co-operate with them ? \_\_\_\_\_

Has any of your relatives other relatives of different clans ? [ ] Yes . [ ] No.

If yes. how do you think they contact to each other ? \_\_\_\_\_

In your opinion , are many people joining their clan systems religiously and socially in Somalia ?

[ ] Yes . [ ] No. Please explain your response \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Q2, Did you undergo any Islamic teachings? [ ] Yes . [ ] No.

If yes, who ? \_\_\_\_\_

What aspects did he/she teach you concerning clanism and your faith ? \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Do you continue attending religious lectures concerning clanism ? [ ] Yes . [ ] No.

Why? \_\_\_\_\_

Do you continue giving religious lectures concerning clanism? [ ] Yes . [ ] No.

Why? \_\_\_\_\_

Q3. How often do you discuss your clan members about your religious requirements of relativism in a day? \_\_\_\_\_ Where do you do this? \_\_\_\_\_

Q4. Do you contribute clan financial matters? [ ] Yes . [ ] No. If yes, about how mach monthly? \_\_\_\_\_

How frequently do you do so? [ ] daily . [ ] monthly. [ ] yearly. [ ] Other \_\_\_\_\_

What do you think is the importance of this contribution? \_\_\_\_\_

Q5. Do you travel or take transport for your clan interest? [ ] Yes . [ ] No.

If yes, how often? [ ] daily . [ ] monthly. [ ] yearly. [ ] Other \_\_\_\_\_

Why? \_\_\_\_\_

Q6. Do you think there is any difference between your clan and other Somali clans concerning the conflict?

[ ] Yes . [ ] No. If yes, how? \_\_\_\_\_

Q7. Do you think it is important to go for bringing them together? [ ] Yes . [ ] No. Why?

Q8. How can you comment on your ideology of clanism in :

1. The Qur'an \_\_\_\_\_

2. The Sunnah \_\_\_\_\_

3. Al-Qiyas \_\_\_\_\_

4. Somali Social Structure \_\_\_\_\_

Q9. Do you find yourself called sometimes to partake in community dispute between them?

[ ] Yes . [ ] No. If yes, Please give an example

What do you do in such situations? \_\_\_\_\_

Q10. Do you often observe the behaviour/activities of fellow clans? [ ] Yes . [ ] No.



Q3. How often do you discuss your clan members about your religious requirements of relativism in a day ? \_\_\_\_\_ Where do you do this ? \_\_\_\_\_

Q4. Do you contribute clan financial matters? [ ] Yes . [ ] No. If yes, about how mach monthly? \_\_\_\_\_  
How frequently do you do so? [ ] daily . [ ] monthly. [ ] yearly. [ ] Other \_\_\_\_\_  
What do you think is the importance of this contribution ? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Q5. Do you travel or take transport for your clan interest ? [ ] Yes . [ ] No.  
If yes, how often? ? [ ] daily . [ ] monthly. [ ] yearly. [ ] Other \_\_\_\_\_  
Why? \_\_\_\_\_

Q6. Do you think there is any difference between your clan and other Somali clans concerning the conflict?  
[ ] Yes . [ ] No. If yes, how? \_\_\_\_\_

Q7. Do you think it is important to go for bringing them together? [ ] Yes . [ ] No. Why?  
\_\_\_\_\_

Q8. How can you comment on your ideology of clanism in :

1. The Qur'an \_\_\_\_\_
2. The Sunnah \_\_\_\_\_
3. Al-Qiyas \_\_\_\_\_
4. Somali Social Structure \_\_\_\_\_

Q9. Do you find yourself called sometimes to partake in community dispute between them?  
[ ] Yes . [ ] No. If yes, Please give an example  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

What do you do in such situations? \_\_\_\_\_

Q10. Do you often observe the behaviour/activities of fellow clans ? [ ] Yes . [ ] No.

If yes, do you see them engage in some un Islamic practices? [ ] Yes . [ ] No. If yes, please give examples \_\_\_\_\_

Why do you think they do so ? \_\_\_\_\_

Q11. Where do you meet them normally ? \_\_\_\_\_

How far is it from where you stay ? \_\_\_\_\_

Are you a large congregation ? [ ] Yes . [ ] No. Please estimate \_\_\_\_\_

Is it big enough? [ ] Yes . [ ] No.

Does it have the necessary facilities ? [ ] Yes . [ ] No.

Which are the other meeting places found in the same area ? \_\_\_\_\_

Q12. Are there special Muslim group who interfere the Somali disputes from 1991?

Please name them : \_\_\_\_\_

Q13. Do you have a Court in your area? [ ] Yes . [ ] No.

If yes, where is this office? \_\_\_\_\_

If no, where is the nearest court's office? \_\_\_\_\_

Have solved a desperate in their office? [ ] Yes . [ ] No.

Was the effort rewarding ? [ ] Yes . [ ] No.

Please explain \_\_\_\_\_

What kind of court do you think can be appropriate? \_\_\_\_\_

Q14. In your view and basing of points already discussed, do you think clanism is growing or declining in this region? [ ] Yes . [ ] No.

Please explain your sand \_\_\_\_\_

Q15. Are there any problems faced the Somali Muslims from the clanism? [ ] Yes . [ ] No.

If yes, what are they? \_\_\_\_\_

How can they be tackled? \_\_\_\_\_

Q16. Did you witness relativism cases of un Islamic practices among some local clans?

Yes .  No. If yes, Please explain \_\_\_\_\_

Q17. Have you witnessed cases of killing or looting other Somali clans?  Yes .  No.

Yes .  No. If yes, Please explain \_\_\_\_\_

Q18. What is your opinion on the availability and function of the following institutions in your area:

1. Mosques \_\_\_\_\_

2. Islamic Schools \_\_\_\_\_

3. Shariah Courts \_\_\_\_\_

4. Forces training \_\_\_\_\_

Q19. In your view, does Islam face any serious threats from the clanism?  Yes .  No.

If yes, Please explain \_\_\_\_\_

Q20. What is your choice of presidential candidates, liberal versus conservative, self-image, and general attitude toward government spending? \_\_\_\_\_

Q21. Is there religious intervention in politics?  Yes .  No.

If yes, Please explain \_\_\_\_\_

## Appendix II

### LIST OF RESPONDENTS

#### Political Leaders:

1. Mahad Dirir Gulde, member of Somali Parliament both AbdiRashi Ali Sharmarke and Mohamed Siyad Bare governments and minister, interviewed on 20-23/2/1999, in Nairobi.
2. Hassan Dahir Aweys, Al-Itihad leader interviewed on 6/2/2000 in the United Arab Emirates.
3. Barer Adan Shier, interviewed on 15/4/99, in Nairobi.
4. Abdulkadir H. Ali (Dagaweyne), former Military leader interviewed on 12-15/12/1997, Namanga , Kenya.
5. Ali Shire Warsame, late well-known businessman, interviewed on 12/1/1999, Nairobi.
6. Mohamed S. Warsame, Kismayo Police Commander interviewed on 24/4/99, in Nairobi.
7. AbdulKadir H. Mahmoud, interviewed on 19/12/1998, Nairobi.
8. Guhad Ali Mire, military commander in Somalia, interviewed on 28-29/1/1998, in Nairobi.
9. Awjad Ali Adde, interviewed on 2/12/99, in the United Arab Emirates.
10. Muse Abbi , military commander in Somalia , interviewed on 12/12/1998 in Namanga, Kenya.

## **Religious and Traditional Leaders**

1. Ugas Farah Ugas Abdille, interviewed on 30/1/1999, in Nairobi
2. AbdiSalam A. Ali, interviewed on 27/1/1999, in Nairobi.
3. Haji Mahmud Idle, interviewed on 23/3/1999, in Nairobi.
4. Malaq Mahmoud Yusuf, interviewed on 11/1/1999, in Nairobi.
5. Aw Dahir Haji Ige, interviewed on 9/1/1999, in Nairobi.
6. Suldan Ali Suldan Mahamed, interviewed on 3/3/1999, in Nairobi.
7. Sayid Mahamed Sayid Ali interviewed on 10/2/1999, in Nairobi.
8. Sheikh Mahamed Farah, interviewed on 13/2/1999, in Nairobi.
9. Sheikh Abdullahi hirsi Maalim, interviewed on 11/2/1999, in Nairobi
10. Hared Adan Gurey, interviewed on 8/2/1999, in Nairobi
11. Ahmed Mahamed Adan "Alandhe" interviewed on 2/2/1999, in Nairobi.
12. Mohamed Ali Abdi, "Gas" interviewed on 13/3/1999, in Nairobi.
13. Abdi Ali Ba'alwan, interviewed on 17/4/1999, in Nairobi.
14. Ahmed Dahir Burshad interviewed on 18/4/99, in Nairobi.

## **Other Social Group Leaders**

1. Qasim hirsi Farah (Dulaan Jeel) , interviewed on 13/3/1999, in Nairobi.
2. Husein Adan Ashkir , interviewed on 17/12/1998, in Nairobi.
3. Yusuf Barre Adow, interviewed on 23/2/1999, in Nairobi.

4. Hussain Abdi interviewed on 24/1/1999 , in Nairobi .
5. Mahamed Jama interviewed on 2/1/1999, in Nairobi.
6. Salad Abdi “Yaraw” , interviewed on 18/9/98, in Nairobi.
7. Yusuf Hassan Salah “Yusuf Gaab”, interviewed on 5/6/1998, in Nairobi.
8. Ahmed H. Aden “Marade”, interviewed on 23/3/99, in Nairobi.
9. AbdiRahman Ahmed Dahir , interviewed on 13/3/1999, in Nairobi.
10. Mahamed Hussein Omar, “Aar”, interviewed on 13/3/1999, in Nairobi.
11. Anab Ali Shire, interviewed on 25/2/1999 , in Nairobi.
12. Anab Jama, interviewed on 6/12/1998, in Nairobi.
13. Mohamed Salad Ahmed , interviewed on 22/3/1999 , in Nairobi.
14. Amino Ibrahim Shafi, interviewed on 19/2/98, in Nairobi.
15. Sharifa Isma'il Maalim, interviewed on 29/1/1999 , in Nairobi.
16. Masbal Isma'il Shire , interviewed on 29/1/1999, in Nairobi.
17. Fartun Ahmed Dahir, interviewed on 11/2/1999 , in Nairobi.
18. Hibo Mahamed Ali, interviewed'on 14/2/1999, in Nairobi.
19. Nuur Abdi Ali, “Kodey”, interviewed on 13/4/99, in Nairobi.
20. Yasin Issa Wardhere, interviewed on 13/3/99, in Nairobi.
21. Abdi Wahab Mahamed “Ali Arab”, interviewed on 13/3/99, in Nairobi.
22. Mahamed Abdi Farah Botan (Shiike) , interviewed on 14/4/1999, in Nairobi.
23. AbdiFarah Sharif Mahamed, interviewd on 14/2/1999, in Nairobi.
24. Anisa Ali Amir, interviewed on 12/1/1999 , in Nairobi.
25. Sade Yasin Ibar, interviewed on 15/3/1999, in Nairobi.
26. Mahad Ali Hashi, ‘Computer” interviewed on 15/3/1999, in Nairobi.

27. Maalim Mahamed Ayanle, 'Badal' interviewed on 15/3/1999, in Nairobi.
28. AbdulLaahi Abdi 'Ayrow", interviewed on 13/3/1999, in Nairobi.
29. Maryan Haji Dhagah, interviewed on 13/3/1999, in Nairobi.
30. Ahmed Haji nuur, 'Wil-wal' interviewed on 17/3/1999, in Nairobi.
31. Jumale Aweys Hussain Dhere, interviewed on 9/2/99, in Nairobi.
32. Faysal Abdi Gele, interviewed on 6/9/1998, in Nairobi.