

POLITICS, CLIENTELISM AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT:


**THE ROLE OF THE MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT IN CHOICE AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF SELECTED CDF PROJECTS IN SOUTH IMENTI
CONSTITUENCY, MERU COUNTY**

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T50/72212/2008

**A Project Paper Submitted to the Institute for Development Studies in Partial
Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Award of the MASTERS OF ARTS
DEGREE IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES, University of Nairobi**



November, 2011

DECLARATION

This project is my original work and has not been submitted for a degree to any other university



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
This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as a university supervisor.



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DEDICATION

To my Mother

**For urging me to do my best: 'I keep hearing the echo of your voice giving me pieces of advice
wherever I go'.**

May The Almighty God bless you.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I feel indebted to very many people and institutions who have in one way or the other contributed to making this journey a success. To all of you, I say a big thank you. Nonetheless, I say a special thank you to the following:

My colleagues in the MA class of 2008 who dared me to believe that it can be done; my acknowledgement goes to the University of Nairobi for having financed my study by awarding me a Scholarship. Without the Scholarship, it would not have been possible for me to finance my studies; my family that has formed me, offered moral support and in whom, I continue to draw encouragement and challenges; the entire Institute for Development Studies led by the Director and the entire academic staff, for the nurturing that you have bestowed on me.

The Honourable Kiraitu Murungi, MP for South Imenti, and All the members of staff at South Imenti CDF office; South Imenti Milk plant; The District Commissioner South Imenti District and key informants who afforded me time from their busy schedules and answered numerous questions that i had. My other acknowledgements go to my friends Muchai, Muriu, Indimuli and Wainaina for having provided good company while we were working until late in the Library.

I acknowledge Professor Njuguna Ng'ethe, Professor Karuti Kanyinga and Dr. Rachel Musyoki, for their tireless efforts in steering me towards the right direction. Dr. Musyoki, especially for having encouraged and given me the morale to carry on with the research even when there seemed to be no light at the end of the tunnel. The contribution of Professor Ng'ethe to the theoretical underpinning of this paper is exceedingly recognized. Without his support, it would have been quite difficult to write a paper with a strong theoretical back up.

I nevertheless affirm that the form and content of this project are my sole responsibility, and the views expressed are not necessarily those of the Institute for Development Studies or any other institution mentioned here.

ABSTRACT

This study is an attempt to review and analyze the multiple layers of formal and informal political powers at the Local-level in Kenya using selected CDF projects in South Imenti, Meru County. In the recent years the Kenyan Government has intensified the use of decentralized programs in its strategy to tackle poverty, reverse regional disparities, improve service delivery, enhance economic governance, promote citizen participation as well as enable local-level institutions to effectively manage revenues and expenditures. A prime example of this policy is the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) launched in 2003. The CDF allocates resources to all of the 210 constituencies, taking into account constituency poverty levels. The legal framework entrenching CDF covers the legal and institutional framework through which the fund operates, the financial and procurement procedures, project identification, planning and implementation and monitoring and evaluation process. It is hoped that, the strategy will enhance people's participation and power in decision making process to promote good governance.

The CDF is designed to consider local needs and preferences, by transferring resources directly to constituencies and stipulating that the Members of Parliament (MP) in each constituency should decide along with members of the local community how to use the funds to tackle poverty. The CDF Act allows the MPs to be members of the Constituency Development Fund Committees (CDFC), constitute and convene the CDFC meetings, serve as chairpersons or patrons in addition to transmitting projects proposal to the District Projects Committee among other multiple duties. In practice however, there have been concerns that the CDF Act gives MPs blanket powers leading to a conflict of interest. Participation of project beneficiaries in the decision making processes and implementation of the funds has also been limited. Are the legal powers being stretched through political means?

CDF is essentially about distribution of power and resources among different levels of the society and among different interests in their relationships to ruling elites. This study therefore suggests that, the institution of the office of MP in Kenya, while vibrant, is conducive to the provision of goods and service in clientelistic networks.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATION

AGM	Annual General Meeting
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
CACC	Constituency Aids Control Council
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CDC	Constituency Development Committee
CDF	Constituency Development Fund
CDFC	Constituency Development Fund Committee
DC	District Commissioner
DDO	District Development Officer
DFRD	District Focus for Rural Development
DPC	Districts Projects Committee
DO	District Officer
ERSWEC	Economic Recovery for Wealth and Employment Creation
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FY	Financial Year
IPAR	Institute of Policy Analysis and Research
IEA	Institute for Economic Affairs
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KARI	Kenya Agricultural Research Institute
KIPPRA	Kenya Institute of Public Policy and Research Analysis
KNBS	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
KPU	Kenya Peoples Union

LATF	Local Authority Transfer Fund
LDC	Locational Development Committee
MCC	Meru County Council
MP	Member of Parliament
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NMC	National Management Committee
PMC	Project Management Committee
PNU	Party of the National Unity
RMF	Road Maintenance Fund
SICDF	South Imenti Constituency Development Fund
SID	Society for International Development
SIDA	South Imenti Development Association
SIDFC	South Imenti Dairy Farmers' Company
SLDC	Sub Locational Development Committee
WDC	Ward Development Committee

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

This is a study of the role of political clientelism by a local MP in the choice and implementation of selected CDF projects in South Imenti, Meru County. The government of Kenya has over the years initiated several reforms aimed at strengthening local governance and institutional capacity especially in the rural areas. Indeed, Kenya achieved her independence in the decade of the "Development Administration" movement and therefore her first concern was creation of development institutions. The aim of these initiatives is to enable local-level institutions to effectively manage revenues and expenditures, improve service delivery, enhance economic governance and promote citizen participation in poverty reducing projects. However, the outcomes of these initiatives, in terms of economic growth, poverty reduction and human capital development have not been impressive. The *Ndegwa Report* (Government of Kenya, 1971) recommended that for the government to realise its concerns of accelerating development in rural areas, the process of plan making and implementation had to be extended to the district level and even into divisions, where government is exposed to local realities.

Between 1960s and 1980s Kenya experimented with a number of decentralisation effort that did not succeed because of the centre's unwillingness to involve local level units in decision making (Chitere and Mutiso, 2011). In fact, decentralisation efforts have been operating under very centrally set guidelines. The field agencies were expected on behalf of the centre, to ensure that the guidelines are adhered to. The decentralisation efforts were given further impetus through the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (ERSWEC). Recognising that the benefits of economic growth may not reach all people, particularly the most disadvantaged members of the population, and in the conformity with the government's goal of fighting poverty, the strategy outlines interventions aimed at reducing poverty at the grassroots. One key intervention has been the disbursement of financial resources directly to the constituencies (Government of Kenya, 2003 (a)).

Constituency Development Fund (CDF) was established by the CDF Act No. 11 of 2003 (Government of Kenya, 2003 (b)) as amended by the CDF (Amendment) Act, 2007 (Government of Kenya, 2007) and the CDF regulations, 2004 (Government of Kenya, 2004). The objective of this fund is to ensure that a specific portion of the government annual ordinary revenue is devoted to the constituencies for the purposes of development and fighting poverty. "It is an annual budgetary allocation by the central government to each of the country's Parliamentary jurisdictions, the Constituencies" (Kimenyi, 2005). These funds are called Constituency Development Fund because they are meant for the implementation of development initiatives at the constituency level, which is assumed to be the lowest level of governance.

The CDF Act gives provision for earmarking at least 2.5% of ordinary government revenue for the CDF kitty. 75% of it is distributed equally to all the 210 constituencies in the country and the remaining 25% is further distributed based upon the poverty index of constituencies. The government directly transfers resources to constituencies in order to finance community identified socio-economic development priority projects that ensures the "prospective benefits are available to a wide spread cross-section of the inhabitants of a particular area" (Government of Kenya, 2003(b)). These funds are disbursed directly from the Ministry of Finance (Treasury) to communities through Constituency Development Fund Committees (CDFC) for which the local Members of Parliament (MPs) are either the Chairperson or Patrons. The Fund targets constituency level development projects with particular emphasis on project targeting poverty alleviation. Allocation of the fund to the various projects, which are supposedly identified by the community, is done by the CDFC.

These resources are over and above sector ministry budgetary allocations and are aimed at giving communities ownership to resources for effective local development. They give the local communities at the grassroots level an opportunity to take part in its administration by contributing towards identification of development priorities within the community. CDF can therefore be seen as community driven development initiative that empowers local community by giving them the chance to manage their development projects (Kimenyi, 2005).

Since its inception in 2003, Constituency Development Fund (CDF) has facilitated a transfer of over Kshs Fifty (50) billion from the central government to the two hundred and ten (210) different constituencies (<http://www.cdf.go.ke>), with South Imenti Constituency benefitting with about Kshs. 264 million. These funds are earmarked to finance the implantation of public projects that will contribute towards the overall socio-economic development.

Official discourse about CDF holds that poor people are able to get access to services, like improved roads, water, school equipment and health services, which did not reach them directly from the government through line ministries. Despite this glowing tribute paid to CDF, there is doubt as to whether the funds are being used optimally or "it has been hijacked by politicians to advance their patron-client networks" (Kimenyi, 2005).

The legal framework entrenching CDF is a hallmark in regional development. It covers the legal and institutional framework through which the fund operates, the financial and procurement procedures, project identification, planning and implementation, monitoring and evaluation processes. It is hoped that, the strategy will enhance people's participation and power in decision-making processes to promote good governance. It has provided for an elaborate institutional framework with clearly defined roles and responsibilities for each level of management and coordination of the fund. The law establishing the CDF has clearly delineated how the funds will be administered and managed by various committees such as; the CDFC, Locational Development Committee (LDC) and Project Management Committees (PMC).

The CDF Act under section 2 (1) allows sitting MPs to be members of the CDFC. The MPs are mandatorily required to constitute and convene the CDFC within the first thirty days of the new Parliament. They serve as chairperson or the patrons of this committee. The CDFC deliberates on projects from all locations and draws up a priority projects list that is submitted to Parliament by the MP. The MPs also transmits projects proposals to the District Projects Committee (DPC), where they are also members. The DPC approves tenders and quotations (CDF Act, 2003). Projects to be funded are identified at a location through community meetings according to section 23(3) of the CDF Act. Identification of projects at the grassroots is aimed at promoting project ownership and enhancing sustainability of projects by using local information.

The CDF therefore looks at the participation of people as a means of attaining effective development projects. Thus, under CDF planning, the voice of poor people is assumed heard and respected during consultations in public meetings and various community gatherings. Essentially the fund engages in the process of building independent organizations for the poor and establishing new institutions and norms through which empowerment of the poor can be achieved and sustained. CDF like the previous decentralisation efforts in Kenya seems to focus on about distribution of power and resources but among different levels of the society and among different interests in their relationship to ruling elites. This has attracted a lot of attention from rural communities owing to its controversial nature. There are concerns that CDF monies are not managed in a transparent manner and that many CDF projects are not useful to rural communities.

The CDF Act seems to give MPs blanket powers to appoint committee members of their own to manage the funds and oversee its implementation, a role that conflicts with the executive powers of the government. The politics of patron-client relations therefore are useful in explaining how different interests might gain or lose from this set of institutional opportunities, policy initiatives and resource allocation relating these factors to the political purposes of decentralization.

Patron - client relations are not new in Kenya's rural development efforts. For rural families in South Imenti to survive and prosper for instance, they require not just strategic economic acumen but political skill as well: whether to defend the boundary of one's farm, to call ones neighbors to a work party or to borrow land (Haugerud, 1997). The District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD) system introduced in 1983 (Government of Kenya, 1983), incorporated representation of lower tier elected local government councils. Local MPs in collaboration with District Commissioners (DC) made decisions on local development and resource allocation routes based on patronage and access to centrally controlled networks (Crook, 2003). Representation of the poor was weak "to say that ordinary people participate in decision making is a joke. They have to be guided by the elite or at least energized to participate" (Ng'ethe and Kanyinga, 2003). The CDF Act seems to give MPs blanket powers to appoint committee members of their own to manage the funds and oversee its implementation.

Those who query the role of the MPs in the management of the CDF argue that, a sitting MP who is a member and patron of the CDF handpicks people from the constituency into membership to the committee. These people are answerable to him (Ongoya & Lumallas, 2005), but at the same time, the MP sits in Parliament as a legislator formulating and passing laws on CDF. Further, the MP is responsible for appointing the CDFC members who implement CDF at constituency level. The CDFC is empowered; to determine amounts allocated to individual development projects from the fund, develop policies, has a final say on issues of implementation and is responsible for oversight of the fund within the constituency.

This multiplication of roles makes CDF a *de-facto* 'MP's kitty' without regard to MP's competence in development planning and implementation (Wanjiru, 2006) according to critics of the arrangements. The critics support their argument by observing that the MP seems to be everywhere in the CDF project cycle. Is this the case, and if so, is the MP's role consistent with the legal powers given to him by the CDF Act? Are the legal powers being stretched through political means?

The objective of this project was to study the politics of the CDF in one constituency (South Imenti). Specifically the objective of the study was to evaluate whether and to what extent the legal formal powers vested in the MP by the CDF Act have been stretched to embrace informal political powers. The ruling elite have in the past accessed state resources for arbitrary transfer as patronage to selected individuals and to build political support within a structure of dependency. In cases where the resource transfers within such a power structure trickle down to the poor, they merely reinforce dependency rather than counteract the processes. Therefore overcoming poverty would involve empowering the poor within countervailing structures of power. Political leaders may therefore view CDF as an investment in their political careers with returns spread over the electoral cycle. A politician would prefer projects that maximise political returns (Kimenyi, 2005). To the extent that MPs have a key role in the identification and implementation of the projects, we do expect choices to be influenced by political maximisation.

This study sought to find out to what extent the role of MPs in each CDF project stage is influenced by politics, and if so, what type of politics. It enquired into the role the MP play during needs identification, project identification, projects prioritisation, harmonisation, resources allocation, projects implementation management, monitoring and evaluation of CDF projects. This study found out that, resource allocation and distribution in the constituencies is done through patron-client relationships and networks, and that this type of politics is endemic in each stage of the CDF projects cycle. Furthermore, the patron-client politics maintains itself primarily through decision making at each stage in the CDF projects cycle.

1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM

The recent attempt to devolve development funds in Kenya aimed at bringing fiscal decision making down to the community level with an aim of stimulating local participation. The problem is whether there is a divergence between the formal legal powers vested in the MPs by the CDF Act and the actual informal political powers exercised by the MPs on the grassroots during decision making. There has been in public discourses a lot of concern on the way CDF projects are selected, managed and implemented. This has prompted many organizations and institutions at the local, regional and international level to do various studies on CDF (IEA, 2010; KIPPRA, 2006; IPAR, 2006). These studies have pointed out that MPs are the legislators, implementers and auditors of the CDF activities imposing a major constraint on implementation of the funds (KIPPRA, 2006; Mapesa & Kibua, 2006). This discourse has quite often centred on the legal roles played by the MP as stipulated on the CDF Act.

The extent to which there is divergence between the legal formal powers vested in the MP by the CDF Act and the informal powers exercised on the ground, as they play their roles in the project identification and decision making process, remains a research imperative. This calls for a systematic assessment of the actual conflict of interests, if any, generated by the role of the MP in each stage of project cycle of the CDF projects.

A study by KIPPRA (2006) reveals that, the main reason for the CDF mismanagement is the power given to the local MPs to appoint and replace members of the CDF committee. Other main reasons mentioned were that political loyalties have led to the unfair sharing of the resources across the constituencies and wards. In addition, the study reported lack of transparency and accountability due to the blending of supervisory and implementing roles (KIPPRA, 2006). Evidence was found of a “tug-of-war” between MPs and councillors that believe there are enough loopholes that can be exploited for individual financial-political advantage (Mapesa & Kibua, 2006). MPs have been consistently accused of converting CDF into a campaign tool that they overly use to perpetuate their reign. This clearly indicates that they play a role in decision-making processes within CDF scheme.

It is further argued that, owing to the powers accorded to MPs by the CDF Act in appointing CDFC Members, areas perceived as opposing an MP may be excluded from CDFC. “In four out of five of the constituencies analyzed, the appointments of the members of the CDF Committees are composed by MP’s supporters and friends” (Mapesa & Kibua, 2006), a move that is likely to influence decision-making processes. The CDF has also come under particular scrutiny in the media. Major newspapers have also suggested that some MPs have been nepotistic by appointing members of their families to the CDF committees. Reports suggest too that some MPs were funding non-poverty oriented activities, non-inclusiveness in the management of the funds and funding of politically selected projects (Mapesa & Kibua, 2006). Ahead of the 2007 election, media reports suggested that some of the MPs contending for re-election were using CDF money to buy votes and political loyalties (Roxana, 2009). This further raises concern whether the MPs are departing their duties and responsibilities formally.

There is an argument that, the law gives the MPs an upper hand in the management of the fund. It is said that the law negates the principles of separation of powers where legislators become development agents and implementers of development programmes as opposed to law making and representation of the people. In addition, the law does not incorporate checks and balances to ensure accountability by the MPs (IEA, 2010).

Going unnoticed too is the additional issue of the relationship between the formal powers and the informal powers, which was the central thesis of this study. Is there a divergence between formal legal powers vested in the MPS, why is this case and how does this divergence manifest itself? If there is no divergence why is this case and how does this manifest itself? The study enquired into this by employing patron-client relations model. The study found out that the MP as a patron delivers desired benefits to exploit support from the clients, the constituents.

This study found out that, Patron-client relations play significant roles in the designing of public decisions, who gets to make them and for what purposes. This study has examined whether the MPs interests dominate CDF decision-making processes and the conditions around the area MP likely to make them more likely to control the decision making processes, fundamentally shaping development choices.

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES

The broad research question addressed by this study was: What is the role-played by the Members of Parliament (MP) in CDF projects decision making and implementation in South Imenti Constituency?

To answer this broad question, specific research questions were raised:

- i. How does the MP influence the identification of development projects to be funded by the CDF Scheme?
- ii. How does the MP influence prioritisation and location of development projects?
- iii. How does the MP influence the resources allocation to CDF project?
- iv. What roles does the MP play during the CDF Projects Implementation and Management?
- v. What roles do the MPs play during Monitoring and Evaluation of the CDF projects?

The broad research objective was to, analyse the role played by the Members of Parliament (MP) in CDF projects decision making and implementation in South Imenti Constituency.

The specific objectives sought to:

- i. Analyse how the MP influences the identification of needs and development projects to be funded by the CDF scheme.
- ii. Examine how the MP influences the prioritisation and location of development projects
- iii. Analyse the MP influences the resources allocation to CDF projects
- iv. Examine the roles played by the MP during the CDF Project Implementation and Management.
- v. Analyse the roles played by the MP during Monitoring and Evaluation of CDF projects.

The top - down approach to development management through centralised planning driven by the state failed to yield positive results in Kenya hence the shift towards decentralisation and people centred development approaches. CDF has the potential of advancing community welfare through devolving power to the people at the Local – Level especially the poor. Essential to this process is the building of independent organizations of the poor and establishing new institutions and norms through which empowerment of the poor can be achieved and sustained. Empowerment of the poor would enable them to get more equitable access over markets, public resources and basic services such as sanitation, health, education and justice. This devolution of development management could therefore significantly contribute to elusive rural development. There is no doubt that CDF is expected to have major positive impacts on development at the grassroots.

However, in the few years that CDF has been in existence, it has generated significant controversy due to poor, partisan and even fraudulent management. There continues to be numerous reports exposing gross misappropriation of these resources. Most of the projects are either incomplete after huge sums of cash having been pumped into them or simply ghost projects where millions were spent on “completed projects” where there is none. Concerns have been raised over the capacity of CDF to effectively reduce poverty, create wealth and provide employment.

In spite of all the advances in the studies about devolution and how it works, we still lack a good understanding of the ‘nuts and bolts’ of local-level politics, due to a dearth of good data on the everyday behaviour of political elites. In this study I have examined the challenge of devolution focusing on the issues of power, institutions and norms. The purpose is to cast new light on the dialectic of power between the elite and the poor and its impact on governance, efficiency and growth. Generally, most studies on CDF have attempted to evaluate parameters that capture the heterogeneity of a community including income, economic activities and education arguing that these diversities are likely to influence scope of project choices and decisions making process (Kimenyi, 2005).

This study contends that, development projects are initiated within certain existing institutions, structures and environment. There seems to be minimal scholarship on the role of informal institutions in the society and how they influence the community choice of felt needs, project selection and prioritisation. Little exists in terms of the roles played by the political elites in determining the location of development projects to address communities' felt needs and how they influence resources allocation to individual development project. This study sought to lay out the typical duties of an MP, and then provide an account of the office of an MP as a CDF institution. The study offers a descriptive analysis, mapping out the various formal and informal powers that MPs exercise.

It was very important to understand the current arrangements and political realities in rural areas and evaluate how they are influencing rural development processes. Studies on the way local politics and interest articulation actually work in rural development decision-making process and projects management and implementation will serve as a benchmark for identifying loopholes and corrective measures at policy level. Identifying the manifestations of patronage will contribute towards exposing any irregularities that are likely to occur due to particularistic interests of politicians. This will aid in understanding how rural communities power structure, influence decision made to initiate development projects to address various needs.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter is divided in two sections with one dealing with theoretical framework and the other dealing with the conceptual framework that informs the study. The theoretical literature reviewed seeks to identify what is politics and how political decisions are made. The analytical framework of this study is based on political Clientelism (patron-client relationships). This model, patron-client relations model, is used in this study to identify the role played by the Members of Parliament during choice, implementation and management of rural development projects. For this paper, the concepts of Patronage, Clientelism and Patron-Client Relations model are going to be used interchangeably to refer to the same phenomenon. This framework demonstrate how the nature of state society relations determine the design and implementation of policy packages in sub Saharan Africa in general and also applies to the Kenyan context. This model will help in understanding "who gets what, when and how" (Laswell, 1950).

2.2 THEORETICAL LITERATURE

2.2.1 POLITICS

David Easton defines politics as "the authoritative allocation of resources and values" (Easton, 1979). Resources may be values or things that are valued (Easton, 1967), and allocation may be by a market process (Mitchell, 1967) by cliques who alternate the right to make allocations (Truman, 1951) or as a consequence of the socio-political configuration of the community (Easton, 1967). This distribution or allocation of resources presumably takes place under conditions of scarcity, which means simply that not everyone can get everything they want, given the diverse things people want and the amounts in which people want them. Politics is associated with formal or authoritative decisions that establish a plan of action for the community.

Harold Laswell (1950) adds to the definition of politics as, "Who gets what, when and how" (Laswell, 1950). Politics is therefore closely associated with the activities of politicians. Politics is authoritative meaning that formal power rests in individuals or groups whose decisions are expected to be carried out or respected. Politics refers to activities associated with the control of public decisions on resource distribution and allocation where this control may be backed up by authoritative means. Politics, involves the crafting of decisions, who gets to make them and for what purposes. Politics is conceived as being about diversity and conflict, but the essential ingredient is the existence of scarcity. While human needs and desires are infinite, the resources available to satisfy them are limited and therefore politics is the struggle over these scarce resources and the means through which this struggle is conducted.

Politics is the activity by which differing interests within a given unit of rule are conciliated by giving them a share in power in proportion to their importance to the welfare and the survival of the whole community. Politics is an activity whereby people achieve what they want by exerting power and influence. It involves conflict over the distribution of scarce resources. Schattschneider (1960) states that "every conflict consists of two parts: the individuals engaged and the audience attracted to the conflict" (Schattschneider, 1960) Politics is the struggle between individuals and groups for dominion over limited resources. Politics organizes collective decisions and announces victors and the vanquished, and because human interests are often as incompatible as they are highly charged, these distributions cannot be voluntary.

Each political actor starts out with a stock of power, he may be empowered to spend money or make appointments; he may be owed a favour by another actor or be able to blackmail another person by the use of information in his possession. He will use his power only when by doing so he believes he will be acting in his own interests. "An actor exercises power only when he thinks doing so will improve his net power position; when there are alternative investment possibilities, he always chooses the one he thinks will be most profitable (Almond and Verba, 1965). Political scientist Karl Deutsch (1970) defines "politics" primarily in terms of the pursuit and interplay of interests. Politics occurs in pursuit of interests of particular individuals and groups and deals with the interplay of interests, the claiming and distribution of rewards, values, things or relationships that people would like to have or to enjoy (Deutsch, 1970).

Politics is the activity through which people make, preserve and amend the general rules under which they live (Heywood, 2006). It is linked to the phenomena of conflict and cooperation. On one hand, there is existence of rival opinions, different wants, competing needs and opposing interests which guarantees disagreement about the rules under which people live. On the other hand, people recognise that, in order to influence these rules or ensure that they are upheld, they must work with others (Arendt, 1951). The heart of politics is therefore portrayed as a process of conflict resolution, in which rival views or competing interests are reconciled with one another. However, the inescapable presence of diversity and scarcity ensures that politics is an inevitable feature of the human condition (Heywood, 2006).

Politics is a particular means of resolving conflict; by compromise, conciliation and negotiation, rather than through force and use of naked power. Politics is the activity by which differing interests within a given unit of rule are conciliated by giving them a share in power in proportion to their importance to the welfare and the survival of the whole community (Crick, 2000). In this view, politics is therefore a wide dispersal of power. When social groups and interests possess power they must be conciliated; they cannot merely be crushed. This is why he portrayed politics as 'that solution to the problem of order which chooses conciliation rather than violence and coercion' (Crick, 2000).

Politics is the most important form of human activity because it involves interaction amongst free and equal citizens. It gives meaning to life and affirms the uniqueness of each individual (Heywood, 2006). Politics is at the heart of all collective social activity, formal and informal, public and private, in all human groups, institutions and societies' (Leftwich, 1984). The famous Greek Philosopher, Aristotle is credited for declaring that, 'man is by nature a political animal' (Ackrill, 2010) by which he meant that it is only within a political community that human beings can live. Politics is restricted to the activities of the state itself and the responsibilities that are properly exercised by public bodies (Heywood, 2006). Politics gives meaning to life and affirms the uniqueness of each individual (Rousseau, 1913). Politics takes place at every level of social interaction; it can be found within families and amongst small groups of friends just as much as amongst nations and on the global stage.

Politics encompasses the various processes through which government responds to pressures from the larger society, in particular by allocating benefits, rewards or penalties. Politics refers to activities associated with the control of public decisions on resource distribution and allocation where this control may be backed up by authoritative means. Politics is essentially 'the process by which resources are allocated in a society.' (Kramarac et...al, 1984) Political power then becomes the ability of individuals to influence the decision making process to attain their desired goals.

Politics concerns the production, distribution and use of resources in the course of social existence. Politics is, in essence, power: the ability to achieve a desired outcome, through whatever means. Politics is about diversity and conflict, but the essential ingredient is the existence of scarcity: the simple fact that, while human needs and desires are infinite, the resources available to satisfy them are always limited. Politics can therefore be seen as a struggle over scarce resources, and power can be seen as the means through which this struggle is conducted.

A political decision procedure involves discussion and debate followed by a decision which is broadly acceptable to all the parties, or is at least not so unacceptable to all parties, or is at least not so unacceptable to any party that its members decide to oppose it to point of disrupting the system. Making political decision is a serious business because basically politics means making choices on behalf of other people. Political decision making takes place in a context of institutions, roles and relationships. The standards of choice and judgement that we will apply to a certain extent come with the job. Every political role has its own code of decision making, its own canons of performance. Political decisions are strongly influenced by the short time horizons of the political process. Short term, visible projects take precedence over the longer term, more mundane or less visible tasks required to improve service delivery and infrastructure maintenance, operationalise regulatory frameworks or improve municipal organizational capacity (Rakodi, 2003).

Clientelism takes many different forms and the system manifests itself profoundly different from country to country and even from city to city. "Clientelism is a relationship of exchange between unequals" (Clapham, 1982). Brachet-Marquez (1992) suggests clientelism is the 'structuring of political power through networks of informal dyadic relations that link individuals of unequal power in relationships of exchange (Brachet-Marquez, 1992). Clientelism is a system of interpersonal relations involving unequal power in which one individual (the patron) provides an explicit contingent material benefit to an individual or group in return for their support (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984). Patron-client relations model of politics permeates contemporary political systems around the world (Schmidt et al., 1977).

James Scott (1972) defined clientelism as an instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socio-economic status (Patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits or both, for a person of lower status (Client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services to the patron (Scott, 1972). Clientelism therefore is a form of personal, dyadic exchange usually characterized by a sense of obligation, and often by an unequal balance of power between those involved. There exists a hierarchical patron - client relationship in traditional rural societies (Piattoni, 2001). A patron is someone who controls certain resources; money, goods, access to jobs and services. These resources are available for the client under certain circumstances: he has to give his own resources for it. These relationships involve 'the patron providing clients with access to the basic means of subsistence and the clients reciprocating with a combination of economic goods and services and social acts of deference and loyalty' (Mason, 1986).

In other words, clientelism is a way of describing the pattern of unequal, hierarchical exchange characteristic of feudal society, in which patrons and clients were tied to durable relationships by a powerful sense of obligation and duty. Patrons and clients know each other, sometimes the families they are bond to each other for generations. Sometimes a broker is a mediator between patron and clients, especially, when the patron has many clients (Weber, 1991).

In this case, at the top of the pyramid network is always the patron, at the bottom the clients in between the broker. Practically there may be several levels of brokers. In these structures of authority, power is vested in the top individual who personally decides how to distribute resources according to their personal preference. Essentially, in a clientelistic system, there is an exchange between the patron, who has power, and the client who receives the benefits of the patron's power in return for loyalty, support and usually a vote. For instance, the mayor of the community may be the patron, in several wards are different brokers, and at the end are clients. Brokers with direct contacts to clients are brokers of the first order: practically they perform as patrons and clients. They receive resources by the high patron, in that sense they are clients. However, these resources are distributed further down and therefore they become patrons for other clients.

The patron's position of power lends itself to giving client's favours and help. The exchange between patron and client is reciprocal although not necessarily even. The patron needs the client's support to maintain their position and the client receives the benefits from supporting their patron. Patrons therefore, in order to maintain the reciprocal arrangement must be in a position of power or at least wealth in order to reciprocate the support of their clients. "Clientelism assists to understand the mechanism of (how) class control legitimizes the lopsided distribution of resources among social groups and enhances the status of the political elite" (Seteolu, 2005). The relation between patron and client is always asymmetric, resulting in a vertical or hierarchical relationship.

Patron-client relationship is marked by an asymmetrical distribution of information, resources, power, money, goods and prestige. The patron controls material or immaterial resources while the client does not. Patronage networks does not only distribute material benefits, but are also expected to sustain an intimacy of relations between rulers and ruled, a reproduction of the personal ties of the traditional pre-colonial social order in African countries rather than impersonal relations of modernity (Sandbrook, 1972). Distribution of patronage by the wealthy and powerful both displays their status and subordinates to them those who accept their largesse.

Patron-client systems are organized by people of power, both men and women, who build and keep the loyalty of people of more humble position. Both patrons and clients regard the link between them as a personal attachment similar to the bond of affection holding members of a family or kin group together (Hyden, 1983). However, unlike families, where the linkage is regarded as permanent and often is taken for granted, a patron-client relationship must be renewed constantly and renegotiated continuously. Throughout history, clients have provided the work, income, popular acclaim; votes, political allegiance, and military support that patrons need to maintain power and position. For their part, clients have gained protection, access to resources or information, group identity, and opportunities for advancement.

Patron and client know each other and trust each other. Sometimes, patron-client relationships are inherited. The patron turns his patronship to his heirs, and the clients pass the clientship to heirs too (Haugerud, 1997). In clientelistic contexts patrons, or their agents, stand for election and their clients vote for them, sometimes out of a general sense of obligation and attachment, sometimes as part of a specific exchange for services rendered or promised. In some cases, clientelism has evolved into something quite different from this kind of traditional social exchange.

Socio-economic modernization has brought greater geographical mobility and urbanization, higher levels of education, the replacement of agrarian by industrial employment, and the decline of traditional rural elites (Chabal & Daloz, 1999). These developments have weakened traditional patron-client ties, which made way for new forms of exchange. Organized political parties, with relatively bureaucratized structures, have replaced property owners and local notables as patrons. Clients, enjoying higher living standards and less instinctively deferential, demand more immediate material benefits in exchange for their votes. In this new, 'mass party' clientelism, patrons have to 'buy' votes by distributing concrete excludable benefits and favours to individual voters or groups of voters. (Parisi & Pasquino, 1979; Katz, 1986).

Another key aspect of Clientelism is that the relationship is long lasting and durable. However, there is no formal written contract binding the parties involved and it is this ambiguity, which sustains the relationship as both client and patron look to continually reap benefits from the other. This said, clients are free agents and are rational, self-maximising individuals. If they believed they would benefit more greatly from a different patron, they could seek their patronage. In terms of clientelism in political hierarchies, clients, who in the system of clientelism are aspiring politicians, may have more than one patron and may switch mentors in order to increase their chances of climbing the political ladder.

In government, the further the aspiring politician wants to go in government, the higher-ranking politician they will try to attach themselves. Studies on the most traditional contexts argue that, clientelism could draw on age-old reserves of loyalty and deference, so that patrons could obtain political support from their clients without providing too many concrete benefits. Banfield's studies in Italy found that 'just before elections the Christian Democratic party distributes small packages of pasta, sugar, and clothing to the voters' (Banfield, 1963).

In situations of dire poverty, such gifts may be enough to buy votes, particularly if there is a pre-existing foundation of deference towards the patron. The patron-client relationship in the rural context is therefore not strictly reliant on the distribution of specific material benefits. However, the patron is expected, indeed required, to provide diffuse protection to clients; the patron is 'a support in time of famine, his advice will be formally sought before marriages and land purchases, and he is asked for recommendation in the peasant's frequent encounters with the bureaucracy' (Tarrow, 1967).

In some of clientelism, there is less proximity between patron and client, but more emphasis on the provision of excludable selective benefits. The local notables and local party bosses have far lesser autonomy. Their power depends on their party affiliation, which gives them access to the resources necessary to reward supporters and maintain their clientele. The main aspect of the mode of analysis in this study is that the access to and control over the distribution of state resources present politicians with an asset for political mobilization through established networks of patronage.

This theory is chosen because: the study of the management and implementation of CDF is all about the distribution of state resources in a political system that is highly characterized by political patronage. This model therefore, is an opportunity to give explanations as to why CDF has not been able to meet its primary objectives of fostering development at the constituency level and ensuring efficiency in resource allocation.

The rural Kenya political culture is hinged on clientelism politics, which further enhance our understanding of the prevalence of skewed resource allocation and distribution. The pursuit of politics is intended to appropriate the political space and resources among fractions of the political elite (Setenlu, 2005). Clientelism prevents everyone receiving the benefit of fair and equal representation because of the way patrons inhibit access to power. The static nature of the system makes change very difficult, as the system is self-perpetuating in support of the status quo.

I chose to analyze my findings within this framework mainly because the study of the implementation of CDF is all about the distribution of state resources in a political system that is highly characterized by political patronage. In essence, this framework is an opportunity for me to give explanations as to why CDF has not been able to meet its primary objectives of fostering development at the constituency level and ensuring efficiency in resource allocation.

2.2.3 POLITICAL CLIENTELISM AND ITS CHARACTERISTICS

The most famous definition of politics is as the art and science of “who gets what, when and how” in society (Lasswell, 1950). To help understand “who gets what, when and how” many political scientists in the 1970s began to apply the concept clientelism, first elaborated by anthropologists and sociologists to describe the hierarchical social relations that have long marked the countryside in peasant societies (Schmidt et. al., 1977). They found that political clientelism, also known as the patron-client model of politics, permeated contemporary political systems around the world.

Political clientelism is defined as “personalised and reciprocal relationship between an inferior and a superior commanding unequal resource” (Lemarchand & Legg, 1972). Contemporary patron-client relations cannot be understood outside the working of the state apparatus and arms of the government with their coercive capacities. “The vulnerability of clients is most obvious and important. It determines the extent to which they need patrons, and hence the degree of subordination to which they will be willing to subject themselves in order to obtain them” (Clapham, 1982). It is a complex chain of personal bonds between political patrons or bosses and their individual clients or followers. These bonds are founded on mutual material advantage: the patron furnishes excludable resources: money, jobs to dependents and accomplices in return for their support and cooperation.

Lemarchand and Legg (1972), define political clientelism as “personalized and reciprocal relationships between an inferior and a superior commanding unequal resource. In short, it may be looked at as personalized and affective reciprocal relationship between actors, or sets of actors, commanding unequal resources and involving mutually beneficial transactions that have political ramifications beyond the immediate sphere of dyadic relationships” (Lemarchand & Legg, 1972). These relationships are highly characterized by the inequality in status, power and influence between the patron and client. Political clientelism is a form of direct exchange between citizens and holders of political authority.

Political clientelism is the “mode of exchange between the electoral constituencies as principals and politicians as agents in a democratic system” (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). However, the challenge encountered by both the principal and agent is that the exchange between patron and client is gradual and creates room for either the patron or client to renege on deals struck earlier on. The common definition of patronage is that it is the use of state resources to reward political clienteles. It is mainly designed to mobilize electoral support for the patron that dispenses it. A patron as an influential person who has access to and control over scarce resources while Clients on the other hand are people striving to gain from the resources by establishing connections with influential people who have access to such resources (Weingrod, 1968).

Patron client relationships are then established on the basis that the patron avails resources desired by the clients in exchange for political allegiance. The patron should be in a position to meet the demands of his clients for instance building bridges, constructing roads, renovating schools and sinking bore holes to provide the community with water and paying school fees for the constituents' children. Notables are often deployed by their clients to help with the bureaucratic requirements of the state, such as conscription, rather than to access material benefits. As the state's role has expanded in much of the world to involve a detailed regulation of economic activity and the provision of a wide range of financial benefits and public services, the parties governing the state have had a greater ability to manipulate and channel these resources in exchange for political support. Often the parties seek to make the criteria for the access to resources deliberately opaque, in order to enhance the discretionary nature of the distribution and extract greater political returns (Tanzi, 2000; Golden, 2003).

Political patronage and clientelism represent forms of exchange relationships between patrons and clients in which state resources are traded for political support (Muller, 2000; Piattoni, 2001; Roniger, 2004). More specifically, political patronage involves the allocation of jobs in public and semi-public positions such as, for example, the civil service, public sector companies, and universities. Access to patronage typically provides political party leaders with the means to build and maintain their party organizations through the distribution of selective incentives to party supporters in exchange for organizational loyalty.

Political clientelism is a form of representation based on the selective release of public resources in order to secure electoral support from individuals or selected sectors of society. Political clientelism is the use of resources by a person, the patron, to assist or protect some other person, his client, who does not control such resources (Boessevain, 1969). The difference between the patron and the client thus implies a difference in control over resources and power. Patron-client relations vary in duration, extensiveness and scope. They are diffuse personalistic relationships that lack an explicit impersonal quality. The degree of role differentiation between patrons and clients as well as the stability and durability of their relationship increases with the magnitude of the differences between their respective status and depends on the nature of resources available to the actors (Boessevain 1969).

In Political Clientelism, Patron - Client relations may be entirely localised or they can expand and reach higher administrative and political levels. Such extensions may be secured either through the successive intermediary of the patrons, or directly by a single patron's own high position. For instance, a particular local patron may link himself to higher-level political influential. Alternatively, the local patron himself may achieve success in national politics thereby providing a direct conduit of influence. The patron has disproportionate power and thus enjoys wide latitude about how to distribute the assets under his control. Most patrons are not independent actors, but are links within a larger grid of contacts, usually serving as intermediaries who arrange exchanges between the local level and the national center (Kettering, 1988).

Political clientelism can be thought of as a type of instrumental friendship—though not an evenly balanced friendship because patrons target the poor and take advantage of their limited information and autonomy. All the same, each participant in the exchange does get something of value. When asked what party leaders offer them in return for electoral support, Mexican voters come up with an impressive list: cash, caps, tee-shirts, pencils, lighters, dictionaries, bags of basic foodstuff, breakfasts, cactuses, fruits, vegetables, beer, washing machines, bags of cement, cardboard, sand, shovels, pickaxes, machetes, hoses, fertilizer, seeds, chickens, cows and sheep (Mozaffar & Schedler, 2002). The party leaders, of course, get to stay in office with all the benefits that such positions yield.

Political clientelism is a particular form of party-voter linkage: it is a "transaction, the direct exchange of a citizen's vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and services" (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). It is usually carried out through multifaceted and enduring webs of reciprocal exchange. It is more related to material resources and bureaucracy. Clientelism happens when a politician distributes material benefits to voters normally before elections. Infrastructure projects such as dams, schools, healthcare centres and highways are often used for this purpose.

Under competitive conditions, political bosses need criteria to single out and reward followers and to exclude non-supporters. Because ethnicity serves this purpose well, the patron has an incentive to build a winning coalition by steering benefits toward people who visibly share the same background or heritage. For their part, low-income voters may mobilize into ethnic blocs as a strategy for maximizing their chances of obtaining individualized benefits available from the state (Chandra, 2001). Even as such benefits dry up, there is logic to voting for politicians from one's own tribal or linguistic group, on the grounds that such a politician will tend to defend the interests of the group as a whole.

Wantchekon's (2002) field work in Benin, for example, indicates that clientelism has a significant impact on voting behavior and tends to reinforce ethnic voting (Wantchekon, 2002). Patron-client networks play an ambiguous role in the fight against poverty. While clientelism can bring benefits to some of the poor, it breeds inequity because it excludes individuals who have no assets with which to negotiate. More prosperous people who lack patrons due to ethnicity or partisan affiliation may also be left without access to work or land and other factors of production (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002).

Clientelism is instrumental especially when dealing with voting patterns. Voters expect to be rewarded for their votes hence the tendency to cast votes where the returns are likely to be high. Politicians on the other hand mobilize support by promising to provide scarce desirable public goods and services that the electorates need

The implication therefore is that the electorate stands a chance of missing the benefits, services and goods should they fail to vote for the person capable of availing them. Political allegiance is not constant as the electorate is always on the lookout for patrons that are better placed to give them more access to state resources. This fluid nature of allegiance makes politicians to keep sourcing for means of asserting their influence to maintain his clientele (Fatton, 1992).

Clientelistic politics are likely to generate a less generous distribution of public resources to produce collective and large club goods than a polity with a prevalence of programmatic partisan politics. This applies especially to non-targetable benefits, such as social insurance systems and basic income support programs, suggesting that clientelistic countries will exhibit greater inequality. Polities with predominantly clientelistic mechanisms of political accountability may have systematically smaller social transfers, but greater expenditures on targetable budget categories, such as public sector personnel or physical infrastructure (Keefer, 2004).

People within a patron-client network use state authority and resources to improve their incomes and livelihoods, but even the network participants may be held down because of the unequal or extortionate character of the exchange relationships in which they are trapped. Political patronage is the main factor that influences the constitution and functioning of Constituency Development Fund (CDF) local institutions. Due to patronage, CDF committees comprise economically or politically influential individuals (Okinda, 2009).

2.2.4 POLITICAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL CLIENTELISM

Developmental clientelism is generally associated with an under-provision of goods to all citizens and an over-provision of goods targeted to specific groups in African countries. Politicians have over the years distributed state resources to their specific clientele, which are often their co-ethnics. Formal institutions are generally too weak to perform the functions associated with their counterparts in the industrialized world that is, aggregation, mobilization, and representation. Power is instead arrayed through "a system of relations linking rulers not with the 'public' or even with the ruled, but with patrons, associates, clients, supporters, and rivals, who constitute the 'system'" (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982). Patrons offer resources to their clients in exchange for their loyalty, and clients support their patrons to access rewards that cannot be readily attained in a weak formal economy. The state is thus a venue where political actors bargain over the allocation of resources and secure their consumption under conditions of economic scarcity (Hyden, 2006; Lemarchand & Legg, 1972).

Political and developmental clientelism strategies have been used for acquisition, maintenance and aggrandizement of political power, on the part of the patrons. They have devised strategies for protection and promotion of their interests while on the part of the clients and their deployment is driven by given sets of incentives and disincentives. This is closely linked to ethnicity and an absence of collective class identity (Lemarchand, 1972). Patron-client relationship is understood to be the principal mechanism regulating political and economic life in African countries (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997).

Since state resource distribution has primarily been determined by the incumbent president, her or his co-ethnics have been the beneficiaries. Clientelism has served as an instrument for regulating intra-elite competition, permitting the leaders to ration state resources in placating aggrieved groups or punishing would-be challengers. Bayart (1993) argues that this use of patronage has facilitated the integration of ethnic representatives, bureaucrats, and business leaders into more or less cohesive elite, united by their common interest in accessing the state resources on which their positions depend (Bayart, 1993).

After independence, the new powerful leaders adopted the colonial administrative structures, rules and laws, partly because they had directly benefited as their colonial predecessors had and partly because they also enjoyed wide public support and legitimacy having been freedom fighters. For instance, in post independence Kenya, the powers to appropriate land which had been enjoyed by the Governor of the Colony were now taken up by the President who used them to gain and retain power and authority within the state. Subsequent leaders considered legitimate to use the government for the good of the self and kinsmen (Berman, 1974, 2004). The result was Clientelism in Kenya which took an ethnic and regional dimension, with individual politicians considered personally responsible for delivering goods and services to their ethnic brethren.

To maintain political stability and loyalty, Kenyans leaders have often made economic decisions following distributional political (not rational economic – logic). For example, at the same time as he decried “tribalism” in Kenya, Moi pursued “ethnic balancing” policies both to remove the Kikuyu control of the administration and to “reward and punish” leaders. This combined with an increasingly frequent shuffling of key allies into positions from which rents could be easily drawn, resulted in a major erosion of quality in the civil service and administration in the country (Berman et. al., 2004). To maintain control, the executive arms of the government centralized power. This resulted in Africa having the world’s most corrupt systems. The objective of politics was to control the state for the purpose of funnelling state resources back to one’s supporters and local communities. Thus the politics of clientelism have resulted in economic planning patterns that have caused gross inequities in the country.

Political and developmental domination by the executive branch of government in Africa is another demonstration of political and developmental clientelism. This has reflected the personal nature of political power, the dominance of the executive branch in post-colonial Africa and the lack of an effective balance of powers and of institutional checks on presidential power. The political and financial resources accruing to the legislative branch have typically been few and highly dependent on the good will of the Presidency. Legislators have been rewarded for their support with access to state resources, but they have enjoyed little autonomous access to these resources, and indeed, a position in the legislature has been clearly less lucrative and prestigious than a cabinet position (Van de Walle, 2001).

Most governments shielded their elites from austerity measures despite the persistence of the region's economic crisis: "African states have long been notorious for their large cabinets, with ministerial appointments that often have little relevance to policy-making priorities or the size of actual budgets" (Van de Walle, 2001). All African leaders have used ministerial appointments to the cabinet as an instrument for managing elite relations. A cabinet minister in Africa is considered "a kind of super representative" (Zolberg, 1968) who is expected to speak for the interests of co-ethnics, as well as channel resources to them. Ministers not only have a hand in deciding where to allocate public resources, presumably in their home districts, but are also in positions to supplement their personal incomes by offering contracts and jobs in exchange for other favours.

Clientelism overwhelmingly favours a relatively small number of people, who are critical to maintain regime stability. Clientelistic resources have not descended the social pyramid very far, despite much legitimating rhetoric to the contrary. Instead, it has served the purposes of cross-ethnic elite accommodation, in which the presidency has sought to build a national elite coalition on behalf of his rule, by including key elites from different regions, ethnic groups, clans and so on in the presidential coalition (Bayart, 1989). A clear ethnic calculus has often been obvious in the construction of government cabinets, in which different groups would be assured a number of seats (Arriola, 2009). The ethnic elites thus brought into the presidential fold are in most instances expected to play a kind of "brokerage" role between specific communities and the regime: the nomination by the president propelled them to a visible leadership position, in exchange for which they were supposed to ensure their group's support for the regime.

Political brokers and patrons have brought state resources from the capital back to their communities. Certainly, the social imagery and rhetoric around ethnicity has often promoted the illusion of broad redistribution. For instance, A Losi minister in the Zambian government was said to defend Losi interests at the table of government, which in turn would provide substantial benefits to the Losi community. On the other hand, politicians who opposed the president were accused of ensuring that their communities would suffer irreparable harm in terms of jobs and services (Van de Walle, 2001).

The political elite have never had interest in establishing institutionalized state apparatus. In most states where political clientelism is practiced, states are characterized by absence of rule of law, separation of powers and strengthening the bureaucracy. Politicians find the state more viable to enhance their political needs when it is less institutionalized. Low levels of institutionalization have given politicians room for abuse of power and political office for personal gains. Politicians use patron-client relations as a means of centre maintenance, central government maintaining contact with the citizens at the periphery (Chazan...et...al 1992). In native reserves, established by colonialist, a customary organized tribal authority ruled the subjects. Customary power was transformed to act as an agent of the colonial state. The chief as the head of the new customary authority had the powers to pass rules, execute laws, administer the territory and settle disputes among subjects. The subjects were starved of civil and political rights. They could only gain these rights if they graduated into citizens through assimilation of citizen values and culture (Mamdani, 1996).

The patrons who have power and resources to dispose of at will have built up a network of contacts with the clients, who in return offer political support, or at least do not make life difficult for the patron. Public money has been used to set up industries, which were meant to provide jobs. In the jargon of the Cold War, this was known as the 'socialist' road to development. In practice, however, there was no 'road to development, it was simply a pre-modern form of redistribution by the state (Roel, 2003). Political power has been seen as all-embracing and unrestricted, not limited to a certain field of activity. Politics have been dominated by a single party. The party which became synonymous with the state and the one-party state swallowed up the economy. The 'chief patron', the president, controlled everything.

Clientelism dominated, development is not achieved. The system is not focused on growth, which is necessary for higher production and consumption, but on preservation of the existing power structure, the status quo. It gives little prominence to the economic principles of making a profit. Resources are not deployed in the name of progress, but to preserve domestic stability. Africa's competitive power for instance, remains inadequate.

2.3 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE

2.3.1. POLITICAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL CLIENTELISM IN AFRICA

In his seminal work, Bates (1981) writes; "In their efforts to organize political support in the countryside, African governments also manipulate the structure and performance of their public services. Governments everywhere supply roads, clinics, schools, water supplies, and the like. In Africa, and in other developing nations, "development" projects are also standard fare. And whether it is in Mayor Daley's Chicago or Awolow's Western Region of Nigeria, the supply of such services can be, and is tailored to the quest for political support" (Bates, 1981).

Colonialism linked African agents to the competitive factions of lineage and clan through pervasive patron-client networks. Colonialism in Africa rested largely on the institutionalisation of 'big man-small boy' politics in rural society, built on the hierarchies of the 'decentralised despotism' of local chiefs and headmen (Mamdani, 1996). These cadres of African collaborators, whether directly appointed by the colonial state, were clients of local European administrators who rewarded their loyalty through access to the resources controlled by the state. Such access to the state and its patronage became the key to the accumulation of wealth and was controlled by local African officials in the interests of their relatives and extensive clientages.

Britain's famous indirect rule was a common feature of all colonial administrations, relying on intermediary local elites to compensate for the thinly spread colonial apparatus (Mamdani, 1996) African political systems continue to exhibit patterns, based on patron clientelistic networks of patronage, personal loyalty, and coercion. In order to reproduce their leadership, "big men" must ensure regular flows of personal patronage to individual followers (Clapham, 1993). In such patron-client relationships, vertical accountability modelled based on "economies of affection" (Hyden, 1983) means exchanging political support for personalized favours and benefits. These in turn reproduce pacts of mutual loyalty; voters choose representatives based on how good they are as patrons (Chabal, 1986).

In rural Africa, the patronage system takes the form of a pyramidal hierarchy. The pyramidal characteristic political structures consist essentially of unequal exchange relationships, which are reproduced repeatedly from the village to national level (Leys, 1975). Several post independence Africa, regime characteristics can be claimed to have powerfully affected the nature of clientelism in most African states. These regimes are marked by extreme presidentialism. (Van de Walle, 2001). Although, many African states inherited parliamentary rule at independence, power was soon concentrated in a relatively powerful presidency, whose considerable formal powers as defined by the constitution were in fact often dwarfed by their even greater informal and *de facto* ones. Powers of appointment, control of the national budget, and discretion over policy implementation with little oversight was not only concentrated in the office of the presidency, it was often actually controlled by the president himself and a tiny cadre of top politicians, who were often above the law for all intents and purposes (Barkan, 1984). Similarly, the executive branch dominated the other branches of government, with a subservient and pliant legislature and a weak, unprofessional and politicized judiciary.

The executive branch of government dominated political clientelism in the postcolonial era. In part, this reflects the personal nature of political power in that era. President Ahidjo of Cameroon personally stamped every single exit visa granted by the Cameroonian government. President Moi built a presidency of 20,000 employees that effectively constituted a parallel government and took power away from the regular bureaucracy (Van de Walle, 2001). Presidents routinely squirreled away a substantial proportion of the export revenues coming from commodity exports for their personal use and for clientelistic purposes. The political and financial resources accruing to the legislative branch were typically few and highly dependent on the good will of the Presidency.

Patron client relationships are constructed on the reciprocal exchange of material benefits and/or services of different types (Sandbrook, 1972). The hierarchy starts at the level of the poor constituent, each patron within the network is also a client, all the way up to the top rungs of the constituency, where resources are captured in competitive political settings and cascaded down the network.

Chabal and Daloz (1999) are of the view that there exists a high degree of informalisation of politics in Africa due to lack political institutionalization. State activities are premised on or guided by informal institutions; there is no respect for rule of law and public office (Chabal & Daloz, 1999). The post-colonial state is vacuous meaning that the state did not harness successful integration and consolidation of various political interests within its boundaries and fell prey to patronage. Patronage was favoured due to its instrumentality in political mobilization given the fact that the political elite were in a position to respond to the needs of their constituents since they have direct access to state resources. The state has not been able to drive socio-economic development due to its failure to insulate itself from particularistic interests inherent in patronage (Chabal & Daloz, 1999).

Clientelism begun on the premise that African regimes needed to establish decision-making mechanism, extract resources from the state and build and maintain political support while the citizens had to establish means of benefiting from state resources. What followed then was that patron-client relations became the basis of political exchange where by politicians provided services and goods in exchange for political support. The colonial state that had preceded was a state of "exclusion". It divided the society between those who had rights of citizenship and those who did not, the urban and the rural respectively (Kanyinga, 2009).

The postcolonial state adopted without altering the colonial structures. Some of these structures were re-defined to suit the purpose and to enact the particular form of control that the post-colonial elite adopted to consolidate political leadership (Mamdani, 1996). To seal the power vacuum they started forging alliances with influential people within the various ethnic groups and strengthening the ruling political party. They extended branches to the lowest level possible such that as the party coverage widened, the government was able to get grip of the periphery through networks patronage (Weingrod, 1968).

In postcolonial state, the bureaucracy became a major platform for political patronage especially with the expanding role of the state in spearheading socio-economic development and the need to hire personnel to take up duties in government ministries. These government jobs were thus used to reward party loyalists for their support to the party and the regime at that time (Weingrod, 1968). The colonial combination of bureaucratic authoritarianism and clientelism continued virtually unchanged especially the structure of rural control and collaboration between the bureaucratic apparatus and local 'big men' (Berman et... al., 2004). The ruling parties facilitated the spread of political patronage. Government jobs became lucrative platforms of patronage, as the bureaucracy was the key instrument for awarding supporters. In essence, for one to be employed in the government he or she had to be a strong member and supporter of the ruling party (Weingrod, 1968).

Episodic electoral politics, the single party, with committees down to the village level, provides extensive opportunity for political patronage, especially at the grassroots (Shamuyarira, 1966). Experience with one-party states in Africa shows that, power was concentrated in a small elite at the top, and political parties were instruments for carrying out directives. The one-party dictatorship in Africa has been a survival strategy based on a fundamental contradiction in Africa's political economy. After independence, the African political elites who took over faced demands to satisfy pre-independence promises. Unable to satisfy them, they chose the easier path of suppressing them and perpetuating themselves in power through patronage resource distribution (Barkan, 1984).

Given the continuity of colonial structures of surplus accumulation, appropriation and market controls as well as the entry of external development aid, the state remained the essential focus for the accumulation of wealth. The environment was such that "any official decision afforded an opportunity for gain from a fiscal control to a technical verification, civil service departments and public enterprises which constituted virtually bottomless financial reservoirs for those who managed them and for political authorities who headed them (Bayart, 1989). The result has been the extension of political patron-client relationship and networks to the very center of the state apparatus with linkages reaching from the cabinet to the villages.

The post-colonial state in Africa has been for generations a conglomeration of agencies and offices to be captured and manipulated beneath the façade of the official 'development' ideology for individual and communal benefit (Berman, 2004). The rapid demise after independence of the thin and hastily constructed liberal democratic institutions reinforced the mutual dependence of patrons and clients on the increasing authoritarianism of the political process in one-party states and military regimes. There was destruction of an open political process and effective elimination of civic freedoms of speech and organization.

This left the paternalistic ties of patron-client networks as the only available mode of access to the state for ordinary people and the appropriation of the patronage resources of offices as the only source of support and power for politicians and state officials (Haugerud, 1997). The constant analogy and metaphor in political discourses throughout sub-Saharan Africa referring to politics of eating captures the duality of the relations with the state as both opportunity and danger. Those who aspire to eat can also be eaten in the amoral food chain of politics. To survive in such dangerous world requires both support and protection, which are precisely what patrons and clients are supposed to provide to each other. They have developed political machines and consolidated clientelistic networks within formal political apparatus. This has allowed them to respond to the demands for protection, assistance and aid made by the members of their constituency communities in exchange for the recognition of the political prominence and social status which as patrons, they crave (Daloz & Chabal, 1999).

The state in Africa is in fact so poorly institutionalised, so weakly emancipated from society. The business of politics is more usually conducted along informal vertical channels of relations, patron-clients networks linking the elites with the rest of the population (Chabal & Daloz, 1999). The modern political competition demands that political leaders surround themselves with a large number of dependents. They need continuously to widen their support base. This leads to clientelistic and factional politics, the foundations of which are inevitably more precarious. Political elites seek to establish principles of mutual aid of patron-client reciprocity based on the model of kin and family relations (Mamdani, 1996).

In sub-Saharan Africa, prestige and influence are intimately linked to the number of one's clients. It is undoubtedly the recognition, which they bestow upon their leaders, or patrons that determines the latter's social standing and political status. Within such a context, they have at all times they have strived to be seen to cater for those on whose support their political legitimacy rests. The electoral success only becomes operational when it is congruent with patrimonial politics (Chabal & Daloz, 1999). Despite the undeniably large gap in resources between the elite and the populace, leaders are never dissociated from their supporters. They remain directly linked to them through a myriad of clientelistic networks staffed by dependent intermediaries (William, 1993).

There are constant abuses of power as long as the patron is able to meet with adequate largesse the demands, which are made upon his person. The exercise of power in Africa rests firmly on commonly recognised and mutually accepted terms. Political elites themselves must operate within well-defined constraints, even if the patron-client relations remain unequally biased in their favour (Chabal & Daloz, 1999). Recent study on Democracy and Political Culture in Zambia, for example, confirms that patron-client links continue to be fundamental. The populace expects to exchange political support for concrete help: that is the only way in which politics makes sense to them (Chabal & Daloz, 1999).

Patrons have provided a potentially wide variety of services to clients in exchange for client services. They may resolve disputes among clients or between clients and the "outside world", intervene on behalf of clients in conflicts with government officials, serve as a source of insurance or a safety net for clients, supply clients with credit or other economic factors of production, or offer a crucial marketing outlet for clients. All of these activities allow the patrons to form credible relationships with citizens, and to coordinate these citizens' responses.

Centralization of powers around the presidency is the solid foundation on which clientelism thrives in Africa given the power the president commands over the control and access to limited state resources. Hence, state resources have been accessed through well-established patron-client networks (Faton, 1986). These resources actually trickle down to the lowest level of the network. Instead, they are concentrated within the domain of the patrons due to the monopoly they have over the control of scarce resources. Clientelism has facilitated intra-elite accommodation. "State resources have been used to establish alliances with social elites" (Szeftel, 2000) limited redistribution is due to the fact that clientelism is mainly instrumental for mobilizing electoral support to enable politicians get access to political power and state resources.

Recent empirical studies indicate that MPs in African countries do spend large shares of their campaign funds on personalized networks (Lindberg, 2003). The implications for voting behaviour are distinct from voting based on performance and programmatic evaluation. Votes are exchanged based on the ability of the incumbent MP or opposition candidate to "buy" votes and "take care of his people" providing gifts, paying for fees, finding jobs, and showing concerns on a personalized basis (Wolf, 2003).

Resources for patronage can be accessed by patrons through policies geared towards the establishment of a mechanism for allocation of resources for development. There have been several court cases and complaints to the National Management Committee (NMC) against Members of Parliament due to their excessive role in influencing cash disbursements towards certain locations allied to them. Locations where the MP does not enjoy much political support tend to be sidelined in project prioritization (Wanjiru, 2008). Abandoned infrastructure projects are a symptom of clientelistic influences in politics (Robinson & Torvik, 2004). They are what one would expect in countries where politicians can only make credible promises when they are in politician interests, but not in the interests of competitors. Projects are left unfinished as a spur to constituents to vote for the incumbent, since only the incumbent will complete them. When competitors come to office, they abandon unfinished projects, which are value subtracting except for the political entrepreneur who began them, and begin their own.

2.3.2 POLITICAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL CLIENTELISM IN KENYA

Accumulation and the allocation of public resources in Kenya has in the past involved changes in established property rights and institutions or the creation of entirely new ones. The objectives of state officials and social actors determine their goals while their ideologies influence the ways in which they attempt to achieve them. Exchanges have been carried out within patron-client networks, which are expected to be value maximizing since the partners to the exchange, want to achieve value maximization for themselves or at least for others (Olson, 1992). Differences in the power of specific groups of clients across countries may be important in understanding differences in the bargains they are able to strike with their patrons.

Contemporary patron-client structures emerged in Kenya partly out of a colonial political system that reinforced local and ethnic identities and discouraged broader affiliations based on common interest grouping. Patronage ties built on antecedent cultural assumptions about justified mutual claims (Haugerud, 1997). Elsewhere, the poor were referred to as *ragai* 'lazy or useless' (Macharia, 1992) patronage relations then became part of cultural etiquette of social bonds that entailed gradation of obligation and room for maneuver and contestation (Haugerud, 1997). Patronage therefore became "informal means of persuasion and coercion built around the selective allocation of state resources (LeMarchand, 1988).

Kenya inherited the effects of a deep-rooted anti-colonial political mobilization, which empowered their emerging "middle classes". They inherited a tradition of political activity based on a wide variety of emotive symbols including language and these patterns of mobilization were widely accepted as legitimate in the post-colonial society. Politics based on these symbols has enabled successive layers of emerging middle class groups to get access to public resources based on their ability to organize much more numerous groups below them. Those amongst the intermediate classes who happened to be in power found it necessary to organize transfers to the most vociferous of the excluded groups in ongoing processes of accommodation and incorporation (Barkan & Chege, 1989).

The colonial powers in Kenya had relied on traditional leaders to enhance their control of their territories. They enticed the leaders with gifts in exchange for assistance in administering the colony in terms of curbing resistance. Szeftel (2000) observed that the rapid decolonization process did not give the radical upcoming African leaders enough time and resources to organize a strong grass root political base as independence elections were called at a short notice. Now political clientelism became the principle mode of political mobilization where by local and regional power brokers were incorporated in national movements to build up electoral support in exchange for access to state resources such as jobs (Szeftel, 2000). Patronage has remained a central element in African politics given its instrumentality in mobilizing political support.

Patronage politics have been used in Kenya to sanction the diversion of state or public resources into private hands and include exchange among members of the elite as well as appropriation of public resources by sectarian interests (Watts, 1989). To keep his pyramid of followers intact, a patron distributes personal favours assisting in obtaining employment, commercial loans, school admission, trade licenses or land. In addition successful politician must bring to their constituencies developments such as roads, schools, health centres and water. In Kenya, they do so in part by organizing and contributing to *Harambee* or self help development projects (Barkan, 1984, 1992).

It is important to note also that large part of the transfer from patrons to intermediate classes of clients has been based on the political bargaining power of these pyramidally organized groups of clients. These transfers in turn have had to be financed and patrons had to find the resources for such transfers at times through exchanges with other groups of clients. The inadequacy of general fiscal resources is an important part of the reason behind enmeshing both political and economic exchanges in patron-client networks in Kenya. Political elites have often found the resources with which they "finance" their political survival in their economic exchanges with other groups of clients, in particular the slowly emerging class of industrial capitalists (Barkan, 1984).

Clientelism in Kenya can also link to the concept of state formation. Pre-colonial Kenya was organized along ethnic groups and was highly decentralized with no identifiable single authority. The notion of state as a political organization was introduced by the colonial powers that drew up boundaries linking various communities under one centre of command. At independence, the emerging leadership faced a major challenge of asserting their authority over the state. For instance, they were to consolidate nation-states out of defined colonies through national integration of all groups existing within the new state and mobilize resources for national and regional development (Van De Walle, 2003; Chabal, 1986).

Political parties driven political patronage was adopted with the aim of widening the scope and penetration of government activity hence linking rural areas to the central government. Patronage was institutionalized within the structures of the ruling party such that access to job opportunities was through the party. For one to get a job in the government of Kenya he/she had to go through the ruling party; Kenya African National Union (KANU). By being an ardent supporter for instance by being active representatives at the various branches countrywide. In essence, position in government office was determined by the position one held in the party either nationally or locally (Karimi & Ochieng, 1980).

Sussane Mueller (1984) argues that, Kenyatta's government monopolized economic rewards to party followers and threatened to withdraw them as deterrence to opposition. Some MPs who were sympathetic to Kenya Peoples Union (KPU) could not join it for fear of losing their salaries, car loans, and other economic privileges extended to them (Mueller, 1984). Civil servants who enjoyed status, power, subsidized housing, healthcare, travel allowances, car allowances and other fringe benefits through their relations to KANU officials could not risk loss of these benefits or expected promotions by being associated with opposition parties.

In multi party Kenya, voter attachment to political parties has attenuated clientelism. Where the electorates have overwhelmingly favoured specific political party irrespective of their policies, they have voted for those parties even if the party's candidate is low ability. Knowing that voters' electoral preferences will be little affected by their efforts to demonstrate their individual ability, incumbents have less incentive to dedicate effort to constituent service (Aldrich, 1995).

Voter attachment to parties has affected political parties' candidate nomination. Political party's positions have mirrored local preferences. This attachment is linked to the ability of nominees to make credible promises to provide public goods, reducing political incentives to pursue narrowly targeted policies (Keefer & Khenami, 2008). Political parties are organized to provide individual rewards to party supporters. They are organized around clientelism and not programs and public policy has immensely suffered. Victorious politicians have targeted rewards to particular individuals and small groups whom they know with high certainty supported them in their bid for office. Clientelism has thus increased political susceptibility to the diversion of public resources to well-defined rent-seeking interests and to corrupt and predatory conduct on the part of elected officials (Kitschelt, 2000).

Competitive parliamentary elections too allowed voters to bring distributive pressures to bear on candidates (Patrons) with clients' loyalty driven more by material inducements. Leadership accountability under President Kenyatta for instance came to depend upon each elected politician's ability to deliver patronage rewards to a locality (Haugerud, 1997). The emergence of political clientelism in Kenya may also be associated with, Centralization of power around the presidency, which was the solid foundation on which clientelism thrived given the power the president commanded over the control and access to limited state resources. State resources could only be accessed through well-established patron-client networks. The patron-client relationship served the purpose of mobilizing and building political support (Van de Walle, 2003; Fatton, 1986). Indeed, little portion of these resources actually trickle down to the lowest level of the network. Instead, they are concentrated within the domain of the patrons due to the monopoly they have over the control of scarce resources.

Clientelism has also been perpetuated through systematic consolidation of power and wealth in particular families, a process that has directed attention to class dynamics. Factional leaders emerged typically from similar social backgrounds and from "within a dominant" category of some description whether of seniority wealth or status (Bujra, 1973). Supporters of a particular leader are repaid not through a restructuring of the basis of power, but through distribution of patronage benefits.

The prevailing empirical conclusion about resource sharing in Kenya is that government provide more funds to regions where it has more support politically. The electorates have come to expect that it is gravely detrimental if the candidate that one openly supports does not assume power. The principal contenders in the elections are people from wealthy circles; *Matujiri* (Barkan & Holmquist, 1989). These Kenyan elite now own former European large farms, ranches and estates. There has been also a dense structure of interlinked economic and political exchanges, leading each group of politicians to organize their own networks of resource collection and distribution (Barkan, 1984). The interlocked networks based around each political faction in turn have had important implications for the Patron-client relations in Kenya. Capitalists too are rational political actors and in a context where no political actor or bureaucrat is able to operate without satisfying their constituencies, it has been relatively easy for capitalists to ensure that they too were, funding powerful constituencies so that their interest in leading the easy life could not be challenged (Barkan, 1984).

As a result, the politicians and bureaucrats have organized their political survival through such localized arrangements, which have perpetuated clientelism. Political mobilization since independence in Kenya has centered on competition for access to the patronage of such wealthy individuals, rather than on opposition to them. Rural political mobilization through *Harambee* or self-help projects was oriented towards "gaining a toehold in the system" (Thomas-Slayer, 1991). One of the most popular types of rural *Harambee* projects was building of local secondary schools, since many citizens view education as the principal means of upward mobility and make enormous sacrifices to educate their children.

Kenyatta had institutionalized the *Harambee* system, as a free zone where villagers often entrapped the MPs, prospective candidates, and the local elite especially those employed in cities and extracted resources for building local projects such as schools, dispensaries and cattle dips (Miller, 1984).

Resources for patronage are accessed by patrons through policies geared towards the establishment of a mechanism for allocation of resources for development. For instance, the patrons use resources allocated for development to further political interests such that the nourishment of the patron-client network becomes dependent on the flow of resources from the central government coffers to the periphery. Such funds remain highly susceptible to being used for political mobilization (Lemarchand & Legg 1972).

Political disorder is favoured by political elite in Kenya as an instrument for maintaining political power, wealth and prestige. Clientelistic networks have been nurtured from structural inequality, social exclusion and rising unemployment. In contexts pervaded by lack of access to essential physical survival needs, clientelistic practices function as real problem-solving machineries mediated through personalized political relationships and re-signified through symbolic promises (Barkan, 1984).

Locally, patronage networks depend on rural roots. The relative leverage or bargaining power of rural clients can exercise with national patrons varies locally and historically. The success or failure of development strategies and projects and the distribution of wealth depend on wider arena of patron–client and other structures. A pyramid of patron–client ties link rural populace in the countryside to cabinet ministers and the head of state, with intermediate links including assistant chiefs, chiefs, councillors, District Officers, cooperative society officials and Members of Parliament among others. The patron–client structure of Kenyan society resembles the “inflationary democracy” (Scott, 1972). Shrinking national resources means that patrons have less capacity to deliver benefits to clients and local patrons are dependent brokers who draw their power and wealth from state patronage.

Post independence Kenya adopted district based development planning in the form of the District Development Grant Programme, The Special Rural Development Programme in particular areas, The Rural Development Fund and District Development Planning. However, by late 1970s, Kenya slid into ‘private estate’ for a few and a no – go area for the majority (Oucho, 2010). The country became sharply polarized between the chosen districts that enjoyed the fruits of independence and the neglected districts that languished in poverty.

The Moi regime flagging the *Nyonyo* “footsteps” philosophy perfected the system of polarization by adopting the famed but short-lived District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD) in 1983. The DFRD Strategy was to make districts the focal center for planning and budgeting. Sadly, the DFRD turned out to be a complete debacle as the country’s political leadership manipulated it for political ends, directing development to selected districts in Rift valley province and others with the leaders closest and most loyal to president Moi. One would argue that Moi was simply emulating Kenyatta, who had confined development within central province, with Kiambu receiving lion’s share (Oucho, 2010; Kanyinga, 2010). Moi used this patronage to divert and concentrate national resources in those districts, which had traditionally supported him in politics, as a means of consolidating his foothold (Barkan & Chege, 1989).

President Moi converted *Harambee*, which had been used as a vehicle for localized political patronage into an instrument of self-aggrandizement (Kiraitu, 2000). He frequently held *Harambees* in which Cabinet Ministers, MPs, Civil Servants and the entire populace were obligated, coerced or intimidated to "donate generously". The local projects built from such funds were treated as president Moi's personal gifts to the people, for which they should owe him personal loyalty. President Moi used the *Harambee* as a forum for lecturing people on the suffering they would experience if he were not in power (Haugerud, 1997).

Another key institution that helps to anchor the idea of clientelism in everyday life is the public assembly or *Baraza*. *Baraza*s offer a stage on which, local elites use political oratory to foster national unity, territorial identification and loyalty (Haugerud, 1997). To preserve public silences and to marginalize critics the state deploys both coercive and symbolic weapons. In rural areas, these assemblies include; *Harambee* fundraising meetings, political party rallies, and multipurpose gathering at which state officials transmit policy, programme directives, or instruct people on new farming techniques and health measures. In these assemblies, oratory is a striking linguistic blend, with strategic and socio-linguistically significant shifts from one language to another within and between speeches (Haugerud, 1997).

In Kenya rural areas, code switching is significant strategy that is connected to the power asymmetries of languages and to individual negotiation of power and status in conversation (Njogu, 1990). Code switching among English, Swahili and local language is a mark of academic, political and administrative elite status in Kenya. "Code switching and language choice can be interpreted as symbolic expressions of identity or relations of domination and thus as constitutive parts of political patronage" (Gal, 1989). Language choice in *Barazas* may either reinforce or challenge the current political hierarchy, which accords higher status to English than to Swahili.

For instance, one of the junior politicians at a public assembly that includes nationally prominent individuals such as the government minister inserts a few English words and phrases into a speech in local language. His occasional use of English words does not convey the same message to everyone in his audience. To some his code switches may re-affirm the gap between him and the superiors because his English is more forced with a deep local accent. On the other hand code switching conveys a message of superiority to the many non-educated persons in his audience who recognizes that he uses words from the country's language of power, but do not themselves perceive the differences in English fluency that are apparent to the well-educated (Haugerud, 1997). The linguistic strategy has been reversed to perpetuate clientelism in case of a well-educated senior politician or civil servant addressing a local audience who comprise his clients. In this instance, the official may find it most important to demonstrate fluency not in English but in his local language, to show that he has not forgotten it after taking up life in the city or in international circles (Njogu, 1991).

Clientelism has also been continued through addressing the *Baraza*'s. Who addresses a *Baraza* is a politically charged issue. This is a forum where who can speak is a matter regulated during the meeting by a master of ceremonies (Scott, 1976). Before the meeting, the organizing authorities such as chief or councillors schedule their meeting to discuss themes and speakers. There is always some flexibility about who will address a meeting and in what order, since it is never certain who will turn up and when. The masters of ceremonies and individuals on the speaker's platform make final decisions about who speaks and in what sequence. A prominent guest of honour, such as cabinet minister or provincial commissioner, is likely to give a key note address late in the meeting and may not even arrive until the event has been underway for an hour (Haugerud, 1997).

The master of ceremonies invites selected speakers to "greet the people" giving them an opportunity to make speech if they wish. Those who precede the guest of honour are expected to give much shorter addresses. The guest of honour has no time limit. Speaking time is an approximate index of status (Haugerud, 1997).

Politicians in power in a particular locality prefer not to share a speaker's platform with political opponents or competitors who are not in office (Irvine, 1979). Outside political campaign periods, then, a sitting MP is unlikely to welcome as co-speaker a rival for his elected position. Sometimes such a rival may be seated at the front of the gathering and not be invited to address it (Haugerud, 1997). By controlling who can speak at various meetings, the organizing officials also control to a degree what is said and what information is disseminated. There is a moving boundary between what can and cannot be stated in public. Speakers in most instances practice more generally a "strategy of keeping open secrets out of the public domain (Bailey, 1991). This entrenches clientelism in that only piece meal information is disseminated.

A meetings speech usually begins with formulaic greetings to a number of categories of people, which connotes the power, authority and influence that they hold in the society. Either before or after such a list, the speaker is likely to say to the entire audience "how are you" to which they reply, "We are fine" (Haugerud, 1997). The speaker might then thank the organizer of the meeting, emphasize the importance of its theme and proceed to give a supporting address. The guest of honour and highest-ranking officials may talk for up to an hour. The *Baraza* is a forum in which both elites and subordinates usually conform to "the well known" boundaries (Holmquist, 1984).

Meetings provide a platform for those in power to threaten rivals, opponents and political dissidents. They capture the unexpected rise and decline of personal influence in elite political circles. Politicians speaking at *Baraza* threaten to name publicly figures behind scandals and thereby to humiliate dissenters or rivals whom they wish to eclipse (Haugerud, 1997). The downfall of a prominent person may be orchestrated from the centre of power through a series of meetings. Such meetings give the audience some sense of power in allowing them occasionally to see the powerful fall. Coercion as practiced among the elite is sometimes as striking as that practiced by elites on the rest of the population (Haugerud, 1997).

Meetings mediate the construction of new patron - client pyramids, and provide space for leaders to appeal directly to local residents. This is an arena in which reputations collapse and blossom, as individuals negotiate positions within patron-client hierarchies. An individual in the audience who publicly challenges or antagonizes a speaker risks his or her own access to economic opportunities and resources (Haugerud, 1997). A politician who publicly expresses opposition to government policies or senior officials jeopardizes his or her own position and possibly constituents' collective access to central government funds to support public goods and services: schools, main water and health centres.

Non-state actors too are major actors in political clientelism during rural development. NGOs are expected in most cases to work directly with communities but usually they only meet opinion leaders, civic and religious leaders, and other elites. The poor and marginalized populations, who are mostly project beneficiaries, often end up being bypassed, as they are not on equal status as elites, nor do they have the opportunity to take time away from farming or other subsistence activities.

A study by IPAR, on the management and utilisation of the CDF in Kenya, found out that, there was an obvious tug-of-war between MPs and councillors to control grass-roots development funds. Councillors argued that the local councils are endowed with the relevant structures, systems and personnel to administer the funds while MPs are individuals lacking any supporting mechanisms and systems to manage development funds (Mapesa and Kibua, 2006). This implies that the two groups are competing over who should patronise at local level. Each of the group seems to lay a claim that, they are better placed to respond to local felt needs and manage the implementation of development projects.

The study also found out that, the MPs opted to excuse themselves out of being chairpersons and ended up being the patrons of the constituency committees while the Act makes no provision for a patron (Mapesa & Kibua, 2006), a clear indication that they act as de facto leaders within the CDF structure.

2.4 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The political strategy of the rural societies is to mobilise influence and bring it to bear on resource allocation and distribution. The MP has become premier patron in CDF patron-client structure. The system is based on informal relationships among a variety of officials at all levels of governance in the constituency. Other patrons would include: politicians out of office or those in office, local authority leaders, community development officers, senior civil servants, clergy, prominent businesspersons and members of provincial administration.

Various community and development project leaders turn to the local notables and elites because they feel they are too low in status to bridge the political gap between the communities where they reside and the "outside authorities" (Ngethe, 1979). They know felt needs of the community, but they are not in a position to lobby for assistance. They therefore turn to those who can solicit for resources and support, who are then the "influential men" (Ngethe, 1979) who are the target of the local notables.

The "influential men" are likely to be the elected local Councillors, CDFC Members, leading businesspersons, members of provincial administration or high-ranking civil servants. These are the patrons of the local notables. MPs as the premier patrons in a CDF clientelistic network are the patrons to these "influential men".

The patrons to the "influential men" need not necessarily be just Members of Parliament, though we expect that they are dominant. Why would the patrons respond to the invitation of the notables and the "influential men"? The patrons would respond because the structure of leadership accountability in the rural areas demands that they respond. They must deliver "development" if they are to stay in power. Access to resources is therefore an integral part of the patron-client structure in Kenya (Barkan, 1984).

Constituents will expect their local leaders and development projects committee to acquire resources for local development projects like the building of schools, roads and health centres. Politicians have to establish a mechanism through which they can manage their patron client relationships with the electorate to minimize cases of shifting political allegiance.

This is done by establishing organization hierarchies of exchange consisting of pyramidal structure with the electorate occupying the lowest position at the base, brokers in the middle and patrons at the top most position. Brokers in high levels of the pyramid may have the tendency of diverting resources for their private gain instead of letting them flow down to local brokers for distribution to the clients in the form of reward or enticement for their political support (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007).

The patrons operates by gaining the support of certain section within the local area in the constituency by promising to represent their interests and helping them directly in small ways. They then use the position thus created to gain the patronage of someone more influential than them within the constituency promising them support of their own clients. The local notables will ask the influential men and the MP for the resources needed to develop their localities. The system of patronage thus uses a series of patron-client networks in the constituency to connect constituents with the centre of constituency development structure.

This study seeks to analyse data using the following analytical framework.

Structure of politics




Fig 1.1 Analytical Framework

Under the CDF, local people in consultation with CDF Committees identify their priority needs and assume responsibility for planning and implementing development projects. MPs are likely to influence decisions regarding needs identification and project selection by appointing their friends and relatives to head CDF Committees (Kibua & Mapesa, 2006) and influencing the selection of project management committee. Due to the powers accorded to MPs, areas perceived as opposing an MP may be excluded from the CDFC membership; the MPs may also determine the venue where the CDFC meets to deliberate on the development matters.

MP is also likely to use various forums like the fundraising, burial ceremonies, public *Barazas* and public meetings to set the development agenda for the community as well as dominating in the meetings where community members are not guaranteed to speak.

Local notables especially the village elders, sub chief, headmen and community development leaders are expected to mobilise the community to attend the consultative meetings to identify and select development projects. They are also expected to enable people access information about CDF projects and project planning. Local notables and influential men can also determine the development trajectory through public meetings or community gatherings. At the Sub-Location level, the assistant chiefs who are local notables convene and select members that comprise the Sub-Location Development Committee (SLDC), they determine when and where the meetings will be held. They also set up the agenda and oversee the appointment of the representatives to sit at the LDC. They are also likely to dominate the meetings and be the sole contributors of ideas, no wonder people refer to public meetings as chief's meeting.

Patron-client relations approach therefore has a rather obvious advantage in explaining the politics of decision making in South Imenti constituency. One cannot fully understand the politics without investigating the political linkages between various local development projects, local elites and notables and Constituency Development institutions such as the MP and CDC. This investigation is only possible within a patron-client relations model.

The patron-client network enhances "influential men" careers and opportunities. Most of them, notably businesspersons are integrally involved in business ventures. Incumbent local councillors also enhance their political careers. Certain contractors with close links to the MP are likely to be favoured, and genuine proposals are likely to be ignored. This current political structure is likely to have a bearing on social and economic inequality within the constituencies. Because development projects are dependent on the ability of local notables to gain resources for clients, some parts of the constituency are likely to fare better than others.

The local notables, as agents procure specific benefits for their localities in the form of development projects and service and finding bursary funds for their children in school. "For those at the very bottom of the social order, the material prosperity of their betters is not itself reprehensible so long as they too can benefit materially from their association with a patron linking them to the elites" (Chabal & Daloz, 1999). Indeed, a recent study by KIPPRA on the challenges of implementing decentralised funds argues that, corruption cases have been witnessed in the use of the CDF funds, such that some councillors and MPs are demanding that beneficiaries make advance contributions before receiving a fraction of the benefits due (KIPPRA, 2006).

CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides an outline of the research methods employed in the fieldwork and identifies the process of collecting the study's data. The chapter then outlines how the site selection was done, how the sampling procedure was accomplished before going to the different data collection techniques employed to gather data. The chapter ends with a discussion of how the data collected was analysed.

The questionnaires, Key informant interviews, participant observation methods were used to collect the data for this study. The information about the role and the relationships between various Actors involved in needs and project identification, project prioritisation, resource allocation, implementation and management was sought from various CDF project beneficiaries, CDF Committees as well as key informants.

3.2 STUDY SITE

This study focussed on South Imenti Constituency. The rationale for going for this particular constituency was deliberate, influenced mainly by geographic and regional spread, poverty index, agro-ecological and socio-economic conditions. South Imenti Constituency is again among the constituencies described as purely rural constituency fitting well in the objectives of the study. The choice was also because of the researchers' knowledge of the area and the local language

South Imenti is bordered by Mount Kenya on the West and drier lowlands to the East. Rainfall is bi-modal, falling between March and June, and October through December. The population within the constituency is 156, 302 people. The growth rate is 1.48 percent. Population density is an average of 398 people per square mile. Farm average 1.1 hectare for small holders who are the majority (KNBS, 2002). About 45 percent people of the total population are also considered to be poor.

The study population consisted of all development projects initiated under the CDF scheme during the financial year 2009/2010 in the whole of South Imenti constituency. These development projects were the unit of analysis. This study employed both probability and non-probability sampling techniques.

Sample selection involved a multi-stage sampling procedure. The first stage is listing all the development projects for the year 2009/2010; the list was availed by the South Imenti CDI office. This was followed by listing all the 12 electoral wards in South Imenti. The projects were then grouped in terms of the electoral wards where they are located. The choice of wards was in line with the objectives of the study in that, wards are political units and represents the MPs interests as well as the opponents interests. This gave twelve (12) sets of development projects. For purposes of this study, five wards were selected randomly from the list of twelve wards. This means that every ward had an equal chance of being selected.

The following wards were chosen. Mweru, Kithangari, Kanyakine, Uruku and Abogeta, and therefore projects to be studied were picked from them. The wards selected had diverse agro-ecological zones that ranged from very productive high potential to poor and unproductive areas and their relative progressiveness were based on the differences in socio-economic development. However, these wards have similar physical, socio-cultural, demographic, religious make up and topographical characteristics.

To achieve the objective of the study, the sampling technique was used. The advantage of using a sample are saving time, reducing costs and giving more accurate data if it is chosen correctly due to the high rate of response from the respondents (Bailey, 1987). One development project from the wards was selected randomly making five different CDF development Projects. Ten (10) project beneficiaries were selected from each project making 50 project beneficiaries, who were the main respondents for the study. In addition, committee members from the selected development projects were also interviewed using semi-structured questionnaires, the local councillors and area chiefs were included as respondents. The researcher also attended at least three Ward Development Committee (WDC) meetings as an observer participant.

The major sample unit, which was used in this study, was the project beneficiaries of the sampled CDF Projects. The beneficiaries sampling frame was based on the beneficiaries lists provided by the Project Management Committee (PMC). With limited time and facilities at the researchers' disposal, it would have been difficult to interview all the project beneficiaries of the selected CDF projects. After obtaining a good up-to-date list of all project beneficiaries the researcher used a simple random sampling method for selecting respondents. This study was designed to be as representative as possible of the rural population.

DATA SOURCES AND COLLECTION METHODS

Relevant information for the study was collected from the sampled development projects through interviews using structured questionnaires, key informant interviews and informal discussions. The questionnaire consisted of various elements including respondent's personal data, their knowledge of CDF, Participation patterns and their knowledge on the roles played by various actors. The questionnaires were administered face - to - face with the help of a research assistant, as residents in rural areas prefer interpersonal channels of communication (Chambers, 1994). Informal discussion with key informants, Project Management Committee Members, Local chiefs and Councillors provided additional information on the relevant issues. Photography and observation techniques were also employed.

Since rural dwellers are, the people whom the CDF projects are intended to serve, the study sought the ordinary rural dwellers relationship with the premier patrons and the roles played by other actors within CDF decision-making continuum

The beneficiaries' interviews were to provide a precise data, to find out the relationship between them as clients and different level of patronage. The research was developed around such key terms as needs/project identification, project prioritisation, CDF resources allocation, Implementation and Management, Monitoring and Evaluation, beneficiaries' communication with their leaders and Project Management Committee selection.

To ensure the study received confidence from the beneficiaries and have all questions answered, the researcher had to gain the trust of the local leadership. Therefore, the local councillor and the area chiefs of the respective wards were notified of the research and they were expected to announce to the residents of the areas before the study commenced.

Face-to-face interviews enabled the researcher to probe, to explain, to follow up important points that were raised by the project beneficiaries and to obtain detailed and rich information on the patron-client relationship.

Documentary sources

Before starting the fieldwork, the researcher attempted to study and collect a considerable amount of literature. A substantial amount of CDF documents, reports and minutes were obtained from the CDF office. However, the researcher faced considerable difficulties in getting copies of the minutes from the office, and was only allowed to peruse them from the office. This included reports, brochures, annual reports and evaluation reports. Other secondary data included information from the internet, library and other publications and newsletters from other constituencies.

Key informant interviews

Four key informants were selected. These were individuals deemed to have been knowledgeable or holding substantial information regarding CDF. These respondents included; CDF Manager, a civic leader, a local DO who has been the longest member of the CDFC, and the CDF Account Manager. Through semi-structured interviews, the researcher was able to gather qualitative primary data on decision-making, resources allocation, management and implementation of CDF projects.

Braintorming Sessions

Braintorming sessions, were held with two Project Management Committees. The braintorming sessions helped to comprehend the practical operations of the CDF, for instance, the researcher got data on the birth of the idea, how the project was started, process of consultation and project identification, project description, who participated at what point.

Both of these sessions were held at the sites of projects with demonstrations being carried out. The six questions of Who? What? When? Where? Why and how? were used to generate data. The brainstorming sessions focused more on practical and strategic issues.

Observation Method

This involved researchers attending meetings of CDF committees, for instance, and observing what was going on. It also involved visiting a number of the ongoing projects in the constituency and recording the observations. The fieldwork provided us with the opportunity to observe newly started, on-going, finished and unfinished CDF supported projects on the ground. The researcher was also able to interview the people found on the site including some contractors who gave valuable information.

3.5 DATA ANALYSIS

All data collected was cleaned to ensure completeness, consistency and accuracy before entry and subsequent analysis. At end of every interview day, the researcher went over all the questionnaires collected for review to ensure completeness and semi analyse them. At the end of each day, the researcher also took notes of any memorable event or finding of that particular day.

All the qualitative data was then compiled into an MS Word table capturing the question, the responses from all respondents and a thematic grouping of the responses. This was done for questions 4, 5, 6,7,8,9,10,11,13,16,18,20,21 and 23. Responses from each of the questions above were sorted and analysed thematically. Responses from key informants were noted down and together with above responses formed the data that was analysed.

Of particular interest was the data that was generated from the Key informant interviews and the one generated from interviews with the CDF Office Manager and the CDF Account Manager that gave important insights into the operations of the CDF in South Imenti since its inception.

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The broad research objective of this study was to analyse the role played by the Member of Parliament (MP) in CDF projects decision making, management and implementation in South Imenti Constituency. This study has evaluated whether and to what extent the legal formal powers vested in the MP by the CDF Act have been stretched to embrace informal political powers. The study sought to find out to what extent the role of the MP in each CDF project stage is influenced by politics and if so, what type of politics and how the politics is depicted. It enquired into the role the MP play during needs identification, projects identification, projects prioritisation, harmonisation, resource allocation, projects implementation and management of CDF projects.

This study argued that, resource allocation and distribution in the constituencies is done through patron-client relationships and networks. The study wanted to find out how the patron-client politics maintains itself through decision making at each stage in the CDF projects cycle. The study took close look at the factors that determined the role of the MP, the prevalence of patronage in some projects as well as lack of it in others. The analysis of the role played by the MP revolving around patronage is therefore discussed in this chapter.

This chapter begins by highlighting in general how CDF has been allocated and disbursed in the country since inception. It delineates how CDF has been disbursed in South Imenti Constituency since 2003/04 financial year to 2009/10. The chapter further discusses the general characteristics of the CDF project beneficiaries highlighting how their characteristics predispose them to patronage tendencies especially from the area MP. The role of the MP in the project cycle is also evaluated as well as the role of other actors within the CDF decision making framework

CDF ALLOCATION AND DISBURSEMENT

The CDF Board allocates funds to constituencies based on established criteria. The Fund consists of an annual budgetary allocation equivalent to 2.5% of all the government ordinary revenue (CDF Act, 2007). Three quarters of the total allocation to the Fund is divided equally among all constituencies, while the remaining quarter is allocated to various constituencies based on their weighted contribution to national poverty. A maximum 15% of each constituency's annual allocation may be used for an education bursary scheme. Up to the 2009/10 fiscal year, over Kshs. 60 billion has been allocated to the Fund. Kshs. 1.26 billion was allocated in 2003/2004, Kshs 5.43 billion in 2004/05, Kshs. 7.03 billion in 2005/06, Kshs. 9.74 in 2006/07, Kshs. 9.8 billion in 2007/08, Kshs. 9.8 billion in 2008/09 and Kshs 9.9 billion in 2009/10.




Figure 1.2: Amount Allocated to the CDF (2003 -2009 Kshs Billions)

Source: CDF website (<http://www.cdf.go.ke/index.php?>)

This figure illustrates how the amounts allocated to the Fund increased sharply between the 2003/04 fiscal year and 2006/07 fiscal year, but stabilized thereafter. During the 2003/04 fiscal year, each constituency received an equal allocation of Kshs 6 million because the criteria for allocation had not been finalized.

4.2.1

CDF DISBURSEMENT IN SOUTH IMENTI CONSTITUENCY

South Imenti has been allocated funds totalling Kshs 264.3 million by the 2009/10 fiscal year. During the 2003/04 fiscal year, the constituency was allocated Kshs 6 million. Further, the constituency was allocated Kshs 26.12 million during 2004/05 fiscal year, Kshs 33.78 million during 2005/06 fiscal year, Kshs 46.80 million during 2006/07 fiscal year, Kshs 47.19 million during the 2007/08 fiscal year, Kshs 47.19 million during the 2008/09 fiscal year and 57.2 million during the 2009/10 fiscal year (<http://www.cdf.go.ke>).




Figure 1.3. Amount allocated to the South Imenti Constituency (2003-2009 Kshs Millions)

The funds allocated to the constituency increased rapidly between 2003/04 and 2007/08, with the biggest leap between 2003/04 and 2004/05 when allocation more than quadrupled. These funds have been allocated to projects mainly in education, electricity, education bursary; water and health. In the education sector, the funds were used to purchase books, construct classrooms, and construct ablution block, laboratories, libraries and dining hall in primary and secondary schools. Electricity projects aimed at supplying electric power to market centres, households, schools, and health facilities. Water projects aimed at either rehabilitating public water springs or supporting piped water supply to households. Health projects involved the construction of staff houses in health centres, repairs of damaged buildings or purchase of other equipments like water tanks.

THE LOCAL ELITES, NOTABLES AND BENEFICIARIES

The two categories of respondents; CDF Management Committee Members, and project beneficiaries (ordinary community members) were interviewed. The study sought to get responses and feedback from the beneficiaries' as the recipients of services delivered and how they assessed the CDF in their localities. This section gives the general characteristics of the project beneficiaries and Project Management Committee members who were the main respondents in this study.

This study noted that socio-economic characteristics such as age, gender and level of education usually have a positive relationship with community participation in development projects. Basic literacy and especially high levels of education for example influence levels of community involvement in needs and project identification, prioritization, management and implementation as well as monitoring of the utilization of development funds. The mobilization and participation of people in development projects is related to their social, economic and demographic characteristics. A combination of people's socio-economic and demographic characteristics explains what niche they occupy within clientelistic network, their relationship with the patrons, how they are mobilized and participate in development projects.

Gender distribution

Men and women look at things differently and they have different views on different issues. Although women compose between 60 and 80 percent of the labour force in peasant agriculture (IAO, 1993), the study found out that in South Imenti constituency, women have little access to CDF information and structures. From the five wards, 50 respondents were interviewed, 30% of them were women and 65% were men while 5% of the total respondents did not indicate their gender. During the interviews, some women expressed the view that men dominated CDF and they (women) felt marginalised.

The study noted that due to power relations in the society, most respondents tended to be men. Women are marginalised, isolated, alienated and segregated during decision making and development projects implementation. The majority of women in the wards where the study took place were largely unaware of the events taking place outside what their husbands told them. Women passivity and apathy can be attributed to dominant clientelistic relations that control village life; women are indebted or fear reprisals from men. Therefore the situation of women is poor regarding participating in local development. The gender gap still exists regarding access to and control of resources, opportunities and political voice. The existing power relations therefore perpetuated clientelism.

The study found that there is a policy that at least one third of the members of South Inenti Development Association (SIDA), the structure under which CDF is implemented, decision making structures including committee at all levels must be from either gender. In all the wards, even though attempts were made to create gender balance in selection of respondents, there were more male respondents compared to females. CDF structures are dominated by men and where women have little access, they lack ability to demand and take control of the CDF resources.

It was also generally observed that women at the local level are more sensitive to community issues. Power in the household is usually centred in the household head and since most households are male headed; women are generally subservient to men. Women equate CDF with politics and since politics is traditionally a male domain in rural areas, almost all activities pertaining to CDF in South Inenti Constituency are conducted by men. Women have very limited access to decision-making process, and they have a severe lack of access to and control over local resources including information. This effectively reduces women to clients to other patrons starting with men within their vicinity. Men have control over most resources and have relatively better education; they have a dominant position in terms of political power and women remain surrogate actors in the CDF project cycle. Women councillors and local women leaders may not necessarily be educated. They lack awareness leading to situations where they have become dependent on their male counterparts. In some cases women are elected as Committee Members to satisfy the gender requirement and they are not expected to actively participate in committee activities.

Most women lack any effective power or influence in local governance structure. Many of them do not have the necessary skills to present ideas effectively. Lack of awareness of the possibilities of political participation means inadequate contribution to public affairs on the one hand and dependence to male counterparts on the other.




Figure 1.4 Respondents Gender Distribution

Age distribution

This study noted that age bestows honour, prestige or social privilege. This was demonstrated when some members of the societies were referred to as superiors, they accepted others as equals or looked down on others as inferior. The respondent's ages ranged from between 15 years to above 55 years. Most of the respondents (44%) were in the 45-54 years age group. About 28% percent were aged above 55 years, while about 20% were aged between 35-44 years. 6% of the respondents were aged between 25-34 years and about 2% of the respondents did not indicate their ages.

This study noted that the society had more respect for the married people and those who had some material wealth. They formed local elites who mainly occupied the first echelon of the patron and hence were more knowledgeable about CDF. The rite of undergoing various rituals in South Imenti, both physically and mentally, is paramount in defining a person's status. Through rituals such as circumcision and marriage, one is deemed to have attained adulthood, and is accorded the respect and responsibilities that go along with it.

It marks their initiation not just into adulthood, but also into society and thus full membership of the community where they participate in local development activities. The study noted that, the more rites one has undergone gives them leverage over other members of the society thus perpetuating clientelism.

Marital Status

This study noted that, Marital status determine social mobility which comes with new status in the society. This status determines the role that one is expected to play in the community. For instance, young unmarried men do not play an active role within the Meru Council of Elders (*Njuri Ncheke*) which is quite critical in rural development projects decision making. A significant percentage of the respondents (50%) were married, of these 17% were female and 83% were male. Singles accounted for 35% and the separated were a partly 6% and 4% of the respondents were divorced and separated respectively. 5% of the respondents did not indicate their marital status.

Majority of the respondents are married and therefore they occupy coveted positions within the society since they have proved to be house heads. The study noted that majority of those falling under the singles category were actually widowed, however, due to cultural barriers such option was available on the questionnaire. Widows brought about the concept of female headed households which were never considered in local planning. They are effectively clients of their male counterparts and wherever a decision needs to be made the nearest male is usually consulted.

Highest Level of Education Attained

The importance of education in community development cannot be ignored. Basic literacy and especially high levels of education influence levels of involvement in development and monitoring of the utilization of development funds. The study revealed that, 16% of the respondents had attained university education, 4 % have never been to school while 4% of the respondents had attained tertiary education, 34% of the respondents had attained secondary education while majority of the respondents (36%) had attained primary education as their highest level of education and 6% did not indicate.

The study noted that the highly educated members of the society acted as patrons to those who occupied a level lower than them. The university graduates are the major opinion shapers in every ward and their word is taken in most instances without further refining. The study observed that, those with higher levels of education were likely to one earn high income and could afford to own some material wealth and therefore reduces their dependency however it has also increased their patronage to the rest of the society.

The study realized that the average level of education attained by committee members was at least secondary education. Twenty-five percent had either primary education or none at all. Since education levels are considered whenever one seeks an employment opportunity, most households are respondents are likely to attract meager paying jobs. This has a bearing in local development in that it makes them vulnerable to manipulation and machinations which perpetuates clientelism. Residents with lower levels of education are clients to the residents with higher levels of education. The level of education has a bearing on the overall management of projects in addition to understanding the CDF regulations and rules. In turn, this may affect the quality of decisions made and eventually determine the outcomes of the funded projects.

Occupation

The respondents were also asked to state their occupation. A large number (40%) were self-employed while 28% were employed by the informal sectors. 12% were working with the formal sector, 10% as casuals while 6% of the respondents were unemployed and 4% did not indicate. This has divided the rural community horizontally as to who constitutes the rich and who is poor in their midst. This has been done through wealth ranking. The wealthy influential classes are likely capture elected councils while the poor and marginalized are excluded and even middle peasants achieve only minority representation.

Those who earned higher income and were in more stable forms of employment have gone ahead and employed other members of the society as casuals or in non-formal sector establishing a master and servant relationship. Within this master and servant relationship clientelism is perpetuated. The development in such context is likely to be characterised by coercion of the people into community development projects.

The inequity and poverty is likely to make people more vulnerable to political manipulation. The better off will often tend to dominate decision making and leadership. Elites are likely to push decisions forward to meet specific personal or collective interests among them.

Status differentiation based on occupation, age, level of education and marital status perpetuates clientelism right from the basic unit, the household in local development efforts. This study found out that those who occupy a higher niche in the society owing to their achievement in terms of education, occupation and marital status have a higher status in the society. These members maintain a good reputation by being considerate superiors and fulfilling their responsibilities to kin and others with whom they have established patronage ties. The local elites are a reference groups to the rest of the society. This has demarcated the society in terms of powerful and powerless, since more income has translated into more power and ability to manipulate.

The study noted that elites tend to support the status-quo because it gives them considerable power. Each ward has elites of their own, who in most instance absorbed in the constituency elites and therefore they act as the appendages of the area MP. They serve as the intermediaries between the local populace in villages and the constituency elites like the premier patron, the MP. They manipulate traditional and legal models for political purposes in order to maintain their positions in the community. Elders are the main advisors to all parliamentary aspirants and when they get into parliament, the elders become their major clients and intermediaries. The elders thus have their own clients too.

CDF projects are expected to be initiated through widespread consultations. However, project beneficiaries' socio and economic characteristics are likely to determine the niche, roles, duties and responsibilities of each of the actors within the project cycle. Most project beneficiaries, who occupy the lower niche, were found to be the prime agents and were more likely to have no formal education or only attained basic levels of education. In terms of occupation, the study found out that most of them are self-employed, casual workers or engaged in informal sectors. There was over therefore likely to be mere pawns in a complicated political chess game.

The study assessed the community's levels of awareness of CDF and the sources of information available to them. Given the fact that CDF was introduced as a means of realizing community based development, it was encouraging to learn that over 75% of the respondents knew that CDF existed and that there is a CDF office although only 40% knew where it was located. This implies that residents could engage in CDF activities or access CDF resources. Discussions with beneficiaries in a series of Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) revealed that CDF is generally well known in many communities. Indeed the study noted that, the majority of CDF projects originated from grass root level with the aim of addressing the most urgent community needs; for instance provision and improvement of learning facilities in schools, access to water for both domestic and livestock consumption and accessibility to affordable health care among others.

About 30% of the respondents stated that they had visited the CDF office. Most of the enquiries to the office were related to the CDF education nursery. In some wards, majority of the constituents were not aware about the CDF and they could not differentiate it from other funds. Information about the funds received is availed to community members mainly through *barazas*, the CDF offices, the South Imenti News, (A local publication sponsored by the CDF) and in a few cases, through the constituency CDF website.

A high level of awareness was attained through a number of ways including, community meetings such as *barazas* in Kanyakine ward and through community involvement in the CDF projects in Mweru Ward. It was also mentioned in one of the wards that the CDFC educated the community groups, such as, the youth, elderly, women groups on the provisions of the Act. Other strategies used included sensitization campaigns on the CDF. The level of awareness is high especially in shopping centres and project sites' neighborhood. This is because the level of information sharing in these areas is relatively high compared to the communities living in interior parts of the constituency which makes those nearer the sites and shopping centers, patrons to those living in interior parts. The study noted that, mostly civil servants owned shops at the shopping centres where they would pass through after their normal days in office.

Some CDF projects like schools, health centers and water projects in the regions which have had fewer development activities in the past, or even none, has created a lot of curiosity among the communities regarding the source of funding for these new initiatives. However, this study noted that despite the high level of awareness of CDF in the constituency, the fund is still regarded as the MP's money. Many Community members hold this view contributing to micro-management of funded projects by the MPs for political mileage and ceremonial functions. This further perpetuates patronage in that the area MP would like to capture the imagination of everyone that he is their source of their livelihood. The MP hands over cheques and impromptu pledges to fund projects in the vicinities.

The study found that knowledge on the level of funding is low among many projects beneficiaries compared to that of the various management committee members again depicting patron-client relationship that exists. Many respondents who were interviewed (70%) could not tell the actual amount of money allocated to their development project and instead they referred that question to the area chief or the local councilor. However, the study found out that the same information was available in the local newspaper (The South Imenti news) but only a few members of the society are willing to purchase the same. Indeed it is associated with the area MP since it is normally sold to those who attend 'his' functions and rarely is it available to the other vendors. Other project beneficiaries could not tell the difference between CDF and other funds such as the Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF), Constituency AIDS Control Funds and Constituency Bursary Funds.

The participation of community members in the implementation of the CDF projects depends wholly on the decision by the officials to either involve them or not. In some instances, the lack of participation from community members is highly attributed to their relationship with the Project Management Committees (PMC). Some respondents argued that whenever labour was required and there were some payments to be made the PMC only employed those close to them but if the project required labour input and there were no resources to pay they forced all members of the community. This adversely disorients them and diverts their attention away from CDF matters making them vulnerable to manipulation and clientelism.

In some cases substandard contractors and labourers are sourced from neighbouring constituencies by the project committees thus limiting the involvement of locals and hence the limited community knowledge and awareness of projects. The handicap in some projects is that sometimes the local MP dictates who should be awarded a contract.

4.5 CDF PROJECT IDENTIFICATION AND SELECTION

Identifying how development projects were prioritised was considered a necessary step in understanding patron-client relations within CDF project cycle in this study. Section 23 (3) of the CDF Act (2007) states that elected Members of Parliament convene location meetings to deliberate on development issues for the location, constituency and the district and prepare a list of priority projects to be forwarded to the CDCs. It is expected that the development needs of the constituency are identified, deliberated on and prioritized. CDF only funds projects that benefit the community at large. The most common types of CDF projects are school and health centre buildings, water projects, roads, chief's offices, and police posts. CDF does not fund: private enterprises, Merry-go Rounds, Religious Organizations and activities, political organizations and political activities (CDF Act, 2007).

Participation of the area MP is captured at the level of selecting CDF Committee members, contribution of ideas in CDF needs and projects identification meetings and involvement in project selection. The study noted that in South Imenti Constituency, CDF is implemented through South Imenti Development Association (SIDA), a local Community Based Organisation (CBO) started during the first term of the current MP. Before the CDF was established, the constituency development was organised by SIDA, which was under the patronage of the area MP. SIDA had structures at the Ward level that were used for community mobilisation. The CDF implementation is therefore done through the existing structures of SIDA which were inherited by the CDI without any alterations to capture the will and spirit of the CDF.

The researcher noted that CDF in South Imenti has established an organ at the Ward level as a result, contrary to the CDF Act provisions. There exists no Locational Development Committee at the Locational level as envisaged by the CDF Act. This study noted however, that at inception SIDA had structures at the Locational level which were chaired by the local chiefs. The power struggle between the local chiefs and the councillors ensued and the councillors by their virtue of being politicians were able to lobby the area MP to scrap the locational committees in favour of ward committees.

During a key informant interview, the area MP argued that both groups are integral in rural development and still play a critical role locally. This study noted that they co-chair meetings but local chiefs address administrative issues leaving "development" to the councillors.

Mobilisation within SIDA entails, coordinating various actors and preparing them for collective action. This is achieved through raising their awareness of development projects, arousing and arousing their interests and encouraging them. CDF projects in South Imenti are therefore identified, implemented and managed through the Ward Development Committee (WDC) which was one of the SIDA grassroots structure. The WDC, convenes a meeting with the community where they identify the projects they want based on their priorities. Evidence had shown that SIDA's robust planning systems would among other things, help in eliminating duplications, and waste of resources and encourage faster project identification hence promoting faster project implementation.

This study found that during WDC meetings, the local chief and the councillor are the conveners, co-chairs and facilitators of the meeting. The chief and the councillor also set the agenda of the needs and projects identification meetings. These Meetings are the powerful forums in which decisions are made and choice of their venue and agenda depicts power relations in the society. Interestingly, the area MP chaired very few of the meetings (10%) that he attended. The area councillor and local chief chaired the majority of the meetings (75%), while other local leaders like the local leader of the CBOs chaired the rest.

The majority of the beneficiaries (76%), who attended meetings that were also attended by the area MP indicated that although there was space for contributions the master of ceremonies who happened to be the local chief, the local councillor or the chairperson of the local CBOs decided who was supposed to speak and for how long. The local chief and councillors are the major clients to the area MP and in most instances, whenever the local councillor is addressing the meeting, he or she invokes the name of the area MP. This study noted that in several occasions councillors talked of having consulted the MP and therefore they were just reporting his wishes. When faced by questions regarding several issues, the councillors argued that they will consult the area MP.

The sitting arrangements at public meetings reflected the existing social power relations. The area MP, Councillors and the members of provincial administration usually sit at the centre of the front row, surrounded by other government officials. Security personnel sit or stand at strategic positions during public meetings. Some seats are reserved for prominent people from the area, invited guests and any such a person appearing was directed to reserved seat. Other community members who are not influential sit on the ground or stand and follow the proceedings from a distance. Everyone knows her or his place in public meetings.

Those interviewed cited dominance of local chiefs and councillors, the clients of the MP, in the meetings most of which are classified as chiefs *barazas*. Local leaders, especially, invited women told the researcher that in most cases they were not given a chance to speak but only listen. A women representative merely says the opening and perhaps the closing prayers in the meetings. The researcher noted that, there was poor coordination or lack of consultation between project beneficiaries and the implementing organs. After all, the chiefs *barazas* which are the main avenues used by the chief and the councillors to create CDF awareness and dissemination are not compulsory. The researcher noted also that most members of the provincial administration, especially the chiefs, and D.O were also discontented with other local leaders especially the councillors. One councillor indicated that the local people were not capable of understanding fully what their needs were.

These conflicting attitudes have not only strained the relations locally but also perpetuated dependency. The study realised that power and authority is based on giving and granting of favours, in an endless series of dyadic exchanges that go from the village elites to the highest reaches of the constituency, the MP. The village elders, religious leaders and officials of the provincial administration argued that, they often contacted the MP for help to solve a problem or to ask for his views. Most times they contacted their MP "about community or public problems."

Given the dominance by the councillors and the area chiefs, the study sought to know from the councillors as well as the beneficiaries how they knew what were the needs and priorities of local citizens. The responses the researcher received from the councillors and the project beneficiaries interviewed typifies the attitude of the local leaders.

The Councillors asserted, "We know our people", "we meet them all the time," but the researcher realised that often, the meetings were held through agents with no formal system of consultations. One councillor confirmed that people came to their houses. However, some project beneficiaries argued that they did not have any influence, especially when told there are no resources or equipment.

The South Imenti Constituency Development Fund (SICDF) Account Manager revealed in one interview that, the existing CDF Act does not have an Information, Education and Communication (IEC) strategy, which is necessary for informing and educating the people within constituency. Project beneficiaries access information about development projects through different methods and different sources. Presumably the Information obtained through these unstructured avenues enhances their knowledge and understanding of the planning and implementation of development projects. Mobilization through a given method depends on the number of people who obtain accurate information about the development projects. Thus, depending on which methods are used sections of the community will access reliable information while others will be left out. The study noted that the community is rarely mobilized as a whole and therefore the collective action is rarely the result.

Project beneficiaries in South Imenti access information about development projects through public meetings or community gatherings, from relatives or neighbours, from chiefs or assistant chiefs, and through the media. Public meetings or community gatherings was the most common method of accessing information, while access through the local media was least common. The role of the MP was evident during CDF project cycle and the origins of development projects in the respective localities. The CDF Act (2003) gives MPs leeway in the management of the CDF. Besides giving the MP power as the automatic chair and patrons of the fund, the Act also allows for long ranger approaches in accessing common public utilities. The CDF Amendment Act (2007) does not specify the real powers and role of the MP in relation to grassroots committees in the management of CDF.

Asked about the role the MP plays during need /project identification, the respondents seemed to confirm the perverse role the MP plays. The study found that the area MP attended specific needs project identification meetings. However attendance to these meetings was dependent on the timing of the meetings in relation to the General Election, the likely location of the development project and the type of the project likely to be proposed. The MP attended majority of the meetings held one year to the General Election presumably to influence the choice of the projects and locations with an aim to scoring political goals. This study noted that experience in managing funds, honesty and interests in the community are some of the aspects that respondents claimed to value a great deal. The area MP is said to have influenced the choice of all "CDF Mega Projects" in the constituency which apparently were on the campaign manifesto with an appeal to be allowed to "finish the good work."

The study found that the MP attended these meetings armed with a 'bit' to coerce the residents to support his preferred development project. For instance, for the MP to have residents approve a proposed water project that would cut across along three wards, the area MP promised to lobby the ministry of fisheries to increase the funding for the local department so that it can assist many locals start aqua-culture. The area MP would tell residents of how he visited another constituency where they have been able to practice what he is proposing. This study noted, the area MP was more interested in those projects that would be visible.

The area MP also sought to include local people in planning and implementing of large development projects which he ultimately controlled by inviting experts to talk about them. This study found that, input of opinion and ideas was shaped by the area MP directly or through the local chiefs and councillors however, "invited guests and experts" who in most cases are drawn from neighbouring wards or constituencies actually prepared project plans. This has ensured that the MP has grip and control of what is happening while at the same time he is able to blame the "experts" if the project fails to meet the people's expectations. In most cases, the rural population has not been included in some aspects of such projects such as implementation and evaluation. The area MP has determined the degree of popular participation.

This study noted that Ward Development Committees (WDC) have implemented participatory and accountable planning framework which have adopted a clear calendar of public meetings. The projects patron who is the area MP has this calendar and it is normally adjusted to suit in his programme. The meetings are the basis for planning, status updates and monitoring the progress of CDF at Constituency and local level. In some instances, the area MP is accompanied by a number of bureaucrats who are normally invited by the MP as key speakers. Their speeches are normally characterised with the praises for good work that has been done by the MP but they also propose improvements by adopting a couple of changes that they propose, once they are done with their presentation the area MP normally provides the way forward and in most cases, he ends up proposing development projects that are unanimously agreed upon by the local residents.

The study sought to find out what roles does other actors within CDF scheme play in the project cycle. This is important since most actors are either patrons or clients. It is important to note also that some patrons are also clients to other patrons. The study found that the conveners of the meeting are the same people who determined the venues of the meetings and by default, they also decided on the agenda. Majority of the respondents (70%) said that most of the meetings were co-chaired by the local councillors and the local chiefs. The area chiefs addressed general development while the local councillors dwelt on CDF related development issues.

During public meetings, the chief or assistant chiefs merely inform people about projects that have already been earmarked for implementation. This is contrary to the CDF Act, which requires that people participate in identifying projects funded. The study found that, despite the dominance, most people do not trust their leaders who they think are selfish people only interested in pursuing personal benefits. Most respondents were also concerned about the capacity of their local leaders and especially the councillors, indicating that some of them were illiterate. Some do not even attend other local development meetings. One of the project beneficiary intimated that one councillor locked horns with a local dispensary administrator over the selection of a contractor. Indeed, one provincial administrator was of the view that the relevant technical departments were colluding with councillors even during project implementation and management.

Furthermore, the project beneficiaries are not clearly informed about the source and purpose of the funds and the roles they are expected to play. Similarly, community gatherings relate to meetings held in the in an area for specific purposes like funerals, fund raising, parent day meetings in schools and religious meetings. The chief or the assistant chiefs who usually attend take advantage of the occasions to inform the people about the CDF activities. In other cases, the chief or assistant chiefs sends a representative to such gatherings to inform people about development projects.

Although several methods are employed to communicate information about development projects, not all respondents obtained information through the same methods. This study noted that, project beneficiaries who occupy the lower echelon in the society were more likely to be mobilized through friends or relatives. They were likely to have received that kind of information that their friends wanted to pass. In one instance, respondents claimed that they were never aware of the CDF meetings but only got to know about them later. This study realized the area MP had cultivated a culture of reimbursing fares to those who attended meetings especially the ones that were held during the electioneering year presumably to motivate more people to attend or may be to motivate them to listen to the goodies being dished to entice them. Whenever this happened, sections of people never wanted to invite their friends so that they can maximize the returns since the total amount to be reimbursed in each meeting was fixed.

According to the CDF Act, each location is expected to develop a list of priority projects to be submitted to the CDFC. The CDF Act provides that the elected Member of Parliament for every constituency shall, within the first year of a new parliament and at least once every two years thereafter, convene locational meetings in the constituency to deliberate on development matters in the location, the constituency and the district. Each location shall come up with a list of priority projects to be submitted to the CDFC which shall deliberate on project proposals from all the locations in the constituency. It has been argued that involving men and women in CDF projects and programmes at the local level creates ownership of the CDF funded projects and the people look at it as their own project and utilize it optimally while at the same time taking care of it and safeguarding it against vandalism and destruction since it is their property.

In South Imenti constituency, the area MP convenes such meetings through the village elders, chiefs and councillors. The members of community are called for these meetings and *barazas* to deliberate on the project priority at the community level. This study noted that, the chief and assistant chiefs normally meet with the area MP mostly at his residence or at a local farmers training institute. In this meeting they are taken through a programme highlighting what is expected of them in relation to CDF projects. It is at this meeting where they also come up with areas of priority and at times decide on the venue and time of their respective meetings. After meeting the area MP, the Chiefs in collaboration with the village elders, convene public meetings. Village elders inform people of venues of planned public meetings through regular announcements made along main village pathways. The chief, assistant chiefs and village elders also inform people of planned public meetings whenever they meet in their day-to-day interaction.

This study found that, the area MP attends meetings that are expected to prioritize a high cost development project otherwise known as 'Mega Projects'. These are water projects, the milk cooling plant or even an open air market whose benefits are likely to be felt throughout the entire constituency.

In these meetings the MP uses the opportunity to spell out the government policies and efforts to eradicate poverty and argues that to complement such efforts there is need for such projects. This study noted that, the area MP attended such meetings that prioritized Ntharene Open Air Market along Nkubu-Thuchi road and also Milk Cooling plant at Kanyakine. However, Meetings held at the ward level where the people of a particular ward meets to prioritize projects for their particular ward, the area MP participates through a proxy.

This study noted that, every Local Councillor receives a 'special message' from the area MP to take to these residents at the meetings. The study noted that if an area is represented by a councillor from the opposition party, the area MP dispatches one of his close aides to deliver the 'special message'. Members of the CDFC are in most instances present during these meetings and in one meeting the researcher observed that the CDFC representative was consulted before the priority projects were arrived at. At times the local councillor or the CDFC representative consults the MP on phone as the meeting is taking place ostensibly to take information or to give the feedback from the meeting.

The study however, noted that the area MP never attended many CDF projects prioritization meetings presumably to give an indication that the local community and leaders came up with possible solutions to their prevailing conditions. The researcher noted that this was deliberate attempt to dissociate himself from the process in case it fails to address the communities felt needs or in case of conflicts. The prioritized projects are then submitted to the CDFC to be considered for funding. The CDFC meetings are normally attended by the area MP who either chairs the meetings or sits as the patron providing input and the way forward. After the CDFC meeting the area MP is said to attend community gatherings where he comments about the prioritised projects. In one instance, the MP is said to have asked the community to identify other projects that would merit the CDF support since he was not impressed by the community prioritised projects.

During one of the participant observer sessions, the researcher noted that, each ward was allocated a total of Kshs 2 million from the CDF kitty to decide on how to use, during the annual convention. The WDC meetings therefore are to discuss and plan how their allocation will be utilized and distributed within the ward while the 'Mega Development' projects are discussed in most instances informally during Public barazas, community gatherings or the annual convention where leaders were expected to come up with the possible solutions to the prevailing situations that were to be implemented throughout the year.

The researcher sought to know how various development plans were made. It was revealed that, during the annual convention where all opinion leaders and stakeholders in South Imenti Constituency are invited, normally for two (2) days, every August, various wards come up with priority areas. The convention is not purely a CDF affair and the area MP chairs all the sessions of the convention. Wards are normally represented by the local chiefs and the local councillors. Other opinion shapers invited in the annual convention had positions of leadership in many groups in the area and generally engaged in several economic activities. Thus, they own more resources and are likely to occupy a higher echelon in the society. It is this category of economically, socially and politically influential people who are normally consulted during the discussion to deliberate on the CDF projects to be implemented in their respective wards.

The annual convention comes up with Ward Development Plans where development projects are extracted from for implementation through various development funds. After the annual convention, the participants are expected to hold meetings in their respective areas to deliver the message from the convention. This normally makes all the attendants clients to the area MP while at the same time they are patrons to the constituents who look upon them to deliver "development" from the convention.

The majority of the project beneficiaries interviewed confirmed that in addition to extracting the projects from the plans and community identifying the rest, the area MP also suggested development projects. Indeed 66% of the respondents confirmed that the area MP either attended a needs assessment meeting, attended projects determination meetings, contributed ideas in CDF meetings or provided the way forward at the needs and projects identification meetings thus altering the Ward development plans.

However, in one of the wards during an informal discussions, the majority of the residents including some Project Management Committee Members agreed that the utilization of the funds was not based on any agreed upon master plan. The political elite, especially local councillors have been instrumental in altering the agreed upon development plans perhaps to score political goals. This has caused discontent among various project beneficiaries. Funds are allocated across the ward in the constituency leading to thin spread and incomplete projects. Indeed a memo seen by the researcher was warning the local councillors against initiating new projects before completion of the previous ones an indicator that there exists some level of patronage within the wards.

During one of the research tours, the researcher noted also that, prior to scheduled CDF meetings the area MP met with all the councillors from the constituency in what appeared to be a meeting to build consensus on the development projects to be mooted in their respective wards. The councillors gave out their progress reports on the previous projects and highlighted their expectations. After that, the area MP pointed out specific projects he would like to be implemented in each ward. The area MP also revealed that he had invited some guests who would speak at the meeting about his preferred development projects. This study noted that, the area MP preferred to meet the local councillors separately and the provincial administration members like chief and their assistants separately.

The study also noted that the MP and some of the local leaders have also used the CDF to provide special balls to the youth. They were special because the patrons' names were written on them. The researcher also realised that, each Ward Development Committee (WDC) received a memo (Annexed) from the CDF Account Manager, reminding them on the need to give priority to specific projects, reminding them also that their total allocation was limited and that the development projects to be funded were also limited.

The process of disbursing funds is clearly stated within the CDF Act. All funds must be approved by the National Management Committee (NMC). Disbursement of funds to the constituencies is undertaken annually by the NMC. The funds are then expected to be reallocated to particular projects within the constituencies. Eligibility criteria for projects funded under the fund is set out in sections 21 and 22 of the Act. There must be at least 5 and at most 20 projects being undertaken regardless as to whether they are uncompleted projects from the previous financial year. None of the projects is expected to be over half of the annual constituency allocation. In undertaking project identification the Act specifies location meetings which must be held and such forums used to select projects for onward submission to the CDFC.

This study observed that, although in South Imenti Constituency project beneficiaries have been involved in projects identification, they do not determine the amount of allocation for the identified projects. The study noted that each ward of the 12 wards of South Imenti constituency was allocated a total of Kshs 2 million from the CDF kitty (Appendix 5) during the annual convention. This amount of money is expected to be utilized in implementing ward specific development projects. CDFC in consultation with WDC decides on the additional projects to be implemented and the amount of resources to be allocated. Asked how the Kshs 2 million was arrived at, the CDFC secretary said that, the area MP proposed that each of the 12 councillors manage the Kshs 2 million while the rest is managed by the CDFC during the first convention. This proposal has since been ratified and it is the official policy of the South Imenti CDF that each ward gets Kshs 2 million annually.

This study sought to know how the final decision on the resources allocated to individual ward is made. The development projects funded from the Ward Development Committee Kshs 2 million kitty was said to be allocated through consensus according to 56% of the respondents while 40% of the respondents said that Chief, D.O, D C and the Local Councillors influenced the allocation. The chiefs, Councillors and the D C are said to have argued that they were representing the area MP at the decision making avenues. The area MP decided in a few of the meetings that he attended. Interestingly these few meetings were on the 'Mega Projects'.

In other cases, the invited guests influenced the decisions in the meeting they attended though the decision was made through consensus. The guests in most cases happened to be bureaucrats who argued that unless the projects got a quite substantial amount of resources other donors would not support them. The bureaucrats also promise to support the projects with technical advice and assistance only if a certain amount of resources is allocated. This study noted that, projects where the local community is supposed to contribute resources like labour, wood or even construction stones, the bureaucrats and the provincial administrators were used to cajole or even coerce them. The study assumes that politicians would not like to be seen asking for labour or other resources partly because they were free or because they would be asked to pay for the same.

This study found that the projects listed for funding from the CDFC kitty are submitted by the respective councillors to the area MP through the Constituency Manager based at the CDF office. The researcher noted that the CDF Manager has designated officers called Projects Assistants who receive and compile such projects on his behalf. The CDF Manager tables the projects for review by the CDFC in a meeting mostly attended by the area MP as the patron. The recommended list showing the total number of projects and the total cost of the projects for all the wards is then discussed for funding by the CDFC.

The study sought to find whether CDF initiated development projects received additional resources from other sources. During informal discussions it was revealed that, most friends and relatives of the MP also contributed resources to various CDF projects in exchange for tenders and contracts. Indeed, majority of project beneficiaries criticised the way in which tendering and the whole contractual process was being handled. Some members of the provincial administration complained of lack of open tendering and cited construction of chief's camp and Administration Police lines where the majority of contracts were awarded to contractors whose bids were prohibitively high. They felt that if the local people were mobilised to provide some of the goods and services that do not require heavy machinery and financial input such as supply of sand, timber and other local materials, simple furniture and construction of pit latrines and water storage facilities, the project would cost much less. They argued that resource allocation and utilisation process largely benefitted the rich and highly connected individuals.

4.8 CDF PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND MANAGEMENT

The provision in the Act is such that projects are implemented by the respective government department in which they fall. Implementation involves making purchases, payments, record keeping, overseeing the work of the contractor to ensure it is done according to specification, and eventually handing over the completed project to the community. For instance, the implementation of water projects is expected to be done by the water and sanitation department while projects geared towards improving education facilities to be implemented by the area education department.

The members of particular constituencies are expected to be active in the implementation phase to ensure that objectives of the project are met using resources allocated for them within a given period of time. The implementation of development projects is likely to be hindered by continuity of various committees. The CDF Act stipulates that, with the advent of each new parliamentary term, a new committee has to be established (Government of Kenya, 2007). However, it does not point out the fate of the serving committee members. The Act does not specify the arrangement for discontinuation neither does it have a transition clause. This has led to a high turnover and replacement of committee members who are 'fired' at the whim of the area MP. This is likely to have adverse effects on the continuity and institutional memory of a particular committee and progress of the projects (Mapesa & Kibua, 2006).

The revised CDF law stipulates that all CDF projects must be managed by a Project Management Committee. This PMC is recognized as a public entity and is therefore subject to government financial regulations. It is a committee comprising community members who manage an individual project on behalf of the community. However, the MP has in the past argued that he is best placed to oversee the management of these funds, given their critical role in the development of their constituencies. They have also argued that they have a stake in ensuring the success of the CDF, based on the potential political ramifications of failing to do so (SID, 2007).

The study sought to inquire whether there was PMC in place and how it came about in order to establish whether there was a relationship between the patrons and the clients. Majority of the Project Management Committee Members (70%) hold their offices by the virtue of their status in the community. These included local businesspersons, current and retired civil servants whom were all identified by the community. The rest, are identified and selected by the MP and they may hold another position in similar projects funded by other sources. The selection of different committee members was doubtlessly due to their influence, and chiefs and assistant chiefs usually involved them in all development initiatives. Additionally, most committee members were either respected or 'feared' by other community members so that no one would openly go against their opinions.

This study noted that, local leaders especially the provincial administrators and councillors exercise full influence in the formation and running of CDF Committees, without being answerable to anyone. Other members in these committees consisted of a retired secondary school head teacher, a retired district educational officer, a retired primary school head teacher. Another member of the committee used to be a Kenya National African Union (KANU) youth leader who had contested in the previous general elections but lost, others were still active officials of other political parties especially Party of National Unity (PNU) that sponsors over 80% of the councillors and the area MP. However, the area MP was not directly involved in selecting the PMC members. All the members of various Project Management Committees were however closely linked to the area MP through the political party. They were either the officials of the party or campaigners of the party candidates in their local villages.

The study found that in Uruku ward, all the committees were composed of the 2007 General Election losers. All the members of the Ward Development Committee had tendered their candidature as prospective councillors. All these former candidates and their close confidants have been again appointed in the Project Management Committee in the ward. Apparently, the local councillor comes from the same political party with the area MP and it appears that the local community members must have appointed them to reap benefits from the MP.

The study sought to know what other roles the members of the PMC members, selected using the above illustrated criteria, play in the community. The majority of the members (66%) campaigned for either the MP or the councillor or both. 80% of them were members of other development projects. In one instance, the researcher attended a meeting where the entire management committee were committee members to a minimum of five other development committees.

Project beneficiaries participate by providing labour during the implementation of CDF projects. Labour takes different forms, including collection of stones during the rehabilitation of water springs, or the clearing of various development project sites. The study found that in most cases, people who contribute labour during implementation of development projects were never paid. They were viewed as contributing to the construction of development projects that would benefit them. In one instance, labour provision involved voluntary activities by willing community members without pay. In another case, all members of the community were expected to contribute labour for community projects failure of which they were reprimanded. In this case, people participated because they either feared punishment from village elders or the provincial administration. Also there were instances where people participated because of the personal benefit they expected from the project.

The members of particular constituencies are expected to be active in the implementation phase to ensure that objectives of the project are met using resources allocated for them within a given period of time. The implementation procedure requires that project beneficiaries hold periodic meetings with community members to discuss implementation of prioritized development projects. The study therefore sought to find out whether the community held meetings to discuss management of development projects and obstacles faced. The study found that, majority of the beneficiaries (66%) never knew whether such meetings were held and therefore they said, they did not know who convened them. However, where these meetings were held they were convened by the local MP (14%), Local public administrators like the chiefs, D.O and the D.C convened 12% of the meetings while the CDIC officials convened 8% of the meetings.

This study noted that the convenors of such meetings never wanted to disclose their identities for fear of reprisals from the community members in case they were dissatisfied with the project. The meetings convened by the area MP on the other hand were reduced to ribbon cutting functions where the area MP is accompanied by a chief guest who officially opened the projects whether there were outstanding issues or not. In deed the area MP is said to have convened meetings for the projects where he wanted to showcase his managerial skills and in most cases the attendants had to go through a vetting process. The administrators convened the meetings on projects related to their work especially if the project was a chief's camp or an administration police camp. The area DC also convened the meetings to take advantage of the enthusiastic project beneficiaries to spell out various government policies.

The Project Management Committee is in charge of CDF projects at the lowest community level. The PMC meetings constitute a powerful forum in which Project Management decisions at the project level are reached. This study found that although public meetings had been held in various wards in South Imenti, no meetings had been held ostensibly to discuss project management and implementation. Public meetings that had been held discussed other issues affecting the community, the area MP issued cheques or commissioned the projects with little time left for development projects

Project Management Committees were made up people from institutions that had received funding or were contractors who had been awarded a tender to implement a project. PMC usually selected people to participate in project implementation based on their requirements. Thus, PMC decided who participated and who was left out in the provision of labour during implementation of projects. As became also apparent, often, they selected either their friends or relatives, or those who were recommended by influential people. This means that people who were not friends, relatives, or recommended by an influential person, were left out of labour provision, especially when it involved payment.

During one of these meetings held to publicize the CDF, the area MP and other local leaders attended and only issued cheques to the heads of those institutions that had been allocated funds. The people who attended merely listened to the proceedings. Some public meetings were also held at distant District headquarters, which discouraged people from attending.

The CDF Act and antecedent regulations stipulate that, the community should be consulted in the location meetings in order to come up with project objectives, identify activities to be carried out, determine the resources required, time frames, responsibilities, expected outputs, success indicators and how monitoring and evaluation is to be conducted. Monitoring and evaluation of implemented projects is important in providing feedback whether projects are successful in meeting their objectives. In addition, any weaknesses during implementation can be identified and rectified before a project begins to fail.

Besides the community, the CDC and DPC ensure that the projects are focused and address core poverty issues and that the desired outcome of the project can be achieved before onward transmission to the next stage. Information dissemination is perhaps the most powerful tool that can enable project beneficiaries monitor and evaluate the progress. The study also sought to know whether the community is informed about development progress and how. It was established that local chiefs, D.O, D.C and other members of the provincial administration were the main institutions that relayed the information despite the presence of Project Management Committee. 70% of the beneficiaries interviewed said they were informed about the progress by the local chiefs, D.O, D.C while 24% got the information from the PMC. Perhaps this has been occasioned by the politicians desire to have the projects safeguarded from vandalism and abuse. When the information comes from the provincial administration it is associated with the coercive powers exercised by the provincial administrators to enforce the law in local level.

The study noted that, the source of information about various stages of the CDF projects depicts the relationship between the clients and the premier patron. The majority of the respondents said that even when the councillors announced the progress, they did so at the chiefs *Barazas*. The researcher attended three of such meetings and realised that prior to the meeting, the local chiefs and the councillors met the MP at his residence where various development projects were discussed, meetings scheduled, agendas drawn and some of the speakers chosen. However, has it has been observed in the previous stages the area MP was not keen to attend all the meetings.

This study also sought to inquire whether CDF projects had set targets and if they were set, who set them. The majority of the respondents, (34%) said that the local Councillor sets the project performance targets, 30% said the Chief and other members of the provincial administration while 16% of the respondents said that the targets were set by the MP. 10% of the respondents argued that the community members and the beneficiaries set the targets while 3% of the respondents said the CDF Committee and 2% did not know. This study took note that, the councillors were very active in this particular realm perhaps to exert their authority.

During a key informant interview it was also revealed that the area MP was not keen on setting the project targets preferring to leave that role to his agents like the local councillor and the provincial administrators. The area MP wanted the projects to run autonomously at this stage so that there is some element of ownership. The MP argued that if the targets are set by "outsiders" the local community would not appreciate them in most cases.

During the course of this study, it was interesting to note that many respondents who were interviewed associated any development projects in the constituency with the MP. Few people appeared to distinguish between CDF and MPs projects or those sponsored by other agencies or organizations. Indeed 60% of the respondents said that, even though they participated in most project activities like providing labour they did so in most cases because they did not want to be seen rebelling from the societal norms and expectations or because there was a fine imposed to those who never participated. They argued that, whenever a development project was being initiated or implemented it is only 'MPs people' who were involved. The MPs people formed the committee, provided inputs and managed the projects.

The CDFC secretary argued that, due to the large number of projects in the constituency, the CDFC alone could not visit every project site before, during and after implementation of projects. However, it was evident that there is no institutional framework within which a representative cross-section of people in the constituency are involved in monitoring and evaluation of CDF projects. Therefore various actors emerged to monitor the projects for various reasons. The councillors for instance were active since the projects guaranteed them a lifeline.

This study also realized that, many people do not have clear information about projects funded and amounts of money involved a prerequisite for proper monitoring and evaluation. Although records of amounts allocated to projects are displayed at the CDFC office at the district headquarters and printed in the local newsletter, these records are out of reach for most residents of the constituency. Unfortunately, the records are not displayed at the chiefs or assistant chiefs' offices, which can be easily reached by the people.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses two case studies where the MP has intensely participated in the former and intermittently participated in the latter. The case studies offer some detailed examples of how the MP has engaged himself in the decision making process: from project inception, targeting, prioritization, resource allocation, implementation to monitoring and evaluation. The study findings presented here underscore and complement some of the general observations articulated in Chapter 4.

5.2 CASE STUDY 1: MILK COOLING PLANT

The milk cooling plant is located at Kanyakine shopping centre, Kanyakine ward next to the South Imenti Constituency Development Fund (SICDF) offices. The facility was started in 2008 and was projected to cost Kshs 14.1 million, a lion's share coming from the CDF kitty. Kanyakine ward is also home of the decentralized Imenti South district headquarters, where the various departments are housed at the Multi-million district headquarters. It is along Meru-Thuchi road and one can never fail to note the upcoming construction taking place in the shopping centre. The ward is represented by a relatively young councillor who is also the chair of the powerful finance committee at the Meru County Council (MCC). Kanyakine is also home to the local MP's perennial rival who has contested for the last three consecutive General Elections, spreading real panic to incumbent every time.

Until recently, suspicion was rife that the constituency would be split and there were indications that whichever formula that was going to be used, the incumbent MP would face stiffer challenge. Kanyakine ward gave the area MP least votes in the last General Elections and at the Constitution referendum, the ward voted against the constitution despite the area MP being one of the National Co-conveners of the pro-constitution secretariat.

The milk plant is a result of local initiative that was meant to collect and market milk produced within the sub-location to the local societies. Perhaps based on political benefits, the area MP got interested in the project and prevailed upon the local development committee to revise the project with a promise that they would get assistance to construct an "Ultra-modern milk cooling plant". After revision, the proposed milk cooling plant would collect milk from all over the constituency. In addition, it was assumed that all milk to be received would be processed and marketed. The possible extension of the processing capacity was included in the design. The proposed UHT-treatment technique combined with a suitable sachet packaging line would offer jobs to many jobless youth within the locality.

The project would also boost milk production in the area and greatly improve producer prices in the area that did not have a reliable cash crop like tea or coffee. The local community had envisaged to finance for the project through personal contributions in the two sub-locations. The local people were expected to contribute around Kshs 4,000 in total per household to successfully complete the project. However, to raise the sum would prove insurmountable task in an area that relies on subsistence farming and majority of the residents 55% live below the poverty line. The study noted that, the area MP might have seen the project as a coordinated local cell of opposition and decided to hijack and monitor the project closely to win credit for the same. The membership of the project being undifferentiated peasant majority and lowly educated petty bourgeois elements, the MP decided to act as the patron of the project. For fear that the project would create an impression of a political vehicle, the area MP proposed a formation of South Imenti Dairy Farmers' Company (SIDFC) where he is the majority share holder with shares worth over Kshs 200,000.

The MP also sought assistance from various NGOs and CBO in addition to an allocation he lobbied for at the CDF Committee. SIDA, a local CBO whose patron is the area MP, runs day-to-day implementation and management of this plant. The SIDA chairperson told the researcher that he reports on the project progress monthly to the patron.

The area MP is the patron of the CDF, SIDA and the Milk cooling plant a role that enables him to receive three sets of information on the same project. As a shareholder, the MP also attends periodic meetings that are called to brief the shareholders on the project progress. Virtually all the members of the project have been involved in project activities. To maximize on the minimal resources so as to complete the project the local people agreed to provide free labour at the persuasion of the area MP. The results of the local initiative has added up to a massive construction of the project and has also seen the area MP endear himself to the constituents. Perhaps because of the presence of his perennial rival in the vicinity and the possible challenge of the youthful local councilor, the area MP also contributes labour at times demystifying the notion that he is aloof.

However, the project has projected class conflict and community participation tends to be uneven. Various members of the local elite are seen to be active wherever the area MP visits the project in numerous impromptu visits he makes to the project. This plant has been constrained to fit into a broad constituency definition of what constitutes a 'a proper project' in order to be eligible for token aid and other resources. The CDF has been allocating substantial amounts to the project. The disbursements to the milk processing have been as follows; 2008/2009 the plant received Kshs 2,400,000 and 2009/2010 Kshs 1,750,000. The Local Authority Transfer Funds (LATF) has also contributed Kshs 500,000 towards the project.

The project covers the whole of South Imenti constituency which has experienced massive production glut in recent past, where several milk producers opted to pour their milk. The milk farmers have however, over the previous year's marketed their products through the now defunct Meru Central Farmers Cooperative Union. With optimal and intensified utilization of land to maximize dairy production coupled with harmonized breeding programmes, there is no doubt that the Constituency will witness increased milk yields. The main economic activity is dairy production which has been introduced recently through the efforts of an international NGO, Techno Serve. Milk processing therefore was a major issue of concern to majority of residents in South Imenti Constituency.

As such during *barazas* and public meetings the residents came together to provide a solution to their challenges. The Kanyakine milk plant was therefore conceptualized. The project was therefore people driven. When the area MP heard about this particular project he encouraged it and asked to be invited for the following meeting. This study found that, during the meeting, the area MP came with officials from the ministry of Agriculture who were the guest speaker. When the project chairperson invited the MP to speak, he instead invited the officials who convinced the local that they stood to reap more benefits from the project if it was expanded to value addition project. They proposed, packaging and Ultra Heat Treatment that would make the milk last longer. The officers used audio visual materials to supplement their otherwise excellent communication skills and when they were done speaking it was apparent that the locals were confused

The Project Committee Chairperson, who was also chairing the meeting, asked the area MP to provide the way forward. At this juncture, the South Imenti Dairy Farmers' Company (SIDFC) was born with the area MP becoming the first shareholder with shares worth Kshs 100,000. The MP topped up the shares in subsequent meeting and currently his share capital is worth over Kshs 200,000. The councillors, chiefs and assistant chiefs were tasked with the duty of going round to talk about the idea in their respective areas.

The project attracted instance attention from the area MP perhaps because of its location and the stiff opposition that the incumbent faces from the ward. The establishment of a Mega project would be seen as a 'giving back' to the community. The project also provides the prospects of changing the tide against local elites who had traditionally supported the opposition candidate but were now involved as agents to the MP in the milk plant.

The incumbent MP has mobilized numerous councillors to embrace the project that is widely seen as an example of their value to constituents owing to their proximity to the MP. The councillors are the agents of the MP.

The milk plant project is run by a committee of 15 people, 5 from each Division within South Imbabura Constituency. The Project Committee consists of 'exceptional' people who are everyday residents of the constituency. Their exceptional nature has varying roots. They are slightly above average economic status of the peasants who are majority shareholders, have proven record of leadership in other projects and at one time or another they have been engaged in politics. The study found that, two of the Committee members have unsuccessfully contested in civic elections. The Project Committee members are privileged to meet the project patron both at his rural home or Nairobi home wherever they need to brief him. This makes the committee, the principal agents to the patron and patron to the rural peasants who are shareholders in the plant.

The committee oversees the implementation of the project and manages the project funds from diverse sources such as CDF, LATF, Shareholder contributions, donations and grants. However, the Project Committee is closely supervised by SIDA, whose chairperson briefs the area MP periodically on various project progresses. This has established a two-tier leadership structure. The project Committee takes care of everyday business and SIDA on the other level which has higher status, provides advice and facilitates relations with various donors and the area MP. The study noted that, the relationship with the MP are cordial ultimately leading to confidence in the project. This was he has garnered community support without appearing to buy people's loyalty. The milk plant has a capacity of taking in every little of milk produced in the constituency and will create numerous jobs especially to the local community that has always been in the opposition

One cannot fail to notice that, the local community has also warmed to the incumbent perhaps after failing thrice in quest to have one of their own represent the constituency in parliament. A good measure of the popular support for this project is the fact that so many people have bought shares and contributes so much without any level of suspicion. There is greater community involvement in the project probably because of numerous years of marginalization and existence of fewer projects in this locality. The area MP uses immobile local civil servants like assistant chiefs and chiefs to contact the Project beneficiaries.

This has also created another group of patrons who are relied upon for any news from the area MP who is known to reach out to the constituents through multiple avenues. The Project Management Committee convenes meetings when necessary to either brief the residents on the project progress or allocate duties. In most cases community meetings were held weekly. This study noted the area MP has attended about 60% of the meetings on the progress which are usually held at the project site.

In most cases, the area MP is expected to offer advice or invite someone who will offer assistance to technical development of the project. The study noted that the project committee tends to rely more on politicians to "deliver the goods" and it remains true that the least aware people continue to exaggerate the power of the MP and politicians in general. The political class and especially the area MP is courted for his organizing talents and his ability to plug into the project technical advice through the bureaucrats. One cannot fail to notice that the project has therefore appealed to almost everyone because it has come to define a personal morality of community identity, service and obligation. It is no wonder; the plans are being to rename the plant after the area MP.

The timing and location of this project, the nature of resources used and even the design of the project are matters influenced by the area MP. The residents provide free labour to the projects while the MP visits the projects with officials from relevant ministries to offer technical advice. The study noted that unlike other projects that have come up with a fine for members who do not participate in their projects, anyone who misses in this project is never reprimanded in any way. The area MP has developed a formula based upon himself as supreme arbiter who ensures that all members of the community participate in the project activities. To curb dissent he has initiated micro projects to supplement the plant where he involves local politicians and opinion shapers in their implementation and management.

There is a high sense of ownership on the project among the community members since it was their idea and they have been involved at all states of the project. However, the study noted that the area MP has also been involved despite "busy schedule".

He was available to lay the foundation block, participated in leveling the path to the site and was involved in cleanup activities next to the site that were geared to ensure there is a clean environment next to the plant. The area MP has launched all steps of the project implementation. Presumably the MP's aim, implicit in the resource allocation and contributions in the plant was to serve and ensure his existing vote banks. On the surface there is no doubt the project will serve the cause of the poor, but in reality, it is also a patronage distribution effort which intends to secure the support of local power structure (and households) for the incumbent MP.

Information related to the project like calling for the meetings is given through various channels that ensure that the information reaches as many people as possible. The channels include: Churches, *Buruzas*, word of mouth from one person to another with a multiplier effect as well as notices at the chief's camp. However, this study found the level of information sharing is relatively high around the shopping centres compared to the communities living in interior parts of the constituencies which give those nearer the sites and shopping centres patrons to those living in interior parts.

This study noted that the project committee publicly table how the money has been spent. The committee holds an Annual General Meeting (AGM) on a yearly basis where they present the financial report of every year to the members. During the first AGM, elections were held where the members unanimously endorsed the area MP as the patron. Incidentally the interim committee members who had been proposed by the same MP were elected, effectively giving them the entire mandate to run the project. This might have been on the basis of good work and being transparent in their work or perhaps it is as a result of proximity they enjoy and leverage from the project patron.

The project is monitored by the project committee as well as the community members. The area MP has been keen following on every detail of the project. A patron's file was opened when the plant started receiving milk, a file that is sent to him for perusal every Monday of the week. He also conducts impromptu tours flanked by the SIDA officials, CDFC, the area D.C as well as representatives from Techno-serve, the main NGO that advised on the project.

The project covers the whole of Igoji division of South Imenti Constituency. The water project started 6 years ago in 2004. At the initial stages the project was being financed by the people's contributions in the four locations. The project was expected to cost about Kshs 9 million and the local people were expected to contribute around Kshs 14,000 in total per homestead. The local community would also organize a fundraising, invite well wishers and get grants to successfully complete the project. The project received a major boost at initiation in 2004/2005 financial year when Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) through SIDA gave the local people a grant of Kshs 1.4 million with the help of the Member of Parliament. The residents also agreed to provide free labour to the project in addition to their financial contributions which were meant to purchase pipes and other building materials.

Igoji division borders Nithi Constituency and there exists a general feeling that, with the re-organization of constituencies in Kenya the division might become a constituency of its own. This has attracted numerous young people who have initiated various development projects as entry points in the constituency politics. This study found out that the incumbent MP, who is serving his fourth term in parliament, has been receiving few votes from this part of the constituency in the last two General Elections. This is despite winning in all polling stations during his first and second terms in parliament.

Igoji division of South Imenti suffers from regular extreme weather events which exacerbate rural poverty, with devastating impact on majority of residents who are subsistence farmers. This phenomenon has had the cumulative effect of reducing household food availability, purchasing power, and coping capacity, impoverishing the local population. The division is however very productive agriculturally the only problem being acute water shortage especially during dry spells. The main economic activity is agriculture which is highly dependent on water availability for viability and sustainability. Water therefore was a major issue of concern for the residents in the division. During *Barazas*, community gatherings and public meetings the residents came together to look for a solution to their problems.

The generation of project ideas came from within the community which started recruiting membership which attracted external donors like SIDA and the CDF. The community members had talked about the project worked up a rough plan and discussed how to obtain adequate resources. They held general meetings which were basically to confirm and ratify prior informal consensus among a few. The project was to be actualized through resident's contributions and provision of free labour. Women who are more affected by water shortage and food insecurity were instrumental in inception and implementation of the project. The area MP attended one meeting immediately after initiation of the project and made a personal contribution to the project. He was immediately invited to act as a patron as it is the case in several other projects in the constituency, an invitation that he honoured.

Mutethia Mutonga Water project underlying idea was to build assets to be able to cope with regular droughts, rather than only acting when the emergency struck. The water project is run by a committee of about 17 people. In South Imenti constituency, there is a policy which states that in all the committees at least one third of the members must be from either gender and therefore 6 committee members are women. Also considering the issue of water impacts more on women, they tend to be very active participants in the project sometimes outnumbering men in meetings in order to adequately advance their interests. However, there is no youth representative in the committee. This study noted that, Women are respected opinion shapers in this division and youth are discriminated against for no one invites them to meetings, "they are assumed to be in school," said one respondent.

This study noted that the project patron rarely attended the initial meeting of the project, perhaps because they were taking place during the Kenya's constitution referendum of 2005, where he was actively involved. However, he closely monitored the progress through the councillors who were actively involved in the project. In the run-up to the referendum, the area MP visited the project and the constituents demanded "better representation." The local social etiquette demands that you wet people's throats when you seek a favour from them. They believed that they were going to do him a great favour by supporting the side that he was supporting. He highlighted to them the benefits of the projects that would make them self sustaining.

The project implementation suffered hiccups thereafter, after the area MP slowed down his attention after a humiliating defeat in the division. This study noted the local councillors, majority of who come from the opposition parties have taken over the implementation of the project that they have used successfully to win their own support. The membership of the project being unemployed and casual labourers the local elites have been able to patronise them. The councillors, the area chief, the school heads and the religious leaders all serving in the area have taken over as the patron of the project. This study noted however, that because of policy and ideological divisions as well as growing political party conflicts the relationship between the area MP and the local councillors has deteriorated. This has tremendous effects on the project in that factions also emerged among the locals.

This study found that the project stalled briefly in the year 2005/2006 because of the frosty relationships and the CDF withdrew their support citing accountability concerns. The water reservoir that had been constructed by the community through their contributions was even damaged by the heavy downfall that swept the uplands unabated. In the run-up to 2007 General Elections the area MP visited the division where he promised to revive the project. A very big fundraising was conducted where several cabinet ministers were invited and contributed immensely towards the project. The whole community was activated and the CDF Committee promised to allocate some resources to the project. A ground breaking ceremony was scheduled and the area MP was invited as the chief guest.

Once again the MP might was displayed in that he was accompanied by a platoon of bureaucrats from the Ministry of Water led by an assistant minister. A very elaborate programme of activities was drawn by the assistance of SIDA and everybody vowed to contribute in the project. A very effective communication between the project beneficiaries and the area MP was developed. *Baruzas*, Church functions, Education activities were effectively used by the local elites to shower praises on the 'Mega Project' in the division that had promised to deliver them from the yoke of poverty. Women groups came together and initiated small scale projects geared towards tapping the benefit envisaged from the project. The message of the impending success was passed through all available avenues.

There was local sourcing of materials and labour for the construction of the water project and the committee members were required to update the community of the expenses. The project status was always unveiled to the community so that they could witness how their money was spent. The area MP attended majority of these meetings and was really concerned about the project progress. This study noted that, this took place presumably because the development projects are some of the most potent tools for political leverage in the constituency. The incumbent MP effectiveness would be measured almost exclusively by the number of projects initiated. The success of the project would give the MP prominence and a head start in the elections.

The PMC was charged with the duty of overseeing the implementation of the project and managing the project funds. However, unlike other projects, SIDA was not directly but the autonomy to oversee was left to the Ward Development Committee (WDC). This study noted that, 2007 being an electioneering year, the councillors were left to run the affairs. Involvement of SIDA which leans towards the area MP would antagonise them.

This particular project has established a two-tier leadership structure with Project Committee overseeing day-to-day running of the project and the local politicians supervising them. It was noteworthy that, councillors were divided into factions with one section supporting the area MP and the other supporting the opposition candidates. The relationship with the MP in sections of the division were cordial while on other sections it was lukewarm.

This project enjoyed a good measure of popular support from the local community. There was a greater community involvement after the area MP showed enthusiasm to the project after several months of abandonment. The area MP used local religious leaders, school heads and SIDA officials to organize meetings to explain to the community on the need to own the project. The MP conducted impromptu tours to meet the project beneficiaries too directly without having to go through any intermediaries. In a number of cases he offered advice and invited bureaucrats to talk to the people offering technical expertise.

This study noted that the project was able to make tremendous growth by the end of the year 2007 when the country went to polls. After the Post Election Violence, the Project Management Committee convened a meeting of all stakeholders including political leaders, provincial administrators, technocrats and project beneficiaries. However, the meeting did not take off because only a fraction of project beneficiaries attended. The Project Management Committee decided to change tact and impose a fine onto those who never attended the meeting. Majority of the project beneficiaries being poor peasants attended the meeting for fear of being fined. This study noted that the project experienced intense political conflict as some of the local leaders accused the elected councillors who were sponsored by the opposition parties of sabotaging "the good work of *mbeshimiwa*." Local political factions divided on the issue of fining members and some donors were displeased particularly by provincial administration's own apparent alliances with particular factions in the dispute.

Recognizing the potentially explosive situation at hand the area MP and the Project Management Committee agreed to hold another meeting at a "neutral venue." The meeting was finally held at a local Catholic Church grounds and members were given an opportunity to express their dissatisfaction. The choice of the venue was to help reconcile the warring factions since the church is taken as a holy ground locally. Project beneficiaries in the audience complained that sections of the Project Management Committee had "eaten" the money. They wondered publicly why some of them were the campaign managers to the local councillor, who won after trying to capture the position unsuccessfully twice earlier on. One questioner complained that the projects money was embezzled to sponsor the councillor. The Project Management Committee members ignored all the inquiries; later in the meeting the area MP promised the members of the community that private audit would be launched to investigate the matter.

This study noted that CDF funding was suspended and the area MP never attended the subsequent meeting, he instead chose to send a representative as he was "held up by ministerial duties in Nairobi." During a key informant interview, the MP said that he had urged the people to elect good leaders: individuals who he could work with, but people chose to give him untrustworthy people.

The area MP had decided not to pay much attention to the project, presumably because of the stiff opposition and challenge posed by the opposition councillors in the division and may be because he received the least votes from the division. It is noteworthy that out of four elected councillors from the ward; only one comes from the same political party with the area MP. The area MP said that he assumed that, the leaders people elected were good, since he is not a local person it is up to the voters to make that judgement. This study deduces that such responses might have been motivated by suspicion that the constituency will be split thereby separating the incumbent MP from his energetic young rivals.

After several months of infighting, the local community members organized themselves under the auspices of a local Community Based Organization to rejuvenate the project. They approached various institutions including the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) for assistance. Another Project Committee was put in place devoid of politicians and their campaigners. The new Committee is chaired by the chairlady of the local women group and most committee members are also women. The residents wrote a set of rules detailing how they will participate in the project activities and reflecting willingness to provide labour for the projects as well as dutiful attendance to the weekly meeting. Everyone participated in the water project on equal basis until they exhausted the resources that were available.

This study noted that, the project had briefly stalled again after exhausting the resources that were available. The Project Committee is in the process of securing assistance from well wishers and the CDF; however, since the local councillor "insulted" the area MP the CDF conditionalities are overwhelming. The Project Committee has been asked to furnish the CDF office with a proof that the project is community based hence community participation should be demonstrated. This is expected to be given as the quality and extent of beneficiary's participation such as decision making, priority setting, money, provision of local resources and labour. The CDF Committee also expects the Project Management Committee to list all the stakeholders indicating their roles, other financiers and sponsors and the role they play. This study noted that much as these conditions may be a requirement of the CDF Act, for this particular project the CDFC is quite strict perhaps to identify opposition elements within the project.

This study noted the Project Committee is transparent evidenced by periodic passing of information to members of any funds received towards the project. They also publicly table how the money has been raised and spent. The committee holds meetings regularly to monitor the project progress. The project beneficiaries are also involved and if there is any problem the public reports to the project committee for action. This study noted that after the "storm" was over the area MP has been sending overtures insinuating that he is keen following the water project. During meet the people tour he contributed some money to help in buying pipes to distribute water to the families at the lower end of the pipeline.

The project has however, taken a very long time to be completed as a result of political interference and obstruction. The reason possibly the area MP has started to show concerns is because the gains are about to be realized. Like many other projects, this study assumes that the area MP will hijack the commissioning of the project, invite high profile guests and have the project named after him.

CHAPTER 6 FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study is about the role played by the Member of Parliament during decision making and implementation of local-level development projects. It examines the role played by the Member of Parliament during Identification, Prioritisation, Resources Allocation, Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation in South Imenti Constituency. The study's interest with local-level politics emanates from recognition that poverty includes powerlessness and vulnerability. Empowering all stakeholders to participate in each cycle during development project implementation improves their well being. This improves the capacity of all stakeholders to take actions essential in improving their well-being, improves effectiveness of projects, enhances project sustainability, and promotes social learning among those involved as well as increasing efficiency of funded projects.

6.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Patronage is dispersed throughout South Imenti Constituency. It is entangled in social and political relations between actors who differ in their interests, identities and resources. Political power is thus articulated through complex mechanism including tactics of enrolment and negotiations. Overall the study established that the Member of Parliament is active during all phases of the CDF project cycle, playing an active role both directly and indirectly. The local chiefs, Councillors and leadership of the local CBO are the major clients to the area MP.

South Imenti Constituency CDF activities are actively carried out through the South Imenti Development Association (SIDA), a local Community Based Organisation (CBO) started during the first term of the current area MP in the mid 1990s. The area MP has been the patron of SIDA since it was launched and the emergence of CDF gave the CBO new impetus in its quest to "promote all aspects of economic, social and cultural development of the constituency." SIDA provides a forum for discussions on the development needs and strategies in the constituency and CDF inherited its structure and institutions throughout the constituency.

This study therefore established that South Imenti CDF has its structures at the Ward level, as a result, contrary to the CDF Act provisions. On the other hand there exists no Locational Development Committees (LDC), presumably because the Ward Development Committees (WDC) gives the area MP through the local councillor more control of the CDF institutions. The study established that majority of the development projects are extracted from the development plans made during the annual convention which is normally chaired by the area MP. However, the community is mobilised by SIDA for collective action.

The WDC convenes meetings to identify the projects they want based on their priorities. WDC meetings are normally convened by the local chiefs but the local councillors address the "development" needs of the wards. Whenever the local councillor is addressing such meeting he or she invokes the name of the area MP to back his or her assertions. When faced by questions regarding several issues, the councillors argued that they will consult the area MP. During instances when the local MP attends the WDC meetings, the study established that the Master of Ceremonies who happens to be the Local Chiefs, Councillors or the Chairperson of the SIDA decides who speaks and for how long. Men usually dominate in these meetings and women are merely expected to say the opening and closing prayers.

The study noted the sitting arrangements at various meetings reflected the existing social power relations. The area MP, Councillors, members of the Provincial Administration and the local CBO leadership usually sit at the centre of the front row surrounded by other government officials who occupy the dais. The members of the community sit or stand on the ground in front and follow the proceeding from a distance.

Power and authority is thus based on giving and granting of favours, in an endless series of dyadic exchanges that go from village elites to the highest reaches of the constituency, the MP. The majority of the people feel that the criteria of selecting projects within the CDF is not sufficiently objective and that it is basically politically motivated. The area MP and the local political leaders were found to be more likely to credit themselves with development projects in their localities, achieved through CDF and other devolved funds and use them as campaign tools. Political loyalties have also been established and they have led to unfair sharing of resources across the constituency and wards.

The study established that councillors are active in lobbying for goodies for their respective wards, arguing that local people were not capable of understanding fully what their needs were. The village elders, religious leaders and other members of the community with "clout" said that they often contacted the MP for help to solve a problem or to ask his views on a community need. This typifies the attitude of the local leadership.

The study established that this situation has been escalated by lack of Information, Education and Communication (IEC) strategy by the CDF, which is necessary for informing and educating the people within the constituency. Most of the information is obtained through unstructured avenues which do not necessarily disseminate accurate information. Majority of the constituents are not aware about the CDF and they cannot differentiate it from other funds. Information about different funds is availed to community mainly through *barazas*, CDF offices, *The South Imenti News* and through the constituency CDF website which are out of reach of ordinary citizen. CDF is thus still regarded as the MP's money presumably because of micro-management of funded projects by the MP for political mileage and ceremonial functions. The CDF Act (2003) gives MPs leeway in the management of the CDF by making them automatic chair and patrons of the fund, the Act also allows for lone ranger approaches in accessing common public utilities.

The knowledge on the level of funding is low among project beneficiaries compared to that of various committee members. The participation of community members in CDF projects depends wholly on the decision by the officials to either involve them or not.

The study noted that, women for instance, have little access to CDF information and structures presumably because of lower education levels and gender stratification which led to domination by men thus making them clients to their male counterparts. The gender gap also exists in regard to access and control of resources, opportunities and political voice. However, the study noted that there is a policy that at least one third of the members of SIDA at all levels are from either gender. The study realised that despite that, women lacked the ability to demand and take control of the CDF resources although they were more sensitive to community issues. Women equated CDF with politics and since politics is traditionally a male domain in South Imenti almost all activities pertaining to CDF are conducted by men

This study took note that, age bestows honour, prestige and social privilege in South Imenti with some members referred to as superiors, equals or looked down as inferiors. The society has more respect for the married and those people with material wealth; they are deemed to be more knowledgeable and are often consulted on various issues including CDF. Marital status determines the role that one plays in the society giving them access to more information and resources, hence more leverage. Household heads were found to be the major decision makers and in instances where a woman was widowed, she was considered to be subordinate to the male counterparts within the homestead especially the brothers-in-law.

The study found that highly educated members of the society acted as major sources of information and opinions they form a pool where various Projects Management Committee Members are picked from. The higher levels of education, the more one was likely to earn high incomes which made the rest of the community depend on them. The study noted that this has increased patronage. Those who have high education, earn high incomes are in more stable forms of employment. They have gone ahead and employed other members of the society as casuals or in non-formal sectors establishing and perpetuating a master and servant relationship. They are likely to coerce their servants into playing different roles within the CDF development projects. These local elites are a reference group to the rest of the society, demarcating the society in terms of powerful and powerless and translating into clientelism.

The study found that the MP attended specific needs/ project identification meetings depending on the timing of the meeting in relation to General election or a major political activity. The proposed location of the development project, the type of project and the expected amount of resources to be used also determined the MP's attendance. The MP attended majority of meetings held during the electoral year presumably to influence the choice and locations of the projects with an aim of scoring political goals. When he attended these meetings he was armed with a "bit" to coerce the residents to support his preferred development projects which were also spelt out in his campaign manifesto with a promise to "finish the good work." The study found that input of opinion and ideas was shaped by the MP directly or through the local chiefs, councillors and "invited guests and experts" which ensured that he had control of what was happening.

The study noted that during the public meetings co-chaired by the chief and the councillors, the area chiefs addressed general administrative issues while the local councillors dwelt on CDF and other devolved funds related development issues. However, people were merely informed about the development projects earmarked for implementation. Despite this dominance, most people do not trust their leaders who they think are selfish people interested in pursuing personal benefits.

Prior to these meeting, the area MP meets with the chiefs and councillors to come up with areas of priority and at time to decide on the venue and time of the respective meetings. The study noted that the area MP is the patron of all development projects in the constituency. He conducts the ground breaking activities of all major CDF projects, and invites guest to officially launch them. A couple of development projects have been named after the MP too.

Findings show that whenever meetings are held at the ward levels, the area MP usually sends a "special message" to the people through the councillor. In areas represented by a councillor from a different political party to that of the MP, a close aide delivers the "special message" and at times the local councillor consults the MP on telephone during the course of the meeting. However, the MP never attended many CDF project prioritization meetings presumably to give an indication that the local community and leaders came up with possible solutions to their prevailing conditions. This might be a deliberate attempt to dissociate himself from the process in case the projects fails to address the communities felt needs or in case of conflicts.

This study noted that each ward in South Imenti constituency is allocated Kshs 2 million from the CDF kitty. This money is normally allocated to development projects discussed during the annual convention, where all opinion leaders and stakeholders in South Imenti constituency are invited to come up with priority areas. The annual convention is not purely a CDF affair, the area MP chairs all the sessions and wards are represented by the area chiefs and the local councillors. Other people invited include: Political Party leaders, the clergy, educationists and senior civil servants from the constituency all of whom are economically, socially and politically influential. The annual convention comes up with Ward Development Plans where all development projects implemented through all devolved funds are extracted from.

After the annual convention, the participants are expected to hold meetings in their respective areas with the intended beneficiaries to deliver the messages from the convention. Mega development projects are discussed in public *barazas*, community gatherings or at the CDFC meeting and resources allocated while the WDC allocates the Kshs 2 million to development projects within their respective wards.

The study noted that there are instances when the political elite, councillors and the MP alters the agreed upon development plans at times spreading the resources thin or allocating funds contrary to the expectations of the beneficiaries. Sometimes the WDC receives memo from the CDF Account Manager, reminding them to give priority to specific earmarked development projects. The project beneficiaries are however, not involved in determining the amount of resources allocated for the identified projects. The WDC members are normally drawn from local political party leaders, former councillors and aspirants. It is chaired by the local councillor and distributes the Kshs 2 million to the Ward projects. The study also noted that, most projects received additional resources from other sources especially friends and business associates of the political elite.

The Political elite and especially the MP have been against the notion of hiring professionally qualified personnel like auditors to audit the CDF kitty. Besides, they have been against the idea of hiring professional accountants to manage and coordinate the implementation of the fund.

This is evident in the fact that the newly appointed CDF managers charged with the responsibility of keeping constituency expenditure records argued that he is finding it difficult to execute his duties due to the influence of the CDFC patron.

The study found that the majority of the Project Management Committee members held their offices by the virtue of their status in the community. Some are identified and selected by the MP and hold similar positions in several similar projects funded by other funds. Their selection was doubtlessly due to their influence and lobbying through provincial administration. Many are linked to the area MP through the political party, business and even kinship ties.

6.2 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

CDF is a noble innovation in resource allocation with positive implications for rural development. This program is well intentioned and targeted and if implemented in an all-inclusive manner, it is most likely going to bring the desired growth and re-distributive results. The CDF is an ideal forum for community involvement and participation in local level development. The purpose of the CDF is to address those specific local development needs, which may have been neglected by centrally, run development programmes or to let local communities move ahead with much-needed projects without having to wait on central government. The study on South Imenti has highlighted the formal and informal roles played by Members of Parliament, most probably because the CDF was introduced without much afore thought of the policy framework and existing infrastructure within which it would be implemented (Kibua & Mapesa, 2008).

Nevertheless, CDF is miles away from realizing its primary objectives of stimulating development from below and enhancing efficiency in resource allocation and use. This is due to the dominance of political interests of the MPs in its implementation and management. What emerges from this study is that the main agenda for CDF's establishment; to enhance equitable distribution of resources and enhance efficiency in resource has not been achieved.

On the contrary, CDF has enabled political elites to have equal access to state resources regardless of their party affiliation aiding them to further their political interests by dishing out favours in the name of projects to their supporters in order to win their confidence and maintain their support bases.

From the study findings it can be noted that the degree and manner of the MP participation in needs and project identification, projects prioritization and resources allocation appeared to be pervasive although it varies within the constituency. The MP as the premier patron appears to be the key driver within CDF projects cycle.

The MP wields tremendous power accorded to them in CDF management which coupled with the dichotomy of the local politics results in outcome that do not meet the CDF's policy goals of redistribution and grassroots development.

The role of the MP has been virtually visible during the project identification, prioritization processes and resources allocation none of which has induced popular participation and involvement of all stakeholders. Political patronage had influenced the constitution and composition of CDF Committees and people's consultation in public meetings. Political patronage is the single most factor that explains how various actors are mobilised and how they participate in CDF funded development projects in South Imenti Constituency. Through patronage, influential men and local notables are selected to various CDF Committees and dominate decision making avenues including public meetings where consultations about development projects takes place. CDF officials and provincial administrators shape the way in which participation occurs and where it occurs.

The lacuna in the CDF Act has placed the MP in a very powerful position to influence the projects chosen, their distribution and the amount of funding allocated hence continuing the marginalization of some sections of the community. The project beneficiaries could have their needs dictate which projects are selected and how much funding they should be awarded. However, the MP is accorded a lot of influence regarding how these needs are captured, interpreted and ultimately implemented.

The CDF local institutions and public meetings are permeated with social power in which the economically, socially and politically powerful influence decision making. The political elites have failed to institutionalize the state and its apparatus lending credence to devolved funds as avenues for private capital accumulation. The political elites have instead made use of their positions as policy makers to come up with policy instruments and laws that mandate them to implement the policies they make. As has been demonstrated, most project beneficiaries are greatly disadvantaged in accessing information about development projects.

This is because they rarely belong to privileged groups or other social networks that would enable them to access timely information. Various CDF officials and actors do not consider project beneficiaries sufficiently knowledgeable or respectable to contribute to the development process and do not bother to inform them about development projects.

Consequently, the same group of beneficiaries is the one least likely to be consulted during choice and decision making process to implement other devolved funds. It also seems that socialization has led to internalized feelings of subordination, apathy, self-blame and powerlessness. It appears that CDF in South Imenti operates as exclusive organizations accessible only to the political elites, the provincial administrators and individuals who have material and other resources. As a result, the current CDF institutions perpetuate patron-client relations, because of the politicians and the provincial administration's role in convening and chairing public meetings. Community participation is understood in terms of CDF Committees identifying and selecting projects to be funded and submitting the lists of proposed projects to the CDFC. Thus, local development planning has not taken into cognizance the rules played by the project beneficiaries and every member of the community. Hence, powerlessness and lack of resources have perpetuated patronage under the current state of affairs.

This study concludes that the legal and operational framework of CDF is highly beneficial to the political elite in its present form as it gives them an upper hand in the management of the fund. This is due to the fact the CDF Act is only clear about the role and position of the Member of Parliament in the management of the fund while it is not clear how members of the public are to be involved in the CDF processes.

The study has also concluded that rules and regulations are not adequately adhered to. The MP has deliberately chosen to ignore the rules and regulations spelling out procedures to be followed during formation of CDF Committee and has instead decided to utilize South Imenti Development Association (SIDA) networks. The MP and local leadership have deliberately chosen not to publicize the fund.

There exists little information on how much money the constituency is allocated, its purpose, management and the stake holders involved in its implementation. Thus CDFC has periodically disseminated information selectively, to avoid queries on CDF account. To this end CDF appears more or less to be MP's money being spent in the constituency rather than public resources earmarked for initiating development projects aimed at improving service delivery at the constituency level.

Based on theoretical discussion in this paper, it can be pointed out that decision-making, implementation and management of CDF projects privilege sections of the community over others. This has clearly undermined the intended objective of the CDF; to enable effective management of revenues and expenditure, enhance economic governance and promotion of citizen participation in poverty reducing development strategies.

The CDF structure has enabled the MP who is the patron to organize the flow of resources through the entire organization of hierarchy exchange. The flow of resources as demonstrated in the study is that the CDFCs control the funds while allowing only portions to flow to the WDC and PMC's regularly not necessarily following any conventional rules of resource distribution. The flow of resources to the lowest level of the pyramid is seen in the numerous projects initiated and implemented in the constituency with the support of the devolved funds.

6.3 CDF, POLITICS AND CLIENTELISM IN SOUTH IMENTI

Clientelism is the structuring of political power through networks of informal dyadic relations that link individuals of unequal power in relationship of exchange. They are usually characterized by the pattern of hierarchical exchange in which patrons and clients are tied to durable relationships by a powerful sense of obligation and duty. It implies mediated and selective access to resources conditioned on subordination, compliance or dependence. Those in control of material and immaterial resources provide selective access to goods and opportunities while clients are expected to return their benefactors' help, politically and otherwise, by working for the patron at election times or boosting the patron's prestige and reputation.

Political clientelism is a form of direct exchange between citizens and holders of political authority. It is associated with the particularistic use of public resources and with the electoral arena, and entails votes and support given in exchange for material resources, services and other benefits handed over by incumbent and contesting power-holders as favours. It is a complex chain of personal bonds between political patrons and their individual clients or followers founded on mutual material advantage, characterized by inequality in status, power and influence. Political clientelism is based on selective release of public resources in order to secure electoral support from individuals.

All CDI activities in South Imenti are carried out through South Imenti Development Association (SIDA) committees, which are organized by 'people of power'. Both the MP and the SIDA Committees regard the link between them as a personal attachment. Power is attained through a system of relations linking the area MP with Influential men, local notables, clients, supporters and rivals who constitute the structure of the politics. Political power is centralized in the hands of the area MP who applies it for his self-interest and loyal supporters are rewarded and selectively favoured. These supporters, or "clients", are expected to mobilize political support for the incumbent and refer all decision making to the "patron". Clientelism continues to thrive in the implementation of the CDF due to non-adherence to rule of law, inadequate separation of powers and failure by the political elites to detach from social enclaves.

This study has shown that inadequate institutionalization of the mechanism has been beneficial to the political elites by giving them an upper hand in the control and management of the Fund. It is evident with regard to the composition of various committees. The CDF Act makes the MP a patron of the CDIC by vesting so much power on him with regard to determining the composition those committees. The MP has in some instances nominated his political allies to these committees as the law does not stop him from doing so. Patron-client relations have been built on the basis that the MP uses the Fund to address the needs of his supporters presumably in exchange for votes. The material benefits are distributed by acts of political elites and 'brokers' ostensibly to construct and support a long-term commitment within an ethics of co-operation, companionship and solidarity.

structures and institutions have therefore been organized hierarchically to facilitate exchange with the MP as the premier patron at the top followed by brokers and then the electorates occupying the lowest position of the pyramid for the purposes of managing political clientelism.

The society has ranked people based on their age, marital status, levels of education, and income, giving them social privilege that has facilitated emergence of local patrons. The higher one is ranked within the echelon, the more they are considered most knowledgeable about the CDF and have been accorded responsibilities to manage the funds locally. Those at the lower echelons of the ladder are effectively clients of their counterparts at the top. The situation of women for instance is poor in regard to participation in local development. The gender gap exists regarding access to and control of resources, opportunities and political voice with the existing power relations favouring their male counterparts. Women have limited access to political power and influence hence they lacked ability to demand and take control of the CDF resources.

The use of village elders, chiefs and councillors to prioritise development projects to be funded, as seen in the study, during the annual convention has elevated these groups above the rest. They have used their position to bargain for development projects to be initiated in the areas where they will enjoy some leverage. The area MP attends several prioritisation meetings but his role remains passive to give an indication that the project beneficiaries and their local leaders came up with the possible solutions to their prevailing conditions.

Despite the process of disbursing funds being clearly stated within the CDF Act, each of the 12 wards in South Imenti is allocated a total of Kshs. 2 million from the kitty to utilise. These funds have enabled the local councillors to stretch their influence and control over local politics. Majority of the Project Management Committee members have a direct or indirect relationship with the political elite. It appears that they are normally appointed to reap the benefits of being politically correct. PMC officials normally decide who participates and who is left out during implementation of projects. Often, they select either their friends or relatives, or those who were recommended by influential people. Resource allocation and utilisation has arguably benefitted the rich and highly connected individuals because of their political influence and utility.

The CDF Act has established organization hierarchy of exchange within the framework for example at the constituency level, there is the CDFC which is the supreme committee, followed by the WDCs, PMCs and the project beneficiaries. This in return has organized the flow of resources through the entire hierarchy with the top most hierarchy dominating. CDF money has been identified by politicians as a resource to be exploited and utilized as a medium of exchange that enables political elites to invest in projects in the constituency in exchange for political support. One can conclude that, the MP has facilitated local-level development in that, he cares about the needs of his constituents (clients) by providing goods and services they need as seen in the case of the Milk Plant. It is clear that in some instances the political elites and the CDFC facilitated efficient distribution of resources and enabled local communities to carry out their duties efficiently without due interference.

The MP tends to conform pretty well to standard assumptions that the MP's primary goal is to get re-elected. The MP tends to act strategically in pursuit of that goal by engaging in a multiple strategic games. The MPs' behaviour therefore is largely demand-driven, presumably, defined by immense pressures he faces at the micro-level. To this end, one can conclude that the devolved funds can work efficiently and successfully depending to the politicians' attitude towards the general development of their constituencies. It is therefore the commitment of the political elite to initiate development that earns them political support. In other words, electoral support is an end product of benefits accruing from the devolved funds.

6.4 RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY TO DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

The 2010 Constitution of Kenya has restructured the government to allow for full devolution in which national government shares power with 47 county governments. Through county assemblies' people in these counties are expected to get an opportunity to participate in governing themselves but also play an important role in ensuring equity. However, Patron-client networks play an ambiguous role in the fight against poverty at the local levels. While clientelism can bring benefits to some of the poor, it breeds inequity because it excludes individuals who have no assets with which to negotiate.

This study will contribute immense knowledge to aid in understanding how politicians skew resources distribution to build and maintain Patron-client networks and mechanisms for political support. This study has added to the existing literature on clientelism and has attempted to understand how, why, where and when politicians allocate material incentives to their constituencies, especially in the rural areas.

This study will provide useful insight to development practitioners engaged in the process of reforming development administration and management. This study takes note and provides lessons to various reformers who are engaged in reconfiguring their public institutions, trying to build systems that are responsive and accountable to citizens, and that effectively support economic investment and growth. Such reform efforts have tended to concentrate on formal institutions, rules and procedures. Formal rules are important in the sense that, if they are well-constructed institutions they will channel people toward equitable and above-board behaviour. Nonetheless, formal rules about how political and administrative institutions are supposed to work are often poor guides to what actually happens.

In many cases, informal systems of clientelism are key contributors to stifling popular participation, subverting the rule of law, fostering corruption, distorting the delivery of public services, discouraging investment and undermining economic progress. Because they are deeply entrenched, seldom authorized or openly acknowledged, and take different forms depending on their context.

This study will contribute towards development of civic education programmes geared to facilitate the understanding of the politics around devolved units. Being a new phenomenon, counties will be the centres of development as they will execute roles and utilise at least 15% of devolved funds. This study, therefore, will contribute in preparing various development practitioners and stakeholders from the residents, the central government officials, development practitioners and development students. The findings of this study will contribute immensely towards understanding the CDF frameworks and provide necessary recommendations that can be integrated into the county development structures.

This study will contribute in understanding how in areas where little institutionalisation has taken place, idiosyncratic variables take precedence determining the trajectory of development. Recognising that leadership in Africa is less institutionalised and more personalised, this study has gone far to contribute in demonstration that personal rule varies greatly. This study has demonstrated how political clientelism has established a system through which rewards in the form of public resources and privileges are distributed downwards from the premier patron at the constituency level and his close associates who in return receive support.

This study will greatly benefit development practitioners and students who wish to understand how the system of patron-client relations is closely tied to the informal and more traditional forms of organisations in the societies. This study has highlighted how political elite, in order to maintain power and influence, need to enter into close alliance with associates to achieve control over significant public resources.

6.5 RECOMMENDATIONS

CDFs are becoming increasingly significant tools of politicized and decentralized resource allocation in developing countries. The CDFs are quickly evolving and emerging as increasingly important development tools. The enormous potential for abuse in the operations of CDFs creates a significant challenge for policy makers and scholars to devise norms, rules and procedures for the effective operation of these increasingly important policy tools. CDF in Kenya however, is miles away from realizing its primary objectives of stimulating development from below and enhancing efficiency in resource allocation and use. This is due to the dominance of political interests of the MPs in its implementation and management. What emerges from this study is that the main agenda for its establishment was not to enhance equitable distribution of resources and enhance efficiency in resource use but to enable politicians (MPs) to have equal access to state resources regardless of their party affiliation.

CDF can only contribute towards efficiency in resource allocation and use if it is depoliticized. Politicians have opponents and supporters. There is evidence that politicians have used the fund to initiate development projects in areas where their supporters are and neglected opposition areas and the end resulted in skewed development to particular areas. The dominant role and influence of the MPs over the fund should be reduced to make it more accommodative. This can be done by revising the legal framework such that MPs become watchdogs over the implementation of the fund and not being the main actor in the implementation process to avoid conflict of interests. Loopholes emanate from the CDF structure: lack of proper engagement of all actors and stakeholders, and the dual role of MPs: legislating laws governing the fund and implementing them together with monitoring and evaluation, makes CDF a fertile ground for private capital accumulation, corruption and leakage of resources.

This in return translates to inefficiency in resource allocation and use. There is urgent need to amend the current CDF Act with a view to reducing the power and influence of MPs in the CDF project cycle. In particular, measures for inclusion and active participation of more actors in CDF affairs need to be instituted.

The MP should not be legally empowered to nominate members of various CDF committees. The MP should also not be automatic patrons and chairpersons of the CDF committee. Parliament should legislate a law that will ensure that committees are democratically constituted vide elections by the majority stakeholders. Minimum qualifications should be established for membership in these committees. It must be made illegal for MPs to unilaterally decide who sits in these committees and when one must be dropped or rendered useless. This will check the current dual system that has brought a sharp conflict of interest and politically laced constituency development effort.

Alternative avenues of securing inclusiveness in CDF committees need to be explored. Due to the importance of local institutions in mobilization and participation, the CDF law should provide for nomination and election of various committees directly by the people. This would challenge the exclusive role of the politicians and the provincial administrators.

To ensure that the institutions facilitate genuine participation, the institutions should use participatory methodologies to establish people's priority projects and to develop strategic plans through which projects can be implemented systematically. This is because clear interaction between people and established local institutions is essential to achieve successful participation by all stakeholders.

Communication and information are variables that are constantly needed by people in a democratic society at all levels for purposes of governance and development. Similarly, general communication and provision of information is recognized as a critical ingredient to the practice of democracy. Peoples' participation in governance and decision making processes can be greatly improved through institutionalized and professionally structured communication.

There is need to initiate Civic Education with an aim to sensitize the public, especially women and the youth on development activities and the role they are supposed to play in their respective localities. A lot of publicity should be done on CDF so that citizens become aware of the fund especially the exact amount of money their constituencies get every financial year, the purpose of the fund, who is in charge of its overall management and implementation and the importance of their involvement in the activities of the fund.

The structure should be revised to make it more inclusive by clearly stating the position and role of the public in matters concerning the management of the fund. This will help check excessive influence by various patrons, increase public vigilance and scrutiny and improve access to information and records. This might also enhance equitable distribution of CDF especially at ward levels. It is also likely to increase community involvement and participation in CDF activities.

The CDFC should design and implement educational and awareness activities to enable people understand the nature and operations of the CDF. Such activities could specifically address the information needs of all the stakeholders who are excluded from formal networks. This would enable people at the local level effectively to engage CDF officials in all steps within project cycle.

Strategic plans for constituencies should also be made in an all inclusive process and circulated in the same manner to ensure that the voice of the people informs priority projects. Furthermore advocacy skills, knowledge, negotiations, budget and evaluation should be incorporated in the training programs. This will ensure that the emerging gaps on monitoring and evaluation of development projects are addressed.

Populations in the country side live largely in areas which are at times far apart due to their geographical locations and infrastructural arrangements; this continues to separate them. It is thus recommended that the devolution efforts should embrace the role of the media as agents for transmitting information and news needed to balance the knowledge gap and stimulate the levels of interest and participation in specific counties and nationally.

All constituencies should formulate five-year strategic plans for their constituencies, identifying needs and showing how funds would be spent. This will ensure that any misunderstanding or potential conflict is resolved before projects are implemented. The Ministry of Planning and National Development through the DDOs should liaise with CDFCs to ensure that plans developed are feasible, relevant and consistent with the national plans. When people have such knowledge and awareness, they can challenge projects that do not address their needs, because they know their roles and procedures to follow. This would also facilitate control, end duplication and waste, enhance sustainability of development programs and countercheck all decisions being made by the MPs.

Information regarding the operation, management and implementation of the devolved funds should be packaged in a way that all stakeholders understand their role in the whole process. This can be done by coming up with clear description of CDF and the intended usage.

Community members and project beneficiaries should get some easy to understand pamphlets on how the fund should benefit the community. This will reduce the current ignorance on quality of awareness on the usage of the CDF and other devolved funds. It will also assist in enhancing participation of the community at giving feedback on the utilization of CDF.

To further enhance, people's knowledge and awareness of the Fund, information should be decentralized; notice boards should be located at the chief's and the assistant chief's offices, and at all local shopping centres, where people frequent. These notice boards would display details of the CDF, like amounts disbursed, projects selected, funds allocated to various projects, ongoing and completed projects, and when project-planning meetings are held. Of course, it would be necessary to update the notice boards regularly, so that people are aware of what is happening at any one time. People should also have an opportunity to confirm whether the projects selected are the ones to be funded, and whether they are being implemented.

6.6 FURTHER RESEARCH REQUIRED

This study has looked at only one type of devolved fund, the CDF. What the study did not gather is whether political intricacies exist in other devolved funds like LATEF, CACC Funds, Ministry of Education Bursary Funds, Road Maintenance Fund (RMF) and Kazi kwa Vijana Programmes among many devolved funds. This is important because the government has also introduced these other forms of funding to go to the communities for poverty alleviation. There is need for a policy framework to guide devolved funds to complement each other which can only be possible if; a clear analysis of each individual fund has been done and points of complimentary vis-a-vis duplication have been established for all the funds.

This study focused on political influences in decision-making. In the near future, there is need to conduct a broader study on all the devolved funds with a view to establishing the extent or other potential sources of conflicts of interest and advise government on how to stem or forestall them.

Another area of further study is how politics influence choice, decision-making, implementation and management of devolved funds in urban areas. This study focussed on South Imenti which is a rural constituency and studies in other set-ups would provide valuable lessons to policy makers in Kenya.

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1. Do you know / have you ever heard of the CDF or CDF projects?

Yes No

2. How did you learn about CDF? (Mark all that apply)

- a. Through other community members
- b. Chief's Barazas
- c. Notices, posters, Newspapers
- d. Members of the project committee
- e. Member of Parliament (MP)
- f. Other (Specify)

3. Have you ever been involved in any of the following CDF project activities?

- | | Yes | No |
|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| a. Attended needs assessment meetings | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| b. Attended projects determination meetings | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| c. Contributed ideas in CDF meetings | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| d. Contributed labour in project implementation | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| e. If No, in any of the above explain | | |

4. How were the projects funded by the CDF identified?

- a. Community identified/agreed
- b. Extracted from constituency/ district plans
- c. CDF committee identified/ proposed
- d. MP suggested projects
- e. Other (specify)

5. Has the area MP been involved in any of the following project activities

- | | Yes | No |
|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| a. Attended needs assessment meetings | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| b. Attended project determination meetings | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| c. Chaired any of the meetings | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| d. Contributed ideas in CDF meetings | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| e. Provided the way forward at the meetings | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

- f. Invited guests to talk about probable projects
- g. Sent a representative to give his word

6. Who were / are the conveners of CDF meetings?

- a. The area MP
- b. Local councillors
- c. The chief
- d. CDF Committee
- e. Other (Specify)

7. Who determines the venue and the meetings?

.....

8. How is/was the agenda of the meeting set?

.....

9. How were the speakers at the CDF meetings selected?

- a. Chairperson picked them
- b. The chief picked them
- c. The MP picked them
- d. The Masters of Ceremony picked them
- e. Don't know

10. How was the decision on the projects to be funded made?

- a. The MP decided
- b. The local leaders decided
- c. Through voting
- d. Consensus building

11. Is there a project management committee?

Yes No

12. How was the project management committee appointed?

- a. MP selected/appointed
- b. Community members identified / agreed
- c. Chief / local leaders identified

- d. Don't know
- e. Other (explain)

13. How is the community informed of the projects progress?

- a. The area MP announces in meetings
- b. Project Committee announces in meetings
- c. Chief / local leaders announces
- d. CDF Committee announces

14. Do you have / hold meetings to discuss progress in implementation and obstacles encountered

- Yes No

15. Who convenes / chairs these meetings?

- a. The local MP
- b. The chief / local leaders
- c. CDPC officials
- d. Other (specify)

16. Who sets the projects performance targets?

- a. The area MP
- b. Community members / Beneficiaries
- c. Chief / local leaders
- d. Local councillor
- e. CDF Committee
- f. Other (specify)

17. Who verifies the performance of the CDF project?

- a. Beneficiaries
- b. The CDF committee
- c. Chief / local leaders
- d. The MP
- e. Other (specify)

18. Does the MP visit / tour your development project?

Yes

No

How frequently?

19. How is the information on project progress disseminated?

a. The area MP announces

b. The chiefs Barazas

c. Local councillor

d. The project committee

e. Other (specify)

20. How does the MP monitor project implementation?

.....

21. How is the project monitoring done?

.....

22. Who selects the project monitors?

.....

APPENDIX 2: Questionnaire for Committee Members

IDENTIFICATION

- 1) Name of the respondent.....
- 2) Age:
- 3) Sex: Male
Female
- 4) Highest level of education reached
None Primary Secondary Tertiary University
- 5) Location
- 6) Division
- 7) Name of the project
- 8) Type of the project
- 9) Position held in the committee:
Chairperson Secretary Treasurer Ordinary member
- 10) Category of the respondent:
 1. Project committee
 2. Location committee
 3. Constituency fund committee
 4. District project committee
 5. Other committee (Specify).....

Section 1: Needs and project identification

1) How did you learn about CDF? (mark all that apply)

- a. Through other community members
- b. Chief's Barazas
- c. Seen notices, posters, newspapers
- d. Member of the project committee
- e. Member of Parliament
- f. Other (specify)

2) Are you aware of any projects or activities in the community financed by CDF?

Yes No

3) If yes: please answer the following questions

a. How were the projects funded by the CDF identified?

- i. Community identified / agreed
- ii. Extracted project from constituency/district plans
- iii. CDF Committee identified/proposed
- iv. MP suggested project
- v. Don't know

4) Has the area MP been involved in any of the following project activities?

- | | Yes | No |
|--|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| a. Attended needs assessment meetings | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| b. Attended project determination meetings | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

- c. Chaired any of the meetings
- d. Contributed ideas in CDF meeting

5) How were the speakers during CDFC meetings selected?

- i. Chairperson picked them
- ii. The chief picked them
- iii. The MP picked them
- iv. Don't know

6) Who determines the venue of your committee meetings?

.....

7) Who sets the date and agenda for your committee meetings?

.....

8) How was the Project Management Committee members selected?

.....

9) How were the members of CDFC appointed?

- i. Community identified / agreed
- ii. Chief / local leaders identified
- iii. MP suggested / appointed
- iv. Don't know

10) Where do the Members of the CDFC hold their meeting?

.....

11) How many meetings of your committee are attended by the area MP?

.....

12) How many meetings are chaired by the area MP?

.....

Section 2: Project Prioritization

13) How are projects prioritized in your committee?

.....
.....

14) How is the final decision made?

.....
.....

15) How does the CDFC prioritize projects?

.....

16) Does the MP give the type and number of CDF projects to be initiated?

Yes No

If yes where

When

How

17) Was the project part of pre-election campaign promises?

Yes No

Section 3: Implementation and Management

18) How is the Project Management Committee appointed?

i. Community identified / agreed

ii. Chief / local leaders identified

11) How many meetings of your committee are attended by the area MP?

.....

12) How many meetings are chaired by the area MP?

.....

Section 2: Project Prioritization

13) How are projects prioritized in your committee?

.....
.....

14) How is the final decision made?

.....
.....

15) How does the CDPC prioritize projects?

.....

16) Does the MP give the type and number of CDI' projects to be initiated?

Yes No

If yes where

When

How

17) Was the project part of pre-election campaign promises?

Yes No

Section 3: Implementation and Management

18) How is the Project Management Committee appointed?

i. Community identified / agreed

ii. Chief / local leaders identified

iii. MP suggested / appointed

iv. Don't know

19) Does the area MP attend Project Management Committee meetings?

Yes. No do not know

20) Does the area MP attend follow up meetings?

Yes. No do not know

21) How is the community informed of the project progress?

.....

22) Who verifies the performance of the CDF projects in your area?

- The beneficiaries
- Chief/ Local leaders
- The MP

Other (specify)

Section 4: Monitoring and Evaluation

23) Who sets the projects performance targets?

- The area MP
- Community Members
- Chief/ Local leaders
- Local Councillor
- CDFC
- Other (specify)

24) Does the area MP visit/ tour your development project?

Yes No

How frequently?

25) Do you hold meetings to discuss progress in implementation and obstacles encountered?

Yes No

26) Who convenes and who chairs these meetings?

.....

27) Who disseminates information on project progress?

.....

28) How does the area MP verify the project performance?

.....

APPENDIX 3: Interview Schedule for Focus Groups

- I. Who are the actors in CDF projects identification, planning, implementation and management?
- II. What role does the MP play during identification of projects to be funded under CDF Scheme?
- III. What role does the MP play during determination of where various development projects will be located?
- IV. Who determines the amount of money to be allocated to the projects, and how is it determined?
- V. Who is involved in the procurement of goods and services for the CDF projects, what role do each of them play?
- VI. How is the MP involved in managing development activities at the community level?
- VII. How does the MP monitor/ keep track of CDF projects being implemented?

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APPENDIX 4: Key Informant Discussion Guide

- i. How does the MP participate in CDF projects (projects identification, targeting and prioritization, resource allocation, implementation and management, monitoring and evaluation)?
- ii. What community development planning structures exists and what is their participation in identifying, prioritization, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of CDI Projects?



REPUBLIC OF KENYA
CONSTITUENCIES DEVELOPMENT FUND

SOUTH IMENTI CONSTITUENCY

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KANYAKINE - MERU

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0203586628

Ref: SICDF/WDC/JULY/10

29th July, 2010

TO THE CHAIRMAN,
WARD DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE,

MITUNGUU..... WARD

Dear Sir/ Madam,

RE: 2010/2011 FINANCIAL YEAR PROJECT PROPOSAL PRIORITY

This is to inform you that your committee is requested to submit the 2010/2011 FY C.D.F. proposals to the C.D.F office by 20th August, 2010 at 2.00 pm.

The following should be considered:

1. Give priority to uncompleted projects; **No funding of new projects.**
2. The project list should include:
 - (i) The name of the project,
 - (ii) Amount allocated,
 - (iii) Specific details of the activity to be funded by the amount allocated i.e classroom construction from foundation to rental or roofing of two classrooms, walling of the dormitory, purchase of 4" pipes class B in case of water projects etc.
3. The total allocation for all the projects should not exceed Kshs 2,000,000 (2M).
4. The total no. of projects should be up to a maximum of five (5).
5. Include the respective C.D.F committee members in your respective wards meeting and **MUST** be invited when holding your meetings. Find attached respective CDF committee members per the respective ward.

Yours faithfully,