# University of Nairobi

# Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies

## The Impact of United States' Counterterrorism Response to Global Terrorism: A Study of the War in Afghanistan, 2001-2010

By

Richard Hussein Chesang

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## Declaration

I, Richard Hussein Chesang hereby declare that this research project is my own original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.

Signed............................................................date.........9| 11| 2011.

Richard Hussein Chesang

This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as university supervisor;

Signed..........................................................date. October 10th 2011

Prof. Maria Nzomo

## Abstract

The war in Afghanistan was a result of the September 11, 2001 bombing of New York and Washington which killed more than 3000 people and injured many more. The US president at the time George Bush demanded the Taliban government under the leadership of Mohammed Mullah Omar to hand over Osama bin laden and company to the US or else face the wrath of war. This order was however not heeded and the Afghan government refused to hand over the masterminds of the 9/11 bombings. For the US, failure of the diplomatic measure called for the threat to be fulfilled for them not to look weak. On October 7, 2001 the United States and allies-(operation enduring freedom-OEF)-waged a protracted war to oust the Taliban government and rid Afghanistan of terrorists. This was the beginning of the war that is still ongoing.

At one time or the other, different methods of counterterrorism have been utilized depending on the prevailing circumstances. This study looked at the counterterrorism responses by the US in post September 11th 2001 to 2010 in Afghanistan in an effort to counter if not eliminate the terrorists and the subsequent terrorism incidences. Terrorism has become an issue that has been widely studied and though it has attracted a lot of attention, it is still unresolved and the counterterrorism measures has been put to question in terms of its effectiveness to eliminate the menace, efficiency, and the aftermaths to perhaps eliminate the re-entry question. That is why this study investigates the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan-what the US prefers to call the "war on terror" – as a counterterrorism mechanism and its aftermaths in the period in question. The findings show that the war in Afghanistan just like the war in Iraq has worsened the terrorism occurrences. It calls policy makers to look at the measures employed and make them more responsive in the fight against terror.

## Abbreviations

| | | |
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| COIN | : | Counterinsurgency |
| FATA | : | Federally Administered Tribal Areas |
| NGO | : | Non Governmental Organization |
| US | : | United States of America |
| CIA | : | Criminal Investigation Agency |
| LTTE | : | Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam |
| GIA | : | Armed Islamic Group. |
| IRA | : | Irish Republican Army |
| WMD | : | Weapons of Mass Destruction |
| FNL | : | National Liberation Front |
| GDP | : | Gross Domestic Product |
| ATPU | : | Anti Terrorism Police Unit |
| NSIS | : | National Security Intelligence Service |
| NCTC | : | National Counterterrorism Center |
| NSAC | : | National Security Advisory Committee |
| RDX | : | Research Department explosives |
| GWOT | : | Global war on terrorism |
| NSS | : | National security strategy |

## Dedication

I dedicate this research project to the victims of the terrorist attacks in Kenya; December 1980 Norfolk hotel Nairobi, August 1998 US embassy Nairobi, and November 2002 paradise hotel in Kikambala, Mombasa. It is in the service of the nation they encountered this brutal attack.

## Acknowledgements

This fruitful work of my hands has not been done by my effort alone but with the guidance of God and the following people. First and foremost I would like to acknowledge my father Musa Chesang Chekaitany and my mother Salina Talai Chesang for their upbringing and instilling the value of education in me without which I may not guess where I could currently be. It is their continued support and encouragement that has seen me set my sights high and always strives to be the best. I extend my sincere gratitude to them.

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## Table of Contents

## List of Tables

# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

This study attempts to assess the aftermaths of counterterrorism by the US and investigate if those counterterrorism efforts have increased or reduced the occurrence of international terrorism. The study analyzes the challenges, responses and policy framework that have come up due to the occurrence of global terrorism with a bias on global Islamic terrorism and the war in Afghanistan. This introduction covers the background of the study, statement of the research problem, purpose of the study, objectives of the study, hypotheses, and justification of the study, significance of the study, scope and limitations of the study.

### 1.1.0 Background of the Study

In the interaction of states, new global issues have emerged requiring the attention of all actors globally. Terrorism has emerged as a problem that needs collective and individual attention to stamp out. Though terrorism has been there for a long time, perhaps since the evolution of mankind, it has evolved through a myriad of ways. "Terrorism has become one of the most pressing political problems during the last half century. Its many-sidedness, inexpensive lethality and unpredictability make prevention and control difficult, costly and undependable."[1]

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[1] See preface ,Whittaker J. D. (eds.), *The terrorism reader*, (London and New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis group, 2003)

In the present scenario, terrorism has increased both in magnitude and occurrence. The term terrorism and terrorist has its roots in the French revolution and since then it has been used to denote violence in whatever form it takes.[2] Since 1968 the year credited with making a turning point in modern international terrorism, the 2001 September 11 attacks were so lethal and without any other credible precedent. The suicide attacks of September 11 were so enormous and simultaneous consequently eclipse the previous terrorist activities in both scope and magnitude. In terms of scope and dimension, it portrayed a rare sense of systematic co-ordination and synchronization, dedication and determination of the 19 aircraft hijackers who killed themselves, passengers and crews of the four aircraft taking approximately 3000 at the world trade center and the pentagon.[3]

It's imperative to note that the main features of international terrorism are that, the US has always led in the number of citizens frequently attacked whether within the US or overseas. Statistics show that until Sept 11, 33, years before not more than 1000 Americans were killed but Sept 11 attacks marked a turning point. In less than 90 minutes that day nearly three times that number were killed. It marked a turning point in that it depicts the changing face of terrorism. Kenya too has been faced by three major terrorist attacks; December 1980 Norfolk hotel in Nairobi, August 1998 US embassy Nairobi and the November 2002 paradise hotel in Kikambala Mombasa. All these attacks has had a

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[2] Grant, W., *Political terrorism, theory, tactics, and counter-measures*, (Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 1989), P. 18
[3] Hoffman, B., *Rethinking terrorism and counterterrorism since 9/11*, (Arlington VA,USA: Taylor & Francis,2002)

toll in Kenya's economy as well as the deaths both targeted and collateral damage among other effects. It's also important to note than all the above attacks were aimed at the US and their allies by al-Qaeda led by Osama bin laden. The notion that "Terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening and not a lot of people dead" was wiped clean by the September 11th attacks[4]. People in the past stood consoled in the wisdom made famous by Brian Jenkins and many states had not taken terrorism seriously. The September 11, 2001 attacks to the US citizen can be equated to the shock of the killing of the of US president J.F Kennedy in 1963. It stands as a transformational event at par with the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor and the July 16, 1945 first test detonation of an atomic bomb. The occurrence faulted the ignorance of mankind to correctly address issues before hand and sense of foresightedness in addressing issues in the right way and promptly resulted in much destruction never before imagined.

This beckons us to think more on terrorism and how it should be addressed. Before Sept 11, the US lacked political will to sustain a long determined counterterrorism campaign which retarded this problem. The US hegemonic status dictated that it should lead in addressing the issue of terrorism from the outset. Indeed "The carnage of the September 11 attacks laid bare Americans vulnerability and too belatedly resulted in a sea change in national attitude and accompanying political will to combat terrorism

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[4] Jenkins, B. M., 'International Terrorism: a New Mode of Conflict,' in Carlton, D. & C. Schaerf (eds.), *International Terrorism and World Security*,(London: Croom Helm, 1975), P. 15

systematically, globally and most importantly without respite".[5]It led the US to rethink its foreign policy on terrorism and to take concrete measures in response to terrorism threats. They began seeing the reality of terrorism and this realization propelled the concerted counterterrorism efforts seen in post Sept 11 attacks. Indeed "Terrorist organization has become the dark side of globalization, transnational entities with the ability to inflict casualties against their political opponents anywhere in the world".[6]The problem of terrorism has generated a number of counterterrorism responses globally. One among which is war, which has been loosely called the 'global war on terror'. The war on terrorism in the US perspective presumes that you take the war to terrorists in the places they may be-to terrorize the terrorists.

The al-Qaeda seen by the US as the masterminds of the Sept 11 attacks was based in Afghanistan and the US was determined to capture Osama Bin Laden and company and to rid Afghanistan of terrorists. The government of the time in Afghanistan was led by Taliban under the leadership of Mohamed Mullah Omar who refused to hand over Osama Bin Laden and company to the US leading to the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and the recent killing of Osama bin laden in Pakistan. The present fight against terrorism has centered on the Islamic terrorist groups which the US perceives to be the most visible threat.

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[5] Discussion of two former members of the US national security staff, Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, 'A Failure of intelligence?' in Silvers, R. B. & B. Epstein (eds.), *Striking Terror: America's New War*, (New York: New York review of books, 2002), pp.279-299.
[6] William, N. W., 'Reorganizing For National Security' *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 62, special issue: Democratic Governance in the Aftermath of September 11, 2001 (Sept., 2002), p.128

What should be the ideal position to a country faced with terrorism and reeling from first hand effects like America? War of course is the first in mind to a preponderant power since its well endowed and can be unleashed to anybody threatening the American interests, but is it an effective, efficient and without side effects? This question leads us to our research problem: has the counterterrorism response by the US increased the occurrence of global terrorism? A study of the war in Afghanistan, 2001-2010.

### 1.1.1 Statement of the Research Problem

There has been a marked increase in the counterterrorism efforts employed globally, regionally as well as domestically. Despite this increase, terrorism has continued unabated. This resilience has brought a challenge to policy makers to look for more practical ways of addressing the issue. Many counterterrorism responses have been utilized ranging from legal, judicial, diplomatic, military, political, international cooperation among others. Money, physical and personnel resources have been pumped on counterterrorism as result of the terrorist incidences in contemporary liberal democracies with the justification that more protection is needed to fight terrorism. More state laws limiting personal freedom and increasing police powers in a similar response leads to infringing on fundamental human rights.

To avoid the perceived over reaction and infringing personal freedoms, governments as well as the societies should strive to understand more the nature of terrorism and devise more effective ways of countering the menace without more effects

to the society at large. In this regard the researcher seeks to bring more understanding on terrorism and the counterterrorism responses utilized by the US in the hope that this perhaps will help in progressive policies and procedures in countering the menace. Therefore, in the task of investigating this problem, this researcher asks; has the counterterrorism response by the US increased the occurrence of international terrorism? A study of the war in Afghanistan, 2001-2010

### 1.1.2 Broad Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to investigate aftermaths of the counterterrorism responses by the US with a focus on the war in Afghanistan. Towards this end, the study analyzes the efficiency, effectiveness and consequences of the counterterrorism mechanisms utilized given that terrorism activities are seamless in nature and very unpredictable. Thus the study seeks to investigate whether the counterterrorism measures employed by the US in the response to terrorism in post September 11 2001-2010 increased the occurrence of global terrorism.

### 1.1.3 The Specific Objectives

The specific objectives of the study will be to:

a) Investigate the history of insurgency in Afghanistan and trends in terrorists and insurgent activities.

b) Examine terrorism and terrorists to understand it in an effort to better respond to the menace.

c) Investigate the counterinsurgency measure used by the US in Afghanistan and its effectiveness.

d) Investigate the consequences of the global war on terrorism in Afghanistan as a counterterrorism measure.

e) Suggest appropriate strategies and recommendations on alternative measures that would help fight international terrorism.

### 1.1.4 Hypotheses

a) There is a significant increase in international terrorism due to the counterinsurgency measures employed in Afghanistan.

b) The US military force and power is not adequate to counter terrorism in Afghanistan.

c) Counterinsurgency polarizes the terrorists and energizes their resolve in present and future terrorism incidences.

d) Military Counterterrorism measures cannot prevent international terrorism but are key ingredients in the effort to combat international terrorism.

### 1.1.5 Justification & Significance for the Study

This study will help in re-assessing the best approach in counterterrorism and cultivates a better understanding of terrorists and terrorism. To know what motivates terrorists and how it should be viewed. In terms of equivocal perception and chronological historical approach, the study will make us not overreact to issues but take calculated steps in countering the menace. The study will therefore bring a broad

understanding on terrorism and in particular, the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan as a counterterrorism measure and its aftermaths. These achievements, whether positive or negative will assist policy makers to develop better approaches in similar situations in future since it's apparent that terrorism notwithstanding its form and nature is here to stay. What remains for humanity is to devise mechanism that will ensure it is contained.

But it must avoid letting a thirst for vengeance be quenched by turning to tactics which cause terror themselves, unless it can be sure (or as sure as humanly possible) that the act will have a deterrent effect and will not only provoke further terrorism.[7]

Progress is always a product of inquiry and it promotes logical thinking and organization. Therefore this research hopes to provide information and guidelines that can contribute to solving governmental social problems and a source of knowledge to scholars who may wish to study the same field in future.

### 1.1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study

Due to the large scope of the study, the researcher focuses the study on the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan as a counterterrorism measure employed by the US and its allies in response to the September 11 attacks and its aftermaths. Due to budgetary constraints and the short time span of the study since studies are conducted while the researcher is on regular duties, the researcher did not visit Afghanistan as part of the study. Information on this sensitive area of terrorism is regarded by governments as

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[7] Grant, W., *Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter-measures,* ib.id, p.204

classified information and accessing or obtaining information is by express permission. This however may be difficult if you encounter uncooperative government officials.

Therefore much of the information on terrorism may not be available to the researcher because both terrorist organizations and intelligence organizations responsible for countering the menace depend heavily on secrecy for their effectiveness. The terrorists are not accessible and information from them may not be gotten therefore limiting the quality of information at the disposal of the researcher. State agents also perceive the research as a challenge on their legitimacy and have nothing to offers in return. The researcher in this case has utilized secondary data in most of the research since most of the data that may be collected by primary means may not be dependable and may not be in-depth. Those organizations with the information may not divulge sensitive information therefore the researcher will mostly utilize secondary and primary documents in data collection.

## 1.2 Review of Relevant Literature

Review of relevant literature amalgamates the available literature on terrorism and the counterterrorism measures to assist us better understand the problem of the study. It covers an introduction, nature of terrorism and terrorists, the global war on terrorism in Afghanistan, objectives of the war in Afghanistan, and counterinsurgency as a counterterrorism measure. It will also cover the theoretical framework, definition of key terms, and operational definition.

## 1.2.1 Review of Relevant Literature: Introduction

Terrorism as an emerging global issue has been there for the last 2000 years and has manifested itself in various ways. Its seriousness has never been a global issue for a long time until 1968 when it became apparent that terrorism was an issue that required concerted efforts. This was the year that saw terrorism escalate to a level that elicited international concern. This fight on terrorism otherwise referred as counterterrorism has become global because the problem of international terrorism transcends borders and can never be effectively fought by a single state. September 11, 2001 was a turning point in the understanding of terrorism and terrorists. Though it was not the first incident that occurred, it was so lethal in its nature and magnitude that it exhibited a rare recourse of terrorist resolve. The US had left a gap in antiterrorism defense where a traditional long proven tactic of airline hijacking was neglected in favor of less conventional threats. No single attacks in the entire 20th century had killed more than 500 persons at any one time, a record broken by 9-11 attacks. Malcolm Shaw says that "the use of terror as a means to achieve political ends is not a new phenomenon, but it has recently acquired a new intensity".[8] It owes its survival to an ability to adapt and adjust to challenges and countermeasures and to continue to identify and exploit its opponent's vulnerabilities.[9] The problem of terrorism is multi-dimensional; politically, it ranges from self determination, political independence, sovereignty, jurisdiction, security, interference

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[8] Shaw, M. N., *International Law 6th edition,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) p.1159
[9] Hoffman, B., *Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism,* ib. id, p.314

between conventional diplomacy and diplomacy of terrorism. In finance and economics: destruction of property, decreased investment, money laundering, decreased tourist visiting hence low per capita income and GDP and Legally it covers international criminal law, national penal law and human rights law. This multi-dimensional nature calls for a multi-faceted approach that will deal with terrorism in a multitude of ways. First and foremost a clear definition of terrorism that is universal in character devoid of sectarian interests should be the devised to succeed in the cooperative efforts in countering the menace.

The 9-11 attacks on world trade centre and the pentagon was an aftermath of terrorist planning that begun way before the actual commission. The bombing of Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in 1998 was a result of detailed planning that took five years. Historical facts indicate that the beginning of Islamic politics may have been a rejuvenating factor in international terrorism seen in the Middle East. The first Islamic revolution was in 1979-1980 to withdraw shah to form the first ever Islamic state in Iran. The 1979 week long takeover of Mecca by Islamists got brutal response from the Saudi government killing more than 1000 religious rebels. Following those series of events in the Middle East Syria, Algeria, and Egypt cracked down Islamic opposition in their respective countries.

### 1.2.2 Nature of Terrorism and Terrorists

Terrorism has proved to be a perennial ceaseless struggle which has adapted and has adjusted through the challenges and countermeasures imposed by states and

governments as counterterrorism measures. For success in containing terrorism, governments and states must work tirelessly with dynamic countermeasures that are usually above those of the terrorists[10]. Governments should have realistic expectations on the war on terrorism since it's futile to think that you can totally eliminate terrorism and terrorists because it's apt to remain with us. The only realistic effort that states and governments should be keen on is to strive to contain terrorism. The new international terrorism has seldom been exhibited by past occurrences. The US embassy bombing in East Africa on August 7, 1998 occurred almost simultaneously in the cities of Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in Kenya and Tanzania respectively. These synchronized attacks were a turning point in the organizational and logistical coordination of terrorist attacks. It also had a high death toll too.  Other attacks that exhibited a high coordination and lethality is the Bombay march 1993 attacks, when 10 car bombings rocked the city killing nearly 300 people and wounding 700 people. These series of attack had never been witnessed before and significant new terrorist resolve that centers on patience and detailed planning, coordination and dedication. The September 11 2001 attacks on the pentagon and world trade centre was a replica of the two previous trends of diligent coordination and patience and in lethal nature it was a turning point. One dominant feature of these terrorist attacks was the suicide attack trend that featured in both the September 11 attack and the East Africa bombings. These suicide bombers were motivated by a religious concept of martyrdom.

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[10] Hoffman, B., *Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, op. cit, P.314

Martyrdom can be traced back to the assassins in Shia Ismailia movement 700 years ago. Assassins embraced an ethos of self sacrifice regarded as a sacramental act which was regarded as highly desirable aspiration and divine duty commanded by religious text and communicated by clerical authorities. An additional motivation to martyrs is that the martyr would feel no pain in commission of his sacred act and would ascend immediately to a glorious heaven- a place with rivers of milk and wine…lakes of honey, the services of 72 virgins and martyr will see the face of Allah and later joined by 70 chosen relatives.[11] Volunteers for this suicide attacks come from all levels of the society including the sons of millionaires contrary to the popular belief that suicide terrorists are exclusively derived from the mentally unstable, poor or abject isolated loaners. The liberation tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) or the Tamil tigers in its commission of terrorist activities had battle hardened, skilled, and dedicated persons willing to volunteer to commit suicide attacks. This fact is a development of terrorism assuming new and lethal forms.

The use of airline hijacking as a weapon of terrorism has been used in the past though without success. Therefore, the September 11, 2001 attacks using the same means is not an entirely an unexpected mode. The antiterrorism defenses of the US claim that it was not expected is self serving at best and was only meant to divert the people's attention in their country.

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[11] "Wedded to death in blaze of glory-profile: *The Suicide Bomber*" The Sunday Times (London), 10th March 1996; and Christopher Walker, *Palestinian 'was duped into being a suicide bomber,'* The Times (London), 27th March 1997.

### 1.2.3 The Global War on Terrorism in Afghanistan

Since the beginning of the war in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, the initial combat phase ended early 2002. Despite that, war is still ongoing threatening to rejuvenate. This is a different kind of war fought by America on what they prefer to call the 'war on terror'. Under the rules of war, the war in Afghanistan was not justified. This is because a just war has to meet certain prerequisites; it should be fought against aggressors, should be linked to a particular situation and should respect ethical norms. War must be fought by a competent state authority that can be held responsible for decisions held in warfare. To justify their actions the US conveniently assimilated the Taliban for purposes of war. This is supposedly because they refused to hand over the al-Qaeda members suspected in the attacks of the world trade center and the pentagon. However, the US may have had other reasons that were a driving force in that irrational decision since the Bush government was under great psychological and political pressure to do something drastic in response to the 9-11 attacks. The counterinsurgency in Afghanistan was a diversion of the inadequacies of the US security to prevent the attacks. This unjust war on terrorism has been a reason the US has made many enemies.

A group of 126 Saudi scholars wrote in a joint statement in 2002 that "we consider the United States and its current administration as a first class sponsor of international terrorism, and it along with Israel form an axis of terrorism and evil in the

14

world".[12] They claimed that the two have been instigating acts of terrorism calling it the war on terrorism. The US believes that the war on terrorism is a response in terrorizing the terrorists. The global war on terrorism in Afghanistan had two primary national interests; to rid Afghanistan of terrorists and ensure it never again becomes a safe haven for terrorists and that chaos in Afghanistan does not spill over to Pakistan. To destroy al-Qaeda safe haven is a long feat for the US and may take a long time and many wars to finish alternatives for al-Qaeda.[13] But this was a justification the US used to wage war in Afghanistan. The US forces are still in Afghanistan through al-Qaeda having long fled there since 2002 making me ask; what is the real American objective in the COIN in Afghanistan? Many a time large countries often do what they wish while small countries do what they must. This is because of the strength they possess in terms of military, economic as well as the diplomatic maneuvers is adequate to arm twist any country in pursuit of its perceived national interests. It's a known fact that "access to Middle East oil on favorable terms remains a national-security priority for the US government and Saudi Arabia will be a US ally so long as the Saudi government cooperates with US efforts to maintain a steady flow of reasonably priced oil".[14] This among other national interests has been driving the US to wars least of all expected.

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[12] Washington post, April 24, 2002.

[13] Rockmore T. et al., *The Philosophical Challenge of September 11,* (Victoria: Blackwell Publishing, 2005)

[14] Larson, A. P., *'Economic Priorities of the National Security Strategy'* US Foreign Policy Agenda, (electronic journal of the Department of State) 7, No. 4 (Dec 2002) available at http://usinfostate.gov/journals/itps/1202/ijpe/PJ7-4 larson.htm:

And there is reason to think that what is being called a war on terrorism but which increasingly serves other interests, is itself a major source of further terrorism, a help not a hindrance to the creation of terrorism around the world.[15]

Beginning 1996, a small group of right wing policy operatives, gathered under the name of the project for a new American century (led by William Kristol, Richard Parle and Paul Wolfowitz) that 21st century should be American century where; US military and economic power should dominate the world, safe for "free markets", and "democracy". Globalization backed by American power would make the world safe for 'American way of life'.[16] This perception has been very influential in American foreign policy. This is best seen in the way America acts with double standard when labeling some people terrorists and others not. Therefore it's the national interest of the US which they seek to protect that makes them continuously go to war. Inis L. Claude observes that; "States frequently go to war for lack of imagination; blinded by their aroused passions and wounded sensitivities; they are unable to conceive honorable schemes of mutual accommodation and consequent blunder into belligerence in a state of intellectual bankruptcy."[17] The US and all other democracies that value freedom and liberties remain vulnerable to terrorism because protecting all possible targets all the time is a practical impossibility. Also because of the many enemies the US has created due to its actions in

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[15]Rockmore, T. et al., *The Philosophical Challenge of September 11*, ib. id
[16] Washington based think tank. This think tank became very influential in the foreign policy of the United States in the later years.
[17] Claude L. I. jnr., *Swords into Plow Shares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization* 2nd (eds.), (New York: Random house, 1963) p.226

the war on terror, they will be targets of terrorists. The Taliban for example are and will remain enemies of the US because of the war in Afghanistan. They US have incorporated everybody in the fight in terrorism and made everybody think they are together in it.

### 1.2.4 Counterinsurgency as a Counterterrorism Measure

The use of military options in the war on terrorism has been rather an overreaction by the US to the fight against terrorism. A military option in counterterrorism has several limitations. The cardinal rule for war is that you should know your enemy well. War in this sense is caused by ignorance and misunderstanding of facts involved in international terrorism. Strive to know everything about your enemy through investigating adequately the causes of terrorism, grievances, power or ability of terrorists. In terms of the war in Afghanistan pinpointing who is the enemy and who is not is hard. Therefore in the cause of COIN other people will be affected raising emotions and anger. This increases terror, extremism and hatred provoking incidences aimed at them. "Above all states must remember not only who they are fighting, but what they are fighting for. A government faced with terrorism must be concerned, therefore with both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of its policies."[18] American power is adequate to address the vital US interests emanating from any state or combination of states "however it's much harder to deter motivated individuals and small groups that often thrive where central authority is weak, and where deterrence is therefore less effective"[19] .military options range from pre-

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[18] Grant, W., *Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter-measures,* op. cit p.210
[19] Rockmore, T. et al., *The Philosophical Challenge of September 11*, op. cit

17

emptive operations, search and recovery operations, rescue operations and retaliation and punitive raids. (Brian Jenkins, 1975) Military options act as a motivating factor affecting the proper utility of power. The adversary may be more energized to face your own motivation. The COIN in Afghanistan has not been successful in eliminating the enemy but rather dispersed them to other places making it harder to find, target, monitor and contain. Al-Qaeda has crossed the border to Pakistan FATA region since 2002. This fact has been seen by the killing of Osama in Abbottabat inside Pakistan. Dealing with terrorism through war polarizes the nation states hampering anti-terrorist efforts. When terrorists diversify their strength is hard to estimate. Therefore counter-terrorism efforts should be reassessed with the view of not becoming reactionary but of concrete basis of legitimacy and efficiency not to provoke the terrorist resolve and turn the masses against the government in place.

This quest of changing policies and mechanisms should be done with the aim of countering terrorism and not to embolden their resolve. Wardlaw Grant argues that there is substantial evidence of the emergence of the international links of terrorists. He says that "there are cooperative efforts in training, procurement of weapons, and documentation (passports, visas, identity cards etc) reconnaissance of airline routes and targets, and actual terrorist operations".[20]Brian Jenkins gives another possibility of this international network that governments rather than political groups may sponsor terrorism as an arm of foreign policy. He further goes on to say that though terrorism is

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[20] Grant, W., *Political Terrorism: Theories, Tactics and Countermeasures*, op. cit, p.55

now rejected as a legitimate form of warfare, its future may be different in that terrorists could be employed to provoke international incidences or existing terrorists may be employed to attack other terrorists or they could create their own terrorists.[21]

Legally, efforts geared towards agreeing on international law to regulate political crimes of violence have been hampered by the problem of defining terrorism. Attempts at reaching at a satisfactory definition have been hampered by divisions, political differences and sectional differences. Grant argues that the problem of universal definition of the term terrorism has been marked by divergent views with reference to the famous phrase 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter'.[22] This has hampered the way states have reacted to the issue of counterterrorism. Domestically police powers have been broadened, others fear to act for fear of incidence against them. There has also been a rapid increase in attention to antiterrorism response capabilities leading to this inquiry.

## 1.2.5 Theoretical Framework

This research is based on Keohane, R. and Nye, J. (1977) complex interdependence theory in an attempt to explain the events after the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 and its impacts in international security. This is because it is important to re-examine the existing analytical framework to understand the relationship between globalization and international security for adequate internal response to be

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[21] Jenkins, B. J., *International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict*, ib. id, p.31
[22] Grant, W., *Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Counter-measures*, op.cit, p. 3

achieved. They argue that the world has become more interdependent in economics, communications and human aspirations as well an increasing number and type of actors non-territorial in character. These actors include multinational corporations, international organizations, and trans-national movements with a multiple issues with no hierarchy and military concerns play relatively less importance. Their aim was to develop a coherent theoretical framework that could explain continuity and change in world politics. Neoliberal institutionalism focuses on the unique conditions of globalization that accelerates interdependence and its impacts on how states perceive their interests. (Keohane, 2002) According to this theory military power is costly and its costs have continuously increased because of weapons of mass destruction. They also argue that use of force on one issue could have negative effects on other economic goals, domestic opposition to the human costs and people's resistance in weak countries. The new security agenda and the capacity of states and governments to respond unilaterally to issues are undermined by the new issues not wholly within their jurisdiction. Therefore, solutions to contemporary security problems require collaborative actions otherwise their effort is doomed to fail. The complex interdependence theory says that though states are concerned about their benefits, they would not be opposed to the other states maximizing their powers. This encourages states to search for cooperative and mutual economic and political benefits. This theory effectively captures international terrorism as a non-state actor and its transnational character. Counterterrorism efforts should transcend borders and of importance is that the military power is not entirely adequate to stave away this

menace. In this case therefore the complex interdependence being an issue based theory best captures terrorism and the global war on terror and its multifaceted solutions distinct from military success. International institutions are within the scope of interdependence and they induce cooperation and enable states transcend the anarchical forces in the international system. This will eventually affect the international agenda setting and as a result power becomes more diffused. The importance of military power of states will decrease because it would not be effective in pursuing the economic or political interests of the states and as if it is not enough states will prioritize long-term benefits from cooperation over short-term tactical advantage. (Keohane & Nye, 2001) This theory also considers other areas of security concern other than states only by widening the security concerns to include non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, ethnic groups, and minorities. Managing globalization requires multilateral cooperation and states to define their quest for power in terms of mutual gains. In a globalised era, states find that their power is determined by other factors other than the classical military foundations.

When asymmetric power is employed, the actual targets that are hit are important but much of the battle is fought in the media. These means of channeling power makes the weak appear and feel strong creating an incentive to rectify an imbalance of power via asymmetric means. Technological dynamics of globalization make asymmetric power dangerous especially when juxtaposed against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Though power remains the most important independent variable in shaping

international outcomes, globalization compels states to consider exercising both their hard-power and soft-power capabilities. Most often than not, soft-power of persuasion and working with the international community would better deal with a situation than hard-power.

## 1.2.6 Definition of Key Terms

Counterterrorism-: These are government machinery put in place to forestall terrorism occurrences. These range from military, political, legal or diplomatic mechanism.

Counterinsurgency-: military response through full blown war. The terrorists are being fought physically through targeting the presumed places they may be.

## 1.2.7 Operational Definition of Terms

Terrorism: It's usually planned purposeful and premeditated instrument of psychological warfare to cause intimidation and fear in civilians and undermine government confidence and leadership always with a political agenda.

Counterterrorism: Measures put in place by governments like counterinsurgency, economic sanctions, and legislations, among others.

Counterinsurgency: Instrument of counter-terrorism by military means. It is organized violence by the government.

Power:                    Strength defined in terms of military, economic and diplomatic

skill.

## 1.3 Research Methodology

The research methodology deals with the way to systematically solve the research problem. It covers the research design, target population, accessible population, sampling design, data collection methods and procedures, data analysis methods and justification. It also covers a chapter outline. This study is not the kind of research that will find favor with government and security officials because it represents challenging the legitimacy of the government in place and offers nothing practical security officials. Governments and security officials treat information on terrorism as classified information and access is only by express permission. However, the research is correlation study and essentially diagnostic in nature. It is designed to aid policy formulation in future. The correlation between the decision making structures, government responses and frequency of incidences. It seeks to evaluate the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures-counterinsurgency-and its consequences. Therefore it involves descriptive research and because of the limitations on primary data, secondary data has been utilized in the research.

### 1.3.1 Research Design

This research is essentially diagnostic in nature because it determines the frequency of terrorism occurrences due to the counterterrorism measures employed by the US in Afghanistan. This study seeks to establish whether the variables are associated.

For the success of this study the researcher designed the research with the resources and time at the disposal in mind. Indeed, it's important to make a research design that aims to combine relevance and purpose in line with the time and resources at the disposal of the researcher considering that the studies are conducted while the researcher is on regular duties.

## 1.3.2 Target Population

The target population in this study is the total population of the world. The population that terrorism affects is the target of this research. Indeed, global terrorism occurrences are seamless and transcend borders hence it applies to all people in the world.

## 1.3.3 Accessible Population

The researcher was led by the rationale of the study in identifying the accessible population. Information on terrorism occurrences can be obtained in the anti-terrorism police. Therefore the accessible population is the Kenya anti-terrorism police unit and the other partners like the NSIS, among others. It's however important to note that, considering the sensitivity of the matter at hand, the information from accessible population may not be helpful because they treat information on terrorism very secretly. Most of the information on terrorism and terrorists are considered by governments as earlier stated as classified information leaving the researcher to depend heavily on the information from primary documents like government reports, speeches and military

research papers. The secondary sources like books, journals, newspapers, magazines and seminar papers were also utilized.

### 1.3.4 Sampling Design

Since this research seeks useful, in-depth and appropriate information, primary documents like speeches and reports from the United States national counterterrorism center (NCTC) available online and other information from security agencies also accessed through the internet was utilized. The researcher also collected secondary data using recorded documents like books, journals, newspapers, magazines, and the internet among others. To ease the research load and the scope covered with the aim of making the research economical, the researcher did not visit Afghanistan as part of the study. This provided time to get maximum information and improved the efficiency in data collection and analysis.

### 1.3.5 Data Collection Methods and Procedures

Since the research is mainly descriptive in nature, the researcher utilized secondary data as an indirect way of collecting data. Therefore the researcher has utilized books, journals, magazines, and the internet for collecting secondary data. The internet sources are dependable sites like jstor and government reports and transcripts of speeches.

### 1.3.6 Data Analysis Methods and Justification

Data collected was processed and analyzed. Data was arranged, tabulated and subjected to statistical computations. This helps the research to draw dependable

conclusions of the study. The computation of the data will enable researcher know the correlation and frequency enabling the researcher make proper report and recommendations of the findings.

### 1.3.7 Chapter Outline

Chapter one:    Chapter one involves the introduction of the topic. This involves the background of the study, statement of the research problem, purpose of the study, objectives of the study, hypotheses, and justification of the study, significance of the study, scope and limitations of the study. It also contains a review of related literature, theoretical framework, research methodology and a chapter outline.

Chapter two:    This chapter covers a study of the history of Afghanistan and how it became a haven for terrorists and insurgents. It takes a look at the governance of the country and the continuous wars that has become the nature of Afghanistan. The chapter also looks at the Pakistani factor with regard to Afghanistan and an overview of war as an instrument of national policy.

Chapter three: This chapter looks at terrorism and terrorists in an effort to best deal with the menace. It will also look at the GWOT in Afghanistan and the objective the US attaches it, and an overview of counterinsurgency as a counterterrorism measure.

Chapter four: Chapter four involves the consequences of the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan as a counterterrorism measure. This chapter will bring to test the hypotheses and the variables in the study rounding up the findings and data analysis.

Chapter five: This chapter covers conclusion and recommendation on terrorism and counterterrorism. This involves suggesting appropriate strategies and alternative measures that would help fight international terrorism.

# CHAPTER TWO

# A FOUNDATION OF INSURGENCY: AN ANALYTICAL HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN

## 2.1 Introduction

This chapter covers a study of an analytical history of Afghanistan and how it became a haven for terrorists and insurgents. This will touch on the terrain, topography and the geographical conditions that naturally make Afghanistan's cultural heritage and aids insurgents in military maneuver. It specifically takes a look at the Afghan people, the languages, religion, politics, and the governance of the country as well as the continuous wars that has become the nature of Afghanistan. The border sub division that saw people of common origin spill to either side of the border easily internationalizing conflicts on one side of the border. The entry of the Marxists was short lived because the Soviets entered the equation in 1979 bringing a different kind of war that lasted a decade ending in 1989 with the defeat of the Soviet Union. The mujahedeen had fought an existential war with Soviet Union with all the means possible ending in victory. Religion and Muslim fundamentalism which had taken root in the Middle East at the time played a very big part in the success of the mujahedeen. It will also look at the Afghan neighbors and specifically the role of Pakistan in the civil war and how it has become an important factor unalienable in dealing with insurgency in Afghanistan.

## 2.2 Afghanistan: A Historical Overview

Afghanistan is characterized by its rugged terrain, a topography that has had a part in the livelihood and cultural heritage of the people of Afghanistan. This rugged terrain has scattered them as remnants of migratory groups or armies that moved across Asia seeking for security or conquest. As a result "every major Asian people have left its mark; among them eighteen Afghan languages are living descendants of four great linguistic families: the indo-European, Sinic, Semitic, and Dravidian."[23]Much of the history of Afghanistan is marked by a people in perennial struggle for land, water, and independence. The Pushtuns have left a mark in the recent centuries and consequently dominated the struggle for the countries rare resources. These people speak the Pushtu, an offshoot of the Persian language family and they claim the eastern and southern sectors of Afghanistan as their ancestral home. This has seen them extend their power, land, and subjects remaining the undisputed victor in their internal struggles. Though these people are culturally subdivided and in continuous struggle, they are connected by the faith of Islam. Since they are remote from the intellectual centers of the Islamic world, Afghans have developed local variations on Islam major doctrines, incorporating distinctive beliefs and cults that predate Islam. These variations are often organized

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[23] Newell, N. P. & S. R. Newell, *The Struggle for Afghanistan*, (London: Cornel University Press, 1981) p.19

around venerations of local saints, whose shrines play a major role in focusing on emotional elements of religion.

It is estimated that much of Afghanistan population belong to the Sunni branch of Islam while the rest, mostly in the remote parts of the country are Shias with a few Hindu and Sikhs minority. Except a small number of wealthy traders, nomadic tribal leaders (khans), and the royal family and its retainers, poverty is widespread in Afghanistan successfully reorienting their values towards survival as an elementary quality on their culture. Despite the great importance given to personal independence, loyalty to the primary group ultimately takes precedence over self-assertion. Most of the Pushtuns are mixed agriculturalist with herding and nomadic lifestyles a reason why control of mountain valleys, water rights, and grazing land has formed a basis of Pushtun politics, both among themselves and in their relations with others. In addition to observing some basic requirements of Islam, Pushtuns also observe the code of 'Pushtunwali' where "group survival is its primary imperative. It demands vengeance against injury or insult to ones kin, chivalry and hospitality towards the helpless and unarmed strangers, bravery in battle' and openness and integrity in individual behavior".[24]The code aims at limiting anarchy, a virtue that has had an influence within the country in dealing with similar environmental and social realities. Much honor is given to Pushtuns who can successfully

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[24] Newell, N.P, et al, ib.id p.22

arbitrate the feuds that are endemic among them with fines and blood money being devises frequently used to limit violence between rival families.

Tajiks, who share a common origin with Iranians, are the second largest ethnic community in Afghanistan. The Turkish people dominate the extreme northern plains adjacent to the Amu Darya (Oxus) river. The Uzbeks, who are the most numerous, are recent migrants having fled the Bolshevik conquest of their homeland in the Soviet Union are mixed farmers and herding. The mountainous central region of Afghanistan is inhabited by the Hazaras often enslaved for failure to pay tribute to Pushtu and Uzbek chiefs. Most of them speak Persian and most of them are of shia branch of Islam. Nuristanis control the extremely rugged region north of Jalalabad, adjacent to Pakistan. Most of these people live in extremely difficult landscape with either mountainous or desert, sparse rainfall, and sharp seasonal changes that puts farming and livestock herding under strain. Winters are bitterly cold summers dry, dusty and extremely hot. The towns in Afghanistan are located where the largest rivers pass. Kabul for example is a city situated at a passing point for river Kabul and also a hub for trade. The development of Afghanistan into a nation state can largely be attributed to the critical role played by the royal leadership. The monarchy was founded on the basis of tribal confederation intended to prevent anarchy and foreign inversions. During the nineteen century, the British and Russian imperial powers made the role of the king more complex rendering the monarch incapable of maintaining the precarious balance between external diplomacy and the internal repression due to the introduction of modern organization and technology. This

was aggravated by the subdivision of the borders of Afghanistan that saw people of a common origin in either side of the border. By the end of 1970s, the task of the monarch had become extremely complicated that the royal system broke down under strain despite efforts to sustain it. The last king Zahir Shah, ruled until 1973 and his brother in law Mohammad Daoud governed as royal president for the consequent five years, a span that saw Marxists seize power in 1978 as a result of failure by the monarch to cope with the problem of change, unity and national independence. This marked the entry of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the great struggle that would last for a decade between the Soviet Union and the mujahedeen.

## 2.3 The Civil War in Afghanistan

The type of war in the contemporary era is not classic international war combining forces fighting each other but rather a kind of civil war that begins as a conflict and becomes internationalized through the involvement of foreign forces on one or both sides. A conflict arises when two or more parties have incompatible goals about something.[25] Internal conflicts take place within territorial borders of a state and not involving anybody else while international conflicts involve two or more countries.[26] It's however imperative to know that both internal and international conflicts have a connection. Although borders may divide communities, they still have a lot of activities that they are involved in together. Cooperative relationship like intermarriages, trade, and

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[25] Mitchell C.R, *The Structure of International Conflict*, (London: Macmillan Publishers,1998) pp. 15-25
[26] Mwagiru M., *Peace and Conflict Management in Kenya,* (Nakuru: Catholic Justice & Peace Commission, 2003)

cattle rustling as a conflict relationship brings a bond between these communities. What the conflict relationship means is that once there is a conflict on one side of the border, these conflicts immediately spill over and involve communities in the other side of the border.[27]

In a weak state for example, opportunities for insurgents are magnified. Much of Afghanistan's history exposes the fragility of the state from time immemorial. Schmitt M.N (eds. 2009) notes that;

> The twentieth-century Afghanistan was characterized not only by wars against foreigners such as the third Anglo-Afghan wars of may 1919, but also by civil wars, assassinations and coups, as in the conflict of 1928-31 and the seizures of power by Daoud Khan in 1953 and 1973.[28]

Though out the twentieth-century, there has been interplay between the development of a constitutional government and continuation of political violence that has characterized Afghanistan. In 1978, Khalq seized power in a similar way employed by the Parcham-Daoud coalition in 1973. These power wars finally saw the soviet invasion in December 1979 which raised more problem than it solved. The epitome was the 1979-1989 war in Afghanistan that brought major impacts in international politics. It contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union and brought an end to cold war. It also brought in the al-Qaeda under Osama bin laden who strongly believed that having destroyed the Soviet

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[27] Ib. id
[28] Schmitt M.N, *The War in Afghanistan; A Legal Analysis (eds.)*, (Naval war college, Newport, Rhodes Island, 2009), p.6

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Union; he would do the same with the United States. Bin laden events led to the 9/11 and this has ensured the continuity of the war in Afghanistan to date. Schmitt, (2009) notes that "The problem of non-state violence, regional rivalries and the religious element in politics are not new in Afghanistan, but they were reinforced. Long held suspicions towards certain types of foreign presence remained prominent".[29] After the decade war against the soviets that ended in 1989, there was a continued violence in Afghanistan that was partially concluded in September 26, 1996 when Kabul fell to the Taliban, who established a theocratic style of governance in their area of control consequently renaming the country in 1997 "Islamic emirate of Afghanistan". The northern alliance continued to control an area of northern Afghanistan and continued to challenge the Taliban rule. From October 7, 2001 onwards, following the al-Qaeda attack in the United States on September 11, 2001, direct US and coalition military intervention in Afghanistan brought a new twist to the continuing war. This led to the toppling of the al-Qaeda supported Taliban regime in the November-December 2001 war by the US coalition forces and the northern alliance. This war initially had the support with the justification that it is to punish Taliban for allowing Afghanistan to become a preparation ground for attacks on the US and also to free them of an unpopular regime however, this position has changed. Long before the September 11, 2001 attacks, the US was concerned by the direction taken by Afghanistan, as the department of state coordinator for counterterrorism said in 1999 senate hearing that; "Afghanistan has become a new safe-

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[29] Ib. id, p.7

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haven for terrorist groups. In addition to bin Ladin and al-Qaeda, the Taliban play host to members of the Egyptian Islamic jihad, the Algerian armed Islamic (G)roup, Kashmiri separatists and a number of militant organizations from central Asia, including terrorists from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan."[30]

Nobody would have thought that the war in Afghanistan will continue after the defeat of the Soviet Union. Civil war erupted almost immediately between the communist government and the anti-communists, a continuation of the Marxist war that began way back in 1978 but was interrupted by the soviet invasion. Since the fall of the Afghan communist government in 1992, civil war raged between various factions of the anti-communist Afghan fighters-mujahedeen. The Islamic religious leader Mullah Mohammed Omar, who is also a member of the Pushtun ethnic group, led an armed group known as the Taliban.[31] Other mujahedeen leaders of Pushtun background joined the Taliban as they sought to impose law and order on the country with an extreme version of Islamic law. Women were not allowed to work outside the home or attend school while men were expected to grow beards and attend religious services regularly. Other impositions include the banning of television, a sort of identification for religious minority and destruction of all non-Islamic idols and statutes in their areas of control.

Their military prowess saw them defeat local warlords in 1994 attracting support from Osama bin laden and also Pakistan as part of its foreign strategy of establishing a

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[30] Statement by Amb. Michael A. Sheehan, coordinator for counterterrorism, U.S Department of State (1999) available at http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/991102_sheehan_terrorism.html
[31] Taliban- means student. Many of Omar's initial recruits were Islamic religious students.

stable and friendly government in Kabul. This saw them take control of Kandahar in late 1994 and acquiring a large supply of modern weaponry that helped them defeat several militias and warlords seizing Kabul in September 1996. Several anti-Taliban leaders were forced to flee to the northern part of Afghanistan and continued to fight against the Taliban. Ahmed Shah Massoud, one of the anti-Taliban force leaders, began receiving military aid from Russia and Iran both fearing the growing power of the Taliban. Moscow feared the Taliban as a source of aid for the rebels they fought in Chechnya and Tajikistan while Iran- dominated by Shiite Islamic fundamentalists-was concerned about the treatment of Afghan Shiite minority called the hazaris by the Sunni Muslim Taliban. By 1997, the Taliban government began to gather reputation for order and military success gaining recognition as the legitimate government of Afghanistan by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. However, Pakistanis role in the Taliban's military success remained controversial because it's strongly believed much of Taliban's military victories were a result of armed Pakistani intervention. In 1998 following the bombing of American embassies in East Africa, the US launched cruise missiles attack on training camps belonging to the Osama bin Laden organization in Afghanistan. On September 9, 2001 the northern alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud was seriously injured in an assassination attempt believed to be a prelude to the September 11, 2001 attacks in the US by Osama bin Laden. The killing of Massoud sparked aerial attacks on

Kabul on the night of September 11, 2001 by the northern alliance[32] marking the beginning of the global war on terror that is still ongoing.

## 2.4 Muslim Fundamentalism and the Mujahedeen

David C. Rapoport in the theory waves of terrorism argues that modern terrorism has progressed through three waves that lasted roughly forty years each, seeing the entry of the fourth wave of terrorism;[33]

1. The anarchist wave: 1880s to the end of the world war one.

2. The anti colonial wave: end of world war one till late 1960s.

3. The new left wave: late 1960s to the near present.

4. The religious wave: 1980s until the present.

Using the term waves too, Shughart W.F II in his writing on an analytical history of terrorism, 1945-2000 identifies three 'waves' of terrorism. The first wave was the self determination of the colonized people who sought to liberate themselves through violence to create their own independent nation states. The second wave began on 22nd July 1968 with the hijacking of the EL AL flight from Rome to Tel Aviv by the Palestinian terrorists to avenge Egypt's defeat in the 1967 six day war. Attempts by other terrorist organizations to duplicate the PLO success saw terrorism elevated to the international stage. These acts of terror were seen in Turkey, Netherlands among other states. Fuelled by the opposition to the Vietnam war, red brigades, the red army faction

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[32] The northern alliance forces include the Uzbek forces of general Dostum, the Tajik troops of former president Rabbani and the Shiite Hazaris led by Haji Mohammed Mohaqiq.
[33] See Mark Ehrman, *'Terrorism from a Scholarly Perspective,'* los Angeles times magazine, May 4, 2003

and the weatherman also known as the left wing terrorist groups in Europe and north America aided by PLO occasionally; waged a protracted campaigns of political assassinations, bombings, and hijacking that continued till the fall of the Berlin wall. This saw the third wave post war terrorism which was mostly of Muslim origin set in motion by the Iranian revolution of 1979 pushed forward by the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the middle east it was pushed by animas to the American support of Israel and inspired everywhere by the pan-Islamic dreams of uniting the fundamentalist Muslim states freed from western cultural contamination under caliphate hegemony and *sharia* law. From the two distinctions of waves of terrorism, the earlier version covered the other waves mentioned by Shughart.

For the purposes of this paper, the study shall focus on Islamic terrorism and the war in Afghanistan. To effectively do this, it's vital to look at the history of insurgency in Afghanistan that has put a background of terrorism in that country. Afghanistan was undoubtedly the place the foundation of the third wave of terrorism was laid. The war against the mujaheddin was to last a decade to end in 1989. The Arab Afghans was drawn across the Sunni ummah to participate in the war and they were greatly subsidized by Saudi Arabia and the United States. This line of recruitment was a result of controversy that emerged with the death of Prophet Mohammed. The controversy over the proper line of succession to the prophet Mohammed as the caliph, or leader of the ummah, the community of Muslim faithful, a position combining both spiritual and temporal

authority.[34] Successors were first chosen from among the contemporaries of the prophet, but as those passed away, that method of selection were rendered impractical. One group, who became the Shia' argued that the caliphate should remain in the hands of Mohammed's lineal descendants. However another group, who became the Sunni, contended that the caliphate could be held by any man meeting certain standards of faith and learning. This led to a series of struggles that saw the Sunni ascent to the position and have generally retained to date. The second element of religious dichotomy is the Islamic fundamentalism woven in Islamic theology in the eighteen century by Mohammad bin Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1787) an Arabic cleric who fathered a "campaign of purification and renewal. His purpose was the return to the Muslim world of pure and authentic Islam of the prophet, removing and where necessary destroying later accretions". (Lewis, 2001.p.59) Wahhabism and its later accretions in the writings of Sayyid Qatb, a member of the Muslim brotherhood executed in 1996 on charges of treason by the Egyptian government[35] leads adherents to disdain from false Muslims calling them imposters who have strayed from the true faith meriting treatment as (kaffir or kafr), unbelievers beyond the protection of ummah.[36] This are the sentiments that saw the assassination of president Anwar Sadat in 1981 by a group calling itself "the Islamic group of Egypt" popularly

34 Zakaria, F., *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad,* (New York & London: Norton, 2003), p.147
35 National Commission on Terrorist Attack Upon the United States, (2004) p.51
36 Zakaria, F., *The Future of Freedom,* ib.id p.125

known as al-Jihad, claiming he failed to lead the country according to the sharia.[37] This explains why many Islamic terrorist groups began their careers fighting their own governments. Historical facts indicate that the beginning of Islamic politics was a rejuvenating factor in international terrorism seen in the Middle East. Many Arab rulers of the Middle East are autocratic, corrupt, and heavy handed but they are also more liberal, tolerant, and pluralistic than the true believers would prefer(Zakaria,2003.p.120-125) buying protection against accusation of betraying the true faith hoping to gain legitimacy by association. "This explains why the house of Saud openly embraces Wahhabism and generously funds fundamentalist religious schools (madrasas) and terrorist groups throughout the region".[38] Therefore it was no wonder the Taliban regime in Afghanistan supported the actions of al-Qaeda in a similar way.

The first Islamic revolution was in 1979 expelling the repressive pro-American, insufficiently Muslim regime of Shah Mohammad Reza Palilavi and propelled Ayatollah Khomeini from exile in Paris to Iran's highest office. This was the period Iran became an active sponsor of terrorism through to the 1990s. (Pillar, 2001, p.46) The 1979 week long takeover of Mecca by Islamists got brutal response from the Saudi government killing more than 1000 religious rebels. Following those series of events in the Middle East Syria, Algeria, and Egypt cracked down Islamic opposition in their respective countries.

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[37] Rapoport, D. C., 'Sacred Terror: A Contemporary example from Islam' in W. Reich (eds.), *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind*, (Washington D.C; Woodrow Wilson center and Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1990), pp 104-106.
[38] Zakaria, F., *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad*, op.cit p.125

In Syria for example more than 20,000 people were murdered. This crackdown caused involuntary exiling of Arab Islamic militants. They repressed their energies as mujahedin in the holy war against Soviet Union invasion in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia, the United States CIA, and Pakistan secret service heavily financed them. According to former security adviser Zbigniev Brzezinski, the efforts to recruit, train, arm and supply volunteers from several Muslim countries to fight the Soviet Union and its allies in Afghanistan begun in July 1979 following the logic that the enemy of my enemy is my friend.[39]The US also supported Saddam's baathist politics of brotherhood of the Saudis. They also supported under the CIA, the anti Chinese Indonesian Islamists in the anti-Sukarno Indonesian uprising of 1965 which saw 5000 ethnic Chinese slaughtered; most of them were merchants and their families. These wars were mainly during the cold war where the dominant factor was ideological orientation. "Conducting one of the cold war's eleventh-hour conflicts by proxy, America supplied the mujaheddin with some $4 to $5 billion worth of modern weaponry (Rashid,2000,p.18) including 900 stinger missiles (ib.id p.44), which is funneled covertly through Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID)."[40] This action made the war expand and consequently the mujahedeen became victorious in its endeavor leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union, and in 1989-1991, the origin of the global Islamic terrorist network.

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[39] Rockmore, T. et al, (eds.), *The Philosophical Challenge of September*, 11, op cit
[40] Shughart II, W.F, 'An Analytical History of Terrorism, 1945-2000' *Public Choice*, Vol. 128, No. 1/2, the political economy of terrorism, (Jul., 2006) p.29 available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/30026632 accessed on 14/04/2011

Al-Qaeda was founded by Osama bin laden, the son of a wealthy Saudi family in the late 1980 initially in support of the Arabs fighting in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union.[41] His focus shifted to the US after soviet defeat in 1989. Obsessed by the US presence in Saudi Arabia near medina and Mecca the holiest cities of Islam and his perceived American support of Israel oppression of Palestinian Muslims; he issued a fatwa on 23rd February 1998 "declaration of the world Islamic front for jihad against Jews and crusaders" saying it's the individual duty of every Muslim to kill Americans and their allies whenever they see them, wherever they may be. He also declared their maximalist promotion of conversion or the extermination of all infidel Christians and Jews which marked a resurgence of global Islamic terrorism.[42] The mujahedeen in many ways developed as an ill organized unit but gradually developed in many ways that saw their victory over the Soviet Union. They fought with vigor and undying will using operational security that defied the laws of war consequently, giving them advantage over the adversary. This style of warfare was later to be seen in the Islamic terrorism under the al-Qaeda outfit of Osama bin Laden;

Afghan mujahid tactics conform to the classic requirement of guerilla warfare: small group actions using cover of the night, territory remote from centers of

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[41] Williams, P. L., 'The unholy alliance -al-Qaida' in J. D. Whittaker, *The Terrorism Reader 2nd edition*, (London & New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis group, 2003). Al-Qaeda came about from the establishment of a recruiting office called muktah al-khidamat (the office of services) by Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian member of the Muslim brotherhood. This later transformed to the terrorist group al-Qaeda [sic](the base).p.41

[42] World Islamic Front Statement-*'Jihad against Jews and Crusaders'* February 23, 1998- on the website of the Federation of American Scientists at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.html.

power, and a supporting population to inflict damage on an entrenched authority with vastly greater military resources. A great part of the mujahidin's strategy is the dramatization of resistance: making their presence known through assassinations, attacks on outposts, and installations, the blocking of roads, sudden appearances in towns and villages to recruit men and collect supplies.[43]

The war in Afghanistan and consequent defeat of the Soviet Union has contributed to the rise of Islamic terrorism in several ways. Apart from providing skills and experience to a large number of non-Afghans including the use of firearms and explosives, (Pillar, 2001, p.46) It also elevated Osama bin laden to prominence and consequent formation of the al-Qaeda terrorist network. It also drew important lessons that violence and Islam could defeat anyone including the "great Satan" left standing as the world's sole remaining superpower after 1989. (Ib.id pillar) Afghanistan was left with immense resources for redeployment in support of Islamist terrorism wherever the opportunity knocked. These include money, guns, and idle battle hardened Arab veterans. The collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of soviet hegemony in the Eastern Europe and central Asia. This led to the emergence of terrorist activities as well as creating safe havens for terrorist training and network building in this region. The relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan in the civil war and the global war on terror is unalienable factor considering that they share a common border and people of common origin in the FATA.

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[43] Newell, N. P. et al. *The Struggle for Afghanistan,* op cit, p.140

## 2.5 The Pakistani Factor in the Global War on Terror

The Afghan neighbors- China, Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan- all have legitimate interests in the country and its long running conflicts. Russia and India too have interests of its own but of important consideration is its relationship with Pakistan. Pakistan has played a big part in most of Afghanistan's ongoing conflicts and divisions. Pakistan's inter-services intelligence has had a major role in all the conflicts in Afghanistan beginning from the 1979 soviet war. In 1994 onwards Pakistan provided extensive official support to the Taliban movement in Afghanistan. The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan- the Durant line imposed by the British and a reluctant Afghan government in 1893- is artificial. The Pushtuns on either side of the line view it as artificial meaning that conflicts on either side of the line immediately acquire a cross-border internationalized dimension.

According to Steven Biddle (2009) "the Taliban movement in Afghanistan is clearly linked with al-Qaeda and sympathetic to it, but there is little evidence of al-Qaeda infrastructure within Afghanistan today that could directly threaten the US homeland".[44] However, the risk of al-Qaeda re-establishing a haven there is real but it is vital to note that they can also do so in weak states like Yemen, Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Sudan, the Philippines, Uzbekistan or even parts of Latin America or southern Africa.[45] Iraq and Pakistan are likely to be havens to al-Qaeda and presumably if those regions collapse and

[44] Biddle S., *Is it worth it? 'The Difficult Case for War in Afghanistan',* in the American Interest, Vol. IV, NO. 6 July/August 2009, p.6
[45] Ib. id, p.6

are replaced by sympathetic regimes to al-Qaeda. The two countries are far much richer than Afghanistan considering that Iraq is oil rich and Pakistan is a nuclear power. If that is so, why has the US persisted with waging the war on terror in Afghanistan? Osama bin laden enjoys a history in Afghanistan, a region that adjoins the FATA which is sympathetic to al-Qaeda. FATA are a legacy of empire and Pakistan has no policy to deal with this areas. It's also an area that has become a haven for terrorists comparable to one that existed in Afghanistan before 2001.

With much of the Pushtuns in the Pakistani army, there are internal difficulties in Pakistan's attempts to impose capital rule on the Pushtun inhabited areas. Though it is important to deny al-Qaeda a safe haven in Afghanistan, it's a long feat by the US to deny them access to all possible safe havens. Furthermore, decentralized terrorist networks can in any case mount attacks because they do not need physical resources of a state to succeed and it also becomes difficult for monitoring and surveillance. It's important to fight terrorists in a manner that will ensure success not aggravate the position the issue lies because war can lead to failed states which will eventually lead to increase in controversy. "State sponsors may be important, but failed states maybe the greatest danger of all. If intervention brings failed states rather than successful reforms, that is all the more the reason to be wary of activist policy".[46] The western states preoccupation with fighting non-state terrorist organizations is well known and maybe a

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[46]Cowen T., 'Terrorism as a Theater: Analysis and Policy Implications, *Public Choice*, Vol. 128, No.1/2, the political economy of terrorism, (Jul., 2006), p.243 http://www.jstor.org/stable/30026642

rationale to divert attention from their own acts similar to terrorism deeds. Herman Edward et.al says that the "Western model of terrorism focuses on non-state actors, as many western client states would have to be condemned if the traditional meaning was allowed to prevail."[47]

Perhaps this may be the reason why America has been fighting the war on terror with the al-Qaeda and has not fought with state sponsors. However, there may be indirect interests of America that is of utmost importance; to prevent chaos in Afghanistan from destabilizing Pakistan. "With a population of 173 million (five times Afghanistan's), a GDP of more than $160 billion (more than ten times Afghanistan's), and a functional nuclear arsenal of perhaps twenty to fifty warheads, Pakistan is more dangerous prospective state sanctuary for al-Qaeda."[48]The risk of a nuclear armed al-Qaeda is a sure threat to international security and they will consequently have more bargaining power threatening the US hegemonic status. The Taliban are a transnational Pushtun movement active on both sides of the Durant line and closely associated with other Pakistani insurgents. "Pakistan's federally administered tribal areas (FATA), which runs along the border with Afghanistan remains almost completely outside the control of Pakistani government , and have provided fertile grounds for exercise of dominance by the Taliban and al-Qaeda."[49] This has seen the al-Qaeda oscillate freely between Afghanistan and

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[47] Herman, S. E. and O'Sullivan G., The Terrorism Industry: *The Experts and Institutions that Shape our Views on Terror,* (New York: Pantheon books, 1989), p.205

[48] Biddle S., *Is it worth it? 'The Difficult Case for War in Afghanistan'* op.cit p.6

[49] Schmitt, M.N, *The War in Afghanistan: A Legal Analysis,* op.cit p.11

Pakistan with the Taliban regrouping and lounging attacks akin with the mujahedeen operational security. US greatest interest in Afghanistan is to prevent aggravating Pakistan's internal problems and deny the possibility of a nuclear armed al-Qaeda sanctuary there. Foreign policies for both countries are harmonized because "Granted the indissoluble connection between Afghanistan and Pakistan, any policy in respect to one has to be framed in light of its effects on the other."[50] Though this may be America's primary interest in Afghanistan, obvious questions arise as to the applicability of the mathematical formula to reality. The aim of strengthening the central government in both countries has been done erratically without considering the repercussions.

Indeed, the general trend of backing non-Pushtuns in Pakistan and Afghanistan risk aggravating the Pushtun problem in both countries in future. The question as to whether Afghanistan stability will be a guarantee for success in Pakistan or that Afghanistan may become stable but Pakistan still collapse due to its internal problems is one to ponder. This is because the result of any war is uncertain and any of the above or even worst scenarios may happen inevitably. The killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad inside Pakistan, an area with high security and military presence has showed that the al-Qaeda has moved there from 2002 and remained there to continue with attacks against the US and allies. This calls for the US to take the war on terror to the Pakistani side of the border as part of its strategy. However, the US-Pakistani relations have not been favorable for a more pronounced GWOT strategy there since Pakistan doesn't share

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[50]Schmitt, M.N, *The War in Afghanistan: A Legal Analysis*, Op.cit p.34

the same view with the US on the use of force in the "war on terror". The killing of Osama without the knowledge of the Pakistani security agents may be a pointer on the unreliability of the Pakistani authorities in the war on terror. Covert operations will be the story in the war on terror on the Pakistani side of the border. This comes as a result of the presidential order by George Bush in July 2008, ordering US strikes in Pakistan without seeking the approval of the Pakistani government. Perhaps this shows the degree of distrust between the two states and in this case therefore, the US military role in Pakistan cannot be based on close military cooperation because certain elements are willing to pass on intelligence to US enemies. The killing of Osama bin Laden without the knowledge of Pakistani security is a testimony to this mistrust. However, the US national interest and policy puts the war on terror in Afghanistan as a vital interest and they will have to do with the frosty relationship with Pakistan notwithstanding its difficulties.

## 2.6 Conclusion

With much of the history marked by people in perennial struggle for land, water and independence, the Pushtuns have become the dominant tribe in these struggles. The rugged terrain and harsh climatic conditions has left the people in Afghanistan poor and largely dependent on scarce resources. Their major towns have developed in the big rivers and have become the major trading centers. Much of the Afghan population belongs to the Sunni branch of Islam and the rest Shias, with a few Hindu and Sikhs minority. The Tajiks have a common origin with Iranian a factor that has contributed to their interest in the continuous civil wars. On the other hand the Pushtuns inhabit

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Afghanistan and Pakistan making a conflict in either side becomes internationalized. The history of Muslim fundamentalism is seen as the factor that brought about the al-Qaeda under Osama bin Laden. The war between the soviets and the mujahedeen build a background for the al-Qaeda infrastructure in Afghanistan. It left battle hardened veterans and lots of weapons apart from creating a safe haven for training and recruitment in that region conveniently launching attacks. Though trained and equipped by the US, bin Laden and company believed it was they alone who contributed to the soviet defeat and they would do the same for America.

The Taliban movement which largely began as a weak entity during the civil war became victorious forming a government in Afghanistan. Most of the Taliban military success can be attributed to the assistance they received from Pakistan as part of their national interest. Pakistan has long been sponsoring insurgents to further their interests in Afghanistan and also their border with India. The epitome of this turbulent history of Afghanistan was marked by the 9/11 attack on the twin towers in New York and the pentagon in Washington by the al-Qaeda under Osama bin Laden. This incident ensured a continuation of the conflict and the beginning of the GWOT that is still ongoing in Afghanistan. The Taliban and other insurgents in Afghanistan have an advantage of maneuver without ease of capture limiting mobility of the counterinsurgent force because they know the area well. Other factors like the religion, tradition and custom favor the Taliban in both propaganda and recruitment giving them an edge in their rebuilding and rebranding its ideology.

# CHAPTER THREE

## THE US-LED GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:

## COUNTERTERRORISM IN AFGHANISTAN

### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter looks at the global war on terrorism in Afghanistan in general and it covers the role of power in the pursuit of national interest, rethinking counterterrorism: the nature of terrorism and terrorists, the global war on terrorism in Afghanistan, counterinsurgency as a counterterrorism measure, and the objectives of the war in Afghanistan. The antiterrorism measures being utilized globally range from legal measures, diplomatic responses, judicial responses, military responses, international cooperation and political responses. This multifaceted range of measures seeks to approach terrorism from a variety of ways because it is dynamic. "One of the key management tasks for any bureaucracy, public or private, is to create policies and processes that will enable it achieve its goals given the constrains, risks, and opportunities that exist within its operational environment".[51]

Technological developments in the field of transport, communications and weaponry have also complicated the equation of terrorism. The advent of the jetliner has greatly facilitated the emergence of transnational terrorism. The greatest threats posed by

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[51] (Woodward 1958, Burns and stalker 1961, Lawrence and Lorsch) as quoted in William W. N., Reorganizing for National Security: *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 62, special issue, Democratic Governance in the Aftermath of September 11, 2001, (September 2002), P.127

the technological advancements according to Grant may be in the field of conventional weaponry. Media coverage of the terrorist operation is often the major objective of the terrorist to aid in propaganda and recruitment. The occurrence of international terrorism has come with far reaching effects in all sectors of society and most importantly the structures that exist therein. The counterterrorism efforts of the US in post September 11, 2001 may perhaps have elicited an increase in international terrorism. The war in Afghanistan is a brutal means that will raise emotions and may lead to more terrorism instead of countering it. This is because the war in Afghanistan was initially fought by the US and allied forces not with the terrorist themselves, but the government in place because they refused to hand over Osama Bin Laden and company-the suspected masterminds of the September 11, 2001 bombings. This has been termed as terrorism in itself since it is a war hitherto fought in contemporary world. In a situation of war there is misery, displacement, killings and death because of disease and hunger. These factors among others add up to a concoction of anger and rage consequently leading to more volunteers to be terrorists and more enemy base for America as a whole. To set a basis to the driving force of the US led global war on terror in Afghanistan the study looks at the role of power in national interest.

## 3.2 The Role of Power in the Pursuit of National Interest

National interest traces its roots to the pessimistic realism of Machiavelli in the $15^{th}$ century where he argued that you may have splendid moral goals but without sufficient power and the willingness to use it will bring no accomplishment finally. The

aim of Machiavelli was the Italian unification and liberation from foreign occupiers. He argued that there is nothing more moral than the interests of the Italian state and any means employed should ensure its attainment. Power rather than morality is the overriding principle in this school of thought. Michael G. Roskin also says that "national interest lies at the heart of the military and diplomatic professions and leads to the formations of a national strategy and of the calculation of the power necessary to support that strategy"[52] The behavior of states is motivated by its needs to survive and prosper and to safeguard its interests the state must rationally decide to go to war. National interests reflect the general continuing ends for which a nation acts. Extreme realists would equate national interests with national power, and then measure power in terms of material strength, primarily military and economic strength. Power can be defined as the ability or capacity or capacities to control others and get them to do whatever they want them to do and to influence their behavior. "It is the ability of a state to make its will prevail and to enforce respect and command obedience from other states. It can also be defined as the ability to control the behavior of other states in accordance with one's own will". [53]

Wealth, resources, manpower and arms are believed to confer power to nations. This may be true because wealth is an important element of power. However their

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[52] Roskin, M. G., *National Interest: From Abstraction to Strategy,* (Strategic Studies Institute Academic Literature; May 20, 2004), p.1
[53] Kumar, M., *Theoretical aspects of international politics 6th edition,* (Agra: Shiva Lal Agarwal & Company Educational Publishers,1984) p.195

importance is attributed to their capability to influence the behavior of other states. Wealth too it should be noted can be used to purchase other elements of power, can offer rewards to influence the behavior of other states. But possession of wealth is not a guarantee for power but the use of those resources which imparts power to a nation. "A nation who possesses sources of strength and also knows how to utilize its resources successfully to influence or control the behavior of other nations is a nation vested with power".[54] Germany was a nation with power before the first world war but after defeat in the second world war she ceased to count but now emerging as a great power. Similarly the Soviet Union was also a great power during the cold war period. Mahendra Kumar says that nations may rise and maintain their power "but we know from history that nations have come up, achieved greatness, declined and even disappeared"[55]. When a state for example tries to influence the behavior of other states, it engages in politics since its struggling for power. Nations seek power to fulfill their urgent national goals defined in terms of national interest. War as an instrument of power is the actual use of physical violence to compel another state to behave in a desired manner. The most extreme of this force is war whose objective is either to prevent undesired behavior presently and deter others or to encourage desired behavior in future. This is taken as a last resort when all the other methods has failed or ineffective. The reinforcement lies in frightening others and by inflicting pain to coerce them to act in a certain way. However, "Nations differ in

[54] Kumar, M., *Theoretical Aspects of International Politics,* Ib.id p.195
[55] _____Op cit p.224

their degree of vulnerability or immunity to subversion or to economic blockades as also to severance of diplomatic relations or to bombardment".[56] Afghanistan for certain is a hard nut to crack going by the history of the previous wars.

The functions that war has performed are enormous to such an extent that states are unwilling to surrender their right to use it. War and not peace is the normal condition of civilized human society. "While modern war is waged on the diplomatic, economic, and propaganda fronts, as well as on the military front, and while in the broadest sense, the art of war coordinates all these elements to the purpose of victory, yet in the narrower sense used in the discipline, the art is confined to the military aspect".[57] Quincy Wright in history of the concept of war says that war has been considered a customary reaction to circumstances jeopardizing group solidarity and security, a legitimate instrument of state policy, an indispensable means for maintaining justice, a legitimate procedure of settling quarrels between states, an inevitable condition of coexistence between sovereigns and an illegitimate form of state behavior.[58]

Interest pursued by statesmen should be geared to preserve the state and its power and the decisions they make should be inclined to the pursuit of the national interest defined in terms of power. They should be more decisive in engaging armed forces in the event that their national interests are threatened. They should arm and form alliances to

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[56] _____Op cit p.219
[57] Wright, Q., *The Study of International Relations*, ( New York:Appleton-Century-Crofts,1955) pp.149-150
[58] Ib. id

deter imperialist threat and expansionists. "Potentially the most dangerous policy is one of declaring certain interests to be vital but then not backing up your words with military power". [59] The US has usually used force in its approach to foreign policy arguing that "to be most effective, force, diplomacy, and our other policy tools must compliment and reinforce each other- for there will be occasions and many places where we must rely on diplomatic shaping activities to protect and advance our interests".[60]

According to Morgenthau, there are two levels of national interests; vital and secondary interests. Vital interests concern the very life of the state and there is no compromise and hesitation about going to war to preserve them. Vital interests include security, independent nation, and protection of institutions, people and fundamental values of a nation state. They can also be extended overseas to forestall expansionist state amassing power and conquests that may affect you later; imperialist powers that threaten your interests should be dealt with earlier backed by adequate power. Secondary interests concern those interests one may seek compromise because they are removed from your borders and have no direct threat to your sovereignty. Mutually advantageous deals can be negotiated provided the other party is not aggressive and not engaged in expansionist policy. Other distinctions of realists are between temporary and permanent interests, specific and general interests, and complimentary and conflicting interests. The US relationship with china for example should not be jeopardized because of human rights

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[59] Roskin, M. G., *National Interest: From Abstraction to Strategy,* ib. id, P.4
[60] Brown, M. E. et al, *American Strategic Choices,* revised edition(Cambridge: MIT press, 2000)

record because little good will come out of it and much harm will surely be a consequence. Since china offers the US with lots of help in terms of containing nuclear armed North Korea which is more important to the US than human rights since it is a vital interest to the US. Often, politicians should choose wisely between competing interests for the good of their countries. Pakistan is a more dangerous place to become a haven for terrorists and because of its proximity with Afghanistan, the US have to be friends with them. Generous economic rewards including enormous amounts in military aid has been one of the ways the US has always used to ensure a continued ally in Pakistan. However as the prevailing circumstances change war should be reassessed in terms of its utility and efficiency. The nature of terrorism and terrorists will best demonstrate the best counterterrorism mechanism to be utilized in an event of eliminating if not stamping out terrorism.

## 3.3 Rethinking Counterterrorism: The Nature of Terrorism and Terrorists

The emergence of new challenges in the global scenario has presented established governments with problems that were unprecedented. Hans Morgenthau says that "traditionally, governments have possessed a monopoly of organized physical violence which they would use against other governments monopolistically endowed in a similar way or against individual citizens violating the legal order. It is new in modern history that a group of citizens would band together, challenging the monopoly of organized

violence in the hands of the government".[61] Terrorism is one of the problems that has brought a challenge to the sovereignty and existence of the nation state. According to Hyams (1975) terrorism may be as old as civilization but it is confined to the highly sophisticated stages in (civilization) evolution in societies most certainly because only then did certain elements of population realize the use of terrorism, that injustices in social system need not necessarily be tolerated for ever or that ideological culture was strong enough to deter terrorism.[62] Though terrorism may have existed from time immemorial, perhaps since the beginning of civilization for human kind, its seriousness has never before become a global issue until 1968, the year that saw terrorism escalates to a level that elicited international concern. Terrorism has become an issue that needs concerted efforts to contain it nationally, regionally as well as globally. It has also acquired a new intensity and it owes its survival to the ability to adapt and adjust to the countermeasures put in place by governments and as if it is not enough continues to identify and exploit the vulnerabilities that are exhibited by the opponents. They change their modus operandi adapting new tactics and weapons to remain relevant.

Before September 11, 2001, the US foreign policy leaned towards unilateralism, an assumption of great power competition and belief in the necessity of maintaining hegemony.[63] This would constantly put them in contact with other non-state actors who

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[61] See forward by Morgenthau, H. J., in Yonah A. & M. F. Seymour, Terrorism: *Interdisciplinary Perspectives, (eds.),* ( New York; The John Jay Press, 1977) P.vii
[62] Hyams, E., *Terrorists and Terrorism,* (London: JM Dent & Sons Ltd, 1975)
[63] United States Department of Defense 2001, 12

are positioned to challenge their hegemony. In the quest to meet terrorist demands, certain policy decisions may be affected and most certainly structural changes. In addition to creating a climate of fear, terrorist groups may also achieve their goals by provoking governments into adopting repressive measures that undermine civil liberties or simply disrupt daily lives so much that they turn the citizenry against the governing regime. Extensive security precautions may also serve as a terror group's cause by contributing to the public perception of its power.[64] The East Africa bombings and the Bombay attacks have showed a rare feature of terrorism never before exhibited. These terrorist attacks just like the 9/11 attacks exhibited a sense of patience, detailed planning, coordination and dedication that has never before been imagined. It also showed a simultaneous execution of attacks and a rare case of lethality, magnitude and great precision. Both the September 11 attacks and the East Africa bombing had one dominant feature that was not entirely new but was used more often in the new era of terrorism- suicide attacks. Suicide attacks were motivated by a religious concept of martyrdom and were justified by the Islamic concept of jihad. These attacks point towards the role of radical Islam in the grievances expressed by Osama bin laden. Muslim fundamentalism may be the motivating factor on the beliefs of martyrs as depicted by the words of this cleric that;

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[64] Crenshaw, M., 'the Logic of Terrorism: Terrorism behavior as a product of Strategic Choice' in W. Reich (eds.), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind, (Washington D.C; Woodrow Wilson center and Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1990), p.19

A martyr has six privileges with God. He is forgiven his sins on the shedding of the first drop of blood, he is shown his place in paradise, he is redeemed from torments of the grave, he is made secure from the fear of hell and a grown of glory in placed on his head of which one is ruby is worth more than the world and all that is in it. He will marry seventy two of the huris with black eyes; and his intercession will be accepted for seventy of his kinsmen.[65]

Martyrdom as a religious concept can be traced back to the assassins in the Shia Ismaillia movement 700 years ago in the struggle against the European imperialists. Therefore the use of suicide bombers is not entirely new in history but has acquired a new wave of prevalence. It can be blamed on the new caliphate of fundamentalist Islam political entity. Richard Dawkins placed the blame of the 9/11 attacks squarely on religion saying that;

Religion is also of course, the underlying source of the divisiveness in the Middle East which motivated the use of this deadly weapon in the first place......to fill a world with religion, or religions of the Abraham kind is like littering the streets with loaded guns. Do not be surprised if they are used.[66]

In the contemporary era, terrorism has been distinguished by its indifference to collateral damage showing a clear divergence of terrorism tradition. Bin laden himself

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[65] Al-Khatib Al –Tibrizi, The niches of lamps, in D. C. Rapoport, 'Sacred Terror: A Contemporary example from Islam' in W. Reich (ed.), *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind,* (Washington D.C; Woodrow Wilson center and Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1990), pp. 117-118)

[66] Guardian, September 15, 2001.

said that "we do not have to differentiate between military or civilian. As far as we are concerned, they are all targets."[67] The Russian terrorists Narodnaya Volya viewed terrorism in a different way than the present terrorists. According to them, ethical concerns was of utmost importance to an extend that Kalyayev gave up the first attempt to kill grand Duke Serge Aleksandrovich because he was riding with his children in the same carriage and the bomb would have killed them too. However, he was later assassinated in 1905 by the same terrorist. While history can be clearly be traced from the French revolution, to the political movements of the late twentieth century, there is a clear difference in terrorism tradition. Social and technological changes have made terrorism more lethal and effective weapon posing a real threat to contemporary democracies.

Global technological advancement in the telecommunication sector has made communication easier to terrorists since they can communicate around the world in real time. They have also utilized the latest technology, encrypted messages on apple power Macs on Toshiba laptops computers, communicating via e-mail or internet bulletin boards, using satellite telephones and cell phones and traveling first class by air. In utilizing the latest technology they are striving to be ahead of counterterrorism measures put in place by governments as well as overcoming the defenses and physical security barriers designed to prevent attack. Mini-cam, videotape, television, and the internet have become weapons of modern terrorism. The two hour al-Qaeda recruitment videotape of

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[67] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004, p.47

2001 shows the extend they utilize the latest technology. Publicity is a very important factor in the terrorists' decision making calculus since it increases the expected return of carrying out an attack in a country whose media will provide extensive coverage. This will increase returns in propaganda aimed at selling its justification to their cause, attracting recruits for a similar course of action and also supplies real time tactical information on where to best exploit their worries. Sawyer (2005) says it is a fact that violence both as information and entertainment has become a commercial product for the media. However, it is important to break the media coverage of terror scenes without restricting the freedom of the press with an intention of limiting the motives of such attacks and thus discourage terrorism. With the advent of modern information technology it's unlikely that news of situations will not be disseminated. Even if media coverage doesn't, other sources like the internet; blogs, u-tube, twitter, face book, and even newspapers will. Strict enforcement of non-media coverage will lead to more misinformation, more exaggeration, and perhaps more panic. A balance of the two may be a viable option with the realization that the media and terrorism are in a symbiotic relationship that may be inseparable.

The technological advancements that should be of worry to governments are in the field of weaponry. Bruce Hoffman (1999) says that the countermeasures should change fast in many ways to forestall the use of WMD along with the possible use of chemical, biological, and computerized devices to ensure countermeasures are not out of date. It's however been surprising that the recent killing of the al-Qaeda mastermind

Osama bin laden revealed another side of the modern trend. The hideout did not show any modern technology as thought before! Perhaps this may be the contemporary way of dealing with information without unnecessary infiltration. The use of airline hijacking as a weapon of terrorism has been used in the past though without success. Therefore the September 11, 2001 attacks using the same means are not an entirely unexpected mode. The 1986 hijacking of the TWA flight in Karachi with terrorist intention of crushing it in the centre of Tel Aviv and the 1994 hijacking of the air France passenger plane by armed Islamic group (GIA) also planned to crush the aircraft with its passengers into the heart of Paris were clear indication that it was a potential means of attack by terrorists. The claim by the US anti-terrorism defense that it was not expected is self serving at best. Counterterrorism measures should be of broad spectrum to respond across a broad technological spectrum of potential terrorist attacks.

Rethinking of counterterrorism measures has also been motivated by 1995 sarin nerve gas attack on Tokyo subway and nine other attempts to use bio weapons by Aum Shinrikyo. The posting of envelopes with biological weapons in form of anthrax was a weapon least expected. A terrorist survive by identifying vulnerabilities and gaps that exist in a system and continuously evolve to be relevant in its activities. Counterterrorism measures should continue in accelerated speed against the evolution of terrorism machinery. Methods used by terrorists usually change over time according to the prevailing situation. Being rational actors, terrorists have learned to circumvent the counterterrorism responses put in place by the governments. Lessons from the post

second world war wave of terrorism have shown terrorists that can succeed in avoiding loosing not defeating the military establishment.

> Consistent with rational-choice theory, historical records suggest that terrorist groups substituted kidnapping and assassinations of Foreign Service personnel for embassy bombings when steps were taken to protect embassies against such threats. Similarly, terrorists hijacking of commercial aircrafts declined in favor of hostage taking missions after airport security was heightened by installing metal detectors to screen boarding passengers. [68]

The general trend showed by terrorists to utilize a means that is easily manageable and not so complex exhibits a rational choice of mechanism aimed at minimum input and maximum return. Though there was a decline in those mechanisms used by the terrorists it did not disappear altogether. The people and the security responsible for antiterrorism assumed that terrorists were not capable of coordinating an attack of the magnitude witnessed that day. The 9/11 attack happened with full security procedures being followed and this shows that counterterrorism is a kind of war that has alluded everybody because no sure prediction can be made with precision. Though there is a great interest in the causes of terrorism, it is also important to study whether the nature and form of terrorism is attached to its objectives or it is independent of the objectives it is chosen to advance. Studies have shown that terrorism may be used to promote any objective for

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[68] Landes, W. M., An Economic Study of U.S aircraft Hijackings 1961-1976, Journal of law and economics, 21 (1) 1-31, (1978), as quoted in Shughart II, W. F., *'An Analytical History of Terrorism, 1945-2000'* op.cit, p.12

them to justify their actions. Some terrorists have no clearly articulated objectives and this lack of well defined objectives played an important role in the ending of the left wing terror that plagued Europe the $2^{nd}$ half of the twentieth century. Addressing the causes (real or perceived) may not be possible and will not in any case end terrorism while addressing wrong causes may be counterproductive calling for a balance of the two.

### 3.3.1 Causes of Terrorism: A Brief Overview

The understanding of terrorism and its nature is vital in designing a response strategy that will be effective. Response will be effective by the understanding of terrorism causes, including the conditions that create support for terrorists and aid recruitment. Simplistic view of causes will certainly lead to simplistic and narrow sets of counterterrorism options rather than complex multifaceted response that befit terrorism real nature. Should an act of terrorism be praised and condemned, accepted or opposed on the basis of its course? Does the end justify the means? To speak of terrorist cause is often intended to justify the rationale for terrorism though there is widespread view that no cause can justify an act of terrorism. Though causes of terrorism are diverse, Hoffman thinks that terrorism is inherently political, calculated and systematic act in the interest of power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power and the use of power to achieve political change. The popular concept of terrorism as "urban guerilla warfare" grew out of the Latin American experience of the 1960's where cities had become an arena of terrorism because they provided opportunities for a multitude of targets, mobility, communication, anonymity and audience and also a recruiting ground for politicized and

volatile inhabitants. In Ireland it developed as a tradition of physical force that dates back to the eighteen century Irish republican army (IRA) of the Northern Ireland. These militant minorities were driven to resort to violence in service of their cause, "where inequality of forces as between themselves and the government they seek to overthrow or contain to different policies is such that victory for them in open warfare is out of the question."[69] Their objective is to weaken the governments in power in the short term and in the long term employed to enforce social and political changes regarded as unjust, to win civil rights for ethnic minority, to deny civil rights to a religious, ethnic or even political minority regarded as intruding aliens by the terrorists or to create a favorable environment for a mass revolution to be possible.[70]

Government inability to prevent terrorism due to absence of inadequate prevention by police and the intelligence services permits the continued spread of conspiracy. This conspiracy will consequently embolden their resolve and full blown terrorism is a result. Democracies are prone to attacks because it is practically impossible to guard all possible terrorist targets at the same time. Concrete grievances among sub-groups of larger population like ethnic minority discrimination against majority and lack of redress to the grievances will bring a feeling of relative deprivation[71] leading to terrorism in pursuit of those demands with the aim of gaining equal rights or a separate

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[69] Hyams, E., *Terrorists and Terrorism,* Ib.id, p.11
[70] Op.cit
[71] Relative deprivation: Actor's perceptions of discrepancy between their value expectation and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life people believe they are rightly entitled while value capabilities are the goods they think they are capable of getting and keeping. Gurr, T.R, *Why Men Rebel,* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,1970), p.24

state. Evidence shows that all governments in all parts of the world have been forced to change their policies, and in extreme cases have been overthrown by terrorism. Hyams Edward (1975) in his book on terrorism and terrorists argues that official denial that anything can be achieved through the use of terrorism is of course inconsistent with the facts in historical records. He continues to say that;

> Since it is impossible to deny that there often exists social and political conditions in which there are no means of changing the nature and policy of the government except by resort to force, or that the nature and policies of many governments badly need changing if a significant proportion of their people are not to go on living in conditions of social and economic constraint such that no self respecting human being can or should tolerate for a moment longer than he is forced to, we are faced with the proposition that terrorism may, in certain circumstances, be justified; always supposing, of course, that one accepts the liberal proposition that men have a right and perhaps a duty to be as free and as happy as their nature allows them to be.[72]

Perhaps the acceptance on looking at causes of terrorism may be an understanding that terrorism has grievances that a society identifies with and may become popular over time invoking group solidarity. Newman however sees terrorism as a resistance by weaker groups against the dominant preponderant powers. That it is an attempt to challenge the US global hegemonic status and also influence the US foreign policy like the support of

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[72] Hyams, E., *Terrorists and Terrorism*, op.cit, p.10

Israeli or the US troops in Saudi Arabia. He also argues that "in some sense the issue in play has not changed for centuries: great powers compete, preponderant powers dominate, and weaker groups resist."[73] His argument nonetheless, is sound considering the dominance by the sole superpower –the United States- in the international affairs. They have accumulated wealth and power and their position is guarded jealously from impending danger of terrorism or any other power that may prove a challenge.

The al-Qaeda demands were central to their terrorist activities and they include the hosting of infidel American troops within the Hijaz; the area in Saudi Arabia proximate to the Holy cities of Mecca and Medina, they expressed hunger on disastrous public health consequence of tight economic sanctions against Iraq causing deaths of thousands of Iraqi children by barring importation of water treatment plant replacement parts due to alleged potential military applications, and also the control of Islamic Holy sites in Jerusalem. Most of those demands are comprehensible but are driven by religious convictions. However, the justification for the war against America by Osama bin Laden has broadened over time. Initially the grievances started with some specific aspects of US policies but it has quickly become deeper. He blames America for all the conflicts involving Muslims saying that they were responsible for the ills that bedevil them. They also called for America to abandon Middle East, convert to Islam and end the immorality and godlessness of its society and culture threatening that if they don't comply, they will always be at war with the Islamic nation; a nation al-Qaeda says "desires death more than

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[73] William, N., *Reorganizing for National Security*, op. cit p.128

you desire life".[74] They justify terrorism through religious convictions. Jihad is a term used to mean holy war inferring that their fight is against American oppression. This- they say- is an attack on Muslims which should be met by Holy War in terms of terrorism. "In theory this could translate into pressure on the US leaders to do whatever is necessary to end that vulnerability and prevent that loss, whether this means specific policy changes or a less interventionist foreign policy in general."[75] The question to ponder is how do we address the causes without bringing more harm than good?

### 3.3.2 Terrorist Rhetoric

The frequently asked questions are very similar yet diverse in scope. Who is a terrorist? What does a terrorist look like? How do they think and behave? Can a terrorist be identified from a group of people or not? J. M. Post (1990) says that terrorists are product of psychological forces and that they are drawn to terrorism by a special logic used to justify their violence. He argues that terrorist rhetoric paint a picture of terrorists as absolutist, of aggressive personality, flawed self-concept, tendency to blame and scapegoat others and prone to failure. Post however warns about their generalization but notes that uniformity of their rhetoric of "us versus them" as polarizing and absolutist. They believe the establishment is the source of all evil and they must be destroyed because it is the only just and moral thing to do. Post and Crenshaw are in perfect

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[74] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United State 2004, P.52
[75] Roberts, B., Asymmetric Conflict 2010, Alexandria V.A, Institute of Defense Analysis/Defense Threat Reduction Agency as quoted in Shughart II, W. F, *An Analytical History of Terrorism, 1995-2000'* ib.id, p.129

agreement that common characteristics of terrorists is in their normality since their psychology does not reveal major psychopathology in comparative research. In her studies on the national liberation front (FNL) in Algeria in 1950s found, she found members basically normal; neither did Heskin find members of the Irish republican army (IRA) to be emotionally disturbed. Comparative studies concluded that the study did not reveal particular psychological type, particular personality or uniform terrorist mind. But "although diverse personalities are attracted to terrorism, an examination of memoirs, court records and rare interviews suggest that people with particular personality traits and tendencies are drawn disproportionately to terrorist careers"[76] These traits range from people who are action oriented, aggressive, stimulus hungry and seek excitement. Of particular importance to note is the psychological mechanism of "externalization"[77] and "splitting"[78] found with extremely high frequency in population of terrorists and significantly contribute to the uniformity of terrorist rhetoric and psycho-logic. This will lead to what Kohut terms as the 'injured self'.

Though these traits are frequently associated with terrorists, it's important to note that there may be people with those traits but are not terrorists. Therefore in the profiling of possible terrorist suspects it's important to be broadly exposed to different perspectives and scenarios to be able to correctly predict with precision. If the counterterrorist

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[76] Whittaker J. D, *The Terrorism Reader (eds.),* (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis group, 2003), p.22
[77] Externalization is a situation that a person is always looking forward for a source of difficulty or need an outside enemy to blame.
[78] Splitting is characteristic in people whose personality development is shaped by a particular type of psychological damage during childhood which produces narcissistic wounds.

mechanism centers on the personality traits, they may leave dangerous terrorists because they do not fit to the profile. For any group or organization the highest priority is survival and similarly a terrorist group need to commit acts of terrorism to remain relevant and justify its existence. Richard Falk (1986) thinks that there is a convergence between terrorism and counterterrorism. He says that while terrorists seek to paralyze the adversary society, the counterterrorist seeks to mobilize that society to retaliatory violence. According to him it is necessary to break this link because it is crucial to eliminating terrorism suggesting that we deprive terrorist activity of its impact and therefore weaken the incentive to practice. Also says that for them to pull out of their actions provide assurances about their safety and security.

Terrorism is a strategic choice where leaders of a terrorist group will try to maximize return while minimizing the cost for engaging in terrorist activity. Ross, (1993, 321) also argues that "the lion's share of terrorism takes place in democracies". Consistent with the publicity of terrorism activity, terrorists want a lot of media coverage in a terrorist activity to maximize on the propaganda and recruitment. The 9/11 terrorism incident marked the beginning of a new nature of terrorism that saw the united states respond unreservedly igniting a new political will in the fight on terror. This marked the beginning of the war in Afghanistan.

## 3.4 The Global War on Terrorism in Afghanistan

The war in Afghanistan began in October 7, 2001 as a response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in Washington and the pentagon. This war referred to as the global war

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on terror (GWOT) has never before been fought since time immemorial. The type of wars that may be experienced in the contemporary era are not classic international war combining forces fighting each other but rather a kind of civil war that begins as a conflict and becomes internationalized through the involvement of foreign forces on one or both sides. The legal basis for the war in Afghanistan in the US perspective is that the US was in an armed conflict arising from a series of attacks against the US culminating in the September 11, 2001 attacks and hence the US responded in self defense. Though self serving at best they were able to convince the international fraternity resulting in the war that is currently ongoing in Afghanistan. With the entry of the American led operation enduring freedom (OEF) in a continuing war by the northern alliance, they were able to oust the Taliban government in the November-December war. The entry of the NATO further complicated the situation in Afghanistan. It should be noted that the American led alliance (OEF) and NATO led coalition international security assistance force (ISAF) operate under different mandates; the US led coalition are in Afghanistan with the consent of the post Taliban government while the NATO led (ISAF) has the mandate of the security council. However, the American presence in Afghanistan raises more questions than answers. Waging a protracted war and removing the Taliban government was only an over-reaction since they were not responsible for the terrorist attacks of the 9/11 but only sympathizers of the al-Qaeda.

Under the rules of war, the war in Afghanistan was not justified because a just war has to meet certain prerequisites; it should be fought against aggressors, should be

linked to a particular situation, and should respect ethical norms. War must also be fought by a competent state authority that can be held responsible for decisions held in warfare. *Jus ad bellum* addresses the conditions for waging war, however, the available rules of war in The Hague conventions do not refer to non-state or anti-state conflicts but only conflicts between nation states. Notwithstanding that position, "some rules and justifications are self-serving, others are pragmatic, and others are grounded in ethnonationalist or religious traditions. Hence, the just war concept can easily be adapted to justify ethnic, racial, national, and religious extremism in the modern era."[79] The al-Qaeda in this perspective is a non-state organization that cannot be fought by a conventional war neither can we regard a terrorist act as an act of aggression. Al-Qaeda, seen by the US government as the masterminds of the September 11 attacks was based in Afghanistan and of utmost interest to the US at the time was to capture Osama bin Laden and company, rid Afghanistan of terrorists, and denying al-Qaeda of a safe haven anywhere in the world. This war initially had support with the justification that it is to punish the Taliban regime for allowing Afghanistan to be a safe haven for the al-Qaeda. The GWOT according to Newman is a war that has many similarities with the Reagan doctrine of containment;

The Bush doctrine of global war on terrorism is more akin to the Reagan doctrine of containment: it aims to destroy the capability of the terrorists to operate

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[79] Gus, m., *Essentials of Terrorism: Concepts and Controversies,* (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore: Sage Publications, 2008), p. 37

anyplace on the globe, rather than merely to prevent them from assaulting the United States and its foreign based assets.[80]

The doctrine of containment was in play during the cold war ideological and proxy wars and has similarities with the GWOT because it aims at displacing terrorists and denying them a safe haven worldwide. For the US to be seen to respect the laws of war, they conveniently assimilated the Taliban in the war supposedly because they refused to hand over Osama bin Laden and company to the US. Western countries have proposed the adjustment of the laws of warfare to deal with acts of international terrorism.

It is imperative to note that notwithstanding the causes of the war in Afghanistan, American bellicosity may itself be seen as the leading cause for global insecurity. They would be provoked to go to war for the most flimsy reasons but inherently have solitary goals in mind. Rossen S. P says that "not only has the United States been frequently involved in war, most of the wars are of the kind that, in theory, it should have been least likely to fight: aggressive wars, civil wars, and imperial wars."[81] The war in Afghanistan may have been fought because the US government of the time was under great psychological and political pressure to do something drastic in response to the September 11 attacks. This saw the beginning of the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan that may have been a well orchestrated diversion of the internal inadequacies of the US security to prevent the deadly attacks seen that day. Fighting those kinds of wars is a sure recipe for

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[80] William, N., *Reorganizing for National Security*, op.cit, pp.128-129
[81] Rossen, S.P, 'Blood Brothers: The dual origin of the American bellicosity' In the American Interest, *Policy, Politics and Culture*, Vol. IV, No. 6, July/August 2009, p.20

creating a string of enemies all over the world that will not only threaten the US but also become a threat to international security. Many a time they have been referred as first class terrorists because they are instigating acts akin to terrorist deeds. Nye (1985) says that "a democracy can be good and do evil-sometimes even when it is trying to do good." This explains the actions of the United States and any other explanations to the contrary may be misplaced since American actions are perceived as unwarranted and unjust. According to Yasser Arafat; "The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the reason for which each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders, the settlers and the colonialists cannot be possibly called a terrorist."[82] This is a clear reference of the contentions on the definition of the term terrorism. The US has been selective on referring to who is or who is not a terrorist. The famous adage, one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter dictates how states behave and respond in counterterrorism. Brian Jenkins argues that "use of the term implies a moral judgment and if one party can successfully attach the label "terrorist" to its opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral view point."[83]

The 9/11 attacks on the world trade center and the pentagon was an aftermath of the terrorist planning that began way before the actual commission similar to the east

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[82] Hoffman, B., *Inside Terrorism,* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998)
[83] Jenkins, B. M., *'International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict'* in Carlton and Schaerf, ib.id, p.14

Africa bombings that was a result of detailed planning that took five years.[84] The initial combat phase in Afghanistan ended early 2002 but despite that, the war is still ongoing and even threatening to rejuvenate. Just like the loss of the soviets to the mujaheddin in the 80s, failure is not inevitable for the US in this new kind of war. The Obama administration is committed to reforming the corrupt government in Kabul that was accepted by the Bush administration. The increasing of troops in the war in Afghanistan is a sure sign of the importance the US government accord this war. The current US doctrine clearly spells the costs of COIN as high;

> Maintaining security in an unstable environment requires vast resources, whether host nation, US or multinational. In contrast, a small number of highly motivated insurgents with simple weapons, good operations security, and even limited mobility can undermine security over a large area. Thus a successful COIN operation often requires a high ration of security forces to the protected population. For that reason, protracted COIN operations are hard to sustain. The effort requires a firm political will and substantial patience by the governments, its people, and the countries providing support.[85]

With the enactment of the sixth FY2011 continuing resolution through march 18, 2011 (H.J. Res.48/P.L.112-6) congress approved a total of $1.283 trillion for military operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans

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[84] Hoffman, B., *Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism since 9/11*, op.cit p.307
[85] The US Army-Marine Corps '*Counterinsurgency Field Manual*', (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007)

healthcare for the three operations initiated since 9/11 attacks: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Afghanistan and other counter terror operations; Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced military security at military bases, and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Between FY2009 and FY2010 the average monthly DOD spending for Afghanistan grew from $4.4 billion to $6.7 billion a month approximately 50% increase while average troop strength almost doubled from 44,000 to 84,000 and expected to average 102,000 in FY2011.

Table 1: Trends in Afghanistan war funding

| FINANCIAL YEAR | AMOUNT IN USD$ BILLIONS |
|---|---|
| 2003 | 15 |
| 2004 | 15 |
| 2005 | 20 |
| 2006 | 20 |
| 2007 | 39 |
| 2008 | 44 |
| 2009 | 60 |
| 2010 | 105 assuming the pending supplement is approved |

Source: Amy Belasco, the cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and other global war on terror operations since 9/11, congressional research service. March 29, 2011.

The troop surge was according to the president call on increments of troops in OEF to reverse the deteriorating security situation and break the Taliban momentum by targeting the insurgency, key population areas, and training more Afghan forces. In march 2009, shortly after president Obama took office, the administration conducted a strategy review

of both Afghanistan and Iraq war which prompted the president's decision to shift forces in Iraq from combat to an advisory and assistance mission, consequently reducing troop levels from 140,000 in February 2009 to 50,000 by September 2010 and complete withdrawal by December 31, 2011 in order to comply with the US-Iraq security agreement reached at the end of the Bush administration. The cost of Afghanistan has dramatically risen since FY2006 as troop levels and intensity of conflict has grown with a diminishing role of the NATO forces. The cost increases not only reflects higher troop levels and more intense operations but substantial amounts to train Afghan forces. According to DOD the cost per troop is much higher in Afghanistan due to expensive transportation costs for equipment and supplies, more difficult terrain and establishing new facilities.

During the mujahedeen holy war against the soviets invasion of Afghanistan, the US played a covert role in the financing of those groups. This was during the cold war ideological orientation and containment doctrine of the US. This new kind of war is a war hitherto fought and the revival of the COIN doctrine was also one to ponder. In understanding this war, the study will look at the counterinsurgency as a counterterrorism measure in terms of its efficiency, effectiveness and operational security that favors the insurgents and the counterinsurgent force.

### 3.5 Counterinsurgency as a Counterterrorism Measure

The cardinal rule of war is that you should know your enemy well and be best prepared for the eventual clash. Knowing your enemy involves having adequate

intelligence to enable you plan for the best strategy to employ and perhaps have enough resources to support that ultimate strategy. The use of the military option by the US is a rational choice which seems misplaced and may be an overreaction according to the prevailing circumstances that time in history. Strive to know your enemy well through investigating adequately the causes of terrorism, power and the ability of the terrorists. Though American power is adequate to address the vital US interests emanating from any state or a combination of states, it is much harder to fight a non-state organization. According to the game theory, the power differential is of profound advantage in the battle ship and conventional warfare but not in Afghanistan because other parameters of value, space, rules and information favor the insurgents. In terms of power differential, the US is well endowed but as the circumstances change, it requires different solutions. The insurgent is a highly motivated and recognizes that his cause and existence depends on success and failure is not an option. Therefore;

> The willingness of insurgent forces to take far greater casualties in proportion and absolute terms, to fight a foe far better equipped than they, and to intentionally seek out opportunities to inflict casualties' shows that they are well aware of the symmetry of value and employ it to their advantage.[86]

This however is in contrast to the counterinsurgency force that has a high perceived worth of each loss than it could in existential struggle. Each loss is of high value and it

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[86] Kimmitt, T. M., 'War games: Basics Never Change, Circumstances Always do' in the American Interest, *Policy, Politics and Culture*, Vol. IV, No. 6, July/August 2009, P.14

diminishes their motivation and this gives the insurgency enormous psychological advantage over them. This has been clearly shown by the unwillingness by the NATO troops to be proactive in this war. "With so few NATO troops in Afghanistan to begin with, and many of those limited by national caveats, commanders have a great deal of difficulty crafting a coherent strategy, and in particular responding to unforeseen actions by the enemy".[87] Unlike a conventional war, counterinsurgency is won by a strategy of exhaustion of the opponents will through strategic communication, and propaganda designed to diminish the support, patience and will of its adversaries. The Taliban has succeeded in not only strategic communication and propaganda but also managed to sustain the war and escalation conveniently running out the patience of the international community. Currently the initial NATO members are skeptical about the continued war in Afghanistan.

The rules of war are also violated by insurgents, since they are not answerable for their actions in warfare in the first place. This is because they are not a state entity that can be put accountable for its actions in war. These violations are designed to assist them gain advantage in battle and quickly diminish the power of the counterinsurgent force. Killing of prisoners of war, using non-combatants as human shields, using facilities like religious sites, schools among others are some of the violations that give them greater advantage in the battle field. Insurgents also gain advantage by seeking sanctuary in

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[87] Chalmers, W., 'Testing the Alliance: NATO in Afghanistan and the Global War on Terrorism.' *Canadian Army Journal*, Vol. 11.2 Summer 2008, p.132

spaces that diminish speed, maneuver and fire power of the conventional force. They work best in populated areas, mountains, forests, and other inhospitable terrain and topographies. This is best utilized in Afghanistan near the border to Pakistan, an area that is of rugged terrain and harsh topography considerably giving advantage to the Taliban since they are familiar with the area. "The ability to know the locations, strength and often the intensions of conventional forces while denying the conventional forces knowledge of own capabilities is the 'one way mirror' that bedevils the counterinsurgency forces."[88] This is by the fact that the insurgents know the culture, mores and norms of the local society and how to keep information away from the coalition forces.

However, the al-Qaeda had a different operation security in Afghanistan because they alienated the host contributing to the collapse of intelligence to the insurgents. The so called jihad manual is very explicit about the operational security (OPSEC) and discussions of trade craft. It states that "only the leaders of an attack should know all the details of the operation and these should only be revealed to the rest of the unit at the last possible moment."[89] This minimizes infiltration and leakage of information to the 'enemies' giving them the advantage of surprise attacks. The American led counterinsurgent force in Afghanistan are faced by these problems and many more and will continue to become more and more expensive to wage a war that they are not certain

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[88] Kimmitt, T. M., *War Games: Basics Never Change, Circumstances Always do,* op.cit, p.15
[89] Videotape released by the US government in November 2001; discovered by the British police on the hard drive of an al-Qaeda's member computer on March 2000.

of winning. In terms of the costs the counterinsurgent force will have to dig deeper into their pockets to finance this war. Mark T. Kimmitt summarizes counterinsurgency saying that; "Insurgents are less capital-intensive, so discrete, losses are less crucial. Insurgents know the terrain better, ignore rules of engagement as it suits them and often enjoy intelligence advantages. These advantages often overwhelm the advantages of strength enjoyed by the counter insurgent forces."[90] Though critics have analyzed the inefficiency of the military to deter terrorists and state sponsored terrorism inferring from the 1986 and 1993 attacks on Libya and Iraq, self serving perceptions are seen in their writings. However, they correctly observe that it may be a bit harder to fight non-conventional organization like the terrorist organizations. "The 1986 attack in Libya and the 1993 attack on Iraq symbolized for the military establishment effective use of the military power for counterterrorism-limited retaliation with airpower, aimed at deterrence. What remained was the question of how deterrence could be effective when the adversary was a loose transnational network."[91] The hasty withdrawals of the US forces in Somalia and Lebanon show the poor track record of America in COIN operations. The black hawk down fiasco in Mogadishu late 1992, where 20 American lives were lost and the Hezbollah's suicide attack in Lebanon where 240 marines were killed is a clear show of the inefficiency of counterinsurgency. "Great power's poor track record in COIN is due

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[90] Kimmitt, T.M., *War Games: Basics Never Change, Circumstances always Do*, op.cit p.14
[91] National Commission On Terrorist Attack upon the Unites States, 2004, P.98

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partly to the inherent difficulty of undertaking but also to poor strategic choices."[92]

Terrorists' in this case Islamic terrorists have an edge over states in many aspects in operation security since;

> Terrorists are well positioned to exploit existing vulnerabilities because they typically are better informed about the strengths and weaknesses of a nations defensive measures than governments are about the sizes, locations, and effectiveness of terrorist cells and they are organizationally less hierarchical, operationally more independent and hence more nimble and innovative in acting than public law enforcement and counterterrorism agencies are in reacting.[93]

Therefore it is much harder to face a terrorist organization with counterinsurgency because of the obvious advantages they have over the counterinsurgent force. Though America may be well endowed with the military resource, dealing with a loose transnational force may be difficult. The COIN in Afghanistan has not been successful in eliminating the enemy but rather dispersed them to other areas, making it harder to find, target, monitor, and contain. This fact has been clearly seen by the killing of Osama bin laden and Ilyas Kashmiri in Pakistan, Fazul Abdallah Muhammad in Somalia and other terrorist leaders in more isolated places yet the US still insists in remaining in Afghanistan. Dealing with terrorists through war polarizes the nation states hampering antiterrorist efforts. It will also lead to collateral damage raising emotions and anger

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[92] Rockmore, T., et al., *the Philosophical Challenge of September 11*, ib. id
[93] Hirshleifer, (1999) and Sandler, (2005) as quoted in N. William., *Reorganizing National Security*, op.cit, p.12

which consequently leads to extremism, hatred and more terror incidences. The US foreign policy on counterterrorism should be tailored with a view to genuinely countering terrorism and not to embolden their resolve. Therefore, it's a fact the US has a hidden reason in almost every situation; may it be social, political, ideological or economic. This however makes the researcher to ask whether war is a sure recipe for success in the quest for combating terrorism. Has it improved international security or aggravated the issue of terrorism? This questions and more probing inquisitiveness of the researcher leads us to analyze the objectives of this war to the US and whether it serves the intention well.

## 3.6 Objectives of the War in Afghanistan

In his opening remarks on the unveiling of the US foreign policy on national security strategy (NSS), the former US president George Bush said that the US enjoyed enormous military strength as well as great economic and Political influence. He adds that the strength they posses will not be used to press for unilateral advantage but to create balance of power favorable for human freedom and that in a world that is safe, people will be able to make their lives better. For this to happen he stresses that; "We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent."[94] The US well aware of its hegemonic status justifies its use of the military in fighting terrorists and tyrants in its numerous wars

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[94] U.S Foreign Policy Agenda, *An Electronic Journal of the U.S Department of State*, Vol. 7, No. 4 U.S National Security Strategy: A New Era, (Dec., 2002), p.2

including the war in Afghanistan. Though they deny not using their strength pressing for unilateral advantage, it openly shows the US has always used its power to arm twist decisions in international organizations like the UN and WTO among other visible maneuvers. Though not shown in black and white, the most important objective of the US it shows are not what they call the war on terrorism but to safeguard the world favorable for human freedom in economic terms and essentially make room for globalization. The formation of democratic governments gives room for this since it creates an enabling environment for globalization to prosper. Alan P. Larson clearly puts that the aim of NSS is to make the world not just safer but better. He says that the economic dimension of the NSS focuses on three priorities; assure economic security by making the US and global economies more resilient to economic shocks, advance global prosperity agenda through expanding trade and investment between nations and to ensure poor nations participate in the rising tide of prosperity. However, it's a fact that all the proxy wars and the GWOT are designed to ensure economic security and developing diversified and reliable supplies of energy central to the NSS. This is by making international transportation safe and secure from interruption and also ensuring stability of international financial and economic stability of key allies. This is clearly put in the energy security agenda that;

> we will strengthen our own energy security and the shared prosperity of the global
> economy by working with our allies, trading partners and energy producers to
> expand the sources and types of global energy supplied especially in the western

hemisphere, Africa, central Asia, and the Caspian region. We will also continue to work with our partners to develop cleaner and a more energy efficient technologies.[95]

Because two thirds of the proven oil reserves are in the Middle East, aftershocks from global oil supply disruptions will ripple through the global economy and also that problem states control significant amounts of oil. That is why as part of NSS Larson states that "we need to secure reliable supplies of energy at reasonable prices in order to foster economic growth and prosperity and to ensure that oil cannot be used as a weapon."[96] It is not a coincidence that the US and allies reacted with haste to the ongoing civil war in Libya and even made an order of oil from the rebels allegedly because it is to boost their financial base to be able to fight Gaddafi. On the contrary, this is a golden opportunity to get assured oil supplies and to put a friendly government in Tripoli. What is called a war on terrorism but increasingly serves other interests is in itself a motivation for further acts of terrorism and not a hindrance. It may be the US objective for a continued war on terrorism because they will get an opportunity to expand its imperialism in its quest for resource wars energized by capitalism. The continued presence of the US forces in Afghanistan despite the fact that al-Qaeda has long fled there since 2002 opens itself to question. The 9/11 attacks have opened an opportunity yet again for them to extend their military prowess and expand their markets too.

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[95] U.S Foreign Policy Agenda, *The US National Security Strategy: A New Era*, ib.id, p.19
[96] _____, *The US National Security Strategy: A New Era*, op cit., p.19

Despite the fact that of the 15 out of the 19 hijackers suspected of 9/11 attacks were Saudi nationals, the US has neither responded nor spoken ill about Saudi Arabia but instead heaping the blame on al-Qaeda based in Afghanistan. James baker says with regard to Saudi Arabia that; "I worked for four administrations under three presidents. And in every one of those, our policy was that [the United States] would go to war to protect the energy reserves in the Persian Gulf. That is a major and very significant national security interest that we have."[97] Saudi Arabia in this sense will continue to become a US ally as long as it continues to cooperate with US efforts to maintain a steady flow of reasonably priced oil. This is even though she is a leading state sponsor of terrorism and terrorists. It is a known fact that the Saudi elites gain cover for its domestic autocracy by financing Muslim youthful idealists to foreign battle fields. This is a displacement hoping to gain legitimacy by association with the Islamic terrorists.

America has been perceived as the crusaders of globalization and this may be a major cause of terrorism if the talk by Osama bin Laden is anything to go by. He puts his struggle as a "clash of civilization" and cleverly puts the grievances in a manner that will ensure sympathizers in religion and aid in recruitment. He says that "this is a matter of religion and creed; it is not what Blair and Bush maintains, that it is a war against terrorism" he continues to say that "there is no way to forget the hostility between us and

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[97] Front line: Saudi Time Bomb? Interviews: James Baker,2001

the infidels. It is ideological, so Muslims have to ally themselves with Muslims".[98] If bin laden meant that this is not an attack on America then it means that the attack on the world trade center-which stood as a powerful symbol of globalization- is an attack in globalization. Drawing lessons from the Middle East, it shows that American foreign policy is predicated on its national economic interest. This is why state sponsors of terrorism are being ignored in favor of non-state organizations like the al-Qaeda.

## 3.7 Conclusion

From the very beginning, the war in Afghanistan was not only unjust but misinformed about the underlying facts in the events following the terror incident in the US and calls for a sober approach to issues in the international system with a view of understanding terrorism, and terrorists. The emergence of global terrorism called for the rethinking of counterterrorism to cope with the challenges of globalization. Counterterrorism should be of a broad spectrum in line with the technological advancement in communication, conventional weapons, weapons of mass destruction as well as biological weapons. Response should consider the causes of terrorism and respond to the issue with the proper mechanism and corresponding policy changes in an effort to reduce if not eliminate the menace. Though perceived as global in nature, international terrorism is a kind of conflict that has domestic causes that should not be delinked with contemporary terrorism. Pakistan has long sponsored terrorism as part of

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[98]Osama bin Laden declared in a video speech broadcast in al-Jazeera television on November 3, 2001. (bin Laden says the war in Afghanistan is a war against Islam, New York times, November 4, 2001, p. B2

its foreign policy and beneficiaries are the Taliban in Afghanistan and other insurgents in Kashmir in the Pakistan border with India. The cooperative efforts of states should be of utmost importance to deal with international terrorism since states are limited by the issue of jurisdiction with the seamless nature of the global terrorism. Asymmetric power of the terrorists has watered down the military power of states and any unilateral actions by the states are bound to fail. Rather than responding in counterterrorism using counterinsurgency, states concerned need to analyze the effectiveness of such measures in dealing with a loose transnational network. The Taliban resurgence is attributed to their success in propaganda and recruitment because they identify themselves with the peoples cause and also assimilate the GWOT with a fight on Islam. This will eventually lead to more conflicts and increase of latent power of the group in its endeavor.

The current United States foreign policy of democratizing the Middle East as a way of fighting terrorism, has proven counterproductive and in dire need of changing. Instead of producing democratic state, it instead leads to more violence and becomes a cause for instability in the Middle East. The national interests of the United States are far from what they refer as the global war on terror and this makes state become wary of the perceived imperialistic tendencies. This may become a hindrance for real progress in counterterrorism to be realized and may eventually cost more than anticipated. The costs of this war has sky rocketed and will still go up consequently decreasing the economic power of the United States in the short run making them highly indebted to China. The

casualties in this war as also become high both collateral damage and the counterinsurgent forces leading to more terrorism activities.

The contentious definition of terrorism has seen governments in various parts of the world overextend the meaning to include their enemies. This gives a different perception of the war on terrorism that will be misleading and not genuine in the war on terror. The next chapter will look at that perception with regard to the counterterrorism efforts seen in the past and its implications on international peace and security, the findings of the study and data analysis.

# CHAPTER FOUR

## RETHINKING TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM: THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE GWOT IN AFGHANISTAN

### 4.1 Introduction

When a war is fought for the duration the Afghan war has taken, it is prudent to re-examine the action and rethink the counterterrorism strategy with an aim of making corrective measures. This chapter deals with the data collected and analysis of the same in order to see whether there really exists a correlation between the war in Afghanistan and the global terrorism occurrences. William W. Newman says that; "organizational design depends on the strategic goals of the organization and how those goals are adapted to meet the demands of the environment. In terms of national security, changes in the international system call for strategic and organizational reassessment."[99] The international system is dictated by the units therein and how they interact. These interactions are a product of efforts of the different units to claim a place in the system not to be extinct.

The foreign policy of the United States in dealing with terrorism should be analyzed with a view of making it more responsive to the contemporary era. The data collected in the effort of solving this problem will be presented in this chapter with more clarification and analysis of the issues. It looks at counterterrorism in detail and how it

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[99] William W. N., *Reorganizing National Security,* op. cit. p.127

has been done over the ages by the US and other western states. Terrorism has always been perceived as a violence of political inclination and most certainly has political motives. It is important for states to remember the basis for every foreign policy adopted not to make the wrong decisions since terrorism is not an entity to be fought by war but rather fought by intellect and transformation of the ideas inherent in the population and the grievances they generate in advancing their cause. States usually engage in foreign relations realizing that the interests of other states and non-state actors are not related to theirs therefore should always anticipate controversies when pursuing their own interests. The war in Afghanistan was a strategy the United States adopted and wishes to accomplish the goals attached to it. However, the kind of war in Afghanistan is a war *sui generis* and may be counterproductive.

## 4.2 Counterterrorism the Western Way

As many western states continue to degrade the importance of the GWOT in Afghanistan, it means that the US and other select countries will continue to do the most dangerous work in Afghanistan. This saw the recent increase of the US and British forces in the southern part of Afghanistan that clearly reflect this reality meaning the US will continue to rely upon a smaller number of allies. This is because "these nations simply do not place the same importance on the GWOT and remains suspicious of the unchecked US power."[100] The new allies simply join in the US interests because of their own

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[100] Chalmers, W., *Testing the Alliance: NATO in Afghanistan and the Global War on Terrorism*, ib.id, P.132

perceptions of their national interests and the fear of powerful neighbors. "Many of the older original members of the NATO have now drifted away from the US while newer members, often from former eastern bloc have aligned themselves more closely with the US interests."[101] Domestic opinion within the NATO countries may be a major cause of the reluctance to place their troops in dangerous situations. While the situation in Afghanistan has continued to deteriorate, many different opinions have arisen to question the effectiveness of the GWOT in Afghanistan and its possible consequences. Legislative and other policy responses to the 9/11 attacks have widened at a faster pace according to developments in the 90's.

> While the military intervention in Afghanistan mirrored the strikes launched against the al-Qaeda by the order of president Clinton in 1998, the US military efforts was now more resolute, backed by new policies to justify the militarization of the judicial processing of foreign terrorists and new legislation aimed to broaden counterterrorist police strategies.[102]

These efforts saw the PATRIOT[103] Act being approved by the congress followed by the creation of the department of homeland security in November 2002 as part of concrete political efforts to unite and oversee the various US security agencies involved in the war on terror. Crenshaw notes that;

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[101] Gallis, P., *'NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance'* Congressional Research Service report for Congress January 7, 2008;25

[102] Deflem, M., 'Global rule of law, or global rule of law enforcement?' International Police Cooperation and Counterterrorism, p.244 available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/25097769 Accessed on June 3, 2011

[103] PATRIOT Act; Provide Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act.

Obviously counterterrorism is a major concern for governments especially the contemporary American government with at least 30 different bureaucracies dealing with the issue, including not only intelligence and law enforcement agencies but the department of health and human services and defense.[104]

With the evolution of the nation state, functionally divided state institutions created in response to the weakening influence of tradition has led to the diversification of the objectives of state power. It's therefore imperative to harmonize the various state functions essentially autonomous in character.

With the development of the post cold war America foreign policy aimed at spreading democracies, ideological and political sentiments on terrorism are much divided in the world of international politics and diplomacy. Edward Harman et al.[105] in the preface of his book critically looks at terrorism as a detailed use of power of focused attention to arouse empathy and passion to serve the political interests of the western states. He also argues that terrorism is a highly politicized choice that serves a political end as well as a self serving agenda. Therefore, the visibility, attention, indignation and counterterrorism, in the west are a rational choice that has a political agenda and serves their self interests at best. They are ridden with bias in agenda, semantics, and model to serve western ends. In areas like Central America, economist John Weeks has stressed

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[104] Crenshaw Martha, 'The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century' *political psychology*, Vol. 21, No. 2(June, 2000) available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791798 accessed on June 3, 2011, p.407

[105] Harman, S. E. & G. O'Sullivan, *The Terrorism Industry: The Experts and Institutions that Shape our Views of Terror,* (New York: Pantheon books, 1989)

that economic growth has long been based upon "oligarchic rule maintained through endemic state terrorism, which is sought to ensure low wages and a docile labor force."[106] Jan Black also observes that "the stability that the United States sought to maintain was not the absence of violence but rather the absence of structural change, even where violence was required to stave it off."[107] The hegemonic status currently held by the United States is challenged by the terrorist and any action taken to stave it off is welcome.

The 1980 election of Ronald reagent saw support for regimes of terror and their terrorist activities increased. They supported Israel invasion of Lebanon, army of death squads' activity in el-Salvador and Guatemala and formation of the contras to fight terrorism. Though purporting to be championing for democratic governments and installing democratic governments in their 'perceived' autocratic leaders, they were in support of terrorist regimes and state sponsors. "Rather, than standing in a detached judgment over the spread of suppression abroad, United States stands at the supply end of a pipeline of repressive technology extending to many of the worlds authoritarian governments."[108] The counterterrorism measures they took were in itself more oppressive than the terror incidences of the time. At the 1981 gathering of relatives of the

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[106] Weeks John, *'Prospects for the Central American Economies Towards 2000'*, 'Crisis sin solidata' in Michael Conroy (ed.); *Future of the Central American Economy,* (Austin: University of Texas press, 1989) Oligopoly is an industry that only contains only a few firms who dictate the prizes without competition.
[107] Black K. J., *'The Empire Strikes Back; Force and Counterforce in Inter-American relations,'* paper delivered at the Canada-Latin America consultation on human rights and the disappeared, Simon Fraser University, April 26-29, 1988 (mimeo), p.3
[108] Clare M., *Supplying Repression, Field Foundation 1977*, p.10, as quoted in Herman, S. E, and G. O'Sullivan, Terrorism Industry, p.18

disappeared in Latin America, it was estimated that; "the number of disappeared had reached 90,000. By comparison, the CIA estimate of the worldwide total of killings by "international terrorists" between 1968 and 1990 was 3,668 or approximately 4% of the disappeared in Latin America alone."[109] These figures of the disappeared are assumed to be a result of them being killed by death squads of the time under the auspices of the US contras. Not all who were referred to as terrorists were actually terrorists but they overextended the meaning to include their enemies. "Thus, first and foremost, the west is solely the victim of intimidation of others; its own struggle against change that threatens western interests and its role as a primary terrorist are ignored and denied, and the west is portrayed as a promoter of peaceful change and rule of law."[110] Therefore they have successfully tilted the perception showing the west as the primary victims of terrorist deeds and justifying their repressive counterterrorism mechanisms. This is so;

> Because of the power of the west, western interests, and the western media, the terrorism industry has been able to subtly transform rebellion and national liberation movements into terrorism and terrorists and the west's (and the western client states) attempts to contain and repress this struggles as "counterterrorism".[111]

Because of this perception and the western definition, model and focus of attention, they make it possible to engage in the most brutal forms of preventive counterinsurgency

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[109]Herman, S. E, and G. O'Sullivan, *the Terrorism Industry*, ib.id, p.18
[110] Pell E., *The Big Chill,* (Boston: Beacon press, 1984)
[111] Herman, S. E. et.al., *the Terrorism Industry*, op.cit, p.218

under the guise of "counterterrorism". The instances of people defending themselves against repressive economic policies in Brazil, Argentina, Guatemala and elsewhere in the globe were met by ruthless struggle by the US sponsored and US trained military regimes in the guise of counterterrorism. The perceptions propagate by the west on terrorism will obviously create fear and irrationality giving leaders greater freedom of action purporting to be towards the interest of the people. "The Reagan administration needed a terrorism threat tied to a foreign enemy to justify its enormous arms buildup of the early 1980s (and to destruct attention from its regressive economic and social policies)."[112]This definition and attaching a specific profile to individuals and the like, Kurds in Turkey and Iraq have been under attack by military regimes seeing thousands killed, tortured and imprisoned in counterterrorism. The worst 1976-1983 state terrorism in Argentina surpassed that of the actual terrorists where enemies became terrorists everywhere because the west said so or because of ideological bias and prejudice. "We believe that the conversion of the west into the victim of "terrorism" and its victim into the "terrorist" is, in light of the facts, an equal or greater achievement of western scholarship and journalism."[113]

Therefore, the statement by Senator Barry M. Goldwater that; "extremism in defense of liberty is no vice" holds water as the genuine Americas position. This has seen the US engage in acts that are far much worse than the terrorists themselves. Gus Martin

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[112]Herman, S. E. et al, *The Terrorism Industry,* op.cit, p.220
[113]_____, p.230

confirms that "governments have also adopted authoritarian measures to counter domestic threats from the perceived subversives. Similarly, they rationalize their behavior as a proportional response to an immediate threat."[114] In counterterrorism Hyams (1975) says that the arguments employed against the use of terrorism an any circumstance are always the same, regardless of the time and place: that since terrorists cannot have the rights possessed only by rulers of sovereign states, to wage war, are simply law criminals guilty of crimes including murder; that the use of terrorism inflicts suffering, mutilation or death of innocent people often not among the enemies of terrorists, that use of terrorism in a popular cause alienates the sympathy of the people who may have that cause at heart and finally that terrorism always fails in its objectives partly because no government will ever give way to it.[115] This last proposition is wrong in the sense that not all facts show terrorism has having failed. Governments have always rationalized when bowing to pressure on policy change saying that the changes were part of reforms long thought of and not because of terrorism.

The 9/11 terrorist attack generated a retaliatory attack many policy makers understood would be fought unconventionally primarily against shadowy terrorist cells and elusive leaders because it is not a war against a nation but against ideas and behavior. In principle counterterrorism is meant to eliminate terrorist environments and groups with a purpose of saving lives by preventing or decreasing the number of attacks. It however

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[114] Gus M., *Essentials of Terrorism,* ib.id, p.14
[115] Hyams E., *Terrorists and Terrorism,* Op.cit, p.12

beats logic when the measures used in counterterrorism are much worse than the terrorist attacks increasing casualties and generating more attacks instead of decreasing the same. Preemption presumes that direct action against terrorists or their sponsors makes everyone safer. However, it is vital to note that a heavy-handed preemption may create anger and new recruits thereby producing public bad instead of public good.(Rosendorff and Sandler 2004) The OEF was a war with intensive use of special operations forces, commandos, marines and other elite units to destroy al-Qaeda safe havens in Afghanistan while at the same time collecting intelligence intended to disrupt terrorist network around the world as well as capture or kill as many cadres as possible in the short term. They had a long term objective of degrading or destroying the operational capabilities of international terrorists. Will destroying terrorists operational capabilities succeed when other terrorist groups are continuously being formed?

In the operation El Dorado canyon of April 14,1,986 where the US bombed targets in Libya using air force bombers in great Britain and navy carrier based in the Mediterranean sea occurred at the height of tensions between the US and Libya a typical cold war reaction. In this strike, more than 100 Libyans' were killed in Benghazi and Tripoli including Qaddafi's young adopted daughter. Though the US considered it a success, the events over the next decade proved otherwise. This air strike was unpopular in Europe triggering demonstration in several countries expressing outrage and at the same time, terrorists in Beirut murdered one American and two British hostages in retaliation. It should however be noted that the French and Spanish governments refused

to allow the bombers to fly over their airspace because they disapproved the airstrike. This has shown the difficulty of dealing with state sponsors of terrorism, a fact the west has clearly seen through the years. People who are directly or indirectly affected by the bombing will eventually retaliate in revenge whether in Iraq, Afghanistan or currently in Libya.

Terrorism has always concentrated on three pertinent themes; the historical context, the problem of definition, and how to deal with it. The historical context will take us to the cause and effect. Historical reference shows that terrorism has been regarded as an outgrowth of western domination. The problem of definition brings to the fore the means and ends. What end justifies the means? The final one on how to deal with the terrorists brings us back to the definition. The problem of definition is vital to be precise since it will dictate the means we choose to deal with it. If we accept that a good cause justifies bad means, we also have to recognize, that the established system in its good cause against the terrorist attacks has a wide superiority of means at its disposal. This definition fits what most western governments use to justify their repressive counterterrorism mechanisms. Therefore if the way to deal with the menace involves the government using counterterrorism measures more repressive than the actual terrorism incidences, will it decrease or increase terror incidences? The question to ponder may squarely lie on the COIN doctrine used in Afghanistan by the US and allied forces. Are the counterinsurgency doctrine fit for the purposes they were being used in Afghanistan? What are the possible effects of the current war in Afghanistan on international security?

## 4.3 The COIN Doctrine: Lessons from History

The Afghan situation is such that foreign presence is taken with lots of suspicion. Therefore, the strategy to be taken in the fight on terror should be one that will not necessarily incense the general populace but should be efficient in fulfilling the task at hand. Commenting on the type of wars encountered in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, Callwell said over a century ago that;

> With the capture of the capital, any approach to organized resistance under the direct control of the head of state, will always almost cease; but it does not by any means follow that the conflict is at an end..... [T]he French experiences in Algeria, and the British experience in Afghanistan, show that these irregular protracted, indefinite operations offer often far greater difficulties to the regular armies than the attainment of their original military objective.[116]

Understanding the kind and character of the continuous wars in Afghanistan is vital in developing a military and political policy as well as its likely impact on international security in general. Though the initial combat phase in Afghanistan ended in 2002, the war is still dragging on almost a decade on. Many of the modern wars fit quite well to the general description of colonial conflicts offered by Major C.E Callwell of the royal artillery in 1899 in his manual small wars. The British army was involved in two major military campaigns in Afghanistan, 1839-42 and 1878-80. The first war intended to assist

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[116] Callwell C.E, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice 5<sup>th</sup> edition.*, (1989) as quoted in Schmitt, M.N., *The War in Afghanistan; A Legal Analysis (eds.),* (Newport, Rhodes island: Naval War College, 2009)

a weak leader ended in a disaster wiping out a reduced garrison as it struggled back to

Khyber Pass. The second war was also no exception, ending with installation of a suitable

"warlord" as head of state. It may be these events that could best be used to analyze the

historical foundation of Afghanistan and how best this can provide lessons on the most

effective way of dealing with the Afghan situations without further mistakes. Mistakes

are being repeated because of ignoring historical facts, sentiments echoed by Loyn saying

that "the United States and Britain have failed to understand the extent of resistance in

Afghanistan to anything that looks like foreign control. It follows that it is necessary for

the outsiders to accept a very limited role and to negotiate with the Taliban."[117] Paul

Wolfowitz said in November 2001 that; "In fact, one of the lessons of Afghanistan's

history, which we've tried to apply in this campaign, is if you are a foreigner, try not to

go in. If you go in, don't stay too long, because they don't tend to like any foreigners who

stay too long."[118] These statements may be an acknowledgement of the popular position

with regard to the Afghan situation. Notwithstanding this understanding, the US has

continued to stay in Afghanistan for a long time sparking renewed violence. The US

army field manual FM 3-24[119] relies heavily on the works of David Galula's[120]

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[117] Loyn, D., *Butcher and Bolt: Two hundred years of Foreign Engagement in Afghanistan,* (2008).

[118] Interview of Paul Wolfowitz, US Deputy Secretary of Defense, on Face the Nation,(November 18, 2001) transcript available at http://usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/peace/archives/2001/november/111840.html.

[119] COIN doctrine (US army field manual 3-24(FM 3-24) document, (headquarters, Department of the Army and headquarters, marine corps combat development command, FM 3-24/MCPW 3-33.5, counterinsurgency (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf [hereinafter US army field manual 3- 24]

counterinsurgency warfare and Sir Robert Thomson's defeating communist insurgency. Both works placed emphasis on protecting the population as distinct from killing adversaries which require high force levels. It also aspires to prepare the army and marines for COIN operations everywhere in the world oblivious of the uniqueness of every insurgency. Many authors content that the application of principles and fundamentals of COIN varies with the circumstances which vary considerably. The force ratio of 20:1000 of counterinsurgents per residents is a practical impossibility in Afghanistan. With a population of approximately 29,835,392[121] million, it will require approximately 600,000 counterinsurgent forces in the minimum, a figure that is practically impossible.

The 1950's successful COIN campaign in Malaya has often been held as a model. The communist-led insurgents were defeated through promises of withdrawal. However, attempts to replicate the success elsewhere ended without success. One lesson that could be drawn from the Malaya case is that it is sometimes necessary to withdraw to win. It's the UK promise to withdraw completely followed by the federation of Malaya's independence in 1957 that contributed to the defeat of the insurgency in Malaya. Such lessons may be the reason of the promises of complete withdrawal by the US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The November 16, 2008 decision reached by the Iraqi cabinet that

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[120] Galula, D., *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice,* (1964). His works were published in 2008. As quoted in M. N. Schmitt (eds.), the war in Afghanistan: A Legal Analysis, op cit.
[121] July 2011 estimate. Note that this figure was significantly revised from the previous figure of 33,609,937. See the CIA website available at www.cia.gov/.../af.html last update on July 14, 2011

the guarantee of withdrawal was seen as a necessary condition of ending the acute phase of insurgency has shown the importance attached to such promises. It has shown that withdrawal is not perceived as a sign of defeat but a necessary ingredient in the ending of conflict. This withdrawal plan by the US with regard to the Iraqi situation shows that indeed it works because there was a reduction of violence during that material year. In Afghanistan, a similar strategy has been used with the first batch of about 650 US army troops deployed North West of the capital in the province of Parwan flown out on July 13, 2011 not to be replaced by an incoming force. The US army press officer confirmed that this was kicking off a gradual withdrawal due to be completed in 2014. However, "the speed of withdrawal has been heavily criticized in Washington-liberals wanted more, republican hawks complained it was too fast and top pentagon officials felt snubbed for having much of their advice overruled."[122] Both the top US commander in Afghanistan, general David Petraeus, and Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff criticized the withdrawal plan as more aggressive than they had recommended. Visiting Afghanistan for the first time since taking up his job, the US defense secretary Leon Panetta has clarified his focus on handing over the security responsibility to the Afghan forces by 2014.

Though there are a few references to justice in FM 3-24, it doesn't foresee the challenges posed by insurgents because they always use their own judicial procedures to

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[122] Afghan pullout, first American troops leave Kabul as drawdown begins in *Saturday nation*, Nairobi, July 16, 2011, p. 36

reinforce their claims and preserve the existing social order if not create a better one.[123]

The Taliban for example has always placed emphasis on a system of Islamic justice effectively controlling parts of Afghanistan due to the weak and corrupt government of Hamid Karzai. The lack of serious coverage of systems of justice employed by the insurgents has been a big weakness of the manual and brings a big challenge to the counterinsurgent force. The US COIN efforts in Vietnam and Iraq have also had a similar weakness undermining the effectiveness of the manual because of inherent problems unforeseen. Stephen Biddle of the US council on foreign relations queried the manuals fundamental assumptions when he said that;

> It is far from clear that the manuals central prescription of drying up an insurgents support base by persuading an uncommitted population to side with the government makes much sense in an identity war where the governments ethnic or sectarian identification means that it will be seen as an existential threat to the security of the rival internal group, and where there may be little or no supra communal, national identity to counter pose to the sub national identities over which the war is waged by the time the United States become involved.[124]

In adopting the people's war model, the manual assumes that the population interacts with either the government or the insurgents. This fact leads them to conclude that if they are removed from the equation the people will move close to the government. Other

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[123] Schmitt, M. N. (eds.), *the War in Afghanistan: A Legal Analysis,* op.cit
[124] Roberts, A., 'Afghanistan and International Security' in M. N. Schmitt (eds.), *the War in Afghanistan: A Legal Analysis,* op.cit, p.26

notable weaknesses of the manual is failure to say more on comparative merits between waging a COIN with large conventional forces against a small commando detachments, neither did they on relative utility of airpower on COIN or the willingness by the governments to support COIN over long periods. Some options have however come up to reinforce the weak points of the manual; negotiations of local ceasefires between the commandos in Iraq have played a key part in the counterinsurgency and that such local ceasefires don't come from the COIN doctrine. These ceasefires and negotiations have been options being advocated by policy makers as lasting solutions to the war in Afghanistan. Negotiations with the Taliban and a well balanced representation in the government without backing ethnic stereotypes.

The conflict in Afghanistan has always shown signs of ending only to rekindle moments after. The Taliban victory of September 1996 and the victories of northern alliance on December 2001 are moment's conflict was viewed as having ended only to continue in new forms. The insurgency in Afghanistan however began rather slowly with a growing resistance in south Afghanistan for the new regime, a factor that delayed its seriousness for some time. In a way the foreign presence has contributed to the propaganda of the Taliban making them successful in their renewed struggle. Roy Steward, who walked across Afghanistan in 2002 and later retired to run a charitable organization, is very critical about force increase arguing that;

> A troop increase is likely to inflame Afghan nationalism because Afghans are more anti-foreign than we acknowledge and support for our presence in the

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insurgency areas is declining. The Taliban, which was largely discredited and backward movement, gains support by portraying itself as fighting for Islam and Afghanistan against foreign occupation.[125]

Though they label this resistance as Taliban insurgency, there is a possibility source of support for the insurgency may be more numerous or the ideology of the Taliban had evolved. Though labeled the Taliban Ahmed Rashid says they should not only be seen as heroic patriots or Pushtun traditionalists saying that;

> The united states and NATO have failed to understand the Taliban belong to neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan, but are lumped population, the product of refugee 'camps', militarized madrassas, and the lack of opportunities in the borderland of Pakistan and Afghanistan. They have neither been true citizens of either county or experienced traditional Pushtun tribal society. The longer the war goes on, the more deeply rooted and widespread the Taliban and their transnational milieu will become.[126]

In this case therefore, the war in Afghanistan has assisted and continues to assist the rise and proliferation of Islamic militants around the globe, a recipe for increased global terrorism. In his journal on international terrorism as internationalized civil war, Mike

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[125] Steward R., *How to save Afghanistan*, Time, June 17, 2008, 30

[126] Rashid, A., 'Descend into Chaos: How the War against Islamic Extremism is being lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia' (2008) p.401, as quoted in M. N. Schmitt (eds.), *the War in Afghanistan: A Legal Analysis*, (Newport, Rhodes island: Naval War College, 2009)

Ryckman[127] says that findings suggest terrorism disproportionately arises from states with civil wars. He further says that many organizations identified for international terrorism are often also participants in civil wars. In the case of Afghanistan, the Taliban and the northern alliance has been involved in civil war that lasted over a decade before the entry of the US and allied forces as well as the NATO forces. Though international terrorism is often thought to follow an international/global agenda, it is necessary to get a link in relation to internal wars or domestic strive. Therefore we can say that terrorism has been erroneously modeled in a manner that misses the political connections between the states involved. These connections may for example be attacks intended to discourage a foreign actor from interfering from a local issue, stop a foreign actor from continuous interference or draw foreign actor into conflict. In this case therefore international terrorism activities occur because the terror group believes their local goals will be achieved through violence targeted at an international actor whether directly or indirectly. Though it may be controversial, this is true to some certain extend considering terrorist target selection process. The IRA, PKK, and LTTE and other numerous groups appear both in civil war as well as international terrorism. The inference of this means there is a relationship between civil war and terrorism and that a country with civil war increases the risk of terrorism to all other states. This is also true of Somalia's nearly twenty years civil war that has successfully produced a deadly international terrorist network- the al-

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[127] Ryckman M., *International Terrorism as Internationalized Civil War,* Source: school of government and policy, university of Arizona.

Shabaab- which came about because of the same factor. However, this may take us back to the controversial issue of the definition of terrorism. Political, ideological and social concerns that bedevil the quest for a universal definition may not rank all the groups on civil war as terror organizations.

The third world countries during the struggle for independence raised the issue on the selective definition of terrorism to include liberation struggles and revolutions. The recently witnessed inauguration of the new state of South Sudan came about because of a spirited struggle of the Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA) once designated as a terrorist organization. Perhaps we may say that the end justifies the means if the fruits of their hard labor were celebrated with much pomp and decorum even earning the recognition by the US and other powerful western powers.

## 4.4 Terrorism Incidences in Post-September 11, 2001

In an overview of the terrorism incidences directly attributable to the al-Qaeda alone in the period two and a half years before and after 9/11, the congressional research service on March 31, 2004 memorandum written by Audrey Kurth to the house government reform committee sought to analyze these attacks.[128] They however realized that though the attacks may occur, to attribute it to the al-Qaeda is often difficult because it may have been committed by other groups who may want to identify with the al-Qaeda or associate with their goals or ideology even if there is no direct link. Grant says that

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[128] Kurth A., Memorandum to the House Government Reform Committee, Congressional Research Service, March 31, 2004

"terrorism is now an export industry. Not only is one group 'inspired' by the activities or ideas of another, there is a complex interrelationship of training, logistical support, personnel, and operations between them."[129] Though at time they may think an attack may be linked to al-Qaeda, there is no proof to ascertain the attribute. They collected data from the department of state to conform with the definition attached to terrorism and terror attacks. In their findings before September 11, four terrorist attacks were listed by the department of state as attributable to al-Qaeda.

During the two and a half years before 9/11, apart from the October 12, 2000 attack on USS Cole in port Aden Yemen-which according to the definition may not fit to be considered a terrorist attack because the victims were soldiers-no other terror attacks is attributable to al-Qaeda. Two and half years after 9/11, there were approximately ten terrorist attacks attributable to the al-Qaeda (not including any al-Qaeda associated operations in Iraq).[130] Comparisons of the findings show that there was a huge increase of terrorism incidences in the period after 9/11 by the al-Qaeda alone. If we assume that the terror attack on USS Cole is counted as a terrorist attack by the al-Qaeda, it shows there was an increase of approximately ten times more than the previous two and half years before 9/11. This shows there is a general increase in terrorism incidences either due to the counterterrorism efforts seen in the post September 11, 2001 period or that terrorism

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[129] Grant W., *Political Terrorism,* op.cit, p.31
[130] US Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002* (Washington, DC: U.S Government Printing Office, April, 2003) pp. 118-119, also accessible at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls

has had an unprecedented attraction never before experienced. According to RAND-MIPT, terrorism has grown worse not better since 9/11. Since September 11, al-Qaeda has directed, financed, or played a role in 30 fatal operations in 12 countries causing 2500 casualties including 440 deaths.[131]

The UN secretary general report states that the number of security incidents rose to 983 in August 2008, the highest since the fall of the Taliban in 2001 and represents 44% increase compared to the same month in 2007 alone.[132] The counterinsurgent fatalities have also increased each year from 57 in 2003 to 296 in 2008.[133] A combination of high ground forces and overwhelming airpower has become a dominant doctrine of the war for the US in Afghanistan. A human rights watch observes that;

> As a result of the OEF and ISAF airstrikes in 2006, 116 afghan casualties were killed in 13 bombings. In 2007, afghan civilian deaths were nearly three times higher. 321 afghan civilians were killed in 22 bombings, while hundreds more injured. In 2007, more afghan civilians were killed by airstrikes than US and NATO ground fire. In the first seven months of 2008, the latest period for which data is available, at least 119 afghan civilians were killed in 12 airstrikes.[134]

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[131] MIPT, Terrorism knowledge base (Oklahoma city, OK: National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, 2006)

[132] The secretary general, report of the secretary general on the situation in Afghanistan and its implication on international peace and security, 2, UN.DOC A/63/372,s/2008/617 (September 23, 2008)

[133] Casualties for the coalition forces in Afghanistan on http://icasualties.org/oef/jan 11.2009

[134] Human rights watch, Troops in Contact. Airstrikes and Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan (2008) 2 available at http://hrw.org/reports/2008/afghanistan0908/index.htm

In the remaining period of 2008, 33 civilians were killed in a single airstrike on August 22, 2008 making the total number of deaths in that year to 152. This raised an outcry in Afghanistan with Karzai who always supported the US-led coalition condemning the airstrikes. In a statistical analysis of the events from 2005 to 2009 in the 2009 country reports on terrorism, the following findings were brought forward by the NCTC annex statistics on august 5, 2010;

Table 2: Number of attacks worldwide from 2005 to 2009

| YEAR | No. of incidents worldwide | Number of people killed | Number of people injured | Number of people kidnapped |
|------|----------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|
| 2005 | 11,023 | 14,482 | 24,795 | 35,050 |
| 2006 | 14,443 | 20,515 | 38,314 | 15,787 |
| 2007 | 14,434 | 22,736 | 44,139 | 4,981 |
| 2008 | 11,725 | 15,727 | 34,057 | 4,869 |
| 2009 | 10,999 | 14,971 | 34,057 | 4,869 |

Source: The country reports on terrorism 2009, released on August 5, 2010 online edition which can be accessed on www.nctc.gov

The year 2005 recorded the highest number of kidnapping while the 2007 had the highest number of killed and injured people. Apart from the increase of the number of attacks in 2006 and 2007, the number of attacks recorded in 2005 and 2008 are almost at par. This may be attributed to the reduction of violence in Iraq. However the number of incidents

experienced in Afghanistan has gradually rose since 2005 to 2009 as illustrated in the table below;

Table 3: Number of attacks in Afghanistan alone from 2005 to 2009

| Year | Number of incidents | Number of people killed, injured or kidnapped |
|------|---------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| 2005 | 494 | 1,557 |
| 2006 | 962 | 3,532 |
| 2007 | 1,124 | 4,657 |
| 2008 | 1,222 | 5,430 |
| 2009 | 2,126 | 7,584 |

Source: the country reports on terrorism 2009, released on august 5, 2010 online edition which can be accessed on www.nctc.gov.

Of the worldwide number of incidents in 2009, the number of incidents in Afghanistan alone accounted for 19.33 percent of the total incidents. Similarly, the frequency of terrorism occurrences in Afghanistan in 2009 is four times that of 2005. There has been a gradual increase in the terrorism incidents in Afghanistan over the years because there has been increase in violence. Attacks in Afghanistan nearly doubled from 2008 and increased in Pakistan for the third consecutive year. The sunni extremists were identified in about half of all attacks in 2009. Though almost 90 groups were associated with the attacks, the Taliban claimed credit for most attacks. Most of the attacks

employed conventional methods of armed attacks, bombings and kidnappings. Suicide attacks declined from 405 in 2008 to 299 in 2009 largely due to decline in violence in Iraq. Afghanistan had the highest number suicide attacks at 99 followed by Pakistan with 84 and Iraq 82. These three countries account for about 60% of all the terrorist attacks in 2009. Most of the suicide attacks were by the sunni extremists. Police officers were the most favored terrorist target accounting for 14% of the total killed and wounded in 2009. The al-shabaab al- Islamia (Muslim youth movement) was the group with the highest total claimed attacks according to the report but was the second deadliest group. As was the case in 2007, attacks in 2008 were perpetuated using conventional fighting methods such as armed attacks, bombings and kidnappings. Terrorists continued to practice coordinated attacks that included secondary attacks on first responders at attack sites and also continued to reconfigure weapons to create improvised explosive devices (IEDs). According to the 2008 report on terrorism, the Taliban more than any other group claimed credit for the largest number of attacks and highest fatality totals. Suicide attacks declined from 525 in 2007 to 404 in 2008 with attacks in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan accounting for 55% of attacks. The number of attacks decreased in 2007 by 2700 or 18% compared to 2007, while the deaths decreased by 6,700 or 30%. The year 2008 witnessed an attack by an American suicide bomber in Somalia. According to this report released on March 20, 2009 well over 50% of the victims were Muslims mostly victims of attack in Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Despite the above scenario, how can we judge progress in the ongoing war and what could be the parameters to use?

Basing our argument on the data above, it's evident that terrorism has actually increased and that the current war on terrorism has done little in eradicating terrorism. It should however be noted that since the GWOT began, the operational capacity of al-Qaeda has been degraded. Most leaders of al-Qaeda have been killed in the Afghan war while others have been captured like Abu Zubaydah, abu Musab al-Zargawi, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Despite this the organization still continues to function albeit in a more decentralized form. Due to bin Laden's death, Ayman al-Zawahiri continues to lead the organization and terrorism still thrives and poses danger to the United States and their allies.

According to the UN high commissioner for refugees (UNHCR) between January, 2002 and December 31st 2007, a total of 4,997,455 refugees returned to Afghanistan. This accounts for the largest return in the world generation because even in 2006, 2007, and 2008 years of considerable conflict saw returnees though at a reduced rate. The table below illustrates the return of refugees to Afghanistan demonstrating a clear show of progress;

Table 4: Refugee returnees to Afghanistan between Jan 2002-Dec 31st 2007

| YEAR | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NUMBER OF RETURNEES | 1,957,958 | 645,804 | 879,780 | 752,084 | 387,917 | 373,852 |

Information from UNHCR sources; UN refugee agency, statistical yearbook 2006: trends in displacement, protection and solutions 36 (2008); UN refugee agency, 2007 global trends: Refugees, asylum-seekers, returnees, internally displaced and stateless persons 8-9(2008); and UNHCR statistical online population database, http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/45c063a82.html.

Majority of those who returned were from Iran 1.6 million and Pakistan 3.3 million. It's vital to note that despite those returns, Afghan refugees at that period still constituted 27% of the entire global refugee population. Though this may be an important sign of progress, it should be noted that not all the refugees were voluntary returnees because there was pressure on them to return including the closure of camps. There has been a steady decline of returnees from 2002 to 2007 showing the escalation of violence and terrorism incidences following the retaliatory attacks by the Taliban in Afghanistan.

**4.5 Foreign Terrorist Organizations and State Sponsors of Terrorism**

The US department of state lists 28 foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) in 2001 including al-Qaeda. In 2004, this number had however increased to 40 terrorist organizations, representing a 60% increase. Foreign terrorist organizations is designated by the secretary of state in an effort to assist in the fight against terrorism and are also an

115

effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities and also pressuring groups to get out of terrorism business. The US law requires the secretary of state to provide congress, by April of each year, a full and complete report on terrorism with regard to those countries and groups meeting criteria set forth in the legislation. These reports entitled the country reports on terrorism beginning with reports for 2004 which replaces the previous published patterns of global terrorism are intended to stigmatize and isolate terrorist organizations internationally as well deter donations, or contributions to end economic transactions with named terrorist organizations. The designation also heightens the public awareness and knowledge of terrorist organizations while at the same time signaling other governments of the US concerns about the named terrorist organizations. While this may be a noble idea, the designation of terrorist organizations are not systematic or with fool proof criteria that is universal in character but only according to perceived US criteria and conformity with the definition they attach terrorism. It's vital to note that the US has three different definitions on terrorism that affects their classification of FTOs.

The FBI defines terrorism as the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. The US department of defense on the other hand defines terrorism as the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies as to the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological. The US state

department responsible for designating FTOs defines terrorism as a premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetuated against non combatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence the audience. These foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) are continuously revised each year and by 2010, the office of the coordinator for counterterrorism on May 19, 2011 designated the following terrorist organizations in their database;

Table 5: The current list of the designated foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs)[135]

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
Al-Agsa Martyrs brigade (AAMS)
Al-Shabaab
Ansar al-Islam (AAI)
Asbat al-Ansar
Aum Shinrikyo (AUM)
Basque fatherland and liberty (ETA)
Communist party of the Philippines/ new people's army (CPP/NPA)
Continuity Irish republican army (CIRA)
Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic group)
HAMAS (Islamic resistance movement)
Harakat Ul-Mujahidin (HUM)
Hizballah (Party of God)
 Islamic jihad union (IJU)
Islamic movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) (Army of Mohammed)
Jemaah Islamiya organization (JI)
Kahane chai (Kach)
Kata'ib Hizballah (KH)
Kongra-Gel (KGK, formerly Kurdish workers party, PKK, KADEK)
Lashkar I jhangvi (LJ)
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
Libya Islamic fighting group (LIFG)

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[135] Country Reports on Terrorism, Online source on www.state.gov>....>other releases

Moroccan Islamic combatant group (GICM)
Mujahedin-e khalq organization (MEK)
National liberation army (ELN)
Palestine liberation front (PLF)
Palestinian Islamic jihad (PIJ)
Popular front for the liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
PFLP-General command (PFLP-GC)
Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI)
Al-Qaida (AQ)
Al-Qaida in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (formerly GCPC)
Real IRA (RIRA)
Revolutionary armed forces of Columbia (FARC)
Revolutionary organization 17 November (17N0
Revolutionary peoples liberation party/front (DHKP/C)
Revolutionary struggle (RS)
Shining path (Sendero luminoso, SL)
United self-defense forces of Columbia (AUC)
Harakat-UL jihad Islami (HUJI)
Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
Jundallah
Army of Islam

Taking the year 2001 as the baseline number of terrorist organizations, there has been an increase from 28 to 48 foreign terrorist organizations. This represents an increase of more than 71 percent. Currently the US department of state has four countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism; Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria.[136] Tough some countries have been designated as sponsors of terrorism in the past have been removed; some still remain for a long time. State sponsored terrorism makes it possible to motivate terrorists within that environment. They will also access substantial resources to use and in censorship of liberal ideas. This will also see the rise in status of terror leaders who will

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[136] State Sponsors of Terrorism available at www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm

aid them in recruitment and financing terrorists. The table below shows the current state sponsors of terrorism and the years they were designated.

Table 6: State sponsors of terrorism and the date of designation

| COUNTRY | DATE DESIGNATED |
|---------|-----------------|
| CUBA | MARCH 1, 1982 |
| IRAN | JANUARY 19, 1984 |
| SUDAN | AUGUST 12, 1993 |
| SYRIA | DECEMBER 29, 1979 |

Source: online sources on state sponsors of terrorism can be accessed on www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm

Though the US designates the four countries as existing state sponsors of terrorism, other countries have generally been acknowledged are Iraq, Lebanon and Libya.[137] According to the tabulated data on sponsors of terrorism, Syria is the longest designated sponsor of terrorism with Sudan being the latest entrant.

## 4.6 Consequences of the GWOT in Afghanistan

With the events of September 11, 2011, a worldwide consensus emerged on how the terror threat should be tackled as a priority of international peace and security. Though a clear definition is still elusive and tainted by self serving perceptions, over the years, some essential ingredients of the concept have emerged and gained somewhat greater acceptance. Terrorism is often seen as premeditated effort to spread fear and

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[137] Whittaker, J. D., *the Terrorism Reader,* op.cit, p. 38

anxiety in order to achieve political goals. (Jenkins, 1975, Hoffman, 1998, Wilkinson, 2000) That the actual target or audience meant to be wider than the immediate victims of violence. (Schmid and Jongman, 1988)

This consensus on the definition of terrorism will prompt us to ask; how is it possible to find a military solution to a political-cultural problem? Though the war on terrorism has gained legitimacy and justification among the international community with nation states considering it to be their obligation to support the movement for security, it has become a source of pressure to rebel states who regard it as a threat to their system and go ahead to question the current international system. Attaching a specific profile has limited travel to those nationalities perceived as terrorists apart from being subjected to rigorous security procedures. The security in the airports has been heightened and this translates to a high cost in internal security among other visible consequence of increased terrorism due to the global war on terror. Being a global hegemon and a major victim and target of terrorism, the United States of America has come to dominate the scene by abolishing terrorism through prioritizing democratization process. The result of this quest of liberation and democratization of the Middle East Countries is intensification of ethnic and religious factionalism providing a breeding ground for terrorism activities. Afghans have become frustrated and disappointed by the efforts by the international community to fill in the power vacuum in the country. The loss of confidence in the power of the government has worked as a driving force for more skirmishes. The reality is that the effort of democratization has turned more chaotic and counterproductive in the

endeavor of fighting terrorism. In fact; "the divergence between stability and democratization comprehensively demonstrates itself here. Ironically, in the current Middle East any efforts towards democratization equals instability and instability equals increased terrorist activities."[138] The situation in Pakistan in the period before the GWOT was such that it was relatively stable with only a small number of terrorist attacks. This situation has since changed and terrorism incidences are almost at par with that of Iraq and Afghanistan making the government weak and in the brink of collapse. The reality for the Middle East which has worked well in the past is to safeguard the system, to create a calm regional environment in which democratic change can occur. Such change can only occur if it comes from the communities within the society.

The cost of the war on terror is way high, money that could be used to improve the American economy, healthcare system, schools and universities as well as infrastructure. This may be the biggest financial and military disaster to America since the civil war. Besides the enormous expenditure it has left America highly indebted to China making them becomes more powerful than anticipated. The collapse of the Soviet Union according to experts was interpreted to be the costly, failed ten year invasion of Afghanistan or it played a major part in that collapse. Failing to clearly comprehend the cultures, languages and histories of the places they are in war is a contributing factor to the inherent loss in war. The Clausewitzian principle that war is a continuation of politics

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[138] Kayhan, B., *the Middle East and the 'New Terrorism'*. ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs, Vol. I, No. 2, (2005) p.120

by another means has totally been forgotten in Iraq, Afghanistan and now Libya. Never realizing the military and political objectives of the Taliban was the reason that made the struggle in Afghanistan lack in insight.

> Is the objective the unconditional surrender of the enemy, as it was in the world war two? Or a ceasefire along a border, as it was in the Korean War? Or containment of the enemy, as it was in the cold war? Or is it something else? No one knew because the managers of the GWOT were never clear about the final objective of the war were, or what the metrics of victory would look like.[139]

The overreliance on military personnel and military means hindered progress on the ground. Though the American forces are beginning a gradual withdrawal of troops, the Afghan police are least prepared to fight the Taliban calling for a political settlement in Afghanistan as a foreseeable remedy to the current war. The GWOT has severely weakened NATO and a slow but increasingly certain disintegration of Pakistan. A collapsed Pakistan is disaster in the making because they are a nuclear power and will be a deadly sanctuary for al-Qaeda than Afghanistan or Iraq. Attacks in Afghanistan inflicts casualties to civilians and provoking potential groups of anti-western militants angered by what they see as an attack against Islam in the other parts of the Muslim world.

The situation in Afghanistan has clearly deteriorated impacting negatively on international security. The change of the statistics on terrorism beginning 2004 by the

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[139] Flemming, B., *Farewell to the GWOT: What we Learned From the Global War on Terror,* (Calgary: Canadian Defense & Foreign Affairs Institute, September, 2011), p.2 also available on www.cdfai.org

NCTC was a clear testimony of their intention of showing the world how they have successfully fought the war on terror with success. However, the reality is that they have conveniently reduced the number of terror incidents reported because they want to depict a reduced terrorism occurrence since the GWOT began to justify their actions. They do this using the definitions they attach terrorism clearly leaving some terror incidence because they are not in tandem with the definition. Notwithstanding that scenario, according to the limited statistical reports, it clearly shows that terrorism has increased instead of reducing.

# CHAPTER FIVE

## CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It is said that in one way or the other, no question of moral justification arises about violence. In fact there is no act of terrorism that is justified by the causes it stands for. Besides condemning terrorism and a blanket war on terrorism, we should first consider in-depth inquiry what constitutes terrorism, who is a terrorist and which actions should constitute acceptable standards of counterterrorism. If we work by the same set of parameters, terrorism is an act which is unacceptable in society and should be condemned by all possible means. The counterterrorism measures taken should be more responsive to the issue not aggravating the menace.

Violent instruments of foreign policy have sometimes achieved the desired objectives however in certain circumstances it has not been successful. The threat of use of force has not succeeded in some instances and in such a scenario the actual force in terms of war has been the next approach. Not carrying out the threats creates an image of weakness and emboldens the opponents. Military action too is a very expensive venture while the result is uncertain. It has cost billions of dollars, lead to loss of lives to combatants and collateral damage. Properties destroyed too are enormous and will take time and money to rebuild. In the present setting military force and economic sanctions have become more expensive to implement and less effective instruments of foreign policy. The war in Iraq ended the combat phase in 1991, but US forces are still there and

the current situation on the verge of renewed war. Powerful states are utilizing both diplomacy and strength in pursuit of their national interests since the different instruments have varying success rates. Therefore the political class should utilize the various elements of power prudently and flexibly for more effectiveness of the grand strategy designed for the country. Power is an instrument not achieved easily and its use is of utmost importance to those who have it. Those diplomats vested with the responsibility of advising their government on the proper policies should analyze the international system and correctly make favorable predictions on the perceived threats and those areas of great utility.

Assuming governments grasp the limitations of coercive methods, they will develop alternative measures. Conciliatory options provide long term solutions for future extremism. These are peace processes, negotiations and social reforms. In the past though, these methods were used with some degree of coercion should the method fail. This is a pragmatic consideration that is likely to continue into the contemporary era. The use of the COIN doctrine in the Afghan situation may not have been a prudent choice for the fight against terror. Covert operations have proven to be the most efficient when dealing with a diversified transnational network. Avoid generalizing the use of all instruments of power even in situations where the local government does not have sound elements of power at its disposal. In Afghanistan local ways of judicial systems and custom will succeed more than the western model the more reason to be wary of the Taliban local outreach in terms of recruitment and intelligence. The extension of the

mandate of the NATO forces has also aggravated the problem further degenerating to more violence. But of most importance is for the US to realize that the Afghan problem lies in the dislike of foreign presence and take steps to pull out as soon as possible. The troop increases in 2009 has even worsened the situation a testimony is the number of terrorism attacks during the year. Emphasis on the local social structure like community outreach programs and community guard and generally showing a less state based approach than before is a change of tact in the effort at improving community participation by the US and the Afghan government. This is designed to extend the reach of the central government and also rural security presence. The change of government in both Pakistan and the US in 2008 and 2009 respectively, was thought to be a pointer to the consideration of a change to alternative policies. The decision by the Obama administration to increase troop levels to address the problem of the growth of insurgents and recognizing the Pakistani dimension in the GWOT was a result. Though pressure for negotiations is strong, refusal to consider this cause of action could have adverse effects in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. In the Pakistani side, efforts should be geared towards a long term policy for the establishment of a government presence in the FATA and a joint approach in addressing the Taliban and al-Qaeda presence.

Leadership and international cooperation is essential but it is imperative to harmonize divergent views on causes and responses to terrorism. If terrorism is caused by political course for example, the answer would be democracy in the long term. If the 9/11 attack was caused by the US Middle East policies, response should involve a review of

126

those policies as well as public diplomacy. If a backlash on globalization efforts should be geared at addressing anti-globalization sentiments and its roots. Address economic impacts of globalization like effectiveness of development banks to raise standards of living and at the same time opening up societies for commerce and investment. This is intended to appease the losers of globalization through targeting trade preferences, securing public health and other meaningful transformation. Culturally, there is need to promote multicultural education, cultural exchanges with a long term objective of intercultural tolerance. This holistic approach is a sure recipe for a more functional approach to issues of terrorism. Issue linkages and cooperative efforts in a world more interlinked would surely offer a more functional strategy.

However, removing all the grievances, poverty, inequality, lack of political participation will not cure terrorism. There will always be grievances given the imperfect nature of mankind and the changing needs. There will always be social and political conditions in society at one time or the other that will be a source of grievance to terrorists. A comprehensive approach to terrorism needs all actors globally to build reciprocal interests in conducting the current war and meeting future challenges with a mutual coherence. All parties should have a uniform view of terrorism and efforts geared towards an international counterterrorism strategy. This combines building consensus on the broad underlying conditions of terrorism and factors associated in their complex, multifaceted relations. However, because of the uniqueness of each case despite superficial similarities in tactics, we have to devise solutions unique to each case unlike

the practice of solutions applicable to all cases. This may be so because despite the perceived similarities, each case should be taken with its setting in mind and conditions therein. The superimposition of the COIN doctrine in Iraq and Afghanistan in the initial universal form has brought with it challenges unforeseen. States with civil war that have homegrown terrorist organizations should be analyzed with a view of attaching their causes to local political connection. It's also futile to condemn international terrorism while at the same time encouraging western countries to execute the fight on terror at a much larger scale. These efforts should be redesigned with the proper measure of counterterrorism in mind that will not lead to more terror incidents like the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. Though some of the changes in policies may seem a success for the terrorist group, efforts should be made to deal with situations progressively without fear or favors.

Cooperation through coordination and information sharing has succeeded in creating a less permissive operating environment for terrorists while at the same time avoiding actions that will motivate terrorists and provoke sectarian violence. However, these cooperative efforts have been hampered by the presence of state sponsors of terrorism. Any action like the killing of innocent civilians will generate a source of information exploited for propaganda and drawing the masses to their course. Though it may be hard to deny that there are some individuals who enjoy the practice of terrorism for its own sake, most often than not, terrorism is used as a means to an end. The laws that should be put in place should be genuinely meant to counter terrorism not serving the

interests of the ruling class. Since there is no connection between law and justice, law is a compromise of justice and injustice. When law is imposed by force, there will be injustice and toleration of injustice varies from one society to the other. It is in law that social injustice is embedded and by law it is sanctioned.[140] Therefore according to Hyams, terrorism cannot be eliminated except by pre-emptive and sustained counterterrorism or reduced by progressive liberalization of laws in favor of more generous social justice. One consolation he gives is that terrorism is usually self reducing in nature.

In conclusion terrorism is here to stay, what is only realistic for government is to strive to contain it. Counterterrorism efforts should be tireless, progressive and innovative to develop in pace with that of the terrorists. Though the US has taken steps in the fight on terrorism, its objectives should be similar with those of its allies and should be genuinely tailored at curtailing the progress of the menace. The COIN doctrine with its weaknesses should be revised and aligned to the circumstances prevailing in each situation. The counterterrorism mechanism employed should be tailored in a way that will be responsive in its objective. Its however undeniable that whatever counterterrorism mechanism, just like the military counterterrorism strategies utilized are not adequate to stamp out terrorism but plays a critical part towards the ultimate objective.

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[140] Hyams, E., *Terrorists and Terrorism,* op. cit, p.185

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