

PROBLEMS IN THE CONCEPTION OF CULTURE: THE
CASE OF CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

BY

THIS THESIS HAS BEEN ACCEPTED FOR
THE DEGREE OF... *M.A.* 2000
AND A COPY MAY BE BORROWED
UNIVERSITY LIBRARY.


ANTONY MAINA MACHARIA

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF ARTS IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
M.A. DEGREE IN PHILOSOPHY

1999


DECLARATION

This is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.



ANTONY MAINA MACHARIA

This thesis has been submitted for examination with my approval as University supervisor.



10.8.2000

DR. F. OCHIENG'-ODHIAMBO

DEDICATION

To my dad, Cyrus Macharia, I dedicate this thesis.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

My first thanks go to my supervisor Dr. F. Ochieng'-Odhiambo whose good advice, comments, suggestions and kind assistance has contributed immensely to the successful completion of this thesis. To him I owe a debt of gratitude.

I do acknowledge with gratitude that the successful completion of my post graduate programme would not have been possible without the assistance, understanding and co-operation of my parents, Macharia and Wachera, and siblings Nyambura, Wangari, Wambugu and Boto. My heartfelt thanks goes to them all for the sacrifice they made towards seeing me through my academic endeavours.

I also wish to record my appreciation to my wife Mumbi who bear many days and months when I wrote this thesis. I am glad to her for her love, patience and encouragement.

Thanks go to my friends and classmates Waguma, Mbai, Kama Kama, Some and Waweru who contributed in many ways through their constructive criticism of my work. To them I say thanks.

Thanks are also due to University of Nairobi for offering me an opportunity to pursue an M.A. degree in Philosophy.

Last but not least, I thank Mr. F. Mwangi for his skilful processing of this text that enabled this thesis to take its present form. To one and all I express my deep gratitude.

ABSTRACT

The gist of this study revolves round the question and nature of cultural development. Admittedly, many societies in the world in general, Africa in particular have been struggling hard to realise cultural development. This is because cultural development has become a major issue in the development debates. Accordingly, it has been argued that for any meaningful and faster development, cultural development is necessary. Indeed, the contention is that for any full-fledged development, cultural development must be realised first.

The above notwithstanding, controversies and debates over the nature of cultural development in Africa abound. At the heart of these controversies and debates are to be found the Eurocentrist and Afrocentrist interpretations of the nature of cultural development in Africa. Whereas the Eurocentrists define cultural development in Africa in terms of the proximity of African culture to western culture insisting that western culture is the citadel of cultural development, the Afrocentrists define cultural development in Africa in terms of the independence of African culture from western culture as located in Africa's past. The two appear plausible in themselves.

This study thus critically examines the Eurocentrists' and Afrocentrists' perceptions and other views on cultural development in Africa with a view to determining whether or

not cultural development has actually taken place in Africa. This constitutes the objectives of the study. This study is based on Library research. More so it is a conceptual analysis in which various views are examined to see if they are consistent or inconsistent.

It was concluded that cultural development has taken place in Africa. This conclusion was contingent upon the understanding that cultural development presupposes the existence of cultural abilities and opportunities to fulfil cultural needs. These, it was established existed in the form of cultural resources and cultural endowments.

It was however, recommended that a lot be done in the way of resuscitating the desire or will to fulfil cultural needs for ability and opportunity without the desire or will to meet cultural needs is in vain. It was hoped that with the implementation of this recommendation, full-fledged cultural development will be achieved in Africa, for our contention is that, contrary to the prevalent view that Sub-Saharan Africa sadly lacks the capacity to fulfil any need be it cultural or economic, Sub-Saharan Africa has the capacities in abundance. Perhaps a lack of a desire to use those capacities optimum maximally is rampant. It should be noted however, that there is no limit to desire.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--|-----------|
| DECLARATION | ii |
| DEDICATION | iii |
| ACKNOWLEDGEMENT | iv |
| ABSTRACT | v |
| TABLE OF CONTENTS | vii |
| CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| 1.1 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM | 7 |
| 1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES | 8 |
| 1.3 JUSTIFICATION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY | 9 |
| 1.4 LITERATURE REVIEW | 10 |
| 1.5 HYPOTHESES | 23 |
| 1.6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK | 23 |
| 1.7 METHODOLOGY | 24 |
| CHAPTER TWO: THE CONCEPT OF CULTURE | 25 |
| 2.1 THE NATURE OF CULTURE | 25 |
| 2.2 LEVELS OF CULTURE | 31 |
| 2.3 FUNCTIONS OF A WORLD VIEW | 33 |
| 2.4 SYMBOLS, PRACTICAL AND THEORITICAL ASPECTS OF CULTURE | 36 |
| CHAPTER THREE: CULTURE AND OTHER RELATED ISSUES | 40 |
| 3.1 CULTURE AND ENVIRONMENT | 40 |
| 3.2 CULTURE AND INTELLECT | 50 |
| 3.3 CULTURE AND IDEOLOGY | 52 |
| 3.4 CULTURE AND RELIGION | 66 |
| 3.5 CULTURE AND EDUCATION | 69 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| CHAPTER FOUR: THE CONCEPT OF DEVELOPMENT | 80 |
| 4.1 THE MEANING OF DEVELOPMENT | 81 |
| 4.2 VARIOUS CONCEPTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT | 85 |
| 4.2.1 Development as Modernisation | 85 |
| 4.2.1.1 The Meaning of Modernisation | 85 |
| 4.2.2 Development as Economic Growth | 89 |
| 4.2.2.1 The Meaning of Economic Growth | 90 |
| 4.2.3 Development as Technological Progress | 98 |
| 4.2.3.1 The Concept of Technology | 98 |
| 4.2.4 Development as Freedom | 103 |
| 4.2.4.1 The Concept of Freedom | 103 |
| 4.2.4.2 Freedom as Conformity to the Physical Necessity | 103 |
| 4.2.4.3 Freedom as a Product Rational Insight | 104 |
| 4.2.4.4 Freedom and Religion | 105 |
| 4.2.4.5 The Classical Conception of Liberty | 106 |
| 4.2.5.5 Freedom and Development | 118 |
| 4.3 Development: A Working Definition | 121 |
| CHAPTER FIVE: CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT | 125 |
| 5.1 DEFINITION OF CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT | 126 |
| 5.2 CULTURAL CHANGE AND SOCIAL CHANGE | 139 |
| 5.3 ABILITY AND OPPORTUNITY | 153 |
| 5.4 CULTURAL NEEDS: THE CASE OF KENYA | 156 |
| 5.5 CULTURAL RESOURCES | 158 |

| | | |
|---|---------------------------------------|-----|
| 5.5.1 | Literacy | 160 |
| 5.5.2 | Print and Mass Media | 161 |
| 5.5.3 | Cultural Centres and National Theatre | 163 |
| 5.5.4 | Cinema Halls | 163 |
| 5.5.5 | Museums | 164 |
| 5.5.6 | Libraries | 165 |
| 5.6 | CULTURAL ENDOWMENTS | 166 |
| 5.6.1 | Music and Dancing | 166 |
| 5.6.2 | Art | 169 |
| 5.6.3 | Drama | 170 |
| 5.7 | DESIRE AND KNOWLEDGE | 178 |
| CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS | | 180 |
| 7.0 | SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY | 194 |

CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

One of the greatest problems facing world cultures today besides politics is the lack of clarity in the use of concepts. Cultural development is one such concept which has been so universally sanctified to the extent that very few people, if any, would dare say that they are culturally underdeveloped or undeveloped; yet the general tendency is to attach a superficial meaning to the concept of cultural development. Incidentally everyone wants to be, or be seen to be culturally developed. This trend has given rise to different and sometimes controversial interpretations of the concept of cultural development in Africa.

There have been, in regards to Africa, two common interpretations. On the one hand are the Eurocentrists who believe that there is nothing that can be done to "change" the lives and by extension facilitate cultural development in Africa without foreign (western) intervention. On the other hand are Afrocentrists who perceive Africans and their cultures as unique and capable of developing with or without foreign intervention. Indeed, more specifically, they characterise foreign (western) intervention as invasion in Africa, viz., a ploy by the west to harness western cultural establishment at the expense of African cultures.

The Eurocentrists view Bretton Wood institutions (IMF and World Bank), NGO's (Non Governmental Organisations) and

Western Multinationals as the panacea to Africa's quest for development in general and cultural development in particular. In their view, western powers are instrumental in bringing African societies and their cultures into contact with the modern world and in essence establishing the infrastructure necessary for eventual full fledged development thus making Africans economically and culturally advanced members of the international community. Without the intervention of western powers, Africa and Africans might have to take decades or centuries before they can emerge and join world affairs (c.f. Martin and O'meara eds., 1977: 293). Accordingly, Westermann explicitly argues that the socio-economic, political, cultural and any other progress in Africa is to be attributed to the West. It is on the culture of the west that the heavy accent in Westermann's position falls. Indeed, while acknowledging that Africa and Africans have during the last half century progressed in many spheres, Westermann proffers that these progresses are largely by-products of western intervention (1949: 3). Westermann also believes that without western intervention the Africans might today be at the stage where they were centuries ago (1949: 3).

Implicit in this assertion is a certain romanticisation of Africa's past. In this regard, the wheel has come full cycle for neo-colonialists (pro-colonialists) as some Africans have begun to speak the language of Westermann. It might be fascinating for one to examine the award of excellence

conferred on Leopold Senghor by the French National Academy. Senghor, incidentally is acknowledged for having proffered the famous dictum (among the westerners) that "Emotion is Black Reason is Greek", a reaffirmation of eurocentrism albeit implicitly. This view is in total accord with the eurocentric anthropology of the brand linked with Placide Tempels, Levy Bruhl, Jack Goody and Hegel which only has a stock of European prejudices to offer. Nonetheless, most scandalous, is the work of African professional religionists like Mbiti and Idowu *inter-alia* whose sense of divinity and the sacred is so steeped in Judea-christian mythology that it cannot but see a hierarchy of christian angels in the African ethnic patheons (Amuta, 1989: 36).

It is important to note however, that many warnings have been signalled against the indiscriminate valorisation of the African past (c.f. Amilkar Cabral, 1973; Ngugi wa Thiong'o, 1972). Admittedly, Westermann and his neo-colonial auxiliaries are reluctant to see Africa as part of a developing world without foreign intervention. This is a defensive intellection that seeks to rationalise the "European contribution" to Africa's development both materially and spiritually.

Meanwhile, Afrocentrists believe that liberation and conscientisation of Africans is crucial. It is the preponderance of this belief that confer historical importance on men such as Chinua Achebe, Wole Soyinka, Amilkar Cabral,

Kwasi Wiredu, Ngugi wa Thiong'o, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Jomo Kenyatta, Frantz Fanon and Odera Oruka among others. Cabral for example, frowned by the seemingly narrow cultic Eurocentric interpretation of African culture, advocated for a "return to the source" (Cabral, 1973). He insisted on the process of re-Africanisation, and re-conversion of the minds of the elites, achievable only through an integration with the culture of the masses (1973: 45). For him (Cabral) the culture of the masses as opposed to that of the few elites represented the authentic consciousness of African peoples because it was untrammelled by the encrustations of foreign impositions and appropriations (Amuta, 1989: 94-95). This was in recognition of the fact that rural Africa remains the repository of African culture from where a battle against western values and needs could be waged (Amuta, 1989: 95). However, the validity of this position is highly contestable.

Nonetheless, the necessity for the urge for an authentic African cultural development has come to be forcefully articulated, where Afrocentrists while drawing from Africa's past, pre-suppose the existence, albeit latent, of a body of values and practices in the pre-colonial African cultures with the hope of exhuming, refurbishing and systematising them. This, some maintain, should not be viewed as an advocacy of unbridled romanticisation of the pre-colonial culture, but in the context of Africa's current cultural liberation struggle.

Cultural development in Africa according to them relies on independence, independence from western cultural establishment. Thus the more differentiated African culture is from the western culture through having an indigenous content, the more developed it is. In fact their contention is that, now that the shackles of colonialism have been thrown off, the Africans can assume their rightful place in the world system as culturally strong and independent nations (c.f. Martin and O'meara, eds., 1977: 293).

Ideally, independence means self-determination. Consentaneously, an independent nation is one with the autonomy to make decisions on issues affecting its people. In other words, it is a nation that controls its own resources and has the means to favourably utilise its resources be they human or natural with the least degree of foreign (external) intervention. This is with the understanding that absolute absence of external intervention is impossible in reality though possible in principle.

The above notwithstanding, there is consensus among many people that the independence of Africa and its constituent nations is a sham. In this respect, Amuta observes that:

We find ourselves enclosed in a dependant country, wholly subservient of foreign interests. Our economy is geared to the needs of foreigners both of our ex-colonial masters and other western capitalist nations (1989: 147).

In Kenya for example, the post-colonial period has been characterised by a gradual but progressive betrayal, so to

say, of the aspirations and needs of Kenyans (*Mau Mau*) who waged war against the colonial government in the name of freedom (*Uhuru*), so that they could determine their goals and means of attaining those goals. The situation in Kenya today is that of an economy and a culture unmistakably controlled and schemed by foreigners. Thus although Kenya has secured political independence, it has not been able to achieve total economic independence. Kenya remains dependent upon foreign powers and the capitalist West culminating into *Ukoloni mambo leo* (neocolonialism) particularly by United States and Great Britain. Kenyans, especially the elites, have been converted to caricatures of western man.

Implicitly, the problem of cultural development in Africa in general, Kenya in particular, revolves round the wish to develop African cultures unambiguously using western cultural products on the one hand, and preserving and developing an African culture(s) with an indigenous content as located in the past, on the other. The latter presupposes a kind of defensive intellection that seeks to rationalise the African contribution to world culture and its development exclusively in terms of the past glories of illustrious ancestors conceived in broad continental terms (c.f. Amuta, 1989: 35; Odera-Oruka, 1983: 58).

However, it needs to be said that this kind of rationalisation belongs to some consciousness which is akin to the ideological presuppositions implicit in

colonialist/Eurocentrist tradition. Indeed, it also needs to be mentioned that the conception of the past cannot be divorced from ideological positions. Consequently, the more romantic and fixated one is to his past, the greater the tendency for him become insidiously entangled in it.

While granting that the dilemma in question about cultural development is historically inevitable, one is perturbed by a certain insidious ambiguity in the interpretations of the two opposing schools of thought namely Eurocentrists and Afrocentrists. The pendulum of discourse and controversy swings either to "pre-colonial Africa (past)" or "the West". The two interpretations are similar in their ideological assumptions of the source and nature cultural development.

1.1 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

The contemporary problematisation of the question of cultural development in Africa is a by-product of aforementioned interpretations. Cultural development certainly is not a process in which there is simply a decline of African traditional modes of life through adoption of western (or the so called "modern") modes of life, neither does it necessarily call for persisting and sometimes indiscriminate glorification of the African mode of life as located in the past. In fact, Cabral has warned against an indiscriminate systematic exaltation of virtues without an accompanying condemnation of

vices as well as an uncriticised acceptance of native values in African culture without considering its regressive elements (c.f. Amuta, 1989: 95).

It is worth our note that some scholars (Odera-Oruka, 1997: Ngugi wa Thiong'o, 1984) have denounced both Eurocentrists' and Afrocentrists' interpretations of cultural development by offering what they feel at least constitutes cultural development, but not without some faults here and there. In this connection, the pertinent questions would be: What are the general characteristics of cultural development? More so, what can one argue are some of the indicators of cultural development in Africa today, Kenya in particular?

This study therefore, investigates into the seeming ambivalence in the talk and equation of cultural development in Africa to: westernisation or western intervention on the one hand; the glorification of the Africa's past on the other, with a view to offering a rationalised approach to cultural development in Africa thereby obliterating the rather amorphous and nebulous interpretations of the same.

1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The research set to accomplish the following objectives:

- (1) To investigate into the various interpretations of cultural development with a view to determining whether or not cultural development has taken place in Africa.
- (2) To attempt a general definition of cultural development.

1.3 JUSTIFICATION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

A general survey of the literature on cultural development in Africa shows that a general understanding of the concept is lacking. In fact, though cultural development is at present universally sanctified following the realisation of the potential of culture in development and also the need as Kucuradi observes, to "define development a new by incorporating the cultural dimension hence introducing cultural development" (Ogutu, et al., eds., 1997: 91); the interpretations and definitions as well of cultural development in Africa are steeped in either Eurocentrists' or Afrocentrists' perspectives translating into lopsided views which are unfair to the subject. As such, a general consensus about cultural development is seemingly lacking or evidently perverted.

It should be noted, however, that those who have attempted to transcend these perspectives have proffered new ideas and perspectives which have been limited in their own way (c.f. Odera Oruka, 1997; Ngugi wa Thiong'o, 1984; Mazrui, 1986). This study thus hopes besides attempting a general interpretation or definition of cultural development to provoke more studies to facilitate a clear and more or less positive understanding of cultural development in Africa. It is our contention in this study that the ambiguous nature of cultural development in Africa will be obliterated through a

critical analysis of the various views and interpretations as regards the concept in question. It is hoped that this will be achieved through highlighting on their weaknesses and ramifications therein proffering a possible alternative.

It was also hoped that this study will have gone a long way in promoting racial tolerance and by extension a positive understanding of the globalisation process.

1.4 LITERATURE REVIEW

The problem of cultural development has been examined by many scholars and writers; Philosophers, Anthropologists, Sociologists, Religious commentators and literary critics albeit implicitly. Their views may be seen under two groups namely; unilinear and multilinear theories of cultural development. On the one hand, the unilinear theory of cultural development pre-supposes the existence of an absolute or universal path to be followed by all cultures in which there is some ultimate goal understood as the perfection of them all. All cultures aim at this goal in order to be said to be developed and the process towards the universal, follows a set of prescribed paths (see Hegel, 1956; Bruhl, 1975). In this sense all societies have cultures but not all are culturally developed; they may be developing for development is to be evaluated by preference to the fixed value system of the universal culture. Thus basic to this theory is "cultural

universalism" (c.f. Mazrui, 1986: 301).

On the other hand, the multilinear theory of cultural development emphasises on particular cultures and maintains that each culture develops according to its own standards. There is not one single perfect way to be followed by all cultures. It advocates for diverse cultures and diverse perceptions, thus different modes of cultural development.

These further translate into ethnocentrism and cultural relativism. Ethnocentrism is the view that one's way of life is to be aimed at by all other cultures. The underlying claim of ethnocentrism is that one's culture is superior and other cultures are inferior. This consists in the "uncritical preference for one's own culture and its motives and prejudice against alien cultures" (Bidney, 1968: 546).

It is not however, the mere fact of preference for one's own cultural values that constitute ethnocentrism but rather the uncritical prejudice in favour of one's own culture and the distorted biased criticism of alien cultures (Bidney, 1968: 546). This augurs well with the bigotry of the west on African culture which they have described as primitive, simple and unsophisticated.

Cultural relativism is the contrary of ethnocentrism and it is an attitude that advocates for cultural tolerance. Cultural relationship involves tolerance based on skepticism of universal objective standards of value as well as the idea of progress (Bidney 1968: 547). It thus advocates for

suspension of comparative judgement by granting in principle, equality or equivalent value of all value judgement. This is because no two cultures are comparable since each culture is valid to the people and conditions which give rise to it (Okot p'Bitek, 1973: x). Ethnocentric approach to cultural development can be associated with Tempels, Hegel and missionaries who behold that their culture is superior and that inferior cultures should aim at it.

Tempels for instance is acknowledged for having brought the first piece of literature concerning "Bantu (African) philosophy" into academic debate (c.f. F. Ochieng'-Odhiambo, 1995: 40ff). He is acknowledged for having said that "a true philosophy can exist among the natives and that there is a sense in searching for 'it" (Tempels, 1965: 25). It is important to note that for Tempels, the Bantu conception of life is centred on one cardinal value, which is life force, or vital force (in French, *Force Vitale*). "The vital force is the invisible reality of everything that exists, but is supreme in man" (Tempels, 1965: 32). But in as much as Tempels agrees that the native has a philosophy (some form of culture) it is not similar to his:

Tempels contrasts two models of belief and knowledge which for him, are utterly irreconcilable. One includes traditional religious belief systems and magical explanations of life and is identified with African traditional thought systems. Its opposite is identified with western traditions, christian religious beliefs and scientific knowledge. The former for him is the paradigm of irrationality. From a religious point of view it is marked with darkness, epistemologically with ignorance.

the second mode of thought on the other hand is represented as more rational and summary of the destiny of human nature and history; it is characterised by religious light and scientific truth (D.A. Masolo, 1994: 47).

Thus according to Tempels a return of the "evolvee" to his traditions signifies a "fall of regression". It is important to add that Tempels like all other evangelists of his time, was on a mission to convert Africans to christianity.

It has been argued that the two biggest contributions to world culture to date have been the Semites and Europeans.

Notably:

The Semitic people (especially the Jews who developed christianity and Judaism and the Arabs who developed Islam) helped to change the world through religion, a theocratic approach to cultural universalism. Europeans on the other hand have helped to change the world through technology and science - a technocratic approach to cultural universalism' (A. Mazrui, 1986: 301).

However, the question here is which is the best approach to cultural universalism? What is the best approach to cultural development?

This insight by Mazrui sheds light to the question; By whose authority are Europeans or the west mandated to prescribe christianity as the true civilisation? Is not christianity an alien religion imported from the Middle East which the Europeans - West- unduely claim is authentically western?

G.W.F. Hegel, a German philosopher who also falls under this ethnocentric perspective of cultural development. According to him history was a process of change through the

intervention of reason in the world. Reason was the driving force. Through reason man knows and transforms his reality in a continuous dialectical manner. "In these transformations culture is born" (Masolo, 1994: 4). It is thus clear that for Hegel, culture was the concretisation of reason in its historical moments. "To identify the signs of cultural change was to identify the intensity of dialectical reason at work in the world" (Masolo, 1994: 5). According to Hegel, Reason and Culture are Mutually related; thus where there was no reason there no culture and vice-versa.

However, much as reason or knowledge is part of a cultural heritage it is not the only thing that constitutes culture. Culture is a complex whole that includes all the behaviour patterns of a society. Why then must culture be synonymous to reason such that absence of reason means absence of culture?

Moving on to the cultural relativistic perspectives of cultural development, herein are to be found views by various scholars whose stand-points are based on diversity of cultures. They hold that cultures are valid only to the people and conditions that give rise to them. Thus cultural development according to them is time and place conditioned. Similarly they maintain that no culture is superior to any other; since culture involves the expression of the collective values of a people, the feelings of the people about the social group identities and above all else the tests of

loyalty and commitment to their group and society.

Under cultural relativism scholars such as Mudimbe, Okot p'Bitek, Senghor, Nkrumah, Kwasi Wiredu, Odera-Oruka, Mazrui, are eminent. Their works serve to indicate the diversity of cultures and unity in various characteristics of culture viz; cultural universals, and also an attempt to demolish western cultural dominance by restoring as well as promoting African culture and consequently solving the problem of cultural development in Africa.

Reflecting on the Husserlian slogan "Back to the things themselves" all cultures are to be seen as good in themselves on the basis of internal structural completeness. African cultures have to be viewed in terms of their unity with each other and with the whole. This invokes the idea of interaction of diverse cultures and thus interdependence of cultures.

V.Y. Mudimbe, an illustrious Congolese philosopher in his book The Invention of Africa believes that there lies another that may be more fundamental (Gnosis) - (Mudimbe, 1988: 186). In his resistance to the stereotype of African "savage" he gives a brilliant structural historiography of African culture to the present day in which he destroys the bases of present day discourse as part of western epistemological assumptions about standards of rationality. According to him, the African is the invention of the West the different forms as western powers, political and cognitive have succeeded in alienating

and objectifying the African as the "Other" (Mudimbe 1988: xi). Now the problem is how one should construct an authentic African "episteme"?. Assuredly, the African has not been able to harmonise traditionalism and westernism but Mudimbe does not offer any alternative. Thus which way will the African take? traditionalism or westernism? Which one of these would constitute cultural development? Mudimbe illustrates the ways in which western anthropological and missionary interpretation of African life and thought have induced distortions not only for the westerners but also for Africans who try to understand themselves by means of western epistemological models (D.A. Masolo, 1994: 181).

Another scholar Kwasi Wiredu, a Ghanaian philosopher, views unity in diversity of cultures as being in the existence of cultural universals which according to him are "language, logical reasoning, knowledge of the objective world and morality". Wiredu, 1990: 5-19). His insistence is that cultural universals are the only valid criteria for validating the universality of concepts. He believes that conceptual communication, translatability and commensurability within and across cultures is possible without remainder only through their reduction to physical reality.

Of all the cultural universals, language is the key to understanding any culture. Through language, people share ideas, thoughts, experiences, discoveries, fears, plans and even desires. Without language it would be difficult to

transmit culture and culture would develop exceedingly slowly. Ngugi wa Thiong'o says that "any language has dual character; it is both a means of communication and a carrier of culture" (Ngugi wa Thiong'o, 1984: 14). Further, Ngugi wa Thiong'o, adds that "language as communication and as culture are then products of each other" (Ngugi wa Thiong'o, 1984: 15). However, Ngugi thinks that it is best to communicate one's ideas in one's mother-tongue. In fact in his book Decolonising the Mind, Ngugi wa Thiong'o bids farewell to English as a vehicle or tool for communication. Ngugi wa Thiong'o says "From now on it is Gikuyu and Kiswahili all the way" (Ngugi wa Thiong'o, 1984: 15). The problem is: How ineffective is transmitting one's cultural values using a foreign language? Is anything lost in between? Should cultural values be transmitted through the use of one's mother tongue? In other words, what language is best suited for communication and evolution of a culture? But, Ngugi wa Thiong'o hopes that "through the age old medium of translation", he shall be "able to continue dialogue with all" (Ngugi wa Thiong'o, 1984: 15).

Ngugi wa Thiong'o in his other works; Weep Not Child (1964); The River Between (1967), shows a variation of Kikuyu generation struggling to prevent loss of traditions, their sense of identity while painfully trying to assimilate some aspects of "European Modernity". For him "the more knowledge they acquire, the closer they get to this foreign culture, the

further they move from their own" (Martin and Omeara (eds) 1977: 342).

In The Song of Lawino (1966) Okot is pre-occupied, just like Ngugi wa Thiong'o, with the modern African's struggle with the past and the threat western culture presents. Okot in Africa's Cultural Revolution (1973) calls for a cultural revolution to restore African cultural heritage by demolition of western cultural domination. Okot says that "they are trying to ape the culture of the whiteman" (Okot p'Bitek, 1973: x).

One should however note that effective cultural revolution presupposes drawing from the cultural and historical experience of mankind. This is because "all human understanding and knowledge become historical and culture bound. "There is no objectivity or universality beyond a given historical cultural moment" (Odera Oruka, 1990: 93-94). Effective cultural revolution also presupposes the development of a national culture. But Africa is a complex cultural area; a continent marked by variety and diversity. So it is possible to speak of one inclusive national culture? Hassan El-Shamy argues that:

The diversity of social and cultural environment under which various African groups live and the variety of geographical condition found in African make it impossible to speak of one inclusive world view characteristic of African (Martin and O'meara, 1977: 209).

However, the uniform social and cultural conditions

shared by some groups particularly living in what is called a "culture area", give rise to strong similarities in the way in which members of these groups will view their world. This can be seen as "world of unity in diversity" (c.f. Mazrui, 1986: 301).

Mazrui has explored two routes of Africa's redemption. One is the imperative of looking towards Africa's ancestors. The other is the imperative of looking outwards towards the wider world. Indigenous culture has been the foundation of the inward imperative towards ancestry. Islam and western culture have constituted the beginnings of looking outwards towards a wider humanity at large (Mazrui, 1986: 301).

But on the one hand the bigotry of the western world on Africa has alleged that western culture is head of a society happily becoming more mature and humane. On the other hand it has been argued that traditional Africa is anachronistic and the strength of traditional order may impede development to the degree that it makes infusion of any new or modern elements of "modern culture" impossible. This is because culture is the lens through which people see reality including other cultures to the extent that if a perceived culture differs from one's own it is regarded as strange or improper and thus to be condemned.

But for Mazrui, despite the diverse cultures and cultural practices, a world may be formed by people of diverse cultures a world where people are bound by a common interest in

securing the well being of others as well as of themselves to work for principles of universality by which they will be bound (1986: 301).

Now the problem is which imperative is best suited to realise the idea of global African culture - "cultural universalism" (c.f. Mazrui, 1986: 301). Mazrui argues that global Africa is caught up in the four great denials to which the African people have been subjected by the western world - the denial of history, the denial of poetry, the denial of science and denial of philosophy. This falls under the universalist thesis in which western culture is treated as the custodian of such themes as reason, ontology, justice, knowledge, development and truth which apparently are the typical themes in philosophy (c.f. Odera Oruka, 1990: 89). The fundamental question is "whether each culture is unique and African cultures are fundamentally different from other cultures ..." (Masolo, 1994: 247).

But still there is culturalist thesis in which culture is corollary of philosophy. Here in, any philosophical themes are to be understood and handled within the context of the culture and language that originate them. The problem that arises is, are there universally valid meta-standards or judgements for weighing moral values and cultural beliefs? It should be added, however, that the culturalist thesis does not deny that may be a number of philosophical problems that are universal in character, but the solutions to these problems

80), thereby discarding the works of African writers such as Chinua Achebe and Cyprian Ekwensi. But Odera-Oruka wonders "Why we should ourselves read Taban instead of Nietzsche and Homer" (Odera-Oruka, 1990: 80). Should Africans be cultural admirers of western myths and values and thus their cultural achievements and progresses? Claude Levi Strauss advises against such an unwarranted identification of the culture of western Europe (West proper) with the culture of mankind. Accordingly he says that:

The bias can be in principle overcome but only after a great deal of meticulous research into the customs and mores of men on every part of the globe and as far as possible, in every age somehow recorded in history (Byrne, et al., 1969: 321).

Further, he contends that the cultural patterns of any society can be discovered. Moreover, "by concentrating on the form rather than the content of different cultural patterns, we will gradually build up a fairly accurate description of what not only some but all men have in common" (Byrne, et al., 1969: 321). For him the common characteristic is the thinking process; now could this be referring to the cultural universals? Viz. "Logical reasoning" (Wiredu, 1990: 5-19).

It is noteworthy that cultural development is dependent upon the great and small contributions of successful generations expressed by the notion of tradition. Now tradition literally means "Archaic" but it is to be viewed as handing down. The fact that these tradition results in progressively better utilisation of the environment is not to

be underscored. Tradition is thus to be identified with the adjective "cumulative". So then should the cumulative aspects of the African societies be substituted with western cumulative aspects in order to promote a better utilisation of environment? In other words should we substitute the African traditions with the western traditions in order to promote cultural development in Africa?

1.5 HYPOTHESES

The following hypotheses were posited and tested accordingly.

- (1) That cultural development is synonymous westernisation.
- (2) That cultural development is the glorification of African mode of life as located in the past.
- (3) That all societies in the world are culturally underdeveloped or undeveloped.

1.6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study operates on Karl Popper's concept of "unintended consequences" (Popper, 1963: 96-97). Accordingly, a cultural phenomena generates its own problems, follows its own path and determines its own development. Just like science working in a particular paradigm or theoretical framework, develops and changes as the unforeseen implications of the scientific theories are worked out so does culture.

It has been argued that a culture's present state has a good deal to do with its future state, because institutions of

any particular time have implications that become manifest in the institution of a later time. Thus this study operates on the assumption that African culture develops according to its own standards and that the present state of African culture is a major determinant of its future.

1.7 METHODOLOGY

This study was mainly based on library research in which books, journals, theses, magazines, newspapers and relevant unpublished papers were consulted. Information gathered was then subjected to rational scrutiny. Given that this study was a conceptual analysis, the analysis was limited to (an analysis of) concepts. The contention is that in this study, all objectives set have been achieved and hypothesis tested, therein.

The next chapter discusses the concept of culture by examining the various views as regards culture and its aspects vis-a-vis man in general.

CHAPTER TWO

THE CONCEPT OF CULTURE

In this chapter our attention will be focused on some views concerning: the concept of culture in general with a view to gaining a better understanding of the concept of culture and its underlying principles. We shall then proceed with a brief survey of levels of culture and world view while bearing in mind some of the problems associated with conception of culture.

2.1 THE NATURE OF CULTURE

The word "culture" in its social, intellectual and artistic sense is a metaphorical term derived from the act of cultivating the soil (in Latin-Cultura). Cultura describes the act of bestowing labour and attention upon land for raising of crops. Man cultivates land in order to grow crops which fulfil his nutritional needs. The techniques man uses in cultivating land are determined by his culture thus enables man wrest a living out of nature by providing him with the means and ways to do so. Broadly, the term developed in four ways which still affect its meaning and conception today. Firstly, culture came to mean "a general way or habit of the mind" viz; idea of human perfection. Secondly, culture also meant a general state of intellectual and moral development in a given community. Thirdly, culture meant a general body of arts and intellectual works and lastly, culture meant a whole

way of life (material, intellectual and spiritual) of a given community.

It is with these observations in mind that various attempts have been made to understand culture. Nonetheless, culture has been defined differently by different scholars depending on their orientation and scholarly living. Herein we shall focus our attention on some that seem to bring out interesting features of culture. Since there are very many definitions of culture. To start with, "culture consists of all behaviours acquired by men as members of social groups" (Erasmus, 1961: 103).

This is an abbreviated version of E.B. Taylor's definition of culture as:

"that complex whole that includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, customs and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society (1924: 1).

In fact, the usage of culture as a precise scientific term is credited to Taylor. His definition is rich because it includes the material and non-material aspects of culture. It is not surprising to assert that most of the anthropological definitions of culture today are mere modifications of the Taylorian definition.

Shapiro, in his book Man, Culture and Society, defines culture as "the integrated sum total of learned behaviour traits which are shared by the members of society" (1956: 168). For him and many others perhaps, culture is acquired or taught and nobody is born with beliefs, language and values;

and what we learn depends on what is actually taught or given to us. Culture is thus not instinctive, innate or biologically determined. Elsewhere, Shapiro contends that culture is a human creation:

The human capacity for culture is a consequence of man's complex and plastic nervous system. It enables man to make adjustments in behaviour without going through biological modification of his organisms (1956: 169).

Similarly, according to Malinowski culture is merely the instrumental realisation of biological necessities. It is an artificial and a "secondary environment". It is also a means to an end, the end being to satisfy the biological needs for the human species. Thus culture is a medium through which those needs are satisfied and hence culture becomes the product of functional necessity (see Horigan, 1988: 26 ff).

Odera Oruka, in an article entitled "Ideology and Culture" presented at the second Afro-Asian Philosophy conference in Nairobi in 1981, defines culture as follows:

Culture is man's contribution to the nature of environment. It is a general way of life of a people which, among other things, demonstrate their celebrated achievements in thought, morals and material production. These three summarise the content of culture which in totality is a people's body of knowledge, belief and values, behaviour, goals, social institutions plus tools, techniques and material constructions (1981: 57).

In a paper entitled "Philosophy and Culture: A Critique" presented at the same conference aforementioned, Masolo quotes, with approval, Niebuhr's definition of culture which is given as:

The artificial and secondary environment that man has placed on the natural one. It includes language, habits, ideas, beliefs, customs, social organisation, hereditary products, technical procedures, values etc. (1983: 48; see also Niebuhr, 1956: 32).

Interpreting Niebuhr, Masolo thus writes:

Culture is therefore the whole of the network of human activity - spiritual and material. It is the world of man, built by him in accordance with his interpretation of the primary reality or nature which surrounds him as the objective "other". It is the process and fruit of man's own self creation of his search and moral obligation to cultivate and fulfil himself (1983: 48).

For Masolo, culture is a man made phenomenon which enables man to fulfil himself by making use of what nature presents to him. Culture is created by man and for man. In fact humans are animals with a difference, and that difference is culture, a major reason for their adaptability and success. Humans are blessed with a cultural adaptive kit as well as tools which enable them to wrest a living from their environment. The cultural adaptive apparatus also consist of their ideology. By ideology we mean ideas about how things should be done in everyday life.

Okot p'Bitek, a Ugandan born poet and philosopher, in his book Artist, the ruler, defines culture as:

Philosophy as lived and celebrated in society and all their institutions are formed by and in fact built around central ideas about what life is all about; that is their social philosophy, their world view (1986: 13; see also Odera Oruka and Masolo eds. 1983: 106).

Thus, for p'Bitek, culture is a total response of a

people to their reality which includes all aspects of life. Hence culture is to be viewed as a collective heritage of any society. Culture consists of ideas and behaviour of members of society. Such ideas and behaviour may vary with respect to a particular situation and such variation are within a definite range. This is what some would term "real cultural patterns" (Bohannon and Glazier eds., 1988: 20).

In the same vein, Kroeber and Kluckhohn have formulated a summary definition of the notion of culture employed by American anthropologists at mid century: They assert that:

Culture consists of patterns, explicit or implicit, of and for behaviour acquired and transmitted by symbols consisting the distinctive achievement of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on one hand be considered as products of action, on the other, as elements of further action (Morelli, 1984: 3 see also, Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952: 181).

This could indicate perhaps, the modern operative distinction between cultural activities of humans and those activities peculiar to purely biological forms. Culture thus is "a set of meanings and values that informs a way of life" (Morelli, 1984: 2-3). As we have earlier noted, culture is acquired and not biologically determined. It varies from one group to another. However, it is important to note that culture promotes and enhances the experience of all groups in a society. This view makes provision for what many would call sub-cultures which exist within "whole culture" (by whole we

mean those cultures that prevail across communities at large). Normally, sub-cultures are generally viewed as negative and constituting deviance.

Nevertheless, we should take cognisance of the fact that societies have progressed socially, economically and even scientifically as a result of the discoveries and innovations made by the so called deviants or social misfits. Historically, we have big names like Galileo, Socrates and Marx just to name but a few.

Here in Kenya, sub-cultures have developed within whole cultures. We have what many would call urban-culture. It is radically different from the so called rural culture in terms of language, dressing and eating habits. This sub-culture is more often than not associated with the teenagers (boys and girls). However, it is rapidly encroaching on adults. The language used in communication is "Sheng" which is a mixture of Kiswahili and English plus other indigenous languages. We have some examples such as "Mathee" or "Masa" (mother), "Fathee" or "Buda" (father) "filanga free" (feel free) and so on.

The dressing styles also vary from the general dressing style. Teenage boys ("Teens") are usually clad with oversize jean trousers, "big shoes" (army boots) and have different kinds of hair styles ranging from "box-panks" to "Jordan" (clean-head shave). They could also be spotted wearing earrings. On their part teenage girls ("babes") are normally

clad with either baggy jeans or tight fitting ones, miniskirts with funny blouses - they call them "body suits". For their footwear is what they call "blocks" - extra ordinary big women footwear. It has become part of their outfit to wear sunglasses. All these characteristics are different from the more conservative ones of the rural-folks who do not fail to show their discontentment.

2.2 LEVELS OF CULTURE

We must assert here, however, that with the narrowing of the rural-urban divide, those disparities are no longer clearcut. This has been attributed to the rural-urban as well as urban-rural migration which has translated into cultural adjustments and modifications in rural and urban areas at various levels. Louis J. Luzbetak identifies the following three levels of culture on which society organises itself:

- (1) At the surface level are the individual building blocks of culture, the morning less forms, the "shapes", the signs and symbols minus their meaning, the who, what, when, where, how and what kind.
- (2) The society relates such forms to one another through function to create a system of meanings (the immediate whys)
- (3) On the third and deepest level is the basic psychology (the underlying whys of a society, the starting points of thinking, reacting and motivating, the fundamental premises, attitudes, and drives - the "mentality") (Musonda, 1997: 155; see also Luzbetak, 1988: 223).

For Luzbetak, the third and deepest level determines the first two levels. This level according to him answers the

following questions:

Who and what I am? Why am I in the world? What is reality? Is the present life the only possible of the world and its purpose? What is the orientation of time and space? (1997: 158; see also, Luzbetak, 1988: 252).

The answers to these questions, according to Luzbetak, give a distinctive character to a culture. Luzbetak mentions about twenty eight elements that can be investigated to reveal the third level of culture of any particular people. The most important ones of them include world view, religion and mythology (Musonda, 1997: 176; see also Luzbetak, 1988: 251-252). Moreover, for Luzbetak, World view seems the most important element. He thus notes that:

In order to go beyond the level of symbols and experience the realities they symbolise, one has to move to the third level of culture based on fundamental conceptions and values shaped by the world view (Musonda, 1997: 158; see also Luzbetak, 1988: 251-252).

It is important to note that world view is another word for Weltanschauung. Weltanschauung is a German word which is a combination of Welt - world and Anschauung - view. It is a comprehensive or personal philosophy of human life and the universe (Hanks, 1979: 1646). Herein, world view is used in its broadest sense. It may include among other elements, the religious element. Indeed, Mbiti has observed that for the African people of Sub-saharan region, the whole existence is a religious phenomenon; man is a deeply religious being living in a religious universe" (1969: 15). Thus, in Africa, it is

difficult to separate their world view from their religious elements.

In the same vein, the Secretariat for non-Christians also asserts that:

... the African religions impregnate the whole life of the community. They are the beginning and the end of every thing. Reduced to essentials, their Weltanschauung, their vision of the world, is a unifying factor because it does not imply any clear cut difference between sacred and profane, between matter and spirit. In its view the living and the dead, the visible cosmos and the invisible world merely constitute one and the same universe, and the antinomies of good and evil, life and death, which spring from antagonisms inherent in existing beings do not vitiate the unity of this world vision (Musonda, 1997: 174).

From the foregoing, we observe that religion is deeply ingrained in the African world view. The religious element plays a vital role in determining their philosophy and world view. Herein religion and philosophy are synonymous. Since as we observed earlier in Okot p'Bitek culture is a "philosophy or a world view", then it only means that African cultures are heavily laden with religion.

However, Redfield insists that world view differs from culture, ethos, mode of thought and rational character. He says that:

.... It is the picture members of a society have of the properties and characters upon their stage of action (Besanz, 1973: 142).

At this point in time it may be worthwhile looking at some of the functions of a world view.

2.3 FUNCTIONS OF A WORLD VIEW

Charles Krapf outlines five functions that a world view performs for the members of a culture, viz:

- (1) the explanation of reality;
- (2) evaluation;
- (3) psychological re-enforcement;
- (4) integration; and,
- (5) adaptation (Musonda, 1997: 158-160).

Concepts such as witches, sorcerers, taboos and totem are commonly used in Africa to provide a satisfactory explanation of reality viz; enigmatic happenings in the world. They have become a last resort with the failure of science to give better explanations.

Furthermore, witchcraft, sorcery, beliefs, values, meanings and sanctions among African peoples have become a basis for evaluation and assessment of various behaviours in the economic political, social, religious and educational fields.

A people's conceptual system becomes a form of solace in times of misery and crises for example during illness, birth, death and transition say in marriage and puberty. More often than not, the psychological re-enforcement takes the form of a ritual or ceremony communally celebrated to provide support to persons or the community at large. "This is the function that points vividly to the existence of the African world view

in the present situation. In times of crises many people even the most educated one turn to their traditional practices as consulting diviners and traditional doctors" (1997: 159). Tempels had also observed that when the *evolue* (converttee) was faced with matters of life and death, he turned back to the traditional or "pagan" ways because there was a belief that his ancestors had left behind solutions to all problems in life (1959: 13f).

Integration involves the systematisation and ordering of a people's perception of reality with a view to assisting them "interpret multifarious events to which they are exposed" (Musonda, 1997: 159). It also enables the concerned parties to filter out obsolete and unworthy elements that do not conform to the existing beliefs.

Finally, adaptation involves the "reconciling of apparently irreconcilable differences between old and new understandings" (1997: 159). New ideas are integrated into the old system of understanding reality and life. This apparently, is based on the belief that "what is novel in any society is at least partly traceable to one or more elements in the world view that has developed over time" (1997: 160). It could also prompt another adage which says that "old is gold" meaning that we should not throw overboard what we have always lived with or that which has brought us this far, rather we should use it by for example modifying it to suite the current needs and requirements.

At this juncture, it is worth noting that all these five functions of the world view use symbols extensively to bring out the desired effects. It is worth mentioning too that a world view is not easily defined and consequently there is no clear cut meaning of a world view.

A world view is a combination of total common characteristics within the culture. However, in view of some individualistic tendencies from some people within a given culture, such underlying similarities decrease or become less and less. In a nutshell, a world view is the collective or social aspect of human historical developments.

2.4 SYMBOLS, PRACTICAL AND THEORITICAL ASPECTS OF CULTURE

It is also important to note that symbols are material objects used to represent abstract things. Dillistone observes that "a symbol leads the bearer or the watcher to conceive or to imagine an object or event It is not necessarily with direct action Rather it is concerned with thought and imagination " (Musonda, 1997: 158; see also, Dillistone, 1958: 25). From this viewpoint, it is possible to assert that all cultures have different kinds of symbols inherent in them. It means that each culture has two aspects. These two aspects are: the practical and theoretical. The practical aspect of culture is concrete manifestation in the way it is lived while the theoretical aspect of culture is the philosophy or justification that underlies it (Odera-Oruka and Masolo eds., 1983: 45).

Suffice it to say that the practical aspect of culture is represented by that level of culture which includes symbols and signs. This is usually associated with what many social scientists especially anthropologists call "material culture". The Kikuyus for instance, place banana plants at the entrance to the place where a wedding ceremony is taking place. Bananas are a sign or symbol of "prosperity" and well wish to the newly wedded couple by the community at large. However, to a non-Kikuyu, the banana plant so placed, means nothing for he does not know the theoretical aspect of it. Hence, one must be aware of the reasons behind any particular symbol or sign in order to appreciate it.

Similarly, the umbilical cord and the placenta, which are symbols of a child attachment to the mother, are usually given some special reference in many African societies. Mbiti for example, describes the special treatment given to the placenta among the Gikuyu and the Didinga, as well as the Ingassana and the Wolof. He says:

... the Gikuyu deposits the placenta in uncultivated field and cover it with grain and grass, these symbolising fertility. The uncultivated field is the symbol of fertility, strength and freshness; and using it is like a silent prayer that the mother's womb should remain fertile and strong for the birth of more children. Among the Didinga, the placenta is buried near the house where the birth take place; among the Ingassana it is put in a calabash which is hung on a special tree (*gammeiza*); placenta is buried in the back-yard, but the umbilical cord is sometimes made into a charm which the child is made to wear (1969: 113).

Thus it is possible to see that various communities have attached meanings to symbols which could be similar or different and that the said meanings only make sense to the respective members. Symbols thus may be similar but with different meanings depending on their interpretations. Going by their observations, culture can be said to be a totality of a people's way of life. The philosophy of a culture (which is also the theoretical aspect of such and such culture) is the basic reasons and beliefs that justify such and such a practice in a particular culture; that is the "underlying whys". Odera-Oruka and Masolo assert lucidly that:

.... the theoretical aspect of culture is the level at which the observable activities that emanate from culture and which in turn enrich it, are given meaning. This is also the level of deliberation and evaluation, identification of motives and the impure to do or act in a particular manner rather than another. More precisely, it is what underlies the overt actions that make culture trully human acts rather than move instinctive impulses (1981: 47).

Herein, we observe that philosophy and culture are mutually related in that just as philosophy depends on culture; for in as much philosophy is a part of culture and actually springs from it so does culture depend on philosophy since philosophy gives culture its meaning. In other words, philosophy puts culture on its feet by providing culture with some rational basis. Culture cannot do without philosophy.

Reasonably, the notion of culture rests on the historical and creative activity of man and consequently on the

development of man as a subject of that activity. Thus, development of culture coincides with the development of human personality. Herein references are not made to any specific and separate culture but to culture in general. However, this does not throw overboard the objective forms of existence of a given culture viz; the products and results of creative activity. In this view, these results are seen as an embodiment of the general activities of a people. Their significance is revealed when they point or rather become part of the fabric of human living.

Culture is thus to be seen as a dialectical fruit of man's established standards and creativity which testifies the historical evolution of mankind. Indeed, there is a view that cultures developed in an evolutionary process that seemingly has been dependent on the evolution of an increasingly large and complex human brain (c.f. Stanfield and Smith eds., 1949: 42). Leslie White regards "human organism and indeed all the physical universe as constant parameters without which culture could not exist, but which once given have no bearing on the variables involved in cultural process" (Wallace, 1970: 19).

Thus, from the above, culture is an innate creation of man; in that man virtually influences its growth while being influenced by it at the same time. The next chapter examines culture and other related issues with a view to ascertaining the relationship between man and culture.

CHAPTER THREE

CULTURE AND OTHER RELATED ISSUES

3.1 CULTURE AND ENVIRONMENT

According to Collins English Dictionary, environment refers to the external conditions or surroundings especially those in which people live or work. Generally speaking, environment refers to those external surroundings in which organisms, be they animals or plants, live and which inevitably influence their development and behaviour (Hanks, 1979: 489). In this view, environment may be natural (physical) or social. Natural environment is "God given while social environment is usually created by man, essentially for the sake of survival. Natural environment includes, soil, resources, vegetation, fauna, climate, land, rivers, lakes and seas (oceans) as well as man. Social environment basically entails social relations within social settings and it is more often than not associated with man though we normally talk of "social animals and insects". We should bear in mind, that unless otherwise stated the terms physical and natural environment mean the same in this thesis and hence will be used interchangeably.

That natural environment has become a household term is a fact demonstrated by the various summits held frequently. A notable one is the "Earth summit" held in 1997 in Rio de Janeiro in Brazil where deliberations were made on how best to enhance natural environment protection. All this was with the

belief that something had to be done pretty soon as regards the reduction of natural environment pollution following the depletion of the "ozone layer" (which is usually referred to as earth's top blanket that prevents the sun's dangerous ultraviolet rays from reaching the earth's surface thereby unleashing devastating effects), at alarming rates resulting into "global warming" due to the so called "green house effect". Also top on the agenda was the call for the promotion of bio-diversity which basically is the enhancement of natural co-existence between flora, fauna and nature at large.

It has been argued that Africans are poor because of besides other factors such as economic, "lack of a comprehensive knowledge of their natural environment. It is not enough to know that Africa is theoretically rich in minerals if the basic knowledge of where they are to be found is lacking" (Ndeti, 1972: 5). We would like to add that it is not just knowledge of where to find such minerals that is absolutely important, but essentially the knowledge of how best to utilise such minerals without necessarily degrading the environment. Hence our contention is that knowledge of the environment (physical) should not stop at knowing how but knowing what ought to be done. This way, man will benefit from his physical environment without eventually depleting it. At this juncture we would like to take cognisance of the English adage "If we look after the pennies the pounds will

take care of themselves" meaning that if we take care of that we have within our power and reach what is beyond our power and reach will just follow suit.

Natural environment presents man with possibilities for development of culture. In the words of Ngugi wa Thiong'o: The basis of all human communities is the soil, land. Without the soil, without land, without nature there is no human community. Quite apart from anything else man is himself of nature. But man detaches himself from nature, observes it and studies its laws with a conscious aim of harnessing them to his service, to his strategy for survival. Unlike the beast that merely adapts itself to its habitation, man through the labour process acts on the natural environment (1981: 7).

In the same vein, Marx observes that man regulates and controls the material relations between himself and nature.

Marx thus writes:

He opposes himself to nature as one of her own forces, setting' in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate nature's production to his own wants. By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his nature. He develops his slumbering powers and compels them to act in obedience to his sway (see Ngugi wa Thiong'o, 1981: 8).

Thus man determines the natural environment but it also affects his character indirectly. In order to effectively control nature, man develops tools which together with his labour-power constitute forces of production. He then uses the tools and technology to wrest a living from nature (Ngugi wa Thiong'o, 1981: 8). It is worth mentioning here that technology is but an aspect of culture. Suffice it to say ... that culture through its aspect technology enables man wrest

a living from nature since as we noted earlier in chapter two, humans are blessed with a cultural adaptive kit replete with all kinds of assortments which enables them exploit and utilise their environment.

However, there is a view that environment imposes some limits on the culture that may be developed or come to use in a particular area. According to this view there is a hypothesis which states that tropical climates do provide abundance for little effort and thus offer no challenge whereas coldest climates are too severe and require the greatest efforts by man in order to survive. E. Huntington thought that temperate climates were the best and also the centre of culture (1945: 103), since it was believed that when the Caucasoid people were populating the western and northern Europe, they were forced by the exigencies of geography and climate to produce clothes, homes, ploughs and sailing ships and even further, invent mechanical devices that were needed for the making of these; consequently abandoning some rigidities of their old cultural modes. African peoples, on the other hand, came and remained under the influence of geography and climate which apparently did not impede their ability to live though it was essentially harsh. Africans lived without much alteration of their material techniques and without curtailment of their cultural modes, so it is argued.

Nevertheless, the above view has since been rebutted by many scholars. They have argued that tremendous achievement

of Egyptians and Mesopotamians in pre-Christian millennia contrasted with their way of life in more recent times suggest that factors of a non-geographic kind must have been operative (Jacobs and Stern, 1974: 180). In their view, the differences of cultural achievements in for instance, Peru, Mexico, Japan, India Samatra or Nigeria serve to indicate that climate and geographical environment cannot have been a major factor. Geography and climate made possible important features of these cultures but clearly they did not cause cultural change or development at large (c.f. Jacob and Stern 1974: 180). Indeed, the effect of environment on culture not only depends on the climate and geography but somewhat on the state of culture which in turn depends, to a large extent, on other factors such as diffusion (borrowing of one culture from another).

We cannot thus state accurately and precisely the limits of the possibilities presented by the environment on culture. Suffice it to say that climate and geographical environment are a sufficient but not necessary condition for the growth of cultures. Seen in this light, the idea that all developments generally considered, have always risen in the cold temperate regions is misleading. Historically we have had the developments in form of civilisations; for example the Mayan, Aryan and Egyptian ancient civilisations all of which have taken place in warm climate regions of the world. Here in East Africa we could talk about the Gedi ruins while in

Zimbabwe, we could point out at the Monomotapa ruins which still arouse wonder today.

It is important to note that in the course of man's endeavour to control and even subdue nature for his own good, he enters into some kind of relationships. According to Ngugi wa Thiong'o "he enters into certain relations, certain arrangements, certain forms of co-operation with other men" (1981: 8). Moreover, such relations are both at the level of knowledge of nature and at the level of his development of material forces of production. Ngugi wa Thiong'o, quoting with approval Marx's observations, writes:

In production, men not only act on nature but also on one another. They produce only by cooperating in certain way and mutually exchanging their activities. In order to produce, they enter into definite connections and relations with one another and only within their social relations does their action on nature, does production take place (1981: 8).

From the above it is reasonable enough to assert that man's activities on nature generate his social character. As Ngugi wa Thiong'o eloquently puts it:

.... In the process of man acting on the natural environment through a combination of his labour-power and technology (tools), and his knowledge of science, he creates a social environment, a social community (1981: 8).

However, the process of change in the social community largely depends on man's level of knowledge of nature and the degree to which the instruments of production have developed. Ngugi

wa Thiong'o lucidly states that:

As people deepen their knowledge of nature, as they develop their instruments of production and hence change their mode of production (i.e. what, and how, they produce and exchange), so will there occur changes in the political and cultural spheres and hence also in their values and how they look at themselves (1981: 9).

At this point in time, we should take cognisance of the fact that "it is the values that a people have that are a basis of the collective and individual image of self, their identity as a people" (1981: 9). Nonetheless, culture itself embodies such values. As noted by Ngugi wa Thiong'o:

It is the culture that a people have that embodies their values, those aesthetic and moral qualities that they consider basic and important in their contact and interaction with one another, and with the universe. A culture embodies a community's structure of values, the basic of their world outlook and how they see themselves and their place in the universe and in relation to other communities (1981: 9; see also Ngugi wa Thiong'o, 1986: 15).

Thus culture comprises of beliefs pertaining to the place of human beings in the physical environment and also the ethics that guide human behaviour towards that environment (Wiredu, 1992: 14). Moreover, the "community develops a cultural environment in the economic and political process as a means of cementing the economic and political structures" (Ngugi wa Thiong'o, 1984: 9). Culture reinforces the economic and political institutions such that changes that

occur in these institutions are culturally influenced. Nonetheless all changes are ultimately dialectical in nature. Accordingly, Ngugi wa Thiong'o insists that the process of change in a social community is not mechanical. For him it is dialectical. Thus he writes:

.... Mark you, this is not a mechanical process: how people look at themselves, their values and images of self, will affect their cultural, political and economic structures, their relationship to the soil, land and nature. It is a dialectical process with everything acting on one another to produce the ever-changing complexity we call society (1981: 9).

It is important to note that natural or physical environment to a large extent exercises some limitations on the development of culture at a particular time. The advance of a culture progressively frees man from limitations of any particular place but at the same time makes man more and more dependent upon conditions both environmental and cultural especially the so called "remote" areas of Africa. Thus while freeing man from direct and limiting effect of environment, the development of culture also binds man to his physical environment by revealing more of its aspects and making him conscious of its possibilities (Thomas, 1940: 143). Nonetheless, the physical environment cannot be over-emphasised especially when we know that "culture is a man made part of environment" (c.f. Herskovitz, 1948: 17).

The natural/physical environment and all its

ramifications, soil, resources, vegetation, fauna, climate and land influence the social organisation of a people (Ndeti, 1972: 271). Moreover, physical environment shapes the existence of man. Suffice it to say that culture and physical conditions of existence develop together and influence each other. Man created culture to assist him in taming what appears to him a cruel and hostile nature. Natural or physical environment on the other hand, provides man with a natural resource base upon which man acts through the product of his own ingenuity (culture), which then determines what kind of values habits technologies and law that man shall adopt with a view to realising his goal, the goal of taming and controlling nature. The above notwithstanding, nature and culture are often viewed as opposites which are remote from each other. In fact, Rousseau compares the opposition between effective life and intellectual with that of nature and culture. (Needham, 1963: 100). Thus based on this binary opposition, a view of the passage from nature to culture emerges which is largely dependent on population increase but ultimately on the human intellect. Thus:

The passage from nature to culture depended on demographic increase, but the latter did not produce a direct effect, as a natural cause. First it forced men to diversify their modes of livelihood in order to exist in different environments, and also to multiply their relations with nature. But in order that this diversification and multiplication might lead to technical and social transformations, they had to become suspects and means of human thought (1963: 100).

The repeated attention of various beings to others and among themselves have naturally engendered in man's mind the perspective of certain relations. These relations which are in the form of big and small, strong and weak, fast and slow, bold and fearful; have eventually produced in man a kind of reflection. Thus what belongs to nature cannot be used to transcend nature. Instinct which belongs to nature cannot go beyond nature. Instinct is just a "blind urge" that produces no more than a purely animal-like act (1963: 99). This leads us to the subject of our next sub-topic.

3.2 CULTURE AND INTELLECT

By intellect we mean basically the capacity for understanding, thinking and reasoning which is radically distinct from feeling or wishing. In other words, intellect is the opposite of instinct which is an innate capacity in animals (man included) to respond to a given stimulus in a very fixed way.

It is important to note that man, as a rational animal, is capable of intellectual activity. But according to Rousseau, foresight and curiosity which are two important aspects of intellectual activity are usually absent in a state of nature which for Rousseau is the state man was before he entered society where he was animal-like; concerned about instinctual needs and innocent of any form of consciousness be it moral or intellectual (c.f. Ochieng-Odhiambo, 1994: 42). Man thus needlessly abandons himself solely to the consciousness of his physical existence (Needham, 1963: 100). In other words, man in a state of nature is purely mechanical. But as we saw earlier, man, as a historical being is capable of radically objecting reality through culture which depends largely on man's creative abilities.

It has been argued that human cultures developed to an evolutionary process that seemingly depended upon the evolution of an increasingly large and complex brain (Stanfield and Smith eds., 1949: 42). Mitchell is of a similar view and he observes that the development of the

brain gave rise to the capacity for culture. Thus the advent of cultural activities predates the rapid growth of the human brain (1968: 12). Moreover, the advent of culture coincides with the birth of the intellect (Needham, 1963: 101).

There is a major epistemological difference between mind and brain (Nkrumah, 1964: 23), which is, however, not metaphysical. Mind is usually the activity of the brain. In fact, philosophical materialism asserts that "mind is the result of critical organisation of matter The presence of the mind and the attainment of (a) critical minimum of organisation of matter are one and the same thing" (1964: 24). Brain is herein treated as a material substance hence mind being an abstract as opposed to concrete experience. It is "nothing but an upshot of matter with a critical nervous arrangement" (1964: 24). This distinction of mind from brain helps to account for both the intelligent activity and for the matter upon which such an activity stems since if the brain and mind were one it would be difficult to do so as the brain would be an activity and matter at the same time. But the distinction is more a matter of convenience largely because the brain is rather complex and the mind is even more complex. Again in the study of the mind or even the brain, we usually use the mind to study mind which is rather an uphill task for it involves introspection.

The intelligent activity of the brain (which is the mind), is what many refer to but unconsciously. It is this

activity which largely accounts for the creative nature of man. Man invents tools to enable him cope more readily with the unpredictable changes in his physical conditions of existence. Thus through culture and essentially through technology which is an aspect of culture, man curves or wrests a living out of nature. In other words, the ultimate need for survival is realised by man's ingenuity as manifested through his culture. What we are affirming here is of course, the mutual linkage between culture and the intellect; since man faced with problems inevitably develops new skills and techniques which enable him to tackle the problems satisfactorily.

Perhaps this has been the reason behind the view that cultural activities correspond to the growth of the brain. However, more precisely it must be an increase in intelligent activity, subject to the need by man to realise his goal in life, the goal of happiness.

3.3 CULTURE AND IDEOLOGY

According to Collins English Dictionary, ideology refers basically to "a body of ideas that reflect belief and interests of a nation, political system etc" (Hanks, 1979: 728). In other words, ideology is an assemblage of ideas demonstrated in the beliefs and interests of particular communities. It is a term that was coined by Destutt de Tracy in 1796 with the hope that "science of ideas" essentially,

would precipitate into institutional reforms (c.f. Braybrooke, 1967, vol.3-4: 125).

However, ideology is, more often than not, taken to refer to ideas that are essentially false, misleading or held for the wrong reasons but which nevertheless, are believed with such conviction as to be irrefutable. According to Marx thus "ideology signified a false consciousness of social and economic realities, a collective illusion shared by the members of a given social class and in history distinctively associated with that class" (1967: 125). This basically constitutes what we would term as the negative conception of ideology because for Marx, ideology consists of a mystification of nature and society demonstrated through the condition of alienation affecting society as a whole. Furthermore, ideology according to Marx, embraces "the differentiation and alienation of brain workers from hard workers" as its sufficient and necessary condition. Thus according to him, no ideology would have ever originated had there been no alienation which was as a result of division of labour (c.f. Braybrooke, 1967: 125). For Marx thus the bottom line of ideology is false consciousness of reality. It has been argued that:

Deprived of physical objects to work upon, the brain workers' sense of reality is undermined, but *Homo Faber* still, with his thinking shaped to suit his means and activity of gaining a livelihood, he invents fictitious supersensible objects to work and discourse about and attaches to them distorted

conceptions of state, of law and morals, of man's relation to nature, of human history and human prospects. These conceptions reflect current economic arrangements but reflect them so misleadingly as to forestall, their conscious and effective social control (1967: 125).

In all Marxian perspectives thus, ideology entails beliefs that motivate behaviour of its concerned parties which though it may be false, it assists the concerned parties to a period of success. It therefore acts as a smoke-screen. However, this view is slowly by slowly becoming less plausible. In an apparent rejection of this view of ideology, Odera Oruka reckons that:

.... Ideology properly conceived does and must not defy questions of truth and rational judgement. Ideological propositions are truth claims and can be defended or rejected on a rational assessment (Odera Oruka and Masolo eds., 1983: 57).

However, "the problem usually is to establish the objective context on which to make the assessment" (1983: 57). This is because such an assessment apparently, seems to be a paradoxical phenomenon as it supposes that he who produces such an assessment is more or less infallible or at least, possesses in this respect, a special competence, like those characteristic of juridical assessments made by people or persons initiated and well versed in the practice. But the underlying characteristic of a seemingly perfect person is his or her own imperfection, which apparently, is usually demonstrated by a feeling of dissatisfaction with himself or herself which ostensibly prevents him or her from taking the

posture of a judge or mentor. Analogically, using the words by Jesus when answering questions that arose from the condemning of a woman found guilty of adultery: "let one who is not a sinner be the first to throw the stone" (John 8: 4).

It is worth mentioning here that "man has always asked the most terrifying questions: what am I? what is the purpose of life? why do people suffer? What is happiness? What is death? Is it the end etc. etc. ... " (odera and Masolo eds., 1983: 109). However, more often than not, ideologies distort as much by neglecting such questions as by affirming false answers. This prompts the "ideological error" which protracts to the "problem of collective illusion" (Braybrooke, 1967: 127). As Mannheim demonstrates through McDonald:

In every age certain beliefs, suppositions and myths had been absolutised and used as instruments for leadership, as tools whereby contingent policies were given the sanction of eternal truths. Where these were used to maintain status quo, Mannheim called them "ideologies" where they were used to change the social system, he called them "utopias" (McDonald, 1968: 589).

Incidentally, it is worth noting that the common/customary use of "ideology" would include both "ideology" and "utopia" in Mannheim sense. Nevertheless, the above notwithstanding, "wise men or women" in society have formulated acceptable answers upon which society are organised in order to fulfil perceived needs. Those formulations constitute "fundamental ideas, the philosophy of life" which apparently, serve as "pillars on which social

institutions are erected" (Odera Oruka and Masolo, 1983: 109). However, preferring distortions and false answers alike, many people have branded these "fundamental ideas" *myths* or *worldviews*. While some have called them ideologies, others have referred to them as "truths" as though they were about verifiable and indisputable facts.

Nonetheless, given that such fundamental ideas are metaphysical, it is not possible to prove their truth-values. In fact, owing to such observations, positivists have declared metaphysical propositions or statements meaningless since according to them these statements were not verifiable empirically; for according to them truth is what is empirically verifiable. However, it may be possible to recognise their meanings.' Indeed, according to Okot p'Bitek, meanings are of a "wider scope than truth". He thus quotes Dewey's assertions that:

.... truths are but one class of meaning, namely, those in which a claim to verifiability by their consequences is an intrinsic part of meanings. Beyond this island of meanings, which are in their own nature true or false, lies the ocean of meanings to which truth or falsity are irrelevant (1983: 109).

It is important to note that Dewey, as a famous experimental pragmatist preferred "inquiry" to the word "truth" since the quest of certainty, he often said, was not compatible with self corrective process of scientific method (McDonald, 1968: 557). According to him the test of any

proposition was the consequences of following it. This surely is what gave a proposition its "warranted assertability". Indeed, William James said that "an idea is true so long as it is profitable to our lives" (McDonald, 1968: 557). Moreover, Odera Oruka argues that "beliefs and propositions are not just true, but true in a given context" (Odera Oruka and Masolo, 1983: 57). For him a context embraces consciousness: He thus says:

In the social political life, a context usually is a given cultural system or consciousness - cultural domain. It is on the basis of a cultural domain that ideological and other socio-political beliefs acquire meaning and truth value (1983: 57).

Now, according to Kottak, ideology is an aspect of culture (1975: 375). Odera Oruka however, disagrees with such a view arguing that:

Strictly speaking culture is not ideology and ideology does not itself constitute culture. The two are however sometimes easily confused, and in certain cases wrongly separated. For example, communism as an ideology is often confused with communism as a cultural system. The former is a social political theory existing as a philosophy of certain governments and political parties in the world. The latter is ideal for life not yet realised anywhere on the globe (1983: 57).

Odera Oruka thus seems to be dispelling the view that ideology as a philosophy is embraced in a cultural system. This is because ideology, seen as a philosophy of a certain nation or political system, may involve misleading or false ideas; that is ideas that are distorted to suit a particular condition of

existence. For him "culture is often a property, a way of life of a society as a whole. Ideology is usually confined to a class or a sect" (1983: 57). In this view then, Odera Oruka seems to agree with the Marxian view of ideology as embracing "beliefs that motivate behaviour of its adherents and every social class adhering to an ideology does so because it suits a specific set of economic arrangement" (Braybrooke, 1967: 125).

Unfortunately, in Africa, according to Odera Oruka the confusion between culture and ideology is widespread. Odera Oruka asserts that:

.... we often vehemently reject foreign ideologies but remain mum about many values of foreign cultures. We, for example, reject a multiparty democracy as sign of foreign ideology. But we retain all trappings of the judiciary of foreign cultures. In academic circles we sometimes brand and reject ideas of foreign social thinkers as foreign ideological indoctrinations. But on the other hand we continue to keep intact the academic protocols imposed by colonial systems (1983: 57).

However, Odera Oruka thinks that the corrective means from such a confusion are to be found in a clear understanding of the connection between culture and ideology (1983: 57). At this point we totally agree with his observations but we however, disagree with his views that ideology and culture constitute different things altogether and hence essentially remote from each other. Arguing in favour of similarities for the aspects with which they are similar by far outweigh those by which they differ, we could trace their similarities from

philosophy. Now when on one hand philosophy is viewed as arising from the social milieu, where social milieu apparently affects its content either by confirming or opposing it, the implication is that it has something of ideology. On the other hand, if philosophy opposes a social milieu then the implication is that of something of the ideology of a revolution against a social milieu (Nkrumah, 1964: 56). But philosophy ideally is a social fact. Thus in its social aspect, philosophy can therefore be regarded as pointing to an ideology. In other words, philosophy and ideology cannot be separated without encountering problems. Philosophy as we have already seen in chapter two is the theoretical aspect of a culture. In fact, theoretical defence of customs and values in a particular culture involves philosophy. Odera Oruka himself a philosopher practically applied his observations remarkably in the S.M. Otieno burial saga (c.f. Ojwang and Mugambi eds. 1989: 79-87). In this view then, ideology is properly to be conceived as part and parcel of a culture. We would like to assert that ideology of a society is manifested in all departments of life, be it social, political, economic, religious and moral. Indeed, all these serve as its tools (c.f. Nkrumah, 1964: 59).

Thus ideology of a society is total. Consequently, it embraces the whole life of a people and manifests itself in their social stratifications (vertical or horizontal, Marx would readily prefer the horizontal type), history,

literature, art and religion.

Odera Oruka implicitly accommodates such a view but in a rather cautious tone when he writes:

It is possible that an ideology can spread and be practiced as a form of life by all classes i.e. a whole society). But this is possible only when all the rivals have become obsolete both on the institutional existence and moral appeal (1983: 57).

Thus competition characterises ideologies in a society.

Nkrumah further notes that:

In societies where there are competing ideologies, it is still usual for one ideology to be dominant. This dominant ideology is that of the ruling class (1964: 57).

However, it is important to note that ideology gives support to the existing social milieu. In other words, ideology generally characterises the society. As Nkrumah puts it:

.... an ideology does not seek to unite a section of people; it seeks to unite the whole of the society in which it finds itself. In its effect, it certainly reaches the whole society, when it is dominant (1964: 57).

Ideology, especially the dominant ideology, usually promulgates the form various institutions shall take and also the ends to which all efforts are to be projected besides establishing common attitudes and purposes for the society. It is this "Ombudsman - like" nature of ideology that inevitably translates into the negative conception of ideology and consequently the dissociation of ideology from culture translating to the "paradox of ideology".

It is worth mentioning that militant nationalism as an

ideology developed in Africa. It arguably used the viability of pre-colonial African culture as ideological campaign against the colonial order. But in order to counter the increasing black nationalism especially in the fight for independence the colonialists were forced to retreat and shift their emphasis to superiority - inferiority dichotomy. Hence a hierarchy of cultures was presumed with European cultures being at the apex. However, African nationalism rejected such a dichotomy by asserting the merit of African way of life.

Despite the fact that African countries have since gained independence, the colonialists and neocolonialists alike have been promoting a vague, amorphous, ahistorical and largely subjective vision of indigenous African way of life despite adopting a rather cunning "cultural relativistic approach". Moreover, they have been enticing Africans to copy wholesale their way of life. They have effectively done this through education. Education and generally scholarship has become their ideological tool. Indeed, Wamba-dia-Wamba argues that the intellectual workers who are a consequence of the separation of intellectual work from manual labour, have since become "ideological askaris" (watch dogs) of colonialism (Ochieng-Odhiambo 1995: 55-56).

This is on the realisation that individuals are very crucial in the growth and dissemination of different ideas. The only reasonable way by which the colonialists and neocolonialists alike could export their ideas about life was

through individuals from the receiving end. These individuals would then become very useful as propagandists of these domineering ideas towards the masses especially in Africa.

We should note however, that there has been a great yearning for some kind of African cultural revolution. We should bear in mind that a revolution has two aspects: a revolution against an old order; and a contest for a new order (Nkrumah, 1964: 34). The goal of African cultural revolution has been to reconstruct the lost cultural model especially in traditional African cultures which complicates the revolution. At the forefront of such an enterprise are the intellectual workers who have, unfortunately, played a role in the domination of the African people. They have tried perhaps in vain to explicate ways and means to obtain the said goals through a revolution orchestrated not through arms but through ideas about how best to achieve the desired goal. Now, the conception of desirable goals is nurtured by ideology such that when those desired goals change or are may be fulfilled, some of the means to them too change but basic ones change in a quiet and discreet way altogether.

We would like however, to take cognisance of the fact that culture has produced great and talented minds capable of in-depth rational scrutinisation of events and occurrences in our contemporary world. The views and ideas advanced by these talented minds have influenced society at various levels. Odera Oruka lucidly asserts that:

.... one of the most formidable aspect of culture consists of the great thoughtful minds that it has produced and the areas of life that such minds have helped to illuminate (1983: 57).

One remarkable thing about Odera Oruka is his skilful way of advancing his findings on Sage Philosophy, a project basically set to establish the existence of wise men and women in our African societies preferably traditional African societies capable of rational justification of the values and customs and other issues afflicting man, men and women who were innocent of western scholarship, viz., men who were hardly corrupted by western education. Odera Oruka likened these wise men and women in Africa to the Greek sages. That besides, the production of such great minds has had far reaching results as regards African culture and philosophy at large. It is worth stressing however, that both African and western cultures have succeeded in producing very powerful minds whose ideas are manifest in all departments of life. Thus Odera Oruka observes:

In any given culture celebrated achievements in thought consists of ideas of it Sages, scientists, artists, poets, prophets, philosophers, statesmen, moralists etc. Such ideas form the intellectual aspect of a culture. "Intellectual" actually because of serious intellectual attack or defence of a culture is possible if it has to take account of these ideas (1983: 58).

It is important to note that the powerful minds manifested in the categories of people and life mentioned above, are, according to Odera Oruka, the "intellectual

lights" (1983: 58) through which culture may be observed. It is equally important to note that Odera emphasises the greatness of a culture as being characterised by presence and freedom afforded to the "intellectual lights" (1983: 58). Moreover, Odera Oruka wonders:

Can we think of the glory of the Greek culture, for example, without conceiving of figures like Plato, Aristotle and Democritus? Who would have anything meaningful to say about the British civilisation and culture if he is not aware of figures like William Shakespeare, Francis Bacon, John Locke and Winston Churchill? without the ideas of such people, British culture would be a culture of swines not minds.

In our own continent Africa, certain minds have recently appeared and are likely to remain symbols of intellectual lights of modern African culture. Figures like Nkrumah, Nyerere, Senghor have given special shapes and expressions to modern African culture, albeit, political culture. In the field of literature and scholarship in general, we have had individuals like Chinua Achebe, Wole Soyinka and Willy Abraham (from the west) and Okot p'Bitek, Ngugi-wa-Thiong'o and Ali Mazrui (from the east). These figures are symbols of the intellectual lights of modern African, cultures. There, of course, are and will be many others (1983: 58).

Thus these great and powerful minds are both products and torch bearers of their cultures since much as their cultures nurture them especially in their initial stages, they also grow up to serve as pillars of those cultures *per se*. Thus "cultures without a contribution from her men and women of thought would be absurd and stagnant" (1983: 58). Nevertheless, these men of ideas must operate unimpeded or unlimited. Hence, intellectual and academic freedom, a

platform for people of ideas must be a necessity for a genuine and complete cultural development anywhere" (1983: 58). However, if we refer to "intellectual and academic freedom" as an epitome of cultural development then, it is likely that the West, who have attached a high premium on freedom of conscience, would be perceived as being more culturally developed than Africa.

Moreover, the African intelligentsia have found themselves brushing shoulders with the establishments and governments of the day in most African states, notable ones being Wole Soyinka, Ali Mazrui, Ken Saro Wiwa, Ngugi-wa-Thiong'o among others. Consequently, many have had to run away from their native countries in the name of life which is an inalienable right to all, while others, who have not been fortunate enough, have suffered humiliation and even put to death, ostensibly due to lack of freedom of conscience.

From the above it is worth noting that freedom (though much will be said of it later on in chapter four) must include something more than just the absence of restraint, control or coercion. Limiting freedom to absence of such inhibitors surreptitiously results in a negative and limited representation of freedom which predisposes it to unwarranted usage by some individuals to serve as a smoke screen through which their societies are to be observed and compared with other unsuspecting societies. However, let us not delve into the issue of freedom here, but point out that freedom must

embrace other aspects besides absence of restraint, control or even suppression of diverse viewpoints.

3.4 CULTURE AND RELIGION

Religion, basically, is the belief and faith in a supernatural being. According to Collins English Dictionary, religion is the "belief in, worship of, or obedience to a supernatural power or powers considered to be divine or to have control of human destiny". Etymologically it is a concept derived from the Latin word *religare* which means "to tie up".

However, J.S. Mbiti thinks that defining religion is an uphill task especially within the African traditional context. He thus writes:

Religion is a difficult word to define and it becomes even more difficult in the context of African traditional life (1969: 15).

Indeed, many writers have generally described African traditional religion as primitive fetishism, animism, Juju, Shamanism, ancestor worship, paganism and so on. All these descriptions have paradoxically indicated the complex nature of African religion rather than defining it. This has resulted into "terms which are inadequate, derogatory and prejudicial" (Mbiti, 1969: 7).

Nonetheless, religious consciousness is a phenomenon that is deeply ingrained in human life and forms the bound between

man's existence and his origin. Thus religion embraces both the mythical and historical perspectives of man.

Moreover, it is so wide and so encompassing that it is absolutely, impossible to reduce it to a set of logical principles without necessarily distorting and even perverting its essence. That traditional African religion in Sub-Saharan Africa is basically overwhelming is a fact demonstrated by Mbiti when he writes:

Because traditional religion permeates all departments of life, there is no formal distinction between the formal the sacred and the secular, between the religious and non-religious, between the spiritual and material areas of life. Wherever the African is, there is his religion ... (1969: 2).

Thus for him the Sub-Saharan Africans are "deeply religious". Furthermore, for the Africans, religion is "an ontological phenomenon; it pertains to the question of existence of being" (1969: 15). This is very crucial since it means that Africans essentially live in a "religious universe". However, it is worth noting that Mbiti largely studied two communities in East Africa namely the Kikuyu and Kamba and most of these findings largely stem from observations made from traditional settings prompting the question: are they still deeply religious today? Such a question arises because it has been argued that modern life is characterised by secularism - a shift from religious inclinations to worldly things such as technology science, and economics - while traditionalism is

marked by religious inclinations. In other words, modernity is characterised with a distinction between sacred and profane which was not the case in traditional settings.

The above notwithstanding, Mbiti's assertion it seems, is still plausible. Our reasons for saying so are easily demonstrated in the Kikuyus today. For example, although Kikuyus are usually associated with the money craze - they will go against all odds for the sake of money - they are still religious to some extent especially when faced with great problems and pains such as death or disease. They will always be heard saying (or is it crying) "Ooi Ngai wakwa!" (Oh my God). And this is evidenced even in the so called professed Kikuyu atheists. However, circumstances arise when Kikuyus call upon God jokingly or unconsciously (or is it in vain); for instance, it has become common to hear Kikuyu drivers and touts remark "Ni Ngai!" (it is God!) or "Nii Ngai mwega" (it is by God's grace). Many would leave this at its face value. But essentially it should serve as a demonstration of how ingrained the relationship between man and his creator is, to the extent that man cannot do without Him altogether.

Suffice it to say that Africans (Kikuyus) are "*homo religious*" and that religion determines their daily functional behaviour. It also provides them with a capacity to tackle their individual life foibles. It also seems idle talk for individuals in Africa to claim atheism. The role of religion

is virtually in all human societies (including those contemptuously referred to as pagans - Africans). Now, according to Mbiti religion is very akin to the philosophy of life and by extension world view. Moreover, religion constitutes culture comprising of ways and means by which people of a given culture relate to their supernatural being.

Religion viewed and understood that way, only means that culture cannot and must not be treated as a commodity that could be bought or sold. It is the disregard of this view that saw missionaries and their colonial "helpers" imposed their religion (Christianity) and by extension their mother land cultures resulting into frustration among Africans. In fact, neither Christianity nor Islam [which used *Jihad* (holy war) in order to impose and perpetuate Islam in non Muslim areas or the so called pagan areas]; has been able to resolve the problem of frustration and uprootedness in Africa today (Mbiti, 1969: 3).

We should, however, note that there has been a growing demand of western culture in Africa today. This demand however, has coincided with the mistaken view that western culture is the gateway to "good" things in life; better ideas and even religion. Africans have wrongly glorified the west.

3.5 CULTURE AND EDUCATION

As we have already noted earlier in chapter two, a culture has various levels. At one level culture may be

viewed as a system of values, ethos, norms, symbols and rules that regulate behaviour in a given society. At another level, culture may be viewed as an organising principle that enables its members to deal, rationally and logically, with the problems that they encounter in their environment. It is at this latter level that education plays a crucial role.

Education, according to Collin's English Dictionary, basically refers to the "process of acquiring knowledge, especially systematically during childhood and adolescence" (Hanks ed. 1979: 466). Furthermore Ndeti notes that:

While the family is the primary instrument at a lower level of human development education tackles adolescent and adult cultural socialisation at the next stage, provides the techniques for natural and spiritual survival and facilitates cultural adaptability (1975: 54).

Education may be informal, formal or non-formal. It used to be said generally by foreign writers; writers with an imperialist bias, that Africans had no formal education of their own prior to introduction of western education system to the continent. This is far from the truth because in many East African societies there has always been a system by which the youth received formal training relevant to the needs of their societies. They received training in social behaviour, arts, and crafts such as weaving, carving and smithery as well as boat making. The youth were subjected to a rigid apprenticeship lasting several years before they qualified and become accepted as members of an appropriate profession. In

Kenya, we know of the Kamba who are refined in trade, carving as well as weaving. The Kikuyus are well known for smithery especially in agricultural implements such as hoes and jembes as opposed: to the Maasais whose smithery is for war-raiding purposes, hunting as well as beauty purposes.

In Kenya, a large part of the population has however, depended (or depends) largely on the informal type of education to transmit a cultural heritage. This was (or is) perhaps the reason why writers with an imperialist bias have tended to give the impression that Negro Africa had no heritage because the fact that informal education largely makes use of the oral tradition which consequently means that most of our cultural heritage is not preserved in books for future generations hence subjecting it to any eventuality for example, getting lost or even distortions for lack of classification. This is with the understanding that oral tradition is based on actual experiences or observations as well as human relations (Ndeti, 1975: 23), in contradistinction to technical knowledge.

Technical knowledge often requires formalised techniques of transmission and literacy is thus an indispensable prerequisite. More often than not literacy has been associated with formal education. This, nonetheless, is based on a narrow understanding and restriction of education to the formal level only. It is with such a narrow view that illiteracy has been equated to ignorance, where illiteracy has

been seen as that which perpetuates ignorance and inhibits intelligence (1975: 23). Illiteracy thus viewed has been juxtaposed with other afflictions of men such as disease, poverty, hunger, war and want.

It is important to note that illiteracy cannot reasonably be equated to ignorance which ideally is a lack of knowledge. Ndeti rightfully observes that:

It is possible to create and reason without knowing how to read or write. History affords many examples. The general level of illiteracy in many ancient civilisation (for example Egyptian, Mayan, Aztec, Greek, Roman, Zimbabwe, Ghanaian, Malian) was probably much lower than in many modern developing countries. The Egyptians admittedly developed hieroglyphics, but the Mayans and Aztecs apparently had no developed system of writing, nor did the civilisations in Ghana, Mali, Zimbabwe and others. Great as Greeks civilisation was, over 90% of Greeks apparently remained illiterate (1975: 22-23).

In fact, Socrates, himself the greatest moral philosopher that Greeks ever had, hardly ever wrote anything. This has prompted a lot of speculations some assuming that Socrates may have been illiterate. Now, if Socrates was illiterate, then given his ability to comprehend and rationally scrutinise various ethical issues, then, he admittedly, must have been very wise. Thus Socrates may have been illiterate but nevertheless was not ignorant in the strict sense of the word. Using Socrates as our point of reference and then making such an assumption, invokes the contention that illiteracy need not necessarily mean ignorance and as such illiteracy cannot be

equated to ignorance.

Others assume that Socrates may have been of the ancient Egyptian mystic system which prohibited a prophet (a graduate of the last prophet-stage in the ancient Egyptian education system) from writing. He was supposed to remain reticent in nature. The foregoing notwithstanding, all credit goes to Plato his famous student through whom we came to know Socrates. However, controversy still surrounds the authenticity of the "Dialogues" by Plato especially on the issue of whether the words in them are Socrates' or purely Plato's ingenuity. Literacy, nevertheless, enables an individual live a more or less meaningful life in modern society, a society that is scientifically and technologically oriented thus demanding conversance with technical knowledge. Such an acquaintance entails a certain degree of literacy. Though literacy is sufficient for the enhancement of wisdom which is a capacity for judging rightfully in matters relating to life and conduct, it is, admittedly, not a necessary condition for the existence of wisdom. Moreover, ignorance itself, according to Socrates, is not the lack of information but the absence of wisdom. Many people are ignorant not because they lack information or for being illiterate but because they are not wise. Hence there is a possibility of one being knowledgeable yet unwise. Consequently, one may be literate but evidently unwise.

Similarly, other persons may be illiterate but

nevertheless, wise. This in itself does not necessarily deny the fact that there may exist illiterate but unwise persons in a given society or even the existence of literate and wise persons in a said community. History has afforded examples of the latter; for example Plato, Aristotle and Jesus. Perhaps the only problem has been establishing the existence of illiterate and wise men and women especially in Africa. By illiterate we intend to refer to the inability to read and write period. Wisdom can either be popular or didactic. This distinction is well amplified in findings of a research project started by Odera Oruka and his colleagues among them Ochieng'-Odhiambo, whose primary objective was to identify individuals of traditional Kenya who were (or are) wise in the philosophical didactic sense. According to them:

Findings in Kenya show that there are two main division of Sage philosophy. One is that of the Sage whose thought, though well informed and educative, fails to go beyond the celebrated folk wisdom. Such a Sage may not have the ability or inclination to apply his own independent critical objection to folk beliefs. He is, therefore a folk Sage in contrast to the second type of Sage, the philosophic sage. The former is a master of popular wisdom while the latter is an expert in didactic wisdom (Ochieng'-Odhiambo, 1995: 81; see also Odera Oruka, ed. 1991: 34).

While our intention is to illustrate the fact that there could exist illiterate but wise (not ignorant) individuals in our society, Odera Oruka's objective was to prove the existence of genuine African philosophy; a philosophy to be

found through an explication of their critical independent thoughts. Nevertheless, these individuals have to *interalia* satisfy one condition viz., individuals not "corrupted" by western educational system and this has been the bone of contention; especially within the African context.

Admittedly, the inability to read and write may inhibit the promotion of humanity, especially in a world which is increasingly becoming technologically and scientifically oriented. Paradoxically, the ability to read and write and thus the acquisition of vast knowledge in the above mentioned fields has seemingly promoted the subrogation of the humanity especially in Africa where cases still fresh in our minds include Rwanda, Somalia, Angola, Congo, Sudan, Uganda and Burundi, just to name but a few. Africa has since become a laboratory facility for testing new military hardware as well as a dumping site for goods no longer needed in the so called developed nations, which has subsequently resulted in destruction of life and property in Africa while subjecting Africans to untold lifetime miseries and uncertainties.

It should be noted that literacy in Africa, although a relatively new and recent phenomena initially promoted unity of peoples of different ethnic groups through the bonds of acquired common language and equipping the Africans with the means to appreciate more fully their existing conditions. However, it seems that this is no longer the case, perhaps due to the levels of poverty, corruption and disease currently

afflicting Africans especially the African intelligentsia who are supposedly the torchbearers of the societies to which they belong.

All said and done, suffice it to say that the ability to read and write (literacy) presupposes the comprehension of matter in both its concrete and abstract senses but does not necessarily presuppose wisdom. It is for this reason that it is proper to assert that not all literate men are wise and similarly, that wise men may or may not be literate. They even need not be literate.

Just like we said earlier on in this chapter most cultures have produced great and thoughtful minds upon which the organisation and enhancement of the society has been based; men and women whose intellectual wit goes beyond the aphorisms and whims of the society. These men have been both literate and illiterate although many would prefer to relegate the illiterate men by restricting themselves to literate men only for their own selfish and egoistic reasons. We must here compliment the explication by Odera and his colleagues for having thrown into light the richness of the thoughts by men in traditional Kenya and Africa as a whole despite the inherent difficulty in identifying men and women in traditional Africa who have not essentially been "spoiled" by western education system.

It is from such an explication that it is possible to assert today without a contradiction, that there exists

illiterate men and women whose intellectual wit goes beyond popular wisdom (beliefs and customs of the society). These men are surely wise in the positive sense viz., philosophic didactic sense and can be compared to Socrates, the greatest of the Greek Sages.

Thus literacy promotes and enhances the acquisition of relevant skills and capacities for survival but it does not necessarily guarantee survival. Literacy must thus be accompanied by wisdom which apparently is very rare and only a few are gifted. In the Bible, Solomon who is said to be the wisest man who ever lived, acquired that wisdom from God only after asking for it (1 King, 3:9). Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that though Solomon was very wise, we do not have enough evidence to show that he was literate. This prompts us to assume that he may have been "illiterate" since it is known that at his time there was some form of writing and recording presupposing literacy.

Now, if our assumption was justified then this could serve to show that wisdom does not necessarily involve literacy. However, like we pointed out earlier on, the problem has not been in establishing such a fact, but in establishing the existence of such a fact in Africa *per se*; which many writers with imperialist bias have assumed was a "dark continent" before the coming of Europeans. Literacy like we pointed out earlier on, must be just ability to read and write but not the ability to comprehend matter in its

concrete and abstract senses using the 'Western epistemic grid'. It is however, difficult to show how literacy can be attained in Africa by breaking away from what we would refer to as the "vicious circle of western language". We refer to it this way because in an attempt to re-live their lost identity, Africans retrospect to their past experiences using western categories among them western language.

Ngugi-wa-Thiong'o, recognising this problem chooses, as we saw in chapter one, to revert back to indigenous languages as a way of expressing his indigenous thoughts with the hope of utilising the age-long mode of translation to present his views to as many people as possible. However, his endeavour seems to be in vain for it subjects him to the danger of his recent works being lost in the myriad of literary works. It seems like, when a good piece of literature is written in English it attracts more readers than when the same is presented in indigenous languages for instance, Kikuyu. In fact, Ngugi-wa-Thiong'o is famous for his literary works done in English than those in his native languages.

It thus appears an uphill task to revive our lost African identity through the method propounded by Ngugi-wa-Thiong'o. However, it is important to reassert that language is a very important aspect of culture for it, besides communicating culture, acts as a vehicle of culture. It thus carries culture (Ngugi-wa-Thiong'o, 1984: 14). Again language is very important in education especially formal education although

informal and non-formal education realms also use language especially in transmission of cultural heritage and skills respectively. Non-formal education involves things like mass media and print media which inextricably involves the use of language with literacy being necessary especially in so far as print media is concerned.

From the foregoing discussion, it is reasonable to assert that culture on the one hand, influences man intellectually, spiritually and physically. Man on the other hand, influences the creation and development of culture. The next chapter thus analyses the concept of development.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE CONCEPT OF DEVELOPMENT

.... Common views of what constitutes development in contemporary Africa are narrow and inadequate (Wiredu, and Gyekye, 1992: 207).

There are several different, theoretical and practical definitions of development. Development is, assuredly, complex in detail and as such overwhelming and incomprehensible in its totality and in its intricacy. Many a scholars are compelled from the outset either to explore one or several facets of development carefully or to attempt to construct a theoretical scaffolding which endeavours to comprehend the essential elements of the concept itself. However, it is not always easy to determine whether the few who attempt a theoretical scaffolding actually succeed or fail. Nevertheless, some do a more convincing job than others.

Development, Odera Oruka contends "has become a household word in the political relations between African nations and the rest of the world" (1997: 108). It is with this in mind that Odera Oruka writes:

One often hears the expression the "developed and the underdeveloped nations", rather than the expression "the economically and culturally free and the economically and culturally unfree nations"

(1997: 108).

This is fine and correct. However, one would rightfully ask "what is development?" And the answer is far from simple. Nonetheless, it is essential that we obtain a fairly clear idea of what the term development means since "lack of clear units of analysis led to excessive use of analogies and metaphors, instead of vigorously defined concepts" (Mafeje, 1991: 9).

4.1 THE MEANING OF DEVELOPMENT

It is important to note from the outset that there is no clear consensus with regards to the usage of the term. Various meanings can be attached to the term development hence making the need for clarity obvious. Development can be spoken of from the biological, social, scientific and psychological points of view. The meaning of development can be gained through the study of the English verb to "develop" from which the noun "development" is derived. The word develop means to come or bring to a later or more advanced or expanded stage.

Development, from this point of view, is a process marked by a gradual advance through stages. Odera Oruka asserts that "no one would object to the statement that development involves moving from one point to another usually from a lower to a higher point" (1997: 191). Moreover, "development is a gradual advance through progressive stages" (Murray, 1969:

280). Development thus implies moving from a stage that is no longer adequate towards another that is more desirable. But the question is: what are the first and final stages of development?

Development, viewed differently, is "the process of improving the quality of human lives" (Todaro: 1994: 670). This is with the belief that humanity is the goal of all authentic development. Yet others view development as a process in which people gain materially, be it at the individual, community and national level. The implication here is that, development involves the existence of better housing, industries, good infrastructural facilities, better educational and recreational facilities, availability of health services, and the presence of an advanced communication network. In short, development signals an improvement in material/physical conditions of people in a society.

Development, for psychologists, is a process whose beginning is childhood and its end is adulthood. This is what they would prefer to term human development; which according to them is further determined by an interaction between man's hereditary factors with the environment that surrounds him or her. Viewed this way, development is a movement in a positive direction marked by an actualisation of man's potentialities. It is thus man ability to create not only in his environment but also in his entire life. Development is a human enterprise. Todaro gives three aspects of development which

he thinks are very crucial:

- (1) raising people's living levels their incomes and consumption levels of food, medical services, education etc. through relevant economic growth;
- (2) creating conditions conducive to the growth of self esteem through the establishment of social, political and economic systems and institutions that promote dignity and respect; and,
- (3) increasing people's freedom by enlarging their range of variables as by increasing of consumer goods and services (1994: 670).

Thus for Todaro and perhaps others, human beings are central to any kind of development process. Development depends, to a significant extent, on its ability to improve the quality of human life; materially and spiritually. Bishop H. Okullu, captures this noble element of development when he writes:

"Development is not only the concern for economic well being but also the real concern for the development of the whole man so that he can remain in control of the world he helps to create (1974: 22).

The divergence in the views about development makes the term development a very elusive phenomenon. Indeed there is invariably a long period when vague ideas about development have been expounded. Balogun argues that "development is best understood within the context of what it is not" (Balogun, 1997: 71) prompting the question: What is it? The reason given is that development "is not a mathematically precise,

value, neutral, and scientific concept - one which can be approached with a universal formula and an automatic technique" (1997: 71). As Toye eloquently puts it:

Definitions of the goals of development and of the process by which these goals should be striven for unavoidably depend on the values of the person defining, as well as on the facts that are in principle falsifiable (Balogun, 1997: 71; see also Toye, 1987: 10).

This is more or less a cautionary approach to development. It gives room for a multi-cultural variation. From the on-going discussions, we have observed that development means different things to different people. Perhaps a better perspective of development as a concept can be gained through an analysis based on the conflicting conceptions of development. While some analysts would equate development with modernisation, others would equate it with westernisation. Yet others define it loosely as technological progress as the case may be (c.f. Balogun, 1997: 71). Still, others would prefer to define it in terms of the improvement in the material/physical conditions of the people.

It has been argued that none of the preceding attempts at concept clarification has succeeded in overcoming language and cultural barriers; and in promoting a communality of vision on the essence and "techniques of development" (1997: 91). However, it is our contention in this thesis, that an analysis based on the conflicting conceptions of development will help

us in overcoming such barriers.

4.2 · CONFLICTING CONCEPTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT

4.2.1 Development as Modernisation

The most widely "acceptable" term for development in the world is modernisation. According to Streeten "it has become platitude to say that development means modernisation" (1972: 20).

4.2.1.1 The Meaning of Modernisation

Modernisation is "a process by which individuals change from a traditional way of life to a more complex, technologically advanced and rapidly changing style of life" (Rogers, 1969: 18). It is thus a process in which people respond consciously to the various changes in their societies by facing such challenges with the means and capacities readily available to them. Thus "modernisation means a transformation of human being" (Streeten, 1972: 30).

Berger defines modernisation as "the institutional concomitants of a technologically induced economic growth" (1973: 6). Implied here is the recognition that there is no completely modern society. Therefore modernisation is a term used to designate socio-cultural transformations that result from factors and process that are distinctive of the contemporary industrial world (c.f. Steward, 1967: 112). Modernisation viewed this way is a process in which basic

structures and pattern are transformed to suite the existing environment.

Inspite of all these observations, modernisation is seemingly an ambiguous process. On the one hand, the western model of development as modernisation has tremendously improved the economic conditions of the West. It has been argued that modernisation involves "a total transformation of traditional or premodern society into the types of technology and associated social organsiation that characterise the "advanced" economically prosperous and relatively politically stable nations of the western world" (Moore, 1987: 94). As a result, modernisation is a "conceptual cousin of the term economic development" (Smelser, 1966: 111) usually associated with the west. However, it is debatable whether it has improved the quality of human life too. Indeed, Pope John Paul II wonders: "Does having more mean being more" (Wajibu, 1995, Vol. 10, No.1: 3).

It has been argued that modernisation is a process that begun in western countries (see Besanz et al., 1973: 473). From this viewpoint, there is a tendency to inaccurately associate modernisation with westernisation, thereby arguing that modernisation of the "third world" countries is westernisation of the same. This is because "modernisation, the transition from traditional folk-life to modern urban society includes many changes the chief being industrialisation" (1973: 472). Industrialisation, invariably,

is a process of developing "industry on an extensive scale" (Hanks, 1979: 749) which unfortunately is linked with the industrial revolution in Britain. Though it may be true that the discoveries made at that time were the pillars of industrialisation, it is not true that industrialisation is a process whose goal is to achieve the remarkable achievements made by the West.

Reasonably, given that the "infrastructure of modernisation is rationality especially as embodied in the economic and political apparatus of society" (Wuthnow et al., 1984: 55), modernisation cannot and can never be a prerogative of the west. Indeed, the west which is the assumed citadel and progenitor of modernisation has had its own unique problems associated with extreme economism consumerism and hedonism which apparently have superceded humanity. Thus the process of development as modernisation in the west has greatly been compromised. Ostensibly, for the vast majority of people in the "south" the western model of development as modernisation has impoverished them economically, disempowered them culturally by disrupting their ancient religious-cultural wisdom and heritage presumably due to the imposition of unpalatable ideas from the West. "If anything, modernisation or at least, Africa's approach to it, has brought untold suffering to the vast majority of the people" (Balogun, 1997: 72-73). Balogun asserts that modernisation has evidently:

diverted the Africans' attention away from indigenous knowledge and traditional practices which in ancient time produced notable results in fields such as sculpture, iron-smelting and metal fabrication, herbal medicine, weaving, agriculture and territorial administration (1997: 73).

Suffice it to say that Africa or generally the "third world" has lost more than it has gained from an adoption of western ideas and models of development as modernisation. "Yet political and administrative elites in post independence Africa went ahead with a solution which to them appeared most attractive - modernisation" (1997: 73). Balogun asserts that:

To these elites and their local and foreign advisers, that option offers otherwise traditional, agrarian and subsistence economies an opportunity to a life-time break away from "backwardness", and join the advanced societies of the west To be "developed" then came to mean discarding the ways of, and loyalties to ancestors, while embracing the culture of individualism and mass consumption (1997: 73).

Thus development was "the replacement of an old mind-set with a new, predominantly alien one" (1997: 73). However, it should be noted that development is not synonymous with modernisation nor is it synonymous with westernisation.

It is also worth noting that many changes have taken place in the "south". Although they have largely come about through contact with the western ideas, organisational forms and machines that westerners brought with them, they have

meant much less westernisation of the "south". Ideas such as those of inventions viz machines, belong exclusively to no society. Indeed once they are "discovered or invented", machines belong by right to all mankind (c.f. Hallowell, 1964: 174). Moreover when the discoveries come, they carry with them their own logic.

It is, however important to say that traditions of societies in the "south" need to be refined "incessantly so as to survive" (1964: 174). Nevertheless, they do not need to be discarded altogether.

4.2.2 Development as Economic Growth

After a brief survey of development as modernisation, let us now turn to development as economic growth. It has been argued from some quarters that economic growth is the yardstick of overall development. This signals what we would term "economic determinism" which is a doctrine which holds that "all cultural, social, political and intellectual activities are a product of the economic organisation of society" (Hanks, 1979: 465), such that if there is any progress in any society whatsoever, it must have been as a result of economic growth. But rightfully one may ask: What is economic growth?

4.2.2.1 The Meaning of Economic Growth

It is important to note at the outset that there is the traditional economic view of development and the new economic view of development. Both views are radically different in terms of their emphasis. Todaro argues that "in strictly economic terms, development has traditionally meant the capacity of a national economy, whose initial economic condition has been more or less for a long time, to generate and sustain an annual increase in the Gross National Product (GNP) at rates of perhaps 5% to 7% or more" (1994: 14).

Elsewhere, Todaro has asserted that economic growth "in the past has also been typically seen in terms of the planned alteration of the structure and employment so that the manufacturing and service industries increases" (1994: 14). According to this traditional economic view, development is to be viewed in terms of economic growth where there is an increase in per-capita income.

However, the new economic view of development on the other hand, lays emphasis on the eradication of poverty, unemployment and inequality. Indeed "redistribution of growth" has become a common slogan (c.f. Todaro, 1994: 15). Dudley Seers highlighting three basic questions about the new meaning of development writes:

The questions to ask about a country's development are therefore: what has been happening to poverty? what has been happening to unemployment? what has been happening to inequality? If three of these have declined from high levels then beyond doubt

this has been a period of development for the country concerned. If one or two of these central problems have been growing worse, especially if all three have, it would be strange to call the result "development" even if per capita income doubled (1969: 3; see also Todaro, 1994: 15).

From the foregoing discussion, it suffices to say that development as economic growth, largely depends on the perspective taken by any individual, since we have seen that the emphasis in the traditional economic view of development is largely on growth in per-capita income whereas in the new economic view of development, emphasis is on eradication of poverty, unemployment, and inequality besides growth in per-capita income (see Todaro, 1994: 15).

However, at this juncture it is worth noting that some people prefer economic development to economic growth arguing that:

Economic development involves something more than economic growth. Development is taken to mean growth plus change: there are essential qualitative dimensions in the development process that extend beyond the growth or expansion of an economy through a simple widening process. This qualitative difference is especially likely to appear in the improved performance of factors of production and improved techniques of production in our growing control of nature. It is also likely to appear in the development of institutions and a change in the attitudes and values (Meier, 1995: 7)

Furthermore, economic development according to them transcends mere acquisition of industries. Meier thus observes that:

economic development is thus much more than the simple acquisition of industries. It may be

defined as nothing less than the "upward movement of the entire social system", or it may be the attainment of "ideals of modernisation", such as a rise in productivity, social and economic equalisation, modern knowledge, improved institutions and attitudes and a rationally coordinated system of policy measures (1995: 7).

In addition, regarding development, Walter Rodney asserts that development when used exclusively in the economic sense, should mean an increased capacity of the members to deal with their environment, and this depends on their understanding of the laws of nature" (Odera Oruka, 1997: 109; see also Rodney, 1982: 3ff). This signals what has today become common slogan "sustainable development" which is the insistence that all developmental activities must have a concern for the environment to guarantee survival. Environment has thus become a vital part of any development project. In fact, development can still be determined by the level of environmental protection and thus environmental protection has become some indicator or parameter of measuring development.

It is important to note that Jomo Kenyatta recognised the new economic view of development when he championed the eradication of poverty, disease, and ignorance all of which were rampant (and still may be) in Kenya at the time of independence (Uhuru) in order to achieve social-justice, human dignity and economic welfare of all (c.f. GoK., 1964: 1).

It is to be borne in mind that even the World Bank, which in the 1980s championed economic growth as the goal of

development, joined in this new economic perspective of development, when through its 1991 World Development Report quoted by Todaro, asserted:

The challenge of development is to improve the quality of life especially in the world's poor countries, a better quality of life generally calls for higher incomes but it involves much more. It encompasses as ends in themselves better education, higher standards of health and nutrition, less poverty, a cleaner environment, more equality of opportunity, greater individual freedom, and a richer cultural life (Todaro: 1994: 16; see also World Bank, 1991: 4).

Development accordingly, must be dynamic relationship between people, their natural resources, and the transmission of the capacity of human beings so as to generate goods and services to meet their needs. Hence development must be "the development of people rather than the development of things" (Todaro, 1994: 16; see also Owens, 1987: xv). Nyerere also advances a similar argument when he asserts that development is "development of people" (1973: 58ff). It is for this reason perhaps, that Todaro argues that:

Development must therefore be conceived as a multidimensional process involving major changes in social structures, popular attitudes and national institutions, as well as the acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality and the eradication of poverty (1994: 16).

Herein Todaro recognises the complex nature of development and is candid about his dislike of the traditional economic view of development. For him development is that which aims at improving the quality of human beings; perhaps

what we would term "integral welfare". Todaro asserts that:

Development in its essence, must represent the whole gamut of change by which an entire social system, tuned the diverse basic needs and desires of individuals and social groups within that system, moves away from a condition of life widely perceived as unsatisfactory toward a situation or condition of life regard as materially and spiritually "better" (1994: 16).

Integral welfare approach appears most laudable since "it is generally agreed that human capacity is a major driving force to development" (Balogun, 1997: 70). This is because human beings are very central in as so far as authentic development is concerned. Development thus has for its goal, fostering integral welfare. Development must not be limited to economic growth. Economic growth is a sufficient but not necessary condition for the improvement of the quality of human life. There are, besides the economic factors other factors which foster the well being of man.

Nevertheless, "without sustained and continuous economic progress at individual and societal level, the realisation of human potential would not be posible" (Todaro, 1994: 17). Balogun highlighting the linkage between human capacity and resources writes:

Whether a society will progress from one stage of experience to a preferred alternative, or standstill, or worst of all, revert to barbaric, stoneage conditions, depends to a significant extent on the will and capacity of its people to manage and generally add value to available resources (Balogun, 1997: 71).

Thus capacity building has also been an integral part of development. Development depends on the extent to which human potential is harnessed and utilised. In an apparent response to the papal's wonder: "Does having more mean being more?" acknowledged earlier on, Goulet, quoted by Todaro asserts that one has to "have enough in order to be more" (Todaro, 1994: 17). Therefore the underlying thing is not having more but having enough. Thus "raising per-capita incomes, the elimination of absolute poverty, greater employment opportunities, and lessening income inequalities constitute the necessary but not sufficient conditions for development (Todaro, 1994: 17). It should be pointed out here that the philosophical understanding of the terms sufficient and necessary is different things from Todaro's. For one, an A is necessary condition for a B if and only if B must have A; for example oxygen is a necessary condition for combustion. Thus A must be present in order that for B to exist. Similarly, an A is sufficient condition for B if the presence of A is contingent of B. Thus A needs not be present in order for B to exist. For example smoke is the sufficient condition for the existence of a fire. However, it is not a necessary condition since we know of fires that are smoke free - gas fires.

It is important to note that combustion cannot take place without oxygen since oxygen is a necessary condition for combustion. This shows how the terms sufficient and necessary

mean different when used philosophically.

Therefore paraphrasing Todaro would read as constitute the sufficient but not necessary conditions for development. The terms necessary and sufficient have been "converted" (logically, it means the reversal of the positions of the two terms - subject and predicate).

It is worth noting that many economic growth models have been constructed by scholars such as John Keynes, Walt Rostow, Arthur Lewis, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Ricardo Adams, Gailbarth, Harrod Damar among others. Since ours is not an exposition on economic growth models, we intend to just mention them as a way of acknowledging their remarkable works in the field of economics. Lewis is acknowledged for having asserted that "the desire for goods is an obvious psychological factor determining how hard people will strive to improve their material welfare" (Balogun, 1997: 74). According to him:

a frame of mind which stresses abstinence and "place a positive value on prayer and other non economic activities was highly unlikely to foster growth in the short, or development in the long run (1997: 74).

Lewis seems to be saying that development or growth is largely dependent upon economic activities only and that in his view, "secularism and development are synonymous" (1997: 74). However, this argument has been countered with the observation that the efforts in many parts of the "third world" at separating the church from the State or politics

have not yielded the expected developmental results. In fact "for the secularist model of development to operate as intended, a proper balance has to be maintained between consumption and investment" (1997: 74). Africa, it has been argued, is lacking in this. "Though there is no limit to desire, the capacity to fulfil it is sadly lacking" (1997: 74). Africa experiences what economists call "development deficit".

Indeed, it has been said that "the root of Africa's development crisis lies in the recurring tendency to import the taste for foreign goods, as well as the capacity for satisfying it" (Balogun, 1997: 74). This has made the region largely dependent on industrialised economies. Balogun argues that "the doctrine underpinning this dependency relationship is that of "comparative advantage" - one which requires that nations concentrate their attention to what they are best endowed by nature to produce" (1997: 74). This ironically curtails the development of indigeneous capacity to fulfil basic and higher - order needs.

Despite the marked cultural differences, economic growth in Africa is tending to take the classical form that is known in the west presumably due to indiscriminate borrowing of economic models and ideas from the West and even worst of all, the imposition of such models an Africa by the West to be strictly followed as prerequisites for foreign aid packages and to some sense as recovery channels. It needs to be

pointed out, however, that, given that "it is possible to isolate the effects of several interrelated technical, economic and ecological processes accompanying development" (Dalton, 1967: 30), then it is possible for Africa to develop without borrowing or partaking all aspects of development as given by the west. Africa could, for example, make use of the western economic models but utilise indigenous spirit (c.f. Mazrui, 1990: 5). This would encourage continuous economic growth while at the same time retaining or preserving their identity as Africans.

4.2.3 Development as Technological Progress

4.2.3.1 The Concept of Technology

According to Walubengo and Kimani, technology is typically defined "as a body of knowledge that is of use in fashioning, practising manual arts and skills, and extracting or collecting materials" (Walubengo and Kimani eds, 1993: 1). But a wider definition provided by Bryceson indicates that:

Technology is the object and processes which facilitate man's activities in terms of first, reducing human energy expenditure, second, reducing labour time, third improving spatial mobility, fourth alleviating material certainty (Bryceson, 1985: 8-9).

From the foregoing, it is possible to see how development and technology seem to concur. As we saw from the new economic perspective, development aims at improvement of the quality of human life. As postulated and explained by

Bryceson, technology aims at improving the well being of man by ensuring an easy way of working out things by spending the least amount of energy; thus the more the technology one has the higher the chances of one leading a better life and "living standards". Development, basically is dependent upon the will and capacity of man and it is for man that development is meant similarly, technology is dependent upon human needs and it is for this reason perhaps, that necessity becomes the mother of invention. The need to fulfil a certain want compels one to look for ways and means to fulfil it. But once fulfilled another need or want will arise and so on and so forth (c.f. Maslow, 1970: 20ff).

In the "north" technological advancement and economic development generally went hand in hand. As such majority of the people were not aware of the historical and cultural specificity of their artifacts and instead viewed them as neutral objects "the inevitable products of progress" (Stamp, 1989: 17). From this viewpoint, technologies were transferred from the north to the south without taking into account social and cultural assumptions that go with them. This included an ideology that defined technology in terms of increased productivity.

It should be noted, however, that technology is culturally as well as geographically specific or indigenous (c.f. Walubengo and Kimani, 1993: 1). Technologies in fact do carry with them "the stamp" of their originators and may be

useless or even cause serious disruption in societies to which they are transplanted (1993: 1). This is very true. In India for instance, during "Bophal disaster" following a leak from the now defunct Union Carbide, it was discovered that many safety precautions were not put into place by the management in India for they did not understand the plant, its accompanying technology and the side effects. Consequently, many people died following the leak resulting into its closure implying that those who relied on the plant as a source of livelihood as evident from the slum within the vicinity of the plant, were rendered jobless and poor. Many of those who survived the ordeal, still manifest difficulties in one way or another. All that is implicit here is that technologies, in as much as they may assist man dramatically, they may also threaten and even impede on man's survival as well as development. Here in Sub-Saharan Africa, we cannot but point to many of the projects that have stalled in one way or another due to, besides other factors, the unsuitability of technology.

Now, if technology was to be synonymous to development then Sub-Saharan Africa would but fail to fulfil any criteria of development. In as much as technology has a significant place in development, development cannot solely be measured in terms of technological advancement or progress. In fact, it is inaccurate to limit development in the strict sense of the word, to technological progress. Suffice it to say that

technology is a sufficient but not necessary condition for development. Technology applied in agriculture, which is the mainstay of Sub-Saharan Africa, guarantees food security which consequently promotes human development and by extension development *per se*.

If technology was absent in agriculture, crude techniques would be used thereby creating some uncertainty in food security and by extension stagnating overall development. Nevertheless, development is not just an acquisition of the most advanced technology and its accompanying material gains. Development means much more. Wiredu, an illustrious Ghanaian philosopher recognises this when he writes:

Development does not merely mean the acquisition of sophisticated 'technology' with its associated material benefits; it means also the security of such conditions as shall permit self-realisation of men as rational beings (1980: 53).

Wiredu acknowledges that technology is important in so far as development is concerned but development is not just technological achievements; it is much more. It entails the existence of conditions that are suitable for the exercise of rationality, conditions which enhance man's self realisation.

However, it is important to note that self-realisation entails freedom. Freedom is very significant and it seems to permeate the whole process of development. Essentially, the philosophical view of development entails the concept of freedom. Freedom and development are mutually related and

inseparable. Perhaps this is the reason why Nyerere noted that "without freedom, you very soon loose your development" (1973: 58).

It should be borne in mind that the emphasis on development as technological progress inadvertently leads to the view that technological progress is the only thing that humankind should devote all its energies on. This view tends to show that technology is a limitless source of progress. Technology is presented as being the only form of salvation to the miseries of humankind. But it should be noted that technological progress without care has already begun to show that it is not always human friendly, as we have always taken it for granted. We only need a little effort to think about the threats posed by nuclear war, environmental degradation and green house effect or the much talked of "global warming" all accruing from technological progress. To partake of technology that does not take into account the environment in a way that guarantees a well balanced human good, will then have seriously failed our societies. We must be cautious of a technological culture that tends to destroy what cannot be replaced.

Nevertheless, technological progress and innovations highlight man's supremacy over matter, of his improved manipulation of his environment. But the direction and type of technology adopted, at least in a general way must be oriented by man's basic needs or wants defined in a general

sense.

4.2.4 Development as Freedom

4.2.4.1 The Concept of Freedom

"Man's struggle for liberty or freedom is as old as history itself" (Odera Oruka, 1991: 3). From this viewpoint, Odera asserts that liberty is a function of history or historical development (1991: 3). Nevertheless, "the idea of liberty has never meant the same thing to all or most people" (1991: 3).

Freedom basically is a state of being free or at liberty. The concept of freedom implies a condition of not being bound or under control of another being, viz, being unimpeded, unrestrained or unburdened. According to Webster's Third New International Dictionary, freedom, "is a quality or state of being free" (Gove, 1986: 906). Freedom means thus "being free" (Swannell, 1986: 218).

4.2.4.2 Freedom as Conformity to the Physical Necessity

The presocratics, while emphasising on cosmology, maintained that liberty was to be conceived as the experience of the "universal truth". According to them, viz, Heraclitus, Pythagoras and Democritus, "Social laws were derived from

natural laws" (Odera Oruka, 1991: 5). Freedom or liberty for them meant "understanding and conformity to the laws of nature, to the physical necessity" (1991: 3).

4.2.4.3 Freedom as a Product Rational Insight

With the coming of Socrates, the concept of liberty took a different and significant perspective. Socrates as "a strong believer in objectivity of truth" (Odera Oruka, 1991: 7), rejected the sophists conception of liberty or freedom as obtaining "through the independent expression of passions and impulses" (1991: 7) and "asserted freedom was to be attained through rational insight (through control of self by insight)" (1991: 7). This augurs well with the famous Socratic adage "men know thyself" which emphasised "self knowledge" (1991: 7). Consequently, for Socrates "an unexamined life is not worth living" which only means that "understanding oneself automatically enables one to live a better life" (1991: 7).

Socrates, through his student Plato, argued that "he who knows can never go wrong"; since for him "knowledge is virtue" and "virtue is knowledge". Therefore "virtue is equivalent to the knowledge of the good. Hence one is virtuous if and only if one is knowledgeable" (1991: 7). It is worth noting that Socrates has continued to influence many through his views of ethical problems facing man. Indeed, his views are very much applicable as they may be were during his life time.

Socrates' influence is reflected for example in the cynics who borrowed the concept virtue but elevated it to serve as the only good that men should desire in order to be free. According to them "virtue is capable of liberating man and making him independent of worldly problems" (Odera Oruka, 1991: 7). Thus virtue is a means to an end which is freedom.

4.2.4.4 Freedom and Religion

Liberty herein is viewed as a "state in which one is in contact with the divine" (1991: 7). Notable proponents of this view are Plotinus and Origen. According to them, God created the human soul" but due to man's desire to be independent, he left contact with God and descended into the world of material objects" (1991: 8). A close look at this view reminds one of the platonic dualism between the ideal world and the world of appearances. For Plato the ideal world is permanent and real. Plato, being a perfect synthesiser, synthesised the two contradictory views of Parmenides and Heraclitus in which the former maintained that change is just but an illusion while the latter asserted that everything is in constant flux. Plato attributed Parmenides views to the ideal world - permanency which is also real while those of Heraclitus were attributed to the world of appearances.

Although Plato never attributed the ideal world to God, many have used his dualism in which the real world has been associated with God. It is the "native abode" where the soul

returns after liberating itself from the body where it has been held "captive". Usually the Christians call it Heaven which is a "land" of plenty, one of everlasting happiness.

However, this view of liberty is highly contested for some argue that it "ignores the material existence" (Odera Oruka, 1991: 9). This kind of liberty seems to be just a liberation of the soul (immaterial substance), while it is true that the soul is nothing without the body just as the body is nothing without the soul. Nevertheless, it appears to be the most laudable view in so far as religions are concerned.

Christians for instance, have their salvation on the salvaging of the soul from the evil body. Many Christians seek salvation in Jesus Christ in order that they may guarantee their life after death in eternal happiness as opposed to the dreaded eternal condemnation in hell. This has been the threshold of the mushrooming of churches in Africa today.

4.2.4.5 The Classical Conception of Liberty

The classical conception of liberty or freedom is usually associated with modern philosophers such as Spinoza, Rousseau, Kant, Hobbes, Locke and Mill. We have two broad types of liberties under the classical conception of liberty; namely, positive and negative liberty. According to Odera Oruka, conceptions by Spinoza, Kant and Rousseau constitute positive

or "rational liberty" whereas those by Hobbes, Locke and Mill constitute negative liberty. Odera thus borrows Maurice Cranston concept of rational liberty. Maurice Cranston writes:

Rational freedom is realised in rational control Hence in so far as favourable conditions can be established, indeed enforced, by those in authority in community, such enforcement will promote freedom of each individual (Cranston, 1967: 22; see also Odera Oruka, 1991: 20).

Odera Oruka contends that:

freedom is rational control either self imposed as in the case of Spinoza and Kant or imposed from without as in the case of Rousseau; whoever disobeys the general will shall be "forced to be free" (1991: 21).

Odera Oruka envisages in the classics a sought of "revival of those among the Greeks who conceived liberty as either experience of the universal truth or rational fulfilment of the ethical command" (1991: 2).

Spinoza as monist and pantheist believed that nature and God were one thus "the moral and natural are the same. Understanding reality is understanding God" (1991: 15). Spinoza "identified liberty with wisdom attained through rational process employed in the theoretical and practical sciences" (1991: 15). For him reason is of supreme and as such "freedom is the use of reason for perceiving one's own existence in accordance with the laws of human nature" (1991: 5; see also Spinoza, 1964: 127). According to Spinoza then

freedom and reason are correlated.

Rousseau, a renowned social philosopher, argues that man by nature is humble but corrupted by nature. This means that "man is born free and is by nature free" (Odera Oruka, 1991: 16). Rousseau, asserts that "man is born free but everywhere he is in chains" (Muschamp, 1986: 130). This view is contested by a Ugandan born poet Okot p'Bitek who wonders how man can be born free while even at birth he had to be separated from his or her mother! (c.f. p'Bitek 1983: 154ff). Nevertheless, Rousseau propounded the idea of the "General Will" and the transformingly splendid quality of the "General Will" is that it always requires and decrees the true liberty of all. The "General Will" limits the "Civil Liberty" of man which he gains after losing his "natural liberty" while forming a society based on the "social contract" (c.f. Odera Oruka, 1991: 16; see also Muschamp, 1986: 131).

The "General Will" herein means the universal truth which is the truth that applies to all and is also experienced by all those who actively take part in the "social contract" and it is always good. However, some wish to dismiss the Rousseauian ideas about the "General Will" due to the ambiguities in the theory. Russell for example asserts that "Hilter is an outcome of Rousseau" (1961: 660). Nevertheless, the alleged ambiguities in the "general will" are really sources of the strength of the theory (c.f. Muschamp, 1986:137).

Thus for Rousseau, in order to achieve freedom, men would have to be moulded according to a uniform pattern hence the "supremity of the general will" which absorbs all (c.f. Muschamp, 1986: 131). Elsewhere in Emile, Rousseau argues that "man is truly free who desires what he is able to perform and does what he desires" (Muschamp, 1986: 131). This is compatible with being "a master of one's destiny".

Kant as a moral philosopher believed that "moral laws are of freedom and are opposed to, or rather are independent of the laws of nature" (Odera Oruka, 1991: 18; italics ours). Kant postulated the "categorical imperative" according to which "we ought to never act except in such a way that we can also will that our maxim should become a universal law" (c.f. Abbott, 1978). Kant derives the rule of universalisability from practical reason; a universalisable action is therefore not only moral but rational as well. Similarly an action which contradicts the rule is immoral and irrational. Thus Kant observes that morality is governed by the laws of freedom other than those of nature. Nevertheless, freedom for Kant is a presupposition and it belongs to the noumenal world: it is as such a regulative idea of the categorical imperative.

Thus according to Kant "freedom come from only a moral law" (Odera oruka, 1991: 20). Moreover, "freedom requires being independent of anything else but the moral law" (1991: 20) It needs to be acknowledged that basic in these social philosophers is the notion of universalisability. After a brief

survey of rational liberty, let us now turn to what some prefer to call "negative liberty" (see Odera Oruka, 1991: 20).

It should be pointed out that the view of liberty or freedom adopted by the negative liberty proponents is that implicitly there exists some form of restraint. As we shall see through the works of Hobbes, Locke and especially Mill, restraint is sufficient but not necessary in the definition of liberty. Freedom or liberty, especially individual freedom, can be compromised if and only if it threatens social liberty or liberty of other members of a society (c.f. Mill, 1948: 59).

We would like to take cognisance of the fact that "man's existence in society involves an inevitable and inescapable conflict - a conflict of desires" (Nyerere, 1967: 7). Consequently, Nyerere observes that:

Every individual wants two things: freedom to pursue his own interests and his own inclinations. At the same time he wants freedom from fear of personal attack, freedom from the effects of natural dangers which from time to time hit every individual and which cannot be withstood without help, and freedom to gain rewards from nature for which his own unaided strength is insufficient yet as soon as an individual becomes a member of society he must sacrifice in the interest of the society, certain of the private freedom which he possess outside society (1967: 7).

This position by Nyerere points to a question in the form: how is personal/individual freedom maintained in a society without a conflict arising due to diversity in needs? In other words;

is complete individual freedom possible? It does not matter who is what in the society since all arrangements will be tainted with greed and desire to dominate. What is required is a just and stable society that will guarantee the freedom of everybody, viz, everyone is free and secure.

Now, negative liberty is expressed by Hobbes when he says that "liberty of man consists in this that he finds no stop, on doing what he has the will, desire or inclination to do" (Muschamp, 1986: 170; see also Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap xxi). The Hobbesian view of liberty tends to start off with the person who is tainted with egoistic tendencies and therefore while attempting to seek freedom, Hobbes is confronted with the "paradox of freedom" (Muschamp, 1986: 170). For Hobbes, freedom means "absence of opposition" (Hobbes, Leviathan Chap xxi). Nonetheless, if everyone does what he or she pleases before long, one's own freedom is threatened and restricted so that he becomes unfree. Thus "the freedom of one leads to the unfreedom of another" (Muschamp, 1986: 171).

Hegel disagrees with this view of liberty as we see in his lectures on philosophy of history where he refers to the fact that he:

perpetually recurring misapprehension of freedom consists in regarding the term only in its formal, subjective sense; thus a constraint put upon, impulse desire, passion - elimination of caprice and self-will is regarded as a faltering of freedom (Muschamp, 1986: 171).

It is worth noting that Hegel's notion of freedom is

based on "a distinction between what is selfish (in Kantian terms, what is not universalisable) and what is not selfish ("what is universalisable") (Muschamp, 1986: 171). From such a distinction Hegel's notion of freedom escapes the "paradox of freedom" because under "certain conditions - that is absence of selfishness ... loss of freedom does not take place" (1986: 171). Hegel asserts that "the non-selfish attitude is compatible with a variety of views, interests and talents" (1986: 171). Therefore according to Hegel, freedom is a certain mentality. The concrete content of freedom for him is then a certain mentality which he calls the spirit. But just as the substance of spirit is freedom; so for Hegel spirit is reason (c.f. Muschamp, 1986: 172; see also Hegel, 1975: 95). At this point, one may ask: does it mean that what is rational is free and what is free is rational? The answer is in the affirmative. Freedom and reason turn out to be mutually connected. By and large, according to Hegel freedom entails rational willing and the non-rational, will be self seeking. Rational willing is free or freedom producing.

Mill as a rationalist and a utilitarian, believed that liberty is the freedom of doing anything which does not harm others. It was justified for an individual to pursue his or her own private interests as long as he or she does not jeopardise or infringe the rights and interests of others. Thus Mill writes:

The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it (1948: 11).

Mill's operational definition of liberty was self determination - "we are free, when we are capable of being self determining, where for Mill, self determination is explained (*or understood largely in terms of*) by contrast with coercion, external constraints and interference" (Muschamp, 1986: 182; italics ours).

However, Mill recognised the need for some form of control or restraint as a sufficient condition for both individual and social well being; as well as a safeguard of freedom *per se*. Restraint as Mill observed is only justified if and only if it works towards prevention of harm to others. Thus Mill writes:

The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community against his will is to prevent harm to others (1948: 11).

His usage of the term "civilised community" limits his analysis only to those communities which he thinks are "civilised". It is only in those civilised communities that restraint needs some qualification - viz; if it promises to prevent harm of one individual to others, otherwise the individuals are free to do anything they like or please. We must bear in mind that despite its eloquent libertarian appeal, On liberty, which is one of Mill's finest works is characterised by uncertainties of Mill's position. As an

egalitarian, Mill was nevertheless perturbed by the "tyranny of the majority". This is a term he borrowed from De Tocqueville, one of the best known French liberals of his time.

In the same vein, Locke is acknowledged as having advocated for liberty to do what one is capable of doing unimpeded. Thus Locke writes: "Liberty ... is the power a man has to do or for-bear doing any particular action" (1966: 15). We must point out that, according to Locke, the consent of others was not necessary in order to perform an act; one was free to act irrespective of their consent. Man however, left alone unsanctioned could be demeaning either to himself or others. But in order to avoid such an eventuality, it is imperative that there exists some sanctioning body or system.

We should bear in mind that liberty viewed as negative liberty, cannot be of any intrinsic value. This conception of liberty, unless supplemented by another argument based on respect of persons and human autonomy, cannot provide an adequate liberal groundwork for repulsing perceived assaults on development as liberty or freedom. Thus a better view needs to be sought. This compels us to turn to other views on liberty.

Now, marxism offers a different view of what freedom is. However, due to its overwhelming nature and controversies surrounding it, we shall not delve into the details. It is perhaps worth noting that according to Marx freedom or liberty

is the historical goal or direction of man. Man aims at freedom. As already noted before, "freedom is a function of history or historical development", (Odera-Oruka, 1991: 3). This, thus, confirms the Hegelian notion of history as "the history of liberty".

Existentialists too, have a different view of freedom. For them, the conception of freedom is derived from the platonic distinction between existence and essence. Contrary to the earlier view that essence precedes existence, the existentialists are of the view that existence precedes essence, such that man has to exist first so that he may define his nature or essence. Thus, there is no such a thing as innate human nature. Man is what he makes himself. According to Sartre, the most profound proponent of this school of thought, consciousness obtains from nothingness since "conscious being is derived from nothingness" (McDonald, 1968: 536).

However, the basic Sartrean paradox is that though the conscious being comes out of nothingness, it knows itself as nothingness and through such knowledge it finds a revelation of being (c.f. McDonald 1968: 536). Thus beingness comes from being; Beingness belongs in being (that which is). According to Sartre freedom or liberty is basically the attitude we take towards anything. It is important to state here that there are some factors which impinge on freedom such as race, our family and our facial look or physique. There are what

Heidegger, another existentialist, though he resented being called so, termed "brute existents" (1968: 536).

Sartre being an existentialist justifies writing in a marxist framework by invoking the marxist concept of ideology. His aim here is to assist marxism take on human dimension. Thus in the strict marxist - existentialist view, "freedom is the meaning of existence" (Odera-Oruka, 1991: 39). Odera Oruka views freedom in terms of needs. For him, freedom is the "ability and opportunity" to fulfil certain needs; whether economic, social, political, sexual, cultural, religious and intellectual needs. Indeed he maintains that development is to be conceived side by side with freedom. In this light, he writes:

The underdeveloped must be that which has only limited degree of freedom to fulfil these needs. And the developed must be that which processes full freedom to satisfy these needs (Odera-Oruka, 1997: 112).

Thus for Odera-Oruka freedom is a function of needs but is itself a need; a need to satisfy other needs (1997: 107). He goes on to assert that "as a need to fulfil needs, freedom is a right - people usually demand a right because they have some needs that they cannot fulfil without the supporting right" (1997: 107). This observation concurs with Kenyatta's view of freedom as a right without which the dignity of man is violated.

However, Odera-Oruka cautions that we must be conscious

of freedom; for it is only then that the need for enhancement and full realisation of freedom is felt. For him thus:

To be conscious of freedom is to be conceptually and practically aware of these elements, physical and social, that deny freedom. It is to be conscious of the need to remove such elements as a necessity for the realisation of freedom. Hence to be fully conscious of freedom is to be conscious of all those factors that hinder freedom (1997: 106).

Further still, Odera-Oruka asserts that:

To be conscious of freedom one must be conscious of those needs whose fulfilment is a necessity for freedom. These needs are such that some are basic (primary) or secondary depending on whether or not it is freedom to fulfil a primary or a secondary need. We may regard a primary freedom as freedom to maintain life, dignity and culture and a secondary freedom as freedom to enrich life, dignity and culture (1997: 107).

We have seen from the foregoing that freedom necessarily implies a certain felt need. Again, Odera-Oruka views development in terms of freedom such that if we speak of; say economic development, then it will entail economic freedom and by extension it is the ability and opportunity to fulfil certain economic needs (c.f. Odera-Oruka, 1997: 113). For him this criteria qualifies for other forms of development; viz, religious, cultural, political and social as well as intellectual and sexual developments (1997: 113). Thus according to Odera-Oruka, development is to be defined as follows:

If N is a nation, the concept "N" is developed, meaning that in N the people have their economic and socio-cultural needs fully satisfied i.e. in N

one has all the social freedom such as economic, political, cultural, intellectual, religious and sexual freedom (1997: 113).

Similarly, "underdevelopment" should be viewed as follows:

If N is a nation, the concept "N is underdeveloped" means that in N the people have their economic and socio-cultural needs inadequately satisfied i.e. in N the people do not sufficiently have all their social freedom such as economic, political, cultural, intellectual, religious and sexual freedoms (1997: 113).

What Odera-Orika has been advocating for is the conception of development in terms of the fulfilment of human needs. It is a "function of human needs" and entails freedom. Freedom is basic to development. Accordingly, development is a function of freedom.

4.2.5.5 Freedom and Development

Liberty seems to be inevitably bound up with development. A society, it is argued, which aims at rapid development, should create a free "atmosphere" (environment) for its members so as to provide an enabling and inspiring condition to facilitate their participation in development in ways which they are best suited and capable of doing. In this way then "individuals develop and exploit their potentialities for their own good and consequently for the good of their society

at large (c.f. Mill, 1948: 59).

Freedom thus encourages individuals to embark on various experiments in life valuable to them and eventually to many others. Malinowski rightly argues that freedom is an indispensable condition for social development. It provides some kind of motivation to create new ideas, to castigate obsolete ones so that new knowledge; new art and a finer moral quality emerges (c.f. Malinowski, 1944: 335). Men thus can exploit and develop their potentialities to the full in free environs. Liberty is thus both a sufficient and necessary condition for the optimum realisation of innate human potentialities. Anchor asserts that "the freedom to choose our attitudes, values and the whole way of life is what makes us truly human" (Anchor 1963: 121). Without freedom, human dignity is fleeting so to say. It is for this reason, perhaps, that Aristotle asserted that the best life for any organism consists in the exercise of its distinctive facilities or talents at their highest pitch of development upon an appropriate subject matter. From this viewpoint, it is possible to see just how freedom constitutes in the well being of an organism. To be able to realise its potentialities at any given time, an organism needs to be assured of some degree of freedom.

Mill offers some insight into the role of individual, preferably operating in a free situation, in development. Mill argues that development of societies is usually as a

result of individuals and not a multitude; moreso at the original level. He thus writes:

The development of all wise or noble things comes and must come from individuals, generally at first from some individuals (1948: 59).

However, given that development must begin from an individual, it would be difficult for an individual to realise this without some amount of freedom. Joad, like Mill, recognises the role that individuals play in the initiation or creation of ideas. He asserts that:

Original creation in art, original thinking in morals or politics, original research in science are the products of not of the masses of men organised in communities but of the minds of single men and women (1934: 199).

Nevertheless, Joad insists that a free society should elevate and encourage people with new ideas, values and art despite the fact that those ideas, values and arts are non-conventional and may appear to carry with them subversive elements which apparently may threaten and even disrupt existing thoughts and morals. This need for tolerance is expressed by Frank Way who writes:

If we are to have active free market place of ideas, then we must accept the unsettling effects, the temporary disruptions of business as usual, this boderline of disorder that is central to the preservation of open channels of communications (1981: 57).

Thus freedom implicitly entails tolerance, Suffice it to say that freedom and tolerance are mutually related; and perhaps, this leads to the idea of responsibility. However, by and large, the development of the whole society depends on the development of individuals in a free environment. Hence the development of the individual is a pre-requisite for development of the whole society; but this development is largely dependent on liberty be it individual or social liberty. Thus "in the final analysis development of every person depends directly on the development of all persons" (Todaro, 1994: xxxi).

Nevertheless, though freedom has a strong laudatory emotive meaning, it is not always good in itself. It depends on what one is free to do: Being one of the several values, freedom has sometimes to give way to other claims such as equality, justice or security. Justice is usually conceived as a synthesis of liberty and equality.

4.3 Development: A Working Definition

All said and done, development is essentially a conscious act by every man through which he naturally and historically projects himself towards the realisation of his potentialities. Apparently, this view of development is contingent upon man's "ability and opportunity" to rationally control and harness nature for his own use and for his society. The task of struggling to realise this entails the

development for to do so is not only dangerous, unrealistic but also irrational. Masolo, in a conference paper entitled "truth as the basis of fundamental experience of being in the world" asserted that:

Man has the moral duty of transcending himself at any given time. He has the duty to cultivate and perfect himself. He is a continuous self-invention, a potential self transcendence (1981: 7).

Masolo, herein exposes the importance of reason in the conduct of human affairs. Reason is very crucial to the development of man too; as development has to be consistent with reason. Hence reason should be manifest in the development of human productive capacity at all times. Reasonably, development being an attempt by man to liberate himself from the wrath of nature, man requires freedom. Ahmed Babu sees a developed society as:

.... one which has moved further from natural necessity. (...) to this day the most important yardstick of development is the productivity of labour. The most developed society being that with the highest level of labour productivity (1981: 19).

Man thus must benefit from development in all aspects and spheres of life, be they moral, social, intellectual, political, sexual, economic, psychological, cultural and

religious. Such benefits must however obtain from a rational endeavour. Development must be rational. Man as a rational animal must become the "measure" of development. This sounds like a revival of Protagoras famous dictum "man is the measure of all things". However, it is our contention that man must rationally do so. It has been argued that "the ultimate test of development is the capacity of a people to establish and maintain large, complex, but flexible organisational forms (E. Huntington, 1945: 32).

Moreover, the historical fact and need for development must not, however, consist in the liberty or freedom to amass technological valuables and wealth to promulgate political formulae and theories that demean man. Humanity must always be enhanced in every developmental endeavour, and must be reasonably harnessed.

Incidentally, Kucuradi, in an article titled "Goals and Traps in the way out of the current stalemate of poverty" presented at the fourteenth World Conference of World Futures Studies Federation held in Nairobi in 1995 argues that:

The impasse to which developmental policies has led throughout the world made people start thinking of the need for "a new conception of development" or the necessity "to bring a cultural dimension to development". Thus they introduced the idea of cultural development (Ogutu, *et al.*, 1997: 91).

In this view, cultural development and by extension humanity, has become the common theme in development circles all over the world. In Africa, cultural development has been

variously interpreted. Our next chapter thus analyses the concept of cultural development with special reference to Africa.

CHAPTER FIVE

CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

This chapter attempts to grapple with the problem of cultural development which appears to be an upsurge in the so called modern African societies in particular, and the world in general. It is an indisputable fact that the so called modern African societies cannot seem to disengage themselves from campaigns and battles of development. However, more often than not, the conduct of these campaigns and battles appears to engender a considerable enthusiasm that tends to propagate cultural ethnocentrism as manifest in the various interpretations of development in general and cultural development in particular.

While it is true that an unbridled emphasis on culture may have a number of negative implications on the concept of cultural development, it is worthy our note that there is no intimation whatsoever to warrant any condemnation of cultural consciousness *per se* or that people, community or a nation should not strive at promoting a culture that is native to them. Indeed, Ngugi waThiong'o succinctly observes that "only a culture which is a product of our people's history and which in turn correctly reflects that history can push Kenya to the fore-front in the community of nations" (1981: 48). In this view one is obliged to ensure the promotion and sustenance of his or her indigenous/native culture which helps him or her fathom ones history or ones identity *vis a vis* those of others.

In view of the foregoing, we are inclined to argue that if a cultural consciousness is positively nurtured among a people without invoking the idea of its primacy over others, then the dangers of cultural ethnocentrism would be minimised and even eliminated. But what really is cultural development?

5.1 DEFINITION OF CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

The problem of defining cultural development is inextricably tied to the meaning of the term development. Moreover, it is difficult, if not impossible, to give a straight and simple definition of cultural development. As such there seems to be no general agreement as to what constitutes a culturally developed nation, viz. what characteristics distinguish a culturally developed nation from one that is not. However, various views have been advanced as to what constitutes cultural development. There is a view which holds that cultural development involves the exploitation of abilities thereby promoting the inherent potentialities. Kucuradi thus observes:

What people in the western, industrialised countries have understood by cultural development was or is the broadening for the masses of the possibility to have "access to and participation in culture", i.e. to activities considered to afford individuals the possibility to develop their potentialities as human beings, e.g. to artistic, scientific, philosophical activities (Ogutu, et al., eds., 1997: 91; italics ours).

Thus cultural development is to be assessed in terms of development of potentialities. In this view, Africa is ranked down the "scale of cultural development" *vis-a-vis* other continents such as America (North) and Europe (west) merely because "Africa has virtually untapped human and natural resource potentials. Moreover, the prevailing relatively high disease (and death) rates and limited educational opportunities mean that human potentialities are largely unexploited" (Knight and Newman, eds., 1976: 4; emphasis ours). However, this should not be viewed as a lack of Africa's human capacity for responding positively to existing challenges. In fact Kucuradi rightfully observes that:

We have to keep in mind that *the demand to "access to and participation in culture" is a demand stemming from a need felt by the people of the industrialised countries, considered to be a way out of the impasse to which industrialisation has led them* (Ogut, Malaska and Kojola, eds., 1997: 91; *our italics*).

Meanwhile, cultural development, it has been argued, is determined by material conditions of social life. In this view, cultural development does not come without economic growth where economic growth involves "a greater mobilisation of existing resources" (Knight and Newman, eds., 1976: 3). Arguably, "the edifice of social and economic progress cannot be realised on a foundation of economic backwardness" (Baller, 1982: 146). Owing to the fact that "mineral and energy resources in Africa are being used as raw material exports" (Knight and Newman eds., 1976: 4; emphasis ours) Africa,

presumably, lags behind. According to Baller and others perhaps:

A preservation of economic backwardness and a denial of the necessity of scientific and technological progress whatever the ideological motivation for this may be, contradicts cultural development of man and society (1982: 147).

Accordingly, White maintains that technology plays a central role in the growth and development of culture. For him, at the bottom of every understanding of growth and development of culture is technology (c.f. 1949: 366). It is with this in mind that Linton, quoted by Allen, declares that "in the last analysis it is technology which sets the ultimate limits within which culture can develop" (Allen, 1971: 91).

Against such a background, Odera Oruka observes that:

If we conceive development purely in terms of economic or technological means a country such as the USA is more developed than it was one hundred years ago and certainly she is, in this sense more developed than Kenya (1997: 192).

Arguably, technological progress seems to either initiate or strongly influence every major development in modern society. Moreover, it has been argued that a culture in which science and technology are prominent is better off than another in which the two are present but only peripheral. The apparent focus on technology by some countries especially America has been earmarked as the parameter of development (c.f. Herskovits, 1948: 544).

Incidentally, one can argue that because technology has:

firstly, caused a steady, persistent transformation of social environment in areas where values favour its influence; Secondly, shown to be an exceedingly important variable as related to the changing character of war and the practice of medicine today and; thirdly, been an underlying factor in relation to certain other variables such as division of labour and cultural changes, some cultures which embrace the primacy of technology are better off than others which do not. However, basically, no culture is better than another (c.f. Kroeber, 1948: 128). After all, any technological innovation has to be tailored to fit cultural values and past experiences of a given society or culture in order to be successful. Indeed, it suffices to say that "progress in *technology* is possible, but no one is obliged to regard progress in *technology* as a good thing in itself" (Kroeber, 1948: 128; italics ours). Hence cultural development based on technological progress is misleading. In fact technology constitutes part of culture. It is a sub-system (Horigan, 1988: 26).

It should be noted that a country or society may be technologically advanced as well as scientifically advanced (we normally talk of the science-technology cluster) but culturally "backward". This view is well illustrated by Ngugi wa Thiong'o when he writes:

Today America has reached hitherto undreamt of heights in the conquest of nature through a fantastic development of instruments of labour (i.e. technology). But America is

today a man-eats-man society. In the realm of social nature, America is still in a state of social cannibalism. It eats its own children and the children of other lands especially of Africa, Latin America and Asia. What I have said of America is generally true of what has been called western civilisation (1981: 67).

In this view then, technology is deeply embedded in western society though it has not been able to procure social progress. In addition, a country or society may be culturally developed or advanced yet technologically "backward" Ngugi wa Thiong'o thus writes:

Some African civilisations had not developed the conquest of nature to a very high degree, but they had developed to a high degree their control of social nature (1981: 67).

It seems, according to Ngugi wa Thiong'o, that the West attaches a high premium to control of nature in general at the expense of control of social nature. Apparently, it has been argued that the only way a culture of a people could grow was through an invention made by people out of existing natural and social conditions. Nevertheless, "the people of a culture may acquire inventions without making them by importing them from elsewhere" (Ogburn and Nimkoff, 1964: 27). On this note Ngugi wa Thiong'o is very critical. Indeed, Ngugi wa Thiong'o cautions Africans against adopting the above view when he says:

No civilisation has so far been built on the basis of blind imitation of other people Africans are well known for this. We in Africa do not have to

imitate people's languages, other people's mannerisms, other people's cultures in order to be civilised. We must in fact build on our national languages and national cultures (1981: 67: emphasis ours).

The main thrust of Ngugi wa Thiong'o's argument is to intensify cultural identity. It is important to note that in his Writers in Politics and other works such as Homecoming, Barrel of a Pen, and more recently Decolonising the Mind, there is an unmistakably anti-imperialist consciousness that runs through Ngugi wa Thiong'o's social philosophy. This anti-imperialist consciousness is enhanced by advocating for cultural independence *inter alia* (c.f. Amuta, 1989: 85). More importantly, it involves such elements as the identification and reconstruction of "lost" values. Indeed, Kucuradi points to this as the main reason that brought culture and cultural development to the foreground at a global level, she thus writes:

.... Another important reason which brought culture to the foreground at a global level was that numerous developing (or Third World) countries started revolting against the "colonisation of the minds", as a result of which they brought on the agenda the question of "cultural identity" as synonymous to "cultural development". Thus they seconded the motion of "cultural development" still understanding of, mainly as being allowed to develop i.e. to identify and reconstruct, "their own culture" which was suppressed or forgotten under the influence of western culture during the colonisation era (Ogotu et al., eds., 1997: 91).

In this view, cultural development, especially in as far as Africa is concerned, has meant a recourse to ancestry, viz.,

the revival and reconstruction of the pre-colonial African culture, Kacuradi illuminates this theoretical inspiration by asserting that:

What these, usually, conceive as "cultural development" is the resurrection or revival though their claim is that they wish to "restore" and "conserve" it - of the culture prevailing among them before they come into touch with the west (Ogutu et al., eds. 1997: 92).

It must be emphasised that the recourse to ancestry is deliberate because it is an expression of racial injury and also a product of our unfortunate handshake with western Europe (Amuta, 1989: 118). Accordingly, Kucuradi argues that:

What we experience now in various countries is "in the process of modernisation" is a reaction to western culture, a reaction which leads each group towards the search of its "cultural identity" or its own values; and since it is not possible to identify what it wishes to identify in the present state of affairs, it looks backwards and tries to find, in order to resurrect it, what it feels, or thinks, to be its own before its encounter with western culture (Ogutu et al., 1997: 92).

However, arguing that "modernisation is a conceptual cousin of economic growth" (Smelser, 1966: 111), some people have cursorily asserted that the length of transition phase depends on the speed with which local talent, energy and resources are devoted to modernisation plus the phasing out of the past. This is because the past is bound by cultural horizons set by the now seemingly absolute traditions and values; besides being characterised staticity.

In order to emerge from that static nature, the past must be abandoned or even perverted. Thus it appears that the only

way of ensuring "continuous development" and even modernisation is discarding of the past. At this juncture the pertinent question would be: Does traditional African culture shut out modernisation?

Meanwhile, the less traditional a society is, the more modern it will be. As a testimony of this, there is a tendency to view tradition as the "stubborn past". This constitutes in what Amuta refers to as the "static museum view of tradition" (1989: 118). However, many people, Amuta included, have already cautioned against this "static museum view of tradition" and advocated a more dialectical view in which tradition is seen as an active process in which past practices are invoked to harness present existing conditions (c.f. Amuta, 1989: 118).

It is instructive to note, however, that some of the advocates of this position implicitly engender fundamentalism, and worse still antagonistic radicalism. Understandably:

The more fixated one is to the past, the greater the tendency for him to become a slave to it and hence find friendship among Europeans who would rather than Africa remains the way they found it in the 18th century (Amuta, 1989: 119; italics ours).

Kucuradi proffers a reasonable view of how fundamentalists defend their activities but on principles generated in the West inevitably promoting the current stalemate with regards to cultural development within the spectacles of "cultural identity" in Africa. She thus writes:

In order to gain more and more ground fundamentalists

defend their activities on the basis of the freedoms of thought, conscience and expression, as well as on the basis of the so called "respect of cultural identities" they defend their activities using the mottoes floating around, still mottoes developed in industrialised countries in order to tackle the problems they face and which are problems of quite a different origin from the problems of the developing countries (Ogutu et al., eds. 1997: 92).

Admittedly, this is where promotion of cultural development in the sense of cultural identity has failed to emancipate Africans for it has created irreversible facts, the most fundamental being the encroachment of antagonistic radicalism and fundamentalism in various parts of Africa. Consequently, the upshot of the foregoing has been a strong ideological contest implicit in the various understanding of African past. However, despite all these ideological battles, a transition though characterised by tension and conflict, can be successfully achieved without necessarily involving disruption, perversions and destructions; perhaps by accommodation. This is because:

The past persists, shaping the present and the future. So far even if it wished to do so, no human society has been able to cut itself from its history. *Implicitly or explicitly* the past somehow asserts itself in the world today (Knight and Newman, eds., 1976: 18; italics ours).

Africa, however, in the eyes of writers with imperialist biases, is perceived as pivoting round the "deadened past".

In this respect, their contention is that African culture is a primitive way of doing things. Accordingly, Africa's cultural progress or development (if there is anything like it) is largely due to alien impact. It has been fostered by the imposition of the myth of the "dark continent" awaiting the arrival of European culture, technology and religion to lift the Africans out of their "savagery state" (Knight and Newman, eds., 1976: 2). In other words, the West through its culture is viewed the citadel of modernity as well as progress or development in any sphere; culture included.

The above notwithstanding, some African leaders have glorified the past, not for its own sake or as a source of their identity, "but as a way of increasing their national support" (Jensen, 1982: 71). In other words, these leaders have used the past as a means to an end, the end being political gains and headways.

Incidentally, it has been argued that the Africans readily accept modern world achievements but neglect and the same time reject the rational principles accompanying those achievements. According to this view, Africans apparently reject "real" modernity which amounts to a rejection of the scientific method. Nevertheless, it has been observed that:

African expertise, developed in African training colleges and universities as well as abroad, has brought fundamental knowledge and applied technologies to Africa from technologically advanced world. Indeed, in Africa, there is a great promise that technological and scientific "know-how" will be more than advanced, perhaps providing perspectives of human beings and new

models of long-run harmony of human beings in their natural and social environment (Knight and Newman, eds. 1976: 8).

Admittedly, technological and scientific "know-how" largely presuppose a high degree of precision. Seemingly, it is this factor that eludes the African unanalytical heritage so to speak. It somehow falls on the "blind spot" of his faculties. As Wiredu puts it:

.... Consider another way in which our unanalytical heritage serves us poorly in our contemporary circumstances. All African nations have implicitly or explicitly made a choice in favour of modernisation through literacy, science and industrialisation. But industrial activities, to take only one aspect of the matter, often involve the use and therefore the repair and maintenance of machines, and this usually requires precision measurement and systematic analysis of cause and effect. Yet our culturally ingrained intuitive attitudes frequently deter us from just these procedures.

Take a comparatively simple illustration. The gap at the contact breaker point in the distributor of a car, the contraction which affects the distribution of electrical currents to the spark plugs is of the utmost importance for the functioning of the engine at all, in the first place, and its smooth running, in the second place. The gap, which varies only slightly from one make of car to another, is measured in thousands of an inch or fractions of a millimetre. For example, for a volkswagen 1200 it is 0.016 of an inch or 0.4 millimetres. A gap of this narrowness cannot be accurately set by the unaided eye; so car manufacturers have made feeler gauges for the purpose. However, without some form of persuasion, a Ghanaian mechanic will often not use a feeler gauge in adjusting the contact breaker point. When a Ghanaian mechanic works under a European supervisor in a company in a workshop, he will set such gaps with perfection using a feeler gauge and generally do a fine job of engine maintenance. Let the same mechanic establish his

own workshop; he will promptly return to the unaided powers of the eye, an engine newly tuned up by him will immediately stall I would discount any suggestion that this habit of our mechanics is due to laziness or stupidity or ill-will. It is due, I believe, to their having been brought up in a culture that places no special value or exact measurement. There are many other ways in which the effects of our traditional culture are manifested in our dealings with technology. The result is ruined machines, shaky constructional works and delayed project (1980: 14).

For Wiredu, then, precision is the hallmark of technological progress and by extension cultural development. It is apparent from him that technology is distinct from culture especially as regards traditional culture (basically African culture). But while precision is very crucial in technology as portrayed in his lucidly put example, probability has also played a major role in the growth of sciences, where precision appears to be impossible due to the lack of what we may call "litmus test" on human actions. Furthermore, Wiredu asserts that "there is a place for intuition and emotion in life. Life is not all logic" (1980: 12). The example he gives of a mechanic is just an instance of where logic or precision is of utmost importance. However, more often than not modern industrial society grants precision in science and technology primacy over all other considerations. This is because science and technology embrace both the principles of universalism and specificity (particularism). The two exert influence on the African society including needless to say, social and economic

institutions as well as cultural institutions, translating into multifarious changes. Understandably, many changes have taken place in Africa such that it is impossible to study Africa without necessarily mentioning them. As Mbiti lucidly puts it:

.... rapid and radical changes have been taking place everywhere in Africa and no study of African problems would be complete without mentioning them (1969: 216).

Accordingly, change pervades Africa as environment, economy and society are responding to the demands of man in Africa. Sub-saharan Africa which evidently was Mbiti's study area (especially Kenya), is caught up in the process of change. The profound and rapid changes have apparently been as a result of western influence, urbanisation, christianity and islam. These changes have been very drastic. As Mbiti puts it:

Without warning and without physical or psychological preparation, Africa has been invaded by a world revolution. Now a new and rapid rhythm is beating from the drums of science and technology, modern communications and mass media, schools and universities, cities and towns (1969: 216).

Consequently, one is forced to admit that to some extent these changes have seemingly outpaced man in Africa implying that he can no longer control them. Man has thus become their subject. Mbiti observes that:

Nothing can halt this rhythm or slow down its rapid tempo. The man of Africa must get up and dance for the better or for the worse, on the arena of world drama. His image of himself and of the universe is disrupted and must make room for the changing "universal" (1969: 216).

However, this over-emphasis on change has had its share of problems. Many a people have discussed the subject of cultural development in a manner that mostly emphasises cultural change. Indeed, the argument has been that while a proper study of mankind is in man, that of culture is the study of change (Swartz and Jordan, 1960: v). It is for this reason that sociologists and anthropologists alike have used the terms interchangeably but more often preferring "cultural change" to "cultural development".

Nevertheless, it must be emphasised that the main objective of this chapter is to formulate a conceptual base for the further consideration in the conception of cultural development. This initial task, Knotty as it is in some aspects, may be made easier by understanding first what cultural change is.

5.2 CULTURAL CHANGE AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Contact with the western world, especially through elements such as colonisation, industrialisation and modernisation has inevitably resulted in political,

technological and socio-economic "development" in Africa. This has translated into some adjustments and even changes in the cultures of various societies. Basically, these changes have been more rapid and significant in the material aspects of a given culture, viz., "the practical aspects of culture" (Odera Oruka and Masolo, eds., 1983: 45). For example, in Kenya and some other African countries, many people (including school children) in both the rural and urban areas now wear shoes. Initially most school children from rural areas used to go to school barefooted. Shoes were perceived as luxuries and not a necessity. Partly, this has been attributed to the introduction of second hand shoes (*Mitumbas*) designed and made by western cobblers and the now evident rural-urban migration and vice-versa which has reduced the rural-urban divide.

In the area of non-material culture moreso ideas and belief systems, changes have not been so rapid and significant. At this juncture, it is important to note that every culture has these two elements or aspects which are comparable to Odera Oruka's practical and theoretical aspects of culture (see Odera Oruka and Masolo, eds. 1983: 45). While material culture includes clothing utensils, art and handicrafts; non-material culture includes ideas, languages, norms, mores, folklore and beliefs (Odetola et al., 1983: 9).

Thus, though cultural changes occur in both aspects of a

culture (material and non-material; practical and theoretical), the changes are more explicit in the material (practical) aspects of culture.

Cultural changes in African communities have been discussed in such a way as to confuse them with social changes. However, there is a distinction between cultural changes and social changes. Basically as pointed out above, cultural changes involve changes in material and non-material culture whereas social changes are more often than not, confined to changes in social relationships (Odetola et al. 1983: 10).

Cultural changes are manifested through the introduction and the effects of new inventions. Indeed, cultural changes occur through discoveries or inventions. It is worth noting that inventions may be physical (tangible) or non-physical (intangible). Thus it has been argued that:

Several inventions were made in Africa at ancient times. In Egypt, the construction of the pyramid involved many inventions. Inventions which are physical can be seen or touched and are called "material inventions". Inventions which involve intangible things such as music, art and literature are social inventions (Ndeti, 1972: 270).

In Kenya, the change from the use of sandals made from

old car tyres (*akala*) to the use of leather shoes may be described as a material cultural change. It thus represents a type of cultural change but in its material aspects. While distinguishing social change from cultural change, Kingsley is quoted by Allen saying:

By "social change" is meant only such alterations as occur in social organisation that is, the structure and functions of society. Social change thus forms only part of what is essentially a broader category called "cultural change". The latter embraces all changes occurring in any branch of culture, as art, science, technology, philosophy etc. as well as changes in the form and rules of social organisation (Allen, 1971: 37).

Another statement is made by Leopold Von Wiese, also quoted by Allen, as follows:

Social change denotes attractions in man-man relationships, while "cultural change" should refer to variations in man-matter connections. Culture is concerned with the products of inter-human activities, society with the producers themselves (1971: 37).

From the foregoing, cultural change apparently is interrelated with social change in that it embodies social change. However, Moore and others perhaps, elect to include cultural change within the rubric of social change, and consequently assert that:

Social change is significant alteration of social structures (that is of patterns of social action and interaction), including consequences and manifestations of such structures embodied in norms (rules of conduct), values and cultural products and symbols (Allen, 1971: 38).

It is important to note however, that the concentration and emphasis on cultural change by some anthropologists has resulted into "culturology" which is a scientific study and interpretation of cultural phenomena *per se* (c.f. Allen, 1971: 59). Accordingly, White maintains the view that "culture needs to be considered as a process *sui generis* (of its own kind) thus quite apart from its human carriers" (Allen, 1971: 39). However, noting would be more paradoxical than belittling the human hand in culture given that culture itself is a human creation.

As noted in chapter two "culture is a way of life of a people. Indeed, the human origin of culture has been illustrated by Kroeber among other scholars. He thus writes:

Cultural values along with cultural forms and cultural content, surely exist only through men and resides in men. As the products of human bodies and minds and their functioning and as a specialised extension of them. Cultural values thus form a wholly natural point of them (1948: 129).

In this view, a significant change in culture arises when man begins reconstructing his environment for his own ends, "not instinctively as in nest building, but with deliberate intent" (Wisdom, 1975: 199). Accordingly, cultural changes are brought about by inventions and diffusion manifested in modifications in folkways (mores), laws, religion, artifacts and other elements of culture (a way of life) especially values (see Allen, 1971: 41). Admittedly, man is the

logical starting point of any cultural change and preferably cultural analysis (Knight and Newman, eds., 1976: 50). This of course is in keeping with the view that "human physical well being is an important parameter of change generally and cultural change specifically" (1976: 50).

In addition, owing to the fact that culture is built into the structure of the personality via the superego persisting through heritage, culture is undoubtedly a part of man's evolutionary history. Moreover, given that "human thought processes are dynamic, then culture, being essentially product of those thought processes, is invariably subject to change in accordance with the dictates of man himself" (Nyarwath, 1996: 191). Indeed, although basic patterns are relatively stable (especially major values); for they constitute the third and deepest level of culture, they change with time. For this reason, Allen asserts that:

Values may require restatement from time to time in the light of new conditions sometimes people will hold fast to values, sometimes the latter will change; it is important to realise why each has occurred (1971: 51).

Musonda, however, does not succumb to such a view. He maintains that "the deepest level does not change easily because if it does there is disequilibrium in society" (Musonda, 1997: 160). Cultural change in Africa however seems to be most subtle embodying the third and deepest level of culture resulting in loss of identity and subsequently disequilibrium in society.

It is therefore not accidental that though cultural changes may be from internal innovations or from cross cultural contacts and other voluntary diffusion or imposition, imposition has an upper hand in Africa. This amounts to what Ngugi wa Thiong'o calls "cultural imperialism" (1981: 37). It is worth noting that as a method of imperialism, cultural imperialism comprises of all kinds of intellectual influences, political and otherwise, that serve as a means for imperialistic end. However, its aims are not the conquest of territory or control of economic life, but the conquest and control of the minds of men as an instrument for changing the cultural relations between two nations. In this view, it is characterised by a distortion of vision of history as well as jettioning of existing thought processes. Thus cultural imperialism seeks the displacement of one culture by another but always as means to some imperialistic end; which is the overthrow of status quo.

The expansion of European (or western) culture has left in its wake a broad wave of cultural crises in Africa whose varied effects furnish examples of cultural adaptation as well as cultural collapse. An important factor in the effects is the speed and magnitude of outside (external) interference.

It is against such a background that Wiredu delineates three types of cultural changes. He thus writes:

We can distinguish at least three types of cultural change (1) change which is deliberate and self initiated and which substitutes something original

from an old cultural element; (2) change which is deliberate and self initiated but which involves foreign substitutes; (3) change which is neither self initiated nor original in its replacements. From this point of view African's seems to have the third type (1992: 61; italics ours).

Rightfully, one may compare Wiredu's cultural change types with what Odetola et al. call endogamous and exogamous changes (1983: 116). According to them while endogamous changes are those which are influenced by internal factors, exogamous changes are those that are externally influenced. However they assert that "these distinctions are only for academic purposes and not possible in real life situation" (1983: 116). In other words, these two types of changes are simultaneously operational. Indeed, more often than not, exogamous change agents induce internal changes or rather induce motion of internal change agents; that is, some changes which appear endogamous in nature may have been externally invoked. The problem however, is whether the reverse is possible especially with reference to Africa which has acted as westerners' punch-bag all along. Moreover, native agent of foreign enterprises (*comprador*) are abundant in Africa thus driving such a possibility even further away.

In addition, however, Wiredu asserts that the third type of change that he delineates is most problematic basically because it is spontaneous and implicitly involves an

"indiscriminate jettisoning of the elements of a given culture" (1992: 61; italics ours), presumably through the imposition of new cultural elements. In other words, Africans seem to throw overboard their own cultural elements or modes in favour of new incomprehensible cultural elements and modes. In this view "modern change has brought many individuals in Africa into situations entirely unknown in traditional life or for which that life offers no relevant preparation" (Mbiti, 1969: 219). Moreover, Mbiti insists that modern changes are or were not commensurate with their traditions. He says:

For the individual the change has come so suddenly, plunging him into a darkness for which he has not been traditionally prepared. It alienates him both from the traditions of his society and from his roots. Paradoxically, the individual is involved in the change yet alienated from it so he becomes an alien both to traditional life and to the new life brought about by modern change (1969: 219).

From the foregoing it is important to note that cultural change has inevitably meant the erasing of things African hence the indiscriminate jettisoning of traditional life which includes corporate morality, customs and traditional solidarity (c.f. Mbiti, 1969: 219). But much as there may be indiscriminate changes from without, there may be also indiscriminate changes from within one's culture. Wiredu, while acknowledging the fact that indiscriminate changes are unpleasant, prefers indiscriminate changes from within. Wiredu thus writes:

Regarding the idea of indiscriminate changes in a culture, there is a difference between changes of this sort that are off one's own bat so to speak, and ones that come about semi-consciously through impregnation with foreign cultural modes inculcated by way of imposed systems. Indiscriminate conduct is, of course not commendable in any sphere of life. Nevertheless, it seems better if one is going to tamper with one's culture indiscriminately, to do it by one's own decision than through foreign pressures. It is better because it displays a greater degree of free will and free will is a basic human idea (1992: 61).

In this view then, "cultural changes are constant and ambiguous" Wallace, 1970: 4) and need not originate from without. However, the problem in Africa is that even the so called indiscriminate changes from within still have same overtones of foreign influence if not sanction. Consequently, though many African countries have since acquired political "freedom" or the so called political independence, many are still economically and culturally unfree so to speak. Accordingly, most of the changes - cultural changes - have been inadvertent and have been those characterised by the western world.

Indeed, owing to the fact that "development has always been seen as a linkage between economic growth and change" (Knight and Newman eds., 1976: 3), cultural development, analogically, has meant economic growth plus cultural change. In other words, a culture which exhibits cultural changes but no economic growth cannot be said to be developed. Hence the

view earlier noted that cultural development is determined largely by the material conditions of social life though other factors may be significant.

Now, economic growth in the new economic sense, is characterised by a reduction in poverty, unemployment and inequality levels (c.f. Todaro, 1994: 15). Evidently, all these have increased in Africa from the time of political independence. A survey through most parts of Africa will readily reveal this. These conditions have been enhanced by besides natural factors and disasters; human or man-made factors. Even if we put this new economic view aside and revert to the traditional economic view, most African countries still have an economy that barely goes beyond the 5% G.N.P. margin. It is with this in mind that many still think that Africa cannot go alone for it has entangled itself through inefficiency, unfreedom and decline in wealth (Knight and Newman eds., 1976: 46) and subsequently poor living conditions. Arguably, this has resulted into the view that, it is not in order to talk of some, if any, degree of endogamous cultural changes in Africa in line with earlier observations. In Africa it is only possible to talk of exogamous cultural changes, where these cultural changes have ultimately involved the jettioning of African cultural elements.

Nevertheless, the dynamics of culture have not meant the erasing of things African, but rather a syncretism of African

and other cultural elements (Knight and Newman eds, 1976: 6). This has involved interpretations and reinterpretations of many cultural traits across ethnic and race boundaries. For instance, Chinua Achebe in his book No Longer at Ease asserts that R.S.V.P. engraved on wedding invitations was thought to mean, "Rice and Stew Very Plenty" by some Nigerians (1960: 9). In this view Knight and Newman note that:

... western dress has been accepted in many areas: but in others, traditional styles now use machine woven cloth. New clothing styles have emerged offering alternatives to traditional local or formal western dress. Especially prominent is the "African suit" made popular by Tanzania's Julius Nyerere. Indigenous markets and towns now incorporate modern sectors (1976: 6).

In Kenya we have the *Jua kali* sector which incorporates traditional techniques into "modern" equipment thus making all sorts of household items such as improvised *jikos*, *sufurias*, frying pans, water containers and so on. We also have the *kiondo* industry which is becoming popular especially in the export sector where baskets (*kiondos*) are made locally but with factory products. This sector is also very popular with tourists (foreigners).

However, as noted earlier on in chapter one, Taban Liyong who claims to be an admirer of "great things" thinks that Africa has nothing to offer to the world and recommends Africans to be admirers of the western values and customs. For him Africa cannot thus develop in any way especially

culturally, other than by the influence and sanction of the West which, incidentally, is very great according to him.

It is against this background that cultural change has been preferred as a more impassionate term than cultural development. But we have seen that though cultural changes are constant and everywhere. In Africa, such changes are seldomly internally induced. Again, change being a pre-requisite of development analogically implies cultural development though such a change must be accompanied by economic growth. In this view then cultural change accompanied by economic growth appears to be the definition of cultural development which subsequently, excludes Africa from the class of cultural developed nations, since Africa cannot be culturally developed while poverty, disease and illiteracy levels are rampant. Hence there is need to delink cultural development from economic growth and cultural change so as to accommodate other apparent parameters of cultural development. Like we pointed earlier on in this chapter, a country may be culturally developed but nevertheless economically backward and vice-versa. Moreover, a country may be both culturally and economically "backward". Odera Oruka comes close to defining what cultural development is, though his theorisation is not without some limitation. Odera Oruka thus says:

Cultural development is explained by the ability of individuals to free themselves from their cultural inhibition and prejudices and open themselves up for ethical understanding and exchange with the people of other cultures and ethnicities (1997:

192).

While categorising cultural development as the "second order sense of development" (1997: 192); Odera Oruka asserts that this sense of development is characterised not by material quantification but self consciousness. He thus writes:

In the second order sense of development we would conceive point H to be of a higher rank of value than point L, not at all because of material abundance in H and scarcity in L, but in terms of higher quality of self consciousness of ones culture and other cultures and ethical understanding and goodwill to those at position L. In practice this would mean, for example that the citizen at position H is aware of his strong points and weaknesses of his culture and is willing to discard such weaknesses and replace them with desirable values borrowed from other cultures (1977: 192).

Flexibility, accommodation and awareness become the basis of cultural development. Consequently:
 ... A person will have no confinement to a fanatical belief in the purity of his own culture and the absurdities of strange culture, and so he will have good will towards cultures and values alien to his own (1997: 192).

Of course, no human being is a completely an unmoved mover. His thought and desires, though internal, are affected positively or negatively by external causes. But this does not necessarily imply that individual human beings must become patients or helpless subjects of coercive pressures under the

influence of which they do whatever they are told to do. The factors involved in the determination of human behaviour include such things as knowledge or belief, desires, abilities and opportunities, which basically are not coercive pressures. These terms have the idea of freedom built into their meaning (c.f. Odera Oruka, 1997: 112). It is worth noting that the elements of voluntary action (free from coercive forces) are ability, opportunity and desire to act (c.f. Gibbs, 1976: 68). But a person is said to be free to act so long as he has ability and opportunity. In other words freedom entails ability and opportunity. It should be borne in mind that; Odera Oruka while defining development in terms of freedom and freedom in terms of needs, proffered that freedom is the ability and opportunity to fulfil certain needs and cultural freedom presupposes the existence of cultural development which is defined as the ability and opportunity to fulfil cultural needs (see Odera Oruka, 1997: 113; also Odera Oruka, 1991: 62-87). At this point the pertinent questions would be: what are some of these cultural needs? Nonetheless, before answering the question it would be worthwhile understanding what ability and opportunity as elements of freedom are.

5.3 ABILITY AND OPPORTUNITY

According to Collins English Dictionary, ability is the possession of the qualities required to do something (Hanks,

ed., 1979: 3). Ability involves the existence of such things as skill, competence and power. Consequently, ability is a potentiality or capacity of a person to act. Ability may be innate or acquired (achieved). Every normal human being (we insist on normal human beings because this would not be applicable to "abnormal" human beings though we resent having to call them so) has an innate ability to speak, walk, eat or raise an arm. Moreover, a human being may acquire some expertise in the form of skill or art through education and practice. Furthermore, human beings may derive some abilities for their status in society for example abilities attributed to the presidents, judges, doctors, engineers, kings, priests and so on.

Ability, it must be noted, exists more or less independently of the changing circumstances in which human beings find themselves. If someone has learnt and has not forgotten to drive a car for instance, the potentiality remains in him whether one is in Kenya or America; regardless of whether the circumstances permit or facilitate the exercise of the ability to drive a car. Having a car at one's disposal is an extrinsic, usually transitory relation between someone and the car. Ability to drive a car does not presuppose the continuous existence of this relation, though the exercise of the ability to drive a car does. More concretely, the existence of a car is sufficient but not necessary condition for the existence of the ability to drive a car especially

once it has been internalised. However, without the car the skill or art is vain or idle.

Moving over to the other element of freedom viz., opportunity, it is important to note that according to Collins English Dictionary opportunity is the existence of a favourable, appropriate or advantageous combination of circumstances (Hanks, ed., 1979: 1032). Admittedly, opportunity is a relation preferably between an agent and circumstances that he finds himself in (c.f. Gibbs, 1976: 69). Opportunity implicitly, presupposes the idea of propitious circumstances. To say that circumstances are propitious for someone doing something is to assert that there are no eternal obstacles in his way. It seems that opportunity presupposes the absence of external impediments through the existence of propitious circumstances for action. But opportunity involves much more. Arguably, if one was invited to contest in a car rally or championship, for instance Safari Rally, and therefore has the "opportunity" but one does not know how to drive a car and thus cannot accept the invitation, it would seem wrong for one to say that he had the opportunity to drive a car.

Rightfully, if one lacks the ability, one cannot be in a position to exercise that ability and thus cannot be said to have the opportunity to exercise it. This presupposes that there is a sense of opportunity in which one cannot be said to have opportunity to do something unless one knows how to go

about doing it, as well as being unhindered by external obstacles (c.f. Gibbs, 1976: 70). This is because nothing can give men the propitious conditions to develop what he does not have (c.f. Raphel, 1960: 60).

Against this background, it suffices to say that ability is a pre-condition for the existence of opportunity. Now, given that cultural development, which embraces cultural freedom, is the ability and opportunity to fulfil cultural needs (c.f. Odera Oruka, 1997: 113), it is imperative that we articulate some of the abilities and opportunities that we think African culture has in order to determine whatever cultural development has or has not taken place in Africa. In essence, this would provide insight not only into the relationship between ability and opportunity but more crucially into the cultural needs of Africans.

5.4 CULTURAL NEEDS: THE CASE OF KENYA

It is perhaps worth noting from the outset that Kenya is basically heterogeneous. As such it constitutes of different ethnic groups with different cultures. Accordingly, it is difficult, if not impossible to delineate some of the cultural needs of Kenya in general.

It is equally important to note that Kenya has about forty two ethnic groups which are more often than not referred to as "tribes", but tribe is a derogatory term used by colonialists and their sympathisers alike to describe African

communities as manifesting primitiveness (c.f. Okot, p'Bitek, 1970: 9-15).

Moreover, these forty two or so ethnic groups (tribes) have different needs and interests hence they constitute different societies for according to Rawls a society is a group of persons who have roughly similar needs and interests (c.f. Wolgast, 1980: 148). Now, given that Kenya has different societies with varying interests and needs, then the immediate implication would be that of a clash of individual interests and needs and worst still social and political upheavals as individual societies seek to fulfil their individual needs independently and indiscriminately. It can be argued, perhaps, that a great many of the developing countries, especially those of Africa, are beset by ethnic or tribal rooted political and social problems supposedly due to a lack of a unifying factor (c.f. Lijphart, 1977:6). Furthermore, the contention is that national problems are more likely to occur in ethnically heterogeneous areas than in homogeneous areas (c.f. Francis, 1976:90). This is in keeping with another but exaggerated view of the homogeneity of western societies in which development is generally viewed as:
The movement from the present condition of non-western states or their conditions at the time of independence to a described or likely objective. This objective is the ideal type of a highly homogenous western society (Lijphart, 1977:22).

The on-going presupposes that homogeneity is a prerequisite for a developed or progressive system, state or

nation. Directly connected with this view, is Mikhailovsky when he ascertains that:

Progress is the gradual approach to the integral individual, to the fullest possible and the most diversified division of labour among man's organs and the least possible division of labour among men. Everything that impedes this advance is immoral, unjust, pernicious and unreasonable. Everything that diminishes the heterogeneity of society ... is moral, just, reasonable and beneficial (Mikhailovsky quoted in Kitching, 1982: 43).

It is important to note, however, that despite the heterogeneous nature of African societies, aspects such as honesty, generosity, justice, temperance, courage and equality *inter alia* are very profound and presupposing the existence of respect and peace. Accordingly, there is a relatively peaceful and mutual co-existence of various ethnic groups albeit the inherent cultural disparities and by extension their heterogeneous nature, for example in Kenya., Individual ethnic needs and interests exist side by side and within the larger national interests. The Maasais' interests exist alongside those of the Luhyas, Pokots, Kikuyus, Nandis, Kisiis and Luos living in Transmara District. In other words, we can comfortably talk of "unity in diversity". Against this background, cultural needs of Kenya in general may be examined. However, more specifically, Ndeti thinks that a better examination of cultural needs of Kenya is possible only when answers are found to the question: what are the major cultural resources of Kenya?. The answers he insists "provide a guide in examining cultural needs" (Ndeti, 1975: 22).

5.5 CULTURAL RESOURCES

Basically, a resource is something that is resorted to in moments of need. In more specific terms it is a means of doing something expedient (c.f. Hanks 1979: 1242). Resources may be natural or artificial (human). Natural resources include land, rivers, lakes, oceans, forests, minerals, wildlife and domestic animals. Human resources include; labour, culture, personnel and intelligence (rationality). It is worth our note that whereas most natural resources are non-renewable, human resources are renewable and can be increased or improved.

Consentaneously, nature presents resources for man to use through his culture. However, whether man uses those resources, at least reasonably, is highly contestable. Indeed, the presence of such resources is no guarantee that man will use them accordingly through his culture. Moreover, the resources presented by nature do not determine how they will be utilised. Nature, it is argued, gives man the resources but what causes them to be used is determined by inventions or scientific knowledge (c.f. Ogburn and Nimkoff, 1964: 78). Thus the presence of natural resources does not *ipso facto* bring the knowledge for their use. Indeed, animals such as cattle are used variously across the world. Cows provide meat for some, milk to others and for religious purposes for some but still others use cows for all these three reasons. In addition in Kenya, cows constitute the

definition of a person among the Maasai (c.f. Dikirr, 1994: 40-41).

Man is of course adapted to nature. Admittedly, he is ultimately dependent on his natural environment. Wide fluctuations in nature set limits. However, given relative stability of the natural environment such as man now enjoys, he has become a master of nature rather than its subject. Man's growth in knowledge has somehow "freed" man from the limitations that other animals are subject; and even managed to substitute increasingly an environment of his own devising. In the life of man, the major emphasis should be placed on the fulfilment of his cultural needs; understandably through cultural resources. But then what are these cultural resources?

Arguably, the presence of cultural resources which include literacy, mass and print media, cultural centres, national museums, cinema halls, art galleries, archives, national theatres and libraries, *inter alia* are important in as far as the fulfilment of cultural needs is concerned. In fact, they serve as "opportunities" or avenues necessary for the fulfilment of cultural needs and by extension the realisation of cultural development in Africa and needless say everywhere in the world. By consensus they provide propitious condition for improving individual cultures (c.f. Ndeti, 1975: 22).

5.5.1 Literacy

It is worthy our note that literacy is the most basic of the cultural resources in our world today; for the elimination of illiteracy enables everyone to actively participate in nation building without much ado (c.f. Ndeti, 1975: 22), and is a prerequisite for many socio-cultural developments. However, literacy is a recent phenomenon in Africa which has taken over the oral tradition as means of preserving and transmitting cultural values; especially in the advent of modern technological and scientific developments in Africa.

Subsequently, the contention is that "a nation with 80 per cent of its population illiterate finds that it can not cope with modern science and technology on a diet of stories, parables, *palavers* and *fölklore*" (Ndeti, 1975: 22; italics ours). Admittedly, literacy becomes a necessity not a luxury in the contemporary world replete with a medley of knowledge sources and types which is more often than not to be found in books, journals, theses, newspapers, pamphlets and computers.

5.5.2 Print and Mass Media

Print and mass media are important elements in Kenya's cultural modernisation and development. Through the print and mass media facilities information flows. The print media includes, newspapers for example, Daily Nation, East African Standard, Kenya Times, Taifa Leo just to name but a few. It also includes magazines such as Finance, Weekly Review,

Economic Review. All these serve as indicators of the fact that Kenya has a very powerful print media and is proud of the freedom that the print media enjoys. The aforementioned sample of newspapers and magazines each in their own way, keep the population informed on various issues. It has occasionally been argued that the privately and foreign owned newspapers and magazines are less interested in such aspects as cultural development for they do not "sell" easily as news (c.f. Ndeti, 1975: 29).

However, a close look at our daily papers today especially Daily Nation and Sunday Nation reveals that articles about culture are continuously being given a lot of attention.

As regards the mass media, it should be noted that the radio and television sections have really kept the population informed and entertained. In contemporary Kenya, the major broadcasting station is KBC (Kenya Broadcasting Corporation) formerly VOK (Voice of Kenya); although we have other licenced stations following the liberation of air waves. These stations include among others Capital FM, Metro FM, Citizen, Nation, and BBC FM as regards the radio stations and television, DSTV, Discovery, M-net, Movie Magic, Cartoon Network, KTN and many others as regards television stations. All these go a long way in keeping the citizens informed as well as providing them with a source of entertainment.

It is worthy our note that radio is the most influential

of the mass media, reaching more than any other. Usually programmes are in several languages the major ones being Kiswahili and English. Attention is given to international and national angles besides entertainment and educational programmes.

Television is rapidly becoming popular among Kenyans. Mostly, children's film, music, news and current affairs programmes dominate. Current affairs include agricultural shows, sports (incidentally, the intriguing World Cup 1998), traditional dance (Kenya Rhythms) and presidential speeches. Music may be foreign or African. Incidentally, Congolese music has an upper hand in most of the African music that is played. Local drama and plays have become popular for instance "Tausi". This indicates an attempt by television especially KBC to foster African identity and personality thus projecting African rather than western values despite the lack of sponsors for local talents in drama and plays.

5.5.3 Cultural Centres and National Theatre

Cultural centres and National theatre were established basically to provide for the performance of plays, music, drama, dancing and also for the exhibition of works of art and craft. They also ultimately provide for the use and enjoyment of the citizens of Kenya without discrimination in terms of race or creed. Ideally theatre and drama have been the focus of cultural centres and National theatre. Indeed, the

cultural centre was (or still is) the focus for cultural activities including Kenya music festivals (c.f. Ndeti, 1975: 32). In Kenya we have the French cultural centre and the Kenya cultural centre which includes the "National theatre, office accommodation, a committee room and a small Hall" (Ndeti, 1975: 42).

5.5.4 Cinema Halls

Among the most prominent cinema halls are 20th Century, Nairobi cinema, Odeon and Embassy. We also have another cinema place which however, is not a hall namely; Fox Drive in. In all these, films are publicly shown. These films are either locally or foreign produced and in various languages; English, Kiswahili, Indian, Chinese. Censorship is strictly enforced by the government through the Kenya film corporation to ensure decency, order and unity for the government believes that films have been effective in promoting crime, violence, disrespect of all forms and dissent as well as being agents of cultural imperialism (c.f. Ngugi wa Thiong'o, 1981: 37).

The showing of foreign films tends to underline the lack of film production in Kenya itself despite its scenic possibilities. However, various film have been "shot" in Kenya. We have such films as the "Rise and Fall of Idi Amin", "Born Free", "Saikati", "Mlevi", "To Walk with the Lions" and so on which were highly successful and should encourage efforts on similar lines.

5.5.5 Museums

The history of Museums in Kenya goes back to the early part of this century, when some amateur naturalist formed the East African and Uganda History Society. This was provoked by the existence of the rich flora and fauna in East Africa (c.f. Ndeti, 1975: 33).

National museums have a double obligation which entails providing the public with a variety of educational opportunities and engaging in scientific research which promotes the population's educational programme (c.f. GOK 1970-1974: 544-55). Besides aforementioned, museums provide safe preservation sites for Kenya artifacts viz., archaeological monuments, handicrafts, antiquities, the animal heritage and important cultural and historical materials and documents. This is due to the serious concern about the depletion of Kenyan artifacts by unscrupulous private foreign and local collectors who may sell them away. The contention is that if nothing is done to halt the trafficking of artifacts, our future generations may have to go to Europe or America to study the cultures of people living in Kenya (c.f. Ndeti, 1975: 34). In Kenya we have the National Museums of Kenya. We also have a private museum in Nyeri Town. Kisumu too has one.

5.5.5 Libraries

Libraries, being set of rooms where books and other

literary materials are kept (Hanks, 1975: 847), encourage reading which, as an activity, can be entertaining, useful and creative. Thus, a library can be a recreation centre as well as a facility that enhances reading and studying hence the acquisition of relevant knowledge.

An efficient library service can make a tremendous contribution to socio-economic and cultural development. This is with the understanding that "knowledge is power". Among the libraries in Kenya include Jomo Kenyatta Memorial Library, Macmillan, Kenya National Library Service, Tangaza, Catholic University Library, just to name but a few.

From the foregoing discussions on cultural resources, it suffices to say that Kenya has the "opportunities" in the form of cultural resources to develop its culture and implicitly fulfil its cultural needs which apparently are recreation, preservation and transmission of traditional values and artifacts, aesthetics (sense of beauty) and sense of identity especially cultural identity. However, like we noted earlier, the existence of opportunities presupposes the existence of abilities. Thus the existence of cultural resources presupposes the existence of abilities to utilise those resources. These are what Ndeti refers to as "cultural endowments" (1975: 56).

5.6 CULTURAL ENDOWMENTS

It must be noted from the outset that every culture in

the world has its inherent qualities; viz., its cultural endowments. According to Ndeti cultural endowments constitute of music and dancing, drama, handicrafts, art, sculpture and painting (1975:56ff). Moreover, according to Collins English Dictionary an endowment is an intrinsic quality bestowed on anything. In this context a cultural endowment is an intrinsic quality bestowed on culture.

5.6.1 Music and Dancing

Music, presumably, is the richest cultural endowment that Kenya possesses. Admittedly, there are traditional musical forms belonging to the over forty two Kenyan ethnic groups in addition to the musical forms from Asian, American and European continents.

Music often plays a strong part in Kenyan cultures, both as the Kenyan citizens sing of cultural activities and as communities employ musicians for their own purposes which is to sing praise of their cultures. We can not fail to take cognisance of musicians such as Joseph Kamaru as well as the Prisons Band with their famous *Tucheze Utamanduni* (let us dance to our culture). Music and dance are inseparably related. Indeed, the contention is that songs and dances form a substantial portion of individual folktales. Music and dance is used everywhere in Kenya for purposes of recreation or entertainment and it often serves to educate children and help to keep track of historic events as well as cultural

activities.

Performers on the African scene range from amateurs to professionals. Understandably, a nucleus of national dance troupes exist. These dance troupes include Bomas of Kenya, University of Nairobi free travelling theatre, Misango art ensemble, Kisii theatre group, Pwani performance artists, Mirange Kigage just to name but a few.

The Bomas of Kenya, has shown the tremendous possibilities of African music. The Bomas of Kenya has shown that young people anywhere in Kenya can perform music and dances from all the ethnic groups in the country. Ideally, young people from different ethnic groups are being trained to perform music and dances from all sections of the republic (c.f. Ndeti, 1975: 56). This implicitly helps to promote Kenyan music and dances as well as unity and consequently facilitating socio-cultural development.

The aforementioned groups stage their shows at provincial levels. Ideally, they tour all over Kenya with repertoire of dances and music in indigenous languages, English and Kiswahili thus promoting traditional music and dances in the countryside besides Nairobi. In the process, they unleash a torrent of Kenyan talents and abilities in music and dancing (c.f. Ngugi wa Thiong'o, 1981: 45). At this point, we would like to take cognisance of the 1998 International Drama/Theatre Educational Association (IDEA) Congress held in Kisumu town, in which music, art and drama experts from the

world over converged to promote cultural exchanges. In this congress there were traditional dances galore and modern performances which are intended to reinforce and reinvigorate one another. Also given prominence were some stage performances by local thespians and traditional dance troupes which have been earlier mentioned.

In their performance of music and dances, the aforementioned troupes make use of certain instruments. These instruments show an extraordinary variety of forms and musical use and here the evidence is complete enough to confirm this diversity. They make use of drums, *Kayambas*, flutes, *Nyatitis*, *Wandindi*, Xylophone, horns, rattles to name but a few for the list is long.

5.6.2 Art

The artists, art forms and artistic formations are all remarkably real and form a vital part of contemporary Kenyan artistic life. African art can be seen in all departments of African life. African art thus focuses on Africa's rich variety of visual and plastic expressions. Consequently, masks and figures together with their uses are vital and their use in social occasions is very profound. This also is true of artistic skills in architecture, textiles, leather and metalwork, pottery, basketry, house decoration, dress body decoration and hairstyles and objects made for the tourists and domestic purposes, art and Africana (Ndeti, 1975: 57).

Foreign institutions such as French cultural centres, Goethe institute and America cultural centre arrange exhibitions for local artists in areas such as painting, clay, sculpture (wood and stone). Local sculpture has consisted of modelling in wood, the best known being the Akamba wood carving. The Akamba sculptors carve all sorts of objects ranging from animals (wild animals) to man (say the Maasai). Clay sculpturing has become an important medium of communication. Stone sculpture using the Kisii soapstone is also remarkable. The various stone monuments in Nairobi are a manifestation of the abundance of art.

It is worth noting that the various combinations of physical and human endowments as steeped in art enrich Kenya's cultural heritage thereby enhancing tourist attraction in Kenya, as tourists flock in to watch Kenya's rich wildlife and benefit from Kenya's rich cultural heritage manifest in art forms and art formations.

5.6.3 Drama

Drama according to Collins English Dictionary refers to work performed by actors on stage, radio or television (c.f. Hanks eds. 1979: 445). The existence of drama presupposes the existence of actors and actresses (*Thespians*). Drama is currently one of the most powerful means of conveying political, religious, moral, social and cultural ideas in Kenya today.

Kenyan drama groups like University of Nairobi Free Travelling Theatre, Mzizi story tellers, Misango art ensemble, Phoenix players, Miujiza players, Otok community theatre just to name but a few together with committed local thespians such as Wahome Mutahi, Francis Imbuga, Oby-obyerodhiambo continue to enliven the Kenya drama scene with their playlets and even adaptations. We can not fail to take cognisance of the annual Kenyan schools and colleges music and drama festivals. All these "unleash a torrent of Kenyan talents in acting thus putting to shame foreign production" (Ngugi wa Thiong'o, 1981: 46).

It must be noted that recently there has been a resurgence of indigenous theatre and drama. Indeed, Kimani succinctly observes that:

Twenty years after the government crushed what was the most powerful indigenous theatre movement in Kenya, the genre is enjoying a resurgence that shows no signs of tapering off (Sunday Nation, 24th May, 1998).

Upcoming artistes have been attempting to fill in the vacuum after the withdrawal of licence to perform the play Ngahika Ndeenda (I will marry when I want) by Ngugi wa Thiong'o wa and Ngugi wa Mirii and the subsequent detention of Ngugi wa Thiong'o in December 1977 throwing indigenous theatre into disarray. These artistes have been determined to carry on from where the duo left. One of them is Wahome Mutahi whose latest play *Profesa Nyoori*, a Kikuyu play which

addresses post-election issues was recently staged at the Kenya National Theatre. This is in contrast to Ngugi wa Thiong'o's view that talented Kenyans have no avenue for their theatrical performances (1981: 46).

However, it should be noted that Wahome borrows a leaf from Ngugi wa Thiong'o who after writing Decolonising the Mind in the late 1980's vowed to never to write in English again. Wahome who also writes in Kikuyu insists that "to write in Kikuyu is not a novelty; it is natural" (Sunday Nation, 24th May, 1998). He goes on to argue that people do not become great by writing in English. According to him "Conrad, Chekkov and Voltaire did not write in English, they wrote in their own languages yet they are remembered as great writers" (Sunday Nation, 24th May, 1998). The contention is if they were great why can not we?

This appears to be in recognition of Ngugi wa Thiong'o's observation that:

One of the weaknesses of ... various national efforts is that writers ... and actors operate within the same tradition as the foreign theatre they are setting one to challenge. Their theatre has mostly been in a foreign language, i.e. English (1981: 42).

The staging of Wahome's play *Profesa Nyoori* is a resuscitation of indigenous theatre. More importantly, it is a manifestation of the inherent ability or potential of indigenous actors. It should be borne in mind that Wahome has

other plays in Kikuyu namely; *Mugathe Mbogothi* and *Mugathe Ndotono* which are steeped in politics. He believes that "we cannot divorce politics from other aspects of life, be it religious or social life (Sunday Nation, 24th May, 1998).

The staging of Wahome's Kikuyu play, *Profesa Nyoori* is a victory for the proponents of indigenous theatre who have fought to have plays in Kenyan languages staged at the National theatre. It is a big steep forward (Sunday Nation, 24th May, 1998) especially when we take cognisance of what Ngugi wa Thiong'o says about Kenyan groups thus:

Often these Kenyan groups of amateurs (or even professionals) have to go hand in hand to imperialist cultural institutions like the French cultural centre, to beg for stage facilities because there is no room in the ark for them at their own national premises. very occasionally, they may get a 'right or two at the Kenya National Theatre, but only in the months when the foreign European groups are resting (1981: 46; italics ours).

The argument by Ngugi wa Thiong'o that "most of the Kenyan writers for theatre have not tried to ... change the content of their drama to take militantly patriotic stands" (1981: 46) does not suffice with the resurgence of indigenous acts such as those by Wahome.

Meanwhile, other indigenous acts have surfaced. They include *Kit Mikayi* a Luo fable which was recently performed by the mzizi story tellers, and also *Lwanda Magere*. *Kit Mikayi* was performed by committed thespians including Oby

Obyerodhiambo. He has also been performing other Luo playlets as well as others in English but modelled on the Luo oral narrative tradition (Sunday Nation, 24th May, 1998).

It should be noted that in Kenyan schools and colleges music and drama festivals go a long way in promoting indigenous theatre. Indeed, since 1984, schools and colleges are allowed to present three plays during the festival. One should be in Kiswahili, another in English, while the third play can be in any other Kenyan language (Sunday Nation, 24th May, 1998). This provision, it has been argued, has not been utilised very much. Perhaps the reason is well articulated by Ngugi who writes:

... English language dominates a Kenyan child's life from primary school to University and after There is total neglect of the languages of the nationalities that make up Kenya. Thus a Kenyan child grows up admiring the culture carried by these foreign languages, in effect western culture and look down upon the culture carried by the language of his particular nationality (1981: 43).

The above notwithstanding, indigenous theatre have been on the increase. A lecturer at the University of Nairobi, Opiyo Muma attributes this trend to "the realisation that playwrights can communicate more effectively in their own languages" (Sunday nation, 24th May, 1998). His contention is that the current trend stems from the efforts of Ngugi wa Thiong'o and Ngugi wa Miiri and their Kamirithu experience. Nonetheless the difference now is that the local thespians are willing to work in communities that are not necessarily theirs

(Sunday Nation, 24th May, 1998). More importantly, the upsurge of indigenous theatre attests to the existence of talents, freedom and in effect cultural development. This is with the understanding that unless a man has the talents to make something of himself, in this case indigenous Africa theatre, freedom is an irksome burden. Indeed, of what avail is freedom especially if the self be ineffectual? (c.f. Hoffer, 1957: 30).

Incidentally, freedom may aggravate at least as much as it may alleviate failure. As freedom encourages a multiplicity of attempts to success, it unavoidably multiplies failure in other areas. For example, the freedom of press may involve defamation and character assassination besides providing information about somebody or an institution. In such a case people may alleviate their failures by making available the palliatives of action, change and protest. In other words, they may use excuses in the name of freedom of press.

It would seem that the most fertile ground for the propagation and promotion of cultural development is a society with considerable cultural freedom thus lacking the external barriers as well as internal barriers. It is true that the adherents of the increasing indigenous theatre have a strong sense of liberation even though they live and work in an atmosphere of strict adherence to the tenets of the western powers. It seems, it is the escape, the experience of vast

change too, that conveys a sense of freedom and in effect a sense of cultural identity and subsequently cultural development. Against such a background, it is an underestimation to insist that African culture is underdeveloped or undeveloped. The presence of cultural resources and cultural endowments attests the existence of ability and opportunity to fulfil Africa's cultural needs. However, whether those cultural needs are fulfilled is another problem altogether.

It is important to note, however, that it is possible for someone to have the ability and opportunity hence freedom to do something but may dislike doing it. In other words, one may have the ability and opportunity say to drive a car but one does not desire or like driving a car. As such, someone could be said to have the freedom to drive but may have inherent qualities that are not compatible with his driving of a car even if he had the opportunity to drive.

Now, given that someone does have the ability to drive a car and that circumstances are such that they facilitate his doing so, it does not follow that he will actually drive, unless he wants or desires to drive. Even if a driver was so enthusiastic that he took advantage of every opportunity to drive, his life being dominated by this obsession, it would still be true that he drove the car because he wanted or desired to. Arguably, one may possess the ability without wanting to use it on a particular occasion or even at any time

(c.f. Gibbs, 1976: 70).

In this view, a people's culture, in this case African culture, could have the ability and opportunity to facilitate the fulfilment of cultural needs but a given community or people may not wish or desire or want to fulfil their cultural needs. Consentaneously, the presence of cultural resources and cultural endowments does not imply that cultural needs will be fulfilled. Besides the cultural resources and cultural endowment, there must be the want or desire within the people in this case Africans to fulfil their needs. Desires are necessary if action was to take place in this case fulfilling of cultural needs. In this sense, ability and opportunity and desire must exist together. But more specifically, Gibbs is of the view that the ability, opportunity and the desire to act may exist in company with each other or independently. He thus writes:

The ability, the opportunity and the desire to act can exist either in company with each other or independently. This explains how it can be possible for someone to do something without its being possible that he will. It is possible for someone to do something so long as he has the ability to act or the opportunity or both; but it is not possible that he will act unless it is also the case that he wants to (Gibbs, 1976: 72).

Accordingly, if someone has the ability and opportunity to drive but wants to go swimming, the possibility that he will drive is ruled out. Similarly, if a people's culture has the ability and opportunity through the existence of cultural

resources and cultural endowments to fulfil its cultural needs but the desire is to wholesomely adopt other values and hence fulfil other needs, it would be difficult if not impossible to fulfil its indigenous cultural needs.

Implicitly, ability, opportunity and desire together facilitate action (c.f. Gibbs, 1976: 73). In more concrete terms, if someone has the ability and opportunity as well as the desire to do something, his actually doing it is not just possible but necessary; for *ex hypothesi* there is nothing whatsoever to prevent his doing it (c.f. Gibbs, 1976: 72). He has the freedom and desire.

5.7 DESIRE AND KNOWLEDGE

Having mentioned desire here and there in our ongoing discussion, it is imperative that we examine it a little more. According to Collins English Dictionary, desire refers to a wish or longing for something. It also refers to a crave or want (Hanks, eds., 1979: 402). In the same line Gibbs is of the view that to desire is to be inclined to try to do or get something (c.f. Gibbs 1976: 72). According to him thus:

One may be inclined to some course of action for a variety of reason, because it is or is a means to something pleasant, appealing or interesting; because it is expedient right or in accordance with duty; or simply because it is the least repellent of one's options (Gibbs, 1976: 72).

Desire involves the idea of attraction as opposed to aversion. Thus when someone desires something he is more or less inclined to it as opposed to being inclined against it. But one may be inclined to something without being so deeply attracted. In other words, one may be inclined to try to do or mistakenly believe the need does not exist. At such a moment of crisis, though one has the ability and opportunity to fulfil a certain need, one fails to do so. Assuming that one fails to identify the need, the implication will be that one is unable to fulfil it for the exercise of ability and opportunity to do something is contingent on the recognition of that thing that one seeks to do. In other words, the ability and opportunity to fulfil cultural needs is contingent on the recognition of these cultural needs. Suffice it to say that it is not possible for one to fulfil a need that has not been felt and recognised first. The contention here is that the knowledge of any need influences one's desire. However, much as desire seems to be a function of a knowledge (recognition of a need), desire is still fundamental in the fulfilment of a felt need.

It follows therefore that cultural development, much as it is the ability and opportunity to fulfil cultural needs, must include also the desire and knowledge of those needs. But it must be noted that the knowledge of the needs is presupposed. Nonetheless the desire may or may not be present. Incidentally it may be present but focused on other

things or needs which in our case are not African cultural needs.

The following are the things which are not African cultural needs...

The following are the things which are not African cultural needs...

The following are the things which are not African cultural needs...

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

At the outset of this thesis, it was stated that one of the problems facing world cultures today besides politics, is the lack of clarity in the use of concepts. Cultural development was posited as one such concept which has been superficially treated. It was noted that this treatment has given rise to many but sometimes controversial interpretations of the concept of cultural development especially in Africa. However, the contention was that at the centre of these many but controversial interpretations were the Eurocentrists' and Afrocentrists' interpretations.

The Eurocentrists, it was observed, were of the view that cultural development in Africa was tied to the belief that western powers through the Bretton Wood institutions (IMF and World Bank) as well as western multinationals were instrumental in ensuring the realisation of overall development (cultural development inclusive). More concretely, they are of the view that cultural development in Africa entails the degree of proximity of African culture to western culture which according to them (Eurocentrists') was the citadel of development.

Indeed a common western notion, occasionally expressed, usually tacit, is that western culture is superior to other cultures. In western eyes, western culture is generally considered to be identical with cultural development and the

non-western world (especially Africa) is considered to be in varying states of cultural development or even innocent of the same. "Primitive", "underdeveloped" or "undeveloped" are terms frequently used by westerners and Eurocentrists at large to refer to people and cultures which are unlike the west.

Against this view was the Afrocentrists' view. The Afrocentrists' view of cultural development in Africa was based on the liberation and conscientisation of Africans. Their contention was that cultural development in Africa involved a liberation struggle against western cultural establishment. This entailed the idea of cultural freedom.

Meanwhile, there has been an attempt by Afrocentrists to advocate the exhuming, refurbishing and systematising past African cultural values to attain this goal. This is because they believe western culture has often been the cause of the problems faced by non-western peoples who have been subjected to western domination in all spheres of life, be it in the economic political, religious and worse still cultural spheres. The goal of these Afrocentrists was expressed clearly by Frantz Fanon who said: "let us decide not to imitate Europe; let us combine our muscles and our brains in a new direction. Let us try to create the whole man, whom Europe has been incapable of bringing to triumphant birth" (1967: 313).

We said that there are significant flaws in these basic assumptions and ideas proffered by Eurocentrists and

Afrocentrists. In fact these ideas and assumptions presuppose the attempt to rank cultures on some hierarchical scale with the concerned cultures being at the top. This way of thinking which implicitly asserts the uniformity of cultures has been contested. The contention now is that people no longer live in isolation: Diverse cultures come together and may compete for space and survival. The diversity of cultures can be endlessly documented. The question usually is: can there be diversity of culture, while at the same time realising positive co-existence? In other words, can we have "unity in diversity? The answer is in the affirmative.

Ruth Benedict while commenting on the westerners' mistake of assuming that their cultural norms are those of human kind stated:

The whiteman ... has never seen an outsider, perhaps, unless the outsider has been already Europeanised. If he has travelled, he has very likely been around the world without ever staying outside a cosmopolitan hotel. He knows a little of any ways of life but his own. The uniformity of custom, outlook, that he sees spread about him seems convincing enough and conceals from him the fact that it is after all a historical accident (1959: 45).

Incidentally, there is substantial evidence to show that vast differences exist among various cultures. However, Eurocentrists and Afrocentrists attempt to define and even interpret cultural development not by examining those differences among various cultures but by looking at only their own cultural environment. This is an error of provincialism.

It is interesting to note that although the term culture simply refers to the patterns, habits of thought, attitudes and institutional relations of a people, society or area; viz., a people's way of life, some cultures are inherently aggressive in a manner which leads some to seek to dominate over others, and to continually extend the domain of their domination. Here we are implicitly asserting the existence of cultural imperialism. Apparently cultural imperialism has existed in non-western societies (especially Africa). But not all societies have been. It is not a universal trait. And even among those societies which could be classified as culturally imperialistic, not all are culturally imperialistic in the same way or to the same degree. Partly due to its technology and partly due to its values, the west, now controlled mostly from the United States and Britain, has probably been unequalled in the history of humankind and thus its imperialistic tendencies over other societies.

Indeed, despite the fact that Africa has a rich cultural heritage, it risks being overshadowed by other continents' culture (especially European and American) in the face of fast developing information and communication technologies resulting from the globalisation process. As we saw in this thesis, African continent has had a long history of achievements. It has seen development of a high level of artwork not forgetting kingdoms and towns. Africa has also been known as the cradle of mankind: In fact the Gedi ruins,

Zimbabwe ruins, Egyptian civilisations are all part of Africa's rich past (c.f. Ndeti, 1975: 22-23).

Incidentally, before colonialism the custodians of culture were the communities themselves. Thus cultural heritage management and transmission was vested on the community. However, the influence of the west through churches, schools (education) and assimilation changed this set up drastically. Indeed during the colonial era in Africa, the west intended to do away with the African identity as a perfect strategy for control and domination.

At independence it should be noted the new leaders most of whom had studied in Europe appealed to the populace through various avenues including their rich cultures. Culture thus became a rallying point for bringing people together. These leaders had to re-define their cultural policies, ones which would embrace diverse people while calling upon unity in diversity. This was based on the understanding that culture could be examined from four angles, namely; culture as belonging to an ethnic group; culture as symbol of identity and rallying point for those who saw themselves as belonging to a group; culture as transmitted from one generation to another and lastly culture as dynamic process.

The above notwithstanding, after independence the cultural stigma left by the colonialist still prevails. This complicates the role of culture in development and consequently the definition of cultural development.

Initially, many African governments cursory looked at culture. In fact, culture was seen as a luxury viz., not appreciating its role in the totality of human life. Developmental agenda thus was focused on promoting health, education and shelter services beyond cultural considerations. Ministries of culture, where they existed were only peripheral and more often than not cultural affairs have been tossed from one ministry to another. Indeed currently, cultural affairs fall under the Ministry of Home Affairs, National Heritage Culture and Social Services in Kenya.

Accordingly, this treatment of culture culminates into a situation of uncertainty where African governments do not know what to do with culture. However, with the talk of cultural renaissance on the one hand and the threat of cultural heritage being obliterated through globalisation on the other, many African people and governments are now willing to address the role of culture in development and correspondingly the question of cultural development.

Indeed, the realisation of the potential of culture in development and by extension of cultural development is manifest in the thesis. The insurmountable difficulty which developmental policies have led throughout the world has made people think about their stand on development and the foundations of development on culture more carefully. Incidentally, people all over the world in general and Africa in particular have been "speaking of the need for "a new

conception of development" or the necessity "to bring a cultural dimension to development". Thus they introduced the idea of "cultural development" (Ogutu, et al., eds, 1997: 91).

In this view, every effort has to be geared towards ensuring progress and thus development through having a firm cultural foundation which ensures that African culture is neither left behind nor becomes irrelevant to the rest of the world. The contention being that, for the sake of survival; Africa needs to incorporate its culture in every aspect of its development in order to facilitate progress that is relevant to the needs and aspirations of people in Africa thereby in essence promoting cultural development.

There is need thus to embrace new technologies especially in communication but of greater value are the cultural resources and endowments which when properly tapped and utilised could enhance the economic as well as the socio-cultural status of Africa by providing a means for artistic expressions. This requires some form of co-operation between Africa and the rest of the world especially in culture.

With globalisation, however, there has been a reorganisation of the world with economic and political blocks emerging as centres of power and dominations. The question then is: where does Africa fit in, with its abundant cultural resources and endowments?

It should be noted that the superficial definition of cultural development in terms of economic, technological and

political standpoints has inadvertently limited cultural development only to those countries that have seemingly made economic, technological and political progresses and achievements. However, as we noted in the thesis, a country may be economically and technologically developed but culturally backward and vice-versa (c.f. Ngugi wa Thiong'o, 1981: 67). We also proffered that a country may be economically and technologically "backward". The problem of cultural development has always been problematic in reference to Africa for the contention has been that the west is culturally developed and worst still that is the citadel of cultural development or what many refer to as "civilisation". Africa is in the process of culturally developing if and only if it strives to attain the level and standards of the west in terms of ideas, values and customs.

Over the past three decades since most African countries attained independence, many have found themselves entangled with problems directly or indirectly related to the indiscriminate acceptance of some ideas which are not palatable to their needs and aspirations. The sense of taking stock and realisation of past mistakes made because of neglecting its cultural heritage, has prevailed on Africans to embark on the ways and means of bringing cultural issues with mainstream discussions of development.

Africans, however, have embarked on identifying the means or tools for cultural development rather than a proper

definition and understanding of cultural development. This is clear when we look at the works of leading scholars such as Ngugi wa Thiong'o and Ali Mazrui. Ngugi wa Thiong'o apparently zeros in on language. His contention is that "language is both a product of succession of the separate generations as well as a banker of the way of life - culture" (1981: 60). Language for him is "both a means of communication and a carrier of culture" (1984: 14). Thus the position of Ngugi wa Thiong'o that any writer who "wants to speak to peasants and workers should write in the language they speak" or that "in writing one should hear all the whispering, and the shouting and crying and the loving and the hating of many of the voices in the past and those voices will never speak to a writer in a foreign language" (1981: 60) stems from his understanding of language.

Indeed, it is acknowledged that Ngugi wa Thiong'o vowed never to write in English again insisting on either indigenous languages (Gikuyu) or Kiswahili (c.f. 1984: 15). Apparently, for him indigenous languages and even Kiswahili as a tool for cultural development have rarely been exploited in Africa; despite Africa's rich and diverse linguistic diversity. Presumably, his fear was that if no action was taken, Africa will not only be marginalised but also continue to be culturally colonised. This position taken by Ngugi wa Thiong'o, it was stated, is plausible but limited in its own way.

The feeling at present is that the tools for facilitating cultural development are abundant. The concern has always been and may continue to be what cultural development really is.

Growing out of this concern, we must acknowledge, are many definitions and interpretations of cultural development. Incidentally, Odera Oruka's definition of cultural development appears most appealing. In the thesis we saw that Odera Oruka defines development in terms of needs where any development be it economic, cultural, sexual, political, social or religious entails the fulfillment of the needs of the area in question. More precisely, Odera Oruka sees development in terms of freedom where cultural development, for example, presupposes cultural freedom. This cultural freedom is the ability and opportunity to meet cultural needs (c.f. Odera Oruka, 1991: 78-80; 1997: 113).

In Kenya, abundant cultural resources and endowments confirm the existence of the abilities and opportunities to meet cultural needs. Admittedly, these serve as reasons for asserting that Kenyan culture fit in the definition of cultural development as the ability and opportunity to meet cultural needs where cultural development is based on the ability and opportunity to meet cultural needs of any society. Thus we cannot expect Kenya to be underdeveloped or undeveloped culturally. In Kenya, cultural development is supported by the existence of contemporary African art, music,

literature and philosophy to name but a few. These together with the avenues of expression namely; the national theatres, museums, art galleries, broadcasting stations, newspapers and so on, presuppose the existence of those abilities and opportunities necessary for the fulfilment of cultural needs. However, whether or not those cultural needs are met or fulfilled is another problem altogether.

Here we unravel the complexities of cultural development. Incidentally, it is important to note, as we saw earlier in the thesis, that it is possible for one to have the abilities and opportunities to fulfil cultural needs but fails to do so owing to the absence of will, desire or even the presence of some amorphous desire or will.

More concretely, Africans may, through their cultures, have the abilities and opportunities to fulfil their African cultural needs but may not have the desire or will to fulfil them choosing or desiring instead to use their abilities and opportunities to fulfil the cultural needs of other cultures (mostly western cultures) thus pushing their African cultures and by extension their cultural needs further away. This may lead to the belief that Africans and their cultures are not culturally developed.

The contention is that at the core of the conception of cultural development is a conception of will or desire. The concept of will or desire is a concept of the self which controls the behaviour, actions and thought of the self. This

means that the will or desire is considered to be central or most important feature in a person.

However, it should be noted that the error in the above contention is not much the belief that something like a will or desire exists in people but in the importance and emphasis placed on the aspect of the will or desire relative to other aspects of human existence.

Arguably, a people and their culture must be seen relative to other cultures though a people's desire or will is distinct from other people's desire or will. Consequently, it is to be argued that for African culture to survive and develop even more, it must adopt the idea of inclusion and participation rather than of exclusion based on ethnic or racial manipulation. At the same time there is need to incorporate African scientific knowledge and cultural values in development in general.

At present it is believed that numerous factors play a role in development in general cultural development in particular. It is with this in mind that there is need to codify and harness African cultural rights by accepting the existence of cultural diversity and thus implicitly promoting networking and regional integration in as far as all cultures are concerned.

In this view, there is need to revitalise the will or desire among Africans and the West to promote, respect and protect the heritages of all culture and by extension ensure

or facilitate the development of all cultures without discrimination in terms of colour or creed. More importantly, Africans need to understand the on-going changes in the world and know-how to respond to the challenges associated with the globalisation process. They must not be just recipients of ideas and values of alien cultures.

All people in the world thus need to respect cultural pluralism. In doing so the general consensus is that they will be partners if and only if they positively understand the globalisation process. More so, every effort should be made to get rid of the so called "master-servant" conception of cultural development. This is because to conceive cultural development either in terms of western living standards or African mode of life as located in the past only compound confusion. The African countries should reject the aim of imitating patterns of life as well as the indiscriminate glorification of African mode of life as located in the past.

Development in general, and cultural development in particular, is not a lineal process and the aim of cultural development in Africa is not to "catch up" with the West. Indeed, many aspects of western life have become wasteful and senseless and do not contribute to Africa and the Africans' real happiness. Similarly cultural development in Africa is not the indiscriminate or the overwhelming insistence on the validity of African customs and values as they were practised. Certainly many have become "anachronistic". (Wiredu, 1980:

2). Put differently, there is need to get rid of the prevailing superiority-inferiority complexes among the western and African societies in as far as cultural development is concerned. Admittedly, cultural development has nothing to do with which culture is superior and which one is not for none is superior or inferior relative to another. We thus maintain that there is no clear and sharp line between western and African societies in as far as cultural development is concerned. We are not arguing that particular differences which have previously been isolated and discussed are not important, but that the bases of and the interrelationship among these particular differences cannot be adequately used to support the attempt to rank cultures on some kind of vertical hierarchy to prove one culture is superior to another and hence more developed than another.

For this reason the general consensus should be that cultural development is the ability, opportunity and desire or will to fulfil cultural needs. By cultural we mean those needs that are deeply rooted in the way of life of a society in such a way that they affect all or nearly all aspect of that way of life. These of course include the psychological (desire and will), political, religious and philosophical dimensions. Only when all these dimensions and others are adequately tackled and accompanying needs fulfilled can we expect full fledged cultural development in Africa.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abbort, T.K. (1978). Kant's Critique of Practical Reason. London; Longmans.
- Achebe, C. (1960). No Longer at Ease. London: Heinemann.
- Allen, F.R. (1976). Socio-Cultural Dynamics. New York: MacMillan.
- Amuta, C. (1989). Theory of African Literature. London: Zed Books.
- Anchor, J. (1965). Man and Freedom. London: Longmans.
- Babu, M.R.A. (1981). African Socialism or Socialist Africa. London: Zed Press.
- Ballard, E.G. (1978). Man and Technology. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.
- Baller, E. et al., (1982): Culture and Philosophy. London: Penguin Books.
- Balogun, J. (1997). "Economic Recovery and Self Sustaining Development" In Africa's Development. Vol. xxii No.2. 65-69.
- Bates, R. (1973). Ethnicity in Contemporary Africa. New York: East African Studies Programme.
- Braybrooke, D. (1967). "Ideology" In The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed by Paul Edwards. New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc. and The Free Press.
- Benedict, R. (1959). Patterns of Culture. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

- Berger, P. (1973). Pyramids of Sacrifice. Harmondworth: Basic Books.
- Besanz, M.H. (1973). Sociology. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Bidney David (1968). "Cultural Relativism" In International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences. Ed. David L. Sills. London: Crowell Collier and MacMillan.
- Bohannan, P. and M. Glazier, Eds. (1988). High point in Anthropology. New York: Knoff.
- Bryceson, D. (1985). Women and Technology in Developing Countries. Santa Domingo: Santa Domingo Press.
- Byrne, E.F. (1969). Human Being and Being Human. New York: Appleton Century Crofts.
- Cabral, A. (1973). Return to the Source. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Cassirer, E. (1982). An Essay on Man. New York: Harvester Press.
- Cranston, M. (1967). Freedom. London: Longmans Greene and Co.
- Dalton, G. ed. (1967). Tribal and Peasant Economies. New York: The Natural History Press.
- Dikirr, P.M. (1994); "Philosophy and Ethics Concerning Death and Disposal of the dead. among the Maasai". M.A. Thesis, University of Nairobi.
- Dillistone, F.W. (1985) Christianity and Symbolism. London: SCM Press Ltd.
- Drachler, J. (1975). Black Homeland. New York: Kennikat Press.

- Erasmus, C.J. (1961). Man Takes Control: Cultural Development and American Aid. Minneapolis: Minnesota Univ. Press.
- Fanon, F. (1967). The Wretched of the Earth. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Francis, E.K. (1976). Interethnic Relations. New York: Elsevier.
- Gann, L.H. (1969). Colonialism in Africa. London: Hoover Institution Publication.
- Gibbs, B. (1976). Freedom and Liberation. London: Sussex University Press.
- Goody, J. (1977). The Domestication of the Sewage Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gove, B.P. Ed. (1986). Webster's Third New International Dictionary of English Language Unabridged. Massachussets: G and C Merriam Co.
- de Graft, J.J.C. (1954). African Glory. Baltimore: Black Classic Press.
- Hallowell, J.H. ed. (1964). Development. For What? Durham: Duke University Press.
- Hanks, P. ed. (1979). Collins English Dictionary. London: William Collins Sons and Co.
- Hanson, F.A. (1975). Meaning of Culture. London: Routledge Kegan Paul.

- Hegel, G.W.F. (1956). The Philosophy of History. New York: Dover Publication Inc.
- (1975). Lectures on the Philosophy of History. Translated by Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Herskovits, M.J. (1948). Man and his Works. New York: Knoff.
- Hobbes, Thomas (1985). Leviathan. Middlesex: Penguin Books.
- Hoffer, E. (1957). The True Believer. New York: Harper and Brother Publishers.
- Horigan, S. (1988). Nature and Culture in Western Discourses. London: Routledge.
- Horton, R. (1973). Modes of Thought. London: Faber and Faber.
- Huntington, E. (1945). Mainsprings of Civilisation. London: Wiley.
- Huntington, S.P. (1948). Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: The University Press.
- Jacobs, M. and J.J. Stern (1974). Outline of Anthropology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- James, G.M. (1988). Stolen Legacy. San Francisco: Julian Richard Associates.
- James William (1960). Principles of Psychology. London: MacMillan.
- Jensen, L. (1982). Explaining Foreign Policy. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Joad, G.E.M. (1934). Liberty Today. London: Watts and Co. Ltd.

- Kant, I. (1978). Groundwork to Metaphysics of Morals.
Translated by T.K. Abbot in Kant's Critique of
Practical Reason. London: Longmans.
- Kaunda, K.D. (1966). A Humanist in Africa. London: Longman
Green and Co.
- Kenyatta Jomo (1953). Facing Mount Kenya. London: Becker
Warburg.
- Kitching, G. (1982). Development and Underdevelopment in
Historical Perspective. London: Methuen.
- Knight, C.G. and J.L. Newmann eds. (1976). Contemporary
Africa. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Kottak, C.P. (1975). Cultural Anthropology. New York: Randon
House.
- Kraft, C. (1979). Christianity in Culture. New York: Orbis
Books.
- Kroeber, A.L. (1948). The Nature of Culture. Chicago: Chicago
University Press.
- Kroeber, A.L. and C. Kluckhonn (1952). Culture. Cambridge: The
Museum.
- Lerner, D. (1959). The Human Meaning of Social Sciences. New
York: Meridian Books.
- Levy-Bruhl, L. (1975). The Notebooks on Primitive Mentality.
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Lijphart, A. (1977). Democracy in Plural Societies. New
Haven: Yales University Press.

- Locke, John. (1966). The Second Treatise of Government.
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Lo-Liyong, Taban. (1969). The Last Word. Nairobi: East African
Publishing House.
- Luzbetak, K.J. (1988). The Church and Culture. New York: Orbis
Books.
- Mafeje, Archie (1991). The Theory and Ethnography of African
Social Formations. London: Codesria Book, Series.
- Malinowski, B. (1944). Freedom to Civilisation. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press.
- Maquet, J. (1972). Power and Society in Africa. London:
World University Library.
- Martin, P.M. and O'meara, P. eds. (1977). Africa. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press.
- Marx, K. (1867). Capital. New York: Verlag Von Otta Meissner.
- Maslow, A.H. (1970). Motivation and Personality. New York:
Harper and Row.
- Masolo, D.A. (1994). African Philosophy in Search of Identity.
Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers.
- Mazrui, A.A. (1986). The Africans. A Triple Heritage. London:
B.B.C. Publications.
- (1990). Cultural Forces in World Politics.
London: James Curry.
- Mbiti, J.S. (1969). African Religions and Philosophy. London:
Heinemann.

- McDonald, L.C. (1968). Western Political Theory. Vol.3. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Inc.
- Meier, G. (1995). Leading Issues in Economic Development. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mill, J.S. (1948). On Liberty. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Mitchell, G.D. ed. (1968). A Dictionary of Sociology. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Moore, W.E. (1987). Social Change. New Delhi: Prentice Hall.
- Morelli, M.D. (1984). Philosophers Place in Culture. New York. University Press of America.
- Mudimbe, V.Y. (1988). The Invention of Africa. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- Murray, J. et al., eds. (1969). The Oxford English Dictionary. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Muschamp, D. (1986). Political Thinkers. South Melbourne: MacMillan.
- Musonda, D.K. (1997). "African Religious Symbols in Relations to Consecrated Life" In After Vol.39, No.3. 156-181.
- Ndeti, K. (1972). Elements of Akamba Life. Nairobi: East African Publishing House.
- (1975). Cultural Policy in Kenya. Paris: UNESCO Press.
- Ndeti, K. and K.R. Gray (1992). The Second Scramble for Africa. Nairobi: Masaki Publishers.

- Needham, R. (1963). Remarks and Inventions. London: Travistock Publishers.
- Ngugi wa Thiong'o (1964). Weep Not Child. London: Heinemann.
- (1967). The River Between. London: Heinemann.
- (1972). Homecoming. London: Heinemann.
- (1981). Writers in Politics. London: Heinemann.
- (1983). Barrel of a Pen. London: Heinemann.
- (1984). Decolonising Our Mind. London: Heinemann.
- Neibuhr, H.R. (1956). Christ and Culture. New York: Harper and Row.
- Nkrumah, K. (1964). Consciencism. London: Panaf Books.
- Nyarwath, O. (1996). "Philosophy and Rationality in Taboos with Special Reference to the Kenyan Luo". M.A. Thesis, University of Nairobi.
- Nyerere, J.K. (1967). Freedom and Unity. Dar-es-Salaam: Oxford University Press.
- (1973). Freedom and Development. Dar-es-Salaam: Oxford University Press.
- Ochieng'-Odhiambo, F. (1994). Handbook and some Social Political Philosophers. Nairobi Consolata Institute of Philosophy Press.
- (1995). African Philosophy. An Introduction. Nairobi Consolata Institute of Philosophy Press.
- Odetola, T.O. et al., (1983). Man and Society in Africa. London: Longman.

- Odera Oruka, H. and D.A. Masolo eds. (1983). Philosophy and Cultures. Nairobi: Bookwise Publishers.
- Odera Oruka, H. (1990) Trends in Contemporary African Philosophy. Nairobi: Shirikon Publishers.
- (1991). Sage Philosophy. Nairobi: ACTS Press.
- (1991). The Philosophy of Liberty. Nairobi: Standard Textbooks Graphics and Publishing.
- (1997). Practical Philosophy of Liberty. Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers.
- Ogburn, W.F. and M.F. Nimkoff (1964). A Handbook of Sociology. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Ogot, G.P. et al., eds. (1997). Futures Beyond Poverty-Ways and Means out of the Current Stalemate. Turku: Finland Futures Research Centre.
- Ojwang, J.B. and J.N.K. Mugambi, eds. (1989). The S.M. Otieno Case. Death and Burial in Modern Kenya. Nairobi: Nairobi University Press.
- Okullu, H. (1974). Church and Politics in East Africa. Nairobi: Uzima Press.
- Owens, E. (1987). The Future of Freedom. New York: Pergamon Press.
- Okot Bitek (1966). Song of Lawino. Nairobi: East African Publishing House.
- (1970). African Religions in Western Scholarship. Nairobi: Kenya Literature Bureau.

- (1973). Africa's Cultural Revolution. Nairobi: MacMillan.
- (1983). "On Culture, Man and Freedom" In Philosophy and Cultures Ed. H. Odera Oruka and D.A. Masolo, Nairobi: Bookwise.
- (1986). Artist The Ruler. Nairobi: Heinemann.
- Philips, S. Claude (1982). The African Political Dictionary. Oxford: Clio Press.
- Popper, K. (1963). Conjectures and Refutations. New York: Harper Torch Books.
- Raphel, D.D. (1960). Justice and Liberty. London: The Athlone Press.
- Rodney, W. (1982). How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Washington: Howard University Press.
- Rogers, E.M. (1969). Social Change in Rural Societies. New York: Appleton Century Crofts.
- Ronald, Fletcher (1977). "Culture" In The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought. Allan Bullock and Oliver Stallybrass, ed. London: William Collins, Sons and Co.
- Rousseau, J.J. (1968). Social Contract. Middle Sex: Penguin Books.
- (1972). Emile. Translated by Barbara Foxley. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- (1972). The Social Contract and Discourses. Translated by C.D.H. Cole Revised and Augmented by

- J.H. Brunmfit and John C. Hall. London: Faber and Faber.
- Russell, B. (1961). Political Ideals. New York: Barnes and Nobles.
- Seers, D. (1969). "What are we Trying to Measure". In Journal of Development Studies. Vol.3. 27-36.
- Senghor, L.S. (1962). "What is Negritude?" In Negro Digest. April.
- Shapiro, H.L. ed. (1956). Man, Culture and Society. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Smelser, N.J. (1966). The Sociology of Economic Life. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Spinoza, B. (1964). Ethics. Translated by R. White. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Stamp, P. (1989). Technology, Gender and Power in Africa. Ottawa: Research Centre.
- Stanfield, S.S. and M.W. Smith, eds. (1949). Culture and Personality. New York: Viking Fund.
- Streeten, P. (1972). The Frontiers of Development Studies. London: MacMillan.
- Steward, J.H. (1967). The Theory of Culture Change. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Swannell, J. (1986). Little Oxford Dictionary. Ulverscroft Leicester. Oxford University Press.

- Swartz, M.J. and D.K. Jordon (1960). Culture. The Anthropological Perspective. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- Taylor, E.B. (1924). Primitive Culture. New York: Brentano.
- Taylor, R.B. (1969). Cultural Ways. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Inc.
- Tempels, P. (1959). Bantu Philosophy. Paris: Presence Africaine.
- Thomas, M.F. (1940). Environment and Land use in Kenya. London: Methuen.
- Thompson, F.C. ed. (1964). The Thompson-Chain Reference Bible. Indianapolis: B.B. Kirkbride Bible Company.
- Todaro, M. (1994). Economic Development. New York: Longman.
- Toye, J. (1987). Dilemmas of Development. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Wallace, A.F.C. (1970). Culture and Personality. New York: Random House.
- Walubengo, D. and M.J. Kimani, eds. (1993). Whose Technologies. Nairobi: Kengo.
- Way, F. (1981). Liberty in the Balance. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.
- Weiner, M. ed. (1966). Modernisation. New York: Basic Books.
- Westermann, D. (1949). The African Today and Tomorrow. London: Oxford University Press.
- White, L. (1949). Evolution of Culture. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.

- Wiredu, K. (1980). Philosophy and An African Culture.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (1990). "Are there Cultural Universals" in Quest
Vol.4, No.2. 5-19 Dec.
- Wiredu, K. and K. Gyekye (1992). Person and Community.
Washington: The Council for Research in Values and
Philosophy.
- Wisdom, J.O. (1975). Philosophy and its Place in our Culture.
New York: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers.
- Wolf, H.B. et al., (1977). Websters Collegiate Dictionary.
Massachussets: G and C Merriam Co.
- Wolgast, E.H. (1980). Quality and the Rights of Women. New
York: Cornell University Press.
- Wuthnow, Robert et al., (1984). Cultural Analysis. London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul.

OTHER MATERIALS

GoK, (1964). African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya. Nairobi. Government Printers.

Masolo, D.A. (1981). "Truth as a Basis of Fundamental Experience of being in the World". Nairobi: International Society for Metaphysics Conference on Society and Truth, 13th -17th August.

Sunday Nation (1998). Nairobi: 24th May.

Waiibu (1995). Vol.10, No.1.

World Bank (1991). World Development Bank Report. New York: Oxford University Press.