THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND FERTILITY BEHAVIOUR AMONG SELECTED ASIAN GROUPS IN NAIROBI

By

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A Thesis Submitted in Fulfilment for Degree
of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of Nairobi.

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This Thesis is my original work and has not been
presented for a degree in any other University.

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This Thesis has been submitted for examination with
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

The main hypothesis in this study was that people's socio-economic conditions will influence their decisions about family size and family planning.

Most of the studies on fertility tend to either focus on macro-level aggregate variables, or at the micro-level, they tend to be limited to economic interpretations. In order to overcome some of the weaknesses of macro-level studies of fertility, the present study attempted to examine at micro-level the relationship between group-level socio-economic conditions and family size by focusing on particular Asian* groups in Nairobi.

A one-shot comparative research design was adopted for the study. The research design was intended to identify different and contrasting, yet internally homogeneous groupings or communities in order to permit generalizations on the Asian community in Kenya. The Asian population living in Nairobi was chosen both to control for regional variations and also because Nairobi has the largest proportion of the Asian population in

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*   In this study the term Kenyan Asians refers to persons of Indian or Pakistani origin. Sometimes the Kenyan Asians are referred to as Indians. Therefore in this study the term Asian and Indian are used interchangeably.

Kenya. A purposive selection of communities was
undertaken to maximize selection of different ethnic
and religious communities, and internal to each
community, respondents were picked through systematic
random sampling. The four communities chosen for the
present study were two Muslim communities, the Ismailies
and the Lohars, and two Hindu communities, the Shahs
and the Suthars. The basic tools for data collection
were the interview schedule for couples, key informant
interviews and available data.

The major findings of the study were that the
Asians are of a much higher socio-economic status
than the rest of the national population, as measured
by income, education and occupation levels as well as
levels of living scales. However, there are internal
differences among the Asians. The exposure and westerni-
zation scales also reflect considerable internal variations
between the sample groups. The Ismailies consistently
are at the top on most of the socio-economic measures
followed closely by the Shahs and Suthars, with the
Lohars at the bottom, being a very traditional community.

As anticipated in the Demographic Transition
Theory, some of these factors are related to family
size, whereby the least westernized group wants and has
more children than the more westernized groups. The

study showed that the Asians have a small family size
of less than four children which is considerably
lower than the national average of 8 children. The
majority of them want small families and tend to
achieve this goal through modern and traditional
contraceptive use. There were variations in family
size between the communities, so that the Lohars had
and wanted more children than the other groups. An
interpretive scheme was developed to guide the study
and to assist in the analysis of the relevant socio-
economic factors related to fertility behaviour.
Some of the socio-economic factors influencing the
decisions of the Asians regarding family size and family
planning appear to be aspirations to western life styles,
occupation, preference for sons, education, perceived
mobility and community.

The Asian emphasis on the 'quality' of children
rather than 'quantity' stands out significantly in
the study. Groups of higher socio-economic status
wanted and had fewer children because of the very high
costs of educating and raising them. Education is seen
as a major cost, as most Asian parents put a high premium
on education. This is probably related to the perception
of insecurity by the Asians in Kenya, and the possibility
of their eventual emigration from there. Because their
orientation is towards western countries, a move to the

competitive West would require higher education levels
for their children in order to get employment. Besides,
a large number of children would make settlement in
the West difficult, since these countries advocate
small family sizes and emphasize the costs of children.

While education correlated highly with the number
of children, on the basis of regression analysis, the
study concluded that education is only one of the factors
influencing the number of children Asian couples have.
It is argued that education encompasses very many other
important social and economic variables, and that in
examining the influence of education, we are talking
of the confounding effects of many other variables.

Overall, the independent variables in the study
explained about 30% of the variance in the number of
children people have. This implies that a large amount
of the variation would have to be accounted for in
further research.

In conclusion, it has been possible to demonstrate
in this study that the analysis of fertility behaviour
at the macro-level is a narrow approach and does not
adequately offer explanations for decisions about the
number of children. Through the technique of comparative
analysis it has been possible to show that fertility

behaviour is influenced by socio-economic conditions
specific to certain groups and communities. One
policy implication of such findings is that population
policies at the national level should not apply
universally to the whole country.

LIST OF TABLES

ix

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

CHAPTER ONE

PROBLEM STATEMENT AND FOCUS OF STUDY.

According to the Kuhn (1954) tradition, any
scientific study can be based on the analysis and investi-
gation of a gap existing either in the methodology or the
theoretical model relevant to any given problem. In this
respect one can find gaps in existing studies of fertility.
Most of the massive literature on fertility tends to
focus on macro-level, aggregate variables related to family
size and family planning.[1] Borrowing heavily from the
Demographic Transition theory, the studies concentrate on
rather generalized macro-level factors and processes like
per capita GNP, industrialization, urbanization, which do
not provide an adequate understanding of a complex, individual
level behaviour such as that which determines family size.
The present study therefore hopes to bridge this gap
and overcome some of the weaknesses of macro-level studies
of fertility behaviour, by examining, at micro-level,
the relationship between group level socio-economic
conditions and family size among the different Asian groups
in Kenya.

Moreover, studies which attempt to explain fertility
behaviour from a micro-level perspective, very often
tend to use mainly economic models, and are based on
conceptual frameworks derived from western urban
experiences which are not necessarily applicable
to all situations, and especially to the Third World

countries.[2] The study therefore attempts to highlight
the complex set of factors involved in explaining
fertility behaviour in different contexts by focusing
on particular Asian groups in specific and diverse
situations.

According to Y. Ghai (1970) the Asians in Kenya
are an example of a minority group under stress.
According to Kenyan newspaper reports and letters to
the Editor,[3] conventional wisdom about Asians in Kenya,
is that the Asians are an unstable, highly mobile and
politically uncommitted group. According to the 1969
population census, only 44% of the Asians were Kenya
citizens. The remaining 56% were mainly British
nationals. Many of the non-citizen Asians have emigrated
since, and by 1972, it was estimated that there were 40,000
that is 40% non-citizen Asians in the country. (Ghai, 1972:1)

The theoretical supposition is that by virtue
of their potentially mobile status, the Asians in Kenya
tend to have many split families, multi-nationality
families, and are conscious of the costs of emigration.
They therefore will tend to have small families. Moreover,
given their pro-western nationality status, their
mobility would be geared towards the western world which
advocates small families and puts emphasis on the costs
of children. The third focus of the study will then be
to examine this particular minority group and establish
whether the factors of conventional wisdom hold. This

will be significant since few studies have been done
on minority groups' fertility. Moreover, the authenticity
of some of the findings of these few studies is
debatable mainly because they are seen as tending
to reinforce conventional biases.[4]

Finally, an analysis of census results clearly
indicates that the fertility of the Asians in Kenya
has been declining over the last twenty years.[5] The
average total fertility rate of 2.5 and a population
growth rate of about 1% per annum is much lower than a
total fertility rate of 7.6 and a growth rate of 3.5%
for the country's African population. Historically,
the Asians have held a middle position between the
Europeans and the Africans both in terms of socio-economic
characteristics and demographic characteristics, although
there are internal differentials amongst the Asians.
Table 1 reflects the average earnings of the Asians
vis-a-vis the other races.

Table 1:   Number of Enumerated Employees, Average
Earnings and Total Wage Bill by Racial
Groups 1961 and 1970

1961	Europeans	Asians	Africans
No. of Persons Employed (thousands)	22	38	530
Average Earnings (£ per annum)	1,365	511	76
Total Wage Bill (£ Million)	30	19	40
1970			
No. of Persons Employed (thousands)	14	30	601
Average Earnings (£ per annum)	2,207	960	182
Average Wage Bill (£ Million)	30	26	110

Source: Employment, Incomes and Equality – I.L.O.
1972, Table 29, p. 87.

It appears therefore that the Asian community has experienced
increased incomes, and therefore increased levels of living.
This increased welfare situation has been associated with a
decline in both fertility and mortality rates. It is therefore
logical to conclude that the Asian community is showing a
marked response in terms of demographic behaviour, as has been
predicted by the Demographic Transition Theory, with fertility
levels almost matching those of the western countries.

However as shown by Bharati (1972) it is also clear
that this group is extremely diverse in terms of
nationality, caste affiliations, education and
income levels, religious compliance and levels of living.
We would therefore expect that this group would be
showing differential responses regarding fertility
behaviour because of the varying impact of socio-
economic factors. The purpose of this study is to
establish whether this is the case, and if so, the
specific factors which contribute to this differential
response internal to the community.

Footnotes to Chapter One

1.   We are referring to studies and statistics
        such as found in National and International
        development indicators; see also studies by Adelman
        (1963); Stycos (1962-63); Heer (1964); Kirk,
        Nortman, Silver (1966); Stys (1957); Hawley
        (1955); Weintraub (1962).

2.   Refer to studies by Easterlin (1962; 1966); Banks
        (1954); Beckers (1960); Douglas (1966); Leibenstein
        (1957), Sinha (1962); The Mysore Population Study
        (1962).

3.   We are referring to Editorials and readers'
        letters to the Editor in the two English daily
        newspapers in Kenya - The Daily Nation and
        The Standard 1976-1980.

4.   See studies by Campbell, A.A. (1965); Goldscheider, C.
        and Uhlenberg, P.R. (1969); Farley, R. (1966);
        Goldscheider, C. (1965; 1967); G. ering, J.M. (1965);
        Westoff, C.F.; Potter, R.G.; Sagi, P.C. (1963).

5.   Kenya Population Census Vol. IV, 1969, p. 36;
        Altea Hill, "The Fertility of the Asian Communities
        of East Africa", Population Studies No. 29, 3, 1975,
        p. 366.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

INTRODUCTION

As has been made implicit in the earlier section, there has been an over reliance of macro-level research and analyses in the study of fertility behaviour and fertility change. Because of the global concern with high rates of population growth, the analyses of aggregate data on population have emphasized the relationship between population growth, resource use, and economic development. These are often insufficient and lacking in specificity, paying too much attention to the general social and economic processes of urbanization, industrialization, food production etc. However, the proponents of these approaches merely identify the variables with which the components of population are correlated without necessarily attempting to indicate the nature of the relationships between these variables and fertility, mortality and population growth. For example, if rapid population increase, due to high fertility, hinders a society's economic development, what aspects of the economy does fertility affect at the micro level and how does this relate to the wider societal change? Or, if fertility is reduced through economic development, what aspects of development affect individuals and how does this lead them to reduce their family size? This lack of specificity often leads

to conflicting or biased policy conclusions; for instance, that because population growth is the greatest obstacle to economic development, individuals will easily understand this and act rationally to reduce fertility through rapid adoption of family planning practices.

Current low adoption and high drop-out rates in Kenya's family planning programme indicate the need to study fertility at individual and group decision-making levels. This suggests that existing macro-level approaches to the study of population are not sufficient to explain the complex set of factors related to fertility, family size and population growth. A more detailed examination of the existing theories will point out the setbacks of some of these theories and indicate the existing gaps more clearly. In addition, we outline a group level conceptual framework which focuses more on the understanding of individual and group-level socio-economic factors which influence fertility attitudes and behaviour.

Studies Based on the Malthusian Approach

The development-fertility hypothesis being an important one for fertility analysis, has been used in various studies to establish the relationship between development and fertility, using different indices of development. There are two basically contrasting views

concerning the effect of economic development on
fertility, and most studies appear to be centred around
these.

One view, based on the Malthusian argument is
that economic development promotes fertility. Various
studies such as those by I. Adelman (1963), J.N. Stycos
(1962:63), D. Heer (1963); Kirk, Nortman and Silver
(1966), W. Stys (1957) and R. Henin (1969), have
supported this view using income levels, business cycles,
size of farm and levels of living as some indicators of
economic status.

Some Aggregate Studies

Adelman (1963), in her sample of 37 nations found
a positive relationship between per capita income (GNP)
and birth rates. The problem here is the use of per
capita income as an index of development. The setbacks
of such a measure are evident in economies where a large
part of the population is not fully integrated into
the monetary economy, and there is very uneven distribution
of the national product. Such a macro-level analysis
would prove of limited utility in explaining fertility
of the populations of developing countries. In their
studies in Latin America, both Stycos and Heer (1963) found
a positive relationship between economic development
and fertility, However, Heer tried to compromise between
the two contradicting views about income and fertility,

concluding that the direct effect of a rise in per
capita income on fertility is positive, but such a rise
is but one aspect of development in general, other aspects
of which were to depress fertility and so counteract
the income effect. The other aspects referred to are
namely level of education and public health measures.
However, because of the general nature of these
approaches these studies do not reveal the exact nature
of the relationship between these factors and fertility -
how does education for instance work towards lowering
fertility?

Kirk (1960), Kirk and Nortman (1958) as well as
Silver (1966) all found a positive response by fertility to
income fluctuations within the context of business
cycles. However these analyses would not be relevant
for the developing countries as they refer to the
economic swings within the developed countries and
concentrate on the macro-level.

Micro-Level Economic Perspectives

A lot of theoretical and empirical work in the
analysis of fertility behaviour from a micro-perspective
is based on economic explanations using mainly utility
models or the theory of consumer behaviour. In his
application of this framework Becker (1960) found a
positive correlation between income and fertility. As
income rises so fertility will rise also, since more
children can be supported. This type of argument

results from the assumption that children can be
viewed as consumer goods and that there is an elasticity
of demand curve for them just as there is for tangible
goods like cars and T.V. sets. Thus he argues that
parents are free to substitute other goods for expen-
diture on their children; they can have high quality
and low quality children depending on how much they
spend on them.

The problem here, as with all utility models is
to treat fertility behaviour - a highly complex behaviour
influenced by various underlying social, economic,
psychological processes - as purely economic behaviour
influenced by rational decisions about maximizing
utilities, thus leaving out entirely the non-pecuniary
benefits parents derive from children. As Judith Blake
(1968) points out, Becker neglects the social context
of reproduction. Moreover, preferences are extremely
difficult to measure, even purely economic ones. It
would therefore be very difficult to measure psychological
utilities or substantiate empirically that certain
quantitative consumer goods can be substituted for 'n'
extra children. However, Becker's argument about the
need to distinguish between the quality as well as the
quantity of children is a useful one for studying
fertility within a sociological framework. The cost of
a given quality of children and the expenditure upon
them is likely to influence decisions on family size

However, this preference and concern for quality
children is not merely an economic choice, but will be
socially determined. As Freedman and Coombs (1966)
argue, the individual's evaluation and perception of his
economic position may affect fertility apart from the
effect of actual income itself. Thus, higher income may
be associated with a life style demanding higher expen-
diture per child for a smaller number of children. The
desire for"higher quality" children with rising income
is also supported by Leibenstein (1957). The expenditure
per child will be determined by what Easterlin (1969)
terms "tastes". The effect of income on fertility is
seen as the effect of consumer 'tastes' and preferences
for material goods by Easterlin. If incomes are high
but preferences (tastes) low, fertility rises; but
where relative incomes are down and preferences up, the
net effect is a reduction in fertility. According to
him, a couple's tastes for goods is determined when they
are young and is dependent on the parents' income.

The concept of 'tastes' or preferences is useful
for the present analysis and could be equated to social
norms or values about children, which are determined
by socialization, exposure patterns and the social
network process. The effect of income on fertility is
therefore modified and purely economic explanations
will not take this into consideration.

Many of the studies mentioned above are aggregate

studies mainly carried out in the developed countries
at one point in time, and because of their macro-
considerations, they do not demonstrate the nature of
the mechanisms influencing family size and structure
at the individual level. When they are based on micro-
level considerations using mainly economic models, the
conceptual frameworks are derived from western experi-
ences where income is mostly earned through wages within
the monetary sector and the majority of the population
is engaged in a market economy. The experience of the
developing countries is quite different.

The Demographic Transition Theory

The other contrasting view in the development-
fertility hypothesis, and also based on western experi-
ence, is that economic development has a depressing effect
on fertility levels. This is the view expressed by
the Demographic Transition Theory. This 'theory' is
really a descriptive interpretation of the demographic
events as they occurred in Western Europe during the
19th century. However, like the Neo-malthusian theory,
it has played and still plays a significant role in the
interpretation of past population movements and predictions
about the future. The theory is useful for the present
study as it provides a macro-level framework for
studying fertility and also forms a baseline upon which
we will outline a group level conceptual framework.

The Demographic Transition Theory (hereafter referred to as Transition Theory) uses an economic model of fertility where fertility levels are determined by rational economic decision-making. The theory postulates three stages of fertility and mortality levels as being derived from the fundamental economic and social changes of development or "modernization".

The theory can be summarized as follows: During the first stage of transition, which is associated with a traditional agrarian economic system, both fertility and mortality are high, resulting in low population growth. As the economy becomes market-oriented, the second stage is reached with declining mortality while fertility continues at its high level, leading thereby to rapid population growth. Eventually during the third stage, with industrialization and urbanization fertility has also declined, and the transition is complete with both fertility and mortality stabilized at a low level giving a more or less static population.

Notestein (1945), one of the proponents of this theory specifies some of the conditions associated with the changes stating that in the West, the modern era involved initially declining mortality produced by the process of modernization as a whole. This included rising levels of living and new controls over disease. Fertility responded more slowly to modernization, but it

eventually also began to decline through the widespread
use of various control factors. This happened under the
impact of such positive forces as growing individualism
and rising levels of aspirations arising out of the
same process of 'modernization' which had brought
down the death rates.

Notestein (1945) pointed to the "urban industrial
society" as the basis of the demographic transition, stating:

>"It is difficult to avoid the conclusion
>that the development of technology lies
>at the root of the matter".

He emphasized the dissolution of the traditional extended
family and the growth of individualism, as well as drawing
attention to other social processes like "the development
of a rational and secular point of view, the growing
awareness of the world and modern techniques through
popular education; improved health; and the appearance of
alternatives to early marriage and child-bearing as a
means of livelihood and prestige for women".

Critique of the Transition Theory

The prevailing opinion amongst the supporters of
the Demographic Transition has been that the principles
drawn from the European transition would be widely
applicable in the world; and, especially after the major

declines in mortality in the developing countries and
the very rapid increase in population(i.e. the second
stage of transition), the idea has been widely adopted
and has been the basis for analysing population trends
in the developing countries. However, this 'theory'
has very major shortcomings as regards its explanatory
and predictive value. It is a highly generalized
description of very complex social and economic phenomena
which makes vague suggestions about major clusters of
factors which apparently influenced an important component
of population growth, namely fertility. But variables
or processes like industrialization, urbanization,
education, etc. do not provide an adequate understanding
of the way in which fertility decline first occurred in
the west. Even at the micro-level, most studies avoid
the question of why fertility decline sets in. The usual
types of studies based on the transition argument, use
variables of social class, education, income, etc. to
show that those groups with the highest incomes, statuses
and education levels tend to have lower fertility than
those with lower incomes, statuses and education.

Leibenstein (1957) in his cost/benefit analysis
of children supports the transition viewpoint arguing
that with rising incomes, the direct cost of each child
increases since there is a desire for "higher quality"
children - "the new occupational environment limits

opportunities for child labour, requires more costly
training for children and necessitates smaller family
obligations on the part of the parents, so that they
can take advantage of new and different economic
opportunities". The assumption behind his work is that
economic growth is independent of and prior to population
changes, while this may not be the case in most of the
developing countries, though it may be applicable to
certain groups within these countries. Similarly, the
"new occupational environment" seems to refer to the
urban wage economy where the prevailing family system
is the nuclear one. This would be relevant for only a
minority of the population in the developing countries
such as the Asian communities in Kenya and the educated
urban elite.

The Mysore study of India[1] also showed an inverse
relationship between fertility and socio-economic status
in Bangalore city: high education and high socio-economic
status were strongly related to favourable attitudes to
family planning. And in his study of Uttar Pradesh, Sinha
(1962) found an inverse relationship between income and
fertility.

These and other micro-level studies, merely
point at certain correlations between fertility and
socio-economic variables, using assumptions derived
from western experiences where income is mostly earned
through wage employment within the monetary sector. This doe

not take account of different types of economies. For
instance it has been found in a study on fertility
differentials in the Sudan by R. Henin (1968), that a
positive relationship existed between level of living and
fertility. Fertility is higher among the more settled agri-
cultural population with a higher and more stable source
of income, while it is much lower among the pastoral
nomadic population. This illustrates further the complex
set of factors involved in explaining fertility behaviour
and levels, as different factors may apply in different
situations. One needs to go beyond general explanations
and associations and ask what economic, social, and
psychological influences upon individuals or couples
could lead to their decisions about family size within a
given environment. The argument here is to go beyond
the Demographic Transition theory which fails to explain
certain fundamental phenomena such as variations in pre-
industrial fertility levels and in the timing of the
onset and the pace of fertility decline, and the why of
the fertility decline. This is because of its macro-
perspective and high level of generality. One needs to
examine the impact of these macro variables on individual
fertility behaviour i.e. to show how the micro-perspective
can be more effectively related to the macro-perspective.

Conceptual Framework for the Present Study

The importance of micro approaches to the study
of fertility and family size is clearly revealed by

M. Mamdani (1973) in his evaluation of the large-scale
family planning project in India. Mamdani (1973) concludes
that the failure of the birth control programme in the
village of Manipur in Punjab was a result of the failure
by the planners to understand the social reality as
perceived by the villagers. For the poor villagers,
large families were an economically rational choice.

> "The villagers want larger families..
> more important, they want them because
> they need them. The villagers are
> solving their poverty problem by having
> larger families".

For a majority of these people, a large number of
children seemed not only to improve the economic
opportunities for the family, but also provided social
security in old age. A class/caste analysis showed
that for a small minority living under radically
different material conditions the economic benefits
of children were lower. Among the agricultural classes,

> "the newly married sons of the
> mechanised families are the Jat
> group most favourable to the idea
> of family planning through the use
> of modern contraception".
>   (Mamdani, 1973)

Mamdani further concludes:

> "there are people in Manipur who
> will echo the arguments of the
> 'outsider' (the Americans). These
> people maintain that the farmer
> "should" be afraid of land fragmentation
> and should thus limit his family, that...

...he should realize that "population
pressure" exists and should thus be
motivated to use family planning...Those
who think this way, come either from
among the few who own large and mechanized
farms or from those who are outside of
the agricultural economy: a teacher, a
family planning worker, or an ex-moneylender.
They either forget or do not realize that
their own material circumstances have
led them to limit their families..."

Similar Neo-Malthusian arguments of the "outsider" are
also echoed in Kenya's population policy, with little
account being taken of the diverse conditions within
the country.

Mamdani's study thus illustrates the very complex
relationship between the family economy and family size,
and therefore the need for definite knowledge of the
economic and social conditions of families, and how
the size, structure and division of labour within
families are related to these conditions in different
regions and within different social groups or classes.
Mamdani's argument is supported by Rich (1973), and
Caldwell (1976) who attempts to restate the Demographic
Transition Theory. Caldwell argues that the fundamental
choices in any fertility behaviour are social choices
and that economic behaviour is rational only so far
as it is rational within the framework established by
social ends.

This study then is built upon Caldwell's and
Mamdani's arguments that fertility behaviour is rational
only is so far as it is rational within a given social
context. Various empirical studies in addition to
those of Mamdani and Caldwell have tended to support
this position.

Kayongo-Male and Walji (1978) in their comparative
study of different ethnic groups across Kenya, found
that fertility was associated positively with the need
for child labour. Walji (1976) in survey data as well
as some case studies in Kangundo, Machakos, also found
that parents were having many children because they
depended on their children for labour as well as for
old age security.

Monsted's study (1977) on the changing division
of labour in Western Kenya found that in those areas
where children were contributing significantly to family
labour, there was no pressure to have fewer children.
Kabwegyere's study (1976) in Machakos again emphasized
that while economic rationality played a role in
influencing family size, it was social factors which
appeared to play a more dominant role. While economic
conditions would have justified having fewer children,
couples were still having over four-five children
because children were socially desired.

THE HYPOTHESES

The discussion so far indicates that decisions
related to fertility behaviour can therefore be based
on social rationality, which also includes economic and
political rationality, and is not merely dependent on
rising incomes.

The basic hypothesis is that people's socio-
economic conditions determine their decisions about
family size and this in turn will influence the acceptance/
rejection of family planning.

This general hypothesis is derived from our
foregoing discussion on demographic explanations.
However, it is also clear that the Asian community's
fertility related behaviour may be a response to internal
or external non-demographic factors. Such obvious
factors will include the effects of internal and external
reference groups, internal socialization patterns and
knowledge exchange through interpersonal contacts.

Kenya's well documented history indicates that
the colonial administrative and economic system imposed
segregation along racial lines placing the Asian community
midway in the three-tiered strata headed by the Whites,
with the Africans at the bottom. The transition to
independence has little altered the middle position
occupied by the Asians on the stratification ladder.

Nor did their socio-economic status and life-styles change.

Stratification literature indicates that lower socio-economic strata tend to use the upper social strata as reference groups. They will therefore tend to copy their life-styles, values and pay special attention to any conspicuous behaviour which appears to offer prestige and ego-reinforcement.

The acceptance of Western values by the Asian communities can be explained by reference group theory and socialization patterns. According to Goldthorpe (1965) the white man was perceived by the Asian as good and clean. White ways were aspired to. Therefore white life styles, consumption patterns, the nuclear family system and the concept of love and marriage were the "ideal" type characteristics for "progressive Asians". On the other hand, the African was rural, primitive, dirty and backward and to be looked down upon, shunned and avoided or treated as subservient. The school system and the mass media further highlighted this Western model or prototype. Thus, we can conclude that individuals in the Asian community will actively espouse European traits, even those which redefine intimate interpersonal relationships such as fertility-related relationships. For the purpose of this study therefore we hypothesize that the higher the aspirations

towards western life-styles, the smaller will be the
family size.

Intimate interpersonal behaviour could also
be influenced by the communal pattern of social relations
and networks found in the different Asian communities.
Social networks can be defined as "a specific set of
linkages among a defined set of persons with the
additional property that the characteristics of these
linkages as a whole may be used to interpret the social
behaviour of the persons involved." According to Bott
(1971) when many of the people a person knows interact
with one another, members of that person's network tend
to reach consensus of norms and they exert consistent
informal pressure on one another to conform to the norms.

The pattern of social networks for the Asians
hinges mainly around relatives and friends who belong
to the same communal group, or sometimes to different
Asian communities, and around other community members.
Individuals go to Asian community schools, visit Indian
movies and Indian places of worship, live in Indian
residential complexes, attend Indian religious and
social festivities. Only at places of work are they
exposed to non-Asian communities but here again efforts
are made to associate with Asian colleagues.

Basic social psychological studies outline the
very powerful influence groups have on individual
behaviour. Various factors determine this influence
such as the need to be accepted and appreciated by one's
peers etc. It is therefore logical to expect that the
very strong networks in the Asian community will also
be associated with very obvious patterns of social control.
Therefore it will be possible to find situations where
individuals will respond to indirect group pressures in
specific areas of fertility -related behaviour such as
having large families in search for sons in families with
only daughters or having few children because group norms
dictate it. It is therefore possible to hypothesize
for example, that those couples with no sons or very
few sons will have little interest in controlling
fertility. The discussion so far has outlined hypotheses
which can be summarized in a path chain as shown below:

Socio-economic   Socially rationalized   Receptivity
   conditions   ⟶   decisions on family   ⟶ to family
                         size.   planning

                         Values and attitudes
                         about children.

                         Perception of future
                         economic status.

                         Perceptions of invest-
                         ments in children.

                         Western life-styles.

SUMMARY

The main hypotheses to be tested are:

(1)   The higher the aspiration towards western
        life styles, the smaller the family size.

(2)   Those couples with no sons or very few sons
        will have little interest in controlling
        fertility. This will hold especially where
        sons are considered to provide old-age security.

(3)   The potentially mobile status of the Asian
        community motivates smaller family size. Thus
        those who are non-citizens are the most likely
        to want and have small families as they perceive
        themselves the most insecure and therefore likely
        to emigrate.

(4)   That the woman's occupation will influence the
        number of children i.e. those in employment will
        tend to have fewer children than those not employed.

(5)   That the number of children will vary by community,
        so that we would expect the Ismailies to have
        fewer children compared to the other communities.

(6)   That it is not the level of education or income
         or woman's occupation alone or jointly that
         determine the number of children, but that a
         number of additional social variables like the
         preference for sons, westernization, political
         status and exposure also influence decisions about
         the number of children.

Footnote   to Chapter Two

1.   "The Mysore Population Study". New York:United Nations
         Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1962.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

RESEARCH DESIGN

As has been pointed out in the foregoing
chapter, this study aims at examining at the micro-
level the relationship between family size and social
and economic conditions and also determining what
influences the acceptance/rejection of family
planning. A one-shot comparative research design
was adopted for the present study. The research
design was primarily meant to identify as many different
and contrasting yet internally homogeneous groupings
as possible to permit generalization on the Asian
community in Kenya. Within this design the analysis
of fertility behaviour was undertaken at the group and
the individual or family level. The relevant variables
at each level are shown in the chart below.

Chart I: Levels of Analysis of Fertility Behaviour

Level	Relevant Independent Variables	Relevant Dependent Variables
Group and Community	**Stratification and Status:** Income, Education and Occupation Levels, Levels of Living, Political Status, Religion, Consumption Patterns **Exposure and Westernization** Media, Interaction Networks, Socialization and Social Control, Leisure Patterns.	– Actual and preferred family size. – Acceptance/rejection of family planning.
Family and Individual	Perception of Role/Value of Children, son preference. Status: Income, Education, Occupation Levels of Living. Perception of Time and Family Stability.	

THE SAMPLING UNIVERSE

For the present study, the Asian population living in Nairobi has been chosen. This concentration in an urban area was deliberate in order to control for regional variations. Additionally, Nairobi has the largest proportion of the Asian population in Kenya. Also, for comparative purposes internal to the Asian community, four different groups were chosen. However, before identifying the actual populations being studied, it must be pointed out that in the present study, the Asians as a whole, as well as the different groups of the Asians have been referred to as communities. It would therefore be useful to indicate in what context the term is being used.

On reading the literature written about the Asians in East Africa and Kenya, it became apparent that while most of the works refer to the Asian "community", they all consistently manage to avoid defining what they mean by the term community and merely use it as a label. Being conversant with the Asian population in Kenya, the researcher knew that the Asians are not a homogeneous group, although they are often treated as one, mainly because they are a "nationality ethnic group" (Enloe, 1973) i.e. they are characterized by communal identity, which has its roots in association with foreign countries namely, India and Pakistan. One therefore needs to be specific when

one talks of the Asian community-and within that larger
group, of the Ismaili community or the Shah community -
exactly what population one is referring to.

Our concern here is to clarify the concept as it
is used throughout this thesis, both for analytical
and methodological purposes. As has been outlined in
the theoretical model, analytical distinctions are
being made at various levels namely the communal, the
family and the individual level, and it is felt that
these analytical distinctions would become clearer if
certain clear-cut definitions were given. In the
present study, the concept really refers to an ethnic
community. However, unlike a lot of other definitions
of the community, the concept of territoriality has
been left out in the definition since these groups
cannot be identified by mapping out boundaries or
localities. Rather, for our purpose, Tonnies' (1955)
definition which identifies a community on the basis of
patterns of social relationships should suffice. A
community then is a group of people united by common
norms of behaviour which have arisen through being
together under a common tradition. The Asians, both
as a whole, as well as at different levels, form ethnic
communities because of their expressions of communal
distinctiveness, for, according to Enloe (1973):

> "ethnicity depends on self-identification
> not on objective categorization(alone)".

and again,

> "an ethnic group must have reality in
> the minds of its members, not just in
> the eye of the beholder".

In addition, they also possess other characteristics

of ethnic groups, namely that they are self-perpetuating,

they share values and beliefs and they possess communal

institutions that are parallel to those of the larger

society. To summarize, then, each Asian sub-community

was defined as a group united by:

- common norms of behaviour, religion, caste-
  membership
- self-identification
- endogamous marriage
- shared values and beliefs

On the basis of the above criteria we have identified

the sample communities at different levels for conceptual

and methodological purposes as is shown below:

Chart 2:   Selection of the Sample Communities

The Major Community	Religious Sub-communities	Primary Sub-communities	Secondary Sub-communities
		Shias ——→	Ismailies
	Muslims		
The Urban Asians		Sunnis ——→	Lohar-Wadhas
	Hindus and Jains	Jains ——→	Shahs
		Hindus ——→	Gujar Suthars

Selection Criteria:

	Religion	Religious sects	– Ethnicity – Caste membership – Numeric strength – Economic status

33

For the purposes of the study, the primary and secondary
sub-communities were used to identify the different
strata. The selection criteria used to select the
different groups are based both on the earlier theoretical
discussions and the internal dimensions within the
Asian community. Religion was used to identify the
major sub-communities because it is one of the basic
factors dividing the Asians into broader groupings.
For the selection of the primary sub-communities,
religious sects proved the most useful criterion because
internal to the broad religious groupings, one finds
numerous religious sects each with its own dogmas and
practices, and more importantly, with its own interactional
unity. The criteria for the secondary sub-communities
are mostly based on the discussions in the theory section.
Ethnicity as well as caste membership are important
because they determine differences in patterns of
cultural interaction. Studies in India (R.G. Potter;
1965, G.B. Saxena; 1965, J.R. Rele; 1963) show that
these variables are related to family size. The numeric
strength of the group was seen to affect its position and
exposure relative to the other groups. Finally, as
has been discussed in the theoretical section, economic
status has been seen to be related to fertility behaviour.

Among the Muslims then, two communities were chosen,
The Shia Ismaili Khojas (to be referred to henceforth as the
the Ismailies) and the Lohar-Wadhas (to be referred to as

Lohars). The Ismailies are not only the most numerous
of the Muslim groups, but also the most "thoroughly
modernized" and perhaps the most successful of all the
sections of the Asian minority. They are often referred
to as the pace-makers or the "pioneers of western-oriented
emancipation among the Asians". In contrast, the Lohars
are a very small Sunni sect belonging to the lower rung
of the socio-economic ladder. They are also less exposed
to western influences and more traditional in their
beliefs and practices.

The non-Muslim Gujerati-speaking groups selected
were the Shahs (commonly referred to as the Jains) and
the Gujar Suthars (to be referred to as the Suthars).
Although technically the Shahs are not Hindus, as they
follow Jainism and not Hinduism as their religion, they
have been treated here as Hindus because, within the
East African context they are culturally and linguistically
very close to the Hindus; in fact most Asians do not make
a distinction between them and the other Hindu communities.
According to Zarwan (1976):

>"...there has been a general falling
>away from Jainism. Throughout the
>community, even among strict adherents
>to Jain rituals, there is little knowledge
>or understanding of Jain philosophy".

He later adds:

> "Jainism is closely related to Hindu
> religion, and many Jains consider
> themselves Hindus, and are often
> treated as such".

In his observations on caste and marriage
Bharati (1972) supports this contention about the
cultural similarities between Jains and Hindus:

> "The Jains of East Africa are culturally
> so close to the Lohanas and Patels that
> no one but the Gujarati expatriate Hindu
> could tell the difference".

Being economically and numerically dominant of all the
non-Muslim Gujarati-speaking groups of Nairobi (numbering
7,262 by the 1972 communal census), it was felt that
the Shahs would be representative of the Hindu community
in Kenya.

Lastly, the Suthars or Sutarias are a much smaller
group numbering about 600 and were chosen to represent
the lower castes among the Hindus. They are supposed
to be economically much poorer and more traditional
than the Shahs.

This strategy then explains the setting up of
the research design for the present study. More will
be said about the social, cultural, economic and
religious organizations of these different groups in
the later chapters.

Ismaili =
Shah =
Gujarat = 7262
Suthars = 600 (about)
Lohars = 200 (about)

SAMPLING STRATEGY

Considering that the communities chosen for the
study were fairly large, and given the constraints of
time and finance, it was obvious that a representative
(sub) sample would have to be selected from each community.
Efforts were made to secure complete lists of the
different communities, since the national census does
not have a classification of the Asians into different
communal groups. It was, however, fortunate that the
different groups had their own communal listings. Both
the Ismaili and Shah communities had carried out
censuses in 1972 and these being the latest counts,
were used as sampling frames. For the two smaller groups,
a complete listing of the families was acquired through
the community heads. These were fairly recent counts
taken in 1974 for the Suthars and 1976 for the Lohars.

Multistage sampling was therefore used. In
the first stage, because of internal diversity the
which Asian population was stratified into different communi-
communities ties as has been indicated in the previous section.
Then, internal to each strata or community, systematic
random sampling was used. This method of random sampling
was the most suitable because the sampling frames consisted
only of a listing of the names of household heads, without
any additional information or detail, for example, on
occupation, income, age etc. whereby the population
could be stratified. Thus for the Ismaili and Shah

groups, after a random selection of the first household,
every 20th and 19th household respectively was picked
For the Suthars every 5th household was picked, while
for the Lohars practically all the households were picked
randomly because there were only about 200 members.
It was felt that this sampling method would provide a
sample representative of the total population.

SAMPLE SIZE

Although the individual household comprising of
husband and wife was used as the sampling unit, the
interview unit was categorized as the individual husband
and the individual wife. This was done because it was
expected that among the Asians, due to different patterns
of socialization for the two sexes, the attitudes and
responses of the men and women might differ on similar
issues. Since both partners are responsible for making
decisions regarding family size, the responses of both
men and women as individuals were considered important
in order to get at any differences which might exist in
their views.

Where the extended family was found to exist
(especially among the Hindus) one married couple,
usually the eldest son and his wife, was selected, since
the older parents were either too old or absent or in
most cases unwilling to be interviewed. Details of
the proposed and actual sample selected are given in
Table 2.

Table 2: Description of the Sample by Community and Sex

Community	Proposed Sample			Actual Sample		
	Husbands	Wives	Total	Husbands	Wives	Total
Ismailies	50	50	100	42	50	92
Lohars	25	25	50	21	25	46
Shahs	50	50	100	49	50	99
Suthars	25	25	50	22	25	47
Total	150	150	300	134	150	284

The proposed sample for the Asians consisted
of 150 couples, amounting to a total of 300 interviews.
Of these, fifty couples each were to be picked from the
two large communities, and twenty five couples each
were to be picked from amongst the Lohars and the
Suthars. The latter two groups were relatively smaller
than the other two, and therefore a larger percentage
of each was selected. All in all then, the sample
size was considered adequate to represent each separate
sub-community as well as the total Asian community in
Nairobi, which numbered about 139,037 by the 1969
census, and should be much lower now because of the
high rate of emigration.

However, as is evident from Table 2 the
proposed number of respondents i.e. 300 was not
achieved. While it was possible to locate and interview
all the women, it proved more difficult to interview
all the men. Out of the 150, 134 were finally interviewed.
Of the remaining 16, three were deceased, nine were
unavailable even after numerous visits, three refused
to be interviewed, and one was a complete invalid and
could not be interviewed. The final sample therefore
comprised of 284 respondents which is 134 couples.
However, it must be pointed out that in the analysis,
there were certain responses, which though derived
from the women's interview, have been classified as those
for the couple, in which case N becomes 150 couples.

For example, the question on the number of children
obviously refers to the couple.

Some key-informants like religious leaders,
community heads, and those with exceptional knowledge
about the communities and their economic, religious
and social organization were interviewed in depth.
These provided the necessary structural information
on the communities.

METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION

The study adopted the survey research design
within which the basic tool for data collection was
the interview schedule. Once the sample of households
was selected, both husbands and wives across age groups
were interviewed using the interview schedule. Inter-
viewing proved to be the most appropriate technique
compared to any other technique, because of the very
many open-ended questions included which would require
a lot of probing. The schedule contained both pre-coded
and open-ended questions in an attempt at eliciting
information on key socio-economic variables as well as
attitudes to family size and contraceptive use. The
strategy was to interview the men and women independently
in order to minimize the bias from mutual collaboration.
Furthermore in order to avoid embarassment and thereby
perhaps non-response, because of the personal nature of
certain questions, the husbands were interviewed by male

interviewers and the wives by female interviewers.
In addition to information given by key informants,
the necessary background information was also collected
through consulting sociological and anthropological
studies of the Asians in Kenya and East Africa. Some
amount of participant observation done especially at
social and religious gatherings also provided
useful insights into the different Asian communities.
These included meetings in restaurants, communal
luncheons, communal plays etc. This helped give insights
into the different community life styles and interaction
patterns. Much of the chapter on the background to the
Asian groups relies heavily on this.

Official documentary information like birth
registration, as well as documented rules governing
the community organizations were consulted, especially
for the Ismailia community. However, since this
information was not available for the other communities,
information on fertility and mortality levels was
derived from specific questions included in the interview
schedule. The data derived from these gives an indication
of current levels and patterns as well as trends in
fertility and mortality. This is important because no
previous demographic study of the different Asian groups
in Nairobi or Kenya has been carried out.

Finally, a pretest of the interview schedule was carried out on a small sample which helped detect the biases in the questions as well as the sensitive areas, and also to determine the relevance of certain variables.

Sampling and Interview Issues

The selection of a representative sample for a transient and extremely mobile community like the Kenyan Asians is bound to be problematic. One of the main problems faced during sampling was the fact that a large number of the Asian families have emigrated and are still emigrating to other countries. This phenomenon was most pronounced in the late sixties, when very many of the non-citizen Asians left for Great Britain, after which the movement subsided but was sparked off again around 1972-1973 by the Ugandan expulsion, and the process, though it has slackened, is still on-going. Thus all the available censuses and lists were outdated, giving no indication of the volume of migration. Sampling therefore became a very time consuming and cumbersome task. After locating the sampling frame, the researcher had to go though the lists with some well informed members of the community and and cancel out the names of all those families which had left. Of course it was not possible to cancel out the names of all who had emigrated as one had to rely mostly on the information and memory of other people.

In order to cater for this, the sample picked was much
larger than that which was actually needed. Thus
for example, in the case of the Ismailies and Shahs, a
sample of 100 households was picked in order to ensure
that at least 50 households, which was the proposed
sample size, would be located.

A major problem in interviewing was posed by
the extreme mobility of those non-emigrant Asians
residing in Nairobi. During the field work it was
extremely difficult to locate many of the male
respondents because of their frequent business or
vacation trips both overseas as well as local. This
caused a lot of delay and led to some amount of non-response.
Moreover, when it was possible to contact the respondents,
they generally did not give on-the-spot interviews.
One had to arrange appointments to see them and even
then some would not be there at the arranged time,
which necessitated a number of revisits. In addition,
the difficulty of finding Asian research assistants
posed tremendous problems and in fact the bulk of the
women's interviews had to be done by the researcher.

All these problems, coupled with the respondents'
suspiciousness of and sensitivity to any kind of research
which they feel touches on their personal lives, caused
some difficulty in setting up and carrying out the research.
However, the suspiciousness and sensitivity of the
respondents was overcome so that eventually the

researcher was able to get a lot of cooperation during
the interviews.

DATA ANALYSIS

Analysis of the survey data was done using the
statistical package for the social sciences. Frequencies
for all the variables, as well as cross-tabulations and
correlation coefficients for the major dependent and
independent variables were run both for the total sample
as well as for each sub-group within the sample.

Statistical tests which were run included: the
gamma, and chi-square statistics and multiple regression.
A Guttman scale of household possessions was constructed
using data from the women's questionnaire. This scale
is discussed at length in Chapter Five. Two indices
were computed and referred to as the exposure and wester-
nization index.

The exposure index was computed by combining
together the data on the frequency of listening to the
radio, reading newspapers and magazines, watching T.V.
and travelling abroad. The westernization scale was
computed from various questions about leisure activities
and type of dressing. The scores from these indexes
were then regrouped into high, medium and low values
to determine the levels of exposure and westernization
of the respondents. The construction of the indexes is

discussed more fully in Appendix I. .

In conclusion, this chapter has attempted to
describe the research design, the sampling strategy,
methods of data collection and data analysis used
for the present study.

In the chapter that follows, the background
to the Asian community in Kenya is presented. This
will then set the stage for analysing the research
findings.

CHAPTER FOUR

GENERAL BACKGROUND TO THE ASIAN COMMUNITY IN KENYA

It would be out of place to dwell on an analysis of
the fertility behaviour of the different Asian communities
without presenting the economic, political and social
context within which the Asians have been operating.
The present chapter will attempt to examine the transition
of this minority group, from its arrival into Kenya
during the colonial era, through the period of indepen-
dence to the post-independent years. The approach
will be two-fold: first, the "Asian community" will
be treated as a single social entity vis-a-vis the
other major groups in Kenya's plural society, namely
the Africans and the Europeans. This will highlight
the factors which have been at work at the national
level, and have influenced the behaviour of the Asian
minority within the country, regardless of their
internal cultural, religious, linguistic, economic and
social differences. Secondly, given the heterogeneous
nature of the Asian society in Kenya, a description of
the structure and organization of each of the four
groups in the study will be provided in the next chapter,
in order to detect whether and how the internal structure
of each group has affected the adaptation of each to the
same forces of change. This will have a bearing on the
behaviour of the individuals belonging to the various
communities. This two-fold approach will then set the
background against which to analyse the research findings.

Demographic Developments

Available evidence[1] shows that although Indian
contact with the East African Coast can be traced back
to many centuries, mainly because of long-established
trading activities between India and the African
continent, the large-scale immigration of the Indians
for the purpose of settlement in the interior of
East Africa only started during the present century.
The present generation of Indians in East Africa originated
mainly from the Western Indian states of Kutch and
Gujerat, and, contrary to popular belief, are not
descendants of the "coolies" or indentured labourers
imported into Kenya for the construction of the Kenya-
Uganda railway (January 1896), and who came mostly
from Punjab.[2] The majority of Indians who emigrated
did so "voluntarily" or as "free" immigrants, attracted
by reports sent home by the "coolies" (as the indentured
labourers were called) about the opportunities available,
and by prospects of employment and trade in the yet
(as perceived by them) virgin lands of Africa. Moreover,
economic conditions in India were deteriorating and
there was a lot of poverty and hardship. Thus both push
and pull factors were at work in the process of Indian
immigration to East Africa.

At the beginning of the century, the flow was
slow though steady but declined during the periods of
recession and depression of the early 1920s and in 1930.
The population also increased slowly during the interwar
periods, but after the second world war the immigration

caught up dramatically, and continued at a rapid rate
until 1948 when Government legislation restricted
Indian immigration to Kenya. However, by that time the
Indian population had rapidly increased both through
immigration and natural increase which was estimated
at 2 to 3% per annum. (J.S. Mangat., 1969:140).

Ever since their immigration and settlement in
East Africa, and despite their rapid rate of population
growth, the Asians have at no time been numerically
a very strong group. Estimates and census counts show
that even during their demographic peak, in the early
1960s, they numbered a little over 350,000[3] in all
the three East African countries, which formed 1.5%
of the total population. The Indian population was most
numerous in Kenya where, according to the 1962 census
(Vol. III), the Indians numbered 176,613, or about 2%
of the country's total population. Table 3 shows
the total Indian population in Kenya at the various
census dates.

Table 3:   Total Indian Population (Kenya) at Various
            Census Dates Between 1911-1969

Census Data	Population	% of Total Population
1911-13	10,651	0.35
1921	22,822	0.89
1926	26,759	1.04
1931	39,644	1.30
1948	90,528	1.68
1962	176,613	2.5
1969	139,037	1.2

Sources: Indian Population of British East Africa by
           C.J. Martin, Population Studies, No. 3, 1953,
           pg. 23.

           Kenya Colony and Protectorate Census Reports,
           1921, 1926, 1931, 1948.

           Kenya Population Census, 1962 and 1969.

           R. Zwanenberg and A. King, 1975, An Economic
           History of Kenya and Uganda 1800-1970.

The 1972 estimate is between 100,000-105,000
(D. Ghai, 1972:1) which is about 0.7% of the total
population. It is evident that the Asian community in
Kenya had been growing steadily since the arrival of its
members from India at the turn of the century upto 1962.
As has been indicated, immigration from India played a
vital role in contributing to the population increase.
This is reflected by the proportion of the Indian population
born outside East Africa. According to the 1948 Kenya
census 50% of the population was born outside, whereas
the 1969 census for Kenya shows that only 16.3% of the
Kenyan Asians and 46% of the non-Kenyan Asians were born
outside the country. The migration stream followed the
usual pattern comprising at the outset, mostly young adult
males, without women and children. Later, when the migrants
were more established and stabilized, having obtained some
form of permanent employment, the women and children followed
and later, whole families seemed to emigrate, so that
gradually, once the effects of selective migration were
diminished, the excess of males over females was reduced
and the age structure showed a more normal age distribution
(see graph 1).

Evidence from various sources[4] shows that the
population also increased as a result of the high rate of
natural growth especially during the period between 1930
and the late 1950s after which the fertility decline set
in (Altea Hill, 1975; J.G. Blacker; 1959). It has
been estimated that the rate of natural increase

The Asian Population of Kenya
1931, 1948, 1962, 1969

Graph I: Age Structure of Asians at Different Census Dates

Source: Altea Hill, *Population Studies*. Vol. 29, pp. 359.

during this period was high, in the region of 2.5-3.2%
per annum because of the high birth rate and a relatively
low death rate, a situation comparable to the developing
countries today. According to Bharati (1972:15):

> "The population increase of Asians
> in East Africa tended to be higher
> than in parallel linguistic and
> caste groups in the Indian homeland."

However, since independence, all evidence points towards
a much lower rate of growth amongst the Asians as a
result both of a drop in the natural increase, as well
as substantial emigration from Kenya after 1968, set in
motion by certain political developments.[5] A comparison
of population figures at the last two censuses shows a
percentage decline of 21.7% among the Asians. Statistics
are not available since the last census, but it is
evident that the population has been declining since
then because of continued emigration and the low rate
of natural increase. (D. Ghai, 1972:1).

The demographic developments of the East African
Indians show that mortality rates, as would be expected,
were initially high because of natural hazards, and the
poor health and sanitary conditions of the pioneer
population trying to settle in the harsh conditions
of an unexplored area. However, once the population
established itself in Kenya, conditions of life changed
substantially. With the general improvement in the
health and living standards, increased education as

well as the fact that over 90% of the population was
residing in or within the vicinity of the urban areas,
and therefore had relatively easy access to hospitals,
sanitary services and piped water supplies, the death
rate declined substantially. According to C.J. Martin
(1953:99), between 1946-1950 the crude death rate was
in the region of 8-10 per 1,000, and it is   likely
that the infant mortality was below 75 per 1,000 births.

With the continued improvement in living standards,
it is likely that mortality rates have dropped even lower
and are now comparable with those of the developed
countries.

According to the 1969 census analysis for Kenya,

> "....the mortality rates for the Europeans
> and Asians were conspicuously lower than
> those for the Arabs and Africans..."

In the 1969 Uganda census the Asians had a crude death
rate of 7.3 and 4.9 for males and females respectively,
with a life expectancy (e_o)   of 62 for males and 66
for females, and an infant mortality rate of 30.
These figures can be taken as a reflection of the
mortality situation in Kenya. On the whole, the
mortality estimates indicate that even by 1948 mortality
was lower than in India itself, and that it has been
declining at least since that date. Thus, as Altea Hill
(1975:356),   points out:

"by 1969 levels of mortality in the
Asian community resembled those found in
contemporary Europe rather than those pre-
vailing in contemporary India, or indeed
among the African population of East Africa
at the same date. There is little reason
to doubt that this accurately reflects the
general standard of health and medical
care in the Asian community of East Africa".

In keeping with the western demographic trends,
fertility decline among the Asians has lagged behind the
moratality decline, though the time period has not
been long. In fact the transition from high to low
fertility and mortality levels seems to have taken a
period of about five decades.

Fertility data for Kenya are derived from the
available censuses of 1931, 1948, 1962 and 1969. A
comparison of the data indicates that the fertility
of the Asian population as a whole has declined
considerably especially since the late 1950s (Kenya
Population Census, 1969:36), although of course there
are internal differentials between the different
communities.

Using different methods of estimating fertility
levels among the Asians of Kenya and Uganda, Altea Hill
(1975:366) concludes that most of the estimates confirm

"the general picture of a marked and
rapid fertility decline in the 1960s
(perhaps also in the 1950s in Kenya)
due not only to a fall in achieved pari-
ties but also to a postponement of the
beginning of childbearing....".

Bharati (1972:15) also observes that among the Asians,

> "...during the past decade there
> has been a conscious and widespread
> attempt to curb the number of
> children...".

Thus all evidence seems to point out this decline. The available fertility statistics for Kenyan Asians are summarized below:

Table 4: Estimates of CBR and TFR for Kenyan Asians
Between 1930 - 1969

Period	CBR	TFR
1930 - 1950	40 - 45	6
1962	25 - 30	3 - 3.5
1969	20 - 25	.2.5

Source: Altea Hill, "The Fertility of the Asian
Community of East Africa". Population
Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3, 1975, p. 367.

Note: CBR = Crude birth rate is the number of
live births per 1,000 population.

TFR = Total fertility rate is the average
number of live births a woman is
expected to have if she goes through
her child-bearing period.

Given that the socio-economic conditions of the Asians have not declined drastically since the last census, it can safely be projected that the present day fertility rates are even lower.

Various explanations have been offered for the
major decline in fertility rates, namely: the relatively
high levels of living enjoyed by the Asians - their
levels of living are appreciably higher than those
enjoyed by most Indians in India, as well as by the
surrounding indigenous African population; their high
degree of urbanization; that the majority of the
working population is gainfully employed deriving a
regular income from salaried jobs or from commerce; high
literacy levels; a very low infant mortality rate; a
rise in the age at marriage for women. Perhaps one
salient factor is the potential mobility of the Asians
due to their perception of the economic and political
insecurity of an ethnic minority, related to the
transfer of political power to the indigenous population,
and the government's emphasis on the Kenyanization and
Africanization policies especially in the economic
sphere. As A. Hill (1975:371) confirms,

> "It has frequently been remarked that
> large families are a liability rather
> than an asset in modern western society,
> and it is possible that political uncer-
> tainty gave an extra impetus to the
> tendency to restrict fertility".

Thus we can argue that as a result of specific socio-
economic and political conditions to which the Asians
have been exposed in Kenya, their fertility has
declined substantially. More specifically the decline
seems related to the widespread practice of family
planning - in the absence of any official birth control

movements, a pattern similar to that of Europe during
the Demographic Transition. The conditions affecting
decisions about fertility and family size amongst the
Asians at the micro level will be examined at length
later in this thesis.

On the basis of census statistics, the emerging
demographic picture for Kenyan Asians resembles that
of the more developed rather than the developing
countries. The mortality level is low, with a crude
death rate below 10 per 1,000, and an expectation of
life at birth over 60 years. Fertility is also low with
a birth rate between 20 and 25 per 1,000 and a total
fertility rate not much over 2.5. This results in
a low rate of natural increase for the population, about
1-1.5% per annum, which means the population will double
in about 70 years. The actual rate of population growth
is perhaps even lower because of the process of emigration
since the late 1960s, mostly of those Asians who were
non-citizens. This demographic picture stands in marked
constrast to that of the indigenous African population,
which has much higher birth and death rates (see table 5).

Table 5:   Demographic Characteristics of the Africans
and Asians, 1969

	CBR per 1,000	TFR	CDR per 1,000	e_o	Rate of Natural Increase	Estimated Doubling of population (Years)
Africans	50-52	7.6	17	50	3.3-3.5	21
Asians	20-25	2.5	10	60+	1.1-1.5	70

Source: 1969 Census analysis, Vol. IV.

Altea Hill, "The Fertility of the Asian
Community of East Africa", Population Studies,
Vol. 29; No. 3, 1975.

These figures place the two populations within the
same country at different ends of the demographic
continuum. The causes of such marked differentials
between the two populations, especially with regard to
fertility levels will be discussed at a later stage.

Ethnic Classification

Despite their very small numbers vis-a-vis the
total population of the country, the Asians are a highly
visible minority in Kenya's pluralist society, both
because of their colour and economic position which is
out of proportion to their numbers, as well as their
urban concentration. They are politically very weak
and yet an object of hostility and resentment for the
indigenous population which regards them as alien and
potentially disloyal, a view "reinforced after indepen-

dence when large numbers of them were not and did not
become citizens of the new state and in addition tend
to be more prosperous and privileged than the rest"
(D. Ghai and Y. Ghai., 1972:1). In order to assess
how the Asians came to acquire their present position
within the Kenyan context, one has to trace their
economic, social and political development as an
immigrant minority community from the colonial period
upto the present.

Within the context of the colonial and independent
periods in Kenya, the Asian minority can be categorized,
according to C. Enloe's (1973:23) classification of
ethnic groups, as a national and racial ethnic group.
National ethnicity,   to use the words of Enloe, is
"characterized by communal identity having its roots
in association with a foreign country", (namely India
in the case of the Kenyan Asians).

> "During political integration, national
> ethnic groups are likely to be looked
> upon as alien, having less right to the
> rewards of national sovereignity than
> indigenous groups. For this reason
> nationality ethnic problems often resolve
> around guarantees of citizenship".
> (Enloe 1973:24)

Therefore the dominant question in the minds of the
indigenous population is whether the Asians are "merely
opportunistic transients who still identify with
their homeland or with Britain" (Enloe, 1973:26), or

whether they are genuine Kenyans eager to accept Kenya as their home.

Racial ethnicity on the other hand, is characterized by values and bonds stemming from physical distinctions and is usually a result of somebody's prejudices (C.Enloe, 1972:24). Within Kenya, this racial ethnicity was cultivated and perpetuated by the colonial regime for whom racial superiority was basic to their claim to rule Kenya. The combination of these types of ethnicity among the Asians, together with their cultural and communal boundaries, has increasingly alienated them from the rest of the country's population and rendered them vulnerable.

Colonial Period

The foundation and subsequent growth of the Indian settlement in Kenya is closely tied up with and largely shaped by the historical process of development in the country which was influenced to a large extent by the racist and segregationist policies of the British colonial regime. One striking feature that emerges from the analysis of the development of the Asian role in Kenya is that their history is largely one of accommodating or responding to the current situation rather than determining or having control over the development of events which affect them.

A key feature of British colonial policy was the division of Kenyan society along racial principles, not only on the social and cultural plane, but also in the economic and political spheres. Within the three-tiered Kenyan society, the Asians occupied the intermediate position between the politically supreme Europeans at the apex, and the numerically powerful Africans at the base. However, within this set up, relations between the European and the Asians were characterized by constant racial tensions and rivalries because of the European perception of the Asians as a political and economic threat.

Many of the free or unindentured Indians who migrated to East Africa did so for the purposes of establishing trade and commerce in these regions. As J. Mangat (1969:49) has noted,

> "It was as traders that Indian presence
> in the interior of East Africa became
> particularly marked in the early years of
> the colonial period".

The majority of the Indian traders were petty traders who established dukas in local trading centres, and helped establish trade where none existed before, by creating a demand for imported goods among the local people. They introduced the rupee currency to the indigenous population, and paved the way for the transition from a barter to a money-based economy. The opening up of the interior to trade was greatly

facilitated by the construction of the Kenya-Uganda
railway by the Indian labourers between 1896 and 1902.
Thus the real pioneers of Indian commercial enterprise
in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika were the petty shop-
keepers or "duka-wallahs", who emigrated from Kutch and
Gujerat, and not surprisingly East Africa came to be
described as the "America of the Hindu". The role of
the Indian was fundamental and crucial for the economic
life of the country. By 1948, 82.2% of the Indian
working population in Kenya was engaged in private
industry and commerce. (Kenya Census Report; 1945).

However, the Indians had to face a lot of restrictions
imposed on their economic activities by the Europeans
who resented and feared their advancement in the
commercial field, and demanded a restriction of Indian
immigration. The patterns of economic activity,
employment, settlement, political participation and
social exclusivity of the Asian population therefore
were in part a response to the limited opportunities
open to them under the European segregationist policies.

The Asians were unable to divert their economic
activities into agriculture partly because they were
precluded from acquiring land rights, since the best
agricultural land was reserved for the Europeans while
the rest belonged to the Africans. This development,
coupled with the fact that the Indians themselves
showed little interest in agricultural pursuits

(although very many originated from rural backgrounds
in India), resulted in confining their economic
activities to wholesale and retail trade, or employment
in the civil services or as skilled artisans and clerks
in the private and public sectors. This employment
pattern was further reinforced by administrative
measures prejudiced to keep the Europeans in the top
executive and administrative posts.

One outstanding characteristic of the Asian
population has been its very high degree of urbanization.
This can also be attributed to a series of ordinances
which prevented Indian traders from conducting business
outside specified townships and trading areas. This
prevented the Indian from gaining a foothold in the
rural areas and resulted in alienating him even further
from the African rural life-style since he had little
exposure to it. The young urban-born Kenyan Asian has
perhaps never been exposed to horizons other than
those of the urban, western environment. The concentration
of the Asians in urban areas has contributed to the
"Indian look of almost all major towns and cities" in Kenya
(D. Ghai; 1970:100). Moreover, it facilitated their
organization into economically independent and socially
exclusive communities. The isolation of the Asians was
also enhanced by the colonial policy of segregating
residential, educational and other public facilities along
racial lines. However, the rigid communal and caste
traditions of the Asians themselves, whereby social

relations were confined to members of one's own community,
cannot be ignored; so that religious, caste, and
sectional compartmentalization reinforced the isolation
created by the historical process of development in
colonial Kenya under a racist and segregationist regime.

The response of the Asians to this set of
restrictive policies established their status in Kenyan
society. The Asians were politically weak and although
a few protested against the restrictions about land
ownership, trade, immigration, unequal political
representation and segregation, they met with little
success. However, though the majority of them never
actively participated in politics, some Indians did make
a significant contribution towards the promotion of
African Nationalism in Kenya by assisting and supporting
several key African leaders,for example,Desai supported
Harry Thuku in the 1920s.

Asian agitation played a key role in defining
the future of Kenya in favour of the Africans as in
1923 (D. Ghai; 1970:9). However, all in all, they were
more the receivers of political decisions and their
political role was ineffective in influencing policy
formulations.

Thus, failing to gain equality with, and acceptance
by the Europeans who were their immediate reference group,
and unwilling to get assimilated into the indigenous

culture which they regarded as alien and inferior, the
Asians became increasingly isolated, falling back on
their own resources to provide basic services and
amenities through the organization of communal self-
help projects. These projects are comparable with
the present phenomenon of grass-roots Harambee projects
in Kenya's rural areas, which can also be attributed
to a feeling of alienation by the rural people from
the development process.

Being barred from certain economic activities the
Asians directed and concentrated their efforts mainly
towards commerce and trade, expanding into manufacturing
and service industries, transportation, building and
construction, middle-level employment and, with increasing
education, into professional and skilled employment. So
that in the late 1960s a majority of the Asians occupied
what might be called middle-level manpower in the Kenyan
economy, and their contribution to high level manpower
was also substantial (D. Ghai, 1970:106). Since
income levels are closely tied up with occupational
patterns, and given that most of the Indians were traders
or wage and salary earners, the majority of them fell
in the middle income group. In 1948, approximately
a quarter of the Indian working population had an income
of up to £15 per month, about 60% earned between £15 and
£30, and the balance up to £50 per month, including 2%
with an income of from £50 to £100 (J. Mangat, 1969:140).
Thus, both with regard to occupation and income the Asians

had come to occupy the middle position in the 3-tier
system. However since then, there has been a marked
improvement in income levels and the general standard of
living of the Indian community.

The Indians also increasingly diverted their
attention to the expansion of education within the community,
in recognition of the importance of education for
securing jobs in the civil service, for the successful
operation of the small-scale businesses, as well as for
the transmission of the Indian culture. Most of the
schools were built on a communal basis by the various
Indian religious sects. Later, increasing government
control transformed the schools from centres of
Indian religious and cultural education to a system of
education based on English standards, and also encouraged
the education of girls, one factor which contributes
to the relatively high degree of female labour participation
in the formal sector. The initial concern of the Asians
was mainly with primary education, but later there
was a growing awareness of the role of secondary education
for skilled and professional employment, so that the
older generation made tremendous financial sacrifices
to invest in their children's education. Thus substantial
progress in Indian education was made especially in
the post-war period, with a growing stream of Indians
going overseas for higher education. For example, in 1960, of
2,500 students studying overseas nearly half were Asians
(Abdulla and Rattansi, 1970:134). Abdulla and Rattansi

(1970:129) are right in concluding that education
has played a crucial role in the transformation of the
community

> "within a short span of time from
> a largely traditional Indian society
> into an increasingly western and cos-
> mopolitan one".

However, the impact of western education has not been
uniform on the different groups and this may have
contributed to their different orientations.

Besides expanding the educational institutions,
the Indians organized a series of social and cultural
facilities also along communal lines which reinforced
their separate identities. Most communities established
their own places of worship, social and cultural halls,
clubs, recreation grounds, and burial places, while some
built their own communal hospitals.

These economic and social developments had profound
repercussions for the Indian community. As Ghai (1970:141)
points out:

> "the process of settling down, of
> adaptation to the East African
> environment and to British institutions,
> the extensive urbanization of a community
> emigrating from Indian villages, the
> rise of a new generation exposed to the
> influences of western education and to
> better economic standards - all these
> factors foreshadowed far-reaching changes
> within the Indian society. In essence....

> ...they initiated a process of
> greater East Africanization of
> the Indian immigrants, and the
> gradual decline of their initially
> strong links with India - this
> was to be particularly true for the
> younger generation born or brought
> up in East Africa".

However, these developments also resulted in increasingly
isolating the Indians from the rest of the Kenyan society,
as a "distinct racial and cultural" minority group.

Independence and Post-independence Period

At independence, the Asians presented the picture
of a self-sufficient, economically powerful, highly
urbanized and educated, relatively affluent and socially
exclusive group; an unpopular minority resented by the
Africans (then and now) because of their commercial
activities and occupation of positions which are the
immediate aspirations of the African masses. Thus:

> "one finds a vast reserviour of anti-
> Asian opinion among the rural folk and
> especially amongst the unemployed".
> (F. Furedi, 1974:357)

The Indians have further incurred African hostility
because of the inward-looking organization of their
social structure which is closed to outsiders so that
to the Africans and others, Asian ways remain a mystery.
This in turn adds heat to and perpetuates the stereotypes
of the Asians created and in a sense legitimized by the

Europeans who gave great emphasis to the 'parasitic'
nature of the Asian community. They were able to do this
by using the Asian traders as middlemen in the marketing
of agriculture and other produce. The Asians were
pushed into positions which made them appear the
immediate exploiters of the Africans. These 'stereo-types'
portrayed the Asian as "crafty, underhanded, dishonest,
out to exploit the poor Africans and to compete unfairly
with the Europeans, clannish, unhygienic and dangerous
because of their intelligence and propensity to
reproduce like rabbits"(P. Van den Berghe; 1970:171).
The European policy of compartmentalizing society
along racial lines reinforced behaviour patterns which
at times gave authenticity to the stereotypes. The
general racist attitude of the Asians also resulted in
producing a negative impact upon them; Furedi (1974:349)
observed that:

> "the Asians saw the Africans as being
> clearly inferior to them and they were
> not reluctant to express this view".

The average Indian found the African dirty, lazy, untrust-
worthy, dull and unintelligent. A prominent Kenyan
novelist aptly sums up the Asian-African relationship
thus:

> "The Indian traders were said to be
> very rich. They too employed some
> black boys whom they treated as nothing.
> You could never like the Indians because
> their customs were funny in a bad way.
> The Indians were not liked and they abused
> women, using dirty words they had learned
> in Swahili".
>
>   (J. Ngugi, 1969:8)

These perceptions set the stage for explaining why
at the onset of Uhuru the Indians were faced with a
tremendous dilemma at the prospect of African rule.
(Y. Ghai, 1972:181) aptly points out:

> "It is one thing to accept rule of
> a superior race, indeed one even tries
> to imitate them, but how humiliating
> to be bossed around by members of an
> inferior race".

The Asians have always insisted on and prided themselves
in their cultural superiority vis-a-vis the African
culture while being ambivalent towards the European
culture, thus making it difficult for them to get
assimilated into the indigenous culture.

After Independence, the problem of citizenship
became a crucial and very confusing issue for the
future of the Asians in Kenya. Recognizing their
status as an easily identifiable and vulnerable
minority, on account of their race and privileged
economic position, many feared and expected scapegoating,
victimization and redundancy at the hands of the new
regime. Writing about the Asians, A. Bharati (1972:17), had

indicated:

> "The fear possessing most Indians
> that the taking out of East African
> citizenship, as recommended by official
> voices of the countries involved, may not
> eventually help them to preserve their
> jobs and livelihood, constitutes the
> most pervasive anxiety syndrome among all
> Asian groups...".

Those who felt that they would have to make their homes
in other countries therefore did not opt for Kenya
citizenship but chose to remain either British nationals
or citizens of India and Pakistan. Of the remaining,
a few opted to take up citizenship whereas the rest
became automatic citizens. The figures below show the
citizenship status of the Asians in 1969.

Table 6:   Kenya Asian Population by Citizenship, 1969

	Total	Male	Female
All Asians	139,037	71,599	67,438
Kenyan	60,994	32,052	28,942
Non-Kenyan	78,043	39,547	38,496

Source: Kenya Population Census, 1969.

The table shows that about 44% of the Asians
in 1969 were Kenya citizens, while 56% were non-citizens.

However, given Kenya's commitment to explicit
policies of Kenyanization and Africanization, whereby
key areas of economic activities are transferred to
citizens, it can safely be stated that significant
numbers of non-citizens have left. A series of exoduses
took place especially after the Immigration Act of 1967
whereby non-citizen employees within certain categories
were required to obtain work permits which could be
granted and cancelled at the discretion of the immigration
authorities, and the Trade and Licencing Act, by which
non-citizens were restricted from trading in non-scheduled
areas and in certain basic commodities. Thus:

> "feeling that their days were numbered,
> large numbers left both as a result of
> Government policy measures and known
> fears and anxieties".
> (Y. Ghai, 1973:222)

In 1972 the British Government gave an estimate of
non-citizen Asians at 40,000. (Ghai, D., 1972:2)
At that time, the anxiety caused by the Asian expulsion
in neighbouring Uganda, triggered off a further stream
of emigration of the Kenyan Asians.

The integration of the school system and the
preference given to African children for admission into
schools has meant reduced educational opportunities for
Asian students. The Asian response to this has been a
reversal to the establishment of community-run schools,
or private schools, as well as increasingly sending

their children overseas. It has been argued that
educational prospects for their children have been an
important motive for the emigration of several families
to the United Kingdom, India and Pakistan. Not all
the non-citizen Asians have emigrated, and it is
difficult to give current estimates. Those who have
left or are planning to leave seem to have a preference
for the western countries as their places of destination,
rather than India, the place of their cultural origin.
Most of them tend to prefer affluent though culturally
alien British or Canada over familiar but poor and
destitute India or Pakistan (Van den Berghe, 1970:169). This
preference for the West will significantly influence their
orientations regarding the family institution.

What is the situation of those Asians who have
chosen to remain in Kenya? These include those non-citizens
who have managed to acquire work permits or trade licenses,
as well as the citizen Asians. Mangat (1969:175)
describes this group as:

> "a generation which was born and brought
> up in East Africa and had developed a
> greater consciousness of their countries
> of adoption and in the process had lost
> much of the sympathy of their parents for
> the places of their origin in India and
> Pakistan. Moreover, the younger generation
> of Asians, exposed to a highly urbanized
> East African environment, a system of
> education modelled on the western pattern
> and higher standards of living, developed
> marked changes in food habits, mode of
> dress and language".

These comprise less than one percent of the total
Kenyan population at present. They have made Kenya
their home and it is unlikely that many want to leave
their place of adoption. However, they are getting
increasingly anxious and apprehensive about their
future here, chiefly because of the Government's
emphasis of accelerating Africanization of commerce
and industry, periodic anti-Asian speeches by some
politicians and their description as 'second class'
or 'paper-citizens'. Finally, one fear which looms large
over the Asian population in Kenya is that the implementation
of the Ugandan strategy of mass expulsion is a political
possibility, a fear reinforced by the anti-Indian sentiment
often expressed by the man on the street.

The perception of economic and political insecurity
was therefore not only paramount on the eve of independence
but still persists, and to a large extent determines the
reactions and attitudes of the Asians to the current
situation. This factor becomes important in the present
study where it is argued that if the Asians are considering
eventual emigration from Kenya, they are likely to limit
their family size. To quote one anthropologist, A. Bharati,
(1969:16):

> "The ubiquitious feeling that the
> coming generation of Indian settlers
> does not have much of an economic and
> social future in East Africa is no doubt
> the most powerful single factor in the
> reduction of the birth rate among the
> minority in the last few years".

However, while we accept that this feeling of insecurity
may be an important factor we do not support Bharati's
view that it is the most powerful single factor in
limiting Asian fertility.

The Asian population of Kenya today can be
described as a heterogenous one divided by religious
linguistic and communal considerations, living in tightly-
knit, parochial communities and practicing a high degree
of social exclusiveness for which they have always shown
a predilection perhaps owing to the traditional caste
system in their culture of origin.

Unlike the African population the majority of the
Asians (over 90% of them) are living in the main urban
centres of the country, deriving their livelihood from
trade, commerce, and middle and high level employment.
Table 7 below gives the distribution of Asian employees
by citizenship and industry in 1971.

Table 7:   Asian Employment by Citizenship and Industry
1971 (%)

	Kenya Citizens	Non-citizens	Total
Agriculture and Forestry	1.0	1.2	2.2
Mining and Quarrying	0.1	0.3	0.4
Manufacturing	12.1	13.2	25.3
Building and Construction	1.1	4.4	5.5
Electricity and Water	0.2	0.2	0.4
Commerce	21.7	12.0	33.7
Transport and Communications	7.7	3.5	11.2
Services	9.3	12.0	21.3
Total	53.2	46.8	100.0

Source: Economic Survey, 1972.

The statistics however, only cover those Asians
who have regular wages or salaries, thus leaving out
30% of the gainfully employed who do not fit this
definition of employment. The majority of these would be
self-employed and family workers in small-scale enter-
prises in trade, repairs, a variety of industries like
catering, tourism, transportation and professional
services.

Income figures for the Asians contradict the
popular belief in the country that all Asians are

affluent. Income figures for those in regular employment
in 1970 are presented in table 8.

Table 8:   Asian Employees by Income Groups, 1970

Shs. Per Month	Male	Female	Total	Total %
Under 100	241	138	379	1.4
100 -- 199	263	68	331	1.2
200 - 299	336	188	524	1.9
300 - 399	555	286	841	3.0
400 - 599	1553	619	2172	7.7
600 - 999	4396	1268	5664	20.2
1000 - 1499	5755	1710	1710	26.6
1500 - 1999	4108	726	4834	17.2
2000 - 2999	4676	206	4882	17.4
3000 and over	952	42	994	3.5
Total	22,835	5,251	28,086	100.1

Source: Statistical Abstract, Kenya 1971
Note: Excluding unpaid directors and casual employees

        The table shows that at least 15.2% of the
employees earned less than Shs. 600/- per month, while
only 3.5% were earning more than Shs. 3,000/- per month.
According to Ghai (1970:109):

> "It is forgotten too often in the
> emotionally charged atmosphere surrounding
> this subject that a substantial minority
> of the Asian population in East Africa
> has income levels barely sufficient to
> provide for the basic needs of the family".

There has been a general increase in income levels over the past few years, but the improvement has also been accompanied by a general simultaneous increase in the cost of living.

However, as table 9 below indicates, in relation to the African population, the Asians have relatively higher incomes and thereby higher standards of living.

Table 9: Number of Enumerated Employees, Average Earnings and Total Wage Bill for Africans and Asians 1961 and 1970

	Asians	Africans
1961		
No. of persons employed (thousands)	38	530
Average earnings (£) per annum	511	76
Total wage bill (£ million)	19	40
1970		
No. of persons employed (thousands)	30	601
Average earnings (£)	960	182
Average wage bill (£ million)	29	110

Source: Employment Incomes and Equality, ILO 1972, Table 29, p. 87.

Vis-a-vis. the local African population, the
Asians are a highly literate and educated group chiefly
as a result of the high premium that Asian parents
have placed on education. The majority of the Asian
children go through primary and secondary education up.to
form IV, while a considerable number of them, generally
from the bigger communities, pursue higher education
at university. This emphasis on education has resulted
in eroding the Indian cultural influences thus making
the Asians a highly exposed and western oriented society.
According to two authorities:

> "education has played a key, if
> unintended role, in promoting
> social change within the Asian
> community".
> (Abdulla and Rattansi, 1970:148)

The degree of exposure to the western model is
clearly reflected in the social make-up of the community.
Of course western impact has penetrated the different
communities in varying degrees, with the Shia Ismailies
being considered the most 'modernized' as it were, of all
the Asian groups. In general, the social life of the
Asians reflects an interesting mixture of Indian and
Western influences, with a noticeable absence of any
real local, African influence. The pattern of social
relationships is based on communal or ethnic social
networks, with very little contact or integration with the
Africans except superficially at the sundowner, shopkeeper-

customer, or master-servant level. The Asian pre-
occupation with economic advancement (their chief
motive for immigration), coupled with their tendency
towards clannishness, has prevented any meaningful
involvement with the indigenous people. Ghai (1970:11)
has put this succinctly:

> "the notion of social exclusiveness
> within the framework of commercial and
> administrative relations came naturally
> to them....It was possible to be loyal
> to the system and the government under
> it, and yet restrict intimate social
> relations to members of one's own
> community".

The pattern of social and economic stratification
within the community is closely related to the styles
of life of the different groups. Therefore, the social
patterns and customs of each community will be examined
in depth in the next chapter. However, some behaviour
patterns are common to the whole community.

The pattern of social life of the Asians comprises
of regular visits to Indian and Western commercial films.
Statistics for the 1960s show that 70% of the theatres
portray Hindi movies, where 98% of the audience is
Indian, whereas in the movie theatres which depict
Western movies, at least 50% of the audience is Indian
(A. Bharati, 1964). Another popular and regular past
time (especially for the women) is listening to Indian
film music, or for the more westernized youngsters, pop-

music. In keeping with the ability to improvise in the
face of restrictions imposed upon them in various
spheres, the Indians have overcome the restricted time
allocated on the Voice of Kenya to the Indian programme,
through substituting the radio with the tape recorder.
The cassette tape-recorder appears to be a universal
household possession playing popular romantic love
tunes from Hindi movies, at any time of the day. The
combination of movies and music from India is perhaps
responsible for inculcating into the younger generation
an idealized notion of romantic love, a notion which is
further dramatized by the depiction of romantic love
in the western commercial movies. However, despite the
idealized view of love, marriage for the Asians still
follows intraracial and intra-ethnic lines, a reflection
of the great disparity between theory and practice, and
the prevalence of strict norms and rules guiding marriage.
The occurence of exogamous marriage is rare. The author
knows of very few instances of Asian-European marriages
and of even fewer cases of Asian-African marriages in
Kenya. Marriage is strictly endogamous, not only by
race but also by religion and caste, and marriage customs and
rituals in general are still closely related to practices
in India. Although Western-style dating is slowly
becoming popular with the younger more educated generation,
arranged marriages are still widely practiced, since the
family still plays a vital role in an individual's life;
the family as much as the individual is a unit of social
interaction among the Asians. (R. Desai, 1965:2).

The impact of western values and institutions
in affecting social change within the family structure
can be seen in the desire expressed by the younger
couples to replace the extended family pattern by the
nuclear form. However, the joint or extended family is
still widespread. Even where families have to split
physically due to limitations of space or other problems,
the household still remains economically, socially and
emotionally extended, since it serves a number of economic
and social needs. In the words of Desai (1965:6):

> "Vis-a-vis business, an Asian
> primarily sees himself as a member of
> the joint family and later at the
> centre of a number of over-lapping
> circles (such as caste, language group,
> religious groups, network of kinship
> and so on), which comprise the Asian
> society. With the Asian society business
> activity is part of the total social
> activity. The same individuals and
> groups which interact socially do so
> economically as well".

However, the extent of nuclearization varies significantly
between the different communities.

One important leisure activity for the Indians
perhaps springing from their close familial attachments,
is the visiting of relatives and friends. In fact for
some of them, next to visiting Indian movies, this is
the only form of recreation. Since the friends and
relatives are normally from one's own community, this
reinforces communal identity and perpetuates their
exclusiveness. Finally, this sense of identity is

further enhanced through religion. Religion seems to be basic to the Indian value system, and in fact for some communities like the Ismailies and other Muslim groups, social life of the members is so inextricably intertwined with religion that it becomes difficult to draw a line between the two. As has been shown by Mawani (1975) for the Indians, places of worship serve both religious as well as social functions, thus providing solidarity for the group and a sense of belonging to its members. This is perhaps why the Asians devote so much time to visiting temples and mosques.

These brief glimpses of the social life of the Asian society present an impression of the effort by the members to create a small corner of "westernized" India in the heart of Kenyan society, so that social activity and participation with non-Asians is minimized, and the cultural values and customs transferred from India are maintained, if in a somewhat modified manner. This alienates the Indian from the rest of the society and makes him a mystery to the outsider, thus reinforcing further alienation.

So far, the above description has treated the Asians "en mass" as one social entity within the framework of the historical, economic, social and political developments which have been taking place in Kenya since the colonial to the present times. This attempted to highlight, at the macro-level the factors that have

influenced their role vis-a-vis the other two races in
the country. However, as has been previously stated, the
Asian population does not form a homogeneous group.

Table 10 attempts to classify the different
Asian groups found in Nairobi, according to origin,
religion, language, major occupation and size.
(See pages 86 and 87). The Asians are composed of a
number of diverse sub-communities which are differentiated
from each other on the basis of religion, language, caste,
community etc, and each has its own internal organization
and social structure with strict norms about boundary-
maintenance. Within this context, the behaviour of the
individual Asian is determined less by the fact that
he is an Asian and more by his membership in one of the
sub-communities, i.e. whether he is an Ismaili, a Patel,
a Sikh or a Shah, etc. It is therefore appropriate
at this juncture to turn to the individual communities
examined in the present study, thereby giving a perspective
of the internal diversity within the minority.

However, one concept which needs to be clarified
regarding the social divisions among the Kenyan Indians,
because of its pervasive application to Indians everywhere -
is the concept of caste. Therefore, before proceeding
to the separate treatment of each community in the next
chapter, a brief discussion is presented on the nature
of the caste system in Kenya.

Table 10:   Indian Groups in Nairobi by Religion, Origin, Language, Size and Occupation

Asian Group	Religion	Origin in India	Language (Dialect)	Estimated Size 1976-1978	Common Occupation
Ismailies	Shia Muslim	Kathiawar and Cutch Districts	Cutchi § Gujerati	4,000-5,000	Business, Professional and Middle level employment
Ithna' Asharis	Shia Muslim	Cutch, Kathiawar	Cutchi	N/A	Business
Bohoras (Dawoodi)	Shia Muslim	Cutch	Cutchi	2,000-2,500	Merchants
Memons	Sunni Muslim	Sind and Cutch	Cutchi	N/A	Businessmen, Traders
Lohar/Wadhas	Sunni Muslim	Cutch	Cutchi	200-250	Artisans (stone-masons, Carpenters, Blacksmiths, Mechanics)
Manjotis	Sunni Muslim	Cutch	Cutchi	N/A	Artisans
Kumbhars	Sunni Muslim	Cutch	Cutchi	N/A	Artisans (potters), dairy industry
Punjabis	Sunni Muslim	Cutch	Urdu	N/A	Government and Clerical Services
Sikhs	Sikhism	Punjab	Punjabi	N/A	Artisans (fundis), Contractors, Mechanics, Businessmen, Architects
Shree Visa Oshwal (Shahs)	Jainism	Gujerat	Gujerati	6,000-6,500	Businessmen
Patels	Hinduism	Gujerat Bombay	Gujerati	N/A	Professional and Clerical Employment + Business
Lohanas	Hinduism	Gujerat	Gujerati	1,674	Businessmen

Asian Group	Religion	Origin in India	Language (Dialect)	Estimated Size 1976-1978	Common Occupation
Brahmans	Hinduism	Gujerat	Gujerati	2,000	Clerical and Professional employment + Business
Suthars	Hinduism	Gujerat	Gujerati	400 - 500	Artisans, Carpenters, Archietcts + related crafts and clerical employment
Sonis	Hinduism	Gujerat	Gujerati	N/A	Goldsmiths
Mochis	Hinduism	Gujerat	Gujerati	N/A	Shoemakers
Hajam (Nao)	Hinduism	Gujerat	Gujerati	N/A	Barbers
Dhobis	Hinduism	Gujerat	Gujerati	N/A	Laundrymen, Clerical Employment
Darji	Hinduism	Gujerat	Gujerati	N/A	Tailors
Punjabis (Arya Samaj)	Hinduism	Gujerat	Hindi	N/A	Government and Clerical Services
Parsis	Zoroastrian	Gujerat	Sundhi		Clerical Employment, Skilled Artisans, Mechanics, Engineers and Contractors

Sources: Shia Imami Ismaili Directory, 1979
          Shri Visa Oshwal Directory, 1976
          Lohana Directory, 1978
          Community Chairmen and Key Informants

Footnote: 1. The Goans are not included here as Indians. Although they originate from Goa in India, they are Roman Catholics, speak mainly English and more important they neither consider themselves as Indians nor are considered as such by the other Asians. They prefer to be treated as Portuguese.

2. The above list is not exhaustive - there are other very small Indian communities, many of them found mostly at the Coast, namely: Baluchi (Sunnis from Baluchustan), Kokni Muslims (Sunnis), Sindhis (Hindus), Bhatias (Hindus), Hindu Lohars - Blacksmiths.

The Nature of the Caste System in Kenya[6]

The Indian caste system has been a popular topic of discussion especially because of its rigid stratification pattern and immense influence over the Indian's daily behaviour. However, within the Indian society in Kenya, one cannot discern the traditional caste system as it is supposed to have existed in India. Here it is a slightly different phenomenon from India, although some norms related to caste are still adhered to. Because of the breakdown in the rigidity of the caste system, there are different views about its existence here. Some writers (J. Mangat, 1969; D. Pockock, 1959:299-300; A. Chattopadhya, 1970; Dolson and Dolson, 1969:125) argue that castes have broken down within the East African context while others like Bharati (1969:30) maintain that:

> "castes in Asian East Africa are well
> defined and there is no group which is
> not clear about its own image vis-a-vis
> the other jatis".

In order to appreciate the extent to which the caste system is operative in Kenya, it is important to examine the principles used to define the traditional concept of caste or jatis in India.

A caste can be defined as a socially exclusive group which tends to be endogamous, commensal and trade-exclusive.

According to the ancient Hindu scriptures, the <u>Vedas</u>, society is classified into <u>Varna</u> or castes which are hierarchically arranged. There are four main castes originating from the head, hands, thighs and feet of <u>Brahma</u>,[7] and each is assigned with a particular occupation. The caste hierarchical lay-out is as follows:

(1)   The Brahmans   — the priests and teachers

(2)   The Kshatriyas   — the warriors and rulers

(3)   The Vaishyas   — the mercantile and
                           agricultural section

(4)   The Sudras   — the slaves and labourers

However, this four-fold <u>Varna</u> scheme can be considered an ideal type or a guideline for normative behaviour. Within this set-up, there are numerous sub-castes or <u>jatis</u>, and at the operative level, it is the <u>jatis</u> which are pivotal for the day-to-day behaviour of the Indian people and form the core of their social organization.

The main principles which determine caste-groupings all ensure strict boundary-maintenance and perpetuate the existence of castes as separate social entities. The main principles are:

(a)   <u>Ascription</u>:   Caste status is ascribed rather than
      achieved so that an individual can only be born
      into a particular caste. Nor is there any way of
      altering one's caste membership and becoming the
      member of another caste if one chooses to. This
      is closely related to the Hindu belief in <u>Karm</u>
      (fate) whereby an individual's fate is pre-deter-
      mined as a result of his previous destination. The
      Indian pattern of caste ascription by sight is
      probably related to the hereditary nature of caste
      membership; usually the higher the person on
      the caste ladder, the lighter the skin colour is
      reckoned to be and the lower the person, the
      darker the colour. The Sudras are therefore
      supposed to be very dark. Perhaps within Kenya,
      the connotation of the African domestic worker as
      being inferior derives from this. He would be
      equivalent to an untouchable (<u>Sudra</u>). It must be
      pointed out that the Muslim sects, are divided
      on religious grounds, and it is possible with
      some sects like the Ismailies, to gain membership
      within the group through conversion.

(b)   <u>Caste-hierarchy</u>: Castes are arranged hierarchically
      such that any caste or sub-caste occupies a
      particular position on the stratification ladder.
      In the undisputed position at the top are the
      Bramans, while the Sudras always occupy the

91

bottom of the ladder. However, within the
broad groupings, there is further caste-ranking;
for example if we consider the artisan castes, the
goldsmiths would rank higher than all the others.
The Suthars would rank higher than the Lohars,
while the Mochis (cobblers) would be placed at
the bottom because they work with animal hides.
It is however, difficult to generalize because
in India the operation of the caste-system tends
to be localized and varies from region to region
(A. Mayer, 1970). The caste-system is considered
the most rigid form of stratification because
traditionally mobility between castes is prohibited.
In Kenya, although caste hierarchy is not manifest,
the connotations of status do linger, so that if
one is a mochi, there is general awareness that
he comes from lower down the hierarchy. Mention
must be made here that the Muslims in Kenya form
distinct religious sects but these unlike the
castes, are not necessarily hierarchically arranged.

(c)   The Principle of Commensality: Commensality
refers to physical contacts or the cooking and
consumption of food with other castes. Closely
connected to the principle of caste hierarchy is
the theory that each caste has a certain quality
of ritual purity. The "Hindu pollution concept",
(A.N. Stevenson, 1954:54) which is the basis of

ritual status implies that the purity of a
caste is undermined or polluted by certain
commensal contacts with inferior castes. Ideally
the most superior caste (the Brahmans) will eat
from nobody, while the most inferior one (the
untouchables) will eat from everybody. This
ensured that mixing on any level was avoided and
each caste kept itself to itself. It is evident
that in Kenya the principle of caste commensality
has been eroded. One finds members of different
caste groupings socializing and eating together
either at home or at hotels. Not only do the
Hindus intermingle among themselves, but they also
mix with the Muslims, a fact which is strong
evidence of the erosion of this principle. This
breakdown probably set in as early as the period
of immigration to Kenya when members of different
castes were forced to travel together from India.
Once they had settled in Kenya, the socio-economic
environment did not make it possible to practice
this principle.

(d) Trade/Occupation Exclusiveness: According to
the ideal model, traditionally each caste and
sub-caste was assigned a broad occupational field
within which the members came together. There is
usually an implied correspondence between the caste
name and the traditional occupation practiced by

its members. Thus the members of the Darji
caste are usually tailors, while the Brahmans
are the priests and teachers. Often there is a
prevailing feeling that the traditional occupation
is genetically passed on since the caste members
appear to portray a natural aptitude for their
respective occupations. As one Suthar informant
stated,

> "Even if my son had never touched
> carpentry, and I gave him a hammer,
> he would know exactly what to do with
> it, and he would feel at home because
> he'd have a natural aptitude for it".

Not all members of the caste always follow the
prescribed occupation. In Kenya, initially, the
choice of employment for the Asians was to an extent
influenced by caste considerations. Most artisan
groups took up employment as carpenters, masons,
tailors, shoemakers, etc., while many of the
mercantile groups played a dominant role in commerce.
This tended to change later with the changing socio-
economic conditions within the country, and the
Asians diversified into various occupations
irrespective of caste status. We find for example,
that most Suthars and Lohars do not practice their
traditional trades of carpentry and iron-mongering
because of lack of demand for their skills and
the possibility of more lucrative employment in

other fields. However, there are still instances
of castes which have continued their respective
trades where these proved more lucrative. For
example, the majority of the <u>Soni</u> caste, is in the
goldsmith trade. Also, only <u>Brahmans</u> will perform
the marriage rites at Hindu weddings. Nevertheless,
this important distinguishing factor of the Indian
caste system has to a large extent been undermined
within the Kenyan context.

(e)   <u>Caste Endogamy</u>:   The clearest caste demarcation
is seen in rules regarding marriage. For the
Indians, caste endogamy is a strict rule and one
that is rigidly observed. It is strongly associated
with the hierarchical arrangement of castes and the
notion of purity and impurity and helps ensure
that castes exist as socially exclusive groups.
In Kenya, all the Indian groups practice endogamy
and in fact group endogamy is one of the pre-
conditions for marriage rites; an Ismaili cannot,
for example, get married in the mosque according
to custom if he/she marries a non-Ismaili. This
is perhaps one of the most important factors in
perpetuating the heterogeneity of the Asian
community in Kenya.

Of the five caste principles discussed above
it is evident that the ones of ascription and endogamy
are applicable to all the Asian groups in Kenya.
In relation to the others, we find that the rules of
commensality are not adhered to, occupation is not
caste determined and the Asians experience occupational
mobility, nor are notions of purity and impurity or
caste hierarchy strong. In their efforts at accommodating
themselves to a different social and economic structure
which was stratified on the basis of colour and race,
the Indians could no longer practice the caste system as
they had known it in India. They therefore had to modify
it. As Morris (1968:288) has observed:

> "If the Indians in Africa wished to
> maintain the identity of their jatis
> and yet organize themselves into
> communities, then they necessarily
> produced something quite different
> from the castes they had known at home".

In conclusion, what has emerged in the process of
Indian adaptation in Kenya are distinct communal
groupings demarcated by religion, language, endogamy and
forms of social organization. Every Indian is aware of
his membership in a particular community while he may not
necessarily be aware of his caste, especially since some
of the groups like the Muslims do not have caste divisions
which are hierarchically arranged. The researcher was
consistently being asked what community (jat) she belonged
to, not what caste. It therefore appears more plausible

to refer to the Indian Jats, (jatis), as communities
rather than castes in order to accommodate the various
Asian groups in Kenya.

We now turn to highlight major similarities and
differences between the four communities in the present
study.

Footnotes to Chapter Four

1.   See: J.S. Mangat, A History of the Asians
        in East Africa, 1886-1945, London, 1969; D. Ghai
        and Y. Ghai, Portrait of A Minority; Asians
        in East Africa, 1970; A. Bharati, The Asians
        in East Africa, Jayhind and Uhuru, Chicago,
        1972; H. Chattopadhaya, Indians in East Africa,
        A Socio-Economic Study, Calcutta, 1970;
        Hollingsworth, Asians in East Africa, London
        1963; G. Delf, Asians in East Africa, London,
        1963.

2.   It is estimated that of the 32,000 indentured
        labourers, 16,312 returned to India at the
        expiry of their contracts, 2,493 died, 6,454
        were invalided home after being incapacitated
        and only 6,724 stayed on (see Mangat; 1969,
        p. 39 and D. Ghai, 1970; p. 3).

3.   See Census Reports, Kenya, 1962, Uganda and
        Tanganyika, 1959.

4.   See Altea Hill, "The Fertility of the Asian
        Community of East Africa", Population Studies,
        No. 29, 3, 1975, A. Bharati, 1972; C.J. Martin,
        "A Demographic Study of an Immigrant Community:
        The Indian Population of British East Africa",
        Population Studies, Vol. VI, No. 3, 1953;
        D. Ghai, 1970, p. 99.

5.   These are discussed later in this chapter, p.71-75.

6.   The Phenomenon of Caste is discussed in:
        A.C. Mayer, Caste and Kinship in Central India:
        A Village and its Region, 1970; Max Weber,
        "The Development of Caste" in Class Status and
        Power, eds. R. Bendix and S.M. Lipset, N.Y.
        1966; M.N. Srinivas,"Caste in Modern India",
        in Journal of Asian Studies XVI, 4, 1957,
        p. 529-43: J.H. Hutton, Caste in India, Cambridge
        L. Dumont, Homo Hierarchius: The Caste System
        and its Implications, London, 1972.

7.   This is one of the names of the Hindu God.

COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS BETWEEN THE COMMUNITIES

The preceding chapter presented the historical,
economic, political and social development of the Asians
as a minority group in Kenya. This was done to highlight
the factors at the national level which have influenced
the role of the Asians within the country. However, it
was also pointed out that the Asians do not form a
single social entity. The Asian population is composed
of diverse sub-communities, which differ from each other
on the basis of religion, caste, language, socio-economic
status, social structure and organization, etc. This
chapter will attempt to show these internal diversifications
among the four sample communities using mainly key-
informant interviews, available documentary evidence
and the sample data.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

The Shia Imami Ismaili Community

The Shia Imami Ismailies, referred to as the
Ismailies, are the most numerous of all the Muslim groups
in Nairobi, although during the last eight years their
population has considerably declined. It is estimated
that in 1968 there were between 8,000-10,000 Ismailies
in Kenya, but at present this figure has dropped to about

4,500.[1]   The Ismailies have been the focus of very
many studies[2], and have been widely discussed perhaps
because of both their highly complex and efficient
social organization and the feeling that they are the
most "modern" and affluent of all the Asians in Kenya.
They have been variously described as the most "thoroughly
modernized", the most "emancipated", the most "progressive"
of all Asian communities, the "pace-makers and pioneers
of western-oriented emancipation among the Asians".

The Ismailies are members of the Shia[3]   sect in
Islam and are followers of Prince Karim Aga Khan. The
Kenyan Ismailies are descendants of Hindus from India
(perhaps Lohanas and certain lower caste Hindus) who
were converted to Ismailism a few hundred years ago by
a Muslim Dai (missionary).[4] The Ismailies migrated to
East Africa from their homes in Kutch and Kathiawar during
the late 19th and early 20th century, (though the pioneers
came in the early 19th century). The factors leading
to their emigration were the same as for other Asian
groups, mainly the push of deteriorating economic
conditions in India and the pull of better economic
prospects and opportunities in Africa. However, for
the Ismailies there was an added push factor; the 3rd
Aga Khan, (the leader of the Ismailies), perceiving the
harsh conditions resulting from famine, plague and Hindu-
Moslem riots, advised his followers as early as 1895 to
migrate to East Africa. These factors resulted in the

large-scale immigration of the Ismailies to East Africa.

In Kenya, most of the Ismaili migrants, taking
advantage of the prevailing conditions, entered business
as petty traders (dukawallas) and gradually went into
middle-grade employment and commercial enterprise. This
pattern was quite different from the occupation they
practiced in their country of origin; in India agriculture
formed the basis of their economy. This encouraged the
growth of the extended family, and villages were composed
of members who were related to one another through the
father's lineage. Although whole agnatic groups migrated
from their villages and established a pattern of residence
in Kenya, individualism in economic matters, because of
better prospects and changing economic conditions, gradually
led to a dispersed form of settlement and may have had
the effect of undermining the traditional extended family
system. This will be discussed in a later section.

It has been argued that it was the tradition of
shopkeepers which "provided the avenue for social prestige
and upward mobility" for the Ismailies (Walji, 1974:59).
For some of the other Asian groups, like the Lohars and
Suthars, their traditional occupations formed the basis
of their livelihood and thus limited the opportunities
for mobility and change in economic status. According
to Walji (1974:60):

> "The prosperity of the Ismaili community
> as a result of their enterprising,
> innovative spirit made it possible to
> initiate changes".

This could also apply to the other major business community,
i.e. the Shahs. However, there was a difference for the
Ismailies as indicated by Walji (1974:60):

> "There were other internal factors like
> the centralized bureaucratic system, the
> emphasis on education and the active
> participation of women in communal acti-
> vities",

as well as the direction of the Aga Khan in all matters,
which provided a further impetus to change. No description
of the community would be adequate or meaningful without
discussing the role of their Imam or guide. In fact the
community takes its name from the sixth Imam, Ismail,
thus indicating the importance of religion to their basic
way of life. For, as Walji (1974:9) aptly puts it:

> "the presence of the Imam is the basis and
> foundation of their Shia doctrine".

The Ismailies are the only Muslim group which believes in
a living, hereditary leader in the person of the Imam,
who guides them in their daily affairs and is supposed
to be in touch with modern developments. The present
Aga Khan is the 49th Imam and traces his descent to the
first Imam. Ali (cousin to Prophet Muhammed). For the

Ismailies the _Imam_ is both a secular and spiritual leader.
According to Prince Karim Aga Khan,

> "Islam is concerned with the whole life
> of the followers, not only with their
> religion. The Pope is only concerned
> with the spiritual welfare of his flock.
> The Imam looks after the community's
> temporal and spiritual interests".
>   (Fischauer, 1970:17)

The total belief in the unquestionable divine and
charismatic authority of the _Imam_ is the major unifying
force in the community. The role of the _Imam_ in
determining the organization a to belief system of the
community cannot be over-emphasized. One of the main
reasons that the impact of the western institutions
is more marked among the Ismailies than any other Asian
group is that their receptiveness to change has been
encouraged by the two Aga Khans. The main channel
through which the _Imams_ direct and guide their followers
is the "_Firmans_" or pronouncements which every Ismaili
considers his religious duty to follow. An analysis of
the "_Firmans_" reflects the process by which the Imam(s)
brought the East African community to modernization by
means of religion (Adatia and King, 1969). It is
therefore very difficult to separate the secular from
the religious aspects of the Ismaili's life since the
two are inextricably intertwined. Examination of the
Firmans reveals that they deal with the religious,
political, economic and social aspects. The _Firmans_

stress the need for absolute faith in Islam and Ismailism,
the importance of daily prayers and meditation; the
value of education and emancipation of the status of
Ismaili women; they emphasize loyalty and allegiance
to one's country, economic diversification of the
community, the necessity for thrift and control of
conspicuous consumption, and even speak out against
smoking, drinking alcohol and gambling. It must be pointed
out that there is considerable deviation by the individual
members regarding the observation of the Firmans. Not
all Ismailies visit the Jamat Khana (mosque) regularly,
or observe daily prayers, or Du'a. Fifty four per cent of the
respondents indicated that they go to the Jamat Khana
almost everyday, while the remaining 46% either went
once a week or once a month. Again a large percentage of
the men and a few women indulge in smoking, drinking
and gambling. Moreover, the Ismailies are stereotyped for
their very lavish and extravagant style of life, frequenting
expensive restaurants and night-clubs, buying expensive
houses, cars and other modern gadgets, dressing according
to the latest fashions etc. Unlike the Shahs, the Ismai-
lies are not seen to practice asceticism and thrift. All
this shows that adherence to the Imam's guidance is not
so strict especially among the younger generation, some of
whom in the extreme, may even question the authority of
the Imam. It is the author's contention that the immigration
to England and Canada, where the communal institutions
are not so central to the Ismaili's life, may lead to

perhaps more conflict and a lesser degree of cohesiveness than is found here. Nevertheless, the recognition of the Imam's authority by practically all the Ismailies is an overriding factor and the basis of the strong sense of identity and cohesiveness within the community and can be said to have determined their different pattern of development compared with the other Asian groups in Kenya. As Robert Bocock (1971:365) aptly puts it:

> "The existence of the living Imam
> has meant that Ismailies have been
> more flexible in adjusting to changing
> conditions in the last hundred years
> or so".

Apart from the Firmans, the community also has a constitution[5] prepared by the Imam in consultation with the community leaders. This provides rules of conduct for religious, social as well as personal matters like marriage, divorce, birth and death. The Aga Khan's pronouncements have thus had a great impact upon the organization of the communal institutions, most of which have evolved according to his advice, as well as the day to day behaviour of the individual members. The role of the Imam has been discussed at length since any analysis and understanding of the structure and functioning of the Ismaili community, and the changes taking place therein have to be within the context of the guidelines provided by their spiritual leader.

In addition to the above, there are other
mechanisms which tend to reinforce cohesiveness in the
community. One of these is the Jamat Khana or communal
prayer house of the Ismailies. The social life of the
Ismailies to a great extent revolves round the Jamat
Khana which is more than just a place of worship for the
Ismailies. (P. Mawani, 1975). The members frequently
visit the Jamat Khana; in fact some of them go daily, while
others go on certain days like Fridays and big religious
days. The social aspect appears to take prominence over
the religious one since people more often than not go
with the intention of meeting with relatives and friends
after the normal prayer time is over. Mawani (1975)
concludes that because the Jamat Khana is both a religious
and a social institution, it creates a strong degree of
cohesiveness in the community..."The Jamat Khana has
remained the centre of the community in the country;
both ideally and practically as its visible symbol of
social and cultural identity as well as its source of
cohesiveness". (Mawani, 1975:215). The Jamat Khana
makes feasible a high level of frequent contact and mutual
exchange, which factors, according to Durkheim reinforce
social solidarity. The Jamat Khana therefore, reinforces
group identity and a pattern of social networks which is
along communal lines; only Ismailies can participate in
the activities within the Jamat Khana since membership is
restricted.

Group cohesion also results from, and can be measured by, the existence of various communal social facilities. The Ismailies have their own housing schemes in the way of communal flats which are concentrated in certain areas, and where a large proportion of the members reside. The community also has its own welfare assistance scheme to help the poor and the needy, health facilities (the Aga Khan Hospital), a religious and cultural centre in Parklands, a recreational club, and boarding or rest houses. An Ismaili therefore does not need to step out of bounds of his group for the necessary social welfare services required for day to day living. This further limits his involvement with other groups within the country and crystallizes the community.

It has been stated that in the field of education, no other Asian community can compare with the Ismailies (Wilson, 1950:115). They were the first Asians to start their own private school. Today the community has its own nursery, primary and secondary schools, a school for the handicapped and a girls' hostel. Initially however, being a business community, the Ismailies saw no practical need for more education for their sons beyond the fundamentals of a basic education, as was the case with the other communities. This was changed through the influence of the Aga Khan (III), who not only encouraged education for the boys, but emphasized the value of girls' education even over that of the boys.[6] This explains the development

of very high levels of education among the Ismailies
and the large numbers of highly professional and skilled
manpower, as will be illustrated later.

Besides encouraging changes in education the Aga
Khan has also been a motivating force in developing
the economic sphere of the Ismailies. He initiated the
Jubilee Insurance Company and the Diamond Jubilee
Investment Trust Company (now the Diamond Trust), both
of which provided the necessary means for financing
business ventures. Later, after independence, the
Industrial Promotion Services was established by Aga
Khan IVth, to facilitate and promote industrial
development. All these companies are still operating
profitably today.

It is commonly believed that all Muslims are allowed
to practice polygamy. However, for the Ismailies, polygamy
is strictly prohibited and a man is not allowed more
than one wife. Marriage as with the other Asians, is
endogamous, and the proportion of Ismailies marrying
outside the community is quite small (P. Walji, 1971).
Where such marriages do occur they are mostly with other
Asians, and it is evident that inter-racial marriages
are not favoured. However, inter-marriages are not
encouraged due to religious and social pressures.

In conclusion, the Ismaili community appears to
be a highly self-sufficient community with its own
constitution, a complex organization of councils, boards
and committees, economic, health, housing and welfare
institutions. Because of this complex set-up, it has
often been described as a "state within a state". The
role of Aga Khan III has been very important in
establishing this 'state' and initiating changes which
have directed the community towards Westernization in
the colonial context. In 1952 he directed that the
Ismaili women of East Africa should "adopt colonial
dress and a western standard of living",[7] thus implying
the need for cultural and social change to facilitate
the assimilation of the group within the existing colonial
environment. Later, since Independence, the present
Aga Khan (IV) has constantly impressed upon the Ismailies
the importance of loyalty to, and identification with
Kenya, as well as the need to adjust to the changing
political, economic and social conditions within the
country.

These factors probably have been instrumental in
social change within the community, thus leading the
Ismailies to be described as the most advanced and
progressive of all the Asian communities of Kenya.

An analysis of the other Muslim group in the sample, the Lohar-Wadhas, which follows, should further highlight the differences between the communities.

The Lohar-Wadha Community

Reference to this Muslim community has hardly been made anywhere in the extensive literature on the Asians in East Africa, probably because of the 'en block' treatment of the Asians, and the concentration on numerically signi-ficant groups like the Ismailies. The Mombasa Social Survey (Wilson, 1950:126-127) refers to the community very briefly under the discussion of the various Asian communities of Mombasa. Therefore, all the information presented here is derived mainly from key informants, oral interviews with a few community members, informal talks with some of the male and female respondents during the survey interviews and finally observations by the researcher during several visits to the Lohar families. On the basis of these an attempt has been made to recon-struct their historical development from their origin in India, to their present situation in Kenya. It is difficult to verify the authenticity of the information by comparison with other written sources since none are available. However, an effort was made to get as reliable information as possible from the different sources.

The Lohar-Wadha community numbers about three hundred people in Nairobi and about one thousand in

Mombasa. According to one key informant who has been
to India and consulted a kind of griot[8] about the history
of the community, the Lohar-Wadhas trace their origin
centuries back to three brothers; Muru. Bhin and Mindar
who were Hindus (perhaps Lohanas) living in the state
of Sindh. These brothers migrated to Kutch where they
came into contact with a Sunni Muslim pir (saint)
called Dada Sada who was already engaged in the blacksmith
occupation. This pir converted them into accepting the
Sunni Muslim religion (as far back as the 10th century)
and also taught them their traditional blacksmith's
occupation. This is where the community traces its
roots. It is named Lohar/Wadha on the basis of the
traditional occupation of the group. Lohar means a black-
smith and Wadha means a carpenter. One explanation given
for this combined reference is that one of the major
occupations the community was involved in was the making
of swords with iron and wood for the Maharajas and princes
of the state of Kutch. This therefore entailed becoming
familiar with both ironmongering and carpentry. However,
after the British occupation of India, and the substitution
of manual production by machines, the community could not
carry on sword-making and therefore resorted to other
blacksmith and carpentry jobs. At present in India and
Pakistan the Lohar/Wadhas are still practicing their
traditional occupation but often with a specialization in
modern gadgets like furniture-making, radiator products,
etc. in response to increasing mechanization. The

Muslim Lohar/Wadhas are not the only carpenters and blacksmiths among the Asians. There are also carpenter. (Suthar) and blacksmith (Lohar) communities among the Hindus, but apart from the common traditional occupation, there are few similarities in their life styles as will become evident in the present study.

The Muslim Lohars appear to have migrated to East Africa from India around 1870 mainly for economic reasons. The semi-arid region of Kutch offered harsh economic and geographic conditions and very limited opportunities for improving these conditions. The Lohars found it possible to immigrate to East Africa on the trading dhows of another Muslim community, the Bhadalas, who were a sea-faring group on the coast of Kutch and were pioneers in establishing trading links with the East African Coast as early as the 15th century. Because all the dhows first landed in Zanzibar, the Lohars initially settled there, and then gradually moved northwards to Mombasa where most of them settled since this coastal town offered many employment opportunities. Later on some of them moved inland to Nairobi.

The early migrants found their skills in high demand, for example, in designing dhows, making anchors and other required materials for boats, as well as making furniture, roofing, etc. for houses, and in making iron and steel implements. Those who did not engage in the traditional

occupations found employment as labourers and manual
workers. However, according to the informants, because
of the demanding and exacting nature of the work, and
relatively poor returns, most of the migrants did not
encourage their sons to carry on the traditional occupation.
Moreover, with increased mechanization, the demand for
their work started declining till eventually the trade
died out; so that at present there are only three 'real'
blacksmiths in Nairobi and a few in Mombasa. Most of the
Lohar men are presently engaged in related manual
occupations like car mechanics, major and minor building
repairs, furniture making, and some in clerical jobs.
Because of the relatively low education levels within
the community, there are hardly any professionals.
The pattern of occupation of the Lohar men which emerges
from the survey data shows that unlike many other Indian
groups the Lohars are not a business group.

It appears that most Lohar women do not participate
in the labour force. The low participation of the women
could perhaps be attributed to the fact that the attitude
to secular education has been influenced by religion and
tradition. As a whole the community has not put much
emphasis on education or professional training either for
the men or the women. The manual orientation within the
community did not require the men to get educated and
therefore the only training considered important for the
women has been good housekeeping and domestic science

which could be taught at home by female members of the
extended family. In addition, the fear that secular
education which is western-oriented, would uproot the
child from his society and totally alienate and "corrupt"
him, prevented parents from encouraging their children
to go to school. As one informant explained:

> "The Sunnis are more orthodox than
> the Shias and giving independence
> and exposure to a girl is not
> desirable.which is what education
> would do".

In his study of the Sunni Memons, Bagha (1967) also
found that for the Memons the idea of seclusion of women
was important and:

> "the emphasis was always on religious
> education to the detriment of secular
> education".

Moreover, unlike some of the other larger Indian
communities the Lohar community does not have a school
of its own, perhaps because of the low emphasis on
education and most Lohar children attend either government
schools or schools belonging to other communities.
However, the attitude seems to be changing in favour of
secular education, but compared to the other groups the
position is still not very favourable.

Another reason for the low levels of education in the community may be the early marriages. For the Lohars marriage appears to be a universal ideal. The Prophet Muhammed is supposed to have put a lot of emphasis on marriage :

> "It is necessary for you to marry, because marriage is a protection against wickedness of the sight". (9)

Since the social customs and traditions of the Lohars are based on religion, (the Islamic Sharia[10] or law dictates their behaviour), they tend to be influenced by the sayings of the Prophet and therefore put great emphasis on marriage. However, given also their Hindu origin, a lot of their customs and ceremonies are based on Hindu practices, and the pattern of early marriages is essentially a traditional Hindu practice.

Another custom pertaining to marriage, which was also brought from India is the arrangement of marriage by the parents or close relatives without the consent of the two individuals concerned. All the women indicated that they had no say in the choice of their spouse. To quote one respondent:

> "My marriage was arranged by my parents and I never saw my husband until the wedding night. With us, marriages are arranged without consulting the girl".

This further reflects on the relatively traditional nature of the community. The concept of romantic love, or the pattern of western-style dating is almost non-existent among the Lohars. Change towards the western life-style has not permeated the community significantly.

A further point pertaining to marriage and social organization is the endogamous nature of the community. As with all the other Indian communities, the Lohars practice strict endogamy in order to maintain "the purity" of the group. This reflects a strict adherence both to Islamic law and to Hindu caste tradition. According to one writer (Ashraf, 1974:71-73), Islam does not permit a Muslim woman to marry a non-Muslim but allows Muslim males to marry non-Muslims. Adherence to this law can be seen in the feelings expressed by a female informant who had been living in England for the last five years:

> "I would never want to marry outside the community because according to the Sharia, if a girl marries a non-Muslim her marriage is illegal in the eyes of God".

Not only is it important to marry within the Muslim religion, but it is more important to marry within one's community; there was no respondent who had married a non-Lohar. Bagha (1967:56) also found in his study that no Memon girl had married outside the community. In addition, because the Muslim law strongly influences

the social customs and behaviour of the Lohars, it is
quite common to find a man marrying his father's brother's
or father's sister's daughter or his first cousin. This
practice is very common among the Sunni Muslims and is much
favoured in order to maintain and reinforce communal soli-
darity and communal interests. However, among the other
Indian groups this is rare and very often prohibited. [11]

Muslim law allows the practice of polygamy up to
four wives. However, although the incidence of polygamy
is high among the Arabs, most of the Indian Muslims
practice monogamy. According to one informant, less than
5% of the Lohar men are polygamists and these are all in
Mombasa. Finally, although divorce is allowed on specific
grounds like alcoholism, adultery and cruelty, the incidence
of divorce is very low because of societal disapproval
which is probably based on the Prophet's views. He is
reported to have said:

> "Never did Allah allow anything more
> hateful to him than divorce".
>   (M. Ashraf, 1974:53)

In the Lohar community as well as Muslim society in general,
a divorced woman suffers ostracism and is considered a
social outcaste.

The social behaviour of the Lohars appears to be
sanctioned by religious law. The pattern of marriage

and kinship closely follows the Indian tradition whereby
the older generation exercises a great deal of authority
and influence in the every-day life-style of the younger
generation.

The description of the Lohars gives the impression
of a very tightly-knit, traditional community with very
limited exposure as compared with the other groups.
Social networks are determined by the family and
community at large, and the pattern of socialization
emphasizes religious aspects and the Indian value system.
Bagha's (1967:98) description of the Memons that:

> "being tied down by mistaken conceptions
> of religion and tradition has led to a
> very insignificant role being played by
> the Memon community in Kenyan society"

aptly sums up the limited role of the Lohar community
within the wider Kenyan context. The attitudes, behaviour and
life-style of the Lohars are determined by religion and
communal membership. The main leisure activities of the
members are visiting Indian movies, listening to popular
Indian music and socializing with relatives, all of which
reinforce the closedness of the group. It was interesting
to note that 100% of the respondents owned a luxury item
like a tape-recorder which constantly played Indian pop
music; also most respondents go to see an Indian movie at
least once a week. Yet, many do not own what have become
necessary items in other Indian households, namely refri-

gerators, cars and toasters.

This brief account of the origin and social
organization of the Lohars shows them to be more traditional
with relatively little exposure to western life styles as
compared to the other communities in the sample. We now
turn to examine the two non-Muslim groups in this study.

The Visa Oshwal Community (The Shahs)

As has been mentioned, the Visa Oshwal community,
referred to as the Jains or Shahs throughout this thesis,
has been chosen to illustrate the position of the more
numerically and economically dominant Hindu groups in
Kenya. Unlike the two smaller groups, relatively more
research has been done on this group.[12]Therefore, for
the purposes of this section the author has relied on the
various studies and documentation of the community,
together with key informant interviews, the survey
results and personal observations.

The origin of the Jains can be traced to Mahavira,
an ascetic who was looked upon as a saint or a prophet
and became the charismatic leader of Jainism. It is
argued (Balwant, 1971:141) that Jainism like Buddhism,
arose as a reaction against Hindu scriptures which
emphasized that salvation was limited to persons born
into the Brahmin or the highest caste. According to

Radhakrishnan, (1923:328), the Jains are not opposed
to the caste system which they tried to relate to a
person's character and behaviour:.This is also indicated
in the Sacred Books of the East (XIV:140).

> "By one's actions one becomes a
> Brahmin or a Kshatriya or a Vaishya
> or a Sudra".

Thus they make a distinction between ascribed and achieved
status and therefore the emphasis on the individual –
one of the elements similar to the Protestantic Ethic.
In addition the Jains also deny the existence of a
Creator or first cause of the Universe, and instead
worship deified saints. However, many of them do worship
some Hindu deities. In fact among the Kenyan Jains there
seems to be little awareness and understanding of the Jaina
philosophy; hardly any respondent was able to give an
answer when asked how the Jains considered themselves
different from the Hindus. Some even felt that Jainism
was a branch of Hinduism, and yet they prefer to regard
themselves distinct from Hindus and their caste system.

The set of principles that guide the Jains in their
daily behaviour are mainly derived from religious doctrines.
The main one is the principle of Ahimsa, or a conviction
in non-violence and non-injury to any living being.
This has tended to have significant economic and social
implications primarily because of its effect on occupation
and diet. Jains were forbidden to eat meat and fish, to

consume liquor, and to engage in agriculture or any
occupation which involved the taking of life (Balwant,
1971:175). Such restrictions:

> "proved to have economic as well as social
> worth, for the Jains found they could make
> higher profits when they turned from
> occupations involving direct harm to living
> creatures, to careers in business as
> bankers, lawyers, merchants and proprieters
> of land".
> (Noss, 1956:152)

This factor (in addition to the economic set up in Kenya
during the colonial period) probably determines the
present day occupational patterns and partly the life
style of the Jains both in India and in Kenya.

Unlike the Ismailies and some of the other Muslim
groups, the Jains were much later migrants to Kenya.
According to Zarwan (1977:49) the first Oshwal settled
in Kenya between 1895-1899. However, the bulk of the
migrants started coming from India after 1920. There
was a decline during the recession and the Great
depression, but after 1934, there was large scale
immigration up till Independence, and then a decline
because of new regulations regarding citizenship. (At
present, it is estimated that there are about 7,000
Jains in Nairobi).[13] The migration of the Jains had much
in common with the general pattern of Indian immigration
to East Africa. The major factors leading to migration
were mainly economic deterioration in India and the

pull of the developing Kenyan economy, as well as the presence of kin and caste members. However, unlike the major Hindu groups like the Patels and Lohanas, the Oshwals settled almost entirely in Kenya. Very few went to Uganda and there were some in Tanzania (Zarwan, 1977:68). This is because the choice of location depended heavily on the presence of relatives and caste mates. Initially the migrant stream constituted young, unmarried males who would return to India to marry, leave their wives behind, until they had finally settled down in Kenya. It was only later that the men married Kenyan Oshwal girls. According to Zarwan (1977:53) the present migration of the Shahs from Kenya to Britain is perhaps similar, where the son or brother is sent to settle and obtain regular income and then send for the rest of the family.

The Oshwal community in Kenya belongs to the <u>Swetem-</u>
<u>bara</u> Sect and comes from Saurashtra and Gujerat in Western India. They can be considered as <u>Vaishyas</u> (the merchant caste) according to the four major caste groupings. Within this major caste they form the <u>Vania</u> or <u>Banya</u> (trading) sub-caste. Although their traditional occupation in India was farming, the Jains in Kenya are in commerce and industry and are the most important business community amongst the Indians in Kenya. Their pervasive influence in commerce is witnessed,for example,in the commercial areas of Nairobi like Biashara Street, Jogoo-lane,

parts of Ngara, River Road, and Kimathi Street. The
Shahs have increasingly moved from retail to wholesale
and manufacturing. They are the wealthiest Indian group
in Kenya and are perceived as such by other Indians and
by the Africans. (That is why a successful shrewd African
businessman may often be referred to as a banyani).

This success of the Shahs in business is probably
related to the existence of elements within Jainism similar
to the Protestant ethic; especially values like individual
salvation and thrift (Karkasar), whereby the Jains are
expected to limit their possessions and restrict personal
effects to necessities; as Weber (1958) puts it:

>"the joy in possession is objectionable,
>but not possession or gain itself".

In addition, the organization of the community along
caste and kin lines has also played a dominant role.
A historian of the Shah community has recently shown
that:

>"of prime importance to the successful
>establishment and functioning of Oshwal
>businesses in East Africa was the existence
>of a wide and closely knit network of
>caste and kin".
>   (Zarwan, 1977:209)

Zarwan (1977:76) further goes on to say that:

> "Jains possess a unity and cohesiveness
> unmatched by other Kenya Hindu castes
> and sub-communities".

The survey results showed that three quarters of
the men were in business, an extremely high proportion
compared to the other communities, and yet very many
of them have been trained in a wide range of professions
like accounting, medicine, law, pharmacy, etc. This can
perhaps be explained by the fact that a high premium
is put on education by most Asians and therefore parents
have invested greatly in their children's education.
However, although there have been far-reaching changes in
many aspects of social life, certain institutions, like
the joint family system are still an important aspect of
social and economic organization for the Oshwals, so that
most businesses are still family-owned and controlled.
This means that the sons, inspite of their professional
qualifications are still taking over their father's
businesses - business being far more lucrative than
employment. Also, a number of families may have educated
their sons so that they might play well-defined roles
in operating and managing businesses in order to enhance
growth and diversification.

It appears that although changes have taken place
in some aspects of the social and economic set-up with

the impact of westernization, certain traditional or
core values still dictate behaviour. We thus find that
while many men and a few women have given up the
vegetarian diet, frequenting restaurants, eating meat and
consuming liquor, the home still remains vegetarian;
although social relations and friendships have cut across
caste and racial lines, most still remain within the
caste so that the pattern of social networks is very much
determined along communal lines and socializing is usually
done   with other Shahs and then other Indians. Marriage
is endogamous and one is not usually allowed to marry
outside the community although marriage with other Hindu is no
totally prohibited. However, in practice most Shahs
marry within the community and none of the sample respon-
dents had non-Shah spouses. Marriage is still very often
arranged by the parents as per tradition, and choice of
spouse is not always left to the individual. In the Jain
sacred book (Balwant, 1971:173) a couple may cohabit
only with the view to procreate, never for the purpose
of sexual pleasure. Moreover, according to the religious
doctrine, chastity must be preserved. Therefore,
traditionally, any kind of dating or premarital sex has
been taboo. It is only recently that the younger generation
follows western-style dating, though virginity is still
highly valued. This perhaps explains the strong parental
control over choice of mate. Clothing should also not
be revealing so as to excite sexual passion. This probably
explains the origin of the custom that after marriage,

the woman's garb should be a sari which would not leave
her legs exposed. These moral standards and values are
closely derived from religion and are not secularly based.
Finally, although unmarried girls are educated and
given professional training, and many participate in
the labour force, upon marriage, there is little change
in their traditional sub-servient role of becoming
domesticated and staying home. On being asked why they
were not working, some women answered, "My husband
doesn't want me to work".

However, there appears to be a shift in the life-
style of the younger generation and the trend seems to be
away from the old Jaina simplicity and asceticism towards
a greater emphasis on material possessions and luxuries
and the pleasures characteristic of the West. Group
cohesion among the Shahs is further reinforced because of
the establishment of education, religious and social
institutions, similar to those of the Ismaili community.
The Oshwal community has its own nursery, primary and
secondary schools, a hostel, an educational and relief
board to improve education levels and facilities in the
community; a communal centre or "Mahajanwadi" which serves
various functions i.e. as a wedding hall, a place for
communal feasts, a meeting place, and a place for various
social activities, and communal temples. Thus while the
country has undergone important and far-reaching political,
economic and social changes since colonialism, the essential

characteristics of the Shah community have remained
unaltered even after independence.

The Shahs are therefore, a highly cohesive and
successful business community in Kenya. They probably
consider themselves transients who will eventually move
out of the country to Britain since most of them have
taken up British citizenship. This perhaps limits their
participation in various apsects of national life. They
are highly advanced economically and materially, with
high levels of education. Their dominant concern in
Kenya seems to be economic and relationships with the
African groups are determined by this factor. The
community has borrowed certain behavioural traits from
the west and at the same time retains to an extent
traditional value systems and institutions, for example, the
marriage and family, not very dissimilar from the ones
in India. Religious ideology based on Jainism seems to
play a dominant role in their lives and yet most of them
will either migrate to Britain or other western countries
or remain in Kenya. But, as with the other Indian groups,
the whole fabric of social networks is governed by
community membership and the group projects a very strong
sense of group identity and in-group feeling. Thus the
behaviour and attitudes of the individual members regarding
major aspects of social life are more going to be determined
and influenced by the fact that he/she is a Shah rather
than an "Asian".

The Gujar Suthar Community

The Suthars (carpenters) who are ecnomically
poorer and numerically smaller (about 500-600 people) than
the Shahs, were chosen to represent the position of the
various small castes (choti jats) in the Hindu system,
like the Mochis (cobblers), Darjis (tailors), Lohars
(iron mongers) and the Sonnis (gold smiths).[15] Mention
of the Suthars has been made in passing in some writings
on the East African Indians (Wilson, 1950; Bharati, 1972),
but as with the other smaller communities no detailed
account of the group could be found in any of the sources
referred. The present analysis is therefore mainly based
on interviews with key members of the community, observations
during interviews, informal chats with some respondents and
finally the survey results.

The Suthars are Hindus and since traditionally the
Hindu population is divided into four major varna or
castes, they can be classified as Vaishyas or the caste
of merchants and craftsmen. However, compared to the
Shahs, who could be said to belong to a higher sub-caste,
the Suthars together with their counterparts form the
artisan or fundi labour class and belong to the lower
sub-caste within the main Vaishya caste. Internal to
the Suthar community, there are further divisions or
tribes determined by the place of origin in India. These
tribes can also be hierarchically ranked with the Gujars
on the top, the bulk of whom settled in Nairobi, followed

by the Vains (mostly in Kisumu), the Sorathya (in
Tanzania) and lastly the Mevada (also in Kisumu). Accord-
ing to one informant, rigid boundaries are maintained
between these tribes in India and there is no social
interaction or intermarriage. However, this rigidity does
not exist in Kenya and there is intermingling including
inter-marriage between the different sub-groups.

The origin and history of emigration of the Suthars
from India is the same as that of the other Indians.
The Suthars, like the Shahs were late-comers to Kenya,
most of them arriving after the 1930s. This is reflected
in the survey data which show that a relatively large
proportion of Suthar women were born in India.

The reasons for emigration can be attributed
to the extreme poverty in India especially of the
labourer groups. Majority of the Suthars settled in
Kenya and started working in their traditional
occupation as carpenters for building contractors. It
was only much later that some of them started their own
businesses in the way of small-scale carpentry and
joinery work-shops. Today a few of them are building
contractors, or own furniture-making and joinery concerns
as well as blacksmith workshops. However, the majority
of the Suthars are still in middle and lower level
employment. The sample statistics show that the Suthars
(unlike the Shahs) are not a business community.

As far as the occupation status of the women is
concerned, the level of participation in the labour force
is very low. It appears from the survey results, that
except for the Ismailies, the Indian women, although
they have depicted some changes in their life-styles
a là the western pattern, have not taken to working
outside the home, and still continue their traditional
roles.

Unlike the other small group, the Lohars, low
levels of education for the women do   not seem to offer
an explanation for non-participation in the labour force.
One of the informants indicated that over the last few
years, there has been a shift in the attitude to girls'
education so that they are now encouraged to go for higher
education. Previously it was not deemed necessary for
girls to study much beyond standard seven or form four.
For the boys, education has been emphasized especially
because the traditional occupation was not encouraged,
and also not many would have had an opportunity to go
into business. Therefore, education was looked upon as
the vehicle to highly paid employment. However, the
community does not have any schools of its own, and
Suthar children mostly go to government or other Indian
schools. This factor however, does not appear to have
undermined the close-knitted nature of the group.

As with all the other Indian communities,
marriage for the Suthars is endogamous. Marriage to
non-Suthars is not allowed and is highly ostracized.
According to one of the informants, dating and interming-
ling with the opposite sex is not encouraged, and parents
tend to be very strict about this especially with their
daughters. Most of the marriages are arranged by the
parents and very few people choose their own spouses.
The major criteria that the girls' parents consider are
the family's reputation or khandan, the boys' economic
position and education level. The marriages take place
at the Suthar religious and social centre situated in
Ngara, and as with the other Hindu marriages, tend to
be communal affairs and most of the members are invited
to celebrate the wedding.

Finally, the social life of the Suthars is similar
to that of the other groups. Social networks occur along
communal lines and visiting relatives and friends is a
common leisure activity, besides going to Indian movies.
And yet it is ironical that although the day to day
behaviour is influenced by and patterned along Indian
cultural practices, the majority of the Suthars have
opted for British citizenship, which implies eventual
settlement in the West rather than in their cultural
home.

In the description of the Suthars, again the
pattern emerges of a self-sufficient, socially exclusive
community with rigid communal traditions and identity.
Although western influences have penetrated the social
organization, certain traditional values are still
adhered to and guide the attitudes and behaviour patterns
of the members.

The above section has attempted to highlight the
heterogeneous nature of the Asian population in Kenya.
It gives some insight into the internal diversity within
the group by illuminating certain key features of the
organization of each sub-community within the sample.

We now turn to the socio-economic description of
the communities using the sample data, indicating
similarities and differences between the communities.

NATIONALITY

One of the independent variables considered
relevant for this study was the citizenship status of
the Asians. Table 11 gives information on this variable.

Table 11:   Nationality of the Respondents (%)

	Total	Ismailies	Shahs	Suthars	Lohars
Kenyan	57.0	87.0	38.4	23.4	71.7
Tanzanian or Ugandan	4.9	4.3	-	8.5	13.1
British	35.6	7.6	60.6	63.8	8.7
Indian	2.1	1.1	1.0	4.3	4.3
Other	0.4	-	-	-	2.2
Total	100.0 (284)	100.0 (92)	100.0 (99)	100.0 (47)	100.0 (46)

It is clear from the table that the Asians are of multi-
nationalities. In fact in many cases, while one spouse
was Kenyan the other tended to be British. The data show
that a little over 55% of the respondents were Kenyan,
and almost around 35% were British, while only 2.0%
were Indian. Yet, as table 12 on place of birth of
the respondents shows, the majority of them were born either
in Kenya or East Africa, while the rest were mainly born
in India. None of the Indians were born in the western
countries.

Table 12:   Birth-Place by Community (%)

Birth-Place	Ismailies	Shahs	Suthars	Lohars
Kenya	62	80	16	60
East-Africa	28	-	40	20
India	8	20	44	8
Elsewhere	2	-	-	12
Total	100	100	100	100

The citizenship status implies that those who are non-Kenyans will be moving to the West rather than the East, which would conform to our argument that the potentially mobile Asians will orient themselves more towards western life-styles and behaviour patterns.

As is reflected in Table 11, there was quite a variation in the citizenship status of the communities. The majority of the Ismailies (almost 90%) were Kenyan, since following the advice of their Imam most Ismailies took up Kenyan citizenship. This is a total reversal from the status of the Hindu groups, the majority of whom are non-Kenyans. It is rather a paradox that the less westernized ones are looking towards Britain as their future home. Over 60% of the Shahs and Suthars were British subjects. The majority of the Lohars (over 70%) were Kenya citizens and considered Kenya their

permanent home, with very little allegiance to India or
Pakistan. The two Hindu groups would therefore appear
potentially more mobile than the two Muslim groups. The
significance of this factor for family size will be tested
in this study.

SOCIAL CHANGE AND WESTERNIZATION

As was pointed out in the methodology section, two
indexes and Guttman scales were constructed for the
sample, to reflect the pattern of social change and
westernization among the Asians. These and a few
other indicators are discussed below.

Level of Living: Level of living has been defined as
"the degree to which the basic needs of nutrition, clothing
and health are met" (Rogers, E., 1969:374). Levels of
living, unlike standards of living, represent actualities.

In this study of the Asians, household possessions
were used to measure the concept. It must be emphasized
that given the relatively high income levels of the
Asians and their western middle-class values, the poss-
ession of items would be very different from the ones
we would use for the general Kenyan population. A lot of
the items would appear to be luxury items rather than
basic needs.

Guttman Scaling

In this study Guttman scaling was used to reflect differences in levels of living and life styles of the sample communities.

Guttman scaling uses the presence or absence of phenomena (traits) as raw data. It is defined as "the general deterministic procedure for determining whether or not the responses of subjects to items form a scale". Guttman scaling therefore affords a procedure for ranking individuals or groups along a single dimension, at the same time testing the assumption that the items "group together" to present a single concept.

The technique can be illustrated by the matrix which follows in which household possessions, which were used as indicators of levels of living - appear as columns and the units of analysis i.e. the respondents appear as rows.

	Items				
Respondents	1	2	3	4	5
A	1	1	1	1	1
B	1	0	1	1	1
C	1	1	1	0	0
D	0	1	1	0	0
E	1	0	1	0	0

In the matrix, possession of an item is shown by 1 while the absence of an item by 0. An important property of the Guttman scale is its manifestation of a cumulative order in that it is assumed that the presence of an item is a pre-requisite for the one which follows immediately. Thus, possession of item 5 means that the other four are present. Errors are regarded as departures from the perfect scale type.

Statistics for testing to what extent a scale is as near perfection as possible and therefore useful have been developed. These are the coefficients of scalability and reproducability:

Coefficient of Scalability $= 1 - \dfrac{\text{Number of Errors}}{\substack{\text{Smallest number} \\ \text{of non-modals}}}$

Coefficient of Reproducability $= 1 - \dfrac{\text{Number of errors}}{\substack{\text{Number of Items} \\ \text{x respondents}}}$

Non-modals refer to the least common of either the positive or the negatives on both rows and columns. The accepted value for the coefficient of scalability is any figure above .65 (see Menzel, 1953:260-280), and for the coefficient of reproducability any value above .90.

In this study, five Guttman scales were developed;
one for the total sample and one each for each of the
communities in order to detect differences in levels of
living between individuals and communities as well as
within communities. A group of 19 items representing
household possessions were subjected to Guttman scaling
in an attempt to rank order respondents.

The results are shown below for the total sample
in an attempt to rank individuals and communities according
to levels of living. The higher the levels of living,
and the more westernized the community, the more common
will be the rare items. (See Table 14, page 139).

Table 13:   Percentage Distribution of Total Sample
on Level of Living Scale

Scale Step	Item	Errors	Percent of Sample Dis-criminated
1	Tape recorder	1	99
	Gas/electric cooker	2	98
	Electric iron	2	98
	Radio	4	97
	Table clock	6	95
2	Pestle and Mortar	5	95
3	Car	6	91
4	Refrigerator	7	89
5.	T.V. set	11	84
6	Camera	18	76
7	Electric toaster	21	68
8	Telephone	15	63
9	Record player	7	60
10	Washing machine	7	11
11	Tennis courts	1	7
12	Table tennis table	7	6

Total cases   150 households

Coefficient of scalability   .65

Coefficient of reproducability .95

Table 14:   Percent Distribution of Members of
              Communities on Overall Level of
              Living Scale

Scale Step	Percentage Distribution of Members				
	Total	Ismailies	Shahs	Suthars	Lohars
1	1.3	0.0	0.0	4.0	4.0
2	3.3	2.0	0.0	0.0	16.0
3	2.7	2.0	0.0	4.0	8.0
4	3.3	2.0	6.0	0.0	4.0
5	4.7	0.0	10.0	0.0	8.0
6	5.3	6.0	4.0	4.0	8.0
7	8.0	12.0	6.0	8.0	4.0
8	16.7	18.0	18.0	24.0	0.0
9	42.0	40.0	42.0	48.0	44.0
10	6.7	12.0	4.0	8.0	0.0
11	4.7	2.0	10.0	0.0	4.0
12	1.3	4.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	(150)	(50)	(50)	(25)	(25)

The table above shows what percentage within each community
fell on each scale step. We see that compared to the other
communities a very large percentage of the Lohars (twice
that of any other community) fall at the lower end of the
scale i.e. within   eight scale steps. The proportion

at scale step nine are more or less the same for all the
communities, whereas the Ismailies have a larger proportion
at the top end of the scale relative to the other communities.
On the basis of this distribution, we have grouped the
communities into low, medium and high levels of living
as is shown in Table 15.

Table 15:   Levels of Living by Community (%)

	Total	Ismailies	Shahs	Suthars	Lohars
Low	28.6	24.0	26.0	20.0	52.0
Medium	58.7	58.0	60.0	72.0	44.0
High	12.7	18.0	14.0	8.0	4.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	150 (households)				

Overall, the nature of the items in the scale
indicate that the Asians as a whole have relatively
high levels of living and westernization levels compared
to the rest of the country's population. A large majority
of them possess many modern gadgets like electric/gas
cookers, refrigerators, T.V. sets, etc. which would
be considered highly luxury items in very many other
populations. One gets the impression of a western middle-
class with a high sense of western fashion movements in domes-
tic appliances. Traditional household items like the coal-iron,

jiko or the traditional grinder etc. have been either completely replaced by modern gadgets, or may be used only for special purposes, for example, the _jiko_ for making "chapatis".

However, we also find that there are definite differences in levels of living between the communities, with the Lohars being much lower than the other groups while the Ismailies possess more of the very rare items. In order to highlight further the differences between the communities as well as within the communities, different scales for each group were constructed. Tables 16 to 19 show us the Guttman scales for each community.

Observation of the scales shows that there are very limited differences between the members within each community. The pattern of differentiation in terms of cumulative sequence appears to move from basic needs like gas/electric cookers, electric irons, table clocks to more conspicous consumption items like washing machines, tennis courts, aquariums and swimming pools.

Table 16:   Scale of Level of Living - Ismailies

Scale Step	Item	Errors	Percent of Sample Discriminated
1	Electric iron	0	100
	Gas/electric cooker	0	100
	Tape recorder	0	100
	Table clock	1	98
2	Refrigerator	1	96
	Radio	1	96
	Pestle/mortar	3	94
3	T.V.	1	94
	Car	4	90
	Camera	5	84
4	Book shelves	4	84
	Electric toaster	8	80
5	Jiko (coal)	11	72
6	Electric grinder	8	72
7	Telephone	5	68
8	Record player	3	64
9	Washing machine	7	16
10	Table tennis table	2	14
11	Tennis courts	0	8
12	Aquarium	1	4
	Swimming pool	1	2
Total cases		50	
Coefficient of Scalability		.65	
Coefficient of Reproducability		.94	

Table 17:   Scale of Level of Living - Shahs

Scale Step	Item	Errors	Percent of Sample Dis-criminated
1	Pestle and mortar	0	100
	Gas/electric cooker	0	100
	Tape recorder	0	100
	Car	0	100
	Table clock	1	98
	Electric iron	1	98
	Electric grinder	2	96
	Refrigerator	2	96
	Radio	2	96
	Jiko	4	92
2	T.V.	4	84
3	Camera	5	76
4	Telephone	5	72
5	Electric toaster	6	66
6	Record player	6	64
7	Bookshelf	6	60
8	Tennis court	2	10
9	Washing machine	0	10
10	Aquarium	2	4
	Table tennis table	1	2

Total cases   50 households

Coefficient of scalability   .66

Coefficient of reproducability   .96

Table 18:   Scale of Level of Living - Suthars

Scale Step	Item	Errors	Percent of Sample Dis criminated.
1	Gas/electric cooker	0	100
	Radio	0	100
	Tape recorder	0	100
	Electric iron	1	100
	Car	2	96
	Pestle and mortar	2	92
	Electric grinder	2	92
	Table clock	3	88
2	Refigerator	1	88
	T.V.	2	88
	Jiko	4	84
3	Electric toaster	3	76
	Bookshelves	6	72
4	Camera	6	72
5	Telephone	1	68
6	Record player	2	48
7	Washing machine	0	8

Total cases	25 households
Coefficient of scalability	.65
Coefficient of reproducability	.93

Table 19:   Scale of Level of Living - Lohars

Scale Step	Item	Errors	Percent of Sample Dis- criminated
1	Electric iron	0	100
	Radio	0	100
	.Jiko	1	96
	Table clock	1	96
	Tape recorder	1	96
	Gas/electric cooker	2	92
2	Pestle and mortar	2	92
3	Car	1	72
4	T.V.	3	68
5	Refrigerator	1	64
6	Camera	5	56
	Record player	5	56
7	Bookshelves	3	52
8	Electric grinder	5	48
	Electric toaster	2	40
9	Telephone	2	40
10	Tennis court	1	4
11	Table tennis table	0	4

Total cases   25 households

Coefficient of scalability   .66

Coefficient of reproducability   .93

Area of Residence

In addition to the Guttman scales, the area of residence of the respondents can also be used to reflect levels of living. It is possible to broadly rank Nairobi by residential areas, so that places like Muthaiga and Lavington could be classified as areas of high socio-economic status while Eastleigh, Mathare Valley etc. would be classified as poor residential areas. For the study, the areas of residence of the respondents were grouped into upper, middle and low status areas. The results for each community are presented in Table 20.

Table 20:   Area of Residence for the Different
                              Communities   (%)

Area	Total	Ismailies	Lohars	Shahs	Suthars
Upper	5.0	10.0	4.0	2.0	0.0
Upper Middle	10.0	12.0	4.0	8.0	16.0
Middle	38.0	44.0	4.0	64.0	8.0
Lower Middle	43.0	34.0	64.0	26.0	76.0
Lower	4.0	0.0	24.0	0.0	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	150	50	25	50	25

Once again, the results conform to the general
pattern. Over one-fifth of the Ismailies live in the
rich areas, compared to relatively lower proportions for
the other groups. It is also interesting to note that
while no Ismailies, Shahs or Suthars live in the very
poor areas, almost a quarter of the Lohars are found
in those areas. The data showed that the majority of
the Lohars lived in the poorer residential areas of
Nairobi like Eastleigh, Kirinyaga Road and Pangani
under relatively poor and congested housing conditions.
The majority of the Suthars lived in places like Nairobi
West and South 'C', while most of the Shahs and Ismailies
lived in Parklands and Highridge.

Having examined levels of living within the
Asian community, we now turn to their exposure and
westernization levels.

EXPOSURE

Overseas Trips

One way of measuring exposure is to see if
a person has travelled outside of his usual environment.
It has been mentioned previously that the Asians and
especially the men, are a very mobile community. In
Table 21 are presented responses of the women to the
question, "Have you ever been abroad?"

Table 21:   Responses to the Question: "Have you
Ever Been Abroad?" by Community (%)

	Ismailies	Shahs	Suthars	Lohars
Yes	78	92	76	36
No	22	8	24	64
Total	100	100	100	100
N	50	50	25	25

The table shows that the majority of the Lohar
women had never been abroad. Those who did go tended
more towards India and Pakistan which are culturally
more familiar. For the other groups, the percentage
of respondents who had gone abroad was very high.
Of those who had been abroad, almost 75% went to western
countries, mainly Britain and Canada. The remaining
25% visited India and Pakistan. This reflects the
orientation of the Indians to the west rather than
their land of origin.

The Exposure Index

As has been indicated previously, an exposure
index was constructed using various media measures,
to show the different levels of exposure for the Asians.
According to the index, 33%, 32% and 37% of the
respondents showed low, middle and high levels of
exposure respectively. Differences between the

communities were significant as can be seen in
Table 22   below.

Table 22:   Level of Exposure by Community (%)

Level of Exposure	Community			
	Ismailies	Shahs	Suthars	Lohars
High	44	24	40	8
Medium	42	36	40	24
Low	14	40	20	68
Total	100	100	100	100

Once again, as with various other measures, the
Ismailies fall at the upper end of the index, while the
Lohars show extremely low levels, with over two-thirds
of them falling at the lower end.

The Asians thus appear to show a relatively high
degree of exposure according to the different indicators.
The hypothesis that exposure is one of the factors which
influences family size and family planning will be tested
later.

Westernization

    The other index which was constructed was the
westernization index (see appendix I) to measure the level
of westernization for the Asian groups. The values
ranged from 0 to 26 and the mean score for the sample
was 10.1. The internal differences between the groups
are presented in Table 23.

Table 23: Level of Westernization for the Communities (%)

Level of Westernization	Community			
	Ismailies	Shahs	Suthars	Lohars
High	60	20	24	8
Medium	30	36	32	36
Low	10	44	44	56
Total	100	100	100	100
N	150 Households			

    The differences between the communities are
significant. Again the Ismailies scored the highest of
all the communities with almost two-thirds having high
levels, followed by the Suthars and Shahs respectively,
with much lower levels, and finally the Lohars with
over half at the lower end. It is expected that the
level of westernization will be an important variable

affecting family size and family planning behaviour.

It should be pointed out at this juncture that
there was a deviation from the assumptions regarding the
extent of exposure and westernization among the Suthars.
It was expected that the Suthars, being of a lower caste
and socio-economic status, would score significantly lower
than the Shahs in terms of exposure and westernization.
However, the scales constructed did not illustrate this
difference. On the contrary as is shown in tables 22
and 23 the Suthars scored higher than the Shahs. Yet
on some of the other socio-economic status variables,
like income, education, household possessions, they
conformed to the expected pattern.

One of the ways to explain this deviation is that
the westernization index used measures which indicate
indulgence in western style leisure activities like
going to plays, movies, night clubs, restaurants, etc.
The reason the Suthars do not appear less westernized
than the Shahs is probably because the Shahs, as a
result of the Jaina emphasis on asceticism and thrift, do
not indulge excessively in such activities, although
economically they are in a position to afford it. This
is why the Shahs show far lower levels of westernization
than the Ismailies, and there is not much difference
between them and the Suthars. But the two communities do
differ on other indicators as has been indicated.

152

Footnotes to Chapter Five

1.   Ismaili Community headcount Nairobi,
      August 1978.

2.   See S. Walji, "A History of the Ismailia
      Community in Tanzania", (unpublished) Ph.D.
      Thesis, University of Wisconsin 1974;
      S. Walji, "Ismailies on Mainland Tanzania"
      (unpublished) M.A.Thesis, University of
      Wisconsin 1969; P. Mawani, "The Jamat Khana
      as a source of cohesiveness in the Ismaili
      community in Kenya", (unpublished) M.A. thesis
      University of Nairobi 1975; R. Bocock, "The
      Ismailies in Tanzania: A Weberian Analysis"
      in The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 22
      No. 4, 1971, p. 365-380; H.S. Morris "The
      Divine Kingship of the Aga Khan: A Study of
      Theocracy in East Africa" in The Southwestern
      Journal of Anthropology XIV, 1958, p. 454-472;
      E. Kjellberg, "Ismailies in Tanzania",
      (unpublished) M.A. thesis, Dar es Salaam
      University College, 1967, A.S. Picklay,
      History of the Ismailies, Bombay, 1940;
      W. Frischauer, The Aga Khans London, 1970;
      D. Ghai, Portrait of a Minority: Asians in
      East Africa; London, 1970.

3.   These are two basic sects in Islam, the Shias
      and the Sunnis. The Shias distinguish themselves
      from the Sunnis by accepting that on Prophet
      Mohammed's death, Ali bin Abu Talib was the
      rightful successor and the first Imam. The
      Sunnis reject this. The Shias are further
      divided into three sects, the Ismailies, the
      Ithna ashris, and the Bohoras (see A.S. Picklay,
      History of the Ismailies, op.cit.). The Lohars,
      one of the Muslim groups in the present study,
      are Sunnis.

4.   Known as Pir Sadar din who went to India to
      convert the Hindus and is considered the real
      founder of the Ismaili Khojas in Western India.

5.   "The Constitution of the Shia Ismailies in
      Africa", published by H.H. The Aga Khan Shia
      Imami Supreme Council for Africa, 5th edition
      1962.

6.   See S. Alidina and M.J. Kassim Ali, Precious
      Pearls:Firman Mumbarak of Hazrat Imam Mowlana
      Sultan Mohammed Shah (Karachi 1954), Rule
      No. 80 p. 55 - Firmans made in Mombasa June
      1945.

7.   The Aga Khan's directive at a Conference at
       Evians (France) in 1952 attended by Ismaili
       leaders from Africa.

8.   Each Community in India is supposed to have
       its own griot or historian. These griots
       are supposed to know in depth the history of
       their respective communities.

9.   See Prophet Mohammed Ahadith p. 23 Lessons in
       Islam Book No. V.

10.   The Shari'a or the Islamic law derives from
       the Koran and the sayings of the Prophet and
       encompasses the religious, social, economic
       and domestic life of the Muslims.

11.   See The Constitution of the Shia Imami Ismailies
       in Africa, 1962. Rule No. 3 on marriage.

12.   See: J. Zarwan, "Indian Businessmen in Kenya
       during the 20th Century", A Case study –
       (unpublished) Ph.D. thesis, Yale University,
       May 1977; J. Zarwan, "Social Evolution of
       Jains in Kenya" in Hadith 6, Proceedings of
       1974 Conference of the Historical Association
       of Kenya, Nairobi, 1976; N. Balwant, Capitalists
       without Capitalism, Connecticut 1971;
         "Pluralistic Realism of the Jains" in Indian
       Philosophy by Radhakrishnan Vol. I, London 1923;
       A. Bharati, Asians in East Africa 1972;
       V.A. Sangave, Jaina Community, Bombay 1959.

13.   Visa Oshwal Community Headcount, Nairobi, 1978.

14.   The Jains are divided into two main sects,
       the Swetembara, and the Digambara differing
       in their ethical tenets. The former are
       considered less extreme while the latter are
       more ascetic. Practically all the Visa Oshwals
       are Swetembaras.

15.   See Section on Castes in Kenya, p. 88-96.

CHAPTER SIX

SOCIO-ECONOMIC FEATURES AND DEMOGRAPHIC
PATTERNS OF THE COMMUNITIES

In this section, findings on the major socio-economic and demographic variables are presented. Some of these variables will be used in bivariate analyses in the next chapter in order to test the main hypotheses in this study. The findings are presented in tabular form for the total sample, and for the different communities, where necessary.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC FEATURES

Education

Data on education was derived by asking the number of years of schooling completed by the respondent. The findings are presented in Table 24.

Table 24:   Education Level of the Respondents
(Percentages)

	Women	Men	Total
No education	4.7	1.5	3.1
Primary	39.0	23.3	31.2
Secondary	40.0	54.9	47.4
Higher education	16.3	20.3	18.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	(150)	(134)	(284)

The table shows that less than 5% of the population had no education, while over 65% had secondary school and higher education. One therefore gets the impression of a highly educated and literate community. The men have higher education levels than the women. However there were significant differences between the different groups as can be seen in Table 25.

Table 25:   Education Level by Community
                        (Percentages)

Education Level	Community			
	Ismailies	Shahs	Suthars	Lohars
No education	2.0	1.0	0.0	13.0
Primary	26.0	30.2	33.1	43.0
Secondary	46.0	47.5	58.3	40.0
Higher education	26.0	21.3	8.6	4.0
Total	100.0 (92)	100.0 (99)	100.0 (47)	100.0 (46)

The Lohars were the least educated; over 55% had either no education or only primary education. This contrasted very clearly with the other communities where education levels were relatively higher. Over 70% of the Ismailies and 65% of the Shahs and Suthars respectively, had secondary and higher education compared to lower percentages for the Lohars. The differences

were much greater for the women. These differences
will become important when we test the hypothesis
related to education and family size.

In addition the literacy measures showed that
84% of the Ismaili women spoke English compared to only
68% for the Shahs, 48% for the Suthars and 56% for
the Lohars (however, a lot of the Lohar women were not
very fluent and could not be interviewed in English).
This is a further indication of the greater influence
of western education on the Ismailies relative to the
other groups.

Professional Training and Occupation

Table 26 gives the professional training and
occupation status of the Asian women.

Table 26: Professional Training and Occupation Status
of the Women (Percentages)

	Professional Training	Present Occupation
No training/Housewife	54.7	84.7
Semi-skilled and Clerical	31.3	11.3
Professional	14.0	4.0
Total	100.0	100.0
N	150	150

It is evident from the table that although 45%
of the women indicated that they had been trained for
some profession, only 15% were in employment. The rest
were all housewives. The labour force participation of
the Indian women appears to be relatively low as compared
to that of western women (estimated at around 35%).

Analysis by community (Table 27)   shows that
the bulk of.the employed women come from amongst the
Ismailies. This can probably be seen as the product
of the colonial system and western mode of life which
has penetrated the communal value system more profoundly
than in any other Asian community. Moreover, as will
be shown later, unlike the Shahs, the majority of the
Ismailies were not in business, which is economically
more lucrative than employment. This probably forces
some of the women to work in order to meet the standards
of the life-style they have cultivated.

Table 27:   Occupation Status of the Women by
Community (Percentages)

	Ismailies	Shahs	Suthars	Lohars
Housewife	66.0	90.0	100.0	96.0
Semi-skilled and Clerical	26.0	6.0	-	4.0
Professional	8.0	4.0	-	-
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	50	50	25	25

However, although the proportion in employment
is highest for the Ismailies, it is still rather low
considering that 60% indicated that they had been
trained in professions like secretarial, dressmaking,
teaching and managerial positions, and also considering
the very high education levels within the community.
The proportions of women trained for some professions
was lower for the other groups; 40% for the Shahs, and
36% for both the Suthars and the Lohars. It appears
from the survey results that except for the Ismailies,
the married Indian women, although they have depicted
some changes in their life-styles according to the
western pattern, have not taken to working outside the
home. Most still continue to follow their traditional
role as home-makers. This situation is quite different
from that of western Europe where a larger proportion
of the women are in employment. This perhaps reflects

the differences in cultural prescriptions about the
sexual division of labour and the role of women within
the two societies.

It has been argued in the Transition Theory
that one of the factors contributing to fertility
reduction was the increasing participation of women
in the labour force, because of industrialization and
urbanization. However this factor does not appear to
be significant in influencing family size among the
Asians probably because of their different social and
economic context. Although the majority of the women
are not working, they still have a relatively small number
of children.

The professional training and occupation status
of the men are presented in a separate table because
of the obvious differences between male and female
occupations.

Table 28:   Professional Training and Occupation
                   Status of the Men (Percentages)

	Professional Training	Present Occupation
Businessmen	37.3	50.7
Professional/ Managerial	22.4	16.4
Semi-skilled and Clerical	29.1	26.9
Manual	11.2	6.0
Total	100.0 (134)	100.0 (134)

The data show that, as has been previously
indicated, the Asians concentrated heavily in commerce
and trade. Over half the men in the sample stated that
they were in business. It appears that many of those
trained to be professionals had also moved into business,
giving a relatively low proportion in the professional
and managerial category. A very small proportion were
in manual occupations like car mechanics, carpentry,
etc. But as we can see in Table 29, the distribution
was not uniform and the communities varied a lot in terms
of occupational status.

Table 29:   Occupation Status of the Men by Community
(Percentages)

Occupation	Community			
	Ismailies	Shahs	Suthars	Lohars
Business	47.6	81.6	22.7	14.3
Professional/ Managerial	31.0	14.3	4.6	4.8
Semi-skilled and Clerical	21.4	4.1	59.1	57.1
Manual	0.0	0.0	13.6	23.8
Total	100.0 (42)	100.0 (49)	100.0 (22)	100.0 (21)

It is very clear from the table that the Shahs
are a business community. Those who were not in
business were in professional or managerial positions.
A large proportion (almost 50%) of the Ismailies,
were in business. Of all the groups, the Ismailies had
the highest proportion of men in professional and managerial
occupations. The pattern among the Shahs and Ismailies
implies that very many of them are in a rather comfortable
income bracket, by virtue of their occupation. For the
two smaller groups however, the bulk of the men were
in semi-skilled, clerical and manual occupations. These
occupations tend to be lower paid than the business and
professional ones.

Income Levels

The income data was derived mainly from the men's questionnaire because the women in very many cases appeared not to know the family income. Table 30 gives the income distribution for the sample.

Table 30:   Income Levels of the Respondents

Income per month (K.shs.)	Total	Ismailies	Shahs	Suthars	Lohars
Under 2000	1.5	2.4	0.0	0.0	4.8
2000-4999	17.2	16.7	0.0	22.7	52.4
5000-7999	17.2	21.4	6.1	22.7	28.5
8000-11,999	26.0	23.8	34.7	27.3	9.5
12,000 & over	38.1	35.7	59.2	27.3	4.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	(134)	(42)	(49)	(22)	(21)

The table shows that the Shahs were clearly the richest community, with no one earning under 5,000/- per month. This can be explained by the fact that the majority of them were in business, which was much more lucrative than employment. The Ismailies on the other hand had lower incomes, although they scored high on all the other socio-economic and westernization variables. This reflects the conspicuous life styles of the Ismailies. Once again the Lohars were at the bottom, with income levels far lower than the other communities; over 50%

of them were earning less than 5,000/- per month.

The data on socio-economic variables once again show the Ismailies and Shahs to be of much higher status than the other two groups. The Suthars fall in the middle, while the Lohars consistently have a relatively low socio-economic status, and low levels of living. It must be pointed out however, that overall, the levels of living for the Asians are much higher than the average for the national population.

The next section deals with the major demographic features.

DEMOGRAPHIC PATTERNS

Age

Table 31 gives the age distribution of the population by five year age groups.

Table 31:   Age Distribution of the Respondents by
             Five Year Age Groups (Percentages)

Age Group	Women %	Men %
15-19	0.7	0.0
20-24	4.7	0.8
25-29	17.3	10.4
30-34	18.7	26.1
35-39	26.7	17.9
40-44	11.3	15.7
45-49	9.3	11.9
50+	11.3	17.2
Total	100.0	100.0
Total Sample (N)	(150)	(134)

The percentages have been calculated separately
for men and women, in order to show the distribution of
women in the childbearing ages. There were very few women
in the peak child-bearing ages (20-24 years). The
bulk of the women (68%) was in the mid and late child-
bearing ages betweeen 25-40 years, while 32% were past
or almost past their reproductive period.

Age is a very important variable in demographic
analysis and most fertility measures are calculated by
five year age groups. Age is related to the number of
children women have, their ability to have children,

and it also influences the attitudes regarding family
size and family planning. It is therefore treated
as one of the independent variables in this study.
For the purposes of analysing the relationship between
age and other variables, the respondents were further
grouped into young (under 30), middle (30-45) and
old (45+) age groups. The percentages for each group
were 23%, 57% and 20% respectively.

Age at Marriage

The findings show that age at marriage for the
Asian women was relatively low compared to the
western societies.

Table 32:   Age at Marriage of the Women by
                        Community

Age at Marriage	All Women	Ismailies	Shahs	Suthars	Lohars
Under 15	2.0	2.0	0.0	8.0	0.0
15-19	37.3	34.0	30.0	48.0	48.0
20-24	50.0	52.0	60.0	32.0	44.0
25-29	8.0	4.0	10.0	12.0	8.0
30+	2.7	8.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total	100.0 (150)	100.0 (50)	100.0 (50)	100.0 (25)	100.0 (25)

Table 32 shows that almost 90% of the women were
married by the time they were 25 years old. The age
for men however was much higher than that for the women.
A little over 50% of them were married by the time they
were 25 years old. This conforms to the general pattern
for most populations whereby women tend to marry at
younger ages than do the men. The figures for the
men and women are not very different from the 1969 census
statistics which show mean age at first marriage for
the Asian men and women to be 26.2 and 23.5 years
respectively.[1] The Lohar and Suthar women appeared
to be marrying at younger ages than the other groups as
is seen in Table. 32.

The Asian women are therefore exposed to the risk
of child bearing for a relatively long period. It has
been argued that all other things being equal, young
age at marriage for women leads to high fertility.[2]
However, it has also been argued that this relationship
does not hold under conditions of widespread use of
contraception. In this study age at marriage may not
be a major variable influencing family size.

Family Size

The table below gives the number of children
couples have in the different communities.

Table 33:   Number of Children by Community

Number of Children	Total	Community			
		Ismailies	Shahs	Suthars	Lohars
None	8.0	2.0	16.0	0.0	12.0
1-2	43.3	50.0	46.0	52.0	16.0
3-4	35.3	36.0	28.0	32.0	52.0
5+	13.3	12.0	10.0	16.0	20.0
Total	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	150				

X^2 = 18.3   df = 9   Significant at .05 level

It is clear from the above table that Asian couples tended to have few children. The majority of them, almost 70% had between one and three children. The 13% with five and more children tended to be mostly older women over 45 years as can be seen in Table 34.

Table 34:   Number of Children by Age of Mother

Number of Children	Age Group		
	Under 30	30-45	45+
None	22.8	3.5	3.3
1-2	48.6	51.8	13.3
3-4	28.6	35.3	43.3
5+	0.0	9.4	40.0
Total	100.0	100.0	99.9
N	(35)	(85)	(30)

$x^2 = 43.07$ df = 6 Significant at .005

The table shows that the age of the mother was important in explaining variations in the number of children. Whereas the majority of the younger women had between 0-2 children, the majority of the. older women had five or more children.

The data in Table 33   show that there were variations within the sample regarding the number of children. The Lohars tended to have more children than the other three groups with the average number of children being 3.1 compared to much lower average number of children for the other groups. Whereas over 50% of the couples in the other groups had under two children, the corresponding figure for the Lohars was only 28%.

The number of children is the major dependent variable in the study.

Number of Dead Children

It has been indicated in previous chapters that infant and child mortality for the Asians is lower than for the rest of the country's population. Table 35 gives the findings on children's mortality.

Table 35:   Couples with Dead Children (Percentages)

	Total	Boys	Girls
0 dead	86.1	91.4	94.7
1 dead	11.3	6.0	5.3
2-3 dead	2.6	2.6	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	150		

Only a quarter of the parents indicated that they had lost any children. And most of those that did, lost only one child. More deaths seem to have occurred among boys than among girls. Studies have indicated that high infant and child mortality will lead to a desire for more children. However, for the Asians, mortality may not be a significant factor for family size because it is already quite low; parents do not need a large number of children as insurance against high infant and

child mortality.

Ideal, Desired and Optimal Number of Children

Not only do Asian couples have small family sizes but they also want and desire few children. Seventy percent of them indicated that they did not want any more children, while only 30% indicated that they did. In Tables 36, 37, and 38 we present the findings to the questions on ideal and optimum family size.

Table 36:   What do you Consider the Ideal Number of Children for a Couple to Have?

Number of Children	Community				
	Total %	Ismailies	Shahs	Suthars	Lohars
1-2	31.3	30.0	32.0	48.0	16.0
3	44.0	48.0	62.0	32.0	12.0
4-5	20.7	20.0	6.0	8.0	64.0
As many as God Gives	4.0	2.0	0.0	12.0	8.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	(284)	(92)	(99)	(47)	(46)

$x^2 = 52.0$ df = 9   Significant at .001

Table 37:   Given the Existing Conditions Here.
            How Many Children Should a Couple Have

Number of Children	Percentage
None	1.3
1-2	48.0
3-4	46.0
5+	0.7
As many as God gives	5.0
Total	101.0
	(284)

Table 38:   What Do you Consider to be the Optimum
            Number of Children for a Couple?

Number of Children	Percentage
1-2	16.7
3	44.0
4	39.3
Total	100.0
	284

From the above tables it is clear that the Asians
consider four to be the maximum number of children
for a couple to have. In fact three-quarters of them
feel that the ideal number should be three and under.

Therefore the actual family size does not differ much from the desired and ideal family size. The Asian couples are having the number of children they want. The Lohar community differed from the other three groups, in that their actual and desired family size was slightly larger. While the majority in the other three groups felt that the ideal number is under three children, two-thirds of the Lohars stated 4-5 as the ideal number to have.

Sex Distribution of Children

The sex distribution of the children showed that quite a number of couples (one-fifth) did not have any sons, while the majority (75%) had between 1-3 sons Table 39 shows the mean number of children by sex for each community.

Table 39:   Mean Number of Boys and Girls by Community

Community	Mean Number		
	Children	Boys	Girls
Ismailies	2.6	1.4	1.3
Shahs	2.2	1.3	1.4
Suthars	2.7	1.4	1.7
Lohars	3.1	1.9	1.7
Total	2.6	1.5	1.5

The number of boys couples have is one of
the independent variables in the study. It is expected
that the absence of sons is likely to prevent couples
from controlling their family size.

Son Preference and the Extended Family

The Asians like many other societies tend to
put a high premium on sons. This has also been the
case with the Kenyan Indians, especially since they are
patrilineal, and sons would carry on the family name
as well as support the old parents. Moreover, for many
business communities, the sons usually took over (and still
do) the father's business. The absence of sons is
therefore likely to prevent couples from controlling
their family size especially where sons are expected to
provide old age security.

The preference for sons by the different groups
is shown in Table 40. Respondents were asked whether
a couple should have an additional child if it had (a) four
sons only, (b) four daughters only.

Table 40:   Son Preference by Community

| Community | Extra Child if | | | | | |
| | 4 Sons Only | | | 4 Daughters Only | | |
	Yes	No	Total	Yes	No	Total
Ismailies	16.0	84.0	100.0	20.0	80.0	100.0 (92)
Shahs	8.0	92.0	100.0	32.0	68.0	100.0 (99)
Suthars	12.0	88.0	100.0	44.0	56.0	100.0 (47)
Lohars	48.0	52.0	100.0	80.0	20.0	100.0 (46)
	$X^2 = 19.4$ df = 3 Significant at .001			$X^2 = 37.6$ df = 3 Significant at .001		

The data show that son preference for the Ismailies
was not high. The figures reflect a significant change
among the Ismailies as regards this traditional value.
For the Ismailies, the proportions who said couples should not
have an extra child were more or less the same in both
cases. However, for the other groups the proportions
in favour of an extra child were much higher if there
were no sons. From the table it appears that once again
the Lohars were the most traditional in so far as they
attached a very high value to sons, followed by the Suthars
and the Shahs respectively. The X^2 shows that the differences
are very significant. The hypothesis that preference for
sons will influence family size will be tested in this
study.

It has been stated that one of the reasons
sons are considered important is because they are
expected to provide old-age security for the parents,
especially by living within the joint family system.
The expectations of parents to live with their married
sons were examined. Respondents were asked a question
"if your sons are grown up and married, do you expect
to live with them?" The responses to the question are
shown in Table 41.

Table 41: Expectation of Parents to Live with
      Married Sons, by Community - (%)

		Community			
	Total	Ismailies	Shahs	Suthars	Lohars
Expect to live with married sons	43.0	22.0	64.0	48.0	36.0
Depends on son and wife	23.0	28.0	22.0	24.0	12.0
Never expect to live with married sons	32.0	48.0	12.0	24.0	52.0
Don't know/ Not applicable	2.0	2.0	2.0	4.0	0.0
Total	100.0 (284)	100.0 (92)	100.0 (99)	100.0 (47)	100.0 (46)

It appears that quite a large proportion (43%) of the
respondents expected to live with their married sons either
all the time or at least for a while. However, it is
significant that almost a quarter of the respondents said

that it would depend on the son and his wife, which would imply that there is a move away from the extended family.

As the table shows, considerable differences existed between the communities. For the Ismailies, the most westernized group, only 22.0% indicated that they expected to live with their married sons, compared to very high percentages for the Shahs (64.0%) and the Suthars (48.0%). For the Lohars, contrary to expectation the percentage expecting to live with their married sons was lower than for the two Hindu groups. It appears that the Hindu communities still value the extended family system, much more than the two Muslim groups. Table 42 shows that the extended family system is still dominant in the social organization of the Hindu groups, but is less common for the Ismailies and Lohars. The table presents responses of the women to a question on how long they had lived with their in-laws.

Table 42:   The Prevalence of the Extended Family by
                              Community

| | Community | | | |
	Ismailies	Shahs	Suthars	Lohars
Lived with in-laws				
Never	24.0	4.0	8.0	20.0
Under 5 yrs.	32.0	18.0	20.0	36.0
5-10 years	16.0	10.0	24.0	16.0
Throughout/ still living	28.0	68.0	48.0	28.0
Total	100.0 (50)	100.0 (50)	100.0 (25)	100.0 (25)

It should be noted that although more than half
the Lohar women indicated that they were not living with
their in-laws any longer, it may not necessarily reflect
a break-down of the traditional norm of the extended family
and a trend towards nucleation as is the case with the
Ismailies. A large number of the Lohar respondents were
recent migrants to Nairobi from Mombasa. They were
young couples who had moved away from the older parents.
Therefore it is probably the factor of physical mobility
rather than a value change which explains this pattern.
Although there were differences between the communities
regarding expectations and practice of the extended family
system, there appeared to be a general scepticism among
parents about the sons'willingness to stay with or support
their parents in old age. Almost 40% and 44% of the

respondents respectively, indicated that compared to the past married sons are not at all willing either to live with or support their parents in old age. These percentages did not vary much by community.

Knowledge, Attitude and Practice of Family Planning

Contraceptive use is an important variable in fertility studies because of its obvious role in affecting family size. The more widespread the adoption of contraception by couples, the more control there is over family size. In this study the family planning variable is treated largely as a dependent variable. Table 43 gives the attitude of the couples to family planning.

Table 43:   Do You Approve or Disapprove of Using
                 Family Planning (by Community)

		Community			
	Total	Ismailies	Shahs	Suthars	Lohars
Approve	81.4	86.0	78.0	80.0	76.0
Disapprove	17.3	14.0	16.0	16.0	24.0
Don't know	1.3	0.0	6.0	4.0	0.0
Total	100.0 (284)	100.0 (92)	100.0 (99)	100.0 (47)	100.0 (46)

It appears that among the Asians, the attitude to family planning is a very positive one. The majority of them indicated approval of family planning. We also note that although there are differences between the communities, with the Ismailies having higher proportions approving compared to the Lohars, on the whole approval among all the communities is very high. However, although the majority of the Asians approve of family planning either for controlling or spacing the number of children, there are variations in what they consider to be the upper limit on children as has been shown earlier in the chapter.

Table 44 gives the main reasons for approval of family planning.

Table 44:   Reasons for Approving of Family Planning

	%
So that parents can plan number of children they want and can afford	65.3
It is good to plan and space children	32.2
Can give better love and attention to fewer children	2.4
Total	99.9
N	230

Asian couples therefore appear to be conscious about
the need to plan their families and are willing to
use the available methods to do this. The 17% who
disapproved of family planning did so either for health
reasons (15%) or on religious and moral grounds (2%).

Not only do the Asians approve of family planning
but among the majority of them there is both widespread
knowledge about and use of contraception. Table '45
shows knowledge and use of family planning among the
couples.

Table 45   Family Planning Knowledge and Use
                        Among Asians

	Know Family Planning	Use Family Planning
Yes	97.3	83.3
No	2.7	16.7
Total N =	100.0 150 couples	100.0

Most of the respondents knew at least two or more
contraceptive methods and very many of them (almost 45%)
had used a combination of methods, both modern and
traditional.[3]

Table 46   shows the type of methods used by
the respondents.

Table 46:   Type of Contraceptive Method Used by
            Couples, by Community (Percentages)

Method	Community				
	Total	Ismailies	Shahs	Suthars	Lohars
Only Traditional	12.0	4.0	16.0	12.0	20.0
Only modern	34.7	50.0	24.0	32.0	28.0
Traditional and Modern	36.7	40.0	32.0	40.0	36.0
No method	16.7	6.0	28.0	16.0	16.0
Total	100.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	150 couples				

The data show that the pattern for the Ismailies
was what would be expected because of their high levels
of education, exposure and westernization. A very small
proportion used only traditional methods while the pro-
portion for the Lohars was five times that. This might
to an extent explain the larger family size for the
Lohars, since traditional methods are considered to be less
effective. What was unusual was that the largest proportion
of non-users was not among the Lohars as would be expected,
but among the Shahs. This could be either because there
were more older women among the Shahs or there were more
Shah women without any children.

Overall, however, there were not very major differences between the communities regarding knowledge, attitude and practice of family planning. The later chapters will attempt to identify the factors which influence family planning attitudes and behaviour among the Asians.

In the two preceding chapters, we have looked at the levels of living, exposure and westernization levels as well as some socio-economic and demographic features of the Asians. Many of these variables form the independent variables in the study.

The next chapter moves into the testing of the major hypotheses of the study, in an attempt to analyse the variables which influence the fertility behaviour of the Asians in Nairobi.

Footnotes to Chapter Six

1. See Kenya Population Census Analysis 1969, Vol. IV, p. 80, Table 8:2.

2. See studies by N.C. Das (1967), L. Bumpass (1969), S.N. Agarwala (1967),

3. Modern methods include, the pill, the I.U.D., condom, diaphragm, jellies and creams, and foam tablets, sterilization, injections and abortion. Traditional methods include, rhythm, withdrawal, abstinence and traditional herbs.

THE IMPACT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS
ON FAMILY SIZE

In this chapter the major hypotheses in the study will be tested, by cross-tabulating each independent variable with the dependent ones. The chi-square and gamma will be the two measures of association used in order to determine the strength and the direction of the relationship between each set of variables.

The Gamma Measure of Association

The gamma measure shows the direction and strength of association between two cross-tabulated variables The gamma values vary between -1.00 (indicating a perfect negative relationship) and +1.00 (indicating a perfect positive relationship). A gamma of .00 or near that value means that there is no relationship between the variables.

The computational formula for the gamma measure is:

$$\text{gamma} = \frac{(A \times D) - (B \times C)}{(A \times D) + (B \times C)}$$

The cells are identified in a 2-way table as follows:

Therefore the formula involves the relationship between
the A-D diagnal (a concentration of cases here implies
a positive relationship) and the B-C diagnal (a
concentration of cases here implies a negative relation-
ship).

While the illustration here uses a 2x2 table, the
gamma measure can also be applied to more complex tables
than just simple 2x2 tables. The principle remains the
same, though the arithmetic becomes more complicated
(Prewitt; 1974:8-10).

In most of the cross-tabulations in this chapter,
the gamma measure is one of the statistics used.

The Chi-Square Statistic (X^2)

The chi-square is a non-parametric measure
used to assess statistical significance. However, it
may also be used to show association by showing that
statistical independence does not exist. According
to McNemar (1957:223) the chi-square is a "measure
of testing the significance of the correlation or
association as a chance departure from zero or no
relationship, and the significance test can be used

without knowledge of the degree of correlation. Such
a test of significance is sometimes spoken of as a test
of independence - are the two variable classifications
independent? If so, X^2 should be no larger than would
arise by chance...".

The chi-square therefore measures whether
something observed differs significantly from something
expected. The actual computation involves calculating
the difference between no relationship, called the
expected result, and the relationship one finds, the
observed result. In the formula below, the O stands
for the observed result and the E for the expected result:

$$X^2 = \frac{(O - E)^2}{E}$$

In testing the major hypotheses in this chapter, the
test for non-independence was established by the X^2
measure and the degree of association was established
by the gamma measure.

Aspirations to Western Life Styles and Number of Children

To test the hypothesis that higher aspirations
to western life styles will influence family size, the
westernization index computed for the sample couples
was cross-tabulated with the number of children
couples have. The cross table is presented below.

Table 47:   Number of Children by Level of Westernization
(Percentages)

| Number of Children | Level of Westernization | | | |
	Low	Medium	High	Total
0	5.8	5.8	12.8	(12)
1 - 2	25.0	54.9	51.1	(65)
3 - 4	46.2	27.5	31.9	(53)
5+	23.1	11.8	4.3	(20)
Total	100.1	100.1	100.1	
N = 150 couples	(52)	(51)	(47)	(150)
X^2 = 17.7 df = 6 Significant at .005 Gamma = -0.38				

As the Table shows, the hypothesis that westerni-
zation will be associated with family size is confirmed,
with a chi square of 17.7 significant at .005. Majority
of those with a larger number of children have low
westernization levels. The most westernized·will tend
to emulate both western attitudes and behaviour patterns
and therefore will have smaller family sizes as is
emphasized in the west. We have established that the
Lohars have the lowest westernization levels of the four
Asian groups, while the Ismailies have the highest
levels (see Table 23, chapter Five). It therefore
follows that if westernization is significantly related

to the number of children, then the Lohars should have
a relatively larger number of children compared to the
other communities. This is confirmed by the Table
below:

Table 48:   Number of Children by Community and
                        Westernization

Number of Children	Westernization		
	High Ismailies	Middle Shahs and Suthars	Low Lohars
0	2.0	8.0	12.0
1 - 2	50.0	49.0	16.0
3	28.0	23.0	28.0
4+	20.0	20.0	44.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

The community with the lowest westernization levels
appears to have more children than those with higher
westernization. The reason that the middle group has
a higher proportion with no children than the Ismailies
is because the sample for the Shah women had quite a
number of women who could not get children.

Nationality and Family Size

It has been argued in the study that the
potential mobility of the Asians, as a result of
their minority group status and their multinationalities
will lead them to have fewer children.

The hypothesis being tested in Table 49
is that those who are non-citizens are the most likely
to want and have small families.

Table 49:   Nationality versus Number of Children

Number of Children	Nationality	
	Kenyan	Non-Kenyan
0	6.1	9.5
1 - 2	42.4	44.0
3 - 4	37.9	33.3
5+	13.6	13.1
Total	100.0 (125)	99.9 (159)

x^2 = 0.8   Not significant
Gamma = 0.09

The statistics show that contrary to our
hypothesis, there is no significant relationship between
citizenship status and number of children. We had
expected that the non-citizen Asians would be a poli-
tically more mobile group and therefore conscious

of the costs of emigration. However, if one examines
Asian families it is evident that the question of
citizenship status is much more complex. Very many
Asian families are multi-nationality families so that
while the husband might be Kenyan, the wife might
be British, the parents might be Indian and the
children could be either. So that the dichotomy between
Kenyan and non-Kenyan is not that clear-cut.

The data also showed that the majority of the
respondents indicated that they had family members settled
in other countries, mainly Britain and Canada. This
therefore implies that not only the non-citizen but also
the citizen Asians are potentially mobile due to split-
families. Moreover, the social perception of the Asians
as being "paper" or "second-class" citizens might create
feelings of economic and political insecurity amongst
the Asians as a whole, making them even more potentially
mobile. A number of factors might further enhance this
perception of insecurity, namely:

- the Government's emphasis on accelerating
  Africanization of commerce and industry.

- periodic anti-Asian speeches by politicians,or
  anti-Asian sentiments in letters to the editor
  in the local dailies.

- The fear that the 1972 Ugandan strategy of mass expulsion of Asians could be a political possibility in Kenya.

- When a community sees itself as relatively marginal to the political and decision-making process, they are likely to develop a reactive perspective as one would find in trade unions or even ethnic groups. Thus they will emphasize rules of membership, endogamy, intensified in-group social interaction and thereby isolate themselves further. This process will tend to escalate their collective feeling of marginality and their search for alternative group level solutions, such as multi-nationality families and resource-distribution strategy.

Therefore, the Asians, whether citizens or not, are persistently conscious of their minority group status and the possibility of eventual emigration from Kenya. Being aware of the costs of emigration they are having smaller families. This can be further seen in their responses to the question on whether a large number of children would make it easier or more difficult for them to emigrate. The findings are presented in Table 50.

Table 50:   Responses to the Question: If for
Some Reason or Another you had to
Change your Country of Residence,
Do you think a Large Number of
Children would make it Easier,
make no Difference or make it more
Difficult to Move to a New Place?

	%
Make it easier	4.7
Make it difficult	87.4
Make no difference	6.0
Depends on circum- stances	2.0
Total	100.1
	(284)

The majority of the respondents (almost 90%) felt
that many children would make it difficult to settle
in a new place. The main reasons they gave were that
it would be very difficult and expensive to settle
down even without many children; providing education
and housing for children and finding jobs would be
difficult. Thus they were all aware of the problems
to be encountered in emigration, and felt that large
family sizes would be disadvantageous.

Further, over 70% of the respondents indicated
that if they had to they would immigrate to the western
countries mainly Britain, Canada and the United States
(the remaining 30% opted for India and Pakistan).
The western countries advocate small family sizes and
emphasize the costs of children. Since the orientation

of the Asians is towards these western countries, it
follows that they will plan their family sizes to
fit that socio-economic context.

Desire for Children versus Number of Boys

The hypothesis being tested here is that those
couples with no sons or very few sons will want more
children and will have little interest in controlling
fertility. Table 51 presents the results of the cross-
tabulation.

Table 51:   Want More Kids versus Number of Sons

Want Kids	Number of Sons			
	0	1-2	3-4	5+
Yes	75.0	21.0	5.0	50
No	25.0	79.0	95.0	50
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	(32)	(97)	(21)	(2)
x^2 = 39.8 significant at .001				

It is clear that the hypothesis is upheld. The
x^2 shows a significant relationship at the .001 level.

Preference for sons is a widespread phenomenon in most societies especially patrilineal ones like the Asians. Studies (see T. Patel; 1963, May and Heer, 1968; Poffenberger, 1968) have shown that those couples with no sons have little interest in limiting family size. In this study the preference for sons was further revealed by questions on whether a couple should have more children if: (1) it had only four girls and no boys, (2) it had only four boys and no girls. The answers are given in Table 40 in chapter Six.

It is clear from the table that Asians put a higher premium on sons than daughters; more than twice the number felt a couple should have another child if they had no sons, than if they had no daughters. The main reasons given were that sons could carry on the family name and could support the parents in old age. It is therefore clear that the number of sons couples have is a significant factor in influencing decisions about family size. However since it is not the only factor influencing family size, there were significant differences between the communities. The Ismailies did not show as high son preference as did the other communities, especially the Lohars (see Table 40 in Chapter Six). The contribution of each variable in explaining the dependent variable will be discussed in Chapter Eight.

One factor which affected son preference
was the degree of westernization as is shown in
Table 52.

Table 52:   Son Preference by Westernization
(Percentages)

Westernization	Extra Child if 4 Daughters		
	Yes	No	Total
Low	57.7	42.3	100.0 (52)
Medium	41.2	58.8	100.0 (51)
High	17.0	83.0	100.0 (47)

$x^2 = 17.26$ df= 2   significant at .001

The statistics show that the relationship
between westernization and son preference is a signi-
ficant one. The majority of those with high westernization
levels did not favour an extra child even if there were
no sons. Westernization therefore implies a move away
from the traditional value system

Women's Occupation and Number of Children

Although we have pointed out earlier that Asian
women tended to have relatively small families even
though most of them were housewives, we did however

expect some difference between those who were employed and those who were not. The hypothesis which was tested regarding occupation and the number of children was that the woman's occupation will influence the number of children. Those women in employment will have fewer children than those not employed. The bivariate relationship is shown in Table 53.

Table 53: Women's Employment versus Number of Children

| Number of Children | Employment Status | |
	Employed	Housewives
0	17.0	6.0
1 - 2	61.0	40.0
3 - 4	17.0	39.0
5+	4.0	15.0
Total	99.0	100.0
N	(23)	(127)

$x^2 = 9.04$ significant level = .05

Gamma = -0.53

The relationship between women's employment and number of children is significant at the .05 level. Our hypothesis was therefore supported. Those who are in employment seem to be having fewer children than the housewives. However this relationship must

be taken with caution. The data showed that only
15% of the women were employed. Of these almost 75% were
Ismaili women, while only 22% were Shahs and 4% Lohars.
(See also Table 27 in Chapter Six).

Since the Ismailies are also the most westernized
and have the highest exposure and education levels, one
can therefore expect that there will be a relationship
between employment and number of children due to the
confounding effect of these other variables. However,
employment may not be a significant variable in
influencing the dependent variable if we control for
other variables.like community, westernization and
exposure.

Community and Number of Children

It was hypothesized that the number of children
couples have would differ by community. .This is because
the communal pattern of social networks and social
control tends to influence individual behaviour to a
large extent. We would therefore expect Ismailies to
have fewer children than the other groups. Tables 33
and 39 in Chapter Six show us the number of children
by community. We found that the average number of
children for the Ismailies, Shahs and Suthars was more
or less the same, contrary to our expectations, and only
the Lohar community differed significantly from the
other groups. The majority of them had more than three

children.

Often in demographic analysis, the age of the mother ·can be a ·confounding variable affecting the relationship between family size and another variable. We therefore tried to control for the effect of age to see if there was any significant relationship between community and the number of children. Two broad age groups were used, the younger age group included women under 35 years, since it was assumed that they had still not completed child bearing and were likely to have more children. The older group included those 35 years and over. assuming that by that age the women have more or less had the number of children they want. The age categories had to be broad in order to avoid having very small numbers in the cells. The Table= below shows the relationships for those women with children.

Table 54:   Number of Children by Community Controlling for Age of Mother

Number of Children	Women Under 35 Years (%)				Women 35 years and over(%)			
	Ismailies	Shahs	Suthars	Lohars	Ismailies	Shahs	Suthars	Lohars
1 - 2	80.0	85.0	78.0	13.0	38.0	41.0	38.0	28.0
3+	20.0	15.0	22.0	87.0	62.0	59.0	62.0	72.0
Total	100.0 (15)	100.0 (20)	100.0 (9)	100.0 (18)	100.0 (34)	100.0 (29)	100.0 (16)	100.0 (7)

The table shows that while age of mother was important in influencing family size for the three communities, this was not the case for the Lohars. The Lohar women, whether young or old were having more children than the other women, so that even after controlling for age, we found that the relationship between number of children and community still held. In order to test if the relationship was significant, a chi square was calculated for each age group. Since there was not much difference between the other three communities, these were all grouped together for the chi-square. The results are presented below:

Table 55:   The Relationship Between Number of
                Children and Community by Age

Number of Children	Women under 35 years			Women $\leq$ 35 years +		
	All communities	Lohars	Total	All communities	Lohars	Total
1 - 2	30	2	32	31	2	33
3+	7	13	20	48	5	53
Total	37	15	52	79	7	86

X^2 = 18.58 $X^2 = 1.18$
significant at .005   not significant

NB: A correction factor of .5 was used to cater for
      for the small cell sizes so that:
$$X^2 = \frac{(0 - E - .5)^2}{E}$$

While the X^2 for the younger ages was significant at the
.005 level, for the older ages it was not significant.
This shows that the relationship between number of
children and community was significant for the younger
women even after controlling for the mother's age.
However, the older women in all the communities, tended
to have more children which is why the relationship was
not significant for women over 35 years of age.

We have established that the Lohars are once
again different from the other three communities in
terms of their fertility behaviour. However, the
community variable correlates highly with other variables
like education, exposure, occupation and westernization,
and it is these characteristics of the community
which are probably the intervening variables at work
in influencing the relationship between number of
children and community.

In this chapter we have tried to test our main
hypotheses by using bivariate analysis as well as
three-variable tables. We now turn to correlational
and regression analysis in order to measure the impact
of some of the major independent variables on the main
dependent variable and thereby test our last hypothesis.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EDUCATION ON FERTILITY BEHAVIOUR

The main hypothesis being discussed in this
chapter is that it is not the level of education alone
that determines the number of children people have,
but that a number of additional socio-economic
variables like son-preference, number of dead children,
exposure and westernization levels, will also influence
decisions about family size and receptivity to family
planning.

In order to test this hypothesis, multiple
regression analysis using the beta coefficients was
considered the most useful statistic, since simple bi-
variate or regression analysis would not have been adequate.
If there are a large number of independent variables,
multiple regression and partial regression can be used
to obtain a measure of:

(1)   the overall contribution of these variables in
        explaining the dependent variable by using the
        coefficient of determination (R^2).

(2)   the amount of change in the dependent variable
        that can be associated with a given change in one
        of the independent variables with the remaining
        independent variables held fixed. This can be
        indicated by the beta coefficient or the partial
        regression coefficient.

Since our concern is merely to indicate that education
is not the only variable influecing family size it is
felt that multiple regression analysis will be adequate.

For the purpose of our discussion, we first
present the bivariate relationship between education and
the number of children couples have in Table 56.

Table 56:   Number of Children by Education
                    (Percentages)

Number of Children	Education Level		
	No Education	Primary	Secondary and above
0	0.0	5.0	11.0
1 - 2	29.0	24.0	58.0
3 - 4	0.0	51.0	27.0
5+	71.0	20.0	4.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

x^2 = 45.8   df = 6   Significant at .001

Gamma = -0.62

It is evident from the statistics that there
is rather a strong negative relationship between education
and number of children. This relationship also held when
the variables were cross-related without condensing the
categories, as is shown in Table 57.

Table 57:   Number of Children by Education (Percentages)

Number of Children	Education Level						Higher	
	No education	Primary		Secondary			Higher	
		1-4	5-7	8-11	'O' levels	12-13	14-17	17+
0	0.0	0.0	6.4	8.5	7.7	10.1	23.1	0.0
1	14.3	0.0	8.5	21.3	30.8	20.0	15.4	0.0
2	14.3	8.3	19.1	38.3	23.1	30.0	46.2	100.0
3	0.0	33.3	31.9	23.4	30.8	20.0	15.4	0.0
4	0.0	0.0	23.4	4.3	7.7	10.0	0.0	0.0
5-6	42.9	50.0	10.6	4.3	0.0	10.0	0.0	0.0
7+	28.6	8.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total	100.1	99.9	99.9	100.1	100.1	100.1	100.1	100.0

$x^2 = 95.1$ Significant at .001   Gamma = -0.47

It has been shown in many fertility studies[1] that
education is negatively highly related to family size and
receptivity to family planning. While we accept
that education is an important variable in influencing
fertility, our argument is that the relationship between
education and number of children may not be a direct
one, and that there are other intervening variables
which might be confounding this relationship. The
table below using the Spearman's correlation coefficients
can be used to illustrate the relationship between
education and some of these variables.

Table 58:   Correlation Coefficients (r) for
              Education with Other Variables

	Education (r)
Age	-0.2261
Age at marriage	0.1767
Westernization	0.4216
Exposure	0.4079
Occupation	0.2612
Community	-0.1432
Number of children	-0.4217
Ideal number of children	-0.3129
Family Planning use	-0.1261

The table shows that education is related in varying
degrees to some of the variables used in the present
study. It correlates highly with westernization and
exposure, as well as with the actual and ideal number
of children. Westernization and exposure are also
correlated with a coefficient of 0.4119. This shows that
the effect of education on number of children may not
be an independent one.

Our argument about the role of education is based
on the theoretical and philosophical conceptualization
of education in Kenya.

According to the I.L.O. report (1972) it is very
clear that what one possesses when one has a certain number
of years of education is some basic technical knowledge, a
larger measure of attitudes and aspirations and a significant
exposure to the external world outside his community. It
is clear therefore that when one computes education in
terms of number of years of schooling one is in actual
fact measuring to an extent the acquired aspirations,
attitudes and technical knowledge. Many East African
writers, including Okot p'Bitek, Ngugi wa Thiongo, etc.
have argued that the education process in Kenya systematicall
exposes children to western value systems through choice
of literature such as Shakespeare, or in the content of
technical knowledge, geography, economics, history, physics
and chemistry and biology. Students acquire notions of the

ideal life style and a large measure of the Protestant
ethic by the time they finish their schooling. Although
changes have been initiated in the teaching of literature
and history, the westernization forces set in motion
through education have also been transmitted into deep-
seated attitudes which are carried on into adult life.

It is plausible therefore to argue that education
can subsume a cluster of indices such as aspirational
levels, exposure, westernization, life-styles. In
fact in everyday life referring to someone as an educated
person refers to all these dimensions.

The effect of education on life chances is closely
linked to the economic structure and pattern of employ-
ment within Kenyan society so that the higher the education,
the more likelihood of high level employment. This would
lead to higher incomes and thereby higher levels of
living. Again the content of education reinforces
western value orientations because it is structured along
the lines of colonial education. Children start school
at very young ages and therefore the school is a very
important socialization agent. Given the content of
education, it is natural that socialization will inculcate
western values, aspirations and western life styles,
and therefore undermine to an extent ethnic socialization
and certain traditional/cultural prescriptions and values.
The relationship between education and exposure is an

obvious one. One therefore finds that education becomes
an integral package encompassing very many important
social and economic variables,so that when we talk of
education as an independent variable we are talking of the
confounding effects of very many other variables.
Tables 59, 60 and 61 below show the very significant
relationships between education and some of these
variables in the present study.

Table 59:   Education by Exposure
                         (Percentages)

Exposure	Education		
	None	Primary	Secondary
Low	100.0	44.0	19.0
Medium	0.0	39.0	38.0
High	0.0	17.0	43.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
x^2 = 29.37	df = 4	Significant at .001	
Gamma = 0.59			

Table 60:   Education and Westernization
                    (Percentages)

Westernization	Education		
	None	Primary	Secondary
Low	57.0	56.0	18.0
Medium	43.0	36.0	32.0
High	0.0	8.0	50.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

x^2 = 37.23   df = 4   Significant at .001

Gamma = 0.69

Table 61:   Education and Son Preference
                    (Percentages)

Preference	Education		
	None	Primary	Secondary
Would have more children if no sons	57.0	61.0	23.0
Would not have more children if no sons	43.0	39.0	77.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

x^2 = 23.78   df = 4   Significant at .001

Gamma = -0.63

All the above factors were also found to be closely
related to the number of children couples have as
was discussed in the previous chapter. This illustrates
the complex nature of the relationship between education
and family size.

The actual contribution of education in
influencing the number of children was determined by
using correlation coefficients and multiple regression
analysis as has been discussed. It must be remembered
that we are not claiming to provide a causal cluster of
variables in explaining family size. The exercise here
is merely to illustrate the relative position of education
vis-a-vis other independent variables as regards the
number of children. The correlation coefficients
between the major independent variables and some of the
dependent variables together with their levels of
significance are presented in Table 62.

Table 62: Correlation Coefficients for the Major
Independent and Dependent Variables

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables		
	Number of Children	Ideal Number of Children	Want more Children
Age	0.303***	0.019	0.182*
Age at marriage	-0.165*	-0.117	0.114
Education	-0.422***	-0.313***	-0.187*
Westernization	-0.293***	-0.031	-0.189*
Exposure	-0.045	-0.052	0.025
Occupation	-0.235**	-0.098	-0.103
Community	-0.072	0.088	0.072
Nationality	-0.055	-0.126	0.120
Family Income	0.099	-0.057	0.146
Use of Family Planning	0.013	-0.076	0.639***

Note: *** = Significant at .005
         **   = Significant at .025
          *   = Significant at .05
         N   = 150 couples

From the above it appears that education correlated
highly negatively with both number of children and ideal
number of children. Other variables important in influ-
encing number of children were age of mother, westernization,
and occupation.

The actual amount of variance in the number of
children that could be explained by some of the above
variables was determined through the use of multiple
regression analysis. The results of the regression
analysis are shown in table 63, using the beta
coefficients and the R^2 (the square of the correlation
coefficient) to show the amount of variance.

Table 63: Multiple Regression Analysis on
Number of Children

Social Characteristics	5 variables	4 variables	3 variables	2 variables
Education	-.354***	-.298***	-.350***	-.372***
Age	.195***	.220***	.231***	.219***
Age at Marriage	-.127***	-.117**	-.109*	
Westernization	-.184***	-.125**		
Exposure	.188***			
R^2	.2736	.2473	.2346	.2232

Note: *** = Significant at .01 level
        ** = Significant at .05 level
         * = Significant at .10 level

Overall, about 30% of the variation in the number
of children people have was explained by our independent
variables, which included education, and this finding was
significant at the .001 level.

Examination of the beta coefficients for the
variables in the table shows us that education is still
significant in explaining this variation compared to
the other variables. One unit change in education given
that the four remaining variables are held constant
will explain .35 unit changes in the number of children
people have, as compared for example, to age at marriage
which explains .13 units of change. Since the direction
of the change is negative, an increase in the education
level would influence parents to have fewer children.
Next in importance to education in influencing the
dependent variable was age, followed by exposure,
westernization and age at marriage. While age and age
at marriage are relatively independent variables,
education, westernization and exposure, as we have already
discussed, are very closely interrelated.

On the basis of our regression analysis, we can
conclude that our hypothesis is upheld. Education is
only one of the variables influencing the number of
children among the Asians. In this case, only 30%
of the variance in the dependent variable has been
explained by the major independent variables in the
study. The remaining 70% of the unexplained variance
would have to be accounted for in further research.

It is important to note again that we have
only considered the influence of education vis-a-vis
a few of the independent variables which could go
into the regression equation to predict fertility
behaviour among the Asian community in Kenya.

Some of the other variables which need to
be examined in further research will include those
which focus on the social, political and economic
environment of the Asians, and its relation to
their mobility, perception of their instability
and rational decisions about the number of children.
Such an exercise would also take into account the
following:

- the changing perceptions of the Asians
  about the value of children, and the
  emphasis on having a particular quality
  of children.

- the internal pattern of social networks
  among the different communities and
  social control mechanisms which reinforce
  norms about low fertility.

-    the Asian aspirations towards life-styles
     and levels of living which might not make
     it conducive to have large families.

-    the breakdown of cultural values which
     tended to encourage having many children
     and put a high premium on sons.

-    the actual and perceived insecurity
     and instability of the Asians in Kenya.

The point being emphasized is the need to move
beyond the conventional variables used to explain
fertility behaviour and to focus on factors which
might make it socially rational for the Asians to
have few children, even though in absolute economic
terms they might be in a position to afford a large
number of children.

Footnote to Chapter Eight

1. See studies by E.D. Driver (1963), R.P. Sinha
   (1962), J. Abu-Lughod (1965), The Mysore
   Population Study in India (1962); J.C. Caldwell
   (1967).

CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSION: SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

SUMMARY

The central focus of this study has been
the examination at the micro-level of the relationship
between socio-economic conditions and family size.
Having identified some of the weaknesses and inadequacies
of both macro and micro-level studies of fertility,
this study has argued for the need to study the complex
set of factors influencing fertility behaviour at the
group, community and individual level by focussing on
particular Asian communities in Nairobi.

Although the study has criticized the Demographic
Transition Theory for being a highly generalized
description of a very complex social and economic phe-
nomenon like fertility, we nevertheless have found the
theory useful both in providing a macro-level framework
for studying fertility behaviour, and in forming a
baseline upon which we outline a group-level conceptual
framework.

Therefore, in agreement with Caldwell's and
Mamdani's arguments that fertility behaviour is rational
only in so far as it is rational within a given social
context, the study has tried to show that decisions

related to fertility can be based on social rationality
which includes economic and political rationality and
is not merely dependent on rising income levels. We
have tried to demonstrate how the specific economic and
social conditions of the Asians in Nairobi have influenced
their decisions regarding family size and family planning.

The discussion in Chapter Four highlights the
historical, demographic, economic and political
developments of the Asians since their settlement in
Kenya during the beginning of the present century.
It is clear from the discussion that these developments
at thenational level have led to the existing social
context of the Asians in Kenya.

The summary of the Asian socio-economic context
in Nairobi is firstly the extremely high exposure to
education vis-a-vis the African population and by
implication, high levels of westernization, high wage
or self employed incomes and high levels of living.
The Asian community can therefore be seen as a highly
privileged minority group within the country, visible
because of its conspicuous style of life which actively
reinforces its privileged position. This is done in
several ways. Firstly, through the increased value for
education and social mobility. The Asians put a high
premium on education. The section on socio-economic

characteristics in Chapter Six shows that the Asian
community is a highly educated and literate community
with the majority having secondary level education.
The parents also indicated very high aspirations
regarding their children's education. A lot of them
send their children to very expensive private schools
and would send their children to study abroad because
of the feeling that education standards are better in
the western countries. It was clear that the major
expenditure on children was schooling; parents wanted
fewer children in order to be able to give them the
best education, which by implication would make them
more socially mobile. There were clear distinctions
between the different groups, so that the Lohars were
both the least educated and appeared to put lower emphasis
on their children's education than did the other groups.
Secondly, the Asian's visibility as a privileged minority
group is reinforced through high levels of conspicuous
consumption. Again the data in Chapters Five and Six,
on westernization, income levels and levels of living
(measured from the Guttman scales and area of residence)
show that the Asians, some groups more so than others,
indulge in consumption patterns which are extremely
conspicuous, for example, driving expensive cars,
living in high status areas, dressing expensively and
ornately, owning modern gadgets like video-sets, washing
machines and swimming pools,   frequenting restaurants and

movie theatres and having holidays at beach hotels or weekend visits to game lodges. This type of conspicuousness stands out even more markedly when compared to the general African population which appears to have much lower income levels and living levels. Although the different communities showed variations in life styles and living levels, with the Ismailies appearing the most westernized group, and the Lohars having low socio-economic status and the lowest levels of living and westernization, overall, even the Lohars showed much higher living levels compared to the average for the national population.

The third factor reinforcing the minority group status of the Asians is strengthened group ideology vis-a-vis national and collective belief systems, values and interaction networks. The discussion in Chapter Four outlines the factors at the national level which contributed to the isolation of the Asians from the rest of the Kenyan society, as a distinct "racial and cultural" minority groups. These factors were mainly the national ethnic status of the Indians, the segregationist policies of the colonial regime, which divided Kenyan society along racial principles in the social, political, economic and cultural spheres, and the restrictive policies in economic activities, which confined the Asians to the urban areas. The increasing isolation enhanced group consciousness rather than class consciousness, and

tended to lead to the dramatization of group cohesiveness.
However, because of the rigid communal and caste traditions,
of the Asians, whereby social relations were confined
to one's own community, loyalty and conformity of the
individual was dramatized at the community or group
level rather than at the ethnic level. This points
to a very active social control process where individuals
tend to suspend their judgements in preference for
the group's preference. This is clearly brought out
in Chapter Five where we outline the social organization
and social network patterns of each individual community
in an attempt to reflect the controls over individual
behaviour imposed by caste, community, religion etc.
We find that a person from the Shah community is first
a Shah, then an Asian and then a Kenyan in terms of his
behaviour patterns. This explains the internal differences
found in this study between the Ismailies, Shahs, Suthars
and the Lohars.

The study has therefore focused on the dynamics
of fertility behaviour at the micro-level. By doing
so, it has attempted to bridge the gap existing in
fertility studies due to the lack of intensive micro-
level studies. The Asian study brings out clearly
the internal differentiation among the Asians regarding
fertility size and family planning existing within a
sub-group, as a result of the varying impact of socio-
economic factors. The Ismailies with the highest

levels of exposure, westernization, education and
living standards, also tended to have smaller actual,
desired and ideal family sizes than the Lohars who showed
relatively lower levels of living, westernization,
education, etc.

A second important feature of the Asians is the
existence of multi-nationality and split families, which
makes the whole Asian population potentially mobile.
This factor raises the whole question of the meaning of
possessing Kenyan nationality for this minority group.
It was argued in the study that the non-citizen Asians
would tend to be more mobile and perceive themselves
socially and economically more insecure than the citizen
Asians. This potential mobility would lead them to have
fewer children firstly because they would be more conscious
of the problems and costs of immigration and secondly,
because their mobility would be geared to western
countries like Britain, the United States and Canada,which
emphasize the costs of children and therefore advocate small
families.

The study however did not fully support this argu-
ment.   It was found that possession of Kenyan nationality
did not significantly influence perceptions and attitudes
relevant to mobility and insecurity. We find that
conventional wisdom that all the Asians in Kenya are
a highly mobile, unstable group holds. This can be
attributed to the existence of multi-nationalities within

a single family. Also the majority of the population
had very close family members who had emigrated and sett-
led in the United Kingdom and Canada. One can conclude
therefore that this split-family status of most Asians
makes them all potentially more mobile towards the west
and thereby leads   them to have small family sizes.
As the study showed, most of the respondents felt that
a large number of children would make it difficult for
them to settle in a new place, clearly indicating in
their answers that they were referring to the costs and
problems of settling down in western countries. The
study therefore shows the reactions of a minority group
especially regarding fertility behaviour, within the
context of specific social, political and economic
conditions.

All the factors discussed above, as well as
other environmental factors are collectively interacting
to make the Asian community unique in the way it is
responding to the predictions of the Demographic
Transition Theory. We argue that this is the special
contextual factor, since as has been shown in various
studies, the African population in Kenya, especially
the rural population, is not responding in a similar
manner. On the contrary, recent statistics show that
the fertility of the African population has not declined
and might even be increasing despite the existence of
an official national population policy in the country.

In fact, as Agbasi (1977), Dow (1967) and Martin (1970)
have indicated not even the African urban elite is
responding in as spectacular a manner as the Asians
regarding fertility behaviour, although there are
similarities in income, education, westernization
levels, etc.

As we show in Chapter Four another factor which
makes the Asian community unique in its response is
the time factor involved in fertility reduction. The
Transition theory does not specify how long it should
take for fertility decline to begin after mortality
has declined. But evidence shows that it took the
western countries a very long time period before the
onset of the fertility decline. It is also argued that
because values regarding fertility are so deeply-rooted
in the culture, it would take long for these values to
change. We find however that the Asians have accomplished
this reduction in less than twenty years. The study
shows that most of the respondents' parents had at least
five or more children.

The Asians can be said to be in the third stage
of the transition, with a relatively low total fertility
rate of 2.5 and a low average population growth rate of about
1-1.5%. They also favour a small number of children,
between two and three. Although there are variations
between the communities, the optimum number of actual

and desired children is 4, which is still much lower
than the national average for the country.

We find that the Asians are consciously limiting
the number of children to between 2-3 through the
extensive use of both traditional and modern contraception.
The study showed that both knowledge and use of contra-
ception is extremely widespread and there is a very
favourable attitude to family planning among the Asians.
While some of the couples are using traditional methods
most of them are using the modern methods like the pill
and the condom.

The change to small family sizes for the Asians
is not necessarily attributed to the factors of industria-
lization, high education and income levels, increasing
participation of the women in the labour force etc. as
is indicated in the transition model. As has been
pointed out above, there are certain specific contextual
factors that/contributed to this decline, so that even
though the majority of the Asian women are housewives,
they are still having between two and three children.

Moreover, our argument that economic models about
fertility, derived from western conceptual frameworks
do not necessarily apply to all situations, is supported
in this study. We found that although the Asians kept
emphasizing the cost of children, stating that a large number

of children   is   not easy to maintain or is expensive,
these "costs" were not purely economic costs measured
by levels of income and expenditure. The Asians have
very high income levels compared to those of the African
population and they could easily afford more children
if they wanted more. However, for the Asians the
emphasis is on quality children, who would get the best
of everything i.e. education, a certain given style of life,
and   a lot of parental time, care and attention, so
that "affording a given size of family is only super-
ficially an economic matter" (Rainwater, 1965). This
clearly came out in the responses on the reasons for
having and wanting fewer children. As was shown in
the last two chapters, non-economic factors like
preference for sons, perceptions of insecurity and mobility,
western orientations etc. were also important in influencing
family size preferences.

On the basis of correlation and regression
analysis in chapter Eight it was possible to show that
fertility behaviour is influenced by a very complex set
of socio-economic factors. The findings showed that while
education was significant in explaining variations in
the number of children, it was only one of the variables
influencing fertility behaviour among the Asians.
Together with the other independent variables in the
the study, it explained about 30% of the variance in the

number of children. This leads us to conclude that
although very many fertility studies have emphasized
the significance played by education in influencing
fertility behaviour, this may not necessarily be the
most significant factor. Moreover, we have also argued
that a variable like education represents "overlapping
penumbras of meaning" (Ryder, 1959:414), encompassing
very many social and economic dimensions. This implies
that the influence of education on fertility is not an
independent one. Therefore family planning approaches,
which emphasize the crucial role played by education
in creating motivations for limiting family size, may
not be focusing on the more significant and relevant
factors.

In conclusion, this study therefore indicates
clearly that it is not always useful to generalize
fertility behaviour at the national or macro level. The
Asian community is extremely unique compared to the
rest of Kenya as regards its demographic characteristics.
Whereas it is expected that the Kenyan Europeans would
reflect traits that are peculiar to the west, it is
also expected that the Asians should show behaviour
patterns similar to the African population, because they
derive from the Asian sub-continent. However we have
found that the understanding of certain unique contextual
features like stratification issues, the impact of
socio-political factors, social network patterns etc.

are extremely important in explaining Asian fertility
behaviour. It is hoped that the theoretical approach
in this study will be useful in future research on
the analysis of fertility behaviour.

IMPLICATIONS

One of the implications of the study springs from
the fact that the Asians have shown a very surprising
fertility pattern which has followed the trend postulated
in Demographic Transition Theory and has in fact
completed the transition in a country which is as still
developing and has one of the highest fertility levels
in the world. Nor does the socio-economic environment
exhibit patterns of industrialization and urbanization
that were found in the West during its transition.
Moreover, the fertility pattern of the Asians is also
surprising because they are an ethnic group whose origin
and background in India, a developing country, would not
have led one to expect their fertility pattern to follow
the model of the developed world. The theoretical
implication here is that macro-level generalizations
about fertility should be treated cautiously, because
groups and segments of the population may differ signi-
ficantly in their fertility behaviour.

Secondly, the study of the Asians has shown
that the pattern of demographic transition has not been

the same as it was in the West. While the end result
has been the same, the conditions under which the
fertility decline occurred, as well as the time period
have been very different. Fertility decline occurred
within a larger context where very little industrialization
has taken place, although the Asians are highly urbanized.
In addition, contrary to the arguments put forth by the
proponents of transition theory, the Asians did not
show these traits. For instance, the majority of the
women were not in the labour force, and yet they all
had and wanted small families; the costs of children
were not purely economic but social and political costs.
The decline in fertility was achieved in a very short
time period of about twenty years and finally this has
been achieved through the extensive use of mainly modern
contraceptive methods. Therefore one related policy
implication of such findings is that policies at the
macro-level should not apply universally to the whole
country. Also the future of the Asian community in
terms of population growth patterns and in terms of
mobility should be of major concern to Kenyan politicians
from the point of view of a relatively diminishing
minority, especially because of their relatively central
role in the economic sphere.

The findings on the nationality status of the
Asians can be extended further, and it can be implied
that the Asians still appear to be having problems of

social and political integration in their country of
adoption.

On the basis of the above implications, the
study has pointed out the need for much more systematic
micro-level studies of different groups in Kenya, for
example, the Arabs, the Kiswahili, the Europeans as
well as the urbanized Africans and the elite, etc.

Secondly, much more research and analysis is
required in order for a theoretical and methodological
reformulation of the notion of social context and social
rationality in the study of contraceptive behaviour.

Finally, the study advocates comparative studies
of the impact of Westernization on fertility behaviour
since most countries are not likely to follow the path
predicted by the Transition Theory especially in terms
of historical trends in structural transformation.

INDEX CONSTRUCTION

The Exposure Index

The Exposure Index was computed by adding together the scores of individuals on exposure variable like listening to the radio, newspaper and magazine reading, television-viewing and going on overseas trips. The table below shows the allocation of weights and values to the variables. In the index a weight refers to the relative importance given to one variable (item) as compared to another variable. A value refers to the response of an individual for that particular variable.

Allocation of Scores and Values in the Exposure Index

Weights	Variable	Values given to the frequency of occurrence	
		Values	Frequency
1	Radio listening	2	Daily
2	Newspaper reading	1.5	1-3 times a week
2	Magazine reading	1.0	1-3 times a month
3	T.V. viewing	0.5	Seldom
		0	Never
1	Overseas Trip		

The table shows that specific weights and values respectively were given to the variables (items) and the frequency of occurrence of the item. The items were weighted differently in terms of exposure. It was felt that television viewing gives more exposure than the other media items and was therefore given the highest weight. Listening to the radio was given a lower weight than the other items because most respondents indicated that they listened to the Indian programmes on the eastern service of the Voice of Kenya. This programme appears on the air for only one and a half hours a day, of which one hour is devoted to Indian popular music. It was therefore felt that the amount of exposure from listening to the radio would be much lower. The values assigned to the frequency of occurrence are self-explanatory. Those exposed daily would be expected to gain much more exposure than those seldom or never exposed to the mass media. In addition, those who had been on overseas trips were given a score of one, while those who had never been were scored zero. On the basis of the above weights and values, the exposure index was constructed.

For each individual the weight for the item was multiplied by the value for the response given. For example, anyone who indicated that he watched T.V. daily was scored 3 x 2 = 6, while someone who never watched T.V. scored 3 x 0 = 0. The scores for all the

items were then added for each individual to get his
total score on the exposure index. The table below
describes the construction of the index more fully.

Exposure Index Construction

Item	Index Construction	
	Highest possible score	Lowest possible score
Radio listening	2	0
Newspaper reading	4	0
Magazine reading	4	0
T.V. viewing	6	0
Overseas trip	1	0
Total possible score	17	0

The index values could therefore range from 0 (the lowest
possible score) for someone who never engaged in any
of the media activities, to 17 (the highest possible
score) for someone who indicated that he daily performed
these activities. Once the total scores were computed,
respondents were divided into a low (0-9.5), middle
(10-14.5) or high (15-17) level of exposure.

The Westernization Index

This index was computed by scoring individuals on different leisure activities, which were chosen so that they would indicate a trend towards western-oriented behaviour patterns, as well as style of dressing. As with the exposure index, both the variables (items) and frequency of occurrence were given scores. The frequency was given the same values as in the exposure index. The weight and values for the items are shown in the table below which describes the index more fully. Once again, the weight for each items was multiplied by the value for the frequency of occurrence to get an individual's score on that particular item. Then the scores were added to get the total.

Index Construction

Weights	Activity (Going to)	Highest Possible Value	Lowest Possible Value
4	Western Plays	8	0
3	Indian Plays	6	0
3.5	Both kinds	7	0
4	Western Movies	8	0
3	Indian Movies	6	0
3.5	Both kinds	7	0
2.5	Restaurants	5	0
2.5	Night-Clubs/ Dancing	5	0
2.5	Casino	5	0
0.5	Tourist Lodges	1	0
0.5	Country Clubs	1	0
0.5	Beach Hotels	1	0
	Dressing		
0	Only Traditional	0	0
4	Only Western	4	0
2	Both Types	2	-
Total possible score		38	0

Scores on the westernization index could therefore range from 0 to the highest possible score which was 38. Again, as with the exposure index, respondents were divided into a low (0-6.99), medium (7-12.49) or high (12.5-38) westernization levels.

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

<u>QUESTIONNAIRE</u>

<u>SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND FAMILY SIZE AND STRUCTURE</u>

<u>Questionnaire:</u>   Married Women

Interviewer: .... Date..................Sample No..........

Respondent's Name: ....

Respondent's address: ....

How are you? I am a researcher from the University of
Nairobi. I am working for a survey on Socio-economic
Conditions and Family Size. This survey has the support
of the Office of the President. As you may have heard,
we are as.ing couples about the factors influencing
their decisions about the number of children they have.
We would very much appreciate getting information from
you for our study. The information you give will be
treated as strictly confidential.

First, a few questions about your personal history

1.a   Date of birth (if not sure any major marker event)..................

b.   Marital status:

Married	Divorced	Separated	Widowed	Other-specify

c.   Age at marriage: 1st marriage......2nd......... 3rd......... 4th ....

d.   Place of birth: Town name.....................Country name...............
Other, specify ....

e.   Nationality: Kenyan............... Other, specify.................

f.   Asian community: Ismailia...........Shah(join)........... Suthar........
Suni kuchi (spec. group)............... Other, specify.................

2.   Religion (specify denomination)

	Christian	Moslem	Hindu	Other

How often do you	daily or almost	1-3 times a week	1-3 times a month	seldom	never other specify
a. Pray					
b. Go to the mosque/ temple/church					
c. Read the Koran/ Ramayan/Bible/ other religious texts					

4.a. Years of education ....left school/college in what year..........

b. Speaks English: Yes....No..... Reads English: Yes.....No.....
Speaks Swahili: Yes....No..... Reads Swahili: Yes.....No.....
Speaks Gujarati: Yes....No..... Reads Gujarati: Yes.....No.....

5. Profession.................(b) present occupation..................

6. Any other occupation: Yes.....No.......

If yes, what? ....

7. Husband's present occupation ....

a. Any other occupation: Yes......No.
If yes, what? ....

8. Have you held any responsible positions in any communal, local
or national institutions? Yes......No.......

If yes, specify:	Institution/ committee group, etc.	Membership duration	Office held

9. Have you ever been abroad? Yes......No ....

If yes,	How many times	Where	When	How long

10.

How often do you :	daily or almost	1-3 times a week	1-3 times a month	seldom	never
a. Listen to the radio					
b. Read the newspapers					
c. Read monthly/weekly magazines					
d. Watch television					

e. Types of newpapers/magazines read...................................

f. Types of clothes worn at home: ....
At work (if working) ....
When going out: ....

g. Do you drive? Yes.......No.........

How often do you go to:	daily or almost	1-3 tms. a week	1-3 tms a month	seldon	other	never	Type (where applicable)			
							Indian	Western	Local	Other
Plays										
Cinema										
Stage/ variety shows concerts										
Music parties										
Restau- rants										
Night clubs/ dancing										
Casino										
Tourist- spots (e.g lod- ges)										
Country clubs										
Picnics										
Beach hotels										

House hold possessions (give number and type (where applicable)	Number	Type
Table clock		
Coal Iron		
Electric iron		
Jiko		
Gas or electric cooker		
Pestle and mortar		
Electric grinder		
Electric toaster		
Refrigerator		
Radio		
Car		
Record player		
Tape recorder		
Television set		
Book shelves		

14. contd.

Household possessions	Number	Type
Tennis courts		
Table tennis table		
Swimming pool		
Aquariums		
Washing machine		
Domestic workshop		

Family Details

15. How many children do you have? No...............................

16. For each child record information as indicated on Table

17. Any children who were born alive but not living now? Yes......No......

    If yes, how many boys............ how many girls ....

18. Do you want any more children? Yes.......No........

    If yes, (a) why? ....

    ....

    (b) How many more ....

    (c) How many boys and how many girls: Boys.......Girls......
         doesn't matter ....

b. If no, why not ....

    ....

19. If you were planning another child, in what country would like it to be

    born? ....

    (a) why ....

    ....

20. If a husband and wife have four sons and no daughters, do you think
    they should have more children? Yes........No........

    (a) Specify your reasons ....

    ....

Children number	Sex		Date of birth	Living			Education		Deceased children			
	M	F		home	Elsewhere		Yrs.of sch.	Grade attained	Sex		Age at death	
					where	with whom			M	F	M	F
Oldest child												
second oldest												
third oldest												
fourth oldest												
fifth oldest												
sixth oldest												
seventh oldest												
eighth oldest												
ninth oldest												
tenth oldest												
Total no. of children												

239

21. If a husband and wife have four daughters and no sons do you think
they should have more children? Yes........No........

    (a)   Specify your reasons: ,.......................................

....

22. If a husband and wife have two sons and two daughters, do you think
they should have more children? Yes.......No.........

    (a)   If no, what is the optimum number? ....

    (b)   If yes, what is the optimum number? ....

        why ....

....

23. Do you think having many children gives a woman more prestige than
one who has few? Yes.........No..........

    (a)   specify your reasons ....

....

....

24. Number of children mother had?   ....

25. Would you like to have the same number, fewer or more than she had?
Same no.......... fewer......more.......don't care......don't know.....
other ....

Why? ....

....

26. Did you and your husband at any time after your marriage, live with your
parents/in laws? Yes.......No..........

If yes, (a) when.................... (b) for how long ....

27. If your son/s was/were grown up and married, would you expect to   live
together:

    (a) Only for a few years after son/s marriage ....

    (b) All the rest of your life ....

    (c) Only when you are old ....

    (d) Never ....

    (e) Depends on son and wife.....................................

28. Compared to the past, sons nowadays are :

		Just as willing	Less willing	Not at all willing
(a)	to live with their parents after they are married			
(b)	to support their parents in old age			

29. Children's education:

a. How many of your children are in school? No. ....

b. If not all children of school age go to school why do they not?
....
....

30. If any of your children wanted to go for further studies after completing school where would you like them to study?

Here........elsewhere.......don't care.........don't know...........
            (specify)

a. If elsewhere, why? ....
....

If respondent working:

31. Income per month earned............... don't know..............

32. Husband's income per month .... don't know..............

33. Anybody else in family working   Yes..........No.........

a. If yes,   specify who   earning how much per month
        1. .... 2. ....   1. .... 2. ....
        3. .... 4. ....   3. .... 4. ....

34. Total family income spent per month on: food................

school fees .... clothing............. domestic labour ....

other expenses (specify) ....
....

35. Are there any relatives or other people depending on you for livelihood?
Yes...........No..............

a. If yes, how many ....

b. How much do you spend on them each year? ....
....

36. If children earning income, do they contribute towards household expenses,
fees, etc.? Yes.........No...........

a. If yes, how much? ....
For what? ....

37. If respondent working outside for how long did you stop working when
you gave birth? 1st child .... 2nd child........
3rd child .... 4th child............ 5th child ....

38. Did your income decline during this/these period/s?
Yes.......No........ If yes, by how much? ....

39. What do you consider to be the ideal number of children to have?
number .... as many as I can .... as many as God gives..........
don't know.......... other (specify) ....

a. If gives number, specify your reasons? ....
....

40. What are your views about the present future conditions here (e.g. social,
economic, etc. probe) ....
....
....
....

41. Given the existing conditions, how many children should a couple have?
number .... as many as they can afford........ as many as
God gives....... don't know....... other (specify) ....

42. It appears that some people (e.g. non-citizens) are leaving this place
to settle elsewhere. Do you know of anyone who has left or is planning
to leave? Yes............. No ....

a. If yes, where do you think they would go?

....

43. If for some reason or another you had to change your country of residence, do you think that a large number of children would:

make it easier.......... make no difference......make it more

difficult....... to move to a new place? ....

a. Why? ....

....

44. If :for any reason you could not carry on with your business/profession
or your husband

here, what would you do? (probe) ....

....

....

45. Do you think there is a tendency among the Asians to have smaller families

today than in the past? Yes........No........

a. If yes, what are the reasons ....

....

Family Limitation

46. Do you approve or disapprove of delaying or preventing a pregnancy?

approve.........disapprove...............

a. If approve, give reasons ....

....

b. If disapprove, why? ....

....

47. Do you know of any methods that married couples use to delay or prevent

a pregnancy?   Yes........No........ If yes, what methods do you

know of? ....

....

48. Have you and your husband ever tried to prevent or postpone a pregnancy?

Yes.......... No ....

a. If yes, what method did you use? ....

....

49.   Are you still using this method? Yes .... No........

a.   If yes, why? ....

b.   If no, why not? ....

50.   Have you discussed this method with your husband? Yes........ No........

51.   Have you or your husband used or are using any of the following?

		Yes Used Using	No	No, but know of it
a.	Abstinence			
b.	Rhythm method			
c.	Withdrawal			
d.	Condom			
e.	Medicines or herbs			
f.	Jellies or creams			
g.	Douching			
h.	Diaphragm			
i.	Foam tablets			
j.	Pill			
k.	I.U.D. (loop, coil)			
l.	Wife sterilized by doctor			
m.	Abortion			
n.	Any other (specify			

52. . If used or know of method, how did you first learn about it?

....

....

53.   Have you ever visited a family planning clinic? Yes.....No

a.   If yes, why? ....

....

b.   If no, what are the reasons? ....

....

54.   In the past, do you think it was easier than more difficult than or

much the same as today to bring up a large family?

Easier........ more difficult......... much the same as today ....

don't know............ other ....

Why? ....

....

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY
UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND FAMILY SIZE AND STRUCTURE

Questionnaire: Married Men

Interviewer................................... Date..............Sample No.............

Respondent's Name: ....

Respondent's Address: ....

> How are you? I am a researcher from the University of
> Nairobi. I am working for a survey on Socio-economic
> Conditions and Family Size. This survey has the support
> of the Office of the President. As you may have heard,
> we are asking couples about the factors influencing their
> decisions about the number of children they have. We
> would very much appreciate getting information from you
> for our study. The information you give will be treated
> as strictly confidential.
>
> First, a few questions about your personal history.

1.a   Date of birth (if not sure, any major marker event) ....

  b.   Marital status: Married Divorced Separated Widowed Other specify

  c.   Age at marriage: 1st marriage.........2nd.......3rd........4th...........

  d.   Place of birth: Town name.................Country name...........
       other, specify...........................

  e.   Nationality: Kenyan..............Other (specify).................

  f.   Asian community: Ismailia..............Shah (Jain).......... Suthar..........
       Suni kachi (specify group)................. Other (specify group).............

       Religion (specify denomination)

Christian	Moslem	Hindu	Other

How often do you:	Daily or almost	1-3 times a week	1-3 times a month	seldom	never	other specify
Pray						
Go to the mosque/ temple/church						
Read the Koran/ Ramayan/Bible/other religious texts						

4.a.   Years of education........left school/college in what year..............

  b.   Speaks English: Yes.....No...... Reads English: Yes.....No.......

        Speaks Kiswahili: Yes....No..... Reads Kiswahili: Yes....No.....

        Speaks Gujarati: Yes....No..... Reads Gujarati: Yes....No.......

5.   Profession:...

6.   Present occupation: ....

7.   Any other occupation: Yes.....No..........

  a.   If yes, what? ....

  b.   Any other source of income? Yes.......No..........

  c.   If yes, specify...

8.   Wife's present occupation: ....

  a.   Any other occupation? Yes......No.........

        If yes, what? ....

        ....

9.   Have you held any responsible position in any communal/local or
        national institutions? Yes............. NO..............

  a.

If yes, specify:	Institution/committee group etc.	Membership duration	Office held

10.   Have you ever been abroad? Yes........No..........

  a.

If yes,	How many times	Where	When	For how long

11.

How often do you	daily or almost	1-3 times a week	1-3 times a month	seldom	never	other specify
a. Listen to the radio						
b. Read the newspaper						
c. Read monthly/weekly magazine						
d. Watch television						

e. Types of newspapers/magazines read: ....

....

12. Types of clothes worn at work: ....

At home ....

When going out ....

13.

How often do you go to	daily or almost	1-3 tms. a week	1-3 tms. a month	seldom	other	never	Ind. ian	West. ern	Loc. al	Other
Plays										
Cinema										
Stage/ variety shows concerts										
Music parties										
Restau- rants										
Night clubs/ dancing										
Casino										
Tourist- spots (e.g. lodges)										
Country clubs										
Picnics										
Beach hotels										

Family Details

14. How many children do you have? Number...................................

16. If you were planning another child, in what country would you like it to be born?
....

a. Why? ....
....

17. If a husband and wife have four sons and no daughters, do you think they should have more children? Yes.......No.......

a. Specify your reasons ....
....

18. If a husband and wife have four daughters and no sons do you think they should have more children? Yes.......No.........

a. Specify your reasons ....
....

19. If a husband and wife have two sone and two daughters, do you think they should have more children? Yes.......No........

a. If Yes what is the optimum number? ....

b. If No what is the optimum number? ....

Why ....
....

20. Do you think having many children gives a   man more prestige than one who has few? Yes.........No...........

a. Specify your reasons ....
....

Number of children mother had? Number ....

Would you like to have the same number, fewer or more than she had?
same number........fewer........more.........don't care.......
don't know........... other...........

Why? ....
....

22.   Did you and your wife at any time after your marriage live with
       your parents/in-laws? Yes.....No........

a.   If yes, when...................

b.   For how long ....

23.   If your son/s was/were grown up and married, would you expect to
       live together:

a.   Only for a few years after son/s marriage ....

b.   All the rest of your life ....

c.   Only when you are old ....

d.   Never ....

e.   Depends on son and wife ....

24.   Compared to the past, sons nowadays are:

		just as willing	less willing	not at all willing
a.	to live with their parents after they are married			
b.	to support their parents in old age			

25.   Children's education:

a.   How many of your children are in school? No. ....

b.   If not all children of school age go to school, why do they not?

       ....

       ....

26.   If any of your children wanted to go for further studies after completing
       school where would you like them to study?

       Here.......elsewhere.......don'tcare........don't know..........
              (specify)

a.   If elsewhere, why? ....

       ....

       If Respondent working:

27.   Income per month earned................. don't know..........

28.   Wife's income per month (if working) ....

29. Anybody else in the family working: Yes.......No.........

a. If yes,   specify who   earning how much per month

1................ 2. .... 1. .... 2. ....

3. .... 4. .... 3. .... 4. ....

30. Total family income spent per month on: food...........

school fees............clothing........... domestic labour...........

other expenses (specify) ....

....

31. Are there any relatives or other people depending on you for livelihood?

Yes......... No ....

a. If yes, how many ....

b. How much do you spend on them each year? ....

32. If children earning income, do they contribute towards household
expenses, fees, etc. Yes......... No..........

a. If yes, how much ....

For what? ....

33. What are your views about the present future conditions here (e.g.
social, economic, etc. probe)

....

....

....

34. Given the existing conditions, how many children should a couple have?
number............ as many as they can afford......... as many as
God gives........... don't know.............Other (specify).............

35. It appears that some people (e.g. non-citizens) are leaving this place
to settle elsewhere, do you know of anyone who has left or is planning
to leave?

Yes.........   No..........

a. If yes, where do you think they would go?

....

36. If for some reason or another you had to change your country of residence,
do you think that a large number of children would:

make it easier........make no difference.......make it more
difficult.......... to move to a new place ....

36.a.   Why ....

        ....

37.   If for any reason you could not carry on with your business/profession here, what would you do? (probe)....................................

        ....

        ....

38.   Do you think there is a tendency among the Asians to have smaller families today than in the past? Yes.......No.........

  a.   If yes, what are the reasons....................................

        ....

Family Limitation

39.   Do you approve or disapprove of delaying or preventing a pregnancy? approve................ disapprove................

  a.   If approve, give reasons ....

        ....

  b.   If disapprove, why? ....

        ....

40.   Do you know of any methods that married couples use to delay or prevent a pregnancy? Yes.......No........ If yes, what methods do you know of?

        ....

        ....

41.   Have you and your wife ever tried to prevent or postpone a pregnancy? Yes......... No............

  a.   If yes, what method did you use? ....

        ....

42.   Has your wife ever tried to prevent or postpone a pregnancy? Yes....No.....

  a.   If yes, what did she do? ....

        ....

43.   Is she still using this method? Yes........No........

  a.   If yes, why ....

  b.   If no, why not? ....

        ....

44.   In the past, do you think it was easier than
        more difficult than, or much the same as today
        to bring up a large family?

        Easier.... ..more difficult......much the same
        as today....... don't know........ other........
        Why!...
        ....
        ....

45.   What do you consider to be the ideal number of children
        to have?
        number.........as many as I can........as many as
        God gives....... don't know......other (specify)..........

   a.   If gives number, specify your reasons....................
        ....
        ....

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