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**THE IMPACT OF AFRICAN EXTERNAL FORCES IN THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC) CONFLICT, 1990 - 2002.**

BY

MAINA MICHAEL ARMSTRONG THEURI

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REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE IN
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
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
DECLARATION

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to the memory of my dad John Maina Nguru and to my nephew named after my dad Felix Maina Githaiga.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express thanks to the University of Nairobi, through the Department of History, for allowing me to pursue this postgraduate degree program. Thanks to my two supervisors, Prof. Vincent G. Simiyu and Dr. Kenneth S. Ombongi, for having taken time to go through my work. I wish to thank them for advising me to pursue a career in policing and later continue with my project. Special thanks to Jamila Mohammed and Colonel Peter Chege for allowing me to use their computers to print my drafts. Special thanks to Francois Grignon who allowed me access to the International Crisis Group (ICG) library in Nairobi. Lastly, I wish to express gratitude to all the lecturers and colleagues in the History Department whose names have not appeared in this page for their role in making this work a success.

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ADP: Armed Democratic Front (Uganda)	
ADFL: Alliance for the Democratic Reconstruction of the Congo (Initiative for Congo-Congo Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo Kinshasa)	
AFM: Armed Forces of the Congo (Congolese National Army)	
AG: African Group	
CGA: Central Intelligence Agency	
CND: Conférence Nationale Congolaise	
DDI: Department of Documentation and Information	
DFA: Department of Foreign Affairs (South Africa)	
DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo	
ECLWAF: Economic Community of West African States	
FAC: Forces Armées Congolaises (Congolese Armed Forces) until 1997	
FAR: Forces Armées Rwandaises (Rwandese Armed Forces)	
FAZ: Forces Armées Zaïroises (Zairean Armed Forces) (until 1997)	
FDD: Front pour la Démocratie et le Développement (Front for the Defense of Democracy)	
FDDC: Front de Libération Nationale Congolaise (Congolese National Liberation Front)	
GLP: Great Lakes Region	
IMC: Joint Military Commission (of Lusaka Agreement)	
MLC: Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (Movement for the Liberation of Congo)	
MONUC: Mission d'Opérations Multinationales Unies au Congo (United Nations Mission in the Congo)	
OUA: Organisation of African Unity	
RD-C: Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (Congolese Rally for Democracy)	
RFA: Rwandan Patriotic Army	
RPF: Rwandan Patriotic Front	
SADC: Southern Africa Development Community	
UN: United Nations	
UNF: United Nations Forces	

ABBREVIATIONS

- ACCORD** African Center for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (South Africa).
- ADF** Allied Democratic Forces (Uganda).
- ADFL** Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire (Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire).
- ANC** Armée Nationale Congolaise (Congoese National Army).
- AU** African Union.
- CIA** Central Intelligence Agency.
- CNS** Conférence Nationale Souveraine.
- DDR** Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.
- DFA** Department of Foreign Affairs (South Africa).
- DRC** Democratic Republic of Congo.
- ECOWAS** Economic Community of West African States
- FAC** Forcee Armées Congolaises (Congoese Armed Forces) since 1997.
- FAR** Forcee Armees Rwandaises (Rwandese Armed Forces).
- FAZ** Forcee Armées Zairoises (Zairian Armed Forces) (under Mobutu).
- FDD** Front pour la Defense de la Democratie (Front for the Defense of Democracy)
Burundi
- FLNC** Front de Libération Nationale Congolaise (Congoese National Liberation Front).
- GLR** Great Lakes Region
- JMC** Joint Military Commission (of Lusaka Agreement).
- MLC** Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (Movement for the Liberation of Congo)
- MONUC** Mission d'Organisation Nations Unis au Congo (United Nations Mission to the Congo).
- OAU** Organization of African Unity.
- RCD** Rassemblement Congolaise pour la Democratie (Congoese Rally for Democracy).
- RPA** Rwandese Patriotic Army.
- RPF** Rwandese Patriotic Front.
- SADC** Southern Africa Development Community.
- UN** United Nations.
- UNF** United Nations Forces.


UNITA Uniciao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola).

UPDF Uganda People's Defence Forces.

US United States of America.

ZDA Zimbabwe Defence Forces.

Figure 1: Map of DRC and its neighbours.



Source: CIA World Fact Book: Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)", Washington: CIA Publications, 2004, p. 1.

ABSTRACT

This research is an analysis of the DRC conflict between 1990 and 2002. The study seeks to demonstrate that African states have affected the character of the DRC conflict. Research shows that African states which took minimal role in the internal affairs of their neighbours began taking an active role after the demise of the Cold War in 1991. The study argues that African states have exacerbated and fought an international war on DRC soil, making the country the vortex of political destabilization in the Great Lakes region. It is through these intervening countries that the conflict in DRC has to be understood.

The overthrow of Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997 led to a security dilemma in the Great Lakes Region conflict system with DRC as the locus of conflict. This study proves that issues such as mineral resources, rebel movements and cross border ethnic integration and rivalry have impacted negatively on the DRC conflict. The armed conflict in DRC has eroded Great Lakes regional security relations and ushered in a new pattern and trend of conflict in post Cold War Africa. The internationalization of the DRC conflict has severely compromised non-interference in the internal affairs of states as articulated by the United Nations Charter.

Working definitions

Conflict

The incompatibility of goals between two or more parties.¹ Conflict occurs when competing groups, objectives, needs or values clash and aggression (although not necessary) occurs.

Conflict System

This is the inter connectivity of one conflict with others in a region. Conflict system refers to a set of patterned interactions between actors and issues within the system. States of a given region suffer directly or indirectly from conflicts in any one of them in the region.²

Conflict Internationalization

This is a situation whereby internal conflicts cross state borders and involve communities in the neighbouring countries. It makes conflicts to be much broader than they were at the beginning. Internationalization also arises as a result of involvement of media, humanitarian organizations, and Non Governmental Organizations (NGO'S), regional and international organizations.³

External Forces

These are actors in a conflict that are foreign to the state sovereign in question. External forces can be states, militia groups, mercenaries, traders, all types of smugglers, civil society, and refugees.

¹ Makumi Mwagiru, *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, Nairobi: Watermark, 2000, p.3.

² Ibid., p. 73 – 74.

³ Makumi Mwagiru, *Peace and Conflict Management in Kenya*, Nairobi: Pann Printers, 2003, p. 28.

Mediation

Mediation is a means for people to deal with problems and conflict. It happens when people involved want to talk to each other to find a solution to the problem but are unable to come together without the assistance of a third party.

Conflict management

Is used to refer to any process by which parties to the conflict are encouraged to come together and address their conflict.

International community

This includes all the other countries other than those of the Great Lakes region and the international organizations such as the UN and AU.

Great Lakes region

Includes Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Tanzania and DRC.

1.0. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The DRC covers a total area of 2,345,410 sq km, and is located in Central Africa, northeast of Angola.¹ The country has as many as 250 exceptionally wide range of culturally and linguistic groups mostly Bantu speaking.² DRC borders nine countries, Congo (Brazzaville), Central African Republic, Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Zambia and Angola. DRC is ranked among the poorest countries in the world by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), despite the existence of considerable natural resources, such as diamonds, gold and coltan.³

This study is an analysis of the DRC conflicts between 1990 and 2002. The study contends that there is a fundamental link and continuum in the conflicts that have affected the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), (former Zaire). External intervention as a factor has exacerbated the conflict to become a regional conflict. This study establishes the locus of the DRC conflict in external pressure that has perpetually weakened state apparatus as well as undermined the country's development for decades. This chapter focuses on the background of the study, 'the impact of African external forces in the DRC conflict'.

¹ CIA, "The World Fact Book: Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)". Washington: CIA Publications, 2004, p. 2.

² David, N. Gibbs, *The Political Economy Of Third World Intervention: Mines, Money and U.S. Policy in the Congo Crisis*, Chicago: University Press, 1991, p.xxvi.

³ Celine Moyroud and John Katunga, "Coltan Exploration in Eastern DRC", in Jeremy Lind and Kathryn Sturman, *Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of African Conflicts*, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 2002, p. 159.

Post-colonial Africa has experienced conflicts of varying intensity and forms, both at the inter and intra-state levels. Conflicts in Africa have ranged from struggle for political power, ethnic supremacy and exclusivity, religious intolerance to territorial expansion and resource competition. The serious erosion of 'stateness' of many African polities in the 1990s limited the scope for effective reform and opened the door to a complex web of civil conflicts.⁴ State power in Africa has been declining since the end of the Cold War. Warlords and ethnic leaders have dictated affairs of the state, making the public to hold their loyalty and allegiance to them rather than to the state. This erosion of the state power opened space for a multitude of actors in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) with varying interests seeking to exploit resources by all means, most of them choosing violence.

The first DRC war in the 1990s followed the 1994 Rwandan genocide, when more than eight hundred thousand Tutsi and moderate Hutu perished at the hands of Hutu militias and the army of Rwanda. After loosing Kigali to Paul Kagame's Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), the *genocidaires* (those who perpetrate genocide) crossed into eastern DRC with hundreds of thousands of refugees and established camps on the border. In July 1996, a coalition of Congolese rebels backed by Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Zimbabwe and Angola, and led by the late Laurent Desiré Kabila set out to overthrow Mobutu and to destroy the *genocidaires* military bases in DRC.⁵

⁴ Crawford, Y., "The End of the Post-colonial state in Africa? Reflections on Changing African Political Dynamics", *African Affairs*, Volume 103, No. 410, January 2004, p. 23.

⁵ International Crisis Group, "Congo at War: A briefing of the Internal and External Players in the Central Africa Conflict", Nairobi/ Brussels: 1998, p.1.

By May 1997, Kabila and his forces were in the capital Kinshasa having deposed the government of Mobutu Sese Seko who was the then President of the former Zaire now DRC.⁶ In 1998, barely a year after deposing Mobutu from power, the second DRC war broke out. By May 1999, international pressures on the parties succeeded in freezing the war front. Negotiations motivated by South Africa and Great Lakes Region (GLR) countries led to several peace Agreements. Kabila was assassinated in January 2001 and his son Joseph Kabila took over power as President.⁷

The armed conflict in DRC has spread to the entire GLR, causing problems among the countries' security. The conflict has brought in a number of interveners who have exacerbated it. Conflict internationalization in the GLR has severely compromised the principles of territorial sovereignty and the doctrine of non-interference in internal affairs as articulated in the UN Charter. Armed conflicts in the DRC have led to human rights violations and devastating spill over effects across the boundaries of the neighbouring states. DRC has been mired in the dilemma of cross-border incursion and devastating armed conflicts that has led to over 3.3 million deaths and displacement of millions of Congolese.⁸

When external forces intervention is considered in the DRC conflict a set of questions emerge. Were the external actors justified in their intervention? What were their interests *vis à vis* those of the sovereign state of Democratic Republic of Congo? What were the

⁶ Celine Moyroud and John Katunga, Coltan Exploration In Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)", in Jeremy Lind and Kathryn Sturman, *Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of African Conflicts*, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 2002, p. 161.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

⁸ Chris Talbot, "France leads Clamour for Congo Intervention", International Rescue Committee publication, 2003, p. 1.

outcomes of the intervention? In trying to answer these questions, this study seeks to analyse the role of African external forces in the DRC conflict. The role of African states and non-state actors in the conflict will be put at centre of this analysis.

1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

There are two scholarly perspectives that explain the DRC conflicts. One, some scholars argue that DRC is one area where several western powers and African states are jostling for influence and setting African groups against each other.⁹ In terms of natural resources, DRC has among the most vital minerals in the world. These include gold, copper, diamonds, columbite-tantalite (coltan) and uranium. Two, other scholars have looked at the dictatorial regime of Mobutu that came to power in 1965 and argued that the problem lies in state collapse and bad governance witnessed over the years.¹⁰ They have also advanced the perception that both Kabilas, Laurent and Joseph, have been rebel leaders who captured power through the barrel of the gun as opposed to democratic elections.

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During the Cold War, Super-power rivalry between the Americans and the Soviets led to the scramble to establish spheres of influence in the DRC because of its strategic location and crucial resources. In the subsequent 1960-65 conflict, the Americans won and imposed Joseph Desire Mobutu as the President. During the 1977-78 Shaba invasions, which were sponsored by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) through

⁹ W.R Ochieng, in B.A. Ogot and P.G Okoth (Ed.), *Conflict in Contemporary Africa*, Nairobi: Jomo Kenyatta Foundation, 2002, p. III.

¹⁰ Claude, K., "Policy, Issues and Actors in the Democratic Republic of the Congo", Vol. 12. Pretoria: Centre For policy Studies, 1999, p. 2.

Angola and threatened peace and security in the DRC, Mobutu was assisted by his Western allies and defeated the rebels.¹¹

The end of the Cold War changed the course of events in the DRC as Mobutu's significance to the United States diminished. The fall of the 'iron curtain' removed the motivation for outside powers to intervene militarily in support of client regimes in Africa.¹² Instead of supporting Mobutu, the US demanded democratization and inclusion of the opposition political parties in the government. The ensuing America's and her allies withdrawal of support to Mobutu created a power vacuum that allowed African countries to intervene in the country and aggravate the conflicts. Rwanda and Uganda claimed that Mobutu had supported rebel groups against their governments and it was now their turn to support Mobutu's opposition.

The gap that this study seeks to fill is how African external forces have influenced and affected the nature, scope and dynamics of the 1990s DRC conflicts. The study contends that while internal conflict continues in DRC, there are outside forces that continue to support the warring factions militarily. This study looks at the 'African external forces' since most scholars have looked at intervention only as that involving the Western countries and United Nations. The study will attempt to assess the consequences of this intervention with a view to indicate that much is yet to be done about its management and resolution.

¹¹ Godfrey Muriuki, "Some Reflections on Cold War Africa and After", in Macharia Munene *et al*, *The United States and Africa: From Independence to the End of the Cold War*, Nairobi: East African Educational publishers, 1995, p. 12.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

African countries have played a pivotal role in the DRC conflicts both as actors involved in war and as peacemakers. Within Africa, a new found disposition for intervention in armed conflicts in neighbouring states in support of either governments or rebels has eroded the doctrine of non-interference in other states' internal affairs that was in vogue in the 1960s and 1970s. The role of African external forces and their impact provides an occasion to explore issues of intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

1.3. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The study aims at investigating African external forces involved in the DRC conflict since 1990. To achieve this goal the specific objectives of the study will be:

1. To assess the role and significance of African external forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo conflict.
2. To evaluate effectiveness of African peace initiatives in DRC since 1997.

1.4. HYPOTHESES

1. Vested economic and geo-political interests have driven external forces to intervene in the DRC
2. Peace initiatives have failed because of external vested interests in DRC.

1.5. JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

The Democratic Republic of Congo is the second largest country in Africa and among the world's wealthiest in natural resources.¹³ Conflict erupted in the country soon after independence in the 1960s, raged and died down, re-emerged in the 1970s and dissipated, only to re-emerge again in the 1990s. Justified intervention has been viewed as a means of resolving conflicts. This situation has, for example, been witnessed in West Africa in Liberia through (Economic Community of West African States) ECOWAS. The study of the Democratic Republic of Congo conflict as a case study of external intervention by African states will serve as a tool of understanding conflicts and their management in Africa.

DRC was chosen as the country of study because of the importance of its natural resources and geo-strategic position within the GLR. Most of the minerals are of military and technological importance to industries, especially coltan and uranium. The study has focused on 'African external intervention', since most of the scholars have focused at intervention from the western perspective. All the years the blame on interventionism was blamed to the West and East during the cold war. The study looks at this new shift of interventional actors from outside Africa to intervention within Africa. 1990 is the starting point because the conflict began after the end of the Cold War and consequent withdrawal of support for Mobutu. Due to this pulling out, African countries intervened to exploit minerals under the pretext of maintaining peace and security in the GLR.

¹³ Jermain O. Mc' Calpin, "The Origins of the Congo War", in J.F. Clark, (Ed), *The African Stakes of the Congo War*, Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2003, p. 33.

African states intervention in the conflict continued to complicate the political landscape in the Great Lakes with DRC playing the vortex role.

The period of study up to 2002, when African foreign armies withdrew also looks at the peace initiatives as intervention mechanisms and their impact on the conflict. The study of the DRC conflict intervention will weave into the existing body of literature on peace and conflict management because it will help in a better understanding of the forces that surrounded the DRC conflict during the period of study.

Despite being dubbed in the international news headlines as “Africa’s seven nation war”, the study of African external forces has yet to be carried out. The role of external forces and their impact provides a subject of study for the DRC conflict. Having trained with the African Center for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), on Disarmament, Demobilization and Disarmament in DRC, I find myself suited for this study.

1.6. SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

The study focuses on African external forces involved in exacerbation of civil war in DRC. The study has concentrated on the African states intervening in this conflict and their proxy rebels. Because of time constraints, the study has focused on: Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Congo Brazzaville, Sudan, Chad, and Libya as external forces. Other actors that have not been analysed include; Tanzania, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Central African Republic, Zambia and Kenya.

1.7. LITERATURE REVIEW

The study of DRC conflict has attracted attention of many scholars. Generally, scholars of DRC conflicts intervention fall under two categories. First, those scholars who look at intervention from the 'Western' perspective. They have explained intervention that has involved actors outside African continent. Second. African scholars like Mwesiga and Ntalaja who have asserted that the DRC intervention involves both 'African' and 'Western' actors. The fundamental obsession on all these scholars is that they viewed external intervention as only that involving countries outside Africa, and the only African intervention was through proxies of the 'West' and 'East'.

Hoskyns, C. in his book *The Congo Since Independence* covers the period between 1960 and December 1961. Hoskyns relates the internal and external aspects of the military mutiny and secessionist crisis to show how events outside the Congo shaped the conflict. Her main focus has been to relate the internal and external aspects of the conflict. She shows how at every stage events outside the Congo reacted on those inside and vice versa. In spite of her contribution to the external actors Hoskyns work has left a gap to be filled. Her emphasis on Belgium and the United Nations as the main actors is important but she leaves out others like the Soviet Union and the United States.¹⁴

Hoare, M. in his book *Congo Mercenary*, talks of his roles during the 1964 revolt in Kwilu district. He says that the revolt was communist inspired and was supported by the Soviet bloc, Ghana and Guinea. He says the Congolese soldiers believed Mai 'dawa' or

¹⁴ C. Hoskyns, *The Congo Since Independence*, London: Oxford University Press, 1965.

water to make them invincible and immune to bullets.¹⁵ The book stresses the use of mercenaries but fails to clarify on their main interests and those of their employers as external actors in the conflict. His analysis is anti-communist and only stresses the role that the Soviet Bloc played as an external actor. Being a hired mercenary he is biased against those he was fighting and looks at the conflict only from his perspective.

Khareen Pech, in an article “The Hand of War: Mercenaries in the former Zaire 1996 – 97”, sees the mercenaries industry as injecting an additional, destabilizing factor in African conflicts. The mercenary problem has also exacerbated impoverishment, impunity and also stands at the base of small arms proliferation, the narcotics business, banditry and gross human rights violations on the African continent. Pech analyses the role of mercenaries in the former Zaire during the 1996-97 conflict. She examines the connections between African conflicts, the extraction of minerals and the use of private military companies using Zaire as the case study. She looks at the mercenaries as soldiers who protect their employer’s interests and not as the cause of the conflict. She concentrates on the 1996-7 period leaving the other phases of the conflicts. The book does not address the rebel-hired mercenaries, but focuses only those hired by the government. Despite these gaps, the book is relevant to this study because it gives an insight into the roles played by mercenaries in the DRC conflict.¹⁶

Lefever in his book *Crisis in the Congo* analyses the role of the United Nations during the 1960 and 1964 crisis. He claims Congo’s ethnic divisions and the Belgian refusal to

¹⁵ M. Hoare, *Congo Mercenary*, London: Robert Hale Ltd, 1978.

¹⁶ Khareen Pech. “The Hand of War: Mercenaries in the former Zaire 1996 – 97”, in Abdel – Fatau Musah and J. ‘Kayode Fayemi, *Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma* (Ed.), London: Pluto Press, 2000

withdraw their forces led to the crisis in Congo. He also details the political wrangles among the Congolese leaders, especially Lumumba and Kasavubu. His book illuminates the rivalry in the United Nations headquarters that led the intervention to be viewed as advancing the United States' interests rather than those of the Congolese. Lefever looks at the conflict more from its management angle and, therefore, does not deal with the external causes. He has justified the United States approach to the conflict as a blessing to the Congolese people. Consequently, he does not analyze the role of the US in prolonging of the conflict.¹⁷

Orwa in his book *the Congo Betrayal: The UN-US and Lumumba* claims that the UN and US were responsible for the conflict of the Congo state immediately after independence. He makes a contribution to the 1960-62 crisis in the Congo and the way it was handled by the international community and analyses the way the Cold War rivalry was fought out in Congo after independence. Orwa has looked at the intervention as a cause of the conflict, which was violating Democratic Republic of Congo's sovereignty.¹⁸ He also dwells much on the UN, the US, Lumumba and his communist links, and omits the rebels involved in the conflict from his study.

Calder argues in his book *Agony of the Congo* says that the conflict in the Congo lies in the country's history, which made external influence from European countries inevitable. Congo was ill-prepared for the transition to independence and lacked qualified personnel to run the political and economic positions of government. These positions, therefore, had

¹⁷ E. W. Lefever, *Crisis in the Congo*, Washington DC: Brookings Institute, 1965.

¹⁸ D.K. Orwa, *The Congo Betrayal: The UN-US and Lumumba*, Nairobi: Kenya Literature Bureau, 1985.

to be taken by expatriates who with time were to train Congolese to take up the positions. He also says much about the Katanga and Kasai secession movements, which were funded and supported by the Belgians who wanted to safeguard their interests in these provinces. The book traces the influence of the Tutsi who had run away from the Hutu massacre in Rwanda and Burundi in 1959 prior to Congolese independence. He, however, does not see the international community's presence in the Congo as a cause for the increased tensions.¹⁹

Merriam in his book *Background to Conflict* argues that the Belgians failed to prepare the Congolese for independence. This opened up the country to external interference due to the Cold War rivalry between the Superpowers who wanted allies from newly independent African states. He claims that the tremendous degree to which the Congo had essentially been controlled by outside forces, is emphasized by the three-pronged unofficial organization among the state, church, and business. While acknowledging the fact that colonial history did much to influence the 1960 conflict, the author nonetheless leaves a gap to study the roles that these forces played during the conflict. He, like Calder, blames the conflict on the Belgian colonial legacy. Merriam also does not look at the rebel actors and the involvement of various private foreign armies.²⁰

Shraeder argues in his book *United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change*, that the nature of events on the African continent, ranging from normal routine relations to crisis, and extended crisis situations affected the

¹⁹ T. Calder, *Agony of the Congo*, Hertfordshire: The Garden City Press Ltd, 1961.

²⁰ A. P. Merriam, *Background to conflict*, New York: Northwestern University Press, 1961.

operation of the US policymaking process. The book traces the historical evolution of US foreign policy from the 1940s to the 1990s in Ethiopia, South Africa and Zaire. The latter, through Mobutu Sese Seko, was said to be the most valued ally of the US on the African continent. The US, therefore, supported Mobutu against any opposition and eliminated Lumumba in order to allow Mobutu to rule the country militarily. Shraeder also analyses the role of the US in directing the United Nations Force that defeated Moïse Tshombe's secessionist ambitions in Katanga.²¹

Sean Kelly in his book *America's Tyrant: the CIA and Mobutu of Zaire* analyses how the United States put Mobutu in power, protected him from his enemies, and helped him become one of the richest men in the world. The book tells much about the role played by the United States as an external force in the Congo conflict. The US not only financed his military force, but also continued to maintain him in power for three decades. Kelly's analysis leaves a gap to be studied, in particular he dwells much on the United States aid to Mobutu and omits other leaders opposing him who got foreign motivation from other quarters, for instance the Soviet Union and other independent African states.²²

Crawford Young and Thomas Turner in their book *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State* examine the political history of Mobutu's Zaire and the external forces that maintained him in power despite opposition. They also give a historical background of the country and how the colonial legacy led the DRC into conflict at independence. Their

²¹ P.J. Shraeder, *United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

²² S. Kelly, *America's Tyrant: the CIA and Mobutu of Zaire*, Washington D.C: the America University Press, 1993.

comprehensive study on the major political trends, economy and international relations during Mobutu's regime helps us to understand why these external forces supported him. Their study however dwells too much on the sociopolitical factors and the overall economy of the DRC. The book does not look at the other forces, like non- state actors behind the conflict other than the United States and her western capitalist allies.²³

Claude Kapemba in his article "Policy, Issues and Actors" looks at the causes of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) between 1990 and 1998 and the way forward. He argues that the collapse of the state has been a major cause of the spiral conflict witnessed in the DRC. Kapemba portrays the DRC conflict as an internal one that due to the collapse of the state, external powers have been able to influence to suit their own interests. He requests researchers to investigate the external actors to understand the motivations for their intervention in the conflict. The gap that he leaves is what this study tries to bridge: to investigate the role of external actors' intervention in the DRC conflict.²⁴

Baregu Mwesiga claims in his article "Resources, Interests and Conflicts in the Great Lakes Region" that The Great Lakes Region has had a number of protracted conflicts, which sprawl the area moving back and forth across borders and defying all manner of peaceful transformation. Baregu refers the DRC conflict as "Africa's First World War" involving at least seven foreign armies and a myriad of rebel groups. He says that DRC conflict is a highly internationalized conflict within the Great Lakes conflict system. He

²³ C. Young, and Thomas, T. , *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, London: the University of Wisconsin Press, Ltd, 1985.

²⁴ C. Kapemba, "Policy, Issues and Actors Vol. 12", Pretoria: Centre for Policy Studies (CPS), 1999.

also analyses the actors and interests according to their identity and description. His analysis categorises the actors into peacemakers, peace-spoilers, and peace-opportunists. However, his paper does not analyze individual actors like states and rebel factions, which this study seeks to investigate. He also dwells too much on the peace initiatives and generalizes the actors and interests within the region. We however appreciate his analysis of the conflicts from a regional perspective and a wider scope.²⁵

The International Crisis Group (ICG) portrays the DRC conflict as an international conflict fought on the DRC soil. Both national and international actors have exacerbated this conflict due to poor conflict management methods. It argues that the peace initiatives have not been all-inclusive leading to failures that have led to re-emergence of the conflicts. ICG has also addressed the causes of the 1990s conflicts, nonetheless, their analysis lacks the connection from previous conflicts, which this study attempts to establish.²⁶

Paul Kagame in his paper “The Great Lakes Conflicts, Factors, Actors, and Challenges” dates the conflicts back to the pre-colonial period. He cites the ‘false start’ at independence and chronic bad governance as the greatest causes of the Great Lakes conflicts. He justifies the Rwandan attack on DRC by arguing that the *ex-FAR* (former Rwandan army) and *Interahamwe* militias that committed the genocide in Rwanda ran into Congo. Kagame claims that the continued presence of refugee camps just across

²⁵ B. Mwesiga, “Resources, interests and conflicts in the Great lakes region”: a paper presented for CODESRIA’S 10TH General Assembly on Africa in the new Millennium Kampala, Uganda-12 December 2002.

²⁶ International Crisis Group (ICG), “Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War”, ICG Report, 20th December, 2003.

Rwanda's borders with Congo posed a serious threat to Rwanda's security.²⁷ While acknowledging the security threat to Rwanda the 20,000 Rwandese soldiers in Congo does not justify a border threat. The justification could have held water if the soldiers were deployed along the border other than in the Capital Kinshasa.

Charles Owori *et al* in their research "The causes of Uganda-Rwanda clashes in Kisangani, the Democratic Republic of Congo" claim that the Rwanda-Uganda clash in Kisangani was a major setback in the relationship between these two neighbours. They argue that both the two states had gone to fight rebels threatening the peace and harmony of their respective countries but ended up embroiled in the local Congolese problems. They argue that Uganda's strategy was to mobilize the Congolese people to fight Kabila and empower them to develop an alternative leadership. Rwanda's first priority, on the other hand, was to establish a secure border with the DRC.

They also claim that the clash was about rivalry over regional leadership and competition over Congo resources. The research dwells much on the role played by Ugandan forces against the Rwandese hence it is biased. Their emphasis on the clash between these two major actors should be appreciated. However, these are external actors fighting on DRC soil and the clash did not involve them only. This study seeks to investigate other actors involved in DRC conflict, since the research was in scope restricted to Uganda and Rwanda.²⁸

²⁷ P. Kagame. "The Great Lakes Conflicts, Factors, Actors, and Challenges", an inaugural lecture delivered by Paul Kagame at the Nigeria War College, Abuja 16th September 2002.

²⁸ Charles Owori *et al*, "The Causes of Uganda – Rwanda Clashes in Kisangani, The Democratic Republic of Congo", Parliament of Uganda Research Service, July 2002.

Nzongola–Ntalaja in his book, *The Congo–From Leopold to Kabila: A People's History*, tells us much about the historical happenings in Congo. He says that the people of the Congo have suffered particularly brutal experience of colonial rule, external interference by the US and other powers, a generation long spoliation at the hands of Mobutu and periodic warfare, which even now continues fitfully in the east of the country. Nzongola argues that the Congolese people have responded by attempting to establish democratic institutions at home and to free themselves of exploitation from abroad.²⁹ This book is significant for this study but focuses more on the struggle for democracy by the Congolese people than conflict exacerbation by external forces.

The existing literature on the Congo conflict, in general, does not provide a comprehensive account of the role and impact of African external forces in the conflict. Little effort has been made to evaluate the role of intervention in 'African' context. African intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo conflict has not been studied, and it is this existing gap that the study attempts to fill. The research, therefore, studies the role played by the African external actors in the DRC with a view to explain the dynamics of the conflict.

1.8. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

War and conflict are an important part of contemporary international relations practice. The realist theory sees the international system as being anarchic, where states relate with each other on the basis of force and its manipulation. Power is the main credo within the

²⁹ Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A Peoples History*, New York: Palgrave, 2002.

world of realism.³⁰ The world is revealed to realists as a dangerous and insecure place, where violence is regrettable but endemic. In their account of the conflictual nature of international politics, realists give high priority to the centrality of the nation-state in their consideration, acknowledging it as primary actor in world politics.³¹ Realism regards the conception of sovereignty as a natural political condition of mankind. International law is regarded skeptically, particularly if states believe that it infringes upon their capacity to pursue national interests.

The influence of external actors' on the internal affairs of another state can better be understood when analysed through this theory, which accounts for the violent behaviour of nation states by focusing on the role of power. It accords priority to military power, perceptions of vulnerability and the role played by national interests. The international realm is characterized by conflicts, suspicion and competition between nation states in their search for national interests, in this case the natural resources in the DRC. Relations between states in the Great Lakes region have been centered on competition over resources, dominance, alliances and counter alliances in pursuing regional supremacy. Relations with the DRC have been of influence through use of force; it is within this framework of political realism theory that the study has been carried out.

Realism proponents like Hans Morgenthau argue that national interests always provide policy makers with a rational guide to action, they are fixed, politically neutral and always transcend changes in government. This explains why capitalist countries

³⁰ H.J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, New Delhi: Kalyani, 2001, p.3.

³¹ *Ibid.* ,

supported Mobutu as long as he protected their interests against the Soviet Union and other communist countries. This support ceased after the demise of the Soviet Union. The US interests now required a democratic state, which Mobutu was not ready for. Once Western support diminished other African countries, especially neighbours like Uganda, Burundi, Angola and Rwanda, helped the rebels to oust Mobutu from power.³²

The realist theory is relevant in this study because of its emphasis on states, territorial sovereignty, intervention and interests. Realism speaks to these concerns directly by privileging strategic interactions and distribution of power, in this case, in the Great Lakes region. Realists such as Morgenthau, Arnold Wolfers and Klaus Knorr argue that every state, whether industrialized or not, has vital interests which it always aims to preserve against other states, and that the nature of the national interests that must be preserved at all costs, is open to various interpretations.³³ Realism has articulated a conflict management approach based on strategy and use of force to maintain peace. While acknowledging states as the main actors in the conflict, the study will also critically analyse non-state actors that are supported by different external forces. Realism best explains relations between and among states, Katete Orwa has used it³⁴ in analyzing the Congo crisis immediately after independence.

In addressing the non-state actors, the study will utilize liberal institutionalism theory. Liberal institutionalism theory in particular rejects the state centric view of the world adopted by realists. World politics is no longer an exclusive arena for states, liberal

³² Jermain O. McCalpin, *Historicity of a Crisis*, *op cit.*, p. 47.

³³ B.A. Ogot and P.G. Okoth, *Conflict in Contemporary Africa*, *op cit.*, P.10.

³⁴ D. Katete Orwa, *The Congo Betrayal*, *op cit.*,

institutionalism argues that the centrality of other actors, such as interest groups, transnational corporations, warlords, arms dealers, mercenaries, private militaries, money launderers, Médecins Sans Frontiers, UN agencies and International Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's) have to be taken into consideration.³⁵

The DRC conflict involves states and a myriad rebel forces and mercenaries, which will be analyzed by both theories to understand the cobweb of diverse actors linked through multiple channels of interaction. The fact that domestic government monopoly and international autonomy has declined in the DRC can be explained by the proliferation of non-state actors through liberal institutionalism theory. Warlords control large swathes of land at the expense of the government. The study will utilize both theories; realism will analyze state actors, whereas liberal institutionalism will look at the non-state actors.

1.9. METHODOLOGY

The study was based entirely on library research, both primary and secondary sources were analyzed. Primary sources included archival materials and personal unpublished papers. Secondary sources consisted of reports, relevant articles, journals and books. Particular important were reports conducted by the International Crisis Group. International Crisis Group (ICG) is a private, multinational organization committed to strengthening the capacity of international community to anticipate, understand and act to prevent and contain conflicts.

³⁵ J. Baylis and S. Smith. *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p 170.

ICG's approach is grounded in primary field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflicts. ICG's reports are distributed widely to email and printed copies to officials in foreign ministries and at the same time via the organization's Internet site.³⁶

This research was based on existing literature. Extensive document analysis of ICG reports was conducted at the ICG library in Nairobi.

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³⁶ www.crisisweb.org.

CHAPTER TWO.

2.0. HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE DRC CONFLICT.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter is divided into five parts: part one is the introduction to DRC during the pre-colonial period, part two deals DRC under Leopold II, part three deals with Belgian Congo, part four examines independent DRC and part five deals with the post-cold war DRC. This chapter examines the history of the DRC and how it relates to the conflict of the 1990s.

European involvement in the region began as early as fifteenth century when contact with the Portuguese brought a considerable influx of European influence in the Kongo Kingdom. The situation changed with the Berlin Conference partitioning of Africa when the country was given to King Leopold II of Belgium.

The Post independence period began with the crisis that led to the death of Patrice Lumumba, the first Prime Minister and overthrow of the elected government. Mobutu toppled the government in 1965 and established a dictatorial regime that lasted for thirty-two years. Laurent Kabila ousted Mobutu in 1997 and ruled for four years before he was assassinated in 2001. Joseph Kabila, the son of the slain president, took charge of the country and has ruled to-date. The plundering of Congolese resources has been a recurring theme throughout the history of the DRC and has led to violent conflicts.

2.1. PRECOLONIAL DRC

The Kingdom of Kongo was an African Kingdom located in West Central Africa in what are now northern Angola, Cabinda, Republic of the Congo, and the western portion of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Several smaller autonomous states to the south and east paid tribute to it. The Kongo Kingdom was ruled by the *manikongo*, or king, and was divided into six provinces, each administered by a governor appointed by the *manikongo*.³⁷ The Kingdom of the Kongo was roughly three hundred miles square and its capital was Mbanza Kongo.³⁸ The kingdom had been in place for at least a hundred years before the Portuguese arrived.³⁹

The first exploration in the DRC region by the Europeans which have a clear record was the discovery of the mouth of the Congo River in 1482 by a Portuguese explorer Diego Cão, who named it Zaire, a word supposedly derived from the African word Zadi, or 'big water'.⁴⁰ Cão returned later in 1485 and made contact with the people and the King along the river. In 1491, a Portuguese expedition of priests and emissaries set up residence as permanent representatives of their country in the court of the Kongo King.⁴¹ This Portuguese encounter marked the beginning of the European relations with the Congo.

The relations between the Portuguese and Kongo Kingdom initiated Trans-Atlantic slave trade in the 1500s as the Portuguese opened up trading expeditions to Brazil. By the seventeenth century, 15,000 slaves a year were being exported from the Kingdom of

³⁷ The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, "kingdom of the Congo", Pearson Education, 2007, p.1.

³⁸ A. Hochschild, *King Leopold's Ghost*, London, Macmillan, 1998, p.8.

³⁹ *Ibid.*,

⁴⁰ A.P. Merriam. *Background to Conflict, op cit.*, p. 4.

⁴¹ A. Hochschild, *King Leopold's Ghost*, London, Macmillan, 1998, p.8.

Kongo.⁴² The contact with Portugal brought a substantial influx of European influence in the Kongo Kingdom. Linguists have researched on the slaves taken from Congo and have found the Kikongo language spoken around the Congo river's mouth, as one of the African tongues found in the Gullah dialect spoken by African Americans today in the coastal islands of South Carolina and Georgia.⁴³ King Affonso I of the Kongo Kingdom traded with the Portuguese in the sixteenth century, with copper and slaves. He got European products, mostly guns, which helped him to win battles in the region and therefore obtain more captives as slaves. Affonso I used this trade to influence Kongo's relations with Portugal.⁴⁴ The other European countries began engaging in the lucrative slave business and by the end of the 1500s, the British and Dutch vessels were concentrating on African coasts searching for human cargo.

Later Europeans in Congo include, Henry Morton Stanley who was born in Liverpool England where he worked for a newspaper. He later migrated to New Orleans, USA.⁴⁵ Stanley joined the American Civil War in 1862 fighting for the Union Army and enlisted in the Union Navy in 1864. He later deserted the Navy in 1867 and returned to his career as a newspaperman.⁴⁶ Stanley was a permanent roving correspondent for the *Herald* in London.⁴⁷ He travelled Africa looking for David Livingstone, whom he found in 1872, at the end of Lake Tanganyika (Burundi). He returned to Europe to tell tales of an essentially empty Africa. Stanley was hired by King Leopold II of Belgium to explore the

⁴² A. Hochschild, *King Leopold's Ghost*, London, Macmillan, 1998, p.11.

⁴³ *Ibid.*,

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p.12.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*,

interior of Congo along river Congo after the King heard of his finding of Livingstone.⁴⁸ Prior to Henry Morton Stanley's expedition, European travellers had not, up until the later-half century of the nineteenth century, penetrated into the interior of the Congo Basin. In 1878, King Leopold II of Belgium and Henry Morton Stanley established a "Survey Committee for the Upper Congo."⁴⁹ Stanley signed several treaties with the local chiefs in the Congo from 1883 onwards. Prior to these treaties, Congo remained a nominal colony of the Portuguese. Between 1883 and 1885, Stanley concluded 500 such treaties, founded 40 posts, launched 5 steamers on Stanley Pool an inland Lake on River Congo, and explored further inland.⁵⁰ The indigenous Chiefs did not understand the content of the treaties they were made to sign. Indeed, the treaties were coercions by European Empire builders.

Between 1878 and 1884, European states were scrambling for spheres of influence in Africa, which almost brought them to a full-scale conflict. The Berlin Conference of 1884-85 was thus called by Otto von Bismarck of Germany to solve the wrangles amongst European powers. Leopold II succeeded in persuading the United States and thirteen European powers to recognize the Congo Free State (CFS) as a sovereign state but basically his personal possession. Congo Free State was so brutally exploited that there was international outcry. Leopold II had to relinquish it in 1908 when the colony was transferred to the Belgian government. The United States' support of Leopold enabled him to receive one of the largest and richest parts of Africa. He, in return, agreed

⁴⁸ Jermain O Mc' Calpin. *Historicity of a Crisis, op cit.*, p. 34.

⁴⁹ A.P. Merriam, *Background to Conflict, op cit.* .p.7.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*,

to keep the area free for commerce by other nations.⁵¹ This meant that the Congo colony was open for the commercial interests of all those who helped Leopold acquire it. These interests, especially rubber and palm oil were in great demand in European industries at that time. The private companies were not interested in the administration of the vast colony, only in the profits that they would accumulate from its resources.

2.2. The Congo Free State 1884 – 1908

Throughout the Congo Free State period, immense concessions were granted to private companies, which were entrusted to have power over their land.⁵² Lasting from 1885 to 1908, this period was the most controversial in the history of the Congo. It was characterized by human rights violations, murder of many Congolese, resource exploitation of a great magnitude and ineffective administration. Leopold was forced to cede his colony in 1908 to the Belgian government, which administered the colony until 30 June 1960.

Having acquired the vast and rich country, over 80 times the size of his Belgium Kingdom, Leopold II was resolved to make it a profitable enterprise.⁵³ From 1885 onwards, Leopold became the ruler of two sovereigns, Belgium and Congo simultaneously. Leopold's agents used torture, murder and other inhumane methods to compel the Congolese to abandon their way of life in order to produce or do whatever the

⁵¹ D.K. Orwa, *The Congo Betrayal*, op cit., p.12.

⁵² A.P. Merriam, *Background to Conflict*, op cit., p.13.

⁵³ Georges Nzongola – Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A Peoples History*, New York: Palgrave, 2002. p. 20.

colonial state required of them.⁵⁴ The Congo Free State colonial resources accumulation was therefore based on forced labour, which took the features of slave labour in a political entity created as a humanitarian venture against slavery.

Between 1892 and 1894, the conflict against Swahili–Arab economic and political power was disguised as a Christian anti–slavery crusade by a colonial state whose regime surpassed human rights violations of Arab slavery.⁵⁵ The invention of inflatable rubber tyre in 1887-88 resulted in mass production of bicycles and motor vehicles.⁵⁶ It was the collection of wild rubber that led to the depopulation of entire villages and the perpetration of crimes against humanity in the Congo.⁵⁷ Villages that were unwilling or unable to meet the assigned daily quotas of production were subjected to rape, arson, bodily mutilation and murder.⁵⁸

The Leopold regime resulted in a death toll that is estimated to be as high as 10 million people.⁵⁹ Ironically, even though King Leopold II originally owned Congo as a personal property, during the entire 23- year ownership period (1885-1908) he never put his feet on Congolese soil despite all the wealth he was accumulating from it. The Congo Reform Association (CRA) was the first major human rights organization and campaign of the twentieth century. CRA mobilized the world public opinion against the gross violations of human rights in the Congo Free State. The CRA movement went beyond its success in

⁵⁴ Georges Nzongola – Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: op cit.*, p. 20.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p.21.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* ,

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p.22.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*,

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*,

bringing pressure on major world powers to end the Leopoldian regime in Central Africa.⁶⁰ The Leopoldian system was replaced by a colonial regime that was just as oppressive, albeit in a less brutal manner.⁶¹

2.3. Belgian Congo 1908 – 1960

Belgium took over the running of the Congo in 1908 and operated on the economic and administrative establishments set up by Leopold II. As a colony, Congo was strongly influenced by the Leopoldian legacy as a system of economic exploitation, political repression and cultural oppression.⁶² The first step Belgium took towards the alteration of Congo was adoption of a colonial constitution, drafted by men who were major shareholders in Belgium companies with interests in the colony.⁶³ The Congo was subdivided into six provinces, twenty-three districts, and chieftaincies.⁶⁴ To prevent problems with the traditional leaders, the Belgians recognized their authority but they became answerable to the colonial government. Throughout the history of Belgian colonialism, private companies played a crucial role in the exploitation of the territory as profit rates were consistently higher in the Congo than in metropolitan Belgium.⁶⁵

During the early period of colonialism, the state's authority was established mainly through concession companies that were chartered to exploit Congolese wealth. The colonialist administrative system utilized traditional African rulers or chiefs to administer the rural population. The Belgians also put a colonial army or *force publique* to maintain

⁶⁰ Georges Nzongola – Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: op cit.*, p. 25.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁶² *Ibid.*,

⁶³ *Ibid.*,

⁶⁴ D.K. Orwa, *The Congo Betrayal, op cit.*, p.6.

⁶⁵ David, N. Gibbs, *The Political Economy of Third World Intervention: Mines, Money and U.S. Policy in the Congo Crisis*, Chicago: University Press, 1991, p. 60.

a healthy and tranquil political atmosphere.⁶⁶ The Congolese referred to the Belgian administrators as *Bula matari* (he who breaks rocks) in Kikongo, the language of the Kongo people. The name symbolizes the brutal form of extortion by the administration of the colonial regimes.⁶⁷ As a colony, Congo continued to be a free trade area for the European businesses. More than any other colony in Africa, Congo was run as a business undertaking.⁶⁸ The colony was supposed to service its debts and make profits for the Belgian great companies that had invested in the country.

The continuing weaknesses of the colonial state during the First World War enhanced the power of the Roman Catholic Church. The government's educational policy reflected its reluctance to encourage more social change among Africans than was absolutely necessary.⁶⁹ The government entrusted the Catholic Church with building and running of schools. The church evolved an educational system related to religious studies and technical training.⁷⁰ This system made many of the Congolese not to receive professional training. There was little provision for post-primary education among Africans, except for those pursuing theological studies to work for the church. The education offered by the missionaries achieved its objectives from the colonial economic and political development standpoint. In other words, it instilled in the Congolese a "consciousness of duty, respect for Belgian authority, and loyalty towards Belgium".⁷¹

⁶⁶ David, N. Gibbs, *The Political Economy of Third World Intervention*, *op cit.*, p. 37.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. xxvii.

⁶⁸ B. Jewsiewicki, Belgium Africa, in J.D. Fage, *The Cambridge History of Africa from 1905 to 1940*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 492.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 481.

⁷⁰ D.K. Orwa, *The Congo Betrayal*, *op cit.*, p. 8.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

Prior to 1958, political parties were prohibited and encouragement was given to local ethnic associations and formation of *évolués* clubs (clubs of Congolese who had gone to school or progressed).⁷² These clubs were established in order to curtail any form of nationalism among the Congolese people, because they fostered ethnic, regional and class allegiances. Political activities in Congo were organized along ethnic lines, which were manifested in the pre-independence political parties. Although the United States State Department had pressured France and Britain to liberate their colonies, it encouraged the Belgians to hold on to Congo.⁷³

In the entire country after 80 years of Belgian rule, there were only 17 Congolese graduates at independence.⁷⁴ This demonstrates how Congo was ill-prepared for independence by the Belgians, and was therefore susceptible to foreign influence, assistance, control and also internal instability.

2.4. Independent Congo

Congo attained independence on 30th June 1960 under the leadership of Joseph Kasavubu as the President and Patrice Lumumba as the prime Minister. King Baudoin of Belgium's speech on Independence Day warned the Congolese not to make any hasty reforms in the political, administrative and economic structure the Belgian's were handing over, and to be aware of foreign countries that might interfere.⁷⁵ Congo has been affected by conflicts

⁷² D.K. Orwa, *The Congo Betrayal*, *op cit.*, p. 15.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁷⁴ T. Calder, *Agony of the Congo*, *op cit.*, p. 37.

⁷⁵ Catherine Hoskyns, *The Congo Since Independence*, *op cit.*, p. 85.

ever since the Belgium authority was abruptly withdrawn in the summer of 1960.⁷⁶ Within a week of independence, the new nation was held hostage by a Congolese army mutiny and became the subject of international attention.⁷⁷ Congolese soldiers in the *force publique* (the state army) mutinied against their Belgian officers. Katanga, mineral rich province of Congo and the wealthiest seceded on July 11, 1960 under the leadership of Moitse Tshombe.

Belgium intervened to protect its nationals by deploying its troops to calm the violence that was now spreading throughout Congolese towns. The government of Lumumba and Kasavubu, however, interpreted this action as an affront on independent Congo's nascent sovereignty.⁷⁸ Therefore, Congolese leaders requested the United Nations' assistance to protect Congo against external aggression from Belgium. Lumumba's request for help and advice from Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union resulted in the United States and her western allies' assertion that he was a communist, and was advancing the communists' interests in Congo. The Soviet Bloc and some radical African leaders, like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana supported Lumumba's advocacy for a strong central government and opposition to Katanga's secession.⁷⁹ Lumumba made a secret deal for a shipment of Soviet military supplies and technicians to be used against the secessionists, especially Tshombe.⁸⁰ Lumumba said he would not hesitate to "make a pact with the devil himself" to achieve immediate departure of the Belgians.⁸¹ The resulting four-year

⁷⁶ E.W. Lefever, *Crisis in the Congo, op cit.*, p. VIII.

⁷⁷ Jermain O. Mc'Calpin, *Historicity of a Crisis, op cit.* , p. 38.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

⁷⁹ E.W. Lefever, *Crisis in the Congo, op cit.*, p. 31.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁸¹ Allan P. Merriam, *Background to conflict, op cit.* , p. 220.

peacekeeping effort between 1960 and 1964 was the largest, most complex and costly operation ever carried out by the UN up until then.⁸²

External parties exacerbated the Congo conflict to suit their interests. For instance, there was antagonism between Joseph Kasavubu and Mobutu Sese Seko towards Ghana and Guinea because of their support for Lumumba.⁸³ Foreign interference also included military aid to factions and troop support through white mercenaries. The United Nations Force (UNF) was an instrument of a coalition of states with different and frequently opposing interests in the Congo and in the larger world.⁸⁴ Consequently, the UN military and civilian staffs in Congo were dragged into the Cold War rivalry between the two superpowers and allies. The lack of consensus among various troops under the UNF led to clashes with the local secessionist units who also got support from the two rival blocs. The UNF suffered from the dual loyalty of its key funding states, which were also supplying weaponry to the Congolese rival groups as well as supporting a multilateral solution to the conflict.

Lumumba governed Congo for only a few months before he was overthrown and finally assassinated on January 17, 1961, just three days prior to Kennedy's assumption of power in the US.⁸⁵ Lumumba was allegedly assassinated with the support of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives in the Congo. The Katangan secession ended in

⁸² E. W. Lefever, *Crisis in the Congo*, *op cit.*, p. VIII.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

⁸⁵ Peter J. Shraeder, *United States foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 58.

January 1963 and Tshombe fled into exile.⁸⁶ In 1964 the country was renamed Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) with a new constitution.⁸⁷ Laurent Désiré Mobutu, who was the Chief of General Staff used the political conflict and seized power on 25th November 1965, declared himself president and banned all political parties. This marked the end of five years of chaos in the newly independent Congo. Mobutu consolidated power and brought order by restoring nominal stability and state apparatus in the country. The coup d' état was supported by the western powers with the blessings of the United States. From 1965, US successive presidents publicly reiterated Washington's special relationship with Mobutu and supported him to reorganize the military against further uprisings.

Mobutu not only constituted a valued anti-communist ally in the eyes of the CIA, but also served as an important conduit to the *Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola* (FNLA) the Angolan guerilla faction headed by Holden Roberto with which the US had links through its Kinshasa office.⁸⁸ The US saw the Congo as the regional hegemony in the Central African region, which would play an important role in protecting the region against communist infiltration. In 1971 DRC was renamed Zaire.⁸⁹ To indigenize the ideals of state control inherited from Belgium, Mobutu introduced Zairianization measures in November 1973.⁹⁰

⁸⁶ Jermain O. Mc'Calpin, *Historicity of a Crisis*, op cit., p. 40.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.* ,

⁸⁸ Peter J. Shraeder, *United States foreign Policy toward Africa*, op cit., p. 81.

⁸⁹ Jermain O. McCalpin, *Historicity of a Crisis*, op cit., p. 42.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*,

Zairianization was a bid for economic independence by the country. The decisions provided for the seizure of a vast swath of economy which had remained in foreign hands⁹¹. These included most commerce, plantation sector, many small industries, construction firms, transportation and property holding enterprises. Zairianization was a broader Congolese trend of displacing foreigners from the commercial sector, which they had dominated over the colonial period. This new inclination was an expression of the state impulse to seek economic autonomy⁹². Through this new police the Mobutu regime aimed at achieving economic nationalism.

Even though Mobutu was supported by the supposedly capitalist western bloc his domestic economic policies like *Zairianization*, were socialist in orientation. Yet, because of the Cold War the West did not rebuff his economic policies. The new system was aimed at nationalization of thousands of small foreign owned businesses and their transfer to indigenous ownership. The new policy of *Zairianization* destroyed the economy because patronage and ethnicity played a key role in governance, but Mobutu rhetorically continued to espouse an anti-communist stance in order to maintain western support and sponsorship.

On March 7, 1977, approximately 1,500 Zairian exiles under the banner of the *Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo* (FNLC) invaded Zaire's Shaba Province from neighbouring Angola. FNLC attacked Zaire with the publicly stated goal of overthrowing the Mobutu regime, the FNLC advanced virtually unopposed and threatened to capture

⁹¹ C. Young, and Thomas, T. , *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, *op cit.* , p. 326.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 327.

the mining center of Kolwezi, the source of nearly 70 percent of Zaire's foreign export earnings.⁹³ The invasion that came to be known as Shaba I became the focus of Jimmy Carter's administration due to its regime-threatening character, origins in Marxist ruled Angola, and the possibility that the insurgents were being accompanied by Cuban advisers and troops.⁹⁴ Mobutu was unable to stop the rebel advance alone and turned to western allies on the pretext that the FNLC were sponsored by the communists. The US, France, Belgium and Morocco provided the military transport planes and troops that eventually defeated the FNLC.

On May 13, 1978 a year after the first Shaba crisis, the second Shaba invasion took place from Zambia. The rapidity of the attack placed over 2,500 Europeans and 88 US citizens under FNLC control.⁹⁵ The US once again provided transport and logistical support for Belgian and French paratroopers. Due to the Mobutu's failure to quell the Shaba crises, the US State Department and the Pentagon coordinated with the French and Belgians to put together a military reform package for the Zairian Armed Forces.⁹⁶ The rationale provided for the assistance was that Zaire was unable to halt the advance of a relatively small number of insurgents due to lack of army training and pervasiveness of corruption in the country.

Mobutu's support to the United States anti-communism crusade in the African continent made him an important ally. Mobutu had also established links with Jonas Savimbi of

⁹³ Peter J. Shraeder, *United States foreign Policy Toward Africa*, *op cit.*, p. 87.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*,

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), who was fighting against the *Movimento Popular de Liberação de Angola* (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), the MPLA communist government in Angola. Mobutu also supported US military efforts in Chad, as well as facilitating the Reagan capitalist doctrine in Mozambique and Angola.⁹⁷

2.5. Post-Cold War Congo, 1990 – 2002

The Cold War ended after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, marking a new beginning in the international arena. The emergent unipolar world led by the US focused its attention on human rights, democracy, good governance, transparency, accountability, responsibility and therefore dropping the former anti – communist allies around the world. On April 24, 1990, Mobutu pronounced the end of his dictatorial regime and a move towards political pluralism.⁹⁸ He declared that there would be a National Conference on Democracy that would administer the re-introduction of multi party political system in Zaire. A national conference was convened, but Mobutu retained control – artfully exploiting divisions in the opposition, co-opting dissidents and occasionally unleashing the army⁹⁹

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From 1991, thousands of Zairians began demonstrating on the streets in the capital and other cities to protest Mobutu's rigging of the National Conference for Democracy.¹⁰⁰ In

⁹⁷ Peter J. Shraeder, *United States foreign Policy Toward Africa, op cit.*, p. 101.

⁹⁸ Kevin C. Dunn, *Imagining the Congo: International Relations of Identity*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 139.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

¹⁰⁰ Peter J. Shraeder, *United States foreign Policy Toward Africa, op cit.*, p. 104.

September 1991, some of the troops mutinied due to non-payment of salaries thus threatening the foreigners in the country. French and Belgian troops intervened to ensure safe evacuation of non-nationals who feared an outbreak of chaos in Zaire. Economically, Zaire was in shambles. Its formal economy shrank more than 40 percent between 1988 and 1995¹⁰¹.

During the early 1990s, neighbouring countries such as, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Angola portrayed Mobutu and Zaire as a 'cancer' and a pariah in the Great Lakes Region. This was largely due to the fact that the country's poor economic condition had regional implications with thriving illicit market (smuggling) trade across its highly porous borders. Mobutu's unpopularity to his nation and neighbouring countries was largely attributed to his open support for UNITA, a rebel group attempting to overthrow the Angolan government and the fact that rebels fighting the regimes in Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda were using eastern Zaire as a base of operations.¹⁰²

From 1991 a generalised crisis in the Great Lakes Region continued and on April 6, 1994, a plane carrying Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana and Burundian president Cyprian Ntaryamira was shot down over the Rwandan capital of Kigali.¹⁰³ This led to the 1994 Rwandan genocide, where over 800 000 Rwandan Tutsi and moderate Hutu perished at the hands of the ex- FAR and *interahamwe* militias.¹⁰⁴ The genocide caused over two million Rwandan's move to refugee camps inside Zaire to seek protection from

¹⁰¹ Kevin C. Dunn, *Imagining the Congo: op cit.*, p. 140.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*,

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*,

advancing RPF Tutsi forces. Over the next two years, these refugees with Mobutu's support reorganized and rearmed. Soon they began launching attacks from the camps into neighbouring Rwanda and against the Banyamulenge in South Kivu.¹⁰⁵

The Banyamulenge are a group of Tutsis living in the eastern region of the DRC, they are originally from Rwanda who were taken to DRC as labourers. Ethnic violence in Rwanda subsequently forced more members to Congo as refugees. Their nationality has always been disputed resulting to its members often clashes with other ethnic groups. They are concentrated in the province of South Kivu close to the Burundi-Congo-Rwanda border. The ambiguous political position of the Banyamulenge contributed to the start of the First Congo War in 1996, the Second Congo War in 1998 and continues to a point of contention since 2003, when the Second Congo War officially ended.¹⁰⁶ The Banyamulenge are accused by other inhabitants of the region of being in league with RPF regime in Rwanda.

Laurent Désiré Kabila the leader of Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) was a former supporter of Lumumba and a member of the 1965 rebellion who had survived as a small career rebel ensconced in the east and engaged in gold smuggling and occasional armed attack¹⁰⁷. He was briefly joined by Ché Guevara before the Cubans became deeply disillusioned by what they considered the ineptitude and disorganization among the Congolese rebels.¹⁰⁸ In 1967, Kabila and his supporters withdrew into the South Kivu mountains where they continued to operate under *Parti de la Révolution Populaire* (PRP). Over the next three decades, Kabila and his followers continued to practice collective agriculture, extortion and mineral smuggling. It was Julius Nyerere, former Tanzanian president who introduced Kabila to Paul Kagame of Rwanda and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda.¹⁰⁹ These connections proved vital when Laurent Kabila began the rebellion against Mobutu's government in 1996.

¹⁰⁵ Kevin C. Dunn, *Imagining the Congo: op cit.*, p. 144.

¹⁰⁶ C. Kapemba, "Policy, Issues and Actors Vol. 12", *op cit.*, p. 4.

¹⁰⁷ Kevin C. Dunn, *Imagining the Congo: op cit.*, p. 144.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*,

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) led by Laurent Désiré Kabila, declared war on the already beleaguered Mobutu regime from early 1996. AFDL, with the support of Rwanda, Uganda and Angola eventually defeated Mobutu forces in May 1997.¹¹⁰ Mobutu fled to Morocco after recognizing imminent defeat by the alliance forces, leaving the country to Kabila. Within days, Kabila renamed Zaire the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and declared himself the president. Another rebellion broke out in early 1998 led by rebels who claimed that Kabila had become worse than Mobutu.¹¹¹ Laurent Kabila was assassinated in January 2001 by Rachidi Kasereka, a young member of his personal bodyguards.¹¹² Kabila's son Joseph, who was then the Chief of General Staff, was declared president.

¹¹⁰ Jermain O. McCalpin, *Historicity of a Crisis: op cit.*, p. 47.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

¹¹² Kevin C. Dunn, *Imagining the Congo: op cit.*, p. 1.

3.0. CHAPTER THREE: AFRICAN EXTERNAL FORCES

INTRODUCTION

This chapter focuses on the role of African countries in exacerbating the DRC conflict, especially in the period between 1996 to 2001. The fundamental argument of this chapter is that the conflict has been fought for the sake of resource exploitation. Indeed, the DRC conflict has had security implications throughout the Great Lakes Region (GLR). The chapter discusses each individual country intervening in the conflict and its interests.

The chapter asserts that the end of Cold War resulted in the withdrawal of United States and other Western powers as interveners and de facto enforcers of inter-states armed conflicts. This left a power vacuum that was filled by individual African countries and a host of regional and international organizations. GLR is a geopolitical concept, which implies that the region constitutes a conflict and a security complex. Conflicts in the region are interrelated with reciprocal effects. The conflict in the DRC is of a regional scale.

One of the driving forces behind the conflict has been the desire of the intervening countries to have access to, and control over, the vast mineral resources of the DRC. The regions security has been affected by conflicts of individual countries due to the spillover effects and internationalization¹¹³. Conflicts in the GLR stem from common interrelated root causes and are propelled by common driving forces. Any conflict in one of the regions' countries directly affects the others, mainly because of the refugee movements within the region.

¹¹³ C. Kapemba, "Policy, Issues and Actors Vol. 12", *op cit.*, p. 6.

In some instances during the conflict, external actors were resolving their own conflicts on DRC's territory. Of all the eleven countries discussed in the chapter, only four were not suffering from internal strife. The intervention was therefore used to divert the attention of the internal actors in individual countries to that of regional attention of their country's involvement in the DRC conflict. COC Amate asserts that whenever leaders are faced with intensive opposition to their rule there is a tendency to allege subversive activities against the government or even an outright attack on the country.¹¹⁴ There have been continued attempts to externalize domestic problems as a way of sustaining Presidency.

At the time of intervention for instance, the opposition political party in Zimbabwe was against the seizure of land and staged demonstrations that were handled by the government. President Robert Mugabe was under pressure to deliver on his promise to confiscate and redistribute white-owned farms to the poor Africans in Zimbabwe. They later held demonstrations against their government's military intervention in the DRC conflict when their people were dying of hunger, consequently diverting the issue of land.

On the other hand, President Museveni was facing severe opposition against his quest to change the constitution that would have enabled him to vie for presidency for a third term which was not included in the country's constitution. However, this intervention diverted the attention of the Ugandans from thinking about Museveni's clamour for constitutional change to allow him run for another term to that of questioning their country's use of immense resources in the DRC conflict. This demonstrates how African leaders

¹¹⁴ C.O.C. Amate, *Inside the OAU: Pan-Africanism in Practice*, New York: Macmillan, 1986.p.37.

intervening in the DRC conflict have used diversionary tactics to sidetrack internal problems to a regional focus.

Regional hegemonic struggles have also played a key role in the intervention of the DRC conflict. The factor that was introduced by the powerful Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) army into East Africa and GLR had to be confronted by Uganda. President Museveni's position as the region's military hegemon was threatened by Rwanda. Uganda had earlier seen itself as a kind of 'regional policeman' in the GLR after Mobutu was toppled by Laurent Kabila in 1997. Rwanda who played a significant role in ousting Mobutu from power had improved its military position in the region. Museveni's prestige had been dented for not committing troops against Mobutu in 1996-97. The DRC conflict of 1998 thus opened up a chance for him to regain his regional standing.

Laurent Kabila's rise to power was largely due to the machinations of external regional actors, particularly the regimes of Rwanda and Uganda.¹¹⁵ The conflict in the DRC is complex and involves a multiplicity of regional and international actors including Angola, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Uganda, South Africa, Burundi, Congo-Brazzaville, Chad, Libya, Namibia and Sudan.

3.1. ANGOLA

Angola and DRC share a border that divides several transnational communities who live in both countries. Angola participated in the 1996-97 DRC conflict in order to defend

¹¹⁵ Kevin C. Dunn, *Imagining the Congo: op cit.*, p. 2.

itself against Jonas Savimbi's UNITA.¹¹⁶ Indeed, Angola contributed decisively to the overthrow of Mobutu Sese Seko by Laurent Kabila as it wanted any leader who would disengage DRC from any existing arrangement with UNITA.¹¹⁷ Angola sent several battalions approximately (2,000 to 3,000 troops) to Bukavu to assist Kabila's ADFL march to Kinshasa. Angola maintained a military presence in DRC after Mobutu was overthrown in 1997. Angola's strategy of intervention in the DRC was to pursue the fight against Savimbi by interdicting his weapons supplies, which was facilitated by DRC under Mobutu.¹¹⁸ Support for Kabila, therefore aimed at maintaining a friendly and compliant regime in DRC that would assist in the fight against UNITA. The Luanda government feared that without an effective presence in DRC Savimbi would once again use the country as a rear base for his rebellion, as he did during the Mobutu regime.¹¹⁹

Through its intervention in the 1996-97 wars, Angolan authorities hoped that a new regime replace Mobutu would be less inclined to allow UNITA ready access to its territory.¹²⁰ In December 1996, Angolan president Eduardo Dos Santos, and DRC Prime Minister Kengo wa Dondo, met in Brazzaville and agreed to respect each other's security concerns.¹²¹ Angola was to prevent the Katanga Tigers rebel group from using its territory as an operational base to make incursions into DRC. In return, DRC would prevent UNITA from using DRC territory to export diamonds, receive arms, and would

¹¹⁶ Thomas Turner, "Angola's Role in the Congo War", in John F. Clark, *The African Stakes of the Congo War* (ed). Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2003, p. 75.

¹¹⁷ International Crisis Group, "Africa's Seven-Nation War", Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group DRC Report No. 4, 21 May, 1999, p. 4.

¹¹⁸ Thomas Turner, *Angola role in the DRC War*, *op cit.*, p.76.

¹¹⁹ Georges Nzongola – Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: op cit.*, p.238.

¹²⁰ Thomas Turner, *Angola role in the DRC War*, *op cit.*, p. 81.

¹²¹ *Ibid.* ,

dismantle UNITA bases on its territory.¹²² This agreement was not honoured by the Mobutu regime and UNITA continued receiving ammunitions through DRC, this made Angola a ready ally for Laurent Kabila in his attempt to topple the Mobutu government. Between December 1996 and February 1997, Angola sent several battalions of up to 3000 troops to Kigali, Rwanda to assist the AFDL advance towards Kinshasa.¹²³ During the conflict of 1998, UNITA became increasingly powerful after rebuilding its army because Kabila's government was fighting other DRC rebel factions. By mid 1998, the Angolan army began to cut UNITA's supply lines, ports and airfields in the DRC.¹²⁴ Angola's intervention in the conflict therefore led to the dismantling of UNITA's bases in the DRC territory. Angola's intervention in the DRC was such a success that by the year 2000 UNITA was defeated due to the presence of Angolan forces in the DRC, which frustrated UNITA efforts to find munitions, fuel, and spare parts.¹²⁵

Economically Angola gained control of DRC's petroleum distribution and production networks.¹²⁶ Generals of Angolan army also gained footholds in DRC's diamond industry soon after intervention.¹²⁷ Although Angola intervened to stop the UNITA incursions this argument does not hold water, the key weakness in this argument is that the Angolan soldiers were involved on the exploitation of DRC minerals for personal gains. Through its intervention and militarization Angola flagrantly violated territorial sovereignty of the DRC.

¹²² Thomas Turner, *Angola role in the DRC War*, op cit., p. 81.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

3.2. ZIMBABWE

The decision by Zimbabwe to deploy a contingent of 600 Zimbabwean forces under Operation Restore Sovereignty was made in August 1998 and aimed to save Laurent Kabila from external attack that was threatening his new government.¹²⁸ Zimbabwe's security was not threatened by events in DRC, partly because unlike Angola, Rwanda or Uganda, it does not share a border with the DRC. The Zimbabwean President, Robert Mugabe, stated on 21st February 1999, that Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia would spare no effort to save Kabila.¹²⁹ Zimbabwe's involvement came after an assertion by Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni in Windhoek that he had deployed Ugandan forces in support of the rebels in DRC.¹³⁰ Zimbabwe realized that the government of Kabila could not withstand the combined onslaught of Uganda and rebel forces if it did not receive assistance.

Following Museveni's admission, the DRC formally made a request for assistance as a member of SADC, in a meeting of the Inter-State Defense and Security Committee (ISDSC) held in Harare in July 1998.¹³¹ Zimbabwe, as chair of the Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security, and imbued with the spirit of the former Frontline states, was ready to assist Kabila and claimed justification under international law that prohibits violation of other state's sovereignty. Further, the countries that were attacking DRC

¹²⁸ Martin R. Rupiya, "A Political and Military Review of Zimbabwe's Involvement in the Second Congo war" in John F. Clark (ed), p. 94.

¹²⁹ International Crisis Group, "Congo at War:" *op cit.*, p. 7.

¹³⁰ Martin R. Rupiya, "A Political and Military Review of Zimbabwe's Involvement in the Second Congo war", *op cit.*, p. 95.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

were also non-members of SADC, thus making Zimbabwean's intervention justified as that of saving a member of SADC.

Zimbabwe had been irked by Museveni's declared support for the rebel forces and argued that both Rwanda and Uganda intended the war to continue in order to exploit resources of the DRC.¹³² The initial military deployment of Zimbabwe was coordinated with the Angolan and Namibian defense forces.¹³³ Despite objections by South Africa about identifying Zimbabwe's intervention with the regional organization, Mugabe committed the largest military contingent among Kabila's allies, with as many as 11,000 to 12,000 troops.¹³⁴

The intervention of Zimbabwean forces was largely due to the millions of dollars Kabila owed to the Zimbabwean business firms that had extended military uniforms and equipment to Kabila for the purchase of armaments during the war. By the end of August 2000 Zimbabwe had spent \$200 million for the DRC war effort.¹³⁵ Like Rwanda and Uganda Zimbabwe was also determined to finance its war effort with the DRC's resources and a diamond-mining venture involving Mugabe and Kabila's allies was set up in Kasai in 2001.¹³⁶ Robert Mugabe had intervened in order to re-direct the attention of the Zimbabwean people who were up against him to introduce democracy in their country.

¹³² International Crisis Group, "Congo at War." *op cit.*, p. 7.

¹³³ Martin R. Rupiya, "A Political and Military Review of Zimbabwe's Involvement in the Second Congo war", *op cit.*, p. 98.

¹³⁴ Georges Nzongola - Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: op cit.*, p. 238-239.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 239.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

Zimbabweans were calling for the withdrawal of all their forces in the DRC and the finances used in the war be used to feed the hungry in their country. Mugabe succeeded in diverting the attention of his people by intervening in the DRC conflict.

3.3. RWANDA

The Rwandan government admitted participation in the DRC conflict, justifying its intervention on humanitarian and defensive grounds.¹³⁷ The triumph of Laurent Kabila and his AFDL could not have taken place without the RPF drive against the *genocidaires*.¹³⁸ A wide range of objectives that have shifted over time motivated Rwanda to intervene in the DRC conflict. During the 1996-97 war, Rwanda justified intervention on eliminating the threats to her security posed by Hutu rebels that were operating from DRC.¹³⁹ Rwanda believed that the Hutu were planning another genocide and felt Mobutu was not doing enough to stop them. RPA's invasion of the Eastern DRC prevented the Hutu militias from carrying out an offensive against the Rwandan people who lived along its shared border with the DRC. The Rwandan invasion, on the other hand, increased the vulnerability of the Congolese Tutsi who were attacked inside DRC by the government forces.

Rwandan incursion into DRC also seems to have been inspired by other motives such as the need to quell domestic unrest, opportunities for personal and national enrichment, and the desire to be a regional power.¹⁴⁰ Rwanda's continued reluctance to withdraw from

¹³⁷ Timothy Longman, "The Complex Reasons for Rwanda's Engagement in Congo" in John F. Clark (ed), p. 129.

¹³⁸ Georges Nzongola – Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: op cit.*, p. 224.

¹³⁹ Timothy Longman, "The Complex Reasons for Rwanda's Engagement in Congo", *op cit.*, p. 130.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*,

DRC even after its stated goals had been largely accomplished explains the unspecified objective of intervention.¹⁴¹ Whereas Rwandan involvement in the 1996-97 wars in DRC was justified as primarily defensive, the Rwandans are said to have awarded mining concessions for rare metals such as nobium and tantalum in the occupied territory to foreign firms.¹⁴²

The Rwandan Hutus clearly did use Eastern DRC as a base of their operations.¹⁴³ There are however, some clear difficulties with Rwanda's claim to its security as justification to attack DRC. First, while controlling Hutu rebel activity could justify invasion of north and south Kivu, it cannot explain why the RPF carried out the incursion into Katanga, Kasai and Orientale, where there were no evidence of Hutu militia activity.¹⁴⁴ These attacks into the interior of the DRC clearly show that the main reason of intervening was not designed for security purposes. The assertion that the Hutu insurgents in DRC were going deeper into the interior to evade Rwandese forces, hence the need to progress into the interior and finish off the rebels once and for all does not justify the continued occupation of DRC territory.

The idea that nothing serves to unify a divided country like an external threat worked well for Rwanda's continued claim of security threats posed by DRC to its people and hence justification for intervention.¹⁴⁵ Security and humanitarian concerns only partly contributed to Rwanda's involvement in the DRC conflict. RPF leaders have denied the

¹⁴¹ Timothy Longman, "The Complex Reasons for Rwanda's Engagement in Congo", *op cit.*, p. 130.

¹⁴² Georges Nzongola – Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: op cit.*, p. 237.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

quest for personal and national enrichment as a reason for intervention in the DRC, but reports suggest that Rwanda and Uganda were transit points for diamonds and other minerals extracted from DRC and smuggled out of the country.¹⁴⁶ Evidence further suggests that Rwanda profited considerably from its involvement in DRC, exporting coltan worth US\$ 20 million and increasing its diamond exports substantially between 1998 and 2000.¹⁴⁷

Indeed, the conflict between Rwanda and Uganda in Kisangani in mid-1999 was fuelled in large part by competition over diamonds.¹⁴⁸ However, the plunder in the DRC is not limited to the extraction of mineral wealth but includes looting of goods.¹⁴⁹ Witness report indicate that after RPF soldiers attacked a village they suspected of harbouring militia groups, they sacked the town, taking whatever valuable items they could transport.¹⁵⁰ Witnesses interviewed by Longman reported that RPF troops chased Mai Mai soldiers out of Shabunda town in January 2000, and looted goods from the communities, loaded them in a plane and shipped them to Rwanda.¹⁵¹ Extraction of resources and goods in DRC benefited not only the Rwandan government and army but also individuals engaged in smuggling and other forms of trade, including RPF officers.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁶ Georges Nzongola – Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: op cit.*, p. 136.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*,

¹⁴⁹ Timothy Longman, "The Complex Reasons for Rwanda's Engagement in Congo", *op cit.*, p. 137.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*,

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*,

Rwanda's intervention in the DRC for the period covered in this study has therefore been inspired by complex motives that sometimes conflicted. The desires to eliminate security threats and to protect the Congolese Tutsi were undermined by the desire for personal and national enrichment.¹⁵³

3.4. UGANDA

Uganda justified its intervention in the DRC as a response to insecurity emanating from the border regions it shares with the DRC.¹⁵⁴ Uganda claimed DRC was unable to guarantee security along its western frontiers; consequently, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebels based in the DRC across the border from the Ugandan district of Bundibugyo, Kabarole, Bushengi, Rukungiri, and Kisoro had been conducting raids into Ugandan territory since 1996¹⁵⁵.

Uganda's initial support for Laurent Kabila's ADFL was motivated by the fact that Mobutu was assisting ADF rebels against Uganda. The ADF raided Ugandan border towns to steal property, conduct ransom abductions and murder and to forcefully recruit the locals. For instance, in one ADF raid against Kichwamba Technical School in Kasese district in June 1998, eighty students were burned alive inside their locked dormitories.¹⁵⁶ Uganda was obliged to intervene in the DRC to prevent atrocities committed by the ADF from their bases in the DRC territory.

¹⁵³ Timothy Longman, "The Complex Reasons for Rwanda's Engagement in Congo", *op cit.*, p. 141.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 148.

¹⁵⁵ John F. Clark, "Museveni's Adventure in the Congo War", in John F. Clark (ed), p. 148.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

However, the fact that UPDF deployed its soldiers more than 1000 kilometers from the Uganda – DRC border suggests that Museveni and his government had other goals other than that of countering the security threat posed by ADF.¹⁵⁷ After assisting Kabila to ascend to power, Uganda and DRC signed a “memorandum of understanding” that called for joint operations of the UPDF and FAC against ADF.¹⁵⁸ The agreement allowed Ugandan troops entry into the DRC territory to pursue the ADF rebels. Kabila was unable to curtail ADF operations inside DRC territory and this heightened insecurity in the country, amidst fears that ADF allies of deposed Mobutu would destabilize Kabila’s regime. UPDF presence in DRC was aimed at combating ADF and other groups opposed to the Kabila and Museveni’s regimes.¹⁵⁹

The Kabila government was unable to purge the ADF rebels’ bases in its territory, primarily due to inadequate personnel and resources. Ugandan authorities contented that the only approach of achieving security along their border was to get to the root cause of the problem, which was, to remove from power the regime installed in May 1997.¹⁶⁰ The removal of Laurent Kabila’s government did not guarantee Uganda’s security, they only wanted a regime they could manipulate, Kabila had changed and was seeking autonomy from his former backers.

¹⁵⁷ John F. Clark, “Museveni’s Adventure in the Congo War”, in John F. Clark (ed), p. 149.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*,

¹⁵⁹ International Crisis Group, “Africa’s Seven-Nation War”, Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group DRC Report No. 4, 21 May, 1999, p. 10.

¹⁶⁰ John F. Clark, “Museveni’s Adventure in the Congo War”, *op cit.*, p. 149.

Volumes of highly valuable commodities had been flowing out of DRC via Uganda since late 1996 after Uganda began supporting the ADFL.¹⁶¹ It is therefore plausible to argue that Uganda's invasion was aimed at furthering its economic interests.¹⁶² Museveni supported the war for both national and personal reasons. DRC's natural resources such as timber, coffee, gold and diamonds improved the performance of Uganda's economy. In 1997, for instance, gold was among Uganda's largest source of export earnings, second only to coffee and amounting to 12 percent of all exports earnings despite the extremely little gold produced domestically.¹⁶³

Uganda's goals for intervention in the DRC conflict like those of Rwanda have changed over time. Officially, Uganda's intervention in 1998 aimed to prevent Sudanese from using airfields in Eastern DRC to attack Uganda.¹⁶⁴ Museveni asserted that the Sudanese forces had assisted the ADF to attack Uganda through DRC's territory. However, Uganda's continued occupation of the northeastern DRC was meant to furnish the off-budget spending of the military because the World Bank guidelines specified that only 2 percent of Uganda's GDP was to be used on military and security efforts.¹⁶⁵ Reports suggested that period between September 1996 and August 1999, the UPDF carried off minerals, livestock, agricultural and forest products from the DRC.¹⁶⁶ Indeed John F. Clark reports that Museveni's brother, Salim Saleh, and his wife, Jovia Akandwanaho,

¹⁶¹ John F. Clark, "Museveni's Adventure in the Congo War", *op cit.*, p. 149.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*,

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

¹⁶⁴ International Crisis Group, "Africa's Seven-Nation War", Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group DRC Report No. 4, 21 May, 1999, p. 6.

¹⁶⁵ John F. Clark, "Museveni's Adventure in the Congo War", *op cit.*, p. 156-157.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*,

took charge of the exploitation of diamonds in the portion of DRC controlled by Uganda.¹⁶⁷

3.5. SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa is a major player in the DRC conflict although it has not been involved militarily. In early 2002, the South African Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stated its objectives with regard to the Central Africa region as conflict resolution, promotion of peace and stability, good governance, economic reconstruction and development.¹⁶⁸ DFA claimed that the key challenge facing South Africa was to assist DRC in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 1999. The Agreement defined clear ceasefire lines that were agreed upon by the belligerents. It also outlined both military and political measures to bring peace to Congo.¹⁶⁹ For instance, it called for the deployment of an appropriate UN peacekeeping force to help implement the ceasefire, track down and disarm militias, and screen them for war crimes. Further, South Africa also wanted to intervene in order to contain, and prevent, a spill-over of the conflict into its own territory.¹⁷⁰ South Africa was also intervening to avert the claim from the Kabila allies that it was assisting the DRC's rebels between 1998 and 2000.¹⁷¹

South Africa's involvement in the DRC conflict began under the leadership of former President Nelson Mandela, who launched diplomatic initiatives to end the war when it began in 1996. Mandela called for a negotiated settlement that could have solved the

¹⁶⁷ John F. Clark, "Museveni's Adventure in the Congo War", *op cit.*, p. 156-157.

¹⁶⁸ Chris Landsberg, "The Impossible Neutrality: South Africa's Policy in the Congo War", in John F. Clark (ed), p. 169.

¹⁶⁹ International Crisis Group, "Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War", Nairobi/Brussels: ICG Africa Report No. 26, 2000, p. 1.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*,

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

security concerns of Rwanda and Uganda and the withdrawal of all foreign troops. In February 1997, when the rebel movement was advancing towards Kinshasa to overthrow Mobutu's regime, Mandela invited Laurent Kabila, the then head of ADFL, to visit South Africa.¹⁷² South Africa managed to push forward its preferred stance of democratic peace and convinced Kabila of the need for an accommodating regime that would have included Mobutu.¹⁷³

On 29 April 1997, Mandela agreed to mediate the DRC conflict as South Africa was against the overthrow of Mobutu by Kabila and advocated for a political rather than a military solution.¹⁷⁴ Kabila refused to attend the final mediation meeting and instead called for Mobutu's resignation. Around this time the ADFL assault towards Kinshasa was at an advanced stage, and reached the capital on 17 May 1997.¹⁷⁵ After Kabila's takeover South Africa convinced DRC to join the SADC as a new member. The move was aimed at having influence over Laurent Kabila, to be able to nudge him towards democratization.¹⁷⁶

South Africa even offered Kabila some post conflict reconstruction aid, including the building of infrastructure and business investments in exchange for democratization.¹⁷⁷ The post-reconstruction phase of the DRC conflict would have served South African economic interests, through sale of manufactured products and the mineral extraction

¹⁷² Chris Landsberg, "The Impossible Neutrality: South Africa's Policy in the Congo War", *op cit.*, p. 170.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*,

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*,

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*,

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*,

concessions. Kabila however accused South Africa of playing double standards in the DRC and supporting anti-Kabila forces. For example, South Africa continued to sell arms to Rwanda and Uganda but refused to sell weaponry to Kabila.¹⁷⁸ South Africa saw itself as the impartial mediator since the other members of the SADC organization were directly involved in the conflict. Although Kabila continued blaming the role South Africa was playing, the South African government continued seeking peaceful resolution of the DRC conflict.

In its conflict resolution efforts South Africa also prepared, inter alia, a ten-point plan to resolve the war in DRC.¹⁷⁹ The efforts aimed at establishing a UN peacekeeping force, deployment of a joint military council and the withdrawal of foreign forces from the DRC. By the end of 2000, some 100 technical specialists of South Africa National Defense Force had already been deployed in DRC.¹⁸⁰ The South African government also offered to sponsor the talks that were held in Sun City on April 2003. The commercial stakes in the DRC, including mutual investment opportunities dictated South Africa's quest for intervention to resolve the conflict.

South African mercenary firms like Stabilco and Executive Outcomes were also playing a role in the Congolese war, in arms supply, transport, mines and commerce. South Africa's mercenary firms were working on both sides, in the government and rebels. In its intervention, South Africa received credit from the western countries for having

¹⁷⁸ Chris Landsberg, "The Impossible Neutrality: South Africa's Policy in the Congo War", *op cit.*, p. 174.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 178.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 179.

injected itself diplomatically in mediating the Mobutu and Kabila conflict that ended the former's tyrannical regime and brought the latter to power. South Africa intervention can be viewed in two dimensions, first, because of commercial stakes and investments in the mineral industry. Secondly, it wanted to maintain its role as the region's power which was contested by the other SADC members and Rwanda and Uganda who had intervened.

3.6. Burundi

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Burundi has played a less conspicuous role in the DRC conflict, although being affected by it. Under Mobutu, DRC was the base for the Burundi rebels until 1996, when the AFDL attacked the Front pour la Défense de la Démocratie (FDD) camps and forced the rebels to flee to Tanzania.¹⁸¹ In order to counteract the rebels the Burundi government deployed forces in southeastern DRC. The presence of Burundian forces in Congo began in 1996 when they supported Laurent Kabila to overthrow Mobutu from power, viewing the latter as a major supporter of opposition forces in Burundi.¹⁸² Burundi's main motive of engaging in the Congo war was to secure its border with DRC and maintain the security of its people. The government sought to justify its limited military involvement as arising out of the need to stop incursions of Hutu extremists based in the DRC.¹⁸³

Until the imposition of economic sanctions in the wake of the coup of July 1996 by Major Pierre Buyoya, the Bujumbura free trade zone was the major market for gold

¹⁸¹ International Crisis Group, "Africa's Seven-Nation War", Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group DRC Report No. 4, 21 May, 1999, p. 27.

¹⁸² International Crisis Group, *Congo at War: Internal and External Players in the Democratic Republic of Congo conflict*, ICG Report, No 2, 1998, p. 22.

¹⁸³ Georges Nzongola – Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: op cit.*, p. 238.

smuggled from the DRC.¹⁸⁴ Burundi's neighbours Uganda and Rwanda were involved in the plunder of minerals in the DRC and as an ally of both it could not have been left out in the scramble of the DRC's resources. However, Burundi's intervention in the DRC conflict was minimal because of the political situation at home, which was threatening the existence of the regime there.

3.7. Congo – Brazzaville

Congo- Brazzaville could not avoid being drawn in a war fought in its eastern neighbourhood.¹⁸⁵ Congo- Brazzaville and DRC have Bakongo populations, due to conflict internationalisation in the Great Lakes Region the Congo Brazzaville Bakongo have assisted their kinsmen in DRC from systematic massacres either from the government or from the rebel forces. This has been made possible by the relationship ties maintained by the Bakongo people throughout the GLR. Dennis Sassou Nguesso, the President of Congo-Brazzaville supported Mobutu's former presidential guards to attack AFDL's forces¹⁸⁶. The two countries however made an agreement in January 1999 not to support forces hostile to the other.¹⁸⁷ As in Burundi, the domestic situation in Congo-Brazzaville is porous thus it has played minimal intervention role in the DRC conflict.

3.8. Chad.

In 1998, a rebellion against Kabila started in Kivu, and within weeks the rebels had seized large areas of the country. On September 1998, Kabila's search for allies amid

¹⁸⁴ Georges Nzongola – Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: op cit.*, p. 238.

¹⁸⁵ International Crisis Group, "Congo at War: *op cit.*", p. 24.

¹⁸⁶ International Crisis Group, "Africa's Seven-Nation War", *op cit.*, p. 27.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*,

intensifying pressure at home led him to French-speaking African countries.¹⁸⁸ Eventually, an agreement with Chad saw the dispatch of about one thousand soldiers to DRC. Chadian authorities explained their intervention as a form of gratitude for military support from Kinshasa during their own troubles in the 1980s, when DRC supported the government against rebels.¹⁸⁹ They have explained their intervention as a form of gratitude for the military support they received DRC.

Chad committed troops to help Kabila after its President Idriss Déby's agreement with Libya that the latter would pay for the upkeep of the Chadian troops in DRC.¹⁹⁰ Chad, which has been faced by growing internal opposition and frequent rebel incursions from bases in DRC sought to support Kabila so as to deny the rebels bases from which to operate. Chad withdrew its troops from the DRC following the April 1999 Sirte (Libya) ceasefire agreement between DRC and Uganda.¹⁹¹ Chad intervention was also a form of showing support to a francophone country to the detriment of the SADC counties who had intervened.

3.9. Libya

Libya was faced by economic sanctions imposed by the UN, US and European countries after failing to apprehend a Libyan national involved in a Pan Am jet explosion over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988, Colonel Gaddafi saw the DRC conflict as an opportunity to escape from international isolation. Libya organized a summit meeting between Kabila and the presidents of Uganda and Rwanda on the DRC's situation in 1999. Libya also

¹⁸⁸ International Crisis Group, "Congo at War: Internal and External Players in the Democratic Republic of Congo Conflict", Nairobi/Brussels: ICG Report, No 2, 1998, p. 25.

¹⁸⁹ Georges Nzongola – Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: op cit.*, p. 240.

¹⁹⁰ International Crisis Group, "Africa's Seven-Nation War", *op cit.*, p. 27.

¹⁹¹ Georges Nzongola – Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: op cit.*, p. 240.

used the conflict in DRC to initiate a shift in the focus of its foreign policy from Arab to African issues.¹⁹² Libya had played a vital role in the launching of New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), and thus the intervention in the DRC conflict could have entrenched its new move towards African issues.

3.10. Namibia

Namibia a SADC ally came into the conflict in a far more moderate fashion than Angola and Zimbabwe by claiming to safeguard the security of a SADC member¹⁹³. Namibia's intervention in the DRC was designed to defend Kabila's regime against Rwanda and Uganda, and by extension, the interests of Sam Nujoma's brother in law, which included mineral company holdings.¹⁹⁴ Nujoma's brother in law, Aaron Mushimba had been awarded a stake in the Miba diamond mining company which was mining in DRC¹⁹⁵. Mushimba is quoted to have run the business arm of the ruling South West Africa People's organization (SWAPO). Namibia also feared the effects of conflict spillover caused by the UNITA rebels of Angola who had a base in the DRC.

Political and economic considerations caused Namibia's adventurism in the DRC conflict.¹⁹⁶ Nujoma, like Mugabe of Zimbabwe, was trying to compete for mineral resources with South Africa. Namibia reportedly provided about twenty tons of military weapons and other supplies to the DRC government in mid 1998.¹⁹⁷ Namibia's

¹⁹² International Crisis Group, "Africa's Seven-Nation War", *op cit.*, p. 12.

¹⁹³ International Crisis Group, "Scrabble for Congo: *op cit.*, p. 65.

¹⁹⁴ Paul S. Orogun, *Crisis of Government, Ethnic Schisms, Civil War, and Regional Destabilization of the DRC*. Washington: World Affairs 2003. p. 18.

¹⁹⁵ International Crisis Group, "Scrabble for Congo: *op cit.*, p. 65.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*,

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*,

intervention in the DRC conflict was largely for personal gains of Nujoma and his political cronies, disguised in the salvation of Kabila's regime.

3.11. Sudan

Sudan became an indirect participant in the war in DRC in two ways; first Sudan financed the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), West Nile Bank Front Movement (WNBFM) and Lord Resistance Army (LRA) against the Ugandan government. Sudan was allegedly reported to have been working with the three rebel movements towards bringing them into a federation. Second, by agreeing to support Kabila's government in his war against the Rwanda-Uganda coalition.¹⁹⁸ Sudan's interests against Uganda were motivated by the claim that Museveni's government supported the SPLA movement, which was fighting the government of Sudan from the south.

Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), comprising members of a fundamentalist Islamic sect, carried out several attacks in 1999 against Uganda in the Kasese region from DRC territory.¹⁹⁹ The West Nile Bank Front Movement, composed of the former soldiers of Idi Amin (overthrown by the Tanzanian army in 1979) is active in northwest Uganda and has rear bases in DRC.²⁰⁰ The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony allegedly received support from the Sudanese government.²⁰¹ Sudan was accused by Uganda of supporting these rebel groups which have bases in the DRC to topple Museveni's government.

¹⁹⁸ Human Rights Watch, "Fuelling political and Ethnic Strife". Human Rights Watch, 2001, Vol 13, No. 2A, p. 23.

¹⁹⁹ International Crisis Group, "Congo at War: *op cit.*, p. 20.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*,

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

CONCLUSION.

This chapter has established that in the course of intervention the countries discussed have had diverse justification for their intervention. These countries have been drawn in the conflict either in the support of the government, rebels or as mediators. Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia have intervened on the government side whereas, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi have supported the government and rebels at different stages of the conflict. Zambia and South Africa have sporadically sought to serve as mediators, though South Africa had been an arms supplier to both its SADC partners and to the anti-Kabila partners. The war in DRC was being commercialized and exploited by both the government and rebel forces allies. Despite the claim of intervening for security reasons of their countries, vast natural resources have played key role in the intervention to finance the war and develop the economies of the external players.

4.0. CHAPTER FOUR: PEACE INITIATIVES

INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores the various peace initiatives undertaken to resolve the DRC conflict between 1996 and 2001. There have been several diplomatic initiatives at the national, regional and international levels to resolve the conflict. The chapter argues that the actors have largely not acted with altruistic motives but have instead attempted to advance their interests in the country. Some actors in the peace initiatives like South Africa presented themselves as impartial mediators in the conflict while, in reality, it was acting in the defense and pursuit of its particular interests. International Conflict's scholars like Mwangi asserted that the mediator possesses certain resources that the parties value, hence the parties in conflict are more interested in whether the mediator can deliver these resources, rather than in whether or not the mediator is impartial.²⁰²

A number of peace initiatives have been undertaken to address the conflict. These include, Lusaka Agreement, Inter Congolese Dialogue (ICD), Gaddafi initiative, Victoria Summit and United Nations Mission for Congo (MONUC). What seems common between these initiatives is that they have met with limited success of the parties and their interests. Why was this the case? In an attempt to address the above question, this chapter has suggested three main reasons why these initiatives have not been successful. The disarming of *interahamwe* and *Ex – FAR* elements provided for in the Lusaka Agreement of 1999, for example, has far reaching regional implications and yet

²⁰² Mwangi, M. *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, Nairobi: Watermark, 2000, p. 116.

there was no regional accord to handle the problems that were bound to arise in its implementation.

Conflict transformation initiatives, which normally involve actors interests, strategies, processes and timing have not been followed in these initiatives. Most of these peace initiatives have concentrated on players signing agreements for the sake of the international community. The international community has also concentrated on the processes rather than outcomes of these peace initiatives. Most of these initiatives were arrived at without taking into account actors interests and therefore difficult to implement.

Peace initiatives in the DRC have fallen in the fallacy of 'all inclusiveness' in peace negotiations. Emphasis has been placed on the intervening countries' interests rather than strategic actors with great influence over others. Most of these initiatives tend to show little concern for root causes and are usually preoccupied with either symptoms of the conflict, exacerbating factors and trigger events. These initiatives have also assumed that all the parties intervening in the conflict have an interest in peacemaking. What emerges from these peace initiatives is the preoccupation with the process rather than the substance of the outcome.

Peace approaches in the DRC have also tended to be 'internalist' in the sense that they have defined the conflict by territorial boundaries. The DRC conflict clearly transcends and indeed defies national boundaries of the GLR conflict system. The agreements

arrived at have thus created an aggravating condition in the DRC, since the actors used the agreements as a mechanism to buy time in which they changed the facts on the ground to justify their continued intervention. These agreements have also been partial and therefore subject to the rather vague notion of 'political will' of the actors for their implementation. Although the conflict involves regional actors in scope, dynamics and consequences, these initiatives have largely remained DRC focused.

4.1. THE VICTORIA FALLS SUMMIT

SADC continued to play a crucial role in the search of peace in the DRC. Victoria Falls Summit was held in August 1998 in Zimbabwe, under the aegis of President Robert Mugabe.²⁰³ The mission of the meeting was to effect a cease-fire and establish mechanisms required for monitoring compliance with ceasefire provisions, especially those relating to the withdrawal of foreign troops from the DRC. The OAU and UN presented a draft agreement for a cease-fire to the Ministers of Defence and other government officials from DRC, Namibia, Angola, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Zambia.²⁰⁴ The meeting was held with a view to offer protection to civilians, an embargo on ammunition and weapons' supplies, the release of prisoners of war, the opening of humanitarian corridors and the withdrawal of foreign troops from DRC territory after deployment of a peacekeeping operation.²⁰⁵

The Victoria Falls Agreement reaffirmed the territorial integrity of the DRC and the need for state administrative control to be re-established throughout the country. However, the

²⁰³ International Crisis Group, "Africa's Seven-Nation War", *op cit.*, p. 7.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.* ,

Agreement created a basis for confusion rather than negotiation. It recognized belligerent forces and signatories as the governments of Angola, DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.²⁰⁶ Rwanda and Uganda walked out of the meeting in protest at the exclusion of any DRC rebel movements from the list of signatories. Zambia was also included as a signatory despite not having any troops in the DRC. The RCD and MLC rebel groups refused to accept the agreement and claimed the Congolese were capable of resolving their conflict. To the rebels the conflict was an internal affair of the DRC and not an inter-state conflict as the signatories claimed. The agreement was a failure because Kabila and his allies refused to recognize the rebel forces who were supported by Rwanda and Uganda. This draft cease-fire created a basis for confusion rather than for negotiation.

4.2. LUSAKA AGREEMENT

The Lusaka peace initiative was under the auspices of the OAU and UN and was signed on 10th July 1999, in Lusaka Zambia. The Lusaka Agreement is a very complicated plan for peace resting on six essential elements.

First, that sovereignty of DRC in its present frontiers and that of its neighbours is agreed upon. Second, that an all inclusive process will be undertaken by the Congolese in order to establish a new political order. The process is to have a neutral convener and is to include all parties to the internal dispute whether armed or not, and they are to meet as equals. Third, the parties agreed to cooperate in addressing the security concerns of each state. Fourth, the agreement specifically calls for the disarming of militia groups in the DRC. Fifth, it calls for withdrawal of all foreign forces from the DRC. Sixth, it calls for the Chapter VII UN peacekeeping force to ensure implementation of the agreement.²⁰⁷

This was to be achieved under the auspices of a Joint Military Commission (JMC) composed of the representatives from each signatory and a neutral OAU-appointed

²⁰⁶ International Crisis Group, "Africa's Seven-Nation War", *op cit.*, p. 8.

²⁰⁷ Herbert Weiss, "War and Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo", Durham NC, American Diplomacy Publishers, Vol. V, No. 3, 2000, p. 5.

Chairman, who would report to a political committee made up of the Foreign and Defence ministers of the signatories.²⁰⁸

The countries involved in the agreement agreed on a cessation of hostilities between all belligerent forces in the DRC. The Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), one of the DRC's rebel movements, signed the agreement on 1st August 1999. The agreement included provisions for the normalization of the situation along the DRC border, the control of illicit trafficking of arms and infiltration of armed groups, the holding of a national dialogue and the need to address security concerns.²⁰⁹

Limitations of the Lusaka agreement

The agreement led to the withdrawal of foreign forces, but its implementation was beset by numerous problems. First, the agreement failed to consider the Mai Mai (Traditional militias found in the eastern DRC) and other local ethnic militias in DRC and instead classified them as negative forces. Secondly, the agreement failed due to an absence of leadership. The agreement depended entirely upon the cooperation of the parties to succeed. Tragically, none of the signatories fulfilled what they had pledged, each suspected the others of a double game and used its suspicions to justify its own duplicity.²¹⁰ The agreement became empty; today it remains only as a reference document.²¹¹

²⁰⁸ International Crisis Group, "Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War", *op cit.*, p. 1.

²⁰⁹ ACCORD, "Training for Peace, DDR program", Lusaka, Zambia, 2004, p. 3.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

Kabila also contributed to the failure of the peace agreement, when he refused to accept a UN peacekeeping force. Inadequate policies of the international community have contributed to this ongoing fragmentation of the DRC. The international community pressured the belligerents to sign the Lusaka ceasefire agreement to stop the fighting. The document fitted especially well with the United States preference for 'African solutions for an African problem'.²¹²

The agreement also focused on major warring parties without dealing with the more complex issue of disarming non-Congolese armed groups destabilizing the region from their bases in the DRC.²¹³ The largest of these groups included the forces that were associated with the former Rwandan army that executed the genocide of 1994. These ex-FAR forces continued to pose a danger to Rwanda by planning an attack from their bases in the DRC. After the Lusaka process had begun, parallel negotiations took place at other venues, under the auspices of the UN, the OAU, and the French government.²¹⁴

Both Kabila and the rebels were reluctant signatories to the Lusaka Agreement, and there were violations on both sides as well. The belligerents persisted with their military adventurism precisely because neither side was able to accomplish its objectives.²¹⁵ The government and rebel forces continued fighting with each seeking to eliminate the other. As a result of their persistence, the war became more intense, leading to massive destruction of infrastructure, human life and the natural environment.

²¹² ACCORD, "Training for Peace, *op cit.*, p. 3.

²¹³ Osita Afoaku, "Congo Rebels: Their Origins, Motivations, and Strategies", in John F. Clark (ed), p. 125.

²¹⁴ John F. Clark, Museveni's Adventure in the Congo: *op cit.*, p. 157.

²¹⁵ Osita Afoaku, "Congo Rebels: *op cit.*, p. 122.

4.3. Inter Congolese Dialogue (ICD)

The Lusaka Agreement attempted to address the issue of power sharing and state-building in DRC, by providing a framework for inter – Congolese negotiations, called the national Dialogue.²¹⁶ The Inter Congolese dialogue was held in Sun City, South Africa. DRC delegates signed the agreement on 2nd April 2003 to end more than four years of brutal warfare and set up a government of national unity. The dialogue started before Laurent Kabila was assassinated in 2001 was signed by his son Joseph who continued negotiating for the resolution of the conflict. The signing was witnessed by South African President Thabo Mbeki and the heads of state of Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Mbeki praised the delegates who had spent 19 months of negotiations.

It was the first peace initiative to include government delegates as well as rebel factions, tribal militias, opposition parties and civil society. Its objectives were to discuss the creation of an interim government and restoration of peace. The parties however, could not reach a consensus over the composition of a transition government and the talks ended with only a partial agreement in April 2003. Among its provisions was the review of all commercial contracts concluded since 1996 in order to ascertain their validity. Some parties refused to sign for example RCD - Goma and Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS).²¹⁷ They were unable to accomplish their objectives, which included inclusion in the army and power sharing with the Kabila government.

²¹⁶ International Crisis Group, "Scramble for the Congo: *op cit.*, p. 79.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.* ,

The ICD was supposed to produce a new political dispensation, leading to the establishment of new institutions in a space of three months.²¹⁸ It was also to oversee elections under a new constitution, which were not held. The OAU was tasked to organize the dialogue under the new aegis of a facilitator chosen by all parties. It was supposed to start immediately after the cessation of hostilities, establishment of the JMC and the disengagement of forces. The OAU was tasked to complete the facilitation before the deployment of the UN peacekeeping mission, the disarmament of armed groups and withdrawal of foreign forces.²¹⁹

Efforts to find a suitable person to fill a facilitator's position took long time. Finally, Sir Ketumile Masire, the former President of Botswana was approved at the suggestion of Robert Mugabe.²²⁰ Masire had problems with Kabila who was not co-operative and closed his Kinshasa office. Kabila was against Masire because the latter recognized and called all the fighting factions to negotiate with the government. Masire's lack of funding from donor countries further undermined his credibility. Apart from being extremely vague, the objectives set out for the dialogue were very optimistic for a country that has never benefited from democratic rule.²²¹

ICD adopted a limited definition of conflict parties and narrowly identified those which were immediate and visibly involved in the conflict. The outcome was arguably most favoured by powerful but invisible actors such as the governments of Rwanda and

²¹⁸ International Crisis Group, "Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War", *op cit.*, p. 79.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*,

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

establishing and maintaining a continuous liaison with the headquarters of all the parties' military forces. It was also to develop an action plan for the overall implementation of the ceasefire agreement by all the parties signatory to it, and to facilitate humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring, with particular attention to the vulnerable groups including women, children and demobilized soldiers.²²⁴

MONUC was also mandated to cooperate closely with the facilitator of the National Dialogue of the Lusaka Agreement, provide support and technical assistance to other United Nations agencies, and to deploy experts in mine action to assess the scope of the mine and the unexploded ordinance problem. When peace making efforts fail, stronger action by Member States may be authorized by Chapter VII of the Charter.²²⁵ This means that the Member States can use all necessary means, including military action to deal with the conflict.

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council authorised MONUC to take necessary actions to protect UN and JMC personnel, facilities and ensure freedom of movement of their personnel and civilians. However, the UN staff occasionally came under attack and several officers lost their lives. By the end of 2002, the mission continued to play an observatory role and was not a peacekeeping mission.²²⁶

²²⁴ Watch list, "The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)", New York: Watch list Publications, 2003, p. 8.

²²⁵ United Nations, *Basic Facts about the United Nations*, *op cit.*, p. 78.

²²⁶ International Crisis Group, "From Kabila to Kabila", *op cit.*, p. 46.

4.5. Gaddafi initiative

Colonel Muamar Gaddafi, the Libyan president attempted to resolve the conflict. In April 1999, President Museveni of Uganda and Laurent Kabila of DRC signed a ceasefire accord at Sirte, Libya. This agreement provided for the deployment of peacekeepers, the withdrawal of foreign troops and the initiation of a national dialogue. Although welcomed by the Security Council it was rejected by RCD and Rwanda who instead recognized the Lusaka Agreement. RCD also disintegrated into three other factions, but with the Sirte Accord 2000 Chadian troops supporting Kabila began to withdraw, and 62 Libyan peacekeepers arrived in Kampala.²²⁷

This agreement called for a ceasefire, the placement of African peacekeeping troops in DRC, and the gradual withdrawal of all foreign forces.²²⁸ It also encouraged the DRC to initiate a national dialogue to resolve the internal political standoff.²²⁹ This agreement failed to become the basis for peace, because it was rejected by Rwanda, which had not participated in the negotiations.

4.6. Key obstacles to sustainable peace

First, due to continued conflict in the entire Great Lakes region, there has been increased proliferation and widespread availability of arms. There has also been neglect of the region by the international community making civilians take up arms as the only means of sustaining lives. An additional obstacle is that key external political and economic

²²⁷ International Crisis Group, "Congo at War; *op cit.*, p. 25.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*,

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

actors benefit financially from the conflict, through illegal exploitation of minerals. As long as profits of violence outweigh the gains of peace, there is little hope of foreign actors allowing DRC government to be sovereign.

The Donor Community has failed to provide funds for the local peace initiatives in the region, preferring only the international forums, which fail to address the root cause of the problems at the local levels. The greatest undoing of the peace processes is that there is a continued neglect of local militia for instance Mai Mai, Hema and Lendu in peace forums. The Hema are an Eastern DRC – based ethnic group with powerful land and business interests.²³⁰ The Lendu are an Eastern DRC – Based ethnic group that has been embroiled in conflict with the Hema.²³¹ The problem of finance and logistical materials is occasioned by the wrangles in the rebel movements whose agenda changes frequently.

Conclusion

All the peace accords in DRC conflict have acknowledged the security interests of the interveners who share a common border with the DRC. This chapter has established that the peace initiatives sought by the belligerent forces to solve the conflict have not been adhered to. This chapter contends that some countries notably, Rwanda and Uganda have violated the peace agreements where their interests are not taken care of. A long-term, peaceful solution for the DRC conflict is inter-linked with the search for peaceful solutions in GLR, and in particular in Rwanda and Burundi.

²³⁰ International Crisis Group, "Congo at War; *op cit.*, p. 32.

²³¹ *Ibid.* ,

Most of the peace initiatives in the DRC have failed mainly because they have been based on three fundamentally flawed grounds. First, they have looked at the conflicting parties solely as those on the DRC soil. Secondly, they have looked at the actors from the perspective of grievances rather than interests. The study has asserted that economic opportunities have played a key role in the intervention. Thirdly, the peace initiatives have assumed that all the intervening countries in the conflict are committed to peacemaking. Commitment to the peace initiatives in the DRC conflict has largely been pegged to the intervening countries' interests at stake.

5.0. CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

The focus of this research has been the African countries intervention in DRC's internal affairs. The fundamental problem of DRC has been, and still is, to build a sense of common identity and loyalty among its many peoples strong enough to sustain a genuine government.

This study has tried to show how external forces have impacted on the DRC conflict. After the country attained independence in 1960 there was external influence in the country's conflicts by the Cold War blocs. The western countries maintained Mobutu in power for 32 years but decided to abandon him after the Cold War. During the Cold War period, the Europeans and Americans were the players in the Great Lakes Region, fighting on behalf of the local leaders.

DRC's minerals have attracted constant interest by the western countries who supported Mobutu to overcome several internal strifes such as the 1977 and 1978 Shaba invasions from Angola. Due to its size and strategic location at the heart of Africa, DRC allowed western states to check communism in Central African region. The 1960-65 crisis in the country led to the assassination of the first Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba in 1961. Mobutu also overthrew the elected government in 1965, ruling until he was overthrown in 1997. External interests to DRC have retained considerable influential features of the conflict that continues to plague this country.

The end of the Cold War and the resultant defeat of Mobutu created a power vacuum in DRC that gave the neighbouring states a chance to intervene in the country's internal affairs. Mobutu lacked the support of western countries and the neighbouring countries took this advantage in helping Laurent Kabila to topple him from power. The genesis of intervention was the 1994 Rwandan genocide, which changed the security relations of the entire Great Lakes Region. Refugees from the conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi sought asylum in DRC. Events of the genocide and Laurent Kabila's AFDL movement had an impact on DRC's political and economic future.

In the case of DRC, external actors have frequently attempted to characterize the country as divided, chaotic, and lacking the ability of self-articulation, which in turn has led to attempts to speak for the country.²³² Due to its strategic location and resource endowment, DRC has served as a theatre for the economic and strategic interests of outsiders. The major determinant of the DRC conflict and resultant instability in the Great Lakes Region is the decay of the state. For it is this decay that has made small states to impose rulers in DRC, invade, occupy and loot its territory. The power vacuum created by state decay enticed foreign countries to maximize their resource extraction from DRC.

The coming of Laurent Kabila to power in 1997 represented the conflict as a win of Rwanda and Uganda against Mobutu. After forming the government, Kabila sought to emancipate himself from the tutelage of his backers. This search for autonomy was interpreted as a threat to Rwanda and Uganda governments and both sought to topple the

²³² Kevin C. Dunn, *Imagining the Congo: op cit.*, p. 9.

very leader they helped install in power. SADC countries sought to support a member state that was under imminent threat of foreign occupation by non-member states. The SADC intervention helped Laurent Kabila to stay in power until he was assassinated in 2001 by his body guard. It was alleged that the army was dissatisfied with Kabila's leadership. They also enabled his son Joseph Kabila take power and continue to rule after the death of his father.

During the second phase of the 1998 war, six national armed forces grouped into two camps and confronted each other on the DRC soil.²³³ The capacity of DRC to govern its vast territory without allying itself with neighbouring countries has become impossible. The conflict is associated with acute physical insecurity for ordinary individuals and communities. It has also led to the loss of basic services like health and education, destroyed physical and social capital and has produced widespread poverty and misery. The Congolese people do not have much of a stake in their own land.

In July 1999 in Lusaka Zambia, the DRC, along with Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe signed the ceasefire agreement for the cessation of hostilities between all belligerent forces in the DRC. Rebel movements were also called upon to sign the peace agreement. This agreement was followed by other peaceful attempts to resolve the conflict. These peace initiatives failed due to vested economic interests that would have been affected by a peaceful DRC.

²³¹ Kevin C. Dunn, *Imagining the Congo: op cit., op cit.*, p. 99.

The solution to domestic problems of the external actors is the way forward to peace. A regional conflict needs to be analysed in all of its lifecycle phases. Also the regional organizations should improve their conflict management approaches to include independent managers and not concentrating much on their dogmatic interpretation of the non-interference of internal affairs of other states. Throughout human history, war has been a constant fact of life. Yet while we accept its seeming inevitability we have struggled fitfully and imperfectly, to manage its scope and its effects.

The greatest challenge in regard to the conflict and its resolution is that the internal conflict in DRC is inseparably interlinked with the internal problems facing other countries involved. The plundering of Congolese resources has formed a recurrent parameter throughout the history of DRC and its successive violent conflicts. DRC's wealth remains the biggest obstacle to a negotiated settlement of their conflict.

Recommendations

The international community should pressure countries involved in DRC conflicts to withdraw. The United States has failed to condemn Uganda and Rwanda governments for illegal occupation and exploitation of DRC natural resources. The United Nations should put financial aid and arms embargo measures on all the African countries that are involved in exploiting and exacerbation of the DRC conflict. Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Uganda and Zimbabwe problems should be addressed both at domestic and at the regional level. If these countries are in conflict, DRC peace will never be achieved.

DRC's problems are multi-faceted and cannot be dealt with in isolation from the entire GLR. The solution should take into account the larger problems of peace and security in the entire region and should include the creation of a regional force and joint training between the armed forces. Ultimately, holistic solutions to the root causes of the conflict must be found by drawing necessary linkages between instability and security in the GLR conflict system.

The Brentton Wood's institutions and International Donors should help rebuild the entire GLR's economy by injecting investible funds for infrastructure and general development. This study has argued that the GLR conflicts are interrelated with reciprocal effects all over the region. The conflicts in Burundi, Uganda, Sudan, Congo – Brazzaville and Rwanda stemmed from common interrelated root causes and were propelled by similar driving forces.

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The avalanche of peace initiatives have not led to a solution to the DRC conflict, since the belligerents simultaneously play the role of both peace makers and spoilers. This study has argued that not all the peace initiative players are committed to peacemaking. There are those actors whose interests are promoted by the prolongation of the conflict and their interests would be threatened by the termination of the conflict. For example, South Africa whose companies are involved in mineral exploitation and sale of arms to the intervening countries would lose a lot if peace was to be achieved in DRC. The peace initiatives have also demonstrated that both Rwanda and Uganda are peace opportunists who are unpredictable as they promote

and spoil the peace initiatives whenever their stakes are threatened. There is need for a neutral peace facilitator especially the United Nations to compel all the foreign actors to respect the peace agreements in place. The African Union should in conjunction with SADC establish a peace building framework that will analyze all the actors in the DRC conflict.

This research set out to test two hypotheses;

- ❖ Vested economic and geo-political interests have driven external forces to intervene in the DRC
- ❖ Peace initiatives have failed because of external vested interests in DRC.

The results of the study prove that indeed external actors interests have played a key role in the DRC conflict and the resultant failure of peace initiatives. An area of further research includes a study on the internal feuds amongst the DRC's peoples and why they cannot fight against external aggression from their neighbours.

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