POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AMONG THE MIJIKENDA OF KILIFI
AND MOMBASA DISTRICTS: 1920 - 1963

BY

ERIC MASINDE ASEKA

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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT FOR THE
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JULY 1984
This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

ERIC MASINDE ASEKA

This thesis has been submitted for examination with our knowledge as University Supervisors:

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4 July 1984
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER ONE:</strong> The Mijikenda and Colonial Land</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alienation before 1930</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER TWO:</strong> Mijikenda Involvement in Political Protests in Mombasa and Kilifi Districts, 1930 - 1955</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER THREE:</strong> District Organizations and Mijikenda Political Activities, 1955 - 1960</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER FOUR:</strong> National Party Politics and Mijikenda Reaction to the 'Mwambao' Autonomy Issue, 1960 - 1963</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF INFORMANTS</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX 1</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX 2</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX 3</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AEMO</td>
<td>African Elected Members Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>APP</td>
<td>African Peoples Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMF</td>
<td>African Workers Federation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAA</td>
<td>Coast African Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAPU</td>
<td>Coast African Political Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGWU</td>
<td>Coast General Workers Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPAP</td>
<td>Coast Pan Africanist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>Coast Peoples Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>District Commissioner</td>
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<tr>
<td>DO</td>
<td>District Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>DWU</td>
<td>Dock Workers Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAA</td>
<td>East African Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>KADU</td>
<td>Kenya African Democratic Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>KANU</td>
<td>Kenya African National Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAPP</td>
<td>Kenya African Peoples Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAPU</td>
<td>Kilifi African Peoples Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAU</td>
<td>Kenya African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>KCA</td>
<td>Kikuyu Central Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFL</td>
<td>Kenya Federation of Labour</td>
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<tr>
<td>KIM</td>
<td>Kenya Independence Movement</td>
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<td>KNA</td>
<td>Kenya National Archives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNP</td>
<td>Kenya National Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPPNP</td>
<td>Kenya Protectorate Peoples National Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>KWADU</td>
<td>Kwale African Democratic Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legco</td>
<td>Legislative Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAAC</td>
<td>Mombasa African Advisory Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>MADU</td>
<td>Mombasa African Democratic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFCP</td>
<td>Mombasa Freedom Convention Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIM</td>
<td>Mombasa Independence Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPAP</td>
<td>Mombasa Peoples Action Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUF</td>
<td>Mwambao United Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAAC</td>
<td>Nairobi African Advisory Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OI</td>
<td>Oral Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Provincial Commissioner</td>
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</tbody>
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This is a study of Mijikenda political activities in Colonial Kenya in the Mombasa and Kilifi Districts of the Coast Province. The study is limited to the period 1920 - 1963. It aims at portraying the colonial conditions at the Kenya Coast within which the Mijikenda, aroused by a section of the educated elite, participated in nationalist organizations between 1920 and 1963.

Our central hypothesis is that Mijikenda political activities in Kilifi District between 1920 and 1963 were a reaction to three major issues. The first problem was the denial of the Mijikenda land rights in the Coastal Strip through the creation of the Nyika Reserves. Taxation, and colonial labour policies were the other two. The impact of these on the Mijikenda was aggravated by perpetual drought conditions in the Northern Nyika Reserve. Consequently, these conditions forced the Mijikenda to migrate into the Coastal Strip for alternative sources of livelihood either as squatters or wage labourers on European plantations or as casual workers in Mombasa. However, the challenges posed by these new occupations paved the way for the rise of a new leadership among the Mijikenda from some of the educated elite. Thus, this emergent leadership formed various organizations through which they sought to express the grievances of the Mijikenda.
The presence of the Arab Community at the Kenya Coast has been a major factor in the shaping of Kenya's Coastal African Political development. The problems created by this community such as elements of favouritism by the official colonial policy led the educated Mijikenda to perceive political action as one way of protecting their interests. Understandably, alienation of Mijikenda lands in favour of the coastal community became the dominant theme on which Mijikenda leaders capitalised to forge Mijikenda political unity.
The establishment of colonial rule in Kenya brought about the restructuring of African Peoples' economic, social and political life. African resentment towards this disruption of their mode of life was to be expressed in political organizations from as early as 1919.\(^1\) In 1920 when the protectorate became a colony, most of the problems which were to straddle its political history (up to 1963) and on which Africans came to base their opposition to colonial rule had already come into being. Alienation of African land and the question of colour bar were major issues which contributed to Kenya's political unrest during the colonial period. When the first nationalist organizations emerged, they challenged the colonial policy of land alienation and other institutions on which colonialism was based. This opposition was to spread everywhere in the colony in reaction to land expropriation and other related economic grievances.\(^2\)

Prior to the onset of organised political protests, African agitation was perhaps the least of the colonial government's worries in the years following the First World War. Politically

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Africans existed only in the phrase "native interests" as they were referred to by the colonial office, settlers, missionaries and Indians. This was often the case in their verbal debates over Kenya's constitutional future. Since the colonial government joined hands with the settler community in demanding the labour of Africans for the development of the settler economy, the colonial history of Kenya revolved around the entrenchment of settler hegemony which to some extent was dependent on the availability of cheap and adequate labour. The colonial government directed its policies toward the promotion of the wealth of the government and the settler community thereby creating an interrelationship of political and economic processes. This administrative support to settler labour needs resulted in the enactment of several laws such as the Master and Servants Ordinances, the Kipande System, and the introduction of the Hut and Poll Taxes.

Owing to what Africans viewed as injustices of the colonial enactments, political protests against the government increased with time. The areas which produced the first nationalist

organizations in Kenya were the Central and Nyanza Provinces. But the issue of land expropriation weighed heaviest among the Kikuyu. Two Kikuyu organizations emerged in the immediate post-war years and while they differed in their approach and the emphasis of their protest, many of their grievances overlapped. Taken together, their grievances included virtually all the issues, except political independence, which African politics in Kenya were to espouse throughout the colonial period. The emergence of a political movement in Nyanza was perhaps greatly influenced by the Kikuyu political activities and this influence and cooperation continued until 1940 when the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA), the successor of the East African Association (EAA) was proscribed. The EAA had changed its name to KCA in 1925 and its fighting spirit was championed by the KCA to inspire and unite as nationalists not only the people of Central Province but also of other provinces.

In spite of the proscription of KCA in 1940, its fighting spirit culminated in the rise of the Kenya African Study Union (KASU) in 1944 when the government was compelled to allow

9 Singh, "East Africa Association", p.140.
a countrywide political organization for all Africans in Kenya. In the same year this organization changed its name to Kenya African Union (KAU).10

The influence of these political organizations among the Mijikenda is what this study envisages to explore. Although the first nationalist organizations arose in Central and Nyanza provinces, their people were represented in the "polyglot" urban communities of Nairobi and Mombasa.11 Thus, the political history of the Mijikenda cannot be considered in isolation but must include the wider Kenyan arena. Formal imposition of colonial rule and its support for the development of favourable conditions for a settler economy also aroused responses at the Coast. However, whereas land in the former "White Highlands" was taken over by settlers, alienated land at the Coast was taken over by Coastal Corporations based in London.12 This alienation of land only served to inflict further losses on the Mijikenda in addition to earlier land seizure by the Afro-Arabs at the genesis of plantation economy of the 19th Century which had been maintained by slave labour.13 Eventually, the colonial political economy relegated

10 Ibid.
many of the Mijikenda to the role of wage labourers on economic structures which undermined their earlier role as producers.  

However, organizational politics among the Mijikenda began in the 1930's. This new outlook can best be understood in terms of conflict between Mijikenda economic interests and those of the colonial political economy. The colonial government sought to create an administrative policy which would buttress the settler community at the expense of the Africans. Alienation of Mijikenda lands in favour of the Arab community at the Coast and the European Corporations made fertile land outside the Coastal Strip scarce. This contributed to the development of a rural and urban wage working class among the Mijikenda as government administrative policies hinged on acquiring labour to support the colonial economy in the strip.

Nevertheless, the beginning of underdevelopment for the Mijikenda had its initial roots in their dependence on a capitalist system in the mid-19th century. Their trading activities were then transformed from being subsistence oriented to becoming market oriented. Their social, economic and political organization


16 Cooper, From Slaves to Squatters, pp.196 - 197.
disintegrated in the face of the pre-colonial impact of Mercantile capital even before the later impact of colonial rule. Indeed, increasing dependence of the Mijikenda on non-productive trade characterised by unequal exchange led to the genesis of under-development long before the advent of colonialism. The Arabs of the Coastal towns had before the 19th century depended on the Mijikenda for grain and other goods. The Mijikenda had in turn relied on these Arabs for cloth, beads, wine and grain in times of famine. They coexisted with the Arabs of these towns on a fairly equal level as trade passed from one section to the other. At this time Kaya* elders called Kambi controlled land and trade as a resource of production.

However, with the consolidation of a political and economic hegemony by Omani Arabs under Seyyid Said Al-Busaidi from 1806 to 1856 over the East Coast, Kaya elders lost control of trade and land when Omani Arabs utilised European and Indian Commercial stimulus in Zanzibar to encourage the development of large-scale plantations. These plantations were to directly provide agricultural products for the East and for the expanding European market.


* See Chapter 1.
Specialization in the production of raw materials was a response to external trade and it involved the adapting and reshaping of the productive structure of the Mijikenda to meet the export demand. It entrenched dependence and vulnerability by diverting capital and labour from other sectors of the local economy. In this case we agree with Walter Rodney when he argues that the element of subordination and dependence is crucial to the understanding of African underdevelopment today and its roots lie far back in the era of international trade. Colonial economic policies on land and labour were to undermine further an already dependent and vulnerable economy of the Mijikenda.

In this period, the policy of relegating Africans to the role of wage labourers and confining the Mijikenda in the Nyika Reserve as opposed to the Coastal Strip, conflicted with Mijikenda land interests. They reacted to this by preferring squatter labour where they had rights to cultivate part of the land to wage labour. Therefore, they relentlessly occupied territory in the Coastal Strip as squatters against the will of the colonial government. Thus, the emergence of nationalist feelings culminating in the union of the Mijikenda politically in the 1940's was an expression of this conflict of interests. It was an expression of conflict with interests of colonial policy-makers that gave the Mijikenda a self-identification amidst other


nationalist organs in the colony. It was intended to counteract growing political and land demands by the Afro-Arabs of the Coast. The nationalist feeling among the Mijikenda did not come up suddenly, neither did it by chance; it derived its substance from exigencies of colonial exploitation.

The importance of the Mijikenda political upsurge in the 1940s was its subsequent impact on Kenya's nationalist struggle before Independence. The Mijikenda were one of the leading groups in the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), the party in opposition to the Kenya African National Union (KANU). The former's advocacy of regionalism fitted in well with their earnest desire to safeguard their interests against domination by external groups. A domination which heretofore during the colonial period had, at the expense of Africans in Kenya, led to the expropriation of their lands, and exploitation of their labour. They feared the repetition of this stage of affairs in Independent Kenya through the domination of the economically and politically more advanced upcountry majority groups. This fear took a very outspoken expression in the formation of the Coast African Political Union (CAPU), which became the militant wing and the mouthpiece of KADU in the Coast.

Apart from Robert Mambo's seminar paper: "Colonial Rule and Political Activity among the Mijikenda of Kenya's Coast to 1960", there has been no major study on the political history of the Mijikenda during the colonial period. Historians have concentrated on Central and Western Kenya. However, one cannot understand fully the politics of colonial Kenya without Coastal politics as well. Among the Mijikenda, the Giriama people suffered great injustices of coercion and subordination. Moreover, Esmond Martin and Frederick Cooper have argued convincingly that Kilifi District was the worst hit by the squatter problem. The district also became the home of retired settlers from the Kenya Highlands in the late 1950's. Here, they purchased plots of land, worked in Malindi as hotel managers, secretaries, teachers and proprietors of other small businesses. Apparently, their view of the African had altered very little if at all.

To understand the political behaviour of the Mijikenda in the 1940's and 1950's a background of the political setting is necessary. At this stage, it appears appropriate to look at some of the works that have a bearing on the Mijikenda. Unfortunately many works on the Coast have tended to concentrate on the

26 Ibid., p.109.
Arab-Swahili peoples. Like Spear the author feels that it is impossible to understand the Coast fully by studying the Arab-Swahili to the exclusion of the Mijikenda. This is because before the era of plantation economy, there was a political relationship and interaction between the Arab-Swahili and the Coastal Africans. This study looks at the development patterns of Mijikenda politics with special reference to their relationship with the colonial policies and institutions, and a variety of situational factors. It seeks to document the role played by the labour movement in determining the social and political behaviour of the Mijikenda. The study also explores the relationship between Mijikenda political leadership and other non-Mijikenda nationalist leaders.

Various historians have addressed themselves to the question of politics at the Kenya Coast. In his autobiography, Hyder Kindy shows how within the framework of colonial policy, political influence and authority were based on race. He contends that the struggle between Arabs and Swahili over status was dictated by the pressures of race politics and their effects on employment and social services including housing. The study highlights the history of factional fighting for the autonomy of the Coastal Strip, a proposition which was opposed by the Mijikenda. Kindy does not give an adequate explanation of the political struggle

between the Arabs, the Swahili and the Mijikenda. This study will attempt to explain how the conflict between Mijikenda interests and those of colonial policy makers was to a great extent responsible for the struggle and character of Mijikenda politics. Ahmed Idha Salim has written extensively on the Coast Province. His Swahili Speaking Peoples of the Kenya Coast analyses the nature and extent of Arab-Swahili political predicament within the colonial setting. Though it extensively examines Arab-Swahili political development during the colonial era, it only makes a passing reference to the neighbouring Mijikenda peoples. In "Native or Non-Native? The problem of identity and the social stratification of the Arab-Swahili of Kenya", he seeks to demonstrate that laws and regulations that were racially inspired aroused tensions and divisions in the colonial administration of the Arab-Swahili peoples. The study examines Arab-Swahili politics up to 1950 when the issue of the autonomy of the Coast


mentioned earlier, was taking shape. Apart from an analysis of political struggles of the Arab-Swahili in reaction to colonial policy, these two works do not discuss the reaction of the Mijikenda to the political struggles between the Arabs and the Swahili. This study will seek to highlight on how the Mijikenda perceived their plight against the protectorate economy and the rancour of Arab-Swahili politics.

In his "The Movement for 'Mwambao' or Coast Autonomy in Kenya 1956 - 63", Salim outlines the historical development of the Mwambao movement and some of the factors influencing the formation of the movement long before the advent of the British Protectorate in 1895. He also notes that the 1956 - 63 Arab-Swahili agitation for Coastal autonomy was opposed by the Mijikenda. Indeed with the formation of the Kenya African National Union and the Kenya African Democratic Union, parties which dwelled more on African aspirations, the Arab-Swahili felt relegated to the political side show. However, this work does not discuss the origin and character of this new African outlook.

In his "Early Arab-Swahili political protest in colonial Kenya", Salim traces the decline of the Arab-Swahili political position during the early period of colonial rule. This state of affairs was aggravated by the erosion of their economic importance with the abolition of slavery in 1907. The subsequent depressed state of their economy activated the seeds of political
consciousness among the Arab-Swahili. This resulted in the formation of political associations through which the Arab-Swahili hoped to raise their status. The work, however, does not survey the reaction of other Coastal communities.

In a biographical work "Sir Ali Bin Salim", Salim traces the rise of an influential Arab leader and how he clashed with members of the Arab-Swahili community. Ali Bin Salim was the government's recognised leader for the whole Arab community in the Coastal Strip. This study examines in depth the political conflicts between the Swahili and the Arabs and the position which Ali Bin Salim took in relation to this struggle. However, the study does not deal with the question of Ali Bin Salim's contribution to Mijikenda political development, if any, at the Coast during the colonial period.

Richard Stren, in a study of low-cost housing policy in Mombasa describes how the distribution process related to patterns of local politics until the 1970's. He attempts to examine closely the influences that have shaped low-cost housing policies, the content of these policies and their consequences. He explains why upcountry people monopolised the job opportunities in the town. This situation was resented by the Coast Africans and

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this resentment was often expressed in political activities. He concludes that African political organizations in Mombasa were weak and faction-ridden. This study seeks to provide some of the factors that led to the weaknesses and conflicts, especially, among the Mijikenda.

Cynthia Brantley, in a study of the Giriama looks at change within their society over a span of many years. Based on the underdevelopment theory, which attempts to explain the creation of dependent positions imposed on peasant economies, this work attempts to bridge the gap between the pre-colonial and the colonial periods in Kenya. It tries to make clear that political control in the colonial period was primarily a means of expanding Britain's plan for economic capitalism. The work achieves this by exploring the Giriama rebellion in terms of the complex and varied economic rather than other formal grievances. By examining the responses of people drawn into the network of international capitalism, it attempts to demonstrate the implications of that involvement not just for the Giriama individuals who were active in trade but for the Giriama society as a whole.

Frederick Cooper, on the basis of the underdevelopment theory examines how differing labour systems were conceived, operated and transformed at the East Coast of Africa. His work

32 F. Cooper, From Slaves to Squatters.
traces the processes and actions which the British Colonial state took in its first decade of rule to undermine the independent economic, political and social power of slave owners in Zanzibar and on Coastal Kenya. He perceives these processes to have weakened the planters' control of labour and the organization of production far more than the colonial state intended. He emphasizes that the genesis of plantations and the strong efforts of the British to preserve them can be understood in terms of the interests and the power of particular groups such as planters, merchants, and the colonial state.

Thomas Spear, in his pre-colonial history of the Mijikenda focuses on their interaction with their neighbours in the Coast. He highlights their history from the time they arrived along the Coast of Kenya in the 16th Century to the advent of colonial administration. He sees the Mijikenda history as dominated by the question of their relationship and interdependence with adjacent peoples. He does not view the Mijikenda in isolation and he places them within the broader sphere of Coastal history. This thorough work on pre-colonial Mijikenda history provided very useful background information for this study.

33 Spear, The Kaya Complex.
Arthur Champion's work provides information on the habits and customs of the Giriama peoples. It is a useful source because Champion tries to account for the origin of unrest and hostility among the Giriama toward the colonial government. He enumerates in his work the various factors he feels brought about the Giriama uprising of 1914.

David Parkin's study of the Giriama around Kaloleni after the 1950's describes the economic and cultural changes, and identifies their consequences among the Giriama. In examining the changes, he takes into account the factors responsible for these changes within a time perspective. Despite Parkin's analysis of the different aspects of the Giriama society and culture and its identification of key figures, such as the innovators, the entrepreneurs and the reactionaries, the study does not link these changes to subsequent Giriama organizational protests. Neither is the relationship between the Giriama and other organs of the nationalist struggle explored here. Nonetheless, it is an important work because it gives a clear and relevant socio-economic background from which this study has benefited especially in explaining the conflict of interests between the Giriama on the one hand and the Arab-Swahili and the colonial state on the other.


Robert Mambo's history of Education at the Kenya Coast examines the educational issue among the Coastal people and its role in the development of their political consciousness. It is a study that explores the environmental and cultural factors together with institutions and financial aspects of educational policy. It looks at the period before the colonial government involved itself directly in the administration and systematisation of education in the early 1920's. It proceeds from this to discuss the provisions of schooling up to 1963. In another work, Mambo traces the political evolution of the Mijikenda in the aftermath of the Giriama Uprising of 1914. He sees political consciousness as having started manifesting itself in the Nyika Reserves over colonial land policies. The paper attempts to explain why the Mijikenda resisted the movement for Coast Autonomy. It demonstrates that the Mijikenda responded to the pressures of colonial rule and the separatist Arab-Swahili politics of the time. However, the paper is mainly based on archival sources and there is need to collect oral data to strengthen it. Furthermore, this study seeks to go beyond Mambo's work and investigate the political activities of the Mijikenda groups in the Mombasa and Kilifi Districts.


37 Mambo, "Colonial Rule and Political Activity Among the Mijikenda". See footnote 24.
Writing on the history of the Mombasa African Advisory Council, Jerusha Nyamwange analyses its activities assessing the extent to which this body succeeded in solving the problems of residence among Africans in Mombasa during the colonial period. She looks at the question of the council's impact and role in the history of local government and its link with the local and national policies. Although the Advisory Council was dominated by Africans from the Coastal region some of whom were Mijikenda, the dissertation's preoccupation with the question of local government inhibits Nyamwange from carefully examining the role of individual Mijikenda groups in Mombasa African politics.

Joseph Harris demonstrates that the Coast African Association served as a training centre and launching ground for Coast African Political leaders. He attributes a great role of leadership to the nationalists he identifies as "Rabaians" and "Freretownians" in Coast African Politics. Harris has limited himself to the history of a single nationalist organization and thus he does not attempt to trace the origin of Mijikenda involvement in organizational politics at the Kenya Coast.


Apart from regional political works, this study has greatly benefited from other studies of a general nature. Such works include George Bennett's study of political organization in Kenya. Bennett traces the development of associations from the beginning of British colonialism in Kenya. His work has thus provided very important background information for this study.

Mwangi Wa Githumo's work on land in Kenya is also relevant to this study. The book traces the expropriation of African land by Europeans and assesses its impact upon the African concept of land ownership and land rights. It also highlights a high degree to which this impact contributed to the rise and development of African nationalist movements in Kenya. The study, moreover, attempts to disprove certain historical misconceptions concerning those factors that have been responsible for the origin and evolution of nationalist movements in Kenya.

Sorobea Bogonko's work on nationalism depicts the role of Africans in bringing about changes in the political, social and economic life of Kenya between 1945 and 1963. It emphasises political change and recognises the problem of colour bar as well.

as that of the unfair distribution of Kenya's resources as the main causes underlying the nationalist struggle by Africans.

Robert Strayer examines the theme of encounter: the relation of missions to protest and nationalist movements in colonial Kenya. He looks at the evolution of African communities associated with the Church Missionary Society on the Coast and Highlands of Kenya between 1875 and the mid 1930's. This work reveals that the community of European missionaries and African converts and students associated with the missions were active in politics. This work helps us to identify the earliest political protest among mission adherents at the Kenya Coast.

The foregoing works together with many others not cited in this review have helped this study to conceptualise its focus and horizon of historical analysis. It is basically, a study of an aspect of colonial history of the Mijikenda, namely their reaction to the demoralizing process of oppression and exploitation. The Mijikenda political behaviour spearheaded by the elite (the nationalist politicians) was operating against the realities of inequality, land expropriation, blocked economic opportunities and racial discrimination. This created in them an earnest desire to resist and overthrow the colonial structure. But the emergent Mijikenda leadership failed to change the status quo.

The study will examine the plight of the Mijikenda and how they redressed their grievances and aspirations through nationalist organizations. The contention here is that the grievances of the Mijikenda, especially that of land loss at the hands of Arabs and Metropolitan Corporations, were the creations of the colonial economy in the protectorate accentuated by denigrating colonial administrative policies. The conflict between Mijikenda land interests and those of colonial policy makers was to a great extent responsible for the character and structure of Mijikenda politics.

At this stage I would like to say something about the research procedure. Two months were spent in the national archives where background reading was done. Here Provincial, District, Department of Native Affairs and Intelligence and Security Reports were examined. Other sources included Labour Reports, Political Record Books and many other official papers. This background reading provided this researcher with a number of issues and incidents to investigate while in the field. It also revealed the official attitudes about the Mijikenda.

This material was analysed in the context of the published works relevant to the study. A total of two and a half months were spent in Mombasa and Kilifi Districts collecting oral data from Mijikenda elders some of whom were the former members of
the various nationalist organizations to be covered in this study.

Initially, a questionnaire was administered but rarely did these leaders find time to sit down and fill in the questionnaire. We stopped administering questionnaires because of this slow progress. The researcher carried out cassette recording of some interviews but this too was dropped owing to the big expenses incurred and to avoid the conditioning of informants' responses. In the course of the interview in addition to autobiographical probing questions, specific questions were posed for which answers were sought. Informants' responses were cross-checked with published works, archival materials and old newspaper reports.

It was necessary to collect oral data in Mombasa District first to enable the researcher to use the information gathered to trace the other informants in the hinterland. The Mijikenda leaders in the colonial period who were in the town did the best they could to explain to the author how to contact their colleagues in the Mijikenda hinterland. The leaders here were so far apart and a lot of walking had to be done in an attempt to reach their homes. This was a handicap and its effect, indeed, was to reduce the number of people that could have been interviewed. All the same, the author feels that this short-coming was adequately counterbalanced by the other sources of material mentioned above and did not in any way affect the conclusion of the study.
This chapter examines the colonial policy of land alienation and its effects on the Mijikenda people. There are two sections included in the chapter. The first consists of a discussion of the origin of land expropriation at the Kenya Coast before the advent of colonialism. The second section deals with the issue of land expropriation from the early colonial period up to 1930. In both these sections, we attempt to trace the problems originating from the loss of Mijikenda lands and assess the effect of these problems on their subsequent behaviour in the colonial political economy. An analysis of land and labour policies is deemed relevant in this chapter. It is only from understanding the problems rendered by these policies that the political character of the Mijikenda before 1930 becomes apparent.

The Mijikenda People and the Origin of Land Alienation

The Mijikenda consist of nine closely related coastal communities with a common linguistic and cultural heritage. The group comprises the Giriama, Kauma, Chonyi, Jibana, Kambe, Ribe, Rabai, Duruma and Digo. They had no generally acceptable name
for themselves until they chose "Mijikenda" in the 1940's to replace the pejorative name "Nyika".¹

"Mijikenda" is a purely descriptive term which means, literally, "the nine Kayas".² A Kaya is a fortified hill-top settlement whose layout is believed by the informants to have been decided in Shungwaya the accepted Mijikenda cradleland. The Kaya is accessible by narrow paths leading to the several entrances called Mivirya in a stockade known as Chengo.³ Although the Mijikenda today are linguistically and culturally distinct from one another, they derive their group identity from the common traditional history of migration from Shungwaya.⁴

The Mijikenda, locally known as "Amidzichenda", are said to be descendants of two sisters, Mbodza and Matsezi.⁵ The children of Mbodza became the founders of the Digo, Ribe, Duruma, Rabai, Kambe, Jibana, Chonyi and Kauma groups. The Giriama, Pokomo,

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¹ Spear, Op. Cit., p.4. The term "Nyika" means "bush" so that a "Mnyika" would in literal translation be a bushman. This is how the Mijikenda were referred to by the Coastal Arab and Swahili Communities. The colonial officials adopted that name until the 1940's when the name "Mijikenda" replaced the term "Nyika".

² Ibid. Note that the plural of Kaya is Makaya but historians such as Spear use Kayas which would appear to be an English version of the former.


⁵ Ibid.
Bajuni, Gunya and Taita on the other hand are believed to be descended from Matsezi. All these people are said to have lived together in Shungwaya. They moved south along the East Coast from Shungwaya because of pressure from the Galla with whom they were in conflict. The latter forced them to the South through constant raiding. Because of the incessant raids from the Galla and the Masaai, the Mijikenda settled in fortified hill-tops whose dense forests with few narrow entrances served a defensive role.

The Mijikenda are said to have reached the hinterland of the Kenya Coast by 1700. After dominating the coastal hinterland throughout the 18th century, Galla power began to decline in the 19th century. They were under attack by the Masaai and the Somali. In the 1850's the Mijikenda reoccupied the territory formerly held by the Galla when the latter started moving northwards. At first, Cashmore notes, the Mijikenda occupied land as tenants of the Galla, paying a form of rent but eventually taking over complete possession of the land. By 1890, the Mijikenda led by the Giriama had reached the Sabaki River.

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6 Ibid.; The Galla of Kenya are nowadays referred to as Oroma.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 See Martin, The History of Malindi, p.76.
The expansion of the Mijikenda into the territories previously held by the Galla made the Mijikenda live in common villages called Midži. Through the original clans called Mbari which came from Shungwaya, each Mudzi identified with its Kaya. However, these clan were subdivided through subsequent lineage outgrowths and segmentation into sub-clans called Mafuko. Each Fuko was named after the territory it occupied. Thus, Kayas were used for political and religious gatherings and purposes.

The primary means of self-identification among the Mijikenda was by Kaya. Thus the people of each Kaya were independent of other Kayas. The Kaya remained the largest group which took corporate action together and each Kaya had its own age-sets whose senior elders were the main political and ritual leaders. Kayas were the seats of an ideology which maintained in power a government by elders. The Kayas councils of elders called Kambi dominated and controlled the Mijikenda community. The Kambi, the governing body, comprised elders initiated into this council from the lower grade of Nyere.

14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.

For a map showing the distribution of Kayas see Appendix 2.
When the Mijikenda lived in and about the Kaya, the Kambi met in the Moro to decide the affairs of the community. They met under an appointed elder called Mvveri wa Kava. He was regarded as the senior elder of the community. The Moro is normally an open place in the centre of the Kaya shaded by two large trees, one a mucandi (fig tree) and the other Muyu (baobab). The Kirao ceremony had to precede the entrance into the rank of Kambi elders. It was an initiation into the mysteries and wisdom of the Kambi elders. Within the Kambi were elders who were in charge of land called Enyi tsi. Enyi tsi means the owners of land. These were elders who had taken their seat in the Moro and were thus qualified to partake of the fees paid to the Kambi.

The Enyi tsi controlled all land relations when the Mijikenda lived in and about their Kaya. According to Mijikenda customary law, all land belongs to God. However, this situation later became modified and with time the Mijikenda tended to become more possessive. Unoccupied grasslands called yuwe when cleared of big trees fell under the continued use and care of the occupant. Whereas cultivated lands called Minda could be inherited, they however could not be sold. Land could be obtained for use from

20 Ibid., p.2.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Prin', Oo. Ci., p.84.
the previous occupier. However, unused cleared land could not be given to a newcomer without the consent of its previous occupier, his neighbours or village elders. In the 19th century the expansion of the Mijikenda out of the Kayas reduced the Kambi's control over land.

However, the Mijikenda peacefully co-existed with the Arab and Swahili communities of the Kenya Coast. Idha Salim notes that by the 1860's the main centres of settlement were Malindi, Takaungu, Mombasa, Gazi, Vanga and Wasini. The population of these centres comprised the newly arrived Omani Arabs, the Mazrui and Shirazi families, Islamized Africans and the Mijikenda. The Mazrui Arab and Swahili communities on one hand and the Mijikenda on the other formed military alliances going back to medieval days. The coastal towns were dependent on the Mijikenda for grain. The Mijikenda in turn relied on these towns for cloth, beads, wire and in times of acute famine, grain. Spear therefore makes a logical conclusion that these communities co-existed on a fairly equal level as trade passed from one section to the next.

24 Ibid. Under the Mijikenda law, land is unalienable. It belongs to God.
26 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
Although the Mijikenda and Mazrui Arab and Swahili economic and political alliances were interrupted by the Al-Busaidi onslaught on the East Coast, these alliances were revived and survived the defeat of the Mazrui in 1837. Some of the Mazrui Arabs, after their defeat in their stronghold at Mombasa, fled to the north and founded Takaungu while others settled at Gazi in the South. Their trade relations with the Mijikenda were continued at Takaungu and Gazi. To appreciate the depth of this relationship, perhaps one should note that the last Mazrui Liwali of Takaungu was an initiated Giriama elder. Seyyid Said had granted the Mazrui families the liwaliships of Takaungu and Gazi where they had built considerable economic and political powers relying on slave labour.

However, with the concentration of European and Indian businessmen in Zanzibar during much of 19th century, the relationship between the Mazrui Arabs and the Mijikenda changed. The Al-Busaidi Arabs utilised the commercial stimulus in Zanzibar to encourage the development of large-scale plantations. These were to produce commodities for the East and industrial raw materials for the expanding European market. The development of large-scale plantations along the East Coast was a result of increased

29 Cashmore, A note on the Chronology of the Nyika, p.2.
demand for raw materials. This, in turn brought about a great deal of alienation of the Mijikenda lands. In 1896, an estimated 110,000 acres or about 172 square miles around Malindi was taken by Arabs. Of this, 5,000 acres or 8 square miles was cultivated and placed under permanent crops like coconuts and mangoes, and 10,000 acres or 16 square miles under grain.  

Frederick Cooper notes that the expanding trade along the East Coast of Africa in the late 18th century and early 19th century transformed a small-scale coastal agriculture into a plantation system. The Swahili and Arabs in the 1840's had brought more and more land under grain cultivation. Cooper further notes that between Malindi and Mambrui, plantations of Arabs extended up to "six hours' marching time inland" in 1873. He argues that this alienation of vast lands had much to do with a factor common to most plantation areas: low population density and the political weakness of the previous inhabitants. We have shown that the Galla and the Mijikenda were the occupants of the entire Coastal region, save for the coastal towns, by 1700.

Prins observed that some Mijikenda groups, for instance the Jibana, became Muslims (Mahaji) and were expected to introduce the Muslim law of freehold. These people moved east

34 Ibid., p.84.
35 Ibid., p.86.
36 See p.3.
towards the Coastal Strip and settled among the Muslim community.

Some Arabs who were part of this community had no local roots, but had originated in places like Lamu, Muscat, Hadramaut and Zanzibar. Salim bin Khalfan, an Al-Busaidi was one of those with large tracts of land. He came to Malindi a little before 1870. Much of his land was acquired by clearing forest and purchases from other Arabs. He became the largest Arab landowner in the Mombasa area as well as Malindi. Suleiman Abdalla Al-Mauli, one of the wealthiest men in Malindi acquired over 1,000 acres near Mambrui.

The Mazrui Arabs after settling at Takaungu and Gazi in 1837 developed plantations on which they grew mostly sesame and millet. The Mazrui like the Al-Busaidi Arabs took advantage of the sparse population of the Mijikenda and their weak political organizations outside the confines of the Kaya to annex Mijikenda lands. After 1895, Mazrui occupation of Mijikenda lands was accelerated by the after effects of the 1895 Mazrui rebellion against the Imperial British East Africa Company. Mazrui rebels disguised themselves as Giriama and were allowed to cultivate

38 See Cooper, Plantation Slavery, p.94.
39 Ibid., p.90.
40 Ibid., p.91.
small plots along side Giriama farms. The Mijikenda participated in the 1895 Mazrui Rebellion because they too were opposed to foreign rule and given the pre-colonial political alliance between the Mazrui and the Mijikenda, this support was not surprising. Hyder Kindy notes that Ngonyo, a powerful blind Giriama, took part in the uprising which may support the notion that it was basically a rejection of foreign rule.

Land Alienation during the Colonial Period

In 1895 the British Government obtained on lease the 10 mile Coastal Strip. By the Anglo-German Agreement of 1886, the Coastal Strip had been recognised as falling under the sovereignty of the Sultan of Zanzibar. In 1888, the 10 mile strip was given as a concession to the British East Africa Company in return for an annual rental paid to the Sultan. When the British took over the strip under the 1895 treaty, the annual payment of rent and interest to the Sultan was fixed at £16,000. Kindy has pointed out that the 1895 Treaty between the British and the Sultan was signed without the consent of or consultation with the indigenous people of the Coast namely the Swahili, Mijikenda and Arabs.

42 Ibid., p.40.
44 Ibid., p.186.
45 Ibid.
By the 1895 Treaty, Britain assumed full power to deal with all questions affecting land, minerals, executive and judicial administration, the right to levy customs and regulate trade. The British promised in turn not to interfere with the Muslim law and custom. After the declaration of the protectorate over the 10 mile strip in 1895, the British acknowledged to respect Afro-Arab land rights. When the interior of the protectorate was annexed as Kenya Colony in 1920, the Coastal Strip remained a protectorate under the nominal sovereignty of the Sultan of Zanzibar.

The British Government did not dismantle the Arab administrative structure at the Coast but retained the local Arab administration of Liwalis, Mudirs and Kadhis. Before colonial rule, these had administered coastal towns like Mombasa, Takaungu, Malindi and Lamu as appointees of the Sultan of Zanzibar. The prominent role which the Coastal Arabs were given in the administration of

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49 See Salim, "Native or Non-native", p.69. See also Cooper, *From Slaves to Squatters*, pp.56 - 57.
the Coastal Strip placed them at an advantageous position from which they protected their land claims. Unlike the local Arab administration, the Kambi, specifically the Enyi-tsi, were not involved by the British on matters concerning land.

Mambo notes that political issues had emerged very rapidly since the completion of the Kenya-Uganda Railway in 1901. The Railway was a significant means of transport between the Coast and the distant hinterland. In the process of securing land for the railway, the government acquired a zone of one mile on each side of the tracks. This zone was designated for freehold titles. However, in order to make the railway pay, the government embarked on a policy of European settlement. To hasten this, it pursued a land policy that designated areas to be reserved for European settlement.

Under the administration of Sir Charles Elliot, the British Commissioner from 1901 to 1904, European settlers were allowed to farm in the Central Highlands of the protectorate. Through the East Africa (Lands) Order in Council in 1901, the colonial

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50 Mambo, "Challenges of Western Education in the Coast Province of Kenya, 1890 - 1965", p.96.
52 Ibid.
government defined Crown Land as wasteland or unused land.\textsuperscript{53} The order permitted the Commissioner to make grants or leases of any Crown Lands as he might think necessary, subject to the direction of the British Secretary of State.\textsuperscript{54} In 1902, the Crown Lands Ordinance was passed allowing the Commissioner to disburse lands as he chose.\textsuperscript{55} But this ordinance was implemented without any reference to the local Africans in the protectorate. By 1904, there were 130 Europeans allotted land in the protectorate.\textsuperscript{56}

Nevertheless, European settlers felt that the 1902 ordinance was restrictive to them. In 1905, a Land Committee of European speculators led by Lord Delamare surveyed and identified lands for possible alienation.\textsuperscript{57} This committee was responding to pressures of land-hungry settlers dissatisfied with the provisions of the 1902 Ordinance. While at the Coast, the Committee under Lord Delamare noted the large-scale immigration of the Mijikenda into the Coastal Strip.\textsuperscript{58} Probably the interests of the Committee

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
at the Kenya Coast were aroused by the fact that since the introduction of registration of title deeds in 1903, some Europeans were interested in land at the Coast. By 1904, these Europeans had began to claim land at the Coast. 59

The first group of Europeans was the Denhardt Brothers and Company which in 1900 was given the right to strip the bark from Mangrove trees at Vanga. The local people were told by the British by some form of directive that stripping of bark was illegal for them. 60 By 1904, Denhardt and Company was joined by A.G.W. Anderson and Company. However, it was not until after the survey of the land Committee of 1905 that the potentialities of Malindi District attracted a big influx of European planters in 1906-7. 61 By the 1905 Coast Titles Ordinance, the government through the Land Titles Court was to investigate all private titles district by district and register all those found to be valid. The remaining land was to be proclaimed Crown Land, which would be made available for alienation to Europeans. 62 The terms of the 1908 ordinance provided for steps to be taken when an owner disposed of his farm after receipt of a certificate of title or after he made an application which still awaited adjudication or receipt of title. 63

59 Ibid.
60 See Salim, The Swahili Speaking Peoples, p.107 and also p.117.
61 Ibid., p.117.
Idha Salim notes that by 1910, "some eight or ten planters" had 1,500 acres under Rubber in the Malindi District. At Kilifi, Powys Cobb had 750 acres under sisal while Mildmay had about 600 acres near Mombasa. At Kipini, a large area was being put under rubber, sisal and cotton. However, the largest concession in the Seyyidieh (as the Coast province was then called) was south of Mombasa to the German border given to East Africa Estates Ltd. These comprised between 250,000 and 350,000 acres. Other British concerns which acquired concessions were the Magarini Estates, the British East Africa Rubber and Cotton Estates, and the British East African Corporation. To help European planters in the British East Africa Protectorate, the government through the Agricultural Department established five experimental farms. Two of these farms were in the Coastal area, at Malindi and Mazeras. Thus, vast tracts of land were proclaimed Crown Land and whereas upcountry fertile regions were taken over by settlers, alienated land at the coast was made available to Coastal Corporations which were managed from London. By 1912, a total of 15,000 acres in the Malindi area were allocated to the Malindi Planters Association.

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65 Ibid.
66 Ibid., pp.117 - 118.
68 Ibid.
However, as Salim aptly argues, the protectorate government granted concessions to European planters "without examining the nature and extent of native land rights." In seeking to establish private ownership of the protectorate the government sought the opinions of the Muslim religious leader, the Chief Kadhi of the Coast. He recommended the application of Muslim law in recognizing claims of ownership of Coastal land. Under this law, freehold titles were given to individuals. However, those who had left their land unattended to lost their rights and the land reverted to the Crown. In addition, freehold titles were given to the dominant Arab Mazrui clan for large blocks of land amounting to 51,000 acres. The Mazrui had lodged land claims of up to three to ten miles inland south of Malindi. We ought to note that when the land titles ordinance was applied to the Malindi area in 1909, because of conflicting claims, a Land

70 Ibid. Under Muslim law, land cleared of bush and cultivated was recognised as 'federal land' but once crops reached maturity, land became the property of the cultivator. He had rights to sell it even if it had reverted to bush. Moreover, the law allowed for strangers to cultivate on one's land as tenants-at-will of the owner, entitled to one month's notice of eviction. While the tenant had the right to take his hut and crops, the owner had no legal obligation to compensate him. See Mbithi and Barnes, *Op. Cit.*., p.44.
71 Mbithi and Barnes, *Op. Cit.*., p.44.
72 Ibid., p.45.
Arbitration Board was set up. The Chairman of the Board was K. MacDougal while the Assistant Liwali for Mombasa Ali bin Salim was the Vice-Chairman. But local Arab officials also served on the Board, while the Mijikenda were excluded.\(^{73}\) The composition of the Board is enough evidence to show the complete disregard with which the Mijikenda and especially the Enyi-tai who cherished the knowledge of Mijikenda pre-colonial land rights in this region were treated.

The 51,000 acres given to the Mazrui clan were spread around five blocks of land at Takaungu, Roka, Watamu, Mtondia and Msabaha. Moreover, some lands around Gazi were recognised as Mazrui property.\(^{74}\) We noted earlier that the Mijikenda Muslims referred to as Mahajji were the only people who practised the Muslim law of freehold.\(^*\) The majority of the Mijikenda in Kilifi district subscribed to the Mijikenda customary law which we have also discussed earlier.\(^**\) Thus, the majority of the Mijikenda had their land rights and claims jeopardised by their ignorance of Muslim land law as well as by the intricacies and expenses of submitting a claim. Cooper notes that the process entailed a


\(^{74}\) Ibid.

* See p.8.

** See p.5.
title certificate and survey cost of 30 shillings. Thus this procedure and the composition of the Board favoured claimants who were members of important Arab families. Status lent credence to their claims and they easily mobilised as witnesses their ex-slaves who had been involved in reciprocal relations with them. By 1917, the District Commissioner for Kilifi noted in his annual report that the Mijikenda and some Arabs were in complete ignorance of the provisions of the Land Titles Ordinance of 1908.

The Arabs, after securing large tracts of land at the expense of their Mijikenda neighbours sold portions of these either to other Arabs, private concerns or Indian speculators. Reporting on this state of affairs, the Report of the Kenya Land Commission in 1932 said:

Large areas of land were granted to the Mazrui Arabs originally as blocks of land vested in the Mazrui Lands Trust Board. This arrangement created a racial privilege over a large extent of the coast in favour of Mazrui Arabs, practically the whole of these lands have now passed into the private ownership of individual Arabs.

75 Cooper, From Slaves to Squatters, p.197.
77 Mbithi and Barnes, Op. Cit., p.45.
The enactment of the Lands Title Ordinance in 1908 was followed by an amendment of the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902 and 1909. In a bill passed by the Legislative Council, the amendment provided for reserves. Because the Ordinance still restricted European settlement to some degree, the settlers strove for the enactment of a new Ordinance in 1915. Under the new Ordinance, those holding land under the previous Ordinance could exchange grants for leases. This ordinance was not much altered before 1945. It redefined Crown Lands as including all lands not occupied by the indigenous people of the protectorate and all lands not reserved for the use of members of any indigenous community. On the basis of this ordinance, the government set aside land for European settlement, company leases and land for other purposes while it ignored indigenous land claims and rights. All land in the Coastal Strip not registered as freehold was declared Crown Land and the establishment of the Northern and Southern Nyika Reserves beyond the Strip in 1921 completed the negation of Mijikenda land claims and rights in the area. Land in the Northern Nyika Reserve (present-day Kilifi District) was

81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., pp.43 - 44.
1.3 million acres but was only 31% arable compared to the Coastal Strip that was 166,000 acres with 79% arable.\(^\text{84}\)

Meanwhile, labour for European enterprises in the Strip was as difficult to procure as it was for the settlers upcountry.\(^\text{85}\) Cynthia Brantley argues that whenever European investors acquired rights to land, their major concern was labour. In the Malindi and Takaungu areas, the three main sources of labour for estates were Swahili, ex-slaves and Mijikenda, mainly the Giriama.\(^\text{86}\) But the reluctance of the majority of the Mijikenda to work as labourers was disconcerting to the Europeans. The European Coast Planters Association pressed the government for a solution.\(^\text{87}\)

As early as 1908, upcountry workers were appearing on European plantations all along the coast. By 1921, the labour shortage at the coast was no longer a major problem.\(^\text{88}\) In 1925, the upcountry workers, mainly Kikuyu and Luo, outnumbered their coastal counterparts. Of the 7,555 registered labourers in Mombasa, only 17% were from the coast.\(^\text{89}\)

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\(^{85}\) See Salim, The Swahili Speaking Peoples, p.118. According to oral evidence the Mijikenda looked down upon wage labour as a form of slavery. Slaves are despicable people whom the Mijikenda locally refer to as "Ahenda-kudza". This literally means "those who just came". As such the Mijikenda preferred squatter labour in the Coastal Strip because it left their family unit intact. However, these attitudes were to change in the late 1920's.


\(^{87}\) Salim, The Swahili Speaking Peoples, p.118.

\(^{88}\) See Cooper, From Slaves to Squatters, pp.247 - 249.

\(^{89}\) Ibid.
However, the colonial government was determined to undermine the position of the Mijikenda as producers in order to convert them into labourers to support the colonial economy. From its inception, the colonial government sought to draw the Africans into the colonial economy by creating conditions of acquiring their labour for a cash income. This partly explains why the Mijikenda were restricted to the dry and unfertile hinterland in order to undermine their self-sufficiency in food production. The European settlers, established a plantation system of agricultural production in the strip for whom the denial of Mijikenda land rights served to the advantage of colonial capital accumulation. Kanogo argues that in order to form that fundamental social category in any capitalist relation namely the wage labourers, the colonialists resorted to the appropriation of vast tracts of African fertile lands. This robbed them of their sole means of production. But the attempts to evict the Mijikenda out of their lands were not without incidents. The Giriama led by Mekatilili Wa Menza and Wanje Wa Madorikola had resisted this in 1914. Other Mijikenda groups like the Kauma, Kambe and Rabai in varying degrees participated in the uprising in support of the Giriama.

90 See T.M. Kanogo, "The Historical Process of Kikuyu Movement into the Nakuru District", p.XVI. It should be noted that after the alienation of Mijikenda lands and after the confinement of the Mijikenda to the Nyika Reserves, the Mijikenda were considered as having no legal rights to land in the Coastal Strip. Their immigration into the Strip accorded them the status of dispossessed and landless people whom the colonialists designated as squatters.

* Refer to pp.12 - 17.
Under British rule from 1895, ivory trading was outlawed although it continued in a clandestine form. Colonial Government officers began patrolling Giriamaland occasionally in 1912 and harassed those Giriama suspected of illegal ivory trade. Due to patrolling in Giriamaland to enforce this law, there were several skirmishes in 1912. The P.C. for Coast in 1913 wrote:

There is little doubt that our interference with this traffic has accentuated the opposition we are encountering and I have considered whether it would be politic to relax our efforts in this direction. I have however come to the conclusion that it is not advisable.

Moreover, the Giriama had long suffered from coercive tax collection. As early as 1908, apart from collecting taxes, headmen were charged with the maintenance of law and order and assisting police in locating offenders. When the protectorate government tried to collect Hut Tax in 1912 in order to force the Giriama into a labour force for the plantation owners, some of the Giriama absconded while others sold goats to pay the tax.

In 1913, the government attempted to evict the Giriama from the territory north of the Sabaki River where they had established homesteads and cultivated large fields. They violently resisted this under the leadership of Kaya elders Wanje Wa Madorikola and Ngonyo Wa Mwavuo. The two responded to a call by a Kaya woman elder called Mekatilili who was opposed to the idea of Giriama men labouring for the British. While in consultation with Wanje and Ngonyo she accused headmen of being traitors to Giriama interests and aspirations.

The protectorate government however crushed the uprising. The aftermath of the uprising was comparatively more peaceful and calm than the period before 1914. Nevertheless the devastation caused by the British reprisal on the society after the uprising upset it culturally, socially and economically. The Giriama were encumbered with exorbitant fines, and the task of reconstructing their homesteads burnt up by the colonial soldiers. But above all, they were very demoralized by British disregard for the sanctity of the Kaya which they destroyed during the suppression of the uprising.

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97 Ibid.
98 For a detailed reading, See Brantley, pp.85 - 90.
According to the 1916 Commission of Inquiry under W.F.F. de Lacey whose job was to investigate the Coastal land issue for the British Government, the eviction had been executed with undue force. But British harassment of the Giriama continued up to the early 1920's when the government gave up its efforts to re-allocate the Giriama onto the territory south of the Sabaki. The Governor intervened to stop the local colonial administrators from arresting and repatriating Giriama squatters in the Malindi area in 1916, and by 1918, the Giriama had reoccupied the territory north of the Sabaki River. Moreover, Giriama squatters occupying Arab and Swahili owned lands were provisionally allowed to remain as the Investigatory Commission set up by the Colonial Office had suggested.

The Digo to the south of Mombasa also expressed their dislike of colonial eviction of the Mijikenda from their lands in the Coastal Strip. The official role played by Ali bin Salim in the Land Arbitration Board was greeted with a lot of antagonism by the Digo. One notable personality who openly opposed the Liwali in 1918 was Mwinyi Haji Chi. Mwinyi led the Digo south of Mombasa in accusing the Liwali of complicity

100 Ibid.
101 Cooper, From Slaves to Squatters, pp.222 - 223.
102 O.I. with Omar Rashid Bakuli at Mombasa on 2/5/83.

* See the map showing the Coastal Strip in appendix 1.
in the eviction of the Digo from their land immediately after the First World War. Robert Mambo notes that this growth of resentment made the Digo articulate in matters of District interest.

Although some former slaves in the Coastal Strip had opted to be squatters after the abolition of slavery in 1907, some of the Mijikenda were forced into the area as squatters or wage labourers with the introduction of closer administration of the protectorate in 1912. In 1917, the Coast P.C. was one of the first administrators to realise that there was a squatter problem. In an attempt to remedy the situation, he recommended that each squatter obtain a temporary occupation permit if he wished to farm in the Strip after payment of a rental of 1 rupee. But nothing came of the P.C.'s recommendation and the Mijikenda continued to move into the strip. By 1924, the D.O. for Malindi noted that there were at least 2,436 squatters on Arab farms in the Malindi area.

The productivity of squatter agriculture made the Mijikenda look down upon wage labour. It was noted earlier how they associated wage labour with slavery and this was what the protectorate government sought to discourage. In 1918, the Resident

103 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
Native Act was passed. It aimed at restricting the rights of squatters and forcing them into wage labour. The act curtailed squatters' cultivation and grazing rights. Even so, during the drought years of the late 1920's and the 1930's, more Mijikenda moved into the rich Coastal Strip where farming could be more successful. Prior to 1918 the Strip had witnessed some squatters living on Arab and Swahili land on the basis of a "contract" based on Muslim land tenure. Others infiltrated on land of absentee landlords who lived in the coastal towns or had abandoned their land. In 1934, there were an estimated 8,000 squatters without any attested agreement with the owners of land they occupied. Whereas there could be other factors which contributed to increased squatting in the Coastal Strip, there is evidence that droughts and famines in the hinterland played a major role. The P.C. for Coast referring to the Coastal hinterland in 1921 stated that the "Nyika country is very badly watered and subject to frequent droughts. It cannot support a population proportionate to its size."}

108 Ibid., Cooper, From Slaves to Squatters, p.220.
110 Ibid., p.50.
The P.C. moreover noted that land in the Coastal Strip was largely owned by "non-natives" who permitted ex-slaves or the Mijikenda to squat on their holdings. They planted coconut and cashewnut trees and established themselves as leading tembo tappers. Under Islamic law, the person who planted trees owned them. In 1930, officials registered 1,600 tappers many of whom were either ex-slaves or Mijikenda migrants to the Coastal Strip.

However, in 1930, the majority of the Mijikenda tappers had no alternative but to accept wage labour. The Native Liquor Ordinance of 1930 forbade the tapping of tembo without a licence. It was a spirited effort to stop the habit of tembo tapping, whose violation became punishable under the Native Tribunals Ordinance of 1930. The Mijikenda experienced economic difficulties since drought and famine had struck in the years between 1925 and 1930. Droughts and food shortage and the legal legislation reduced Mijikenda resistance to migration for labour in the 1930's to the plantations and to Mombasa. These adverse conditions somewhat altered the attitude of the Mijikenda to wage labour.

112 Ibid.
113 Cooper, From Slaves to Squatters, p.186.
114 Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Ordinance and Regulations 1930, Nairobi, Government Printer, 1931, p.34.
The 1920's had witnessed an influx of upcountry workers into Mombasa especially from the Nyanza and Central Provinces. For the Mijikenda, the unemployment caused by this influx meant that the sources of cash income outside the rural economy were less sure. Thus the jobs which had been previously looked down upon by the Mijikenda had now to be accepted for a living. Nevertheless, the political behaviour of the Mijikenda when faced with British demands in a colonial economy can only be understood if the conflict between the Mijikenda and the colonial economic systems is clearly understood. The colonial political economy was characterised by numerous legislations some of whose effects the Mijikenda responded to. However, legislations used to relegate the Mijikenda into wage labour by systematically undermining their role as producers on land, had a very direct economic and political impact. This elicited resistance as this chapter has demonstrated. Resistance, whatever the form it took was inevitable since the protectorate government overlooked Mijikenda tenurial rights at the coast as had existed under the auspices of the Kaya. The government imposed on them a new jurisprudence by declaring them as either tenants-at-will of the crown or of the Arab and Swahili landowners.

116 Cooper, From Slaves to Squatters, p.249.
CHAPTER TWO

MIJIKENDA INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICAL PROTESTS IN
MOMBASA AND KILIFI DISTRICTS, 1930-1955

This chapter attempts to trace the origin and development of ethnic identification and association among the Mijikenda. It seeks to depict how they began to mould themselves into a political force. It demonstrates that the unity of the Mijikenda between 1930 and 1950 was a political reaction to oppression and exploitation by forces of the colonial economy in which Arabs at the Coast took part.

William Ochieng' views the history of a colonial society as one characterised by the struggle for the control of the means of production and the political machinery of the colonial state.¹ By 1930 the Arab community and the European settlers in the Coastal Strip monopolised the key resources of production namely land and the administrative machinery. We have hitherto noted how the denial of Mijikenda land rights in the Coastal Strip and taxation reduced their resistance and forced them to become migrant labourers.² By 1932, forced labour was increasingly used to secure Mijikenda labourers for the plantations.

² Refer to pp.12 - 17.
The previous chapter has highlighted how the process of land allocation in the Coastal Strip was carried out without the participation of Kambi elders who in their society were regarded as the repositories of all knowledge about pre-colonial land relations and procedures of inheritance. It also demonstrated how the exclusion of the Mijikenda in appropriating rights over land facilitated the building of the economy around immigrant races. The colonial government provided the land for the economy and this was achieved in the Coastal Strip by physically moving the Mijikenda into the Nyika Reserves. Consequently, faced with pressures of land loss through legal legislations, taxation and ecological difficulties in the hinterland the Mijikenda swelled the ranks of labourers on plantations or joined ex-slaves as squatters in the Coastal Strip on land designated as either freehold or crown.

The Mijikenda had before the late 1920's shown a high degree of economic self-sufficiency in food production except in isolated cases of prolonged droughts. Thus, they had been to some extent resistant to imperial coercion to migrate for work in towns or on plantations. In the 1930's failure to secure sufficient workers from the Mijikenda forced the government to resort to forced labour and offered arrested tax defaulters as labourers to the local estates in Kilifi District. 3

Elspeth Huxley defended forced labour in the words; "it was both mentally and physically good for the native to go to work". Through such work she felt that "the native could learn at first hand the elements" of better farming, advantages of ploughing, the principles of stock breeding and the concept of manuring. However, Huxley ignored to consider the preponderance of landlessness among Africans as a consequence of colonial policy of land alienation which ignored African rights and therefore quickened the exclusion of Africans from their productive roles on the land. At the Coast, Mijikenda labourers did not have rights to land in the Coastal Strip nor suitable and well-watered areas in the Nyika Reserves on which to practise techniques of European farming as Huxley would have us believe. Through a series of Ordinances the colonial government provided the European and Arab communities in the Strip with land for which it sought Mijikenda labour.

Employment in the Strip was either in the form of wage labour on the European plantations or squatter work on Arab and Indian land. The entry of the Mijikenda into wage or squatter labour in the Strip created a Mijikenda rural working class whose interests were in opposition to European or Arab and Indian agricultural or commercial interests. These land owners' interests were defended and controlled through the enactment of colonial

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laws up to the time of Kenya's independence. The colonial economy thus was characterised by a distinctive social and political context within which Mijikenda labour functioned. However, efforts to organize the Mijikenda to defend their rights and interests through a political action began in 1931 with the formation of the Young Nyika Association.

In order to understand the political behaviour of the Mijikenda from the year 1931, it is necessary to understand the circumstances in which the Young Nyika Association arose. The years 1925 to 1930 were characterised by successive droughts and food shortages in the Northern Nyika Reserve. It appears these conditions contributed to the influx of the Mijikenda into the Coastal Strip as squatters. In 1929, the squatter population in the Kilifi area had risen to 8,000 from about 6,000 people in 1927. Before this period, the number of squatters in the Malindi area in 1924 was about 2,436. As regards wage labour, in 1924, Sokoke plantations employed 40 Mijikenda. This figure sharply increased to 650 in 1928. Kilifi Sisal Estate employed 300 Mijikenda labourers in 1927 and this figure rose to 700 in 1928. The Mijikenda were becoming increasingly receptive to the idea of wage labour as these figures tend to show.

6 Ibid., See also Annual Report 1927, Appendix 10.
However, harsh labour conditions on the plantations in the district led to massive desertions. Karim Janmohamed notes that deserters from agricultural estates in the vicinity of Mombasa increased the number of casual labourers in the city in the 1930's. He observes that working conditions on the estates were very harsh and that reports of the availability of casual work at "good wages were too tempting for these men." He argues that once they drifted into Mombasa, their employer could do nothing to retrieve the loss. Throughout the 1930's the shortage of local labour on plantations continued partly because of Mijikenda evasion of employment on the plantations. However, the period 1925 to 1938 was a time of World Depression whose local effects were worsened by droughts of 1925, 1928, 1930, 1931, 1934, 1936 and 1937. Thus many Mijikenda opted for wage labour in Mombasa in preference to labour on the plantations under harsh conditions or the highly restricted squatter labour.

However, operating against a background of continued denial of land rights in the Coastal Strip, taxation, labour conscription and successive droughts, Western educated Mijikenda conceived the


idea of introducing organized politics in the district. By 1931, the economic condition of the Mijikenda had been severely strained by the World Depression characterised by a decline in agricultural production and trade at the coast. This had led to a severe drop in international prices for agricultural commodities. Prices of agricultural commodities fell drastically and money was not circulating freely because of the decline in trade. The Mijikenda were experiencing great difficulties in paying their Hut Tax.

The Mijikenda educated elite comprised men who had kept in touch with the more educated rising generation elsewhere in the colony. When Josiah Rimber, Shadrack Harrison and James Maya formed the Young Nyika Association in 1931, its main object was to collect money with a view of sending Rimber as the Mijikenda delegate before the Joint Committee on Closer Union in London. The Committee on Closer Union in East Africa was set up in 1929 to tackle the problem of accommodating the claims of British colonists within the alleged overall obligations of the Imperial Government towards the 'native' races.

11 Ibid., p.97. The educated Mijikenda heightened the consciousness of their people because they perceived the various extremes of oppression and exploitation.

12 Ibid.


The Mijikenda educated elite were in contact with the Kikuyu Central Association. The activities of these associations were closely watched by the colonial government in 1930 but when Jomo Kenyatta arrived from Britain, the association, under his leadership concentrated on making contacts with people of different parts of the country. One person whom the association used to establish contacts with the Mijikenda was James Beauttah, a Kikuyu from Maragua in Murang'a. Beauttah in 1904 went to school at the C.M.S. School in Freretown before attending the Telegraphists' Course at Rabai. At the time when Beauttah was a student at Freretown and Rabai, Josiah Rimber was an employee of the C.M.S. at Rabai. Rimber together with Levi Mwangoma, a Taita, had in 1900 led a protest against the lack of English instruction and the strict regulations at the institution. The two, by so doing, had developed what the missionaries termed "a tense spirit of insubordination" among the workers and students of the mission. The mission had thus decided to suspend Rimber and Mwangoma from C.M.S. employment, but when students protested, Rimber and Mwangoma were reinstated as employees of the C.M.S. and not as teachers.

16 O.I. with Reuben Kombe at Kaloleni on 14/6/83.
19 Ibid.
Beauttah established his earliest contacts with the Mijikenda as a student at Rabai. He may have become known to Josiah Rimber as a student at the C.M.S. Mission since the latter was an employee of the same institution. On completion of school at Rabai, Beauttah was employed in Mombasa at the Post Office but retained his contacts with his friends and colleagues both at Rabai and Freretown.20

The colonial government recognised a linkage between the Kikuyu and Mijikenda elite in the Northern Nyika Reserve. The activities of the Kikuyu Central Association among the Mijikenda caused a lot of concern among colonial officials in the district. Reporting on the formation of an organization to represent the Mijikenda in 1931, the D.C. for Kilifi wrote:

Both internally and with its neighbours the people have been peaceful. An attempt was made by Josiah Rimber and a certain other young Nyika to form an association to represent the Wanyika Community. They were in touch with the Kikuyu Association and addressed a memorandum to the Joint Committee on Closer Union.21

20 O.I. with Mwinga Chokwe at Mzambarauni on 19/6/83.
It is important to note that James Beauttah was in 1931 a member of the Kikuyu Central Association. Markhan Singh notes that Beauttah was among the educated Africans who privately helped the association when it was still called the East African Association. The East African Association was itself an off-spring of the Young Kikuyu Association founded in 1921. Given the experience with the Young Kikuyu Association under Harry Thuku, it appears that the colonial government considered it dangerous to ignore a similar organization among the Mijikenda. Before Rimber could mobilise the Mijikenda, the colonial officials quickly used the elders in the Local Native Council to discredit his activities. Josiah Rimber, Shadrack Harrison and James Maya were all members of the Local Native Council.

Colonial officials had hitherto mounted a campaign to incite the Mijikenda against Rimber and his colleagues. In public meetings held at Kaloleni and Kilifi townships, the District Commissioner warned the Mijikenda against people like Rimber who,


24 O.I. with Reuben Kombe.
he claimed, were trying to impose their deceptive and evil-minded views on the ordinary people. \(^{25}\) The D.C. argued that it was improper for Rimber and his colleagues to bypass the local administration and the Local Native Council by addressing a memorandum directly to the Joint Committee on Closer Union. \(^{26}\) The colonial administration thus made it appear to the Mijikenda that by expressing grievances in the memorandum, Rimber and his associate had committed an offence.

Reuben Kombe recalls that in the memorandum, the three leaders had mentioned all the grievances of the Mijikenda. These included the issues of Arab and European settler alienation of land in the Coastal Strip, taxation, and their disapproval of Kipande and forced labour. \(^{27}\)

The colonial officials were alarmed by the way these Mijikenda leaders bypassed them in exposing the conditions of the Mijikenda to the Joint Committee on Closer Union. The three were arrested and held at Kilifi until the local administration was assured of their unpopularity following the campaign against efforts by Rimber. The D.C. for Kilifi for instance, complacently reported:

\(^{25}\) O.I. with Reuben Kombe
\(^{26}\) Ibid.
\(^{27}\) Ibid.
Timely reference to a large and representative meeting of the Giriama elders revealed strong opposition on their part to Rimber's activities and resolutions were recorded for his removal from the Local Native Council and the Local Advisory Board and the prohibition of such Association.28

It is therefore evident that the opposition of the Local Native Council elders to the political activities of Rimber, Maya and Harrison came as a result of the colonial government's pressure and interference. It's officials moved to pre-empt the effort to organize the Mijikenda along both economic and nationalist lines. In April 1931 while the Young Nyika Association's activities were being frustrated by the local colonial administration in Kilifi District, Kenyatta left for England as leader of KCA's delegation to give evidence to the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Closer Union in East Africa.29

28 K.N.A., Kilifi District Annual Report 1931, pp.6 - 7. There was a tendency by Colonial officials to call every Mijikenda Giriama without giving the proper ethnic distinction. It was thus assumed that all the members of the Giriama Local Native Council were Giriama, yet this institution represented the Giriama, Kauma, Chonyi, Ribe, Rabai, Kambe and Jibana. This is in fact why it was changed to Kilifi African District Council in 1953 on a proposal by its Vice-President Japhet Mumba, a Kauma.
Even though the forming of the Young Nyika Association failed for reasons already considered, in February 1933, the Kenya African Civil Service Association formed a few years earlier under Kenyatta's inspiration sent a memorandum to the Commission of Inquiry into the administration of justice. Among its signatories was H.G. Shadrack Harrison then a civil servant in Nairobi. The memorandum deplored laws affecting Africans and other colonial injustices that negated "native" interests.

Nevertheless, the efforts by Josiah Rimber, Shadrack Harrison and James Maya to form the Young Nyika Association marked the genesis of Mijikenda ethnic politics. When the unity of the Mijikenda was once again revived in 1941, the confederation of the Kaya elders was again adopted by the Mijikenda leaders in Nairobi. These were Nimrod Saidi Tabu, Edward Binns Tawo Chiri and Louis Simeon. However, before the official

30 O.I. with Lawrence Bennett at Kaloleni on 18th June, 1983. See also Singh, *History of Kenya's Trade Union Movement*, p. 44.
31 Ibid. H.G. Shadrack Harrison was the son of Shadrack Harrison Karina with whom Josiah Rimber formed the Young Nyika Association. Since Shadrack Harrison was in contact with Kenyatta in Nairobi, the attachment of his father Harrison Karina and Josiah Rimber to the KCA becomes a clearly understandable case.
32 O.I. with Nimrod Saidi Tabu at Taba on 4/6/03.
Mijikenda ethnic organization, individuals had previously aired their grievances in various ways. For instance, in 1932 three literate Mijikenda working in Mombasa were reported by the D.C. to have addressed a complaint to the Mombasa Member of the Legislative Council. They deplored the brutality of extortionism of the Tribal Police among the Mijikenda.  

Moreover, political encouragement of the Mijikenda by the KCA did not end with the failure to institute a political front among the Mijikenda of Kilifi district through the Young Nyika Association. In 1932, the colonial officials in Kilifi were dismayed by a letter from KCA addressed to certain Mijikenda individuals highlighting the issue of Mijikenda land loss at the hands of immigrant races. It appears this KCA encouragement contributed to the subsequent reported unsatisfactory state of affairs caused by Mijikenda and other Africans squatting on Indian and Arab farms. The colonial officials in Kilifi felt that the state of affairs needed to be remedied before it was too late.  

Japhet Mupe, a founder member of the Mijikenda

34 Ibid., pp.4 - 5.
35 Ibid.
Union recalls that before the formation of the Union there were only isolated individual struggles against the policy of denying the Mijikenda land rights in the Coastal Strip. Among the Kauma, such a personality was Mwanyaje, while among the Digo were Mwinyi Haji and Rashid Abdalla Bakuli. 36

When the educated Mijikenda in Nairobi conceived the idea of an organization for the Mijikenda, there were already several other welfare organizations in Nairobi and Mombasa. Because of the numerous problems facing the Mijikenda, an organization was necessary through which they could address themselves to issues affecting them. 37 We have noted before how the World Depression and local droughts had adversely affected the Mijikenda in the hinterland. Despite the World depression and prevalent droughts, throughout the 1930's, the colonial government neither stopped nor revised its collection of taxes among the Mijikenda. These factors had contributed to continued infiltration of the Mijikenda into the Coastal Strip. 38 It was in fact at the height of the depression when the Kenya Land Commission visited Kenya in 1934, and it completely overlooked the issue of the coastal zone as a region where the Mijikenda had an interest. In the year 1933, the D.C. for Kilifi had written:

36 O.I. with Japhet Mupe at Mombasa on 7/7/83.
37 Ibid.
38 K.N.A., Kilifi District Annual Report 1933, p.3.
* See pages 33 - 34.
Infiltration of the Nyika into the Coastal Strip continues and the Strip is fast becoming native country to all interests and purposes. Some regularization of the position of native tenants is required and the recommendations of the Kenya Land Commission are awaited in this regard.39

However, the land problem remained unresolved.

Nevertheless, the adverse economic conditions brought about by the World Depression and droughts had partly contributed to the increasing change of attitude toward wage labour among the Mijikenda. This was reflected in the rising figures of the Mijikenda labourers who were registered in Kilifi District. Whereas in 1931 there were 879 registered wage labourers, the figure rose to 1,006 in 1932 and to 1,341 in 1933.40 In 1934, the district suffered a further set-back when there was a failure of the long rains followed by a locust invasion. There was a severe famine.41

Under these circumstances, despite the absence of aggressive political protests, there were signs of political re-awakening among the various Mijikenda peoples.42 The Rabai for example had ignored the order of the D.C. for Mombasa to leave Miritini and the order was held in abeyance for some time.43

39 Ibid., p.3.  
40 Ibid., p.9.  
42 Ibid.  
43 Ibid.
Miritini was one of the few areas in which the Kenya Land Commission recognised African land rights. The Rabai claimed the area as part of their traditional lands. They did not understand why they should be evicted from their ancestral lands without any consideration.

In the Malindi area, land was continually split up under Islamic laws of inheritance. The Mijikenda squatters in the area found themselves in a different situation as some of them cultivated fields owned by different land owners. Each land owners imposed his own conditions on the squatters and therefore made the squatters insecure in their livelihood as they were answerable to all the land owners.

Labour Protests in Mombasa and Kilifi District

By 1935, although the Mijikenda were faced by the problem of unrecognised land rights in the Coastal Strip and continued colonial demand of the Hut-Tax, they were further aggrieved by the efforts of colonial officials to offer tax defaulters as labourers on European Estates in the District. In the years 1934 and 1935, the energies of the administrative officers appear

44 O.I. with Julius Mwatsama at Rabai on 19/6/83.
45 Ibid.
to have been devoted solely to the collection of Hut-Tax.  
This may explain why by 1936, about 2,000 people were convicted as tax defaulters. Thus, the colonial government seems to have used tax defaulters as a replacement of the deserting labourers from the plantations. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that all voluntary Mijikenda labourers on the plantations deserted for Mombasa or other places. Kurwitu Sisal Estate employed a large number of Giriama and so did Kilifi Sisal Estates by 1938. Other Mijikenda groups who made up a high percentage of the plantation labourers in the district were the Duruma, Rabai and the Hibe. Whereas voluntary workers had some kind of choice on where they could work, tax defaulters were treated like prisoners and served their prison terms on the plantations. Given the high number of tax defaulters by this time, it is not surprising that a considerable percentage of Mijikenda plantation workers remained on the plantations. The Mijikenda plantation workers were able to participate in the labour unrest on the plantations in 1947 which was instigated by the trade union movement in Mombasa. As early as 1937, the Kikuyu and Luo from Mombasa were reported by colonial officials to have been spreading what they termed the "gospel of political discontent" against long working hours on the plantations. Thus the Mijikenda hinterland, especially the plantations in Kilifi District, was not isolated from the activities in Mombasa.

48 Ibid.
As Frank Furedi has pointed out, the history of Africans in the colonial urban centres is crucial for an understanding of the social dynamics of the nationalist movement. Since the Mijikenda rural working classes were not operating in an isolated hinterland, it is necessary to document the political developments in Mombasa. Here, working classes were able to organise themselves along both economic and nationalist lines in their struggle against colonialism. The Mijikenda wage labourers were made to believe that they were being exploited through the labour protests of Mombasa. This is possibly why they later developed a strong solidarity with the working classes on the plantations. The urban living conditions were characterised by disease ridden slums in African residential locations. Overcrowding, unemployment, a high cost of living and a general atmosphere of insecurity were part of life. These problems made the Africans receptive to political agitation. In 1934, the workers in Mombasa, led by the employees of the Kenya and Uganda Railways and Harbours, and the Kenya Landing and Shipping Company organised a strike in opposition to the proposed reduction of wages from two shillings to one shilling and fifty cents per day.

In the absence of a workers' organization, the strikers used canteens, drinking halls and occasions of traditional dances for holding meetings about the strike. According to the oral evidence available, the Mijikenda had used the Sakina Mosque Ground as a venue of their traditional dances on Sundays. As Markhan Singh has noted, this strategy of workers, which involved the use of various venues including the occasions of traditional dances, shows that the Mijikenda participated in the earliest African strike in the city. According to Janmohamed, the 1934 strike involved more than one section of the working class and was in this respect a precursor of the 1939 strike.

The 1939 strike occurred in the same month with the strikes of Tanga and Dar-es-Salaam. In July 1939, the dock workers in Tanga and Dar-es-Salaam went on strike in opposition to maltreatment and verbal abuse during working time. It appears the 1939 Mombasa strike was partly due to an impetus from Tanga and Dar-es-Salaam. When the Mombasa dock workers like their fellow workers in Tanga and Dar-es-Salaam, went on strike in July 1939, more than 6,000 workers cutting across ethnic, racial and occupational boundaries joined in. The colonial state used

55 Ibid., p.46.
56 O.I. with Rashid Omar Bakuli at Mombasa on 6/5/83.
57 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
utmost violence to crush the strike. To the Commission of Inquiry that was set up, the Labour Trade Union led by Markhan Singh and formed in 1935 made broad political as well as more specific economic demands. Singh notes that the Africans were opposed to forced labour, low wages, long hours, compulsory registration system, racial discrimination and such other practices. A major achievement of the 1939 strike was the fact that for the first time the colonial government was forced to see the need for proper housing schemes for Africans in urban areas.

In January 1947, 15,000 workers in Mombasa went on strike and thus paralysed the docks, railways, offices, banks, hotels and other every-day routine of living when they heeded the call to strike by attending daily meetings at Sakina Mosque Ground. Yash Tandon observes that when the colonial state could not crush the strike by means of police and military action, it set up a tribunal to investigate into the circumstances leading to the strike. Before this tribunal, the workers put forward broad political demands. Reporting on the strike, the East African Standard noted in 1947:

Mr. Chege Kibachia, one of the strike leaders and president of African Workers' Federation who was the first witness

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61 Ibid.
before the Tribunal on Monday, made a plea for close adherence to the principle of democracy as a means of solving the difficulties and for courage (sic) in righting the wrongs of the workers and equally for tackling the employees complaints.65

When the colonial state attempted to divide the workers by awarding interim wage increases to those employed by big firms and government servants leaving out the others from small firms, domestic workers, plantation and urban casual labourers, Chege Kibachia refused to accept this. He said: "If you have three children crying because they are hungry, you would not buy bread for one of them and leave the other two crying."66

The colonial government made general concessions to big and small firms and all categories of workers but when the strike gradually spread to the other towns, the government arrested strike leaders and jailed 18 of them including Kibachia.67 The latter was held at Fort Jesus Prison after his arrest on 23rd August, 1947 in Nakuru. When he later appeared in court, he was accused of intimidating the government by threatening to call a countrywide strike.68 The case was

65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 O.I. with Chege Kibachia at Mombasa on 16/5/83.
conducted for 11 days from 21st September to 2nd October, 1947 when he was served with a deportation order under the Deportation Ordinance issued by the Governor. Kibachia was deported to Kabarnet in Baringo where he stayed for 10 years. 69

The importance of the 1947 strike in the study of Mijikenda political development is that its effects reached the very heartland of the Mijikenda. Speaking about the African Workers Federation, Kibachia recalls:

The majority of working Giriama, Digo, Kabai and Taita Taveta were members. They were the architects of the Union along with other tribes of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania (Tanganyika).70

While Chege Kibachia was the president of the AWF, Hilton Mwadilo, a Taita was the Organizing Secretary, Joseph Irungu, Treasurer and William Mbolu Malu the Executive Secretary.71 The Mijikenda however had a high representation in the Executive Committee. Some of the Mijikenda in the committee were Rashid Mbwana, Mwinyi Juma, Omar Lali, Yusuf Bwana Kheri and Japhet 72

69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
Omar Bakuli recalls that Yusuf Bwana Kheri together with others were always on guard to ensure that nobody broke the strike.\textsuperscript{73}

The participation of the Mijikenda in the leadership of AWF seems to explain why the 1947 strike had repercussions in Kilifi District. Kibachia made extensive journeys to plantations in the district and called for a show of solidarity with the working classes of Mombasa.\textsuperscript{74} He explained to them that the strike was a protest by the labouring masses against "low wages and poor conditions of employment, exploitation, racial segregation and other social injustices".\textsuperscript{75} As a result there were strikes at Mtwapa and Kilifi ferries, Vipingo and Kilifi Sisal Estates.\textsuperscript{76}

One informant, Reuben Kombe recalls that work virtually came to a standstill at many places in Kilifi district in response to the Mombasa strike. The strikers in these places were; Railway employees at Mazeras and Mariakani, Mission workers at Kaloleni and labourers at the Gongoni Salt factory near Malindi.\textsuperscript{77} The two strikes at Vipingo and Kilifi Sisal Estates were called off after the D.C. addressed workers at the Estates.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{73} O.I. with Omar Bakuli.
\textsuperscript{74} O.I. with Chege Kibachia.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{76} K.N.A., Kilifi District Annual Report 1947, p.4.
\textsuperscript{77} O.I. with Reuben Kombe.
\textsuperscript{78} K.N.A., Kilifi District Annual Report 1947, p.4.
While the strikes in Kilifi district were expressions of solidarity with the African workers in Mombasa, partly attributed to the extensive tours of Chege Kibachia, the role of the Mijikenda leadership in the AWF should not be underestimated. Kibachia recalls that he was amazed to see how the rural Mijikenda responded to the entire episode. Mijikenda women from the nearby hinterland brought food to the striking masses in the city. This made the workers able to resist efforts by colonial officials to break the strike.79 Central in the organization of the strike was Japhet Bino-Tsawe Chizi, then a clerical officer in the "Office of the Poor", the headquarters of the AWF. Bino-Tsawe Chizi, a Rabai, had accompanied Kibachia to Nakuru to address workers but when the latter was arrested, Bino-Tsawe Chizi went back to Mombasa to help in the running of the AWF.80

The trauma of the 1947 strike aroused political awareness as to the strength of a concerted action. Bino-Tsawe Chizi encouraged by the repercussions of the strike in the Northern Nyika Reserve together with Killian Ngala conceived the idea of opening a branch of the AWF at Kaloleni in 1948.81 Killian Ngala of Mwabaya Nyundo, a former headmaster of the Catholic Mission School there, and Gideon Rimber, the son of Josiah Rimber, were members of KAU

79 O.I. with Chege Kibachia.
80 Ibid.
81 O.I. with Jusius Mwatsama at Rabai on 19/6/83. See also K.N.A., "African Press Articles" from the office of the Director of Intelligence and Security to the Chief Native Commissioner dated 31/3/1948.
Mombasa branch which supported the AWF. Kibachia reckons: "KAU gave moral support all the time to the fight for justice." 82

Both Killian Ngala and Gideon Rimber had in 1946 pleaded with the D.C. for Kilifi to allow Africans to trade in milk. This activity was then restricted to Arabs and Indians in spite of the fact that the Mijikenda in the district kept cattle. The D.C. lifted the restriction and the two leaders started the Coast African Traders Syndicate with Gideon Rimber as the president. 83 Moreover, Killian Ngala was the Kilifi district political news-reporter for Hodi, a newspaper based in Mombasa whose reporters and editorial board comprised exclusively Coast Africans. 84

But the Kaloleni branch of AWF was short-lived. Most of the Mijikenda were reluctant to join the Federation since the arrest of Chege Kibachia and other leaders. Moreover, the Mijikenda came to associate the Federation with the Kikuyu. For instance, in 1947, some Kikuyus who were members of the AWF maltreated Shadrack Harrison, the son of Shadrack Harrison Karisa and then the Municipal African Affairs Officer in Mombasa when he attempted to persuade workers to return to work. On this occasion, he was assaulted and had to be rescued by his friends from the anger of the strikers. 85 The government had intended to use

82 O.I. with Chege Kibachia.
83 O.I. with Francis Ngonyo at Mwabaya Nyundo on 14/6/83. Ngonyo is the youngest brother of the late Killian Ngala. See also K.N.A., Kilifi District Annual Report, p.21.
85 O.I. with Lawrence Bennett at Kaloleni on 18/6/83.
Harrison to divide the workers and call off the strike.  

Moreover, lack of enthusiasm with the AWF among the Mijikenda can be explained by the fact that in 1947 the Mijikenda Union had firmly established itself in the district. The contribution of allegiance to an ethnic union towards lack of interest among the Mijikenda in 1948 in the AWF should not be underestimated. It is essential at this point to trace the roots of the union in the hinterland.

The Mijikenda Union and Ethnic Politics

The Mijikenda Union was formed in 1945 and duly registered in 1946. This Union was the successor of Mbodze Matsezi Union formed in 1941. The name Mbodze Matsezi denoted the traditional ancestors of the Mijikenda namely Mbodze and Matsezi at Shungwaya.

Nimrod Saidi Tabu recalls that it was difficult to gather the representatives of the nine Mijikenda communities' in Nairobi. However, him and a few of those in Nairobi arranged to organize a meeting at the Coast to pursue the issue of Mijikenda unity. At a meeting held on 29th December, 1941 at Nabai, Mbodze Matsezi Union was born. The meeting was attended by all Kaya representatives and all chiefs from Kwale and Kilifi districts.

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86 Ibid.
88 O.I. with Nimrod Saidi Tabu at Ribe on 4/7/83. See also D. Parkin, Palms, Wine and Witnesses, p.80.
89 O.I. with Nimrod Saidi Tabu.
90 O.I. with Nimrod Saidi Tabu.
It is possible to argue that Mijikenda involvement in the activities of the AWF in Kilifi district declined after the 1947 strike. This was because of a call by officials of the Mijikenda Union to support their organization instead of the Kikuyu dominated AWF. H.G. Shadrack Harrison, used by the colonial officials to break the 1947 strike, had contributed to the decline of the Coast African Association. The CAA was an inter-ethnic organization for Coastal Africans. In the months following the strike, he led a campaign against the CAA by arguing that the leadership of the organization was dominated by the ex-slaves of Frere town and Rabai. The CAA had supported the 1947 strike. Lance Jones Bengo, the association's Committee Member, was summoned to state the position of the CAA to the court hearing Chege Kibacha's case. In his submission he stated that he personally supported the strike. Other Mijikenda leaders in the CAA who supported the strike were Gideon Rimber, Gibson Ngorae, and Mohamed Mwichande. H.G. Shadrack Harrison joined the CAA in 1947 after his transfer from Nairobi where he had been a member of the Kenya African Civil Servants Association. While in Mombasa, he campaigned for the withdrawal of the Mijikenda from the CAA on the premise

91 O.I. with Omar Rashid Bakuli.
92 O.I. with Lance Jones Bengo at Mombasa on 21.5.83.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid. Harrison was a founder member of the Kenya African Civil Service Association. He was a signatory to a memorandum to the Commission of Inquiry into the administration of justice in 1933. See. p.42.
that the organization was led by ex-slaves. The Mijikenda have always referred to the ex-slaves as a *henda kudza*, a name that denotes the latter's alien status at the Coast. This element of contempt for the ex-slaves appears to have made Harrison's campaign successful.

The Mijikenda Union, had been formed as a forum through which the nine communities could uphold their cultural similarities and common origins. However these social activities were a mere cloak underneath which were obvious political activities.

The Mijikenda Union had become what David Parkin was later to term "an important politico-welfare organization" through which the traditional council of elders upheld the gerontocratic principle in the 1950's. Cynthia Brantley notes that the *Kayas* were revised in the 1940's as places of traditional political authority and ritual expertise. This meant that once again the *Kayas* had the potential to play a prominent part in Mijikenda public life. Thus at the revival of the *Kayas*, the Young politicians launched the Mijikenda Union as a unifying attempt to respond to increasing Arab domination in the wider political sphere. By means of its branches in the various

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95 O.I. with Omar Rashid Bakuli

* A *henda kudza* in literal translation means "Those who just came".
locations, the Mijikenda Union leaders succeeded in soliciting a deep sense of ethnic loyalty to the union among the nine communities. The Mijikenda became a term connoting solidarity. This solidarity was demonstrated among the various Mijikenda communities on the basis of agnation, affinity and neighbourhood. The Mijikenda elders demonstrated their loyalty to the union through their roles as witnesses and mediators in local disputes, the Native Tribunal Courts and the various branches of the union. This probably explains why during the development of nationalist politics in the Kenya Coastal area in the 1950's, leaders in the union used their own and the Kaya leaders' legitimacy to speak and act on behalf of the Mijikenda people.

The allegiance of the Mijikenda people to the Mijikenda Union which espoused the need to strengthen Mijikenda ritual expertise, education, and tradition for their common goals resulted in the weakening of both the CAA and the AWF. The withdrawal of most of them from the AWF marked the failure of the Mijikenda

99 Ibid. In 1946, the D.C. for Kilifi drew the attention of his seniors to the new Mijikenda Union. He felt it required careful watching. In fact he recommended that since most of the educated Mijikenda belonged to it, with its good aims, it could be useful as a "ginger" group to the Local Native Council. See K.N.A., Malindi Annual Report 1946, p.2 and Malindi Annual Report 1947, p.1.
working class to rise above ethnic jealousies and suspicions. There is evidence that the Mijikenda were interested in the activities of the AWF but for its upcountry leadership. The Director of intelligence in 1948 noted that there was a general dislike by Africans at the coast of imported leadership from upcountry. Some members of the Digo, met privately under the chairmanship of Maalira Juma Mohamed on 5th January, 1948 to discuss the AWF. On this meeting, the Director of intelligence noted:

"... It was decided that every effort must be made to break away from the AWF, otherwise the coast natives could be completely ruled by the upcountry natives...."  

Maalim Juma Mohamed was a member of the CAA. Harrison and Maalim Juma, both members of the CAA, were involved in efforts to withdraw the support of the organization for the AWF after the 1947 strike. Deploiring the attitude of the CAA leadership, an official of the AWF, Rashid Mohamed Mbwana said that "the Coast Africans are letting everybody down and we believe that the Coast African Association wishes to sever all connection with the AWF."  


100 Ibid.  

101 Ibid.  

102 O.I. with Elkana Young at Mombasa on 9/5/83.  

103 K.N.A OP. CK.
Thus, the CAA withdrew their support for the AWF in 1948. This greatly weakened the labour organization. However, the CAA also suffered a similar blow when later in the year its Mijikenda members withdrew from the organization. Members of the Mijikenda Union became increasingly indifferent to the activities of both the CAA and AWF. One member of the Mijikenda Union protested against the AWF's continued use of H.H. Agakhan Sports Club in 1948. The Mijikenda wanted to use the ground for their traditional dances. The Mijikenda had hitherto been accused by the AWF of attending traditional dances instead of attending meetings of the Federation.

The activities of the Union were halted by the suspension of its activities after some of its officials were convicted in court of misappropriating its funds. This state of affairs was continued under the state of Emergency during which no political organization was allowed in the colony. The union had come to be regarded by colonial officials as a political organization in 1947 when it organized agitation in Rabai for the removal of Chief Katimbo. Chief Katimbo was a member of the Giriama Local Native Council who in the preceding years had been praised by colonial officials as an exemplary chief. The involvement of the Union in Rabai affairs arose from the government's

104 Ibid. See p.49.
105 See Giriama Local Native Council Minutes Book 1947. See also K.N.A., Kilifi District Annual Reports of 1938 to 1941.
insistence upon the construction of a water reservoir within the precincts of Kaya Rabai. The Union opposed this move because construction of a water reservoir on top of Be Ponda hill was viewed as a transgression of the sanctity of the Kaya.

Although the Mijikenda Union remained active in Kwale District until 1952, its activities in Kilifi ended in 1949 when it encouraged the Giriama of Kaloleni to claim their lands alienated by the Church Missionary Society. The government however stopped its official activities in the District in 1948 when some of its local leaders in the District were convicted of misappropriating its funds. By mid 1952, the Giriama African District Council was already discussing the fate of the union's finances deposited in the Post Office Savings Bank.

The Mijikenda Union appears to have characterised the political response of many Mijikenda people to other nationalist organizations between 1946 and 1949. However in 1951, when it was non-existent in the district, the Mijikenda people gave other nationalist organizations a somewhat positive gesture. The period 1950 - 1951 became transitional in Mijikenda political development. KAU descended from the Kenya African Study Union formed

107 Ibid.
108 O.I. with Mwinga Chokwe.
in 1944 was in 1951 developing colony-wide political fronts. In that year, it applied for permission to hold meetings and collect funds in Kilifi District.\(^{112}\) The party made an effort to interest the Mijikenda in national politics. Several of those working in Nairobi were enlisted as members. This included men like Ngala Tuva and Julius Mwatsama who were later to play a significant role in the politics of late 1950's and early 1960's.

Mwinga Chokwe who was the General Secretary of the Transport and allied Workers Union resigned his position to concentrate on the leadership of KAU Mombasa branch. Chokwe joined KAU in 1950 and became the provincial Secretary of the party after the death of Gideon Nzaka in 1950 while Gideon Rimber was the Provincial Chairman.\(^{113}\) The two organised meetings in Vuga in Kwale, Mariakani, Kaloleni and Kisauni in Mombasa in 1952. All of these meetings were addressed by Jomo Kenyatta, KAU's national leader. In Kenyatta's entourage were Achieng' Oneko, Bildad Kaggia, Fred Kubai and Jessie Kariuki.\(^{114}\)


113 O.I. with Mwinga Chokwe.

114 Ibid. Gideon Rimber was a personal friend of Jomo Kenyatta. The friendship started way back in the 1930's when his father Josiah Rimber was in touch with the KCA.
The meetings succeeded in enlisting several Mijikenda as KAU members. At the meeting in Vuga, Kwale, Kenyatta talked strongly against Arab occupation of Mijikenda lands and the humiliating Kipande. After the meeting, the Digo went on rampage and stoned cars belonging to colonial officials passing through the area. In October 1952, police from Mombasa arrested Saidi Mgunga, Salim Mbodze Mbodze and Hamisi Juma Bila Shaka all of whom were members of Utsi Society, a secret organization formed in the late 1940's to unite the Digo. This society was in league with KAU. After the proscription of KAU papers of Utsi Society were seized in September 1953 and its three leaders were arrested together with some forty followers. Public meetings were held in Kwale District in which the colonial administration in the area warned the Digo against subversive activities. The leaders of Utsi Society were detained at Hola.

After KAU's meeting at Kaloleni, Chokwe was arrested and fined 200 shillings for enrolling KAU members. After the death of Gideon Riraber in 1952, Chokwe became the Chairman of KAU while the post of Secretary was taken over by Hassan Mwachema.

115 O.I. with Rashid Hamisi at Mombasa on 5/6/83.
116 Ibid. The Utsi Society formed a political front with KAU in 1951.
118 Ibid.
119 O.I. with Rashid Hamisi.
120 O.I. with Mwinga Chokwe.
121 O.I. with Hassan Mwachema at Kambe on 4/7/83.
In Chokwe's view KAU got a lot of publicity among the Mijikenda by holding these public rallies. In order to consolidate the growing political awareness, he inaugurated a publication called Kenya Ni Yetu. This paper highlighted the African grievances and helped to wield the Coast Africans together. It offered moral support to KAU's activities but it had published only 4 issues when Chokwe was arrested and detained in 1952.  

The colonial government alarmed by the radicalism of politics in the early 1950's and what it termed "the usual claptrap and racial animosity", decided to crack down on the efforts of KAU at the Coast. The Kikuyu General Union and KAU, whose political activities were described as near subversive, were banned before the declaration of the State of Emergency. Mwinga Chokwe was the first to be arrested under the Jack Scott Operation. He was picked in connection with the activities of a visiting Labour Member of parliament from Britain, Mr. Fenner Brockway. Mr. Brockway was a great sympathiser of Africans. Chokwe was spotted and arrested by the police among the crowd waiting at Eastleigh Airport for the arrival of Brockway in the evening of 28th October, 1952. He was detained at Hola together with other Mijikenda such as Matano Omar, Saidi Mohamed Mgunga, Salim Mboodzi Mboodzi and Hamisi Bila Shaka. Of these, Saidi Mohamed Mgunga died at Hola.  

122 O.I. with Mwinga Chokwe  
124 Abuur, White Highlands No More, p.91.  
125 O.I. with Mwinga Chokwe.
KAU won Mijikenda support because it espoused the issue of Arab occupation of their lands. By 1953, KAU's radical politics were entrenched among the Mijikenda and this was evidenced in the formation of the Mombasa African Democratic Union and Kilifi African Peoples Union after the lifting of the ban on political organizations in 1955. However, after the proscription of KAU in 1953, there was no initiative in either Mombasa or the Northern Reserve to launch any new organization.

Coast Africans expressed their views through the Mombasa African Advisory Council and the Coast African Association. The MAAC was a non-statutory body which was set up administratively under the Municipal African Affairs Officer to advise both the Municipal Board and the Central Government on matters affecting Africans.

The Council was representative of African interests and its members were elected or selected to represent the interests of tribal associations, religious denominations, African Women on the island and the three mainland areas of Mombasa.

However, by 1954, there was a growing sense of frustration among its councillors since the council lacked executive power. Nevertheless it was in this Council that Ronald Ngala gained

127 Ibid.
experience in articulating African grievances. Ngala had been
asked to sit on the council to represent the interests of the
CAA, the body that had provided the funds for his higher education
together with that of Robert Matano among other Africans whose
education the association had agreed to finance. In this MAAC,
Ngala came to notice the frustrations among Africans because
the Municipal Board was not ready to offer any radical solutions
to African needs. 129 Francis Khamisi was also a member of the
council and by 1953, he became the first African elected Chairman
of the Housing Committee in the Municipal Board. 130

While in the MAAC, both men kept a close touch with the
CAA, a body which, although it appeared to be a welfare association,
was actually a political one. They had tremendously gained
experience in the two bodies and by 1957, when they participated in
the first African elections, they were politically experienced. 131
Khamisi and Ngala were to operate under the umbrella of the
revitalised CAA until 1955 when political organizations at district
level were allowed. 132

129 See Nyamwange, "A History of Mombasa African Advisory
Council", p.53. Not all the Mijikenda had withdrawn
from the CAA and the organization was revitalized in
the early 1950's.


132 O.I. with Francis Khamisi at Kikambala on 22/6/82.
The rise of the Mijikenda Union in the late 1940's had blurred the image of both the CAA and AWF. But the strength of the union had faded in Kilifi District in 1949 when it was banned by the government after a few of its officials had misappropriated its funds. This chapter demonstrates that ethnic loyalties in Mijikenda politics between 1930 and 1949 were a response to colonial oppression and exploitation. The Mijikenda who for several centuries had enjoyed similar cultural and linguistic relationships had not developed any cooperative political front during the colonial era until 1931 when Josiah Rimber attempted to form the Young Nyika Association. The development of such a front, however, materialised in 1941 with the formation of Mbodze Matsezi Union. But Mbodze Matsezi Union did not involve itself in any noticeable political activities until it was officially changed to Mijikenda Union in 1945. In the period between 1947 and 1949, the Union addressed itself to the land and cultural issues affecting the Mijikenda.

It is not surprising that the Mijikenda Union addressed itself to the question of land and Mijikenda cultural rights. The colonial economy had upheld the policy of denying the Mijikenda rights over land in the Coastal Strip, while it buttressed the domination of Arab landowners and control of Mijikenda squatters and wage labourers by use of colonial law. Therefore, although the Union was almost moribund by 1950,
Mijikenda land interests remained essentially the same. It was upon such land unrest that KAU was able to propagate radical political activism. This explains why Mau Mau, a movement emanating from landlessness, found a great deal of sympathy among the Mijikenda. Oral interviews revealed that in the Mau Mau oathing reported by the D.C. for Mombasa in his Annual Report of 1952, a good number of the Mijikenda were involved. An analysis of detainees by 'tribes' by the D.C. for Mombasa in 1954 revealed that the Wagiriama and Warabai were the majority in Mombasa. These two Mijikenda communities had produced the majority of the articulate Mijikenda educated elite by the early 1950's.

CHAPTER THREE

DISTRICT ORGANIZATIONS AND MIJKENDA POLITICAL ACTIVITIES, 1955 - 1960

This chapter explores the Mijikenda response to the colonial policy of restricting political organization to the district level which remained in force until 1955. It also assesses the effect of this policy on Mijikenda ethnic consciousness.

In the previous chapter, it was noted how in a campaign against suspected Mau Mau adherents at the Coast, leading Mijikenda nationalist leaders were detained by the colonial government. The Mijikenda, like other people of Kenya, did not have an organized forum through which to express their grievances after the banning of political organizations in 1953. It was not until 1955, nearly three years since the declaration of the State of Emergency, that the government allowed the formation of political parties at district level. In the absence of a recognised political organization at the Coast prior to 1955, Coast Africans used the Mombasa African Advisory Council (MAAC) and the Coast African Association (CAA).

The Formation of MADU and KAPU

The MAAC had increasingly come under the influence of CAA through the representation of Francis Khamisi and Ronald Ngala. Francis Khamisi had come to Mombasa in 1948 and
joined MAAC. He was a founder member of KAU and was involved in the writing of its newspaper called *Sauti Ya Mwafrika*. He spearheaded the establishment of a branch of KAU in Mombasa in 1948 with Gideon Kimber as Chairman and Gideon Nzaka as Secretary. He had had experience in the Nairobi African Advisory Council (NAAC).\(^1\) Khamisi was instrumental in the re-awakening of the CAA in the early 1950's.\(^2\) Ronald Ngala joined MAAC in 1952 as a representative of the revitalised CAA in the Advisory Council.\(^3\) In the previous year, the MAAC had sent a memorandum to the Governor asking him to reserve one seat for an African from the Coast in the proposed Legislative Council for 1952. Moreover, it had also called for the reservation of 4 seats on the Mombasa Municipal Board for Africans and the institution of African Muslim Kadhis.\(^4\) The election of Francis Khamisi as the first African Chairman of the Housing Committee on the Municipal Board could be seen as the result of that memorandum.\(^5\)

1 O.I. with Francis Khamisi at Kikambala on 23/6/83.


3 On completion of his Diploma in Education at Makerere University College in 1946, Ngala took up teaching at St. John's School, Kaloleni. In 1948, he was transferred to Mbaile School in Taita where he remained until 1950 when the CAA officials sought for his transfer to Buxton School in Mombasa. He succeeded Edmund Chopetta as the Principal.

O.I. with Justin Ponda at Vishakani on 18/6/83. Ponda is a younger brother of Ronald Ngala.


Between 1952 and 1955 when no political organization was allowed because of the Emergency, both the MAAC and the CAA served as welfare organizations in which the politics of the time seem to have been expressed. Both Khamisi and Ngala appear to have matured politically in the two bodies; they served on them until 1955 when Khamisi founded the Mombasa African Democratic Union (MADU). Although it was formed by Francis Khamisi of the ex-slave community at Rabai, it included influential Mijikenda such as Ronald Ngala, Sammy Omar, Lucas Karisa, and Shekue Ali. MADU was an inter-ethnic political organization whose membership comprised mostly the working class of the coastal and upcountry Africans in Mombasa.

The formation of MADU came in the wake of labour unrest in the city. Sammy Omar and Msanifu Kombo who later were to play leading roles in MADU were involved in the calling of a six day strike by the Mombasa Dock Workers Union in 1955. Commenting on this strike Tom Mboya later wrote:

Perhaps the biggest test we faced in that period came with the Mombasa dock strike in March 1955. They were demanding increased wages and the

expulsion of some supervisors. I could see it following the pattern of strikes since 1947 - rioting soon starting because of the ineffectiveness of consultation and negotiating machinery. 7

Tom Mboya was the Secretary-General of the emergent Kenya Federation of Labour after it changed its name from Kenya Federation of Registered Trade Unions in 1953. Sammy Omar recalls that Coast Africans had met with Tom Mboya, Sammy Muhanji and Clement Lubembe in 1954 at the Jeans School, Kabete, during an in-door training course on ways of conducting trade union activities. After this training, Sammy Omar with Francis Kathuna formed the Dockworkers Union which organised the 1955 strike. 8 Thus, Tom Mboya as Secretary-General of the K.F.L. was called upon to help settle the strike since the Dock Workers Union was affiliated to the KFL.

Moreover, apart from the Dock Workers Union providing some of the leadership in MADU, the Kenya Local Government Workers Union was also represented in MADU's leadership through Rashid Mbwana and Daniel Mmbaga. 9 This proves the point that MADU's leadership and membership coalesced with that of the trade union movement in Mombasa.

8 O.I. with Sammy Omar at Mombasa on 6/5/83.
9 O.I. with Lucas Karisa at Mombasa on 5/7/83.
During the years of the Emergency, the colonial government nourished fears that the Mau Mau Movement would spread to other ethnic communities. The government forces continued to hunt for Mau Mau freedom fighters in the forests of the Central and Rift Valley Highlands. Captured suspected Mau Mau adherents were subjected to torture in detention camps. The political tempo in Mombasa at the time of MADU's formation was high because of the pressure mounted by the government in upcountry areas affected by the Mau Mau Movement. Members of these communities (Kikuyu, Embu, Meru and to some extent Kamba) fled to Mombasa to escape arrest. This influx gave credence to the alleged Mau Mau activities in Mombasa and a form of passive support for Mau Mau was reported among the people of the coast. This is perhaps explained by the fact that many Mijikenda leaders, as we noted in the previous chapter, were detained in connection with KAU. Indeed, oral evidence confirms that a number of them took the Mau Mau oath. Among the Mijikenda leaders who took the Mau Mau oath were Hassan Mwachema, Ngala Tuva, Julius Mwatsama, Matano Omar and Mwinga Chokwe. All these people were former members of KAU.

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12 O.I. with Hassan Mwachema at Kambe on 4/7/83.
According to Francis Khamisi, MADU at its inception aimed at encouraging African political thought and campaigning for increased African responsibility in local and colonywide affairs. The encouragement of African political thought was demonstrated by the establishment of MADU's newspaper Sauti Ya Madu in 1958, whose highly political editorial appeared under the title Chemsha Bongo. This literally means "alert your brains". The election of Francis Khamisi to the Legislation Council as a member for Mombasa constituency in 1958 was a demonstration of MADU's determination to participate in both local and colonywide matters. Just a year after its formation, MADU demanded equal opportunity for all races and an exclusively African government for the colony. Moreover, apart from operating in Mombasa the party sought to penetrate into other districts at the coast and bring them into a united African political front through underground connections.

The expansion of MADU's political activities into the neighbouring districts materialised in 1956. MADU used some of its members to found the Kilifi African Peoples Union (KAPU). With the support of Ronald Ngala, Sammy Omar left the leadership of Dock Workers Union to start KAPU. He became the General

13 O.I. with Francis Khamisi. See also K.N.A., Mombasa District Annual Report 1955, pp.4 - 5.
15 O.I. with Msanifu Kombo at Mombasa on 20/5/83.
Secretary of the party while a former KAU member, Julius Mwatsama, became the President. Both Omar and Mwatsama come from Bengo location in Rabai and it was not until 1960 that they dissolved KAPU.

KAPU aimed at fighting for recognition of Mijikenda land rights and economic betterment of the people of Kilifi. The party agitated for the return of land in the Coastal Strip to the indigenous people. Moreover, it opposed porterage or communal work on public projects in the district by the Mijikenda. The issue of land in the Coastal Strip was also to be echoed by NADU in Mombasa and by Kwale African Democratic Union when it emerged in 1958 in Kwale District. The emergence of KWADU had the full support of Ronald Ngala who in 1957 was elected to the Legislative Council as a member of the Coast Constituency.

We have mentioned that the colonial government was determined to end the activities of Mau Mau adherents throughout the affected areas. It suffices to note that the Mau Mau Movement in a way hastened constitutional reform. In 1954, the government adopted the Lyttleton Constitution which provided for a "multi-racial" form of government in which Africans, like the Asians and Europeans before them, would have a significant voice. These changes modified but did not destroy the concept of European.

16 O.I. with Julius Mwatsama at Rabai on 19/6/83.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.

See page 72.
leadership in Kenya. In March 1957 under a restricted franchise suggested by the Coutts report, Africans were elected to the Legislative Council to represent the whole of Kenya.

In these first African elections, Ngala capitalised on support in KAPU to win the seat since Francis Khamisi enjoyed the majority support in MADU. The other candidates were Jimmy Jeremiah, a Taveta who was a former nominated member of the Legislative Council, Claudius Mwalenge Mwashumbe, Dawson Mwanyumba and J.L. Shako all of whom were Taita. Given the ethnic origin of the candidates, one may understand why Ngala decided to fall back on KAPU for support even though he was also a member of MADU and CAA. The membership of KAPU was exclusively Mijikenda and the leadership of the party could probably invoke the spirit of loyalty to the Mijikenda Union. Thus one can understand why Ngala after his election victory made efforts to revitalise the Mijikenda Union with himself as the Chairman in 1958.

The elections of 1957 had aroused a great deal of ethnic consciousness among the Africans in Mombasa. The Taita-Taveta challenge to Ngala was largely reduced by the competition of

20 Ibid.
22 The CAA became defunct in 1959. Ngala was then its President. See Stren, Housing the Urban Poor in Africa, pp.73 - 74.
the four candidates over the Taita-Taveta vote. Francis Khamisi appears to have been disadvantaged by his ancestry. Richard Stren remarks that although Khamisi was born in Rabai, "he was of mixed Nyasa and Nyamwezi parentage." Thus, to the Coastal people he was always a foreigner though he had been born at the Coast. However, Khamisi was nominated to the Legislative Council after his failure to capture the seat.

Referring to the political activities in Mombasa since the 1957 election, the District Commissioner for Mombasa wrote:

Since the elections there has been a marked increase in political activity, particularly among Africans, who are treated to a weekly diet of nationalist politics (sic) at meetings held in Tononoka. Political interest reached its climax at the end of the year following the visit of the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Mombasa at the end of October.

After joining the Legislative Council, the new African politicians formed the African Elected Members Organization. The members of this organization declared after discussion that the Lyttleton Constitutional plan was null and void. The constitutional

24 O.I. with Jimmy Jeremiah at Taveta on 12/5/83.
27 Ibid., p. 3.
settlement proposed by the Secretary of State, Alan Lennox Boyd, aroused considerable opposition from the politically conscious Africans. The AEMO had declared the constitution null and void because it did not challenge the concept of European leadership in Kenya. Gertzel argues that the Lyttleton constitution had given Africans direct representation but had not conceded the principle of majority rule. Referring to the politics of the time in Mombasa in 1957, the D.C. wrote:

Unfortunately, political controversy of this nature does not promote the harmonious relations of which Mombasa has been justly proud in the past and it is hoped that an early settlement can be found so that we can resume our customary ways.

In his visit to Kenya in 1957, Lennox Boyd agreed to establish a new constitution which would include an additional six elective seats for Africans and a second African position in the cabinet. The visit of the Secretary of State was a result of the journey made to London by Tom Mboya and Ronald Ngala to support the opposition of the African Elected Members to the Lyttleton Constitution. Mboya was the Secretary of African Elected Members Organization formed immediately after the elections which took place in 1957 based on the provisions of the Lyttleton constitution.

31 Roelker, Mathu of Kenya, p.143. The AEMO had refused to take up ministerial positions under the constitution.
32 Ibid.
Political Rivalry in MADU and the Rise of Splinter Groups

Within it.

When Lennox Boyd arrived in Mombasa on 31st October, 1957, he was invited to be the guest of honour at a tea party given at the Tononoka African Social Centre by Ronald Ngala. This gave MADU and KAPU officials an opportunity to express their opposition to the provisions of the proposed constitution.

In March 1958, Africans were given a further six elective seats in the Legislative Council under the terms of the Lennox Boyd Constitution for Kenya. That same year saw the rebirth of the Mijikenda Union. Most of the Mijikenda of the Northern Nyika Reserve withdrew their membership from MADU. It appears this massive withdrawal was meant to weaken the candidature of Francis Khamisi. Richard Stren notes that Khamisi accused his opponents of being supported by the Kilifi based Mijikenda Union. Khamisi claimed that leaders of the union mounted a door to door campaign telling people to vote for only the Mijikenda, Binns Taawe Chin. Khamisi further claimed that Arabs were not the rightful owners of freehold land in the 10 mile Strip and called for the re-integration of the Strip into the colony.

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34 O.I. with Francis Khamisi.
37 Ibid.
Faced with what appeared as an ethnic campaign for the candidacy of Binns, a former member of the Mijikenda Union in 1945, Khamisi held firmly on the support of African Muslims like Msanifu Kombo and Shekue Ali. At the time of the elections, MADU comprised mainly the African Muslims particularly the Digo and the Luo from the Dock Workers' Union. Khamisi easily won the Legislative Council election held in March 1958 to fill the seat for the newly created Mombasa constituency. About the same time, James Denis Akumu arrived from Nairobi to become the General Secretary of the Dock Workers Union on the recommendation of Tom Mboya. Khamisi made him the General Organizing Secretary of MADU.

Tom Mboya was very influential in both the trade union and political leadership across the country. The Dock Workers Union was affiliated to the K.F.L. for which Tom Mboya was the General-Secretary. Towards the end of the emergency in 1957, he had formed the Nairobi People's Convention Party in which Denis Akumu was a member. Probably this explains why Khamisi immediately gave Akumu office in MADU; to secure the support of Mboya's big following in the K.F.L. Hence, Khamisi's support was characterised by an alliance between the Muslim Africans and the Luo in the Dock Workers Union.

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38 O.I. with Shekue Ali.
40 Ibid.
However, this political alliance was strained in 1959 when Shekue Ali and Francis Khamisi developed personal differences. Moreover, Khamisi excluded Denis Akumu from the leadership of MADU in 1959 because of the latter's alleged intention to control the party. Thus, personal differences plunged the party in an explicable dissension and rivalry. The result was the formation of several parties by the dissenters, but none succeeded in being registered. Shekue Ali resigned as the Assistant General Secretary of MADU. He, by so doing, brought the party to a point of near collapse as he commanded a great deal of support from the African Muslim circles. This group in MADU comprised the bulk of its membership.

In the same year, Shekue Ali formed the Mombasa African Muslim Association with the professed aim of uplifting the standard of living of the African Muslims. Shekue Ali reckoned that African Muslims were disadvantaged in education because the Arabs discriminated against them in their schools. On the other hand, they disliked sending their children to Christian schools because they feared the childrens' Islamic faith would be corrupted by the Christian faith. Although the Mombasa African Muslim

42 O.I. with Francis Khamisi.
43 K.N.A., Mombasa District Annual Report 1959, p.3.
44 Ibid.
45 O.I. with Shekue Ali.
Association, formed in 1959, was short-lived, it caused a great rift in MADU. The Luo led by Denis Akumu capitalised on Shekue Ali's withdrawal to discredit Khamisi's leadership. However, since Shekue Ali's Mombasa African Muslim Association did not succeed in its bid for registration, Shekue and Akumu hatched a plot to overthrow Khamisi. The two leaders announced that Khamisi was suspended from MADU with effect from 17th February, 1959. \(^{46}\)

After the overthrow of Francis Khamisi, another interesting development took place in the internal strife in MADU. The Luo leadership excluded Shekue Ali and his Muslim group from the leadership of the party. This decision made MADU emerge as virtually a Luo political party. \(^{47}\) Consequently, the political scene in Mombasa was characterised by shifting alliances on the basis of political expedience. Thus, Shekue Ali's Muslim group re-aligned itself with Khamisi's supporters to form what they called the "Independent Group", it advocated for fresh elections in MADU. The group succeeded in its demands and elections were held on 19th July, 1959. Through these elections, the "Independent Group" re-captured the leadership of MADU. \(^{48}\) Nevertheless, of the party's 14,000 alleged members, only 800 people took part in the election. \(^{49}\) What this turn-out means is that probably the

\(^{46}\) K.N.A., Mombasa District Annual Report 1959, pp.3 - 4.

\(^{47}\) Ibid., p.4.

\(^{48}\) Ibid.

\(^{49}\) Ibid.
party's membership was disillusioned with the recurrent rivalry in its leadership. Richard Stren observed that politics in Mombasa from 1958 to 1960 were to be dominated by an often bewildering play of personalities and factional alliances.\(^{50}\)

The defeat of Akumu laid the ground for the multiplication of rival parties. With his supporters, mainly Opar Mboya, Lucas Karisa, Kombo Mohamed and Stanisilas Oloo, he formed the Mombasa Peoples' Action Party. In early August 1959, the party held its inaugural meeting but as a result of speeches made at the meeting, the leaders were arrested and charged with conspiracy and sedition.\(^{51}\) Stanislas Oloo, Harrison Oketch and Kombo Mohamed were imprisoned for 6 months each after conviction in court.\(^{52}\) This party drew most of its support from the trade Union movement, especially the Dock Workers Union and the Kenya Local Government Workers Union. Whereas the former was Luo dominated, the latter had on its roll a good number of Mijikenda who included men such as Rashid Mbwana, Kazungu Tete, Shadrack Karisa and Samuel Kalume. Rashid Mbwana, a former leading official of the African Workers Federation was also the Vice-Chairman of the Mijikenda Union when it was reconstituted in 1958.\(^{53}\)

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\(^{51}\) K.N.A., Mombasa District Annual Report 1959, p.4.

\(^{52}\) Ibid.

\(^{53}\) See "Mijikenda Union Mombasa", File No.2167, Office of the Registrar of Societies, Nairobi.
The rivalry between MADU and its splinter groups brought about isolated cases of violent confrontation. For instance, on 13th September, 1959, a party meeting was to be addressed by leaders of the newly formed and Nairobi based Kenya National Party. MADU had openly expressed support for the policies of the multi-racial party as opposed to those of the Kenya Independent Movement. The leader of KNP was Masinde Muliro who was supported by Ronald Ngala while the leader of KIM was Oginga Odinga supported by Tom Mboya. During the meeting of 13th September, 1959, the address by KNP leaders was disrupted deliberately by a section of the audience. Consequently, the meeting was adjourned. However, the gathering ended up in total dissarray when some people, angered by the decision to adjourn the meeting hurled stones at the Tononoka Social Hall. The D.C. for Mombasa wrote in his annual report that the police had to intervene to stop the "commotion that was turning into hooliganism". What these differences between MADU and its splinter groups seem to indicate is the probable fact that the political alignments in

54 A discussion of the formation of national political organization and political alignments at the Coast will be carried out in Chapter 4.

55 K.N.A., Mombasa District Annual Report, p.5.

56 Ibid.
Nairobi towards KNP and KIM may have already entrenched themselves in Mombasa. This was evidenced by Akumu's effort to establish a branch of the KIM in Mombasa under the name of Mombasa Independence Movement. 57

However, KIM was refused registration. Perhaps, this refusal by colonial officials was influenced by the same factors which disqualified the registration of Akumu's MIM. KIM had been opposed to the concept of multi-racialism and therefore could not be registered since the banning of nationwide political organizations had not been lifted. Moreover, the government seems to have been determined to stop Akumu's leftist brand of politics. The Mombasa Peoples' Action Party, although initially refused official registration, went underground to organize workers under the name the Mombasa Peoples' Congress Party. Its organizers were Ben Opar Mboya and Lucas Karisa. 58 This secret organization operated until 1960 when both Mboya and Karisa were arrested and convicted of managing an unlawful society. 59 Akumu on the other hand went about organizing his Coast Pan Africanist Party.

Tom Mboya's base was in Nairobi. However, his influence in Mombasa was demonstrated in the attempts by Shekue Ali and Msanifu Kombo to form the Mombasa Peoples' Convention Party as

57 Ibid.
58 O.I. with Lucas Karisa. See also K.N.A., Mombasa District Annual Report 1960, p.3.
59 K.N.A., Mombasa District Annual Report 1960, p.3.
a branch of Mboya's Nairobi Peoples' Convention. When their efforts proved unsuccessful they went about forming the Mombasa Freedom Convention Party. When the African Elected Members came back from the Lancaster House Conference in January and February 1960, the MFCP condemned the African leaders for having failed to secure the release of Jomo Kenyatta. Moreover, the party's leadership felt that the constitutional proposals did not allow for responsible African government in 1960, nor did they ensure universal adult franchise. Lastly, the MFCP argued that the proposals did not provide for the appointment of an African Chief Minister. Nevertheless, when efforts were made to launch Kenya African National Union in 1960, both the Akumu's P and Shekue Ali's MTCP identified themselves with the new national party.

MADU on the other hand was weakened by the seemingly process of dissension which had brought about the CPAP TCP. In 1959, the party adopted the slogan of "positive Action." "Positive Action" was a phrase first given prominence at

Ibid.
Ibid., p.4.

Shekue Ali and Maimu Kombo were still in MADU when its president Francis Kamisi called upon the colonial government to release Jomo Kenyatta in 1959.

Ibid.
the All African Conference of Black African leaders at Accra in December 1959. The adoption of "Positive action" as a slogan came after MADU had carried out a remarkable activity in the middle of 1959. It had, with the support of Denis Akumu, engaged a Mombasa advocate called Rustam Hira to represent Mau Mau detainees at Hola. The Hola incident aroused MADU's concern when 11 so-called hardcore Mau Mau detainees were killed on 3rd March, 1959 by wardens during the operation of the Cowan Plan. The tragedy had been a result of what C.O. Abuor terms "compelling force to make the hardcore detainees confess" as recommended by Senior Superintendent J.B. Cowan. Cowan was recognised as the Detention Camp expert in the prisons department. While 11 of the 88 detainees involved in the operation died, 22 more were badly injured.

The Kenya government stated initially that the men had died after drinking water ferried in a hand-cart. Thus, as Anthony Clayton notes, the Hola Camp officials decided to cover up the incident. This aroused perhaps the bitterest political controversy in the British parliament to take place about an African colony.

65 O.I. with Francis Khamisi.
67 Ibid., p.212.
68 Ibid.
Several cabinet Ministers felt that a public inquiry would be necessary and Lennox Boyd, the Secretary of State for the colonies ordered a full inquiry into the incident. A separate committee referred to as the Fairn Committee was also set up headed by R.D. Fairn, one of Her Majesty's Prison Commissioners, to investigate into the matter.

Rustam Hira represented the detainees in the Inquiry on behalf of MADU. But, the efforts of MADU were thwarted when the Attorney-General decided not to order criminal charges against the people concerned with the death of the detainees. However, 144 of the remaining detainees at Hola went on hunger strike in protest against the Attorney-General's decision. They were dismayed by the government's negative attitude to the findings of the Inquest. The Governor Sir Evelyn Baring was obliged as a result of pressure from the Africans and other influential people in the colony to fly to Hola on 19th May, 1959 to assess the threatening situation personally. In a motion tabled in Legco on 19th May, 1959 by Gikonyo Kiano, a member for Central Province South on behalf of the AE MO, the organization called for

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71 Ibid.
73 O.I. with Mwinga Chokwe at Mzambarauni near Mombasa on 19/6/83.
74 Ibid.
the resignation of the Minister for Defence and Internal Security. It also called for the suspension of all officers and wardens at Hola Camp. The motion said that the African members had lost confidence in the Kenya Government's administration of detention camps. But not much was done. The Governor merely changed the name of Hola to Galole, possibly just to make the African people forget the incident.

The so called hard-core Mau Mau were said to belong to the "Jomo Cult". Former KAU members who were close to Jomo Kenyatta before his arrest in 1952 were said to have been influenced by what the colonial officials saw as "Kenyatta's stubborn political will." The news of the Hola incident at the Coast aroused concern among Africans because many of their leaders had been detained there. Apart from Mwinga Chokwe who had been singled out as a hard-core nationalist belonging to the "Jomo cult", Salim Mohamed Mgunga also had died at Hola.

Although MADU did not succeed in its effort to acquire legal representation for the Mau Mau detainees, the Hola incident exposed conditions of maltreatment in detention camps. MADU therefore called for the release of Jomo Kenyatta from detention.

76 O.I. with Mwinga Chokwe.
77 Ibid.
Richard Stren reckons that Francis Khamisi, its president attempted to rise above factional rivalry in the party by becoming the first local leader to demand Kenyatta's release.  

In KAPU, there was no rivalry or dissession haunting the political fabric of the party. It did not face up to the challenge of diverse ethnic membership. Moreover, membership in the Mijikenda Union gave the party a modicum of control over its rank-and-file. Nevertheless, the leadership of the party did not offer or implement an economic and political prognosis that would benefit all the Mijikenda at independence. But the party was subjected to its own unique problems. It was founded at a time when the number of squatters in the Coastal Strip had increased considerably. In 1957, the District Officer for Malindi estimated that one half of the entire Giriama population of the sub-district was living in the Coastal Strip. There was an estimated figure of 24,000 squatters in the Strip in 1957. Although there were squatters in Kilifi, Kikambala, and Mombasa areas, the gravity of the problem did not measure to that of Malindi sub-district.

60 Ibid.
61 Ibid. See also the discussion of the root of this problem in Chapters 7 and 11.
The major effect of so many squatters in the Coastal Strip was the insecurity that their presence produced in the area. Throughout the colonial period, they were under the local Arab administration of Liwalis and Mudirs. Although the Mijikenda were the majority, there was no single "native" authority accredited to them. Julius Mwatsama, KAPU's president recalls that this Arab administration in the late 1950's often interfered with the activities of the party. Frederick Cooper says that by the 1950's relations between landowners and the greatly increased number of squatters had become more impersonal, commercialised and tense. The landowners now charged rent regularly and it was often high. Moreover, squatters were sometimes thrown out or threatened with eviction for refusing to work for the landowner. The tension over the eviction of squatters which officials noted in 1955 became "a political drama" by 1959 when gangs of Mijikenda went around taking cashewnuts from Arab estates.

The involvement of KAPU in this "drama" cannot be ruled out. The party was regarded by the Mijikenda in Kilifi district as the "Citizens Advice Bureau" through which political

82 O.I with Julius Mwatsama.
83 Cooper, From Slaves to Squatters, p.291.
84 Ibid. Note that as from 1952, the Malindi landowners denounced the Cashew Agreement of 1937 insisting that squatters would have no claims at all to all trees planted after that date unless the landowner agreed to it. The 1937 Cashew Agreement was a governmental move in order to discourage the habit of Shifting Cultivation in the Coastal Strip. It was enforced upon landowners in a campaign to plant permanent crops like Cashew trees and Coconuts.
deliberations were made. Ronald Ngala had after his entry into the Legislative Council become more militant on the issue of land. In the same year of his election victory, he denounced Arab land rights in the Coastal Strip. It appears that his access to various records and legal documents in the Legislative Council helped him to understand the land question at the Coast better. Moreover, he replaced Jimmy Jeremiah, a former nominated member for Coast and a parliamentary Under-Secretary, on the Coast Land Advisory Board in 1957. Given the fact in the late 1950's relationship between landowners and the squatters were tense and that as from 1956, the Arabs were advocating for Autonomy of the Coastal Strip, it is possible that these factors contributed to the increasing militancy of Ronald Ngala. He reportedly abandoned MADU and became rare in its meetings. However, he tilted towards bolstering KAPU whose membership was exclusively Mijikenda. Moreover, he re-established the Mijikenda Union as a fundamental political organ that would help KAPU counter the efforts of autonomists in the district. In an attempt to help

85 O.I with Julius Mwatsama.
88 O.I with Julius Mwatsama.
89 Ibid.
settle the squatter problem, the party promised to find new homes for the dispossessed squatters on the settlement schemes established by the colonial government in the late 1950's. But these settlement schemes were primarily on freehold land purchased from Arabs around Chumani, Mtongi and Mtwapa.

Thus, the effort put in by KAPU and Ronald Ngala drew the colonial officials into conceding various settlement schemes that put some squatters on small plots of land. In his campaign booklet for 1961, Ronald Ngala wrote that he had fought until the indigenous people in Vitengeni were allowed to cultivate lands in Mwangea. Moreover, the government had accepted to settle Africans on Crown lands in the Coastal Strip.

Whereas Ngala's politics in the late 1950's were a reaction to the deteriorating squatter conditions in the district one may argue that his style was blended by his heritage of Mijikenda Kaya traditions. His younger brother Justin Ponda, recalls how their father Vidzo Wa Ngala, then a member of the

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90 See Cooper, *From Slaves to Squatters*, p.292.


92 Cooper, *From Slaves to Squatters*, p.292.

Nyere age-set, instructed them on Kaya activities and the dangers that would face anybody who transgressed the proceedings and the rules of the Kaya. After the revitalization of the Mijikenda Union, Ngala chose elders from every Kaya with whom he met at Mariakani to discuss and get the views of the Mijikenda. That way, he upheld the principle of gerontocracy which popularised him as a true Mijikenda representative. Using the legitimacy of his position as the Mijikenda Union Chairman and the member of Legco for Coast, Ngala identified and sanctioned his political followers both in the Northern and Southern Reserves. By 1958, Robert Mambo notes that Ngala had made 16 political meetings in the Southern Reserve. Through these meetings, he strengthened his hold on the political opinion of the Digo and Duruma. He supported the formation of Kwale African Democratic Union (KWADU) in 1958 and this explains why this party aligned itself with Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) in 1960 before the majority of its members defected to Kenya African National Union (KANU). This defection came about when there developed a quarrel among the Digo over the increasing influence of the Mijikenda Union as a mouth piece of KADU in Kwale.

94 O.I. with Justin Ponda at Vishakani on 18/6/83.
95 Mambo, "Colonial Rule" p.33.
96 O.I. with Julius Mwatsama.
District parties wound up in 1960 when organization of political parties on a countrywide basis was allowed once again. But the ethnocentric spirit of KAPU spilled over into the Coast African Political Union which was formed in 1960. Although KAPU had advocated for such national themes as Africanization of the Civil Service, Independence for Kenya, and such slogans as "one man one vote", "racial equality" and "unity among Africans", the party was preoccupied with the Coastal Strip and Mijikenda land rights. No wonder when KAPU wound up, its funds were transferred to the branch treasury of KADU, a party which advocated for regional interests. Its president (Julius Mwatsama) became the Chairman of KADU Kilifi branch while its Secretary (Sammy Omar) became the Secretary of CAPU.

Although both MADU and KAPU had large followings in their respective districts, the parties like other district parties in the country did not offer and implement an economic and political programme on which the two districts would be developed after Kenya's independence. Whereas KAPU was cemented with "Mijikenda-ness" and did not develop any inter-ethnic solidarity because of the nature of its membership, MADU was weakened by internal strife and ethnic antipathies. Lack of commitment to the nationalist cause in the party, failure to conceptualise a clear-cut political

97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
plan, rivalry and imprudence made the party vulnerable to the colonial principle of divide and rule. Thus, the party failed to change the colonial status quo. KAPU had neither a future political plan nor a youth wing to safeguard its economic and political interests. KAPU's inability to act unilaterally laid ground for the give and take politics that left the land question in the district unsolved to a large extent.

The era of district organizations in Kilifi made KAPU operate within what was basically a Mijikenda ethnic unit. This partly raised political leaders like Julius Mwatsama, Sammy Omar and Binns Chokwe who worked hand in hand with the Mijikenda Union under Ronald Ngala to strengthen the Mijikenda ethnic interests. Cherry Gertzel observes that district self-consciousness was heightened by the significant economic and social differences that existed between the ethnic groups.97 Fears about their future economic position were the source of a growing political consciousness among the coast people in the second half of the fifties.98 For the Mijikenda, these fears made the majority of them support Coast African Political Union (CAPU) and KADU in the 1960's.

98 Ibid.
CHAPTER FOUR

NATIONAL PARTY POLITICS AND MIJIKENDA REACTION TO
THE MWAMBAO AUTONOMY ISSUE, 1960 - 1963

This chapter looks at the emergence of nationwide political organizations and the leadership of the Mijikenda. It attempts to identify the political alignments of this leadership with upcountry politicians. In order to provide a clear explanation of the phenomenon of party rivalry at the coast, the chapter firstly, examines the emergence of nationwide political organizations and highlights their responses to constitutional developments in the colony. Secondly, it looks at African party politics at the coast and documents their responses to upcountry politics and the movement for the autonomy of the Coastal Strip.

The decade of the 1950's ended on a note of tension over the land question in the Coastal Strip.¹ Eviction of squatters and the question of land in the Strip had become a leading political issue in the Malindi Sub-district.¹ Ronald Ngala, the Mijikenda nationalist leader had organised political rallies in this area and addressed squatters on the issue of land and Mijikenda rights in the Strip.² These issues in one form or

* See Chapter 3.
1 Cooper, From Slaves to Squatters, p.292.
2 Ibid.
another awakened the squatters and made them receptive to Ngala's efforts to organize them in the Strip to oppose the Mwambao Movement. The movement was led by land owning Arabs and Swahili.

The Emergence of Nationwide Political Organizations

When nationwide political organizations were allowed in Kenya in 1960, political alignments were characterised by the pre-1960 political groupings. The African Elected Members had in 1959 failed to unite all district associations through leaders' conferences. However, Lennox Boyd after his visit to Kenya in 1957, agreed in 1959 to convene a constitutional conference in London in 1960. Ngala had replaced Tom Mboya as the Secretary of African Elected Members Organization and appealed to all elected members of the Legislative Council who opposed the constitution to boycott the Council from 17th February, 1959.

At this time, the idea of a multi-racial national party had been much talked about but discussion over such a party had divided the African Elected Members into two camps. However such

3 Mboya, Op. Cit., p.82.
4 Ibid.
5 Bogonko, Op. Cit., p.211.
a party was formed and registered as the Kenya National Party.\textsuperscript{7} This was a multi-racial party which comprised some of the African, Asian, Arab and White members of the Legislative Council. Masinde Muliro was the president of the party and he was backed by Ronald Ngala, Daniel Arap Moi and Taita Arap Towett.\textsuperscript{8} On the formation of the Kenya National Party with its multi-racial composition, those African leaders who were opposed to multi-racialism launched the Kenya Independence Movement.\textsuperscript{9} However, because it was opposed to multi-racialism, the new party was refused registration. Oginga Odinga was the president of the Kenya Independence Movement and he was backed by Tom Mboya and Gikonyo Kiano.\textsuperscript{10}

Before the African Elected Members proceeded to the Lancaster House Conference in January 1960, they held a Leaders' Conference in Kiambu in which they agreed to cooperate during the London talks.\textsuperscript{11} At this conference, Ronald Ngala was unanimously chosen as the leader of the African delegation.\textsuperscript{12} After the Lancaster

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{7} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{8} Ibid., p.82.
\item \textsuperscript{9} Odinga, \textit{Op. Cit.}, p.170.
\item \textsuperscript{10} Mboya, \textit{Op. Cit.}, p.83.
\item \textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
House Conference of 1960, the idea of forming a national party was brought out at another Leaders' Conference in Kiambu. They formed an African national party called Uhuru Party. This name was later changed to Kenya African National Union and Kenyatta was declared its first president. James Gichuru was made the Chairman of a Committee of 9 which was to draft its constitution. It included Ronald Ngala, Oginga Odinga, Argwings Kodhek, Gikonyo Kiano and Tom Mboya. Gichuru became its acting President, Oginga Odinga, Vice-President and Tom Mboya, Secretary. In their absence, Ronald Ngala and Daniel Arap Moi were elected treasurer and assistant treasurer respectively.

The Lancaster House Conference of 1960 had finally ended European aspiration of the "White Man's Country". A fundamental constitutional change was conceded by the British at the conference and the British Secretary of State accepted the principle of majority rule and ultimate independence for Kenya as an African country. However, when the African leaders came back, they looked for plans to suit the new situation. The result was

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14 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
realignment on the basis of ethnicity.\textsuperscript{19} Ethnic interests revolved upon land and thus upon essentially economic interests. This situation eventually brought about an alliance between the Kalenjin and Masai of the Rift Valley, the Luhya of the then North Nyanza and the Mijikenda of the Coast. This alignment of ethnic and economic interests was probably the single most important factor that led to the division of the nationalist movement into Kenya African National Union and Kenya African Democratic Union.\textsuperscript{20} Sorobea Bagonko argues that the main reason for this cleavage was KADU's fear that the Kikuyu and Luo would be the British heirs and hence dominate the other ethnic communities.\textsuperscript{21}

It appears that these ethnic considerations influenced the decisions of both Daniel Arap Moi and Ronald Ngala to refuse to take office in KANU. They founded the Kalenjin Political Alliance and Coast African Political Union respectively which sought to protect ethnic interests and were instrumental in the launching of KADU on 10th July, 1960 in Ngong town.\textsuperscript{22} In the meeting at Ngong Ngala led his Coast African Political Union, while Moi led the

\begin{enumerate}
\item Bogonko, \textit{Op. Cit.}
\item Odinga, \textit{Op. Cit.}, p.194. The Kalenjin Political Alliance was formed in March and April 1960 and resolved not to join KANU on 21st May, 1960 at a meeting in Eldoret. Paralleling the formation of the Kalenjin Political Alliance was the Masai United Front and the Coast African Political Union.
\end{enumerate}
Kalenjin Political Union to reach an agreement with Muliro's Kenya African Peoples Party (the new name for the Kenya National Party), the Masai United Front and the Somali National Association. The Masai United Front was led by Justus Ole Tipis.


The elections were organised on the basis of a common roll for all races. Out of a total of 53 seats contested, 10 were reserved for Europeans, 8 for Asians and 2 for Arabs. With a large preponderance of Africans in the electorate, 32 seats open or

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25 Ibid., p.118.
unreserved seats went to Africans. The largest number of seats in the elections, 19 seats were won by KANU while 11 were won by KADU.

Both these parties refused to join the government, for both had included in their election manifestos a call for the immediate release of Jomo Kenyatta. However, following conversations held in April 1961 between Ngala who was the president of KADU, the Governor and the Secretary of State for the colonies, KADU agreed to participate in the interim government. An administration was accordingly formed in which Ngala became Minister for Education and Leader of Government Business. Oginga Odinga felt that by breaking the promise not to join the government unless Kenyatta was released KADU had broken the promise made in its election manifesto.

Meanwhile, KANU's position remained unchanged. It maintained its motto; "no Kenyatta no Government". KADU on the other hand felt that the Lancaster House Constitution of 1960 could be stretched to accommodate necessary changes. Nevertheless, KANU called for a new conference to clear out constitutional questions.

26 Ibid., p.130.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
Bennett and Rosberg observe that there was need to phase out the questions of qualitative franchise, reserved seats, the governor's power to nominate some members of the Legislative Council, racial representation in the Council of Ministers and Government veto powers. Thus, KANU felt that the Lancaster House constitution of 1960 had served its purpose and a new constitution must be produced immediately to meet new challenges.\(^3\)

In March 1961, the president of KANU, James Gichuru emphasized to the colonial Secretary that KANU was not prepared to take part in any government until Kenyatta was freed.\(^4\) When Kenyatta was transferred from Lodwar to Maralal he, in a press conference, called upon Europeans and Asians not to fear an independent African government so long as they were willing to accept the concept of racial equality.\(^5\) On the issue of land, he promised that an independent African government would ensure that Europeans working on their land efficiently had no need to be afraid.\(^6\) Nonetheless, he believed that the Lancaster House Constitution of 1960 had already served its purpose and a round-table meeting should be called immediately to discuss the next step towards independence.\(^7\)


\(^{32}\) Ibid.

\(^{33}\) Ibid.

\(^{34}\) Ibid., p.196.

\(^{35}\) Ibid.
The colonial government rejected Kenyatta's suggestions that the Lancaster House Constitution needed to be superceded immediately by another. During his visit to Kenya in May 1961, the British Under-Secretary of State for the colonies, Hugh Fraser, made a statement that Independence was "several years and several constitutional conferences ahead." But Ngala maintained that there was no need for several conferences before achieving independence. He felt the Lancaster House Conference was flexible enough to allow for independence. All the same, he deemed talks and discussions with the British Government as pre-requisites for attaining independence.

KANU's reply to Fraser's announcement was a demand for independence in 1961 and the immediate release of Jomo Kenyatta. At this point, Kenyatta asked for consultation with the leaders of KANU and KADU. They went to Maralal to see him and out of their talks came the KANU and KADU Maralal Agreement. The Agreement set up a working committee to send a joint delegation to the Governor and the Colonial Secretary to demand for Kenyatta's release. It was also to study the land question and report back

36 Ibid., p.197.
37 Ibid., p.199.
39 Ibid.
within a month on steps to be taken jointly by the two parties on a new constitution and for Independence in 1961.\(^{41}\)

KADU, however, retreated from the understanding that the two parties would work out the next stage together. Ngala announced that KADU was working for internal self-government.\(^{42}\) Thus, joint attempts to send a deputation to the Governor and the Colonial Secretary to demand the release of Kenyatta as hitherto agreed failed.

The colonial Government had by now realised that the attempt to get a stable government in Kenya would not be realised as long as Kenyatta remained in detention. By August it was announced that Kenyatta would be released, and he was released on 21st August, 1961.\(^{43}\) He later presided over a joint meeting of KADU and KANU parliamentary groups. By the time the Governor opened constitutional talks at Government House, KANU and KADU had agreed to press for independence on 1st February, 1962.\(^{44}\)

For a short while after his release, Kenyatta did not commit himself to KANU or KADU and he tried to bring the two parties together.\(^{45}\) When differences between the two parties

\(^{41}\) Ibid.

\(^{42}\) Ibid., p.216.

\(^{43}\) Ibid.

\(^{44}\) Ibid., p.218.

continued to grow, he resolved to join KANU and accepted the presidency of the party on 28th October, 1961. He devoted himself to the task of organizing the party. He led the KANU delegation to London to demand independence for Kenya in 1962.

Kenyatta's entry into the Legislative Council was not automatic. There existed a clause in the rules governing entry into the Legislative Council which barred any one who had spent more than 2 years in prison from becoming a member of the Legislative Council. Mwinga Chokwe the former Mijikenda detainee from Rabai challenged the British government to revoke the Order-in-Council which still barred Kenyatta from entering the Legislative Council. The clause was eventually removed. Many African Members of the Legislative Council offered their seats for Kenyatta. At the Coast, this gesture was made by Mwinga Chokwe. However, Kenyatta chose to take the seat of Kariuki Njiiri who had resigned his Fort Hall seat in his favour. In the by election that followed, Kenyatta was returned unopposed for the seat on 12th January, 1962.

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46 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
In February 1962, the Lancaster Constitutional Conference opened in London and Kenyatta attended as president of KANU. Ngala on the other hand led the KADU parliamentary group. By March, the conference encountered grave complications. These were brought about by KADU's insistence on regionalism as the only acceptable form of government for independent Kenya. On the other hand, KANU was intolerant of regionalism and advocated for centralization. Ngala, in his opening speech to the conference, said that KADU wanted to build a country in which dictatorship would be impossible. Regionalism, otherwise referred to as Majimbo was the belief that the best form of self rule was to give power to the regions. Legislation and political organization was also to be at the regional level since the regions were to work in conjunction with the central government. KANU on the other hand demanded a strong central government where regional interests would be subordinate to it.

The constitutional solution devised was a compromise: there were to be two houses; upper and lower with six regional assemblies with rights entrenched in the constitution requiring a 90 per cent

54 Ibid.
vote in the upper house to approve any change.\textsuperscript{58} Whereas the 1960 Lancaster House Constitutional Conference had established one national legislative body, the 1962 conference insisted on two national legislative bodies and Regional Assemblies that conformed to the seven provinces.\textsuperscript{59} The rationale for two chambers was that one would check the other and further that the Upper House would give a better regional balance.\textsuperscript{60}

However, at this conference, KANU and KADU agreed to form a coalition government and to work towards a general election in May 1963.\textsuperscript{61} KANU agreed to transfer all the various services that were supposed to be handed over to the regional assemblies.\textsuperscript{62} The next conference took place during September-October 1963 and it produced the final independence constitution.\textsuperscript{63} When Kenyatta came back at the end of October 1963, he declared:

\begin{quote}
I give a categorical assurance that under the constitution all tribal land is entrenched in tribal authority and no one will take away the land belonging to another tribe.\textsuperscript{64}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{59} Mutiso, \textit{Op. Cit.}
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., p.153.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.
According to the Colonial Secretary Reginald Maudling, the May 1963 elections were to be followed by a period of self-government. But another constitutional conference was to be held to decide the eventual pattern and implementation of an Independence constitution. Elections were subsequently held. KANU and its ally the Northern Province United Alliance of Osman Araru got 69 seats in the May elections. KADU got 31 seats, the African Peoples Party of Paul Ngei got 8 seats and the independents, 4 seats. In the Upper House, KANU won 20 seats, NPUA 1, KADU 16 and APP 2.

In the Regional Assemblies, KANU had 88, KADU 51, APP 8, CPP 2, and independents 12. The preponderance of KANU's membership in all these bodies qualified the party to form a representative government with Jomo Kenyatta as the leader. On 1st June, 1963, Kenyatta was sworn in as the first Prime Minister.

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65 P. Wangalwa, "The Team which took over Leadership", *Daily Nation*, June 1, 1983, p.2.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.

African Party Politics at the Coast and the Movement for Mwambao Autonomy

The ban on African national party organization was lifted in 1960 at the Lancaster House Conference. Political parties or associations thereafter emerged throughout the colony. In the coastal region, the existing associations such as the Coast African Political Union, the Kilifi African Peoples Union and the Kwale African Democratic Union were absorbed into KADU. On the other hand, the Coast Pan Africanist Party and the Mombasa Freedom Convention Party merged into KANU. The MFCP and CPAP were dissolved at a meeting in the office of Francis Khamisi in Mombasa led by KANU national leaders, James Gichuru and Njoroge Mungai. This meeting established a branch of KANU in Mombasa. On the committee to draft the constitution were Shekue Ali, Denis Akuru, Lucas Karisa, Matano Omar and Maalim Juma Mohamed.

The Coast Province had experienced a political revitalization in 1957 and 1958. During that period, Oginga Odinga, Tom Mboya, Argwings Kodhek and Masinde Muliro visited Mombasa and they drew large audiences which approved of the stand taken

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73 See Mombasa Times, April 27, 1960, p.1.
by African Elected Members Organization on Kenya's Constitutional future. During this time Ronald Ngala and Francis Khamisi, the two elected African Members of the Legislative Council from the Coast, had successfully sought popular support for the AEMO's opposition to the Lennox-Boyd Constitution. The two leaders had held political meetings in Kilifi and Kwale and aroused the African population (many of whom were Mijikenda squatters) there to political receptiveness. Commenting on the political awareness of the region, the D.O. for Malindi wrote:

The atmosphere created by political strategems and incidents in the colony throughout the year have even affected the Giriama in this playground of nature.

KAPU, which had its headquarters in Mombasa, was busy in 1958 recruiting Mijikenda squatters as members. This union had been regarded in Kilifi District as a "Citizens Advice Bureau", and all manner of advice to squatters had passed through the headquarters and was channelled out to the D.C. or D.O. concerned.

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74 Ibid.
76 Ibid., p.3.
* See pages 97 and 98 of Chapter 3.
Tension had sprung up between the Arab and Swahili landowners on one hand and squatters on the other at the end of 1958. This was over tenancy agreements and ownership of trees especially the Cashewnut trees. The discontent aroused had been accentuated by claims in Mombasa by MADU that the Coastal Strip was the birthright of the indigenous Africans. The D.O. for Malindi lamented that the trend of politics in the region had the effect of resurrecting African land claims in the Strip and what he called "scores of lost causes."

In 1958 Ngala, in the Legislative Council, deplored the fact that the Amidzichenda were living in difficulty as a result of land policy introduced by the colonial government as early as 1902 and 1903. As a member of the Coast Land Advisory Board from 1957 when he replaced Jimmy Jeremiah, a former nominated member of the Legislative Council, Ngala was in a position to identify the anomalies in land allocation at the Coast from early colonial rule. This had brought about conflicting claims over land in the Strip especially in areas around Malindi, Mambrui, Takaungu, Roka, Mida, Uyombo and Watamu. Commenting on colonial disregard of African land rights in the Strip through the

77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
82 Ibid., p.10.
proclamation as Crown Land of vast areas in Kwale, Ngala expressed dissatisfaction with commonage of land around Likoni, South of Mombasa. He lamented that Africans did not know their rights on the land. Earlier in 1957, he had attacked minority privileges and Arab land rights in the Shimoni-Wasini district and Malindi.

It appears that the question of land rights in the Coastal Strip and the tension over the ownership of trees by squatters weighed heavily on the Mijikenda educated elite. When Ngala revitalised the Mijikenda Union in 1958, it worked closely with other Mijikenda district political parties such as Kilifi African Peoples Union and Kwale African Democratic Union on issues regarding land ownership in the Coastal Strip. The Chairman of the Union in 1958 was Ngala himself while George Konde and David Paul were Treasurer and Secretary respectively. Although some of its aims were to promote and encourage ethnic unity and understanding, to promote and assist economic development schemes and to promote and raise standards of social and cultural activities, Suleiman Said Magogo observed that the union could not ignore

84 Salim, "The Movement for 'Mwambao"", p.217.
85 See "Mijikenda Union Mombasa" File No.2167 in the Office of the Registrar of Societies, Attorney-General's Chambers, Nairobi.
86 Ibid.
political issues which adversely affected the social and economic welfare of its members. In 1957, there were about 24,000 squatters in the Malindi sub-district. The Mijikenda had experienced several disastrous harvests in the hinterland because of the lack of rainfall in 1952, 1954 and 1958. Moreover, Esmond Martin observes that the agricultural department was spreading propaganda emphasizing the profits that could be made from cotton. The Mijikenda in the hinterland saw the value of cotton and they moved into the Coastal Strip to plant the crop there. Some of those who settled as squatters on Arab and Swahili lands were evicted. The tension between the squatters and the Arab land owners culminated in the forceful picking of cashewnuts from Arab lands by gangs of Giriama squatters in the Malindi Sub-district in 1959. It appears the Mijikenda Union and KAPU were behind these activities. Frederick Cooper notes that the Mijikenda leader Ronald Ngala "drove home the squatters' claims to the trees in meetings and organization drives." Moreover KAPU's president Julius Mwatsama, complained to the Mudir of

87 O.1. with Suleiman Saidi Magogo at Kilifi on 7th June, 1983. Magogo was the Chairman of the Union from 1945 to 1950.
89 Ibid., p.122.
90 Ibid.
91 Cooper, From Slaves to Squatters, p.291.
92 Ibid.
Takaungu over squatters' complaints and the matter was referred to the D.C. for Kilifi. The D.C. ruled that the landowners had no right to utilise any of the squatters' property without their consent. Since KAPU was regarded as the "Citizens Advice Bureau", it follows that Arab refusal to heed this call may have been responded to with an incitement of squatters to act as they did.

Colonial official rhetoric on Mijikenda land rights in the Coastal Strip must have been infuriating to the Mijikenda leaders. In his ruling in a case of dispute over land ownership in the Malindi area in 1957 which involved Ngawa Madanje, Karisa Masha, Kambi Mwamgegu and Katana Menza, the D.O. for Malindi said that the Mijikenda did not own land in the Coastal Strip unless they acquired a freehold title by way of sale. In that case, they were unable to produce any such title to substantiate their claim. The following year, three Kaumas Kambi wa Katana, Mwadoe wa Wanyama and Kashuke wa Katana were accused of harvesting bananas and sugarcane on the land claimed by certain Arabs. However, some Kaumas had lived in the Coastal zone for generations where they


had cultivated the land by planting various fruits and palm trees. 95

Francis Khamisi had joined Ngala in 1958 in the Legislative Council as a member for the Mombasa Constituency. The advocacy of the two African leaders on land aroused anxiety among the Arab and Swahili landowners. Sauti Ya Madu, MADU's newspaper had increased the tension by its denunciation of Arab land rights. 96 However, the Coast Arab leaders declared that they had undisputed rights at the coast. 97 In the resultant exchange of words, Salim argues, the Arabs and Swahili fell back onto the 1895 agreement as a legal basis for Coast Autonomy. 98

The issue of autonomy had its roots in 1956 when some Europeans at the Coast, disturbed by the political trends in the country, proposed the idea of some system of provincial autonomy for the coast. 99 This kind of autonomy would have given them control of Mombasa. The two Arab Legislative Council Members; Malifudh Mackawi and Shariff Abdulla Salim, regarded this as a challenge to the Sultan's sovereignty over the Coastal Strip otherwise called Mwambao. 100

95 K.N.A., "Land Cases in the Malindi Sub-district", See Correspondence from Hussein Saad and Mohamed bin Ali to the P.C. Coast dated 17th April, 1958.
96 Salim, "The Movement for 'Mwambao'", p.218.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid. 'Mwambao' is a Swahili word which means Coastal Strip.
The interests of Europeans in Coastal autonomy is explained by the fact that toward the approach of Kenya's independence, Europeans in the area, some of whom had settled or retired in this region years earlier developed long term aspirations in the Coast.  

Many African political parties at the Coast including KWADU, MADU, KAPU CPAP and MFCP opposed the Mwambao movement. When these were dissolved in 1960, the emergent parties, CAPU, KANU and KADU continued to oppose the movement. In the year following the Lancaster House Conference of 1960 Bennett and Rosberg noted that the Coastal Arabs became more and more interested in their position under the Treaty of 1895. Nevertheless, Coastal Africans continued to resist the movement.

Shekue Ali, a Digo, and Msanifu Kombo, a Shirazi, had pulled out of MADU in 1959 to form the Mombasa Freedom Convention Party. Another group from MADU led by James Denis Akumu founded the Coast Pan Africanist Party. In March 1960 when efforts were made under the leadership of James Gichuru to form KANU, at the end  

102 Ibid., p.189. KAPU's Treasurer Burns Chokwe (brother of Mwinga Chokwe) presented a petition to the Sultan of Zanzibar which stated that it would be extremely difficult to separate the strip from Independent Kenya. See Mombasa Times, July 6, 1960, p.5.  
of April, the MFCP became the nucleus of KANU at the Coast. Francis Khamisi together with certain KADU officials had also been identified with the KANU movement.

Denis Akumu and his Coast Pan Africanists on the other hand refused to have anything to do with the organization so long as the currently elected officials remained in the office (MADU officials). In June KANU was registered after it conceded that Kenyatta could not hold office in the party for the time being. When by mid-June, the Mombasa branch of the new party was firmly established, MADU, MFCP and CPAP were merged into it. Akumu and his followers were denied office in the new branch of the party because of his initial reluctance to join the party. However, in his Annual Report, the D.C. for Mombasa noted that Akumu "grudgingly" supported the new party. When a vigorous recruitment of membership for KANU began, the union mainly attracted people of Luo and Kikuyu communities.

107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
On the other hand, when Ngala came back from his tour of the U.S.A., he refused to hold office in KANU. He had been in America for a 6 weeks tour at the invitation of the American African Institute to observe educational systems and industrial development, particularly those related to the Kenyan situation. Ngala together with Daniel Arap Moi made arrangements to start a rival party to KANU. At the Coast, Ngala founded the Coast African Political Union in May.112 Francis Khamisi supported the formation of CAPU which was championing regional interests similar to those of Moi's Kalenjin Political Alliance and Tipis' Masai United Front.113 The leadership of KANU at the Coast expelled Francis Khamisi from the party because of his support for Ngala's CAPU. However, on the persuasion of Masinde Muliro; Khamisi joined KAPP, a party which Tom Mboya calls "a skeleton of KNP".114 On joining the KAPP, Khamisi announced his dissociation with KANU on the ground that no democracy can survive without opposition.115

It was mentioned earlier how in July 1960, leaders of Coast African Political Union, Kalenjin Political Alliance, the Masai United Front, the Kenya African Peoples Party and the Somali National Association met in Ngong on Sunday, 10th July, 1960 and their deliberations led to the formation of KADU. After the Ngong meeting, Ngala convened a meeting of the Coast leaders at Mariakani

112 Mboya, Op. Cit., p.84.
113 K.N.A., Mombasa District Annual Report 1960, p.3.
115 K.N.A., Mombasa District Annual Report 1960, p.3.
to explain to them the reasons that led to the formation of KADU. He informed them that he intended to open a branch of KADU at the Coast for which he required their support.

Shekue Ali, Msanifu Kombo and Mwinga Chokwe (released from detention in 1959) refused to join KADU. They immediately called another meeting at Mombasa under the chairmanship of Maalim Juma Mohamed, an influential Muslim teacher. In that meeting, Maalim Juma Mohamed was elected President of KANU Coast branch, Mwinga Chokwe as Secretary, Abdalla Mwidau as Treasurer and Msanifu Kombo as Organizing Secretary. The meeting asked Msanifu Kombo to establish a Youth Wing of KANU to serve as a vanguard of party plans and interests at the Coast.

Before the registration of KADU Mombasa branch in November 1960, both Ronald Ngala and Francis Khamisi used CAPU officials such as Alex Karisa, Sammy Omar and Katana Juba to hold public meetings and win coast Africans to the side of KADU. KADU's Nairobi branch was registered in August. Before November, at the Coast, CAPU held meetings on its behalf including the recruitment of members. The fact that Ngala and Muliro were national President

117 Ibid.
118 O,1. with Mwinga Chokwe at Mzambarauni on 19th June, 1983.
119 Ibid.
120 K.N.A., Mombasa District Annual Report 1960, p.3.
and Vice-President of KADU respectively, gave impetus to members of the African Coastal Community and Abaluhyia ethnic groups to support CAPU.\textsuperscript{121} CAPU, KAPU, and KWADU respectively dissolved and were absorbed into KADU by the end of 1960.\textsuperscript{122}

It was not long before dissension developed within the KANU ranks. Akumu was dissatisfied with his position in the leadership in the coast branch and made a bid for the control of the party by conspiring to place many of his key supporters in the executive committee.\textsuperscript{123} This was thwarted, however, and resulted in the suspension of Akumu and his supporters from the executive committee.\textsuperscript{124} When Tom Mboya (the Party's General-Secretary) was consulted over the matter, he ruled against Akumu. This strained the friendly relations between Mboya and Akumu, and the latter set about the organization of his "Ginger Group" within KANU.\textsuperscript{125}

The "Ginger Group" in KANU was led by Denis Akumu also the General-Secretary of the Mombasa Dockworkers Union and Joseph Mathenge, the KANU leader in Nyeri.\textsuperscript{126} It opposed KANU's policy of

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid. Musa Amalemba after a meeting at Butere in mid 1960 founded the Buluhyia Political Union which supported KADU. This made the Abaluhyia in Mombasa view themselves as allies with CAPU in KADU against KANU. The Buluhyia Political Union later in the year opened a branch in Mombasa.
\textsuperscript{122} K.N.A., Coast Province Annual Report 1960, pp.2 - 3.
\textsuperscript{123} K.N.A., Mombasa District Annual Report 1960, p.4.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid. Akumu thought that the "Ginger Group" would add some leftist "spices" to the moderate politics of KANU. O.I. with Lucas Karisa.
\textsuperscript{126} Bennett and Rosberg, \textit{Op. Cit.}, p.129.
moderation and cooperation in its projected political and social programme after the elections of 1960. Bennett and Rosberg observed that Gichuru and Mboya had spoken of the need to ensure a continuous flow of capital into Kenya, the necessity for rapid economic development and the country's dependence on investment and non-African skills. They also stipulated that KANU would ensure that conditions were created and maintained which would foster confidence and guarantee security for investors and skilled persons. Moreover, KANU envisaged fair and just compensation to Europeans whose land would be expropriated after independence. Nevertheless the two leaders warned non-Africans against thinking in communal terms and asked them to cooperate in fostering rapid political and social development.

The "Ginger Group" felt that KANU should assign itself to purely African interests in Kenya and devote itself to the rapid development of African Socialism and the ideal of a United Africa. The focus of their attack was on KANU's envisaged compensation for land expropriated by the Independent Government in the former White Highlands. This, they felt, would inhibit the realisation of African Socialism by the impending African government. The group influenced the views expressed in the party's

127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
policy manifesto that was produced on 18th November, 1960. It then appears that the Ginger Group pioneered the conception of African Socialism in Kenya, a concept whose adoption was later to be expressed in the promulgation of Sessional Paper no.10 on African Socialism in 1965 by the KANU government.

The Ginger Group represented the extremist policies of KANU. But this group lost strength when two of its strongest adherents in Mombasa, Lucas Karisa, a Jibana, and Opar Mboya, a Luo, were convicted and imprisoned for managing an unlawful society in October 1960. They had formed the Mombasa Peoples' Congress Party, a secret organization under Denis Akumu in which Karisa and Mboya were Secretary and Organizing Secretary respectively. The party had been refused registration in 1959 as Mombasa Peoples Action Party because of its leftist policies. But after the government refused to register the party, under the new name, its leadership tried to awaken the working class people in Mombasa by distributing political leaflets from the Eastern communist countries. The unregistered party propagated the concepts of racial equality and equal distribution of property.

130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
132 O.I. with Lucas Karisa on 5th July, 1983 at Mombasa. Karisa is presently the Personnel Manager of Atta Ltd. of Mombasa.
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
It incited workers to boycott buses and abstain from smoking cigarettes and beer-drinking in Mombasa in October 1960.\(^\text{135}\) It was then that both Opar Mboya and Lucas Karisa were arrested and convicted of managing an illegal association.

With the arrest of Opar Mboya and Karisa, the Ginger Group was greatly weakened. The formation of the KANU Youth Wing under Msanifu Kombo eventually absorbed some of the adherents of the Ginger Group.\(^\text{136}\) Msanifu Kombo appointed a Giriama, Juma Gonda to help him in organizing Youth Wing activities in the province. The Ginger Group dissolved itself after the arrest of its radical members, nevertheless, its opposition to KANU's moderate policies had not gone unheeded. In the same year, KANU published an amended constitution which aimed at catering for the needs and aspirations of the Ginger Group.\(^\text{137}\)

The imprisonment of Lucas Karisa in October 1960 denied him the opportunity to serve as a Councillor in the Mombasa Municipal Council. He was a nominee of KANU.\(^\text{138}\) The new constitution of the Municipality had made certain changes in the communal representation. There were 5 European Wards, 8 Asian Wards and

\(^{135}\) Ibid.

\(^{136}\) O.I. with Msanifu Kombo.

\(^{137}\) K.N.A., Mombasa District Annual Report 1960, p.4.

\(^{138}\) O.I. with Lucas Karisa.
By October 1960, KADU Mombasa Branch was not registered and so Mombasa's first Municipal Council elections were an outright win for KANU. However, in November 1960 when a by-election was called to fill the seat of Lucas Karisa, KADU Mombasa Branch was registered and it raised a candidate to oppose the KANU candidate. Still, a KANU candidate won. KANU's councillors on the Council were Shekue Ali, Denis Akumu, Japheth Nyagah and J. Muriuki.

After 1960, the formal political sphere expanded considerably in Kilifi and Kwale districts. While Maalim Juma Mohamed, Mwinga Chokwe, Msanifu Kombo and Abdalla Mwidau led the KANU Mombasa branch, John Mambo, Ngala Kibanzu, Sammy Omar, Joseph Mugalla and Simon Msechu led the KADU group. Political support rallied behind Ronald Ngala and Mwinga Chokwe. Ngala attempted to bolster his political strength through the Mijikenda Union in which he was the Chairman since 1958. In 1960, after his accession to the Presidency of KADU, he left the chairmanship of the Mijikenda Union to Robert Matano an Education Officer in Kwale district who was a member of KADU. We have noted how both Robert Matano

140 Ibid., p.13.
141 O.I. with Shekue Ali.
142 Ibid.
143 See "Mijikenda Union Mombasa", File no.2167 in the Office of the Registrar of Societies.
and Ronald Ngala had been sponsored by CAA to Makerere University College in 1946. The Vice-Chairman of the Union was Rashid Mbwana, a staunch Digo trade unionist who had played a significant role in the activities of the AWF between 1947 - 1948. It would appear that Ngala's entrusting of leadership positions in the Union to Matano, a Duruma and Mbwana, a Digo, were meant to circumvent KANU's activities in Kwale district.

Muslim leaders in KANU led by Maalim Juma Mohamed, Msanifu Kombo and Shekue had mounted a massive campaign in 1960 to convert the Muslim Digo to KANU. Ronald Ngala had supported the birth of Kwale African Democratic Union in 1958 but the bulk of its membership comprised the Muslim Digo. KWADU led by Juma Bila Shaka, a Digo of Kwale had received the support of KANU officials in Mombasa in its series of representations to the authorities in 1960. In these representations, KWADU asserted that Africans did not accept the British agreement of 1895 with the Sultan of Zanzibar. KANU Muslim leaders in 1960 convinced the Digo to believe that KANU would have at heart the interests of Muslims and this explains why African Muslims in Kwale readily accepted

144 Ibid.
145 O.I. with Msanifu Kombo.
147 O.I. with Msanifu Kombo.
defection from KADU. Hamisi Rashid, a former Assistant Treasurer of KAU, Kwale Branch, recalls that when KADU opened a branch in Mombasa, "nearly all the Digo were KADU". He therefore was used by officials of KANU in Mombasa to open a sub-branch at Mtongwe from where recruitment campaigns were conducted. Mtongwe became an important point which witnessed frequent visits by the Mombasa based KANU leaders. Through these efforts, Swaleh Zileli and Ali Mbata were converted to KANU and as they were important Digo elders, they succeeded in converting several Digo to KANU.

David Parkin writes:

During the development of nationalist politics in the Kenya coastal area in the 1950's elders in the Mijikenda Union used their own and the Kaya elders' legitimacy to speak and act on behalf of the Mijikenda people in order to mobilise support at the local homestead level for the younger, urban-based politicians operating on an all-Kenya front against the British colonial government. ... 152

148 Ibid.
149 O.I. with Hamisi Rashid at Mombasa on 5th June, 1983.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
152 Parkin, Palms, Wine and Witnesses, p.90.
On his revitalization of the Mijikenda Union in 1958, Ngala as the Chairman of the Union met representatives of the nine Kayas in an office he established for the purpose at Mariakani every month. Since Ngala had the support of the nine Kaya elders, it is logical to argue that both Robert Matano and Rashid Mbwana were rendered similar support by the Kaya elders since they were sanctioned by Ngala. Hence the Mijikenda Union became an important vehicle through which KADU could entrench its support among the Mijikenda in 1960.

When Digo KANU leaders saw the danger inherent in the Mijikenda Union’s support for KADU, they formed the Digo Political Union in 1961. The Digo Political Union was formed to counter the Mijikenda support for KADU, the KANU Digo now felt that the Mijikenda Union "could not be their mouthpiece."

When the KANU Digo leaders formed the Digo Political Union as a rival organization to the Mijikenda Union, in August 1961, Ngala revived the Coast African Political Union. In this organization, Shabuun Mwakiroho, also a member of the Mijikenda Union, was instrumental in persuading the Digo of Likoni not to join KANU where their interests would be overlooked by its

153 O.I. with Suleiman Saidi Magogo.
154 O.I. with Msanifu Kombo.
upcountry leadership. The membership cards which CAPU officials issued read; "Coast African Political Union - Affiliated to Kenya African Democratic Union". The party aimed at uniting all 'tribes' and agitate for Uhuru and democracy. Moreover, it sought to awaken Africans to discover the meaning of democracy and opposed the use of force or intimidation in politics. CAPU called for a commitment to its objectives by its members. It exhorted Coast Africans to believe and promise to be loyal to the coast region. It further asked its members to sacrifice their lives, if necessary, to ensure the success of the region and abide with the law and order of the regional government. Lastly, the party urged its members to fight for freedom, democracy and regionalism.

The revival of CAPU came in the wake of increased political activity following the Lancaster House Conference of 1960. Abdullahi Nassir, a Swahili who had been an Organizing Secretary of Shekue Ali's MFCP had participated in the formation of African political organizations after the conference. When MFCP merged into KANU in 1960, he too became a member of KANU. However, he resigned in

156 O.I. with Shabaan Mwakiroho at Vienani, Likoni on 5th June, 1983. Mwakiroho still keeps his membership for KAU, MIJKENDA UNION, CAPU and KADU together with other documents.

157 Ibid.

158 These were the aims as inscribed on CAPU membership cards.

159 Ibid.

December because of what he termed Luo/Kikuyu imperialism. Nassir set up a Coast Employment Bureau for Coast people and demanded the replacement of upcountry workers at the coast by coastal people. He became a very outspoken proponent of Coast Autonomy through the Kenya Protectorate Peoples National Party in which he was a leader. The future of the Coastal Strip had been raised at Lancaster House and in 1961 the Coastal Arabs became more and more interested in their position under the 1895 Treaty signed between the British Government and the Sultan of Zanzibar. The Liwali for the Coast, Sheikh Salim Muhashamy speaking at the London Conference on the constitutional future of Kenya, urged Britain to retain her protection of the Coastal Strip under the 1895 Agreement. The Liwali feared that the Arab Community's rights and interests would not be adequately protected if power was ceded by Britain to "a Kenya (African) electorate."

The Arab and Swahili community at the coast feared upcountry political and economic domination. Because of this, Bennett and Rosberg note that they became receptive to an Arabic call of Umma Hai (the community is a live). Referring to the Coastal Strip, Nassir said: "We are ready at any time to sacrifice our lives in defending our country's sovereignty."

161 Ibid.
162 Ibid.
163 Ibid., pp.119 - 120.
164 See Mombasa Times, January 30, 1960, p.5.
165 Ibid.
167 Ibid.
The revival of CAPU in 1961 lent support to KADU and KANU in countering the *Mwambao* Movement. According to Hyder Kindy, the main parties which were advocating for Coast Autonomy were the Coastal League, Coast Peoples Party, Shungwaya Freedom Party and the Kenya Protectorate Peoples National Party. Salim notes that whereas leadership of the Coastal League was prepared for a continuation of a British Protectorate until such a time when the coastal people would be able to take over, the Coastal Peoples Party questioned the wisdom of allegiance to a sultanate which seemed reluctant to espouse the cause of its mainland subjects. Salim notes that whereas leadership of the Coastal League was prepared for a continuation of a British Protectorate until such a time when the coastal people would be able to take over, the Coastal Peoples Party questioned the wisdom of allegiance to a sultanate which seemed reluctant to espouse the cause of its mainland subjects.

The CPP was Mombasa based and drew support from the Arabs and the Swahili while KPPNP originated in Malindi in reaction to Mombasa political dominance. The Shungwaya Freedom Party was a Bajuni organization which addressed itself to social and political issues affecting the Bajuni and the coast in general.

CPP had enrolled some African Muslims, a Digo Rashid Bakuli was the Vice-President of the party. Three African parties; CAPU, KADU and KANU, denounced the Mijikenda who enrolled in the Mwambao parties as puppets of Arabs. Mwinga Chokwe referred to

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169 Salim, "The Movement for 'Mwambao'", pp.221 - 222.

170 Ibid.

171 Ibid.
them as "soldiers of fortune" who were being misused by Arabs.\footnote{O.I. with Mwinga Chokwe.}

During the elections of 1960 - 1961, KADU and KANU called on Africans in the Coastal Strip to boycott the polls for the Arab reserved seat in the protectorate.\footnote{Bennett and Rosberg, \textit{Op. Cit.}, p.124.} The boycott was engineered by KANU among the Africans in the Southern Coastal Strip and by KADU in the Northern Coastal Strip. A total of 21,000 electors boycotted the election in protest against Coastal Autonomy.\footnote{\textit{Daily Nation}, December 16, 1961, p.2.}

This demonstrated to the autonomists the negative feelings of rural Africans with regard to Coastal Autonomy. Land troubles were the basis of antagonism between Arabs and the Mijikenda in the Strip.\footnote{Bennett and Rosberg, \textit{Op. Cit.}, p.125.}

A further demonstration of this antagonism was evident in December 1961 when Ronald Ngala, the KADU President, led a public rally of the Mijikenda in Malindi on 15th December, 1961.\footnote{\textit{Daily Nation}, December 16, 1961, p.1.}

We have hitherto noted how the Malindi area was the worst hit by the squatter problem in the Coastal Strip. The rally was organized by Giriama leaders in Malindi led by Bakari Rarua and Menza Wa Shangia.\footnote{O.I. with Bakari Rarua at Malindi on 13th June, 1983. See also \textit{Daily Nation}, December 16, 1961, p.1.}
On this day, Ronald Ngala drove through the streets of Malindi towards the football ground in an open Land-Rover bearing the KADU flag and below it, the red flag of the Sultan of Zanzibar at half-mast. A leader of the Giriama KADU Women's Wing, Fatuma Nzai, pulled down the Sultan's flag amidst cheers by a huge crowd. Ngala on that occasion said: "Today we have lowered the Sultan's flag at Malindi but it will be finally be buried at the London Constitutional Conference in February." 179

He explained that the flag lowering was not a sign of enmity as Africans wished to live peacefully alongside people of other races. But it was their wish to remove all foreign flags. 180 He added that Sir James Robertson's Report would be null and void as far as the Africans were concerned if it did not fulfill the five conditions which the majority of coast people wanted met. These were: Immediate abrogation of the 1895 Treaty; incorporation of Mwambao with the rest of the province; no further agreements with the Sultan of Zanzibar or any other foreign country; a federal type of constitution to ensure freedom of the individual; and an administration on the lines of that constitution. 181

178 O.I. with Bakari Rarua at Malindi on 13th June, 1983. See also Daily Nation, 16th December, 1961, p.1.
179 Ibid.
180 Ibid.
The James Robertson's Report was a study led by Sir James Robertson to recommend to the Sultan and the British government on changes considered advisable in the agreement relating to the Coastal Strip of Kenya as a result of the constitutional development in East Africa.\(^{182}\) When the Report was published, KANU leaders welcomed it as it boosted the desire for a United Kenya under a unitary type of constitution.\(^{183}\) Mwinga Chokwe in a press release after a meeting of KANU delegates from the Coast Province to review the Report reiterated KANU's commitment to the rights of individuals to be recognised under Kenya's new constitution. On the question of compensation to the Sultan, he remarked:

\[\ldots\] compensation to the Sultan of Zanzibar will not be the concern of Kenya Government as the Sultan has already taken enough money so far. If H.M.G. wishes to pay him more money, it should not be the concern of the future African Government.\(^{184}\)

Moreover, he asked the autonomists to forget their demands and join hands with the nationalists to work for the immediate independence of Kenya. Sir James Robertson had reported against the autonomy of the Coastal Strip on economic, ethnic and political grounds.\(^{185}\) He had noted that the Strip's annual deficit of £955,000 would be

\(^{182}\) Salim, "The Movement of 'Mwambao'", p.222.
\(^{185}\) Salim, "The Movement for 'Mwambao'", p.222.
increased by the need to create new services and governmental institutions. Moreover, its boundaries would cut across ethnic territories of Giriama, Pokomo, and Duruma all of whom were anti-Mwambao. According to the Report, the Arabs, Swahili and Bajuni totalled to 37,000 as opposed to 300,000 Africans, 48,000 Asians and 7,000 Europeans. Robertson made a valid observation that if a hostile upcountry African government in Kenya wished to excite agitation and disorder, the Coastal state would not be able to defend itself.

Robert Mambo argues that the Mijikenda resistance to autonomy was characterised by two basic factors; firstly, they were concerned over the dangers of alienating an important zone of Kenya to an alien power and secondly, there were Mijikenda squatters scattered here and there from Malindi to Vanga. These two factors gave the Mijikenda a real motive force to oppose the Mwambao Movement.

However, in response to Sir James Robertson's Report in December 1961, Abdillahi Nassir, the KPPNP said that "recommendations in the Report were utterly unacceptable." The KPPNP felt that

187 Ibid.
188 Mambo, "Colonial Rule and Political Activity", p.32.
189 Ibid.
a great deal still depended on the Sultan of Zanzibar. Its leaders would fight for Coastal Autonomy till they won the struggle. The Mwambao parties planned to visit the Sultan of Zanzibar over the issue. Saidi Omar Abubakar bin Yusuf of the Coastal League called for the ten-mile Strip to revert to the Sultan of Zanzibar should the 1895 Treaty be abrogated. He claimed that Sir James Robertson had spent insufficient time at the coast to fully appreciate the high regard in which the Sultan was held by his subjects. Abubakar Madhubuti of the Central Bajuni Association dismissed the Report as "a financial transaction between the Sultan and the British to placate Kenya in particular and East Africa in general."

The Mijikenda were not silent to these numerous outcries. CAPU on 31st December, 1961 urged that the talks on the Coastal Strip in March 1962 should be between the Sultan of Zanzibar and the indigenous people of the Coast. Its Secretary Sammy Omar pointed out that "members of the Mijikenda tribes are the only people apart from the British government and the Sultan of Zanzibar", who should be concerned in these talks.

191 Ibid.
193 Ibid.
194 Ibid.
196 Ibid., p.3.
Moreover, Ngala in response to Arab attacks over his lowering the Sultan's flag in Malindi convened a KADU district conference in Mombasa on 1st January, 1962. The meeting resolved to break off "diplomatic relations" with autonomists and to boycott their traders in the town. Furthermore, KADU was to devise ways of breaking the Mwambao United Front. **197**

The Mwambao United Front was formed in preparation for the Second Lancaster House Conference in March 1962. **198** The Mijikenda Union under Robert Matano, in an attempt to influence the outcome of the impending talks on the Coastal Strip in London, demonstrated opposition to the activities of the autonomists by organizing a massive procession in Mombasa. This involved a march from Likoni to Makadara Ground carrying an image of Rashid Omar Bakuli, the Digo Vice-President of the CPP. At Makadara, Bakuli was burnt in effigy. **199** Here it was decided that the Mijikenda would despatch a delegation to Zanzibar to see the Sultan. **200** The delegation was led by the Union's Chairman Robert Matano and it included other

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197 Ibid.  
198 Salim, "The Movement for 'Mwambao'", p.222.  
199 O.I. with Mwinga Chokwe. Bakuli is now an Islamic Marriage Officer at Mwembe Tayari Mombasa. During the interview with this researcher, he appeared very sensitive to the issue of Coast Autonomy and refused to divulge any information about it. However, this researcher came to understand his role through other informants or old copies of newspapers reporting on this period.  
200 Ibid.
nationalists like Mwinga Chokwe and Birya Masha, and a Kaya representative from each of the nine sub-ethnic groups. The spokesman of the Kaya elders was Birya Masha.

The Sultan of Zanzibar was not interested in having a territory along the Kenya Coast and promised to ensure that it would revert to the indigenous people of the Coast. However, the fate of the Coastal Strip was finally decided in London at the Kenya Coastal Strip Conference which was sitting at the same time with the Kenya Constitutional Conference. The Sultan's Legal advisor Mr. Dingle Foot stated in the Conference that the Sultan was more interested in the welfare of his subjects than in preserving his sovereignty.

In London Omar Bassadiq, the leader of the Mwambao United Front insisted that the Strip be given Independence because there was the necessary manpower and population in the Strip to establish it as a viable economic and political entity. During the Conference, Sir James Robertson recommended the abrogation of the Treaty made with the Sultan of Zanzibar in 1895 and in consequence, the payment to the Sultan of £1,000,000.

201 Ibid. Note that Robert Matano succeeded Ronald Ngala as the Chairman of the Mijikenda Union in 1960 when Ngala became the President of KADU. See "Mijikenda Union Mombasa", File No.2167, in the Office of the Registrar of Societies in Nairobi.


204 Ibid., p.6.
both Abdillahi Nassir and Omar Bassadiq admitted that in London, the idea of Coastal Autonomy "never left the ground." Consequently, the MUF crumbled rapidly.

Although the idea of autonomy was defeated in London, the last effort for Coastal Autonomy was made by the CPP in Mombasa after the outcome of the London Conference on the Coastal Strip. When the Regional Boundaries Commission, set up by the British government after the Lancaster House Conference of 1962 to fix regional boundaries, visited the Coast in September 1962 under the Chairmanship of Sir Stafford Forster Sutton, the CPP submitted a memorandum to the commission. The Commission had studied Sir Robertson's Report, yet the CPP in its memorandum protested against the Report and said that the party still aimed for Independence for Mwambao. A delegation of the Mijikenda Union and the Digo Political Union supporters on 18th September, 1962 claimed that the Coastal Strip would be the nucleus of the proposed Region. However, the Mijikenda were ready to join with any "nearer ethnic groups" in the Coast from Vanga to Tana, Somali and Taita Districts to form the Coast Region.

207 Ibid.
Salim argues that with the collapse of the Movement for Mwambao Autonomy, what facilitated Coastal Peoples' decision to forgo all their aspirations for separation and opt for full integration with the colony was the appeal of KADU's regionalism. Mwinga Chokwe observed that most of the advocates for Mwambao autonomy joined KADU where they could "find solace in tribalism." The influence of the Mwambao advocates who had joined CAPU and KADU was to be reflected in these parties' deliberations. The autonomists who now feared the wrath of the indigenous Africans broke the Mwambao United Front and sought a provincial autonomy for the Coast by supporting CAPU. CAPU's regional approach and its campaign against the upcountry ethnic communities especially the Luo and Kikuyu resulted in conflicts with KANU. CAPU together with the former parties of the Mwambao United Front such as Shungwaya Freedom Party and the Coastal League formed the Coast Province United Front. The campaigns of these parties made the Coast Africans more politically conscious than ever before as it resulted to a large-scale increase in the support for KADU. The District Commissioner for Mombasa was later to note that KADU in the minds of the indigenous Coastal African was synonymous with CAPU.

210 O.I. with Mwinga Chokwe.
211 Ibid.
213 Ibid.
It appears CAPU had become very militant and its activities had contributed to the growth of fear in the ranks of the Mwambao advocates. The number of cases of violence in which CAPU was involved was rising. On 3rd January, 1962, Chokwe, the KANU leader, was threatened by a mob at his residence in Tudor, Mombasa. The assault on Chokwe's residence was led by a Giriama called Charo Kalama. In March, CAPU's Assistant Treasurer, Katana Juba, in a meeting at Kongowea urged the P.C. of the Coast Province to remove all upcountry chiefs or sub-chiefs in Mombasa from office. CAPU envisaged nomination of Coastal Chiefs and sub-chiefs to take over the posts. During the same month, Sammy Omar asked CAPU and KADU leaders to refrain from answering a call to strike at any one time since such strikes had KANU political motives. He suggested that "when KANU supporters strike at the Coast", unemployed KADU supporters "should take up their positions." It was mostly CAPU adherents who provided this kind of labour.

CAPU's activities and militancy were accentuated by the conditions in Mombasa's adjacent hinterland. The reserves were struck by famine in 1962 which caused an influx of the Mijikenda

216 Most of the trade union leaders at the Coast were from upcountry and mostly KANU followers.
into Mombasa in search of employment.\textsuperscript{218} CAPU was quick to exploit the situation by propagating the view that their joblessness was due to upcountry monopoly of jobs in Mombasa. It considered Mombasa as their legitimate place of employment.\textsuperscript{219} Alex Karisa, its President, capitalised on this to coin the slogan "Wabara Kwao", an epithet which suggested that upcountry ethnic groups should leave the Coast Region.\textsuperscript{219} This became the dominant theme and was even expressed in songs composed by CAPU's Youth Wing to echo the ideal of Coast Regional Autonomy.\textsuperscript{220}

Alex Karisa and Sammy Omar, the two outstanding leaders in CAPU suggested that the only way to overcome the Kikuyu and Luo working monopoly in Mombasa was by a show of force.\textsuperscript{221} In April 1962, CAPU adherents did in fact take over forcibly the jobs of some Kikuyu Municipal Sweepers saying that they had deprived them of their right to work. This was in protest against the Kikuyu monopoly in the Cleansing Department of the Municipality. On 9th April, 1962, CAPU men told Municipal sweepers; "upcountry Africans will no longer sweep the roads of Mombasa".\textsuperscript{222} On the same day, two Taita men were beaten by CAPU supporters after they

\textsuperscript{218} K.N.A., Mombasa District Annual Report 1962, p.3.
\textsuperscript{219} O.I. with Duncan Baya at Mombasa on 18th May, 1983.
\textsuperscript{220} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{221} O.I. with Sammy Omar at Mombasa on 6th May, 1983.
\textsuperscript{222} East African Standard, April 10, 1962, p.5.
shouted "Uhuru na Umoja" (Independence and Unity). Gangs of CAPU Youth Wingers led by Shabaan Mustafa and Sulubu Ndoro brought the "Wabara Kwao" slogan to the Port where they were working. Because of the tension created by this, the Dock Workers Union controlled by upcountry elements threatened to call a general strike if employers accepted CAPU's imposed labour.

CAPU in reaction to the threat made by the Dock Workers Union led by Denis Akumu, formed the Coast General Workers Union entrusted with the task of breaking the stranglehold then held by upcountry people in the local trade unions. Its leader was Wilson Mongo. The clash between these two unions resulted in much recrimination and on several occasions violence was threatened and the police had often to intervene. The Coast General Workers Union did not affiliate itself to the Kenya Federation of Labour since the latter was controlled by KANU adherents. After a representative meeting of coast workers, Wilson Mongo, the Acting General Secretary said that the new union was "dedicated to the preservation of the rights and interests of the workers of coast origin." The officials of the new Union felt that since their

223 Ibid.
224 O.I. with Safari Yeri at Mombasa on 13th May, 1983. See also K.N.A., Mombasa District Annual Report 1962, p.3.
225 Ibid.
226 Ibid.
Union's formation was a result of tension in Mombasa between upcountry Africans and the Coastal people, the KANU dominated Kenya Federation of Labour would be used by KANU as a political instrument to interfere with the local affairs.228

Ngala's political hold on the Mijikenda was strengthened through the Local KADU branches at the Coast, the Mijikenda Union and Coast African Political Union. Moreover he was able to exercise a lot of influence on the Arab and Swahili Community through the Coast United Front since all these organizations backed the concept of autonomy of the Coastal Region. In an attempt to influence the Taita who were mostly KANU, Ngala used Simon Msechu, KADU's executive officer to convert a few. For instance, during his tour of Taita-Taveta, Ngala warned the Taita that KANU's policy of a Unitary System would bring lowlands and National parks under the control of the Central Government after independence. At the climax of this tour, over one thousand Taitas passed a vote of no confidence in Dawson Mwanyumba, the Taita KANU leader.229

228 Ibid.

229 East African Standard, July 23, 1962, p.5. Dawson Mwanyumba was one of Ngala's opponents in 1957 for the Coast Constituency Seat. The others were Claudius Mwashumbe, Francis Khamisi, and Jimmy Jeremiah.
It was this growing strength of Ngala that KANU wanted to undermine. In an attempt to diffuse the local base of Ngala's political strength, Chokwe raised up in 1963 Ngala's cousin, Killian Ngala in order to draw away some of Ronald Ngala's Giriama support. 230 As we noted in Chapter two, Killian Ngala had failed to establish a branch of the African Workers Federation and had thereafter concentrated on his teaching profession at Mwabaya Nyundo Catholic Mission. 231 He had been a KAU member and a partner of Gideon Rimber in the Coast African Milk Traders Syndicate, an organization which pioneered Coast African trade in Milk in 1946. 232 As noted before, Gideon Rimber was the first Provincial Chairman of KAU Mombasa branch whom Chokwe succeeded after his death.

Chokwe tried to bolster the influence of Killian Ngala through the financial sponsorship channelled through him by upcountry politicians for Coastal candidates where KANU was very strong. 233 Chokwe's attempts were not successful since the strength of Ngala in the Northern Reserve was buttressed by influential

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230 O.I. with Francis Ngonyo. Ngonyo is a younger brother of the late Killian Ngala.
231 Ibid.
232 Ibid.
233 Ibid.
men like Birya Masha, Julius Mwatsama, Alex Karisa and Sammy Omar. In the Southern Reserve, Ngala had the support of Robert Matano, Rashid Mbwana and Kassim Mwamzandi. Ngala had represented the Coast Province since 1957, remaining closely in touch with the Mijikenda, more particularly with his own Giriama people of Kilifi district. It appears, Chokwe's choice of Killian Ngala was influenced by the disastrous performance of an independent candidate in the 1960 - 61 elections called Seif Suleman, a member of KANU. Bennett and Rosberg observe that Ngala's hold over the Giriama was demonstrated by his retention of 98% of the poll.

Kenya thus attained independence amidst factional rivalry at the Coast. Inter-party tension and party propaganda had made the Mijikenda receptive to politics of regionalism. From the point of view of Sammy Omar, CAPU's Secretary, the Mijikenda desired to uplift their position and the question was how to do it. Political control was perceived as a means of securing economic power, hence the slogan \textit{Wabara Kwao}. Unemployment among the

\begin{footnotes}

234 O.I. with Julius Mwatsama at Rabai on 19th June, 1983.

235 \textit{Ibid}.

236 Bennett and Rosberg, \textit{Op. Cit.}, p.164. May be Chokwe thought that if pitted against a relative (Killian Ngala and Ronald Ngala were cousins) Ngala's home political support would be shaken. However Killian Ngala too performed disastrously in the 1963 elections.

237 \textit{Ibid}.

238 O.I. Sammy Omar.
\end{footnotes}
Mijikenda and drought conditions in the hinterland in the year 1962 made CAPU's struggle essentially an economic struggle. They also were suffering from the effects of the colonial policy of detention of vagrants, tax defaulters and breakers of the Native Liquor Ordinance of 1930. There was an average number of 469 detention lock-ups per year. Moreover, the squatter problem as we have demonstrated had not been alleviated. These diverse conditions contributed to the entrenchment of ethnic and regional aspirations which persisted until the dissolution of KADU in 1964.

When Ngala called for the dissolution of KADU, CAPU's members were advised to join KANU. However, this was not without protest from some members. Khadija Chai, a Giriama leader of the Women's Wing of KADU insisted that if the men could not fight upcountry people, the women would. Nevertheless, both CAPU and KADU had contributed to the weakening of the Mwambao Movement. Many Mwambao rallies had been interrupted and broken by CAPU and KADU Youth Wingers. In 1963 institutionalised power was laid in the hands of an African Government led by KANU. Throughout 1964, the KANU government under Jomo Kenyatta devoted all its energies to the destruction of the Majimbo constitution.

240 O.I. with Elkana Young at Mombasa on 9th May, 1983.
241 O.I. with Safari Yeri. Yeri is a former CAPU Youth Winger.
It refused to implement the full provisions of this constitution. The Mijikenda groups, except for some Digo, were one of the leading groups in KADU. The defeat of KADU by KANU meant a loss of what the Mijikenda stood for in the new emerging political environment.
CONCLUSION

The primary concern of this study is the place of the Mijikenda of Kilifi and Mombasa districts in the politics of the Kenya Coast from 1920 to 1963. Their contribution to politics in the area is especially demonstrated by the role they played in the resistance against colonial land, labour and taxation policies. The thesis has tried to demonstrate how these policies led to the Mijikenda's political activities.

The central hypothesis in the study is that Mijikenda political activities in Kilifi District between 1920 and 1963 were responses to three important questions. The first of these was the exclusion of the Mijikenda in the appropriation of land rights in the Coastal Strip through the establishment of the Nyika Reserves in the immediate coastal hinterland. Taxation, and colonial labour policies were the other two, but the impact of these policies on the Mijikenda was aggravated by a constant lack of sufficient rainfall in the Northern Nyika Reserve. Colonial land, labour and taxation policies were devices used by the government to facilitate the entrenchment of the colonial settler economy in the protectorate. European settler corporations and Arab owners in the Strip were officially accorded rights to participate in the settler economy. But Mijikenda and other Coastal Africans were to be reduced to the
status of wage labourers in this economy. This policy was realised through the enactment and enforcement of colonial law.

The Mijikenda were forced to migrate from the reserves into the Coastal Strip for alternative sources of livelihood as squatters, wage labourers on European plantations or as casual workers in Mombasa. However, the challenges posed by these new occupations paved the way for the rise of a new type of leadership for the Mijikenda among some of the educated elite. This emergent leadership formed various ethnically based organizations and participated in other inter-ethnic ones through which they could express the grievances of the Mijikenda.

Furthermore, it was demonstrated that land as a fundamental resource of production was inalienable according to the Mijikenda customary law. It was shown how despite the fact that the Mijikenda were at the Kenya Coast long before the Al-Busaidi Sultanate established its political and economic hegemony in Zanzibar in the early 19th century, it was on the basis of the claims by immigrant members of the Sultanate that the so called native land rights in the Coastal Strip were judged. Thus, the British overlooked the Mijikenda land rights in the Strip by

* See Chapter One pp.10 - 20.
recognising the rights of Arab immigrant occupiers of land in the area. It was also illogical for the British to sanction the recognition and granting of land rights in the area in accordance with the Muslim law of land tenure. It was outlined how the Mijikenda subscribed to their traditional law of land tenure under the auspices of the Enyi-tsi. It was therefore wrong for the British to recognise land claims by members of a distant Sultanate without first considering the traditional system of land tenure among the indigenous peoples and honouring their land interests in the area accordingly.

The British recognised the Sultan's sovereignty over the Coastal Strip without prior consent of or consultation with the indigenous peoples of the Kenya Coast. This served their imperial aims in the coastal hinterland in which both the British and the Zanzibaris had economic and political interests. Since there were few European settlers in the area, the British strengthened the settler force in the Strip by including Arabs as participants in the settler economy. The occupation and ownership of vast tracts of land in the Strip by those communities would deny the Mijikenda accessibility to land in the area and make them dependent on European and Arab settler agriculture. Thus, the British and the
Zanzibaris were two fellow soldiers of fortune in the creation of a capitalist economy which suited their imperial aims. We have explained how the Al-Busaidi economic interests in the Kenya Coast undermined the Mijikenda tenurial practices in the hinterland and altered the previously amicable relationship with the Mazrui Arabs through the impact of pre-colonial mercantile capital. However, while this capital stimulated the adaptation and reshaping of the productive structure in the area to meet the export demand, the diversion of capital and labour from other sectors of the local economy that was involved in this process did not create a high degree of dependence among the Mijikenda. The majority of the people still had access to their land as an important resource of production and livelihood.

When the colonial policy-makers envisaged the creation of a Mijikenda labour force on the European plantations through the provision of unfavourable conditions such as the establishment of the Nyika Reserves, incessant taxation and other related policies, these policies conflicted with the interests of the Mijikenda. They responded to the infertility of the soil and climatic conditions in the area by drifting back into the Coastal * See Chapter One pp.6-10.
Strip mostly as squatters on the so called Crown and Arab freehold land. The colonial government was disconcerted by this state of affairs and sought to curtail squatters' privileges through the 1918 Resident Natives Act. When the new conditions brought about by this kind of legislation made squatter agriculture un Rewarding, many squatters drifted into Mombasa to seek for casual labour.* Furthermore, the local effects of the World Depression increased the squatters' drift into Mombasa.

It was demonstrated that wage labourers on the plantations in the district were unhappy about harsh working conditions on these plantations. Mijikenda labourers therefore deserted employment on the plantations and migrated to Mombasa for casual work.** Because of massive desertions from the plantations, the colonial officials in Kilifi district resorted to the detention of tax defaulters to work on the plantations as labourers. Thus, it can be argued that the political reaction among the Mijikenda in the district was a response to the way the society was transformed by forces of the colonial political economy. In this regard, while the beneficiaries of the settler mode of production namely the Arabs in the area collaborated with the colonial administrators, the Mijikenda became discontented since this economy undermined their economic rights and interests.

* See Chapter One pp.25 - 28.
** See Chapter Two pp.30 - 34.
Thus, Mijikenda political behaviour such as preference for squatter living and opposition to Arab control of Mijikenda squatters together with desertion of Mijikenda labourers from the plantations was a conscious resistance to efforts to exclude them from their means of production. This behaviour was a manifestation of a conscious resistance which had taken the form of non-cooperation. It is easy to understand why the Mijikenda expressed their political discontent in this way. An example was given of how the colonial policy-makers attempted to dislodge the Giriama from their roles as producers by alienating their land for the use of capitalist metropolitan corporations. The Giriama responded in a violent uprising against British rule. Other Mijikenda peoples participated in the uprising in varying degrees and made it virtually a Mijikenda affair. This uprising was suppressed and the Mijikenda were made to pay heavy fines. It is therefore easy to understand why the Mijikenda future political discontent took the form of non-cooperation. The Mijikenda saw the futility of violent rebellion in the face of a ruthless and well-armed imperialist government.

In short, there was a continuous open and conscious opposition by the Mijikenda of the region to exclusion from their most fundamental resource of production and livelihood.

* See Chapter One pp.21 - 24.
This opposition took many forms from the time of the imposition of colonial rule to the time of Kenya's independence. We submit that the emergence of an elite leadership and its participation in political organizations was one form of this conscious resistance. The first political organization among the Mijikenda came up in 1931 against a background of adverse economic circumstances and it addressed itself to the immediate Mijikenda problems related to land rights, taxation and other unfavourable colonial economic policies. Thus, the Young Nyika Association was the precursor of the Mijikenda Union.

In our account of the rise of political organizations among the Mijikenda, evidence has been provided to show how political organization in the area received an impetus from upcountry politics as shown by the activities of KCA and KAU. Whereas KCA merely encouraged the formation of the Young Nyika Association, KAU was involved in the enrolment of the Mijikenda educated elites as members of the union from the late 1940's. This enrolment increased in the early 1950's at a time when denial of squatter privileges by the land owning Arabs often led to open conflict between the Arabs and the squatters. It was upon these unresolved land grievances that KAU was able to propagate its radical brand of
political activism. The conclusion can thus be drawn that continued deprivation of land rights in the Coastal Strip by the government and the Arab land owners made the Mijikenda easily receptive to the ideas of Mau Mau activists in 1952 and 1953.

We have also explored how the Mijikenda participated in district political organizations between 1955 and 1960. In so doing, we emphasized the development of political conflicts which at times took ethnic dimensions and created serious dissension in the parties. In our analysis of the two parties (KAPU and MADU) which operated in the area of study, we made a valid observation that they did not formulate nor promulgate a clear-cut economic and political program that would cater for the interests of the vast majority of their members. They occupied themselves with the denunciation of Arab land rights in the Coastal Strip without stipulating what they felt would be the acceptable basis of land subdivision and re-allocation in the Coastal Strip. Therefore, these parties did not come out with what one may call their political blue-print of Kenya's economic future and how they were going to safeguard the interests of Africans in the area against those of Arab and European land owners in the Strip.
With the emergence of colony-wide political parties in 1960, the Mijikenda and other Coastal Africans aligned themselves with various upcountry politicians. These alignments gave rise to a serious factional rivalry at the Coast in which the Mijikenda of Kilifi district were caught. The participation of the Mijikenda of the district in the political activities of these parties both in Mombasa and Kilifi district was accentuated by increased unemployment among the Mijikenda. In the study, there is evidence that the drought conditions of the early 1960's in Mombasa's immediate hinterland and the resultant famine in the Nyika Reserves forced a big number of the Mijikenda to migrate to the city in search of employment opportunities. However, faced with the increasing problem of unemployment in the city and competition for job opportunities with upcountry migrant workers, the Mijikenda came to believe that their problem of unemployment in the city was caused by job monopoly by upcountry ethnic groups. Thus, this resentment of upcountry job monopoly in Mombasa was often expressed in open political conflicts.

The alignment of the Mijikenda leaders with the leading upcountry politicians in either KANU or KADU made them agreeable to these parties' adoption of a land programme which offered no major structural transformation in land relations at the Kenya Coast. These leaders like their upcountry colleagues
in KANU and KADU did not seek to alter the foreign ownership of the huge commercial and industrial enterprises which had under colonialism upheld a state of dependency among its African workers through constant exploitation and oppression. This study has described some of the activities of industrial unrest in Mombasa which were sparked off by extremes of colonial exploitation and oppression by these enterprises. Thus, while the impact of pre-colonial mercantile capital had introduced some degree of dependency among the Mijikenda, the colonial settler economy and exploitation of African labour in the urban industrial and commercial concerns entrenched this dependency among the Mijikenda. In essence, this explains the origin and continuous process of underdevelopment among the Mijikenda since pre-colonial mercantile capital and colonial policy-makers systematically incorporated the Mijikenda's local economy into the world of capitalism.

Nevertheless, when we look at the role of the various political organizations described in the study, it becomes clear that the Mijikenda played an important part in the politics of the Kenya Coast and the entire pre-independent Kenya. In my opinion these numerous activities were manifestations of a conscious opposition by the Mijikenda to colonial land, labour and taxation policies.
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III. NEWSPAPERS

IV. BOOKS


LIST OF INFORMANTS, THEIR ETHNIC GROUPS AND THE
DATES OF INTERVIEW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Ethnic Community</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abdalla Mwanzimo</td>
<td>Digo</td>
<td>5th May, 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashid Omar Bakuli</td>
<td>Digo</td>
<td>6th May, 1983</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sammy Omar</td>
<td>Rabai</td>
<td>6th May, 1983</td>
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<td>Abdalla Mwidau</td>
<td>Digo</td>
<td>7th May, 1983</td>
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23. John Paul Kambi
24. Maurice Mboja
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26. Francis Ngonyo
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28. Biryā Masha
29. Masha wa Kalama
30. Muthengi wa Sofa
31. Nyambu wa Mupe
32. Shindo wa Dzomba
33. Charo wa Cheya
34. Justin Ponda
35. Lawrence Bennett
36. Julius Mwatsama
37. Mwinga Chokwe
38. Francis Khamisi
39. Gideon Ngetsa
40. Ezekiel Karisa
41. Ngala Tuva
42. Johnston Mramba

Digo
Kauma
Rabai
Giriama
Giriama
Giriama
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Giriama
Descendant of Freed Men

5th June, 1983
7th June, 1983
8th June, 1983
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Appendix 2.

DISTRIBUTION OF KAYAS IN THE MIJKENDA COUNTRY

ADAPTED FROM: T. Spear, KAYA COMPLEX, p. 2
Appendix 3.

CLASSIFICATION OF LAND AT THE COAST BY 1960.