

"Security and Pastoral Conflicts in Northern Kenya: A case study of the Mandera Triangle"

By

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**A Research Project Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Award of
Masters of Arts Degree in International Conflicts Management**

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Declaration

I, Abdul Ebrahim Haro, hereby declare that the contents of this thesis are original, and that this work has not been submitted to any other university degree, other than the University of Nairobi, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies for any type of academic degree. The use of materials other than my own has been acknowledged to the authors.


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Ochieng Kamodhayi

Dedication

I dedicate this work to my family, with love

Acknowledgements

I thank my supervisor Ochieng Kamodhayi for his relentless support, advice and provision of extra information from his personal library, which made this work a success. I also thank him for the hospitality and fatherly guidance that he constantly gave throughout my research. My gratitude also goes to Professor Makumi Mwangiri, Director Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi for his leadership and stewardship of the Institute's study programmes which made my study period a success. I wish to thank the librarians at the Jomo Kenyatta Memorial library, for their assistance in literature search.

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Abstract

This study aimed to identify security issues in pastoral areas, and why national security policies need to address pastoral conflicts in a special way. The study also investigated the relevance of the concept of human security and how lack of it leads to Pastoral Conflicts in the Mendera Triangle. The nexus between human insecurity, national security and pastoral conflicts as a unique challenge to contemporary Horn of African states and societies has been critically analysed in this study.

The Study contains five chapters. Chapter One introduces the research study by contextualizing the research problem and provides justification for this study. The chapter also presents a literature review where the relevant literature by other scholars on the issue of human security, national security, and Mendera Triangle and Pastoralist conflicts are presented and tied to the pastoralist community conflict in the Mendera Triangle. Theoretical framework adopted by the study is also presented. The chapter ends by giving the data collection and data analysis methods that were used by the study. Chapter two looked into the overview of Emerging Dimensions of security. This included a comparative analysis of dimensions of old security and the emerging trends in new thinking about security. This chapter also highlights the defining moments in the shifts from the old to the new and the interregnum between the two in relation to the context in Mendera Triangle.

Chapter three is about the Mendera triangle case study. This dwells on the question of analysis of security issues in the region. Chapter four is the critical analysis chapter on all the previous three chapters and chapter five contains a summary of the study, conclusion and recommendations.

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

ALRMP:	Arid Lands Resources Management Project
ASAL:	Arid and Semi-Arid Lands
CCR:	Center for Conflict Resolution
CEWARN:	Conflicts Early Warning and Early Response
CIRI:	David <u>Cingranelli</u> and David <u>Richard</u>
DFID:	Department of Foreign International Development
FAO:	Food and Agriculture Organization
FEWER:	Floods Early Warning and Response
FSI:	Failed States Index
GDI:	Gross Development Index
GDP:	Gross Domestic Product
GOK:	Government of Kenya
HDI:	Human Development Index
HDR:	Human Development Report
IR:	International Relations
KHRC:	Kenya Human Rights Commission

LICUS:	Low Income Countries Under Stress
MNC:	Multi National Company
NGO:	Non-Governmental Organization
NOPA:	Nomadic Pastoralists in Africa Project
ODM:	Orange Development Movement
OECD:	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PNU:	Party of National Unity
PRIO:	Peace Research Institute Oslo
PTS:	Political Terror Scale
TFG:	Transitional Federal Government
UCDP:	Uppsalla University Conflicts Dataset Project
UNDP:	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF:	United Nations International Childrens' Educational Fund
UNSO:	United Nations Support Operations
USAID:	United States Assistance and International Development

Table of Contents	Pages
Declaration	ii
Dedication	iii
Acknowledgements.....	iv
Abstract	v
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations	vi
CHAPTER ONE	1
INTRODUCTION	1
1.0 Background of the Study.....	1
1.1 Statement of the Research Problem.....	3
1.2 Objectives of the Study	6
1.3 Literature Review	7
1.3.1 Conceptualizing National Security	7
1.3.2 Conceptualising Human Security.....	16
1.3.3 Contending debate on Human Security vis-à-vis National Security	18
1.3.4 Literature on Manderu Triangle	21
1.3.5 Literature on Internationalized Conflicts.....	23
1.3.6 Justification	26
1.4 Theoretical Framework	26
1.5 Operationalisation of terms	30
1.6 Research Methodology.....	31
1.7 Sampling Design Strategy/methods	31
1.8 Data Collection and Analysis Strategies	33

1.9 Chapter Outline	34
CHAPTER TWO	35
EMERGING DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY	35
2.0 Introduction	35
2.1 The Concept of Security in the Cold War period.....	36
2.2 Shifts in the Concept of Security in the post Cold War period.....	38
2.3 The Traditional notion of Security	41
2.4 Defining Security	43
2.5 Non traditional notion of security	46
2.5.1 The Copenhagen school and security	46
2.5.2 Human Security	51
2.5.3 Conclusion	54
CHAPTER THREE.....	56
CASES STUDY OF THE MANDERA TRIANGLE.....	56
3.0 Introduction	56
3.1 Overview of Mandera Triangle Region	56
3.2 Genesis of the Contemporary Pastoral conflicts in the region.....	60
3.3 Human Insecurity Indicators in Northern Kenya	69
3.4 Security Issues and drivers of conflicts in pastoral areas.....	71
3.5 Specific Human Security Issues and their implications for Mandera Triangle.....	80
3.5.1 Food Security Implications.....	82

3.5.2 Demography and its Implication.....	84
3.5.3 The Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms.....	87
3.5.4 The Environmental security.....	89
3.5.5 Economic Security.....	90
CHAPTER FOUR.....	92
CRITICAL ANALYSIS	92
4.0 Introduction.....	92
4.1 Critical analysis of the security concept in the context of Mandera triangle	93
4.2 Analysis of Objectives of the study.....	99
CHAPTER FIVE	120
CONCLUSIONS	120
5.0 Introduction.....	120
5.1 Study Findings.....	120
ANNEXES	139
Annex 1: Political Map of Kenya.....	139
Annex 2: Map of Ethnic Somali Concentration in Mandera Triangle	140
BIBLIOGRAPHY	141

List of Tables

Table 1: What is the Source of the Security Threat? 28

Table 2: The summary of two schools of thought in relation to four orienting questions – security referent, values, threats, and instruments or means 30

List of Figures

Figure 1: Social, Economic and Political indicators of state failure in Ethiopia	109
Figure 2: Social, Economic and Political indicators of state failure in Kenya	113
Figure 3: Social, Economic and Political indicators of state failure in Somalia.....	116

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Background of the Study

The state is a major source of both threats to and security for individuals because individuals provide much of the reason for and some of the limits to, the security seeking behaviour of the state¹. The relevance of human security and other forms of emerging security to this study is found in the relationship and contradiction between human security and state/national security. Given that the state has been intervening in the pastoral conflicts from the stand point of national security, other aspects of pastoral conflicts have continued to be ignored. In contemporary times, insecurity in pastoral areas have assumed characteristics of individual security taking on broader regional, societal and political dimensions. This leads directly to questions about whether national security policies take cognisance of the special nature of pastoral conflicts. This study consequently serves as a foundation for investigating this nexus between human securities, national security and internationalized pastoral conflicts.

With the end of the cold war, development and security establishments have each undergone a period of conceptual turmoil. One consequence has been the emergence of the concept of human security. As fostered by the United Nations Development Program, this term usually means "freedom from fear and want."²

¹ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd ed. (Lynne Rienner Publishers: 1991), p.34

² See, L. C. Chen, "Human Security: Concepts and Approaches" in T. Matsumae and L.C. Chen, eds., *Common Security in Asia: New Concepts of Human Security* (Tokyo: Tokai University Press, 1995); United Nations Development Program (UNDP), *New Dimensions of Human Security* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

The “Mandera Triangle” encompasses a tri-border region of Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya that is predominantly populated by pastoralists, though there is a small sedentary minority population along the riverbanks. The area exemplifies, in a microcosm, both a complex and a chronic humanitarian crisis that transcends national boundaries. The resident Somali pastoral population is highly vulnerable to periodic droughts and floods; high level of poverty; long-term disruption to the traditional systems of livelihood; ongoing inter-clan conflicts and border tensions between states.

Many scholars and policy makers merely brush aside the incidences of pastoral conflicts as a “usual phenomenon”. Such perceptions have, unfortunately, tended to misinform the public view and shaped the glaring lack of response to the problem. In combination, these features of the pastoralists provide the background and the context within which pastoral conflicts have to be analysed.

The study aims to identify security issues in pastoral areas, and why national security policies need to address pastoral conflicts in a special way. The study will investigate the relevance of the concept of human security and how lack of it leads to internationalization of Pastoral Conflicts in the Mandera Triangle. The nexus between human insecurity, national security and internationalized pastoral conflicts is a unique challenge to contemporary Horn of African states and societies. This study aims at bringing out these issues in the context of Mandera triangle in order to equip researchers and policy makers with tools from which to design an intervention.

1.1 Statement of the Research Problem

There exist competing meanings of conflict, its causes, and management. The term conflict therefore means different things to different people based on their disciplinary background. Old definitions of conflict tend to rely on value laden terminology, such as: "breaches in normally expected behavior,"³; "a breakdown in standard mechanisms of decision-making,"⁴; "a threat to cooperation,"⁵; "opposition processes in any of several forms-competition, status, rivalry, bargaining, sabotage, verbal abuse...,"⁶; or "antagonistic struggles,"⁷. To many other scholars, this approach is not useful for analytic purposes.

Pondy (1967)⁸ argues that the term "conflict" has been used to describe antecedent conditions like the scarcity of resources, and policy differences of conflictful behavior, or affective states like stress, tension, hostility, and anxiety of the individual involved, or cognitive states of individuals like their perception or awareness of conflictful situations, and conflictful behavior, ranging from passive resistance to overt aggression. Similarly, Dahrendorf (1959)⁹ argues for a broad usage of the term "conflict" for contests, competitions, disputes, and tensions as well as for manifest clashes between social forces.

³ See Beals, Alan R., and Bernard J. Siegel, *Divisiveness and Social Conflict An Anthropological Approach*, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1966).

⁴ See March, James G. and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations*, (New York: John Wiley, 1958)

⁵ Marek, J. "Conflict, a battle of strategies." In J.R. Lawrence (ed.), *Operational Research and the Social Science*, (London: Tavistock, 1966) pp. 483- 498

⁶ Walton, Richard, E."Theory of conflict in lateral organizational relationships." In J.R. Lawrence (ed.), *Operational Research and the Social Sciences*, (London: Tavistock, 1966)p.409

⁷ Coser, Lewis A. *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1956)p.87-115.

⁸ Pondy, Louis R. "Organizational conflict: concepts and models." In *Administrative Science Quarterly*, vol.12, 1967, pp. 296-320.

⁹ Dahrendorf, Ralf 1959 *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1959) p.135.

Conceptually, three criteria are useful in definition of conflict: value freedom, focus on specific actions and be conceptually distinct both from its antecedent conditions and its consequences. In addition, to be useful as an analytic tool, the conditions necessary for conflict to occur should be specified.¹⁰ This study will attempt to meet these criteria by adopting the simplest, precise and action centered definition as conceptualised by contemporary scholars.

According to Mwangi¹¹ it is not possible to understand, analyze, or even manage conflict before defining its nature and content. He gives one of the simplest definitions of conflict, adopted from Mitchell 1998¹², as a situation that arises when two or more parties have incompatible goals about something and that this incompatibility of goals also defines more complex conflicts, be they organizational, communal, or international. Bujra¹³ argues that “writers often describe conflicts in Africa using terms such as civil war, violent conflict, civil strife, hostility, war and political instability, interchangeably.” To appreciate the types of internationalized pastoralist conflicts in the Mandera Triangle it is necessary to identify the underlying causes of pastoral conflicts and the extent of their impact on the individual person and pastoral livelihoods. The extent of human insecurity and livelihood disruption is contingent upon the type and intensity of conflict. Thus at least three types of conflicts can be identified in the Mandera Triangle borderlands.

¹⁰ Stuart M. Schmidt and Thomas A. Kochan, “Conflict: Toward Conceptual Clarity,” In *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Sep., 1972), pp. 359-370

¹¹ Makumi Mwangi, *Conflict in Africa: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management* (Center for Conflict Research; Nairobi: 2006)pp 1-3

¹² C.R. Mitchell, *The Structure of International Conflict*, (London:MacMillan, 1998)pp.15-25

¹³ Bujra A., “African Conflicts: Their Causes and Their Political and Social Environment” in *Development Policy Management Forum (DPMF), Occasional Paper No.4* (2002)pp2-3.

These are conflicts over means of survival, insecurity dilemmas, and natural resource related conflicts. In order to protect human lives effectively, actors must deliberately identify and prepare for distinct threats. Threats to human security are critical – that is, they threaten to cut into the core activities and functions of human lives.

All the above three types of conflicts have continued to impact the ways in which pastoral resources are accessed and utilized on all sides of the Mandera Triangle border lands. Current problems of ethnic conflicts throughout Mandera Triangle Region have complicated utilization of pasture and other resources in the area because access and control of these resources is prerequisite to utilization. Communities in the region have more often than not found themselves fighting for access and control of these resources before they think of utilizing them. This is further complicated by the fact that the region has been poorly administered by both colonial and contemporary regimes, and the fact that pastoralist peoples have long histories of raids and counterraids against each other. Attempts to set up tribal grazing areas in many parts of the region with the intention of keeping competing groups apart has not been fruitful because of the free flow and easy availability of automatic weapons to the contending groups. Some of these pastoral groups have also developed the capacity to continue to resist established regimes. National police occasionally bring order to these regions, but in many occasions, the government forces are often incapable of tracking down cattle rustlers or highway banditry or policing rough cross border and roadless areas.¹⁴

¹⁴ Elliot Fratkin, "East African Pastoralism in Transition: Maasai, Boran, and Rendille Cases," In *African Studies Review*, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Dec., 2001), pp. 1-25

Pastoral resources and related conflicts are therefore complex and highly dynamic which causes a challenge to problematization of internationalized pastoral conflicts in the study area. Nevertheless, this study focuses on how human insecurity is a major threat to functional pastoral society and how traditional security has not sufficiently been protective when it comes to internationalized pastoral conflicts. The human security approach which urges institutions to offer protection which is institutionalised, not episodic; responsive, not rigid; preventative, not reactive is an urgent requirement. Safeguarding human lives implicate not only those institutions that intend to promote human security overtly, but also institutions that unintentionally undermine it. The strategies that are associated with providing human security should aim to identify the threats and then seek to prevent threats from materializing, mitigate harmful effects for those that eventuate, and help victims cope.

1.2 Objectives of the Study

The project objectives will be:

- (i) To carry out situational analysis of Mandera Triangle and establish its relationship with the human security.
- (ii) To identify and analyze perceptions held by the actors about security in the Mandera Triangle Region and,
- (iii) To establish the relationship between Pastoral Conflicts and Human Security from the perspectives of state failure.

1.3 Literature Review

This section presents and discusses the literature relevant to the study. It starts by discussing the contending debate on Human Security vis-avis National Security. It then proceeds to discuss the literature on Mendera Triangle in relation to Human Security. Lastly, the section will examine literature on internationalized conflicts in the Mendera Triangle.

1.3.1 Conceptualizing National Security

Whereas the classical notion of security is centered on the idea that looks at security as purely state centric. Classical realism informs international relations theory, on which the normative core of realism of national security and state survival is anchored. In an arena of rivalry, conflict and war between states in which the same basic problems of defending the national interest and ensuring continued survival of the state is repeated over and over again.¹⁵ state becoming the basic unit of analysis on security. According to Morgenthau¹⁶, touted as probably the leading realist thinker of the twentieth century, men and women have a 'will to power' and that "politics is a struggle for power. For Morgenthau power is the immediate goal of national interest and the mode of acquiring, maintaining and demonstrating it determines the technique of political action."¹⁷

¹⁵ R. Jackson and G. Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations Theories and approaches* (New York: Oxford) @ online resource center, third edition, (2005)p.60

¹⁶ See H.J. Morgenthau, , *Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace* (6th edn. New York: Knopf, 1985)

¹⁷ H.J. Morgenthau, , *Scientific Man versus Power Politics* (Chicago: Phoenix Books, 1965)p.195

This political and philosophical realist orthodoxy were ideas that shaped mainstream security debates during the 50 years of the Cold War and were derived from a combination of Anglo-American, Statist, Militarized, Masculinized, Top-Down, and Methodologically Possitivist thinking, all shaped by experiences and memories of the inter war years and World War II and the perceived necessities of the Col War. The emerging Security Conceptions challenge the conceptualization of security derived from such a world view.¹⁸

Locke¹⁹ argues that the state is a mechanism by which people seek to achieve adequate levels of security against societal threats to life, liberty and estate which in the state of nature is 'very unsafe, very unsecure'. The paradox is however, that as state power grows, it becomes a source of threat to individual freedom and estate. According to Buzan, the concept national security indicates that the object of security is the nation²⁰, but the questions that emerge are, what is a nation? And what is security?

A nation is generally viewed as a group of people who either live in a definite geographical location or are dispersed, but who share a common language, cultural heritage, and similar historical experiences.²¹ Most modern states are not nations per se; they may be defined as a clear-cut and bordered territory, with a permanent population, under the jurisdiction of supreme government that is constitutionally independent of foreign governments: a sovereign

¹⁸See Booth, Ken (ed.), *Critical Security Studies*, (New Delhi: Raj Publishers, 2005)

¹⁹ John Locke, "second Treaties of Government," reprinted in Carl Cohen (ed.), *Communism, Fascism and Democracy: The theoretical foundations* (New York: Random House, 1972 2N Edn.)pp406-7

²⁰ Buzan, B., *People, States and Fear: National Security Problem in International Relations*, (Prentice-hall, Hertfordshire, 1983)pp. 44-53

²¹ Ibid., (Jackson, Robert, and George Sorensen, 2005).pp62-74

state.²² The problem arises in establishing the link between the nation and the state. It is this that complicates the idea of the state in national security. The difficulty arises especially in Africa where there is no congruence between the nation and the state. The problem can be traced to the partition following the Berlin Conference of 1884-5, where European powers shared Africa arbitrarily. Most states that were created as a result, cross-cut communities territorially in other nations in the continent, a good example being the Manderla Traingle where Somali community was split up into three countries of Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia. This division of an ethnic group into different countries has impacted heavily on the internationalization of internal conflicts²³ particularly in the Manderla Triangle. In the case of this region, because of the Somali question, most conflicts have become internationalized through contagion.

Stavenhagen,²⁴ argues that internationalization of what starts off as an internal conflicts as in the case of Manderla Triangle is fuelled by many factors including kin psychological attachments, ideological sympathies, and migration dynamics. 'Security' refers broadly to a feeling or condition of being secure or 'safe'²⁵. It refers to a universal aspiration to live in the expectation that life and physical integrity will not be threatened by any other person, group, or society.²⁶

²² Ibid., (Jackson, Robert and George Sorensen)pp.77-86

²³ Ibid, op.cit p.66

²⁴ R.Stavenhagen, "Ethic Conflicts and Their Impact on International Society," in *International Social Science Journal*, Vol.43 (1991) p.117.

⁵ Choucri, N. and North, R. C. "Population and (in) Security: National Perspectives and Global Imperatives," In *Dewitt et al, Building a New Global Order: Emerging Trends in International Security*, (Oxford University Press: Toronto, 1993) pg. 229

⁶ Brock, L. "Security Through Defending the Environment: An illusion," in *Boulding, E. New Agendas for Peace Research: Conflicts and Security Re-examined*, (Lynne Rienner Publishers: London, 1992), pg. 95

Man's security seeking behaviour involves and affects the whole fabric of society. The underlying myths and beliefs, religious and identity systems, structures of thought, gender roles, and leadership requirements as well as political and economic systems are all affected. So is social status.²⁷ Not only is the realm of possible threats enlarged, but the actors or objects that are threatened (what are termed as the "referent objects" of security) can be extended to include actors and objects well beyond the military security of the territorial state²⁸.

The idea of national security is viewed differently depending on the theoretical views that influence it and the historical contexts of the time, and consequently, different states will experience different kinds of insecurity and security in relation to the national question²⁹. The normative core of realism is national security and state survival; these are the values that drive realist doctrine and realist foreign policy. The state is considered to be essential for the good life of its citizens: without a state to guarantee the means and conditions of security and promote welfare, human life is bound to be, in the famous phrase by Thomas Hobbes, "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short."³⁰ The state is thus seen as a protector of its territory, of the population, and of their distinctive and valued way of life. This means that the only fundamental responsibility of states people is to advance and to defend the national interest and that there cannot be progressive change in world politics comparable to the developments that characterize domestic political life.

²⁷ Mische, M. P. "Security through Defending the Environment: Citizens say yes!" In *Boulding, E.* (1992) Op.cit p. 105

²⁸ Williams, M.C "Words, Images and Enemies: Securitization and International Politics," in *International Studies Quarterly*, September 2003, Blackwell Publishing Inc. New York p 513

²⁹ For a Comprehensive discussion of the nation-state and state-nation debate and its national security implications, see Buzan, B. (1983) op.cit pp. 44-53

³⁰ See Hobbes, T. *Leviathan*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1946)

This also means that realists' thought about security is considered to be valid not only at particular times but at all times, because the foregoing basic facts of world politics never change. This, at any rate, is what most realists argue and evidently believe.³¹

Realism is basically normative in approach and classical realists have lived in many different historical periods, from ancient Greece right down to the present time. There are many criticisms for realism from scholars ascribing to non realist school of thought. The International Society tradition regards realism as a one-dimensional IR theory that is too narrowly focused and thus has failed to capture the extent to which international politics is a dialogue of different IR voices and perspectives. Realism has been accused of ignoring other important actors besides states, such as human beings, and NGOs.³² Realism plays down the extent to which the relations of states are governed by international law and International society theorists recognize the importance of the national interest as a value, but they refuse to accept that it is the only value that is important in world politics.³³

Emancipatory theorists argue that their view is the transformation of the realist state-centric and power-focused structure of international politics since their goal is human liberation and fulfillment,³⁴ and criticize the familiar realist view of the "Westphalian System," as a game that is played by diplomats and soldiers on behalf of statesmen.

³¹ See Waltz, K. *Theory of International Politics*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979)

³² See Mearsheimer, J. *The tragedy of Great Power Politics*, (New York: W.W.Norton, 2001)

³³ See Wight, M. *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, ed. Wight and B. Porter (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991)

³⁴ Booth, K. "Security and Emancipation," In *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 17 (Oct. 1991) pp. 313-326

Booth³⁵ further claims that the realist game of power politics and the military strategy is now obsolete because security is now a local problem with disorganized and sometimes failed states. Its is no longer primarily a problem of national security and national defense. Security is now more than ever both cosmopolitan and local at the same time: a problem of individual humans (for example, citizens in failed states) and of the global community human kind (facing, for example, ecological threats or nuclear extinction). Security is different in scope; it is also different in character: emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do. War and threat of war is one of those constraints as is poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on. Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security. Linklater³⁶ argues that there should be a global legal and political system which goes beyond the realists' state-centric notion and affords protection to all human subjects and propagates for a decline of self-interest and competitiveness and the rise and spread of human generosity that transcends state boundaries and extends to people everywhere and the consequent development of a community of human kind to which all people owe their primary loyalty.

The national security has traditionally emphasized the security of the state as its primary concern.³⁷ This implies that national security and state security are one and the same thing. From this perspective, anything that enhances the security of the state is beneficial, and anything that

³⁵ Ibid, op.cit(Booth, 1991)p.319

³⁶ Linklater, A. *Beyond Realism and Marxism*, (New York: St. Martins Press, 1989)p.199

³⁷ Ibid

detracts from its security is harmful.³⁸ What contributes to or detracts from national security are often phrased in terms of national interests and policy preferences which further means that to brand any issue as a national security issue is a political matter.³⁹

Indispensable in the formation of national security policy is the decisional process and structure. In turn, the organizational framework within which such decisions are made reflects the basic characteristics of the society on whose behalf national security policy is formed. Ideally, the basis for national security policy rests upon the existence of a national strategy that flows from national goals and a conception of national interests. Moreover while decisional processes and structures inevitably form the context within which national security policy is shaped, they bear resemblance not only to the society whose interests they serve, but also reflect the scope and level of effort undertaken by the state: the greater the national security interests, commitments and capabilities of a state, the greater and perhaps more complex its decisional processes and structures are likely to be.⁴⁰ Those communities that have faced political marginalization, like the pastoralists in Northern Kenya will, therefore, in one way or the other find national security measures as inadequate in addressing their many “insecurities,” including sometimes becoming a threat to their security. For example, the government policy of disarmament in pastoral areas without providing guarantees or alternative for security simply creates a vicious cycle of security dilemmas for these communities.

³⁸ Snow D. M. *National Security Defence Policy in a Changed International Order*, (St. Martins Press, New York, 1998). pg. 24-25

³⁹ Ibid (Snow, 1998)p.30

⁴⁰ Pfaltzgraff, R. L. Jr. “National Security Decision Making: Global Implications,” in Pfaltzgraff, L. R. Jr. and Ra'anani, (1984). *National Security Policy: The Decision Making Process*. (Trans Asia Publishers: New Delhi, 1984)pg. 29

Perhaps Spanier's definition of national security captures well the reasons why national security is inadequate in dealing with internationalized pastoral conflicts. Spanier argues that national security can be broken down to different categories. At the very least, national security means the physical survival of the state; thus implying the preservation of a state's territorial integrity; and lastly the concept is associated with political independence (sovereignty) which could mean a state's freedom from foreign control or, positively to the preservation of its domestic political and economic system. Spanier, rejects this and points out that security involves more than a state's physical survival and territorial security. He views security as including the perpetuation of the values, patterns of social relations, lifestyles and a variety of other elements that make up a nation's way of life.⁴¹ In nations where the pastoralists have been in the minorities, the values which are perpetuated by the national security policy are those of the majority. In cases where this majority is insensitive to the minority social relations and lifestyles, the national security is inadequate and the security concerns of the minority are not fully addressed. This results in such groups seeking alternative means to provide for their security needs, for example arming themselves which again leads to security dilemma.

For Buzan, national security means the security of the whole socio-political entity. It is about the country as well as the states. It concerns the way of life of self-governing people including their social, cultural, political and economic modes of organization, and the right to develop themselves under their own rule⁴².

⁴¹ Spanier J. *Games nations Play*. New Delhi, Macmillan India Ltd: New Delhi, 1990) pg. 76

⁴² Buzan, B. Quoted in Baregu, M. and Landsberg, C. (eds), *From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges*. Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc. Colorado, 2003) pg. 33

Both Spanier's and Buzan's definitions of national security, reaffirms the view of security in traditional terms. The traditional school of security, views security as the absence of threats from other states and as the major threat to the existence of states is the threat of war, military threats take precedence over any other threats⁴³.

The modern concept of national security acknowledges that there are other threats to national security apart from military threats. Dewitt et al. argue that, as exemplified by character of pastoral conflicts, security no longer presumes a principal concentration on challenges to a government and country from outside its borders, environmental degradation, absorptive capacity, illicit drugs, unregulated movement of large amounts of capital or people, epidemic disease and terrorism, all are now seen by some, including governments and intergovernmental organizations, as potentially part of broadened security agenda⁴⁴.

Mary Kaldor⁴⁵ argues that a new type of organized violence has developed post-cold war as one aspect of the globalized era. The new wars she argues, are, characterized by a blurring of the distinctions between war, organized crime, and wide scale violations of human rights and that in contrast to the geopolitical goals of earlier wars, the new wars are about identity politics.

⁴³ Agostinho, Z: Redefining Security, in Baregu, M. and Landsberg, C. (eds) Op.cit.((2003)) pg. 32

⁴⁴ Ibid.Op.cit(Dewitt, D. et al 1993)pg. 2

⁴⁵ See Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).

1.3.2 Conceptualising Human Security

Conceptions of human security vary widely. Human security is the latest in a long line of neologisms-including common security, global security, cooperative security, and comprehensive security-that encourage policymakers and scholars to think about international security as something more than the military defense of state interests and territory.⁴⁶ Although definitions of human security vary, most formulations emphasize the welfare of ordinary people. Among the most vocal promoters of human security are the governments of Canada and Norway, which have taken the lead in establishing a "human security network" of states and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that endorse the concept.⁴⁷

According to United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) standard definition, "Human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities. Such threats can exist at all levels of national income and development."⁴⁸ Closely associated with the idea from the beginning was the consulting economist, the late Mahbub ul Haq. According to Haq, human security is not about states and nations, but about individuals and people.

⁴⁶ Roland Paris, "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?," In *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Autumn, 2001), pp. 87-102

⁴⁷ Y. F. Khong, "Human Security: A Shotgun Approach to Alleviating Human Misery?," in *Global Governance*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (July-September 2001)

⁴⁸ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). *Human Development Report 1994*. New York: Oxford University Press, 23. <http://www.undp.org/hdro/1994/94.htm>> 20/04 09

Thus, he argues that the world is “entering a new era of human security” in which “the entire concept of security will change – and change dramatically”. In this new conception, security will be equated with the “security of individuals, not just security of their nations” or, to put it differently, “security of people, not just security of territory.” Elsewhere, more normatively, he writes, “We need to fashion a new concept of human security that is reflected in the lives of our people, not in the weapons of our country.”⁴⁹ Human security concept is therefore concerned with non-militaristic threats to peace and security and the protection of individuals (and their property) as opposed to the traditional notion of security which is militaristic and state centric.⁵⁰

According to Thakur,⁵¹ human security refers to the quality of life of the people of a society or polity. Anything which degrades the quality of life – demographic pressures, diminished access to or stock or resources, and so on – is a security threat. Conversely, anything which can upgrade their quality of life – economic growth, improved access to resources, social and political empowerment, and so on – is an enhancement of human security.”

Thomas,⁵² outlines the increasing inequality brought by globalisation, and the insufficiency of current international measures to address it. She writes that human security entails basic material needs, human dignity, and democracy. Paris,⁵³ however criticizes those who identify certain values as more important than others, without providing a clear justification for doing so.

⁴⁹ M. Haq, “New Imperatives of Human Security,” in RGICS Paper No. 17, Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies (RGICS), (Rajiv Gandhi Foundation, New Delhi, 1994), p. 1

⁵⁰ See T. Anara, *Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks in Central Asia* (Paris: UNESCO, 2006)

⁵¹ Ramesh Thakur, “From National to Human Security.” *Asia-Pacific Security The Economics-Politics Nexus*. Eds. Stuart Harris, and Andrew Mack. (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1997), p. 53-54.

⁵² Caroline Thomas. *Global Governance, Development and Human Security*. (London: Pluto Press, 2000), p. 6-7.

⁵³ P., Roland. 2001. “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” in *International Security*. Vol. 26:2. 92-99

The process of identifying elements of human security is not elaborated; nor is it mentioned on what grounds their definitions would evolve.

According to Hampson et al⁵⁴, the concept of 'security' can be defined as the absence of threat to core human values, including the most basic human value, the physical safety of the individual. These scholars identify other core human values as physical security, and the protection of basic liberties, economic needs and interests and that human security in all instances is regarded as an "underprovided public good."

Leaning and Arie develop a proposal for human security measurement with special attention to Africa. Their definition and exposition of human security is based in the human development and capability approach, yet emphasizes the psychological and the non-material aspects of security.⁵⁵

1.3.3 Contending debate on Human Security vis-à-vis National Security

Human security as envisioned in the context of Mander Triangle may be a timely extension of the state security framework, one which explores and develops the newer issues that are already on the edges of the security agenda, and brings outside expertise to bear on issues that already have the attention and concern of decision makers.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ See Hampson, F. O., Daudelin J., Hay, J. B. Todd M., and Reid. H. *Madness in the Multitude Human Security and World Disorder*. (Ottawa: Oxford University Press, 2002)

⁵⁵ J. Leaning, and Arie. S. "Human Security: A Framework for Assessment" in *Conflict and Transition*, 2000

⁵⁶ See McRae, Rob and Don Hubert, Eds., *Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace.* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001).

In the earlier definition of national security adopted for this study, the concept was defined narrowly as “protection of the nation’s people and territories against physical assault,” which even in this narrow sense, also implies protection, through a variety of means, of vital economic and political interests, the loss of which could threaten the fundamental values and vitality of the state.”⁵⁷

It is therefore important to argue that National Security should not only advocate for investment in basic human needs as part of the national security strategy but also relate the material well-being of those living in the Manderu Triangle region to national security: This study aims to show why states in the region should pursue, within the limits of what is prudent and realistic, the expansion of material abundance and the eradication of poverty. There are no guarantees against violence and evil in the world but the expansion of basic material well-being constitutes a sturdy bulwark against them.⁵⁸

Proponents of national security in the context of Manderu Triangle would argue that human security demands would dilute the capacity of the state to effectively protect its borders by overloading national security with an ambitious agenda of problems and issues that would compromise the power of the state. States in the region would likely criticise human security advocates for offering the promise of a new, more cooperational, but perhaps unattainable and unrealistic national order.”⁵⁹

⁵⁷ See Tow, William T; Thakur, Ramesh Chandra, and Hyun, In-Taek. 2000. *Asia's emerging regional order reconciling traditional and human security* (Tokyo; New York: United Nations University Press, 2000)

⁵⁸ See Roxborough, Ian., “The Hart-Rudman Commission and the Homeland Defense.” *Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College* (2001)

⁵⁹ See Tow, William T; Thakur, Ramesh Chandra, and Hyun, In-Taek.. *Asia's emerging regional order reconciling traditional and human security* (Tokyo; New York: United Nations University Press, 2000).

Those who promote human security on the other hand, argue that “the expansion of human rights and basic material well-being constitutes a sturdy bulwark against [violence and conflicts].” That is, protecting others’ human security strengthens the security of national populations and thus would be in the self-interest of the nation-state, because it would be significantly less costly than countering violence or conflict. The problem with this logic of course is that interest in human security might swiftly cease if more cost-effective violence prevention mechanisms were discovered.

A characteristic aim of foreign policy in the realist theory, which is also a defacto aim in many nations, is to *maximize* the state’s power. Thus national security is also substantially concerned with the relative distribution of power between states, and with territorial integrity. The proponents of human security argue against this by positing that in theory, the human security agenda could be realized even if a hegemon’s dominance disappeared, because as long as human beings enjoyed security of their core vital functions in a way that was consistent with their long-term fulfilment, the human security agenda could be said to be complete.

In summary, human security proponents have rarely delved into questions of antagonisms that will proceed simultaneously between actors who may be cooperating in human security matters. Articulating the human security approach in a way that recognizes legitimate and distinct spheres of state interest such as the distribution of power will therefore be an important area of focus of this study.

1.3.4 Literature on Manderu Triangle

The Manderu Triangle straddles the boundaries of the three states of Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia. Strife in the triangle produces perennial tension along state borders and given the fragmentation of communities by frontier lines, conflict in one country often spills across borders. Kin groups cross borders and help each other, and refugees from conflict and famine stricken areas seek shelter across the border. Cross-border raiding is common, especially on Kenya's frontier with Ethiopia, and looted animals are trekked across frontiers.⁶⁰ The larger conflicts in which pastoralists become involved immensely complicate inter-state relations in the Horn.

The region comprising the Manderu Triangle is historically a marginalized area both politically and economically. Embattled regimes often arm pastoralists to combat their opponents. This has happened in Sudan, and Uganda. Elsewhere, pastoral groups respond to the call of ethnic kinship, as in the Somali region of Ethiopia, or to religion, as in Eritrea⁶¹. Conflicts in Manderu Triangle have depopulated huge stretches of land as people flee for fear of violence, and also limit the land available for grazing. The pastoralist zone in eastern Africa and the Horn is wracked by conflict and it was never a peaceful place⁶². In the second half of the twentieth century, conflict in this zone has increased in frequency and scale, and changed form. The region has in more recent times experienced worsening security including dramatic rise in murder rates.

⁶⁰ Tegegne and Alemayehu, *Cross-Border Trade and Food Security in the Ethiopia-Djibouti and Ethiopia-Somalia Borderlands*, (Addis Ababa: Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa, 2002), p. 20.

⁶¹ See Markakis, J., *National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa*, (Cambridge: CUP, 1987).

⁶² See John Markakis, "Pastoralism on the Margin Report", in *Minority Rights Group International 2004*

Cattle-rustling, an established practice in the region has also exhibited significant transformation. No longer are relatively small numbers of cattle seized at a time; they now number in the thousands. Raiders now often torch local dwellings in the process and, in another unprecedented practice, use automatic weapons to target people, including women, children and the elderly and stolen livestock are not recoverable any longer as they had been in the past⁶¹ and much of the region is under the control of bandits and local warlords – to the extent that the state’s actual sovereignty over the region is sometimes questioned – causing most communities to arm themselves in self-defense.

From the foregoing, the nature of conflict in the entire region has thus changed fundamentally from being a communal venture, organized and sanctioned by community leaders to those “motivated by individual gains which are narrow.”⁶⁴ The region has also been referred to as the triangle of trouble, ‘arc of crisis,’⁶⁵ or ‘arc of conflict.’⁶⁶ Mandera Triangle has the largest number of internally displaced persons in the Horn and leads to the congregation of people around security centres and relief stations. Concern over state security has prompted extremely harsh state repression in northern Kenya.

⁶¹ Juma, Monica Kathina, ‘Unveiling Woman as Pillars of Peace: Peace Building in Communities Fractured by Conflict in Kenya (*An Interim Report*)’, (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2000)p.53

⁶⁴ Ocan, C.E., *Pastoral Crisis in North-eastern Uganda: The Changing Significance of Cattle Raiding*(Kampala: Centre for Basic Research, 1992), p. 2.

⁶⁵ See Menkhaus, K., Muchemi, Wachira, and Stephen Muiruri, *Kenya-Somalia Border Conflict Analysis* (Nairobi: USAID-DAI, 2005)

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, (Menkhaus et al, 2005)

1.3.5 Literature on Internationalized Conflicts

The term “internationalized armed conflict” refers to internal hostilities that have international characteristics. The factual circumstances that bring out internationalization are numerous and often complex: Basically internationalization occurs when a conflict crosses international borders. This can occur when two internal factions secure backing from two different states or when foreign intervention occurs in support of an insurgent group fighting against an established government.⁶⁷

Motivations for intervention in civil wars may have changed since the end of the Cold War, but the increased economic interdependence of States born of *globalization*, and the increasing scarcity of natural resources provide continuing incentives for foreign intervention in domestic conflicts. As a reflection of that reality, internal conflicts are presently more numerous, brutal and damaging than their international counterparts.⁶⁸ The difficulty from a conflict management perspective is that although internationalized armed conflicts have special features distinguishing them from both international and internal armed conflicts,⁶⁹ there are no policies designed by the states to bridge the gap between the measures applicable in internal armed conflicts and that relevant to international warfare.

⁶⁷ D. Schindler, “International humanitarian law and internationalized internal armed conflicts”, in *International Review of the Red Cross*, No. 230, 1982, p. 255.

⁶⁸ B. De Schutter and C. Van De Wyngaert, “Non-international armed conflicts: The borderline between national and international law”, in *Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law*, Vol. 13, 1983, p. 279.

⁶⁹ H.P. Gasser, “Internationalized non-international armed conflicts: Case studies of Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Lebanon”, in *American University Law Review*, Vol. 33, 1983, p. 157.

Recent statistics show that a fifth of all the armed conflicts after World War II have been internationalized.⁷⁰ The events following 11 September 2001 demonstrated the phenomenon of international involvement in internal conflicts. While most internal armed conflicts simply peter out, internationalized armed conflicts tend to end through victory or, almost as frequently, through a negotiated settlement.⁷¹ External powers may become involved in internal armed conflicts, either by invitation or by invasion.⁷² Such intervention may be the official and formal action of states,⁷³ or it may be surreptitious intervention.⁷⁴ Whatever its precise form, external intervention has the effect of making the conflict a matter of international concern.⁷⁵

The regionalization of domestic conflict that has come to characterize Africa in the past decade has affected the region as well. Active Armed conflicts in neighboring countries have destabilized the whole region through cross-border incursions and trade in small arms, often related to kinship ties that traverse international frontiers. In addition, the statelessness situation in Somalia has had an impact, in a big way, on all the neighboring areas that make up the Manderla Triangle and beyond. For example, fighting in Ethiopia has spilled into the region manifested in Ethiopian security forces crossing both Kenya and Somalia borders in pursuit of Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ogadenia National Liberation Front (ONLF) , which are

⁷⁰ Lotta Harbom & Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflict and its International Dimensions, 1946-2004", in the *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 42, no. 5, 2005, pp. 623-635 Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi) <http://jpr.sagepub.com>

⁷¹ Ibid, (Lotta et al, 2005) p.629

⁷² McCoubrey & White, *International Law and Armed Conflict* (Dartmouth, 1992), pp. 318-9.

⁷³ E.g. when Ethiopian forces entered Mogadishu, Somalia in December 2006; American aircrafts made regular bombing raids on Ras Camboni, Somalia.

⁷⁴ E.g. Eritrean assistance to the Somali Islamists

⁷⁵ Bailey, *The United Nations and the Termination of Armed Conflict: 1946-1964 Vol. I* (Clarendon Press, 1982) p.20.

fighting secessionist war in the southern and Eastern Ethiopia with the Ethiopian government. Members of the OLF are reported on many occasions to have placed landmines in Kenyan territory and attacked local ethnic Somalis,⁷⁶ while the members of the ONLF have been reported to be collaborating with Islamist groups in Somalia for ideological reasons against the Ethiopian regime. Militias from Somalia have also frequently entered Kenya, attacking Somali refugees and Kenyan ethnic Somalis, effectively rendering the border area unsafe. Local warriors in Southern Sudan have launched many cattle raids in Turkana in Kenya in the recent past. Far worse and more widespread geographically has been the influx of small arms into the Mandera Triangle region.

Mwagiru⁷⁷ argues that internationalization of conflict raises profound questions about the proper methodologies of conflict management especially whether the methodologies used in the management of internal conflicts are equally suitable for the management of internationalized conflicts and whether it is necessary to develop new mechanisms for the management of internationalized conflict which has both internal and international characteristics. International actors get involved in the process of internationalization of internal conflicts due to the existence of certain internationalizing agents. These include,⁷⁸ “the idea of interdependence, domestic sources of international conflicts, negative ethnicity and ethnic relations, the media, the problem of refugees and universality of human rights.”

⁷⁶ Muggah, Robert and Berman, Eric, *Humanitarianism Under Threat: The Humanitarian Impact of Small Arms and Light Weapons*, Special Report No. 1, (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2001)p.16.

⁷⁷ Makumi Mwagiru, *Conflict in Africa: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management* (Nairobi: Centre for Conflict Research, 2006)pp.61-62

⁷⁸ Makumi Mwagiru, *Conflict in Africa: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management* (Nairobi: Centre for Conflict Research, 2006)pp. 62-68

1.3.6 Justification

Academically the study will add to the body of knowledge on the subject of Human security. The findings of the study will contribute towards a better understanding of the internationalized conflict existing in the Mandera triangle and implication on human security. Secondly the study will form a basis for future research. As the researcher will rely on the works of other scholars, this work will also be used by future scholars in the research work.

African policymakers are often only marginally aware of the overall security dimensions of internationalized pastoral conflicts. The study findings will also be useful for policymakers on the issue of human security in the Horn of Africa. The security agents may use the findings of the study to draft policy papers which can tackle the issue of human insecurity in the Mandera triangle. The findings of the study may also be used by the government agencies to draft policies on the best ways to combat the security threats posed by the internationalized pastoralist conflicts in the Mandera Triangle. The recommendations from the study might be useful in ending the conflicts.

1.4 Theoretical Framework

This study will use the Human security concept as its conceptual Framework of analysis.

Human security is an increasingly contested concept which on the other hand is also gaining legitimacy in many academic and policy arenas.

Although, human security concept has no single accepted definition and no consensus-commanding analytic framework for its measurement, it has been used to coalesce ideas around important international instruments like the International Criminal Court which proves that it is both popular and legitimate as a tool of International policymaking.

To avoid controversies surrounding the definition of human security and to avoid contradictions over whether the state or the individual are singularly or jointly important players in ensuring human security this study will use the human security concept as conceptualised by the Human Development Report and the Human Security conception by Roland Paris in order to come up with an approach that will produce an overall human security framework that is best suited for analysis of internationalised pastoral conflicts. The similarities on many aspects of human security between these two different conceptions probably outweigh their differences hence their suitability for reconciling and merging for this study.

Roland Paris argues that Human Security can be identified as a broad category of research on military and/or non-military threats to societies, groups and individuals.⁷⁹ That is, he classifies security approaches in a two by two matrix (Table 1), with one axis that distinguishes approaches concerned exclusively with military threats from those of non-military security threats such as economic deprivation or environmental crises. The other axis distinguishes approaches that conceive of the state as the appropriate unit of analysis for security from approaches of security for societies, groups, and individuals.

⁷⁹ See Sabina, Alkire. "A conceptual Framework for Human Security." In *CRISE Working Paper 2* (2003)

This partition seems a sensible division of approaches that helps to orient human security in relation to the traditional security studies as well as to the wider “comprehensive,” “common,” and “global” security agendas that are still state-focused. This kind of conception and approach is appropriate for internationalized Pastoral Conflicts because the four approaches in real sense are inter-related in that the “military” columns single out a key subset of the “both” columns. There is also significant overlap between threats that affect states and those that affect individuals and groups. Hence Paris’s work is useful, in the context of pastoral conflicts because of its recognition that multiple definitions of human security will and should persist.⁸⁰

Table 1: What is the Source of the Security Threat?

	Military	Military, Non-Military or Both
States	<p>National Security (Conventional realist approach to security studies)</p>	<p>Redefined security (e.g. environmental and economic [cooperative or comprehensive security])</p>
Security for Whom?	<p>Intrastate security (eg., civil war, ethnic conflict, and democide)</p>	<p>Human Security (e.g., environmental and economic threats to the survival of societies, groups, and individuals)</p>
Societies, Groups, and individuals		

Source: Paris, Roland. “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” In *International Security*. Vol. 26, No.2. (2001) p.98

⁸⁰ Paris, Roland. “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” In *International Security*. Vol. 26, No.2.(2001))p.98

The 1994 UNDP *Human Development Report on Human Security*⁸¹ was intended to bridge the gaps between freedom from want and freedom from fear. The phrase 'freedom from fear' is intended to indicate freedom from violence, and the phrase 'freedom from want', freedom from poverty. This concept cuts into the heart of security concerns in pastoral areas, because its key premises are central to concern with human beings and defines human security as safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression as well as protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in jobs, in homes or in communities.⁸²

This definition in relation to seven dimensions of human security: personal, environmental, economic, political, community, health, and food security will be the key to answering the question of the relationship between human insecurity and internationalized pastoral conflicts in the Manderu Triangle as is being investigated by this study. The conception by Roland Paris will fit in well because it brings in the element of the role of the state and its concerns for security which is also useful in the context of the study.

⁸¹ Rothschild, Emma. "What is Security?" In *Daedalus*. Vol. 124 No.3 (1995) pp.53-98.

⁸² United Nations Development Program. "*Human Development Report*," (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994)

Table 2: The summary of two schools of thought in relation to four orienting questions – security referent, values, threats, and instruments or means

	Human Security Conception	Roland Paris Conception
Security for Whom	Primarily the Individual	Primarily the Individual but state security is also important
Security for What Values	Personal safety/well-being and individual freedom	Personal safety/well-being and individual freedom
Security from What Threats	Direct and indirect violence; greater emphasis on indirect violence	Direct and indirect violence; greater emphasis on direct violence (both internal and external)
Security by What Means	Promoting human development: basic needs plus equity, sustainability and greater democratization and participation at all levels	Promoting political development: national norms and institutions (governance)

Source: Adopted from Kroc Institute Occasional Paper No.19:Op.1. (August 2000)p.30 and modified by Haro(2010).

1.5 Operationalisation of terms

Human Security – for the purpose of this project human security is the protection of “ the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and fulfillment.”⁸³

Mandera Triangle- this is the area covering the borderlines of Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia.

This area is inhabited by pastoralist communities who engage in pastoral livelihood and cattle economy which lead to conflicts.

⁸³ UN Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now* (New York: United Nations Publications, 2003)p.4

1.6 Research Methodology

To achieve the objectives of this study, the study will undertake a qualitative exploratory on the question of the relationships between human insecurity and Internationalized Pastoral Conflicts in the Mendera Triangle. In general terms, this study will systematically use flexible procedures to seek answers to the question under investigation. The study will collect evidence and produce findings that were not determined in advance and which are applicable beyond the immediate boundaries of the study.

This particular approach has been preferred because its open endedness allows for further probing which gives participants the opportunity to respond in their own words, rather than forcing them to choose from fixed responses, and the responses received are meaningful and culturally salient to the region, unanticipated by the research, and rich and explanatory in nature.

1.7 Sampling Design Strategy/methods

Snowball Purposive sampling will be employed for this study. Snowballing-also known as chain referral sampling- is preferred by the study because of the need to capture the opinions of "hidden populations" in the study area owing to difficulties of reaching some populations in the area of Mendera Triangle due to the ongoing conflicts in Somalia and parts of South and Eastern Ethiopia. In this method, research institutions with which the researcher interacts, makes use of their social networks to refer the researcher to other people/institutions who could potentially participate in or contribute to the study.

This method is also useful in that there is already a predefined research institutions (international agencies) and allows for flexibility in sample sizes, which may or may not be fixed prior to data collection, depending on the resources and time available, as well as the study's objectives. Purposive sample sizes are also often determined on the basis of theoretical saturation (the point in data collection when new data no longer bring additional insights to the research questions). For better results, data review and analysis in this study will be done in conjunction with data collection.

Secondary data will be obtained from analysis and review of books, journals, papers and other available literature on the issue of human security, national security and internationalized pastoral conflicts in the Manderu Triangle. A comprehensive analysis of secondary data will be undertaken, including review of published books, journals, and articles by authors who have examined the subject of pastoral security and pastoral conflicts outcome as a whole.

Research findings on on-going works will be obtained from a number of organizations (local and International Organizations) working on development and conflict projects in the area and used to inform this study. Different perspectives and opinions on internationalized pastoral conflicts will also be solicited from a wide range of stakeholders, including local leaders, government officials in the region, herders, livestock traders and pastoralists.

1.8 Data Collection and Analysis Strategies

This study will employ the Case study method of data collection. Case Study of Mandera Triangle was selected because it is “information rich.” and illuminative and offers useful manifestations of internationalized pastoral conflicts: sampling is aimed at insight about this phenomenon and not the empirical generalizations from a sample to this population. The case study will be systematically conducted beginning with the designing of the case study followed by the actual conduct of the case study which will then be followed by the analysis of the case study evidence and finally the development of conclusions, recommendations and implications.

Case Study Research Approach for the Mandera Triangle will have the Research Purpose of describing the Mandera Triangle case in depth and address the research question and human security issues in the Region. The Data Analysis will be done using Holistic description through inductive analysis and creative synthesis in search for themes shading light on the interrelationships in the case, and the Narrative Report Focus will be on rich description of the context operation of the case and discussion of themes, issues, and Implications.

The case study final report will be aimed at providing a rich (i.e., vivid and detailed) and holistic (i.e., describes the whole and its parts) description of the case and its context. The case will begin by exploring, then confirming, guided by analytical principles rather than rules, and ends with creative synthesis and knowledge creation.

1.9 Chapter Outline

The Study contains five chapters. Chapter One introduces the research study by contextualizing the research problem and provides justification for this study. The chapter also presents a literature review where the relevant literature by other scholars on the issue of human security, national security, and Mander Triangle and Internationalized Pastoralist conflicts are presented and tied to the pastoralist community conflict in the Mander Triangle. Theoretical framework adopted by the study is also presented. The chapter then outlines the hypotheses made by the researcher which will be tested. The chapter ends by giving the data collection and data analysis methods that will be used by the study. Chapter two looks into the overview of Emerging Dimensions of security. This will include a comparative analysis of dimensions of old security and the emerging trends in new thinking about security. This chapter will also highlight the defining moments in the shifts from the old to the new and the interregnum between the two in relation to the context in Mander Triangle.

Chapter three will be the Mander triangle case study. This chapter will center on the question of analysis of security issues in the region. Chapter four will be the critical analysis chapter on all the previous three chapters and chapter five will contain a summary of the study, conclusion and recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

EMERGING DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY

2.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses the emerging dimensions of security. It begins by analyzing the concept of security and thereafter, delves into the evolution of the concept of security, while at the same time addressing different conceptions about threats to security. It argues that the concept of security is strongly contested and has been redefined after the Cold War. Looking back, the study of security has always been a central concern in the academic discipline of International Relations (IR). This reflects the circumstances of the discipline's birth in the profound and shocking violence of World War I (1914-1918). The issue area of security continued to dominate world politics in the aftermath of World War II and through the nearly half-century of the Cold War.⁸⁴

After the Cold War, the study of Security declined in its centrality to students of IR particularly in the decade between the fall of the Soviet State and the September eleven (9/11) terrorist attacks on the World Trade center, the two defining moments of what is viewed by many analysts as the brief interregnum of the Post Cold War era.⁸⁵ These defining moments have thrust the security debate and all its manifestations back at the top of the agenda and seems like it is going to remain this way for a long period of time.

⁸⁴ Booth, Ken. "Strategy," in A.J.R. Groom and Margot Light (eds.), *Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory* (London: Pinter, 1994)pp.109-127

⁸⁵ See Cox, Michael, Ken Booth, and Tim Dunne (eds.). *The Interregnum: Controversies in World Politics, 1989-1999*, (Cambridge,UK: Cambridge University Press,1999).

According to Giddens⁸⁶, other than traditional insecurities (inter-state rivalry, ethnic conflicts), the emerging threats from forces of globalization coupled with causes and consequences of the war on terrorism combine to ensure that human society will for a long period live in an "Age of Anxiety," a world, "on the edge," a "runaway world." This has given rise to a situation Booth has described as potentially threatening "long hot century."⁸⁷

2.1 The Concept of Security in the Cold War period

The subject of Security and Crisis, developed in its orthodox form during the Cold War was constructed in the image of Political Realism. To understand better the character and nature of crisis in the Cold War period in order to appreciate the shifts in the epistemology of security from the Cold War to the Post Cold War period in the international system, it is worth to do analysis of the contributions of Alexander L. George particularly his seminal work in 1991, titled "Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management,"⁸⁸ and the works of Janice Cross Stein, "Crisis Management: Looking Back to Look Forward."⁸⁹ The Cold War period has been touted by many scholars as the most dangerous and insecure time in all of history. During this period, there was likelihood of irreversible disaster soars in the highly stressful setting of a nuclear confrontation, which demanded instant decisions and fine-tuned control of far-flung military operations.

⁸⁶ See Giddens, Anthony. "Affluence, Poverty and the Idea of a Post-Scarcity Society," in Booth (ed.), *Security and Statecraft: The Cold War and Beyond* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

⁸⁷ See Booth, Ken. "Two Terrors, One Problem." In J.N. Rosenau and E. Aydinli (eds.), *Globalization, Security, and the Nation State* (New York: SUNY Press, forthcoming)

⁸⁸ See Alexander L. George. "Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management" in *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, vol.21,no.2.1992

⁸⁹ Stein, Janice Cross, "Crisis Management: Looking Back to Look Forward" in *Political Psychology*,vol.29,no.4 (2008)

This is the period during which many Scholars were deeply concerned about the prospect of war between the super powers: a war that they feared could erupt inadvertently through miscalculation or through the ratcheting up of tensions among their smaller allies.⁹⁰ It was in this context of an international system shaped by the rivalry between the two superpowers that the Cold War played out in the world.

According to Stein⁹¹, Cold War gave structure and meaning to global politics for more than four decades, and this structure and meaning defined what constituted a threat. She further adds that during this period, threats may have been severe, but they were “knowable,” broadly familiar, and increasingly fitted into established structures of thinking and response. What was known and familiar, however, could not easily be prevented or managed effectively. George⁹² on the other hand, referred to the Cold War period as the nuclear age, and a period when crises were an endemic attribute of a bipolar nuclear world in which some could be prevented but most had to be managed but at a high risk that the crisis could spin out of control. An important scenario that played out during the Cold War period was the fact that smaller allies had high affinity for crisis creation and that effective communication and control between super power and ally was necessary but not sufficient.⁹³

⁹⁰ See Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., “Crisis Management: Looking Back and Looking Ahead”, in paper presented at The Crisis Management Conference: *Athena, Organized by The Hellenic Ministry of National Defense* (July 2, 2008)

⁹¹ Stein, Janice Cross, “Crisis Management: Looking Back to Look Forward” in *Political Psychology*, vol.29,no.4 (2008)p.554

⁹² *Ibid*, op., cit, (stein, 2008)

⁹³ Alexander L. George, “Crisis Management: The Interaction of Political and Military Considerations.” *Survival*, Vol. XXVI, No. 5 (September/October 1984), p 224.

Stein concludes that the super powers struggled not only to manage an adversary who shared their aversion to war but, equally important, to restrain their ally who considered the use of force an acceptable if not preferred instrument of conflict management.

Prior to World War II, Security concerns were influenced by the policy of appeasement but in the Cold War period policy makers and scholars emphasized on strategies of deterrence and coercive diplomacy as the principal strategies of avoiding war⁹⁴. Theories of deterrence were long-standing in the history of international relations, but they became very popular during the Cold War, owing to the bi-polar nature of the international system in which the world was tightly structured into two blocs each headed by a nuclear superpower and a large group of uncommitted states where the superpowers played out their rivalry. These theories of deterrence and coercive diplomacy were too simplistic for a complex world where the use of force by either superpower against the other would have been catastrophic.

2.2 Shifts in the Concept of Security in the post Cold War period

There is a clear shift in the epistemology of security in the international system after the end of the Cold War Period. The understanding of security and crisis has changed dramatically⁹⁵. This shift is largely attributable to the changing structure of global politics. Conventional war between states has declined, but ferocious civil wars rage within states and civilians are their

⁹⁴ Dror, Y., Lagadec, P., Porfiriev, B., & Quarantelli, E. L., Crises to come. In U. Rosenthal, R. Boin, & L. K. Comfort (Eds.), *Managing crises: Threats, dilemmas, opportunities* (Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas, 2001), pp. 342-349.

⁹⁵ See Carnes Lord, "Crisis Mis-Management", in *Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, JFQ* (Summer 1999)

primary victims. Non-state actors have also emerged as important players in international politics. There has also emerged new kind of threats to the international system. These new threats and challenges are also credited with defying theories of national security management that assumed unitary actors and rational choice. Global politics is today less structured, the meaning of threat is contested, and consequently what constitutes a security matter is far less clearly demarcated⁹⁶ and the ontology and metaphysics of “security” are at the core of the debate, and the meanings that political leaders give to security are constitutive of our understanding of contemporary global politics. There are clear fundamental challenges coming from the breakdown of “familiar symbolic frameworks that legitimized the pre-existing social order.”⁹⁷

In her paper, “Crisis Management: Looking back to Look Forward,” Stein further elaborates that changes in the meaning, the explanation, and the understanding of crisis have been informed by the increasing complexity and diversity of the international environment and that “Linear thinking (‘big events must have big causes’) has given way to a more subtle perspective that emphasizes the unintended consequences of increased complexity. A new understanding has thus evolved that qualifies crises as the complex result of multiple consequences, which interact over time to produce a threat with devastating potential.

⁹⁶ Ibid, op.cit (Cames, 1999)p.560

⁹⁷ t’ Hart, Paul “Symbols, Rituals and Power: The Lost Dimensions of Crisis Management.” In *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, 1(1), (1993) p.39.

The post Cold War thinking about insecurity is thus contrary to the linear models of causation, anchored by unitary actors making rational choices, and is informed by theories of complexity and epidemiology that focus on the “pathogens” that live within a system and explode once they cumulate and reach a critical mass. The new kinds of crises are therefore more difficult to see, more challenging to manage, and less amenable to the primitive notions of “control” that so informed theories anchored in the Cold War experience. Stein gives a parting shot that “Contemporary crisis management is-or should be-less infected by hubris”.

The post Cold War period has also seen the rise to prominence of new kinds of actors, with organizational structures that differ sharply from those of states. This is a new context which Stein argues in her paper that in the “contemporary international system, networks of non-state actors have joined states as important players in global politics... Today, almost all development assistance is delivered by non-governmental organizations, security in war-torn societies is increasingly managed by private security firms, and militias, not connected directly to states, engage in violence across borders...In this far more crowded environment, states are the most important but no longer the exclusive players in global politics.”

Stein makes a clear case of how the non-state actor networks operate in contemporary times. She argues that networks are the form of social organization that increasingly defines the global system in the twenty-first century; that networks are flatter, less hierarchical than states, and resilient insofar as they build in redundancy and duplication; that the loss of one node in a network does not disable the network as a whole, since information and decision making moves around the disabled node; that networks are often more nimble and more flexible in their

response than hierarchies where information travels up through channels to centralized decision makers and down again for implementation; that in a “just-in-time” global system, state structures are slow and lumbering in their responses when compared to the lighter and more flexible responses of networks⁹⁸.

Because of these Changing realities, there is a raging debate on re-thinking of the concept of security from its traditional notion⁹⁹ and this re-thinking debate took on new urgency with the 9/11, 2001 attack on the only Super Power and the events that followed, including the declared Global War on Terror which has left in its wake clouds of destruction, terror, and incomprehension. Terror has since become a new predominant form of security threat which comes in many forms and from many fronts, from states as well as non state actors. Under these circumstances the search for security has never been more difficult, more urgent and more contested.

2.3 The Traditional notion of Security

Many Security Studies scholars and analysts are in agreement that security is essentially a derivative concept which means that contending theories about world politics give different meanings of what security is all about leading to different implications, different response measures and different impacts.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ Ibid, op., cit (t Hart, Paul, 1993)p.561

⁹⁹ Galtung, Johan. “ Violence, Peace and the Peace Research,” in the *Journal of Peace Research* Vol.6, No.3 (1989)pp.167-192

¹⁰⁰ Booth, Ken. “Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist.” In Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds.), *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Causes* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997)pp.83-119

This therefore means that the ideas that shaped mainstream security debates during the Cold War were derived from a Philosophically Realist thinking, and largely shaped by experiences and memories of the inter war years and the perceived necessities of the Cold War.

Basic realist ideas and assumptions include, a pessimistic view of human nature, a conviction that IR are necessarily conflictual where international conflicts are ultimately resolved by war, a high regard for the values of national security and state survival, and a basic skepticism that there can be progress in international politics that is comparable to that in domestic political life.¹⁰¹

Realism advances a strong belief that the goal of power, the means of power and the uses of power are central preoccupation of political activity. International systems are thus portrayed as- above all else- "power politics": an arena of rivalry, conflict and war between states in which the same basic problem of defending the national interest and ensuring the continued survival of the state repeat themselves over and over again.¹⁰² The normative core of realism is national security and state survival; these are the values that drive realist doctrine and realist foreign policy. The state is considered to be essential for the good life of its citizens: without a state to guarantee the means and conditions of security and promote welfare, human life is bound to be, in the famous phrase by Thomas Hobbes, "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short."¹⁰³ The state is thus seen as a protector of its territory, of the population, and of their distinctive and valued way of life.

¹⁰¹ See Morgenthau, H.J. " *Scientific man versus Power Politics*," (Chicago: Phoenix Books, 1965)

¹⁰² See Morgenthau, H.J. " *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6thn Edn.*" (New York: Knopf, 1985)

¹⁰³ See Hobbes, T. " *Leviathan*," (Oxford: Blackwell, 1946)

This means that the only fundamental responsibility of states people is to advance and to defend the national interest and that there cannot be progressive change in world politics comparable to the developments that characterize domestic political life. This also means that realists' thought about security is considered to be valid not only at particular times but at all times, because the foregoing basic facts of world politics never change. This, at any rate, is what most realists argue and evidently believe.¹⁰⁴

The emerging Security Conceptions which is the concern of this study challenge the conceptualization of security derived from such a world view.¹⁰⁵ The contemporary security debate has therefore ignited rethinking of security from the bottom-up in two dimensions- deepening and broadening the meaning of security. Deepening involves embracing a more extensive set of referents for security than the sovereign state, from individuals to the whole of humanity. Broadening involves expanding the agenda of security studies beyond that of hitherto militarized and statist orthodoxy of Realism.¹⁰⁶

2.4 Defining Security

According to standard dictionary definition of Security, "Security means, simply, the absence of threats." The definition of Security is not that simple when the concept is looked at in the context of world politics. 'Security' refers broadly to a feeling or condition of being secure or

¹⁰⁴ See Waltz, K. *Theory of International Politics*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979)

¹⁰⁵ See Booth, Ken (ed.), *Critical Security Studies*, (New Delhi: Raj Publishers, 2005)

¹⁰⁶ See Buzan, Barry, et al. *The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post Cold War Era* (London: Printer, 1990)

'safe'¹⁰⁷. It refers to a universal aspiration to live in the expectation that life and physical integrity will not be threatened by any other person, group, or society¹⁰⁸.

Security is not a fixed or steady state, it is dynamic and always in flux, and functions more like an organizing principle, stimulating and steering a dynamic evolutionary process. Security systems are total systems. The ways human societies organize for security involves and affects the whole fabric of society at conscious and unconscious levels. The guiding myths, religious and identity systems, structures of thought, gender roles, and leadership requirements as well as political and economic systems are all affected. So is social status, that is, who is valued and who is marginalized? Who will lead and who will follow? Who will rule and who must obey? States and leadership are greatly affected by a society's perception of who can make the most important contribution to group security, and who is a burden, liability or threat to it¹⁰⁹.

This means that there is no politics free definition of Security and there is no simple conceptualization of the speculative definition around which every body, from all theoretical perspectives, can agree. The best starting point for conceptualizing Security lies in the real conditions of insecurity suffered by people and collectivities. Security might therefore be conceived as synonymous with opening up space in people's lives. Security can therefore, be understood as an instrumental value which frees its possessor to a greater or lesser extent from life determining constraints and so allows different life possibilities to be explored. Second,

¹⁰⁷ Choucri, N. and North, R. C. "Population and (in) Security: National Perspectives and Global Imperatives" In Dewitt et al. *Building a New Global Order: Emerging Trends in International Security* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1993) pg. 229

¹⁰⁸ Brock, L. "Security Through Defending the Environment: An illusion." In Boulding, E. *New Agendas for Peace Research: Conflicts and Security Re-examined*, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992) pg. 95

¹⁰⁹ Mische, M. P. "Security through Defending the Environment: Citizens say yes!" In Boulding, E. (1992) *Op.cit* p-105

Security is not simply survival. It is survival-plus, the plus being the possibility to explore human becoming. Because the condition of security is of such importance to societies- because it is primordial and deeply politicized-to have something labelled security is to give it priority on the agenda. Security, above all, is a powerful political concept; it is the sort of word that energizes opinion and moves material power. This is because it represents instrumental and political value and demands the committing of appropriate collective resources. It is something over which people(s) have been willing to fight.

Buzan on the one hand and Gallie¹¹⁰ and Smith¹¹¹ on the other hand argue that certain terminologies in Social theory were “Contested Concepts” and that the concept of security has been under developed therefore generating unsolvable debates about its meaning and application.¹¹² Bill McSweeney disagrees with Buzan and argues that concepts like security and state are not contested but all other concepts of the social order are.¹¹³ He also argues that the term Security has added value moral importance in comparison with many other concepts hence cannot be considered factual and cannot lend itself to objective measurement.

¹¹⁰ Gallie, W.B. “Essentially Contested Concepts,” in the *Proceedings of Aristotelian Society* vol.56 (1955-1956)pp.167-168

¹¹¹ Smith, Steve. “The Contested Concept of Security,” in Booth, Ken (ed.) *Critical Security Studies* (New Delhi, Raj Publishers, 2005)p.23

¹¹² See Buzan, Barry. “People, State, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies.” In the *Post-Cold War Era, 2nd Edition* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991)

¹¹³ See McSweeney, Bill, “ Security, *Identity and Interests: A sociology of International Relations,*” (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999)

2.5 Non traditional notion of security

2.5.1 The Copenhagen school and security

This is a school of thought on security studies which had contributions from many scholars but which Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver have had the most influence on the debate. The term “Copenhagen School” was coined by Bill McSweeney.¹¹⁴

According to Ken Booth, Buzan’s 1983 book, “People, states and Fear”, gave the “most comprehensive theoretical analysis of the concept of Security in International Relations literature today.”¹¹⁵ Buzan in his book, aimed at broadening the security agenda to include political, economical, society, economical societal, ecological security and military security. Buzan also regarded the individual as the “irreducible base unit” for discussions about security. However, he further argued that state still remained the referent object for the analysis of international security because the state has to cope not only with the substate-state-interaction of insecurity but the state was also the dominant actor in the international political system and was also the primary agent for the alleviation of insecurity.¹¹⁶

Despite widening the definition of security, Buzan has been criticised for presenting a refined form of neorealist account of security. Instead of state as referent object, Booth proposes that human emancipation should be at the centre of security studies and that people’s security should come first before that of the state.

¹¹⁴ McSweeney, Bill. “Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School,” In the *Review of International Studies* Vol.22, No. 1 (1996) PP 81-93.

¹¹⁵ Booth, Ken “Security and Emancipation”, In the *Review of International Studies* Vol. 17, No. 4 (1991) Pp. 313-326.

¹¹⁶ See Buzan, Barry. “*people, states and fear*,” (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1983)

Booth concludes that "individual humans are the ultimate referent."¹¹⁷ Martin Shaw however has differed with both Buzan and Booth by arguing that since both state and individual need to be understood in a sociological context and since neither can stand alone; the society should be the referent point for security studies.¹¹⁸

In a significant shift from their earlier work which advocated for the state as the referent object for security,¹¹⁹ Buzan and Ole Waever made further contributions in a number of publications which argued for societal security which was envisaged to focus on identity which encompassed ability of a society to maintain its language, culture, religion and national identity and customs.

Waever et al argued for a context in which societal security became the centre of analysis with state security confined to the periphery of sovereignty while society security was concerned with identity issues.¹²⁰ For Waever, security is best understood as a Speech Act- the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and places the issue either as a special kind of politics or above politics. Security studies, conceptualizes security as a structured field, in which some actors are placed in positions of power by virtue of being generally accepted as voices of security, by having power to define security¹²¹. Treating security as a speech-act provides, in principle, for an almost indefinite expansion of the security agenda.

¹¹⁷ Ibid,op.cit (Buzan, 1983)p.320

¹¹⁸ Shaw, Martin. "There is No Such Thing as Society: Beyond Individualism and Statism in International Security Studies." In the *Review of International Studies* Vol. 19, No. 2 (1993) P. 159-175.

¹¹⁹ See Buzan Barry et al, "*The European Security Oder Recast: Scenarios for Post Cold War Era,*" (London: printer 1990)

¹²⁰ See Waever, Ole at al. "*Identity, Migration and New Security Agenda in Europe,*" (London, printer 1993).

¹²¹ Buzan, et al. "*Security A New Framework of Analysis.*"(Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1998)Pp. 23-31

Not only is the realm of possible threats enlarged, but the actors or objects that are threatened (what are termed as the “referent objects” of security) can be extended to include actors and objects well beyond the military security of the territorial state¹²². This means that you can label something as a security issue to imbue it with a sense of importance and urgency that legitimises the use of special measures outside of the usual political process to deal with it. This he refers to it as the concept of “securitization.”¹²³

This is exactly what has been happening in Northern Kenya; by securitization banditry and cattle rustling rather than for example treating it as a criminal act, the government made its intervention to deal with the problem a military rather than a legal or political action. The implication is that the usual political procedures do not apply in states of banditry and cattle rustling and so responses by the state to these issues fall outside standard political practices, these implications arise directly from the securitization of the issue. Waever is concerned that securitization results in a militarized and confrontational mind set, which defines security questions in an us-versus-them manner. Waever proposes, instead, desecuritizing issues, that is, removing them from the security agenda. The practise of Securitization is therefore the center of analysis for the Copenhagen School.”¹²⁴

¹²² Williams, M.C. “Words, Images and Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” In *International Studies Quarterly*, September 2003, (New York: Blackwell Publishing Inc.,2003)p. 513

¹²³ See Waever, Ole. “Securitization and Desecuritization.” In *Ronnie Lipschutz* (ed.) on Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

¹²⁴ Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde. “*Security A New Framework for Analysis.*” (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998). P.32

Buzan et al further expound that "securitization studies aims to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who securitizes on what issues (threats) for whom (referent of objects), why, with what results, and not least under what conditions (i.e. explains when securitization is successful)."¹²⁵ A successful securitization attempt requires that the actor has the position of authority to make the securitizing claim, that the alleged threats facilitate securitization and that the securitizing speech act follows the grammar of security. Buzan, waever and de Wilde then relate this securitization approach to the five sectors outlined by Buzan in 1983 and to a regional focus, rather than a state focus on security.

Lenne Hansen has based her criticism for the Copenhagen School on the absence of gender based insecurity.¹²⁶ She criticised Copenhagen school for using the societal as referent point and not individual or group, hence absence of gender. She also argues that while securitization approach assumes that is possible to speak about the security issue, the honour killings cases show that it is not possible to securitize it. If women speak about them then, they might increase the threat to themselves. Hansen concludes her criticism that "the focus on speech produces problems in situations where the possibilities of speaking security are constrained and the conditions for becoming a referent object are such that gender security is almost excluded from qualifying."¹²⁷

¹²⁵ Ibid, (Buzan, 1998)p.33

¹²⁶ Hansen, Lenne. "The little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemmas and the Absence of Gender in Copenhagen School." *Millennium* Vol.29 No.2 (2000) pp 285 – 306.

¹²⁷ Ibid,op.cit (Hansen, 2000)pp. 299-300

Wynn Jones¹²⁸ wants critical security studies to have a commitment to emancipation as seen in other approaches especially Waever's concept of securitization but which must rest on a notion of what emancipation means. Booth and Wynne Jones argue for reconceptualization of security because they think statism and scientism of the orthodoxy was wanting and inadequate. They also argue that any such reconceptualization must be focused on human emancipation. Booth sees emancipation as a philosophical anchorage, a strategic process and tactical goal which is not a universal timeless concept nor can it be at the expense of others nor is it synonymous with westernization.¹²⁹

Booth defines emancipation as "the freeing of people (as individual and groups) from the physical and human constraints which stop them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do. War and threat of war is one of those constraints, together with poverty, poor education, and political oppression and so on. Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation not power or order produces true security. Emancipation theoretically is true security."¹³⁰ For Booth, Emancipation offers a theory of progress for politics, it provides a politics of hope and it gives guidance to politics of resistance and that emancipation is the only permanent hope of becoming. Accordingly, "The next stage of thinking about Security in world affairs should be marked by moving it out of its almost exclusive Realist framework into the critical philosophical maps."¹³¹

¹²⁸ See Wynn Jones, Richard. "Security, strategy, and Critical Theory," (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999).

¹²⁹ Booth, Ken. "Three Tyrannies," In Tim Dunne and Nick Wheeler (eds.), *Human Rights in Global Politics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999) pp. 31-70.

¹³⁰ Booth, Ken. "Security and Emancipation," In the *Review of International Studies*, Vol 17, No. 4 (1991) pp 313 – 326.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, op.cit (Booth, 1991) P. 321

McSweeney has also come up with a reflective sociological approach to security studies whose underlying intellectual theme concerns the emancipation of individuals.¹³² He sees security policies as involving choices and thus human agency and he argues that "security only makes sense to individual human beings who are seen as its primary referent or subject... the basic need for security... is that which expresses itself as such in everyday life and in all social action. It is the security of social relations.... it is from this elemental experiences, by definition common to all individuals, that we derive the social order as the general condition of ontological security."¹³³

2.5.2 Human Security

The concept of Human Security has risen to prominence in the debate following the 1994 United Nations Development programme's (UNDP), Human Development Report.¹³⁴ This Report proposed that the focus on security should shift from nuclear Security to human security. This Report appreciated that with the receding dark shadows of the Cold War there were now many conflicts within nations rather than between nations; that for most people, a feeling of insecurity was arising more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event; that many people were now more worried about whether they and their families have enough food to eat; whether they will lose their jobs; whether their streets and neighbourhoods will be

¹³² See McSweeney, Bill. *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

¹³³ Ibid.op.cit (McSweeney,1999) p. 208.

¹³⁴ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). "Human Development Report 1994 ." (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Citations from a reprint of sections of the report. "Redefining Security: The Human Dimensions," *Current History* (?May, 1995)pp.229-236

safe from crime; whether they risked being tortured by a repressive state; whether they risk becoming a victim of violence because of their gender; and whether their religion or ethnic origin will target them for persecution. In the final analysis, the report argues strongly that, human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced and that Human security is not a concern with weapons but a concern with human life and dignity.¹³⁵

Such a conception of security fits well with the debates within the ambit of pastoral conflicts in the Mandera Triangle which is the subject of this study. Much of the discussions over why raiders in pastoral conflicts act as they do, and more saliently why they seem to receive so much support from their tribes, focus on the role of poverty and despair. The protracted nature of pastoral conflicts and their characteristics to defy state interventions can be directly traced to problems that a human security perspective highlights. The UNDP Report, 1994 has brought out four main features of the concept of human security which lends itself well for analysis of pastoral conflicts outside traditional tools of analysis. Human Security is a universal concern relevant to people everywhere because the threats are common to all; Its components are interdependent since threats to human security do not stay within national borders; it is easier to achieve through early rather than later intervention; and it is people-centered, in that it is concerned with how people “live and breathe” in society.¹³⁶

¹³⁵ Ibid,op.cit (HDR, 1994)p.229

¹³⁶ Ibid,op.cit (HDR,1994)p.229

This kind of approach will be less controversial and aims at redefining security from pre-occupation with freedom from fear to freedom from want which shifts security concerns from traditional thinking of achieving security through weapons to concentrating on achieving security through sustainable human development.¹³⁷ The UNDP Human Development Report outlines seven areas of human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security. It also identifies six main threats to human security: Unchecked population growth, disparities in economic opportunities, migration pressures, environmental degradation, drug trafficking, and International terrorism.¹³⁸ These shall be the main focus of this study.

Caroline Thomas in her book, *In search of Security*, argues that human security involves not only a shift from a focus on the state to the individual but also a shift from notions of the security of the individual to a focus on individual needs.¹³⁹ In her work, she builds on the arguments of Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, who has emphasized the importance, a “human needs” approach to human security.¹⁴⁰ Borrowing from Scholars like Johan Galtung (Structural Violence) and John Burton (on human needs), Lord Axworthy argues that: “At minimum, human security requires that basic needs are met.”¹⁴¹

¹³⁷ Ibid.op.cit (HDR,1994)p.230

¹³⁸ Ibid.op.cit (HDR,1994)p.230-236

¹³⁹ See Thomas, Caroline. “*In Search of Security The Third World in International Realtions*,” (Brighton, UK: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1987)

¹⁴⁰ See Thomas, Caroline. “*Global Governance, Development, and Human Security. The Challenge of Poverty and Inequality*,” (London.Pluto, 2000)

¹⁴¹ Axworthy, Lloyd. “Canada and Human Security: The Need for leadership,” in *International Journal* vol.52, No.2 (1997)pp.183-196

Thus according to Axworthy, and Thomas, human security requires both that basic material needs are met (food, shelter, education, health etc.) and the achievement of human dignity that “incorporates personal autonomy, control over one’s life and unhindered participation in the life of the community.”¹⁴² Given that Acharya has noted, “three different conceptions of human security today: one focussing on human costs of violent conflicts, another stressing on human needs while a third emphasizes the rights dimensions of human security,”¹⁴³ this study will concentrate on the aspects of human needs as human security issues.

2.5.3 Conclusion

In conclusion, one can deduce the fact that the concept of security is a battle ground in and of itself. There are those who wish to broaden and deepen it and those who insist on maintaining the traditional meaning of the concept. The proponents of re-definition of the concept argue that the traditional security studies reinforces existing order, reports “neutrally” on the existing natural order and works within the paradigm of positivism while the proponents of traditional conception argue that broadening and deepening security only threatens to undermine the utility of the concept and render it useless for analysis. They argue that if the concept of security refers to any threat, then it becomes meaningless. They further argue that broadening and deepening also carry the risk of undermining the important practises of state security, by undermining the core activity of state security.

¹⁴² Ibid,op.cit (Axworthy, 1997)p.6

¹⁴³ See Acharya, Amitav, and Arabinda Acharya. “Human Security in the Asia Pacific:Puzzle, Panacea, or peril?” In the *Cancas Bulletin*, no.27 (Nov.2000) Available online at www.iir.ubc.ca/cancaps/cbu127.html#husec.

The concept of security and national security in particular is dynamic, from its earlier pre-occupation with military threats to security, it has been broadened to address a wide array of non-military threats for example, demographic insecurity, environmental factors, illicit drugs, terrorism, economic considerations, socio-cultural considerations and so on.

In a world that is not only ecologically interdependent, but economically and politically interdependent as well, the primary focus on "national" security is inadequate. Individual countries must respond to internationalized conflicts spilling over or into their borders because national governments are still the principal decision makers, but many threats to security require a co-ordinated response with all the other actors. National security cannot be sensibly considered in isolation. In effect, although it remains crucial, the traditional military concept of "National Security" is growing ever less adequate as non-military threats grow more formidable.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁴ Brown, L. R. "Redefining National Security," in Kegley, C. W. Jr. and Wittkopf, E. R. (1984) *Ibid. Op.cit.*, pg. 344

CHAPTER THREE

CASES STUDY OF THE MANDERA TRIANGLE

3.0 Introduction

According to Yin¹⁴⁵, “a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. In other words, you would use the case study method because you deliberately wanted to cover contextual conditions – believing that they might be highly pertinent to your phenomenon of study.”

This chapter gives an in-depth explanatory case study of Mandera triangle. It starts by giving a brief analysis of the region and its relationship to the wider Horn of Africa region. It also gives a brief overview of the pastoralist political economy and livelihood resources. On the security perspectives, the case gives an overview of security issues in the region, and implications of specific human security issues in the region.

3.1 Overview of Mandera Triangle Region

The defining feature of Mandera triangle is its aridity. Annual rainfall in the region ranges between 150mm and 550mm per year. Temperatures in the arid districts within the region are high throughout the year, with high rates of evapo-transpiration. The primary policy challenge in the entire region is how to ensure sustainable food security in environments that are prone to

¹⁴⁵ Yin, Robert K. “Case Study Research: Design and Methods,” 3rd ed., In *Applied social research methods series*, vol.5, (London: Sage Publications, 2003) p13.

drought, where people's access to and control over critical livelihood resources such as land is insecure, and where unpredictability is set to increase as climate change takes hold¹⁴⁶.

The economy of the arid districts in Mander triangle is dominated by mobile pastoralism, while in the better-watered and better-serviced areas a more mixed economy prevails, including rain-fed and irrigated agriculture, agro-pastoralism, bio-enterprise, and conservation or tourism-related activities. Pastoralism is the extensive production of livestock in rangeland environments. Wilson¹⁴⁷ defines pastoralism as a system in which societies derive more than 50% of their total income, or more than 20% of their total food energy, from livestock or its products. On the other hand Swift¹⁴⁸ describes pastoralists as deriving at least 50% of their food and income from their livestock. Baxter¹⁴⁹ describes the same pastoralists as "people who derive most of their income or sustenance from keeping livestock in conditions where most of the feed that their livestock eats is natural forage than cultivated fodders and pastures."

Pastoralism takes many forms, but its principal defining features are livestock mobility and the communal management of natural resources. Other groups within the triangle depend on fishing, hunting and gathering for their subsistence. The ecology of the districts within the region allows for the intensification of production but some districts especially in the tri-border areas within the triangle experience chronic food insecurity and face critical challenges such as

¹⁴⁶ See Government of Kenya, *Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey*, 2005-06.

¹⁴⁷ Wilson R T and Light D. "ivestock production in central Mali: Economic character and productivity indices for traditionally managed goats and sheep," In *Journal of Animal Science Vol 62* (1986)pp.567-575.

¹⁴⁸ See Swift, J. *Major Isssues in Pastoral development with special emphasis on selected African countries* (Rome: FAO, 1988)

¹⁴⁹ See Baxter, P.T.W. "Pastoralists are People: Why Development for Pastoralists not the Development of Pastoralism?" in *The Rural Extension Bulletin No.4* (1994).

population increase, degraded ecosystems, and climate change.¹⁵⁰ According to Farah¹⁵¹, Pastoral communities like those in Mandera triangle are particularly vulnerable to natural and man-made disasters because of reliance on natural resources and that under normal circumstances, they often face extreme challenges in meeting basic needs due to significant reductions in land and water available as a result of desertification, bush encroachment, soil erosion, population growth, and political and economic marginalization.

The other defining feature of pastoral life in Mandera Triangle is persistent crises including drought, food shortages, disease, and severe cold, lack of access to grazing lands, looting, and resource-based conflicts which have conspired and threatened the survival of pastoralists and their livestock in the region not forgetting high rates of population growth and Poverty that have also exerted pressure on an already fragile ecosystem.¹⁵² Mandera triangle displays many of the characteristics of remote rural areas caught in chronic poverty traps, which face multiple and interlocking forms of disadvantage. Isolation, insecurity, weak economic integration, limited political leverage, and a challenging natural environment combine to produce high levels of risk and vulnerability.¹⁵³ Pastoralists depend on markets to sell their animals and purchase food, mostly grains.

¹⁵⁰ See Cannon, T., Twigg, J. and Rowell, J. "Social vulnerability, sustainable livelihoods and disasters." in a *report to DFID, Natural Resources Institute*, (Kent: Chatham, 2003)

¹⁵¹ Ibrahim Farah, "Human Security and the Livelihood of Pastoral Communities in the Horn of Africa," in Makumi Mwangi (ed.), *Human Security: Setting the Agenda for the Horn of Africa* (Nairobi: Africa Peace Forum, 2008) p. 159

¹⁵² See FAO, "The Elimination of Food Insecurity in the Horn of Africa: A strategy for Concerted Government and UN Agency Action," in *Final Report*, September 2000.

¹⁵³ See Bonffoglioli, A.M. "Pastoralists at crossroads: Survival and development Issues in African Pastoralism," in *UNICEF/UNSO Project for nomadic pastoralists in Africa*, NOPA, Nairobi (1993)

They are at risk of losing their livelihoods due to severe recurrent drought visiting the region.¹⁵⁴ The successive shocks coupled with structural problems have led to increase in the frequency of movement by pastoralists with their herds to cope with seasonal fluctuations and drought effects. In contemporary times, this mobility has also been hampered by clan, ethnic, district, and national conflicts and boundaries, making long-distance migration difficult leading to conflicts.¹⁵⁵ Communities constantly face isolated humanitarian emergencies which often accumulate leading to the depletion of household assets, including herd sizes rendering pastoral communities in the region vulnerable to food insecurity. This leads to persistent conflicts resulting from the competition for the scarce resources available.

Until recently, most governments in the region viewed pastoral areas as net consumers of national wealth that offered poor prospects of return on investment. Governments in the horn region have different perception of who a pastoralist is. They also have a more or less unified perception about Nomadic Pastoralism in general. They all perceive Pastoralism as an anarchic form of production whose time has passed and that pastoralists cannot benefit from government services because they are not settled.¹⁵⁶ Pastoralism is therefore less valued than other forms of land use and less well-supported in the region. Recent studies have however shown that these views were misplaced because Pastoralism provides a critical means of survival for many in the

¹⁵⁴ See FAO, *Persistent Food Insecurity and Livelihood Crises in the Horn of Africa* (Nairobi: FAO information Office, May 2006)

¹⁵⁵ See Kona, E.S. "Contemporary Pastoralist Conflicts in Kenya: Nature, Dynamics, Trends and Transformation." in *Draft Research Proposal submitted to the Development Policy Management Forum*, Addis Ababa, April, 2005)

¹⁵⁶ UNDP, "Pastoralism and Mobility in the Dry Lands," in *The Global Dry Lands Imperatives Second Challenge Paper Series*, (June 2003) pp.4-7

Horn of Africa, accounting for the livelihoods of 15 to 20 million people in Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, the Sudan, and Uganda.¹⁵⁷

3.2 Genesis of the Contemporary Pastoral conflicts in the region

Pastoral conflict and violence in the region is historically linked to the violence that accompanied state formation in the colonial era.¹⁵⁸ Throughout much of the 20th century, the Mander Triangle region used to be a part of British East Africa. However, after the dissolution of the former British colonies in East Africa, Britain granted administration of the different parts of the region to Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia. Northern Frontier districts remained with Kenya, British Somaliland and Italy Somaliland remained with Somalia, while Western Somalia or Ogadenia became part of Ethiopia¹⁵⁹. Some analysts trace the protracted social conflicts in this region to this historical background and the events that followed of an informal plebiscite demonstrating the overwhelming desire of the region's population to join the Somali Republic, and the fact that this region though separated along three state boundaries was and still is almost exclusively inhabited by ethnic Somalis¹⁶⁰.

¹⁵⁷ See USAID, "Horn of Africa: Multi-Sectoral Interventions in Pastoral Communities," in *USAID Fact Sheet*, No.2.(September,2005)

¹⁵⁸ See Nyaba, P.A. & Otim,P. *Conflicts in Pastoral Areas Along Borders: Kenya, Uganda, Sudan* (London:CEWARN Consultancy Report, FEWER, 2001)

¹⁵⁹ David D. Laitin, *Politics, Language, and Thought: The Somali Experience*, (University Of Chicago Press: 1977), p.75

¹⁶⁰ Women's Rights Project, *The Human Rights Watch Global Report on Women's Human Rights*, (Yale University Press: 1995), p.121

Somalis in the NFD in Kenya for example, vigorously sought union with the Somali Republic to the north¹⁶¹. In response, the Kenyan government enacted a number of repressive measures designed to frustrate their efforts: Somali leaders were routinely placed in preventive detention, where they remained well into the late 1970s. The North Eastern Province was closed to general access as a "scheduled" area (ostensibly closed to all outsiders, including members of parliament, as a means of protecting the nomadic inhabitants), and news from it was very difficult to obtain. A number of reports accuse the Kenyan regime of mass slaughters of entire villages of Somali citizens and of setting up large "protected villages" -- in effect concentration camps.

The government refused to acknowledge the ethnically based irredentist motives of the Somalis, making constant reference in official statements to the "shifita," (banditry) problem in the area¹⁶². The war ended in 1968 when Abdirashid Ali Sharmake, President of the Somali Republic, signed a ceasefire with Kenya. However, the violence in Kenya degenerated into disorganized banditry, with occasional episodes of secessionist agitation, for the next several decades. The war and violent clampdowns by the Kenyan government caused large-scale disruption to the way of life in the region, resulting in a slight shift from pastoralist and transhumant lifestyles to sedentary, urban lifestyles.

¹⁶¹ Bruce Baker, *Escape from Domination in Africa: Political Disengagement & Its Consequences*, (Africa World Press: 2003), p.83

¹⁶² Rhoda E. Howard, *Human Rights in Commonwealth Africa*, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.: 1986), p.95

With Somali support for their movement for self-determination temporarily halted, many former rebels returned to the traditional activity of Pastoralism. The forced internment of the Northern Frontier District's inhabitants also resulted in an economic bifurcation of its other minority residents. Those with means diversified into trade and sedentary farming. Those without became wage laborers, while the poorest were reduced to dependence on outside relief aid. Some 40 percent of the pastoralists in the region had been driven to peri-urban shanty villages in the new administrative townships. There, they eked out a bare subsistence, hanging around trading centers for odd jobs, hawking for miraa (Khaat), doing illicit small businesses and engaging in prostitution¹⁶³. The shifta war thus marked the beginning of decades of violent crackdowns and repressive measures by the police in the NFD coupled with trumped-up allegations and unsubtle innuendo on the part of the Kenyan media charging the region's almost exclusively Somali inhabitants with "banditry" and other vice¹⁶⁴. This has also had the twin effect of marketing the whole region poorly as a security zone.

Pastoral conflicts between neighboring ethnic groups in Mandera have restricted livestock movements to better grazing locations. This has resulted in abnormal livestock deaths, loss of body weight of animals and their market value. In other cases, these conflicts have triggered internal population displacement and refugee influx and hampered deliveries of basic humanitarian assistance.

¹⁶³ Paul T.W. Baxter, "The 'New' East African Pastoralist: An Overview" in John Markakis (ed.), *Conflict and the Decline of Pastoralism in the Horn of Africa*, (London:MacMillan,1993) pp. 145-146, quoted in Alex de Waal, 1997, *Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa*, African Issues series, African Rights & the International African Institute, p. 39

¹⁶⁴ Vigdis Broch-Due, *Violence and Belonging: The Quest for Identity in Post-colonial Africa*, 1 edition. (Routledge: 2005), p.174-175

The lifestyle of pastoralism is one of survival and the conflicts are characterized by a frontiersmen type of warfare where groups in conflict are not permanent, but constantly broken and reformed. On the other hand, warrior status is highly honored and endemic to the nature of the conflict in the region: bitter struggles over scarce resources and harsh environment makes the conflicts and conflict behavior more cruel.¹⁶⁵ Governments' failure and that of other actors in the Horn of Africa to address pastoral destitution has encouraged the 'institutionalization' of violent conflict and raiding as part of Pastoralism in the region. Similarly, rebel activities along the borders further complicate matters leading to internationalization of pastoral conflicts across the borders.

In contemporary times, community warriors have transformed into small well-equipped "militia" armies and have acquired more sophisticated weapons than those of the government. Such militias, for example, have become the de facto government in most parts of Mandera triangle.¹⁶⁶ This scenario has been fueled by the fact that the region is characterized by weak state structures in pastoral areas which has escalated the many social conflicts in the region. As in the colonial days, state security considerations predominate in official thinking, and human security is generally disregarded. While governments are usually concerned about border controls, regional insecurity, refugee movements and the proliferation of small arms, a significant amount of literature shows that guns did not traditionally play a prominent role in the

¹⁶⁵ See Clayton, A. "Violence in Africa since 1950: Frontiersmen," in C. Pumphrey & Barcott, S. (eds.) *Armed Conflict in Africa* (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 1998).

¹⁶⁶ See Osamba, J. "The Sociology of Insecurity," in *African Journal on Conflict Resolution Vol. 1, No.2.* (2000)

military organization of many of the Horn of Africa's pastoral and agro-pastoral communities.¹⁶⁷

Today however, new forms of banditry, cattle-rushing and warlordism have emerged; over which elders seem to have no control. To the last two decades, a number of pastoral communities have become militarized and increasingly rely on firearms. Hence, conflicts among the pastoral communities have taken new and exaggerated dimensions.¹⁶⁸

Internationalized pastoral conflicts have arisen in Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia, due to limited security and political stability in all the three countries.¹⁶⁹ An examination of the character of many international borders in the Horn of Africa reveals interesting economic and ecological features.¹⁷⁰ The border areas are generally arid and semi-arid environments inhabited by pastoralists and agro-pastoralists.¹⁷¹ The very nature of pastoral livelihoods demands a high degree of mobility guided by the need to access water and grazing land rather than deference to state borders.¹⁷² This ecology has created a symbiotic relationship between pastoralists and agro-pastoralists that transcends modern state borders. This means that pastoralists easily move across borders in search of pasture and rely on agro-pastoralists for crops to supplement their food.

¹⁶⁷ See Mazrui, A. (ed.) *The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa* (London: MacMillan, 1977)

¹⁶⁸ See Kenya Human Rights Commission, *Where Terror Rules* (Nairobi: KHRC, 1998)

¹⁶⁹ See UN, *Consolidated Appeals Process for the Horn of Africa*, 2006

¹⁷⁰ See Mwagiru, M. et al, *Borders, Frontiers and Conflict in Africa* (Nairobi: CCR & FES, 2001)

¹⁷¹ See Teka, T., A. Azeze, & A. Gebremariam, *Cross Border Livestock Trade and Food Security in the Southern and Southern Eastern Ethiopia Borderlands* (OSSREA Development Research Report Series 1, 1999.)

¹⁷² See Assefa, H. *Towards a Culture of Peace: A Regional Approach for the Transformation and Prevention of Conflict in the Horn of Africa* (UNESCO Peer Culture of Peace Project, 1997).

In turn, the pastoral understanding and response to ecological pressures was systematically eroded by colonialism. This was affected by drawing ethnic and national boundaries that restricted cattle movement [which] is essential to the pastoralists' livelihoods after independence.¹⁷³

The situation in Mandera triangle is made more complex by the dilemma facing the population of this region as a result of a combination of factors that have their roots in the economy, social organization, policy and ecology.¹⁷⁴ The situation of acute socio-economic underdevelopment and deliberate neglect in the region is linked to a colonial political economy that favored production activities and regions and private over communal ownership of the principal means of production land.¹⁷⁵ The Horn of Africa which is the region in which the Mandera triangle is embedded is largely a region with a lot of historical and contemporary indicators for human insecurity.¹⁷⁶ Between 1982 and 1992 two million people died in the Horn of Africa due to a combination of war and famine with over 100,000 Ethiopians dying as a result of their forced resettlement by their own government in 1983¹⁷⁷. By the end of 1991 around 4.5 million people in Somalia were reported to be at serious risk of famine.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷³ See Awuondo, C.O. *Life in the Balance: Ecological Sociology of Turkana Nomads* (Nairobi: ACTS Press, 1992)

¹⁷⁴ See Ahmed, A.G. & Teka, T. "Livelihoods in the Drylands of East Africa," in a *Paper presented at a regional workshop on Agricultural Policy, Resource Access and Human Nutrition*, Addis Ababa, 1999)

¹⁷⁵ See Ibid (Nyaba, 2001)

¹⁷⁶ See Michael Mortimore, 'Dryland Opportunities: A New Paradigm for People, Ecosystems and Development' (2009)

¹⁷⁷ See John Prendergast, *Peace, Development, and People of the Horn of Africa* (Centre of Concern, Washington, 1992)

¹⁷⁸ See Prendergast, op. cit.

By 1992 analysts had shown that some 23 million people in the region as a whole were endangered by food shortages.¹⁷⁹ The region also has the largest number of people on the run (refugees and displaced)¹⁸⁰ than any other part of the world. The governments of the Horn have also been spending lavishly on weapons yet many of their peoples' basic needs remain unmet. In Somalia social spending was cut by 75% between 1974 and 1988 while arms imports accounted for more than 49% of all imports between 1977 and 1986¹⁸¹. Another analysis carried out in 1987 shows that Ethiopia spent 8.8% of its GNP on military and only 1.3% on health and 4.2% on education.¹⁸² Somalia on the other hand spent 2.2% on military, 0.2% on health and 0.6% on education during the same period. This compared with a country like Australia which for the same period had spent 2.7% on military, 5.5% on health and 5.3% on education shows how the countries in the region under study have prioritized military spending over important issues that promote human security. This is especially so when the people of the Horn are touted to be among the poorest in the world and their economies doing badly, even by African standards. Ethiopia's total income per capita for example, is third lowest in the world¹⁸³.

The sorry picture painted in the Horn of Africa region as shown by statistics above have been reflected in the ASALs in Mandera triangle which have been characterized by low development indicators and high incidences of poverty. This is partly the result of conscious public policy choices taken by the three governments of Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia in the past

¹⁷⁹ See Samia el Hadi El Naar, 'Children and War in the Horn of Africa', in Lionel Cliffe et al. .ed. *Beyond Conflict in the Horn* (Red Sea Press, Trenton, 1992)

¹⁸⁰ See Prendergast, op. cit.

¹⁸¹ See Jeffery A. Lefebvre, *Arms for the Horn*, (University of Pittsburg Press, 1991)

¹⁸² See *Sub-Saharan Africa: from Crisis to Sustainable Growth*, (World Bank, Washington, 1989.)

¹⁸³ See *Sub-Saharan Africa Report op., cit.*

that have contributed to regional inequalities within these countries. Mandera triangle region brings together three locations found in the three countries but bordering each other and with similar characteristics. Their similarity in character and difference in geo-political boundary is a twist of fate with historical background discussed earlier. In Kenya for example, causes of underdevelopment vary from region to region with the overarching explanation for this regional pattern of development being a historical policy bias established by the colonial administration, namely, defining economic potential by agro-ecological zones¹⁸⁴. This policy bias was inherited by the first independence government and is articulated, in very plain language, in paragraph 133 of seminal Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, under the subheading "Provincial Balance and Social Inertia" as follows,

"One of our problems is to decide how much priority we should give in investing in less developed provinces. To make the economy as a whole grow as fast as possible, development money should be invested where it will yield the largest increase in net output. This approach will clearly favour the development of areas having abundant natural resources, good land and rainfall, transport and power facilities, and people receptive to and active in development." (p. 46).

¹⁸⁴ See David Ndi, "Economic Policy Imperatives in the Context of Kenya's Political Transition(2001-2003)," in a paper presented at the Institute of Economic Affairs Open Forum, 25th January 2001.

For many years this statement guided the direction of Government resources in the country, with the result that the social and physical infrastructure of the arid districts was neglected. Many analysts also argued that the region's main livelihood strategy, mobile pastoralism, was economically irrational and environmentally destructive, and that the ASALs contributed little to the national economy. This convoluted economic logic defines the agricultural highlands as high potential areas and pastoral areas as low areas. This further implies that the rangeland (ASAL) 70% of the country as practically useless. This study recognises that these arguments are not based on sound socio-economic analysis but stem from a lack of appreciation of the region's potential and a lack of understanding of its production systems which has manifested itself in many ways that has enhanced human insecurity and regional insecurity. The ASALs have enormous resources that can be harnessed not only to sustain themselves but to contribute to national development and regional security.

The Kenya scenario is replicated in the whole Mandera triangle region. As exhibited by the Kenyan case, trickle-down approaches from more favoured areas have not enhanced state security, while the potential for significant growth in these areas is now limited. Poverty, inequality and insecurity in the Mandera triangle region will drag down and diminish not only the three states under study but the whole region in terms of realization of Millenium Development Goals. In the Mandera Triangle part of arid northern Kenya, the basic foundations of development and enhanced human security are either inadequate or lacking. Access to education, health, water, infrastructure, energy, and ICTs are all well below the national average.

These are critical enablers of growth and their absence is holding the region back. In Kenya, eighteen of the twenty poorest constituencies, where 74% - 97% of people live below the poverty line, are in Northern Kenya which is found in the Mandera triangle.¹⁸⁵ The consequences for human development are exhibited in seven districts in the north of Kenya which have a Human Development Index lower than that of Sierra Leone, the lowest-ranked country in the world in 2005¹⁸⁶.

3.3 Human Insecurity Indicators in Northern Kenya

Northern Kenya covers close to 400,000km² of land but has less than 700km of tarmac road, most of which is in disrepair.¹⁸⁷ Only one district in arid northern Kenya, Isiolo, is currently connected to the national electricity grid. Mobile telephone operators are expanding their networks, but coverage is still limited to the major towns. The ICT infrastructure is inadequate and expensive. Although the fibre-optic cable has now reached several locations in the north, for the most part communication remains heavily reliant on satellite. Water and sanitation infrastructure is poor and badly maintained. Nearly 43% of people in arid districts take more than one hour to reach water in the dry season; 24% take more than two hours.¹⁸⁸ A significant proportion of the population aged 6-17 in Northern Kenya has never been to school.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁵ See Government of Kenya, *Constituency Report on Well-Being in Kenya, 2008*

¹⁸⁶ See UNDP, "Human Security and Development: A Deliberate Choice," in *Kenya National Human Development Report, 2006*

¹⁸⁷ See GOK, "District Development Plans 2002-2008," in *Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey, 2005-06*

¹⁸⁸ See Arid Lands Resources Management Project II, *Baseline Survey, 2006*

¹⁸⁹ See OP, Cit., ARLRMP, *Baseline Survey, 2006*

Analysis shows that, four years after the introduction of free primary education in 2003, the average net enrolment ratio in public primary schools in Kenya across the arid districts was 51.1% (2007), against a national average of 91.6%¹⁹¹. This was an increase of nearly 45% on the 2003 National Enrollment Ratio (NER), suggesting a growing demand for education but it also conceals significant differentials within the region where enrolment in some arid land districts such as Wajir, Garissa and Ijara are still below 30%. At secondary level, the NER in 2007 was 5.52%, against a national average of 24.2%. For 60% of students in Arid Northern Kenya there is no school within 6km: for nearly 50% there is no school within 11km.¹⁹¹

Rates of retention, survival and completion in Arid Northern Kenya are also very low. The primary completion rate in the north in 2007 was 42.3%, compared with 81% nationally. More specifically, 56.4% of boys completed but only 27.6% of girls¹⁹². Northern Kenya also has the lowest ratios of trained teachers to pupils, low performance in the national examinations, and low rates of transition to university. Similar inequalities are evident in adult literacy. Only 18.5% of adults in Mandera and 19.1% of adults in Turkana can read and write, compared with the national average of 79%.¹⁹³ Again, the figures are worse for women: for every five literate men in Mandera there is only one literate woman.¹⁹⁴ Health indicators in Northern Kenya are generally poor, but particularly so for women and children, with high maternal, infant and child mortality and low immunization coverage.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹¹ See Sara Ruto, 2009: 'Education on the Margins', in unpublished *background study for UNESCO*

¹⁹² See Ibid, ALRMP II Baseline Survey, 2006

¹⁹³ See GOK, *Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey, 2005-06*, table 4.6

¹⁹⁴ See Ibid, *Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey, 2005-06*, table 4.6

¹⁹⁵ See Ibid, *Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey, 2005-06*

Sanitation coverage is also low. Toilet coverage for North Eastern Province in 2003 was 19.1%; the lowest in the country, against a national average of 83.8%.¹⁹⁶ The health service infrastructure is poorly distributed and inadequately staffed. At the time of an assessment by the APHIA II programme in North Eastern Province in late 2007, nearly one-third of the province's health facilities (49 out of 153) were closed due to lack of personnel.¹⁹⁷ The doctor-patient ratio in North Eastern Province is nearly six times higher than that in Central Province (1:120,823 as against 1:20,715).¹⁹⁸ Of the six Rural Health training and Demonstration Centres in Kenya, none are in the arid districts, meaning that trainees have inadequate exposure to the particular health challenges of mobile pastoralist communities.

3.4 Security Issues and drivers of conflicts in pastoral areas

Despite their vital role in food production in marginal environments, nomadic pastoralists in Mandera triangle find themselves in a seemingly persistent state of crisis.¹⁹⁹ Their herds are threatened by lengthy drought and emergent diseases.²⁰⁰ Their traditional raids have become more explosive due to the influx of guns and other modern weaponry. Their pastures and transit routes are shrinking in the face of increasing population, spreading nature conservation areas and hardening international borders.

¹⁹⁶ See Government of Kenya, 'Demographic and Health Survey, 2003' (2004)

¹⁹⁷ See USAID, 'Report of Human Resources for Health (HRH) Rapid Assessment in North Eastern Province (NEP) Kenya,' 2008.

¹⁹⁸ See Ibid, UNDP, 2006: Human Security and Human Development: A Deliberate Choice'

¹⁹⁹ Hadley H. Jenner, "Pastoralist Cosmology: The Organizing Framework for Indigenous Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa," in *Pastoralists in Africa Project Paper*, (March 1997) p.4

²⁰⁰ See Bonfiglioli A.M., "Pastoralists at a Crossroads: Survival and Development Issues in African Pastoralism." in *UNICEF/UNSO Project for Nomadic Pastoralists in Africa, Nairobi, (1992).*

As a consequence, these pastoral communities remain among the most politically and economically marginalized groups in the region rendering them susceptible to radicalization and recruitment by insurgent groups and conflict entrepreneurs.²⁰¹ With outside social, environmental, political and economic threats narrowing their options, the incidences and intensity of clashes within and between pastoral communities in the region, their neighbours and the state are on the rise.²⁰² This has had serious implications extending beyond local violence and transforming intranational conflicts into internationalized conflicts. Pastoral communities in the Mandera Triangle region today face great challenges to their way of life, challenges which threaten impoverishment, marginalization and a loss of freedom, and which contribute to feelings of insecurity and to tensions within and between pastoral groups and their neighbouring cross border communities.²⁰³

Recent studies show that tensions, competition and conflict around natural resources are prevalent in pastoral lands²⁰⁴, and it is likely that with more people competing for fewer resources, this has become a major driver of insecurity in pastoral areas.²⁰⁵ Traditional nomadism, which entails constant migration in search of pasture and water, is the main pastoral livelihood in the Mandera Triangle which has proved to present unique challenges to

²⁰¹ Michele Nori, Jason Switzer, and Alec Crawford., "Herding on the Brink: Towards a Global Survey of Pastoral Communities and Conflict," In an *Occasional Working Paper*, ICUN Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy (2005) p.3

²⁰² See Scoones, I., ed., *Living with Uncertainty: New Directions in Pastoral Development in Africa*, (London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 1995).

²⁰⁷ Fratkin, E. "Pastoralism: Governance and development issues." In *Annual Review of Anthropology* Vol.26 (1997) pp.235-261.

²⁰⁴ See Kratli, S. and J. Swift. "Understanding and managing pastoral conflict in Kenya: a literature review " In *Mimeo*, Institute for Development Studies, University of Sussex. (1999).

²⁰⁵ See Blench, R. "Aspects of Resource Conflict in Semi-Arid Africa." in *Natural Resource Perspectives* (London: ODI, 1997)

sovereignty. It destabilizes the state's ability to maintain a territorially fixed population under law, undermining the state's ability to control its borders. Adopting a constructivist approach, states in the region have viewed pastoral nomadism as a system which constitutes a serious material threat to the state. The structure of sovereignty has been an impulse to de-legitimate and curtail nomadism in the region. By its nature, nomadism defies national and international borders. This is viewed as a way of disrupting territorial foundation of statehood which has led to securitization of nomadism making it a source of ontological insecurity for the state.

Chambers et al²⁰⁶ argue that states all over the world have responded to nomadism mainly in three ways: "Many forcibly settle nomads. Others facilitate relatively free international migration, by reducing the salience of borders as barriers to transit. In many further instances, weak states are unable to secure borders, allowing nomads to migrate relatively freely." These scholars have further offered three examples: "Bedouins, often forcibly settled; Roma, permitted to migrate trans-nationally within the European Union; and African pastoralists, permitted to migrate by porous borders." From this scenario, it is argued that while the Bedouin and African instances suggest a necessary conflict between the role of state and the culture of nomadism as exhibited by the Manderla triangle case, the European experience suggests that an ontological de-securitization of nomadism is possible: a relaxation of borders can allow these two political frames of reference to coexist.

²⁰⁶ See Simone Chambers and Bruce W. Jentleson (eds.), "Territoriality and Statehood," in *American Political Association 2009 Annual Meeting Report* (Washington, DC, 2009).

Didier²⁰⁷ in his discourse "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease," has argued that migration, a common feature of pastoralists is increasingly interpreted as a security problem. This prism of security analysis is especially important in the Mandera triangle region for politicians, for national and local police organizations, the military police, customs officers, border patrols, secret services, armies, judges, some social services (health care, hospitals, schools), private corporations (bank analysts, providers of technology surveillance, private policing), many sensationalist journalists, and a significant fraction of general public opinion, especially but not only among those attracted to "law and order."

The popularity of this security prism is not an expression of traditional responses to a rise of insecurity, crime, terrorism, and the negative effects of globalization; it is the result of the creation of a continuum of threats and general unease in which many different actors exchange their fears and beliefs in the process of making a risky and dangerous society.²⁰⁸ The states in the region usually out of fear of losing grip on the local population, tend to quickly transfer the legitimacy they gain from securitizing the region toward other targets, most notably transnational political and human rights activists, people crossing borders like nomadic pastoralists, or people born in the country but with relatives across the border which is a common feature in the Mandera Triangle.

²⁰⁷ Bigo, D. (2002) 'Security and Immigration: Towards a Governmentality of Unease', In *Alternatives/Cultures & Conflicts* (2002) pp.63-92.

²⁰⁸ See Op.Cit., (Bigo,D.2002)

This expansion of what security is taken to include effectively results in a convergence between the meaning of international and internal security and by extension the internationalization of internal conflicts.²⁰⁹ The convergence is particularly important in relation to the issue of nomadic pastoralism and migration, and specifically in relation to questions about who gets to be defined as an immigrant in this case. The security professionals themselves, along with some academics, tend to claim that they are only responding to new threats requiring exceptional measures beyond the normal demands of everyday politics, hence the securitization of nomadic pastoralism.

In practice, however, the transformation of security and the consequent focus on pastoral immigrants is directly related to their own immediate interests. This process of securitization is now well known, but very few critical discourses have drawn attention to the securitization of pastoral migration over the years hence the articulation of nomadic pastoralism as a security problem continues.²¹⁰ In the recent past, this securitization agenda has taken more extreme dimensions in the region with persistent framing of nomadic pastoralism in relation to terrorism, crime, unemployment and religious zealotry, on the one hand, and to integration, interest of the migrant for the national economy development, on the other, rather than in relation to new opportunities for Pastoral societies, for freedom of travel over the region, for cosmopolitanism, or for some new understanding of citizenship.²¹¹

²⁰⁹ See Op.Cit., (Bigo, D. 2002)

²¹⁰ See Op.Cit., (Bigo, D. 2002)

²¹¹ See <http://www.questia.com/googleScholar> accessed 6th April 2010

On a general basis security issues for pastoralists in the region include.²¹² *Land security* which bears on rights to resources; *Political security* which bears on conflict, violence and civil order; *Food security* which bears on agrarian productivity and rural markets; and *Environmental security* which bears on resource access, control and management. Pastoral communities in Manderia Triangle therefore, face human security threats to all the six important capitals of existential value to any society (Natural capital, financial capital, Physical capital, Human capital, Social capital and Political capital).²¹³ Key source of natural capital in the region includes the vast rangelands which form the resource base of the pastoral system, water resources which are the basis for the survival of people and livestock and many other range products. There are many threats to pastoralists in their quest for accessing and utilizing these resources. These threats include limitation to their access, or to migratory routes and their degradation.²¹⁴ Other threats may come from the result of excessive pastoral use (overgrazing) or the consequence of external encroachment, others' utilization or State policy and law (e.g. land privatization). Lack of access to water, drought, and falling water table, increasing animal and human populations, contamination, and salinization are also threats to natural capital worth documenting. When conditions are made worse by extended periods of drought, conflicts become more intensified and frequent.²¹⁵

²¹² See Galaty, J.G. & Johnson, D.L. *The World of Pastoralism*. (London: The Guilford Press, 1990).

²¹³ See Lane, C.R. and J. Swift, "East African Pastoralism: Common Land, Common Problems," in *Dryland Networks Programme Issues Paper, No. 8*, (London: IIED, 1989).

²¹⁴ See Homewood, K. and W.A. Rodgers, 1987, "Pastoralism, Conservation and the Overgrazing Controversy," in *Conservation in Africa*, D. Anderson and R. Grove, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

²¹⁵ See Oxfam, "Delivering the Agenda: Addressing Chronic Under-development in Kenya's Arid Lands," in *Oxfam International Briefing Paper No.88* (2006).

Increasing scarcity is the product of a limited or declining supply of natural resources (as a result of depletion, degradation or natural decline), of rising demand for them and of unequal distribution of such key resources.²¹⁶ A rapid loss of wellbeing in the region has come about as a result of a failure to ensure sustainable and equitable resource use; over-consumption of resources in support of particular livelihoods; and from the impacts of sudden shock such as war, (animal or human) disease, and policy changes to the mechanisms needed for resource transformation. This scenario had gone on unchecked for many decades, thus leading to severe consequences witnessed today in the whole region, including impoverishment, out-migration, dynamic power shifts and, extremism, and violence.²¹⁷

Livestock represents the overwhelmingly most important form of financial capital for pastoralists, both in terms of stock and flows. It is the primary source of pastoral income, savings, loan, gift, investments and insurance.²¹⁸ It is also a form of social capital assisting in sharing, buffering and minimizing risks related to this single-asset economic system under such uncertain conditions. Threats to the herd or to the clan are therefore serious blows to pastoral financial capital. Variations in market prices and problems in accessing remittance income and market-based opportunities represent major financial threats to the region.²¹⁹

²¹⁶ See Thomas Homer-Dixon, *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999)

²¹⁷ See Schwartz, Daniel and Singh, Ashbindu., "Environmental Conditions, Resources, and Conflicts: An Introductory Overview and Data Collection", in a *new report* (Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 1999).

²¹⁸ See Sperling, L., and J.G. Galaty, "Cattle, Culture, and Economy: Dynamics in East African Pastoralism." in *The World of Pastoralism*, J.G. Galaty and D.L. Johnson, eds., (New York: Guilford Press, 1990).

²¹⁹ See Hjort, A., "Herds, Trade and Grain: Pastoralism in a Regional Perspective." in *The Future of Pastoral Peoples*, J.G. Galaty, D. Aronson, P.C. Salzman, and A. Chouinard, eds., *Proceedings of a Conference Held in Nairobi, Kenya* (1981).

Lack of access to other sources of income – such as government employment has also been perceived as evidence of injustice, as the feeling of exclusion and underdevelopment in the region attests. Pastoral communities in the region have limited access to and ownership of physical capital, especially compared to more settled communities, as a result of their mobility and of their economic and political marginalization. Obstacles to accessing critical infrastructure and facilities for water, communications, movement, transportation, grazing, and exchange opportunities with markets or urban environments are important concerns.²²⁰ These assets are in fact vital in ensuring the integration of remote ranges to other areas which provide for alternative and complementary resources (e.g. health care, market exchanges, cereals, water), especially during critical times.²²¹

The loss of traditional knowledge or custom due to violence, displacement, and disease²²², urbanization, cultural incorporation and migration have dealt a serious blow to the skills transfer between older and younger generations, and have also affected the functioning of other social mechanisms. Variations in prices of critical staples have also had repercussions on pastoralists' nutritional and health status, especially that of children. An absence of appropriate health and educational services represents a threat to the human capital of current and future pastoral generations. Social capital is traditionally strong and important among pastoralists, in that it minimizes risk, enables common resource management and provides safety nets in times of

²²⁰ See Office of the President, *National Poverty Eradication Plan 1999-2015*, (Nairobi: Department of Development Co-ordination, 1999).

²²¹ See Little P.D., *Cross-Border Cattle Trade and Food Security in the Kenya/Somalia Borderlands*, (Kentucky: University of Kentucky, 1996)

²²² See Refer to Morton J., *Conceptualizing The Links Between Hiv/Aids And Pastoralist Livelihoods*, (University of Greenwich, 2003)

crisis. Tensions may nevertheless emerge in pastoral societies over leadership and succession, generational and gender struggles, or through external drivers (such as market integration, state regulation, privatization processes, among others).²²³ These may result in a breakdown of traditional social structures based on trust, reciprocity and exchanges, common rules and support networks, and may generate problems in accessing natural (ranges) or social (safety nets) resources. The dilution, distortion or erosion of traditional institutions, often overridden by imposed or inadequately developed institutions, can lead to contested resource claims.²²⁴

Furthermore²²⁵ fraying of tradition results in an overall weakening of effective traditional resource management as well as the social support systems, which have sustained pastoral societies for centuries. Without adequate alternatives to replace traditional structures of governance and security, pastoralists operate in an anarchic environment.²²⁶ Longstanding clan and or ethnic divisions have become open to manipulation, and tensions have resulted from progressive exclusion of certain groups from key resources. While a traditionally relevant feature among pastoralists, a distinction needs to be made between the diverse forms of socio-political capital.

²²³ See Broch-Due V. "Cattle are Companions, Goats Gifts: Animals and People in Turkana Thought." In Palsson G. (ed.) *From Water to World Making: African Models and Arid Lands*. (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies Press, 1990).

²²⁴ Paul Anand, "Does economic theory need more evidence? A balancing of arguments." in *Journal of Economic Methodology*. Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 10, No. 4, (2003). pp 441-463.

²²⁵ See Duffield, Mark. "Ethnic war and International Humanitarian Intervention: A Broad Perspective," In *Understanding and Managing Pastoral Conflict in Kenya: A Literature Review*, ed S. Kratli and J. Swift, (Sussex, University of Sussex, 1997).

²²⁶ See Mkutu, Kennedy, "Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms: The Kenya- Uganda Border Region." in *Saferworld Report (2003)* <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/Pastoral%20conflict.pdf>.

Pastoral groups show strong internal ties (binding relationships among members of a same sub-clan), while their bridging and networking capacities (linking to external groups or forces in the wider societal frame) are often weaker, leading to their traditional marginalized status. With the socio-political environment largely determining access to and control of natural resources, the political marginalization of pastoralists have led to land, food and environmental insecurity, as land access and mobility are restricted by the state, other users and environmental degradation.

Each of the above forms of capital is affected by issues of power and politics, and the threats are not mutually exclusive to one form of capital – a threat to natural capital can also represent a threat to financial capital, for example. While these are underlying threats, they can be politicized or exacerbated when combined with historical, cultural or ethnic differences.²²⁷ Managing resource scarcity and variability, negotiating their access and resolving disputes over their management are central to sustainable pastoral livelihoods and should represent key components of development of a regional security strategy.

3.5 Specific Human Security Issues and their implications for Mandera Triangle

Without claiming that traditional aspects of state security are necessarily diminished, Mathews suggest the need for a broadening of the definition of national security to include resource, environmental and demographic issues.²²⁸

²²⁷ Bollig M., "Intra- and Inter-ethnic Conflict in Northwest Kenya: A Multy-causal Analysis of Conflict Behaviour," in *Anthropos* No.88 (1993) pp.176-184.

²²⁸ Mathews, J. T. "Redefining Security" in *Foreign Affairs*, vol.68, No.2 (Spring 1989), pg. 162

Security issues in Mandera triangle can be viewed in the light of these new conceptualizations of security where the numerous new threats derive directly or indirectly from the rapidly changing relationship between humans and the natural resources. This relationship initially begins off as ecological crisis and resource scarcities. In the case of Mandera triangle as in many other places these stress dynamics have translated into economic crises – lack of entitlement, unemployment, capital scarcity, and poverty. Ultimately, these economic stresses convert into social unrest and political instability.²²⁹ It is this scenario which ultimately has degenerated into serious threats to national security and a spill over into neighbouring countries leading to internationalization of internal conflicts ultimately snow balling into a regional security problem.

Agostinho²³⁰ argues that security should be looked at as an all-embracing conceptual architecture of which peace, justice and economics are the main pillars. The co-existence of these three pillars in a structural relationship forms the environment for security in this region under study: the conditions in which the fulfillment of human aspirations is best served. While protection against external aggression remains an essential objective of national governments in the region, other important security challenges arise from threats to the natural environment, economic deprivation, the proliferation of conventional small arms, the terrorizing of civilian populations by both states and domestic armed groups, and gross violation of human rights.²³¹

²²⁹ Kegley, C. W. and Wittkopff, E. R. (eds). *The Global Agenda: Issues and Perspectives*. (New York: Random House Inc., 1984)pg. 342

²³⁰ See Zacarias, Agostinho., "Redefining Security," In *From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges*, edited by Mwesiga Baregua and Christopher Landsberg. (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2003).

²³¹ See The Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

Security challenges have become more complex for decision makers in the region because of human insecurity issues that may not directly challenge the viability of the state in traditional terms, but nevertheless undermine the sovereignty of the state, compromise its ability to control the penetrability of its borders, and exacerbate relations between groups within the polity and states within the region. Demographic pressures on land, food and resources, environmental degradation, illicit movement of populations, technology, information, and drugs; unintended spread of disease and pollution – these are but a few of the factors that increasingly affect the security and well being of individuals, communities and states²³² in the region.

3.5.1 Food Security Implications

Food insecurity and the associated instability in food prices have in the past, led to political instability in many parts of the world. The two centuries old dynasty in Ethiopia came to an end in 1974, not because a foreign power invaded and prevailed, but because ecological deterioration precipitated a food crisis and famine.²³³ In the summer of 1976, the Polish government²³⁴ was badly shaken by riots when it tried to raise food prices closer to the world level. In 1977, the riots that followed official attempts to raise food prices in Egypt came closer to toppling the government of the late president Anwar Sadat²³⁵. In Kenya, the maize crisis in 2009 almost

²³² Dewitt et al, *Building a New Global Order: Emerging Trends in International Security*, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1993) p. 9

²³³ Peter Cutler, "The Political Economy of Famine in Ethiopia and Sudan," in *Ambio*, Vol. 20, No. 5, Environmental Security (Aug., 1991), pp. 176-178

²³⁴ Charlotte Chase, "Symbolism of Food Shortage in Current Polish Politics," in *Anthropological Quarterly*, Vol. 56, No. 2, Political Rituals and Symbolism in Socialist Eastern Europe (Apr., 1983), pp. 76-82

²³⁵ See Shepherd, J., *The Politics of Starvation*, (Washington, D. C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 1975).

brought the government to its knees. In 2008, the world confronted food-insecurity situations that provoked political demonstrations in more than 50 countries.²³⁶ Food insecurity is one of the major drivers of internationalized conflicts in the Mandera triangle region. This threatens to bring more insecurity if not addressed because food is one of the ontologically human needs.

The alleged sources of food riots all over the world have been production failures and spiking food prices because of bad weather and flawed food and development policies, conditions which are permanently present in the Mandera triangle region. The quantitative and qualitative adequacy of diet is a major problem in the region. Not enough is available in the region and this short supply coupled with often lack of means to get it to those in need has made the region reel heavily under the burden of food insecurity. Years of drought have brought on massive undernourishment, exacerbated by war, and resulted in large-scale starvation.²³⁷ The most troubling food problem, and the one with the most direct national security consequences, is the increased use of food as a politico-military weapon. The Moi regime in Kenya (1978-1997) practised the 'Siasa Mbaya, Maisha Mbaya,' politics which excluded regions perceived to be against the regime from any form of development just in the same way that Saddam Hussein of Iraq, used the withholding of food supplies to weaken the Kurdish population.²³⁸

²³⁶ See ELLEN MESSER, "Rising food prices, social mobilizations, and violence: Conceptual issues in understanding and responding to the connections linking hunger and conflict." in *Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy*, (Boston: Tufts University, Boston).

²³⁷ Snow D. M. *National Security Defence Policy in a Changed International Order*, (New York: St. Martins Press, 1998) P.247

²³⁸ *Ibid.* (Snow D. M. 1998) P.248

The famine in Ethiopia provided the government an opportunity to use its scarce foreign exchange potential for purchasing arms rather than grain.²³⁹

3.5.2 Demography and its Implication

There is a close relationship between population growth and national security in the structural sense. Growing population strains food supplies, absorbs economic resources that could be used for economic development, places demand for social services that weaken stability of already marginally legitimate governments, and produces a climate of misery that is the breeding ground for continued despair and the potential for violence²⁴⁰. At the structural level, security is defined as a viable balance or ratio between the size of a state's population and the demands of that population relative to the level and characteristics of its technology, economic performance, and resource endowments; in other words, the structural dimensions refers to a country's economic foundations.²⁴¹

In the third world generally, the result of population pressure is economic and political destabilization. Young people migrate to the urban areas, where there are neither jobs nor living facilities to absorb them, unemployed or underemployed, they become discontented and, in some cases, violent.²⁴²

²³⁹ Shawcross, W. *The Quality of Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust, and Modern Conscience*. (London: Andrew Deutsch, London, 1984) p. 464

²⁴⁰ Op.cit (Snow, D. M. 1998) p. 248

²⁴¹ Choucri, N. and North, R. C. "Population and (in) Security: National Perspectives and Global Imperatives," In Dewitt et al, (1993) *Building a New Global Order: Emerging Trends in International Security*, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1993) p.23

²⁴² Snow D. M. (1998) Ibid p. 249

In the region under study, reasons for migrations from the rural areas to urban centers are due to the hope of economic opportunity (as among many pastoralists going to the capital cities); in others, it is the fear of physical insecurity and political repression, and in places like Somalia, both economic and political motivations combine to send pastoral populations into flight.

Demographic security in East Africa for example, has been affected by the relaxation of restrictions on the emigration of the region's population. In recent years, citizens of the countries in the region have become increasingly sensitive to immigration be it legal or illegal, from other regional countries especially those from the war torn Somalia. Cultural and religious tensions have become acute, giving rise in many countries to right-wing xenophobic groups as is the similar case in Europe²⁴³. The potential large numbers of immigrants, the inevitable chaos accompanying attempts to control their flow and the emotions surrounding these movements, all make this an explosive issue with a clear connection to national security. This matter alone has contributed immensely to the internationalization of pastoral conflicts in the region.

This problem of demographic security is acute in Kenya as many Kenyans feel that people of Somali origin whether from northern Kenya, Somalia or Ethiopia were posing an unnecessary economic competition. At the same time, religious prejudice targeting the same people has been on the rise in the recent past. According to Talbot²⁴⁴ Most of the attention focused on the effects of human population increase in pastoral areas is directed to urban centers and farming areas.

²⁴³ Charles C. Pentland, "The European Union and Civil Conflict in Africa," in *International Journal*, Vol. 60, No. 4, Africa: Towards Durable Peace (Autumn, 2005), pp. 919-936

²⁴⁴ Lee M. Talbot, "Demographic Factors in Resource Depletion and Environmental Degradation in East African Rangeland," in *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Sep., 1986), pp. 441-451

Yet according to him, demographic pressures affect pastoral areas with atleast equal intensity, and in the Mander triangle rangelands the critical relationships among population increase, environmental degradation, and human welfare are much more dramatically evident. Reflecting deeply into Talkot's arguments one can deduce the fact that the growth of human populations affects the region under study in a unique way: This involves the fact that increases in the size of the pastoral populations themselves (those who live on the rangelands) are directly dependent upon the grazing resource. The carrying capacity of these lands for people is directly related to their carrying capacity for livestock. Increased numbers of people lead to increased numbers of livestock, which, in turn, lead to overgrazing, degradation of the range resource and ultimate reduction of the ability of these lands to support both livestock and people.

This effect is particularly pronounced when the degradation occurs during a period of wet years followed by a period of drought, with consequent famine, loss of livestock, and, often, loss of human life which is a common characteristic of the region under study. The effect of increasing human populations is to intensify the demand for the resources of rangelands beyond the ability of the lands to provide them, and beyond the ability of the traditional management systems and institutions to meet them. Ultimately the most serious effect is environmental; all too often the result is catastrophic famine.²⁴⁵

²⁴⁵ Jacobs, A.H. *An Overview of Population Dynamics in Kenya's Rangelands*, (Morrilton, Arkansas: Winrock International Institute for Agricultural Development, 1984)pp441-442

3.5.3 The Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms

The proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons has in the recent past, become a serious security issue in the region. This has exacerbated the lethality of conflicts which are prevalent in Mendera triangle. Small arms are used in most if not all of the conflicts in Africa. It is a major factor that fuels and sustains conflicts, increases their impact, and makes reconciliation more difficult. The popularity of light weapons in the wars in the region reflects their low cost, efficiency at killing, ease of use, maintenance, and portability.²⁴⁶

The ongoing conflicts in Somalia and Ethiopia have been conflicts mainly fought with small arms. The vast numbers of light weapons already in the region after years of turmoil have been augmented by new supplies of arms brought in by interested parties including soldiers from the various foreign armies fighting in Somalia. The involvement of these foreign forces in the region's conflict has internationalized them and they are motivated and sustained by a variety of powerful interests. These interests include security concerns, regional ambitions, ethnic solidarity, and financial gain. Consensus for even a ceasefire is thus very delicate, and the threat of violence and non-compliance is present at all times.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁶ See Michael Klare "The Kalashnikov Age," in *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, (Jan/Feb 1999).

²⁴⁷ Paul Eavis, "SALW in the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes Region: Challenges and Ways Forward," in *The Brown Journal of World Affairs Volume IX, Issue , (Spring 2002)pp.252-252*

Small arms are perceived as the decisive tools of internal conflict. In the Somali civil war, the role of small arms was so great because almost one out of every four Somali males was armed with a weapon.²⁴⁸ If these tools of violence are not collected and destroyed once a conflict reaches a plateau or concludes, however, they tend to find their way to another country or region where internal conflict is rife or mounting. Despite this situation, weapons are often not the primary focus of attention in the reconstruction of post-conflict societies in the region which has contributed to a great extent the overflow and easy availability of weapons which destabilizes the region which is also affected by unrestricted trade of light weapons across borders.

The easy availability of small arms has also resulted in the rise in violent crime, and made cultural practices such as cattle rustling more lethal. Cattle rustling are a traditional activity among many pastoralist groups in the region. Traditionally, the pastoralists practiced cattle rustling using spears and bows; now, the weapon of choice is the AK-47. Pastoral communities seem to be arming themselves for defensive and offensive reasons. First, they need to protect themselves and their cattle from being plundered by hostile groups. Second, they are using arms to forcefully steal stock from other pastoral communities. Guns are therefore seen as an economic investment. These have direct implications for national and regional security. When pastoralists in the region are forced to flee from their communal areas, their ability to maintain their livelihood is affected. Consequently, people are forced to congregate in more secure areas, which increase the pressure on land and resources.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁸ See M. Nur Galal, "The Case of Somalia," in *Small Arms Control*, Ashgate (ed.) and UNIDIR, (1999).

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, op.cit, (M. Nur Galal 1999) p.253

Complex development and social issues are associated with light weapons and the easy availability of guns in the region is directly linked to the increase in violent crime and domestic assaults, creating a culture of violence where disputes are settled with deadly force.²⁵⁰

3.5.4 The Environmental security

In the recent past, a number of scholars have asserted that environmental pressures may seriously affect national and regional security²⁵¹. Many of their postulations are however, hypothetical. Wirth²⁵² for example, has proposed that environmental change may shift the balance of power between states either regionally or globally, producing instabilities that could lead to war. Countries may fight themselves over dwindling supplies of water and the effects of pollution upstream.²⁵³ Gurr²⁵⁴ argues that ultimately, the consequence of environmental change could be the gradual impoverishment of societies in both the north and the south which could aggravate class and ethnic cleavages, undermine liberal regimes, and spawn insurgencies. Homer-Dixon argues that: "Poor countries will in general be more vulnerable to environmental change than rich ones; therefore environmentally induced security threats are likely to arise first in the developing world.

²⁵⁰ International Crisis Group (ICG), "Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War." in *Report 26*, Brussels: ICG, 20 December 2000) p.13.

²⁵¹ See Renner, M, "National Security: the Economic and Environmental Dimensions." in *World Watch Paper 89*, Washington, D. C.: World Watch, 1989).

²⁵² Wirth, D. "Climate Chaos" in *Foreign policy*, 74, (Spring 1989), 10

²⁵³ See Falkenmark, M. "Freshwaters as a factor in Strategic Policy and Action", in Arthur Westing (ed) *Global Resources in International Conflict: Environmental factors in strategic policy and Action*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) pg. 85-113)

²⁵⁴ Gurr, T. "On political Consequences of Scarcity and Economic Decline" in *International Studies Quarterly*, No. 29 (1983) pg. 51-75

In these countries, a range of environmental pressures will in time probably produce either singly or in combination, four main causally interrelated social effects: reduced agricultural production, general economic decline, population displacement and disruption of regular legitimized social relations. These social effects, in turn may cause several specific types of severe conflict, including scarcity disputes between countries, clashes between ethnic groups, and civil strife, and insurgency.²⁵⁵ The cattle rustling menace in the Mandera triangle region of Kenya and across the Kenya-Somalia and Kenya-Ethiopia border, with its attendant insecurity consequences, can be attributed to environmental degradation leading to resource competition, and the political marginalization of that region.

3.5.5 Economic Security

Economic security refers to a state's maintenance of its economic well-being. Gasteyer argues that "economic security" has become as much a pre-occupation as military security for many countries.²⁵⁶ Economic security is particularly important, considering the threats posed by poverty to national security. Of particular concern is the escalation of crime in an attempt by the deprived to reverse their deprivation. Conventional views on the causes of new wars and political instability in many countries, usually hinge upon their arising from a developmental malaise of poverty, resource allocation and weak and predatory institutions.

²⁵⁵ Thomas, F. Homer-Dixon, "Global Environmental Change and International Security," in *Dewitt D et al* (1993) *Op.cit* pg. 188

²⁵⁶ Gasteyer, C, *Searching for world security: Understanding Global Armament and Disarmament*. (London: Frances Pinter Publishers London, 1985) pp. 181

A country's ability to manage multiple problems of under development and transition (poverty, resource competition, unemployment, population growth, crime, environmental degradation and so on.) and, especially to resolve antagonisms peacefully, is now a central concern within the new and wider security framework.²⁵⁷ There is a close relationship between security and development.²⁵⁸ Development motivates people (the citizens) to defend the state. Poverty and institutional malaise in many third world countries can neither mobilize human resources nor national institutions to address the different challenges to security. To the extent that a state cannot provide essential services such as education, health, and an enabling socio-economic framework that can facilitate job creation as is the case in Madera triangle, its legitimacy wanes. People are often able to tolerate economic deprivation and disparities in the short run because the government creates conditions that allow people to improve their living standards and that lessen the disparities between the rich and the poor, in this context, Brown's statement that national security cannot be maintained unless national economies are sustained²⁵⁹, makes a lot of sense.

²⁵⁷ Duffield, M, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The merging of Development and Security*, (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2001) pp. 15-36

²⁵⁸ See McNamara, R. S., *The Essence of security: Reflections in Office*, (New York, Harper and Row, 1968) pp. 145-149

²⁵⁹ Brown, L. R. "Redefining National Security," in *State of the world-1986* (New York: Worldwatch, Norton, 1986) p. 341

CHAPTER FOUR

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter deals with a critical analysis of the previous chapters. The analysis looks at several research studies carried out by international research organizations and agencies and relate these to the Mander triangle case. In the introduction to this study in chapter one, we have argued that the state is a major source of both threats to and security for individuals because individuals provide much of the reason for and some of the limits to, the security seeking behaviour of the state²⁶⁰. This study therefore exhibits relevance of human security and other forms of emerging security as found in the relationships and contradictions between human security and state/national security.

To avoid controversies surrounding the definition of human security and to avoid contradictions over whether the state or the individual are singularly or jointly important players in ensuring human security this study used the human security concept as conceptualized by the Human Development Report, 1994 and the Human Security conception by Roland Paris. This approach proved useful in producing an overall human security framework that is best suited for analysis of pastoral conflicts. Paris's work was useful, in the context of pastoral conflicts because of its recognition that multiple definitions of human security will and should persist while the 1994 UNDP *Human Development Report* on Human Security²⁶¹ was useful in bridging the gap

²⁶⁰ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd ed. (Lynne Rienner Publishers: 1991), p.34

²⁶¹ Rothschild, Emma. 1995. "What is Security?" In *Daedalus*. Vol. 124 No.3 (1995) pp.53-98.

between freedom from want and freedom from fear. The phrase 'freedom from fear' is intended to indicate freedom from violence, and the phrase 'freedom from want', freedom from poverty. This concept cuts into the heart of security concerns in pastoral areas, because its key premises are central to concern with human beings and defines human security as safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression as well as protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in jobs, in homes or in communities.²⁶²

To achieve its objectives, this study undertook qualitative exploratory on the question of the relationships between human insecurity and Pastoral Conflicts in the Mandera Triangle. In general terms, this study systematically used flexible procedures to seek answers to the question under investigation. The study collected evidence and produced findings which are applicable beyond the immediate boundaries of the study.

4.1 Critical analysis of the security concept in the context of Mandera triangle

As it has been argued by many scholars in the literature review and the second chapter of this study, a major source of military conflict that provided focus for the Western world's perception of the threat to human security was removed when the Cold War came to an end.²⁶³

²⁶² See United Nations Development Program. *Human Development Report*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994)

²⁶³ See Sagaren Naidoo, "A Theoretical Conceptualization of Human Security," in *Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention in Africa Proceedings of the UNESCO-ISS Expert Meeting held in Pretoria, 23rd-24th July 2001*

The contributions of Alexander L. George particularly his seminal work in 1991, titled "Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management,"²⁶⁴ and the works of Janice Cross Stein, "Crisis Management: Looking Back to Look Forward"²⁶⁵ are worth revisiting to understand this argument.

This study shows in chapters one and two that various attempts have been made to provide an adequate conceptualization of security. However, many scholars have argued primarily on two main contending theories. One school of thought has argued for a continued emphasis on the primacy of the state within a broadened conceptualization of security in what they have referred to as the 'new security thinking.'²⁶⁶ Strong advocates of this school include "structuralist" scholars such as Barry Buzan in his famous seminal work *People, States and Fear*.²⁶⁷ Buzan argued in chapter two of this study that the militaristic approach to security that dominated the discourse during the Cold War was 'simple-minded' and led to the underdevelopment of the concept.²⁶⁸ He subsequently advocated for broadening the concept of security to include political, economic, social and environmental threats, in addition to those that are militaristic.²⁶⁹

²⁶⁴ See Alexander L. George, "Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management" in *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, vol.21,no.2.1992

²⁶⁵ See Stein, Janice Cross, "Crisis Management: Looking Back to Look Forward" in *Political Psychology*,vol.29,no.4 (2008)

²⁶⁶ See Thompson, L. 'Theoretical Approaches to Security and Development,' in ISS Monograph No. 50(2000)

²⁶⁷ See Booth, K. 'A Security Regime in Southern Africa: Theoretical Considerations,' in *Southern African Perspectives* No. 30, CSAS (1994).

²⁶⁸ Buzan, B. 'New Patterns of Global Security in the 21th Century,' in *International Affairs* Vol. 67, No. 3,(1991) pp. 431-451.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid* (Buzan,B.1991)

This is perfectly in line with the provisions of the Human Development Report (1994)²⁷⁰ extensively quoted in the literature review and forming part of the theoretical framework for this study. Although Buzan examines security from three perspectives of the international system, the state, and the individual, he concludes that the most important and effective provider of security should remain the sovereign state. His analysis provides the most extensive contemporary examination available of human security from a state-combined perspective but his position contradicts that of Haq,²⁷¹ one of the economists associated with the "Human Development Report, 1994" who argued that human security is not about states and nations, but about individuals and people and that the world is entering "a new era of human security" in which the entire concept of security will change dramatically.

He further contends that in this new conception, security will be equated with the "security of individuals, not just security of their nations" or, to put it differently, "security of people, not just security of territory," and that "we need to fashion a new concept of human security that is reflected in the lives of our people, not in the weapons of our country." The other school of thought is the postmodernist or 'critical human security' approach that is rooted within the pluralist theory of international politics. This approach is based on a set of assumptions that essentially attempt to dislodge the state as the primary referent of security, while placing greater emphasis on the interdependency and trans-nationalization of non-state actors.

²⁷⁰ See United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). *Human Development Report 1994*. New York: Oxford University Press, 23. <http://www.undp.org/hdro/1994/94.htm>> 20/04/09

²⁷¹ M. Haq, "New Imperatives of Human Security," in RGICS Paper No. 17, Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies (RGICS), Rajiv Gandhi Foundation, New Delhi, 1994, p. 1.

This approach to human security, reflected in the work of Ken Booth, also advocates a broadened conceptualization of security that goes beyond a military determination of threats²⁷² but the advocates of this approach further stress quite explicitly that the state must be dislodged as the primary referent of (human) security, and encompass instead a wide range of non-state actors, such as individuals, ethnic and cultural groups, regional economic blocs, multinational corporations (MNCs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and just about all humankind. In expanding the concept of security horizontally and vertically, Booth argues that human security is ultimately more important than state security.²⁷³

Postmodernist idea of conceptualization of security does not equate state security with human security. In Booth's view states and implicitly governments must no longer be the primary referents of security because governments which are supposed to be 'the guardians of their peoples' security', have instead become the primary source of insecurity for the many people who live under their sovereignty, rather than the armed forces of a neighbouring country'.²⁷⁴ This agrees with the contention by Haq above and Anara who has argued that Human security concept is basically concerned with non-militaristic threats to peace and security and the protection of individuals (and their property) as opposed to the traditional notion of security which is militaristic and state centric.²⁷⁵

²⁷² Booth, op. cit., p. 4.

²⁷³ Ibid (Booth, op. cit.,) p. 4.

²⁷⁴ Ibid (Booth, op. cit.,) p. 5.

²⁷⁵ See T. Anara, *Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks in Central Asia* (Paris: UNESCO, 2006)

As seen from the major arguments fronted by both approaches in chapter two of this study, both attempts to address the non-military threats to human security. However, their fundamental difference lays in the way their analyses point to action. The broadening of security to conceive of more than just military threats raises the contentious question of what is to be made secure?²⁷⁶ As a result, the ongoing (security) debate centres on the identification of a primary referent or unit of security. Arguments for the state to remain the primary referent of security should not mean maintaining the state as the sole or unitary referent of security. But rather it means that the security of the state, in particular a state that is weak, should continue to remain primary, since the 'main aim is to build the capacity of the state to provide and maintain security for its citizens'.²⁷⁷ In other words, although the conceptualization of security must make the security of people and human beings its end, the state, as the means, cannot be dislodged as the primary referent. After all if the state is to provide and maintain security, it has to be secure itself or to use Buzan's words, 'it has to be or become a strong state'.²⁷⁸

Another question then arises as to what constitutes a state? Conventional interpretation as argued out in detail in chapter two posits that a state is made up of a government, people and territory.²⁷⁹ In other words the whole (that is the state), comprising all its constituent parts, has a reciprocal relationship with the individual parts. The state cannot be secure if its constituent parts are insecure or unstable.

²⁷⁶ Buzan, op. cit., p. 435

²⁷⁷ See Van Aardt, M. 'The emerging security framework for Southern Africa: Regime or Community,' in *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*. XIX.(1997).

²⁷⁸ Van Aardt, M. 1996. 'Doing Battle with Security: A Southern African Approach,' in *South African Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 2, (1996) pp. 13-28.

²⁷⁹ See Jackson, Robert, and George Sorensen. *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, 3rd Edn. (New York: Oxford, 2005)

At the same time, if the state as the institution representing its constituent parts is weak or insecure in relation to other states, its elements will also be affected by such weakness or insecurity.

The Mandera triangle case in chapter three depicts that states in the region have consistently featured top of the list in the international Failed States Index therefore cannot fulfil one of the primary roles of any state which is to provide peace and security for its citizens both within the nation-state and to ensure their protection against threats from outside.²⁸⁰ This raises yet another important question: What do we do with such states which have failed in their cardinal duty of providing security for all its citizens? Booth acknowledges that state security can and was used by 'governments that posed as guardians of their peoples' security, to cloak reality and hide what essentially was the security of their regime and its supporters and should therefore be dislodged as a primary referent of security'.²⁸¹ The political developments in the three countries of Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia have continuously shown this trend. This argument in the case of Mandera triangle however, need not mean the termination of the state per se as a referent of security, but rather that the type of state that has been unable to deliver security to its people should be questioned. It is such governments that do not allow the state to fulfil their functions of statehood that need to be eradicated and 'dislodged'.

²⁸⁰ See Rugumamu, S. 'Post-Cold War Peace and Security: Prospects in Southern Africa,' in *SAPES Occasional Paper Series* No. 5, (1993) Harare.

²⁸¹ Booth, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5.

4.2 Analysis of Objectives of the study

This study had set out with three objectives of 1) To carry out situational analysis of Mandera Triangle and establish its relationship with human insecurities in the region, 2) To identify and analyze perceptions held by the actors about security in the Mandera Triangle Region and 3) To establish the relationship between Pastoral Conflicts and Human Security from the perspectives of state failure. In answering the first objective the study zeroed in on the concept of Human Security as is debated in the 1994 United Nations Development programme's (UNDP), Human Development Report.²⁸² This Report proposed that the focus on security should shift from military/nuclear Security to human security.

This Report appreciates that, with the receding dark shadows of the Cold War there were now many conflicts within nations rather than between nations; that for most people, a feeling of insecurity was arising more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event; that many people were now more worried about whether they and their families have enough food to eat; whether they will lose their jobs; whether their streets and neighbourhoods will be safe from crime; whether they risked being tortured by a repressive state; whether they risk becoming a victim of violence because of their gender; and whether their religion or ethnic origin will target them for persecution.

²⁸² United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). "Human Development Report 1994 ." (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Citations from a reprint of sections of the report. "Redefining Security: The Human Dimensions," *Current History* (?May, 1995)pp.229-236

In the final analysis, the report argues strongly that, human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced and that Human security is not a concern with weapons but a concern with human life and dignity.²⁸³ This conception of security fits well with the debates within the ambit of pastoral conflicts in the Mandera Triangle and explains why the protracted nature of pastoral conflicts and their characteristics to defy state interventions can be directly traced to problems of poverty and despair that the human security report highlights.

Almost every country in the Mandera triangle region remains trapped in a volatile mix of poverty, crime, unstable and inequitable political institutions, ethnic discrimination, low state capacity and the 'bad neighbourhoods' of other crisis-ridden states—all factors associated with increased risk of armed conflict.²⁸⁴ This could be deduced from the evidence provided by the various research findings.

According to Uppsala/PRIO²⁸⁵ research, the combination of pervasive poverty, declining GDP per capita, poor infrastructure, weak administration, external intervention and an abundance of cheap weapons, plus the effects of a major decline in per capita foreign assistance for much of the 1990s, mean that armed conflicts in these countries are difficult to avoid, contain or end.

²⁸³ Ibid. op. cit (UNDP Reprot, 1994)p.229

²⁸⁴ See Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, *Peace and Conflict 2005, Center for International Development and Conflict Management* (College Park, MD: University of Maryland, May 2005)

²⁸⁵ See UCDP, Armed Conflict Termination Dataset Codebook,

http://www.pcr.uu.se//research/UCDP/our_data1.htm

Kenya's Human Development Index for example though showing an increase from 0.520 in 2004 to 0.532 in 2005 indicates that a majority of Kenyans are still trapped in deepening poverty and that regions within the country with low HDI and GDI coincide with those encountering persistent human insecurity in form of conflict and disasters such as floods, low potential as in ASAL areas and those that suffer degradation.²⁸⁶

Moreover, it has been argued that violent conflict exacerbates the very conditions that give rise to it in the first place, creating a classic 'conflict trap' from which escape is extraordinarily difficult. In recent times humanitarian organizations in Mandera triangle region and conflict researchers in Somalia have paid increasing attention to the phenomenon of "indirect" war deaths-those fatalities from war-exacerbated disease and malnutrition that would not have occurred had there been no conflict. This argument is strengthened further by Kenya National Human development Report²⁸⁷ of 2006 which explains that: "As a fundamental platform for the human development process, human security lays emphasis on human rights and opening up resources and livelihood opportunities to people. It anchors on the entrenchment of the rule of law and legal and judicial systems that deepen concerns for human rights in the country and safeguarding people from underlying causes of human insecurity that include economic despair and social injustice."

²⁸⁶ UNDP, "Human Security and Human Development: A deliberate Choice," in Kenya National Human Development Report 2006 (p.viii)

²⁸⁷ Ibid (UNDP, Kenya National Human Development Report, 2006)p. viiii

A much cited article in the *British Medical Journal* also notes in 2002, that “for at least a decade, the ratio of indirect to direct conflict deaths has been quoted as 9:1”²⁸⁸ while in a study of Africa’s wars published in 1994, Reginald Green claimed that “lack of food and of medical services, combined with the physical stress of flight, kill about twenty times as many human beings as do bombs, bullets and cold steel.”²⁸⁹

More recently, the wide-ranging *Global Burden of Armed Violence* report published by the Geneva Declaration Secretariat estimated that for every person who died violently in wars around the world between 2004 and 2007, another four died from war-exacerbated disease and malnutrition.²⁹⁰ The report did not claim there was a consistent ratio between the two simply that *on average*, the indirect-to-direct war death ratio was 4:1. This ratio is contested. There are, in fact, huge variations in the direct/indirect death ratios between countries afflicted by conflict.²⁹¹ In wars in relatively developed countries, for example, there are remarkably few indirect deaths; in poor-country wars, by contrast, they greatly outnumber direct deaths. Yet, while the *extent* of indirect death tolls in warfare remains largely unknown, humanitarian organizations know a great deal about the relationship between conflict and the vulnerability of conflict-affected Manderia triangle populations to malnutrition and deadly disease.

²⁸⁸ See Christopher Murray et al., “Armed Conflict as a Public Health Problem,” in *British Medical Journal* 324 (2002), <http://gking.harvard.edu/files/armedph.pdf> (accessed 19 November).

²⁸⁹ Cited in Hugo Slim, *Killing Civilians: Method, Madness, and Morality in War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 91.

²⁹⁰ See Geneva Declaration Secretariat, *Global Burden of Armed Violence*, 2008, <http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/Global-Burden-of-Armed-Violence-full-report.pdf> (accessed 19 November 2009).

²⁹¹ See Figure 4.1 in Andrew Mack, ed., *Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

To strengthen this argument further in order to link human insecurity to conflicts, it is worth looking at a focus group study in post-conflict Guatemala. This study found out that most violent acts in the country were driven by economic rather than political motivations.²⁹² Other Major qualitative studies by development and humanitarian organizations have also produced important insights.

The World Bank's *Voices of the Poor*—characterized as 'an unprecedented effort to gather the views, experiences and aspirations of more than 60,000 poor men and women from 60 countries'—reveals a consistent preoccupation with physical safety and suggests that poor people are particularly vulnerable to violence and intimidation. Women in particular report feeling a pervasive threat of violence on the streets and sometimes in the home as well.²⁹³ The *People on War Report* prepared for the International Committee of the Red Cross on the other hand, employed a similar approach by soliciting the views of individuals caught up in humanitarian crises. Here the overwhelming concern for the physical safety of those polled was less striking than their policy preferences. Fully two-thirds of respondents in 12 war-torn countries called for greater international intervention on behalf of threatened populations.²⁹⁴

In responding to the second objective of this study, that is, to identify and analyze perceptions held by actors about security in the region, the study looked at a number of research findings by international agencies to explain people's fears, perceptions and human rights issues

²⁹² See Caroline Moser and Cathy McIlwaine, *Violence in a Post-Conflict World: Urban Poor Perceptions from Guatemala* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000).

²⁹³ See Deepa Narayan-Parker, *Voices of the Poor: Can Anyone Hear Us?* (New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 2000).

²⁹⁴ See Greenberg Research Inc., *The People on War Report* (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1999).

which influence how security is viewed in the region. In January 2004 Gallup International published one of the most ambitious global surveys ever to examine people's concerns about security. Carried out between November and December of 2003 for the World Economic Forum, it was based on interviews with 43,000 people in 51 countries.²⁹⁵ Gallup not only found that perceptions of global security varied dramatically from region to region, it also revealed that people across the world had widely differing views on their own country's national security, with most being fairly pessimistic. For example, 35% of respondents in the global sample rated their country's national security as 'poor'. Ironically, respondents in Africa, the region most afflicted by armed conflict, were considerably less pessimistic than those from the more secure South American and Pacific regions.

Another research, the Ipsos-Reid survey²⁹⁶ also produced striking evidence showing that people's fears of violence and the objective risk that they will become a victim of violence often differed radically. Fear by the community according to this survey did not come from the media's favourites, war, terrorism and violent crime. Fear was found to come from ignorance, hunger, thirst, loss of dignity, loss of identity and disease. With these factors present ad-libitum in Mendera triangle, it is feasible to argue that the people of this region are very fearful which has over the years led to a lot of security dilemmas.

²⁹⁵ See Gallup International, 'Executive Summary: Voice of the People Survey 2003', 5 January 2004, in *Gallup International website*, [http://www.voice-of-the-people.net/ContentFiles/files/VoP2003/Executive%20Summary%20Report%20\(January%209th%202004\).pdf](http://www.voice-of-the-people.net/ContentFiles/files/VoP2003/Executive%20Summary%20Report%20(January%209th%202004).pdf) (accessed 6 February 2005).

²⁹⁶ See *Ibid* (Ipsos-Reid website)

Closely linked to the above is human right which is another critical human security agenda in the Mandera triangle region. According to Kenya National Human Development Report 2006, human rights anchors on the entrenchment of the rule of law and legal and judicial systems that deepen concerns for human rights in any country and safeguarding people from underlying causes of human insecurity that include economic despair and social injustice.²⁹⁷ However it is interesting to note that, no international organization, least of all the UN's new Human Rights Council, has a mandate to collect comprehensive data on human rights abuse.²⁹⁸

There is also no single measure that can be used to track core human rights abuses, given that violations can range from torture and extrajudicial executions, to imprisonment without trial and political censorship. One way around this problem is to create a scale or index that provides measures of different levels of human rights violations. Such an index can then be used to assess each country's performance in protecting-or violating-human rights. There are two modestly resourced academic research projects that compile such indices-the Political Terror Scale (PTS) is compiled by researchers at the University of North Carolina, Asheville,²⁹⁹ while the Physical Integrity Rights Index is produced by the CIRI Human Rights Data Project network.³⁰⁰ Both compile their data from the annual reports on human rights published by Amnesty International and by the US State Department. The findings of these indices can provide the national, regional, and global data needed to track human rights violations around the world.

²⁹⁷ See Ibid (UNDP, Kenya National Human Development Report, 2006)

²⁹⁸ See Ibid (Human security Report, 2006)

²⁹⁹ See Mark Gibney, Linda Cornett, and Reed Wood, *Political Terror Scale 1976-2006* (Asheville: University of North Carolina, 2007), <http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/> (accessed 16 February 2008).

³⁰⁰ See CIRI 'Human Rights Data Project,' in <http://ciri.binghamton.edu/> (accessed 16 February 2008). The acronym CIRI derives from the names of the dataset's creators, David Cingranelli and David Richards

PTS data coders review the reports on individual countries for the year in question and assign each country two scores: one based on the Amnesty International report, and the other based on the State Department report. The scores range between 1 and 5-with level 5 signifying the highest incidence of rights abuse and level 1 the lowest. All the states in the Mendera triangle region have consistently fallen in the level 5 category which indicates that terror is usually expanded to the whole population and that the leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.³⁰¹

The PTS trend data for the period between 1980 and 2006 indicated that three regions in the world with the highest incidence of human rights abuses were Central/South Asia, the Middle East/North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa. By definition, some countries in a region will always suffer more human rights abuses than the average, and it is particularly correct to indicate that the three countries in the Mendera triangle region fall in the category of those who suffer more human rights abuses. The economic status of a country has also been found to influence human rights situation of its people. The world's richest countries are almost all members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Meanwhile, the world's weakest and poorest states belong to a category that the World Bank calls, "Low Income Countries Under Stress" (LICUS).³⁰²The PTS data for the period 1980 to 2006 showed the PTS score for LICUS states growing significantly, but unevenly, worse from 1980 to 1999. Overall, the score has gone from 2.8 in 1980, to 3.4 in 2006-indicating a serious deterioration in the respect for core human rights.

³⁰¹ See PTS, <http://www.politicalterroryscale.org/about.html> (accessed 16 February 2008)

³⁰² See Ibid(PTS)

The trend for OECD countries reveals that there was some improvement in the aggregate PTS score in this category from 1987 to 1990 as a result of changes occurring in Eastern Europe in the 1990s.

The third objective of this study was to establish the relationship between pastoral conflicts and human security from the perspectives of state failure in the region. State failure is characterized by all those factors which hamper human security in any country or region. When a state fails, it becomes incapable of ensuring security for its citizens and in the case of Somalia, for example, it becomes a source of insecurity itself. According to the *Washington Quarterly Journal*³⁰³ of 2002, human insecurity factors defining state failure which are also the whole mark of Mandera triangle region are summarized as follows:

"Failure for a nation-state looms when standards of living massively deteriorate, when the infrastructure of ordinary life decays, and when the greed of rulers overwhelms their responsibilities to better their people and their surroundings... The civil wars that characterize failed states stem from or have roots in ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other intercommunal enmity... there is no failed state without disharmonies between communities... In contrast to strong states, failed states cannot control their borders and lose authority over chunks of territory... Often, the expression of official power is limited to a capital city and one or more ethnically specific zones. Indeed, one measure of the extent of a state's failure is how much of the state's geographical expanse a government genuinely controls... In most cases, driven by ethnic or other intercommunal hostility or by regime insecurity, failed states prey on their own citizens

See Ibid(The New Nature of Nation-State Failure)

where ruling cadres increasingly oppress, extort, and harass the majority of groups while favoring narrowly based elite... As state authority weakens and fails, and as the state becomes criminal in its oppression of its citizens, so general lawlessness becomes more apparent. Gangs and criminal syndicates assume control over the streets of the cities and swathes of rural areas. Arms and drug trafficking become more common. Ordinary police forces become paralyzed. Anarchy becomes more and more the norm. For protection, citizens naturally turn to warlords and other strong figures who express ethnic or clan solidarity, thus projecting strength at a time when all else, including the state itself, is crumbling... Nation-states any where in the world exist to deliver political goods—security, education, health services, economic opportunity, environmental protection, a legal framework of order and a judicial system to administer it, and fundamental infrastructural requirements such as roads and communications facilities to their citizens. Failed states honour these obligations in the breach. They increasingly forfeit their function as providers of political goods to warlords and other nonstate actors. In other words, a failed state is no longer able or willing to perform the job of a nation-state in the modern world... Failed states are unable to provide security—the most central and foremost political good—across the whole of their domains. Citizens depend on states and central governments to secure their persons and free them from fear. Because a failing state is unable to establish an atmosphere of security nationwide and is often barely able to assert any kind of state power beyond a capital city, the failure of the state becomes obvious even before rebel groups and other contenders threaten the residents of central cities and overwhelm demoralized government contingents, as in contemporary Somalia.”

An analysis of the three states sharing the tri-border region of Mandera triangle from the human security indicators which are also used in determining state failure shows that indeed the regional states of Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia's standing in a "Failed State Index" have remained in the top 20 states in a critical condition since 2007.³⁰⁴ Kenya's standing has in particular been shown to have fallen for four consecutive years, with the country ranked 13th among 20 states in "critical condition" in 2010. Kenya is actually said to be in greater danger of collapse than North Korea or Iran in the annual stability ranking of 177 countries.³⁰⁵ Somalia, another state in the region has topped the list of failed states from 2007 to 2010 and has since moved from a failed state to a collapsed state, the most extreme form of state failure.

Figure 1: Social, Economic and Political indicators of state failure in Ethiopia

	Total Score	Social			Economic			Political/Military					
		Demographic Pressures	Refugees & Displaced Persons	Group Grievance	Human Flight	Uneven Development	Economy	Legitimacy of the State	Public Services	Human Rights	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention
2007	95.3	9.0	7.9	7.8	7.5	86	80	7.9	7.0	8.5	7.5	8.9	6.7
2008	96.1	8.9	7.5	7.8	7.5	86	82	7.9	7.5	8.5	7.5	8.9	7.3
2009	98.9	9.4	8.0	8.2	7.7	88	83	7.9	8.2	8.5	7.5	8.8	7.6
2007 to 2008	▲	▼	▼	◄	◄	◄	▲	◄	▲	◄	◄	◄	▲
2008 to 2009	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	◄	▲	◄	◄	▼	▲

Source: <http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/> accessed 19th July 2010

³⁰⁴ See Fund For Peace website, <http://www.fundforpeace.org> accessed 2nd July 2010

³⁰⁵ See www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010 accessed 2nd July 2010

The indicator for demographic pressures for Ethiopia worsened to 9.4 in the FSI (Failed State Index) 2009 from 8.9 in the FSI 2008. Ethiopia faces a number of demographic pressures including floods and drought which displace huge numbers of people every year. It has a very young population, with 46% under the age of 15 and only 2.7% of the population over 65 years old. Life expectancy at birth is only 55 years and the population growth rate is quite high at 3.21%.³⁰⁶ UNICEF estimates that malnutrition accounts for 50% of deaths in children under five and unsafe drinking water accounts for 20% of such deaths.³⁰⁷ The indicator for refugees and displaced persons worsened to 8.0 in the FSI 2009 from 7.5 in the FSI 2008. Ethiopia hosts tens of thousands of refugees, mainly from Somalia, Eritrea, and Sudan.

According to international monitoring groups many Ethiopians have been displaced due to food shortages, land competition, inter-tribal conflicts, and a counterinsurgency effort in the Somali region. The indicator for group grievance increased to 8.2 in the FSI 2009 from 7.8 in the FSI 2008. Many opposition leaders have been jailed, alternately pardoned and rearrested. The indicator for human flight increased slightly from 7.5 in the FSI 2008 to 7.7 in the FSI 2009. Ethiopia has one of the largest diaspora populations of all African nations. Brain drain is particularly noticeable in the health care profession: thousands of Ethiopian doctors practice abroad while there are only two to three doctors per 100,00 Ethiopians.

³⁰⁶ See United Nations Development Programme, "Statistical Annex," in the *Human Development Report, 2009*
<http://hdr.undp.org>

³⁰⁷ See UNICEF Report on the State of the World's Children report available at www.unicef.org or
<http://www.childinfo.org>

The indicator for uneven economic development worsened slightly from 8.6 in the FSI 2008 to 8.8 in the FSI 2009. In the impoverished country, annual per capita GDP is only \$220.³⁰⁸ The vast majority (80%) of the labor force works in the agricultural sector, which accounts for a little under half of the national GDP.³⁰⁹ The government controls many sectors of the economy and, under the constitution, owns all of the land, leasing it to tenants. The adult literacy rate is very low at around 36%. Primary education is free but not compulsory, and enrollment rates are further decreased by the cost of books and supplies and an inadequate number of schools. The indicator for the economy increased slightly to 8.3 in the FSI 2009 from 8.2 in the FSI 2008. The GDP in 2008 was \$66.29 billion.³¹⁰ Agriculture accounts for half of the GDP and about 60% of exports. Ethiopia is almost entirely dependent on imports of foreign oil and the government's involvement in many sectors of the economy discourages foreign direct investment.

The indicator for the legitimacy of the state remained high at 7.9 in the FSI 2009. After national elections in May 2005, disputes and complaints over the electoral results turned violent and led to scores of political arrests, trials, and sentences. The Ogaden National Liberation Front is an armed ethnic insurgency in the Somali region of Mandera triangle seeking greater autonomy. The national army has used harsh measures against the group and civilians in the area. The indicator for public services has also worsened from 7.5 in the FSI 2008 to 8.2 in the FSI 2009. Ethiopia's public health system is severely understaffed, with some estimates noting only two or three doctors per 100,000 people.

³⁰⁸ See *Ibid* (Human Development Report, 2009)

³⁰⁹ See <http://www.ilo.org/trends> accessed 19th July 2010

³¹⁰ See United Nations Development Programme, "Statistical Annex," in the *Human Development Report, 2008*

Ethiopia has an infant mortality rate of over 80 deaths per 1,000 births, and ranks 11th worldwide in HIV/AIDS-related deaths.³¹¹ Public education is extremely weak; students are expected to spend an average of eight years in school, and fewer than 43% of Ethiopians are literate. The human rights indicator remained high at 8.5 in the FSI 2009. The Ethiopian government's counterinsurgency against the Ogaden National Liberation Front has resulted in extensive human rights abuses in the Somali region. A Human Rights Watch Report released in June 2008 accused the Ethiopian forces of killings, rape, torture, destroying villages, looting and pillaging. The security apparatus indicator remained high at 7.5 in the 2009 FSI.

Ethiopia has one of the largest armed forces in Africa. It carries out regular counterinsurgency campaign against the armed ONLF in the Somali region. Local militias commonly act as security forces, operating with impunity. The indicator for factionalized elites declined slightly from 8.9 in the FSI 2008 but remained very high at 8.8 in the FSI 2009. The indicator for external intervention worsened slightly from 7.3 in the FSI 2008 to 7.6 in the FSI 2009. Ethiopia relies heavily on international aid mainly from United States to feed its population and provide assistance after natural disasters like droughts and floods. The US Government also aids the military in training efforts.

³¹¹ See World Bank, "World Development Indicators database," at www.worldbank.org/data Accessed on 2nd July 2010

Figure 2: Social, Economic and Political indicators of state failure in Kenya

	Social			Economic				Political/Military					
	Total Score	Demographic Pressures	Refugees & Displaced Persons	Group Grievance	Human Flight	Uneven Development	Economy	Legitimacy of the State	Public Services	Human Rights	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention
2007	91.3	8.4	8.0	6.9	8.0	8.1	7.0	8.0	7.4	7.0	7.1	8.2	7.2
2008	93.4	8.7	8.5	7.6	8.0	8.1	6.9	8.2	7.4	7.2	7.1	8.4	7.3
2009	101.4	9.0	9.0	8.6	8.3	8.8	7.5	9.0	8.0	8.2	8.0	8.8	8.2
2007 to 2008	▲	▲	▲	▲	◄►	◄►	▼	▲	◄►	▲	◄►	▲	▲
2008 to 2009	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲

Source: <http://www.fundforpeace.org/web>

The demographic pressures indicator worsened from 8.7 in the FSI 2008 to 9.0 in the 2009 FSI. Kenya has an average population density of roughly 69 people/km².³¹² The annual population growth rate is 2.7%, ranking 25th worldwide.³¹³ Kenya has a significant youth bulge: the average age is 19 and over 42% of Kenyans are under 15.³¹⁴ Severe droughts and floods, as well as violence spilling over from neighboring Somalia, have made life extremely difficult in the northeast (found in Mandera triangle), prompting those that are able to migrate towards Nairobi. The refugees and displaced persons indicator worsened from 8.5 in the FSI 2008 to 9.0 in the 2009 FSI. As violence in Somalia has increased, many Somalis have fled to Kenya's North Eastern Province, which is inhabited almost exclusively by ethnic Somalis and which attempted to join the Somali Republic after Kenya's independence in 1963.

³¹² See Republic of Kenya, "Social-Economic Profile of the Population," in the *Population and Housing census*, Vol.2, 1999

³¹³ Ibid(Human Development Report, 2009)p.193

³¹⁴ See Ibid(Human Development Report,2009)

Kenya is host to over 320,000 refugees, primarily from Somalia and Sudan. There are also over 404,000 internally displaced Kenyans, most of who have been forced to flee their homes as a result of political violence or drought. The group grievance indicator worsened from 7.6 in the FSI 2008 to 8.6 in the FSI 2009. Ethnic violence has plagued Kenya for much of its history, as the large tribes have continually marginalized the smaller ones. Political violence has also been common in Kenya since the establishment of a multi-party system in 1991. The human flight indicator increased to 8.3 in the 2009 FSI. Kenya suffers from a brain drain, which has been exacerbated by the wave of political violence that followed the December 2007 elections, encouraging educated Kenyans to continue to seek jobs abroad.

The uneven development indicator worsened from 8.1 in the FSI 2008 to 8.8 in the FSI 2009. The poorest 10% of Kenyans account for only 2% of the national income, while the richest 10% account for over 37%.³¹⁵ Many wealthy government officials have been accused of embezzling millions of dollars in public funds, while the country has a 40% unemployment rate, one of the highest in the world. The economic indicator worsened from 6.9 in the FSI 2008 to 7.5 in the 2009 FSI. The Kenyan economy suffers from a lack of foreign investment, as many investors fear the political instability, corruption, and economic mismanagement that have plagued the country in recent years. In addition, the inflation rate has risen to over 25% and is currently one of the highest in the world.

³¹⁵ Ibid(Human Development Report,2009)p.197

The indicator for legitimacy of the state worsened from 8.2 in the FSI 2008 to 9.0 in the 2009 FSI. The disputed results of the December 2007 elections led to demonstrations and violence across the country, resulting in over 1,500 deaths. The vast majority of domestic observers and many international observers claim that the elections were flawed. The public services indicator worsened from 7.4 in the FSI 2008 to 8.0 in the FSI 2009. Severe droughts in 2008 forced officials to ration water and electricity in the North Eastern Region in Mandera triangle, an area in which both were already scarce. The human rights indicator worsened from 7.2 in the FSI 2008 to 8.2 in the FSI 2009, largely as a result of the political violence following the December 2007 elections. The police were largely unable to protect civilians, instead targeting dissidents and demonstrators. In addition, Somali refugees in the North Eastern Region live in extremely overcrowded camps, and in many instances have been forcibly deported to Somalia.

The security apparatus indicator worsened from 7.1 in the FSI 2008 to 8.0 in the FSI 2009. Militia groups operate in many parts of the country, despite government efforts to defeat them. In many cases, these militias have been formed as a result of land disputes between ethnic groups. Ethnic violence linked to active militia groups increased significantly in 2008 after a failed government crackdown in 2007. The factionalized elites indicator worsened from 8.4 in the FSI 2008 to 8.8 in the FSI 2009. The disputed results of the December 2007 presidential election have created a rift between President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga. After reaching a power-sharing agreement in February 2008, arguments over political influence split their joint government along party lines.

Both the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and President Kibaki's Party of National Unity (PNU) have been victims of elite fragmentation, as prominent party members attempt to carve new parties out of the existing coalitions.

The score for external intervention increased from 7.3 in the FSI 2008 to 8.2 in the FSI 2009. The United Nations significantly increased its presence in Kenya in the wake of the political violence of early 2008. The power-sharing agreement that was reached in February 2008 between Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga was facilitated by a UN mediation team led by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The political violence also prompted a dramatic increase in humanitarian aid from the UN, the Red Cross, and UNICEF. The World Bank is heavily involved in Kenya, currently sponsoring many community projects. US ambassador has actively been involved in spearheading quest for constitutional reforms in the country

Figure 3: Social, Economic and Political indicators of state failure in Somalia

	Total Score	Social			Economic			Political/Military					
		Demographic Pressures	Refugees & Displaced Persons	Group Grievance	Human Flight	Uneven Development	Economy	Legitimacy of the State	Public Services	Human Rights	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention
2008	114.2	9.8	9.8	9.5	8.3	7.5	9.4	10.0	10.0	9.9	10.0	10.0	10.0
2009	114.7	9.8	9.9	9.7	8.5	7.7	9.5	10.0	9.9	9.9	10.0	10.0	9.8
2010	114.3	9.6	10.0	9.7	8.3	8.0	9.6	10.0	9.6	9.9	10.0	10.0	9.6
2008 to 2009	▲	◀▶	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	◀▶	▼	◀▶	◀▶	◀▶	▼
2009 to 2010	▼	▼	▲	◀▶	▼	▲	▲	◀▶	▼	◀▶	◀▶	◀▶	▼

Source: <http://www.fundforpeace.org/web>

Only one of Somalia's social indicators worsened from the 2009 FSI, while the other three either stayed the same or improved. The demographic pressures indicator improved slightly from 9.8 in the FSI 2009 to 9.6 in the FSI 2010. Somalia's population growth rate is 2.815%, the 16th highest in the world.³¹⁶ Also, 45% of the Somali population is between 0-14 years of age and the median age is 17.5 years, demonstrating a population distribution severely skewed toward younger generations. The country has an extremely high birth rate of 43.7 births per 1,000 Somalis, threatening the availability of resources and land. The indicator for refugees and displaced persons worsened from 9.9 to 10.0 for the FSI 2010. Somalia currently has 1.1 million internally displaced persons resulting primarily from ongoing civil wars since 1988.³¹⁷

The risk of contracting infectious disease is high and there are several food and/or waterborne diseases that threaten the health of the Somali population, especially displaced persons. Somalia's group grievance indicator has remained constant at the high level of 9.7 from the FSI 2009 to the FSI 2010. There are numerous clan factions in Somalia that both support and oppose the transitional federal government. Local governing bodies throughout Somalia attempt to control their territories separate from the interim Somali government. The human flight indicator lessened from 8.5 in the FSI 2009 to 8.3 in the FSI 2010. Somalis are leaving the country at a slower rate, in part because so many have already left.

³¹⁶ Ibid(Human Development Report,2009)p.194

³¹⁷ See United Nations High Commission for Refugees at www.unhcr.org accessed 2nd July 2010

Both economic indicators worsened for Somalia in the FSI 2010. The uneven development indicator worsened from 7.7 in the FSI 2009 to 8.0 in the FSI 2010. Somalia's infant mortality rate is one of the highest in the world with approximately 109.19 deaths per 1,000 infants.³¹⁸ The agricultural sector employs 71% of the labor force, while only 29% work in industry and services.³¹⁹ The indicator for the economy worsened from 9.5 in the FSI 2009 to 9.6 in the FSI 2010. The average GDP per capita is only \$600 (U.S. dollars).³²⁰ The country's GDP did grow, however, by 2.6% in the year 2009. Somali's total debt for the year 2009 was \$3 billion. There is currently no accurate data pertaining to the unemployment rate or the percentage of the population that lives below the poverty line.

All of Somalia's political/military indicators either remained the same or improved from the FSI 2009 to the FSI 2010. The indicator for state legitimacy remained the same at the highest possible score of 10.0, as there is currently no permanent national government. Somalia's interim government has been wholly ineffective and unable to minimize corruption and outbreaks of violence in the country. The public services indicator improved from 9.9 in the FSI 2009 to 9.6 in the FSI 2010. Approximately 49.8% of men and 25.8% of women are literate, while 62.2% of the population as a whole is unable to read and write.³²¹

³¹⁸ See World Health Organization and United Nations Children's Fund, Joint Measurement Programme (<http://www.wssinfo.org/>) accessed on 2nd July 2010

³¹⁹ See <http://www.ilo.org/trends> accessed 19th July 2010

³²⁰ See International Monetary Fund, *Government Finance Statistics Year Book and data files* at <http://search.worldbank.org/data> accessed on 2nd July 2010

³²¹ See UNESCO Institute for Statistics, *Education Indicators and Data Analysis Monitoring International Goals database* (<http://uis.unesco.org>)

The risk for major infectious diseases is extremely high because a majority of Somalis do not have access to clean water or to hospitals and doctors. The TFG, which is only able to control a small section of Mogadishu, is unable to provide public services.

The indicator for human rights remained extremely high at 9.9, as civil conflict has been ongoing since the collapse of the Somali national government in 1991. Journalists and human rights defenders are among the most threatened groups and suffer from severe abuse and violence. Also, fighting amongst clans has led to widespread rape and murder as well as the massive displacement of civilians. The security apparatus indicator remained at the highest level of 10.0 in the FSI 2009 and 2010 due to the continuation of conflict among armed militias and militant organizations. The factionalized elites indicator held steady at 10.0 in the FSI 2010. Significant fragmentation exists between conflicting clans in Somalia. Somalia's score for external intervention improved slightly from 9.8 in 2009 to 9.6 in the FSI 2010. The international community is proceeding with caution in involving itself in Somali affairs, but the United States is attempting to prevent the spread of terrorism and combat piracy in the region by actively supporting the Transitional Federal Government.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter points out important findings in the previous chapters especially on conceptualization of emerging security, different manifestations of human insecurities in the region under study and the role of the state in ensuring human security for its citizens. This conclusion posits that there is an evident lack of scholarly interest on the subject of pastoral conflicts from the perspectives of human security, which can be linked to the treatment of the problem as a concern purely for the pastoral groups.³²² While there is a general academic draught on the subject, some of the existing literature romanticizes the brigand and fails to establish a firm anchor of the phenomenon with geopolitical issues that wrap together poverty, political instability and inexorable lawlessness. This conclusion addresses this gap in our knowledge of internationalized pastoral conflicts whose motive, opportunity, and means though manifested within the State, are actually symptoms of regional human security problems.

5.1 Study Findings

This study sought to understand the relevance of human security and other forms of emerging security in pastoral areas of Mandera triangle and the relationships and contradictions that exist between them and national security. This was prompted by the desire to address a life-

³²² Nene Mburu. "Contemporary Banditry in the Horn of Africa: Causes, History and Political Implications," in *Nordic Journal of African Studies* vol.8, No.2 (199) pp.89-107

and-death issue for millions of people in the region: how to address the unique insecurity challenges created by the nexus between human securities, national security and internationalized pastoral conflicts in the region. The study began dissatisfied with the existing literature on internationalized pastoral conflicts in Mandera triangle, which has failed to answer several key questions: 1) what is the nature of emerging dimensions of security in the pastoral areas? 2) What are the general perceptions about security in the region under study? and 3) What are the relationships between internationalized pastoral conflicts and human security issues in Northern Kenya?

From the perspectives of the Mandera triangle case study in chapter three and in relation to the issue of securitization dealt with extensively in chapter two, this study demonstrates that violence in the Mandera triangle is often viewed narrowly as a symptom of inter-tribal conflict over cattle and other common property resources.³²³ This line of thought can be challenged because as seen from this study, the reality is more complex. Equally important to understanding insecurity among pastoralist groups is their distant and often oppositional relationship to the state. As with other peripheral groups, pastoralists in the region have suffered systematic marginalization from central authorities³²⁴ and have a history of rejecting the authority of the state, which they view as threatening to their distinct nomadic way of life.³²⁵ Pastoralist violence must therefore be situated, in terms of these forces of mutual opposition and exclusion as well as

³²³ Bol Aken N., "Violence Fuelled by the State," In Bennett O. (ed.) *Greenwar: Environment and Conflict*, (London: The Panos Institute, 1991).

³²⁴ Mwaura, Ciru. 'Kenya and Uganda Pastoral Conflict Case Study,' in *Occasional Paper* (UNDP Human Development Report, 2005).

³²⁵ Broch-Due V. Rich-Man, Poor-Man. Administrator, Beast: The Politics of Impoverishment in Turkana, Kenya, 1890-1990," in *Nomadic Peoples*, (September 1999).

the struggle for control of resources. Ultimately, pastoralists do not partake of a nation's so-called 'public goods'.

They are often denied government services and since formal legal and police services are usually nonexistent in pastoralist communities, the state seldom plays a role in guaranteeing their security. When they do become an object of state interest and intervention, it often involves forced settlement and other coercive efforts which only strengthen their impulse to remain apart.³²⁶

Furthermore, in the case of security promotion, state actions tend to be authoritarian and heavy-handed. Under such conditions, the demand for small arms mediated by preferences for self-defense and acquisition of resources increases. Meanwhile, the perseverance of vibrant migratory and trade networks has enabled pastoralists to procure firearms by drawing on existing social contacts.³²⁷ The demand for weapons remains robust among pastoralists because of very strong perceptions held by pastoral groups that states have no capacity to guarantee their security. They have the fear of being attacked as relived in the past. Again, owing to the relatively high concentration of rural populations living in volatile border areas and their singular reliance on livestock as a source of livelihood, arms are widely considered indispensable for protecting their livestock especially from cattle rustlers.³²⁸ In one of the interviews during the study, one pastoralist stated: "If the state can provide armed security for Banks to safe guard the

³²⁶ De Waal A. "Contemporary Warfare in Africa: Changing context, Changing Strategies." in *IDS Bulletin Vol 27* No.3(1996) pp. 6-16.

³²⁷ Brauer, Jurgen and Robert Muggah., 'Completing the Circle: Building a Theory of Small Arms Demand.' In *Journal of Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 25, No. 2, (2006) pp. 138-54.

³²⁸ Goldsmith P. "Cattle, Khat, and Guns: Trade, Conflict, and Security on northern Kenya's Highland- Lowland Interface," in *A Case Study*, A paper prepared for the USAID Conference on *Conflict Resolution in the Great Horn of Africa*,(June 1997).

cash investments in urban centers, why should any body be worried if pastoralists safeguard their multi-million investments in form of livestock by hiring armed herders?³²⁹ Pastoralists also hold strong convictions that, given the inability or unwillingness of regional governments to provide police protection and enforce rule of law in pastoral areas, households frequently acquire arms as a means of protecting themselves from violent crime.³³⁰ Pastoral wars-usually over pasture, farmland, and wells, but also arising from political and commercial rivalries played out between elites-are endemic in the region. Communities unable to protect and defend their communal resources risk losing them to better-armed rivals.

As a result of these and other security dilemmas, tribes seek to maximize their firepower as a form of deterrence. There is also widespread belief among pastoralists that their peace is always insecure, and that a new phase of the war with their neighbours is likely and always inevitable. Local pastoralists are adamant that they need to shore-up their arsenals for the next round of fighting.³³¹ Many of country border areas in the Mandera Triangle are plagued by cross border insecurity owing to heavy presence of armed groups. While some pastoralists publicly deplore the violence-especially when it impacts them directly-many of them, in private, benefit from it materially.³³²

³²⁹ An interview with Hajj Mohamed Abdirahman, a livestock farmer and trader in Mandera district of Northern Kenya

³³⁰ Bevan, James. "Blowback: Kenya's Illicit Ammunition Problem in Turkana North District," in *Occasional Paper 22* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2008a).

³³¹ Bevan, James. "Crisis in Karamoja: Armed Violence and the Failure of Disarmament in Uganda's Most Deprived Region," in *Occasional Paper 21*. (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2008b).

³³² McEvoy, Claire, and Ryan Murray. "Gauging Fear and Insecurity: Perspectives on Armed Violence in Eastern Equatoria and Turkana North," in *Small Arms Survey Working Paper 14*, (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2008c).

Until rather recently there was a pronounced "blame the victim" approach in discussions about the pastoralists. The searing images from the famines of the 1970s and 1980s, much of it from the Sahel, reinforced the notion that the pastoralist was largely responsible for these immense difficulties. This understanding spurred much inappropriate development that is only now beginning to be fully reassessed and understood. The human-security dimensions of the pastoralist plight are now more clearly seen as attributable to population growth, immigration, and conflict and government policies. The following statement, while applying to pastoralists in Kenya, could equally serve to describe the situation among pastoralists elsewhere in the region.

*"In sum, what we clearly see is the gradual truncation of pastoral relations and narrowing of their access to resources, in land use, labor and livestock networks. Such circumscription undermines the strength of a more collective specialized pastoralism – for example, access to a range of pasture and an extensive shared labor pool - to the benefit of a privileged minority."*³³³

Nevertheless, the image of eco-disaster and collapse should be tempered by the realization of the complexities, cultural resilience and the possibilities of pastoral viability.³³⁴ Moreover, if we move beyond blaming the pastoralist victim, neither will the victimization of pastoralists suffice. The pastoral areas have also been securitized for over a long time. Securitization concept begins with identification of security issues in the region and classifying them either as non-politicized, politicized or securitized issues.³³⁵

³³³ Sperling, L., and J.G. Galaty, "Cattle, Culture, and Economy: Dynamics in East African Pastoralism," in *The World of Pastoralism*, J.G. Galaty and D.L. Johnson, eds., (Guilford Press: New York, 1990).

³³⁴ Ibid, (Bonfiglioli, 1992).

³³⁵ Makumi Mwangi (Ed.), "Human Security: Setting the Agenda for the Horn Africa," (Nairobi: Africa Peace Forum, 2008)p.226

Non-politicized refers to an issue which does not warrant the attention of the state and the local community can deal with it under their normal ways of life. Politicized issue is part of why the government exists and government must formulate policy decision on it and allocate resources for it. Securitized issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency response measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure. 'Securitization,' is the more that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or above politics.³³⁶ Securitization is thus a more extreme version of politicization and the placement of issues on this spectrum is open. Existing circumstances can make any issue non-politicized, politicized or securitized.

This study on security and pastoral conflicts therefore bring the human security agenda to the center stage of all public issues in the Mandera triangle region. This is mainly because Regional security policies need to be captured in human security perspectives as its central fulcrum even when it is addressing matters of physical security. This will sensitize the consumers of peace and security in the region on the dimensions and importance of human security as a tool of addressing security problems bedeviling the region. The Horn of Africa region and its sub-set, the Mandera triangle do not have a security strategy inspite of it being one of the security trouble spots in the world. This means that the region's security agenda has been dominated by the traditional notion of state security.

³³⁶ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde. "A New Framework for Analysis." (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998)p.22

According to Mwagiru et al, a regional security strategy plays useful roles in the security agenda of the region and gives a road map of where the region intends to go in the context of security.³³⁷ These scholars further argue that a regional security strategy also identifies road blocks that might be encountered on the way, and prescribes strategies for avoiding or confronting them. This is the reason why there has to be a guiding framework for addressing human insecurity issues that have become major contributory factors of pastoral conflicts in this region under study. The development of a regional security strategy that has human security as its structural basis will ultimately give birth to a grand regional security policy that will exhibit commonalities amongst the states in the region. This is the reason why this study has concentrated on the relationship between security and pastoral conflicts in the region. Human security issues are core cross cutting security issues in the region.

Debates over the nature and meaning of "security" in the context of Mandera triangle should be generated to provide insights into the controversy over what entails security and what are political issues. The local perceptions on this matter might be different from that of the governments in the region. For over four decades the whole Mandera triangle region has become "securitized," and treated as a security zone, through biased state policies which do not describe existing security situation, but which have succeeded in convincing the regional and sub-regional constituents into believing (either through coercion or consent) that pastoral conflicts are an issue of existential threat to the state(s) in the region which must be tackled or else everything else will

³³⁷ Makumi Mwagiru and Njeri Karuru, "Human Security in the Horn of Africa: Emerging Agenda," in Makumi Mwagiru (Ed.), *Human Security: Setting the Agenda for the Horn Africa* (Nairobi: Africa Peace Forum, 2008) p.224

be irrelevant.³³⁸ By successfully representing the issue as such, the individual states in the region often justify the use of extraordinary means in dealing with pastoral conflicts including bending of normal political rules. These extra-ordinary means have manifested themselves in the region in many forms including secret military operations, forceful disarmaments, limitations on otherwise inviolable rights of the people in the region, and focusing the people's energies and state resources on the maintenance of state security in the region at the expense of important human security issues of health, nutrition, education, employment and social crime among others.

Many scholars have described conflicts in pastoral areas in many different ways. Bujra³³⁹ for example, argues that "writers often describe conflicts in Africa using terms such as civil war, violent conflict, civil strife, hostility, war and political instability, interchangeably." This study has adopted the simplest, precise and action centered definition as conceptualized by contemporary scholars like Mwagiru³⁴⁰ and Mitchell 1998³⁴¹ and consequently identifies at least three types of conflicts in the Mandera Triangle borderlands. These are conflicts over means of survival, insecurity dilemmas, and natural resource related conflicts. All these three types of conflicts have continued to impact the ways in which pastoral resources are accessed and utilized on all sides of the Mandera

³³⁸ ³³⁸ Michael C. Williams, "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics," in *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Dec., 2003), p.511

³³⁹ Bujra A., "African Conflicts: Their Causes and Their Political and Social Environment" in *Development Policy Management Forum (DPMF), Occasional Paper No.4* (2002)pp2-3.

³⁴⁰ Makumi Mwagiru, *Conflict in Africa: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management* (Center for Conflict Research; Nairobi: 2006)pp 1-3

³⁴¹ C.R. Mitchel, *The Structure of International Conflict*, (London:MacMillan, 1998)pp.15-25

Triangle border lands. Current problems of ethnic conflicts throughout Mandera Triangle Region have complicated utilization of pasture and other resources in the area because access and control of these resources is prerequisite to utilization.³⁴²

In spite of this scenario, conflicts in this region have received little attention from conflict scholars due to several reasons, one of which is the fact that the world's media and researchers pay more attention to new eruptions of political violence and war on terror than to regional conflicts emanating from structural factors.³⁴³ The other important reason for this sorry picture is that official state statistics on pastoral conflict trends do not exist in the region. Every year, governments in the region collect economic, health, education and environmental data that are collated and analysed for national planning purposes. These collated data provide information that help governments and international organizations formulate and evaluate policy.³⁴⁴ However, these agencies which are also charged with protecting and enhancing national security have no comparable data on regional conflicts to help them formulate and evaluate security policies.

This kind of inaction is also replicated at the International level. A huge collaborative project involving the UN, the World Bank, and other international organizations, with governments from around the world, is currently collating data to measure progress toward meeting the Millennium

³⁴² Elliot Fratkin, "East African Pastoralism in Transition: Maasai, Boran, and Rendille Cases," in *African Studies Review*, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Dec., 2001), pp. 1-25

³⁴³ Human Security Centre, *Human Security Report 2006* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006)

³⁴⁴ See C. Burnside and D. Dollar, 'Aid, Policies and Growth', in *American Economic Review* 90, 4 (September 2000): 847-868.

Development Goals-which target halving global poverty by 2015.³⁴⁵ Unfortunately no data is being collected on conflicts-even though conflict is a major driver of poverty in many parts of the developing world. In fact, the threat that conflicts pose to the MDGs is completely ignored in the UN's Millennium Declaration, despite the fact (1) that reducing the incidence and costs of armed conflict is clearly a development as well as a security priority. This implies that in the absence of conflicts, there will be more resources committed to improving the peoples welfare which in the long run leads to a happy and secure society, (2) that war, in the words of the World Bank, is 'development in reverse' which means that without guaranteed safety from personal harm and threats to life and property, human beings cannot engage in development activities that enrich their lives and enable them to conquer adversities such as hunger and poverty, and (3) that the average civil war costs some \$54 billion³⁴⁶ making it too expensive for poor economies to afford. One of the reasons why there are no official datasets on community armed conflicts or core human rights abuse especially in the Mendera triangle region is because governments in the region are anxious to divulge details of violent conflicts within their own borders. Political leaders invoke national security and sovereignty to justify non-disclosure. The real cause of their reluctance is often a desire to avoid domestic and external criticism.³⁴⁷ Because of this lack of official states data on conflicts in the region, this study made use of dataset created jointly by the Uppsala University's Conflict Data Program and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo

³⁴⁵ Development Data Group of the World Bank, 'Millennium Development Goals,' in *The World Bank Group website*, www.developmentgoals.org/ (accessed 1 June 2005).

³⁴⁶ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, 'The Challenge of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil War', in *Copenhagen Consensus Challenge Paper, Conflicts*, 26 March 2004, http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/Files/Filer/CC/Papers/Conflicts_230404.pdf (accessed 31 August 2005).

³⁴⁷ *Ibid*(Human Security Report 2006)p.3

(PRIO) some of which has been used as primary source of data in this study. According to a review of armed conflict trends based on Uppsala University's Conflict Data Program and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)³⁴⁸, overwhelming majority of today's armed conflicts are fought within, not between, states and that most take place in the poorest parts of the world like the region under study. Although some scholars believe that the number of armed conflicts in the world has declined radically since the cold war³⁴⁹, the Horn of Africa region has exhibited dramatic and sustained presence of conflicts.

In the light of this sustained and protracted pastoral conflicts in Mandera triangle, a cycle of wants has emerged leading to vicious web of conflicts because when people are faced with existential threat to their lives they tend to move to places they consider safe haven. The full impact of the resultant situation, as exemplified by Mandera triangle case can best be described by the Human Security Report 2005, which notes:

"Wars destroy property, disrupt economic activity, divert resources from health care ... Crowded into camps, susceptible refugees fall ill from infectious diseases and contribute to the further spread of these disease . . . Wars increase exposure to conditions that, in turn, increase the risk of disease, injury and death. Prolonged and bloody civil wars usually displace large populations-either internally or across borders . . . Bad food, contaminated water, poor sanitation and inadequate shelter can combine to transform camps into vectors for infectious disease-measles, respiratory disease and acute

³⁴⁸ UCDP, Armed Conflict Termination Dataset Codebook, http://www.pcr.uu.se//research/UCDP/our_data1.htm (accessed 13th December 2006).

³⁴⁹ See Andreas Wenges and Daniel Mockli, *Conflict Prevention: The Untapped Potential of the Business Sector* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).

diarrhoea—while malnutrition and stress compromise people's immune systems Diseases rampant in refugee camps easily spread to wider populations . . . Prevention and treatment programs, already weakened by the wartime destruction of health care infrastructure, simply cannot cope with new threats posed by mass population displacements . . . Civil wars also deplete the human and fixed capital of the health care system. Heavy fighting often destroys clinics, hospitals and laboratories, as well as water treatment and electrical systems."³⁵⁰

Given the above condition, social systems which are not responsive to individual needs are subjected to instability and forced change (possibly through violence or conflict).³⁵¹ The other immediate result is usually internationalization of conflicts in the region, because of the existence of internationalizing environment.³⁵²

The findings on the second objective of this study on security and pastoral conflicts in terms of human rights as a human security concern through (the Political Terror Scale[PTS]) data as discussed in chapter four has important implication for the Mandera triangle region. While it is not clear what drives the changes in rights violations revealed in the regional trend data, there is, as the comparison between OECD and LICUS states indicates, a strong association between income and respect for human rights. People in rich countries suffer far fewer rights violations than do those in poor countries.

³⁵⁰ See Ibid, (Mack, ed., *Human Security Report 2005*) pp 129–130.

³⁵¹ Roger A. Coate and Jerel A. Rosati, 'Preface,' in *The Power of Human Needs in World* edited by Ryoger A. Coate and Jerel A. Rosati, ix. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988.

³⁵² Makumi Mwangi, *Conflict in Africa. Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management* (Nairobi:CCR Publications, 2006)pp.60-67

This if looked at from in conjunction with the relationship between democracies and human rights again inclusive democracies in rich nations have better human rights records than either autocracies or "anocracies"-the latter being states whose governance mechanisms are a mix of democratic and authoritarian elements.³⁵¹ Mandera triangle suffers from both poor economies and a greater increase in the number of anocracies in the region.³⁵⁴ In fact, the number of anocracies in sub-Saharan Africa increased more than tenfold between 1988 and 2006. So, any increased respect for human rights associated with the new democracies may have been negated, in part at least, by the higher levels of human rights abuses associated with the new anocracies.³⁵⁵

Another important finding from the above research was that countries embroiled in, or recently emerging from, armed conflicts as is the case in Mandera triangle tend to be characterized by higher levels of human rights violations. Indeed, all but one of the nine countries with the worst human rights records in 2006, were involved in armed conflicts in that year.³⁵⁶ It is also useful to note that when states believe that repression works, they are more likely to employ it, especially when the government in question perceives itself to be under serious internal threat. This has happened in Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia on many instances.

The findings from surveys used to identify and analyze perceptions held by actors about security in the Mandera triangle region showed that people's fears about violence are important in their own right and have major social and political consequences, but they are not a reliable

³⁵¹ Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R.Cole, 'Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility,' in the Polity IV Project Global Report 2009 published jointly by The Center for Systemic Peace and the Center for Global Policy, (accessed 19 July 2010).www.systemicpeace.org

³⁵⁴ Ibid.

³⁵⁵ See Christian Davenport and David A. Armstrong II, "Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996," in *American Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 3 (July 2004): 538-554.

³⁵⁶ See Human Security Centre, 'Human Security Report 2005,' (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005)p. 79.

guide to the reality of national security. When people were asked what problems they thought their governments should address, economic and social issues took precedence, not only over war and terrorism, but over crime as well.³⁵⁷ Over one-third of the respondents showed that 'economic issues' (including jobs and taxes) should be the number one priority for governments, with another 20% naming 'social issues' (including poverty, health and education). This by extension explains why the marginalized pastoral communities of Mandera triangle a region where joblessness, poverty, diseases, hunger and illiteracy are the order of the day have always remained insecure.

This study on security and pastoral conflicts also found that there is an important relationship between human insecurity, state failure and conflicts. Failed states are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and bitterly contested by warring factions. In most failed states, government troops battle armed revolts led by one or more rivals. Official authorities in a failed state sometimes face two or more insurgencies, varieties of civil unrest, differing degrees of communal discontent, and a plethora of dissent directed at the state.³⁵⁸ Nation-states fail because they can no longer deliver positive political goods to their people. Their governments lose legitimacy and, in the eyes and hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens, the nation-state itself becomes illegitimate. Only a handful of the world's 191 nation-states can now be categorized as failed, or collapsed, which is the end stage of failure. Several dozen more are weak and serious candidates for failure.

³⁵⁷ see Ipsos-Reid website, <http://www.ipsos.ca/> (accessed 10 May 2005).

³⁵⁸ Robert I. Rotberg, 'The New Nature of Nation-State Failure,' in *The Washington Quarterly* vol.25 No.3 (Summer, 2002) pp. 85-96.

There are twelve human insecurity and state failure indicators¹⁵⁹ analyzed in the case of the three states in the Mandera triangle region. These were categorized into social, economic and political indicators and included: Mounting demographic pressures, massive movement of refugees or internally displaced persons creating complex humanitarian emergencies, legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance or group paranoia, and chronic and sustained human flight; uneven economic development along group lines and severe economic decline; delegitimization or criminalization of state, progressive deterioration of public services, suspension or arbitrary application of the Rule of Law and widespread violation of Human Rights, security apparatus operate “state within a state,” rise of factionalized elites and intervention of other states or external political actors.

For the period under study, Ethiopia’s core five state institutions were qualified as weak leadership, weak military, poor police, poor judiciary and poor civil service all of whom lead to a situation of human insecurity in the country. Kenya’s core five state institutions were described as being characterized by weak leadership, moderate military, weak police, weak judiciary and weak civil service while Somalia’s core five state institutions were described as consisting of poor leadership, poor military, poor police, poor judiciary and poor civil service. These are the state factors that have led to human insecurities in the region under study which draw a clear relationship between human security and pastoral conflicts.

¹⁵⁹ http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/content/fsi/fsi_12.htm accessed on 19th July 2010

From all the foregoing, an adequate conceptualization of human security for Mandera triangle states and other states in Africa would 'link human security with human development'.³⁶⁰ Economic development will have to be at the top of the institutional agenda, since development and security are 'two sides of the same coin'.³⁶¹ Non-state actors do not have the power to bring about large-scale development or to resolve the new security threats alone, without any state assistance. This study agrees that, 'it is only academic to conceive of rudimentary security and development without strong, legitimate states'.³⁶² Consequently, in the context of Mandera triangle's soft states, strengthening the state is a necessary precondition for the institutionalization of peace and security. African states will have to remain interventionist to build the institutional capacity to manage the non-traditional security threats that affect the people of the continent.

This study further finds that Pastoral conflicts cannot be viewed from a simple platform of intra-state dynamics or human security issues alone since they show symptoms of wider political problems in a turbulent geopolitical environment. Furthermore, the states in the region were found to lack plausible mechanism for pro-active resolution of sub-national tensions of this nature which further justifies this study making the recommendations advanced apply to other parts of the African continent.

³⁶⁰ United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report*, 1994 quoted in Van Aardt, op. cit., p. 21.

³⁶¹ Mandaza, I. 'Peace and Security, Regional Cooperation and Economic Integration,' in *SAPEM* Vol. 8 No. 7, (1995) pp. 29-31.

³⁶² Du Pisani, A. 'Security and Peace in a post-apartheid southern Africa,' in *International Affairs Bulletin* Vol. 16 No. 3, (1992) pp. 4-16.

Findings from this study also agree with the prediction by Creveld¹⁶³ that pastoralists can attain a level of violence that is not easily stoppable by governments and by its nature pastoral conflicts present laissez-faire of a kind where individual and community relationships are increasingly built on domination and coercion.

In spite of all these, constructing a generalizable theory on internationalized pastoral conflicts has attendant difficulties due to the conspicuous literary barrenness on the subject, particularly the paucity of academic analysis of its nature and regional implications. Without such an authoritative frame of reference, internationalized pastoral conflicts that cannot be classified as traditional feuding will continue to hinder scholarly attempts to analyse its threat to security, as it will be difficult to explain the extent to which it emanates from, or is restrained by, specific international circumstances.

This lacuna may be explained in part by the limitation of empirical investigation due to the insecurity experienced by field researchers that arises from hostility that typifies a pastoralist's environment, where it is physically dangerous to carry out a meaningful research. Yet, desk top research has to grapple with the risk of sensationalism that can turn the portrayal of tragedy into catharsis. The problem is aggravated by the erroneous impression that pastoralists' warfare is purely a problem for the horn of Africa countries. Consequently, the phenomenon fails to attract international scholarship, which leads to a conspicuous imbalance in our knowledge of the subject when compared to other forms of violence, like international terrorism.

¹⁶³ Creveld, M. V., "*On future war*," (London: 1991) pp195-197

In the final analysis, two major findings emerge from an examination of the cause of internationalized pastoral conflicts. First, bearing in mind that collective predilection of the region's pastoral people is still based on lateral bonding through a high degree of linguistic affinity, miscegenation, commensality, trade and the common pursuit of pastoral economy, internecine internationalized pastoral conflict can only be explained by wants emanating from lack of human security. Second, although contemporary pastoral conflicts is caused by the pauperization of people that live in a harsh physical environment, the opportunity and means to violence emanate from existing political turmoil in the region where recent civil wars have made arms bearing a part of their material culture. This is in contrast with the available literature on the Horn of Africa which focuses mostly on social conflicts in the 19th century whose motive as noted by Crummey³⁶⁴, was to protest against centralism of authority.

The study also identifies two broad categories/types of conflicts in Mandera triangle. On the one hand are those that begin as internal conflicts in the sense that they involve primarily domestic forces and issues. On the other hand are those conflicts that begin between two or more states in the region. The conflicts in the region under discussion also have four other major characteristics. First, they tend to escalate into violence, are protracted and costly to the countries affected by them. Second, they are complex and interrelated. Third, the state has played a major role in their origins and continuation hence our argument that they are state driven. Finally most of them have a long history with some dating back to as far as the pre-colonial period.

³⁶⁴ Crummey, D. (ed.), "*Banditry and social protest*," (London: 1986)pp133-144


Consequently, studies of internationalized pastoral conflicts in Mandera triangle suggest that interest in these conflicts is justified on a number of practical grounds which have been summarized by Peter Wanyande as follows:³⁶⁵

"First is that the conflicts are very costly to the governments and the peoples of the region as a whole and the individual countries in which they occur. The costs are in terms of loss of human life and property and the destruction of public infrastructure. Hundreds of thousands of people have been killed in many of the countries in which the conflicts occur. Many others have also suffered and continue to suffer untold psychological trauma associated with conflicts. Second, these conflicts drain the scarce resources available to the affected countries. Once conflicts occur, scarce resources are inevitably diverted to the purchase of military equipment at the expense of socio-economic development. This is not to mention the fact that the conflicts disrupt normal economic activities such as agriculture and trade. Third, the conflicts and violence they generate in any one country creates insecurity and related problems far beyond the countries in which they originate. Conflicts in the region have also caused diplomatic tensions between neighbouring countries in the region. Fifth, most of these conflicts have resulted in large numbers of refugees and displaced persons."

This implies that states in the region must invest a substantial effort in trying to understand their indifference to the symmetrical connection between regional political instability, poverty and lawlessness.³⁶⁶

³⁶⁵ Peter Wanyande, 'State Driven Conflict in the Greater Horn of Africa,' in paper presented at the USAID organised Workshop on Conflict in the Greater Horn of Africa. (May 1997).

Annex 2: Map of Ethnic Somali Concentration in Manderia Triangle



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