

THE ROLE OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN ETHNO-IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICTS

IN SOMALIA, 1991 - 2010

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DECLARATION

This research project is my own original work and has not been presented to any other University.



Mohamed Shale Billow

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Date

This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as a University supervisor.



Dr. Anita Kiamba

Date

DEDICATION:

To my parents SHALE BILLOW and HABIBA EDOW.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Declaration.....	ii
Dedication:.....	an
Acknowledgement.....	iv
Table of Contents.....	v
Abstract.....	ix
List of Acronyms.....	x
CHAPTER ONE:INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY.....	1
1.1 Background of the study.....	1
1.2 Statement of the research problem.....	4
1.3 Objectives of the study.....	5
1.4 Literature Review.....	6
1.4.1 Literature on conflict and conflict transformation.....	6
1.4.2 Transformation of conflicts.....	9
1.4.3 Literature review on Ethnic conflict.....	13
1.4.4 Management of Conflicts.....	13
1.4.5 Literature review on Somali conflict.....	19
1.5 Literature Gap.....	21
1.6 Justification of the study.....	22
1.7 Theoretical framework.....	23
1.8 Hypotheses.....	25
1.9 Research Methodology.....	25
1.10 Chapter outline.....	25
CHAPTER TWO:AN OVERVIEW OF THE SOMALI CONFLICT.....	27
2.1 Introduction.....	27
2.2 Historical background of Somalia.....	27
2.3 The Rise and fall of Mohammed Siyad Barre (1969 - 1991).....	29
2.4 Collapse of the Somali state.....	32
2.5 An Overview of the Peace Process in the Somali Conflict.....	36

2.5.1 Arta conference.....	37
2.5.2 Mbagathi Peace Process.....	37
2.6 Conclusion.....	39

CHAPTER THREE: THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION IN CONFLICTS:

CATEGORIES, TYPES AND EFFECTIVENESS.....	41
3.1 Introduction.....	41
3.2 Types of third parties.....	41
3.3 Categories of third party intervention.....	43
3.4 Forms of third party intervention.....	48
3.5 Effectiveness of Third Party Intervention.....	50
3.6 Conclusion.....	53

CHAPTER FOUR: AN ANALYSIS OF ETHNO IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT IN SOMALIA.....

4.1 Introduction.....	55
4.2 Ethnic Identity.....	55
4.3 Causes of ethnic conflict.....	56
4.4 Management of ethnic conflict.....	60
4.5 Ideological differences.....	61
4.6 Clan identity and the Somali conflict.....	63
4.7 Conclusion.....	66

CHAPTER FIVE: ROLE OF RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT.....

5.1 Introduction.....	68
5.2 Religion and conflict.....	68
5.3 Non Violence Means of Conflict Management.....	69
5.4 The role of religious leaders in conflict management.....	72
5.5 Conclusion.....	78

CHAPTER SIX: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN SOMALI A.....	80
6.1 Introduction.....	80
6.2 Why the peace conferences failed.....	80
6.3 Significance of third party interventions.....	83
6.4 Ethnic and Islamic identity.....	84
6.5 Strategies of religious leaders.....	86
6.6 Somali Religious Leaders and conflict management Initiatives.....	86
6.7 The implication of Islamic Identity on the Somali Conflict.....	92
6.8 Conclusion.....	95
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	97
7.1 Summary.....	97
7.2 Key findings.....	97
7.3 Recommendations.....	100
Bibliography.....	102

ABSTRACT

The Somali state collapsed in **1991** after the overthrow of Siyad **BarTe** a nation that had the entire ingredient for successful state formation. It's cultural and religious homogeneity was unique in the continent but nevertheless collapsed. The collapse of the Somali state led to intra clan conflict that lead to loss of life and property. The emergence of clan rivalry has led to the displacement of people from their homeland and become refugees within the country and outside the country. The humanitarian situation has necessitated international organizations such as the United Nations to respond to the dire need of the Somalis. Numerous efforts with the aim of restoring normalcy have been employed by various governments and inter-governmental bodies but all in vain. Some of the states such as Ethiopia have unilaterally intervened the Somali conflict exercepting the already trouble situation of Somalia while the United Nations and IGAD have deployed peace keeping force. The failure of the international community effort has been the mismatch between the proposed institutional mechanism that is used for addressing the Somali conflict and the peculiarities of the Somali context. Somalis have a rich pastoral culture with well developed institution for conflict prevention, management and transformation. The militant use of religion by the Islamic groups and lack of accommodating the Islamic views by those fronting the secular agenda has frustrated the potential use of the religious leaders to resolve the conflict. The study seeks to establish the role of religious leaders in resolving the Somali conflict by examining their past role and mode of resolving conflicts The study utilizing both secondary and primary data made an effort to shed light on the role of religious leaders in the Somali conflict and thus a humble effort towards understanding the issues involved in the conflict. It recommended religious leader to be fully engaged in the management of the conflict.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AU	-	African Union
ARS	-	Alliance for Re-liberation of Somali
EU	-	European union
ICU	-	Islamic Court Union
IGAD	-	Intergovernmental Authorities and Development
NATO-		North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFD	-	Northern Frontier District
NRM	-	National Resistant Movement
NSCC	-	New Sudan Council Churches
OAU	-	Organization of African unity
SNM	-	Somali National Movement
SPLM-		Somali people liberation Movement
SPM	-	Somali Patriotic Movement
SRRC	-	Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council
SSDF	-	Somali social democratic movement
SYL	-	Somali Youth League
TFG	-	Transitional Federal Government
TNG	-	Somali National Government
UN	-	United Nations
UNSOM		United Nation Mission in Somalia
use	-	United Somali Congress

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Background of the study

Like almost all African states, the Somali state is the creation of European conquest and colonization of Africa in the late 19th century. Although the people of Somalia inhabited the region that today forms part of the state of Somalia since time immemorial but the state of Somalia come into being only after the establishment of European colonial rule.

Colonial powers introduced the modern centralized state to the Somali society which is in total contradiction to the traditional, radically egalitarian structure of the Somali.¹ The Somali social system is composed of families that are tied into an alliance such as clan sub-clan and sub-sub clan. The clans are headed by an elder known as Ugas or Malag. Before the arrival of the Western colonizers in the late 1980's the Somali culture and Islam was the primary source of knowledge and guidance to the Somalis. The religious leaders acted as the guide on legal issues such as inheritance, divorce, marriage, murder and generally all disputes relating to members of the society.² The Religious leaders were the enlightened members of the Somali community and highly respected within the Somali community because of their knowledge and expertise in Islamic law and thus entrusted with leadership on issues affecting the community especially on dispute resolution.

¹ Lewis I M, *A Modern history of the Somalis*; Fourth Edition, (Ohio University press Athens 2000), p.265.

² *Ibid*, p.266.

During the colonial era between 1800- 1960, the religious leaders served the colonial administration as judges because of their level of literacy and also spearheaded the liberation efforts against the colonialist. Scholars such as Sayid Mohamed Abdille Hassan and Sheikh Hassan Barraï lead the liberation efforts.³

The Somali community had its own traditional conflict resolution mechanism based on Somali traditional law called (Xeer) and the Islamic law. The religious leaders called "Wadad" or Sheikh fulfill task like teaching the young the Quran and the basic teachings of Islam. Solemnizing marriage and ruling according to the Sharia on matrimonial disputes, inheritance, assessing damages for injuries and generally directing the religious life of the community in which they live.⁴ The religious leaders were the final arbiters in conflicts that arise within the community and solve it through the Islam penal code. They were regarded by the community as fair and neutral in mediating conflict. The establishment of the modern state however diluted the influence of religious leaders as state position was controlled by those with secular education thus weakening their traditional role.

The conflict in Somalia started with an insurgency within the Somali state in 1980 where Siyad Barre used military machine to quell the insurgency in the Southern part of Somalia and later the collapse of state institution in 1990 where clan warlords controlled most of Somalia where each clan tried to occupy and dominate where their clan lived. Ethnicity which manifests itself in the Somali conflict as danism and clan rivalry over resources was practiced by Somali community in the absence of any functioning state authority. Traditional

³ *Ibid*, p.267.

⁴ Mohamed M.A"/ie *Somali conflict*, (ALShihab publishers LTD2010), p.24.

leaders; clan elders and religious leaders filled the vacuum and shaped the destiny of the country.

In the late 2000 however, the Somali conflict mutated from clan rivalry to an ideologically based conflict. Different Islamic movement with different ideological orientation emerged and become influential parties in the Somali conflict. Two major ideologically oriented Islamic movements become popular these were: *Ikhwan* and Salafi. The first one Ikhwan. its centre of development was in Egypt. Ikhwan has branches in most of the Muslim world including Somalia. It argues for Muslims to liberate themselves from all forms of ignorance. They advocate for Islamic solution to all problems including⁵ the idea of establishing on Islamic state. Islah is the official branch that represents the Muslim brotherhood (Ikhwan) in Somalia.

Secondly, the Salafi orientation of Islam was founded by Sheikh Mohamed Abdulwahab. This orientation focused on improving the understanding of Islam and rejection of superstition that were practiced by Muslim such as visiting the graveyard. The salafi orientation tends to use a literal interpretation while the others attempt to go beyond literal interpretation and engage in some form of textual analysis." In the Somali conflict groups that have a Salafiya orientation are Al-Shabab and Hizbul Islam led by Sheikh Dahir Aways who is in the list of the US terror group.

The United Nations, EU, AU, the Arab League have tried to resolve the conflict in Somalia by holding numerous peace conferences. The president of Djibouti convened the first reconciliation conference in 1991. The IGAD and the European Union have sponsored the

⁵ Al-Qaradawi Y "*state in Islam*" (Cairo Alfalah foundation 2004), p. 121.

⁶ El-Affends, A. *Turabi's Revolution Islam and Power in Sudan* (Grey Seal London 1991), p.5.

Mbagathi (2004) and Arta conference (2000) and the United Nations sponsored the Addis Ababa conference of (1993). All this effort has not made the bloodshed to stop because according to Lewis the Somali clan system work against centralized authority modeled on the European style of government recommended by the peace process.⁷

The apparent failure of official diplomacy in bringing peace to Somalia is what this study is trying to rectify by pointing out the role of non-official diplomacy such as religious leaders to spearhead the peace process. Somalia is a Muslim country and religious leader are key actors in the process of resolving conflict therefore its essential that a political space be created for the active participation of religious leaders. In all the peace process they have been completely marginalized and where they have been invited, they have been invited as observers and attended the conference in their personal capacity.

1.2 Statement of the research problem

This study investigates the role of religious leaders in resolving ethno ideological conflict in Somalia. Religious leaders have traditionally shared power with the clan elders and were highly respected by the Somali community because of their expertise in the Islamic law and viewed by the members of the community to be impartial and honest when resolving conflicts.

The fall of Siyad Barre regime in 1991 led to the collapse of the Somali state creating conflict fought in terms of clan lineage and patronage. The chaos precipitated by the

Lewis LM *A Modern history of the Somalis* op cit, p. 15.

disintegration of the state caused other countries to become home to a lot of refugees hence jeopardizing the stability of the international community.⁸

The international community responded to the conflict in two fold. Firstly, attention was put to humanitarian situation by means of providing food and shelter to the displaced and secondly to the development of conflict resolution process from 1991 as follows. Djibouti peace process (1991), Addis Ababa peace process (1993) Cairo (1997) Arta (2000) Mbagathi (2004) and Djibouti (2009).⁹

The peace processes to manage the conflict have not yielded an effective control of the conflict because the main actors that participated this conference were the warlords who in the eyes of the Somalis were responsible for their misery and perpetual continuation of the conflict and gave little attention to other actors such as the civil society because the conveners of this conference thought that those wielding power in the conflict will be the best people to chart the destiny of the country. However these initiatives have failed to bring peace to the Somali conflict. The study therefore tries to ask what roles do religion leaders have to play in managing the Somali conflict.

1.3 Objectives of the study

The overall objective of the study is to examine the role of religious leaders in ethno-ideological conflicts in Somalia during the study period: 1991 - 2010. More specifically, the study aims to:

Lyons T. and Samatar A.I *Somalia state collapse mutilated intervention and strategies for political reconstruction* (brooking institution (1995) Washington DC), p. 1.

Elmi A.A. and A. Barisse.A *The Somali conflict root causes, obstacles and peace - building strategies Africa security review* 15:1, p.32.

- i) Provide an overview of the Somali conflict and the role of religious leaders
- ii) Investigate the role of religious leaders and the strategies they use in managing the Somali conflict
- iii) Explore the theoretical linkage between religion and conflict

1.4 Literature Review

The study endeavors to investigate the role of religious leaders in the Somali conflict. The study will therefore review the following categories of literature: Literature on conflict and conflict transformation. Literature on ethnic conflict and conflict management will be reviewed and subsequently literature on Somali conflict.

1.4.1 Literature on conflict and conflict transformation

Conflict has been a social phenomenon since time immemorial; humanity has witnessed a great deal of conflict. Ramsbotham define conflict as the pursuit of incompatible goals by different groups whether it's pursued by peaceful means or by use of force.¹⁰

Mwagiru on the other hand defines conflict as the existence and pursuance of incompatible goals by two or more parties"¹¹ incompatible point of view means that people cannot accommodate the other without giving in anything and position that they value.

Burton sees conflict as a social phenomenon that can either lead to a peaceful end or degenerate into a destructive end. Conflict is an inescapable condition so far as human

¹⁰ Ramsbotham; O. Woodhouse T.and. Miall H. "*Contemporary Conflict resolution, the preparation management and transformation of deadly conflict* (Polity press 2006), p.27.

¹¹ Mwagiru M "*Peace and conflict management in Kenya*"(A Catholic justice and peace commission Nakuru Dioceses publication in partnership with Mission Austria 2003), p. 11.

relation is concerned according to Burton¹². Okoth simplifies the definition of conflict as just an issue in dispute between or among parties."

Lederach views conflict as dynamic and progressive in nature, they are constantly changed by ongoing human interaction and they constantly change the very people who caused them and the social environment in which they are born, evolve or perhaps end.¹⁴

Coser¹⁵ on the other hand observes that conflict is a struggle over values and claims to scarce resource, power and status in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate rivals. Conflict is therefore an interaction involving human. In the case of the Somali conflict for example shifting alliances were formed between different clans and sub clans to gain leverage in the conflict and to stake stronger claims to particular land resource.

Conflict takes different forms and shape, Ramsbotham classifies according to historically and geographically based generation of conflict revolution ideology and identity/succession conflict.¹⁰ To him conflict is divided over its historical and geographical approaches. Mwangi on the other hand classifies conflict in terms of its effects he thus categories conflict as a violent or no violent conflict.¹¹ Violent conflict inflicts physical harm on those affected by it while non-violence conflict cannot be seen or imagined and characterized itself as structural conflict.

¹² Burton J, *world society*, (Cambridge university press Cambridge 1972), p. 137.

¹³ Okoth P.G *"Conflict in contemporary Africa* (Jomo Kenyatta Foundation Nairobi 2000), p. 1.

¹⁴ Lederach J.P *Building peace, sustainable reconciliation in divided society*, (Washington DC United States Institute for peace press 1997), p.63.

¹⁵ Coser,L,A *The functions of social conflict* (New York free press 1956), p.3.

¹¹ Ramsbotham O . *Contemporary conflict resolution the preparation management and transformation of deadly conflict* (polity press 2006), p.65.

¹ Mwangi M *"Conflict in Africa theory, process and institution of management* (Nairobi: CCR. 2006), p. 15.

Inter-state conflict is another form of conflict, many African states had border disputes for instance Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakasi Island, Tanzania and Malawi over Lake Nyassa and Somalia and Ethiopia over the Ogaden region.

Ideological and religious conflict is also another form of conflict such the Iraq Iran war in 1988. Religious sect between the Shia and Sunni provided a pretext that fanned it for eight years. The war in Philippines is between ideologically leaning Al-Qaida opposition and the secular government.

Conflict has affected in all parts of the world, in Africa it has caused social, economic and political challenges since 1970. Africa has seen more than thirty wars which has resulted a lot of death. These conflicts have lead to genocide in Rwanda and gross violation of human right in Sierra lone, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Sudan and Uganda ^s it has also caused the collapse or near collapse of some states such as Somalia and disrupted the lives of many by making them refugees.

Enloe¹⁹ highlights two factor considered as catalyst for conflict. Competition for resource in condition of scarcity and the role the state plays in controlling the allocation of such resources. Different groups come to view access to power as being of vital importance to their welfare and compete with each other to secure that power. In the Horn of Africa such competition has lead the state to become both the object of the conflict and the principle means by which it's waged.

¹⁸ Mengisteab K."Africa's intrastate conflict. Relevance and limitation of Diplomacy, *Africa issue vol 31 No.* 1/: p.25.

¹⁹. Enloe H "*Ethnic Conflict and Political Development*, (Boston Little Brown 1973), p.22.

Deng and Zartman argue that conflict in Africa have many underlying causes. Incomplete nation building, differences in identities derived from ethnicity, religion .culture, language, economic and competition for limited resource, political demand that exceed state [capabilities."⁰

After the end of the cold war and the setting of the era of globalization the line between internal and external conflict become very thin. Every conflict takes an international I dimension and it's internationalized because of the actors involved and the issues fanning the conflict, the Somali conflict is one example where the conflict has extended beyond the traditional boundaries of the state. As a result neighboring states arc viewing the conflict with a concern over the insecurity it has caused in their common frontiers with Somalia/¹ The I interconnectedness of the world has therefore necessitated concerted efforts in managing I conflicts.

1.4.2 Transformation of conflicts

I Conflict transformation entails the creation of new situations in the dynamics of conflict with or without intervention of external influence. Issues, perceptions, relationships and | communication patterns change along the path of conflict dynamics. Transformation can be regarded as the movement from latent conflict to confrontation to negotiation." This means that the situation in which a conflict starts changes as the conflict progresses.

Transformation of a conflict also entails a change in structure of the conflict. As a conflict progresses, its structure undergoes a continuous change where new actors come in with new

²⁰ Deng,F. and Zartman. I.W. *Conflict resolution in Africa* (Washington DC Brooking Institute. 1991). p 11

¹ Koech J. Emerging Challenges of Security in IGAD in M. Mwangiru.(ed) *Africa regional security in the age of globalization*, (Nairobi Heinrich Boll Foundation 2004), p. 128.

²² Joeng.H.W. *Peace and Conflict Studies: An Introduction*, (Aldershot: Ashagte,2000), p.37

issues and interests. The structure of a conflict was first defined by Wall²³ who argued that the structure of a conflict includes not just both the parties to the conflict and the mediator but also their constituents.

Different scholars explain conflict transformation in different ways. For example, Wall,²⁴ Levy,²⁵ Tures,²⁶ and Vayrynen²⁷ explain conflict transformation in terms of changes in the structure of the conflict. Other scholars like Merton,²⁸ Lederach,²⁹ Curie,³⁰ Mudida³¹, and Galtung,³² explain conflict transformation in terms of the shift from latent/structural conflict to manifest/direct conflict then to peace building.

Vayrynen²⁷ demonstrated that the involvement of different actors transforms the conflict significantly. Because conflicts are dynamic processes, the dynamism must be reflected in their analysis and their management processes. Conflict dynamism leads to conflict transformation. This kind of transformation is caused by the involvement of different actors who help in the transformation of the issues, rules, interests and structure of the conflict.

Wall, J.A. 'An Analysis, Review and Proposed Research,' *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 25 (1981) p.157-180.

I Ibid

Levy, J.S. "Theories of Interstate and Intrastate War: A Level of Analysis Approach," in C.A Crocker, et al, (eds) *Turbulent peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001), p. 3 - 27

^{2b} Tures, J.A. 'Will New Blood in the leadership Produce New Blood on the Battlefield? The Impact of Regime Changes on the Middle East Military Rivalries,' *Middle East Journal*. Vol. 58 No. 4 (Autumn, 2004), PP 612-635.

¹ Vayrynen, R. "To settler or to Transform? Perspectives on the Resolution of National and International Conflicts' in R. Vayrynen (ed). *New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation* (London: Sage Publications, 1991), p. 25

Merton, R.K. *Social Theory and Social Structure*, (New York: Free Press, 1968). P 131

¹ Lederach, J.P. *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), P. 63

Curie, A. *Making Peace* (London: Tavistock, 1971), P 45

¹ Mudida, R. 'The Security-Development Nexus: A Structural Violence and Human Needs Approach,' *New Faces Conference*, 2007, p. 11 -22

¹ Galtung, J. 'Peace and Peace Research' *Journal of Peace studies*, Vol. 6, No.3 (1969). p.167-191

³³ Vayrynen, Op. Cit

The argument by Vayrynen⁴ points that conflict transformation may happen in several different ways that include actor transformation, issue transformation, rule transformation, interest transformation and structural transformation. Actor transformation means internal changes in major parties to the conflict or the appearance and recognition of actors. Internal transformation may be predicated on the idea that the convergence of domestic organization of parties lessens the probability of violence while polarization of same increases the probability of violence.

Positive issue transformation alters the political agenda of the conflict; it reduces the relative importance of issues on which antagonism exists and emphasizes the issues on which commonality prevails. Dissonant interests and issues are changed to appear less weighty and less salient, while making consonant ones more clearly perceived and stronger, making conflict management more successful as opposed to if the issues and interests were altered to appear more contentious. Negative issue transformation does the opposite."

Rule transformation means restructuring the conflict by altering the rules of the game. Since rule transformation may try to redefine the norms which the actors are expected to follow in their mutual relations. Structural transformation entails the entire structure of inter-party relations. Such a structural transformation is more profound than limited changes in the composition of actors, issues or rules. The external structure of a conflict is transformed when the mutual relations experience a qualitative change.

Conflict transformation may also happen through altering the interest structure. Provided it is possible to increase the commonality of interests, the expansion of interdependence,

³⁴ Ibid

³⁵ Ibid

mode of operative policy, should help transformation of a conflict into a more peaceful direction^{3,1}

Levy' argues in the same line with Vayrynen and he adds that conflict transformation, whether intentional or unintentional, has profound effects on the management efforts of a given conflict. For instance, if the domestic organization of the parties to the conflict gets changed from dictatorship to democracy, the management efforts of such a conflict will have higher chances of success. This is because democracies rarely if ever go to war with each other, hence the notion of democratic peace as found in the Kantian liberal theories.^{3*}

Levy^{3"} adds that change in leadership of the parties to the conflict may also see new leaders who are either warmongers or committed to peace. The change from hard-line/extremist leadership to a moderate one or vice versa transforms the direction of a conflict where a moderate leadership is susceptible to peaceful resolution. In cases where change in leadership leads to transition from a charismatic leader to a leader whose objective is to mobilize political support from the governed, such a leader is bound to engage in external scapegoating. This means the leader will promote historical myths that glorify his/her people's own history and demonize the adversary at the expense of good relations with such adversary.

³⁶ **Ibid**

³⁷ **J.S. Levy, Op. Cit**

³⁸ **Ibid**

³⁹ **Ibid**

1.4.3 Literature review on Ethnic conflict

Ethnic conflicts are problems that exist in most countries in Africa. Ethnic groups are defined as a community of people who share cultural and linguistic characteristics including history, tradition, myth and origin.⁴⁰ Just like other types of conflict, ethnic conflicts are about political, economic, social cultural or territorial issues. However for them to be classified as ethnic the groups involved most use ethnic criteria to make claims against the state or their action.

Colonialism has played a role in dividing and identifying different ethnic communities in Africa. The Somali community has been for instance divided over Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Djibouti. The 1977 Ethiopia- Somalia conflict over the Ogaden region was caused by the marginalization of the Somali ethnic community in Ethiopia. The Rwanda genocide was as a result of ethnic conflict between the Hutus and Tutsi. Generally conflict has been a challenge in Africa and in the Horn of Africa in particular. Some causes of conflict are local while others are as a result of transformation in the international structure since the end of cold war therefore there are no mono- causes of conflict as argued by Mwangi.⁴¹

1.4.4 Management of Conflicts

Conflicts are dynamic processes⁴² As such; any successful management of conflicts has to take into account transformations that the conflict is going through.⁴³ Conflict management is composed of numerous styles and tactics including official conflict management (which in

⁴⁰ Irobi, E.G. 'Ethnic. Conflict management in Africa a comparative study of Nigeria and South Africa *Foreign policy Vol. 11 (2005)*. P.2.

⁴¹ Mwangi M. *Conflict in Africa, theory process and practice* op cit P 5

⁴² Lederach, J.P. *Op. Cit.* p.63

⁴³ Mwangi.M. *Conflict: Theory. Process and Institutions of Management, Op. Cit.* p.1 18

turn includes litigation, arbitration, formal mediation and so on) and unofficial conflict management (which include informal negotiation, informal mediation like problem solving workshops and so on).⁴⁴ This means that in choosing the most suitable type of conflict management, the conflict manager has to understand the type of the conflict and the way in which it is getting transformed. Consequently, such choice can only be arrived at after a thorough understanding of the various ways and means of conflict management.

Ramsbotham for instance define conflict management as the settlement and containment of violent conflict.⁴⁵ The aim is to limit and avoid future violence by promoting positive behavioral change in the parties involved. Azem on the other hand views conflict management as a process covering every action taken by the parties to the conflict to handle the situation.⁴⁶ Vayrynen argues that conflict management is a process by which the parties to the conflict are encouraged to come together to do something to the conflict.⁴⁷ Conflict management requires different approaches in order to effectively manage the conflict however the international legal and political system requires that the conflict management process must be peaceful. The charter of the United Nations forbids the use of force or the threat of the use of force in the conduct of relation between states and specifies methods of peaceful settlement of disputes.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Ibid. pp. 107-118

⁴⁵ Ramsbotham..O. *Con temporary conflict resolution* op cit, p.29.

⁴⁶ Azem H.A' *The re-conceptualization of conflict management peace conflict and development. An interdisciplinary journal vol. 17 (2005), p. 18.*

⁴⁷ Vayrynen R." *7b settle and to transform? Perspective on the resolution of national and international conflict theory. Conflict resolution and transformation (sage publication (1981), p.25.*

⁴⁸ The UN Charter Article 2 (4), Article 23.

Conflict management is composed of two methodologies: conflict resolution and conflict settlement. Mwariguru posits that the relationship to power, and with power, distinguishes settlement and resolution. Settlement is anchored on the notion of power, while resolution rejects power as the dominant framework for managing social relationships.⁴⁹ Settlement is imposed by a third party or a greater power while resolution implies a solution acceptable to all the parties, which does not sacrifice any basic interest, and which no party will wish to later repudiate.⁵⁰

At a certain stage in a conflict when the actors are characterized by big power asymmetry, intense competition, failure to distinguish interests and needs, and sharp incompatibility of goals, forced accommodations and bargains especially at the expense of the weaker party may be the best choice to mitigate the conflict for the time being.⁵¹ Settlement of conflict is founded on the notion that, since the nature of society is anarchical, and the role of power in relationships is paramount, the best option in such situations of conflict is to reach accommodations that the parties in the conflict are forced to live with.

Settlement therefore does not address the root causes of the conflict but merely readjusts and regulates conflictual relationships. The outcome in a settled conflict is based on the existing power relationships between the parties, which means that as soon as the power balance between them changes, the entire bargain must be re-evaluated. In settlement of a conflict, the weaker party accepts the outcome because it has no power to contest it, but not because it is convinced that the outcome is the best achievable. The process of settlement is accompanied by bargaining. Bargaining is conditioned and informed by the power relations

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, p.38

⁵⁰ Burton, J.W. *Conflict and Communication*, (London: Macmillan, 1969), MI-221

⁵¹ Mwariguru.M., *Conflict: Theory Processes and Institutions of Management*, Op. Cit,p.40

between the parties. Indeed, Groom notes that stronger party strikes a better bargain for itself at the expense of the weaker one in this zero sum game where one party's gain means the other party's loss. Bargaining does not therefore address the root causes of the conflict and as such it does not endure.⁵²

Conflict transformation can lead to a shift from power asymmetry to symmetry among the conflicting parties,⁵³ or from failure to distinguish their interests and needs to a clear distinction between the two.⁵⁴ At such a stage in a conflict when the parties are characterized by equality in power or clear distinction between their interests and needs, the best choice of management would be to negotiate non zero sum solutions acceptable to both parties. Conflict resolution negates power as the basis of relationships. Resolution of conflict is therefore non-coercive, non-zero sum and aims at post-conflict relationship which is not based on power, and which endures because it is legitimate to the parties.

The starting point in conflict resolution is that conflicts are caused by non-fulfillment or competition over certain needs that are not negotiable and, as such, resolution seeks ways in which these needs can be fulfilled for both parties. Adherents of conflict resolution argue that these needs are not in short supply. Each party can therefore have its need satisfied without leading to a corresponding loss for the other.^{3"} In conflict resolution, the parties analyze their conflict, making adjustments to their relationship with the goal of re-perceiving and re-defining it. This engenders a new set of values between them that they can pursue in non-

⁵² Groom.A.J.R.'Paradigms in Conflict. The Strategist, the Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher, *Review of International Studies*. Vol.14, No.2 (Apr,1988) p.97

⁵³ .Mwarigu.M., Conflict: Theory. Processes and Institutions of Management, Op. Cit, p40

⁵⁴ . Levy,J.S. Op. Cit.P.30

⁵⁵ Burton,J.W.: *Conflict Resolution and Prevention*, (London: Macmillan, 1980)

coercive and mutually self-sustaining relationships/⁵⁶ Resolution therefore addresses the core causes of the conflict and as such it is enduring.⁵⁷

Other scholars like Zartman⁵⁸ make a distinction between "conflict resolution" and "conflict management." Resolution refers to the elimination of the causes of the underlying conflict, generally with the agreement of the parties. Management refers to the elimination, neutralization, or control of the means of pursuing either the conflict or the crisis. Conflict resolution is therefore a tall order.

Although the parties directly involved in a conflict sometimes settle or resolve their differences without any external assistance, third party intervention is the most prominent mode of conflict management. Third party intervention is any attempt to manage a conflict by an actor not directly involved in the conflict. Entry of a third party into a conflict transforms its structure from the originally dyadic structure into a triadic one. Thus instead of a two-way negotiations, it now becomes a three way process.⁵⁹ Despite mediation being the most resorted to of all the modes of third party intervention, it is the most complex conflict management mechanism. Mwangi⁶⁰ defines mediation as the continuation of negotiations by other means where the need for mediation arises when the parties to a conflict have attempted negotiation, but have reached an impasse. In such a situation, the parties agree on a third party to be a mediator and help them negotiate the conflict. Mediation is a voluntary process because the parties have to agree on both the mediation process and on the mediator

⁵⁶ Mwangi.M., *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, Op. Cit.p.40

⁵⁷ GroomT.A.J.R. Op. Cit P.99

⁵⁸ Mwangi.M. *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, Op. Cit.p.42

⁵⁹ Zartman.I.W., Op. Cit, p.8

⁶⁰ Bercovitch.J.'*International Mediation*,' Op. Cit

Galtung and Ramsbotham have come up with ways and means of managing resolving and settling conflict. Galtung proposed an influential model of conflict management that encompasses both symmetric conflict (conflict where the two parties have similar military power and resources and rely on tactics that are similar generally but differing in details such as Ethiopia and Eritrea over their border region) and asymmetrical conflict (conflict between belligerent whose relative power differs significantly or whose strategy or tactics differ significantly for example Israel Palestinian conflict). He suggests that conflict could be viewed as a triangle with contradiction (C), Attitudes (A) and behaviour (B).

The contradiction is the underlying conflict situation which includes the actual or perceived incompatibility of goals between the conflicting parties such as demands of secession by a guerilla movement and retention of a unitary state by a government. Attitude consists of the parties' perception and misperception of each other. In violent conflict attitudes are often influenced by emotions, such as fear, anger, bitterness and hatred. Behaviour includes cooperation or coercion gesture signifying conciliation or hostility. Violent conflict behaviour is characterized by threats coercion and destructive attacks.

According to Galtung for full conflict to exist the three components must be present. He sees conflict as a dynamic process in which structures attitudes and behaviour are constantly changing and influencing one another. He therefore argues that for a conflict to be managed, resolved and settled effectively the entire three components must be addressed.⁶¹

Ramsbotham, develops the hourglass model as a conflict resolution model. The hourglass represents the narrowing of political space that characterized conflict escalation and the

⁶¹ Galtung .J *Cultural violence*. *Journal of peace research* (1990), p.301.

widening of the political space that characterized conflict de-escalation."⁶² As the space narrows and widens different conflict resolution responses become more or less appropriate. If the conflict is at the stage of difference and contradiction between the parties the conflict ought to be transformed through cultural or structural peace building initiatives in order to address the difference.

If the conflict has reached the level of violence and war it ought to be contained through peace keeping avoiding the escalation of violence. If the conflict has reached the cessation of hostilities and agreement the conflict is settled through peace building effort in order to avoid the recurrence of the conflict. There are therefore three ways of managing conflict either by transforming, settling or containing the conflict.

1.4.5 Literature review on Somali conflict

Most of the literature on the Somali conflict emphasis on its devastating nature and some of the initiatives that have been taken to combat it. Lyons and Samatar emphasized on the state collapse and argue that state collapse is what compelled international action because of the chaos that extended to other regions. The chaos precipitated by the disintegration of the state caused other countries to become home to a lot of refugees hence jeopardizing the stability of the international community. This explains why the United Nation had to intervene in Somalia from 1992 to 1995. Other authors such as Bradbury look at the origin and process of the conflict. He argues that there is no single factor that can explain the causes of the Somali conflict.

⁶²Ramsbotham,0 *Contemporary conflict resolution* op cit, p. 12.

He points out the legacies of European colonialism, the Somali kinship system, cold war politics and lack of power sharing as having contributed to the conflict.⁶³ Elmi argues that the main causes of the Somali conflict are competition for resources or power, the colonial legacies and repression of the military regime. Politicized clan identity, availability of weapons and the presence of large number of unemployed youth as some of the contributing causes of the conflict in Somalia.⁶⁴

Samatar traces the Somali conflict to two major historical events in the evolution of the Somali society this are the commercialization of the subsistence economy and the imposition of colonial structures which were not compatible with the Somali social structure.⁶⁵ Osman concurs with Samatar and others in arguing that the seed of the Somali conflict was planted in the 19th Century by the colonial powers.⁶⁶

It created a political order that monopolized resources, in order to manage the conflict there is need to restructure and create a political order that does not allow for personal access to resources. The nature of the Somali social and political organization is based on decentralized culture, authority rest with the local clan elders but the introduction of the European style of governance has eroded their influence.

The Somali conflict has been a protracted one that has not escaped the attention of the international community. The United Nation was among the foreign actors that responded to the conflict. However their response was late and was criticized by non-other than one of its

⁶³ Bradbury M. *"Somaliland Century report"* (Totton, Hobbs the printer Ltd 1997) P.1

⁶⁴ Elmi A.A. *Understanding the Somalia conflagration identity, political Islam and peace budding* (Pambazuka press 2010) P. 16

⁶⁵ Samatar, A. S. *Somalia a nation in Turmoil*, (minority right group London 1999) P. 5

⁶⁶ Osman A.A, *The Somali Conflict and the rule of inequality tribalism and danism* in A. Osman and K. source (eds) *Somalia at crossroads challenges and perception on reconstituting a failed state* (Abbey publisher Ltd 2007) P. 92

diplomat Mohamed Sahnun a special envoy of the United Nations in Somalia. While describing the Somali conflict and the inadequate responses from the United Nation he says the ingredient of a crisis gathers like clouds before the storm and early action is required to prevent conflicts/' His argument is that U.N has failed to see the problem degenerating into crisis and has not taken the necessary actions to address the conflict before it becomes a crisis. However the United Nations has responded to the humanitarian crisis caused by the conflict and later become an active actor in the conflict through the support for the United State intervention and deploying peace keeping force. Other scholars such as Bradbury posit that the United Nations effort in managing the Somali conflict has only enhanced the prestige of warlords^{6s} strengthened their political role and left little room for other potential leaders because all the peace process sponsored by the United Nations gave priority to the warlords.

1.5 Literature Gap

The above review of existing literature focused on conflict, conflict management and the Somali conflict. From these themes the following gaps has emerged. In what way does transformation of conflict affect its management process and what is the relationship between conflict transformation and conflict management? A review of existing literature shows that the influence of conflict transformation on conflict management efforts has not been adequately established. The literature on Somali conflict emphasized only on the causes of the conflict and the conceptual approach to the resolution of Somali conflict based on the international community desire to ensure that Somalis create some form of central

⁶⁷ Sahnun M. "*Somalia the missed opportunity* (Washington DC the United State Institute for peace 1994) P. 10

⁶⁸ Bradbury M. "*Somaliland century reporttattan, Hobbes the printer Ltd 1997*) P. 15

government hoping that such as authority will bring the anarchical situation to an end. This study therefore tries to address this gap using the Somali conflict.

1.6 Justification of the study

Many scholars and researchers have not adequately addressed the area of conflict transformation. Some of the scholars who have worked on the general nature of conflict transformation include: Lederach , Azam, Burton, Wall and Vayrynen.

Lederach argues that conflict transformation must actively envision, include, respect and promote the human and cultural resources from within a given setting. This involves a new set of lenses through which we do not primarily "see" the setting and the people in it as the problem and outsider as the answer. Rather we understand the long term goal of transformation as validating and building on people and resources within the setting"

The Somali conflict has been there for over twenty years since the demise of Siyad Barre. The Somali conflict has been a protracted one: It has had negative consequences for the Somali as well as stability of the horn of Africa sub-region. This study will go along way in generating insight of managing the conflict more effectively. The importance of this study lies in exposing the relevance of considering conflict transformation during the management of a conflict.

Taking into account of how a conflict is changing is important to conflict managers because the emerging issues and actors are given more attention as opposed to the old and waning issues. The Somali conflict has underwent a lot of transformation in the period 1991-2010

⁶⁹ Lederach .J.P. *Preparing for peace conflict transformation across cultures.*(New York: Syracuse University press 1995) p 39

because some actors were removed from the conflict while new ones come in leading to a change in the issues of conflict. In the early 1990s the conflict has been clan rivalry over resources and domination but in the late 2000 the conflict has changed into ideological rivalry between different Islamic groups and the secular government. The changes that happened along the conflict will affect the successful management of the conflict as the changes must be factored in. Conflict manager will benefit from this study because they will use its new insights of how a changing conflict can affect its management

1.7 Theoretical framework

The study will use the human needs theory to analyze the role of religious leaders in ethno-ideological conflicts in Somalia. This theory, which was developed in the 1970s and 1980s as a generic or holistic theory of human behavior, is based on the hypothesis that, in order to maintain stable societies, human beings have basic *needs* that have to be met.

As Burton describes:

"We believe that the human participants in conflict situations are compulsively struggling in their respective institutional environments at all social levels to satisfy primordial and universal needs - needs such as security, identity, recognition, and development. They strive increasingly to gain the control of their environment that is necessary to ensure the satisfaction of these needs. This struggle cannot be curbed; it is primordial."⁷⁰

This struggle for primordial needs, which is theoretically related to the frustration-aggression theory of conflict studies,⁷¹ is also based on the stimulus-response hypothesis. It is based on the fact that the frustration of not satisfying these basic human needs is what leads to aggression and subsequently, to conflict.

⁷⁰ See John Burton, "Conflict Resolution as a Political System." in Vamik Volkan, et al (eds.), *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships: Volume II: Unofficial Diplomacy at Work*. (Lexington. MA: Lexington Books, 1991), p.82-83.

⁷¹ For more about the frustration-aggression theory, see Makumi Mwangi, *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions for Management*, (Nairobi: Watermark Publications, 2000).p.20

The difference between the human needs theory and the frustration-aggression theory of conflict is that the former is concerned only with absolute requirements - which are the basic human needs ~ while the later is also concerned with the wants and desires which are more secondary and not as primary.

Burton's argument is based on the fact that "there are fundamental universal values or human needs that must be met if societies are to be stable,"⁷² and that "that this is so thereby [it] provides a non-ideological basis for the establishment of institutions and policies." ' To Burton, "unless identity needs are met in multi-ethnic societies, unless in every social system there is distributive justice, a sense of control and prospects for the pursuit of all other human societal developmental needs, instability and conflict are inevitable."⁷⁴

The significance of this theory is that it both recognizes and legitimizes both the religious leaders and other conflicting parties in the Somali conflict. It is based on the fact that the needs of both must be met, not the needs of one at the expense of the other; as this helps to move the conflict from a zero-sum to a win-win situation. It is also on the premise that the abstraction *of human needs'* helps to eliminate the sense of mutually exclusive goals. Rather than fighting over the dominant role of various actors in the Somali conflict, with the mutually exclusive goals of maintenance of their unity and working together in order to resolve their conflict, the situation shifts to one in which both groups should seek to fulfill their needs such as security, identity, recognition and development. It is on this basis that the study utilizes the human needs theory in order to analyze the study.

⁷² John Burton, 'Political Realities' in Vamik Volkan, et al (eds.), *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships: Volume II: Unofficial Diplomacy at Work*. (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1991). p.21.

"Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

1.8 Hypotheses

The study will test the following hypotheses;

- i) Religion has a role to play in conflict and management of the conflict
- ii) There is linkage between religion and conflict
- iii) Religious leaders play a central role in resolving conflict

1.9 Research Methodology

The study employed descriptive research design where the study described the role of religious leaders in the Somali conflict. Both primary and secondary data have been utilized in the study. Primary data was derived through interviews and discussion with religious leaders, conflict practitioners and diplomats. The study also utilized secondary data from books, journals; reports which were obtained from libraries and archives. The study targeted 7 religious leaders, 2 diplomats and 1 conflict practitioners because of their knowledge and expertise on the Somali conflict. The data collected for the study both primary and secondary were processed and analyzed.

1.10 Chapter outline

Chapter one of the study constitute, the background of the study, statement of the problem, objectives of the study significance of the literature review, theoretical framework, hypothesis and methodology.

Chapter two will provide a general overview of the Somali conflict; it will discuss the historical background of the Somali conflict, the peace building initiatives undertaken by both regional and international actors in the conflict.

Chapter three will examine third party intervention in conflict it will discuss the various interpretation of third party intervention, manifestation of third party intervention, forms and qualities of third party intervention.

Chapter four will analyze the causes of ethnic conflict, management of ethnic conflict and ideologically based conflict.

Chapter five will discuss the role of religious leaders toward conflict and management of conflict. It will examine the strategies employed and how effective they were in the management of conflict.

Chapter six will constitute a critical analysis of the issues that have emerged in the previous chapters and focuses on the initiatives of the Somali religious leaders and suggest ways and means of improving the future peace initiative to resolve the Somali conflict.

Chapter seven will constitute the conclusion. This chapter would be an assessment of the study. Religious leaders, regional and international approach of managing the conflict will be assessed to see the lesson that have been learnt and suggest on the way forward.

CHAPTER TWO

AN OVERVIEW OF THE SOMALI CONFLICT

2.1 Introduction

The previous chapter established the foundation of the study by giving an introduction to the study. It examined the background of the study, the statement of the research problem, objectives, theoretical framework, hypotheses, research methodology and chapter outline.

However, chapter two seeks to explore the overview of the Somali conflict and the peace process undertaken to manage the conflict. It also seeks to find out more on the reasons that led to the failure of the peace initiatives.

2.2 Historical background of Somalia

Somalia is located in the Eastern part of the Horn of Africa. It covers around 640,000 square kilometers' Somalia has a relatively semi-arid environment which makes pastoral nomadism ideal as a way of life. The Somalis are a nation of pastoral nomad, continually forced by the exigencies of their demanding climate and environment to search for grazing and water for their flocks of sheep camel and cattle.²Water was scarce and easily provoked communal conflict over wells as most part of the country as nomads rely primarily on well rather than surface water.

The Somali speaking people form one of the largest ethnic groups in Africa dispersed throughout the horn of Africa, from the wash valley through Ethiopian Ogaden and to the Northern Kenya/Somalis, as an ethnic group are African in race and Muslim in faith within

¹ Bradbury M. *The Somali conflict, prospect for peace*, (An Oxfarm working paper oxford 1994) P. 13

² Lewis I.M *A pastoral democracy* London University Press 1961) P. 43

³ Lewis, I.M *A Modern history of the Somalis*, op cit P. 265

the Somali ethnic group there are many clan and sub-clans that are on a patrilineal kinship.⁴ They are divided into six clan families - Darood, Hawiye, Diir, Issaq and Rahawyne which are 'Further subdivided into sub-clans. The clan structure is therefore to the Somali a fundamental political unit essential for individual and group survival particularly during conflict times.

Before the arrival of the colonialist the Somali "nation" was not organized in a single political unit, there was a decentralized political authority vested in community elders and clan elders. Customary law or "Xeer" and Islam were used to manage relations within and among Somali communities. The clan elders used to resort to customary Law (xeer) and the diya system (blood compensation) which was mainly derived from the Sharia law helped them to prevent communal conflict and contained lawlessness in the pre-colonial Somalia.

After the arrival of the colonizers they partitioned Somalia into five parts. Bradbury argues that it was only when the colonial powers of Britain, Italy and France divided the Horn of Africa and the land of the Somalia people into five states in 1897, did the concept of a nation state begin to grow.⁵ These five states were British Somaliland, Italian Somalia, French Somaliland (Djibouti), The Ethiopian Ogaden and NFD of Kenya in response to the partitioning and the colonization that followed, Somalia fought back. Sayid Mohamed Abdille Hassan led a strong struggle against Britain while several groups resisted France and Italy,⁶ Besides Sayid Mohamed Abdille Hassan protracted struggle between 1899 and 1921,

⁴ Elmi .A.A. *Understanding the Somali conflagration* op cit p.17

⁵ Bradbury M. *The Somali conflict prospect for peace* op cit P. 5

⁶ Elmi, A.A *Understanding the Somali conflagration* Op cit P. 18

and the most significant organization was the Somali Youth League (SYL) which was established in 1943 following Italy's defeat in the Second World War

In the first year after independence Somalia was generally perceived as a model democracy in Africa. A large number of parties competed in the election. Although the SYL was the dominant political party, there were as many as six political parties in the 1969 election."

2.3 The Rise and fall of Mohammed Siyad Barre (1969- 1991)

On October 21, 1969 General Mohamed Said Barre seized power through a military coup and turned Somalia into a socialist state, introduced one party system and declared clan loyalty as backward and primitive. He outlawed clans and their strictures, but concentrated political power in his Marehan sub clan and his maternal sub-clan of Ogaden. All these sub clans belong to the Darood clan, thus perpetuating the Darood domination of the Somali politics. The representation of members of his Darood clan in the cabinet was 50 percent."

To show the level of dominance by his sub clan, Siad Barre addressing his sub clan men said comrades, sultans, the other Darod sub clan for example the majeerten are power thirsty and I don't want them to be part of this businesses, the Ogaden and the Dulbahante are poor nomads, I will accept them as soldiers, they will defend the revolution. The Issaq are cunning, I warn you of their conspiracy. They were responsible for the defeat of Mohamed Abdille Hassan by the British in 1920. They are infidels as the Ogaden called them "Galka to

⁷ Heinrich, W. *Building the peace experience and reflections of collaborative peace building the case of Somalia.* (Life and peace institute (2006) P. XIII

* Elmi A.A. *Somali conflagration* op cit P. 17

⁹ Abdullahi O., *The Somali conflict and the role of inequality tribalism and danism in* O. Abdullahi and K. I. Soure (eds) *Somali at crossroads challenges and perspectives on re-constituting a failed state* (Adonis and Abbey publishers Ltd 2007) P. 108

door" I will drive them out of government position. The Hawiye will be busy with their agriculture and they will never realize what is happening."¹⁰

During the reign of Siyad Barre, the country endured major armed conflict. The first was the Ogaden war with Ethiopia in 1977 - 78 in which Somali forces intervened in support of Somali rebel fighters in a bid to liberate the Somali inhabited region of the Ogaden. Somalia lost the war and suffered around 25,000 casualties." According to Kioko Somalia under the reign of Siyad Barre adopted a policy that opposed the 1964 OAU Cairo declaration that sanctified colonial borders and become aggressive towards Ethiopia" in order to bring back the Ogaden region under the control of Somalia so as to achieve the ideal of a greater Somalia, which encompasses Djibouti, Ogaden, Somaliland, the NFD of Kenya and Southern Somalia.

The defeat of the Ogaden war in 1978 led to a high number of casualties and led an increase questions about the legitimacy of Barre regime, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf from Majeerteen sub clan stage a coup that aborted in 1978 against Barre government. The abortive coup by the Majeerteen officers polarized the Darood clan. The coup also alienated the Majerteen group from other clans who regarded the coup as a narrow, parochial initiative.¹¹ Abdullahi Ahmed Yusuf then formed the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) which waged Guerilla warfare against the government. In response Baree government used the national army and police to punish civilian members of the Majeerteen sub clan and the military was

¹⁰ Ashkar, A.O *Sharks and Soldier*, (Prince and fordland 1992), P. 5

¹¹ Samatar, .A. *Socialist Somalia, Rhetoric and reality*zed press London 1998,) P. 137

¹² Koko, S. whose responsibility to protect? Reflection on the dynamics of an abandoned disorder in Somalia. *Africa security review* 16(3) 2007 P. 6

¹³ Lewis I.M.A *modern history of Somalia* op cit, P. 51

involved in the killing of civilians, mass abuses and destruction of areas inhabited by the sub clan.¹⁴ The military focused on the North - Eastern corner of the Somali peninsula in the mudug, Nagaal and Bari region. The SSDF collapsed in 1986 when Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was arrested by Mengistu Haile Maryam that was seeking good relation with Barea.

The second major conflict was the war between the Somali military and the Somali National Movement. The SNM was formed in 1981 by the politicians of the Isaaq clan in London. The civil war mounted by SNM began in 1988 when they attacked the cities of Hargesa and Bur'o an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 Somalis died mostly members of the Isaaq clan which was the core support for SNM.¹⁵ Heavy bombardment leveled the city of Hargesa and 400,000 Somalis were forced to flee across the Ethiopian border as refugees while another 400,000 were internally displaced.

The US intervention tilted the scale in favor of Siyad Barre against the SNM because initially the SNM defeated and contained the government troops before the intervention of USA. U.S military assistance valued at about S 1.4 million arrived in June 1988 at the port of Barbera. The lethal arms come at a critical point in the war and were used to regain control of the land including Hargesa which the SNM controlled.¹⁶

The third major conflict pitted embattled government forces against a growing number of clan based liberation movements in 1989 and 1990. The strongest of this movement was the United Somali Congress (USC) mainly dominated by the Hawiye clan led by General

¹⁴ Elmi,A.A. *The Somali conflagration* op cit P. 18

¹⁵ Africa watch, *Somalia, a Government at war with its own people*, (London 1990)P. 10

¹⁶ Lefebure,,J.A. *Arms for the horn. US security policy in Ethiopia and Somalia. 1953 - 1991* (University of Pittsburgh press 1991)P 242

Mohamed Farah Aidead and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) mainly by the Ogaden clan and the Somali Salvation Democratic Movement mainly of the Majeerteen sub clan.¹⁷

The ensuing inter-clan violence threatened Siyad Barres position and turned his heavy war machinery on the Hawiye part of Mogadishu because they posed the major threat to his rule. The Issaq clan under SNM gained popular support in the Northern part of the country (The present day Somaliland) and engaged an armed rebellion and declared a state of Somaliland in 1991 though Somaliland claim of sovereign independence has not received recognition from the United Nation or any state. The USC finally managed to overthrow Siyad Barre and fled Mogadishu in 1991.

2.4 Collapse of the Somali state

After Siyad Barre was overthrown in 1991, most of the country institution such as schools and hospitals as well as structures of law and order such as the police and judiciary were destroyed hence anarchy spread in the country. USC was successful in overthrowing the regime but they failed to reach a negotiated settlement to form a government as they split into two groups General Mohamed Farah Aided faction mainly dominated by Habar Gedir and Ali Mahdi's Abgal sub-clan. The leaders of the opposing camps quarreled over who will be in control of the state and its resources Mogadishu thus divided into two one part controlled by Aided and the other Ali Mahdi. Habar Gidir and Abgal militias fought for four month and destroyed what was left of the city¹⁸ militias groups that belonged to the Darood clan also controlled the lower Jubba and Puntland region while the Rahawayn controlled the Bay and

¹⁷ Bradbury, M. *The Somali conflict* op cit P. 14

¹⁸ Elmi; A.A *Understanding the Somali conflagration* op cit P 19

Bakool regions. However the control of these areas changed hands where the stronger clan militia will control even though they were not original inhabitant of that particular area.

Demographically the civil war has altered the clan settlement patterns. Strong clans occupy valuable urban and agriculturally productive regions by force. The pattern of clan settlement has changed mainly in the urban and arable lands such as lower Shebelle, Juba valley and Mogadishu. These areas have undergone substantial changes due to heavy infusion of non-resident clan supported by their militia.¹⁹ In South central Somalia for example valuable agricultural land, urban real estate and seaport have been taken away by armed clans for economic gains. The stronger clan such as Habar Gedir has occupied rich plantation and real estate owned by agricultural clans and indigenous groups such as the Rahawen leading them to displacement.

In the wake of the breakdown of law and order, it become necessary for each group to rely itself for its safety and defense thus each clan form its own militia composed mainly of young illiterate men. The fighters were maintained by the communities in return for the defense of the clan interest and for fighting off attacks from opposing clans. This state of affairs has made the Somali leadership failed to get the country upon the cause of national unity, stability and development. The leaders lacked vision, common trust and moral fiber instead in satisfying their ego the lust for power become contagious.¹ The warlords destroyed what remained of Somalia to satisfy their lust for power. Said and David argue that

¹⁹ ICG Africa report no. 59 *"negotiating a blue print for peace in Somali"* March 6, 2003

²⁰ Isse, AM *The collapse of the Somali state, the impact of colonial legacy* (Haer publishing London 1990) Pg. 140

the unity and cohesiveness of the Somali people a trait that was once assumed to be the nation's greatest asset have come under severe strain.²¹

The feud between the Habar Gedir Saad and the Majeerteen was caused by General Farah Aided desire to acquire grazing rights in the mudug region, General Farah Aided was eventually defeated and the region was then divided into two parts. The Northern Galkahyo was inhabited by the Harti and the South become home to the Habar Gedir Saad. Having defeated Aided, the SSDF leadership decided to participate in the 1993 Addis Ababa peace process and accept its terms.²² In 1999 a group of warlords formed an alliance in order to have bargaining power in reconciliation conferences the alliance was named Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC)

Lewis says²³ that Ethiopia was sponsoring the SRRC group. Elmi and²⁴ Barrise also argue that "Shatigudud" who was a leader in SRRC was sent to the Arta conference by Ethiopia meaning that he did not attend the conference to make meaningful contribution but to inform them of the outcome thus enabling Ethiopia to make strategic assessment of the conference. They argue that Ethiopia believed it can eliminate any threat from Somalia by dividing the Somalis.

In 2004, Abdullahi Yussuf Ahmed was elected president but the government could not relocate to Mogadishu because it was controlled by strong warlords from Hawiye sub-clan. Abdullahi Yusuf was unable to negotiate with the warlords in Mogadishu and relocated to Jowhar. Meanwhile, the Ethiopian government was instigating a confrontation between

²¹ David D. and Said S. S., *Somalia nation in search of state*, (West new pres boulder colored 1997) P. 153

²² Lewis.I.M A *Modern history of Somalis* op cit P. 287

²³ *Ibid* P 301

²⁴ Elmi A.A& Banske.A.A. *The Somali conflict; Root causes obstacles and peace building strategies. Africa security review 151 P. 32*

Hassan Mohamed Noor known as "Sharti Gudud" and Habsade.²⁵ A large quantity of arms was channeled to Shartigud by the Ethiopian government in order for Baidoa remained in their influence.

The speaker of the transitional parliament persuaded the President and the Prime Minister to relocate from Jowhar to Baidoa. Abdullahi Yusuf accepted the offer on condition that some security guarantees were implemented. Ethiopia's troops provided security to the T.F.G. the relocation did not enhance the government credibility among the Somalis as Mogadishu was still associated with the seat of the government.

In 2006, the Islamic Court Union was formed and defeated the warlord in Mogadishu and extended their influence to other part of the country as far as Kismayo. They established some law and order particularly the perennial problems of piracy.²¹ The Sharia courts transformed into a political force and proved that it was possible for a single political party to rule Mogadishu and establish the rule of laws. However, the "Warlords" described the Islamic Court Union as "Al-Qaeda" and "a terrorist" establishment. The description appealed to the U.S and the Ethiopian government thus leading Ethiopia invading Mogadishu under the pretext of fighting Al-Qaeda. The I.C.U was finally defeated in 2007.

Abdullahi government becomes weaker and unable to govern the country well thus his government replaced with a unity government between TFG and a faction of the I.C.U in 2009 a new government was established in Djibouti lead by Sheikh Shariff Sheikh Ahmed.

²⁵ Lewis. I.M. Op cit. P. 308

²⁶ Ibid P. 305

2.5 An Overview of the Peace Process in the Somali Conflict

Having examined the overview of the Somali conflict, we shall now look at the various peace process undertaken to end the conflict. The first peace conference was held in 1993 in Addis Ababa. The conference was convened by the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali who took advantage of the relative lull in fighting because of the American presence. The warlords who represented their clan were invited to the conference. The UN also invited clan elders, women, religious leaders and artists but acted just as observers as the final declaration was signed by the warlords who had the military support of their militia. The Addis Ababa agreement collapsed when General Aided one of the signatories withdrew from the agreement because of United Nations support of Ali Mahdi Faction.²⁷

On the 26th March 1997, the UN Security Council invoked chapter VII of the UN Charter and unanimously adopted resolution 814 (1993) to expand the UN's role in Somalia. The UN mandate provides authorization for the establishment of United Nations Office for Somalia II (UNOSOM II). The implication of the resolution is that it entrenches the militarization of the UN engagement in Somalia at the operational cost of \$1.5 billion, making it the most expensive UN peacekeeping operation, according to Bradbury²⁸.

The United Nations tried to manage the warring faction by trying to disarm General Aided but he attacked UN forces. The UNOSOM retaliated by bombing Aided's compound, resulting in the killing of prominent personalities from the Habar Gedir clan, according to Adam.²⁹

²⁷ Bradbury, M. *The Somali conflict, prospect for peace* (Oxfarm working paper 1994) P. 23

²⁸ Ibid P. 25

²⁹ Adam, A. *From tyranny to anarchy*, (The Red Sea Press (2008) Asmara) P. 26

The military operation of the UN also consolidate the hawiye sub clan solidarity with General Aided, when admiral Howe placed \$20,000 reward on General Aided head who did the same in show of force against UNOSOM

The UN departed from Somali in 1995 when it has failed to resolve the Somali conflict. The military failures come at a cost of\$ 4 billion from 1993 - 1995 according to Adam

2.5.1 Arta conference

It was held in Djibouti in 2000 under the initiations of the president of Djibouti Ismail Omar Gelle. The intergovernmental authorities and Development (IGAD) that includes Somalia, Djibouti, Eriteria, Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda sponsored the peace process. About 2000 delegates representing various warlords' clan interest and civil society were invited. Abdul Qassim Salad Hassan was elected as president. The delegates according to Adar³⁰ were motivated to create the building blocks of a system of government. However the Abdul Qassim government was unable to control beyond Mogadishu and replaced by the next government of Abdullahi Yussuf.

2.5.2 Mbagathi Peace Process

In 2002, IGAD sponsored a peace process after realizing the TNG of Abdul Qassim had failed and the Mogadishu warlords were becoming dominant threatening the national security of Kenya and Ethiopia. The UN and European Union agreed to sponsor the peace process. The peace talks were strongly divided in terms of the pro Ethiopia group led by Abdullahi Yussuf and the anti-Ethiopia groups led by Mohamed Qanyare Afrah (representing the Mogadisho warlords. Abdullahi Yussuf was finally elected president of TFG (Transitional

. Adar K.G. *Somalia; Reconstruction of a collapsed state: (conflict trends(2001) P. 13*

Federal government of Somalia) in 2004. The first act of the president was to appoint a pro-Ethiopian Prime Minister Mohamed Ali Gedi³¹ Shariff Hassan Sheikh Adan was also elected speaker of the transitional parliament.

Internally the TFG faced many challenges, after its inception the government broke down into two factions in 2005, the president and the Prime Minister were on one side, and the speaker and several Mogadishu warlords were on the other. The president of Yemen mediated the two groups in 2005, the parliamentary speaker and the president agreed to end their hostility and hold a parliamentary meeting in Baidoa.³²

Abdullahi Yussuf government finally collapsed when renewed rivalry between the president and the Prime Minister continued. A new government was formed in Djibouti between the faction led by Sheikh Shariff and other members of the T.F.G the Djibouti Conference ended in 2009 where Shariff Ahmed was finally elected as president in 2009.

In all the peace process undertaken from the Addis Ababa conference (1993) Arta (2000) Mbagathi (2002) and other conference attempted to create a central state. Menkhaus argues that attempt to revive a central state have actually exacerbated armed conflict³ in Somalia new state building is not going to work because the rivalry is to acquire state resource hence the peace building effort involved only the agreement of the political leaders who have lost credibility in the eyes of the public but denied the involvement of religious leaders who command respect within the Somali community.

³¹ Adam .A.From Tyranny to Anarchy, op cit P. 180

³² Yemen declaration 2005 Sanaa

³³ Menkhaus, K. *Somalia; State collapse and the threat ofterrorism* (London Routledge 2004) P. 2

Of all these peaceful efforts in managing the Somali conflict it has failed to produce a meaningful solution. Elmi and Barisse³⁴ allege that Ethiopia has dominated most of those peace process especially the Mbagathi peace conference. They argue that Ethiopia has been keeping Somalis divided in order to maintain its hegemony in the region. It rewarded warlords that supported its policies by appointing them as Member of Parliament and cabinet ministers.

Lack of will by some of the major warlords like General Mohamed Farah Aideed also led to the collapse of the Addis Ababa peace conference. Aideed refused to sign the agreement in Addis Ababa because he wanted to be accorded the right to appoint the representatives of the conference while the United Nations refused to accept thus leading to confrontation between Aideed and the UN.

Most peace initiatives initiated by neighboring countries such as Kenya, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Djibouti failed because they were competing to bring peace in Somalia. Each has a vested interest and tended to favor one faction over the other. The European initiatives were seen by some of the warlords as colonial thus accorded less cooperation by the Somali warring faction.

2.6 Conclusion

The causes of the Somali conflict are multiple. The major cause of the conflict was the inter-clan competition for power and resources. Militia from major clans such as Habar Gedir, Abgal Digil and Mirifle competed for control of strategic areas. Militias from Hawye clan expelled other Somali clans from Mogadishu and other towns in central and Southern regions.

³⁴ Elmi A.A and Barisse.A. A. 'the Somali Conflict op cit P. 35

Darood clan also controlled the lower Jubba and Puntland region while Digil and Mirifle took charge of the Bay and Bakol region.

The emergence of strong Islamic force also contributed to the escalation of the conflict various Islamic groups with different Islamic ideology such Al-Shabab Hizbul Islam became major parties to the conflict.

Regarding the reasons that led to the failure of the efforts to end the Somali conflict a combination of factors such as lack of inclusiveness, lack of will on the part of the Somali faction leaders' and foreigners meddling the affairs of the Somali lead to the collapse of the peace process.

CHAPTER THREE

THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION IN CONFLICTS: CATEGORIES, TYPES AND EFFECTIVENESS

3.1 Introduction

Chapter two discussed a general overview of the Somali conflict and the peace process undertaken during the period of the conflict and the factors that led to the failure of the peace efforts. This chapter will address third party intervention in a conflict, its forms and qualities of an intervener with specific reference to its application on the Somali conflict.

3.2 Types of third parties

Mwagiru examines the entities that are engaged in third party intervention and classifies them into three.¹ Endogenous third party who are from the conflict itself such as Kalonzo Musyoka mediation effort between Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga during the conflict that arose after the disputed presidential election in 2007. Exogenous third parties come from outside the conflict such as Kofi Anan during the Kenya post election conflict and Heterogeneous third party who have the characteristic of outsiders and insiders.

Mwagiru further examine the three different types of third parties and gives the advantage and disadvantage of each kind of party. Exogenous third parties have the advantage of being less emotionally involved in the conflict and can bring in other perspective from elsewhere in the management of the conflict. However they have the disadvantage that being outsider, they may not fully understand the dynamics of the conflict or parties involved. For example

¹ Mwagiru M "*The water edge mediation of violent electoral conflict in Kenya* institute of Diplomacy and International studies(2008) P. 15

during the Mbagathi peace process in 2002 that formed the Transitional Federal Government of Somali led by Abdullahi Yussuf Ethiopia and Kenya, with the help of IGAD arbitrarily selected most of the 275 members of the parliament. They alienated factions and countries that were important for any successful peace agreement.²

Endogenous third parties have the advantage that being from within the conflict; they are better able to understand not only the conflict but also the parties in the conflict. But they have the disadvantage of being so closely associated with the conflict and the parties they are unable to maintain the kind of distance required to secure useful outcome. Heterogeneous third parties have the same disadvantage of both³

Various definitions have been advanced on the meaning of third party intervention. Young defines third party intervention as any action taken by an actor that is not direct party to the crisis that is designed to reduce or remove one or more of the problem of the bargaining relationship.⁴ Beloff on the other hand defines third party intervention as the attempt by one state to affect the internal structure, and external behaviour of the other states through various degree of coercion.⁵ Little defines it as a ubiquitous social phenomenon, actions varying from the donation of foreign aid to the use of military force in the international system."

Third party intervention is essential and useful in the process of conflict management and they can make positive and direct contribution by focusing on the parties, providing agenda and manipulating the timing of the negotiation process. The international legal system has

" Elmi A.A. *Understanding the Somali conflagration identity, political Islam and peace* (Pambazuka Press (2010) P. 23

Mwagiru; op cit P. 16

⁴ Young O. "The intermediate third party in international crisis " Princeton university press (1967) P. 5
Beloff.M. " Reflection on intervention" *Journal of international affairs Columbia (1968) Vol. XXII No 2 P 198*

⁶ Little.R. "*Intervention external involvement in civil wars* " (Martin Roberstan Company Ltd (1975) P. 1

provided a venue and provision for third party intervention. Article 33 of the United Nation allows for third party intervention. In his Agenda for peace, the former UN General Secretary Boutros Ghali outlined various options for third party intervention. According to Boutros Ghali "preventive diplomacy" aims at preventing the escalation of conflict into violent confrontation and to resolve the underlying contradiction ⁷

3.3 Categories of third party intervention

There are four main categories of third party intervention in a conflict situation. These are states and inter-governmental organizations, development and humanitarian organization, international NGO's concerned with conflict prevention and transformation and parties to the conflict and other relevant groups within the affected societies.

First, states and international organization are among the influential actors because the positive and negative consequences of their interaction are fully seen by the public and exercise their power directly on the conflicting parties. States and inter-governmental organizations also called track 1 include international governmental organizations such as the United Nations, regional governmental structures, individual governments and other governmental actors. States intervenes in conflict for a variety of reasons. They may intervene in order to enhance their influence and prestige through mediation. For example Algeria mediated between the United State and Iran on the American hostage.

Algeria's mediation has been inspired by the hope that mediation will generate goodwill from US.⁸ Countries may also mediate to enhance their international standard for example

Ghali, B. B. *An Agenda for peace* (United nations, New York, 1992) P 10

⁸ Ramsbotham .0. Op cit P. 246

India's attempt to mediate the United States, the Soviet Union and China in 1950 was to enhance its standing in the international arena. The effort of Nkrumah of Ghana to mediate Vietnam War in 1965 - 66 is also an example.

States also intervene in a conflict so as to avoid a spill over into their territory. The Ethiopian government intervened militarily in the Somali conflict in 2006 largely in fear of the threat posed by the Islamic Court Union as they have threatened to take back the Ogaden Ethiopian once they subdue the entire Somalia. The Ethiopian government thus invaded Somalia and defeated the Court Union in 2007 in order to secure itself from an attack from within Somalia. In the recent Arab revolution, Saudi Arabia intervened by spending a lot of resource in Bahrain government in order to contain the conflict so to secure itself.

States may also intervene because one of their members in an alliance has been attacked. Countries form security alliance to counter a threat to one of their parties for example the NATO Alliance.⁹ If a member of a NATO alliance is attacked by a non - members, then the rest of the NATO members are obligated as per their security arrangement to help the aggrieved state

Other scholars such as Findley and Ted argue for the need of interventions from the foreign policy perspective. They view intervention as a primary or foreign policy tool motivated by international influence and domestic constraints. State decides to intervene based on convergent or divergent interest they hold with the government involved in the civil war.¹ A potential intervener supports a government if they share a convergent interest. For example Somali Transitional federal Government (TFG), headed by Abdullahi Yussuf, after it was

⁹ Alaster.S. "To intervene or not to intervene a biased decision "*Journal of conflict resolution* 40 <1996> P. 16

¹⁰ Findley.M.G and Ted,.T.K. Rethinking third party intervention into civil war. An actor centric approach *The journal of politics* vol. 68 (4) 2006 P. 831

weakened by the Islamic Court Union influence (ICU). They branded the ICU "a terrorist" organization that is out to destabilize the region and a security threat to the horn of Africa in order to win sympathy from the Ethiopian government and Bush administration. The Ethiopian government responded by intervening militarily because it felt they were also a security threat to them."

States may also intervene in reaction to earlier instance of third party entry into the same conflict especially if that party is your rival in terms of regional or international dominance. States that have strategic importance to a particular country risk losing their interest if they allow their strategic rivals to intervene in a conflict without a commensurate response.¹¹ In the Somali conflict, the intervention of Ethiopia has made Eritrea also to meddle in the Somali affair. The Asmara government has hosted leaders of the ousted Islamic Union and fuelled the insurgency in Somalia.

Different third parties intervene in a conflict for different reasons. Carment and Patric argue that conflict with an ethnic component makes intervention more probable especially when ethnic affinities exist between the intervener and target.¹² When there is ethnic relationship between the ethnic group that live in the border of two states people pressure their government to intervenes to aid their co-ethnics an example where a state has intervened because of ethnic affinity is the Somali intervention on the Ogaden war in 1977.

¹¹ A.A Elmi. A.A "Understanding the Somali conflagration. Identity Political Islam " (Pumbuzuka press 2010) P. 26

¹² Findly, M.G. and . Ted, T.K op cit P. 836

¹³ Carment J and Patric.D. "The United Nation at 50. Managing ethnic crisis past and present,*journal of peace research* (1998) 35 (J) P. 61 - 62

Sharing the same ideology with one of the parties in the conflict is also a reason for third party intervention in a conflict. It provides an attractive target for intervention as evident from the super power intervention into the ideological conflict in Nicaragua, Mozambique and Angola during the cold war¹⁴ because different parties supported either the capitalist or the communist ideology.

Some international organizations as well as regional organizations intervene, in conflict because it's their responsibility to intervene as enshrined in their charters. The United Nations has been engaged in conflict management efforts in places like Cambodia, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and El-Salvador. The United Nations effort calls for military measures to secure the demobilization, disarmament and cantonment of opposing forces. Constitutional measure to implement elections and establish a transitional government, governance measures to support civilian government and infrastructure, including the training and, if necessary, supervision of local police, human right measures, return of refugees, and the restoration of the war damaged infrastructure". The United Nations intervention has been successful in place in Namibia and Mozambique because a peaceful transformation from war was achieved. However in places like Angola and Cambodia conflict is still going on. The United Nation and the African Union charters provides for intervention in a conflict.

The United Nation for instance intervened in Somalia's conflict in 1992 in order to assist the Somalis in promoting national reconciliation, rebuilding the central government, reviving the

¹⁴ Reagan .P. "Third party intervention and the duration of intrastate conflict, *Journal of conflict resolution* (2002) 46 (1) P. 55

¹⁵ Hugh M. *Conflict Transformation: A multi-dimensional* to*(Berghof research center for constructive conflict management 2001), P12

economy, protect relief fund and to end the famine ravaging the country. The AU has also intervened in the Sudan conflict by providing troops to the Darfur region. However sometimes they are challenged because its success depends on the goodwill of the members especially the major powers. For example, the AU countries have pledged forces to be deployed to Somalia but only Uganda and Burundi honored their pledges thus weakening the AU intervention capabilities in Somalia.¹⁰

The second category is the development and humanitarian agencies. These are agencies involved in conflict management by re-building the war torn societies through initiating development and humanitarian programme. Their strength is their direct experience of effects of conflict on the communities often they enjoy the trust of large parts of the civilian population through their long standing involvement in development or humanitarian activities¹⁷. For example Oxfam conflict transformation work in the nomadic pastoral communities in Northern Kenya.

Non - state actors may also intervene in a conflict in order to defend their reputation for example the world council of churches and all the African council of churches launched their mediation of the Sudanese conflict in order to prove that they have a role to play.

Thirdly, international NGOs that seeks an in-depth understanding of the roots of the conflict, working closely with people both within and outside the conflict partner. The methods and tools employed include supporting and sustaining local groups building and strengthening capacity. For example the London based NGO conciliation resource (CR) in Fiji which made

¹⁶ Sagar.A. *"The Somali conflict and the international competition on the horn of Africa"* (Red sea Press (1996) P. 19

¹⁷ Wolfgang. F. *Building the peace. Experience and reflection of collaborative peace building the case of Somalia* .f Life and Peace Institute, Uppsala (2006), P12.

¹⁸ Ramsbotham O. Op Cit P. 246

significant contributions to the constitutional settlement in 1996 with the introduction of the alternative voting system and power sharing.¹⁹

Finally the local actors have themselves the opportunity of transforming their own conflict. These are third parties who emerge out of conflict and play a role of opening up channels of dialogue. The Somali religious leaders are in this category of third party interveners as they are within the conflict

3.4 Forms of third party intervention

Fisher categorizes the modes of third party intervention into six these are; first, conciliation in which a trusted third party provides an informal communicative link between the antagonist for the purpose of identifying the issues, lowering tension and encouraging direct interaction usually informs of negotiation.²⁰ Secondly, consultation, in which the third party works to facilitate problem-solving through communication and analysis making use of human relation skills and social scientific understanding of the conflict dynamics. Thirdly, pure-mediation in which the third party works to facilitate a negotiated settlement on substantive issues through the use of reasoning, persuasion, effective control of information and the suggestion of alternatives.²¹

Fourthly power mediation which encompasses pure mediation but also moves beyond it to include the use of leverage and coercion on the part of the mediator in the form of promised rewards and threatened punishment. Fifthly arbitration where the third party renders a

¹⁹ Wolfgang. F. Op cit p 14

²⁰ Fisher J. Third party consultation. A method for the study and resolution of conflict" *Journal of conflict resolution* 16 (1972) ,P. 67

²¹ Ibid. 69

binding judgment arrived at through consideration of the individual merit of the opposing positions and then imposes a settlement which is deemed to be fair and just.²²

Lastly, peace keeping in which the third party provides military personnel in order to monitor the antagonist and may also engage in humanitarian activities to restore normalcy in concert with civilian personnel who may also assist in the management of political decision making process such as election.²³

Third parties in the Somali conflict have used power mediation and peace keeping modes. Power mediation mode has been used by Ethiopia during the Mbagathi peace process where it used its leverage to manipulate the election Abdallahi Yussuf as president in 2004. Peace keeping effort has been used by the UN in 1993 when it deployed UN forces 30,000 to secure humanitarian relief and to monitor the first UN brokered ceasefire of the Somali civil war in the early 1990s²⁴ and the deployment of AU troops from Burundi and Uganda in 2008.

Zartman and Touval analyzed third party intervention by their modes of intervention" and come up with three modes of intervention, first the intervener act as a communicator this is when contact between the parties become impossible. He/she act as a conduit, secondly, the interveners act as a formulator, where he enters into the substance of the conflict he/she persuades the parties and suggest solution to their disputes,²⁶ thirdly, the intervener becomes a manipulator by getting involved into the conflict. He/she uses his power to bring the parties to an agreement, pushing and pulling them away from a conflict to a resolution.

~ Ibid 70

²³ Ibid 71

~²⁴ Rothchild.D "The United State and conflict management in Africa in J. Harbeson and D. Rotchild (eds) *Africa in the world politics*. (Boulder Co. West new Press 1995), P. 61

Zartman W. and Touval, S. *Mediation, the role of third party diplomacy and informal peace keeping in resolving third world conflict*, (United State Institute of peace press 1992), P. 250

• Bercovitch, J. International mediation and dispute settlement, evaluating the conditions for successful mediation, *negotiation journal* (1991) 7 (1) P. 17

Different forms of intervention find their legitimacy in different types of power and need to be evaluated in terms of both their effectiveness and their ethical acceptability. Arbitration, power mediation and peace keeping are characterized by high level of control over both the process and outcome while conciliation and consultation tend to exert lower level of control over the process and outcome. Third parties should therefore carefully consider the approach they are proposing to implement and carryout detailed analysis of the conflict before assuming that their method is useful so as to avoid failure. In the Somali conflict power mediation and peace keeping has been the common method of intervention, conciliation and consultation is rarely used.

3.5 Effectiveness of Third Party Intervention

For third party intervention to be effective there should be some degree of power parity between the parties otherwise the stronger party influences the interaction for his own benefit while the fundamental issues remained unresolved. The third party can work to balance their power by supporting weaker parties through activities like training and advice, thus enabling them to be effective players.

The Ethiopian government practiced this by arming one of the factions' leaders in the Somali conflict, "Shatigud." So that he can be able to control the strategic town of Baidoa which later become the seat of government during the Abdullahi Yussuf government who was on ally to the Ethiopian government.

The other components that is critical for effective third party intervention is that the third party should be impartial, without favoring one party over the other, though this view is challenged by scholars like Touval who argues that mediators possess certain resources which the parties in the conflict value. Because they value the resources they are less concerned with whether the mediator is impartial.²⁷ If its litigation and arbitration he has to listen to each of the party and make a final decision^{28*} and if its mediation and facilitation the gains of one party does not mean a loss for the other party.

The timing of the intervention is also important for effective third party intervention. Parties are likely to consider outside intervention if they have exhausted themselves to the point of a costly deadlock from which they see no exit what is called "ripe moment" and "Hurting stalemate." The intervener can also create the "ripe moment"²⁹ if it has not presented itself for intervention to be effective.

Third parties can apply coercive means in termination of conflict. This includes; pressure, sanction and force, pressure threatens the target parties to come to an agreement or face certain consequence. For example president Moi pressured the Uganda military and NRM to sign a peace agreement in 1985 or they go back and fight. The United Nations employed pressure to the South African government to alter its policies on minority racial domination.

²⁷ Touval S "Biased intermediaries; theoretical and historical consideration, *Jerusalem Journal of international relations (1971) vol. 1 P. 51*

²⁸ Mwagiru M peace and conflict management in Kenya Op Ct P. 78

²⁹ Zartman W "*ripe moment for resolution conflict and intension in Africa*, (Oxford University Press (1981), P. 9

³⁰ James, L. "*The conflict resolution field in Scot Thompson dialogue on conflict resolution Bridging theory and practice* (US institute of peace (1993), P. 22

Third party can also use sanctions such as trade and economic sanctions. It's a measure in which one country suspends major parts of its trade with another country to attain political objectives. For example the economic sanction against Burundi put in place by the East African countries in 1996. The sanction imposed severe cost on the Tutsi government of Major Piere Buyoya making him to assure the mediator Julius Nyerere that the Burundi regime was prepared to negotiate with pro Hutu group on the restoration of parliamentary government.³¹

In situations where conflict has escalated, third party involvement brightens the prospect of its resolution bringing the conflicting parties to the negotiation table. They help to contain reduce and resolve the conflict."²

Religious leaders are such interveners who are impartial and acceptable to the parties in conflict as they are within the conflict environment. They have personal relationship with the conflicting parties and trusted by all sides' therefore religious leaders are trusted and acceptable interveners in conflicts who their connectedness and trusted relationship with the conflictants can be used to resolve the Somali conflict.

Though third party intervention is crucial and necessary in conflict management, they would be faced with challenges and obstacles in managing conflict. If a state is mediating an internal conflict and the state lacks the capacity to regulate effectively the management fails. Third parties will also have a limited ability to exert pressure to change the pattern of the conflict if both parties have totalistic perception and non-negotiable demands. Third parties

³¹ Ethreinreich, F "Arusha summit decides to maintain embargo. *African research bulletin political, social and cultural series* vol. 33 Oct (1996),?. 1243

³² Weber and Lederach J.P. "Mediating conflict in Central America" *Journal of peace research* vol. .8 no. 1 1991 p. 86

will have little scope for altering the basis of the conflict. In such a situation both parties will prefer mutual defection or unilateral concession. However when both parties have pragmatic perception and make negotiable demands an opening exist for bargaining mutual concession.³³

The United Nation as the custodian of international peace has invested heavily in several peace building efforts in Somalia. The African Union as well as IGAD countries have shown interest of intervening the conflict in Somalia by force as shown by the intervention of Ethiopia and Uganda, Burundi peace keeping efforts. However the state building efforts has not been all inclusive. Somalis of all persuasion including the religious leaders, intellectuals and business leaders need to be included so as to create a durable peace.

3.6 Conclusion

Various third parties intervened in the Somali conflict, the United Nations the A.U engaged in the conflict through sending peace keeping forces. Ethiopia unilaterally sent its troops to defeat the Islamic Court Union. Peace building efforts have also been organized by the international community through convening peace conference though local civil societies were not properly engaged to manage the conflict. The international community has emphasized on power mediation and peace keeping as mode of intervention rather than given a chance other modes of intervention such as direct engagement with grassroots actors. The international community efforts have also failed due the involvement and dominance of

³³ Licklider R. "The consequences of negotiated settlement in civil wars 1945 - 1993 " *American political science review* (1995) Vol. 9 P. 684

regional government such as Ethiopia who have vested interest and lack of providing enough resources for the operations of interim governments established for Somalia

CHAPTER FOUR

AN ANALYSIS OF ETHNO IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT IN SOMALIA

4.1 Introduction

Chapter three examined the types of third party interventions their forms and effectiveness. The chapter concluded by exploring the significance of third party interventions in conflicts. This chapter shall discuss ethnicity, causes of ethnic conflict and its management. Ideological conflict and how it has shaped the conflict would be examined and finally analyzes religious identity as a response to the ethnic identity.

4.2 Ethnic Identity

Smith defines ethnicity as a named human population with a myth of a common ancestry, shared memory and cultural elements, a link with a historic territory or homeland and a measure of solidarity¹ Horwitz on the other hand says skin, colour, language and other attributes of common origin as determining ethnicity.² Though the Somali are of the same skin colour and language ethnicity has been fully entrenched, the type of ethnicity practiced in Somali is in form of danism. Vail on the other hand sees ethnicity as an ideological statement of popular appeal in the context of profound social, economic and political change in Africa as a result of historical experience in colonial Africa.³

¹ . Smith A.D "The ethnic source of Nationalism." In M.E. Brown (ed) *ethnic conflict and international security*; (USA Princeton University Press 1993), P. 28

² Hortwitz. D. "Ethnic groups in conflict." (University of California Press (1985) Pg. 5

³ Vail L "Introduction" L. Vail (ed) *Creation of tribalism in Southern Africa*, (Bancely and Los Angeles, University of California Press 1991) P. 1

He notes several factors that resulted in ethnic conflict in Africa. First, he identifies the European nationalism and its implantation in Africa. Intellectuals had created ethnic awareness among Africans.⁴ Ordinary people have had a need for traditional values at a time of rapid change which led to acceptance of ethnicity as an ideology. Intellectuals and ethnic elites carefully created in order to define the characteristics of members of various ethnic groups.

Brown defines ethnic conflict as a dispute over, political economic cultural or territorial issue, between two or more ethnic groups. He observes that ethnic conflict is differentiated from other conflict because the battle line is defined on ethnic identity/ Therefore ethnicity is an instrument of mobilization for political leaders hence what is commonly called ethnic conflict is in the end conflict over power and control of important economic resource.

4.3 Causes of ethnic conflict

Scholars such as Stere have tried to understand, the underlying causes of ethnic conflict. Stere employs the internal colonialism model that uses to explain relationship based on racism, ethnic and cultural categorization of the population within a state that contribute to accentual differences that focuses into makers of inequality/'

He identifies political social and economic domination of an ethnic group by another as the underlying causes of the dominated group to be mobilized on ethnic basis. During the cold war rivalry between the two ideologically blocks largely shaped security environment of many states through internationalization of otherwise local conflict. Each super power

⁴ Ibid P. 5

⁵ Brown M.E "causes and implication of ethnic conflict in M.E Brown (ed) *ethnic conflict and international security* op cit P. 26

⁶ Stere: J Internal colonialism" Ethnicity and racial studies. *Journal of conflict resolution* (1979) Vol 2 P 255.

tearing the other might provide decisive support and gain political advantage was driven to assist one party hence the bipolar structure of the cold war allowed local actors to seek assistance from the super power to advance their respective interest. Asiwaju argues the partitioning of Africa has resulted ethnic groups divided into two or more states.

He argues that this was manifested efforts of separation and the systematic application of different ethnic names for the same ethnic group to distinguish between those on different sides of particular interstate boundaries. Colonialism thus played a role in dividing and identifying different ethnic communities in Africa hence leading to the marginalization of some ethnic groups in several states such as Ogaden in Ethiopia.

Ethnic conflict are also caused by weak states there are unable to control their frontiers. Ethnic groups fear for their survival and in turn invest in violence. State weakness thus serves as a catalyst for violent ethnic conflict such as clashes that occurred in Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia were as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.⁸

Ethnic conflict strains the bond that sustains civility and it's often violence that results in looting, death, homelessness according to Horwitz.⁹ Ethnic affiliation is powerful and passionate with people. Ethnic conflicts have led to suffering in various parts of the world such as North Ireland, Yugoslavia, Egypt, Sudan, Israel, Checheynia, India and Pakistan.

When state structures are weak, nationalism is more likely to be based on ethnic identity rather than equal and universal citizenship right. State reliance on coercive means rather than

Aasiwaju, A.J "The Conceptual framework" in A.J Asiwaju (ed) *Partitioned Africans; ethnic relation across Africa's international boundaries 1884 - 1984*, (London Hurt and Co. 1980) .P. 5

⁸ Woodward S. "Bosnia and Herzegovina how not to end a civil war" in Walter and Sunder (eds) *civil war. in security and intervention* (New York Columbia University Press 1999), P. 81

⁹ Horwitz D. *Opcit*P. 10

legitimate authority will imply weakness and therefore generates resentment especially if the interests of some ethnic groups are served and others neglected.

Most states in Africa for instance were constructed by the colonial powers without any regard for ethnic diversity and the political elites inherited these alien structures developed through forceful means and maintained it instead of reconstituting to safeguard the interest of their citizen. This has resulted authoritarian system whose leaders manipulated ethnic affliction in away similar to the¹⁰ colonialist plus use of force to crush resentors. The Mengistu regime in its final days used to incite the public against the Tigre speaking ethnic group accusing them of being threat to Ethiopia unity.

Security dilemma (a situation in which actions by a state intends to heightens its security that can led to other states to respond with similar measure producing increased tension that creates conflict) is also a useful concept that explains the outbreak of ethnic conflict. There is no overall authority to govern states this forces state to feel for their safety and build their arsenal to increase their security however this arms meant for defensive purpose can also be used for offensive purposes.¹¹

Ethnic group also experience security dilemma. Posen¹² argues that ethnic groups have the same security concerns as states (territorial, integrity and political autonomy) though they lack sovereign authority, ethnic group therefore act as states. For example after the end of cold war, Yugoslavia disintegrated and war broke out between ethnic groups. As central

¹⁰ Mengisteb, K.. "Africa's intrastate conflict relevance and limitation of diplomacy, *African issue Vol. I No.*

" R o ^ ^ T h e intrastate security dilemma, ethnic conflict as a tragedy" *Journal of peace research vol 36 No.*

'^Posln in Cederman et al, "Why do ethnic groups rebel? New data and analysis, *world politics, vol. 62 (2010)* P.88

authority begins to collapse political elites will begin to mobilize their groups on an ethnic identity basis.

The right to own a particular territory is also a cause of ethnic conflict. The 1967–70 civil wars in Nigeria were control over Biafra. The Ethiopia, Eritrea war was over the right to exercise control over the border areas between the two states. Ethiopia–Somali was over Ogaden region. The civil war in Somalia has also experienced such conflict where major and strong clan occupy areas inhabited by weaker clans but the weaker clan because they think they own that particular territory it leads to constant conflict. For example the Habar gedar sub-clan occupied the Biado region which the Digil and Mirefle clan claim as their ancestral land and no other clan should settle.

Competition among different groups for resources and control of state policy set in motion ethnic conflict. Countries with ethnic minorities are more prone to conflict since these minorities tend to feel discriminated against. This group will demand from the state fulfillment of their welfare if their demands are not met, the dissatisfied groups are likely to organize secession on the understanding that they will serve their interest better with state of their own. Gurr frustration/aggression theory captures this situation.^MTo him when frustration is sufficiently prolonged and sharply felt, it often results in anger and violence more so when there is significant discrepancy between what they think they deserve and what they get. The attempted secession by the Somali community in Northern Kenya was largely due to marginalization and under development in the region.

¹³ Toff, M.D. *The geography of ethnic violence, identity interest and indivisibility of territory* (Princeton University press 2003) ,P. 2

¹⁴ Gurr, T.R. "*why men rebel*" (Princeton University Press (1970)),P. 24

4.4 Management of ethnic conflict

Having discussed ethnic conflict and the underlying causes of ethnic conflict we now shift attention to management of ethnic conflict. Different scholars have proposed different strategies of managing ethnic conflict. Leary and Garry¹⁵ provide methods of eliminating ethnic difference which includes self-determination, integration and assimilation, these are political strategies aimed at eliminating ethnic difference within a state. The second method of managing ethnic conflict is hegemonic control of an ethnic group through involvement of third party or power sharing strategies that seeks to manage ethnic conflict through control means. The Somali peace process has adopted the second method of managing the conflict. Though Somalis are ethnically homogenous their style of ethnicity is manifested in clanism.

Rothchild¹⁶ argues that an ethnic conflict can be mediated. He says that ethnic conflict mediation as a strategy is based on a mutual acceptance of the legitimacy and survival of the state and ethnic identities and willingness to concede a degree of autonomy and participation to each party. He points out that mediating ethnic conflict is distinct from mediating disputes between sovereign states. Emphasis should be placed on the leverage of the mediation because the whole mediation process is inter-linked.

Offaway argues that post - Cold War nationalism has come to be associated with ethnic nationalism which can be democratic or authoritarian, divisive or unifying, she therefore says

¹⁵ Garry, J.M. and Leary B.O "The macro - political regulation of ethnic conflicts" in J.M and B.O Leary (eds). *The politics of ethnic conflict regulation*, (Routledge New York, London(1993) ,P. 48

¹⁶ Rothchild, D. "*Managing ethnic conflict in Africa* (west view press(1995),P. 10

ethnic conflict can be managed by democracy, political will to accept compromise by the parties to the conflict, self determination and revival of the concept of group right.¹⁷

Capson on the other hand observe that despite the favourable development in the regional and international system conflict remains a serious problem, he therefore advocates for an in-depth examination of many factors that lead to warfare and violence.¹⁸

4.5 Ideological differences

Difference of ideology based on religions or even within a particular religion is common all over the world. Conflict of different religions and within people of the same religion is evident as predicted by Huntington. Huntington argues that conflicts in the 21st Century will be based on clash of civilization.¹⁹

Religious difference can develop into conflict because one can only have one religion and used as an identity stronger than any other identity such as language. Ideological differences based on religion imply different way of understanding the world thus clash between people of different ideology is inevitable. This has made scholars such as Huntington asserting that conflict between civilizations will be particularly common and violent and that Islamic civilization would be the greatest threat to Western civilization.²⁰

¹⁷ Offaway M. *"Democratization and ethnic nationalism Africa and Eastern European experience"* (Washington DC Overseas Development Council (1994), P. 15

¹⁸ Capson R.W "Peace in Africa the influence of regional and international change in F.M. Deng and I.W Zartman, *conflict resolution in Africa* (Washington DC Brookings Institution 1991) .P. 19

¹⁹ Huntington S. P. "The clash of civilization" *Foreign Affairs*, 72. (1993) P. 22

²⁰ Huntington, S.P. *"The clash of civilization and the remaking of world order.* (Simon and Shuster New York,(1990), P.30

The September 11 attack in USA by Al-Qaeda has brought to the fore, the arguments of Huntington. The Somali conflict had its share of ideological differences. Various Islamic groups with different ideology emerged in the Somali conflict and become active within Somali conflict. These include Al-Itihad, Al-Islah, Al-Salafi and Ahlus Sunnah wal-Jamaha.

Al-Salafi was started by Mohamed Abdul Wahab in Saudi Arabia and gained foothold on the continent. Students who have studied in the Islamic universities of Saudi Arabia especially, Medina University introduced the Salafi based ideology in Somalia.²¹

Revolutionary visions, political perspective and religious vigour were the characteristics of the Salafi. This orientation originally focused on improving the understanding of Islam. They rejected excesses and some superstition that many Muslims practiced such as visiting graveyards and seeking help from the dead. They emphasized on the purification of the society.²² They participated the Somali conflict by directly fighting with the USC of the Hawiye sub-clan. They also took control of Kismayo in 1992 before they were later defeated by Aideed.

Al-Itihad and Al-Shabab who were also a group affiliated to Salafi engaged armed conflict with SSDF of Majerten sub-clan in Bosaso in 1992. It also fought with Ethiopia in the Gedo region in 1996. The Salafi group wants to install an Islamic government throughout Somalia but their efforts have been thwarted by secular group who were also armed, ideologically this group are the only ones that say, they would use force in order to change the situation.

²¹. Elmi.,A.A. Op Cit P. 55

²² Denoeux.,G. 'The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam.' *Middle East Policy* 9 (2003),p.60

The other group are Islah which is a branch of Al-Ikhwan, Al-Muslimin (Muslim brotherhood) founded by Hassan Al-Bana. Among the prominent leaders of this groups are Dr. Ibrahim Dosoqi, Sheikh Qurdubi and Dr. Mohamed Ibrahim. This group did not engage in the civil war as militias as was done by the Al-Salafi group. They completely devoted to social services and national politics by providing some basic welfare services. The Al-Islah movement maintained its position of non-violence throughout the conflict." There are similarities between these two major ideologies, the establishment of an Islamic state and positive perception of the history of Islam. However the two ideologies differ in their emphasis; while the Ikhwan approach focuses on politics the Salafi orientations emphasized the purification of the society.²⁴

Ideological differences in Somalia thus manifested itself in two folds. First, there are two major Islamic groups with different ideologies. There are those pursuing the use of force to impose their ideology by actively engaging in the conflict and those who stayed away from engaging the conflict militarily but through provision of social services and ideological difference between the Islamic groups and the secular group.

4.6 Clan identity and the Somali conflict

Ethnicity which in the Somali context is danism is an important aspect that creates identity. These are two groups that explain the place of clan identity in the Somali conflict. First those who have primordial new of identity such as Abdalla Omar argue that clan identity and the danism that is often associated with it are the main culprits for the initiation, escalation and

²³ Elmi.A.A. Op cit P. 61

²⁴ Ibid

perpetuation of the conflict.²¹" This view is corroborated by one of the clan elder Mohamed Hassan saying clan identity is in the heart of many and they consider that it tells about their origin and evokes strong emotions²⁰

The second groups are those who have instrumentalist view of identity that clan identity is used to in order to obtain resource or achieve power objectives.²¹ This view is supported by Mohamed Ali Ghandi a Somali anthropologist who presented a case of clan identity that was constructed in the Bakol region. According to him a number of Somali communities who did not share a common ancestry came together and named their newly formed clan "Isman Dahasho" meaning the members of the clan will not inherent each other as those who are related by blood.²⁸

This shows that clan identity is a creation used by the elites to perpetuate their personal interest. Some of the Somali intellectuals interviewed such as Mohamed Warsame,²⁹ are of this view. He says Somali politicians have used the clans for selfish ends rather than for the interest of the people. Many criminal acts have been committed and are being committed in the name of the clan, often without their consent or participation of the clan. All Somali politician he says since independence have practiced clanism at varying degree. The military communist government of Mohamed Said Barre extensively used the clans but at the same time denied them in the name of the Revolutionary Somali socialist party.

²⁵ Abdalla O. M "The nature of the Somali clan system in A. J. Ahmed (ed), *the invention of Somalia*.

(Lawrence NJ red sea press(2001) ,P. 117

²⁶ Mohamed .S, Interview with Mohamed Hassan, clan elder, Nairobi. August 2011

²⁷ Samatar A.L "Leadership and Ethnicity in the making of African state model BotswanaVs Somalia, *7lurcl World quarterly. 18 No. 4 (1997),2. 687*

²⁸ Elmi A. A and Barisse, The Somali Conflict root causes obstacles and peace building strategies, *African security review (2006) ,P. 35*

²⁹ Mohamed.S.An interview with Mohamed Warsame, former diplomat, Nairobi .September 2011

Though Somalis are homogenous ethnic wise but are plural clan wise. Ethnic homogeneity is not sufficient as people regardless of what they are always find difference that make sense for them.³⁰ Clan identity has played a significant role in the initiation and perfection of the Somali conflict. It has been used as a mobilization instrument based on the argument of John Burton³¹ human need theory which says that conflict results from unmet needs and identity is one of the basic human needs which is not negotiable.

Clan identity has been the most dominant identity for the Somali people, clan identity is the main characteristics that they use to recognize and identify each other since almost all Somali are Muslims

Since the collapse of the state in 1999, the Somali conflict has been based on clan identity. Scholar such as Mohamed Warsame argues that clan identity is the instrument necessary for building viable states but the various conferences held to resolve the conflict was based on clan representation and it has failed to rally the community a common cause so that the conflict is resolved. A contrary opinion has thus emerged that argues clan identity is the cause of all the ills the nation feels. One of the Somali religious scholars Sheikh Barut argues that if we want to survive, we need to abandon clannism, as an identity. The clan identify has therefore been the cause of the ills and suffering of the Somali community as each and every clan wants to benefit at the expense of the others this is manifested by the various clan rivalry.

³⁰. Smith D "Trend and causes of armed conflict in M.T Norberts Rupears, Alexander Austin and Clans. Dieterwelds (eds) the Berghof handbook for conflict transformation (research centre for constructive conflict management No. 1) P. 4

³¹ Burton. J. *World society*.(university press, Cambridge 1972,)P137

In order to manage the conflict there is need to identify an identity that all combating groups share, religious scholars interviewed point out that religion should be that identity which all Somalis share as evident from the religious based movements such as Islah, Salfi. with their call of Somali unity. Religious leaders will thus be the perfect initiators of such unity due to their high level of acceptability within the Somali community.

4.7 Conclusion

Somalis are divided along clan families and sub-clans that are based on "patrilineal segmentary lineage. Clan identity is important for Somalia by providing psychological and emotional need.

In the Somali civil war clan identity acts as a mobilization instrument, one that affects the efforts of building durable peace in Somalia. The major warlords have mobilized their clansmen in controlling area they live and parts of the country occupied by the weaker clans.

Though clan factor has been the major factor affecting the Somali conflict an Islamic identity that is counter to the clan identity emerged. Groups pursuing an Islamic agenda become dominant in the conflict thus restructuring the actors in the conflict. The Islamic groups pursuing an Islamic agenda have capitalized the homogeneity of Somali society in terms of their religion thus wants to replace the Islamic identity with the clan identity. It needs to be emphasized in conclusion that Somalis are one ethnic group but divide themselves in terms of clans thus clannism has been the driving force of the conflict. The failure of getting a single dominant clan to impose their will has led to the emergence of an alternative party with an Islamic ideology.

Those with an Islamic ideology want to impose an Islamic identity on the Somalis but the secular groups are resisting their moves. Between the two competing identities in the Somali conflict the clan and the Islamic identity Islamic identity has a better chance of reconstructing Somalia as it's an inclusive identity.

CHAPTER FIVE:
ROLE OF RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT

5.1 Introduction

Chapter four analyzed ethnicity and Islamic identities based on religious ideology as the major factors affecting the Somali conflict. Though ethnicity has been the major cause of the conflict however ideological rivalry has become dominant between the religious groups and between the religious and secular groups.

This chapter will discuss the role of religion and religious leaders in conflict management. It will examine the strategies religious leaders employed and how effective they were in the management of conflicts.

5.2 Religion and conflict

Hyman and Handal define religion as external, rituals or organizational practice that one performs in group setting and that guides ones behaviour. Religion has played both as a source of conflict and peace. Religious inspired conflict has been a common occurrence in the world. The Israel Palestine conflict though its about control of territory, the religious difference between the Israel and the Arabs is manifested over their difference in controlling the city of Jerusalem which each party claims' authority over the control of the holy city. The religion dimension of the conflict is further demonstrated by the title given to the outbreak of hostilities beginning at the end of September 2001 "Al-Aqsa Intifidha."² Al Aqsa is the

¹ Hyman C.and . Handal P.J. Definition and evaluation of religion and spirituality items by religion professionals a pilot study *Journal of religion and health* vol. 45 No. 2 (2006) P. 2

² Frisch H and . Sandle S. Religion, state and the international system in the Israel Palestinian conflict. *International political science review* Vol 25 No. 1 (2004) P. 378

mosque in Jerusalem holy both to Muslims and Jews where the first act of violence took place.

The decade long civil war in Sudan is also an example of a religious conflict between Muslims and Christians. The North is predominately Muslims while the South is dominated by Christians and animist. The religious dimension of the conflict is felt when the Islamic government come to power in Khartoum with an Islamic agenda. President Numeiri introduced the sharia law throughout the country thus infuriated the South which saw it as a domination of one religion. In Nigeria Religion is divisive and a factor in the conflict. Both Muslims and Christians fight in places like Kaduna and plateau state.³

Religious conviction was the motivation for the September 11, 2001 attacks. Al-Qaeda with extreme Islamic ideology attacked America in reprisal of Western domination. The conflict in Iraq is driven by ideological difference between the Sunnis and the Shiites Muslims. In Somalia Al-Shabab is propagating an extreme brand of Islam upon the Somalis to accept their ideology. In the Balkan, Muslims and Christian supported either of the two parties in Yugoslavia war Serbia were predominately Christians and Albania were Muslims.

5.3 NON VIOLENCE MEANS OF CONFLICT MANAGMENT

All the three Abrahamic faith Judaism, Islam and Christianity contain aspect of peacemaking. Abunemir⁴ has developed body of theories positing that religion remain important in the modem era. He argues that religious norms and values are central aspects of the cultural

³ Smock, D. *Religion in world affairs its role in conflict and peace*, (United States Institute of peace(2001) P. 51

⁴ Abunemir . M "conflict resolution, culture and religion. Towards a training model of inter-religions peace building. *Journal of peace research* Vol. 38 no. 6 (2001) P. 686

identity of many people in conflict dynamics. Abunemir argues that Galtung and Vayrvnen have recognized the critical influence of cultural attributes in the escalation and de escalation of conflict. The cultural religious values play an equally important role in such process of conflict resolutions. Religious values like other cultural values can motivate people to fight or to reconcile. Religion can also bring social, moral and spiritual resource to the peace building process.

Just as ethnicity has been a major problem in the conflict in Africa, religion and religious based conflict has been a common occurrence in Africa especially in Nigeria. Religious leaders were thus thrust into conflict management. Christianity has made an important contribution to non-violent means of resolving conflict through the evolution of the just war tradition. It has accepted it as its mainstream framework for reflecting on problems of war and peace.⁵ For example the revolution of Romania in 1989, the religious leader such as Laszto Tokes were key figures in the agitation that led to the downfall of Nicolae Ceausasu. The Islamic religion on the other hand has ideas, practices and principles which advocates for conflict resolution mechanism that can be applied within the Islamic world without importing the Western model. There is the ritual of Sulh (settlement) and Muslaha (reconciliation) which are key element of conflict resolution. Conflict management takes place within a communal not on an individual framework. Kinship and patriarchy are important aspect of the process.⁶

⁵ Welgel G. *"Religion and peace argument complexified in resolving third world conflicts challenges for new era"* (Polity press 2006) P. 178

Ramsbotham O. Op cit P. 312

In Buddhism conflict resolution is a common practice a basic idea in Buddhist understanding of conflict is that the causes of the situation are not in the past where there will be in accessible but in the present where they can be tracked and resolved if we have the tools.

Buddhist religious leaders such as Gautama Siddhartha intervened in disputes over water between neighboring India states in the fifth century where he brought them back from the brink of war*

Religious leaders have advocated for peace and peaceful resolution of conflict. According to Douglas Johnston in promoting peace and reconciliation, religious leaders and organization such as New Sudan Council of Churches offer credibility as trusted institutions. They have the moral warrant to oppose injustice and unique leverage of promoting reconciliation among conflicting parties. They have the capability to mobilize communities, nations and international support for a peace process and a sense of calling that often inspires perseverance in the face of major obstacles.⁹

When conflict has a religion identity he is of the view that traditional diplomacy will be of no help in managing the conflict. He identifies condition that suits religious leader's intervention these are; first, religion is a significant factor in the identity of one or both parties to the conflict. Secondly, religious leaders on both sides of the disputes can be mobilized to facilitate peace and thirdly the forces of real politic have led to an extended paralysis of action.¹⁰

Connel, M.C. *Mindju\ mediation, a handbook for Buddhist peacemakers. Bangkok (Buddhist research center 1995) P. 185*

* *Ibid P. 284*

' Johnston, D. *Trumping real politics Faith based Diplomacy* New York Oxford University Press (2003) P. 56

¹⁰ *Ibid P. 65*

Johnston further identifies the attributes that religious leaders and institutions can offer to promote peace and reconciliation; these are first credibility as a trusted institution. Secondly, unique leverage for promoting reconciliation among conflicting parties to re-humanize a situation that has been dehumanized over the course of protracted conflict and finally a sense of calling that often inspires perseverance in the face of obstacles." Harr in supporting the effectiveness of religious leaders in conflict management he says,

"bringing the spiritual dimension into the peacemaking process can create access to the more deep-seated, effective base of the parties, enabling them to examine critically their own attitude and actions".

People's conflict behavior is often based on more emotional consideration and thus may not be changed simply by rational negotiation process and subsequent agreement. "Cognitive decision and commitment he argues do not necessarily translate into feelings and action.

5.4 The role of religious leaders in conflict management

The end of cold war saw an increase in intra state conflict. Intrastate conflicts undermine the state in which they occur according to Sagarien. He argues that conventional international strategies and mechanisms to resolve intrastate conflict i.e. diplomatic effort for mediation and reconciliation are ineffective. He therefore argues that it can be handled more rapidly by unofficial intervention.¹³

Religious leaders played a role in the mediation and reconciliation of warring parties as a result of their holy and neutral position, men of religion could make any movement between two hostile groups. Religious leaders from different religions have been engaged in conflict

"~Ibid

Harr, G. "Religion source of conflict or resources for peace in Gurr te Han and James J. Busuti (eds) *Bridge or Barrier. Religion and vision for peace*, (Brill Academic Publishers 2000) .P.22
¹³ Sagarien.N. "The role of track two diplomacy in the Democratic republic of Congo (DRC), *African Journal of conflict resolution* (2000) P. 89

management in Sudan, Nigeria, Somalia and Palestine as advocated by scholars such as Johnston. Clergymen, Sheikhs and Monks have been engaged in conflict management throughout history. Communities oppose repression and promote peace and reconciliation therefore religious leaders and institutions have played the role of conflict management in different conflict in the world.

In Sudan the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) reconciled the Sudan parties. SPLM army experienced a split within its leadership one faction based in Torit led Dr. John Garang de Mabior a Dinka and SPLM united based in Nasir led by Dr. Riak Machar a Neur. The split resulted in fighting between the armed faction and seven years of conflict between Neur and Dinka population. In 1998 NSCC brought together Nuer and Dinka tribal leaders in Lokichogio Kenya and later at Warlot in 1999 which ended the bloody conflict between the Dinka and Neur.¹⁴

In Nigeria when thousands of people have perished over the last five years due to violence between Christians and Muslims in the plateau state religious leaders took the initiative to manage the conflict. Pastor James Wage and Imam Mohamed Ashafa who themselves fought on the opposite of the religious conflict realized that their two faiths contains warrants for peace. They established the inter faith mediation centre and committed to work collaboratively to promote interfaith reconciliation. Their mediation has succeeded and a sense of normalcy was restored in plateau¹⁵ states. Their success was replicated in Kaduna state thus promoting reconciliation between the two faiths. In South Africa, clergymen

¹⁴ Iliia E.L.- *Intra faith and inter faith dialogue in Southern Sudan, in religion contribution to peace making* David R. Smock (ed)(United State Institute of Peace 2000) p26

¹⁵. Smock D R. *Mediating between Muslims and Christians in plateau state. Nigeria, (United State Institute for peace (2000) P. 7*

Desmond Tutu, Frank Chikane and Beyer Naunde spearhead effort to break the bond of apartheid. Their efforts entailed civil disobedience and advocating for international sanctions against South Africa and white South Africans Christians into recognizing that their effort to justify apartheid contradicts the teaching of the Bible.¹⁶

In the Israel Palestine conflict key Jewish, Muslims and Christian religious leaders joined hands to promote a religious approach to peace. The leaders were Chief Rabbi Menachem Froman from Israel, the most important Palestinian sheikh, Sheikh Talal Sidr and the Latin patriarch in Jerusalem. They gathered in Alexandria Egypt in January 2002 to deliberate and foster good relation between members of different faith.¹

The meeting had the backing of both Yassir Arafat the president of Palestinian and Ariel Sharon the prime minister of Israel. The meeting was chaired by Archbishop of Canterbury and the Grand Imam of Azhar Sheikh Mohamed Said Tantawi leading to the signing of the Alexandria agreement. This is a clear indicator of the leading role religious leaders undertook to settle the difference between the different faith members. Rabbi Froman has reached across the lines of religion and ethnic division to communicate. When Hamas leader was incarcerated in an Israel prison Froman visited him frequently. Before Yassir Arafat death, Froman regularly visited his office in Ramala, carrying message between him and the Israel government. After Hamas come to power he established contact with its leadership.^{1*} This

¹⁶ David R. S. *Religion in world affairs its rule in conflict and peace* (United States Institute for peace (2000) P. 21

¹⁷. White C.A., *Bringing religious leaders together in Israel-Palestine*, (United State Institute for Peace (2000) P. 59

" David R. S. Op cit P. 33

was to reduce tension between the followers of both religions as the leaders have shown they can work on a common cause.

In Somali conflict, in 1993 religious leaders reconciled two hostile clans of Marehan and Rahanwyne in Gedo region. They negotiated between the two clans after prolonged war and finally managed to secure peace and security in the area.¹⁹

Buddhist religious leaders also spearhead peace and reconciliation in Myanmar (Burma). They promoted human rights and peace²⁰ by leading street demonstrations that generated national and international attention on the plight of the people of Myanmar. The monks also refused to accept alms from members of the military which was a declaration that the regime's policies and actions violated Buddhist principles.

Religious leaders as an integral part of peace building, their intervention is mainly to facilitate communication, reduce tension and assist in rebuilding relations. The religious leaders in Northern Uganda conflict have performed this role effectively. ARPLI an interfaith collaborative framework of leaders of the Catholic Church and Muslims in the District of Gulu have called on the government to engage in talks with the LRA but the Ugandan government refused to negotiate with them and argued that Military solution should be the only response to end the conflict.²¹ The religious leader's efforts were later vindicated when the Uganda government realized it has to negotiate with the rebels.

¹⁹ Mohamed S. An interview with Adam Hassan, a religious scholar Nairobi 3rd Sept 2011

²⁰ ⁱⁱⁱ [^] ^j

²¹ UN office of the special advisor on Africa (OSAA). *Assessing the role of civil society in the prevention of armed conflict in Africa* Nov. 2004. P. 1

Apart from religious leaders taking part in conflict management, they promote interfaith dialogue and understanding so that religious tension is reduced between different faiths this will act as a preventive measure to all out conflicts. In 2007, 138 Muslims scholars, clerics and intellectuals gathered in Aman Jordan and issued a statement titled "a common world between us and you," a statement that declared a common ground between Islam and Christianity. The signatories to this message come from every denomination and school of thought in Islam.²² The declaration cites scriptural parallel between the two faiths and the similarities in their core teachings. A large group of Christian scholars and clergy signed a response prepared at Yale divinity school expressing appreciation for the Muslim declaration and concurring with its central assertion. This shows respect to other member of different faith, such gestures if repeated will reduce religious sensitivity.

Religious leaders also focused on providing moral and practical support to their people in conflict zone. When the Somali conflict erupted, the *Uleema* council provided fund and shelter to the displaced likewise the church in Northern Uganda provided shelter and help to re-integrate child soldier so that they become useful member of the society.

Track two diplomacy which is practiced by actors outside the official track one diplomacy, such as religious leaders though they do not have the power and authority that government official brings to negotiation nevertheless they can exercise freedom that allows them to create initiatives for a lasting peace. In this regard world leaders have realized the importance of track two diplomacy especially religious leaders.

²² David R. S. Op cit p. 35

Madeline Albright former secretary of state for America recommended that all foreign services be trained in relevant religious subject and specialist on religion be posted to US embassies abroad.²³ This will equip them to deal effectively matter with religious sensitivity on the other hand Haya Rashid Al-Khalifa, the president of the United Nations General Assembly in January 2007 stated that

"promoting a true dialogue among civilizations and religions is perhaps the most important political instruments that we can use to reach out across borders and build bridges of peace and hope".²⁴

Western assumption is that Islamic religion and culture contradicts the principle of peace building conflict resolution non-violence and even democracy. Western media reports and policy documents often reflects them as violent and aggressive image of Islam.²⁵ Peacemaking and negotiation are recommended as the first strategy to resolve conflicts as clearly expressed in the Quranic verse. "If they incline to peace, you should also incline to it and trust in God." Principles and techniques in Islam that support non-violent resistance are tolerance, persuasion, arguing, patience, civil disobedience. Islamic values which relate directly to peace building include justice, equality of mankind including the abolishment of slavery racial and ethnic barriers

The religious leaders of Somalia after the collapse of state institution advocated for peace and peaceful resolution of the conflict. The religious leaders appealed to politicians and warlords towards reducing all forms of conflict and violence. It was a moral duty that the religious leaders undertook because Islam as a religion through its scriptures and religion teaching

²³ Albright M. *"The mighty and Almighty*, (New York Harper Collins 2006) P. 15

²⁴ United Nation press release, June 13 2007

²⁵ Al-Hibri A. *"Islamic and American Constitutional law, Borrowing possibilities or a history of borrowing"* AJruted State Institute ofpeacef 1991) P. 493.

advocates for conflict resolution when it erupts. The prophet Mohamed peace be upon him urged his followers to make peace. Peacemaking and reconciliation of differences and conflict are preferred and highlighted by the followers." He who makes peace between people is not a liar.²⁶ The Quran also says

"if two parties among the believers fall into any quarrel make you peace between them, but if one of them transgress beyond bounds against the other, then fight against the one that transgresses until it complies with the command of Allah. But when it complies then make peace between your brethren and fear Allah that you may receive mercy (Q49 - 9 - 10)."

The verse thus supports the concept of mediation between conflicting parties with fairness and justice as the primary reason of intervention. Conflict resolution practitioners such as Abu Numeir have begun explaining the role of religion in shaping theory and practice of conflict resolution. He argues that focus is shifting away from religion as a source of conflict to a source of the study of conflict resolution and peace.² The Somali religious leaders in line with this religion teaching participated in managing the conflict though their effort has not been fully appreciated by the international community because of the fear of the emergence of a group with an Islamic agenda.

5.5 Conclusion

Religion is a double edged sword that can be used to perpetuate violence in conflicts by those pursuing their personal interest at the same time religion plays a fundamental role of promoting peace. Religious leaders have taken a leading role in managing conflicts because

²⁶ Sahih Al-Bukhari Vol. 3 Bk 49 Vol. 857

. Abu Numeir, M A framework for non-violence and peace building in Islam *Journal of Law and religion* Vol 15 no. 1 and 2 (2000) P. 218

they are trusted within their communities. They can appeal to the heart and mind of the conflicting parties.

However, in the Somali conflicts religious leaders have not been fully utilized in managing the conflict. All the Deace process held to resolve the conflict religious leaders have not participated. The exclusion of religious leaders has not helped as they are the only people within the Somali community who have the trust and confidence of the Somali.

CHAPTER SIX

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN SOMALI A

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter discussed the role of religion in escalating and de-escalating conflicts and the strategies employed by religious leaders in conflict management has been analyzed.

This chapter will constitute a critical analysis of the issues that emerged in the previous chapters such as the failure of the peace initiatives, significance of third party interventions, ethnic and Islamic identity in the Somali conflict and the credibility of religious leaders and their strategies in conflict management.

6.2 Why the peace conferences failed

There are several factors that led to the failure of the peace conference held to manage the conflict. One of the factors that contributed to the failure is lack of clarity and purpose of the mediation process in the Somali conflict. Mediation process has often focused on the establishment of central government before attempting to resolve the issue. According to Coleman,¹ the establishment of a central government may be the ultimate goal but without peace there is little chance of building effective government.

The international mediation efforts have been centered on top-down approach. The United Nations, the Africa Union and the Arab League have made an initiative of managing the conflict. Several conferences have been held including Addis Ababa (1993), Arta (2000)

¹ Coleman, P.T. *Cooperation and competition* in M. Deutsch, P.T. Coleman and Marcus E.C (eds) *The Handbook of conflict resolution* San Francisco Jossey- Bass (2006) P. 446

Nairobi (2002). In all of these conferences the solution has been to establish a central government. Lewis¹ disagrees with the top-down approval but instead proposes a bottom-up approach for establishing the formal structures of government. He argues that the top-down approach advocated by the international community is against the decentralized concept inherent in the Somali system.³

In advocating for bottoming approach Lewis⁴ argues that embracing indigenous approach to conflict may contribute to the legitimacy of the outcome of the peace process thus the peace process held to manage the Somali conflict were not home grown solution to the Somali conflict and were all held outside the country.

Bradbury on the other hand posits that customary procedures founded upon traditional law (xeer) provide a framework for clan and religious elder's participation in the negotiation process." Its therefore clear that the international community remedy for the conflict is not working because its not homegrown solution.

The outcome of these conferences has been institutional mechanism to address the conflict. However there has been a mismatch between the proposed institutional mechanism and the Somali conflict. The state building efforts gave more prominence to the secular leaders undermining other stakeholders such as religious leaders, clan elders and other members of the civil societies. The international community was not able to reconcile between the secular and the Islamic agenda.

¹ Lewis, I.M *Understanding Somali and Somaliland*, London Hurst Publishers (2008) P. 92

³ **Ibid**

⁴ Lewis I.M. *A Pastoral Democracy* London Transaction Publishers (1999) P. 161

⁵ Bradbury, M. *The Somali Conflict prospect for peace*, An Oxfam working paper Oxford (1994) P. 31

Another reason that led to the failure of the peace process was that some faction leaders that participated in the conference thought they could win the war through military victory and therefore were not interested in negotiated settlement.⁶ For instance, the groups that met in Djibouti signed a peace accord but General Mohamed Farah Aideed rejected the deal because the agreement did not reflect the realities on the ground. Right after the accord, war broke out between the factions of General Aideed and Ali Mahdi over power - related issues.

Crocker and Hampson⁷ argue that in any internal conflict the under dog insurgent hold the ability to continue the struggle resisting all attempt at disarmament before a political agreement has been reached while the government insist that disarmament is pre-condition for talks to begin. These have been the reason why they have always been conflict before the start of any peace conference or after an establishment of government in Somalia. The warlord will try to control new areas so that they have bargaining power in the peace conference and the oppositions to the established government prepare to sabotage the government as happened to Abdullahi Yussuf government in 2004.⁸

This study has shown that the international community have got wrong in its approach in solving the Somali conflict by focusing on establishing a central government rather than engaging in peace building effort within the local communities through participation of all the stakeholders.

"Elmi A.A. *opcit* P. 21

Crocker, C.A; Hampson, F.O. and Aall, P. *why mediation matters, Ending intractable conflict in J. Bercovitch, V. Kremenyuk and I.W. Zartman (eds) Handbook for conflict Resolution (2009) P. 495.*

* Elmi A.A. *Op Cit* P. 26

6J Significance of third party interventions

Third party intervention is essential in conflict management; societies have had access to external actors to whom they can turn when they find they are unable to manage their differences by themselves. Though direct involvement of third party intervention in conflict situation is desirable and the most common, others such as Crocker and Hampson proposed non involvement of third party interveners.

Crocker and Hampson" argues that one option of settlement is to leave the conflict settle itself these will mean abstaining from intervention while hoping that both parties either reach a compromise or that one side wins. This study however disagrees with idea of leaving conflict settling itself as disputants have proven to have insufficient capacity to reach a settlement without third party intervention.

Third party intervention is crucial but not all interventions have been successful and necessary in the Somali conflict. It has emerged that the military intervention of Ethiopia has radicalized the Islamic groups as they mobilized people against Ethiopia. It was seen as invasion on the sovereignty of the country thus was a mistake of the international community by allowing Ethiopia to meddle the affairs of the Somali conflict.¹⁰ The use of power mediation and peace keeping as the only mode of intervention has really hampered the peace process as other alternative mode of intervention with less application of force has not been utilized.

¹⁰ Crocker, C.A Hampson, F.O. and Aail P. Op Cit P. 496

Menkhaus, K. Warlords and Landlords. *Non state actors and Humanitarian norms in Somalia*. Draft paper presented at the curbing Human Rights violation of Armed Groups Conference. Liu Institute for Global issues. University of British Columbia, November 2003.

The end of cold saw an increase in intra-state conflicts and challenges faced by the official track diplomacy. The need for track two diplomacy was noted by the Carnegie commission on preventing deadly conflicts in 1998" when it argued that institutions and civil society contribute to deadly conflict within states. Conventional track one diplomacy which is the -diplomatic efforts for mediation and reconciliation are ineffective.¹²

- he relevance of track two diplomacy is its focus on building linkage, friendship and understanding between all the conflicting parties so as to engage in constructive dialogue rather than track one diplomacy which is focused on strategic interest.¹³

6.4 Ethnic and Islamic identity

Ethnic identity (clan identity in the Somali context) has been the cornerstone of peace building initiative while at the same time clan identity has played a significant role in the initiation and perpetuation of the civil war. However it has to be noted that clan identity has been used as a mobilization tool for those pursuing their personal objectives. These arguments is based on John Burton human needs theory which argues that conflict results from unmet needs and identity is one of the basic human needs which is not negotiable.¹⁴

The clan identity has failed to resolve the conflict as clan rivalry is deeply entrenched within the Somali community. Each want to dominate state power thus militias based on clans rocked havoc in Somalia. The clan system based on the 4.5 formulae adopted in Nairobi Conference (2002) has brought to the fore the equality of clans as the smaller clans see

¹¹ UN office of the special Advisor on Africa (OSAA) *Assessing the role of civil society in the prevention of Armed Conflict in Africa*, November 2004 P. 1

¹² **Ibid**

¹³ **Ibid**

^M **Burton j., Conflict: *Basic Human needs* New York, St. Martins press (1990) P. 63**

themselves being despised and given lesser consideration thus become one of the factors that caused the collapse it was used by spoilers seeking political positions.¹⁵

Clan identity based conflict resolution has failed in the peace building effort in Somalia. The organizers of the peace conference have faced the difficulty of identifying the right representative of each clan as warlords were not the right representative of the clan according to Mohamed Warsame a former Somalia Ambassador to UN¹⁶ clan identity also strongly affects the legitimacy of government as it has a strong impact on the perception of representation and territorial ownership, the popular perception among Somalis is that each clan owns the traditional areas that it inhabits so that only that clan would have a say in the political and economic issues that are related to that part of the country.¹

The emergence of ideological differences between the Islamic groups and between the Islamic movements and the secular group has complicated the peace initiatives in the conflict though the Islamic groups have been critical actors in the conflict they have not been involved in the political process. The implication of these omissions has been the rejection of all peace initiatives undertaken by the international community who are viewed as foreigners thus perpetuating the conflict.

The Islamic groups are well organized political group and most of them have national agenda though there are some radicals who need to be de-radicalized and integrated within the

¹⁵ Mohamed S. Interview with Mohamed Ali Nairobi August 15

¹⁶ Mohamed S. Interview with Mohamed Warsame Nairobi former Ambassador to Somalia to UN Nairobi 2" September 2011

¹⁷ Elmi A.A. Op Cit P. 38

Somali conflict.¹⁸In examining the Somali conflict, it's very clear that the Somali conflict had an ethnic and ideological dimension. The ethnic factor has however been overshadowed by the ideological factor and any attempt to manage the conflict has ignored this aspect. There is need to integrated the various ideological differences to get sustainable peace.

6.5 Strategies of religious leaders

Religious leaders and institutions are trusted and their involvement in conflict management is essential¹'.The major strategy adopted by religious leaders has been advocacy. They advocate for social justice and human rights in the conflict area; to build capacity in conflict analysis and resolution; promote peaceful co-existence between different communities.

Dialogue within the conflicting parties and building peace at the grassroots level have been very instrumental peace initiatives undertaken by religious leaders though their initiatives are rarely appreciated.

6.6 Somali Religious Leaders and conflict management Initiatives

Islam as a religion played a significant role in the lives of Somalis. It was and still a strong identity that compete and at time replaces the clan identity for individual Somalis." Hersi argues that Islam as a religion and a system of values thoroughly permeates all aspects of Somali life that it is difficult to conceive of any meaning in the term Somali itself without at the same time implying Islamic identity.²¹

•[^]bid

" Abu Numeir M.A *A framework for non-violence and peace building in Islam*, *Journal of Law and religion* vol 5 No. 1 (2000) P. 210

¹ Elmi A.A. *Op cit* P. 50

²¹ Hersi, A. A. *The Arab factor in Somali history, the origin and the development of the Arab enterprise and cultural influence in the Somali peninsula.*(Los Angeles University of California Press (1977) P. 29

Somalis have used religion in even every aspect of life. They have used Islam to resist colonial forces and any transgression among themselves. Said Mohamed Abdille Hassan used Islam to mobilize Somalis against the colonialist Great Britain, Italy and France." Later nationalist movement adopted both nationalist and religious rhetoric when they were mobilizing Somalis against the colonial forces such as Ali Hussein Mohamed Dhidan.

Somali clans also used Islam when resisting what they considered to be transgression from other clans. During the civil war many poets who wanted to justify their struggle used both clan and religious rhetoric in mobilizing people against the Barre government. These poets include Mohamed Qandal of the Ogaden clan and Ali Baafas of Issaq clan.

The religious leaders in Somalia were aligned to the two major Islamic orientations that were dominant in the Islamic world. Ikhwan and Salafi were the two major orientations that have taken root in Somalia. Ikhwan was established 1928 in Egypt by Sheikh Hassan Albana and several Islamic movements in Somalia identify themselves with this orientation these are; Islah, tajamu Al - Islam.²³ The second group of the religious leaders represented the Salafi orientation this include Al - Shabab and Hizbul - Islam led by Dahir Aways who is currently under the list of the United State terror group.

The religious leaders of both orientations worked together after the collapse of state institution in 1991. One of the religious leaders, Sheikh Nur Barud²⁴ gave an account of how the religious leaders come together and issued declaration and the cessation of hostilities. He said

²² Lewis, I M *Pastoral Democracy*, (London Transaction Publishers (1999) P. 38 ^

^{B 6} Mohamed. S.. An interview with Yussuf Mohamed a religious scholar, Nairobi 1 ^ September, 2011

³⁴ Mohamed.S. An interview with Sheikh Nur Barud a religious scholar, Nairobi, 2r August, 2011

"We issued a declaration dubbed "Saut Al Haq" the just voice in which we demanded the establishment of civilian government that will restore peace and order".

- he response of the Religious leaders is not a new phenomenon as traditionally the religious leaders were the first to respond and mediate conflicting parties whenever an outbreak of conflict occurred within the Somali community. Abdirahman notes that religious leaders used to carry out caravan of peace in the conflict areas reminding the parties to the conflict about the fear of Allah and the consequence of the conflict on the lives and property of people."⁵ They had a unique way of intervening a conflict by raising the holy Quran and standing between the conflicting parties. This method was very effective because of the high status of religious leaders within the Somali community.

Sheikh Ibrahim Ahmed'" another religious leader described how they have positively participating in the conflict.

"We opened mosques and declared them sanctuaries for any faction willing to seek resolution to the conflict. One of the biggest conflict resolution efforts by religious leaders took place in 1992 when clan elders failed to stop the violence between Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahda Mohamed. Mohamed Maalim. Sheikh Ibrahim Saley meet with both Ali Mahdi and Mohamed Farah Aideed and advised them against escalating the conflict".²⁷

The religious leaders formed organizations and lobby groups such as the Islamic Council in 1994 to mediate the warring faction. Their efforts were confined to giving public lectures and sending delegation to the conflicting parties and mediating between them. The signing of

²⁵ Abdullahi A. "*Tribalism. nationalism and Islam, the crisis of political loyalty in Islam*. Thesis submitted to the faculty of graduate states and research institute of Islamic students(M.G Gill university Montreal (1992) P. 40

[^] Mohamed. S Interview with Ibrahim Ahmed .religious scholar .Nairobi,20^h August,2011

²⁷ The role of the Islamic perspective in the Somali conflict, Al - Daawa 57 edition Feb 1998 London P. 53

peace agreement such as the agreement of the clans in Hiran and Mogadisho 1994 and the Baidoa agreement were the successful efforts of the religious leaders²⁸. It's clear that during the period between 1991 - 2000, the religious leaders were not directly involved to the conflict. Their role was mainly peaceful intervention between the conflicting parties. However, after the September 11, 2001 their role has changed from being a third party to an active actor in the conflict.

The Al Qaeda attack on September 11, 2001 has transformed the conflict by changing the actors involved. The warlords with the backing from Ethiopia government and American intelligence began to hunt down religious leaders and labeled them as terrorists. The warlords who felt threatened by the emerging influence of the religious leaders within the Somali community took advantage of the America war on terror by labeling the religious leaders as terrorists so as to get financial assistance from America. An interview with Ismail Buba former foreign affairs minister commenting on the move of America told me that Americans have fallen into the trap of the warlords by escalating the conflict."¹¹

However America may not have blindly followed the advice of the warlords as argued by Buba they may had their own strategic interest of ensuring that groups that might threaten their national security should not emerge from Somalia thus it was a preventive security move by America.

After 2001, the religious leaders took more proactive role in the conflict; they waged war against the warlords. The umbrella body of the Somali scholars led by Sheikh Mohamed

***Ibid**

**ˆ Mohamed.S. An interview with Ismail Buba former foreign affairs minister and a diplomat Nairobi.3' .
Semptember,2011**

.nrahim Suley and Sheikh Nur Barud issued a fatwa (religious decree) that it was incumbent upon to fight with the warlords. An interview with Sheikh Nur Barud in Nairobi explained to me the reasons as to why they had to take such a decision. The reason was to guarantee the security, safety and wealth of the people against the warlords whom he accuses of displacing innocent people from their homes and killing innocent lives for their personal interest.³⁰

The religious leaders formed Islamic courts which finally defeated the warlord in 2005 and secured a secure environment. The courts secured justice for those who have been affected by the conflict through killing of their family member, losing of their property and other body harm inflicting upon them by those in the conflict. The religious leaders enjoyed support from the people by providing social services. They ran schools, health centers and provide security for businessmen in the private sector. Mohamed Yussuf interviewed during the study told me this group cannot be ignored anymore because they have many supporters and a constituency.³¹ It's evident that the Somali religious leaders are interested in transforming the conflict and most of them would want to resort to non violent means if conditions allowed.

Religious leaders such as Sheikh Ali Dhere established an Islamic court in the Northern part of Mogadishu which was known for its criminal activity especially the Siisii Street. There were many sayings that become popular with this area before the establishment of the court. According to one of the scholars (Sh Nur Mohamed) told me one of the sayings as "Siradka Qiyama Iyo Siisii alow namorti" (Oh God save us from the trouble that are associated with

⁵⁰ Mohamed. S. An interview with Sheikh Nur Barud religious scholar in Nairobi, 2^r August, 2011

³¹ Mohamed. S. An interview with Sheikh Nur Mohamed, religious leader in Nairobi, 1st August, 2011

he Day of Judgment and those of Siisii street). The interviewee told me that siisii the most dangerous street become safe after the courts secured the area.

- the aim of the religious leaders to become active actors in the conflict was not to seek power according to Nur but to liberate the Somalis from the invading forces such as Ethiopia and warlords. The efforts of the leaders though gained support from the people because of the Law and order they have secured, it has brought them into focus in the international arena as a group with ulterior motives.

The human right concerns raised by the human right groups on how the sharia courts were implementing the law by amputating hands of criminals without proper judicial system has painted them in bad light in the eyes of the international community.³¹ Hashi notes that the representative of the European Union (EU) to Somalia at the time Sigured Illing visited northern Mogadishu and meet with politicians. According to Hashi Mr. Illing told politicians to do something about the human right issue as it may affect the presence of humanitarians' agencies? Hashi says in the western world anarchy is more tolerable than the Islamic way of restoring law and order.

Hashi seems to suggest that it was only the international community that raised concerns about the conduct of the court but equally important was the Somali population who also were not happy with some of the crude methods and unprofessional manner the judgments were carried out. Abdullahi Ali one of Somali experts explain to me that those in charge of

³¹ Mohamed.S. Interview with Nur Mohamed, Religious scholar Nairobi 1st August 2011

³³ Hashi A.N. "*Leadership racism, weapons and clan politics in Somalia.*(Mogadishu Horn of Africa printing press 1996) P. 103.

managing the judicial process were not well trained thus passed hurried judgments that was not well thought of.³⁴

The use of force to dismantle the warlords and the human right concern raised during the operation of the courts has significantly made the religious leaders to be viewed with suspicion by the international community. Their actions seem to have vindicated the propaganda of the warlords that extreme groups are emerging in Somalia has made the international community to be cautious about them. This partly explains why in the reconciliation efforts organized by the regional and international organization the religious leader were not involved.

6.7 The implication of Islamic Identity on the Somali Conflict

For any meaningful peace process to take place its necessary to include all the actors on the ground which means the Somali religious leaders have to be accepted and included in the state building effort. But the international community does not yet seem to be ready to allow the religious leaders to the negotiating table as an active actor in the conflict or at least as mediators. According to Abdullahi Haji Ali a conflict practitioner and currently Member of Parliament argues that they are a number of factor that make the international community not to accept the religious leaders as a partner in the peace building process. First, the modern system of government that they want to impose based on Liberal democracy is contrary to the Islamic state that they (religion leaders) would want for Somalia.

^M Mohamed S. Interview with Abdullahi Haji Ali conflict practitioner Nairobi 1st September 2011

Secondly Ethiopia and Kenya whom he referred it as frontline counties are worried about an Islamic agenda emanating if they are involved. He says they are harboring the ambition of greater Somalia that will make part of Ethiopia (Ogaden region) and Kenya (North Eastern) to be part of Somalia thus do not trust them at all.³⁵

Abdalla is supported by Roland Paris who argues that the Islamic movement style of governance that they wish Somalia to adapt is not the same as the state building effort in Somalia undertaken by the West and the regional governments.³⁶

The argument of Abdalla is corroborated by the actions of the leaders of the Islamic Court when they extended their authority to large part of Somalis. One of the leaders of the Islamic Court Union hinted that they are going to pursue their objectives until they liberate all the regions of Somalia implying the Ogaden region in Ethiopia which was under contention between Ethiopia and Somalia this prompted Ethiopia to attack Somalia and defeated the Court Union. On the other hand former president of Kenya Daniel Arap Moi speaking in the National Defence university in Washington DC in September 2003 told participant that Somalia at independence it was claiming part of Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia initiating armed conflict to try and realize their dreams. Their neighbors fear that a reunited and prosperous nation might resurrect Somalis territorial claims. On the other hand there is fear by the US that if given a chance, we shall challenge the US war on terror as we believe that the war on terror is against Islam said one of the religious scholars "

⁵⁵ Mohamed.S An interview with Abdulla Haji Ali Conflict Practitioner Nairobi, 1* September.2011
Paris R peace building and the limit to liberal democracy, *international security* 22 No 2 (1997) P. 54
Mohamed S. An interview Daud Ali religious leader, Nairobi,30thAaugust.2011

This mistrust between the religious leaders and the international community has alienated them into the periphery in the peace building process. Many of the religious leaders and scholars interviewed have different opinion on the basis of building the state and the form of government best for the country. Scholars such as Mohamed Warsame known as "kimiki" a former Somali ambassador to UN, US and France and the president of Galmadug state 2008 - 2009 Said to me that the clan system is the best way to address the conflicts. The clan identity he argues is the only identity that Somali can sort their difference." The religious scholars such as Sheikh Barrud counter such arguments by Saying if clan identity is used then the powerful and armed clans would use their might against the unarmed thus perpetrating the conflict.³⁹

The Islamic religious scholars want to install an Islamic based state and their proposal clashes with the liberal ideal that is embedded within the international community peace building efforts. This difference of strategy has led the international community to label them as groups with radical ideology that is not compatible with the modern system of governance thus all efforts have been put in place to keep them away from the political process as Condolisa Rice argued

"Although we do not know whether politics will ultimately de-radicalize violent groups we do know that excluding them from the political process grants them power without responsibility.⁴⁰

³⁸ Mohamed S. An interview with Mohamed Warsame, former Ambassador of Somalia to UN Nairobi 2nd September.2011

³⁹ Mohamed.S. An interview with Nur Banid, Somali religious leader Nairobi 21st August 2011

⁴⁰ Rice.C. "Rethinking, the National interest America realism for a new world. *Foreign affairs* 87 No. 4 (2008) P. 2

The suspicions of the international community is however valid as they are element with extreme ideologies that have tarnished the good image of the well intention religious leaders. It is therefore the responsibility of those involved in the peace building process to identify the moderate Muslim leaders. The Djibouti conference in 2008 between the Transitional federal Government and the Alliance for Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) included a good number of religious leaders among them Sheikh Shariff Sheikh Ahmed who was later elected as president is a step in the right direction in recognizing the positive role they can play in the peace building process. Sheikh Shariff himself was among the scholars responsible for the establishment of the Islamic Court Union and was the head of the Court Union before they were ousted by Ethiopia.

Sheikh Shariff government in its reconciliation efforts recognized the role of religious leaders by forming the Uleema council (religion leader's council). The aim of the council was to create a religious authority that could provide moral leadership to people.⁴¹

The council indeed provided leadership with its ranks was highly respectable scholars within the Somali community such as Omar Farrog, denouncing all forms of violence instigated by extremist within the Islamic movement whose action are hurting the Somali community by destroying the good image the Somali community had for the religious leaders.

6.8 Conclusion

Islam is both an identity and faith to the Somali it's therefore imperative to consider the Islamic identity and the role that religious leaders can play in the state building effort. Challenging and alienating the religious leaders and Islamic based movement will only make

⁴¹ Mohamed S An interview with Mohamed Hussein a religious scholar Nairobi, 25th August, 2011

them enjoy the support of the Somalis who are apprehensive of outside intervention. It's therefore crucial that if peace and security are to be sustained in Somalia the engagement of religious leaders will be crucial. The official track one diplomacy is vital in conflict management but it cannot function effectively without the complimentary role of the unofficial track.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Summary

Chapter one looked at the background of the study, statement of the research problem objectives of the study, justification of the study and the methodology of the research project. Chapter two explored an overview of the Somali conflict and looked at the various peace conferences and their failures. In chapter three, the study examined third party interventions and the effectiveness of the interventions on the Somali conflict. Chapter four analyzed ethno-ideological conflict and analyzed the causes of this conflict. The study then examined strategies and roles of religion and religious leaders in conflict management. Finally, chapter six gives critically analyses of the failures of the peace initiatives, significance of third party interventions, ethnic and Islamic identity and roles of religious leaders.

7.2 Key findings

After independence the country went in to war with war Ethiopia over the Ogaden region then in 1980's an insurgency from the North ,the inter clan war after the overthrow of Siyad Barre and finally ideological rivalry between the religious movement and the secularist. Despite the fact that Somalia was considered to be a unique state in Africa having a single ethnic group, the same language and religion it puzzled experts why should the Somalis fight.¹ The unique features of the Somali would have been a great advantage however with such commonality people will always find ways of differentiating among themselves.

¹ Adam, H. Op Cit, p20

The United Nations, the European Union, the African Union and IGAD have made an attempt to manage the Somali conflict. The United Nations and African Union intervention was informed by the requirement of their charter and the study agrees that their intervention is legitimate. Other organizations and governments have also intervened on humanitarian grounds which is acceptable.

The United Nations though it intervened in the Somali conflict it was accused of a late response to the crisis because it was focusing its attention in the Balkans. Mohamed Sahnun, the UN special envoy to Somalia, was of the view that "If the international community had intervened earlier and more effectively much of the catastrophe could have been avoided." The international community's interventions, though legitimate, their mode of solving the conflict is what the study has differed with. The international community is trying to manage the conflict through state building efforts. The initiative, however, has left out an important stakeholder like the religious leaders and legitimate clan elders; thus, no successful conflict resolution has been achieved.

The United Nations has left Somalia in March 1995 without having achieved their aim of restoring peace and reconciliation³ in the discussion of religious leaders; we have found that they have played a significant role in the maintenance of Islamic values amongst the Somalis. Their participation in politics has been indirect; they usually keep giving advice and instruction to the administrative bodies, especially in cases of conflict between two or more clans or sub-clans. During the era of Siyad Barre's rule in 1969 - 90, the religious leaders

² Sahnun, M., *Somalia the missed opportunity* (Washington DC United States Institute for Peace 1994) P. XIII
The United Nations and Somalia 1992 - 1996 (The United Nations Blue Books series Vol. VIII P. 68)

become weak and undermined by the secular state. However they re-asserted their role during the rebellion against Barre regime. They engage themselves in social development with the objective of returning the country back to normalcy by enforcing the Islamic law.

Religious leaders have played some role both positive and negative in the management of the conflict. During the struggle for independence they spearhead the liberation movement, in the era of the dictator Siyad Barre they managed to mobilize people against the ruthless dictator and engaged the conflict to wrestle power from the warlords who have caused suffering to the Somali population.

Their engagement in the conflict however was however taken advantage by foreigners, with foreign ideology thus dented their reputation with the emergence of extreme groups such as Al — Shabab though they are still religious leaders with genuine intention fighting for the cause of Somalis.

The religious leaders and Islamic movements with religious orientation are advocating for the establishment of Islamic state based on the Islamic sharia while the secular politicians are for a secular state thus creating conflict between the religious group on one side and the other faction on the other side. This confrontation has lead to the failure of implementing the agreement reached as the initiatives made by the international community has not been warmly received because it was seen as "foreign" to the Somalis according to Mohamed Warsame.

The Somali conflict has reached a level where the inter clan rivalry has reduced but still lacks a common philosophy to unite them and the study recommends that unifying philosophy is

⁴ Mohamed S. An interview with Mohamed Warsame former diplomat, Nairobi²nd September 2011

Islam and the religious leaders to spearhead that effort so as to bring peace in the Somali society. However the support of the international community is still needed in terms of availing resources but the ultimate decision on the way forward rest with the Somalis themselves with full participation of all actors.

7.3 Recommendations

The study recommends multidimensional approach to be undertaken in the management of the Somali conflict. In this approach both track one and two diplomacy to be blended as they complement each other and more emphasis to be given to religious leaders due to their level of respectability within the Somali society. This is in line with Thomas Bailey argument that the general and the diplomat should cooperate in both peace and war since diplomatic and military affairs are intertwined.⁵

To find solution for the current complicated dispute one of the main steps to be taken is to reconcile secular politician and religious leaders. There is need of removing the misunderstanding between these two groups. Clarifying the role of Islamic law in politics and public affairs need to be addressed.

Education and training for both secular and religious groups need to be enhanced in order to enlighten both sides. Secular leaders should have sufficient knowledge about Islam and its main principle while religious leaders must be familiar with modern system of governance so

⁵ Thomas B. *"The art of diplomacy, the American experience* (New York Appleton - century Croft (1968)P. 214

that they are able to interpret Islam according to the current situation. This will help to remove misunderstanding between the two groups.

The study recommends open and fair dialogue with moderate religious leader so that they can take their role of preaching people not to engage on act of violence that destabilize the country and deny the Somalis their statehood. The engagement of the moderate leaders will alienate the extremist hence reduce their influence within the Somali community. The international and regional organizations to impose an embargo and effectively monitor arms that infiltrate into Somalia so that groups with destabilizing objectives are denied their source of arms and other material support.

The study recommends that any peace building initiative should not be spearhead by regional state as there is a lot of sensitivity towards regional state especially Ethiopia which has had an animosity with Somalia

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