

**CONFLICT EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS AND CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT: A CASE STUDY OF INTER-GOVERNMENTAL
AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT (IGAD) CONFLICT EARLY
WARNING AND RESPONSE MECHANISM**

BY

TIMOTHY NJUGUNA NGUGI
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**A Project Submitted to the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies,
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Declaration


This project is my original work and has not been submitted for a degree award in any other university.



.....
Timothy Njuguna Ngugi

24.11.11
.....
Date

The project proposal has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor.



.....
Dr. A. Kiamba

24th NOV. 2011
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Date

Dedication

This research project is dedicated to my wife Sarah and my daughters Clara, Angela-Zoe and Felister who have been a great inspiration in the completion of the work and without whom my academic life would have little meaning.

Acknowledgement

During the entire study, I received tremendous support and encouragement from many individuals and institutions. I thank them all for their time. I also feel greatly indebted to my supervisor Dr. A. Kiamba of the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS) for her professional advice and guidance.

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Abbreviations

AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
AOR	Area of Reporting
APRM	Africa Peer Review Mechanism
APSA	African peace and Security Architecture
ASF	Africa Standby Force
AU	Africa Union
CAAU	Constitutive Act of African Union
CADSF	Common African Defence and Security Policy
CC	Country Coordinators
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel and Saharan States
CEW	Continental Early Warning System
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CEWERU	Conflict Early Warning and Response Units
COMESA	Common Market for East and South Africa
COMWARN	Comesa Early Warning and Response mechanism
COPAX	Council de Paix et de Securite de l'Afrique Centrale
CPRM	Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution Mechanism
CPS	Committee of Permanent Secretaries
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
EAC	East Africa Cooperation
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group
ECOWARN	Ecowas Early Warning System
ECOWAS	Economic Organization of West Africa States
EW	Early Warning
EWs	Early Warning System
FAST	Fruhnanalyse Von Spannungen und Tatsachenermittlung
FEWER	Forum on Early Warning and Early Response
FM	Field Monitors
FOMUC	Force Multinationale de l'Afrique Centrale
GTZ	German Technical Assistance Agency
ICG	International Crisis Group
IGAD	Inter Governmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
IPDC	Interstate Politics and Defence Committee
IPSS	IGAD Peace and Security Strategy
ISDSC	Interstate Defence and Security Committee
LITCU	Livestock Identification and Traceability Coordination Unit
LIVA	Life Integrity Violation Analysis
MARAC	Mechanisms of Rapid Alert in Central Africa
MSC	Military Staff Committee
NEPAD	New Africa's Partnership for Development
NRI	National Research Institute

OAU	Organization of African Unity
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OMC	Observation and Monitoring Centre
OMZ	Observation and Monitoring Zones
OSCE	Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSINT	Open Source Intelligence
PSA	Peace and Security Architecture
PSC	Peace and Security Council
RRF	Rapid Response Fund
SADC	South African Development Cooperation
SALWs	Small and Light Weapons
SIPO	Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ
UN	United Nations
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USAID	United States International Agency for Development
WASCOF	West African Civil society Forum

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Abstract

The post- cold war period has witnessed the emergence of conflict early and response system. Their emergence has been necessitated by the need to prevent conflicts before they escalate into violence. This is because it is easier to manage conflict in its early stages prior to eruption. To effectively do this, there is a need for a system capable of alerting policy makers on an impending violent conflict and where possible craft intervention strategies.

In Africa, a continent which has witnessed high levels of violent conflicts, the African Union has established a Continental Early Warning system. Similarly, sub-regional organizations have set up such systems although different regions have made varied progress. In the Horn of Africa, the premier sub-regional organization-Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)-has set up an elaborate Conflict early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN). The mechanism remains the most advanced in Africa. However despite this position a question remains whether conflict early warning systems do play a role in conflict management. Using CEWARN as case study the research has endeavored to answer this question.

Using a conceptual framework which has analytically categorized the operation of these systems into two, that is, early warning and early response and identified the key variables involved in either as well as activities undertaken, the study has comprehensively analyzed the contributions of CEWARN to IGAD's conflict management. Drawing from data gathered through desk top and interview methods, the study shows that there exist a gap between the expectations and reality of early warning and response systems. They have made modest contribution to conflict management. This is because they are hampered by challenges ranging from been founded on weak national and regional structures, resources constraints and lack of response capacities and political commitment by policy makers.

The study concludes that for early warning and response systems to live up to their mandate, there must be commitment by member states. States need not only to ratify or accede to regional treaties but also implement them in good faith. Essentially they should walk the talk and back up regional peace and security projects with all the resources-material or otherwise-that they need to function effectively.

CHAPTER ONE

Background of the Study

Introduction

Africa has witnessed widespread insecurities during the post-cold war period when the colonial and cold war legacies unravelled. Consequently, most of the states have witnessed varying degrees of violent conflict. The extreme of this conflict was the Rwandan genocide which claimed an estimated one million lives.¹ During the genocide, the international community turned its back on Rwanda, either because of the Somali experience two years earlier, lack of strategic interests or unwillingness to characterise the violence as Genocide, for this would have created an obligation to intervene on humanitarian grounds.²

The international community unwillingness to intervene, proliferation of intra-state violent conflicts and the need for African solutions to African problems occasioned a quest for an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The quest is traceable to the Kampala All Africa Conference on Security and Stability, Development and Cooperation where leaders expressed commitment to overcome the hindrance which had plagued previous continental security operations.³ The subsequent, OAU Secretary General Report of 1992,⁴ led to establishment of a more permanent Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution Mechanism (CPRM) to replace the prior ad hoc ones.

¹See for instance P. D. Williams, 'Thinking about Security in Africa', *International Affairs*, 83: 6, 2007, pp.1021 – 1038. Also Golaszinski, who notes that in past 40 years there have been at least 30 major conflicts which claimed more than seven million lives and displaced 20 million people. U. Golaszinski, 'Africa's Evolving Security Architecture', Dialogue on Globalization, Briefing papers, p.1

² See Article one of the 1948 *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* which creates a responsibility on the parties to intervene to stop acts of genocide.

³ B. Franke, *Enabling a Continent to Help Itself: US Military Capacity Building and Africa's Emerging Security Architecture*. Centre for Contemporary Conflict, 2007, p.5

⁴ Ibid, p.5

Around the same period, the United Nations was pushing for increased role of sub-regional organisations maintenance of peace and security. The *Agenda for Peace*⁵ and UN Secretary General's report of 1995, drawing on article 52 and 53 of the United Nations charter, which calls for regional collective security arrangements, impressed on the need to regional organisations to play an active role in maintaining of international peace and security.⁶ A need further reinforced by the 1998 UN's secretary General report on *Durable and Sustainable Development in Africa*, which called for Africa regional organisations to complement UN peace and security effort.

Additionally there was increased realization by the regional and sub-regional organizations and their members that other goals set could not be achieved in a climate characterized by violent conflict and other threats to peace and security. This is because violent conflicts and other threats to peace and security in a given state often have sub-regional and regional consequences. The regionalization of threats weaves states in a given geographical region into a security complex where no state can secure itself without cooperating with others.⁷ Consequently during the post-cold war periods, African regional and sub-regional organizations increasingly embraced the need to have peace and security components as a part of their core mandates.

In the Horn of Africa sub-region which has remained the most unstable in Africa, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has increasingly acquired peace and security mandates. IGAD is made up of seven states. These are: Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia,

⁵ B. Ghali, *An Agenda For Peace*: Report of the secretary general Pursuant to the statement adopted by the summit meeting of the security council on 31st Jan, 1992, A/471/277-5/24, 17th June, 1992

⁶ K. Annan, *Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa*, 1998. Also, UN Secretary General Report on *Improving Preparedness for Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping in Africa*, 1995

⁷ On security complex see B. Buzan and O. Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2003, p.229

Djibouti, Sudan and Eritrea. All these states have either witnessed violent conflicts, exhibit very high risks of violence or are currently gripped by violent conflicts.⁸

Taking cognizance of this situation, The IGAD Protocol of 1996 which endowed IGAD with peace and security competencies makes various provisions. Article 7 (g) identifies the commitment 'to promote peace and stability in the sub-region and create mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-state conflicts through dialogue. To achieve this objective, Article 18 (a) of the protocol calls upon member states to: Establish effective mechanisms of consultation and cooperation for peaceful settlement of differences and disputes; to take effective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional cooperation, peace and stability and deal with disputes between member states within these sub-regional and international organisations.'⁹

In pursuit of these objectives, IGAD has established a Peace and Security architecture. Among the components of IGAD's Peace and Security Architecture (PSA) is the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN). Under the 2002 *Protocol on the Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism for IGAD Member States*, the CEWARN is mandated to (a) receive and share information concerning potentially violent conflicts as well as their outbreak and escalation, (b) undertake analysis of the information, (c) develop case scenarios and formulate options for response, (d) share and communicate information, analysis

⁸ See M. Ali, 'Transforming Conflicts in Africa: The Need to Focus on Shared Security', in Sthlm Policy Group (ed.), *Faith, Citizenship, Democracy and Peace in the Horn of Africa*. A Report of the 7th Annual Conference on the Horn of Africa: Lund, Sweden, October 17-19, 2008, pp.42-3

⁹ IGAD Protocol, 1996

and response options, (e) carry out studies on specific types and areas of conflict in the IGAD region.¹⁰

By undertaking these activities it is expected that IGAD will be in a position to proactively deal with conflicts before they escalate into widespread violence. However the reality is the objectives contained in constitutive documents (treaties and protocols) establishing such organs are rarely achieved leading to gaps between expectation and performance. Hence there is a need to analyze whether IGAD's CEWARN has achieved its mandate.

The Research Problem

The rationale for the establishment of the early warning systems is that 'prevention is better than cure' that is prevention should be initiated at the earliest possible stage of a conflict cycle in order to be most effective.¹¹ To be able to effectively respond, there is a need to have the correct information regarding a certain conflict, its root and escalating causes and an analysis of possible interventionary strategies. This role is ideally supposed to be played by the early warning systems.

Importantly the output of such systems must be effectively linked to the response tools. Otherwise the system becomes irrelevant. A position best captured by Schnabel that it is not simply enough to generate information and hand it to those who might be in the situation to take necessary responses. If the recipients of the information are not placed, capable or willing to take action, early warning analysis would be reduced to nothing but an academic exercise without any effect on the improvement of the volatile environment. Hence conflict early warning systems

¹⁰ Annex, Part I of the 2002 *Protocol on the Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism for IGAD Member States*

¹¹ A. Matveeva, 'Early warning and Early Response: Conceptual and Empirical Dilemma', European Centre for Conflict Prevention, Issue Paper 1, 2006, p.8

must be viewed and understood as structures which anticipate, analyse conflicts and develop response strategies and ensure that such strategies are implemented.

Conflict early warning systems in Africa have been mandated to undertake these roles. As a part of regional and sub-regional Peace and Security Architectures they act as key signals to other components to act. Despite their existence, there is a need to analyze whether they have achieved their intended goals. This study answers this question by critically analyzing IGAD's CEWARN, its operations, success and challenges.

Objectives of the Study

The main objective of the study is to analyse the effectiveness of the IGAD's CEWARN in conflict early warning and prevention within its member states.

Specific objectives

- i. To analyze the conceptual and theoretical issues on conflict early warning systems
- ii. To provide an overview of early warning systems in Africa
- iii. To examine the contributions of the CEWARN to IGAD's Peace and Security Architecture.
- iv. To identify the challenges which have hampered the performance of CEWARN

LITERATURE REVIEW

This section reviews literature on various thematic areas which have a bearing on the conflict early warning systems. The first section reviews literature on peace and security architectures. This is important since as already noted early warning systems are anchored on such architecture and hence the need to review debates on peace and security. The second part reviews literature on conflict and its causes. The review is necessary because how conflict and its dynamics is

understood provides the basis of examining whether early warning systems have been operationalised in a manner capable of addressing different kinds of conflict and their causes. The other section reviews literature on the rationale for the involvement of sub-regional organizations in the business of peace and security and whether they are best suited to undertake this mandate. The final section concerns with the literature of early warning systems and provides the gaps in literature.

Literature on Peace

In the literature on what peace means there are two perspectives.. The first perspective treats peace as the antithesis of war; a situation in which behavioural or physical violence is absent. The conceptualization is reflective of the way realist conceptualizes human nature as inherently dominating and violent. Consequently, no other peace is possible except that which is characterised by absence of physical violence.¹² This way the goal is to suppress physical violence.

The above conceptualization has elicited debates especially from the proponents of peace research paradigm of conflict. In his seminal work *Making Peace Work*, Curle rejected the dichotomy between peace and war and argued that, while societies can be in conditions of peace or war, they can also be in a situation which can be classified as unpeaceful.¹³ Unpeaceful societies do not have physical violence but they have structures which generate injustices. in effect hampering the realisation of self and group capabilities. In the expanded classification, peace exists in two dimensions: Positive and negative peace.

¹² See a summary in A JR Groom, 'Paradigms in Conflict: The Strategist, the Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher' *Review of International Studies*, vol 14, No. 2, 1988 . pp.96, 105-107

¹³ See A. Curle, *Making Peace Work*. London: Transtock Publications, 1971

The concept of positive and negative peace mirrors Boulding's classification of stable and unstable peace. According to him, unstable peace is maintained through the use of threat and force and is sustainable as long as the status quo remains. In this situation, war is a possibility and parties are constantly preparing for one. As such when power balances shift, instability follows. In contrast, stable peace exists when actors learn how to make peace by creating trusting relationship that disarms people's minds as well as their institution.¹⁴ As a result, parties are neither preparing for war nor do they foresee a situation where they will have to resort to force as a way of resolving their differences.

Developing on a similar theme Galtung has enriched the understanding of peace. His conceptualization is rooted on his analysis of the three dimensions of violence. These are cultural, structural and physical violence. The argument is that, before conflict transforms into overt violence, it is preceded by cultural and structural violence. Structural violence manifests itself through injustices generating structures which prevent individuals from achieving their full potential whereas Cultural violence constitutes those mechanisms that renders acceptable both direct and indirect violence such as killing, repression and delocalization and justify structural violence in form of exploitation, marginalization, and discrimination and so on.¹⁵

On the basis of these dimensions of violence, peace means much more than absence of direct violence and sustainable peace is founded on addressing of physical violence as well as social injustices (eliminating social – economic institutions and relations that oppress human beings) and cultural violence which justifies the other two kinds of violence.¹⁶

¹⁴ K. Boulding, *Stable Peace*. Austin: University of Texas ,1978

¹⁵ See various works of Galtung such as J.Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research', *Journal of Peace Research*, 6 (3), 1969, pp.167-192. Also J. Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. London: Sage,1996, p.196

¹⁶ Ibid

Drawing from the above debates it is observable that there are two main positions influencing the quest for peace. Depending on the position someone holds, there is bound to be different structures aimed at addressing threats to peace. For instance an understanding of peace in its negative sense will lead to prioritization on the structures targeting suppression of physical violence without giving much attention to the underlying factors which have led to physical violence. This can be contrasted with a positive understanding of peace which demands that beyond physical violence there is a need to address the underlying causes. The importance of these epistemological positions is more apparent in the following section, since they have influenced the understanding of security.

Literature on Security

According to Reiter, the debate on security is based on two main issues: Who or what is to be secured: what constitutes security threats and who provides security.¹⁷ Regarding what constitutes security threats there is the traditional realist perspective which understood threats to security as meaning militarised ones. Mwangi has observed that in the traditional thinking of security, security meant physical security. The view was predominantly driven by the realist school of thought which posited that security has to do with external military threats to the nation states.¹⁸

However this position was critiqued as inadequate by various scholars who did not negate the centrality of state as the main reference of security but argued that there are other threats beyond the militarised one. The pioneering work on this perspective was done by Ullman and Buzan. Ullman argued that security can be defined as 'an action or sequence of events that (i) Threatens

¹⁷ E. Reiter, *Europe's New Security Challenges*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2001, pp.30-35

¹⁸ M. Makumi, 'Refugee Protection and Diplomacy of National Security in Kenya' in Refugee Consortium of Kenya publication, 2008, p.23

drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state or (ii) threatens significantly the narrow range of policy choices available to government of a state or to private non-governmental entities within the state.¹⁹ Taking the cue from Ullman, Buzan, published the most influential book on widening of security. He noted that security threats emanates from five sectors. These are military, political, economic, societal and environmental.²⁰ Consequently, security refers to absence of threats to the above sectors.

Despite the progressive problem shift in the conceptualization of security, scholars viewed the perspective as inadequate. Ayooob for instance rejected the externalisation of security threats arguing that in non-western world the assumption about states cannot hold. He argued that unlike the western states that have largely solved their legitimacy problem and possess representative government that preside over socially mobile population that is relatively homogeneous and usually affluent and free from want, non-western states are different.²¹ Consequently most security threats are internal and closely linked to the state-building processes. Thus, the main sources of security threats are lack of unconditional legitimacy for state boundaries, state institutions and regimes, inadequate social cohesion and the absence of consensus on fundamental issues of social, political and economic organizations.²²

The other position was advanced by the proponents for human security research program. The human security research program advocated for an understanding of security as those factors which threatens the well being of individuals. Booth argued that, although security is concerned with survival (absence of physical threats), security and survival are not synonymous. Rather

¹⁹ See R. Ullman, 'Redefining Security', *International Security*, 8, No 1, , 1983, pp.129-153.

²⁰ B.Buzan, *People, States and Fears: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 1991, pp.19-20

²¹ M. Ayooob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System*. London: Boulder, 1995, pp.10-11

²² See, M. Ayooob, 'Review of the Security Problematic in the Third World', *World Politics*, vol 43, No. 2, 1991, pp.257-283.

there is a need to make a distinction between survival (existential condition) and security (having the conditions to pursue cherished political and social ambition). As such security, should be understood as 'survival- plus, the plus being some freedom from life-determining threats and therefore some life choices.²³

Similarly in a seminal study the United Nations Development Program argued threats to individual freedoms amounts to security threats.²⁴ The argument is that security means protecting vital freedoms. It means protecting people from critical and pervasive threats and situations, building on their strengths and aspirations. This way security connects different types of freedoms – freedom from fear, and freedom from want.

The examination so far indicates that there has been an expansion of what constitutes security threats. Traditionally threats were viewed from a physical or militarised perspective. However this has been expanded to include non-militarised threats emanating from political, economic, societal and environmental sectors. Initially the threats were conceptualised in relation to the state. This has been critiqued on the ground that there are other referents of security which must be secured against fear and want. This progress has influenced the debate on the second issue on who to secure.

At the centre of this debate is the argument on whether security should largely revolve around states security or there are other actors who are equally important and in need to be secured. The realists have taken a state-centric position arguing that state is the only referent object of security. Realists such as Hans Morgenthau argued the focus of security is the state.²⁵ Similarly Buzan in defense of state security has argued that despite the shortcomings of the state, there is

²³ K. Booth, 'Security and Emancipation' *Review of International Studies* vol 17:3,1991, pp 313-326

²⁴ United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report*. New York: UN Publication, 1994, p.22

²⁵ See H. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (5th Ed). New York: Alfred A. Knoff, 1978

no other agency that can replace it. Because states hold this position, they can claim their own right of survival over and above that of their individual citizens.²⁶

In rejection of this privileging of states, various arguments have been advanced. Waever has argued that state and nation do not mean the same thing in majority of countries and national-state security is becoming an irrelevant framework of analysis. Rather the focus should be on securing the society.²⁷ Similarly Aseka notes that such a focus is based on an assumption of state as an abstract edit that is devoid of humanity and is autonomous from domestic society.²⁸ Others like Makinda have pointed out the futility of focusing primarily on state since, while state security is important, it is difficult to maintain it in a situation where an individual or groups feel deprived of basic needs. Without individual and group security, state security becomes precarious.²⁹

Drawing from such arguments, a strong case has been made that there are other referents objects of security. Buzan has identified three levels of security: Individual, societal and national.³⁰ According to Makinda the people are the foundation of political communities and states.³¹ Hence they should be the main locus of security. Similarly Hubert has argued for an alternative way of seeing the world, taking people as a point of reference, rather than focusing exclusively

²⁶B. Buzan, Human Security in International Perspective. A paper presented to ISIS, Malaysia, 14th Asia – Pacific Round table on Confidence Building and Conflict Reduction; Kuala Lumpur, 3rd-7th June, 2000, pp.23-2

²⁷ O. Waever, 'Societal Security: The Concept' in Waever, O, Buzan, B et al (Eds) *Identity, Migration and New Security Agenda in Europe*. London: Printer, 1993, p.23

²⁸ E.M Aseka 'Globalization, Intellectuals and Security in Africa' In Mwagiru M. (ed) *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization*. Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004, pp 32.

²⁹ S. Makinda 'African Thinkers and the Global Security Agenda' in Mwagiru M et al (eds) *Rethinking Global Security: An African Perspective*. Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Stiftung, 2006, p.134

³⁰ See B. Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies In the Post-Cold War Era*. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 1992,pp 112-140

³¹ S. Makinda 'African Thinkers and the Global Security Agenda' , Op cit, p.36

on the security of territory or government.³² Thus as Williams persuasively observes security should be based on people, justice and change. Its objective is to eliminate insecurities that breed violence and conflict within the society.³³

From the literature on security the study holds that security is a multi-faceted and multi-level concept which despite its conceptual contestations reflects progress on the way it is understood. It means protecting both the state and the people inside it. Importantly it refers to the move aimed at addressing threats whether physical, militarized or non-militarized. Ultimately citizens can live free from fear and want and can provide sustainable foundations for peaceful states and regions.

Literature on Conflict in Africa

In general speak conflict is often viewed negatively. It is seen as a social phenomenon which is dysfunctional, disruptive of normal life and desirable social interactions. As such it should be eliminated. In more enlightened discourses conflict is viewed as a pervasive and inevitable social phenomena whether in simple or complex society and irrespective of the time and space.³⁴

Nhema observes that conflict is an inevitable and intrinsic aspect of social change. It is an expression of heterogeneity of interest, values and beliefs that arise as new social formations come up against inherited constraints.³⁵ Reuck, defines a conflictual situation as one characterized by presence of parties (however defined or organized) who perceive that they

³² D .Hubert, 'Human Security: Safety from People in a Changing World' A paper presented at a regional conference on the management of African security in the 21st centre. Nigeria institute of international affairs, Lagos, 23-24 June, 1999, p 3

³³ See Paul D Williams *"Thinking About Security in Africa in the 21st Century*. Paper presented to Nigeria Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, 23-24 June 1999, p.3

³⁴ Ibid, p.1.

³⁵ A. Nhema, *'The Quest for Peace in Africa: Transformation, Democracy and Public Policy*. Utretch: International books, 2004, p .12.

possess mutually incompatible goals.³⁶ Wolfgang defines conflict as a social relationship that is determined by perceived and articulated contradictions about perceptions, judgments and expectations.³⁷

From the above definitions which mirror a host of other definitions, there exists a convergence on what conflict is. The convergence as Dixon notes is that conflict arises from mutual recognition of competing or incompatible material interest and basic values and conflict is a pervasive feature of social relations.³⁸ As such Wolfgang notes that conflict entails three elements. These are: conflict about perception of how things are (conflict about facts); conflicts about how things should be (conflict of values) and conflict about who is entitled to what (conflict of interests).³⁹

The recognition of conflict as inevitable has led to a practical need to regulate conflict. The need as Lederach notes is informed by the premise that social conflict is a phenomenon of human creation, lodged naturally in relationships.⁴⁰ It is a phenomenon that transforms events, the relationships in which conflict occurs and indeed its creators. The transformation process of conflict can either be destructive or constructive. Paffenholz observes that when dealt in a constructive way, conflict can lead to positive development both for individuals and societies as a whole for it leads to reexamination of relationships.⁴¹ Thus the main goal of regulating conflict

³⁶ A. De Reuck, *The Logic of Conflict in World Society: A New Perspective in International Relations*. Sussex: Wheatsheaf, 1984, pp 97-113

³⁷ H. Wolfgang, *Building the Peace: Experiences and Reflections of Collaborative Peace Building: The Case for Somalia (2nd ed)*. Uppsala: Life and Peace Institute, 2006, p.3

³⁸ William Dixon 'Third Party Techniques for Preventing Conflict Escalation and Providing Peaceful Settlement', *International Organization*, 50, 4, Autumn 1996, p.655.

³⁹ H. Wolfgang, op cit p 3

⁴⁰ See J.P. Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington: Institute for peace, 1994.

⁴¹ T. Paffenholz *Community Based Bottom up Peace Building (2nd ed)* Uppsala: Life and Peace Institute, 2006, p.15.

as Lederach notes is to maximize mutually beneficial processes and outcomes of conflict as well as minimizing its destructive impact.⁴²

However to effectively regulate conflict and make it a constructive social process there is a need to understand its causes. According to Stedman there are four main causes of conflict in any political system namely identity, participation, distribution and legitimacy. Identity provides the individual with a core sense of self-hood and acts as a boundary marker for exclusion and inclusion. When a group's identity is threatened conflict inevitably follows as a defensive move. Participation provides persons with chances to chart their own destinies and have a voice on how affairs affecting them are managed by authoritative institutions whereas distribution determines who benefits or loses from authoritative allocation of values to the society. Lack of participation in normal political process makes violence an attractive option while unequal distribution of resources leads to feeling of relative deprivation. Legitimacy determines individual(s) belief in the rightness of the rules governing affairs within the society.⁴³ Where persons view the state as illegitimate they are bound to challenge it militarily.

According to Allen in his analysis of Burundi and Rwanda violent conflicts, the main cause lies in the way politics are practiced in Africa. He notes that political entrepreneurs rely on instrumental manipulation of differences to win political support.⁴⁴ As a result, the political discourse has become highly divisive and encouraged political elite to pursue hegemonic instead of accommodative politics. In some cases, Lemarchand notes that this has led to extreme policies

⁴² J.P. Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Dividend Societies*. Washington: Institute for peace, 1994

⁴³ S. Stedman 'Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Africa: a Conceptual Framework' in W. Deng and I .W Zartman (eds) *Conflict Resolution in Africa*. Washington DC: Brookings Institutions, 1991.

⁴⁴ See for instance, C. Allen, 'Warfare, Endemic Violence and State Collapse in Africa', *Review of African Political Economy*, vol 26, No 81, 1999, pp.367- 384.

aimed at eliminating perceived opponents. This was the case with Rwanda, where the Hutunisation project justified extermination of Tutsis and moderate Hutus.⁴⁵

Other scholars have focused on the foundational causes arguing that the state in Africa is flawed and artificial making it incapable of exercising its infrastructural and despotic power. Ayoob has argued that Africa's security predicament is rooted in the nature of state-formation in Africa. States in Africa were arbitrarily imposed by the colonizing powers, with total disregard of the social composition of the territories partitioned. As a result, international boundaries cut across linguistic, ethnic, religious ties, lumping together and separating social groups which before existed as independent entities.⁴⁶ As a result, Jackson has concluded that most African states lack empirical legitimacy and their survival has been made possible by international norms of sovereignty. Importantly lack of empirical legitimacy makes them extremely weak.⁴⁷

Another group of scholars have prioritised on environment and how related scarcities have been a key cause of conflict. A leading proponent of this perspective is Homer-Dixon who argued that the environmental resource scarcity is a key driver of violent conflicts. This is through three types of scarcities: The supply-induced scarcity which is caused when a resource is either degraded or depleted; demand-induced scarcity caused by either an increase in per-capita consumption or by simple population growth. If the supply remains constant, and demand increases by existing users consuming more or more users each consuming the same amount, eventually scarcity will result as demand overtakes supply. The third type of environmental scarcity is known as structural scarcity, a phenomenon that results when resource supplies are

⁴⁵ See, R. Lemarchand, 'Patterns of State Collapse and Reconstruction in Central Africa: Reflections on Crisis in the Great Lakes Region', *African Spectrum*, vol 32, No 2, 1997, pp.173 – 193.

⁴⁶ M. Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State making, Regional Conflict and the International System*. London: Boulder, 1995, p.34

⁴⁷R. Jackson, 1990, p.169 cited in J. Glenn, *The Interregnum: The South Insecurity Dilemma. Nations and Nationalisms*, b (1), 1992, p 45-63.

unequally distributed. This leads to marginalization of some groups leading to grievances against the state or groups perceived to be responsible.⁴⁸

The other body of literature has focussed on the role of natural resources and how they lead to violent conflicts as greed driven group seeks to capture such resources. According to this literature violent conflicts have economic motivations and anarchy is created to enable looting.⁴⁹

Importantly the economic motivations according to Renner have led to wars which can be characterised as economic insurgency.⁵⁰ This refers to a situation whereby the benefit accrued from war economies exceeds expected returns in case there is peace. Consequently, actors have interest in continuing the war, since war has become a continuation of economies by other means'.⁵¹

The final category of literature approaches conflict from anthropological or historical perspective. Mamdani in analysis of Rwandan genocide has argued that violence is not its own meaning, to be made thinkable it must be historicized.⁵² This is because as Funk et al have argued conflicts have memories; moral agency, myths and narratives justifying the war.⁵³ Indeed it this justifying history which makes violence possible. Similarly Richards in a critique to the natural resource based model in explaining the Liberian conflict has argued that these wars need

⁴⁸ T. Homer-Dixon, (1999). *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence*. Princeton, Princeton University Press

⁴⁹ K. Ballentine et al. *The Political Economy of Civil War and Conflict Transformation*, 2005, <http://www.Berghof-handbook.net>; D. Snow, *National Security for a New Era: Globalization and Geo-Politics*. San Francisco: Pearson Education Inc, 2004, p.264

⁵⁰ See N. Renner, 'Economic Motivations of Warfare in Collapsed States', *National Strategy Review*, vol 10, No 2, 2000.

⁵¹ Cited in K. Ballentine and H. Nitzschke, *The Political /economy of Civil War and Conflict Transformation*. 2005, <http://www.berghoff-handbook.net>.

⁵² M. Mamdani: *When Victims become Killers: Colonization, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, p 364

⁵³ See A. Aziz-Said and N.C. Funk, 'The Role of Faith in Cross-Cultural Conflict Resolution', *Peace and Conflict Studies*, 2002, vol 9, No.1, p.39

to be understood in relation to historical patterns of violence already embedded within the society.⁵⁴

From the review of the literature on conflict and its causes it is observable that conflict is an enduring social process. Where correctly managed, it can lead to constructive outcomes. However to effectively manage it one needs to understand its causes which might be historical, politics, dysfunctional state policies, greed (for instance, natural resources looting) or grievances (for instance, environmental scarcities) driven.

Literature on Sub-Regional Organizations in Conflict Management

According to Franke, when it comes to conflict management, a case has been made for more involvement by regional organizations. This is because their geographical and cultural proximity can facilitate more rapid and less expensive responses to violent conflicts. Second, they possess better understanding of conflict dynamics, key players and context specific management and resolution options. Third, there is a possibility, that warring parties are more willing to or feel comfortable at managing disputes at a regional level as opposed to international level through UN.⁵⁵

In their analysis of third parties and negotiated settlements, Dixon et al observes that regional organizations seem to be the best at serving negotiated settlement. This is because they provide legitimacy and are more likely to foster trust that the organization will help fulfill the terms of settlement. Importantly by operating within a normative framework as outlined in their

⁵⁴ P. Richards, *No Peace No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2005, p.12

⁵⁵ See B. Franke, 'In Defense of Regional Peace Operations in Africa', *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, Article 185, 2006. Also B. Frank 'Competing Regionalism in Africa and the Continents Emerging Security Architecture', *Africa Studies Quarterly*, vol 9, issue no 3, 2007.

respective charters, they are perceived as neutral, compared to states which are more motivated by self interests⁵⁶.

In the analysis of regions and powers, Buzan et al have justified the role of sub-regional organizations using the concept of security complex. The notion of regional security complex is rooted on the reality that states which are contiguous have interlinked security concerns and none can guarantee its own security without cooperating with the neighbours.⁵⁷ This creates security interdependence, best addressed through regional structures of security cooperation tailored to fit the security environment they target. This is more so when a given region is characterised by violent conflicts which have become internationalised.

Within the structures set is the Conflict Early Warning Systems the system constitutes a key cog of sub-regional Peace and Security Architectures. Though early warning systems are relatively newcomers, they have attracted immense attention from scholars. The attention focuses on the definition, methodology they apply, assumptions that they are based on, their linkages with other PSA components, their success and challenges.

Early warning systems have been defined variously depending on the focus of the persons defining them. Austin in a definition whose focus is on methodology defines EWS as any initiative that focuses on systematic data collection, analysis and/or formulation of recommendations, including risk assessment and information sharing regardless of whether they are quantitative or qualitative or a blend of both.⁵⁸ Nyeihm definition which focuses on the target of the warning defines early warning as a process that (a) alerts decision makers to the

⁵⁶ D. Fraizer and W.J, Dixon 'Third Party Intermediaries and Negotiated Settlements 1946-2000', *International Interactions*, 32, 2006, pp 384-408.

⁵⁷ B. Buzan and O. Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, Op cit, pp.4-5

⁵⁸ A.Austin, 'Early Warning and the Field: A Cargo Cult Science'. Berlin: Berghoff Handbook, 2004, p.2

potential outbreak, escalation, resurgence of violent conflicts, (b) promotes an understanding among decision makers of the nature of the violent conflicts.⁵⁹

Regarding methodology, the debate has focussed on the most appropriate methodology to use. Goldstone has argued that neither the qualitative nor the quantitative methodology is superior. He notes that in forecasting, the goal is to identify an unknown. In identifying the unknown better results can often be gained by triangulating with several different approaches.⁶⁰ Austin in a critique of quantitative approach notes that, it cannot identify the origins of conflict because it is based on empirical causal relationships which overlook the role of human agency in violence.⁶¹ Matveeva in analysis regarding methodology has argued that though qualitative methodology provides an in-depth, context and actor sensitive and typically narrative information they are vulnerable to analyst's biases, cognitive blindness and limits.⁶²

The other body of literature on conflict early warning systems concerns the challenges they face. Opoku in his analysis of Economic Community of West African States early warning system has observed that any effective warning system must have a well developed database which can be used to predict, forecast and extrapolate on future scenarios. Importantly this must be backed by the necessary resources and linkage to the response system. Based on this argument he states that ECOWAS early warning system has been faced by the above challenges.⁶³

Nathan in an analysis of the South African Development Community (SADC) has identified value incongruence as the main challenge. She observes that member states are sharply divided

⁵⁹ D. Nyeihm, *Preventing Violence, War and State Collapse: The Future of Early warning and Response*. Paris: OECD, 2009, p.53

⁶⁰ J.A. Goldstone, *Using and Quantitative and Qualitative Models to Forecast Instability*. Washington: USIP, 2008, Special Report 204, p.2

⁶¹ A.Austin, 'Early Warning and the Field: A Cargo Cult Science', Op cit, p.16

⁶² A.Matveeva, *Early Warning and Early Response*, Op cit, p.12

⁶³ J.M. Opoku, *West African Early Warning and Response System: The Role of the Civil Society Organizations*. Accra: KAIPTC, 2009, No.19, p.11

over the orientation of conflict management strategies and mechanism. This has led to a weak peace and security architecture.⁶⁴

According to Schnabel, the main challenge lies on the gap between early warning and response. He has observed that strong imperative by all stakeholders to act timely, appropriately and in a coordinated manner is critical. Where there are no linkages, early warning becomes a mere academic exercise.⁶⁵ Related to this is that conflict early warning systems lack the autonomy to have policy influence. Hansohm in an analysis of SADC has concluded that such organs need some degree of autonomy and supranationality.⁶⁶ This will enable them to set the tempo of regional direction.

The analysis of literature on early warning system shows that the main goal is to forecast violent conflict before escalating. In this endeavor they employ different methodologies, each conferring certain advantages and disadvantages. Importantly they are not without challenges. This section is elaborated further in chapter two which provides a comprehensive analysis of early warning systems. In chapter two various issues on conflict early warning systems have been dealt with and backed by theoretical foundation.

Hypotheses

The study has tested the following hypotheses:

- i. Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism is founded on an inappropriate epistemology
- ii. CEWARN has contributed to the success of IGAD's Peace and Security Architecture

⁶⁴ L. Nathan, 'Power, Security and Regional Conflict Management in Southern Africa and South Asia', in Harpiviken. K. b (eds), *Troubled Regions and Failing States: The Clustering and Contagion of Armed Conflicts*. Birghley: Emerald Group Publishing, 2010, p.326

⁶⁵ A. Schnabel, *Towards a Human-Security Based Early warning and Response System*. pp.7-8. Accessed at www.swisspeace.ch

⁶⁶ D. Hansohm, 'Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa', *South African Yearbook*, 2005, Vol 5,

iii. CEWARN has not achieved its goal as envisaged in its constitutive protocol

Justification of the Study

The study has both academic and policy justifications. Academically the study is justified on the ground that conflict early warning systems remain understudied and their relevance is often taken as a given. However this is not always the case. Their relevance need to be tested against the reality on the ground. Do they predict conflicts ?, are their modeling/analytical indicators capable of capturing all the dynamics of conflict ?, are they based on the appropriate epistemology and importantly do they influence responses or has the business of early warning remained a mere academic exercise ?. Additionally, by focusing on CEWARN which remains the most advanced early warning system in Africa, the study provides cutting edge information which can be used as a point of reference when studying early warning systems in Africa.

At policy level the study is important for it has generated information relevant to various stakeholders and which can be applied during the functional improvement of early warning and early response systems in Africa. Additionally the strong theoretical grounding of the study provides critical illuminations to policy makers and other practioners especially considering that more often than not these persons rarely engage in serious epistemological questions prior to setting up organs such as CEWARN.

Conceptual Framework

In the analysis of conflict early warning and response mechanisms two broad components are identifiable: Early warning and early response. On the early warning side the main activities include data collection, data analysis, assessment for early warning or identification of scenarios, formulation of proposals, transmission of recommendations and assessment of early response.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ A. Matveeva, *Early Warning and Early Response*, Op cit P.7

The operationalization of these activities is guided by the epistemological underpinning of the early warning organ especially whether it is prioritized on state or human security. Additionally the success is guided by the methodology of analysis, the conflict indicators used and capacity for analysis and generating of response scenarios (human, technological, communication, institutional and financial) Hence in the conceptual framework used in this study all these activities and factors are used to explain the success or failure of the CEWARN in undertaking its early warning role and constitutes the demand side of the CEWARN.

On the early response component the main activity is reacting to the early warning using a range of response tools. The tools range from means of pacific settlement of disputes such as negotiations, mediation, arbitration, inquiry, conciliation and judicial settlement.⁶⁸ Additionally response may be in form humanitarian assistance and intervention which involve use of force to deter or reverse widespread or egregious human suffering, peace keeping and enforcement where there is a threat of relapse to violence among other tools. Whether these activities are undertaken is critical in determining the relevance of early warning. Further, the extent which they are undertaken is determined not only by the quality of early warning information but by the capacity of sub-regional or national response, the focus of security (human or state security), the norms of sovereignty and governance and the extent which they are shared by member states, activities of civil non-governmental organizations, political commitment, human and material capacities and the general nature of the regional (in)security environment. Drawing from these variables, the conceptual framework has enabled the researcher to focus on success and challenges facing early response, which in the study has been categorized as the demand side of CEWARN.

⁶⁸ See the UN Charter, Chapter Six on pacific settlement of disputes

By conceptually integrating and analytically separating the supply side (early warning) and demand side (early response) issues, the framework provides a fruitful and useful tool for holistically analyzing the role of CEWARN in enabling IGAD to undertake the business of conflict management in the troubled region. This is because it has enabled the researcher to focus on the variables which to a large extent determines whether CEWARN will deliver on its mandate as contained in the constitutive protocol and expected by various stakeholders.

Methodology

The research has used a qualitative case study design. This involves an in-depth investigation of an individual, group, institution or phenomena.⁶⁹ The design is appropriate for the study for it has enabled the researcher to capture critical issues, opinions and view expressed by scholars and practitioners who have written on conflict early warning and response. This has been integrated with ground research which has been used to collect and collate data from individuals who have been purposively sampled by the researcher.

Methods of Data Collection

The study has sourced its data from both primary and secondary sources. Secondary data has been accessed through library research of published and unpublished materials in public and private university libraries, as well as publications of the sub-regional organizations in the world. Magazines have been used to provide current news on the present state of conflict in this region. Magazines published by the sub-regional organizations have also been used to provide data on the state of CEWARN. Published reports on proceedings of conferences and symposia have been utilized to provide views of various organizations and individual stakeholders on conflict prevention.

⁶⁹ O. Mugenda, *Research Methods: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches*. Nairobi: ACTs Press, 1999, pp.17

Regular CEWARNs reports on the state of affairs in the continent accessed through the internet have also provided a key source of secondary data. These reports have provided information on the current extent of surveillance done by the CEWARNs and the interventions that have been sought. This has been useful in answering the question of effectiveness of the CEWARN especially in terms of coverage.

Lastly, reports on conflicts published by the UN Security Council and others have been used for providing an in depth understanding on the state of affairs relating to conflict resolution in Africa. The information has been supplemented with reports, if any, from the international organizations in question.

Primary data

Primary data have been collected through interview schedules. The interviews have prioritized on information on the contribution of the IGAD CEWARN as well as the major impediments to its activities. The interviewees were purposively sampled depending on their expertise on early warning and response systems as well as their connection to IGAD's CEWARN.

Chapter Outline

The study has been divided into five chapters:

Chapter One has provided the background of the study through development of the research problem, reviewing the literature and developing an appropriate methodology and conceptual framework for the study.

Chapter Two has provided an in-depth conceptual and theoretical analysis of conflict early warning and response systems

Chapter three has provided an overview of conflict early warning systems in Africa and a detailed analysis of IGAD's CEWARN in terms of its structure, operations, and achievements.

Chapter Four has looked at the IGAD CEWARN - its role, its success and challenges

Chapter Five deals with a critical analysis of the IGAD CEWARN.

Chapter Six is a conclusion of the study.

CHAPTER TWO

An Analysis of Conceptual Issues on Early Warning Systems

Introduction

The preceding chapter has brought out the main issues which the study addresses. It has shown that the quest for African peace and security architecture has been an ongoing process during the post-cold war period. This quest has been informed by the realities that the international community can indeed turn its back on Africa even in the face of imminent violent eruption as exemplified by the Rwandan genocide. Significantly as a part of African renaissance, there is a growing recognition and acceptance that Africa needs to provide solutions to the complex problems it is facing. A key plank of Africa's solution to Africa's problem is the need to ensure there is peace and security, since in the absence of this condition, other goals remain a mirage. Within the rubric of enhancing peace and security, is the establishment of conflict early warning systems at both continental and sub-regional levels.

This chapter attempts to dissect the key issues that have informed and shaped the tenor of conflict early warning systems. The debate ranges from their historical origins, definition, analytical methodologies, epistemological grounding, their relevance, linkages to other peace and security components, sources of information and levels of openness as well as the target of the information. All these issues are dealt with in this chapter.

Historical Development of Conflict Early Warning

Though conflict early warning systems are a recent development having emerged during the post-cold war period, the presence of early warning systems is traceable to 1950s.¹ Historically

¹ T.Debiel and H.Wulf, "*Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism: Tools for Enhancing the Effectiveness of Regional Organization? A Comparative Study of the AU, ECOWAS, IGAD, ASEAN/ARF and PIF*". London: Crisis States Research Center Working Paper Series No. 2 , 2009, p.5

early warning systems have double heritage. The first heritage was rooted in the need to forecast humanitarian disasters. To undertake this function, early warning systems were initially developed "to predict impending dangers emanating from natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, and stock market crashes in the economic sphere as well as to predict the effects of these disasters on people."² This was expanded beginning in 1980s to include prediction of famine and refugee migration with the purpose of alerting relief agencies about looming humanitarian crises.³

The other heritage of the early warning system is rooted in the cold war period military needs. In the period the threat of full scale warfare between the communist bloc lead by the Soviet Union and the capitalist bloc headed by the United States was highly possible. This is because though the cold war super powers relation was based on spheres of interests and the *modus vivendi* was that they should respect each other sphere especially where vital interests were at stake, both were constantly trying to spread their ideology, through a mutual process of destabilizing the other's sphere of influence.⁴ At times the policy of destabilization led to eruption of full scale war as especially in Asia where in 1952, the communist North Korea invaded the capitalist South Korea. Each was supported by its super power patron. This pattern was repeated in Vietnam where an essentially nationalist civil war transformed into a super power conflict.⁵

Though such wars were fought on the periphery, the threat of surprise nuclear attack on the core cold war states was an accepted reality. This made it imperative to put in place a system which

² R. Doom and K. Vlassenroot, "Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Minerva's Wisdom?" *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, 1997. Available at <http://www.jha.ac/articles/a022.htm>.

³ Schmeidl, *Conflict Early Warning* 72-73.

⁴ See W. Loth and M. R. Knight, 'The East – West Conflict in Historical Perspective: An Attempt at Balanced Views', *Contemporary European History*, Vol 3, No.2, 1994, pp.193 – 202.

⁵ On Asia's war of the cold war see R. Crockart, *The Fifty Years War: The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941 – 1991*. London: Routledge, 1995; J. L. Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold-War History*. Oxford: OUP, 1997

would timely warn the military establishment of an imminent attack to enable early response. In order to anticipate surprise nuclear attacks and other military incidents during the Cold War, early warning systems were deployed by both militaries.

However after the cold war, early warning systems were increasingly adopted as a mechanism for conflict prevention. There was acceptance in the policy circles that it was cheaper to prevent a conflict before it became violent.⁶ Contrary to the expectations that the end of cold war would lead to prolonged periods of peace, the post-cold war period became increasingly bloody. The withdrawal of super powers patronage which often had enabled extremely authoritarian regimes to maintain their control in many states especially in Africa and Eastern Europe exposed such regimes to violent sub-national challenges.⁷

Unlike wars of the cold war which were often infused with strong political ideology, this violent sub-national challenges exhibited different characteristics. They were based on exclusivist identities.⁸ The exclusivist identities whether based on religion or ethnicity were cultivated through fear and hatred. Where such hatreds were non-existent or had been long been suppressed, an unambiguous dichotomy of 'us' vs. 'them' was instrumentally cultivated to justify the extermination of the others.⁹ As a result of this exclusionist project the wars became

⁶ A. Matveeva, *Early Warning and Early Response: Conceptual and Empirical Dilemmas*. Den Haag: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 2006, p.8

⁷ See for instance the case of Democratic Republic of Congo, where the West had supported the dictatorial Mobutu regime during the cold war. M. McNulty, 'The Collapse of Zaire: Implosion, Revolution or External Sabotage?', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol 37, No.1, 1999

⁸ See M. Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in Global Era (2nd ed)*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006, pp.1-12. Also see D. Snow, *National Security for a New Era: Globalization and Geo-Politics*. San Francisco: Pearson Education Inc, 2004, pp.262-266; R. D. Kaplan, 'The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism and Diseases are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of our Planet', *Atlantic Monthly*, Feb, 1994, 273(2), p.26

⁹ See D. Snow, *Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996, pp.102 – 105

extremely bloody, highly destructive and enduring as evidenced by Somalia civil war, the Rwandan genocide and the violent breakup of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Further, the wars in some states like Somalia, Sierra Leone and Liberia exhibited a different goal in the sense that the combatants were more interested in destroying the state rather than retaining.

This is because a degenerated state facilitated the privatisation of resources, looting and sheer criminality.¹⁰ This logic gave such wars a strong economic basis whereby greed rather than grievance became the main motivating factor.¹¹ The economic logic meant that the wars would continue as long as they generated economic rents to conflict entrepreneurs.

Significantly, the conflicts violated the law of wars especially on the need to have a clear distinction between combatants and non-combatants. Rather than relying on persuasion and propaganda to control the population, extremely brutal strategies such as ethnic cleansing and mass expulsion became the preferred operational strategy.¹² Indeed it has been argued that these wars lacked a clear military objective or respect of laws of warfare. Though violation of these laws was present in wars of the cold war, the difference was that violation became normalized. Their defining characteristic was extreme atrocities against civilians. It is during this period that new lexicons such as ethnic cleansing, mass rapes and politicide emerged to capture the atrocious nature of these wars.¹³ Bangura and Muller have noted that the violations witnessed

¹⁰ M. Snow, *Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts*, Ibid, pp.101-102

¹¹ For instance see Berdal, Mats and Keen, David, 'Economic Agendas in Civil Wars', *Millennium*, 26, no. 3, 1997: pp.795-818, Also see P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, 'Justice-Seeking and Loot Seeking in Civil War', *World Bank Paper*, 17 February 1999

¹² D. Snow, *National Security for a New Era*, Op cit, p.262

¹³ R. Jackson, 'Violent Internal Conflict and the Africa State- Towards a Framework of Analysis', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 20, 1, 2002, pp. 29 -52

reached a degree where they no longer served any strategic goal and became a reflection of hedonistic proclivities.¹⁴

Faced by these new wars, the international community elaborated the culture of prevention. To be effective, prevention had to be based on timely and accurate knowledge of the facts, understanding of developments and global trends and sound analysis.¹⁵ To achieve this goal, there was a need for development and adoption of early warning systems by international organizations, academic and research institutions and national governments.

The need to forecast violent conflicts and pre-empt them led to the first generation of conflict early warning systems. The first generation systems were different in the sense that they were often based outside the conflict region (usually in the West) and their goal was to guide international agencies and donor states on the risks of operating in a given territory. With time, they were succeeded by second generation early warning systems which though similar to the first generation, had their monitoring mechanisms in the conflict zone. Here field monitors were deployed to gather data and relay it to analysts working outside the conflict zone. Due to increased recognition of the need to link warning and response, a third generation of early warning systems emerged. Unlike its predecessors, the system is entirely located in the conflict zone and integrates early warning and response as a simultaneous process.¹⁶ The IGAD's CEWARN is an example of a third generation early warning system.

¹⁴ Y. Bangura, 'Understanding the Political and Cultural Dynamics of the Sierra Leone War: A Critique of Paul Richards fighting for the Rain Forests', *African Development*, XXII, 3/4, 1997, pp.117-148: 123; J. Muller, 'The Banality of 'Ethnic War'', *International Security*, vol 25, No. 1, 2000, pp.42-70

¹⁵ United Nations, *An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peace Making and Peace-keeping*; A Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the summit meeting of the security council on 31st January, 1992

¹⁶ K. Rupesinghe, 'A New Generation of Conflict Prevention: Early Warning, Early Action and Human Security', A Paper Presented at the Global Conference on the 'Role of Civil Society in the Prevention of Armed Conflict and Peacebuilding', July, 2005

Definitions of Conflict Early Warning System

The issue of naming and defining something is critical for it does not only reflect our understanding of the intended objectives but also the level of focus or prioritization. Though often presumed, how we define something has both constitutive and regulative effects. This is because one cannot explain the link between cause and effect in social life without understanding the meaning that the activity under study has for the subject, that is, for an action to have a meaning it must be socially/culturally contextualised.¹⁷ Hence there is a need to focus on definitional issues for they capture the intentions and understanding of framers of various institutions which they set up to fulfill certain activities.

For instance how one defines conflict and conflict prevention will have a profound impact on the approach taken to deal with violent conflicts. If viewed as dysfunctional social process the goal of prevention will be to suppress it forcefully, whereas if understood as an inevitable social process the goal of prevention is to channel it towards constructive ends while simultaneously mitigating its destructive effects. As such words must be sociologically examined and must not be treated as external and independent of actors. Rather they are social constructs woven from rules and meanings, which define relationships and give interactions their purpose.¹⁸ Additionally what is fronted as a meaning of something represents a subjective form of

¹⁷ See excellent elaboration of constructivist approach in A. Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organisation*, Vol 40, No.2, 1992, pp.391-425; A. Wendt, 'Constructing International Politics', *International Security*, Vol 20, No. 1, 1998, pp.71-81; T. Hopf, 'The Promise of Constructionism in International Relations Theory', *International Security*, Vol 23, No 1, 1998, pp.171-200

¹⁸ J. Milken, 'Intervention and Identity: Reconstructing the West in Korea' in Weldes J et al (ed), *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1999, pp.92-103. Also, J. Milken, *The Social Construction of Korean War: Conflict and its Possibilities*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001, pp.30-39.

knowledge and this in form of broad discourses constitutes the building blocks of social systems in a profound and inescapable way.¹⁹

When it comes to definition of conflict early warning systems, the definitions either primarily focus on who to warn or methodology of data analysis or a blend of both. A definition which focuses on methodology has been provided by Austin. According to him EWS is defined as any initiative that focus on systematic data collection, analysis and/or formulation of recommendations, including risk assessment and information sharing regardless of whether they are quantitative or qualitative or a blend of both.²⁰ This definition indicates that the priority of early warning system is generally generation of warnings and response strategies. Importantly it underscores the importance of the integrity of data collection and analysis. Indeed it can be argued that how these two activities are undertaken is the most critical determinant of the credibility and legitimacy of early warning systems. Failure in these two areas can lead to a crying wolf syndrome whereby persistently wrong diagnosis and forecasting means that if when EWS are accurate they will be ignored.

In contrast, other definitions have focused on the target of warnings. A representative definition of this category has been provided by Nyeihm. He defines early warning as a process that alerts decision makers to the potential outbreak, escalation, resurgence of violent conflicts and promotes an understanding among decision makers of the nature of the violent conflicts.²¹ This definition points out to the centrality of decision makers in any early warning system. The logic

¹⁹M. Foucault, *The Will to Knowledge: The history of Sexuality, Vol 1*. London: Penguin, 1998. p.100. Also M. Foucault, 'On Archaeology of Science: Response to the Epistemology of the Circle', In Fabion, J.D. (ed), *Aesthetic: Essential work of Foucault, 1954 – 19184, Vol 2*. London: Penguin Books, 1998.

²⁰ A.Austin, 'Early Warning and the Field: A Cargo Cult Science'. Berlin: Berghoff Handbook, 2004, p.2

²¹ D. Nyeihm, *Preventing Violence, War and State Collapse: The Future of Early warning and Response*. Paris: OECD, 2009, p.53

is that the relevance of early warning system is dependent on how successful it is in warning and by extension eliciting appropriate responses from relevant decision making actors.

Drawing on the need for data collection and analysis, crafting and eliciting of responses, some definition of early warning are of hybrid nature, that is, they combine methodological and target considerations. This category is reflected by the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER's) definition that conflict early warning is the systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of crises for the purposes of (i) anticipating the escalation of violent conflicts, (ii) development of strategic response to these crises, and (iii) the presentation of options to critical actors (national, regional and international) for the purposes of decision-making and preventive action.²² The definition by FEWER which has been adopted by this study reflects the whole cycle of early warning and response and captures the activities of the third generation early warning systems which institutionally link the two main roles of warning and responding appropriately to such warnings.

Classification of Early Warning System Methodologies

The Webster dictionary defines methodology as a body of methods, rules and postulates employed by a discipline: a particular procedure or a set of procedures.²³ In any discipline, methodology acts like a compass directing someone on the kind of information to collect, how to collate and analyze it and importantly how to present findings. As Pursiainen has observed facts do not say or tell anything by themselves, instead a person has to select them, put them in order

²² FEWER Secretariat, 'A New Collaborative Effort', *Refugee* 16, No. 1, 1997, p. 24.

²³ Webster dictionary accessed at www.meriam-webster.com

and classify them to give the meaning and finally to act on the basis of knowledge thus accumulated. This is made possible through use of a given methodology.²⁴

In any inquiry, failure to adopt the right methodology inevitably leads to wrong results. This fact has made the question of methodology a central issue when setting up or analyzing conflict early warning systems. The quest for good enough forecasting and development of intervention strategies demands that such system should adopt not only the most rigorous but appropriate methodology. Appropriateness is important because even when faced with the same set of facts, different methodologies may lead to different results.

Broadly the methodologies used in early warning systems can be divided into two: Quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative methodology is based on standardized set of variables which are assigned numerical values based on their relevance and used as benchmarks for analyzing empirical evidence and through statistical manipulation generate results.²⁵ The results are presented graphically showing trends of a given conflict.

Under the quantitative models several categories are identifiable. The main ones are: structural, accelerator, threshold and response models.²⁶ Structural models draw from Galtung's conflict triangle which argues that long before there is a violent outbreak of conflict, there exists structural factors which generate injustices driving individuals and groups to violence.²⁷ Based on this understanding, structural models focuses on identifying conditions and context under which violent conflicts occur. This is based on a predefined list of indicators, a review of causal

²⁴ See J.A. Goldstone, *Using Quantitative and Qualitative Models to Forecast Stability*. Washington: USIP, Special Report, 2008

²⁵ A. Matveev, *Early Warning and Early Response*, Op cit, P.13

²⁶ A. Austin, *Early Warning and the Field: A Cargo Culi Science*. Berghof.: Berghof Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 2004, p.4

²⁷ See various works of Galtung such as J.Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research', *Journal of Peace Research*, 6 (3), 1969, pp.167-192. Also J. Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. London: Sage,1996, p.196

relationship between indicators and their magnitude in relation to conflict.²⁸ Indicators include regime type, economic inequality, and health and education indicators.

The accelerator model, unlike structural one focuses on the immediate variables which move a given situation to violence. It is informed by an understanding that usually the presence of enabling structural factors does not lead to violent conflicts. Gupta observes that there can be a wide ranging social, political, economic or even religious grievances in the society but this will not necessarily lead to violence.²⁹ Political violence takes place when grievances are given a voice through a well defined social construction of the collective identity and grievances based on 'us' versus 'them' logic.³⁰ This is done through attribution and framing of the grievances in a manner that justifies violence. Framing refers to the active construction and dissemination of meaning and the success of a social movement with regard to mobilizing resources and gaining adherents.³¹

As such the accelerator model aims at identifying the triggers and antecedent processes that spark or lead to conflict. Through the use of such indicators the model aims at predicting when a clustering of events leads to violent conflicts.³² For example, the clustering of increased political competition, ethnic fractiousness and absence of fair electoral system leads to a high probability of triggering violence especially during the electioneering period.

²⁸ Ibid, p.7

²⁹ D. K. Gupta, 'Exploring the Root of Terrorism', in Bjorg T(ed). *The Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Way Forward*. New York: Routledge, 2005, p.19.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ See, M. Crenshaw, 'Decision to Use Terrorism: Psychological Constraints and Instrumental Reasoning', in Porta D (ed), *Social Movements and Violence*. London: JA Press, 1992, p. 31. Also, D. Porta, 'Introduction: Individual Motivation in Underground Political Organisations', in Porta D (ed), *Social Movements and Violence*, Ibid, p.5; D. Snow 'Frame Alignment Processes, Micro-mobilization and Movement Participation', *American Sociological Review*, 51, pp.464-481.

³² A. Austin, *Early Warning and the Field*, Op cit, p.7

The threshold model focuses on both structural and proximate causes with a goal of abstracting on generalities from a set of information gathered in other conflicts.³³ The rationale of the model is that conflicts are not ideographic, that is, they are not peculiar and do not share characteristics with other conflicts. For instance within a given conflict system, there are systemic linkages and logically no conflict can claim to possess particularities that are not shared by other conflicts in the system.³⁴

Based on this understanding, threshold models develops a data set derived from analysis of conflicts globally and regionally and uses the knowledge generated to develop a set of variables which are assigned numerical values and used as an index of mapping conflicts. Depending on the scores recorded against the benchmark indexes, states and regions are categorized on an instability risk scale and it is possible to establish causal factors. An example is the Predictive Model of the Political Instability Taskforce (PITF) which uses four independent variables: regime types, infant mortality, a bad neighbourhood indicator and presence of state-led discrimination to predict the onset of instability.³⁵

The final model under the quantitative category is the response model. The model is similar to the threshold model, but it does not try to establish violent conflicts causation. Rather it focuses on various interventions and their appropriateness to the conflict. The focus of the model is guided by the fact that early warning key goal is not predicting conflict, but rather to prevent them. Prevention entails interventions by various third parties and the strategies employed have a

³³ Ibid, p.8

³⁴ M. Mwangiru, *Conflict in Africa: Theories, Processes and Institutions of Management*. Nairobi: CCR, 2006, pp.72-73

³⁵ H.Wulf and T. Diebel, *Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanisms: Tools for Effectiveness of Regional Organisations?*, Op cit, p.9

real risk of further escalating the situation if not carefully crafted to suit the conflict context and needs.

A case of interventions escalating a given conflict is exemplified by the Rwandan genocide. Despite the early warning of the Rwandan genocide, the French which was former colonising power of Rwanda responded by strengthening the military capacity of the Hutu dominated regime. By the onset of the genocide, the force had expanded from 5,000 to 30,000 troops. This enabled the *Forces Armees Du Rwandaise* (FAR) capacity to implement the genocide policy. Later on when victory was imminent by the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front-a Tutsi dominated group- France under *Operation Turquoise*, created a 'safe humanitarian zone' whose sinister intention was to facilitate the passage of the defeated *Forces Armees Du Rwandaise* and the genocidal militias to Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where they continued with their killing targeting Banyamulenges (Tutsis in Eastern DRC). Eventually, this led to conflagration of the Greatlakes region as Rwanda and Uganda intervened in DRC with a goal of regime change and creating of *cordon sanitaire*.³⁶

Drawing from experiences of successful and failed conflict prevention interventions, the response model generates various hypothetical scenarios and the best forms of interventions. Also it tracks conflicts at different phases and measures the impacts of intervention on de-escalating or escalating the conflict. A good example of this model is the Life Integrity Violation

³⁶ See M. McNulty, 'The Collapse of Zaire: Implosion, Revolution or External Sabotage?', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol 37, No.1, 1999, pp.70-71; T. Longman, 'Rwanda: Chaos From Above' in villalon a et al. *The African State at a Critical Juncture: Between Disintegration And Reconfiguration*: Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1998, pg 78

Analysis (LIVA) whose goal is to trace the impact of government intervention and aid on the level of violation.³⁷

The examination of quantitative models shows that they use standardized data sets to evaluate the risks of instability. Such data sets are used as benchmarks and depending on the score of a given conflict, a situation is ranked along stability scale. However despite the benefits accrued from such models especially analytical tidiness, empirically and scientifically generated evidence, they are not without weaknesses. Austin has argued that,

‘Quantitative models cannot identify the origins of conflict because they are based on empirical causal relationships. Empirical evidence is insufficient because the issues remain conceptual. Also the origins of conflict do not lie in causal relationships outside of the individual, but rather as a reason within the perception of the individual or the group. These reasons cannot be ascertained through empirical evidence.’³⁸

Similarly such models have been critiqued for their inability to capture the complexities of human action and subjectivities. Perryman has convincingly argued that evidence of statistical correlation does not establish causation. He states,

‘The statistical significance of a given factor in the onset of intrastate conflict tends not to explain the pathways through which the identified factors lead to conflict. Statistical significance and correlation does not explain why human beings take a particular action and why others faced with seemingly similar circumstances do not take the same action.’³⁹

Others have critiqued the standardization of such models arguing that different factors will have differing impacts in different societies and hence they cannot be fitted neatly within a given framework. Metelits has observed that when it comes to conflict, no case precisely compares with another case and causation is at best conjectural, that is, the impact of one factor may

³⁷ V. De Goor et al, *Conflict Prognostication: Bridging the Gap from Early warning to Early Response*. Hague: Netherlands Institute of Internal Relations, 1999, Appendix V

³⁸ A. Austin, *Early Warning and the Field*, Op cit, p.6

³⁹ B.N. Perryman, *Developing an Early Warning System for Interstate Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Nova Scotia: Dalhousie University Press, 2011, p.40

depend on presence or absence of other causal conditions such as the role of the human agency, cultural values of peace and violence and history of relationships.⁴⁰

Additionally, there are other weaknesses such as unavailability of data, divergent outcomes of data when subjected to analysis using different quantitative analysis models and inability to capture the contextual or sociological background of the conflicts.⁴¹ Such contexts are important since different persons and individuals have varied levels of tolerance in the face of grievance.⁴²

For instance in a community where warrior culture is valorized, there is a very high risk of violence compared to a society where dialogue and negotiations are exalted values.

The above shortcomings have led to the development of qualitative conflict early warning models. The models are not pre-occupied with statistical analysis. Rather the goal is to conduct an in-depth research (desk top and field) and present findings in form of a narrative capturing the context, the actors and their interests and opinions and how they impact on a given conflict situation. Often field researchers are posted to different regions where they conduct research and write reports which are then integrated with expert opinion to generate different scenarios and how they should be dealt with.⁴³

The most successful qualitative model is the one informing the early warning and response activities of the International Crisis Group. The group which enjoys global presence is reputed for generating authoritative qualitatively analyzed reports on different conflict situations. The

⁴⁰ C.M. Metelits, ' The Consequences of Rivalry: Explaining Insurgent Fuzzy Sets', *Political Research Quarterly*, 62 (4), pp.673-684

⁴¹ A. Matveeva, *Early Warning and Early Response*. Op cit, p.14

⁴² Ibid, p.18

⁴³ T. Debiel and H. Wulf, "*Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism*. Op cit. pp.10-11

analysis is presented in forms of crisis alerts, bulletins and articles which are then transmitted to relevant authorities for action.⁴⁴

Despite the ability of the qualitative models to capture contextual particularities of a given conflict, they are faced with a number of weaknesses. The main weakness is how to deal with subjective biases of analysts either because of the personality, presuppositions of the conflict or ideological orientations. Pursiainen has noted that personal beliefs and presumptions may make an analyst fail to see early warning signals and amplify others leading to faulty predictions.⁴⁵ Lastly, a cultural outsider may not be able to interpret social action, rituals, meanings and symbols. This cultural illiteracy may lead to ethnocentric biases, making early warning a flawed exercise.

The various shortcomings of both qualitative and quantitative models have made it imperative for creativity when dealing with early warning and early response. Goldstone has observed that forecasting the unknowns is fraught with difficulties and no approach can yield near-perfect results. To substantiate his view Goldstone has used analyzed conflicts using different models- quantitative and qualitative- and each has yielded different results.⁴⁶ To address this pitfall there is a need to triangulate different approaches. This way, one can get good enough result drawing from the strengths of various models.

In the category of mixed system (triangulated) model, the most authoritative one has been developed by Swiss Peace. The model is named *Fruhanalyse Von Spannungen und Tatsachenermittlung* (FAST). The model combines both qualitative and quantitative analysis and

⁴⁴ A. Austin, *Early Warning and the Field*, Op cit, pp.5-6

⁴⁵ C. Pursiainen, *Why early Warning Sometimes Fails? A Case of Civil Protection*. Nordregio: Nordic Centre for Spatial Development, 2007, p.20

⁴⁶ See J.A. Goldstone, *Using Quantitative and Qualitative Models to Forecast Instability*. Op cit, 2008

focuses on the interaction of root causes, proximate and intervening factors which may lead to armed conflicts or provide a window of opportunity for de-escalation and peace-building efforts.

This model has been adopted by IGAD's CEWARN.⁴⁷

The Question of Predicting Conflicts

The issues on methodology reflect an underlying question of whether EWS are relevant or just another unnecessary feather on the hat of conflict management. This is because at the heart of methodology is the issue of whether it is possible to predict violent conflict or at best what is generated as warnings are conjectures, which whenever they come to pass, early warning systems are credited with right forecasting and whenever they fail, analysts scramble looking for explanations on what has changed making the prediction fail to materialize.

The complexity of prediction is due to that fact that human action is informed by multiplicity of intrinsic and extrinsic processes and reactions to the same stimuli is as varied as there are people. Matveeva has captured this problem by observing that scientific, objective and apolitical evidence of impending conflict is a myth. More so faultless capacity to predict conflict or crisis does not exist. The best that can be achieved is a 'good enough' analysis which enables timely intervention.⁴⁸

The problem is further limited by the knowledge we have and our cognitive abilities. In any form of forecasting there exists four kind of 'spaces': The known, knowable, complex and chaotic.

The known is a space where cause and effect are understood and predictable; the knowable is a space where cause and effect relationship may be difficult to derive or understand but researchers and experts with sufficient time and resources can determine the relationship. The complex is

⁴⁷ H. Krumennacher and S. Schmeidl, 'Practical Challenges in Predicting Violent Conflicts FAST: An Example of a Comprehensive Early-Warning Methodology', Swiss Peace Foundation, Working Paper, No. 34, 2001, P.8

⁴⁸ A. Matveeva, *Early Warning and Early Response*, Op cit, p.9

where we can only understand cause-effect retrospectively, that is, what appears logical after the fact is but one of many other logical outcomes that could have occurred. Finally, there is the chaotic which is a space so turbulent that cause and effect are unknown.⁴⁹ Within these spaces, only the known and knowable is accessible to human mind *a priori* and since conflict dynamics operates in all spaces, prediction is highly probabilistic.

The high probabilistic nature of prediction poses a risk that response founded on generated warnings may be guided by faulty analysis leading to embarrassment on the side of decision makers. Indeed most decision makers especially state actors are more inclined towards acting on information generated by their intelligence agencies rather than EWS. This has made Schnabel and Krummenacher observe that it is difficult to measure the extent which early warning are incorporated into the work of relevant stakeholders, and to what degree and extent they do trigger early action.⁵⁰

Further, there is a real chance that a faulty warning especially publicly made may have the opposite effect of triggering violence especially where there exist severe intra- and inter-state insecurity dilemmas. The concept of self fulfilling prophecy best illustrates this risk. Introduced in 1948 by American sociologist Merton, the term refers to false beliefs that lead to their own fulfillment.⁵¹ This social process which has been empirically tested in different social science disciplines have shown that, when a certain belief is constantly projected towards a target, the target often moves down the path of fulfilling that belief.⁵² In our case an early warning which

⁴⁹ C. Bellavita, 'Changing the Homeland Security: Shape Patterns not Program', *Homeland Security Affairs*, vol II, Issue 3, 2006, pp.5-6

⁵⁰ A. Schnabel and H. Krummenacher, '*Towards a Human Security Based Early Warning and Response System*', accessed at www.swisspeace.ch

⁵¹ See R. K. Merton, 'The self-Fulfilling Prophecy', *Antioch Review*, 8, 1948, pp.193-210

⁵² See for instance S.Madon et al. 'Am I As You See Me or Do You See Me As I Am? Self Fulfilling Prophecies and Self Verification', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, Vol 27, No.9, 2001, pp.1214-1223; D. Bar-Tal,

constantly paints a certain group as an aggressor, always bent on attacking others, runs the risk of making such a group behave as alleged. This is because erroneous percepts sometimes create the reality they implied.

Alternatively, in a situation characterized by insecurity dilemmas, that is, ever present mutual fear of imminent attack by the group perceived as the enemy, warnings confirming the fears of attacks may force the 'threatened' group to launch pre-emptive attacks.⁵³ A similar argument regarding EWS has been put in place that early warning information may serve as a signal to the threatened group that they are under imminent attack and the best defensive move is to attack first.⁵⁴ This indicates the risk posed by forecasting of conflicts, especially when such forecasting is faulty and its consequences negative.

The Issue of Who to Warn or Warning for Who?

That warnings are supposed to be availed to actors is not debatable. However, the question of who to warn is significant. As already noted the ultimate goal of early warning is to trigger preventive responses. This raises a fundamental practical and moral question of who ought to be warned and what are potential negative repercussions which might arise out of that warning.

The practical question is concerned with the most appropriate actor who is capable of responding to the warning. The organizational structures of early warning are based on the principle of subsidiarity. The principle entails that,

'a community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving the latter of its functions, but rather should support it in case of

'Why Does Fear Override Hope in Societies Engulfed by Intractable Conflicts, as it Does in the Israel Society', *Political Psychology*, 22, 3, 2001, pp.601-627;

⁵³ See arguments in S.J. Kaufmann on making of ethnic insecurity. S.J. Kaufmann, *The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War*. London: Cornell University Press, 2001, pp.30-34

⁵⁴ A. Matveeva, *Early Warning and Early Response*, Op cit, p.22

need and help coordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of society, always with a view to the common good⁵⁵

In the international system, the UN charter affirms this principle in Article 53.1 that, 'the Security Council shall where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority'. Further at the continental level, the Africa Peace and Security Architecture is built on the same principle. For instance the Continental Early Warning System is linked to sub-regional EWS which are in turn linked to national EWS.⁵⁶

Based on this principle, warnings should be dealt with at the most appropriate level, but in reality most of the organizations lack the capacity or political will to respond to such warnings. For instance pastoral based conflicts in the IGAD sub-region should be dealt at national and sub-regional levels, but there is no genuine commitment or capacity at these levels to deal with the same. Yet bringing in the African Union or United Nations to deal with the same violates the principle of subsidiarity which is critical in maintaining operational balance among various states, regions and organizations of state. Importantly bringing higher level actors may encourage a 'bystander syndrome' whereby lower level actors become so dependent on higher levels actors such that they become unwilling to undertake even those preventive functions they are capable of.⁵⁷

The ethical question concerns with the possible negative consequences of availing or not warning to actor(s). This is more pronounced in environments characterized by prioritization on

⁵⁵ Cited in, B.Moller, *The Pros and Cons of Subsidiarity: The Role of African Regional and Sub-Regional Organisations in ensuring Peace and Security in Africa*. Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Studies, 2005, p.3

⁵⁶ See Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy, February, 2004, Section 26.

⁵⁷ By-stander syndrome refers to a situation where the problem is known but none is willing to commit to addressing it. For instance where someone is being robbed on a street full of onlookers but none intervenes. See R.M. Levine, 'Rethinking Bystander Non-Intervention: Social Categorization and Evidence of Witness at the James Bulger Murder Trial', *Human Relations*, 52, 1999, pp.1113-1115

regime security usually couched in the language of national security.⁵⁸ In such environment, any challenge to the regime in power is often met with violent suppression characterized by widespread brutalization and violations. On the other hand the brutalization creates conditions for violent resistance by victims of state policy. As such information may arise in such a state of anti-regime mobilization and arming of resistance movement with a goal of violently toppling the regime. Assuming the warning information is channeled through the government, what are possible negative consequences? This raises a fundamental ethical dilemma since the government may take the information as solid intelligence justifying massive and violent crackdown of the opposition.

Furthering the argument, a critical question arises of how ethical is it to refuse to warn the actual target of possible violence. As already argued in situations where there is intra- or inter-state insecurity dilemmas, public early warnings might end up being the signal for violent confrontation.⁵⁹ This justifies the need for restricted access of the warning information. However, it is plausible that warning possible targets of violence directly may provide them with an opportunity of flight before violence erupts in case preventive actions fail. Consequently thousands of lives will be saved in the face of violence. This situation poses a profound ethical dilemma which is almost impossible to solve.

The Issue of Whose Security

In the literature review section it was brought out that Conflict early warning systems are a sub-component of peace and security architectures.⁶⁰ As such they are supposed to enhance the

⁵⁸ For further elaboration on conflation of regime security with national security see B. Job, 'The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World', in Job, B (ed.), *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992, pp.11-35.

⁵⁹ See page 43 above.

⁶⁰ See Chapter One, p.18

performance of other PSA components which are mainly focused on response action. This relationship between EWS and security raises the question of whose peace and security they should focus on and by extension what kind of actions constitute threats to security.

Different debates on security have been reviewed in chapter one. The chapter showed that there exist two key perspectives on security. One perspective focuses on state security whereas the other roots for human security.⁶¹ Depending on the perspective adopted by the regional organizations there will be different concerns. An early warning system whose priority is state security will be more concerned with analyzing and reporting threats to state within the traditional understanding of security. In contrast a human security based early warning system will privilege securing of individuals and will incorporate indicators on social, environmental, economic and political, education, health variables.

Indeed taking cognizance of the fact that most EWS systems are founded on state security paradigm and matters of human security are viewed through this prism, that is, they only attract attention if absence of human security poses visible threats to the state, there is increased demand for human security based early warning system. Schnabel has argued that,

'On one hand, threats to the basic human needs of individuals and communities lead to human suffering, social and communal deterioration and thus to violence in its various direct and structural manifestations. On the other hand, individuals and communities feel secure and protected from actual and feared existential threats that emanate from social, political and economic injustices, military violence, environmental disruptions or natural disasters-that is if their basic human security is assured-human suffering on an individual level and conflict on communal, regional and international levels can be significantly reduced.'⁶²

⁶¹ See chapter One, pp.8-12

⁶² A. Schnabel and H. Krummenacher, *Towards a Human Security Based Early Warning and Response System*, Op cit, P.5

The argument for such a human security based approach is pertinent especially when it comes to Africa. This is because threats to peace and security are primarily internal and caused by widespread human insecurity in terms of marginalization, environmental degradation, bad governance, absence of state legitimacy, exclusivist identity based politics as well as other factors which negatively impacts on human collectivities.⁶³ However, the complexity of these sources of insecurities and states inability to solve them have made majority of states very insecure and the only way they can survive is through pursuit of state security irrespective of the impacts of such pursuit on human security. Herein lies the dilemma of Africa's quest for peace and security and this dilemma is yet to be resolved when conceptualizing and establishing conflict early warning and early response structures.

⁶³ M. Ayoob. *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System*. London: Boulder, 1995

CHAPTER THREE

An Overview of Conflict Early Warning Systems in Africa

Introduction

Chapter two has dealt with the issues on conflict early warning systems. It has shown that during the post cold war period the increasing need to address conflicts before they become violent has led to the emergence of a preventive culture. Among the tools of effecting this culture is the conflict early warning system whose goal is to anticipate conflicts through analysis of various indicators and accordingly informing the relevant authorities so that they can initiate response processes. Despite the consensus on the imperative for conflict prevention, early warning systems are faced with a series of issues ranging from their relevance, the predictive capacity, analytical models, linkages with response tools and whether the very act of warning can lead to negative consequences.¹

This chapter provides an overview of conflict early warning systems in Africa, with the exception of Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) early warning system, which is given detailed analysis in chapter four. The overview aims at locating various EWS within the broader structure of Peace and Security Architectures. Additionally it focuses on the thrust of such EWS, their level of development, operations and challenges. This is important for it yields insights which are useful in analysis of IGAD's EWS. It is divided into sections. Section one focuses on Africa's Union EWS. Section two provides an overview of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) EWS while section three focuses on Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) early warning mechanisms. Section four examines the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) early warning tools and section five

¹ See Chapter Two on conceptual analysis of early warning systems.

provides an overview of other early warning systems which are in the nascent stages of development.

The African Union Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)

The international community unwillingness to intervene, proliferation of intra-state violent conflicts and the need for African solutions to African problems occasioned a quest for an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The quest is traceable to the Kampala All Africa Conference on Security and Stability, Development and Cooperation where leaders expressed commitment to overcome the hindrance which had plagued previous continental security operations.² The subsequent, OAU Secretary General Report of 1992,³ led to establishment of a more permanent Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution Mechanism (CPRM) to replace the prior ad hoc ones.

The watershed of establishing APSA was the transformation of the impotent OAU into Africa Union in 2002. The Constitutive Act of African Union (CAAU), 2000 preamble noted that member states 'are conscious of the fact that the scourge of conflict in Africa constitutes major impediments to the socio-economic development of the continent and of the need to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for our development and integration.⁴ To make this goal a reality the APSA sought to address the legal institutional challenges which had shackled its predecessor.

A key legal challenge was the narrow definition of sovereignty which was based on the article II of the UN charter and replicated in the article III of the OAU charter.⁵ The narrow definition

² B. Franke, *Enabling a continent to Help Itself: US Military Capacity Building and Africa's Emerging Security Architecture*, Centre for Contemporary Conflict, 2007, p.5

³ Ibid, p.5

⁴ Preamble, Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2000

⁵ T. Mureithi, *The African Union: Pan-Africanism, Peace Building and Development*. Aldershot: Ashgate publishing, 2005, p.29

treated sovereignty as a right without accompanying responsibilities. Consequently, regimes in power, to use Jackson words, had turned Hobbes inside out, that is, the domestic [became] state of nature and the international the civil society.⁶ As a result, regimes could engage in all manners of excesses and when challenged, hide behind the veil of sovereignty, and non-interference in internal affairs.

CAAU reversed this rigid interpretation through appropriating the right of intervention, demand for respect of democratic principles, rule of law and good governance, and condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of government.⁷ These were and still are the elements which have determined the stability of states in Africa. In addition, the act paved way for the establishment of an elaborate peace and security institutional matrix to carry out its functions, and objectives as outlined in Article 3 on objectives and four on principles.

An Overview of the APSA

APSA is anchored on the Peace and Security Protocol of 2002, which established Peace and Security Council (PSC). The objectives of the PSC include promotion of peace, security, stability, conflict prevention, management, peace building, enhancing of democratic practices and rule of law. Also, it is tasked with promotion of respect for human life, international humanitarian law and establishment of common defence policy.⁸

To carry out its task the PSC has powers to take preventive actions against disputes and policies that may lead to genocide and crimes against humanity, mounting and deployment of peace support missions and developing their mandates. Further it is authorized to sanction humanitarian intervention, institute sanctions whenever there is unconstitutional change of

⁶ Cited in, J. Glenn, 'The Interregnum: The South Insecurity Dilemma', *Nations and Nationalisms*, 3 (1), 1992, pp.45 – 63:48

⁷ See article IV of the Constitutive Act of the African Union.

⁸ See Article 3, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 9th July, 2002.

government, implement common defense policy and coordinate sub-regional and extra-continental peace and security cooperation.⁹

To achieve its mandate the PSC has a set of institutions. These include the Commission, Secretariat, Panel of Wise, Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), Africa Standby Force (ASF) and Military Staff Committee (MSC).¹⁰ Among the institutions set, the CEWs and ASF are the most important innovations. The CEWs are required to gather and process information on conflict indicators and relay the same to the PSC situation room for policy actions. To achieve this task CEW is linked to regional and national conflict early warning mechanisms.¹¹ The Africa Standby Force (ASF) which is a multinational force, constituting of six brigades, five based at sub-regional level, and the sixth one at Addis Ababa, are mandated to undertake observation and monitoring missions, humanitarian intervention, post-conflict peace building and other functions as it may be assigned.¹²

Further, to streamline continental operations PSC protocol identifies sub-regional organizations as key pillars in the overall peace and security architecture. These organizations are expected to coordinate their actions in line with objectives and principles of the African Union. Further, member states are required to release standby brigades immediately upon request by the commission, and avail all forms of assistance and support required for maintenance of peace, security and stability.¹³

In addition to Peace and Security Council, other initiatives which constitutes APSA include New Africa's Partnership for Development (NEPAD) and the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSF). The NEPAD was established during Abuja summit of October 2001 and

⁹ Ibid, Article 7

¹⁰ Ibid, Articles, 10, 11, 12 and 13

¹¹ Ibid, Article 12.

¹² Ibid, Article 13(3)

¹³ Ibid, Articles 13(17) and 16

adopted by the 37th OAU Lusaka summit as the integrated socio-economic development programme to accelerate Africa's renewal.¹⁴ NEPAD has strong peace and security components based on enhanced economic cooperation development and political and economic governance. In its recognition of the importance of peace, security and stability as a precursor for sustainable development, section 49 of NEPAD framework calls upon leaders to strengthen mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution at sub-regional and continental level. Further, it requires the leaders to promote democracy and human rights in their respective countries by developing clear standards of accountability, transparent and participatory governance at national and sub-national levels. To promote good governance, NEPAD establishes Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) whereby countries voluntarily 'open their books' to be examined within a formal structure according to NEPAD's guidelines.¹⁵

The other key pillar of APSA is CADSF. CADSF was adopted in 2004, and constitutes an overarching policy framework which integrates Africa Union peace and security organs. It identifies the building blocks of ASPA as including AU's peace and Security institutions and several sub-regional organisations. These are ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC, EAC, CENSAD, Arab Maghreb Union and COMESA.¹⁶

CADSF was a transformative idea especially in its conceptualization of security. This is because it integrated both state and human security concerns. Also, it elaborated such concerns along external and internal dimensions, which is recognition of the dominance of domestic security threats to African states. Importantly, it provided a systemic approach to peace and security in Africa by stating that the security of African states is inextricably linked to other states, hence

¹⁴ See NEPAD Framework, October, 2001.

¹⁵ A. Kajee, 'NEPAD's APRM: A Progress Report, Practical Limitations and Challenges', *SA Yearbook of International Affairs*, 2003/04, p.243

¹⁶ See Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy, February, 2004, Section 26.

indivisible.¹⁷ Equally important, it defined sovereignty both as a right and responsibility and grants the AU right to intervene in cases where weak states are unable to protect the citizens from war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. In addition, AU has a right to intervene to protect a legitimate government and restore peace and stability in relevant state.¹⁸

The APSA is conceptualized as a collective security and early warning arrangement with a mandate for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The continental early warning system is tasked with anticipating and preventing system conflicts through gathering and analysing information with a goal of enabling the chairperson of AU commission, the PSC and other actors in the PSA to prevent conflict in a timely manner. To enable CEW's continental reach, it is structurally linked to sub-regional EWS. Article 16 of the PSC protocol identifies observation and monitoring units of the regional mechanisms as integral part of CEW. The mechanisms are tasked with collecting and processing data at sub-regional level and transmitting the same to CEW's situation room located in Addis Ababa.¹⁹

The CEW was established by PSC protocol article 12, with responsibilities for anticipation and prevention of conflicts in Africa working in concert with regional organisations. CEW's is linked to sub-regional organisations EWS. The sub regional organisations are IGAD, ECOWAS, Common Market of Eastern and South African states (COMESA), Community of Sahel and Saharan states (CEN-SAD), Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and ECCAS.

The CEW is deeply rooted in human security paradigm. However, despite this progressive move, CEW has adapted a narrow definition of human security noting that local disturbances can be

¹⁷ Ibid. See, Articles 6-10 or pp.4- 6.

¹⁸ Ibid. Article 11.

¹⁹ U. Engel and J. G. Porto, 'Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture', in Ungel U and Porto J. G. (eds) *Africa's New Peace and Security architecture: Promoting Norms, Institutionalising Solutions*. Surrey: West Gate publishing, 2010, p.9

managed by local agencies and attention should be brought to bear only when casualties are outrageous. Hence, it is observable that, CEW focus only on one facet of human security, that is, freedom from fear, leaving out freedom from want, yet it is want in terms of poverty and marginalisation which often act as root causes of violence.²⁰

Despite the stated intention of CEW it is operationally faced by lack of cooperation from member states. Nhema has argued that the bottom line is that in Africa the key early warning indicators for intra-state conflict and regional instability in Africa are abuse of power, ethnic politics, exclusionary practices, human rights violations, bad governance and institutional corruption. These indicators are related to decision making ability and political willingness of member states to address them. Unless there is a move towards addressing them, CEWS will remain unsuccessful.²¹ It will only be generating early warnings, without matching them with appropriate response.

The challenge is further exacerbated by lack of functional governments in many African states. Since states are the building blocks of any continental effort, their internal incapacity is reflected in AU institutions. Reflecting on this weakness Cilliers has rightly pointed out that no amount of tinkering at continental level can ultimately compensate for the absence of functional governance at national, provincial and local levels.²² Also, as long as states are not willing to uphold the protocols passed by the AU on peace and security, the effort of establishing CEW cannot succeed.

²⁰ See African Union, *Report on Meeting the Challenges of Conflict Prevention in Africa-Towards the Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System*, South Africa, Kempton Park, 2006, p.9

²¹ A.G. Nhema et al, *The Resolution of African Conflicts: The Management of Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Reconstruction*. Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2008

²² J. Cilliers, 2004, p.18, cited in C. MacAulay and T. Karbo, 'Up to the Task? Assessing the Ability of ECCAS to Protect Human Security in Central Africa' in Ayangafac C(ed), *Political Economy of Regionalisation in Central Africa*. Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2008, p.161

The other challenge of CEW is absence of EWS harmonization, as well as institutionalization of the same in various regions, yet sub-regional EWs have been identified as key pillars of CEWS.²³ Harmonization is important since there is a need to have an agreed model of analysis, equal levels of sub-region EWS institutionalization and rationalization of response mechanisms in terms of tools and the most appropriate actor for implementing the response. In key regions such as central and Northern Africa, EWs are inoperational. In regions where they have put in place, they lack effective linkages with CEWS despite having, memorandum of understanding between AU and Sub-regional organisations on peace and security cooperation.

Further AU is hampered in its response capacities. In the conceptualization of CEW, the AU views it not as a tool for merely early warning but a part of an integrated system which incorporates conflict prevention, peace support operations, reconstruction and developmental agenda.²⁴ However, currently it does not have the resources to undertake these functions especially those which require huge financial, technological and human resources such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement and post-conflict reconstruction. Also member states are suspicious of any interference in their internal affairs even in situations where the AU protocols allow and often national and historical ties, inter-state regime relations and sympathies, fear that involvement in one state will set a precedent for future interventions have made consensus on responses impossible²⁵.

Significantly when it comes to data collection and analysis, the CEWS situation room receives insufficient real-time diplomatic reporting and intelligence. The AU lacks its own network of

²³ AU Conflict Management Division, *Framework of the Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning system*. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2008(a), p.51

²⁴ Africa Union, *AU Report on Meeting the Challenges of Conflict Prevention in Africa-Towards Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System*. Kempton Park, South Africa, 2006

²⁵ P.D. Williams, *The Africa Union's Conflict Management Capabilities*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Working Paper, October, 2011, P.5

embassies and political offices for information gathering. Moreover, senior and mid-level leadership cannot easily access national and supranational intelligence sources, forcing them to rely mostly on open-source journalism or whatever African leaders choose to share. Also it does not have adequate, diverse and well trained staff to undertake early warning activities. For instance the situation room in Addis Ababa has only one analyst who is supposed to timely process all the information coming through. This is a key challenge because if the CEWS is to have a real impact on conflict dynamics, it must be able to detect risks and crises at the very early stages. Also some member states have actually requested that the commission not report on events affecting them, in effect, asking the commission to “turn off” the CEWS when embarrassing situations arise.²⁶ As such the information gathered becomes irrelevant since the source state is unwilling to have it discussed by the AU.

The other challenge facing the CEWS is the difficulty of analyzing information and using it to influence decision-making within the PSC. For example, CEWS personnel were unable to generate early discussions within the PSC on the crisis surrounding the Kenyan elections in 2007 or instability in Guinea-Bissau in late 2008. The failure is because the CEWS faces a delicate balancing act: it is mandated to provide information rather than explicitly engage in analysis and steer the PSC policymaking process.²⁷

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

ECOWAS was founded by 15 West African states in 1975. Its goal at the time was to pursue market integration. However, in the wake of post-cold war conflicts in the region coupled with their transnational nature, ECOWAS was compelled to pay increasing attention to peace and

²⁶ Ibid, p.9

²⁷ Ibid, p.10

security matters. Initially, this was done on ad-hoc basis, since it lacked a dedicated PSA.²⁸ In the face of increased instabilities in West African region, ECOWAS Constitutive Protocol was revised in 1993. The chapter two of the revised protocol, Article 4 established the mandate for maintenance of regional peace, stability and security through the promotion and strengthening of good neighbourliness.

Though this shift indicated intention to deal with peace and security issues, it was not followed by a specific protocol addressing how to implement the mandate. The situation remained that way until 1999, when the *Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security* was adopted.²⁹ The protocol was further reinforced by the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Governance which elaborated an institutionalized peace and security architecture.³⁰

The PSA included Council of the Wise, Special Mediators, Office of the Special Representative, the Security Council, Chiefs of Defence of Staff, the Executive Secretariat (Commission), Council of Elders, ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Mechanism ECOWARN). All this organs are functionally linked, in order to have a seamless early warning and response capabilities.

Structurally, ECOWARN is geographically divided into four zones each making an Observation and Monitoring Zone (OMZ) Under the OMZ are zonal bureaux each focusing on a single state. The OMZ are linked to Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC) located at the ECOWAS commission in Abuja, Nigeria. The first OMZ located in Banjul (Gambia) and covers Cape-Verde, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau. The Ouagadougou OMZ (located in Burkina Faso) covers

²⁸ H. Wolf and T. Debiel, *Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanisms*, op cit, p 16.

²⁹ Ibid, p.16

³⁰ J. M. Opoku, *West African Early Warning and Early Response System: The Role of the Civil Society Organizations*: Accra: KAIPTC, Paper No. 19, 2007, p.5.

Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali and Niger. The third OMZ headquartered in Cotonou (Benin) mentors Benin, Nigeria and Togo. The fourth OMZ situated in Monrovia (Liberia) covers Liberia, Ghana, Guinea and Sierra Leone.³¹

ECOWARN strongly focuses on human security and enjoys strong civil society participation. Under the umbrella CSO networks West African Civil Society Forum (WASCOF) and the Civil Africa Civil Society Forum (WASCOF), civil society groups actively participate in the system. Indeed every zonal bureau is manned by an ECOWARN official and another one from the civil society. The strong civil society involvement was institutionalised through the 2008 Conflict Prevention Framework, whose goal was to provide a mechanism for multi-stakeholders cooperation in the ground in order to prevent conflict and enable peace building. The active CSO participation has allowed for a bottom approach to early warning, strong focus on human security as well as having an open and transparent early warning system.³²

A key point of strength for ECOWARN is its strong response capacity. Indeed, in terms of response, ECOWAS scores highly relative to other sub-regional organisations. This is done through mediation or militarily. Military ECOMOG intervention has helped in stabilising Liberia and Sierra Leone where there were civil wars reverse coups in Guinea-Bissau (2003), Togo (2005), and reject electoral manipulation in Ivory Coast (2011). Also through ECOWAS mediation, more than a dozen peace agreements have been signed ending destructive wars.³³

Further, ECOWARN as a component of ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture derives hegemonic benefits which have enhanced its capacity. It has been observed that the presence of

³¹ See details on <http://www.wanep.org/programs>

³² J.M. Opoku, *West African Early Warning and Early Response System*, op cit, p.11

³³ See ECOWAS, *ECOWAS Workshop: Lessons from ECOWAS Peacekeeping Operations, 1990-2004*, p.15

hegemony is critical for it provides state organisations with resources needed for action.³⁴ In ECOWAS sub-region, Nigeria has actively played a hegemonic role which explains the regional response capacity. For instance, it provided the bulk of troops and resources during the military interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone.³⁵ In absence of such involvement by Nigeria, ECOWAS would not have managed to intervene in these conflicts.

Despite the success, ECOWARN is faced by a number of challenges. The first challenge regards regional coverage. Though the OMZs have covered the whole region, coverage is shallow and sporadic, both in terms of information collection and analysis. Each country has two monitors (one governmental and one civil (society) to monitor vast and often inaccessible areas as well as complex issues. Secondly, despite focusing on human security, ECOWAS response mechanism and institutional culture is largely pre-disposed to macro level and reactive responses as opposed to proactive conflict prevention.³⁶

The other key challenge lies in the fact that ECOWAS lacks a supranational mandate limiting its intervention and ability to deal with large states even when they do not conform to the provisions of protocols they have ratified.³⁷ For instance ECOWAS does not have the capacity to intervene in Nigeria even where there is a violation of principles and norms. The lack of supranational powers poses a foundational challenge. This is because, the formation of regional arrangements require that regional institutions be developed in a manner which allows subordination of states to the regional organisations which they are members. In absence of this subordination, such

³⁴ B. Moller, *The Pros and Cons of Subsidiarity: The Role of African Regional and Sub-regional Organisations in Ensuing Peace and Security in Africa*. Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Studies, Working paper, No.2005-4, pp.39-40

³⁵ Nigeria provided the bulk of ECOMOG forces in Liberia and Sierra Leone missions. Also it financed the operations up to 8 billion US dollars. See A. Adedeji, 'ECOWAS: A Retrospective Journey' in Adebajo A, and Rashid, I. *West Africa Security Challenges: Building Peace in Troubled Region*. London: Lynne Rienner, 2004, p.45

³⁶ D. Nyeihm, *The Global Balance Sheet: Emerging Security Threats and Multilateral Capabilities*. Stanley Foundation, 2009, p.5

³⁷ A. Musah, 'ECOWAS and Regional Response to Conflict', in Jaye T. And Amadi S (eds), *ECOWAS and Dynamics of Conflict and Peace Building*. Dakar: Codesria, 2008, p.204.

organisations are left without policy making capacity, being merely administrative institutions.³⁸ Another challenge concerns lack of political will to effect response. Member states have divergent political calculations making consensus on the appropriate response hard to achieve. As a result, ECOWARN has been unable to initiate systemic early response, often moving into action when conflicts have turned violent.³⁹ The lack of political will is further compounded by extra-regional involvement especially by France. Under ECOWAS, there are former French colonies, which are viewed by France as its sphere of influence. In such states, France involvement is strong, leading to tension between Anglophone countries led by Nigeria and Francophone ones supported by France. Often, the Francophone states look up to France for direction, the expense of ECOWAS when it comes to dealing with peace and security issues.⁴⁰ Finally, the early warning personnel lack the requisite skills to monitor, analyse, catalogue and prepare reports for policy makers.

Southern African Development Community (SADC)

SADC was formed in April, 1980 in Lusaka, Zambia through the adoption of the Lusaka Declaration titled: Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation. Initially it was named South Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and was made up of nine members. Following the independence of Namibia, it was transformed into SADC through the adoption of the Treaty of the South Africa Development Community in 1992. Since then the membership has expanded from the original members ((Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland,

³⁸ H.D. Hansohm, 'Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa', *South Africa Yearbook*, Vol 5, 2005, p.116

³⁹ J.M. Opoku, *op cit*, p.19

⁴⁰ S. Ulriksen, 'Regional Conflict Formations in West and Central Africa', in Harpiviken K. B. (ed), *Troubled Regions and Failing States: The Clustering and Contagion of Armed Conflict*. Birghley: Emerald Group Publishing 2010, p.357

Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) to include Namibia (1995), Mauritius (1995), Democratic Republic of Congo (1997), Madagascar (2005), Seychelles (2007) and Angola.⁴¹

The SADC peace and security architecture is traceable to the Protocol of 1992 which identified promotion of common values system and institutions and the defence of peace and security among its mandate.⁴² This intention was elaborated by the SADC Security Organs Protocol: *The Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security*. This Protocol is founded on democratic peace thesis that democracies seldom if ever go to war with each other and are less likely to experience enduring internal conflict.⁴³

The implementation of the Organ protocol is guided by the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) which was launched in 1996, with a goal of playing the vanguard role as a part of the institutional framework for promoting and maintaining defence, state security, public security and institutional framework for the daily implementation of the organ's objectives.⁴⁴ To further enhance this role, SIPO is reinforced by the Southern Africa Defence Pact of 2004, which directs the implementation of the organ protocol.

The organ is tasked with *inter alia* promoting regional cooperation on matters related to defence and security, preventing, containing and resolving inter and intra-state conflict by peaceful means, enforcement action as a matter of last resort only with authorisation of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), promoting cooperation between police and state security services, promotion of human rights, encouraging implementation of the UN treaties on arms control,

⁴¹ A. Dithlake. *SADC Status Report*. Pretoria: Southern Africa Development Community Council of Non-governmental Organizations, 2008, p.2

⁴² SADC protocol 1992, Articles 5:1 b and c

⁴³ C. Cawthra, 'Key Challenges to Southern African Development Community', in Kaunda. J.M (eds), *Proceedings of the 2006 FOPRISA Annual Conference*, Gaborone, 2007, p.101

⁴⁴ A. Dithlake. *SADC Status Report*, op cit, p.16

disarmament and peaceful relations between states and developing of peace keeping capabilities.⁴⁵

Structurally, the security organ operates at Summit level (Head of state) as well as at ministerial level (from each country a number of ministers are involved, for example foreign affairs, defence, police, intelligence and home affairs). Under the ministerial level are two committees which are required to make key decisions on peace and security. These are: Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) and the less active Interstate Politics and Defence Committee (IPDC). The organs are serviced and supported by Directorate of Politics, Defence and Security at SADC secretariat in Gaborone, Botswana.⁴⁶

Among the mechanisms available to the organ is the conflict early warning system. The Organ protocol provides for the establishment of 'an early warning system in order to facilitate timely action to prevent the outbreak and escalation of conflict.⁴⁷ It has national early warning centres in each member state and a regional early warning centre in Botswana. To realise the goal of EWs, SIPO, which is the strategic implementation guide, identifies three main activities of the early warning system. These are: Identification of potential early warning signs of interstate and intra-state conflicts, monitoring regional security situation and exchange of information of interest

One main unique feature of SADC early warning system is that, unlike other sub-regional EWS in Africa, it operates as a closed system. It relies on the traditional state intelligence agencies to create an integrated system of regional intelligence communities. This operationalisation is in contrast to the ideal way EWS should operate, that is, as open sources of information, characterised by information sharing, involvement of other non-state actors, and including the

⁴⁵ SIPO, 2001, Article 2

⁴⁶ A. Dithake, *SADC Status Report*, op cit, p.11

⁴⁷ SADC Organ Protocol, Article 11 (3) (b)

target population as has been the case with ECOWARN.⁴⁸ Additionally, the information generated is classified meaning that, it is only accessible to state agencies and is solely for serving state policy.

Related to its closed nature, is the fact that despite whatever intentions SADC organ has on human security issues, the reliance on intelligence community has made the EWS focus on state security only. This is because intelligence agencies are set up to serve State's interest.⁴⁹ The focus overlooks the fact that, as Nkwane has stated, South Africa's prospects for peace has more to do with non-militarised threats especially the questions of social-economic dimensions of democratic question.⁵⁰ This is because the region is characterised by high levels of poverty, ravages of past civil wars and unequal access to economic resources within the states.

More so, the reliance on intelligence community has denied EWS intellectual rigour, knowledge and information which can be readily availed by experts and civil society organisations. Adebajo has argued that SADC has kept a distance from the civil society, with the ironic results that a sub-region with world class security institutions does not reap the readily available knowledge.⁵¹ Also such distancing denies the early warning local roots since most of the citizens are not aware of what is happening. Ultimately, the early warning is like a regionalised spying agency. This is a serious omission considering that in most of these states, civil society groups have more intensive interactions with local communities and hence are well versed with local contexts, issues and dynamics which if harnessed can lead to a more robust conflict prevention regime.

⁴⁸ J. Cilliers, *Towards a Continental Early Warning System*. Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2005, p.1.

⁴⁹ A. Hammerstand, '*Defending the State or Protecting the People: SADC Security Integration at Cross Roads*', South Africa Institute of International Affairs, 2003, Report No.39, p.6

⁵⁰ T. Nkwane, 'The Quest of Good Governance' in Bareguru I et al (ed), *From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Growing Security Challenges*. London: Boulder, 2003, p.55.

⁵¹ A. Adebajo, 'ECOWAS and the SADC: A Tale of Two Invalids', *City Press*, 22nd May, 2005, p.26

Apart from its closed and state-centric nature, SADC EWS is faced by a number of challenges which reflects the fundamental weakness of SADC's organisational operations. The main challenge is divergence on the norms and values which SADC should uphold. Nathan has observed that the apparent absence of common values has led to the failure of the SADC common security project. This is because member states do not have a consensus on what kind of security EWS should focus on. On one hand states especially South Africa, Botswana and Mozambique have favoured a more comprehensive approach rooted on the need to address human security challenges, and rooted in preventive culture. On the other hand, states such as Angola and Zimbabwe have favoured a more traditional state centric approach where threats are viewed as external and militarised.⁵²

Another fundamental challenge lies in the weak implementation capacity of treaties and protocols ratified by members. According to Hammerstand, since 1992, the gap between protocols signed and their implementation is big and widening creating credibility problems for the organisation. The problem is exacerbated by presence of weak states which politically are often too inward gazing and immersed in their internal problems to the extent that, they hardly have time resources to spare for regional projects.⁵³

In the face of state weakness, regional organisations can play a role of assisting the state to implement the commitments they enter into and in the process, strengthen them. For instance, through implementation of protocols on human rights, good governance and transparent electoral process, states can become more legitimate in the eyes of the citizens. However, to achieve this goal, sub-regional organizations need to be given supranational competencies. This requirement has been denied for SADC. The constitutive treaty is based on sovereign equality-whereby

⁵² L. Nathan, *The Absence of Common Values and the Failure of Common Security in Southern Africa, 1992 – 2005*. London: Crisis States Program, Working paper No 50, 2004.

⁵³ A. Hammerstand, *Defending the State or Protecting the People*, op ct, p.27

sovereignty is understood in the traditional sense of non-interference in internal affairs of others – and inter-governmental rather than supranational processes. As a result, SADC security organs operations is at best administrative and implementation one with no political decision making power.⁵⁴

Also state weakness has made intervention in internal affairs of member states difficult to the extent that SADC has shied away from even publicly denouncing governance failures and human rights violation in member states. Often when such states are criticised internationally, SADC members tend to close rank in condemning such criticism on the ground that it reflects western neo-colonialism impulses.⁵⁵ This unified response reflects the reality of African states whereby juridical sovereignty is their main source of survival and as such protects it jealously.

Finally, the culture of conflict prevention has been lacklustre at regional level often because of serious divisions on the appropriate responses to crisis and conflicts and historical sympathies. For instance during the Madagascar crisis of 2009, when the President Ravalomana government was overthrown by the military in support of Rajoelina, SADC's initial response was to reject the unconstitutional change of government. At that stage, it was even considering sending the SADC brigade (SADCBRIG) for military operations aimed at restoring constitutional order. However in the face of stiff opposition especially from the authoritarian monarchy of Swaziland which was even offering military support to coup plotters, SADC backed down and overtime 'accepted' the unconstitutional take over government.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ A. V. Nieuwerk, 'Organizational Dimensions of Security Cooperation in the Southern Africa Development Community', in Kaunda J.M. (eds) *Proceedings of the 2006 FOPRISA Annual conference*, op cit, p.118

⁵⁵ C. Cawthra, 'Key Challenges to SADC Security Cooperation', in Kaunda J. M. (eds), *Proceedings of the 2006 FOPRISA Annual Conference*, op cit, p.107

⁵⁶ C. Cawthra, *The Role of SADC in Managing Political Crisis and Conflict: The Case of Madagascar and Zimbabwe*. Maputo: Friedrich-Stiftung, 2010, pp.21 – 22

In Zimbabwe, since 2000, when the government of Mugabe forcefully seized white owned farms, the response has been dismal. At the beginning, SADC responded by congratulating Mugabe's government on the success of land redistribution, and was silent on issues of gross human rights violations and respect of private property. Further, it adopted a bystander stance, often arguing that Zimbabwe's problem should be handled internally and in the face of severe criticism by the international community, SADC amplified Mugabe's claim that such criticism reflected neo-colonial tendencies by the west. It was not until 2008 that SADC became involved in mediating the conflict. Ironically, the involvement was not a regional initiative but came after the AU directed SADC to mediate during the 2008 Sharm el-Sheik summit.⁵⁷ By the time of intervention, Zimbabwe had transformed from South Africa's breadbasket to a basket case, whereby at some stage, almost half of the population had migrated to other states, leading to crisis in South Africa and Botswana.

Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)

ECCAS was established in early 1980s as a part of the continental project arising out of the then OAU's Lagos plan of action in order to prepare regional levels for continental wide integration. However since its inception it remained largely dormant especially during the 1992 – 1998 period when it had literally closed shop.⁵⁸ In the face of major crisis in a region which has remained highly conflictual with wars in the D. R. Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Central African Republic, and Chad, the organisation was revived in 1998 with a goal of addressing regionalized security threats. During the Yaoundé summit on 25 – 26th February, 1999, ECCAS member states decided to create an organization for the promotion and consolidation of peace

⁵⁷ Ibid, pp.25-29

⁵⁸ A. Meyer, *Peace and Security Cooperation in Central Africa: Assessment and Perspectives 10 years After Revival*. Gent: Academia Press, 2008. p.9

and security in the region. The organisation was named Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX), which constituted ECCAS' peace and security architecture.⁵⁹

COPAX was established in 2002 summit with the following organs. The Council of Peace and Security (Counseil de Paix et de securite de l'Afrique centrale (Copax)). Under Copax, various organs were instituted. The organs are: Commission pour la defence (Defence and Security Commission), Force Multinationale de l'Afrique Centrale (Multinational Force of Central Africa (Fomuc) and an early warning system Mecansime de'alerte Rapide pour l'Afrique Centrale (MARAC). Operationally MARAC and FOMUC are the main instruments of peace and security supported by the political and diplomatic action which was set up in 2007 to enhance crisis and conflict prevention in the region.⁶⁰

Under the MARAC protocol, the early warning was mandated to collect and analyse data for early detection and prevention of crisis. This was to be achieved through a network of offices, a staff of inter disciplinary experts and situation room for data collection and analysis in order to prevent crisis and conflicts.⁶¹ However, despite the stated goals, MARAC, similar to other organs of ECCAS is largely at its nascent stage. It is yet to set up offices and structures beyond the regional observation centre and has not concluded on developing of early warning indicators and models.⁶² Once fully operational, MARAC will be similar to ECOWARN and CEWARN.

The operational nature of MARAC is a reflection of the overall multiple weakness of ECCAS as an organisation. Firstly, ECCAS as an organisation has been driven more by external actors whether AU, Western States or United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)

⁵⁹ ECCAS website, www.ceac.org

⁶⁰ C.G. Awoumou, 'ECCAS or CEMAC, Why Regional Economic Community for Central Africa', in Ayangafac C(ed), *Political Economy of Regionalisation in Central Africa*. Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2008, pp.110-135

⁶¹ J. Cilliers, *Towards a Continental Early Warning System for Africa*, op cit, p.8

⁶² S. Ntalunga 'ECCAS Peace and Security Architecture', Accessed at www.ceaac.org

rather than commitment by member states to make it work. Indeed ECCAS remains the most donor dependent sub-regional organisation with members failing to avail their contributions. As a result, it has become a captive of non-regional interests. Meyer has argued that this dependency especially on France defeats the whole notion of African ownership and provides such donors with an opening to manipulate operations of ECCAS to suit their interests. Such manipulation raises the question of not only whose interests does Copax serve but also how effective can it pursue objectives of regional peace and security.⁶³

Secondly, the majority of member states have witnessed violent conflicts in the last two decades. As a result most of them are still recovering from the ravages of the conflict, making them extremely weak. Truism in weak states leads to weak regional organisation, and no amount of tinkering at regional level can ultimately compensate for the absence of functional government at national levels. Consequently, ECCAS operations have been at best minimal since member states are more pre-occupied with addressing internal insecurities rather than focus on regional common security goal.⁶⁴

Thirdly, the regional international relations are marked by mistrust, suspicion and xenophobia borne out of experience. In Central Africa, member states have often been a part of their neighbour's problems, as evidenced by higher degree of activist and interventionist foreign policies adopted by states in region. For instance, Chad has fuelled insecurity in Central Africa Republic while Angola, Rwanda and Republic of Congo have in various occasions intervened in D.R. Congo. The outcome has been that neighbours are conflict generators often disregarding the

⁶³ A. Meyer, *Peace and Security Cooperation in Central Africa: Development Prospects and Challenges*. Uppsala: Nordiska: African Institute, 2011, p.28

⁶⁴ C. MacOulay and T. Karbo, 'Up to The Task? Assessing the Ability of ECCAS to Protect Human Security in Central Africa', in Anyagafac C (eds), *Political Economy of Regionalisation in Central Africa*, op cit, pp.160 – 162

territorial integrity of states.⁶⁵ Considering that the two main basic conditions – mutual trust and common values – must be present if security integration is to take off, it is observable that there are no prospects of a working PSA and by extension early warning system in the ECCAS region in the near future.⁶⁶

Fourthly, at leadership levels, especially at the head of states and government, there is a lot of animosity and rivalries making cooperation impossible, even if other challenges were absent. Importantly, where cooperation takes place it is often driven by self serving interests often geared towards survival rather than realisation on a regional security project. For instance during the year 2001 – 2003, FOMUC was deployed in Central Africa Republic to protect the regime of Ange-Felix Patasse after an attempted coup. However, in March 2003, Patasse was overthrown despite the presence of FOMUC troops. Later, it emerged that FOMUC which ideally was expected to undertake a regional mandate, had been instructed not to intervene by Chad which was the main contributor of the troops. This move was informed by Chad's president Idris Derby desire to remove Patasse from power. Indeed, he had actively supported General Francoil Bozize the coup plotter, in effect undermining the ECCAS goal of protecting the regime of Patasse.⁶⁷ Fifthly, ECCAS suffers from severe human resource shortage. Since its revival in 1998, it had only 20 staff members in 2010. Regarding MARAC, by the same period only the position of the regional observation director had been filled. Without support staff and field officers, there is nothing much the director can do, since EWS requires data collectors, analysts and other types of staff.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Y.A. Choula, 'Regional Relations and Conflict Situations in Central Africa', in Ayanafac C (ed), Ibid, pp.155 – 175

⁶⁶ See A. Meyer, *Peace and Security Cooperation in Central Africa*, op cit, p.28

⁶⁷ A. Meyer, Ibid, p.21

⁶⁸ S. Ntahuga (Director of MARAC), *ECCAS Peace and security Architecture*, op cit

Despite the challenges, Copax has made some progress especially in elections observations. Considering that elections have emerged as a key cause of violent conflicts in Africa, the move is timely. It has supervised elections in D. R. Congo (2006), Gabon (2005) and Republic of Congo (2007).⁶⁹ Additionally, though the motivations might be contrary to regional security goals, ECCAS has managed to deploy FOMUC in the region and has made progress in transforming it into a regional brigade. However, in absence of early warning and early prevention culture and systems, ECCAS remains incapacitated.

Other Sub-Regional Early Warning Systems

The chapter has so far provided an overview of the main sub-regional early warning systems in Africa. It shows that sub- regions have operationalised such systems, albeit being at different stages of development. This sub-section provides an overview of other sub-regional organisations and the progress they have made within the broader framework of sub-regional peace and security architectures.

Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

COMESA was founded in 1993 as a successor of the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA) which was established in 1981. The succession reflected institutional progress since the goal was to establish a common market ten years after the entry into force of the PTA treaty. Initially COMESA was primarily focused on regional economic integration but increased recognition that peace, security and stability are basic factors for providing investment, development, trade and regional economic integration, has seen COMESA acquire peace and security competencies.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ E. Fanta, *The Capacity of Regional Organization in Peace and Security*. A paper presented at ERD workshop: Transforming Political Structures: Security, Institutions and Regional Integration Mechanisms, Florence, 16th – 17th April, 2009, p.20

⁷⁰ See COMESA profile. Available at www.comesa.int

In response to this need for peace and security, COMESA started preparations for a PSA in 1999 during a meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee with an exploratory program on how COMESA can be directly engaged in peace and security issues.⁷¹ In a follow up meeting held in Nairobi, the same year, a decision for establishing formal structures and modalities for peace and security engagement was initiated under article 3 (d) of COMESA treaty.

Since then COMESA has managed to set up a conflict early warning system though it is at initial stages. In June, 2009, COMESA launched its early warning system – COMWARN - whose goal is to respond to conflict prevention through preventive diplomacy focussing on structural factors of conflicts. The entry point of COMWARN is addressing of structural vulnerabilities by targeting the root causes of conflicts within COMESA with special focus on factors leading to war economies. To do so COMWARN will utilize strategic conflict analysis methodology and working in concert with other sub-regional organisations initiate responses.⁷²

Currently, it is not possible to evaluate the performance of COMWARN since it is still at developmental stage. Various conferences have been held with a goal of developing a comprehensive early warning and analysis system capable of identifying the conditions, processes and actors that cause the eruption, escalation and persistence of conflicts. Towards this end, COMESA has actively involved the civil society, and this involvement is expected to lead to a more comprehensive human security conflict early warning system.⁷³

The main challenge which COMWARN may face is the fact that most COMESA members belong to other sub-regional organisations with EWS. For instance Kenya is a member of CEWARN and COMWARN; it is going to be a member of East African Community (EAC) and the Community of Sahel-Saharan state (CEN-SAD) early warning systems. This situation is

⁷¹ Ibid

⁷² COMESA Peace and Security Program. Accessed at <http://programmes.comesa.int/>

⁷³ United Nations Security Council Document S/20/01/694.30th December, 2010

unsustainable considering that, one of the recurring challenge facing PSAs and their components is lack of resources. As such multiple membership means that states will stretch their resources thin, yet the activities of COMWARN are duplicative of what EWs are already doing. Further, states are bound to show more commitment to EWS which they already belong to, leading to lack of support for COMESA.

Further, COMWARN is bound to be faced by the challenges arising out of diversity of its member states. For instance, how capable is COMWARN in overcoming the challenges of extreme state weakness and mutual suspicions in Central Africa or how will it harmonize its open source system with a closed one such as SADC's regional early warning system.

Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)

AMU was founded in 1989 in Marrakesh. Its members include Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Mauritania. Though AMU is made up of states with strong resources base, with exception of Mauritania, little progress has been made due to political differences, especially between Morocco and Algeria. According to Engel and Porto, AMU's PSA organs are embryonic at best.⁷⁴ Considering the ongoing political crisis in the region, whereby Libya is gripped by civil war, Tunisia has gone through a popular revolution, Algeria is recovering from a bloody civil war and Mauritania is witnessing sub-national challenges from the marginalized indigenous communities and the Morocco monarchy is feeling threatened by ongoing revolutions, the situation is bound to remain that way. This is because internally insecure states are inward focussing and views neighbours as potential sources of threats, making cooperation difficult. Importantly, AMU members such as Morocco have withdrawn from AU, while all the members are bound to have more attachment to the Arab league, relative to AU.

⁷⁴ U. Engel and J. G. Porto, 'Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture; An Introduction,' in Engel U and Porto J. G. (eds), *Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture*, op cit, p.11

Community of Sahel – Saharan States (CEN-SAD)

CENSAD is the youngest sub-regional organisation which was established in 1998. Arguably, it is the largest in Africa considering its geographical and demographic coverage. Geographically, it covers about 45 percent of Africa's continent. Demographically it has an estimated population of five hundred and twenty seven million which constitutes more than 50 percent of Africa's population. Additionally, it has 28 member states stretching from Red-sea to Atlantic Ocean.⁷⁵

On 2004, CEN-SAD adopted a conflict management and resolution mechanism for the purpose of promoting peace and security in the Sahel-Saharan community. The protocol established a PSA made up of the following organs: Meeting of leaders and head of states, Sahel-Saharan Council for Peace and Security, meeting of Ministers, meeting of Ambassadors, General Secretariat, military staff, Defence and Security committee, the Sahel-Saharan Intervention Force, Conflict Prevention, Surveillance and Response system.⁷⁶

CEN-SAD has not made much progress on operationalisation of these organs, though it has deployed the intervention force along Chad/Sudan border. However the force did not have much impact. Regarding the establishment of conflict prevention, surveillance and Response system, CEN-SSAD has held preparatory meetings.⁷⁷ The last one was held in 2010 with a goal of analysing the AU Peace and Security Protocols and how they can guide the development of early warning System in CEN-SAD sub-region.

East African Community (EAC)

EAC is a relatively young Sub-regional Organization with very old roots, having been existence until 1977 when it collapsed due to disagreements among the then member states (Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya). EAC was revived in 1993 when these states signed an agreement to

⁷⁵ See CEN-SAD profile at <http://www.ame-global.com/ame/en/area-cen-sad>

⁷⁶ Ibid

⁷⁷ CEN-SAD Hold a Summit in May, 2010. Accessed at www.uneca.org/cen-sad/nigeria.htm

establish a Permanent Tripartite Commission for East Africa Cooperation. This was followed by the establishment of the EAC secretariat in March, 1996 and subsequently the signing of the treaty establishing the East African Community on 30th September 1999. Since then it has made great integration progress and currently is a Customs Union. Additionally, it has expanded its membership to include Rwanda and Burundi.⁷⁸

Due to shared historical and cultural connections, EAC remains the most natural sub-regional organisation where political federation is envisaged. As EAC progresses, matters of peace and security have increasingly gained attention. Taking cognizance that the goals of integration cannot be achieved in absence of peace and stability, EAC has been working towards establishing a peace and security architecture rooted in the Conflict Prevention Management and Response Mechanism (CPMRM). Among the organs envisaged is the EAC early warning system.⁷⁹ The system emphasis will be on security among the member states, inter-state defence and intra-state conflicts that emanate from cattle rustling, smuggling and illegal trade, preventing and economic inequalities, human right violations in partner states and sharing of cross-border and intra-state natural resource and land.⁸⁰

Similar to COMESA's COMWARN, EAC early warning system is at its infancy and hence its performance is hard to evaluate. However, it represents a fundamental problem facing sub-regional organisations in Africa. This is the problem of organisational isomorphism, whereby, each organisation is imitating others, rather than rationalizing its activities and engaging in functional specialisation. Consequently, many activities are duplicative leading to overstretching of the already scarce resources. This problem is more pronounced in EAC where states belong to

⁷⁸ B.B. Kiraso, *EAC Integration Process and Enabling Peace and Security Architecture*. A Paper Presented during the EAC Peace and Security Conference, Kampala, 5th, October, 2009

⁷⁹ See International Coalition on Responsibility to Protect, <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org>

⁸⁰ EAC, Draft Protocol of the East African Community, 2004

multiple organisations. Kenya and Uganda belong to IGAD, COMESA, CEN-SAD and EAC. Tanzania belongs to EAC and SADC, Rwanda and Burundi belongs to EAC, COMESA and ECCAS. Consequently, EAC brings on board at least seven sub-regional organisations which have early warning systems as discussed above.

Conclusion

The chapter has provided an overview of continental and sub-regional early warning systems. That each state in Africa belongs to a sub-regional organisation with an early warning system – though at different stages of development – points out the importance that has been attached to such systems for the purpose of conflict prevention. However, there exist gaps between expectations and realities. This is because EWS have been faced by challenges ranging from human and financial resources constraints, divergent definitions of security, inadequate geographical coverage, hostile international relations, lack of commitment by states, inability to respond to early warnings and outdated principles of statehood such as absolute sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of member states. Drawing from the insights on operations of other EWS in Africa, the next chapter examines the workings of IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism beginning with its establishment, operational structure, early warning models, linkage to other PSA organs and its achievements and challenges in conflict prevention activities.

CHAPTER FOUR

IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism

Introduction

The preceding chapter has provided an overview of early warning systems in Africa. It has shown that the African Union and sub-regional organizations in Africa have made efforts towards establishing conflict early warning systems as a part of their peace and security architectures. This reflects a move towards the entrenchment of preventive culture and a need to generate own solutions to various threats to peace and security. However there exist various challenges as already discussed.¹ These challenges are reflective of the underlying structures on which such systems have been built upon. Nevertheless, that there are challenges does not negate the fact that early warning systems are now important cogs in Africa's peace and security machine.

This chapter provides an analysis of IGAD's early warning system. This system has been characterized as the most advanced in Africa. Adelman has stated, 'What is important to keep in mind is that CEWARN is cutting edge and even in its infant state shows greater strength than virtually any other early warning system extent with respect to data collection. The documentation function alone that has been achieved so just in the pilot study of the Karamoja Cluster is absolutely remarkable, and, horrifying.'² Bearing that in mind, the chapter will analyze CEWARN model, its operations and what it has achieved so far.

¹ See Chapter Three

² N. von Keyserlingk and S. Kopfmüller, *Conflict Early Warning Systems: Lessons Learned from Establishing a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) in the Horn of Africa*. Addis Ababa: GITZ, October 2006, p.5

Historical Background

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) succeeded the the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), which was founded in 1986 primarily to react to the recurring and severe droughts and other natural disasters in the Horn of Africa in 1996.³ However, the initial mission of IGADD remained elusive and the organization had a shadowy existence until 1995, when the then Kenya's president initiated a revitalization process. The revitalization led to a revamped and renamed organization whose mission was extended to assist member states to achieve food security and environmental protection, promote and maintain peace, security and humanitarian affairs and facilitate economic cooperation and integration.⁴

Important to this study is Article 18 (a) of the IGAD's protocol which dedicated itself to peaceful peace and security. It calls on member states to: Establish effective mechanisms of consultation and cooperation for pacific settlement of differences and disputes; to take effective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional cooperation, peace and stability and deal with disputes between member states within these sub-regional and international organisations.⁵

In a follow up to this call, IGAD established early warning system in 2002. The *Protocol on the Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism for IGAD Member States* in its preamble reaffirmed article 18 of the IGAD founding protocol and underscored the determination to act collectively to preserve peace, security and stability in the region and

³ H. Wulf and T. Diebel, *Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanisms: Tools for Enhancing the Effectiveness of Regional Organisations? A Comparative Study of the AU, ECOWAS, IGAD, ASEAN/ARF and PIF*. London: Crisis States Working Papers Series , 2009, No. 2, p.18

⁴ U. Terlinden, *IGAD-Paper Tiger Facing Gigantic Tasks*. Berlin: Friedrich-Ehbert-Stiftung, 2004, p.1

⁵ IGAD Protocol, 1996

enhance cooperation in eliminating all forms of threats.⁶ To achieve this, article two established the CEWARN whose functions are to enhance both early warning and response, through gathering, verifying, processing and analyzing information about the conflicts in the region. The information generated should be transmitted to decision makers of IGAD policy organs and national government of member states.⁷ In order for IGAD to effectively undertake its mandate, member states should uphold the principles of timeliness, transparency, cooperation and free flow of information.⁸ These principles aim at making the system as open as possible, in effect disentangling it from the secrecy of national intelligence agencies.

The Structure of CEWARN

The 2002 protocol is clear that CEWARN is an integral part of IGAD.⁹ As such it is supposed to be embedded in the already existing structures especially the decision making ones. Through such integration, the expectations are that there is going to be a seamless early warning-early response process because information gathered is timely relayed to decision makers, and each component is aware of what the others are doing. Importantly, such synergies are critical since CEWARN represents a third generation early warning model which combines field presence, expert analysis, early warning generation and early responses.¹⁰

To effectively integrate CEWARN the following organizational structure has been put in place. At the apex is the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, which is the IGAD supreme body and the Council of Ministers, which is composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and any other Focal Minister designated by each member state to supervise the mechanism. Under

⁶ Preamble of the Protocol on the Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism for IGAD Member States

⁷ Ibid, Articles 2, 5(b) (c)

⁸ Ibid, Article 5 (a)

⁹ Ibid, Article 2 (2)

¹⁰ See Chapter Two

the council of ministers is the Committee of Ambassadors, which is comprised of IGAD member states' Ambassadors or Plenipotentiaries accredited to the country of IGAD Headquarters. The committee of ambassadors advises and guides the Executive Secretary of IGAD. At the CEWARN operational level, the Committee of Permanent Secretaries (CPS), composed by undersecretaries of the member states, is formally responsible for political decisions on CEWARN and works closely with the IGAD Secretariat (see diagram below).¹¹ At operational level, a CEWARN unit has been instituted and tasked with the co-ordination and supervision of the national units or Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Units (CEWERUs). In the CEWARN unit, all seven member states are represented. This Unit facilitates the exchanges of information and builds capacity of the national CEWERUs. The third level of the mechanism is composed by the seven national CEWERUs and national research institutes, one in each member state. The institutes are expected to inject intellectual rigor and expert knowledge which is needed in conflict analysis, recruit and supervise of CEWARN country coordinators and field monitors, receive, code and analyze field data as well as ensure timely submission of analyzed reports to CEWARN and CEWERU units¹²

In terms of operation, the CEWARN unit apart from supervising and coordinating CEWERUs, houses the country and regional data reporter system. Also, it is responsible for setting standards, supervision, coordination and quality control of data and analysis produced.¹³ Regarding CEWERUs, they are required to receive and review analysis from the National Research Institutes and any other relevant sources, formulate and adopt response strategies to prevent and


¹¹ See CEWARN structure at <http://www.cewarn.org/structure.html>

¹² The national research institute selected are: Cabinet de Consultant Formation et Ingenierie Sociale (Djibouti); Citizens for Peace (Eritrea); Inter Africa Group (Ethiopia), Africa Peace Forum (Kenya); Peace Research Institute (Sudan); Center for Basic Research (Uganda). Source: A document provided by an IGAD CEWARN consultant Legawork Assefa

¹³ Information provided by Legawork Assefa, Program Coordinator, IGAD Peace and Security Division.

mitigate pastoral conflicts, establish and ensure functioning of local peace committees in the areas of reporting.¹⁴

To enhance the activities of CEWERU especially in response, a Rapid Response Fund (RPF) has been set up. The fund aims at financing short term projects targeted at preventing, de-escalating or resolving pastoral and related conflicts in the region. It finances programs generated by CEWERUs and local peace committees especially those whose goal is to support dialogue initiatives, immediate support activities for vulnerable pastoralists, improving community access to resources and local capacity building. The maximum amount which is given for such projects is 50,000 United States dollars.¹⁵



Source: <http://www.cewarn.org/structure.html>

¹⁴ Information provided by Legawork Assefa, Program Coordinator, IGAD Peace and Security Division.

¹⁵ CEWARN, *Rapid Response Fund Handbook*, Accessed at cewarn.org/index.php?option=com_content&view

The CEWARN Analytical Model

The CEWARN mechanism employs both quantitative and qualitative methods to collect data, analyze and produce early warning reports. As observed in chapter two, the analytical model used is critical, since neither quantitative nor qualitative method can capture all the dynamics of conflict. As such to minimize the risks of faulty diagnosis and predictions, a strong case has been made for a triangulated methodology which incorporates both quantitative and qualitative approaches.¹⁶ To address the shortcomings CEWARN has adopted the *Fruhnanalyse Von Spannungen und Tatsachenermittlung* (FAST) analytical model. The model combines both qualitative and quantitative analysis and focuses on the interaction of root causes, proximate and intervening factors which may lead to armed conflicts or provide a window of opportunity for de-escalation and peace-building efforts.¹⁷


The FAST model as shown in the diagram below is a third generation model which addresses various shortcomings of other models. It focuses on the root and proximate causes of conflict with an aim of understanding how clustering of factors leads to violent conflicts. More so, it is not limited to generation of early warning but also crafts early response strategies. Additionally, the model focuses not only on the drivers of conflict but also other factors which may lead to de-escalation. As such it is capable of identifying the ripe moments for intervention as well as avoiding biases which arises when one focuses primarily on the negative dynamics. For instance in the analysis of pastoral conflicts it will not only focus on indicators such as increased arming

¹⁶ Chapter Two, p.40

¹⁷ H. Krumennacher and S, Schmeidl, 'Practical Challenges in Predicting Violent Conflicts FAST: An Example of a Comprehensive Early-Warning Methodology', Swiss Peace Foundation, Working Paper , No. 34, 2001, P.8

of communities or decline in pasture but also on activities such as peace meetings, races, and provision of water supply.¹⁸

FAST CONFLICT ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK



Source: H. Krumennacher and S. Schmeidl, 2001


Fruhnanalyse Von Spannungen und Tatsachenermittlung (FAST) Outputs

The FAST model generates different kinds of reports. On annual basis, the model generates baseline studies, risk assessment, policy options and supportive data whose goal is to assess the long term conflict indicators, make projections and propose measures which can be put in place to reduce escalating pressures and transform the conflict into a constructive social intercourse. On quarterly basis, the model generates reports which show the conflict pathways overtime as well as possible remedies. Further, weekly reports are produced which capture the events in a given week and their likely impact on conflict, that is, will they lead to escalation or de-escalation. The information is augmented by daily reporting which captures incidents which have

¹⁸ See the graphical representation of the FAST model

a bearing on the conflict. For instance a rape incident by a person from a different community may lead to retaliatory attacks which may include cattle rustling even if all other indicators did not predict such a possibility.

The outputs are diagrammatically captured below:



Source: H. Krumennacher and S. Schmeidl, 2001

Drawing from the Fast model CEWARN collects and analyses data using software called the Reporter to generate the following types of reports: Alerts, Situation briefs, Country updates and Cluster reports. In the process of collecting data for these reports IGAD has collected structural and supplemental data and once this data is integrated in the reporter, CEWARN will be able to produce long term conflict assessment reports such as annual risk assessments and baseline surveys.

The outputs are indicated in the table below:

Type of Report	Frequency	Level
➤ Alerts	Immediately	National/Regional
➤ Situation Briefs	As the need arises	National/Regional
➤ Country Updates	Every four months	National
➤ Cluster Reports	Every four months	Regional
➤ Annual Risk Assessment	Annually	National/Regional (to be launched)
➤ Country Baseline Studies	For all new areas; and evaluation every 5 years	National

Source: Information provided by Legawork, Adviser IGAD peace and security division

CEWARN INDICATORS

Schirnding has observed that CEWARN indicators have become widely used in many different fields and play a useful role in highlighting problems, identifying trends, and contributing to the process of priority setting, policy formulation and evaluation, and monitoring of progress.¹⁹ In conflict analysis, the ability to identify root, proximate causes, triggers, their dynamics and make

¹⁹ Y. Von Schirnding, *Health in Sustainable Development Planning: The Role of Indicators*. Geneva: World Health Organisation, 2002, P.5

prediction is not only aided by the model used but by the indicators selected. Good indicators should be able to capture the conflict relationships and how they evolve overtime since conflict environment is fluid.²⁰

In conflict analysis, indicators are the main ingredients which will determine the integrity of the analysis. This is because conflicts are driven by a different interaction of indicators and importantly such indicators will have varying degrees of impact in different conflicts. For instance the impact of media incitement will vary across societies depending on how fractious social interactions are. Similarly, authoritarian regimes may be a source of stability in one state and a source of instability in another or despite the presence of indicators showing high probability of violence, the ability of resources of the opposition to engage in violence may be the single most important determinant of whether conflict will escalate. As such having the right indicators is critical since the capacity to analyze the causes and dynamics of conflict forms the foundation for settlement or resolution.²¹

CEWARN drawing from the holistic approach of the FAST model has developed a set of 52 behavioral indicators covering tracking communal relations, civil society activities, economic activities, governance and media, natural disasters and resource use safety, security and social services. These indicators focus on both escalation and de-escalation dynamics enabling monitors to identify not only risks for violence but also opportunities for peacemaking.²²

Though it is not within the breadth of this research to analyze the appropriateness of each indicator, several observations can be made: One, the indicators focus on the local dynamics

²⁰ United States Institute of Peace, *Conflict Analysis*. Washington: USIP, 2005, p.7

²¹ M. Ebata, *Mainstreaming Conflict Prevention in Analysis and Programming: A Review of CCA/UNDAF Model*. Toronto: Toronto University, 2001, p.8

²² For instance exchange behaviours, inter-group sharing and cross border trade indicates de-escalation while increase in arms, pre-raid blessings reflects escalation trends.

which might disable or enable violent conflict among the pastoral communities. As such they are equally concerned with the dynamics that threaten both state security and human security and evidences the fact that rather than treating the two dimensions of security as mutually exclusive, it is possible to generate a framework rooted on the dual conceptualization of security.

Two, the indicators have amply captured the different drivers of pastoral conflict such as scarcity of pasture, availability of small arms and border porosity. Importantly, though CEWARN is currently limited to analyzing and reporting on pastoral conflicts, the indicators cover different kinds of conflict and as such, with slight modification provides a foundation for analyzing the numerous categories of conflicts, both at local, national and regional level. Third, they have avoided generalization by developing context and cultural specific indicators reflecting the actual dynamics of pastoral conflicts such as all male migration and pre-raid blessings by elders.²³

The indicators are shown in the table below:

CEWARN INDICATORS

Alliance Formation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inter-ethnic group alliance • Ethnic group – government alliance 	Peace Initiatives <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Women peace messengers • Weapons reduction program • Local peace initiatives • Religious peace building • NGO peace initiatives 	Exchange Behavior <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Celebration • Inter-group marriage • Gift offering • Inter-group sharing • Cross-border trade
Armed Intervention <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal armed support • External armed support 	Environmental Pressure <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Natural disaster • Land competition • Livestock disease • More livestock in secure areas and grazing areas abandoned 	Mitigating Behavior <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Access to health care • Relief distributions • Law enforcement • Small arms disclosure • Markets remain open • Bride price stable • Access to education • Negotiations taking place • Positive media coverage
Provocative Behavior <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All-male migration • Pre-raid blessing 	Aggravating Behavior <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interrupt other activities • Pastoral migration • Bullets as commodities • Harmful migration 	

²³ See the list of indicators, pp.86-87

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Traditional forecasting 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy Protest • Harmful livestock policy • Influx of IDPs • Livestock sales increase • New Markets • Small arms availability • Development aid problems • Security escorts • Negative media coverage • Post-raid blessing • Migrant laborers • Media controls • Separation of groups • Livestock prices dropped • Student attendance interrupted 	
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Source: Herbert Wulf and Tobias Daniel, 2009

CEWARN Communication

Any EWS is founded and constructed on three main stages: these are the collection of information, the analysis of information and the communication of information.²⁴ For it to be effective these three stages must operate in a seamless way. The first two stages perform the monitoring and predicting role.²⁵ However this is only a part of the process and communication systems are needed for delivering warning messages to the potentially affected location and to alert the relevant actors.²⁶

The centrality of communication cannot be gainsaid since the transition from warning to action is achieved through a form of centrifugal communication. It is actually the repetition in eccentric circles of a basic sequence that an important detail is isolated from the stream of information; the detail is amplified and interpreted. Then the interpretation is first shared and then agreed by a larger community. Every time the sequence is repeated successfully, energy and speed are added

²⁴ V. Walraven. 'Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Limitations and Possibilities: Introduction', In Walraven V (ed). *Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Limitations and Possibilities*. Hague: Kluwer Law International Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998, p.3

²⁵ V.F. Grasso. *Early Warning Systems: State-of-Art Analysis and Future Directions*. Nairobi: United Nations Environmental Program. 2010, p.6

²⁶ Ibid, 2010, p.3

to the process. Without a communication process this energy does not succeed in crossing the borders that separate analytical units, competing risk assessment entities and policy units.²⁷

To avoid this situation which Adelman refers to as dead- ending where a signal is produced and received at some stage in the process but is not transferred to the actor responsible for its further analysis or its transformation into policy option there is a need to have clear channels of communication among various units.²⁸ This calls for an integrated surveillance and information system capable of ensuring that the collected data is properly shared, analyzed and processed and communicated.²⁹

Taking cognizance of the importance of communication, CEWARN has developed an elaborate communication channel connecting the grass roots to the top decision makers. The communication channel is integrated in a way that allows for top-down, horizontal and bottom-up communication between different units. However at this stage it should be observed that there is a difference between having a well elaborated organizational communication channel and actualizing it. Also such channels should be based on a strategic communication framework whereby data is not only comprehensive but is disseminated in a way which best captures and appeals to the interests of actors whose responsibility is to respond. This is because states are primarily motivated by logic of interests.³⁰ Such logic is more pronounced in Africa where

²⁷ L. Montanaro and J. Schunemann, *Walk the Talk: The EU Needs an Effective Early Warning System to Match its Ambitions to Prevent Conflict and Promote Peace*. London: International Alert, 2011, pp.23-24


²⁸ H. Adelman, 'Difficulties in Early Warning: Networking and Conflict Management', in Walraven V (ed), *Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Limitations and Possibilities*, op cit, p.65

²⁹ C. Pursiainen, *Why Early Warning Sometimes Fail? The Case for Civil Protection*. Nodregio: Nordic Centre for Spatial Development, 2007, p.18

³⁰ On logic of interests see arguments on realism and neo-realism: S. Burchill 'Realism and Neo-realism' in Burchill, S et al (eds), *Theories of International Relations*. Hampshire: Palgrave Press, 1996, pp.70-102, and T. Dunne and B. Schmidt 'Realism' in Baylis, J and Smith, S (eds), *The Globalization of World Politics (2nd ed)*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp.141-160.

organizations lack a normative congruence capable of making states to act motivated by logic of appropriateness instead of naked interests.³¹

Information Flow



Source: Legawork Assefa, Advisor IGAD Peace and Security Division

³¹ On logic of appropriateness see T. Farcell, 'Constructionist Security Studies: A Portrait of a Research Program', *International Studies Review*, vol 4, No 1, 2002, pp.49-72

CEWARN Geographical and Operational Reporting Coverage

The move towards security regionalism reflects increased internalization of the understanding that national securities are interdependent and that excessively self-referenced security policies, whatever their jingoistic attractions are ultimately self defeating.³² This internalization informs the quest for regional peace and security architecture in the face of regionalized threats. These threats emanate from multiple sources and ideally a conflict early warning system should have an extensive geographical and operational coverage. Otherwise localized conflicts and various security threats will go unreported.

A comprehensive geographical and operational coverage is necessary especially in the horn of Africa where threats to security emanate from multiple sources and geographically expansive territories are characterized by lawlessness and are sites of widespread human insecurities.³³

There are numerous conflicts such as the civil wars in Sudan, protracted state collapse in Somalia, uneasy peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea, border dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti, insurgencies in Ogaden region of Ethiopia and Northern Uganda and volatile inter-ethnic relations in Kenya.³⁴

However CEWARN has adopted an incremental approach to early warning and response in anticipation that cooperation in less contentious areas will generate trust and increased cooperation on sensitive issues pertaining to peace and security. Accordingly it has focused on

³² B. Buzan, *People, States and Fears: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 1991, p.208

³³ The notion of borderlands best denotes these territories – vast uncaptured spaces that thrive on the margins of existing states and are characterised by privatization of the use of force by communities, cattle rustlers, warlords and bandits. See T. Weiss, *Guns in the Borderlands: Reducing the Demand for Small Arms*. Pretoria: ISS, Monograph, 2004

³⁴ See M.Ali, 'Transforming Conflicts in Africa: The Need to Focus on Shared Security', in Sthlm Policy Group (ed.), *Faith, Citizenship, Democracy and Peace in the Horn of Africa*. A Report of the 7th Annual Conference on the Horn of Africa: Lund, Sweden, October 17-19, 2008, pp.42-3

pastoral conflicts.³⁵ Geographically, it has limited its coverage to Karamoja cluster, Somalia cluster and Dikhil (Djibouti). Among the focus areas only Karamoja cluster is fully operational.³⁶

The geographical coverage of CEWARN is shown in the map below:



Source: Legawork Assefa, IGAD's Advisor, Peace and Security Division

Engagement with Civil Society

Civil societies refers to those non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on

³⁵ M.K. Juma, 'The Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the East African Community', in Landsberg et al (eds), *From Congo to Cape: South Africa Evolving security Challenges*. London: Lynne Reinner publishers, 2003, p.240

³⁶ B. Mersha, 'Achievements and Challenges of the CEWARN Mechanism in Ethiopia', in Ateya E. and Wisler D. (eds), *Conflict Early Warning System for Sudan*. Khartoum: University of Khartoum, 2007

their ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations.³⁷ They range from community groups, non-governmental organizations, labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable groups, faith based organizations, professional associations and foundations. The organizations provide individuals and groups to pursue common interests without been subjected to undue interference by the state.

A case has been made for the involvement of the civil society groups within the structures of conflict early warning and response mechanisms. This is because such groups do have certain areas of strengths which when harnessed makes early warning systems more effective. One, they have been pacesetters in the development of early warning systems. A key example is the Swisspeace which developed the FAST program, International Crisis Group which has a global early warning coverage has developed the authoritative crisis alerts, and Forum for Early Warning System (FEWER).³⁸ Secondly, because they are often trusted more than the government by the people, they are capable of accessing critical information at the grassroots level and detecting marginal shifts of conflict indicators. In some situations they are the only sources of information especially where government infrastructure is absent. Third, owing to high levels of donor funding, these organizations are capable of investing in the requisite experts, technology and resources enabling them to deliver high level of information and analysis.³⁹

CEWARN has recognized the role of CSOs in various ways. It has allotted a seat for one civil society representative from each member state in the Technical Committee on the Early

³⁷ www.worldbank.org/ngo

³⁸ M. Fischer, *Civil Society in Conflict Transformation: Ambivalence, Potentials and Challenges*. Berghof: Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 2006, pp.4-5

³⁹ E. Bakker, 'Early Warning by NGOs in Conflict Areas', in Arts B et al (eds), *Non-State Actors in International Relations*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001, pp.263-277

Warning.⁴⁰ Also at CEWERU level, the protocol requires membership from civil society organizations.⁴¹ Further the analysis carried should be made available to the greatest extent possible to civil society.⁴² More so, the analysis of data gathered by field monitors is done by National Research Institutes which in most cases are non-governmental such as Kenya's Africa Peace Forum. Finally, the Rapid Response Fund programs are primarily undertaken by Civil Society Organizations.

The involvement of non-governmental organizations especially in data collection, analysis and quality control of reports has enabled the generation of unbiased and objective reports. This arrangement has alleviated the fear that the objectivity of early warning reports could be compromised if they were handled by government agencies due to their vested interests. This does not mean, however, that all CSOs are non-partisan and free from vested interests. With this in mind, this fear is counter-checked by the arrangement that requires the reports to be reviewed by the CEWERU before being adopted.⁴³

Conclusion

The comprehensive analysis of the CEWARN shows that IGAD has put in place an elaborate conflict early warning system. Indeed the system has been credited as the most sophisticated and advanced in Africa.⁴⁴ In its conceptualization and implementation it has approximated the ideal type of early warning systems. It focuses on both state and human security and it is an open source system with strong participation by non-governmental actors. Also, it has managed to overcome methodological limitations by adopting a triangulated methodology. Importantly,

⁴⁰ Article 9 (5) (b) of CEWARN Protocol

⁴¹ Ibid, 11 (3) (f)

⁴² Ibid, operational guidelines, Part IV (5)

⁴³ E. Ateya and D. Wisler (eds), *Conflict Early Warning System for Sudan*. Khartoum: University of Khartoum, 2007

⁴⁴ See Chapter Four, p.76

CEWARN represents a third generation system which integrates both early warning and response. This progress is critical since the ultimate end of early warning is to trigger responses capable of conflict prevention. Additionally, the system has incorporated the principle of subsidiarity enabling responses to be effected at the most appropriate level.⁴⁵ For instance the rapid response fund is primarily dedicated to local preventive efforts by peace committees and CSOs. These actors owing to their familiarity with local contexts are better placed to respond compared to governmental agencies from state capitals. Drawing from this analysis and conclusions derived, the next chapter addresses the contribution of CEWARN in conflict management and what factors have enabled or disabled its functioning.

⁴⁵ On subsidiarity see Chapter Two, p.43

CHAPTER FIVE

A Critical Analysis of the IGAD's Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism

Introduction

Chapter Four has provided a detailed analysis of CEWARN as a component of IGAD's Peace and Security Architecture. It has detailed its legal basis, mandate, operational framework, its analytical model and outputs. Also, it has brought out the extent of CEWARN's geographical and reporting coverage as well as its relation with civil society organizations.¹ The chapter has shown that the system has an elaborate organizational structure representing a model third generation early warning systems.

This chapter provides a critical analysis of the contributions CEWARN has made to IGAD's conflict management efforts. The analysis is critical since quite often when it comes to organizations of states there is a gap between policy making and implementation. The significance of policy implementation cannot be gainsaid. Makinde has noted that no matter how beautiful the policy blueprint, a defective implementation of it will make nonsense of the whole effort. Indeed implementation is the graveyard of policy where the intentions of the designer of policy are often undermined by a constellation of forces.² Regarding CEWARN that the appropriate conceptualization and frameworks have been put in place does not in any way mean that the system is working as envisaged.

The chapter is divided into three broad sections. Section one focus on the achievement of CEWARN in conflict management, whether in conflict diagnosis, issuing of alerts and effecting responses. Section two and three address the challenges faced by CEWARN using the conceptual

¹ See Chapter Four

² T. Makinde, 'Problems of Policy Implementation in Developing Nations: the Nigerian Experience', *Journal of Social Science*, 11 (1), 2005, pp.63-69

framework developed in chapter one. The framework analytically classifies the activities of CEWARN as either early warning or early response.³ Accordingly section two focuses on challenges of early warning whereas section three focuses on obstacles to early responses.

Contributions of the IGAD CEWARN

CEWARN being a third generation conflict early warning system creates an appropriate linkage between the early warning system and early response units. As such it represents the most advanced early warning system in Africa in terms of its conceptualization and structuring. Since its inception, it has achieved measured success as elaborated below.

At a conceptual level, its very existence reflects a commitment by IGAD to adopt a preventive culture. As observed elsewhere the more conflict moves upward the escalation spiral, the more it becomes expensive to manage. As such it is always prudent to arrest escalation before it transforms to violence, prevent relapse into violence once de-escalation has been achieved and comprehensively pursue post-conflict peace building through addressing the indicators of violence as they emerge.⁴ All this activities are originated by early warning systems which are in a position to sniff out and track threats long before they reach crisis levels.

Practically, CEWARN through a system of data collection and analysis has managed to develop an advanced database of pastoral conflicts in Africa. It is observable that the region has the largest concentration of pastoralists in the world often occupying vast geographical areas. A defining characteristic of these communities is the extent they have socially, politically and economically marginalized. For instance within the Karamoja cluster, 82 percent of the

³ Chapter One, pp.22-23

⁴ B.T. Tiruneh, *Establishing Early Warning System in the African Peace and Security Architecture: Challenges and Prospects*. Accra: Koffi Annan International Peace Training Centre, 2010, P.5

population lives below the poverty line. No more than 20 percent of children go to school and the region measures low in all human and economic development indicators.⁵

The extent of marginalization reflects the governments' attitude towards pastoralists. Ateyo and Akabwai have observed that central governments in the region seem to judge these communities' pastoralist lifestyle as pre-modern, chaotic and economically unproductive. Policies pursued therefore serve to marginalize pastoral communities and their needs are ignored. At times the eradication of these cultures and identities is considered especially in states where the ruling groups come from farming and sedentary communities.⁶ The outcome of these practices is that much of what goes on in pastoral areas is ignored, suppressed and when there is response, it is usually through despotic power of state best exemplified by forceful disarmament exercises.⁷

By developing the database on pastoral conflicts CEWARN helped to illuminate on these peripheral conflicts which have created widespread human insecurities and have been conveniently ignored by state operatives.⁸ For instance the annualized data represented in the graphs below shows the extent which pastoral conflicts have contributed to violence and deaths in Karamoja and Somalia clusters. It indicates that between July, 2003 and September, 2009 there were 2,627 recorded violent incidents. During the same period there were 4,192 deaths. Currently this has led to increased attention towards addressing the causes of pastoral based conflicts. Importantly it has led to extensive knowledge on the dynamics of such conflicts especially in Karamoja and Somali clusters.


⁵ C. Chapman and A. Kagaha, *Resolving Conflicts Using Traditional Mechanisms in Karamoja and Teso Regions of Uganda*. Minority Rights International, August 2009, p.2

⁶ D. Akwambai and P.E. Ateyo, *The Scramble for Cattle, Power and Guns in Karamoja*. Boston: Feinstein International Centre, Tufts University, 2007, p.13

⁷ For example see Human Rights Watch, *Bring the Gun or You Will Die: Torture, Rape and other Serious Human Rights Violations by Kenyan Security Forces in the Mandera Triangle*, 2009. Accessed at <http://www.hrw.org>.


⁸ H. Wulf and T. Debiel, *Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanisms: Tools for Enhancing the Effectiveness of Regional Organisations? A Comparative Study of the AU, ECOWAS, IGAD, ASEAN/ARF and PIF*. London: Crisis States Working Paper No.49, p.19

Karamoja and Somali Clusters - Violent Incident Reports (Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda Combined)



The cumulative annualized violent incidents, 2003-2009. Adapted from materials provided by Legawork

Karamoja and Somali Clusters Human Deaths (Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda Combined) (July 2003 - January 2009)



The cumulative number of deaths, 2003-2009, Adapted from materials provided by Legawork

In addition to bringing into light the extent of pastoral based conflicts, CEWARN has managed to build confidence and cooperation among actors involved. This has been the case especially with local actors who have been integrated into CEWERUs. A respondent pointed out the importance of such integration noting that, 'you find that these organizations have often been working there for a long time and have garnered a lot of trust within the local communities. They have strong linkages especially when they are Community Based Organizations because a lot of their members are from these local communities. So working with them just garners more trust and you have much more oversight with these organizations on the ground. When you combine that with field monitors on the ground, you have a very good collaborative effort.'⁹

The linkages and cooperation have an additional benefit of spreading shared practices and in the process help build an early warning constituency. Though the study did not evaluate the extent of these contributions, the role of dissemination of certain norms and values is paramount in enabling the localization and institutionalization of the early warning culture. New institutionalism scholars have made an important observation that institutions are not things but processes.¹⁰ In this understanding, there is a difference between organizational structures and institutions (patterns, norms and practices of interactions). The existence and robustness of organizational structures is dependent on the institutional progress which is realized through increased spread and sharing of norms, values and practices. The spread leads to institutional isomorphism which creates a commonality of techniques, codes of conduct and methodologies for determining how to confront challenges.¹¹ Drawing from this argument, the study notes that

⁹ An interview with a member of Kenyan CEWERU conducted on 10th August, 2011

¹⁰ M.E. Smith, *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalisation of Cooperation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.45

¹¹ J. Baylis and S. Smith, *The Globalization of World Politics (3rd Ed)*. Oxford: OUP, 2005

CEWARN has contributed towards the entrenchment of early warning cultures in its Areas of Reporting (AORs).

A key contribution by CEWARN has been in issuing of early warnings. Since its inception in 2002, CEWARN has produced a number of early warnings which have helped avert violent conflicts through timely responses. The first CEWARN alert was related to a conflict that occurred between two cross-border pastoral communities, namely the Dassench of Ethiopia and the Turkana of Kenya. The conflict emerged from the increasing fishing activities on Lake Turkana (Rudolph) by the Dassench fishermen who worked for a government owned enterprise, the Ethiopia Fishing and Marketing enterprise. The Turkana fishermen felt that the increase would deplete the fishing resources of the lake and thus threaten their income/livelihood. Moreover, some of their long time clients, the Kenya Somali traders began to turn to the Dassench fishermen attracted by the lower prices the latter were offering them. The Turkana launched 10 separate attacks between June 13 and July 23 on the Dassench fishermen to disrupt their fishing activities on the lake. In these attacks, they managed to steal 47 fishing nets. On July 27, the situation escalated to a more alarming level. On that day, the Dassench encircled and ambushed the Turkana who came on motorboats to steal fishing nets. They killed nine of them and seized their motorboats. On the following day, around 20 Kenyan security forces came to the Dassench area and killed three Dassench fishermen.

After these incidents, the NRI produced its first early warning alert.¹² The alert, then, was communicated to the CEWERU head through e-mail on July 27, 2005. The head then passed the information to the relevant member institutions of the steering committee – the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Security, Immigration and Refugees Affairs Authority (SIIRA). The two

¹² B. Mersha Achievements and challenges of the CEWARN Mechanism in Ethiopia in Ateya E. and Wisler D. (Eds). *Conflict early warning system for Sudan*. Khartoum: Peace Research University of Khartoum, 2007

bodies passed the same information with attached request for necessary measures to the regional and district level officials. In the next two weeks, the following activities were witnessed on the ground :i) Security beefed up on the Ethiopian side of Lake Turkana that restrained the movement of communities in the area. The immediate outcome of this action was a marked decline in fishing net thefts and assaults; ii) Representatives of the local administration, elders and women went to a nearby Kenyan town to discuss about the conflict with their Kenyan counterparts. Both sides agreed in principle to return the stolen fishing nets and find ways the two communities can resume fishing on the lake.¹³

The second alert was about the conflict that occurred between two pastoral communities who live on the Ethiopian side of the Karamoja cluster: the Nyangatom and Dassench. The conflict began on June 4, 2005. Up to the time the alert was produced a total of 10 violent incidents of reprisal and counter-reprisal nature occurred between these two communities. As a result of these incidents, 10 people were killed and 220 cattle were stolen. Subsequently, many negotiations and peace conferences were held in November and December, whereby the two communities reached an agreement on many issues, among which were joint utilization of resources and bringing to justice those who committed crimes and disturbed the peace. As a consequence, marked decline in violent incidents between these two communities was observed.¹⁴

Additionally CEWARN has contributed towards capacity building in early warning and management of conflicts. For instance June, 2010 CEWARN held a capacity building program in Eldoret. The program brought together 60 grass root women organizations from Karamoja

¹³ IGAD, *CEWARN Monthly*, 2007. The conflict early warning and response mechanism of the IGAD, retrieved from <http://igad.int/index.php?option=com>

¹⁴ CEWARN/IGAD, *CEWARN Activity Report*, 2007

cluster with a goal of enhancing their capacities in conflict management.¹⁵ In February, in collaboration with German Technical Assistance Agency (GTZ), CEWARN held a training workshop on best practices on local response strategies in Hawassa town, Ethiopia. The workshop brought together community level peace actors as well as governmental and non-governmental stakeholders from cross border areas of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Southern Sudan.¹⁶

The capacity building program has further been enhanced through the development of training manuals. The manuals cover capacity building for Conflict Prevention and Response Mechanism (CPMR), report writing, training on setting up of indicators to anyone interested in setting up early warning mechanism.¹⁷ Additionally, under the Rapid Response Fund (RRF), CEWARN has instituted top down and bottom up capacity building which involves analyzing of capacity gaps at national and local levels and providing support where needed. The dissemination of such knowledge is an important component of CEWARN's knowledge management.

On the response side, CEWARN has set up a rapid response fund. The fund aims at financing short term projects targeted at preventing, de-escalating or resolving pastoral and related conflicts in the region. It finances programs generated by CEWERUs and local peace committees especially those whose goal is to support dialogue initiatives, immediate support activities for vulnerable pastoralists, improving community access to resources and local capacity building. The maximum amount which is given for such projects is 50,000 United States dollars.¹⁸ With the setting up of the fund, CEWARN has enhanced its response capacity especially where speedy

¹⁵ Karamoja Women for Peace Building and Networking meeting Kicks off today'. Accessed at <http://eastafrika.usaid.gov/en/usaaid/article/1314>

¹⁶ CEWARN Monthly, 'Community-level peace Actors share the best practices in Prevention and Mitigation of Pastoral Conflicts', Issue No.33, Dec-February, 2010

¹⁷ K.H. Christensen, *Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism in the Horn of Africa: IGAD as a Pioneer in Regional Conflict in Africa*. Uppsala: Department for Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2009, p.30

¹⁸ CEWARN, *Rapid Response Fund Handbook*, Accessed at cewarn.org/index.php?option=com_content&view

interventions are needed. However, it should be noted that the temporary nature of intervention might encourage 'short termism' or band aid solutions and in the process the root causes of pastoral conflicts will be ignored.

To be able to increase the chances of livestock recovery, CEWARN has initiated pilot animal tracking program. Animal tracking refers to the ability to trace the whereabouts of an animal at any one given time.¹⁹ The program has targeted regions in both Karamoja and Somali cluster. The first step has been already completed. It involved a comprehensive research whose goal was to locate the place of livestock identification, traceability and tracking in checking livestock raiding related violent conflicts among pastoralist communities in the IGAD sub-region and Tanzania.²⁰ The study was completed in 2009 and proposed a raft of measures key among them the establishment of Livestock Identification and Traccability Coordination Unit (LITCU) and an advisory body-Livestock Identification Steering Committee within CEWARN.²¹ So far the measures have not been put in place, but the blue print developed cannot be dismissed as irrelevant.

Lastly, CEWARN has been piloting the use of remote sensing and Geomatic research to map out environmental security in pastoral areas. Using remote sensing technology it is possible to detect environmental change over wide area and predict the possible outcome through simulations. When combined with local information gathered through field monitors, it is possible to develop a systemic view of environmental changes and how they may impact different communities.

¹⁹ D. E. Ekuam, *Livestock Identification and Traceability, and Tracking: Its Role in Enhancing Human Security, Disease Control and Livestock Marketing in IGAD Region*. Addis Ababa: CEWARN, 2009, P.41

²⁰ Ibid, P.4

²¹ Ibid, P.96

Also remote sensing technology provides a superior method of resource mapping.²² The mapping can guide the implementation of structural prevention programs.

Challenges Facing CEWARN Early Warning and Response Capacities

As already noted the analysis of challenges will be analytically separated into early warning and early response challenges. The first subsection will deal with early warning challenges facing CEWARN while the second section will deal with early response challenges. The analysis of challenges is important since despite the claim that CEWARN is the most advanced early warning system the assessment of its achievements indicates that it has performed below par. Importantly, the IGAD sub-region has remained the most unstable in Africa and this is a pointer to the fact that conflict management efforts are yet to realize the intended goals.

Early Warning Challenges

CEWARN has been faced with a challenge when it comes to whether the indicators are comprehensive enough to capture all the dynamics of pastoral conflicts. As observed in chapter three indicators have become widely used in many different fields and play a useful role in highlighting problems, identifying trends, and contributing to the process of priority setting, policy formulation and evaluation, and monitoring of progress.²³ However for indicators to play this role they must capture all aspects of the targeted phenomenon. Though CEWARN has an elaborate set of indicators which are capable of capturing the dynamics of pastoral conflicts, they have left out an important form of rustling. That is the commercialized livestock rustling.

²² S. Peppino et al, 'Environmental Security and Pastoralism', in Stojanovic R et al (eds), *GeoSpatial Visual Analytics: Geographical Information Processing and Visual Analytics for Environmental Security*. London: Springer, 2010, p.414

²³ Y. Von Schirmding, *Health in Sustainable Development Planning: The Role of Indicators*. Geneva: World Health Organisation, 2002, P.5

In their analysis of cattle rustling, Lind and Buchanan have observed that in Mandera triangle, there exist commercialized rustling or livestock warlordism.²⁴ Similarly Mkutu has observed that, it (commercial rustling) has increased the intensity of raiding and is leading to major changes in social, economic and political structures in the border area. It is creating a black market for commercial trading that straddles the localities, urban areas and the wider region. Access to arms has become essential to successful commercial cattle raiding.²⁵ This kind of rustling poses a unique problem since it is usually initiated by well resourced individuals with access to weapons and funds to recruit bandits and ex-fighters from the region. Also such individuals have access to major urban areas where the stolen livestock is sold making recovery impossible and in other cases they have political networks which guarantee them protection. Ultimately they should be captured by early warning indicators since they will increasingly shape the tenor of pastoral based conflicts and their attacks are characterized by high numbers of casualties.

Related to inadequacy of indicators is the issue of data validity. As noted in Chapter Two, the relevance of early warning systems has been questioned especially on whether they can predict conflict.²⁶ Indeed continued failure in prediction will lead to credibility crisis. Though it is not possible to make accurate prediction, it is possible to make a good enough prediction through rigorous and meticulous collection of data. This calls for avoiding of bias and poses a challenge to CEWARN.

²⁴ M. Buchanan and J. Lind, *Armed Violence and Poverty in Northern Kenya: A Case Study for the Armed Violence and Peace Initiative*. Bradford: Centre for International Cooperation and Security, Bradford University, 2005, pp.8-14

²⁵ K. Mkutu, *Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms: The Kenya Uganda Border Region*. Nairobi: Saferworld, 2003, p.15

²⁶ Chapter Two, p.41

Mersha has observed that the Field Monitors (FMs) are the beginning and end of CEWARN's data collection. The early warning reports produced by the NRI heavily depend on the incident and situation reports sent by the FMs. Notwithstanding the importance of this information from the FMs, there is, however, a downside risk from relying exclusively on these field reports. There is a possibility that FMs could report biased information or withhold important information to the benefit of their own group as most of them come from the same communities he/she is stationed. There is also possibility that the FMs can miss an incident or other important events due to the distance of the area he/she covers. These risks are well noted by the NRI and are frequently raised by CEWARN.²⁷

Further early warning is faced by communication barriers. Though structurally there are systems for top-down, down-top and horizontal communication, in practice there exist barriers to information flow.²⁸ To enhance vertical and horizontal flow of information there is need for transparency in dealing with information. The issue of transparency is in fact quite delicate in CEWARN. There is a widespread belief that a hidden agenda is at work. Many of the actors who detain information refrain from passing it due to their concerns over the circles that may utilize them for what is viewed as a hostile action.²⁹ Also communication on early warning is relayed to relevant governments and the governments on receiving the information have discretion on who accesses the information.³⁰ This defeats the whole notion of open access. Significantly, in

²⁷ B. Mersha 'Achievements and challenges of the CEWARN Mechanism in Ethiopia in Ateya E. and Wisler D. (Eds). *Conflict early warning system for Sudan*, op cit

²⁸ See CEWARN communication chat in Chapter Four, p.89

²⁹ M. Abdelghaffar, 'Sudan's Experience with IGAD's Early Warning Mechanism', in Ateya E Wisler D. (Eds), *Conflict Early warning System for Sudan*, op cit

³⁰ The CEWARN Protocol Part IV (5) gives states power to place restrictions on free access only on compelling grounds of national security. Considering members practices of hiding behind the veil of national security, this qualified restriction is prone to abuse especially where high ranking individuals are involved in fuelling pastoral conflicts.

situations where the government which has received the warning is complicit in pastoral conflicts, such information loses its purpose.

Additionally, the geographical remoteness of Areas of Reporting (AORs) poses considerable communication problems. Cilliers has stated that the FMs used in collecting and sending information are facing difficulties in sending their reports in time due to the poor communication infrastructure. This makes relying on FMs in providing field reports a major setback. This is because they are unable to relay the information on time. Also there is a possibility that the FMs can miss incidents or other important events due to the distance of the area he/she covers.³¹

The difficulties of communication can be exemplified by what happened during the Turbi massacre in 2005. On July, 2005, 1000 heavily armed bandits made a series of raids in the Digalgalo-Turbi area some 130 kilometers from Marsabit town. In the attacks more than one hundred people were killed. Despite the enormity of violence, the reports reached Marsabit, the nearest town, twelve hours later.³² Even the government security personnel lacked communication gadgets to relay calls for back up. In this region the reality is faced by such obstacles the FMs cannot manage to forward information in a timely manner. Such geographical barriers to communication will remain since pastoral regions face severe infrastructural deficit.

Moreover, the geographical coverage and AORs is limited. Geographically it has limited its coverage to Karamoja, Somalia clusters and Dikhil (Djibouti). Among the focus areas only Karamoja cluster is fully operational.³³ This leaves vast territories which are affected by pastoral conflicts unreported or underreported.

³¹ J. Cilliers, 'Towards a Continental Early Warning System for Africa', Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies Paper, No.102, 2005, p.1

³² On turbi massacre see O. Mwangi, 'Kenya: Conflict in the 'Badlands': The Turbi Massacre in Marsabit District', *Review of African Political Economy*, No.107, 2006, p.86

³³ B. Mersha, 'Achievements and Challenges of the CEWARN Mechanism in Ethiopia', op cit

Even in areas where early warning has presence, there is limited number of monitors making it difficult to capture all events, some of which might be critical indicators. Currently the regions have a combined total of 33 field monitors who are expected to gather data in vast and remote areas.³⁴ Critically the early warning has limited itself to one kind of conflict, that is, pastoral conflicts in the hope that it will move towards other conflicts. Though this incremental approach is aimed at generating trust and cooperation in a region where states are highly suspicious of each other it reflects to a serious error in judgment and assumptions. This is because the region is faced by multiple kinds of conflicts and pastoral based conflicts are ranked lower in the list of priorities by governments in the region.³⁵

Another challenge facing the early warning functions of CEWARN is the weak institutional capacity of the CEWERU units. Some CEWERUs have no proper housing institutions as well as budgets of their own. Some are housed within the ministry of foreign affairs which might influence their working. The Ethiopian CEWERU for example has not established the local committee which is crucial for effectiveness of the CEWERU. Also there are various actors relevant for the work of CEWERU that have no formal relation with the unit. These agencies include CSOs and government bodies at various levels of government. It would be difficult to incorporate all these actors in the CEWERU structure. However, to establish a formal collaboration mechanism or network with these institutions would certainly enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of CEWERU activities.³⁶

Early warning is not only about compilation and analysis of information but also developing a body of knowledge which can be used to improve on operations as well as develop best

³⁴ Information provided by Legawork, IGAD's Peace and Security Division advisor.

³⁵ K. H. Christensen, *Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism in the Horn of Africa*, op cit, p.30

³⁶ J. Cillers, 'Towards a Continental Early Warning System for Africa', op cit, p. 1

practices. To achieve this there is a need for knowledge management. Knowledge management is a process that helps organizations to identify, select, organize, disseminate, and transfer information and expertise that are a part of organization's memory. The structuring of knowledge enables effective and efficient problem solving, dynamic learning, strategic planning, spread of best practices and decision making.³⁷ In discussing knowledge and knowledge management there is a need to make distinction between data, information and knowledge. According to Maglitta, data is raw numbers and facts, information is processed data and knowledge is information made actionable.³⁸ As such what qualifies as knowledge is that which is capable of generating solutions.

When it comes to knowledge management, the process operates in six steps cycle. The first step is when knowledge is created. This takes place on discovery of new ways of doing things or development of know-how. The second step concern with capturing of that knowledge. In capturing, the knowledge must be identified as valuable and presented in a reasonable way. The third step deals with refining of knowledge and making it actionable whereas the fourth step concerns with storing of knowledge in a reasonable format in a repository for others to access and use. The fifth step involves periodic review of knowledge to make it relevant and accurate. The sixth step which is very critical entails dissemination of the knowledge generated to relevant constituents for use in solving problems.³⁹ All this steps must be effectively dealt with if knowledge management is going to be effective.

The early warning system has been unable to manage knowledge that it has accumulated since its inception. During the course of this study the researcher did not come across any CEWARN

³⁷ J. Aronson, 'Knowledge Management', in McLean. T et al (eds), *Information Technology for Management: Transformation Business in the Digital Economy (3rd edition)*. New York: Willey, 2002, pp.388-392

³⁸ J. Maglitta, 'Smarten Up!', *Computer World*, vol 29, No.23, pp.84-86

³⁹ J. Aronson, 'Knowledge Management', op cit, pp.394-396

originated document containing intellectually progressive, scientifically sound ideas on early warning. Also there was no evidence of intra-organization transfer of best practices. Rather each component is engrossed in its own activities without making efforts of gaining knowledge from what the other components are doing. This is a glaring omission considering that the fastest way and most effective way of managing knowledge assets is through systematic transfer of best practices.⁴⁰ In terms of dissemination, CEWARN has operated on limited basis and much of the knowledge generated is only availed to epistemic circles. Indeed despite its stated goal of popularizing itself, it is rarely known beyond the academia and policy circles.⁴¹

Further, CEWARN has not pursued all source intelligence. Though it has developed a data base on pastoral conflicts, it has not benefitted from closed intelligence sources. Ideally as noted in the study, early warning systems are supposed to be open source systems; however in environments where open source intelligence is inadequate and state intelligence pervasive, a close collaboration with state intelligence agencies can generate a more comprehensive data on conflicts. Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) refers to publicly available information as well as other unclassified information that has limited public distribution or access. It also includes any information that may be used in an unclassified context without compromising national security or intelligence sources and methods.⁴²

Despite the attractiveness of OSINT to early warning systems, a case has been made about its inadequacy. Nye has argued that OSINT provides the outer pieces of the jigsaw puzzle without which one can neither begin nor complete the puzzle. But they are not sufficient of themselves. The precious inner pieces of the puzzle, often the most difficult and most expensive to obtain

⁴⁰ Ibid, p.425

⁴¹ An interview with Assefa conducted on 15th August,2011

⁴² W.O. Studeman, 'Teaching the Giant to Dance: Contradictions and Opportunities in Open Source Information within Intelligence Community', *American Intelligence Journal*, Spring/Summer, 1993, pp.11-13

come from the traditional intelligence. Open source intelligence is the critical foundation for all-source intelligence product, but it cannot ever replace the totality of the all-source effort.⁴³ The all-source effort should be pursued by early warning actors in a way which does not compromise their independence. Such a mode has been utilized by ICG which has maintained both field and high ranking government contacts who provide information gleaned from traditional intelligence sources.⁴⁴ Importantly, such pursuit will make early warning more credible since governments tend to trust their own intelligence agencies than any other organ when it comes to analysis of threats.⁴⁵

The final challenge hampering CEWARN's early warning efforts is lack of adequate and competent staff. This is a key challenge since as Friedman has argued, information consumers, officials and policy makers are not suffering from shortage of information, they are suffering from saturation. The flood of mass produced raw data now available and the ensuing overload means that collection is no longer the principal problem. The greatest challenge is analysis, timely dispatch of data and results to individuals who need it. Effectiveness of the process will depend upon allocation of human resources among those responsible for analysis and other responsible for transmission.⁴⁶ Importantly, the human resource deployed must be competent enough to be able to generate good analysis, predictions and response strategies.

In the CEWARN early warning component there is severe staff shortage. In the face of inadequate funding the system has spread its staff thin. As observed, it has 33 field monitors who

⁴³ Dr. Joseph Nye, then chairman of the National Intelligence Council speaking to members of the Security Affairs Support Association at Fort George Meade, Maryland on 24th April, 1993

⁴⁴ An interview with an Analyst working with ICG Nairobi office conducted on 22nd August, 2011

⁴⁵ K.P. Apulli, 'IGAD's Peace and Security Strategy: A Panacea for Long Term Stability in the Horn of Africa', in R. Sharamo and B. Mesfin (eds), *Regional Security in the Post-Cold War Horn of Africa*. Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2011, p.362

⁴⁶ R.S. Friedman, 'Open Source Intelligence', *Parameters*, P.21, Accessed at <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters>

are expected to comprehensively deal with all the AORs. When it comes to the Addis Ababa situation room there is only one professional conflict analyst and with the amount of information being received, she is overwhelmed and on occasions unable to do the work.⁴⁷

The severe shortage of staff is further compounded by lack of analytical competencies among the early warning staff. Apulli in study on IGAD has concluded that the analysis generated lacks intellectual and practical rigor and currently focus on politically insensitive pastoral conflicts that have not attracted serious attention by policy makers. Similarly, Fanta has concluded that the staff lack appropriate motivation to work in difficult conditions. And even if it is not always the case, appointments are recurrently based on political and national affiliations rather than professional experiences and merit.⁴⁸ Competency is critical because facts do not 'say' or 'tell' anything by themselves. Instead a person has to select them, put them in order and classify them to give meaning and finally to act on the basis of knowledge thus accumulated.⁴⁹ These activities demand specialised competencies.

Early Response Challenges

The ultimate goal of early warning is early response. Schnabel et al have succinctly stated that it is not simply enough to generate information and hand it to those who might be in situations to take necessary responses. If the recipient of early warning are not placed, capable or willing to take action, early warning analysis would be nothing but an academic exercise without any effect

⁴⁷ An interview with senior official, IGAD PSD conducted on 25th August, 2011

⁴⁸ E. Fanta, *The Capacity of Regional Organizations in Peace and Security*. A Paper presented at the ERD workshop, Transforming Political structures: Security, Institutions and Regional Integration, Florence, 16th -17th, April, 2009, p.15

⁴⁹ C. Pursiainen, *Why Early Warning Sometimes Fails: the Case of Civil Protection*. Nordregio: Nordic Centre for Spatial Development, 2007, p.5

on the improvement of volatile situations.⁵⁰ To avoid this pitfall, the CEWARN protocol integrates early warning and response mandates.⁵¹

To understand the early response challenges there is a need to situate the analysis in the Peace and Security Architecture (PSA) since CEWARN with exception of the Rapid Response Fund and local peace committees lacks any other capabilities of response. As such early responses are dependent on other PSA's organs which have the diplomatic, military and financial competencies to respond. Thus, the issue is, the challenges which have hampered the workings of IGAD's PSA. The challenges are enumerated below:

Weak Member States

The member states of IGAD are internally weak and incapable of asserting empirical control over their territories. Consequently there are vast territories where there is minimal state presence. The notion of borderlands best denotes these territories – vast uncaptured spaces that thrive on the margins of existing states and are characterized by privatization of the use of force by communities, cattle rustlers, warlords and bandits.⁵² These borderlands unite the region in a system of cross border insecurities. It is in these territories that pastoral conflicts are located and the affected states are not capable of effectively deploying their power even in the face of warnings.

In response to this inability, states have responded to the infrastructural and despotic power deficit by arming local communities to take care of their own defense needs. In other situations owing to the availability of Small and Light Weapons (SALWs) and government inability to provide security, communities are actively arming themselves for defensive and offensive

⁵⁰ A. Schnabel et al, *Towards a Human Security Based Early Warning and Response System*, p.7. Accessed at www.swisspeace.ch

⁵¹ CEWARN Protocol Article 5 (1) states that the functions of CEWARN cover both early warning and response.

⁵² T. Weiss, *Guns in the Borderlands: Reducing the Demand for Small Arms*. Pretoria: ISS, Monograph, 2004

reasons. First they need to protect themselves and their livestock from being plundered by hostile groups. Second, they use the arms to forcefully raid other pastoral communities.⁵³ The culture of arming communities whether from government armories or illicit sources has led to localized arms race in regions such as the Mendera Triangle which extends to Kenya, Ethiopia and Southern Sudan.⁵⁴

The region is highly militarized and different pastoral communities are locked in cycles of cattle rustling. Such arming undermines the whole idea of preventive culture and management of pastoral conflicts, since cluster based disarmament is critical component of managing these conflicts. According to an early warning experts, a holistic and regional response to pastoral conflicts is required which addresses both the demand and supply dynamics fuelling such conflicts. This is hard to achieve since states view pastoral areas as sources of peripheral and economically non-viable environments. Even where there might be some commitment, the states do not have the capacity to fully deal with conflict drivers such as climate changes and droughts. SALWs proliferation and marginalization.⁵⁵

Presence of Regionalized Conflicts

A defining feature of the Horn of Africa is not only the presence of numerous conflicts but the extent they are linked and subsequently regionalized. This has created complex conflict systems whereby armed conflict within one state rapidly become internationalised or a settlement of conflict in one state is usually followed by eruption of conflict in another state as the conflict

⁵³ P. Eavis, 'SALW in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region: Challenges and Way Forward', *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Vol IX, Issue 1, 2002, pp.252-253

⁵⁴ See I. Farah et al, 'Small Arms and Border Control in the Horn of Africa: The Case of Malkasufta, Ethiopia; 2006, Mendera, Kenya; and Bula Hawa, Somalia', in Africa Peace Forum, *Controlling Small Arms in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region*. Nairobi: APF, 2006, pp.53-69

⁵⁵ An interview with an early warning expert working at the Institute of Security studies conducted on 20th August, 2011

epicenter shifts.⁵⁶ The interlinkages of these conflicts pose fundamental security threats to IGAD members.

In the face of the numerous conflicts, states have more pressing priorities. Indeed though pastoral conflicts were supposed to be the entry point for CEWARN, in anticipation that success achieved will encourage states to increase its coverage, the motivation behind this limitation was that this conflicts were not on top of their priorities. As such they assigned them to a regional body. In essence they were shifting the burden to CEWARN without any intention of playing their part in addressing them.⁵⁷

Absence of Common Values

The presence of common uniting values is critical in determining regional peace and security efforts. This is best exemplified by democratic peace theory which has shown that common democratic values in a given region to a large extent explains the sustained presence of peace and security.⁵⁸ In IGAD sub-region there lacks consensus on how the region should go about addressing the issues of common concern. This has hampered the crafting and implementing of a regional strategy for responding to early warnings.

Importantly, that members have divergent values has made it impossible to develop benchmarks for conduct which can go a long way in addressing some of the conflict indicators. Nhema has argued that the bottom line is that in Africa the key early warning indicators for intra-state conflict and regional instability in Africa are abuse of power, ethnic politics, exclusionary practices, human rights violations, bad governance and institutional corruption. These indicators are related to decision making ability and political willingness of member states to address them.

⁵⁶ On HoA conflict system see M. Mwagiru, *Conflict in Africa: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management* Nairobi: Center for Conflict Research, 2006, pp.74-82.

⁵⁷ An interview with a regional security expert conducted on 2nd September, 2011

⁵⁸ S.M. Walt, 'International Relations: One World, Many Theories', *Foreign policy*, No 110, 1998, p. 39

Unless there is a move towards addressing them, CEWS will remain unsuccessful.⁵⁹ The observation captures the situation in the Horn of Africa where issues such as exclusionary politics explain the marginalization of pastoral communities. Yet IGAD lacks the capability of influencing internal policies of states in a manner which can address marginalisation and exclusion.

Hostile Regional International Relations

IGAD has been characterized as an organization of 'hostile brothers', a reflection of the international relations characterized by enmity rather than amity.⁶⁰ Indeed all the members have fragile and at times hostile relations. For instance Ethiopia and Eritrea have gone to war twice and have troops on their shared borders. Ethiopia and Somalia has a shared history of enmity and Sudan and Uganda have accused each other of sponsoring rebellions in their territories. This has made trust impossible since members view each other through a securitized lens. The absence of trust has hindered genuine cooperation and engendered fragility in the IGAD's region inter-state relations.

A good example of the impact of hostile regional international relations is the failure to adopt IGAD Peace and Security Strategy (IPSS), which Mwagiru et al has characterized as critical for it provides a roadmap on where the region intends to go in the context of security.⁶¹ The IPSS in many ways aims at shaping the tenor of regional international relations and promoting the emergence of a regional normative framework. This is because it is based on the principles of: Collectivism which calls for regional approach to security and a shift from rigid interpretation of

⁵⁹ A.G. Nhema et al, *The Resolution of African Conflicts: The Management of Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Reconstruction*. Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2008

⁶⁰ U. Terlinden, *IGAD-Paper Tiger Facing Gigantic Tasks*. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, 2004

⁶¹ Mwagiru M and Njeri K., 'Human Security in the Horn of Africa: Emerging Agenda', in Mwagiru M(ed), *Human Security: Setting the Agenda for the Horn of Africa*. Nairobi: Africa Peace Forum, 2008 , p.254

sovereignty and state-centric understanding of security; Interest convergence which envisages promotion of frameworks which reconciles competing national interests leading to convergence of common regional interests; Subsidiarity which entails leaving activities to authorities or levels best suited to handle them and Supranationality which invests regional organizations with policy making and enforcing competencies. Additionally, it aims at establishing a Conflict Management and Response Mechanism (CPMR) which will anchor peace and security issues and also expand CEWARN mandate from pastoral conflicts to other areas.⁶²

In absence of trust and cooperation, regional efforts are not possible. Hammerstad has argued that there are two main basic conditions which must be met if security integration is to take place. These are mutual trust and a common value basis.⁶³ Where they are absent regional organizations operates at the whims of member states. This view was captured by a respondent who noted 'if an organization [whichever] is a house of incompatible interests, obviously programs won't move. This has been the case with IGAD and its programs. Members are always bending such programs to serve their own and where they think the programs do not serve their narrow interests they do not support them. After all there are no enforcement mechanisms at a regional level.'⁶⁴

Absence of a Regional Hegemony

The concept of hegemony is associated with the work of Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci refined the Marxist theory which posited that the ruling class dominated the rest of the society through coercion. Instead he argued that there are multiple dimensions of overt and covert power which are maintained through coercion and consent. According to him the mix of

⁶² See K.P. Apuuli, 'IGAD's Peace and Security Strategy', Op cit, pp.360-361

⁶³ A. Hammerstad, '*Defending the State or Protecting the People: SADC Security Integration at Cross Roads*', South African Institute of International Affairs, Report No.39, 2003, p.2

⁶⁴ An interview with a staff at IGAD Peace and Security Division conducted on 11th August, 2011

coercion and consent defines hegemony.⁶⁵ Most of the times hegemony is maintained through consent since the dominant class use its political, moral and intellectual leadership to establish its view of the world as all inclusive and universal and to shape the interests and needs of subordinate group.⁶⁶ This way it is capable of co-opting the working class into a grand coalition under its own leadership.

The notion of hegemony has since found its way in international relations. Critical scholars such as Cox have defined hegemony as the formation of a coalition of top-down forces activated by a common consciousness in which those at the bottom are able to participate.⁶⁷ Keohane has argued that hegemony differs from simple domination in that the hegemonic power (state at the top of the coalition) has to forge consent around their own values and strategies as common ones, which means that every relationship of hegemony is necessarily a pedagogical relationship.⁶⁸ In essence a hegemon acts like a benevolent big brother, rewarding and disciplining the younger ones.

The 'benevolent brother' role of a hegemon has been used to explain the success of regional organizations. Moller has argued that, a hegemon is critical in solving problems associated with production and consumption of public goods especially free riding. This is because their total share of production is so large such that it has noticeable implications for what will be available for 'consumption'. This ability to influence production and consumption of public goods and what is available for others to consume be it in trade, peace or security endows a hegemon with

⁶⁵ J. H. Mittelman, 'Globalization: Captors and Captive', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol 21, No.6, 2000, p.920

⁶⁶ D. Woods, 'Civil Society in Europe and Africa: Limiting State Power through a Public Sphere', *African Studies Review*, Vol 35, No.2, 1992, p.82

⁶⁷ R. Cox, 'The Way Ahead: Toward a New Ontology of World Order', in Richard W. Jones (ed), *Critical Theory and World Politics*. Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001, pp.45-50

⁶⁸ R. Keohane, 'The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Change in International Regimes, 1967-1977', excerpted in Roe C et al (eds), *International Political Economy, State-Market Relations in the Changing Global Order*. Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996, pp.78

enormous influence in regional processes since the 'younger brothers' are dependent on the activities of the hegemon.⁶⁹ Also the possession of power means that a hegemon can infuse its values and norms through regional regimes and discipline the deviant members. Importantly it is ready to underwrite the costs of regional activities since it stands to gain more relative to others when such activities are successful.

The success of the South African Development Community (SADC) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been attributed to the hegemonic role played by South Africa and Nigeria respectively.⁷⁰ This is due to their capacity to avail resources-military, financial and diplomatic-necessary for regional peace and security initiatives. For instance during ECOWAS intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone, Nigeria provided the bulk of forces and financed the operation to a tune of eight billion dollars.⁷¹ Certainly, no member of IGAD can afford to raise 8 billion American dollars.

Indeed IGAD is opposite of SADC and ECOWAS since none of its members can undertake the hegemonic role. The absence means that no single state can successfully manage to undertake and underwrite regional initiatives, incentivise and/or apply pressure on other members to cooperate. The outcome has been unwarranted rivalry among members, hostilities, absence of consensus and a weak regional organization starved of powers and resources to act. These problems extend to the workings of the early responses.

⁶⁹ B. Moller, *The Pros and Cons of Subsidiarity: The Role of African Regional and Sub-regional Organizations in Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa*. Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Studies, Working paper, No.2005-4, p.8

⁷⁰ Ibid, pp.39-40

⁷¹ A. Adedeji, 'ECOWAS: A Retrospective Journey' in Adebajo A, and Rashid, I (eds), *West Africa Security Challenges: Building Peace in Troubled Region*. London: Lynne Rienner, 2004, p.45; B. Moller, *The Pros and Cons of Subsidiarity: The Role of African Regional and Sub-regional Organizations in Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa*, ibid, pp.229-267

Membership to Multiple Regional Organizations

The member states of IGAD region belong to more than one regional organization, which have their own peace and security components. For instance, Kenya and Uganda are members of IGAD, EAC, CEN-SAD and COMESA. Sudan and Djibouti belongs to IGAD, Arab League, COMESA, CEN-SAD and Organization of Islamic States. It is only Ethiopia which lacks a viable alternative to IGAD.⁷² From the overview in chapter three, it is evident that all these organizations either have conflict early warning systems or are in the process of setting up one. Further, the East Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) is in the process of setting its own early warning system yet its core membership is from IGAD sub-region.⁷³

Multiple memberships pose a challenge to the implementation of early responses in various ways: One, it weakens members' ability to pull together their resources in building up relevant security institutions since the resources are spread across various regional institutions. Such spread of resources is ill advised because member states are resource strapped. Also it has led to duplication of roles. For instance IGAD, EAC and COMESA have early warning and response systems envisaged to play similar roles. Two, it may lead to potentially conflicting political commitments of states to opposing objectives. Three, it encourages states to evade the responsibility of addressing specific security problems by claiming that the responsibility lies with one or other sub-regional organizations.⁷⁴

⁷² U. Terlinden. *IGAD-Paper Tiger Facing Gigantic Tasks*. Op cit, p.16

⁷³ African Union, *Africa Peace and Security Architecture: 2010 Assessment Study*. Addis Ababa: African Union, 2010, p.76

⁷⁴ A. Fentaw, 'A Nascent Peace and Security Architecture in the Horn of Africa: Prospects and Challenges', *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, March, 2010, pp.3-4

IGAD's Lack of Resources and Capacities to Actualize Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism

The analysis so far shows that IGAD CEWARN is plagued by multiple challenges making it a paper tiger facing gigantic tasks.⁷⁵ The challenges are further exacerbated by weak resource – human and financial– capacity of IGAD. The resource constraints facing CEWARN means that even in a more ideal situation, it would still be incapable of implementing its early warning and response objectives.

Regarding financial capacity, CEWARN is dependent on donors to fund its activities. Member states contributions are hardly enough to cover the costs of running the secretariat, leave alone implementation of the programs. Currently CEWARN is funded by United States International Agency for Development (USAID) which contributes 50 percent of overall budget, German's GTZ (30 percent) and member states (20 percent).⁷⁶ This has led to unhealthy dependence on donors and compromises CEWARN's independence. Critically some member states especially Uganda, Eritrea and Somalia do not make their contributions regularly.⁷⁷ Significantly, lack of adequate financial resources mean that IGAD is incapable of undertaking response operations such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement which requires huge financial outlays.

Additionally the weak resources base means that CEWARN is incapable of recruiting the required number of staff to undertake its mandate. As noted, the AORs are covered by 33 persons who are expected to undertake early warning activities. Similarly the CEWARN situation room is manned by one professional staff. This situation is hardly conducive for

⁷⁵ U. Terlinden, *IGAD-Paper Tiger Facing Gigantic Tasks*, op cit, p.1

⁷⁶ Information provided by Legawork. Advisor, IGAD Peace and Security division

⁷⁷ United Nations University-Comparative Regional Integration Studies, *Capacity Survey: Regional and Other Intergovernmental Organizations in the Maintenance of Peace and Security*. Bruges: UNU-CRIS, 2008, p.85

mobilizing response since there is a need for communications to relevant policy makers and conducting of extensive lobbying so as to bring pastoral conflicts to the attention of leaders.

Conclusion

The chapter has critically and comprehensive analyzed the contribution of CEWARN to conflict management. It has shown that CEWARN has made modest contributions in the management of pastoral conflicts. These include setting up of early warning structures, generation of comprehensive data and knowledge of these conflicts and bringing them to the attention of policy makers. Additionally, it has assisted in local capacity building for peacemaking as well as providing funds under its Rapid Response Fund initiative, to local actors who are engaged in conflict management activities. However, despite the stated intentions, there exist gaps in both early warning and early response capacities. The gaps hinder the operation of CEWARN and unless addressed, CEWARN will remain a case of good policy undermined by poor implementation.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS

The study sought to examine the role of sub-regional organizations' conflict early warning systems in the management of conflict. To do so, the study used the IGAD's Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism as case study.¹ This mechanism has been labeled as pioneering and the most advanced in Africa. It represents a third generation early warning which structurally integrates early warning and response. Additionally CEWARN has adopted a cutting edge analytical model which employs the FAST system developed by the Swisspeace. The model covers all cycles of conflict and captures both escalationary and de-escalationary trends. This way, windows of opportunity for conflict management can be identified and exploited. Also it is possible to evaluate the impact of various interventions at any phase of conflict.²

Ideally conflict early warning and response systems have been termed as a progressive move aimed at entrenching the culture of preventing of conflicts from transforming into violence. However as the study has shown in analysis of various early warning systems in Africa and in particular CEWARN, it is one thing to have an elaborate structure of such systems on paper and transforming them into reality.³ To use the analogy of building the value, creativity and beauty of architectural designs can only be appreciated and evaluated once that design is transformed into a building. The reality is how various variables- financial and material resources, masons, engineers, suppliers and such-interact and actualize the plan will determine whether the design becomes a reality.

¹ See Chapter One

² See Chapter Four which analysis the structural and operational aspects of CEWARN

³ See Chapter Three and Four

Summary

To evaluate whether the grand designs of conflict early warning systems have been actualized and their utility achieved, the study was divided into six chapters. Chapter introduced the study by developing the research question. It noted that the post-cold war Africa out of experience has initiated several initiatives aimed at addressing the Spectre of violent conflicts which have been the bane of the continent. The desire to generate African solutions to African problems, have led to continental and sub-regional organizations incorporating peace and security issue in their mandates. Among the components established are conflict early warning and response systems. The systems aim at conflict prevention. However, this is not necessarily the case, hence the question, have they played their envisaged role.⁴ To answer the question the study used an analytical model which incorporates different aspects of conflict early warning and response, and whether they have been effectively addressed.⁵ This is because such mechanism can only perform their functions if they operate seamlessly as a system.

The second chapter brought out the conceptual issues on conflict early warning and response mechanisms. It showed that since 1950's early warning systems have been in place.⁶ However, the systems started making inroads into the field of conflict management during the post-cold war period.⁷ As relatively new entrants into this field, they have elicited various debates. The debates focus on their relevance (are they important or just another unnecessary feather in the hat of conflict management), what is the most appropriate analytical model (quantitative, qualitative or triangulated ones), how capable are they in predicting conflicts considering that human action is a product of complex process, what are the most appropriate indicators of capturing conflict

⁴ Chapter One

⁵ Chapter One, pp.21-23

⁶ Chapter Two, pp.26-27

⁷ Ibid, p.28

dynamics and lastly, who to warn.⁸ All these remain unsettled though it is generally agreed that with creativity it is possible to realize the utility of early warning and response system. Using a triangulated analytical model, and the right set of indicators, analyst can make 'good enough' predictions. More so, practically it is better to make a faulty prediction rather than make no prediction at all. Further it is now acknowledged that the ultimate goal of early warning is to generate early response in absence of early warning remains a more academic exercise.⁹

Chapter three provided an overview of conflict early warning systems in Africa. Beginning with the African Union's continental early warning systems, the chapter has shown that all sub-regional organizations have early warning systems, albeit there are variations in the extent of their development. At continental level, African Union's CEW has made modest advances, though it is faced with challenges such as harmonization with sub-regional early warning systems which have been identified as key pillars of CEW.¹⁰ Also, there exist financial and human constraints, inadequate institutionalization and weak response capabilities.¹¹

Regarding early warning systems at sub-regional levels, the picture is rather mixed. ECOWAS has made progress with an extensive early warning system backed by response capabilities, as civil society organizations. However, ECOWAS lacks depth in its coverage, is subject to both inter and extra-regional rivalries and lacks a supranational mandate.¹² When it comes to SADC, it has adopted an early warning system which is akin to regional traditional intelligence agency. This is because it involves linking of states intelligence agencies which source information on threats and generate early warning. The key challenges facing the system are weak

⁸ See Chapter Two, pp.33-47

⁹ A. Schnabel and H. Krummenacher, *Towards a Human Security Based Early Warning and Response System*, p.7. accessed at www.swisspeace.ch

¹⁰ Chapter Three, pp. 43-56

¹¹ *Ibid*, p.55

¹² *Ibid*, pp.56-60

implementation of constitutive protocols and strategy plans, absence of civil society participation, normative values incongruence, and structural weakness of SADC.¹³ Beyond these two early systems, and CEWARN, other sub-regional organizations only have nascent early warning and response mechanisms.

Chapter four provided has provided a detailed analysis of CEWARN. It has shown that operationally CEWARN has adopted a state of art structure which links early warning and response.¹⁴ Additionally, it has adopted a triangulated analytical model, which addresses the pitfalls of relying singly on either quantitative model.¹⁵ Since its inception, it has primarily focused on pastoral conflicts notable in Karamoja and Somali clusters. Further, through a structure which links the regional to the local, it has managed to establish field presence in its areas of reporting (AORs) and generated various early warning outputs such as incident and situational reports, which forecasts the pastoral conflicts and their dynamics.¹⁶ In its operation, CEWARN enjoys strong civil society engagement. Lastly, it has established a modest rapid response fund, whose goal is to capacity build local peace constituencies, respond and pre-empt imminent crisis and violence.¹⁷

Chapter five has examined the contributions of CEWARN to conflict management in IGAD sub-region. The chapter shows that CEWARN has generated a comprehensive data on pastoral conflicts, and importantly has brought to attention the hitherto peripheral conflicts among pastoral communities. More so, CEWARN has contributed to local peacemaking capacities which are critical in ensuring sustainable peace and overtime has issued alerts which have helped

¹³ Ibid, pp.60-66

¹⁴ Chapter Four

¹⁵ Ibid, pp.81-84

¹⁶ Ibid, pp. 80, 84, 90-91

¹⁷ Ibid, pp.80, 91

in preventing violence, inter-communal conflicts. It has also initiated pilot livestock tracking system to enhance the recovery of stolen stocks, piloted remote sensing and geomantic technology to capture the extent of environmental (in)security in its AORs and established a rapid response fund.¹⁸

Nevertheless, CEWARN has faced a raft of challenges, in both early warning and response. On early warning, the indicators have left out a critical kind of cattle rustling which is commercialized and prioritized.¹⁹ CEWARN also faces severe human and financial capacities, with thinly spread early warning staff. Other early warning challenges include the integrity of data generated, communication bottlenecks, weak institutionalization of CEWERUs, poor knowledge management and lack of access to traditional sources of intelligence.²⁰

On the response side, CEWARN faces a host of challenges which are borne out of the weakness of member states and IGAD's peace and security architecture. Truism is the stability and strength of a structure is dependent on its building blocks. Hence, the key challenges are that IGAD is founded on weak states, the states interactions are characterized by 'enmity' rather than 'amity', there lacks convergence of values, and the region is a crucible of regionalized violent conflicts. Also, there lacks a regional peace and security strategy to guide the tenor of regional security project, states belongs to multiple organizations and IGAD organs suffers from resource constraints.²¹ All these factors have made responses difficult to achieve.

Research Findings

Drawing from the findings made in various chapters, several issues have emerged. The issues are elaborated below:

¹⁸ Chapter Five, pp.96-104

¹⁹ Ibid, pp.104-105

²⁰ Ibid, pp.106-112

²¹ Ibid, pp.112-121

Firstly, conflict early warning and response mechanism are faced with various fundamental issues which challenge their *raison d'être*. Indeed, whether they are necessary remains an enduring question and these can only be answered if the system can practically undertake their envisaged mandate and prove their relevance.

Secondly, the idea of a system means that, conflict early warning and response mechanisms should be seamlessly integrated. Shortcomings in one aspect say indicators, or analytical model will have systemic consequences. Hence, systems integrity must be maintained in all phases of early warning and response.

Thirdly, accurate predicting of conflict is impossible since the main objects on analysis are human beings. Human beings are complex and exhibit varied responses to similar stimuli. As such, the goal of early warning is to generate a good enough prediction of violent conflicts.

Fourthly, that accurate prediction is not possible demands that early warning systems should adopt a triangulated analytical model which incorporates solid empirical data, intuition, expert insights, field observation and other contextual factors. Significantly, they should opt for an all-source approach to intelligence gathering. Though they are supposed to operate as open systems, open source intelligence is inadequate and should be corroborated by traditional intelligence as well as data from any other source.

Fifthly, no matter how progressive or visionary early warning and response systems are, they do not operate in a vacuum. They are a part of sub-regional peace and security project. Thus, whatever weaknesses plague the working of sub-regional organizations- environmental, legal, financial and human resource, attributes and conduct of members – will have consequences on early warning, early response or both. Hence, sub-regional organizations need to be strengthened, if the mandate of their organs is to be achieved.

Sixth, early warning and response activities should be simultaneously governmental and societal processes. This is more so in areas where the power reach of states is weak and the vacuum left has been filled up by civil non-state actors. Thus, the systems should have strong civil society component and both the government and societal group should act in concert: each bringing on to the table its unique capacities.

Objectives and Hypotheses of the Study

On the strength of these findings, the following section examines whether the study has achieved its objective and tests the hypothesis. The first objective was to analyze the conceptual and theoretical issues on conflict early warning systems.²² This has been achieved in chapter two which has provided a detailed analysis of various conceptual issues early warning system.

The second objective was to provide an overview of early warning systems in Africa.²³ The objective has been met in chapter three which has examined conflict early warning system beginning with the African Union CEW.

The third objective was to examine the contribution of CEWARN to IGAD's peace and security architecture.²⁴ The objective has been met in chapter four and five. The chapters have examined the structuring of CEWARN, its outputs and how the outputs have contributed to peace and security through conflict management.

The fourth objective was to identify the challenges which have hampered the performance of CEWARN.²⁵ This objective has been met in chapter four which has analytically brought the early warning and early response challenges.

²² Chapter One, p.5

²³ Ibid. p.5

²⁴ Ibid. p.5

²⁵ Ibid. p.5

Having achieved the objective set out the onset of the study, the key question is whether the hypotheses have been validated or nullified. The first hypothesis was that CEWARN is founded on an inappropriate epistemology.²⁶ The hypothesis has been nullified. This is because CEWARN is conceptualized as a third generation model, has a dual approach to security (both state and human), conceptualize conflict as a cyclical process as evidenced by indicators, and uses a triangulated analytical model.

The second hypothesis was that CEWARN has contributed to the success of IGAD's peace and security architecture.²⁷ The second hypothesis is neutral since as the study has shown, CEWARN has had a modest success, but the success is limited to pastoral conflicts. This in no doubt has addressed some threats to peace and security, however considering the different types of conflicts in the sub-region, the contribution is limited.

The third hypothesis was that CEWARN has not achieved its goals as envisaged in the constitutive protocol.²⁸ The hypothesis has been validated because as the study has shown particularly in chapter five, CEWARN is facing multiple challenges which have hampered its early warning and response activities. As such, there exist gaps between its mandate and what in reality has been achieved.

Conclusion

Sub-regional conflict early warning and early response have had mixed outcomes. They reflect a commitment to preventive culture and a desire for African solutions to African problems. However, intention no matter how lofty it is does not equate reality. Having a beautiful dream is a good thing, but without taking concrete measures to actualize it means that it will remain just a

²⁶ Ibid. p.20

²⁷ Ibid. p.20

²⁸ Ibid. p.21

dream. Africa has dreamt for long and now it is time to walk the talk and talk the talk. This must be done through faithfully observing the treaties states concludes and implementing them in good faith, instead of hiding their heads under heaps of treaties documents like the proverbial ostrich.

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Interview Guide for Interviewers

Serial No.....

Dear Respondent:

This interview is a part of a research project required for the award Master of Arts degree in International Conflict Management course at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi. Kindly answer the following questions:

General Information

Name.....(Optional)

Job/ professional Position.....

(The questions are divided into four categories which cover different dimensions of peace and security architecture. These are: Organizational capacity, resource and operational capacity, internal and external relations)

Organizational Capacity

1. What is IGAD's capacity in the following areas:

I. Early warning system *(focuses on the following issues)*

- What are the types of security concerns in the sub-region?
- What is the capacity for gathering information on the identified concerns?
- What is the capacity for processing and analysis information gathered?
- What are the challenges facing the implementation of early warning mechanisms?

2. Response Mechanisms *(focuses on the following issues)*

II. How does IGAD respond to information indicating threats to peace and security?

- Is there an institutionalised mechanism for response or is it ad hoc?
- Does IGAD have structures for mediation, peace building, peace keeping and peace enforcement, assessment and evaluation of implementation processes?
- How would you rate IGAD's overall capacity for peace and security information management and response?

Resource Capacity

3. What are the main sources of funding for IGAD's peace and security activities

4. Is the funding adequate for its peace and security operations?

5. Does IGAD have the required personnel in terms of numbers and expertise to undertake its peace and security functions?

Operational Capacity

6. What peace and security missions have IGAD undertaken *(focuses on various methods of third party interventions such as :*

- Inquiries

- Conciliation
- Mediation
- Peacekeeping and peace enforcement
- Post conflict peace building

7. What are the challenges faced when undertaking these activities (*focuses on issues such as :*)

- Logistics
- Financing
- Political commitments by member state
- Extra-regional involvement
- Personnel

Internal and External Relations

8. What is the nature of inter-state relations within IGAD sub region?

9. How do these relations impact on IGAD's peace and security activities?

10. Apart from geographical criterion of membership, does IGAD have other requirements based on political and social benchmarks which members must adhere to?

11. If these requirements are there, what are the enforcement mechanisms?

12. How does IGAD balance the need to respect member states' sovereignty and to intervene in execution of its mandate?

13. How does IGAD manage bilateral peace and security relations between member and non-member states that impact on its peace and security activities?

Any Other Issues

14. Are there any other issues which impacts negatively on IGAD's peace and security architecture?

Thank you for your cooperation