RESPONSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE
UNITED STATES TO THE CONGO CRISIS:
EVENTS AND ISSUES/

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EVENTS AND ISSUES

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ABSTRACT

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RESPONSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES TO THE CONGO CRISIS: EVENTS AND ISSUES (351 pp.)

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The Belgian Congo crisis of 1960 stemmed from a lack of preparedness on the part of both the Belgians and Congolese leaders in a transition toward national self-determination. The demand for independence came suddenly and in a more radical form than the Belgians had anticipated. Officials capitulated before they could arrange for the transfer of power from the Europeans to the Africans. Thus all parties were unable to handle the post-independence crisis. The Belgians wished to play a "big brother" role, while Congolese leaders wanted to be masters in their own house.

The Afro-Asian states feared the possibility of Soviet-American confrontation in the troubled Congo. Their leaders therefore believed that the United Nations, if charged with keeping the peace, could diffuse the situation. They also thought the organization would assist the Congolese government in resolving its problems. They may have expected too much.

The United Nations was inexperienced in peace-keeping. It had not faced a situation in which it had to confront armed forces as it sought to defend a weak state's territorial integrity. It had no
precedent, and its success or failure also depended on the willingness of its members to contribute troops and funds.

Many states refused to support the operation, and the UN thus became dependent on the United States not only for finances, but also for logistical support. The operation, therefore, could only succeed if it received the unqualified support of the United States.

But this was not always the case. The United States had rejected the request of the Congolese government for American troop intervention. It favored a UN peace-keeping operation, but it did not want UN units to confront Belgian armed forces in the area. Ties through its NATO alliance largely determined that policy decision. Policymakers revealed a simplistic attitude. They saw the conflict as between Africans and whites with Communists behind the former. The Eisenhower administration thus sought to protect European interests, to save Europeans from humiliation, and to block Communist designs. It insisted that an unprepared UN solve the problems. A successful UN operation, however, would have given power to the radical Lumumbists; hence the United States actually frustrated UN efforts to reestablish order and became involved in plots to assassinate Lumumba.

The Kennedy administration fared no better. Its strong anti-Communist position led it to insist on the exclusion of any Soviet influence in the Congo and on the creation of a unified Congo. Yet factionalism within the administration and opposition in Congress led to continued ambivalence and caution. They thus failed to develop a single comprehensive policy. They mistakenly blamed communism for the Congo's problems.
Conditions in the Congo were not the result of Soviet intrigues. Had the Belgians not manipulated Tshombe to secede, had the Americans not worked to create a rift between Lumumba, on the one hand, and Kasavubu and Mobutu, on the other, the history of the Congo during the period under study would have been different. United Nations and United States officials never did understand the internal factions which had developed over regionalism and unitarism. The Americans also ignored national sentiment when they plotted to assassinate Lumumba, the only Congolese leader who had broad national support.

The passing of Lumumba left a leadership vacuum which created problems for American policymakers that have not been resolved to date. Even after Mobutu and the army assumed political power in November of 1965, the Congo only achieved a semblance of political stability while the economic situation has deteriorated.

This study covers only the period from July, 1960 to January, 1962. But it is unique on several planes. First, it appears to be the first work by a historian devoted to the examination of United States Congo policies. Second, its reliance on hundreds of the recently declassified State and Defense and CIA documents, separates it from Professor Stephen Weissman's study. But most of its findings confirm Weissman's conclusions drawn largely from newspapers and interviews with policymakers and others who were participants in the events. Finally, the study shows clearly that the UN and the United
States plotted to have Lumumba overthrown and the Soviet Union's charges against Hammarskjöld cannot be simply dismissed as propaganda.
The idea of studying United States Congo policy first occurred to me in the fall of 1974, as a result of a special reading course at Hiram College during the winter of that year. My reading material focused mainly on United States foreign policy, especially the Cold War period. In the process, I began to realize that Africa received little attention from American advocates of "self-determination." Yet, the literature dealing with the Cold War rivalries of the 1960's often mentioned the role that the United Nations had played in the Congo and claimed that the presence of the UN in that country prevented a Soviet-American clash. This theme reminded me of a conversation I once had with a cousin in Nairobi in 1971. Drum Magazine had published a letter attributed to Patrice Lumumba, the first Prime Minister of the Congo. This document ordered provincial presidents to arrest and possibly execute all of Lumumba's opponents. A covering article noted that Lumumba had been killed by a Katangese tribal mob in February, 1961, as he attempted to escape from prison in Elizabethville.

The Drum letter seemed to be a forgery and the accompanying story implausible. I recalled an August, 1963, encounter with Congolese refugees in Kampala, Uganda, when I was then in grade seven. Many of these Congolese believed Lumumba had simply vanished and that he would eventually reappear as a messiah and savior. When he
returned, they too would go back to a free and independent Congo. Certainly my 1971 skepticism derived from the faith these Congolese had in Lumumba. Like them in 1963, I envisioned a national hero and not a blood-thirsty dictator.

The Lumumba story brought to memory the 1963 assassination of President John F. Kennedy. By coincidence, I saw the film of President Kennedy's assassination at the United States Information Agency Cultural Center in Kampala, just a few weeks after it happened. Then I did not understand the meaning of political murder. The assassinations of Dr. Martin Luther King in April, 1968, Robert Kennedy that summer, and Tom Mboya, Kenya Minister of Economic, Planning and Development, in July, 1969, crystalized my perception. The Mboya one made me aware that political killings often stem not from the average men and women. Hence, I could not accept, at face value, the allegation that tribal people had killed Lumumba, especially knowing well the respect that nationalists received from the "native" population. I mean the nonelite.

I knew Mboya well. We came from the same village. He was my political idol. I vigorously defended his ideas every time my student colleagues, who entertained some pseudo-socialist ideologies, accused him of being an American puppet and on the CIA payroll. His association with American public figures, John F. Kennedy, Justice Thurgood Marshall, Martin Luther King, and many others, greatly influenced my perception of the United States. I knew him as one who cared for the underprivileged. The responses he received from the American
people—churches, private individuals, and universities and colleges, in the early 1960's, when he sought to give African youths a chance for higher education, made me believe that America is a land of justice and opportunity. Lumumba, in my mind, shared most of the ideals cherished by Americans.

Thus, when I met with Professor Warren F. Kuehl on August 13, 1974, to map out my graduate program, one of the areas we discussed was the role of the United Nations in decolonization debates. As he directed me into reading and manuscript sources, I began to realize how important the Congo crisis had been in 1960. More importantly, I began to discover that the Cold War was a major factor in both United Nations and United States responses. Furthermore, I increasingly became uneasy with works that had depicted Lumumba as villain and Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary-General of the United Nations, as saint. I also found Soviet charges against Hammarskjöld disturbing. But two factors made me focus my attention sharply on the role of the United States. First, I realized that the Secretariat's public positions on the Congo controversies often paralleled those of the United States. Second, in November, 1974, I read, by coincidence, a 1963 New Republic article which implied that the CIA might have been involved in the 1961 assassination of President Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic. From then on I wanted to know what part, if any, the CIA might have had in the Lumumba affair.

In this study, the term "Americans" refers to those who made Congo policies. In my mind, the American people cannot share in what
their leaders did in the Congo. Hence where United States is used it means the Federal Government. My faith in the people of the United States has not been eroded by the indiscriminate acts committed by the CIA, senior officials in the State Department, and the Executive Branch. Had the American public been informed of the creation of a death squad, use of biological toxins, and other means of assassination in the Congo, they would have opposed those policies.

I am indebted to many people and institutions. The University of Texas, Houston; the University of Wisconsin at Madison; North Carolina University at Chapel Hill; and Florida State University Libraries kindly lent their precious French collections. Valerie Johnson, the current interlibrary-loan librarian and her predecessor Dorothy Kantosky have been very helpful in locating material for this study. University Research Libraries, Chicago University, made available the declassified documents. The staff of the United Nations Library in New York were kind in filling my request for documents. I am also grateful for the summer 1978 research fellowship from the History Department of the University of Akron.

Special thanks to Professor Robert Zangrando in whose 1974 seminar my ideas took form; Professor Barbara Evans Clements who provided stimulating intellectual insights drawing largely from her experience with Soviet conditions. My former professors at Hiram College proved invaluable again in 1977-1978 when I joined them as a faculty member. I owe much to them, especially Professor Roland Layton, President Elma Jagow, and Dean Robert McDowell. To my students
in the twentieth century African class whose marks can be traced in
the introduction to this study.

To Warren Kuehl, a word of special thank you. He transcended the call of duty in helping me through my studies at the
University of Akron. I am indebted to him in ways beyond student-
advisor relationship.

Finally, I wish to express my deepest appreciation to my
American father Nelson P. Bard. He unselfishly committed his personal
resources toward my education in the United States. He molded me
from the son of African peasant parents to what I may eventually
become as a result of this education.

I have written this study in memory of Mabel Bard, who taught
us that Christian love and generosity know no race, religion, or
creed.
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INTRODUCTION
THE UNSTRUCTURABLE WORLD, 1950-1960

The end of World War II left the United States determined to shape the future of mankind. The creation of an orderly and peaceful world that had eluded President Woodrow Wilson in 1919 at last seemed possible. The United States and the Soviet Union had allied in a struggle against the Nazis menace and the wounds of America's 1918 intervention in Russia appeared healed. It seemed that an American international ideology based on "self-determination" and the principle of human rights would prevail. The new world envisioned by United States officials proposed to ensure individual freedoms and the economic well-being of all people. Future international crises would not be settled on the battlefield but in the United Nations. Economic protectionism which twice had brought the world to disastrous wars would cease. The new community of nations would be open for the free exchange of goods. Imperialist wars would also be averted, because all people would have the right to determine their own destinies. These were basic ideals. Indeed, American leaders felt a "responsibility" to safeguard them in the name of national security. But the Americans also wished to have them enjoyed by other nationalities as well.¹

Though the Soviets held differing political and economic ideologies, American leaders believed the Russians could be led to accept and cooperate in this proposed world community by persuasion and negotiation. If the Soviets refused to compromise, pressures could be asserted by tying the continuation of American economic aid to their acceptance of the idea of a free democratically-structured postwar world. In addition, the Soviet Union would not receive the benefits stemming from the peaceful uses of atomic energy. With a monopoly of atomic weapons the United States possessed an edge over the Soviet Union, and it could thus force the latter to participate in the proposed world system.2

Soon after the war ended in the summer of 1945, American officials had to face the inevitable. The Soviet Union refused to accept the idea of a free, democratic and capitalistic society. It subsequently rejected the terms of United States economic aid, noting that it would benefit the Americans more. Then in 1949, the Soviets exploded an atomic bomb, and the Communists routed the nationalists out of mainland China. These events seemed to confirm the growing fear that

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democracy and communism were incompatible and that the two must compete against each other and possibly clash.  

The United States, insisting that democracy and free enterprise should prevail, developed its policy of containment. Ideologically, economically, and militarily, the United States would confront the Soviet Union in every corner of the globe. The rivalry assumed a strange form. Where the Soviets called for the liberation of oppressed people, the United States spoke of self-determination. It meant, of course, the freedom of a people from domination by a stronger power, and it focused on Eastern Europe which had come under Communist control. But the colonized peoples in Africa and Asia also felt they should be included in the call for self-determination. Other citizens under dictatorial regimes also sought to liberate themselves.

The American ideology of self-determination thus had within itself the very seeds to destroy colonialism and in the process upset the United States dream of a reordered world. Its self-contradictory policies reflected that dilemma. It supported dictatorships in Spain and Greece while calling for self-determination in Eastern Europe. It

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4 On the origins of the containment policy see X (George Kennan), "The Sources of the Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, XXV (July, 1947), 566-582; and his American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1951), pp. 107-128.
offered extensive economic and military aid to Britain, France, and Portugal, who used the money and weapons to suppress advocates of independence in Africa and Asia. Finally, the economic assistance and military protection that it gave to its friends who were colonial powers enabled them to hold their colonies, thereby thwarting the realization by the colonized of the fruits of self-determination and human rights.

Yet the American call for self-determination and respect for human rights did not diminish, and it contributed to the eventual destruction of colonialism. Public advocacy of these ideas stimulated desires for a better economic world in which individuals would be properly clothed, fed, and given good health care, and challenged on existing social, political, and economic systems associated with imperialism. Colonial people admired the United States, looked favorably toward America and only on occasion did they wonder about contradictory policies.

The 1950's, therefore, were crucial years in the world. Whether one talked of Europe, Africa, or Asia, Latin America or the Caribbean, history was being made. The old order and the status quo came under attack. All major powers, including the United States and the Soviet Union, found themselves in conflict with a new generation of men and women who wished to use every means available to alter the existing social conditions.

For the United States, the challenge came first in Korea in 1950. In that year, Communist nationalists operating from the Russian occupational zone (North Korea) invaded the American sector (South
Korea). Until then the United States had only limited military involvement in the area. The United States remained true to its containment policy. Invoking the United Nations Charter and claiming that international peace and security had been threatened, American forces entered the conflict without first consulting the United Nations. The United States presumed it would receive the approval of the United Nations by simply sounding an alarm in the Security Council. The United Kingdom and France rallied to support the American position and other members agreed. The Communist's early successes were soon reversed, but Communist China, having consulted with the Soviet Union, joined in the war effort. The Americans, their Korean allies, and other United Nations forces retreated south of the 38th parallel. There the battle became a stalemate.5

The landing of American troops in Korea was important for three reasons. First, it revealed dramatically how the United Nations could be used for the furtherance of a particular individual nation's foreign policies, and it established that any big power could intervene militarily in the affairs of weaker nations by claiming that it was responding on behalf of the United Nations.6 Second, the United Nations

support of the American action reaffirmed the legitimate and legal right of big powers to intervene in the internal affairs of other nations. The Korean incident could be considered an internal matter, with Communist and non-Communist factions fighting for control of the country. Finally, it demonstrated that distance was no barrier to the deployment of American forces to uphold the policy of containment.

Soon after Korea, the United States found itself faced with new crises. In 1953 the Shah of Iran, having staged an abortive coup against the new progressive government of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh, fled the country. Because Mossadegh had nationalized the British-controlled Iranian oil industry, the United States considered his actions to be communist inspired. It had seen Iran under the Shah as a buffer between the Soviets and the Middle East, and Mossadegh now not only threatened the free-enterprise system but also oil supplies and routes. Thus in the summer of 1953, the United States sent the Central Intelligence Agency to organize, in the words of an American Broadcasting Corporation telecaster, "our mob" to return the Shah to power. That August, a coup directed by the CIA overthrew the government, and the Shah returned. American oil companies soon followed.6

The following year, in Guatemala, a legally elected government under Jacobs Arbenz was in the process of instituting land reforms. Most of Guatemala's cultivatable land had for many years been held by the American firm of United Fruit. Because Arbenz's economic programs envisaged land redistribution and a partial nationalization of natural resources, Washington viewed his government as communist. The United States could not fight against communism in Korea and tolerate it in the Western Hemisphere. Thus, in June, 1954, United States armed Guatemalan dissidents, supported by a CIA organized airforce, overthrew Arbenz. The old order returned and the status quo was preserved.

In the second half of the 1950's the struggle for self-determination spilled into Eastern Europe where it challenged the Soviet machine. In 1956, a revolution in Hungary routed the pro-Soviet government there. The Soviets, however, moved forces into Hungary, crushed the revolution, and reestablished control. The Russians had watched in 1950 as American troops fought in Korea. In 1956, the United States watched with folded hands. Both the Soviets and the Americans had been forced to recognize certain realities in the evolving international power structure. Where one of them acted first, the other would have to stand by. That same summer, Britain

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and France intervened in Egypt over the Suez Canal. The Soviet Union, as a sponsor of Egyptian socialism, complained but did not deploy troops.

The Middle East next saw a Cold War confrontation. In July 1958, American troops landed in Lebanon to put down a civil war between Christians and Muslims. The administration there had sounded an alarm that the socialist regime in Egypt was behind the crisis. The British also stole the show by landing forces in Jordan where a decaying autocratic monarchy faced the possibility of being overthrown. Again the Soviets challenged these actions in the United Nations but did not send in troops.\(^8\)

In Indochina, the French suffered a defeat at the hands of nationalist forces in 1954 and eventually withdrew, having agreed to a ceasefire under which the 17th parallel separated the French from the Vietnamese nationalists. As in Korea, the line divided Vietnam. When in the late 1950's fighting grew between various factions, the United States viewed it as another communism to contain.

As the Middle East and Southeast Asia attracted the attention of the super powers, Africa appeared to be of little interest to the Soviet Union and the United States, despite sensational developments there. They began in 1948 when the British government arrested the Ghanaian nationalist leader Kwame Nkrumah. An ensuing demonstration

at Christianberg ended in a bloodbath when police overreacted. Even after a 1951 election produced some self-government in Ghana, the demand for total independence erupted into another bloody riot in 1954.

In East Africa, the British also faced another uprising. Since 1948, a group of Kikuyus, seeking to wrest traditional lands from white settlers, had organized a movement later known as Mau Mau. Its members intimidated European farmers along with their African collaborators, and in October, 1952, the Mau Mau assassinated Senior Chief Waruhiu. In March, 1953, the Mau Mau attacked a Reserve at Lqri in the Central Province. Many of the Kikuyu Homeguards lived in the reservation and the violence resulted in several deaths. White settlers on isolated farms also came under assault. From then on, Kenya saw a reign of terror. Detention camps became the dwellings of thousands of Kikuyus and remained so until the crisis subsided in 1959.9

The French, too, had a problem. A revolution in Algeria broke out in 1954, setting in motion pressure that eventually toppled the entire French empire in Africa and may have contributed to the collapse of French control in Vietnam and other Southeast Asian colonies. The war in Algeria proved costly in both men and material.

By the late 1950's it was costing one billion francs a day, and between 400,000 to 800,000 French troops were committed in the war.¹⁰

In Angola, a small guerilla group began to battle the Portuguese in 1959, operating mainly in the Cabinda region in the north at the mouth of the River Congo. Next door, in Belgian Congo, riots broke out early in 1959 and again in November. Demands for self-determination in both places clashed with the right of the white man to rule over the "native."

The United States and the Soviet Union paid only limited attention to these developments in Africa. They spoke from a distance. The United States particularly argued that colonized people should have a right to determine their own destiny but insisted that change must come gradually and peacefully. The Soviet Union claimed it was prepared to support liberation movements. But both refrained from taking an active role in the decolonization politics that raged in Africa.

Apparently, in the 1950's the United States and the Soviet Union had defined spheres in which their national interests were of paramount significance. The United States had established the right of intervention in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and in the Western Hemisphere according to need. The Soviet Union apparently recognized this hegemony when it withheld from Iran, the Suez crisis, Korea, and Vietnam. The United States also recognized the right of the Soviet

Union to intervene militarily in Eastern Europe when it failed to send forces into East Germany in 1948, Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Because Africa was outside their spheres of influence, the United States and the Soviet Union formulated no specific African policies in the 1950’s. But the United States, unlike the Soviet Union, had a direct interest in the area because many of the colonial powers were member-nations in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The United States thus assumed some responsibility for their protection against the Soviets by keeping them economically, politically, and militarily strong. Furthermore, whereas the Soviet Union had limited investment in the form of commitments to Egypt and Guinea, the United States together with its citizens had a considerable economic stake in Africa. Private American capital in Africa exceeded $600 million in 1957, about one half of which was in South Africa. Africa also accounted for 4 percent of United States export-import trade. The government had advanced military and development aid

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11 For an interesting insight into how the two powers undervalued their African policies see Department of State Memorandum for the President, Paris, March 5, 1956, from Henry Cabot Lodge. Lodge was then the U.S. representative to the UN.
loans to most of the non-colonial African states. Finally, the United States possessed military bases in Africa with facilities in Ethiopia, Senegal, and Morocco.

Psychologically the Americans also had attachments to Africa. Missionaries worked there, and the United States also shared with western Europeans, whose power was being challenged in Africa, a belief in democracy and capitalism. Radical changes could threaten American lives, and the resulting property damage would affect United States citizens as well. Therefore, United States officials favored a carefully-planned process of self-determination which would produce the least violence. It meant that the colonial powers themselves should set the timetable for change.

As a result, the United States made efforts during the 1950's to encourage its allies to prepare their colonial subjects gradually for eventual independence. Decolonization, however, could not be

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13 Department of State Memorandum for the President, 3 March 1963, from David Bell: Attachment: Memorandum for David Bell concerning President's meeting with General Gray; 4 March 1963 from William P. Bundy.
hurried, lest it result in chaos. That would play into the hands of the Communists. Officials recognized that since independence would come, the shift should be peaceful, orderly, and in a fraternal way.

To achieve this end and combat Communist influence, American officials focused on improving economic conditions in the poorer nations. During the 1950's Africa's poverty received increased attention in their statements. The State Department even suggested ways by which Africa's economic development could be spurred. One solution was to encourage private investors to participate effectively in exploiting Africa's natural resources without threatening European interests. Private capital would improve the standard of living of the people, thereby undercutting the appeal of communism.  

Perceived interests soon expanded to include political, economic, geographic and military factors. The large African population, though insignificant in actual military power, could be essential in a war between the West and the East. As long as Western European influence dominated, the United States would have no concern. However, independence movements might erode the European presence and the entire continent might fall within the Communist bloc. That would be unacceptable to the United States.

14 Department of State Bulletins, XXII (June 19, 1950), 999-1003; XXIII (November 25, 1950), 849-850; (December 18, 1950), 966; XXV (July 16, 1951), 97-101; Louis Minclier, "The Use of Anthropologists in the Foreign Aid Programs," Human Organization, XXIII (Fall, 1964), 188; Harlan Cleveland, "Caricature of Foreign Aid," Modern Language Association of America; LXXVIII (May, 1963), 1-5; James Schlesinger, "Foreign Aid: A Plea for Realism", Virginia Quarterly Review, XXV (Spring, 1959), 222-223; Department of State Bulletin, XXXIV (April 30, 1956), 716.
Africa also grew in importance strategically. If the Soviet Union dominated there, its military power would be enhanced not only on the Indian Ocean but also in the South Atlantic and the Pacific. Southern Europe and the Middle East would be vulnerable to Soviet attacks launched from points inside Africa. Furthermore, the Soviets could control the oil routes from the Mediterranean through the Red Sea into the Indian Ocean.

Finally, strategic considerations involved Africa's unexploited deposits of strategic minerals. Would these pass over to the Soviets?

Real or imagined, a concern existed that any Communist gains in Africa would have a far-reaching political, economic, and military effect. Not only would the international balance of power be disturbed but United States interests and security could be jeopardized. These feelings were expressed repeatedly in the 1950's. They reflected the fears of post-1945 developments which carried over to the 1960's. The loss of East Europe and China seemed evidence of an aggressive objective of world domination by the Communists, and Africa was a potential area for Soviet exploitation in the minds of most citizens. Fortunately, to these same thinkers, the continuing European control of the continent prevented such a development. Perhaps unfortunately, it also hindered the formulation of an American policy for Africa.  

15 Compare Vice-President Richard Nixon's report to President Eisenhower in Department of State, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957, p. 1066.
A few Americans did call for a positive policy but to no avail. In Congress, liberals like Adam Clayton Powell of New York City, John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts, and Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota spoke for a more active role. Conservatives like Barry Goldwater of Arizona at times appeared to support their call for a constructive African stand, but his views were extremely cautious and largely identical to the administration's position that any action taken in Africa must not antagonize the colonial powers. Between 1950 and 1960, the United States government still saw Africa only from the larger perspective of its European policy.

Outside the Congress, liberals like Chester Bowles, later to become Under-Secretary of State during the Kennedy administration, urged a reassessment of United States policy toward Africa.

The most powerful country in the world, which asserts that it is leading a global coalition for freedom, cannot declare itself to be a nonparticipant in the affairs of a continent boiling with change without abdicating its position of leadership.

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18 Chester Bowles, Africa's Challenge to America (Berkeley: The University of California Press 1956), pp. 96-97. Nation had expressed the same view in a December 26, 1953 editorial. Nation, CLXXVII (December 26, 1953).
The highest point in the call for a new African policy came with the presentation to Congress of an 84-page policy study on Africa by Professor Melville J. Herskovits of Northwestern University in October, 1959. Herskovits noted that United States posture for a decade had been based on an assumption that Africa, under NATO concept of defense, was of minor importance. He suggested that communism and African nationalism not be confused and advised that the United States follow an independent African course without hurting its relations with its NATO allies. This warning came late.

When the crisis in the Congo came in July, 1960, the United States still had no clear-cut African policy. It was faced with both a call to intervene unilaterally and a threat that the Soviet Union or Communist China might become involved. Officials responded. First, they decided that Belgium as the former colonial mentor must shoulder most of the responsibility. Then the State Department issued a statement that

The United Nations has before it an official appeal for assistance from the Congolese Government, and the United States believes that any assistance to the Government of the Congo should go through the United Nations and not by any unilateral action by any one country.20


The Americans apparently thought they had found a way of keeping the Communists out without too much United States involvement. But it soon became evident that the Belgians had lost the authority needed to stabilize the situation. Even the United Nations role as a neutralizing agent came to be questioned. A fear grew in the United States that the Soviets might step in, and American officials reacted. They did not, however, clearly understand events and thus could not define their role or respond decisively. Even after they identified the issues, they still failed to formulate effective solutions. Instead, they committed grievous errors in their pursuit of policy objectives and aggravated an already tense and involved condition.

This study of the United States rendezvous with the Congo, from July, 1960, to January, 1962, seeks to identify the major issues, to determine how soon American officials isolated them, to examine the policies formulated and applied, and to weigh the consequences.

It begins with five preliminary assumptions. First, the United States did decide that its basic interests in the Congo were at stake and that the outcome could possibly influence future relationships between other African countries and Western democracies. Second, Africa belonged in the European sphere of influence and ought to remain so even after decolonization. This meant that America's role would remain minimal, in the form of support to the Belgians. Third, since Belgian official policy favored the concept of a unified Congo, the United States supported that principle. Fourth, aware that there was no immediate Soviet threat in the area, the
United States decided against direct military intervention and endorsed the idea of a United Nations peace-keeping force which could effectively neutralize any unilateral Soviet action. Finally, Americans wished to see pro-Western government established in the Congo under moderate nationalist leadership.

If one accepts these assumptions, it is possible to understand the subsequent involvement of the United States in the Congo. It initially hoped to limit its commitment to supporting Belgium and the United Nations. In the course of time, however, American leaders perceived shortcomings in this approach. The United Nations' failure to remove Belgian troops from the Congo and the organization's inability to stabilize the country threatened the prestige of the United Nations itself. Since the United States policy objectives were to be pursued through the United Nations, any action that threatened the United Nation's role in the Congo could directly affect the United States. A desire to preserve both Belgium's and the United Nation's credibility thus increasingly shaped United States responses. Inept responses by the United Nations and Belgium eventually forced the United States government to take both overt and covert steps, and in the end the United States emerged as the most influential power in the Congo.
CHAPTER I

MYTHS AND REALITIES OF COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT

The "new imperialism" which dawned on Africa in the 1870's did not exclude the Congo. The area had been a nominal colony of Portugal since the sixteenth century, but in 1882, Belgium, Britain, France, and Portugal each claimed a right to the territory or to portions of it. Had it not been for the United States the Congo could have been parcelled out among the antagonists at the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference. The United States support of the claim of King Leopold II of the Belgians enabled him to receive one of the largest and richest parts of Africa. He, in return, agreed to keep the area free to the commerce of other nations.¹

Leopold received the Congo under the name of the Congo Free State, mainly as a commercial colony.² He conceived of the Free State, mainly as a commercial colony.² He conceived of the Free


State as a chartered company whose obligations included the promotion of economic enterprise and public works. The Congo produced wild rubber and palm oil needed in industrial Europe and ivory used for making false teeth, necklaces and piano keys. The existence of copper in the region had been known since the fifteenth century, while rumors about Congolese gold persisted. Leopold thus invested large sums of personal money in the Congo Free State, hoping to make quick profit. He became an unscrupulous "robber baron" to whom economic gains overshadowed political and human considerations. The reign of the Free State, which lasted from 1885 to 1908, has been recorded as one of the most controversial eras in the history of the Congo, characterized by human plunder, resource exploitation, and inefficient administrative apparatus.

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Political ineptitude did not affect Leopold's ability to found and to charter companies which grew to dominate the Congolese economy. He realized that the vast territory he claimed for himself could not be effectively controlled and exploited by the Free State alone. Thus in 1887, he created, with the help of interested Belgian bankers, the Compagnie pour le Congo du Commerce et de l'Industrie (CCCI). As a private corporation, the CCCI encompassed industrial, financial, agricultural and commercial operations. In addition, it had to perform political and public administrative works in areas where it received concessions.

Yet Leopold seemed to have been dissatisfied with the efforts of the Free State and the CCCI. Therefore, in 1891, he chartered the Compagnie du Katanga "to annex, occupy, organize, administer, and create the economic infrastructure" in the Congolese southwest (later Katanga), an area then controlled neither by the Free State nor the CCCI. In return, the Compagnie du Katanga received a grant of one-third of the area. Here Leopold and his Belgian associates again demonstrated organizational failure. Instead of one single vast tract,

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the company's concessions consisted of thousands of plots, each of 12,500 hectares, scattered throughout the Congo with a 99-year lease on subsoil resources. Like the Free State and the CCCI, the Compagnie du Katanga exercised governmental control over the land it held.

The policy of combining private business with political and public administration proved defective. It limited the ability of the companies to make a profit, since most of the earnings went into financing military expeditions and other governmental programs. In an attempt to remedy the situation and make invested capital more profitable, the Congo Free State and the Compagnie du Katanga, by convention, founded the Comité Special du Katanga (CSK) on June 19, 1900, "for the management of the assets of the two associates." The CSK was to operate under a six-member board, four of whom had to be appointed by the Congo Free State, including a chairman with a tie-breaking vote. Article 5 of the convention also gave the State a two-thirds share in the CSK, with the other third going to the Compagnie du Katanga. Profits, dividends, and liabilities incurred would be shared by the two associates in proportion to portfolio holding. Thus began the process of government-private business cooperation which anthropologist Allan Merriam called the corporate state.

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The reorganization produced the desired effect. Business thrived and the Compagnie pour le Congo du Commerce et de l'Industrie made a substantial profit in 1902. The following year the Congo exported 54 million Belgian francs worth of goods against imports of 20 million. European humanitarians responded by calling on the Belgians to use this wealth to better the conditions of the Congolese populace, but Leopold termed such suggestions "heresy." He and his Belgian agents still saw business in mercantilistic terms.

The French historian R. J. Lemoine, struck by this phenomenon, wrote:

We are dealing here with a system of exploitation referred to in classical terminology as 'Rauwirt-schaft.' Thus on the eve of the twentieth century, a historical form of colonization practiced by Spain in America during the sixteenth century appears again; there is no development here [in the Congo Free State], but only commercial exploitation of natural wealth.

Meanwhile, the inhumane treatment of the Congolese by Free State agents stimulated international concern. British journalist E. D. Morel's criticisms led in 1903 to the appointment by the British government of a one-man commission to investigate alleged atrocities.

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14 Williame, Patrimonialism, p. 12

After a few months in the Congo, Roger Casement, an Irish nationalist and a member of the British Parliament, largely confirmed the rumors. His report helped increase opposition to Leopold's administration in the United States, where Mark Twain satirized Leopold's rule in 1904 and called the United States government "the godfather of the Congo Graveyards." The Independent magazine in a 1906 editorial agreed that "It is no longer of any use to deny the terrible atrocities that have been made a part of the personal rule of King Leopold in the Congo Free State."  

Leopold's economic stake had already been threatened because of his failure to invest in the exploitation of the area's subsoil resources, copper, diamonds, and cobalt, that required greater capital, especially for railroads and other improvements. Furthermore, the founding of the Comité Special du Katanga had undermined Leopold's mercantilistic views. Its less-parochial directors had as one of their first acts, internationalized operations. They then entrusted British prospector, Robert Williams, with the responsibility of locating minerals in South Katanga. In addition, the CSK and Williams signed a convention in 1901 with Tanganyika Concessions, a firm with its head office in Salisbury, Rhodesia, and a subsidiary of the London-based Tanganyika Holding, Ltd. The two companies agreed to mine all

16 Twain, *King Leopold's Soliloquy*, pp. 17, 29-62.

the minerals Williams would discover, to provide the needed capital, and to develop a railroad network in Katanga. In 1902, they founded the Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Katanga.18

Leopold, too, in a frantic effort to avert joint Anglo-American pressure to end his rule in the Congo, abandoned his exclusive exploitation of the areas he controlled. In 1906, he invited leading American financiers J. D. Rockefeller, J. P. Morgan, Thomas Fortune Ryan, and Daniel Guggenheim to buy shares in his Congolese companies. The same year, Ryan and Guggenheim helped found the Société Internationale Forestière et Minière du Congo (FORMINIERE) to discover and exploit diamonds in Kasai Province.19

At the same time, the Comité Special du Katanga and Tanganyika Concessions launched, in accord with their 1901 convention, the Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK) to develop mines in Katanga Province. The management of the UMHK's assets were subsequently delegated to the Brussels bank of Société Générale, which eventually transformed the UMHK into a giant monopolistic multinational corporation.20

Leopold's battle against international pressure failed. The United States government, after many years of remaining aloof, joined


the United Kingdom and Turkey in demanding that the Belgian government assume direct responsibility for the Congo. It agreed and the Congo became the Belgian Congo in 1909.

From the start, the Belgians planned to administer the area without financial responsibility to the Belgian government. It created its own flag and financed separately its administration. In this concept of colonial sovereignty one found the fundamentals of Belgian colonialism and the accompanying problems.

The Belgian Congo government faced a number of problems. An administrative apparatus, with a reliable security agency, had to be established. Under the Leopoldian hegemony no systematic political structures had ever been created. The paramilitary police known as the Force Publique, had been organized in 1888, mainly for the control of African rubber and ivory collectors. However, most of the Congo had not been in direct contact with Belgians. Unlike their predecessors, the 1909 officials envisaged the creation of a nation-state, subdued and administered in accordance with Belgian political, legal, and military precepts. Thus the Force Publique was reorganized and

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22 Legum, Congo Disaster, pp. 82-83.

23 Willame, Patrimonialism, p. 58.
put under the command of Belgian military officers, and it evolved into an effective instrument of colonial administration. \(^{24}\)

The Belgians also embarked on a major political reorganization by dividing the Congo into six provinces, twenty-three districts, and hundreds of territories and chieftaincies. This hierarchical structure had administrative bureaus at the top with provincial governors and district commissioners in charge of regions. In order to tie the people to the system, traditional chiefs were recognized and they became answerable to the colonial government. Courts appeared in all regions to dispense justice under Belgian law. At the top of this bureaucracy sat the Governor-General, an appointee of the Belgian King. \(^{25}\)

The new government also had to raise revenue for its operations, but no tax base existed. The Congolese of 1909 were predominantly illiterate and their economy mostly non-monetary. How then could revenue be raised? One answer lay in sales of grain to Europeans living in the country, payable in Belgian francs. This approach proved deficient because of a subsistence agricultural economy uninformed about the European market system. An alternative lay in a


Diagram A. Administrative Structure 1909-1960

Colonial Central Government
Governor-General

Vice-Gov.
General

Vice-Gov.
General

Consultation Council

6 Provincial Governors
Belgians

23 District Commissioners
Belgians

132 Territories
Belgians

445 Chieftaincies
39 Centers
509 Native Sectors

23 District Commissioners
Belgians

132 Territories
Belgians

445 Chieftaincies
39 Centers
509 Native Sectors
reversed labor system where Africans could be required to work for Belgian and other European settler-farmers, mining interests, urban-centered businesses and the colonial bureaucracy. These employees could then earn enough francs to pay a head tax. However, before the Congolese could become an effective source of labor, the new administration had to overcome inhibiting local traditions.

Throughout black Africa, traditional attachment to ancestral land and a pride in living on and working that land is strong. Moreover, in many African societies the selling of one's labor was seen as the equivalent of slavery. Since working for Belgians required internal migration, it also violated the essence of Congolese tradition. Yet the Europeans demanded the right to use African workers, and the government, because of its avowed policy of orienting "the Congolese economy toward a capitalist system based on free labor, low transportation costs and smaller land concession," felt obligated to supply them.  

The administration achieved this objective by passing mandatory labor laws by which Africans had to be forcibly recruited for work in mines, plantations, and on public projects. It further forced the "cultivation of staple food crops" to supply the needs of the workers, but the peasant producers received the lowest prices for their produce.  

26 Willame, Patrimonialism, p. 11.

27 Young, Politics in the Congo, pp. 205-206.
The African, compelled to work for the government or the European against his will, often returned to his native home. Europeans then concluded that Africans were naturally lazy, that they could not perform their duties without being policed. This attitude received reinforcement from the fact that Africans did not have a European concept of time and did not feel obligated to report to their jobs regularly. The European colonial administration redressed this problem by imposing high taxes and minimal wages and by recruiting potential laborers from distant areas. The economic and social results revealed themselves when the African employee found that he had to save several months to pay assessed taxes. Hence, he had to stay longer on the job. Long distance from home and lack of transportation also hampered the Congolese's effort to abandon his place of work. Therefore, separated from his family for many months a year, he became isolated, automized, alienated, and indifferent.

The minimal wage and forced labor policies had further social and political implications. Unable to earn sufficient francs, the African worker could neither build nor purchase a house of his own, nor could he afford to pay for health care that urban life required. It subsequently fell upon the colonial government and some of the larger corporations and plantations to provide the uprooted worker with housing, health and public services.\(^{28}\) However, the Congolese worker

paid indirectly for these welfare programs through taxes to the colo-
nial government and by accepting subsistence wages. The successful 
exploitation of natural resources combined with the need for a con-
uous supply of a stable cheap labor, created another kind of problem. 
The seasonal nature of work had to give way to regular employment, 
which led to programs to house workers. The low wage policies and 
controlled labor scene then enticed foreign entrepreneurs to invest 
in Congo ventures because profit could be realized.

In time, the capitalization of the Congolese economy and its growing technology associated with mining and agro-businesses eventu-
tually produced a need for a different type of African worker. Sci-
tific production demanded some literary education. Officials recog-
nized that "the better educated a person is, the stronger his economic performance and thus the higher his income" and that mass education was good for the economy in general. Yet the colonial government refrained from assuming responsibility for public education. Instead it entrusted the Catholic Church with the building and running of schools in return for government subsidies. Thus the Church evolved

29 Young, Politics in the Congo, pp. 213-215.
30 Willame, Patrimonialism, p. 12.
Diagram B. Educational Organization in Belgian Congo

I. BELGIAN CURRICULUM

- Nursery school
- Primary
- Secondary

II. CURRICULUM ADAPTED TO THE NATIVES

A. INSTRUCTION FOR GIRLS

- Upper level (post-primary)
  - Home economics
  - Pedagogical training school
- Lower level
  - Transitional classes
  - Vocational
- Homemaking (primary level)

B. INSTRUCTION FOR BOYS

- Upper level (ordinary)
  - Teacher training for uncertified teachers in village schools
- Pre-primary level
  - Workshop instruction in crafts and trades
  - Assistant nurses

Secondary school
- Selective upper level
  - Teacher training section
- Secondary academic
- Pre-university
  - Admin. and commercial division
  - Teacher training division
  - Veterinary and medical division
  - Physical education division
  - Vocational education division

S.T.A.
an educational system oriented toward both religious studies and technical training.\textsuperscript{33}

From the standpoint of colonial economic and political developments, the system of education achieved its objectives. It instilled in the Congolese a "consciousness of duties," respect for Belgian authority, and "loyalty towards Belgium."\textsuperscript{34} All these qualities were necessary before a successful economy based on native labor could become a reality. The post-World War I period and beyond revealed the extent of that success. In 1919, there were 2,000 European and American companies operating in the Congo.\textsuperscript{35} Labor productivity increased so rapidly that by the 1930's Belgian firms in the Congo earned more income than their counterparts in Belgium.\textsuperscript{36}

The outbreak of World War II and the quick defeat of Belgium by Germany, coupled with the profitability of Congolese-based business, set many Belgian entrepreneurs rushing to the Congo. Conditions at the end of the war unleashed a flood of European capital. The economy, oriented toward raw material extraction, changed. The new

\textsuperscript{33}Willame, Patrimonialism, p. 13; see also Diagram B, Belgian Congo, II, pp. 148-149.

\textsuperscript{34}Louis Frank, Le Congo belge, 2 vols., (Brussels: La Renaissance du Livre, 1930), I, 311-; II, 208-209.

\textsuperscript{35}Belgian Congo, I, 312-313.

\textsuperscript{36}Jove and Lewin, Les Trusts, p. 57.
investors as well as the old began to establish manufacturing indus-
tries producing for domestic consumption.\textsuperscript{37} By 1957, 3,600 foreign-
owned businesses were classified as major enterprises.\textsuperscript{38} A 1958
official record listed 32,054 firms with a total of 49,622 installa-
tions. Belgians owned 17.6\% of the former and 24\% of the latter.\textsuperscript{39}

This proliferation of business reflected the continuing
profitability of operations. For 1947-1950, the average income
earned from Congo businesses was 15.07\% as against 6.88\% from those
in Belgium. These percentages stood at 21.48\% and 8.20\% respectively
in 1951-1954, and 21\% to 9.49\% in 1957.\textsuperscript{40} All other indices of the
economy showed a steady growth rate.\textsuperscript{41}

The importance of foreign investment to colonial development
appeared in many ways. This sector had gross fixed capital of 83,649
million Belgian francs, while the colonial government's portfolio
holding in private companies had a value of 35,000 million Belgian
francs.\textsuperscript{42} American direct investment amounted to about 2,535 million

\textsuperscript{37} Belgian Congo, I, 117-119; Epstein, Revolt in the Congo,
pp. 176-177.

\textsuperscript{38} Young, Politics in the Congo, p. 205.

\textsuperscript{39} Belgian Congo, II, pp. 78-79.

\textsuperscript{40} Willame, Patrimonialism, p. 11; Joye and Lewin.
Les Trusts, p. 57.

\textsuperscript{41} Colin Legum, ed., African Contemporary Record: Annual

\textsuperscript{42} Belgian Congo, II, pp. 57, 77.
Belgian francs. Commerce, banking, insurance, and real estate represented 28.7% of the invested private capital, while the mining industry constituted 20.5% and transportation, warehousing, and communication 16.8%. Manufacturing industry, and agriculture took 16.5% and 11.4% respectively. The remaining 6.1% went into construction and public utilities. Likewise, between 1950 and 1958, the non-native economy accounted for the bulk of the gross national production.

The data reveal the extent to which the colonial government succeeded in transforming the Congolese economy into an open competitive system, with a few businesses multi-national in nature. These included the Union Minière du Haut Katanga, the giant British Lever Combine, whose subsidiary UNILEVER owned large plantations, and the Société Internationale Forestière et Minière du Congo. The latter had six subsidiaries by 1954 producing diamonds, gold, and asphalt. One of these, the Société d'Elevage et de Culture du Congo (S.E.C.) ran a 34,000-head cattle ranch. The Société Agricole, Commerciale et Industrielle du Kasai managed the FORMINIERE'S agricultural, lumber, pastoral, industrial, and commercial enterprises. In addition, the FORMINIERE mined diamonds and gold for the Belgian firms of Société Minière du Beceka, the Société Minière du Kasai, the Société Minière

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du la Lueta, and the Société Minière du Luebo, all of which had been granted concessions.46 (See Diagram C below)

The Comité Special du Katanga controlled more than twenty major corporations in the Congo, including the Tanganyika Concessions. The commercial activities of its subsidiaries, like those of the FORMINIERE, involved mining, agriculture, industry, commerce, housing, and public utilities. The single most important firm in this group, the Union Minière du Haut Katanga, had a monopoly over the production of copper, cobalt, zinc, germanium, silver, uranium oxide, and cadmium. Capitalized at 8 billion Belgian francs in 1960 and with a stock market value of 1,875 billion francs, it employed 20,876 in manual labor and 1,755 in management. Of the latter, Africans numbered 86. Its British associate, the Tanganyika Concessions, was capitalized at 9,507, 448 British pounds sterling. The UMKH further had controlling shares in Compagnie du Katanga, Congometaux, the Electrorail, Congovielmont, and Société Minière du Beceka. It also participated in seventeen other Congolese and ten Belgian-based companies. Finally, it was joined with other firms into a single multi-national corporation through the Belgian international bank of the Société Générale.47

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46 Belgian Congo - American Survey, pp. 94-95.

Diagram C. Multi-National Cartel

This corporate centralization achieved economic miracles in the decade after 1945. The cartel produced raw materials for export, mainly to the Western democracies, with strategic minerals going to Europe and the United States. In 1959 the Congo produced 9% of the Free World's copper, 49% of its cobalt, 69% of its industrial diamonds, 80% of which went to the United States, 60% of its uranium, which the United States and United Kingdom bought, and 6% of its tin. Furthermore, the Congo's international trade was with the Western world. The United States received 24.7% of the Congo's exports in 1959, while the Belgo-Luxemburg Economic Union accounted for 18.9%, France 11.9%, Britain 9.7%, and the German Federal Republic 9.2%. Italy and the Netherlands also bought significant quantities. On the import side the Belgo-Luxemburg Economic Union provided 36%. The United States followed with 15%, the German Federal Republic 9%, and the United Kingdom 8%.^48

The Belgians created one of the largest and most efficient distribution systems in Africa. Goods were imported from Europe mainly for workers in plantations and factories — often owned by a single firm or financial group in Europe — which produced for export. The United States was able to establish itself as the second largest supplier to the Congo market... [However],

American goods which found their way into this market were normally imported by these European companies. 49

Fundamental to this Belgian success was the political atmosphere pervading the Congo before 1958. Through a selective use of force and a welfare system, Belgian officials controlled the Congolese and kept them from participation in politics. Thus the Congolese performed their factory and plantation duties with very little manifestation of external discontent, while the Belgian exploited them. 50 Even when trade unions appeared, they remained ineffective. 51 The Belgians enhanced this atmosphere with restrictions on contacts with the outside world, both intellectual and professional. 52 The absence of native outbursts, such as plagued the British in Ghana and Kenya and the French in Algeria, Tunisia, Vietnam and Laos during the first half of the 1950's, underscored the Belgian concept of a model colony and gave investors a sense of confidence and security. Almost


50 For the Congolese income per month against the cost of living in the post-World War I see Fetter, The Creation of Elizabethville, pp. 82, 84, 111.


all outsiders admired Belgian rule during these years. Even the United States, with its sophisticated intelligence network, praised Belgium's performance in the Congo.

Yet impregnating this atmosphere of confidence were dynamic forces masking political instability, economic stagnation and national disintegration. Jean-Claude Willame, a specialist on Congo politics, observed in 1972 that "colonialism contains the seeds of its own destruction, and ... African nationalism itself bears the stamp of a highly unstable political system." Maurice Hennessy, a former British colonial official made the same observation in 1961. The Congo which the Belgians molded was an amalgam of traditionalism and modernity and, despite over seventy years of colonialism, the two elements had never been successfully harmonized. Responsibility for this failure lay with Belgian policies and with the Congolese elites who accepted European ways without breaking with traditionalism.

Thus, in spite of a semblance of unity and integration, the Congo remained a divided and diverse area. In its precolonial days,


55 Willame, Patrimonialism, p. 18.

56 Hennessy, The Congo, p. 58.
it consisted of many kingdoms composed of individual ethnic groups. The most important of these were the Bakongo kingdom of the Kongo in the south at the mouth of the River Congo, the Lunda kingdom of South Katanga, the Baluba kingdom of North Katanga, and the Luba and Lulua kingdoms in Kasai. From the fifteenth century to the 1880's, the kingdom of the Kongo had claimed nominal authority over many satellite states, which on occasion included the Luba and Lunda kingdoms. To enforce recognition of their paramountcies, the kings of the Kongo developed a central bureaucracy headed by the Manikongo (the king of the Bakongo). His appointed regional administrators theoretically represented the Manikongo's authority in the satellite states. The effectiveness of these agents was measured by the amount of tribute they collected, but the symbolic recognition of the supremacy of the Kongo was more important. Therefore, the Kongo's central authority existed on a tenuous base. The traditional political arrangement in the area thus could be described as a loose confederation of equals characterized by frequent antagonism and warfare, especially between Kongo and Lunda and Lulua.

The territorial reorganization which the Belgians undertook in the Congo left basically intact the ethnic boundaries that had existed. Within Katanga Province the traditional rivals Lunda and Baluba formed distinct districts, while the Bakongo and Luba also constituted separate administrative regions in Leopoldville and Kasai Provinces respectively. Other colonial boundaries followed ethnic and linguistic lines. The Belgians recognized this by dividing the people into smaller groupings called chieftaincies, administered by
Belgian-appointed "traditional chiefs." Underlying this arrangement was the principle of "indirect rule" practiced by the British in West and East Africa. In the Congo the policy worked mainly to augment a thorough-going Belgian penetration of the Congolese population which differed from the old confederacies because of its effectiveness through Belgian officials and the might of the Force Publique. However, the Belgians inherited with the pre-colonial system the propensity for rebellion against central control. Both geography and history fostered a smoldering sense of regional independence which undermined all efforts to develop a spirit of nationalism.

Even the educational system revealed these inner contradictions. It emphasized obedience to Europeans and a paternalistic system which required the Congolese worker to relinquish his individuality for material well-being. Yet in doing so it maintained an African tradition under which the young must obey the old. But in African societies such conformity bears the seeds of rebellion, for a youth becomes a man only when he can stand on his own and demonstrate his prowess by defending his honor, his family, the clan, and the tribe, in that order. The Belgians succeeded in getting the Congolese to fear and obey Europeans, but they failed to eliminate his rebellious personality.

57 Young, Politics in the Congo, pp. 66-67.
There was and will always be, in Africa a nomadic section of the population which can never be regulated. It was this native element which did so much to spread the gospel of independence in the area south of the Sahara and which, by its very nature, was uncontrollable as it was effective.  

As in other African colonies, the idealistic and democratic slogans of the Second World War and the United Nations' Declaration on Human Rights in 1948 rekindled a sense of self among the Congolese elites and members of the Force Publique. The quick defeat of the Belgian army by the Germans and the successful performance of the Force Publique in North Africa and Burma also undermined the myth of European superiority. Even before the end of the war the Force Publique battalions garrisoned at Luluabourg in Kasai revolted against their Belgian officers in 1944. Civilian elites, perhaps inspired by the feeling that the entire Belgian war effort was being waged by Congolese soldiers and the Congo's resources, also began to ask for democratic rights.  

The failure to respond to this new spirit released waves of discontent and disillusionment which finally led to political violence. Prior to 1958, Belgian officials banned political parties while encouraging ethnic associations and the formation of évaluate clubs. (Évalué was a term used to refer to the few Congolese considered to have

58 Hennessy, The Congo, p. 58.
evolved from "savagery to civilization"). The administration saw these affiliations as essential in containing Congolese nationalism, because they fostered regional, ethnic, and class allegiances. Yet the call for political "emancipation," when it took shape during the second half of the 1950's, came from the leaders of these associations and évalue clubs. As Belgium lost political control, they transformed themselves into pseudo-nationalist movements and created numerous factions under the guise of political parties.

The Belgian policy of paternalism had also been designed to restrict any rise of Congolese consciousness, and the post-war years saw a concerted effort to strengthen the system in the 1949 Ten-Year Plan, which sought to keep the people in the countryside. The 50-billion franc program envisaged investments in transportation, electric power stations, scientific research, improvement of native education and health services and the extension of tenant farming. It anticipated the establishment of 385,000 settlement plots and the projected repatriation of 450,000 urban dwellers by 1965. It obviously sought to check rural migration to the cities.

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62 Young, Politics in the Congo, pp. 66-67, 68; Hennessy, The Congo, pp. 54-56.
Because of a belief that the Ten-Year Plan would improve native conditions as well as have an overall impact on the Congo's exports and imports, many nations and corporations invested in the program. These included Belgium, the Belgian Congo government, the United States, Switzerland, and the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development. In 1957 alone the bank granted the Belgian Congo a $40 million loan for road construction. This brought the bank's total contribution to the Ten-Year Plan to $110 million. A United States government report to Congress underscored this participation by observing that the Congo had "become the world's largest supplier of cobalt and diamonds and a major exporter of copper and other minerals." The program expended 18,198 million Belgian francs between 1957 and 1959, with more than 70% invested in infrastructures connected with mining and plantations. In addition, 67% of the ordinary national budget went into non-welfare programs. Yet the Belgians continued to believe that paternalism worked; that the Congolese workers were generally satisfied and content with their material achievements.

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63 Hennesy, The Congo, p. 56.
64 Current Documents, 1957, p. 179.
65 Belgian Congo, II, 52-53.
By 1956 it was illusionary to hold this conviction, because the Congolese scene was rapidly changing economically and politically. A few Belgian officials had realized this as early as the 1940's, but most of them thought political "emancipation" unlikely. Indeed, the Belgians viewed with contempt the decolonization stance of the United Nations.  

The rapid changes both in the Congo and the world inevitably affected both the values and the Congolese masses. The former believed they had evolved high enough to be given equal treatment with their European counterparts, while they shared with the urban and rural masses a desire for a better economic life.  

The Belgians, however, felt that economic improvement should precede social and political reforms. Unfortunately for the Congolese, the financial picture remained bleak. In 1935, the European Sector of the economy employed 400,000 native workers. By 1955, these numbered 1,200,000, but unemployment rose in 1956 and continued unchecked. In 1958, about 200,000 Congolese were without jobs. Efforts to repatriate Africans to rural settlements met with some success but they did not solve the problem. On the eve of independence, urban unemployment was 27%.  

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67 Willame, Patrimonialism, pp. 19-20.  
69 Belgian Congo, II, 152-153.  
70 Weiss, Political Protest, p. 15n.
In addition, per capita income remained extremely low, $50 to $52 in 1959. Only 25,000 workers earned an average of $80 a month, while the remaining 975,000 made from $18 to $40 a month.\textsuperscript{71} Since all Congolese paid head taxes, these levies cut deeply into their meager earnings.\textsuperscript{72}

Employees of the colonial government fared no better. This sector had 100,000 Africans and 11,340 Belgian workers in 1960. The highest paid Belgian officials made 500,000 francs a year while the lowest Belgian functionary earned 115,300. Nine Congolese had incomes of 216,500 francs, while 1,690 Belgians were on this scale. This disparity continued through all ranks with the Congolese rarely represented in the higher paying jobs.\textsuperscript{73}

The low wage paid to the Congolese was sanctioned by law, but after 1955, the economic situation negated increases. Despite rapid economic growth in the immediate postwar years, revenues in the non-native economic sector showed only marginal increases. Meanwhile, gross national production steadily declined. Income from

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{71} Young, Politics in the Congo, pp. 206, 213; CIA Special Report, 14 June 1963, p. 7.
\item \textsuperscript{72} Belgian Congo, II, 52.
\item \textsuperscript{73} Willame, Patrimonialism, p. 28.
\end{itemize}
this sector between 1951 and 1958 stagnated at an annual average of 21,000,000 million francs, while gross fixed capital investment continued to decline after 1952.74

A number of factors may explain this development. First, the all-encompassing cartel that foreign companies achieved in the 1950's eliminated competition while stabilizing profit. Secondly, the persistent low-wage policy may have reduced the Congolese worker's incentive for greater productivity. Third, the reliance on raw material exports affected the economy when world prices for mineral products fell in the 1950's.75 This fact may help account for a concerted effort by the foreign-owned businesses to increase their investment in producing domestic goods during the 1950's.76 Expansion in this area, however, was slow.

The economic stagnation had a far-reaching effect on the colonial government in the 1950's. First, a disproportionate share of public financing fell on the native sector. In the 1950's Congolese-owned commerce, which comprised only 10% of the gross national production, contributed 46% of the national income. After 1952, this averaged 53%.77 Second, a shift from mineral and European-owned plantations as major sources of national income to a subsistence agriculture

74 Belgian Congo, II, 76-77, 79.
75 Epstein, Revolt in the Congo, pp. 177-178.
77 Belgian Congo, II, 76, 78-79.
gravely affected the colonial budget. From 1939 to 1956, the government had enjoyed substantial annual surpluses. However, in 1957, an initial deficit occurred of 597 million Belgian francs, and the following year it rose to 2,168. This came at a time when direct public debt was increasing. Until 1950, the debt had stabilized at about 4,000 million Belgian francs. It jumped from 10,000 million in 1951 to 42,500 million in 1958 and reached 45,000 million on the eve of independence. It took 15% of the national budget each year to service the debt in 1957 and 1958, and 16.99% in 1959. The United States Department of State estimated that it would take 23% in 1960. The Department and the Central Intelligence Agency attributed the unsatisfactory debt situation to the fateful Ten-Year Plan, and to the policy of financing "public improvements . . . largely . . . by the floating of bonds, many of which had been sold in foreign money markets." The situation was aggravated further by a flight of capital that began in 1959 and intensified during the first six months of 1960.

In every conceivable manner, the Belgians had succeeded in giving the Congo the outward appearance of "the most developed country in tropical Africa." Yet beneath that exterior, the Congo remained

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78 Belgian Congo, II, 76, 78-79.
82 Epstein, Revolt in the Congo, p. 176.
the most politically backward colony outside of Portuguese Africa. The economic picture combined with entrenched colonial administrators and inflexible institutions also invited trouble, if coupled with radical nationalism. That is what happened within a week after the Congo became independent on June 30, 1960.
CHAPTER II
CONGO DEVELOPMENTS AND UNITED STATES RESPONSES

Early American involvement in the Congo began under the administration of President Chester A. Arthur. He said in 1883 that "the rich and populous valley of the Congo" had to be kept free for trade, and he agreed to send a delegate to the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885.\(^1\) When the meeting ended on February 25, 1885, the United States position had prevailed. The General Act which the powers signed kept the Congo Free State open to the commerce of all. The American representative, John A. Kasson, scored another point of great humanitarian concern to Arthur -- religious freedom.\(^2\)

These twins, commercial and religious freedom, constituted United States Belgian Congo policy until 1908 when the United States decided to join in the demand to end Leopold II's rule. When the Belgian government agreed to take control of the Congo, the United States and Britain "pressed" and received from the Belgians an agreement that "absolute freedom of commerce, the right of Christian missionaries, [and] humane and equitable treatment for the native

\(^{1}\)Clenden, America in Africa, p. 53.

population" would be observed. 3 At the end of the First World War, most of the signatories to the 1885 Berlin Treaty, including the United States, signed the Treaty of St. Germain en Laye which reiterated the "open door policy in the Congo." 4

Interestingly, that position reflected mostly sentiment. American citizens seemed slow in responding to opportunity for investment before the 1950's. No direct government loans materialized either. 5 Humanitarian issues influenced policy, with American officials anxious to help Protestant missionaries in the area.

The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, combined with the Ten-Year Plan, increased the United States financial commitment in the Congo. The Economic Cooperation Administration put $17 million into programs for road construction and the development of water ways. The ECA also financed a $1.7 million "Private tin expansion project," while the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, which relied

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on United States contributions of 40% to its fund, loaned the Belgian Congo $70 million in connection with the Ten-Year Plan. In 1951, the ECA provided the Belgian Congo with an additional $15 million to spur the production of strategic minerals, especially uranium and copper.

This move came when the Korean War intensified and at a time of growing disenchantment with the Atomic Energy Commission's inability to meet demands for "fissionable materials." Through Belgium the colony received another $15,500,000 loan at 3 1/4% interest to be used in building and improving highways, "vital water-ways and to construct new power stations," all of which were associated with mineral extraction.

The Ten-Year Plan stimulated confidence among American officials and even a few financiers took advantage of it. Demands for Congolese products during the Korean war created an economic boom. Business Week noted that the Congo's exports increased by 50% in 1952, and that it produced 80% of the world's cobalt, 70% of its industrial diamonds, 140,000 tons of copper, 80,000 tons of zinc, and 15,000 tons of tin, while a newly-opened manganese mine was expected to yield

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9 Department of State, Bureau of the Budget, Memorandum for the President, June 21, 1951, from Director.

100,000 tons by the end of 1952. Simultaneously, Business Week reported that the American "stake" increased in the Congo. In addition to American oil, automobile, and machine companies, which already had distribution plants in the Congo, industries like United States Plywood and American Rolling Mills went into manufacturing. A Rockefeller group led by Lawrence Rockefeller established a textile plant near Albertville. The Brown Paper Company and Readers Digest joined with Belgian investors to start a $10 million wood pulp mill.¹¹

To American government officials, the Ten-Year Plan represented not only a means for furthering capitalism but also a logical way to improve the lives of the Congolese people.¹² Although the State Department had pressured France and Britain to liberate their colonies, it encouraged the Belgians to hold. "Most Western Europe's colonial powers, especially Britain and France, are on a three-front defensive these days—against communism, against native nationalism, and against United States criticism. Not so Belgium, which owns the potentially richest colony left in the world—the Belgian Congo."

The Americans considered the Congo's contribution to the North Atlantic Alliance's economy and security too important to warrant even a carefully planned change.¹³

¹¹ "Atomic Age Closes in..." pp. 145-146.

¹² Department of State Bulletin, XXV (July 16, 1951), p. 100.

¹³ "Atomic Age Closes in..." p. 145.
The only criticism of Belgium's colonial policies came in 1951 when Senators Dennis Chavez of New Mexico and George W. Malone of Nevada, speaking alternately, questioned the morality of colonialism during an appropriation bill debate. Chavez felt that British and Belgian colonialisms were exploitations disguised in self-righteous claims and that the rights of native people had been ignored. Malone conceded that Dwight D. Eisenhower may have struck close to the truth when he observed that the United States "must protect Belgium in the Belgian Congo" to guarantee the continued flow of "uranium and other fissionable materials from the Belgian Congo."

Malone noted, however, that Belgium's policy of buying these commodities and then selling them to the United States increased costs for American buyers. An independent Congo would sell directly to the United States and the Americans would save on "broker fees." Colonialism, in his view, was "slavery" and American funds should not be used to support it. Chavez added that "colonial capitalism" existed in the Congo and it favored Belgium and England. The latter, he argued, bought Congo's copper and then sold it to the United States at an increased price. Chavez attacked the exploitation of the Congolese who worked the mines while earning 12 to 14 cents a day. This was not capitalism in the American sense.  

Business Week shared Chavez' and Malone's sentiment when it noted that "private capital is top dog" in the Congo, though "under a

14 Congressional Record, 82nd Cong. 2nd, Sess., 1951, pp. 10998-10999.
peculiar paternalistic capitalism." Basil Davidson, the American journalist-historian, in an article on "Enlightened Colonialism: The Belgian Congo" gave the Belgians credit for their economic and social achievements. He then added, "They run the Congo as an autocracy" which prevented the development of "self-realization and social cooperation which comes when men feel that they are responsible for their own lives." The Belgian policy, he predicted, was bound to lead to a crisis as the Congolese struggled for self-determination. "The collision [was] already taking place in a subtle and typically dangerous form."

No evidence exists to indicate that United States officials shared the views of these prophets of doom. Relationships with the Belgian Congo continued to revolve around technical and financial assistance. In a major policy speech, a State Department official in charge of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs declared on October 31, 1955, that the Belgian colonial policy was unique among the Europeans.

Primary emphasis is given to economic and social development as foundation for eventual political evolution.... They believe in building from within by local training and by local institutions. They are seeking to transform the Congo into a great producer of minerals and other natural resources.... They

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15 "Atomic Age Closes in...," p. 145.
are also instituting a broad system of primary education to be followed by the establishment of higher institutions of learning locally.

The speaker added that the Belgians had succeeded "in creating [an] African middle-class on a solid economic basis" and that eventually "attention will be given to political development." 18

The claim that Africans had become middle-class was without statistical support. In 1956, only 120 Congolese held a carte d'immatriculation, a pass that allowed them to go to certain entertainment clubs and cinemas reserved for Europeans. Another 900 held a carte de mérite civique, which gave them some privileges that the masses could not enjoy, such as buying a car. 19

The Belgians, however, recognized this favorable United States official attitude and sought to capitalize on it to influence Americans to invest in the Congo. In 1954, the Belgian Chamber of Commerce in the United States published Belgian Congo-American Survey in a campaign to entice capital. The Chamber bemoaned the fact that of the S800,000,000 in private holdings in the Congo only 1% came from the United States. It reminded Americans of the opportunities and provided data showing the increases in trade. 20 The campaign did not

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18 Department of State Bulletin, XXIX (November 16, 1953), 638.


stimulate much response. Of the $2,000,000,000 in foreign capital invested in the Congo in 1956, the Belgians accounted for 75%.

The United States government, however, continued to participate in the development of the Congo's resources. It supplied Belgium with specialized technical data needed in connection with "sewage drainage in mushrooming native cities." It also provided technology for "non-ferrous metallurgy, road building, tropical agriculture" and other related areas of economic activities, including "statistical services." In 1955, "as part of Foreign Operation Administration's aid to underdeveloped countries," the United States participated in a Belgian plan to build a hydro-electric power station capable of producing 1/5 of the electric consumption in the United States at the time. The International Bank of Reconstruction and Development also remained as a major financier for the Ten-Year Plan, especially for projects which facilitated increased mineral production.

This emphasis on economic development revealed what had become the United States' public position in the decolonization debate. Beginning in 1950, the State Department held economic progress in Africa and other third world countries to be a major insurance against communism and a basis for the growth of democratic

22 Ibid., May 25, 1954, 8.
23 Ibid., April 18, 1955, 33.
24 American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957, p. 179.
institutions in these areas. In the Congo the Ten-Year Plan provided a unique means of achieving economic democracy. The emergence of the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya in 1953, and the Algerian Liberation Front in Algeria in 1954, confirmed the belief that the Belgian colonial system was sound. It therefore becomes understandable that the United States was willing to pressure Britain and France to move their colonies toward eventual self-determination, while at the same time saying nothing about political conditions inside the Congo. Probably equally important in this seemingly pro-Belgian policy was the Belgian sensitivity to any United States anti-colonial posture at the United Nations and the desire of American officials to keep the Congo as a major supplier of strategic minerals and other natural resources to the Western democracies.

The form in which Congolese nationalism revealed itself also led to misconceptions by outsiders. Before 1956, Belgian officials...

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had perceived a radical and dangerous form of nationalism in reli-
gious movements that began in the Sinkuru district of Kasai province
as early as 1904. Two of these survived into the 1950's. The
Kibanguists followed the teachings of Joseph Kibangu, who founded the
movement in 1921 and died in prison in 1925. The Kitawala (in Kichawili it means rule one's self) was a native offshoot of the American
Methodist Episcopal Church.

Outside of the Belgian Congo, the Kibanguism and Kitawala move-
ments were viewed mainly as "sycretistic" religious upheavals. The
Belgians, however, treated their leaders as nationalist revolutionar-
dies. By 1952, official figures showed that 3,880 advocates of Kiban-
anism and Katawala were held as "political prisoners." The records
listed 631 as "dangerous." The Belgians may have been right in
classifying Kibanguism and Katawala as political movements. They were
nationalistic, a fact underscored in 1956 when the Kibanguist petition-
ed the United Nations to declare Belgian control in the Congo and
Portuguese rule in Angola illegal so that a "Kibanguist government"
could take their place.

Such movements, however, did not attract widespread support.
Until July, 1956, even the Congolese evalues had remained silent.
That month, however, a group of moderate Catholic intellectuals and

27 Lemarchand, Political Awakening, pp. 170-172.
28 Ibid., pp. 170-173.
29 Davidson, "Enlightened Colonialism...," p. 38.
30 Lemarchand, Political Awakening, p. 171.
editors of the African-owned Conscience Africaine, consisting of Cyrille Adoula, a former bank clerk turned trade union leader, Jean Bolikango, a government employee and a prize-winning novelist, and Joseph Ileo, a journalist, published a series of editorials which became known as Conscience Africaine Manifesto. The Manifesto responded to a 1955 publication by a Belgian professor of political science, A. A. Joseph Van Bilsen, who presented a plan for the emancipation of the Congo in thirty years. The Manifesto endorsed Van Bilsen's suggestion for Congolese self-determination and called for an end to racial privileges, "economic exploitation" and the Belgian monopoly of politics. The authors argued that the Belgians' "presence" should be separated from "their domination."

The Conscience Africaine Manifesto also revealed economic concerns. It asserted that "total emancipation" could not be realized until Europeans ceased to monopolize the means of production. It demanded the end of the government policy of forced low wages "which permitted companies to reinvest a large part of their enormous profit" and the abolition of the practice of "confiscating a part of the just salary of the workers for the profit of a state-socialist economy."

Thus the Manifesto was more a call for economic reform than for political independence.

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32 Ibid., pp. 321-323.

33 Ibid., pp. 323-329.
The language of the Conscience Africaine Manifesto had a number of implications domestically as well as internationally. First, it had revealed an internal awareness that the people were dominated politically and exploited economically. Second, it might have led the Belgians and the outside world to believe that the Africans were more interested in social welfare than in political rights. Third, it provoked a response from other Congolese évalués. Among these was Joseph Kasavubu, the grandson of a Chinese laborer and Bakongo housewife and president of an ethnic association called Alliance des Bakongo (ABAKO). He and his Alliance issued a counter manifesto arguing that the key to political emancipation could be found in political parties. Without these the exploitation of Africans by "the largest companies" would persist. The ABAKO asserted that the era of colonialism had passed, and it demanded all "political rights and liberties" associated with democracy. Van Bilsen's Thirty-Year Plan, the Alliance declared, should be annulled "because its application would serve only further to retard the Congo.... Our patience is already exhausted.... [E]mancipation should be granted us this very day.... [W]hen the hour has come people do not wait." 34

Patrice M. Lumumba, who later emerged as the leading Congo-lese nationalist, also pondered these ideas. In prison on charges of embezzlement when the two manifestos appeared, he responded with a book-length manuscript. In his emphasis on sociopolitical conditions, he revealed himself to be closer to the Adoula camp than to the Alliance des Bakongo. Like the authors of the Conscience Africaine Manifesto, Lumumba believed that a Belgo-Congolese Community could be realized in a racially integrated Congo. All that was needed to achieve such a society were a series of political, economic, and social reforms. He shared with the Adoulaists their appreciation of the good work that the Belgians had done, but he differed from them in his acute concern over the lack of respect for human rights in the Congo. Citing the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, he called upon the Belgians to introduce immediate economic, political, judicial, and other reforms. He noted that Aristotle's assertion that "man is a political animal does not merely mean that man is naturally made for life in society; it also means that men naturally wish to lead a political life and to take active part in the life of the political community."\(^{35}\)

Lumumba had only an eighth grade education, and his highest position had been that of a third class post office clerk, yet he

understood that political philosophy which called for a sharing of power between whites and blacks. Therefore he warned that if segregation practices and judicial discriminations continued, a "crisis of confidence" would arise among the people and the hope for a Belgo-Congolese society would be doomed.36

The Adoulaists and Lumumba shared one thing with the Belgians and Americans—a belief in a peaceful and gradual change in the Congo. The Belgians believed that the economic and social well-being of Africans would blunt any surge for political freedom and that those groups of évolues who talked of political emancipation did not speak for the majority of the Congolese.37 American African specialists also believed that economic development and higher standards of living would work to minimize political instability.38 Thus United States officials continued to emphasize that point. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Julius C. Holmes, in a policy address before The World Affairs Council at Philadelphia on January 25, 1958, said that African nationalism could no longer be ignored, even in the Congo "where... economic and social development" had been

36 Patrice Lumumba, Congo, My Country, pp. 135-146, 69, 189, vi, xxxi.

37 Merriam, Congo: Background, p. 335; Willame, Patrimonialism, p. 20; Wall Street Journal, January 13, 1959, pp. 1, 12.

38 Department of State Bulletin, XXIII (December, 1950), 966; XXXIV (April 30, 1956), 716-718.
placed first. Holmes hinted, however, that dangers existed. A secret report indicated that "nationalism in the Congo would eventually expand to become something that the Belgians would be unable to control. The Belgians would be slow to move, but I believe they will move to preserve their economic and political influence." 39

Holmes had expressed a nearly accurate analysis. On April 20, 1958, Joseph Kasavubu, who had been elected mayor of the commune of Dendale in Leopoldville City, delivered a surprising inauguration speech. He strongly attacked colonial policies and demanded that the government establish scholarships for Congolese students, that they be admitted to European universities, and that Belgium recognize the Congo as a nation and not as a colony. 40

Kasavubu and his Alliance des Bakongo (ABAKO) had been the only organized group to champion the cause of independence, but new parties now emerged. Lumumba, Albert Kalonji, Cyrille Adoula, Joseph Ileo, and others founded the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC); Antoine Gizenga, a school teacher, organized Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA); in Katanga, Moishe Tshombe and his associates formed the Confédération des Katanga in South Katanga (Conakat); while Jason Sendwe created the Association des Baluba du Katanga (Balubakat). Many of the old tribal associations transformed themselves into ethnic

39 Howe, Along the Afric Shores, pp. 117-118; Department of State Bulletin, XXXVIII (February 17, 1958), p. 258-262.
40 Merriam, Congo: Background, p. 79.
political parties. These developments occurred in spite of a continuing Belgian ban on such organizations.

These mass organizations not only defied Belgian authority, but they also showed that the Belgian model system of colonial administration was illusionary. Developments in 1959 affirmed this. On January 3, 1959, the ABAKO organized a political meeting in Leopoldville and then, for unknown reasons, cancelled it. The crowd refused to disperse, leading to a clash with "armed policemen" which led to reported deaths. The mob then looted European-owned shops and burned and stoned cars. Some even shouted "independence now." Kasavubu and other ABAKO leaders were subsequently arrested and imprisoned.

International reaction to the riots varied. A Wall Street Journal reporter in Leopoldville wrote, "Bloody rioting in Leopoldville ... has shattered a widely held belief that the Belgians had found a formula for insulating this rich colony from Africa's explosive surge toward freedom." Other writers pondered the economic consequences as "shares of copper and other mining companies" fell and "created another source of worry." Among the diplomatic corps no

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consensus emerged. In Washington, sources viewed the riots with grave concern, while in Leopoldville observers expressed confidence in the ability of the Belgians to control the situation.

The United States refrained from any official comment until the Belgian government in Brussels responded. The Belgians, in an apparent acknowledgment of a serious situation, announced a program of political reform on January 13. It envisaged the election of Africans and Europeans to local councils by December and projected independence at an unspecified date. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Joseph C. Satterthwaite, told an audience at Tulane University that the Belgians had adjusted to the changing conditions in the Congo. He added that, as a result, the Africans would increasingly participate in the political development of their country.

The United States had always favored a policy of gradual evolution toward self-determination. The faith in Belgian good-will toward the native population was reinforced by the visit to the United States by King Baudouin of the Belgians from May 11-31, 1959. In an address before a joint session of Congress on May 12, the king thanked Americans for the help they had given Belgium during the First and Second World Wars, and he even recalled the role of the United States

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46 Department of State Bulletin, XL (January 17, 1959), 91.
at the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference which had made possible King Leopold II's effort to bring "civilization into unexplored regions of Central Africa...." For 75 years, he said, Belgium had labored to give "the Congo security and human life." He then pledged that all my countrymen join me in the desire to raise the population of the Congo to a level that will enable them freely to choose their future destiny. As soon as they are mature, as soon as they have received the loving care in education that we can give them, we shall launch them forth on their own enterprise and independent existence.\(^47\)

King Baudouin obviously believed that the surge for freedom in the Congo could be restrained. United States politicians and officials who cared to comment on developments also shared his illusion. Thus Republican Senator Jacob Javits of New York told the Senate a day after Baudouin's address:

the king spoke of self-determination, which he sees as something in prospect for the peoples whose fortunes are now so heavily the responsibilities of the Belgians. I refer to people in Africa. We see the modern concept of trusteeship and stewardship by people in a more advanced degree of industrialization in behalf of less fortunate people [Congolese], so that they can soon conduct their own affairs and fully participate in all important matters which need to be decided in the world.\(^48\)

A State Department release three months later echoed Javits' sentiment. However, for the first time, officials revealed a sense of uneasiness and some awareness of the complex situation. "Belgium

\(^{47}\) Congressional Record, 86th Con., 1st. Sess., June 1959, pp. 7179, 7969-7970.

\(^{48}\) Ibid., p. 7970.
had already created economic and social conditions in the Congo in advance of ... other African territories, while refraining from encouraging the growth of political parties and political life." Now "the proliferation of political parties in the Congo," had forced Belgian officials to call upon the Congolese "to defend the unity of the country and to turn their backs on political parties based on regional tribal affiliations."^49

Events in the Congo showed that efforts to stabilize conditions made little headway. With Kasavubu in prison, Patrice Lumumba of the Mouvement National Congolaise became the leading advocate of Congolese nationalism, as he replaced the jailed Kasavubu as the champion of independence. Lumumba had attended the All African Peoples Conference in Accra, Ghana, in December, 1958, while Kasavubu had been denied travel documents by Belgian authorities. ^50 He returned from Accra completely committed to Congolese unity and Pan-Africanism. ^51 The emergence of Lumumba as a militant nationalist raised concern among Europeans as well as the African elites. The Alliance des Bakongo, which through Kasavubu had agitated for the emancipation of the "Congo," now began to threaten the formation of

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49 Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 1086-1087.

50 Kanza, Conflict in the Congo, p. 49.

a separate Bakongo state in central and southern area of the Congo. Europeans who feared Lumumba because of his radicalism and Pan-
Africanism contemplated eliminating him. Belgian entrepreneurs and plantation owners in Katanga joined Tshombe's Conakat and steadily steered it toward secession.

Colonial administrators, too, became increasingly perturbed. In an effort to counter Lumumba's rising fortunes, officials began dispensing millions of Belgian francs to support government-sponsored parties. The French, who also feared the possibility of a radical Lumumbist government, intensified their effort through Abbé Fulbert Youlou of the Congo Brazzaville, to influence the Alliance des Bakongo to take a strong anti-Lumumba stand.

Meanwhile, the Congo situation deteriorated as the Belgians lost control and reports of police brutality increased. In October, 1959, the Belgians released a timetable which provided for self-rule in 1964. Lumumba in a speech in Stanleyville denounced the plan, urged the Congolese to reject it and demanded immediate independence. Again armed police confronted a jubilant crowd, opened fire, and killed and injured hundreds. On November 1, 1959, by order of the

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53 Ibid., p. 197.
governor, Lumumba was arrested and violence broke out anew. Mobs attacked Europeans, who for years had enjoyed respect. The lack of political institutions through which native anger could be contained increased the propensity for disorder, while Belgian officials intensified repressive measures, incorrectly thinking this would bring an end to instability.57

In the United States, officials became increasingly wary. Belgian control could no longer be taken for granted. The internal political scene, so long ignored, now had to be carefully followed. In December, the Belgians announced a plan for a January, 1960, Round Table conference to discuss the colony's future. The United States also prepared to send a commission to the Congo to study economic needs. It arrived there in May, 1960.58 The Central Intelligence Agency also began to monitor the political activities of the Congolese leaders as fears grew that Soviet and other Communist nations might have sought to influence developments.59

The Round Table meeting in Brussels took place in January and February. Lumumba was in prison and not expected to attend, but


58 Department of State Bulletin, XXXXII (May 23, 1960), 835; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 53.

all Congolese delegates, including Tshombe and Kasavubu, formed a common front in demanding Lumumba's release and his presence at the conference. The Belgians capitulated and in late January, Lumumba was flown to Brussels. There, his dominant personality soon thrust him forward as the spokesman for those Congolese who wanted immediate independence. On February 27, a signed declaration proclaimed Congo independence for June 30, 1960, and hopes for a peaceful transition period increased.

The role of the United States during the Round Table discussion cannot be fully determined. Official records related to the conference are heavily sanitized, but evidence indicates that United States officials, especially the CIA, began to follow Lumumba's movements carefully. The CIA also began to monitor both native and foreign communist activities in the Congo. A February 12, 1960, CIA report from Brussels informed the Washington office that a member of Lumumba's MNC had contacted and asked the Communist Party of Belgium for support in the forthcoming May elections. The unnamed Congolese also "requested the CPB's help in establishing state cooperative stores" in the Congo. CPB official, Albert Deconinck, reportedly answered that such a project would be possible, but the Congolese would first have to have Lumumba meet with CPB leaders.61

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60 Lumumba, Lumumba Speaks, pp. 151, 157-163.
Given the anti-Communist sentiment of the 1950's and 1960's, this report promoted concern among United States officials who viewed with trepidation the possibility that Lumumba would be the first Congolese prime minister. Deconinck reportedly told his Congolese guest that "in keeping with a decision by delegates to the recent Pan-African Congress in Tunisia, Cadres will be sent to the Congo from other African nations and popular democracies, including China, to help the new Congolese government" once it was established. He also informed his collaborator that the Soviets planned to loan the Congo large "sums of money at 2% interest per annum," and they would possibly "help build the Inga Dam" on the River Congo. Finally, Deconinck seemingly revealed that before the end of the Round Table Conference, the Congolese delegation would "demand and receive [the right to] control [departments] of defense, justice, and foreign affairs."\(^{62}\)

Another undated February, 1960, CIA report informed Headquarters that Lumumba had met with members of the Communist Party of Belgium in Liege, where he had discussed plans for a later meeting at which he would be the key speaker. The reports also showed caution on Lumumba's part along with the expression of some ideas which could be interpreted as communistic. First, he rejected an all-Communist party meeting and suggested that arrangements should be made to include other Belgian political groups. Second, he outlined the MNC

program for the forthcoming national election campaign, which included land distribution and "agrarian reform." The MNC would stand for the total unification "of all the Congolese people" and the extension of essential public services to "native cities." Third, he reportedly made "reference to planned economy for the Congo" and the formation of "state cooperatives" as a means of breaking "foreign commercial firms." Finally, the CIA noted that Lumumba's basic desire was a united Congo which he believed would play a very important role in Africa.63

These revelations apparently convinced United States policymakers that the Congo was a potential area for possible Communist influence. They viewed this prospect with acute concern because they believed the Soviets would use the Congo to encourage violent anti-colonial movements in Angola, in Rhodesia, and possibly in South Africa.64 Nevertheless, a series of intelligence studies showed that the Communists had not made significant gains in the Congo or Africa.65

As the Belgians made final arrangements for the first national elections and the Congolese organized their campaigns, American officials speculated on the future of the Congo. The presence of

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64 CIA, Office of National Estimates, Memorandum, NLK-77-938, 11 December 1962, p. 4.
mutually antagonistic factions in the Congo prompted serious concern. Since the summer of 1959, an ethnic war had ranged between the Baluba and Lunda of Kasai province. Then as the Congo neared independence, Belgian officials informed the State Department that Katanga planned to secede from the new nation.

The Americans hoped that a moderate would win a majority and form a pro-West government. On the final count, Lumumba's Mouvement National Congolaise won a plurality of 36 seats in an election in which 53 self-styled and real political parties participated. This caused a problem, because Lumumba had already been classified in Washington as "leftist-inclined" and a radical. The scare passed, however, when in mid-June, 1960, the National Assembly elected Joseph Kasavubu honorary head of state with Lumumba as prime minister.66

Apart from the problem of having Lumumba as prime minister, officials contemplated the future of Europeans when the Congo became independent. A fear grew that because of Lumumba's outspokenness against Belgians, Africans would attack whites and property. Belgian officials, however, informed the Americans that the Force Publique would remain loyal to its Belgian officers and it would protect European lives as well as their interests.67

The economic situation also promoted concern as American
policy-makers came to appreciate another danger. The colonial ad-
ministrators had accumulated a public debt of more than $800,000,000
in the name of the Ten-Year Plan, and the Belgians planned to
"saddle" this burden on the new government. Furthermore, due to
a flight of capital that began in the summer of 1959, and intensified
in the first five months of 1960, the Congo's liquid assets had
fallen from $150 million to $13.6 million. In addition, colonial ad-
ministrators had worked out a 1960 ordinary budget of $342 million,
$54 million more than the anticipated receipts for the fiscal year.
An extraordinary budget, which had been established to finance de-
velopment projects, called for another $140 million.

These conditions posed serious problems for American policy-
makers. First, there was the question of what a new Congolese govern-
ment, faced with impossible economic problems, would do with Belgian
investments worth over $3.5 billion. What would it do to meet cur-
rency shortage? How would it handle the presence of thousands of
Belgian employees in a country where native urban unemployment had
been increasing since 1958? Equally important was a concern among
some persons in the American business community that the closure of
the Katangan mines would affect the London Metal Exchange. This, in

68 CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, 16 June 1960,

turn, would result in high metal prices in the United States as aluminum would have to be substituted for copper. The 1959 riots, which had closed the Katangan mines for a time, showed the Congo's importance in the world's copper market.70

The CIA and the State Department speculated that an economic crisis would come unless something could be done. The Congolese government would possibly nationalize foreign capital, dismiss Belgian employees, and resort to the printing press to meet its currency problem. The end result would be an economic and political collapse. Thus, the Americans concluded that an urgent step had to be taken as soon as the Congo became independent. This could be in the form of a loan to enable it to sustain its budgetary expenditures. The State Department estimated that the Congo would need $180 million to cover its 1960 budgetary deficit, and officials had worked out a program for raising the money. Part of the funds would be raised from Congolese sources, while the United States, some European nations, and the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development would provide the rest.71

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United States officials had thus followed events and formulated responses prior to June 30. They had developed an economic program in advance but no strategy for emergency political action. The only plan here appeared in invitations to select Congolese leaders to visit the United States prior to independence. Among those who made the trip were Albert Kalonji of Kasai province, Moïshe Tshombe of Katanga, and Jean Bolikango. The Americans obviously believed the Belgian view that the Force Publique was a dependable instrument of security. Therefore they felt that domestic instability could be controlled. Thus, the Americans planned to help the new Congolese government overcome financial problems that could otherwise lead to a possible expropriation of foreign investment. However, the desire to protect capital did not arise out of consideration for American citizens. Their direct investment in the Congo was small. In fact, the United States government's financial commitment in the Congo was five times that of private Americans. The policy-makers, in this instance, seemed primarily concerned with Belgian interests, the continuation of the flow of strategic Congolese minerals to Western Europe and the United States, a stable market and price for these commodities, and a general atmosphere for free enterprise.

Policy-makers showed little awareness yet of internal political conditions in the Congo, especially of constitutional considerations. The Loi Fondamentale (the Congo's provisional constitution) provided for a Head of State whose duties were largely ceremonial, while executive powers rested with a Prime Minister. Whether the
Congolese understood this arrangement remained unclear. Kasavubu and Lumumba, who held these offices, were diametrically opposed to each other. A misunderstanding of responsibilities on the part of one might very well lead to an explosion, because of the principle of division of powers. The Belgians may have intentionally left the subject ambiguous. The Loi Fondamentale also established two Houses of Parliament—the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Their duties overlapped and, instead of being complementary, seemed antagonistic. Conditions were further complicated by the ambiguous military situation. There were Belgian national troops who had been stationed in the Congo and these remained, presumably under the control of the Belgian government. The regular army, still named the Force Publique, could not be viewed as a stable security organ. Its past mutinies against the Belgians underscored this fact. Thus no one knew who controlled these various units or whether they were reliable. In ensuing months this situation plagued efforts to stabilize the Congo.

More importantly, the movement for the secession of Katanga assumed threatening proportions on the eve of independence. The loss of that province would be intolerable, because it provided 60% of the central government's foreign revenue. Yet the Belgians, still hopeful that the Force Publique would maintain discipline, underestimated the danger. The Americans, too, did not consider it in their contingency plan for preliminary responses to possible crises. They accepted as such Belgian advice that the Force Publique would remain loyal under Belgian officers. Thus, the United States was unprepared to deal with either military or political crises if they came.
A few minutes before 11 p.m. on June 30, 1960, colonial flags were lowered throughout the Belgian Congo and national ones raised. A new Congo had been born; but old wounds remained. That appeared even in the rhetoric of the independence celebration. King Baudouin told the Congolese that Belgium had made them a gift by setting them free. Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba could not overlook this remnant of colonial superiority. He responded to the cheering Congolese that they were no longer servants of the Belgians. They had won their freedom by shedding blood in a "noble and just struggle . . . one which was necessary to bring to an end the humiliating slavery which had been imposed upon us by force." The Belgian king felt insulted and responded by trying to walk out in the course of the speech. This rupture between Lumumba and the Belgians proved to be a tragic omen, because cooperation between them seemed paramount to a successful transition.


Pro-Belgians blamed Lumumba for the mishap. Robert Murphy, "the grand old man of the Foreign Service," who led the United States delegation to the independence celebrations in the Congo, thought the king's address "graceful." Murphy, a former Ambassador to Belgium, had retired from the State Department in 1959. He subsequently accepted chairmanship of Corning Glass International and he also became director of Morgan Guaranty International. Murphy considered the Congolese a "tribal" and "primitive people who had to be trained to assume responsibility." He believed European lives to be in constant danger among the "native race." In the Congo, he favored the Belgian economic establishment but he also wished to promote American interests.

President Eisenhower's views paralleled those of Murphy. The President recognized lack of politically trained manpower among the Congolese, the problem of tribalism and political fragmentation. He had sensed "a restless and militant population in a state of gross ignorance—even by African standards." He had therefore hoped that the Congo's way out lay in close collaboration with the Belgians. The latter, Eisenhower believed, had a legitimate right to "protect

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3 Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 47; Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (New York: Doubleday, 1964), pp. 328, 324, 330-338.

4 Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 47; Kanza, Conflict in the Congo, p. 141.
Lumumba threatened all these by his unequivocal attack on Belgian colonial rule. Yet only Belgian and Congolese political leaders working together could save a delicate economic and political situation through minimizing preindependence differences, suspicions, and distrusts. The Congo's economy was already in a shambles. The flight of capital, the departure of employers without paying wages, and an early collection of taxes for the fiscal year 1960-1961 had occurred under Belgian administration. The refusal of the Belgian government to transfer the Belgian Congo's portfolio holdings in private corporations to the new government and the secret removal of the country's gold reserves from the Congo Central Bank by Belgian officials left the infant government economically paralyzed. American officials knew of these conditions in advance.

Political problems also worsened because of the Belgians' unwillingness to collaborate with Lumumba and their desire to "handicap" his effort to form a government. They had asked him in May to form a cabinet, but they then withdrew that mandate on June 16 and turned instead to Kasavubu. Lumumba protested. Kasavubu's ABAKO had won only twelve seats in the national election to MNC--Lumumba's

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thirty six. On June 21, when Kasavubu's search for an acceptable cabinet failed, the Belgians turned once more to Lumumba. The latter then organized a broad-based coalition with Kasavubu as "honoric" Head of State. The Belgians may have been influenced in this latter change by the American and British Consulates. The American and British Consuls still viewed Lumumba as the only Congolese capable of leading a government that would be free of Communist influence.7

The swearing in of Kasavubu as Head of State on June 26 provided some relief to skeptics. Lumumba's Belgian opponents hoped his government would "give way to a coalition of moderates." Meanwhile, Kasavubu would be able to moderate any radical policies.8 Thus an embittered Lumumba continued to distrust the Belgians, and they him.9

An explosive situation might have been avoided had the Force Publique, "the final repository of state power," remained quiet.10

The troops had demonstrated a degree of loyalty during the independence


8 Quotation from CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, 16 June 1960, p. 2; see also Kanza, Conflict in the Congo, pp. 138, 140; CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, 30 June 1960, p. 1; Current Intelligence, 14 July 1960, p. 3.

9 U.S. Department of State Telegram 14 (Leop.), 6 July 1960; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, pp. 55, 56, 57-58; Kanza, Conflict in the Congo, p. 160.

ceremonies. They appeared less concerned with changes taking place in the civilian sector. Lumumba also believed that the army could be Africanized without substantial change. "We are not, just because the Congo is independent, going to turn a second class soldier into a general." He echoed Belgian confidence that the soldiers would remain loyal, but everyone had miscalculated. He, like the Belgians, overlooked the fatigue that the army had suffered performing police duties.

The Force Publique consisted of 25,000 Africans and 1,000 Belgian officers. Other than a limited but successful participation in the two world wars, it had dealt mainly with domestic instability. The Africans in the Force formed a caste, segregated from the rest of the population by confinement to the barracks. They had their own schools and medical and recreational facilities. But during the pre-independence campaigns they had become increasingly politicized, mainly along ethnic lines. They had a long history of mutiny and of brutality against the civilian population.


13 Ganshof, Fin de la souverainete, p. 405; Williamé, Patrimonialism, pp. 63-64.

14 Williamé, Patrimonialism, pp. 62-63.
leaders and army commanders had not anticipated it, the troops expected to immediately reap the benefits of independence.15

Thus on July 5, 1960, the Force Publique units garrisoned at Camp Hardy in Leopoldville mutinied.16 First, they arrested their Belgian officers and then demanded salary increases and promotions. Then they attacked the residences of Lumumba, Kasavubu, and other ministers, who the troops accused of having expropriated big cars and houses and of having awarded themselves large salaries without due consideration for the army. Finally, they commanded the Africanization of the officer corps, thus ignoring General Emile Janssen, the Belgian Commander-in-Chief of the Force Publique. He had written on a blackboard that for the Africans, "Before Independence = After Independence."17 Beneath the revolt lay a history of Belgian mistreatments and "racial frustration" and a fear that Belgian para-troopers might intervene. Under the terms of the June 29, 1960 treaty of friendship, the latter could act at the request of the Congolese government to reestablish law and order.18


16 Ganshof, Fin de la souveraineté, p. 405.


18 Gerard-Libois and Verhaegen, Congo 1960, pp. 353-354, 1081; Willame, Patrimonialism, p. 64; see Lefever, Crisis in the Congo, pp. 199-200.
At first, Lumumba, who served both as Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense, and Kasavubu, who also held title as Head of State and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, persuaded the soldiers to be patient. Lumumba ordered the promotion of Africans one step, dismissed Janssen and some Belgian officers, but retained others. He renamed the Force Publique the Armée Nationale Congolaise and, on July 8, appointed Joseph Mobutu as Commander and named Victor Lundula, a professional soldier, as Commander-in-Chief. Mobutu had worked with the army in the early 1950's but left to become a journalist. These actions produced a short-lived positive result.

Between July 7 and 11, a relative calm prevailed in Leopoldville and Bas-Congo areas, but developments in Katanga and Kasai soon eroded any chances of reestablishing order among troops. First, in Elizabethville and in Lulunbourg, in Kasai, Belgian officers refused to "hand over command to Congolese," who had been promoted on Lumumba's order. Second, "on July 8, at 5 p.m. African" soldiers clashed with "white officers" at Kongolo in Katanga.

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20 Gerard-Libois, Katanga Secession, p. 95.
Meanwhile, on the morning of July 9, the Belgian Council of Ministers decided to dispatch a "reinforcement of Belgian para-commandos" to the Congo without first consulting the Congolese government. Later that night, the Congolese units garrisoned at Camp Massart in Katanga mutinied, with five civilians and two soldiers dead. Hence, Europeans organized self-defense units, thus increasing tension, while the Belgian government ordered its forces at Kamina base to occupy Elizabethville.\(^{21}\) The following morning, Belgian paratroops intervened throughout Katanga "without the consent of the Congo government and without giving Lumumba another opportunity to negotiate a settlement," as he had done in Leopoldville.\(^{22}\)

The troop mutiny in Katanga and the subsequent Belgian intervention in that province increased the propensity for the secession of Katanga. Since 1959, a group of Katangans, led by Moise Tshombe, Codefroide Munongo, and Jean-Batiste Kibwe, and supported by European separatists, had been working to create a state of Katanga. They had received encouragement from Sir Roy Welensky, the Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and from the French in Congo Brazzaville. Both Welensky and the French hoped the seceding...

\(^{21}\)Ibid., pp. 96-97.

\(^{22}\)Quotation from Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 56; see also Gerard-Libois, Katanga Secession, p. 97; see also Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence, pp. 100-104.
provinces would affiliate with their respective colonies. A plan to declare Katanga independent before June 30, 1960, had been thwarted on June 26 when the colonial authorities arrested a European conspirator and threatened a military confrontation with Rhodesia.23

Now Tshombe, as the secessionist leader in Katanga asked Rhodesia and the United Kingdom for "police forces" to assist an Independent Katanga on security matters. Pierre Wigny, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, reacted strongly. On July 10 and 11, he sent messages to European governments and the United States establishing his government's opposition to Tshombe's maneuvers. He asked that if Katanga seceded the régime should not be recognized, because "the Congo without Katanga . . . would become a prey for Communism." The withdrawal of Katanga, the center of the Congo's wealth, would ruin the country. Thus Tshombe and his colleagues were informed on July 11 of the decision of the Belgian government that recognition would not be granted.24

Lumumba and Kasavubu had also worked hard to diffuse the situation. On July 9 and 10, they informed Tshombe of their plan to visit Katanga and try to calm down the soldiers.25 On the latter

23 van der Meersch, Fin de la souveranete, pp. 580, 588, 582, 567, 92; Gerard-Libois, Katanga Secession, pp. 55-56, 56n, 31, 26, 19-20, 22.


25 Ibid., pp. 98, 100.
date, both the Prime Minister and the Head of State also inquired of United States Ambassador Clare H. Timberlake whether the United States could provide technical assistance needed to reorganize the armed forces. Timberlake, however, advised the two leaders to address their request to Ralph Bunche, Under-Secretary General of the United Nations. Bunche had been in the Congo since June 30 as Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld. On July 11, Lumumba and Kasavubu sent a "delegation" led by Adjutant Justin Kokolo to Katanga to pacify the mutinous soldiers. However, Belgian paracommandos prevented the delegation from landing.

In the meantime, Belgian troops expanded their military pacification not only in Katanga, but also in Leopoldville. On the morning of July 11, Belgian naval forces arrived at Matadi, a port city located at the mouth of the River Congo, where they attacked Congolese military installations using gun-boats and aircraft. Several Congolese were killed. Then in the afternoon they occupied Boma, another port city a few miles north of Matadi. Observers agree that these cities were peaceful when the Belgians attacked and that this action precipitated violence against Europeans.


27 Gerard-Libois, Katanga Secession, p. 100.

followed these developments with concern. The State Department and the CIA supplied reports on initial engagements between the Armée Nationale Congolaise and Belgian troops at Matadi and at Boma.\textsuperscript{29} The widening Belgian intervention worsened an already unstable situation. Tshombe, who had been momentarily restrained by Belgian authorities, declared Katanga independent on the evening of July 11.\textsuperscript{30} He subsequently requested and received the support of Belgian troops. The Belgian government apparently had changed its preindependence opposition to the Katanga secession even though it did not officially recognize the Katanga régime. Another threat appeared in South Kasai where Albert Kalonji sought United States help in overthrowing Lumumba's government.\textsuperscript{31} Kalonji resented Lumumba for having excluded him from the Cabinet. Conditions became totally confused when workers in Leopoldville joined in demanding unpaid wages, and United States observers feared that there might be a food riot.\textsuperscript{32}


\textsuperscript{30}Department of State Telegram 50 (Leop.), 12 July 1960, Timberlake to Secretary of State; CIA Current Intelligence (Congo) Weekly Summary, 14 July 1960, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{31}Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 58; Gerard-Libois, Katanga Secession, pp. 98-99.


\textsuperscript{32}Telegram 50 (Leop.), 14 July 1960, Timberlake to Secretary of State; "Policy Paper," p. 5; Telegram 58 (Leop.), 12 July 1960, Timberlake to Secretary of State.
In spite of Belgium's unilateral actions, Kasavubu and Lumumba reached an accord with the Belgian Consul at Lualabourg on July 12 which allowed Belgian troops to remain in Kasai for two months to maintain order. They then flew to Elizabethville to negotiate with troops there, but Munongo, who had been named Katanga's Minister of Interior "forbade [their] landing on Katangan territory." The plane that carried them subsequently refueled at Kamina military base where Belgian soldiers and refugees insulted Kasavubu and Lumumba. Angered by these experiences, the Congolese Prime Minister and the Head of State rescinded the Lualabourg agreement and demanded the end of the Belgian troop intervention. Without these the Katanga secession would cease to be a major threat, because Tshombe had no troops of his own. Until their expulsion from Katanga in the middle of July by the Belgian paracommandos, the Congolese army units in Katanga, under the command of General Lundula, still paid allegiance to the central government. But the Belgians now rallied to the support of Katanga.

Katanga was as important to Belgium as it was to the Congo. The Belgians had invested most of their $3.5 billion in Katanga and 40,000 Belgian citizens lived there. The Kamina military base, with

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34 Quotation is from Gerard-Libois, Katanga Secession, pp. 100-101; see also Hoskins, The Congo Since Independence, pp. 97-100; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 58.
its NATO facilities, was located at Elizabethville. For the new Congolese government, the loss of Katanga meant a loss of 60% of its foreign currency earnings and other tax revenues payable by the Union Minière and its affiliated corporations. A successful secession would thus lead to a serious financial crisis.

Since the Force Publique surprised observers by its mutiny, they then and later sought explanations. An unnamed Belgian military officer, who served in Katanga until 1961, asserted in 1969 that Lumumba had incited the soldiers to rebel against the Belgian officers. A Central Intelligence Agency report also held Lumumba responsible because of his "tyranny and favoritism," his transformation of "the army into his personal fief" and his rejection of a demand by the army that the minister of defense be a military man. These contentions seem implausible. Lumumba had dismissed some Belgian officers, an action within his constitutional powers, but his purpose had not been to promote his supporters. He only sought to calm resentment among the troops of their Belgian officers. No evidence exists to confirm the CIA report that the Force Publique had demanded that the position of minister of defense go to one of them.


Finally, Congolese leaders simply followed that democratic Western tradition which calls for civilian control over the armed services.

The army situation involved more than military considerations, and it got out of hand because of a number of factors. Four of these can be attributed to Congolese shortcomings. First, as the renowned Indian diplomat Rajeshwar Dayal put it, "When power was hurriedly transferred to Congolese hands, [without previous political and administrative experience], the new Central Government, like that of any other newly independent country, wished to be master in its own house and not to submit to a status of tutelage or subordination to the former metropolitan power." This attitude may have prevented the Congolese leaders from requesting Belgian troop intervention when the mutinies first began. Yet the Africanization of forces required discipline. The Belgians had dealt with previous disorders. They could have helped, but the distrust of the Belgians and the Congolese for each other inhibited cooperative action. Also, no one perceived the relationship of the army to the survival of the state. The army was not only its military arm but also its police force. Its collapse meant that governmental regulations could not be enforced. Also, the disintegrated army encouraged the Katanga secessionists. Finally, a lack of consensus among Congolese leaders hampered their ability to deal with the problem.

39 Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, p. 2.

But the situation also arose because of Belgian shortcomings. They failed to understand that collaboration was preferred over gunboat diplomacy. Unfortunately, national pride, a lingering sense of colonial superiority, and anti-Lumumba attitudes led them to move toward intervention between July 10 and 11 before the mutiny led to atrocities and later to maintain a de facto regime in Katanga.  

Yet, despite pressures from the American, British, and French consulates to act, the Belgians had held off. They moved only after French troops stationed in Congo Brazzaville were reported prepared to evacuate Europeans and after rumors arrived that Rhodesia had massed 1,000 men on the Congo border "ready to protect European" lives. Belgian paracommandos then attacked various Force Publique camps, thus widening the conflict. The Congolese leaders, who had been challenged by their army, now found themselves allied with the dissidents in charging the Belgians with "aggression," while the latter became belligerent in their support of Tshombe's regime. 

The United Nations soon found itself called upon to intervene in this complicated situation and to assume a responsibility it had never undertaken elsewhere—to reestablish law and order, to avert an economic catastrophe, to reorganize security forces, to decide territorial issues related to questions of self-determination, and to

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41 Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 58; Gerard-Libois, Katanga Secession, pp. 93, 95.

42 Department of State Telegram 58 (Leop.), 12 July 1960, Timberlake to Secretary of State.

43 Quotation from Welch, Soldier and State, p. 276; see also Department of State, Telegram 58 (Leop.), 12 July 1960, Timberlake to Secretary of State.
find a government acceptable to internal factions and external nations.

Whether the United Nations succeeded or failed would depend on the innovation and creativity of the Secretariat, the degree of support provided by member states, and a clear understanding of the issues.

Secretary-General Hammarskjöld, believing that the UN could play a limited but significant role, tried a broad African policy. He had returned from his African journey early in 1960 more convinced than ever that the United Nations could fill a modest but influential role in helping the weak and inexperienced new African Member states to build national strength thus reducing the temptations offered by weakness to great power interventions from outside the continent or ambitious adventurers from among their midst.

He hoped the United Nations could fulfill this function by providing "expert development administrative assistance" as well as "moral support." For the Congo, Hammarskjöld also planned to provide whatever "technical assistance that United Nations resources would permit...." He believed it would face major post-independence problems but none of the magnitude that arose in July.

Lumumba and Kasavubu had hoped to resolve the problem of the Force Publique's mutiny gradually and peacefully, and on July 8, they had appealed to Bunche for support. Bunche and Lumumba wished the UN "to restore discipline in the Congolese army." Thus Bunche relayed

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46 Department of State, Telegram 33 (Leop.), 11 July 1960, Timeberlake to Secretary of State.
the request and the Secretary-General reportedly responded that the
UN would help "in the field of security administrations." When the
Belgians unilaterally intervened on July 10, 11, and 12, Hammarskjöld
faced a changed situation because of the presumed external "aggrres-
sion." Kasavubu and Lumumba did not confine their appeals to the UN.
On July 10, they had asked for United States assistance but Timberlake
avoided the issue by advising them verbally to direct their request to
the United Nations. On July 12, Kasavubu and Lumumba had also flown
to Katanga in a futile effort to end the one-day-old secession, and
while they were away, a significant development occurred. At 3:30
p.m. Deputy Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga convened a Cabinet meeting
along with Timberlake, Belgian Ambassador J. van den Bosch, and Bel-
gian "emissaries" W. J. Ganshoff van der Meersch, Belgian resident
Minister in the Congo, and Auguste De Schrijver, former Belgian mini-
ster for the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi. Two days after his conversa-
tion with Kasavubu and Lumumba, Timberlake apparently had changed his
view regarding the role of United States troops. He telegraphed the
State Department that the situation in Leopoldville appeared "poten-
tially most critical," and van den Bosch and representatives of France
agreed that a large scale troop intervention should be taken by a for-
eign power starting in Leopoldville city.

48 Timberlake, "First Years of Independence. . . ." pp. 10, 70; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 58.
49 Department of State, Telegram 50 (Leop.), 12 July 1960, Timberlake to Secretary of State.
representatives of the powers may explain why Gizenga called the cabinet into session apparently without permission of either the Head of State or the Prime Minister and in contravention of the powers vested in him by Article VI of the Loi Fondamentale.50

After an hour and one-half secession, the Cabinet, having engaged in conversation with Timberlake, submitted a written request for 2,000-3,000 United States troops to be sent immediately to the Congo to restore law and order and to ensure peace "in collaboration with the Congolese Army." The document, bearing the signatures of Foreign Affairs Minister Justin Bomboko, Secretary of National Defense A. Nyambo, and Gizenga, made clear that Belgian unilateral intervention had undermined the possibility of cooperation between the ANC and Belgian units. Thus "a foreign neutral" force was necessary to stabilize the situation.51

The Cabinet's action may have been well-intended, but it did not help matters. It merely intensified confusion among the inexperienced Congolese officials. Lumumba and Kasavubu learned of developments in Lualabourg, where they had returned after being humiliated in Elizabethville. They reacted by cabling a request to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for an "urgent dispatch by the United Nations of military assistance." They added that the main


51 Department of State, Telegram 54 (Leop.), 12 July 1960, Timberlake to Secretary of State; see also his "First Years of Independence...," p. 70; Editors' note in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 18; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 58.
reason "of the requested military aid is to protect the national
territory of the Congo against the present external [Belgian] aggres­sion which is a threat to international peace." They did not refer to the Katanga secession. Perhaps they believed the removal of the Belgians would solve that problem.

Bomboko, apparently aware of the Kasavubu-Lumumba telegram, went on the radio to speak. He said that "terrorism" existed in Leopoldville. Therefore, the United States government had been asked for troops pending the organization of a United Nations Force. The latter, when they arrived, would assist the American units in restoring order.

Timberlake meanwhile reported to Washington on his discussion with Congolese officials that afternoon. He informed the State Department that "even a token force of two companies American forces might serve to stabilize situation long enough to permit peaceful entry [of UN contingents]." He noted that Bomboko had been on the radio announcing the plea for United States troops and that the French and the Belgians were ready to deploy troops in Leopoldville to evacuate Europeans.

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52 Department of State, Telegram (Lualabourg), 12 July 1960, Kasavubu and Lumumba to Secretary-General in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 18-19; see also Weissman, American Foreign Policy, 61-62; Gerard-Libois, Katanga Secession, p. 101.

53 Department of State, Telegram 57 (Leop.), 12 July 1960, Timberlake to Secretary of State.

54 Telegram 58 (Leop.), 12 July 1960, Timberlake to Secretary of State.
When Bomombo called at the American embassy late on the night of July 12 to inquire about the arrival time of any United States units, he was informed that no answer had come from Washington. Furthermore, any United States troops would come only under UN auspices because Nikita Khrushchev, the leader of the Soviet Union, had said that the United States was "trying to reimpose colonialism on the Congo."55 Earlier in the day, French officials had informed Timberlake that their forces stationed in Brazzaville could be used only if requested by either the Congo government or by the United Nations.56

In the wake of the Soviet criticism, Timberlake must have seen the logic of the French approach. He therefore advised Bomombo to contact independent African states to support UN-US intervention. Bomombo responded:

With a view to assuring public order in our country we have been obliged to ask the intervention of UN and in the immediate future that of the U.S. in its capacity as member of UN. [P]lease support this request which is only possible to guarantee independence of our country.57

These maneuvers took place in the absence of the Head of State and the Prime Minister. No evidence indicates that they were consulted or informed before Gizenga or Bomombo acted. More

55Telegram 59 (Leop.), 12 July 1960, Timberlake to Secretary of State. Compare Weissman, American Foreign Policy, pp. 56-57.

56Telegram 58 (Leop.), 12 July 1960, Timberlake to Secretary of State.

57Cited in Telegram 59 (Leop.), 12 July 1960, Timberlake to Secretary of State.
importantly, these subordinates apparently responded under the influence of the United States and Belgian ambassadors. Though all parties may have simply wished to find a means to resolve the crisis quickly, neither Timberlake nor van den Bosch seems to have recognized that they had seriously undermined Kasavubu and Lumumba.

The latter reached Kindu, in Kivu province, on July 13. Early that morning Belgian reinforcements had arrived, occupying Leopoldville airport and that sector of the city where the government buildings were situated. Most Europeans lived there thus assuring their temporary safety. From Kindu, Lumumba and Kasavubu sent a second telegram to Hammarskjöld. They sought to clarify the contents of their previous cable and to repudiate the request sent to the United States by the Cabinet. They carefully distinguished between possible reasons for any outside intervention. A United Nations Force was not needed to "restore the internal situation in the Congo but rather to protect the national territory against acts of aggression committed by Belgian metropolitan troops." The telegram made it clear that the United Nations Force should consist "of military personnel from neutral countries and not from the United States as reported by certain radio stations." To underscore the latter point, the Chief of State and the Prime Minister added that, if the United Nations failed to come quickly to the aid of the Congo, they would "be obliged to appeal to the Bandung treaty powers." Again there was no mention of the

Katanga secession. The overriding issue seemed to be the Belgian intervention.

The Bandung powers consisted of the presumably non-aligned nations that had met at Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955 to dissociate themselves from the Cold War. They included, among others, the United Arab Republic (Egypt), Ghana, Indonesia, Communist China, and Yugoslavia. Lumumba and Kasavubu did inject the Cold War into the situation when they sent a telegram to Khrushchev on July 14 informing him that the Congo might ask for Soviet "intervention [if] certain Western nations supporting the plot of Belgium against" the Congo did not stop.59

Though the Belgians had asked the United States for logistical support for their Congo military operation, it does not appear that Lumumba knew of it.60 The decision to appeal to the Soviet Union undoubtedly reflected concern over the maneuvers of Timberlake and van den Bosch, the Gizenga-Bomboko-Nyambo actions of July 12, and the massive reinforcement of Belgium troops the following day. Lumumba reportedly explained to Bunche that they asked the Soviet Union for possible assistance because the United States had rejected their request and the United Nations had not yet responded to the two cables.61

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59 Quotation from Department of State, Telegram 136 (Wash.), 15 July 1960, Secretary Herter to U.S. Embassies and US-UN Mission; see also Hilsman, To Move a Nation, pp. 236-237; Editors' note in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 19.

60 Department of State, Telegram 82 (Wash.), 13 July 1960, Herter to U.S. Embassy, Leop.

61 Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence, p. 128; Lumumba's
Alerting the Soviet Union was a bad calculation on the part of the two leaders because it complicated the situation for the UN. It now not only had to stabilize internal conditions and attempt to effect the withdrawal of Belgian forces, but it also had to deal with a possible big power confrontation. The latter became imminent when the United States announced that it opposed any form of unilateral intervention in the Congo and insisted that all aid to the Congo be channeled through the United Nations. 62

The United Nations lacked experience in dealing with such complex situations. It had engaged in previous peace-keeping efforts in the Suez crisis of 1956 and in Lebanon and Jordan in 1958, but all these involved permanent members of the Security Council. In the 1956 Suez situation, Britain and France intervened on the side of Israel to keep the Canal open. The 6,000 soldiers dispatched by the United Nations saved Egypt from the humiliation of defeat. 63 In the Congo, the UN faced an army in rebellion, a seceded province, and Belgian troops apparently incapable of controlling the various Force Publique factions. The latter soon became a problem themselves. Frustrated by their inability to achieve stability, the Belgians

became increasingly belligerent, making the United Nations task more difficult by their support of secessionists.  

The riot in Lebanon in 1958 provided a partial parallel to the Congo. The conflict there involved religious issues combined with armed forces divided between Christians and Muslims. The situation developed into an international concern when the Lebanese government delivered a letter to the Security Council on May 22 in which it accused the United Arab Republic of intervening in the internal affairs of Lebanon. The Security Council responded modestly by authorizing the Secretary-General to send in an observation group. It would watch for the illegal infiltration of any personnel and the supply of military material across the Lebanese border. Washington viewed Egypt, under Gamal Abdel Nasser, as pro-Soviet; thus it landed troops in Lebanon that July, despite reports that no external threat existed, and by so doing stymied the UN mission.

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64 Gerard-Libois, Katanga Secession, pp. 102-106; Gordenker, The UN Secretaries-General, pp. 267-268.


The Jordanian situation of 1958 appeared serious. In July, the threat of a military coup led to a request by the Jordanian monarch for British and American support. When British troops arrived on July 17, the Soviet Union introduced a resolution in the Security Council calling for the speedy removal of British and American forces from both Jordan and Lebanon. The United States and Britain, while denying any wrong-doing, agreed to withdraw their units if United Nations observation forces could be sent to the area. The Jordanian crisis was thus effectively diffused, and the United Nations played little more than stabilizing role. The Security Council and the Secretary-General could do little except issue appeals without invoking Chapter XV, Article 99, of the Charter which provides that "the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security." The United States and Great Britain would have vetoed any resolution for a UN force which would have removed American and British troops from Lebanon and Jordan. The organization, thus, relied on its political rather than its military power.

These previous experiences contrasted markedly with events in the Congo where the rebellious army had left the Central Government with little effective police power and no military force to deal with an externally encouraged secession. Furthermore, Belgian intervention

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68 Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1958), p. 164339A.
69 See Burns and Heathcote, Peace-Keeping by UN Forces, pp. 24-25, 249, 9-10, 11, 15, 19.
had failed to reestablish order, producing an effect counter to that of British and American forces in Jordan and Lebanon. More importantly, the circumstances in which Article 99 had been implemented in the Suez situation had weakened its implied police powers because the Secretary-General relied solely on moral suasion and any inference to the Article was by "implication" only. Internal disorder had been brought under control without United Nations direct involvement. In the Congo, the United Nations not only had to deal with a divided people and tribally inhibited and insecure political leaders, but it also had to negotiate the Belgian withdrawal and maintain internal security. Furthermore, the United Nations had to find a solution to the secessionist regime of Katanga and avert a spill-over of the Cold War.70

When Hammarskjöld received the Congo's request for "urgent ... military assistance" against Belgian "aggression," his mind turned to the Suez, Jordanian and Lebanese experiences for a precedent. Thus when the Security Council convened on the night of July 13 to consider the situation, Hammarskjöld relied on Article 99. This definitely limited the police powers of the United Nations because the Article authorized him only to "bring to the attention of the Security Council" dangerous situations. He would have been wiser to rely on Chapter VII, Articles 41 and 42, of the Charter, which

70 On the application of Article 99 to Suez see Gordenker, The UN Secretary-General, pp. 145-146. For fear of Cold War spill-over see The New York Times, July 12, 1960, pp. 2, 12; State Department Telegram 98 (Wash.), 16 July 1960 Herter to U.S. Embassies.
empowered the Security Council to take military action to ensure international peace and security.71

Did the Congo involve a breach of the international peace? Four conditions indicated that it did. First, Belgium had intervened in violation of its treaty of friendship which stated explicitly that its forces stationed in the Congo could not respond except on command from the Congolese Minister of National Defense.72 Second, the arrival of Belgian metropolitan troops and their subsequent engagement in military operation and the military occupation constituted a violation of the Congo's sovereignty. Third, the danger of Soviet intervention seemed real at the moment and the United States insisted that a Soviet military presence in the Congo would be a threat to the international community.73 Finally, the increasing involvement of European mercenaries and Belgian soldiers in the secessionist regime in Katanga could not be overlooked.74

Under the circumstances it is difficult to understand why Hammarskjöld responded so mildly. His internal memoranda are not available; hence it is impossible to discover what reasoning led him to invoke Article 99 instead of Chapter VII of the Charter. United

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71 Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, v, 18-19; 40-43, 72-73.

72 Full text of the treaty is found in Lefever, Crisis in the Congo, Appendix D, pp. 199-200; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 63.

73 Department Telegram of State, 33 (Leop.), 13 July 1960, Herter to USUN Mission.

States documents, however, shed some light and may explain that government's decision not to accept the Congo's plea for troops. Before the Security Council convened, it was clear that Lumumba and Kasavubu wanted the UN forces to confront Belgian troops. This ran counter to the desires of both Hammarskjöld and the United States. Hammarskjöld wished "to formulate terms of reference describing mission in terms other than those Congolese requested." The United Nations Force would be used for "peace and security functions" and work for the eventual withdrawal of the Belgian contingents. While Hammarskjöld's position paralleled that of the Department of State, it appears that he arrived at it independently of the Americans.

United States policy, as it unfolded beginning on July 13, seemed to have been influenced by three factors—the presence of Belgian forces, the possibility that a non-Western power would intervene, and a desire to avoid being viewed in Africa as a neo-colonialist power. That led to the public position that all aid to the Congo should be channeled through the United Nations. The United States supported the speedy establishment of a force drawn from the smaller member states, providing it would not be used against the Belgians. The State Department believed that the Belgians had intervened only to protect European lives and that they had "not committed aggression." Any UN action based on that assumption would receive American support.

75 Department of State Telegram 33 (Wash.), 13 July 1960, from Secretary of State Herter to USUN Mission.
76 Telegram 33 (Leop.), 13 July 1960, Herter to USUN Mission; see also Telegram circular 98 (Wash.), 16 July 1960, Herter to Embassies.
It appears, therefore, that United States officials rejected the Congolese request for American troops because they felt the area was a Belgian responsibility and they did not want to undermine Belgium's self-esteem.

It was considered too dangerous to let the Belgians solve the Congo problem alone, but every effort would be made to protect Belgian interests, the more so as these were basically the interests of America's European allies in Africa.\textsuperscript{77}

Surprisingly, the Americans believed that the Soviet Union lacked the capacity to intervene in the Congo, but they felt that Communist China as a signatory to the Bandung treaty might heed the Congo's appeal for help. The latter problem could be overcome by dispatching a United Nations force to the area immediately.\textsuperscript{78}

In contrast to Korea in 1950 and Lebanon in 1958, where a Communist threat, represented by North Korea and Egypt challenged the policy of containment, the Congo seemed reasonably secure. It was bordered on all sides by the British, the Portuguese, and the French, all members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Belgium also belonged. The presence of a United Nations Force armed not with police power but moral suasion could thus effectively check Soviet or Chinese designs and prevent the possibility of a direct Soviet-American confrontation. Furthermore, it allowed Belgium freedom of action while

\textsuperscript{77} Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 63.

\textsuperscript{78} Department of State Telegram 33 (Wash.), 13 July 1960, Herter to USUN Mission; Telegram 137 (Wash.), 15 July 1960, Herter to Embassy, Brussels; CIA, Office of National Estimates, Memorandum, 7 January 1963, from Sherman Kent to Director. Weissman, American Foreign Policy, pp. 59-60, 65.
it rallied the support of the Afro-Asian states which also wished to avoid cold war rivalries.\textsuperscript{79}

The policy of pursuing United States goals through the UN seemed wise. It gave the Americans an edge over the Soviets because the Western bloc controlled four of the five permanent seats in the Security Council. The Americans and the British held 49 of the 102 senior positions in the Secretariat, and the Secretary-General's closest advisors were strongly pro-Western. The three top Secretariat officials who handled UN Congo policies came from the United States—Ralph Bunche, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, Andrew Cordier, the Executive Assistant, and Heinrich Weisschoff, the Secretariat's African Affairs expert. This pro-Western bias also appeared in the appointment of field officers.\textsuperscript{80} Thus, any action by the Secretariat would be closely coordinated with the United States.

As the Security Council prepared to convene, Secretary of State Christian Herter telegraphed policy instructions to the United States UN Mission. They should support Hammarskjöld's plan for the organization of a United Nations Force, agree with his decision not to criticize Belgian actions, and concur in his desire not to include Soviet troops in the UN Force. To "neutralize Soviet" opposition, the United States could endorse the inclusion of a few Yugoslavs as


\textsuperscript{80}\footnote{Lefever, Crisis in the Congo, p. 201; Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, p. 23; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 60 n.}
long as they did not receive "overall command." The United States should also volunteer to assist the UN with Transportation, Communication, and logistics upon request by the Secretary-General, even though he might understandably wish to play down such a role.  

The debate that ensued in the Security Council on July 13-14 centered around the presence of Belgian forces. Most of the Afro-Asian and Communist countries regarded their presence as an act of aggression. The United States, through its representative Henry Cabot Lodge, spoke in favor of Belgian intervention. He argued that Belgium was only trying to restore order and therefore it had not committed aggression. Britain, France, and Italy supported Lodge's position.  

Lodge obviously selected one legal position over another in his argument. He discarded the treaty of friendship between Belgium and the Congo, which limited Belgium's right to intervene, and he relied on a broader doctrine of international law which allowed a nation to act to protect its citizens and national interest. He did not, however, explain such a position in his speech. The debate led to a Security Council resolution of July 13-14 which, in keeping with the stipulations of Article 99, authorized "the Secretary-General..., in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the government with such military assistance as may be necessary until...the national security forces may be able...to meet fully their tasks." The resolution called upon the Belgian

81 Department of State Telegram 33 (Wash.), 13 July 1960, from Herter to USUN Mission.

82 Department of State Bulletin, XLIII (August 1, 1960), 159-161; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 63.
government to withdraw its troops. Both the United States and the Soviet Union voted affirmatively, but Britain and France felt it gave the UN too much power and they abstained.\(^83\)

With the adoption of this resolution, the United States scored a singular success in its UN policy. It was based largely on a draft prepared in the State Department and relayed to Hammarskjöld with a recommendation that he ask representatives of Tunisia and Ceylon to introduce it in the Security Council. Such an approach, American officials anticipated, would avoid a Soviet veto.\(^84\) As passed, the resolution differed only from the American version in its first operative paragraph which called for the withdrawal of Belgian troops. The United States, Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium, while they disliked the paragraph, considered the resolution toothless.\(^85\) It neither set a limit date for Belgium's withdrawal nor did it condemn Belgian actions. It did, however, establish a pattern for later declarations.

The Secretary-General's appeal for troops received an enthusiastic response from independent African states. Contingents came from Tunisia, Morocco, Ghana, Ethiopia, Guinea, and Nigeria aboard


\(^84\) Department of State Telegram 33 (Wash.), 13 July 1960, from Herter to USUN Mission.

\(^85\) Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 25-26.
American planes. Within two days after authorization, a UN military presence was established.  

Their vigorous response demonstrated that the Afro-Asian bloc felt the United Nations offered a way to help the Congo without any big power rivalry. That, however, seemed unavoidable. On July 14, the Soviet Union had already charged in the Security Council that United States fifteenth and twenty-fourth infantry divisions were on their way to the Congo. The Soviet representative further accused Ambassador Timberlake of "interfering in the domestic affairs of the Republic of the Congo." The Americans promptly denied such allegations. However, there was truth to the Soviet charges. The aircraft carrier, USS WASP, had been dispatched to the Coast of West Africa and "a carrier" apparently was stationed close to the "mouth of the Congo river."  

Meanwhile, Lumumba and Kasavubu, who had to use various airports now occupied by Belgian forces in their cross-country shuttles to reestablish order, had been repeatedly frustrated by Belgian

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87 Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 101.


nationals and troops. They therefore broke diplomatic relations with Belgium on July 14. Bunche, Hammarskjöld's special representative, felt this diplomatic rupture to be uncalled for, and he criticized Lumumba. Bunche apparently did not know what Timberlake had been reporting to the State Department.

Parenthetically, Belgian troops and civilians are behaving similarly [to the Force Publique] and worse in the streets of Leopoldville.

He noted that "a white civilian" had killed a Congolese "on the street...without any provocation." He recorded on July 16, that some Belgians,...particularly the military, have become completely irrational and in many instances have behaved worse than the worse Congolese.90

The severing of diplomatic relations convinced Belgian officials that the Soviet Union might intervene, and they decided to give Katanga a de facto recognition.91 They also believed that the United States should publicly warn the Soviets against sending any troops. Under instruction from Foreign Minister Wigny, the Belgian Ambassador to the United States, Raymond Scheyven, called on Herter on July 15. Citing the July 14 Lumumba-Kasavubu telegram to Khrushchev, Scheyven told Herter that Lumumba was "acting under Soviet influence" and that Khrushchev had threatened to take drastic action if Belgian troops failed to withdraw. Under the circumstance, the Congo might lead to a Third World War. The United States should warn that it would respond militarily if the Soviets sent forces there. Herter, already aware that the Soviets planned no invasion, promised

91 Gerard-Libois, Katanga Secession, pp. 103-115.
neither a public nor private response to Khrushchev's threat. However, he assured Schevven that Belgian troops should remain in the Congo until the UN was in "firm control."^1

Unfortunately, the presence of Belgian forces continually frustrated the UN in its operation. They proved to be a source of instability in the Congo; they became an issue which divided the Secretariat and Congolese leaders; and they encouraged cold war rivalries. Both Kasavubu and Lumumba had hoped that the arrival of the United Nations Force would be followed by the withdrawal of the Belgians. Apparently the Secretary-General never explained to them that the first operative paragraph of the July 13-14 Security Council resolution would not be applied forthwith. The United Nations Command had also been plagued with organizational problems, but the Secretariat appears not to have informed the Congolese leaders of the situation. 93

Thus when the UN took no action regarding the Belgians, Lumumba and Kasavubu reacted. First, they sent a letter to the Soviet Union requesting assistance. Then, on July 18, while in Stanleyville, Orientale province, they demanded that the UN order Belgian forces out of the Congo in 72 hours. Kasavubu even charged that the "UN was involved in imperialism" because of its refusal to send troops to

91 Department of State Telegram 137 (Wash.), 15 July 1960, Herter to US Embassy Brussels.

Katanga. More than 10,000 Belgian soldiers had now returned to the Congo. 94

The apparently common front between Kasavubu and Lumumba worried UN representatives and Timberlake. Kasavubu had done little to moderate Lumumba's alleged "radical" policies, which most Western observers saw as a real danger. 95 Bunche readily assumed Lumumba had initiated the diplomatic rupture with Belgium and issued the appeal to the Soviet Union for assistance. Timberlake, though appalled by Belgian behavior in the Congo, still felt ties between Belgium and the Congo should be maintained. Major-General H. T. Alexander, the British Commander-in-Chief of Ghanaian armed forces and the head of that country's UN units, met with Kasavubu and Lumumba in Stanleyville and reported to Bunche and Timberlake he thought Kasavubu did not like the way Lumumba had handled matters but that the president felt weak. While this assessment may have been correct and Kasavubu may not have liked Lumumba, both still seemed in accord in their demand for Belgian withdrawal. 96

94 Quotation is from Department of State Telegram 133 (Leop.), 18 July 1960, Timberlake to Secretary of State. The paragraph is based on "Policy Paper," 25 January 1961, p. 14; Telegrams 141 and 178 (Leop.), 18 and 20 July 1960, Timberlake to Secretary of State; Epstein, Revolt, p. 17; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 65; Kanza, Conflict in the Congo, p. 215. For the number of Belgian troops see Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, p. 27.

95 Timberlake, "First Years of Independence," p. 67; Murphy, Diplomat, pp. 333-338; Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 573.

At this point Timberlake's role became crucial for Lumumba's future. Alexander and Bunche had already concluded that Lumumba was irrational, and Timberlake had come to believe he was a crypto-Communist. Therefore, Timberlake met with Foreign Minister Bomboke and Minister to the UN Thomas Kanza. They subsequently agreed to convene the Cabinet when Lumumba and Kasavubu returned from Stanleyville. In the meantime, they would work to line up enough votes in the Cabinet to reject the ultimatum of Lumumba and Kasavubu to the UN to rid the Congo of Belgian troops within three days and override the request for Soviet aid. Apparently someone took up the subject with the Congolese Senators, because on July 19, a day after Timberlake met with Bomboke and Kanza, the Senate repudiated the ultimatum and the appeal for Soviet intervention. It insisted further that it should have been consulted before diplomatic relations were broken with Belgium, but it affirmed the demand for immediate Belgian withdrawal. 97

The July 18 incident and the Senate's reaction to the policies hitherto pursued jointly by Lumumba and Kasavubu produced a recognizable effect. American officials believed the Upper House of the Chamber to be strongly pro-Kasavubu and equally anti-Lumumba. 98 Thus, the targeting of Lumumba for blame by Bunche, General Alexander, and Timberlake, may have been a strategy to isolate him from Kasavubu.

They recognized Lumumba's ability but they also distrusted him. Kasavubu obviously understood, and he quietly withdrew from the rhetorical diplomacy that had characterized his and Lumumba's responses to the crisis since July 5. In contrast, Lumumba maintained his militant posture.

For Bunche, the situation represented a "crisis of confidence," and he relayed this view to Hammarskjöld. The Secretary-General subsequently went before the Security Council on July 18 not only to give it his first progress report but also to ask it to clarify the United Nation's mandate. Hammarskjöld informed the Council that the United Nations agreed to intervene in the Congo for two legitimate reasons. First, the "breakdown" in internal order threatened international "peace and security." Second, the government of the Congo had requested UN assistance. Therefore, the presence of Belgian troops against the wishes of the latter was "legally not essential" to the United Nations intervention. In other words, the evacuation of Belgian troops would be subordinated to the establishment of internal security. He noted, however, that Belgium had agreed to withdraw its forces from the city and area surrounding Leopoldville. But "in case of grave and imminent danger the Belgian forces will continue to take necessary security measures" in consultation with the United Nations.

99 Kanza, Conflict in the Congo, p. 215.

Command. He added on July 20 that eventually the Belgians would have to leave the Congo including Katanga.  

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union protested to the Secretary-General that American troops had entered the Congo under the umbrella of the United Nations. The Soviet note demanded their immediate withdrawal. When the Security Council convened on July 20, Lodge noted that a "few" noncombatant American technicians were in the Congo to provide transport, communication, and food. They had been requested by the United Nations. He added that "With other United Nations members we will do whatever may be necessary to prevent the intrusion of any military forces not requested by the United Nations." He presumably meant the Soviets and possibly the Chinese.

In Leopoldville, Lumumba appears to have been frustrated by the rhetoric in New York. At a July 20 news conference he first expressed confidence in Bunche and the United Nations. Then he attacked the inactivity of the UN Force, which he claimed stood still while Belgian troops killed Congolese. He further criticized the United Nations practice of submitting "decisions to the Belgians for approval," warning that the Congo would invite help from any country if that meant the removal of the Belgians. However, he withdrew the

101 Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 37-38, 29-30, 42; Kanza, Conflict in the Congo, pp. 215-216.

102 Quotation from Department of State Bulletin, XLIII (August 8, 1960), 222-223, 206; Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 44; see also State Department Telegram 655 (NY), 5 September 1960, from Wadsworth, USUN to Secretary of State; Security Council Official Record, Supplement for July, August, and September 1960, doc. S/4398.
earlier requests for Soviet assistance pending responses of the Security Council. It is worth noting again Lumumba's silence on the issue of the Katanga secession. He must have known of the weakness of Tshombe's government which could fall once the Belgians left. This may explain his consistency in not mentioning the secession in his speeches. Or, he apparently still minimized its danger to the Congo.

The Council on July 22 unanimously adopted a Tunisian-Ceylonese resolution. It called upon Belgium to withdraw its troops speedily and empowered the Secretary-General to do all he could to effect that objective. It did not, however, authorize the UN to use military force to evacuate the Belgians. More importantly, the Council recognized the Congo by recommending that the "Republic of the Congo" be admitted into the United Nations membership "as a unit." 104

The debates indicated that the American and Hammarskjöld's strategy of having Afro-Asian states introduce draft resolutions in the Security Council to neutralize a Soviet veto might be threatened in the future. First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union Vasily V. Kuznetsov announced in the 879th meeting that the United States, because of its majority in the UN, had imposed its policies on the Organization's Congo operation. He noted that when Lodge spoke of "military forces not requested by the United Nations" he

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103 As reported in Department of State Telegram 178 (Leop.), 20 July 1960, Timberlake to Secretary of State; see also "Policy Paper," 25 January 1961, p. 14.

meant troops not approved by the United States. The Soviet Union could not accept that American view because "the USSR responds to all appeals when it is a question of helping people who are struggling for their liberation." Kuznetsov cautioned Hammarskjöld that the UN mission in the Congo was to safeguard "the territorial integrity" of that country and not any internal security administration. He meant the removal of the Belgian forces and not the administration of law and order.

Developments in the Congo led to some relaxation of tension. The Council of Ministers met, endorsed the demand for immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops, and upheld earlier actions of Lumumba and Kasavubu. However, with the adoption of the Security Council resolution, Lumumba reaffirmed on July 23 that the Congo no longer needed Soviet military assistance. He believed that with its new mandate the United Nations could protect the Congo's territorial integrity. Even the Soviet Union reportedly "lessened" its "concern over the Congo crisis...." Only the Belgians continued to resist any withdrawal from their Congo bases and Katanga. Almost everyone, however, believed they would change their policy if sufficient pressure could be rallied against them.

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105 Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 45-46.
106 Department of State Telegram 197 (Leop.), 22 July 1960, Timberlake to Secretary of State.
107 Telegram 218 (Leop.), 23 July 1960, Timberlake to Secretary of State.
Lumumba hoped to achieve this by pleading his case personally to Hammarskjöld and President Eisenhower. He arrived in New York on July 24, where he discussed the implementation of the Security Council resolution with Hammarskjöld and top Secretariat officials. During the discussions he insisted that the United Nations must take decisive action against Belgian troops because the Congo's peace and tranquility depended on their total withdrawal. But, as one eyewitness put it, Hammarskjöld "gave no hint of any intention to collaborate with Lumumba as an individual." The Secretary-General wanted to help the Congo but within the framework of his generalized interpretation of the mandate. Lumumba apparently wished a direct military confrontation between UN forces and those of Belgium. Neither he nor Hammarskjöld would compromise. When they concluded their talks on July 26, they were farther apart than before they met. 

Still there was hope because of Lumumba's impending visit to Washington.

American officials had carefully considered their responses. They viewed his mission as extremely important for developments in the Congo. They had even consulted Lumumba's Congolese opponents who had advised Timberlake that it would be wise to promise substantial economic aid. Joseph Ileo, President of the Chamber of Deputies, worried that if they did not help, Lumumba "would turn to the Soviet and bloc countries for assistance." Had Lumumba succeeded in enlisting the support of United States officials for his

109 Kanza, Conflict in the Congo, pp. 237-239.

policies, the history of the Congo crisis might have been different. But the Congo seemed predestined to suffer years of instability, chaos, and bloodshed.

Lumumba did not make things easy for the Americans. Before he left New York for Washington he had two meetings with Kuznetsov. Though nothing important ensued, American officials disliked the idea. Eisenhower, who had earlier been willing to see Lumumba, diplomatically explained that he had to leave Washington. Lumumba considered the President's move discourteous, and he attempted to cancel the trip. African and Congolese diplomats, however, convinced him that this would be unwise. The Congo's problems required him to go. He arrived on July 27, and the Americans provided accommodations at the Blair House. King Baudouin had stayed there several months earlier, and the Belgians who had unsuccessfully opposed Lumumba's journey to Washington, were outraged by this American courtesy.

During his stay, which lasted until July 29, Lumumba met with Herter and Under-Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon. Two points dominated the discussions. First, Lumumba solicited strong United States assistance in persuading Belgium to withdraw its troops because they were at the root of the crisis. Herter and Dillon politely informed him that the United States supported the policies of the United Nations. Lumumba also asked for bilateral American economic and technical aid, including reforming the valueless

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111 Kanza, Conflict in the Congo, pp. 237-238.

Congolese francs. Again, the Americans told him that the United States would enter into no bilateral arrangements with his government, but they promised that the Congo would receive substantial aid from the United States through the UN. Eisenhower had predetermined that point in a directive. They advised Lumumba to discuss the currency issue with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The Americans felt so strongly against Lumumba's efforts to get official and private United States assistance that they vetoed an agreement Lumumba had concluded with the Phelps-Stokes Fund of New York, a black philanthropic foundation. It had stipulated that the Phelps-Stokes Fund would provide the Congo with technically qualified black Americans to assist that country at no expense. 113 As in the past, Lumumba did not raise the Katanga issue in Washington. One can, therefore, conclude that, to him, the central problem throughout the month of July was the presence of Belgian troops in the Congo, particularly in Katanga where most of them had been deployed. Had he received United States support in this regard, the crisis would have been solved without a major backlash.

Lumumba had come to the UN and the United States hoping to win some understanding for his position. He failed because both the Secretariat and Department of State had long ruled out any collaboration with him. The UN could do nothing to alter its already well-established ground rules. Hammarskjöld encountered intense pressure from the United States, United Kingdom, and France not to pursue a

vigorous policy aimed at removing the Belgians either from the Congo bases or from Katanga. The resolution of the Congo's "problems [lay] in the passage of time and in the absence of precipitate UN actions." To Americans, the maintenance of NATO solidarity required that nothing be done to undermine Belgium's honor. Also, insistence that all aid pass through the UN reduced the threat of bilateral "Soviet assistance and its inevitable subversive accompaniments." American policy-makers did not consider the military bases important, though some advisors in the Pentagon thought they were. Officials also appeared uninterested in whether Katanga seceded or not.

The unwillingness of the Americans to deal with Lumumba can be explained in three ways. First, he was considered in Washington as irrational, radical, and pro-Soviet. Second, his demand for speedy Belgian troop withdrawal endangered the solidarity of the NATO alliance. Finally, the absence of any real Communist threat in the Congo encouraged a policy of gradualism. Therefore, the chapter on a peaceful resolution of the Congo crisis seems to have closed with the departure of Lumumba from the United States on July 29.

114 Ibid., pp. 20-22, 31-32.
118 Weissman, American Foreign Policy, pp. 66, 60.
A Congolese minister who worked closely with both Lumumba and Hammarskjöld has testified that the Secretary-General sincerely wanted to help the Congo even though he showed no desire to collaborate with Lumumba.\(^1\) The two men may have disagreed, but the Secretary-General remained committed to bringing "peace with justice" and order to the Congo.\(^2\) Within a day after he and Lumumba completed their discussions in New York, Hammarskjöld left for the Congo via Brussels. He hoped to persuade the Belgians that "they must plan to evacuate their Con. bases" and to convince the Congolese government that it should cooperate fully with the United Nations command.\(^3\)

The Secretary-General arrived in Brussels on July 27 and engaged in what Andrew Cordier and Wilder Foote have described as a day of strenuous behind-the-scenes efforts to persuade the Belgian government to urge upon Tshombe acceptance of the peaceful entry of United Nations troops and the simultaneous withdrawal of Belgian troops from the province.

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\(^1\)Kanza, *Conflict in the Congo*, pp. 237-239.

\(^2\)Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 51.

The Belgians rejected both suggestions. They believed that if they stayed in Katanga, Lumumba and Tshombe would agree to an arrangement whereby Katanga would rejoin the Congo under a loose confederation.

The Belgians thus undermined Hammarskjöld's efforts. Had his strategy succeeded two results may have been attained. First, he would have established a formula for the peaceful entry of UN forces into Katanga without a major backlash. Second, he would have alleviated any fears about UN intentions.

But Hammarskjöld did not give up easily. Disappointed but still hopeful, he left Brussels, arriving in Leopoldville on July 28. He received a warm welcome from Acting Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga and members of the government, but difficulties awaited him. The previous day, the United States, as a result of the recommendation of its ambassador to Belgium, William Burden, instructed Timberlake as soon as possible after Hammarskjöld's arrival... seek to see him and ascertain his plans with respect to Katanga and Belgian bases. The Department has consistently felt that the best chance of working out these problems lies in the passage of time and the absence of precipitate UN actions.

France and Britain also informed Hammarskjöld that they opposed his Katanga policy. The Secretary-General could not ignore these pressures, particularly that from the United States upon whom the United Nations

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4Editors' note in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, p. 46.

5CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, 28 July 1960, p. 1.

depended for its Congo operation. When Bunche recommended that the Secretary-General serve a notice on Tshombe that UN troops would soon enter Katanga, Hammarskjöld resisted. He was walking a tightrope.

U. S. Military Attache Laurence Devlin reported to the State Department that

the Belgian troop issue is the central, all pervading issue occupying all Congolese minds. . . . The whole future of the UN mission is tied up in this issue. If the UN fails or appears to drag its feet [it] will probably be asked to leave and be replaced by some who want Belgian troops out.\(^8\)

Hammarskjöld recognized the danger but he remained committed to his interpretation of the mandate, a peaceful solution which would reflect the true principles authorized. He revealed this thinking fully on July 31 at a dinner given in his honor by the government of the Congo.

He listened patiently to a scathing criticism by Gizenga, acting in the absence of Lumumba, who charged that the UN had failed to enter Katanga and disarm Belgian troops. Hammarskjöld responded by saying only that the subject belonged in the Security Council. Then he appealed to the Congolese to work with the UN toward the achievement of a peaceful and just resolution. The task ahead would be hard but eventually the United Nations and the Congolese people would prevail. He called on them to forget the past and join him in looking to the future.

We desire peace in the Congo. We desire calm in the Congo. We desire independence for the Congo, and offer to the Republic of the Congo all the assistance of which the United Nations and its affiliated agencies are capable of. [sic]

On August 1, at a dinner he hosted in honor of President Kasavubu, he repeated this theme. Citing the famous Franklin D. Roosevelt's dictum, he told the Congolese "they had nothing to fear but fear itself."  

Hammarskjöld worked hard during his stay. In addition to conferring with officials, he also talked with local representatives of the Belgian government to impress upon them the necessity of Belgian support of UN policies. He again sent the Secretariat's African Affairs expert Heinrich Wieschhoff to Brussels to seek further cooperation. Wieschhoff carried a warning for Foreign Minister Pierre Wigny that a breakdown in the UN operation would only lead to an expansion of the conflict. These efforts also failed.  

Hammarskjöld understood the consequences should the UN Congo venture collapse. He increasingly saw that the entry of United Nations forces into Katanga was essential. It could pave the way for a negotiated, gradual, but steady evacuation of the Belgians. In an attempt to facilitate the entry, Hammarskjöld backed away from his initial position that the presence of UN troops in Katanga be accompanied by a "simultaneous withdrawal" of the Belgians. Having earlier rejected Bunche's advice that a notice be served on Tshombe, Hammarskjöld instructed the former on August 2 to travel to Katanga on August 5 to

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10Editors' note in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 57.
inform Tshombe that United Nations military contingents would enter Katanga the following day. That plan had to be abandoned when Bunche reported to Hammarskjöld that Tshombe would fight the UN units.

Bunche "exaggerated" the strength of Tshombe's militia. Thus, Hammarskjöld's efforts to attain a peaceful settlement of the Katangan problem had been thwarted.

Meanwhile, Lumumba, who had gone to Canada at the end of his visit to Washington, returned to the United Nations on August 1. He had met with a disappointment in Ottawa where officials, like the Americans, told him the Canadian government would channel its aid through the UN. He had also received a full report of an earlier Belgian attack on ANC soldiers "loyal to the Central Government" in barracks at Kolwezi near Elizabethville in Katanga. Subsequently, he delivered to the chairman of the Security Council a letter attacking Belgium and critical of the United Nations Force. Then he spent a week travelling to independent African states unsuccessfully soliciting troops. The Congolese ultra-nationalists, led by Lumumba and Gizenga, now seemingly lost patience. They could no longer understand

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11Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 62-64; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 78; Gerard-Libois and Berhaegen, Congo 1960, p. 618; Gerard-Libois, Katanga Secession, pp. 112-113, 114.

12Editors' note in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 56; Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence, pp. 162-164; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 78.


14Editors' note in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 56; CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, 28 July 1960, p. 2.
why the UN, with 11,000 troops to maintain stability, still failed to evacuate Belgian forces and end the Katanga secession.

In the Congo, another crisis loomed where the ultra-nationalists had moved to a near collision with the UN over Bunche's pending trip to Katanga. Both the cabinet and the Council of Ministers wanted officials of the Central Government to accompany Bunche "escorted by twenty soldiers of Ghanaian nationality." The Secretary-General rejected this move by noting that it would compromise the UN's policy of neutrality and noninvolvement in domestic conflicts.15

The failure of the UN forces to enter Katanga on August 6, Hammarskjöld's disagreement with the cabinet and the Council of Ministers over Katanga, and Lumumba's cross-African trip in search of troops, coupled with the unwillingness of Belgium to withdraw, produced varying reactions. In Africa, responses came from Guinea and Ghana, the two strongest supporters of Lumumba's government. President Sekou Toure of Guinea telegraphed the Secretary-General urging him to immediately send Guinean contingents of the UN Force into Katanga. Toure warned that if the UN failed to act quickly on this suggestion, the troops would be withdrawn from the UN command and put "under the direct authority of the Congolese government." Hammarskjöld objected to Toure's suggestion by noting that the UN operation would comply with the Security Council mandate and only the Secretariat could decide upon the composition of troops or when they would enter Katanga. He

15Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 62-66.
also informed Toure that the Security Council would meet in due course to debate Congo developments. The exchanges between the two leaders, however, showed they basically agreed that the UN should handle matters.  

Ghana and the Soviet Union entered the controversy more vocally than Guinea. President Kwame Nkrumah issued a long statement later circulated in the Security Council. He declared that Ghana would not permit the establishment of "a puppet régime in the heart of Africa "maintained by Belgium troops" for the benefit of "an international mining concern." If the UN failed to put an end to this Belgian intrigue "Ghana would lend such armed assistance as the Republic of the Congo might request." This would be done "even though it meant that Ghana and the Congo had to fight along against Belgium troops and other forces maintained and supplied by Belgium."  

Soviet responses paralleled Nkrumah's. One statement accused the United Nation's Congo mission of ineffectiveness, while another threatened that the Soviet Union might "take resolute measures to rebuff the aggressors" who had the support of "the colonialist Powers of NATO." On August 6, a Soviet spokesman called for the replacement of the United Nations "command" with one capable of "resolute and effective action."

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16 Telegrams dated August 6, 1960, from Toure to Secretary-General, and from Hammarskjöld to Toure; dated August 7, 1960, from Toure to Secretary-General, and from Hammarskjöld to Toure. Reproduced in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 67-68.


he appealed to the Security Council to send an Afro-Asian observation
team "to ensure, on the spot and without delay, the strict applica-
tion" of the Security Council resolutions. Hammarskjöld rejected
his idea, and the Security Council did not act on it.20

The United States and the Secretariat perceived a threat in
these developments and agreed "to propitiate the radicals" while
working covertly to overthrow them. Hammarskjöld even "vowed to
break Lumumba."21

The United States in particular saw a danger. An August 6
circular telegram instructed American ambassadors to inform their
host countries that "bilateral assistance" to the Congo would lead to
big power conflict by injecting the Cold War in the area. The interest
of the Congo was best served through the United Nations. The U. S.
Mission to the UN and top Secretariat officials concurred and decided
that the Secretary-General should play up the theme in his private
consultation with Afro-Asian delegates.22

19Ibid., doc S/4421.

20Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 79.

21Department of State, "Policy Papers," 25 January 1961, p. 33. Observers agree that U.S. Department of State guided UN policy. Weiss-
man, American Foreign Policy, p. 87.

22Quoted in Department of State memorandum for Rulph A. Dungan
from L. D. Beatle entitled Analytical Chronology of the Congo Crisis,

23Quotation from Department of State Telegram 318 (N.Y.), 10
August 1960, USUN Mission to Secretary of States; Circular Telegram
223 (Wash.); 6 August 1960, Herter to Embassies, "Policy Paper," 25
The Security Council also reacted strongly to developments and to Hammarskjöld’s report that Belgian and Katangan officials had obstructed his implementation of the Council’s mandate. After a few days of debate, it unanimously adopted on August 9 a Tunisian-Ceylonese resolution, the most important to date. It reviewed the difficulties the Secretary-General had experienced and Belgium’s failure to comply with previous Council decisions. In brief, the Council held Belgium in contempt of its power. The second, third, and fifth operative paragraphs made this clear. The second called upon the Belgian government "to withdraw immediately its troops from the province of Katanga under speedy modalities determined by the Secretary-General..." while the third made entry of the UN Force into Katanga paramount to the implementation of the Council’s prerogatives. The fifth invoked Articles 25 and 49 of the Charter of the United Nations and called upon all Member states... to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council and to afford mutual assistance in carrying out measures decided upon by the Council. It thus invoked Chapter VII of the Charter, short of a direct call on permanent members of the Security Council to mobilize their armed forces.

The resolution was important in another way. By invoking Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council suggested the application of

24 Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 70-75.

more force than was possible under Chapter XV, Article 99. But the resolution had built-in weaknesses. First, it failed to define the phrase "to withdraw immediately . . . under speedy modalities . . . ." Second, it did not formally direct action by the Secretary-General; rather it left him the discretion to interpret the meaning of the resolution, including any powers implied under Articles 25 and 49. Third, the fourth operative paragraph, which declared that the United Nations Force would "not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise," meant that the UN mandate could apply only to the Belgians. This was a mistake, because it made UN operations completely independent of the government that had requested its assistance. It certainly left the fate of Katanga unclear. Since the Secretary-General had freedom of interpretation, however, this defect did not seem serious.

Unfortunately, Hammarskjöld's interpretation of the resolution did not help matters. He assumed unilateral powers for himself under the new mandate. Then he defined "with speedy modalities" as meaning that the "maintenance of law and order" took precedence over the immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops from either Katanga or the Congo. He further argued that the departure of Belgian forces must be weighed against the socio-economic effect upon the Congolese who depended on them for employment. Finally, he applied only the fourth operative paragraph of the 9 August resolution, thereby reactivating Article 99 of the Charter. Citing the 1956 Hungarian and the 1958 Lebanese crises, both of which were irrelevant to the Congo situation,
he concluded that the Congolese government could not question or negotiate any aspect of the United Nations Congo operation with the Secretary-General. It could, however, appeal to the Security Council if it disagreed with Hammarskjöld's interpretation of the mandate. Hammarskjöld had therefore revised the United Nation's initial mission, that of assisting the Congo in consultation with the government.

On August 11, Hammarskjöld left for Leopoldville en route to Katanga to oversee the entry of UN troops into that province. In doing so, he further complicated the political scene. He had stayed in Leopoldville until August 12 but did not confer with or inform Congolese officials of his presence. He apparently believed that no such courtesy was necessary. Furthermore, he selected 300 soldiers of Swedish nationality to accompany him to Katanga even though it was clear that Lumumba preferred to have mostly African troops under the UN mandate. The July 13-14 resolution also required the Secretary-General to consult with the Congolese government which Hammarskjöld did not do. A CIA document noted a day before Hammarskjöld left Leopoldville for Katanga that the exclusion of African units from the

26Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 80-88.
28Gordon, United Nations in the Congo, pp. 43-44.
contingents going to Katanga was obvious, while a UN spokesman in New York said categorically that the UN would not allow ANC troops into Katanga. 30 His arrival in Katanga where he dealt directly with the secessionist leader Moishe Tshombe, without the approval of the Congolese government, also amounted to a "de facto recognition" of Tshombe's regime. 31 The Katangans exploited this. Newspapers carried Tshombe's pictures with Hammarskjöld on their front pages. The Katangan radio made the Secretary-General's visit top news. Tshombe, who had been depicted throughout Africa and non-Western countries as a traitor and servant of imperialist forces, received an unexpected reward. Arch opponents like Lumumba were stunned by the publicity, and the Congolese leaders became suspicious of Hammarskjöld. 32 The Secretary-General had set the stage for a confrontation with Lumumba's government.

The breach between Lumumba and Hammarskjöld became public on August 14. Hammarskjöld had returned from Katanga and he wished to report to the Congolese government about his mission. The Secretary-

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General again acted with unusual lack of tact for a diplomat. Instead of dealing directly with Lumumba as Prime Minister, he asked Foreign Minister Justin Bokoko, whom he viewed as a "moderate," to arrange the meeting. Lumumba and the Council of Ministers refused to meet with him, and Hammarskjöld's pride seems to have been hurt.

Before leaving the Congo, Hammarskjöld received a letter from Lumumba, which contained his government's interpretation of the 9 August resolution. Lumumba pointed out that it should be interpreted in light of the one of July 13-14. It should have been clear that in its intervention in the Congo the United Nations is not to act as a neutral organization but rather that the Security Council is to place all its resources at the disposal of [the] government [of the Congo]. From these texts it is clear that, contrary to your interpretation, the United Nations Force may be used to subdue the rebel government of Katanga, that [the] government [of the Congo] may call upon the United Nations services to transport civilian and military representatives of the Central Government to Katanga . . . and the United Nations has the duty to protect [them] in Katanga.

This statement reflected the initial aim of the Congolese government when it requested assistance and the United Nations when it accepted the appeal, because the Katanga session was maintained by Belgium. Hammarskjöld had, however, moved away from this primary objective. He may have been influenced in this direction by three factors. First,

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33Editors' note in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 75.


Britain, France, and most NATO member nations endorsed a de facto independence for Katanga. Second, Hammarskjöld "sympathized with the European view." Finally, the United States, upon whose support the UN operation depended, had decided to keep the "Katanga option" open in case Lumumba succeeded in swinging Leopoldville to the left.  

The thrust of Lumumba's note rested not on the interpretation of the mandate but on the demands it put forward. First, he insisted that African troops belonging to the UN Force be sent to Katanga along with ANC and that non-African military contingents, the Swedes, be recalled. Second, the United Nations command should seize weapons supplied to the Katangan gendarmerie by Belgium and turn them over to the Central Government. Third, the United Nations should place "aircraft at the disposal of the" Central Government for transport of its forces and "civilians engaged in restoring order throughout the country." Finally, he called on the United Nations Force to return control of all airports to the ANC and the Congolese police.  

Lumumba even went further. For the first time he attacked the Secretary-General. He denounced Hammarskjöld's "manoeuvres in sending to Katanga only troops from Sweden . . . a country which Is known . . . to have special affinities with the Belgian royal family."  


One may also add that Hammarskjöld himself came from a distinguished Swedish noble family. Then Lumumba informed Hammarskjöld that "the government and the people of the Congo [had] lost their confidence in the Secretary-General of the United Nations." He subsequently appealed to the Security Council again to establish an Afro-Asian observation team to oversee the implementation of the Council's decisions. In other words, Lumumba asked the Security Council to remove Hammarskjöld from control of the United Nations Congo operation. These reactions of Lumumba led many people to conclude that he had become "a paranoid or hysterical. It is possible that Lumumba may have manifested symptoms of hysteria, but his allegations had merit. Since its arrival, the United Nations Force had accomplished little except take steps aimed at reducing the authority of Lumumba's government. By the end of July, all the 11,155 UN troops had been deployed in the provinces where the Central Government had reasonable control. They held strategic points in these areas, including air and sea ports. No parallel actions had been taken in Katanga where Belgian troops supported the rebellious regime. Katanga received foreign weapons and mercenaries, while UN control of the airports in areas where the Central Government exercised authority upheld the United States-UN


39 Colin Legum in a forward to Congo, My Country, p. xxviii; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 80; Editors' note in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 98.

40 Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 49.
The entry of the 300 Swedish soldiers into Katanga symbolized only the presence of the United Nations. They did not lead to Belgian withdrawal, and Tshombe saw them as a buffer between his and the government’s troops. While a majority of the UN Force came from Africa, Hammarskjöld appointed as Supreme Commander Major-General Carl von Horn of Sweden; a man whose "ways were set," one who "engaged in petty vendetta..." Sture Linner, also of Sweden and a former employee of a mining company in Lebanon, headed the United Nations’ Civilian Operation in the Congo. Afro-Asians served only in advisory capacity. Either by commission or omission, Hammarskjöld’s policy consistently had undermined the authority and interests of the Central Government.

41State Department Telegrams 773 (Wash.), 29 August 1960, from Dillon to USUN; 524 (N.Y.), 27 August 1960, from Lodge to Secretary of State; Circular Telegram 326 (Wash.), 31 August, Herter to Embassies. On Belgian assistance to Katanga, see Gerard-Libois, Katanga Secession, pp. 102-114; compare Sharma, Afro-Asian Group, p. 179.


43Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, p. 27.

44Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 119, 79. Almost all of Hammarskjöld’s representatives in Elizabethville come from Western Europe or countries allied to the US-NATO group. Lefever, Uncertain Mandate, p. 227.
The break between Lumumba and Hammarskjöld came over irreconcilable differences. Lumumba wanted to reunify the country by ending Katanga secession, even if it meant the use of military force, but the United Nations seemed to contravene that objective. The Secretary-General said categorically that the UN would not be used to influence the internal restructuring of political power. However, he also stated that the UN would not interfere with any action of the Congolese government to re integrate the country. Hammarskjöld later failed to live by that statement. When he made the initial remark, he did not think the Congo had the military resources to act on its own. 45

To obtain the materials needed for any operation, the Congo had to seek assistance either from the West, from the Soviet Union, or from Communist China. No one from the West seemed ready to respond. Britain and France supported the secessionists and Belgian intervention. 46 They possessed colonies bordering on the Congo and would hardly support a man who whole-heartedly opposed colonialism. The United States and Canada, the other two major NATO powers, had already established their position. The Security Council could have imposed directives on Hammarskjöld to give the government of the Congo "such military

45 Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 88. Richard Miller has written that Hammarskjöld viewed UN troops in Katanga as separating two "opposing forces." Dag Hammarskjöld, p. 284; compare Sharma, Afro-Asian Group, p. 179.

assistance as may be necessary until ... the national security forces may be able ... to meet fully their tasks," but the Council was dominated by NATO nations. Lumumba stood no chance in a confrontation with Hammarskjöld. 47

Thus on August 15, Lumumba turned to the Soviet bloc for assistance, and when he did he played into the hands of his enemies. Tshombe quickly expressed "full confidence" in Hammarskjöld while insisting that Katanga's independence was nonnegotiable. Albert Kalonji declared South Kasai an autonomous state. This was a serious defection because South Kasai was to diamonds what South Katanga was to copper. The ABAKO, Kasavubu's ethnic political party, which had previously called for a federal constitution and a referendum, now voted a motion of no confidence in Lumumba. Kalonji responded that he favored a confederacy over Lumumba's unitary state. The CIA reported on a possible coup against Lumumba within a week. 48

Lumumba subsequently took a number of actions to deal with the deteriorating political situation and to prepare for a military campaign against sessionist South Katanga and South Kasai.

In his message of August 15 to the Soviet Union, Lumumba requested the Soviets to supply his government with transport planes, together with crews and army trucks. He also asked for arms of high


quality and the latest types of military communication equipment. These were "needed immediately" to facilitate the government's drive to reintegrate the country. He also proceeded to reorganize the Armée Nationale Congolaise, and he declared a state of emergency.

Without delay, the ANC units in Leopoldville clamped down on Belgian "spies" who were "disguised" as UN personnel. The crackdown led to the arrest of several "Belgian soldiers" and the seizure of some "radio communication equipment." A U. S. Department of State policy paper, in referring to this incident, observed:

> It was clear the Belgians were organizing the Abako and other elements to overthrow Lumumba and that Lumumba was preparing to fight dirty.\(^50\)

Lumumba's emergency measures met with reasonable success.

An August 18 CIA report observed that the Congolese Premier Patrice Lumumba continues to hold the initiative in the Congo crisis . . . [H]e moved actively to suppress domestic criticism and to destroy the vestiges of Belgian political influence.

Lumumba successfully persuaded Kasavubu to publicly renounce the ABAKO's demand for a confederacy. The clash between him and Hammer-skjöld also intensified. Lumumba not only demanded the withdrawal of non-African troops from Katanga, but he also asked the Security Council

\(^49\)Department of State Telegram 848 (Leop.), 29 September 1960, from Timberlake to the Secretary of State transmitting Lumumba's letter of 15 August.

\(^50\)Quotation from "Policy Paper," 25 January 1961, p. 27; see also CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Summary. 11 August 1960, p. 1; 25 August 1960, p. 3.
to end the secession. If the organization felt unable to accomplish that task then it should withdraw from the Congo altogether.  

To complicate matters, UN personnel increasingly came under suspicion. On August 17, some of them who had gone to deliver a letter from Bunche to Lumumba, were detained and searched by units of the Armée Nationale Congolaise. The following day the ANC at Ndjili airport boarded and inspected an Indian aircraft that carried Canadian military personnel working for the United Nations command. They were reportedly "manhandled" by the Congolese soldiers. Thus Hammarskjöld launched a strong protest with the Congolese government. He even threatened to invoke Article 49 which he had completely ignored when he put into effect the August 9 Security Council resolution. The same day U. S. Air Force personnel at Leopoldville airport were also checked.

Under the circumstances, the Security Council took up the Congo debate again, but in a rather changed atmosphere. What Cordier and Foote called the "East-West consensus" that had characterized the previous three resolutions ended. The Council listened to Hammarskjöld's passionate speeches, which portrayed his actions until then as consistent with the UN mandate. He repeatedly told the Council that Belgium had been conscientious in complying with the Council's

51CIA Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, 18 August 1960, pp. 1-3.


53Editors' note in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V., 154.
decisions, while problems had been experienced with the Congolese government and Tshombe. Hammarskjöld, who had no means of verifying information provided by the Belgians, accepted them at face value. He later became disillusioned when he discovered "that he had been misinformed . . . even deceived" by the Belgians.

The two-day intensive Security Council discussions revealed clearly that Hammarskjöld enjoyed overwhelming support there. Only the Soviet Union and Poland endorsed Lumumba's demands. A Soviet resolution to have Council appoint the proposed observation group had to be withdrawn when it became apparent it would be defeated. No other resolution appeared from the Afro-Asian-American coalition for fear of a Soviet veto. Thus, when the discussions ended, Hammarskjöld emerged unscathed.

Meanwhile, Lumumba's efforts caused temporary strains elsewhere. Excited Belgian officials vented some anger on the United States when they charged that American support for Belgium had been limited. They even criticized the United States for having voted for the Security Council resolutions. The State Department reacted vigorously. American

54Ibid., V, 101-112, 115-120.

55Editors' note in ibid., 142. Some scholars have accepted the information given by Belgium that their troops had been withdrawn at this time. Epstein, Revolt in the Congo, p. 31; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 80.

officials replied that the United States had "prevented Belgium from being branded [an] aggressor" in the Security Council, and "had largely on Belgium's behalf interpreted the paragraph on withdrawal of forces" in the July 13-14 resolution "to mean phased withdrawal as UN forces assure effective control." Furthermore, the United States "had defeated a Soviet proposal" which would have required Belgium to get out of the Congo within three days after July 22. Finally, the Americans added, at Belgium's request the Soviet Union had been warned against sending troops into the Congo. 57

Lumumba's activities, however, worried Americans in other ways. The Eisenhower administration viewed as serious developments the apparent success of Lumumba's emergency measures, his request for Soviet transport planes and trucks, and his threat to ask for withdrawal of the UN units. Even though Lumumba still sought to maintain a good relationship with the United States, he could no longer be propitiated. Public and Congressional attacks on him, along with open support for Tshombe and "pressure from Belgium," forced some reassessment in policy. 58 The forthcoming presidential campaign also stimulated Cold War attitudes. Political leaders increasingly saw the situation as an attempt by Communists to intrude in Africa.


The Democratic candidate, Senator John F. Kennedy, particularly emphasized the threat. He accused the Eisenhower administration of allowing the Soviet Union a foothold in Africa. He blamed this on the administration's indifference toward Africa. At one time television viewers and radio listeners heard him ask, "Which system, communism or freedom, will triumph in the next five years? Will the Congo go Communist? Will other countries?" On another occasion, he claimed that Communism had gained in Guinea and the Congo. Lumumba, he said, was pro-Russian and anti-American.  

The Republican candidate, Vice-President Richard M. Nixon, echoed the Kennedy theme. Embassy and CIA reports from Leopoldville also revealed increased concern. Timberlake especially saw danger, both from communism and racialism. He feared that Lumumba's increasing effective use of the ANC would aggravate matters and advised that the UN Force move immediately to disarm the ANC. The ANC


60Special Report 994, Part II, pp. 443, 461, 99.
already has shown its lack of responsibility and under Lumumba's direction could be incited to action against UN troops and even whites in general. He has already shown the direction of his next step which is an attempt to secure the withdrawal of the Swedes. If that is successful, I expect the Irish and the Canadians will be next on his list. . . . I can assure the Department that if the UN does not immediately act to take the [ANC] out of Government of Congo control . . . most of the handful of Europeans still in Leopoldville will leave. . . .

This withdrawal would open the field for "Communist agents" and "carpetbaggers" because Lumumba, his Information Minister Anicet Kashamura, and their Ghanaian and Guinean supporters were "all anti-white." The Guineans were also communists. 61

Timberlake's despatches, usually factual in their observations, showed some bias of a racial nature. ANC harassments, he reported, had become "common occurrence" and without reason.

Houses, offices and apartment buildings are regularly invaded by Force Publique and police on any and all pretexts from harboring Belgian paratroopers to possession with or without permit of arms and radio transmitters or simply to check identity documents.

There was nothing unusual in such procedure. All colonial regimes had forbidden Africans to possess weapons, and police often searched them and demanded identification cards. Timberlake understood this.

What bothered him was that under the emergency measures even Europeans, who previously had been excluded, were checked. As he put it:

While in any ordinarily organized society any of these acts might be expected and justified, here they are carried out by simple tribal types who have been trained to use rifles, bayonets, machine guns and even mortars, but who cannot read and most do not speak French.

Under the circumstances, Timberlake could not understand why the UN, whose mandate (in Timberlake's opinion) solely called for the maintenance of law and order, could not disarm these "tribal types." He still minimized the degree of any communist threat, but the CIA did not. A cable from Victor Hedgman, its Station Officer in Leopoldville, observed that the communists were making a concerted effort to take over the Congolese government. He added, however, that it had not been established whether Lumumba was a "Commie," but the "pro-Western forces" had increased their effort to replace him. Hedgman's report prompted Bronson Tweedy, Chief of the African Division of the CIA's clandestine service, to seek the State Department's approval of a plan to eliminate Lumumba from power. The request apparently led to a National Security Council meeting on the evening of August 18.

62 State Department Telegram 496 (Leop.), 20 or 21 August 1960, from Timberlake to Secretary of State; "Policy Paper," 25 January 1961, p. 28.

it convened, Acting Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon told members that the United Nations had to remain in the Congo to prevent Soviet intervention. He stressed that everything had to be done to keep the UN there and asserted, erroneously, that Lumumba was on the Soviet's payroll. Dillon then and later failed to comprehend Lumumba's personality. He observed in 1975 that Lumumba "would never look you in the eye" and he gave one a "feeling that he was gripped by... messianic" drive.

Lumumba was not a Communist. Available State Department and CIA documents reveal no evidence to that effect. Allegations were made by Timberlake and two CIA field officers. All these, however, cite Lumumba's association with Guineans and Ghanaians as proof that he was a Communist. Even Timberlake, who in the summer of 1960 considered Lumumba to be a fellow traveller, portrayed him in a 1963 master's thesis as pro-American. William Attwood, U. S. Ambassador to Guinea in 1961, and later to Kenya, wrote in 1967 that Lumumba


65 Dillon, Testimony, 2 September 1975, in Ibid., p. 53; see also Weissman, American Foreign Policy, pp. 65-66.


"spoke the language of an authentic radical African nationalist [and] he was not a Communist." Thomas Kanza who worked closely with Lumumba, noted in his later account that a handful of Congolese did receive token payments from the Communist bloc. He did not mention Lumumba as one of these. A State Department policy paper also concluded that there were no known Communists among the top Congolese leaders and as it observed that in the Congo it was difficult to differentiate radicalism of the African type from Communism.

Yet Dillon's remark at the National Security Council meeting influenced Eisenhower. He told the Council that the United States would ask for European troops to keep the UN in the Congo even if it led to a confrontation with the Soviet Union. He thought it ridiculous that "one man," Lumumba, could force "us out of the Congo. . . ." Robert H. Johnson, a member of the National Security Council for over ten years, alleged in 1975 that he thought Eisenhower ordered Lumumba's assassination. Dillon later confirmed that such a course of action was discussed at high levels in August of 1960. However, he could not recall the President's direct order to that effect.

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69 Kanza, Conflict in the Congo, p. 141.


Following the National Security Council meeting, Richard Bissel, Deputy Director of the CIA's Directorate of Plans and head of covert operations, sent a cable to Hedgman which authorized him to proceed with plans to replace Lumumba. A week later, CIA Director Allen Dulles sent a follow-up cable. It gave the station officer wide authority in planning and executing the removal of Lumumba from office. The message advised Hedgman to take aggressive action if he was convinced that it would remain covert. He could also spend up to $100,000 (5,200,000 Congolese francs) to carry out his crash program without first consulting CIA headquarters. Dulles further informed Hedgman that "in high quarters here it is the clear cut conclusion that if Lumumba continues to hold office," the Congo would remain in chaos. That could lead to a Communist victory, a development which would particularly hurt the prestige of the United Nations and the interest of the free world generally. Dulles' cable had been prompted by an August 25 Special Group (a subcommittee of the National Security Council) decision to authorize any action that could remove Lumumba from office.

Thus CIA officials drafted plans which provided for a number of alternatives. One called for the importation of an assassin using

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73 CIA Cable, Director to Leopoldville, 19 August 1960, cited in ibid., p. 15.
74 CIA Cable, Dulles to Station Officer, 26 August 1960, reproduced in ibid., pp. 15, 16, 52.
75 Special Group Minutes, 25 August 1960, in ibid., p. 60.
a weapon sent through a United States diplomatic pouch. If this proved unworkable, a commando group, trained and armed by the CIA, would make an assault on Lumumba's residence to kill or abduct him. A third approach called for the use of a biological material capable of either killing or causing permanent disability. A CIA scientist, Joseph Scheider, was entrusted with this phase of the operation. A fourth course of action became necessary when two Congolese leaders who became involved in the CIA plot, Kasavubu and Colonel Mobutu, opposed assassination. Under the direction of Military Attaché Laurence Devlin, it envisaged either a takeover by the army or a coup de grâce supported by the military under Mobutu.

While the Americans finalized their plans, plotters under Belgian and French auspices also increased their efforts either to immobilize Lumumba as a politician or kill him. The conspirators met simultaneously in two cities—one group at Elizabethville and another at Brazzaville in neighboring Congo Brazzaville—to outline a plot. At Brazzaville, the Belgian Technical Mission paid 3,000,000 Belgian francs to Lumumba's opponents, with some of the funds used to corrupt government officials and military officers so they could undermine Lumumba's authority. These Europeans, Americans, and the anti-Lumumba Congolese shared a common interest, "the desire to overthrow

76 Interim Report, pp. 21-23, 19, 24-25, 32; CIA Cables, Director to Leopoldville, 13 September 1960, in ibid., p. 15; Leopoldville to Director, 7 September 1960, in ibid., p. 17.

77 CIA Current Intelligence (Congo) Weekly Supplement, 25 August 1960, p. 3.

[him] and the fear of being eliminated by him." The pro-Kasavubu elements under the direction of French agents Charles Delarue (Kasavubu's lawyer in the 1959 trial) and Christian Jayle (he worked with Fulbert Youlou of Congo Brazzaville) declared that they must "rid the Congo of Patrice Lumumba by legal or illegal means." 79

Hammarskjöld had also reached the conclusion that Lumumba must go. The "situation in the Congo could not be straightened out until" he had been "dealt with." The Secretary-General awaited only an appropriate time to act, because "the issue in the Congo must come to a crisis shortly and ... Lumumba must be broken." This would allow either Kasavubu or Tleo to take "effective control." 80 At the same time, Western technicians employed in the Congo expressed fear that they might be displaced by Soviet and bloc technicians who had been arriving, though in smaller numbers. 81

Until the last week of August, the Soviet Union had given Lumumba only moral support. With his determination to take action independent of the UN to end the Katangan and Kasaian secessions, the Soviets felt "obligated to do something concrete in order to win his


81 CIA Current Intelligence Weekly Summary. 25 August 1960, p. 3.
full confidence." First, they delivered 100 military trucks. Then sixteen Ilyushin transport planes arrived in Stanleyville. Until then neither the UN nor the Western powers had thought Lumumba would organize enough transportation to make his forces mobil for military actions. 82

This growing capability of Lumumba's troops raised an alarm among American, Belgian, and United Nations officials. The United Nations reinforced the airports, while the United States instructed its embassies to ask various host countries to inspect Soviet planes en route to the Congo for arms. The United Nations command also initiated a program of checking Soviet shipments as they arrived in the Congo. None of these procedures ever unveiled arms, but United States officials remained suspicious. 83

Meanwhile, incidents occurred in Stanleyville and Leopoldville on August 27 that moved Hammarskjöld deeper into the anti-Lumumba European and American camp. Lumumba had planned a visit to Stanleyville in Orientale and a large crowd had gone to the airport to greet him. Two American transport planes landed ahead of him carrying American and Canadian bilingual military personnel. Then from the crowd a voice shouted "paratroopers." The ANC units at the scene responsible for security responded, fearing the Prime Minister's life was in danger. They reportedly roughed up the Americans and Canadians.


83 State Department Telegrams 773 (Wash.), 27 August 1960, Dillon to USUN; 534 (N.Y.), 27 August 1960, Lodge to Secretary of State; Circular Telegram 326 (Wash.), 31 August 1960, Herter to Embassies; Telegram 507 (N.Y.), 25 August 1960, Lodge to Secretary of State.
Rumors about Belgian paratroopers landing in Stanleyville circulated in Leopoldville at approximately the same time. Again concerned about the safety of Lumumba, Congolese security forces there began a search of Europeans.84

Hammarskjöld, who had expected Lumumba to make an impromptu apology on his return to Leopoldville for the way the ANC had treated Europeans, became outraged when Lumumba did not. Timberlake, too, intensified his call for the United Nations Forces to act against Congolese troops. He declared that the Congolese were uncivilized and the government "irresponsible." He pleaded with the State Department that Lumumba might soon demand UN withdrawal. If he did, Timberlake recommended, the UN should send Guinean forces out first. Then he added that he would be glad if something happened to Lumumba.85

One could blame Congolese leaders for the ANC responses, but the striking coordination of time indicates that the rumors may have been the work of foreign agents. The State Department's description of activities in Leopoldville on that day sheds some light on the tense situation.

The battle-lines had been drawn. Lumumba had become the man to get. Hammarskjöld was thirsting for a showdown. The Belgians poured in money and agents to bring about Lumumba's downfall. U. S. hoped he would fall and was beginning (covertly) to work in the same direction as the Belgians. Leopoldville became a city of anarchy.


as well as cloak and dagger intrigue. The Soviets unloaded 100 trucks for Lumumba's government, to help his military campaigns to unify the Congo. The Cold War had arrived.

Events in the Congo pointed toward a serious crisis and, for the first time, a major debate occurred among American policy makers, with three questions dominating. First, what could be done if Lumumba asked the UN to leave? Second, what could the United States do if the UN decided to honor that request? Finally, the question of Belgians had to be addressed.

During the discussions, the African Bureau, supported by the Bureau of International Organizational Affairs, proposed that, if the legal government of the Congo asked for UN withdrawal, the UN should agree to maintain at least a limited presence. That would minimize Soviet interference. Alternatively, the United States should create an "All-African umbrella for foreign aid to the Congo, with military training either retained by the UN or entrusted to one country." The African Bureau argued that United States policy would not succeed without some support from African countries, because they did not want a "cold war in the center of Africa."

The European Bureau dreaded the idea that the UN might withdraw from the Congo. It warned that the result would be disastrous. It would mean a "Communist triumph and a declaration of bankruptcy by the UN." Therefore it recommended action to

86Ibid., p. 30. Weissman has noted that the CIA had by this time sent its agents all over the Congo. This gave out money recruiting future politicians. American Foreign Policy.
get Lumumba out [by organizing] a coup d'etat, [or] split the Congo and openly support Katanga; [or] get behind the provincial governments, [and] warn the Soviets more forcefully to keep out of the Congo [and] to consult with Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and NATO on possible joint responses.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military establishment wanted the military bases, airfields, and important sea ports "denied to the [armed] forces of the Soviet bloc." The National Security Council had already decided that the United States would respond militarily "to prevent or defeat Soviet intervention in the Congo."

But a fear had developed that with Lumumba's plan to invade Katanga, these facilities might eventually fall into Soviet hands if the Belgian troops withdrew. The JCS also wondered if the Secretary-General could be persuaded to ask for U. S. forces to disarm the Armée Nationale Congolaise.

The answer to the questions raised by the military seemed more forthright than those emanating from the African and European Bureaus. The JCS's were told that the United Nations was prepared to resist any Soviet attempt to take over bases or other facilities. While Hammarskjöld wanted the ANC disarmed, no "legal basis for it" existed yet. These replies drew a warning that "if the UN continued to adhere to its present policy, it might preside over a Communist takeover of the Congo."

In the end, however, policy makers agreed that the United States should work to bring down Lumumba's government and replace it with a "pro-West" regime, even though it was doubtful such covert
activities would remain unknown to Lumumba. It was further decided that a contingency plan for military action to deny the Soviet Union and bloc forces access to the Congo should be undertaken. This was the position of the United States at the end of August, 1960, when the Soviet Union delivered its sixteen IL-13 transport planes to Lumumba's government.

Meanwhile, Hammarskjöld took steps to recall Bunche as his Special Representative in the Congo. Bunche had disagreed not only with Lumumba, but also with General von Horn. To replace Bunche, the Secretary-General appointed Rajeshwar Dayal. He had been India's permanent representative to the UN, and in 1958 he had been named to the UN observation group to Lebanon. When Hammarskjöld nominated him to succeed Bunche, Dayal had been serving as India's High Commissioner to Pakistan.

Until Dayal could be relieved of his duties in Pakistan, the Secretary-General sent Andrew Cordier to the Congo as his temporary representative. Cordier and Foote wrote in the Public Papers of the Secretaries-General that

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87 The above paragraphs are based on Department of State, "Policy Paper," 25 January 1961, pp. 31-36. Also see Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 85.

88 Editors' note in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 152.

89 Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, p. 23.
Cordier had been working day and night as the Secretary-General's closest associate and right-hand man at Headquarters on all matters relating to the Congo since the crisis erupted on July 12.90

He must have been aware of Hammarskjöld's avowed feelings that Lumumba must "be broken" when he arrived in Leopoldville on August 30.

Cordier had reached the Congo at a critical moment. Lumumba had received the Soviet trucks and transport planes, and he and his closest Congolese ministerial associates had planned the invasion of South Kasai and Katanga. Their strategy was supposed to remain secret, but one or more Congolese officials involved in the planning leaked the information.91 Lumumba, however, proceeded as scheduled.

The ANC troops landed in South Kasai and quickly captured the capital of Bakwanga, in an operation which Cordier and Foote and other Western Europeans characterized as "massacres" of Baluba tribesmen.92

The success of the Kasai pacification revealed two important facts. First, it proved that Lumumba had significantly rebuilt the Armée Nationale Congolaise. Even a CIA report of September 1 conceded that the ANC contingents in South Kasai threatened the secessionist regime in South Katanga. Tshombe, too, recognized the pending
confrontation and began demolishing bridges and destroying roads and railroads connecting South Kasai to Katanga. Second, the operation showed that Albert Kalonji, the self-declared King of Kasai, had little support. The Lulua of North Kasai, who had refused to associate themselves with Kalonji's secession, had backed the government's effort.

The position of Tshombe's regime paralleled that of Kalonji, except in one respect. Tshombe received both overt and covert military assistance from Belgium and he had the endorsement of several western governments. But Tshombe had little local support. The Bula of North Katanga, led by Jason Sendwe, had always opposed the secession. Naturally, Lumumba's military and political strategists wished to take advantage of that weakness. Hence, they planned a military invasion through South Kasai and a simultaneous political revolt in North Katanga. The CIA learned of this strategy and feared that the Bula would rally behind the government.

Lumumba also had been working to rally the support of independent African states behind his military venture. The heads of several of these had assembled in Leopoldville on August 19, but they rejected

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93 CIA Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, 1 September 1960, pp. 1-2.

94 Editors' note in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 142; Kanza, Conflict in the Congo, p. 274.

95 The plan is discussed in Kanza, Conflict in the Congo, p. 274. That the revolt in North Katanga got underway see Gerard-Libois, Katanga Secession, pp. 123-125.

96 CIA, Current Intelligence (Congo) Weekly Summary, 1 September 1960, p. 2.
Lumumba's appeal for military assistance. They urged, instead, a UN resolution. Only Guinea was reported to have endorsed Lumumba's action, but it did not volunteer troops. African leaders still failed to realize that the UN, under Hammarskjöld, would never resolve the Katanga issue as long as the Lumumbaists retained the initiative.

To frustrate the effort to invade Katange, Hammarskjöld issued a directive to his representatives in the Congo not to deal with Lumumba alone. These subordinates interpreted that instruction to mean a lack of confidence in Lumumba. Next, he planned a public confrontation with the Soviet Union for having supplied the transport planes, and crews, and trucks to the Congolese government. But this posed a problem. The Belgians had continued to provide Tshombe with military officers and non-commissioned personnel, as well as materiel for the gendarmarie. Although his New York office advised the Secretary-General to treat Belgian forces as a special "category" of UN concern, Hammarskjöld felt that was not possible. Therefore he decided to demand Belgian withdrawal of assistance to Tshombe while attacking Soviet actions.

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98 Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, p. 31; CIA, Current Intelligence, 1 September 1960, p. e.

99 Department of State Telegram 566 (N.Y.), 1 September 1960, from Lodge to Secretary of State; Editors' note in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 153. Compare with Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 80.
The United States approved of Hammarskjöld's decision to initiate a public confrontation with the Soviet Union, but officials disliked the inclusion of Belgium in the controversy. Secretary of State Herter raised several points. First, any Belgian withdrawal from Katanga would produce a new "panic among Belgian civilians" there. Second, any "loss of Belgian officer corps would weaken Lumumba's" military strength and ensure Lumumba's success. Third, Herter wanted to know if the removal of the Belgians would be paralleled by that of the Soviet technicians. Fourth, would it prevent any "infiltration" of Lumumba's government by "Communist advisors of other nationalities?" He warned that any direct Soviet involvement would lead to a big power conflict, and he doubted that the UN forces in Katanga could stand against those of Lumumba. Herter concluded that the evacuation of the Belgian officers was undesirable until United Nations gained control of the Congolese army. To drive home the point, the United States dispatched a naval force to the coast of West Africa.

The disagreement ended on September 3, 1960, when events took a dramatic turn. A Congolese Deputy had been arrested in the Chambers in disregard of parliamentary immunity, allegedly for carrying a concealed weapon. Kasavubu, when informed of the incident, declared that Lumumba had been arming his supporters and the time had come for

his removal from office. Two days later, on September 5, at 8:15 p.m. Kasavubu went to the Leopoldville radio station where he read a statement dismissing Lumumba and announcing the appointment of Joseph Ileo, President of the Senate and Hammarskjold's preference, as the new Prime Minister.

During the seven minute speech, Kasavubu accused Lumumba of betraying the office of the Prime Minister, and of provoking "discord within government." He further charged that Lumumba had deprived "citizens of fundamental liberties" and that he had plunged "the country into a fratricidal civil war." He concluded by appealing to the United Nations to ensure "peace and order." Secretly, Kasavubu told his close associates that, "the President has now spoken and Lumumba will die. He may die slowly, but he will eventually die."

Kasavubu's allegations against Lumumba reflected European and American perceptions of Lumumba, and it is doubtful that Kasavubu believed what he said. Ten days before he acted he had rejected the CIA proposal that Lumumba be assassinated. Furthermore, when he drafted his dismissal speech, he neither had it countersigned by two ministers as required by the Loi Fondamentale nor did he include in

101 Quotations from Department of State, "Policy Paper," 25 January 1961, p. 35; for other accounts see Editors' note in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 160-161; State Department Foreign Service Dispatch 287 (Brussels), Memorandum of Conversation with A.A.J. Van Bilsen, 23 September 1960, from Stanley M. Cleveland to Secretary of State, Parts I and II.

102 Foreign Service Dispatch 287, Part II, p. 3.

103 CIA Cable, Leopoldville to Headquarters, 25 August 1960, in Interim Report, p. 15.
it any reference to a successor for Lumumba. The appointment of Ileo was an afterthought, made only after A. A. J. Van Bilsen, the Belgian advisor, reminded Kasavubu a few minutes before the latter left for the radio station that it would be better if someone filled the vacuum to be created. 104

Kasavubu had responded to intense external pressures. Timberlake and the CIA prodded him to act. Cordier encouraged him by promising a limited UN support. 105 Finally, he had faced increased pressure from the Belgians and the French, described by Van Bilsen as a "right-wing, semi-Fascist group which surrounds President Fulbert Youlou" of the Congo Brazzaville. 106 Without this external encouragement, Kasavubu could not have dismissed Lumumba. He had never built a political base, and he lacked any parliamentary, military, or mass following.

Lumumba, who had the support of both the Chamber and the Senate, countered by dismissing Kasavubu as Chief of State. The Chamber, however, reconsidered and, on September 7, by a vote of 60 to

104 Department of State Telegram 642 (Leop.), 7 September 1960, Timberlake to Secretary of State; Foreign Service Dispatch 287, Memorandum of Conversation, part II, p. 2.


19 annulled both dismissals. The following day, the Senate voted against Kasavubu by rejecting his appointment of Iléo as Prime Minister. Kasavubu, assured of the support of the United Nations and the major NATO powers, continued to violate the Loi Fondamentale. He defied the Chamber and the Senate and issued a decree which purportedly empowered Iléo to form a new government. Both Houses responded by conferring full powers on Lumumba. 107

The Chamber and Senate debates of September revealed Lumumba at his best. He told both Houses that Kasavubu's action was illegal. The latter's decree of dismissal had not been "countersigned" by two ministers. Furthermore, only "an act of parliament" could dissolve the parliament. Therefore, Kasavubu had deprived the members of their rightful responsibility. Turning to the charges of illegal arrests, he insisted that those arrested had acted against the state. Explaining "plot by plot," Timberlake surmises, "he made Kasavubu look ridiculous."

Then he told members

that everything in Africa that is done for the people is called Communism by the imperialists. He had turned to the Russians for [assistance] only when Belgians supplied Tshombe with military material and "after both the UN and the U. S. abandoned" his government. 108


The responses of the Chamber and the Senate left no doubt about Lumumba's support. Timberlake reported that

I believe today may well close the door, open for the past few months and wide open since Kasavubu's declaration of last Monday, to the opportunity of at least stopping the current trend. . . .

A CIA report added that while "the power struggle" remained "unresolved" Lumumba had "the initiative." Indeed several of Kasavubu's supporters had sought "the protective custody of the UN Command..." 109

Clearly Kasavubu's effort to stage a coup de grace failed.

Yet, the Chamber and Senate rejection of Ileo failed to convince United Nations and American officials that Lumumba had the support of the representatives of the people. Those policy makers involved with the Congo crisis became more determined than ever to eliminate him. Timberlake declared that a successful overthrow of the Prime Minister would solve the problem of separation, with a loose federation under Kasavubu, Cyrille Adoule, Tshombe, Kalonji, Jean Bolikanga, and Ileo. Anti-Lumumba sentiment among these Congolese would facilitate such collaboration. Therefore, the United Nations should act to control Lumumba, otherwise he would stop his opponents and that would lead to "rapid Soviet influence and control..." 110


110 Department of State Telegram 623 (Leop.), 6 September 1960.
On September 8, Secretary of State Herter informed the US-UN Mission that he hoped the UN could "reinforce Kasavubu's effort to oust Lumumba." He instructed the mission to approach Hammarskjöld "privately" and suggest that the UN should proceed on the assumption that Kasavubu's action had been legal. In return, the United States would advise Kasavubu, Ileo and Bomboko to follow normal procedures and form a new cabinet. In addition to assuming parliamentary security duties, UN forces should accord the anti-Lumumba Congolese protection, and the army and the police should be disarmed. Herter noted that, since Colonel Mobutu had "joined others [conspirators] at Kasavubu's home," it would be easier to gain the cooperation of the army and the police. He advised the US-UN mission to inform the Secretary-General that the United States knew he had "been examining these possibilities and that we recognized the question of timing." The United States would, nevertheless, appreciate a prompt report.

The following day, Hammarskjöld told the Security Council that Kasavubu had a constitutional right to dismiss Lumumba. Hammarskjöld was wrong. Kasavubu was empowered only to ask for the resignation of a prime minister when the latter no longer enjoyed parliamentary confidence. The Head of State had no legal capacity under the Loi Fondamentale to dismiss the head of government. Nevertheless, Hammarskjöld's statement encouraged Lumumba's opponents.

111 Department of State Telegram 332 (Wash.), 8 September 1960, Herter to USUN Mission.

Meanwhile, on September 6, Kasavubu had named Mobutu as Commander-in-Chief, replacing General Lundula. Mobutu had been Colonel Devlin’s protege and involved with a group of conspirators, the "Binza boys." On September 12, Mobutu arrested Lumumba, but the latter was promptly released by "other Congolese soldiers." On September 13, a joint session of parliament conferred full powers on Lumumba. Supported by Timberlake, Devlin, and other CIA agents, Kasavubu insisted that the suspended parliament had acted illegally. When Kasavubu appeared to lose initiative to Lumumba, Mobutu stepped in. On September 14, he staged a bloodless military coup when he entered the radio station without encountering opposition from a UN guard. He announced that the armed forces had temporarily assumed power to politically neutralize both the Prime Minister and the Head of State. He further said that there would be no political activities until December. In the meantime, the country would be administered by a College of Commissioners of university graduates and students. Mobutu also established an executive branch in the form of a Board of Commissioners composed of pro-Western politicians, among them Bomboko and Jean Bolikango. This action assured the dominance of the Binza boys. This form of governance appears to have been conceived by Wieschhoff of the UN Secretariat but put to implementation by the CIA.


The United Nations had played a decisive role in determining the outcome of the power struggle between Lumumba and Kasavubu-Mobutu. Cordier consulted with Kasavubu from September 3-5. He reported his discussions to Hammarskjöld, who authorized Cordier to take any action that would, in his judgment, preserve peace and order. On September 4, Cordier and Ileo talked about preventing any reinforcements reaching Lumumba by air. Then on the fifth, Cordier assured Kasavubu that the UN command would provide security at his residence, that the UN would close the radio station, and that it would reinforce its troops at the key airports. But Cordier rejected Kasavubu's request that the UN arrest Lumumba and twenty-five other politicians. Finally, Cordier asked Hammarskjöld to authorize the use of $1,000,000 (52 million Congolese francs) from the UN operational budget to pay the 4,000 ANC soldiers stationed in Leopoldville to keep them out of the Lumumba-Kasavubu-UN political struggle. Timberlake had earlier informed Cordier that other funds would be available for the same purpose. 115

Cordier then took two steps which prevented Lumumba from wresting power from Kasavubu and Mobutu. First, he ordered United Nations troops in Leopoldville to occupy the radio stations; then on September 6, UN technicians rendered it inoperable. UN forces also closed all airports to prevent the return of General Lundula and Cleophas Kamitatu, the President of Leopoldville, to the capital

115Cordier's account is in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 160-161; Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, pp. 28-35; Department of State Foreign Service Dispatch 287, Memorandum of Conversation, parts I and II; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, pp. 89-91.
bringing with them troops loyal to Lumumba. This action was extremely important, because General Lundula would have won the allegiance of most of the 4,000 soldiers garrisoned in Leopoldville while Kamitatu would have helped rally the support of the civilian population in the area. Finally, on September 10, two days after Cordier left for New York and five days after Dayal's arrival, Major-General Ben Hammon Kettani, Deputy Supreme Commander of UN Force, and Mobutu disbursed money to the contingents in Leopoldville. Mobutu claimed credit for the payment "to build his prestige among troops." Dayal, who was at the scene, wrote that Mobutu had little following among the 4,000 ANC soldiers and that the payment influenced their behavior in critical days that followed.116

Cordier's actions and later those of General Kettani guaranteed the successful overthrow of Lumumba. Since forces most loyal to Lumumba were in the Orientale and Kasai provinces, they could only be flown into Leopoldville by air. The occupation of the airports closed that possibility. Lumumba initially could count on the support of the soldiers in Leopoldville, but not after the payoff. Finally, the control

of the radio station hurt Lumumba. He could no longer rally the people or the army to his side. Conor Cruise O'Brien, who was in the UN at the time and later served as Hammarskjold's representative in Katanga, wrote in 1965 that

even though the CIA had claimed that by discovering Mobutu it helped bring about the fall of Lumumba; it has been established by Catherine Hoskyns . . ., that by paying Mobutu at the critical moment, and by selective use of UN control of the airports UN officials helped to make Lumumba's fall final.\textsuperscript{117}

A Department of State summary confirmed that Cordier's actions had been decisive.

It is important to recognize that the UN, which had up to then refused to intervene, intervened to freeze the situation after Kasavubu had dismissed Lumumba, but before Lumumba had successfully resisted Kasavubu. By taking over the control of Leopoldville airport, the UN prevented Lumumba from bringing the forces most loyal to him into Leopoldville . . . Being the most skilled rabble-rouser, denial of access to the national radio network also imposed on him an intolerable handicap.\textsuperscript{118}

Lumumba had been placed in that situation by a conglomerate of diverse interests. What brought them together was Lumumba as a common enemy. Of the anti-Lumumba Congolese, three camps existed. The Tshombeists wanted an independent provincial state of Katanga. They were supported only by Belgian, British, and White South African interests. In Leopoldville, two factions, the Mobutu-Bomboko and the


CHAPTER V

TOWARD TROIKA AND BEYOND: THE UNITED NATIONS IN A CRISIS

The fifteenth annual session of the General Assembly that convened at the United Nations in September, 1960, must be recorded as one of the most memorable and controversial in the annals of the organization's history. Cordier and Foote observed that "Never before had the General Assembly attracted so many heads of government or heads of state as came to the fifteenth annual session which opened on September 20." It met in a charged and tense atmosphere. The uneasy environment had been caused by the constitutional crisis that developed in the Congo on September 5 when Kasavubu attempted to dismiss Lumumba as Prime Minister, the United Nations role in the power struggle that developed, and the subsequent military coup by Colonel Mobutu on September 14. A Cold War element had also been injected into the picture in May when the Soviet Union shot down a United States U-2 spy plane. However, in order to understand developments during the month of September and after, a review of Hammarskjöld's policy in the Congo prior to the constitutional crisis is appropriate.

\[1\] Editors' note in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, v, 194.
Between July 14 and August 9, 1960, the Security Council adopted three resolutions. The first two were explicit in their instruction to the Secretary-General to assist the government of the Congo militarily. Also absent in these early texts was "the principle of non-interference in the internal disputes." This interpretation of the mandate originated with Hammarskjöld. Because Lumumba objected to that concept of the United Nations operation, Hammarskjöld asked the Security Council to clarify the situation. This produced the August 9 resolution and, for the first time, the Council reaffirmed Hammarskjöld's policy of neutrality. 2

But there were two interpretations of the new mandate, neither of which was officially rejected nor accepted. The United States shared Hammarskjöld's view that the principle of non-interference meant that the United Nations forces would not assist the central government in any effort to end the secession of Katanga. The Soviet Union, while accepting the principle, made it clear that the Katanga problem was not an internal matter. The Afro-Asian members, though apparently confused over the concept of neutrality, also wanted to assist the government of the Congo through the United Nations to end the Katanga secession. 3 In implementing the decision of the Council,

2 For text of these resolutions see Security Council Official Records, docs. S/4426; S/4387; S/4405.

3 Sharma, Afro-Asian Group, pp. 152, 180.
Hammarskjöld ignored the latter's view. In this, he seemed to have been motivated both by his and the United States attitudes toward Lumumba.

Lumumba had been depicted as anti-white, and Hammarskjöld "sympathized with [the] European view." The presence of Belgian troops in Katanga and their use to maintain a secessionist government there, lay at the root of the entire Congo fiasco. U. N. Sharma has pointed out that two actions of Hammarskjöld—the failure to send troops into Katanga on August 6 and his interpretation of the United Nations mandate—"worsened the fast-deteriorating condition in the Congo." That the United Nations forces were used disproportionately in favor of Europeans, drew a commentary from Dayal, too. The United Nations Force followed an "unjust order of priorities [by assigning] large elements of the UN Force to the sole function of locating and escorting the scattered Europeans to safety." Little attention was paid to Congolese civilians who suffered most from brutalization by both Belgian and Congolese soldiers. Later, after the Lumumba threat appeared eliminated, no one seemed overly concerned about the safety of Europeans.

While Hammarskjöld's advocacy of UN neutrality derived from the 1958 Lebanese experience, in the Congo it functioned mainly as a

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4 Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 77.
5 Sharma, Afro-Asian Group, pp. 150-156.
6 Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, pp. 182, 184-185, 189-190,
temporary expediency. Within two weeks after the United Nations Congo operation began, he appeared disinclined to collaborate with Lumumba in an attempt to resolve the Congo crisis. Hammarskjöld seemed to have reacted more to Lumumba's personality than to principle. The personality clash between them was extremely inhibiting. Dayal, no doubt one of Hammarshjöld's greatest admirers, presented a revealing testimony.

Hammarshjöld could not pardon Lumumba's inadequacies and crudeness. They were both deeply sensitive people, Hammarshjöld's sensitivity expressing itself in an utter refinement of spirit and behavior, Lumumba's in dark suspicion and blind anger. Hammarshjöld who always tried to rise from the particular to the impersonal, was pitted against Lumumba, in whom impersonal love of country was metamorphosed into a sense of personal dignity. . . . [Hammarshjöld] in fact judged Lumumba from his own elevated standpoint, not from that of the rough-hewn African's.

But the Indian diplomat went beyond this balanced appraisal. He added that if

Hammarshjöld could not forgive Lumumba's transgressions, he was generous to a fault to those of his close associates. Andrew Cordier, Sture Linner, and Major General von Horn were people who, out of personal loyalty, were retained at their posts longer than their usefulness required.

The Secretariat's hostility toward Lumumba, which expressed itself in a kind of indifference, reflected also the influence of the

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7 Kanza, Conflict in the Congo, pp. 237-239.
United States. Scholars generally agree that the Secretariat's Congo policy paralleled United States' and was coached, if not directed, by the State Department. Major-General Carl von Horn wrote in 1967, in language reminiscent of Timberlake's diplomatic dispatches, that top UN officials considered Lumumba "a potential dictator bent on wrecking our operation." Hammarskjöld also reportedly told his Advisory Committee on the Congo on August 28 that a successful UN operation required a fundamental change in the Congo's leadership. A Wall Street Journal article, reflecting on the attitudes of the Secretariat and the State Department during the month of August, noted that both felt threatened and began to look "for means of ousting Mr. Lumumba, swinging the independent African nations into support of a new anti-Communist government, and subsequent disarmament of the disruptive Force Publique."

In the Congo, the policy of non-interference applied to Lumumba and his associates but not to other antagonists. First, it was contrary to the United Nations mission of assisting the government of the Congo "to maintain its territorial integrity."

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9 Lefever, Uncertain Mandate, p. 30; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 77.


11 Hammarskjöld wrote Dayal that Touré seemed "to consider that it would have been and is legitimate and perhaps necessary for Lumumba to turn Congo into nation through suppression of opposition by actions touching on civil war." Mission for Hammarskjöld, p. 101.
Second, neutrality could not be reconciled with the preservation of law and order. Else, the United Nations could have responded to protect the Baluba of North Katanga against the onslaught by Tshombe's gendarmerie led by Belgians. Instead, UN troops kept a low profile, with the command confining itself to passive protest. Since Hammarskjöld's position precluded UN responses that could have enhanced Lumumba's authority, the United Nations forces often stood still. Thus, Hammarskjöld's policy enabled "the secessionists to consolidate their positions." This, in turn, served to protect Belgian interests in Katanga and Kasai. In the end, Hammarskjöld and Lumumba both paid with their lives in their attempt to end the secessionist regimes, each under mysterious circumstances.

The contradiction in Hammarskjöld's policy of non-interference reached its climax between September 5 and 14. From the fifth to the ninth, UN officials used their military power to support the Kasavubu-Ileo coup de grace against Lumumba. This action was seen mainly as facilitating a political solution. Since early August, the Secretariat had been recruiting Congolese university students for participation in an anticipated collegiate government. But, the use of

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12 Quotation from Sharma, Afro-Asian Group, p. 180; Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, p. 184; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 92.


14 Weissman, American Foreign Policy, pp. 87-88.
the United Nations Force to further Kasavubu's political ambitions in the hope of creating a moderate government could not be regarded as an act of neutrality. It made a mockery of that principle.

It was really something difficult to understand that UN Force could be used to close a radio station and an airport in the name of maintaining law and order but refuse to help the Central Government in solving its principal problem—the secession of Katanga—for which the UN help was sought by the Central Government.\textsuperscript{15}

Catherine Hoskyns also has pointed out that this action by the United Nations command failed to uphold a "balance of power," which was the purported basic aim of Hammarskjöld's acclaimed neutralism.\textsuperscript{16}

Further evidence shows that the policy of non-interference was pure expediency in the Secretariat's struggle with Lumumba.

While preventing General Lundula and Kamitatu from returning to Leopoldville, the United Nations command permitted Belgian planes flying military missions against North Katanga to take off from Elizabethville airport. At the same time, "Ileo was allowed to fly to the provinces to test out support for his proposed government."\textsuperscript{17}

On October 10, when General Kettani paid the 4,000 Congolese soldiers, it was done purely for political reasons—to undermine the loyalty of the troops to Lumumba. By permitting Mobutu to claim credit for raising the money, the UN had either by commission or omission set the stage for the September 14 military take-over. This point is

\textsuperscript{15}Sharma, Afro-Asian Group, pp. 180, 152, 156-157.

\textsuperscript{16}Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence, p. 223.

\textsuperscript{17}Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 92.
underscored by the fact that shortly after Mobutu announced his coup at 8:15 p.m., he met with British Ambassador Ian Scott, Timberlake, and Sture Linner. Meanwhile, Jean David, the Haitian diplomat who had been sent to Leopoldville by Hammarskjöld to seek a conciliation between Kasavubu and Lumumba, African diplomats, and Congolese politicians had struck an agreement. But a telephone call, reportedly from Timberlake to Kasavubu, sabotaged the plan. Kasavubu, who had been getting ready to go to the radio station to read the document, subsequently defaulted. Finally, UN officials in the Congo had advance knowledge of the Mobutu coup but did not act to prevent it and General Kettani may have been directly involved.

In spite of the overwhelming evidence of the United Nations involvement in the events leading to the September 5-14 mishaps, Hammarskjöld looked to other sources for blame. He had written on August 31, 1960, an introduction to the Fifteenth Annual Report of The Secretary-General to the General Assembly. One passage read:

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19 Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence, pp. 215-222; Weissman American Foreign Policy, p. 98. Hammarskjöld, a trained lawyer, may have recognized Kasavubu's action to dismiss Lumumba knowing well that Loi Fondamentale was not clear on the powers of the Head of State. On Hammarskjöld's legal training see Miller, Dag Hammarskjöld, p. 15.
There are those who try to maintain what history has already judged. There are those who try to put in place of the past new and subtle forms of predominance and influence. There are, on the other hand, also those for whom independence is an end in itself, irrespective of whether or not, in the form in which it can be offered, it serves the best interest of the people. There are, finally, those who, using these various reactions and counter reactions, try to manipulate them for their own ends.  

Though intended for the consumption of the new but large African delegation to the Fifteenth Annual Session, one discerned in the message a criticism of the Belgians, the big powers, and Lumumba. But one also noted a sense of irony because Hammarskjöld had manipulated "these reactions and counterreactions" to his own end. His strong anti-Lumumba sentiment had led him and the Secretariat to join in the anti-Lumumba activities. In doing so, they helped cause a serious constitutional crisis in the Congo and in the event threatened the United Nations organization itself.

Hammarskjöld apparently did not anticipate any serious crisis from the United Nations involvement in the Kasavubu-Lumumba-Mobutu power struggle. If he did, he initially tried to be indifferent to affairs. He appeared before the Security Council on September 7 to submit to it his fourth progress report on the Congo. He asked the Council to establish a special account for $100 million in international financial assistance to the Congo. Hammarskjöld argued that aid would stabilize the government and provide a "foundation for the

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20 Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, v, pp. 124-125.
future growth of the Congo economy." Without such help, the political action taken thus far by the UN would be jeopardized. He did not refer to the developments of September 5-6. Somehow, the Council adjourned without discussing the report. However, at Hammarskjöld's request, it reconvened on September 9. Since the Congo situation had grown quite complex, it then debated matters at length.

Discussions began with a proposal by the Soviet Union, which called on the Security Council to accept Lumumba's appeal that the Council meet in Leopoldville. During the debate, Soviet representative Kuznetsov raised questions about the role of the United Nations in the Congo. He accused the United Nations command of improprieties there, a charge which forced Hammarskjöld to reply. He defended and supported Cordier's action in closing the airports and radio station, even though the latter had not consulted him on those steps. They were necessary for the preservation of law and order under the mandate. He alleged that the troops that Lumumba had sent to Kasai had massacred the Balubas and that they were engaged in looting. These soldiers were not under effective control and could not be viewed as part of the national army. But he was silent on the ongoing slaughter of North Katangese by Belgian-led forces. Finally,

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Hammarskjöld gave Kasavubu's dismissal of Lumumba legality by arguing that the decree had been "countersigned by two cabinet ministers."\(^\text{23}\)

Obviously, Hammarskjöld presented the case as he saw it. He could not have understood the problem of discipline in a revolutionary and politically unstable situation. It is also possible that he had been misinformed on the constitutional question of Lumumba's dismissal. The document eventually did carry two signatures, but these had been added later and could thus not be considered legal.\(^\text{24}\) Whatever the circumstances, Hammarskjöld did not give a balanced account in his summary.

Yet, only the Soviet Union and its bloc of representatives and Lumumba questioned Hammarskjöld's interpretation. The next day, Lumumba, in a note, challenged the legality of Kasavubu's action and the correctness of Hammarskjöld's views, and questioned the UN's Congo mandate. He also charged the Secretary-General with "interference" in the internal affairs of the Congo.\(^\text{25}\) Surprisingly, Lumumba, though he knew of Timberlake's involvement in these matters, still did not mention the United States.\(^\text{26}\)

\(^{23}\) *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, v, 163-164.*

\(^{24}\) *Department of State Telegram 642 (Leop.) 7 September 1960, Timberlake to Secretary of State: "Policy Paper," 25 January 1961, pp. 44-46; Telegram 635 (Leop.) 6 September 1960, Timberlake to Secretary of State.*


\(^{26}\) *Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 95.*
The Soviet Union, apparently dissatisfied with developments, despatched Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin to New York. He entered debate on September 12 by attacking Hammarskjöld's credibility.

One can hardly help but be struck by the unseemly role assumed in regard to the Congo by the United Nations Secretary-General. . . . The events in the Congo and the part played by the United Nations representatives in the implementations of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council were a serious test of the impartiality of the United Nations organism; and it must be said quite bluntly that the senior official of the organism—the Secretary-General—has failed to display the minimum impartiality required of him in the situation which has arisen.27

With these words, Zorin established the line to be followed throughout the Fifteenth Session by the Soviet Union and bloc delegates.

When the Council reconvened on September 14, these attacks forced Hammarskjold to the defensive. Though some of his actions in the Congo seemed highly questionable and Soviet claims that he had promoted western interests had some validity, only the Russians and other Communist delegates apparently perceived the Secretariat's bias. "Although other governments had numerous doubts about the Congo policy," they seemed disinclined to publicly attack the Secretary-General. Even a majority of African and Asian countries did not seem to recognize this, and the Soviets may have miscalculated badly here. They probably assumed that most of the Afro-Asians shared their concern about

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Hammarskjöld's seemingly misconducts when they intensified their attack on the Secretary-General. They may have pushed to discredit him, hoping to influence the Afro-Asians to withdraw their support for the Congo mandate. It is also possible that the Soviets spoke out on what they sincerely believed to be the truth. Evidence thus far has tended to support Soviet allegations against Hammarskjöld and the Secretariat. Even Richard I. Miller, no doubt a fan of Hammarskjöld, conceded that the UN "had a built-in Western bias," but the Soviets had "blown up and distorted a grain of truth out of reasonable proportion" during the 1960-1961 period.²⁹

Miller's argument may be only partially correct. If taken in the Congo context, it becomes less acceptable. The Soviet Union supported Hammarskjöld and the United Nations mandate until August 12, when Hammarskjöld made his historic visit to Elizabethville. The public disagreement between Hammarskjöld and the Soviet Union occurred in August first over the secession of Katanga and United Nations responses. The second stage of the conflict came in September over the United Nations' intervention in Leopoldville on behalf of Kasavubu and Mobutu. Finally, at later dates, Soviet attacks on Hammarskjöld mounted over the arrest of Lumumba in December and his subsequent murder in January, 1961.³⁰ The assassination might have been averted if the United Nations command and Hammarskjöld had not invoked

²⁹ Miller, Dag Hammarskjold, p. 331.
³⁰ Gordenker, The UN Secretary-General, p. 49.
principle of non-interference in ordering the Ghanaian units of the
United Nations Force not to prevent the arrest on December 1, 1960. 31
Nevertheless, if the Soviet attacks on Hammarskjöld were a strategy
intended to influence the Afro-Asians to withdraw their support for
the Congo mandate, it backfired.

The Afro-Asian bloc faced a number of problems and dilemmas.
First, the African group which should have taken the lead in develop­
ing an effective policy was divided into factions. The former French
colonies, excluding Guinea and Mali, had close ties with France. Like
their former colonial mentor, they preferred Kasavubu over Lumumba.
Thus they opposed UN policies that could enhance Lumumba's power
before and after the September 5 constitutional crisis. The Casablanca powers led by Ghana and the United Arab Republic wished to
give Lumumba full support. The Lagos-Monrovia axis, consisting of
Nigeria, Liberia and, on occasion, Ethiopia, had been organized at
the urging of the United States. In order not to antagonize either
the United States or the other two African factions, it treaded a
neutralist or a moderate route. As a bloc, the African states were
all wary of Cold War rivalries over the Congo. In this, they opposed
equally the Soviet Union and the United States. During the Fifteenth
Session they cast five negative votes on Congo issues, each against
the super powers. 32

31 Dayal, looking back to when UN failed to rescue Lumumba, wrote
that he "later wondered if we could have taken similar action (referring
to too late attempt by him to prevent murder of Lumumba) at the time of

32 Thomas Hovet, Jr., Africa in the United Nations (Evanston:
As an Afro-Asian group, they not only faced the dilemma of keeping the Cold War out of the Congo, but they also encountered a constitutional problem. The Loi Fondamentale provided for a non-executive Chief-of-State and an executive Prime Minister who also was the head of government. This provisional constitution had been framed on the basis of that of Belgium. The Belgians had initially hoped for a Congo united to Belgium through the Belgian King.  

Most of the Afro-Asian countries had either presidential-republicanism systems or premierships. Even in the few that had a dual executive, such as India and Nigeria, the predominance of the office of the prime minister was constitutionally unquestionable. In the Congo, the Afro-Asians sought to solve the dilemma by recognizing Kasavubu as "President" (they may have had in mind the Indian system in which the president is only ceremonial) and Lumumba as Prime Minister, thus giving legality to both. The bloc's members of the Security Council, Tunisia and Ceylon, believed that Lumumba "had secured overwhelming support of his Parliament and his government was the Legal Government of the Congo whose representatives alone deserved permission to represent the Congo in the UN."  

The Afro-Asian attitude toward the United Nations Congo mandate and the role of Hammarskjöld was largely shaped by the basic factors. Member nations wanted to give the Congo collective assistance but

33 Young, Politics in the Congo, pp. 176-178.
34 Sharma, Afro-Asian Group, p. 164.
they lacked an alternative machinery to that of the United Nations.

In the UN "there was no proper agency except the Secretary-General
to which the responsibility of implementing UN resolutions or handling
of the Congo problem could be transferred." This is not to say that
the group had lost faith in the Secretary-General. While there were
those who criticized Hammarskjöld on constitutional grounds, many agreed
with his interpretation of the mandate and a majority saw no other way
out. As in the case of Lumumba and Kasavubu, the Afro-Asians looked
for responses which could uphold the UN and the Secretary-General while
giving satisfaction to Lumumba.35 In this manner the group balanced
out Soviet-American interests. It shared with the United States and
its allies the support of Hammarskjöld and, with the Soviet Union, end-
dorsement of Lumumba as the head of a legal Congolese government.

Finally the Afro-Asians, faced with the threat of a spillover
of the Cold War, apparently believed Hammarskjöld's claim that the UN
was their only insurance that Cold War rivalries would not engulf the
Congo and possibly spread to the new nations.36 Thus, they saw con-
tinued support of the United Nations Congo operation as "the acceptable
formula" capable of insulating the region.37 This reliance on the
United Nations called for the continued support of the organization's
executive official—the Secretary-General.


(New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 132; Public Papers of
the Secretaries-General, v, 124-125.

The foregoing points are essential to any understanding of the Afro-Asians defensiveness toward Hammarskjöld. They revered the office of the Secretary-General and could not bring themselves to believe that Hammarskjöld could act maliciously or engage in a conspiracy in his conduct of the Congo mandate. Hence, they rallied to his support against Lumumba's criticisms and the Soviet attacks, even though a significant number felt dissatisfied with the Congo operation. Most of the states felt that any UN failings in the Congo must be blamed on the entire UN membership not on the Secretary-General.

If anyone had doubts about the Afro-Asian support for Hammarskjöld, they should have been dispelled by the debates in the Security Council and the General Assembly during the second half of September, 1960. A confirmation came first on the evening of September 16. Three draft resolutions had been placed before the Council, but only two came to a vote. That of the Soviet Union, which called for the withdrawal of the United Nations command from the Congo, was critical of the Secretary-General. It lost decisively with Tunisia and Ceylon abstaining. An American one had been withdrawn, apparently for two reasons. First, it paralleled the compromise draft introduced jointly by Tunisia and Ceylon and endorsed by the Afro-Asian states, some of which had participated in the debates.

39 Sharma, Afro-Asian Group, p. 158.
These included Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Morocco, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia. Second, it invited a Soviet veto. This left the third resolution. American officials, together with the Secretariat and Afro-Asians had reasoned that the Soviet Union would abstain rather than vote against the Afro-Asian draft. They miscalculated. The Soviet Union felt so strongly about the wrongdoings of the Secretary-General and the UN command that solidarity with the Afro-Asians no longer counted. It cast a negative vote. That act established that no resolution could pass in the Security Council that embodied legal loopholes and ignored Soviet views. The Afro-Asian draft reaffirmed the previous decisions of the Council, called on members not to supply military material to the Congo outside of the UN framework, and urged governments to contribute quickly to create "a United Nations Fund for the Congo." In all aspects, it was an expression of confidence in Hammarskjöld, and the Soviets could not accept it.

This development prompted United States Ambassador James Wadsworth to suggest that member states by-pass the Security Council by invoking an emergency session of the General Assembly where a Soviet veto could not apply. The Council did, and after two days of debate a resolution passed on September 19. It was the same as the one the Soviet Union had vetoed, but this time its delegates abstained.

41 Department of State Bulletin, XLIII(October 1960), 583-586.
That unimportant resolution established three basic points.

First, the United States had continued to exploit successfully Afro-Asian fears of a possible Soviet-American confrontation. The Ghanaian and Tunisian representatives clearly reflected that reality. Alex Quaison-Sackey of Ghana declared "that no help whatsoever should be sent to the Congo without the express request of the United Nations and that this help should be through the United Nations medium."

Mongi Slim of Tunisia warned of the "grave danger which should be averted. Any assistance of this type coming from one side may well result in similar types coming from the other side."43 Second, the Afro-Asians' trust of Hammarskjöld remained untainted. Finally, they still believed that the UN could achieve a solution acceptable to all parties.44

The Soviet Union, although outnumbered, did not abandon the UN as a forum. It carried the battle with Hammarskjöld to the Fifteenth Annual Session of the General Assembly, hoping to win support there. Khrushchev had called on all heads of state to attend that "Summit Assembly," but the West had treated his message with indignation. However, when it became clear that Khrushchev and other Communist leaders would be at the United Nations, presidents, kings, dictators, and prime ministers streamed to New York.45

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45 Editors' note in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, v, 194.
The Fifteenth Annual Session of the General Assembly had other attractions. The shooting-down of the American U-2 spy plane raised questions about international peace and security. The controversy between the Soviet Union and Hammarskjöld was raging. Furthermore, the Soviet Union had boycotted disarmament talks in Geneva but Khrushchev was now reported to carry with him new ideas relating to the subject. Equally important in the history of the United Nations, sixteen new African states had applied for membership. That could be important in the East-West rivalries.

The importance of the "Summit Assembly" was further underscored when President Eisenhower, who had planned to address the delegates at a later time, moved his schedule forward and spoke ahead of Khrushchev. But it was the latter who attracted international attention both by his manners and his attack on the Secretary-General and the structure of the United Nations. Speaking on September 23, and later on October 3, Khrushchev squarely charged Hammarskjöld with grave misconduct in executing the Congo mandate. He challenged Hammarskjöld to "muster courage and resign" because "We do not, and cannot, place our confidence in Mr. Hammarskjöld."

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46 Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, pp. 41, 92-95.


Yet it was not the call for resignation or Khrushchev's "shoe-banging and shouts from the floor" that intrigued world leaders and observers. These were largely parliamentary behaviors common in many western democracies. Rather it was the famous "troika" proposal or tripartite executive plan that Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India called the "three-headed god."

The threat of the troika plan lay on its call for the abolition of the office of the Secretary-General. It would be replaced with a three-man executive representing the Socialist states, the United States and its allies, and the neutralists. Any decisions of the three Secretaries-General would be unanimous. This implied that a negative vote by one would be a veto. The Soviets argued that since each of these blocs had a population of a billion people the troika arrangement would give everyone equal representation in the tripartite Secretariat.

The proposal struck at the very root of the constitutional structure of the United Nations and gravely threatened United States interests. Hammarskjöld also appeared very concerned. While he vigorously defended his policy and actions in the Congo, he was not afraid of resigning and he had considered doing just that. But the

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50 Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, p. 93.

move by the Soviets involved far more than the survival of Hammarskjöld. It jeopardized the continuation of the UN as a world institution. Thus Hammarskjöld appealed to the "smaller powers" to defend the UN because it was their only protection against big power adventures. He answered Khrushchev's call for resignation by saying that he had the responsibility to protect the smaller nations to whom the organization belonged and he would resign only if they wished such. Hammarskjöld believed, and rightly so, that if he had the support of the Afro-Asians he would "surmount" the Soviet attacks. 52

American officials apparently saw a danger into the troika. While Herter called the proposal "a declaration of war against the United Nations," 53 Under-Secretary of State Dillon talked of Khrushchev's "effort to destroy the United Nations." Lodge added that the Soviet leader was "aiming to bust up the United Nations." 54

The phrase "to destroy" found its way in many remarks during these discussions, and it was not confined to the Americans. The Afro-Asians reportedly objected to the reform of the office of the Secretary-General for fear the UN might collapse. 55 Even King Hussein of Jordan

52 Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, pp. 91-100; Sharma, Afro-Asian Group, p. 153; General Assembly Official Records, Fifteenth Sess. 83rd meeting.

53 Lefever, Crisis in the Congo, p. 50.


55 Sharma, Afro-Asian Group, p. 333.
felt that the Soviet move threatened the survival of the UN. The dip-
omatic corps in Washington also expressed a concern that the troika
was an attempt "to destroy the United Nations."56

Exactly what these spokesmen meant by "destroy" is not clear.
From the United States and a NATO point of view, it may have meant a
breakdown of the United Nations as an institution as well as of the
organization as an instrument of American foreign policy. The New
York Times reported on November 22, 1960, that the North Atlantic
Treaty Council in London had been studying the formation of a politico-
economic unit if Khrushchev succeeded in destroying the UN.57 A
September 26, 1960 Wall Street Journal warned that the Soviet proposal
for the restructuring of the Office of the Secretary-General would
endanger United States' interests.58 This view seems closer to
Soviet intention and probably is more representative of the concern
among American officials. This does not mean that those who feared
a possible collapse of the UN were overreacting. A reorganized
Secretariat along the Soviet plan would have diminished the usefulness
of the United Nations for American purposes. Robert G. Wesson, after
examining Soviet-American policies in the UN, commented that

56 The New York Times, October 4, 1960, pp. 1, 22; October 16,
1960, p. 34.


It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the Secretariat carried out American policies for several years, and where the Russians had once seen a magnificent opportunity for the installation of a revolutionary, anti-Western if not procommunist, regime, there eventually emerged under American and U.N. guidance a pro-Western and anti-Soviet government.\textsuperscript{59}

Whether the United States would have remained a member of the United Nations with a weakened Secretariat is difficult to judge. However, the Americans and their Western allies did raise doubt about such a United Nations.\textsuperscript{60}

Because the troika caused such an out roar and fear for the survival of the United Nations, varying explanations of Soviet intentions have been advanced. Ernest Lefever suggested that the Soviet Union had been "infuriated by Hammarskjöld's interpretation of his mandate in the Congo."\textsuperscript{61} Even Dayal felt "that a question of personality was equally involved with that of structure. . . ."\textsuperscript{62} Bloomfield, Miller, and David Kay suggested, among other factors, that the Soviets responded to the growing independence of the "Secretary-Generalship under Dag Hammarskjöld to fill vacuums created by

\textsuperscript{59}Wesson, "The United Nations in the World Outlook. . .\textquotedblright, p. 17.

\textsuperscript{60}Lincoln P. Bloomfield, made a concerted effort in a 1962 article to show that the UN still served important American interests. "The United Nations in a Crisis: The Role of the United Nations in United States Foreign Policy," Daedalus, XCI (Fall, 1962), 749-765.

\textsuperscript{61}Lefever, Crisis in the Congo, p. 50.

\textsuperscript{62}Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, p. 95.
great power deadlocks." Miller added that "the Secretary-General had become too powerful in the eyes of the Soviet Union." While the question of personality and that of Hammarskjöld's interpretation of the mandate can be accepted as part of the explanation, any suggestion that the Soviet Union wanted to "destroy" the UN or the power of the Secretary-General must be rejected. Miller believed that the United Nations was "valuable for their operation. . . ."64

The troika merely expressed a long-time historical concern of the Soviet Union related to the structure of the Secretariat. The Congo crisis was "only the last drop which filled the cup of [Soviet] patience to overflowing,"65 or as Miller put it, "The Congo situation provided them with an excellent cause celebre."66

The United Nations from its founding had operated at the expense of Soviet interests because of the domination of the United States and its allies. The Soviets anticipated this fact at the 1945 San Francisco conference when V. M. Molotov proposed a two-year-one-term Secretary-General, with four deputies. The post would be rotated

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64 Miller, Dag Hammarskjöld, p. 332.

65 Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, p. 95.

66 Miller, Dag Hammarskjöld, p. 331.
among the five permanent members, with the incumbent ineligible for reelection. But after a prolonged discussion, the mono-Secretariat prevailed. The troika was a restatement of the kind of leadership desired by the Soviet Union and presented with great fanfare and showmanship. All this concealed certain constructive aspects.

The troika not only sought to reform the office of the Secretary-General, but it also raised questions about two other issues, one of which was subsequently carried to a successful conclusion by the smaller member states. The first issue involved disarmament. The Soviet Union felt that the troika arrangement would ensure a fair UN supervision of compliance with any terms reached. Furthermore, the Soviets desired the establishment of a standing international army. Thus, "The Secretariat must be adapted even now to the conditions which will come into being as disarmament decisions are implemented."68

Another issue of concern for the Soviets, which they shared with the Afro-Asians and other smaller nations, was the predominance in the United Nations civil service of Americans, western Europeans, and Canadians. For example, all the Directors-General, except that of the Food and Agriculture Organization which an Indian headed, were held by

67 Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, II, 191-192; v, 195; see also Miller, Dag Hammarskjöld, p. 331.

Westerners. Not a single specialized UN agency had its headquarters in Moscow. The "overwhelming majority" were situated in Western countries. The troika argued that this unfair recruitment practice, rationalized by claims of "merit," violated the principle of equality of the Charter. It called for geographical distribution in appointment to UN jobs.

Though perceiving merit in making adjustments, Western representatives opposed the idea. They argued that "geography was subordinated to the paramount consideration of merit." To deviate from the established procedure would violate Article 101 of the Charter, and the acceptance of the Soviet view would make officials of the Secretariat vulnerable to instructions from their governments, Article 100 notwithstanding. The new nations, however, supported the Soviet position by arguing that the UN appointments based solely on merit had violated the principle of equality of the Charter. Even Hammarskjöld conceded that the Secretariat should be more representative of world population. The Soviet Union won the point when the General Assembly appointed a Committee of Experts to study the problem. In its 1964 report, the Committee recommended that the existing underrepresentation should be rectified and steps were subsequently taken toward correcting the situation.

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70 Kay, The New Nations, pp. 15-16

71 Meron, The United Nations Secretariat, pp. 27-46, 14-18, 125-126, 120.
The Soviet Union's genuine but long-standing grievances had received a sympathetic hearing, especially from the new Afro-Asian members.\(^7\) They feared, however, that the removal of the Secretary-General not only would lead to the collapse of the mandate, but it could also cause a breakdown of the UN. They wanted to avoid both.\(^7\)

To read in this action a defeat for the Soviet Union and a victory for the West, as has been implied, is to miss the point.\(^7\)

When Hammarskjöld called on the Afro-Asians for support, he appealed to them to defend an institution, not himself. Hammarskjöld must have known that the bloc did not wish to take sides on Cold War issues unless these involved the direct interests of its member states.\(^7\)

Evidence suggests that the Cold War played only a limited role in their stands. One examination of voting data on Cold War issues indicated that in twenty-one General Assembly regular sessions, support of the United States against the Soviet Union was lowest in the Fifteenth Session. With the exception of the Twelfth Session, the

\(^{72}\) Bloomfield, "The United Nations in Crisis," p. 744; Miller, Dag Hammarskjöld, p. 331; Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, p. 45.

\(^{73}\) Sharma, Afro-Asian Group, pp. 158-333; Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, p. 96.

\(^{74}\) Bloomfield, "The United Nations in Crisis. . . .", p. 754.

\(^{75}\) Meron, The United Nations Secretariat, pp. 43-44.
United States encountered its strongest opposition in the Fifteenth Session with the more experienced members less likely to agree with the United States.  

Data on the voting behavior of the African caucusing group documents that study. In the Thirteenth Session, a majority voted identically with the United States 52.5% of the time, while it agreed with the Soviet Union 69.6% of the time. In the Fifteenth Session the respective figures were 36.4% and 63.8%. The issues on which the disagreements arose in the Fifteenth Session concerned mainly Third World countries. Interestingly, on Congo issues, a majority of the caucus more or less opposed the United States, as they did the Soviet Union.  

Why then did the Afro-Asians support the troika section that called for equal representation in the Secretariat but opposed reforming the Office of the Secretary-General? First, the Afro-Asians were concerned mainly with advancing their interests. The application of the principle of equality in recruitment practices of the Secretariat benefited the group. In the same vein, the Afro-Asians

80 Meron, The United Nations Secretariat, pp. 43-45.
felt that a single strong Secretary-General was essential for the successful conclusion of the United Nations Congo operation. Its failure would hurt the "prestige" of the group.  

While initially the Afro-Asians reacted favorably to the troika idea, Nehru rallied them behind Hammarskjöld, though he had misgivings about the Secretariat and questioned Hammarskjöld's attitude toward Lumumba. He also favored the creation of "a consultative council" to advise the Secretary-General." In addition to Nehru's appeal to them to support Hammarskjöld, the Afro-Asians shared a common experience with the western concept of parliamentary procedure. First, in a debate one may criticize the other but the speech must remain impersonal. When Khrushchev attacked Hammarskjöld personally, he violated a cardinal rule and offended the Afro-Asians. Second, Western democratic tradition also taught that a government is answerable to any actions taken by its civil servants in the course of pursuing governmental policies. Hence they took the position that "the blame...be laid at the door of the UN as a whole." 

The failure of the Afro-Asians to join the Soviets in their efforts to force the resignation of Hammarskjöld did not alter the

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81 Sharma, Afro-Asian Group, p. 162.
82 Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, pp. 99, 100, 84.
83 Editors' note in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, v, 207-208.
85 Sharma, Afro-Asian Group, p. 158.
Soviet stance on the Congo operation. Because it believed that Hammarskjöld had conducted the mandate in support of the United States, it refused to pay its assessment for United Nations Force for the Congo. The operations "were illegal because they were not duly authorized by the Security Council." France, which disapproved of the United Nations' policy toward Katanga, also declined to pay its share. Their actions had far-reaching effect.

Between 1960 and 1962, only the United States paid anything toward the Congo operation. The United Kingdom and Canada, however, helped airlift troops to the Congo at a cost of $650,000 for Canada and $520,00 for the United Kingdom. The United States spent $10,317,662 in transporting men and equipment. In addition it contributed $3.9 million toward the operation in 1960 alone.

This was hardly enough. The Congo mission cost $10 million a month. Since it had no other sources of funds, the UN soon faced a financial crisis. In November, it operated with a deficit of $75 million, with its Congo activities accounting for 45%. Thus, on November 22, Hammarskjöld warned that, because of the expenses incurred, the UN's solvency was "periled."

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87 Lefever, Uncertain Mandate, pp. 235-237.
The United States continued to carry the burden. In 1961, it contributed $15,305,596 for the Congo operation. On April 22, 1961, the General Assembly approved a $100 million authorization toward expenses there. This passed only after the United States made a significant concession by increasing its contribution above the assessment, thus giving the poor countries a rebate of 55%. It still took a threat by the United States to the Afro-Asian delegates that it would withdraw its financial obligation to the UN Congo effort and let it collapse unless they voted for the authorization. They did, but not one ever paid. They wanted to have their cake and eat it. Deviating little from the Soviet position, the Third World countries argued that the Congo mission was a Security Council operation and should be paid for by permanent members of the Council.

In spite of the authorization, which has been perceived as a vote of "confidence" in Hammarskjöld, the financial picture did not change. Not until 1963, did some other countries, including Japan, Australia, and Austria, begin to pay their assessments. By 1964 their total contribution was about $1.5 million while the United States' share, including transport services, reached $43,396,648. In contrast, non-payment amounted to $74,295,329. The U.S.S.R. and its two


member republics, Byelorussia and the Ukraine, accounted for over $45 million of this figure. 92

Clearly, the United Nations found itself in a precarious situation. The total cost of the Congo operation stood at $411 million dollars by December, 1964, while the deficit then reached $111.6 million. Conditions were so serious that the survival of the United Nations itself came to be doubted. 93

The United States did everything to keep the United Nations afloat. In 1962, it persuaded the UN to issue $200 million in bonds, hoping that member states would buy. This approach was intended both for solving the current financial crunch and for setting a precedent for future UN fund raising for peacekeeping efforts. The United States ended up purchasing half of these bonds and most of them remained unsold. 94 Then in 1964, the United States made a concerted effort to have the General Assembly declare those members who had failed to pay their assessments "delinquents," so they could be deprived of their votes. That effort failed "to muster much support." 95

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92 Lefever, Uncertain Mandate, p. 236.


In these developments, the Soviet Union won both in the short-run as well as the long-run. First, when more than three-quarters of the members failed to contribute their assessments, they lifted much of the pressure from the Soviets for their refusal to pay. United States attempts to "force the issue" may have further influenced many states to accept Soviet position that any peacekeeping operation by the UN not authorized properly by the Security Council can only be financed by a "voluntary contribution." Second, when the United States also said that in the future it would refuse to contribute to operations it disapproved of, it accepted the very policy its officials had worked hard to defeat. Third, the failure of the UN to establish a formula for financing peacekeeping operations meant that the organization would be reluctant to engage in any future costly operation.96

Perhaps it should be added that of all parties failing to pay their share of the Congo operation, only the Soviet Union seemed to have had a legitimate reason. Hammarskjöld had never made a sincere effort to invite constructive Soviet participation. First, he never asked the Soviets to help transport UN troops to the Congo. Second, not one of the Secretary-General's field representatives came from the Soviet Union or the Communist bloc. Finally, all UN representatives

in Katanga were Western Europeans. The Soviet Union could not be expected to finance a UN peacekeeping operation dominated by its enemies.

Without question United Nations auspices served United States objectives in the Congo...over the short run. This operation was a notable example of a situation where the policy and actions of the United Nations have been generally in accord with our thinking, while the Soviet view has been consistently overridden.

Although the office of the Secretary-General survived the Soviet assault, actions against the Secretary-General still faced problems in the Congo. He had blocked any effort by Lumumba to unite the country by force of arms. He also hoped Kasavubu could emerge as an executive president with a moderate government. He did not expect the situation to develop into a military dictatorship, encompassing what Dayal termed "the politics of murder." Nor did he expect that Kasavubu and Mobutu would be even of greater threat than Lumumba had been.

Long before the financial impact could be felt, Hammarskjöld and his representatives began to encounter problems from both the Congolese they had assisted in ousting Lumumba and the powers that

98 Sewell, "Keeping the Peace. . .," p. 150
had forcefully defended the Secretary-General against Soviet attacks. The Congolese had come to resent the UN command. Even Tshombe defied the UN. He asserted that Katanga's independence was complete, and he would not negotiate with the UN. The United States moved to support Tshombe's régime and Mobutu's junta.

This seemed a safe posture, because after September, no one could be sure of the power alignment in the Congo. Lumumba, although removed from office, could come back because his disciples became increasingly popular. Mobutu therefore attempted to arrest Lumumba on September 22, the latter then sought and received UN protection under house-arrest. The United States felt uneasy about this protection; hence, relationships between Hammarskjöld and the United States grew strained.

Meanwhile, with Afro-Asian opposition growing, many members of the group approved of the UN's protection of Lumumba, but they also felt the UN Force should remove Mobutu and the army from politics and reinstate Lumumba's government. Some countries even threatened to

103 Gerard-Libois, Katanga Secession, p. 94.
withdraw their UN military contingents from the Congo unless the situation was rectified, and at a later date several did. They had decided that the UN had failed in its major objective to remove Belgian troops. At the same time, they did not charge Hammarskjöld with failure.

Since Afro-Asian support of the United Nations was deemed very crucial, the United States and the UN responded in a variety of ways. Hammarskjöld apparently had supported Kasavubu's move against Lumumba, but when Kasavubu failed to emerge as an effective leader and, instead, Mobutu's College of Commissioners assumed political power, Hammarskjöld and Dayal refused to recognize the Collegiate government. Timberlake made an attempt to bring the various factions together to establish a government. When Bomboko informed Timberlake that a convened parliament would support Lumumba, Timberlake reported that reality to the State Department on October 13.

The growing militancy of the African states also worried American officials. The administration responded to assure them that it shared their concerns over the situation. On October 14, Eisenhower initiated the practice of personal diplomacy, later popularized in the

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108 Sharma, Afro-Asian Group, pp. 158, 152.

Kennedy administration, by receiving fifteen African delegates to the UN at the White House. The next month they toured the United States at the government's expense. A second group from recently independent African countries received an invitation in November and began a tour on December 2.110

At the same time, Hammarskjöld faced a number of problems. In early October, Mobutu's College of Commissioners had issued a warrant for Lumumba's arrest. Dayal, with Hammarskjöld's approval, refused to release him. They argued that unless the Chamber met and removed Lumumba's parliamentary immunity he could not be arrested. Mobutu responded by serving the United Nations command with an ultimatum to withdraw its protection. Hammarskjöld answered that Lumumba would receive the same protection as had his opponents in late August and early September. He further refused to honor the warrant because it was "not prima facie valid" and its authors had not complied "with the Basic Law from which the warrant purports to derive its authority."

This was unusual, because the document contained the signature of Kasavubu whom Hammarskjöld still recognized as "President." Interestingly, he later even admitted that "until the Congolese parliament had expressed itself, Lumumba might not be the legitimate Prime Minister but he was more Prime Minister than anyone else." He added, however that he desired some secret effort by the United States to strengthen Kasavubu as an effective head of state.111

110 Department of State Bulletin, XLIII(December 1960), 922-923, 752-756.

Timberlake did not agree with Dayal and Hammarskjöld. He informed the State Department that "The argument that warrant is not prima facie valid simply does not wash." It had been "issued by proper authority and was countersigned by Kasavubu." He rejected the notion that the UN had any right to "interpret the Congo's law and constitution." Timberlake seemed aware of Hammarskjöld's inconsistencies. In July and August, the Secretary-General had refused to become involved in the interpretation of the Loi Fondamentale. Then when he recognized Kasavubu on September 10, he did so by claiming that the Loi Fondamentale gave Kasavubu power to appoint and dismiss a prime minister. Hammarskjöld, however, apparently unaware of his self-contradiction, made it clear to American officials that Mobutu's government now lacked legitimacy because it did not have the approval of parliament.\(^\text{112}\)

Hammarskjöld faced opposition from other quarters. Mobutu continued to invite in an increased number of Belgians and Hammarskjöld aroused the hostility of almost all of the major North Atlantic Treaty powers in October when he demanded that Belgium comply with the terms of the September 19 General Assembly resolution which called for the prompt withdrawal of all "military, para-military, [and] civilian personnel." An August 9 resolution had called specifically for the "speedy withdrawal" of the Belgians, but Hammarskjöld had interpreted

\(^{112}\)Ibid., pp. 47-48, 54.
that to mean phased withdrawal. By October, however, he believed that Belgian assistance after September 19 should have been channeled through the United Nations.

The situation became heated when on October 19, Hammarskjöld delivered a letter to the Belgian representative at the UN which complained that Belgian military officers were commanding the Katangan gendarmerie. Hammarskjöld had avoided that subject since July, but conditions now forced him to speak. The Belgian involvement with Mobutu's army and government had created a hostile atmosphere against United Nations personnel. 113

Belgian officials reacted by asserting that the UN was making a scapegoat of them. They sought United States and NATO support and rejected Hammarskjöld's demand for a total withdrawal. American representatives to NATO reminded the State Department that the United States had assured the North Atlantic Council that "the return of Belgian personnel to the Congo [would be] essential." American Ambassador William Burden recommended from Brussels that the United States support the presence of the Belgian technicians or it would lose influence. Meanwhile the State Department reminded Hammarskjöld that he had previously recognized that the Belgians were needed to maintain effective government. 114

Hammarskjöld did not oppose the return of those Belgian technicians who had left while Lumumba was still in power. He objected

113 Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, v. 214-217.
to their being invited by a government he considered illegal and temporary. The College of Commissioners did not represent the government of the Congo; the Belgians were only using it "to reestablish their influence throughout the Congo." If the Belgians had good intentions, why, in Katanga and Kasai, had local Congolese renewed their attacks on civilian Europeans, on Belgian and Congolese troops, and on UN personnel? Timberlake reached the same conclusion. "All embassy officers who have visited [the areas] agree that the heav-handedness and lack of subtlety on the part of the Belgians is unbelievable." Unlike Hammarskjöld, however, the American Ambassador felt that Belgian "know-how to operate the government" compensated for any misconduct. 115

Hammarskjöld sought to rationalize his position to American policymakers. He agreed with them that the Congo needed a government with Kasavubu holding uncontested powers and supported by parliament. The "continued absence of an effective government" played "into the hands of the Belgians," and the Africans were beginning to realize that fact. Turning to Katanga, he notified the State Department that the reunification of that province "with the rest of the Congo is a political, legal, and economic necessity" and the only sure way to keep "the cold war" out of Central Africa. Commenting on one of his notes to Belgium, Hammarskjöld said that Belgium should "do what the [United States] had already asked, namely, that all aid go through the UN." 116


Mobutu was a usurper of power, and Hammarskjöld and Dayal refused to deal with him.  

Dayal particularly annoyed Timberlake because he resisted efforts to arrest Lumumba and his desire to disarm the "undisciplined" Congolese troops. Timberlake, who earlier had demanded their control by the UN, now saw them and Mobutu as the only guaranty that Lumumba would not ascend to power again.  

To counter Dayal's attitude toward Mobutu, the Western embassies in Leopoldville began a verbal campaign against him. On November 2, 1960, Dayal responded with a devastating report in which he unsparingly criticized the activities of the Belgian technicians in Leopoldville, Katanga, and Kasai, and the undisciplined, lawless behavior and brutality of Mobutu's soldiers. The report caused an immediate uproar. Belgium threatened to withdraw from the United Nations while the United States Department of State categorically declared it would not accept Dayal's charges against Mobutu and the Belgian advisors. It asserted that Belgium was working "in good faith in its desire to be of assistance to the Congo" and that the United States opposed any "implications to the contrary contained" in Dayal's report.  

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117 Department of State Telegram 867(Leop.), 30 September 1960, Timberlake to Secretary of State.  


119 Editors' note in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, v, 220-221; Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, pp. 213, 259, 111-113.  

120 Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, p. 476.  

Policymakers brought pressure against Hammarskjöld in other ways. A private memorandum of October 21 from Wadsworth, criticized both the Secretary-General and Dayal. It noted Tshombe's willingness to cooperate in a unified Congo, and it hinted that the Secretary-General might find it hard to replace immediately all the Belgian technicians in Katanga. Wadsworth also criticized the UN for protecting Lumumba and his supporters, and he concluded in "a low-key threat" that the United States might withdraw its support for the Congo operation unless Hammarskjöld shifted in his current Congo policy. On November 10, 1960, the New York Times reported that the support of the United States would be withdrawn if the Secretary-General facilitated Lumumba's return to power. 122

These American threats, unlike those from the Soviet Union and Lumumba, could not be ignored or publicly challenged. The United Nations needed United States support. Indeed, in November it faced such an acute financial crisis that some American communities began taxing themselves on behalf of the UN. 123 Loss of official United States support could mean the end of the UN Congo mission. 124

Yet, the disagreement between the United States and the Secretary-General continued despite similar broad objectives. Both

124 Lefever, Uncertain Mandate, p. 235.
November 22, 1960. During these discussions, many nations urged the Secretary-General to take steps to reconcile the factions, to reconvene the Congolese parliament, and to restore civilian government. Hammarskjöld would have liked to respond, but the United States opposed such measures, lest they bring Lumumba back to power.

The second issue, that of reconvening the Congolese parliament, also found Hammarskjöld and the Americans at odds. Both Timberlake and Burden believed the Congolese incapable of ruling themselves. They also feared that reconvening parliament would strengthen Lumumba's hand. Timberlake telegraphed the State Department that "the fact is that the Congo is years from more than a facade of democracy." Not one Congolese understood "even the most elementary principles of democracy." How then could they be expected to practice what made no sense to them? To reconvene parliament, he argued, would mean a "decision to support Lumumba." He had become "the single most popular issue" in Congo politics, and even several years hence


"a majority might vote in favor of him." Therefore, the United States should oppose "the restoration of Lumumba as bad for the Congo, for the U.S., and bad for the UN." 129

Timberlake's correspondence reveals the impact of the Congo crisis on those who were engulfed in it. During his first weeks, he demonstrated a degree of balance; however, as the arena became more complex and the crisis more difficult to resolve, he appears to have lost his objectivity. The Congolese were not uncivilized or uninformed in democratic practices. The Congolese had demonstrated very clearly that they understood the workings of parliamentary processes. Even when Lumumba declared the state of emergency in August the parliament continued to function effectively. Its handling of the Kasavubu-Lumumba rivalry established that fact. Indeed, the collapse of parliamentary government in the Congo rests squarely with Timberlake, Devlin, Hedgman, the Belgians, and UN officials who, in supporting Kasavuhu and Mobutu, precipitated the September 5, 1960, constitutional crisis.

The real issue was not over competency but direction. The Americans and their European and Congolese allies agreed that Lumumba should be kept from power and they knew that not a single Congolese leader who had their blessing could win against Lumumba. Thus the State Department issued a directive to its embassies that

The participation of Lumumba in a Congo Government has been discussed in the Department and the consensus is that such a development would be disastrous, with Lumumba using any position, however minor, as a springboard for his return to full powers.\textsuperscript{130}

United States fears over the results of a reconvened parliament explain why the Eisenhower administration moved to eliminate Lumumba completely. The Kasavubu-Mobutu coups had failed to accomplish their goal. Officials felt so strongly against Lumumba that they sent a senior CIA case officer, Michael Mulroney, with two Europeans to the Congo in November to assassinate Lumumba.\textsuperscript{131} One way or the other, the United States was committed to denying Lumumba's return to power.


\textsuperscript{131} Interim Report, pp. 39, 43-46, 33, 49.
CHAPTER VI

LUMUMBA'S ARREST AND ITS AFTERMATH

Dead or alive, free or in prison, it is not me who counts. It is the Congo, it is our poor people for whom independence has been turned into a cage.

Patrice Lumumba, January 1961

My dear Thomas, I shall probably be arrested, tortured and killed. One of us must sacrifice himself if the Congolese people are to understand the idea we are fighting for. My death will hasten the liberation of the Congo, and help to rid our people of the yoke of imperialism and colonialism.

Patrice Lumumba, November 26, 1960

For two and one-half months, Lumumba remained under UN protection, with his safety apparently assured. This made his Afro-Asian supporters content, because there was a general belief that time would be in his favor. Two events took place in November, however, which changed the situation. On November 1, 1960, Gizenga left Leopoldville for Stanleyville to lay the groundwork for the eventual transfer of the seat of the central government there. Then, later that month, Lumumba's daughter died. A funeral was planned in Stanleyville, where the Lumumbists held firm control, and Lumumba wished to attend. When he asked for a UN escort, UN officials, probably with

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1 Kanza, Conflict in the Congo, p. 310.
Hammarskjöld's knowledge, refused his request. On the night of November 27-28, 1960, he left his residence reportedly without UN protection, mysteriously passing unnoticed through a UN guard and Mobutu's troops. The latter, with the help of the CIA, set up roadblocks, and members of the Congolese National Army loyal to Mobutu were alerted. The United Nations reported Lumumba's absence on November 30, at the same time claiming that it "at no time assumed any responsibility for confining Mr. Lumumba to his quarters."5

Lumumba's escape from house arrest has remained shrouded in mystery, but the United States apparently played some role in developments. Mulroney had arrived in the Congo with a direct order to assassinate Lumumba. In 1975, he indicated to a Senate Select Committee on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders that he refused to carry out the order on moral grounds. However, he did go to the Congo to try to draw Lumumba from UN protective custody and turn him over to his Congolese opponents on the assumption that they would execute him. Once in the Congo, Mulroney made contact with a UN guard who was to lure Lumumba away from UN surveillance.6

Two weeks after Mulroney arrived, a CIA cable reported that Lumumba's supporters in Stanleyville wanted him to "break out of his

4 CIA Cable, Leopoldville to Headquarters, 11 November 1960 in Interim Report, 48.
6 Interim Report, pp. 42-43.
confinement" so he could "engage in political activity." The cable also noted that "station expects to be advised by [an agent] when the decision" for his departure had been reached. Meanwhile, the station had "several possible assets to use in event of breakout and studying several plans of action." Following Lumumba's disappearance, the station reported a few hours later, on November 28, that the CIA was working closely with pro-Mobutu troops to apprehend Lumumba. The following day another cable informed Headquarters that an agent identified only as QJ/WIN planned to enter "Lumumba's residence and provide [him] with escort out [of] residence."8

The contradiction between the November 28 and 29 cables, and Hedgman and Mulroney's denials may have led to the Select Committee's conclusion that the CIA did not play a role in hastening Lumumba's departure, but that conclusion may not be correct.9 First, the former cable may suggest that the second one carried a misleading message, a not unusual practice in intelligence information. Second, since Lumumba's absence became public knowledge within hours on November 28, it seems strange that the CIA should send an agent to his residence a day later to effect his departure.10 Finally, the escape ploy was an

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7 CIA Cable, Station Officer (Leop.) to Tweedy, 14 November 1960 in Interim Report, p. 48. For an earlier CIA report see Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, 2 November 1960, pp. 1-2.

8 CIA Cables, Station Officer (Leop.) to Tweedy, 29 November 1960; Station to Headquarters, 28 November 1960 in Interim Report, pp. 48, 44.


10 Kanza, Conflict in the Congo, pp. 310-311; Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, pp. 142-143.
official policy of the Eisenhower administration toward Lumumba, and other agents may have been involved.¹¹

Since the guard around Lumumba's residence precluded his leaving the area undetected, success required the collaboration of the Moroccan units stationed at the residence by the UN or the bribery of Mobutu's troops at watch behind the UN column. Evidence suggests that the former was the case. In the days preceding the departure of Lumumba, a Moroccan officer of the United Nations guard had gained Lumumba's trust. This man knew in advance of Lumumba's plan and had conveyed that information to Lumumba's confidants in Leopoldville a day before Lumumba left.¹² Second, another Moroccan guard became the first to announce Lumumba's absence.¹³ Finally, United States sources concluded that the departure was facilitated by Moroccan or UN force.¹⁴ These, plus the fact that Mulroney had "an observation post over the [same] palace in which Lumumba was safely ensconced,"¹⁵ indicate that the CIA may have facilitated Lumumba's escape. Even if one discounts the participation of Hedgman, Mulroney, and QJ/WIN in the events, evidence still points to United States involvement. These three aside, other CIA agents and American intelligence officers operated in Leopoldville. A European identified only as QJ/ROGUE

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¹¹Interim Report, p. 42n.

¹²Kanza, Conflict in the Congo, p. 310.

¹³Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, p. 142.


¹⁵Michael Mulroney, Testimony before the Senate Select Committee, September 6, 1975, in Interim Report, p. 43.
had organized a death squad. He, too, had been sent there to assassinate Lumumba. Franc C. Carlucci, III, and Alison Palmer worked from the United States embassy mainly as provocateur. 17

Devlin, the CIA expert on military affairs, along with Major-General Ben Hammou Kettani of Morocco, the Deputy Supreme Commander of the United Nations Force, advised Mobutu on military matters. 18 None of these other Americans were interviewed by the Senate Select Committee. Yet, while Kasavubu, Bomboko, and Ileo seemed genuinely stupified by the news of Lumumba's departure, Mobutu gave a near-accurate account of the event in a statement to the press. 19

The Americans had desired Lumumba's arrest because of an illusion that it would lead to a quicker Congo solution acceptable to the United States. 20 He would be in the hands of his enemies who could facilitate his elimination. This goes far to explain why the CIA worked so hard to facilitate his apprehension. But Lumumba's capture

18 Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, pp. 35, 61, 64-65, 69, 86, 90, 135; for Colonel Devlin's relation with Mobutu see Colvin, The Rise and Fall of Tshombe, pp. 37, 146-147, 207-208, 218; Kamitatu, Les Crimes de Mobutu, pp. 14, 98; "Mobutu Sese Seko. Zaires' 'Helmsman,'" Africa News, X (May 29, 1978), 5. Other observers have added that the seating of Kasavubu's delegation at the UN might have also influenced Lumumba's departure. Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 107; Hoskyns, Congo, p. 266; Heinz and Donney, Lumumba, p. 29.
19 Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, p. 143.
20 New York Times, December 5, 1960, p. 4; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 107.
by Mobutu's militia on December 2, 1960, complicated matters for the United Nations as well as the United States. An ugly scene had been created by Mobutu's residence when Lumumba arrived at 5 p.m. the following day. Having been driven hundreds of miles in a military truck from Port Francgui, in Kasai, his hands tied to his back and his mouth bloody, he was forced into "a semi-bending" position. For the satisfaction of Mobutu and the entertainment of the international press, a soldier found Lumumba's last press statement and forced the pieces down the prisoner's throat. Then, at Binza military prison, a few blocks from Mobutu's residence, with television camera on, Lumumba was thrown to the ground and jumped on by "howling" jailors. 21

This publicized brutality disturbed United States officials, who worried that it might arouse international opinion. Timberlake warned the State Department that the television movies would be damaging. He counselled that the Department ask the various TV agencies "to suppress the pictures" by explaining policy problems and the implications to the United States and the UN if they were shown. He added that the Department could argue that the inhumane manhandling of Lumumba by Mobutu's gendarmerie were in response to treatment of prisoners held in Stanleyville "on Lumumba's orders and that violence breeds violence in return." 22 Lumumba does not appear to have ordered any arrests in Stanleyville, and little evidence exists to support

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22 Department of State Telegram 1,329 (Leop.), 3 December 1960, Timberlake to Secretary of State.
Timberlake's allegation. Mobutu's treatment of Lumumba presented the Americans with a serious moral dilemma. Should they condemn the act as inhumane? That would imply a sympathy for Lumumba. Thus unsubstantiated reasons had to be found to rationalize Mobutu's action.

Even the United Nations, with more than 21,000 troops, most of them in the Leopoldville area, did not respond. The Secretariat issued a directive to all command posts throughout the Congo not to make an attempt to rescue Lumumba from Mobutu's militia. Officials seemed relieved that they no longer had to protect him and face the continuing criticism from anti-Lumumba Congolese and their supporters.

Hammarskjöld particularly shared the American position that Lumumba ought to be put to trial for specified violations. Responding to charges from the Afro-Asian delegates that Lumumba faced "immediate execution," he joined with the State Department in noting that it was "important Lumumba be treated within legal framework." Thus the Department instructed Timberlake to approach Kasavubu . . . and impress upon him importance Lumumba's case be handled through legal process, and that his physical treatment be as humane as is compatible with maximum security." Secretary of State Herter recommended that Lumumba be tried for "treason," which carried a mandatory death sentence.

23 Department of State Telegram 1,324 (Leop.), 2 December 1960, Timberlake to Secretary of State; "Policy Paper," 25 January 1961, p. 58; Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, p. 144.

24 General-Libois and Verhaegen, Congo 1960, pp. 1,059-1,060.

25 Department of State Telegram 1,527 (Wash.), 3 December 1960, Dillon to Embassy, Leopoldville.
sentence under Congolese law. But Kasavubu had no control over Lumumba; only Mobutu did.

Americans had to exercise some public restraint because of their concern over the reaction of Afro-Asian and Communist countries toward developments in Leopoldville in the event of Lumumba's assassination. Gizenga already claimed that he headed the legitimate government from Stanleyville. As Vice-Premier, he asserted his constitutional right to act in the absence of the Prime Minister. Because parliament had rejected Kasavubu's appointment of Ilco, Lumumba and Gizenga technically remained in office. Therefore, American officials feared that many African states might recognize Gizenga's government. Such a régime, unlike Katanga, would raise serious policy problems, because it would most likely receive military and material assistance from radical African countries and the Soviet Union. The fear seemed so real that the United States strongly warned African governments that we believe it essential that all governments abide by the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, which preclude recognition or support for secessionist movements (Katanga as well as) Orientals.

The circular noted that, if the Soviet Union supported Gizenga's régime, a "civil war" would develop in the Congo which could "constitute a grave threat to international peace [and] the US would take the most serious view of such a development."  

26 Telegram 1,524 (Wash.), 6 December 1960, Herter to Embassy, Leopoldville; Telegram 1,619 (N.Y.), 3 December 1960, Wadsworth to Secretary of State.

The Americans understood that, as long as Lumumba remained alive, the Afro-Asian and Communist blocs would not shift recognition from Leopoldville to Stanleyville. Or, if Lumumba was executed after a trial, Gizenga's claim to legality would be hard to justify either by him or his supporters. But Lumumba's life was clearly threatened. The State Department and CIA efforts to facilitate his departure from UN protective custody and to turn him over to his Congolese opponents had been based on the belief that he would be executed. Among these Congolese were Victor Nendaka, Chief of the Secret Police (Suréété) and Mobutu. With the help of the CIA, they created a death squad that one Congolese described as "une sorte de Gestapo." Meanwhile, efforts to have television films of Lumumba's beatings suppressed failed. The pictures provoked angry reactions from African, Asian, and Communist countries, especially when a report by Dayal circulated to members of the Security Council confirmed that Lumumba had been "mistreated and confined under inhumane conditions." The Soviet Union reacted by asking for a Security Council meeting on the matter. The United States sought to improve its position. Herter instructed Timberlake on December 6 to "strengthen Congolese justification for [Lumumba's] arrest as well as justify intention to hold [him] for fair trial." Kasavubu should make a well-documented

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28 Mulroney's testimony before the Senate Select Committee, September 11, 1975, in Interim Report, p. 42.


30 Quotation from Department of State Telegram 1,539 (Wash.), 6 December 1960, Herter to Embassy, Leopoldville; see Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, p. 145.
"statement" that Lumumba had "committed treason in fomenting civil strife, dismemberment of the Congo and conniving with Communists and other outside supporters and that he had been arrested for actions constituting 'flagrant delit' pursuant to Article 66 of Loi Fondamental.

In another telegram, Herter counselled that Kasavubu counter the impact of television films, the press, and Dayal's reports by sending an urgent widely-publicized message to Harrmarskjöld to be circulated to members of the Security Council. This should give Kasavubu's account of Lumumba's arrest and confinement, extend an invitation to Red Cross doctors to visit the prisoner, and provide a "doctor's report indicating Lumumba's condition satisfactory." Kasavubu should also affirm that Lumumba would receive a "fair trial" and that he would be safe. Herter concluded that this document was necessary so that "friendly members" could draw on those points in their support when the Security Council convened.

Other than an apparently fabricated doctor's report on Lumumba's condition, the Congolese neither promised a trial nor did they accept a United Nations request for Red Cross doctors to examine Lumumba.

The Security Council convened on December 7 and remained in session until the night of December 13-14. It met ten times and debated three draft resolutions, none of which passed. The most important was introduced by the Soviet Union. It called for immediate action by the

31 State Department Telegram 1,542 (Wash.), 6 December 1960, Herter to Timberlake.

32 State Department Telegram 1,539 (Wash.), 6 December 1960, Herter to Embassy, Leopoldville.
United Nations to liberate Lumumba, Joseph Okito, Vice-President of the Senate, Maurice Mpolo, Minister of Youth and Sports, all of whom had initially been arrested with Lumumba, and other political prisoners. Soviet representative Zorin attacked the NATO powers, the UN, the Secretariat, and particularly the United States for working to undermine the viability of the legal government of the Congo. He charged that the United States embassy in Leopoldville was directing criminal activities against the Congolese parliament and government. Zorin further suggested that the UN disarm the "gangs" that Mobutu had created to foment terror and lawlessness, remove all Belgian troops, and appoint an Afro-Asian Commission to investigate the source of funds used by Mobutu to maintain his armed bands.

Since by December no central government existed in the Congo—four factions claimed sovereignty—, the Soviet resolution raised relevant questions. But the West opposed it because it would have, among other things, led to the resumption of parliamentary activities and the release of all political prisoners, including the dreaded Lumumba. With him free, the Kasavuhu-Mobutu-Nendaka-Bomboko opposition could possibly collapse. Thus the representative of the United Kingdom thought it strange that the Soviet Union felt such concern for Lumumba. Armand Berard of France called the tone of the Soviet resolution insulting and observed that his country would not accept it. The Italian delegate concurred, while the United States denied the Soviet charge

34 Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, pp. 150-167.
that the United States had engaged in criminal activities. Wadsworth made it clear that the acceptance of the Soviet draft resolution would only intensify chaos, and James Barco added that the Soviets wanted to undermine Kasavubu's authority and the United States would not permit that to happen. 35

Wadsworth argued further "that there is no question as to the right of the Congolese authorities" to take Lumumba into custody. He had engaged in "activities" constituting "a threat to the security of the state." Wadsworth thus called upon "all members" of the United Nations to give "full support and recognition to what has been characterized as one of the two organs still functioning in the Congo: the office of the President, Mr. Kasavubu." 36

The representative of India, Krishna Menon, caustically noted in Wadsworth's argument serious flaws:

Now, what I find in this paragraph is that there is a reference to two organs in the first part of it, but as the paragraph goes on it gets fatigued and loses sight of one organ: there is only the President there. We endorse what has been said by representatives at the United Nations, that there are two legal organs that we can deal with. . . . 37

The United States, by using Kasavubu to give legality to Mobutu's College of Commissioners, overlooked the fact that Mobutu claimed to have neutralized both the Head of State and the Prime Minister. 38


38 Gordon, United Nations in the Congo, 56-57; Dayal, Mission
Furthermore, when Mobutu brought Kasavubu into the College in October, the latter joined as co-chairman with Illéo. Since neither the United States nor any other government had recognized the military régime, it seemed peculiar for the United States to assume the legality of Kasavubu's office while rejecting the authority of Lumumba.

Yet even Hammarskjöld, both in the Security Council and General Assembly debates, endorsed the American interpretation of the Congo's constitutional structure. He defended the United Nations Command's order to Ghanian troops not to prevent Lumumba's arrest, noting that to do otherwise would have violated a neutrality principle. Then, by demanding the prompt withdrawal of Belgian military, paramilitary, and other personnel, Hammarskjöld responded in a language similar to that of Wadsworth's October 21 memorandum to the Secretary-General.

I do not believe that we have the right to break individual contracts nor to use our military means for arrest and deportation of individuals . . . short of a direct request to that effect from such authorities as unquestionably would be entitled to take such actions themselves.

The United Nations, he said, lacked the manpower to replace Belgian technicians who had been assigned to the Congo outside the United Nations framework.39 D. N. Sharma, struck by Hammarskjöld's speech, for Hammarskjöld, p. 64; Sharma, Afro-Asian Group, p. 151; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 98.

noted that he spoke "like Cabot Lodge." It seemed a turnabout from Hammarskjöld's October-November position.

Since the beginning of the UN Congo operation, Hammarskjöld had manifested inconsistencies in his position. In the early stages of the crisis he rejected repeated requests by Lumumba and Kasavubu that the UN use force to evict Belgian troops and bring an end to the Katanga secession. Then in September he supported Kasavubu's dismissal of Lumumba. But in October he ruled not "prima facie valid" a warrant of arrest issued by the College of Commissioners and signed by Kasavubu, and he ordered the UN command to protect Lumumba. During the months of October and November he demanded total withdrawal of the Belgians. Yet after Lumumba's capture by what Hammarskjöld described as Mobutu's private army, he called for the legal treatment of the victim.

During the Security Council discussion of December 7-14, the Afro-Asian delegates supported the Soviet draft resolution. They accused Mobutu of being responsible for terrorism in the Congo, and they criticized Kasavubu's opposition to a United Nations-appointed Reconciliation Commission. More importantly, for the first time since July a significant number of African representatives questioned in public debate the activities of the United Nations in the Congo. Many

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40 Sharma, Afro-Asian Group, p. 173.
of them demanded that the UN convene the Congolese parliament, release all political prisoners, and provide protection to all parliamentarians against the marauding private militia. The representative of Yugoslavia charged that events in the Congo revealed grave contradictions by the United Nations. Mobutu's régime, which the UN now appeared to endorse, was illegal, and Yugoslavia planned to withdraw its pilots and personnel assigned to the Congo.

Many Third-World delegates reiterated the view that the United Nations mission had failed in its purpose. The Ceylonese representative Sir Claude Corea, who together with Mongi Slim of Tunisia until then had collaborated with the United States and the Secretariat in sponsoring resolutions, felt disgruntled. He wondered why UN troops stood by in the presence of looting, rape, arson, and murder, and he suggested that they be given greater police and military power to deal with the situation. He strongly endorsed the movement to convene the Congolese parliament, efforts to send a reconciliation commission to the Congo, and he called for a round-table conference of all Congolese leaders. Indonesia was no more amicable. Its delegate declared that his country had withdrawn its contribution to the UN Congo operations. Others warned that their countries would withdraw from UN operation unless its methods changed. This strong feeling among the Afro-Asians about the deteriorating situation in the Congo may explain why they carried the debate into the General Assembly when the Security Council failed to adopt a resolution. There Ghana and

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India on December 18 jointly introduced the single most important draft resolution in the history of the United Nations Congo mandate. Endorsed by six Afro-Asian countries and Yugoslavia, it noted "with grave concern the hostile attitude and resistance of armed detachments to the operation of the United Nations in the Congo . . . and also the continuation of lawlessness, violence and the continuing deterioration of economic situation." But the thrust of the resolution rested on its six operative paragraphs, which explicitly sought to give United Nations forces in the Congo wide sweeping authority not only to deal with the Belgians and private armies, but also to handle decisively political problems.  

The implication of the draft resolution seemed obvious. First, it indicated a growing disaffection among the Afro-Asians with the Security Council and the United Nations. This was clearly demonstrated when African states which had consistently voted with France and the United States largely abstained or supported the Afro-Asian draft resolution. Second, the document challenged the United Nations constitutional structure. The powers it would have conferred on the UN Force could only be granted by the Security Council by invoking Articles 41 and 42 of Chapter VII of the Charter. But it failed of adoption on December 20, a development which demonstrated the division within the

Afro-Asian bloc. It might deny the United States a majority on occasion, but it lacked any consensus to carry its own motions. The West and Hammarskjöld strongly opposed the Afro-Asian document even though the Department of State described it as "a tough draft resolution many of whose provisions would probably have been welcomed by Ambassador Timberlake in the days when Lumumba's troops were harassing the United Nations and intimidating the opposition and when the Soviet aid was going to the Force Publique." The United States rejected it, first, because it could have led to the disarming of Mobutu's militia with the possible accompanying release of Lumumba. Second, American delegates feared that it could result in the removal of all Belgians, military and nonmilitary personnel. Finally, the Americans objected to the authorization of the UN to convene the Congolese parliament, because only the Congolese themselves should decide when to restore "full constitutional government." Hammarskjöld particularly felt uneasy about efforts to increase the powers of his mandate. Having earlier blamed his "critics" for having denied him authority to disarm ANC when Lumumba was in office, he now had a second thought. He told the General Assembly that "if I did not ask for a widened mandate or for new means, it was because I do not believe that it is by such new means . . . .


that the present Congo problem can be solved." He preferred "political and diplomatic persuasion [to] the use of military initiative" to bring about a resolution of the Congo crisis. Hammarskjöld's view disturbed some Afro-Asians who felt that the time had come for the UN to take decisive action. Krishna Menon reacted to Hammarskjöld's speech by saying that "it is now necessary for the United Nations to govern or get out." The failure of the UN to adopt any measures left the lives of the prisoners in limbo, because the Security Council did not take up another Congolese issue until January 12. Again, it was "stalemate." United States, its allies, and, to some extent, Hammarskjöld would not permit any action that would lead to a UN-imposed solution. The impasse also stemmed from the growing unwillingness of the Afro-Asian bloc to allow continued United States domination of the Congo operation and a desire to find an effective UN solution to the Congo problem while keeping Cold War rivalries out.

The Afro-Asians thus reacted to developments which they felt the United Nations could have controlled. For nearly six months, the UN Force had accomplished little to restore law and order, its acclaimed objective. Anarchy reigned and in South Kasai thousands of

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46 State Department, "Policy Paper," 25 January 1961, pp. 68, 63; Public Papers of the Secretary-General, V, 278, 277, 257, 129, 133.


people were dying of starvation. In Leopoldville, and other areas where Mobutu had assumed authority, political assassination and terror persisted. Even more appalling, Mobutu's gendarmerie even harassed UN personnel. Mobutu not only initiated a systematic arrest of UN employees, but his troops also stole UN supplies, including the hijacking of trucks. Worse still, Mobutu’s militia even engaged units of the UN Force in unnecessary bloody fights, resulting in the loss of UN personnel and Congolese lives. The Afro-Asian bloc wanted to correct these excesses but it lacked unanimity or a broad consensus to defeat the pro-Western coalition.

Timberlake and even the publishers of the New York Times, felt differently. Timberlake saw nothing unusual in the behavior of troops loyal to Mobutu. He claimed that the ANC had committed similar acts under Lumumba and that under Gizenga they simply behaved the same. He feared that the opposition to Mobutu's troops was intended to weaken the latter. Dayal, on the other hand, viewed the situation in another perspective. To him, the financial support of the United States for Mobutu caused the problems. Yet when he attempted to bring the subject to the public attention through the New York Times, the paper, according to the State Department, censored the information.

49 Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 258.


Mobutu's harassment of United Nations forces and personnel could not be attributed to the strength of his gendarmerie. These had "no fight in them" and were inherently weak. This worried the United States as the power of Gizenga grew in Stanleyville.

On December 25, an incident disclosed the precarious state of the American-backed régime. Sixty Lumumbists, soldiers and civilians, arrived at Bukavu, the capital of Kivu province. There, without firing a shot, they overthrew the provincial government, which until then had leaned toward Leopoldville. Within a few days, Anicet Kashamurj, former information minister in Lumumba's government, appeared in Bukavu to establish a Lumumbist government. He was regarded in Washington as a Communist and had been denied shelter at the United States embassy on the night of the Mobutu coup.

The ease with which the Lumumbists took over Kivu disturbed American officials. It came just when the Americans ran into difficulties in their "effort to stimulate creation of a new régime with better international credentials in Leopoldville." Timberlake and the CIA, who had been spearheading these efforts, hit a dead end when Kasavubu informed them that until a working anti-Lumumba coalition had first been organized no government would be formed and he would not convene parliament. Furthermore, a proposed roundup of anti-Lumumba forces

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that Kasavubu had suggested for January 1961 also fell apart. During the third week of December prominent leaders gathered at Brazzaville to map out plans, but the meeting became chaotic when Kalonji and Tshombe disagreed over the execution of Balubas. Tshombe, who had earlier declared that he would participate in the round table if held in Elizabethville, now denounced all the leaders, saying he would not attend such a conference until the end of March 1961. A frustrated Timberlake complained that the Americans always had to seek the Congolese to advise them to steer the right "path." The latter rarely sought the former and that those who had worked with Lumumba had faced the same problem. 56

The inability of the Americans to organize the politicians may have made reliance on Mobutu even more compelling. Toward the end of December they contemplated giving Mobutu military support so that his troops could invade Orientale and bring down Gizenga's government. 57 But Dayal's continual refusal to deal with Mobutu or the College of Commissioners presented a problem. Thus United States officials made a concerted effort to convince Hammarskjöld that the Soviet Union was supplying Gizenga with weapons and other material. This support, the Americans explained, might develop into a major showdown with the Soviet Union. Hammarskjöld, however, doubted that the "problems would become greater," largely because the Soviets could not maintain a major operation in the Congo. Nevertheless, he agreed to shift Egyptian

57 Ibid., p. 60.
troops from Stanleyville so that they could not possibly rally to Gizenga's defense. 58

Timberlake also succeeded in persuading Washington to postpone any contemplated military operation. He informed the State Department that the Stanleyville régime faced an immediate economic collapse, that the solution seemed close, and that it could be accomplished without serious problems. He based his analysis on two basic points. First, the survival of Gizenga would be possible only if the Soviet bloc instituted an "airborne" operation in his support and if assistance came from Egypt. These Timberlake ruled out. Second, he believed that the people of Stanleyville would riot as they became more hungry. Mobutu thus preferred a "blockade" of Orientale to speed the uprising and the fall of Gizenga. Timberlake endorsed this idea. In addition, American policy-makers felt that any Western-supported military action would lead to a confrontation in the UN and UN troops would most likely clash with Mobutu's forces. Furthermore, concern existed over plans for any assistance to Mobutu against Gizenga that might produce open and effective African and Asian support for the latter. The West would lose their support in the East-West confrontation over the Congo. Finally, officials appeared unwilling to accept the reality that the Gizengaists had considerable popular support. 59

Thus an economic embargo was secretly imposed against Orientale province. 60

58 State Department, Telegram 1846 (N.Y.), 27 December 1960, from USUN Mission to Secretary of State.
60 Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, pp. 182-183.
Meanwhile, some developments stimulated hopes that a compromise solution might be attainable, while others pointed to continuing problems. The United Nations Reconciliation Commission proposed in November to go to the Congo to bring the antagonists together but Kasavubu opposed. Hammarskjöld had also written several letters to Kasavubu appealing for the humane treatment of Lumumba, but he had succeeded in provoking only hostile replies. Then toward the end of December he received encouraging information. First, he learned that Kasavubu was willing to receive the Commission, providing Ghana, Mali, Guinea, India and Morocco were not represented on it. Second, an unidentified source indicated that Lumumba was "eating at officers mess at Thysville" military camp where he was being held. Lumumba had been allowed that privilege as a concession to the enlisted men who objected to the way he had been treated. That arrangement, however, posed problems. Lumumba might influence the officers to support him against Mobutu, or the rank and file might force his release. His opponents realized they could no longer trust ANC loyalty; hence, they initiated negotiations with Kalonji and Tshombe for the transfer of Lumumba either to Kasai or Katanga.

These plans were still underway when Mobutu embarked on his first major military assault against the Gizengaists. On December 30,

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61 Letters to President Kasavubu, December 3 and 5, 1960 in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 236-241; Editors note in *ibid*, p. 241.

62 State Department Telegram 1846 (N.Y.), 27 December 1960, USUN Mission to Secretary of State.

ailed by Belgian authorities in Ruanda-Urundi, a trust territory of the United Nations, Mobutu flew his troops to Usumbura, the capital, enroute to Kivu. They then crossed the border on foot. Commanded by Captain Gilbert Pongo, the ANC officer who with forty soldiers had captured Lumumba, they marched toward Bukavu. Gizenga's forces knew of the attack and with carefully-timed gunfire forced Pongo's men to retreat or surrender. Among those captured was Pongo. The State Department summarized the situation perfectly:

The Gizenga forces had just scored some spectacular successes which could not be explained only in terms of foreign support for them (which was still very small), or in terms of Mr. Dayal's partiality or by lack of money or arms on the Mobutu side. The plain fact was that the Mobutu soldiers seemed to have no fight in them.

Even Timberlake commented that money "will not cure the disease from which Mobutu's army is suffering but will simply provide expensive aspirin tablets to reduce fevers temporarily." He added that the willingness of the Gizengaists to fight was "political, not military."

The obvious ineptness of Mobutu as a military leader, the weakness of his troops, and the inability of the Leopoldville-based anti-Lumumba politicians to organize a government contrasted greatly with the actions of Gizengaists and General Lundula. In spite of the economic embargo, Stanleyville held on, while Lundula's few and poorly armed soldiers repeatedly demonstrated their professionalism. On


January 9, 1961, they defeated a UN force that had attempted to block their invasion of North Katanga to establish a Lumumbist government there. They withdrew later after negotiations with the UN.66 Elsewhere developments leaned toward a solution that would result in the release of Lumumba and other political prisoners. The UN Reconciliation Commission, under the chairmanship of Nigerian jurist Jaja Wachuku, arrived in Leopoldville on January 5. The African-dominated Commission remained in the Congo two months, but its members never saw Lumumba. In Stanleyville they visited with Pongo and Miruho, both of whom appeared to be in good health.67 While the Commission was in Stanleyville, officials there suggested an exchange of Pongo for Lumumba. Apparently the Kasavubu-Nendaka-Mobutu triumvirate considered Lumumba too big a price to pay for Pongo.68

Meanwhile, in Casablanca, Morocco, on January 7, the heads of state of Morocco, the United Arab Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Algeria, with the participation of Libyan and Ceylonese delegates, reaffirmed their intent to withdraw from the United Nations Congo operation "unless it acted to disarm Mobutu's soldiers, free Lumumba and all other imprisoned members of Parliament, reconvene the Parliament,


67 Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, p. 173.

68 Heinz and Donnay, Lumumba: The Last Fifty Days, pp. 70-71.
eliminate all Belgian military and paramilitary personnel. . . ."69

General Lundula, in charge of the pro-Lumumba-Cizenga troops, also told the UN Reconciliation Commission that he favored the disarming of all ANC forces by the UN. Dayal's position on this issue was unequivocal. Hammarskjöld, however, does not appear to have put his full weight behind the idea.70

Meanwhile, Mobutu's position grew increasingly shaky. The politicians he had appointed to the College of Commissioners felt it no longer served a useful purpose. Ileo, therefore, proposed a Round Table Conference to form a government of national conciliation.

With the growing international pressure for the liberation of Lumumba, the United States and NATO allies believed Ileo's plan would restore Lumumba to power. Mobutu, with his armed bands, managed temporarily to block the proposal. But pressure continued when ANC troops in Leopoldville City and throughout the province began to experience sporadic disorders early in January. Three factions emerged. Some officers did not want Lumumba in their camps because of his influence with the rank and file, others wanted him freed, while some wished to execute him.71

With an uprising among the soldiers spreading, American officials feared that the army might even reinstate Lumumba. Toward

69 Quotation from editors' note in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 308-309; see also Weissman, American Foreign Policy, pp. 110-111; Sharma, Afro-Asian Group, pp. 36-37, 173; Hovet, Africa, pp. 53-54.

70 Daval, Mission for Hammarskjöld, pp. 173-186.

71 Heinz and Donnay, Lumumba: The Last Fifty Days, pp. 71-78.
the middle of January it became apparent that the ANC units stationed in Leopoldville would mutiny unless pay-offs were made. CIA station officer Hedgman reported on January 12 that an uprising could be expected within two to three days. A later cable declared that the station and embassy believed that the "present government" would shortly fall and that Lumumba could return to power. Hedgman therefore advised that convening a parliament under UN supervision would be unwise because of Lumumba's popularity. He would dominate it. To refuse "to take drastic steps [against Lumumba] at this time will lead to defeat of United States policy in Congo."  

Lumumba's future seemed doubtful in the face of such an attitude. He was feared by his Congolese opponents, by American policy makers, and by the CIA. "Even in jail in Katanga, that charismatic leader was the largest single factor in Congolese politics." On January 14, Hedgman learned from a trusted Congolese official that Lumumba would be sent from Thysville military camp to Bakwanga in South Kasai, where he would be killed by Albert Kalonji and his tribesmen. The transfer took place on January 17. Because a Ghanaian contingent of the United Nations Force was at the Ndjilli airport, the plane did not land. CIA officials again reported on all these movements. The plane carrying Lumumba, Okito and Mpolo was subsequently diverted to Katanga, where

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74 Interim Report, pp. 49-51.
an emissary of Mobutu had been negotiating with Katangan officials to take Lumumba into custody. The prisoners arrived at Elizabethville airport at 5 p.m. January 17, 1961, with Lumumba badly beaten, his nose broken, and teeth knocked out. They were murdered that night, but Katangan authorities did not announce the deaths until February 13.

Whether Lumumba's life could have been saved, can only be conjecture. Certainly American officials, who had a chance to influence events, did nothing to save him. There is no evidence that any response came either from CIA Headquarters or the State Department supporting or discouraging Lumumba's transfer. Even earlier, officials seemed ready to separate themselves from assassination plots. Hedgman had reported on November 30, 1960, that QJ/Win wanted to pursue Lumumba to Stanleyville and "execute the plan" himself. The Headquarters responded only by asking "how close would this place [United States] to the action?".

It is puzzling, then, to explain the reaction on January 18, 1961, when the State Department received a report from its Consulate in Elizabethville that Lumumba had been transferred there and his life was jeopardized. Herter reacted by instructing the Consulate that Tshombe should be informed immediately that the United States government deplores [brutal] treatment, hopes Lumumba will be given humane treatment, medical attention as necessary and his case disposed of in accordance law. You may wish point out this sort of action, coupled with Tshombe's recruitment of European troops can only

75 Department of State Telegram 415 (Elizabethville), 19 January 1961, Consultate to Secretary of State.

76 Interim Report, p. 44. On the lack of "precaution to save Lumumba" see Weissman, American Foreign Policy, pp. 138, 109; Kamitatu, Les Crimes de Mobutu, pp. 97-98.
serve further isolate him even from moderate Africans, further discredit all pro-Western moderates in Katanga and Congo, and render UN cooperation with these elements more difficult.77

Consul William Canup apparently did not see Tshombe. He reported two days later that Katanga Minister of Interior, Godefroid Munongo, had been informed, but the latter replied that he was "astounded that USG [United States Government] would raise question of Lumumba's welfare," the man who had caused thousands of deaths and in whose name thousands more were likely to die in the future. In another cable Canup correctly noted that Lumumba might have already died.78

Kasavubu's delegation at the UN received official information of Lumumba's death on January 19.79 Herter had obviously responded too late.

Two answers may be advanced for his unusual action. First, from a moral standpoint, Herter apparently did not favor the murdering of Lumumba. He may not have wanted Lumumba alive; he would have preferred a legal execution. Thus his protest against any harm coming to the victim may not have reflected an official State Department position or that of the CIA. What seems apparent is that Herter might not have participated in any of the Fall, 1960, National Security Council meetings in which the assassination was discussed.

77 Department of State Telegram 343 (Wash.), 18 January 1961, Herter to U.S. Consulate, Elizabethville.

78 State Department, Telegrams 420, 421 (Elville), January 20, 1961, from Consulate to Secretary of State.

79 Kanza, Conflict in the Congo, pp. 320-321.
The second reason for the late shift could have reflected political considerations. By January both the State Department and the CIA recognized that Lumumba's liquidation or mistreatment might stimulate new sympathies for him in moderate African states. Furthermore, the CIA did not want to make him into "a premature martyr," while the Department wished to avoid the reappearance of a stalemate UN Security Council and General Assembly. Such an explanation, however, still cannot explain why no one in Washington responded more quickly or directly to the information conveyed by Hedgman on January 14, at least two weeks before Lumumba's death.

Lumumba died painfully. One version described Munongo inflicting a slow bayonet wound in the victim's chest. A group of Europeans then shot him. No American citizens were present at the scene, but evidence suggests that European agents working for the CIA may have participated. Burr Jerger of the Los Angeles Free Press wrote in 1975 that in 1969 he interviewed a Belgian military officer with the Katangan army who admitted that he had killed Lumumba on Mobutu's and the CIA's order. Two Belgian expatriates who worked for Mobutu's government in the mid-1960's, after a thorough investigative research, concluded that the death of Lumumba really cemented the relationship between


81 Heinz and Donnay, Lumumba: The Last Fifty Days, pp. 129-146.

Third, CIA financial records indicate that QJ/WIN was paid for his Congo services shortly after Lumumba's death, and he resided in Europe thereafter. Fourth, the three top Congolese leaders, Mobutu, Kasavubu, and Nendaka, who engineered the transfer of Lumumba, had been working closely with the CIA since August 1960. The dismissal of Lumumba on September 5, 1960, and the subsequent Mobutu takeover on September 14, fulfilled a U.S. policy objective aimed at eliminating Lumumba as a vehicle for Soviet assistance to the Congo. Finally, it may be irrelevant whether the United States held the "smoking gun." The CIA's efforts to assassinate Lumumba encouraged everyone, including his Congolese opponents, to kill him, thus achieving a foreign policy objective which may have been wrongly conceived from the beginning.

The extent to which the Katangans had succeeded in keeping Lumumba's death secret is puzzling. Unaware of the murder, Joseph Kasongo, the pro-American President of the Chamber of Representatives, told one embassy officer in late January 1961 that "Kasavubu is hopeless...[T]he only solution [to the Congo problem] is to release Lumumba" so that parliament could be convened. Even Timberlake had reported to the State Department on January 18 that the United States should rather confront "a military takeover by the Communist bloc," but the UN must not be permitted to take decisions that could lead to

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83 Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 138.
84 Memorandum to CIA Financial Division: Re: Payment to QJ/WIN, March 31, 1961, in Interim Report, pp. 43, 44; for his domicile in Europe see ibid., p. 45.
Lumumba's release. Instead, anti-Mobutu troops should be eliminated by the United Nations. Alternatively, all armed units in the Congo could be disarmed as long as Lumumba remained in jail.  

The new Kennedy administration which took over on January 20, 1961, equally remained uninformed of Lumumba's murder. For almost two weeks officials operated on the assumption that Lumumba might still be alive. What had happened to the elaborate American intelligence machine? Did the CIA conceal information from the State Department and the White House? What about the Department's own intelligence service? Available documents are silent on these questions. Therefore, one must conclude that the inability of the Americans to learn definitely that Lumumba had been killed on January 17 indicated a failure of the CIA and other United States intelligence organizations.


87 Department of State, "Policy Paper," 11 March 1961, pp. 4-7; Department of State Telegram 1458 (Wash.), 11 February 1961, Secretary of State to USUN Mission.
Kennedy had been in office only a short time when he faced all the accumulated problems of the Congo. The Eisenhower administration had achieved a limited victory by keeping the Soviet Union from gaining any substantial influence there, but its policies had helped intensify the chaos. A weak pro-Western military government, run by a College of Commissioners and headed by Mobutu, still existed in Leopoldville but it had no control outside of that province. The incoming administration which took office on January 20, 1961, provided some hope, because Kennedy had identified with African nationalism for some time as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He had also visited Algeria and he supported that country's liberation struggle against the French. He had made the Congo crisis an issue during the Presidential campaign. Yet, he too, was unable to resolve the Congo crisis.

One reason lay in the changes taking place in Africa and at the UN. Before 1960, only a handful of African nations were represented in the UN. By December, twenty-six countries had been represented in the UN.

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1Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace, pp. 65-81; Dynamics of World Power, v, 581-583, 591-593.
admitted, enough to affect decisions. The African bloc had caused a stalemate over resolutions in December, January, and part of February, 1961, a development which suggested that the United States had lost its decisive majority in the General Assembly. Also, the Soviet Union, which since July, 1960, received support only from Eastern European Communist states, now voted with some consistency with the Afro-Asian bloc on Congolese issues. Meanwhile the number of the Afro-Asians, who joined with the United States and its allies on these matters, progressively decreased. The Eisenhower administration had left office unable to check the trend. For the United States to continue its lead in directing UN Congo policies, it would have to modify its position to win the support of the Third World countries, whose votes became so vital. Finally, the debates had revealed that Africans increasingly doubted the UN's performance as they began to assert themselves.

The mandate of the United Nations Force in the Congo was another thorny issue that the Kennedy administration inherited. It invited serious attention and scrutiny. The Force had been in the country since July, 1960, under strict orders not to take aggressive police action in maintaining order. It had therefore been unable to deal with looting, rapes, or murders. Many Afro-Asians, appalled by the excesses, demanded that the UN respond vigorously.

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and reestablish security in the country. Such a shift needed American support and, because Kennedy and his appointees in the African Bureau were considered strongly pro-African, the new African nations looked to the administration for a positive formula. They seemed to have expected too much.

The most threatening problem when Kennedy took office was the weakness of the Leopoldville-based government. Since early January the Gizengaists and their allies in Bukavu had continued to reveal their military superiority over Mobutu's troops in conflicts that had developed into a limited civil war. Toward the end of the month they claimed control over more territory, had a broader mass support, and were better organized than the Leopoldville group. The Eisenhower administration in its last days in office blamed the United Nations for this situation, especially Dayal and Hammarskjöld. Dayal had continued his refusal to deal with Mobutu's College of Commissioners, and he had resisted Timberlake's pressure that he unleash UN troops to arrest Gizenga. Hammarskjöld, too, had supported his representative in this struggle with the Department of State. It therefore fell upon the new

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3 Security Council Official Records, Sixteen Year, February 1, 1961, 928th-930th meetings; Young, Politics in the Congo, pp. 329-333; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 111.

4 Department of State Telegram 825 (Accra), 24 January 1961, from Russell to Secretary of State Transmitting letter from Nkrumah to Kennedy; Telegram 839 (Accra), 25 January 1961, from Russell to Secretary of State: letter from Nkrumah to Kennedy; Telegram 1386 (Wash.), 2 February 1961, from Rusk to Russell, transmitting letter from Kennedy to Nkrumah.
administration to bridge the gap that had developed between
Hammarskjöld and United States officials in the State Department
and at the United Nations.  

The President and the men who surrounded him seemed confident that a solution would soon be found based upon Kennedy's idealism. His "new generation" would protect human rights and not allow any nation to pass from one oppressor to another.  

The President had set the tone of his new team during the campaign:

We must ally ourselves with the rising sea of nationalism in Africa. The desire of self-determination is the most powerful force in [the] modern world. It has destroyed all empires, created new nations. . . . America must be on the side of man to govern himself because that is one of our principles, because the final victory of nationalism is inevitable and because nationalism is the force which disposes of sufficient power and determination to threaten the integrity of [the] Communist empire itself.

Kennedy had established himself as an anti-colonialist in the Senate

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7 Special Report 994, part III, p. 273; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 116.
as far back as 1957 and 1959 when he shocked Europe and America with his unrelenting attack on French policy in the Algerian war of independence. 

G. Mennen Williams, former Governor of Michigan known for his support of civil rights movements, became Kennedy's Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. He was not an expert on Africa but his liberalism seemed to qualify him for the job. He viewed the UN as a forum where African nations "have a voice equal to that of any other nation, where African opinion ranks with that of any other areas in the world." Africa, he believed, brought to "the U.N. a new insistence on the dignity and worth of man, and enthusiasm for belie: that the U.N. really is man's hope for peace..."

Williams appealed to African nationalists in February, 1961, when he visited the continent. In Nairobi, Kenya, he declared that Africa was for Africans, a comment which took many Europeans and Americans by surprise. Conservatives in Congress attacked his remark as irresponsible, and in England the Colonial Office felt misgivings


9 Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 122; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 130, 143, 555.

because three British East African colonies were demanding independence. But Williams received support from liberals like Senator Frank Church of Idaho, Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota and Kennedy. The President responded to Williams' critics by saying, "I don't know who else Africa should be for."11

The New Frontier Liberals, like their Republican predecessors, feared any Communist influence in Africa, but they believed that democracy would prevail there. The Kennedy administration's Congo policy therefore encompassed both anti-colonialist sentiments and an instinctive hatred of Communism.

Unfortunately, Kennedy and his team never really understood colonialism. Adlai Stevenson, the new Ambassador to the UN, spoke of a "New Africa." The continent had been developed by Europeans; now the United States should move in and use Africa as an example to disprove "the Communist claim that free institutions and free enterprise are irrelevant to man's destiny anywhere else." This required that the American people put in more effort, provide more help, and give generously to the building of a free Africa. Stevenson noted that if the work was not done well then the civilization which the West had transplanted on the continent would have succeeded only in the "destruction of the gods" and the creation of frustration among people. That would damage "every confident claim on our part to be the wave of the future." He did show some awareness of the complexity

of the situation. "We must see that more than economic interests, more than social influence, more than the political balance, are at stake in Africa." What was being tested was the "moral capacity of our society." 12

Harlan Cleveland, an expert in foreign economic aid and Kennedy's Under-Secretary for International Organization Affairs, sought to implement such paternalistic idealism and fight against Communist infiltration in Asia and Africa through an economic assistance program which would set in motion "rapid development." His "liberal model" offered developing nations a choice between free enterprise or a controlled economic system:

The Asian and African leaders are beginning to see the true choice in these terms; they can pursue their economic development by maintaining considerable freedom of economic choices by their own people importing a significant part of their investment capital from outside, or they can adopt the Soviet idea of autarchic development by rigid state control of economic choices...squeeze its needed industrial capital out of its own domestic production...One formula makes it possible to maintain a degree of freedom in political and economic choices by individuals.

Cleveland saw a dual struggle underway. First, there was a "cultural battle between the Christian-European civilization and the unholy alliance of its internal rebels." Second, there was a competition for influence between capitalists-democratic institutions and the Communist-Socialist models. Africa would best be served if it chose the former. 13


13Harlan Cleveland, "The Theory and Practice of Foreign Aid." Paper prepared for special studies project of the Rockefeller Brothers
Chester Bowles, former Governor of Connecticut and Kennedy's appointee for the post of Under-Secretary of State, was the most outspoken of the Africanists in the new administration. More than anyone else, Bowles had a deep interest in the area and his idealism toward the Third World bordered on activism. He was pragmatic and sincerely opposed to colonialism. In 1954, as Ambassador to India, Bowles had suggested that the United States encourage colonial countries to fight for their independence. Two years later, he published *Africa's Challenge to America*, in which he declared that America as a free nation could not be indifferent to nationalist movements there. The United States had every reason to support demands for independence, because the continent was important to the United States' economy. He therefore called for a positive policy which would lead to a "mutually profitable economic association" with the African countries when they became independent. He rejected America's pro-colonial and pro-NATO posture with regard to Africa.

If the simmering South African volcano should erupt or the tricky balance of forces in the Congo break down, our position in the nuclear jet age would be mortally threatened. If practical American policy is to extend beyond the arrival of the next shipload of cobalt, columbite or pitchblende from Africa, such factors must be taken into account.  

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Chester Bowles, *Africa's Challenge to America*, pp. 52-54, 56, 100, 96-97.
Bowles carried his ideas to the State Department. On July 1, 1961, he sent a memorandum to the Secretary of State in which he called for "a radical but essential shift in our foreign policy. . . ."

At a time when American officials still viewed neutralist states more or less in the same light as allied to the Soviet bloc, Bowles registered his dissent.16 "However, we still regard neutralism as less than our highest aim for other nations." If they came "out strongly 'on our side' we would be enormously pleased." But if the United States undermined the neutrality of these states, it would provide a rationale for Communist intervention in the areas. To win them over to the American side it was imperative that in each case we provide and publicize our own democratic alternatives; that we spell out our proposals to the nations leaders, and make known where we stand to the people in the market place, the universities and in rural areas where most of them live.17

In 1962 he sounded even more idealistic yet sincere. "The Cold War [had] led to a growing partnership between the United States and peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America," and the evolving Third World would "shape the United Nations and. . .be shaped by it."18

These New Frontier Liberals shared one thing in common--political idealism and economic realism. The war to be waged against Communism would protect the ideal and the real. Their policy would

17 Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep, Appendix III. See also Heilsman, To Move a Nation, pp. 152-154.
help Africans form societies and governments which would be independent, and the United States would promote friendship and economic relationships.\textsuperscript{19} Racism especially disturbed the Africanists. Wayne Fredericks, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs (an alleged "CIA man"), had worked in South Africa and emerged as an opponent of apartheid. In Katanga "he saw [a] 'small European group' contributing to a destructive racism in Africa." If such a trend continued, the moderate African leaders with "visions of racial harmony...might be overwhelmed."\textsuperscript{20} Though appointed early in 1961, he did not come to the African Bureau until May.

The appointment of Edmund Gullion as the new Ambassador to the Congo in June, 1961, added another pro-African to the State Department. He had worked as "counsellor of the American legation during the first Indochina war." He had then concluded that the French had no capacity to retain the colonies. As a strong anticolonialist and as "an old friend and trusted advisor" to the President, he boosted the position of the African Bureau.\textsuperscript{21} Born in Kentucky, he saw the Congo faced with problems similar to those of the Civil War. "If the Katanga secession were not ended, then the Congo would break up and the communists would pick up most of the pieces."\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{19}Department of State Bulletin, XLVI (March, 1962), 216; Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace, pp. 128, 130-136, see also the preface.
\textsuperscript{20}Quotation from Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 130; see also Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 573, 556, 511, 152, 572.
\textsuperscript{21}Weissman, American Foreign Policy, 131; See also Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 66; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 370-371.
\textsuperscript{22}Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 576.
While ideologically these men seemed willing to pursue a reasonable policy toward Africa, they lacked power. Not one held a cabinet position. They were a liberal group pitted not only against the European Bureau in the Department, but also against a conservative cabinet and a President whose liberalism was subject to question. Arthur A. Schlesinger, Jr., Special Assistant to the President, wrote that, after looking at the composition of the new administration, "I suggested [to Kennedy] that what he had in mind was an administration of conservative men and liberal measures."23

Yet radical African leaders felt Kennedy had sufficient interest in Africa to be able to lead in finding solutions to its many problems. Because of "a desire to meet the man who had said no to De Gaulle," Kennedy had broken a speaking tour of California in 1959 to fly to New York to converse with Sekou Touré. The latter found in the "President a man quite open to African problems and determined to promote the American contribution to their happy solution."24 Within four days after Kennedy came to office, Nkrumah revealed that he looked "to the future and not the past." Nkrumah was impressed by the number of pro-African officials in the new administration. He would cooperate with Kennedy, he said, in efforts to wrestle with the deteriorating Congo situation, and he hoped the President would support a stronger UN mandate and help in the release of Lumumba.25

23Quotation from Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 143, 133-145; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, pp. 117, 131-133.

24Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 568-569.

25Department of State Telegrams 825 (Accra), 24 January 1961, from Russell to Secretary of State, transmitting summary of letter,
Meanwhile, Stevenson reported from the UN on January 26, that Hammarskjöld was reserved about United Stated intentions in the Congo. He had been angered by the American demand that Dayal be recalled from the Congo because the latter was biased in favor of Lumumba. Hammarskjöld also resented Timberlake's continuing pressure on the UN to recognize the Mobutu-Kasavubu regime and take military action against Gizenga. Hammarskjöld further expressed his distrust of the United States by noting that the Lebanese-Laos experiences had led him to wonder about the reliability of intelligence information supplied to him by the United States. But he still hoped the U.S. could help UN efforts in the Congo.

Hammarskjöld also worried about the decision by the Casablanca states to withdraw their troops from the Congo. He had hoped that India would replace them. Unfortunately, Nehru's response left that possibility doubtful. He acknowledged that his government attached "great importance to the United Nations effort in the Congo," but developments had been disappointing. The United Nations had remained passively ineffective, and it had no specific policy goals. Therefore, no Indian contingents would be supplied until the United Nations

Nkrumah to Kennedy; 839 (Accra), 25 January 1961, from Russell to Secretary of State, transmitting letter, Nkrumah to Kennedy.


came up with a clear policy position aimed at solving the problems. Thus Hammarskjöld hoped that the United States could intercede with Nehru.  

A State Department intelligence analysis further underscored the problem.

For the UN to break the impasse, the Secretary General and many member states believe that it would be necessary to neutralize the military forces of the various factions and diminish disruptive exterior influences. Obtaining a new mandate or sufficient diplomatic support for this would involve winning the cooperation of a substantial number of African and Asian states. This in turn would depend upon reducing Belgian military influence in the Congo.

The parliament would have to be reconvened with the possibility that Lumumba or his representatives would participate. To support this approach would be risky, "but the alternative of either direct Western intervention or collapse of the UN effort appear more dangerous."  

At the same time, the Casablanca powers, which had supplied most of the UN troops in the Congo, put Hammarskjöld on notice. They would not back the Stanleyville regime if the United Nations carried out its mandate by "disarming Mobutu's troops, release of political prisoners, recalling of Parliament, and expulsion of foreign advisors."

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28 Department of State Telegram 2010 (N.Y.), 26 January 1961, from Stevenson to Secretary of State transmitting copy of letter, Nehru to Secretary-General.

29 Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Memorandum No. 8403, "Policy Paper," 11 March 1961, p. 3.
Hammarskjöld, however, hoped that with the help of the new administration a workable formula could be found acceptable to a majority of the Afro-Asians, the United States, and the Soviet Union. American officials had led him to believe that NATO considerations would not inhibit Congo policies.

It was in this atmosphere that the new Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, instructed Williams in the last days of January to sit down with other interested bureaus to rethink the Congo policy. The directive was plain: "take the ceiling off your imaginations and... be uninhibited by past attitudes." Thus Williams gathered at the end of January with his colleagues from the International Organization Affairs and the European Affairs. During the discussions two views emerged—Williams, Bowles, Cleveland, and on occasion, Stevenson, advocated pro-African policies. Roving ambassador Averell Harriman, Timberlake, and George McGhee, former Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, Middle Eastern, and African Affairs, and a State Department Counselor, represented the European Bureau. They received support from Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury, and George Ball, a prominent lawyer, and Under-Secretary for Economic Affairs, whose firm represented the European Economic Community and other large European corporations. The Defense Department, headed by Republican

30 Daival, Mission for Hammarskjöld, pp. 187-188.

Robert McNamara, favored a policy which put considerable emphasis on European and NATO interests.\(^{32}\)

Both groups agreed on one fundamental point: "If the UN was to be effective in the Congo, it needed a strengthened mandate to neutralize the warring Congolese factions. . . .", but the men parted company on prescriptive measures.\(^{33}\) The Williams-Bowles-Stevenson triumverate proposed a broadly based coalition government which would absorb Lumumba or his followers. They also advocated "neutral" Congo, the release of political prisoners, an end to "big power" support for the various military factions, authority for the UN to disarm "Congolese soldiers," and an end to the Katanga secession.\(^{34}\)

The Europeanists felt such an approach would be unwise. It would be "like what we did in China," a reference to the cooperation of Chinese Communists with the nationalists in the war effort against Japan.\(^{35}\) Convinced that the Congo crisis approached the magnitude of the Vietnam problem, they felt it best to support the creation of a pro-Western controlled government. The group shunned the proposal to disarm Mobutu's troops, because the latter would resist such a move by the United Nations. The Europeanists further argued that a broadly based coalition which included Lumumba would facilitate his

\(^{32}\)Ideas expressed in this paragraph draw from Weissman, _American Foreign Policy_, pp. 134, 135, 132, 133.


\(^{34}\)Weissman, _American Foreign Policy_, pp. 138-139.

return to power. Thus they favored "a loose federation of tribal or power factions" that would preserve European influence and solve the problem of factionalism. Yet, the draft paper that the two groups submitted to the President for his consideration spoke only "of a broadly based government including all principal political [leaders]." The President approved the new policy on February 2. It reflected a watered-down Africanist position. First, the warring factions would be neutralized, but there would be no disarmament of Congolese soldiers. Second, once a degree of security prevailed a "broadly based" or "a middle of the road government" might be formed. By these phraseologies officials meant "a large anti-Lumumba coalition." It might be realized by revitalizing the now discredited Ile-o-proposed Round Table Conference. Third, political prisoners would be released. Finally, the parliament would reconvene after the three objectives had been attained. Because the New Frontiersmen did not know of Lumumba's death, they tied his release to these conditions. This meant that he could not be freed until after the proper political machinery had been established.

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36 Weissman, American Foreign Policy, pp. 139, 142n; Christian Science Monitor, February 13, 1961, p. 1.


The paper took into account both the Africanists and Euro-
peanists views, but the former came out somewhat better. However,
their advantage soon eroded as a result of Timberlake's determination
to abort this dangerous development. On February 4, he met with
Kennedy for an hour. Next, he testified before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee. In these
instances he emphasized the threat of Communism and stood at variance
with his boss, Williams. His emotional appeal, which revealed an
almost pathological fear of Lumumba, gained the support of Senators
William Fulbright of Arkansas, Frank Church of Idaho, and George
Aiken of Vermont, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee concurred.
The Belgians and the French also indicated that they disapproved of
the direction of the new administration's Congo policy.\(^{39}\)

When the National Security Council met on February 9,
Timberlake and the Bureau of European Affairs prevailed. The policy
that emerged excluded Lumumba from any coalition government that
might be organized "because he would immediately climb to the driver's
seat and initiate irresponsible policy." Some Lumumbists would be in-
cluded in the broadly based government, while the UN would retrain
and reunify Congolese forces rather than disarm or neutralize them.
In the meantime, the ANC troops loyal to the Leopoldville régime as
well as the government would receive assistance until the

\(^{39}\) Quotation from Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 140;
see also Gerard-Libois, Katanga Secession, p. 195.
reunification had been accomplished. Attempts to sell the new policy encountered some difficulties. First, at the UN the Afro-Asian states, whose support the Americans wanted, wished to have the prisoners released and parliament reconvened immediately. Second, the Mobutu-Kasavubu-Bomboko triumvirate saw it as complicity with the Casablanca powers' effort to undermine the position of the Leopoldville-based régime. Thus, it "exacerbated" conflict between the UN, on the one hand, and Kazavubu and Mobutu on the other. The "Francophone" states (former French colonies), soon known as the Brazzaville group, opposed the "American plan. . .for the neutralization of the Congolese army." At Brazzaville, in December 1960, these countries had already resolved to oppose any UN effort to disarm Congolese troops loyal to Mobutu and Kasavubu. The major NATO powers also objected to the plan for neutralizing forces in the Congo.

American officials were still negotiating with various power blocs for the acceptance of their plan when Munongo announced Lumumba's death on February 13. The news shocked the world and reactions varied. Some people blamed it on tribal hatred, others accused the Communists, but many fingers pointed toward the United States and

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43 Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 140.
Belgium. Kwame Nkrumah, in a national radio address, told the Ghanaian people that a brother had been murdered by imperialists.

In the British Parliament, labor members, in a fit of anger, declared that Lumumba's death rested not only with the Belgian government, Mobutu, Kasavubu, and Tshombe, but also on "our government and the Eisenhower régime." In Cairo, the British and American embassies were stoned and the Belgian set afire, while in Moscow thousands of workers demonstrated at the American, British, French, and Belgian embassies. Isvestiia, the Soviet government newspaper, editorialized that "Mr. Hammarskjöld, your hands are covered with the blood of Patrice Lumumba and it is impossible to wash it off with anything." Premier Chou En-Lai of China called the death a "vile murder" committed by "the United States and Belgian imperialists and their agents."

In England, thousands of demonstrators clashed with police when they attempted to storm the Belgian embassy, while more than one hundred pickets were arrested in front of the Belgian embassy in Paris. Indonesian youths attacked the American Ambassador's residence and the Belgian legation there. Demonstrations also took place.

44 The Times (London), February 17, 1961, p. 12.
47 Ibid.
in Colombo, Ceylon, Dublin, Ireland, Rome, Iran, in the Sudan, Australia, India, the Netherlands, Nigeria, and Accra, Ghana, where angry demonstrators ripped the United States seal from the American embassy. 48

In Geneva, the International Commission of Jurists, an organization representing 39,000 lawyers, judges, and professors of law in 62 countries, declared that it was "deeply concerned by the circumstances of the death of Mr. Lumumba and his colleagues, and it considers it essential that a thorough legal investigation should be carried on by a highly qualified and impartial international commission." 49 The Indonesian poet, A. Anataguna, reflected the populist view of Lumumba.

The news came early in the morning.
Lumumba is dead
Lumumba is dead
Anger split the whole world asunder.
A worker shouts:
who can murder my age-
the rail of the trains
the length of the light of the sun
we are all Lumumba
Lumumba.
A peasant stamps his feet
the people never die-
the heart is in the paddy
growing along in struggle and song
Freedom that's Lumumba
Lumumba.

48Ibid., February 20, 1961, p. 3; February 16, 1961, pp. 11, 10;
February 18, 1961, p. 3; February 19, 1961, p. 15. For State Depart-

49The Times (London), February 17, 1961, p. 11g.
The news came early in the morning.
Lumumba is dead
Lumumba is dead
the earth shook
the revolution marches on
Long live Lumumba.50

The worst outburst occurred at the United Nations in New York where black demonstrators repeatedly heckled Adlai Stevenson, forcing the adjournment of the Security Council. The situation worsened when they clashed with white pickets supporting Hammarskjöld. The former group carried placards which read that Lumumba "died for freedom" and that Hammarskjöld "has to go."51

Responses to Lumumba's death in the United States reflected diverse interests. Some government officials and public leaders accused Communists and pro-Africanists for inciting the riots in the United Nations and around the world.52 But those close to the black people seemed to hold different explanations. George M. Houser, Chairman of the American-African Committee, observed that the "American public did not fully appreciate the intensity of feeling among Negroes in relating African struggle for freedom with their own fight against discrimination and prejudice." Roy Wilkins, the Executive Secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, said that "the murder of Lumumba has horrified the

50 Quoted by Colin Legum in Congo, My Country, p. xxv.


world and that it was natural that American Negroes should add their protest." James Lawson, president of the United Nationalist Movement, whose members had participated in the outbursts at the UN, said the group believed in "freedom for all African people," while Daniel H. Watts, head of the Liberation Committee, whose members wore mourning black veils and arm bands when they heckled Stevenson, denied that his organization had any affiliation with Communists. Stevenson believed his interrupters came from the Harlem Writers Guild, while Ralph Bunche deplored the Negro demonstration. 53

In Washington, the Reverend S. E. Williams, a black minister, held the United States responsible for Lumumba's death because of its failure to develop an imaginative policy with an African perspective, by treating the Congo problem in terms of black and white, and by failing to see the difference between nationalism and communism. 54 Senators McGhee and Aiken thought otherwise. They expressed relief at Lumumba's death, because, in McGhee's opinion, Lumumba was Africa's Hitler. 55 Aiken declared that had Lumumba escaped to the Communist-controlled areas, the Congo would have seen more bloodshed. His death was a blessing in disguise. 56

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53 Ibid., February 17, 1961, pp. 1, 3; February 16, 1961, p. 11, February 18, 1961, p. 3.


The New York Times deviated from the official position of the United States government and the claim by pro-Katanga leaders that Lumumba was a Communist. In a series of unsigned articles, the paper put Lumumba into perspective. "In power as Premier of the Congo or in jail as a threat to a rival, Patrice Lumumba was a pivotal figure in the turbulent politics of his fledgling nation."

It determined that "his manner was that of a confident nationalist who said he wanted independence without Communist influence."^57

The Afro-Asian delegates at the UN were particularly hurt. Most had supported the UN operation because they thought the UN would protect Lumumba. Others saw the UN as the best means of preventing bloodshed in the Congo. Now they had doubts.

In small, private wakes for Lumumba, the Afro-Asian delegates...swallow their drinks as if there were a bitter taste to their mouths...They may not all have felt the same concern for Lumumba alive and active, but out of the buried corpse has risen a powerful spectre. Here in the lobbies and corridors and bars of the United Nations' glass palace, you can hear growing almost hour by hour, a menacing myth that could destroy the world organization itself.^58

Thus, in death Lumumba became a martyr to many and remained a villain to some. For the new Kennedy administration the tragedy compounded an already complex problem. Many of the embittered Afro-Asian states, in addition to demanding the strengthening of the United Nations mandate, recognized the Stanleyville régime. Within three days twenty

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^57 Ibid., February 14, 1961, pp. 16, 14.

countries shifted recognition from Leopoldville. The situation seemed even more threatening when the United Arab Republic and the Soviet Union called Gizenga's government the only legal one in the Congo and promised to give it every support needed. The Soviet Union then publicly held Hammarskjöld responsible for Lumumba's death and again challenged his power as Secretary-General.

For Kennedy, the situation appeared dangerous. He had written in Profiles in Courage that "courage" is the "most admirable human virtue" and that "in the days ahead, only the courageous will be able to take on the hard and unpopular decisions for our survival in the struggle with a powerful enemy. . . ." Close observers knew him to be eager to project an image of a courageous and decisive President. As for the Congo, Schlesinger noted that "the President had a simple and constant view that unless the United Nations filled the vacuum, there would be no alternative but a direct Soviet-American confrontation." He believed it might be necessary to send American troops to the Congo to keep the Soviets out.

59 Hilsman, To Move a Nation, pp. 235-240.
62 George Kateb, "Kennedy as Statesman," Commentary, XLI (June, 1966), 54-56; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 135.
63 Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 575.
Fearing that the Russians might use Stanleyville as a base for intervention elsewhere in the Congo, Kennedy responded by first warning that the situation made it impossible for any big power to attempt unilateral intervention. Then he confirmed United States recognition of the "legal government under President Kasavubu," and he denounced Gизenga's régime. Stevenson sounded the same warning in the United Nations. Meanwhile, the Pentagon formulated a contingency plan for the dispatch of 80,000 troops by air or sea, and five naval vessels which had arrived on the coast of West Africa in late November were ordered to the Gulf of Guinea off the Congo. Two of them had marines aboard.

These actions came with no clear evidence that the Soviets planned any military intervention. Ernest Lefever wrote in 1967 that "the real Communist danger was the subversive exploitation of civil strife and chaos, and not a direct military confrontation as implied in American statements." Allen Dulles, who as Director of the CIA


had approved covert operations against Lumumba to prevent a Communist takeover, admitted in April, 1962:

I think we overrated the Soviet danger. . . . They went in there with a great fanfare. They supported Gizenga. They established the Lumumba Institute in Moscow, and it looked as though they were going to make a serious attempt at take-over in the Belgian Congo. Well it didn't work that way at all.68

If any threat existed for the United Nations and United States policies in the Congo at this time, it came from the Afro-Asians. They complicated the situation not only by recognizing Gizenga's government, but they also seriously weakened the United Nations by the withdrawal of troops serving with the United Nations, as their governments expressed disapproval of the role of the United Nations in the Congo. In November and December, 1960, Mali and Yugoslavia had withdrawn their contingents followed by Burma and Guinea in January, 1961, the United Arab Republic in February, Morocco in March, and Indonesia and the Sudan in April.69 Of the pro-Lumumba African countries, only Ghanaian units of the UN Force remained in the Congo, but they had a special purpose.

Though Nkrumah had given Kennedy an assurance early in February that he would not give military assistance to Gizenga if the


President agreed to support the release of Lumumba and allow the latter's participation in the government, the death of Lumumba and Kennedy's recognition of Kasavubu seemingly changed his position. But Nkrumah had other ambitions. His relationship with Lumumba had been predicated on the belief that a unified independent Congo under Lumumba would join Ghana in the struggle for the creation of pan-African states and influence other nations on becoming independent to overcome the danger of tribalism. He had high hopes of an eventual federation of the Congo with Ghana, and he saw Lumumba's murder as the Western powers' determination to thwart such a development.

Thus Nkrumah entered into a secret agreement with Gizenga that Ghanaian troops would remain in the Congo under the UN command, and when the time was right they would be put at the disposal of Gizenga to help rid the country of dissident militia and foreign mercenaries. A formal unification treaty would then be signed between the two countries enabling Ghanaian forces to fight in the Congo as federal troops. In the meantime, Ghana, the United Arab Republic, and other friendly countries would give Gizenga financial support and supply him with military material through the Sudan. Hammarskjöld and

70 Department of State Telegram 880 (Accra), 2 February 1961, from Russell to Secretary of State; "Policy Paper," 11 March 1961, p. 5; see also Telegram 911 (Accra), 9 February, 1961, from Russell to Secretary of State.

Williams successfully blocked the plan by persuading the Sudanese government not to allow the transit of such equipment through its territory. 72

These developments caused a dilemma for American officials. Kennedy feared that they might lead to external intervention and a risk of war. 73 The State Department's African Bureau officials felt disappointed that their effort to "promote a new constructive approach . . .would be swept away in a new wave of violence and passion" in the aftermath of Lumumba's death. 74 They had hoped to work with selected African and Asian leaders to find a solution, but "it was now immeasurably more difficult to find Afro-Asians to front for us. . . ."75 In a communication with Kennedy, Nehru agreed that Indian troops would go to the Congo if two conditions were met. First, he needed assurance that the Eisenhower policy would be changed. Upon receiving an affirmative response, he informed the President that the strengthening of the United Nations mandate must precede the arrival of Indian forces. 76 Sekou Touré, in addition to implicating

72 Nkrumah, Challenge of the Congo, pp. 152-153; for Williams' trip to the Sudan see Benoit Verhaegen, Congo 1961 (Brussels: Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politiques, 1962), p. 190; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 141.


the United States in the murder of Lumumba, notified Kennedy that Africa was looking and waiting for what the U.S. would do in the future. Nkrumah added that "cooperation between the African states and the Western powers. . . and the relation between Africa and the United States" would be gravely damaged unless a solution to the Congo crisis was found soon.

The State Department's European Bureau apparently did not see any serious danger in these manifestations. They thought the death of Lumumba opened the way for reconciliation on the Congo. Timberlake again suggested that Lumumba's death had weakened the Stanleyville régime and that Mobutu should "be allowed to proceed" with a military "offensive" to conquer that province. But the Stevenson group cautioned that such action stood little chance of succeeding and could lead to intervention by militant African states in collaboration with the Soviet Union. Such involvement also seemed unlikely because it was doubtful that Mobutu's soldiers had the capacity to defeat Gizenga's forces under the command of the brilliant General Lundula.

Meanwhile, discussion in the Security Council had been dominated by the Casablanca powers, supported by India. They, too, had

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77 Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, February 25, 1961: President Toure's message to the President; see also the New York Times, February 17, 1961, p. 7.

78 Department of State Telegram 1015 (Accra), 23 February 1961, from Embassy, Accra, to Secretary of State, transmitting letter, Nkrumah to Kennedy.

proceeded between February 2 and 13 on the assumption that Lumumba was still alive. However, the debates produced no resolution. The Department of State had instructed its delegation to slow down the Council's proceedings because of a fear that Lumumba might be released. The Department had decided that if Lumumba was dead, the United States would support the immediate release of political prisoners "since there would be no one left whose [liberation] would result in instability and/or civil war."\(^{80}\) The reaction of the Afro-Asian delegates after Lumumba's death made further delays impossible.

Between February 15 and 16, the Afro-Asian states met in committees to seek compromise language that would be acceptable to them as well as to the veto-wielding powers. On the 17th they arrived at a consensus and submitted a resolution sponsored by Ceylon, Liberia, and the United Arab Republic. The draft addressed three basic points. First, it called for the withdrawal of foreign military, paramilitary, and political advisors. Second, it urged the United Nations to take measures to prevent the outbreak of a civil war with UN troops authorized to use "force, if necessary, in the last resort." Third, it advised "all states" not to allow their nationals to become involved in the Congo except through the UN. The resolution further called for "The convening of the Parliament" and urged that armed Congolese units and personnel "should be reorganized," disciplined and controlled. The UN was also to protect parliament and keep the army from interfering in political life.\(^{81}\)

\(^{80}\) Department of State Telegram 1458 (Wash.), 11 February 1961, from Secretary of State to USUN Mission.

The United States raised objections to this mild document. The "Timberlake group" opposed it because "it was necessary at all costs to strengthen Kasavubu, Mobutu, and Tshombe to resist compromise with Stanleyville." The Africanists, or "the Bowles faction" wanted the United States to support the resolution after amending it because it had been proposed by Afro-Asian states "not associated with Moscow." But United States opposition to the Afro-Asian draft resolution rested on three major points. First, the resolution did not mention the Secretary-General as the executor of the new mandate. Second, it talked of military, paramilitary, and foreign personnel, but it had no provision against sending military material to Gizenga. Finally, it empowered the UN troops to use force but without any specific restriction on the exercise of the new power, nor was the Command required to consult with the Congolese government. Stevenson thus received instruction not to vote for it unless he succeeded in inserting these points.

The Security Council again appeared headed for a stalemate. On February 20, the United States delegation engaged in a determined effort to effect the required amendments. Their actions portended not only a Soviet veto of the resolution but also a split within the Afro-Asian rank. As Catherine Hoskyns put it: "Whether the resolution was accepted or not seemed in these circumstances to depend on just

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how the Americans were to force through their changes." While the
governments maneuvered, another shocking message came from Leopold-
ville. Six additional Lumumbists, who had been secretly shipped to
Kasai by Mobutu and Kasavubu, had also been murdered. In Stanleyville,
the Lumumbists retaliated by executing before a firing squad fifteen
pro-Leopoldville politicians, including Pongo. These events made
a mockery of any UN peacekeeping and eliminated any possibility that
the Afro-Asians would compromise their resolution.

Hammarskjöld and Stevenson thus pleaded with Kennedy to per-
mit the American delegation to vote affirmatively. The President
agreed and on February 21, with Stevenson having put his reservations
on record, the resolution passed. Though it allowed United Nations
units to use arms "if necessary, in the last resort," the power
granted still limited the Force's ability to control the situation.
American reservations also meant that effective implementation could
come only if the action taken conformed to United States interests.

The new mandate produced an immediate backlash. In Leopold-
ville, Elizabethville, and Brussels, reaction was markedly hostile.
Kasavubu called it a UN betrayal of the Congo, an attempt to establish

84 Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence, p. 332; Weissman
American Foreign Policy, p. 143.

85 Editors' note, Public Papers of the Secretaries-General,
v, 353; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 143; Hoskyns, The Congo
Since Independence, pp. 332-333; Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld,
pp. 207-209.

86 Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 143; Hoskyns, The
Congo Since Independence, pp. 332-333.
a trusteeship. He appealed to Congolese soldiers to defend their country against UN domination, and he appealed to Tshombe to join in the struggle against the new threat. Tshombe termed the UN mandate "a declaration of war against Katanga and the Congo," and he offered employment and citizenship to Belgians serving in Katanga. These utterances found a ready champion in the person of Timberlake. To withdraw "political advisers is dynamite. The Communists will have a field day pushing out present non-UN advisers much faster than they can be replaced." 87

The Belgian government feared that the new resolution would lead to the indiscriminate removal of Belgians. Its ambassador in Washington had sought to persuade Rusk to alter the language of the resolution. Rusk noted that "undesirable Belgian adventurers and mercenaries" would have to "be withdrawn as rapidly as possible," but he also reaffirmed the Eisenhower administration's position that "Belgian advisers should remain until UN replacements are available" so that there could be no further "chaos in the Congo." This stand continued the policy of protecting Belgium by circumventing the UN resolution. The only country that had military, paramilitary, and other personnel throughout the Congo, except in Kivu and Orientale, was Belgium. Attempts by the United States to establish the presence

of Communist advisors had failed. Therefore, the resolution applied mainly to Belgium and Mobutu's forces.

Mobutu responded by first increasing his troops' physical abuse and arrest of United Nations personnel. Then on March 1, Congolese soldiers attacked Sudanese units of the UN Force stationed at Matadi, and other UN garrisons soon felt the assault of Mobutu's militia. The UN Force, instead of using the power granted under the new mandate to put Mobutu's units out of action, simply disarmed the Sudanese garrison. As Daval observed, "Instead of the increased power given to the United Nations being put to use to curb violence between opposing Congolese factions, they had to be invoked by the UN Force to defend itself in the Lower Congo area and Katanga. . . ."

Hammarskjöld's reaction to this humiliation was characteristic. He refused to ask member nations to provide the necessary troops so that the terms of the February 21 resolution could be upheld. He shied away from the use of force, permitting such action only in self-defense. Hammarskjöld's faith in political and diplomatic persuasion had remained unchanged since July 13, 1960. Thus he responded to the situation by dispatching unheeded letters of protest to Kasavubu and the Belgians.


90 Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, v, pp. 395-413; Daval, Mission for Hammarskjöld, pp. 215-227.
The United States remained silent. Officials, however, did attempt to use the weakening position of the UN to extract concessions from Hammarskjöld. India had finally agreed to send a 5,000-man battalion, but UN representatives and the Secretariat feared that Mobutu's militia might attack them upon arrival. Thus, Rusk instructed Stevenson on March 1 to inform Hammarskjöld that the United States would work to ensure the peaceful entry of the Indian units. However, he laid down three conditions. First, Dayal would have to be recalled because of his support for Gizenga. Second, control of the UN military operation should remain in the hands of the Secretary-General. Third, if Dayal could not be replaced before the dispatch of the Indian forces, he had to be recalled for consultation in New York. Timberlake especially advised on March 13 that the Indian troops should be used in a manner favorable to the West. They should not be kept as a separate battalion. He recommended that on arrival they be mixed with other units. Dayal should not be replaced by an Indian or a "dark skin" because any Indian would consider himself superior to the Congolese and any black was unqualified. The Congolese must "accept white." Hammarskjöld capitulated. He recalled Dayal for consultation late in March. Then, in accord with the United States demand, Dayal remained in New York until he resigned on May 27, 1961.  

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91 Department of State Telegram 1694 (Wash.), 1 March 1961, from Rusk to Stevenson; see Telegram 2447 (N.Y.), 13 March 1961, Stevenson for Secretary of State.  
92 State Department Telegram 2003 (Leop.), 13 March 1961, Timberlake to Secretary of State.  
93 State Department Memorandum, 20 March 1961, for Acting
Thus, conditions following Lumumba's death, especially the February 21 resolution, favored the policies pursued by the State Department's Europeanists. Given the strength of Gizenga's government and its recognition by many Afro-Asian states, the United States abandoned, for the time being, a military solution and opted for a political one. 94 American officials discovered, however, that the intense factionalism defied any simplistic political approach and that only the United Nations could still resolve the problem. That did not mean that the United States abandoned its own policies and left everything to the UN. The Americans worked to win Tshombe to their dream of a federated Congo with a centralized government. As the strong man of Katanga, Tshombe could keep that province within the federation, an indispensible need because it contributed most of the government's revenue and foreign currency earnings through the Union Miniere du Haut Katanga. Finally, the United Nations still provided a means by which Gizenga's power could eventually be destroyed without serious backlash. But these views underestimated the psychological commitment of Tshombe and other Katangan secessionists to an independent Katanga.

Secretary of State from Harlan Cleveland; Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, p. 264.

94 Weissman, American Foreign Policy, pp. 146, 131-132.
CHAPTER VIII
THE VICTORY AT LOVANIUM AND THE STRUGGLE FOR KATANGA

The elimination of Lumumba provided the United States with a chance to guide the formation of an anti-radical government centered in Leopoldville. That opportunity finally came at Lovanium University when the parliament convened under the auspices of the UN on August 2, 1961, to elect a new civilian government. Even before then developments had tended to favor that possibility, especially in the Congo proper. Mobutu's hold on the army had grown weaker since January 24, when the rank and file at Camp Thysville mutinied, demanded the release of Lumumba and raped the wives of their officers.¹ His military campaigns against Gizenga had also been dismal, with many of his soldiers defecting to the enemy's side.² Congolese politicians no longer felt subservient to Mobutu, and on February 9, Ileo disbanded the College of Commissioners and formed a provisional civilian government composed of representatives from the Leopoldville and Bas-Congo areas. He hoped to

¹Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, p. 190.
²Lefever, Uncertain Mandate, pp. 231-232.
broaden it to constitute a government of national conciliation, and American officials seemed ready to help. Because these developments coincided with the formulation of the Kennedy administration's policy in the Congo, State Department officials thought they had actually influenced events.

While this was not true, further changes supported the belief that Lumumba's disappearance would encourage the creation of a stable pro-Western government. The Americans did not yet know of Lumumba's murder when members of Kasavubu's inner circle, of whom Ileo was one, learned of his death around January 19, 1961. That knowledge encouraged the elected politicians to remove the army from politics. No evidence supports claims that a leak to the press of the American plan affected the thinking of the Congolese. The United States, however, did attempt to promote the shift of power to Leopoldville by pressuring Belgium to withdraw troops from Katanga. Care was taken, though, that such action not weaken NATO's capacity to respond.

The February 21 Security Council resolution, which authorized United Nations troops to use force if necessary, also produced definite responses. First, on February 28 the Leopoldville, Katanga, and Kasai


4Kanza, Conflict in the Congo, pp. 320-321; see also Department of State, "Policy Paper," 11 March 1961, pp. 5-6.


6Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 144; Christian Science Monitor, March 17, 1961, p. 4.
régimes entered into a military alliance against the United Nations. Then Kasavubu, Tshombe, and Kalonji, with their Belgian and French advisors, met at Tananarive, the capital of the Malagasy Republic in the Indian Ocean, on March 8, 1961. They feared that the UN armed with the new mandate would impose a settlement upon them. They had, therefore, gathered to devise a plan for resolving their differences. Gizenga had been invited but he refused to attend noting that a rigid application of the Loi Fondamentale could be the only basis for a solution and that parliament, not a round table, was the appropriate body to conduct the discussions.

When the conference ended on March 12, the results revealed the dominance of Tshombe. A signed convention decreed confederacy, with each state sovereign. It dissolved Ileo's provisional government and created in its place a "Coordination Committee." It was understandable that Tshombe would neutralize Ileo. The latter was a centralist. The Tananarive agreement made Kasavubu president of the proposed confederacy to preside over "a Council of Member States, composed of representative presidents," each with a veto power. Finally, the three leaders reaffirmed their anti-UN military alliance.


8 Young, Politics in the Congo, p. 337.

9 Gerard-Libois, Katanga Secession, p. 42.

Reactions to the Tananarive agreement varied. Some hailed it as a major achievement; others denounced it; and some, like the United States, remained ambivalent. In Leopoldville, Kasavubu returned to hostile colleagues. They could not endorse the humiliating pact and Kasavubu had a "second thought." In Stanleyville, Gizenga "denounced" the decisions of the conference "as a betrayal of the Congolese people." He saw Kasavubu's support as a "division of the country in violation of the constitution." Tshombe's supporters rejoiced because Katanga as an entity had finally been recognized by Kasavubu and Kalonji. Wigny read the outcome as reflecting the wisdom of Belgium's policy "which we have patiently followed."

Hammarskjöld had favored the conference and had instructed Dayal to persuade Gizenga and "moderate Lumumbists" to attend. He had, however, rightly feared that the latter's absence would assure Tshombe's dominance at the meeting. Britain and France rejoiced for different reasons. The former viewed a moderate autonomous Katanga as a guaranty that the Congo's chaos would not spill over to Northern Rhodesia, while the French saw themselves as replacing the Belgians in Katanga.


14 Editors' note in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 394.

15 Gerard-Libois, Katanga Secession, pp. 149, 177.
The United States position was unclear. Officials wished to play many cards. Timberlake, who had returned to Leopoldville in the middle of February, wanted some form of parliamentary government because a continued political stalemate worked in "favor" of Gizenga. He believed that a convened parliament would constitute an anti-Gizenga majority. Timberlake also advocated a western-supported military operation against the Stanleyville-based régime. But his attitude on the Tananarive agreement seemed ambiguous. He wished the United States and the United Nations to support a coalition consisting of Kasavubu, Tshombe, and Mobutu. He did not show how the triumvirate would rule. Consul Canup and Devlin appear to have held opposing views. Canup preferred a centralized authority in the Congo, while Devlin endorsed the plan worked out at Tananarive.

Officially, policy remained "ambivalent and indecisive." It was agreed that Katanga should be reintegrated but only if such action could eliminate the influence of the Gizengaists. Furthermore, the outcome must not "weaken" NATO. American officials thus adopted an

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17 Department of State, "Policy Paper," 11 March 1961, pp. 6-7; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 145.
18 Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 145.
19 Gerard-Libois, Katanga Secession, 184; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 145.
20 Gerard-Libois, Katanga Secession, p. 177; direct quote is from Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 144.
attitude that any political settlement, short of a total independence of Katanga, would receive United States support. They were, therefore, willing to give the Tananarive plan a chance. Nevertheless, the Americans still hoped that their policy of February 9, which called for a "gradual return to parliamentary government," might eventually become the basis for a permanent resolution of the constitutional crisis.  

The United States passive response to the Tananarive initiatives reflected a division within the policy-making apparatus. African Bureau officials wanted the United States to support a strong united Congo, and they advocated the use of UN military power to facilitate the reunification. The United States should be more concerned with the interests of the Congolese and Africans instead of being inhibited by Belgian and NATO considerations. Senior members of the European Bureau endorsed a confederacy solution. They argued that United States relations with Belgium and NATO should take precedence over the desires of the Congolese and any rapport the United States wished to develop with Afro-Asian States. The executive office seemed more inclined to bridge the two views. The United States role would remain minimal except when danger of external intervention appeared, or when the Communists might

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make gains. This meant that the United States would confine itself to manipulating the various Congolese and Afro-Asian factions to prevent the success of policies unfavorable to the western powers.

Apparently because of this lack of consensus, the United States influence on Congo developments during the months of March through May was limited. Senator Church thought this situation had arisen because the Kennedy administration had ignored African nationalism. He thus called for an American policy which focused on African aspirations rather than on European interest.

Meanwhile, the Afro-Asian delegates in the UN grew restless. Since the adoption of the February 21 resolution, the Secretariat had been slow in implementing its provisions. Belgian-led Katangan gendarmerie waged a systematic war of extermination against the Balubas of North Katanga. Mobutu's soldiers turned against United Nations units causing several deaths.

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25 Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 145.


28 Lefever, Uncertain Mandate, pp. 232-234; see also Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, V, 395-409.
The Afro-Asians responded. First, 5,000 Indian troops began arriving on April 1. Nehru had already demanded that they be put to a constructive and effective use, because "the United Nations effort in the Congo" had not met expectations.  

The first Indian contingents arrived in Katanga on April 2. Tshombe's gendarmes had increased their operations against the Baluba, and on April 5 and 6 the Afro-Asian representatives introduced two draft resolutions to the General Assembly. The first deplored Belgium's failure to comply with UN decisions and called for the prompt withdrawal and evacuation of all Belgian and foreign military, paramilitary personnel and political advisors not under the United Nations command, and mercenaries.

It held Belgium a contributor "to the further deterioration of the situation in the Congo." Most of the western powers opposed the resolution. Stevenson insisted that Belgium was cooperating with the UN and that the problem of foreign military and political advisors constituted only one element in the continuing Congo crisis. But the resolution passed on April 15, mainly with the support of the Third World delegates. It signified the Afro-Asians' disenchantment with the Secretariat's slowness in implementing the decisions of the February 21 resolution.  

29 Direct quotation from Department of State Memorandum of Conversation with Prime Minister Nehru with Dean Rusk, New Delhi, March 30, 1961, p. 1; Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, pp. 241-242.

30 General Assembly Official Records, Fifteenth Session, resolution 1599 (XV).

31 Department of State Bulletin, XLIV (May 22, 1961), 782.

Meanwhile, the United Nations command took action. First, it instructed its force in North Katanga "to oppose and resist any further aggressive moves by the Katangan gendarmery." Then on April 7, fully reinforced by Indian troops, the UN units clashed with the Katangan soldiers, captured thirty European mercenaries, and sank "a barge carrying 150 Katangan gendarmes, some of whom drowned." The Saturday Evening Post reflected one viewpoint in the United States when in an April 18 editorial it accused the United Nations of being "neutral against" the West. It found UN actions to be unfavorable to pro-Western Congolese. The magazine labeled Mobutu as pro-Communist and charged that United States officials, by continuing to support the UN, were promoting a Communist influence in Africa.

A rapid series of developments in the Congo gave policy-makers no time to respond to such charges. On April 17, Robert Gardiner, a Ghanaian diplomat in the employ of the United Nations, signed an agreement with Kasavubu which pledged that UN troops would not be used against any military, paramilitary, personnel and political advisors in Leopoldville. The United Nations also promised to give Kasavubu every assistance in his effort to rid the Congo of all "foreign" adventurers not invited "under the authority of the President."

34 Gerard-Libois, Katanga Secession, pp. 174, 185.
thus "received, without having formally called for it, what had always been refused Lumumba in 1960; military and political assistance to put an end to the Katanga secession."\(^37\)

The April 17 agreement may have had three objectives. First, it probably sought to diffuse anti-UN feelings that had developed in Leopoldville since February 21 by strengthening Kasavubu and thus lessening Tshombe's influence. Second, from the Afro-Asian perspective, the Secretariat appeared ready to implement the decision of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Third, the accord acknowledged some changes in Belgium. A general election there had produced a Social-Christian-Socialist coalition government. Paul-Henri Spaak, former Belgian Foreign Minister and Secretary-General of NATO, was to be sworn in as the new Prime Minister on April 25. Since a visit to the Congo in 1955, he had opposed Belgian policy there. Spaak had already informed the State Department that he would support the immediate evacuation of Belgian adventurers from the Congo. However, he disapproved of any rash removal of Belgian military, paramilitary personnel and political advisors. The latter especially served the "mutual interest of the Government of the Congo, Belgium, and the U.S. . . ."\(^38\)


Spaak had also let it be known that his government would cooperate somewhat with the United Nations if the February 21 Security Council resolution was not applied too liberally. The UN thus gave a secret assurance to Spaak’s government that only illegal Europeans would be affected under the terms of both the resolution and the agreement with Kasavubu. This meant the mercenaries serving with Tshombe’s régime would be directly affected.

Thus, during the months of May, June, and July, United Nations troops moved against unauthorized Europeans in Katanga, often initiating their deportation. But only a few were really deported. Hence, the operation did not provoke any reaction either from the Spaak administration or from the United States.

Meanwhile, Afro-Asian leaders continued to pressure the Secretary-General to help reconvene the Congolese parliament. On May 17, Nkrumah suggested to Hammarskjöld that the UN could realize that objective by providing security to deputies. Kasavubu also reportedly asked Hammarskjöld for assistance in that regard. Even at the State

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Department sentiments seemed hopeful. A memorandum from Bowles to the President declared on May 20 that the time was now for the United States to take measures to stabilize the Congo's economy. Kasavubu's government seemed prepared to cooperate and European countries were willing to contribute to the UN Program of Financial Aid.\footnote{44}

The Tananarive agreements also contributed to the changes. They had provided for another conference and on April 24, Tshombe and his Foreign Minister Evariste Kimba arrived at Coquilhatville in Equateur to meet with Kasavubu and Kalonji. Also attending was Tshombe's arch-enemy Jason Sendwe. Kasavubu and his entourage had gone to repudiate the Tananarive convention. Tshombe demanded that Sendwe and any delegate that had not participated in the Tananarive proceedings should be expelled from the meeting. When rebuffed by the men he had manipulated only a month earlier, Tshombe left the conference to return to Elizabethville.

Taking everyone by surprise, ANC soldiers that Tshombe had "ousted from Katanga" in July, 1960, arrested him at the scene on April 26. After several days of panic among the Leopoldville-based politicians, Bomboke declared . . . that Tshombe would be tried for the crime of high treason, . . . the massacre of the Baluba of North Katanga and the murder of Patrice Lumumba.

He was subsequently detained in Leopoldville where he remained until June 22, 1961.\footnote{45}

\footnote{44} Department of State Memorandum, Chester Bowles, Acting Secretary of State, to the President, 20 May 1961.

The arrest and subsequent detention of Tshombe did not affect the Coquilhatville discussions. Delegates from Leopoldville, Kasai, and North Katanga worked several weeks hoping to come up with a formula for the resolution of what they perceived as a constitutional crisis. When the conference concluded on May 28, the delegates had adopted a system of twenty "states" united under a federal government and a president. Each state would have its own president and the principle of equal representation would apply in the proposed Federal Congress. The participants further agreed that parliament be convened with the help of the United Nations so that the proceedings would be "free from outside pressures."^46

Gizenga and the Lumumbists were not represented at the Coquilhatville conference. As the heir of Lumumba's principles, Gizenga was disdainful of such round tables. He believed in a rigid application of the Loi Fondamentale. While agreeing that the Loi Fondamentale could be amended to meet certain needs, the unity and powers of the central authority should not be too gravely altered. Many of the pro-Western moderates shared his sentiment.47

United Nations officials seemed to have been impressed by the outcome of the Coquilhatville conference. They hoped that another meeting of all Congolese leaders might achieve a final compromise.

^46 Direct quote is from Nkrumah, Challenge of the Congo, p. 162; Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjold, pp. 253-254.

^47 Young, Politics in the Congo, p. 525; Verhaegen, Congo 1961, pp. 166-181, 423. The difficulty in implementing the proposed territorial changes is discussed in Willame, Patrimonialism, pp. 40-41.
resolution. The idea of another round table had to be abandoned, however, when Gizenga insisted that only the Parliament could discuss any constitutional changes. The Secretariat thus made plans to bring all Congolese parliamentarians to Lovanium University, twelve miles outside of Leopoldville city, to create a new civilian government. Officials selected the site because "it was removed from local pressure." The Gizengaists accepted the arrangement. The United States, which had been watching developments carefully, favored the idea, but Katanga moved reluctantly. Without the contingent of deputies from there, the Lumumbists, led by Gizenga, might dominate the proceedings. Another Lumumbist government would be most unwelcome. Moreover, the Binza group insisted that until an anti-Lumumbist majority could be attained, the parliament could not convene. Thus the session which had been planned for June had to be postponed awaiting the arrival of the Katangans.

Meanwhile, many of the antagonists manipulated, each faction hoping to dominate the conference. The radical African states favored

49 Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, p. 256.
50 Nkrumah, Challenge of the Congo, pp. 162-164.
the Gizenga slate. The United States, whose leaders saw a chance to establish a moderate pro-Western government in Leopoldville, sought moderate candidates interested in eliminating factionalism. The Americans envisioned a compromise government of the radical Lumumbists, the conservative Tshombeists and Kalonjists, and the moderates led by Adoula, a labor leader who received the endorsement of the American Federation of Labor. He was also the Secretariat's candidate for the Premiership.

The lobbying for candidates created some tensions, which outsiders also sought to ease. To diffuse the situation, the British government replaced its ambassador, Ian Scott, who with Timberlake had been the strongest opponents of Dayal's Congo policies. The United States also recalled Timberlake.

With Timberlake out of Leopoldville, the American embassy became more active, concentrating on recruiting candidates for the pending election at Lovanium, supporting the United Nations effort for the same, and persuading Tshombe that it was in the interest of Katanga as well as the West that Katanga deputies participate. But a problem existed. Tshombe was still held in Leopoldville. The United States,

52 Nkrumah, Challenge of the Congo, pp. 163-164.


believing that a Leopoldville-Elizabethville coalition would thwart a resurgence of the Lumumbists, sought Tshombe's release. The Americans also feared an ultra-rightist coup in Katanga if Tshombe remained in prison. Though that concern seemed unfounded, they convinced Leopoldville authorities to release Tshombe.\textsuperscript{55}

Once in Katanga, he ignored repeated State Department appeals to send deputies to Lovanium. The United Nations, which had also worked for Tshombe's release, likewise failed to gain his cooperation. The Americans thus asked Britain and France for assistance.\textsuperscript{56} The State Department even sent a threatening letter to Tshombe early in July. The United States would rather abandon its current position on Katanga than lose the support of the Afro-Asian states in its cold war rivalry with the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{57} The British, too, responded by asking Welensky to intercede with Tshombe. He had to convince Tshombe that the latter's alliance with Kasavubu was needed to isolate Gizenga.\textsuperscript{59} Welensky tried but failed. Finally, the Americans turned to the Union Miniere and asked its officials for help.\textsuperscript{59}


\textsuperscript{57}Gerard-Libois, Katanga Seccession, p. 192; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 148.

\textsuperscript{58}Welensky, Welensky's 4,000 Days, p. 219.

\textsuperscript{59}Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence, p. 372; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 149.
Tshombe's reluctance stemmed from a number of reasons. First, he wished not to participate in a conference where the United Nations and the United States hand-picked in advance most of the candidates for office in the new government. Their slate consisted of pro-Western politicians, although they included one radical as a token to reconciliation. Adoula was to be prime minister, Kasavubu president, and there were to be three vice-premiers, Gizenga, Sendwe, and Jean Bolikango. This arrangement was expedient, because it accommodated a Lumumbist while ensuring that he could not become the number-two man in the government. Second, Tshombe feared that a reconvened parliamentary conference would produce a Leopoldville-Stanleyville understanding which would work against Katanga's interest. He might have been wrong in this regard. The position of the United Nations, the United States, the western powers, Belgium, and the Leopold-based moderates called only for the formation of a Leopoldville-Elizabethville alliance to neutralize the radicals.° The latter "were strong enough to decisively influence the formation of the Government" unless the Katangans participated.° Finally, those who assert pressure ignored Tshombe's commitment to Katanga's sovereignty. In this stand he received support from Abbe Youlou of the Republic of the Congo (Congo Brazzaville). Youlou

60 O'Brien, To Katanga and Back, p. 189; Welensky, Welensky's 4,000 Days, pp. 221-222; The New York Times, July 18, 1961, p. 7; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 149.


had abandoned Kasavubu when he discovered that the latter was not a secessionist, and had then rallied to the Katanga cause.  

The parliamentarians finally assembled on July 19 without their Katangan colleagues. Two factions seemed in evidence—the "Nationalist Bloc," representing the Lumumbist-Gizengaists and the "National Democratic Bloc," consisting of a Leopoldville-Kasai axis. On July 24 and July 25, they voted on the first fourteen offices. The Nationalists captured thirteen of them and created a tense situation when they began to press for the right to form a government. Mobutu let it be known that the army would not accept such a government. American officials concluded that Katangan deputies might make a difference, and they again appealed to Tshombe to send delegates. Offices still remained to be filled, and they could tip the balance in favor of the moderates. On July 29, 1961, Michel Struelens, a Belgian lobbyist for Katanga in the United States, and three visiting Katangan provincial deputies, including Tshombe's brother, went to the State Department where they were asked to persuade Tshombe to dispatch parliamentarians to Lovanium immediately. This time the strategy worked but it was already too

63 Gerard-Libois, Katanga Secession, p. 192; Department of State Airgram G-48 (Brazzaville), 25 May 1961, Embassy to Secretary of State; Department of State Memorandum of Conversation. Unsigned. President Kennedy. President Youlou and Congo official, June 8, 1961.

64 Young, Politics in the Congo, p. 338.

65 Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 150; Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence, p. 376.
A government had been elected on August 2, with Adoula as Prime Minister, before the Katangans could arrive.

How did a conference dominated by the Nationalists produce a pro-Western government? They had captured the presidency of the Chamber of Representatives and sixteen of the twenty-seven ministries. First, the UN and the United States had gone to Lovanium determined to see their candidates to victory. With all interested groups locked out except UN officials, the situation favored the United States. It and the UN supported the same slate. Thus they encouraged an abnormal enlargement of the cabinet to neutralize the strength of the radicals. Second, the nationalists, fearing another Mobutu coup, "had modified their attitude and accepted an Adoula government, in which half the ministries would be held by the Lumumbist alliance." Two other factors also recommended Adoula. He had not been implicated in Lumumba's


67 Struelens, The United Nations in the Congo, p. 150; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 151.

68 Young, Politics in the Congo, p. 338.

murder, and as Minister of Interior under Ileo's provisional government he had prevented the persecution of the Lumumbists in Leopoldville.  

Third, weeks of confinement of delegates to the Lovanium campus, including denial of outside visits, had been psychologically taxing.  

Finally, observers agree that the bribes paid to delegates by United Nations officials, the CIA and other agents determined the final outcome at Lovanium. This practice had assured the emergence of a government wanted by the Secretariat and the United States. But it was far from one that could solve the Congo crisis. Money brought it into being; but more had to be spent to maintain it.  

The immediate post-Lovanium developments made a mockery of those who had assumed that Lumumba had been the center of the Congo crisis and the Katanga secession. Events subsequently proved that it was illusionary to think that the Katanga régime could be ended without the use of military force. Elizabethville and Leopoldville were distinct poles, with differing political and economic interests. A few observers had recognized the irreconcilable differences. Jules Young, Politics in the Congo, p. 338.  

Lefever, Crisis in the Congo, pp. 53-54; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 151; Struelens, The United Nations in the Congo, p. 151.  

Gerard-Libois wrote in 1963 that

the movement for Katangan autonomy is not a product of the years 1957-1960; before that time, however, it had been a monopoly of the Europeans, at least publicly.

They wished to "preserve a certain type of traditional, paternal society" in that region. Smith Hempstone, the pro-Katanga American journalist, put it more theatrically in 1962.

From that fateful day when Rodson shot M'siri, Union Miniere, in a very sense, is Katanga. It cannot escape it. It is a destiny it cannot escape. Its dams, its highway, its mines, its treatment plants all recall the names of the men who made Katanga what it is today. Many of those working for the company now . . . are sons and grand-sons of the men who opened up Katanga. They can no more sit by and allow Katanga to collapse than a Cabot, a Lodge, or a Kennedy can disavow a responsibility toward Massachusetts.

The "authentic Katangans" led by Tshombe, Munongo, and other traditional leaders shared in these European sentiments. The difference lay only on one point. The Katangan Africans wanted to preserve their traditional elitism, and some dreamed of recreating the pre-colonial empires such as the Lunda and Bayeke. American officials, before the Lovanium and after, naively believed that the Tshombeists could be

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73 Gerard-Libois, Katanga Secession, pp. 9-10. This view is supported by the pro-Katanga writer Michel Struelens in his The United Nations in the Congo, pp. 99-100; see also Young, Politics in the Congo, p. 490.


75 Gerard-Libois, Katanga Secession, p. 11, 12. 19-22. 277-278; Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politiques, Congo 1959, 2nd ed. (Brussels: Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politiques, 1961), p. 84; Young, Politics in the Congo, pp. 490-491.
persuaded to rejoin the Congo. Like their predecessors in 1960, the New Frontiersmen failed to comprehend the spirit of Katangan nationalism.

Likewise, the Katangan leaders and their European accomplices seemed unable to recognize that Congolese nationalism and international political arrangements, especially cold war rivalries, stood against Katangaism. The United Nations and the United States had forged a government at Lovanium. They felt a commitment to protect it and give it their support. This meant that if the continued secession of Katanga threatened their creation or appeared to contribute to the possibility of its fall the United Nations and the United States would respond.

Unfortunately, the new government seemed unable to play the role devised for it. Adoula did not prove to be a popular politician. The Lumubists despised him, considered his government illegitimate, and sought to topple him through votes of no confidence. The presence of the Katangans, contrary to American expectations, aggravated matters. They too wished to bring Adoula's government down. The situation became more complicated when Tshombe and Gizenga refused to participate in the new government. Yet the Westerners continued to feel safe with

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76 Department of State Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy from Lucius D. Battle, Executive Secretary, 25 November, 1961; Memorandum to the President. Unsigned, 24 September 1961: State Department position on Congo; Telegram 850 (Leop.), 27 September 1961, Cullion to Secretary of State.
Adoula, and they used large sums of money to buy votes whenever it appeared the government would lose a crucial motion in the National Assembly.77

American officials had hoped that with the creation of the civilian government the resolution of the Katanga secession would follow.78 Unfortunately, further divisions weakened the position of the United States and the United Nations even more. It had been assumed that the presence of the Gizengaists at Lovanium would lead to a rapprochement among the antagonists, but Gizenga refused to return to Leopoldville and cooperate.79 The United States-United Nations support of Adoula's premiership over Ileo, and their objection to Bolikango's aspiration for the presidency also had created a division within the moderate camp.80 The survival of Adoula's government thus depended on what actions the United States and the United Nations took to help him consolidate his power.

That was a formidable task. Tshombe possessed an army more powerful than that of the central government. By August it had 11,000 to 12,000 men, including Belgian officers assigned to Tshombe by the

77 New York Times, July 29, 1962, Sec. 4, p. 3; For various censures see J. Gerard-Libois and Bonoit Verhaegen, Congo 1962 (Brussels: Centre de Recherches et d'Information Socio-Politiques, 1963), pp. 41, 48, 49, 149.

78 Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 251.


Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and French, British, Portuguese, and white South African mercenaries. With such a force, Tshombe shied away from gestures which sought to end his secessionist government.  

The Afro-Asian bloc's demand that the United Nations act to remove Belgian military, paramilitary, and mercenaries from Katanga plus rumors in New York that the bloc planned to join the Soviet Union in a public censure of Hammarskjöld led to a UN response in the form of "Operation Rumpunch." Its initial aim was to arrest undesirable personnel and deport them. No major military confrontation with Katanga seemed to have been contemplated but the operation led to an unexpected military confrontation known as "Round One." The United States Department of State's African Bureau endorsed the basic plan. Williams reportedly informed Welensky on August 26, 1961, that  

if the Katanga did not come to an accommodation with the central government soon, it was to be expected that the government would seek to impose its will by force of arms and that the U.N. forces would be justified in intervening on the side of the central government on the grounds that it was the only legitimate government.  

Two days later, United Nations troops moved to arrest foreign officers and mercenaries serving in the Katangan gendarmerie. They began by occupying strategic points in Elizabethville. Tshombe, caught unaware, appealed to the UN to suspend the operation, and he agreed


82 Welensky, Welensky's 4,000 Days, pp. 221-222; see also Visa Procedure: Hearing, pp. 48, 59, 235, 212.
to release those persons the UN sought to deport and to Africanize his army. UN units thus paused on August 29. Tshombe had outwitted his adversaries for, while some of the European officers and the mercenaries were repatriated, most of them remained in his employ.

This forced the United Nations to resume Operation Rumpunch in September when anti-United Nations demonstrations occurred in Elizabethville. The situation continued to intensify and on September 9 the United Nations reinforced its garrison there. In the meantime, UN officials tried unsuccessfully to persuade Tshombe to negotiate a settlement with Adoula. A direct confrontation came on September 13, as fighting broke out in Round One. The action lasted only a week with the United Nations forces soundly beaten and more than 150 of them taken prisoners. Hammarskjöld, on his way to Northern Rhodesia to negotiate a ceasefire with Tshombe, died on September 17, 1961, in a mysterious plane crash. 83

Katanga's victory undermined the prestige of the United States. France, Britain, and other major NATO powers had opposed the use of force. But the United States had publicly supported the UN. Privately, however, American officials had warned Hammarskjöld against provocative actions. UN commanders had failed to recognize the risks involved or to perceive the military strength of the Katanga government. 84

The reaction appeared in several ways. Conor Cruise O'Brien, a UN

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representative in Katanga, later resigned, claiming that Britain and France had sabotaged his efforts to end the Katanga Secession. Kennedy and Secretary of State Rusk felt disappointed because they had not been consulted in advance. They and officials of the British government had pressed Hammarskjöld to negotiate a disengagement with Tshombe and thus they contributed to his death.

Tshombe's successful resistance made one thing clear; he meant to maintain his régime indefinitely, and only the use of a massive military force would bring him to accept the United Nations and American call for a unified Congo. Such an armed operation would require the full support of the United States, but American officials again opposed that course of action.

Yet Round One led to some significant changes. Hammarskjöld had been too soft and subservient to America's position. His death led to the appointment of U Thant, a Burmese diplomat of many years experience, as Acting Secretary-General. He had stated his views on the United Nations' role in the Congo almost a year before. He viewed the crisis as a test case. Should it fail its prestige could be destroyed just as that of the League of Nations had been undermined.


86 Department of State Bulletin, XLV (October, 1961), 550; Gavshon, Mysterious Death, p. 126; Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, p. 375; Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, VI, 12, 47; Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, pp. 272-274.
Thant had also registered his misgivings with both the Security Council and the General Assembly when those two branches failed to give Hammarskjöld sufficient authority to help the central government solve its internal problems. Certainly vigorous action could be expected of him, but only if carried out within the limits of United States guidelines.

That view was held by the new United States Ambassador to the Congo, Guillici, who had been appointed in June but did not arrive there until September. As a native of Kentucky, he believed that a disunited Congo would play in the hands of the Communists and unity could not be achieved by the peaceful diplomacy of Kennedy and Rusk. A forceful policy would be needed.

Yet he, too, had to accept the prevailing position in Washington, that Tshombe could be peacefully led to negotiate an accommodation with Adoula.

United States officials recognized the vulnerability of the United Nations forces in Katanga, and they did not want another war. Yet State Department personnel also decided that the "effective presence of the UN in all sections of the Congo" could lead to the

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87 Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, VI, 12.
89 Department of State Telegram 850 (Leop.), 27 September 1961, Gullion to Secretary of State.
realization of "the peaceful process of reconciliation." To assure that "effective presence," the United States sent two transport planes to the Congo on September 21, just two days after the United Nations and Katanga signed a cease-fire agreement. Another two planes arrived thereafter in an attempt to give the United Nations a balance of air power with Katanga.

It was difficult, however, to implement any decisions because Round One produced widespread criticism from Senators, Congressmen, and the general public. Democratic Senator Thomas Dodd of Connecticut strongly attacked the administration's Congo policy. He repeatedly told the Senate that Adoula's government leaned toward the Communists and that Tshombe was the only true anti-Communist in central Africa. He urged Congress to support the independence of Katanga. The United Nations, Dodd said, was promoting the interests of the Communists and the Congo would fall into their hands. In a resolution calling for the establishment of a Committee to investigate the situation in the Congo, Dodd received support from Senators Kenneth Keating, Ralph Yarborough, and Strom Thurmond. He had caught the liberal Democrats

100 Direct quote is from Department of State Bulletin, XLV (October, 1961), 550; Department of State Memorandum to the President: Position on Congo. Unsigned, 24 September 1961; Memorandum to the President concerning UN troops. G. Mennen Williams, 25 September 1961.

101 Lefever, Uncertain Mandate, p. 83; Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, p. 577.

unprepared. Humphrey, who wished to defend the administration, ended up confessing his ignorance on the subject. The African Bureau immediately took note of Dodd's attacks and sought to enlist support in the Senate for its policy. On September 19, Humphrey and Church, having been briefed by Bureau officials, ably defended the administration. Humphrey warned the Senate on September 21 that separatism in the Congo would provide favorable ground for the spread of Communism. Williams also warned that "separatism on the part of one province could only encourage separatism on the part of others, or Civil War or both." The result would be an instability in Africa on which the Soviet Union would capitalize. But the Americans still proposed to talk Tshombe into ending that secession.

The previous administration had employed the anti-Communism rhetoric to promote its Congo policies. Now the Africanists too began to exaggerate the possibility of a Soviet take-over in the Congo to master both Congressional and public support. Responding to Dodd’s accusations, Williams said in October:

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105 Department of State Bulletin, XLV (October, 1961), 668-670.

106 Department of State Memorandum, to the President, unsigned, 24 September 1961; Memorandum, Williams to the President, 25 September 1961; Telegram 850 (Leop.), 27 September 1961; Cullion to Secretary of State.

107 Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 163.
Too much public discussion, too many news reports, register on the negative factors at work in Africa. The danger of Soviet penetration is a category under which every possible item is faithfully entered, usually without too much background or perspective. . . .

Williams then asked whether it was "fair to expect African states to forego diplomatic relations, trade and other contacts with the Communists when their former colonial mentors engage in such atrocities." 108

Gullion took this position when he told Meet the Press in December that the survival of "a strong Central Government" favorable to the United States "might fail and further secessions could occur" if the United States supported Tshombe. He noted that the Soviets had already become the "apostles and architects of Congo unity by all means," and they were trying hard "to recover a strong position of leverage" there. He had earlier warned the Department that the stalemate in Katanga worked to strengthen Gizenga and Tshombe. The former's popularity was increasing as champion of the Congo's unity. 109 Such rhetoric set the stage for the pending "Round Two," but a military confrontation with Katanga was destined to arouse strong opposition in the United States because of a growing pro-Katanga attitude among the American people.

Since Round One, Struelens had waged a strong pro-Katangan campaign throughout the United States, and he had established a dependable lobby in Washington. His activities worried the State Department


which even contemplated his deportation. It did not act, however, because it wished to avoid a sensational encounter with Dodd, who saw no reason for Struelens' departure. Struelen's impact upon American opinion became crystal clear in November when the American Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters was founded. On December 4 a full page advertisement appeared in the New York Times and seventeen other influential newspapers in the United States. It proclaimed Katanga as "the Hungary of 1961" and appealed to citizens to write to Kennedy and Stevenson demanding the withdrawal of United States' financial aid to the United Nations mission in Katanga. More than 3,000 major U.S. firms reportedly contributed to the Committee's fund.

Many prominent Americans, white and black, responded favorably to the plea. They included William Buckley, the editor of the conservative National Review, General Albert Wedemeyer, and Dodd. President Herbert Hoover spoke out for Katanga, and Senator Barry Goldwater joined in the charge that the State Department by encouraging a United Nations' military intervention in Katanga paved the way for a Communist take-over in the Congo. Republican National Chairman William Miller also criticized the Congo policy. Former Vice-President Richard


Nixon, Senator Thurston Morton, and Republican Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois lent support to the pro-Katanga lobby that demanded a congressional investigation of those responsible for the African policy.\footnote{Hilsman, To Move a Nation, pp. 252-254; New York Times, December 14, 1961, p. 49.}

Other groups working for Katanga's interests included Young Americans for Freedom, an anti-Communist organization, the Committee for One Million, initially founded to work against the admission of Communist China to the United Nations, and the John Birch Society, the most anti-Communist organization in the United States.\footnote{Gerard-Libois, Katanga Secession, pp. 181-182.} The American Friends of Katanga in Indiana and the New England Committee for the Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters also emerged. On March 7, 1962, these groups conducted a fund-raising rally in Madison Square Garden, New York, attended by Goldwater, Marx Yergan, the National Chairman of the American Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters, and George Schuyler, editor-in-chief of the Pittsburgh Courier. Yergan and Schuyler were black intellectuals who had been left-wing activists of the 1930's. By the 1960's they had become quite conservative. The meeting raised $80,000.\footnote{New York Times, March 8, 1962, pp. 1, 21.}

Though the pro-Katanga lobby was strong in Washington where Dodd and Senator Donald Bruce of Indiana championed the cause, it did
not alter the State Department's African Bureau's belief that somehow the Katanga secession must end. Such opposition, however, reinforced the position of the President and that of Europeans for a negotiated agreement between Elizabethville and Leopoldville.

A limited degree of stability encouraged such thinking, and Kennedy decided to try some diplomatic magic on Tshombe. Ignoring Gullion and the Africanists' view that Tshombe would respond to nothing short of force, the President sent his Ambassador-at-Large W. Averell Harriman to Geneva in November, 1961, to meet with Tshombe. Harriman failed to convince Tshombe that the better course was a negotiated settlement, yet when he returned to Washington he was more pro-Tshombe than he had been before, and he subsequently opposed a militant policy. 116

The international situation also contributed to Kennedy's willingness to negotiate. Many NATO members continued to oppose UN military initiatives. In April, the President had faced the Bay of Pigs crisis, and two months later the Berlin Wall confrontation, and he knew he had to rely upon allies. The Portuguese Azores underscored that reality. The United States military bases there, deemed essential to the defense of Europe, could be lost if the Portuguese were alienated.

They worried about their colony of Angola and had reacted negatively to UN military expeditions in Katanga. Under these circumstances Kennedy seemed reluctant to rupture NATO to solve the Congo crisis. Events in the Congo, however, soon forced his hand.

Gizenga had abandoned his secessionist movement and joined the Leopoldville government soon after the cease-fire on September 19, because he thought he could bring about the end of the Katanga régime by working through the central government. By then he wanted a unified country. He grew disillusioned when he discovered that neither the United States nor the United Nations intended to forceably reunify the Congo, and he returned to Stanleyville in October. His return and subsequent actions helped precipitate Round Two.

American officials initially hoped that Gizenga would be viewed as a common enemy by both Leopoldville and Elizabethville, thereby fostering a reconciliation between Adoula and Tshombe. Indeed Gizenga promoted a wider rupture and complicated efforts at accord. Many of the Lumumbists, now his supporters, had wanted him to stay in Leopoldville as Vice-Prime Minister. They became alienated when Gizenga


118 Department of State Telegram 896 (Leop.), 3 October 1961, Gullion to Secretary of State.

left the government, and some withdrew their allegiance to him. Even General Lundula, the most senior officer in the Congolese National Army who had remained faithful to Gizenga, also withdrew his loyalty. Thus on the surface events seemed to favor the American policy of non-military confrontation with Katanga.

Yet developments in Katanga and in the United Nations pointed to the contrary; a show of force in Katanga, where Tshombe's gendarmerie had been reinforced, appeared unavoidable. He had more than six fighter bombers, and Union Minière and other European firms operating in Katanga had converted some of their factories to produce military material. Some made bombs for the planes, others manufactured armored cars, and the companies' officials provided Tshombe with demolition experts to replace those Europeans who had been repatriated in the August Rumpunch.

African countries became increasingly disenchanted with the failure of the United Nations to remove the mercenaries and other Europeans in Katanga. Early in November they demanded a new Security Council session to consider strengthening the Congo Operation. The United States reacted coldly. But this time even moderate countries like Nigeria and Ethiopia supported a policy of firmness. They declared that Katanga's secession was not a domestic matter but the result

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120 Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence, pp. 438-440; Nkrumah, Challenge of the Congo, p. 172; Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 162; Department of State Telegram 884 (Leop.), 2 October 1961, Gullion to Secretary of State; Struelens, The United Nations in the Congo, p. 154.

of outside influence and maintained by outsiders. The UN mandate, Ethiopian and Nigerian delegates insisted, must be clarified so that United Nations forces could "deal effectively with mercenaries and foreign personnel." Because Ethiopia and Nigeria had large units in the Congo under the United Nations command, they could not be ignored.

For a time the United States mission to the UN opposed an Afro-Asian resolution to empower the United Nations to wage war against Tshombe. The United States felt that Gizenga should be included in such action, but the bloc wished to be silent on the Stanleyville issue. Conditions, however, forced the United States to alter its position when General Lundula and his Stanleyville-based troops attacked Katanga from the North on November 13 and captured Albertville. American officials still suspected Lundula even though he had withdrawn his support of Gizenga and pledged his allegiance to the Leopoldville government. Adoula too ignored the United States peace efforts by dispatching a contingent of the Congolese National Army to Katanga through Kasai in the South. The undisciplined units acted without decency. In Kendu, a port on River Congo, they massacred thirteen Italians in the employ of the United Nations, and in Albertville some of them

mutinied for unknown reasons. The Americans thus concluded that the offensive on Katanga had to be stopped because it presented a Communist threat to the Congo.

The debate in the United Nations over the new mandate continued until November 24, delayed because the United States insisted on amending the resolution to include Stanleyville. The Americans wished to keep radicals from power regardless of the circumstances. If Katanga's secession could be ended, Gizenga might then gain control of the Leopoldville government, because many of its parliamentarians still wanted him as a Deputy Prime Minister. After reserving the right to demand UN action against Gizenga, the United States finally voted for the resolution on November 24. It authorized action by United Nations units to use force to secure "freedom of movement" and to respond against further attacks from the gendarmarie. This authority fell under Chapter VII of the Charter, the only section providing for

123 Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, VI, 48. The Congolese government, especially Adoula and Kasavubu, appeared to respond because of fear that the radicals might succeed in Katanga, thus undermining the influence and standing of the moderates. Department of State Telegrams, 884 (Leop.), 3 October 1961; 896 (Leop.), 2 October 1961; 917 (Leop.), 5 October 1961, Gullion to Secretary of State.


125 Weissman, American Foreign Policy, p. 164.

126 Department of State Bulletin, XLVI (January, 1962), 47-48; for U.S. reason in delaying passage see Department of State Telegram 954 (Wash.), 18 October 1961, Rusk to Embassy, Brussels.

police action. Unfortunately, either deliberately or through oversight, the Security Council did not invoke the chapter which applied.

In early December, the Katangan militia had harassed United Nations officials. On December 1, a senior Indian officer was kidnapped. The Indian Commander in Elizabethville Brigadier K. A. A. Raja and other field officers wished to wage a major military action. Raja proposed to wipe out a Katangan paracommando camp and clean Elizabethville of any armed elements and, if necessary, extend the operation to the Rhodesian border. The American Consulate and the UN Chief of Staff opposed the Raja plan, because it would lead to a widespread military undertaking by the UN. Nevertheless, armed with their new mandate, they moved on December 5 to secure by force freedom of movement throughout Katanga. The United Nations' units acted with the support of a massive airlift of troops and materials by United States Air Force transport planes. Ethiopian fighter bombers also attacked. Tshombe's power crumbled, and he fled to Rhodesia, from where he threatened a "scorching earth war" on the United Nations. Ten days later, after receiving secret messages from American officials, he asked Kennedy to intervene and stop the war because of the loss of human lives and great material damage. . . .

I confirm my desire to negotiate with M. Adoula.
I ask your intervention as a free man and as a

128 Department of State Telegram 683 (El'ville), 1 December 1961, Consulate to Secretary of State.
Christian to designate a suitable negotiator and to stop at once useless bloodshed.  

The President responded by appointing Gullion to act on his behalf.

United States support made Round Two a success, because its airlift provided the United Nations contingent with the mobility and flexibility needed. Its action, however, exposed the United States to violent verbal attacks. Spaak insisted that the UN had exceeded its mandate, and U Thant defended its action as authorized by the November 24 Security Council resolution. When Britain and France joined Belgium in bitterly protesting the United Nations' militarism, Thant, assured of support from Washington, responded with vigor and accused the Union Minière of precipitating the war. Rusk and Ball concurred.

Elsewhere Tshombe's friends spoke out. Welensky expressed his concern. In England, the Tory members of parliament demanded

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130 Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Staff Communications Office, Telegraphic Message 2476 (Wash.), 5 December 1961, Joint Chiefs of Staff to United States Commander-in-Chief in Europe; Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer to General Earle G. Wheeler, undated, December, 1961; Struelens, The United Nations in the Congo, p. 164.

131 See correspondence between Thant and Spaak on the subject in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, VI, 54-57.

that the UN stop its aggression in Katanga. Senator Dodd publicly championed Tshombe's cause, while the American Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters called the United Nations' action and America's support of it illegal. Both Williams and Carl T. Rowan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, denounced the pro-Katanga campaign. In a speech on December 27, 1961, Williams accused the agitators of fabricating "horrendous tales of indiscriminate mayhem" committed by the United Nations forces. Rowan added that there had been "a clever big-money campaign to convince Americans that they ought to support Katanga's secession." The State Department quickly disavowed these views, thus revealing the continuing uncertainty in decision-making.

On December 31, George McGhee, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, declared that the speeches had not been cleared at "the highest levels" of the State Department.

The journalistic community certainly sensed the ambiguous mood. Raymond Moley, writing for Newsweek, attacked what he called the "scattered policy-making" by American officials. William S. White in an article for Harper's accused the Africanists of being "emotionally committed to anti-colonialism" and called on Kennedy to act forcefully to prevent them meddling with the President's viable position. He

133 "Britain and America in the Congo," p. 501.
134 Leever, Crisis in the Congo, p. 101-102.
concluded by observing that these Africanists were "seized with a holy mission, almost as zealous as the abolitionists who so plagued the fair and reasonable and practical Lincoln."  

Kennedy responded by instructing Gullion on December 17 to bring Tshombe and Adoula together to resolve their differences. Seeking to be impartial, the President ordered the Ambassador not to take part in the discussions. U Thant appointed Robert Gardiner and Ralph Bunche to represent the United Nations. They too were expected to remain unbiased.  

The two leaders met late that day at Kitona, a port in the mouth of the River Congo in the Atlantic coast, Tshombe having been flown in from his hiding place in Katanga in a special United States presidential plane. There Adoula and Tshombe signed a document late on the night of December 20-21, 1961, in which the latter accepted the Loi Fondamentale, the unification of the Congo, and the incorporation of his militia into the Congolese National Army. He also vowed to accept and respect all United Nations resolutions. With the Kitona agreement, Tshombe bought his freedom. He left assured of his continuing political power in Katanga, and he returned to Elizabethville a

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138 Ibid., pp. 17-18.
victor. On December 29, he denounced the document he had signed at Kitona, as he charged that Gullion had interfered with the negotiations.\footnote{Department of State Bulletin, XLVI (January, 1962), 11, 95; "Uncertain Pact," pp. 17-18; Gordon, United Nations in the Congo, p. 175; Gerard-Libois, Congo 1962, p. 3.}

Under these circumstances it remains unclear why Kennedy continued to put so much faith in Tshombe. He did not resort to military force but turned again to diplomatic negotiation. One thing seems certain, however. The United States did not wish to end the Congo crisis until all radical or suspected pro-Communist leaders had been neutralized. Thus Tshombe was a useful conservative force who could not be destroyed, even though human lives continued to be in danger in Katanga and other parts of the Congo as a result of his hold on power.\footnote{Gerard-Libois, Katanga Secession, pp. 264, 268.}

Meanwhile, the United Nations claimed that it had completed its "limited objective" and secured freedom of movement. Yet the Katanga secession remained intact, the gendarmerie continued to harass the United Nations units in Katanga, and in the northern part of the province war raged between Tshombe's forces and the Congolese National Army. The United States and the United Nations closed their eyes to all these problems, at least momentarily, as they turned their attention to Gizenga.
When Gizenga's 300-man bodyguard clashed with a unit of the Congolese National Army loyal to the central government in Stanleyville on January 13, 1962, the United Nations moved troops in. Its contingents disarmed Gizenga's militia, arrested him, and flew him to Leopoldville aboard a UN plane. There he was handed over to Adoula, who ordered Gizenga's detention without trial.\footnote{Gerard-Libois, 

Gizenga's arrest was instigated by Sturre Linner, who had become chief of UN operations since the departure of Dayal. He had told Adoula on December 22, two days after the signing of the Kitona agreement, that the "time was ripe to settle Gizenga" because the latter had committed "further treasonable . . . actions." Linner was wrong in his allegations. Removing Gizenga from the political scene at this time served only the interests of the United Nations and the United States, who stood accused of waging an illegal war against Katanga. Since all the major NATO members blamed the United States for supporting United Nations military activities in Katanga, it seemed logical that Tshombe should be preserved as a provincial leader. By arresting and turning Gizenga over to Adoula for imprisonment, the United Nations sought to convince its pro-Katanga critics in the United States and...
Europe that the organization stood against any Communist influence in
the Congo. In reality, that action seems to have been taken for two
reasons. First, it continued the United Nations and the United States
policies directed against radicalism. Second, officials may have
thought that Gizenga's elimination would solve the problem of faction-
ality.

During Round Two, attitudes had emerged in the Kennedy admini-
stration as well as in the Secretariat which proved difficult to change.
UN officials felt that no major UN military action should be taken in
Katanga, because that might jeopardize any future UN peace keeping opera-
tions. As for the Americans, the factions that had developed in Febru-
ary, 1961, persisted. The African Bureau endorsed a UN military offen-
sive to bring the situation to a final conclusion. That would be the
best way to avert Communist gains. The European Bureau, led by McGee
and Harriman, opposed that course. Pentagon leaders feared that the
use of force by the UN would set a bad precedent that could be applied
against Portuguese colonies, with serious consequences to United States
bases in Azores. 143

In these discussions, officials of the African Bureau lost until
late 1962, when all NATO powers that had supported Tshombe saw the
continuing Katanga secession as a liability to western interests. Policy

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143 Weissman, American Foreign Policy, pp. 167, 169. Also see
Hilsman, To Move a Nation, pp. 253-256; Christian Science Monitor,
December 12, 1961, p. 1; The Joint Chiefs of Staff perception is in
Memorandum, General Lumnitzer to General Wheeler. Undated (about Dec-
ember 8-15, 1961).
makers gradually conceded that there was no Communist threat to warrant an all out UN military drive in Katanga.\textsuperscript{144} They thus suggested the imposition of political, diplomatic and economic pressures on Tshombe not to abrogate the Kitona agreement while limiting the actions of the United Nations forces to self-defense.\textsuperscript{145} This situation demonstrated that the New Frontiersmen had not come to grips with Congo realities and they had failed to evolve a policy different from the Eisenhower administration. Kennedy officials had watched the Congo crisis from outside the State Department and they had had the time to reflect on the situation. The Congo provided them with a real "frontier," but they failed to exert the leadership needed in resolving the crisis.

After what seemed as a good start in February, 1961, of an American search for a workable formula, they had let events out-pace them. It became evident that the Kennedy administration had been inhibited by internal factionalism and a President who, instead of leading, appeared to compromise the factions. Also it was handicapped by a lack of a cadre of African experts in the policy-making establishment. Finally, the New Frontiersmen, like their predecessors, became more preoccupied with movements, activities and responses to radicals

\textsuperscript{144}Weissman, \textit{American Foreign Policy}, p. 169.

\textsuperscript{145}Department of State Telegrams 1117 (Wash.), 23 December 1961, Rusk to Embassy, Leopoldville; 3458 (Wash.), 27 December 1961, Rusk to Embassy, London; 1160 (Wash.), 28 December 1961, Rusk to Embassy, Leopoldville; 1147 (Brussels), 27 December 1961, Macarthur to Secretary of State.
than with real issues. The Belgian Congo crisis was the result of a clash between whites and blacks, tradition and modernity, economic and political beliefs, all complicated by Cold War rivalries. Ignorance and misunderstanding on the part of all the parties involved also played a role as did the course of uncertainty on the part of United Nations and United States policymakers.

The initial responsibility for developments rested with the Belgians, who kept the people of the area in economic and political submission; with Britain and France, who wished to protect regional interests; and with the fears of the United States that the natural resources of the area would fall into the hands of the Soviet Union and that the Soviets would use the Congo as a base for the domination of Africa. On the African side, Congolese leaders remained divided because they valued traditional political institutions above national ones and were easily manipulated by outsiders. Other African and Third World leaders trusted the UN and believed that a Soviet-American confrontation posed a danger to them. Finally, the United Nations prolonged the crisis because it failed to recognize the complexity of the situation, and it overestimated its capability. It was further limited by its total dependence on the United States which prevented UN officials from pursuing policies at variance with American objectives.

The United States held the key, but too many people and agencies were involved and officials never effectively coordinated their efforts. Policymakers revealed a simplistic attitude. They saw the conflict as between Africans and whites with Communists behind
the former. The Eisenhower administration thus sought to protect European interests, to save Europeans from humiliation, and to block Communist designs. It insisted that an unprepared UN solve the problems. The United Nations could have succeeded with unqualified support from the United States at the outset. A successful UN operation, however, would have given power to the radical Lumumbists; hence the United States actually frustrated UN efforts to reestablish order and became involved in plots to kill Lumumba.

The Kennedy administration fared no better. Its strong anti-Communist position led it to insist on the exclusion of any Soviet influence in the Congo and on the creation of a unified Congo. Yet factionalism within the administration and opposition in Congress led to continued ambivalence and caution. They thus failed to develop a single comprehensive policy. The Congo provided the New Frontier idealogues with an opportunity to forge a United States-African coalition, but they failed for simple reasons. First, they never recognized what the problems really were and they never did address issues--national attitudes and the nature of leadership--which the United States mistakenly branded communism.

Further it would be unwise to assume that conditions in the Congo were the result of local circumstances only. Had the Belgians not manipulated Tshombe to secede, had the Americans not worked to create a rift between Lumumba, on the one hand, and Kasavubu and Mobutu, on the other, the history of the Congo during the period under study would have been different. United Nations and United States officials never did understand the internal factions which
developed over regionalism versus unitarism. The Americans also ignored national sentiment when they plotted to assassinate Lumumba, the only Congolese leader who had broad national support.

The passing of Lumumba left a leadership vacuum which created problems for American policymakers that have not been resolved to date. Even after Mobutu and the army assumed political power in November of 1965, the Congo only achieved a semblance of political stability while the economic situation has deteriorated.

Yet it would be simplistic to say that the Congo situation was too complex to preclude an easy solution. That had defied both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administration, handicapped as they were by a number of factors and considerations. First, almost all policymakers suffered from a severe ignorance of African conditions. This arose from a long-standing lack of interest in the political development of Africa and partly because previous administrations had also failed to evolve a relevant United States policy toward Africa. Second, the Americans, though aware that there was no serious Communist challenge in the Congo, seemed unable throughout the crisis to transcend the contemporary anti-Communist mood and face the main issues—internal factionalism and disintegrated security forces. Instead, they focused on containing a communism that never existed. Finally, the Americans were inhibited in their Congo policies by European and NATO considerations. These reflected a historical indifference toward the African race and the dominant belief during the 1950's that Africans seeking independence would be unable to maintain civilized institutions without the assistance of Europeans and
Americans. Hence, from July 10, 1960, when the United States declined a request by the Congolese government for American military intervention, to January 13, 1962, when Gizenga as the heir of Lumumba's nationalism was arrested, the United States had increased its influence in the Congo but it failed to solve the problems of political and military factionalism and the constitutional question. Developments during the next ten months of 1962 underscored this fact.

General atmosphere and Tshombe's apparent willingness to cooperate with the United Nations, the United States, and the Congolese government had given everyone hope the Congo could be unified peacefully. When he rejected all effort toward a reconciliation in December, 1962, both the United States and the UN finally recognized that he had to be immobilized as divisive force. Thus UN troops moved against him with the support of the United States.

Yet even then, this policy decision on the part of the United States fit previous ideologies. Advisors still feared external Communist influences; they reacted to an event rather than responded to general conditions, and they still seemed unaware that broader issues were at stake. The subsequent history of the newly constituted state of Zaire shows a country left largely alone to flounder with its post independence problems and reveals that the United States failed to achieve its goals—a politically stable and economically viable Congo—because those goals were poorly conceived and halfheartedly executed.

Handwritten note: "A Doctorate well deserved. And a Professorship long overdue."
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