


" M A R X ' S C O N C E P T I O N O F M A N "

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


DECLARATION

MARX'S CONCEPTION OF MAN

THIS THESIS IS MY ORIGINAL WORK AND HAS NOT BEEN
PRESENTED IN ANY OTHER UNIVERSITY

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To be acknowledged is my Principal Supervisor, Dr. Fr. Burke whose scholarly assistance and dedication enabled me to accomplish this task.

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FOREWORD

Throughout my stay in the community of University of Nairobi, I have encountered students who ardently shared Marx's ideas on man and society. These ardent Marxists' have relentlessly criticised the present capitalist society of Kenya, and offered as a recipe for present human predicaments, socialism. It was this tendency towards Marxism that aroused my interest in Marx. At first encounter one gets the impression that in the ardent student 'Marxists' lies a clear, unshakeable understanding of reality, (both human and social). This impression is bound to fizzle out as one looks beneath the surface.

Nevertheless, there seems to be something attractive in Marx's ideas which ensures its continued thriving. Marx's writings reveal a conception of human nature that is historical, and that emphasizes the significance of social forces in determining man's nature. It is on the basis of that conception that Marx launches his virulent critique of capitalism. It is the weapon of criticism plus Marx's vision of a society in which man is unalienated in existence that seems to attract students and some scholars to marxism. Marxism is conceived as a means for dismantling present capitalist existence and achieving a more humane existence. There was a time I shared that understanding of marxism, and the hope concomitant with it.

Unlike some of my fellow students, however, I had chance in the course of my philosophy studies to go beyond ardent acceptance of Marxism as a means to a humane existence. (I had chance in the course of my philosophy studies to go beyond ardent acceptance of Marxism as a means to a humane existence).

I had to read deep and wide on Marx and Marxism in order to make a reasoned subscription and defence of Marxism. That required reading Marx and in some cases reading critiques and commentaries on Marx. It was in trying to understand Marx that I encountered Any Rand's The New Left: The Anti-Industrial Revolution. This book, and later We the Living, stirred questions in my conscience on the feasibility of Marx's higher social existence and the 'new man'.

Greatly influenced by Rand, we argue that the individual's role in social transformation is not well conceived in Marx's writings. In that argument we have used the word "Individualism" in this thesis to mean activities, interests, values and judgement arising from man's individual efforts. The concept does not, therefore, have the connotation of avarice and greediness that are often associated with it. Another issue worth our attention is the use of the concept "man". Our use of that concept is in no way a disregard of the equality of woman to man. We use the concept "man" to refer to all human beings. Where possible, however, we have used the word "human being".

ABSTRACT

Communism as a possible social system has been sought by large numbers of human beings since its formulation. It has been applied in matters of economics, government, ethics and law, to name just a few areas. However, it seems today that efforts towards realising that social system which Marx postulated as the highest, have given way to a fall back onto capitalism the arguments, views and postulates of Marx on capitalism and socialism have been contradicted by historical events.

The central issue in Marx's critique of capitalism and of his postulation of communism is man and society. He argues all through his writings that the essence of human being is social, and not religious or individualistic. This central thesis of Marx is studied critically by looking at religion, socio-economic infrastructure and technology.

We observe that Marx's conception of man is to a large extent social and holistic, and argue that the result is an anthropology that is one sided. There is a pervasive underestimation of the individualistic dimension of human beings capitalism and in his postulation of communism. We argue that Marx's views on religion as a historical reality that is bound to wither away with capitalism are not properly founded. Similarly his postulation of a social stage in which all human beings are superior to their predecessors in capitalism is ill-founded.

Individualism is as much an essence of human being as are the social relations. In fact it is our view that individualism is the primary dimension of all unalienated human beings.

Individualism as a primary reality of human beings is key to the failure of Marx's predictions. We particularly note the manifestation of the religious sentiment in various forms, the lack of a revolutionary spirit in proletariats and the stagnation and regression in socialism.

In emphasizing the importance of individualism as a dimension of unalienated men we consider individual cognition and values as paramount. In so far as cognition depends on individual will human values and existential projects it varies with each human being. Thus our findings point to a need for policies that facilitate the development and utilisation of individuals' cognition-wether in economic or recreational activities. Only in pursuing such policies can there arise predominantly unalienated human beings.

TO JACINTA
FOR BEING SO INSPIRING

C O N T E N T S

FORWARD

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CHAPTER ONE

MARXIAN ANTHROPOLOGY: A PERSPECTIVE

Introduction

For Marx man is the beginning and the end of all social activities. Human beings are the basis of his (Marx) conception of social activities and reality in toto. Indeed, it is the 'centrality and emphasis of man's social essence that provides the justification to talk of Marxian anthropology.

Marx's conception of human nature was radical for a number of reasons. The main feature of the revolutionary conception of human nature lay in the repudiation of both the idealist and the materialist conception of human nature. Marx repudiated the idealism of Hegel, Kant and others, pointing out the inseparability of existence from essence. Unlike the other materialists of his day, however, Marx comprehended the importance of thinking as a human activity. In the first thesis on Feuerbach, he argues, that:

The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism - that of Feuerbach included - is that the thing [...], reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object [...], but not as human sensuous activity, practice, not subjectively.¹

There is an element of dynamism in human existence according to Marx. That dynamism is conceived as an essential aspect of human existence, and is in the quotation referred to as sensuous activity. For Marx a conception of human nature must not only be based on sensuous activity but should also, be historical. In other words, human nature for Marx is a product of sensuous activity and historical conditions. The view that man is the creation of history has to be understood in that framework.

Quite evidently, there are two realities which deserve our attention, namely: the sensuous activity and the historical conditions. Human sensuous activity is related to historical conditions dialectically; being determined and determining historical conditions. It is a consequence of the conception of human nature in terms of activity and historical conditions, in our view, that Marx posits a higher human individuality in communism. Yet the dialectics of human sensuous activity and historical conditions do not per se seem to suffice for Marx's positing of a higher individuality.

The positing of a higher individuality by Marx is based on two facts of human existence: the primacy of material conditions in relation to consciousness and the reaction of consciousness on material conditions. There is a dialectical relationship between material conditions and consciousness. This relationship is the basis of social transformation. In Marx's view the liberation from nature and social reality is a result of social transformation.

As a result of that view, Marx conceives human nature to be transformed through history, from alienated, subhuman forms to liberated human forms of existence. In Marx's view, capitalism though dehumanizing in developing man's productive powers at the expense of all other powers, is a necessary epoch for the actualization of a higher individuality. In other words alienation is a necessary evil for the actualization of a real human nature.

It is, in our view, the linkage of alienation to capitalistic mode of production that lead Marx to expect and predict a

revolution in Britain, France and Germany as impending. In these three countries the capitalistic machinery of production was highly developed and alienation was exceptionally glaring.

Apart from the linkage of the intensity of alienation and capitalistic development to the liberation of man, there is another view of Marx. That other view conceives the development of productive forces as inevitably leading to the liberation of man from alienation. In this second view the realization of a higher human individuality is more or less the consequence of productive forces per se than decisions of men.²

The two views have the common element of positing a higher individuality on the basis of the development of productive forces. Capitalism is conceived as the epoch that has the potential for a real human existence. For Marx, we can say, the question of a higher individuality is not a scholastic, philosophical question but a matter of praxis. In other words, the riddle of alienation is not solved by philosophizing but through theory and practice linked. Needless to point out, there is here again a conception of two aspects of existence as linked. This linkage is in our view interesting because through history, or rather existence, no form of human consciousness remains intact. Consciousness is not only transformed by reality, it is transcended.

One form of consciousness which Marx conceives to be transformed and transcended by alterations in the social conditions is religion. Indeed, religion is conceived as a consequence of definite sensuous activity and historical conditions. It is argued by Marx that a radical transformation of social existence,

precisely the overthrow of private property, necessarily leads to human beings without need for religion. In a nutshell, religiosity is argued to be non-essential for man in communistic existence. In the seventh thesis on Feuerbach Marx argues, that:

Feuerbach [...] does not see that the 'religious sentiment' is itself a social product, and that the abstract individual whom he analyses belongs in reality to a particular form of society.³

Thus Marx repudiated religiosity and egotism, as embodied in private ownership, arguing that it was non-essential to human nature. He conceived the two attributes as capitalistic and, therefore, bound to die with private property. In contrast to the religious, egoistical man that had been conceived as normal, Marx posited a completely social individual. Such an individual, Marx argued, could only arise from the transcendence and restoration of state, law, morality and property to man. That stage he called 'communism'.

The Problem with Marx's Conception of Man

In existence man engages in a variety of activities ranging from production to playing. Indeed the history of man's existence seems to be a chronicle of the unfolding of human nature. There was a time when man's distinctive attributes were just two: a social being and a tool maker. Throughout history more attributes have been realised, namely rationality, religiosity and conscious merry-making. On top of these man is a free being. He has a part to play in his existence and destiny. There are other aspects, such as, love, hatred, jealousy, sympathy, hope and despair, which also seem to be largely human.

The transformation of material conditions by human beings and vice versa is a complex matter. There is an interplay between

human beings and material conditions. Since man is a free being he is to a large extent not given an automatic way to react to nature. Man has to choose what to do and how to do it. The society may enlighten him on these matters of choice, and his cognition assist him, but ultimately each individual has freedom to choose. The exercising of choice involves the aspect of morality and at times patience.

So that, in our view, the transformation of material conditions does not necessarily mean the transformation of individual men. Some men may choose to play a passive role in social transformation, thus, remaining more or less untransformed. Since capitalism involves an increasing utilization of intelligence in certain spheres of production and an automated work pattern, it is highly possible that while some men are transformed, others are retarded. In other words, the automated production system in capitalism can likely retard mental and emotional growth, leading to very subhuman beings. Moreover, as capitalism flourishes, men seem to be guaranteed basic satisfaction, making authentic striving to existence unnecessary and unattractive. As a result men may choose to be consumers rather than creators. Such a choice has to be understood to be made on basis of a conception of striving as burdensome and, where existence is guaranteed by the system, unnecessary. While it is true to say that capitalism is increasingly characterized by abundance and a highly efficient machinery for production, an inference of a higher individuality seems far-fetched. Most of what constitutes human individuality is a consequence of a dialectical relationship between man and

material forces. This dialectic depends very much on the right conception of material forces and the will to transform them in a particular direction.

Marx's conception of man does not take into consideration individual differences in conceiving and exercising the will to transform material conditions. Differences in exercising the faculty of reason and, consequently, choice lead us to argue that a higher individuality as conceived by Marx is just a possibility. Moreover, if we take into consideration the reality of free will and the wide range of possibilities, a society in which all human beings regard each other as highest beings is remote. The possibility follows from the fact that value is an expression of cognition.

Thus, Marx's conception of man does not seem to be tenable—particularly in matters which depend on individual choice and effort. In view of this, the conception stands in need of reassessment.

The Purpose of this Study

Current social trends in both capitalistic and socialistic societies seem, in our view, to offer very little hope for the liberation of man from alienation. The seeming retreat of socialistic societies to 'capitalism' and the entrenchment of capitalism in monolithic form appears to mean that human beings have no alternative but to suffer the dehumanizing existence which this form of capitalism offers. Societies which a century ago were feudal are today striving to perfect their capitalistic infrastructures and attain a level similar to the one of such societies as U.S.A., Japan and Western Europe. In other words,

there seems a universal tendency towards capitalism.

This study is an attempt to contribute to the understanding of man. We presume that most human endeavours are directed to realizing a more authentically meaningful and happy existence. It is hoped that this study will facilitate such endeavours by clarifying or emphasizing certain issues of significance to man. A clear understanding of what human nature is will, hopefully, go along way in helping mankind to understand some of its present predicaments.

Moreover, it is our aim to look critically at socialism, hoping that at the end we will be able to say whether or not the mode of existence is in harmony with human nature. In the process of examining socialism, capitalism and communism we will clarify certain realities, namely, religion, technology and wealth. This clarification is intended to enable us to avoid certain pitfalls. Since human existence has been affected by ideas of Marx, especially in terms of the future possibilities of existence, it is our aim to study those ideas and point out inherent tendencies. If it is realized at the end of this study that Marxian anthropology has positive ideas on human existence, we will have cautioned those hastily abandoning Marxism as impractical. In other words, we intend to participate in the ongoing social re-orientations by pointing out what is positive and what is negative in Marx. In a way, then, our aim is either to hasten the dismantling of social systems based on Marx's concept of man or check the extent of that process by pointing out the valuable elements.

More particularly, in reference to our own society, this study is purported to contribute to the present and future direction of national social policy. For many years there has been an ongoing debate on whether capitalism or socialism is more suitable for man. That debate has not quite been resolved intellectually. This study is an attempt to go to the roots of that unresolved debate; trying to judge capitalism and socialism through the nature of human being. At the end of this study, therefore, there should be a philosophical base for present social policies or an alternative.

Ultimately, this study should enable us to answer the following question? Are our present social policies facilitating the realization of a higher individuality?

Justification and Significance

Since Marx's death many scholars have ventured into his work and a lot of literature has been published on Marxism. It is certainly hard to recount all the writings on Marx currently on shelves.

However, most of those writings have been concerned with issues which only indirectly address themselves to the concept of man in Marx. There is, for example, a lot that has been written on Marxian critique of religion, capitalism and history in general, which only touch on the theme of man secondarily. Granted that man is a central theme in Marx's writings it is only fair that issues such as religion, capitalism and socialism be studied in their link to man. In other words, it is more plausible in trying to understand the ideas of Marx that the centrality of man is borne in mind. This has not been the case except in very

notable cases such, for example, as in the humanist scholars and some critics like Any Rand, Allen Greenspan and Nathaniel Branden.

In these cases of keeping in mind the centrality of man in Marx, there have been controversies over theoretical frameworks used. The humanist scholars have been avidly criticized for reverting to neo-Hegelianism, while most critics of Marx's conception of man have been said to be purely anti-Marxists. The consequence is that for some individuals, Marx's conception of man is the most human, while for many others it is the acme of an inhuman anthropology. The gap between the two positions is enormous and needs bridging.

In Africa most of the available literature on Marx's conception of man has been extensive but without the strength that can only arise from an intensive study. There are such people as Leopold Sedar Senghor, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Frantz Fanon, Ayi Kwei Arma and Ngugi wa Thiong'o who have made efforts to expound and critique Marx. These African scholars have not, however, focused on the issue of Marxian anthropology directly. Moreover, some, if not all the mentioned have not been very convincing due to their ideological bias and the polemic tone of their writings. In other words, the writings of most reknown African scholars on Marx in general have been lacking in intellectual impartiality. The consequence is that although Africa has been for quite some time been haunted by the possibility of adopting Marxist doctrine of government, an impartial study of Marx's central theme has not been easy to come by. Since man is, or rather should be, the key

deterrent of choosing and implementing any policies, it is only logical that an effort be made to understand man.

The need to comprehend Marx's conception of man is today made more pressing by the changes taking place in the socialistic societies and even those in capitalistic societies. We think that a study of Marx at this juncture would be enlightening on the proof of present human problems.

Ultimately, it is hoped this study will contribute to the perennial debate on the conception of man. In so doing it will be a contribution towards efforts for a more humane world.

Literature Review

Marx's writings have drawn a mixture of responses from scholars, ranging from whole-hearted acclaim to outright rejection. The subject of our study, Marx's conception of man, has been no exception. The literature on Marx's conception of man can be grouped into three definite standings, namely: the whole-hearted acclaimers, the cautious, middle-of-the-road scholars, and those that have found Marx's anthropology totally unacceptable. We will look at a number of literature, which hopefully will be representative of the groupings.

Since the acclaimers of Marx express more or less the ideas of their mentor, we will not spend much time reviewing their literature at this stage. We will, nevertheless, point out certain notable acclaimers, who seem to expound on Marx in respect to our problem of study. One such an acclaimer is Lucien Seve, who in his Man in Marxist Theory and the Psychology of Personality (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1978) clarifies certain issues in Marx.

Seve conceives Marx's ideas as the basis for a more tenable study of man. He argues that

... the theory of personality as a whole is necessarily implied in the coherent scientific whole which constitutes Marxism and the area which it occupies is crucial today for the development of research.⁴

In his anthropology Seve tries to use Marx's ideas on society, production and alienation to expound and clarify issues of psychology. He conceives the individual as lined dialectically to the society in all his activities. Moreover, man is very much determined by material forces, although in turn he determines the conditions of those material forces. Seve, therefore, views Marx's conception of man as radically distinct from the humanism of his predecessors and contemporaries.

In Seve's understanding of Marx man can only be understood as a whole and not in fragments. He says, for example, that:

In looking closely at the Grundrisse and the Contribution we find a many-sided proof of the fact that on the basis of historical materialism and of political economy, individuals and social relations, anthropological and economic relations are absolutely indissociable...⁵

Like Marx, Seve conceives "every development of the productive forces as at same time the development of human capacities".

While Seve does well to point out the nascent psychology and anthropology based on Marx's historical-dialectical materialism, he fails to realize that fact real life situation involves possibilities. The author does not grasp in the relation of individual and society possibilities but necessity. We know that individual existence is not wholly a matter of necessity. The individual has a certain range of choice from which he chooses. In our view, the failure of the author to incorporate the reality

of freedom and individual differences can lead to a distorted anthropology.

Inasmuch as we concur with the author that materialistic and idealistic anthropology is from the beginning based on wrong premises, it is our contention that Seve does not impartially take into account the realities of human freedom, cognition and the implications of the universality of the human species.

Some of the issues which Seve tries to expound have been dealt with by Plekhanov in his work Fundamental Problems in Marxism. Of interest to us is the problem of necessity and freedom, and the role of the individual in history. The author also looks at Marx's resolution of the being-essence dichotomy in man.

Generally, Plekhanov's position is more or less the same as Marx's concerning the significant issue of freedom and necessity, Plekhanov argues that:

When the consciousness of my lack of free will presents itself to me only in the form of the complete subjective and objective impossibility of acting differently from the way I am acting, and when at the same time, my actions are to me the most desirable of all other possible actions, then in my mind necessity becomes identified with freedom... Such a lack of freedom is at the same time its fullest manifestation.⁶

This argument is very plausible and is substantial clarification of Marx' view that in the proletariat revolution freedom and necessity are fused. The question that is not answered by the argument, however, is: To what extent can the proletariat's subjective choice in their revolution coincide with what is objectively human? Plekhanov does not deal with our question, perhaps because it is not relevant to his subject. It is our opinion that necessity and freedom for a humane revolution cannot

be realized without clear comprehension of other human possibilities. We will try to examine the issue of freedom and necessity in the course of our research.

Closely connected with the problem of necessity and freedom is the dichotomy of individual and society. In Plekhanov's view that dichotomy, as argued by Marx, is resolved in the communistic mode of existence. Man's individual needs, desires and happiness are said to coincide with that of other men. In our view the author's arguments fail to take into account elements of human being such as love, jealousy, hatred, sympathy and selfishness, which in our view are very much a part of the human reality. Like Marx, Plekhanov seems to assume that human beings have or can have similar dispositions, a matter that is open to dispute. A little critical of Marx we find Erich Fromm whose extensive writings all revolve around the conception of man.

Fromm in his works, namely The Art of Loving, Escape from Freedom, The Sane Society, and especially his Marx's Concept of Man makes a tremendous efforts to understand man. He applauds Marx for the revolutionary ideas on man, on the basis of which he criticizes capitalism. Like Marx, Fromm holds that capitalism is incompatible with authentic human existence. Generally, the author endorses Marx's view that a truly human existence can only be realised through a radical reorganization of the socio-economic aspects of existence. In his view capitalism thrusts on man too much freedom and need for responsibility. Moreover, the institution of private ownership and concern for wealth stifle genuine human relatedness. In his book The Revolution of Hope, Fromm envisions the possibility of a communistic

individuality as tied to abolition of private ownership and reorganization of society.⁷

It is notable, however, that Fromm does not fully concur with Marx. Fromm criticizes Marx for embracing what he calls the bourgeois vision of man. In the author's view Marx fails to take into consideration destructive passions that are rooted in man. Further, it is argued that Marx erred in his concept that:

... the socialization of the means of production was not only the necessary, but also the sufficient condition for the transformation of the capitalist into a socialist co-operative society.⁸

As a result of these errors Marx is said to have been over optimistic in his vision. Fromm also believes that Marx did not fully understand man's psychological dimension, and as a result overestimated the effectiveness of the economic and political forces to the development of human nature.

All these are strong criticisms of Marx and we find them plausible. In our view, however, Fromm does not carry the logic of these substantial criticism to their right end. We hope to do so in our study, and bring into a better focus the reality of human free will.

Moreover, Fromm does not offer us a basis for a 'revolution of hope'. So that, ultimately, the problem of human essence stands in need of more attention from philosophers.

Another relevant book is Herbert Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man. In this book the author gives an account of how human beings have lost the individual dimension of their being. The account is centered on the kind of humans who have emerged from industrialization, with its concomitants. The arguments advanced by Marcuse apply to man in capitalistic and socialistic societies

in advanced stages. The gist of the arguments is that the process of industrialization, and civilization in general, has led to a kind of dehumanized mankind. In Marcuse's view both capitalism and socialism necessarily involve dehumanizing man by emphasizing the dimension of social existence and material concerns, over and against individual existence and spiritual concerns. He says that:

... the productive apparatus tends to become totalitarian to the extent to which it determines not only the socially needed occupations, skills, and attitudes, but also individual needs and aspirations. It thus obliterates the opposition between the private and public existence, between individual and social needs.⁹

In our view there is truth in Marcuse's thesis. there is an evident tendency for human beings in capitalism and socialism to become one-dimensional. The phenomenon of one-dimensional in mankind, that is actually a lack of individual and spiritual reality, is not in our view a consequence of the social structures. We think that there is need to look at the nature of human being in trying to explain the totalitarian tendencies in capitalism and socialism.

Furthermore, Marcuse does not explicitly articulate any theory on man. So that however valid his accounts may be they are without a positive ground. In other words, although there is evident dehumanization of a majority of human beings in capitalism and socialism we cannot conclude that both social systems are essentially injurious to man. We need to research into the nature of man to make such a conclusion.

Rene Coste in Marxist Analysis and Christian Faith tries to look at the arguments of Marxists on Christian faith. Coste concedes

the gravity of some of the arguments, particularly as concerns the failure of Christianity to guide mankind to liberation. The author, however, argues that what Marx offers as a solution to problems of human alienation is inadequate. In Coste's view Marxist conception of man is reductionist in conceptualizing man as essentially social.¹⁰ Man more than being a social being is a religious being, and his relationship to God can only be served at the price of dehumanizing him. Nevertheless, Coste subscribes to the view that a liberation of human beings on a material level is necessary for complete liberation.¹¹

We intent to show that Marx fails to recognize the reality of religiosity, even in the communistic individuality. Moreover, we believe that any authentic liberation of man is a consequence of concerted effort on the spiritual, material and social level by the individual. In other words, we think that the individual reality of each man is significant in alienation and in striving for liberation.

In Africa there have been a number of efforts to expound on and criticize Marx's conception of man. Most of those efforts have, however, not been directly addressed to the subject of man.

J. K. Nyerere, Man and Development, looks at the linkage between human beings and socio-economic activities. His thesis is that man should be the purpose of any activity initiated by the society. This is the position of Marx in criticizing the social infrastructure of capitalism. Moreover, like Marx, Nyerere argues that the liberation of men cannot be accomplished without their involvement in the process. But Nyerere stops short of holding the Marxian view that good social policies are of insignificant value. He argues that:

We can by use of our skills, help people to transform their lives from abject poverty - that is, from fear of hunger and always endless drudgery - to decency and simple comfort.¹²

This argument, when combined with Nyerere's acceptance and understanding of religion, imply difference with Marx on the nature of human being. But Nyerere's argument that religion has a role to play in the realization of an upright human individuality does not, in our view, have an articulated basis. This shortcoming can lead to misunderstanding on the status of religion, viz., whether it is essential or non-essential to man. If we cannot find religiosity in man's nature, then we can safely conclude that it is just an institution that results from socio-economic conditions. We will try to look for the basis of religion, and examine critically the issue of alienation and the possibilities of liberation.

In conclusion we find in the above reviewed literature a need for a study of Marx's conception of man.

Methodology

This will be essentially a library based research, in which various texts will be studied. We shall employ two philosophical tools, namely critical analysis and logical analysis. The first tool, critical analysis is employed in examination of Marx's views and conclusions in relation to human reality as we know it presently. We also utilize various literature material in critically analysing Marx.

Logical analysis is employed in pointing out inconsistency and contradictions in the arguments of Marx. Because this is a study of a concrete reality, namely man, the kind of logic used is metaphysical discourse that is based and constituted from human

reality in its diverse forms we expect to concludes and make recommendations at the end of this research that will be a result of both critical analysis and logical analysis.

Theoretical Framework

This study of Marx's conception of man will be done within the theoretical framework of humanism. We will try to assess Marx in view of what man is, emphasizing the compatibility or incompatibility of Marx's arguments with human beings in actual life situations.

By remaining within the theoretical framework of humanism this study will avoid the criticism of being based on a different perspective. Moreover, since the subject of our study is man, it is only logical that we adopt a humanistic approach in preference to any other.

Notes

1. K. Marx, "Thesis on Feurbach" F. Engels and K. Marx On Religion, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971, p.62.
2. In other words, human freedom is to a large extent lacking. Human beings act only in definite ways and are, thus, determined by social conditions of their time. This deterministic power of social conditions of men is, however, argued to wither a way in communism.
3. Op. cit., p.64.
4. L. Seve, Man in Marxist Theory and the Psychology of Personality, Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1978, P.11.
5. Ibid. p.90.
6. G. V. Plekhanov, Fundamental Problems of Marxism, London; Lawrence Wilshart, 1969, p.87.
7. E. Fromm, The Revolution of Hope, New York: Harper & Brothers Co. 1969, p.87.
8. E. Fromm, The Sane Society, New York: Fawcett Premier 1955, p.232.
9. H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, New York: Beacon Press, 1964, p.XVI.
10. R. Coste, Marxist Analysis and Christian Faith, trans. A. C. Roger, Maryknoll,: Orbiss Books, 1985. The reader can consult this work for a more detailed argument.
11. Ibid.
12. J. K. Nyerere, Man and Development, Dar es Salaam: OUP, 1974, p.8.

CHAPTER TWO

MARX'S CRITIQUE OF RELIGIONIntroduction

The most stinging criticisms of religion and religious sentiment are concentrated in Marx's early writings. After 1848, his criticisms are directly addressed to capitalistic socio-economic structure and only indirectly and sparsely dwell on religion. There is, however, a more truly materialistic perspective in the later works than in the early ones. In our view, there is a progressive improvement in Marx's use of the framework of historical dialectical materialism in the conception of religion. We intend in this chapter to survey Marx's critique of religion, paying special attention to its implications for his understanding of man. Our thesis is that in criticizing religion and relegating it to a non-essential status, Marx ignores certain elements that are vital for human beings. We will see the nature of these elements as we proceed. However, it is important that we first understand Marx's conception of religion.

1. Marx's Conception of Religion

Marx conceives religion as essentially a product of and a form of alienation. He categorizes two forms of religion, namely, natural and social religion.

Natural religion is a form of worship that characterizes the primeval stage of human existence. It arises as a consequence of the incomprehensible and indomitable nature of untransformed reality. The incomprehensible and indomitable aura of reality at the primeval stage of human existence gives rise to fear, awe,

eneration and a consciousness of reality as a supernatural reality. Thus Marx says:

... [(nature)] appears to men as completely alien, all powerful and unassailable force, with which men's reactions are purely animal and by which they are overawed like beasts; it is thus a purely animal consciousness of nature [(natural religion)]¹

The elements of the human spirit, namely, fear, awe, veneration and adoration, that are directed towards nature are what constitutes natural religion and are, as such, manifestations of alienation.

Marx explains the reality of natural religion as short-lived, because human beings are drawn into activities of appropriating that reality for their satisfaction. In other words, as men transform reality to satisfy their needs, the supernatural aura of reality is destroyed. The transformation of social reality which grows over time and come to assume status of a reality that is independent of and more powerful than men. It is this status of social reality as independent and more powerful than men that gives rise to social religion.² Thus, social religion is conceived as a consciousness of products of human will as superhuman forces, to which men have to adjust. But, apart from being a product of alienated human beings, social religion functions to justify that alienation. Thus religion arises as an offspring of an alienated social reality and is itself an alienated social reality. In "The 1844 Manuscripts" Marx conceives "religion and wealth as "but the estranged world of human objectification", and further adds that "just as man has less the more he projects into God, so he has less the more he projects into capital".³

It is evident that in the conception of both natural and social religion Marx identifies alienation as a key element. Moreover, he comprehends religion in terms of the activities of men on reality; growing out of those activities of production and being transformed by them. It is as a result of Marx's historical dialectical materialism that religion is understood as a mutable reality. At a particular period in people's history and given the level of material development and the modes of relationship between the individual and transformed reality religion will be of a befitting intensity and form.

The question which arises here is: what are the attributes of religion that qualify Marx's view that it is essentially a consequence and a form of alienation?

According to Marx, all modes of production that antecede communism are characterized by alienation. That alienation is related to religion in the following terms:

Religion is the general theory of that world - its encyclopedic compendium, its logic in a popular form, its spiritualistic point d'honneur. ... It is the fantastic realization of the human essence because the human essence has no true reality.⁴

As "a general theory" religion expresses at an abstract level the specific theories, say of justice, love, and right, which pertain to the social system prior to communism. It is in that instance the ultimate warrant which stands as a back up to specific views and activities. As "the fantastic realization of the human essence" religion is a reality that distorts reality by arousing in human beings baseless exultations and feelings of fulfilment. Marx has an extensive characterization of this aspect of religion; calling it "the sigh of the oppressed creature", "the

heart of the heartless", and "the opium of the people". Seen in this light religion is a palliative that functions to soothe an afflicted human individuality.

Within the metaphysics of dialectical historical materialism, Marx comprehended the reality of religion as only characteristic of the alienated capitalistic individuality and as doomed to be transcended through praxis and dialectics. We will try to understand this conception of religion and Marx's anthropology.

2. The Conception of Religion and Marx's anthropology

One finds the theme of human liberation in all writings of Marx. This theme is closely interwoven with the fate of religion. It is Marx's view that the demise of religion is inevitable and is necessary for the realization of a free and unalienated human individuality. Reacting to Feuerbachian conception of religion and man, Marx argues:

Feuerbach, ... does not see that 'the religious sentiment' is itself a social product, and that the individual whom he analyses belongs in reality to a particular society.⁵

Marx outrightly rejects the conception of religion, or for that matter the religious sentiment as an essential element of the human individuality. In his view, religion, like any other form of consciousness, arises as a consequence of particular social conditions. The transformation of those social conditions, are necessarily reflected in changes in people's consciousness, and this does not leave out the 'religious sentiment'. The close relation of religion and the human individuality can be perceived clearly in the following view:

The religious world is but the reflex of the real world. And for a society based upon the production of commodities, ... Christianity with its cultus of

abstract man, more especially in its bourgeois developments, Protestantism, Deism, ... is most fitting form of religion.⁶

In Marx's view there is not simply a cult of an abstract man but, in fact, human beings exist in capitalism as fragmented functions of the social machinery. The separation of the religious world from the mundane world as in Deism aggravates the intensity of alienation in human beings. Marx comprehends these religions, Protestantism and Deism, as necessarily tied up with alienated human individualities.

The revolutionary side of Marx's view, however, is the argument that religion falls into decay progressively and is subsequently negated by the proletariat. The decay and subsequent negation of religion is accompanied by the growth of the proletariat individuality, that is implicit in his view that "religion ... will be dispatched in due time by the proletariat for whom theoretical ideas do not exist". This is an individuality, therefore, that negates the "general theory" of capitalism and rejects the fantastic realization of its human essence. The negation of religion arises gradually through the processes of production, in which the proletariat is involved, albeit as a tool for the whole machinery. We will not go into examining the issues raised by the notion of a proletariat as such, suffice to observe that from the proletariat individuality Marx posits a higher individuality, that is the communist.

The communist is a higher individuality over all other individualities, not in terms of the historical progression from primitive levels to civilized levels, but is such in the sense of being a synthesis of all positive values of human

civilization. In terms of religion, the communist individuality transcends both religion and atheism, by finding no need to affirm or deny the supernatural.⁷ In this respect the deliberate denial of religion by the proletariat is only a temporal stage in the development of the human individuality which flourishes in the communistic individuality. For Marx, the communistic individuality finds fulfillment in the concrete and unalienated involvement "in material production and reproduction".⁸ The need for religion, which in capitalism is caused by alienation, does not arise. Granted the above arguments of Marx, we concur with Donald McKnown that:

In the characterizing religion, Marx emphasized over and again his conviction that it was an inessentiality.⁹

Only with such a strong conviction could Marx have proceeded to posit an individuality without a religious sentiment as the perfect goal of human history. In arguing thus Marx broke ranks with other materialists, and Feuerbach, for example, and set into a motion ideas that were to affect destinies of many people. The world has been more or less divided between people who think he was right and those who think he was wrong in his conception of religion. In U.S.S.R., 1917, marked the beginning of massive policy efforts to combat religion. Apart from policies aimed at the suppression of the institution of religion, the U.S.S.R. government subsequently mobilized forces with the explicit purpose of completely banishing religiosity. While it is true that the soviet economy had not attained the forms of fledgling capitalism to be a test of Marx's ideas, the anti-religion policies and activities of the government are representative of

the negation of religion. For as Marx says in "The 1844 Manuscripts" the negation of the religious individuality (that is in fact, the capitalistic individuality) is accomplished by force and mercilessly.¹⁰

At the level of thought there have been two different forms of reactions in defense of religion. It has been argued that religion is an essential dimension of human existence. The religious dimension of human nature, it has been argued, is the only basis on which authentic search for freedom, justice and equality can be made. One finds this view expressed by the proponents of African Socialism such as Julius Nyerere, Leopold Sedar Senghor, Kenneth Kaunda and Ayi Kwei Armah. For example, J. K. Nyerere argues that religion's "love must be expressed in action against evil, and for good". Further, that "the purpose of the church is Man - his human dignity, and his right to develop himself in freedom".¹¹ more or less the same view is expressed by Rene Coste, Nikolai Berdyaev, and Karl Barth. The Vatican has also been vocal on the Marxist critique of religion.

Thus the Vatican says:

The Marxists have proposed one way, and in pursuing their program they rely on man alone; Father Murray said: 'Now Pope Paul VI has issued a detailed plan to accomplish the same goal on the basis of true humanism - humanism that recognizes man's religious nature.'¹²

The other argument for religion is based on the view that certain aspects of human consciousness are religious in nature. Faith, hope, appreciation of value, love and adoration are some of the recurring aspects in this second position. In varying ways, Wolfhard Pannenberg, Luis Segundo, David Lawrence, Erich Fromm, and implicitly, but strongly, Ayn Rand, are some of the

proponents of the essentiality of religiosity in the basic sense. Since our criticism of Marx's conception of religion inclines to the argument for the essentiality of faith, hope and adoration, we will explore these second position in the next part.

3. The Basic Sense of Religion

A distinction between the essence of something and its manifestation is necessary if real comprehension of reality is to be achieved. Marx does not, in our view, seem to make a distinction between the essence of religion and its manifestations. As a consequence of that failure, his conception of religion and man is a little one-sided. We agree with McKnown in his observation that

Marx understood religion more in terms of function than content. In summary, the range of ills to which religion may respond to as an opiate is for all practical purpose unlimited and immensely broader than Marx was willing to admit. Hence, although what he had to say about this aspect of religion may be true, it is not the whole truth.¹³

In our view the conception of religion as arising from certain social conditions and interwoven with those social conditions is basis for Marx's dismissal of religion as inessential. In other words his conception arises from the framework of dialectical historical materialism, which proceeds on the assumption that human consciousness is a reflection of material conditions and mode of interaction between man and reality.

It is possible to grant the argument that religion is a form of opiate and that it is determined by the social conditions without necessarily finding the conclusion that religion is nonessential true. An opiate that is tied to material conditions may just as well be essential; changing in forms, but basically remaining the

same. The communistic individuality, however, is characterized as without need for religion and the religious sentiment. This, therefore, is an individuality that does not require to fantasize about its essence, because it realizes that essence in its activities. The obsolescence of the religious sentiment, which essentially involve a psychological state of fear, awe, veneration and adoration, is posited on the ground that the communistic individuality is guided by nothing but rational practical attitude. We can say, therefore, that Marx articulated a materialistic anthropology, which is built on human beings' activities in production and actual conditions of their social life. The assumption here is that the consciousness of the communist does not have such elements as fear, awe and veneration, first because the nature of reality is fully comprehended and is not estranged from him, and secondly because the individual's rational nature preclude the religious sentiment.

In our view the basic elements of the religious sentiment awe, veneration and adoration are essential aspects of human being. In the primitive stages of man's history these basic elements are manifest in the attitude of the individual towards nature, which Marx terms as natural religion. These elements prevail even as nature is transformed by men, and are evident in the attitude of awe, veneration and adoration which men hold towards such social realities as accumulated wealth and technological gadgets. These latter form of religion in its protracted forms, as in capitalism's advanced stages, abandons the distinction between the mundane world of production and the world of gods. In our

view, Marx does not transcend this form of religion in his positing of the communist individuality. In fact Marx's conception of man, in respect to religion, is a systematic expression of a reality which capitalism had created. Marx comprehends the deterioration of religion as was known in the western world as a sign of the end of religion as an institution and the negation and subsequent transcendence of the religious sentiment.

We grant the fact that Christian religion has been on the decline and in a state that warrants Marx's use of the term 'decay', but the interpretation of that decline and decay to mean an eminent negation and transcendence of religion is unjustified. We strongly concur with Lawrence that:

The real problem for humanity isn't whether God exists or not. God always is, and we all know it. But the problem is, how to get at Him.¹⁴

Expressed unambiguously, the problem which men have to grapple with, if at all they can do that, is that of determining the target of their religious sentiment. The target of men's religious sentiment has been varied throughout history. The assertion of "the doctrine that for man the supreme being is man", and that human beings' supremacy lies in the social nature of their production and consumption, involves the element of adoration. At least if "the doctrine that for man the supreme being is man" is to have any authentically humane meaning, the communistic individuality cannot be without adoration. The target of the religious sentiment in this case is man, and more specifically men's creative and productive abilities.

Apart from adoration, the communistic individuality, like all other hitherto individualities, may not manage to completely dispense with faith. In this respect Wolfhard Pannenberg argues that:

Actually, faith as a vital act is synonymous with trust, a trust that has to do with the fundamental and basic moments in life, this trust extends beyond the boundaries of any Christian avowal ... It leads us to trust in the undermined.

In our view, 'Faith', or 'Trust', which Segundo calls 'anthropological faith' is the basic sense of religion which is indispensable for all men. Of course there is a distinction between the promethean faith of the communist individuality and the mystic faith that characterizes early human life. And the distinction is largely in terms of the underlying metaphysics. For the promethean faith the universe is determinable by men's rationality, and it is absurd for a human being to distrust the mind. This is a kind of faith that the communistic individuality acts upon. Depending on the intensity of the faith, the intensity of religious sentiment will vary. The mystic's faith is such that it cannot define in definite terms the nature of reality and its operations. Certainly, these are two different individualities, but neither is conceivable without the element of faith.

In our view, the development of reason facilitates individual faith and clarifies the object of adoration. These two aspects, therefore, cannot be expected to die as productive forces are developed, especially in those beings actively involved in production. The spiritual values which an individual strives to realize and maintain crystallize in the process of interacting

with reality. The communistic individuality and the mystic individuality both share the characteristic of striving to realize and maintain a particular value. The value which stands high above all other values is the absolute, and this will vary with the individuality at issue. Insofar as all human beings have such a value, there is again, a religious sentiment in all individualities.

For the communistic individuality the highest, or 'supreme value' is man, and this reality cannot be shorn off the intense emotional attachment without risking to reduce human beings to robots. Thus we find as instructive Segundo's argument that:

... even the most scientific and objective methodology is grounded on an existential structure ... Its importance derives from something absolute sought by human beings, from something that becomes our 'saviour' once it is attained, even though it does not cease to be human. That something is the absolute criterion of what is good for us.¹⁵

In this respect Marx's argument that the religious sentiment is only characteristic of the capitalistic individuality is untenable. The institution of religion is not a necessary condition for religiosity; in fact religion only emerges as a consequence of the religious sentiment, as manifest in faith, adoration and value.

We feel that the term 'religious sentiment' means more than is included in Marx's conception. In a sense, we can say that an individual is religious if his existence is guided by faith and adoration of a definite value. Contrary to Marx's view that the increasing use of reason leads to a demise of the religious sentiment, reason ought to reorient and entrench the individual's faith of and intense attachment to a particular value.¹⁶ This

is more so if we grant the relationship between faith the absolute value and emotional attachment is essential rather than accidental. In our view, that relationship is essential, meaning that a strong emotional attachment necessarily involves a strong faith on a particular value.

Perhaps it would be more illustrative in our conception of religion in this basic sense if we could think of a promethean individual who has so much faith and high value of another person that he would rather die than see his value destroyed. Rand, through the character of John Galt, expresses this choice in the life of a very rational man. John Galt would rather die than live to see his lover, Dagny, debased. In our view, the choice of this rational man, of his death to save his highest value, is a religious choice. The religious sentiment which is expressed in Galt's decision is a consequence of understanding.¹⁷ In fact, it is our view that without a definite understanding of the value of a particular reality a man cannot choose death over witnessing destruction of that reality.

Religion in the basic sense expressed in the foregoing views is basic and necessary for the individuality that is unalienated. And, therefore, the alienated capitalistic individuality as conceived by Marx, cannot be liberated by an indiscriminate negation of the religious sentiment. Indiscriminate negation of religion can only lead to such a tragedy as Lawrence describes

The new little monster, the new "good man" was perfectly reasonable and perfectly irreligious. Religion knows the great passions. The homme de bien, the good man performs the robot trick of isolating himself from the great passions. For the passion of life substitutes reasonable social virtues. There is nothing to worship. Such a thing as worship is nonsense. But you may get a 'feeling' out of anything.¹⁸

Thus there is a danger arising from Marx's wholesale relegation of religion to a non-essential status. This is precisely the danger of policy makers conceiving and implementing the destruction of religion. In the past, all orthodox Marxist regimes sought to determine the reality of religion on account of its being an obstacle to human growth.

Conclusion

Merek Fritzhand writes that

The human being who lives a meaningful and valuable life is one who finds happiness and consummation in activities which transform nature and society. He seeks Truth, Beauty and the Good, seeks expression in and through culture and civilization, and absorbs everything new and valuable created in these spheres.¹⁹

In our view, an individual such as described here is religious in the basic sense of the word. This description, found in Fritzhand's article "Marx's Ideal of Man", leads us to the conclusion that man ought to strive for values which are in harmony with his nature, determined by the rational faculty. Insofar as man experiences harmony and happiness he is in the realm of religion. In our view, therefore, Marx was implicitly religious in his own arguments against religion and the capitalistic man, and more so in his articulation of the communistic individuality. Explicitly, however, Marx was so anti-religious that he has been interpreted as advocating an individuality bereft of the religious sentiment, and has been behind social policies that destroy this essential dimension of man.

Whether or not a man pronounces the word God, the fact is that there is in each normal man a value that is absolute and conceived to give meaning to existence. The existence of the absolute in all normal men is a confirmation of the essential nature of religion.

Notes

1. D.B. McKnown, The Classical Marxist Critiques of Religion: Marx, Engels, Lenin, Kautsky, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976, p.19.
2. Ibid., p.27.
3. K. Marx, "The 1844 Manuscripts", in Marx's Early Writings, ed. D. Hoare, New York: Vintage Books, 1975, p.347.
4. K. Marx, "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right", in Marx and Engels, On Religion, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975, p.37.
5. K. Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach", ibid., p.64.
6. In Mcknown, op. cit., p.79.
7. Marx, "The 1844 Manuscripts" op. cit., p.64.
8. Ibid., p. 350.
9. McKnown, op. cit., p.47.
10. Marx, op. cit., p.346.
11. J.K. Nyerere, Man and Development, Dar-es-Salaam; OUP, 1974, p.98.
12. In A. Rand, "Requiem for Man", in Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, ed. A. Rand, New York: New American Library, 1962, p.315.
13. McKnown, op. cit., p.53.
14. D.H. Lawrence, Phoenix, ed. E.D. McDonald, London: William Heinmann Ltd., 1936, p.724.
15. J.L. Segundo, Faith and Ideologies, vol. 1, tran. J. Drury, Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1984, p.133.
16. Our reader can consult Segundo's Faith and Ideologies for a more detailed expression of this view.
17. A. Rand, Atlas Shrugged, New York: New American Library, 1967, pp.1012-1012.
18. D. H. Lawrence, op. cit. p.630.
19. M. Fritzhand, "Marx's Ideal of Man", Socialist Humanism, ed. E. Fromm, London: Allen Lane, 1967, p.136.

CHAPTER THREE

THE SOCIAL INDIVIDUALIntroduction

In the last chapter we argued that Marx's critique of religiosity is a consequence of a one-sided conception of human individuality. We concluded that religiosity is, contrary to Marx's view, a basic reality of the human individuality.

In this chapter we shall pursue further the implications of Marx's repudiation of religiosity arguing that repudiation of religiosity leads to a phenomenon called the 'social individual'. The term "social individual" is used here to refer to human being without a transcendent dimension. The transcendent dimensions of human individuality, we argue, consists of a reality of goals and values which are prior to the existential projects. The repudiation of the primacy of this transcendent dimension of human individuality involves an implicit assertion of the social individual. There are also explicit arguments for the social individual in the writings of Marx.

We intend to show that the social dimension of human individuality is a consequence of human selfishness. We shall emphasize the need for a distinction between first or primary instances and the ultimate instances of human individuality. Apart from the realm of values, we shall also refer to the realm of emotions, in trying to show the one-sidedness of Marx's conception of human individuality.

The Essence of Human Individuality

In the sixth thesis on Feuerbach, Marx argues that:

... the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.¹

Throughout the theses on Feuerbach, Marx makes it quite clear that, he is opposed to both idealism and vulgar materialism of his predecessors. Consequently he conceives man, as determined by material conditions. Evidently, Marx strives to strike a balance between the human individuality and the social conditions. It is upon these efforts that Marx strikes out a tone of balance between objectivity as embodied in social reality and subjectivity as embodied in human beings.

We find, nevertheless, that it is towards the social conditions that the balance tilts. Marx argues for example that:

The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but ... the real individuals, their activity, the material conditions determining their life.²

This quotation, coupled with the argument that human consciousness is the product of social conditions, means that the individuals with whom Marx begins his study are determined. For if their consciousness are determined it means that the individuals are more or less social archetypes. Conceived as social archetypes human beings are without transcendence. The dimension of transcendence in human beings is only brought into the picture if the primacy of social conditions is repudiated. Marx's argument that human beings "begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence"³ implies his recognition of the transcendent dimension. It is a fact, however, that Marx

conceives this transcendent dimension as nothing but "the ensemble of social relationships."

For human beings in subsistence production are primarily individualistic. In their first instance of affecting material conditions, human beings seek to satisfy selfish needs. The satisfaction of selfish interests is, nevertheless, best realised in human relationships. It is, we think, for this reason that Jügen Habermas argues that:

The cognitive interests are neither ideology-critical, nor based on a psychology or sociology of knowledge: 'they are invariant'.⁴

Marx leaves out this invariant dimension that transcends contingents social conditions in his conception of human essence. The individualistic, selfish and variant dimension of human beings is conceived as a consequence of historical conditions. Precisely, Marx conceives individualism and selfishness as mere historical realities, which will be transcended by realization of communism.

In socialism, Marx argues, the essence of human being - the ensemble of social relationships - is real and fully realised. Thus Marx conceives the social essence as antagonized in capitalism, but harmonized in socialism. Obviously, therefore, this study must examine Marx's conception of human individuality in three sections: in capitalism, in the transition between capitalism and communion, in communism.

1. The Essence of Human Individuality in Capitalism

Capitalism is a mode of social organization characterized by private ownership of property and individualism.⁵ In this mode of organization, men gain access to each others' property through

a system of exchange. The system of exchange is based on money and gold. Thus Ayn Rand, defines capitalism as follows:

Capitalism is a social system based on the recognition of individual rights, including property rights, in which all property is privately owned. (...) of all the social systems in mankind's history, capitalism is the only system based on an objective theory of values.⁶

Marx would agree for the most part with Rand on the definition of capitalism, but he would dispute that 'objective theory of values' is in harmony with human essence. Thus Marx criticizes capitalism for its exchange mechanism that does not take into consideration differences between human beings.⁷ This form of human existence, Marx argues, leads to dehumanization of human beings by the objective operation of the exchange system.⁸ The relationship between human beings takes on an aura of a relationship of inanimate objectives, with the mediating object, money, assuming immense powers over human beings.⁹ Marx uses the relationship between the labourer and the capitalist to depict the dehumanization which results from capitalistic social system. The relationship between the labourer and the capitalist progressively takes the form of a relationship of inanimate objects, with capital dominating and subjecting both to its own laws:¹⁰

The consequence of capitalistic social system on human individuality is that the ensemble of social relationships is relegated to a secondary, inconsequential status. Marx conceives the alienation of human beings from the products of their labour, the process of production, nature, themselves, and from their species. This multi-faceted alienation is what Marx conceives to be the alienation of the essence of human beings, the social relations.¹¹

The gist of Marx's argument against capitalism is that the realization of human sociality is made futile by the unjustifiable power of capital. As a result of capital's power, the process of production leads to an increase of the inanimate power of that same capital. Thus, human beings find themselves enslaved and without choice but to go on enslaving themselves. Describing such an instance Marx says:

The more the worker exerts himself in his work, the more powerful the alien, objective products which he brings into being over against himself, the poorer he and his inner world become and the less they belong to him.¹²

The worker is impoverished and made helpless the more he 'exerts himself in his work'. Yet in work it is human beings who are engaged in a relationship. Why, therefore, does the worker suffer impoverishment and impotency in an activity that is supposed to enrich him/her?

Marx traces the root of human alienation to the logic of capital. The logic of capital is 'the means of production monopolized by a certain section of society', 'the product of labourers turned into independent powers', 'money', 'commodity', and even 'value that sucks up the value of creating powers'.¹³ In the logic of capital's working social relationships are thrust into the background, leaving human beings exposed to objective, inhuman forces. The worker is driven by necessity to exert himself more and more to acquire capital for his existence. The capitalist is equally driven by the urge and necessity of maintaining his status and demands more and more from the worker.

Thus the logic of capital usurps the power of human beings and comes to pervade all spheres of human existence. Marx regarded

the pervasiveness of the objective, iron-clad laws of capital as anti-social and anti-human. "The 1844 manuscripts" provide the strongest and most graphic arguments as to why capitalism is an epoch in which the essence of human individuality is alienated. In The German Ideology, Marx demonstrates at length the fact that 'the (history) of the productive forces is also the history of the development of the forces of the individuals themselves.'¹⁴ In Marx's view, it is clear that individuals are not free in capitalism. This view is the reason for regarding the epochs hitherto socialism as prehistoric. The epochs are prehistoric in the sense that men engage in the transformation of reality as mere objects, that have to adjust to the transformed reality instead of the other way round. Human beings are impotent, and are therefore mere objects in the operational logic of capital. He argues:

Within the capitalist system all methods for raising the social productiveness of labour are brought about at the cost of individual labourer; all means for the development of production transform themselves into means of domination over, and exploitation of, the producers; they mutilate the labourer into a fragment of a man, degrade him to the level of an appendage of a machine, destroy every remnant of charm in his work and turn it into hated toil; ... they transform his life-time into working time and drag his wife and child beneath the wheels of the juggernaut of capital.¹⁵

In capitalism, thus, there is, lack of human consideration in the relationship between the proletariat and the bourgeois. This lack of human consideration is what Marx criticized when he argued that "capitalism attacks the individual at the very root of his life' manifest 'the vampire thirst for the living blood of labour', and brings about 'the most extravagant waste of individual development'"⁶. The root of individual life is the

social relations between human beings; and the thirst for labour is the root of exploitation and private ownership. Seen thus, capitalism is certainly a social system in which 'individual development' is stifled.

Since "all methods for raising the social productiveness of labour" are anti-social, the individual has no choice but to alienate his powers. In one sentence, this situation means that human beings can neither prevent the evil of capitalism nor find a way for dealing with the consequences of that evil in their midst. In other words, Marx conceives human individuality in capitalism as without authenticity, freedom, and therefore, without the essence of being human.

We agree with Marx that the social conditions of his day were dehumanizing, and therefore alienating of the human individuality. Nevertheless, we find his view that the essence of human individuality is underdeveloped in capitalism untenable. For if it is granted that the essence of human individuality is alienated in the epochs prior to socialism, it cannot at the same time be tenable to hold that during that time that essence is being developed. Rather we would concur with Martin Schoolmann in arguing that:

Although capital invades and subjects to its rule the social forms of human existence, the existential inclination or fundamental human striving toward love, friendship and community are increasingly denied and limited as their areas of expression are annexed by commodity economy. Yet, as these inclinations constitute the individual, it not only remains possible but also is necessary to speak of an individual living even though this individual now views this world in fetishized terms.¹⁷

Further, we would hold that however annexed by the commodity economy human beings may be, there is never a total annexation of social dimension as Marx conceives. Indeed, it is the permanence of the individuality's essence which makes it meaningful to talk about possibilities of rectifying the circumstances. It can be said, therefore, that the history of human civilization is always the history of strivings by individual beings to realize both the social and individual dimension of human being.

Marx in his conception of human essence as the ensemble of social relations, and in his view that this essence is progressively lacking in capitalism implies that human being in capitalism are without human dimension. We find this conception of human individuality wanting, because it fails to take into consideration the individual dimension of man. Arising from this position of ours is the following question: is the ensemble of social relations alienated in capitalism? 18

In the "1844 Manuscript" Marx argues that the essence of man is realised only when human beings perceive each other as supreme values. 19 As supreme values, human beings are not means to one's ends in themselves. Human beings in relating to each other as species exist to enhance each other's lives. This view is expressed later in Grundrisse, where Marx talks of human beings transcending their individuality to serve other individuals. 20

While we would agree that the ensemble of social relations is important, it's importance can be no more than secondary to the

goals and values of the individual. In the capitalism of Marx's day, men, women and children went out to work in factories - which were quite unhygienic in most cases. Able human beings invented machines, others with financial ability gained access to the inventions and set up factories. In all these activities, that is, inventing, setting up factories and going out to work, two dimensions of human reality are involved. There is the individual dimension, dovetailing with the social dimension of human individuality. The individual dimension is primary and active, and involves the individuals' goals and values. 21 The social dimension, on the other hand, is secondary, and arises from the fact that human beings are a universal species. The universality of human beings means that human beings have the potential to utilize for their own benefits works of other human beings. Marx expresses this view in his early writings, but seems to fail to pursue it to its logical end.

To the extent that the production process in capitalism is individualistic, or rather holds the primacy of the individual, only human beings who exercise their potential to use human inventions have access to nature. Marx does not conceive the individual dimension that predominates in capitalism as an essence of human individuality. He conceives it (the individual dimension) as a manifestation of alienation of the most essential reality of human individuality.

It is Marx's view, however, that capitalism is both positive and negative. It is positive in the sense that human control over

nature is extended and tools for control perfected. But in the sense that human beings are increasingly alienated from their existence, capitalism is negative. He argues:

Although at first the development of the capacities of the human species takes place at the cost of all the majority of human individuals, and even classes, in the end it breaks through this contradiction and coincides with the development of the individual; the higher development of the individuality is thus only achieved by a historical process during which individuals are sacrificed.²²

We realize, therefore, that besides arguing that human individuality is alienated and without freedom, Marx deduces a higher mode of individuality from capitalism. The postulation of communism from capitalism seems to be contrary to our understanding of human individuality and history. For example M. Horkheim argues that:

The possibility is no less than the doubt. There are no guarantees, structural or rational; the revolution rests on the will of the revolutionaries. Can it free itself from the logic of capitalism? And how?²³

Our view is that in capitalism, as in any other stage of men's civilizations, the productive forces need not violate individual human essence. The view that human essence is violated arises from the position of Marx that the essence is the social relations. This position of Marx does not fit in with alterations that have occurred in human spirituality in the last thousand years. Alterations in human spirituality have been tending towards the use of reason, even in spheres that were previously considered sacred.²⁴ The consequence has been a

situation in which ethics condemns prostitution as Wrong but some women find it a necessity. 25 The conclusion which Marx derives from this ethical crisis, that the social dimension of human being is alienated, is a result of failing to take note of the alterations in human spirituality. Moreover, Marx does not find any ethical underpinnings in capitalism.

Alterations in human spirit tend towards increasing use of reason, and this does not leave out human relations. 26 Marx does not provide rational justification of his humanism, apart from the argument that the development of history necessarily tends towards a consummated human individuality. We shall now move on to examine Marx's arguments for the transition from capitalism to socialism.

2. The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism

We have seen how Marx conceives human individuality in capitalism. Needless to say, that conception denies the significance of the selfish dimension to human beings. It is that denial of a real, authentic human individuality in capitalism that explains Marx's view that: "the higher development of the individuality is... only achieved by a historical process during which individuals are sacrifices." 27

It seems to us that Marx conceives the role which human beings play in capitalism as subhuman. Thus Marx's view that human beings are determined in their existence by social conditions 28 must be interpreted to mean that they are not authentically free.

Rather, human beings in capitalism are just one of the forces of production - the subjective forces. 29 This subjective force is nevertheless, compelled by the objective laws of capitalism to strive against itself. There is, therefore, a compulsive force, which dictates the direction of human society. This compulsion is conceived by Marx as the merging of necessity and freedom, particularly in the revolution that overthrows capitalism.

Plekhanov says for example that:

When the consciousness of my lack of free will presents itself to me only in the form of the complete subjective and objective impossibility of acting differently from the way I am acting, and when, at the all other possible actions, then in my mind necessity becomes identified with freedom and freedom with necessity ...30

This conception of a human individuality with freedom that is necessity is very much central to Marx's postulate of a transition from capitalism to socialism. There are, however, two major variations of Marx's conception of the transition from capitalism. There is the activistic conception and the evolutionary conception.

The activistic conception of the transition from capitalism, though imbued with necessity, conceives human individuality as consciously involved in realizing the revolution. This is evident in the following argument of Marx:

A class is called forth, which has all the burdens of society without enjoying its advantages, which ousted from society is forced into the most decided antagonism to all other classes; a class which forms the majority of all members of society and from which emanates the consciousness of the necessity of the

fundamental revolution, the communist consciousness, which may, of course, arise among the other classes through the contemplation of the situation of this class.³¹

The human individuality, however much necessitated in its action, is consciously involved; first in deciding to antagonize class reality and in developing "consciousness of the necessity of the fundamental revolution". This necessity, seen from Plekhanov's view of the merging of necessity and freedom, is a product of the most stringent exercising of human mind on reality.³² It is important, in our view, that if a revolution is to be fundamental it must be a product of human beings' authentic perception conception of reality - including themselves. Only through exercising of the minds in existential projects can human beings be said to be involved in transforming reality as human beings.

The proletariat, the class which Marx conceives as "called forth" is only minimally conscious of its task. In fact it seems more correct to say that the proletariat's conscious and therefore decided task, is no more than to rid themselves of disadvantages of the time. For this reason, we find the following view of Marx more precise, namely:

The proletariat is compelled as proletariat to abolish itself and thereby its opposite, private property, which determines its existence and which makes it proletariat ...³³

The preciseness of this quotation lies in the fact that it points out what is truly possible within the individuality of the proletariat. Alienated and dehumanized by the iron-logic of

capitalism, the proletariat do not seem to us to have capability for consciously perceiving their universality and that classes simultaneously. This lack of capability for consciously perceiving their universality and that of other classes is evident in the writings of Marx. Luis Dupre recognizes this feature in the writings of Marx, and says that:

...Marx had never attributed philosophical significance to the ideas actually existing among proletarians. The proletariat, he had written, represents the negation of philosophy qua philosophy. The proletarian class lacks all insight into its own universality, including the one that will be required for accomplishing its future task.³⁴

Whereas it is possible for this messianic class, the proletariat, to accomplish a revolution without too much philosophizing, we doubt if it could do so without insights into its own universality. That the lack of insight extends to the task of accomplishing a fundamental revolution makes the problem greater. We are led to conceive a human individuality involved in radical transformation without consciousness of the radicality of its activity. Such an individuality does not have one fundamental attribute requisite for real revolution consciousness of the possibilities and, therefore, freedom.

The lack of freedom of possibilities means that "the social-economic factor" is "the sole effective agent" at the stage of history. Marx's conception of the human individuality at the historical stage of transition from capitalism is such that it is plausible to attribute revolution to the social-economic factor as capable of leading to a higher human individuality is

certainly a radical conception of reality. Marx comprehends this radical element in his conception, and observes that:

... Only at a few decisive moments in history does the structure simply break the superstructure which it has gradually built up over the years, sometimes over the centuries. Only in the final stage of the capitalist epoch, the proletariat revolution, can we consider the social-economic factor the sole effective agent of history.³⁵

The question that arises here is: does "the final stage of capitalist epoch" have an inevitable logic towards a society of higher individuality? This question leads us to the evolutionary conception of the demise of capitalism.

In the evolutionary conception of capitalism's demise, there is an explicit relegation of consciousness and choice to a non-issue level. For example, Marx argues that:

To the degree that large industry comes to depend less on labour time and on the amount of labour employed than on the power of agencies set in motion during labour time, whose "powerful effectiveness" is itself in turn out of all proportion to the direct labour time spent on their production, but depends rather on the general state of science and on the progress of technology, or the application of this science to production... As soon as labour in the direct form has ceased to be the great wellspring of wealth, labour-time ceases and must cease to be its measure, and hence exchange (must cease to be the measure) of use value. The free development of individualities, and hence not surplus labor, of society to a minimum, which then development of the individuals in the time set free, and with the means created for all of them.³⁶

Evidently Marx conceives the forces that bring about change as social-economic. Labor time ceases to be the measure of value; the surplus labor of the mass cease to be a condition for the

development of general wealth; and free time comes into reality, not by the conscious choice of the human beings. The rendering of certain realities such as labor time null and void is accomplished by forces set in motion by human beings, but quite beyond their control. There is a problem here. Marx talks of "The free development of individualities" as if it necessarily follows from transcendence of labor time as a condition for wealth. In our view, there is no guarantee that the transcendence of labor time as a measure of use value is followed by free development of human individualities.

There are many possibilities which the transcendence of capital's facets such as labour time, surplus labor and exchange value point to. Unless it is granted that the development of productive forces involves progressive, and not regressive, growth of the human essence it is difficult to conceive of higher individualities arising from social-economic forces. For this reason we find Habermas argument that "the norms which govern our intersubjective activity must exist before the speaking subjects which actualize them³⁷ plausible. We agree with Habermas further, in his view that:

Atomized individuals in a presocial situation would be incapable of coming together to make a sort of contract claiming universal validity.³⁸

Marx conceives the human beings in capitalism as without individual dimension although very much involved in production of wealth.³⁹ The lack of individual dimension in capitalism means that human beings are no more or less than spokes in the wheel of production.

The transcendence of capital's dehumanizing facets such as labour time, can lead to forestalling of agitation for revolution. As Herbert Marcuse argues, the satisfaction of material needs of human beings in mature capitalism is accompanied by ideological justification of that satisfaction.⁴⁰ In this case, if it is argued that the social conditions ultimately determine human consciousness, there is left no reason for revolution by the rational ordering of the social-economic aspects of reality. In other words, Marx's conception of human beings in capitalism as lacking in human dimension militates against the possibility of capitalism's demise.

If, however, it is granted that there is a potent human dimension operative in capitalism, it seems to us that Marx's arguments for the inevitability of a proletariat revolution are fatally undermined. A potent human dimension means that individuals are able to exercise their sense of judgment and act accordingly. The problem of judgment and action is essentially a problem of right and clear perception of reality. Thus Bertell Ollman observes:

... our 'values' are all attached to what we take to be the 'facts', and, could not be what they are apart from the ... each includes the other and is part of what is meant by the other's concept.⁴¹

Seen in this light, the ability to judge reality correctly is simultaneously the ability to comprehend reality. Ollman's argument that the inseparability of 'fact' from 'value' leads to the merging of necessity and freedom does not, however, boost the arguments for the proletariat's individuality as able to transcend capitalism. The merging of necessity and freedom is a consequence of clear and right judgement, a condition which is scarcely present in proletariations.

The conception of human individuality in capitalism as without human dimension must grant one fact if it has to postulate any transcendence: the ability of individual human beings to transcend their socio-economic reality. Such a fact cannot be granted by Marx's social conception of the human individuality, because it amounts to outright denial of truth to a conception of man in exclusive social terms.

It is our view, nevertheless, that human beings as conceived by Marx in the transition from capitalism to socialism are incapable of an authentic, and as he says, fundamental revolution. We shall now try to see how the conception of human individuality in capitalism and in the transition from capitalism is reflected in communism.

3. Communism

Communism is the social system that follows the demise of capitalism. It is, in Marx's view, the ultimate goal of human history and involves the crystallization of the social essence as the most significant attribute of men. Marx defines communism as:

The act of positing the negation of the negation, and is therefore a real, necessary phase for the next period of historical development in the emancipation and recovery of mankind.⁴²

Thus, while the proletariats negate the bourgeois and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat, communism is the negation of the proletariat. Marx regards the negation of the proletariat as representing 'the positive supersession of private property'. Moreover, he regards it as 'the positive supersession of all estrangement'.⁴³ Marx conceives human individuality in communism as liberated from the necessities of material kind, and posed to

self-realization.⁴⁴ In the "1844 Manuscripts" Marx writes about human beings who are totally restored to human beings, and the anguishing abyss between individual and society, necessity and freedom, transcended.

Elsewhere, in the "Theses on Feuerbach," Marx proclaims that the human essence is not an abstract, inherent element in each individual, but the ensemble of social relations. We saw in section (1) that Marx comprehends human essence in capitalism as alienated. Although Marx obstinately refuses to use the term essence to point to an element inherent in all human beings, it seems to us that the essence of the individuality is a quality inherent in all human beings. Thus, Lucien Seve interprets Marx thus:

When it is said that 'the individual is the social being', this means that, even though 'we must avoid postulating "society" again as an abstraction vis-a-vis the individual, that the social being is not different from the individual and that the individual is therefore 'the totality'.⁴⁵

The realization of social being is understood by Marx to be accompanied by the withering away of the state, religion and law. The withering away of these institutions results from the harmonization of the human individuality with the rest of the universe. In terms of human interrelationships, it means that individual human interests are also social interest. In other words, it means that in each individual's interests lie the interest of other human beings. Thus Marx argues that communism is a stage in which:

(Individuals) are not indifferent to one another, so that individual B, as objectified in the commodity, is a need of individual A, and vice versa; so that they stand not only in an equal, but also in a social relation to one another ... The fact that this need

on the part of one can be satisfied by the product of the other, and that each confronts the other as owner of the object of the other needs, this proves that each of them reaches beyond his particular need as a human being, and that they relate to one another as human beings, that their common species-being ... is acknowledged by all.⁴⁶

There is, thus, a consistent view in Marx's writings that the individual human essence realizes itself as a social essence in communism.

Simple as Marx's conception of a human individuality in harmony with the other human beings' needs seems, there is a problem. Are we to understand Marx to mean that the individual in working to satisfy his needs also satisfies other human beings' needs? Or, are we to take other beings and serves them accordingly? Perhaps from an uncritical reading these two interpretations seem to mean just one thing, which they don't. Let us try to look at each of them more closely.

The interpretation that in working to satisfy his needs, the individual consequentially serves other human beings' needs means the individual is primary. It means, moreover, that the social dimension of the human individuality is the result of, rather than the root of, human existence. It means that the reaching beyond particular need (viz', beyond self-interest), is an unintended result of the individual's actions. This interpretation would mean that social relations, which Marx conceives as human essence, would remain secondary to certain selfish interests. We shall come back to this view later after examining the second interpretation of Marx's individual-social harmony.

The view that the individual enhance his essence by holding other human beings as supreme value and, therefore, serving them for his own satisfaction means that social relations are of primary value to the individual. This certainly is what Marx intended in his conception of social relations as the essence of human being. We think that so long as it is possible for an individual to perceive all human beings as the highest value to be served, this conception of Marx is commendable. In concrete terms, the view that human beings are the supreme value for human being means that the individual finds the highest meaning for his life in enhancing and maintaining that high value.⁴⁷ It means, ultimately, that all other things that do not serve this high value are of lesser importance to the individual.

It seems to us that for the individual to hold other human beings as the highest value, certain things must happen first. First and foremost, all human beings must transform themselves into equally productive workers. Second to that is that human beings must be able to perceive human individuality as the highest value to be served with the sole aim of the meaningfulness and joy arising from the activity. The first condition which we deem necessary for the attainment of the communistic individuality is expressed by Marx in the following words of Seve:

It is 'the development of the social individual which appears as the great foundation stone of production and wealth' and that the forces of production and social relations' are 'two different sides of the development of the social individual', ...⁴⁸

The Marxian argument is that there is a dialectical relationship between the individual and the social conditions. This dialectical relationship means that in developing his productive

ability the individual transforms his essence. Thus what we take as two conditions for a communistic human individuality are for Marx inseparable. For Marx, the historical process of development of production and wealth is intricately linked with the development of human beings. Thus Marx argues:

By ... acting on the external world for changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature. He develops his slumbering powers and compels them to act in obedience to his sway.⁴⁹

While it is true that in "acting on the external world and changing it", human beings develop their productive ability, this development does not necessarily seem to us to lead to the transformation of individuals. It is possible that the real dialectic between human beings and productive forces is restricted to few individuals. In disputing the link between the individual and productive forces, we agree with the view of Marcuse that:

... the administrative suppression of the economic structures of monopolistic exploitation is a necessary but not sufficient condition of liberation. For the revolution to succeed, a properly philosophical appreciation of the essential structures of concrete individual experience is also required.⁵⁰

Indeed, throughout history there has been a segment of human beings whose role in the transformation of nature has been largely passive, rather than active. Marx refers to this segment of human beings when he talks of unfreedom and alienation of human beings in capitalism. In the high division of labour, and the treadmill which is entailed, human individuality is not transformed positively. So much that the result is not a fuller or enhanced individuality, but a degraded appendage of the machinery of production.

The stage in social history when human beings are liberated from shackles of labor time, exchange value and from being appendages of the machinery of production, does not necessarily lead to a human individuality in harmony with society. In our view that only accentuates the distinctions between human beings: on the one hand the active, inventive individuality and, on the other hand, the passive, receptive individuality. Drawing of implications of this distinction on the Marxian conception of human individuality is our next task.

Individuality: Active, Inventive and Passive, Receptive

This is the end to which the analysis of Marx's conception of human individuality has led us. For it seems to us that throughout human history there have been these two kinds of individualities. In capitalism Marx denies the reality of an active, inventive individuality, capable of fundamentally affecting history. The lack of freedom and choice in capitalism is such as to lead Marx to the conception of change as resulting from the inevitable development of forces of capital - (with the proletarian and bourgeoisie as forces of capital).

Marx, it seems to us, sees human being in entirely social-historical perspective, and as a result explained passive, receptive individuality as characteristic of the epochs of capitalistic nature.⁵¹ The vision which Marx describes in the German Ideology, of a man who herds cattle, goes fishing, and criticizes poetry over dinner, without being bound for life to any of them, ⁵¹ is the contrast being as envisioned by Marx is an individuality that is active and creative.

The claim that there is no free, active, creative individuality in capitalism is, however, dubious. The same fate befalls the view that the transcendence of the power of capital, as manifested in labour time, exchange value and so forth, leads to a free, active and creative individuality. An epoch may be riddled with material problems or it may be without much material problems, but in neither case does that straightaway lead to a particular human individuality. Within the capitalistic, as well as the communistic epoch, active, creative individualities and passive, receptive individualities exist. In our view it is not the transformation of material conditions per se that determines human individuality. Individual human beings, in their conception and transformation of reality are determiners of their individualities. Poor conception of reality is inextricably linked to very little transformation of reality and the individual.

The communistic work ethic, spelled out in the words, : From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs,⁵³ is an attempt to assert the primacy of the social essence, over and above the individual dimension of human being. This ethic, however, has an inherent tendency to lead to social regression.⁵⁴ For if ability is not any longer the criterion for human living, it is possible that human beings will choose the easiest. Of course, there will also be some human beings who will prefer to strive to activate all their abilities. It seems to us that Marx assumes in his view of human individuality a premise that there comes a stage in history when all human beings find work satisfying and conceive their relationships as the highest value.

The premise explained leads to the communistic individuality. The view is, however, untenable outside the conception of capitalism as fated by its own operation to a demise.

We need not repeat here that neither socio-economic transformations nor proletariat consciousness seem to us to point unwaveringly to communism. While in the capitalism of Marx's day material impoverishment, or stated in another way, socio-economic conditions were a possible reason for a perception of inevitableness, it seems that capitalism has removed that condition. Not only has need as a basis for ethic been struck off, there has also arisen a discriminative process in opportunities of work. Consequently, there has arisen a more passive, receptive segment of mankind than history ever known,⁵⁵

The passivity and receptivity of a large section of society in mature capitalism is epitomized in what has been called 'one-dimensional man'. There is high satisfaction of material needs, but hardly any positive growth in human beings' spiritual stature. This means that the communistic individuality which Marx posits from capitalism does not, in fact, arise. Instead, there flourishes a mass culture in which workers and the unemployed and unemployable are offered fulfilment, instead of being left to strive for it.⁵⁶

We repeat, therefore, that the uniqueness which Marx attributes to the proletariat, viz. consciousness of the evils of private property, is progressively obliterated by the forces of capitalism. Without the intelligence to perceive evil and patience to devise suitable ways for eliminating it, the proletariats do not seem capable of transforming themselves into higher individualities.

History, it seems to us, is a product of active and creative human individualities at the root. Only active, inventive individuals hold the key to a higher individuality. We concur with D.H. Lawrence, therefore, who argues that:

A change is a slow flux, which must happen bit by bit ... You can't drive it like a steam engine. But all the time you can be alert and intelligent about it, and watch for the next step, and watch for the direction of the main trend. Patience, alertness; intelligence, and a human good will and fearlessness, that is what you want in a time of change. Not Funk.⁵⁷

The qualities listed in this quotation are, we think, paramount for a truly fundamental revolution of the magnitude conceived by Marx in the overthrow of capitalism. These are qualities which only active creative human beings have and can have. Important here is the fact that Lawrence places the functioning of human mind in the forefront. This view agrees with our earlier emphasis on the importance of clear and right judgement in Marx's quest for an authentic revolution. Unfortunately, let us repeat here, the proletariat does not have these qualities. Moreover, the transcendence of such realities of capital as labour time, exchange, and need for surplus labour per se does not lead to a universal individuality with qualities of active creativity. The passive, respective individuality, largely determined by forces from outside, is lacking in spiritual qualities such as intelligence and self-motivated drive for creation and enhancement of values. In other words, they are lacking in the transcendent dimension of being human. Marx comprehended transcendent dimension of human individuality to arise from the overthrow of capitalism, which in fact does not seem to be the case.

The transcendent dimension of human being is a reality whose denial leads to a state that Lawrence terms as "funk". In conclusion we quote Ernst Bloch, whose view we share strongly. He says:

The subject factor here represents our inexhaustible capacity to change the course of things; and the objective factor is the world's inexhaustible potentiality to undergo change ... The subjective potency coincides not only with the forces which alter the direction of history but also with that which realizes itself in history - and this coincidence increases as men become the conscious producers of their history. Similarly the objective potency coincides not only with what is changeable but also with what realizes itself in history; and here again this coincidence increases as the external world - outside of man comes more and more into mediation with man.⁵⁸ (My italics)

A human being is more than a social being. The social environment provides the background against which man in his individual striving goes about performing his existential projects. Although the capacity to "change the course of things" is human, it is exercised in varying ways and with varying consequences.

We will in our next chapter try to look at one existential project of man - technology - with the aim of developing the criticism of the social individual further.

Notes

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4. D. Howard, The Marxian Legacy, Macmillan Press Ltd.: London, 1977, p.140.
5. A. Rand, Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, New American Library: New York, 1964, p.18.
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7. L. K. Dupre, Marx's Social Critique of Culture, Yale University/Haven Press; New Haven, 1983, p.185.
8. K. Marx, 'The 1844 Manuscripts', in Early writings ed. Livingstone and Benton, Vintage Books: New York, 1975 p.289.
9. Ibid.
10. L. Seve, Man in Marxist Theory and the Psychology of Personality, trans. J. McGreal, The Harvester Press: Sussex, 1978, p.106.
11. Ibid., p.322-334.
12. Ibid., p.298.
13. B. Ollman, Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society, Cambridge university: Cambridge, 1971, p.14.
14. Marx and Engles, op. cit., p.58.
15. Quoted in Seve, op. cit., p.104.
16. Ibid.
17. M. Schoolman, The Imaginary Witness: The Critical Theory of Herbert Marcuse, quoted in R. Kearney, Movements in European Philosophy, Manchester University Press: Manchester, 1986, p.206.
18. I suggest to the reader a perusal of Rand, op cit.
19. Marx, "The 1844 Manuscripts", op cit., p.345.

20. K. Marx, Grundrisse: Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, Pelican Books: London, 1973, in Dupre, op cit., p.211.
21. The reader can consult A. Rand, "The Goal of My Writing", The Romantic Manifesto, New American Library: New York 1975 ed.
22. K. Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, vol.I Progress Publishers: Moscow, 1963 cited in Seve, op cit., p.73.
23. Howard, op cit., p.100.
24. For detailed arguments on this point, our reader can consult E. Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, Jonathan Cape: London, 1973.
25. Marx, "The 1844 Manuscripts", op cit., p.327.
26. A. Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness, New American Library: New York, 1964, p.23.
27. Marx, and Engels, op cit., p.26.
28. Ibid.
29. Marx, Capital, vol.II, trans. So. Moore and E. Aveling, Progress Publishers: Moscow, 1951, p.300.
30. G. Plekhanov, Fundamentals of Marxism, Lawrence Wishart: London, 1969, p.96.
31. Marx and Engels, op cit., p.141.
32. It is generally accepted that freedom is enhanced when man has a wide range of alternatives. With a comprehensive grasp of reality freedom and necessity tend to merge.
33. Marx, Collected Works, 4:36, cited in Dupre, op. cit., p.71.
34. Ibid.
35. K. Marx, "The xviii Brumaire", Selected Works, 1:250-51, ibid. p.195.
36. Marx, Grundrisse, pp.492-493, ibid. p.195.
37. Howard, op. cit., pp.129-300.
38. Ibid., p.130.
39. This is implicit in all the writings of Marx, more emphatically the later works.

40. H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, Beacon Press: New York 1964, p.8.
41. Ollman, op. cit., p.61.
42. Marx, "The 1844 Manuscripts", op. cit., p.348.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Marx, Grundrisse, p.712, Seve, op. cit., p.92.
46. Ibid., p.263, cited in Dupre, op. cit., p.211.
47. Our reader can consult L. Segundo, Faith and Ideolies, Orbis Books: Maryknoll, 1985, for a more incisive treatment of the dimension of values in human existence.
48. Seve, op. cit., p.92.
49. Marx and Engels, op. cit., p.56.
50. Kearney, op. cit., p.206.
51. Marx does not use the terms "passive" and "receptive" in his writings, but they are implicit in his view that human beings in capitalism are no more that instruments of capital.
52. Marx and Engels, op. cit., p.27.
53. Ibid., p.70.
54. For more comprehensive arguments on this point consult A. Rand, Capitalism
55. Marcuses and Fromm share this view on mankind in present industrialized societies.
56. B. Russel, "In praise of Idleness", in Socialist Humanism, ed. E. Fromm, Allen Lane: London, 1967, pp.229-236.
57. D.H. Lawrence, Selected Essays, Penguins Books,: Middlesex, 1986, p.97.
58. Kearney, op. cit., p.124.

CHAPTER FOUR

MARX'S QUEST FOR A HUMANIZED TECHNOLOGY

Contemporary human individuality in capitalism and socialism seems more alienated and hardly with real self-esteem. The alienation and lack of self-esteem, in spite of technological advancement and material abundance, is confounding. Scholars have advanced a number of explanations for the confounding anthropological reality.

Some scholars explain this alienation and lack of self-esteem as a consequence of the alienating nature of technology.¹ Karl Marx, on the other hand, explains the paradox of spiritual impoverishment amidst sophisticated, abundant wealth as a consequence of private property.² This explanation of Marx, however, seems to have been overtaken by trend of history. History furnishes us with ample evidence to show that the problem of human individuality is not entirely rooted in the institution of private property.

Marx conceives technology under bourgeois institution of private property as a tool that aggravates distinctions between human beings on material lines.³ Moreover, he perceives in the capitalistic methods of production alienation of the human individuality.⁴ In his extensive arguments Marx points out that private property sanctions the use of technology for selfish interests and values. The selfish usage of technology, in Marx's view, denies human being qua human being access to technology and

created wealth. Further, Marx argues that, the whole machinery of production in capitalism enslaves the worker, dictating the pace and mode of his existence.⁵

We argue that the progressive perfection of technology is not necessarily linked to alienation of human essence. Technology is, in fact, a manifestation of individual choice and action to enhance life essence. It is, more precisely, a means to an end. In so far as human beings use technology to achieve their ends, it is not alienating. In our view, alienation arises only when technology is improperly conceived by individual human beings.

Thus, we continue our argument, that the individual through the use of his cognitive faculty can overcome alienation (and spiritual impoverishment). We argue that in so far as any individual chooses not to exercise his cognitive faculty, advances in technology can only lead to more alienation. We start by examining Marx's conception of technology.

a) Marx's Social Conception of Technology

To what extent is technology a social reality? Karl Marx answers this question in two ways:-

- i) With reference to mankind in capitalism, and
- ii) With reference to mankind in post-capitalism.
- iii) In capitalism technology is not a means to the enhancement of the social essence.⁶ Instead, technology is instrumental in antagonizing and violently stifling the

social essence of man.⁷ Since the social essence is the sole and supreme essence for man,⁸ the unsocial use of technology in capitalism is inhuman.

Marx uses the two terms "unsocial" and "inhuman" as synonyms. By "unsocial" Marx means a state of reality in which man is obstructed from relating to other men as human being. He uses the term frequently to refer to the capitalist and the proletariat, who relate to each other as means for the realization of private goals and values.⁹ The unsocial nature of the dealings are in Marx's view antagonistic to human essence, and are therefore inhuman. Marx consistently denounces private interest as inhuman.¹⁰ In the sixth thesis on Feuerbach, Marx argues that man's essence is his social relationships.¹¹ This is the essence which capitalism's use of technology and private accumulation of wealth does not serve. He argues:

Within the capitalist system all methods for raising the social productiveness of labour are brought about at the cost of individual labourer; all means for the development of production transform themselves into means of domination over, and exploitation of the producers; they mutilate the labourer into a fragment of a man, degrade him to the level of an appendage of a machine, destroy every remnant of charm in his work and turn it into hated toil... they transform his lifetime into working-time and drag his wife and child beneath the wheels of the juggernaut of capital.¹²

This quotation is evidently a pointer to Marx's view that technology in capitalism antagonizes and stifles human essence—the ensemble of social relationships. Marx conceives the antagonization as resulting entirely from the machinery of production, and the institution of property ownership. Here we are presented with a description of the destructiveness of

capitalistic mode of production. Elsewhere we are told that the institution of private property sanctions this destructiveness as 'The right of property'.¹³

In Marx's view the right of property, by sanctioning the primacy of self-interest, creates a situation whereby "other men (are) not the realization but the limitation of their own freedom."¹⁴

In Marx's view technology, in so far as it is private property, functions to aggravate the intensity and the extent of the alienation of human essence.¹⁵ Marx conceives the alienation of human essence as taking the form of material estrangement and species alienation, among others.¹⁶ The central notion about alienation in Marx's conception is that social relations, which in his view is the human essence, are relegated to a secondary place at best and at worst to naught.¹⁷

Nevertheless, Marx conceives the expansion and perfection of technology, like other productive forces, as important, for two reasons:

1. Without it only want is made general, and with want all the struggle for necessities and all the old filthy business would necessarily be reproduced.
2. Only with this universal development of productive forces is a universal intercourse between men established, which produces in all nations simultaneously the phenomenon of the propertyless mass ...¹⁸

Thus despite the fact that the sophisticated machinery of capitalistic production alienates the essence of human beings, it slowly abolishes necessity and makes universal intercourse

possible. Notwithstanding the violation and alienation of that which Marx conceives as the essence of human beings, the productive forces, particularly technology, demand and develop human productive abilities. So that instead of a fully integrated human being, Marx argues, there is only homo faber.¹⁹ Marx thinks that the methods of production is capitalism' "transform his (the individual's) life-time into working-time."²⁰ Homo faber as a term carries with it the meaning of emotional involvement in the work process. The human individuality that Marx conceives is, in our view, less than a homo faber. He says:

(The capitalist) as capitalist ... is only capital personified. His soul is the soul of capital. Except as personified capital, the capitalist has no historical value, and no right to historical existence ... If, therefore, the proletarian is but a machine for production of surplus - value (then on the other hand, the capitalist is ... only a machine for the conversion of this surplus - value).²¹

This is more emphatically brought out in Das Kapital. Here Marx conceives human beings in largely social terms - abstract social persons', that are no more than their role in the production machinery. Thus the individual as a human being is non-existent in Marx's conception of capitalism. Marx conceives capitalism as an epoch in which 'the productive forces take on a form' that is "indifferent to the intercourse of individuals as individuals".²²

What these arguments of Marx mean is that in capitalism there is a negligible dimension of social relations among human beings. Instead, there is an overwhelming inhuman power, all rolled up in the machinery of capitalism. The fact that human beings are

rolled up in the machinery of capitalism means that neither the proletariat nor the bourgeois can stop the gallop towards a historical resolution of contradictions in the human essence.²³ Apart from the fact that human beings are too immersed in capitalism to act humanly, they are also alienated from themselves. Thus Marx points out that

... the productive forces appear as a world for themselves, quite independent of and divorced from the individuals. ... the reason is that the individuals, whose forces they are, exist split up and in opposition to one another ...²⁴

Focused on our subject, we can say that technology appears to human beings as a independent, objective reality, that is not amenable to human beings' vicissitudes and feelings. What this implies is that individual human beings, capitalist or proletariat, inventor or user, conceive technology as a reality over which they have no control and to which they have to submit. Such a conception is not without its justification and indeed seems to us quite tenable. To grasp the problem properly, we have to pose it in a different way. For the problem of technology appearing independent of human beings is ultimately the problem of whether or not technology is neutral. That is to say, whether it can serve human beings not by its own logic, but by a logic of their choice.

Perhaps the question of whether technology has its own logic should be answered in historical terms - as Marx answers it.

Technology appears to have its own logic to human beings in capitalism, but not beyond that epoch. Since we are here dealing with capitalism, it seems quite reasonable to leave out the epoch that follows. Suffice it to observe here that technology is by

definition a means to facilitate human life. In so far as it is utilized to serve consciously chosen human values it is good.

Technology, however, assumes the form of a determinant when and where the individual is lacking in cognition and ethical judgement. Then, technology dictates the individual's whole existence. This phenomenon, referred to by Erich Fromm as 'technomania', is a common feature in capitalism.²⁵ The crux of technomania is that human beings conceive their own activities as technological efficacy.²⁶ In other words, the particular use of technology is considered to be justified by the fact that it is possible. In capitalism, for example, technology is used to promote private property, and in Marx's view to aggravate the proletarian's misery, with the justification that it is in the nature of technology to do that. Marx conceives human beings in capitalism as incapable of seeing through the illusion of objective, independent reality.

We will now turn to Marx's conception of technology in communism. Since the foregoing has been mainly criticisms of productive forces in capitalism, this next survey of Marx will hopefully give us his positive contributions regarding the concept of human being and technology.

ii) In communism Marx conceives technology as socialized;²⁷ meaning that it is an instrument in enhancing human beings' essence - social relations. This social conception of technology is expressed as early as 1844, when Marx says that, in:

... a production activity in which we are human beings,

1. In my production I would have objectified the specific character of my individuality ...
2. In your use ... I would have the immediate satisfaction and knowledge that in my labour I had gratified a human need, ...
3. I would have acted for you as the mediator between you and the species, thus I would be acknowledged by you as the competent complement of your own being, as an essential part of yourself. I would thus know myself to be confirmed both in thoughts and your love.
4. In the individual expression of my own immediate expression of your life, and so in my individual activist, I would have directly confirmed and realized my authentic nature, my human communal nature.²⁸

Expressed in our own words, Marx conceives the activity of inventing and using technology as motivated by the communal nature of each human being. And it seems that social relations which have only a secondary place in capitalism, are here given primacy in the individual's productive activities. It is possible however, to interpret Marx to mean that in communism exercising productive abilities is individual and social simultaneously. This would mean that we avoid positioning one or the other as given primacy by Marx. This interpretation would presume, of course, that most aspects of social reality are completely transformed.

The withering away of the state, law, and religion will come about when human beings, en masse, appropriate their alienated social essence. Marx assumes, needless to say, that the development of human beings productive abilities is accompanied by en masse development of consciousness of human essence.²⁹ The assumption underlies the argument that human beings attain higher

individuality, not by reflecting, but by praxis, and is central to Marx's anthropology. Involved in the concept of praxis is the inseparable dialectics of consciousness and reality.³⁰ We can say, therefore, that human beings through praxis develop nature." Marx did not abandon this view in his later writings. If anything, he laboured throughout to clarify it from various perspectives. Thus Bertell Ollman observes that:

Marx's conception of man's powers and of power is required for their realization provides the basis for his claim that man's activity (work, creativity) must be done with others, and, consequently that he is a social being (...). A scientist who spends his lifetime in a laboratory may delude himself that his lifetime is a modern version of Robinson Crusoe, but the material of his activity and the apparatus and skills which he operates are social products. They are inerasable signs of the co-operation which binds men together. The very language in which a scientist thinks has been learned in a particular society.³¹

The concept of the individuality in communism is of men fully conscious of their social essence as the most significant essence. They are conscious of the unshakable indeed pleasant, bond that exists between themselves with other human beings. It seems to us that the individuality in communism gets its ability to invent and use technology, not as self-motivated acts but as simple appropriation of what other human beings have created. Further, it seems that Ollman, in trying to emphasize the reality of the social essence, does not keep in mind the obvious differences between invention and appropriation.

The Marxian view, which Ollman expresses strongly, is that the communistic individuality knows technology and other productive

forces as social through and through. This social nature of technology is realized in the communistic individual, who does not have individualistic, egoistic conception of his essence. Marx conceives the socialization of technology as a remedy to the inhuman, independent appearance which it assumes in capitalistic modes of production. The argument behind this view is that as a socialized reality, technology loses the appearance of a reality over which human beings have no control. In place of a reified technology one finds a technology that is an expression of all human beings ability to invent and, in its accessible nature, to that a reality of social value primarily.

We have no doubts about the radical nature of the communistic individuality. What we find nagging our minds is the possibility of such an individuality being realized, and with it the truth in the conception of technology as tout court a social reality. We will not repeat here our arguments against the possibility of such an individuality. We will, however, point out that in our view technology is primarily an individualistic activity and, only secondarily social. In the next part of this chapter we will try to argue in support of this position, viz the primacy of individualism in technology.

b) The individualistic Dimension of Technology

As a preamble to a study of the individualistic dimension we quote Ayn Rand, who is an avowed proponent of egoism and rationality both issues here. She argues that:

A process of thought is an enormously complex process of identification and integration, which only an individual mind

can perform. There is no such thing as a collective brain. Men can learn from one another, but learning requires a process of thought on the part of every individual student. Men can co-operate in the discovery of new knowledge, but such co-operation requires the independent exercise of his rational faculty by every individual scientist.³²

In other words, which technology is to be constituted for satisfying certain needs is not an open secret. There is a mandatory requirement for striving on the part of human beings. A human being has the freedom to exercise his rational faculty in inventing and using technology or to be content with using existing inventions. The choice between inventing and using already constituted technology is a choice between long, hard work that involves a clear set end to be realized, and quick, easy work that involves less creativity - if any at all.

Thus, while we agree with Ollman in observing that the scientist uses skills and material, not excepting the language in which he thinks, constituted by other human being, we would follow it up with Ollman's own argument that:

Expressing what he knows as well as how he knows it, Marx's concepts tell us much more (often), much less (sometimes), and much different (always) than we think they do.³³

The individual has the freedom to exercise his mind to a certain extent. He can transcend the known universe or remain within it. So that in spite of the truth about the social dimension of technology, that dimension is not the sole essence of human beings. In fact, the social facility technology seems to us to

be a result of the universality of the human species, rather than being a reality of conscious human aspirations. Human beings in their aspirations are individualistic, seeking to satisfy selfish interests by either passively or actively appropriating that reality.³⁴ We do not therefore agree with Marx who argues that:

It is superfluous to add that men are not free to choose their productive forces - which are the basis for their history - for every productive force is an acquired force, the product of former activity.³⁵

The human individuality seems, in our view, to be so constituted that freedom is an inescapable fact. The process of history seems to develop and clarify the facticity of freedom. Thus Erich Fromm observes:

Even taking into account the main controversial views about the nature of instinct, it is generally accepted that the higher an animal has risen in the stages of evolution, the less is the weight of stereotyped behaviour patterns that are strictly determined and phylogenetically programmed in brain.³⁶

Following from the above argument of Fromm is the fact that the human individuality that Marx conceives as without freedom is certainly free. That freedom is not, in our view, destroyed by the capitalistic productive forces. On the contrary, the capitalistic mode of production especially advanced capitalism, make the reality of freedom so glaring, that many individuals are anguished by the avenues of action. There are so many gadgets, which are supposed to be means to one end, but infact each variety carries with it particular consequences and excluded other consequences. Fromm commenting on this reality says:

Capitalism has been disastrous in this regard: far from solving the problem of man's alienation, it worsens it immeasurably in many ways. (...) capitalism and individualism thrust upon man unprecedented freedom that was "bound to create a deep feeling of insecurity, powerlessness, doubt, aloneness, and anxiety."³⁷

We shall see later the consequence which deduces from the working of capitalism. At the moment it suffices to emphasize the reality of freedom in inventing and using technology. Marx debunks any notion of human freedom in capitalism, because he conceives the primacy of individualistic interests as a negation of the social essence. In other words, Marx conceives self-interest that is protract in capitalism, as amoral and inherently destructive of the humane dimension of man.

Yet, in our view, individualistic interests are not necessarily a negation of the social essence. Indeed it seems that the social essence arises only as a consequence of individualistic interests. For this reason a scientist engaged for hours in trying to invent something is, through his egoistic goal and value, enabling other human beings to have access to the same goal and value. The primary aim, motive, value is, nevertheless, individualistic.

The intent and use of technology is based on exercising of individual volition. At the level of inventing, one can either choose to invent or not at all. Thus, Galt, a character in Rand's novel argues:

A being of volitional consciousness has no automatic course of behaviour. He needs a code of values to guide his actions. Value is that which one acts to gain and keep, virtue is the action by which one gains

and keeps it. 'Value presupposes an answer to the question of value to whom and for what? 'Value' action in the face of an alternative. Where there are no alternatives no values are possible.³⁸

For Marx 'the question of value to whom and for what? is only characteristic of the capitalistic individuality. A higher individuality of human being should not, in Marx's view, attach to his invention a demand of something in return. In other words, the relationship of men at this stage is based on spiritual values rather than material values. Erich Fromm seems to express Marx's view on the issue more precisely. He says:

The principle underlying capitalist society and the principle of love are incompatibilities ... in essence, all human beings are identical. We are all part of one; we are One. This being so, it should not make a difference whom we love.³⁹

In our view, this argument is similar to that of Marx, according to which authentic human individuality ought to relate to all human beings qua human beings, and not for self-interest. Self-interest is used by Marx to refer to activities and attitudes that do not take into account the well-being of other human being. The possibility of a selfless human individuality seems, to us, to be very remote. However much we try to play down the reality of individualism, it seems that it cannot be totally muzzled without the grave consequences of social regression. This consequence arises from the fact that it is the individual in his self-interest who constitutes social reality. Social relations are primarily affected by the aims, goals and values which the individual chooses to realize.

The link of dependence of social relations on the aims and values cherished by the individual means that it is the development of human beings in their individual capacities which must have priority, not social relations. It means for example, that in capitalism the right to property is an expression of the individual's control over the fruits of his striving. Whether or not the individual puts his invention or product at the disposal of other human beings depends largely on self-interest, and not social interest. In the Marxian view, to the extent that self-interests are social in nature, viz. While serving other beings' interests the individual realizes the highest valued. In the second place, selfish interest are circumscribed around an individual's happiness and that of the loved ones. In this case other human beings gain access to it through their species abilities and needs. In the Marxian view the individual ought not to sell his product, because its target man qua man is always value - a supreme value. However Marx's position is found wanting in the access to a produce simply by virtue of species abilities and needs. The inventor or producer will demand a material value in return for access to his product.

The difference between the two, the Marxian ideal human being and the capitalistic human being does not negate the individualistic dimension of technology. The individualistic dimension of technology in communism strives to act in resonance with other human beings' feelings, needs and values. For this individuality, only by observing and subordinating all other interests to the social interests, does he find satisfaction and

meaning in life. In a perfect capitalist society, the individualistic dimension of technology demands material value from those who intend to use an invention. The question posed by Rand's Galt: "of value to who and for what?", is answered differently by the two individualities. The capitalistic individuality answers that an invention is of value to human beings who may need it and for this much in exchange. The communistic individuality answers that an invention is of value to all human beings, on condition that they are human beings. In simpler terms, there is no price that human beings have to pay for access to technology.

The point that emerges from this comparison is that in both the capitalistic and communistic human beings there is need for a value. It seems safe, on the basis of the perennial need for value by human beings, to concur with Berdyaev that:

Man is a being which estimates and defines quality. The definition of values and their arrangement in hierarchic order is a transcendental function of consciousness.⁴⁰

Wherewithal, then, does the danger of social regression lie in communism? Expressed more precisely, is it possible to find in the Marxian ideal human beings seeds of social regression?

(d) The Danger of Regression in Communism

It is paradoxical that we should talk of 'the danger of regression in communism - a stage in which Marx envisioned a

wholesome prosperity. The paradox is the more confounding when it is traced to the concept of human individuality.

The danger of regression is that it means the opposite of life: death. Social regression that is simply a mirroring of withdrawal in human beings' activities, can only result from antagonism of human individuality and social reality. In our view the danger of regression in communism arises from subordinating the individual to social demands that are not valuable to him. Granting our already expressed view that the human individuality is perpetually in need of an absolute value which motivates it to work, it must follow that there is a danger in accepting the principle that all human beings are one's supreme value.⁴¹ This principle is too general and, therefore, open to many interpretations, and refutations. Marx does not give any rational explanation for the variations and distinctions amongst human beings. This lack of explanation undermines the credibility of that central principle on which communism is based, namely the significance of the social essence over and above the individual.

While human beings in the primeval stage did accept and embrace quite many irrational notions, in advanced capitalism and communism there is less acceptance of the irrational. Thus we agree with Bergson that "intelligence has largely supplanted instinct." Earlier we saw Fromm's view that there is an undeniable evolution towards the use of reason in human existence. Marx endorses this view in his eight thesis on Feuerbach where he says that:

Social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which mislead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of the practice.⁴²

In view of this tendency towards demand for rational justification, communism seems to be in danger of its individuality rebelling against that principal tenet. Whichever form such a rebellion may take, it can certainly undermine the society's growth.

In view of this possibility it seems opportune to find out what kind of reality in human individuality is responsible for continued, meaningful striving. Luis Dupre says:

The question is ... whether unlimited growth is truly essential to the capitalist system and whether a shift in emphasis from the production of exchange to use value would destroy the operational coherence of the capitalist system. ⁴³

The point Dupre is making is that since communism requires the sustenance of the high level productiveness of capitalism, it is imperative to find out what reality underlies capitalism. Rand conceives the condition for sustained, high level productiveness as freedom. She says:

The same condition of freedom that is necessary in order to sustain a high level of industrial development - a high level of 'complexity' - is necessary in order to keep it. ⁴⁴

We deem this last view of Rand to link with the conception of human being as a value-seeking creature. Linked together it means that we conceive freedom to constitute and concretize values as a condition for sustained social growth for man.

Social growth in capitalism and, later, in communism, depends very much on the ability of human beings to invent and to use those inventions.⁴⁵ Freedom to constitute and concretize values means that human beings have inalienable right to choose the value which they receive in return for their inventions and products being used by human beings. In our view, the inventor, or producer, is bound by his nature to choose both spiritual and material value in return for his own product. Whether in capitalism or communism, it seems that a human being is bound by his biological nature to need material return for his own product. The biological nature of man is such that there are material needs which can only be satisfied in an individual and other men. The Spiritual value for which a human being gives his product is often intertwined with a material value that may be an act or object. All authentic relationships between human beings involve spiritual values. But the spiritual values are not unconditional; rather they are a consequence of definite, inspiring qualities of a particular individual.

The danger which communism faces arises from the denial of the limitedness of spiritual values. The denial is expressed in the view that all human beings be conceived as the supreme value for the communistic individuality. It must outrightly be pointed out to involve deception on the part of any human being trying to exist by it. Consequently, communism can prosper, so long as this deception is not realized in the view that an inventor, a vagrant and a lazy officer are the same - the supreme value. Such a society must emphasize social relations over the individual. But emphasis of social relation in human existence

is likely to lead to spiritual atrophy, unless there has been a prior transformation of the individuals not only in their abilities, but also in their self-perception.

Marx conceives the transformation of human individuality as a consequence of the dialectics of individuals and productive forces. Thus, Marx puts more emphasis on the role of transformation of human individuality. We will in the next part of this study see how this emphasis leads to a conception of technology playing a central role in the emergence of a higher individuality confounded by the relationship between technology and human beings in , capitalism - a relationship that, in our view, emphasize the importance of the individualistic dimension of human beings.

(e) Obliteration of the individualistic Dimension of Technology

Human beings in choosing are motivated by values, which in the last analysis give meaning to their existential projects.

Technology is one existential project which human beings invent and use. Needless to say, in inventing and using technology values. To the extent that goals and values determine the choice of invention to make, and the choice of technology to use in a social force exists constituted by earlier generations to the individual, and the latter can only transcend it by harnessing it to serve his goals and values. Marx's view that human beings are not free to choose their productive forces is made on the basis of the view that they find these forces in existence at their birth. In the course of arguments for the individualistic dimension of technology, We pointed out that the universality of human species and the fact that diverse technologies exists at

any time means that human beings can use existing technologies to procure their existence, or invent new, more suitable technology.

The individualistic dimension of technology can be obliterated by choice of individual and proliferation of technologies, as it happens in advanced capitalism. Herbert Marcuse describes this obliteration in the following words.

... the productive apparatus tends to become totalitarian to the extent to which it determines not only the socially needed occupations, skills, and attitudes, but also individual needs and aspirations.⁴⁶

Thus the authenticity of human individuality is eroded by the productive apparatus, which increasingly determines his goals and values. What this means in terms of the conception of human being is that human beings are determined in a sense which denies the volubility of both the individualistic and social dimensions.

The erosion of authenticity in human individuality, it seems to us, is what Marx least foresaw. Marx conceived the development of productive forces, technology particularly, as inevitably leading to more wholesome human individuality. As a result of development and perfection of technology he says:

The free development of individualities and hence not the reduction of necessary labour time so as to posit surplus labour, but rather the general reduction of necessary labour of society to a minimum, which then corresponds to the artistic, scientific, e.t.c., development of the individuals in the time set free, and with the means created, for all of them.⁴⁷

Instead of the foretold development of human individualities there has been a phenomenal erosion of human beings' individual dimension. So that, in spite of technology advancement, real authentic freedom has been denied rather than enhanced.

If there was a problem in the human individuality in the capitalism of Marx's day, the problem has been accentuated in advanced capitalism and in societies that call themselves "communistic". And the problem that runs through social systems is the problem of freedom to choose, enhance and keep values. Freedom to choose, enhance and keep values, and to engage in aesthetic creation and appreciation is undermined by what Jacques Ellul calls "technical automatism". In Marcuse's view technical automatism manifests itself in the fact that

If the individuals are satisfied to the point of happiness with the goods and services handed down to them by the administration, why should they insist on different institutions of a different production of different goods and services. And if the individuals are pre-occupied so that the satisfying goods also include thoughts, feelings, aspirations, why should they wish to think, feel, and imagine for themselves?.⁴⁸

The question that arises here is: Is technology neutral as a productive force? We briefly looked at this issue in Marx's conception of technology in capitalism.

We saw that Marx's conception of technology as neutral, viz vulnerable to human beings decisions and values. Our view is that the condition for human freedom to utilize natural and social resources for human goals and values is the use of cognitive faculty. Only by use of his own cognitive faculty can

any human being break from a condition of feeling powerless or being determined by forces constituted by other human beings.

Thus we agree with Rand that:

A process of thought is not automatic nor "instinctive" or involuntary - nor infallible. Man has to initiate it, to sustain it and to bear responsibility for its results. He has to discover to tell what is true or false and how to discover how to validate his concepts, his conclusions, his knowledge; he has to discover the rules of thought, the laws of logic, to direct his thinking. Nature gives him no automatic guarantee of the efficacy of his mental effort.⁴⁹

An individual who cannot exercise his mind in existence must be at the mercy of either nature or social reality. This has been more or less the case with many human beings in advanced capitalism. Instead of learning social reality, technology, to serve their goals and values, many human beings are spurred by easy accessibility to technology into unreflected and endless actions. The absence of definite goals to the domination of technology over the individuals.

Not surprising, therefore, the human individuality in advanced capitalism is what has been called by various scholars, "technomaniacs", "technocrat" and "one dimensional man". The question we must answer then is: Are all human beings in advanced capitalism one-dimensional viz human beings whose actions are determined largely by availability of means to action? Or is it that the phenomenon of one-dimensionality afflicts only certain human beings, with certain characteristics.

In our view, the answer to this question is implicit in the foregoing discussion. Explicitly, then, the phenomenon of one-dimensionality is not inherent in the essence of human individuality, nor is it inherent in the logic of technology. Marx's conception of the human individuality in capitalism is, however, such as to mean that human beings in that epoch have no alternative but to be instruments of production. We view such a conception of human individuality as untenable, since selfishness is not historical, but a reality that is central to all men. Selfishness, which Marx conceives as pervading all human relationships in capitalism, is the individualistic dimension of human being. Unlike social reality that human beings find existing, their individualistic dimension can only be constituted through use of their rational and emotional faculties. The use of these two faculties, as Rand says, needs initiative, sustenance and responsibility.

We pointed out earlier how the universality of human being enables many a person to have access to inventions and productions of other human beings. The arduous task involved in inventing and producing is such as to warrant a distinction of work from leisure in the common sense view of reality. This view leads, inevitably to the choice of leisure over and against work. When alongside this view there is easy access to produced goods, those human beings who find the task of exercising their mind too heavy appropriate the created goods, and with them goals and values.

One-dimensionality, the obliteration of the individualistic dimension of technology, afflicts those human beings who evade the tasks necessary for authentic living; these being thought, choice and individually initiated action. Such beings are content to appropriate the thoughts and choices of other human beings. Quite obviously such beings are by their evasion reduced to mechanical action (that also become limited with technological advancement) and consumption. One-dimensionality, or technomania is therefore a state of existence in which thought and choice are rarely exercised, as action and consumption are increase. Under these circumstances, the human beings existing cannot be said to do so by reason. Real reason demands that one exercise his abilities to comprehend the nature of reality, including that of human individuality. The evasion of reason and choice by the one-dimensional man, facilitated by continued growth, can deserve no better term than 'automatism'. Such a reality is characterized by D.H. Lawrence in the following terms:

The social consciousness can only be analytical, critical, constructive but not creative, sensational but not passionate, emotional but without feeling.⁵⁰

There is in Rand's view of initiative, and appreciation of value. This situation is, in our view, worse than Albert Camus' Caligula, because such human beings are not even able to grasp their tragedy.

Within the tragedy of an obliterated individualism, however, there are human individualities that remain wholesome. They are wholesome in the sense that they use science and technology for satisfying goals and values which they set. The existence of

such human beings in capitalism and "communism" is what enables social growth to occur. And thus Berdyaev observes:

The creation of spiritual culture and values, religious, intellectual, moral or aesthetic, is something aristocratic and presupposes a spiritual even in a classless society. The disappearance of such an aristocracy would mean the disappearance of quality.⁵¹

social growth is, in our view, a matter of value enhancement and creation. This is only possible to a human individuality which is integrated, viz. a synthesis of value, thought and reality. It is apparent in all the arguments brought forth in this chapter that the individual in his self-centred knowledge and actions is the root of social reality. Capitalism is in our view a conscious product of individualistically centred activities; communism's danger of social regression is a danger arising from individualist repudiation of its principal ethic; and, the obliteration of the individualistic dimension of technology is the blunting of men's individual capacities for initiation and creativity.

Conclusion

Technology as a means of production does not carry the ultimate answer to the riddle of human alienation, and the consequent unfreedom. Productive forces may be developed, technology perfected to an extent of minimizing the labour hours needed for maintaining and raising production, but in itself it does, not permit a deduction of one type of human individuality or another. We strongly concur with Branden that:

The problem of alienation is not metaphysical; it is not man's fate, never to be escaped, like some sort of original sin; it is a disease. It is not the consequence of capitalism or industrialism or "bigness" - and it cannot be

legislated out of existence by the abolition of property rights. The problem of alienation is psychoepistemological: it pertains to how man chooses to use his consciousness.⁵²

Insofar as we share Branden's view, Marx was right in rejecting the classical explanation of alienation as an immutable aspect of man. Furthermore Marx's rejection of the biblical rationalizations of alienation is quite in agreement with our own position. But we part ways with Marx at the point where he conceives technology in capitalism as fundamentally alienating. Reality, in this case technology, does not have any metaphysical element in its constitution that determines with rigidity the type of human individuality in existence. The individual, through his activities causes a particular metaphysical element to emerge. The kinds of activities we have in mind are the exercising of the mind in choosing from alternative realities and in affecting the chosen reality.

An alienated human individuality arises when a man defaults on the use of his cognitive abilities. This Branden says:

To the extent that a man chooses to think, his premises and values are acquired first-hand and they are not a mystery to him; he experiences himself as the active cause of this character, behaviour, and goals. To the extent that a man attempts to live without thinking, he experiences himself as passive, his person and actions are accidental products of forces he does not understand, of his range-of-the-moment feelings and random environmental influences.⁵³

Thus the seizure of technology by the dictatorship or the reduction of human labour input in production as a result of the perfection of technology can not eliminate from society an alienated individuality. The elimination of alienation can only result from man's individual and independent initiative in the choice of values to be realized and in the act of realizing and maintaining the chosen values.

Notes

1. Some such scholars are H. Marcuse, D.H. Lawrence and J. Elull.
2. This is the general view running through all the writings of Marx.
3. K. Marx, and F. Engels, The German Ideology, part I & II, ed. R. Pascal, New York: International Publishers Inc., 1939, p.46.
4. K. Marx, "The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts" Early Writings ed. Livingstone and Benton, New York Vintage Books, 1975, 1975, p.324.
5. Marx, "Excerpts from James Mill's Elements of Political Economy" op. cit., pp.260-269.
6. Marx, "On the Jewish Question", ibid. pp.229-230.
7. K. Marx, Capital vol. 1 trans. S. Moore and E.Aveling, Moscow; Progress Publishers, 1957, p.645, quoted in L. Seve Man in Marxist Theory and the Psychology of Human Personality, Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1978, p.103. This view is also expressed in "The 1844 Manuscripts".
8. Marx, "Thesis on Feuerbach," in K. Marx and F. Engels, On Religion, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972, p.64.
9. See, for example, Marx's conception of alienation in "The 1844 Manuscripts" and in the Das Capital, vol.1.
10. Marx, "On the Jewish Question," op. cit. p.223.
11. Marx, "Thesis on Feuerbach," op. cit. p.64.
12. Marx, "On the Jewish Question". op. cit. p.23.
14. Ibid., p.230.
15. "The 1844 Manuscripts" provide the most systematic examination of the problem of alienation.
16. Marx and Engels, op. cit., p.23
17. Marx, "A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right", op. cit., p.277.
18. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, Part I & III ed. Pascal. R., New York: International Publishers Enc.1939. p.27
19. This is more or less the view expressed by Marx in Das Capital, vol. 1.

20. Ibid., p.645. A similar view is expressed by E. Bloch, who says: Historically, it is only with capitalism where, for reasons of ideological legitimation, the ruling class is led to emphasize the role of labour.. This paraphrased in Howard D. The Marxian Legacy, London: Macmillan, 1977, p.80
21. Marx, op. cit., p.107
22. Marx, Capital, vol. II, p.780.
23. See K.R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, London: Routledge and Kegan, for criticism of this view.
24. Marx, "Excerpts from James Mill's Elements of Political Economy", op. cit. p.227.
25. E. Fromm, The Revolution of Hope, New York: Harper & Brothers Co., 1967, p.23.
26. Ibid., p.24.
27. Marx, "The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts."
28. Marx, op. cit., pp.277-8.
29. Marx and Engels, op. cit., p.71. This view is also to be found in "Letter from France - German Yearbooks".
30. This view is expressed in all the works of Marx.
31. B. Ollman, Alienation: Marx's Concept of Man in Capitalist Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971, pp.106-108.
32. A. Rand, Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, New York: New American Library, 1962, p.16
33. Ollman, op. cit. p.151.
34. See Rand, "The Goal of Writing" in The Romantic Manifesto, New York: New American Library, 1962.
35. Marx and Engels, op. cit., p.26.
36. E. Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, London: Jonathan Cape, 1973, p.223.
37. E. Fromm, Escape From Freedom, New York: Rinehard and Co., 1941, p.119.
38. A. Rand, Atlas Shrugged, New York: New American Library, 1957, p.939.

39. E. Fromm, The Art of Loving, New York: Harper Brothers, 1956, p.939.
40. L. Berdyaev, The Realm of the Spirit and the Realm of Ceaser, trans. D.A. Lowrie, London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1952, p.86
41. See Rand, Atlas Shrugged and A. Greenspan, "The Assault on Integrity" in Capitalism, ed. Rand, New York: New American Library, 1965.
42. Marx, "Thesis on Feuerbach, "op. cit.", p.62.
43. L. Dupre, Marx's Social Critique of Culture, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983, p.201.
44. Rand, Capitalism, p.94.
45. Our reader can consult F. Marek, "Marx's Ideal of Man", in Socialist Hujanism, ed. E. Fromm, London, Allen Lan, 1967, p.158.
46. H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, New York: Beacon Press, 1964, p.XXI.
47. Marx quoted in Dupre, op. cit., p.195.
48. Marcuse, op. cit., p.195.
49. A. Rand, The Romantic Manifesto, New York, New American Library, 1962, p.16.
50. D.H. Lawrence, Phoenix, ed. E.D. McDonald, London: William Heinmann Ltd., 1971, p.750.
51. Berdyaev, op. cit., p.96.
52. Ibid. p.295.
53. N. Branden, "alienation", Capitalism, ed. Rand pp.290-1.

CHAPTER FIVE

AN OVERALL CRITIQUE OF MARX'S ANTHROPOLOGY

In the last four chapters, we have raised a number of criticisms on Marx's conception of man. Those criticisms, however, are limited to specific aspects of human reality. We intend in this last chapter to address criticism to Marx in terms of the whole reality of man. We will also look at the implications of our criticisms.

We may recall here that Marx conceives social realities as significantly contributive to the moulding of the individual. According to him, realities such as technology, religion and the structure of production, determine in the last instance the nature of man. This determination follows from the fact that social realities exist as facilitating and constraining factors to human activities. In so far as they have the dual potential of facilitating and constraining, social realities determine the limits of human growth. But, and this is an important point, although Marx emphasizes the primacy of social realities and conceives human nature as essentially an ensemble of social relations, his ideal man cannot arise from a determined human reality. In other words, it is not possible to justifiably derive a universal communistic individuality from the capitalistic individuality. It is this view that is the basis of our criticism of Marx's social individual and his conception of technology.

In making our criticism, however, it is important to bear in mind the fact that Marx does not conceive human nature as completely determined. Indeed, we have to include the aspects of dialectics and praxis in raising criticisms on Marxian anthropology. Dialectics, as it manifests itself in praxis is, in our view, an essential element in Marx's conception of man. It is through praxis that human nature develops and emerges from the primitive stages to the higher stages. Since praxis involves conception and transformation of reality, including that of man, it follows that man is undetermined in some respects. The relationship of the individual to social reality is dialectical; that is, the individual transforms is in turn transformed by social reality.

As we have seen in the preceding chapters, Marx, conceives the relationship between man and social reality in historical terms. In other words, the relationship between the individual and social reality varies from time to time. It is on the basis of this variation that Marx postulates a stage in social history when the individual is no longer over-determined by social reality. Marx conceives capitalism as a stage in human history when the individual is totally lacking in freedom. The lack of freedom means, of course, that the individual is constrained in his life to bend to the requirements of the forces of production. We saw in chapter four how technology can become overwhelmingly constraining on the life of an individual. Suffice it to recall that the determinative nature of the forces of production in capitalism totally negates the individual dimension in

production, and destroys any element of dialectics between the individual and social reality. There is, in fact, a matching of the individual to the operation of the forces of production.

A state in which the individual is totally determined by social reality is conceived by Marx and Engels in their anthropology. George Lukacs, too, has pointed out the lack of individual freedom in twentieth century capitalism. In the last analysis, therefore, Marxian anthropology comprehends man in capitalism as largely determined.

Yet Marx goes further and postulates a higher type of man as emerging from the over-determined existence of capitalism. It is, in our view, questionable that from an alienated individuality Marx derives an unalienated individuality. The question raised is: Is the communistic individuality possible? And from this question two aspects of Marx's anthropology are at stake. First, is Marx justified to infer the communistic individuality from the capitalistic individuality? Second, is the communistic individuality as a universal reality feasible? We will study each of these questions briefly.

1. Marx's postulate of a higher individuality

For praxis to be authentic, there must be a dialectical relationship between the individual and social reality. In the absence of the dialectic element in this relationship, the individual is coerced to the logic of the forces of production.

This determination of the individual by the forces of production is a predominant reality in monolithic capitalism. Generally, scholars such as Marx, Engels, Lukacs, Marcuse, Fromm and Jacques Ellul, agree in the observation that a weak individual dimension of man is accompanied by the domineering development of the social reality.

The repercussions of the impropportionate growth of social reality over individual dimension of man are complex. The consciousness of the individual is warped by the might of the forces of production. The individual conceives the social reality as a reality over which he has little control. Moreover, the operation of capitalism both at the substructural and superstructural level, is such as to guarantee most human beings their basic needs. The guaranteeing of basic needs and the provision of modalities of appropriating those needs eliminate the necessity for proper comprehension of reality. Although man is not principally a consumer the socio-economic system of monolithic capitalism and socialism leads to the blunting of other attributes. This is a view also expressed by Fromm and polemically by Rand.

The derivation of a communistic individuality from the above sketched individuality does not seem to us justified. Marx, in conceiving man in capitalism, did not quite foresee the pattern of production and consumption that has emerged in this second half of twentieth century. The individuality that develops in capitalism's blossoming is predominantly a determined and

contended kind. While Marx was right in attributing to the capitalist individuality indifference and eventually abandonment of religion and philosophy, he failed to grasp the possibility of revolutionary spirit being lost.

In our view, starting from the premise of a capitalistic individuality that is without a high value to strive for and also without proper comprehension of reality, Marx is not justified in inferring the communistic individuality.

Of course it will be argued that Marx does not simply start from the capitalistic individuality, but does so using the metaphysical logic of dialectics. So that for Marx, as expressed in the "1844 Manuscripts", religion and private ownership are negated by atheism and appropriation of the appropriators by the proletariat. From this negation Marx derives the communistic individuality that has not need for religion and does not find satisfaction in material ownership per se. The communistic individuality, therefore, is a synthesis inferred from the capitalist and the proletariat. The capitalist individuality and the proletariat individuality are conceived in this logic of dialectics as thesis and antithesis respectively.

Our question is: Where is Marx's justification in holding that the metaphysical logic of thesis-antithesis-synthesis must end in a communistic individuality? After all, the reality on which that logic is formulated does not seem, in our view, to have the qualities necessary for the movement from the thesis to the

antithesis and to the synthesis. It is our view that the logic of historical dialectical materialism is not justified by the nature of reality in the capitalism of his day. The reality of capitalism does not have processes that warrant a derivation of the proletariat individuality, leave alone the communistic individuality. In fact the underivability of the proletariat as conceived by Marx from capitalism's production operation robs the logic of historical dialectical materialism an intermediate element - the antithesis - that is necessary to link the capitalist to the communistic individuality. The antitheses of capitalism is 'blunted', to use Marcuse's terminology.

Although in the above paragraph we have indicated the unwarranted nature of a derivation of the communistic individual from the capitalistic one, we will, in answering the question of the feasibility of a universal communistic individuality, assume its possibility.

In the historical stage called communism, Marx conceives a kind of man that has overcome the constraints of nature and realized the interpenetration of his being with that of all other men. There is, therefore, a human type that has mastered a greater part of nature. This achievement is a consequence of the development of science and the application of technology to men's social needs. Whether this state comes about as a result of the operational logic of capitalism itself, or appropriation of that technology by the proletariat's dictatorship and its subsequent socialization, is not the issue here. The issue is that there

is a kind of human being who has mastery over technology and, through it, over nature. That may as well be possible, but, what about the consciousness of the interpenetration of all human beings?

The mastery of nature and technology is not a sufficient guarantee of the consciousness of the essentiality of being social. In other words, it is possible to realize technical mastery over the forces of production without making progress towards the communistic individuality. If, however, it is possible to have human beings who conceive their fate as interwoven with that of all other human beings, the mastery of technology can be utilized to serve only human beings' needs without such conditions as commodity exchange or money.

The assumption in all the above arguments is that all human beings have the ability to conceive everything properly. For, quite obviously, the mastery of technology and nature, and the consciousness of such a complicated reality as the interpenetration of the individual's joys and sadness with that of other men requires very deliberate and rigorous conception. In other words, such a mastery and consciousness of reality cannot be a result of accidental discovery and it cannot be understood easily. In fact, it is not just deliberate conception that is needed here, but one that would uphold the social essence (positive relations between men) as the fundamental reality of human being. While the importance of the social essence is indisputable, it is not conceivable how an individual

would cease to regard some human beings as more dear to him than others. The point we are trying to make here is that a realistic conception of human reality cannot uphold all human beings as the same. Human beings are not the same, or for that matter equal, in spite of the universality of the social essence.

The communistic individuality is, therefore, built on the assumption of very complicated issues. Can all human beings at one point in history conceive technology and nature in the right manner, that is, as means to a human purpose? What of the universal consciousness of the interpenetration of human fate - is this possible? It is our view that Marx's man that goes shepherding, returns to a dinner over which he engages in criticism of poetry, and cooks and washes his clothes, without becoming a specialist of a communistic individuality is not feasible. This envisioned individuality in *The German Ideology* would fail to cope with the dynamics of technological changes in the present highly industrialized societies. And the consequence of such a failure in a highly industrialized environment can range from bafflement through phobia to destruction.

We will in the next section try to point out the essentiality of individual cognition and value in man. We will moreover, mention certain strengths in Marx's anthropology.

2 Individual Cognition and Value

Human nature is an extremely complex reality. Man has been conceived in the following terms: Homo sapiens, Homo indens, Homo neqans, Homo sperans, Homo faber, Homo economicus, Homo

religiousus, and so forth. Each of these concepts subsumes only a particular facet of human nature, leaving out other equally important facet. Scholars who emphasize any of these realities as the primary and the most essential for human nature commit a fallacy. Bateson has likened this fallacy to Whitehead's 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness', meaning that one attribute is unjustifiably upheld as primary and essential. The emphasis of the social reality which is a human essence in so far as it arises from individual initiative. Thus, while granting the fact that social reality has an antecedent meaning and significance, it is the individual that determines that meaning and significance. This determination, of the meaning and significance of reality, comes about as a result of the forms of values and the extent of understanding which the individual has on reality.

Marx's conception of human nature as dynamic is revolutionary. On the basis of that conception, it is possible to understand human progress. But Marxian anthropology by leaving aside the complexity of man's nature, specifically its openness to both good and evil, could not foresee the remoteness of the communistic individuality. In other words, Marx did not take into account the fact that man is not predetermined to evil or good in his nature. A recognition of the reality of the element of freedom, and cognition and value of the social reality would have cautioned Marx against too much optimism on the future of all human beings.

It is our view that individual initiative in human existence is a necessary condition for the transformation of human nature. Moreover, it is only from the interplay of individual initiative and social reality that a more meaningful existence is possible. Without individual initiative, reality takes on the appearance of an independent, immutable force to which the only choice is submission. Thus we agree with Nathaniel Branden that:

As a living entity, man is born with specific needs and capacities; these constitute his human nature. How he exercises his capacities to satisfy his needs - i.e, how he deals with the facts of reality, how he chooses to function, in thought and in action - constitutes his personal or individual identity.¹

In our view, what emerges from Marxian anthropology, like in totalitarian capitalism, is an alienated individuality. The common factor in the individuality of Marxian anthropology and the totalitarian capitalism is the emphasis of the social reality and processes. This emphasis, as we saw in chapter three and four, stifles individual identity which is the basis of authentic human initiative. Moreover, there is as a consequence the loss of individual attributes in rigorous striving to conform to a set archetype. For this reason we find Fromm's philosophy as articulated in the Revolution of Hope and Sane Society untenable. Fromm's view that "true freedom is possible only when production is taken out of the hands of private individual and placed under the absolute control of the group -" is quite opposed to our advocacy of individual initiative in cognition of reality and constitution of existential values.

Fromm believes that centralization of production and ownership would enable planners to re-organize forces in line with creativity in the place of compulsive production and consumption. In his tenaciously held view, human beings should be directed to active, creative existence by a well planned control of access to certain industrial products. Fromm conceives this as a condition for men to exercise their species capacities. Consciously or unconsciously, this view constitutes an attempt to de-emphasize social reality and to uplift the individual dimension of human existence, in the search for meaning. This is a proposal that we share, for it implies a recognition of the significance of individual initiative in existential activities. Fromm's intention in proposing a re-organization social reality in order to promote individual growth is noble, but that intention like that of Marx is undermined by the means which he proposes. And arising from the proposed means, there is a misconception of the nature of human freedom, cognition and values.

The key to an unalienated individuality is a conscious and free choice of values, living in accordance with those values and individual initiative in all man's activities. One thing must be pointed out explicitly here: the consciousness and choice of values and their implementation should be based on an objective metaphysics. By an objective metaphysics we mean an individual perspective (or attitude) that is founded on the recognition of the definite modes of reality. The cognition of the definite modes of reality and constitution of individual existential values is the only guarantee for the creation of unwarped individuality.

Note

1. N. Branden, "Alienation", in Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, ed. A. Rand, New York: New American Library, 1966, pp.290-291.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As indicated in our conclusion the primary dimension of human being is individualistic, rather than social as Marx conceived. While the social dimension of man is important in providing a basis for individual activities, it is the individualistic dimension that is essential for the realization of an unalienated man. Arising from the conclusion a number of recommendations are plausible.

First, and foremost, there is need for a radical re-definition of the functions of a government. Functions bestowed on most governments in the present day exceed the optimal limit and violate the personal dimension of human beings. In such excessively powerful governments, there is a danger of the individual being relegated to the status of a statistic element that has a fixed value as in Marx's conception of capitalism. The point here is that any form of government, be it capitalism or socialism, can violate the personal dimension of men depending on the extend of its operations. The solution to human alienation, therefore, is not the replacement of capitalism and by the proletariat's dictatorship, but a re-definition of government functions. In a re-defined form, governments should fulfil the functions of guaranteeing the fundamental rights of each individual. In this respect government functions that directly or indirectly tamper with the right to life and the right to create, own and dispose of wealth ought to be reduced to the minimum.

Following from the above, every government should pursue policies that encourage individual initiative and entrepreneurship. Totalitarianism, whether of the capitalistic socio-economic machinery or the proletariat dictatorship, must be avoided, since such can only hamper and even mutilate the development of individual cognition and value-structure. Thus, it is our view that the best way out of the present day monolithic capitalism, that dehumanizes men on a scale larger than the capitalism of Marx's day, is the reduction of tendencies to a totalitarian culture.

In order for the above recommendations to be effectively implemented it is necessary that the kind of education offered in our society be re-examined, with express purpose of determining whether it promotes or stifles the development of individual cognition and value structure. This logistic recommendation arises from our finding that the transformation of a social system, say feudalism to capitalism and capitalism to communism, does not necessarily entail the transformation of the individual human beings. There is need therefore to pursue programmes of education that promote individual growth. Unless this is done it will not be an accident if our society (Kenya) finds itself to boost a high Gross Domestic Production (GDP) and per capita income while a large segment of human beings are alienated in a more intense manner than the proletariat and bourgeois of the capitalism of Marx's day.

Our last recommendation pertains to one of the increasingly dominant means for men attaining and maintaining their values - this is technology. Needless to observe, technology is a means only in so far as there are definite ends or values to be attained or maintained. The choice of a particular technology from an array of alternatives and from a diversity should always be determined by the values that are to be attained or maintained. In order to avoid a situation of human alienation such as perpetrated by capitalism, as observed by Marx, Fromm, Marcuse and others, it is necessary that individual cognition and value-structure be properly developed. This recommendation arises from the view articulated in this thesis that the alien nature of reality, and technology in particular, arises from poor cognition. Needless to add, the benefits of a free market economy can only be enjoyed by human beings of properly developed cognition and value-structure, who alone can rightly choose an appropriate technology from the diverse modes and thus achieve their aims.

Last but not least, the subject of the effects of technology on man ought to be studied more thoroughly. In our thesis the concern for humanised technology by Marx, though addressed to the problem of technology and human liberation, is not extensive enough.

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