THE IMPACT OF REFUGEES ON SECURITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: AN APPRAISAL /)

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
DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work and has not been submitted for a degree in any other University

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Florence Munanye Joel   Date

This thesjS'-hSsTtaen submitted for examination with my approval as University supervisor.

Dr. Ibrahim Farah   Date

DEDICATION

To my dearest daughter Mary Mueni in Josnah Academy, refugees and their host communities all over the globe, especially refugees in the horn of Africa, not forgetting refugees from southern Sudan who are in Kakuma and Dadaab refugee camps all situated in Kenya. Congratulations to Southern Sudan for attaining independence. Congratulations to UNHCR for the good work they are doing for these stateless people (refugees).

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Finally, I thank all my friends and colleagues for their invaluable support and encouragement throughout the work .1 thank you all abundantly and wholeheartedly for your encouragement and being with me during the period of my studies. I, however, remain solely responsible for any criticisms and short comings in this paper.

ABSTRACT

This study is concerned with refugees and their impacts on security in the Horn of Africa. Chapter one gives an introduction to the study. It begins by naming the countries forming the Horn of Africa and the factors contributing to refugees' influx in the region. The next chapters discuss the impacts of refugees on security in the Horn of Africa. Throughout the World, the UNHCR is not only concerned with the hosting, feeding, sheltering, clothing and educating the refugees but also addressing their impact on the host communities that face the consequences of their presence. In the effort to host protracted refugees, many developing host communities face various forms of socio-cultural influence, security and economic challenges. Previous findings from research on hosting refugees have shown that the burdens of the refugees' presence in the host communities surpass the benefits. However, the findings of this study are rather the opposite since the benefits are also noticeable. The overall objective of the study is to provide an appraisal of the impacts of the refugees on security in the horn of Africa. This study examines the socio-cultural and economic impacts of the presence of refugees and security in the horn of Africa. However, there are some minor negative developments as a result of the refugees' presence for almost two decades in the Horn of Africa. Refugees' presence on the host community for example in Eastleigh Kenya has upgraded the place from a small estate to a business centre. The study found the types of development that can be associated with the presence of refugees to include employment of the local community, cultural exchange and skills. Donation sent to refugees by their relatives in the Diaspora spillover to the locals. This study has used conceptual framework. Political and economic problems force people to flee their countries to look for better and secure land. Weak and failed states in the Horn of Africa are prone to terrorists' attacks due to bad governance and lack of security. Other scholars have also written about the refugees in the Horn of Africa and security officials have made the study successful. This study recommends that among other positive aspects towards refugees, change of attitude towards them, understanding them and the problems contributing to their migration is important. We should change our perception towards refugees and learn to live together as one people, one community to minimize conflicts. Let us give them warm reception, freedom of movement and allow them to have access to resources to improve their living standards.

List of Abbreviations

AIDS- Acquired Immuno-Disease Syndrome

AU- African Union

CTJF-HOA- Combined Joint task Force-Horn of Africa

HIV- Human Immune Virus

IDPs-Internally Displaced Persons

IGAD- Inter-Governmental Authority on Development

IGPs- Income Generating Programs

IJ-Islamic Jihad

NGOs-Non-Governmental Organizations

RAD- Refugees Affairs Department

RHA- Refugee Hosting Area

SPLA-Sudan People's Liberation Army

UN- United Nations

UNEP-United Nations Environmental Program

UNHCR-United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

US- United States of America

USA ID- U.S Agency for International Development

WFP- World Food Programme

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<center>**CHAPTER ONE**</center>

<center>**INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY**</center>

1.0 Introduction

The refugee issue is as complex as its causes, solutions and effects. It is important to note that the primary victims of the refugee problem are always individuals. Nonetheless, it also manifests itself in various forms on the societal, governmental and international levels. Obviously, it is a clear humanitarian, moral and development issue facing humanity. Indeed, its scope is wide enough to have significant bearing on security, environmental and natural resources concerns.[1] However, a casual look back into history tells us that the refugee movement is not a recent phenomenon. For instance, the Israelites were made refugees on several lands as they moved from Egypt to the Promised Land.

The world of refugee problem is caused by a variety of reasons; factors and forces. These include massive violations of human rights, especially the practice of colonialism, direct and structural violence, war, internal conflicts, external aggression, ethnic and religious strife, direct political persecution and economic and national disasters. Nevertheless, most refugee movements today are caused by conflict. Contemporary conflicts are mostly of an internal, inter-communal nature.[3] The Horn of Africa has in the most recent history been constantly marred by violent conflicts. In this study the Horn of Africa will refer to countries that form the Inter-Government Authority on Development (IGAD) namely Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda.

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[1] H. Hakovirta, (1988), "The Global Refugee Problem: A model and Its Application". *International Political Science Review* (1993), Vol.14, No. 1, pp. 35-57.
[2] Exodus 12:31-51.The Bible.
[3] L. Gil, (1992), "Refugee Movements and International Security". Brassey's for The International Institute for Strategic Study. Published by Brassey's for the IISS.

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Mwagiru observes that the pattern of conflicts in the Horn of Africa is depressing because conflicts in the region have been highly destructive[4]. But it is also interesting because it brings into focus the regional dimension and the nexus in the conflict system. In these rough neighborhoods, displaced people face challenging environments, and often impose economic, environmental and security burdens on their hosts. But to view refugees as passive victims, waiting for relief handouts and bringing nothing but trouble to their host countries, fails to see the multiple ways in which they pursue livelihoods for themselves and in so doing can contribute to the economic vitality of host areas.

The main focus of the study is to explore the threats posed by refugees on security in the Horn of Africa and circumstances forcing them to go against the law.

1.1 The statement of the research problem

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that the Horn of Africa has over half a million refugees from at least four countries Somali, Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea.[5] Refugees and instability normally go hand-in-hand. In 1992 to 2008, enormous number of refugees entered Kenya from Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and other parts of great lakes and the Horn of Africa. Influx of the refugees is seen to escalate the rate of violent crimes, proliferation of small arms, drug trafficking, armed banditry and cattle rustling among others.

Many refugees face serious humanitarian crises due to the fact that, many reception countries are also beset by severe economic problems, including decreasing agricultural production, stalled industrialization, and rising foreign debt burdens. The hospitality of host

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[4] M. Makumi, (1997). The Greater Horn of Africa Conflict System: Conflict Patterns, Strategies and Management Practices.

[3] UNHCR, (2005). *UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2005* New York, NY: UNHCR.

countries in Africa is beginning to wear thin, especially for those refugees without assistance and protection. The presence of refugees in the horn of Africa due to intra-state wars has resulted to deterioration of security.

The refugee policies of the host government or in cases where the central government's remit is weak, the local authorities are a key determinant of refugees' vulnerability and their ability to pursue livelihoods. In many host countries, refugees suffer from the absence of civil, social and economic rights including freedom of movement and residence; freedom of speech and assembly; fair trial; property rights, the right to engage in wage labor, self-employment and the conclusion of valid contracts; access to school education, access to credit; protection against physical and sexual abuse, harassment, unlawful detention and deportation.[6]

This study is focused to explore the impacts of refugees on security in the horn of Africa. The study seeks to identify ways in which humanitarian assistance can increase economic security in the refugee hosting area by supporting livelihoods and sharing up the rights of both refugees and their host communities. By the end of the study, will the presence of refugees in the horn of Africa have any impact on security? Do refugees have only negative impacts on the host community or they have some benefits?

1.2 Objectives of the study

The overall objective of the study is to provide an appraisal of the impacts of the refugees on security in the horn of Africa. More specifically the study aims to:

- Provide an overview of the refugee situation in the Horn of Africa sub-region.

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[6] G. Kibreab, (2001). "Displacement, Loss and Constraints on (Re)-Construction of Sustainable Livelihoods," Paper prepared for Workshop, "Moving Targets. " Cornell University, November 2001.

- To examine the extent to which refugees are a security threat in the Horn of Africa.

- To explore the theoretical linkage between the refugees and security.

1.3 LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter reviews literature relevant to the study. It will explore the impact of refugees on security in the horn of Africa. The study will highlight on areas covering the horn of Africa and will also give an estimate of refugees in the region. The study will look at refugees' pursuit of livelihoods and their impacts on host communities. The study will identify ways of improving the living standards of refugees and minimize competition of resources with the local community.

1.3.1 The Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa refers to countries that form the Inter-Government Authority on Development (IGAD) namely Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that the Horn of Africa has over half a million refugees from at least four countries Somali, Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea.[7] Refugee camps are a hotbed of discontent producing a large, disaffected population open to criminal activities and terrorist recruitment. For example, the Kenyan government, and UNHCR believe that the Dadaab refugee camp on the Somalia-Kenya border is a reputed terrorist training ground for Islamic extremists.[8]

Refugees and instability normally go hand-in-hand. The mere fact that these individuals abandon their homes and valuables indicate a problem (e.g. civil war, humanitarian disasters, insecurity, economic disparity, famine, and political upheaval and

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[7] UNHCR, (2005). *UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2005* New York, NY: UNHCR.
[8] Ibid

violence) exists. While most experts agree that instability and poverty are linked, not all believe that poverty and terrorism are as closely connected. Fisher argues that the Saudis involved in the 11 September attacks were generally spoiled; educated men that were brainwashed by evil people with evil intent.[9] Frustration and desperation on the inability to escape from a life of poverty, social and political injustice are the roots of terrorism in the Horn of Africa.

The Horn of Africa has been marred by conflicts for many decades resulting to influx of refugees in the region. Applying Buzan's theory provides deeper insights into how different types of conflict suddenly erupt and quickly spread in space and time and also into the interplay between these different types. Security complexes are exposed to four major types of threats and their interaction: balance of power contests between great powers; lingering conflicts which emerge between states; intra-states conflicts which are usually spillovers of internal politics; and, conflicts which arise from trans-national threats caused, for instance, by the rise of radical Islam and informal networks, state fragility, demographic explosion, environmental degradation or resource scarcity.

1.3.2 Refugees' pursuit of livelihood and their impact on host Communities

Protracted refugee situations give rise to problems for the host community and refugees alike. Rutinwa et al observes that the most significant are security problems, which can include military incursions from the sending country, increased local crime and violence, predation on refugees and thence the local community by war lords and bandits, and often

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[9] *J.* Fisher, (2005). "U.S. Counter-Terrorism Official Reports Progress to African", *Washington File,* 5 may 2005.

an increase in organized crime including gun running, drug smuggling and human trafficking.[10]

A related set of problems is the economic impact. The nature of this impact varies and it is often difficult to determine what can be specifically attributed to the refugees. In conflict-affected Refugee Hosting Areas, local microeconomic systems are often already destroyed or badly frayed by insecurity or prior economic problems. Kibreab et al argues that although Refugees bring new problems including pressure on scarce economic resources, this effect is often mixed, because refugees can also bring resources with them."

The refugee policies of the host government or in cases where the central government's remit is weak, the local authorities are a key determinant of refugees' vulnerability and their ability to pursue livelihoods. Kibreab argues that in many host countries, refugees suffer from the absence of civil, social and economic rights including freedom of movement and residence; freedom of speech and assembly; fair trial; property rights, the right to engage in wage labor, self-employment and the conclusion of valid contracts; access to school education, access to credit; protection against physical and sexual abuse, harassment, unlawful detention and deportation.[12]

The main policy factors preventing refugees' pursuit of livelihoods are: host governments' desire that refugees be allowed only as temporary guests (no permanent residence); poor standards of protection and physical security for refugees; restrictions on

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[10] B. Rutinwa, (1999). "Refugee Protection and Interstate Security: Lessons from the Recent Tensions Between Burundi and Tanzania." Oxford, March.
" G. Kibreab, (1996). *People on the Edge in the Horn. Displacement, Land Use & the Environment in the Gedaref Region, Sudan.* (N.J.: Red Sea Press, Inc.).
[12] G. Kibreab, (2001). "Displacement, Loss and Constraints on (Reconstruction of Sustainable Livelihoods," Paper prepared for Workshop. "Moving Targets.. " Cornell University, November 2001.

freedom of movement and settlement, and restrictions on property rights and employment. In many host countries, refugees are widely treated as illegal migrants, with few rights and little protection by the government. Hyndman and Nylund observes that most refugees living in border zones are prima facie refugees, i.e. they have not undergone formal determination procedures and do not qualify as legal refugees.[13] Kibreab argument makes sense because, if the refugees are denied their freedom to pursue their livelihood, they turn to other means of earning their living i.e. proliferation of arms, drunk trafficking, conflict proliferation in the region and terrorism among others. These activities are illegal therefore threatening regional security in the hom of Africa.

Anderson argues that when refugees are allowed to gain access to resources, have freedom of movement and can work alongside their hosts to pursue productive lives, they will be less dependent on aid, and better able to overcome the sources of tension and conflict in their host communities.[14] They will help mend the fraying economic fabric that binds communities and strengthen what Anderson calls peace economies in contrast to war economies.

According to Burton, if basic needs namely; food, healthy, and security among others is not met then conflict is inevitable.[15] Refugee flows may imply the direct "importation" of combatants, arms, and ideologies from neighboring states that facilitate the spread of conflict. Refugees fleeing conflict centers physically expand the geographic scope of social networks to their receiving areas.

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[13] J. Hyndman, and B.V. Nylund, (1998). "UNHCR and the Status of Prima Facie Refugees in Kenya," *International Journal of Refugee Law* 10, (1/2).

[14] M. Anderson, (1999). *Do No Harm - How Aid Can Affect Peace - and War.* Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

[15] J. Burton, (1990), Human needs theory New York. Martin's press.

Large refugee inflows can upset the economic and social equilibrium in receiving areas, sparking discontent and a feeling of threat. Both the refugees and indigenous group become frustrated because both of them are unable to satisfy their basic needs. They all compete for the scarce resource. They use illegal means to satisfy their needs. Prolonged serious cuts in refugee aid including life sustaining assistance such as food, has also forced refugees to turn to crime to survive thus enraging, further the local communities and the government. Furthermore, if refugees are seen as threatening to the local balance of power and the distribution of resources, conflict may ensue having in mind that human security is a basic need.

1.3.3 The humanitarian assistance in the refugee hosting areas

The arrival of humanitarian assistance following a refugee influx creates a new set of livelihood resources in the RHA. These resources appear in two forms. The first is formal livelihood support programs, like income generating activities, which are directly implemented by aid agencies in camps and official settlements and sometimes in the host community itself. Relief interventions target many parts of the livelihood system, ranging from food security, water safety, and environment protection, to disease control and management of community resources.[16]

The second way in which livelihood is supported by humanitarian assistance is through indirect economic stimuli to the RHA economy. Relief agencies create new economic inputs and demands that spread beyond the camps, creating livelihood opportunities for both locals and refugees. New demands include the need for services like

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[16] J. Crisp, (2001). "Mind the Gap! UNHCR, humanitarian assistance and the development process." UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 43, May.

trucking and delivery, construction, administration or translation. New inputs take the form of relief commodities that are traded throughout the RHA often creating entire new regional economies. For example, the trading of food aid and merchandise from refugee camps within RHAs and across borders has evolved into a complex and multifaceted system, supporting the livelihoods of different social groups including unaccompanied youths. It is common for some part of the UNHCR/WFP food package to be bartered in exchange for missing or desired items of food available locally in the host community.Where humanitarian inputs occur in conflict-affected areas, the consequences can be negative when the resources become targeted by warlords and other forms of organized crime, or when competition for them leads to violence and further conflict.

Income generating programs (IGPs) are intended to enable refugees to attain 'self-sufficiency' by providing economic inputs and training for livelihood activities like agriculture, service provision (e.g. food vending, charcoal making) or trade. The idea behind self-sufficiency or self-reliance is that most refugees are able to support themselves and should not be forced to depend on food assistance while awaiting their return.[17] Some host governments therefore allow refugees to farm or pursue income generating activities. In a few cases, IGPs are linked to a policy of local integration, where refugees are helped to pursue their livelihoods as part of the host community. This helps to minimize conflict with the local community.

Refugees from neighboring countries can increase the risk of intrastate conflict. The effect holds up even when controlling for the main factors believed to be associated with civil war, including transnational variables, and when using different operational

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[17] UNHCR Uganda, (1999). Strategy Paper: Self Reliance for Refugee Hosting Areas, 1999 - 2003. With Office of the Prime Minister, Kampala, Uganda.

indicators. The Government in conjunction with the United Nations high commissioner for refugees should grant refugees freedom to pursue their livelihood in the host countries. This will help to minimize conflict over resources. However, further research into the diffusion of war is warranted to assess the importance of other spillover mechanisms.

1.4 Justification of the study

A study done in relation to refugees' impact on security in the horn of Africa is inadequate. It has been difficult for the hom of Africa to maintain peace and security in the region. Due to political instability, there has been a lot of movement by a big population to seek refuge in the neighboring countries. The refugee policies of the host government or in cases where the central government's remit is weak, the local authorities are a key determinant of refugees' vulnerability and their ability to pursue livelihoods.

In many host countries, refugees suffer from the absence of civil, social and economic rights including freedom of movement and residence; freedom of speech and assembly; fair trial; property rights, the right to engage in wage labor, self-employment and the conclusion of valid contracts; access to school education, access to credit; protection against physical and sexual abuse, harassment, unlawful detention and deportation.

The main policy factors preventing refugees' pursuit of livelihoods are: host governments' desire that refugees be allowed only as temporary guests (no permanent residence); poor standards of protection and physical security for refugees; restrictions on freedom of movement and settlement, and restrictions on property rights and employment. In many host countries, refugees are widely treated as illegal migrants, with few rights and little protection by the government. Most refugees living in border zones are prima facie

refugees, i.e. they have not undergone formal determination procedures and do not qualify as legal refugees.

To bridge this gap of knowledge, conclusions arrived at in this study will be of great importance to both academicians and policy-makers. The study envisions that having knowledge of refugee rights is useful in designing management strategies of dealing with refugee impact on social, economic and political security in the horn of Africa. The study will enable policy makers to come up with better policies which grant refugees freedom of livelihood. Whatever policies they put in place, to respect refugees' rights. This will enable the region to minimize conflict between refugees and indigenous people in the region.

It is remarkable then that refugees are able to pursue any sort of livelihood, but many do, usually because local communities see the value of their activities and benefit from them, and authorities turn a blind eye, or are encouraged to do so with bribes. Policy makers will be meant to understand that like other marginalized groups, refugees are experts in the art of survival.

1.5 Conceptual framework

Barry Buzan's pioneering study of People, States and Fear was the first sustained and serious attempt to put forward guiding ideas pertaining to the concept of regional security. According to Ayoob, one major benefit of Buzan's theory is that it enables analysts to challenge prevalent conceptions and 'talk about regional security in terms of the pattern of relations among members of the security complex.[18] In the first place and in security terms, Buzan argued that a region 'means that a distinct and significant subsystem of security relations exists among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into

'V Ayoob, (1995). *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

geographical proximity with each other.'"' Buzan's theory is applicable in this study since it is confined in one region and in our case (the Horn of Africa). Moreover; military and political threats are more significant, potentially imminent and strongly felt when states are at close range.

The frustration-aggression hypothesis of violence is prominent in the literature. This hypothesis is based mostly on the relative-deprivation hypothesis, as proposed by Gurr, an expert on violent behaviors and movements,[20] and reformulated by Davies to include a gap between rising expectations and need satisfaction.[21] Relative deprivation is believes oneself to be entitled to have. It refers to the discontent people feel when they compare their positions to others and realize that they have less than them. Schaefer defines it as "the conscious experience of a negative discrepancy between legitimate expectations and present actualities.[23] It is a term used in social sciences to describe feelings or measures of economic, political, or social deprivation that are relative rather than absolute. Refugees feel discriminated when they experience being deprived of something which they should have. They compare themselves with others who have access of resources in both state of origin and host state. If their voice is not heard then tension develops hence conflict. Those unable to cope with conflict flee for safety, and others form terror groups to revenge.

1.6 Hypotheses

The study will test the following hypotheses;

- There is a linkage between refugees and insecurity.

[19] B. Buzan, (1991). *People, Slates and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era.* London: Harvester Wheat sheaf.
[20] T. Gurr, (1970). *Why Men Rebel.* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970.
[21] T. R. Davies, (1970). "Aggression, Violence, Revolution and War." Pages 234-60 in Jeanne N. Knutson, ed., *Handbook of Political Psychology.* San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973.
[22] J. Smith, (2001). *Relative Deprivation: Specification, Development, and Integration,* Cambridge University Press.
[23] T. Schaefer, (2008). *Racial and Ethnic Groups, llth Ed.,* Pearson Education, 2008, p. 69.

- The presence of refugees impacts negatively on security in the host country.

- Bad governance leads to Refugee influx

1.7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study examines the impacts of refugees on security in the Horn of Africa. The study is confined within the Horn of Africa sub-region. Primary and secondary data have been used for the study. Primary data is derived from focus group discussions held with refugees and security officers.

Secondary data will be obtained from books, documentaries, magazines, newspapers, internet, documents from UNHCR, Refugee law projects, British Council library and Catholic of East Africa library.

There is limited secondary data since there are very few documents on refugees and security. To add on that, available documents do not give detailed information. It is difficult to collect accurate data since some of the refugees do not want identification. Language barrier is a problem so they are not able to express themselves. Time allocated for the study is not enough.

1.8 Chapter outline

The study is structured into five chapters;

- Chapter one: Introduction to the study.

- Chapter two: An overview.

- Chapter three: An appraisal.

- Chapter four: A critical analysis.

- Chapter five: Conclusions.

CHAPTER TWO

THE IMPACT OF REFUGEES ON SECURITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: AN OVERVIEW

2.0 Introduction

The previous chapter gave an introduction to the study. It looked at the refugees general situations from the international arena to the host countries in general and the possible impacts on the host communities. The chapter captured that refugee movements in most of the time have different causes so also as it impact on the host communities. Also, in recent time refugee movement has increased globally and most ended up in developing and poor countries.

This chapter gives an overview of refugees and security in the Horn of Africa. It will review related literature to the research topic. It will look at theoretical and historical background of refugees. The study looks at the protracted nature of refugees in the horn of Africa.

2.1 Refugees in the Horn of Africa

Though theoretical knowledge is crucial in providing a good foundation and better understanding in any academic research of importance very little theories exist in refugee research. Musoke, is of the view that until very recently most of the research and the resulting literature on the impact of refugees to host communities and the subsequent government policies on refugee protection have been guided and inspired by the population theory by Thomas edited by James that population growth generally affect the natural

resources of a country and for that matter refugee host communities.24 He cited pressure on food as an example.

The migration problem in the Horn of Africa has been substantial in the past four decades. Bariagaber observes that, during the period between 1978 and 1995, flows of refugees in the region peaked.[25] The political overthrow of the Ethiopian Imperial Government in 1974, the independence struggle of Eritrea, the war between Ethiopia and Somalia between 1977 and 1978, and the civil conflict in Sudan and Somalia in the 1980s have all been mentioned as major catalysts of large involuntary movements of people in the region.[26]

Exploring the causes of the migration patterns in the Horn of Africa is complex due to the fact that there are so many agents present at the same time. Bariagaber says that untangling the causes of refugee formations in the Horn of Africa requires examination of a host of factors, including ethnic and religious conflicts, irredentist and separatist-inspired violence, international war between countries in the region, and intervention in domestic conflicts by external powers. Berhanu et al has noted that, apart from war and political issues, ecological factors are also seen as drivers of population movements in the Horn of

[24]**K**. Musoke, (2004). "A Critique of Demographic and Economic Determinism on the Question of the Impact of Refugees" Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam.T. Maltus, (1798), "An Essay on the Principle of Population" (ed.) by P. James, (1989). Vol. 1, Cambridge University Press.

[25] A. Bariagaber, (2006). *Conflict and the Refugee Experience: Flight, Exile and Repatriation in the Horn of Africa.* United Kingdom: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.

[26]Ibid. (1997). pp. 26-42.

[27] A. Bariagaber, (1999). States, International Organizations and the Refugee: Reflections on the Complexity of Managing the Refugee crisis in the Horn of Africa. *The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 37,* no. 4, pp. 597-619.

Africa.' Governments also played a large role in manipulating population movements, often out of security reasons.

The refugee crisis that eventually developed in the Horn of Africa is complex. Refugee flows have shown variations over time and over countries, but variations can also be seen within countries over time. Moreover, the refugee crisis in the Horn of Africa is different from other refugee crises in the world, due to different factors. First, the area has seen substantial interventions by external, international actors, which often led to an intensification of conflict. Second, due to inter-linkages of political issues in the region, all countries became sending, transit, and destination countries for refugees, often at the same time. These refugees were often used as bargaining objects in political matters, which in turn made the political conflicts more intense. Bariagaber observes that the nature of the conflicts and the accompanying refugee formations in the region, have become temporally more enduring, spatially more extensive, emotionally more intense, and less amenable to • • • lQ compromise and negotiated solutions.

The Horn of Africa became internationally known for its refugee problem mainly because of the high number of refugees: millions of people crossed the borders of their countries to seek refuge elsewhere. Their living conditions in, for example, refugee camps were often horrendous. After 1986 the Horn of Africa became the top Refugee-sending region in Africa.[30] Most of the refugees in the area, however, were migrants from Ethiopia,

[28] B. Berhanu, and M. White, (2000). War, Famine, and Female Migration in Ethiopia, 1960-1989. *Economic Development and Cultural Change, 49(\),* pp. 91-113.
[29] A. Bariagaber, (1999). States, International Organizations and the Refugee: Reflections on the Complexity of Managing the Refugee crisis in the Horn of Africa. *The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 37, no.* 4, pp. 597-619.
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moving to neighboring countries Somalia, Djibouti, and the Sudan. The country has seen tremendous displacement of people, compared to other African countries.

2.2 The Security Complex Theory

Barry Buzan's pioneering study of People, States and Fear was the first sustained and serious attempt to put forward guiding ideas pertaining to the concept of regional security. According to Ayoob, one major benefit of Buzan's theory is that it enables analysts to challenge prevalent conceptions and 'talk about regional security in terms of the pattern of relations among members of the security complex.   In the first place and in security terms, Buzan argued that a region 'means that a distinct and significant subsystem of security relations exists among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each   other.'[32] Moreover, military and political threats are more significant, potentially imminent and strongly felt when states are at close range.

Buzan stressed that regional security systems such as South Asia with, for instance, the military standoff between India and Pakistan can be seen in terms of balance of power as well as patterns of amity which are relationships involving genuine friendship as well as expectations of protection or support, and of enmity which are relationships set by suspicion and fear arising from 'border disputes, interests in ethnically related populations, to long-standing historical links, whether   positive or negative'.[33] These patterns are, according to Buzan, confined in a particular geographical area. He used and popularized the term security complex to designate the ensuing formation. Buzan defines security complex as 'a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently

[31]M. Ayoob, (1995). *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System.* Boulder Lynne Rienner.
[32] B. Buzan, (1991). *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era.* London: Harvester Wheat sheaf.
"Ibid.

closely that, their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.' Such complexes 'are held together not by the positive influences of shared interest, but by shared rivalries. According to Sheehan, the dynamics of security contained within these levels operate across a broad spectrum of sectors - military, political, economic, societal and environmental.'[34]

Buzan's theory provides deeper insights into how different types of conflict suddenly erupt and quickly spread in space and time and also into the interplay between these different types. Security complexes are exposed to four major types of threats and their interaction: balance of power contests between great powers; lingering conflicts which emerge between states; intra-states conflicts which are usually spillovers of internal politics; and, conflicts which arise from trans-national threats caused, for instance, by the rise of radical Islam and informal networks, state fragility, demographic explosion, environmental degradation or resource scarcity.

2.3 The Horn of Africa

In a narrow geographic sense, the Horn of Africa is that northeastern part of the African continent which faces in the east the Red Sea, in the southeast the Indian Ocean and in the west the Nile Basin. The Horn of Africa is described by farer as conventionally comprising the key states of Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti, though it embraces geopolitically the adjoining states of Sudan and Kenya.[35] It should also be pointed out that Uganda which is a

[34] M. Sheehan, (2005). *International Security: An Analytical Survey.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner. pp. 49-60.
[35] T. Farer, (1979). *War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: The Widening Storm.* New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. S. Danfulani, (1999). 'Regional Security and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa: Somalian Reconstruction after the Cold War.' *International Studies, vol. 36, no. I.*

member of IGAD, Yemen, Libya and Egypt are not less involved in the issues and processes of the region, certainly having an impact on power balances and developments. All these states share social and cultural values emanating from a centuries-old tradition of interrelationships, common religious practices and economic linkages. Furthermore, the political fate of each state in the region has always been inextricably intertwined with that of neighboring states. Indeed, no state in the Horn of Africa has been insulated from the problems of the other states no matter how distant, no matter how strong or weak.

The six states which make up the Horn of Africa cover an area of around five million square kilometers and had in 2000 a total population of about one hundred and thirty point one million which grew to one hundred and seventy million in 2008. The region's average population growth rate, of not less than two point nine percent, is one of the highest population growth rates of the world and nearly half of the population is under 14 years of age. In the Horn of Africa which is the meeting point between Muslim, Christian and Animist cultures, Muslims constituted in 2000 a slight majority, making up some forty four percent of a one hundred and thirty point one million population forty three percent of whom were Christians.

The Horn of Africa can be characterized as the most deprived and the poorest region in Africa, if not in the world. In the region, the most basic needs of life (clean water, food, health care and education) are not available to the majority of the population. In the Horn of Africa, per capita income, life expectancy and literacy are among the lowest in the world while adult and infant mortality are among the highest. The region is prone to deadly droughts which hamper crop and livestock production. These droughts result in food deficits each year thus making the Horn of Africa one of the most food insecure regions of

the world. In 2008, OCHA gave an estimate of seventeen million people who were in need of emergency assistance in the horn of Africa.[36]

According to Shinn, the Horn of Africa is the most conflict-ridden region in the world [37] with conflict exacerbated by external interference and accompanied by widespread human rights violations, raging sometimes simultaneously within and between states. In fact, the African continent's longest-running intra-state conflicts, the Eritrean conflict and the South-Sudanese conflict with an estimated death toll of over two million, took place in the Horn of Africa. It is also generally held that, due to the abovementioned natural and man-made disasters, the Horn of Africa has the highest Percentage of refugees, estimated to have reached in 2003 seven hundred thousand which is roughly Djibouti's population, and internally displaced persons in Africa, a trend reinforcing future cycles of conflict. In 2008, the total number of internally displaced persons in Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia and Uganda was estimated at two point seventy four million out of which an estimated one point three million people were displaced in Somalia which is one of the world's worst humanitarian disasters . In Sudan alone, in 2003, there were over 4 million internally displaced persons, virtually Eritrea's entire population.

2.4 **The Colonial Legacy**

Chege et al observes that the seeds of the current conflicts in the Horn of Africa to a large extent go back to the European colonial experience in the Horn of Africa even though most of the conflicts' root causes predate this experience.[39] Woodward argues that, at the end of

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[36]OCHA, (2008). 'Horn of Africa Crisis Report.' A Report for the Regional Humanitarian Partnership Team.
[37]D. Shinn. (2009). 'Horn of Africa: Priorities and Recommendations.' Testimony to the Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations, Washington DC.
[s]OCHA, (2008). 'Horn of Africa Crisis Report.' A Report for the Regional Humanitarian Partnership Team.
[39]M. Chege, (1987). 'Conflict in the Horn of Africa.' In *Africa: Perspectives on Peace and Development,* edited by Emmanuel Hansen. London: Zed Books.L.Cliffe, (1999). 'Regional Dimensions of Conflict in the Horn of Africa.' Third World Quarterly, vol.29 no.l.

the nineteenth century and after the construction of the Suez Canal, the European colonial powers partitioned the previously free constituent parts of the Horn of Africa, joining unrelated areas and peoples into territorial units.[40] The establishment of new states (Sudan got its independence in 1956, British and Italian Somali lands in 1960, Kenya in 1963, and Djibouti in 1977 while Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia in 1952 and forcefully gained its independence in 1993, leaving Ethiopia landlocked) was thus based on misdrawn borders which were agreed upon by the colonial powers and basically ignored ethnic, cultural, historical and religious groups' natural lines. And, consequently, it resulted in intra-state conflicts (in particular demands for autonomy for ethnic groups) as well as in the regimes of the newly independent states lodging territorial claims in turn leading to conflict with other states.[41]

The challenge was compounded by the fact that the framework of colonial laws and institutions had been designed to exploit local divisions rather than to overcome them. Colonialism also disrupted the political, social and economic lives of pastoral societies. The emergence of colonial ports as well as the development of modern transport systems disrupted the ancient trade networks on which pastoralists depended, coastal markets disappearing in many cases. Moreover, transportation networks and related physical infrastructure were designed to satisfy the needs of the colonial power rather than to support the balanced growth of an indigenous economy.

During the same period, by taking advantage of inter-European rivalries, the Ethiopian rulers doubled through conquest the geographic size of their independent state built on the interior highlands. A vast and multi-ethnic state was created there. The need to maintain

Woodward, (1996). The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations. London: Tauris Academic Study.
[41] Ibid.

intact the unity of this fragile and disparate entity led to the excessive centralization of political and economic power which in turn stimulated widespread infringement upon local cultures and led to religious coercion and political repression.[42] Conflicts were also triggered by ethno-centrism arising from colonial rule which favored certain ethnic groups accorded access to education and economic privileges. This was done at the expense of other ethnic groups in the context of divide and rule tactics employed by the colonial powers and inflicted deep societal wounds in some states. In the post-colonial era, ill-advised policies have entrenched colonially-designed disparities and chronic injustice, thereby worsening ethnic animosities and antagonisms in most states of the region. Such a legacy lives on especially in Sudan in which a pernicious conflict was resuscitated in 1983 as a result of Gaafar Nimeiri's imposition of the Sharia or Islamic law on all segments of the Sudanese population - Muslims, Christians and Animists alike.

The widely perceived racial and religious discrimination against the mainly Christian and Animist Black-Africans from South Sudan by the Arabs from Sudan's north essentially Muslim and controlling Sudan's governing regimes and Economy contributed largely to the commencement of the conflict. This conflict which provoked an influx of refugees into neighbouring states including Ethiopia presented the latter's post-1974 regime the opportunity to reciprocate for Sudan's support to Ethiopian rebel movements by giving support to the rebel movement emerging in Sudan.

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[42] P. Woodward, (1996). The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations. London: Tauris Academic Study.

2.5 Political and Economic Problems

In the Horn of Africa, the nature of state power is a key source of conflict, political victory assuming a winner-takes-all form with respect to wealth and resources as well as the prestige and prerogatives of office. Irrespective of the official form of government, regimes in the Horn of Africa are, in most cases, autocracies essentially relying on ethnic Loyalties. Medhane observes that, the military and security services, in recent times emerging from a liberation front background, ensure the hold on power of these militarized regimes.[43] By default, a controlled, not to speak of peaceful change of power, is an exception. And, insufficient accountability of leaders, lack of transparency in regimes, on-adherence to the rule of law, lack of respect for human and peoples' rights made political control excessively important and the stakes dangerously high.

Also, given the highly personalized milieu in which politics operates in the Horn of Africa, it was possible for a 'strong-man benevolent leader'[44] in the likes of Mengistu Haile Mariam, Gaafar Nimeiri or Siad Bare who were all deeply insecure behind their ruthlessness and vindictive egomania, to shape the political destiny of a state almost single-handedly and to enter into warm or conflictual relations with other states, inducing civilian populations to join in and converting them into military and para-military groups.

In fact, despite the devastation they brought, such leaders and their behind-the-scenes operators used senseless conflicts to divert popular impatience to their inability to improve conditions. Moreover, there is, in these states, a lack of trained personnel mustering a long-term vision and with long experience in security policy-making and

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[43] T. Medhane, (2004). 'New Security Frontiers in the Hom of Africa.' Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Dialogue on Globalization.

[44] M. Rupiya, (2008). 'Interrelated Security Challenges of Kenya and Uganda in Eastern and Hom of Africa.' Paper presented at the Conference on the Prevailing Interlocked Peace and Security Conundrum in the Horn of Africa, Addis Ababa.

management who prefer to go abroad in order to better their lives or escape systematic maltreatment. Leaders exploiting the international community's laissez-faire attitude turn deaf ears to the advice of professional policy advisors and opinion-formers. This automatically leads to what an observer of regional politics described as 'short-term thinking'[45] and clumsy ad hoc decision-making and eventually to shocks such as the unanticipated Ethiopia-Eritrea War of 1998-2000.

Moreover, political competition in the Horn of Africa is not rooted in viable economic systems. All of the region's states are barely capable of reaching a level of economic development at which even the basic needs of their populations are met. Economic activities are strongly skewed towards primary commodities for export which are subject to the whims of the fluctuating prices of the international commodity market. Economic activities are also hampered by external dependence, inadequate infrastructure, shortage of capital, shortage of skilled manpower and misguided development policies. Moreover, the state is unable to provide adequate health and education services and to remedy mass unemployment which partly results from unsustainably high population growth.

Furthermore, in order to hold on to power, to hold the state together and to defend it against the claims and attacks of other states and rebel movements, governing regimes build and maintain military forces of large dimensions. They spend a large share of national expenditure disproportionate to available economic resources and existing security

[45] T. Medhane, (2004). 'New Security Frontiers in the Horn of Africa.' Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Dialogue on Globalization.

threats. This kind of excessive militarization eventually entails an increased burden especially in the present times of dwindling resources and economic crises. Excessive military spending is essentially a wasteful expenditure because of which social projects in education or health remain stagnant or even nonexistent. It also heightens the perception of mutual threat with a wide range of unintended political consequences.

2.6 Access to Shared Resources and Environmental Degradation

Woodward points out that, even though the states of the Horn of Africa appear to be independent of each other,' there may have to be a sharing of resources. An obvious example is the flow of a river but shared resources may also be reflected in the cross-border movements of pastoralists'.[46] Swain et al posits that the most prominent river is the Nile River which has always been an intricate part of Horn of Africa geopolitics. Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt are geographically partly owners and users of the river, and all three consider it as a major security issue.[47] Egypt, in particular, totally depends on the Nile River's waters for its very existence[48] and thus 'the first consideration of any Egyptian government is to guarantee that these waters are not threatened. This means ensuring that no hostile power can control the headwaters of the Nile or interfere with its flow into Egypt'.

^P. Woodward, (1996). *The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations.* London:Tauris Academic Study.

[4] A. Swain, (1997). 'Ethiopia, the Sudan and Egypt: The Nile River Dispute.' Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 35, no. 4.

[48]M. Abdel, (1995). 'From Geopolitics to Geo-Economics: Egyptian National Security Perceptions.' In *National Threat Perceptions in the Middle East.* Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

Accordingly, Egypt repeatedly made it crystal-clear that it would resort to the threat of military action[49] to preserve its portion of the Nile River (the 1959 Egyptian-Sudanese Treaty allocated fifty five point five billion cubic meters of the river to Egypt) even though, 'owing to a combination of political and economic conditions and technological limitations in Central and Eastern Africa, this threat fortunately did not materialize for a long time'. For instance, after signing a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, Egypt's late president Anwar Sadat issued a stern warning which was well-noted in Ethiopia and according to which 'the only matter which could take Egypt to war again is water. This policy aimed at preventing upstream states, especially Ethiopia which contributes more than eighty percent of the water flowing to Egypt, from claiming their share of the Nile River's total water.

Furthermore, being the Arab world's most populous, politically influential and militarily strongest state, Egypt entertained the long-established ambition of projecting its power into the Red Sea. Ethiopia was exposed to this geopolitical projection which included overt support to the Eritrean Liberation Front established in Cairo, military support to Somalia during the 1977-1978 Ogaden War, military support to Eritrea during the 1998-2000 Ethiopia-Eritrean War and short-circuiting Ethiopia's IGAD-mandated mediation in Somalia during the mid-1990s. Indeed, a military pact was signed in 1976 between the two states following which Egypt stationed troops in Sudan, trained its military personnel and undertook joint military planning given that, in the case of aggression against one, the other will come to its rescue. Clearly, Egypt regards Sudanese

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[49]A. Swain, (1997). 'Ethiopia, the Sudan and Egypt: The Nile River Dispute.' Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 35, no. 4.

territory as providing added depth to its geopolitical objectives and is not comfortable with the idea of South Sudan attaining independence as it 'might jeopardize Nile security'.[50]

In addition, pastoralists have to be constantly on the move looking for areas offering better water and grass which ignite conflicts among pastoralists as well as with sedentary agricultural communities in the Horn of Africa. However, the creation of artificial borders and of states which are interested in controlling all movements and imposing taxes limited the size of available resources and disrupted the traditional movement patterns of pastoral societies.[31] Armed clashes, negative state policies leading to violently expressed grievances and recurrent drought lead to an environmental crisis and the militarization of pastoral societies which in turn exacerbate inter-ethnic tensions. What happened in Darfur was partly an environmentally-generated antagonism over shared resources such as water systems, woodlands and grazing land for livestock. As populations in Darfur and its surroundings increased and access to these resources became more acutely scarce, conflicts between and among communities erupted and became difficult to resolve.

2.7 The Logic of Subversion

According to Cliffe et al, the states of the Horn of Africa took advantage of every local

tension or conflict to support rebel movements in neighboring states. Sponsoring subversive activities had simply become a customary tool poised to destabilize and endanger the security of another state, in what some observers called the time-honored

[50] B. Buzan, and W. Ole, (2003). *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[51] J. Markakis, (1993). 'Introduction.' In *Conflict and the Decline of Pastoralism in the Horn of Africa,* edited by John Markakis. The Hague: The Institute of Social Studies.

[52] L. Cliffe, (1999). 'Regional Dimensions of Conflict in the Horn of Africa.' *Third World Quarterly, vol. 29. no. I.*

principle of my enemy's enemy is my friend extending throughout the Horn of Africa.[53]

This enhanced inter-state rivalries, mutual suspicion and the development of an eye-for-an-eye mentality. Mills et al gives an example of the long and bloody game of tit-for-tat which bedeviled relations between Ethiopia and Sudan for over four decades.[54]

It is impossible to prove who was the original culprit in this long-running proxy war' as ensuring the secrecy of the support's details was paramount because a disclosure of its true extent would threaten its effectiveness and risk major embarrassment to the regimes. In any case, Sudan's support for Ethiopian rebel movements was the reason why the Sudan People's Liberation Army enjoyed strong and sustained support from the post-1974 Ethiopian regime.

Other examples abound in the Horn of Africa in which 'pursuing regional foreign policy through proxy forces in neighbouring countries has been the normal pattern of relations for decades. This activity has proved persistent over time and has survived radical political reconfigurations, including changes of regime.'[55] 'Mengistu engaged Barre in a proxy guerrilla war in which they each supported the other's insurgent.[56]' The Christian-fundamentalist Lord's Resistance Army received support from Islamist Sudan in retaliation for Uganda's support for the Sudan People's Liberation Army. Sudan's support for the Eritrean Islamic Jihad invited Eritrean support to the Sudan People's Liberation Army and

"A. Weber, (2008). 'Will the Phoenix Rise again? Commitment or Containment in the Horn of Africa.' Paper presented at the Fourth Expert Meeting on Regional Security Policy at the Greater Horn of Africa, Cairo. S. Healy, (2008). 'Ethiopia-Eritrea Dispute and the Somali Conflict.' Paper presented at the Conference on the Prevailing Interlocked Peace and Security Conundrum in the Horn of Africa, Addis Ababa.
[54] M. Ottaway, H. Jeffrey and G. Mills, (2004). 'Africa's Big States: Toward a New Realism.' Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Outlook. Pettiford, Lloyd and Melissa Curley (1999) *Changing Security Agendas and the Third World.* London: Pinter.
[55]S. Healy, (2008). 'Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel.' *Chatham House Horn of Africa Group Report.*
Lefebvre, (1996). 'Middle East Conflicts and Middle Level Power Intervention in the Horn of Africa.' *Middle East Journal, vol. 50, no. 3, p. 401.*

the National Democratic Alliance which was even allowed to occupy the Sudanese embassy premises in Asmara.[57] It has to be pointed out that Eritrea has become a recklessly belligerent bully especially adept at pursuing a low-cost strategy of supporting rebel movements against Sudan and Ethiopia as well as in Somalia. Many analysts describe Eritrea's support to the Somali Islamist movements, despite facing its own Islamist movement, as a proxy war.

2.8 **The Horn of Africa**'s **Strategic Importance and Superpower Interference**

According to Imru, the Horn of Africa has never acquired a strategic importance for its raw materials or for any other continental advantage. Indeed, the region has always been allotted a relatively important strategic value owing to its proximity to the Red Sea which is an important and expeditious route of international trade and communications between Europe, the Middle East and the Far East as well as the navigation route through which oil is transported from the Persian Gulf (in which the largest oil deposits of the world are located) to consumers in North America and Europe.[59] Hence, the states of the Horn of Africa were forced into economic, political and military dependence on either one of the two superpowers of the Cold War - the US and the Soviet Union. Competing to establish positions of influence and military advantage in the strategically significant regions of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, the two superpowers supported client states in the adjacent Horn of Africa primarily by injecting military aid and undermined inimical states by supporting rebel movements and Weaving unfriendly alliances and counter-alliances.[60]

[57]Ibid.

[58] Z. Imru, (1989). *The Horn of Africa: A Strategic Survey.* Washington DC: International Security Council. p. 55.

[9] J. Lefebvre, (1996). 'Middle East Conflicts and Middle Level Power Intervention in the Horn of Africa.' *Middle East Journal, vol. 50, no. 3.*

[60] J. Abbink, (2003). 'Ethiopia-Eritrea: Proxy Wars and Prospects for Peace in the Horn of Africa.' *Journal of Contemporary African Studies, vol. 21, no. 3, p. 407.*

The interests of the US can be explained in terms of securing access to oil for the West in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf. It was thus in the interests of the US to fend off any expansion of Soviet power and influence, whether through proxies or not, in the Middle East, Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa. Conversely, the Soviet Union aimed at promoting its credibility as a superpower by influencing and over arming the largest number of strategically placed client states, at imperiling oil tankers bound to the West via the Suez Canal and at reducing to nil the influence of the US in the above mentioned regions. Geopolitical logic also required the Soviet Union which needed to have maritime staging areas for its rapidly increasing navy to control the arc running from South Asia to the Horn of Africa.[61]

2.9 Terrorism

Since the mid-1990s, the states in the Horn of Africa have witnessed hundreds of acts of terrorism against foreign as well as local citizens and interests. The region is accordingly considered both as a breeding ground and a safe haven for terrorist organizations, especially after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the US. Hence, this region has come under increased scrutiny in the war against terrorism. For instance, Kenya in which around ten percent of the population is Muslim was the site of the 1998 terrorist attack on the US embassy in Nairobi, the bombing of a Mombasa hotel and the missile attack on an Israeli commercial jetliner in 2002. According to Usama these acts have accentuated the fear that Kenya's Muslim-dominated coastal areas may fall under fundamentalist influence

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[61]T. Farer, (1979). *War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: The Widening Storm.* New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp. 114-115.

and affect the state's internal structure and foreign relations as well as exacerbate latently existing social and ethnic conflicts.[62]

In the wake of the terrorist attacks in the US, Somalia came under the watchful eyes of Western intelligence services and military forces. In view of Somalia's lengthy and easily penetrable seacoast as well as the prolonged absence of a functioning administration, the US worried that A1 Qaeda might establish training bases or use it as a conduit of money, and material for future terrorist operations beyond the Horn of Africa. Moreover, the increasing flexibility and speed of twentieth century transportation and communications meant that states could expect no time to be warned against terrorist attacks. The US thus created a Combined Joint Task Force-Hom of Africa (CTJF-HOA) with an area of responsibility covering the Horn of Africa plus Yemen.

The US is only bent on reducing the ability of terrorist organizations to operate and move in the region. The actions of the US clearly show a discrepancy between its own interest of fighting terrorism in the Horn of Africa and that of the regional regimes which have an utter disdain for its concerns. All of the region's states will continue to try to survive as cohesive and united entities and to defend their territorial integrity with far greater zeal than expected. But, they will still be unable to control unregulated population movements both within and across unresolved borders and to militarily overcome rebel movements once and for all. Making matters worse, the states in the Horn of Africa will continue to be engaged in a cutthroat geopolitical chess game across the region, with leaders unable to fully get into the minds of their counterparts as well as professionally

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[62] A. Usama, (2009). 'Security across the Somalia-Lamu Interface.' Chonjo. no. 6.

assess their real intentions and precipitously trying to keep one step ahead of each other in order to avoid being eclipsed.

Conclusions

How security threats are perceived and articulated in the Horn of Africa could provide better insights into how the region actually works. The 'seemingly irrational stances vis-a-vis neighbours[63]" and the rapidity of the shifts in alliances and subversive support in the Horn of Africa suggest that regional security is intimately linked to the survival and interests of regimes in place as well as of rebel movements which actually all gain from conflict and are respectively part and manifestation of the problem rather than part of the solution. Healy et al suggest that 'interactions between the states of the region support and sustain the conflicts within the states of the region in a systemic way.[64] The region's conflicts are usually continuations of previous conflicts spanning out of control and they, themselves, can very easily either set off or further complicate other conflicts.[65] In the longer term, turmoil and conflict will continue to threaten large portions of the Horn of Africa which is shackled to its tangled history.

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[63] L. ClifTe, (1999). 'Regional Dimensions of Conflict in the Horn of Africa.' *Third World Quarterly, vol. 29, no. I.*
[M]S. Healy, (2008). 'Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel.' *Chatham House Horn of Africa Group Report.*
[65]S. Joireman, (2004). 'Secession and its Aftermath: Eritrea.' In Ulrich Schneckener and Stefan Wolff, (eds.), *Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts,* New York: Palgrave McMillan, p. 186.

CHAPTER THREE

THE IMPACT OF REFUGEES ON SECURITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: AN APPRAISAL

3.0 Introduction

Chapter two has given an overview on the impacts of refugees on security. It has explored theory and history related to refugees in the horn of Africa. From the previous chapter, we have learnt that the issue of refugees is not a new phenomenon. Refugees existed long time ago and the book of exodus confirms this. Colonial legacy, bad governance, protracted conflicts among others, has played a bigger role in political instability in the horn of Africa.

This chapter is going to give an appraisal of the impact of refugees on security in the Horn of Africa. It will look at the following key areas: the impacts of refugees on security in the horn of Africa, socio-economic impacts, environmental impacts and conflicts in the Horn of Africa sub-region and their impacts on security.

3.1 Background

Research shows that the Horn and Great Lakes Region of Africa is a global hot-spot generating annually thousands of refugees.[66] Kenya, unlike other states in the Horn of Africa has had relative peace since 1990, except for the brief political debacle over the December 2007 general elections. Conclusively, Kenya is a safe haven for the influx of refugees from the neighbouring politically unstable and war-torn countries of Somalia,

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[66]A. Ekuru, (2004); it is better to be a Refugee than a Turkana in Kakuma: Revisiting the relationship between Hosts and Refugees in Kenya *Refugee, Vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 73-83.*

Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Congo DRC, Rwanda and Burundi not forgetting other refugee hosting countries like Tanzania and Uganda among others. Kenya today, hosts over one million refugees in two settlement camps namely; Dadaab in the North-eastern part bordering Somalia and Kakuma in the North-western part bordering Southern Sudan and Ethiopia.

A scrutiny of available literature on refugees portrays largely a rather negative perception on their role in socio-economic development of countries of origin and asylum. Traditionally, refugees are associated with all kinds of societal and environmental evils such as; arms and drug trafficking, violations of human rights, especially women and children, disease epidemics, and environmental degradation among many others.[67]

It is generally recognized that there are humanitarian, political, security, and development challenges during the time of displacement and the period after durable solutions have been identified, either in the home country, a neighboring state, or elsewhere. This study provides some examples of specific aspects and impacts of forced displacement, which demonstrate that the impacts of refugees on the host country are not invariably negative, and that refugees can make positive contributions to the host society and create opportunities for both the displaced and their hosts.

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[67] H. 0. Ayiemba, and O. John, (1995). The Refugee Crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa: What are the Solutions? *African Population Paper No. 4 April 1995.* African Population and Environmental Institute, Nairobi. N. Blondel, (2000); Firewood survey around Dadaab Refugees Camps. *EESS Mission Report* UNHCR, Kenya. J. R. Rogge, (1990); *African Refugees: Causes, Solutions, and Consequences. New* York.

Refugee flows present a challenge to one of the key principles of state sovereignty: the control of borders and of non-citizens in the country. African host countries experience a range of security related problems associated with refugees and others crossing the border from conflict- ridden neighboring countries. In 2001-2002 alone, direct attacks or armed incursions from either rebel or government forces or both occurred in Tanzania (from Burundi), Uganda (from Sudan) Kenya (from Ethiopia), to name only some. Armed incursions by sending country government forces occur as search-and-destroy missions aimed at rebels mixed up with refugees, and are usually accompanied by rape, looting,

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abductions, cattle theft and loss of civilian lives.

Undefended and lawless refugee camps create security problems too. The resources contained in them are targeted as booty by rebel groups, and raids on camps have been a problem in many border hosting areas, including northern eastern and northwestern Kenya. Petty and organized crime flourishes, and bored young men are recruited into rebel militias or crime syndicates. Political radicalism and militancy amongst refugees is a chronic problem for host states. The difficulty of separating bona fide refugees and war displaced people from combatants and criminals means that rebel forces or criminals often live among refugees. Military recruitment is a common problem both within and outside refugee camps. In some cases, the political control of entire camps has been taken over by militias, for example, North Western Kenya (Kakuma Refugee Camp).[69]

The Kenyan government and United Nations high commissioner for refugees believe that the Dabaab refugee camp on the Somalia-Kenya border is a reputed terrorist

[68] *World Refugee Survey, (2001).* Washington, DC: US Committee for Refugees.
[69] W. Van Damme, (1995). 'Do refugees belong in camps? Experience from Goma and Guinea; The Lanset 346:370.

training ground for Islamic extremists.[7]" Mohammed Abdi Guhad, a 24 year-old Somalia refugee at the Dabaab refugee camp epitomizes this point. Mohammed has been living in the refugee camp for six years. With little to do, no chance for employment or education he and many others are ready to return to Somalia and fight alongside the Islamists. According to Mohammed he would rather kill than stay in Dabaab doing nothing.[71] Frustration and desperation about the inability to escape from a life of poverty, social and political injustice are the roots of terrorism in the Horn. Basically; 'poverty can foster an environment where individuals may feel that they have nothing to lose.'[72]

According to survey carried between January and February this year at selected sites in Northern Kenya, it shows that Kenya continues to grapple with the effects of illegal migration/migrant smuggling. The country has become a transit point as well as destination for smuggled migrants mostly of Somali and Ethiopian origin perpetrated by profit-seeking syndicates of criminals.[74] Somali nationals are noted to seek refuge in Kenya from violence and economic hardship in their country, with a few transiting to other parts of Africa. Interviews and discussions with various stake holders shows that the uniqueness of the north eastern part of Kenya where communities sharing the same language, culture and religion reside along the common border complicate the problem due to the ease of alien crossing into the country.[75]

[70] UNHCR, (2005). *UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2005* (New York, NY: UNHCR.
[1] K. Calabria, (2006). "Somalia's woes grow in Kenyan refugee camps", *The Mail and Guardian,* 10 October 2006.
[7:] G. Bush, (2006). *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, March 2006), p. 37.
  Interview with Joseph Murunga, Intelligence officer, Nairobi, June 26, 2011.
[74] Ibid.
[5] UNHCR officer interviewed by Kenya counter terrorism officer, March 2011.

3.2 The Impacts of Refugees on Security in the Horn of Africa

3.2.1 Introduction

Developing countries that host refugees for protracted periods experience long-term economic, social, political, and environmental impacts. From the moment of arrival, refugees may compete with local citizens for scarce resources such as water, food, housing, and medical services. Their presence increases the demands for education, health services, infrastructure such as water supply, sanitation, and transportation, and also in some cases, for natural resources such as grazing and firewood.

According to united nation high commissioner for refugees, the impacts of the refugee presence are both positive and negative.[76] The dynamic between positive and negative factors is complex and varies depending on several factors, including the political economy of hosting countries, urban-rural interactions, and the nature of host-refugee relations. Furthermore, even when a refugee situation creates economic opportunities for both the displaced and their hosts, there can be winners and losers in each group.

3.2.2 Socio-Economic Impacts

Large-scale and protracted refugee influxes can have macro-economic impacts on the host country economy. Some of these impacts are associated with increased but uncompensated public expenditures related to the care and maintenance of the refugee population. According to Alix-Garcia, an assessment undertaken of the impact of Rwandan refugees on local agricultural prices between 1993 and 1998 in Tanzania[77]found a significant increase in the prices of some agricultural goods (e.g., cooking bananas, beans and milk) and a

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[6] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, (2004). *Economic and Social Impacts of Massive Refugee Populations on Host Developing Countries, as well as other Countries.* Standing Committee. UNHCR, EC/54/SC/CRP.5.

J. Alix-Garcia, (2007). *The Effects of Refugee Inflows on Host Country Populations: Evidence from Tanzania.* University of Montana, USA.

decrease in the price of aid-delivered goods (e.g., maize). As a result, many Tanzanian farmers who produced a surplus benefited from an increased demand for their agricultural products in local markets. Anecdotal evidence suggested that on average, farmers doubled the size of their cultivated land and their production of bananas and beans during 1993-1996.[78] The increase in the size of the local markets also boosted business and trade activities conducted by both hosts and refugees.

Whitaker asserts that, welfare indicators such as electricity, televisions, and refrigerators increased in host population households near refugee camps.[79] A recent impact evaluation of refugee camps in Daadab, Kenya which hosts one of the largest refugee populations in the world, estimates that the total annual direct and indirect benefits of the camp operation for the local host community were around eighty two million US dollars in 2009, and is projected to reach hundred US dollars Notwithstanding the positive contributions that refugees can make to the economy of host countries, such contributions should be viewed in terms of both winners and losers among refugees as well as host populations.

Report given by Maystadt et al shows that, in Tanzania, refugees have provided cheap labor in sectors such as agriculture, construction, housekeeping, and catering. In this regard, the refugee presence has affected the wages of local non-skilled workers and benefited local entrepreneurs. Maystadt et al further observes that when refugees arrive, those among the host population who have access to resources, education, or power are

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[s] E. B. Whitaker, (2002). Refugees in Western Tanzania: The Distribution of Burdens and Benefits among Local Hosts. *Journal of Refugee Studies Vol. 15, No. 4. pp. 339-358.*

[79] Ibid.

[*°] Nordic Agency for Development and Ecology (NORDECO), 2010. *Impacts of Dadaab Refugee Camps on Host Communities.* (Draft Study Report).

[81] J. Maystadt and P. Verwimp, (2009). *Winners and Losers among a Refugee-Hosting Population.* International Association for Research and Teaching, ECORE, Belgium.

better positioned to benefit from the refugee presence, while those who lack these resources in the local context become further marginalized.[80]

Whitaker considered the following developments as some of the negative impacts of the refugees' presence on the host communities. One was that the sudden population increase affected food security and local access to environmental resources in the local villages, particularly at the beginning of the influx, although deforestation was a problem even before the refugees, its rate accelerated after their arrival. The massive deforestation led to a water problem because the water resources were depleted.[01]

Whitaker argues that the economic boom associated with the refugee presence was accompanied by an increase in the cost of living. The prices of basic items and rent went up. He also considers the following as negative development and that the refugee situation also affected local infrastructure. During the influx, border area schools were damaged when refugees slept in classrooms, burned desks as firewood, and filled latrine. Local health facilities quickly became overstretched. Notwithstanding this the refugee presence was associated with an influx of diseases, including high-fever malaria and skin diseases affected large members of Tanzania children.

There were a lot of HIV/AIDS cases among the refugees. The criminal justice system was also overburdened; according to government records, refugees at times represented as many as seventy five per cent of jail inmates.[84]

[8:]J. Maystadt, and P. Verwimp, (2009). *Winners and Losers among a Refugee-Hosting Population.* Internationa] Association for Research and Teaching, ECORE, Belgium.
[83]E. B. Whitaker, (2000). "Refugees in Western Tanzania: The distribution of Burden and Benefits among Local Host". Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, NC, USA. *Journal of Refugee Studies Vol. 15, No. 4.*
"ibid.

Social relations between refugees and hosts also had some negative consequences. The camps were associated with problems such as drunkenness, prostitution, and sexual promiscuity. Elderly people perceived a breakdown of traditional social structure. In addition, western Tanzania experienced high levels of theft and insecurity.

Andrian, in his study of Bonga camp in Ethiopia argues that the most obvious environmental impact of the refugee camp is deforestation, although he believes that this problem was already occurring before the refugees arrived in 1993 but it has increased because of the expansion of slash and burn agriculture into the nearby hillsides, mainly for growing sorghum. He noted that both refugee and host people also rely on wood for fuel and construction, and there are high levels of hunting with traditional weapons and dogs.

Andrian has observed that the host communities were strongly outnumbered by the refugees. He recorded the locals as blaming the refugees of being the cause of the environmental problems facing them. They believe life was considerably easier before the arrival of the camp. Resources such as land, forests and wildlife have now become much scarcer. They also complained that refugees stole their crops and water, destroyed their irrigation channels, used illegal fishing methods and spoiled their traditional grazing land.[85] Andrian noted that the lack of benefits accompanying the refugee camp was a specific source of dissatisfaction. When the camp was located there, UNHCR had apparently promised a number of benefits, including a new school in the village.[86] These never materialized, and this may be the reason that the locals were made victims and the refugees being at advantage.

[CJ] M. Andrian, (2005), "Environmental Conflict between Refugees and Host Communities". School of Development Studies, 2005 *Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 42, no. 3, 2005, pp. 329-346.*
[86] Ibid.

The report given by United Nations high commissioner for refugees shows that, almost half of the global refugee population resided in cities and towns, compared to one third who lived in camps in 2008.[87] Urban refugees tend to reside in densely populated and poorly serviced environments. As a result, increasing competition and conflict between communities over limited urban resources such as land and water can aggravate the

potential for urban crises.

The refugee presence in hosting countries has potential social impacts on the ethnic balance of hosting areas, social conflict, and delivery of social services. The social impacts of refugees on the host community may occur simply because of their presence. Thus, if traditional animosities exist between cultural or ethnic groups, it may cause problems when one group becomes exposed to another that has been forced to become refugees. However, United Nations high commissioner for refugees has also found that when refugees are from the same cultural and linguistic group as the local population, there are greater opportunities for peaceful co-existence and interaction among them.[80]

For the same has been the case with the massive influx of Somali refugees into the Dadaab area in Kenya, which is inhabited by people sharing the same culture and language, and which are often related by clan or tribal ties to the refugee population.

[8] UN High for Refugees, (2009). *Policy on Refugee Protection and Solutions in Urban Areas.* Switzerland.

[M] R. Zetter, Roger and G. Deikun, (2010). *Meeting Humanitarian Challenges in Urban Areas.* Migration Review issue 34, February. University of Oxford. United Kingdom.

[89] UN High Commissioner for Refugees, (1997). *Economic and Social Impacts of Massive Refugee Populations on Host Developing Countries, as well as other Countries.* Standing Committee. UNHCR, EC/47/SC/CRP.7

In refugee-affected and hosting areas, there may be inequalities between refugees and non-refugees that give rise to social tension.[90] Refugees are frequently viewed as benefiting from privileged access to resources unavailable to the local host population. In this regard, refugee status offers an opportunity for education, literacy, vocational training, health, sanitation, and basic livelihood. However, when social services provided through international funding also target host communities, there is likelihood that the local population will have a positive impact.

Some of the funds for the camp operation are allocated to infrastructure investments that benefit the host community. The impact of the Daadab camps on the local host community are widely felt through trading opportunities and reduced food and commodity prices. Furthermore, refugee camps have developed major local markets with considerable purchasing power in relation to pastoral products such as milk and livestock. However, despite these positive indicators, the presence of refugees is also associated with the depletion of firewood and building materials as well as competition for grazing land in the immediate vicinity of the camps. The assessment concludes that impacts on the host community are complex and have both negative and positive aspects.

One of the positive contributions that refugees can make to host countries is skills and knowledge that can be utilized for the benefit of local people. In this regard, the multiple ways in which refugees pursue their livelihoods can make significant contributions to the local economy. Jacobsen states that refugees have access to transnational resources provided by other refugees and co-nationals living abroad, including remittances and social

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[90] B. Alexander, (2009). *Development Assistance and Refugees, Towards a North-South Grand Bargain?* Forced Migration Policy Briefing 2. Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford. United Kingdom.

networks.[91] A study of Somali refugees and remittances explains how cash transfers to refugees have impacts on receiving communities.[92] Individual remittances that often go to displaced families and relatives are used to meet basic livelihood needs. Similarly, research on the Somali Diaspora in Canada points out how informal banking systems have facilitated cash transfers to Somali refugees in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Yemen.[93] These resources have contributed not only to the improvement of living conditions at the household level, but also to those in refugee camps, especially in terms of housing, water provision, and telephone services.[94]

3.2.3 Political and security Impacts

In most cases, the presence of refugees does not have a significant negative impact on the political and security situation of the host countries. In some circumstances, the presence of refugees can have negative political and security impacts. According to Salehyan and Gleditsch, the influx of refugees from neighboring countries can destabilize neighboring countries through Expansion of rebel social networks and diffusion of violence.[95] Refugee camps located close to the boundary of the country of origin can provide sanctuary to rebel organizations, and a base from which to carry out operations and fertile grounds for recruitment. For example, the rebel group made up of mainly Uganda-based Tutsi refugees

[91]K. Jacobsen, (2002). *Livelihoods in Conflict: The Pursuit of Livelihoods by Refugees and the Impact on the Human Security of Host Communities.* Expert Working Paper, prepared for the Center for Development Research Study: Migration-Development, Evidence and Policy Options. Feinstein International Famine Center, Tuft University, USA.
[92]C. Horst and N. Van Hear, (2002). "*Counting the Cost: Refugee, Remittances and the War on Terrorism".* Forced Migration Review, *No 14.* University of Oxford.
[93] B. Hamza, (2006). *A Report on the Somali Remittance Sector in Somalia.* Nathanson Centre for the Study of Organized Crime and Corruption. York University. Canada.
[94] Interview with Israel Habakkuk a refugee from Congo, July 12, 2011
[95]1. Salehyan, and K. Gleditsch, (2006). „*Refugees and the Spread of Civil War*, International Organization, 60: 335-366.

from Rwanda, which in October 1990 formed the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and invaded northern Rwanda.[96]

Facilitation of transnational spreading of arms, combatants, and ideologies conducive to conflict is another impact..[97] Refugees can also serve as domestic opposition groups in the host country with material resources and motivation to wage their own armed battles. For instance, Somali refugees have often worked closely with ethnic Somali separatists in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.

Creation of bilateral tensions by the refugees can pose a security and political threat to the host country; and this, in turn can create tensions in bilateral relations between neighboring countries for example; the involvement of Rwandan Tutsi refugees in Uganda in the removal of the Milton Obote administration (1980-1985).[98]

3.2.4 Environmental Impacts

The presence of large influxes of refugees has also been associated with environmental impacts on land, water, natural resources, and slum growth. Various studies provide examples of different types of environmental impacts related to the influx of refugees and their long-term presence.[99] The initial arrival phase of refugee influxes may be accompanied by severe environmental impacts when displaced people often move into and

[96] Z. Lomo, A. Naggaga and L. Hovil, (2001). *The Phenomenon of Forced Migration in Uganda. An overview of Policy and Practice in an Historical Context.* Working Paper No. 1. Refugee Law Project. Uganda.

[9] I. Salehyan and K. Gleditsch, (2006). *Refugees and the Spread of Civil War,* " International Organization, 60: 335-366.

[98] Ibid.

Jacobsen, (1997). *Refugee's Environmental Impact: the Effect of Patterns of Settlement.* Department of Political Science. Oxford University Press. United Kingdom. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 1998. Economic and Social Impacts of Massive Refugee Populations on Host Developing Countries, as well as other Countries. Standing Committee. UNHCR, EC/47/SC/CRP.40

through an area to secure their immediate needs.[100] Some of these immediate effects include fuel wood crises and water pollution in refugee camp areas. As the emergency period passes and refugees become settled, the nature of the environmental impact changes, but can still be significant.

A recent environmental assessment conducted in Sudan highlights that the massive presence of refugees is related to serious environmental damage in hosting areas. Environmental impacts are closely associated with the type of refugee settlements and particularly the concentration of people in large camps. The most evident environmental impacts include: deforestation and firewood depletion, land degradation, unsustainable groundwater extraction, and water pollution. In addition, human waste disposal by displaced persons can contaminate local groundwater and cause the spread of diseases.[101] Other impacts from the initial and long-term displacement are related to uncontrolled slum growth.

Another observation is that the type of refugee settlements also affects the access of displaced people to land and natural resources. The assessment of the environmental impacts of refugees in Daadab, Kenya also shows that environmental degradation is a direct consequence of policies aimed at housing refugees in large camps with tight movement restrictions in an area of low productivity.[109] Moreover, large camps tend to slow the development of land use practices that are both sustainable and compatible with

[100]UN High Commissioner for Refugees and Food and Agricultural Organization. (1998). *Tanzania: Environmental Assessment Report of the Rwandanese Refugee Camps and the Affected Local Communities in Kagera Region,* 2-30 June 1994. PTSS Mission report 94/29N. Tanzania.
[101] UN Environmental Program, (2005). *Population Displacement and the Environment. Sudan, Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment.*
[102] Nordic Agency for Development and Ecology (NORDECO). (2010). *Impacts of Dadaab Refugee Camps on Host Communities.* (Draft Study Report).

local practices.[103] Such environmental impacts can also affect the long-term livelihood opportunities of both refugees and the host population.

Experiences in countries such as Tanzania and Kenya have shown that when refugees have been able to access land or common property resources, their productive capacities tend to increase significantly. Correspondingly, in such cases, the burden of refugee presence on host communities and assistance providers tend to decrease as well. Despite some positive experiences regarding access to land for refugees, shortages of land and natural resources is a critical factor affecting the self-reliance of displaced people during their exile.

3.3 Conflicts in the Horn of Africa sub-region and their impacts on security

The Horn of Africa-Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Eritrea, and Sudan - is a volatile environment which offers an advantageous landscape for terrorist organizations and networks to flourish. African initiatives coupled with external United States efforts are attempting to combat this common foe. These efforts have laid a solid foundation for combating terrorism; however, improvements will be needed if the Horn of Africa is to be free of a significant terrorist presence.

Violent conflict is more the norm than the exception in the Horn of Africa. Conflicts are waged at various levels: state, regional, and local. Conflict involves various actors: governments, nationalist groups, religious groups, and community or identity groups with significant backing from external forces. It is a common for conflicts in the sub-region to promptly acquire a sub-regional dimension, thus transcending national borders by attracting kinsmen from across the border. The result is often a flow of refugees,

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[103] K. Jacobsen, (1997). *Refugee's Environmental Impact: the Effect of Patterns of Settlement.* Department of Political Science. Oxford University Press. United Kingdom.

who destabilize economic and trade relations between neighbouring states, and pose a security threat to the sub-region.

United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as any person who, owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his/her nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself/herself of the protection of that country.[104] Refugees are the human casualties that stream from the world's trouble spots. They are driven from their homelands by major crises such as war, religious and political persecution, brutal regimes, ethnic cleansing, military uprisings and anarchy. Very few refugees have emerged from their experiences without having endured or witnessed some form of physical or psychological trauma.

The Horn of Africa is known for decades as one of the hottest geographical spaces of internal dissidence and interstate conflicts. Africa's longest civil wars occur in this region.[10:1] This was the case of the Eritrean war of liberation against Ethiopian regimes. The civil war in Sudan is another civil war that is associated in one way or the other with the region. States have disintegrated in the Horn. The emergence of Eritrea and the prolonged absence of a recognized government in Somalia constitute the basis of anxiety in the community of states in that part of Africa. States affected by conflicts tend to bolster their own security and try to weaken other states believed to be undermining their sovereignty.

Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace estimate about two billion people live in weak, failing, or failed states "with varying degrees of vulnerability to widespread civil

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[104]1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.
[105] H. Assefa, (1999). "A Lack of Visionary Statesmanship and Democratic Leadership" in *Searching for Peace in Africa* Utrecht: European Platform on Conflict Prevention and Transformation.

conflict".[106] Horn of Africa's landscape offers the same regional challenges. "The dangerous exports of failed states-whether international terrorists, drug barons, or weapons arsenals-are the subject of endless discussion and concern".[107] Terrorism, conflict, and regional instability are not only on the rise throughout the developing world, but can also be seen as a root cause to most weak, failing or failed states. For more than a decade, the United States has continued to consider the Horn of Africa as a major source of

terrorism.   This area, made up of mostly weak and failing states, has come under increased scrutiny as one of many strategic focal points in the war on terrorism.[109] Most countries within the Horn of Africa have undergone numerous regime and political organizational changes since the 1970s.[110]

Tied to the political corruption and instability and inept security capabilities of most countries in the Horn of Africa, geography also plays a role in this region's status. Geographically, in this region "with its rugged terrain and vast, undeveloped areas with little or no infrastructure, is tailor-made for insurgency, rebellion, and banditry and difficult for conventional military operations."[111] The result is an inability to provide the basic human security. Religious; ethnic, economic, and political hard ships are often linked back to a lack of human security.

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[106] Foreign Policy & the Fund for Peace, (2005). "The Failed States Index," The Fund for Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
[107] Ibid.
[08] United States Institute of Peace, (2004). *Terrorism in the Horn of Africa* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, I.
-Ibid.
    J. Markakis, (1987). *National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
"' J. W. Turner, (1998). *Continent Ablaze: The Insurgency Wars in Africa 1960 to the Present* (London New York NY: Arms and Armour Press; Distributed in the USA by Sterling, 1998), 178.

The great majority of African citizens exists in poverty and is locked under corrupt leaders who maintain control through tribalism, fraud, corruption, and violence. These weak state characteristics have laid the foundation or set the conditions for infiltration of transnational terrorist groups. A1 Qaeda cells are active in Eastern Horn of Africa and they continually plan, finance, train, and execute terrorist operations all over the continent."[3] A1 Qaeda and other terrorists do this by taking advantage of "Africa's porous borders, weak law enforcement and security services and nascent and inefficient judicial institutions to move men, weapons and money around the globe".[11]"[4] Weak human security is prevalent throughout the Horn of Africa. Terrorists take advantage of the poor and disillusioned large populace and exploit their religious or ethnic grievances to recruit them for a means to hit targets. Continuous internal civil war and state border disputes offer a limelight for the unnoticed terrorist side-shows. The Horn of Africa has not been without a recent past of terrorist activity.

Kenya, with its "lax immigration and security laws" has been classified as a soft target by international terrorism experts.[115] "The bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 as well as the Paradise Hotel in Kenya in 2002 demonstrates that anti-American and anti-Israeli terrorism is alive and well in

Africa."[116] The four men who were tried and linked to the American embassy bombings confirmed how their terrorist network was able to flourish in such a permissive Kenyan environment.[117] Additionally, in 2002, al

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[12] Mentan, *Dilemmas of Weak States : Africa and Transnational Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century,* 2.
"[3]Ibid.
,"[4]Ibid.
[115] UN Institute of Peace, *Terrorism in the Horn of Africa, 2.*
[16] Mentan, *Dilemmas of Weak States : Africa and Transnational Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, 2.*
[17] US Institute of Peace, *Terrorism in the Horn of Africa,* 1.

Qaeda was linked to the attempted shoot down of a commercial Israeli airliner in Mombasa (Kenya).[118]

An analysis of the available literature suggests that weak economies often translate to weak and fragile states and the presence of violent conflict, which in turn prevents economic growth. Collier and Hoeffler argue that the risk of war in any given country is determined by the initial level of income, the rate of economic growth and the level of dependency on primary commodity exports."[9] The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing: reduced levels of domestic economic activity tend to create incentives for increased external and internal conflict, which in turn reinforce low levels of domestic economic activity resulting in a poverty-conflict trap. Across Sub-Saharan Africa, violence and social unrest could lead to a further eroding of confidence in already weak governments, putting into place a vicious cycle of instability and public unrest. The main threats are: Decreased income levels, mass unemployment and the rising costs of living.

There are concerns that increasing unemployment, especially amongst young men, could be directed towards governments. Combined with rising costs of living, there is a risk that unemployment could lead to violence, public unrest and criminality. In addition, the selling of assets could exacerbate conflict as people become desperate and run out of options. Collier, for example, has argued contentiously that rising unemployment in already fragile states can cause conflict due to comparative income opportunities for young men in

"Ibid.
[119] P. Collier, and A. Hoeffler, (2002), On the incidence of Civil War in Africa, *Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 13-28. P.* Collier, and A. Hoeffler, (2004), „Greed and Grievance in Civil War, Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 54, pp. 563-95.

labour markets as opposed to in rebel groups.[120] In Kenya for example, young men are unemployed and therefore disturbing the peace of the country.

Increased crime levels are related to unemployment and increasing living costs are a key issue, particularly for young people who are vulnerable to the compound effects of the food, fuel and financial crises. Instances of children robbing each other of food in schools have been reported as have instances of children trading sex for snacks in Kenya.[121] Unemployment may create a pool of people who are easily preyed on by criminal groups seeking recruits. The recent spate of piracy off the coast of Somalia for example, could be related to decreasing remittances, unemployment and the rising costs of living.

Braun found that food insecurity has become a source of conflict in many countries with people turning to the streets in protest with many instances of the political unrest becoming highly violent. [122] Governments on a number of occasions have dealt with public protest using excessive force and many who were claiming their right to an adequate standard of living have been killed and injured. Amnesty International for example, report that demonstrations against the sharp rise in living costs have taken place in Somalia and recently in Kenya.[123]

Arbache and page argue that institutions in poor countries tend to be so strained that ethnic tensions and confrontational politics can get worse when competition for scarce resources increases.[124] There have been some signs of increasing unrest due to socio-

[120] Ibid.
[U]N. Hossain, and R. Eyben, (2009). Accounts of Crisis: Poor Peoples Experiences of the Food, Fuel and Financial Crises in Five Countries, Institute of Development Studies: Brighton.
["2]J. Von Braun, J., (2008), Food and Financial Crises: Implications for Agriculture and the Poor, Brief prepared for the CGIAR Annual General Meeting, Maputo, December
['Amnesty International, (2009), „Amnesty International Report 2009: State of the Worlds Human Rights, Amnesty International: London.
[:4]J. Arbache, and J. Page, (2007). More Growth or Fewer Collapses - A New Look at Long Run Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series, World Bank: Washington D.C.

economic cleavages amongst religions and ethnic groups. In Nairobi for example, tensions have emerged between Christian and Muslim groups because of exclusionary feeding programmes in mosques.[125]

Kenya has always regarded the Somali as either an internal nuisance or embarrassment.[126] Today the prevalence of modern weapons, Somalia's most significant legacy of superpower involvement during the Cold War, has undermined the very foundation for order in Somalia's society - the authority of the clan elder. The instability in South-West Somalia is hurting Kenya's security because of the influx of illegal arms across the border.[178] The dominant view in Kenya holds the Somalia conflict responsible for increased crime. This view focuses on post-1991 war in Somalia and blames the war for escalated trafficking into Kenya of illicit products including, most importantly, sophisticated guns. These, it is argued, have contributed to increased insecurity in North Eastern Kenya and Eastleigh in Nairobi where most refugees settle. President Moi, in a presidential order, gave credence to this assumption when he ordered the Kenya-Somalia border closed.[190] He explained that armed refugees entered into Kenya and has contributed to increased incidence of insecurity and crime in Nairobi.

In banning border trade, President Moi noted that 'although Kenya showed hospitality by accommodating refugees from Somalia, they abused their welcome by bringing illegal firearms into the country.' For him, 'the Somalis were to blame for the

Hossain, and R. Eyben, (2009). Accounts of Crisis: Poor Peoples Experiences of the Food, Fuel and Financial Crises in Five Countries, Institute of Development Studies: Brighton.

V. Glenday quoted in E. R. Turton, (1974). 'The Isaq Somali Diaspora and Poll-Tax Agitation in Kenya,' in *African Affairs,* 73 (July 1974), p. 325.

[u?] J. Clark, (1993). 'Debacle in Somalia: Failure of the Collective Response,' in Lori Fisler Damrosch (ed.) *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), pp. 207-208.

[::5] President, D. Arap Moi quoted in *The East African Standard,* Nairobi, 29 May 2001.

[129]Ibid.

current state of insecurity in Kenya.'[130] The Somali 'refugee' problem dates back to the colonial era. With it has always been a problem of state security in Kenya. The relationship currently drawn between refugees and security problems in Kenya ought to be understood in the context of the historical partition of Somalia and its legacy; a context that repudiates the one-sided focus on Somalia refugees.[131]

The prevalence of light weapons in vast regions of Kenya occupied by pastoralist communities has created conditions amenable to abuse by gun traffickers whose eventual aim is to use them for illegal activities. Other than guns and light weapons that are for personal and community protection, networks of armed bandits who use guns to rob, maim and kill have also sprung up. The demand for these weapons in far flung areas like Nairobi have also facilitated the rise of criminal networks that specialize in acquiring weapons from war tone area and supplying them to criminal gangs within Nairobi and other towns. These criminal networks get the weapons from neighbouring countries especially those with a history of internal conflict like Northern Uganda, Southern Sudan, and Somalia. The ease with which these weapons cross the Kenya-Somalia border is attested to by the fact that the border region is well over 1,000 kilometers long and it is inadequately policed. Further, the geographical and climatic conditions in the area makes it more difficult to police. Furthermore, these weapons traverse vast region that are already saddled by the gun culture. Unscrupulous traders, government officials and the police are also actively involved in facilitating the influx of these weapons.

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[130] *Sunday Standard,* Nairobi, 29 July, 2001
[31] A. I. Asiwaju, (ed.), (1985). Partitioned *Africans: Ethnic Relations across Africa's Internationa! Boundaries. 1884-1984* Lagos. University of Lagos Press.

The lack of democratic governance and the grievances related to it is a major political factor underlying the conflicts in the horn of Africa. Democratic governance refers to the political practice based on universal principles of democracy and rule of law, popular legitimacy, participation, accountability and the responsiveness of rulers to the governed [1] This sort of governance is an essential requirement for sustained peace, economic growth, and development. Unfortunately, in most cases, governance in the Horn is non inclusive, lacks popular legitimacy, authoritarian, and unresponsive to public grievances.

Previous regimes in Ethiopia saw cultural heterogeneity as an obstacle to national harmony and nation building. As a result, they concentrated on policies of forced assimilation and cultural repression, which resulted in creating more alienation and fomenting radical nationalist sentiment among the excluded.[133]To redress the imbalance, the present government has tried a federal state structure with self-administering (autonomous) regions, primarily on the basis of ethnic or linguistic boundary lines. Reaction to the new arrangement has been mixed.

According to interviews conducted in the North Rift, 'government intransigence' was cited as a common reason for the insecurity in pastoralist occupied regions and the increased influx of illegal weapons into Kenya. The police have been accused of inaction or knowingly looking the other sides as arms traffickers operate with impunity.[134] There are well known centres where guns are purchased, but little action has been taken to control illegal purchases of such guns. For instance, Gedo area of Somalia is a key source of

[1-2] N. Georges, (2004). Democratic Governance and Human Rights in the International Framework (Keynote address for the joint monthly assembly of the Finnish Advisory Board for Human Rights and the Finnish Development Policy Committee Helsinki, Finland), June.

'J. Markakis, (1987). *Notional and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa,* New York, Cambridge University Press. J. Berdal, Dominique and Aida Mengistu, (2006)."Nationalism and Identity in Ethiopia and Eritrea", In A. Bekoe, Dorina, (ed.). *East Africa and the Horn,* USA, Lynne Rienner Publishers.

[154] Kamenju, et al. *Terrorized Citizens,* p. 49 and *Daily Nation,* 29th July 2004, p. 11.

ammunition while weapons are regularly picked at Manyatta Burji-Moyale in Ethiopia. In Garissa, weapons from Somalia go through Diff, Liboi and Daadab from where they find their way into Ijara, Tana River, Ukambani, and Nairobi. These guns eventually end up in Eastleigh and Kariobangi estates in Nairobi. These weapons and ammunitions are at times carried by women and children and on other occasions transported using donkeys, ox-carts and Lorries to towns in Kenya.[135]

Sudan, a government run by radical Islamists in Khartoum, has had to struggle with a seventeen-year civil war with a rebel force, the Sudan People's Liberation Army.[136] Both have been guilty of terrorist related bombings of civilian targets.[137] Today, the Sudan government is attempting to distance itself from terrorist organizations, engage in peace negotiations with the SPLA, and improve relations with the U.S. Sudan has a past of state sponsorship of terrorist organizations such as Islamic Jihad (IJ), Hezbollah, Hamas, and al Qaeda have earned a spot on the U.S. State Sponsors of Terrorism.[138] These terrorist organizations and operatives were not only provided safe haven, but also established offices, businesses, training camps and logistical bases.[139]

In an attempt to improve U.S. relations, Sudan is attempting to clamp-down on some terrorist organizations. Coupled with Somalia, Sudan has accounted for much of the instability within the Horn of Africa. Although the Sudanese government lays claims to distancing itself from terrorist ties, it is hard not to question the sincerity of their efforts considering the current large scale crisis situation that has been occurring since 2003 in its

' Interview with Joseph Murunga, intelligence officer, Nairobi, 26,h June, 2011.
¹ Mentan, *Dilemmas of Weak States : Africa and Transnational Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century,* 2.
'"Ibid
United States Institute of Peace. *Terrorism in the Horn of Africa,* 13.

western Darfur region. This ethnic driven humanitarian disaster has resulted in approximately 180,000 casualties and an estimated two million displaced black Africans.[140] Sudanese rebel forces have attacked governmental targets claiming they have neglected the black Africans, favoring the Arabs in the region.[141]The Sudanese government denies linkage to the Janjaweed (militant group primarily responsible for the atrocities in the region) but admits to only "self defense militias" in response to the rebel attacks. Currently, this situation has met a stale mate with United Nations peacekeeping efforts denied by the Sudanese government.

Somalia, a war torn country, has been without a government since a multi-factional civil war erupted in 1991.[142] With the overthrow of the government in 1991, the southern part descended into continued factional fighting while the northern part, Somaliland, followed a different path and ratified a constitution in 2001.[143] In addition to the ratification of the previously listed constitution in Somaliland, they have hosted two successful elections. Somaliland's developing banking systems, telecommunications, and geographical transport links increase the attractiveness for terrorists.[144]

Prior to these events, the civil war and a lack of United States importance to maintain Somalia as a client state to offset the neighboring then, Soviet supported Ethiopia, were factors that began to hinder establishment of a transitional government for Somalia. Additionally, the disastrous events of 1993 when Mogadishu warlords killed 18 U.S. military members and dragged their burnt bodies through the streets, halted U.S. relations with the transitional government.

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[140]BBC News, "Q&A: Sudan's Darfur Conflict," review of Reviewed Item, no. (2005).
[141] Ibid.
 "Mentan, *Dilemmas of Weak Slates: Africa and Transnational Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century,* 178.
[143] K. Shillinger, "Recognizing Somaliland: Forward Step in Countering Terrorism," *RUSI (2005):* 48.
,44Ibid.

Terrorist activity in Djibouti and the perceptions of it are primarily linked to its function; a major port of entry in the upper Horn of Africa.[145] Djibouti's importance is derived from its transit capabilities rather than its potential for terrorist safe havens and bases of operation.[146] Unfortunately, Djibouti's weak government and lack of resources prohibit it from monitoring this porous border.[147] Djibouti is also host to the Horn of Africa's International Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Combined Joint Task Force -Horn of Africa.

Conclusions

The presence of refugees in the horn of Africa has both merits and demerits. The Horn of Africa, as previously mentioned, is no stranger to terrorist acts or activity. These terrorist acts have taken place both in the region and launched from safe havens within the region. Terrorist acts combined with weak, failing, and failed states within the Horn of Africa have negatively affected most of the region. Also, terrorism has not limited itself to just the Horn of Africa, but rather across the continent. This threat not only affects the national security of Africa but of the globe. Several African led initiatives have been implemented to combat this terrorist threat and restore human security. A series of continental treaties and conventions have been established in an attempt to utilize African unity to combat terrorism. The Africa's Peace and Security Agenda incorporates key elements into the fight against terrorism throughout the continent. The Horn of Africa either actively participates in these initiatives or looks to reap the benefits of them.

" United States Institute of Peace. *Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*, 5.
[146] Ibid.
[147] Ibid.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE IMPACT OF REFUGEES ON SECURITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

4.0 Introduction

The previous chapter gave an appraisal of the impact of refugees on security in the Horn of Africa. The study has changed individual perception towards refugees. Their presence should not be viewed as a loss and burden to the host community but there are also benefits from them. The sub-Saharan region has been marred by conflicts and therefore forced migration is inevitable.

The Horn of Africa is known to be a safe haven for terrorism because some of the states within the region are weak/failed states. This chapter will critically analyse the impact of refugees on security in the Horn of Africa. It will analyse the following key areas: forced migration and reception of refugees, conflict and insecurity in the Horn of Africa, the perception of refugees, the issue of forced migration, weak and failed states in the horn of Africa.

4.1 Emerging issues

4.1.1 Forced migration and reception of refugees

The phenomenon of forced migration is fraught with controversial and, sometimes, contradictory interpretations and connotations. We talk of forced migration in opposition to voluntary migration. In this way, displacement is viewed from its causes. Thus, accordingly, we may talk of economic migration as opposed to socio-political migration.[148]Whereas, the former refers to migrants who leave their respective residence

D. Turton, (2003). 'Conceptualizing Forced Migrants' Refugee Studies Centre Working Paper, No. 12. Oxford: Queen Elisabeth House.

and settle elsewhere in search of economic opportunities such as employment, business opportunities, and education among others,[14y] the latter refers to migrations caused by social and political problems such as armed conflicts, human rights violations, natural disasters, and others.[150] In these cases forced migrants, commonly referred to as refugees, flee their places of residence for their physical security and to protect themselves from an imminent threat to their physical well-being. Thus, Nick Van Hear[151] talks of voluntary as opposed to involuntary nature of the forces that lead to migration.

Forced migration, is associated with the threat and fear that force people to flee their place of residence in search for security and safety.[1^2] Forced migrations are also divided into two categories depending on the causes of displacement. We can distinguish between forced migration caused by natural disasters on the one hand and migration caused by violence and/or armed conflict, also known as man-made displacement as well as migration in response to repressive state policies and persecution, that is, refugee migration in a narrow sense, as defined by international humanitarian law.[153]

According to Kunz, refugees are different from voluntary migrants in that they have to leave their homeland against their will, with no positive motivation to settle anywhere else.[1:14] The term 'refugee' not only carries empirical sociological and socio-political connotations, but above all, is a normative and legal category, enshrined as such in

[149] G. Anthony Constance, (1999), "Africa's Refugee Crisis: State Building in Historical Perspective". International Migration Review, 35, 3, pp. 116-133.
[150] Ibid.
[151] N. Van Hear, (1998). New Diasporas. London: UCL Press.
F. Deng, (1993). Protecting the dispossessed: A challenge for the international community. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
A. Sen, (1981). Poverty and Famines: an Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Forced migration in Africa 191.
[154] E. F. Kunz, (1973). "The refugee in Flight: Kinetic Models and Forms of Displacement". *International Migration Review, Vol. 7.*

international law.[155] The responsibility to grant or deny the refugee status to the claimant lies with the State in which the asylum is being sought. The United Nations high commissioner for refugees is mandated to assist governments to follow the rules and procedures in granting refugee status, providing assistance and protection to qualified refugees and asylum seekers. The United Nations high commission for refugees is also mandated to find durable solutions to people's flight.

Three solutions have traditionally been suggested to address 'refugee problems', namely, voluntary repatriation, permanent settlement in the host country and resettlement in a third country. Without entering in a debate about the best and/or the successful of any of the three envisaged durable solutions of the refugee problem, it is worth noting that the search for durable solutions to refugee crises requires more alternatives considering the magnitude and the recurrence of refugee crises that often display similar features. However, the procedure of granting refugee status on individual basis has proven to be impossible in some circumstances, especially in developing countries, in Africa in particular, where frequent incidence of mass refugee flows renders individual status determination procedures largely impractical. Only countries which receive a limited number of asylum seekers such as the western countries and some African countries which are privileged to be geographically situated far from refugee producing countries can follow individual status determination procedure. In these circumstances where the status determination on individual basis is not possible, a procedure known as 'prima facie' is used to recognize refugees collectively and to accord protection to such refugees on

[5] A. Kraler, (2005). The state and population mobility in the Great Lakes - What is different with post-colonial migrations? Sussex Migration Working Paper Nr. 24, Brighton: Sussex Centre for Migration Research.

humanitarian grounds.[156] This procedure is favoured by many States, especially in developing countries, not only because the individual procedure is not practical but also and primarily to avoid the responsibility of granting the rights and privileges that the individual refugee status brings to its bearer.[157]

The 'prima facie' procedure is supposed to be used temporarily while preparing for individual determination of refugee status. However, the reality is that many refugees in Africa spend many years, if not their entire life in exile under this regime of collective protection. This collective recognition of refugees on humanitarian ground also creates confusion and abuse of the term 'refugee' as non-refugees in the sense of the above-mentioned international legal instruments find it easy to call themselves refugees. This constitutes the biggest challenge faced by some African countries in trying to identify and

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separate genuine refugees from illegal migrants.

4.1.2 Conflict and insecurity in the horn of Africa

Literature traces the beginning of the problem of refugees in Africa back to the period of struggles for independence. As Milner points out, "while migration, both forced and voluntary, has been a defining feature of African history since pre-modern times, the emergence of the modern refugee phenomenon in Africa may be linked to the struggle for

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[1] E. Rwamatwara, (2003). Le Rapatriement Forc6 Des Refugies: Un D£fi Humanitaire. Le Cas Des Refugtes Rwandais De 1994. Geneve: Unige, PPAH (M&noire De MaTtrise).

[157] Ibid.

*G. Okoth-Obbo, (2001). 'The Refugee experience and policy issues in Southern Africa. In Zonke Majodina (ed.). The challenge of forced migration in Southern Africa. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa.

and attainment of independence by most African states in the late 1950s and early 1960s.'
[159]

Deng identifies civil and ethnic conflicts as the main causes of forced migrations in Sub-Saharan Africa.[160] Violent armed conflict experienced in several African countries in the post-Independence period are thus often the direct result of exclusionary policies pursued by newly independent regimes that in important ways can be seen as a continuation of similar colonial policies. The conflicts often opposed ruling groups trying to maintain the status quo on the one hand and excluded group rallying for change, on the other. Thus, in general, struggles over the control of political and economic power and concomitant massive human rights abuse, including widespread violence are the main cause of population flights in Sub Saharan Africa. Anthony (1999) cites Chad, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda as examples of major refugee producing countries in sub-Saharan Africa, but the list can undoubtedly be prolonged.

Moreover, armed conflicts that cause population displacement are, in many instances, a result of failure or unwillingness of certain governments to resolve long-standing ethnic tensions or the tendency of certain governments to oppress particular population groups.[161] For many socio-economic and developmental analysts armed conflicts and the resulting mass flight of refugees constitute the greatest challenge for economic development and the greatest obstacle to economic take off.[162] The responses to the refugee

J. Milner, (2004). Golden Age? What Golden Age? A critical history of African asylum policy. Paper presented to the centre for Refugee Studies, York University, 28 January 2004.

[160] F. Deng, (1993). Protecting the dispossessed: A challenge for the international community. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution

A. Adepoju, (1989). "Les Consequences Des Movements De Refugees Sur Les Pays D'accueil En Afrique". [/incidence Des Migrations Internationales Sur Les Pays En D^veloppement. London: Appleyard; Reginald.

D. Nabudere, (2003)."Towards a new model of production. An alternative to NEPAD". African Perspective, 4, 15 Issues. Autumn 2003.

problem as well as the management of refugee crises in Africa reflect this complex nature of the refugee phenomenon and the root causes of population displacement. The complexity of the refugee problem in Africa constitutes a great challenge for researchers, humanitarians as well as policy makers.

Repeated conflicts and civil war in various parts of the region have displaced thousands of people from Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia. Some find shelter - often provided by UNHCR and other aid organizations - in camps within their own country (IDP camps). Others are crossing the border and have taken shelter in refugee camps over there. Nowadays; especially the fighting in Somalia brings about huge displacement. Many Somali entering Kenya arrive in Dadaab, just past the Somali border. Three overcrowded camps there house two hundred and seventy thousand people. Extension of the camps is desirable but complex, as there is simply not enough land for the thousands more expected to arrive[163].

The above situation has caused loss of critical infrastructure and markets, wiping out the regional agricultural production capacity.[164] Massive displacements of population due to prolonged conflict and instability disrupted the critical time of planting and harvesting for large parts of the farming community.[165] Furthermore, the inflow of refugees from Somalia and Eritrea altered the food security situation in Kenya, Djibouti and the Somali and Afar regions of Ethiopia. Migration from Ethiopia and Somalia also has a tremendous effect on food insecurity in Djibouti City. Although the southern part of Sudan is very fertile, the acute malnutrition rate in this region is one of the highest in the world

[u] UN News Service, (2010). "Somali refugees strain resources of neighbouring countries, UN official warns". *UN Daily News,* 3 May 2010.
  Red Cross, (2009). *Horn of Africa: Exceptional Food Security Crisis Appeal and Budget revision.*
[165] World Food Programme, (2010). *Somalia.*

due to conflict and displacement of people.'"[6] Mass migration also strongly affects the level of forest degradation.

The refugee crisis in Africa has always been at the same time a cause and a consequence of armed conflicts. Unresolved refugee problems and difficult living conditions within which large numbers of refugees find themselves have forced the latter to resort to violence to return to their countries of origin.[167] This has resulted in recurring conflicts and new waves of refugees. Furthermore, conflicts have been spreading from one country to neighboring countries in which refugees fleeing violence in their countries have sought refuge. This is mainly due to the fact that in many instances armed elements are mixed with ordinary refugees creating instability in the area of refugees' settlement.[168]

Many refugee situations in Africa qualify as protracted and are likely to remain so as no durable solution is foreseeable in the near future. This is the case for refugees from Sudan, Somalia, and Uganda. Moreover, of the three commonly agreed-upon durable solutions, namely, voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement in a third country, African countries favor 'voluntary' repatriation and are usually against the local integration solution. As Kibreab argues, the result of this general tendency is that refugees are usually forced to return back to their countries of origin even when the cause of their

'"World Food Programme, (2009). *Djibouti.*

B. Rutinwa, (1996). "The Tanzanian Government's Response to the Rwandan Emergency." *Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3.*

* J. C. Jeff., (2003). "No solution in sight: the problem of protracted refugee situations in Africa." New Issues in Refugee Research; *Working Paper No. 75* Geneva: UNHCR, January Rutinwa, Bonaventure. 1996. "The Tanzanian Government's Response to the Rwandan Emergency." *Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3.*

flight has not totally been solved."[1]' This results in high mobility of refugees across the continent in fear of being forcibly returned to their countries of origin.[170] It also quite often results in armed conflict as refugees try to make their voice heard and their rights respected in their of origin

4.1.3 The perception of refugees

The major challenge of addressing the refugee problem in Africa consists of harmonizing the perceptions and assumptions attached to the African refugees. The challenge also consists of the applicability of the traditional legal definition of the term 'refugee' as well as the rights that this legal definition implies as compared to the practice observed in most countries hosting refugees. It also refers to the national asylum policies which are constantly moulded to suit the interests of the host countries at the expense of the refugees. In fact, as the number of refugees increases in Africa commitment to assist refugees decreases at local and international levels. The traditional warm welcome, compassion and generous reception of African host communities towards refugees decreases and is gradually replaced by xenophobic attitudes as it is observed in many countries hosting refugees.[171]

As Kibreab points out, 'the policies of nearly all refugee-hosting countries are designed to prevent rather than promote the integration of refugees'.[172] As Kibreab notes, 'nearly all refugee-hosting countries in the South have a policy of keeping refugees in

[1] G. Kibreab, (2003). *Displacement, host governments' policies, and constraints on the construction of Sustainable livelihoods.* UNESCO, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

[5] E. Rwamatwara, (2005), "Forced migration in Africa: a challenge to development." In A. Kraler and V. Bilger, eds. *African Migration: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Dynamics.* Vienna Journal of African Studies, Vienna: Stichproben.

E. Rwamatwara, (2003). Le rapatriement forc£ des r6fugi6s: Un d6fi humanitaire. Le cas des r^fiigtes rwandais de 1994. Geneve: Unige, PPAH (M6moire de Maitrise).

G. Kibreab, (2003), 'Displacement, host governments' policies, and constraints on the construction of sustainable livelihoods'. UNESCO. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. p. 590.

segregated sites with little freedom of movement and residence'.[17j] This policy is also meant to prevent frequent contact and interaction with locals which could lead to fast integration and permanent settlement of refugees. The policy is also intended to control and minimize the refugees' competition with locals over scarce resources and services such as education, employment, health facilities, and other important services.

The end result of this exclusive and controlling policies is that refugees in Africa cross several borders looking for better reception and hospitality.[174] Furthermore, refugees compelled to stay in remote refugee camps where the only possible sustaining activity is small scale farming tend to migrate to urban areas in search for alternative income generating activities. These are mainly the youth who cannot foresee any meaningful future by staying in a remote closed refugee camp and educated refugees who cannot use their skills while staying in a remote rural refugee camp. Once in urban centres, the majority of these refugees lead a destitute life which may compel some of them to engage in illegal activities for survival.

Moreover, African refugees are gradually perceived as constituting a security threat as they are thought to include dangerous elements that can compromise the State security and national integrity. Thus, by keeping refugees and controlling them in closed guarded camps, host countries claim to control and minimize the security incidents that are associated with uncontrolled movements of refugees. Although this assumption has some foundation in some cases such as the 1994 Rwandan refugee mass flows which caused insecurity in the host countries such as DRC (then Zaire) and Tanzania, the control of

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[173] Ibid.
[4]E. Rwamatwara, (2003). Le rapatriement fore6 des r^fiigies: Un defi humanitaire. Le cas des r6fugi6s rw an dais de 1994. Geneve: Unige, PPAH (Memoire de Maitrise).

refugee movement is closely linked to the States' closed door asylum policies which aim at discouraging refugees to stay long in the country.

Furthermore, the change in refugee management policies has shifted the focus from the long term solution of the refugee problem in favour of the short term solution. In fact, during the 'golden age' many refugees were given citizenship and were helped through the total integration in local communities. Tanzania has been applauded for its exemplary policy of integrating refugees from Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and recently Somali refugees. However, in the new era, this policy has been put aside and Tanzania has shown yet another example by harassing and forcibly repatriating Rwandan refugees in 1996.[17]" In the 'closed door' policies era, countries prefer the short term solution which involves meeting the immediate needs of the refugees by giving them emergency aid calculated to ensure their survival and arrange for a return as soon as the conditions in country of origin improve.[176] Thus, host countries are fast in convincing refugees to return back to their countries of origin even when the situation back home has not yet come back to normal.

The negative perception of refugees is not always true. Nowadays refugees are becoming profitable to host communities for example; refugees in Eastleigh estate in Nairobi Kenya. They have put businesses and are selling their goods at an affordable price and therefore making life simple for those who are unable to afford goods sold at higher prices. Most of these refugees are connected to other refugees in the Diaspora who support them dearly. They spillover the benefits to the host communities. The exchange of culture

[1 5] J. Milner, (2004). Golden Age? What Golden Age? A critical history of African asylum policy. Paper presented to the centre for Refugee Studies, York University, 28 January 2004.
[1 6] A. Adepoju, (1982). *'The dimension of the Refugee Problem in Africa ".* African Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 322, pp. 21-35.

and skills also create a peaceful atmosphere between the refuges and host communities. This minimizes the conflict between the host communities and the refugees. They learn to live together as one community.

4.1.4 The issue of forced migration

One of the main issues today is the ever-increasing number of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) on the continent and its negative impact on the social, economic, political and human development. As Cohen and Deng put it, "large numbers of persons are regularly turned into 'refugees' and forced into a life of destitution and indignity."[177] According to United nations high commissioner for refugees, the total population of concern to UNHCR, namely, refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless, and other people of concern, increased from seventeen million persons at the end of 2003 to nineteen million by the end of 2004. Africa has the biggest share of this number with nearly three million refugees, often concentrated in regions with considerably inadequate capacities to host them. The current points of concentration of refugees in Africa are the great lakes region which is home to nearly one and half million refugees, East and Horn of Africa which hosts an estimate of one million refugees and the West African block which hosts half a million refugees.[178]

Today, refugees flow from one African country to another in an uncontrolled manner. In some cases the flow of refugees is too huge and fast to be adequately managed. For example, the influx of Rwandese refugees was at the rate of two hundred and fifty thousand refugees crossing into Tanzania within twenty four hours and in two months the

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[^] F. Deng, and R. Cohen, (eds.). (1998). Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution
[171] UNHCR, (2004). Global Refugee Trends. Geneva: UNHCR Publications

number of refugees fleeing from Rwanda to Tanzania rose to nearly a million people.[179]

These mass displacements of people constitute a serious threat of security. They also affect economic, environmental and political stability of the transit and final destination countries. In fact, countries which host a big number of refugees have complained of the latter's destruction of environment in terms of tree-cutting in search of fire wood, water pollution, deforestation for setting up camps among others.[180] These countries have also complained of spending considerable amounts of money over refugees which would have been used to improve the standard of living of their own citizens.

The presence of refugees has caused unnecessary insecurity in the area of their settlement. The insecurity usually stems from the conflicts between refugees and local communities over the limited resources. More importantly, hosting refugees has been a source of political conflicts between the host country and the country of origin of the refugees. For example, the presence of the Rwandan refugees in DRC after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda created a political conflict between the two countries until today.

Furthermore, the increase in number of refugees and asylum seekers is accompanied by the fading generosity of African States regarding the acceptance, assistance and protection of refugees and asylum seekers. As Rutinwa rightly points out, '"while the refugee problem has on the whole increased since the 1980s, African states have become less committed to asylum. African states now routinely reject refugees at the frontier or return them to their countries of origin even if the conditions from which they

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® B. Rutinwa, (1999). "The end of asylum? The changing nature of refugee policies in Africa" New Issues in Refugee Research. May, 1999.
*°R. Mupedziswa, (1993). Uprooted: Refugees and Social Work in Africa, Harare: Nigel Hall.

have fled still persist".[181] The compassion and support shown by governments and host communities towards refugees in the past - victims of liberation struggles as well as victims of human rights abuse and ethnic cleansing - has disappeared. Both governments and communities are no longer prepared to sacrifice their economic resources and security for continuous cycles of waves of mass flights.

Tanzania has hosted and supported several freedom fighters from Zimbabwe, South Africa, Mozambique and Namibia. It also accepted and integrated large numbers of refugees from Rwanda and Burundi. In the context of the crisis of the 1990s, however, Tanzania's refugee policies radically changed. When hundreds of thousands Hutu refugees from Rwanda poured into Tanzania, the latter closed its doors to several thousand refugees and later forcibly repatriated many Rwandan refugees on grounds that they posed a security threat.

Whitaker examines the implications of the refugee presence for host communities in Tanzania. Over the years, there have been many calls for strategies linking refugee relief with local development, but a number of factors have impeded their effective integration, including lack of donor support, weak coordination between refugee and development bureaucracies, and increasing numbers of refugees.[182]Despite the common assumption that refugees represent a problem or burden,[183] it is clear that refugee

" B. Rutinwa, (1999). "The end of asylum? The changing nature of refugee policies in Africa". New Issues in Refugee Research. May 1999.
E"T. F. Betts, (1981), "Documentary Note: Rural Refugees in Africa", *International Migration Review* 15(12): 213-218 Gorman, R. F. (1994), "Refugee Aid and Development in Africa: Research and Policy Needs from the Local Perspective", in: Adelman, H. and Sorenson, J. (Ed.) African Refugees: Development Aid and Repatriation. Boulder: West view Press.
Harrell-Bond, (1986). "Imposing Aid: Emergency assistance to Refugees". Oxford University Press, London.

migrations bring both costs and benefits to host countries.[184] Refugees generally impose a burden on local infrastructure, environment, and resources, but they also provide cheap labour, expand consumer markets, and justify increased foreign aid.

On the beneficial aspects of refugees Whitaker cited as a support to his findings that refugees represent a source of cheap labour for Tanzanian villagers.[18"] Local farmers generally hired refugees to do agricultural work, but also to build houses. Before the arrival of the refugees, labour shortages and lack of markets were significant constraints to agricultural production and their presence has moved markets closer to local villagers. The refugee relief operation meant an increase in employment opportunities for hosts. In response to the calls from the communities, NGOs initiated development projects in host communities which included more than 50 primary schools and 20 dispensaries, four district hospitals were expanded, at least 120 water systems were improved or installed, a community centre was constructed, and several teacher resource centres were built.

4.1.5 Weak and Failed States in the Horn of Africa

The most dramatic demonstrations of the relationship between weak/failed states and international security are probably provided by experiences of terrorism and forced migration. A range of pathologies have been associated with the condition of weak and failed States and some of these are claimed to have an international or even global impact. These situations often involve violent conflict, either as a cause or a consequence of state failure or weakness, which involves a number of negative transnational effects. These

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E. B. Whitaker, (2000), "Refugees in Western Tanzania: The distribution of Burden and Benefits among Local Host". Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, NC, USA. *Journal of Refugee Studies* Vol. 15, No. 4, 2002

L. Ndege et al. (1995). "Tanzania/Netherlands Fanning Systems Research Project, Lake Zone: Diagnostic Survey of Karagwe District", Karagwe District Rural Development Programme, October.

include forced migration flows which can lead to the spread of insurgents, threatening regional stability on an ongoing basis and sometimes causing conflicts in neighbouring states.[186] There is ample evidence of this. Forcibly displaced Rwandans in Uganda formed the basis of the Rwandan Patriotic Front which fought an ongoing armed struggle with the government of Rwanda in the 1980s and 1990s.

Weak and failing states are vulnerable to all forms of smuggling, including trafficking in small arms and light weapons through porous borders, and this is also a demonstrable source of regional insecurity.[187] There is also a more intuitively reliable claim that such states also provide an environment in which - due to the absence of orderly institutions and accountable governance - recalcitrant or aggressive governments can come to power, abuse the privileges of sovereign statehood and pose a threat to regional security, for example Somalia and Sudan. These states are also more likely to host war economies: the illegal commercial networks and activities which thrive in environments where there is no effective rule of law[188] as well as fuelling conflicts within these societies and across the region. Paul Collier, for example, claims that 'Ninety five percent of global production of hard drugs is from conflict countries'.[189] In particular, an overwhelming proportion of cocaine and heroin originates from such countries and their production is arguably facilitated by the absence of government control in vast regions of those countries. The

[k] G. Loescher, J. Milner, E. Newman and G. Troeller (eds), (2008). Protracted Refugee Situations: Political, Human Rights and Security Implications Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

R_ Jorg, et al, 'Dark Networks as Problems', *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 13, So. 4* (October 2003), pp. 413-39.

[a] D. M. Malone, and H. Nitzschke, (2005). 'Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: What We Know, What We Need to Know', Discussion Paper No. 2005/7. (2005), p. 4.; P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, 'Greed and Grievance in Civil War', World Bank Working Paper 2002/03 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003); P. Collier, (1999) 'Doing Well Out of War', World Bank Working Paper 1999/04 Washington, DC: World Bank.

P. Collier, (2007). The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are failing and what can be done about it Oxford: Oxford University Press). P. 31.

impact of the narcotics trade upon Western countries is clearly taken very seriously as a security threat and this is reflected in the policies and resources directed to this issue.

The challenge of piracy also highlights how illegal entrepreneurs can exploit an absence of law enforcement in order to prey on international business, with far-reaching ramifications. This phenomenon is again epitomized by the case of Somalia, where lawlessness has enabled pirates to attack ships deep into the Indian Ocean, resulting in significant increases in shipping costs.

Weak and failed states may have an adverse impact upon the natural environment, with transnational effects, because such countries are unlikely to have effective regulations to govern environmental degradation. The conflict in Sudan serves as an example, which has been described as the first climate change conflict. The government of the country has been unable or unwilling to address the competition over resources in Darfur that has been exacerbated by the spread of the desert and the decline in habitable and agricultural land. That conflict has drawn in neighbouring countries and posed huge humanitarian problems that cannot be ignored by the international community.

Failing and post-conflict states pose one of the greatest national and international security challenges of our day, threatening vulnerable populations, their neighbors, our allies, and ourselves. Struggling states can provide breeding grounds for terrorism, crime, trafficking, and humanitarian catastrophes, and can destabilize an entire region. Experience shows that managing conflict, particularly internal conflict, is not a passing phenomenon. It has become a mainstream part of our foreign policy.[190]

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[190] US Department of States, 'About the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.

4.6 Other issues

Most of the refugees all over the globe depend on humanitarian aid especially those who are not well connected. Piracy threatens the delivery of vital humanitarian assistance to the Horn of Africa, much of which arrives by sea. The delivery of U.S. food and humanitarian aid to Somalia is hindered by a non-permissive security environment on land. Food insecurity in the region, caused by drought and instability, has been heightened by high food and fuel prices in the region.

Officials from the World Food Program (WFP), which ships tens of thousands of metric tons of food monthly to the Horn of Africa region, reports that it has become more expensive to ship assistance to Mogadishu, and that their ability to deliver relief is significantly hampered. A1 Shabaab militants demanded in December 2009 that the WFP halt imports of food assistance in favor of purchasing supplies from Somali fanners. The WFP suspended operations in southern Somalia in January 2010, amid growing threats and intimidation. The UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies states that 'the establishment of refugee camps must be only a last resort. A solution that maintains and fosters the self-reliance of the refugees is always preferable.[191]

The central principle of the dependency syndrome is that refugees who receive emergency support become accustomed to free handouts and give up all self initiative. A moral breach is also implied: they would rather be beggars than take care of themselves. Rogge, an experienced consultant and analyst of refugee events espouses the idea of refugee dependency.[192] Rogge states: 'It appears that these refugees have been in a state of near total dependency since the late 1970s.Interventions which will make them more self-

[191] UN High Commission for Refugees, (1982). P. 57.
J. Rogge, (1985) 'Africa's displaced population: dependency or self-sufficiency?' in Clarke J. et al ieds.) Population and Development Projects in Africa Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

reliant are needed'[193].Clark suggests that the apparent dependency of refugees derives from their removal from their social, political and economic coping systems. It is has become expensive to support refugees since some are not genuine refugees. The number increases on daily basis and therefore making it difficult for charity organizations to assist them. In Kenya, Dadaab refugee camps, it is difficult to differentiate refugees from Somali from the residents because they look alike.

This study justifies refugees' behavior in their host countries. They do not intend to break the law but they are forced to do so by circumstances. Refugees are tied in that they are unable to exercise their talents. They are denied freedom of movement, access to health, education and employment among others. In Somali, for many years they have been busy fighting therefore lagging behind in development. The youth is engaged in crimes mostly pirating, and trafficking dangerous weapons to get money. They earn their living through these funny and dangerous activities. Research shows that small arms business is doing well in Kenya with the Somali community stationed in Eastleigh estate. Frustration and desperation about the inability to escape from a life of poverty, social and political injustice are the roots of terrorism in the Horn.

Refugee flows are a symbol of the crises which afflict many societies in Africa. In particular, most of the refugee flows are the result of armed conflicts and civil strife. Ethnic intolerance; the abuse of human rights on a massive scale; the monopolization of political and economic power; refusal to respect democracy or the results of free and fair elections; resistance to popular participation in governance; and poor management of

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[n]*J.* Rogge, (1992), The Displaced Population in South and Central Somalia and Preliminary Proposals for Their Reintegration and Rehabilitation. (A report to the UNDP) Winnipeg: Disaster Research Unit,University of Manitoba. P. 27.

public affairs all play a part in forcing people to flee their normal places of residence. Refugee policies have always tended to assist refugees with food and materials instead of equipping them with capacity to produce what they need by themselves. Refugees are seen as a burden especially in sharing of resources with the local community. They are known to be as worse as challenging the sovereignty of a state.

From this study, the best assistance and protection to refugees should consist of capacity building through proper education, loans and facilitation so that refugees can maximize the exploitation of their talents and skills as well as find strong markets for their products. There is also a need to facilitate the process of obtaining their administrative papers, thus enabling them to exercise their entrepreneurships without hindrance. Instead of confining refugees in restricted areas, refugees should be encouraged and allowed to work and produce, and hence contribute to the development of the host country.

Refugee influx in the hom of Africa is as a result of armed conflicts in failed states. Such states have become safe havens for terrorists therefore threatening national security. Refugees compete with the locals over scarce resource hence degrading the environment. The countries hosting refugees have suffered a lot since they get no support from donor countries that of late have been very reluctant on that issue. Refugees turn to small business like charcoal burning which is also used for cooking.

Conclusions

Refugees should not be discriminated from the locals in all aspects of life. They should be treated equally. The policy governing refugees is weak and need to be revised. The policy tends to treat them as foreigners, denying them their rights. Refugees have right to education, right to employment, freedom of movement, right to health. Their dependency

syndrome is not natural but manmade. Is not that the refugees are lazy but do not have freedom to mingle and earn daily bread for their siblings. When the situation becomes worse, they try all means to earn their living without caring about the consequences. The findings of this study show that the presence of refugees has negative impacts which outnumber positive impacts. Refugees impact negatively on security especially state, human and environmental security.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS

5.0 Summary

Addressing and solving the problem of refugees in Africa requires a good analysis of its root causes so as to address them and prevent the problem before it occurs. Refugee flows are a symbol of the crises which afflict many societies in the Horn of Africa. External factors have also played a part in at least contributing to forced population displacements. Historically, the main cause of coerced population displacements has been colonialism.

Today, there is no question that international economic forces have contributed to the widespread poverty in Africa and to the widening gap between the poor and the rich. In many African countries, there is competition over scarce resources, and the human and physical environment has suffered degradation. Some States can no longer carry out the critical functions of government, including the control of national territory; oversight over the nation's resources; extraction of revenue; maintenance of an adequate national infrastructure; rendering of basic services such as sanitation, education, and housing; and governance and maintenance of law and order. Most of the countries in the Horn of Africa are weak and failed states. The above factors contribute in one or- another way to the root causes of displacement.

External causes are also worth mentioning, such as arming and sponsoring rebel movements by external forces in order to have easy access to minerals and to find markets for their products, especially weapons; the unfair trade deals and unfair international economic system which leave many African states too poor to adequately attend to the needs of the citizens. The previous chapters show that the Horn of Africa is an ideal

location for terrorist activities. Much of the region's territory qualifies as a zone of state failure, where central state authority is weak to non-existent and where terrorist cells can presumably operate with impunity. Where state authority is robust, it is generally experienced as a repressive and predatory force to be evaded or resisted, stoking deep resentments that erode the willingness of local communities to cooperate with counter-terrorist monitoring. Borders are porous and poorly patrolled throughout the Horn of Africa, fueling robust smuggling networks that facilitate cross-border terrorist and criminal operations.

5.1 Key findings

The study has given an appraisal on the impacts of refugees on security in the Horn of Africa. The study portrays the Horn of Africa as one of the poorest and most underdeveloped regions of the world, and is also the site of multiple, protracted armed conflicts; the region's desperate poverty and militarization has the potential to produce a ready supply of recruits into terrorist cells. Corruption is endemic in most regional governments, compromising the effectiveness of counter-terrorism operations by police and security forces.

According to the findings of this study, the root cause of refugees' flights in the horn of Africa is armed conflicts whose causes include poverty, civil strife, arms trade, violations of human rights and lack of accountability and democracy on the part of leaders. The 1994 Addis Ababa Declaration confirms this. Other factors which play a significant role in forced population displacement in Africa are ethnic and religious intolerance, the abuse of human rights on a massive scale; the monopolization of political and economic power; refusal to respect democracy or the results of free and fair elections; resistance to

popular participation in governance; and poor management of public affairs.[194] In addition, the Horn of Africa also possesses a number of specific features which make it susceptible to the particular form of terror activity of special concern to the United States namely, Islamic jihadism.

Five of the region's seven states are divided between Christian and Muslim communities, and as such constitute potentially fertile ground for sectarian tensions and religious extremism, especially in Kenya and Ethiopia, where Muslim populations have historically been politically marginalized. Portions of the region - especially Kenya are rich in soft Western targets. Many of the most important, substantial, and long-running terrorist activities in the Horn of Africa have either been situated where they enjoy state sponsorship (Sudan, circa 1991-96) or in a weak, multi-ethnic state (Kenya).

Kenya was the principal site for multiple, major terrorist attacks, because it sports the greatest number of soft targets but also because it has porous borders,[19^] largely unpoliced, and multiethnic urban settings where foreign jihadists can go unnoticed, and a police force and service sector that historically has been quite corrupt. It is easy to imagine how al Qaeda operatives rented private light aircraft to fly them from Wilson airport in Nairobi to known radical Islamist centers in Somalia with no questions asked in Kenya; it is impossible to imagine that same scene at an Ethiopian airport and the ease with which foreign al Qaeda operatives set up shop in Kenya especially Eastleigh estate in Nairobi.

[M] The Addis Ababa Document on Refugees and Forced Population Displacements in Africa. Adopted by the OALi/UNHCR Symposium on Refugees and Forced Population Displacements in Africa 8 - 1 0 SEPTEMBER 1994 ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA

Kenya High Commission for Security and Border Control, (2007), "Challenges for Law Enforcement in Border Security" Presentation made at the 2007 the 2007 Fifth Special Meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Committee with International, Regional and Subregional Organisations, "Prevention of Terrorist Movement anc Effective Border Security."

The presence of refugees in the horn of Africa impact negatively on state security, economy and political affairs. The host community and the refugees compete for scarce resource hence conflict. Finally, the observations made in this study point to a troubling feature of state building enterprises in collapsed states like Somalia. The shift from collapsed state to fully functional central government - one which can provide an enabling environment for development, public security for its citizens, and a security sector which can monitor and prevent terrorist activities - necessarily involves a long transitional period during which the state is no longer a zone of complete collapse, but one which presents many of the features of a weak state.

5.2 Recommendations

Addressing the above problems discussed in the previous chapters requires a commitment of all stakeholders locally and globally. Some of the concrete measures to be taken include; the democratization of African states in a manner that associates every citizen in the major decisions of public administration and governance. It also includes banning and criminalizing illegal sales of weapons. The major solution is also and primarily the sustainable development which eradicates extreme poverty provides basic infrastructures and improves people's standard of living.

Recognition must be given to the specific skills and nature of the contribution that people from protracted refugee situations can bring to the employment market, and targeted training be provided to enable them to capitalize on the skills that they have and to update and upgrade skills for those who have not had any opportunity for training or employment for a number of years.

Specific employment programs should be designed to enable refugees who have experienced severe torture and trauma to enable them to deal with the stress and challenges of employment in a new, foreign and stressful environment. Every effort must be made to recognize and upgrade the skills and qualifications of newly arrived refugees acknowledging that many have lost documentation during flight and are unable to access source documents because of their refugee status. The gains that can result from the presence of refugees should be maximized.

The measures currently taken to protect the environment in refugees affected' areas should be maintained and enhanced. At the same time, there is a need to rethink several aspects of refugee administration including the concentration of refugees in small geographical places and the use of wood as the main source of energy which exasperate environmental problems in refugee-habited areas.

Infrastructure that is used for relief work should be prioritized, roads, bridges and other facilities which the local people consider important should in future be given due consideration. The government and United nations high commission for refugees should negotiate a package for local governance and administration which incorporates all the extra demands made on all government offices and institutions at regional and local level of the presence of refugees.

In order to maximize the benefits of the presence of refugees while minimizing the negative impact, there must be an appropriate institutional framework in terms of the policy, law as well as refugee services delivery arrangements. The present policy regarding refugees in Tanzania is repatriation oriented. In my view, such a policy is not conducive to maximizing the benefits of the presence of refugees. Such a policy does not send the right

signals to those who might be contemplating funding major investments in refugee affected areas for the benefits of both refugees and local populations. From review above, the reasons for Tanzania's policy stance are understandable. When the genuine concerns pointed out are addressed, the government may wish to reconsider its repatriation oriented policy for in reality it does not make much difference in terms of when refugees will leave. This is determined by the situation prevailing in the country of origin.

Further research should be done in all refugee hosting areas to address the impact of presence of refugees. This will enrich the evidence which may inform the government which is currently in the process of developing a refugee policy and the revision of the refugees act, which has also been muted.

The security challenge posed by illegal immigration demands proactive measures to reverse the trend. There should be Continuous monitoring of trends and patterns of illegal migrants/smuggling with a view to facilitate information exchange and analysis of migratory flows and routes for the reason of curbing the vice.

Laws relating to refugees and illegal immigrants should be reviewed so that security concerns precedence.[196] While observing the united nations charter governing the refugees, the refugee affairs department (RAD) of the government should enhance its efforts in control and monitoring of refugees and aliens in collaboration with other government agencies on the ground.

Reconsider tribal balance of the security administrators working in the vulnerable areas to limit siding with their kinsmen across the border. Instituting disciplinary measures

The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol to the Convention.

against government officers found to engage in human smuggling and corrupt dealings should also be considered.[197]

In conclusion, effects of illegal immigration, particularly migrant smuggling, are likely to pose grave national security challenges to the countries concerned in to the foreseeable future. As an emerging problem, there may be need to address capacity gaps of national authorities and the law enforcement agencies responsible for dealing with the challenge. Otherwise, if the issue of refugees is not addressed in time, it may run out of hand.

Interview with Joseph Murunga, Intelligence officer, Nairobi, 26th June, 2011 Nairobi.

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List **of Interviewees**

Habakkuk Israel, a refugee
Mr. Joseph Murunga Intelligence officer, Nairobi.

MIGRATION INSTRUMENTS

- **The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees**

- **The 1961 protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees**

- **The 1969 OAU Convention**