

CLASSES AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION  
STRUGGLE: THE CASE OF SOUTHERN  
AFRICA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE  
ON THE FRONTLINE STATES

By  
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
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
To my father Elias and Mother, Esemi and  
Mary and in memory of the late Gulam Hassan  
a South African Freedom Fighter

This Research is my original work and  
has not been presented for a degree in  
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


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Banda, E.S.

This Research Paper has been submitted for  
examination with our approval as University  
Supervisors.



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DR MICHEL CHEGE



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DR NJUGUNA NG'ETHE

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## ABSTRACT

The national liberation of Southern Africa with an exception of few other areas in Africa assumed and continues to assume an ever wider mark of armed struggle. For instance, 1985, has witnessed escalating armed struggle in South Africa and Namibia, the last of the remaining colonies. The South African regime continues to carry out hot pursuits amongst the frontline states in its determination not only to wipe out freedom fighter bases but also to compel these states to sign a non-aggression pact with her.

At no time in the history of the national liberation struggle have the character of classes that rule the states on the globe revealed their true character towards the national liberation more than during the national liberation struggle of Southern Africa. In particular, the class forces that are the ruling parties in the frontline states have increasingly led bare their true character towards the national liberation particularly between 1969 to 1984 when one of them (Mozambique) signed a non-aggression treaty with the national colonial bourgeois state of South Africa. There can be no doubt that the final liberation of South Africa and Namibia is yet to reveal the character of classes that rule the states on the globe more fully.

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(iii)

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## CHAPTER ONE

### NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

#### 1.1. THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE NATIONAL MOVEMENTS

It is rising capitalism out of the pre-capitalist socio-economic formations that gave rise to the emergence of national movements. National movements are thus a historical phenomenon belonging to a definite era, the era of rising capitalism. National movements are inseparably bound up with the development of capitalism. It was the growth of exchange between different regions, the steady growth of commodity circulation and the concentration of minuture local markets into a single state or country market that is the secret behind national movements. The chief leading force of this movement was the bourgeoisie class. In Western Europe, the process of destruction of feudalism and the emergence and development of capitalism was at the same time the constitution of its peoples into different nations. For the complete triumph of commodity production and commodity circulation, the bourgeoisie in Western Europe had to capture the home market, for only in a nation state can the bourgeoisie develop its production forces to the highest degree possible under this mode of production. Therein lies the economic

basis of national movements. Lenin underscored this point when he wrote:

"... the tendency of every national movement is towards the formation of national states (Lenin's italics), under which these requirements of modern capitalism are best satisfied. The most profound economic factors drive towards this goal, and, therefore, for the whole of Western Europe, nay, for the entire civilised world, the national state is typical (Lenin's italics) and normal for the capitalist period".

The first characteristic feature of a nation is common language. This is the ideal for the development of capitalism. A nation speaking the same language allows for the free and extensive commercial interaction quite consistent with the faster development of capitalism. Language spoken in common allows for the free interaction of various classes and their being drawn closer to the state market. Indeed every producer whether a bourgeois or a petty bourgeois is pulled towards the state market and so is every buyer and seller. However it does not follow that different nations must necessarily speak the same language. This leads to the second characteristic of a nation, namely that it must possess a common territory. Thus although the British and Americans speak English, they do not form one nation because of the different territories which they occupy. However a common territory does not in itself result into

the creation of a nation. Hence the third characteristic of a nation, namely, that it must have an economic interaction which capitalism engenders. Capitalism provides the blood vessels for wielding the different regions into a single whole. Finally a nation must have the same psychology or rather the superstructure manifested in a common culture. Stalin summarised the characteristics of a nation as a "historically constituted, table community of people" with common "language, territory, economic life, and .... a common culture"<sup>2</sup> In Western Europe nations developed into states. Hence the British, French, German, Italian for instance became transformed into national states.

The ideal for the development of capitalism which assumed form in Western Europe was by no means a reality in Eastern Europe. Here national movements began to develop only in the twentieth century. Owing to the requirements of defence when feudalism had not yet been smashed by capitalism, states had already been developed. Nevertheless commodity production and commodity circulation based upon the capitalist mode of production also began to develop in the Eastern European regions. This stirred up the national movements in various states. The emerging bourgeoisie found itself blocked by the

bourgeois of the dominant nation that was in control of state power. Hence, its leading role in arousing its oppressed nation to secure a home market for itself. The oppressed bourgeoisie was unlucky in that the ruling strata of the dominant nations in control of state power ruled out their transformation into national states. Thus it is capitalism that is the economic foundation of national movements. The result was the formation not of national states but multinational states. Such was the case of Russia and Austria-Hungary. This is abnormal exclusively in the sense of what is best required from the point of view of the development of capitalism which requires a national state and not a multi-national state.

The third historical phase in the stirring up of national movements is the one we are now finally going through with the liberation of Southern Africa. This phase arose out of the development of capitalism in countries of Western Europe into the monopoly stage. The law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall increasingly became acute for the monopoly bourgeoisie. They were compelled to export capital from around 1870 to the backward areas where land, labour and raw materials were cheap. The foreign policy of the bourgeoisie



changed from democracy to political reaction, to colonialism. The foreign policy of capitalism became characterised by division of the world amongst the principle capitalist countries of the time. Here is the summary of the trends between 1876 to 1900. It is clear from the data below that the political superstructure of monopoly capitalism was a change from

Table 1.1: PERCENTAGE OF TERRITORY BELONGING TO THE EUROPEAN COLONIAL POWERS  
(Including the United States)

	1876	1900	Increase or decrease
Africa	10.8	90.4	+79.6
Polynesia	56.8	98.9	+42.1
Australia	100.0	100.0	-
America	27.5	27.2	- 0.3

Source: V.I. Lenin. Collected Works Vol. I  
(Moscow, Progress Publishers 1978) p. 690.

democracy which corresponded to free competition to political reaction through colonialism abroad. Thus for the first time in the history of mankind, owing to the internal dynamics of the capitalist mode of production, the world was completely divided up. Lenin concluded:

"Hence, we are living in a peculiar epoch of world colonial policy, which is most closely connected with the 'latest stage in the development of capitalism', with finance capital".<sup>3</sup>

In order that one must have no doubt about this development in the foreign policy of the dominant capitalist countries of the time, let us look at the position of Great Britain, France and Germany in the following table.

Table 1.2: COLONIAL POSSESSIONS

Year	Great Britain		France,		Germany	
	Area (000,000 sq.m.)	Pop. (000,000)	Area (009,000 sq.m.)	Pop. (000,000)	Area (000,000 sq.m.)	Pop. (000,000)
1815-30	?	126.4	0.02	0.5	-	-
1860	2.5	145.1	0.2	3.4	-	-
1880	7.7	267.9	0.7	7.5		
1899	9.3	309.0	3.7	56.4	1.0	14.7

Source: V.I. Lenin. Selected Works Vol. I, op. cit,  
p. 699.

The above table not only verifies the absolute law of the capitalist mode of production, namely, the law of uneven development as reflected in the uneven seizure of territories, but it also verifies the transformation of foreign policy of these states from

democracy to political reaction. As can be seen from the table 1.2, the period of enormous expansion of colonial acquisition by Great Britain was between 1860 to 1880. As for France and Germany political reaction begins between 1880 to 1899. Finally let us look at the following table which reflects the situation at the beginning of the World War I.

Table 1.3: COLONIAL POSSESSIONS OF THE GREAT POWERS

(000,000 Square Kilometres and  
000,000 inhabitants)

	Colonies		Metropolitan				Total	
	1876		1914		1914		1914	
	Area	Pop.	Area	Pop.	Area	Pop.	Area	Pop.
G.Britain	22.5	251.9	33.5	393.5	0.3	46.5	33.8	440.0
Rusia	17.0	15.9	17.4	33.2	5.4	136.2	22.8	169.4
France	0.9	6.0	10.6	55.5	0.5	39.6	11.1	95.1
Germany	-	-	2.9	12.3	0.5	64.9	3.4	77.2
United States-	-	-	0.3	9.7	9.4	97.0	9.7	106.7
Japan	-	-	0.3	19.2	0.4	53.0	0.7	72.2
Total for 6 Great Powers	40.4	273.8	65.0	523.4	16.5	437.2	81.5	960.6
Colonies of other powers (Belgium, Holland) --							9.9	45.3
Semi-colonial countries (Persia, China, Turkey)							14.5	361.2
Other countries							28.0	289.9
Total for the world							133.9	1657.0

Source: V.I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. I, op. cit, p. 693.

## 1.2. THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

The development of commodity production and circulation in Southern Africa based upon capitalism stirred the oppressed masses on the path of national movement like elsewhere in colonised territories. The rising classes such as the petty bourgeoisie were constantly retarded in their transformation into the national bourgeoisie class. The national bourgeoisie that was created under this oppressive capitalism could not freely expand itself owing to various laws of discrimination say in the acquisition of bank loans. The working class could not freely demand for improvement in their conditions of living. The peasantry as a survival of the pre-capitalist socio-economic formations was not free to participate completely in the commodity circulation because of colonialism.

The national liberation in Southern Africa is aimed at capturing the home market in which the emerging oppressed classes of capitalism seek to consolidate their respective positions. Otherwise stated, the national liberation movements of Southern Africa aim at the overthrow of oppressive capitalism and the establishment of free capitalism. Therein lies the historical significance of the national liberation movements. The national

liberation movements of Southern Africa are bourgeois in their social and economic content. They are not aimed immediately at overthrowing capitalism (in spite of the illusions of petty bourgeois socialists as shall be shown soon) but rather at entrenching capitalism, thereby enabling the antagonism of national classes to develop more fully, thereby signalling the beginning of the end of the capitalist mode of production in the epoch of monopoly capitalism and final capital. Stalin was right when he wrote:

"The chief problem for the young bourgeoisie is the problem of the market. Its aim is to sell its goods and to emerge victorious from competition with the bourgeoisie of a different nationality. Hence its desire to secure its 'own', its 'home' market. The market is the first school in which the bourgeoisie learns its nationalism".<sup>4</sup>

At the stage of the national liberation movement all oppressed classes in Southern Africa like elsewhere in Asia and Africa while being relatively independent (e.g. the workers' movement, the peasants' struggle) develop in close interaction obeying the general laws of the revolution. However, although acting in common, the different classes participating in revolutionary battles against national colonial oppression work at the same time for their own aims, for the improvement of their own lives and hence have their specific interests and zones of actions. A social zone or sphere is a section (self-contained) of the

revolution occupied by the movement of a particular class. For instance, the peasantry is the one that does engage in armed struggle while the working class does economic struggles with the imperialist bourgeoisie. Lenin was right when he wrote:

"What should be understood by a national movement, is not at all one which - in the conditions of a bourgeois democratic revolution - the whole bourgeois, or at least the liberal bourgeoisie is in agreement. Only opportunists hold that view. On the contrary, a national movement is one which expresses the objective needs of the whole country, and aims its heaviest blows at the central forces of the enemy opposing the country's development".<sup>5</sup>

Thus in the national liberation movement of Southern Africa like elsewhere in Asia and Africa, all oppressed classes are drawn into the struggle for the objective requirements of the whole country against the central forces of national-colonial oppressors opposing the country's development. Indeed the leading forces or masters of the national liberation movement has been the national bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie. These leading masters of the national liberation movement claim throughout the struggle that their cause is the cause of the whole movement. Their ideologies are claimed to be the ideologies of all the classes participating in the national liberation struggle. Their own behaviour or character in the national

liberation struggle is claimed to be that of all oppressed classes.

However, the national liberation of Southern Africa like elsewhere in Asia and Africa in the last 10 to 20 years has revealed the emergence of forces or elements, which in class terms, belong to the petty bourgeoisie, but who have raised themselves to the position of revolutionary democracy<sup>6</sup> vis-a-vis imperialism. Scholars consider the concept of revolutionary democracy inadequate particularly so when the concept is applied to regimes that have at times reserved and even negative attitude towards democratic forms of public life in their domestic politics. This is quite natural. Yet it is indisputable that their approach to solution of anti-imperialist problems is often by revolutionary means. It is in this sense though limited but nevertheless crucial for the understanding of the differences of fractions of the petty bourgeoisie towards the national liberation movement that we use this concept in this thesis. The opponents of the concept have not proposed up to now any suitable term from the theoretical and practical point of view. In any case, it is how we analyse the phenomenon under investigation with this "adequate" concept that is important.

Revolutionary democracy is the politically active sections of the urban petty bourgeoisie, the peasantry and progressive intelligentsia who support anti-feudal, anti-imperialist struggle in addition to organisations and groups expressing the interests of these sections. Objectively the working class where it exists becomes a component part of the politically active section of revolutionary democracy. The social base of the politically active sections of revolutionary democracy is much broader in content and social base than is the case for the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeoisie. The social base of revolutionary democracy is provided for by the petty bourgeois class itself, the patriotic elements of bourgeois nationalism, the working class (in the absence of a communist party), the peasantry, the radical circles of the national intelligentsia, and the semi-proletarian urban population. While the essence of revolutionary democratic platform is its proclamation of building socialism (i.e. in fact this is its main distinguishing feature), the following are also its general characteristics.

- (1). Exercise of power under politically active sections of an anti-imperialist bloc under the hegemony of the radical petty bourgeoisie;



- (2). A consistent course of foreign policy aimed at consistent non-alignment;
- (3). A regulatory role of the state in the economy through the encouragement of public sector in the hope of the latter playing a dominant part in industry, finance and foreign trade policy as well as becoming the leading role in the country's economic development;
- (4). Nationalisation of foreign monopolies, and its regulation in accordance with the proclaimed socialist objectives;
- (5). Agrarian reforms aimed at allotting land to the small and landless peasants and the stimulation of co-operative movement;
- (6). Destruction of the local bourgeoisie and a consistent urge to end its economic and political dominance and control over the private sector in accordance with the declared national goals;
- (7). Establishment of mass educational system;
- (8). Enactment of legislation in favour of the working class by abolishing racist laws;

- (9). An anti-imperialist foreign policy through solidarity with revolutionary democratic movements as well as countries with socialist orientation.

Revolutionary democracy is not a homogeneous but rather a heterogeneous force whose tone is often set by the radical petty bourgeois circles or those with petty bourgeois psychology which makes them politically unstable and hence exposes the bloc to the influence of antagonistic classes. In the right place we shall see how this has affected Mozambique as a member of the frontline state. Upon independence the class members of the bloc increasingly become aware of their class interests. The differentiation that intensifies after independence leads to the members of the inter-class coalition to become more and more aware of their class interests and oppose the petty bourgeois socialists. For instance, the peasantry upon independence accelerates its own disintegration into the rich, middle and poor strata.<sup>6</sup> The rich and the middle strata increasingly show opposition to the schemes of the petty bourgeois socialists. The emergent national bourgeoisie within the framework of revolutionary democracy in both the agrarian and non-agrarian sectors increasingly feel the need to usurpe

political power that is commensurable with their growing economic strength. Once the national bourgeoisie have begun to influence the domestic policy, the degeneration of revolutionary democracy sets in.

In the socio-political sense, the rise to hegemony of revolutionary democracy not only reflects the weakness of the national bourgeoisie, but at the same time it also reflects the crisis of its political strategy, that of reformism which was too narrow for the people who rose against national-colonial oppression. Not infrequently the national bourgeoisie utilise the slogans of the national liberation movements to deceive the other oppressed classes while at the same time entering into reactionary agreement with the imperialist bourgeoisie. The rise to hegemony of revolutionary democracy also reflects the crisis of the political strategy of the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeoisie, that of compromises, paltry reforms, which was also too narrow for the people depending on the strength of the national liberation struggle. At the same time the rise to hegemony of revolutionary democracy reflects the lack of influence of the working class, or sometimes (i.e. like in the most backward countries) even the absence of the working class itself or what is but the same

thing, the lack of the leading role of Marxist-Leninists in the national liberation movement.

There is ideological poverty in all the platforms of revolutionary democratic movements similar to that of the Russian Narodniks<sup>8</sup> which base their socialism on the peasantry, which is the main social force in the anti-colonial struggle. The Russian Narodniks saw the peasantry as the natural builder of socialism. The essence of this petty bourgeois utopia socialism is its failure to understand that the national liberation movement is immediately aimed at the overthrow of the national colonial oppressors and not at the overthrow of capitalism. The struggle is designed to clear the obstacles of the free development of national classes that colonialism imposes. The peasantry in particular is hardly aware of the difference between the inevitable domination of the national bourgeoisie as well as its own disintegration into the rich, middle and poor strata and the immediate and closer aim of overthrowing colonialism. The inability to understand this is reflected in the variety of petty bourgeois socialism which is hardly surprising since the interests of the peasantry partly runs parallel to those of the petty bourgeoisie and partly coincides with those of the latter. The result is that politically the ignorance of the

peasantry feeds into the petty bourgeois socialism of revolutionary democrats. The ignorance is mainly about the difference between democracy (national liberation struggle) and socialism.

However, in appraising revolutionary democratic petty bourgeois socialism in the national liberation movement we should avoid making the mistake made by many Marxists who from the point of view of socialism rightly criticise petty bourgeois socialism such as "ujamaa" but stop there. Such Marxists forget that revolutionary democratic socialism is a comflouge (whether or not its propounders are aware) and indeed serves as a banner for the most determined struggle against national-colonial oppression. Thus socialism such as "ujamaa" has a progressive and revolutionary character albeit limited by historical circumstances.

The revolutionary petty bourgeois socialist imagines that the overthrow of national-colonial oppression will do away with capitalism, whereas (and that is the irony) in reality such a victory will clear away in the most ruthless manner the obstacles to the development of capitalism within the limits of late capitalism. Thus without knowing it, revolutionary democratic socialists expresses the interests of the most determined anti-imperialist fighters. Whatever else is left -

of revolutionary democratic socialism upon victory or after the victory is nothing but ideological smokescreen which is resisted by the peasantry let alone the national bourgeoisie who are eager to participate fully in the commodity economy based upon the capitalist mode of production on a liberal democratic basis.

The weakness of both revolutionary democracy and the national bourgeoisie resulted into the hegemony of the neo-colonial conservative fraction of the petty bourgeois in the national liberation movement as well as in some frontline states.<sup>9</sup> The social basis of these movements are provided by the middle strata. By middle strata is meant those classes and social groups occupying an intermediate position between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat including the petty bourgeois owning private property such as the artisans, craftsmen, small shopkeepers, owners of small enterprises and middle peasants. The experience of national liberation struggle of Southern Africa has demonstrated that the petty bourgeoisie which does not own property or what Dr. Michael Chege has called the "new" petty bourgeoisie in his study of the Ethiopian Revolution in 1979 such as the intelligentsia, office employees, professional workers and poor peasants show more consistency in

their anti-imperialist revolutionary stance than the petty bourgeois entrepreneurs. The 1976 Soweto uprising by students testifies to this proposition. The general characteristics of the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeoisie in the national liberation struggle is that of compromises, inclination towards paltry reforms, fear of the outburst of the revolutionary energy of the masses. In the domestic policy. Once they have become the ruling party, this fraction of the petty bourgeois class pursues moderate policies towards the imperialist bourgeoisie depending upon the circumstances. Lenin was right when he stated that this fraction of the petty bourgeois is nothing but a screen for the unlimited dictatorship of the national bourgeoisie. We shall see how this fraction of the petty bourgeoisie manifests itself in the frontline states towards the national liberation movement.

### 1.3 NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA ON THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The impact of the national liberation movements of Southern Africa has been firstly on the international organisations of the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) and the United Nations (U. N.). Since these organisations are the supreme creation of sovereign states

under the hegemony of different class forces, the attitude of the various classes towards the national liberation struggle is graphically illustrated by the history of these organisations in relationship to the national liberation movements. Resolutions, material assistance channelled to the liberation movements and the like reflect in the final analysis which class(es) forces are dominant in these organisations at any given phase. Related to the international organisations are the quasi-international organisations such as the Non-Aligned Movement, the Common Wealth and the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conferences. In these quasi-international organisations, the impact of the national liberation movement has been felt as is evident in the resolutions and diplomatic gestures in favour of the national liberation movements. Finally the national liberation movement has made an impact on both the capitalist states and the socialist states.

The capitalist states use two methods, two forms of foreign policy towards the national liberation movement which are intended to advance a neo-colonial solution. Neo-colonialism has its material base in the means of production owned by the imperialist bourgeoisie while its social basis lies in reactionary upper crust of the national



bourgeoisie who are linked with these companies. Its methods are economic dominance by imperialist bourgeoisie, the granting of aid conditional on political concessions being made to the imperialists in say the United Nations. The two methods of foreign policy are that of force and liberalism. The first method rejects any onslaught on the economic interests of the imperialist bourgeoisie by the national liberation movement as a whole and in particular against revolutionary democracy. Several cases illustrate this proposition. In Iran Mossadeq who came to power in 1951 had nationalised the oil wells owned by imperialist bourgeoisie. In 1953 the U.S.A. Administration of Eisenhower organised for a coup against Mossadeq. The Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A) of the U.S.A. headed by Kermit Roosevelt set off for Iran and instigated a coup which overthrew Mossadeq and installed General Fazollah Zahedi who met all the demands of the imperialist bourgeoisie. He returned the oil wells back to the imperialist bourgeoisie.<sup>10</sup>

The second method of liberatism is one of steps towards the development of political rights, reforms and concessions towards the national liberation movement on the conviction that it should not overstep the national democratic phase into socialist revolution. A ruling party in one

capitalist country or another during its term of office uses one method more than the other. Several examples illustrate this. For instance, during the Congo crisis the U.S.A. utilised both methods to get rid of Patrice Lumumba who was moving the country towards revolutionary democracy.<sup>11</sup> The west capitalist states in their foreign policy towards the national liberation movements passes from one method to another not because of the malicious intentions of their politicians but is due to the contradictory nature of the class whose interest these states advance. Hundreds of years of capitalist development could not successfully have been developed without a more or less firmly established representative system and without some basic rights for its population. This 'minimum' culture is created by the conditions of the development of capitalism itself, with its commodity economy, flexibility, mobility, rapid development of world trade and competition. The movement from one method to another by the international bourgeoisie is intended to find the right equilibrium to defend and protect its interests.

The foreign policy of the socialist states towards the national liberation movement is based on the fact that the development of commodity production and capitalism requires the fullest

democracy. That only through democracy is the class struggle of the proletariat against the national bourgeoisie guaranteed. Thus the support for the national liberation struggle is subordinated to the interests of class struggle.

From this, it follows that socialist states by subordinating the national liberation struggle to the interests of class struggle, do not support unconditionally every demand for national self-determination.

"As a party of the proletariat, the social-Democratic Party considers it to be its positive and principal task to further the self-determination of the proletariat in each nationality rather than that of peoples or nations."<sup>12</sup>

The socialist states only combat attempts to subjugate any nation by imperialist countries.<sup>13</sup> Only within this limit do they support the national liberation struggle. For example, when Biafra wanted to secede from Nigeria, the socialist states refused to consider the secession as a demand for self-determination. In Kenya when Somalis wanted to secede the socialist states also refused to support such demands. Thus all conditions remaining the same, socialist states have always stood for larger states, for they provide the greatest advantage to the development

of productive forces not only under capitalism but more so under socialism. As shall be shown in the proper place, these states have supported the national liberation movement in all forms. At the United Nations, they have consistently fought the machinations of the imperialist forces against the national liberation struggle. Outside the diplomatic field, the socialist countries have given moral and material support to the national liberation movements.

#### 1.4. LITERATURE REVIEW

None of the studies on the frontline states have singled out the class approach as a basis of analysing the character of classes towards the national liberation struggle.

In order to illustrate this, we intend to divide the body of literature into two broad categories, namely, those which look at the influence of domestic policy towards foreign policy and those who look at the influence of external (international) factors on foreign policy.

Many writers are agreed, for instance, that Tanzania's foreign policy has been consistent. Professor David H. Johns in an article entitled

"The Foreign Policy of Tanzania" admits that "Tanzania's foreign policies have demonstrated remarkable consistency"<sup>13</sup>. In explaining this consistency, Johns takes a look at the domestic policy of Tanzania. The "domestic policy system shapes foreign policy - perhaps more than the international political system itself",<sup>14</sup> he writes. He quotes Professor Good to support his argument who states that "Unless the omnipresent task of state - building is allowed to illuminate the objectives and motives of foreign policy, it cannot be understood at all".<sup>15</sup> Also quoted is Weisentein who states that as a positive instrument in the promotion of the nation's development, foreign policy cannot be ignored.

Johns argues that in the domestic sector, it is the absence of class differentiation that has enabled Tanzania to maintain a consistent line in her foreign policy. He quotes Hoskyns who writes that "Tanzania's great strength lay in the fact that because of --- relative lack of class differentiation within her society a great degree of change could be made without antagonising already established interests".<sup>16</sup> However says Hoskyns on one hand there was no effective opposition to these changes within the society itself whereas on the other hand there was little local discontent which could be

manipulated by forces outside the country.

Tanzania's consistency is also attributed to Nyerere as a Head of State. He quotes Carter who states that Nyerere "is the key to the continued success and future independence, both domestically and internationally of the United Republic".<sup>17</sup> Johns also quotes Zartman who argues in general that decision-making in developing countries is centred on the President whose "anger and ardour, his whims and his convictions, may become the mood of his country's policy, and his friendships and acquaintances mark its limits".<sup>18</sup> In applying this to Tanzania, Johns argues that within limits Zartman's description can be applied to Nyerere. "His June, 1960 proposal to delay Tanganyika's independence as a quid proquo for the moving up of Kenya's and Uganda's independence dates so as to facilitate the establishment of an East African Federation was made without consultation within TANU".<sup>19</sup> Johns then goes on to verify his thesis with Tanzania's foreign policy towards anti-colonialism, non-alignment and the like. In a Ph.D thesis by Zuberi Mwamba entitled "Tanzania: Foreign Policy and International Politics"<sup>20</sup> he notes the consistency of Tanzania's foreign policy. To illustrate this, he discusses in detail the Tanzania's policy against the Unilateral Declaration

of Independence of Rhodesia (UDI).

On the domestic disturbances in Africa, Olajide Aluko in his article entitled "African response to external intervention in Africa since Angola",<sup>21</sup> attributes intervention to what he calls an internal power vacuum. The power vacuum he says was responsible for external intervention into Zaire in 1977 and in Ethiopia in 1978 between the Eritrean guerrillas and the Ethiopian Government forces. He concludes; "all these power vacuums attracted external military interventions".<sup>22</sup> The other internal reasons he gives for military intervention is the weak economic and military situation.

On Botswana Hunderson in his article "Independent Botswana A Reappraisal of Foreign Policy Options",<sup>23</sup> looks at the domestic factors such as geography, the size of the population as explaining the country's preference for negotiations. He correctly states that Botswana has accepted in total the Lusaka Manifesto.

Professor Timothy Shaw in an article entitled: "Zambia's Foreign Policy" highlights correctly the fact of "President Kauda's sense of mission in advocating peaceful negotiations in the subsystem".<sup>24</sup>

He correctly appraises the fact that Zambia "was gratified by the revival of the Lusaka Manifesto".<sup>25</sup> He also gives a behind-the-scenes activities of Zambia in "drafting the subsequent April 1975 Dar es Salaam Declaration which effectively replaced (our emphasis) the intervening, radical Mogadishu Declaration".<sup>26</sup> Shaw argues that this development is due to Zambia's fear of renewed guerrilla warfare.

What is the chief defect of the above authors in the investigation of the influence of domestic factors on the frontline states' foreign policy towards the national liberation movement? It is their failure to descend to the class base of state power. Even Professor Johns, who in support of his thesis, quotes several authors, nevertheless having come across a correct conception on the lack of class differentiation in Tanzania does not pursue the discussion to the root of the matter, namely, the class question in Tanzania. He thereby ends where he is supposed to begin. This deficiency leads him for instance to make Nyerere appear a hero when he states that Nyerere delayed the independence of Tanzania without consulting the party of TANU. In this sense Nyerere would seem to be a mysterious and marginal figure. As long it is not shown that Nyerere is a conscious leader of a social base whose majority includes the peasantry, thanks to the



backwardness of Tanzania, and that he is the foremost personification of the social base and above all of the class base of the peasantry (Nyerere's works express both the strength and the weakness, the might and the limit actions, precisely of the peasant movement against national colonial oppression), Authors like Professor Johns only succeed to make Nyerere appear a hero, a mystical figure which he is not.

Failure to descend to the class base of who controls state power in the frontline states and hence investigate the state's class character in the field of foreign policy towards the national liberation movement also leads to several grave mistakes. For instance one of the consequences is to become an apologist of the given class's behaviour.

Professor Shaw falls into this trap when he says that Zambia's advocacy of regional co-existence and its aggregation of interest in the 'detente faction' of African states can be seen as a response to the changed strategic situation in Southern Africa, "with the possibility of renewed guerrilla warfare as one possible response to any failure of alternative forms of statecraft".<sup>27</sup>

However, according to the law of gravity, once you start falling you must continue to fall (if nobody can save you from further falling or you refuse to be saved) until you hit the rock bottom. Professor Shaw confirms this law with striking accuracy. All the way he becomes an apologist of Kaunda. He finds several reasons to save Kaunda from answering to the dictates of this petty bourgeois class. Shaw writes that given the determination of President Kaunda not to become too closely identified with the socialist bloc and to maintain Zambia's stance of non-alignment, the new and fluid situation in Southern Africa can be exploited to loosen the dependence of frontier Africa and the liberation movements on support from communist states.<sup>28</sup>

Let us look at the authors that emphasize the influence of the international system on the frontline states.

Ali Mazrui and his co-author David Gordon in their article entitled "Independent African States and the struggle for Southern Africa" lump together all the frontline states. They question the generally held view that Western aid influences the foreign policy towards the liberation struggle in Southern Africa independent states. Comparing Malawi and

Zambia, they ask: "Does Western aid to independent Black Africa countries affect their relations with Southern African Liberation Movements?"<sup>29</sup> In fact, the presumed inverse correlation between Western aid and support for liberation is weak so they contend. For example, they observe that Zambia and Malawi have received about the same amount of Western aid in the last ten years, yet Zambia has been one of the major centres of commitment to liberation, while Malawi 'has tended to collaborate with the white minority regimes.

Mazrui stops his investigation and goes on to examine what he calls the "Dialectual Relations: Regional and Global". He argues that Cuba's role in Africa has had contradictory implications. Although Cuba is a model for Third World countries, says Mazrui and his colleague, she "is beginning to play a sub imperial role in other parts of the African continent".<sup>30</sup>

Arthur Jay Klinghoffer in his book, The Angolan War: A Study in Soviet Policy in the Third World confines himself to accounting for facts in a purely journalist fashion.

Such authors have not descended to the class base which determines the foreign policy towards the national liberation struggle at the international level. And yet it is the international capitalist class headed by the United States and the proletariat class headed by the Soviet Union that is a clue to analysing the influence of the international system on the frontline states' foreign policy towards the national liberation struggle.

#### HYPOTHESES

The first hypothesis we intend to explore is that the international class system of the Western capitalist countries headed by the United States and the socialist bloc headed by the Soviet Union, have a decisive influence on the frontline states' foreign policy towards the national liberation struggle through the influence they have on ruling classes of the frontline states. In advancing their influence on the frontline states, the respective class forces at the international level seeks to advance their own class interests.

The second hypothesis we intend to explore is that the economic interests and the economic position of classes that rule the frontline states lie at the

root of their domestic and foreign policies. The foreign policy towards the national liberation struggle has been singled out for an independent inquiry. The purposes of foreign policy towards the national liberation struggle is to advance the class interests of a given class or classes in the area of domestic policy.

The third hypothesis to be explored is that the frontline states under the hegemony of revolutionary democracy show a marked tenacity to retain their revolutionary ardour as they move towards the Marxist-Leninist ideology in their domestic and foreign policies. Such a tendency leads to the creation of an economic base which enhances a given frontline states' struggle for total national colonial liberation. The basis for such a solid economic base was frustrated in Mozambique owing, among other things, to the Maoist policies. In Tanzania Nyerere's policies are largely responsible for the destruction of the productive forces. If in addition to such a destruction a frontline state has a relatively advanced national bourgeoisie which begins to collaborate with the regime of South Africa such as Mozambique its foreign policy towards the national liberation struggle is bound to be affected.

The fourth hypothesis we intend to explore is that the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) is bound to strengthen the economic base of the frontline states and enable them depending on which class controls state power to either increase their power for support of the national liberation movement or curtail such support. This is because SADCC is bound to attract international capital which cannot but increase the economic base of the national bourgeoisie and multiply the number of the petty bourgeoisie. Since the petty bourgeois class is nothing but a screen for the unlimited dictatorship of the national bourgeoisie, SADCC's influence may result into the triumph to power of the national bourgeoisie in some of the frontline states.

The sixth hypothesis to be explored is that the development along capitalist road strengthens the national bourgeoisie which has a tendency towards collaboration with the national colonial powers. Their accession to power is bound to weaken the struggle for national liberation in the frontline states.

The seventh hypothesis to be explored is that the development of domestic economy along Marxist-Leninist road not only enhances the growth of productive forces but is also a firm guarantee

for the revolutionary victory over colonialism and racist regime of South Africa in particular.

#### 1.5. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework used in this thesis had two components. Firstly, this thesis takes the international system's approach to the study of Frontline States. The system's approach considers the world's nations as one integral system. It offers the best basis for comprehending the interaction between the international system and its sub-system: the frontline states in Southern Africa.

Secondly, the theoretical framework adopted is based on the work of Karl Marx, namely, the materialist conception of history. This framework singles out the production relations as being primary over other social relations such as cultural, ideology and religious social relations. However, the application of this theoretical framework has its own concrete features or rather specific features. In the study of political phenomenon the law of the unity and the struggle of opposites is the basis of the class approach of society's life. This law has enormous importance for the comprehension of the nature of political systems, international

relations, and the domestic and foreign policies of states.

Without isolating the opposing tendencies at the international level vis-a-vis the national liberation struggle as well as within the frontline states, it is impossible to forecast the radical changes that will take place amongst the states of the region which have a bearing on the national liberation struggle. The March 1984 Nkomati between Mozambique and South Africa can only be understood using the Marxist method. Otherwise the sharp turns a nation like Mozambique may experience would look incomprehensible and even arbitrary without isolating the opposing tendencies within the nation. The capitalist mode of production as it embraces the frontline states must be taken as a basis of discovering the classes that manifest themselves on the domestic and foreign policies.

The Marxist methodology enables us first to isolate the totality of the external above all economic and social influences on the relations in the international realm. It enables one to view the operation of the international system as well as the laws of its changes in the light of the influences of the domestic systems. From this theoretical premise, the foreign policy is determined



first and foremost by domestic policy which enhances the needs of the economically dominant class to maintain and develop its social system.

However, it does not follow that identical domestic policies inevitably lead to one and the same policies. Other factors (secondary though) are at work. Thus, for instance, although the revolutionary democratic regimes of the frontline states have as has been stated earlier similarly of social base of basic political positions, they however exercise different influences on the national liberation struggle because of the factors we have pointed out to.

#### 1.6. METHODS OF RESEARCH

Research will be based on three sources of information namely library or secondary material, government documents and wherever possible, interviews. Government documents like treaties, communiques, and agreements will be particularly useful.

#### DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS

Colonialism: is a system and policy of capitalist powers forcibly depriving the countries they conquered of their political and economic independence and turning them into colonies.

Domestic Policy: is a policy expressing the relationships between the classes, social groups and nations of a given state and aimed at safeguarding the interest of the dominant class.

Foreign Policy: is a policy regulating a particular country's relation with other states and peoples in the international arena.

National Liberation Revolution: the revolution growing out of the national liberation movement and aimed at destroying foreign domination and winning national independence, eliminating national colonial oppression and exploitation and implementing the right of nations to self determination and establishing a national state.

Revolutionary Democracy: politically active sections of the urban petty bourgeois, the peasantry patriotic elements of the national bourgeois, the unconscious working class and progressive intelligentsia who support anti-feudal, anti-imperialist struggle as well as parties, organisations and groups.

Petty Bourgeoisie Democracy: primarily, the non-proletarian made up of intellectuals, hired workers, office employees, poor peasants, shopkeepers, artisans, and middle peasants.

### 1.7. SUMMARY

We have seen that national movements are a phenomenon of rising capitalism. The leading forces of this nationalism are the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie. However, in the era of third world national movements, we witness the emergence of revolutionary democracy (a bloc of revolutionary classes and groups vis-a-vis imperialism) under the hegemony of a fraction of the petty bourgeois class whose distinguishing feature is that of proclamation of socialism. Revolutionary democracy is here used only in the anti-imperialist sense in both the domestic and foreign policy. It does not imply that there is such a democracy in the entire domestic politics. In the next chapter we proceed to see the impact of the national liberation movement on various classes at the international level.

## CHAPTER TWO

### THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

### MOVEMENT ON THE INTERNATIONAL

### ORGANISATIONS

#### 2.1. THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (O.A.U)

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) is itself the product of the impact of the national liberation movement on the African continent. The national liberation movement against national-colonial oppression in black Africa (i.e. Africa South of Sahara) and the Arab areas took place mostly after the first and second world wars. In 1884 Africa was divided amongst the imperialist powers of Britain, Italy, Spain, France, Portugal and Belgium. Two countries were independent in the political sense of the word. These were Ethiopia and Liberia. However, Ethiopia was constantly subjected to harassment by various imperialist powers. For instance, the north-eastern part called Eritrea often fell to invaders among whom was Italy which controlled the area for a century as a colony of Italian traders and colonialists. Liberia although independent since 1847 had nevertheless colonial surroundings and the

external pressures kept the indigeneous people under "colonial conditions".

The Arab countries became independent in the 1950s although Egypt had been independent in the formal sense of the word since 1922. Black Africa began to gain the independence in the late 1950s with Ghana (1958) and Guinea in the forefront and continued to do so in the 1960s. For instance in 1960 alone 16 African countries achieved their independence. The national liberation in some of the above countries assumed a violent form as in the case of Algeria which took six years (1956-1962) to overthrow French colonialism before becoming independent in July 1962. The liberation of Portuguese colonies of Angola, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique also assumed a violent form. In Zimbabwe the struggle had assumed a violent form. In Namibia and South Africa, the struggle for national liberation is assuming ever-widening dimensions of armed struggle.

The unliberated areas of Africa influenced the formation of the OAU as is vividly reflected in some clauses of its charter. Thus the aim of the OAU was not just to consolidate their national independence against any foreign interference, but

also to offer their moral, and material support to those countries that were still under colonial-national oppression.

The history of the OAU reveals the revolutionary democratic leadership in the anti-imperialist struggle on the one hand and the compromising tendencies of the national petty bourgeoisie as well as the reformist tendencies of the national bourgeoisie on the other hand.

It was the revolutionary democratic states that arranged for the convening of the first All African People's Conference (AAPC) which met in 1958 in Accra Ghana. The conference called for the establishment of a "Commonwealth of Free African States". However, what is significant from the viewpoint of the impact of the national liberation movement on the conference was the setting up of an autonomous secretariat to coordinate and harmonize the forces fighting against national-colonial oppression in the unliberated areas of Africa. The secretariat was later to be dissolved when the OAU created the OAU Liberation Committee in 1963. This development showed the ever-increasing impact of the national liberation movement in Africa.

Amongst the aims and objectives of the conference was "to accelerate the liberation of Africa from imperialism and colonialism",<sup>2</sup> to "mobilize world opinion in support of African Liberation and to formulate concrete means and methods to achieve that objective".<sup>3</sup> Other aims and objectives clearly revealed the unanimity of ideals and emotions owing to the same historical background of having been under national-colonial oppressors. Clause (a) talks of promoting "understanding and unity among peoples of Africa",<sup>4</sup> whereas clause (d) talks of development of "a feeling of one community among the peoples of Africa with the object"<sup>5</sup> of enhancing emergence of a United States of Africa.

The composition of the conference also testifies to the seriousness which African revolutionary democrats attached to the anti-colonial struggles. It was made up of delegates from the new political parties which had been formed in the First and Second World Wars or thereafter. The other All African Peoples' Conferences were held in Tunisia in January, 1969 and in Cairo in 1961.

Indeed revolutionary democracies of Ghana and Guinea formed a union called Ghana-Guinea Union in 1958. The failure of the union testifies to the fact that the revolutionary petty bourgeois socialism expresses nothing but the most radical aspirants of freedom against national-colonial oppressors, for the purposes of consolidating bourgeois nationalism within the separate states. That union served as a basis for the most radical struggle against imperialism because it expressed a deep hatred of colonial boundaries.

The all African Peoples' Conferences group was later joined by the new members and became transformed into what came to be known as the Casablanca Group. The whole group was now composed of the Ghana-Guinea Union, Mali, Morocco, the United Arab Republic and the Algerian Provisional Government. This group was formed on 4th January 1961 in Casablanca, Morocco.

The African Charter of Casablanca testifies the revolutionary content of revolutionary democracy against national-colonial oppression and the necessity of achieving unity among the African countries. The charter states:



"We, the Heads of the African States, meeting in Casablanca from January 3rd to January 7th 1961, conscious of our responsibilities towards the African continent, proclaim our determination to promote the triumph of liberty all over Africa and to achieve unity --- proclaim our determination to liberate the African territories still under foreign domination, by giving them aid and assistance, to liquidate colonialism and neo-colonialism in all their forms, to discourage the maintenance of foreign troops and the establishment of bases which endanger the liberation of Africa".<sup>6</sup>

It is clear that the revolutionary democratic states sought unity for the purposes of facilitating the liquidation of national-colonial oppression. It is the anti-imperialist character that we are concerned with and the above facts clearly testify to the fact that revolutionary democracies approach the solution of democratic anti-imperialist problems often by revolutionary means.

The conservative national bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie were dominant in what became known as the Monrovia group. The group was composed of nineteen independent states namely: Chad, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Gabon, Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), the Central African Republic, Malagassy, Togo, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Niger, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Somalia, Tanzania, Liberia and Senegal. It was formed on the 8th of May 1961 in Monrovia.

The dominance of the conservative national bourgeois and petty bourgeois member states in the group resulted into inadequate attention being paid to question of the role of national liberation movement, and at the same time laying emphasis on the need to maintain stable and lasting ties with the former colonialist countries, first and foremost with France.

The resolutions of the Plenary Sessions held at Monrovia City Hall between 8th - 12th May, 1961, did not even mention the national liberation movement for fear of offending the former colonialists. The group members were solely concerned with preserving their national independence. The principles adopted were accordingly the following:

1. Absolute equality of African and Malagasy States, whatever may be the size of their territories, the density of their populations, or the value of their possessions;
2. Non-interference in the internal affairs of states;
3. Respect for the sovereignty of each state and its inalienable right to existence and development of its personality;

4. Unqualified condemnation of outside subversive action by neighbouring states;
5. Promotion of cooperation throughout Africa, based upon tolerance, solidarity and good-neighbour relations, periodical exchange of views, and non-acceptance of any leadership;
6. The unity that is aimed to be achieved at the moment is not the political integration of sovereign African states, but unity of aspirations and of action considered from the point of view of African social solidarity and political integrity.<sup>7</sup>

At the second session in Lagos Nigeria, the delegates debated the draft charter which later became known as the charter of the Inter-African and Malagasy Organisation. A closer look at the charter shows that in spite of the accelerating national liberation movement, this group which became known as the Brazzaville group never mentioned amongst its purposes and principles the support for the national liberation movement. Only in the preamble do they reaffirm their faith in the "principles of the charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights". It is only after this declaration that

acceptable to especially the 'liberal' international bourgeoisie that there is a word about the group's dedication "to the progress of a renascent Africa forever freed from colonialism".<sup>8</sup> Such is the timidity of the conservative national bourgeoisie and their petty bourgeoisie towards the anti-colonial struggle. There is not a word about the necessity of setting up a secretariat to coordinate and harmonize the national liberation struggle. Not a word about giving active moral and material support to the national liberation movements.

It is clear that in the judgement of political and social issues there were major differences between the revolutionary democracies on one hand and petty bourgeois and bourgeoisie regimes on the other hand. The former comprised or rather dominated the Casablanca group. The latter comprised or rather dominated the Brazzaville group. Nevertheless in spite of these differences, they compromised on the need for solidarity and cooperation leading to the creation of the OAU.<sup>9</sup>

When the charter is closely examined, it is clear that the Casablanca group asserted their vanguard role as consistent anti-colonialists

supporters. Article II of the charters clause (d) on the purposes of the OAU charter talks of the eradication of "all forms of colonialism from Africa". Article III on the principles of the charter clause (6) calls for "absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent". The OAU Liberation Committee was created which replaced the permanent secretariat that was created at the 1958 All-Africa Peoples' Conference in Accra Ghana.

Thus the vanguard role of the African-national liberation movement within the OAU squarely falls on the shoulders, not of the conservative national bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie regimes, but of the revolutionary democratic regimes.<sup>10</sup>

The OAU has taken a definite anti-colonial stand thanks to the hegemony of the revolutionary democratic forces at any given time. The resolutions passed by the heads of states and governments or by the ministers of foreign affairs since 1963 testifies this contention.

Let us now summarise these resolutions.

The heads of states and governments meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 22 May to 25 May 1963 having considered all aspects of the question of decolonisation, agreed unanimously on the urgent necessity of coordinating and intensifying the attainment of independence by all territories still under foreign domination and reaffirmed that it was the duty of all African independent states to support the dependent peoples in Africa in their struggle for freedom and independence. The OAU also agreed to coordinate efforts amongst themselves against national-colonial oppressors vis-a-vis the national liberation movement. Finally, the resolution after condemnation of colonialism called upon the colonial powers to take the necessary measures for the immediate application of the UN declaration on the granting of independence to colonial peoples.<sup>11</sup>

In 1963, the OAU called for boycott of foreign trade of Portugal and South Africa by firstly, the prohibition of the import of goods from these countries, secondly, the closing of African ports and airports to their ships and planes of those two countries to overfly the territories of all African countries.

Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, the Republic of Congo and Sudan. Somalia had no diplomatic relations with Britain.

In 1966 the OAU member states renewed their appeal to all peaceloving states not to recognise the racist minority regime in Rhodesia. They called on Britain to use all measures up to and including the use of force to bring about the downfall of the Ian Smith regime. The OAU set up a five-nation committee of solidarity for Zambia whose task it was to seek appropriate measures of technical and economic assistance by member states to Zambia. The OAU once again deplored the continued trade with South Africa by Japan, West Germany, France and Italy as well as the great increase in investments in South Africa by the corporations from the U.S., Britain, West Germany and France.

In 1967 the OAU demanded the use of force to topple the Ian Smith regime. The OAU also called on the United National Security Council to use force on South Africa if the latter refused to hand over Namibia to the United Nations. It also called on France to ensure that the coming referendum in French Somaliland was conducted in a just and democratic manner. The organisation

condemned the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the capitalist countries of giving aid to Portugal in its colonial policy.<sup>12</sup>

In 1968 the OAU Summit of the heads of states and governments approved a resolution which stated that a Portuguese, Rhodesian or South African armed attack on any African states was an aggression against all African countries.

In 1970 the OAU adopted a resolution on solidarity with Guinea in the fight against Portuguese aggression. It also condemned NATO powers that were supporting Portugal.

In 1974 the heads of states and governments reinforced their economic boycott of the Southern African regimes and were ready to resume diplomatic relations with Portugal.

At the 1980 OAU Summit of the heads of states and governments the resolution on sanctions against South Africa was reaffirmed with the additional call for an oil embargo against South Africa. During the same conference the OAU approved an air traffic study on South Africa prepared by Mr. Kodjo which concluded that a total African air traffic embargo on South Africa would be "the most severe blow so far in the campaign to



isolate apartheid South Africa".<sup>13</sup> The study concluded further that major European airlines and the Israel airline El Al could be made economically unviable if African states implemented a ban on launching and overflying by such flights.

It is clear from the above resolutions that the impact of the national liberation movement on the OAU has grown tremendously with passing years and indeed as one territory after another became liberated. However it is not just in the area of resolution that we can look for the impact of the national liberation on the OAU. In addition the OAU has also given guidance, and provided moral and material assistance to the liberation movements.

The OAU recommendations since 1963 included, amongst other things, call for increased member contributions to the funds for the national liberation movements, a call for the coordination and harmonization of the national liberation movements and the like.

A special fund was set up in 1963 for the purposes of supplying the necessary practical and financial aid to the various African national

liberation movements. This fund was to be administered by the OAU Liberation Committee which initially consisted of 11 members with its headquarters in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. In 1972, the committee was enlarged to 17 member states. It is now a habit for the heads of states and governments to declare their personal contributions to the fund. For example, when King Hussen II of Morocco was elected the Chairman of the OAU he pledged his own contribution of \$ 1m to the fund. Other heads of states and governments also declared their amounts. In this way, if only for the reasons of prestige, the reformist national bourgeois regimes and the compromising petty bourgeois regimes were forced to contribute thereby objectively accelerating the national liberation struggle. The annual budget of the OAU Liberation Committee is roughly £ 1 million sterling.

The OAU since its formation in 1963 has called on the liberation movements to coordinate their efforts by establishing common action fronts wherever necessary so as to strengthen the effectiveness of their struggle and the rational use of resources given to them.

For instance, in the case of Zimbabwe national liberation movements in 1972 the Executive Secretary of the OAU Liberation Committee Mr. George Mugombe announced on March 23rd that a United Military Command for the liberation of Zimbabwe had been established following the signing of a joint protocol in Mbeya, Tanzania by the leaders of ZAPU and ZANU.<sup>14</sup> In the case of Angola, the OAU Liberation Committee also announced in the same year a pact between the MPLA and the then Government in exile headed by Holden Roberto called GRAE.<sup>15</sup>

The very fact that the OAU is honestly involved as a body towards genuine unity for the various national liberation movements shows the impact of the national liberation struggle on the African body.

However, that does not mean that unity at all costs can fulfil the aims of the OAU towards total liberation of Africa. The failure of the OAU body to descend to the social basis of the various national liberation movements in each territory, in itself, reflects the dominance of the bourgeois and petty bourgeois forces (they always forget class struggle).

Otherwise the objective course of the national liberation struggle in each colonial territory is such that as the struggle intensifies the bourgeoisie and the conservative petty bourgeoisie become more and more reformist and move to the right wing position vis-a-vis the imperialist powers. In such a situation the national liberation movement cannot be advanced unless the bourgeois and the conservative petty bourgeois are isolated and a new liberation movement formed. United Front tactics in such a situation is treachery to the objective needs of the country's further development. The history of the national liberation movement in Southern Africa testifies to the fact that it is not a bloc with such bourgeois and conservative petty bourgeois forces that has advanced or can advance the national liberation struggle. On the contrary it is only a split of the revolutionary democratic forces that advances the national liberation struggle. The compromising bloc must be isolated as Stalin put it:

"... in order to smath this bloc, fire must be concentrated on the compromising national bourgeoisie, its treachery exposed, the toiling masses freed from its influence..."<sup>16</sup>

Thus united front tactics are only applicable to the countries that have practically no proletariat and hence are industrially quite undeveloped. However, as the given colonial country becomes industrialised and the more it moves away from backwardness, the United Front tactics far from aiding the national liberation struggle, turns into their opposite (in line with dialectics) and begin to retard the national liberation struggle owing to the facts indicated above.

The OAU also requested on the member states to receive the national liberation movements on their territories in order to give them training in all sectors and accord young people all the assistance they need for their educational and vocational training. The OAU also requested the member states to promote voluntary contributions in various fields, with a view to providing the various African national liberation movements with the assistance they require. The frontline states (more in the proper chapter) have considerably shouldered responsibilities as requested for by the OAU.

It is clear from the foregoing that the impact of the national liberation movement on the OAU has been to compel it to adopt an ever increased anti-colonial stand, thanks to similar historic roots of its member states of national-colonial oppression by various western capitalist countries.

There is no doubt that there is a cardinal difference in the assessment of political and social questions between the states led by revolutionary democratic leaders on one hand and the conservative national bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie states on the other hand. These differences have indeed led also to practical divergences in carrying out the decisions of the OAU on the burning questions of the day such as that of breaking diplomatic relations with Britain over Rhodesia.

However, our firm proposition is that all the classes in the nationally oppressed nations display a general democratic content although the character of these classes in the national liberation is different. Nowhere is this proposition verified more than in the history of the OAU vis-a-vis the national liberation struggle. For instance during the OAU crisis on Angola in

1976 no OAU member advocated a government by UNITA and FNLA as opposed to MPLA which had assumed state power. In fact UNITA and FNLA connections with the United States and South Africa neutralised the conservative national bourgeois and petty bourgeois states from attacking the MPLA in spite of their reservations with respect to the Cuban and Soviet Union assistance to the MPLA in 1976. The OAU member states headed by the conservative national and petty bourgeoisie leaders only called for a government of national unity. Once such government became impossible the OAU simply recognised the MPLA government and admitted it as a member to the organisation.<sup>17</sup>

## 2.2. THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION (U.N.)

The impact of the national liberation movement on the international system is also manifested in the history of the United Nations Organisation from the moment of its formation. It is in this organisation that the character of the ruling classes of the socialist countries and the capitalist countries towards the national liberation movement has been revealed with utmost accuracy. The struggle of the two socio-economic systems of capitalism and socialism has been

reflected also in the foreign policies of their states towards the national liberation movement at the United Nations. Also in this organisation the presence of the OAU has been felt vis-a-vis the national liberation struggle. As the national liberation movement has scored more victories so has its impact deepened and broadened at the U.N. Indeed the victories of the national liberation movement have compelled the national-colonial oppressors to make a retreat.

Following the victory against fascism, oppressed nations also sought to free themselves from the national-colonial oppressors. Otherwise stated, the national liberation movement was fuelled by the allied struggle against Hitler's German and its allies. The late President of Guinea, Sekou Toure - underscored this point when he stated:

"During the war of 1939-1945, we sacrificed all for the freedom of France which was then occupied by the enemy. During this war, thousands and thousands of Africans gave their lives for the freedom of France or regaining the freedom it had lost. We agreed to ratio the rice we grew to buy rubber for 150 francs a kilogram and sell it to French merchants for 10 francs a kilogram to save France. We hoped that the liberation of France would bring freedom to our country and the hard-won sovereignty of France would ensure the establishment of the sovereignty of our countries".18



The advanced capitalist states which owned vast colonies wanted liberation only from facism and not the liberation of colonies. The double standards of imperialist countries vis-avis the questions of democracy became manifest. At the height of Nazi offensive in the East in August 1941, the heads of the United States and Great Britain in what came to be known as the Atlantic Charter proclaimed "the right of all peoples to choose their own form of government under which they will live ..."<sup>19</sup>

Even in the Declaration by the United Nations on 1 January, 1942, with the participation of the Soviet Union and other nations, the Allies proclaimed that the future victory was essential to "preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands ..."<sup>20</sup>

However, the Western capitalist colonial powers revealed their true colours when it came to a discussion of the future of German, and Italian colonies which had been placed under control of "mandate" powers in the League of Nations. Was there need to place the colonies under another trusteeship system? The Western capitalist colonial powers reluctantly agreed to a trusteeship system for the former German colonies and territories taken away from the

enemy in Africa and Oceania following the end of World War II.

If they agreed reluctantly to the international supervision of the former German and Italian colonies, they were even less prepared for any international supervision over their colonies.

The French plan hardly mentioned self-government or independence as the goal to which the International Trusteeship system had to work towards. The plan merely called for "progressive development of political institutions".<sup>21</sup> Suffice to say that the plan was clear that this was to apply only to the mandates and enemy colonies and not to the French Empire. The plan never even mentioned the power of the Trusteeship Council to investigate conditions within the trust territories let alone receive petitions.

It is clear that French international capitalism sought to use the Trusteeship system as a supplement in holding and subjugating the nationally oppressed nations. Such was its specific form of character towards the national liberation movement during the process of formation of the United Nations.

The British scheme bluntly refused to consider independence as the goal towards which the Trusteeship system had to work towards. Hull reports that the British Foreign Secretary said that to be perfectly frank, it was the word 'independence' that troubled him. "He had to think of the British Empire which was built on the basis of Dominion and colonial status".<sup>23</sup>

The other capitalist colonial powers took positions similar to the British and French schemes.

On its part the United States was completely dependent on these colonial powers. For instance the U.S. Plan did not specify that independence was to be the goal towards which the Trusteeship system had to work towards.

When it came to the question of compelling the colonial powers to place their colonies under the Trusteeship system, the capitalist colonial powers refused to accept such a formulation. Britain on its part did everything possible to minimize not only the powers of the Trusteeship Council, but also insisted that colonial powers should voluntarily place their colonies under such a council. Britain sought to minimize the importance of the council by insisting that no

separate machinery ( to avoid publicity) was to be created to see to it that the mandatory powers were carrying out their obligations. Thus one finds that it was the economic and social council of the UN that was given the supervisory role. Britain did not even mention the right of the economic and social council to visit trust areas or to receive petitions.

The socialist states headed by the Soviet Union were more specific. The Soviet Union's scheme specified that full national independence was to be the goal of the trust territories and was to ensure progress towards full independence. The Trusteeship Council, stated the Soviet Union Plan, was to possess full powers of direct inspection as well as investigations in trust areas. Accordingly the Soviet Union demanded a permanent seat on the council. The plan called upon all colonial capitalist powers to develop their colonies towards political progress. To this effect Joseph Stalin demanded trusteeship over some colonies such as Libya.<sup>24</sup>

It is clear that the socialist states' attitude towards the national liberation movement is one of complete independence.

It is the class struggle between these two socio-economic systems, capitalism and socialism, in relation to the national liberation struggle that produced the content of chapter XII of the United Nations Charter.

Article 75 of it states that

"The United Nations shall establish under its authority an international trusteeship system for the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent individual agreements. These territories are hereinafter referred to as trust territories".<sup>25</sup>

The very article 75 of the United Nations Charter shows the positive impact of the national liberation movement on the international system and in particular on the United Nations Organisation. It shows that the struggle against national-colonial oppression could not be ignored by the international organisation. The Trusteeship System was seen within the context of the purposes of the United Nations as laid down in Article I of the charter. These purposes were:

- (a) to further international peace and security;
- (b) to promote the political economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progress

development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;

- (c) to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world; and
- (d) to ensure equal treatment in social, economic and commercial matters for all members of the United Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 80.<sup>26</sup>

Article 87 gives the Trusteeship Council the following functions and powers.

- (a) consider reports submitted by the administering authority;

- (b) accept petitions and examine them in consultation with the administering authority;
- (c) provide for periodic visits to the respective trust territories at times agreed upon with the administering authority and
- (d) take these and other actions in conformity with the terms of the trusteeship agreements".<sup>27</sup>

From the foregoing we can see that all the essential functions and powers which the western capitalist colonial powers did not want included (Given their schemes which we have already briefly outlined) were included thus clearly showing the impact of the national liberation movement in the international organisations.

The victories of national liberation in Asia and Africa in the late 40s, 50s and early 60s concretely compelled the United Nations to take a more serious attitude towards the national liberation movement.

When analysis is made of speeches of the newly independent states at the United Nations the issue of great concern was that of the national liberation or as referred to diplomatically "decolonisation". Indeed as author R. Emerson has stated, the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to colonial countries and peoples "can without too gross exaggeration be taken as almost an amendment of the charter".<sup>28</sup>

That famous declaration is so far as the national liberation is concerned stated firstly that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constituted a denial of fundamental human rights contrary to the UN charter and was an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation. Secondly, that all peoples have the right to self-determination and hence were free to pursue their chosen economic, social and cultural development. Thirdly that there could be no excuse such as inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational for delaying the granting of independence by the national-colonial powers. Fourthly that in case where the oppressed peoples were peacefully demanding independence, no armed action or



repressive measure had to be meted upon them and that the integrity of their national territory had to be respected. Fifthly that immediate steps had to be taken by the colonial powers in the Trust and Non-Self Governing Territories or in all other territories which had not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the oppressed peoples without any conditions or reservations in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people themselves without any distinction as to race, creed or colour for complete independence. Sixthly that there should be no disruption of the unity of the nation. Seventhly that all states observe in good faith and in strict form the provisions of the charter relating to UN human rights and the declaration itself.<sup>29</sup>

Such was the continuing impact of the national liberation movement on the world body, thanks to the increased membership of the formerly oppressed countries. The national-colonial powers were forced to make a tactical retreat in the face of the unavoidable rise of the national liberation movement in the UN. No longer was colonialism a legitimate system.

The chosen instrument for seeing to it that the declaration was implemented was the special committee on the situation with regard to the implementation of the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples otherwise simply known as the Special Committee established in 1961, it initially consisted of 17 members but was later increased to 24 members. Resolution No. 1654 of November 27, 1961, stated that the Special Committee was to carry out its tasks by employment of all means which it will have at its disposal within the framework of the "procedures and facilities which it shall adopt for the proper discharge of its functions".<sup>30</sup>

In 1963, all committees dealing with the national liberation movements were brought under this special committee. Resolution 1970 of December 16, 1963 justified this on the grounds that all UN activities concerning non-self-governing territories should now be coordinated and consolidated with a "view to the immediate ending of colonialism".<sup>31</sup>

In 1966 the United Nations passed a convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination which reflected the

the deepening impact of the national liberation movement in the international system. The convention has been signed by over seventy-one states and a hundred and eight states have become parties.

In 1973 yet another convention on the suppression and punishment of the crime of apartheid was opened by the General Assembly for ratification. In summary since 1960, many resolution of the General Assembly have reaffirmed, the declaration on the granting of independence to the colonial countries and peoples.

On apartheid in South Africa, the General Assembly dealt with the question for the first time in 1952. Two resolutions of the Assembly were passed. The first one established a three man commission to study the racial situation in South Africa and called on South African Government to extend its full co-operation. The second resolution called on states to bring their policies into conformity with the obligations under the charter to promote the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms.<sup>32</sup>

The impact of the South African liberation movement has forced the United Nations into varied forms of actions against the national-colonial oppression of a 'special type'. A special type because both the oppressed and the oppressors reside in the same territory unlike the classical form of colonialism. The more resistant the regime of South Africa has been to the actions of the United Nations, the more the world body has intensified its efforts to compel the regime to abandon its policies of apartheid.

The regime of South Africa refused to recognize the three-man commission set up by the United Nations General Assembly. However, the commission did manage to present reports to the assembly in 1953, 1954 and 1955. Meanwhile the General Assembly persistently appealed to the regime of South Africa between 1953 and 1959 to revise its racial policies in line with the United Nations charter. At each occasion, the assembly expressed regret at the refusal of the regime to do so.

On 21 March 1960, South African troops opened fire on a peaceful demonstration killing 69 people and wounding over 180 people. The

event has come to be known as the Sharpeville Massacre. Following the massacre 29 African and Asian states requested the Security Council to meet to consider "the situation arising out of the large-scale killings of unarmed and peaceful demonstrators against racial discrimination and segregation,"<sup>33</sup> in South Africa. The Security Council adopted a resolution stating that if the situation in South Africa continued it might endanger international peace and security. The council called on the regime to abandon its policies of "apartheid" and racial discrimination. It also requested the Secretary General in collaboration with South Africa to uphold the purposes and principles of the charter.

In 1962 the session considered for the first time the item "The policies of 'apartheid' of the government of the Republic of South Africa."

It is clear that the national liberation of South Africa was forcing the world body to adopt a new form of approach to dealing with the question of "apartheid".

A resolution adopted by the Assembly on November 6, 1962 requested member states to firstly break diplomatic relations with the government of South Africa. Secondly to close all ports to all vessels flying the South African flag. Thirdly to enact legislation prohibiting the ships of each state from entering the ports of South Africa. Fourthly to boycott all South African goods and desist exporting goods including all arms and ammunition to the Republic. Fifthly refuse launching and passage rights and facilities to all aircraft belonging to government companies registered under the Republic of South African laws.

An eleven member Special Committee was appointed by the Assembly to keep the situation under review between the sessions of the General Assembly.

The Assembly also requested the Security Council to take appropriate measures up to and including sanctions to secure South Africa compliance to the United Nations resolution and to consider article 6 of the charter which provides for expulsion of a member.

The Special Committee heard petitioners and carried out a study of numerous communications and documents. Having reviewed the developments concerning South African racial policies, it made recommendations to the General Assembly. The committee has also submitted interim reports between sessions of the General Assembly.

On August 7, 1963, the Security Council solemnly called upon all states to cease the sale as well as shipment of arms, ammunition and military vehicles to South Africa. On December 7, the council extended the arms embargo to cover equipment and materials for manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunitions in South Africa.

The council besides calling for the release of all the persons imprisoned for having opposed "apartheid", called for the formation of an expert group to examine methods of resolving the situation in South Africa "through full, peaceful and orderly application of human rights and fundamental freedoms to all inhabitants of the territory as a whole"<sup>34</sup> and invited South Africa to avail itself of the assistance of the group to bring about peaceful and orderly transformation.

The expert committee provided its report on 20 April, 1964. The report called for the formation of a national convention fully representative of all people of South Africa for the purposes of consultations and the future of their country decided thereon. As the first step towards this end, the experts called on the regime of South Africa to release all political prisoners. The committee recommended sanctions in the event of refusal by South Africa to heed the recommendations.

The Security Council approved the report. At the same time, the Secretary General was asked to establish in consultation with appropriate specialised agency, an educational and training programme abroad for South Africans.

The world body's concern has now included a general call to mankind as a whole to join in the struggle against "apartheid". This has included seminars, conferences to various sections and groups which it has sponsored.

The General Assembly has been calling upon the governments, organisations, and individuals to take "more vigorous action to publicize and support the legitimate cause of such persons"<sup>35</sup> detained in South Africa.



The General Assembly for instance approved a resolution adopted by the International Conference of Trade Unions against apartheid in 1973.

The said conference was attended by 380 delegates from more than 200 trade unions organisations representing 180 million workers. The conference also included leaders of the trade union organisations in South Africa, Namibia, Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde.

The resolution is similar to those passed in previous years by the assembly such as the calling for the severing of diplomatic relations with South Africa. Although the resolutions passed in all seminar and conferences, are similar, what is crucial here is to note the ever increasing sections at the international level in the Southern Africa national liberation movements, including students and youths. Thus in 1973 the assembly authorised the Special Committee on Apartheid to associate the South African liberation movements closely with its work and asked the specialised agencies and other inter-governmental organisations to take similar steps.<sup>36</sup>

Efforts have been turned more and more to countries that are the major trading partners of South Africa such as the United States, Britain, West Germany, France and Japan. In such countries, the Special Committee holds seminars and conferences with various sections of the anti-apartheid population with the co-operation of the national liberation movements. The assembly also stresses "the need for more films and audio-visual material on apartheid, in various languages"<sup>37</sup>.

The Special Committee also invites the United Nations specialised agencies to formulate their own action programme against apartheid. The UN has established a Trust Fund for South Africa since 1965 made up of voluntary contributions from states, organisations and individuals. It is used for grants to voluntary organisations, government of host countries of refugees from South Africa and other appropriate bodies. The grants also provide:

- (a) legal assistance to persons persecuted under the repressive and discriminatory legislation of South Africa;

- (b) relief to such persons and dependencies;
- (c) education of such persons and dependants;
- (d) relief for refugees from South Africa;
- (e) relief and assistance to persons persecuted under repressive and discriminatory legislation in Namibia and Southern Rhodesia and to their families.

The United Nations has designated important days in the history of the national liberation movements when a major conflict has taken place with the South African regime as international days to commemorate its continued solidarity with the struggling peoples of South Africa. For instance, the March 21 1960 Sharpeville massacre has been designated the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. A recent day is 16 June 1976 when students in the Soweto township fought with the regime of South Africa to protest against the imposition of the language of the oppressor.

It is not just such black dates in the national liberation movement of South Africa that the UN body remembers and during which it renews its commitment to side with the struggling peoples, in addition the UN body itself takes its own

initiative to declare a certain period as one for intensification of the struggles against apartheid.

On the 10th anniversary of the founding of the Special Committee in April 1973, the UN body availed itself of the opportunity to declare a programme of the decade which came to an end in 1983. The aims and objectives were firstly to promote human rights without any discrimination for all particularly in the sphere of eradicating racial prejudice, racism and racial discrimination. Secondly to check the further spread of racist policies and counteract alliances based upon racism and racial discrimination. Thirdly to resist any policies and practices which strengthen racist regimes and hence contribute to the sustenance of racism and racial discrimination. Fourthly to get rid of the mythical beliefs, policies and practices that contributed to racism and racial discrimination. Fifthly to put an end to racist regimes.

On Rhodesia, the UN Security Council by Resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968 imposed sanctions on Rhodesia in an effort to bring down the minority regime of Ian Smith which had on 11th November 1966 declared Unilateral Declaration of Independence (U.D.I.)

Since the sanctions in 1968 up to the time of independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, the UN Committee on sanctions carried out every effort to see to it that the sanctions were observed. The stand of the Special Committee in these years was to firstly reaffirm the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination, freedom and independence and to recognise the legitimate right of its oppressed people and its national liberation movements to use all forms of struggle to attain their right to self-determination. Secondly to uphold the principle that there can be no independence before majority rule and hence that any settlement had to be worked out with the full participation of the genuine political leaders as well as the leaders of the national liberation movements to be endorsed fully by the people. Thirdly the committee called on Britain not to recognise de facto or de jure the regime of Ian Smith and ensure that the country attained independence on a democratic basis in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the majority of the population. Fourthly it urged Britain to take active steps to bring about conditions necessary to enable the people of Zimbabwe to exercise their right to self-determination, which had to include the unconditional release of all

political prisoners, detainees and restrictees, repeal of all repressive and discriminatory legislation, removal of all restrictions on political activity and the establishment of democratic freedom and the equality of political rights. Fifthly it condemned the continued presence of South African forces in the territory. Sixthly it called on Britain to carry out adult suffrage as a pre-condition to determine how the people of Zimbabwe wanted their wishes and aspirations for the future to be implemented. Seventhly the committee called on all states, specialised agencies as well as other international organisations within the UN system including non-governmental agencies to extend to the people of Zimbabwe through their national liberation movements and with the co-operation of the OAU all the moral and material assistance necessary in their struggle to end national-colonial oppression. Eighthly called upon Britain to cooperate with the Special Committee in the realisation of the aims and objectives of the oppressed people of Zimbabwe and then report to the Committee on the progress towards the implementation of these resolutions. Ninthly asked the Secretary General to make aware to the world as a whole the situation in Zimbabwe as

well as the relevant decisions and actions of the UN and finally the Assembly kept the situation in the territory under constant review.

On sanctions against the minority regimes between 1968 and 1980 the UN constantly deplored the continued failure of the United Kingdom government to put an end to the illegal regime and called upon it to do so immediately. Secondly it condemned the policies of South Africa and Portugal for their continued collaboration with the illegal regime in violations of the resolutions of the UN and called upon them to cease all such collaboration with immediate effect. Thirdly it condemned all violations of sanctions by any state contrary to their obligations under Article 25 of the charter. Fourthly the committee condemned the United States for continued importation of chrome in violation of the UN imposed sanctions and called upon it to cease such importations. Fifthly it called on states which had not yet taken stringent measures on sanctions to do so with respect to all individuals, associations and corporate bodies within their jurisdiction in order to ensure compliance. Sixthly it called upon governments to refrain from taking any action whatsoever that may confer a semblance of legitimacy on the illegal regime. Seventhly

it called for discouragement of all emigration to Zimbabwe. Lastly it invited all governments, specialised agencies within the UN system, the UN bodies concerned and non-governmental organisations to take appropriate steps to give widespread and continuous publicity to the application of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and requested the Secretary General to give widespread publicity to the violation of sanctions.

Such was the impact of the national liberation movement of Zimbabwe on the United Nations Organisations, which compelled the latter to take ever tougher measures against the national-colonial oppressors.

Indeed various UN bodies addressed themselves at various occasions to the resolutions either in the form of studies or recommendations to the General Assembly. For instance the Economic and Social Council used to address itself to the economic and social conditions of the oppressed people of Zimbabwe. The Special Committee continued to address itself to the political developments of the people of Zimbabwe in order to determine further course of action towards the realisation of their independence.



Namibia has also occupied the United Nations since its inception.<sup>38</sup> Like the other national-colonial oppressors, South Africa refused mandatory transfer of Namibia to the Trusteeship System. The world body thus could do nothing to compel South Africa to hand over Namibia to the body, for preparation to independence.

However, the effect of the Namibia national liberation movement on the world body was such that it not only compelled South Africa to furnish it with reports, but also force the body to reject South African demands that it should incorporate Namibia into South Africa. These two victories of the world body provided a breathing space for the reorganisation of the forces of the national liberation movement in Namibia.

The world body's rejection of the incorporation move by South Africa was supplemented by an advisory opinion of 11 July 1950 of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ ruled that the authority which the union exercised over Namibia was based on the mandate of 17 December 1920. If the mandate lapsed, as the union government contends, the latter's authority would equally have lapsed. To retain the rights derived from the mandate and to deny the

obligations thereunder could not be justified.<sup>39</sup> The court found that the union regime was under obligation to submit annual reports and to transmit petitions to the General Assembly which is legally qualified to exercise supervisory functions previously exercised by the League of Nations. As to the obligation of the Union to place the territory under the trusteeship system the court by a narrow margin (of 8 votes against 6) decided that the Union government was under no legal obligation to do so.

In 1966 the UN revoked South African mandate. The Assembly resolution of October 1966 was followed by the setting up of an Ad Hoc Committee with the purposes of recommending appropriate measures to implement the UN resolution. The world body then created the United Nations Council for Namibia.

The UN council for Namibia's recommendations to the General Assembly has always been firstly to reaffirm the United Nations direct responsibility for Namibia and reiterate its determination to ensure that the Namibian people achieve self-determination. Secondly to reaffirm the mandate for the council for Namibia and the necessity of the council being consulted to all

matters patterning to Namibia. Thirdly to deplore the refusal of South Africa to hand over Namibia to the UN and hence condemn its illegal occupation of Namibia; brutal suppression of the people and violations of their human rights, and finally to reiterate its call for all states to respect UN resolution and take all measures possible to bring about the withdrawal of South Africa and Namibia.

In turn the Assembly has mandated the United Nations Council for Namibia to firstly seek to establish itself inside the territory of Namibia. Secondly to be the representative of Namibia wherever is required. Thirdly continue consultations with governments of member states of the issue. Fourthly to meet with Namibians. Fifthly to co-operate with the OAU and attend its meetings. Sixthly to establish close co-operation with the UN specialised agencies, and other institutions and obtain as the legal authority of Namibia representation in all their deliberations and finally to co-operate with all parties wherever they may be who are interested in Namibia including participation in conferences on the issue.

According to the Assembly the tasks of the United Nations Council for Namibia are to ensure travel documents for Namibians. Secondly coordinate emergency programme of technical and financial assistance to Namibia. Thirdly organise an educational and training programme for them. Fourthly collaborate the United Nations Education and Scientific and Co-operation with the Secretary General in connection with Namibians. Fifthly to represent Namibia in all international organisations and various meetings. Sixthly to review the compliance of member states with the UN resolutions on Namibia. Seventhly to undertake a study of foreign economic interests operating in Namibia. Eighthly to hold consultations with the representatives of the Namibian people and the OAU. Ninthly discuss with the UN agencies on the effective implementation of UN resolutions on Namibia and finally to consider ways and means to improve the dissemination of information on Namibia.

In discharging its duties the UN Council for Namibia has persistently maintained the following recommendations to the General Assembly. One the council has always called on all states to take measures to ensure that interests in Namibia property or resources obtained after the termination of the mandate in October 1966 are illegal

Two, it has maintained that all states require their nationals to obtain a visa from the council for Namibia for the purposes of travelling to Namibia and to prohibit tourism and emigration to the territory. Three, the council has always maintained that all states prohibit their nationals and companies under their jurisdiction in taking part in the Cunene River Basin Scheme. Four, that all inter-governmental organisations and the International Mandatory Fund and World Bank in particular consult with the council for Namibia. Five, that Food and Agricultural Organisation (F.A.O.) assist the council in preparing for a comprehensive study of the issues relating to the territorial waters of Namibia. Six, that UNESCO assist the council in the provision of education for the people inside Namibia by all available means such as radios. Seven, that the International Wool Secretariat and its member states review their involvement in the marketing of Namibian products.

The General Assembly has constantly evoked the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples in relation to Namibia. To this end, the Assembly has demanded firstly withdrawal of all South African forces from Namibia and termination of its administration

thereto. Secondly called upon the Security Council in accordance with the relevant sections of the UN to bring to an end South Africa's occupation. Thirdly called on all states to respect the relevant UN resolutions relating to Namibia as well as those of the Security Council including the ICJ's 1971 advisory opinion which stated that the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia was illegal and that she was under obligation to withdraw its administration from the territory. Fourthly called on all states, specialised agencies, other organs within the U system, non-governmental organisations to co-operate with the UN council for Namibia in discharging its mandate. It calls on the council's collaboration with the OAU to render material and moral support to continue the struggle for freedom. It calls on the termination of ordinary or honorary missions in Namibia by all states.

It is clear from the foregoing that the United Nations has become more and more involved in the national liberation of Namibia than perhaps any other colony. That the world body has responded in a very form to aid the oppressed people of Namibia to free themselves testifies to the impact of the national liberation movement and

in particular that of Namibia on the world body.

Yet another major step was taken in 1978 when the General Assembly passed what has come to be known as Resolution 435.<sup>40</sup> The resolution provides for a seven-month "transitional period" following the establishment of a ceasefire and deployment of a 7,500 strong United Nations peacekeeping force, the United National Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAD). UNTAD's deployment along the Angola/Namibia border to monitor the ceasefire would be followed by a 3-month raindown of South African troops in Namibia to 3,500 men. At this stage a four-month election campaign for a Namibian Constituency Assembly commences. Once the UN has certified the election results, the remaining South African troops would then withdraw, and then the drafting of the constitution and the proclamation of independence.

### 2.3 SUMMARY

Nowhere has the character of classes towards the national liberation movement been so vividly testified than in the international organisations of the OAU and the UN. Indeed the objective course of national liberation struggle compelled

the imperialist bourgeois states to make a tactical retreat. Increasingly the two bodies became instruments not for the defence of oppression in favour of the imperialist states, but rather became instruments for the national liberation struggle. Such has been the vivid impact of the national liberation struggle on the international organisations.



CHAPTER THREETHE IMPACT OF NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT  
OF SOUTHERN AFRICA OUTSIDE INTERNATIONAL  
ORGANISATIONS3.1. THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND THE AFRO-ASIAN  
PEOPLE'S SOLIDARITY ORGANISATION (AAPSO)  
AND THE COMMONWEALTH

The impact of the national liberation movement of Southern Africa outside the international organisations must inevitably differ in form. This arises from the fact that the members of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation and the Commonwealth are either members of the O.A.U. or all of them belong to the UN. Hence, the impact of the national liberation outside international organisations must take the form of resolutions. Material assistance in the form of provision of military, food, educational and other assistance to liberation movements are channelled either by individual states themselves or through international organisations to which they belong. It follows that outside international organisation the impact takes the form of resolutions.

3.1.1. THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT.

The decision to draw together the continents of Asia and Africa was made at a conference of Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan on 28 - 29 December 1954. The Prime Ministers agreed to sponsor an Afro-Asian conference for the purposes of defining their common attitude vis-a-vis international affairs as well as attempt a closer solidarity in economic and cultural fields. Hence, the birth of the non-aligned movement held at Bandung (Indonesia) on 18 - 23 April 1955. Sukarno of Indonesia characterised the conference as the first inter-continental conference of "the so-called coloured peoples in the history of mankind".<sup>1</sup>

A closer examination of the communiqués shows a devotion to the question of national liberation. Indeed the conferences called for independence of the dependent peoples and pledged support for all resolutions undertaken at the United Nations. The Bandung Conference declared its full support of the fundamental principles of Human Rights as set forth in the charter of the United Nations and took note of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.

"The conference declared its full support of the principle of self-determination of peoples and nations as set forth in the charter of the United Nations and took note of the United Nations resolutions on the rights of peoples and nations to self-determination which is a pre-requisite to the full enjoyment of all fundamental human rights".<sup>2</sup>

The conference deplored the policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination which it noted were the basis of government and human relations in large regions of Africa and in other parts of the world. Such a denial, the communique-declared was not just a gross violation of human rights but also a denial of the dignity of man. The conference extended its warm sympathy and support for all the national liberation movements, and in particular Africa, those composed of peoples of Indian, and Pakistan origin in South Africa. The conference reaffirmed the determination of Asia-African peoples to eradicate every trace of racialism that might exist in their own countries.

Turning specifically to the problems of the dependent peoples, the conference agreed in:

- (a) declaring that colonialism in all its manifestation is an evil which should

- speedily be brought to an end;
- (b) affirming that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation;
  - (c) declaring its support of the cause of freedom and independence for all such peoples;
  - (d) calling upon the powers concerned to grant freedom and independence to such people.<sup>3</sup>

Such was the attention that the Bundung Conference paid to the national liberation movement. The conference of 6 September 1961 solemnly reaffirmed its support to the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples and called for the immediate unconditional, total and final abolition of colonialism and imperialist domination in all its forms and manifestations. The conference called an end to armed action and repressive measures of any kind directed against dependent peoples to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence and called for the respect of their territorial

integrity. Any aid given to a colonial power was contrary to the charter of the United Nations.

In subsequent years the Non-Aligned Movement continued to reaffirm its unconditional opposition to colonialism of any kind. The 1964 Cairo conference called for the right to self-determination and independence. The conference condemned neo-colonialism, imperialism particularly in South Africa in all its forms. The 1970 Lusaka conference also called for the liquidation of the vestiges of colonialism. In particular the conference recognised the Non-Aligned Movement as itself a product of the anti-colonialist revolution. The 1972 Foreign Ministers' Conference held in Georgetown (Guyana) reaffirmed the Non-Aligned countries' support for African liberation movements. At the 1973 Algiers conference 14 liberation movements recognised by the OAU were represented. The conference reaffirmed its solidarity with the liberation movements in Africa. The 1978 conference of Foreign Ministers was also attended by certain liberation movements and international organisations. The conference committed itself to the struggle against colonialism. The 1974 Havana conference reaffirmed the basic principles of the movement as being, amongst others, that

of the struggle for national independence and against colonialism and imperialism.

It is clear from the above exposition that in the Non-Aligned Movement, the national liberation movement was farther given a new form of support. Such has been the impact of the national liberation movement on the Non-Aligned Movement.

### 3.1.2. THE AFRO-ASIAN PEOPLE'S SOLIDARITY ORGANISATION (AAPSO)

The organisation of AAPSO originated at the conference in Cairo in 1958. Since then it has addressed itself to the questions of national liberation struggle in Southern Africa.<sup>7</sup>

At the Moshi conference in 1963, the organisation condemned Britain and France sales of arms to South Africa and a demand for the release of political prisoners held there. The conference approved the creation of a committee to assist the national liberation movements in their struggle against colonialism. The 1969 conference held in Khartoum (Sudan) called for the recognition of national liberation movements of the then colonised Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Rhodesia, Mozambique and of South Africa and Namibia.

### 3.1.3. THE COMMONWEALTH

The commonwealth is an association of independent sovereign states that were formerly British colonies and who recognise the Queen or King as their symbolic head of state. Over 43 countries including Britain are members.

The impact of the national liberation movement on the commonwealth was particularly felt on the question of Rhodesia. The independent countries sought through this association of independent sovereign states, to compel Britain to yield to the independence demands in general and in particular to the demands of the national liberation movements in the British colonies.

In 1971 the Singapore conference issued a Declaration of Commonwealth Principles. Amongst the principles was that of using every effort to foster human equality and dignity everywhere, and to "further the principles of self-determination and non-racialism". The 1977 Gleneagles (Scotland) issued an agreement on apartheid in sport. The agreement stated that the commonwealth being an embodiment of peoples of diverse races, colours, languages, and faiths have long

recognised racial prejudice and discrimination as a dangerous sickness and an unmitigated evil and pledged to use all their efforts to foster human dignity everywhere. The Heads of state and government reaffirmed that apartheid in sports was an abomination and thus ran counter to the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles declared earlier at the 1971 Singapore conference. The conference reaffirmed its support for the international campaign against apartheid and welcomed the UN efforts to reach universally accepted approaches to the question of sporting links with apartheid regimes. The conference called on its members to withhold any form of support to apartheid through sports.

The 1974 Lusaka conference finally resolved the Rhodesian crisis. Meeting in the Zambian capital from 1 August 1979 to 7 August 1979, a framework agreement was unanimously approved for a peaceful settlement of the Rhodesia crisis. The conference strongly condemned racism. On Rhodesia the conference agreed inter alia that it was:

- (a) the constitutional responsibility of the British government to grant legal independence to Zimbabwe on the basis of majority rule;



- (b) the search for a lasting settlement must involve all the parties to the conflict;
- (c) independence on the basis of majority rule requires the adoption of a democratic constitution including appropriate safeguards for minorities.<sup>5</sup>

It was further agreed that free and fair elections had to be supervised under British government authority and with commonwealth observers. On racism, the conference brought out a lengthy declaration known as the Lusaka Declaration of the Commonwealth on Racism and Racial Prejudice.

### 3.2. THE WESTERN CAPITALIST SYSTEM

The impact of the national liberation movement on the Western capitalist states has been to compel them, under the inevitable triumph of national independence, to seek a neo-colonial settlement in defence of the interests of international capitalists.

Neo-colonialism is a system of relations between the imperialist countries and the developing countries whose material basis lies in the means of production owned by foreign monopolies. The social basis lies in the conservative upper crust of the national bourgeoisie linked with these

companies. In pursuing neo-colonialism imperialism uses varied methods as is evidenced in the foreign policy of the western capitalist states towards the national liberation movement. The switching from one method to another is not accidental nor is it the malicious intentions of individuals directing the foreign policy, but rather arises from the contradictory nature of the capitalist system of production. Economically, it is economic dominance of monopolies, granting economic "aid" dependent on political concessions being made to the western capitalist states. To achieve this, these countries foment national and ethnic strife and create rivalry between the different political groups with a view to preventing a united front against national-colonial oppression.

In achieving neo-colonialism the western capitalist states utilize two methods or rather forms of foreign policy. There is firstly the method of force, the method which rejects any concessions to the national liberation movement. It is the method of supporting the national-colonial oppressors and being dependent upon them to grant independence to oppressed people. It opposes the mass movement of the oppressed people

to effect the victory of the national liberation movement from their own efforts. Any struggle from below, from the nationally oppressed classes is branded as 'terrorism'. The second method utilized is that of 'liberalism'. This involves encouragement towards the development of political rights for the oppressed classes, encouragement of reforms, concessions and the like. This form of foreign policy, towards the national liberation movements is designed to check the further advance of the national-bourgeois democratic revolution into the socialist revolution.

We have already stated earlier that the alternating from one method to another is not due to malicious intentions of the rulers of the western capitalist states but rather is due to the contradictory nature of their international position situated as it were between on one side a socialist system and on the other side the continued and irresistible victories of the national liberation movement.

The two methods, are sometimes interwoven in various proportions in the life of one administration. Sometimes they succeed each other depending on the party in power.

From the point of view of the western capitalist states, some states may represent one of these methods for a long period of time, while others show a rapid change from one method to another. For instance the Scandinavian capitalist states have shown 'liberal' foreign policy towards the national liberation movements. As for the United States government, one party emphasizes the method of force (the Republican Party) whereas the other emphasizes the method of 'liberalism' (the Democratic Party).

Nowhere have these two methods been more clearly revealed than in the national liberation of Southern Africa. To illustrate this, we shall look at the examples of Portuguese colonies, Namibia and South Africa.

### 3.2.1. MILITARY ALLIANCE

When the armed struggle broke out in Angola against Portuguese national-colonial oppression in 1961, Portugal took her NATO assigned divisions to Africa.

The liberal administration of Kennedy in the United States protested at this move on the part of Portugal. However, the Portuguese foreign Secretary Franco Nogueira rightly pointed

out that "Portugal had the right to send troops armed by NATO to Angola. He pointed to the use of NATO forces by France in Algeria",<sup>5</sup> NATO's new Secretary-General Dirk Stikker, went to Portugal where he reassured Salazar about the attitude of his European allies. He declared: "We must unite against the communist danger".<sup>6</sup>

It is clear that the impact of the national liberation movement on the western capitalist states has been to compel them to rely upon the national-colonial oppressors by arming them.

The commander of the African front, Silva Tareres was very pleased with NATO's role to help fight against the national liberation movement in its colonies. He praised "the men of NATO who executed true acts of heroism in the struggle against the insane hordes".

Let us go into details about the extent and nature of support of NATO to Portuguese wars against the national liberation movement.<sup>7</sup> It should be pointed out that there is no such a thing as NATO weapons as a property of NATO. Each NATO country has its own weapons which are capable of being stationed on the soil of other NATO countries owing to the highly developed division of labour

within the arms industry.

50 fighters of the type Republic F-84 G Thunderjet were supplied to Portugal under the American Military Assistance Programme (AMAP). These aircrafts were supposed to be used solely in defence of NATO countries. However they were frequently used in the war against the national liberation movements in Portuguese colonies. Another 50 fighter aircraft of the type North American F-86 T-Sabre were supplied to Portugal for use within the alliance under the American Military Assistance Programme. They were supplied in the 1960s. Many witnesses testified to the fact of their being used against the national liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies.

West Germany supplied in 1966 40 fighter planes of the Fiat G-91 of the NATO type R.4. Although it was specifically designed for NATO, it found its way to the Portuguese colonies against the national liberation movements. The United States supplied in 1963-4 30 aircraft of the type Cessna T-37c. These aircrafts were specifically equipped against guerrilla warfare and Portugal gladly utilized them in her colonies. Under AMAP Portugal received several hundreds of North American Harvard T-3 and T-6 aircraft. The United Kingdom also supplied T-3's and the T-6 under

AMAP. Other aircrafts supplied to Portugal under NATO assistance but which were used in colonies against the national liberation movement include;

- (a) 18 bombers of the type lockheed PV-2 Harpoon;
- (b) 12 bombers of the type lockheed P-2V Neptune;
- (c) 110 Donier D0-27's equiped with rockets under the wings (West Germany);
- (d) 20-odd Duglas B-26 bombers flown in 1965-66 from the United States in co-operation with the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) to be used in the colonies;
- (e) 20 transport planes of the type Nord 25 of Nortlas (French).

It is clear from the above description that the western capitalist countries collaborated militarily with Portugal to crush the national liberation movement in defence of the interests of the international bourgeoisie. The active collaboration of the western capitalist states and the national-colonial oppressors is also revealed in the case of South Africa.

Pretoria's military machine is now more than 600 aircraft, 200 helicopters, more than 500 tanks and over 1,000 armoured troop carriers

including scores vessels and submarines.<sup>8</sup> It is the industrial complex under the hegemony of the international bourgeoisie that is the secret to the massive arms build up by South Africa. Many of those companies are making fabulous profits in fulfilling government military orders under ARMSCOR a government owned corporation that specialises in the manufacture of arms. For instance the African Explosive and Chemical Industries Company was commissioned to build three munitions plants, several machine-building electrical engineering and chemical plants.

The western capitalist states' international capitalists gladly grant licences to the South African state and private companies. For instance the French company Marcel Dassault, sold South Africa a licence to produce a short-range bomber of Mirage - Milan type. The Italian company Construction Me-canique due Normandie Panhard sold South Africa a licence to produce armoured vehicles. Licences have also been purchased for the production of helicopters, missiles, warships, small arms and the like.<sup>9</sup> Although the western capitalist states yielded to the pressure of the United Nations in 1977 to stop the sale of arms to South Africa, nevertheless they secretly



continue to collaborate with South Africa.

In 1979, for instance, South African industrial complex could only satisfy up to 75 per cent of its military requirements whereas in 1980 it could satisfy about 80 per cent. The balance has to be met from outside. Thus although the UN Security Council has imposed an arms embargo on South Africa, nevertheless the western capitalist states continually violate the ban. In the same year (1977) of the ban, the United States shipped 55,000 155-mm shells to South Africa.<sup>8</sup>

The International Institute for Strategic Studies in London in its Military Balance year admits that 40 per cent of South African aircraft are fully or partly US made. Such is for instance the C-131 Hercules transports. The United States magazine Natic (1977) found that there were several loopholes and secret channels used by the US to send weapons to South Africa. One of these loopholes is to sell the US-made military aircraft under the guise of civilian aircraft. Yet another is to manufacture the planes outside the US under the US licences which are later sold to the South African regime. The US also sells planes to 'private civilians'

living in South Africa.

Such revelations by the Nation clearly shows that the international capitalists will stop at nothing to arm the national-colonial oppressor of South Africa.

The Nigerian Herald (1976) revealed that four nuclear powered submarines are being built at a South African naval base in conditions of total secret. It was the United States that aided South Africa to develop the nuclear capability. In the early sixties the US Allis - Charlmers Manufacturing Corporation sent a SAFARI-L atomic reactor to South Africa. Nuclear specialists were given an opportunity to study at the Oak Ridge Laboratory of the Atomic Energy Commission. West Germany has played a no less important part in developing nuclear capability for South Africa. The Steinkohlenerlektrizität and Gesellschaft für Kernforschung companies aided the racist regime to develop a new uranium enrichment technology.

Such cases clearly reveal that the western capitalist states actively collaborate with the national colonial oppressors in the

military field in order to halt the armed struggle of the national liberation movement.

Most of these arms are used by South Africa to sometimes invade Southern Angola and in the frontline states. The purpose besides crushing the armed struggle is also to weaken the frontline states.

### 3.2.2. DIPLOMATIC ALLIANCE

The western capitalist states have given diplomatic support to the national-colonial oppressors in defence of the class interests of the international capitalists. This has been done in two forms. The first has been voting against all resolutions at the United Nations which have called for immediate independence of the colonies. This form of support is the method of force in diplomacy. Then there has been the method of absentions. This form of voting at the United Nations is the method that tacitly support the national-colonial oppressors against the national liberation movements.

As we indicated before the western capitalist states did all they could to prevent a unilateral transfer of colonies to the supervision of the

United Nations Trusteeship System. Since then national-colonial oppressors have persistently refused to hand over their colonies to the United Nations Trusteeship Council. The classical case is that of Namibia of which a lot has already been written. South Africa has refused to hand over Namibia to the Trusteeship Council.

The western capitalist states have persistently voted against or abstained from the resolutions of the United Nations which have called upon the national-colonial oppressors to grant immediate independence to the colonial peoples. Such for instance has been the resolution of 1960 which we have already seen, called The 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to colonial countries and peoples. The western capitalist countries voted against this famous resolution thereby giving diplomatic support to the national-colonial oppressors.

In voting against the resolution, one of the most advanced capitalist powers, the United States<sup>10</sup> gave flimsy reasons to justify its actions for the purposes of concealing its active diplomatic support to the national-colonial oppressors of the day. In defending the stand, the United States representative to the UN stated that it was

hard to understand why a resolution on the broad subject of decolonisation was completely silent on the important contributions which the administering powers, including the U.S.A. had made in the advancement of dependent peoples towards self-government.

The reader will see that the essence of the Declaration was to grant independence to the very dependent peoples and not to thank the colonial powers. In fact the preamble of the resolution states in general the contributions of the colonial powers to the advancement of the dependent peoples towards self-government or independence. There is no doubt that the representative was using words in order to hide his real thoughts.

The second reason given was that there was need to prepare for independence which he stated had been ignored unintentionally when drafting the resolution. Thirdly he stated that the resolution did not take into account the necessity to maintain law and order during the transition to independence. Fourthly he stated that he had reservations to the view that only complete independence and freedom was the acceptable political goal for dependent peoples.

On the second reason, we refer the reader to our section on the national liberation movement and the United Nations Organisations where we have quoted the whole resolution in full. The said paragraph warns against the colonial powers delaying the granting of independence on the basis that the territory was not ripe as yet in terms of the economy, social and cultural development. Without knowing it the resolution was guarding against precisely what the U.S.A. representative was using as a reason for voting against the resolution. The third reason is also flimsy. A closer look at the paragraph reveals the contrary. The paragraph prevents the use of force only in cases where people are attempting peacefully and freely to exercise their right to independence. The event of the Sharpville massacre was yet to come to testify the correct forecast of the framers of the resolution. The fourth reason is also flimsy. Nowhere does the said resolution exclude any other political independence other than national independence. On the contrary it leaves room for the territories to unite depending on the freely expressed wishes of the peoples.

At the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, a resolution was passed calling for immediate granting of independence to the colonial peoples. Once again the western capitalist states voted against it.

It is not just during discussion and voting on general resolutions affecting the national liberation movements that the western capitalist countries show a negative stand in the field of diplomacy towards the national liberation struggle. On the contrary, such support is given to individual colonial powers as each of them comes under attack at the United Nations on various issues affecting the nationally oppressed people. For instance, the western capitalist countries up to the 1974 coup de'tat in Portugal persistently voted against or abstained to any resolution condemning the said national-colonial oppressors. Another typical example is that of South Africa's relationship to Namibia. Up to 1978 when the western capitalist powers formed the contact group to water down resolution 435, these countries blocked every determined effort by the United Nations to bring Namibia to speedy independence. When in October 1966, the African group supported by Pakistan, called for the creation of a United Nations Council for South

West Africa to take over the administration of the mandated territory pending its independence, which had to be not later than June 1968, the western capitalist states voted against the resolution.

Instead, the western capitalist states led by Canada, America and Italy proposed a resolution which did not call for the immediate take-over either by use of force or negotiations of Namibia. Their proposed resolution merely provided for the appointment of a Special Representative for South West Africa responsible to the small U.N. Council. According to the proposed resolution, the council would be restricted to the gathering of information about the territory and the establishment of necessary contacts with the representative elements so as to establish in the territory a nucleus of self-government "with their accord". The Ethiopian representative indeed unmasked the diplomatic support given by the western capitalist states to South Africa as manifested in their proposed resolution. He stated that the crucial question was how long the western powers could afford to continue to play what could only be described as a game of double standards by which on the one hand they gave support to principles and decisions of the UN while on the other hand they continued giving strength to



the very forces that abstract and "frustrate the efforts of the organisation".<sup>11</sup>

Defending their stand on their proposed resolution the western capitalist countries simply continue with their words which hid their real though but put in different versions. The British representative urged for "a slow success rather than a quick failure". Coldberg of the United States went as far as quoting a celebrated philosopher, Salvador due Mudariaga who wrote that our eyes had to be idealistic and our feet realistic by walking in the right direction "step by step".<sup>12</sup> This trend in giving diplomatic support to the colonial powers by the western capitalist powers was also recently revealed in the case of Namibia.

The contact group's activities since its formation clearly reveals not just its diplomatic support of South Africa but also its active efforts to collaborate with the racist regime in order to see Namibia become a neo-colony. As we have seen earlier the UN resolution 435 calls for elections in Namibia before a constitutional conference. All indications are that SWAPO would win a landslide victory thereby allowing it the right to frame a constitution which may not suit western capitalist powers.

The strategy of the western capitalist states headed by the contact group has been to firstly call for constitutional conference before general elections. These efforts have persistently been rejected by the world body and SWAPO. Secondly, when the group realised it could not get its way, it now played with the method of elections so as to prevent SWAPO from winning an outright majority, and hence prevent it from dictating the constitution of the future Namibia.

According to the UN plan (Resolution 435) electoral matters are to be determined by the UN Special Representative appointed to head the UN civilian presence in Namibia and the Administrator-General as the head of the Namibia civil authority.

The contact group reverse all this. Their proposal is that electoral matters be left not in the hands of the United Nations but in the Constituent Assembly. Their plan provide for an agreement on the principles of the constitution before an election takes place. They make commitment to these principles a condition of participation in the elections by all parties.

The contact group's constitutional guidelines are thus the following:

- (a) A requirement for multi-party democracy, with elections at prescribed intervals;
- (b) The non-expropriation of private property;
- (c) An entrenched bill of rights to protect 'minorities' and in particular the whites;
- (d) An understanding by an incoming Namibian Government not to harbour any group hostile to any neighbouring state. (This would affect both the ANC and UNITA of Angola);
- (e) Guaranteed representation for whites in parliament, with probably 20 out of 100 seats.<sup>13</sup>

Britain went further to call for a permanent demilitarized zone in Northern Namibia and Southern Angola until independence with the UN policing and control.

The United States also went further than the British. It produced what came to be called the "Untitled Non-Paper".<sup>14</sup> This paper calls on Namibia to sign a non-aggression pact with its neighbours.

The "Untitled Non-Paper" is regarded as phase II in the settlement negotiations. A document of about one-page, it avoids to state which neighbour Namibia has to sign a non-aggression pact with. The proposal is for a "reciprocal assurances of non-interference and non-resort to force".<sup>15</sup> It states that Namibia would not permit within its territory "the installation of foreign military bases or the presence of foreign military units"<sup>16</sup> let alone permit organised activities directed towards the committing of acts of aggression against "any other state".<sup>17</sup> Neighbouring states would have to follow the same line with regard to Namibia. The proposal specifically mentions that ANC offices can be allowed in Namibia without allowing operations against South Africa.

When SWAPO rejected the contact group's plan, the latter began to play around with the method of elections in order to deprive SWAPO a decisive majority so as to bar it from dictating the constitution in accordance with its will.

The group chose the Western German electoral system.<sup>18</sup> The electoral system provides for half of the seats of the Assembly to be elected by proportional representation

which means parties being represented in exact proportion to the number of votes they receive. The other half of the seats to be elected on the basis of single member constituencies containing as nearly as possible equal a number of inhabitants as is at all practicable.

This electoral procedure means that each voter will have two votes, one to be counted on the level of a single national constituency, the other on the basis of his local constituency.<sup>19</sup>

The reader may wonder as to why the contact group chose the most backward electoral procedure within the members of the contact group.

The reason is simple. Assuming the present total amount of seats of 50, SWAPO under proportional representation can win up to about 18 of the 25 seats (since half of 50 seats are to be elected on the basis of proportional representation). However, SWAPO would not be able to win many seats on the single-member constituents of the remaining 25 seats because much of SWAPO's support comes from the Ovambos who although constituting 47% of the population are nevertheless concentrated in the north.

Under such an electoral procedure the multi-ethnic Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) and several other parties would win more than a third of the Assembly seats, thereby depriving SWAPO of a 2/3 majority which is needed to adopt the Namibian constitution. The DTA and other parties would therefore have some say and block SWAPOs crucial proposals.

Such is the impact of the Southern African national liberation movement on the western capitalist states. Their response has been a neo-colonial strategy in defence of the economic interests of the international capitalists.

### 3.2.3. WESTERN ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND NAMIBIA

The South Africa regime represents the highest stage of development of the foreign policy of the imperialist bourgeoisie, as colonialism. Nowhere in the world has colonial policy been so harshly institutionalised as in the case of South Africa. This policy is known "popularly" as "apartheid" policy which means separate development.

It is therefore in the interest of western capitalist countries where imperialist monopolies have reached the highest stage that South Africa and Namibia should be supported in everyway. The "apartheid" regime of South Africa allows for the entire repatriation of profits by the transnational corporations. So it does in Namibia as well.

54 minerals are mined in South Africa. The country is the leading world producer of gold, diamonds, platinum, manganese, chromites, vanadium, circonium oxide and antimony. It is the second leading producer of asbestos and vermiculite. It ranks third in the production of ferro chromium and uranium concentrates and the fifth in the production of ferromanganese.

Namibia on the other hand produces copper, lead, zinc and vanadium.

Giant transnational corporations are busy exploiting the mineral resources in the two colonial territories from the western capitalist countries. Amongst these are British Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation, Lonrho in the coal, platinum and gold mining, the Newmont Mining Corporation, American Metal Climax (copper) and Union Carbide

(chromium and vanadium) companies from America.

There is a close connection between these western transnational corporations and their governments, designed to influence them to adopt a foreign policy which perpetuates the colonial situation for as long as it possible. However, whenever independence is inevitable the transnational corporations influence their governments to settle for a neo-colonial situation.

Although we have already seen how in practice this goes on in say the case of the contact group, it is necessary here to reveal some aspects of this background connections between the western capitalists states and the transnational corporations. The growing number of politicians recruited to the transnational corporations who have connections with the western governments has now become an established fact.

For instance, Rio Tinto-Zinc Corporation exercises a great influence on the British Government. The Daily Telegraph claimed that as well as supplying uranium, copper and other metals, Rio Tinto-Zinc is also in a position to furnish "a coalition government should one be required".<sup>20</sup> Most of the politicians recruited had the ear



of the Foreign Office and inner trade union circles. In addition to the appointment of the present Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, in 1974, the company also recruited Lord Sidney Greene, former General Secretary of the National Union of Railwaymen, and past President of the Trade Union Congress. By May 1975, Lord Shackleton, a former Labour Foreign Office Minister, had become the company's deputy chairman; while efforts continued to find a replacement for Lord Byers, the senior liberal peer, who also occupied a seat on the board .<sup>21</sup>

The transitional corporations have connecting threads with the foreign policy departments through various means.

In Washington, the link is provided through the Washington law firm of Shipley, Smoak and Ackerman, who are the senior partners.

Shipley served as an adviser to President Eisenhower and Nixon and hosted one of President Reagan's inaugural balls. Smoak served briefly as an adviser to Nixon. The duties of the two is to dispatch constant letters to the congress, large corporations, newspaper editors, United Nations Missions and heads of states. Once in a while they send out polemical material against

United Nations to the American public on its policy towards Namibia.

They have also fought in the US Federal Court on behalf of the transnational corporations in Namibia. In one of the suits, they state that US contributions to the UN are made under a law authority "such sums as may be necessary".<sup>22</sup> They argued that there is already a legitimate government in Namibia through the DTA. Since, therefore, the UN continues to support SWAPO, the American funds are not necessary. It thus appealed to the court to prohibit the State Department from "disbursing funds to the UN for the support of SWAPO".<sup>23</sup>

The Republican Nixon Administration made no secret of the fact that they were connected with the regime of South Africa. For instance almost all the top decision makers had clients in South Africa. Roger Morris lists, for instance, John Mitchell, and Richard Nixon himself. They were "lawyers who must have had clients in South Africa ... I know I did"<sup>24</sup> admits Morris.

It is clear from the above that in the background of the active foreign policy of

western capitalist states towards the national liberation movement is a direct influence of the transnational corporations.

The western capitalist states have wide investments in South Africa and Namibia. Their share in the total volume of foreign investments from 1960 to 1978 grew from 89 per cent (3,800 million dollars) to 96 percent (about 23,000 million dollars). A breakdown of the countries reveals the following picture. British investments in the sixties and seventies increased fourfold from 2,500 million dollars to approximately 10,000 million dollars. The United States comes the second. From 1960 to 1978, the investments increased from 600 million to about 6,000 million dollars. This is a tenfold increase. Thus the US foreign investments in South Africa rose from 13.7 percent to 23.6 per cent in value.<sup>25</sup> West Germany comes the third followed by France.

The above exposition shows that international capitalist foreign policy of colonialism is best served by the regime of South Africa.

### 3.3. THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM

The approach of socialist countries towards the national liberation movement is based on the necessity to unite the working class of all nations against international capitalist class. From their point of view, self-determination is only one aspect of the national question, or their minimum programme. The socialist countries fight for the fulfilment to the maximum, of the minimum programme or the democratic programme, because only in a Republic is the last class battlers fully fought against the bourgeois class by the working class. Lenin underscored this point when he stated that democratic revolution "clears the ground for a new class struggle".<sup>26</sup>

Marx on whose theoretical foundation the socialist countries founded its foreign policy towards the national liberation struggle subordinated the question of self-determination to that of the working class struggle against the bourgeois class. He declared that no "nation can be free which oppresses another".<sup>27</sup> Unless oppression of one nation by another was done away with, the bourgeois class which is

interested practically to divide the working class in order to make it easier to oppress and exploit them, will be the beneficiary. The bourgeois class advances nationalism for the purposes of dividing the working class. The proletariat, stated Marx, stood for consistent democracy for the purposes of opposing the bourgeois intrigues. So long as one nation oppresses another, the proletariat had to support the democratic struggles of the oppressed nation. However, as soon as independence has been achieved, the working class must oppose the fortification of nationalism which the national bourgeois cannot help fortifying in their class interests. The working class of such an independent nation must oppose bourgeois nationalism will proletariat internationalism

Lenin wrote:

"As the party of the proletariat, the Social Democratic Party considers it to be its positive and principal task to further the self-determination of the proletariat in each nationality rather than that of peoples or nations. We must always and unreservedly work for the very closest (Lenin's italics) unity of the proletariat of all nationalities".<sup>28</sup>

Hence the proletariat supports the oppressed national bourgeoisie only in certain direction but does not coincide with its policy of nationalism.

It is on this theoretical and practical foundation that the socialist countries base their foreign policy towards the national liberation movement. They have in collaboration with the Asian and African countries been responsible for the major diplomatic victories relating to the national liberation movements at the United Nations. The Soviet Union was the most consistent country, as has already been shown, at the formation of the UN to call for the independence of colonies. The Soviet Union was the co-author of the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to the colonial countries and peoples. It was also the co-author of the 1962 Declaration on the immediate granting of independence to colonies. In 1973 it was the Soviet Union and Togo which sponsored the 1973 Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.

The socialist countries have voted or abstained against resolutions in favour of the national liberation movements only when they had been altered thereby paving the path for a neo-colonial solution. The classical case is that of Namibia. When the African countries watered down the resolution calling on sanctions

against South Africa, the socialist countries abstained. In explaining the move on behalf of the other socialist countries, the Cuban representative stated that the resolution did not include the major demand of condemning the United States as spearheading the imperialist designs on Namibia. Rodriquez Astiazarain declared:

"The final emancipation of that people will not be won in this Assembly hall or in the Security Council Charter. It will be the result of the struggle of those people against their South African oppressors and against imperialist interests that support them ... To the people of South West Africa, and in their present and future struggles, we can assure them that they will always have the help and military support of .... Cuba".29

Such is the nature of response of the socialist countries at UN to the national liberation movements. They have either co-sponsored or supported all resolutions calling on the independence of the colonial peoples. This diplomatic support has been crucial for the liberation of the oppressed peoples and demonstrates proletariat attitude to the national question.

All treaties concluded amongst the socialist countries point to the question of national liberation amongst other issues. Article 4 of the treaty between Poland and the Soviet Union states that the High Contracting Parties shall continue to support efforts to secure international peace and security and to "complete the abolition of colonialism".<sup>30</sup> Articles of the treaty between Germany Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia states that the High Contracting Parties work towards the elimination of every kind of "colonialism and neo-colonialism".<sup>31</sup>

The socialist countries have openly supported the national liberation movements in the form of arms. It was the Soviet Union, for example, which called on the United Nations to recognize Algeria as a belligerent country in 1955. The socialist countries went ahead to provide arms to the Algerian Liberation Movements in their six years, of arms struggle against French colonialism. They provided assistance to the Red Cross as well as other solidarity organisations in settling Algerian refugees in Tunisia. In Southern Africa, the Soviet Union's provision of arms to Zimbabwe directly to ZAPU and indirectly to ZANU was decisive in bringing about a settlement in 1979. Similarly such assistance to



FRELIMO and MPLA in the case of Mozambique and Angola respectively was decisive for the final liberation of these two countries. Such assistance is also channelled to ANC of South Africa and SWAPO of Namibia.

#### 3.4. SUMMARY

The true character of various classes that are ruling their states towards the national liberation movement have clearly unmasked themselves outside international organisations. The imperialist bourgeois states have clearly been exposed as supporters of colonial powers through their actual practice. So have the socialist countries been exposed as supporters of the national liberation movements through their actual practice. The third world states of Asia and Africa, although owing to different class rule, their character towards the national liberation struggle differs, nevertheless as formerly oppressed countries, they have continued the offensive against colonialism outside international organisations.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE FRONTLINE STATES

#### 4.1. NATIONAL LIBERATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Apart from Algeria and Kenya, independence came to Africa in a non-violent manner. However, in Southern Africa violence has become a typical form of struggle to win national independence. Thus Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe achieved their independence by violent means. Violence is going on in Namibia and South Africa. The stubborn resistance of the national-colonial oppressors has been the distinguishing feature of national liberation movements in Southern Africa preventing quick victories. Indeed the case of South Africa and Namibia owing to the "special type" of colonialism has worsened the situation. In these colonies, the oppressors and the oppressed live in one country. In thus tracing the national liberation movements in Southern Africa we restrict ourselves only to the unliberated territories of South Africa and Namibia.

Revolutionary democracy has already become evident in the platform of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) and the South West Africa Peoples (SWAPO). This is not surprising. The long and stubborn struggle in those territories has revealed clearly the character of classes in the national liberation struggle. The compromising tendencies of the conservative bourgeoisie in South Africa and Namibia to strike a deal with the oppressors for the purposes of thwarting the complete victory of the national liberation movement has already become evident. In South Africa this has manifested itself in the formation of Bantustans which have been declared independence such as Transkei. This process which began in the 1970s has since been intensified thanks to the co-operation of the reactionary conservative bourgeoisie.

The reactionary conservative bourgeoisie, seeing no way to national victory, owing to their reformism, in the face of the growing military might of South Africa turn to reactionary nationalism of accepting "homelands" as fully independent. This reactionary policy apart from retarding the development of productive forces of South Africa worst of all leads to the disorgani-

sation of the oppressed working class. However the objective requirements of South Africa's development demand a consistent struggle against the reactionary conservative bourgeoisie who have already strike a deal with the oppressors in South Africa. This also applies to the Turnhalle Democratic Alliance in Namibia.

The ANC and SWAPO are organisations of revolutionary bloc against the compromising tendencies of the conservative bourgeoisie. The history of these movements is a history of the struggle against elements who have at a given phase succumbed to the tactics and strategies of colonisers in the hope of thwarting a complete victory of the national liberation movement. The ANC programme called the Freedom Charter<sup>1</sup> adopted at Kliptown in 1955 is a document which correctly characterises the nature of the national liberation struggle. The document shows revolutionary democracy as we shall see soon. The congress leading to the adoption of the charter was convened by the ANC in collaboration with the South African Indian Congress, the South African Coloured Peoples' Organisation and the Congress of Democrats (an organisation of whites supporting the national liberation

movement). All in all 2,888 delegates attended the congress. The very composition of the congress shows a representation of all nationally oppressed races in South Africa.

The programme states that South Africa belongs to both black and white and hence unless a government is based on the will of those races, it cannot claim a just authority. It calls for the institution of a democratic state based on the will of all people irrespective of race, colour, sex or belief. The programme then goes on to emulate the rights which a democratic state shall endorse as belonging to all citizens such as the right to vote, participation in the administration of the country, equal rights for all national groups, equality before the law, right to use one's own language, right to worship and abolition of all apartheid laws and practices. Upon the victory of a democratic state, land shall be returned to the tillers.

Apartheid and racial discrimination opposes South Africa's development. The historical necessity of the country's further advance requires the abolition of apartheid and racial discrimination. Such is the objective needs of South Africa. The ANC expresses this objective need in the most precise manner in its Freedom

## Charter.

The demands of the Freedom Charter are bourgeois democratic demands. The victory over apartheid is not in the least directed against commodity production or against capitalism. On the contrary, such a victory will create a broader foundation for the rapid development of commodity production and circulation based upon the capitalist relations of production. It is only in this democratic republic that the class struggle of the proletariat against both the national and international bourgeoisie will for the first time develop in its pure form. The Freedom Charter is the maximum programme of the bourgeoisie but is a minimum programme for the proletariat. This is evident from the fact that the ANC incorporates the Communist Party of South Africa. Thus the charter is not a socialist programme. Its historical path judged from the proletariat point of view lies in its clearing the path for the victory of the proletariat.

Nelson Mandela the leader of the ANC, who has been given a life sentence is aware of the bourgeois democratic nature of the Freedom

Charter. He stated at one time that the charter was more than a mere list of demands for democratic reforms. It was, he said, a revolutionary document precisely because the changes it envisages cannot be won without dismantling the apartheid regime. The charter, said Mandela was not socialist. Whilst the charter proclaimed democratic changes of a far-reaching nature, stated Mandela, it was by no means a blue-print "for a socialist state but a programme for the unification of various classes".<sup>2</sup>

The events leading to the formation of the Union of South Africa led to the formation of the ANC in 1912. All the races and groups that were discriminated against joined the then South African Native National Congress which was a forerunner of the ANC. The ANC was so renamed in 1925. Dominated initially by the national and petty bourgeoisie, the ANC was essentially a reformist moderate organisation which sought to achieve its aims within the legal framework of South African oppressors. However, continued and intensified repression particularly after the Nationalist party came to power in 1948 led to the loss of confidence by the oppressed masses in the leadership of the ANC. The reformism of the national and petty bourgeoisie was too narrow

for the people who were rising up against national oppression. Thus the national liberation movement in South Africa began to gain by loss of illusions of the masses in the strategy and tactics of the national and petty bourgeois leadership.

In the forties and fifties the masses joined the ever emerging revolutionary democrats from the Youth League among whom Mandela was a leading figure. It is these revolutionary democrats who took over the leadership of the ANC Mandela himself was a personification of the self-sacrifice that goes with revolutionary democrats, and their readiness to die for the Republic.

"I have always cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and I hope to achieve. But if need be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die."<sup>3</sup>

In an open letter to the oppressed classes and groups Mandela continued to invoke the oppressed people to raise themselves to the level of revolutionary democracy.

"I shall not leave South Africa, nor do I intend to give myself up. I shall go on fighting for freedom until my last day".<sup>4</sup>



It is these revolutionary democrats led by Mandela, who in 1962 founded Umkonto We Siewe (The spear of the Nation) which is the military wing of the ANC. Thus 1962 marked the beginning of the armed struggle with the sole aim of overthrowing the regime of South Africa. Mandela himself had gone underground following the sharpville massacre. While in the underground, he had disguised himself as a priest and sometimes as a window washer. He visited illegally 15 African and Arab countries without election by police. However, luck ran out on him in August 1962. While on a highway Mandela was stopped by the police. They had his finger prints which coincided with those of the main in the car, thereby identifying him.

The Pan African Congress (PAC) is a right wing petty-bourgeois revolutionary organisation. It was founded in Johannesburg in April 1959 when Witwatersrand University lecturer Robert Sobakwe was elected President, in an American Embassy in South Africa. It is a splinter movement from the ANC that was dissatisfied with the Freedom Charter for championing the interests of all oppressed classes and groups. Its programme is simple.

South Africa belongs to the black people only and hence the liberation of South Africa means the liberation of the black people. As its President Robert Sobakwe put it, the PAC is aimed at:

"government of Africans by the Africans and for the Africans, with everybody who owes his loyalty to Africa and is prepared to accept the democratic rule of an African majority being regarded as an Africa".<sup>5</sup>

There can hardly be any doubt that the PAC does not represent the objective course of the national liberation in South Africa. It only expresses only one race of the oppressed masses and thus threatens to play in the hands of the national-colonial oppressors whose policy of "divide and rule" has always prevented a joint anti-imperialist struggle by revolutionary bloc.

SWAPO's programme<sup>6</sup> reflects revolutionary democracy. The immediate aim of the struggle is said to be firstly the liberation and winning of independence for the people of Namibia, by all possible means and the establishment of a democratic people's government. Secondly, it aims at the realisation of genuine and total independence of Namibia in the spheres of politics, economy, defence social and cultural affairs. In

this regard SWAPO pledges to firstly work in close co-operation with all progressive governments, organisations and popular forces for the total emancipation of the African continent. Secondly, it pledges to fight against all manoeuvres from any quarter that are aimed at a reactionary solution which is contrary to the realisation of a total and genuine liberation of Namibia. Finally, SWAPO pledges to foster and strengthen the anti-imperialist unity amongst the national liberation, world socialist, progress and peace-loving forces in order to eliminate all forms of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism.

Upon independence SWAPO pledges to firstly to wage a struggle towards the abolition of all exploitation of man by man and the destructive spirit of individualism and aggrandisement of walth and power by individuals, groups or classes. Secondly to ensure that all the major means of production and exchange of the country are owned by the people. Thirdly to strive for the creation of an integrated, national economy in which there is proper balance between agricultural and industrial developments along the following lines:

- (i) the establishment of processing industry;
- (ii) a comprehensive agrarian transformation aimed at giving land to the tiller;
- (iii) the establishment of peasants' co-operatives or collectives;
- (iv) the establishment of state-owned ranching and crop farms, aimed at making Namibia an agriculturally self-sufficient nation, and
- (v) the cultivation of a spirit of self-reliance among our people.

The revolutionary democratic petty bourgeois socialist character is evident in the SWAPO programme. The programme fails to see that a complete victory of the national liberation movement in Namibia will not do away with, for instance, the exploitation of man by man, nor can it lead to balanced development of agriculture and industry. On the contrary, the victory will intensify in the most free form the exploitation of man by man and results into a further acceleration of the law of uneven development between industry and agriculture. It is the petty bourgeois self-deception that out of their own will they can change the objective course of capitalism in

Namibia which objectively must develop. However, the essence of SWAPO programme is that it saves a banner for the most determined struggle against national-colonial oppression. Therein lies its historical significance.

SWAPO<sup>7</sup> was a revolutionary democratic movement from the outset. In April 1959, Sam Nuyoma launched the Ovamboland People's Organisation (OPO) in Windhoek, thereby steadily extending the organisation out of Ovamboland where it originated. OPO eventually succeeded to draw all classes and groups that were oppressed in the struggle for a democratic republic. The climax of OPO was what can be called the Namibia 'sharpville' of December 1959. The incident was provoked by the intended forcible removal, characteristic of the racist regime of South Africa, of people from the old location of Windhoek to a new apartheid - style township called Katutura. From lower forms of resistance such as boycotts of municipal services, the struggle culminated into demonstrations. The South African forces killed eleven Namibians and wounded fifty four of them. SWAPO was thus born. It started the armed struggle in 1966.

#### 4.2. THE FRONTLINE STATES

The origin of the frontline states goes as far back as Pan-African days. We have already dealt with the Casablanca group and the Brazzaville group when we traced the effect of the national liberation movement on the continent. The Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (Pafmeca) which was later broadened to include Southern Africa and henceforth known as Pafmeca was dominated like the Brazzaville group by the national bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie classes. Their naked nationalism prevented the formation of concrete institutions and facilities in the broad united front against national-colonial oppression in the East, Central and Southern Africa. Naturally, as independence draw closer in each of the territories, these classes moved further and further away towards the right demonstrating their reformism and compromises towards the national liberation struggle. They became more concerned with capturing the home markets after independence for the domination of their classes and accepted such unions as would aid in the furtherance of their class interests. The formation of the East African Community in 1967 put to rest the dream of the Great East African Federation.

The revolutionary democrats of Tanzania headed by Nyerere did everything in their power, in the most resolute and courageous manner, since the formation of Pafmeca and later Pafmecsca, to lead and push all anti-imperialist forces against the East, Central and Southern Oppressors for the sake of general progress. The revolutionary democrats of Tanzania sought a united front against imperialism not just in the economic field, but more so in the political field. However, the national bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie of East, Central and Southern Africa did everything possible, overt and covert, to paralyse Tanzanians efforts. Nyerere was too revolutionary for them. The result was the collapse of the dream of the Great East African Federation. This however, did not deter revolutionary democrats even after independence of some of the territories from holding periodic conferences of the East, Central and Southern Africa states known as Good Neighbours Conferences the effects of which was to push all of them to participate in the liberation of the remaining pockets of colonialism in Southern Africa. Hence the 1969 Lusaka Manifesto and the 1971 Mogadishu Declaration, all for the sake of general progress.

After the formation of the East African Community in 1967, the frontline group against imperialism became smaller with only Tanzania and Zambia as active members. Later Botswana joined, followed by Mozambique (1975), Angola (1976) and Zimbabwe (1980). As we stated in the introduction, the petty bourgeoisie plays a positive role only in conditional situation, though the petty bourgeois leadership itself continues to stick to peaceful methods, compromises and paltry reforms. This has been the position of Zambia and Botswana as shall be shown in the proper place. The conditional situation was provided by the U.D.I. of Ian Smith, Portuguese colonies and the "apartheid" system in South Africa as well as by the Namibian situation.

The Mulungushi Club as shall be shown was simply a transitional phase in which the last of the national bourgeois and petty bourgeois states of East, Central and Southern Africa was making a final exit.

The first attempt to form a Pan-African movement of East, Central and Southern Africa was in 1954.<sup>8</sup> Kaunda was the first to have attempted to organise an inaugural meeting of the Pan-African movement in Northern Rhodesia. However, the



national colonial oppressors refused entry permission to other liberation movements in East, Central and Southern Africa. After this initial attempt at organisation Pan-Africanism went underground only to resurrect in 1958 when the national liberation struggle intensified in the East, Central and Southern Africa. East and Central national liberation leaders or their representatives met finally in September 1958 in Mwanza, Tanzania. It was at this conference that the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (Pafmeca) was formed. The motto of the conference was "unity is strength".<sup>9</sup> Delegates from Tanganyika, Kenya, Zanzibar, Nyasaland and Uganda attended.

The anti-imperialist character of the movement is evident in its objectives. It was firstly designed to foster the spirit of Pan-Africanism in order to eradicate all forms of colonialism, imperialism, white supremacy, economic exploitation and social degradation by stepping up nationalistic activities and achieve self-determination or independence. Secondly, the movement aimed at co-ordinating nationalist programmes, tactics, projects and efforts for the speedy liberation of their territories. Thirdly, the movement sought to assist in the establishment and organisation

of united nationalist movements in African territories through political education, periodic conferences and encouragement of inter-territorial African contacts in all fields. Fourthly it aimed at the setting up of a joint East and Central African Freedom Fund. Finally, it sought to achieve its aims through non-violence.

It is clear from the foregoing that as in other regions of Africa, such as the Casablanca and Brazzaville groups, the Pafmeca's objectives testify to the fact that all oppressed classes and groups are objectively poised to unite their efforts and crush the central forces of the colonialists who were opposing their countries' development although the character of classes in the national liberation struggle differed.

In the Freedom Charter which was adopted along with the constitution the anti-imperialist character of Pafmeca was even more clear with the declaration that freedom was the birth right and self-government their (Pafmeca) heritage as sons and daughters of the free men and women who inherited Africa.

"It is therefore not only just but imperative that we restore our birth right for ourselves and our children and our children's children ... We declare that democracy prevail throughout Africa from Senegal to Zanzibar and from Cape to Cairo; that colonialism, the so-called partnership, apartheid, multi-racialism and white settlerism are enemies of freedom, and can be eradicated only by African nationalism, virile and unrelenting; that the right of self-determination is God-given and no man or nation is chosen by God to determine the destiny of others; that poverty, ignorance, ill-health and other human miseries cannot be satisfactorily eradicated under imperialism, but only under self-government and international co-operation on the basis of equality and mutual beneficence".<sup>10</sup>

Such was the beginning of a broad united anti-imperialist struggle uniting all the oppressed classes and groups of East and Central Africa. Nyerere saw Pafmeca as growing out of African history because "we were all oppressed".<sup>11</sup> Obote also recognized Pafmeca as a reaction to "foreign rule" that "played havoc for 60 years".<sup>12</sup> Kenyatta agreed that "we have been trodden down for so long".<sup>13</sup> Tom Mboya remarked that the Mwanza meeting would go down in history as "the place where the Pan-African ideal took real shape in terms of an organisation pledged to set objectives and a course of activities and action to achieve them".<sup>14</sup> The dominance of the petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeois agents were to prove Mboya's remarks false owing

to the extreme nationalism of these classes. Indeed as the movement progressed these classes moved further and further to the right wing leaving it to revolutionary democratic petty bourgeois forces to drag them along.

The second meeting took place in Zanzibar in April 1958. The third meeting was at Moshi, Tanganyika in September 1959. At this meeting for the first time, thirty-four delegates attended from 13 parties in six territories (including Ruanda-Urundi and Congo). The fourth meeting was at Mbale in Uganda during which 14 parties from 11 countries attended (including South Africa and Mozambique for the first time). It was also the first time that Northern Rhodesia attended. In 1960, Pafmeca met in KANU offices in Kenya. In 1961 at the independence celebrations of Tanzania, the leaders decided to extend Pafmeca to include Southern Africa and changeu to Pafmesca.

In February 1962 at Pafmesca meeting in Addis Ababa the conference decided to include Ethiopia and Somalia. In November 1962 Ethiopia and Somalia were invited to attend the East African Central Legislative Assembly at Kampala.

In May 1963, The Tanzanian President announced the dissolution of Pafmesca following similar dissolutions of the Cassablanca and Brazzaville groups in the interests of OAU.

In the course of its existence the organisation passed several resolutions against national-colonial oppression in the region. The resolutions were against all forms of discrimination, victimization or segregation based on race, colour or religion; in support of social justice and the principle of human equality; in favour of rights of citizens, as well as human liberties; and in defence of all members of all races in the multi-racial societies.

The organisation addressed itself against specific forms of reaction of the national-colonial oppressors and against the national liberation movement in the region. It protested not only against the detention of Kenyatta but also against the harsh treatment of the Mau Mau fighters at the hands of the colonial regime. It called on the Kenya colonial regime to end the state of emergency. On Central African Federation, the organisation called for its dissolution and independence for separate territories. On South Africa, the organisation called for stern measures including a world-wide boycott against the South African goods. It encouraged the

formation of a Great East African Federation from Ethiopia down to the Southern African states. When the Katangese crisis emerged, the members formed a common stand against secession and sought to mediate in the crisis.<sup>15</sup>

It is clear from the foregoing that Pafmesca was a broad united front of all the oppressed classes against imperialism.

However, the character of classes in the Pafmesca accounted for the difficulties which the organisation was facing in implementing the resolutions let alone improve its organisational effectiveness. The dominance of the national bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie led to the difficulties the organisation faced. Indeed had it not been for revolutionary democrats from Tanzania sacrificing themselves and pushing all other classes forward for the sake of general progress against imperialism, nothing much would have been achieved.

It was TANU that looked after Pafmeca's Office and secretarial work. TANU offered the organisation an office within TANU Headquarters in the first two years. Thus it had no separate room of its own. The first secretary of the organisation was a Tanzanian who for a long time handled

Pafmeca's typing and auditing of accounts.

The national bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie of the organisation were only interested in the forum, which the organisation was providing, in attacking imperialist forces. This gave them a chance to project themselves as leaders of the national liberation movement of respective colonial territories. So much was this forum a suitable form for national bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie that at one time KADU of Kenya protested that Pafmecas' meeting had been held in KANU Offices. These classes hardly supported the day to day running of the organisation in terms of finance or otherwise.

For instance, in October 1961 Koinange, the Secretary of the organisation complained that Pafmeca had only £10 in the bank and yet the organisation needed £10,000 a year to function. No amount of money that was sort was ever received although the members were supposed to pay £1,000 annually. The secretary further stated that the organisation was existing on the generocity of Tanzania. The exceptions that paid were Ethiopia and Uganda. But the exception proves the general rule.

Nye concludes that "Pafmecca never got beyond the symbol of its own existence".<sup>6</sup> Nye should add that Pafmecca never got beyond the symbol of its own existence, because that symbol was that of the national bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie who were dominant. This is the crux of the matter.

As independence in each of the territories drew closer and closer, so the reformist nature of the national bourgeoisie increased and the inconsistency of the petty bourgeoisie also increased and both of them moved more and more to the right. This made the work of revolutionary democrats even much more difficult in organising a determined anti-imperialist stand for the remaining pockets of colonialism in the region.

It proves that Pan-Africanism served as the most determined ideology in forging a broad united front against imperialism. Beyond that nothing could come out of it but mere petty bourgeois illusions of revolutionary democrats.

Following the dissolution of the group with the formation of the OAU, the leaders of the East,



Central and Southern Africa began to meet periodically under the name of Good Neighbours Conferences. Like Pafmesca, this forum was least best suited for the national bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie as a talking shop. However, the frontline states who are most closely connected with the national liberation in Southern Africa have now and again pushed this group forward to become concerned with the final liberation of Southern Africa. Thus, the 1969 Lusaka manifesto which opted for peaceful methods to end national-colonial oppression and the 1971 Mogadishu Declaration which observed that the Lusaka manifesto had failed to achieve national liberation struggle and that the only way to achieve freedom was through the armed struggle.

The Mulungushi Club (named after the Mulungushi Rock near Kabwe, Zambia where periodic United Nations Independence Party (UNIP) conferences took place during which East African leaders were invited) was the transitional arena in which the last of the national bourgeoisie leaders and the petty bourgeois leaders (whose conditional situation for positive role did not exist owing to their being far away from Southern Africa) of East, Central and Southern Africa retreated.

The club addressed itself to the national liberation of Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola, Namibia and South Africa. The club sought a united stand on the issue of racism and colonialism in Africa, particularly Southern Africa. Hence, the periodic conferences if not extraordinary conferences whenever the need arose.

The members of this club met frequently particularly after 1969 owing to the intensification of the national liberation struggle. For instance Kaunda paid a state visit to Botswana during which a common stand was adopted towards the national liberation struggle. In 1971, Obote of Uganda, Kaunda of Zambia and Nyerere of Tanzania met in Tanzania to plan their opposition to the British Government's proposed resumption of arms sales to South Africa. At the meeting, they agreed to adopt a united front at the commonwealth conference on the issue, which they did in January 1971 at Singapore.

In 1973, the members of Mulungushi Club met in Zambia. Zaire was also represented by Mobutu. The members adopted a common stand on the liberation struggle in Angola.

"Nyerere and Kaunda were especially concerned about the situation in Angola where the liberation movements challenge was so ineffective that Portugal was able to move more troops from there to cope with Frelimo's greater pressure in Mozambique".<sup>17</sup>

In Angola no progress was being made to unite the MPLA and FNLA and this worried the club members. Prior to the informal meeting the club leaders were invited to address the Mulungushi conference during which Nyerere bluntly stated that the "Mulungushi Club is not a mutual admiration club". He meant by this that it was a serious business of adopting a united front against colonialism. military might of Zambia and Tanzania against Portugal.

In 1974 meetings between Zaire, Tanzania and Botswana were held in Arusha (Tanzania). On 4 February, in Kitwe (Zambia) on 31 May and 1 June in Lumumbashi (Zaire), on 27 to 28 July, on Mwanza (Tanzania), on 27 to 29 October. All the meetings were intended to bring about a common stand on the liberation of Southern Africa but more particularly Angola. In the same year, Khama of Botswana visited Tanzania on a state visit.

In 1975 the members of the club met once again. Nyerere spent a considerable amount of time in Zambia, Zaire and Congo to bring about a common stand on Angola. At this time Mozambique President

Samora Machel joined the club.

However, the core of the frontline states is much smaller and composes of Zambia, Botswana, Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe.

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that Mulungushi Club was the last stage, for the exit of the national bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie.

Kenya in 1967 ceased practically to be a member of the group. Kenya was the most advanced bourgeois state of the Mulungushi Club. Zaire ceased to be a member after its strategy on Angola in advancing a neo-colonial solution failed in 1975. Uganda also ceased to be a member during Amin's regime. The frontline states were shaped more by the Rhodesian crisis, particularly after the fall of Portuguese power in Mozambique and Angola following the April 25, 1974 coup. This (frontline states) informal alliance of states emerged with the coming together of these states for "subregional interests, primarily to solve the Zimbabwe crisis".<sup>18</sup>

#### 4.3. SUMMARY

The character of classes towards the national liberation of South Africa and Namibia is forever being unveiled. The ANC and SWAPO are revolutionary democratic movements which stand for a complete victory of the national liberation struggle as opposed to reactionary conservative bourgeoisie in South Africa and Namibia that have strike a deal with colonialism. The impact of the struggle on the region has been the emergence of the frontline states.

CHAPTER FIVETHE SOCIAL BASIS OF POLITICS AND FOREIGN  
POLICY OF RULING PARTIES OF THE FRONTLINE  
STATES

The distinction which we have all alone in the thesis drawn between oppressor nations (imperialist nations) and the oppressed nations (colonised or neo-colonised) is crucial to understanding the social structure of the ruling parties of the frontline states. Suffice to say that our thesis solely deals with the character of the frontline states towards national liberation movement vis-a-vis imperialism. Thus domestic politics will be touched upon only in so far as they determine or is bound to determine the form of foreign policy of frontline states towards the national liberation movement.

The frontline states like every state based upon commodity production of the capitalist mode of production contains the same basic classes. Classes<sup>1</sup> are large groups of people that differ from each other by the place they occupy in the historically evolved system of social production to the means of production. It is the social position in the production process that determines the share of social wealth. The frontline states

contain the national bourgeoisie, the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie classes. The peasantry<sup>2</sup> under the influence of commodity production based upon capitalism splits or differentiates itself into the peasant bourgeoisie and rural proletarian peasant. The middle peasantry is essentially a petty bourgeois. To the above must be added various groups spread between the two main classes of the national bourgeoisie and the working class such as the office employees, the unemployed and the intelligentsia.

In the frontline states, the ruling parties are under the hegemony of either the petty bourgeois fraction which has raised itself to revolutionary democracy or under the conservative petty bourgeois otherwise known as ordinary or traditional petty bourgeoisie. By hegemony is meant leadership, preponderance in power and in influence. We should emphasize here that our distinction between oppressor nations (imperialist nations) and the oppressed nations (colonialised or neo-colonised) leads us to see that whereas the petty bourgeois class of the imperialist nations cannot help being the tail of imperialist bourgeois parties in supporting colonialism, the petty bourgeois class of an oppressed nation or neo-colonial nation has an anti-imperialist character. This difference is fundamental for understanding the character of

frontline states towards the national liberation movement vis-a-vis imperialism in both the domestic and foreign policies.

The conservative petty bourgeois frontline states as neo-colonies are inclined towards compromises, reformism and paltry concessions vis-a-vis imperialism in their domestic policy which is manifested in the same manner towards the national liberation movement. This becomes too narrow for the revolutionary democrats as is manifested, as shall be shown, in the demonstrations against the regimes for their inconsistencies towards the national liberation struggle. Zambia and Botswana belong to the ordinary or conservative petty bourgeois frontline states. It is the weakness of revolutionary democracy and the national bourgeoisie in these two countries which left a vacuum for the hegemony of the ordinary petty bourgeois fraction. To examine this process is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Revolutionary democracy, as we stated in chapter one, is a bloc of revolutionary classes in the anti-feudal, anti-imperialist struggle characterised by a declaration towards socialism - petty bourgeois socialism. That nothing can come out of the petty bourgeois socialism shall be shown in



country studies soon. However, what is crucial for our thesis is not so much the petty bourgeois socialist illusions in the domestic policy for the realisation of socialism. Rather what is crucial is the fact that such petty bourgeois socialism serves as the most determined banner to attack foreign capital in the domestic scene and a radical foreign policy against imperialism and in favour of the national liberation movements. This is our firm stand. Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania and Zimbabwe belong to revolutionary democracy in the frontline states. To examine the history and the strength of revolutionary democracies vis-a-vis the compromising national bourgeoisie is beyond the scope of this thesis. There is hardly any doubt that such a task would throw a great deal of light on what is taking place for instance in Angola in the struggle between the MPLA and UNITA and in Mozambique between FRELIMO and MNR.

What then are the cause of reversals in the domestic and foreign policy in the frontline states? Already mozambique signed in March 1984 the Nkomati Accord with the racist regime of South Africa.

The first and foremost cause lies in the internal dynamics of class struggles in the country. There increasingly grows differentiation within.

the ruling parties. This is objectively caused by the internal dynamics of capitalist development. This development leads to class demarcation and the members of the ruling parties become more and more aware of their social class. The new national bourgeoisie that has grown up within the socio-economic structures controlled by the revolutionary democrats or conservative petty bourgeois increasingly becomes dissatisfied with the domestic and hence the foreign policies of these regimes. This new national bourgeoisie insistently seeks to acquire political influence within the ruling parties that is commensurable with its economic strength. To this must be added the petty bourgeois narrow-mindedness whether he has raised himself to the position of revolutionary democracy or he is still on the level of the ordinary or conservative petty bourgeois. He finds it difficult to draw clear cut political conclusions which renders him susceptible to the influences of other classes including antagonistic classes. Above all there is the international factor to which the petty bourgeoisie is more vulnerable than is the working class and the national bourgeoisie.

The above stated causes of reversals in the domestic and policy leads politically to the struggle between the right wing section and the

left wing section of either revolutionary democratic regimes or the ordinary petty bourgeois regimes within the frontline states. By left wing is meant political groupings and activists who are progressive and revolutionary minded vis-a-vis imperialism and in favour of the national liberation movement. By right wing forces is meant those who are satisfied with what has so far been achieved in the anti-imperialist struggle. The left wing forces would like to move further and further towards embracing scientific socialism. The right wing forces work against any further movement towards the left particularly when it comes to the question of the formation of a vanguard party of exclusively the working class.

5.1. THE SOCIAL BASIS OF POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RULING PARTIES OF REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRACY

From the point of view of the anti-imperialist struggle, the social basis of revolutionary democracies of Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania and Zimbabwe is provided for by the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie and the working class.

5.1.1. COUNTRY STUDIES

5.1.1.1. TANZANIA

5.1.1.1.1. THE SOCIAL BASIS OF THE TANGANYIKA  
AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION (TANU)

The principal characteristic of revolutionary democracy is its declaration towards socialism. TANU revolutionary democracy took shape at the time of the Arusha Declaration in February of 1967. The Declaration called for socialism and self-reliance. Indeed the declaration marked the coming into age of revolutionary democracy in Tanzania. Once again revolutionary democracy should not be taken to mean that there is such a form of democracy in the domestic policies. On the contrary, it should be understood in the context of this thesis, namely, in the struggle against foreign capital and a radical (often) approach against imperialism in favour of the national liberation struggle.

In this respect the peasantry, the petty bourgeois and the working classes have supported consistently TANU's policies against foreign capital. The nationalisation of foreign capital since 1967 has met with the support of these classes. For instance the 1971 TANU document entitled Mwongozo or Guidelines on Guarding, Consolidating and Advancing the Revolution of Tanzania and of Africa was widely welcomed by the working class of Tanzania. The real content of that document

does not lie in the petty bourgeois socialist ideals, but rather lies in its attack on imperialism;

"For a people who have been slaves or have been oppressed, exploited, and humiliated by colonialism or capitalism, 'development' means 'liberation'. Any action that gives more control of their own affairs is an action of development, even if it does not offer them better health or more bread ... our main emphasis at times should be development of people and not things".<sup>3</sup>

Indeed clause 15 provides that there must be a deliberate effort to build "equality between leaders and those they lead".<sup>4</sup> That equality say between the leader and the led is petty bourgeois illusions under commodity economy based upon capitalism is beyond doubt. However, what is crucial in the document is its anti-imperialist character. When TANU declared 1974 as the year of liberation, the peasantry not only formed vigilant groups in the borders with the then colonial Mozambique but also contributed significantly to the donations which were later given to Frelimo. Machel still recalls this incident whenever he has the opportunity to thank the people of Tanzania.

Only in the anti-imperialist sense should we understand the resolutions of TANU of 1967 which declares that it is a party of workers and peasants, as being correct.<sup>5</sup> TANU is a revolutionary

bloc of classes<sup>6</sup> only in the anti-imperialist sense. Otherwise in the domestic policy as shall soon be shown, the petty bourgeois socialist policies are being opposed by the peasantry, let alone the working class. TANU relies simultaneously on the petty bourgeoisie and the working class in building socialism. The party thus does not rely exclusively upon the working class but rather on all anti-imperialist classes or groups in building socialism. That nothing can come out of such socialism is evident from the opposition to the socialist implementation of TANU's socialism.

The national liberation struggle is bourgeois in its social and economic content. It is aimed at overthrowing external oppressive capitalism. Thus while acting in common, the participants in the revolutionary battles against colonialism were working at the same time for advancement of their respective class interests. Upon independence the revolutionary bloc of classes vis-a-vis the anti-imperialist struggle become more and more aware of their respective interests and their antagonism with those of other classes and groups. The revolutionary bloc classes under the hegemony of petty bourgeois revolutionary democrats support the petty bourgeois socialists in so far as their socialism attacks imperialist capitalists in the domestic scene in their own interests.

Beyond this anti-imperialist struggle of which petty bourgeois socialism saves as a banner, nothing can come out of the ujamaa policies when it is applied to the very members of the revolutionary bloc of classes under TANU. Many studies done on Tanzanian brand of socialism reveal overt and covert resistance by the peasantry to the ujamaa villages, co-operatives and village regrouping. The studies show that the peasants would like to participate in commodity economy based upon capitalism and that they see ujamaa policies as obstacles to the realisation of their respective interests. These studies show that the peasantry is constantly differentiating into rich, poor and middle peasantry, in spite of ujamaa policies. In other words the peasantry is splitting into the rural bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeois and the rural proletariat. In fact other studies have shown that some rich peasants utilize ujamaa programmes to advance their own interests.

The petty bourgeoisie and the working class have also registered resistance to ujamaa policies when they have been affected. The shopkeepers were greatly angered by the decision to turn their shops into co-operatives in accordance with ujamaa brand of socialism. This resistance reached climax in 1974 with open revolts against the implementation.<sup>8</sup> The working class since 1971<sup>9</sup>

in a space of six years labour unrest affected eleven parastatals and twelve private companies. The class struggles have taken various forms such as strikes, petitions against some management and locking out of the personnel managers.

Otherwise the only sphere of the implementation of TANU's petty bourgeois socialism supported by the revolutionary bloc of classes is in the attack on foreign capital. TANU has carried out widespread nationalisation of foreign monopolies which testifies its solution of anti-imperialist monopoly struggle often by revolutionary means. Since 1967 TANU has nationalised the manufacturing and mining industries, transport, communications, the power industry, the health service, the bulk of the wholesale trade, import and export operations. Suffice to say as Nyerere has admitted during his OAU term of office as chairman, TANU presided over the total collapse of these nationalised industries. Nyerere has cited the sisal industry as an example. This shows that petty bourgeois socialist attacks on foreign capital, even if supported by the revolutionary bloc of classes, leads to the destruction of productive forces. However, a detailed investigation of this process is beyond the scope of this thesis.



However, the objective course of the internal dynamics of capitalist development, is such that the very institutions created by TANU such as parastatals, becomes arenas for the defection of elements to join the ranks of the new national bourgeoisie through say corruption. Deprived of ownership in the means of production through which they can appropriate surplus value, owing to the leadership code, some bureaucrats in both the TANU and government engage into widespread embezzling of money. Some leave the public institutions thereafter to invest in the private sector thereby adding new numbers to the national bourgeoisie. The more there is growth of the new bourgeoisie, in spite of the restrictions, the more the power base of the revolutionary democracy is threatened, all conditions remaining the same.

5.1.1.1.2. THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE LEFT WING AND RIGHT WING FORCES IN TANU

The inevitable causes of the reversals in the anti-imperialist struggle on foreign capital in the domestic scene is explained by the dynamics of capitalist development which leads to the disintegration of the revolutionary bloc of classes. The peasantry becomes differentiated into the rural bourgeoisie, the rural petty

bourgeoisie (middle peasants) and the rural proletariat. The urban petty bourgeoisie engenders the development of the national bourgeoisie out of itself, while more of its members become proletarianised. Indeed the "older" TANU's petty bourgeois socialism persists the more intensive the disintegration of the revolutionary bloc classes against imperialism becomes.

Politically this disintegration of the revolutionary bloc of classes vis-a-vis imperialism is manifested in the struggle between the left wing section of revolutionary democracy and the right wing section of revolutionary democracy. This struggle is carried out within the transmission belts or institutions set up by TANU, such as the Youth League and the Women League. As stated earlier, the left wing forces are political groupings and activists who are progressive and revolutionary minded vis-a-vis imperialism and in favour of the national liberation movement. The right wing forces work against any further movement towards the left in the anti-imperialist struggle, say towards scientific socialism.

The right wing forces of revolutionary democracy of the TANU Youth League<sup>10</sup> in 1971

clashed with University Students' African Revolution Front which had started a magazine similar to Lenin's "Iskara". The league accused the Front of giving an impression that Tanzania was building Russian socialism. Not surprisingly, Nyerere rejected the idea of the Marxist-Leninists within TANU who advocated in favour of a vanguard party in the early 1970s. TANU, said Nyerere ought to remain "a mass party and not become a 'vanguard party' which led the peasants and workers".<sup>11</sup> Such has been the basic political forces within the institutions or transmission belts to the social base of TANU's revolutionary democracy. A ceaseless political struggle between the right wing forces of revolutionary democracy and its left wing forces.

Coup plots of both the left wing forces and the right wing forces have also been unmasked in Tanzania. The pro-Moscow faction sought to take power headed by Kassim Hanga of Zanzibar. On the right wing Biti was accused of leading an attempted coup in 1969 against Nyerere's brand of socialism. Oscar Kambona's<sup>11</sup> Supporters who were also opponents of Nyerere's socialism in the army were also arrested the same year. Once the right wing forces in TANU will have started on the part of abandoning ujamaa villages, co-operatives communes and started on encouraging private capitalism, TANU's

degeneration as revolutionary democracy vis-a-vis imperialism will set in.

5.1.1.2. MOZAMBIQUE

5.1.1.2.1. THE SOCIAL BASIS OF THE FRONT FOR  
THE LIBERATION OF MOZAMBIQUE  
(FRELIMO)

In Mozambique revolutionary democracy took shape at the time of the proclamation of the independence of Mozambique. The principal aspect characterising revolutionary democracy (socialist orientation) was declared in 1975. FRELIMO declared a new phase of People's Democracy against "colonial-capitalist"<sup>13</sup> state, which it declared was an instrument of exploitation and oppression in whose place a people's state which served the interests of the working people would be established. As we have stated in the case study of Tanzania, Mozambique revolutionary democracy should not be taken to mean that there is such a form of democracy in the domestic politics. On the contrary, it should be understood in the content of this thesis, namely, in the struggle against foreign capital.

In this context the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie and the working class have supported FRELIMO in the anti-imperialist onslaught on

foreign capital and all vestiges of colonialism in the domestic scene. The peasantry supported the agrarian reforms carried out by Mozambique against foreign rural bourgeoisie. The petty bourgeoisie supported FRELIMO in the nationalisation measures against foreign capital. The working class supported FRELIMO in the legislation to remove discrimination in labour laws inherited from the Portuguese colonialists. The essence of petty bourgeois socialism masked in 1977 by FRELIMO's declaration of Marxism-Leninism as its guiding ideology is clear from the fact that socialism is to be built by a simultaneous reliance upon all radical anti-imperialist classes or groups on the mistaken petty bourgeois assumption that all anti-imperialist forces are at the same time anti-capitalist.

Beyond the anti-imperialist struggle of which petty bourgeois socialism saves as a banner, nothing can come out of FRELIMO socialist policies. When applied to the domestic scene, the policies are opposed by the peasantry and the working class and even the petty bourgeois class when it is affected. When in the domestic scene FRELIMO appealed to the working class to work hard and refrain from demanding for high wages in the interests of "socialism", the working class refused to take hid. A wave of strikes swept

Mozambique from 1974 onwards. At the end of 1976 FRELIMO was still meeting "opposition from the urban workers to its austerity and production drives".<sup>14</sup> The working class accepted petty bourgeois socialism only in so far as it was an attack on foreign capitalist racist policies and restrictions on its advancement. The working class saw this as the real content of socialism of the petty bourgeois. The interests of the working class demand a constant struggle to improve their conditions vis-a-vis the petty bourgeois attitudes of FRELIMO towards labour.

The working class in the domestic scene was particularly incensed by FRELIMO's austerity and production drives at a time of a general crisis of world capitalism. The petty bourgeois socialist measures only worsened the conditions of the working class. The working class would not accept petty bourgeois attitudes towards labour as being in the national interests. They responded by further demand one of which was that they would increase production only to the extent that their wages improved. Machel said:

"We have heard the case of a clothing factory, where from 60 shirts a day they increased production to 150. What they wanted was an increase in wages, and they told the management: we will increase production only if you pay us more".<sup>15</sup>

Thus the real content of petty bourgeois socialism lies in the anti-imperialist drive in the domestic scene in removing discriminatory laws as far as the working class in Mozambique is concerned. Beyond that, when it interferes with their economic struggles, they have nothing to do with the petty bourgeois socialists.

The peasantry while it supported FRELIMO's agrarian reforms vis-a-vis imperialism, increasingly became dissatisfied with the implementation of petty bourgeois socialist policies in the rural areas. They resisted collective forms, co-operative societies and communal forms when it interfered with their participation in the commodity economy based upon capitalism on liberal lines. More over the continuing differentiation of the peasantry into rural bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat, in spite of FRELIMO's policies intensifies the resistance of the peasantry to FRELIMO's socialist policies.

The only sphere in which FRELIMO's petty bourgeois socialist policies are supported by the revolutionary bloc of classes is in the anti-imperialist onslaught on foreign capital. The party nationalised banks, cement factories, insurance companies, and operations of several foreign factories were placed under government

control. This onslaught accelerated the flight of foreign capitalists in Mozambique thereby disrupting production. Expatriates, technicians, engineers, administrators and civil servants made an exit out of the country.

"At one abandoned firm, Monteiro and Company, which employs seven thousand workers and is now run by a government-appointed administrative committee, the company's Portuguese managers stopped paying wages before their departure, embezzled funds needed for regular operating expenses, smuggled out currency, failed to renew vital contracts, and plundered the firm's equipment".<sup>16</sup>

If later the very revolutionary bloc of classes vis-a-vis foreign capital should turn around around to accuse FRELIMO for disorganising the economy, resulting into economic hardships, they should not forget that they were the ones who cheered Machel in carrying out a radical attack on foreign capital.

Agriculture, for instance, which is the main stay of the Mozambique economy, should not have drastically collapsed in the face of world economic crisis had it not been for the petty bourgeois socialist radicalism against foreign bourgeoisie. Sugar production fell from 285,581 tons in 1974/75 to 253,600 tons in 1975/76.<sup>17</sup> Sisal production fell from 21,000 tons in 1973 to 15,000 tons in 1975.<sup>18</sup> The



country's tea estates were all abandoned by the white Mozambique national bourgeoisie.

"It was a similar story in the rural areas where Portuguese farmers abandoned numerous plantations and often tried to take valuable agriculture equipment with them out of the country".19

5.1.2.2 THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE RIGHT WING FORCES AND LEFT WING FORCES WITHIN FRELIMO

The inevitability of reversals in the anti-imperialist struggle on foreign capital in the domestic policy is explained by the intensification of differentiation within the revolutionary bloc of classes against imperialism. The defection of elements into the strata of the new national bourgeoisie aided by corruption, is such that it can no longer tolerate petty bourgeois socialist measures. The peasant bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeois class contributes its share to the new national bourgeoisie. In other words FRELIMO's petty bourgeois socialist measures when applied to the members of the revolutionary bloc of classes is opposed.

Politically, this disintegration of the revolutionary bloc vis-a-vis FRELIMO's petty bourgeois policies against itself is manifested

in the struggle between democracy and the left wing forces of revolutionary democracy. In Mozambique the political struggles have taken a muted form through administrative dismissals, transfer and the like. The Marxist-Leninists Marcelino dos Santos and Sargento Rebelo were relieved of their jobs as government ministers when they sought to move the country further towards a staunch Marxist-Leninist path.<sup>20</sup> Machel himself represents the right wing forces who refuse to move the country further towards Marxism-Leninism. Already he is reversing his domestic policies in favour of private capitalism. In the foreign policy towards the national liberation movement, he has already succumbed to the behaviour of the national bourgeoisie of making a deal with imperialism to advance its interests.

### 1.1.3. ANGOLA

#### 1.1.3.1. THE SOCIAL BASIS OF THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (MPLA)

Revolutionary democracy of Angola took shape in 1977 when the MPLA declared the goal of building socialism. Like in the case of Tanzania and

Mozambique revolutionary democracy of Angola is to be understood only in the anti-imperialist sense and not in the context of democracy in general in the country. The peasantry has supported land reform vis-a-vis colonial practices of the portuguese. The working class has also supported MPLA's removal of discrimination in matters relating to labour, that were legislated during colonialism. These classes together with the petty bourgeoisie have supported the MPLA's attack on foreign capital. Only in this sense must we accept as correct the MPLA constitution which characterised itself as a broad anti-imperialist force in charge of the political, economic and social leadership in the nation.

However, the petty bourgeois socialists of MPLA have been cautious not to carry out outright radical policies against foreign capital in the domestic scene. This is to be explained by the fact that MPLA is dominated by a petty bourgeois leadership that is pro-Marxism-Leninism and is making a desperate attempt to apply that ideology in its concrete situation. As Lara the Secretary of the MPLA put it: -

"We are going to form an Angolan Marxist-Leninist party. But what does that mean in practice? It means we are going to form a revolutionary party consisting of all those militants who have assimilated the teachings of Marxism-Leninism in relation to Angola, in relation to our realities and experience, in relation to the needs and possibilities of our own people. We are not in the least concerned with persons who parrot extracts from the Marxist classics as though these were some kind of magic".<sup>21</sup>

The MPLA constitution for instance recognises, protects and guarantees private property, including that of the foreigners "provided these favour the economy of the country and the interests of the Angolan people",<sup>22</sup>

Owing to the progressive policies towards the national and foreign bourgeoisie, many western "business interests"<sup>23</sup> were reported flocking to Luanda. Scandinavian and Dutch firms were openly accepted. MPLA officials also expressed a desire to have the American bourgeoisie come to invest in Angola. The country has maintained its markets in the west for its products. MPLA's nationalisation measures were mainly against the abandoned enterprises numbering 400,000<sup>24</sup> which the Portuguese left behind. There was thus no other alternative but to take over the firms. The state has only nationalised mines, textiles, engineering and food factories belonging to

foreign capitalists. It has also taken over power stations, shipyards, 61 per cent of the diamond mining concern DIAMANG. It has in addition to these established state run fishing and transport associations and state-owned airline. The state has monopolised foreign trade. Neto's line is thus being followed:

"The progress of our economic transformation towards socialism will be expressed by a steady growth of both the state sector and the co-operative sector in the rural areas, and by steady reduction of the mixed sector, of the private capital sector".<sup>25</sup>

To what extent MPLA will move towards Marxism-Leninism from the petty bourgeois socialism is hard to say at the present moment. Already Lara is dissatisfied with Soviet Union aid to agriculture and is leaning towards small scale production in agriculture. In an interview he stated:

"I read Dumont and saw my own country. We make big plans and we don't know enough to be realistic about our actual problems. For example, we made some plans with the Bulgarians or the Russians to grow cotton, and we bought their machines. But the machines turn out not to work here; they're not suitable for Angola. Again, I saw a giant machine for pineapple cultivation. You see that kind of thing everywhere. We need to do things our own way".<sup>26</sup>

5.1.1.3.2. THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE RIGHT WING FORCES AND LEFT WING FORCES IN THE MPLA

The political struggles within the MPLA were particularly extreme when compared to other revolutionary democratic parties of the frontline states in the same period. The left wing forces of revolutionary democracy headed by Eduardo dos Santos have sought since the 1977 congress to move the MPLA further to the Marxist-Leninist part. Such was the purpose of the 1977 declaration which stated that henceforth the struggle was being waged to transform the peasantry and the proletariat classes into ruling classes.<sup>27</sup>

This is not a Marxist-Leninist position which requires the exclusive rule of the proletariat as a transition to socialism since all the other classes stand for the preservation of bourgeois society. Lenin wrote of the Soviet Union on the dictatorship of the proletariat as thus:

"The class which took political power into its hands did so knowing that it took power alone. This is part of the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This concept has meaning only when this one class knows that it alone is taking political power in its hands, and does not deceive itself or others with talk about 'popular' government, elected by all, anointed by the whole people".<sup>28</sup>

The MPLA left wing force of revolutionary democracy is thus deceiving itself as well as the working class and the peasantry when, relying, upon, not the exclusive rule of the proletariat but on collaboration with the peasantry also the petty bourgeois; it believes that it will objectively be capable of effecting a transition to socialism. To hope to build socialism by simultaneous reliance on the peasantry (it is already broken into strata), the petty bourgeoisie and the working class is pure fantasy by the petty bourgeois left wing of MPLA within the social base of revolutionary democracy. That is why the real progressive historical role of the MPLA lies in the anti-imperialist struggle. Thanks to the leanings towards Marxism-Leninism, the MPLA openly accepted the Cuban troops to be stationed in their country which has greatly aided the national struggles in Namibia and South Africa.

#### 5.1.1.4. ZIMBABWE

##### 5.1.1.4.1. THE SOCIAL BASIS OF THE ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION (ZANU)

Revolutionary democracy in Zimbabwe became evident in 1980 when Mugabe declared that although his party's ideology derives from marxism-leninism, nevertheless it was not at variance with the principles and practices of traditional society.<sup>29</sup> He has

constantly maintained that he is committed to the goal of socialism. Like in the cases examined already, this petty bourgeois socialism has value and is supported by the revolutionary bloc of classes only in so far as it saves as a banner of onslaught on the foreign bourgeoisie and other colonial legislations of discrimination. This is the real basis on which the peasantry support ZANU's petty bourgeois socialism. At the Lancaster House, Mugabe fought consistently to resolve the land question. In fact had it not been for the concessions made by Britain and the U.S.A. to provide funds to independent Zimbabwe so that it could buy land, the talks would have broken down on the land issue. The peasantry have already been given from about a million acres bought.<sup>30</sup>

Beyond this, the revolutionary bloc of classes supporting ZANU would like to advance their respective class interests and are bound to clash with the petty bourgeois socialist policies when it will come to implementation. Demonstrations and strikes by the workers started soon after independence. Over 243 railway workers went on strike to demand for the immediate implementation of their seven-month-old wage claim. Nurses and teachers joined the demonstrations in seeking to advance their groups demands.<sup>31</sup>



5.1.1.4.2. THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE RIGHT WING FORCES AND THE LEFT WING FORCES IN (ZANU)

Political struggles within ZANU have surfaced and have taken amunited form through organisational resuffles. Such for instance, was the exclusion from the Central Committee of ZANU of Eddison Zvobgo by Mugabe. Zvobgo had insalted Lonrho which is a multi-national congromerate with big interests in the country during a reception hosted by the company. He is said to have extreme leftist views.<sup>32</sup>

5.2. THE SOCIAL BASIS OF POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY OF NEO-COLONIAL CONSERVATIVE PETTY BOURGEOIS REGIMES

In contract to the fraction of the petty bourgeoisie who have raised themselves to the position of revolutionary democracy and hold state power in Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, the other fractions are conservative petty bourgeoisie who have come to wield state power in Botswana and Zambia. There are various types of conservative petty bourgeois parties. Such parties in the imperialist nations (oppressor nations) follow bourgeois parties and support the oppression of other nations. But the conservative

petty bourgeois parties in colonised or neo-colonised countries are anti-imperialist. This is the conditional or peculiar situation which makes the ruling parties in Botswana and Zambia, anti-imperialist although consistent with their class position they continue to cling to compromises, reformism and paltry concessions towards the national liberation vis-a-vis imperialism in the domestic policies.

By conservatism of these petty bourgeois ruling parties we are not at all referring to domestic politics in general. Rather we are alluding, within the context of this thesis to the anti-imperialist in so far as foreign capital is concerned. Domestic politics are touched upon only in so far they lead to possible reversals in the foreign policy towards the national liberation struggle.

Indeed the traditional petty bourgeois confirms more vividly Marx's postulation of the conservative behaviour of the petty bourgeois class as a transitory class:

"The lower middle class, the small manufacturer, the shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant all fight against the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the middle class. They are therefore not revolutionary but conservative. Nay more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history. If by chance they are revolutionary, they are so only in view of their impending transfer into the proletariat, they thus defend not their present, but their future interests, they desert their own standpoint to place themselves at that of the proletariat".<sup>33</sup>

The traditional petty bourgeois regimes seek often - although in consistent and contradictory manner - the solution of anti-imperialist questions by sticking to international legal methods of lawful, peaceful and virtuous forms of struggle in their relations with the national liberation struggle.

The history of all traditional petty bourgeois regimes since independence testify to the fact that they are full of bluster and loud protestations against imperialism in favour of the national liberation struggle so long as it is not a question of being faced with support in terms of armed struggle from their territories. Once it comes to the question of supporting armed struggle from their territories, they become inconsistent, faint-hearted, cautious and extremely calculating. They become alarmed and start to waver as soon as

they see the actual armed struggle in action with all the consequences of hot pursuit from colonial powers being conducted on their territories. They become treacherous to the whole national liberation struggle for the sake of their traditional petty bourgeois existence.

The social base of the petty bourgeois regimes are the middle peasants, the artisans, the shopkeepers, and other petty bourgeoisie entrepreneurs. The concept of petty bourgeois thus reflects primarily a non-proletarian base as manifested in inconsistent, conventional and unsteady type of political thinking as well as behaviour regardless of the social nature of those who adhere to such positions.

The 70's have shown that the petty bourgeoisie who do not own property and work for hire such as semi-proleterians, office employees, intellectuals, poor peasants are more consistent in their revolutionary stance towards the national liberation struggle. This fraction's consistency in democracy has already been revealed in Michael Chege's study of the Ethiopian Revolution.<sup>34</sup>

5.2.1. BOTSWANA5.2.1.1. THE SOCIAL BASIS OF THE BOTSWANA  
DEMOCRATIC PARTY (BDP)

The conservative petty bourgeois ideology of the BDP of Botswana is summarised in four slogans namely, democracy, development, self-reliance and unity. The slogan of self-reliance summarises all there is to conservative petty bourgeois ideology manifested in self-help projects.

The conservative petty bourgeois attacks on the foreign capital has been moderate and in most cases indirect in Botswana. Thus a Botswana Enterprise Development Unit (BEDU) was set up for the purposes of developing the rural areas with the usual mistaken belief of this class that it can equally develop both the urban and rural areas to the same degree under capitalism.

"If there is one theme on which he (the late Khama who has been succeeded by his former Vice-President Masive) insists more than another it is the abolition of rural poverty and the development of prosperous agriculture. This, he hopes will counter to the worst effects of rapid industrialisation: a large influx of peasants to the towns and growth of a shifless urban population".35

In terms of policies towards the foreign bourgeoisie, the BDP conservative petty bourgeois ideal has been to call upon foreign bourgeoisie to use labour-intensive methods or what is the same thing "appropriate technology".<sup>36</sup> Botswana has created the Botswana Development Corporation (BDC) intended to assist in the national development. At the same time it has progressively bought shares in some foreign corporations such as in the DeBeers Mining Company. In order to encourage an alternative to multinational banks, Botswana has created the National Development Bank through which it hopes to progressively take control of financial transactions.

Botswana has also emphasized small-scale production. For instance the Arable Lands Development Programme (ALDEP) has been set up to assist small producers in agriculture. The present plans call for the expenditure of "P11m over five years to assist 70,000 small farmers to cultivate 10 hac of land each."<sup>37</sup> Masire has indicated that as much as PZ1m might be expended during the period.

It is clear that the BDP is a neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois party that does not want to attack foreign capital viciously, quite consistent with its traditional character of compromises and paltry reforms. However, the objective course of commodity economy of capitalism is such that the moderate policies enhance the emergence of the new national bourgeoisie who cannot but be eventually critical of the BDP petty bourgeois policies.

5.2.1.2. THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN RIGHT WING FORCES  
AND LEFT WING FORCES IN BDP

The right wing elements of the conservative petty bourgeoisie have called on the government for a broader utilisation of the institutional set up and not to be confined to the small producers. For instance they have been critical of "governmental over-regulation of the small entrepreneurs". They call for an end to the bureaucratic set up intended to protect the small producers. However, the backwardness of the country has prevented this struggle to reach a boiling point where coup attempts and the like become a common occurrence.

## 5.2.2. ZAMBIA

### 5.2.2.1. THE SOCIAL BASIS OF THE UNITED NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE PARTY (UNIP)

President Kenneth Kaunda has consistently defended small producers as opposed to large-scale producers. This is summarised in his books Humanism Part I published in 1970 and Humanism Part II published in 1974. That part of the conservative petty bourgeois ideology such as humanism is political populism is beyond doubt, in so far as it defends the "small man". This investigation would definitely have thrown more light on the domestic politics of Zambia. However, in this thesis we touch upon domestic politics only in so far as they concern the behaviour of the conservative petty bourgeoisie against foreign capital. Its anti-imperialist nature is our emphasis. For Kaunda, large-scale production is temporary to resolve the immediate pressing shortages, but in the long run they need to be broken up into small scale production towards the realisation of a humanist society. Referring to both industry and agriculture, he states:



"If the Zambian Humanist Revolution is to succeed it must find an answer to the development problems of the small producer. This is one reason why each district needs to upgrade the agricultural activities of its small farmers to a point at least where each district is self-sufficient in the production of its own basic foodstuffs".<sup>39</sup>

The small scale production passes into large-scale production under commodity economy based upon capitalism is beyond doubt. That defence of the "small man" cannot be maintained in the long run as long as capitalism is developing in Zambia. But that is not the concern of this thesis. Over concern is to examine the real historical significance of Zambian humanism. Its significance lies in the fact that it serves as a banner, though not in a determined manner as those of revolutionary democracies, in the struggle against foreign capital on a moderate level.

Nationalisation of foreign firms has been accompanied by satisfactory compensation to the point where the firms have willingly sought to sell their shares for the purposes of repatriating the country's foreign exchange.<sup>40</sup> When UNIP sought to nationalise foreign banks in 1971, the latter resisted and the were left alone. These moderate domestic policies towards foreign capital are reflected in the foreign policy towards the

national liberation movement vis-a-vis imperialism which is often moderate with a preference for negotiations. Compared to Botswana, Zambia represents the highest development of conservative petty bourgeois ideology. This perhaps explains Zambia's prominence over Botswana in foreign policy towards the national liberation as we shall see in the next chapter.

#### 5.2.2.2. THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE LEFT WING AND THE RIGHT WING FORCES IN UNIP

The right wing forces of UNIP are dissatisfied with humanist policies because they restrict their expansion. For instance, according to UNIP policies once a business enterprise has reached a turnover of K500,000 a year it must be taken over by the state. While in practice the national bourgeoisie break up their companies as soon as they have reached that mark in order to avoid state takeover, nevertheless they find humanism an ideology which inhibits their expansion. They thus have sought for not only just political influence within UNIP, but more so even have attempted coups. This is evidenced by the latest treason trial in which its purported leader Shamwana attacked humanism. Indeed, Kaunda himself has dismissed several top cabinet ministers owing to their open

opposition to humanism. The recent case is that of Humphrey Malemba and Nalumino Mundia who were the Secretary General and Prime Minister respectively.

In Zambia the main active new petty bourgeoisie (to use Dr. Chege's expression has been from the University of Zambia. The University has faced several closures following anti-UNIP demonstrations over its often moderate and inconsistent policy towards the national liberation movement. In 1971 the University students led by their union demonstrated against the French Embassy following Paris's decision to sell licence to manufacture mirage jet fighters to South Africa. When in the same year, Zambia imported 75,000 tons of maize from Rhodesia, the students once again demonstrated against what they said were inconsistent policies towards the national liberation of Rhodesia. The campus was closed. In 1975/76 another demonstration was carried out against the Government's position on Angola. President Kaunda was calling for a government of national unity in Angola while students were calling for the exclusive recognition of MPLA. The campus was closed, once again.

### 5.3. SUMMARY

The social basis of the frontline states has been examined from the point of view not of domestic politics in general, but rather in so far as the domestic policy towards foreign capital is concerned. Revolutionary democracy does not mean that there is such a democracy within the countries of Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. On the contrary the concept should be understood in the sense of the struggle against foreign capital as well as other relics of imperialism. Similarly the conservative neo-colonial petty bourgeois regimes of Botswana and Zambia have been examined from view point of their anti-imperialist behaviour towards foreign capital. It has been testified that the revolutionary bloc of classes under different ruling parties of revolutionary democracies support the petty bourgeois revolutionary socialists only in the attack on foreign capital. The petty bourgeois revolutionary socialism is utopia when applied in practice has also been proved. Revolutionary petty bourgeois socialism thus only serves as a banner for the most determined struggle against foreign capital, all conditions remaining the same.

We must now proceed to investigate the behaviour of revolutionary democracies and the petty bourgeois regimes of the frontline states in the foreign policies towards the national liberation movement vis-a-vis imperialism.

CHAPTER SIXFOREIGN POLICIES OF REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRACYTOWARDS THE NATIONAL LIBERATION STRUGGLE6.1. INTRODUCTION

The strategy of revolutionary democracies of the frontline states of Angola, Tanzania, Mozambique and Zimbabwe has been to support all forms of struggle such as diplomacy, negotiation, economic sanctions and armed struggle in favour of the national liberation struggle vis-a-vis colonialism often by revolutionary means. Their approach towards negotiation or any form of dialogue has been that they would not engage in any form of dialogue with the oppressive regimes of Southern African until these regimes openly declare and accept the principle of majority rule. All throughout the national liberation of Southern African colonies of Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe, Tanzania which is the oldest member of revolutionary democracies of frontline states did not undertake initiative for negotiations thereby remaining true to the preconditions for negotiations which is that the colonial masters had first to openly accept the principle of majority rule.

Once the colonial masters had accepted the principle of majority rule, then negotiations are not to be on the granting of independence. Independence was non-negotiable. Rather the negotiations had to deal with the mechanism of transfer of power to the majority. For this to be possible political prisoners had to be released to take part in the negotiations. The role of African was not to usurp the role of the national liberation movements in relation to oppressive regimes, but rather to act as messengers and facilitate negotiations between the two parties and never make any commitment on their behalf. Nyerere clearly spelt out the strategy and tactics in the Dar es Salaam Declaration more clearly than anywhere else as follows:

"African objectives in Southern Africa are unchanged. They are independence for the whole country on the basis of majority rule in both Rhodesia and Namibia; and an end to apartheid and racial discrimination in South Africa. Africa's strategy should be to separate the two issues as far as practical, and to give priority to ending the colonial situation in Rhodesia and Namibia ... In both colonial issues Africa needs to be willing to talk with the South Africa authorities, and with the local subsidiary authorities, about the mechanics of a transfer of power as soon as there is any evidence of a willingness to accept our objectives in principle. The task of free Africa in this matter is to facilitate the work of the nationalist movements of each country, to provide contact, act as messenger if required, but never to make any commitment on behalf of the nationalists except at their request and never in any way to usurp their authority in their own country".<sup>1</sup>

Nyerere of course hid from himself and the entire African the fact that the strategy and tactics he was advocating were those of revolutionary democracies and thus were not binding for the conservative petty bourgeois regimes. Thus revolutionary democracies have not taken and will not take any initiatives for negotiations before the racist oppressive regimes of Southern Africa openly accepts the principle of majority rule. Until such time that the racist oppressive regimes of Southern African will accept the principles of majority rule, revolutionary democracies of frontline states will continue to fully support armed struggle and other forms of struggle in favour of the national liberation movements. In this respect they have welcomed the establishment of military bases on their territories. Tanzania, Mozambique and Angola have at different times welcomed the establishment of military bases on their territories by the various national liberation movements.

## 6.2. RHODESIA'S STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION:

The strategy of revolutionary democracies towards the national liberation of the then Rhodesia was that there would be no independence in the territory before majority rule. They stood firm on this principal until independence. In resolving the national-colonial question of Rhodesia, revolutionary



democracies often employed revolutionary means, by supporting all forms of struggle.

On negotiations, they were very clear, namely, that they would not negotiate unless the national-colonial oppressors in the then Rhodesia or the British Government which they held to be responsible for Rhodesia accepted first and foremost the principle of majority rule. They thus never took the initiative to negotiate with Rhodesian Ian Smith. When Kaunda through his special political assistant took the initiative and informed Presidents Nyerere and Machel, both were uneasy. This was reflected in the questions they both posed to President Kaunda and his assistant.

In the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969 the revolutionary democratic frontline state (of which Tanzania was the only one) took care to have its strategy and tactics inserted into the manifesto towards the national-colonial question of Zimbabwe.

"The question which remained in Rhodesia was: whether Britain was to reassert her authority in Rhodesia and then negotiate the peaceful progress to majority rule before independence. In so far as Britain is willing to make this commitment, Africa will co-operate with her attempts to re-assert her authority. This was the method of progress they would have preferred, it could have involved less suffering for all the people of Rhodesia both black and white.

If not then Africa has no choice but to support the struggle for the people's freedom by whatever means were open".

Following the Lusaka Manifesto, Tanzania consistently fought any misinterpretation that the Lusaka Manifesto was for dialogue per se with the national-colonial oppressors in order to grant independence to the oppressed people. In 1971 President Nyerere issued a paper that was presented on his behalf at the OAU Summit in Addis Ababa entitled "Why We Will Not Negotiate", when President Kaunda was the Chairman of the organisation. The paper goes on to clarify the Lusaka Manifesto that although the manifesto says "we would prefer to negotiate rather than kill" it lays pre-conditions for such negotiations.

"... after briefly reviewing the situation in each area it regrettably acknowledges that there is nothing to talk about until fundamental principles or human equality and self-determination have been accepted by those who now deny them. At present the road to peaceful progress towards implementation is blocked by those at present in power".<sup>3</sup>

Thus revolutionary democracies sought to have their strategy dominate on the question of negotiations. That negotiations are acceptable only on the precondition that those in power have accepted the principle of human equality and

self-determination. Otherwise stated, there can be no negotiations on principles of human equality and self-determination, in other words independence. Negotiations can thus be only about how, by what steps, and with what timing independence on the basis of majority rule can be established. The other pre-condition for negotiation had to be the fact that Smith had to release the imprisoned African nationalists so that they could take part in these negotiations. Another pre-condition for negotiations was that the liberation of Rhodesia was the work of the oppressed peoples themselves. They (Africa) only had to provide points of contact, act as messengers if required but never to make commitments on behalf of the nationalists except at their request and never attempt to usurp their authority in their own country.

The history of the national liberation of Rhodesia from the time of the Lusaka Manifesto to April 1969 testifies to the foregoing strategy and tactics of revolutionary democracies of the frontline states towards the national liberation struggle. In 1971 seeing that the strategy of finding a peaceful solution to majority rule and hence the mechanism of transfer of power from the minority regimes had failed as envisaged in the 1969 Lusaka Manifesto, revolutionary democracies fully endorsed

at another conference in Mogadishu (of the East and Central African states) the method of armed struggle as the only way to compel the minority regimes to accept the principle of independence

"The Mogadishu declaration noted that the Lusaka Manifesto had failed to achieve its objective of a peaceful solution and that force therefore remained the only way likely to change the regimes in Salisbury and Pretoria".<sup>4</sup> -

Tanzania and later Mozambique backed the Mogadishu declaration by providing more facilities, funds and the like to the freedom fighters of ZANU in particular (ZANU compared with ZAPU was a revolutionary democratic liberation movement) which infiltrated several hundreds of guerrillas into the North-Eastern Rhodesia between 1971 to 1975. That ZANU managed to do this, was thanks to the consistent and staunch support of revolutionary democracy of Tanzania. The revolutionary democracies welcomed the efforts of the socialist countries such as China for providing arms to ZANU. The Soviet Union arms reached ZANU through Ethiopia. Thus Tanzania was the base for the most radical of the two national liberation movements of the then Rhodesia, namely, ZANU.

External events aided Tanzania to fulfil the Mogadishu declaration. Such an event was the downfall of the Portuguese fascists in April 1974. The coup created the possibility, once Mozambique was free, for ZANU guerrillas to have easy access into Rhodesia. It also provided for the possibility of intensive sanctions against the rebels in Rhodesia. Already Britain had promised financial assistance to independent Mozambique if it as well joined economic sanctions against Rhodesia. By the time of the Portuguese coup, the guerrilla war had intensified to such an extent as to force Smith to close the border with Zambia in January 1973. When Smith reopened the border Kaunda responded by sealing off his side. Indeed Zambia's action was welcomed by Tanzania as representing a "tightening of United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia".<sup>5</sup> President Kaunda as shall be shown reversed his decision in 1978 in spite of the last minute pressure from Presidents Nyerere and Machel who flew to Lusaka a few days before to persuade him not to reopen the border.

The change of the regime in Portugal in favour of granting independence to its colonial dependencies compelled the other national-colonial oppressors in Southern Africa to reassess their position. Vorster for instance who even prior to

the coup had already known that the Portuguese were "throwing in the towel"<sup>6</sup> began to give reconciliatory statements. Speaking at his constituency in Negel Vorster stated:

"This Government and Governments before it have never shied away from the fact that South West Africa possessed an international character .... It is not the government of South Africa's task or function to decide the future of South West Africa, but South Africa will also not permit any outsider to do so".<sup>7</sup>

Then came Vorster's speech of 23 October 1974 for which Vorster invited all diplomats to Cape Town. In that speech Vorster stated that Southern Africa was at "crossroads and should choose now between peace and escalating violence". Vorster warned that the cost of confrontation was "too high for Southern Africa to pay". Turning to Rhodesia, Vorster stated that "it is in the interests of the parties to find a solution".<sup>8</sup>

The revolutionary democracies saw in this new changed situation the necessity to intensify armed struggle in order to compel Smith to openly accept the principle of human equality and self-determination for the oppressed peoples of Rhodesia. It was also to compel Vorster to realise that any further support to Smith in military forms would not be successful for long. To the revolutionary democracies, Vorster had not explicitly stated his support for majority

rule in Rhodesia. However, his speech showed a potential for yielding to the wishes of the oppressed masses.

Nyerere replied to Vorster's speech by reminding him that the only basis for negotiations was for Smith to openly accept the principle of human equality and self-determination.

"... it is necessary that everyone who may be involved, directly or indirectly should be quite clear about the basis for any possible negotiations. There must be no misunderstanding about the purpose they have to fulfil. For Rhodesia ....there will be no independence .... except on the basis of majority rule. Second, negotiations will be about how, by what steps and with what timing independence on the basis of majority rule will be established. And third, the African nationalist leaders now in jail must be able to take a full and active part in these negotiations. On these three points there can be no compromise"!

Nyerere was well aware that it was the armed struggle which had now compelled not only the change in external forces such as the April 1974 coup, but also that it was the armed struggle which had compelled Vorster to make the remarks. In spite of Vorster's remarks Nyerere never took the initiative to test whether there now existed a basis for negotiations with the national-colonial oppressors in Southern Africa because there was no explicit admittance of the principle of

of majority rule.

It was President Kaunda who took the initiative through his special political assistant Mark Chona. So long as President Nyerere and Machel had not heard an explicit declaration of acceptance of majority rule from Smith himself for the purposes of opening negotiations, naturally they were suspicious of President Kaunda's preliminary contacts of which they were briefed. As Martin and Johnson put it:

"Machel had been briefed about the de-tente contacts in September after signing the agreement in Lusaka with Portugal on Mozambique's independence and, like Nyerere, he was extremely uneasy about what was taking place and about the motives of South Africa and Rhodesia. Their doubts were reflected in their questions to Kaunda and also to Chona, who was called into the meeting. Chona said South Africans did not want the war to go on and they were willing to pressurize Smith to agree to a negotiated settlement".<sup>10</sup>

Indeed the suspicions of revolutionary democracies that President Kaunda was violating the Lusaka Manifesto on the pre-conditions for negotiations were soon confirmed Smith has not accepted the principle of majority rule and hence the break down of the Victoria Falls talks.

This development drew Nyerere and Machel together. A week after the failure of the talks they met to reaffirm their total support for armed struggle as contained in the Dar es Salaam



Declaration. They observed that if the objectives and aspirations of the people could not be achieved by peaceful means, "then the people will carry out the clauses of the Dar es Salaam manifesto on Southern Africa".<sup>11</sup> Smith, said Nyerere, had now provided the answer that the pre-conditions for negotiations had not been accepted. The fighting in Rhodesia, said Nyerere, would therefore continue and would "be intensified, with the full support of Africa".<sup>12</sup> In a communique in 1976 Nyerere and Machel jointly noted that the independence of Mozambique radically altered the balance of forces in favour of the African nationalists and "created more favourable conditions for the success of the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe".<sup>13</sup>

Mozambique carried out FRELIMO's earlier pledge of applying full economic sanctions against Rhodesia and closed its frontiers, thereby reducing by about a third the possible access and agress route available to Salisbury for the movement of goods by rail and road.

Tanzania was the base of ZAPU before the formation of ZANU. Later ZAPU moved to Zambia and Tanzania provided a base for ZANU. This development reflects the attitude of revolutionary democracies towards the solution of imperialist

problems often by revolutionary means, by aiding the most revolutionary democratic movement at any given time and wherever possible attempt to merge the reformist and revolutionary movement under the hegemony of the revolutionary democrats as happened latter with the formation of the Patriotic Front in 1977. With Mozambique's independence, the guerrilla bases of ZANU moved into the country from Tanzania owing to the best geographical location for guerrilla infiltration into the then Rhodesia. As H. Hutson notes:

"ZANU insurgents based in Mozambique and fully supported by President Machel were intensifying their operations while the rival ZAPU faction was launching a new series of infiltrations from Zambia and Botswana".<sup>14</sup>

This notwithstanding revolutionary democracies' irresistible disapproval of anything that smelt of disorganisations within the ZANU as was the case when Sithole was removed secretly by Mugabe and his colleagues out of leadership. While they were in prison, they at the same time did not and could not allow armed struggle to be impaired by the actions of anyone including a member of the frontline states.

Thus when Kaunda had detained several ZANU guerrillas Nyerere and Machel intervened and put pressure on Kaunda to release the freedom fighters.

"In December 1975 Kaunda released, at the insistence of Nyerere and Machel, the bulk of ZANU guerrillas goaled in Zambia. They were transported to camps in Mozambique and Tanzania, where they were joined by young Zimbabweans who had fled into exile to take part in the armed struggle".<sup>15</sup>

Kissinger came into the picture of Southern Africa in 1976 with his peace plan for Rhodesia. The entry of the United States into Southern Africa was prompted by the events in Angola where its supporters, the FNLA and UNITA lost to the Soviet Union and Cuban backed MPLA. Kissinger sought to diffuse (through liberalism) a similar situation through a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia. The main points in the Kissinger package deal were:

1. Rhodesia agrees to majority rule within two years;
2. Rhodesian Government representatives and black leaders to meet immediately at a mutually agreed place to organise an interim government to function until majority rule is implemented;

3. The interim government will also have a council of ministers with an African majority and an African Forst Minister. The Ministers of Defence and Law and Order will be white. Decisions of the council of ministers will be taken on a two-thirds majority and its functions will include delegated legislative authority and executive responsibility;
4. The British Government will enact enabling legislation for the process to majority rule Upon enactment Rhodesia will also enact necessary legislation;
5. The interim government is to comprise a Council of State, a suprement body with half black and half white members and a white chairman without a special vote;
6. Upon the establishment of the interim government sanctions will be lifted and all acts of war including guerrila warfare will cease;
7. Substantial economic support will be made available by the international community to provide assurance to Rhodesia about the economic future of the country.<sup>16</sup>

The revolutionary democracies were jubilant, thanks to the petty bourgeois narrow mindness of its leadership, and they accepted the package deal because it had accepted the principle of majority rule. We say, thanks to the petty bourgeois narrow-mindness of its leadership, because a closer look at the plan clearly shows an attempt through liberalism by the capitalist imperialist state of the United States to thwart a complete victory by the revolutionary democratic movements as happened in Angola. The whole of its strategy could easily be utilised by any intelligent bourgeois imperialist politician (and Kissinger was such a politician) to thwart the national liberation movement on a neo-colonial path. Their strategy renders them subject to the diplomatic influences of classes such as the imperialist bourgeoisie who are not interested in the complete victory of revolutionary democracy because such a victory is hardly in their interest. This is not an approach to solutions of imperialism by revolutionary means. However, from the point of view of our thesis, such an exception proves the general rule of the attitude and practice of revolutionary democracies towards the solution of democratic problems vis-a-vis imperialism often by revolutionary means.

Nyerere stated soon after that:

"I believe Dr. Kissinger is right in saying if you want to work for American interests in Southern Africa, throw your weight on the side of those who are working for majority rule. If you won't and the war goes on ....(and) we can't give these people arms to fight, they will achieve their independence only through support which they will get from the communist countries and this is not in the interests of Western powers. So I suppose he is right in doing this; but I am saying so what? I want his pressure ....I want American pressure on the side of majority rule".17

The petty bourgeois narrow-mindedness (which we pointed out in chapter 5) of the leadership of revolutionary democracy is here revealed through Nyerere. The whole of their (revolutionary democracies) petty bourgeois strategy became revealed. To want to co-operate with anyone, no matter who, so long as they accept the principle of majority rule- is this not sophistry? It is failure to understand that each class on the international scene advances its own interests through diplomacy which hides their real thoughts and intentions. That the imperialist bourgeois class of the U.S.A through its spokesman Kissinger aimed at such a goal is beyond doubt. Kissinger has even admitted that his plan was to prevent the influence of the socialist countries and Nyerere quotes Kissinger and fails to see the real intention, namely, to thwart the complete victory of the revolutionary

democratic movement for which he himself Nyerere was working for. No wonder Fredrich Hegel wrote that common sense was the "poorest where it means to be richest".<sup>19</sup> Read materialistically, the petty bourgeois revolutionary democrats think it is just "common sense" that one must co-operate with anyone, no matter who, so long as they are willing to accept majority rule.

Nyerere's resolute action for a negotiated settlement once there is an acceptance of the principle of majority rule, at any cost, shows how the often revolutionary approach to the solutions of national liberation struggle vis-a-vis imperialism becomes inconsistent of revolutionary democracies. The position of conservative petty bourgeois was even worse. They believed that America should replace Britain as a colonial power a position which was opposed by Nyerere and Machel.

Revolutionary democracies accepted the Kissinger plan because it agreed with their strategy and tactics towards national-colonial powers on the question of preconditions for negotiations, namely the acceptance of the principle of majority rule. As for the mechanism of transfer, which includes the time span, the

revolutionary democracies left it to the Patriotic Front. They persuaded the Patriotic Front to attend the Kissinger - inspired Geneva Conference of October 1976. The Patriotic Front yielded to the plan with suspicion and dismissed the package (and rightly so) as nothing but the "legalisation of colonialists and racist structures of power".<sup>19</sup> The Kissinger plan failed on the mechanism of transfer of power to majority rule. Although Smith and Britain saw the plan as leading to majority rule, the Patriotic Front did not. As Mathews says:

"The central point of divergence between the liberation movements and Smith regime was to who should control the instruments of state power during the transitional phase, and they had to adjourn without reaching any agreement."<sup>20</sup>

For the revolutionary democracies Smith refused agreement on the mechanism of transfer of power, it meant that his acceptance in principle of majority rule was not genuine. Hence they called upon the Patriotic Front to intensify the armed struggle. Meanwhile Nyerere undertook a state visit to the United States during which he urged them not to be discouraged by the adjournment of the Geneva talks. During the visit, he sought American support in order to:

1. remove Smith's illegal regime.
2. dismantle its army and replace it by an army



- created from the liberation forces; and
3. to hold elections based on the principle of one-man-one vote as had long been demanded by the OAU and the UN to enable Zimbabwe to achieve independence in 1978.<sup>21</sup>

Nyerere, thanks to petty bourgeois narrow mindedness, forget that it is precisely the above three demands which would result into a complete victory of the national liberation movement that the imperialist bourgeois state of the United States was afraid of. Thus the revolutionary democrats saw the new phase as a combination of military and diplomatic pressures on the Smith regime for the purposes of compelling her not only to accept the principle of majority rule but also agree on the actual mechanism of transfer of power to the Patriotic Front. They saw a new source of pressure as coming from the Americans. Nyerere also called upon the Americans to intensify their economic sanctions on the Smith regime in accordance with the U.N. relevant resolutions.

In 1977 came the new Anglo-American proposals to end the war in Zimbabwe. The plan which was now more specific than the Kissinger plan sought majority rule within the course of 1978. Seven principal elements were laid out:

1. surrender of power by the illegal regime and a return to legality;
2. an orderly and peaceful transition to independence in the course of 1978;
3. free and impartial elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage;
4. the establishment by the British Government of a transitional administration with the tasks of continuity the elections during the transition period;
5. a U.N. presence, including a U.N. force during the transition period;
6. an independent constitution providing for a democratically elected government, the abolition of discrimination, protection of individual human rights and the independence of the judiciary;
7. a development fund to revive the economy of the country which the U.K. and the U.A. view as predicated upon the implementation of the settlement as a whole.<sup>22</sup>

The whole content of the plan is a neo-colonial solution only differing from the Kissinger one by being more sophisticated. It was designed to thwart a complete victory of the national liberation movement by revolutionary democrats on the Angola path. The revolutionary democrats called upon the dissolution of the Rhodesian army in support of the Patriotic Front demands. The Anglo-American proposals envisaged the existence of certain units of the Rhodesian armed forces to be integrated with the Zimbabwean national army. Nyerere was firm on this point:

"... Smith's army must go. We do not want to hear that independent Zimbabwe is going to have a Smith army somewhere and a liberation army somewhere. The settlement should include the dismantling of the Smith forces and their replacement by the forces of the national liberation movements".<sup>23</sup>

As would be expected, Smith rejected the Anglo-American proposals not only because the plan talked bluntly of one-man-one-vote but also because there was no preferential representation for the whites. Smith had not yet been convinced of the necessity of majority rule. He was still strong in the military field. The Patriotic Front could not be expected to win on the conference table if they had not already done so in the battle field.

Smith went his own way. He incorporated several proposals of the Anglo-American plan into his own scheme of internal settlement. He opened discussions with Muzorewa's United African National Council (UANC), Sithole's African National Congress - S (ANC-S), and Chief Chiraells Zimbabwe United Peoples Organisation (ZUPO). An agreement was reached only within a few weeks following the collapse of the Anglo-American proposals. The agreement was signed on 1 March 1978 amongst the parties. The constitution agreed upon ensured a complete control of state power by Smith and nothing had to be done to alter one of the main consequences of national-colonial oppression namely, land distribution. Smith was thus ready to organise general elections under majority rule knowing fully well that in fact he controlled the entire state apparatus. "Zimbabwe-Rhodesia" was the name given to the new country.

The reformist national bourgeois representatives of the UANC, ANC-S and ZUPO revealed their true character of entering into a deal with the national colonial oppressors while utilizing the slogans of the revolutionary masses. J. V. Stalin was right, there is only one way to save the revolution and that is to isolate the national bourgeoisie and fire to be concentrated on them. The national

liberation struggle had entered a new phase, the phase of a complete break with the tactics of an all-national united front towards "a revolution of the vast masses of the workers (Stalin's italics) and peasants (Stalin's italics), towards an agrarian (Stalin's italics) revolution, which will strengthen and broaden the struggle against imperialism".<sup>24</sup>

Indeed Stalin was right:

"... with the growth of the revolutionary movement, the national bourgeoisie ... is splitting up into two parts, a revolutionary part (the petty bourgeoisie) and a compromising part (the big bourgeoisie), of which the first is continuing the revolutionary struggle, whereas the second is entering into a bloc with imperialism ... The revolution cannot be advanced and the complete independence of the capitalistically developed colonies and dependent countries cannot be won unless the compromising national bourgeoisie is isolated".<sup>25</sup>

The history of the national liberation in Southern Africa and Rhodesia in particular testifies to the correctness of the Marxist-Leninist analysis advanced by Joseph Stalin.

Revolutionary democracies not only refused to recognise the existence of the new situation and called for an intensification of armed struggle, but they also engaged in an international campaign to discredit the reformist bourgeois regime of Muzorewa. The guerrillas in response to the

Muzorewa regime organised the populace and established "a parallel government in the liberated zones".<sup>26</sup> Mozambique not only, pledge total support, for the guerrillas, but even went further to assign certain units of FRELIMO army to help the ZANU guerrillas! Such is the manner in which revolutionary democracies approached the resolution of the national-colonial question in the then Rhodesia-often by revolutionary means. The reformist national bourgeois was isolated and fire was concentrated upon them and only this accords with the objective needs of the country's development, namely, to concentrate fire on the central forces opposing the country's further development.

The petty bourgeois narrow mindedness of revolutionary democracies of the frontline states, again led them into inconsistencies. They blamed America and Britain for not putting sufficient pressure on Smith, as if it is not in the interests of the imperialist bourgeois states not to do so. Tanzania's strongest remarks came at the joint meeting of the Patriotic Front and the frontline states, held between 25-26 March 1978.

In July 1979, Machel after listening to the British Broadcast of Thatcher's speech in which she pledged a positive outcome to the Rhodesia crisis

exclaimed: "That lady can help us end the war in Rhodesia".<sup>27</sup> Machel dispatched an envoy to London in order to learn about the Commonwealth Summit which was due to be held later that year in Lusaka. Indeed the active participation of revolutionary democracies was crucial to the outcome of the commonwealth summit on the Rhodesian issue. Machel at the Lusaka Commonwealth Conference sent a personal message of congratulations to Thatcher, praising her on the handling of the Rhodesian situation.

Nyerere as leader or chairman of the frontline states outlined the strategy for the resolution of the then Rhodesia colonial question at the Commonwealth Conference. He conceded the possibility of reserved seats for the minority white population but was not prepared to see the white minority left in control of the armed forces, civil service, judiciary, the police and holding a blocking vote in Parliament to prevent changes in the constitutional clauses. So long as such a system remained in force the war would continue. Indeed it was the revolutionary democracies - firm stand that helped the Commonwealth Conference make its positive decision on the future of Zimbabwe. The Commonwealth Conference thus finally resolved:

1. that the internal constitution of the then Rhodesia was defective;
2. reaffirmed commitment to genuine black rule in the then Rhodesia;
3. that it was Britain's constitutional responsibility to grant independence to the territory;
4. that all parties to the dispute must be involved in the solution of the problem of colonialism;
5. that they were deeply conscious of the need to resolve the question soon;
6. that a democratic constitution be adopted including appropriate safeguards for the minorities.
7. acknowledged that only a government formed on such a basis can guarantee an end to war.<sup>28</sup>

The pressure of revolutionary democracies was essential for the imperialist bourgeois state within the Commonwealth to make a tactical retreat. The revolutionary democracies followed the ensuing Lancaster House talks very closely. Mozambique put pressure on the last minute when Mugabe was ready to throw away peace talks at the Lancaster House over



the land issue. Indeed, at one point, reports Colin Legum, Mugabe ended his intervention on a defiant note of "the struggle continues", with Machel remarking that "there was no struggle to continue".<sup>29</sup> The Patriotic Front accepted the terms for settlement on 17 December 1979.

During the period of transition, the revolutionary democracies maintained vigilance in order to thwart any manoeuvres from the imperialist camp against the Patriotic Front. When Lord Soames appeared to be taking sides, Nyerere accused him of wishing to trick the world and observed that it was now becoming clear that the elections were not going to be fair. The "British are tampering with the ballot - box".<sup>30</sup> He further warned that should the elections be rigged the armed struggle will resume and that his country would consider cutting its links with Britain. Such was the resolute manner of revolutionary democracies in resolving the national-colonial question in the then Rhodesia often by revolutionary means. In April ZANU-PF won the elections and Zimbabwe was born.

### 6.3. MOZAMBIQUE'S STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION

Nyerere categorically refused to accept the Portuguese argument that Mozambique was a province of Portugal. He saw national colonial oppression being as was the case in Zimbabwe. Only the overthrow of the Portuguese fascists in Mozambique would resolve the situation Nyerere stated.

"The metropolitan government claims that Mozambique, Angola and 'Portuguese Guinea' are part of Portugal; there can therefore be no question of independence ....and a call for it is regarded as treachery ... The only choice available is a violent struggle for freedom or continued acquiescence in slavery.... The peoples of all the Portuguese colonies have now chosen; they are fighting".<sup>31</sup>

Such was the stand of revolutionary democratic Tanzania over Mozambique. Tanzania went further and severed diplomatic relations with Portugal. Nyerere was aware of the economic costs involved in severing relations with Portugal. But that did not deter him from doing so all the same. Nyerere stated:

"The refusal to have diplomatic relations with Portugal after independence or trade with her has not caused any measurable economic effect on Tanzania ... Tanzania could, however, have gained something by a different policy towards Portugal".<sup>32</sup>

Tanzania backed up in action its revolutionary democratic character towards the national liberation of Mozambique by not only allowing for the establishment of bases within the country, but also calling for unity amongst the movements, various parties had been formed abroad between 1960 and 1962 for the purposes of liberating Mozambique, the Uniaro Nacional Democra'tica de Moçambique (UDENAMO), the Mozambique African National Union (MANU), and the Uniaro African de Moçambique Independence (UNAMI). In 1962, Tanzania offered premises for a conference of the three movements during which FRELIMO was born. The armed struggle began in 1964 from the Tanzanian territory. However, like in every country in the colonised countries of Southern Africa, the growth of the revolutionary struggle led to a split in the all-national united front in 1969 into revolutionary democracy under FRELIMO and they compromising national bourgeoisie under COREMO. Nyerere refused to recognise COREMO and the movement moved its headquarters to Zambia.<sup>33</sup>

The strategy adopted for Zimbabwe by Nyerere was also applied to Mozambique. In the Lusaka Manifesto Nyerere while preferring negotiations to armed struggle, nevertheless made a pre-condition for negotiation an acceptance by Portugal of the

principle of human equality and self-determination:

"... Even now, if Portugal should change her policy and accept the principle of self-determination, we would urge the liberation movements to desist from armed struggle and co-operate in the mechanics of a peaceful transfer of power from Portugal to the peoples of the African territories".<sup>34</sup>

As long as the Portuguese fascists had not accepted the principle of human equality and self-determination, armed struggle was to be the main form of struggle. Independence was non-negotiable. What was negotiable were the mechanics of transfer of political power with full participation of African nationalists themselves.

By 1971 when peaceful methods envisaged in the Lusaka manifesto failed to move Portugal, Tanzania fully endorsed the Mogadishu Declaration which clearly stated that only armed struggle would liberate the oppressed peoples in Southern Africa. In 1974 TANU declared it a "Year of Liberation".<sup>35</sup> The party mobilized all sections of the country's population in support of the national liberation movements and in particular FRELIMO. Tanzania generously contributed to the FRELIMO struggle. At the end of 1974, Machel was presented with Shs.4 million as Tanzania's contribution to the national liberation of Mozambique. Machel has constantly

referred to the contribution in various of his speeches.<sup>36</sup>

The fall of Portuguese fascist regime in 1974 marked the beginning of the end of the struggle. At the time of the coup, FRELIMO once again reaffirmed its opposition to colonialism:

"Any attempt to elude the real problem will only lead to new and equally unavoidable sacrifices. The way to solve the problem is clear: recognition of the Mozambique's people's right to independence. If, however, the objective of the coup d'etat is to find a new formulae to perpetuate the oppression of our people, then the Portuguese leaders are warned that they will face our firm determination".<sup>37</sup>

Nyerere fully endorsed FRELIMO's stand. He supported Machel who called for an immediate granting of independence otherwise the armed struggle was going to intensify.

FRELIMO rejected anything to do with a referendum to decide whether or not Mozambique should federate with Portugal. You cannot ask a slave if he wants to be free "particularly if the slave happens to be in full revolt"<sup>38</sup> was FRELIMO's statement. It was thanks to the firm stand of Tanzania throughout the national liberation struggle of FRELIMO that Mozambique became

independent in April 1974. Its approach towards the resolution of national-colonial questions often by revolutionary means largely contributed to the final outcome.

#### 6.4. ANGOLA'S STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION

Revolutionary democracies were confused about which of the three liberation movements to support. These movements were the Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA), the Unity Movement for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) and the Popular Movement for the National Liberation of Angola (MPLA). In the case of Zimbabwe and Mozambique revolutionary experience and practice of various nationalist movements was clear cut. The revolutionary democrats in TANU and above all Nyerere were able to judge as one liberation movement excelled over the other in terms of its actual practice against national-colonial oppressors. Thus in Zimbabwe it was easy to see how ZAPU became reformist when ZANU was formed. In Mozambique it was also easy to see how FRELIMO continued to retain its revolutionary character even when COREMO appeared on the scene.

Our thesis speaks of the often revolutionary character of the revolutionary democracies. This

arises from the fact that the hegemony of revolutionary democratic bloc of classes is held in these frontline states by the revolutionary petty bourgeois. While under oppression of imperialism, this class is anti-imperialist, nevertheless its petty bourgeois narrow-mindedness renders it vulnerable to various political influences from the international scene. These influences may overwhelm it from arriving at correct political decisions, thereby at certain times, becoming the unconscious tool in the hands of antagonistic classes of the imperialist camp (even if for a short time) to advance its own interests like the Angolan case will show. That is why taking into account such influences, our thesis characterises the revolutionary democrats as approaching the questions of national liberation movement often by revolutionary means and not always. In any case the exception proves the general trends.

For the conservative petty bourgeois regimes of the frontline states matters were even worse. The Zambian Government, even went to the extent of withholding recognition to the MPLA Government, thereby fuelling the imperialist bourgeois states reservations towards the Angolan Government.

Only Mozambique owing to its closeness to the Angolan movements was able to make a choice for MPLA without reservations. Machel was adamant on this point of support for MPLA. As early as 1975 at the OAU conference in Addis Ababa when summoned to vote on MPLA's recognition he stated that the vote was crucial because it will lead to the discovery of who "will call our friends (Soviet Union and Cuba) 'mercenaries' when they come to help us, if we are attacked (i.e. by South Africa)".<sup>39</sup>

Nyerere in voting in favour of MPLA stated that the OAU in Addis Ababa Summit Conference had failed:

1. to distinguish between South African aggression in Angola and the continued desire to end internal fighting in that country;
2. to see that MPLA had received arms from communist countries including the Soviet Union and Cuba largely because western countries had refused to supply them;
3. to recognise that communist support to MPLA was not a fight for communism but continuation of struggle against colonialism and neo-colonialism which South Africa was trying to perpetuate by taking advantage of Angola's



internal division.<sup>40</sup>

On a state visit to India immediately after the OAU and before meeting with the members of the frontline states, Nyerere reiterated this thesis of his and directly mentioned the Soviet Union and Cuba as the communist countries he had in mind.

At the same time Nyerere and Machel concretely became aware of the designs of the imperialist bourgeois of the United States which openly made it clear that its support to FNLA-UNITA was motivated by its pursuit of "imperialist policies largely based on cold-war rivalry"<sup>41</sup> rather than by support for liberation. It was thanks to the staunch stand of revolutionary democracies of the frontline states that the OAU eventually recognised the MPLA Government and admitted her as a full member of the OAU in February 1976.<sup>42</sup>

## 6.5 NAMIBIA'S STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION

The national liberation of Namibia will present the greatest test for revolutionary democracies of the frontline states as it will prove to what extent they will be true to their strategy and tactics as developed during the national liberation of Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe. Indeed, one may ask: to what extent are they going to resolve the

national-colonial question of Namibia often by revolutionary means? This question arises out of a number of factors. First of all Namibia shares the special colonialism of South Africa in that both the oppressor and oppressed live in the same territory. The former is backed by the entire military machinery of South Africa. Secondly as we saw in chapter 3 South Africa is armed with the latest sophisticated weapons. This military strength has enabled her to carry out hot pursuits against these frontline states giving bases to SWAPO of Namibia. For a long time since 1980, Southern Angola had been under South African occupation (until of recent), already there are facts which point to the degeneration of revolutionary democracies in the face of South Africa military might. For instance the creation of a joint Angola-South African Commission whose tasks are actually to chase SWAPO into the bush is no less a significant development.

Revolutionary democracies have sought to maintain the same strategy and tactics towards the resolution of the national-colonial question of Namibia, as they did in the case of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. These are that for negotiations to take place, South Africa must accept the principle of human equality and self-determination.

Secondly, that the negotiations should be about the mechanisms of transfer of power. Thirdly, that the jailed nationalists be released so that they can take part in the negotiations until such a time, revolutionary democracies have sought to commit themselves to helping SWAPO engage in armed struggle. Nyerere in the Lusaka Manifesto like in the case of Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola was careful to incorporate the strategy and tactics of revolutionary democracy into the solution of the national-colonial question of Namibia. The Lusaka Manifesto a 1969 briefly examined the UN General Assembly resolution of 1966 which we have already seen in the first chapter. The resolution terminated the South African mandate over Namibia. However, observes the manifesto:

"South West Africa remains in the clutches of the most ruthless minority Government in Africa. Its people continue to be oppressed and those who advocate even peaceful progress to independence continue to be persecuted".<sup>43</sup>

The manifesto calls upon South Africa to accept the principle of majority rule otherwise Africa will have no choice but to support armed struggle. This in fact requires South Africa to accept in principle the settlement of Namibia based on resolution 435.

Although Angola has constantly stated that it still adheres to resolution 435 and wants a settlement on that basis, constant incursions of South African troops into Southern Africa since 1975 have compelled her to retreat on the question of support for armed struggle. This was reflected, for example, in the negotiations in early 1984 between South African forces and the Angolan Government. The negotiations took place in Lusaka. The conference agreed on the setting up of a joint Angolan-South Africa Commission whose task is to monitor the disengagement progress in Southern Angola and to detect, and investigate and report "any alleged violations of the commitments of the parties".<sup>44</sup> In actual fact the agreement legitimises chasing SWAPO into the bush. This fact, so significant, shows the degenerations of revolutionary democracy owing to international factors in trying to resolve national-colonial questions often by revolutionary means.

Naturally SWAPO did not welcome the agreement. Angola fought hard to convince the entire world that the agreement with South was to secure peace and not to sacrifice the national liberation movement under the auspices of SWAPO. Eduardo do Santos stated that the chief aim that Angola pursued in the talks with South Africa, was the "withdrawal of the

occupation troops from our territory".<sup>45</sup> But it is clear also that the chief aim that South Africa pursued in the talks with Angola was the withdrawal of SWAPO bases or at least their restrictions from penetrating into Namibia. It was thus simply a diplomatic face saving device when South Africa demanded in the talks that SWAPO halt its hostilities in Namibia from the Angolan territory, both Angola and SWAPO appeared to have agreed with the South African condition only if the latter agreed not only to withdraw its troops from Angola but also to the implementation of resolution 435.

The mere fact of an agreement to chase SWAPO into the bush casts a dark cloud on whether revolutionary democracy in Angola will hold on in the face colonialism of South Africa so that it can continue to support SWAPO often by revolutionary means. Already signs show that the petty bourgeois revolutionary democrats in MPLA are desperate for a "quick" resolution of the national-colonial question even when chances were slim. The narrow mindedness of the petty bourgeois revolutionary democrats about which we have talked on more one occasion prevents them from arriving at an objective assessment of the situation. Colin Legum correctly observed:

"The Angolan involvement in diplomatic exercise (with South Africa in Namibia) was, very largely, a state-interest - just as it was in the case of its Marxist ally, Mozambique, which made a crucially important contribution to the success of the Lancaster House Conference on Rhodesia as well as to the subsequent peaceful transition to Zimbabwe's independence".<sup>46</sup>

It was Angola which persuaded SWAPO to accept the UN plan. In fact "its strong influence at times amounted to pressure".<sup>47</sup>

This act of Angola is contrary to the general strategy and tactics of revolutionary democracies, followed all along in the liberation of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, of simply facilitating the various parties involved to come together and leave it up to them whether to accept or not to accept a given plan such as the UN plan. In fact Angola tends to takeover the role of SWAPO and dictate to the organisation about what it should do. When South Africa demanded as a condition for Geneva negotiations in 1980 that the internal parties under the so-called Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) be included, SWAPO opposed this demand. However, Angola agreed with South Africa that they be included in secret diplomatic exchange. Angola also "persuaded" SWAPO to accept another of South African demands which were that, SWAPO renounce the UN certification as the sole

authentic representative of Namibian people. Again SWAPO had to agree to this request, namely, that once independence was agreed upon on the basis of resolution 435, she would renounce the U.N. stands, although:

"SWAPO had an obvious interest in not wanting to lose the advantage of its exclusive recognition and in wishing to portray the DTA as being simply Pretertia's stooge".<sup>48</sup>

With Angola in the face of South Africa military might, and if only because of this will it degenerate into conservative petty bourgeois character towards the national liberation struggle vis-a-vis imperialism? It is difficult to say, because of Soviet union and Cuban support, whether the MPLA will completely degenerate into a conservative petty bourgeois regime vis-a-vis the national liberation struggle for Namibia. All known facts point towards degeneration. For instance, when the Geneva talks failed the then Angolan foreign minister Jorge did not hit on the previously obvious fact that armed struggle was the answer nor did he even mention it. He simply remarked that he did not consider the collapse of the Geneva talks as "final breakdown" and proposed new steps to review the dialogue between SWAPO and South Africa within the UN framework.

## 6.6. SOUTH AFRICA'S STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION

If the national liberation of Namibia has to a great extent reduced the approach to the solution of problems of national-colonial oppression often by revolutionary means of revolutionary democracies, then the national liberation of South Africa will show to what extent whatever is left of revolutionary democracies approach will survive.

The chances are that very little if any will be left of revolutionary democracies approach towards the national liberation of South Africa often by revolutionary means. The Nkomati Accord between the national-colonial oppressors of South Africa and Mozambique to physically drive out the ANC of South Africa from Mozambique shows that nothing may be left of the solution of national-colonial questions often by revolutionary means by revolutionary democracies of the frontline states.

It is said that an equation contains within itself terms for its own solution or that no equation can be solved without the terms for that solution.

The strategy and tactics of revolutionary democracies towards South Africa already contains within itself the "happy" degeneration of the



approach of these states towards the South African liberation often by revolutionary means.

Africa and the frontline states in particular objectively regards South Africa as a sovereign republic whose internal problems is simply to end racial discrimination and apartheid. This is the strategy.

Thus by this position South Africa is objectively excluded as a national-colonial question justifying the same approach as was the case with the national-colonial questions of Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique as well as Namibia.

This contradictory approach quite consistent with the petty bourgeois approach to all questions, has indeed and justly puzzled the ANC.

With this fundamental modification the tactics of revolutionary democracies towards the national liberation of South Africa as applied to other former colonial situations in the region becomes not revolutionary but in fact reactionary. This is because the tactics in this case contradict the strategy. Hence, the whole approach justifies a "happy" degeneration of revolutionary democracies of frontline states towards the solution of the South African national-colonial

problem often by revolutionary means.

Nyerere once again has reiterated that there can be no dialogue with South Africa until she accepts not the principle of self-determination, but to end racial discrimination and apartheid in South Africa.

If South Africa does accept to do so, then she should release political prisoners and talk to them with a view of settling the "internal problems" and hence South Africa has no need for free Africa.

"Nelson Mandela, Robert Sobukwe and hundreds of other non-white South African leaders are either rotting away physically on Robben Island or in other prisons and places of restriction. When Vorster decides to release these men and women, to allow peaceful African political activity, and to listen to what they say, we shall know that justice might well triumph in South Africa without bloodshed we fear. Until those signs are evident we must treat South Africa as an outlaw".50

There hardly any doubt that this strategy and tactics squarely puts the national-colonial problems of South Africa as an internal matter of a sovereign republic of South Africa.

Thus it would appear what is needed is not to aid in the overthrow of that oppressor race, but rather to treat it as an outlaw, say through sanctions.

There is no doubt that this petty bourgeois approach to South African national-colonial question contains within itself the seeds for "happy" degeneration of frontline states' revolutionary democracies. Under any slightest domestic difficulties as shall be shown with Mozambique it can sacrifice the ANC on the pretext that she is concluding an agreement with the Republic of South Africa for an end to support of each other's dissidents!

The Lusaka Manifesto begs the question even more unshamefully when it states: "On every legal basis its internal affairs are a matter exclusively for the people of South Africa (sic!)".<sup>51</sup> This approach has not infrequently led to conclusions that what is on the agenda now in South Africa is a socialist revolution and not a democratic revolution since South Africa is already a republic. This question however does not concern us.

The approach renders degeneration in every way for revolutionary democracies for they have lost the content of the national-colonial question which is the existence of colonialism of a special type in which the oppressed and the oppressors live in one territory or "Republic".

The result is weak diplomatic offensive and indecisions on whether or not to support the armed struggle against a "sovereign Republic of South Africa".

It is thus not surprising that less than a year after declaring the necessity to overthrow the regime of South Africa on the part of frontline states through the assistance on ANC, Mozambique had to sign the Nkomati Accord.

"Under the leadership of the ANC, the people through strikes and armed action, are vigorously rising against apartheid', It went on to commit the frontline states to intensify their material and diplomatic support for the liberation. movements, SWAPO, and ANC of South Africa, so that they can intensify the armed struggle for the attainment of the national independence of their peoples".<sup>52</sup>

In the Nkomati Accord speech, Machel has no pungenes of conscience when he addressed Mr. Botha as the "Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa".

The principles we have enshrined in the Accord of Nkomati are universally valid ones that govern relations between sovereign states regardless of their political, economic and social system" (our emphasis).<sup>53</sup>

Since South Africa is a sovereign state with its own political, economic and social system why should it not be on a peaceful coexistence with a socialist Mozambique? This is the level to which the petty bourgeois radicals have degenerated. in the approach to the national-colonial question of South Africa.

"The People's Republic of Mozambique cherishes peace as the most precious possession of mankind, the deepest aspiration of all peoples. Peace and co-existence are written into our constitution. Based on our socialist policy of peace we have proposed, since the first meeting between our governments on 17 December 1982, that we should agree, formally or informally, to let peace and coexistence prevail between our states".<sup>54</sup>

If Nyerere should later have expressed reservations to the Nkomati Accord it is because he forgets that his own strategy and tactics towards the "Republic of South Africa" contained within itself the seeds not for just one accord but for several between some members of the frontline states wherever it suited their domestic peace.

The ANC was quite right in condemning the Nkomati Accord as a blue printer for the perpetuation of the illegitimate rule of the South African Settler minority.

"The peoples of Southern Africa know from their own experience that there can be no peaceful coexistence between freedom and independence on the one hand and colonialism and racism on the other."55

In practice as the Nkomati Accord shows, the revolutionary democracies have shed off their approach to the ANC often by revolutionary means.

The Nkomati Accord itself as we stated in chapter four arose out of the fact that FRELIMO first of all had not yet established itself as a force in the most vital centres of the country. Its social base was in fact narrowed by this historical fact. Secondly, FRELIMO's radical petty bourgeoisie destroyed the countries productive forces through reactionary petty bourgeois policies against the national and foreign bourgeoisie. Their socialist petty bourgeois policies further alienated the social base from them. Thirdly, there was a growth of bureaucracy both in the army and the state from the masses. Fourthly the undemocratic approach to the recruitment into the army of the masses demoralised the cadres. In addition to the above, the world economic crisis further worsened the situation.

The Mozambique National Resistance was able to capitalise and accelerate the disintegration of FRELIMO by blaming it on the socialist policies of

Machel.

South African support in military hardware only accelerated the crisis to the point where, in trying to save itself from being ousted out of power, FRELIMO had to enter into the accord with racist South Africa, thanks to the loophole already contained in the strategy and tactics of revolutionary democracies as already elaborated.

According to the accord the High Contracting Parties<sup>56</sup> would not allow their territories, territorial waters or airspace, to be used as a base, thoroughfare, or in any way by another state government, foreign forces, organisations or individuals which plan or prepare to commit acts of violence, terrorism or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other or may threaten the security of its inhabitants.

Subsection (6) of article 3 of the accord adds that the High Contracting Parties shall eliminate from their respective territories bases, training centres, places of shelter, accommodation and transit for elements who intend to carry out the acts contemplated in the above paragraph. To supervise the implementation of the accord each

High Contracting Party has appointed high-ranking representative to serve on a Joint Security Commission which will "act as watchdog". Mozambique is to stop supporting the ANC just as South Africa is to do so in the case of the MNR.

#### 6.7. SUMMARY

We have testified to the fact that revolutionary democracies of the frontline states have given support to the national liberation movements often by revolutionary means. However, the petty bourgeois narrow mindedness hampers the petty bourgeois revolutionary democrats from drawing clear-cut political conclusions. It is this fact that renders them inconsistent preventing them from adopting revolutionary means always towards the solution of imperialism problems.

In the next chapter, we must examine the character of the conservative petty bourgeois regimes of the frontline states towards the national liberation movement.



CHAPTER SEVENFOREIGN POLICIES OF NEO-COLONIAL CONSERVATIVE  
PETTY BOURGEOIS REGIMES TOWARDS THE NATIONAL  
LIBERATION STRUGGLE7.1. INTRODUCTION

The distinction between imperialist oppressor nations and the colonial and neo-colonial nations (i.e. maintained throughout this thesis) is essential for understanding the behaviour of the various conservative petty bourgeois political parties towards the national liberation movement in these two categories of nations. United National Independence Party (UNIP) and Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) of Zambia and Botswana respectively are not "ordinary" petty-bourgeois conservative political parties. They are not petty bourgeois conservative imperialist parties. Rather and owing to their neo-colonial status, these conservative petty-bourgeois political parties are anti-imperialist. This difference is fundamental. However, although they are anti-imperialist and hence play a positive role in the objective course of sweeping away the central forces opposing the development of productive forces in the colonised territories, nevertheless as conservative petty bourgeois parties their approach

towards the national liberation struggle is often by inconsistent and reformist means. Thus the strategy and tactics of conservative petty bourgeois frontline states of Botswana and Zambia has been to support all forms of struggle (i.e. owing to their belonging to neo-colonial status) towards the national liberation struggle such as diplomacy, negotiations economic sanctions and armed struggle often by inconsistent and reformist means.

The tactics have been to engage in negotiations per se including negotiations on independence itself. Thus the regimes have been happy to take initiative for negotiations in everything including independence whether or not the national-colonial oppressors have agreed in principle to handover power to the oppressed. On the question of economic sanctions they have also expressed inconsistency and reformist approach in their implementation. This inconsistent approach has also been followed in matters of armed struggle. This inconsistency arises from the fact that the conservative neo-colonial petty bourgeois subordinate all other forms of struggle to that of negotiations, which they prefer. In fact had it not been for the revolutionary democracies who push them (the conservative petty bourgeois regimes)

towards providing bases for the national liberation movements, it is quite unlikely that they would have supported in practice the armed struggle.

Engels was right when he wrote:

"It is most unlikely that the petty bourgeois, if left to its own devices, would have gone outside the legal framework of lawful, peaceful and virtuous struggle and taken up the musket and the paving-stone in place of the so-called weapons of the spirit. The history of all political movements since 1830 in Germany, as in France and England, shows that this class is invariably full of bluster and loud protestations, at times even extreme as far as talking goes, as long as it perceives no danger; faint-hearted, cautions and calculating as soon as the slightest danger approaches; aghast, alarmed and wavering as soon as the movement it provoked is seized upon and taken up seriously by other classes; treacherous to the whole movement for the sake of its petty bourgeois existence as soon as there is any question of a struggle with weapons in hand".

Engel's characterisation of the petty bourgeois is fully applicable to the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois regimes in the frontline states towards the national liberation movements.

The conservative neo-colonial petty bourgeois regimes of the frontline states have sought to impose their strategy and tactics to be recognised as those for the frontline states as a whole towards the national liberation struggle. Thus since the 1969 Lusaka Manifesto for a negotiated solution to the problems of national-colonial

oppression, Zambia and Botswana have consistently fought to subordinate all the other forms of struggle to negotiations. Richard Hall observes:

"Zambia attached such importance to the manifesto that it went to the unusual lengths of having it printed in the form of an advertisement in The Times and the Guardian. The latter commented: 'It almost seems that the humanity we taught the authors of this manifesto, we have ourselves forgotten'".<sup>2</sup>

At the United Nations, the late President Khama categorically stated that while he could not make a secret of the country's detestation of apartheid, he preferred peaceful solution to the solutions of international conflicts throughout the world including that of the national liberation of Southern Africa.

"Lusaka manifesto 'for the achievement of self-determination through negotiation' It was thus that Botswana achieved majority rule, and eventually independence, and this has been the path which most African states have been fortunate enough to tread. It is the wish of the government and people of Botswana that the indigeneous population of the neighbouring territories should eventually share this experience".<sup>3</sup>

We shall soon see in practice that such public statements for the preference of negotiation and subordination of other forms to negotiation in support of the national liberation struggle is fully documented.

## 7.2. RHODESIA'S STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION

Zambia and Botswana preferred negotiations to other forms of struggle during the entire period of our investigations (which is between 1969 to 1984) towards the solution of the national-colonial oppression in the then Rhodesia. On Rhodesia the Lusaka Manifesto pledged its support of Britain to re-assert its authority and "then negotiate the peaceful progress to majority rule before independence".<sup>4</sup> This, stated the manifesto was the method of progress which was preferred, because "it could involve less suffering for all the people of Rhodesia". At the 1971 Mogadishu Declaration Zambia was dissatisfied because that declaration replaced the Lusaka Manifesto by stating that peaceful methods had failed to achieve the independence of Zimbabwe and that the only way was armed struggle. By 1972 Kaunda did not change his position vis-a-vis the Lusaka Manifesto. He told a nine-man delegation of American Congressmen and Senators in January that the manifesto was still on the table and was not a document of confrontation but rather it was a challenge to the minority regimes and their supporters to work out a just and lasting "solution on the basis of equality". Professor Timothy Shaw correctly

observed "President Kaunda's sense of mission in advocating peaceful negotiations in the subsystem". In April 1975 when the Dar es Salaam Declaration was being drafted, Timoth Shaw gives an account of a behind-the-scenes activities of Zambia to water down the Mogadishu Declaration. Indeed Zambia "was gratified by the revival of the Lusaka manifesto".<sup>5</sup>

It is in negotiations where the conservative petty bourgeois regimes of the frontline states show great deal of enthusiasm or zeal. This is because negotiations as a form of struggle promises a peaceful, virtuous and noble form which is legally acceptable to them. The late President Khama committed himself to the Lusaka Manifesto "for the achievement of self-determination through negotiations". As we have just stated in the introduction, Khama used to argue that it was through negotiations that Botswana achieved majority rule, and eventually independence and that was the path which most African states had been fortunate to tread. Khama wished that the indigeneous population of the neighbouring territories should eventually share Botswana's experience.

It is this preference of the conservative neo-colonial petty bourgeois regimes of the frontline states of Botswana and Zambia to remain within the bounds of international legal framework through peaceful methods that is the basis for their open acceptance of their right to accept refugees from the then Rhodesian national-colonial oppressors. When President Kaunda paid a state visit to Botswana in 1969, both countries reaffirmed their commitment to admit "genuine" refugees (not guerrillas) from the then Rhodesia. In the joint communique the two frontline states reaffirmed their "international obligations towards 'genuine refugees?'" <sup>6</sup> By then Zambia had a total of 8,000 refugees whereas Botswana had 400 refugees.

In diplomacy and negotiations President Kaunda did not hesitate to take the initiatives in approaching the national-colonial oppressors thereby testifying to the preference of peaceful methods. In the Kaunda Vorster secret correspondence revealed in 1971 by the Zambia Daily Mail, Kaunda said that his country had never advocated that "majority rule will come tomorrow".<sup>7</sup> Certainly this was not the position of the national liberation movements who were fighting for immediate independence. President Kaunda sought to convince himself that his preference for a negotiated

settlement would win the day:

"I am convinced beyond doubt that you personally Mr. Prime Minister hold the key to the future in so far as finding peaceful solutions to problems confronting the whole of Southern Africa is concerned".<sup>8</sup>

William Todoff correctly observes that in 1974-75 Zambia's foreign policy towards South Africa was "sound in seeking to achieve black majority rule in Rhodesia through negotiations."<sup>9</sup> Botswana on her part sought to play up the idea of a "bridge role" between black Africa and the white dominated Africa. She pledged here good offices to create a forum where people can meet and "iron out their differences".<sup>10</sup>

The neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois regimes backed up their preference in Rhodesia with the collaboration of South Africa, in its enthusiasm for peaceful change. Mark Chona, the Special Political Assistant to President Kaunda, was shocked when he handed over the Lusaka manifesto to Vorster's envoy Van den Bergh. The document was rudely thrust back across the table to Choma. Bergh would not accept the content of the document concerning South Africa although an honest De Villiers (one of Voster's contacts) was even amazed by the document's "conservative" position. Such set backs did



not discourage the President to renew his approach towards a peaceful settlement of the national-colonial problem of Zimbabwe.

In October 1974 in collaboration with two of Vorster's men de Villiers and Van den Bergh in Lusaka at State House, Mark Chona produced a document entitled "Towards the Summit: An Approach to Peaceful Change in Southern Africa." Indeed as Karl Marx stated, the petty bourgeois comes out of the most disgraceful defeat as innocently as he entered into them. If things did not work out in accordance with his wish, it was not his fault nor was it because he always forgets the class struggle, but that it is someone else's fault. The petty bourgeois again and again goes over the same process in the hope that luck will strike and his strategy will be realised. The document states:

"The Zambian Government recognises the importance of the issues raised in the recent contacts with the representatives of the South Africa Government .... For many years now attempts have been made to find a military solution to problems of South Africa. These effort have been futile and very costly in terms of human lives and property .... It is, therefore, the hope of the Zambian Government that the implementation of the programme contained in this paper will facilitate the preparations for the historic summit".11

On Rhodesia the document urges Vorster to advise Smith that a political solution is most desirable and very urgent, that he (Vorster) should not interfere in the internal affairs of Rhodesia, that Vorster withdraw his security personnel and equipment from Rhodesia, that he declare that a negotiated settlement was in the best interests of Rhodesia. The document called upon Vorster to urge Smith to urgently implement the following four points:<sup>12</sup>

1. Releasing of all political detainees and prisoners so that they be allowed to take part in the negotiations. Mr. Homo, Sithole were mentioned as the key figures to be released;
2. That a ban be lifted on ZAPU and ZANU and the restrictions of movements be lifted so that they participate fully and actively in search of a peaceful solution as an alternative to armed struggle;
3. Suspension of political trials and revocation of death sentences so passed;
4. Suspension of all discriminatory legislation.

That the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois regime engaged in negotiations per se without any pre-condition, is clear from the fact that the question of majority rule which was the essence of the struggle was not mentioned in the document. However, Vorster did not meet the deadline of December 1974. Indeed he had not met any of the conditions. Hence the failure of the so-called summit meeting which was scheduled for the self half of December 1974.

In spite of this set back President Kaunda did not abandon his preference for a negotiated settlement over Rhodesia. In October 1974, Vorster delivered a speech in Cape Town in the presence of diplomatic corps in which he stated that Southern Africa was at crossroads and that it had to choose between escalating violence and peace. Kaunda saw in this new situation or development the necessity to press ahead with a negotiated settlement. Taking advantage of the graduation ceremony, the President described Vorster's speech as the voice of reason for which Africa and the rest of the world had been waiting for. He offered Zambia's help to remove any obstacles to peace in the region. Indeed Vorster revealed by March 1975 that the President's Special Political Assistant had made fifteen trips

to South Africa to prepare for peaceful talks since 1974.

President Kaunda's initiative for a negotiated settlement culminated in the August 1975 Pretoria agreement which contained the following aspects.<sup>13</sup>

1. The Rhodesian Government through its ministerial representatives and the African National Congress through their appointed representatives will meet not later than 25 August on the Victoria Falls Bridge in coaches to be supplied by the South African Government for a formal conference without any preconditions;
2. The object of the formal meeting was to give the parties the opportunity to publicly express their genuine desire to negotiate an acceptable settlement;
3. After this the conference to adjourn to enable the parties to discuss proposals for a settlement in committee or committees within Rhodesia;
4. Thereafter., the parties to meet again in formal conference anywhere decided upon to ratify the committee proposals which had been agreed upon;
5. The South African Government and the Governments of Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia,

respectively, hereby express their willingness to ensure that this agreement is implemented by the two parties involved.

President Kaunda had assured Nyerere and Machel that Smith had accepted the principle of majority rule. As it turned out Smith had not accepted the principle of majority rule. When Muzorewa explicitly stated on behalf of the ANC that the only genuine settlement for the majority of the people of Zimbabwe was that which was to be based on the transfer of power from the "minority to the majority people of the country, that is to say, majority rule now", Smith refused to accept the question of majority rule.

President Kaunda was not simply demonstrating his preference for a negotiated settlement since 1969 on Zimbabwe, he also showed preference for the reformist national liberation movement led by Joshua Nkomo the leader of the ANOs Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) wing. Indeed, when the negotiations recommended for December 1975 were underway, Zambia observes William Tordoff provided Nkomo "with legal and secretarial assistance". Divisions and mistrust grew both within the frontline states and the national liberation movements of the then Rhodesia.

"The ANC divisions grew, making it not only difficult but increasingly impossible to restitch its unity: not only did Nkomo decide to make an open bid for the leadership by manipulating his position as the last remaining veteran nationalist politician in Rhodesia, but a dissident section of Sithole's ZANU, led by Robert Mugabe, adopted an openly hostile attitude to Zambia and against the entire initiative of seeking peaceful change in Rhodesia".<sup>14</sup>

The so-called "dissident" group denounced the Muzorewa - Sithole leadership from their Mgagao camp in Tanzania:

"These men have proved to be completely hopeless and ineffective as leaders of the Zimbabwe revolution ....these men have done nothing to promote the struggle for liberation of Zimbabwe, but, on the other hand, they have done everything to hamper the struggle. They have no interest in the revolution or the people at heart, but only their personal interests. They cherish an insatiable lust for power".<sup>15</sup>

Once again, more cheated than anything else, the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois regimes of the frontline states relapsed into a state of silence until 1977.

In 1977 Kaunda openly came out against majority rule as a precondition for the settlement of the national-colonial problem of Zimbabwe. In September 1977 he began to argue that to hold elections in Rhodesia during a six-month transition preceding independence would only

exacerbate deep racial, tribal and clan tensions. Instead he believed that Zimbabwe should become independent with a Government of National Unity based on the Patriotic Front. In the same month he once again invited Smith to Lusaka to meet with Nkomo. Mugabe was greatly incensed by the meeting and he accused Kaunda of acting behind his back and spreading disunity in the ranks of the Patriotic Front. Although nothing came out of the meeting Kaunda declared that he was ready to meet Smith again in his search for a negotiated settlement. During all this period Seretse Khama of Botswana was constantly informed and he was rightly described as Kaunda's "close ally".<sup>16</sup>

Preference for a negotiated settlement did not and does not mean that Zambia and Botswana did not support in practice other forms of struggle against colonialism in Zimbabwe such as armed struggle, economic sanctions and the like. It should rather be understood to mean that all other forms of struggle were subordinated to that of negotiation. Thus taken on their own (other forms of struggle) Zambia and Botswana were inconsistent in supporting them. They only declared their support and actually did support other forms of struggle only when negotiations had disastrously failed - only as a way of pressurising the Smith regime

from without for a negotiated settlement. In other words these two countries did not believe that, for instance, armed struggle would recite out the racist regime nor would economic sanctions. These forms of struggle were simply to supplement the main form preferred by the neo-colonial petty bourgeois regimes that of negotiation.

In 1970 when ZAPU guerrillas opened up an offensive from the Zambezi border against Rhodesia, Kaunda intervened and deported 125 ZAPU guerrillas back to Rhodesia where they were gaoled, some were executed.<sup>17</sup> In 1975 Zambia detained several hundreds of ZANU's guerrillas. The guerrillas headed by Chitepo had refused any form of negotiations and on the night before Chitepo's death the latter bluntly refused Kaunda's pledges. The whole affair became revealed in ZANU's detailed reply to the chitepo report called The Price of Detente. In the report, it is stated that Zambia supported ZANU dissidents against those whom it detained because the former accepted Kaunda's peaceful methods to resolving the Rhodesian crisis:

"Zambian support for the dissidents arose from the fact that Sanyanga, a close friend and former classmate of Mark Chona, one of the key figures in the detente exercise, had convinced the Zambians that the dissidents would support Detente if they were allowed to gain control of ZAPU, and that it was in the interest of the Zambian



Government to remove the leaders known to be violently opposed to Detent."<sup>17</sup>

Later on the Commission of inquiry that had been appointed to look into chitepo's death confirmed the report of the supporters of ZANU.

Only when a negotiated effort had failed that Zambia declared its support for operations against Rhodesia. In December 1975 following the failure of the Victoria Falls, Kaunda "now recognised that guerrilla warfare was inevitable and pledged Zambia's support for operations against Rhodesia".<sup>18</sup> During such moments Kaunda did not hesitate to follow Nyerere and Machel's unswerving support for armed struggle. In September 1976, Zambia pledged its support for the "further intensification of the armed struggle in Zimbabwe".<sup>19</sup> With the Kissinger plan on the scene Kaunda saw it as a way to realise a negotiated settlement in Zimbabwe. He at this time saw the armed struggle as supplementary to that of his strategy in the national liberation struggle. William Tordoff was right when he summarised Kaunda's initiatives as follows:

"... it was above all his strategy that went wrong, relying as it did on a compromising contact within South Africa. Moreover, the fact that he with Mr. Vorster to achieve a break-through in Rhodesia has not made him any less stern a critic than previously

of South Africa's apartheid policy and the recent disturbances in Soweto and other of South Africa's black and coloured townships have further convinced him of the emptiness of that policy".<sup>20</sup>

That Zambia is anti-imperialist is beyond doubt. However, the character of neo-colonial classes towards the national liberation struggle is such that the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois regimes such as Zambia and Botswana prefer negotiations.

The history of economic sanctions towards the Smith regime, also testify to the inconsistent character of the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois regimes of the frontline states. At another time they apply economic sanctions and at another time, they relax the sanctions. R. Sutcliffe gives us an insight into Zambia's observance of economic sanctions from 1965 to 1966. In 1965, Zambia's imports from Rhodesia was worth about £35m. In 1966, the imports were worth about £23m.<sup>21</sup> Thus Zambia's actual "imports from Rhodesia in 1966 were less than half what they might have expected to be in the absence of sanctions."<sup>22</sup> In 1973, Zambia refused to reopen the border with Rhodesia. However, she reopened the border in 1978 arguing that Zambia's survival was at stake and that the

country needed to bring in vital supplies to keep production up. At the last minute Machel and Nyerere flew to Lusaka to try and persuade President Kaunda to change his mind and continue to seal off the border but to no avail:

"Nyerere was left close to tears as his old friend forcefully held his ground and refused to reconsider a decision that had driven a deep wedge of the two leaders and their countries. Reliable sources reported that Nyerere argued passionately that the border opening would weaken the liberation struggle in Rhodesia. The counter-argument was simple. Zambia's survival was at stake and past sacrifices could not be continued to the point of national ruin. To avoid collapse, the country needed speedy imports of fertilizer and industrial lubricants and a rapid export of copper to foreign markets".<sup>23</sup>

In 1969 Botswana only stopped the shipment of arms and other military equipment to Rhodesia through the Botswana railways. Every other shipment was allowed. President Khama even went further to state that he refused what he called unrealistic solutions framed in the United Nations "regardless of the consequences to us" and "unmindful of the repercussions to Botswana".<sup>24</sup>

That Zambia and Botswana supported the application of sanctions against the then racist regime of Zimbabwe, follows from their objective position as neo-colonial petty bourgeois regimes in the frontline states supported the sanctions

inconsistently and not totally as compared to the revolutionary democracies of the frontline states. Every class can find reasons to justify its own actions. The aim of the thesis is to avoid being an apologist of the actions of the conservative neo-colonial regimes towards the national liberation struggle and to show that their inconsistencies reflect their objective class positions in the neo-colonies vis-a-vis imperialism. Zambia and Botswana were not against the national liberation of Zimbabwe. The foregoing analysis only testifies to the fact that these countries supported in an inconsistent manner the national liberation of Zimbabwe and subordinated other forms of struggle to that of negotiations which they prefer, owing to their class position vis-a-vis imperialism.

### 7.3. MOZAMBIQUE'S STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION

Mozambique's national liberation struggle also testifies the preference to negotiations of the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois regimes of the frontline states and the subordination of other forms of struggle to negotiations. When in 1972, the armed struggle in Mozambique under FRELIMO led to the opening of yet another new offensive in the Manica e Sofala Province on 25 July 1972, sabotaging roads and rail links,

Zambia became alarmed. Kaunda used Malawi as an intermediary in 1973 to contact Lisbon as well as Jorge Jardim, a wealthy international capitalist. Jardim had served as Secretary of State for Commerce and Industry in the then Salazar Administration. He began a series of secret visits to Lusaka for discussions with Kaunda. It was Jardim who arranged first meetings with Kaunda, through the latter's long-time friend Lonrho's 'Tiny' Rowland.

Kaunda agreed with Portuguese envoys that FRELIMO should halt its armed struggle. Machel had just returned the third national conference of FRELIMO's defence department in Tete when Kaunda met him to give him the message from Portugal. Kaunda told Machel not to intensify the armed struggle, avoid bringing in sophisticated weapons into the war. He also proposed to Machel that FRELIMO should agree to the establishment of a 'moderate' FRELIMO inside Mozambique that could be used as a point of contact with Portugal. Kaunda also further informed Machel that Jardim wanted to meet him to know whether he was a communist. This request by Jardim was based on the assurances from Kaunda that Machel was not a communist but a nationalist. Machel, however, rejected all Kaunda's proposals. Machel explained

to Kaunda that Jardim was not just a businessman, but rather a politician and worse still a reactionary one. Machel warned Kaunda that the practical implementation of his proposals would raise a civil war in Mozambique. Machel stated that FRELIMO only wanted two forces (i.e. not a third force inside Mozambique to be used as a point of contact) to be involved in the Mozambique conflict, the Portuguese forces on one hand and itself FRELIMO on the other hand.

The preference for negotiations towards colonialism and above all reformism through support of 'moderate' nationalist movements cannot be more clear by the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois regimes of the frontline states. Such is the character of the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois regimes towards the national liberation struggle. If things went wrong the previous time, it is not their self-deception as a class, it is not their objective class nature of not analysing the relations of class forces (since they always forget class struggle) but some accident beyond their control

In the same year (1973) another of the secret contacts began. This time it was a British peer by the name of Lord Colyton. He acted as a link to introduce Kaunda to members of the

Portuguese armed forces serving in Mozambique. They travelled to Lusaka to see Kaunda. Kaunda recalls:

"I can't say what ranks they were .... And I can't say whether they were actually PIDE (the Portuguese secret police) trying to find out what we were flunking here. But they did come and I would say they were quite clear, clearer than Jardim, that this thing (Mozambique) was going to collapse and they were talking in terms of .... really I think they were talking of a trace".25

Lenin was right when he stated that "everyone sees in new conditions his own self (Lenin's emphasis)". The neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeoisie saw in the visit by PIDE (the Portuguese secret police) the necessity to advance their character towards the national liberation movement more forthrightly. Kaunda did not inform Machel on this meeting with PIDE men, perhaps believing that to do so would encourage FRELIMO to intensify the war. Yet this information was vital for FRELIMO.

"I didn't establish the identity of these people so I didn't want to bother Samora about it. I just mentioned it to Tiny Rowland, it showed that FRELIMO was certainly being effective".26

What could have contributed to the moral and hence the victory of the armed struggle, Kaunda kept a secret and did not tell Machel. However, what could have contributed to the weakening of the armed struggle, is what Kaunda told Machel.

"Senior FRELIMO officials ... confirm that they were not informed, and a Zambian who was a Cabinet Minister at the time said that FRELIMO were deliberately not informed because they would have opposed the negotiations (our emphasis). If FRELIMO had known about it, it would have been the end of it. The Portuguese officers were told that FRELIMO would not accept the negotiations because they could see victory in sight".<sup>27</sup>

He it is very clear that the inconsistency of the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois regimes in matters of armed struggle and their preference for a negotiated settlement reveals their objective basis as a class to have its hegemony in the national liberation movement recognised by the other anti-imperialist forces. This one sided-emphasis does nothing other than giving ammunition to the imperialist forces to thwart the complete victory of the national liberation struggle and settle for neo-colonialism.

The confidential memorandum dated 12 September 1973 entitled "Zambia's View of Trends in Portuguese Territories" reveals deeply the tendency of the



neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois regimes to compromise even on independence during negotiations. The first thing that strikes the reader of the memorandum is the use of the concept "Territories" instead of "colonies". This may have been intended not to offend the Portuguese, but there is hardly any doubt that is reformism from the point of view of complete national liberation of which FRELIMO was aiming at. Once reformist, all the way reformism. Thus another compromise or reform was about the nature of FRELIMO. The memorandum stated that national movements such as FRELIMO should be recognised as an important political factor "whose assistance in the formulation of future political framework cannot be ignored".<sup>28</sup>

To state that FRELIMO had to be recognised as an important force instead of the only force (OAU position) was complete reformism towards the Portuguese fascists. The formulation shows that Zambia was not thinking at the time in terms of FRELIMO overthrowing Portuguese colonialism but rather that the movement be included in a future government of Mozambique. This testifies to the character of the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois character towards the national liberation movement, that or reformism.

Zambia continued to make commitments to Portugal on behalf of FRELIMO without the latter being aware. In the October 1974 de-tente "Scenario" which we have mentioned already entitled "Towards the Summit: An Approach to Peaceful Change in Southern Africa" Zambia made the following commitments on behalf of FRELIMO.<sup>29</sup>

1. FRELIMO undertakes to reaffirm its policy of non-aggression against South Africa and will not allow its territory to be used by mercenaries and insurgents against South Africa;
2. FRELIMO undertakes to reaffirm its policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other independent countries including South Africa;

In relationship to point one, it now seems strange that after FRELIMO concluded the Nkomati Accord that President Kaunda should have expressed reservations. On the contrary, to be consistent, he should have fully supported it. But then, it is not in the nature of the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois regimes to be consistent. This confirms their class position between the bourgeoisie and the working class manifested in vacillation in politics towards the national

liberation struggle.

When Machel later learnt of the secret contacts, he became so annoyed that he refused to talk to Kaunda although, Mozambique had by then joined as a member of the frontline states. A correspondent in Zambia wrote in August 1976 that:

"Only a year ago, Samora Machel ... refused even to speak to Kaunda. Nyerere was reported as having to scuffle back and forth carrying messages when they met ... Now the situation is very different, with state visits every few weeks, smiling posed photographs, and even amazing statement by Kaunda that he would be willing to step down to allow Machel to become joint head of state of Mozambique and Zambia (not surprisingly no more was heard of this)".<sup>30</sup>

President Khama stayed in the background throughout the Mozambique national liberation struggle until the April, 1974 Portuguese coup. The sudden statement he made shows that he had not expected quick results in the national liberation of Mozambique.

"July 20, 1974, he attacked the 'indecision of the new Portuguese regime, from which bold and forthright policies' had been expected. He pointed out that the pledge by independent African countries in the Lusaka manifesto to persuade the liberation movements to end their guerrilla war was entirely dependent on the condition of 'total and unconditional independence'. If this was not met the war would continue, for 'there can neither be surrender or compromise on the objective of liberation'.<sup>31</sup>

Engels (analysing the petty bourgeois) was right that once the petty bourgeois see that danger is far away, they swear to stand or fall with the Frankfurt Assembly and take property and life for the Imperial Constitution. Only here there is no imperial constitution to struggle for but the national liberation struggle of Mozambique.

Khama who had made it state policy to arrest and deport guerrillas now swore to stand and fall with the national liberators in Mozambique after seeing that the period of hot pursuits were now over, with the April 1974 coup. This can hardly be said to have been the stand of revolutionary democracies.

On economic relations with Mozambique Kaunda did not cut off any links with colonial Mozambique as Tanzania did. Instead, he openly sought trade with colonial Mozambique. Thus soon after UDI, Kaunda had written to the Portuguese fascist dictator, Dr. Antonio Salazar, seeking increased access for trade from his landlocked country, west over the Benquela railway through Angola's port of Lobito and east through Malawi to the port of Beira.<sup>32</sup> The Portuguese naturally agreed in spite of the fact that the FRELIMO guerrillas and armaments were travelling through Zambia to the Tete and Manica e Sofala fronts.

This shows that in the absence of an international embargo, the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois regimes do not take any initiatives on themselves to use economic sanctions as a form of pressure against imperialism and in favour of the national liberation movement.

#### 7.4 ANGOLA'S STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION

Angola once more reveals with more clarity the preference of the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois regimes of a negotiated settlement. Indeed their aversion to armed struggle played into the hands of the imperialist forces headed by the United States of America. Their (neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois regimes) preference for a negotiated settlement was utilised by the imperialist bourgeois states for the purposes of installing a neo-colonial regime in Angola.

Since 1972 Kaunda had urged for the unification of the three movements of the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA and as usual, going by appearances (a typical mode of judgement of the petty bourgeois) he had agreed about the "leadership qualities of Savimbi".<sup>33</sup> In June 1974 Kaunda offered Lusaka as a venue for unification of the three factions of MPLA. However in August the attempted unification

broke down over who was to be elected the leader. In fact its even more correct to state that the unification failed because the compromising national bourgeoisie under Chipenda could not agree to come under the revolutionary democracy under Neto. Neto walked out and went to Angola to call for MPLA congress and seek his mandate. He stated that the Lusaka conference had been imposed on MPLA. Kaunda was incensed at Neto's failure to reach a negotiated settlement.

From 1974 onwards Kaunda supported the Chipendu faction not so much because of a changed attitude towards armed struggle but because he wanted to paralyse the MPLA's armed struggle. He obstructed the transportation of "supplies to the MPLA in 1975".<sup>34</sup> He also permitted the provision of arms to UNITA and South African interference was encouraged. Zambia's coordination with the United States was a significant feature of its policies at this time. Thus, not surprisingly, "Kaunda consulted with President Ford in Washington in April 1975".<sup>35</sup>

While condemning the Soviet Union and Cuba, Kaunda refused to condemn the U.S.A. for providing arms to UNITA and FNLA let alone condemn South Africa invasion of Angola. On 28 January 1976, Kaunda declared a state of emergency to deal with revolutionary democrats particularly from the

University who were opposing his stand. Five University lecturers were detained and some 20 students and the University was closed.

The inconsistency of the neo-colonial petty bourgeois regimes was utilised by the imperialist propagandists for the sake of thwarting the complete victory of the national liberation struggle in Angola under the MPLA. The Lusaka office of the UNITA was thus an arena to attack the MPLA and its allies. For instance, one of the Lusaka fabrications accused Cuban soldiers of committing atrocities in Angola. It mentioned rape and pillage. Later on the office stated that some of the soldiers had been captured and tried before a tribunal of Ovumbando women. Lusaka Broadcasting House on behalf of UNITA kept this story running endlessly throughout the programme. UNITA's Lusaka office ran intelligence - gathering teams into Sila Parto, "coordinated with President Kaunda of Zambia and with Savimbi and contributed to the propaganda campaign".<sup>36</sup> Thus not infrequently, the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois character of subordination of other methods of struggle to that of negotiations, is utilized by the imperialist forces to advance their own interests by installing reformist regimes. At the OAU summit Botswana and Zambia voted for a Government of National

Unity. Zambia went even further and refused to recognise the MPLA government in February 1976. It was only in April 1976 that Zambia finally recognised the MPLA government.

#### 7.5. NAMIBIA'S STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION

The national liberation of Namibia is bound to reveal more inconsistency and contradictions towards the national liberation movements by the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois regimes of the frontline states. Indeed such inconsistencies and contradictions may no doubt play into the hands of the imperialist forces to realise their ends.

In Kaunda's de'tente 'scenarios'<sup>37</sup> South Africa was asked to reaffirm its policy of self-determination in accordance with the will of the majority. Secondly, to guarantee SWAPO freedom as a movement in Namibia. Thirdly, to cease floggings and other forms of corporal punishment. Fourthly, at the highest level to urge Namibians outside the country to return and participate in normal "political activities".

Reformism in the above outlined demands by Zambia is evident on closer examination. The position of the UN and the OAU is that SWAPO is the only authentic representative of the people



of Namibia. To state as the "Scenario" does that SWAPO is one of the liberation movements is a concession to the plans of the imperialist bourgeoisie of utilizing the compromising national bourgeoisie to realise a neo-colonial solution. Secondly, the 'Scenario' does not mention the release of political prisoners on Robben Island and elsewhere. Thirdly, the 'scenario' does not mention the Walvis Bay which South Africa has claimed to be an integral part of its territory and hence should not be included in the final settlement. Fourthly, the 'scenario' does not mention the necessity of South Africa to handover the territory to the U.N.

It is interesting to note that Zambia was asked to chase SWAPO out of the country in so far as bases were concerned. Thus while South Africa did not meet any of the conditions, Zambia met her condition. Soon SWAPO (thanks to its divisions at the time) received a letter from the Zambian Government signed by the Minister of State for Defence, General Kingsley Chinkuli, ordering them to stop fighting from Zambia. SWAPO moved and established its base in Angola in 1976.<sup>38</sup>

## 7.6 SOUTH AFRICA'S STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION

If the national liberation of Namibia is revealing more inconsistencies and contradictions of the behaviour or attitude of the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois of the frontline states then that of South Africa will intensify them. The strategy of preference towards negotiations has been maintained. The Lusaka Manifesto talks of the Union of South Africa as an independent sovereign state and a member of the UN. It is recognised as being highly developed and richer than any other nation in Africa. The manifesto states further that although legally the internal matters in the Republic are a matter exclusively for the people of South Africa, nevertheless world cannot help getting involved in its affairs because of its apartheid policies.

Zambia and Botswana have emphasized the content of the manifesto for peaceful solution and thus have refused to provide bases to the Mkonto We Sizwe, the military wing of the ANC. Kaunda went ahead to meet Prime Minister Botha of South Africa in 1982 with Botswana's cooperation. The ensuing communique stated that there was a frank exchange of views on the southern Africa

situation. It further states of a determination in search for peaceful solutions to the problems of the sub-continent particularly with regard to Namibia and South Africa. During the meeting, Kaunda's caravan was on the Botswana border while Botha's was in his country's side.<sup>39</sup>

### 7.7 SUMMARY

We have testified the fact that the objective position of the conservative petty bourgeois regimes of the frontline states in neo-colonies compels them to take an anti-imperialist stand. As a class fraction, they cannot but obey the general characteristics of the petty bourgeois in the political movements of which the anti-imperialist political struggle is one aspect which we have singled out.

CHAPTER 8

8. CONFLICT AND CO-OPERATION AMONG  
FRONTLINE STATES

8.1 INTRODUCTION

The conflict between revolutionary democracies and the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois regime within the frontline states becomes evident when the often revolutionary approach towards the national liberation struggle of revolutionary democracies does not coincide with the often reformist and inconsistent approach of the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois regimes towards the national liberation struggle. The area of co-operation has been in the economic field. This co-operation culminated in the formation of the Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) in July 1979 in Tanzania. As shall be shown, this economic co-operation verifies our thesis which is that the essence of the national liberation movement is to crush the central forces of the enemy opposing the country's economic development, while appropriating its productive forces and developing them further on a democratic line.

8.2 AREA OF CONFLICT

The conflict amongst members of the frontline states becomes latent and sometimes open, when the

character towards the solution of democratic tasks vis-a-vis imperialism often by revolutionary means on the part of revolutionary democracies does not coincide with the character towards the solution of the same often by reformist and inconsistent means on the part of the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois regimes.

On Rhodesia the strategy and tactics of revolutionary democracies of the frontline states did not always coincide with those of the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois regimes in areas of armed struggle, diplomacy, economic sanctions and negotiations. On armed struggle, the conflict became apparent when Kaunda in seeking to achieve a negotiated settlement had to detain hundreds of ZANU guerrillas under Herbert Chitepo who were opposed to detente. These guerrillas had refused any kind of negotiations which President Kaunda had initiated. Nyerere and Machel had to fly to Lusaka and intervene on behalf of the ZANU guerrillas. They were later released. On another occasion during the height of de tente President Kaunda became furious that Chitepo told a Guardian correspondent while on a flight to Lusaka in the presence of Nyerere that:

"There will be no talks, no negotiations, no discussions involving our movement until Mr Smith recognises the right to immediate majority rule. That is not majority rule tomorrow, next week, next year or whatever, it is now. Until we hear that man, the rebel leader of the rebel regime, speak those words our war goes on and it will continue until we have liberated every acre of our country ... We are not going to be bound by whatever is decided in Lusaka, great as if our respect for the leaders who are gathering there and who have helped us so much in the past"1

There was hardly any doubt that Chitepo's remarks being made in the presence of Nyerere gained the latter's approval but were greeted with furiousness by Kaunda.

Economic sanctions against Rhodesia imposed by the UN General Assembly was another area in which the revolutionary democracies whose approach to sanctions was often revolutionary came into conflict with the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois regime whose approach towards sanctions was often inconsistent. In 1973 Smith closed the boarder with Zambia. When he re-opened it, Zambia refused to do so and instead closed its side of the border. There was thus unity of purpose amongst the frontline states. Revolutionary democracies greeted Zambia's action as tightening sanctions. However, in 1978 at the height of sanctions, Zambia reopened the border on the argument that her survival was at stake and it

was necessary to reopen the border to bring in much needed goods. At this point there was no coincidence. James McManus reported:

"Nyerere was left close to tears as his old friend forcefully held his ground and refused to reconsider a decision that has driven a deep wedge of the two leaders and their countries. Reliable sources reported that Nyerere argued passionately that the border opening would weaken the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. The counter-argument was simple. Zambia's survival was at stake and post sacrifices could not be continued to the point of national ruin. To avoid collapse, the country needed speedy imports of fertilizer and industrial lubricants, and a rapid export of copper to foreign markets."<sup>2</sup>

Kaunda did not give in. He reopened the border. Thus conflicts over implementation of economic sanctions became now open and now hidden owing to the often inconsistency methods of the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois regimes and the often revolutionary approach to implementation of sanctions by revolutionary frontline democracies.

Diplomacy and negotiations as forms of struggle were other areas in which revolutionary democracies came into conflict with the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois regimes of the frontline states when there was no coincidence. Here one must point to the

unprincipled approach of the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois regimes in engaging into negotiations. Hence, their voluntarist approach in taking initiatives for negotiations. This approach did not always please revolutionary democracies who on principle stated that negotiations presupposed the acceptance by the colonial powers on the necessity in principle of majority rule. They were united on this stand. Thus for them, negotiations could only be about the mechanisms of transfer of power upon the releasing of jailed nationalists who had to take part in the negotiations.

Zambia took the initiative to open secret negotiations with Vorster and Smith in 1975 on a Voluntarist basis since there was no indication that Smith had accepted the principle of majority rule. The pre-conditions which were embodied in the Lusaka manifesto were thus ignored, even if they had been defended by the OAU in 1971 when Kaunda was its chairman. The conflict became apparent when Kaunda was questioned by Nyerere and Machel whether Smith had really accepted the principle of majority rule to which Mark Chona (Kaunda's Airate political assistance) gave a positive reply. However, at the Victoria Falls talks it became evident that Smith had not accepted



the principle of majority rule. The talks were thus deadlocked on the issue of majority rule. This brought Nyerere and Machel closer together and soon after issued a statement stating that the only alternative was armed struggle.

"Kaunda embarked on a number of unilateral initiatives which at times separated him from his closest colleagues Nyerere and Machel ... Kaunda's policies differed from those of his colleagues and especially from Nyerere's over his championing of Nkomo as the major leader within the Patriotic Front and his doubts about the wisdom of insisting on elections before independence"<sup>3</sup>

There was also differences over the role of the United States in the settlement of Rhodesia. Nyerere in 1977 insisted that it was not wise that the US should take over Britain's role in Rhodesia. Kaunda on the other hand told Andy Young that he believed that Britain lacked "the will and ability to fulfil their proper role in Rhodesia" and suggested to young that it was up "to the US to decide how to do it"<sup>4</sup>.

On Mozambique the areas of conflict were similar to those of Rhodesia. On armed struggle Tanzania was fully supporting the armed struggle until the fall of the Portuguese faciets in April 1974, Zambia owing to its preference for negotiations was used to thwart the armed struggle. Such was the case when following the meeting with Jorge

Jardim, Kaunda met Machel during which he laid down Jorge Jardim's plan for Mozambique namely, to persuade FRELIMO not to intensify the war and not to bring sophisticated weapons in the war. Machel's rejections of Jardim's proposals must have been fully reported to Nyerere by Machel. Indeed Machel became so annoyed that he refused to talk to Kaunda. Nyerere knowing well the situation had to act as a messenger between Kaunda and Machel by taking messages to each of them from the other, whenever they met.

Economic sanctions against facist ruled mozambique was another area of conflict (latent though). Nyerere had completely severed economic relations with Mozambique. Kaunda on the other hand wrote to the Portuguese regime in 1973 seeking access and trade with Mozambique. Salazar welcomed Kaunda's request and Zambia (inspite of the armed struggle in Mozambique) began to export and import its goods through Mozambique.<sup>5</sup>

During the national liberation of Angola the conflict began after the invasion of Angola by South Africa in 1975. After that invasion Nyerere joined Machel to support the MPLA government. At the OAU conferece in 1976 both Nyerere and Machel voted in favour of the Angolan government under the MPLA. They both supported the presence of Soviet Union advisers and Cuban

troops to drive out the invaders, Kaunda and Khama supported a government of national unity. While Kaunda condemned Cuban presence in Angola, he refused to condemn the US and South Africa help to UNITA and FNLA. Instead he actively helped to deliver arms to UNITA. Kaunda even went further as to deny recognition to the MPLA government. As one reporter put it:

"The Angolan affair was especially painful to Kaunda because .... he found himself taking a different position from that of his close friend and ally, Julius Nyerere. They had worked since 1972 to try and bring the three Angolan movements together, and they had agreed about the leadership qualities of Savimbi Nyerere recognised MPLA together with Mozambique"<sup>6</sup>

The liberation of Namibia may reveal more conflicts between revolutionary democracies and the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois regimes. Already the conflict is becoming apparent over the implementation of U.N. Resolution 435. For instance South Africa is pressing the joint Military Commission between Angola and South Africa to monitor a Namibian ceasefire between the South African Defence and the Peoples National Liberation Army (PLAN) the military wing of SWAPO. This is essential to South Africa's plan of watering down the UN presence in Namibia in favour of a "regional" monitoring force. Says one report:

"President Kenneth Kaunda, together with the leaders of a group of Francophone countries - Gabon, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Togo - have provisionally agreed to back such a solution .... Kaunda who is a strong candidate to be the next OAU Chairman, would be able to secure wide backing for the scheme."<sup>7</sup>

Such are the facts as reported to the Africa Confidential.

In the case of South Africa, there has already occurred conflicts between revolutionary democracies and the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois regimes. Kaunda embarked on a voluntarist move to negotiate with Mr Botha, the Prime minister of South Africa even without the pre-conditions of the 1969 Lusaka Manifesto which state that for negotiations to take place, Vorster must accept the principle of majority rule. Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Tanzania criticized Zambia's moves. Botswana actively collaborated with Zambia by offering facilities for the meeting. The Zambian delegation sat on the soil of Botswana while that of Botha sat on the soil of South Africa.

### 8.3 AREAS OF CO-OPERATION

#### 8.3.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE EMERGENCE OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICA DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION CONFERENCE (SADCC)

#### 8.3.2 INTRODUCTION

The emergence of the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) confirms our entire thesis in that it testifies to the struggle between an oppressor or oppressor nations (the colonialists) and the colonial or neo-colonial countries. It the relation between economics of imperialism and its superstructure. SADCC expresses a social contradiction against the colonial policies of imperialism. SADCC expresses the objective necessity of doing away with oppressive policies of imperialism while at the same time appropriating the fruits of the productive forces brought forth by international capitalism and further developing them. The representatives of the neo-colonial national bourgeoisie in Malawi, together with a coalition of neo-colonial national bourgeoisie and feudal forces in Lesotho and Swaziland have joined forces with the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois regimes of Botswana and Zambia and those of revolutionary democracy of Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania and

Zimbabwe to develop the productive forces on a democratic platform vis-a-vis colonialism. It is our firm conviction that whoever fails to take into account the distinction between the oppressor and oppressed nations denies himself or herself the only correct basis for understanding the emergence of SADCC over the so-called constellation of states advanced by the South Africa racist regime inspite of its strong capitalist economic base.

The greatest impact of the colonial policy of imperialism manifested through the various governments of South Africa on the development of the productive forces has been on Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS) and to a lesser extent on the rest of the SADCC members. Owing to the rapid development of capitalism in South Africa (thanks to its natural resource endowment which attracted massive international capital), the BLS and to a lesser extent other SADCC member states became cheap labour reserves. They at the same time became markets for the sale of goods and services produced by the South African capitalist economy. Finally they became arenas for the expansion of both national and international capital from South Africa. The superstructure or

rather the socio-politics of colonialism, reinforced the objective necessity of the capitalist mode of production of South Africa thereby thwarting the development of capitalism in the SADCC members. For instance, as shall be shown soon the regime of South Africa enacted the South African Act of 1909 between the BLS and itself which formally came into operation on 3 May 1910 under the customs union. Customs union implies the eradication of tariffs within the area while retaining an external tariff. South Africa also concluded agreements with Rhodesia, Malawi, Mozambique and Angola. It also continued to influence greatly the economy of Zambia particularly after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by Rhodesia on 11 November 1965.

The national colonial bourgeoisie of South Africa enacted the South African Act of 1909 and it came legally in force in 1910. This agreement provided for the pooling together of the revenues collected from customs and excise duties of the BLS countries and those of South Africa. The distribution was fixed at 1.31 per cent of the collected revenue for the BLS countries and the rest was taken up by South Africa. Let us look at the following table to illustrate the point:

Table 8.1 Distribution of Customs and Excise Revenue Under the 1910 Potchefstroom Agreement

Country	Percentage Share	Total Share
South Africa	98.68 903	of
Lesotho (Busutoland)	0.88 575	BLS = 1.31097
Botswana (Bechunaland)	0.27 622	
Swaziland	<u>0.14 900</u>	
	<u>100</u>	

Source: Peter Robinson: "Economic Integration in South Africa" in The Journal of Modern African Studies, 5, 5(1967), P 474. The national colonial bourgeoisie of South Africa kept this fixed rate for 25 years inspite of the development of capitalism in each of the BLS which influenced their exports to the Republic of South Africa. It is generally known that the dissolution of household pre-capitalist production compels the population (itself differentiating into classes) to buy and sell. It meant that the BLS oppressed population could not but increase their volume of exports to the Republic of South Africa in exchange for imports. Being at a fixed rate, the Customs Union was thus an outright body for robbery of the revenue which was supposed to accrue to the BLS countries.



As if that was not enough, the rural colonial bourgeoisie pressed the South African government to impose quotas on South African imports from the three countries for the purposes of advancing its class interests. This was particularly so for cattle which was the major export in all the three countries. This was in spite of the clauses in the so-called Customs Union agreement which provided for "free trade" free interchange of goods". Donald Kalinde Kowet observes that after the 1909 quarantine was lifted;

"... South African farmers immediately sought government restrictions to protect their own cattle; consequently quotas were imposed the following year through "weight" restrictions on all cattle from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. There were no abattoirs in these countries (until Botswana's only abattoir was opened in 1954 and Swaziland's in 1965). This meant that all cattle had to be driven live to South Africa for marketing."<sup>9</sup>

The action of the South African government under pressure from the national colonial rural bourgeoisie worsened the development of productive forces in the BLS countries. Since revenue depended upon exports to South Africa, it meant a further loss of revenue.

The national colonial manufacturing bourgeoisie did no lesser damage on the development of productive forces amongst the BLS countries. They pressed on the government of South Africa to impose

restrictions on the importation of manufactured goods into the country. In 1925, for instance, duty was imposed on cotton and blankets. The only commodity allowed into South Africa free of charge was labour power from the BLS countries free of charge from the other SAADCC countries as table 8.2 illustrates.

TABLE 8.2: Estimated Total Employment, Earnings and Remittances of Foreign African Workers in the Republic of South Africa

	Total No. of workers	Earnings in millions of Dollars	Remittances in millions of Dollars
Mozambique	115,000	53.2	10.3
Rhodesia	27,000	10.0	1.5
Angola	11,000	4.7	0.9
Zambia	11,000	5.0	0.8
South West Africa	2,000	0.8	0.1
Malawi	82,000	30.8	5.7
Swaziland	18,000	6.3	1.1
Lesotho	164,000	58.3	10.2
Botswana	52,000	18.3	3.2
Other African	26,000	11.2	2.3
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>530,000</u>	<u>188.6</u>	<u>36.1</u>

Source: Eschel M. Rhoodie "Southern Africa Towards Commonwealth" in Christian P. Potholm and Richard Dale (ends), Southern African in

Perspective (New York: The Free Press 1972)

P.2 89.

There was also a non-formal agreement on monetary union between the Republic and the BLS countries which reflected the cunningness of the national colonial bourgeoisie of South Africa to suck the BLS countries. The BLS countries are treated as residents of the Rand Currency and hence no restrictions exist on payments between the BLS countries and South Africa. The branches of international financial bourgeoisie extend into the BLS countries from South Africa and regulate loans and credits based upon the interests of the South African economy. The regime of South Africa is at liberty to adjust the Rand in anyway without consulting the BLS countries. This in spite of the adverse effect this might have upon the BLS countries. In 1971, South Africa for instance, devalued its currency without any consultations with the BLS countries. This does nothing but retard the development of productives forces in the BLS owing to the colonial (undemocratic) policies of the racist regime of South Africa.

The pace of the national liberation movements in the BLS compelled the British Government to review the Customs Union in 1965.

Unfortunately South Africa was not affected by the readjustment. Instead, it was Lesotho which had its share of revenue reduced as the table 8.3 shows.

Table 8.3 Distribution Customs and Excise Revenue Under the Lewes Formula of 1965.

Country	Percentage
Botswana	0.30971
Lesotho	0.47093
Swaziland	0.53033
Total	1.31097

Source: Donald Kalinde Kowet, Land, Labour Migration and Politics in Southern Africa: Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. (Uppsala, The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies 1978) P114.

South Africa's share remained the same at 98.7 per cent of the total revenue, thanks to the colonial policies of retarding the development of productive forces of the BLS countries by the national colonial bourgeoisie of South Africa.

8.3.3. THE SITUATION AFTER INDEPENDENCE AND BEFORE THE EMERGENCE OF SADCC

Although the national colonial bourgeoisie of South Africa did everything to thwart the

development of capitalism, commodity economy based upon capitalism stimulated the national movement against colonialism which was opposing the BLS countries objective development. Upon independence the BLS spokesmen did not hesitate to state their opposition to the Customs Unions. Botswana made it clear that whilst the Customs Agreement relieved her of the burden of costly administration, the increased revenue accruing to the exchequer from the source was not related to the growth in economic activity within the country. The Botswana Government pointed to the high protective duties imposed by the racist regime of South Africa to protect its industry which did nothing but diminish the total revenue collected and the revenue accruing to herself. The Botswana Government thus pledged to negotiate with the racist regime a more equitable customs agreement. Lesotho indirectly stated its dissatisfaction when it pointed out that the Customs Union had not led to rapid economic expansion in Lesotho whereas it had done so for the racist regime of South Africa. Swaziland complained of certain limitations on its country's freedom of action in matters of economic and fiscal policy imposed by the Customs Unions. It is clear that neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois leaders of

Botswana sought in collaboration with the neo-colonial national bourgeoisie in coalition with the feudal forces in Lesotho and Swaziland a common strategy to confront the national colonial bourgeois leaders of South Africa, with a view to accelerating the productive forces.

The national colonial bourgeoisie in South Africa sought to exploit the contradictions or rather the competition between the representatives of various entrepreneurs of the BLS to prevent a "holly" alliance. They hoped that the 1965 agreement which deprived Lesotho of revenue could be further aggravate the contradictions within the BLS. Already Botswana and Swaziland according to the economic surveys of the early seventies showed rich natural resource endowment. This was not the case with Lesotho. Hence, the latter's caution in its statement above against the Customs Union. However, the natural greed of the national colonial bourgeoisie of South Africa at the last minute led to the alliance of neo-colonial BLS countries against her. South Africa demanded to influence the capitalist industrialisation policies in exchange for a more favourable Customs Agreement. By this request, it meant that the racist regime of South Africa wanted to influence the introduction of those industries which would not compete with her own

industries. The bourgeois press picked it and released the news. Secondly the racist regime had accepted the Franzen Commission's<sup>10</sup> recommendations that sales tax on its exports to BLS countries on manufactured goods be imposed. This meant that BLS's imports would be more costly. The BLS countries were thus united to reverse the trends. Hence the 1969 Customs Union Agreement.

The 1969 Customs Union Agreement testifies to the correctness of our thesis, namely, that the struggle against colonialism is intended to clear away the central forces opposing the country's objective development. Thanks to the victory over colonialism in the BLS countries the latter sought to win certain reforms from the racist regime of South Africa for the purposes of accelerating the development of productive process in their respective countries. Looked at closely the reforms were not sweeping, but nevertheless they were an advance over the 1910 and 1965 customs Agreements which was possible only because of the victory over colonialism within the BLS.

The 1969 agreement called for diversification of productive forces in the BLS. It thus recognised the need for encouraging the development of the less advanced members of the Customs Union. It called

for firstly distribution of revenues. Secondly, for free exchange of goods. Thirdly it called for consultations amongst members. Fourthly, it provided for trade with non-members of the Union. Finally, it called for the protection of infant industries in the less developed regions. Looked at closely, the reforms were not for reaching. For instance let us look at the shares accruing to each member.

TABLE 8.4 Distribution of Customs and Excise.  
Renue under the 1969 Agreement

Country	Percentage
Botswana	0.74
Lesotho	0.89
Swaziland	0.95
Total	2.58'
South Africa	97.42

Source: Donald Kalinde Kowet Land Labour Migration and Politics in Southern Africa:

Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland op.cit P 117

There is hardly any doubt that the racist regime of South Africa retained the large share. A much more favourable agreement would have been to redistribute income by fiscal means towards the BLS by South Africa, or favourable markets



for the BLS in South Africa and the need to aid the infant industries by South Africa in the BLS. But this is utopia under the national colonial bourgeoisie of South Africa. Hence the limitedness of the reforms. Article 5 of the agreement calls for consultations amongst the Customs Union members before imposing, amending, and abrogating any customs duty. Nevertheless this does not apply if the intended action forms part of the measures designed for fiscal purposes.

The ruling BLS classes have particularly paid attention to the development of productive forces, thanks to independence.

The following data speaks for itself. Capital promotion for Botswana has arisen from R7m in 1965 to R 55.2m in 1971/2. New investments have been covered by foreign loans and grants.

TABLE 8.5 Capital Formation for Botswana

	1965	1966	1967/8	1968/9	1971/2
Gross Fixed Capital formation (Rm)	7.2	8.1	9.9	9.9	55.2
As % of GDP	20.1	21.0	23.4	20.7	61.7

Source: David Jones. Aid and Development in

Southern Africa (London. Croom Helm 1977) P 84

Lesotho's capital formation estimated at R 4.1m in 1966/7 rose to R 6.6m in 1971/2. As for

Swaziland, the following is the picture

Table 8.6 Capital Formation for Swaziland

	(R'000)	
	1969/70	1970/1
Agriculture and forestry	2,548	3,104
Mining	1,009	1,906
Manufacturing	1,436	6,023
Transport and Communications	253	1,125
Community, Social and personal services	2,840	2,295
Other	1,371	1,696
Total	9,457	16,149

Source: David Jones: Aid and Development  
in Southern Africa op cit. P 225

There can be no doubt that the development of productive forces and thus the development of capitalism is accelerating in the BLS countries.

Looking at the development of productive forces since independence and hence the development of capitalism from the point of view of foreign trade, we get the following picture. For Botswana see table 8.7.

TABLE 817 Exports and Imports for Botswana

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969/70	1970/1	1971/2	1972/3
Exports	10.2	10.8	9.2	7.5	11.1	20.0	30.0	42.7
Imports	16.6	18.8	22.4	23.2	34.3	44.8	62.7	85.1
Deficit	6.4	8.0	13.2	15.7	21.2	24.8	32.7	42.4

\* Estimate

Source: David Jones. Aid and Development in Southern Africa op.cit. P 84

For Lesotho, table 8.8 tells the story.

Table 8.8 Exports and Imports for Lesotho (R'000

	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Exports	4,387	5185	4188	4891	4237	3014	6093	8604
Imports	22917	23800	23930	23907	22876	27997	42972	60479
Deficit	18530	18615	19750	19016	18639	24983	36879	51875

Source: David Jones Aid and Development in Southern Africa op. cit P. 167

Discrepancies between exports, imports and balance appear in original source for years 1966, 1965, 1970 be revised.

Finally here is the data for Swaziland

Table 8.9 Imports and Exports for Swaziland

	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
Imports	35,027	34107	34355	42,749	47824	51309
Domestic Exports	40,232	39347	44518	50,202	56034	65485
Re-exports	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	522	655	1499
Visible balance	+5,205	+5243	+7163	+7975	+ 8865	13675

Source: David Jones. Aid and Development in Southern Africa op.cit P. 226

- a. The plan gives a balance of R7,555m but this appears to have been calculated by subtracting instead of adding re-exports.

Exports which are a manifestation of the development of productive forces, and hence of capitalism have no doubt increased over the years, thanks to independence.

#### 8.3.4 THE EMERGENCE OF SADCC

National liberation aims at sweeping away the central forces (colonialism) opposing the objective development of the country. Once Namibia and South Africa are freed, they will participate in SADCC on a democratic basis. Thus the creation of SADCC seems to verify our thesis which is that the aim of national liberation struggle was (in essence it is bourgeois in its social and economic content) to clear away the political forms that were retarding the development of the formerly oppressed countries.

The fact that revolutionary democracies of the frontline states were the first to take the initiative show that these states express nothing but the aspirations of the most radical

national petty bourgeoisie against imperialism.

Thus:

"Nyerere was largely responsible for conceiving the idea of co-operation among the black Southern African governments and it was his constant encouragement and inspiration that gave birth to SADCC"<sup>11</sup>

Indeed it was in Tanzania that SADCC was first founded. President Khama stated:

"We are gathered here today to try to chart a new course for the future of Southern Africa, or to launch a new type of struggle for liberation - economic liberation ... We can wage a successful struggle for economic liberation provided we can begin now, in the free states of Southern Africa, to plan together for our economic future."<sup>12</sup>

Even prior to SADCC the frontline states had entered into bilateral economic co-operation in an effort to isolate minority regimes for the purposes of enhancing the national liberation struggle. Such co-operation at the same time substituted goods and services from the minority regimes. One can cite the Tanzania Zambia railway link, road and oil pipelines and Mozambique - Zambia transport links.

SADCC<sup>13</sup> is intended to develop economic links in the region in a comprehensive manner in transport river development, economic co-ordination trade and production, and knowledge and finance.

The development of transport is bound to enhance the development of capitalism for the landlocked frontline states. For backward countries speedy transportation of commodities both of productive consumption and personal consumption from the ports is crucial to the maintenance of extended reproduction. At the same time it is crucial for the transportation of raw materials to overseas markets to earn foreign exchange.

So long as capitalist development has not deepened and broadened within SADCC it is only natural that transport should be given top priority (thanks to the racist regime) of South Africa. SADCC has encouraged the use of existing ventures such as the TANZAM railway, improvement of roads to border points through co-operation agreements.

New projects are yet to be developed. Botswana for instance, has extensive coal reserves (10 million tonne mine). Export of coal requires the development of a deep water port. This is so even if capitalism will have deepened and broadened to the extent that more and more of the coal (an element of department I) will be consumed within the SADCC. It is the same with other raw materials in Botswana such as copper mines on Ngami Ridge, the build-up of commercial agriculture in Ngamiland, the

exploitation of Sua Pans salts all these require a development of communications through an independent Namibia.

For Zimbabwe a Botswana Namibia route would ease her problems of outlet to the sea. A rail link can be built between Selebi - Pikwe through Windhoek to Walvis Bay. All this is possible under SADCC.

In 1980/81 transport and communications had been allocated over 338 million dollars of which 273m dollars was to come from external sources and 65 million dollars from internal sources. By 1982, over half of the projects were in some stage of implementation. With this the volume of work, SADCC introduced the Southern African Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC) with a all-time professional staff to supervise the operations.

River development is another natural area of co-operation in the region. Use of electricity in the development of productive forces cheapens the end products. Electrification enlightens labour in homes. River development is also useful in other areas of production such as agriculture.

In the region there can be joint development by more than two states of the already existing

complexes such as Kareba Dam and the Cabora Bassa Dam. Angola and Namibia can develop the Ruacana Falls Dam. All rivers bordering or transiting Northern Namibia arises in Angola or Zambia. One of these rivers, the Okavango is crucial for the development of agriculture in Botswana. Namibia and Angola can jointly use the Cunene river for irrigation. Already the co-operation between Mozambique and Tanzania to co-ordinate programmes for the Ruvuma Basin shows that such developments in the region are inevitable.

Besides reducing dependence on South Africa while at the same time enhancing the national liberation struggle, such projects deepen and broaden the development of productives forces in the regions.

The large market created by SADC will intensify the competition of the already existing national companies, state corporations and multinational corporations. All countries in the region will easily acquire elements of Department I and Department II without need for foreign exchange. At the moment lack of foreign exchange is the main obstacle to the development of productive forces. For instance, Zimbabwe has a high industrial capacity at the moment which would initially be made to meet shortages in other countries. This



can be achieved by reaching agreements on specific targets, prices and provision of annual clearings. Such trade would not only enhance the development of productive forces in Zimbabwe, but would also provide a breathing space for those countries whose production capacity had been impaired before the formation of SADCC. The modest trade existing at the moment between Mozambique and Tanzania shows how this can be done.

The development of capitalism requires credit facilities. The formation of SADCC has attracted financial houses in the entire capitalist world. The European Community has pledged to finance various projects. So has the World Bank. A Southern African Development Bank (if formed) will no doubt be crucial as well in financing some projects.

Another area of co-operation in the draining of manpower. Specialised training units can be established in various countries of the region to which students from respective countries can be trained. At the present moment it is expensive for each country to develop all the necessary educational institutions which are specialised such as mine artisans and Mine engineers.

From the foregoing it is clear that economies of scale, or large-scale production will cheapen the end products, be they productive or personal consumption. In other words the growth of productive forces will be ensured.

SADCC has assigned various projects for co-ordination to specific countries. Annual Disease Control is being co-ordinated by Botswana. Already a number of projects in the field of Vaccine production and cross-border control are being implemented. Food security is being co-ordinated by Zimbabwe. Technical assistance has already been acquired. Swaziland is co-ordinating Manpower Development. At the moment priority areas are being selected for joint co-ordination, as well as funding of separate specialised institutions. Tanzania has been assigned industrial co-ordination. Several concrete proposals are already underway. Angola is to co-ordinate energy. Zambia is to co-ordinate mining. Lesotho is to co-ordinate soil conservation and land utilisation, Botswana is to co-ordinate crop research while Malawi is to co-ordinate Fisheries, Wildlife and Forestry.

#### 8.3.5 SUMMARY

The conflict between revolutionary democracies and the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois regimes within the frontline states towards the national liberation struggle occurs when the often

revolutionary approach of the former does not coincide with the often reformist approach of the latter. However, being objectively anti-imperialist, they have co-operated on the economic front. This has verified our thesis that the national liberation struggle is designed to sweep away the central forces (imperialism) that is opposing the country's objective development while appropriating the fruits of the productive forces inherited from international capitalism. The history preceding SADCC and SADCC itself has confirmed our thesis to the last detail. We must now in the next chapter summarise the entire thesis.

## CHAPTER 9.

C O N C L U S I O N

The national liberation struggle is an objective process arising out of oppressive external capitalism. The national liberation struggle seeks to overthrow the central forces of colonialism which pose as an obstacle for the free development of class forces created by international capitalism. Thus the national liberation struggle is not aimed immediately at overthrowing capitalism. Rather it is aimed at clearing the path for the objective development of capitalism. Only in an independent state is class struggle broadened and transforms itself at certain stage into political struggles for the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat which is a political transition for the victory of socialism and hence the abolition of classes.

However, the class forces which are nationally oppressed have different characters when it comes to their participation in the struggle for national liberation. Some classes within the united front of all classes against imperialism begin to show reformism and tendency to strike a deal with imperialism particularly on the part of the national bourgeoisie. The more longer and intensive the struggle, the more the reformism of the national bourgeoisie turns into reactionary form. In order

that a complete victory of the national liberation takes place, the national movement is compelled to split into the revolutionary block of classes and the reformist part for the purposes of the objective requirements of the country. Thus the tactics of the united front are not absolute but relative.

Revolutionary democracy is the most radical wing against imperialism, composed of a bloc of classes and groups. These classes and groups break away from the united front as soon as the national bourgeoisie begin to consolidate their positions. The petty bourgeoisie socialism of this force, serves as a banner for the most determined struggle against imperialism. Thus revolutionary democracy should not be understood in isolation from the anti-imperialist struggle. It should not be understood to mean that there is such a democracy in the national set up. On the contrary, it must be understood in relation to the anti-imperialist struggle, namely in the attack against domestic foreign capital and in the anti-imperialist foreign policy. There is hardly any doubt that in domestic politics the fraction of the petty bourgeois which holds a hegemony in revolutionary democracy is averse to revolutionary democracy. That is beyond dispute. Then there is another fraction of the petty bourgeois, the conservative petty bourgeois

who owing to their position vis-a-vis imperialism cannot help playing a positive role in the anti-imperialist struggle although as a fraction of the class they cannot help engaging in reformism, paltry reforms, inconsistency and the like towards imperialism.

However, the national liberation struggle does not take place in abstract, but rather in definite international conditions. International politics has a great impact on the liberation struggle. The tactics and strategies of the imperialist bourgeois states play a great role in wooing the reformist national bourgeoisie for the purposes of striking a deal with it against the revolutionary wing of the national liberation struggle. The national bourgeoisie thus utilize the slogans of the revolutionary wing of the national liberation movement while striking a deal with the forces of imperialism in its own class interests. These is also the tactics and strategies of the socialist countries which are running and giving moral, material, and arms assistance to the revolutionary wing for the purposes of winning complete independence. Thus the international political system when split up (consistent with Marxist dialectics) consists of class forces vis-a-vis

the national liberation movements which is itself split into classes. This is the unity and struggle of opposites. Which force in the national liberation struggle wins, depends on the correlation of the class forces in the international system.

We have attempted to verify our thesis. Lenin<sup>1</sup> was right when he stated that in scientific research, we ought to seek to build a reliable foundation of precise and indisputable facts and that to be a real foundation, we must take not individual facts, but the sum total of facts, without any exception, relating to the question under consideration. Otherwise, continued Lenin, there would be an inevitable, and fully justified, suspicion that the facts were selected or- compiled arbitrarily, that instead of historical phenomena being presented in objective interconnection and interdependence and treated as a whole we are presenting a subjective concoction. That is why we sought hard to trace the impact of the national liberation movement not just in international organisations but also outside the international organisations. In particular we traced the impact of the national liberation movement of southern Africa on the region and we saw that the impact gave rise to the frontline states. This testifies to the objective logic of the national liberation movement.

However, these international organisations as well as quasi-international organisations are composed of 'atoms' called classes. To be trueful we attempted to show that the class struggles within the international organisations and outside of them accounted for a given degree of impart of the national liberation at any given time on the international organisations and outside of them.

In the O.A.U. the national bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie regimes did all they could to minimize the impact of the national liberation movement on the body. This points to the fact that the more the national bourgeoisie (i.e. since the petty bourgeoisie are always a screen for the unlimited dictatorship of the national bourgeoisie) consolidates its position, the more it cannot help striking a deal with the forces of imperialism. The forces of imperialism in turn reinforce the tendency towards minimizing the impact of the national liberation movement on the OAU. The national liberation movement increasingly became felt on the OAU owing to the pressure of revolutionary democratic regimes. Thus the increased impact of the national liberation movement was due to the political struggles between the national bourgeoisie and revolutionary democracies within the OAU vis-a-vis imperialism. This fact is deliberately overlooked by liberal scholars and



always forgotten by the petty bourgeois scholars when it comes to the role of the OAU towards the national liberation movement.

At the UN the states controlled by the imperialist bourgeoisie sought hard to minimize the impact of the national liberation movement on the world body. From its inception these states did everything in their power to prevent the UN from paying closest attention to the national liberation. Covertly and overtly, these states thwarted the national liberation struggle. However, the states controlled by the working class ( the socialist countries) fought the mechinations of the capitalist states and sought hard to broaden the impact of the national liberation movement on the world body. These socialist states were later joined by independent states whose voice against colonialism grew more radical through, say, the OAU. This compelled the imperialist states to make a tactical retreat in the face of growing pressure within the UN in favour of the national liberation struggle. Material assistance and the like increased vis-a-vis the national liberation movement.

Outside international organisations movements were created which increasingly voiced their determined opposition to colonialism. Such were the Non-Aligned movement, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation and the Commonwealth. This did nothing

but broaden the impact of the national liberation movement. Conferences after conferences of these movements took up the issue of the national liberation and through resolutions (the only form possible in non-international organisations) called for more assistance to the national liberation struggle.

In Southern Africa itself, the impact of the national liberation struggle has given rise to the formation of an informal grouping called the frontline states. The history of the frontline states is a history, of the impact of the national liberation of Southern Africa. The national bourgeois states as well as those ruled by a coalition of national bourgeoisie and feudal elements made a hasty exist from the frontline states grouping. Their reformist character suited well with their supporting the national liberation movement from the OAU, UN and such organisations. The frontline states became literally a grouping of revolutionary democrats and neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois regimes (these latter most closely connected with revolutionary democracies).

However, we tried to show that even as a frontline grouping, due to the different class fractions of the petty bourgeoisie holding a hegemony in each of them, their behavior in practice towards the national liberation movement could not but

differ. To do so, we tried to analyse the composition of classes and groups that form the social base of the ruling parties. That was essential, not only because it enables us to understand which classes directly support the given regime's behaviour towards foreign capital and its policy towards imperialism, but also to discover the inevitable causes of change in the character of the regimes toward the national liberation struggle. We discovered that the very determined attack on foreign capital, creates a basis for the emergence of the new national bourgeoisie or elements susceptible to the national bourgeois influence. The differentiation of the peasantry into strata accelerates (owing to radical land reforms of revolutionary democracies). Such class demarcation results into the class - coalition members to become more and more aware of their class interests which are enhanced by these regimes' attack foreign capital. The class struggles become transformed into political struggles. Owing to certain favourable international conditions, the national bourgeoisie may succeed not just to swing the domestic policy away from socialism as proclaimed by the petty bourgeois revolutionary democrats, but may even usurp power. Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe belong to revolutionary democracies.

The neo-colonial petty bourgeois regimes of the frontline states are distinguished by their paltry reforms, inconsistent towards foreign capital. These regimes create a favourable ground for the emergence of the national bourgeoisie. They are simply a thin screen for the unlimited dictatorship of the national bourgeoisie. Under certain favourable conditions this class may succeed to usurp power thereby making an exit from the frontline state.

We then proceeded to investigate the character of the frontline states towards the national liberation struggle picking out Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola, Namibia and South Africa as case studies. We discovered that the radical approach against foreign capital by revolutionary democracies was manifested in their often revolutionary approach towards the solution of democratic questions vis-a-vis imperialism and in favour of the national liberation struggle. The neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois regimes' approach against foreign capital in the domestic scene was paltry, and inconsistent and this was reflected in their foreign policy towards the national liberation struggle which was often by inconsistent means and a preference for negotiations. We saw that this voluntarist approach by the neo-colonial conservative petty bourgeois regimes clashed with that of the revolutionary democracies whenever the two approaches did not coincide.

The thesis went on to examine the history of SADCC. We saw that the BLS states and other SADCC members were struggling not against international capitalism as concretised in the racist regime of South Africa, but against the latter's colonial policies by its national colonial bourgeoisie which were retarding the development (BLS) of productive forces. It was thus not accidental that the BLS states proclaimed their support of SADCC.

The implications of this thesis is that the liberation of Namibia and South Africa is an inevitable process. The oppressed classes of South Africa led by the ANC and those of Namibia led by SWAPO are bound to triumph over colonialism perpetuated by the national colonial bourgeoisie of South Africa. The riots of the 1985 which led to the declaration of the state of emergency, shows the increased pressure of the oppressed classes against the racist regime. The dialectics of the struggle is such that more and more people (classes) become aware of the necessity of crashing the colonial regime of South Africa. But all depends on the correlation of class forces within South Africa and Namibia and Outside them vis-a-vis the national liberation struggle. The riots of the 1985 may be a prelude to the overthrow of the racist regime or it may be thwarted for a while if only due to the state of

emergency. All depends on the correlation of forces and how the oppressed masses (classes) there apply to greater or lesser degree particular forms of struggle. For instance, the classes (in the 1985 season) have intensified the application of demonstrations and strikes as forms of struggle in South Africa to the point of climax resulting into the state of emergency. However, once a given form of struggle has been exhausted, another form must assume prominence - unless this is done, temporary defeats are inevitable. It must be understood that the national liberation struggle is a struggle of live social forces.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER I

1. V.I. Lenin, "The Right of Nations To Self-determination" in V.I. Lenin, Questions of National Policy and Proletarian Internationalism (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1977) p 47.
2. J.V. Stalin, "Marxism and the National Question" in J.V. Stalin, Works Vol. 2 (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953) P 307.
3. V.I. Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism" in V.I. Lenin. Selected Works Vol. I (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1978) P 690.
4. J.V. Stalin, "Marxism and the National Question" in J.V. Stalin. Works Vol. 2 Op. Cit. p 316.
5. V.I. Lenin., Collected Works Vol. 18 (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1964) P472.
6. Historically revolutionary democracy was simply a trend. Its essence is its declaration of petty bourgeois socialism. Karl Marx criticised this trend as far back as 1846 in his article entitled "General Redistribution for America". He attacked the American Socialist - Revolutionary, Herman Kriege who argued that land distribution in America would lead to communism. Lenin coined the concept of revolutionary democracy referring to the above Marxist article. See (V.I. Lenin Collected Works Vol. 18

Op Cit p 165; V.I. Lenin Collected Works Vol 41.  
Moscow, Progress Publishers 1964, pp 281, 282).

7. The author has investigated peasant differentiation in chapter I of the manuscript entitled "The Development of Capitalism in Zambia" (unpublished).
8. For critic of Narodnik socialism see: V.I. Lenin,, Petty bourgeois and Proletarian Socialism (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1977); V.I. Lenin, "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky" in V.I. Lenin., Selected Works Vol. 3 (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1978); V.I. Lenin. The Development of Capitalism in Russia (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1962) Chapter I.
9. The author has investigated the character of classes in the national liberation in Zambia. See S.E. Banda,, "Imperialism and National Liberation in Zambia" (Unpublished).
10. For details See: Richard J. Barnet., Intervention and Revolution (New York, The World Publishing Company, 1968) pp 228, 229.
11. For details see. Ernest W. Lefever., Crisis in the Congo (Washington D.C.; The Bookings Institution, 1965).
12. V.I. Lenin. "The National Question in our Programme" in V.I. Lenin., Collected Works Vol. 6 (Moscow; Progress Publishers 1964) p 454.



13. David Johns; "The Foreign Policy of Tanzania",  
in Olajide Aluko (ed). The Foreign Policies of  
African States (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1973)  
p. 196.
14. Ibid; p 196
15. Ibid; p 196
16. Ibid; p 198
17. Ibid; p 199
18. Ibid; p 199
19. Ibid; p 199
20. Z. Mwamba., Tanzania, Foreign Policy and International  
Politics (Washington: University Press of America  
1978) P 88.
21. Olajide Aluko, "African Response to External  
Intervention in Africa since Angola" in  
African Affairs Vol. 80 No. 319, April 1981 p. 172
22. Ibid; p 181
23. I. Hinderson, "Independent Botswana. A Reappraisal  
of Foreign Policy Options" in African Affairs Vol 71  
No. 310 March 1980, P 132.
24. Timothy Shaw, "Zambia's Foreign Policy" in Alajide  
Aluko (ed) The Foreign Policies of African States  
Op. Cit. p 226.
25. Ibid; p 226
26. Ibid; p 226-227
27. Ibid; p 227
28. Ibid; p 227

29. Ali Mazrui and David Gorden, "Independent African States and the struggle for Southern Africa" in John Seiler (ed). Southern Africa Since the Portuguese Coup. (Boulder. Westview Press, 1980) p. 183.
30. Ibid; p. 191

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1. L.B. Sohn, (ed). Basic Documents of African Regional Organisations (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, Inc. 1971) P.I.
2. Ibid; p 33
3. Ibid; p. 33
4. Ibid; p 33
5. Ibid; p. 33
6. Ibid; p. 53-54
7. Ibid; p. 55
8. Ibid; p. 55
9. The movement towards the formation of the OAU and Pan-Africanism has been traced by various authors. See: R. Adloff. West Africa: The French - Speaking Nations, Yesterday and Today (New York, 1964); B. Cervenku, The Organisations of African Unity and Its Charter (New York, 1969); B. Davidson. Which Way Africa: The Search for a New Society (New York 1964); J. Hatch. A History of Postwar Africa (New York, 1965); A. Hazlewood e.d.; African Integration and Disintegration: Case Studies in Economic and Political Unions (London, 1967); T. Hovetjr; Africa in the United Nations (Chicago, 1963); H. Kitchen. A Handbook of African, Affairs (New York, 1964); R.C. Lawson. International Regional Organisations; Constitutional Foundations (New York, 1962).

The failure of the above and other historians on the OAU and Pan-Africanism is their natural tendency to forget the character of various classes who dominate various states which led to the formation of the African body. For instances, the alliances of the Casablanca and Brazzaville groups cannot be fully understood without class analysis. The result is that such authors become apologists of each and every group when they write.

10. It should be emphasized here that the concept of revolutionary democracy is a dynamic one. The class struggles which intensify within the social base of revolutionary democracy caused among other things by the class differentiation due to the development of capitalism, results in the emergency of right wing elements who under certain national and international favourable circumstances may take state power. Thus Libya which initially was a member of Casablanca group withdrew. However after the 1969 revolution headed by Colonel Gaddafi, Libya is back into the camp of revolutionary democracies (i.e. Gaddafi's Green Book is nothing but petty bourgeois socialism). Ghana underwent several changes of regimes since the revolutionary democratic regime of Nkurmah. Now Ghana is back in the revolutionary democratic group following a successful coup detat by J. Rawlings. The same with Egypt. After Nasser

died, its revolutionary democracy degenerated.

11. For OAU Resolutions from 1984 to 1967 see  
International Organisations Vol. 22 (Autumn 1968)
12. For the OAU Resolutions from 1967 to 1974 see  
Z. Gyenge, "The role played by the Organisation of  
African Unity and reinforcing contacts with the  
socialist countries" in P. Mandi, (ed) Economic  
Relations of Africa with the Socialist Countries  
Vol. I. (Budapest; Centre for Afro-Asian Research  
1978) p. 56-58. The author's shortcomings is his  
failure to examine the different ruling class forces  
of the OAU that inevitably account for the divergences  
in the practical realisation of the OAU resolutions,  
recommendations and requests.
13. Kessings Contemporary Archives (KCA)  
November 7, 1980 P. 30559.
14. African Research Bulletin: Political, Social and  
Cultural (ARB-PSC) (1972) P. 2419
15. Ibid; p. 2497
16. J.V. Stalin, "Task of the University of the Peoples  
of the East" in J.V. Stalin. Works Vol. 7 (Moscow,  
Foreign Language Publishing House, 1953) p. 150
17. Kessings Contemporary Archives (RCA) April  
9, 1976 pp. 27662, 27663.

18. Quoted in A. Gromyko, (ed). October Revolution and Africa (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1980). P 33
19. Ibid; p 33
20. Ibid; p 33
21. E.B. Haas, "The Attempt to terminate Colonialism: Acceptance of the UN Trusteeship System", in International Organisation Vol. VIII No. I (February, 1953) p. 51
22. Ibid; p 16
23. Ibid; p. 16
24. Ibid; p. 13
25. I. Brownlie., Basic Documents on Human Rights (London, Larendon Press 1981) p. 10.
26. Ibid; p 10
27. Ibid; p 13
28. R. Emerson., "Colonialism, Political Development and the Un" in International Organisation Vol. XIX, No. 3 (Summer, 1965).
29. For the full outline of the resolution see.  
I. Brownline., Basic Documents on Human Rights Op. Cit.  
P. 29-30.
30. Quoted in R. Emerson., "Colonialism, Political Development and the UN". International Organisation Vol. XIX, No. 3  
Op. Cit. p. 493.

31. Ibid; p. 494
32. Everyman's United Nations (New York, UN Publications, 1968) P 157
33. Ibid; P. 157.
34. Ibid; p. 158.
35. Year book of the United Nations Vol 27  
(New York, UN office of Public Information, 1973)  
p. 77
36. Ibid; p. 77
37. Ibid; p. 78
38. The history of the United Nations and Namibia has been adequately dealt with in Literature. See: I. Dugard. The South West Africa/Namibia dispute (Berkeley, University of California Press 1973); L.P. Singh, The U.N. and Namibia (Nairobi East African Publishing House 1980).
39. L.P. Singh, The U.N. and Namibia Op. Cit.
40. For details see. AGD Africa Economic Digest  
Vol. 5 N. 8 February 24 - March 11, 1984.

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1. H.W. Degenhardt, Treaties and Alliances of the World (London, Longman Group Ltd, 1979) P. 387
2. G.A. Lanyi., Crisis and Continuity in World Politics (New York; Rondon House, 1966) p. 597.
3. Ibid; p. 598
4. For details see. H.W. Degenhardt. Treaties and Alliances of the World op cit. pp. 393-7.
5. Africa Contemporary Record (London; Africa Research Ltd; 1969) P. c121.
6. Ibid; p. c121
7. For details see: Africa Contemporary Record (London: Africa Research Ltd: 1969).
8. For details see. A. Gromyko. Southern Africa Shall be Free (Moscow: Progress Publishers 1982).
9. Ibid; p. 32
10. For details see. A.M. Schlesinger. The Dynamic of World Power. A Documentary History of United States Foreign Policy 1945-1973 (New York. Chelsea House Publishers 1973). pp. 616-617.
11. L.P. Singh. The U.N. and Namibia op. cit. pp. 104-105.
12. Ibid; p. 105



13. For details see Africa Confidential Vol. 22 No. 10  
(6 May, 1981).
14. Ibid
15. Africa Confidential Vol. 23 no. 3 (February  
1982).
16. Ibid
17. Ibid
18. Ibid
19. Africa Research Bultelin Vol. 18. No. 2 (1  
December - 3 December, 1982) p. 6293.
20. CANUO: The Inside Story of Britains Secret  
Contract for Namibian Uranium (London, The Russell  
Press Ltd., 1977) p. 17
21. Ibid: p. 7
22. Africa Confidential Vol. 22 no. 2 (January, .  
14 1981).
23. Ibid
24. R. Morris. Uncertain Greatness (London,  
Quartet Books, 1977) p. 116.
25. A. Gromyko. Southern African Shall be Free. Op. Cit.  
p. 28
26. V.I. Lenin Collacited Works Vol. 6 (Moscow,  
Progress Publishers, 1964) P. 457.

27. Quoted in V.I. Lenin., Questions of National Policy and Proletarian Internationalism Op. cit.  
p. 88
28. V.I. Lenin., Collected Works Vol. 6 Op. Cit.  
p. 457
29. Quoted in L.P. Singh., The U.N. and Namibia Op. Cit. P 109.
30. International Legal Materials Vol. 4 (1964)  
p. 907.
31. International Legal Materials Vol. 6 (1967)  
p. 549.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

1. For details on the freedom charter see:  
The Freedom Charter (New York. UN centre, 1979).
2. Quoted in B. Bunting., Moses Kotana (London, Inkululeko Publications, 1973) p. 215.
3. Quoted in New Dawn No. 6 (151) (Moscow, Novosti press Agency, 1983) p. 31
4. Ibid; p. 32
5. Quoted in B. Punting., Moses Kotane Op. Cit. p. 245
6. For details on SWAPO's programme see. SWAPO.  
Political Programme of the South West Africa People's Organisation (Lusaka. Swapo Department for Publicity and Information, 1976).
7. For details on the history of SWAPO see SWAPO.  
To Be Born A Nation (London. Zed Press, 1981).
8. For History of PAFMECA and PAFMESCA see. I. Nye.,  
Pan Africanism and East African Integration (London, Havard University Press, 1966); Cox Richard.,  
Pan - Africanism in Practical PAFMESCA 1958-1964 (London, Oxford University Press, 1964); C. Legum.,  
Pan- Africanism (London, Longman, 1969). V.B. Thompson., Africa and Unity (London, Longman, 1969),  
The Evalution of Pan-Africanism (London, Longman, 1969).

9. I. Nye., Pan - Africanism and East African Integration. Op. Cit. p. 35.
10. D.W. Nabudere. "The Role of Tanzania in Regional Integration in East Africa - Old and New Patterns" in K. Mathews and S.S. Moshi. Foreign Policy of Tanzania (Dar es Salaam, University of Dar es Salaam, 1981) p. 265.
11. I. Nye., Pan - Africanism and East African Integration Op. Cit. p. 35
12. Ibid: p. 35
13. Ibid: p. 35
14. Ibid: p. 122
15. For details see. K. Nnoli., Self-Reliance and Foreign Policy in Tanzania. (New York., NOK Publishers, 1978) pp. 31-32.
16. J. Nye., Pan - Africanism and East African Integration Op. cit. p. 127
17. Africa Contemporary Record 1979-75 (London, Africana Publishing Company Ltd, 1975) P. B277
18. K. Mathews, " Tanzania's Foreign Policy as a Frontline State in the Liberation of Southern Africa" in K. Mathews and S.S. Mushi. Foreign Policy of Tanzania. Op. Cit. p. 219

## NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

1. For a definition of classes see: V.I. Lenin., Collected Works Vol. 29 (Moscow; Progress Publishers, 1964) p. 421.
2. There is hardly any doubt that differentiation of the peasantry has intensified class struggles within it. However we use this concept from the view point of the anti-imperialist behaviour of the peasantry. Its desire for land reforms objectively compels it to join the revolutionary bloc of classes under the hegemony of the fraction of the petty bourgeois that has raised itself to the level of revolutionary democracy.
3. Quoted in J.V. Mwapachu., "Industrial Labour Protest in Tanzania; an analysis of influential variables" in The African Review Vol. 3 No. 3 (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Publishing House, 1974) p. 386.
4. Ibid; p. 386
5. Africa Diary 1967. p. 3683
6. Stalin wrote: "It is not true that marxism does not in principle admit the possibility of a party of a bloc of oppossed, revolutionary classes". See J.V. Stalin, "Talk with Students of Sun Yat-Sen University" in J.V. Stalin. Works

Vol. 9. (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954) pp. 241-273.

7. See the following studies: W.M. Freud, "Class Conflict, Political Economy and the Struggle for socialism in Tanzania" (Africa Affairs Vol. 80 No. 321 October 1951); S.D. Mueller, "Retarded Capitalism in, Tanzania" in (The Socialist Register: London Merlin Press 1980). J. Boesen, "Development and Class Structure in a Small holder society and the potential of Ujamaa" in (Institute for Development Research May 1972).
8. G. Hyden. Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania (London, Heinemann, 1980) P. 132.
9. J.V. Mwapuchu: "Industrial Labour Protest in Tanzania: An Analysis of Influential Variables" in The African Review Vol. 3 No. 3 Op. Cit. p. 385
10. Africa Contemporary Record 1970/71 (New York, African Publishing Company, 1971). P. B 169.
11. Ibid; P.B169
12. Africa Contemporary Record 1969/70 (New York. African Publishing Company 1970).P. B194-5.
13. T. Hodges. "Mozambique" in G.M. Carter and P. O'meara Ceds) Southern Africa in Crisis (Bloomington. Indiana University Press, 1977) P. 55-6
14. Ibid; p. 67

15. Ibid; p. 67
16. Ibid; p. 63
17. Ibid; p. 63
18. Ibid; p63
19. Ibid; p. 63
20. Africa Contemporary Record 1980/81 (new York, Africana Publishing Company,1981) P.B. 702.
21. Crawford Young: Ideology and Development in Africa (New Haven, Yale University Press,1982) P85
22. J. Marcum. "Angola" in G.M. Carter and P. O'meara (eds) Southern Africa Crisis, Op. Cit. p. 156-7
23. Ibid; p 157
24. Crawford Young: Ideology and Development in Africa, Op. Cit. p. 85
25. Ibid; p. 85
26. Ibid; p. 89
27. Africa Contemporary Record 1977/78 Op. Cit P 497.
28. Quoted in J.V. Stalin. "Concerning Question of Leninism" in S.V. Stalin. Works Vol. 8. (Moscow. Foreign Languages Publishing House,1954) p. 27
29. Africa Contemporary Record 1980/81 (New York, Africana Publishing Company,1981) P. B917.

30. Ibid; P. B 927-9
31. Africa Contemporary Record 1981/82 (New York, Africana Publishing Company, 1982).
32. Africa Confidential Vol. 22. No. 2 January 1981.
33. K. Marx and F. Engels., "The Communist Manifesto" in K. Marx and F. Engels Selected Works in three Volumes Vol. I (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1973) P. 117-118
34. M Chege., "The Revolution Betrayed: Ethiopia, 1974-9") in the The Journal of Modern African Studies (London, Cambridge University Press, 1979).
35. A. Sillery., Botswana: A Short Political History (London, Methuen and Co Ltd, 1974) P. 189.
36. E.P. Morgan., "Botswana" in G.M. Carter and P. O'omerara (eds) Southern Africa in Crisis Op. Cit.
37. Africa Contemporary Record 1980/81 Op. Cit. p. B671.
38. Ibid; P. B671
39. K.D. Kaunda. Humanism in Zambia Part II (Lusaka, Government Printers, 1974) P. 39.
40. See. R. Molteno. "Zambian Humanism: The Way Ahead" in The African Review No. I. 3 No.3 1973 p. 551.



NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

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(London; Africana Publishing Company, 1976) P. A45-6.
2. Africa Contemporary Record 1969/70 (London;  
Africana Publishing Company, 1970) P. C43
3. U.R.T. Why We Will Not Negotiate (Dar es salaam;  
Tanzania Publishing House, 1971). P5
4. Africa Contemporary Record 1970/71 (London;  
African Publishing Company, 1971) P. B 125
5. Africa Contemporary Record 1973/74 (London;  
Africana Publishing Company, 1974) P. B. 457
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