



UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
COLLEGE OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
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**CHALLENGES TO FOOD AID TARGETING:
THE CASE STUDY OF DARFUR**

BY
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DECLARATION

This project paper is my original work and has not been presented for a degree award in any other institution.

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Abstract

This research is on the challenges of food aid targeting: the case of Darfur which aims at establishing whether food aid relief agencies consider the most essential factors when distributing the food aid that is who, when and where. It further sought to establish if targeting is effective and efficient in Darfur and also find out the challenges faced in the different levels of targeted. The main objective of the study is to find out whether there is proper food aid relief targeting in Darfur. The specific objectives are; to identify and analyze the various targeting strategies used by humanitarian organizations, to identify and analyze targeting challenges in Darfur and to assess the community's level of satisfaction with the targeting approaches used so far. The study was guided by the Inclusion and Exclusion model. In food aid targeting, exclusion error occurs when a proportion of individuals eligible to receive food does not access it. Assuming the overall size of the targeted population is known, the exclusion error can be derived from the estimate of coverage. Inclusion error occurs when a proportion of individuals access the food when they are not eligible to receive it.

The descriptive research design was used in this study. This study utilized the probability and purposive sampling. Simple random sampling was used to select the respondents from the target population as it gives each element an equal chance of being selected. One refugee camp was randomly selected from each of the Darfur regions namely North, South and West. Questionnaires were the key research instrument for data collection. A step rating scale was used to collect data on the levels of satisfaction by the beneficiaries of food aid.

Among the key findings were that on average 26% of families in the camps have not been registered as beneficiaries of relief food in which Kalma has the highest number of families in the camp that are not registered (36%), followed by Morni (25%) and then Zamzam (16%). The main criteria used for selecting agencies include the agencies mandate (Whether the agency's core competence is relief distribution), experience of the agency (for how long the agency has been in the business of relief distribution) and those that have been screened and identified by the government. Evident too is the fact that all the agencies contacted indicated that the process of identifying and selecting beneficiaries is done through a Food Security Assessment. The distribution of ration cards is skewed given that a child above 5 years old is legible for a ration card. In general the recipients of food aid were satisfied with the services they were getting. Lastly, I offer my regards and blessings to all of those who supported me in any respect during the completion of the project.

TABLE OF CONTENT	PAGE
DECLARATION	1
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	2
ABSTRACT	3
TABLE OF CONTENT	I
LIST OF FIGURES	IV
ACRONYMS	4
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION	5
1.1.0. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY	5
1.1.2 DARFUR SITUATION.....	9
1.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT.....	10
1.3. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY	12
1.3.1 <i>General Objective</i>	12
1.3.2 <i>Specific Objectives:</i>	12
1.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS.....	12
1.5 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY.....	12
DEFINITION OF IMPORTANT TERMS	13
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW	15
2.1. INTRODUCTION.....	15
2.2. SECURITY	17
2.3 IMPACT OF RELIEF.....	18
2.4 TARGETING	20
2.5. RELIEF DIVERSION	24
2.6 RESTRICTED RELIEF ACCESS.....	25
2.7 LIMITED PROGRAM OPTIONS.....	26
2.8. DOUBLE REGISTRATIONS.....	26
2.9. VARIOUS AGENCIES INVOLVED IN FOOD AID RELIEF AND TARGETING.....	26
2.9.1 <i>World Food Programme (WFP)</i>	26
2.9.2. <i>Cooperating Partners</i>	27
2.9.3. <i>Food Relief Committees</i>	27
2.9.4. <i>Government of Sudan—Humanitarian Aid Commission</i>	27
2.9.5. <i>Recipient communities</i>	27
2.9.6. <i>Local administration</i>	28
2.9.7. <i>Traditional leaders</i>	28
2.9.8 <i>The targeting process:</i>	29
2.9.9. <i>Conceptual framework</i>	30
2.9.10. <i>Theoretical framework</i>	31
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	33
3.0. INTRODUCTION.....	33
3.1. RESEARCH DESIGN.....	33
3.3. POPULATION.....	33
3.4 STUDY SAMPLES AND SAMPLING PROCEDURES	33
3.5 RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS.....	34
3.6. DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES (DIRECT RECIPIENTS)	34
3.7. DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION.....	34
3.8. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS	34
3.9. SITE DESCRIPTION	35

CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION.....	42
4.0. INTRODUCTION.....	42
4.1.1: <i>The social Characteristics of the respondents</i>	43
4.1.2 <i>Gender of the respondents</i>	43
4.1.3 <i>Age of the respondents</i>	44
4.1.4. <i>Size of the family</i>	44
4.2.0. <i>Targeting strategies</i>	45
4.2.1: <i>Number of families in the camps vs. those registered</i>	47
4.2.2: <i>The criteria of selecting agencies to participate in the distribution of relief food</i>	49
4.2.3: <i>The criteria of selecting recipients of food aid</i>	49
4.2.4. <i>The criteria used to register beneficiaries</i>	50
4.2.5: <i>Determining the quantities for distribution</i>	50
4.2.6: <i>The channels used for distribution</i>	51
4.2.7. <i>Frequency of food aid distribution</i>	52
4.2.8. <i>Plans the agencies have to address the problem of non registration</i>	52
4.2.9: <i>Challenges the agencies are faced with</i>	52
4.2.10: <i>Suggestions to deal with the challenges</i>	52
4.2.11. <i>Levels of satisfaction by the recipients of relief food</i>	53
4.2.12 <i>Graph on overall levels of satisfaction (%)</i>	54
CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION.....	56
5.0. SUMMARY	56
5.1 CONCLUSIONS	57
5.2. RECOMMENDATIONS	58
6.0. REFERENCES	59
APPENDICES 1: CONSENT OF RESEARCH PARTICIPATION LETTER.....	I
APPENDIX II: QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN.....	III
APPENDIX A: FOOD AID RELIEF BENEFICIARIES.....	III
APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR FOOD AID RELIEF AGENCIES.....	V
APPENDIX C: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR FOOD AID RELIEF COMMITTEES.....	VII
APPENDIX D: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR HUMANITARIAN AID COMMISSION	IX

List of Tables

Table 1: Showing the gender distribution of household heads43

Table 2: Showing the age of the respondents44

Table 3: Showing the size of families in the three camps45

Table 4: The number of families in the camps and those actually registered for relief48

Table 5: Showing the distribution of ration cards50

Table 6: Standard relief food rations51

List of figures

Figure 1: The Inclusion, Exclusion Error Model	32
Figure 2: Level of satisfaction among respondents of Morni	53
Figure 3: Level of Satisfaction among respondents of Zam Zam	53
Figure 4: Level of Satisfaction among respondents of Kalma	54
Figure 5: level of satisfaction among respondents of three camps (%).	55

Acronyms

CBTD: Community Based Targeting and Distribution

CPs: Cooperating Partners

DFSNA: Darfur Food Security and Nutrition Assessment

DPA: Darfur Peace Agreement

EMOP: Emergency operations.

FRCs: Food Relief Committees

GOS: Government of Sudan

HAC: Humanitarian Aid Commission

IDPs: Internal Displaced Persons

IOM: International Office for Migration

JEM: Justice and Equality Movement

NGOs: Non Governmental Organizations

SLA: Sudan Liberation Army

SHARTIE: Main clan chief

SULTAN: clan chief of chiefs

UNAMID: United Nations and African Mission in Darfur

UNOCHA: United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

UMDA: clan chief –one tribe

PRRO: Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations.

WFP: World Food Program

TSAP-FP: The Social Acceptance Project –Family Planning

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1.0. Background of the Study

The term “humanitarian aid” has outgrown its traditional Red Cross definition of providing swift emergency assistance to people in disaster or emergency situations. Today humanitarian action is commonly defined in a broader sense; according to Larry Minear and Thomas Weiss (1995) it is “activities undertaken to improve the human condition.” This study has adopted the contemporary definition of humanitarian aid according to Minear and Weiss (ibid), and named the traditional definition of humanitarian aid “food aid relief” to remove ambiguity. Also known as emergency aid, food aid relief refers to any provision of aid during an emergency that is meant to attend to the immediate needs of people.

Food aid relief is any provision of aid that benefits people suffering from a shortage of food. It can be used to improve peoples' lives in the short term, so that a society can increase its standard of living to the point that food aid is no longer required. Conversely, badly managed food aid can create problems by disrupting local markets, depressing crop prices, and discouraging food production. Sometimes a cycle of food aid dependence can develop. Its provision, or threatened withdrawal, is sometimes used as a political tool to influence the policies of the destination country, a strategy known as food politics. Sometimes, food aid provisions will require certain types of food be purchased from certain sellers, and food aid can be misused to enhance the markets of donor countries. International efforts to distribute food to the neediest countries are often co-ordinate by the World Food Programme. That is meant to attend to a person’s immediate requirements for survival or recovery, Needs on the other hand as used in a disaster context, refer to immediate requirements for survival or recovery from a calamity.” “Needs arise out of the crisis itself, and are relatively short-term.

Food aid relief is any provision food assistance during an emergency that is meant to attend to a person’s immediate requirements for survival or recovery, necessary for social services, and security when a person is faced with circumstances beyond her or his control. Needs on the other hand as used in a disaster context, refer to immediate requirements for survival or recovery from a calamity.” “Needs...arise out of the crisis itself, and are relatively short-term.”

Targeting is defined as directing a particular type or quantity of food, to a defined population group. Food aid relief targeting involves ensuring that assistance reaches people who need it when and where they need it, in an appropriate form, in appropriate quantities and through effective modalities and conversely does not flow to people who do not need it. (Barrett & Maxwell, 2005)

Targeting is further defined as follows:-

- a) The identification and selection of certain groups or households or even individuals, and the distribution of benefits (or costs) to them' [Lundberg & Diskin 1994, p.4].
- b) It is the process by which areas and populations are selected to receive a resource ... and then provided with it' [Borton & Shoham 1990, p79].
- c) Restricting the coverage of an intervention to those who are perceived to be most at risk, in order to maximize the benefit of the intervention whilst minimizing the cost.' [Jaspars & Young 1995, p.136].
- d) The practical process of] defining, identifying and reaching the intended recipients of aid' [Sharp 1997, p.4].

The above definitions of targeting reflect its two-edged nature: such that in order to select beneficiaries, it is inherently necessary to exclude others and restrict the distribution of resources. The main reasons for doing this are: humanitarian reasons so that the food aid relief agencies concentrate on assisting the neediest; efficiency reasons to ensure that the food aid relief organizations maximize the impact of scarce resources; and development reasons so as to minimize dependency and economic disincentives). All three of these concerns are high on the current agenda in Darfur.

Targeting food aid within different relief agencies and NGO's is important for three main reasons; first to reach those most in need of food, to maximize the use and impact of scarce resources; and to prevent over-supplying food aid which may result in negative impact on communities (e.g. dependency and displacing traditional social reciprocity networks), and markets (e.g. depressing prices and acting as a disincentive to production).

According to Sharp (1995), there are four basic types of targeting methods:

1. Administrative targeting: in this type of targeting, beneficiaries are selected by outsiders (such as project managers within NGO'S or government officials), using pre-defined criteria or indicators which should be as objective, measurable and standardized as possible. This is the type of targeting method used in welfare systems in developed countries. However, it has major weaknesses when applied in situations where management capacity, accountability procedures, and the feasibility of collecting and analyzing the necessary standardized data are limited. At the beneficiary level of targeting, it gives considerable responsibility and power to decision-makers, laying them open to risks of bias, corruption, intimidation, theft or honest error due to poor information. At the geographic area level, there is no alternative to administrative targeting: data and information systems for this level are therefore crucial.

2. Self-targeting: The beneficiaries themselves decide on whether or not to take up the offer of aid. In order to achieve this, the intervention needs to be designed so as to offer a benefit which only the target group are expected to want (such as a low-preference commodity or a small ration) and /or to incur a cost which only the target group will be willing to pay. Successful self-targeting removes the need for costly and potentially biased administrative selection, and self-targeting elements in program design tend to limit the number of beneficiaries, thus saving on food aid quantities. However, it does not remove the need for good information and analysis, which are needed in order to determine the cost and benefit factors which will attract the intended target group. Inclusion and exclusion errors can both be high if the design is wrong, or if limitations on the number of beneficiaries produce competition for entry among the eligible.

3. Market targeting: In this type of targeting, there is no direct selection of individual recipients, but interventions are made in the market to manipulate price, supply, or demand either of food or of commodities sold by the target group in exchange for food. Examples are releasing strategic grain stocks onto markets in targeted areas (to increase the supply and therefore bring down or stabilize the price); or purchasing livestock from pastoralists during a food crisis (to maintain demand for this vital asset and keep up the price, thus supporting the purchasing power of livestock owners). A disadvantage of such market based targeting is that it tends to be quite indiscriminate in its effect, benefiting broad groups such as all maize-purchasers or all livestock-

sellers in the area. It is therefore generally more advantageous to the better-off (who are likely to buy and sell larger quantities) than the poor.

Well-designed market interventions can, however, provide an alternative to food aid by strengthening people's own capacity to cope with a crisis, and price stabilization in food-insecure areas is a common objective of government food sales. It is rare for food aid resources as such to be used directly in markets with the aim of reaching particular target groups, particularly in emergencies. A broader but related issue is the role of efficient markets in redistributing food shortages, ensuring availability for those who can purchase, and thus minimizing the overall need for food aid.

4. Community targeting: in which beneficiaries are selected not by outside managers but by insiders—community members who are themselves potential beneficiaries. Selection criteria tend to be more subjective and less standardized than in administrative targeting. The institutional features and the effectiveness of community targeting vary enormously, but it is a widespread and important element at the final (end-user) stage of targeting. Governments, WFP and NGOs frequently stress the importance of community decision-making, often through committees, in food aid distributions. It is, however, important to realize that beneficiaries and their communities may have quite different concepts of vulnerability and fairness from those assumed by the outsiders designing food aid programs (Sharp, 1995).

In practice, these four targeting types are often combined. Food aid distribution programs usually include elements of two or more targeting methods at different stages. Area/geographic targeting are entirely administrative, while beneficiary targeting often features a combination of administrative, self-targeting and community selection elements. The various distribution mechanisms for food aid (selective free distribution, food-for-work, school feeding, etc.) also, in practice, tend to include elements of more than one type of targeting. For example, free distributions are primarily targeted by administrative or community decision, but self-targeting elements can be introduced through the choice of commodity distributed, the timing or location of distributions, etc. Food-for-work, on the other hand, is generally considered self-targeting because the non-needy will exclude themselves by choosing not to work, but in reality a degree of administrative selection is very often added (due to limited resources or other factors).

1.1.2 Darfur Situation

War in Darfur erupted in February 2003 after years of skirmishes over land and water between ethnic groups that identify themselves mainly as "African" or "Arab." The two main rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement, accused the central government in Khartoum of supporting Arab pastoralists in their disputes with African farmers. Most observers have blamed the Sudanese armed forces and a pro-government militia, known as the Janjaweed, for most of the atrocities in the war, including killing and raping civilians and destroying homes, wells and crops (Suleiman, 2007).

The conflict has already left tens of thousands of people dead. Some 2.3 million require emergency assistance, including an estimated 1.65 million who have been uprooted from their homes. Darfur is home to some 80 tribes and ethnic groups divided between nomads and sedentary communities. The unrest, especially which associated with the SLA, appears to have been identified with one particular ethnic group, the Zaghawa tribe, which straddles the Sudan-Chad border. The JEM group has come to be identified with extremist Islamic political leaders hostile to the present Sudanese government.

Tens of thousands of people in Darfur are at risk of dying for lack of humanitarian aid. Three years into the armed conflict, more than three million people, half the population of Darfur, depend on humanitarian assistance. The massive aid operation put in place in 2004, albeit late, has saved hundreds of thousands of lives but is now under threat. In August 2006 the access of humanitarian organizations to the civilian population fell drastically to its lowest level since 2004 (Amnesty International, 2006).

In July 2006, 470,000 Darfuris were cut off from food aid. This number dropped to 224,000 in September, but it included 139,000 who had not received food aid for four months, according to the World Food Programme. As fighting escalated with the ending of the rainy season, and fresh attacks on civilians drove thousands more people from their homes, humanitarian access to civilians in Darfur remains seriously compromised. Many fled into neighbouring Chad. A humanitarian crisis has ensued. In January 2004, UN media sources reported that "about 85

percent of the 900,000 war-affected people in Darfur...are inaccessible to humanitarian aid, according to the UN, mainly because of insecurity."(Amnesty International, 2006).

Since the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006, humanitarian agencies have been facing increasing obstacles to deliver vital aid to the civilian population. These include, rising insecurity, attacks on aid workers, proper targeting and restrictions on the work of humanitarian agencies by government forces and armed opposition groups have narrowed the space in which humanitarian assistance can be provided in Darfur (Susanne & Sorcha, 2008)

1.2. Problem statement

Targeting is of special importance in food aid relief for two basic reasons. First, food aid relief is a critical resource. People who go without enough and appropriate food for even a relatively short period of time can suffer irreversible health effects of under nutrition and related diseases and injuries. Therefore, reaching beneficiaries who would otherwise suffer under nutrition, in a timely manner, and in an appropriate form is especially important for the effectiveness of food aid relief transfers. And if done right, food aid relief transfers can be fundamental to effective development strategy, by safeguarding the most valuable asset of the poor: the human capital embodied in their health and education (Barrett 2002).

Second, the key alleged problems surrounding food aid –delivery delays, misuse by intermediaries, diversion to resale or feeding livestock or alcohol brewing, dependency, inattention to beneficiaries and security issues all revolve ultimately around questions of targeting. If the donor community could improve the targeting of food aid, it could improve the effectiveness of food aid in accomplishing its primary humanitarian and development aim – the maintenance of valuable human capital – and reduce many of the errors that sometimes make food aid controversial, ineffective, or both.

As food aid relief organizations distribute food aid relief, they have to consider three specific factors to ensure that the right people get the right food aid relief and at the right time. These are “who?”, “where?” And “when?” These can be summarized as who requires assistance, where the targeted groups are physically located, and the way in which needs compare between the groups or areas and when needs should be re-assessed.

War brings a sense of urgency. When humanitarian aid workers operate in conflict-torn countries, they too feel the need to act as quickly as possible. This sense of urgency, however, often leads to hastily organized food aid relief programs that may or may not have a positive impact. This mainly brings about targeting errors which are mainly caused by the lack of considering the “who, where and when” elements causing the programs to have targeting errors.

An ideally targeted program would have neither inclusion nor exclusion errors. Exclusion errors occur when members of the target subpopulation are left out of the program sometimes referred to as “under coverage”. On the other hand, errors of inclusion occur when individuals not in the target subpopulation benefit nonetheless, sometimes referred to as “leakage”. Errors of exclusion entail direct humanitarian costs as people suffer unnecessarily. Errors of inclusion cause waste of scarce resources, often leading to indirect humanitarian costs because transfers to the non-need crowd out inclusion of the truly needy in the face of tight budgets, and they can distort behaviors, especially by disrupting market demand(EMOP - 2010).

All real world transfer programs suffer targeting errors for the simple reasons such as

- Information is costly to collect and process therefore it is impossible to have perfect information about all people at all times (i.e., to know who is and is not needy or eligible for food aid)
- Actual allocations are made for multiple reasons, only one of which is objective need. Especially where means-based screening of prospective beneficiaries proves administratively infeasible – as is true in most low-income countries – then intra-community heterogeneity and factor market failures tend to generate significant errors of inclusion even in self-targeting program designs (Sharp, 1999)

Because a program without targeting errors is practically infeasible, there exists a difficult tradeoff between wasteful and distortion errors of inclusion and potentially damaging errors of exclusion. These errors could largely relate to the strategies put in place by Humanitarian organizations and other stakeholders. This research therefore aimed at establishing whether food aid relief agencies consider the most essential factors when distributing the food aid that is who, when and where. It further sought to establish if targeting is effective and efficient in Darfur and also find out the challenges faced in the different levels of targeted.

1.3. Objectives of the study

1.3.1 General Objective

The overall objective of the study is to find out whether there is proper food aid relief targeting in Darfur.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives:

1. To identify and document the various targeting strategies used by humanitarian organizations.
2. To identify and analyze targeting challenges in Darfur.
3. To assess the community's level of satisfaction with the targeting approaches used so far.

1.4. Research Questions

- What are the food aid relief targeting strategies used by humanitarian organizations in Darfur?
- What are the main challenges faced in the food aid targeting process?
- How satisfied is the Darfur community with relief food they get?

1.5 Scope and limitations of the study

Different countries in Africa such as Somalia, Liberia, Sudan and Northern Uganda are undergoing war and post war crisis. To be able to cover the study well the research will concentrate on Darfur as its one of the areas that receives food aid relief and has numerous targeting issues. On targeting the study restricted itself to analyzing number of families in the camps they are covering and those actually registered for relief aid, the criteria used in selecting agencies to participate in the distribution of relief food, the criteria used in selecting recipients of food aid, the criteria used to register beneficiaries, how the quantities for distribution are determined, the channels used for distribution, frequency of distribution, plans the agencies have to address the problem of non registration, challenges the agencies are faced with and suggestions to deal with the challenges. Further, the study sought the opinion of the Darfur community of relief targeting by looking at their levels of satisfaction.

Definition of important terms

Beneficiaries: are individuals/groups who receive food aid and/or other humanitarian assistances.

Central government: is the government at the level of the nation-state

Conflict: is actual or perceived opposition of needs, values and interests.

Coping strategies: are strategies adopted when households do not have enough food to eat or enough money to buy it.

Distress sales: Occurs when households sell more livestock at throwaway prices for survival.

Emergency: is a situation that poses an *immediate risk* to health, life, property or environment.^[1]
Most emergencies require urgent intervention to prevent a worsening of the situation

Ethnic groups: is a group of people whose members identify with each other, through a common heritage, consisting of a common language, a common culture (often including a shared religion) and a tradition of common ancestry.

Exclusion and inclusion errors: Exclusion errors occur when members of the target subpopulation are left out of the program sometimes referred to as “under coverage”. On the other hand, errors of inclusion occur when individuals not in the target subpopulation benefit nonetheless, sometimes referred to as “leakage”.

Human capital: refers to the stock of competences, knowledge and personality attributes embodied in the ability to perform labor so as to produce economic value.

Humanitarian access: is a specific legal term, referred to the ability by neutral humanitarian actors (such as the United Nations, the ICRC, and foreign or local NGOs), to enter an area during a conflict, to provide humanitarian aid as well as monitor and promote human rights.

Humanitarian crisis: is an event or series of events which represents a critical threat to the health, safety, security or wellbeing of a community or other large group of people, usually over a wide area

Humanitarian organizations: is an organization dedicated to distributing aid.

Individual aid recipients: those designed to receive aid.

Janjaweed: Armed Gunmen from Arab tribes in Darfur region of Sudan.

Livelihood: the capability, assets and activities available to the household to make ends meet.

Remittances: is a transfer of money by a foreign worker to his or her home country and sometimes within the borders of the country and hence internal remittances.

Targeting (Humanitarian context): is a viable way for resource allocation to the neediest people (most vulnerable and most poor households for instance).

Tribe: refer to societies organized largely on the basis of kinship.

Geographical targeting: A form of administrative targeting in which people from outside of the beneficiary communities decide the targeting criteria on the basis of the geographical spread of factors that result in food insecurity.

Institutional targeting: A form of administrative targeting in which people are targeted on the basis of their association with a particular institution e.g. being a pupil at a school.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction

Before the conflict, livelihoods in Darfur were based upon a combination of farming, herding, and trade and labor migration. The region was normally able to achieve food self-sufficiency, except in very bad drought years. The more prosperous and surplus-producing parts of the region were a source both of employment and grain for poorer deficit parts of the region. On the other hand the most food insecure part of the three states has long been the north-east of Darfur.

Ethnicity in Darfur is a historical construct that has limited value in understanding the conflict and groupings in Darfur. The crisis in Darfur is a complex political emergency, in which ethnicity has been mobilized to serve the interests of the main warring parties. Mobilization on the basis of tribal identities and the involvement of different groups in the violence, indicate the nature of resource distribution among different livelihood groups in Darfur. Observing the distribution of, and access to, resources through a livelihood lens provides clear insights into the motives of the different groups involved in the violence.

The conflict has drawn in a complex web of local, national, and transnational interests, which play out in different types of inter-connected conflict throughout the region. From the start of the conflict in 2003, protection threats and restricted access have been major challenges to the humanitarian community. Since then the level of insecurity, the numbers affected, and degree of humanitarian access have evolved and changed. From the early days, the caseload of WFP has coincided with the general estimates of numbers affected, and other, more general humanitarian needs often followed and are based on the registration of beneficiaries for food aid.

As a result of the conflict, an estimated 300,000 people have been killed and almost 2.5 million displaced, while an additional 1.8m are considered in need of humanitarian assistance (UN OCHA 2008).

Many displaced camps have now existed for over five years, becoming increasingly violent and volatile, with reports of deaths, riots and the arming of inhabitants. The government of Sudan continues to promote return, particularly to central or 'cluster villages', which is in turn actively

discouraged by the DPA's non-signatory groups. In some areas like eastern West Darfur, the very mention of return provokes hostility from camp leaders (Sheikhs).

People have continued to be displaced because of conflict and, increasingly, crop failure. The poor harvests of 2006 and 2007 have crushed rural people's remaining coping strategies and led many to move to camps in order to access food and services. UN officials estimate that approximately 50% of new arrivals in the camps are 'harvest-' rather than 'conflict'- affected. This has prompted a recent move by the government to insist on a clear differentiation between 'conflict-affected' and 'harvest-affected' groups, with only conflict-affected individuals considered eligible for assistance as IDPs (UN OCHA 2008).

WFP's policy is to provide emergency rations for two months to new arrivals due to crop failure. With Darfur in a continued situation of acute crisis, where many groups have suffered severe asset depletion and erosion of their livelihoods, it is impossible to make a distinction between 'conflict-affected' and 'harvest-affected'. With no comprehensive peace deal in sight, Darfur therefore remains in an acute humanitarian crisis.

The combination of population displacement, widespread destruction and looting of assets and restricted movement had an immediately devastating impact on lives and livelihoods at the outset of the conflict. Within the first year of the conflict the livelihoods of over a million people were more or less destroyed. This figure has continued to rise as the number of IDPs has risen, to over 2 million today

Livelihoods have been affected in many ways such as: Flight of human capital through displacement as outflow of men and boys to Central Sudan increases to escape the violence. The numbers of conflict-related deaths have also increased leading to reduced human capital. Labour migration, has gone as far as Libya. Those who are still living and working away from their home villages are facing much greater difficulty in sending back remittances.

The frequent attacks have resulted into looting and loss of assets. These assets include; houses, livestock, agricultural tools and infrastructure, seed and food stores. Looting and theft continues in many towns and camps. Many households have engaged in distress sales of animals early in

the conflict, either to raise income when other livelihood sources collapsed or because of the fear of being looted. The consequence of restricted livestock movement and blocked migration routes has since accelerated livestock losses through disease and lack of pasture and water, a particular issue for pastoralists.

Crop production of both staple grains and of cash crops has been badly affected. This is partly because of the destruction of agricultural infrastructure and implements. This has reduced the food productivity in the region adding to the existent crisis. There has been a loss of public infrastructure in many rural areas, including health centers, schools and water supplies. Development assets such as grain banks and revolving funds have often been looted.

Darfur's natural resource base has been badly affected. Large-scale population displacement has resulted in environmental degradation, especially around camps and towns where natural vegetation is rapidly exhausted and there is severe pressure on water sources. Environmental degradation is also an issue where pastoralists are gathered in large concentrations, causing overgrazing and depleted water resources.

Many schools in Darfur are no longer functioning, or more commonly, families can no longer afford to send their children to school. This is one of the main items of expenditure that some households have had to sacrifice, especially IDPs. This poses a threat to human capital in the longer term, for which the experience of South Sudan is a salutary reminder where a generation grew up more or less uneducated.

Due to these distractions many have turned to petty trade, precarious alternatives and daily laboring. These opportunities are poorly remunerated and this has prompted humanitarians to come in and assist.

2.2. Security

Although the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed in 2006, only one rebel faction was included, and the security situation in Darfur has not improved. During the second half of 2006, security deteriorated, as armed groups fractured and new alliances formed and changed wherever a

“power vacuum” was created. The situation remained unpredictable through 2007. Though not at the levels of 2003–2004, on-going insecurity led to more displacement and prevented WFP from reaching identified beneficiaries, with an average of 250,000 targeted individuals cut off from assistance each month of 2006, and 103,500 each month of 2007. Though no accurate data is available, the security situation for the humanitarian agencies and the security situation for the war-affected or displaced population of Darfur are rather different.

After the humanitarian ceasefire agreement was signed by the government and the parties in April 2004 security for humanitarian operations was not a major constraint, at least for the remainder of that year. While the civilian population still faces significant security risks, the level of conflict and new displacement has declined as compared to the period of 2003 to early 2004 which was the height of the Government’s counterinsurgency operations. In the first nine months of 2007, 98 humanitarian vehicles were hijacked, 61 convoys ambushed, 100 humanitarian staff kidnapped, 66 assaulted, and five killed (WFP DFSNA 2007). The increasing conflict and the resulting civilian casualties and attacks on humanitarian actors contributed to a delay in the WFP-planned shift into a PRRO in 2007. Instability and insecurity has worsened in the Darfur states, with no visible political solution on the horizon.

This insecurity has resulted in the current ration cuts which are made necessary not by overall declines in donor support for the EMOP, but because of logistical constraints inside Darfur due to the need for heightened security for vehicle convoys, and a decreased number of transporters willing to run the risks of delivery inside Darfur. It is now estimated that there are over twenty different rebel groups operating most of which are off-shoots of either the SLA or the JEM. The UNAMID force intended to provide civilian protection as well as protection for the humanitarian operation has never been sufficiently strong to be able to do either.

2.3 Impact of Relief

The impact of food aid on extremely precarious livelihoods in Darfur has been overwhelmingly positive. It is not just a source of food for consumption but also a valuable income transfer, especially for IDPs who have limited livelihood alternatives. The relative contribution of food aid as a source of livelihood has reportedly ranged from 40 to 80%. In some places it has reduced dependence on damaging coping strategies, such as begging or the sale of valuable assets. In some regions of Darfur like Dar Zaghawa and Dar Meidob, there has been a significant drop in

livestock sales due to food distribution pastoralists no longer engage in distress sales to raise income (Targeting in complex emergency in Darfur – study -2009)

The distribution of food aid has encouraged some people to return to their villages, both from camps and from hiding in the bush, thus enabling agricultural production particularly during the last rainy season. This study came across no evidence of disincentive effects of food aid on agricultural production. On the contrary, despite the risks and insecurity that many farmers face in accessing their land, cultivating their crops emerged as a clear priority. (Targeting in complex emergency study -2009)

Indirectly, the distribution of food aid has had a positive impact in protecting IDPs and some resident populations. It has provided them with a 'safe' source of food and income so they do not have to engage in some of the most risky and dangerous livelihood strategies, for example firewood collection around Kebkabiya where levels of harassment are very high (and food aid rations have been 100%). (Sussana jaspers and Sorcha Challenging choices-protection and livelihood in Darfur 2008)

It has also strengthened the bargaining power of IDPs when negotiating for daily labor. It has been reported that the IDPs no longer have to take any work they can out of sheer desperation. Where food aid is being provided to all population groups in an area, (from different tribes, both IDPs and the host population) it has eased relationships. This is particularly important where there is a very large IDP population relative to the resident population placing great strain on existing resources and services. However, Food aid alone cannot protect people. (Sussana jaspers and Sorcha Challenging choices-protection and livelihood in Darfur 2008)

There have also been problems with registration, especially in West Darfur. Some of the most vulnerable have been excluded and now have to depend upon damaging and risky coping strategies. Meanwhile there are claims of corruption and double registration of others. (WFP Evaluation report, 2005). A large proportion of Darfur's population has been accused of being very reliant on food aid as a source of livelihood, but for good reason, because there are few alternatives. Despite fears of some government and aid agency officials that IDPs in camps have got used to high levels of services and will never return home, these were not the views of IDP as most of them claim that they would want to return home as soon as its secure.(Lancet (2009)

The scale and reach of the food aid operation run by WFP is a success story, not least the extent to which it has protected precarious livelihoods. However, premature cuts in food aid, as is happening could quickly undo the valuable gains it had achieved previously. Without the injection of food aid, livelihoods will deteriorate further, there will be population movements from rural areas to camps, tensions between groups will increase, and the specter of famine on the horizon looms once again (WFP Evaluation Report, 2005).

Food aid is currently also the main form of livelihood support in Darfur as the provision of food aid means that people do not have to engage in damaging coping strategies and any income earned from selling food aid is spent on essential non-food needs and investment in livelihoods. Food aid reduction should only be considered if other livelihood support interventions really expand in the current context, with a demonstrable positive impact on livelihood security. On the other hand, if security deteriorates further, there are likely to be rising food aid needs.

It is possible that total quantities of food aid required can be reduced by addressing some of the diversion and inequalities in distribution. This needs to be done by close monitoring, removing multiple registrations and making sure the most vulnerable are targeted. However, the ongoing provision of food aid needs to be supported by ever-stronger assessments of need and well-informed targeting.

The impact of these cutbacks must be monitored to warn of rises in malnutrition and mortality so that emergency measures can be taken, and also to understand the impact of the cutbacks on lives and on livelihoods.

2.4 Targeting

The analysis of the targeting of humanitarian food assistance in Darfur, and especially the participatory elements of it, follows this general outline of questions.

The primary sources of information for planning and targeting purposes include the annual Darfur Food Security and Nutrition Assessment (DFSNA 2005) and more localized needs assessments conducted in response to changes in local situations. Distribution lists were set by the 2005 re-registration process, and have been altered only marginally since. Generally, results of the DFSNA are not directly applied to targeting. It is reported that there is very little

household targeting of food aid at the local level. The accepted basis of entitlement of food assistance in Darfur is based on group status. These include; the IDPs, host/resident, rural and not need "protection food".

As a general principle targeting of food aid should continue to be carried out on a geographical basis rather than within affected communities. The targeting could be according to severity of livelihood insecurity, IDPs in camps, resident in towns and nomad populations in that priority. Food aid should also be provided to both IDPs and to resident populations in rural areas to reduce the risk of creating further displacement.

Where residents outnumber IDPs and are still able to depend upon pre-conflict livelihood sources (eg agricultural production), it may be possible to vary the ration so that they receive a proportion of the ration that IDPs receive. But in many places differential rations could increase tensions between resident and IDP groups, resulting into greater exploitation of the latter. Therefore any decision to vary the rations between groups in the same area must be based on a well-informed assessment of need and of risk.

In rural communities food aid rations should not differ between residents and IDPs as their livelihood situation is usually very similar, and many rural communities support large numbers of IDPs with limited humanitarian assistance. As a general guideline, resident rural populations should receive food aid at least through the hungry season and during cultivation up until harvest time, for as long as their access to agricultural land is severely constrained. Whether they receive food aid during the rest of the year should be dependent on the harvest performance, and whether people were able to hold on to their harvest.

The relatively narrow range of humanitarian programming options dominated by food aid) and the short-term planning cycle of one year are unsuited to the protracted nature of the Darfur crisis. The narrow range and short-term cycle it ignore the deeper causes of vulnerability and the wider impacts of humanitarian aid on the local economy, the environment and local governance, and therefore the livelihoods of many groups, and the interactions between conflict and livelihoods. There is a need to expand time scales, in both analysis, from one or two decades to the past century or more, and in relation to strategic planning, from far beyond the immediate 12 months to far beyond, into the future.

Recovery and development approaches engender different underlying principles and assumptions as compared with humanitarian aid, which are not all compatible with conflict and protection. Lacking are humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality, which need to be constantly reinforced in conflict settings. If they are not, discrimination in favor of one group will fuel the conflict. Consequently, recovery initiatives need to be pursued with the utmost caution and conflict sensitivity, which means they should be based on an in-depth understanding and analysis of livelihoods of all groups, and on links with tensions and conflict at a local level

Increasingly, food aid management includes mechanisms for the recipient community to effectively determine criteria and oversee the selection of recipients and the distribution of the assistance – a set of practices known as community based targeting and distribution (CBTD). The aims of CBTD are to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of targeting, but also to promote community ownership and participation and to uphold the dignity and choice of people caught in crisis.

The World Food Programme has an Executive Board mandate to make its targeting more community-based and has a policy on participation of recipient community members in the design and implementation of assistance programs. Many NGOs involved in food distribution are committed to the application of Sphere Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, which includes a minimum standard on participation of disaster-affected populations in assessment, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of emergency response. Reviews and evaluations show that CBTD functions best in slow-onset emergencies, in stable situations with good local governance traditions, no displacement, and where communities are not fractured along ethnic or other grounds. Implementing agencies need to have long-term presence and adequate time to work with community groups.

In complex emergencies, CBTD has only rarely been successfully applied, but realities on the ground mean that some kind of “community-managed” process is often one of the only options for food distribution in many complex emergencies. There are a number of challenges in the application of community-based targeting that are magnified in complex emergencies. These include lack of access, on-going displacement and population movement, and the potential for bias in beneficiary selection, the diversion of aid, and the exclusion of marginal groups, all of

which have been documented for food distributions in complex emergencies. All these issues also have immediate implications for the protection of conflict affected populations, and targeting therefore is a critical consideration in ensuring safety from acute harm.

Several constraints affecting targeting have been identified and the extents to which communities have a say in targeting. These include geographic access, insecurity, limited program options, and relief diversion.

According to Young and Maxwell (2009), there are six elements that must be addressed in targeting: However, the most commonly thought-of element of targeting is answering the question of who requires assistance—the assumption usually being that if these groups are included, everyone else should be excluded. Hence much analysis of targeting is focused on the question of “who?”

Of nearly equal importance, in a situation of a broad-scale emergency or of several competing crises, is the question of geographic targeting, or where the targeted groups are physically located, and the way in which needs compare between the groups or areas. So a secondary component implicit in targeting decisions is the question of “where?”

A third element of targeting, overlooked in some contexts is the question of “when?” This includes not only an assessment of the urgency of response in the short term in response to a shock, but also is a consideration of seasonal adjustments to entitlements, and an assessment of how long such assistance will be required (or, at a minimum, when needs should be re-assessed).

All these questions are presumed to be addressed by emergency needs assessment, but in some cases, the humanitarian imperative takes precedence over targeting in an acute emergency. Targeting systems therefore need a built-in mechanism to ensure that such questions are addressed periodically in any operation.

Any targeting system must address the question of how all these factors will be taken into consideration and what kind of targeting will be done (“how?” questions). Generally, there are only a handful of methods for this: administrative targeting, in which criteria are set by assessments and actual targeting done according to indicators that represent these criteria; community-based or participatory targeting, in which the recipient community prioritizes criteria

and the members of the community who fit the criteria; or self-targeting, in which it is left to the discretion of the individual whether to participate or not.

Equally critical to the more operational issues raised above are the objectives of the program (“why?” questions). This includes the intended outcomes of the actual provision of the assistance, and also the objectives of the targeting itself. These may vary from the objectives of the overall operation (protecting life, reducing malnutrition, etc.) to the objectives of the targeting (maximizing the usefulness of an inadequate level of resources, maximizing the number of people reached, etc.). And where participatory approaches are implied in the operational plan, the objectives of participation must also be clearly laid out (for example to uphold the rights of local communities, to improve the efficiency of the food aid operation, or to engage the participation of local communities in targeting decisions).

Often overlooked however, is the question about the type of assistance (“what?” questions). Perhaps that is because the type of intervention is not really up for question—either because of organizational mandates or donor preference (food aid is by far the major, if not only, response in most WFP emergency operations). But even if food aid is the response, there are still questions about modality, ration scales, and composition of ration, and changes in these over time (Barret & Maxwell, 2005).

2.5. Relief Diversion

It is extremely difficult to get estimates on the levels of food assistance that are diverted to uses other than consumption by food-insecure or conflict-affected populations, most respondents note that some amount of food is diverted. Even monitoring major markets for the volume of food aid changing hands is not necessarily an accurate measure. At times in the past, extra food has been provided in an attempt to defray the costs of milling. In addition, some of the diversion is internal and may be utilized by FRCs or sheikhs in part to address actual targeting (exclusion) errors. Stories of “ghost IDPs”; has been clear evidence where IDP camps are registered yet there is no one living there but distributions are done(Barrett & Maxwell 2005).

Food Relief Committees (FRCs) have been seen by the humanitarian community as a means of promoting participation. They are also a means of shifting power and authority over food distribution away from local leaders (i.e., challenging elite capture of resources). With the re-

registration of 2005, the authority and power of these leaders was significantly diminished and was superseded by the authority and control vested in the registration process and ration card.

This marked a shift in responsibilities for humanitarian governance way from local leaders, and toward a system more under the control of international agencies. Under this arrangement, “food for protection” or food for access was introduced. This refers to the strategy of providing food assistance to potential aggressors who threaten the humanitarian convoys, personnel, or the other beneficiaries. While this is not an official category of food aid, it is perhaps a pragmatic approach in some specific situations. However, this practice is not based on impartiality and undermines the commitment to provide humanitarian assistance on the basis of assessed need.

2.6 Restricted Relief Access

Humanitarian agencies are said to only access 71% of the affected population in Darfur. In some rural areas like Jebel Marra, access has been limited since 2006. Banditry and direct targeting of humanitarian staff and assets resulted in the deaths of 13 aid workers and the disappearance of 28 WFP contracted drivers, the hijacking of 181 humanitarian vehicles and 93 attacks on humanitarian facilities and compounds in 2007. In the first four months of 2008 alone, figures had already reached 50% of the previous year’s total (UN Darfur, 2008). A decrease in World Food Programme convoys due to problems with banditry has resulted in a cut in general food rations of more than 40% since May 2008. By the middle of 2008, the UN Country Team issued a warning that the situation of communities in Darfur would be precarious during the annual hunger gap.

It was estimated that at least 2.7m people would be affected by a reduction for at least the next two months (Sudan UN Country Team, 2008). The IDP claim or “right to food” is closely interwoven with the “claim for protection”. The latter is directed at WFP and closely intertwined with other politicized claims. This hinders the delivery of the aid to the categorized beneficiaries such as IDP, rural residents, etc. As long as food aid entitlements are so closely linked with wider and more highly politicized claims, there remains very limited potential for community-based targeting in this complex setting.

2.7 Limited program options

During 2003 and 2004, logistics was the big push and WFP rapidly expanded its program, initially focusing on the displaced populations. Cooperating Partners were few, and registration was haphazard. A 2006 evaluation notes, “The emphasis was on life saving interventions, not on targeting or registration. WFP faced a choice between concentrating resources on a rigorous registration exercise and beginning immediate food distribution in a situation with a very real and very obvious need for food. This was an example of WFP putting the humanitarian imperative ahead of other considerations” (Cosgrave et al. 2006) this however resulted in food aid rolls being inflated at some sites.

2.8. Double registrations

By 2005, registration and verification had become a bigger issue. It became clear that the total numbers of food aid recipients exceeded the affected population (i.e., over-registration), as a result of localized corruption and multiple card-holders. Particularly in the larger more politicized camps, registration and ration cards were controlled by local leaders. Resistance to improved registration on the part of sheikhs and other leaders who had acquired multiple ration cards became a significant security issue. The re-registration exercise in 2005 was largely successful in realizing numbers of people in IDP camps at the time, but a comprehensive means of tracking IDP movement and of registering new arrivals was still a problem a year later (WFP 2006) and to some degree is an issue that is still unresolved.

2.9. Various Agencies Involved in Food aid relief and Targeting

2.9.1 World Food Programme (WFP)

WFP is responsible for many elements of the process, including overall policy on targeting. WFP is the agency primarily responsible for the registration of recipients, although there are many other parties. This particular element of the process has many implications beyond the provision of food assistance. Registration for food aid is not only the means by which other forms of assistance are provided, particularly in the IDP camps, but holding a WFP ration card is also the primary form of identification as an IDP. WFP is also responsible for the logistics of the food aid operation and the pipeline management, which has major implications for targeting.

2.9.2. Cooperating Partners

CPs is responsible for more local level assessments. They usually play a significant role in the registration of beneficiaries in both camp and community settings. They are responsible for distribution of food, for the training and oversight of Food Relief Committees, and for conducting post-distribution monitoring. Given their multiple-function mandates they are more significant than WFP in non-food interventions.

2.9.3. Food Relief Committees

FRCs was introduced in Darfur operations beginning in about 2006/2007. Given the nature of the institution, and their similarity to the institutions that sometimes play a significant role in facilitating community participation in targeting and distribution of food aid; they are described here in some detail. The main role of the FRCs, particularly in the IDP camps, is to help with the management of the distribution. This includes informing the recipients about the time and dates of distribution and mobilizing group leaders in their area group distributions; taxing recipients to pay porters; receiving food, accounting for it, and providing for the security of food from the time it arrives until it is distributed; crowd control; and in some cases, serving as a complaints mechanism. However, the main stated purpose for FRCs is to ensure continuity of operations in the event that the security situation deteriorates.

2.9.4. Government of Sudan—Humanitarian Aid Commission

HAC is the main office involved in the administration of humanitarian assistance from the Government of Sudan. Formally, its tasks involve receiving and verifying the original lists of recipients from displaced groups, ensuring that WFP registers such groups and that the registration list is verified by IOM. It is also responsible for overall GOS policy on humanitarian assistance. It is widely believed to have a security function as well as a humanitarian function.

2.9.5. Recipient communities

Recipient communities are of course the intended beneficiaries or clients of the targeting system and are thus influenced by the targeting process, but they are also exerting influence over it through the FRC or through more direct means if they feel excluded. Recipient communities are affected by the timing of assistance, by ration composition and scale, and obviously by targeting

error both inclusion and exclusion. There are limited mechanisms for community participation in targeting food assistance in Darfur.

Sometimes community institutions have a formal input into the question of who is targeted, but more frequently the influence of the recipients on targeting is informal, and in the form of post-distribution dynamics that alters who actually ends up consuming the food either through voluntary contributions to other members of the community who were excluded or did not receive adequate food or other consumers, or through sales of food to merchants. Beneficiaries are heterogeneous, representing a diverse range of experiences of the conflict and political affiliations.

2.9.6. Local administration

Local councils are usually not directly involved in food aid management, but may be responsible for security, particularly in communities with IDP camps or mixed IDP/host settings.


2.9.7. Traditional leaders

Traditional leaders in non-displaced communities include the most local leader, the sheikh, as well as the *omda* and *sultan* or *shertai*). With regard to humanitarian assistance, these leaders are responsible for the initial registration of recipients and for the oversight of FRC. They often play a role in handling complaints. Under some circumstances, they may be responsible for significant redistribution of assistance after the WFP/CP-managed distribution. This can be for the purposes of correcting targeting errors on the part of the formal distribution ensuring that community members who were inadvertently left off food aid roles receive at least some amount of assistance. However, it can also be for the purpose of diverting assistance away from recipients either towards traders or other consumers

Violence in this area of West Darfur has a long history, with years of neglect, marginalization and exploitation. Cycles of drought in the 1970s and 1980s and the resulting desertification of the northern parts of Darfur pitted different groups against each other in disputes over increasingly scarce natural resources. Ever since ethnicity conflict has been consistent hence disrupting households and the social fabric as a whole. This has necessitated various agencies both local and international to come in as humanitarians to assist the affected households.

2.9.8 The targeting process:

The diagram below is an example of a targeting process using participatory methods for a community based intervention. Different tools are used to facilitate the choice of intervention. They also help to determine how intended beneficiaries will be reached. The diagram illustrates different levels of targeting: regional, community, household or individual.




Source: WFP: 2008

Food aid relief targeting involves ensuring that assistance reaches people who need it when and where they need it, in an appropriate form, in appropriate quantities and through effective modalities and conversely does not flow to people who do not need it (Barrett and Maxwell,

2005). The common element of targeting is on 'who needs the assistance'. On equal importance is a situation of a broad-scale emergency or of several competing crises. The question of geographic targeting, or where the targeted groups are physically located, and the way in which needs compare between the groups or areas arises. In this case a secondary component of 'where' arises.

Another element of targeting is "when". This includes not only an assessment of the urgency of response in the short term in response to a shock, but also is a consideration of seasonal adjustments to entitlements, and an assessment of how long such assistance will be required (or, at a minimum, when needs should be re-assessed).

2.9.9. Conceptual framework



Targeting is the process by which areas and population are selected to receive a resource and then provided with it (sharp, 1997). This definition implies that:

Targeting requires a series of steps. Its not just one stage of design and implementation. The beginning of targeting process precedes the choice of intervention. This involves assessing the needs of the population and then identifying to whom and where resources should be given. Targeting is integral to project design. Targeting design features include how intended beneficiaries are identified and ensuring they are attracted to and receive the benefits of the project.


Targeting is dependent on accurate information. Without accurate and reliable information concerning intended beneficiaries, effective targeting is difficult to carry out. Targeting is dynamic. It relies on continuous surveillance and data analysis to monitor to whom and where assistance should go as people move in and out of poverty, natural or political crises change in intensity and location, and demographics change over time.

2.9.10. Theoretical framework

The Inclusion and Exclusion Error Model.

The concept of errors of inclusion and exclusion is widely used in the social sciences, notably in studies of the distribution of welfare benefits in developing countries (Clay, Molla & Habtewold 1999). In food aid targeting, exclusion error occurs when a proportion of individuals eligible to receive food does not access it. Assuming the overall size of the targeted population is known, the exclusion error can be derived from the estimate of coverage. Inclusion error occurs when a proportion of individuals access the food when they are not eligible to receive it. (See fig. 1 below).

Figure 1: The Inclusion, Exclusion Error Model



Sources: (Clay, Molla and habtewold 1999).

In the field of welfare benefits the rules for distribution of relief are crucial to the effectiveness and efficiency of the operation. If they are too widely drawn then those who do not require relief may be included (an error of inclusion). If they are too closely or wrongly drawn those who are in need may be denied benefit that they need (an error of exclusion). The optimum situation is one where only those who deserve or need benefits actually obtain them.

A targeting mechanism can be assessed by estimating the leakage rate (i.e., measure of the inclusion error) and under coverage rate (i.e., measure of the exclusion error). The leakage rate is the ratio of the number of non poor households included in the program to the total number of beneficiaries. On the other hand, under coverage rate is the ratio of the number of poor households that should be beneficiaries but are not, to the total number of poor households. At best, errors of inclusion and exclusion under perfect targeting are zero and so are the leakage and under coverage rates (Jaspars, S., and H. Young, 1995).

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0. Introduction

This chapter covers the research design that the researcher used in the study. It also covered information on the target population, description of the sample, instruments and the data collection procedures. The data analysis, presentation and ethical considerations are also covered in this section.

3.1. Research Design

Research design is defined by Peil (1995) as planning; organizing, collecting and analyzing data to produce the information the researcher is looking for. Kothari (2004) categorized research designs as exploratory research studies, experimental studies and descriptive design.

The descriptive research design was used in this study. The researcher sought to describe the existing conditions of a particular individual, or of a group (Kothari, 2004). It involves studies concerned with specific predictions, with narration of facts and characteristics concerning individual, group or situation. It determines and reports the way things are. Under this design numerical data are gathered through tests, surveys, observations and interviews.

3.3. Population

Population refers to an entire group of individual's events or objects having a common observable characteristic. In other words, population is the aggregate of all that conforms to a given specification (Mugenda & Mugenda, 1999). Kothari (2004) defines population as all the items under consideration in any field of inquiry constitute a 'universe' or 'population'. According to Kumar (2005) population is the class, families, living the city or electorates from which you select a few students, families, electors to question in order to find answer to your research questions. The population under study was the Darfur people who have been affected by the conflict and require emergency assistance and are estimated to be 2.3 million.

3.4 Study Samples and Sampling Procedures

There are two methods of sampling, probability and non probability sampling. Under probability sampling design, every item of the population has an equal chance of inclusion in the sample. This study utilized the probability and purposive sampling. Simple random sampling was used to select the respondents from the target population as it gives each element an equal chance of

being selected. One refugee camp was randomly selected from each of the Darfur regions namely North, South and West.

Using the camp registers as a sampling frame, 75 families were selected randomly from each camp and the head of the household was interviewed. Besides that, the study used purposive sampling to sample a total of 7 key informants namely: Relief committees, 1 chief each from the three camps, for the Food Aid Agencies, 1 official each from Sudanese Red Crescent Society, German Agro Action and Catholic Relief Services and finally 1 official from the Humanitarian Aid Commission.

3.5 Research Instruments

Questionnaires were the key research instrument for data collection. A step rating scale was used to collect data on the levels of satisfaction by the beneficiaries of food aid.

3.6. Data Collection Procedures (Direct recipients)

In this study the researcher used well structured questionnaires that had both open ended and close ended questions. This was selected because it is easier to administer and is less time consuming. Besides there was a desk review of evaluation reports with a view to systematically document the strengths and weakness in food targeting.

3.7. Data Analysis and Interpretation

Data analysis was done through the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS). This helped the researcher to also analyze the data using descriptive and inferential statistical methods. Methods of data presentation include frequency charts, pie charts, tables, percentages and means. The results are presented using tables and charts. Qualitative data was analyzed using themes that originated from responses and then integrate them with findings from quantitative data.

3.8. Ethical Considerations

The researcher conducted the study in accordance with the appropriate ethical considerations. The researchers adhered to integrity in undertaking any research and not use it for personal gains or negative effects on others (Mugenda & Mugenda 1999). The researcher made sure there was no misuse the trust of the respondents or any negative use of power. The information provided has been treated with confidentiality and any disclosure shall be done with the consent of the

respondents. Anonymity was maintained so as to protect the respondents' identity. The researcher sought voluntary consent from the respondents by revealing to them the purpose of the study and giving them the opportunity to consent or decline participation in the study.

3.9. Site description


Figure 2:

Sudan Map



Figure 3

Darfur map



Sudan is the largest country in Africa with enormous diversity, from the deserts of the North through swamps and mountains to the rainforest of the south. One of the first British African colonies to gain independence (in 1956) Sudan has been wracked by conflict almost from the early 60s. The main axis of conflict was between the mainly Muslim North and the mainly Animist and Christian South. Civil war ranged between North and South from 1962 to 1972, and then again from 1983 to 2002. Shortly after the 2002 ceasefire between North and South, conflict flared up in Darfur. The facts of what happened in Darfur are highly contested between the Government and Western countries. Even the number of IDPs is contested.

The 2010 Work Plan for Sudan (United Nations and Partners, 2009 pp 122,134, 136) gives the total of IDPs in Darfur as 2.7 million. The violence in Darfur led not only to large scale death (directly and indirectly), the destruction of productive assets, the displacement of millions of people away from their homes and livelihoods, and economic dislocation for those who were not displaced. The Darfur conflict is now in its seventh year, and Young notes that the conflict "has drawn in a complex web of local, national, and transnational interests, which play out in different types of inter-connected conflict throughout the region" (Young and Maxwell, 2009, p. vi). The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in early 2006 has increased conflict rather than reducing it as the rebel groupings fragmented after some elements signed the DPA.

The presence of the large hybrid African Union/United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) has not delivered security for the affected population or freedom of movement for humanitarian workers despite the high cost. Even without the conflict, Darfur was subject to frequent bouts of food insecurity and had seen famine on several occasions (de Waal, 1989). WFP had a project in North Darfur, addressing chronic food insecurity there, even prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Although Sudan has a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita equal to the average for sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2008, p. 1), it is ranked lower than others in Human Development Terms. Sudan is ranked 150th out of 182 countries ranked in the 2009 Human Development Report, 13 places lower than its ranking on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) would suggest (UNDP, 2009, p. 173).

Sudan is still a significant food deficit country, and the Global Hunger Index (GHI) Report shows that Sudan is in serious GHI category and is highly vulnerable to the global downturn

(Grebmer et al., 2009, p. 18). However, the same report shows that Sudan had reduced its GHI from 26.3 in 1990 to 19.6 in 2009 (p 13). Sudan is a very expensive country for WFP to operate in. The average cost per metric ton of food for EMOPs (excluding Sudan, but including other high-cost locations like Somalia) in 2009 was estimated to be just over 1,000 USD per MT. The planning figure for Sudan was 1,351 USD per MT, 35% higher than the average cost per metric ton for other EMOPs¹¹. This calculation excludes the SOs which is essential to facilitate the EMOP. In 2009, SOs in Sudan was almost half of the total of all WFP SOs in that year.

The 2007 WFP evaluation noted that partner performance was a problem and that *"the performance of some partners was not good enough"* (Cosgrave et al., 2006, p. 14) even though they were good cooperating partners in other contexts. The same report noted that Supplementary Feeding Programmes (SFP) were limited to areas where WFP could find willing and capable partners, rather than being implemented in all areas of need. Apart from partner capacity, targeting has been a recurrent problem in Darfur. The 2007 Food Security and Nutrition Assessment estimated that 11% of food aid recipients may have represented inclusion errors (Government of Sudan et al., 2008, p. 114). Estimates provided to the team by key informants were typically higher than this, possibly because, while almost no-one has been added to the relief rolls since 2007, neither has anyone who died or moved away been removed.

The 2009 targeting study highlighted the difficulties of targeting in Darfur, noting that: *"the accepted basis of entitlement of food assistance in Darfur is based on group status (IDP, host/resident, rural), not need (food insecurity)" ... As long as food aid entitlements are so closely linked with wider and more highly politicized claims, there remains very limited potential for community-based targeting in this complex setting"* (Young and Maxwell, 2009, p. viii).

Young and Maxwell (2009) list the following as key players as influencing targeting Darfur:

1. **World Food Programme** as responsible for many elements of the process, including overall policy on targeting. WFP is the agency primarily responsible for the registration of recipients, although there are many other parties. This particular element of the process has many implications beyond the provision of food assistance.

2. **Cooperating Partners** who are responsible for more local level assessments. They usually play a significant role in the registration of beneficiaries in both camp and community settings. They are responsible for distribution of food, for the training and oversight of Food Relief Committees, and for conducting post-distribution monitoring. Given their multiple-function mandates they are more significant than WFP in non-food interventions.
3. **Traditional leaders.** These include the most local leader, the sheikh, as well as the *omda* and *sultan* or *shertai* (higher level traditional authorities—see section below on governance for further explanation). With regard to humanitarian assistance, these leaders are responsible for the initial registration of recipients and for the oversight of FRC. They often play a role in handling complaints. Under some circumstances, they may be responsible for significant redistribution of assistance after the WFP/CP-managed distribution.
4. **Camp leaders.** Camp leaders include *sheikhs*, camp “executive committees,” or committees appointed by the “sheikh of sheikhs.” Their roles with regard to targeting and humanitarian assistance are similar to traditional leaders in non-camp settings, but the difference is that many of their other traditional roles are significantly curtailed in camp settings—meaning that supervision and control of assistance, in addition to security, is one of their main current roles.
5. **Food Relief Committees.** These were introduced in Darfur operations beginning in about 2006/2007. Given the nature of the institution, and their similarity to the institutions that sometimes play a significant role in facilitating community participation in targeting and distribution of food aid; they are described here in some detail.
6. **Government of Sudan—Humanitarian Aid Commission.** HAC is the main office involved in the administration of humanitarian assistance from the Government of Sudan. Formally, its tasks involve receiving and verifying the original lists of recipients from displaced groups, ensuring that WFP registers such groups and that the registration list is verified by IOM. It is also responsible for overall GOS policy on humanitarian assistance. It is widely believed to have a security function as well as a humanitarian function.
7. **IOM/OCHA.** IOM is responsible for verification of recipient lists in IDP camps and mixed IDP/host community settings. It maintains a database on displacement that should be able to track IDPs if they move from one camp or location to another

8. **Recipient communities.** Though these are the intended beneficiaries or clients of the targeting system and are thus influenced by the targeting process, they are also exerting influence over it through the FRC or through more direct means if they feel excluded. Sometimes community institutions have a formal input into the question of who is targeted but more frequently the influence of the recipients on targeting is informal, and in the form of post-distribution dynamics that alters who actually ends up consuming the food—either through voluntary contributions to other members of the community who were excluded or did not receive adequate food or other consumers, or through sales of food to merchants (which extends the impact of food aid through the market).
9. **Local administration.** Local councils are usually not directly involved in food aid management, but may be responsible for security, particularly in communities with IDP camps or mixed IDP/host settings.
10. **Armed rebel groups.** Armed groups have an indirect influence on targeting in that some areas may not be accessible, depending on the actions and policies of such groups. As such, these stakeholders primarily play a constraining role on targeting. But as the *de facto* local authorities in territories they control, they may also play facilitating roles as well. Armed groups are also believed to be the recipients of some food aid diverted from camps or recipient communities.
11. **Armed bandits.** Armed bandits have an indirect influence on targeting in that their presence may make access difficult or impossible. Unlike rebel groups, they rarely if ever play a facilitating role. In Darfur currently, banditry has led to a slowdown in the pipeline that has forced WFP to cut rations—initially to half rations, but as of October 2008 about 70–75 percent of the intended ration is being met by most distributions.
12. **Cereal and other traders.** Cereal trader's influence targeting by providing a demand and a commercial outlet for food aid. This enables individual recipients to monetize some portion of their allocation to pay for other needed expenditures, but it also provides a ready "pull factor" for the diversion of assistance from intended recipients.
13. **Commercial truckers.** Given the high number of attacks on convoys carrying humanitarian assistance, commercial truckers have begun refusing to go to certain places or refusing to go unless given adequate security escorts.

14. Non-beneficiary communities. Communities that were not targeted for food assistance on the basis of a needs assessment, but through which convoys have to travel or that are located near targeted communities, often demand some amount of food for themselves. This is sometimes provided, both to prevent convoys passing through their territory from being attacked, or to prevent members of these communities from attacking neighboring communities that may be recipients.

15. Multiple rations card-holders. Some individuals hold multiple ration cards and thus receive considerably more food than that to which they are entitled. This influences targeting in two ways. First, it means that some of the food is channeled away from the intended recipients—either to traders or other consumers. In other words, it leads to both inclusion and exclusion errors. It is widely believed that the holders of multiple ration cards are often related to camp leaders, and that some of the food so diverted is actually used to redress exclusion errors in targeting within the camps, but the greater portion of it is diverted to other purposes.

CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION

4.0. Introduction

As it can be pointed out in chapter 1, in July 2006, 470,000 Darfur people were excluded from receiving food aid. In January 2004, UN media sources reported that "about 85 percent of the 900,000 war-affected people in Darfur were inaccessible to humanitarian aid." (Amnesty International, 2006).

It has also been noted that since the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006, humanitarian agencies have been facing increasing obstacles to deliver vital aid to the civilian population. These include, rising insecurity, attacks on aid workers, proper targeting and restrictions on the work of humanitarian agencies by government forces and armed opposition groups have narrowed the space in which humanitarian assistance can be provided in Darfur (Susanne & Sorcha, 2008)

Food aid relief is considered one of the major services the people in Darfur need for their wellbeing. Food aid targeting therefore is important in ensuring the right type or quantity of food reaches a defined population group. In this background that this study sought to identify and analyze the various targeting strategies used by humanitarian organizations, targeting challenges in Darfur and assess the community's level of satisfaction with the targeting approaches used so far.

In this chapter data on targeting strategies used by humanitarian organizations, targeting challenges in Darfur and level of the community members' satisfaction with the targeting approaches used so far. The chapter is organized into four sections namely section one in which data on the social characteristics of the respondents is presented, section two in which data on targeting strategies is presented, section three in which the targeting challenges is presented and section four in which data on the community members' level of satisfaction is presented. Simple frequency table and graphs are used to present data from the field. In addressing the challenges a desk review of evaluation reports was done in data on the various challenges pointed out in the reports captured and presented.

4.1.1: The social Characteristics of the respondents

In this section data on the respondents' gender, age, and family size is presented and discussed. The study restricted itself to the three variables as guided by objectives in which data on gender guides in understanding the gender distribution of household heads and therefore, recipients and managers of household food aid. Data on age guides in understanding the age distribution of respondents in the three camps and data on family size guides on understanding the household size distribution which shall be used later to compare with the rations they receive and the levels of satisfaction.

4.1.2 Gender of the respondents

The female headed household phenomenon is fast emerging in Africa breaking away from the strict male headed household. It is expected that this phenomenon could be extended to the war camp. The study sought out to establish the percentage of female headed household in the three camps and data from the field is presented in table 1 below.

Table 1: Showing the gender distribution of household heads

	FEMALE		MALE		TOTAL		
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	
MORNI	29	38.7	46	61.3	75		100
ZAMZAM	37	50.7	36	49.3	73		100
KALMA	29	39.2	45	60.8	74		100
TOTAL	95	42.8	127	57.2	222	100	

In the three camps, out of the 222 respondents interviewed, 57.2% were male while 42.8 were female. Meaning that the distribution of household heads in the three camps between the two genders nearly equal. This could have been as results of most male who are supposed to be traditionally household heads are not in the camps due to insecurity. Most agencies tend to target households headed by females, on the basis that such households are most vulnerable. For example in a study done in Ethiopia (Sharp et al, 2003), it was found that female-headed households were four times more likely to be destitute than male-headed households. However, there is the other argument that if female headed households were used as a criterion for targeting of food assistance to the most needy, there would be a high inclusion error (as two-thirds of these households are not destitute) and high exclusion errors (because of the higher

frequency of male headed households). In other country contexts, female headed households may not face economic disadvantage compared to male headed households.

4.1.3 Age of the respondents

Age is a key factor in terms of who is the head of the household. However, war in Sudan is forcing young adults to shoulder the responsibility of household heads. Findings presented in table 2 below are a testimony to this.

Table 2: Showing the age of the respondents

VALUE	20-25		26-30		31-35		36-40		OVER 40 YRS		TOTAL	
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%
MORNI	15	20.3	11	14.3	12	16.2	17	23	19	25.7	74	100
ZAMZAM	7	9.5	8	10.8	18	24.3	24	32.4	17	23	74	100
KALMA	19	25.3	9	12	8	10.7	12	16	27	36	75	100
TOTAL	41	18.4	28	12.6	38	17	53	23.8	63	28.3	223	

Majority of the respondents (28.3%) in the three camps were under the age group over 40 years while the age group of 26-30 was least represented (12.6%). This shows that most of the population in the three camps comprises of persons above 40 years. This could be as a result of ages 20 to 30 being in the battle frontline particularly the SPLA/JEM. The reason why those of age group 26-30 are few is because they could have moved to Khartoum for employment and studies.

4.1.4. Size of the family

A study by TSAP-FP (2003) observes that decisions in the Sudanese household on the family size are usually made unilaterally by the husband, including how many children to have and when to have them. Use of traditional methods has not been successful as there have been reported cases of accidents. Where the husband is generally not in favor of his wife using the more modern methods of contraception for fear he would lose control over their sex life he would ask his wife to mark the days in the calendar when it is safe and unsafe for them to have sex. However, According to TSAP-FP (ibid), Things do go awry when the husband come home and insists on having his way in the marital bed, regardless of what the calendar says and the result is usually another unplanned baby in the family. On the other hand the woman find it had

to say no to sex anytime the man want fearing that he will marry another woman. Table three below shows that majority of the respondents have a family size of seven members and above.

Table 3: Showing the size of families in the three camps

VALUE	1-3		4-6		7-9		ABOVE 9		TOTAL	
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%
MORNI	25	33.3	22	29.3	14	18.7	14	18.7	75	100
ZAMZAM	22	29.7	28	37.8	15	20.3	9	12.2	74	100
KALMA	16	21.3	21	28	18	24	20	26.7	75	100
TOTAL	63	28.1	71	31.7	47	21	43	19.2	224	

From table 3 above it is evident that 31.7% of the households have a family size of between 4 and 6 members per family with only 19.2% households having a family size of more than 9 members. This can be explained by the fact that The Fur community is largely polygamous where girls are married as early as 13 years old. The other factor contributing to this is as stated above that Sudanese have hardly embraced modern family planning methods.

4.2.0. Targeting strategies

Non-discrimination and impartiality are cornerstones of humanitarian law. This is the reason why food aid must always be distributed according to need (rather than meaning everyone needs to get an equal share). The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Crescent Movement and NGOs in disaster relief (1994) states that "Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind" and "Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone". It is in this background that the main reasons for targeting has been identified as:

1. A means to ensure food aid is received on the basis of need. It is obvious that people have different degrees of need in an emergency and therefore, targeting is often used as a mechanism to reach those in greatest need.
2. Targeting is also used to avoid harm. The argument here is that targeting can reduce the quantity of food supplied and reduces the risk of depressing producer prices and production, disrupting trade, or displacing traditional social reciprocity networks.
3. It is through targeting that agencies can ensure efficient and effective use of resources. Food aid is sometimes regarded as a 'free' resource. In fact, the large transport and other

associated costs do often compete with other non-emergency investments. Where the targeted population is a minority, accurate targeting can reduce costs. Targeting can be used to maximize the impact of a given quantity of food.

4. Targeting is also used to address the problem of insufficient relief food. Early warning failure, political, logistical and security constraints may lead to late and inadequate deliveries of food, and decisions must be taken about who is to receive this.

According to Taylor and Seaman (2004), Food can be distributed in many ways. Distribution may be through existing facilities, e.g. health centers, schools, or through agency designed and controlled centers, e.g. supplementary feeding centers. Food may be provided directly to households through home-based care or given directly to the community in bulk for redistribution. A distribution method must be chosen that maximizes coverage of targeted people and minimizes inclusion errors. In practice, the precision with which food can be targeted will tend to vary with:

- a) The quality of the information available.
- b) The ability to reach a practical working arrangement with the community that meets both externally perceived needs and those recognized by the recipient population. It is generally easier to do this with more physically accessible and smaller populations, where there can be good contact between the external agency and the recipient community. However, much depends on local circumstances, e.g. whether people are settled or mobile.
- c) The quantity of food available for distribution. The larger the available food aid relative to the perceived needs of recipients, the easier it is to accommodate both donor and community objectives. In settings where information is inadequate and/or the food available is less than the assessed need, targeting may break down entirely. Under these conditions, systems may have to be adopted which impose criteria to ensure that the minimum survival needs of the maximum number of needy people are met.

In addressing the issue of strategies used by Agencies for targeting, the study sought to find out from selected Agencies on the ground the number of families in the camps they are covering and those actually registered for relief aid, the criteria used in selecting agencies to participate in the distribution of relief food, the criteria used in selecting recipients of food aid, the criteria used to

register beneficiaries, how the quantities for distribution are determined, the channels used for distribution, frequency of distribution, plans the agencies have to address the problem of non registration, challenges the agencies are faced with and suggestions to deal with the challenges. All the questions, except the questions on numbers in the camp, numbers registered and frequency of distribution were text open-ended and the findings are presented below.

4.2.1: Number of families in the camps vs. those registered

Identifying and registering beneficiaries is one of the key steps in the whole process of targeting. It is with this in mind that Jaspars and Shoham (1999) have identified the following steps in targeting:

1. Implementing agency meets with local authorities and village members in public meetings to explain that food aid will be provided and the proportion of the population to be targeted.
2. A Relief Committee (RC) is elected with the aim of having broad representation of all the constituent groups, including adequate representation of women. The RC could be at village level or cover a larger geographic area.
3. The RC discusses with the implementing agency the criteria which should be used for inclusion in the beneficiary group. These criteria are then sometimes discussed publicly.
4. The RC then draws up lists of households which meet the agreed criteria, who are then registered to receive food, and lists are read out in a public village meeting.
5. The distribution is conducted by the RC, perhaps with a staff member of the implementing agency present.
6. Post distribution monitoring is conducted by the implementing agencies, perhaps in collaboration with the RC, either through food basket monitoring or qualitative interviews and key informant interviews.

The study aimed at establishing whether the agencies that are responsible for relief aid have covered this vital step of identifying and registering beneficiaries in the camps and findings are presented in table 4 below.

Table 4: The number of families in the camps and those actually registered for relief

CAMP (Agency)	No. of families	No registered	No. not registered	
			F	%
Morni (HAC/SRC)	24,000	18,000	6,000	25
Zamzam (HAC/GAA)	20,600	17,280	3,320	16
Kalma (HAC/World Vision)	22,000	14,000	8,000	36
TOTAL	66,600	49,290	17,320	26

The evidence from the ground is that on average 26% of families in the camps have not been registered. Kalma has the highest number of families in the camp that are not registered (36%), followed by Morni (25%) and then Zamzam (16%). The reasons could be that after 2005 no registration has taken place due to;

- a) The families registered up to 2005 have not been re-verified to confirm the true beneficiaries. Therefore, new registration can not take place without a true record of the existing beneficiaries.
- b) The government is reluctant is registering new cases with a hope that they IDP will go back to their original home.
- c) There is the donor resistance to fund registration.
- d) Lack of capacity to carry out registration exercise.

4.2.2: The criteria of selecting agencies to participate in the distribution of relief food

The main criteria used for selecting agencies include the agencies mandate (Whether the agency's core competence is relief distribution), experience of the agency (for how long the agency has been in the business of relief distribution) and those that have been screened and identified by the government. However, after the agencies were expelled by the government of Sudan 2008, the food aid agencies were subject to contracting local and international NGOs to continue the operation. From a technical and managerial aspect, the capacity in the contracted NGOs was lacking. This is therefore, negatively impacting on the targeting goals.

4.2.3: The criteria of selecting recipients of food aid

All the agencies contacted indicated that the process of identifying and selecting beneficiaries is done through a Food Security Assessment. Taylor and Seaman (2004) point out that this is a situation where the quantity of food aid available is much less than the assessed survival need, i.e. where there is no possibility of providing aid to meet household needs. In this situation, there are two choices, either to give everyone a tiny share, or target the available resources at a particular group facing the greatest risk. The decision will depend on the context and also the future estimate of availability of resources. For example, in an acute emergency and before the food pipeline has been established and more discriminating systems organized, an agency may decide to do a blanket food distribution for all children aged less than five years. This will provide a meager household ration and may help to protect those most vulnerable to malnutrition, i.e. under fives. The commodity selected may be chosen with children's consumption in mind, e.g. a blended food, or blended food pre-mixed with sugar and oil, in the hope that this will strengthen the targeting by making it difficult to include this in the general household diet.

Basically the criteria identified above does not identify the very vulnerable individual because the food security assessment they do does not allow for in-depth livelihood classification i.e. Food secure, insecure, people who are in transition and those who are under humanitarian emergency or alert. Instead they do income/expenditure and consumption.

4.2.4. The criteria used to register beneficiaries

Generally, registration is done after the agencies have conducted surveys and identified and registered. Some beneficiaries register through the government screening system. However, the whole process of registration is flawed leading to leading to double registration. The other flaw identified is that instead of interviewing the household heads during the surveys, the agencies get their evidence from school by interviewing school going children. This is basically substituting respondents. As a conclusion it can be said that at the present the system could be the ideal because of political bias and mistrust between the Humanitarian Aid commission and IDP camp leaders who are political gate keepers of the IDPs). After registration household of 5 year and above are issued with ration card to access their rations. Data on the same is indicated in table 5 below.

Table 5: Showing the distribution of ration cards

VALUE	YES		NO		TOTAL	
	F	%	F	%	F	%
MORNI	16	21.6	58	78.4	74	100
ZAMZAM	9	12.3	64	87.7	73	100
KALMA	16	21.3	59	78.7	75	100
TOTAL	41	55.2	181	244.8	222	

From the data collected from the three camps the results showed that Zamzam camp members held the highest number of ration cards in the households as shown in table above. The distribution of ration cards is skewed given that a child above 5 years old is legible for a ration card. Meaning that households with members up to 5 is qualified for at least 2 ration card, while those above 7 qualify for at least 4 ration card.

4.2.5: Determining the quantities for distribution

According to UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP and WHO recommended food rations for populations fully dependent on food aid (UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, 2002). The ration standard ration for food aid is as indicated in the table below:

Table 6: Standard relief food rations

Nutrient	Energy	Protein	Fat	Calcium	Iron	VIT. A B3 (Retinol)	B1	B 2	B3	VIT C
Average Population	2100 Kcal	53g	40g	450mg	22mg	1650 IU	1mg	1mg	12 mg	28 mg
% of requirements met by standard ration	101%	113%	121 %	109%	103%	284%	241 %	83%	158 %	71%

Source: UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, 2002

The agencies on the ground indicated that they determine the quantities using the above criteria. Typically, a 'general ration' in a poor developing country is made up of cereals, sometimes pulses, less often oil and very occasionally, salt and other items. Calculations of food aid needed for households are usually based on an average population nutrient requirement which includes the additional needs of pregnant and lactating women. However, in spite of requirements and recommended rations the size and composition of the ration available to be given to emergency affected people varies widely, largely according to the availability of specific commodities. In some locations, the ration falls far short of requirements while in others, e.g. the Balkans, more elaborate rations have been distributed and elsewhere, e.g. Iraq, rations given with the wider objective of income support may include non-food items, such as soap and detergent. General rations are often inadequate, in either quantity or quality, to meet the needs of all individuals. This makes a case for targeting subgroups of the population who have elevated requirements for nutrients (Taylor and Seaman: 2004).

4.2.6: The channels used for distribution

The agencies contacted indicated that they used relief committees, NGO staff, and local leaders to assist in the distribution of relief food. However, these channels could be abuse of authority since the Food Relief Agencies do not have a strong monitoring and evaluation mechanism systems in place that has link and viable implementation in place.

4.2.7. Frequency of food aid distribution

Except for Kalma which does distribution once every two months, the other two camps do the distribution on a monthly basis. The reason for this is high movement of the population owing to insecurity. The distribution pattern is also determined by the availability of resource and adequate stocking capacity in the area.

4.2.8. Plans the agencies have to address the problem of non registration

In the three camps it was unanimous, that there were no plans to address the non registration issue. This is as a result of non commitment on the part of the government to register and non sponsorship by the donor community to carry out the exercise.

4.2.9: Challenges the agencies are faced with

Some of the challenges identified include:

1. Lack of adequate security therefore contributing to haphazard distribution of relief food.
2. There is also the challenge of registration of beneficiaries. Meaning that to date there is no reliable register and at the same time there are families that have not been registered at all.
3. Lack of capacity within the local NGOs and partners.
4. Lack of motivation by local leaders.
5. No consensus among the agencies in terms of survey outcomes. This leading conflicting figures and facts.
6. There is no application of other targeting methods except geographic targeting under general food distribution.

4.2.10: Suggestions to deal with the challenges

The respondents suggest that there be re-verification of beneficiaries and registration of new cases.

1. They suggest an introduction of food for recovery and food for work instead of free food.
2. Capacity building for both the community leaders and other implementing partners.
3. Introduction of food vouchers to enable them to purchaser other items besides those being distributed. This they claim will reduce the sale of food by the beneficiaries to get money to buy other items they need.
4. Improve coordination among different stakeholders.

4.2.11. Levels of satisfaction by the recipients of relief food

Figure 2: Level of satisfaction among respondents of Morni




Figure 3: Level of Satisfaction among respondents of Zam Zam






Figure 4: Level of Satisfaction among respondents of Kalma



4.2.12 Graph on overall levels of satisfaction (%)



Overall it is evident that the food aid recipients are satisfied with the services they are getting so far. The dissatisfaction which stands at a mean of 35% can be attributed to the problems identified above namely:

- a) **Non registration of beneficiaries:** The beneficiary communities in the three camps indicated that the IDPs were not fully settled in camps and that there was still population. This impacted on the registration of the beneficiaries of food aid. On the other hand, the

government has been reluctant in registering new caseloads. This has greatly contributed to the level satisfaction of intended beneficiaries.

- b) **Lack of capacity in the implementing agencies:** There were no proper targeting mechanism in place due to lack of capacity in the beneficiaries selection, distribution, monitoring and reaching poorest of the poor. This is further complicated due to the fact that the implementing partner have not carried out an impact assessment to understand if they are reaching pocket of food insecure groups in community settings. This could in one way or the other affect targeting thus leading to dissatisfaction.
- c) **Low frequency of distribution of the food aid:** Food aid interventions was based on available quantities and pipeline situation instead of food needs while certain situation was disproportionate based on kilo claries of each individual/day, on the other hand due volatile security situation food has not been distributed regularly which has direct impact on targeting, thus lack of continuation of food aid caused dissatisfaction of beneficiary communities.

In summary the level of satisfaction varies from one camp to another due different situation, however it is worth noting that “Kalma” camps in worst of due to volatile security situation and lack of access which has impacted on frequency of food aid distribution.

CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION

5.0. Summary

The study established that out of the 222 respondents interviewed, 57.2% were male while 42.8 were female. Majority of the respondents (28.3%) in the three camps were under the age group over 40 years while the age group of 26-30 was least represented (12.6%). This shows that most of the population in the three camps comprises of persons above 40 years. On family size, it was established that 31.7% of the households have a family size of between 4 and 6 members per family with only 19.2% households having a family size of more than 9 members.

The evidence from the ground is that on average 26% of families in the camps have not been registered as beneficiaries of relief food in which Kalma has the highest number of families in the camp that are not registered (36%), followed by Morni (25%) and then Zamzam (16%). The main criteria used for selecting agencies include the agencies mandate (Whether the agency's core competence is relief distribution), experience of the agency (for how long the agency has been in the business of relief distribution) and those that have been screened and identified by the government. Evident too is the fact that all the agencies contacted indicated that the process of identifying and selecting beneficiaries is done through a Food Security Assessment. Generally, registration is done after the agencies have conducted surveys and identified and registered. Some beneficiaries register through the government screening system. From the data collected from the 3camps the results showed that Zamzam camp members held the highest number of ration cards in the households as shown in table above. The distribution of ration cards is skewed given that a child above 5 years old is eligible for a ration card. The agencies on the ground also indicated that they determine the quantities using UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP and WHO recommended food rations. The agencies indicated that they used relief committees, NGO staff, and local leaders to assist in the distribution of relief food. Except for Kalma which does distribution once every two months, the other two camps do the distribution on a monthly basis. In the three camps it was unanimous, that there were no plans to address the non registration issue.

The main challenges identified by agencies include:

1. Lack of adequate security therefore contributing to haphazard distribution of relief food.
2. There is also the challenge of registration of beneficiaries. Meaning that to date there is no reliable register and at the same time there are families that have not been registered at all.
3. Lack of capacity within the local NGOs and partners.
4. Lack of motivation by local leaders.
5. No consensus among the agencies in terms of survey outcomes. This leading conflicting figures and facts.
6. There is no application of other targeting methods except geographic targeting under general food distribution.

The respondents suggest that there be re-verification of beneficiaries and registration of new cases.

1. They suggest an introduction of food for recovery and food for work instead of free food.
2. Capacity building for both the community leaders and other implementing partners.
3. Introduction of food vouchers to enable them to purchase other items besides those being distributed. This they claim will reduce the sale of food by the beneficiaries to get money to buy other items they need.
4. Improve coordination among different stakeholders.

5.1 Conclusions

In conclusion it can be said that the entire targeting in Darfur is limited to geographical targeting.

This type of targeting can only work:

- a) When there are routinely identifiable differences between the targeted population and the non-targeted population
- b) Where the community co-operates with the targeting strategy.
- c) Where distribution mechanisms can be established which are not subject to massive diversion by powerful groups and
- d) Where the amount of resources available broadly matches, or even better, exceeds the scale of the immediate needs of the population.

In the absence of these conditions, any targeting system is either likely to be so expensive that any saving realized by delivering a smaller quantity of food aid is eliminated, or the system will experience a scale of inclusion and exclusion error which invalidates any attempt at targeting in the first place.

It is also evident that there is biased assessment and definition of needs which end up undermining the primary principle of targeting of ensuring that resources are received according to need. The result is often targeting which does not address real needs.

5.2. Recommendations

1. There is need for proper identification and registration of beneficiaries. This can be done through a Participatory Assessment food security
2. Apart from that there is need for regular re-verification of beneficiaries in order to the separate the haves and have-nots in the camps.
3. There is also need for a clear cut criteria for distribution of ration cards
4. It is also imperative that community leaders be motivation through adequate reward for the roles they are assigned to play. This can minimize the sale of relief food through corrupt means.
5. There should be a well established community managed targeting combining community determined and administrative criteria, targeting some households according to socio-economic criteria and targeting malnourished children with a feeding programme to ensure a safety net for those excluded from the household distribution.
6. Careful judgments on expected and acceptable errors should be made and factored into food aid planning
7. There is need for further research to:
 - a. Establish and categorize the food needs in Darfur. This can go a long way to separating relative food needs from felt needs.
 - b. Study and classify the livelihood in Darfur
 - c. Establish the capacity of the implementing partners.

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Appendices 1: Consent of Research Participation letter

Title of Research: Challenges to food aid targeting, The Case Study of Darfur

Investigator: Mohamed Ali Mohamoud

Before agreeing to participate in this research study, it is important that you read the following explanation of this study. This statement describes the purpose, procedures, benefits, risks, discomforts, and precautions of the program. Also described are the alternative procedures available to you, as well as your right to withdraw from the study at any time. No guarantees or assurances can be made as to the results of the study.

Explanation of Procedures

You are being asked to participate in the research project which aims whether food aid relief agencies consider the most essential factors when distributing the food aid that is who, when and where. The project will further seek if targeting is effective and efficient in Darfur and to find out the challenges faced in different levels of the targeting.

The approach of the research is administering structured questionnaire with both open and close ended questions. Once you accept the participation you will answer questions asked. You will be asked some questions about the food you receive or not receive, what you see the modality how the food is distributed, who are the real beneficiaries of the food aid and the transparency of distribution, who is entitled and who actually receives among other exploratory questions related to food aid targeting in your area. Nothing will audio typed, filmed or videoed during the interview.

If you allow, the questions will take 40-45 minutes of your valuable time.

Risks and Discomforts

You will not be at physical or psychological risk and should experience no discomfort resulting from the research procedures.

Benefits

There are no direct benefits by participating in this research. However, this research is expected to yield knowledge about food aid targeting modalities in Darfur affected areas and might be useful in improving the targeting in the near future in Darfur.

Alternative Procedures

If a person chooses not to participate, an alternative procedure is not necessary.

Confidentiality

All information gathered from the study will remain confidential. Your identity as a participant will not be disclosed to any unauthorized persons; only the principal will have access to the research materials, which will be kept in a locked draw. Any references to your identity that would compromise your anonymity will be removed or disguised prior to the preparation of the research reports and publications.

Participant's initials: _____

Withdrawal without Prejudice

Participation in this study is voluntary; refusal to participate will involve no penalty. Each participant is free to withdraw consent and discontinue participation in this research at any time without prejudice from this institution.

Costs and/or Payments to Subject for Participation in Research

There will be no costs for participating in the research. Also, participants will not be paid to participate in this research project. However, complimentary refreshments will be available to you during the interview time.

Payment for Research Related Injuries

Although there are no risks of injury involved with this study, principal researcher has made no provision for monetary compensation in the event of injury resulting from the research. In the event of such injury, researcher will provide assistance in locating and accessing appropriate health care services. The cost of health care services is the responsibility of the participant.

Questions

Questions regarding rights as a person in this research project should be directed to Mohamed Ali Mohamoud, the principal researcher. You can call: +249912177042

Agreement

This agreement states that you have received a copy of the consent letter. Your signature below indicates that you agree to participate in this study.

Signature of participant: _____ Date: _____

Participant's name (printed): _____ Date: _____

Signature of Researcher: _____ Date: _____

APPENDIX II: Questionnaire Design

APPENDIX A: Food aid relief Beneficiaries

1. Respondents code Number.....
2. Gender of respondent
 - Male
 - Female
3. Under what age group do you fall (tick against your age group)
 - a) 20-25 years.....[]
 - b) 26-30years.....[]
 - c) 31-35 years.....[]
 - d) 36-40 years.....[]
 - e) Over 40 years.....[]
4. I) What is the size of your family?.....
 - a) 1-5.....[]
 - b) 6-10 []
 - c) Above 10[]
 - ii) How many children under the age of five are in your family?
 - d) 1-5.....[]
 - e) 6-10 []
 - f) Above 10 []
5. In your family, how many ration cards do you have?
 - i.) Do any of the children in your family who are under the age of five have ration cards?
 - a) Yes.....[]
 - b) No.....[]

ii) If yes, how many?

a. 1-5.....[]

b. 6-10[]

c. Above 10[]

6. Indicate the level of your satisfaction in the following areas of food aid distribution.

Variable	Levels of satisfaction		
	Very satisfied (2)	Fairly satisfied (1)	Not satisfied (0)
Appropriateness			
Quantity			
Timing			
Fairness in distribution			
Frequency			

7. What do you propose be done to improve on the weak areas in he food aid distribution

.....

.....

APPENDIX B: Questionnaire for Food Aid Relief Agencies

1. Name of agency (optional).....

2. Location of the Agency.....

3. What criteria do you use to select the people who will receive food aid relief?

4. How do you determine the quantity to give to each recipient of the food aid relief?

5. What channels do you use to distribute food aid relief?

6. 1) Do you have any specific strategies that you employ when distributing food aid relief?
 a) Yes..... []
 b) No..... []

7. If yes kindly state the specific strategy/strategies used

8. How often do you offer food aid relief?

	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Annually
Cereals				
Vegetable Oil				
Flour				
Sugar				
Salt				

9. What are the main challenges you are faced with as an Agency in your day today operations (Food Aid targeting)?

10. What is the perception of the community about the process of identifying and distributing food aid relief?

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APPENDIX C: Questionnaire for Food Aid Relief Committees

1. What processes do you use to distribute food aid relief?

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2. What quantity (in kilogram`s) of food aid relief have you received from the food aid relief agencies in the last three months?

a) Cereals.....(kgs)

b) Vegetable oil.....(kgs)

c) Flour.....(kgs)

d) Sugar.....(kgs)

e) Salt(kgs)

3. What quantity (in kilogram`s) of food aid relief received from the food aid relief agencies have you sold in the last three months?

a) Cereals.....(kgs)

b) Vegetable oil.....(kgs)

c) Flour.....(kgs)

d) Sugar.....(kgs)

e) Salt(kgs)

4. How often do you receive food aid relief?

	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Annually
Cereals				
Vegetable Oil				
Flour				
Sugar				
Salt				

5.i. What is the average number of families in the camps?

.....

ii. How many families in the camp are in the target list for food aid relief?

.....

iii. How many families in the camp have ration cards for food aid relief?

.....

6. What are the main challenges you are faced with as at your various distribution sites.....

7. In your opinion is there anything that the food aid relief agencies could do to make your work more efficient and effective...

a) Yes..... [] b) No..... []

If yes explain further.

.....

APPENDIX D: Questionnaire for Humanitarian Aid Commission

1. What criteria do you use to select agencies to be involved in food aid relief distribution.....

.....

2. What criteria do you use to register beneficiaries of food aid relief?

.....

.....

3. How many families are in the camp?

.....

4. For how long have they been in this camp?

.....

5. How many of these families are registered with your commission for food aid relief?

.....

.....

6. What plans do you have for the non-registered families in the camps?

.....

7. What are the main challenges you are faced with a commission in the food aid targeting?

.....

.....

8. What do you suggest for improvement?

.....

End